-
Notifications
You must be signed in to change notification settings - Fork 16
/
ContraGentiles3b.htm
3261 lines (3260 loc) · 938 KB
/
ContraGentiles3b.htm
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
110
111
112
113
114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121
122
123
124
125
126
127
128
129
130
131
132
133
134
135
136
137
138
139
140
141
142
143
144
145
146
147
148
149
150
151
152
153
154
155
156
157
158
159
160
161
162
163
164
165
166
167
168
169
170
171
172
173
174
175
176
177
178
179
180
181
182
183
184
185
186
187
188
189
190
191
192
193
194
195
196
197
198
199
200
201
202
203
204
205
206
207
208
209
210
211
212
213
214
215
216
217
218
219
220
221
222
223
224
225
226
227
228
229
230
231
232
233
234
235
236
237
238
239
240
241
242
243
244
245
246
247
248
249
250
251
252
253
254
255
256
257
258
259
260
261
262
263
264
265
266
267
268
269
270
271
272
273
274
275
276
277
278
279
280
281
282
283
284
285
286
287
288
289
290
291
292
293
294
295
296
297
298
299
300
301
302
303
304
305
306
307
308
309
310
311
312
313
314
315
316
317
318
319
320
321
322
323
324
325
326
327
328
329
330
331
332
333
334
335
336
337
338
339
340
341
342
343
344
345
346
347
348
349
350
351
352
353
354
355
356
357
358
359
360
361
362
363
364
365
366
367
368
369
370
371
372
373
374
375
376
377
378
379
380
381
382
383
384
385
386
387
388
389
390
391
392
393
394
395
396
397
398
399
400
401
402
403
404
405
406
407
408
409
410
411
412
413
414
415
416
417
418
419
420
421
422
423
424
425
426
427
428
429
430
431
432
433
434
435
436
437
438
439
440
441
442
443
444
445
446
447
448
449
450
451
452
453
454
455
456
457
458
459
460
461
462
463
464
465
466
467
468
469
470
471
472
473
474
475
476
477
478
479
480
481
482
483
484
485
486
487
488
489
490
491
492
493
494
495
496
497
498
499
500
501
502
503
504
505
506
507
508
509
510
511
512
513
514
515
516
517
518
519
520
521
522
523
524
525
526
527
528
529
530
531
532
533
534
535
536
537
538
539
540
541
542
543
544
545
546
547
548
549
550
551
552
553
554
555
556
557
558
559
560
561
562
563
564
565
566
567
568
569
570
571
572
573
574
575
576
577
578
579
580
581
582
583
584
585
586
587
588
589
590
591
592
593
594
595
596
597
598
599
600
601
602
603
604
605
606
607
608
609
610
611
612
613
614
615
616
617
618
619
620
621
622
623
624
625
626
627
628
629
630
631
632
633
634
635
636
637
638
639
640
641
642
643
644
645
646
647
648
649
650
651
652
653
654
655
656
657
658
659
660
661
662
663
664
665
666
667
668
669
670
671
672
673
674
675
676
677
678
679
680
681
682
683
684
685
686
687
688
689
690
691
692
693
694
695
696
697
698
699
700
701
702
703
704
705
706
707
708
709
710
711
712
713
714
715
716
717
718
719
720
721
722
723
724
725
726
727
728
729
730
731
732
733
734
735
736
737
738
739
740
741
742
743
744
745
746
747
748
749
750
751
752
753
754
755
756
757
758
759
760
761
762
763
764
765
766
767
768
769
770
771
772
773
774
775
776
777
778
779
780
781
782
783
784
785
786
787
788
789
790
791
792
793
794
795
796
797
798
799
800
801
802
803
804
805
806
807
808
809
810
811
812
813
814
815
816
817
818
819
820
821
822
823
824
825
826
827
828
829
830
831
832
833
834
835
836
837
838
839
840
841
842
843
844
845
846
847
848
849
850
851
852
853
854
855
856
857
858
859
860
861
862
863
864
865
866
867
868
869
870
871
872
873
874
875
876
877
878
879
880
881
882
883
884
885
886
887
888
889
890
891
892
893
894
895
896
897
898
899
900
901
902
903
904
905
906
907
908
909
910
911
912
913
914
915
916
917
918
919
920
921
922
923
924
925
926
927
928
929
930
931
932
933
934
935
936
937
938
939
940
941
942
943
944
945
946
947
948
949
950
951
952
953
954
955
956
957
958
959
960
961
962
963
964
965
966
967
968
969
970
971
972
973
974
975
976
977
978
979
980
981
982
983
984
985
986
987
988
989
990
991
992
993
994
995
996
997
998
999
1000
<!DOCTYPE html>
<meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=utf-8">
<title></title>
<body style="text-align=justify;font-family:" unicode="">
<blockquote>
<center>
<h1>CONTRA GENTILES</h1>
<h2>BOOK THREE: PROVIDENCE<br>
Part II: Chapters 84-163</h2>
<h3>translated by<br>
Vernon J. Bourke<br>
<br>
CONTENTS</h3>
</center>
<table>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td valign="top">
<ol>
<li value="84">
<a href="ContraGentiles3b.htm#84">That the celestial bodies make no impression on our intellects</a>
<li>
<a href="ContraGentiles3b.htm#85">That the celestial bodies are not the causes of our acts of will and choice</a>
<li>
<a href="ContraGentiles3b.htm#86">That the corporeal effects in things here below do not necessarily result from the celestial bodies</a>
<li>
<a href="ContraGentiles3b.htm#87">That the motion of a celestial body is not the cause of our acts of choice by the power of its soul moving us, as some say</a>
<li>
<a href="ContraGentiles3b.htm#88">That separate created substances cannot be directly the cause of our acts of choice and will, but only God</a>
<li>
<a href="ContraGentiles3b.htm#89">That the movement of the will is caused by God and not only the power. of the will</a>
<li>
<a href="ContraGentiles3b.htm#90">That human acts of choice and of will are subject to divine providence</a>
<li>
<a href="ContraGentiles3b.htm#91">How human events may be traced back to higher causes</a>
<li>
<a href="ContraGentiles3b.htm#92">How a person is favored by fortune and how man is assisted by higher causes</a>
<li>
<a href="ContraGentiles3b.htm#93">On fate: whether and what it is</a>
<li>
<a href="ContraGentiles3b.htm#94">On the certainty of divine providence</a>
<li>
<a href="ContraGentiles3b.htm#95">That the immutability of divine providence does not suppress the value of prayer</a>
<li>
<a href="ContraGentiles3b.htm#96">That some prayers are not granted by God</a>
<li>
<a href="ContraGentiles3b.htm#97">How the disposition of providence has a rational plan</a>
<li>
<a href="ContraGentiles3b.htm#98">How God can act apart from the order of His providence, and how not</a>
<li>
<a href="ContraGentiles3b.htm#99">That God can work apart from the order implanted in things, by producing effects without proximate causes</a>
<li>
<a href="ContraGentiles3b.htm#100">That things which God does apart from the order of nature are not contrary to nature</a>
<li>
<a href="ContraGentiles3b.htm#101">On miracles</a>
<li>
<a href="ContraGentiles3b.htm#102">That God alone works miracles</a>
<li>
<a href="ContraGentiles3b.htm#103">How spiritual substances do certain wonderful things which, however, are not truly miracles</a>
<li>
<a href="ContraGentiles3b.htm#104">That the works of magicians are not solely due to the influence of celestial bodies</a>
<li>
<a href="ContraGentiles3b.htm#105">Where the performances of the magicians get their efficacy</a>
<li>
<a href="ContraGentiles3b.htm#106">That the intellectual substance which provides the efficacy for magic works is not morally good</a>
<li>
<a href="ContraGentiles3b.htm#107">That the intellectual substance whose help the arts of magic use is not evil in its own nature</a>
<li>
<a href="ContraGentiles3b.htm#108">Arguments whereby it seems to be proved that there can be no sin in demons</a>
<li>
<a href="ContraGentiles3b.htm#109">That sin can occur in demons, and in what way</a>
<li>
<a href="ContraGentiles3b.htm#110">Answer to the previous arguments</a>
<li>
<a href="ContraGentiles3b.htm#111">That rational creatures are subject to divine providence in a special way</a>
<li>
<a href="ContraGentiles3b.htm#112">That rational creatures are governed for their own sakes, while others are governed in subordination to them</a>
<li>
<a href="ContraGentiles3b.htm#113">That the rational creature is directed by God to his actions not only by an ordering of the species, but also according to what befits the individual</a>
<li>
<a href="ContraGentiles3b.htm#114">That laws are divinely given to man</a>
<li>
<a href="ContraGentiles3b.htm#115">That the divine law principally orders man toward God</a>
<li>
<a href="ContraGentiles3b.htm#116">That the end of divine law is the love of God</a>
<li>
<a href="ContraGentiles3b.htm#117">That we are ordered by divine law to the love of neighbor</a>
<li>
<a href="ContraGentiles3b.htm#118">That through divine law men are bound to the right faith</a>
<li>
<a href="ContraGentiles3b.htm#119">That our mind is directed to God by certain sense objects</a>
<li>
<a href="ContraGentiles3b.htm#120">That the cult proper to <i>latria</i> is to be offered to God alone</a>
<li>
<a href="ContraGentiles3b.htm#121">That divine law orders man according to reason in regard to corporeal and sensible things</a>
</ol>
<td valign="top">
<ol>
<li value="122">
<a href="ContraGentiles3b.htm#122">The reason why simple fornication is a sin according to divine law, and that matrimony is natural</a>
<li>
<a href="ContraGentiles3b.htm#123">That matrimony should be indivisible</a>
<li>
<a href="ContraGentiles3b.htm#124">That matrimony should be between one man and one woman</a>
<li>
<a href="ContraGentiles3b.htm#125">That matrimony should not take place between close relatives</a>
<li>
<a href="ContraGentiles3b.htm#126">That not all sexual intercourse is sinful</a>
<li>
<a href="ContraGentiles3b.htm#127">That the use of food is not a sin in itself</a>
<li>
<a href="ContraGentiles3b.htm#128">How man is ordered by the law of God in regard to his neighbor</a>
<li>
<a href="ContraGentiles3b.htm#129">That some human acts are right according to nature and not merely because they are prescribed by law</a>
<li>
<a href="ContraGentiles3b.htm#130">On the counsels that are given in divine law</a>
<li>
<a href="ContraGentiles3b.htm#131">On the error of the attackers of voluntary poverty</a>
<li>
<a href="ContraGentiles3b.htm#132">On the ways of life of those who practice voluntary poverty</a>
<li>
<a href="ContraGentiles3b.htm#133">In what way poverty is good</a>
<li>
<a href="ContraGentiles3b.htm#134">Answers to the arguments brought forward above against poverty</a>
<li>
<a href="ContraGentiles3b.htm#135">Answer to the objections against the different ways of life of those who embrace voluntary poverty</a>
<li>
<a href="ContraGentiles3b.htm#136">On the error of those who attack perpetual continence</a>
<li>
<a href="ContraGentiles3b.htm#137">Another error concerning perpetual continence</a>
<li>
<a href="ContraGentiles3b.htm#138">Against those who attack vows</a>
<li>
<a href="ContraGentiles3b.htm#139">That neither meritorious acts nor sins are equal</a>
<li>
<a href="ContraGentiles3b.htm#140">That a man’s acts are punished or rewarded by God</a>
<li>
<a href="ContraGentiles3b.htm#141">On the diversity and order of punishments</a>
<li>
<a href="ContraGentiles3b.htm#142">That not all rewards and punishments are equal</a>
<li>
<a href="ContraGentiles3b.htm#143">On the punishment due to mortal and venial sin in relation to the ultimate end</a>
<li>
<a href="ContraGentiles3b.htm#144">That by mortal sin a man is eternally deprived of his ultimate end</a>
<li>
<a href="ContraGentiles3b.htm#145">That sins are punished also by the experience of something painful</a>
<li>
<a href="ContraGentiles3b.htm#146">That it is lawful for judges to inflict punishments</a>
<li>
<a href="ContraGentiles3b.htm#147">That man needs divine help to attain happiness</a>
<li>
<a href="ContraGentiles3b.htm#148">That by the help of divine grace man is not forced toward virtue</a>
<li>
<a href="ContraGentiles3b.htm#149">That man cannot merit divine help in advance</a>
<li>
<a href="ContraGentiles3b.htm#150">That the aforesaid divine help is called grace, and what sanctifying grace is</a>
<li>
<a href="ContraGentiles3b.htm#151">That sanctifying grace causes the love of God in us</a>
<li>
<a href="ContraGentiles3b.htm#152">That divine grace causes faith in us</a>
<li>
<a href="ContraGentiles3b.htm#153">That divine grace causes hope in us</a>
<li>
<a href="ContraGentiles3b.htm#154">On the gifts of gratuitous grace, including a consideration of the divinations of demons</a>
<li>
<a href="ContraGentiles3b.htm#155">That man needs the help of grace to persevere in the good</a>
<li>
<a href="ContraGentiles3b.htm#156">That he who falls from grace through sin may again be restored through grace</a>
<li>
<a href="ContraGentiles3b.htm#157">That man cannot be freed from sin except through grace</a>
<li>
<a href="ContraGentiles3b.htm#158">How man is freed from sin</a>
<li>
<a href="ContraGentiles3b.htm#159">That it is reasonable to hold a man responsible if he does not turn toward God, even though he cannot do this without grace</a>
<li>
<a href="ContraGentiles3b.htm#160">That man in the state of sin, without grace, cannot avoid sin</a>
<li>
<a href="ContraGentiles3b.htm#161">That God frees some men from sin and leaves others in sin</a>
<li>
<a href="ContraGentiles3b.htm#162">That God is not the cause of sin for any person</a>
<li>
<a href="ContraGentiles3b.htm#163">On predestination, reprobation, and divine election</a>
</ol>
</table>
<hr>
<a name="84" id="84">
<table cellpadding="12">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td align="center"><b>Caput 84<br>
Quod corpora caelestia non imprimant in intellectus nostros</b>
<td align="center"><b>Chapter 84<br>
THAT THE CELESTIAL BODIES MAKE NO IMPRESSION ON OUR INTELLECTS</b>
<tr valign="top" style="text-align:justify">
<td>Ex his autem quae praemissa sunt, in promptu apparet quod eorum quae sunt circa intellectum, corpora caelestia causae esse non possunt. Iam enim ostensum est quod divinae providentiae ordo est ut per superiora regantur inferiora et moveantur. Intellectus autem naturae ordine omnia corpora excedit: ut etiam ex praedictis patet. Impossibile est igitur quod corpora caelestia agant in intellectum directe. Non igitur possunt esse causa per se eorum quae sunt circa intellectum.
<td>[1] From the things set forth earlier it is immediately evident that celestial bodies cannot be causes of events which go on in the understanding. Indeed, we have already shown that the order of divine providence requires the lower things to be ruled and moved by the higher ones. But the understanding surpasses all bodies in the order of nature, as is also clear from what we have said before. So, it is impossible for celestial bodies to act directly on the intellect. Therefore, they cannot be the direct cause of things that pertain to understanding.
<tr valign="top" style="text-align:justify">
<td>Adhuc. Nullum corpus agit nisi per motum: ut probatur in VIII Physicor. Quae autem sunt immobilia, non causantur ex motu: nihil enim causatur ex motu alicuius agentis nisi inquantum movet passum dum movetur. Quae igitur sunt omnino extra motum, non possunt esse causata a corporibus caelestibus. Sed ea quae sunt circa intellectum, sunt omnino extra motum, per se loquendo, sicut patet per philosophum in VII Phys.: quinimmo per quietem a motibus fit anima prudens et sciens, ut ibidem dicitur. Impossibile est ergo quod corpora caelestia sint per se causa eorum quae circa intellectum sunt.
<td>[2] Again, no body acts except through motion, as is proved in <i>Physics</i> VIII [6]. But things that are immovable are not caused by motion, for nothing is caused by the motion of an agent, unless the agent moves a passive subject during the motion. So, things that are utterly apart from motion cannot be caused by the celestial bodies. But things that are in the area of understanding are entirely apart from motion, properly speaking, as is evident from the Philosopher, in <i>Physics</i> VII [3]. On the contrary, “through being undisturbed by motions, the soul becomes prudent and knowing” as is stated in the same place. Therefore, it is impossible for celestial bodies to be the direct cause of things that pertain to understanding.
<tr valign="top" style="text-align:justify">
<td>Amplius. Si nihil causatur ab aliquo corpore nisi inquantum movet dum movetur, oportet omne illud quod recipit impressionem alicuius corporis, moveri. Nihil autem movetur nisi corpus, ut probatur in VI Phys. Oportet ergo omne quod recipit impressionem alicuius corporis, esse corpus, vel aliquam virtutem corpoream. Ostensum est autem in secundo quod intellectus neque est corpus neque virtus corporea. Impossibile est igitur quod corpora caelestia directe imprimant in intellectum.
<td>[3] Besides, if nothing is caused by a body unless the body is moved while the motion is going on, it is necessary for everything that receives an impression from a body to be moved. Now, nothing is so moved except a body, as is proved in <i>Physics</i> VI [4]. So, everything that receives an impression from a body must be a body, or some power of a body. Now, we showed in Book Two that the intellect is neither a body nor a bodily power. Therefore, it is impossible for the celestial bodies directly to make an impression on the intellect.
<tr valign="top" style="text-align:justify">
<td>Item. Omne quod movetur ab aliquo, reducitur ab eo de potentia in actum. Nihil autem reducitur ab aliquo de potentia in actum nisi per id quod est actu. Oportet ergo omne agens et movens esse aliquo modo in actu respectu eorum ad quae passum et motum est in potentia. Corpora autem caelestia non sunt actu intelligibilia: cum sint quaedam singularia sensibilia. Cum igitur intellectus noster non sit in potentia nisi ad intelligibilia in actu, impossibile est quod corpora caelestia directe agant in intellectum.
<td>[4] Moreover, everything that is moved by another thing is reduced by it from potency to act. But nothing is reduced by a thing from potency to act unless that thing is actual. So, every agent and mover must be in some way actual, in regard to the effects to which the passive and movable subject is in potency. Now, the celestial bodies are not actually intelligible, for they are certain individual, sensible things. And so, since our intellect is not in potency to anything except actual intelligibles, it is impossible for celestial substances directly to act on the intellect.
<tr valign="top" style="text-align:justify">
<td>Adhuc. Propria operatio rei consequitur naturam ipsius, quae rebus generatis per generationem acquiritur, simul cum propria operatione: sicut patet de gravi et levi, quae habent statim proprium motum in termino suae generationis, nisi sit aliquid impediens, ratione cuius generans dicitur movens. Illud ergo quod secundum principium suae naturae non est subiectum actionibus corporum caelestium, neque secundum suam operationem potest esse eis subiectum. Pars autem intellectiva non causatur ab aliquibus principiis corporalibus, sed est omnino ab extrinseco, ut supra est probatum. Operatio igitur intellectus non subiacet directe corporibus caelestibus.
<td>15] Furthermore, the proper operation of a thing depends on its nature, which, in things that are generated, is acquired, along with the proper operation, through the process of generation. This is clear in the case of heavy and light things, which immediately at the end of the process that generates them possess their proper motion unless there be some impediment. Because of this the generating agent is called a mover. So, that which in regard to the beginning of its nature is not subject to the actions of celestial bodies cannot be subject to them in regard to its operation. Now, man’s intellectual nature is not caused by any corporeal principles, but is of completely extrinsic origin, as we proved above. Therefore, the operation of the intellect does not come directly under the celestial bodies.
<tr valign="top" style="text-align:justify">
<td>Amplius. Ea quae causantur ex motibus caelestibus, tempori subduntur, quod est numerus primi motus caelestis. Quae igitur omnino abstrahunt a tempore, non sunt caelestibus subiecta. Intellectus autem in sua operatione abstrahit a tempore, sicut et a loco: considerat enim universale, quod est abstractum ab hic et nunc. Non igitur operatio intellectualis subditur caelestibus motibus.
<td>[6] Again, effects caused by celestial motions are subject to time, which is “the measure of the first celestial motion.” And so, events that abstract from time entirely are not subject to celestial motions. But the intellect in its operation does abstract from time, as it does also from place; in fact, it considers the universal which is abstracted from the here and now. Therefore, intellectual operation is not subject to celestial motions.
<tr valign="top" style="text-align:justify">
<td>Adhuc. Nihil agit ultra suam speciem. Ipsum autem intelligere transcendit speciem et formam cuiuscumque corporis agentis: quia omnis forma corporea est materialis et individuata; ipsum autem intelligere habet speciem a suo obiecto, quod est universale et immateriale. Unde nullum corpus per formam suam corpoream intelligere potest. Multo igitur minus potest quodcumque corpus causare ipsum intelligere in alio.
<td>[7] Besides, nothing acts beyond the capacity of its species. But the act of understanding transcends the species and form of every sort of bodily agent, since every corporeal form is material and individuated, whereas the act of understanding is specified by its object which is universal and immaterial. As a consequence, no body can understand through its corporeal form. Still less, then, can any body cause understanding in another being.
<tr valign="top" style="text-align:justify">
<td>Item. Secundum illud quo aliquid unitur superioribus, non est inferioribus subiectum. Anima autem nostra, secundum quod intelligit, unitur substantiis intellectualibus, quae sunt superiores ordine naturae corporibus caelestibus: non enim potest anima nostra intelligere nisi secundum quod lumen intellectuale inde sortitur. Impossibile est ergo quod intellectualis operatio directe motibus caelestibus subdatur.
<td>[8] Moreover, a being cannot be subject to its inferiors by the same part whereby it is united to its superiors. But our soul is united to the intellectual substances, which are superior to the celestial bodies in the order of nature, by virtue of the part which is the understanding. In fact, our soul cannot understand unless it receives intellectual light from those substances. Therefore, it is impossible for intellectual operation directly to be subject to the celestial motions.
<tr valign="top" style="text-align:justify">
<td>Praeterea. Huic rei fidem faciet si consideremus ea quae a philosophis circa hoc sunt dicta. Antiqui enim philosophi naturales, ut Democritus, Empedocles, et huiusmodi, posuerunt quod intellectus non differt a sensu: ut patet in IV Metaph., et in III de anima. Et ideo sequebatur quod, cum sensus sit quaedam virtus corporea sequens corporum transmutationem, quod ita esset etiam de intellectu. Et propter hoc dixerunt quod, cum transmutatio inferiorum corporum sequatur transmutationem corporum superiorum, intellectualis operatio sequatur corporum caelestium motus: secundum illud Homeri: talis est intellectus in diis et hominibus terrenis qualem in die ducit pater virorum deorumque: idest sol; vel magis Iupiter, quem dicebant summum Deum, intelligentes per ipsum totum caelum, ut patet per Augustinum, in libro de civitate Dei.
<td>[9] Furthermore, our confidence in this view will be increased if we consider the statements of the philosophers on the point. As a matter of fact, the ancient natural philosophers, like Democritus, Empedocles, and those of similar persuasion, claimed that understanding does not differ from sense perception, as is evident from <i>Metaphysics</i> IV [5] and from Book III of <i>On the Soul</i> [3]. And so, the conclusion was made that, since sensation is a bodily power depending on changes in bodies, the same thing is also true of understanding. For this reason, they said that intellectual operation results from the motion of the celestial bodies, because change in lower bodies results from change in the higher bodies. According to a passage in Homer: “So understanding in gods and in earthly men is like the daylight which the father of men and gods brings down”; the reference is to the sun, or, better, to Jupiter, whom they called the highest god, understanding him to be the whole heavens, as is clear from Augustine in his <i>City of God</i> [IV, 11].
<tr valign="top" style="text-align:justify">
<td>Hinc etiam processit Stoicorum opinio, qui dicebant cognitionem intellectus causari ex hoc quod imagines corporum nostris mentibus imprimuntur, sicut speculum quoddam, vel sicut pagina recipit litteras impressas, absque hoc quod aliquid agat: ut Boetius narrat in V de consolatione. Secundum quorum sententiam sequebatur quod maxime ex impressione corporum caelestium intellectuales notiones nobis imprimerentur. Unde et Stoici fuerunt qui praecipue necessitate quadam fatali hominum vitam duci posuerunt.
<td>[10] Next came the opinion of the Stoics, who said that intellectual knowledge is caused by the fact that the images of bodies are impressed on our minds, as a sort of mirror or as a page receives the letters imprinted on it without its doing anything; as Boethius reports in Book V of the <i>Consolation</i>. According to their view, it followed that intellectual notions are impressed on us chiefly by an impression from the celestial bodies. Hence, the Stoics were the ones who especially asserted that the life of man is directed by a fatal necessity.
<tr valign="top" style="text-align:justify">
<td>Sed haec positio inde falsa apparet, ut Boetius ibidem dicit, quia intellectus componit et dividit, et comparat suprema ad infima et cognoscit universalia et simplices formas, quae in corporibus non inveniuntur. Et sic manifestum est quod intellectus non est sicut recipiens tantum imagines corporum, sed habet aliquam virtutem corporibus altiorem: nam sensus exterior, qui solum imagines corporum recipit, ad praedicta non se extendit.
<td>However, this theory appeared false, as time went on, as Boethius says in the same place, for the understanding combines and separates, compares the highest things with the lowest, and knows universals and simple forms that are not found in bodies. So, it is obvious that the understanding is not simply receptive of bodily images, but has a power higher than bodies, since external sensation which is only receptive of bodily images does not encompass the actions mentioned above.
<tr valign="top" style="text-align:justify">
<td>Omnes autem sequentes philosophi, intellectum a sensu discernentes, causam nostrae scientiae non aliquibus corporibus, sed rebus immaterialibus attribuerunt: sicut Plato posuit causam nostrae scientiae esse ideas; Aristoteles autem intellectum agentem.
<td>[11] Now, all the philosophers who followed distinguished understanding from sense perception and attributed the cause of our knowledge not to bodies, but to immaterial things. Thus, Plato claimed that the cause of our knowledge is the Ideal Forms; while Aristotle said that it is the agent intellect.
<tr valign="top" style="text-align:justify">
<td>Ex his omnibus est accipere quod ponere corpora caelestia esse causam nobis intelligendi, est consequens opinioni eorum qui ponebant intellectum a sensu non differre: ut patet etiam per Aristotelem, in libro de anima. Hanc autem opinionem manifestum est esse falsam. Igitur manifestum est et eam esse falsam quae ponit corpora caelestia esse nobis causa intelligendi directe.
<td>[12] From all these views we may gather that the assertion that the celestial bodies are the cause of our act of understanding is a consequence of the opinion of those who claimed that understanding does not differ from sensation, as is clear from Aristotle in his book <i>On the Soul</i> [III, 3]. Now, it has been shown that this opinion is false. So, it is also obvious that the opinion which asserts that celestial bodies are directly the cause of our act of understanding is false.
<tr valign="top" style="text-align:justify">
<td>Hinc est etiam quod sacra Scriptura causam nostrae intelligentiae attribuit, non alicui corpori, sed Deo: Iob 35-10 ubi est Deus qui fecit me, qui dedit carmina in nocte, qui docet nos super iumenta terrae, super volucres caeli erudit nos? Et in Psalmo, qui docet hominem scientiam.
<td>[13] Hence, Sacred Scripture also ascribes the cause of our understanding, not to any body but to God: “Where is God, Who made me, Who gives songs in the night; Who teaches us more than the beasts of the earth, and instructs us more than the fowls of the air?” (Job 35:10-11). Again, in the Psalm (93:10): “He who teaches man knowledge.”
<tr valign="top" style="text-align:justify">
<td>Sciendum est tamen quod, licet corpora caelestia directe intelligentiae nostrae causae esse non possint, aliquid tamen ad hoc operantur indirecte. Licet enim intellectus non sit virtus corporea, tamen in nobis operatio intellectus compleri non potest sine operatione virtutum corporearum, quae sunt imaginatio et vis memorativa et cogitativa, ut ex superioribus patet. Et inde est quod, impeditis harum virtutum operationibus propter aliquam corporis indispositionem, impeditur operatio intellectus: sicut patet in phreneticis et lethargicis, et aliis huiusmodi. Et propter hoc etiam bonitas dispositionis corporis humani facit aptum ad bene intelligendum, inquantum ex hoc praedictae vires fortiores existunt: unde dicitur in II de anima quod molles carne bene aptos mente videmus.
<td>[14] However, we should note that, though celestial bodies cannot be directly the causes of our understanding, they may do something indirectly in regard to it. For, although the understanding is not a corporeal power, the operation of understanding cannot be accomplished in us without the operation of corporeal powers: that is, the imagination, the power of memory, and the cogitative power, as is evident from preceding explanations. And as a result, if the operations of these powers are blocked by some indisposition of the body, the operation of the intellect is impeded, as is evident in demented and sleeping persons, and in others similarly affected. And that is why even the good disposition of the human body makes one able to understand well, for, as a result of this, the aforesaid powers are in a stronger condition. Thus it is stated in Book II of <i>On the Soul</i> [9] that we observe that “men with soft flesh are well endowed mentally.”
<tr valign="top" style="text-align:justify">
<td>Dispositio autem corporis humani subiacet caelestibus motibus. Dicit enim Augustinus, in V de civitate Dei, quod non usquequaque absurde dici potest ad solas corporum differentias afflatus quosdam valere sidereos. Et Damascenus dicit in secundo libro, quod alii et alii planetae diversas complexiones et habitus et dispositiones in nobis constituunt. Et ideo indirecte corpora caelestia ad bonitatem intelligentiae operantur. Et sic, sicut medici possunt iudicare de bonitate intellectus ex corporis complexione sicut ex dispositione proxima, ita astrologus ex motibus caelestibus sicut ex causa remota talis dispositionis. Et per hunc modum potest verificari quod Ptolomaeus in Centilogio dicit: cum fuerit Mercurius in nativitate alicuius in aliqua domorum Saturni, et ipse fortis in esse suo, dat bonitatem intelligentiae medullitus in rebus.
<td>Now, the condition of the human body does come under the influence of celestial motions. In fact, Augustine says, in the <i>City of God</i> V, that “it is not utterly absurd to say that certain influences of the stars are able to produce differences in bodies only.” And Damascene says, in Book II [ <i>De fide orthodoxa</i> ], that “different planets establish in us diverse temperaments, habits and dispositions.”“So, the celestial bodies work indirectly on the good condition of understanding. Thus, just as physicians may judge the goodness of an intellect from the condition of its body, as from a proximate disposition, so also may an astronomer judge from the celestial motions, as the remote cause of such dispositions. In this way, then, it is possible that there is some truth in what Ptolemy says in his <i>Centiloquium</i>: “When, at the time of a man’s birth, Mercury is in conjunction with Saturn and is itself in a strong condition, it gives inwardly to things the goodness of understanding.”
</table>
<hr></a> <a name="85" id="85">
<table cellpadding="12">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td align="center"><b>Caput 85<br>
Quod corpora caelestia non sunt causae voluntatum et electionum nostrarum</b>
<td align="center"><b>Chapter 85<br>
THAT THE CELESTIAL BODIES ARE NOT THE CAUSES OF OUR ACTS OF WILL AND CHOICE</b>
<tr valign="top" style="text-align:justify">
<td>Ex hoc autem ulterius apparet quod corpora caelestia non sunt causa voluntatum nostrarum neque nostrarum electionum.
<td>[1] It further appears from this that the celestial bodies are not the causes of our acts of will or of our choices.
<tr valign="top" style="text-align:justify">
<td>Voluntas enim in parte intellectiva animae est: ut patet per philosophum in III de anima. Si igitur corpora caelestia non possunt imprimere directe in intellectum nostrum, ut ostensum est, neque etiam in voluntatem nostram directe imprimere poterunt.
<td>[2] Indeed, the will belongs in the intellectual part of the soul, as is evident from the Philosopher in Book III of <i>On the Soul</i>. So, if celestial bodies cannot directly make an impression on our intellect, as we showed, then neither will they be able to make an impression directly on the will.
<tr valign="top" style="text-align:justify">
<td>Amplius. Omnis electio et actualis voluntas in nobis immediate ex apprehensione intelligibili causatur: bonum enim intellectum est obiectum voluntatis, ut patet in III de anima et propter hoc non potest sequi perversitas in eligendo nisi intellectus iudicium deficiat in particulari eligibili, ut patet per philosophum in VII Ethicorum. Corpora autem caelestia non sunt causa intelligentiae nostrae. Ergo neque electionis nostrae possunt esse causa.
<td>[3] Again, every choice and act of will is caused immediately in us from an intelligible apprehension, for the intellectual good is the object of the will, as is clear from Book III of <i>On the Soul</i> [10]. For this reason, perversity cannot result in the act of choice, unless the intellectual judgment is defective in regard to the particular object of choice, as is evident from the Philosopher in <i>Ethics</i> VII [3]. But the celestial bodies are not the cause of our act of understanding. Therefore, they cannot be the cause of our act of choice.
<tr valign="top" style="text-align:justify">
<td>Item. Quaecumque ex impressione corporum caelestium in istis inferioribus eveniunt, naturaliter contingunt: cum haec inferiora sint naturaliter sub illis ordinata. Si ergo electiones nostrae eveniunt ex impressione corporum caelestium, oportet quod naturaliter eveniant: ut scilicet sic naturaliter homo eligat operari suas operationes, sicut naturali instinctu bruta operantur, et naturaliter corpora inanimata moventur. Non ergo erunt propositum et natura duo principia agentia, sed unum tantum, quod est natura. Cuius contrarium patet per Aristotelem in II physicorum. Non est igitur verum quod ex impressione corporum caelestium nostrae electiones proveniant.
<td>[4] Besides, whatever events occur in these lower bodies as a result of the influence of celestial bodies happen naturally, because these lower bodies are naturally subordinated to them. So, if our choices do occur as a result of the impression of celestial bodies, they will have to occur naturally; that is to say, a man might choose naturally to have his operations go on, just as brutes are involved in operations by natural instinct, and as inanimate bodies are moved naturally. In that case, there would not be choice and nature, as two active principles, but only one, and that is nature. The contrary of this view is evident from Aristotle, in <i>Physics</i> II [5]. Therefore, it is not true that our choices originate from the influence of the celestial bodies.
<tr valign="top" style="text-align:justify">
<td>Praeterea. Ea quae naturaliter fiunt, determinatis mediis perducuntur ad finem, unde semper eodem modo contingunt: natura enim determinata est ad unum. Electiones autem humanae diversis viis tendunt in finem, tam in moralibus quam in artificialibus. Non igitur electiones humanae sunt naturaliter.
<td>[5] Moreover, things that are done naturally are brought to their end by determinate means, and so they always happen in the same way, for nature is determined to one result. But human choices tend to their end in various ways, both in moral actions and in artistic productions. Therefore, human choices are not accomplished by nature.
<tr valign="top" style="text-align:justify">
<td>Amplius. Ea quae naturaliter fiunt, ut plurimum recte fiunt: natura enim non deficit nisi in paucioribus. Si igitur homo naturaliter eligeret, ut in pluribus electiones essent rectae. Quod patet esse falsum. Non igitur homo naturaliter eligit. Quod oporteret si ex impulsu corporum caelestium eligeret.
<td>[6] Furthermore, things that are done naturally are done rightly in most cases, for nature does not fail, except in rare cases. So, if man were to choose naturally, his choices would be right in most cases. Now, this is evidently false. Therefore, man does not choose naturally. But he would have to ff he chose as a result of the impulsion of celestial bodies.
<tr valign="top" style="text-align:justify">
<td>Item. Ea quae sunt eiusdem speciei, non diversificantur in operationibus naturalibus quae naturam speciei consequuntur: unde omnis hirundo similiter facit nidum, et omnis homo similiter intelligit prima principia, quae sunt naturaliter nota. Electio autem est operatio consequens speciem humanam. Si igitur homo naturaliter eligeret, oporteret quod omnes homines eodem modo eligerent. Quod patet esse falsum, tam in moralibus quam in artificialibus.
<td>[7] Again, things that belong to the same species do not differ in their natural operations which result from the nature of their species. Thus, every swallow builds its nest in the same way, and every man understands naturally known first principles in the same way. Now, choice is an operation resulting from the species of man. So, if man were to choose. naturally, then all men would have to choose in the same way. This is clearly false, both in moral and in artistic actions.
<tr valign="top" style="text-align:justify">
<td>Adhuc. Virtutes et vitia sunt electionum principia propria: nam virtuosus et vitiosus differunt ex hoc quod contraria eligunt. Virtutes autem politicae et vitia non sunt nobis a natura, sed ex assuetudine: ut probat philosophus, in II Ethic., ex hoc quod quales operationes assuescimus, et maxime a puero, ad tales habitum habemus. Ergo electiones nostrae non sunt nobis a natura. Non ergo causantur ex impressione corporum caelestium, secundum quam res naturaliter procedunt.
<td>[8] Besides, virtues and vices are the proper principles for acts of choice, for virtues and vices differ in the fact that they choose contraries. Now, the political virtues and vices are not present in us from nature but come from custom, as the Philosopher proves, in <i>Ethics</i> II [1], from the fact that whatever kind of operations we have become accustomed to, and especially from boyhood, we acquire habits of the same kind. And so, our acts of choice are not in us from nature. Therefore, they are not caused from the influence of celestial bodies, according to which things occur naturally.
<tr valign="top" style="text-align:justify">
<td>Adhuc. Corpora caelestia non imprimunt directe nisi in corpora, ut ostensum est. Si igitur sint causa electionum nostrarum, aut hoc erit inquantum imprimunt in corpora nostra, aut inquantum imprimunt in exteriora. Neutro autem modo sufficienter possunt esse causa electionis nostrae. Non enim est sufficiens causa nostrae electionis quod aliqua corporalia nobis exterius praesententur: patet enim quod ad occursum alicuius delectabilis, puta cibi vel mulieris, temperatus non movetur ad eligendum ipsum, intemperatus autem movetur. Similiter etiam non sufficit ad nostram electionem quaecumque immutatio possit esse in nostro corpore ab impressione caelestis corporis: cum per hoc non sequantur in nobis nisi quaedam passiones, vel magis vel minus vehementes; passiones autem, quantumcumque vehementes, non sunt causa sufficiens electionis, quia per easdem passiones incontinens inducitur ad eas sequendum per electionem, continens autem non inducitur. Non potest igitur dici quod corpora caelestia sunt causae nostrarum electionum.
<td>[9] Moreover, celestial bodies make no direct impression, except on bodies, as we showed. So, if they are the cause of our acts of choice, this will be either because they influence our bodies, or because they influence external things. But in neither way can they be an adequate cause of our act of choice. In fact, it is not an adequate cause of our choice, for some corporeal things to be externally presented to us; for it is clear that on encountering some pleasurable object, say an item of food or a woman, the temperate man is not moved to choose it, but the intemperate man is moved. Likewise, whatever change might take place in our body as a result of the influence of a celestial body, it would not suffice to cause our choice, because there are no other results from this in us than certain passions, more or less strong. But passions, whatever their strength, are not an adequate cause for choice, since by the same passions an incontinent man is led to follow them by choice, while a continent man is not so induced. Therefore, it cannot be said that celestial bodies are the causes of our acts of choice.
<tr valign="top" style="text-align:justify">
<td>Amplius. Nulla virtus datur alicui rei frustra. Homo autem habet virtutem iudicandi et consiliandi de omnibus quae per ipsum operabilia sunt, sive in usu exteriorum rerum, sive in admittendo vel repellendo intrinsecas passiones. Quod quidem frustra esset, si electio nostra causaretur a corporibus caelestibus, non existens in nostra potestate. Non igitur corpora caelestia sunt causa nostrae electionis.
<td>[10] Furthermore, no power is given anything unless it has a use. But man has the power of judging and deliberating on all the things that may be done by him, whether in the use of external things or in the entertaining or repelling of internal passions. Of course, this would be useless if our choice were caused by celestial bodies which do not come under our control. Therefore, celestial bodies are not the cause of our act of choice.
<tr valign="top" style="text-align:justify">
<td>Praeterea. Homo naturaliter est animal politicum, vel sociale. Quod quidem ex hoc apparet quod unus homo non sufficit sibi si solus vivat, propterea quod natura in paucis homini providit sufficienter, dans ei rationem, per quam posset sibi omnia necessaria ad vitam praeparare, sicut cibum, indumenta, et alia huiusmodi ad quae omnia operanda non sufficit unus homo. Unde naturaliter est inditum homini ut in societate vivat. Sed ordo providentiae non aufert alicui rei quod est sibi naturale, sed magis unicuique providetur secundum suam naturam, ut ex dictis patet. Non igitur per ordinem providentiae sic est homo ordinatus ut vita socialis tollatur. Tolleretur autem si electiones nostrae ex impressionibus corporum caelestium provenirent, sicut naturales instinctus aliorum animalium.
<td>[11] Again, man is naturally a political animal, or a social one. This is apparent, indeed, from the fact that one man is not sufficient unto himself if he lives alone, because nature provides but few things that are sufficient for man. Instead, it gives him reason whereby he may make ready all the things needed for life, such as food, clothing, and the like; one man is not sufficient to do all these things. So, to live in society is naturally implanted in man. But the order of providence does not take away from a thing what is natural to it, but provides for each thing in accord with its nature, as is evident from what we have said. Therefore, man is not so ordered by the order of providence that his social life is taken away. Now, it would be removed if our acts of choice arose from impressions due to the celestial bodies, as do the natural instincts of other animals.
<tr valign="top" style="text-align:justify">
<td>Frustra etiam darentur leges et praecepta vivendi, si homo suarum electionum dominus non esset. Frustra etiam adhiberentur poenae et praemia bonis aut malis, ex quo non est in nobis haec vel illa eligere. His autem desinentibus, statim socialis vita corrumpitur. Non igitur homo est sic secundum ordinem providentiae institutus ut electiones eius ex motibus caelestium corporum proveniant.
<td>[12] Besides, it would be useless for laws and rules of living to be promulgated if man were not master of his own choices. Useless, too, would be the employment of punishments and rewards for good or evil deeds, in regard to which it is not in our power to choose one or the other. In fact, if these things disappear, social life is at once corrupted. Therefore, man is not so established by the order of providence that his choices originate from the motions of the celestial bodies.
<tr valign="top" style="text-align:justify">
<td>Adhuc. Electiones hominum ad bona et mala se habent. Si igitur electiones nostrae ex motibus stellarum provenirent, sequeretur quod stellae per se essent causa malarum electionum. Quod autem est malum, non habet causam in natura: nam malum incidit ex defectu alicuius causae, et non habet causam per se, ut supra ostensum est. Non igitur est possibile quod electiones nostrae directe et per se a corporibus caelestibus proveniant sicut ex causis.
<td>[13] Moreover, men’s choices are made in regard to goods and evils. So, if our choices originated from the motions of the stars, it would follow that the stars would be the direct cause of evil choices. But an evil thing has no cause in nature, since evil results from a defect of a cause and has no direct cause, as we showed above. Therefore, it is not possible for our choices to originate directly and of themselves from celestial bodies as causes.
<tr valign="top" style="text-align:justify">
<td>Potest autem aliquis huic rationi obviare dicendo quod omnis mala electio ex alicuius boni appetitu provenit, ut supra ostensum est: sicut electio adulteri provenit appetitu boni delectabilis quod est in venereis. Ad quod quidem bonum universale aliqua stella movet. Et hoc necessarium est ad generationes animalium perficiendas: nec debuit hoc commune bonum praetermitti propter malum particulare huius, qui ex hoc instinctu eligit malum.
<td>[14] Now, someone might be able to oppose this argument by saying that every bad choice arises from a good that is desired, as we showed above. For instance, the choice of an adulterer arises from the desire for a pleasurable good associated with sexual activity, and some star moves him toward this universal good. As a matter of fact, this is necessary for the accomplishment of the generating of animals, and this common good should not be set aside because of the particular evil of this person who makes a bad choice as a result of such prompting.
<tr valign="top" style="text-align:justify">
<td>Haec autem responsio sufficiens non est, si ponantur corpora caelestia per se causa electionum nostrarum, utpote per se imprimentia in intellectum et voluntatem. Nam impressio universalis causae recipitur in unoquoque secundum modum suum. Effectus ergo stellae moventis ad delectationem quae est in coniunctione ordinata ad generationem, recipietur in quolibet secundum modum proprium sibi: sicut videmus quod diversa animalia habent diversa tempora et diversos modos commixtionis, secundum congruentiam suae naturae, ut Aristoteles dicit in libro de historiis animalium. Recipient ergo intellectus et voluntas impressionem illius stellae secundum modum suum. Cum autem aliquid appetitur secundum modum, intellectus et rationis, non accidit peccatum in electione, quae quidem semper ex hoc mala est quod non est secundum rationem rectam. Non igitur, si corpora caelestia essent causa electionum nostrarum, esset unquam in nobis electio mala.
<td>[15] But this argument is not adequate if celestial bodies are claimed to be the direct cause of our choices, in the sense that they make direct impressions on the intellect and will. For the impression of a universal cause is received in any being according to the mode of that being. So, the influence of a star, that impels toward the pleasure associated with the generative act will be received in any being according to its own mode. Thus we observe that different animals have different times and various ways of reproducing, according to what befits their nature, as Aristotle says in his treatise on the <i>History of Animals</i> [V, 8]. So, intellect and will are going to receive the influence of this star according to their own mode. But, when an object is desired in accordance with the mode of intellect and reason, there is no sin in the choice; in fact, a choice is bad, always because it is not in accord with right reason. Therefore, if celestial bodies were the cause of our choices, there would never be a bad choice for us.
<tr valign="top" style="text-align:justify">
<td>Amplius. Nulla virtus activa se extendit ad ea quae sunt supra speciem et naturam agentis: quia omne agens agit per suam formam. Sed ipsum velle transcendit omnem speciem corporalem, sicut et ipsum intelligere: sicut enim intelligimus universalia, ita et voluntas nostra in aliquod universale fertur, puta quod odimus omne latronum genus, ut philosophus dicit in sua rhetorica. Nostrum igitur velle non causatur a corpore caelesti.
<td>[16] Moreover, no active power extends to effects that are beyond the species and nature of the agent, for every agent acts by virtue of its form. But the act of willing surpasses every bodily species, as does the act of understanding. Indeed, just as we understand universals, so also is our will attracted to the universal object; for example, “we hate every kind of thief,” as the Philosopher says in his <i>Rhetoric</i> [II, 4]. Therefore our will-act is not caused by a celestial body.
<tr valign="top" style="text-align:justify">
<td>Praeterea. Ea quae sunt ad finem, proportionantur fini. Electiones autem humanae ordinantur ad felicitatem sicut ad ultimum finem. Quae quidem non consistit in aliquibus corporalibus bonis, sed in hoc quod anima coniungatur per intellectum rebus divinis: ut supra ostensum est, tam secundum sententiam fidei, quam secundum philosophorum opiniones. Corpora igitur caelestia non possunt esse causa electionum nostrarum.
<td>[17] Furthermore, things that are related to an end are proportioned to that end. But human choices are ordered to felicity as their ultimate end. Of course, it does not consist in any corporeal goods but in the union of the soul with divine things by way of understanding, as we showed above, both according to the view of faith and according to the opinions of the philosophers. Therefore, celestial bodies cannot be the cause of our acts of choice.
<tr valign="top" style="text-align:justify">
<td>Hinc est quod dicitur Ier. 10-2 a signis caeli nolite metuere, quae gentes timent: quia leges populorum vanae sunt.
<td>[18] Hence it is said: “Be not afraid of the signs of heaven which the heathens fear; for the laws of people are vain” (Jer. 10:2-3).
<tr valign="top" style="text-align:justify">
<td>Per haec autem excluditur positio Stoicorum, qui ponebant omnes actus nostros, et etiam electiones nostras, secundum corpora caelestia disponi. Quae etiam fuisse dicitur positio antiqua Pharisaeorum apud Iudaeos. Priscillianistae etiam huius erroris rei fuerunt, ut dicitur in libro de haeresibus.
<td>[19] By this conclusion the theory of the Stoics is also refuted, for they claimed that all our acts, and even our choices, are ordered by the celestial bodies. This is also said to have been the position of the ancient Pharisees among the Jews. The Priscillianists, too, shared this error, as is stated in the book <i>On Heresies</i> [Augustine, 70].
<tr valign="top" style="text-align:justify">
<td>Haec etiam fuit opinio antiquorum naturalium, qui ponebant sensum et intellectum non differre. Unde Empedocles dixit quod voluntas augetur in hominibus, sicut in aliis animalibus, ad praesens, idest, secundum praesens momentum, ex motu caeli causante tempus, ut Aristoteles introducit in libro de anima.
<td>[20] It was also the opinion of the old natural philosophers who claimed that sensation and understanding did not differ. Thus, Empedocles said that “the will is increased in men, as in other animals, in respect to what is present”; that is, according to the present instant resulting from the celestial motion that causes time, as Aristotle reports it in his book <i>On the Soul</i> [III, 3].
<tr valign="top" style="text-align:justify">
<td>Sciendum tamen est quod, licet corpora caelestia non sint directe causa electionum nostrarum quasi directe in voluntates nostras imprimentia, indirecte tamen ex eis aliqua occasio nostris electionibus praestatur, secundum quod habent impressionem super corpora. Et hoc dupliciter. Uno quidem modo, secundum quod impressiones corporum caelestium in exteriora corpora est nobis occasio alicuius electionis: sicut, cum per corpora caelestia disponitur aer ad frigus intensum, eligimus calefieri ad ignem, vel aliqua huiusmodi facere quae congruunt tempori. Alio modo, secundum quod imprimunt in corpora nostra: ad quorum immutationem insurgunt in nobis aliqui motus passionum: vel per eorum impressionem efficimur habiles ad aliquas passiones, sicut cholerici sunt proni ad iram; vel etiam secundum quod ex eorum impressione causatur in nobis aliqua dispositio corporalis quae est occasio alicuius electionis, sicut cum, nobis infirmantibus, eligimus accipere medicinam. Interdum etiam ex corporibus caelestibus actus humanus causatur inquantum ex indispositione corporis aliqui amentes efficiuntur, usu rationis privati. In quibus proprie electio non est, sed moventur aliquo naturali instinctu, sicut et bruta.
<td>[21] Yet we should note that, though celestial bodies are not directly the cause of our choices, in the sense of directly making impressions on our wills, some occasion for our choices may be indirectly offered by them, because they do make an impression on bodies, and in a twofold sense. In one way, the impressions of the celestial bodies on external bodies are for us the occasion of a certain act of choice; for instance, when the atmosphere is disposed to severe cold by the celestial bodies, we choose to get warmed near a fire or to do other such acts which suit the weather. In a second way, they make an impression on our bodies; when a change occurs in them, certain movements of the passions arise in us; or we are made prone by their impressions to certain passions, as the bilious are prone to anger; or again, some bodily disposition that is an occasion for an act of choice may be caused in us by their impression, as when, resulting from our illness, we choose to take medicine. At times, too, a human act may be caused by the celestial bodies, in the sense that some people become demented as a result of a bodily indisposition and are deprived of the use of reason. Strictly speaking, there is no act of choice for such people, but they are moved by a natural instinct, as are brutes.
<tr valign="top" style="text-align:justify">
<td>Manifestum autem est, et experimento cognitum, quod tales occasiones, sive sint exteriores sive sint interiores, non sunt causa necessaria electionis: cum homo per rationem possit eis resistere vel obedire. Sed plures sunt qui impetus naturales sequuntur, pauciores autem, scilicet soli sapientes, qui occasiones male agendi et naturales impetus non sequuntur. Et propter hoc dicit Ptolomaeus in Centilogio quod anima sapiens adiuvat opus stellarum; et quod non poterit astrologus dare iudicia secundum stellas nisi vim animae et complexionem naturalem bene cognoverit; et quod astrologus non debet dicere rem specialiter, sed universaliter: quia scilicet impressio stellarum in pluribus sortitur effectum, qui non resistunt inclinationi quae est ex corpore; non autem semper in hoc vel in illo, qui forte per rationem naturali inclinationi resistit.
<td>[22] Moreover, it is plain and well known by experience that such occasions, whether they are external or internal, are not the necessary cause of choice, since man is able, on the basis of reason, either to resist or obey them. But there are many who follow natural impulses, while but few, the wise only, do not take these occasions of acting badly and of following their natural impulses. This is why Ptolemy says, in his <i>Centiloquium</i>: “the wise soul assists the work of the stars”; and that “the astronomer could not give a judgment based on the stars, unless he knew well the power of the soul and the natural temperament”; and that “the astronomer should not speak in detail on a matter, but in general.” That is to say, the impression from the stars produces its result in most people who do not resist the tendency that comes from their body, but it is not always effective, for, in one case or another a man may resist, perhaps, the natural inclination by means of reason.
</table>
<hr></a> <a name="86" id="86">
<table cellpadding="12">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td align="center"><b>Caput 86<br>
Quod corporales effectus in istis inferioribus non sequuntur ex necessitate a corporibus caelestibus</b>
<td align="center"><b>Chapter 86<br>
THAT THE CORPOREAL EFFECTS IN THINGS HERE BELOW DO NOT NECESSARILY RESULT FROM THE CELESTIAL BODIES</b>
<tr valign="top" style="text-align:justify">
<td>Non solum autem corpora caelestia humanae electioni necessitatem inferre non possunt, sed nec etiam corporales effectus in istis inferioribus ex necessitate ab eis procedunt.
<td>[1] Not only is it impossible for the celestial bodies to impose necessity on human choice; in fact, not even corporeal effects in things here below necessarily result from them.
<tr valign="top" style="text-align:justify">
<td>Impressiones enim causarum universalium recipiuntur in effectibus secundum recipientium modum. Haec autem inferiora sunt fluxibilia et non semper eodem modo se habentia: propter materiam, quae est in potentia ad plures formas; et propter contrarietatem formarum et virtutum. Non igitur impressiones corporum caelestium recipiuntur in istis inferioribus per modum necessitatis.
<td>[2] For the impressions of universal causes are received in their effects according to the mode of the recipients. Now, these lower things are fluctuating and do not always maintain the same condition: because of matter which is in potency to many forms and because of the contrariety of forms and powers. Therefore, the impressions of celestial bodies are not received in these lower things by way of necessity.
<tr valign="top" style="text-align:justify">
<td>Item. A causa remota non sequitur effectus de necessitate nisi etiam sit causa media necessaria: sicut et in syllogismis ex maiori de necesse et minori de contingenti non sequitur conclusio de necesse. Corpora autem caelestia sunt causae remotae: proximae autem causae inferiorum effectuum sunt virtutes activae et passivae in istis inferioribus, quae non sunt causae necessariae, sed contingentes; possunt enim deficere ut in paucioribus. Non ergo ex corporibus caelestibus sequuntur in istis inferioribus corporibus effectus de necessitate.
<td>[3] Again, an effect does not result from a remote cause unless there be also a necessary intermediate cause; just as in syllogisms, from a necessary major and a contingent minor, a necessary conclusion does not follow. But celestial bodies are remote causes, whereas the proximate causes of lower effects are the active and passive powers in these lower things, which are not necessary causes, but contingent, for they may fail in a few instances. So, effects in these lower bodies do not follow of necessity from the motions of the celestial bodies.
<tr valign="top" style="text-align:justify">
<td>Praeterea. Motus caelestium corporum semper est eodem modo. Si igitur effectus caelestium corporum in istis inferioribus ex necessitate proveniret, semper eodem modo se haberent quae in inferioribus sunt. Non autem semper eodem modo se habent, sed ut in pluribus. Non ergo ex necessitate proveniunt.
<td>[4] Besides, the motion of the celestial bodies always is in the same mode. So, if the effect of the celestial bodies on these lower ones came about from necessity, the events in lower bodies would always happen in the same way. Yet they do not always occur in the same way, but in most cases. So, they do not come about by necessity.
<tr valign="top" style="text-align:justify">
<td>Adhuc. Ex multis contingentibus non potest fieri unum necessarium: quia, sicut quodlibet contingentium per se deficere potest ab effectu, ita et omnia simul. Constat autem quod singula quae in istis inferioribus fiunt ex impressione caelestium corporum, sunt contingentia. Non igitur connexio eorum quae in inferioribus contingunt ex impressione caelestium corporum, est necessaria: manifestum est enim quod quodlibet eorum potest impediri.
<td>[5] Moreover, it is not possible for one necessary thing to come to be out of many contingent things, because, just as any contingent thing of itself can fall short of its effect, so, too, all of them may together. Now, it is obvious that the individual effects that are accomplished in these lower things, as a result of the impression of celestial bodies, are contingent. Therefore, the combination of these events that occur in lower things as a result of the impression of celestial bodies is not a necessary one, for it is plain that any one of them may be prevented from happening.
<tr valign="top" style="text-align:justify">
<td>Amplius. Corpora caelestia sunt agentia naturaliter, quae requirunt materiam in quam agant. Non igitur ex actione corporum caelestium tollitur id quod materia requirit. Materia autem in quam agunt corpora caelestia, sunt corpora inferiora: quae, cum sint corruptibilia secundum suam naturam, sicut deficere possunt ab esse, ita ab operari; et sic eorum natura hoc habet ut non ex necessitate producant effectus. Non igitur ex necessitate proveniunt effectus caelestium corporum etiam in corporibus inferioribus.
<td>[6] Moreover, the celestial bodies are agents in the order of nature; they need matter on which to act. So, the need for matter is not removed as a result of the action of celestial bodies. Now, the matter on which the celestial bodies act consists of the lower bodies which, being corruptible in their nature, may be just as able to fail in their operations as they are able to fail in their being. Thus, their nature has this characteristic: they do not produce their effects by necessity. Therefore, the effects of the celestial bodies do not come about by necessity, even in the lower bodies.
<tr valign="top" style="text-align:justify">
<td>Aliquis autem forte dicat quod necessarium est ut effectus caelestium corporum compleantur, nec tamen per hoc tollitur possibilitas a rebus inferioribus, eo quod quilibet effectus est in potentia antequam fiat, et tunc dicitur possibilis, quando autem iam est in actu, transit a possibilitate in necessitatem; et totum hoc subiacet caelestibus motibus; et sic non tollitur quin aliquando effectus sit possibilis, licet necessarium sit effectum illum quandoque produci:— sic enim Albumasar, in primo libro sui introductorii, defendere nititur possibile.
<td>[7] But someone will say, perhaps, that the effects of the celestial bodies must be accomplished. Yet, possibility is not removed from the lower bodies by this fact, because each effect is in potency before it comes about. So, it is then called possible, but when it now becomes actual, it passes from possibility to necessity. All of this comes under the control of the celestial bodies; and so, the fact that the effect is at one time possible is not removed in this way, even though it is necessary that this effect be produced at another time. Indeed, this is the way that Albumasar, in his book, <i>Introduction to Astronomy</i>, tries to defend the possible.
<tr valign="top" style="text-align:justify">
<td>Non est autem possibile quod per hunc modum possibile defendatur. Possibile enim quoddam est quod ad necessarium sequitur. Nam quod necesse est esse, possibile est esse: quod enim non possibile est esse, impossibile est esse; et quod impossibile est esse, necesse est non esse; igitur quod necesse est esse, necesse est non esse. Hoc autem est impossibile. Ergo impossibile est quod aliquid necesse sit esse, et tamen non sit possibile illud esse. Ergo possibile esse sequitur ad necesse esse.
<td>[8] But one cannot defend this meaning of the possible. For there is a sort of possibility that depends on what is necessary. Indeed, what is necessary in regard to actual being must be possible in regard to being; and what is not possible in relation to being is impossible in regard to being; and what is impossible in regard to being is necessarily nonbeing. Therefore, what is necessary in relation to being is necessary in relation to non-being. But this is impossible. So, it is impossible for something to be necessary in relation to being, yet not possible in regard to this being. Therefore, possible being follows from necessary being.
<tr valign="top" style="text-align:justify">
<td>Hoc autem possibile non est necessarium defendere contra hoc quod effectus ex necessitate causari dicuntur, sed possibile quod opponitur necessario, prout dicitur possibile quod potest esse et non esse. Non dicitur autem aliquid per hunc modum possibile vel contingens ex hoc solum quod quandoque sit in potentia et quandoque in actu, ut praedicta responsio supponit: nam sic etiam in motibus caelestibus est possibile et contingens: non enim semper est coniunctio vel oppositio solis aut lunae in actu, sed quandoque quidem in actu, quandoque autem in potentia; quae tamen necessaria sunt, cum de his dentur demonstrationes. Sed possibile vel contingens quod opponitur necessario, hoc in sua ratione habet, quod non sit necesse illud fieri quando non est. Quod quidem est quia non de necessitate sequitur ex causa sua. Sic enim dicimus quod Socratem sessurum esse est contingens, ipsum autem esse moriturum est necessarium, quia secundum horum ex causa sua de necessitate sequitur, non autem primum. Si ergo ex motibus caelestibus de necessitate sequitur quod eorum effectus sint quandoque futuri, tollitur possibile et contingens quod necessario opponitur.
<td>[9] As a matter of fact, we do not have to defend this meaning of possible against the statement that effects are caused by necessity, but, rather, the possible that is opposed to the necessary, in the sense that the possible is called that which can be, and also not be. Now, a thing is not called possible, or contingent, in this way from the sole fact that it is at one time in potency and at another time in act, as the preceding answer takes it. In fact, in that preceding sense there is possibility and contingency even in celestial motions, for there is not always an actual conjunction or opposition of the sun or moon. Rather, it is sometimes actually so, sometimes potentially so; yet these events are necessary, for demonstrations of such events may be given. But the possible, or contingent, that is opposed to the necessary has this characteristic: it is not necessary for it to happen when it is not. This is indeed so, because it does not follow of necessity from its cause. Thus, we say that Socrates will sit is a contingent fact, but that he. will die is necessary, because the second of these facts follows necessarily from its cause, whereas the first does not. So, if it follows necessarily from the celestial motions that their effects will occur at some time in the future, then the possible and contingent that is opposed to the necessary is thereby excluded.
<tr valign="top" style="text-align:justify">
<td>Sciendum est autem quod ad probandum effectus caelestium corporum ex necessitate provenire, Avicenna, in sua metaphysica, utitur tali ratione. Si aliquis effectus caelestium corporum impeditur, oportet quod hoc sit per aliquam causam voluntariam vel naturalem. Omnis autem causa voluntaria vel naturalis reducitur ad aliquod caeleste principium. Ergo impedimentum etiam effectuum caelestium corporum procedit ex aliquibus caelestibus principiis. Impossibile est ergo quod, si totus ordo caelestium simul accipiatur, quod effectus eius unquam cassetur. Unde concludit quod corpora caelestia faciunt necessario esse debere effectus in his inferioribus, tam voluntarios quam naturales.
<td>[10] Moreover, we should note that, in order to prove that the effects of the celestial bodies come about by necessity, Avicenna uses an argument like this in his <i>Metaphysics</i> [X, 1]. If any effect of the celestial bodies is blocked, this must be due to some voluntary or natural cause. But every voluntary or natural cause is reducible to some celestial source. Therefore, even the blocking of the effects of the celestial bodies results from some celestial sources. So, if the entire order of celestial things be taken together, it is impossible for its effect ever to fail to come about. Hence he concludes that the celestial bodies produce necessarily the effects which must occur in these lower bodies, both the voluntary and the natural ones.
<tr valign="top" style="text-align:justify">
<td>Haec autem ratio, ut Aristoteles in II Phys. dicit, fuit quorundam antiquorum, qui negabant casum et fortunam, per hoc quod cuiuslibet effectus est aliqua causa determinata; posita autem causa, ponitur effectus de necessitate; et sic, cum omnia ex necessitate proveniant, non est aliquid fortuitum neque casuale.
<td>[11] But this way of arguing, as Aristotle says in <i>Physics</i> [II, 4], was used by some of the ancients who denied chance and fortune on the basis of the view that there is a definite cause for every effect. If the cause be granted, then the effect must be granted. Thus, since everything occurs by necessity, there is nothing fortuitous or by chance.
<tr valign="top" style="text-align:justify">
<td>Hanc autem rationem ipse solvit in VI Metaphys., negando duas propositiones quibus haec ratio utitur. Quarum una est quod, posita causa quacumque, necesse sit eius effectum poni. Hoc enim non oportet in omnibus causis: quia aliqua causa, licet sit per se et propria causa et sufficiens alicuius effectus, potest tamen impediri ex concursu alterius causae, ut non sequatur effectus. Alia propositio est, quam negat, quod non omne quod est quocumque modo, habet causam per se, sed solum ea quae sunt per se; quae autem sunt per accidens, non habent aliquam causam; sicut quod sit musicum, habet aliquam causam in homine, quod autem homo sit simul albus et musicus, non habet aliquam causam. Quaecumque enim sunt simul propter aliquam causam, ordinem habent ad invicem ex illa causa: quae autem sunt per accidens, non habent ordinem ad invicem. Non igitur sunt ex aliqua causa per se agente, sed solum per accidens hoc evenit: accidit enim docenti musicam quod doceat hominem album, est enim praeter eius intentionem, sed intendit docere disciplinae susceptibilem.
<td>[12] He answers this argument, in <i>Metaphysics</i> VI [2-3], by denying two propositions which the argument uses. One of these is: “if any cause be granted, it is necessary to grant its effect.” Indeed, this is not necessary in the case of all causes, for a certain cause, though it may be the direct, proper and sufficient cause of a given effect, may be hindered by the interference of another cause so that the effect does not result. The second proposition that he denies is: “not everything that exists in any way at all has a direct cause, but only those things that exist of themselves; on the other hand, things that exist accidentally have no cause.” For instance, there is a cause within a man for the fact that he is musical, but there is no cause for the fact that he is at once white and musical. As a matter of fact, whenever plural things occur together because of some cause they are related to each other as a result of that cause, but whenever they occur by accident they are not so related to each other. So, they do not occur as a result of a cause acting directly; their occurrence is only accidental. For instance, it is an accident to the teacher of music that he teaches a white man; indeed, it is quite apart from his intention; rather, he intends to teach someone who is capable of learning the subject.
<tr valign="top" style="text-align:justify">
<td>Sic igitur, proposito aliquo effectu, dicemus quod habuit aliquam causam ex qua non de necessitate sequebatur: quia poterat impediri ex aliqua alia causa concurrente per accidens. Et licet illam causam concurrentem sit reducere in aliquam causam altiorem, tamen ipsum concursum, qui impedit, non est reducere in aliquam causam. Et sic non potest dici quod impedimentum huius effectus vel illius procedat ex aliquo caelesti principio. Unde non oportet dicere quod effectus corporum caelestium ex necessitate proveniant in istis inferioribus.
<td>[13] And thus, given a certain effect, we will say that it had a cause from which it did not necessarily follow, since it could have been hindered by some other accidentally conflicting cause. And even though it be possible to trace this conflicting cause back to a higher cause, it is not possible to trace this conflict, which is a hindrance, back to any cause. Thus, it cannot be said that the hindrance of this or that effect proceeds from a celestial source. Hence, we should not say that the effects of celestial bodies come about in these lower bodies as a result of necessity.
<tr valign="top" style="text-align:justify">
<td>Hinc est quod Damascenus dicit, in secundo libro, quod corpora caelestia non sunt causa generationis alicuius eorum quae fiunt, neque corruptionis eorum quae corrumpuntur: quia scilicet non ex necessitate ex eis effectus proveniunt.
<td>[14] Hence, Damascene says, in Book II [ <i>De fide orthodoxa</i> ], that “the celestial bodies are not the cause of any process of generating things that come into being, or of the process of corrupting things that are corrupted”; that is to say, these effects do not come about of necessity from them.
<tr valign="top" style="text-align:justify">
<td>Aristoteles etiam dicit, in II de somno et vigilia, quod eorum quae in corporibus sunt signorum etiam caelestium, velut aquarum et ventorum, multa non eveniunt. Si enim alius vehementior isto accidat motus a quo futurum est signum, non fit: sicut et multa consulta bene, quae fieri expediebat, dissoluta sunt propter alias digniores inchoationes.
<td>[15] Aristotle also says, in <i>On Sleep</i> II, that “of those signs which occur in bodies, and even of the celestial signs, such as movements of water and wind, many of their results do not come about. For, if another movement occurs, stronger than the one which is a sign of the future, then the event does not happen; just as many of our well laid plans, which were suitable to be accomplished, come to no result, because of the interference of higher powers.”
<tr valign="top" style="text-align:justify">
<td>Ptolomaeus etiam, in quadripartito, dicit: rursus, nec aestimare debemus quod superiora procedant inevitabiliter, ut ea quae divina dispositione contingunt et quae nullatenus sunt vitanda, necnon quae veraciter et ex necessitate proveniunt. In Centilogio etiam dicit: haec iudicia quae tibi trado, sunt media inter necessarium et possibile.
<td>[16] Ptolemy, too, in his <i>Fourfold Work</i>, says: “Again, we should not think that higher events proceed inevitably, like things that happen under divine control and which can in no way be avoided, nor as things which come about truly and of necessity. He also says in the <i>Centiloquium</i>: “These prognostications that I give you are midway between the necessary and the possible.”
</table>
<hr></a> <a name="87" id="87">
<table cellpadding="12">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td align="center"><b>Caput 87<br>
Quod motus caelestis corporis non sit causa electionum nostrarum ex virtute animae moventis, ut quidam dicunt</b>
<td align="center"><b>Chapter 87<br>
THAT THE MOTION OF A CELESTIAL BODY IS NOT THE CAUSE OF OUR ACTS OF CHOICE BY THE POWER OF ITS SOUL MOVING US, AS SOME SAY</b>
<tr valign="top" style="text-align:justify">
<td>Est tamen attendendum quod Avicenna vult quod motus caelestium corporum sint etiam nostrarum electionum causae, non quidem per occasionem tantum, sicut supra dictum est, sed per se. Ponit enim corpora caelestia esse animata. Unde oportet, cum motus caelestis sit ab anima et sit motus corporis, quod sicut, inquantum est motus corporis, habet virtutem transmutandi corpora, ita, inquantum est ab anima, habeat virtutem imprimendi in animas nostras, et sic motus caelestis sit causa nostrarum voluntatum et electionum. Ad quod etiam redire videtur positio Albumasar, in primo sui introductorii.
<td>[1] However, we should note that Avicenna maintains that the motions of the celestial bodies are also the causes of our acts of choice, not simply as occasions, as was said above, but directly. For he claims that the celestial bodies are animated. Hence, since celestial motion is from a soul and is the motion of a body, therefore, just as it is a bodily motion with the power of causing change in bodies, so as a motion from the soul it must have the power to make an impression on our souls. And thus, the celestial motion is the cause of our acts of will and choice. On this point also he seems to return to the theory of Albumasar, in his <i>Introduction</i> I.
<tr valign="top" style="text-align:justify">
<td>Haec autem positio irrationabilis est. Omnem enim effectum, qui est per instrumentum aliquod ab efficiente procedens, oportet esse proportionatum instrumento, sicut et agenti: non enim quolibet instrumento utimur ad quemlibet effectum. Unde illud non potest fieri per aliquod instrumentum ad quod nullo modo se extendit actio instrumenti. Actio autem corporis nullo modo se extendit ad immutationem intellectus et voluntatis, ut ostensum est: nisi forte per accidens, inquantum ex his immutatur corpus, sicut praedictum est. Impossibile est ergo quod anima caelestis corporis, si sit animatum, in intellectum et voluntatem imprimat mediante motu caelestis corporis.
<td>[2] But this theory is not reasonable. Every effect proceeding through an instrument from an efficient cause must be proportionate to the instrument, as also to the agent, for we cannot use just any instrument for any effect. Hence, a result cannot be accomplished by means of an instrument if the action of the instrument in no way covers the result. Now, the action of a body in no way extends to the production of a change of understanding and will, as we showed, unless, perchance, by accident, through a change in the body, as we said before. So, it is impossible for the soul of a celestial body, if it be animated, to make an impression on the intellect and will by means of the motion of a celestial body.
<tr valign="top" style="text-align:justify">
<td>Amplius. Causa agens particularis similitudinem in agendo gerit causae agentis universalis, et est exemplum eius. Si autem anima humana in aliam animam humanam aliquid per operationem corporalem imprimeret, sicut cum per significationem vocis suam intelligentiam pandit, actio corporalis quae est ab una anima non pervenit ad aliam nisi mediante corpore: vox enim prolata immutat organum auditus, et, sic a sensu percepta, pervenit eius significatum usque ad intellectum. Si igitur anima caelestis aliquid imprimat in animas nostras per motum corporeum, actio illa non perveniet ad animam nostram nisi per immutationem corporis nostri. Quae quidem non est causa electionum nostrarum, sed occasio tantum, sicut ex praemissis patet. Non igitur erit motus caelestis causa nostrae electionis nisi per occasionem tantum.
<td>[3] Again, a particular agent cause, when acting, bears a likeness to the universal agent cause and is patterned on it. But, if a human soul were to impress another human soul through a corporeal operation, as when it reveals its thought by means of meaningful speech, the bodily action initiated by one soul does not reach the other soul without the mediation of its body. In fact, the spoken word moves the auditory organ, and then, having been so perceived by the sense power, it extends its message to the understanding. So, if the celestial soul makes an impression on our souls through bodily movement, that action will not reach our soul without making a change in our body. Now, this is not a cause of our acts of choice, but simply an occasion, as is clear from the foregoing. Therefore, celestial motion will not be a cause of our act of choice, except as a mere occasion.
<tr valign="top" style="text-align:justify">
<td>Item. Cum movens et motum oporteat esse simul, ut probatur in VII Phys., oportet quod a primo movente perveniat motus usque ad ultimum quod movetur, quodam ordine: ut scilicet movens per id quod est sibi proximum, moveat illud quod est ab eo distans. Corpori autem caelesti, quod moveri ponitur ab anima sibi coniuncta, propinquius est corpus nostrum quam anima, quae non habet ordinem ad corpus caeleste nisi mediante corpore:- quod ex hoc patet, quia intellectus separati nullum ordinem habent ad corpus caeleste, nisi forte moventis ad motum. Immutatio igitur corporis caelestis ab anima eius procedens non pertingit ad animam nostram nisi mediante corpore. Ad motum autem corporis non movetur anima nisi per accidens, nec immutationem corporis sequitur electio nisi per occasionem, ut dictum est. Motus igitur caelestis non potest esse causa electionis nostrae per hoc quod est ab anima.
<td>[4] Besides, since the mover and the thing moved must be simultaneous, as is proved in <i>Physics</i> VII the motion must extend in a definite order, from the first mover to the last thing that is moved; that is, such that the mover moves what is far away from it by means of what is near to it. Now, our body is nearer than our soul is to the celestial body which is asserted to be moved by a soul joined to it, for our soul has no relation to a celestial body except through our body. This is evident from the fact that separate intelligences have no relation to a celestial body, unless, perhaps, that of a mover to a thing moved. So, a change in a celestial body, initiated by its soul, does not reach our soul except through the mediation of our body. But our soul is not moved when our body is moved, except accidentally; nor does choice result from a change in our body, except by way of occasion, as we said. Therefore, celestial motion, by virtue of the fact that it is from a soul, cannot be the cause of our act of choice.
<tr valign="top" style="text-align:justify">
<td>Praeterea. Secundum positionem Avicennae, et quorundam aliorum philosophorum, intellectus agens est quaedam substantia separata, quae quidem agit in animas nostras inquantum facit intellecta in potentia esse intellecta in actu. Hoc autem fit per abstractionem ab omnibus materialibus dispositionibus: ut patet ex his quae dicta sunt in secundo. Quod igitur agit directe in animam, non agit in eam per motum corporeum, sed magis per abstractionem ab omni corporeo. Anima igitur caeli, si sit animatum, non potest esse causa electionum vel intelligentiarum nostrarum per motum caeli.
<td>[5] Moreover, according to the theory of Avicenna and some other philosophers, the agent intellect is a separate substance that acts on our souls by making potentially understood things to be actually understood. Now, this is done by abstraction from all material conditions, as is evident from our explanations in Book Two. So, that which acts directly on the soul does not act on it through corporeal motion, but, rather, through abstraction from everything corporeal. Therefore, the soul of the heavens, if it be animated, cannot be the cause of our acts of choice or understanding through the motion of the heavens.
<tr valign="top" style="text-align:justify">
<td>Per easdem etiam rationes potest probari quod motus caeli non sit causa electionum nostrarum per virtutem substantiae separatae, si quis ponat caelum non esse animatum, sed a substantia separata moveri.
<td>[6] It is also possible to prove by the same arguments that the motion of the heavens is not the cause of our acts of choice by means of separate substances, if someone claims that the heavens are not animated, but moved by a separate substance.
</table>
<hr></a> <a name="88" id="88">
<table cellpadding="12">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td align="center"><b>Caput 88<br>
Quod substantiae separatae creatae non possunt esse causa directe electionum et voluntatum nostrarum, sed solus Deus</b>
<td align="center"><b>Chapter 88<br>
THAT SEPARATE CREATED SUBSTANCES CANNOT BE DIRECTLY THE CAUSE OF OUR ACTS OF CHOICE AND WILL, BUT ONLY GOD</b>
<tr valign="top" style="text-align:justify">
<td>Non est autem aestimandum quod animae caelorum, si quae sint, vel quaecumque aliae intellectuales substantiae separatae creatae, possint directe voluntatem nobis immittere, aut electionis nostrae causa esse.
<td>[1] Now, we must not think that the souls of the heavens, if there be such, or any other created, separate, intellectual substances can directly insert a will-act into us or cause our act of choice to occur.
<tr valign="top" style="text-align:justify">
<td>Omnium enim creatorum actiones sub ordine divinae providentiae continentur: unde praeter leges ipsius agere non possunt. Est autem providentiae lex ut unumquodque immediate a proxima sibi causa moveatur. Causa igitur superior creata, tali ordine praetermisso, nec movere nec aliquid agere potest. Proximum autem motivum voluntatis est bonum intellectum, quod est suum obiectum, et movetur ab ipso sicut visus a colore. Nulla igitur substantia creata potest movere voluntatem nisi mediante bono intellecto. Hoc autem est inquantum manifestat ei aliquid esse bonum ad agendum: quod est persuadere. Nulla igitur substantia creata potest agere in voluntatem, vel esse causa electionis nostrae, nisi per modum persuadentis.
<td>[2] For the actions of all creatures are embraced under the order of divine providence, so they cannot operate outside its laws. But it is the law of providence that everything be moved immediately by its proximate cause. So, unless such an order were obeyed, a superior created cause could neither move nor do anything. Now, the proximate mover of the will is the good as apprehended, which is its object, and it is moved by it, just as sight is by color. So, no created substance can move the will except by means of a good which is understood. Now, this is done by showing it that something is a good thing to do: this is the act of persuading. Therefore, no created substance can act on the will, or be the cause of our act of choice, except in the way of a persuading agent.
<tr valign="top" style="text-align:justify">
<td>Item. Ab illo agente aliquid natum est moveri et pati per cuius formam reduci potest in actum: nam omne agens agit per formam suam. Voluntas autem reducitur in actum per appetibile, quod motum desiderii eius quietat. In solo autem bono divino quietatur desiderium voluntatis sicut in ultimo fine, ut ex supra dictis patet. Solus igitur Deus potest movere voluntatem per modum agentis.
<td>[3] Again, a thing is by nature capable of being moved by, and of undergoing a passion from, an agent with a form by which the thing can be reduced to act, for every agent acts through its form. But the will is reduced to act by the desirable object which gives rest to its desire. Now, the will’s desire finds rest in the divine good only, as in its ultimate end, as is evident from what we said above. Therefore, God alone can move the will in the fashion of an agent.
<tr valign="top" style="text-align:justify">
<td>Adhuc. Sicut in re inanimata se habet inclinatio naturalis ad proprium finem, quae et appetitus naturalis dicitur; ita se habet in substantia intellectuali voluntas, quae dicitur appetitus intellectualis. Inclinationes autem naturales dare non est nisi illius qui naturam instituit. Ergo et voluntatem inclinare in aliquid non est nisi eius qui est naturae intellectualis causa. Hoc autem solius Dei est, sicut ex superioribus patet. Ipse igitur solus voluntatem nostram ad aliquid inclinare potest.
<td>[4] Besides, as natural inclination in an inanimate thing, which is also called natural appetite, is related to its proper end, so also is the will, which is also called intellectual appetite, in an intellectual substance. Now, to give natural inclinations is the sole prerogative of Him Who has established the nature. So also, to incline the will to anything, is the sole prerogative of Him Who is the cause of the intellectual nature. Now, this is proper to God alone, as is evident from our earlier explanations. Therefore, He alone can incline our will to something.
<tr valign="top" style="text-align:justify">
<td>Amplius. Violentum, ut dicitur in III Ethic., est cuius principium est extra, nil conferente vim passo. Si igitur voluntas moveatur ab aliquo exteriori principio, erit violentus motus:- dico autem moveri a principio extrinseco quod moveat per modum agentis, et non per modum finis. Violentum autem voluntario repugnat. Impossibile est ergo quod voluntas moveatur a principio extrinseco quasi ab agente, sed oportet quod omnis motus voluntatis ab interiori procedat. Nulla autem substantia creata coniungitur animae intellectuali quantum ad sua interiora nisi solus Deus, qui solus est causa esse ipsius, et sustinens eam in esse. A solo igitur Deo potest motus voluntarius causari.
<td>[5] Moreover, the violent, as is said in <i>Ethics</i> III [1], is “that whose principle is outside; the patient making no contribution of force.” So, if the will is moved by some external principle, the motion will be violent. Now, I am talking about being moved by some external principle which moves in the way of an agent, and not in the way of an end. But the violent is incompatible with the voluntary. So, it is impossible for the will to be moved by an extrinsic principle as by an agent; rather, every movement of the will must proceed from within. Now, no created substance is joined to the intellectual soul in regard to its inner parts, but only God, Who is alone the cause of its being and Who sustains it in being. Therefore, by God alone can voluntary movement be caused.
<tr valign="top" style="text-align:justify">
<td>Adhuc. Violentum opponitur naturali et voluntario motui: quia utrumque oportet quod sit a principio intrinseco. Agens autem exterius sic solum naturaliter movet, inquantum causat in mobili intrinsecum principium motus: sicut generans, quod dat formam gravitatis corpori gravi generato, movet ipsum naturaliter deorsum. Nihil autem aliud extrinsecum movere potest absque violentia corpus naturale: nisi forte per accidens, sicut removens prohibens; quod magis utitur motu naturali vel actione quam causaret ipsum. Illud igitur solum agens potest causare motum voluntatis absque violentia, quod causat principium intrinsecum huius motus, quod est potentia ipsa voluntatis. Hoc autem est Deus, qui animam solus creat, ut in secundo ostensum est. Solus igitur Deus potest movere voluntatem, per modum agentis, absque violentia.
<td>[6] Furthermore, violent movement is opposed to natural and voluntary movement, because both of the latter must arise from an intrinsic source. The only way in which an external agent moves a thing naturally is by causing an intrinsic principle of motion within the movable thing. Thus, a generating agent, which gives the form of weight to a heavy generated body, moves it downward in a natural way. No other extrinsic being can move a natural body without violence, except perhaps accidentally, by removing an impediment, and this uses a natural motion, or action, rather than causes it. So, the only agent that can cause a movement of the will, without violence, is that which causes an intrinsic principle of this movement, and such a principle is the very power of the will. Now, this agent is God, Who alone creates a soul, as we showed in Book Two. Therefore, God alone can move the will in the fashion of an agent, without violence.
<tr valign="top" style="text-align:justify">
<td>Hinc est quod dicitur Prov. 21-1: cor regis in manu domini, et quocumque voluerit inclinabit illud. Et Philip. 2-13: Deus est qui operatur in nobis velle et perficere, pro bona voluntate.
<td>[7] Hence it is said in Proverbs (21:1): “The heart of the king is in the hand of the Lord; wherever He wishes, He turns it.” And again in Philippians (2:13): “It is God Who works in us, both to will and to accomplish, according to His good will.”
</table>
<hr></a> <a name="89" id="89">
<table cellpadding="12">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td align="center"><b>Caput 89<br>
Quod motus voluntatis causatur a Deo, et non solum potentia voluntatis</b>
<td align="center"><b>Chapter 89<br>
THAT THE MOVEMENT OF THE WILL IS CAUSED BY GOD AND NOT ONLY THE POWER OF THE WILL</b>
<tr valign="top" style="text-align:justify">
<td>Quidam vero, non intelligentes qualiter motum voluntatis Deus in nobis causare possit absque praeiudicio libertatis voluntatis, coacti sunt has auctoritates male exponere: ut scilicet dicerent quod Deus causat in nobis velle et perficere, inquantum causat nobis virtutem volendi, non autem sic quod faciat nos velle hoc vel illud; sicut Origenes exponit in III periarchon, liberum arbitrium defendens contra auctoritates praedictas.
<td>[1] Some people, as a matter of fact, not understanding how God could cause a movement of the will in us without prejudice to freedom of will, have tried to explain these texts in a wrong way. That is, they would say that God causes willing and accomplishing within us in the sense that He causes in us the power of willing, but not in such a way that He makes us will this or that. Thus does Origen, in his <i>Principles</i>, explain free choice, defending it against the texts above.
<tr valign="top" style="text-align:justify">
<td>Et ex hoc processisse videtur opinio quorundam qui dicebant quod providentia non est de his quae subsunt libero arbitrio, scilicet de electionibus, sed providentia refertur ad exteriores eventus. Non enim qui eligit aliquid consequi vel perficere, puta aedificare vel ditari, semper poterit ad hoc pervenire: et sic eventus actionum nostrarum non subiacent libero arbitrio, sed providentia disponuntur.
<td>[2] So, it seems that there developed from this view the opinion of certain people who said that providence does not apply to things subject to free choice, that is, to acts of choice, but, instead, that providence is applied to external events. For he who chooses to attain or accomplish something, such as to make a building or to become rich, is not always able to reach this end; thus, the results of our actions are not subject to free choice, but are controlled by providence.
<tr valign="top" style="text-align:justify">
<td>Quibus quidem auctoritatibus sacrae Scripturae resistitur evidenter. Dicitur enim Isaiae 26-12: omnia opera nostra operatus es in nobis, domine. Unde non solum virtutem volendi a Deo habemus, sed etiam operationem.
<td>[3] To these people, of course, opposition is offered quite plainly by the texts from Sacred Scripture. For it is stated in Isaiah (26:2): “O Lord, you have wrought all our works in us.” So, we receive not only the power of willing from God, but also the operation.
<tr valign="top" style="text-align:justify">
<td>Praeterea. Hoc ipsum quod Salomon dicit, quocumque voluerit, vertet illud ostendit non solum divinam causalitatem ad potentiam voluntatis extendi, sed etiam ad actum ipsius.
<td>[4] Again, this statement of Solomon, “wherever He wishes, He turns it” shows that divine causality is not only extended to the power of the will but also to its act.
<tr valign="top" style="text-align:justify">
<td>Item. Deus non solum dat rebus virtutes, sed etiam nulla res potest propria virtute agere nisi agat in virtute ipsius, ut supra ostensum est. Ergo homo non potest virtute voluntatis sibi data uti nisi inquantum agit in virtute Dei. Illud autem in cuius virtute agens agit, est causa non solum virtutis, sed etiam actus. Quod in artifice apparet, in cuius virtute agit instrumentum, etiam quod ab hoc artifice propriam formam non accepit, sed solum ab ipso applicatur ad actum. Deus igitur est causa nobis non solum voluntatis, sed etiam volendi.
<td>[5] Besides, God not only gives powers to things but, beyond that, no thing can act by its own power unless it acts through His power, as we showed above. So, man cannot use the power of will that has been given him except in so far as he acts through the power of God. Now, the being through whose power the agent acts is the cause not only of the power, but also of the act. This is apparent in the case of an artist through whose power an instrument works, even though it does not get its own form from this artist, but is merely applied to action by this man. Therefore, God is for us the cause not only of our will, but also of our act of willing.
<tr valign="top" style="text-align:justify">
<td>Amplius. Perfectius invenitur ordo in spiritualibus quam in corporalibus. In corporalibus autem omnis motus causatur a primo motu. Oportet igitur quod et in spiritualibus omnis motus voluntatis a prima voluntate causetur, quae est voluntas Dei.
<td>[6] Moreover, a more perfect order is found in spiritual things than in corporeal ones. Among bodies, however, every motion is caused by the first motion. Therefore, among spiritual things, also, every movement of the will must be caused by the first will, which is the will of God.
<tr valign="top" style="text-align:justify">
<td>Adhuc. Superius est ostensum quod Deus est causa omnis actionis, et operatur in omni agente. Est igitur causa motuum voluntatis.
<td>[7] Furthermore, we showed somewhat earlier that God is the cause of every action and that He operates in every agent. Therefore, He is the cause of the movements of the will.
<tr valign="top" style="text-align:justify">
<td>Item. Argumentatur ad hoc Aristoteles, in VIII Eudemicae Ethicae, per hunc modum. Huius quod aliquis intelligat et consilietur et eligat et velit, oportet aliquid esse causam: quia omne novum oportet quod habeat aliquam causam. Si autem est causa eius aliud consilium et alia voluntas praecedens, cum non sit procedere in his in infinitum, oportet devenire ad aliquid primum. Huiusmodi autem primum oportet esse aliquid quod est melius ratione. Nihil autem est melius intellectu et ratione nisi Deus. Est igitur Deus primum principium nostrorum consiliorum et voluntatum.
<td>[8] Besides, an argument that is pertinent is offered by Aristotle, in Book VIII of the <i>Eudemian Ethics</i>, as follows. There must be a cause for the fact that a person understands, deliberates, chooses, and wills, for every new event must have some cause. But, if its cause is another act of deliberation, and another act of will preceding it, then, since one cannot go on to infinity in these acts, one must reach something that is first. Now, a first of this type must be something that is better than reason. But nothing is better than intellect and reason except God. Therefore, God is the first principle of our acts of counsel and of will.
</table>
<hr></a> <a name="90" id="90">
<table cellpadding="12">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td align="center"><b>Caput 90<br>
Quod electiones et voluntates humanae subduntur divinae providentiae</b>
<td align="center"><b>Chapter 90<br>
THAT HUMAN ACTS OF CHOICE AND OF WILL ARE SUBJECT TO DIVINE PROVIDENCE</b>
<tr valign="top" style="text-align:justify">
<td>Ex quo patet quod oportet etiam voluntates humanas et electiones divinae providentiae subditas esse.
<td>[1] It is clear, next, that even acts of human willing and choosing must be subject to divine providence.
<tr valign="top" style="text-align:justify">
<td>Omnia enim quae Deus agit, ex ordine providentiae suae agit. Cum igitur ipse sit causa electionis et voluntatis nostrae, electiones et voluntates nostrae divinae providentiae subduntur.
<td>[2] For, everything that God does He does as a result of the order of His providence. So, since He is the cause of our act of choice and volition, our choices and will-acts are subject to divine providence.
<tr valign="top" style="text-align:justify">
<td>Amplius. Omnia corporalia per spiritualia administrantur, sicut superius est ostensum. Spiritualia autem agunt in corporalia per voluntatem. Si igitur electiones et motus voluntatum intellectualium substantiarum ad Dei providentiam non pertinent, sequitur quod etiam corporalia ipsius providentiae subtrahantur. Et sic totaliter nulla erit providentia.
<td>[3] Again, all corporeal things are governed through spiritual beings, as we showed above. But spiritual beings act on corporeal things through the will. Therefore, if choices and movements of the wills of intellectual substances do not belong to God’s providence, it follows that even corporeal things are withdrawn from His providence. And thus, there will be no providence at all.
<tr valign="top" style="text-align:justify">
<td>Item. Quanto aliqua sunt nobiliora in universo, tanto oportet quod magis participent ordine, in quo bonum universi consistit. Unde Aristoteles, in II Phys., arguit antiquos philosophos, qui ponebant casum et fortunam in constitutione caelestium corporum, non autem in inferioribus rebus. Substantiae autem intellectuales sunt nobiliores substantiis corporalibus. Si ergo substantiae corporales, quantum ad suas substantias et actiones, cadunt sub ordine providentiae, multo magis substantiae intellectuales.
<td>[4] Besides, the more noble things are in the universe, the more must they participate in the order in which the good of the universe consists. So, in Physics II [4], Aristotle accuses the ancient philosophers of putting chance and fortune in the make-up of the celestial bodies, but not in things below. Now, the intellectual substances are more noble than bodily substances. Therefore, if bodily substances, in their substances and actions, fall under the order of providence, so do intellectual substances, for a greater reason.
<tr valign="top" style="text-align:justify">
<td>Praeterea. Ea quae sunt propinquiora fini, magis cadunt sub ordine qui est ad finem: nam eis mediantibus etiam alia ordinantur in finem. Actiones autem substantiarum intellectualium propinquius ordinantur in Deum sicut in finem, quam actiones aliarum rerum, sicut supra ostensum est. Magis igitur cadunt actiones intellectualium substantiarum sub ordine providentiae, qua Deus omnia in seipsum ordinat, quam actiones aliarum rerum.
<td>[5] Moreover, things that are nearer the end fall more definitely under the order which is for the end, for by their mediation other things also are ordered to the end. But the actions of intellectual substances are more closely ordered to God as end than are the actions of other things, as we showed above. So, the actions of intellectual substances, by which God orders all things to Himself, more definitely fall under the order of providence than the actions of other things.
<tr valign="top" style="text-align:justify">
<td>Adhuc. Gubernatio providentiae ex amore divino procedit, quo Deus res a se creatas amat: in hoc enim praecipue consistit amor, quod amans amato bonum velit. Quanto ergo Deus aliqua magis amat, magis sub eius providentia cadunt. Hoc autem et sacra Scriptura docet in Psalmo, dicens, custodit dominus omnes diligentes se; et etiam philosophus tradit, in X Ethicorum, dicens quod Deus maxime curat de his qui diligunt intellectum, tanquam de suis amicis. Ex quo etiam habetur quod maxime substantias intellectuales amet. Sub eius igitur providentia cadunt earum voluntates et electiones.
<td>[6] Furthermore, the governance of providence stems from the divine love whereby God loves the things created by Him; in fact, love consists especially in this, “that the lover wills the good for his loved one.” So, the more that God loves things, the more do they fall under His providence. Moreover, Sacred Scripture also teaches this in the Psalm (144:20) when it states: “The Lord keeps all those who love Him.” And the Philosopher, also, supports this view, in <i>Ethics</i> X [8], when he says that God takes greatest care of those who love understanding, as He does of His friends. It may, then, be gathered from this, that He loves intellectual substances best. Therefore, their acts of will and choice fall under His providence.
<tr valign="top" style="text-align:justify">
<td>Amplius. Bona interiora hominis, quae ex voluntate et actione dependent, sunt magis propria homini quam illa quae extra ipsum sunt, ut adeptio divitiarum, vel si quid aliud est huiusmodi: unde per haec homo dicitur esse bonus, non autem per illa. Si igitur electiones humanae et voluntatis motus non cadunt sub divina providentia, sed solum exteriores proventus, verius erit quod res humanae sint extra providentiam, quam quod providentiae subsint. Quod quidem ex persona blasphemantium inducitur, Iob 22-14, circa cardines caeli considerat, nec nostra considerat; et Ezech. 9-9, dereliquit dominus terram, dominus non videt; et Thren. 3-37, quis est iste qui dixit ut fieret, domino non iubente?
<td>[7] Again, man’s internal goods, which are dependent on will and action, are more proper to man than things that are outside him, like the acquisition of wealth or anything else of that kind. Hence, man is deemed good by virtue of the former and not of the latter. So, if acts of human choice and movements of will do not fall under divine providence, but only their external results, it will be truer that human affairs are outside providence than that they come under providence. But this view is suggested by the words of blasphemers: “He walks about the poles of heaven, and He does not consider our things” (Job 22:14); and again: “The Lord has forsaken the earth, and the Lord does not see” (Ez. 9:9); and also: “Who is he who will command a thing to be done, when the Lord does not command it?” (Lam. 3:37).
<tr valign="top" style="text-align:justify">
<td>Videntur autem quaedam in sacra doctrina secundum praedictam sententiam sonare. Dicitur enim Eccli. 15-14: Deus ab initio constituit hominem, et reliquit illum in manu consilii sui. Et infra: 17 proposuit tibi aquam et ignem: ad quod volueris, porrige manum tuam. Ante hominem vita et mors, bonum et malum: quod placuerit ei, dabitur illi. Et Deut. 30-15: considera quod hodie proposuerit in conspectu tuo vitam et bonum, et e contrario mortem et malum. Haec autem verba ad hoc inducuntur ut hominem esse liberi arbitrii ostendatur: non ut eius electiones a divina providentia subtrahantur.
<td>[8] However, certain passages in Sacred Scripture appear to be consonant with the aforementioned view. It is said in fact (Sirach 15:14): “God made man from the beginning, and left him in the hand of his own counsel”; and later: “He has set water and fire before you; stretch forth your hand to whichever you wish. Before man is life and death, good and evil; that which he chooses shall be given him” (Sirach 15:14, 17-18). And also: “Consider that I have set before thee this day life and good, and on the other hand death and evil” (Deut. 30:15). But these words are brought forward to show that man is possessed of free choice, not that his choices are placed outside divine providence.
<tr valign="top" style="text-align:justify">
<td>Et similiter quod Gregorius Nyssenus dicit, in libro quem de homine fecit, providentia est eorum quae non sunt in nobis, non autem eorum quae sunt in nobis; et Damascenus eum sequens, dicit in secundo libro, quod ea quae sunt in nobis Deus praenoscit, sed non praedeterminat, exponenda sunt ut intelligantur ea quae sunt in nobis divinae providentiae determinationi non esse subiecta quasi ab ea necessitatem accipientia.
<td>[9] Likewise, Gregory of Nyssa states in his book <i>On Man</i>: “Providence is concerned with the things that are not in our power, but not with those that are in our power”; and, following him, Damascene states in Book II, that “God foreknows the things that are within our power, but He does not predetermine them.” These texts should be explained as meaning that things in our power are not subject to determination by divine providence in the sense that they receive necessity from it.
</table>
<hr></a> <a name="91" id="91">
<table cellpadding="12">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td align="center"><b>Caput 91<br>
Quomodo res humanae ad superiores causas reducantur</b>
<td align="center"><b>Chapter 91<br>
HOW HUMAN EVENTS MAY BE TRACED BACK TO HIGHER CAUSES</b>
<tr valign="top" style="text-align:justify">
<td>Ex his ergo quae supra ostensa sunt, colligere possumus quomodo humana ad superiores causas reducuntur, et non aguntur fortuito.
<td>[1] From the things shown above we can gather how human actions may be traced back to higher causes and are not performed fortuitously.
<tr valign="top" style="text-align:justify">
<td>Nam electiones et voluntatum motus immediate a Deo disponuntur. Cognitio vero humana ad intellectum pertinens a Deo mediantibus Angelis ordinatur. Ea vero quae ad corporalia pertinent, sive sint interiora sive exteriora, in usum hominis venientia, a Deo mediantibus Angelis et caelestibus corporibus dispensantur.
<td>[2] Of course, acts of choice and movements of the will are controlled immediately by God. And human intellectual knowledge is ordered by God through the mediation of the angels. Whereas matters pertinent to bodily things, whether they are internal or external, when they come within the use of man, are governed by God by means of the angels and the celestial bodies.
<tr valign="top" style="text-align:justify">
<td>Huius autem ratio generaliter una est. Nam oportet omne multiforme, et mutabile, et deficere potens, reduci sicut in principium in aliquod uniforme, et immobile, et deficere non valens. Omnia autem quae in nobis sunt, inveniuntur esse multiplicia, variabilia, et defectibilia.
<td>[3] Now, in general, there is one reason for this. Everything that is multiform, mutable, and capable of defect must be reducible to a source in something that is uniform, immutable, and capable of no defect. But all things that are within our power are found to be multiple, variable, and defectible.
<tr valign="top" style="text-align:justify">
<td>Patet enim quod electiones nostrae multiplicitatem habent: cum in diversis et a diversis diversa eligantur. Mutabiles etiam sunt: tum propter animi levitatem, qui non est firmatus in ultimo fine; tum etiam propter mutationem rerum quae nos extra circumstant. Quod autem defectibiles sint, hominum peccata testantur. Divina autem voluntas uniformis est, quia unum volendo, omnia alia vult; et immutabilis et indeficiens; ut in primo ostensum est. Oportet ergo omnium voluntatum et electionum motus in divinam voluntatem reduci. Non autem in aliquam aliam causam: quia solus Deus nostrarum voluntatum et electionum causa est.
<td>[4] It is clear that our acts of choice have the character of multiplicity, since choices are made of different things, by different people, in different ways. They are also mutable, both because of the instability of the mind, which is not firmly fixed on the ultimate end, and also because of the fluctuating character of the things which provide our circumstantial environment. That they are defectible, of course the sins of men testify. But the divine will is uniform, because by willing one object it wills all else, and it is immutable and without defect, as we showed in Book One. So, the movement of all wills and choices must be traced back to the divine will, and not to any other cause, for God alone is the cause of our acts of will and choice.
<tr valign="top" style="text-align:justify">
<td>Similiter autem intelligentia nostra multiplicationem habet: quia ex multis sensibilibus veritatem intelligibilem quasi congregamus. Est etiam mutabilis: quia ex uno in aliud discurrendo procedit, ex notis ad ignota proveniens. Est etiam defectibilis, propter permixtionem phantasiae et sensus: ut errores hominum ostendunt. Angelorum autem cognitiones sunt uniformes: quia ab ipso uno veritatis fonte, scilicet Deo, accipiunt veritatis cognitionem. Est etiam immobilis: quia non discurrendo ab effectibus in causas, aut e converso, sed simplici intuitu puram veritatem de rebus intuentur. Est etiam indefectibilis: cum ipsas rerum naturas seu quidditates intueantur per seipsas, circa quas non potest intellectus errare, sicut nec sensus circa propria sensibilia. Nos autem quidditates rerum ex accidentibus et effectibus coniectamus. Oportet ergo quod nostra intellectualis cognitio reguletur per Angelorum cognitionem.
<td>[5] Likewise, our understanding has the quality of multiplicity, since we gather, as it were, intelligible truth from many sense objects. It is also mutable, for it advances by discursive movement from one thing to another, proceeding from known things to unknown ones. It is, moreover, defectible, because of the admixture of imagination with sensation, as the errors of mankind show. On the other hand, the cognitive acts of the angels are uniform: for they receive the knowledge of truth from one fount of truth; namely, God. Their cognition is also immutable, because they see directly the pure truth about things by a simple intuition, not by a discursive movement from effects to their causes or the reverse. It is even incapable of defect, since they directly intuit the very natures, or quiddities, of things, and understanding cannot err in regard to such objects, just as sense cannot err in regard to proper sensibles. We, however, make guesses as to the quiddities of things from their accidents and effects. Therefore, our intellectual knowledge must be regulated by means of the angels' knowledge.
<tr valign="top" style="text-align:justify">
<td>Rursus, de corporibus humanis, et exterioribus quibus homines utuntur, manifestum est quod est in eis multiplicitas commixtionis et contrarietatis; et non semper eodem modo moventur, quia motus eorum non possunt esse continui; et quod defectibilia sunt per alterationem et corruptionem. Corpora autem caelestia sunt uniformia, utpote simplicia et absque omni contrarietate existentia. Motus etiam eorum sunt uniformes, continui, et semper eodem modo se habentes. Nec in eis potest esse corruptio aut alteratio. Unde necessarium est quod corpora nostra, et alia quae in usum nostrum veniunt, per motus caelestium corporum regulentur.
<td>[6] Again, in regard to human bodies and the external things that men use, it is obvious that there is in them a multiplicity of admixture and contrariety; and that they are not moved uniformly, since their motions cannot be continuous; and that they are defectible through alteration and corruption. In contrast, the celestial bodies are uniform in the way of simple beings with no contrariety in their constitution. Their motions are also uniform, continuous, and always in the same condition. Nor can there be corruption or alteration in them. Hence, it is necessary for our bodies, and the others which come under our use, to be regulated by means of the motions of the celestial bodies.
</table>
<hr></a> <a name="92" id="92">
<table cellpadding="12">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td align="center"><b>Caput 92<br>
Quomodo dicitur aliquis bene fortunatus, et quomodo adiuvetur homo ex superioribus causis</b>
<td align="center"><b>Chapter 92<br>
HOW A PERSON IS FAVORED BY FORTUNE AND HOW MAN IS ASSISTED BY HIGHER CAUSES</b>
<tr valign="top" style="text-align:justify">
<td>Ex his autem apparere potest quomodo aliquis possit dici bene fortunatus.
<td>[1] Next, we can show how a person might be said to be favored by fortune.
<tr valign="top" style="text-align:justify">
<td>Dicitur enim alicui homini bene secundum fortunam contingere, quando aliquod bonum accidit sibi praeter intentionem: sicut cum aliquis, fodiens in agro, invenit thesaurum, quem non quaerebat. Contingit autem aliquem operantem praeter intentionem operari propriam, non tamen praeter intentionem alicuius superioris, cui ipse subest: sicut, si dominus aliquis praecipiat alicui servo quod vadat ad aliquem locum quo ipse alium servum iam miserat, illo ignorante, inventio conservi est praeter intentionem servi missi, non autem praeter intentionem domini mittentis; et ideo, licet per comparationem ad hunc servum sit fortuitum et casuale, non autem per comparationem ad dominum, sed est aliquid ordinatum. Cum igitur homo sit ordinatus secundum corpus sub corporibus caelestibus; secundum intellectum vero sub Angelis; secundum voluntatem autem sub Deo: potest contingere aliquid praeter intentionem hominis quod tamen est secundum ordinem caelestium corporum, vel dispositionem Angelorum, vel etiam Dei. Quamvis autem Deus solus directe ad electionem hominis operetur, tamen actio Angeli operatur aliquid ad electionem hominis per modum persuasionis: actio vero corporis caelestis per modum disponentis, inquantum corporales impressiones caelestium corporum in corpora nostra disponunt ad aliquas electiones. Quando igitur aliquis ex impressione superiorum causarum, secundum praedictum modum, inclinatur ad aliquas electiones sibi utiles, quarum tamen utilitatem propria ratione non cognoscit; et cum hoc, ex lumine intellectualium substantiarum, illuminatur intellectus eius ad eadem agenda; et ex divina operatione inclinatur voluntas eius ad aliquid eligendum sibi utile cuius rationem ignorat: dicitur esse bene fortunatus; et e contrario male fortunatus, quando ex superioribus causis ad contraria eius electio inclinatur; sicut de quodam dicitur Ierem. 22-30: scribe virum istum sterilem, qui in diebus suis non prosperabitur.
<td>[2] In fact, we say that some good fortune has befallen a man “when something good happens to him, without his having intended it.” For example, a man digging in a field may find a treasure for which he was not looking. Now, something may happen to a certain agent which is not intended by him as he is doing his job, but which is not unintended by the superior under whom he is working. Suppose, for instance, a master orders a servant to go to a certain place to which the master has already sent another servant, unknown to the first one; the encounter with his fellow servant is not intended by the servant who has been sent, but it is not unintended by the master who sent him. And so, though the meeting is fortuitous and a matter of chance to this servant, it is not so to the master, but has been a planned event. So, since man is ordered in regard to his body under the celestial bodies, in regard to his intellect under the angels, and in regard to his will under God—it is quite possible for something apart from man’s intention to happen, which is, however, in accord with the ordering of the celestial bodies, or with the control of the angels, or even of God. For, though God alone directly works on the choice made by man, the action of an angel does have some effect on man’s choice by way of persuasion, and the action of a celestial body by way of disposition, in the sense that the corporeal impressions of celestial bodies on our bodies give a disposition to certain choices. So, when as a result of the influence of higher causes in the foregoing way a man is inclined toward certain choices that are beneficial to him, but whose benefit he does not know by his own reasoning, and when besides this his intellect is illuminated by the light of intellectual substances so that he may do these things, and when his will is inclined by divine working to choose something beneficial to him while he is ignorant of its nature, he is said to be favored by fortune. And, on the contrary, he is said to be subject to misfortune when his choice is inclined to contrary results by higher causes, as is said of a certain man: “Write this man barren, a man that shall not prosper in his days” (Jer. 22:30).
<tr valign="top" style="text-align:justify">
<td>Sed in hoc est attendenda differentia. Nam impressiones corporum caelestium in corpora nostra causant in nobis naturales corporum dispositiones. Et ideo ex dispositione relicta ex corpore caelesti in corpore nostro dicitur aliquis non solum bene fortunatus aut male, sed etiam bene naturatus vel male: secundum quem modum philosophus dicit, in magnis moralibus, quod bene fortunatum est esse bene naturatum. Non enim potest intelligi quod hoc ex natura intellectus diversa procedat, quod unus utilia sibi eligit et alius nociva praeter rationem propriam, cum natura intellectus et voluntatis in omnibus hominibus sit una: diversitas enim formalis induceret diversitatem secundum speciem; diversitas autem materialis inducit diversitatem secundum numerum. Unde secundum quod intellectus hominis illustratur ad aliquid agendum, vel voluntas a Deo instigatur, non dicitur homo bene natus sed magis custoditus vel gubernatus.
<td>[3] But, on this point, a difference is to be noted. The impressions of celestial bodies on our bodies cause natural dispositions of our bodies within us. Thus, as a result of a disposition left by a celestial body in our body, a man is called not merely fortunate or unfortunate, but also well or ill favored by nature, and it is in this way that the Philosopher says, in his <i>Magna Moralia</i>, that a man favored by fortune is also favored by nature. Indeed, this fact, that one man chooses things beneficial to him, whereas another man chooses things harmful to him, apart from their proper reasoning, cannot be understood as resulting from differences of intellectual nature, because the nature of intellect and will is one in all men. In fact, a formal diversity would lead to a difference according to species, whereas a material diversity leads to a numerical difference. Hence, in so far as man’s intellect is enlightened for the performance of some action, or as his will is prompted by God, the man is not said to be favored by birth, but, rather, well guarded or well governed.
<tr valign="top" style="text-align:justify">
<td>Rursus, attendenda est circa hoc alia differentia. Nam operatio Angeli, et corporis caelestis, est solum sicut disponens ad electionem: operatio autem Dei est sicut perficiens. Cum autem dispositio quae est ex corporis qualitate, vel intellectus persuasione, necessitatem ad eligendum non inducat, non semper homo eligit illud quod Angelus custodiens intendit, neque illud ad quod corpus caeleste inclinat. Semper tamen hoc homo eligit secundum quod Deus operatur in eius voluntate. Unde custodia Angelorum interdum cassatur, secundum illud Ierem. 51-9: curavimus Babylonem, et non est curata; et multo magis inclinatio caelestium corporum; divina vero providentia semper est firma.
<td>[4] Again, another difference on this matter is to be observed. As a matter of fact, the operation of an angel and of a celestial body is merely like something disposing toward choice; while God’s operation is like something perfecting. Now, since a disposition which results from a quality of the body, or from an intellectual persuasion, does not bring necessity to the act of choice, a man does not always choose what his guardian angel intends, or that toward which a celestial body gives inclination. But a man does choose in all cases the object in accord with God’s operation within his will. Consequently, the guardianship of the angels is sometimes frustrated, according to this text: “We would have cured Babylon, but she is not healed” (Jer. 51:9); and still more is this true of the inclination of the celestial bodies, but divine providence is always steadfast.
<tr valign="top" style="text-align:justify">
<td>Est etiam et alia differentia consideranda. Nam cum corpus caeleste non disponat ad electionem nisi inquantum imprimit in corpora nostra, ex quibus homo incitatur ad eligendum per modum quo passiones inducunt ad electionem; omnis dispositio ad electionem quae est ex corporibus caelestibus, est per modum alicuius passionis; sicut cum quis inducitur ad aliquid eligendum per odium vel amorem, vel iram, vel aliquid huiusmodi. Ab Angelo vero disponitur aliquis ad eligendum per modum intelligibilis considerationis, absque passione. Quod quidem contingit dupliciter. Quandoque enim illuminatur intellectus hominis ab Angelo ad cognoscendum solum quod aliquid est bonum fieri, non autem instruitur de ratione propter quam est bonum, quae sumitur ex fine. Et ideo quandoque homo aestimat quod aliquid sit bonum fieri, si tamen quaereretur quare, responderet se nescire. Unde, quando perveniet in finem utilem quem non praeconsideravit, erit sibi fortuitum. Quandoque vero per illuminationem Angeli instruitur et quod hoc sit bonum, et de ratione quare est bonum, quae pendet ex fine. Et sic, quando perveniet ad finem quem praeconsideravit, non erit fortuitum. Sciendum est etiam quod vis activa spiritualis naturae, sicut est altior quam corporalis, ita etiam est universalior. Unde non ad omnia ad quae se extendit humana electio, se extendit dispositio caelestis corporis.
<td>[5] Moreover, there is still another difference to be considered. Since a celestial body does not dispose to a choice, unless it makes an impression on our body by which man is stimulated to choose in the way that passions induce one to choose, every disposition to choice which results from the celestial bodies works by means of some passion, as when a person is led to choose something by means of hatred, or love, or anger, or some similar passion. But a person is disposed to an act of choice by an angel, by means of an intellectual consideration, without passion. In fact, this happens in two ways. Sometimes, a man’s understanding is enlightened by an angel to know only that something is a good thing to be done, but it is not instructed as to the reason why it is a good, since this reason is derived from the end. Thus, at times, a man thinks that something is a good thing to be done, “but, if he be asked why, he would answer that he does not know. Hence, when he reaches a beneficial end, to which he has given no thought before, it will be fortuitous for him. But sometimes he is instructed by angelic illumination, both that this act is good and as to the reason why it is good, which depends on the end. And if this be so, when he reaches the end which he has thought about before, it will not be fortuitous. We should also note that, just as the active power of a spiritual nature is higher than a corporeal one, so also is it more universal. Consequently, the disposition resulting from a celestial body does not extend to all the objects which human choice covers.
<tr valign="top" style="text-align:justify">
<td>Rursumque, virtus humanae animae, vel etiam Angeli, est particularis in comparatione ad virtutem divinam, quae quidem est universalis respectu omnium entium. Sic igitur aliquod bonum accidere potest homini et praeter propriam intentionem; et praeter inclinationem caelestium corporum; et praeter Angelorum illuminationem; non autem praeter divinam providentiam, quae est gubernativa sicut et factiva entis inquantum est ens, unde oportet quod omnia sub se contineat. Sic ergo aliquid fortuitum bonum vel malum potest contingere homini et per comparationem ad ipsum; et per comparationem ad caelestia corpora; et per comparationem ad Angelos; non autem per comparationem ad Deum. Nam per comparationem ad ipsum, non solum in rebus humanis, sed nec in aliqua re potest esse aliquid casuale et improvisum.
<td>[6] Still another point: the power of the human soul, or also of an angel, is particularized in comparison with divine power which, in fact, is universal in regard to all beings. Thus, then, some good thing may happen to a man which is apart from his own intention, and apart from the inclination given by celestial bodies, and apart from the enlightenment coming from the angels—but not apart from divine providence, which is regulative, just as it is productive, of being as such, and, consequently, which must include all things under it. Thus, some good or evil may happen to man that is fortuitous in relation to himself, and in relation to the celestial bodies, and in relation to the angels, but not in relation to God. Indeed, in relation to Him, nothing can be a matter of chance and unforeseen, either in the sphere of human affairs or in any matter.
<tr valign="top" style="text-align:justify">
<td>Quia vero fortuita sunt quae sunt praeter intentionem; bona autem moralia praeter intentionem esse non possunt, cum in electione consistant: respectu eorum non potest dici aliquis bene vel male fortunatus; licet respectu eorum possit aliquis dici bene vel male natus, quando ex naturali dispositione corporis est aptus ad electiones virtutum vel vitiorum. Respectu autem exteriorum bonorum, quae praeter intentionem homini evenire possunt, potest dici homo et bene natus, et bene fortunatus, et a Deo gubernatus, et ab Angelis custoditus.
<td>[7] But, since fortuitous events are those apart from intention, and since moral goods cannot be apart from intention, because they are based on choice, in their case no one can be called well or ill favored by fortune. However, in regard to them, a person can be called well or ill favored by birth; when, as a result of the natural disposition of his body, he is prone to virtuous, or vicious, acts of choice. But in regard to external goods, which can accrue to a man apart from his intention, a man may be said to be both favored by birth and by fortune, and also governed by God and guarded by the angels.
<tr valign="top" style="text-align:justify">
<td>Consequitur autem homo ex superioribus causis et aliud auxilium, quantum ad exitus suarum actionum. Cum enim homo et eligere habeat, et prosequi quae eligit, in utroque a causis superioribus adiuvatur interdum, vel etiam impeditur. Secundum electionem quidem, ut dictum est, inquantum homo vel disponitur ad aliquid eligendum per caelestia corpora; vel quasi illustratur per Angelorum custodiam; vel etiam inclinatur per operationem divinam. Secundum executionem vero, inquantum homo consequitur ex aliqua superiori causa robur et efficaciam ad implendum quod elegit. Quae quidem non solum a Deo et ab Angelis esse potest, sed etiam a corporibus caelestibus, inquantum talis efficacia in corpore sita est. Manifestum est enim quod etiam inanimata corpora quasdam vires et efficacias a caelestibus corporibus consequuntur, etiam praeter eas quae ad qualitates activas et passivas elementorum consequuntur, quas etiam non est dubium caelestibus corporibus esse subiectas: sicut quod magnes attrahat ferrum, habet ex virtute caelestis corporis, et lapides quidam et herbae alias occultas virtutes. Unde nihil prohibet quod etiam aliquis homo habeat ex impressione caelestis corporis aliquam efficaciam in aliquibus corporalibus faciendis, quas alius non habet: puta medicus in sanando, et agricola in plantando, et miles in pugnando.
<td>[8] Moreover, man may obtain from higher causes still another help in regard to the outcome of his actions. For, since a man has both the ability to choose and to carry out what he chooses, he may at times be assisted by higher causes in regard to both or he may also be hindered. In regard to choice, of course, as we said, man is either disposed by the celestial bodies to choose something, or he is enlightened by the guardianship of the angels, or even he is inclined by divine operation. But in regard to the carrying out of the choice man may obtain from a higher cause the strength and efficacy needed to accomplish what he has chosen. Now, this can come not only from God and the angels, but also from the celestial bodies, to the extent that such efficacy is located in his body. For it is obvious that inanimate bodies also obtain certain powers and abilities from the celestial bodies, even beyond those which go along with the active and passive qualities of the elements, which, doubtless, are also subject to the celestial bodies. Thus, the fact that a magnet attracts iron is due to the power of a celestial body, and so have certain stones and herbs other hidden powers. So, nothing prevents a man, too, from getting, as a result of the influence of a celestial body, a certain special efficiency in doing some bodily actions, which another man does not possess: for instance, a physician in regard to healing, a farmer in regard to planting, and a soldier in regard to fighting.
<tr valign="top" style="text-align:justify">
<td>Hanc autem efficaciam multo perfectius Deus hominibus largitur ad sua opera efficaciter exequenda. Quantum ergo ad primum auxilium, quod est in eligendo, dicitur Deus hominem dirigere. Quantum vero ad secundum auxilium, dicitur hominem confortare. Et haec duo auxilia tanguntur simul in Psalmo, ubi dicitur, dominus illuminatio mea, et salus mea, quem timebo? Quantum ad primum; dominus protector vitae meae, a quo trepidabo? Quantum ad secundum.
<td>[9] Now, in a much more perfect way, God lavishes on man this special efficiency in the carrying out of His works efficaciously. So, in regard to the first kind of help, which applies to the act of choosing, God is said to direct man, whereas in regard to the second kind of help He is said to strengthen man. And these two forms of help are touched on together in the Psalms (26:1), where it is said in regard to the first: “The Lord is my light and my salvation, whom shall I fear?” and in regard to the second: “The Lord is the protector of my life, of whom shall I be afraid?”
<tr valign="top" style="text-align:justify">
<td>Sed inter haec duo auxilia est differentia duplex. Prima quidem, quia ex auxilio primo adiuvatur homo tam in his quae virtuti hominis subduntur, quam etiam in aliis. Sed secundum auxilium ad illa tantum se extendit ad quae virtus hominis valet. Quod enim homo fodiens sepulcrum inveniat thesaurum, ex nulla hominis virtute procedit: unde respectu talis proventus, adiuvari potest homo in hoc quod instigetur ad quaerendum ubi est thesaurus; non autem in hoc quod ei aliqua virtus detur ad thesaurum inveniendum. In hoc autem quod medicus sanet, vel miles in pugna vincat, potest adiuvari et in hoc quod eligat convenientia ad finem, et in hoc quod efficaciter exequatur per virtutem a superiori causa adeptam. Unde primum auxilium est universalius. Secunda differentia est, quia secundum auxilium datur ad prosequendum efficaciter ea quae intendit. Unde, cum fortuita sint praeter intentionem, ex tali auxilio non potest dici homo, proprie loquendo, bene fortunatus, sicut potest dici ex primo, ut supra ostensum est.
<td>[10] But there are two differences between these two helps. First, man is assisted by the first kind of help, both in regard to things subject to the power of man, and also in regard to other things. But the second sort of help extends only to things of which man’s power is capable. Indeed, the fact that a man digging a grave discovers a treasure results from no power of man; so, in regard to such an outcome, man may be helped by the fact that be is prompted to look in the place where the treasure is, not, however, in the sense that he is given any power to find treasure. But, in the case of the physician healing, or the soldier winning a fight, he may be helped in regard to the end, and also in the sense that he may carry out the choice efficaciously, by means of a power acquired from a higher cause. Hence, the first kind of help is more universal. The second difference is that the second help is given to carry out efficaciously what he intends. Consequently, since fortuitous events are apart from one’s intention, man cannot, properly speaking, be called fortunate as a result of such help, as he can be from the first, as we showed above.
<tr valign="top" style="text-align:justify">
<td>Contingit autem homini bene vel male secundum fortunam, quandoque quidem ipso solo agente, sicut cum fodiens in terram invenit thesaurum quiescentem: quandoque autem actione alterius causae concurrente, sicut cum aliquis vadens ad forum causa emendi, invenit debitorem, quem non credebat invenire. In primo autem eventu, homo adiuvatur ad hoc quod aliquid sibi bene contingat, secundum hoc solum quod dirigitur in eligendo illud cui coniunctum est per accidens aliquod commodum quod provenit praeter intentionem. In secundo autem eventu, oportet quod uterque agens dirigatur ad eligendum actionem vel motum unde sibi occurrant.
<td>[11] Now, it is possible for a man to be well or ill favored by fortune, in some cases, when he is the sole agent, as for instance, when he is digging in the earth, he finds a treasure lying there. In other cases, it may result from the action of another concurrent cause, as when the man going to market to buy something encounters a debtor whom he did not think he would find. Now, in the first case, the man is helped so that something good happens to him, only in the fact that he is directed to the choosing of an object to which something advantageous is attached, and this comes about apart from his intention. But in the second case, both agents must be directed to choose the action, or movement, which is the occasion for their meeting.
<tr valign="top" style="text-align:justify">
<td>Oportet autem et aliud considerare circa ea quae praedicta sunt. Dictum est enim quod ad hoc quod homini aliquid bene contingat vel male secundum fortunam, et ex Deo est, et ex corpore caelesti esse potest: inquantum homo a Deo inclinatur ad eligendum aliquid cui coniunctum est aliquod commodum vel incommodum quod eligens non praeconsiderat; et inquantum a corpore caelesti ad tale aliquid eligendum disponitur. Hoc autem commodum vel incommodum quidem, relatum ad electionem hominis, est fortuitum; relatum ad Deum, rationem amittit fortuiti; non autem relatum ad corpus caeleste.
<td>[12] We must consider another thing in regard to what was said above. For we said that, in order for something favorable or unfavorable to happen to a man on the basis of fortune, the help can come from God, and it can also come from a celestial body: in so far as a man is inclined by God to choose something with which there is combined an advantageous, or disadvantageous, result which the chooser has not thought of before, and in so far as he is disposed by a celestial body to choose such an object. Now, this advantage, or disadvantage, is fortuitous in regard to man’s choice; in regard to God, it loses the character of the fortuitous, but not in regard to the celestial body.
<tr valign="top" style="text-align:justify">
<td>Quod sic patet. Non enim aliquis eventus amittit rationem fortuiti nisi reducatur in causam per se. Virtus autem caelestis corporis est causa agens, non per modum intellectus et electionis, sed per modum naturae. Naturae autem est proprium tendere ad unum. Si ergo aliquis effectus non est unus, non potest per se esse causa eius aliqua virtus naturalis. Cum autem aliqua duo sibi per accidens coniunguntur, non sunt vere unum, sed solum per accidens. Unde huius coniunctionis nulla causa naturalis per se causa esse potest. Sit ergo quod iste homo ex impressione caelestis corporis instigetur, per modum passionis, ut dictum est, ad fodiendum sepulcrum. Sepulcrum autem, et locus thesauri, non sunt unum nisi per accidens: quia non habent aliquem ordinem ad invicem. Unde virtus caelestis corporis non potest per se inclinare ad hoc totum, quod iste fodiat sepulcrum et locum ubi est thesaurus. Sed aliquis per intellectum agens potest esse causa inclinationis in hoc totum: quia intelligentis est multa ordinare in unum. Patet etiam quod etiam homo qui sciret thesaurum esse ibi, posset alium ignorantem mittere ad fodiendum sepulcrum in loco eodem, ut, praeter intentionem suam, inveniret thesaurum. Sic ergo huiusmodi fortuiti eventus, reducti in causam divinam, amittunt rationem fortuiti: reducti vero in causam caelestem, nequaquam.
<td>This becomes evident, as follows. In fact, an event does not lose its fortuitous character unless it may be referred back to a direct cause. But the power of a celestial body is an agent cause, not by way of understanding and choice, but as a nature. Now, it is proper for a nature to tend to one objective. So, if an effect is not simply one result, then its direct cause cannot be a natural power. But, when two things are combined with each other accidentally, they are not truly one, but only accidentally so. Hence, there can be no direct, natural cause for this union. Let us suppose, then, that a certain man is prompted to dig a grave by the influence of a celestial body, working by way of a passion as we said. Now, the grave and the location of the treasure are one only accidentally, for they have no relation to each other. Hence, the power of the celestial body cannot directly give an inclination toward this entire result: that this man should dig this grave and that it should be done at the place where the treasure is. But an agent working through understanding can be the cause of an inclination to this entire result, for it is proper to an intelligent being to order many things into one. It is clear, indeed, that even a man who knew where the treasure was might send another man who did not know to dig a grave in that same place and thus to find a treasure unintentionally. So, in this way, fortuitous events of this kind, when referred to their divine cause, lose their fortuitous character, but when referred to a celestial cause, they do not.
<tr valign="top" style="text-align:justify">
<td>Per eandem etiam rationem apparet quod homo non potest esse bene fortunatus universaliter ex virtute corporis caelestis, sed solum quantum ad hoc vel illud. Dico autem universaliter, ut aliquis homo habeat in natura sua, ex impressione caelestis corporis, ut eligat semper, vel in pluribus, aliqua quibus sint coniuncta per accidens aliqua commoda vel incommoda. Natura enim non ordinatur nisi ad unum. Ea autem secundum quae homini accidit bene vel male secundum fortunam, non sunt reducibilia in aliquid unum, sed sunt indeterminata et infinita: ut philosophus docet in II Phys., et ad sensum patet. Non est ergo possibile quod aliquis habeat in natura sua eligere semper ea ad quae etiam per accidens sequuntur aliqua commoda. Sed potest esse quod ex inclinatione caelesti inclinetur ad eligendum aliquid cui coniungitur per accidens aliquod commodum; et ex alia inclinatione aliud; et ex tertia tertium; non autem ita quod ex una inclinatione ad omnia. Ex una autem divina dispositione potest homo ad omnia dirigi.
<td>[13] It is also apparent by the same reasoning that a man cannot be universally favored by fortune through the power of a celestial body, but only in regard to this or that incident. I say universally, meaning that a man might have the ability in his nature, resulting from the influence of a celestial body, to choose always, or in most cases, objects to which certain advantages or disadvantages are accidentally connected. For nature is ordered to one result only. But these factors, in terms of which good or bad fortune befalls a man, are not reducible to any one thing; rather, they are indeterminate and indefinite, as the Philosopher teaches in <i>Physics</i> II, and as is clear to our senses. So, it is not possible for a man to have the ability in his nature to choose always those objects from which advantageous results accidentally follow. But it is possible that, by celestial influence, he may be inclined to choose one thing to which an advantage is accidentally attached; then, from another inclination to another advantage; and from a third to a third advantage; but not in such a way that all such advantages would follow from one inclination. However, from one divine disposition a man can be directed to all results.
</table>
<hr></a> <a name="93" id="93">
<table cellpadding="12">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td align="center"><b>Caput 93<br>
De fato: an sit, et quid sit</b>
<td align="center"><b>Chapter 93<br>
ON FATE: WHETHER AND WHAT IT IS</b>
<tr valign="top" style="text-align:justify">
<td>Ex his autem quae praemissa sunt, apparet quid sit de fato sentiendum.
<td>[1] It is evident from the points set forth above what view we should take regarding fate.
<tr valign="top" style="text-align:justify">
<td>Videntes enim homines multa in hoc mundo per accidens contingere, si causae particulares considerentur, posuerunt quidam quod nec etiam ab aliquibus superioribus causis ordinentur. Et his videbatur fatum nihil esse omnino.
<td>[2] Indeed, men observe that many things happen by accident in this world if their particular causes be considered, and some men have maintained that they are not even ordered by higher causes. To these people it has appeared that there is no fate at all.
<tr valign="top" style="text-align:justify">
<td>Quidam vero ea in aliquas altiores causas reducere sunt conati, ex quibus cum quadam dispositione ordinate procedant. Et hi fatum posuerunt: quasi ea quae videntur a casu contingere, sint ab aliquo effata, sive praelocuta, et praeordinata ut essent.
<td>[3] But others have attempted to reduce these events to certain higher causes from which they result in an orderly way, in accord with a definite plan. These people have asserted that there is fate in the sense that things observed to happen by chance are “pre-fated,” that is, foretold and pre-ordained to happen.
<tr valign="top" style="text-align:justify">
<td>Horum ergo quidam omnia quae hic accidunt a casu contingentia, reducere sunt conati sicut in causas in caelestia corpora, etiam electiones humanas, vim dispositionis siderum, cui omnia cum quadam necessitate subdi ponebant, fatum appellantes. Quae quidem positio impossibilis est, et a fide aliena, ut ex superioribus patet.
<td>[4] Some of these people, then, have tried to reduce all contingent events which occur by chance, here below, to causes among the celestial bodies, and even human acts of choice to the controlling power of the stars; to which power all things are subject, they claimed, with a certain necessity which they called fate. Of course, this theory is impossible and foreign to the faith, as is clear from our preceding considerations.
<tr valign="top" style="text-align:justify">
<td>Quidam vero in dispositionem divinae providentiae omnia reducere voluerunt, quaecumque in his inferioribus a casu contingere videntur. Unde omnia fato agi dixerunt, ordinationem quae est in rebus ex divina providentia fatum nominantes. Unde Boetius dicit quod fatum est inhaerens rebus mobilibus dispositio, per quam providentia suis quaeque nectit ordinibus. In qua fati descriptione, dispositio pro ordinatione ponitur. In rebus autem inhaerens ponitur ut distinguatur fatum a providentia: nam ipsa ordinatio secundum quod in mente divina est, nondum rebus impressa, providentia est; secundum vero quod iam est explicata in rebus, fatum nominatur. Mobilibus autem dicit ut ostendat quod ordo providentiae rebus contingentiam et mobilitatem non aufert, ut quidam posuerunt.
<td>[5] On the other hand, some men have desired to reduce to the control of divine providence all things whatsoever that appear to happen by chance in these lower beings. Hence, they said that all things are done by fate, meaning by fate the ordering which is found in things as a result of divine providence. Thus, Boethius says [ <i>De consol. phil.</i> IV, 6]: “fate is a disposition inherent in mutable things, whereby providence connects each thing with His orders.” In this description of fate, “disposition” is used for ordering; while the phrase “inherent in things” is used to distinguish fate from providence; since the ordering, as present in the divine mind and not yet impressed on things, is providence, but, as already unfolded in things, it is called fate. Moreover, he speaks of “mutable things” to show that the order of providence does not take away contingency and mobility from things, as some men have claimed.
<tr valign="top" style="text-align:justify">
<td>Secundum hanc ergo acceptionem, negare fatum est providentiam divinam negare. Sed quia cum infidelibus nec nomina debemus habere communia, ne ex consortio nominum possit sumi erroris occasio; nomine fati non est a fidelibus utendum, ne videamur illis assentire qui male de fato senserunt, omnia necessitati siderum subiicientes. Unde Augustinus dicit, in V de civitate Dei: si quis voluntatem vel potestatem Dei fati nomine appellat, sententiam teneat, linguam corrigat. Et Gregorius, secundum eundem intellectum, dicit: absit a fidelium mentibus ut fatum aliquid esse dicant.
<td>[6] So, according to this meaning, to deny fate is to deny providence. But, since we should not even have names in common with unbelievers, lest occasion for error could be taken from the association of names, the name fate is not to be used by the faithful lest we appear to agree with those who have held a wrong opinion about fate, by subjecting all things to the necessitation of the stars. Consequently, Augustine says, in Book V of the <i>City of God</i>: “If any man calls the will, or power, of God by the name, fate, let him hold his view, but correct his way of speaking.” And also Gregory, in accord with the same understanding of it, says: “Far be it from the minds of the faithful to say that there is any fate.”
</table>
<hr></a> <a name="94" id="94">
<table cellpadding="12">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td align="center"><b>Caput 94<br>
De certitudine divinae providentiae</b>
<td align="center"><b>Chapter 94<br>
ON THE CERTAINTY OF DIVINE PROVIDENCE</b>
<tr valign="top" style="text-align:justify">
<td>Difficultas autem quaedam ex praemissis suboritur. Si enim omnia quae hic inferius aguntur, etiam contingentia, providentiae divinae subduntur, oportet, ut videtur, vel providentiam non esse certam; vel omnia ex necessitate contingere.
<td>[1] Now, there is a difficulty that arises out of the foregoing. If all things that are done here below, even contingent events, are subject to divine providence, then, seemingly, either providence cannot be certain or else all things happen by necessity.
<tr valign="top" style="text-align:justify">
<td>Ostendit enim philosophus, in VI Metaph., quod, si omnem effectum ponimus habere aliquam causam per se; et iterum quod, qualibet causa per se posita, necessarium sit effectum poni: sequetur quod omnia futura ex necessitate eveniant. Si enim quilibet effectus habeat causam per se, quodlibet futurum erit reducere in aliquam causam praesentem vel praeteritam. Sicut, si quaeratur de aliquo utrum sit occidendus a latronibus, huius effectus praecedit causa occursus latronum; hunc autem effectum iterum praecedit alia causa, scilicet quod ipse exivit domum; hunc autem adhuc alia, quod vult quaerere aquam; quam quidem praecedit causa, scilicet sitis; et haec causatur ex comestione salsorum; quod iam est vel fuit. Si ergo, causa posita, necesse est effectum poni, necesse est, si comedit salsa, quod sitiat; et si sitit, quod velit quaerere aquam; et si vult quaerere aquam, quod exeat domum; et si exit domum, quod occurrant ei latrones; et si occurrunt, quod occidatur. Ergo, de primo ad ultimum, necesse est hunc comedentem salsa a latronibus occidi. Concludit ergo philosophus non esse verum quod, posita causa, necesse sit effectum poni: quia aliquae causae sunt quae possunt deficere. Neque iterum verum est quod omnis effectus habeat per se causam: quia quod est per accidens, scilicet istum volentem aquam quaerere occurrere latronibus, non habet aliquam causam.
<td>[2] In fact, the Philosopher shows in the <i>Metaphysics</i> [V, 3] that, if we assert that every effect has a direct cause, and again that, given any direct cause we must necessarily grant its effect, it follows that all future events come about by necessity. For, if each effect has a direct cause, then any future effect will be reducible to a present or past cause. Thus, if we ask whether a certain man is to be killed by robbers, the cause preceding this effect is his encounter with the robbers; and, in turn, another cause precedes this effect, namely, the fact that he went out of his home; still another precedes this, that he wished to look for water; and a cause precedes this, namely, his thirst; and this was caused by the eating of salted foods; and this eating is going on now, or was done in the past. Therefore, if it be so, that, granted the cause, the effect must be granted, then necessarily, if he cats salt foods, he must get thirsty; and if he is thirsty, he must desire to get water; and if he desires to get water, he must go out of his home; and if he leaves his home, the robbers must encounter him; and if they encounter him, he must be killed. So, from the first to the last, it is necessary for this eater of salty foods to be killed by robbers. Therefore, the Philosopher concludes that it is not true that, granted the cause, the effect must be granted; since there are some causes which can fail. Again, it is not true that every effect has a direct cause, for something that comes about accidentally, for instance, that this man who wishes to look for water encounters the robbers, has no cause.
<tr valign="top" style="text-align:justify">
<td>Ex hac autem ratione apparet quod omnes effectus qui reducuntur in aliquam causam per se, praesentem vel praeteritam, qua posita necesse sit effectum poni, ex necessitate contingunt. Vel ergo oportet dicere quod non omnes effectus divinae providentiae subdantur. Et sic providentia non est de omnibus. Quod prius fuit ostensum. Vel non est necessarium ut, providentia posita, effectus eius ponatur. Et sic providentia non est certa. Aut est necessarium quod omnia ex necessitate contingant. Providentia enim non solum est in praesenti tempore vel praeterito, sed aeterno: quia nihil potest esse in Deo non aeternum.
<td>[3] Now, by this reasoning it appears that all effects that may be reduced to some direct cause, present or past, which when granted requires that the effect be granted must of necessity happen. Either, then, we must say that not all effects are subject to divine providence and, thus, that providence does not apply to all—but we showed earlier that it does; or else it is not necessarily so, that, granted providence, its effect must be granted, and thus providence is not certain; or, finally, it is necessary for all things to happen by necessity. For providence is not only in present or past time, but in eternity, since nothing can be in God that is not eternal.
<tr valign="top" style="text-align:justify">
<td>Adhuc. Si divina providentia est certa, oportet hanc conditionalem esse veram: si Deus providit hoc, hoc erit. Huius autem conditionalis antecedens est necessarium: quia est aeternum. Ergo consequens est necessarium: oportet enim omnis conditionalis consequens esse necessarium cuius antecedens est necessarium; et ideo consequens est sicut conclusio antecedentis; quicquid autem ex necessario sequitur, oportet esse necessarium. Sequitur igitur, si divina providentia est certa, quod omnia ex necessitate proveniant.
<td>[4] Again, if divine providence is certain, then this conditional proposition must be true: If God foresees this, then this will happen. Now, the antecedent of this conditional proposition is necessary, for He is eternal. Therefore, the consequent is necessary, for every consequent in a conditional proposition must be necessary when the antecedent is necessary. So, the consequent is like the conclusion of the antecedent, and whatever follows from a necessary proposition must be necessary. Therefore, it follows that, if divine providence is certain, all things must occur by necessity.
<tr valign="top" style="text-align:justify">
<td>Amplius. Sit aliquid esse provisum a Deo, puta quod talis sit regnaturus. Aut ergo possibile est accidere quod non regnet: aut non. Si quidem non est possibile ipsum non regnare, ergo impossibile est ipsum non regnare: ergo necessarium est eum regnare. Si autem possibile est eum non regnare; possibili autem posito, non sequitur aliquid impossibile; sequitur autem divinam providentiam deficere; non est igitur impossibile divinam providentiam deficere. Aut igitur oportet, si omnia sunt provisa a Deo, quod divina providentia non sit certa; aut quod omnia ex necessitate eveniant.
<td>[5] Besides, suppose that something is foreseen by God; for example, that a certain man will become a ruler. Now, it is either possible that be will not rule, or it is not. But, if it is not possible that be will not rule, then it is impossible for him not to rule; therefore, it is necessary for him to rule. However, if it is possible that he will not rule, and if, given the possible something impossible does not follow, then it does follow that divine providence will fail; hence, it is not impossible for divine providence to fail. Therefore, it is either necessary, if all things are foreseen by God, that divine providence be not certain or else that all things happen by necessity.
<tr valign="top" style="text-align:justify">
<td>Item. Argumentatur sic Tullius, in libro de divinatione. Si omnia a Deo provisa sunt, certus est ordo causarum. Si autem hoc verum est, omnia fato aguntur. Quod si omnia fato aguntur, nihil est in nostra potestate, nullum est voluntatis arbitrium. Sequitur igitur quod tollatur liberum arbitrium, si divina providentia sit certa. Et eodem modo sequetur quod omnes causae contingentes tollantur.
<td>[6] Moreover, Tully argues as follows, in his book <i>On Divination</i> [II, 7]: if all things are foreseen by God, the order of causes is certain. But, if this is true, all things are done by fate. And if all things are done by fate, nothing is within our power, there is no volitional choice. Therefore, it follows that free choice is taken away if divine providence be certain. And in the same way it will follow that all contingent causes are taken away.
<tr valign="top" style="text-align:justify">
<td>Praeterea. Divina providentia causas medias non excludit, ut supra ostensum est. Inter causas autem sunt aliquae contingentes et deficere valentes. Deficere igitur potest providentiae effectus. Non est igitur Dei providentia certa.
<td>[7] Furthermore, divine providence does not exclude intermediate causes, as we showed above, But, among causes, some are contingent and capable of failing. So, it is possible for an effect of providence to fail. Therefore, God’s providence is not certain.
<tr valign="top" style="text-align:justify">
<td>Oportet autem, ad horum solutionem, aliqua repetere ex his quae supra posita sunt: ut manifestum fiat quod nihil divinam providentiam effugit; et quod ordo divinae providentiae omnino immutari non potest; nec tamen oportet quod ea quae ex providentia divina proveniunt, ex necessitate cuncta eveniant.
<td>[8] However, for the purpose of answering these arguments, we must repeat some of the observations put down before, so that it may be made clear that nothing escapes divine providence; also, that the order of divine providence cannot possibly be changed; and yet that it is not necessary for all things to happen of necessity simply because they come about as a result of divine providence.
<tr valign="top" style="text-align:justify">
<td>Primo namque considerandum est quod, cum Deus sit omnium existentium causa, rebus omnibus conferens esse, oportet quod suae providentiae ordo omnes res complectatur. Quibus enim esse largitus est, oportet quod et conservationem largiatur, et perfectionem conferat in ultimo fine.
<td>[9] First, then, we must consider the fact that, since God is the cause of all existing things, giving being to all, the order of His providence must embrace all things. Indeed, on the things on which He has lavished being He must also lavish preservation and guide them toward perfection in their ultimate end.
<tr valign="top" style="text-align:justify">
<td>Cum autem in quolibet providente duo considerari oporteat, scilicet ordinis praemeditationem, et praemeditati ordinis institutionem in rebus quae providentiae subduntur, quorum primum ad cognoscitivam virtutem pertinet, aliud vero ad operativam: hoc inter utrumque differt, quod in praemeditando ordinem, tanto est providentia perfectior, quanto magis usque ad minima ordo providentiae potest produci. Quod enim nos omnium particularium ordinem praemeditari non possumus circa ea quae sunt disponenda a nobis, ex defectu nostrae cognitionis provenit, quae cuncta singularia complecti non potest, tanto autem in providendo unusquisque solertior habetur, quanto plura singularia praemeditari potest; cuius autem provisio in solis universalibus consisteret, parum de prudentia participaret. Simile autem in omnibus operativis artibus considerari potest. Sed in hoc quod ordo praemeditatus rebus imponitur, tanto est dignior et perfectior providentia gubernantis, quanto est universalior, et per plura ministeria suam explicat praemeditationem: quia et ipsa ministeriorum dispositio magnam partem provisi ordinis habet.
<td>[10] Now, two things must be considered in the case of any provident agent—namely, premeditation of the order, and the establishment of the premeditated order—in the things that are subject to providence. The first of these pertains to the cognitive power, while the second belongs to the operative. Between the two there is this difference: in the act of premeditating the order, the more perfect that providence is, the more can the order of providence be extended to the smallest details. The fact that we are not able to think out, ahead of time, the order of all particular events in regard to matters to be arranged by us stems from the deficiency of our knowledge, which cannot embrace all singular things. However, the more a person is able to think ahead about a plurality of singular things, the more adroit does he become in his foresight, while the man whose foresight is restricted to universals only participates but little in prudence. Now, a similar consideration can be made in regard to all the operative arts. But, in regard to imposing the premeditated order on things, the providence of a governing agent is more noble and perfect the more universal it is and the more it accomplished his premeditated plan by means of a plurality of ministers, because this controlling of ministers occupies an important place in the order that pertains to foresight.
<tr valign="top" style="text-align:justify">
<td>Oportet autem quod divina providentia in summo perfectionis consistat: quia ipse est simpliciter et universaliter perfectus, ut in primo libro ostensum est. In providendo igitur suae sapientiae meditatione sempiterna omnia ordinat quantumcumque minima videantur: quaecumque vero rerum aliquid operantur, instrumentaliter agunt ab eo mota, et ei obtemperando ministrant, ad ordinem providentiae, ab aeterno, ut ita dicam, excogitatum, explicandum in rebus. Si autem omnia quae agere possunt, necesse est ut in agendo ei ministrent, impossibile est quod aliquod agens divinae providentiae executionem impediat sibi contrarium agendo. Neque etiam possibile est divinam providentiam impediri per defectum alicuius agentis vel patientis: cum omnis virtus activa vel passiva sit in rebus secundum divinam dispositionem causata. Impossibile est etiam quod impediatur divinae providentiae executio per providentis mutationem: cum Deus sit omnino immutabilis, ut supra ostensum est. Relinquitur ergo quod divina provisio omnino cassari non potest.
<td>Moreover, divine providence must consist in the highest position, since He is absolutely and universally perfect, as we showed in Book One. So, in the function of providential foresight, by means of the sempiternal meditative act of His wisdom, He orders all things, no matter how detailed they may appear; and whatever things perform any action, they act instrumentally, as moved by Him. And they obediently serve as His ministers in order to unfold in things the order of providence, which has been thought out, as I might say, from eternity. But, if all things able to act must serve as ministers to Him in their actions, it is impossible for any agent to block the execution of divine providence by acting in opposition to it. Nor is it possible for divine providence to be hindered by the defect of any agent or patient, since every active and passive power is caused in things in accord with divine disposition. It is also impossible for the execution of divine providence to be impeded by a change in the provident Agent, since God is altogether immutable, as we showed above. The conclusion remains, then, that divine foresight is utterly incapable of being frustrated.
<tr valign="top" style="text-align:justify">
<td>Deinceps autem considerandum est quod omne agens intendit ad bonum et melius secundum quod potest, ut supra ostensum est. Bonum autem et melius non eodem modo consideratur in toto et partibus. In toto enim bonum est integritas, quae ex partium ordine et compositione relinquitur. Unde melius est toti quod sit inter partes eius disparitas, sine qua ordo et perfectio totius esse non potest, quam quod omnes partes essent aequales, unaquaque earum perveniente ad gradum nobilissimae partis: quaelibet autem pars inferioris gradus, in se considerata, melior esset si esset in gradu superioris partis. Sicut patet in corpore humano: dignior enim pars esset pes si oculi pulchritudinem et virtutem haberet; corpus autem totum esset imperfectius, si ei officium pedis deesset.
<td>[11] Next, we must consider that every agent intends the good and the better, in so far as he can, as we showed above. But the good and the better are not considered in the same way, in the whole and in the parts. For, in the whole, the good is integrity, which is the result of the order and composition of its parts. Consequently, it is better for there to be an inequality among the parts of the whole, without which the order and perfection of the whole cannot be, than for all its parts to be equal, even if each of them were to exist on the level of the most important part. However, if the parts are considered in themselves, each part of a lower grade would be better if it were on the level of the higher part. This is exemplified in the human body: in fact, the foot would be a more worthy part if it possessed the beauty and power of the eye, but the whole body would be more imperfect if it lacked the functioning of the foot.
<tr valign="top" style="text-align:justify">
<td>Ad aliud igitur tendit intentio particularis agentis, et universalis: nam particulare agens tendit ad bonum partis absolute, et facit eam quanto meliorem potest; universale autem agens tendit ad bonum totius. Unde aliquis defectus est praeter intentionem particularis agentis, qui est secundum intentionem agentis universalis. Sicut patet quod generatio feminae est praeter intentionem naturae particularis, idest, huius virtutis quae est in hoc semine, quae ad hoc tendit quod perficiat conceptum quanto magis potest: est autem de intentione naturae universalis, idest, virtutis universalis agentis ad generationem inferiorum, quod femina generetur, sine qua generatio multorum animalium compleri non posset. Et eodem modo corruptio, et diminutio, et omnis defectus, est de intentione naturae universalis, non autem naturae particularis: nam quaelibet res fugit defectum, tendit vero ad perfectionem, quantum in se est. Patet ergo quod de intentione agentis particularis est quod effectus suus fiat perfectus quantumcumque potest in genere suo: de intentione autem naturae universalis est quod hic effectus fiat perfectus tali perfectione, puta perfectione masculi, ille autem perfectione feminae.
<td>Therefore, the intention of a particular agent tends toward a different objective from that of the universal agent. Indeed, the particular agent tends to the good of the part without qualification, and makes it the best that it can, but the universal agent tends to the good of the whole. As a result, a defect which is in accord with the intention of the universal agent may be apart from the intention of the particular agent. Thus, it is clear that the generation of a female is apart from the intention of a particular nature, that is, of the power which is in this semen which, as much as possible, tends to a perfect result of conception; but it is in accord with the intention of the universal nature, that is, of the power of the universal agent for the generation of inferior beings, that a female be generated; for without a female the generation of a number of animals could not be accomplished. Similarly, corruption, decrease, and every defect pertain to the intention of the universal nature, but not of the particular nature, for each thing avoids defect, and tends to perfection, to the extent that it can. So, it is evident that the intention of the particular agent is that its effect become as perfect as is possible in its kind, but the intention of the universal nature is that this individual effect become perfect in a certain type of perfection, say in male perfection, while another would become so in female perfection.
<tr valign="top" style="text-align:justify">
<td>Inter partes autem totius universi prima distinctio apparet secundum contingens et necessarium: superiora enim in entibus sunt necessaria et incorruptibilia et immobilia; a qua quidem conditione tanto magis deficiunt, quanto in inferiori gradu constituuntur; ita quod infima corrumpuntur quidem quantum ad esse suum, moventur vero quantum ad suas dispositiones, suos etiam effectus non de necessitate, sed contingenter producunt. Quodlibet igitur agens quod est pars universi, intendit quantum potest in suo esse et naturali dispositione persistere, et suum stabilire effectum: Deus autem, qui est universi gubernator, intendit quod effectum eius hic quidem stabiliatur per modum necessitatis, hic autem contingenter. Et secundum hoc diversas eis causas adaptat, his quidem necessarias, his autem contingentes. Cadit igitur sub ordine divinae providentiae non solum hunc effectum esse, sed hunc effectum esse contingenter, alium autem necessario. Et secundum hoc, quaedam eorum quae divinae providentiae subduntur sunt necessaria, quaedam vero contingentia, non autem omnia necessaria.
<td>Now the primary perfection among the parts of the whole universe appears on the basis of the contingent and the necessary. For the higher beings are necessary and incorruptible and immobile, and the more they fall short of this condition, the lower the level on which they are established. Thus, the lowest things may be corrupted even in regard to their being, whereas they are changed in regard to their dispositions, and they produce their effects not necessarily but contingently. So, any agent that is a part of the universe intends as much as possible to persevere in its actual being and natural disposition, and to make its effect stable. However, God, Who is the governor of the universe, intends some of His effects to be established by way of necessity, and others contingently. On this basis, He adapts different causes to them; for one group of effects there are necessary causes, but for another, contingent causes. So, it falls under the order of divine providence not only that this effect is to be, but also that this effect is to be contingently, while another is to be necessarily. Because of this, some of the things that are subject to providence are necessary, whereas others are contingent and not at all necessary.
<tr valign="top" style="text-align:justify">
<td>Patet ergo quod, etsi divina providentia est per se causa huius effectus futuri; et est in praesenti vel praeterito, magis autem ab aeterno: non sequitur, ut prima ratio procedebat, quod effectus iste sit de necessitate futurus; est enim divina providentia per se causa quod hic effectus contingenter proveniat. Et hoc cassari non potest.
<td>[17] So, it is obvious that, though divine providence is the direct cause of an individual future effect, and though it is so in the present, or in the past, indeed from eternity, it does not follow, as the first argument implies, that this individual effect will come about of necessity. For divine providence is the direct cause why this effect occurs contingently. And this cannot be prevented.
<tr valign="top" style="text-align:justify">
<td>Ex quo etiam patet quod haec conditionalis est vera, si Deus providit hoc futurum, hoc erit: sicut secunda ratio procedebat. Sed sic erit sicut Deus providit illud esse futurum. Providit autem illud esse futurum contingenter. Sequitur ergo infallibiliter quod erit contingenter, et non necessario.
<td>[13] From this it is also evident that this conditional proposition is true: If God foresees that this event will be, it will happen, just as the second argument suggested. But it will occur in the way that God foresaw that it would be. Now, He foresaw that it would occur contingently. So, it follows that, without fail, it will occur contingently and not necessarily.
<tr valign="top" style="text-align:justify">
<td>Patet etiam quod hoc quod ponitur esse provisum a Deo ut sit futurum, si sit de genere contingentium, poterit non esse secundum se consideratum: sic enim provisum est ut sit contingens, potens non esse. Non tamen est possibile quod ordo providentiae deficiat quin contingenter eveniat. Et sic tertia ratio solvitur. Unde potest poni quod iste non sit regnaturus si secundum se consideretur: non autem si consideretur ut provisum.
<td>[14] It is also clear that, if this thing which, we grant, is foreseen by God as to occur in the future belongs in the genus of contingent beings, it will be possible for it, considered in itself, not to be; for thus is it foreseen, as something that is contingent, as able not to be. Yet it is not possible for the order of providence to fail in regard to its coming into being contingently. Thus the third argument is answered. Consequently, it can be maintained that this man may not become a ruler if he be considered in himself, but not if he be considered as an object of divine foresight.
<tr valign="top" style="text-align:justify">
<td>Illud etiam quod Tullius obiicit, secundum praemissa frivolum apparet. Cum enim divinae providentiae non solum subdantur effectus, sed etiam causae et modi essendi, sicut ex praemissis patet, non sequitur quod, si omnia divina providentia aguntur, quod nihil sit in nobis. Sic enim sunt a Deo provisa ut per nos libere fiant.
<td>[15] Also, the objection that Tully offers seems frivolous, in view of the foregoing. Indeed, since not only effects are subject to divine providence, but also causes and ways of being, as is obvious from what we have asserted before, it does not follow that, if everything be done by divine providence, nothing is within our power. For the effects are foreseen by God, as they are freely produced by us.
<tr valign="top" style="text-align:justify">
<td>Neque autem defectibilitas causarum secundarum, quibus mediantibus effectus providentiae producuntur, certitudinem divinae providentiae potest auferre, ut quinta ratio procedebat: cum ipse Deus in omnibus operetur, et pro suae arbitrio voluntatis, ut supra ostensum est. Unde ad eius providentiam pertinet ut causas defectibiles quandoque sinat deficere, quandoque eas a defectu conservet.
<td>[16] Nor can the possibility of failure on the part of secondary causes, by means of which the effects of providence are produced, take away the certainty of divine providence, as the fifth argument implied. For God Himself operates in all things, and in accord with the decision of His will, as we showed above. Hence, it is appropriate to His providence sometimes to permit defectible causes to fail, and at other times to preserve them from failure.
<tr valign="top" style="text-align:justify">
<td>Ea vero quae ad necessitatem provisorum a Deo possent assumi ex certitudine scientiae, supra soluta sunt, cum de Dei scientia ageretur.
<td>[17] Finally, those arguments in favor of the necessity of effects foreseen by God, which might be drawn from the certainty of knowledge, are solved above, where we treated of God’s knowledge.
</table>
<hr></a> <a name="95" id="95">
<table cellpadding="12">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td align="center"><b>Caput 95<br>
Quod immobilitas divinae providentiae utilitatem orationis non excludit</b>
<td align="center"><b>Chapter 95<br>
THAT THE IMMUTABILITY OF DIVINE PROVIDENCE DOES NOT SUPPRESS THE VALUE OF PRAYER</b>
<tr valign="top" style="text-align:justify">
<td>Considerare etiam oportet quod, sicut providentiae immobilitas necessitatem rebus provisis non imponit, ita etiam nec orationis utilitatem excludit. Non enim ad hoc oratio ad Deum funditur ut aeterna providentiae dispositio immutetur, hoc enim impossibile est: sed ut aliquis illud quod desiderat, assequatur a Deo.
<td>[1] We should also keep in mind the fact that, just as the immutability of providence does not impose necessity on things that are foreseen, so also it does not suppress the value of prayer. For prayer is not established for the purpose of changing the eternal disposition of providence, since this is impossible, but so that a person may obtain from God the object which he desires.
<tr valign="top" style="text-align:justify">
<td>Piis enim desideriis rationalis creaturae conveniens est quod Deus assentiat, non tanquam desideria nostra moveant immobilem Deum: sed ex sua bonitate procedit ut convenienter desiderata perficiat. Cum enim omnia naturaliter bonum desiderent, ut supra probatum est; ad supereminentiam autem divinae bonitatis pertinet quod esse, et bene esse, omnibus ordine quodam distribuat: consequens est ut, secundum suam bonitatem, desideria pia, quae per orationem explicantur, adimpleat.
<td>[2] Indeed, it is appropriate for God to consent to the holy desires of a rational creature, not in the sense that our desires may move the immutable God, but that He, in His goodness, takes steps to accomplish these desired effects in a fitting way. For, since all things naturally desire the good, as we proved above, and since it pertains to the supereminence of divine goodness to assign being, and well-being, to all in accord with a definite order, the result is that, in accord with His goodness, He fulfills the holy desires which are brought to completion by means of prayer.
<tr valign="top" style="text-align:justify">
<td>Adhuc. Ad moventem pertinet ut id quod movetur, perducat ad finem: unde et per eandem naturam aliquid movetur ad finem, et consequitur finem, et in eo quiescit. Omne autem desiderium est quidam motus ad bonum. Qui quidem non potest rebus inesse nisi a Deo, qui est per essentiam suam bonus, et fons bonitatis: movens enim omne movet ad aliquid simile sibi. Ad Deum igitur pertinet, secundum suam bonitatem, quod desideria convenientia, quae per orationes explicantur, ad effectum convenientem perducat.
<td>[3] Again, it is proper for a mover to bring the object that is moved to its end; hence, a thing is moved toward its end, and attains its end, and finds rest in it, by means of the same nature. Now, every desire is a certain movement toward the good, and indeed it cannot be present in things unless it be from God, Who is good essentially and the source of goodness. In fact, every mover moves toward something like itself. So, it is proper for God, in accord with His goodness, to bring to a fitting conclusion the proper desires that are expressed by our prayers.
<tr valign="top" style="text-align:justify">
<td>Item. Quanto aliqua sunt propinquiora moventi, tanto efficacius impressionem moventis assequuntur: nam et quae propinquiora sunt igni, magis ab ipso calefiunt. Substantiae autem intellectuales propinquiores sunt Deo quam substantiae naturales inanimatae. Efficacior est igitur impressio divinae motionis in substantiis intellectualibus quam in substantiis aliis naturalibus. Corpora autem naturalia in tantum participant de motione divina quod naturalem boni appetitum consequuntur ex eo, et etiam appetitus impletionem, quod quidem fit dum proprios fines consequuntur. Multo igitur magis intellectuales substantiae desideriorum suorum, quae per orationem Deo offeruntur, impletionem consequuntur.
<td>[4] Besides, the nearer certain things are to the mover, the more efficaciously do they follow the influence of the mover; for instance, things that are nearer to a fire become hotter from it. Now, intellectual substances are nearer to God than are inanimate natural substances. Therefore, the influence of divine motion is more efficacious on intellectual substances than on other natural substances. But natural bodies participate in divine motion to the extent that they receive from Him a natural appetite for the good, and even in the appetite for fulfillment which is realized when they attain their appropriate ends. Therefore, there is much more reason for intellectual substances attaining the fulfillment of their desires which are presented to God by prayer.
<tr valign="top" style="text-align:justify">
<td>Amplius. De ratione amicitiae est quod amans velit impleri desiderium amati, inquantum vult eius bonum et perfectionem: propter quod dicitur quod amicorum est idem velle. Ostensum est autem supra quod Deus suam creaturam amat; et tanto magis unamquamque quanto plus de eius bonitate participat, quae est primum et principale amatum ab ipso. Vult igitur impleri desideria rationalis creaturae, quae perfectissime divinam bonitatem participat inter ceteras creaturas. Sua autem voluntas est perfectiva rerum: est enim causa rerum per suam voluntatem, ut supra ostensum est. Ad bonitatem igitur divinam pertinet ut impleat desideria rationalis creaturae sibi per orationem proposita.
<td>[5] Moreover, it pertains to the essential meaning of friendship for the lover to will the fulfillment of the desire of the beloved, because he wishes the good and the perfect for the beloved. This is the reason for the statement that “it is characteristic of friends that they will the same thing. Now, we showed above that God loves His creature, and the more that any one of them participates in His goodness which is the first and chief object of His love, the more does He love it. So, He wills the desires of a rational creature to be satisfied, for, compared to other creatures, it participates most perfectly in divine providence. But His will is perfective in regard to things; indeed, He is the cause of things through His will, as we showed above. Therefore, it is appropriate to divine providence for Him to fulfill the desires of a rational creature when they are presented to Him through prayer.
<tr valign="top" style="text-align:justify">
<td>Praeterea. Bonum creaturae derivatum est secundum quandam similitudinem a bonitate divina. Hoc autem maxime commendabile in hominibus apparet, ut iuste petentibus assensum non denegent: ex hoc enim vocantur liberales, clementes, misericordes et pii. Maxime igitur hoc ad divinam bonitatem pertinet, ut pias orationes exaudiat.
<td>[6] Furthermore, a creature’s good is transmitted by the divine goodness in accord with a certain likeness. But this characteristic seems most approvable among men: that they should not refuse consent to those who ask for favors in a just manner. Because of this, men are called liberal, clement, merciful, and upright. Therefore, this characteristic, of granting upright prayers, especially belongs to divine goodness.
<tr valign="top" style="text-align:justify">
<td>Hinc est quod dicitur in Psalmo: voluntatem timentium se faciet, et orationes eorum exaudiet, et salvos faciet eos. Et Matth. 7-8, dominus dicit: omnis qui petit accipit, et qui quaerit invenit, et pulsanti aperietur.
<td>[7] Hence, it is said in the Psalm (144:19): “He will do the will of those who fear Him, and He will hear their prayers and save them”; and again the Lord says: “Everyone who asks receives, and he who seeks finds, and to him who knocks it shall be opened” (Mat. 7:8).
</table>
<hr></a> <a name="96" id="96">
<table cellpadding="12">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td align="center"><b>Caput 96<br></b>
<td align="center"><b>Chapter 96<br>
THAT SOME PRAYERS ARE NOT GRANTED BY GOD</b>
<tr valign="top" style="text-align:justify">
<td>Non est autem inconveniens si quandoque etiam petitiones orantium non admittantur a Deo.
<td>[1] Now, it is not inappropriate if also, at times, the requests of some who pray are not granted by God.
<tr valign="top" style="text-align:justify">
<td>Ea enim ratione ostensum est quod Deus desideria rationalis creaturae adimplet, inquantum desiderat bonum. Quandoque autem contingit quod id quod petitur non est verum bonum, sed apparens, simpliciter autem malum. Non est igitur talis oratio Deo exaudibilis. Hinc est quod dicitur Iac. 4-3: petitis et non accipitis, eo quod male petatis.
<td>[2] For we showed by reasoning that God fulfills the desires of a rational creature, to the extent that he desires the good. Now, it sometimes happens that what is sought in prayer is not a true, but an apparent, good; speaking absolutely, it is an evil. Therefore, such a prayer is not capable of being granted by God. Hence, it is said in James (4:3): “You ask and you receive not, because you ask amiss.”
<tr valign="top" style="text-align:justify">
<td>Similiter autem ex hoc quod Deus ad desiderandum movet, ostensum est conveniens esse quod desideria impleat. Mobile autem ad finem motus non perducitur a movente nisi motus continuetur. Si igitur motus desiderii per orationis instantiam non continuetur, non est inconveniens si oratio effectum debitum non sortiatur. Hinc est quod dominus dicit, Lucae 18-1: quoniam oportet semper orare, et non deficere. Et I Thess. 5-17, dicit apostolus: sine intermissione orate.
<td>[3] Likewise, because God moves us to the act of desiring, we showed that it is appropriate for Him to fulfill our desires. Now, the thing that is moved is not brought to its end by the mover unless the motion be continued. So, if the movement of desire is not continued by constant prayer, it is not inappropriate for the prayer to fail to receive its expected result. Hence, the Lord says in Luke (18:1) “that we ought always to pray and not to faint”; also, the Apostle says, in 1 Thessalonians (5:17): “Pray without ceasing.”
<tr valign="top" style="text-align:justify">
<td>Rursus. Ostensum est quod Deus rationalis creaturae decenter desiderium implet inquantum ei appropinquat. Appropinquat autem ei aliquis per contemplationem, et devotam affectionem, et humilem et firmam intentionem. Illa igitur oratio quae sic Deo non appropinquat, non est a Deo exaudibilis. Unde et in Psalmo dicitur: respexit in orationem humilium; Iac. 1-6: postulet autem in fide, nihil haesitans.
<td>[4] Again, we showed that God fulfills in a suitable way the desire of a rational creature, depending on its nearness to Him. But one becomes near to Him through contemplation, devout affection, and humble but firm intention. So, the prayer which does not approach God in this way is not capable of being heard by God. Hence, it is said in the Psalm (101:18): “He has had regard to the prayer of the humble”; and in James (1:6): “Let him ask in faith, nothing wavering.”
<tr valign="top" style="text-align:justify">
<td>Item. Ostensum est quod ratione amicitiae, Deus vota piorum exaudit. Qui igitur a Dei amicitia declinat, non est dignum ut eius oratio exaudiatur. Hinc est quod Prov. 28-9 dicitur: qui declinat aurem suam ne audiat legem, oratio eius erit execrabilis. Et Isaiae 1-15: cum multiplicaveritis orationes, non exaudiam: manus enim vestrae sanguine plenae sunt.
<td>[5] Besides, we showed that on the basis of friendship God grants the wishes of those who are holy. Therefore, he who turns away from God’s friendship is not worthy of having his prayer granted. Hence, it is said in Proverbs (28:9): “He who turns away his ears from hearing the law, his prayer shall be an abomination.” And again in Isaiah (1:15): “When you multiply prayer, I will not hear, for your hands are full of blood.”
<tr valign="top" style="text-align:justify">
<td>Ex hac etiam radice procedit quod quandoque aliquis Dei amicus non auditur quando pro his rogat qui non sunt Dei amici: secundum illud Ierem. 7-16: tu ergo noli orare pro populo hoc, nec assumas pro eis laudem et orationem, et non obsistas mihi: quia non exaudiam te.
<td>[6] For the same reason it happens sometimes that a friend of God is not beard when he prays for those who are not God’s friends, according to the passage in Jeremiah (7:16): “Therefore, do not You pray for this people, nor take to You praise and supplication for them, and do not withstand me: for I will not hear You.”
<tr valign="top" style="text-align:justify">
<td>Contingit autem quandoque quod aliquis ex amicitia denegat quod petitur ab amico, quia cognoscit hoc ei esse nocivum, vel contrarium ei magis expedire: ut medicus infirmanti quandoque negat quod petit, considerans quod non expedit ei ad salutem corporis consequendam. Unde, cum ostensum sit quod Deus ex amore quem ad creaturam rationalem habet, eius desideria impleat sibi per orationem proposita, non est mirandum si quandoque eorum etiam quos praecipue diligit, petitionem non implet, ut impleat quod petenti magis expedit ad salutem. Propter quod a Paulo stimulum carnis non amovit, quamvis hoc ter peteret, providens hoc ei esse utile ad humilitatis conservationem, ut habetur II Cor. 12-8-9. Unde et Matth. 20-22, quibusdam dominus dicit: nescitis quid petatis. Et Rom. 8-26 dicitur: nam quid oremus sicut oportet, nescimus. Et propter hoc Augustinus dicit, in Epist. ad Paul. et Ther.: bonus dominus, qui non tribuit saepe quod volumus, ut quod mallemus attribuat.
<td>[7] However, it happens at times that a person is refused because of friendship a petition which he asks of a friend, since he knows that it is harmful to him, or that the opposite is more helpful to him. Thus, a physician may deny sometimes the request of a sick person, having in mind that it is not beneficial to him in the recovery of his health. Consequently, since we showed that God, because of the love which He has for the rational creature, satisfies his desires when they are presented to Him through prayer, it is no cause for astonishment if at times He does not grant the petition, even of those whom He especially loves, in order to provide something that is more helpful for the salvation of the petitioner. For this reason, He did not withdraw the sting of the flesh from Paul, though he asked it thrice, for God foresaw that it was helpful to him for the preservation of humility, as is related in 2 Corinthians (12:7-9). Hence, the Lord says to certain people, in Matthew (20:22): “You do not know what you ask”; and it is said in Romans (8:26): “For we do not know what we should pray for as we ought.” For this reason, Augustine says in his letter to Paulinus and Therasia: “The Lord is good, for He often does not grant what we desire, so that He may give us what we desire even more.”
<tr valign="top" style="text-align:justify">
<td>Patet igitur ex praemissis quod aliquorum quae fiunt a Deo, causa sunt orationes et pia desideria. Ostensum est autem supra quod divina providentia causas alias non excludit: quin potius ordinat eas ad hoc quod ordo quem apud se statuit, rebus imponatur; et sic causae secundae non repugnant providentiae, sed magis providentiae exequuntur effectum. Sic igitur orationes apud Deum efficaces sunt, nec tamen ordinem immutabilem divinae providentiae solvunt: quia et hoc ipsum quod tali petenti hoc concedatur, sub ordine divinae providentiae cadit. Simile est ergo dicere non esse orandum ut aliquid consequamur a Deo quia ordo suae providentiae est immutabilis, ac si diceretur quod non est ambulandum ut perveniamus ad locum, nec comedendum ut nutriamur: quae omnia patent esse absurda.
<td>[8] It is apparent, then, from the foregoing that the cause of some things that are done by God is prayers and holy desires. But we showed above that divine providence does not exclude other causes; rather, it orders them so that the order which providence has determined within itself may be imposed on things. And thus, secondary causes are not incompatible with providence; instead, they carry out the effect of providence. In this way, then, prayers are efficacious before God, yet they do not destroy the immutable order of divine providence, because this individual request that is granted to a certain petitioner falls under the order of divine providence. So, it is the same thing to say that we should not pray in order to obtain something from God, because the order of His providence is immutable, as to say that we should not walk in order to get to a place, or eat in order to be nourished; all of which are clearly absurd.
<tr valign="top" style="text-align:justify">
<td>Excluditur ergo ex praemissis duplex error circa orationem. Quidam enim dixerunt nullum esse orationis fructum. Quod quidem dicebant tam illi qui negabant divinam providentiam omnino, sicut Epicurei; quam illi qui res humanas divinae providentiae subtrahebant, sicut aliqui Peripateticorum; necnon et illi qui omnia quae providentiae subsunt, ex necessitate contingere arbitrabantur, sicut Stoici. Ex his enim omnibus sequitur quod nullus sit orationis fructus, et per consequens quod omnis deitatis cultus fiat in vanum: qui quidem error tangitur Malach. 3-14: dixistis, inquit, vanus est qui servit Deo. Et quod emolumentum quia custodivimus praecepta eius, et quia ambulavimus tristes coram domino exercituum?
<td>[9] So, a double error concerning prayer is set aside as a result of the foregoing. Some people have said that prayer is not fruitful. In fact, this has been stated both by those who denied divine providence altogether, like the Epicureans, and by those who set human affairs apart from divine providence, as some Peripatetics do, and also by those who thought that all things subject to providence occur of necessity, as the Stoics did. From all these views, it follows that prayer is fruitless and, consequently, that all worship of the Deity is offered in vain. Indeed, this error is mentioned in Malachi (3:14), where it states: “You have said: He labors in vain who serves God. And what profit is it that we have kept His ordinances, and that we have walked sorrowful before the Lord of hosts?”
<tr valign="top" style="text-align:justify">
<td>Quidam vero e contrario divinam dispositionem orationibus vertibilem esse dicebant: sicut et Aegyptii dicebant quod fatum orationibus et quibusdam imaginibus, subfumigationibus, sive incantationibus, vertebatur.
<td>[10] Contrariwise, others have in fact said that the divine disposition is capable of being changed by prayers; thus, the Egyptians said that fate was subject to change by prayers and by means of certain idols, incensings, or incantations.
<tr valign="top" style="text-align:justify">
<td>Et ad hunc sensum pertinere videntur quaedam quae in Scripturis divinis dicuntur, secundum id quod prima facie apparet ex eis. Dicitur enim Isaiae 38 quod Isaias, ex mandato domini, dixit Ezechiae regi, haec dicit dominus: dispone domui tuae, quia morieris tu, et non vives; et quod post orationem Ezechiae, factum est verbum domini ad Isaiam dicens, vade, et dic Ezechiae: audivi orationem tuam. Ecce, ego adiiciam super dies tuos quindecim annos. Et Ierem. 18 dicitur ex persona domini: repente loquar adversus gentem et adversus regnum, ut eradicem et destruam et disperdam illud. Si poenitentiam egerit gens illa a malo suo, quod locutus sum adversus eam, agam et ego poenitentiam super malo quod cogitavi ut facerem ei. Et Ioelis 2-13 convertimini ad dominum Deum vestrum, quia benignus et misericors est. Quis scit si convertatur et ignoscat Deus?
<td>[11] Indeed, certain statements in the divine Scriptures seem, according to their superficial appearance, to favor this view. For it is said that Isaiah, at the command of the Lord, said to King Hezekiah: “Thus says the Lord: Take order with Your house, for You shall die, and shall not live”; and that, after the prayer of Hezekiah, “the word of the Lord came to Isaiah, saying: Go and say to Hezekiah... I have heard Your prayer... behold I will add to Your days fifteen years” (Is. 38:1-5). And again, it is said in the name of the Lord: “I will suddenly speak against a nation and against a kingdom to root out and to pull down and to destroy it. If that nation against which I have spoken shall repent of their evil, I will also repent of the evil that I have thought to do to them” (Jer. 18:7-8). And in Joel (2:13-14): “Turn to the Lord your God, for He is gracious and merciful... Who knows whether God will return and forgive?”
<tr valign="top" style="text-align:justify">
<td>Haec autem si secundum suam superficiem intelligantur, ad inconveniens ducunt. Sequitur enim primo, quod voluntas Dei sit mutabilis. Item, quod aliquid ex tempore Deo adveniat. Et ulterius, quod aliqua quae temporaliter in creaturis sunt, sint causa alicuius existentis in Deo. Quae sunt manifeste impossibilia, sicut ex superioribus patet.
<td>[12] Now, these texts, if understood superficially, lead to an unsuitable conclusion. For it follows, first of all, that God’s will is mutable; also, that something accrues to God in the course of time; and further, that certain things that occur in time to creatures are the cause of something occurring in God. Obviously, these things are impossible, as is evident from earlier explanations.
<tr valign="top" style="text-align:justify">
<td>Adversantur etiam auctoritatibus sacrae Scripturae, quae infallibilem continent veritatem et expressam. Dicitur enim Num. 23-19: non est Deus quasi homo, ut mentiatur; nec ut filius hominis, ut mutetur. Dixit ergo, et non faciet? Locutus est, et non implebit? Et I Reg. 15-29: triumphator in Israel non parcet, et poenitudine non flectetur: neque enim homo est, ut agat poenitentiam. Et Malach. 3-6: ego dominus, et non mutor.
<td>[13] They are opposed, too, by texts of Sacred Scripture which contain the infallible truth clearly expressed. Indeed, it is said in Numbers (23:19): “God is not as a man that He should lie, nor as the son of man that He should be changed. Did He say then, and will not do it? Has he spoken, and will He not fulfill?” And in 1 Sam (15:29): “The triumpher in Israel will not spare, and will not be moved to repentance; for He is not a man that He should repent.” And in Malachi (3:6): “I am the Lord and I do not change.”
<tr valign="top" style="text-align:justify">
<td>Si quis autem diligenter consideret circa praedicta, inveniet quod omnis error qui in his accidit, ex hoc provenit quod non consideratur differentia inter universalem ordinem et particularem. Cum enim omnes effectus ordinem ad invicem habeant secundum quod in una causa conveniunt, oportet tanto esse communiorem ordinem, quanto est universalior causa. Unde ab universali causa, quae Deus est, ordo proveniens necesse est quod omnia complectatur. Nihil igitur prohibet aliquem particularem ordinem vel per orationem, vel per aliquem alium modum immutari: est enim extra illum ordinem aliquid quod possit ipsum immutare. Propter quod non est mirum si Aegyptii, reducentes rerum humanarum ordinem in corpora caelestia, posuerunt fatum ex stellis proveniens aliquibus orationibus et ritibus posse immutari: nam extra caelestia corpora, et supra ea, est Deus, qui potest impedire caelestium corporum effectum qui in istis inferioribus ex illorum impressione secuturus erat.
<td>[14] Now, if a person carefully considers these statements, he will find that every error that occurs on these points arises from the fact that thought is not given to the difference between universal and particular order. For, since all effects are mutually ordered, in the sense that they come together in one cause, it must be that, the more universal the cause is, the more general is the order. Hence, the order stemming from the universal cause which is God must embrace all things. So, nothing prevents some particular order from being changed, either by prayer, or by some other means, for there is something outside that order which could change it. For this reason, it is not astonishing for the Egyptians who reduce the order of human affairs to the celestial bodies, to claim that fate, which depends on the stars, can be changed by certain prayers and ceremonies. Indeed, apart from the celestial bodies and above them is God, Who is able to impede the celestial bodies' effect which was supposed to follow in things here below as a result of their influence.
<tr valign="top" style="text-align:justify">
<td>Sed extra ordinem complectentem omnia, non potest poni aliquid per quod possit ordo ab universali causa dependens everti. Propter quod Stoici, qui in Deum sicut in causam universalem omnium ordinis rerum reductionem considerabant, ponebant quod ordo institutus a Deo nulla ratione potest immutari. Sed in hoc iterum a consideratione universalis ordinis recedebant, quod ponebant orationes ad nihil utiles esse, tanquam arbitrarentur voluntates hominum et eorum desideria, ex quibus orationes procedunt, sub illo universali ordine non comprehendi. Cum enim dicunt quod, sive orationes fiant sive non, nihilominus idem effectus sequitur in rebus ex universali ordine rerum, manifeste ab illo universali ordine vota orantium sequestrant. Si enim haec sub illo ordine comprehendantur, sicut per alias causas, ita et per haec, ex divina ordinatione, aliqui effectus sequentur. Idem ergo erit excludere orationis effectum, et omnium aliarum causarum. Quod si aliis causis immobilitas divini ordinis effectus non subtrahit, neque orationum efficaciam tollit. Valent igitur orationes, non quasi ordinem aeternae dispositionis immutantes, sed quasi sub tali ordine etiam ipsae existentes.
<td>But, outside the order that embraces all things, it is not possible for anything to be indicated by means of which the order depending on a universal cause might be changed. That is why the Stoics, who considered the reduction of the order of things to God to be to a universal cause of all things, claimed that the order established by God could not be changed for any reason. But, again on this point, they departed from the consideration of a universal order, because they claimed that prayers were of no use, as if they thought that the wills of men and their desires, from which prayers arise, are not included under that universal order. For, when they say that, whether prayers are offered or not, in any case the same effect in things follows from the universal order of things, they clearly isolate from that universal order the wishes of those who pray. For, if these prayers be included under that order, then certain effects will result by divine ordination by means of these prayers, just as they do by means of other causes. So, it will be the same thing to exclude the effect of prayer as to exclude the effect of all other causes. Because, if the immutability of the divine order does not take away their effects from other causes, neither does it remove the efficacy of prayers. Therefore, prayers retain their power; not that they can change the order of eternal control, but rather as they themselves exist under such order.
<tr valign="top" style="text-align:justify">
<td>Nihil autem prohibet per orationum efficaciam aliquem particularem ordinem alicuius inferioris causae mutari, Deo faciente, qui omnes supergreditur causas, unde sub nulla necessitate ordinis alicuius causae continetur, sed, e converso, omnis necessitas ordinis inferioris causae continetur sub ipso quasi ab eo institutus. Inquantum ergo per orationem immutatur aliquid de ordine inferiorum causarum instituto a Deo, propter orationes piorum, dicitur Deus converti, vel poenitere: non quod aeterna eius dispositio mutetur, sed quia mutatur aliquis eius effectus. Unde et Gregorius dicit quod non mutat Deus consilium etsi quandoque mutet sententiam: non, inquam, illam quae exprimit dispositionem aeternam; sed illam sententiam quae exprimit ordinem inferiorum causarum, secundum quem Ezechias erat moriturus, vel gens aliqua pro suis peccatis evertenda. Talis autem sententiae mutatio dicitur transumptiva locutione Dei poenitentia, inquantum Deus ad similitudinem poenitentis se habet, cuius est mutare quod fecerat. Per quem modum dicitur etiam metaphorice irasci, inquantum puniendo facit irascentis effectum.
<td>[15] But nothing prevents some particular order, due to an inferior cause, from being changed through the efficacy of prayers, under the operation of God Who transcends all causes, and thus is not confined under the necessity of any order of cause; on the contrary, all the necessity of the order of an inferior cause is confined under Him as being brought into being by Him. So, in so far as something in the order of inferior causes established by God is changed through prayer, God is said to turn or to repent; not in the sense that His eternal disposition is changed, but that some effect of His is changed. Hence, Gregory says that “God does not change His plan, though at times He may change His judgment”; not, I say, the judgment which expresses His eternal disposition, but the judgment which expresses the order of inferior causes, in accord with which Hezekiah was to have died, or a certain people were to have been punished for their sins. Now, such a change of judgment is called God’s repentance, using a metaphorical way of speaking, in the sense that God is disposed like one who repents, for whom it is proper to change what he had been doing. In the same way, He is also said, metaphorically, to become angry, in the sense that, by punishing, He produces the same effect as an angry person.
</table>
<hr></a> <a name="97" id="97">
<table cellpadding="12">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td align="center"><b>Caput 97<br>
Quomodo dispositio providentiae habeat rationem</b>
<td align="center"><b>Chapter 97<br>
HOW THE DISPOSITION OF PROVIDENCE HAS A RATIONAL PLAN</b>
<tr valign="top" style="text-align:justify">
<td>Ex his autem quae praemissa sunt, manifeste videri potest quod ea quae sunt per divinam providentiam dispensata, sequuntur aliquam rationem.
<td>[1] From the points set forth above it may be seen clearly that the things which are disposed by divine providence follow a rational plan.
<tr valign="top" style="text-align:justify">
<td>Ostensum enim est quod Deus per suam providentiam omnia ordinat in divinam bonitatem sicut in finem: non autem hoc modo quod suae bonitati aliquid per ea quae fiunt accrescat, sed ut similitudo suae bonitatis, quantum possibile est, imprimatur in rebus. Quia vero omnem creatam substantiam a perfectione divinae bonitatis deficere necesse est, ut perfectius divinae bonitatis similitudo rebus communicaretur, oportuit esse diversitatem in rebus, ut quod perfecte ab uno aliquo repraesentari non potest, per diversa diversimode perfectiori modo repraesentaretur: nam et homo, cum mentis conceptum uno vocali verbo videt sufficienter exprimi non posse, verba diversimode multiplicat ad exprimendam per diversa suae mentis conceptionem. Et in hoc etiam divinae perfectionis eminentia considerari potest, quod perfecta bonitas, quae in Deo est unite et simpliciter, in creaturis esse non potest nisi secundum modum diversum et per plura. Res autem per hoc diversae sunt, quod formas habent diversas, a quibus speciem sortiuntur. Sic igitur ex fine sumitur ratio diversitatis formarum in rebus.
<td>[2] Indeed, we showed that God, through His providence, orders all things to the divine goodness, as to an end; not, of course, in such a way that something adds to His goodness by means of things that are made, but, rather, that the likeness of His goodness, as much as possible, is impressed on things. However, since every created substance must fall short of the perfection of divine goodness, in order that the likeness of divine goodness might be more perfectly communicated to things, it was necessary for there to be a diversity of things, so that what could not be perfectly represented by one thing might be, in more perfect fashion, represented by a variety of things in different ways. For instance, when a man sees that his mental conception cannot be expressed adequately by one spoken word, he multiplies his words in various ways, to express his mental conception through a variety of means. And the eminence of divine perfection may be observed in this fact, that perfect goodness which is present in God in a unified and simple manner cannot be in creatures except in a diversified manner and through a plurality of things. Now, things are differentiated by their possession of different forms from which they receive their species. And thus, the reason for the diversity of forms in things is derived from this end.
<tr valign="top" style="text-align:justify">
<td>Ex diversitate autem formarum sumitur ratio ordinis rerum. Cum enim forma sit secundum quam res habet esse; res autem quaelibet secundum quod habet esse, accedat ad similitudinem Dei, qui est ipsum suum esse simplex: necesse est quod forma nihil sit aliud quam divina similitudo participata in rebus; unde convenienter Aristoteles, in I Physic., de forma loquens, dicit quod est divinum quoddam et appetibile. Similitudo autem ad unum simplex considerata diversificari non potest nisi secundum quod magis vel minus similitudo est propinqua vel remota. Quanto autem aliquid propinquius ad divinam similitudinem accedit, perfectius est. Unde in formis differentia esse non potest nisi secundum quod una perfectior existit quam alia: propter quod Aristoteles, in VIII Metaphys., definitiones, per quas naturae rerum et formae significantur, assimilat numeris, in quibus species variantur per additionem vel subtractionem unitatis, ut ex hoc detur intelligi quod formarum diversitas diversum gradum perfectionis requirit.
<td>[3] Moreover, the reason for the order of things is derived from the diversity of forms. Indeed, since it is in accord with its form that a thing has being, and since anything, in so far as it has being, approaches the likeness of God Who is His own simple being, it must be that form is nothing else than a divine likeness that is participated in things. Hence, Aristotle, where he speaks about form in <i>Physics</i> I [9], quite appropriately says that it is “something godlike and desirable.” But a likeness that is viewed in relation to one simple thing cannot be diversified unless by virtue of the likeness being more or less close or remote. Now, the nearer a thing comes to divine likeness, the more perfect it is. Consequently, there cannot be a difference among forms unless because one thing exists more perfectly than another. That is why Aristotle, in <i>Metaphysics</i> VIII [3], likens definitions, through which the natures of things and forms are signified, to numbers, in which species are varied by the addition or subtraction of unity; so, from this, we are made to understand that the diversity of forms requires different grades of perfection.
<tr valign="top" style="text-align:justify">
<td>Et hoc evidenter apparet naturas rerum speculanti. Inveniet enim, si quis diligenter consideret, gradatim rerum diversitatem compleri: nam supra inanimata corpora inveniet plantas; et super has irrationalia animalia; et super has intellectuales substantias; et in singulis horum inveniet diversitatem secundum quod quaedam sunt aliis perfectiora, in tantum quod ea quae sunt suprema inferioris generis, videntur propinqua superiori generi, et e converso, sicut animalia immobilia sunt similia plantis; unde et Dionysius dicit, VII cap. de Div. Nom., quod divina sapientia coniungit fines primorum principiis secundorum. Unde patet quod rerum diversitas exigit quod non sint omnia aequalia, sed sit ordo in rebus et gradus.
<td>This is quite clear to one who observes the natures of things. He will find, in fact, if he makes a careful consideration, that the diversity of things is accomplished by means of gradations. Indeed, he will find plants above inanimate bodies, and above plants irrational animals, and above these intellectual substances. And among individuals of these types he will find a diversity based on the fact that some are more perfect than others, inasmuch as the highest members of a lower genus seem quite close to the next higher genus; and the converse is also true; thus, immovable animals are like plants. Consequently, Dionysius says [ <i>De div. nom.</i> VII, 3] “Divine wisdom draws together the last members of things in a first class, with the first members of things in a second class.” Hence, it is apparent that the diversity of things requires that not all be equal, but that there be an order and gradation among things.
<tr valign="top" style="text-align:justify">
<td>Ex diversitate autem formarum, secundum quas rerum species diversificantur, sequitur et operationum differentia. Cum enim unumquodque agat secundum quod est actu, quae enim sunt in potentia, secundum quod huiusmodi, inveniuntur actionis expertia; est autem unumquodque ens actu per formam: oportet quod operatio rei sequatur formam ipsius. Oportet ergo, si sunt diversae formae, quod habeant diversas operationes.
<td>[4] Now, from the diversity of forms by which the species of things are differentiated there also results a difference of operations. For, since everything acts in so far as it is actual (because things that are potential are found by that very fact to be devoid of action), and since every being is actual through form, it is necessary for the operation of a thing to follow its form. Therefore, if there are different forms, they must have different operations.
<tr valign="top" style="text-align:justify">
<td>Quia vero per propriam actionem res quaelibet ad proprium finem pertingit, necesse est et proprios fines diversificari in rebus: quamvis sit finis ultimus omnibus communis.
<td>[5] But, since each thing attains its proper end through its own action, various proper ends must be distinguished in things, even though the ultimate end is common to all.
<tr valign="top" style="text-align:justify">
<td>Sequitur etiam ex diversitate formarum diversa habitudo materiae ad res. Cum enim formae diversae sint secundum quod quaedam sunt aliis perfectiores, sunt inter eas aliquae in tantum perfectae quod sunt per se subsistentes et perfectae, ad nihil indigentes materiae fulcimento. Quaedam vero per se perfecte subsistere non possunt, sed materiam pro fundamento requirunt: ut sic illud quod subsistit non sit forma tantum, neque materia tantum, quae per se non est ens actu, sed compositum ex utroque.
<td>[6] From the diversity of forms there also follows a diverse relationship of matter to things. In fact, since forms differ because some are more perfect than others, there are some of them so perfect that they are self-subsistent and self-complete, requiring no sub-structure of matter. But other forms cannot perfectly subsist by themselves, and do require matter as a foundation, so that what does subsist is not simply form, nor yet merely matter, but a thing composed of both.
<tr valign="top" style="text-align:justify">
<td>Non autem possent materia et forma ad aliquid unum constituendum convenire nisi esset aliqua proportio inter ea. Si autem proportionata oportet ea esse, necesse est quod diversis formis diversae materiae respondeant. Unde fit ut quaedam formae requirant materiam simplicem, quaedam vero materiam compositam; et secundum diversas formas, diversam partium compositionem oportet esse, congruentem ad speciem formae et ad operationem ipsius.
<td>[7] Now, matter and form could not combine to make up one thing unless there were some proportion between them. But, if they must be proportionally related, then different matters must correspond to different forms. Hence, it develops that some forms need simple matter, while others need composite matter; and also, depending on the various forms, there must be a different composition of parts, adapted to the species of the form and to its operation.
<tr valign="top" style="text-align:justify">
<td>Ex diversa autem habitudine ad materiam sequitur diversitas agentium et patientium. Cum enim agat unumquodque ratione formae, patiatur vero et moveatur ratione materiae, oportet quod illa quorum formae sunt perfectiores et minus materiales, agant in illa quae sunt magis materialia, et quorum formae sunt imperfectiores.
<td>[8] Moreover, as a result of the diversified relationship to matter, there follows a diversity of agents and patients. For, since each thing acts by reason of its form, but suffers passion and is moved by reason of its matter, those things whose forms are more perfect and less material must act on those that are more material and whose forms are more imperfect.
<tr valign="top" style="text-align:justify">
<td>Ex diversitate autem formarum et materiarum et agentium sequitur diversitas proprietatum et accidentium. Cum enim substantia sit causa accidentis, sicut perfectum imperfecti, oportet quod ex diversis principiis substantialibus diversa accidentia propria consequantur. Rursus, cum ex diversis agentibus sint diversae impressiones in patientibus, oportet quod secundum diversa agentia, diversa sint accidentia quae ab agentibus imprimuntur.
<td>[9] Again, from the diversity of forms and matters and agents there follows a diversity of properties and accidents. Indeed, since substance is the cause of accident, as the perfect is of the imperfect, different proper accidents must result from different substantial principles. In turn, since from different agents there result different impressions on the patients, there must be, depending on the different agents, different accidents that are impressed by agents.
<tr valign="top" style="text-align:justify">
<td>Patet ergo ex dictis quod, cum per divinam providentiam rebus creatis diversa accidentia, et actiones et passiones, et collocationes distribuantur, non hoc absque ratione accidit. Hinc est quod sacra Scriptura rerum productionem et gubernationem sapientiae et prudentiae divinae attribuit. Dicitur enim Prov. 3-19 dominus sapientia fundavit terram, stabilivit caelos prudentia. Sapientia illius eruperunt abyssi, et nubes rore concrescunt. Et Sap. 8-1 dicitur de Dei sapientia quod attingit a fine usque ad finem fortiter, et disponit omnia suaviter. Et 11-21 eiusdem dicitur: omnia in mensura, numero et pondere disposuisti: ut per mensuram quantitatem, sive modum aut gradum perfectionis uniuscuiusque rei intelligamus; per numerum vero pluralitatem et diversitatem specierum, consequentem ex diversis perfectionis gradibus; per pondus vero inclinationes diversas ad proprios fines et operationes, et agentia et patientia, et accidentia quae sequuntur distinctionem specierum.
<td>[10] So, it is evident from what we have said that, when various accidents, actions, passions, and arrangements are allotted things by divine providence, this distribution does not come about without a rational plan. Hence, Sacred Scripture ascribes the production and governance of things to divine wisdom and prudence. Indeed, it is stated in Proverbs (3:19-20): “The Lord by wisdom bath founded the earth; He has established the heavens by prudence. By His wisdom the depths have broken out, and the clouds grow thick with dew.” And in Wisdom (8:1) it is said of the wisdom of God that “it reaches from end to end mightily, and orders all things sweetly.” Again, it is said in the same book: “You have ordered all things in measure, and number, and weight” (Wis. 11:21). Thus, we I may understand by measure: the amount, or the mode, or degree, of perfection pertaining to each thing; but by number: the plurality and diversity of species resulting from the different degrees of perfection; and by weight: the different inclinations to proper ends and operations, and also the agents, patients, and accidents which result from the distinction of species.
<tr valign="top" style="text-align:justify">
<td>In praedicto autem ordine, secundum quem ratio divinae providentiae attenditur, primum esse diximus divinam bonitatem, quasi ultimum finem, qui est primum principium in agendis; dehinc vero rerum numerositatem; ad quam constituendam necesse est gradus diversos in formis et materiis, et agentibus et patientibus, et actionibus et accidentibus esse. Sicut ergo prima ratio divinae providentiae simpliciter est divina bonitas, ita prima ratio in creaturis est earum numerositas, ad cuius institutionem et conservationem omnia alia ordinari videntur. Et secundum hoc rationabiliter videtur esse a Boetio dictum, in principio suae arithmeticae, quod omnia quaecumque a primaeva rerum natura constituta sunt, ex numerorum videntur ratione esse formata.
<td>[11] Now, in the aforesaid order, in which the rational Plan of divine providence is observed, we have said that first place is occupied by divine goodness as the ultimate end, which is the first principle in matters of action. Next comes the numerical plurality of things, for the constitution of which there must be different degrees in forms and matters, and in agents and patients, and in actions and accidents. Therefore, just as the first rational principle of divine providence is simply the divine goodness, so the first rational principle in creatures is their numerical plurality, to the establishment and conservation of which all other things seem to be ordered. Thus, on this basis it seems to have been reasonably stated by Boethius, at the beginning of his <i>Arithmetic</i>, that: “All things whatever that have been established, at the original coming into being of things, seem to have been formed in dependence on the rational character of numbers.
<tr valign="top" style="text-align:justify">
<td>Est autem considerandum quod operativa ratio et speculativa partim quidem conveniunt, partim vero differunt. Conveniunt quidem in hoc quod, sicut ratio speculativa incipit ab aliquo principio et per media devenit ad conclusionem intentam, ita ratio operativa incipit ab aliquo primo et per aliqua media pervenit ad operationem vel operatum quod intenditur. Principium autem in speculativis est forma et quod quid est: in operativis vero finis, quod quandoque quidem est forma, quandoque aliquid aliud. Principium etiam in speculativis semper oportet esse necessarium: in operativis autem quandoque quidem est necessarium, quandoque autem non; necessarium enim est hominem velle felicitatem ut finem, non necessarium autem velle domus aedificationem. Similiter in demonstrativis semper posteriora ad priora de necessitate sequuntur: non autem in operativis semper, sed tunc solum quando ad finem non nisi per hanc viam perveniri potest; sicut necessarium est volenti aedificare domum quod quaerat ligna, sed quod quaerat ligna abiegna, hoc ex simplici voluntate ipsius dependet, non autem ex ratione domus aedificandae.
<td>[12] Moreover, we should consider the fact that operative and speculative reason partly agree and partly disagree. They agree, indeed, on this point: just as speculative reason starts from some principle and proceeds through intermediaries to the intended conclusion, so does operative reason start from something that is first, and go through certain intermediaries to the operation, or to the product of the operation, which is intended. But the principle in speculative matters is the form and that which is; while in operative matters it is the end, which at times is the form, at other times something else. Also, the principle in speculative matters must always be necessary, but in operative matters it is sometimes necessary and sometimes not. Indeed, it is necessary for a man to will felicity as his end, but it is not necessary to will to build a house. Likewise, in matters of demonstration the posterior propositions always follow of necessity from the prior ones, but it is not always so in operative reasoning; rather, it is only so when there can be only this single way of reaching the end. For instance, it is necessary for a man who wishes to build a house to get some lumber, but the fact that he tries to get lumber made of fir depends solely on his own will, and not at all on the reason for building the house.
<tr valign="top" style="text-align:justify">
<td>Sic igitur quod Deus suam bonitatem amet, hoc necessarium est: sed hoc non necessario sequitur, quod per creaturas repraesentetur, cum sine hoc divina bonitas sit perfecta. Unde quod creaturae in esse producantur, etsi ex ratione divinae bonitatis originem habeat, tamen ex simplici Dei voluntate dependet. Supposito autem quod Deus creaturis suam bonitatem communicare, secundum quod est possibile, velit per similitudinis modum: ex hoc rationem accipit quod sint creaturae diversae. Non autem ex necessitate sequitur quod secundum hanc vel illam perfectionis mensuram, aut secundum hunc vel illum numerum rerum. Supposito autem ex divina voluntate quod hunc numerum in rebus statuere velit, et hanc unicuique rei perfectionis mensuram: ex hoc rationem accipit quod habeat formam talem et materiam talem. Et similiter in consequentibus patet.
<td>[13] And so, the fact that God loves His goodness is necessary, but the fact that it is represented by means of creatures is not necessary, because divine goodness is perfect without them. Hence, the fact that creatures are brought into existence, though it takes its origin from the rational character of divine goodness, nevertheless depends solely on God’s will. But, if it be granted that God wills to communicate, in so far as is possible, His goodness to creatures by way of likeness, then one finds in this the reason why there are different creatures, but it does not necessarily follow that they are differentiated on the basis of this or that measure of perfection, or according to this or that number of things. On the other hand, if we grant that, as a result of an act of divine will, He wills to establish this particular number of things, and this definite measure of perfection for each thing, then as a result one finds the reason why each thing has a certain form and a certain kind of matter. And the same conclusion is obvious in regard to the things that follow.
<tr valign="top" style="text-align:justify">
<td>Manifestum igitur fit quod providentia secundum rationem quandam res dispensat: et tamen haec ratio sumitur ex suppositione voluntatis divinae.
<td>[14] So, it becomes apparent that providence disposes things according to a rational plan; yet this plan is taken as something based on the divine will.
<tr valign="top" style="text-align:justify">
<td>Sic igitur per praemissa duplex error excluditur. Eorum scilicet qui credunt quod omnia simplicem voluntatem sequuntur absque ratione. Qui est error loquentium in lege Saracenorum, ut Rabbi Moyses dicit: secundum quos nulla differentia est quod ignis calefaciat et infrigidet, nisi quia Deus ita vult. Excluditur etiam error eorum qui dicunt causarum ordinem ex divina providentia secundum modum necessitatis provenire. Quorum utrumque patet esse falsum ex dictis.
<td>[15] Thus, a double error is set aside by the foregoing points. There is the mistake of those who believe that all things follow, without any rational plan, from God’s pure will. This is the error of the exponents of the Law of the Moors, as Rabbi Moses says; according to them, it makes no difference whether fire heats or cools, unless God wills it so. Also refuted is the error of those who say that the order of causes comes forth from divine providence by way of necessity. It is evident from what we have said that both of these views are false.
<tr valign="top" style="text-align:justify">
<td>Sunt autem quaedam verba Scripturae quae videntur simplici voluntati divinae omnia attribuere. Quae non dicuntur ad hoc ut ratio tollatur a providentiae dispensatione, sed ut omnium primum principium Dei voluntas ostendatur, sicut iam supra dictum est. Sicut est illud Psalmi, omnia quaecumque voluit dominus, fecit; et Iob 11, quis ei dicere potest: cur ita facis? Et Rom. 9-19, voluntati enim eius quis resistit? Et Augustinus dicit, III de Trin.: non nisi Dei voluntas causa est prima sanitatis et aegritudinis; praemiorum atque poenarum, gratiarum atque retributionum.
<td>[16] However, there are some texts of Scripture that seem to attribute all things to the pure divine will. These are not expressed in order that reason may be removed from the dispensation of providence, but to show that the will of God is the first principle of all things, as we have already said above. Such a text is that of the Psalm (134:6): “All things whatsoever the Lord hath willed, He hath done”; again in Job (9:12): “Who can say to Him: Why dost You so?” Also in Romans (9:19): “Who resists His will?” And Augustine says: “Nothing but the will of God is the first cause of health and sickness, of rewards and punishments, of graces and retributions.”
<tr valign="top" style="text-align:justify">
<td>Sic ergo, cum quaeritur propter quid de aliquo naturali effectu, possumus reddere rationem ex aliqua proxima causa: dum tamen, sicut in primam causam, reducamus omnia in voluntatem divinam. Sicut, si quaeratur, quare lignum est calefactum ad praesentiam ignis? Dicitur, quia calefactio est naturalis actio ignis. Hoc autem: quia calor est proprium accidens eius. Hoc autem consequitur propriam formam eius. Et sic inde, quousque perveniatur ad divinam voluntatem. Unde, si quis respondet quaerenti quare lignum calefactum est, quia Deus voluit: convenienter quidem respondet si intendit reducere quaestionem in primam causam; inconvenienter vero si intendit omnes alias excludere causas.
<td>[17] And so, when we ask the reason why,” in regard to a natural effect, we can give a reason based on a proximate cause; provided, of course, that we trace back all things to the divine will as a first cause. Thus, if the question is asked: “Why is wood heated in the presence of fire?” it is answered: “Because heating is the natural action, of fire”; and this is so “because beat is its proper accident.” But this is the result of its proper form, and so on, until we come to the divine will. Hence, if a person answers someone who asks why wood is heated: “Because God willed it,” he is answering it appropriately, provided he intends to take the question back to a first cause; but not appropriately, if he means to exclude all other causes.
</table>
<hr></a> <a name="98" id="98">
<table cellpadding="12">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td align="center"><b>Caput 98<br>
Quomodo Deus possit facere praeter ordinem suae providentiae, et quomodo non</b>
<td align="center"><b>Chapter 98<br>
HOW GOD CAN ACT APART FROM THE ORDER OF HIS PROVIDENCE, AND HOW NOT</b>
<tr valign="top" style="text-align:justify">
<td>Ex praemissis autem accipi potest duplicis ordinis consideratio: quorum unus quidem dependet ex prima omnium causa, unde et omnia complectitur; alius autem particularis, qui ex aliqua causa creata dependet, et continet illa quae causae illi subduntur. Et hic quidem multiplex est, secundum diversitatem causarum quae inter creaturas inveniuntur. Unus tamen eorum sub altero continetur: sicut et causarum una sub altera existit. Unde oportet quod omnes particulares ordines sub illo universali ordine contineantur, et ab illo descendant qui invenitur in rebus secundum quod a prima causa dependent. Huius exemplum in politicis considerari potest. Nam omnes domestici unius patrisfamilias ordinem quendam ad invicem habent secundum quod ei subduntur; rursus, tam ipse paterfamilias, quam omnes alii qui sunt suae civitatis, ordinem quendam ad invicem habent, et ad principem civitatis; qui iterum, cum omnibus qui sunt in regno aliquo, ordinem habent ad regem.
<td>[1] Moreover, from the foregoing, consideration can be made of a twofold order: one depends on the first cause of all, and consequently takes in all things; while the other is particular, since it depends on a created cause and includes the things that are subject to it. The second is also of many types, depending on the diversity of causes that are found among creatures. Yet, one order is included under another, just as one cause stands under another. Consequently, all particular orders are contained under the universal order, and they come down from that order which is present in things by virtue of their dependence on the first cause. An illustration of this may be observed in the political area. As a matter of fact, all the members of a family, with one male head of the household, have a definite order to each other, depending on their being subject to him. Then, in turn, both this bead of the family and all other fathers who belong to his state have a certain order in regard to each other, and to the governor of the state; and again, the latter, together with all other governors who belong in the kingdom, have an order in relation to the king.
<tr valign="top" style="text-align:justify">
<td>Ordinem autem universalem, secundum quem omnia ex divina providentia ordinantur, possumus considerare dupliciter: scilicet quantum ad res quae subduntur ordini; et quantum ad ordinis rationem, quae ex principio ordinis dependet.
<td>[2] However, we can consider the universal order in two ways, in accord with which all things are ordered by divine providence: that is to say, in regard to the things subject to the order, and in regard to the plan of the order which depends on the principle of order.
<tr valign="top" style="text-align:justify">
<td>Ostensum est autem in secundo quod res ipsae quae a Deo sub ordine ponuntur, proveniunt ab ipso non sicut ab agente per necessitatem naturae, vel cuiuscumque alterius, sed ex simplici voluntate, maxime quantum ad primam rerum institutionem. Relinquitur ergo quod praeter ea quae sub ordine divinae providentiae cadunt, Deus aliqua facere potest; non enim est eius virtus ad has res obligata.
<td>Now, we showed in Book Two’. that these things which are subordinated to God do not come forth from Him, as from one who acts by natural necessity, or any other kind of necessity, but from His simple will, especially as regards the original establishment of things. The conclusion remains, then, that apart from the things that fall under the order of divine providence God can make other things, for His power is not tied down to these things.
<tr valign="top" style="text-align:justify">
<td>Si autem consideremus praedictum ordinem quantum ad rationem a principio dependentem, sic praeter ordinem illum Deus facere non potest. Ordo enim ille procedit, ut ostensum est, ex scientia et voluntate Dei omnia ordinante in suam bonitatem sicut in finem. Non est autem possibile quod Deus aliquid faciat quod non sit ab eo volitum: cum creaturae ab ipso non prodeant naturaliter, sed per voluntatem, ut ostensum est. Neque etiam est possibile ab eo aliquid fieri quod eius scientia non comprehendatur: cum voluntas esse non possit nisi de aliquo noto. Neque iterum est possibile quod in creaturis aliquid faciat quod in suam bonitatem non sit ordinatum sicut in finem: cum sua bonitas sit proprium obiectum voluntatis ipsius. Similiter autem, cum Deus sit omnino immutabilis, impossibile est quod aliquid velit cum prius noluerit; aut aliquid de novo incipiat scire, vel in suam ordinet bonitatem.
<td>[3] But, if we were to consider the foregoing order in relation to the rational plan which depends on the principle, then God cannot do what is apart from that order. For that order derives, as we showed, from the knowledge and will of God, ordering all things to His goodness as an end. Of course, it is not possible for God to do anything that is not willed by Him, since creatures do not come forth from Him by nature but by will, as has been shown. Nor, again, is it possible that something be done by Him which is not comprehended in His knowledge, since it is impossible for anything to be willed unless it be known. Nor, further, is it possible for Him to do anything in regard to creatures which is not ordered to His goodness as an end, since His goodness is the proper object of His will. In the same way, since God is utterly immutable, it is impossible for Him to will something which He has previously rejected with His will; or for Him to begin to know something new; or to order it to His goodness in a new way.
<tr valign="top" style="text-align:justify">
<td>Nihil igitur Deus facere potest quin sub ordine suae providentiae cadat: sicut non potest aliquid facere quod eius operationi non subdatur. Potest tamen alia facere quam ea quae subduntur eius providentiae vel operationi, si absolute consideretur eius potestas: sed nec potest facere aliqua quae sub ordine providentiae ipsius ab aeterno non fuerint, eo quod mutabilis esse non potest.
<td>Therefore, God can do nothing that does not fall under the order of His providence, just as He can do nothing that is not subject to His operation. Nevertheless, if His power be considered without qualification, He can do other things than those which are subject to His providence or operation, but, because of the fact that He cannot be mutable, He cannot do things that have not been eternally under the order of His providence.
<tr valign="top" style="text-align:justify">
<td>Hanc autem distinctionem quidam non considerantes, in diversos errores inciderunt. Quidam enim immobilitatem divini ordinis ad res ipsas quae ordini subduntur, extendere conati sunt, dicentes quod omnia necesse est esse sicut sunt: in tantum quod quidam dixerunt quod Deus non potest alia facere quam quae facit. Contra quod est quod habetur Matth. 26-53: an non possum rogare patrem meum, et exhibebit mihi plus quam duodecim legiones Angelorum?
<td>[4] Now, certain people who have not kept this distinction in mind have fallen into various errors. Thus, some have tried to stretch the immutability of divine order to the things themselves that are subject to the order, asserting that all things must be as they are, with the result that some have said that God can do no things other than what He does. Against this view is what is found in Matthew (26:53): “Cannot I ask my Father, and He will give me more than twelve legions of angels?”
<tr valign="top" style="text-align:justify">
<td>Quidam autem, e converso, mutabilitatem rerum quae divinae providentiae subiiciuntur, in mutabilitatem divinae providentiae transtulerunt, de eo carnaliter sapientes quod Deus, ad modum carnalis hominis, sit in sua voluntate mutabilis. Contra quod dicitur Num. 23-19: non est Deus ut homo, ut mentiatur: nec quasi filius hominis, ut mutetur.
<td>[5] Certain others, conversely, have transferred the mutability of things subject to divine providence to a mutability of divine providence, thinking in their carnal wisdom that God, in the fashion of a carnal man, is mutable in His will. Against this it is stated in Numbers (23:19): “God is not as a man that He should lie, nor as the son of man that He should be changed.”
<tr valign="top" style="text-align:justify">
<td>Alii vero contingentia divinae providentiae subtraxerunt. Contra quos dicitur Thren. 3-37: quis est iste qui dixit ut fieret aliquid, domino non iubente?
<td>[6] Others still have removed contingent events from divine providence. Against them it is said in Lamentations (3:37): “Who can command a thing to be done, when the Lord commands it not?”
</table>
<hr></a> <a name="99" id="99">
<table cellpadding="12">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td align="center"><b>Caput 99<br>
Quod Deus potest operari praeter ordinem rebus inditum, producendo effectus absque causis proximis</b>
<td align="center"><b>Chapter 99<br>
THAT GOD CAN WORK APART FROM THE ORDER IMPLANTED IN THINGS,<br>
BY PRODUCING EFFECTS WITHOUT PROXIMATE CAUSES</b>
<tr valign="top" style="text-align:justify">
<td>Restat autem ostendere quod praeter ordinem ab ipso rebus inditum agere possit.
<td>[1] It remains to show now that He can act apart from the order implanted by Him in things.
<tr valign="top" style="text-align:justify">
<td>Est enim ordo divinitus institutus in rebus ut inferiora per superiora moveantur a Deo, ut supra dictum est. Potest autem Deus praeter hunc ordinem facere: ut scilicet ipse effectum aliquem in inferioribus operetur, nihil ad hoc agente superiori agente. In hoc enim differt agens secundum necessitatem naturae, ab agente secundum voluntatem, quod ab agente secundum necessitatem naturae effectus non potest sequi nisi secundum modum virtutis activae: unde agens quod est maximae virtutis, non potest immediate producere effectum aliquem parvum, sed producit effectum suae virtuti proportionatum; in quo tamen invenitur quandoque minor virtus quam in causa, et sic per multa media tandem a causa suprema provenit aliquis parvus effectus. In agente autem per voluntatem non est sic. Nam agens per voluntatem statim sine medio potest producere quemcumque effectum qui suam non excedat virtutem: artifex enim perfectissimus potest facere opus quale faciat artifex imperfectus. Deus autem operatur per voluntatem, et non per necessitatem naturae, ut supra ostensum est. Igitur minores effectus, qui fiunt per causas inferiores, potest facere immediate absque propriis causis.
<td>[2] Indeed, there is an order divinely instituted in things to the effect that lower things are moved through higher ones by God, as we said above. Now, God can act apart from this order; for instance, He may Himself produce an effect in lower things, with nothing being done, in this case, by a higher agent. In fact, there is a difference on this point between an agent that acts by natural necessity and one that acts according to will; an effect cannot result from one that acts by natural necessity except according to the mode of the active power—so, an agent that has very great power cannot directly produce a small effect, but it produces an effect in proportion to its power. But, in this effect, there is sometimes less power than in the cause, and so, by means of many intermediaries, there finally comes to be a small effect from the highest cause. However, the situation is not the same in the case of an agent working through will. For one who acts through will is able at once to produce without an intermediary any effect that does not exceed its power. For instance, the very perfect artisan can produce any kind of work that the less perfect artisan could make. Now, God operates through will, and not through natural necessity, as we showed above. Therefore, He can produce immediately, without special causes, the smaller effects that are produced by lower causes.
<tr valign="top" style="text-align:justify">
<td>Adhuc. Virtus divina comparatur ad omnes virtutes activas sicut virtus universalis ad virtutes particulares, sicut per supra dicta patet. Virtus autem activa universalis ad particularem effectum producendum determinari potest dupliciter. Uno modo, per causam mediam particularem: sicut virtus activa caelestis corporis determinatur ad effectum generationis humanae per virtutem particularem quae est in semine; sicut et in syllogismis virtus propositionis universalis determinatur ad conclusionem particularem per assumptionem particularem. Alio modo, per intellectum, qui determinatam formam apprehendit, et eam in effectum producit. Divinus autem intellectus non solum est cognoscitivus suae essentiae, quae est quasi universalis virtus activa; neque etiam tantum universalium et primarum causarum; sed omnium particularium, sicut per supra dicta patet. Potest igitur producere immediate omnem effectum quem producit quodcumque particulare agens.
<td>[3] Again, the divine power is related to all active powers as a universal power in regard to particular powers, as is evident from our earlier statements. Now, universal active power can be limited in two ways for the purpose of producing a particular effect. One way is by means of a particular intermediate cause: thus, the active power of a celestial body is limited to the effect of generating human beings, by the particular power which is in the semen; so, too, in syllogisms, the force of the universal proposition is limited to a particular conclusion, by the inclusion of a particular premise. Another way is by means of understanding, which apprehends a definite form and produces it in the effect. But the divine understanding is capable of knowing not only the divine essence which is like a universal active power, and also not only of knowing universal and first causes, but all particular ones, as is clear from the things said above. Therefore, it is able to produce immediately every effect that any particular agent can bring about.
<tr valign="top" style="text-align:justify">
<td>Amplius. Cum accidentia consequantur principia substantialia rei, oportet quod ille qui immediate substantiam rei producit, possit immediate circa ipsam rem operari quaecumque ad substantiam ipsius consequuntur: generans enim, quod dat formam, dat omnes proprietates et motus consequentes. Ostensum autem est supra quod Deus, in prima rerum institutione, omnes res per creationem immediate in esse produxit. Potest igitur immediate unamquamque rem movere ad aliquem effectum absque mediis causis.
<td>[4] Besides, since accidents result from the substantial principles of a thing, the agent who immediately produces the substance of a thing must be able immediately to cause, in relation to this thing, anything whatever that results from the thing’s substance. For instance, the generating agent, because it gives the form, gives all the properties and resultant motions. Now, we showed above that God, at the first establishment of things, brought all things immediately into being by creation. Therefore, He is able immediately to move anything to any effect without intermediate causes.
<tr valign="top" style="text-align:justify">
<td>Item. Ordo rerum profluit a Deo in res secundum quod est praeexcogitatus in intellectu ipsius: sicut videmus in rebus humanis quod princeps civitatis ordinem apud se praemeditatum civibus imponit. Intellectus autem divinus non est determinatus ad hunc ordinem ex necessitate, ut nullum alium ordinem intelligere possit: cum et nos alium ordinem per intellectum apprehendere possumus; potest enim intelligi a nobis quod Deus hominem absque semine ex terra formet. Potest igitur Deus, praeter inferiores causas, effectum illis causis proprium operari.
<td>[5] Moreover, the order of things flows forth from God into things, according as it is foreknown in His intellect. We observe, for example, in human affairs that the head of a state imposes on the citizens an order that is preconceived within himself. But the divine understanding is not determined by necessity to this particular order, in the sense that He can understand no other order; because even we can apprehend intellectually another order. For instance, it can be understood by us that God may form a man from the earth without the use of semen. Therefore, God can bring about the proper effect of these causes without lower causes.
<tr valign="top" style="text-align:justify">
<td>Praeterea. Licet ordo rebus inditus a providentia divina divinam bonitatem suo modo repraesentet, non tamen ipsam repraesentat perfecte: cum non pertingat bonitas creaturae ad aequalitatem bonitatis divinae. Quod autem non repraesentatur perfecte per aliquod exemplatum, potest iterum praeter hoc alio modo repraesentari. Repraesentatio autem divinae bonitatis in rebus est finis productionis rerum a Deo, ut supra ostensum est. Non est igitur voluntas divina determinata ad hunc ordinem causarum et effectuum, ut non possit velle effectum aliquem in inferioribus producere immediate absque aliis causis.
<td>[6] Furthermore, although the order implanted in things by divine providence represents in its own way divine goodness, it does not represent it perfectly, because the goodness of a creature does not attain to equality with divine goodness. But that which is not perfectly represented by a given copy may again be represented in another way besides this one. Now, the representation in things of the divine goodness is the end for the production of things by God, as we showed above. Therefore, the divine will is not limited to this particular order of causes and effects in such a manner that it is unable to will to produce immediately an effect in things here below without using any other causes.
<tr valign="top" style="text-align:justify">
<td>Adhuc. Universa creatura magis est Deo subdita quam corpus humanum sit subditum animae eius: nam anima est corpori proportionata ut forma ipsius, Deus autem omnem proportionem creaturae excedit. Ex hoc autem quod anima imaginatur aliquid et vehementer afficitur ad illud, sequitur aliquando immutatio in corpore ad sanitatem vel aegritudinem absque actione principiorum corporalium quae sunt nata in corpore aegritudinem vel sanitatem causare. Multo igitur magis ex voluntate divina potest effectus aliquis sequi in creaturis absque causis quae natae sunt, secundum naturam, illum effectum producere.
<td>[7] Again, the whole of creation is more subject to God than the human body is to its soul, for the soul is in proportion to its body, as its form, but God surpasses all proportion to creation. Now, as a result of the soul imagining something and being moved by strong emotion in regard to it, there follows at times a change in the body toward good health or sickness, independent of the action of the bodily principles that are present from birth in the body, in order to affect sickness or health. Therefore, by all the greater reason, as a result of divine will, an effect can be produced in creatures without using the causes that are naturally brought into being for the purpose of producing such an effect.
<tr valign="top" style="text-align:justify">
<td>Praeterea. Secundum naturae ordinem, virtutes activae elementorum sub virtutibus activis corporum caelestium ordinantur. Proprium autem effectum virtutum elementarium interdum virtus caelestis efficit absque actione elementi: sicut patet cum sol calefacit absque ignis actione. Multo igitur magis et divina virtus, absque actione causarum creatarum, potest producere proprios effectus earum.
<td>[8] Besides, according to the order of nature, the active powers of the elements are subordinated to the active powers of the celestial bodies. But, at times, celestial power brings about the proper effect of the elemental powers without the action of the element. An example is the sun heating, independently of the action of fire. Therefore, the divine power, for a much greater reason, can produce the proper effects of. created causes without the action of these causes.
<tr valign="top" style="text-align:justify">
<td>Si autem quis dicat quod, cum ordinem istum rebus Deus indiderit, non potest esse absque mutatione ipsius ut, praeter ordinem ab ipso statutum, operetur in rebus effectus absque propriis causis producendo: ex ipsa rerum natura repelli potest. Ordo enim inditus rebus a Deo, secundum id est quod in rebus frequenter accidere solet, non autem ubique secundum id quod est semper: multae enim naturalium causarum effectus suos producunt eodem modo ut frequenter, non autem ut semper; nam quandoque, licet ut in paucioribus, aliter accidit, vel propter defectum virtutis agentis, vel propter materiae indispositionem, vel propter aliquod fortius agens; sicut cum natura in homine generat digitum sextum. Non autem propter hoc deficit aut mutatur providentiae ordo: nam et hoc ipsum quod naturalis ordo, institutus secundum ea quae sunt frequenter, quandoque deficiat, providentiae subest divinae. Si ergo per aliquam virtutem creatam fieri potest ut ordo naturalis mutetur ab eo quod est frequenter ad id quod est raro, absque mutatione providentiae divinae; multo magis divina virtus quandoque aliquid facere potest, sine suae providentiae praeiudicio, praeter ordinem naturalibus inditum rebus a Deo. Hoc enim ipsum ad suae virtutis manifestationem facit interdum. Nullo enim modo melius manifestari potest quod tota natura divinae subiecta est voluntati, quam ex hoc quod quandoque ipse praeter naturae ordinem aliquid operatur: ex hoc enim apparet quod ordo rerum processit ab eo non per necessitatem naturae, sed per liberam voluntatem.
<td>[9] Now, if someone says that, since God did implant this order in things, the production in things of an effect independently of its proper causes, and apart from the order established by Him, could not be done without a change in this order, this objection can be refuted by the very nature of things. For the order imposed on things by God is based on what usually occurs, in most cases, in things, but not on what is always so. In fact, many natural causes produce their effects in the same way, but not always. Sometimes, indeed, though rarely, an event occurs in a different way, either due to a defect in the power of an agent, or to the unsuitable condition of the matter, or to an agent with greater strength—as when nature gives rise to a sixth finger on a man. But the order of providence does not fail, or suffer change, because of such an event. Indeed, the very fact that the natural order, which is based on things that happen in most cases, does fail at times is subject to divine providence. So, if by means of a created power it can happen that the natural order is changed from what is usually so to what occurs rarely—without any change of divine providence—then it is more certain that divine power can sometimes produce an effect, without prejudice to its providence, apart from the order implanted in natural things by God. In fact, He does this at times to manifest His power. For it can be manifested in no better way, that the whole of nature is subject to the divine will, than by the fact that sometimes He does something outside the order of nature. Indeed, this makes it evident that the order of things has proceeded from Him, not by natural necessity, but by free will.
<tr valign="top" style="text-align:justify">
<td>Nec debet haec ratio frivola reputari, quod Deus aliquid facit in natura ad hoc quod se mentibus hominum manifestet: cum supra ostensum sit quod omnes creaturae corporales ad naturam intellectualem ordinentur quodammodo sicut in finem; ipsius autem intellectualis naturae finis est divina cognitio, ut in superioribus est ostensum. Non est ergo mirum si, ad cognitionem de Deo intellectuali naturae praebendam, fit aliqua immutatio in substantia corporali.
<td>[10] Nor should this argument, that God does a thing in nature in order to manifest Himself to the minds of men, be regarded as of slight importance, because we showed above that all corporeal creatures are, in a sense, ordered to intellectual nature as an end; moreover, the end of this intellectual nature is divine knowledge, as we showed in earlier remarks. So, it is not astonishing that some change is made in corporeal substance in order to make provision for the knowing of God by intellectual nature.
</table>
<hr></a> <a name="100" id="100">
<table cellpadding="12">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td align="center"><b>Caput 100<br>
Quod ea quae Deus facit praeter naturae ordinem non sunt contra naturam</b>
<td align="center"><b>Chapter 100<br>
THAT THINGS WHICH GOD DOES APART FROM THE ORDER OF NATURE ARE NOT CONTRARY TO NATURE</b>
<tr valign="top" style="text-align:justify">
<td>Considerandum tamen videtur quod, licet Deus interdum praeter ordinem rebus inditum aliquid operetur, nihil tamen facit contra naturam.
<td>[1] However, it seems that we should keep in mind that, though God at times does something apart from the order implanted in things, He does nothing contrary to nature.
<tr valign="top" style="text-align:justify">
<td>Cum enim Deus sit actus purus, omnia vero alia habeant aliquid de potentia admixtum, oportet quod Deus comparetur ad omnia sicut movens ad motum, et activum ad id quod est in potentia. Quod autem est in potentia secundum ordinem naturalem in respectu alicuius agentis, si aliquid imprimatur in ipsum ab illo agente, non est contra naturam simpliciter, etsi sit aliquando contrarium particulari formae quae corrumpitur per huiusmodi actionem: cum enim generatur ignis et corrumpitur aer igne agente, est generatio et corruptio naturalis. Quicquid igitur a Deo fit in rebus creatis, non est contra naturam, etsi videatur esse contra ordinem proprium alicuius naturae.
<td>[2] In fact, since God is pure act, whereas all other things have some admixture of potency, God must be related to all else as a mover is to what is moved, and as the active is to what is in potency. Now, considering a thing that is in potency in the natural order to a certain agent, if some impression is made on it by that agent, this is not contrary to nature in an absolute sense, though it may be at times contrary to the particular form which is corrupted by this action. Thus, when fire is generated and air is corrupted by the fiery agent, natural generation and corruption take place. So, whatever is done by God in created things is not contrary to nature, even though it may seem to be opposed to the proper order of a particular nature.
<tr valign="top" style="text-align:justify">
<td>Adhuc. Cum Deus sit primum agens, ut supra ostensum est, omnia quae sunt post ipsum, sunt quasi quaedam instrumenta ipsius. Ad hoc autem sunt instrumenta instituta ut deserviant actioni principalis agentis, dum moventur ab ipso: unde talis instrumenti materia et forma esse debet ut sit competens actioni quam intendit principale agens. Et propter hoc non est contra naturam instrumenti ut moveatur a principali agente, sed est ei maxime conveniens. Neque igitur est contra naturam cum res creatae moventur qualitercumque a Deo: sic enim institutae sunt ut ei deserviant.
<td>[3] Again, since God is the primary agent as we showed above, all things that come after Him are like instruments for Him. But instruments are made for the purpose of subserving the action of the principal agent, while being moved by him. Consequently, the matter and form of an instrument should be such that they are suitable for the action which the principal agent intends. This is why it is not contrary to the nature of an instrument for it to be moved by a principal agent, but, rather, is most fitting for it. Therefore, it is not contrary to nature when created things are moved in any way by God; indeed, they were so made that they might serve Him.
<tr valign="top" style="text-align:justify">
<td>Praeterea. In agentibus etiam corporalibus hoc videtur, quod motus qui sunt in inferioribus corporibus ex impressione superiorum, non sunt violenti neque contra naturam, quamvis non videantur convenientes motui naturali quem corpus inferius habet secundum proprietatem suae formae: non enim dicimus quod fluxus et refluxus maris sit motus violentus, cum sit ex impressione caelestis corporis, licet naturalis motus aquae sit solum ad unam partem, scilicet ad medium. Multo igitur magis quicquid a Deo fit in qualibet creatura, non potest dici violentum neque contra naturam.
<td>[4] Besides, even among corporeal agents it may be observed that the motions that go on in lower bodies, as a result of the action of higher ones, are not violent or contrary to nature, though they may not seem to be in agreement with the natural motion which the lower body has in accord with the particular character of its form, For instance, we do not say that the tidal ebb and flow of the sea is a violent motion, because it results from the influence of a celestial body; even though the natural motion of water is only in one direction, toward the center. Therefore, it is much more impossible to say that whatever is done in any creature by God is violent or contrary to nature.
<tr valign="top" style="text-align:justify">
<td>Item. Prima mensura essentiae et naturae cuiuslibet rei est Deus, sicut primum ens, quod est omnibus causa essendi. Cum autem per mensuram de unaquaque re sumatur iudicium, oportet hoc dici naturale unicuique rei per quod conformatur suae mensurae. Hoc igitur erit naturale unicuique rei quod ei a Deo inditum est. Ergo et si eidem rei a Deo aliquid aliter imprimatur, non est contra naturam.
<td>[5] Moreover, the primary measure of the essence and nature of each thing is God; just as He is the first being, which is the cause of being in all things. Now, since a judgment concerning anything is based on its measure, what is natural for anything must be deemed what is in conformity with its measure. So, what is implanted by God in a thing will be natural to it. Therefore, even if something else is impressed on the same thing by God, that is not contrary to nature.
<tr valign="top" style="text-align:justify">
<td>Amplius. Omnes creaturae comparantur ad Deum sicut artificiata ad artificem, ut ex praemissis patet. Unde tota natura est sicut quoddam artificiatum divinae artis. Non est autem contra rationem artificii si artifex aliter aliquid operetur in suo artificio, etiam postquam ei primam formam dedit. Neque ergo est contra naturam si Deus in rebus naturalibus aliquid operetur aliter quam consuetus cursus naturae habet.
<td>[6] Furthermore, all creatures are related to God as art products are to an artist, as is clear from the foregoing. Consequently, the whole of nature is like an artifact of the divine artistic mind. But it is not contrary to the essential character of an artist if he should work in a different way on his product, even after he has given it its first form. Neither, then, is it against nature if God does something to natural things in a different way from that to which the course of nature is accustomed.
<tr valign="top" style="text-align:justify">
<td>Hinc est quod Augustinus dicit: Deus, creator et conditor omnium naturarum, nihil contra naturam facit: quia id est naturale cuique rei quod facit a quo est omnis modus, numerus et ordo naturae.
<td>[7] Hence, Augustine says: “God, the creator and founder of all natures, does nothing contrary to nature; for what the source of all measure, number and order in nature does, is natural to each thing” [ <i>Contra Faustum</i>, XXVI, 3].
</table>
<hr></a> <a name="101" id="101">
<table cellpadding="12">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td align="center"><b>Caput 101<br>
De miraculis</b>
<td align="center"><b>Chapter 101<br>
ON MIRACLES</b>
<tr valign="top" style="text-align:justify">
<td>Haec autem quae praeter ordinem communiter in rebus statutum quandoque divinitus fiunt, miracula dici solent: admiramur enim aliquid cum, effectum videntes, causam ignoramus. Et quia causa una et eadem a quibusdam interdum est cognita et a quibusdam ignota, inde contingit quod videntium simul aliquem effectum, aliqui mirantur et aliqui non mirantur: astrologus enim non miratur videns eclipsim solis, quia cognoscit causam; ignarus autem huius scientiae necesse habet admirari, causam ignorans. Sic igitur est aliquid mirum quoad hunc, non autem quoad illum. Illud ergo simpliciter mirum est quod habet causam simpliciter occultam: et hoc sonat nomen miraculi, quod scilicet sit de se admiratione plenum, non quoad hunc vel illum tantum. Causa autem simpliciter occulta omni homini est Deus: probatum enim est supra quod eius essentiam nullus homo in statu huius vitae intellectu capere potest. Illa igitur proprie miracula dicenda sunt quae divinitus fiunt praeter ordinem communiter observatum in rebus.
<td>[1] Things that are at times divinely accomplished, apart from the generally established order in things, are customarily called miracles; for we admire with some astonishment a certain event when we observe the effect but do not know its cause. And since one and the same cause is at times known to some people and unknown to others, the result is that of several who see an effect at the same time, some are moved to admiring astonishment, while others are not. For instance, the astronomer is not astonished when he sees an eclipse of the sun, for he knows its cause, but the person who is ignorant of this science must be amazed, for he ignores the cause. And so, a certain event is wondrous to one person, but not so to another. So, a thing that has a completely hidden cause is wondrous in an unqualified way, and this the name, miracle, suggests; namely, what is of itself filled with admirable wonder, not simply in relation to one person or another. Now, absolutely speaking, the cause hidden from every man is God. In fact, we proved above that no man in the present state of life can grasp His essence intellectually. Therefore, those things must properly be called miraculous which are done by divine power apart from the order generally followed in things.
<tr valign="top" style="text-align:justify">
<td>Horum autem miraculorum diversi sunt gradus et ordines. Nam summum gradum inter miracula tenent in quibus aliquid fit a Deo quod natura nunquam facere potest: sicut quod duo corpora sint simul, quod sol retrocedat aut stet, quod mare divisum transeuntibus iter praebeat. Et inter haec etiam ordo attenditur. Nam quanto maiora sunt illa quae Deus operatur, et quanto magis sunt remota a facultate naturae, tanto miraculum maius est: sicut maius est miraculum quod sol retrocedat quam quod mare dividatur.
<td>[2] Now, there are various degrees and orders of these miracles. Indeed, the highest rank among miracles is held by those events in which something is done by God which nature never could do. For example, that two bodies should be coincident; that the sun reverse its course, or stand still; that the sea open up and offer a way through which people may pass. And even among these an order may be observed. For the greater the things that God does are, and the more they are removed from the capacity of nature, the greater the miracle is. Thus, it is more miraculous for the sun to reverse its course than for the sea to be divided.
<tr valign="top" style="text-align:justify">
<td>Secundum autem gradum in miraculis tenent illa in quibus Deus aliquid facit quod natura facere potest, sed non per illum ordinem. Opus enim naturae est quod aliquod animal vivat, videat et ambulet: sed quod post mortem vivat, post caecitatem videat, post debilitatem claudus ambulet, hoc natura facere non potest, sed Deus interdum miraculose operatur. Inter haec etiam miracula gradus attenditur, secundum quod illud quod fit, magis est a facultate naturae remotum.
<td>[3] Then, the second degree among miracles is held by those events in which God does something which nature can do, but not in this order. It is a work of nature for an animal to live, to see, and to walk; but for it to live after death, to see after becoming blind, to walk after paralysis of the limbs, this nature cannot do—but God at times does such works miraculously. Even among this degree of miracles a gradation is evident, according as what is done is more removed from the capacity of nature.
<tr valign="top" style="text-align:justify">
<td>Tertius autem gradus miraculorum est cum Deus facit quod consuetum est fieri operatione naturae, tamen absque principiis naturae operantibus: sicut cum aliquis a febre curabili per naturam, divina virtute curatur; et cum pluit sine operatione principiorum naturae.
<td>[4] Now, the third degree of miracles occurs when God does what is usually done by the working of nature, but without the operation of the principles of nature. For example, a person may be cured by divine power from a fever which could be cured naturally, and it may rain independently of the working of the principles of nature.
</table>
<hr></a> <a name="102" id="102">
<table cellpadding="12">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td align="center"><b>Caput 102<br>
Quod solus Deus facit miracula</b>
<td align="center"><b>Chapter 102<br>
THAT GOD ALONE WORKS MIRACLES</b>
<tr valign="top" style="text-align:justify">
<td>Ex praemissis autem ostendi potest quod miracula facere solus Deus potest.
<td>[1] It can be shown from the foregoing that God alone can work miracles.
<tr valign="top" style="text-align:justify">
<td>Quod enim est sub ordine totaliter constitutum, non potest supra ordinem illum operari. Omnis autem creatura constituta est sub ordine quem Deus in rebus statuit. Nulla ergo creatura potest supra hunc ordinem operari. Quod est miracula facere.
<td>[2] In fact, whatever is completely confined under a certain order cannot work above that order. But every creature is established under the order which God has put in things. So, no creature can operate above this order; but that is what it means to work miracles.
<tr valign="top" style="text-align:justify">
<td>Item. Quando aliqua virtus finita proprium effectum operatur ad quem determinatur, non est miraculum: licet possit esse mirum alicui qui illam virtutem non comprehendit; sicut mirum videtur ignaris quod magnes trahit ferrum, vel quod aliquis parvus piscis sit retinens navem. Omnis autem creaturae potentia est limitata ad aliquem determinatum effectum, vel ad aliquos. Quicquid igitur virtute cuiuscumque creaturae fiat, non potest dici miraculum proprium, etsi sit mirum virtutem illius creaturae non comprehendenti. Quod autem fit virtute divina, quae, cum sit infinita, de se incomprehensibilis est, vere miraculum est.
<td>[3] Again, when any finite power produces the proper effect to which it is determined, this is not a miracle, though it may be a matter of wonder for some person who does not understand that power. For example, it may seem astonishing to ignorant people that a magnet attracts iron or that some little fish might hold back a ship. But the potency of every creature is limited to some definite effect or to certain effects. So, whatever is done by the power of any creature cannot be called a miracle properly, even though it may be astonishing to one who does not comprehend the power of this creature. But what is done by divine power, which, being infinite, is incomprehensible in itself, is truly miraculous.
<tr valign="top" style="text-align:justify">
<td>Amplius. Omnis creatura in sua actione requirit subiectum aliquod in quod agat: solius enim Dei est ex nihilo aliquid facere, ut supra ostensum est. Nihil autem quod requirit in sua actione subiectum, potest agere nisi illa ad quae subiectum illud est in potentia: hoc enim agens in subiectum aliquod operatur, ut educat illud de potentia in actum. Nulla igitur creatura, sicut nec creare potest, ita nec agere in aliqua re nisi quod est in potentia illius rei. Fiunt autem multa miracula divinitus dum in re aliqua fit divina virtute quod non est in potentia illius rei: sicut quod mortuus reviviscat, quod sol retrocedat, quod duo corpora sint simul. Haec igitur miracula nulla virtute creata fieri possunt.
<td>[4] Besides, every creature needs for its action some subject on which to act, for it is the prerogative of God alone to make something out of nothing, as we showed above. Now, nothing that requires a subject for its action can do anything other than that to which the subject is in potency, for the agent acts on the subject in order to bring it from potency to act. So, just as no creature can create, so no creature can produce any effect in a thing except what is within the potency of that thing. But many miracles are divinely accomplished, when something is done in a thing, which is not within the potency of that thing; for instance, that a dead person be revived, that the sun move backwards, that two bodies be coincident. Therefore, these miracles cannot be done by any created power.
<tr valign="top" style="text-align:justify">
<td>Adhuc. Subiectum in quod agitur, ordinem habet et ad agens quod reducit ipsum de potentia in actum, et ad actum in quem reducitur. Sicut ergo subiectum aliquod est in potentia ad aliquem determinatum actum, et non ad quemlibet, ita non potest reduci de potentia in actum determinatum nisi per agens aliquod determinatum: requiritur enim agens diversimode ad reducendum in diversum actum; nam, cum aer sit potentia ignis et aqua, alio agente fit actu ignis, et actu aqua. Similiter etiam patet quod materia corporalis in actum aliquem perfectum non reducitur a sola virtute universali agente, sed oportet esse aliquod agens proprium, per quod determinetur impressio universalis virtutis ad determinatum effectum; in actum autem minus perfectum potest reduci materia corporalis sola virtute universali, absque particulari agente: animalia enim perfecta non generantur ex sola virtute caelesti, sed requiritur determinatum semen; ad generationem vero quorundam imperfectorum animalium sola virtus caelestis sufficit, sine semine. Effectus igitur qui in his inferioribus fiunt, si sint nati fieri a causis superioribus universalibus sine operatione causarum particularium inferiorum, non est miraculum si sic fiant: sicut non est miraculum quod animalia ex putrefactione sine semine nascantur. Si autem non sunt nati fieri per solas causas superiores, requiruntur ad eorum complementum causae inferiores particulares. Cum autem aliquis effectus producitur ab aliqua causa superiori mediantibus propriis principiis, non est miraculum. Nullo igitur modo virtute superiorum creaturarum aliqua miracula fieri possunt.
<td>[5] Moreover, the subject in which an action goes on has a relation both to the agent that reduces it from potency to act and to the act to which it is reduced. Hence, just as a certain subject is in potency to some definite act, and not to merely any act, so also is it impossible for it to be reduced from potency to some definite act except by means of some definite agent. Indeed, a different kind of agent is required to reduce to different types of act. For instance, since air is potentially either fire or water, it is actually made into fire by one agent and into water by a different one. Likewise, it is clear that corporeal matter is not brought to the condition of perfect actuality by the sole power of a universal agent; rather, there must be a particular agent by which the influence of the universal power is limited to a definite effect. Of course, corporeal matter may be brought to less perfect actuality by universal power alone, without a particular agent. For example, perfect animals are not generated by celestial power alone, but require a definite kind of semen; however, for the generation of certain imperfect animals, celestial power by itself is enough, without semen. So, if the effects that are accomplished in these lower bodies are naturally capable of being done by superior universal causes without the working of particular lower causes, such accomplishment is not miraculous. Thus, it is not miraculous for animals to be originated from putrefaction, independently of semen. But, if they do not naturally come about through superior causes alone, then particular lower causes are needed for their development. Now, when some effect is produced by a higher cause through the mediation of proper principles, there is no miracle. Therefore, no miracles can be worked in any way by the power of the higher creatures.
<tr valign="top" style="text-align:justify">
<td>Amplius. Eiusdem rationis esse videtur quod aliquid operetur ex subiecto; et quod operetur id ad quod est in potentia subiectum; et quod ordinate operetur per determinata media. Nam subiectum non fit in potentia propinqua ad ultimum nisi cum fuerit actu in media: sicut cibus non est statim potentia caro, sed cum fuerit conversus in sanguinem. Omnis autem creatura necesse habet subiecto ad hoc quod aliquid faciat: nec potest facere nisi ad quod subiectum est in potentia, ut ostensum est. Ergo non potest facere aliquid nisi subiectum reducat in actum per determinata media. Miracula igitur, quae fiunt ex hoc quod aliquis effectus producitur non illo ordine quo naturaliter fieri potest, virtute creaturae fieri non possunt.
<td>[6] Furthermore, it seems to pertain to the same rational principle for a thing to be produced from a subject; for that to which the subject is in potency to be produced; and for an orderly action to be produced through definite intermediate stages. Indeed, a subject is not advanced to proximate potency unless it has become actual in regard to the intermediate stages; thus, food is not immediately potential flesh, but only when it has been changed into blood. Now, every creature must have a subject, in order to make something, nor can it make anything to which the subject is not in potency, as we showed. So, it cannot make anything unless the subject is brought to actuality through definite intermediate stages. Miracles, then, which result from the fact that an effect is produced, but not according to the order in which it can be accomplished naturally, cannot be worked by the power of a creature.
<tr valign="top" style="text-align:justify">
<td>Adhuc. Inter species motus ordo quidam naturalis attenditur: nam primus motuum est motus localis, unde et causa aliorum existit; primum enim in quolibet genere causa invenitur eorum quae in illo genere consequuntur. Omnis autem effectus qui in his inferioribus producitur, per aliquam generationem vel alterationem necesse est ut producatur. Oportet igitur quod per aliquid localiter motum hoc proveniat, si fiat ab aliquo agente incorporali, quod proprie localiter moveri non possit. Effectus autem qui fiunt a substantiis incorporeis per corporea instrumenta, non sunt miraculosi: corpora enim non operantur nisi naturaliter. Non igitur substantiae creatae incorporeae possunt aliqua miracula facere propria virtute. Et multo minus substantiae corporeae, quarum omnis actio naturalis est.
<td>[7] Again, a certain order may be observed in the types of motion. The primary motion is local movement, and so it is the cause of the other kinds, since the first in any genus is the cause of the subsequent items in that genus. Now, every effect that is produced in these lower things must be produced by some generation or alteration. So, this must occur by means of something that is moved locally if it be accomplished by an incorporeal agent, which, strictly speaking, cannot be moved locally. Now, the effects that are produced by incorporeal substances through corporeal instruments are not miraculous, since bodies only work naturally. Therefore, created incorporeal substances cannot work any miracles by their own power, and much less can corporeal substances whose every action is natural.
<tr valign="top" style="text-align:justify">
<td>Solius igitur Dei est miracula facere. Ipse enim est superior ordine quo universa continentur, sicut a cuius providentia totus hic ordo fluit. Eius etiam virtus, cum sit omnino infinita, non determinatur ad aliquem specialem effectum; neque ad hoc quod effectus ipsius producatur aliquo determinato modo vel ordine.
<td>[8] So, it is the prerogative of God alone to work miracles. Indeed, He is superior to the order in which the whole of things are contained, just as from His providence this entire order flows. Moreover, His power, being utterly infinite, is not limited to any special effect or to the production of a particular effect in any limited way, or order.
<tr valign="top" style="text-align:justify">
<td>Hinc est quod in Psalmo dicitur de Deo: qui facit mirabilia magna solus.
<td>[9] Hence it is said about God in the Psalm (135:4): “Who alone does great wonders.”
</table>
<hr></a> <a name="103" id="103">
<table cellpadding="12">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td align="center"><b>Caput 103<br>
Quo modo substantiae spirituales aliqua mirabilia operantur, quae tamen non sunt vere miracula</b>
<td align="center"><b>Chapter 103<br>
HOW SPIRITUAL SUBSTANCES DO CERTAIN WONDERFUL THINGS<br>
WHICH, HOWEVER, ARE NOT TRULY MIRACLES</b>
<tr valign="top" style="text-align:justify">
<td>Fuit autem positio Avicennae quod substantiis separatis multo magis obedit materia ad productionem alicuius effectus, quam contrariis agentibus in materia. Unde ponit quod ad apprehensionem praedictarum substantiarum sequitur interdum effectus aliquis in istis inferioribus, vel pluviarum, vel sanitatis alicuius infirmi, absque aliquo corporeo agente medio.
<td>[1] It was Avicenna’s position that matter is much more obedient to separate substances, in the production of a certain effect, than it is to the contrary agencies within matter. Consequently, he claimed that, when there is an act of apprehension in the aforesaid substances, there results at times an effect in these things here below—for instance, rain, or the healing of a sick person—without the mediation of a corporeal agent.
<tr valign="top" style="text-align:justify">
<td>Cuius quidem signum ab anima nostra accepit, quae cum fuerit fortis in sua imaginatione, ad solam apprehensionem immutatur corpus: sicut cum quis ambulans super trabem in alto positam, cadit de facili, quia imaginatur casum ex timore; non autem caderet si esset trabs illa posita super terram, unde casum timere non posset. Manifestum est etiam quod ad solam apprehensionem animae calescit corpus, sicut accidit in concupiscentibus vel iratis; aut etiam infrigidatur, sicut accidit in timentibus. Quandoque etiam immutatur ex forti apprehensione ad aliquam aegritudinem, puta febrem, vel etiam lepram. Et per hunc modum dicit quod, si anima sit pura, non subiecta corporalibus passionibus, et fortis in sua apprehensione, obedit apprehensioni eius non solum corpus proprium, sed etiam corpora exteriora: adeo quod ad eius apprehensionem sanetur aliquis infirmus, vel aliquid huiusmodi aliud accidat. Et hoc ponit esse causam fascinationis: quia scilicet anima alicuius vehementer affecta in malivolentia, habet impressionem nocumenti in aliquem, maxime puerum, qui propter corporis teneritudinem est facile susceptivus impressionis. Unde vult quod multo amplius ad apprehensionem substantiarum separatarum, quas ponit animas vel motores orbium, sequantur aliqui effectus in istis inferioribus absque actione alicuius corporalis agentis.
<td>[2] He took an indication of this from our soul. For, when it is possessed of a strong imagination, its body may be changed by an act of cognition alone. For example, when a man is walking over a beam placed at some height, he falls quite easily because, through fear, he imagines his fall. But he would not fall if the beam were placed on the earth, where there would be no possibility of fearing a fall. It is also obvious that, simply as a result of the cognitive act of the soul, the body becomes hot, as happens in those who are prone to concupiscence, or anger; or it may also grow cold, as happens in those subject to fear. Sometimes, too, it is moved by a strong cognitive act toward some illness, such as fever, or even leprosy. And on this basis, he says that, if the soul be pure, not subject to bodily passions, and strong in its cognitive functioning, then not only its own body, but even external bodies, obey its act of apprehension. So much so, that on the occurrence of its act of apprehension a sick person may be cured, or some similar result may occur. And he claims that this is the explanation of the casting of a spell by fascination; namely, that the soul of a person strongly moved by malevolence has the power to inflict an injury on someone, particularly a child, who is quite susceptible to impressions, because of the tender condition of his body. Consequently, Avicenna favored the notion that it is much more likely that the cognitive functions of separate substances, which he regarded as the souls or movers of the spheres, result in certain effects in lower bodies, without the action of any corporeal agent.
<tr valign="top" style="text-align:justify">
<td>Haec autem positio satis consona est aliis suis positionibus. Ponit enim quod omnes formae substantiales effluunt in haec inferiora a substantia separata; et quod corporalia agentia non sunt nisi disponentia materiam ad suscipiendam impressionem agentis separati. Quod quidem non est verum secundum Aristotelis doctrinam, qui probat in VII Metaphys., quod formae quae sunt in materia, non sunt a formis separatis, sed a formis quae sunt in materia: sic enim invenietur similitudo inter faciens et factum.