Document credential piping use case in README
Problem
teeclip's encrypted clipboard history creates a natural mechanism for securely passing credentials to CLI tools — but this isn't documented anywhere. Users who discover teeclip see a "tee for clipboard" tool and don't realize it solves a real security problem they face daily: how to get secrets into CLI programs without exposing them to bash_history, ps aux, environment variable leaks, or on-screen visibility.
Proposed solution
Add a "Secure credential piping" section to the README that:
- Shows the traditional exposure vectors (environment variables, command-line args, config files, etc.)
- Demonstrates the teeclip workflow for passing credentials via pipe
- Positions teeclip honestly — not as a credential manager replacement, but as a tool whose encryption happens to solve this problem with zero additional setup
Content outline
### Secure credential piping
Your clipboard is already how you move secrets around. teeclip just makes
that encrypted and recallable.
Traditional methods of passing secrets to CLI tools all have exposure surfaces:
| Method | Risk |
|--------|------|
| `--key=SECRET` | Visible in `ps aux`, `bash_history` |
| `KEY=SECRET cmd` | Leaked via `/proc/PID/environ`, inherited by children |
| `.env` / config file | Persists on disk, can be committed to git |
| Interactive prompt | Requires TTY, breaks pipe workflows |
With teeclip, secrets flow through pipes — never touching shell history
or process arguments:
# Copy API key from password manager (your normal flow)
# Key is now encrypted in teeclip history
# Pass to a tool — bash_history only shows the command, not the key:
teeclip --paste | deploy-tool --key-stdin
# Recall it later without returning to the password manager:
teeclip --get 3 | deploy-tool --key-stdin
teeclip isn't a credential manager — it's a clipboard tool with AES-256-GCM
encryption at rest. But for developers who already copy-paste secrets,
it provides encrypted storage and pipe-native retrieval for free.
Acceptance criteria
Related issues
Analysis
See notes/ideas/2026-02-18__09-18-22__both_secure-credential-piping-via-clipboard.md for the full analysis including comparison with purpose-built credential managers (pass, 1Password CLI, HashiCorp Vault, etc.).
Document credential piping use case in README
Problem
teeclip's encrypted clipboard history creates a natural mechanism for securely passing credentials to CLI tools — but this isn't documented anywhere. Users who discover teeclip see a "tee for clipboard" tool and don't realize it solves a real security problem they face daily: how to get secrets into CLI programs without exposing them to
bash_history,ps aux, environment variable leaks, or on-screen visibility.Proposed solution
Add a "Secure credential piping" section to the README that:
Content outline
Acceptance criteria
Related issues
Analysis
See
notes/ideas/2026-02-18__09-18-22__both_secure-credential-piping-via-clipboard.mdfor the full analysis including comparison with purpose-built credential managers (pass, 1Password CLI, HashiCorp Vault, etc.).