Query_doc.txt

AILA_Q1||The appellant on February 9, 1961 was appointed as an Officer in Grade III in the respondent Bank ( for short 'the Bank'). He was promoted on April 1, 1968 to the Grade officer in the Foreign Exchange Department in the Head Office of the Bank. Sometime in 1964, MCH Society ( for short 'the Society') was formed of which the appellant was one of the chief promoters and thereafter its Secretary. The object of the Society was to construct residential premises for the employees of the Bank and its other members. It appears that the complaint was received in respect of the affairs of the Society relating to misappropriation of the funds of the Society and consequently, in exercise of the powers under Section S of Act A1, the Registrar on April 23, 1969 instituted an inquiry thereof. P1 was appointed the Registrar's nominee who on October 4, 1969; submitted the report holding the appellant and two other office bearers of the Society negligent in dealing with the funds of the Society causing a loss to the tune of Rs. 3,59,000/-. The Registrar on October 21, 1969, passed an order appointing an officer under Section S of A1 to assess the loss caused to the Society. However, the Government by its order dated November 29, 1969 annulled the Registrar's order dated April 23, 1969 and October 21, 1969 and directed a fresh inquiry into the affairs of the Society. On December 17, 1969, the Bank issued show cause notice to the appellant to explain within fifteen days his alleged negligent conduct in dealing with the affairs of the Society as revealed in the report dated 4th October, 1969. In the meantime, P2 came to be appointed by the Registrar vide his order dated 26th July, 1969, to make inquiries under Section S of A1. Petitioner by his reply dated 18/22th January, 1970 submitted his explanation and also challenged the legality of the inquiry and the findings recorded therein. On 5th March, 1970, P3, treasurer of the Society and an employee of the Bank criminal complaints in the Court of Addl. Chief Presidency Magistrate  alleging that the appellant and two other office bearers of the society had dishonestly misappropriated a sum of Rs. 51,000/ and Rs. 80,000/- respectively which was entrusted to the appellant in his capacity as Promoter and Secretary of the Society and thereby committed criminal breach of trust. The Magistrate framed the charges against the appellant. The Bank having regard to the serious misconduct of the appellant involving moral turpitude vide its order dated 3rd November, 1970 suspended the appellant pending trial. The appellant protested this action of the Bank complaining that he was not given an opportunity of hearing before passing the order of suspension. In the meantime, P2, the authorized officer appointed by the Registrar vide his order dated 9th October, 1971 held the appellant liable to pay Rs. 2,36,000/- to the Society in addition to the amount of Rs. 2,03,000/- for which he (the appellant) and two other office bearers of the Society were held jointly liable. The Bank in view of this finding, vide its order dated 29th November, 1971 terminated the services of the appellant with effect from 1st December, 1971 along with notice pay. The appellant protested against the Action of the Bank and on 3rd December, 1971 filed detailed representation against the order of termination. The Bank replied to the appellant's representation and justified its action. The appellant on 28th December, 1971 submitted his reply to the Bank stating, inter alia, that the termination of his services was not simplicitor and was in violation of the principles of natural justice; that no opportunity of hearing was given to him; that the termination order attached stigma. The appellant aggrieved by the findings and order made by P2 appealed before Tribunal. In the meantime, the criminal proceedings ended in conviction vide order dated 27th March, 1972 passed by the Addl. Chief Metropolitan Magistrate. The appellant challenged the order of conviction and sentence in the High Court  and during the pendency of the said appeal, the Tribunal vide its order dated April 12, 1973 dismissed the appellant's appeal but reduced the liability by Rs. 72,000/-. On November 12, 1973, the High Court allowed the criminal appeal and acquitted the appellant. The High Court, however, in its order observed that since the services of the appellant were terminated in view of the criminal proceedings and since the appellant has been acquitted, representation, if a any, by the appellant to the Bank for reinstatement may be considered sympathetically. Taking clue from the observations made by the High Court, the appellant filed three representations, the last being dated 3rd May, 1975 requesting the Bank to revoke the order of termination and be reinstated. The Bank vide its communication dated May 21, 1975 refused to reinstate the appellant. The appellant, therefore, on July 23, 1975 filed the writ petition in the High Court for quashing the orders dated 29th November 1971, 27th December, 1971 and 21st May, 1975 passed by the Bank. The learned Single Judge of the High Court by his judgment and order dated December 6/7, 1979 granted desired relief to the appellant. The Bank aggrieved by the judgment and order passed by the learned Single Judge preferred an appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. The appeal was heard by the Division Bench. The Division Bench of the High Court did not agree with the judgment passed by the learned Single Judge and consequently by its judgment and order dated April 16 1985 allowed the appeal and dismissed the writ petition the ground of laches and also on merits. It is this judgment and order of the High Court which is impugned in this appeal.
AILA_Q2||The appellant before us was examined as prime witness in the trial of T.R. on the file of the Special Judge against the first respondent. The trial ended in conviction against the first respondent and when the appeal filed by him came to be heard by the High Court the appellant had become a Cabinet Minister. On account of the disparaging remarks made by the Appellate Judge the appellant tendered his resignation and demitted office for maintaining democratic traditions. It is in that backgroud this appeal has come to be preferred. Pursuant to a trap laid by the Vigilance Police on the complaint of the appellant's Manager, P1 (P.W.2) the first respondent was arrested on 26.4.79 for having accepted a bribe of Rs. 2,000 from P1. The marked currency notes were recovered from the brief case of the first respondent prior to the arrest. The prosecution case was that the first respondent had been extracting illegal gratification at the rate of Rs. 1,000 er month during the months of January, February and March, 1979 from P1 but all of a sudden he raised the demand to Rs. 2,000 per month in April 1979 and this led to P1 laying information (Exhibit I) before the Superintendent of Police (Vigilance). Acting on the report, a trap was laid on 26.4.79 and after P1 had handed over the marked currency notes the Vigilance party entered the office and recovered the currency notes from the brief case and arrested the first respondent. The first respondent denied having received any illegal gratification but offered no explanation for the presence of the currency notes in his brief case. Eleven witnesses including the appellant who figured as P.W.8 were examined by the prosecution and the first respondent examined three witnesses D.Ws. 1 to 3 to substantiate the defence set up by him, viz., that the sum of Rs. 2,000 had been paid by way of donation for conducting a drama and publishing a souvenir by the Mining Officers' Club and also towards donation for Children's Welfare Fund.The Special Judge accepted the prosecution case and held the first respondent guilty. The Special Judge awarded a sentence of rigorous imprisonment for one year for the conviction under the first charge but did not award any separate sentence for the conviction under the second. Against the conviction and sentence the first respondent appealed to the High Court. A learned Judge of the High Court has allowed the appeal holding that the prosecution has not proved its case by acceptable evidence and besides, the first respondent's explanation for the possession of the currency notes appeared probable. While acquitting the first respondent the learned Judge has, however, made several adverse remarks about the conduct of the appellant and about the credibility of his testimony and it is with that part of the judgment we are now concerned with in this appeal.
AILA_Q3||This appeal arises from the judgment of the learned Single Judge of High Court dated 6th June, 1988 whereby the learned Single Judge declined to quash the prosecution of the petitioner. The petitioner therein has been prosecuted for selling adulterated supari on the basis of a certificate issued by the Director of Central Food Laboratory showing that the article of Food purchased from the accused contained 2000 mgs/kg. saccharin and that the sample does not conform to the standard rules. The High Court took the view the report prima facie goes to show that accused has sold adulterated article of food and consequently declined to quash the prosecution. This appeal is directed against the order of the High Court accepting the appeal against the order of acquittal passed by the Chief Judicial Magistrate. The appeal was filed against the acquittal of accused Nos. 2 and 3 therein and out of whom one is the appellant before us. The High Court confirmed the acquittal of second accused but sentenced the appellant before us to undergo simple imprisonment for six month and to pay a fine of Rs. 1,000 with a default sentence of simple imprisonment for two more months.
AILA_Q4||The Petitioner was married to the Respondent No.2, on 27th November, 2005, as per Hindu traditions and customs. At the time of marriage 12 lakhs in cash, 45 sovereigns of gold and 50,000/- is alleged to have been given to the Accused Nos.1 to 4, who are the husband, the mother-in-law and other relatives of the husband. According to the Respondent No.2, the Petitioner left India for place L1 in January 2006 without taking her along with him. However, in February, 2006, the Respondent No.2 went to place L1 to join the Petitioner. While in place L1, the Respondent No.2 is alleged to have been severely ill-treated by the Petitioner and apart from the above, various demands were also made including a demand for additional dowry of 5 lakhs. On account of such physical and mental torture not only by the Petitioner/husband, but also by his immediate relatives, who continued to demand additional dowry by way of phone calls, the Respondent No.2 addressed a complaint to the Superintendent of Police, from place L1 and the same was registered as Case (Crl.) No.25 by the Station House Officer on the instructions of the Superintendent of Police. Upon investigation into the complaint filed by the Respondent No.2, the Inspector of Police, filed a charge-sheet in CC No.307 in the Court of the Additional Munsif Magistrate against the Petitioner and his father, mother and sister, who were named as Accused Nos.2, 3 and 4. The learned Magistrate took cognizance of the aforesaid case and by his order dated 19th February, 2007, ordered issuance of summons against the accused. The cognizance taken by the learned Magistrate was questioned by the Petitioner and the other co-accused before the High Court and a prayer was made for quashing of the same. The High Court by its order dated 27th August, 2008, allowed Criminal Petition No.2746 of 2008 filed by the Accused Nos.2 to 4 and quashed the proceedings against them. However, Criminal Petition No.3629 of 2008 filed by the Petitioner herein was dismissed. The present Special Leave Petition is directed against the said order of the High Court rejecting the Petitioner's petition and declining to quash Complaint Case No. 307 initiated against him.
AILA_Q5||This appeal is preferred against the judgment dated 19.8.2011 passed by the High Court, whereby the High Court partly allowed the appeal filed by the appellants thereby confirming the conviction of the appellants with certain modifications. On 18.11.1994, at about 8.00 A.M. in the morning the complainant P1 (PW-5) along with his two sons namely P2 and P3 (PW-6) were busy in cutting pullas (reeds) from the dola of their field. At that time, P4 (A-1) and his sons P5 (A-2), P6 (A-3) and P7 (A-4) armed with jaily, pharsi and lathis respectively, entered the land where the complainant was working with his sons and asked them not to cut the pullas as it was jointly held by both the parties. Wordy altercations ensued between the parties and P4 insisted that he would take away the entire pullas.In the fight, the accused persons started inflicting injuries to the complainant, and his sons P5 (A-2) gave a pharsi blow on the head of P2, P4 (A-1) caused injury to P1 (PW-5) with two jaily blows. Additionally, P7 and P6 attacked the complainant with lathi blows on shoulder and left elbow respectively and caused several other injuries to the complainant party. P1 and his injured sons raised alarm, hearing which P9 and P10 came to rescue them and on seeing them, the accused persons fled away. The injured witnesses were taken to the Primary Health Centre where Dr. D1, Medical Officer, medically examined the injured persons. Injured P2 was vomiting in the hospital and later on he was referred to General Hospital, Gurgaon as his condition deteriorated. A CT scan disclosed that large extra-dural haematoma was found in the frontal region with mass effect and P2 needed urgent surgery and he was operated upon and the large extra-dural haematoma was removed. Dr. D1 (PW-2) also examined the other injured persons, PW 5-P1 and PW 6- P3.4. Statement of P1 was recorded, based on which F.I.R. was registered at Police Station. PW 8 P8 (ASI) had taken up the investigation. He examined the witnesses and after completion of investigation and challan was filed. In the trial court, prosecution examined nine witnesses including P1-PW5, P3-PW6 and Dr. D2-PW2 and Dr. D3-PW9, Neuro Surgeon, PW8-investigating officer and other witnesses. The accused were examined about the incriminating evidence and circumstances.First accused P4 pleaded that on the date of occurrence-complainant party P1 and his sons P3 and P2 forcibly trespassed into the land belonging to the accused and attempted to forcibly cut the pullas. P1 further claims that he along with P6 caused injuries to the complainant party in exercise of right of private defence of property. He has denied that P9 and P10 had seen the incident. P5 (A-2) and P7 (A-3) stated that they were not present on the spot and they have been falsely implicated. P6 (A-4) adopted the stand of his father P4.5. Upon consideration of oral and documentary evidence, the learned Additional Sessions Judge vide judgment dated 17.2.2000 convicted all the accused persons and sentenced them to undergo rigorous imprisonment for five years and one year respectively and a fine of Rs. 500/- each with default clause. Aggrieved by the said judgment, the accused-appellants filed criminal appeal before the High Court. The High Court vide impugned judgment dated 19.8.2011 modified the judgment of the trial court thereby convicted P4 (A-1) and sentenced him to undergo rigorous imprisonment for one year, convicted second accused P5 and imposed sentence of imprisonment for five years as well the fine of Rs.500/- was confirmed by the High Court. He was sentenced to undergo six months rigorous imprisonment. Both the sentences were ordered to run concurrently. High Court modified the sentence of P7 (A-3) P6 (A-4) and sentenced them to undergo rigorous imprisonment for six months (two counts) respectively. In this appeal, the appellants assail the correctness of the impugned judgment.
AILA_Q6||On 19.3.1999, SI P1 along Ct. P2 went to Village V1 where Inspector P1, PW-16, had reached along with his staff. After some time, ACP, arrived at the spot. On enquiry, they came to know that one constable of Police Station, namely, P2, having suffered a gun shot injury, had been taken to the hospital. The Head Constable P3 narrated the occurrence to the effect that he along with other officials had received information about the presence of P4, a proclaimed offender of Police Station, was hiding in the house of P5 and about 4.30 p.m., they reached Village V1 and as per the instruction of SI P6, he and Ct. P2 went to the place to obtain information about the presence of P4 and SI P6 waited along with the staff at a distance of 100 meters from the house of P5. When he and P2 reached near the house of P5, accused P4 was standing outside the room. P2 disclosed his identity to him and asked him to surrender, but, P4, instead of surrendering, took out a knife from his shirt pocket with his left hand and tried to assault. However, immediately he was caught hold of by P2 from the rear and both of them grappled with each other for some time. The Head Constable, P3, tried to snatch the knife from the hands of P4 and ultimately he was successful in snatching away the knife from his hands but, at that juncture, P4 took out a desi katta and fired at P2 and the bullet hit in the stomach area. Hearing the sound, the villagers surrounded and assaulted P4. During that time, SI P6 came to the spot along with his staff and injured P2 was taken to the hospital. Desi katta and knife which were seized from the accused were given to the IO by P3. As further revealed, accused P4 was apprehended and five cartridges were recovered and on the basis of the statement of P3, an FIR was registered. When P2 succumbed to his injuries, the case was converted to another section. The bullet that had hit the stomach of the deceased was kept in a sealed cover and the same was sent to P1 and ultimately, on completion of the investigation, charge-sheet was filed in the competent court which, in turn, committed the matter to the Court of Session. Be it noted, after hearing the accused, charges under were framed against the accused-appellant.The accused pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried.
AILA_Q7||This criminal appeal is directed against the judgment of the High Court dismissing the appeal but modifying the sentence. The appellant took his trial on the allegations that he had dishonestly and fraudulently misappropriated a sum of Rs. 3851.60, which amount was in his control in the capacity of a public servant, i.e. Cashier-cum-Accountant in the office of the District Veterinary Officer and that he had wilfully and with the intent to defraud altered and even mutilated the cash book (Ex. 4) and also had forged the said cash book with the intent to defraud the government to the extent of the aforesaid amount. The trial court accepting the case of the prosecution convicted the appellant under all the charges and sentenced him to rigorous imprisonment for a period of one year and to pay a fine of Rs. 3900, in default to suffer rigorous imprisonment for one year and also to undergo rigorous imprisonment for one year on each of the convictions in addition to pay a fine of Rs. 200, in default to suffer imprisonment for a period of two months. On appeal, the High Court while confirming the judgment of the trial court in its entirety, reduced the fine amount from Rs. 3900 to Rs. 2000, in default to undergo six months rigorous imprisonment for the conviction. In other respects, the sentences awarded for the convictions under the other two charges were confirmed. Hence this appeal.
AILA_Q8||This appeal, by special leave, has been preferred against the judgment and order dated 23 February 2005 of the High Court (Aurangabad Bench), by which the appeal preferred by the appellants was dismissed and their conviction and sentence of 7 years RI imposed thereunder was affirmed.  The deceased P1 was daughter of PW1. P2 resident of village Sanjkheda and she was married to appellant no. 1 P3 son of P4 about two and half years prior to the date of incident which took place on 15 September 1991. The appellant no. 2, P5 is the mother of the appellant no. 1 and both the appellants were residing in the same house in village V1. According to the case of prosecution, a sum of Rs. 5000 and some gold ornaments had been given at the time of marriage of P1. For about six months P1 was treated well but thereafter the accused started asking her to bring Rs. 1,000-1,200 from her parents to meet the household expenses and also for purchasing manure. Whenever P1 went to her parental home, she used to tell her parents that her husband and mother-in-law (accused appellants) were harassing her and used to occasionally beat her. Her father PW.1 P2 along with some of his relatives went to the house of the accused and tried to persuade them not to ill-treat P1. Thereafter, the accused treated P1 properly but after about four months they again started harassing her. A few days before Nag Panchami festival P1 came to her parental home and complained that the accused were not giving her proper food, clothing and even footwear. She also told her parents that her husband had asked her to bring an amount of Rs.1,000-1,200 for the purpose of household expenses and manure. The case of the prosecution futher is that in the evening of 15 September 1991 a person came from village V1 on a motorcycle and informed PW.1 P2 that P1 was unwell. PW.1 then immediately went to the house of the accused along with some of his relatives. There he saw that P1 was lying dead and froth was coming out of her mouth which indicated that she had consumed some poisonous substance. The Police Patil of the village PW.3 P6 lodged an accidental death report at 9.00 p.m. on 15 September 1991 at the police station. On the basis of the said accidental death report, PW.6 P7, Police Sub-Inspector, visited the house of the accused, held inquest on the dead body of P1, and thereafter sent the same for post-mortem examination. PW.1 P2 lodged the FIR of the incident at 7.00 p.m. on 16 September 1991 at Police Station, on the basis of which a case was registered against the appellants. After completion of investigation, charge sheet was submitted against the appellants and in due course, the case was committed to the Court of Sessions. The learned Sessions Judge framed charges against both the appellants. The appellants pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. The prosecution in order to establish its case examined six wintesses and filed some documentary evidence. The learned Sessions Judge after consideration of the material on record acquitted the appellants of the charges but convicted them under and imposed a sentence of 7 years RI thereunder. The appeal preferred by the appellants was dismissed by the High Court by the judgment and order dated 23 February 2005.
AILA_Q9||The complainant P1 filed a Special Leave Petition in this court seeking leave to appeal against the judgment dated 6th April, 1993 of the High Court.  The incident for which these accused were charged is the murder of P2, son of the complainant P1 (appellant) on 13th June, 1982. As per the case of the prosecution, the complainant along with his son P2 (deceased) was getting his maize field weeded through the help of a few labourers on the morning of 13th June, 1982. His real brother P3 came on the spot and forbade the complainant from doing so. The complainant insisted that he had right to carry on the work in the field which belonged to him. On this P3, who was accompanied by his son accused P4 and P5 abused the labourers and drove them away from the field. The complainant took strong objection to this but the accused party started abusing the complainant and his son and started pelting stones on them. The complainant and his son also threw stones on the opposite party in their defence. In the meantime, some villagers came and intervened in the fight. As a result of this, the accused persons went away. The complainant and his son P2 continued with the work in the field. After a few hours, that is about 10.00 a.m., few villagers informed the complainant that the accused persons were coming back armed with weapons. The complainant did not pay heed to this warning thinking that the accused persons were his close relations. Within a short time, all the seven accused persons reached the spot. Seeing them, the complainant and his son P2 ran for their safety and entered the nearby house of P6. They hid themselves in a room by bolting the room from inside.2. However, as the main gate of the house had remained open, the accused persons rushed inside the house and broke open the door which had been bolted from inside. They entered the room where the complainant and his son P2 were hiding. P2 was dragged outside the room in the courtyard of the house where accused P4 is said to have given a bhala blow on his stomach. As a result of the blow, P2 fell down. Accused P3 gave a pharsa blow on the head of P2. The other accused persons also assaulted P2 with their weapons. The complainant tried to save his son but he was also assaulted by accused P7 and P5. While this was going on, the villagers accompanied by P9, P10, P11 and P12 came and intervened and saved the victims from further assault. However, P2 died on the spot. Police came in the village at about 1.00 p.m. when statement of the complainant P1 was recorded. On the basis of the said statement, an FIR was recorded and the seven accused persons were charge-sheeted and tried for the aforesaid offences. The sessions court by its judgment dated 19th June, 1992 while giving benefit of doubt to the accused persons and finding fault with the investigation acquitted all the accused persons. The State filed an appeal against the said judgment of the Sessions Court. The High Court dismissed the appeal in limine making the following observations :"As regards merits, it is clear from the perusal of the record that the witness named in the fardbayan have not been examined by the prosecution and also that the witnesses examined in Court were examined by the police after eight months from the date of occurrence. It is also clear that the Investigating Office of the case has not been examined. Therefore, there are no merits. Further the appeal is barred by limitation also, which cannot be considered." Against the said judgment of the High Court, the complainant filed a Special Leave Petition in this Court. Leave was granted. Hence the present appeal. The appeal has been registered for final hearing.
AILA_Q10||The four appellants, along with P1 son of P2, were jointly tried in the court of Additional Sessions Judge on the following charges: "That you all accused nos. 1 to 5 on or about 12th day of November, 1967 at about 5-45 a.m. near XYZ Road, formed an unlawful assembly and in prosecution of the common object of such assembly viz. : to commit murder of complainant P3 or in order to cause murder of P3 or grievous hurts to him committed the offence of rioting and thereby committed an offence punishable under Section 147 of the Indian Penal Code and within the cognizance of this Court. That you all on the same date, time and place, were members of unlawful assembly, in prosecution of common object of which viz. : to commit murder of P3 or to cause grievous hurt to him, one or all you caused grievous hurts to him which offence you knew to be likely to be committed in prosecution of the common object of the said assembly. That you all on the same date, time and place attempted to cause murder of P3 Deshmukh, in furtherance of common intention and thereby committed an offence punishable." The order of the trial court convicting them all concludes thus: "All the five accused are convicted for the offence of rioting punishable and each is sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for the period of six months and to a fine of Rs. 501-, in default, rigorous imprisonment for two weeks for that offence. Accused shall surrender to their bail." 2. They all jointly appealed to the High Court by one memorandum of appeal. Learned judge admitted the appeal only on behalf of P1 and dismissed in limine the appeal on behalf of the four -appellants before us. The only point which concerns this Court in the present appeal by special leave relates to the correctness of the order dismissing in limine the appeal on behalf of the four appellants, when the appeal on behalf of P1, co-accused was admitted for hearing on the merits after notice to, the State.
AILA_Q11||The detenu P1, a French national, at the relevant time was employed as Airport Manager by A1 in L1. By an A1 flight, on September 20, 1981, he arrived at International Airport, L2 and passed through green channel indicating he had no dutiable goods to declare to the Customs Authorities. When he was at Exit Gate No. 1, the Intelligence Officer questioned him about the contents of two suitcases an other packages carried by him. The reply led to the inspection of the baggages which led to the recovery of watch parts weighing 4 1/2 Kgs, in 8 packages. 1. This led to a further enquiry, and evaluation of the watch parts led to the conclusion that the value was Rs. 3, 91, 200 CIF. Ultimately, the Government, on December 16, 1981, made an order of detention with a view to preventing an detenu from smuggling goods. On the same day, he was furnished grounds of detention which inter alia referred to the smuggling of the watch parts and two wrist-watches The detenu filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the High Court at L2. Before the High Court, three contentions were advanced on behalf of the detenu. They were "(1) It was a case of solitary incident, and prosecution was pending; (2) The detention order was mala fide having been served to prevent the Magistrate from passing an order on the application for leaving India; (3) All material documents relevant for subjective satisfaction were not considered and the order has been passed mechanically." The Division Bench of the High Court which heard the petition held on ground number 1 that even though this is the first time the detenu was found indulging in smuggling activities and a prosecution might have been launched yet taking into account all the relevant materials, satisfaction on likelihood of repetition of smuggling activities in future seem to be real. In respect of ground No. 2, the Court was of the opinion that even though the detention order was made on December 16, 1981, the day fixed for pronouncing order on the application of the detenu seeking permission to leave India, yet the file shows that the screening committee had taken the decision of recommending the detention of the detenu as well as those other persons connected with the different incidents so far back as on November 19, 1981 and the actual proposal recommending detention by Customs Authority was forwarded on November 25, 1981. 2. The counter-affidavit before the High Court disclosed that the detaining authority did not know that an application for permission to leave India was filed by the detenu and the decision of the Chief Judicial Magistrate was likely to be pronounced on December 16, 1981, the day on which the detention order was made. After taking note of this fact, the High Court rejected the contention. On the 3rd contention, the Court was of the opinion that there is nothing to show that there was no consideration of material documents and rejected the same. Ultimately, the High Court rejected the petition of the detenu The detenu filed a petition for special leave against the judgment of the High Court as also a writ petition for a writ of habeas corpus. It appears that the writ petition was filed with a view to urging some additional grounds which were not raised before the High Court and, frankly, speaking learned counsel for the detenu, did not press any of the contentions which were canvassed before the High Court, but urged three other contentions which the High Court was not invited to examine On behalf of the detenu, the learned counsel questioned the validity and legality of the detention order on the following three grounds :- The Detaining Authority viz. Secretary to the Government, L2 Home Department (Law and Order) did not consider the representation and thereby violated constitutional guarantee. Even if detenu is alleged to have made a confessional statement, the same was retracted before the detention order was made and yet there is nothing to show that the detaining authority took into consideration the fact that the confession was retracted and it is quite likely that the confessional statement itself may have influenced his mind and, therefore, the detention order is vitiated. Alternatively, it was contended that in any view of the matter, the fact that as the confessional statement was retracted by the detenu, the retraction ought to have been sent to the Advisory Board. It appears that by the continued detention, the detenu has suffered mental disorder as revealed by the report of Senior Psychiatrist. Dr. D1, Senior Psychiatrist of Central Mental Hospital, Yervada and in view of this report, continued detention of the detenu is likely to inflict irreparable harm and, therefore, also the detention on the ground of humanitarian consideration requires to be terminated.
AILA_Q12||The petitioner has been under detention pursuant to the order dated June 5, 1990 passed by the District Magistrate with a view to preventing him "from doing any such work which is prejudicial for the maintenance of public order". The grounds of detention were furnished to the detenu in time. Therein it was stated inter alia: "That you along with one companion on February 12, 1990 about 7.45 indiscriminately fired and murdered Dr D1 who was connected with a Nursing Home when she was returning from Dr D2's dental clinic situated at a busy and crowded road after the dental treatment along with her sister P1, with the result that the people started running here and there and were scared. In this connection a case was registered in Police Station and after its investigation charge-sheet has been submitted in the court against P2." It was stated" that the brutal murder has created a feeling of insecurity in public in general and among doctors in particular". The grounds of detention further said that the detenu was in District Jail in connection with a criminal case and he was on bail. But he got his bail cancelled on February 14, 1990 and was trying for his bail in another criminal case and his bail application was under consideration.
AILA_Q13||This is an appeal with a certificate granted by the judicial Commissioner. P1-hereinafter referred to as the respondent'-was appointed a constable in the Police Force of L1 by the Superintendent of Police, L2 by order dated April 18, 1954. The employment was temporary and was liable to be terminated with one month's notice. On December 6, 1957, the Superintendent of Police, informed the respondent that his services "'will be terminated with effect from 6-1-58 A. M." The respondent presented an appeal to the Chief Commissioner against the order of termination. By letter dated April 11, 1958 the respondent was informed that as he was "an Ex convict for theft, nothing can be done for him". In reply to another application addressed to the Chief Commissioner the respondent was informed by letter dated May 26, 1958, that he was already informed in connection with his previous appeal that as he was "'an Ex convict in a case of theft" he "cannot be reemployed by the Administration." The respondent then filed in the Court of the Judicial Commissioner, L1, a petition for a writ praying for a writ declaring that the order of the Superintendent of Police terminating his service was "illegal" and for a writ of mandamus or a writ of certiorari directing the Chief Commissioner not to enforce the said order and for an order reinstating him in the Police Force of the L1 Administration with retros pective effect. The L1 Administration submitted in rejoinder that the respondent being a temporary employee of the Police Force, his services were lawfully terminated. The Judicial Commissioner of L1 held that the respondent was a temporary employee, but the order terminating the respondent's employment was invalid for it infringed the constitutional guarantee of protection of public servants which applied to temporary as well as permanent public servants. In the view of the judicial Commissioner, termination of employment of a temporary servant  will not per se be treated as a punishment of dismissal or removal, but it is open to the Court even if an order merely of termination of employment of a temporary employee is passed to ascertain whether the order was intended to be of termination simpliciter or of dismissal entailing penal consequences, and that the order dated April 11, 1958, of the Chief Commissioner passed in appeal clearly indicated that the order of the Superintendent of Police was one imposing penalty. He observed: "This reply (dated April 11, 1958) will clearly indicate that though the Superintendent of Police purported to terminate his service, he meant to dismiss the petitioner from am service as a punishment on the ground that he was an ex-convict and that it was intended that he should not be reappointed in future in any department of the Government. Thus it cannot be gainsaid that the termination was in fact a punishment for previous misconduct debarring the petitioner from being, employed even in the future, and that in passing the innocuous order (dated December 6, 1957Annexure D), the Superintendent was really camouflaging his real intention. The real intention came to light, perhaps as the result of an oversight in communicating the orders in appeal to the petitioner".
AILA_Q14||P1 is before us being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the judgment and order dated 17.10.2005 passed by a Division Bench of the High Court. Appellant herein along with P2 (Accused No.1), P3 (Accused No. 3) and P4 (Accused No.4) were tried for committing the murder of one P5. P5 was an accused in a case of murder of the father of the appellant and accused No. 3. Allegedly, when cremation was taking place, the appellant took a vow to take revenge of murder of his father. P5 (deceased) on or about 13.02.1991 at about 11.00 a.m. was going to L1 on a motorcycle. He was accompanied by P6 (PW-4). When they were at distance of about 3 k.m. from P1, the accused persons who were in a Maruti van parked the vehicle by the side of road got down. The motorcycle was stopped by Accused Nos. 2, 3 and 4. P3 (Accused No. 3) is said to have caught hold P5 and P6 (Accused No.2) and P4 (Accused No. 4) inflicted stab injuries with knives. An attempt to rescue the deceased by PW-4 resulted in a threat to him, whereupon he started running towards Jalgaon. Bhaulal also tried to save himself by running away from the said place. He was chased by Accused Nos. 2 and 3 and was again assaulted with knives. PW-4 immediately went to the Taluka Police Station on a vehicle of a passer by. A First Information Report was lodged at about 11.45 a.m. P5 was taken to the hospital in a tractor. At about 12.45 p.m. he died. At the trial, the prosecution examined 17 witnesses. P6 (PW-4) and P7 (PW-5) were examined as eye- witnesses to the occurrence. We have noticed hereinbefore that PW-4 was the informant. PW-5 was the driver of the Maruti van, which was taken on hire by the accused persons. They had gone to L2 and L3. The learned Trial Judge upon considering the evidence brought on record convicted all the accused persons. The High Court by reason of the impugned judgment in the criminal appeal filed by the accused persons, however, set aside the conviction and sentence of Accused No.1. Accused Nos. 2, 3 and 4. Accused Nos. 2 and 3 were also convicted under Section 341 read with Section 34 IPC. Accused No. 2 was further convicted under Section 506 IPC. Indisputably, P1 preferred an appeal before this Court against the said judgment of conviction and sentence passed by the High Court.
AILA_Q15||The appellants are five in number and they have filed this appeal as of right. They were acquitted by the trial court but convicted by the High Court on appeal filed by the State, besides the offence of rioting. On the first count they were each sentenced to imprisonment for life besides fine and to lesser sentences for the lesser offence. The gist of the case against them is that all the five accused formed themselves into an unlawful assembly on the evening of 24-10-1985 and lay in ambush waiting for P1 (deceased) to come through the road and on seeing P1 they all launched an attack with weapons like gandasa, takua and ghope. The wife of P1 (P2, PW 10) who accompanied her husband made a bid to rescue her husband from the onslaughts of the assailants, but she too was attacked by them. P1 died at the spot. PW 10 (P2) furnished first information to the police on the same evening on the basis of which FIR was registered by the police. Subsequently all the five accused were arrested and on the strength of the information elicited from Ist accused P3 and third accused P4 weapons of offences were recovered from concealed places. The most important witness in this case is PW 10 (P2). The importance of her evidence is that no court can possibly hold that she would not have witnessed the occurrence, for she herself sustained as many as eight injuries, some of them serious, during the occurrence. The fact that she gave the police prompt information which has reached the Magistrate on the very same night adds further credence to her version. Added to that, she narrated the incident to PW 12 and PW 13 (a chowkidar) who reached the spot soon after the occurrence. The trial court did not place reliance on the evidence of PW 10 (P2) principally on the ground that her evidence did not agree with the testimony of PW 11 (JoP4). It must be pointed out that JoP4 was cited as an eyewitness and he turned hostile and the Public Prosecutor confronted him with his own previous statements and contradicted him. It is not safe to jettison the evidence of a witness like PW 10 (P2) as important as she is in the syndrome of the facts of this case, with the aid of a hostile witness's stance in the Court. Such a course adopted by the trial court had been rightly deprecated by the High Court. The defence version was that PW 10 would have possibly sustained those injuries at some other place and at some other time and not when she was accompanying her husband at the place of occurrence. Such a suggestion is too unconvincing and very far-fetched. No court can give any weight to such a theory. Even the defence admitted that PW 10 sustained so many injuries as described by PW 1 Dr D1 in his evidence. We are totally disinclined to countenance the contention that PW 10 would have absolved those who have attacked her and turned against the five accused falsely. Such a theory will not fit in with logic and common sense. But unfortunately that version was found acceptable to the trial court and therefore the High Court has rightly repelled it.
AILA_Q16||The appellant P1 is convicted by the Additional Sessions Judge by judgment and order dated 5th/9th August, 1991 and was sentenced to death subject to confirmation by the High Court. Appellant appealed against the conviction and sentence which was partly allowed. The order with regard to the death penalty was set aside and appellant was sentenced to suffer imprisonment for life and to pay a fine of Rs.5,000/- in default thereof to undergo R.I. for 18 months. Against the said judgment and order this appeal is filed. The prosecution version as stated by P.W.1 is that he was a resident of Delhi and was dealer and manufacturer of Umbrellas; he has got two wives known as P2 and P3. His first wife P2 is residing at House No. 377 alongwith her three children, named, P4, P5 and P6 and her other three children have been residing with him at his House No.1584. They are P1 (appellant), P7 and P8. His second wife P3 (deceased) had been residing with him alongwith her six children including daughter P9 aged 17 years (deceased). He was also having a house where his first wife was residing earlier before she shifted. There was dispute between him on the one hand and his wife P2 and her children on the other with regard to the house. The appellant-accused and his brother were insisting for the transfer of the said house in the name of their mother at the earliest. For transferring the said house in the name of his first wife, he went to Tis Hazari on 17th October, 1988 alongwith his son-in-law P10 and met his counsel who advised him to come on the next day. Hence, the said property could not be transferred in the name of his wife. At about 6.00 P.M., when he was sleeping in the house, he woke up on hearing the noise of a quarrel and P8, daughter of P2 abusing P3. He slapped P8 and asked her to desist from abusing P3. After this the appellant and P7 came into the house, P7 went inside the room alongwith P8 and then came out with a dagger. P7 abused him and stabbed on his left eye, he fell down. At that time, P3 intervened and protested saying as to why he was beating his handicapped father. At that time, appellant snatched away dagger from P7 and started stabbing P3 repeatedly. At that stage, his daughter P9 intervened and asked the appellant as to why he was stabbing P3. P7 stated that she was the root of all troubles so the appellant started stabbing P9 at her abdomen, neck and other parts of her body. After sometime when persons collected outside, the appellant ran away. Within minutes P3 and P9 died at the spot. Police recorded the statement of P.W.1 as FIR. Appellant as well as his brother P7 were chargesheeted. P7 was convicted. He has not preferred any appeal against his conviction. After considering the evidence of the prosecution witnesses particularly P.W.1, P.W.2 and P.W.4 who have unequivocally deposed that both the deceased persons were killed by the appellant by inflicting dagger blows, the High Court has rightly arrived at the conclusion that accused is guilty for the offence for which he is charged. Mr. R.K. Jain, learned senior counsel for the appellant, has not raised any contention with regard to the conviction of the appellant.
AILA_Q17||facts of the matter, as is evident from the present Writ Petition challenging an order of detention dated 1st March, 2001 it appears that the petitioner is presently confined in Central Prison and it is this detention which the petitioner contended is without the authority of law and constitute an infringement of his guaranteed fundamental rights. The reason for detention has been and as recorded by the Department is that the Bill of Entry No.235337 dated 19.7.2000 was filed in the name of E Enterprises for clearance of 300 numbers of ACER CD ROM drive 50X by Customs House Agents, C1. According to the Department this Bill of Entry was filed in the name of E Enterprises but the latter expressly intimated the department stating that they did not place any order for import purposes. The department made an investigation and the goods were seized. The total CIF value according to the department was Rs.43,53,189/- and Rs.57,87,200/- was the market value. The petitioner appeared before the Customs Department on 24.7.2000 and the officers detained him and obtained the statements and was subsequently arrested on 25.7.2000 for an offence. The principal allegation against the petitioner/detenu being misdeclaration in the Bill of Entry. The petitioner/detenu however was remanded to judicial custody on 26.7.2000. Subsequently, the detenu was enlarged on bail by the learned Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate on 11.8.2000. The Department after the completion of investigation issued a show-cause notice.  Significantly, though the incident noticed above took place on 24.7.2000 and other important documents have come into existence immediately thereafter, the detaining authority did not pass the detention order immediately but only after a lapse of about seven months, i.e. on 1.3.2000. During this interregnum, however, the detenu admittedly did not indulge in any illegal activities and it is on this context P1, learned advocate appearing in support of the petition with his usual eloquence contended that the incident of 24th July, 2000 had become stale and irrelevant and it is too remote in point of time and as such question of there being any detention order on the basis thereof would not arise. P1 further contended upon reference to the fact situation as adverted herein before in this judgment that the detenu was arrested on 25.7.2000 for offences and was remanded to judicial custody on 26.7.2000. The detenu was however enlarged on bail by the learned Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate (EO.III) on 11.8.2000 and the Department after completing the investigation issued the required show-cause notice on 19.9.2000. The factual score thus lends a substantial credence to the submissions of P1 as regards the charges being too stale to be taken recourse to in the matter of issuance of the order of detention on 1st March, 2001 more so, having regard to the admitted factum of non-involvement of the detenu in any illegal activity and thus consequently too remote as well in point of time to be the basis of an order of detention. It is in elaboration of his submissions P1 contended that once the show-cause notice has been issued, there cannot be any manner of doubt that the investigation is complete, but in the contextual facts the detaining authority has failed to apply its mind as regards the issue of unreasonable delay in passing the order of detention.
AILA_Q18||These appeals involve a pure question of law as to whether an award by which residue assets of a partnership firm are distributed amongst the partners on dissolution of the partnership firm requires registration. Briefly the facts are that a partnership firm was constituted comprising of four persons belonging to the same family. Disputes and differences arose between the partners which were ultimately referred to arbitration. The arbitrators made an award on 2nd October, 1972. The award was challenged by way of objections filed under by some of the partners. The objection petition was contested by the other partners who prayed that the award be made a rule of the Court. The grounds of challenge to the award included misconduct on the part of the arbitrators as well as another ground that the award required registration. The trial Court accepted both the objections holding that there was misconduct on the part of the arbitrators as also that the award was required to be compulsorily registered and since it was not registered it was inadmissible in evidence. This decision of the trial court was challenged before the High Court by way of a Civil Revision filed. The High Court found that in the facts and circumstances of the case it could not be said that there was any legal misconduct on the part of the arbitrators. Thus the first ground of attack against the award was found to be unsustainable. However, the High Court accepted the finding of the trial Court on the second ground, that is, the award was required to be compulsorily registered. Since the award was unregistered, it could not be made a rule of the Court. Hence the present appeals.
AILA_Q19||This appeal is preferred by the appellants against the judgment and order dated 31.08.2012 passed by the High Court whereby the High Court has allowed the appeal filed by the State and convicted all the appellants and sentenced them to undergo rigorous imprisonment for life and to pay a fine of Rs.10,000/- each. The brief facts of the case, as per the prosecution story, are that on 5.1.2001 at about 6:10 p.m. at  L1, the accused persons formed an unlawful assembly and in prosecution of the common object of such assembly, committed the murder of  P2.  P3, son of the deceased (PW-3) lodged an Ejahar about the incident at Police Station on 5.1.2001 at about 10:00 p.m. On receipt of the Ejahar, F.I.R. No.3 was registered by Police Station and started investigation. The police arrived at the place of occurrence and called the Executive Magistrate who prepared the inquest on the dead body and the inquest was sent for post-mortem examination to Civil Hospital. The police found one bag containing one dagger and two hand-made bombs lying near the dead body. After investigation, charge-sheet was submitted against the accused, the said charge-sheet was received by the Chief Judicial Magistrate by the Since Court the offence was of Sessions, the triable Chief Judicial Magistrate by his order dated 15.3.2002 committed the case to the Court of Sessions for trial. During the course of trial the prosecution examined 10 witnesses to bring home the charges levelled against the appellants. The defense adduced no evidence and took a plea of total denial. The Trial Court on a careful scrutiny of the evidence found that the statements of PW-4 & PW-5 were contradictory which created doubt as to the presence of these two witnesses at the place of occurrence. PW-1 deposed that about 6 months ago, when he was returning from the Pharmacy, he met P5 who said that his brother had been killed in the market, but he did not mention the name of any person. The incident took place in the market place where there were about 50 shops on both sides of the road. The Trial Court observed that if accused  P5 and  P6 appeared from the left and right, they must have come out of one of the shops on both sides of the road since PW-4 categorically stated that he had not seen the accused persons on the road while they were going towards the house of the deceased. But none of the shopkeepers, adjacent to the place of occurrence, came forward to depose that any occurrence as stated by PW-4 & PW-5 had taken place in front of their shops. PW-5 during cross-examination stated that he knew the names of two shopkeepers and they are P7 and P8. P8 (PW-2) did not state that the occurrence took place in front of his shop. PW-5 further stated during cross examination that the deceased was an accused in a murder case and had no explanation as to whether the deceased would move around having bombs and other weapons with him. The Trial Court drew the conclusion that the seized articles were belonging to the deceased persons. On analysis of the evidence the Trial Court decided that the evidence of PW-4 and PW-5 was full of contradictions on material particulars and as such the testimony of these witnesses did not inspire any confidence. Under the circumstances, the uncorroborated testimony of PW-4 and PW-5 by some independent eye witness could not be accepted to warrant the conviction of the accused persons. The High Court on the other hand overruled the decision of the Trial Court and convicted all the five accused and sentenced them to undergo rigorous imprisonment for life and to pay a fine of Rs.10,000/- each.
AILA_Q20||This appeal by special leave is directed against the Judgment rendered by a High Court confirming the conviction of the appellant for the offences punishable. The High Court by the impugned judgment confirmed the judgment passed by the Principal Sessions Judge convicting the appellant and sentencing him to suffer imprisonment for life and rigorous imprisonment for seven years, respectively, and further to pay a fine of Rs.1,000/- each and in default, to suffer simple imprisonment for a period of six months each. In the nutshell, the prosecution version which led to the trial of the appellant is as under: On the intervening night of 7th/8th April, 2002 appellant went to the house of the deceased in a village with an intention to end the life of the deceased and knocked at the door of the deceased which was opened by the wife of the deceased,  P1 (PW-3) and the appellant-accused all of a sudden hacked and attempted to kill her by inflicting severe injuries on her body, as a result of which she fell down and then he rushed towards the deceased who was sleeping and hacked him by inflicting severe injuries. The appellant after committing the offence escaped from the place of occurrence by bolting the door from outside. The daughter of the deceased  P2 (PW-4) aged about 9 years raised hue and cry upon which the neighbours opened the door from outside and informed  P1 Gangaraju (PW1) who is a close relation of the deceased who thereafter informed Police Station and lodged first information report at about 4.00 a.m. on 8th April, 2002. A case was registered against unknown persons. The prosecution, in order to establish its case, examined altogether 14 witnesses. The trial court upon appreciation of the evidence found the appellant guilty and sentenced him to suffer imprisonment for life and rigorous imprisonment for a period of seven years, respectively. The trial court mainly relied upon the evidence of PW-3 and PW-4. The High Court vide its judgment dated 20th August, 2007 dismissed the criminal appeal filed by the appellant and accordingly confirmed the judgment of the trial court. The High Court too relied upon the evidence of PW-3 and PW-4. Both courts below found that the appellant attacked the deceased with sharp edged weapon resulting in his death. The courts below also found the appellant- accused attempted to kill PW-3 by inflicting severe injuries on her body.
AILA_Q21||Challenge in this appeal is to the judgment of a learned Single Judge of the High Court by which two Writ Petitions filed by the respondent were disposed of. The controversy lies within a very narrow compass. Before dealing with the rival contentions the factual background needs to be noted. Respondent was appointed on 3.9.1980 as a daily-rated worker in the Horticulture Department of the State. In the Writ Petition the prayer was for regularization as a clerk on completion of ten years of service on daily wages basis. It is to be noted that the union of the employees had moved the Labour Court for regularization of all daily wagers. The same was adjudicated by the Industrial Disputes Tribunal. A reference was made to the Labour Court and the State filed its response questioning maintainability of the reference. Initially the Labour Court had decided in favour of the workers but on a Writ Petition being filed, the High Court held in favour of the State holding that the claim for regularization was not maintainable. It was noted that no appointment order was issued and the case of the respondent was not sponsored by the employment exchange. It was also noted that the claim for equal work for equal pay was not maintainable as daily-rated persons were not required to perform duties at par with those in regular service and they did not also fulfil the procedure at the time of recruitment. Two Writ Petitions were filed; in one the challenge was to the order of the Industrial Disputes Tribunal while the Writ Petition to which this Appeal relates to the Award by the Labour Court. It is to be noted that the Labour Court had observed that the employer had regularized the respondent as a Chowkidar with effect from 5.7.1997 which was refused by him. Thereafter the engagement as daily wager was terminated. This order was challenged before the Industrial Disputes Tribunal which was dismissed. However, as noted above the High Court has remanded the matter to the Tribunal. The High Court in the impugned order held that the approach of the Labour Court was wrong as it has introduced concepts which are unnecessary. It was noted by the High Court that there was no dispute that the respondent was employed as a clerk. Learned counsel for the respondents submitted that the question whether the appointment was as a clerk has been concluded by an earlier order of the High Court which has become final and, therefore, the present appeal is misconceived.
AILA_Q22||Assailing the legal acceptability of the judgment and order passed by the High Court where it has given endorsement to the judgment passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge wherein the learned trial Judge had found the appellants guilty of the offences and imposed the sentence of rigorous imprisonment of seven years and a fine of Rs.1,000/- on the first score, five years rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs.1,000/- on the second score, eighteen months rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs.500/- on the third count and six months rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs.250/- on the fourth count with the default clause for the fine amount in respect of each of the offences. The learned trial Judge stipulated that all the sentences shall be concurrent. Filtering the unnecessary details, the prosecution case, in brief, is that the marriage between the appellant No. 1 and deceased  P1, sister of the informant, PW-2, was solemnized on 24.9.1997. After the marriage the deceased stayed with her husband and the mother-in-law, the appellant No.2 herein, at the matrimonial home. In the wedlock, two children, one son and a daughter were born. On 11.9.2001, the informant, brother of the deceased, got a telephonic call from the accused No. 1 that his sister  P1 had committed suicide. On receipt of the telephone call came along with his friend, P2, PW-20, and at that juncture, the husband of  P1,  P3, informed that the deceased was fed up with the constant ill-health of her children and the said frustration had led her to commit suicide by tying a 'dupatta' around her neck. The brother of the deceased did not believe the version of  P3, and lodged an FIR alleging that the husband and the mother-in-law of the deceased, after the marriage, had been constantly asking for dowry of Rs.2 lacs from the father of the deceased, but as the said demand could not be satisfied due to the financial condition of the father, the husband and his mother started ill-treating her in the matrimonial home and being unable to tolerate the physical and mental torture she was compelled to commit suicide. Be it noted, as the death was unnatural, the police had sent the dead body for post mortem and the doctor conducting the autopsy opined that the death was due to suicide. After the criminal law was set in motion on the base of the FIR lodged by the brother, the investigating officer examined number of witnesses and after completing all the formalities laid the charge sheet before the competent Court, who, in turn, committed the matter to the Court of Session. The accused persons denied the allegations and claimed to be tried. The prosecution, in order to establish the charges levelled against the accused persons, examined 22 witnesses and got marked number of documents. The defence chose not to adduce any evidence. 4. The learned trial Judge principally posed four questions, namely, whether the accused persons had inflicted unbearable torture on the deceased as well as caused mental harassment to make themselves liable for punishment; whether the material brought on record established the offence; whether the physical and mental torture on the deceased compelled her to commit suicide on 11.9.2001 as a consequence of which the accused persons had become liable to be convicted; and whether the accused persons had demanded a sum of Rs.2 lacs towards dowry from the parents of  P1 so as to be found guilty. The learned trial Judge answered all the questions in the affirmative and opined that the prosecution had been able to prove the offences to the hilt and, accordingly, imposed the sentence as stated hereinbefore. Grieved by the judgment of conviction and the order of sentence the appellants filed an appeal. The High Court at the stage of admission had suo motu issued notice for enhancement of sentence. The State had appealed for the self-same purpose. The appeals and the revision application were disposed of by a common judgment dated 6.9.2007 whereby the Division Bench of the High Court concurred with the view expressed by the learned trial Judge and, accordingly, dismissed the appeals preferred by the accused as well as by the State and resultantly suo motu by the High Court also stood dismissed. The non-success in the appeal has compelled the accused-appellants to prefer this appeal by special leave.
AILA_Q23||The petitioner is a firm carrying on business as builders, colonizers and contractors. The petitioner is the owner of 24.45 acres of vacant land situated in s village. Being engaged in construction activities it made an application under the provisions for the grant of licence for group housing scheme. This application was submitted by the petitioner on July 21, 1983 without necessary documents. After several representations the Director of Town and Country Planning Department replied that it was proposed to grant licence to the petitioner for setting up of Group Housing Colony. The petitioner was called upon to fulfil the conditions laid down in the rules within a period of 30 days from the date of service of that notice. The agreement was required to be executed on non-judicial stamp paper of Rs 3. The petitioner was also called upon to execute a bank guarantee for Rs 109.30 lakhs. On a request made by the petitioner for extension of time for furnishing the bank guarantee, time was extended (vide letter dated April 5, 1984) by four weeks. A further extension was prayed by the petitioner that was also granted on July 5, 1984 granting a further extension by four weeks. On October 19, 1984, while returning the estimates for development and service plans, respondent 2 (Director of Town and Country Planning) for 24.45 acres, the petitioner was directed to submit the estimate only for 21.15 acres. On receipt of this letter, the petitioner wrote on November 14, 1984 that the external development charges which were demanded by respondent 2 might be reduced in view of the reduction in the area. This request of the petitioner was not acceded to by the Director. The petitioner was called upon to execute an agreement under bank guarantee as already asked for. After some lapse of time, on December 12, 1987, the petitioner explained the circumstances under which he could not arrange for the bank guarantee of Rs 109.30 lakhs earlier. The bankers were willing to provide a bank guarantee for Rs 109.30 lakhs within 30 days of his intimating them to do so. It was also stated that he was willing to abide by all the directions and conditions which had been prescribed by respondent 2. Again, on September 26, 1988, October 11, 1988, January 2, 1989 and January 7, 1989, the request was rejected for the revival of the sanction and agreeing to comply with the rules and conditions. On September 25, 1989, the petitioner was informed that it is a request for grant of a licence which was refused since it had failed to fulfil the conditions laid down under Rule 11 within the stipulated/extended period. Upon receipt of this letter, the petitioner filed a memorandum to the Governor on May 4, 1991 since the State was under President's rule. It appears from the affidavit that the Governor made a suggestion that the licence granted in February 1984 could be revalidated if the petitioner was ready and willing to pay interest at bank rate on the amount of Rs 109.30 lakhs which was demanded as a security by the Director of Town and Country Planning w.e.f. 1984. Thereupon, the petitioner consented to such a course. The affidavit further avers that the Governor while recording the statement of the petitioner directed to submit a report and to calculate the total amount. 6.  With the change of the government, these directions of the Governor were not implemented. Hence, in this present petition, the petitioner prays for an order in the nature of mandamus to direct the State of Haryana to revalidate the licence/permission granted by the Director by his letter dated 'Nil' Memo No. 1823-5 DP-84 permitting the petitioner to construct the multi-storeyed houses and flats in accordance with law by accepting security/bank guarantee to the tune of Rs 109.30 lakhs as demanded by the respondent. 7.  A further prayer is for permission, approval or sanction to enable the petitioner to construct the multi-storeyed houses in pursuance of the licence granted by respondent 2 in the year 1984.
AILA_Q24||These appeals are directed against the judgment of a High Court whereby an appeal and a criminal revision were disposed of. The appellants were found guilty and sentenced to undergo various terms of sentences. The Criminal Appeal was filed by three appellants questioning the conviction and sentence as recorded. Complainant filed a revision petition stating that she was entitled to compensation. Background facts giving rise to the trial are essentially as follows: "The complainant and the appellants are first cousins, and as such are closely related to each other. Their grandfather was P1. As per site plans Ex. PP prepared by P2, P3 PW4 and Ex. PT prepared by P3 PW9 (I.0.), it shows that the place of occurrence was in the common land owned both by the appellants and the complainant party. The tube well of which the pipes were being taken out by the appellants, was also in the common piece of land. P4 (hereinafter referred to as 'deceased') was standing in the water-course point B (Ex.PT). Complainant P5 was standing in the common land Point C (Ex.PT) and P6 was standing at Point D (Ex. PT). It is the appellants who went 16 to 35 feet towards the complainants where deceased P4 and the other two witnesses P5 (PW6) and P6 (PW7) were standing and thereafter attacked them. P5 (PW6) asked the appellants not to take out the iron and plastic pipes of the tube well, but firstly to talk to the elders. Malkiat Singh, Patwari (PW4), who is a key witness in regard to the ownership of the piece of land where the tubewell was installed, was not put any question regarding the ownership of the common land. P5 (PW6), in his testimony before the Court, stated that the appellants on 7.1.2001 at about 1.00 P.M. armed with spades came to the tube well and started removing the pipes, which was jointly owned by both the appellants and complainant party. On being stopped, the appellants felt offended and attacked the complainant party. He (PW6) has further stated that there was no dispute regarding the joint property, but the appellants were not on visiting terms with them as far social functions were concerned. P4 was attacked in the joint water channel and across the water channel there was the field of P7, father of P8. After leaving the common pipes of land where the tube well was installed, rest of the land had been divided by both the parties and they were cultivating the land separately and peacefully. The complainant party did not have any weapons in their hands when they had gone to stop the appellants. This witness (PW6) has stated that they did not go near the appellants, but asked them not to remove the pipes. They were at that time standing at a distance of 5-6 karms. P6 (PW7) has also reiterated the same. P5 (PW6) has stated, that P9 and P10 have their fields at a distance of about half a kills from the place of occurrence. Both these witnesses P5 (PW6) and P6 (PW7) corroborate each other inter-se and also corroborate the FIR The medical evidence also corroborates the statements given by the eye witnesses. Dr. D1 (PW 1) has stated in his testimony, that on examining P5 he found that he had received one incised wound injury on the scalp left parietal area vertical in position. Similarly on examining P6, he found the first injury to be an incised wound. Second and third were abrasions on the left shoulder and neck. The fourth injury was a lacerated wound on the right parietal area of scalp. On the post-mortem conducted on P4, an incised wound was found on the parietal area of the scalp, about 12 cms from right ear pinna backwards, traversing part of left parietal area of scalp to left occipital area. The medical evidence corroborates the ocular account." Trial court took note of the fact that the appellants and the members of the complainant party are related to each other closely. The dispute arose because of conflicting claims as to the ownership of the land. It was submitted that the occurrence took place when the members of the complainant party came forward and obstructed the appellant from doing the work and restrained them from pulling out the pipe. There was exchange of hot words and in the process, the occurrence, according to the prosecution, took place. In essence it was submitted that the accused were exercising the right of private defence or in the alternative the occurrence took place in the course of a sudden quarrel. Stand of the State was that there appears to be some exchange of words. The trial court found substance in the plea and found the accused persons guilty. Before the High Court it was submitted that the factual scenario has not been correctly appreciated by the trial court. It noted that the appellants pulled out the iron and plastic pipes which were installed on the land jointly owned by both the parties. Since the accused persons pulled out the pipes it was natural that the members of the complainant party who were standing at a distance of 16 to 35 feets from the appellants intervened and asked them not to pull out the pipes unless the elders take a decision. The appellants did not pay any heed.
AILA_Q25||These appeals involving common questions of law and fact were taken up for hearing together and are being disposed of by this common judgment.  The lands situated inter alia in villages V1, V2, V3 and V4 were acquired by the State for the purpose of use thereof by the Appellant. A notification was issued on 31.7.1986. The declaration was issued on 29.12.1987. Upon service of notice upon the claimants, the Collector made an award. In doing so, several deeds of sale executed between 1981 and 1982 in respect of lands adjoining some of the villages were taken into consideration and market value of the land was determined at the rate of Rs. 1.55 per sq. m. The claimants Respondents did not accept the said award and prayed for a reference to the Civil Court. Such a reference having been made the Reference Court purported to be relying on or on the basis of judgments dated 30th October, 1996 and 10th November, 1996 passed by 4th Extra Assistant Judge and 2nd Extra Assistant Judge respectively in L.A. R. Case No. 1349/92 and 1314/92 passed an award computing the amount of compensation at the rate of Rs. 10/- per sq. m. The Appellant herein was not impleaded as a party in the Reference Court. It had, thus, no opportunity also to adduce any evidence either before the Land Acquisition Collector or before the Reference Court. It preferred appeals before the High Court being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said judgment and award passed by the Reference Court. A contention raised by the Appellant before the High Court inter alia was that the Reference Judge acted illegally and without jurisdiction in passing the said judgment solely on the basis of the deposition of one P1 who alleged that the agricultural lands which he and others had been cultivating were of high fertility and three crops in a year were grown therein. The witness further alleged that the village was well-developed. He further contended that the lands of one P2 was acquired for the Appellant wherein compensation at the rate of Rs. 10/- per sq. m. was awarded. It was argued that the Reference Court was bound to consider the deeds of sale relied upon by the Collector in his Award. High Court rejected the said contentions stating that the Reference Court had not committed any error of law in taking into consideration the evidence adduced by the said witness. It was held: "It appears that after the evidence, another judgment was pointed to the Reference Court for which there is a reference in the impugned judgment. The lands covered under that reference cases were situated in the sim of village V1 and V5 and the Reference Court awarded Rs. 10/- per sq. mtrs. In the instant case, the lands are situated at village V1. In view of this evidence, we find no substance in the appeals and appeals are dismissed."
AILA_Q26||The hearing before us now relates to certain objections filed to the Award made by a former Judge of this Court who was appointed the sole arbitrator to adjudicate upon the dispute between the parties pursuant to the Order of this Court dated 18th November, 1987 in the circumstances as set out hereinafter. In order to appreciate the objections, it is necessary to refer to certain facts. The Settlement Commissioner llotted Plot No. 631 at L1 measuring 160 sq. yds to the Respondent under the Settlement Scheme for the refugees from Pakistan for a total price of Rs.4,800. This allotment was made by the Settlement Commissioner on behalf of the Rehabilitation Department of the Government. The Respondent applied for a loan from the Ministry of Defence for construction of the house on the said plot and a loan of Rs.15,000 was sanctioned in his favour. Under the House Construction Rules of the Government, the plans and estimates had to be submitted along with the application and a sanctioned amount was paid in four instalments at different stages of construction. The Respondent started the construction of a building on the said land. By the end of 1973, the Respondent had constructed a house on the said plot upto the roof level. By that time he had obtained and used up a sum of Rs.12,000 out of the loan sanctioned to him and only a balance of Rs.3,000 remained to be paid to him under the said loan. According to the Respondent, this amount was not sufficient for the final completion of the house and he, therefore, sought the help of Appellant No. I who advanced a sum of Rs.5,000 to him. In September, 1973 the Respondent entered into an agreement dated September 6, 1973 to sell the house and the said plot to the Appellant No. 1. The aforesaid amount of Rs.5,000 given by way of loan was shown in that agreement as an advance paid towards the sale price. The Respondent also executed a General Power of Attorney in favour of Appellant No. 1 inter alia enabling him to carry on construction work on the said land on behalf of the Respondent. According to the Respondent, the house was not complete but the Appellants who are husband and wife were occupying the same. Under circumstances, we need not discuss here, on January 29, 1974 another agreement was entered into between Appellant No. 1 and the Respondent which has been described as an agreement for construction. Under that agreement, Rs.80,000 was to be paid by the Respondent as the price of the construction to be put up by Appellant No. I on the said plot and he was to charge Rs.20,000 as the profits and labour charges. He was to deposit Rs.15,000 with the Respondent, this transaction was sham and bogus. Disputes arose Respondent was to return the amount of Rs.1,15,000 within three years in a lump sum and on such payment, Appellant No. I was to hand over the possession of the building and the plot to the Respondent. Till that amount was paid, Appellant No. 1 was entitled to possess and occupy and enjoy the same and to receive rents thereof. According to the Respondent, this transaction was sham and bogus. Disputes arose between the parties and the Respondent filed a suit in August 1977 claiming for the return of the possession of the said plot and the house. A notice of motionfor stay taken out by the Appellants was dismissed. An appeal was preferred against the said decision. In the appeal, which came up for hearing before the Additional District Judge. With the consent of the parties, P1 was appointed as the sole arbitrator to adjudicate upon the disputes in the suit. The said P1 died in July 1979 without making any award. On an application by the Respondent, the learned Additional District Judge filled up the vacancy by appointing P2, Advocate, as the sole arbitrator. P2 made and published his award which went against the Appellants. According to the Appellants, the said award was made ex parte. The appellants challenged the award by filing objectionsbefore the learned Additional District Judge and applied for setting aside the said award. This application was dismissed by the learned Additional District Judge. The Appellants filed an appeal against this decision on October 14,1982 before the High Court but the said appeal was dismissed by the learned Single Judge of that High Court on April 30, 1985. This decision of the learned Single Judge was challenged before this Court by way of Special Leave Petition. Leave was granted and the present Appeal came to be numbered as aforesaid. This Appeal came up for hearing before a Division Bench of this Court on November 18,1987. After hearing Counsel for the parties. in order to ensure fairplay in the action, this Court set aside the award of the Arbitrator and also the judgment of the High Court and appointed a former Judge of this Court, as the sole arbitrator to adjudicate upon the disputes between the parties. The arbitrator was directed to make his award with short reasons within four months from the receipt of the the order. Certain other conditions like payment of compensation and additional expense were imposed on the Appellants. Pursuant to the said order of this Court, former judge entered upon the reference and made and made and published his award on March 18,1988. Under the said award, it was held that the Respondent was entitled to a sum of Rs.58,498.60p and interest on this amount at the rate of 18 per annum from the date of the reference to the date of the award which worked out to a sum of Rs.3,510. Taking into account the amount paid by the Respondent initially towards the arbitrator's remuneration and others costs and after setting off the dues of Appellants against the Respondent, it was held that the Respondent-claimant was entitled to recover possession of the disputed building from the Appellants and that a sum of Rs.57,753 was payable by the Appellants to the Respondent. It is this award which is challenged before us now.
AILA_Q27||Appellant before us was detained. He is the Managing Director of a company, registered and incorporated as CompanyC1. It was an exporter and held a valid licence therefor. The company was to export products of alloy steel. Upon exporting of alloy steel, it was entitled to credits under the Duty Entitlement Pass Book (DEPB) Scheme introduced by the Government of India with an object of encouraging exports. He allegedly misdeclared both the value and description of goods upon procuring fake and false bills through one P1. The said P1 was said to have been operating three firms, CompanyC2, CompanyC3 and CompanyC4. It was allegedly found that non-alloy steel, bars, rods, etc. of value ranging from Rs. 15/- to Rs. 17/- per kg. were exported in the guise of alloy steel forgings, bars, rods, etc. by declaring their value thereof from Rs. 110/- to Rs. 150/- per kg. and the export proceeds over and above the actual price were being routed through a Channel. The officers of the Directorate of Revenue Intelligence (DRI) searched the factory as well as the residential premises of Appellant and that of P1. Various incriminating documents were recovered. Appellant and the said P1 made statements. P1 allegedly admitted to have supplied fake bills to units owned and controlled by Appellant on commission basis without actual supply of the goods. It was also found that Appellant had declared goods exported as "alloy steel" whereas after the tests conducted by Central Revenue Control Laboratory, they were found to be "other than alloy steel", i.e., non-alloy. The Consul (Economic), Consulate General of India at L1 allegedly confirmed the existence of a parallel set of export invoices. Invoices with a higher value were presented before the Indian Customs Authorities with a view to avail DEPB incentives but in fact invoices with a lower value were presented for clearance. On the aforementioned allegations, an order of detention was issued on 5.4.2005. Appellant moved for issuance of a writ of Habeas Corpus before the High Court. The said writ petition was dismissed by an order dated 23.11.2005 by a learned Single Judge. A letters patent appeal, concededly which was not maintainable, was filed thereagainst which was dismissed by reason of the impugned judgment. Although before the High Court, the principal ground urged on behalf of Appellant in questioning the legality or validity of the order of detention was unexplained delay in passing the order of detention which did not find favour with the High Court. Before us, several other grounds, viz., non placement of vital/ material documents before the detaining authority, non- supply of documents relied on or referred to in the order of detention as also non-application of mind on the part of the detaining authority had been raised. In the meantime admittedly the period of detention being over, Appellant had been set at large. He was released from custody on 17.5.2006. This appeal, however, has been pressed as a proceeding and has been initiated against Appellant.
AILA_Q28||Challenge in this appeal is to the judgment of the High Court dismissing the appeal filed by the appellants. The appeal was directed against the judgment dated 31.8.2004 passed by learned Additional Sessions Judge convicting the appellants for offence and sentencing each to undergo imprisonment for life and to pay a fine of Rs. 2000/- with default stipulation. Background facts in a nutshell are as follows: On 27th December, 2000, at about 11.00 a.m., one P1, brother of P2 (hereinafter referred to as the 'deceased') made a complaint to the officer in charge of the Police Station that at about 6 a.m. on the same day P3 s/o P4, P5 S/o P6 and P7 s/o P3 along with two others assaulted his brother P2 with spears thereby severely injuring him while he was ploughing the field. He also stated that deceased-P2 was taken to the hospital for treatment but he died there. Accordingly, a case was registered. On 4th January, 2001, nearly a week after the alleged incident, the statements of  PW-1 and PW-7, the alleged eyewitnessesm were recorded by the Judicial Magistrate. On 13th May, 2002 charge sheet was filed against the appellant herein. By order dated 27th October, 2003, the case was committed by the learned SDJM(S), to the Court of the Sessions Judge, Jothat for trial of offences. On 13th November, 2003, the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Jorhat framed charge. Trial Court, as noted above, convicted the accused, which was affirmed by the High Court.
AILA_Q29||This appeal has been preferred against the judgment and order dated 5.8.2008, passed by the High Court reversing the judgment of acquittal dated 8.4.2003 recorded by the Sessions Court wherein the appellant was charge sheeted for murdering his wife, P1, by giving her Sodium Cyanide. This is a most unfortunate case, in which, a young, B.Com 2nd year student, P1 died under mysterious circumstances within 15 days of her marriage in her parent's house at L1. The appellant, P2, is post-graduate and at relevant time had been employed in the Gulf in a firm, namely, CompanyC1 dealing with golden Jewellery. The couple, after marriage on 15.5.2000, stayed for two days with the brother of the appellant at Ollur and they came back to L1 on 17.5.2000, as the parents of P1 had arranged a reception for them at their house. The couple stayed there for two days and left for L2 on 19.5.2000 and stayed in the house of PW.10, a friend of the appellant. The couple came back on 22.5.2000 to L1, the family house of the deceased, P1. The couple again went to L2 on 30.5.2000 to attend the marriage of PW.10 with one P3, which was scheduled to be held on 31.5.2000 and returned to L1, at 4.00 p.m. on 1.6.2000. The appellant left P1 at her parent's house and went to Hospital to meet his sister and mother as his mother had undergone an operation for cancer and was convalescing. The appellant returned to P1's house at about 10.30 p.m. and found that door of her room was bolted from inside and there was no response on calling to her. The door was broke opened by the appellant and P1's father. P1 was found unconscious lying on the floor. She was taken to the Government Hospital, L1, where she was declared dead by the doctors. PW.1, father of the deceased lodged an F.I.R. on 2.6.2000 at 7.00 a.m.. The inquest was conducted on the same day and post mortem was conducted on 3.6.2000, and the deceased was buried thereafter. PW.21, the Deputy Superintendent of Police while conducting the investigation of the case received information that just few days prior to the incident the appellant had procured Cyanide, thus, he was arrested on 26.6.2000. An alleged confessional statement was made by the appellant that he had purchased Sodium Cyanide from the shop of PW.7, who was dealing with jewellery as well as Sodium Cyanide. PW.7 made a statement that the appellant had procured 1 Kg. Sodium Cyanide from him between 25.5.2000 and 27.5.2000. The post mortem report revealed that P1 died of Cyanide poisoning. As per the statement of PW.9, mother of the deceased P1, the poison was given to P1 by the appellant under the guise of giving her an ayurvedic contraceptive medicine. PW.21, the Investigating Officer completed the investigation and submitted a charge sheet against the appellant for the offence. The appellant pleaded not guilty to the charge of murder and claimed trial. The prosecution examined 21 witnesses in support of its case. Appellant in his statement stated that he was innocent and there was a possibility of the involvement of PW.10, who had misbehaved with P1 and had sexual intercourse with her on 31.05.2000 when the couple was staying with him. More so, P1 might have committed suicide because of feelings of guilt for that reason. The Trial Court dis-believed the prosecution witnesses and acquitted the appellant vide judgment and order dated 8.4.2003. 5.  The High Court considered the submissions made by the prosecution that the appreciation of evidence by learned Sessions Judge was not proper one, thus, the findings of fact recorded by the Trial Court were perverse. The circumstances proved, ruled out the possibility of suicide. The medical evidence proved beyond doubt that the deceased died of Cyanide poisoning. Nobody except the appellant had procured the Cyanide poison and the appellant had persuaded the deceased P1 to take it under the garb of it being an oral contraceptive. There was no question of dis-believing all the prosecution witnesses including the parents and sister of the deceased, P1. Appellant was unhappy with the deceased for her non-cooperation in carnal intercourse. Therefore, all the circumstances necessary to record a finding of guilt against the appellant stood proved by the prosecution. The High Court, vide impugned judgment and order dated 5.8.2008, accepted the State's appeal and reversed the judgment and order of acquittal dated 8.4.2003 passed by the Trial Court. Hence, this appeal.
AILA_Q30||That the deceased P1 got married to P2, the 2nd respondent herein, in the year 2001. In her marital home, she was ill-treated by her parents-in-law, respondents 1 and 3 herein. They would constantly tell her that she was incapable of doing the house work properly, and her mother-in-law did not give her sufficient food to eat. On 29.11.2002 at noon, when the deceased returned home after her bath in the pond, her mother-in-law hurled abuses at her and inquired what she had been doing at the pond. When she replied that she had been washing clothes there, her mother-in-law gave her few slaps, as a result of which the deceased began to cry. Her mother-in-law then directed her husband to burn her alive. Her father-in-law had thus poured kerosene on her and had asked his wife to set her on fire, as a result of which her mother-in-law lit a matchstick and threw the same at her. Since the deceased began to scream, her parents-in-law came out of the house and bolted the door from the outside. On hearing her shriek, a few villagers sent news of the same to her parents who resided in a neighboring village, at a distance of about half a kilometer. Her father, mother and uncle thus came to the place of occurrence. The door was opened by them, and the deceased was taken out. The deceased P1 narrated the said incident to her parents, and thereafter she was taken in a trolley to the Police Station in a severely burnt condition, where she herself lodged a report narrating the incident, and at about 2 p.m., on the basis of the complaint, an FIR, Ex.P-17 was recorded. The Investigating Agency made all the necessary arrangements in order to record her dying declaration and the Executive Magistrate PW.12, was called for the aforementioned purpose. Her dying declaration was recorded by the Executive Magistrate and subsequently, the deceased was admitted to the Government Hospital at 3.25 p.m., where she died at 3.35 p.m. Intimation of her death was communicated by the hospital officials to the Police. The Investigating Agency thus took over the dead body of the deceased, and sent it for post-mortem. They also seized all the necessary articles from the spot, prepared the panchnama, and after recording the statements of the witnesses, submitted a charge sheet before the competent court, which in turn, committed the case to the Court of Sessions. Hence, trial commenced after framing charges. The accused persons abjured their guilt. In order to prove the charges, the prosecution examined as many as 17 witnesses, and placed reliance on Ex.P1 to P24. The respondents- accused took the defence of an alibi in their statement, stating that they had been in their agricultural field at the time of the said incident and it was here that they had received information about the incident. The deceased had committed suicide and they were being falsely been implicated. The learned Additional Sessions Judge, in Sessions Trial No.305 of 2002, vide judgment and order dated 6.12.2003, after appreciating the material on record, recorded findings of fact to the effect that the deceased had not committed suicide, and that the respondents-accused were guilty of the offences. They were convicted and sentenced, in default of payment of fine, to further undergo one month RI; undergo imprisonment for life and a fine of Rs.2,000/- each, in default of payment of fine, to suffer further RI for 6 months. Aggrieved by the aforesaid order of conviction and sentence, the respondents-accused challenged the same before the High Court which was allowed by the High Court vide its impugned judgment and order, acquitting all the accused.
AILA_Q31||This appeal by special leave is directed against the judgment and order dated 26.5.2006 passed by the learned Single Judge of the High Court whereby the learned Single Judge has allowed the writ petition and set aside the impugned order passed by the Revisional Court and remanded the matter back to the Revisional Court for deciding afresh on the basis of direction given by the Court. The brief facts which are necessary for the disposal of this appeal are that a Writ Petition was filed by the petitioner (Respondents herein) before the High Court praying to quash the order dated 21.2.2006 passed in Criminal Revision No.166 of 2004 by the Additional Sessions Judge whereby the revision was allowed and the impugned order passed by the Court below was set aside. One P1 and P2 were recorded bhumidhar of the plot in dispute No.1232, area 3 bigha and plot No.1233, area 4 bigha 17 biswas situated in a village. Thereafter, a forged power of attorney was got executed in favour of P3 allegedly executed by P1 and P2. On the ground of forged power of attorney, P1 lodged the F.I.R. The holder of the power of attorney P3 is the real brother-in-law of P4, Respondent No.9 and a sale deed was executed by him in favour of P5, P6, P4 and P7 all sons of P8. On 17th June, 1993, a registered sale deed had been executed by P1 himself in favour of the respondents P9 and P10, who came in possession over the property in dispute. Therefore, share of P1 was firstly transferred by the holder of the power of attorney and same was again transferred by the owner of the property of P1. Therefore, dispute arose between both the vendees of the sale deeds. An application was moved on 13th June, 2003 on behalf of the respondents in the Court of S.D.M. upon which the report was called from the concerned police station. Similarly, report was also summoned from the Tehsildar at the instance of the respondents and police submitted the challan. Tehsildar also submitted a report with regard to the mutation. P6 started constructing shops on the disputed land with the help of his companions because they themselves wanted to raise construction upon the land. Therefore, a breach of peace between both the parties arose. The S.D.M. concerned passed a preliminary order as well as the attachment order.  After appearance, an application on behalf of the appellants was moved which was rejected vide order dated 12th July, 2004 by S.D.M. Aggrieved by this, the legal representative of P5, P6, P11, P12 and P13 filed Criminal Revision before the Additional Sessions Judge. Learned Additional Sessions Judge by Order dated 21st February, 2006 quashed the order of the S.D.M. Similarly, the order of attachment and supurdaginama regarding disputed land was also quashed and directed that the possession be given to the revisionist upon the disputed land. Thereafter, P9 and others filed a writ petition before the High Court. The High Court after considering the writ petition came to the conclusion that the learned Additional Sessions Judge has gone wrong in quashing the proceedings as well as the order of attachment and supurdaginama. Aggrieved against this order the present appeal was filed before this Court.
AILA_Q32||On 9th May, 2004, the marriage of the daughter of one P1, the brother of P2 PW.1, was to be solemnized in village Janephal, District Aurangabad. P2 PW.1, arranged a water tanker on the 6th May, 2004. As the tanker was being taken towards P2's house the accused appellants, obstructed the way by putting stones and thorny bushes. The accused also abused PW.12 and the deceased P3. P2 reached the village at about 9.30 a.m. and was told by the deceased not to take the tanker to his well, as planned as, the appellants had obstructed the passage in that direction. The tanker was accordingly brought to its destination by some other route by P3. P3 and P2, thereafter, went to police station Shioor for lodging a complaint with respect to the behaviour of the appellants and while they were returning from the police station they were waylaid by the appellants, P4 armed with an iron rod and all the others with sticks. They also attacked P3 with their weapons on which he became unconscious and fell to the ground. He was, thereafter, removed to the hospital by some of the witnesses and an FIR was lodged at Police Station. On the completion of the investigation the appellants were brought to trial for offences punishable and were sentenced to undergo life imprisonment for the main offence and for three months for the offence. This judgment has been confirmed by the High court in appeal. This appeal by way of special leave is before us today.
AILA_Q33||This is an appeal by special leave from the judgment and order of the High Court dated March 27, 1958, whereby the said High Court maintained the conviction of the appellant but reduced the sentence of four years' rigorous imprisonment passed on the appellant by the Special Judge, Kanpur, to two years' rigorous imprisonment. The short facts are these. The appellant P1 was employed in the Police Department. He started his service as a constable on a salary of Rs. 13 per month from August 1, 1930. In 1946 his pay was increased to Rs. 46 per month. He was appointed a Head constable on a salary of Rs. 50 per month in 1947. He officiated as a Sub-Inspector of Police sometime in 1948 and 1949 on a salary of Rs. 150 per month. On March 1, 1949, he was reverted to his post of Head constable. Between the dates February 27, 1951, and September 9, 1952, he was posted as a Head constable attached to the L1. The charge against him was that in that capacity he dishonestly or fraudulently misappropriated or otherwise converted to his own use many articles, principally those seized in connection with excise offences kept in deposit in the said L1. These articles included opium, bottles of liquor etc. The charge further stated that a sum of Rs. 9,284-1-0 was recovered on a search of his house on September 9 and 10, 1952 and this amount was disproportionate to the known sources of income of the appellant. There was an allegation by the prosecution that the acts of dishonest misappropriation etc. were committed by the appellant in conspiracy with two other persons called P2 and P3. Therefore, the charges against the appellant were (1) for the offence of conspiracy (2) for the offence for the acts of dishonest misappropriation or user and (3) for an offence in respect of a particular entry said to have been forged in the Register of Properties kept in the L1. The learned Special Judge who tried the appellant P2 and P3 recorded an order of acquittal in respect of the latter two persons. As to the appellant, he was also acquitted of all the charges except one. On this charge the learned Special Judge recorded an order of conviction, but this was based on the sole ground that the appellant had failed to account satisfactorily for the possession of Rs. 9,284-1-0 which, according to the finding of the learned Special Judge, was disproportionate to the known sources of income of the appellant. It should be noted here that the learned Special Judge held the appellant not guilty of the various acts of dishonest misappropriation or user alleged against him in respect of the properties kept in the L1. In his appeal to the High Court the appellant urged various grounds, one of which was that Hon'ble Justice could not be convicted on the rule of presumption laid down when on the only charge of criminal misconduct alleged he had been found not guilty. The High Court repelled this contention and upheld the conviction of the appellant but reduced the sentence.
AILA_Q34||These writ petitions are filed as Public Interest Litigation by the two petitioners herein who were Members of the Parliament at the time of filing the petitions. Respondent nos. 4 and 5 were formerly Chief Ministers. It is alleged by the petitioners that they filed writ petitions before the High Court alleging large-scale defalcation of public funds and falsification of accounts involving hundreds of crores of rupees in the Department of Animal Husbandary and pursuant to these allegations, several cases were registered by the Police and investigation of these cases was later handed over to the Central Bureau of Investigation. In an earlier petition filed before this Court on 19.3.1996, this Court directed that the investigation shall be monitored by the High Court and in that Order, it was indicated that the CBI Officers entrusted with the investigation shall inform the Chief Justice of High Court from time to time of the progress made in the investigation and if they needed any directions in the matter of conducting the investigation, obtain them from him and it was also said that the learned Chief Justice may either post the matter for directions before a Bench presided over by him or constitute any other appropriate Bench. It was also directed that the State Government shall co-operate in assigning adequate number of Special judges to deal with the cases expeditiously so that no evidence may be lost. The petitioners allege that consequent upon change of the Government in the Centre, attempts have been made to delay and interfere with the judicial process. It is alleged that the public prosecutors who were handling the cases were removed and to protect the interests of respondent nos. 4 and 5, convenient prosecutor was appointed. The respondent no. 5 is an accused in a case. The allegation in that case is that respondent no. 5 as Minister between 1990 to 1996 had acquired assets disproportionate to his known sources of income. Chargesheet was filed in the Court of the Special Judge, CBI. Respondent no. 4 also was charge sheeted in the same case for abetmen. The petitioners allege that certain income tax cases of respondent nos. 4 and 5 were pending before the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal (ITAT) and one P1 who was a member of the ITAT had been hearing those cases and that respondent nos. 4 and 5 found it difficult to pursue the hearings before the said ITAT member and hence at their influence P1 was sent on deputation and he was replaced by one P1 who was on the verge of retirement. It is further alleged that the new member alongwith another member heard these cases within two weeks and orders were pronounced in favour of respondent nos. 4 and 5. It is also alleged that respondent no. 3, namely, the Central Board of Direct Taxes did not prefer appeal in these cases though the decision went against the revenue. This, according to the petitioners, was to help respondent nos. 4 and 5 in the cases filed against them based on the allegation that they acquired assets disproportionate to their known sources of income. The petitioners have also alleged that the Special Case pending before the Special Judge, CBI was at the final stage of hearing and that the Director, CBI, presumably under pressure from the accused changed the prosecutor and appointed one P3 who was only a retired Deputy Superintendent of Police and had no experience of conducting the prosecution. According to the prosecution, this was done at the fag end of the prosecution case to help the accused. The petitioners have made allegations against respondents 1 to 3 also that they were acting arbitrarily and interfering in the judicial process to benefit the respondent nos. 4 and 5. The petitioners have alleged that respondent nos. 4 and 5 obtained stay of proceedings of the case pending before the Special Judge from this Court suppressing some material facts. It is alleged that the respondent nos. 4 and 5 still wield influence and power and, therefore, this Court should monitor the trial of the case pending before the Special Judge, CBI. In these Writ Petitions, the petitioners have prayed mainly four reliefs. The first relief prayed is to issue an appropriate writ, order or direction monitoring the conduct of the trials relating to fodder scam cases proceedings against respondent nos. 4 and 5. The second prayer is to appoint the very same prosecutor who had been conducting prosecution earlier and to direct the High Court to see that no prosecutor or CBI Officer attached with the investigation and trial of the case should be removed, harassed or victimized for discharging their duties. The petitioners have also prayed that at least one inspector be provided for each fodder case. The petitioners have also prayed for cancellation of bail granted to respondent nos. 4 and 5. Petitioners have further prayed for a direction to respondents 1 to 3 to file an appeal against the orders passed by the ITAT.
AILA_Q35||Two appellants, who are brothers, along with their father P1 was prosecuted for an offence. Prosecution case in that the appellants have a sweetmeat shop in L1. PW 6 P2 is residing in a house opposite to the shop. On April 13, 1980, P1, the father of the appellants requested P2 to permit him to tie a rope of the canopy with the projection of the house of the witness, but he did not allow the same. P1 was offended. On April 18, 1980, a wet underwear drying-up on the roof flew away which was picked up by the first appellant P3. But when witness P2 demanded the same, the appellant had declined to return the same saying that he had found the same lying in the bazar and moreover he had not allowed his father to tie the rope. There was an exchange of abuses, but the matter ended there.In the evening on that day when P1 visited the shop of the appellants, P2 complained about the conduct of the first appellant P3.  However, P1 persuaded the first appellant to return the underwear of witness P2. At about 9.30 p.m. on that day deceased P4 accompanied by PW P5 visited the house of witness P2 for settling the details of the marriage that was to be performed in the near future. At about 10.00 p.m., deceased P4 and PW P5 left the house of witness P2. P2 followed them. When they reached the bazar locality, all the three of them saw the two appellants and P1 standing in front of their shop and on seeing deceased P4 and his companions, they raised chargers. P1 raised lalkaras and exhorted the appellants to catch hold of witness P2 and that he should not be allowed to escape. It is alleged that appellants 1 and 2, each of them was armed with a dagger. The first appellant P3 gave a blow with dagger on the left side of the chest of deceased P4, who fell down on the ground. When PW P5 rushed to the rescue of deceased P4, second appellant P7 gave two blows with a dagger and he also fell on the ground. Witness PW 8 P6 raised an alarm and the rickshaws to the hospital where on reaching the hospital P4 was pronounced dead by the Medical Officer who examined him. PW P5 was admitted in the hospital. PW 6 P2 lodged the first information report and the offence was registered. After completing the investigation, the appellants were prosecuted and tried for the offences hereinabove mentioned. At the trial PW P2 and PW P6 were examined as witnesses to the occurrence. PW 4 Dr. D1, who conducted the autopsy on the dead body of deceased P4 deposed that he found one incised stab wound 4 1/2 cm. x 2 1/2 cm. on front of left side of chest at 6 O'clock position, 3 1/2 cm. below left nipple oblique in direction. He also found two minor abrasions, one on front of left knee and the other on left side of fore-head. In his opinion, death was due to shock and haemorrhage as a result of injury to heart corresponding to injury No. 1 and in his opinion this injury was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. The defence of the accused, the first appellant P3, was that he caused one single injury to deceased P4. He has given his own version of the incident to which we would presently refer. Appellant 2 and P1 denied having committed any offence. The learned Additional Sessions Judge rejected the defence version put forth by the first appellant P3 as unworthy of credit and held that the evidence of two witnesses P2 and P6 was reliable and is borne out by a part of the statement made by the first appellant P3 . He however rejected that the first appellant caused injury to P4 in furtherance of the common intention of all the accused. Accordingly, the second appellant P7 was held responsible for his own act of causing injury to PW P5. The Sessions Judge was not satisfied with regard to the participation of the third accused P1 and he was given benefit of doubt and acquitted. Accordingly, the first appellant P3 was convicted for an offence and was sentenced to suffer imprisonment for life and to pay a fine of Rs. 2000 in default to suffer further imprisonment for one year. Second appellant P7 was held guilty for an offence, and as he was aged about 17 years on the date of the occurrence with no previous conviction, he was given benefit of a provision. First and second appellant having been dissatisfied with the order of the Sessions Judge, appealed to the High Court. The High Court agreed with the findings recorded by the learned Additional Sessions Judge and confirmed the conviction and sentence of the appellants.
AILA_Q36||Interpretation and/or application of Medical Benefit Rules applicable in the State S1 as also in the State S2 is in question before us in these appeals which arise out of the judgment and order dated 20th June, 2005 passed by S1 High Court in Writ Petition No. 10942 and that of the judgment and order dated 4th August, 2005 passed by the S2 High Court in D.B. Civil Writ Petition No.6502 respectively.Respondent in the S1 case is an officer working in the Office of the Department of Commercial Taxes. He underwent 'Coronary Artery' Bypass Surgery in the Hospital H1 having been admitted on 19th June, 2000. A sum of Rs.1,50,600/- was said to have been incurred by him by way of medical expenses. He claimed re-imbursement thereof. State S1 sanctioned and reimbursed a sum of Rs.39,207/-. Feeling aggrieved, a writ petition was filed which, by reason of the impugned judgment, has been allowed. S2 case, relates to one P1, who was a Judicial officer. He had been suffering from some kidney problems. Respondent herein is his mother. P2 was being treated for renal failure in 1997. He was referred to Hospital H2 for kidney transplantation by the Hospital H3. However, as H2 showed its inability to admit him because of non-availability of bed. Transplantation of kidney was carried out in Hospital H4, in 1997. Respondent, who was also an employee of the State claimed reimbursement of the said medical expenses. However, a sum of Rs.50,000/- was allegedly found admissible for the purpose of reimbursement out of the total claim of a sum of Rs.2.11 lacs. Respondent, however, claimed that the entire sum may be reimbursed. Other medical expenses incurred by P2, as follow up measures, have been reimbursed to the respondent herein. P2 joined S1 Judicial Service in the year 2000. In February, 2003 he got himself treated in H4. Allegedly his case was not referred therefor by the H3. As he was not treated by H2, he filed a writ petition in the High Court of Delhi for a direction to admit him therein. However, because of an emergent situation, he got himself admitted in H4. The said writ petition was withdrawn. In the month of May, 2003 he again came and got himself admitted and treated in Hospital H4 at L1. He filed a representation before the Registrar General of the High Court of S2 that on account of the sudden demise of his maternal uncle, he had to go to L1 and as he fell ill there, went straightaway to Hospital H4. He, therefore, prayed for reimbursement of his medical expenses incurred on that occasion also. Indisputably, however, the Principal and Controller, Hospital H3, on or about 5th July, 2003, referred him to Hospital H1. Allegedly in the reference order it was mentioned that the same was subject to medical expenses with a ceiling of Rs.10,000/- only. P2 obtained treatment in the Hospital H4 from 4th July to 29th July, 2003. He unfortunately breathed his last on 7th November, 2003. Respondent claimed medical reimbursement to the tune of Rs.6,52,148/- with interest. Only a sum of Rs.75,000/- was, however, sanctioned by the State of Rajasthan as being admissible, purported to be in terms of the Rules.Feeling aggrieved, a writ petition was filed in the High Court of Rajasthan which by reason of the impugned judgment and order has been allowed directing :-As a result of the aforesaid discussion the writ petition succeeds and same is allowed. The respondents are directed to release the amount of Rs.6,52,148/- in favour of the Petitioner of the medical expenses bills of Hospital H4, P1, where his son late P2, an officer of the S1 Judicial Service was treated, within a period of two months from the date of receipt of the copy of this order. The respondents are further directed to pay to the petitioner on the aforesaid amount the interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of submission of the first medical bill for reimbursement of the amount of Hospital H4, New Delhi, till the payment thereof is made."
AILA_Q37||Appellants call in question legality of the judgment rendered by the High Court upholding conviction of the appellants (hereinafter referred to as the 'accused') and sentence as imposed by the trial Court which had sentenced each to undergo rigorous imprisonment for three months, two years and seven years respectively with separate fines for each of the alleged offences with default stipulations. Background facts leading to the trial of the accused appellants are as follows: The case was registered on the basis of information lodged by P1 (PW-6), which was recorded on 10.11.1989 at about 2.00 a.m. According to the informant, he and his son P2's wife P3 (PW- 7) were sitting in the courtyard of the house of P2 (hereinafter referred to as the 'deceased'). It was about 11.00 a.m. on 9.11.1989 when deceased was coming from the village after purchasing vegetables. When he reached near the house of P4, son of P5, P6 (A-1) armed with a Gandasi and P7 (A-2) armed with a lathi were present there. P7 made an obscene gesture. At this P7 and the deceased exchanged hot words and abused each other. P6 gave a Gandasi blow on the right hand of the deceased, which caused a grievous injury. P7 gave a lathi blow on the left foot of the deceased and also gave a thrust blow of lathi on the left side of his head. Deceased fell down on the ground. The occurrence was witnessed by P1 (PW-6) and P3 (PW-7). Both of them took P2 injured to their house. When P1 and P3 raised alarm, both the accused persons ran away from the spot. Since the condition of P2 became serious during the night time, he was taken to the Primary Health Centre. On 10.11.1989 at night at about 0.15 a.m. Dr.D1 examined P2. He found injury No.1 which was an incised wound in the middle phalanx of the index finger of right hand. The second injury was an abrasion on the lateral side of upper 1/3rd part of left leg and the patient complained of pain on different parts of the body. Dr.D1 sent information to the Police Station. ASI P7 reached the Primary Health Centre and recorded the statement of P1 which is the FIR. On the basis of this statement, FIR was recorded by ASI P8. P2 expired at about 1.50 a.m. on 10.11.1989. Hence, information to this effect was sent. The accused persons were charged for offences. The accused persons pleaded innocence and claimed trial. Eight persons were examined to further the prosecution case. P1 (PW-6) was the complainant and claimed to be an eye-witness. P3 (PW-7) wife of the deceased also claimed to be an eye-witness. Placing reliance on their evidence, the learned Additional Session Judge found the accused persons guilty and sentenced them to undergo sentences as noted above. In appeal, the High Court confirmed the conviction and the sentences. In support of the appeal, learned counsel for the accused appellants submitted that the prosecution version was based on testimonies of relatives and, therefore, does not inspire confidence. Further there was delay in lodging the FIR. Additionally, it was submitted that the sentences imposed were high.
AILA_Q38||The appellant herein is a Senior Manager in a fertilizer company C1. The said company is engaged in manufacturing and selling of fertilizer. The Government of India in exercise of power has framed an order known as the Fertilizer (Control) Order, 1985 for controlling the quality of fertilizer. It appears that the samples of fertilizer sold by the appellant was taken from stitched bags of fertilizer and thereafter sent to laboratory for analysis. It is alleged that the laboratory reported that the fertilizer is sub-standard. It is further alleged that on the strength of the said report the respondent threatened the appellant to prosecute him. It is under such circumstances the appellant filed a petition before the High Court challenging the validity of Clause 19 of the Fertilizer (Control) Order. The case of the appellant was that since Clause 19 does not permit an accused a right to adduce evidence to contradict the report of the public analyst, the said clause is ultra vires articles of the Constitution. The said contention of the appellant was accepted by a Single Judge of the High Court. Consequently, Clause 19 of the Fertilizer (Control) Order was struck down. Aggrieved by the judgment of the learned Single Judge, the respondents preferred a letters patent appeal before the Division Bench of the High Court. The Letters Patent Bench, allowed the appeal and set aside the judgment of the learned Single Judge. It is against the said judgment of the High Court, the appellant is in appeal before us. It is not disputed that no charge-sheet on the strength of public analyst's report has been submitted to the Court against the appellant.
AILA_Q39||Challenge in this appeal is to the order of a High Court allowing the appeal filed by the respondent (hereinafter referred to as the 'accused'). The accused was convicted for offence and sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life and to pay a fine of Rs.10,000/- with default stipulation by Principal District Judge. He was also convicted for other offences punishable and sentence to undergo rigorous imprisonment for 10 years and to pay a fine. Background facts in a nutshell are as follows: The deceased is one P1, a Sri Lankan student, who was residing in the first floor of the house belonging to one P2 (P.W.1). The Accused is also a Sri Lankan student studying in a different college, but staying in the second floor of the same premises. The occurrence allegedly took place in the afternoon of 22.4.2003. The First Information Report was lodged by P.W.1 on 24-4-2003 at about 9.30 A.M. It was indicated in the First Information Report that on 24.4.2003 at 9.00 A.M., while the informant had gone to perform pooja in the first floor of the house, he got foul smell in the last room of the first floor and found blood seeping through the front door. On opening the window he noticed that P1 was lying in a pool of blood with her face covered with a bag. On the basis of the aforesaid F.I.R., investigation was taken up initially by P.W.40. Subsequently on the basis of the order of the High Court, such investigation was completed by P.W.42.The accused is stated to have been arrested on suspicion on 26.4.2003. On the basis of the statement of the accused, prosecution discovered many materials including a knife and a log allegedly used for killing. Initially, P.W.40 suspected the role of P.W.1, his wife P.W.2, P.W.3, from whose house certain incriminating material were recovered allegedly on the basis of statement of the accused as well as P.W.4, who was working as a cleaner in the vehicle of P.W.1. Subsequently, however, P.W.42, who took over investigation from P.W.40 filed charge-sheet only against the present appellant on the footing that P.Ws. 1 to 4 had no role to play in the crime.5.  The prosecution relied upon only circumstantial evidence, namely, confessional statements of the accused leading to recovery of various incriminating materials. Ex.P-6 is the statement leading to recovery of Travel bags (M.Os. 2 & 3), knife (.M.0.5), wooden log (M.0.28), rubber gloves (M.0.29 series) cotton rope with human hair (MN.O.30 series), two sponges soaked with blood (M.0.31 series), bloodstained blue clolour jean pant (M.0.32), bloodstained white banian (M.0.33), colour banian (M.0.34), bloodstained grey colour pant (M.0.35), bloodstained pillow (M.0.36), plastic bucket (M.0.37) from the house of P.W.3. Ex-P-8 is the statement leading to recovery of computer and its accessories (M.Os. 6 to 17) from the house of P.W.15, a classmate of the accused. Ex.P-10 is the statement relating to jewelleries, ultimately leading to recovery of gold ingots (M.O.18 series) from the house of P.W.19 on the basis of other connecting statements of P.W.17 and P.W.18. These three statements, Exs. P-6, P-8 and P-10 dated 26-4-2003, were made before P.W.40 in the presence of P.W.22 and C.W.1. The other confessional statement Ex.P-12 dated 22-9-2003 made before P.W.42 and Subbiah and P.W.24, led to recovery of "M" dollar (M.0.38) and key chain with key chain in (M.0.39) from the toilet in the room of the accused. The prosecution has also relied upon the alleged motive to the effect that the accused urgently wanted money with a view to increase his marks in Mathematics and, therefore, the accused had stolen articles belonging to the deceased. The trial court found the respondent guilty and recorded conviction and imposed sentence as aforestated.  The High Court found that the circumstances highlighted were not sufficient to fasten the guilt on the accused, and directed acquittal. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the High Court failed to notice that the circumstances highlighted clearly establish the chain of circumstances which established the prosecution version and the High Court was not justified in directing acquittal. Learned counsel for the respondent on the other hand supported the judgment of the High Court.
AILA_Q40||Having been selected by the Public Service Commission, the respondent herein was appointed as Law Officer-cum-Draftsman in the Directorate of Cooperation. There was only one post in the same Cadre and it had no promotional avenues. He filed a representation that his post be upgraded or two promotional avenues be provided to him. Several representations made by him having not received consideration at the hands of the appellants, the respondent herein filed a writ petition seeking for a specific direction upon the appellant herein to provide at least two promotional avenues. The said contention of the respondent was accepted by the High Court and by reason of its impugned judgment the appellant was directed to provide 'the graded scale' to the appellant by providing three grades, the initial being Grade III which is the Post of Law Officer cum Draftsman and thereafter Grade II and Grade I. Officer of Judicial Service. It was further directed: "The scale of pay of Grade II Law officer-cum- Draftsman shall be same as Grade-II officer of the Judicial Service. The scale of pay of Grade-I Law Officer-cum-Draftsman shall be equal to the scale of pay of Grade-I officer of Judicial Service." Questioning the said direction, the appellants are before us. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant would submit that the High Court went wrong in issuing the aforementioned direction. The learned counsel would urge that the respondent herein did not have any legal right to be promoted to a higher post far less the right to get the scale of pay of Grade I officer of the Judicial Service. Such a direction by the High Court, the learned counsel would contend, is wholly without jurisdiction. The learned counsel, appearing on behalf of the respondent, however, has supported the said order.
AILA_Q41||Appellant calls in question legality of the judgment rendered by High Court confirming his conviction for offence and sentence of imprisonment for life as awarded by the learned Sessions Judge. Background facts as unfolded during trial by the prosecution are essentially as follows. One P1 (hereinafter referred to as the 'deceased') was having industry and he employed a number of girls. The accused used to make fun of the girls/workers outside the factory and this was objected to by the deceased several times. On that score, there had been enmity between the deceased and the accused. At about 8.30 p.m. on 1.5.1990, PW-1, PW-2 and one P2 were standing in front of L1 ground, south of Mail Road. The accused was sitting on the eastern side of a culvert. There was a tube light burning and hence there was enough light at that place. At that time, the deceased, who came in a bicycle proceeding from east to west, took a turn towards south. The accused rushed to the deceased saying "you die, old man" and hit him with a stick (M.O.1) on his head. The deceased sustained injuries and there was profuse bleeding. PW-1, PW-2 and P2 immediately went near him and when the accused saw them coming near ran towards west, leaving the weapon viz., M.O.1 stick. Thereafter, PW-1, PW-2, P2 and the wife of the deceased took the deceased to the Government Hospital. After giving first aid to the deceased, the doctors in the said hospital advised to take the deceased to L2 for further treatment. The aforementioned persons thereafter took the deceased to L2 and at the Government Hospital, the deceased was treated by Doctor D1 (PW-6). The doctor found several injuries. PW-1 narrated the incident to the Head Constable (PW-10) at the police station who recorded the first information report (Ex.P-11). Same was dispatched to the Court of Judicial Magistrate. Assistant Surgeon, Government Hospital (PW-7) treated the deceased who breathed his last at about 1.25 a.m. on 2.5.1990. On receiving information about the death information was sent to the Court of Judicial Magistrate. On postmortem 6 injuries were noticed, out of which 3 were external and the rest were internal. Injuries 1 and 2 as noticed were abrasions but the fatal injury i.e. injury No.3 was stated to be 4" linear oblique sutured wound over the right parietal scalp. The doctor opined that the injury was sufficient in ordinary course of nature to cause death. On 4.5.1990 the accused was arrested and after completion of investigation the charge sheet was placed. The accused pleaded innocence.The Trial Court found that the evidence of eye witnesses PWs. 1, 2 and 3 were cogent and credible. The accused used to tease girls working in the factory of the deceased. When the deceased objected to the same, there was some misunderstanding and at the time of occurrence when the deceased was coming by bicycle, the accused rushed towards him and attacked him; resulting the fatal injury. When the eye witnesses rushed to help the deceased, the accused ran away. Placing reliance on the evidence and considering the entire material on record the trial Court found the accused guilty and convicted as aforesaid. An appeal was preferred before the High Court questioning the conviction and sentence. Before the High Court, it was urged that PWs. 1 and 2 were related to the deceased, and PW-3 was a chance witness and no credence should be put on their evidence. The High Court did not accept the plea and finding the analysis of evidence by the trial Court to be in order, upheld the conviction and sentence.
AILA_Q42||This appeal arises out of the judgment dated 23.8.2016, passed by the High Court wherein High Court has dismissed the petition filed by the appellant. Records reveal that the parents of the appellant, namely, P1 and P2, entered into an agreement to sell dated 14.1.1997 with Respondent No.2 herein. The sale consideration was Rs.33,50,000/- (Rupees Thirty Three Lakhs Fifty Thousand only); the parents of the appellant received earnest money of Rs.6,50,101/- (Rupees Six Lakhs Fifty Thousand One Hundred One only) and remaining amount was to be paid at time of registration of the sale deed. The appellant however denies about the receipt of earnest money of Rs.6,50,101/- by his parents. It seems that the said transaction for agreement to sell was not completed. Civil Suit in that regard is filed and is pending. Respondent No.2 lodged the complaint before the police authorities, making allegations of cheating, breach of trust, etc., against the parents of the appellant as well as the appellant, which came to be registered as FIR No.03/2016. Charge-sheet No.23/2016 also came to be filed against the three persons, including the appellant. Cognizance was taken by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, against the appellant and his parents. The appellant moved an application before the High Court for quashing the proceedings against him and the same came to be dismissed by the impugned judgment.
AILA_Q43||Transfer Petition have been filed to transfer the petitions filed pending before the High Court of S1 to the High Court of S2. The petitioner got married to Lt. P1 on 09.03.2012 as per Hindu rites and customs. Petitioner's husband Lt. P1 is a naval officer who was then posted at S1. After marriage, the petitioner was residing with her husband at S1. As brought on record, the relationship between the petitioner and her husband was not very cordial. On 22.02.2013, the petitioner gave an oral complaint that her husband was withholding her identity card, laptop, mobile phone, original marriage certificate etc. The respondent was called to the police station and directed to handover the belongings to the petitioner. On 04.04.2013, the petitioner lodged a complaint against her husband, her parents-in-law and sister-in-law alleging that they have subjected her to physical and mental cruelty. The petitioner had also levelled charge of sexual abuse against five naval officers and wife of one of the naval officers. Based on her complaint, a case was registered in FIR for the offences punishable against the petitioner's husband Lt. P1, her parents-in-law, sister-in-law and the said five naval officers and wife of one of them. In the complaint lodged subsequently, the petitioner had made allegations of wife- swapping and also implicated new names. Investigation in the said case is pending with Police Station S1. Petitioner's husband had moved an anticipatory bail application before the High Court of S1, which was rejected vide order dated 10.06.2013. While declining anticipatory bail, the High Court has directed that a thorough investigation must be conducted by the police. Pursuant to the said order of the court, Deputy Commissioner of Police vide order dated 12.06.2013 constituted a special team headed by the Assistant Commissioner of Police, S1. Navy officers shown as accused in FIR No.260 of 2013 and private respondents in these transfer petitions namely, Capt. P2, P3, Lt. P4, P5 and P5 have filed petitions before the High Court of S1, which the petitioner now seeks to transfer. The petitioner claims transfer of the said two petitions contending that she has no means or a male member in her family to support her to pursue the case at S1. The petitioner also alleges that she faces threat to her life on account of the private respondents. When these transfer petitions came up for hearing, by an order dated 16.09.2013, this Court granted interim stay of further proceedings in the said quash petitions.
AILA_Q44||This petition is by the State directed against the order dated 10.11.1998 passed by the High Court by which the charges framed against the respondent were quashed. The relevant and necessary facts to dispose of this petition are: The respondent was working as a Road Transport Inspector in the Regional Office of the Road Transport Corporation, Bhopal and is a public servant as such. A complaint for the check period 25.9.1982 to 27.3.1993 was filed stating that he had acquired the property in excess of the known source of his income. During the investigation properties and assets belonging to his mother-in- law, father, brother and nephew were shown as assets of the respondent. The assets of his wife, who is an income-tax payer and a self earning member, were also connected with the assets of the respondent. While submitting charge sheet several important documents, which were collected during the course of investigation, were withheld. According to the respondent the said documents supported him. If those documents were considered even prima facie there was no scope to frame charges against him. At the time of framing charges the respondent made an application seeking production of these documents in court before proceeding to frame charge. But the said application was rejected stating that for the purpose of framing charges only the documents forwarded to the court need to be considered. Hence he filed Criminal Revision in the High court. The said Revision Petition was disposed of by the order dated 8.9.1997 in the following terms: - "In the result the revision is allowed, the order impugned is set-aside and it is directed that the documents made available by the accused during investigation be produced and may be taken into consideration by the court below while framing the charge." Thereafter the trial court framed charges. Aggrieved by the order dated 4.4.1988 framing charges in the Special Case No. 26/96 by the Special Judge, the respondent filed Criminal Revision. The High Court by order dated 10.11.1998 accepted the case of the respondent, set aside the order of the learned Special Judge, framing charges and discharged the respondent. In these circumstances the State has come up in this petition challenging the said order of the High Court.
AILA_Q45||The appellants were tried for offences on the allegations that about four months prior to the incident, some quarrel had taken place between the deceased P1 and the appellant No. 4 P2 in relation to raising of boundary wall. On 12 April 1983 at about 7.00 P.M. the deceased accompanied by P3, had gone to P4 (PW-8) to engage some labourers for cutting crop in his field and while returning from the house of P4, when the deceased came near the L1 of appellant No. 4, he shouted to the remaining accused who were there that the deceased was their enemy and he should not be allowed to go and kill him. The appellant No. 6 P5 assaulted the deceased with the lathi on his head. When he fell down on the ground, all the appellants assaulted him. In spite of P3 intervening, the appellants did not stop assaulting. When they found that the deceased had died, the appellants dragged his body from the spot to place near L2 of appellant No. 1 P6. Thereafter, they ran away. P7 (PW-10), brother of the deceased lodged first information report. The incident was witnessed by P4 (PW-8) and P8 (PW-13). The trial court did not believe the evidence of eye-witnesses P4 (PW-8) and P8 (PW-13); found certain discrepancies in the statements of witnesses; doubted the evidence of eye-witnesses to have identified the accused in darkness; consequently, the appellants were acquitted by the trial court giving benefit of doubt. On appeal by the State, the High Court upset the order of acquittal recorded by the trial court and held the appellants guilty of the offences and sentenced all the appellants to rigorous imprisonment for one year and for imprisonment of life. Both the sentences were to run concurrently. Hence, this appeal to this Court.
AILA_Q46||In this appeal by special leave the sole appellant is P1 who alongwith six others was put up for trial before the Additional Sessions Judge in charged of the offence. It is not necessary to refer to the charges framed against the remaining accused since they are not appellants before us. The trial court by its judgment and order of April 24, 1995 found the appellant guilty of offence and sentenced him to undergo rigorous imprisonment for 10 years. The appellant preferred Criminal Appeal No.125 of 1995 before the High Court which was dismissed by the High Court by its impugned judgment and order of April 5, 2002. We may only observe that of the seven persons put up for trial before the learned Additional Sessions Judge one P2 was given the benefit of doubt and acquitted. One P3 was sentenced to life imprisonment and  P4 was sentenced to life imprisonment. The remaining accused were sentenced to 10 years rigorous imprisonment. The appeals preferred by the remaining accused have also been disposed of by the High Court by the impugned judgment. The case of the prosecution is that the informant Dr. D1 is a resident of L1. On January 13, 1989 at 2010 hours he lodged a first information report at police station in which he stated that on that date at about 7.30 p.m. while he was watching the television, other members of the family were in the house. His son P5, PW-1 had gone to the fields and had not returned. While he was watching the television he saw that three persons entered his house with concealed faces. Of them two were armed with pistols and they demanded the keys from him. He could identify accused P3 by his voice, stature and eyes. He then heard the cries of his daughter-in-law coming from another room and when he rushed to her room he found that two other persons were threatening her, of whom one was armed with country made pistol. His daughter-in-law handed over to them whatever ornaments she was wearing at that time. Two other persons then entered the room who picked up some articles. Those two persons had not concealed their faces. Some other dacoits also entered the room of his daughter-in-law and started making demands from her. A relative of his, namely P6, PW-4, who was residing with him, told his daughter-in-law to handover the keys to the dacoits. Thereafter the dacoits asked P6 to open the almirah but he was unable to do so. One of the dacoits threatened to kill him if he did not open the almirah. Seeing this, the informant rushed and caught that hand of the dacoit in which he was holding the pistol and pushed him towards the verandah. Thereafter the informant's daughter, P7 started raising alarm. Some of the dacoits were in the courtyard of the house and he recognized one of them as Rajesh Yadav who was armed with a pistol. Rajesh Yadav exhorted Parshuram to fire and thereafter Parshuram fired hitting his daughter P7. The dacoits also exploded bombs. The informant claimed to have recognized one of the miscreants as P2 who assaulted him on his back with the barrel of his pistol as a result of which his grip over one of the dacoits, whom he had caught, loosened and that dacoit slipped away. Thereafter the dacoits fled away. His daughter P7 succumbed to her injuries. By this time his son P5, PW-1 had also come. He mentioned in his report that P20, P6, PW-4 and P30, PW-2 were also injured. In the report he also gave descriptions of other dacoits whom he had not recognized.
AILA_Q47||Challenge in this appeal is to the judgment of the High Court upholding the conviction of the appellant for offences punishable and sentenced him to undergo imprisonment for life and also to pay a fine of Rs.1,000/- with default stipulations, as recorded by the Principal Sessions Judge.  The prosecution version, in a nutshell, is as follows. PW-1 is the wife of PW-4. The accused and PW-4 are the sons of P1 (hereinafter referred to as the 'deceased'). PW-2 is the son of PW-1. P1 had certain immovable properties which he partitioned 10 years before the occurrence, and he regained a piece of land namely 10 cents, which is a poramboke, for his livelihood. The accused was insisting him to give that land also. There arose a civil dispute between them. It also ended in favour of P1. On the day of occurrence i.e, 26.05.2003 at about 7.00 A.M., PW-1 was going to the garden to pluck vegetables. At that time, her father-in-law, the said P1, was cutting trees. He was having a spade and aruval in hand. At that time, the accused came there and questioned how he could cut the trees, and following the same, there was a wordy duel. Immediately, the accused snatched the aruval and cut him on the neck and shoulder indiscriminately. PW-1 on seeing this, raised alarm, and immediately, the accused fled away from the place of occurrence. The said P1 met his instantaneous death. PW-1 proceeded to the Police Station, where, the sub- Inspector of Police (PW-11), was present. PW-1 gave a report (Ex.P1), on the strength of which a case came to be registered. The first information report, Ex.P-12, along with Ex.P1 was despatched to the Magistrates' Court. The Inspector of Police (PW-12), on receipt of the copy of the FIR, took up investigation, proceeded to the spot, made an inspection in the presence of witnesses and prepared an observation mahazar, Ex.P-4, and a rough sketch, Ex.P-13. Then, he conducted inquest on the dead body of P1 in the presence of witnesses and panchayatdars and prepared an inquest report, Ex.P-14. The dead body was sent to the Government Hospital along with a requisition, Ex.P-2, for the purpose of autopsy. The Assistant Surgeon (PW-6), attached to the Government Hospital, on receipt of the said requisition, conducted autopsy on the dead body of P1 and found 7 cut injuries. The doctor gave a post- mortem certificate, Ex.P-3, with her opinion that the deceased would appear to have died of hemorrhage and shock due to injuries to major vessels. Pending the investigation, the Investigating Officer arrested the accused on 27.05.2003. He volunteered to give a confessional statement, which was recorded by the Investigator. The admissible part of the confession was marked as Ex. P-6, pursuant to which he produced M.O.-1, aruval and M.O.-4, Shirt, which have been recovered under a mahazar, Ex.P-7. The accused was sent for judicial remand. All the material objects recovered from the place of occurrence and from the dead body and M.Os. l and 4, recovered from the accused, were subjected to chemical analysis by the Forensic Sciences Department, which resulted in two reports namely Ex.P-10, the Chemical Analyst's report and Ex.P-11, the Serologist's report. On completion of investigation, the Investigator filed the final report. Charges were framed. The accused pleaded innocence. Twelve witnesses were examined to further the prosecution version. The accused, in his examination submitted that he has been falsely implicated and in any event, there was a wordy duel before the occurrence in which the appellant had purportedly snatched the weapon from the hands of the deceased and, therefore, a statute has no application. The Trial Court did not accept the plea and placing reliance on the evidence of the eye-witnesses, PWs-l and 2, recorded the conviction and sentence, as noted above. The plea taken before the Trial Court was reiterated by the accused persons before the High Court. By the impugned judgment, the High Court did not find any substance in the plea and dismissed the appeal.
AILA_Q48||Whether sanction is required to initiate criminal proceedings in respect of offences is the question arising for consideration in these cases. The District Registrar lodged a complaint with the Inspector of Police, CBCID on 07.07.1999. The main allegation against the respondents was that while they were working as Sub-Registrars in various offices in the State, they conspired with stamp vendors and document writers and other staff to gain monetary benefit and resorted to manipulation of registers and got the registration of the documents with old value of the properties, resulting in wrongful gain to themselves and loss to the Government, and thereby cheated the public and the Government. On the basis of the complaint, F.I.R. No. 35/1999 was registered by the appellant, and after investigation, report against 41 persons including the respondents herein, was submitted before the III Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate. The respondents raised the objection that there was no sanction and hence the proceedings could not be initiated. Learned Magistrate on 03.07.2007 passed an order holding that: "Whether the sanction is required or not to be considered during the trial and it is the burden on the complainant to prove that the accused acted beyond in discharge of their official duties and there is no nexus between the acts committed and their official duties and at this stage the question that the accused acted within their duties cannot be decided." Aggrieved, respondents moved the High Court leading to the impugned order whereby the criminal proceedings were quashed on the sole ground that there was no sanction, and hence the appeals.
AILA_Q49||Appellant was a Patwari working at village V1 in the year 1976. On an allegation that he had sought illegal gratification, on or about 13 July 1976, a complaint was lodged in the office of Deputy Superintendent of Police, Anti-Corruption that the appellant had asked for illegal gratification. A raiding party laid a trap on the said date and he was found to have accepted illegal gratification. Pursuant thereto he was prosecuted for alleged commission of an offence. He was placed under suspension. He was convicted by reason of a judgment dated 25 February 1985 passed by the Special Judge (A.C.D.). He was dismissed from service in terms of the said judgment of conviction by an order dated 3 October 1987 2. The appellant preferred an appeal against the said judgment of conviction and sentence and by reason of a judgment and order dated 16 January 2001, the said appeal was allowed. The appellant, thus, stood acquitted. In the meanwhile, i.e., in the year 1998, the appellant reached his age of superannuation. Having been acquitted in the criminal proceeding, he filed a writ petition before the High Court which. By an order dated 19 February 2003, a learned Single Judge of the High Court directed that in the event the appellant files a representation before the competent officer with regard to pension, the same may be considered within a period of three months therefrom. An appeal preferred there against was dismissed by reason of the impugned order passed by the Division Bench.
AILA_Q50||A peculiar feature of this appeal by special leave is that it is not an appeal against conviction or against acquittal but one preferred by a prosecution witness for expunction of several highly derogatory remarks made against him by a learned Judge of the High Court while allowing a Criminal Appeal at the High Court. P1, the appellant before us was examined as P.W. 8 in the trial of a case on the file of the Special Judge (Vigilance) against the first respondent. The trial ended in conviction against the first respondent and when the appeal filed by him came to be heard by the High Court the appellant had become a Cabinet Minister in the State. On account of the disparaging remarks made by the Appellate Judge the appellant tendered his resignation and demitted office for maintaining democratic traditions. It is in that backgroud this appeal has come to be preferred. Pursuant to a trap laid by the Vigilance Police on the complaint of the appellant's Manager, P2 (P.W.2) the first respondent was arrested on 26.4.79 for having accepted a bribe of Rs. 2,000 from P2. The marked currency notes M.Os. V to XXVI were recovered from the brief case M.O. II of the first respondent prior to the arrest. The prosecution case was that the first respondent had been extracting illegal gratification at the rate of Rs. 1,000 er month during the months of January, February and March, 1979 from P2 but all of a sudden he raised the demand to Rs. 2,000 per month in April 1979 and this led to P2 laying information (Exhibit I) before the Superintendent of Police (Vigilance). Acting on the report, a trap was laid on 26.4.79 and after P2 had handed over the marked currency notes the Vigilance party entered the office and recovered the currency notes from the brief case and arrested the first respondent. The first respondent denied having received any illegal gratification but offered no explanation for the presence of the currency notes in his brief case. Eleven witnesses including the appellant who figured as P.W.8 were examined by the prosecution and the first respondent examined three witnesses D.Ws. 1 to 3 to substantiate the defence set up by him, viz., that the sum of Rs. 2,000 had been paid by way of donation for conducting a drama and publishing a souvenir by the Mining Officers' Club and also towards donation for Children's Welfare Fund. The Special Judge accepted the prosecution case and held the first respondent guilty. The Special Judge awarded a sentence of rigorous imprisonment for one year for the conviction under the first charge but did not award any separate sentence for the second  conviction. Against the conviction and sentence the first respondent preferred Criminal Appeal No. 31 of 1982 to the High Court. A learned Judge of the High Court has allowed the appeal holding that the prosecution has not proved its case by acceptable evidence and besides, the first respondent's explanation for the possession of the currency notes appeared probable. While acquitting the first respondent the learned Judge has, however, made several adverse remarks about the conduct of the appellant and about the credibility of his testimony and it is with that part of the judgment we are now concerned with in this appeal.