draft-ietf-ace-oauth-authz.txt

Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)                          L. Seitz
Request for Comments: 9200                                     Combitech
Category: Standards Track                                    G. Selander
ISSN: 2070-1721                                                 Ericsson
                                                           E. Wahlstroem
                                                                        
                                                              S. Erdtman
                                                              Spotify AB
                                                           H. Tschofenig
                                                                Arm Ltd.
                                                              March 2022


Authentication and Authorization for Constrained Environments Using the
                    OAuth 2.0 Framework (ACE-OAuth)

Abstract

   This specification defines a framework for authentication and
   authorization in Internet of Things (IoT) environments called
   ACE-OAuth.  The framework is based on a set of building blocks
   including OAuth 2.0 and the Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP),
   thus transforming a well-known and widely used authorization solution
   into a form suitable for IoT devices.  Existing specifications are
   used where possible, but extensions are added and profiles are
   defined to better serve the IoT use cases.

Status of This Memo

   This is an Internet Standards Track document.

   This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force
   (IETF).  It represents the consensus of the IETF community.  It has
   received public review and has been approved for publication by the
   Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG).  Further information on
   Internet Standards is available in Section 2 of RFC 7841.

   Information about the current status of this document, any errata,
   and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
   https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9200.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2022 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
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   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction
   2.  Terminology
   3.  Overview
     3.1.  OAuth 2.0
     3.2.  CoAP
   4.  Protocol Interactions
   5.  Framework
     5.1.  Discovering Authorization Servers
     5.2.  Unauthorized Resource Request Message
     5.3.  AS Request Creation Hints
       5.3.1.  The Client-Nonce Parameter
     5.4.  Authorization Grants
     5.5.  Client Credentials
     5.6.  AS Authentication
     5.7.  The Authorization Endpoint
     5.8.  The Token Endpoint
       5.8.1.  Client-to-AS Request
       5.8.2.  AS-to-Client Response
       5.8.3.  Error Response
       5.8.4.  Request and Response Parameters
         5.8.4.1.  Grant Type
         5.8.4.2.  Token Type
         5.8.4.3.  Profile
         5.8.4.4.  Client-Nonce
       5.8.5.  Mapping Parameters to CBOR
     5.9.  The Introspection Endpoint
       5.9.1.  Introspection Request
       5.9.2.  Introspection Response
       5.9.3.  Error Response
       5.9.4.  Mapping Introspection Parameters to CBOR
     5.10. The Access Token
       5.10.1.  The Authorization Information Endpoint
         5.10.1.1.  Verifying an Access Token
         5.10.1.2.  Protecting the Authorization Information Endpoint
       5.10.2.  Client Requests to the RS
       5.10.3.  Token Expiration
       5.10.4.  Key Expiration
   6.  Security Considerations
     6.1.  Protecting Tokens
     6.2.  Communication Security
     6.3.  Long-Term Credentials
     6.4.  Unprotected AS Request Creation Hints
     6.5.  Minimal Security Requirements for Communication
     6.6.  Token Freshness and Expiration
     6.7.  Combining Profiles
     6.8.  Unprotected Information
     6.9.  Identifying Audiences
     6.10. Denial of Service Against or with Introspection
   7.  Privacy Considerations
   8.  IANA Considerations
     8.1.  ACE Authorization Server Request Creation Hints
     8.2.  CoRE Resource Types
     8.3.  OAuth Extensions Errors
     8.4.  OAuth Error Code CBOR Mappings
     8.5.  OAuth Grant Type CBOR Mappings
     8.6.  OAuth Access Token Types
     8.7.  OAuth Access Token Type CBOR Mappings
       8.7.1.  Initial Registry Contents
     8.8.  ACE Profiles
     8.9.  OAuth Parameters
     8.10. OAuth Parameters CBOR Mappings
     8.11. OAuth Introspection Response Parameters
     8.12. OAuth Token Introspection Response CBOR Mappings
     8.13. JSON Web Token Claims
     8.14. CBOR Web Token Claims
     8.15. Media Type Registration
     8.16. CoAP Content-Formats
     8.17. Expert Review Instructions
   9.  References
     9.1.  Normative References
     9.2.  Informative References
   Appendix A.  Design Justification
   Appendix B.  Roles and Responsibilities
   Appendix C.  Requirements on Profiles
   Appendix D.  Assumptions on AS Knowledge about the C and RS
   Appendix E.  Differences to OAuth 2.0
   Appendix F.  Deployment Examples
     F.1.  Local Token Validation
     F.2.  Introspection Aided Token Validation
   Acknowledgments
   Authors' Addresses

1.  Introduction

   Authorization is the process for granting approval to an entity to
   access a generic resource [RFC4949].  The authorization task itself
   can best be described as granting access to a requesting client for a
   resource hosted on a device, i.e., the resource server (RS).  This
   exchange is mediated by one or multiple authorization servers (ASes).
   Managing authorization for a large number of devices and users can be
   a complex task.

   While prior work on authorization solutions for the Web and for the
   mobile environment also applies to the Internet of Things (IoT)
   environment, many IoT devices are constrained, for example, in terms
   of processing capabilities, available memory, etc.  For such devices,
   the Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP) [RFC7252] can alleviate
   some resource concerns when used instead of HTTP to implement the
   communication flows of this specification.

   Appendix A gives an overview of the constraints considered in this
   design, and a more detailed treatment of constraints can be found in
   [RFC7228].  This design aims to accommodate different IoT deployments
   as well as a continuous range of device and network capabilities.
   Taking energy consumption as an example, at one end, there are
   energy-harvesting or battery-powered devices that have a tight power
   budget; on the other end, there are mains-powered devices; and all
   levels exist in between.

   Hence, IoT devices may be very different in terms of available
   processing and message exchange capabilities, and there is a need to
   support many different authorization use cases [RFC7744].

   This specification describes a framework for Authentication and
   Authorization for Constrained Environments (ACE) built on reuse of
   OAuth 2.0 [RFC6749], thereby extending authorization to Internet of
   Things devices.  This specification contains the necessary building
   blocks for adjusting OAuth 2.0 to IoT environments.

   Profiles of this framework are available in separate specifications,
   such as [RFC9202] or [RFC9203].  Such profiles may specify the use of
   the framework for a specific security protocol and the underlying
   transports for use in a specific deployment environment to improve
   interoperability.  Implementations may claim conformance with a
   specific profile, whereby implementations utilizing the same profile
   interoperate, while implementations of different profiles are not
   expected to be interoperable.  More powerful devices, such as mobile
   phones and tablets, may implement multiple profiles and will
   therefore be able to interact with a wider range of constrained
   devices.  Requirements on profiles are described at contextually
   appropriate places throughout this specification and also summarized
   in Appendix C.

2.  Terminology

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
   "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
   14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
   capitals, as shown here.

   Certain security-related terms, such as "authentication",
   "authorization", "confidentiality", "(data) integrity", "message
   authentication code", and "verify", are taken from [RFC4949].

   Since exchanges in this specification are described as RESTful
   protocol interactions, HTTP [RFC7231] offers useful terminology.
   (Note that "RESTful" refers to the Representational State Transfer
   (REST) architecture.)

   Terminology for entities in the architecture is defined in OAuth 2.0
   [RFC6749], such as client (C), resource server (RS), and
   authorization server (AS).

   Note that the term "endpoint" is used here following its OAuth
   definition, which is to denote resources, such as token and
   introspection at the AS and authz-info at the RS (see Section 5.10.1
   for a definition of the authz-info endpoint).  The CoAP definition,
   which is "[a]n entity participating in the CoAP protocol" [RFC7252],
   is not used in this specification.

   The specification in this document is called the "framework" or "ACE
   framework".  When referring to "profiles of this framework", it
   refers to additional specifications that define the use of this
   specification with concrete transport and communication security
   protocols (e.g., CoAP over DTLS).

   The term "Access Information" is used for parameters, other than the
   access token, provided to the client by the AS to enable it to access
   the RS (e.g., public key of the RS or profile supported by RS).

   The term "authorization information" is used to denote all
   information, including the claims of relevant access tokens, that an
   RS uses to determine whether an access request should be granted.

   Throughout this document, examples for CBOR data items are expressed
   in CBOR extended diagnostic notation as defined in Section 8 of
   [RFC8949] and Appendix G of [RFC8610] ("diagnostic notation"), unless
   noted otherwise.  We often use diagnostic notation comments to
   provide a textual representation of the numeric parameter names and
   values.

3.  Overview

   This specification defines the ACE framework for authorization in the
   Internet of Things environment.  It consists of a set of building
   blocks.

   The basic block is the OAuth 2.0 [RFC6749] framework, which enjoys
   widespread deployment.  Many IoT devices can support OAuth 2.0
   without any additional extensions, but for certain constrained
   settings, additional profiling is needed.

   Another building block is the lightweight web transfer protocol CoAP
   [RFC7252], for those communication environments where HTTP is not
   appropriate.  CoAP typically runs on top of UDP, which further
   reduces overhead and message exchanges.  While this specification
   defines extensions for the use of OAuth over CoAP, other underlying
   protocols are not prohibited from being supported in the future, such
   as HTTP/2 [RFC7540], Message Queuing Telemetry Transport (MQTT)
   [MQTT5.0], Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) [BLE], and QUIC [RFC9000].
   Note that this document specifies protocol exchanges in terms of
   RESTful verbs, such as GET and POST.  Future profiles using protocols
   that do not support these verbs MUST specify how the corresponding
   protocol messages are transmitted instead.

   A third building block is the Concise Binary Object Representation
   (CBOR) [RFC8949], for encodings where JSON [RFC8259] is not
   sufficiently compact.  CBOR is a binary encoding designed for small
   code and message size.  Self-contained tokens and protocol message
   payloads are encoded in CBOR when CoAP is used.  When CoAP is not
   used, the use of CBOR remains RECOMMENDED.

   A fourth building block is CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE)
   [RFC8152], which enables object-level layer security as an
   alternative or complement to transport layer security (DTLS [RFC6347]
   or TLS [RFC8446]).  COSE is used to secure self-contained tokens,
   such as proof-of-possession (PoP) tokens, which are an extension to
   the OAuth bearer tokens.  The default token format is defined in CBOR
   Web Token (CWT) [RFC8392].  Application-layer security for CoAP using
   COSE can be provided with Object Security for Constrained RESTful
   Environments (OSCORE) [RFC8613].

   With the building blocks listed above, solutions satisfying various
   IoT device and network constraints are possible.  A list of
   constraints is described in detail in [RFC7228], and a description of
   how the building blocks mentioned above relate to the various
   constraints can be found in Appendix A.

   Luckily, not every IoT device suffers from all constraints.
   Nevertheless, the ACE framework takes all these aspects into account
   and allows several different deployment variants to coexist, rather
   than mandating a one-size-fits-all solution.  It is important to
   cover the wide range of possible interworking use cases and the
   different requirements from a security point of view.  Once IoT
   deployments mature, popular deployment variants will be documented in
   the form of ACE profiles.

3.1.  OAuth 2.0

   The OAuth 2.0 authorization framework enables a client to obtain
   scoped access to a resource with the permission of a resource owner.
   Authorization information, or references to it, is passed between the
   nodes using access tokens.  These access tokens are issued to clients
   by an authorization server with the approval of the resource owner.
   The client uses the access token to access the protected resources
   hosted by the resource server.

   A number of OAuth 2.0 terms are used within this specification:

   Access Tokens:
      Access tokens are credentials needed to access protected
      resources.  An access token is a data structure representing
      authorization permissions issued by the AS to the client.  Access
      tokens are generated by the AS and consumed by the RS.  The access
      token content is opaque to the client.

      Access tokens can have different formats and various methods of
      utilization (e.g., cryptographic properties) based on the security
      requirements of the given deployment.

   Introspection:
      Introspection is a method for a resource server, or potentially a
      client, to query the authorization server for the active state and
      content of a received access token.  This is particularly useful
      in those cases where the authorization decisions are very dynamic
      and/or where the received access token itself is an opaque
      reference, rather than a self-contained token.  More information
      about introspection in OAuth 2.0 can be found in [RFC7662].

   Refresh Tokens:
      Refresh tokens are credentials used to obtain access tokens.
      Refresh tokens are issued to the client by the authorization
      server and are used to obtain a new access token when the current
      access token expires or to obtain additional access tokens with
      identical or narrower scope (such access tokens may have a shorter
      lifetime and fewer permissions than authorized by the resource
      owner).  Issuing a refresh token is optional at the discretion of
      the authorization server.  If the authorization server issues a
      refresh token, it is included when issuing an access token (i.e.,
      step (B) in Figure 1).

      A refresh token in OAuth 2.0 is a string representing the
      authorization granted to the client by the resource owner.  The
      string is usually opaque to the client.  The token denotes an
      identifier used to retrieve the authorization information.  Unlike
      access tokens, refresh tokens are intended for use only with
      authorization servers and are never sent to resource servers.  In
      this framework, refresh tokens are encoded in binary instead of
      strings, if used.

   Proof-of-Possession Tokens:
      A token may be bound to a cryptographic key, which is then used to
      bind the token to a request authorized by the token.  Such tokens
      are called proof-of-possession tokens (or PoP tokens).

      The proof-of-possession security concept used here assumes that
      the AS acts as a trusted third party that binds keys to tokens.
      In the case of access tokens, these so-called PoP keys are then
      used by the client to demonstrate the possession of the secret to
      the RS when accessing the resource.  The RS, when receiving an
      access token, needs to verify that the key used by the client
      matches the one bound to the access token.  When this
      specification uses the term "access token", it is assumed to be a
      PoP access token unless specifically stated otherwise.

      The key bound to the token (the PoP key) may use either symmetric
      or asymmetric cryptography.  The appropriate choice of the kind of
      cryptography depends on the constraints of the IoT devices as well
      as on the security requirements of the use case.

      Symmetric PoP key:
         The AS generates a random, symmetric PoP key.  The key is
         either stored to be returned on introspection calls or included
         in the token.  Either the whole token or only the key MUST be
         encrypted in the latter case.  The PoP key is also returned to
         client together with the token, protected by the secure
         channel.

      Asymmetric PoP key:
         An asymmetric key pair is generated by the client and the
         public key is sent to the AS (if it does not already have
         knowledge of the client's public key).  Information about the
         public key, which is the PoP key in this case, is either stored
         to be returned on introspection calls or included inside the
         token and sent back to the client.  The resource server
         consuming the token can identify the public key from the
         information in the token, which allows the client to use the
         corresponding private key for the proof of possession.

      The token is either a simple reference or a structured information
      object (e.g., CWT [RFC8392]) protected by a cryptographic wrapper
      (e.g., COSE [RFC8152]).  The choice of PoP key does not
      necessarily imply a specific credential type for the integrity
      protection of the token.

   Scopes and Permissions:
      In OAuth 2.0, the client specifies the type of permissions it is
      seeking to obtain (via the "scope" parameter) in the access token
      request.  In turn, the AS may use the "scope" response parameter
      to inform the client of the scope of the access token issued.  As
      the client could be a constrained device as well, this
      specification defines the use of CBOR encoding (see Section 5) for
      such requests and responses.

      The values of the "scope" parameter in OAuth 2.0 are expressed as
      a list of space-delimited, case-sensitive strings with a semantic
      that is well known to the AS and the RS.  More details about the
      concept of scopes are found under Section 3.3 of [RFC6749].

   Claims:
      Information carried in the access token or returned from
      introspection, called claims, is in the form of name-value pairs.
      An access token may, for example, include a claim identifying the
      AS that issued the token (via the "iss" claim) and what audience
      the access token is intended for (via the "aud" claim).  The
      audience of an access token can be a specific resource, one
      resource, or many resource servers.  The resource owner policies
      influence what claims are put into the access token by the
      authorization server.

      While the structure and encoding of the access token varies
      throughout deployments, a standardized format has been defined
      with the JSON Web Token (JWT) [RFC7519], where claims are encoded
      as a JSON object.  In [RFC8392], the CBOR Web Token (CWT) has been
      defined as an equivalent format using CBOR encoding.

   Token and Introspection Endpoints:
      The AS hosts the token endpoint that allows a client to request
      access tokens.  The client makes a POST request to the token
      endpoint on the AS and receives the access token in the response
      (if the request was successful).

      In some deployments, a token introspection endpoint is provided by
      the AS, which can be used by the RS and potentially the client, if
      they need to request additional information regarding a received
      access token.  The requesting entity makes a POST request to the
      introspection endpoint on the AS and receives information about
      the access token in the response.  (See "Introspection" above.)

3.2.  CoAP

   CoAP is an application-layer protocol similar to HTTP but
   specifically designed for constrained environments.  CoAP typically
   uses datagram-oriented transport, such as UDP, where reordering and
   loss of packets can occur.  A security solution needs to take the
   latter aspects into account.

   While HTTP uses headers and query strings to convey additional
   information about a request, CoAP encodes such information into
   header parameters called 'options'.

   CoAP supports application-layer fragmentation of the CoAP payloads
   through block-wise transfers [RFC7959].  However, block-wise transfer
   does not increase the size limits of CoAP options; therefore, data
   encoded in options has to be kept small.

   Transport layer security for CoAP can be provided by DTLS or TLS
   [RFC6347] [RFC8446] [RFC9147].  CoAP defines a number of proxy
   operations that require transport layer security to be terminated at
   the proxy.  One approach for protecting CoAP communication end-to-end
   through proxies, and also to support security for CoAP over a
   different transport in a uniform way, is to provide security at the
   application layer using an object-based security mechanism, such as
   COSE [RFC8152].

   One application of COSE is OSCORE [RFC8613], which provides end-to-
   end confidentiality, integrity and replay protection, and a secure
   binding between CoAP request and response messages.  In OSCORE, the
   CoAP messages are wrapped in COSE objects and sent using CoAP.

   In this framework, the use of CoAP as replacement for HTTP is
   RECOMMENDED for use in constrained environments.  For communication
   security, this framework does not make an explicit protocol
   recommendation, since the choice depends on the requirements of the
   specific application.  DTLS [RFC6347] [RFC9147] and OSCORE [RFC8613]
   are mentioned as examples; other protocols fulfilling the
   requirements from Section 6.5 are also applicable.

4.  Protocol Interactions

   The ACE framework is based on the OAuth 2.0 protocol interactions
   using the token endpoint and optionally the introspection endpoint.
   A client obtains an access token, and optionally a refresh token,
   from an AS using the token endpoint and subsequently presents the
   access token to an RS to gain access to a protected resource.  In
   most deployments, the RS can process the access token locally;
   however, in some cases, the RS may present it to the AS via the
   introspection endpoint to get fresh information.  These interactions
   are shown in Figure 1.  An overview of various OAuth concepts is
   provided in Section 3.1.

   +--------+                               +---------------+
   |        |---(A)-- Token Request ------->|               |
   |        |                               | Authorization |
   |        |<--(B)-- Access Token ---------|    Server     |
   |        |    + Access Information       |               |
   |        |    + Refresh Token (optional) +---------------+
   |        |                                      ^ |
   |        |            Introspection Request  (D)| |
   | Client |                         Response     | |(E)
   |        |            (optional exchange)       | |
   |        |                                      | v
   |        |                               +--------------+
   |        |---(C)-- Token + Request ----->|              |
   |        |                               |   Resource   |
   |        |<--(F)-- Protected Resource ---|    Server    |
   |        |                               |              |
   +--------+                               +--------------+

                       Figure 1: Basic Protocol Flow

   Requesting an Access Token (A):
      The client makes an access token request to the token endpoint at
      the AS.  This framework assumes the use of PoP access tokens (see
      Section 3.1 for a short description) wherein the AS binds a key to
      an access token.  The client may include permissions it seeks to
      obtain and information about the credentials it wants to use for
      proof of possession (e.g., symmetric/asymmetric cryptography or a
      reference to a specific key) of the access token.

   Access Token Response (B):
      If the request from the client has been successfully verified,
      authenticated, and authorized, the AS returns an access token and
      optionally a refresh token.  Note that only certain grant types
      support refresh tokens.  The AS can also return additional
      parameters, referred to as "Access Information".  In addition to
      the response parameters defined by OAuth 2.0 and the PoP access
      token extension, this framework defines parameters that can be
      used to inform the client about capabilities of the RS, e.g., the
      profile the RS supports.  More information about these parameters
      can be found in Section 5.8.4.

   Resource Request (C):
      The client interacts with the RS to request access to the
      protected resource and provides the access token.  The protocol to
      use between the client and the RS is not restricted to CoAP.
      HTTP, HTTP/2 [RFC7540], QUIC [RFC9000], MQTT [MQTT5.0], Bluetooth
      Low Energy [BLE], etc., are also viable candidates.

      Depending on the device limitations and the selected protocol,
      this exchange may be split up into two parts:

      (1)  the client sends the access token containing, or referencing,
           the authorization information to the RS that will be used for
           subsequent resource requests by the client, and

      (2)  the client makes the resource access request using the
           communication security protocol and other Access Information
           obtained from the AS.

      The client and the RS mutually authenticate using the security
      protocol specified in the profile (see step (B)) and the keys
      obtained in the access token or the Access Information.  The RS
      verifies that the token is integrity protected and originated by
      the AS.  It then compares the claims contained in the access token
      with the resource request.  If the RS is online, validation can be
      handed over to the AS using token introspection (see messages (D)
      and (E)) over HTTP or CoAP.

   Token Introspection Request (D):
      A resource server may be configured to introspect the access token
      by including it in a request to the introspection endpoint at that
      AS.  Token introspection over CoAP is defined in Section 5.9 and
      for HTTP in [RFC7662].

      Note that token introspection is an optional step and can be
      omitted if the token is self-contained and the resource server is
      prepared to perform the token validation on its own.

   Token Introspection Response (E):
      The AS validates the token and returns the most recent parameters,
      such as "scope", "audience", validity, etc., associated with it
      back to the RS.  The RS then uses the received parameters to
      process the request to either accept or to deny it.

   Protected Resource (F):
      If the request from the client is authorized, the RS fulfills the
      request and returns a response with the appropriate response code.
      The RS uses the dynamically established keys to protect the
      response according to the communication security protocol used.

   The OAuth 2.0 framework defines a number of "protocol flows" via
   grant types, which have been extended further with extensions to
   OAuth 2.0 (such as [RFC7521] and [RFC8628]).  What grant type works
   best depends on the usage scenario; [RFC7744] describes many
   different IoT use cases, but there are two grant types that cover a
   majority of these scenarios, namely the authorization code grant
   (described in Section 4.1 of [RFC6749]) and the client credentials
   grant (described in Section 4.4 of [RFC6749]).  The authorization
   code grant is a good fit for use with apps running on smartphones and
   tablets that request access to IoT devices, a common scenario in the
   smart home environment, where users need to go through an
   authentication and authorization phase (at least during the initial
   setup phase).  The native apps guidelines described in [RFC8252] are
   applicable to this use case.  The client credentials grant is a good
   fit for use with IoT devices where the OAuth client itself is
   constrained.  In such a case, the resource owner has prearranged
   access rights for the client with the authorization server, which is
   often accomplished using a commissioning tool.

   The consent of the resource owner, for giving a client access to a
   protected resource, can be provided dynamically as in the classical
   OAuth flows, or it could be preconfigured by the resource owner as
   authorization policies at the AS, which the AS evaluates when a token
   request arrives.  The resource owner and the requesting party (i.e.,
   client owner) are not shown in Figure 1.

   This framework supports a wide variety of communication security
   mechanisms between the ACE entities, such as the client, AS, and RS.
   It is assumed that the client has been registered (also called
   enrolled or onboarded) to an AS using a mechanism defined outside the
   scope of this document.  In practice, various techniques for
   onboarding have been used, such as factory-based provisioning or the
   use of commissioning tools.  Regardless of the onboarding technique,
   this provisioning procedure implies that the client and the AS
   exchange credentials and configuration parameters.  These credentials
   are used to mutually authenticate each other and to protect messages
   exchanged between the client and the AS.

   It is also assumed that the RS has been registered with the AS,
   potentially in a similar way as the client has been registered with
   the AS.  Established keying material between the AS and the RS allows
   the AS to apply cryptographic protection to the access token to
   ensure that its content cannot be modified and, if needed, that the
   content is confidentiality protected.  Confidentiality protection of
   the access token content would be provided on top of confidentiality
   protection via a communication security protocol.

   The keying material necessary for establishing communication security
   between the C and RS is dynamically established as part of the
   protocol described in this document.

   At the start of the protocol, there is an optional discovery step
   where the client discovers the resource server and the resources this
   server hosts.  In this step, the client might also determine what
   permissions are needed to access the protected resource.  A generic
   procedure is described in Section 5.1; profiles MAY define other
   procedures for discovery.

   In Bluetooth Low Energy, for example, advertisements are broadcast by
   a peripheral, including information about the primary services.  In
   CoAP, as a second example, a client can make a request to "/.well-
   known/core" to obtain information about available resources, which
   are returned in a standardized format, as described in [RFC6690].

5.  Framework

   The following sections detail the profiling and extensions of OAuth
   2.0 for constrained environments, which constitutes the ACE
   framework.

   Credential Provisioning
      In constrained environments, it cannot be assumed that the client
      and the RS are part of a common key infrastructure.  Therefore,
      the AS provisions credentials and associated information to allow
      mutual authentication between the client and the RS.  The
      resulting security association between the client and the RS may
      then also be used to bind these credentials to the access tokens
      the client uses.

   Proof of Possession
      The ACE framework, by default, implements proof of possession for
      access tokens, i.e., that the token holder can prove being a
      holder of the key bound to the token.  The binding is provided by
      the "cnf" (confirmation) claim [RFC8747], indicating what key is
      used for proof of possession.  If a client needs to submit a new
      access token, e.g., to obtain additional access rights, they can
      request that the AS binds this token to the same key as the
      previous one.

   ACE Profiles
      The client or RS may be limited in the encodings or protocols it
      supports.  To support a variety of different deployment settings,
      specific interactions between the client and RS are defined in an
      ACE profile.  In the ACE framework, the AS is expected to manage
      the matching of compatible profile choices between a client and an
      RS.  The AS informs the client of the selected profile using the
      "ace_profile" parameter in the token response.

   OAuth 2.0 requires the use of TLS to protect the communication
   between the AS and client when requesting an access token between the
   client and RS when accessing a resource and between the AS and RS if
   introspection is used.  In constrained settings, TLS is not always
   feasible or desirable.  Nevertheless, it is REQUIRED that the
   communications named above are encrypted, integrity protected, and
   protected against message replay.  It is also REQUIRED that the
   communicating endpoints perform mutual authentication.  Furthermore,
   it MUST be assured that responses are bound to the requests in the
   sense that the receiver of a response can be certain that the
   response actually belongs to a certain request.  Note that setting up
   such a secure communication may require some unprotected messages to
   be exchanged first (e.g., sending the token from the client to the
   RS).

   Profiles MUST specify a communication security protocol between the
   client and RS that provides the features required above.  Profiles
   MUST specify a communication security protocol RECOMMENDED to be used
   between the client and AS that provides the features required above.
   Profiles MUST specify, for introspection, a communication security
   protocol RECOMMENDED to be used between the RS and AS that provides
   the features required above.  These recommendations enable
   interoperability between different implementations without the need
   to define a new profile if the communication between the C and AS, or
   between the RS and AS, is protected with a different security
   protocol complying with the security requirements above.

   In OAuth 2.0, the communication with the Token and the Introspection
   endpoints at the AS is assumed to be via HTTP and may use Uri-query
   parameters.  When profiles of this framework use CoAP instead, it is
   REQUIRED to use of the following alternative instead of Uri-query
   parameters: The sender (client or RS) encodes the parameters of its
   request as a CBOR map and submits that map as the payload of the POST
   request.  The CBOR encoding for a number of OAuth 2.0 parameters is
   specified in this document; if a profile needs to use other OAuth 2.0
   parameters with CoAP, it MUST specify their CBOR encoding.

   Profiles that use CBOR encoding of protocol message parameters at the
   outermost encoding layer MUST use the Content-Format "application/
   ace+cbor".  If CoAP is used for communication, the Content-Format
   MUST be abbreviated with the ID: 19 (see Section 8.16).

   The OAuth 2.0 AS uses a JSON structure in the payload of its
   responses both to the client and RS.  If CoAP is used, it is REQUIRED
   to use CBOR [RFC8949] instead of JSON.  Depending on the profile, the
   CBOR payload MAY be enclosed in a non-CBOR cryptographic wrapper.

5.1.  Discovering Authorization Servers

   The C must discover the AS in charge of the RS to determine where to
   request the access token.  To do so, the C 1) must find out the AS
   URI to which the token request message must be sent and 2) MUST
   validate that the AS with this URI is authorized to provide access
   tokens for this RS.

   In order to determine the AS URI, the C MAY send an initial
   Unauthorized Resource Request message to the RS.  The RS then denies
   the request and sends the address of its AS back to the C (see
   Section 5.2).  How the C validates the AS authorization is not in
   scope for this document.  The C may, for example, ask its owner if
   this AS is authorized for this RS.  The C may also use a mechanism
   that addresses both problems at once (e.g., by querying a dedicated
   secure service provided by the client owner) .

5.2.  Unauthorized Resource Request Message

   An Unauthorized Resource Request message is a request for any
   resource hosted by the RS for which the client does not have
   authorization granted.  The RSs MUST treat any request for a
   protected resource as an Unauthorized Resource Request message when
   any of the following hold:

   *  The request has been received on an unsecured channel.

   *  The RS has no valid access token for the sender of the request
      regarding the requested action on that resource.

   *  The RS has a valid access token for the sender of the request, but
      that token does not authorize the requested action on the
      requested resource.

   Note: These conditions ensure that the RS can handle requests
   autonomously once access was granted and a secure channel has been
   established between the C and RS.  The authz-info endpoint, as part
   of the process for authorizing to protected resources, is not itself
   a protected resource and MUST NOT be protected as specified above
   (cf.  Section 5.10.1).

   Unauthorized Resource Request messages MUST be denied with an
   "unauthorized_client" error response.  In this response, the resource
   server SHOULD provide proper AS Request Creation Hints to enable the
   client to request an access token from the RS's AS, as described in
   Section 5.3.

   The handling of all client requests (including unauthorized ones) by
   the RS is described in Section 5.10.2.

5.3.  AS Request Creation Hints

   The AS Request Creation Hints are sent by an RS as a response to an
   Unauthorized Resource Request message (see Section 5.2) to help the
   sender of the Unauthorized Resource Request message acquire a valid
   access token.  The AS Request Creation Hints are a CBOR or JSON map,
   with an OPTIONAL element "AS" specifying an absolute URI (see
   Section 4.3 of [RFC3986]) that identifies the appropriate AS for the
   RS.

   The message can also contain the following OPTIONAL parameters:

   *  An "audience" element containing an identifier the client should
      request at the AS, as suggested by the RS.  With this parameter,
      when included in the access token request to the AS, the AS is
      able to restrict the use of the access token to specific RSs.  See
      Section 6.9 for a discussion of this parameter.

   *  A "kid" (key identifier) element contains the key identifier of a
      key used in an existing security association between the client
      and the RS.  The RS expects the client to request an access token
      bound to this key in order to avoid having to reestablish the
      security association.

   *  A "cnonce" element contains a client-nonce.  See Section 5.3.1.

   *  A "scope" element contains the suggested scope that the client
      should request towards the AS.

   Table 1 summarizes the parameters that may be part of the AS Request
   Creation Hints.

               +==========+==========+=====================+
               | Name     | CBOR Key | Value Type          |
               +==========+==========+=====================+
               | AS       | 1        | text string         |
               +----------+----------+---------------------+
               | kid      | 2        | byte string         |
               +----------+----------+---------------------+
               | audience | 5        | text string         |
               +----------+----------+---------------------+
               | scope    | 9        | text or byte string |
               +----------+----------+---------------------+
               | cnonce   | 39       | byte string         |
               +----------+----------+---------------------+

                     Table 1: AS Request Creation Hints

   Note that the schema part of the AS parameter may need to be adapted
   to the security protocol that is used between the client and the AS.
   Thus, the example AS value "coap://as.example.com/token" might need
   to be transformed to "coaps://as.example.com/token".  It is assumed
   that the client can determine the correct schema part on its own
   depending on the way it communicates with the AS.

   Figure 2 shows an example for an AS Request Creation Hints payload
   using diagnostic notation.

       4.01 Unauthorized
       Content-Format: application/ace+cbor
       Payload :
       {
        / AS / 1 : "coaps://as.example.com/token",
        / audience / 5 : "coaps://rs.example.com",
        / scope / 9 : "rTempC",
        / cnonce / 39 : h'e0a156bb3f'
       }

            Figure 2: AS Request Creation Hints Payload Example

   In the example above, the response parameter "AS" points the receiver
   of this message to the URI "coaps://as.example.com/token" to request
   access tokens.  The RS sending this response uses an internal clock
   that is not synchronized with the clock of the AS.  Therefore, it
   cannot reliably verify the expiration time of access tokens it
   receives.  Nevertheless, to ensure a certain level of access token
   freshness, the RS has included a "cnonce" parameter (see
   Section 5.3.1) in the response.  (The hex sequence of the "cnonce"
   parameter is encoded in CBOR-based notation in this example.)

   Figure 3 illustrates the mandatory use of binary encoding of the
   message payload shown in Figure 2.

   a4                                   # map(4)
      01                                # unsigned(1) (=AS)
      78 1c                             # text(28)
         636f6170733a2f2f61732e657861
         6d706c652e636f6d2f746f6b656e   # "coaps://as.example.com/token"
      05                                # unsigned(5) (=audience)
      76                                # text(22)
         636f6170733a2f2f72732e657861
         6d706c652e636f6d               # "coaps://rs.example.com"
      09                                # unsigned(9) (=scope)
      66                                # text(6)
         7254656d7043                   # "rTempC"
      18 27                             # unsigned(39) (=cnonce)
      45                                # bytes(5)
         e0a156bb3f                     #

        Figure 3: AS Request Creation Hints Example Encoded in CBOR

5.3.1.  The Client-Nonce Parameter

   If the RS does not synchronize its clock with the AS, it could be
   tricked into accepting old access tokens that are either expired or
   have been compromised.  In order to ensure some level of token
   freshness in that case, the RS can use the "cnonce" (client-nonce)
   parameter.  The processing requirements for this parameter are as
   follows:

   *  An RS sending a "cnonce" parameter in an AS Request Creation Hints
      message MUST store information to validate that a given cnonce is
      fresh.  How this is implemented internally is out of scope for
      this specification.  Expiration of client-nonces should be based
      roughly on the time it would take a client to obtain an access
      token after receiving the AS Request Creation Hints, with some
      allowance for unexpected delays.

   *  A client receiving a "cnonce" parameter in an AS Request Creation
      Hints message MUST include this in the parameters when requesting
      an access token at the AS, using the "cnonce" parameter from
      Section 5.8.4.4.

   *  If an AS grants an access token request containing a "cnonce"
      parameter, it MUST include this value in the access token, using
      the "cnonce" claim specified in Section 5.10.

   *  An RS that is using the client-nonce mechanism and that receives
      an access token MUST verify that this token contains a "cnonce"
      claim, with a client-nonce value that is fresh according to the
      information stored at the first step above.  If the "cnonce" claim
      is not present or if the "cnonce" claim value is not fresh, the RS
      MUST discard the access token.  If this was an interaction with
      the authz-info endpoint, the RS MUST also respond with an error
      message using a response code equivalent to the CoAP code 4.01
      (Unauthorized).

5.4.  Authorization Grants

   To request an access token, the client obtains authorization from the
   resource owner or uses its client credentials as a grant.  The
   authorization is expressed in the form of an authorization grant.

   The OAuth framework [RFC6749] defines four grant types.  The grant
   types can be split up into two groups: those granted on behalf of the
   resource owner (password, authorization code, implicit) and those for
   the client (client credentials).  Further grant types have been added
   later, such as an assertion-based authorization grant defined in
   [RFC7521].

   The grant type is selected depending on the use case.  In cases where
   the client acts on behalf of the resource owner, the authorization
   code grant is recommended.  If the client acts on behalf of the
   resource owner but does not have any display or has very limited
   interaction possibilities, it is recommended to use the device code
   grant defined in [RFC8628].  In cases where the client acts
   autonomously, the client credentials grant is recommended.

   For details on the different grant types, see Section 1.3 of
   [RFC6749].  The OAuth 2.0 framework provides an extension mechanism
   for defining additional grant types, so profiles of this framework
   MAY define additional grant types, if needed.

5.5.  Client Credentials

   Authentication of the client is mandatory independent of the grant
   type when requesting an access token from the token endpoint.  In the
   case of the client credentials grant type, the authentication and
   grant coincide.

   Client registration and provisioning of client credentials to the
   client is out of scope for this specification.

   The OAuth framework defines two client credential types in
   Section 2.3.1 of [RFC6749]: client id and client secret.
   [OAUTH-RPCC] adds raw public key and pre-shared key to the client
   credentials types.  Profiles of this framework MAY extend with an
   additional client credentials type using client certificates.

5.6.  AS Authentication

   The client credentials grant does not, by default, authenticate the
   AS that the client connects to.  In classic OAuth, the AS is
   authenticated with a TLS server certificate.

   Profiles of this framework MUST specify how clients authenticate the
   AS and how communication security is implemented.  By default, server
   side TLS certificates, as defined by OAuth 2.0, are required.

5.7.  The Authorization Endpoint

   The OAuth 2.0 authorization endpoint is used to interact with the
   resource owner and obtain an authorization grant in certain grant
   flows.  The primary use case for the ACE-OAuth framework is for
   machine-to-machine interactions that do not involve the resource
   owner in the authorization flow; therefore, this endpoint is out of
   scope here.  Future profiles may define constrained adaptation
   mechanisms for this endpoint as well.  Nonconstrained clients
   interacting with constrained resource servers can use the
   specification in Section 3.1 of [RFC6749] and the attack
   countermeasures suggested in Section 4.2 of [RFC6819].

5.8.  The Token Endpoint

   In standard OAuth 2.0, the AS provides the token endpoint for
   submitting access token requests.  This framework extends the
   functionality of the token endpoint, giving the AS the possibility to
   help the client and RS establish shared keys or exchange their public
   keys.  Furthermore, this framework defines encodings using CBOR as a
   substitute for JSON.

   The endpoint may also be exposed over HTTPS, as in classical OAuth or
   even other transports.  A profile MUST define the details of the
   mapping between the fields described below and these transports.  If
   HTTPS with JSON is used, the semantics of Sections 4.1.3 and 4.1.4 of
   the OAuth 2.0 specification [RFC6749] MUST be followed (with
   additions as described below).  If CBOR is used as the payload
   format, the semantics described in this section MUST be followed.

   For the AS to be able to issue a token, the client MUST be
   authenticated and present a valid grant for the scopes requested.
   Profiles of this framework MUST specify how the AS authenticates the
   client and how the communication between the client and AS is
   protected, fulfilling the requirements specified in Section 5.

   The default name of this endpoint in a url-path SHOULD be '/token'.
   However, implementations are not required to use this name and can
   define their own instead.

5.8.1.  Client-to-AS Request

   The client sends a POST request to the token endpoint at the AS.  The
   profile MUST specify how the communication is protected.  The content
   of the request consists of the parameters specified in the relevant
   subsection of Section 4 of the OAuth 2.0 specification [RFC6749],
   depending on the grant type, with the following exceptions and
   additions:

   *  The parameter "grant_type" is OPTIONAL in the context of this
      framework (as opposed to REQUIRED in [RFC6749]).  If that
      parameter is missing, the default value "client_credentials" is
      implied.

   *  The "audience" parameter from [RFC8693] is OPTIONAL to request an
      access token bound to a specific audience.

   *  The "cnonce" parameter defined in Section 5.8.4.4 is REQUIRED if
      the RS provided a client-nonce in the AS Request Creation Hints
      message (Section 5.3).

   *  The "scope" parameter MAY be encoded as a byte string instead of
      the string encoding specified in Section 3.3 of [RFC6749] or in
      order to allow compact encoding of complex scopes.  The syntax of
      such a binary encoding is explicitly not specified here and left
      to profiles or applications.  Note specifically that a binary
      encoded scope does not necessarily use the space character '0x20'
      to delimit scope-tokens.

   *  The client can send an empty (null value) "ace_profile" parameter
      to indicate that it wants the AS to include the "ace_profile"
      parameter in the response.  See Section 5.8.4.3.

   *  A client MUST be able to use the parameters from [RFC9201] in an
      access token request to the token endpoint, and the AS MUST be
      able to process these additional parameters.

   The default behavior is that the AS generates a symmetric proof-of-
   possession key for the client.  In order to use an asymmetric key
   pair or to reuse a key previously established with the RS, the client
   is supposed to use the "req_cnf" parameter from [RFC9201].

   If CoAP is used, then these parameters MUST be provided in a CBOR map
   (see Table 5).

   When HTTP is used as a transport, then the client makes a request to
   the token endpoint; the parameters MUST be encoded as defined in
   Appendix B of [RFC6749].

   The following examples illustrate different types of requests for
   proof-of-possession tokens.

   Figure 4 shows a request for a token with a symmetric proof-of-
   possession key, using diagnostic notation.

   Header: POST (Code=0.02)
   Uri-Host: "as.example.com"
   Uri-Path: "token"
   Content-Format: application/ace+cbor
   Payload:
   {
     / client_id / 24 : "myclient",
     / audience /  5  : "tempSensor4711"
   }

          Figure 4: Example Request for an Access Token Bound to a
                               Symmetric Key

   Figure 5 shows a request for a token with an asymmetric proof-of-
   possession key.  Note that, in this example, OSCORE [RFC8613] is used
   to provide object-security; therefore, the Content-Format is
   "application/oscore" wrapping the "application/ace+cbor" type
   content.  The OSCORE option has a decoded interpretation appended in
   parentheses for the reader's convenience.  Also note that, in this
   example, the audience is implicitly known by both the client and AS.
   Furthermore, note that this example uses the "req_cnf" parameter from
   [RFC9201].

   Header: POST (Code=0.02)
   Uri-Host: "as.example.com"
   Uri-Path: "token"
   OSCORE: 0x09, 0x05, 0x44, 0x6C
     (h=0, k=1, n=001, partialIV= 0x05, kid=[0x44, 0x6C])
   Content-Format: application/oscore
   Payload:
     0x44025d1/ ... (full payload omitted for brevity) ... /68b3825e

   Decrypted payload:
   {
     / client_id / 24 : "myclient",
     / req_cnf / 4 : {
       / COSE_Key / 1 : {
         / kty /  1 : 2 / EC2 /,
         / kid /  2 : h'11',
         / crv / -1 : 1 / P-256 /,
         / x /   -2 : b64'usWxHK2PmfnHKwXPS54m0kTcGJ90UiglWiGahtagnv8',
         / y /   -3 : b64'IBOL+C3BttVivg+lSreASjpkttcsz+1rb7btKLv8EX4'
       }
     }
   }

         Figure 5: Example Token Request Bound to an Asymmetric Key

   Figure 6 shows a request for a token where a previously communicated
   proof-of-possession key is only referenced using the "req_cnf"
   parameter from [RFC9201].

   Header: POST (Code=0.02)
   Uri-Host: "as.example.com"
   Uri-Path: "token"
   Content-Format: application/ace+cbor
   Payload:
   {
     / client_id / 24 : "myclient",
     / audience /   5 : "valve424",
     / scope /      9 : "read",
     / req_cnf /    4 : {
        / kid /        3 : b64'6kg0dXJM13U'
     }
   }

        Figure 6: Example Request for an Access Token Bound to a Key
                                 Reference

   Refresh tokens are typically not stored as securely as proof-of-
   possession keys in requesting clients.  Proof-of-possession-based
   refresh token requests MUST NOT request different proof-of-possession
   keys or different audiences in token requests.  Refresh token
   requests can only be used to request access tokens bound to the same
   proof-of-possession key and the same audience as access tokens issued
   in the initial token request.

5.8.2.  AS-to-Client Response

   If the access token request has been successfully verified by the AS
   and the client is authorized to obtain an access token corresponding
   to its access token request, the AS sends a response with the
   response code equivalent to the CoAP response code 2.01 (Created).
   If the client request was invalid, or not authorized, the AS returns
   an error response, as described in Section 5.8.3.

   Note that the AS decides which token type and profile to use when
   issuing a successful response.  It is assumed that the AS has prior
   knowledge of the capabilities of the client and the RS (see
   Appendix D).  This prior knowledge may, for example, be set by the
   use of a dynamic client registration protocol exchange [RFC7591].  If
   the client has requested a specific proof-of-possession key using the
   "req_cnf" parameter from [RFC9201], this may also influence which
   profile the AS selects, as it needs to support the use of the key
   type requested by the client.

   The content of the successful reply is the Access Information.  When
   using CoAP, the payload MUST be encoded as a CBOR map; when using
   HTTP, the encoding is a JSON map, as specified in Section 5.1 of
   [RFC6749].  In both cases, the parameters specified in Section 5.1 of
   [RFC6749] are used, with the following additions and changes:

   ace_profile:
         This parameter is OPTIONAL unless the request included an empty
         "ace_profile" parameter, in which case it is MANDATORY.  This
         indicates the profile that the client MUST use towards the RS.
         See Section 5.8.4.3 for the formatting of this parameter.  If
         this parameter is absent, the AS assumes that the client
         implicitly knows which profile to use towards the RS.

   "token_type":
         This parameter is OPTIONAL, as opposed to REQUIRED in
         [RFC6749].  By default, implementations of this framework
         SHOULD assume that the "token_type" is "PoP".  If a specific
         use case requires another "token_type" (e.g., "Bearer") to be
         used, then this parameter is REQUIRED.

   Furthermore, [RFC9201] defines additional parameters that the AS MUST
   be able to use when responding to a request to the token endpoint.

   Table 2 summarizes the parameters that can currently be part of the
   Access Information.  Future extensions may define additional
   parameters.

                   +===================+==============+
                   | Parameter name    | Specified in |
                   +===================+==============+
                   | access_token      | [RFC6749]    |
                   +-------------------+--------------+
                   | token_type        | [RFC6749]    |
                   +-------------------+--------------+
                   | expires_in        | [RFC6749]    |
                   +-------------------+--------------+
                   | refresh_token     | [RFC6749]    |
                   +-------------------+--------------+
                   | scope             | [RFC6749]    |
                   +-------------------+--------------+
                   | state             | [RFC6749]    |
                   +-------------------+--------------+
                   | error             | [RFC6749]    |
                   +-------------------+--------------+
                   | error_description | [RFC6749]    |
                   +-------------------+--------------+
                   | error_uri         | [RFC6749]    |
                   +-------------------+--------------+
                   | ace_profile       | RFC 9200     |
                   +-------------------+--------------+
                   | cnf               | [RFC9201]    |
                   +-------------------+--------------+
                   | rs_cnf            | [RFC9201]    |
                   +-------------------+--------------+

                       Table 2: Access Information
                                Parameters

   Figure 7 shows a response containing a token and a "cnf" parameter
   with a symmetric proof-of-possession key, which is defined in
   [RFC9201].  Note that the key identifier "kid" is only used to
   simplify indexing and retrieving the key, and no assumptions should
   be made that it is unique in the domains of either the client or the
   RS.

   Header: Created (Code=2.01)
   Content-Format: application/ace+cbor
   Payload:
   {
     / access_token / 1 : b64'SlAV32hk'/ ...
      (remainder of CWT omitted for brevity;
      CWT contains COSE_Key in the cnf claim)/,
     / ace_profile / 38 : "coap_dtls",
     / expires_in /   2 : 3600,
     / cnf / 8 : {
       / COSE_Key / 1 : {
         / kty / 1 : 4 / Symmetric /,
         / kid / 2 : b64'39Gqlw',
         / k /  -1 : b64'hJtXhkV8FJG+Onbc6mxC'
       }
     }
   }

       Figure 7: Example AS Response with an Access Token Bound to a
                               Symmetric Key

5.8.3.  Error Response

   The error responses for interactions with the AS are generally
   equivalent to the ones defined in Section 5.2 of [RFC6749], with the
   following exceptions:

   *  When using CoAP, the payload MUST be encoded as a CBOR map, with
      the Content-Format "application/ace+cbor".  When using HTTP, the
      payload is encoded in JSON, as specified in Section 5.2 of
      [RFC6749].

   *  A response code equivalent to the CoAP code 4.00 (Bad Request)
      MUST be used for all error responses, except for invalid_client,
      where a response code equivalent to the CoAP code 4.01
      (Unauthorized) MAY be used under the same conditions as specified
      in Section 5.2 of [RFC6749].

   *  The parameters "error", "error_description", and "error_uri" MUST
      be abbreviated using the codes specified in Table 5, when a CBOR
      encoding is used.

   *  The error code (i.e., value of the "error" parameter) MUST be
      abbreviated, as specified in Table 3, when a CBOR encoding is
      used.

   +===========================+=============+========================+
   | Name                      | CBOR Values | Original Specification |
   +===========================+=============+========================+
   | invalid_request           | 1           | Section 5.2 of         |
   |                           |             | [RFC6749]              |
   +---------------------------+-------------+------------------------+
   | invalid_client            | 2           | Section 5.2 of         |
   |                           |             | [RFC6749]              |
   +---------------------------+-------------+------------------------+
   | invalid_grant             | 3           | Section 5.2 of         |
   |                           |             | [RFC6749]              |
   +---------------------------+-------------+------------------------+
   | unauthorized_client       | 4           | Section 5.2 of         |
   |                           |             | [RFC6749]              |
   +---------------------------+-------------+------------------------+
   | unsupported_grant_type    | 5           | Section 5.2 of         |
   |                           |             | [RFC6749]              |
   +---------------------------+-------------+------------------------+
   | invalid_scope             | 6           | Section 5.2 of         |
   |                           |             | [RFC6749]              |
   +---------------------------+-------------+------------------------+
   | unsupported_pop_key       | 7           | RFC 9200               |
   +---------------------------+-------------+------------------------+
   | incompatible_ace_profiles | 8           | RFC 9200               |
   +---------------------------+-------------+------------------------+

            Table 3: CBOR Abbreviations for Common Error Codes

   In addition to the error responses defined in OAuth 2.0, the
   following behavior MUST be implemented by the AS

   *  If the client submits an asymmetric key in the token request that
      the RS cannot process, the AS MUST reject that request with a
      response code equivalent to the CoAP code 4.00 (Bad Request),
      including the error code "unsupported_pop_key" specified in
      Table 3.

   *  If the client and the RS it has requested an access token for do
      not share a common profile, the AS MUST reject that request with a
      response code equivalent to the CoAP code 4.00 (Bad Request),
      including the error code "incompatible_ace_profiles" specified in
      Table 3.

5.8.4.  Request and Response Parameters

   This section provides more detail about the new parameters that can
   be used in access token requests and responses, as well as
   abbreviations for more compact encoding of existing parameters and
   common parameter values.

5.8.4.1.  Grant Type

   The abbreviations specified in the registry defined in Section 8.5
   MUST be used in CBOR encodings instead of the string values defined
   in [RFC6749] if CBOR payloads are used.

     +====================+============+============================+
     | Name               | CBOR Value | Original Specification     |
     +====================+============+============================+
     | password           | 0          | Section 4.3.2 of [RFC6749] |
     +--------------------+------------+----------------------------+
     | authorization_code | 1          | Section 4.1.3 of [RFC6749] |
     +--------------------+------------+----------------------------+
     | client_credentials | 2          | Section 4.4.2 of [RFC6749] |
     +--------------------+------------+----------------------------+
     | refresh_token      | 3          | Section 6 of [RFC6749]     |
     +--------------------+------------+----------------------------+

            Table 4: CBOR Abbreviations for Common Grant Types

5.8.4.2.  Token Type

   The "token_type" parameter, defined in Section 5.1 of [RFC6749],
   allows the AS to indicate to the client which type of access token it
   is receiving (e.g., a bearer token).

   This document registers the new value "PoP" for the "OAuth Access
   Token Types" registry, specifying a proof-of-possession token.  How
   the proof of possession by the client to the RS is performed MUST be
   specified by the profiles.

   The values in the "token_type" parameter MUST use the CBOR
   abbreviations defined in the registry specified by Section 8.7 if a
   CBOR encoding is used.

   In this framework, the "pop" value for the "token_type" parameter is
   the default.  The AS may, however, provide a different value from
   those registered in [IANA.OAuthAccessTokenTypes].

5.8.4.3.  Profile

   Profiles of this framework MUST define the communication protocol and
   the communication security protocol between the client and the RS.
   The security protocol MUST provide encryption, integrity, and replay
   protection.  It MUST also provide a binding between requests and
   responses.  Furthermore, profiles MUST define a list of allowed
   proof-of-possession methods if they support proof-of-possession
   tokens.

   A profile MUST specify an identifier that MUST be used to uniquely
   identify itself in the "ace_profile" parameter.  The textual
   representation of the profile identifier is intended for human
   readability and for JSON-based interactions; it MUST NOT be used for
   CBOR-based interactions.  Profiles MUST register their identifier in
   the registry defined in Section 8.8.

   Profiles MAY define additional parameters for both the token request
   and the Access Information in the access token response in order to
   support negotiation or signaling of profile-specific parameters.

   Clients that want the AS to provide them with the "ace_profile"
   parameter in the access token response can indicate that by sending
   an "ace_profile" parameter with a null value for CBOR-based
   interactions, or an empty string if CBOR is not used, in the access
   token request.

5.8.4.4.  Client-Nonce

   This parameter MUST be sent from the client to the AS if it
   previously received a "cnonce" parameter in the AS Request Creation
   Hints (Section 5.3).  The parameter is encoded as a byte string for
   CBOR-based interactions and as a string (base64url without padding
   encoded binary [RFC4648]) if CBOR is not used.  It MUST copy the
   value from the "cnonce" parameter in the AS Request Creation Hints.

5.8.5.  Mapping Parameters to CBOR

   If CBOR encoding is used, all OAuth parameters in access token
   requests and responses MUST be mapped to CBOR types, as specified in
   the registry defined by Section 8.10, using the given integer
   abbreviation for the map keys.

   Note that we have aligned the abbreviations corresponding to claims
   with the abbreviations defined in [RFC8392].

   Note also that abbreviations from -24 to 23 have a 1-byte encoding
   size in CBOR.  We have thus chosen to assign abbreviations in that
   range to parameters we expect to be used most frequently in
   constrained scenarios.

      +===================+==========+=============+===============+
      | Name              | CBOR Key | Value Type  | Original      |
      |                   |          |             | Specification |
      +===================+==========+=============+===============+
      | access_token      | 1        | byte string | [RFC6749]     |
      +-------------------+----------+-------------+---------------+
      | expires_in        | 2        | unsigned    | [RFC6749]     |
      |                   |          | integer     |               |
      +-------------------+----------+-------------+---------------+
      | audience          | 5        | text string | [RFC8693]     |
      +-------------------+----------+-------------+---------------+
      | scope             | 9        | text or     | [RFC6749]     |
      |                   |          | byte string |               |
      +-------------------+----------+-------------+---------------+
      | client_id         | 24       | text string | [RFC6749]     |
      +-------------------+----------+-------------+---------------+
      | client_secret     | 25       | byte string | [RFC6749]     |
      +-------------------+----------+-------------+---------------+
      | response_type     | 26       | text string | [RFC6749]     |
      +-------------------+----------+-------------+---------------+
      | redirect_uri      | 27       | text string | [RFC6749]     |
      +-------------------+----------+-------------+---------------+
      | state             | 28       | text string | [RFC6749]     |
      +-------------------+----------+-------------+---------------+
      | code              | 29       | byte string | [RFC6749]     |
      +-------------------+----------+-------------+---------------+
      | error             | 30       | integer     | [RFC6749]     |
      +-------------------+----------+-------------+---------------+
      | error_description | 31       | text string | [RFC6749]     |
      +-------------------+----------+-------------+---------------+
      | error_uri         | 32       | text string | [RFC6749]     |
      +-------------------+----------+-------------+---------------+
      | grant_type        | 33       | unsigned    | [RFC6749]     |
      |                   |          | integer     |               |
      +-------------------+----------+-------------+---------------+
      | token_type        | 34       | integer     | [RFC6749]     |
      +-------------------+----------+-------------+---------------+
      | username          | 35       | text string | [RFC6749]     |
      +-------------------+----------+-------------+---------------+
      | password          | 36       | text string | [RFC6749]     |
      +-------------------+----------+-------------+---------------+
      | refresh_token     | 37       | byte string | [RFC6749]     |
      +-------------------+----------+-------------+---------------+
      | ace_profile       | 38       | integer     | RFC 9200      |
      +-------------------+----------+-------------+---------------+
      | cnonce            | 39       | byte string | RFC 9200      |
      +-------------------+----------+-------------+---------------+

       Table 5: CBOR Mappings Used in Token Requests and Responses

5.9.  The Introspection Endpoint

   Token introspection [RFC7662] MAY be implemented by the AS and the
   RS.  When implemented, it MAY be used by the RS and to query the AS
   for metadata about a given token, e.g., validity or scope.  Analogous
   to the protocol defined in [RFC7662] for HTTP and JSON, this section
   defines adaptations to more constrained environments using CBOR and
   leaving the choice of the application protocol to the profile.  The
   client MAY also implement and use introspection analogously to the
   RS, to obtain information about a given token.

   Communication between the requesting entity and the introspection
   endpoint at the AS MUST be integrity protected and encrypted.  The
   communication security protocol MUST also provide a binding between
   requests and responses.  Furthermore, the two interacting parties
   MUST perform mutual authentication.  Finally, the AS SHOULD verify
   that the requesting entity has the right to access introspection
   information about the provided token.  Profiles of this framework
   that support introspection MUST specify how authentication and
   communication security between the requesting entity and the AS is
   implemented.

   The default name of this endpoint in a url-path SHOULD be
   '/introspect'.  However, implementations are not required to use this
   name and can define their own instead.

5.9.1.  Introspection Request

   The requesting entity sends a POST request to the introspection
   endpoint at the AS.  The profile MUST specify how the communication
   is protected.  If CoAP is used, the payload MUST be encoded as a CBOR
   map with a "token" entry containing the access token.  Further
   optional parameters representing additional context that is known by
   the requesting entity to aid the AS in its response MAY be included.

   For CoAP-based interaction, all messages MUST use the content type
   "application/ace+cbor".  For HTTP, the encoding defined in
   Section 2.1 of [RFC7662] is used.

   The same parameters are required and optional as in Section 2.1 of
   [RFC7662].

   For example, Figure 8 shows an RS calling the token introspection
   endpoint at the AS to query about an OAuth 2.0 proof-of-possession
   token.  Note that object security based on OSCORE [RFC8613] is
   assumed in this example; therefore, the Content-Format is
   "application/oscore".  Figure 9 shows the decoded payload.

   Header: POST (Code=0.02)
   Uri-Host: "as.example.com"
   Uri-Path: "introspect"
   OSCORE: 0x09, 0x05, 0x25
   Content-Format: application/oscore
   Payload:
   ... COSE content ...

                  Figure 8: Example Introspection Request

   {
     / token / 11  : b64'7gj0dXJQ43U',
     / token_type_hint / 33 : 2 / PoP /
   }

                         Figure 9: Decoded Payload

5.9.2.  Introspection Response

   If the introspection request is authorized and successfully
   processed, the AS sends a response with the response code equivalent
   to the CoAP code 2.01 (Created).  If the introspection request was
   invalid, not authorized, or couldn't be processed, the AS returns an
   error response, as described in Section 5.9.3.

   In a successful response, the AS encodes the response parameters in a
   map.  If CoAP is used, this MUST be encoded as a CBOR map; if HTTP is
   used, the JSON encoding specified in Section 2.2 of [RFC7662] is
   used.  The map containing the response payload includes the same
   required and optional parameters as in Section 2.2 of [RFC7662], with
   the following additions:

   "ace_profile"
      This parameter is OPTIONAL.  This indicates the profile that the
      RS MUST use with the client.  See Section 5.8.4.3 for more details
      on the formatting of this parameter.  If this parameter is absent,
      the AS assumes that the RS implicitly knows which profile to use
      towards the client.

   "cnonce"
      This parameter is OPTIONAL.  This is a client-nonce provided to
      the AS by the client.  The RS MUST verify that this corresponds to
      the client-nonce previously provided to the client in the AS
      Request Creation Hints.  See Sections 5.3 and 5.8.4.4.  Its value
      is a byte string when encoded in CBOR and is the base64url
      encoding of this byte string without padding when encoded in JSON
      [RFC4648].

   "cti"
      This parameter is OPTIONAL.  This is the "cti" claim associated to
      this access token.  This parameter has the same meaning and
      processing rules as the "jti" parameter defined in Section 3.1.2
      of [RFC7662] except that its value is a byte string when encoded
      in CBOR and is the base64url encoding of this byte string without
      padding when encoded in JSON [RFC4648].

   exi:
      This parameter is OPTIONAL.  This is the "expires_in" claim
      associated to this access token.  See Section 5.10.3.

   Furthermore, [RFC9201] defines more parameters that the AS MUST be
   able to use when responding to a request to the introspection
   endpoint.

   For example, Figure 10 shows an AS response to the introspection
   request in Figure 8.  Note that this example contains the "cnf"
   parameter defined in [RFC9201].

   Header: Created (Code=2.01)
   Content-Format: application/ace+cbor
   Payload:
   {
     / active /      10 : true,
     / scope /        9 : "read",
     / ace_profile / 38 : 1 / coap_dtls /,
     / cnf /          8 : {
       / COSE_Key / 1 : {
         / kty / 1 : 4 / Symmetric /,
         / kid / 2 : b64'39Gqlw',
         / k /  -1 : b64'hJtXhkV8FJG+Onbc6mxC'
       }
     }
   }

                 Figure 10: Example Introspection Response

5.9.3.  Error Response

   The error responses for CoAP-based interactions with the AS are
   equivalent to the ones for HTTP-based interactions, as defined in
   Section 2.3 of [RFC7662], with the following differences:

   *  If content is sent and CoAP is used, the payload MUST be encoded
      as a CBOR map and the Content-Format "application/ace+cbor" MUST
      be used.  For HTTP, the encoding defined in Section 2.3 of
      [RFC6749] is used.

   *  If the credentials used by the requesting entity (usually the RS)
      are invalid, the AS MUST respond with the response code equivalent
      to the CoAP code 4.01 (Unauthorized) and use the required and
      optional parameters from Section 2.3 of [RFC7662].

   *  If the requesting entity does not have the right to perform this
      introspection request, the AS MUST respond with a response code
      equivalent to the CoAP code 4.03 (Forbidden).  In this case, no
      payload is returned.

   *  The parameters "error", "error_description", and "error_uri" MUST
      be abbreviated using the codes specified in Table 5.

   *  The error codes MUST be abbreviated using the codes specified in
      the registry defined by Section 8.4.

   Note that a properly formed and authorized query for an inactive or
   otherwise invalid token does not warrant an error response by this
   specification.  In these cases, the authorization server MUST instead
   respond with an introspection response with the "active" field set to
   "false".

5.9.4.  Mapping Introspection Parameters to CBOR

   If CBOR is used, the introspection request and response parameters
   MUST be mapped to CBOR types, as specified in the registry defined by
   Section 8.12, using the given integer abbreviation for the map key.

   Note that we have aligned abbreviations that correspond to a claim
   with the abbreviations defined in [RFC8392] and the abbreviations of
   parameters with the same name from Section 5.8.5.

    +===================+======+======================+===============+
    | Parameter name    | CBOR | Value Type           | Original      |
    |                   | Key  |                      | Specification |
    +===================+======+======================+===============+
    | iss               | 1    | text string          | [RFC7662]     |
    +-------------------+------+----------------------+---------------+
    | sub               | 2    | text string          | [RFC7662]     |
    +-------------------+------+----------------------+---------------+
    | aud               | 3    | text string          | [RFC7662]     |
    +-------------------+------+----------------------+---------------+
    | exp               | 4    | integer or floating- | [RFC7662]     |
    |                   |      | point number         |               |
    +-------------------+------+----------------------+---------------+
    | nbf               | 5    | integer or floating- | [RFC7662]     |
    |                   |      | point number         |               |
    +-------------------+------+----------------------+---------------+
    | iat               | 6    | integer or floating- | [RFC7662]     |
    |                   |      | point number         |               |
    +-------------------+------+----------------------+---------------+
    | cti               | 7    | byte string          | RFC 9200      |
    +-------------------+------+----------------------+---------------+
    | scope             | 9    | text or byte string  | [RFC7662]     |
    +-------------------+------+----------------------+---------------+
    | active            | 10   | True or False        | [RFC7662]     |
    +-------------------+------+----------------------+---------------+
    | token             | 11   | byte string          | [RFC7662]     |
    +-------------------+------+----------------------+---------------+
    | client_id         | 24   | text string          | [RFC7662]     |
    +-------------------+------+----------------------+---------------+
    | error             | 30   | integer              | [RFC7662]     |
    +-------------------+------+----------------------+---------------+
    | error_description | 31   | text string          | [RFC7662]     |
    +-------------------+------+----------------------+---------------+
    | error_uri         | 32   | text string          | [RFC7662]     |
    +-------------------+------+----------------------+---------------+
    | token_type_hint   | 33   | text string          | [RFC7662]     |
    +-------------------+------+----------------------+---------------+
    | token_type        | 34   | integer              | [RFC7662]     |
    +-------------------+------+----------------------+---------------+
    | username          | 35   | text string          | [RFC7662]     |
    +-------------------+------+----------------------+---------------+
    | ace_profile       | 38   | integer              | RFC 9200      |
    +-------------------+------+----------------------+---------------+
    | cnonce            | 39   | byte string          | RFC 9200      |
    +-------------------+------+----------------------+---------------+
    | exi               | 40   | unsigned integer     | RFC 9200      |
    +-------------------+------+----------------------+---------------+

         Table 6: CBOR Mappings for Token Introspection Parameters

5.10.  The Access Token

   In this framework, the use of CBOR Web Token (CWT) as specified in
   [RFC8392] is RECOMMENDED.

   In order to facilitate offline processing of access tokens, this
   document uses the "cnf" claim from [RFC8747] and the "scope" claim
   from [RFC8693] for JWT- and CWT-encoded tokens.  In addition to
   string encoding specified for the "scope" claim, a binary encoding
   MAY be used.  The syntax of such an encoding is explicitly not
   specified here and left to profiles or applications, specifically
   note that a binary encoded scope does not necessarily use the space
   character '0x20' to delimit scope-tokens.

   If the AS needs to convey a hint to the RS about which profile it
   should use to communicate with the client, the AS MAY include an
   "ace_profile" claim in the access token, with the same syntax and
   semantics as defined in Section 5.8.4.3.

   If the client submitted a "cnonce" parameter in the access token
   request (Section 5.8.4.4), the AS MUST include the value of this
   parameter in the "cnonce" claim specified here.  The "cnonce" claim
   uses binary encoding.

5.10.1.  The Authorization Information Endpoint

   The access token, containing authorization information and
   information about the proof-of-possession method used by the client,
   needs to be transported to the RS so that the RS can authenticate and
   authorize the client request.

   This section defines a method for transporting the access token to
   the RS using a RESTful protocol, such as CoAP.  Profiles of this
   framework MAY define other methods for token transport.

   The method consists of an authz-info endpoint, implemented by the RS.
   A client using this method MUST make a POST request to the authz-info
   endpoint at the RS with the access token in the payload.  The CoAP
   Content-Format or HTTP media type MUST reflect the format of the
   token, e.g., "application/cwt", for CBOR Web Tokens; if no Content-
   Format or media type is defined for the token format, "application/
   octet-stream" MUST be used.

   The RS receiving the token MUST verify the validity of the token.  If
   the token is valid, the RS MUST respond to the POST request with a
   response code equivalent to CoAP code 2.01 (Created).
   Section 5.10.1.1 outlines how an RS MUST proceed to verify the
   validity of an access token.

   The RS MUST be prepared to store at least one access token for future
   use.  This is a difference as to how access tokens are handled in
   OAuth 2.0, where the access token is typically sent along with each
   request and therefore not stored at the RS.

   When using this framework, it is RECOMMENDED that an RS stores only
   one token per proof-of-possession key.  This means that an additional
   token linked to the same key will supersede any existing token at the
   RS by replacing the corresponding authorization information.  The
   reason is that this greatly simplifies (constrained) implementations,
   with respect to required storage and resolving a request to the
   applicable token.  The use of multiple access tokens for a single
   client increases the strain on the resource server, as it must
   consider every access token and calculate the actual permissions of
   the client.  Also, tokens may contradict each other, which may lead
   the server to enforce wrong permissions.  If one of the access tokens
   expires earlier than others, the resulting permissions may offer
   insufficient protection.

   If the payload sent to the authz-info endpoint does not parse to a
   token, the RS MUST respond with a response code equivalent to the
   CoAP code 4.00 (Bad Request).

   The RS MAY make an introspection request to validate the token before
   responding to the POST request to the authz-info endpoint, e.g., if
   the token is an opaque reference.  Some transport protocols may
   provide a way to indicate that the RS is busy and the client should
   retry after an interval; this type of status update would be
   appropriate while the RS is waiting for an introspection response.

   Profiles MUST specify whether the authz-info endpoint is protected,
   including whether error responses from this endpoint are protected.
   Note that since the token contains information that allows the client
   and the RS to establish a security context in the first place, mutual
   authentication may not be possible at this point.

   The default name of this endpoint in a url-path is '/authz-info';
   however, implementations are not required to use this name and can
   define their own instead.

5.10.1.1.  Verifying an Access Token

   When an RS receives an access token, it MUST verify it before storing
   it.  The details of token verification depends on various aspects,
   including the token encoding, the type of token, the security
   protection applied to the token, and the claims.  The token encoding
   matters since the security protection differs between the token
   encodings.  For example, a CWT token uses COSE, while a JWT token
   uses JSON Object Signing and Encryption (JOSE).  The type of token
   also has an influence on the verification procedure since tokens may
   be self-contained, whereby token verification may happen locally at
   the RS, while a reference token requires further interaction with the
   authorization server, for example, using token introspection, to
   obtain the claims associated with the token reference.  Self-
   contained tokens MUST at least be integrity protected, but they MAY
   also be encrypted.

   For self-contained tokens, the RS MUST process the security
   protection of the token first, as specified by the respective token
   format.  For CWT, the description can be found in [RFC8392]; for JWT,
   the relevant specification is [RFC7519].  This MUST include a
   verification that security protection (and thus the token) was
   generated by an AS that has the right to issue access tokens for this
   RS.

   In case the token is communicated by reference, the RS needs to
   obtain the claims first.  When the RS uses token introspection, the
   relevant specification is [RFC7662] with CoAP transport specified in
   Section 5.9.

   Errors may happen during this initial processing stage:

   *  If the verification of the security wrapper fails, or the token
      was issued by an AS that does not have the right to issue tokens
      for the receiving RS, the RS MUST discard the token and, if this
      was an interaction with authz-info, return an error message with a
      response code equivalent to the CoAP code 4.01 (Unauthorized).

   *  If the claims cannot be obtained, the RS MUST discard the token
      and, in case of an interaction via the authz-info endpoint, return
      an error message with a response code equivalent to the CoAP code
      4.00 (Bad Request).

   Next, the RS MUST verify claims, if present, contained in the access
   token.  Errors are returned when claim checks fail, in the order of
   priority of this list:

   "iss"
      The "iss" claim (if present) must identify the AS that has
      produced the security protection for the access token.  If that is
      not the case, the RS MUST discard the token.  If this was an
      interaction with authz-info, the RS MUST also respond with a
      response code equivalent to the CoAP code 4.01 (Unauthorized).

   "exp"
      The expiration date must be in the future.  If that is not the
      case, the RS MUST discard the token.  If this was an interaction
      with authz-info, the RS MUST also respond with a response code
      equivalent to the CoAP code 4.01 (Unauthorized).  Note that the RS
      has to terminate access rights to the protected resources at the
      time when the tokens expire.

   "aud"
      The "aud" claim must refer to an audience that the RS identifies
      with.  If that is not the case, the RS MUST discard the token.  If
      this was an interaction with authz-info, the RS MUST also respond
      with a response code equivalent to the CoAP code 4.03 (Forbidden).

   "scope"
      The RS must recognize value of the "scope" claim.  If that is not
      the case, the RS MUST discard the token.  If this was an
      interaction with authz-info, the RS MUST also respond with a
      response code equivalent to the CoAP code 4.00 (Bad Request).  The
      RS MAY provide additional information in the error response to
      clarify what went wrong.

   Additional processing may be needed for other claims in a way
   specific to a profile or the underlying application.

   Note that the "sub" (Subject) claim cannot always be verified when
   the token is submitted to the RS since the client may not have
   authenticated yet.  Also note that a counter for the "exi" (expires
   in) claim MUST be initialized when the RS first verifies this token.

   Also note that profiles of this framework may define access token
   transport mechanisms that do not allow for error responses.
   Therefore, the error messages specified here only apply if the token
   was sent to the authz-info endpoint.

   When sending error responses, the RS MAY use the error codes from
   Section 3.1 of [RFC6750] to provide additional details to the client.

5.10.1.2.  Protecting the Authorization Information Endpoint

   As this framework can be used in RESTful environments, it is
   important to make sure that attackers cannot perform unauthorized
   requests on the authz-info endpoints, other than submitting access
   tokens.

   Specifically, it SHOULD NOT be possible to perform GET, DELETE, or
   PUT on the authz-info endpoint.

   The RS SHOULD implement rate-limiting measures to mitigate attacks
   aiming to overload the processing capacity of the RS by repeatedly
   submitting tokens.  For CoAP-based communication, the RS could use
   the mechanisms from [RFC8516] to indicate that it is overloaded.

5.10.2.  Client Requests to the RS

   Before sending a request to an RS, the client MUST verify that the
   keys used to protect this communication are still valid.  See
   Section 5.10.4 for details on how the client determines the validity
   of the keys used.

   If an RS receives a request from a client and the target resource
   requires authorization, the RS MUST first verify that it has an
   access token that authorizes this request and that the client has
   performed the proof-of-possession binding for that token to the
   request.

   The response code MUST be 4.01 (Unauthorized) in case the client has
   not performed the proof of possession or if the RS has no valid
   access token for the client.  If the RS has an access token for the
   client but the token does not authorize access for the resource that
   was requested, the RS MUST reject the request with a 4.03
   (Forbidden).  If the RS has an access token for the client but it
   does not cover the action that was requested on the resource, the RS
   MUST reject the request with a 4.05 (Method Not Allowed).

   Note: The use of the response codes 4.03 and 4.05 is intended to
   prevent infinite loops where a client optimistically tries to access
   a requested resource with any access token received from AS.  As
   malicious clients could pretend to be the C to determine the C's
   privileges, these detailed response codes must be used only when a
   certain level of security is already available, which can be achieved
   only when the client is authenticated.

   Note: The RS MAY use introspection for timely validation of an access
   token at the time when a request is presented.

   Note: Matching the claims of the access token (e.g., "scope") to a
   specific request is application specific.

   If the request matches a valid token and the client has performed the
   proof of possession for that token, the RS continues to process the
   request as specified by the underlying application.

5.10.3.  Token Expiration

   Depending on the capabilities of the RS, there are various ways in
   which it can verify the expiration of a received access token.  The
   following is a list of the possibilities including what functionality
   they require of the RS.

   *  The token is a CWT and includes an "exp" claim and possibly the
      "nbf" claim.  The RS verifies these by comparing them to values
      from its internal clock, as defined in [RFC7519].  In this case,
      the RS's internal clock must reflect the current date and time or
      at least be synchronized with the AS's clock.  How this clock
      synchronization would be performed is out of scope for this
      specification.

   *  The RS verifies the validity of the token by performing an
      introspection request, as specified in Section 5.9.  This requires
      the RS to have a reliable network connection to the AS and to be
      able to handle two secure sessions in parallel (C to RS and RS to
      AS).

   *  In order to support token expiration for devices that have no
      reliable way of synchronizing their internal clocks, this
      specification defines the following approach: The claim "exi"
      (expires in) can be used to provide the RS with the lifetime of
      the token in seconds from the time the RS first receives the
      token.  This mechanism only works for self-contained tokens, i.e.,
      CWTs and JWTs.  For CWTs, this parameter is encoded as an unsigned
      integer, while JWTs encode this as JSON number.

   *  Processing this claim requires that the RS does the following:

      -  For each token the RS receives that contains an "exi" claim,
         keep track of the time it received that token and revisit that
         list regularly to expunge expired tokens.

      -  Keep track of the identifiers of tokens containing the "exi"
         claim that have expired (in order to avoid accepting them
         again).  In order to avoid an unbounded memory usage growth,
         this MUST be implemented in the following way when the "exi"
         claim is used:

         o  When creating the token, the AS MUST add a "cti" claim ( or
            "jti" for JWTs) to the access token.  The value of this
            claim MUST be created as the binary representation of the
            concatenation of the identifier of the RS with a sequence
            number counting the tokens containing an "exi" claim, issued
            by this AS for the RS.

         o  The RS MUST store the highest sequence number of an expired
            token containing the "exi" claim that it has seen and treat
            tokens with lower sequence numbers as expired.  Note that
            this could lead to discarding valid tokens with lower
            sequence numbers if the AS where to issue tokens of
            different validity time for the same RS.  The assumption is
            that typically tokens in such a scenario would all have the
            same validity time.

   If a token that authorizes a long-running request, such as a CoAP
   Observe [RFC7641], expires, the RS MUST send an error response with
   the response code equivalent to the CoAP code 4.01 (Unauthorized) to
   the client and then terminate processing the long-running request.

5.10.4.  Key Expiration

   The AS provides the client with key material that the RS uses.  This
   can either be a common symmetric PoP key or an asymmetric key used by
   the RS to authenticate towards the client.  Since there is currently
   no expiration metadata associated to those keys, the client has no
   way of knowing if these keys are still valid.  This may lead to
   situations where the client sends requests containing sensitive
   information to the RS using a key that is expired and possibly in the
   hands of an attacker or where the client accepts responses from the
   RS that are not properly protected and could possibly have been
   forged by an attacker.

   In order to prevent this, the client must assume that those keys are
   only valid as long as the related access token is.  Since the access
   token is opaque to the client, one of the following methods MUST be
   used to inform the client about the validity of an access token:

   *  The client knows a default validity time for all tokens it is
      using (i.e., how long a token is valid after being issued).  This
      information could be provisioned to the client when it is
      registered at the AS or published by the AS in a way that the
      client can query.

   *  The AS informs the client about the token validity using the
      "expires_in" parameter in the Access Information.

   A client that is not able to obtain information about the expiration
   of a token MUST NOT use this token.

6.  Security Considerations

   Security considerations applicable to authentication and
   authorization in RESTful environments provided in OAuth 2.0 [RFC6749]
   apply to this work.  Furthermore, [RFC6819] provides additional
   security considerations for OAuth, which apply to IoT deployments as
   well.  If the introspection endpoint is used, the security
   considerations from [RFC7662] also apply.

   The following subsections address issues specific to this document
   and its use in constrained environments.

6.1.  Protecting Tokens

   A large range of threats can be mitigated by protecting the contents
   of the access token by using a digital signature or a keyed message
   digest, e.g., a Message Authentication Code (MAC) or an Authenticated
   Encryption with Associated Data (AEAD) algorithm.  Consequently, the
   token integrity protection MUST be applied to prevent the token from
   being modified, particularly since it contains a reference to the
   symmetric key or the asymmetric key used for proof of possession.  If
   the access token contains the symmetric key, this symmetric key MUST
   be encrypted by the authorization server so that only the resource
   server can decrypt it.  Note that using an AEAD algorithm is
   preferable over using a MAC unless the token needs to be publicly
   readable.

   If the token is intended for multiple recipients (i.e., an audience
   that is a group), integrity protection of the token with a symmetric
   key, shared between the AS and the recipients, is not sufficient,
   since any of the recipients could modify the token undetected by the
   other recipients.  Therefore, a token with a multirecipient audience
   MUST be protected with an asymmetric signature.

   It is important for the authorization server to include the identity
   of the intended recipient (the audience), typically a single resource
   server (or a list of resource servers), in the token.  The same
   shared secret MUST NOT be used as a proof-of-possession key with
   multiple resource servers, since the benefit from using the proof-of-
   possession concept is then significantly reduced.

   If clients are capable of doing so, they should frequently request
   fresh access tokens, as this allows the AS to keep the lifetime of
   the tokens short.  This allows the AS to use shorter proof-of-
   possession key sizes, which translate to a performance benefit for
   the client and for the resource server.  Shorter keys also lead to
   shorter messages (particularly with asymmetric keying material).

   When authorization servers bind symmetric keys to access tokens, they
   SHOULD scope these access tokens to a specific permission.

   In certain situations, it may be necessary to revoke an access token
   that is still valid.  Client-initiated revocation is specified in
   [RFC7009] for OAuth 2.0.  Other revocation mechanisms are currently
   not specified, as the underlying assumption in OAuth is that access
   tokens are issued with a relatively short lifetime.  This may not
   hold true for disconnected constrained devices needing access tokens
   with relatively long lifetimes and would therefore necessitate
   further standardization work that is out of scope for this document.

6.2.  Communication Security

   Communication with the authorization server MUST use confidentiality
   protection.  This step is extremely important since the client or the
   RS may obtain the proof-of-possession key from the authorization
   server for use with a specific access token.  Not using
   confidentiality protection exposes this secret (and the access token)
   to an eavesdropper, thereby completely negating proof-of-possession
   security.  The requirements for communication security of profiles
   are specified in Section 5.

   Additional protection for the access token can be applied by
   encrypting it, for example, encryption of CWTs is specified in
   Section 7.1 of [RFC8392].  Such additional protection can be
   necessary if the token is later transferred over an insecure
   connection (e.g., when it is sent to the authz-info endpoint).

   Care must be taken by developers to prevent leakage of the PoP
   credentials (i.e., the private key or the symmetric key).  An
   adversary in possession of the PoP credentials bound to the access
   token will be able to impersonate the client.  Be aware that this is
   a real risk with many constrained environments, since adversaries may
   get physical access to the devices and can therefore use physical
   extraction techniques to gain access to memory contents.  This risk
   can be mitigated to some extent by making sure that keys are
   refreshed frequently, by using software isolation techniques, and by
   using hardware security.

6.3.  Long-Term Credentials

   Both the clients and RSs have long-term credentials that are used to
   secure communications and authenticate to the AS.  These credentials
   need to be protected against unauthorized access.  In constrained
   devices deployed in publicly accessible places, such protection can
   be difficult to achieve without specialized hardware (e.g., secure
   key storage memory).

   If credentials are lost or compromised, the operator of the affected
   devices needs to have procedures to invalidate any access these
   credentials give and needs to revoke tokens linked to such
   credentials.  The loss of a credential linked to a specific device
   MUST NOT lead to a compromise of other credentials not linked to that
   device; therefore, secret keys used for authentication MUST NOT be
   shared between more than two parties.

   Operators of the clients or RSs SHOULD have procedures in place to
   replace credentials that are suspected to have been compromised or
   that have been lost.

   Operators also SHOULD have procedures for decommissioning devices
   that include securely erasing credentials and other security-critical
   material in the devices being decommissioned.

6.4.  Unprotected AS Request Creation Hints

   Initially, no secure channel exists to protect the communication
   between the C and RS.  Thus, the C cannot determine if the AS Request
   Creation Hints contained in an unprotected response from the RS to an
   unauthorized request (see Section 5.3) are authentic.  Therefore, the
   C MUST determine if an AS is authorized to provide access tokens for
   a certain RS.  How this determination is implemented is out of scope
   for this document and left to the applications.

6.5.  Minimal Security Requirements for Communication

   This section summarizes the minimal requirements for the
   communication security of the different protocol interactions.

   C-AS
      All communication between the client and the authorization server
      MUST be encrypted and integrity and replay protected.
      Furthermore, responses from the AS to the client MUST be bound to
      the client's request to avoid attacks where the attacker swaps the
      intended response for an older one valid for a previous request.
      This requires that the client and the authorization server have
      previously exchanged either a shared secret or their public keys
      in order to negotiate a secure communication.  Furthermore, the
      client MUST be able to determine whether an AS has the authority
      to issue access tokens for a certain RS.  This can, for example,
      be done through preconfigured lists or through an online lookup
      mechanism that in turn also must be secured.

   RS-AS
      The communication between the resource server and the
      authorization server via the introspection endpoint MUST be
      encrypted and integrity and replay protected.  Furthermore,
      responses from the AS to the RS MUST be bound to the RS's request.
      This requires that the RS and the authorization server have
      previously exchanged either a shared secret or their public keys
      in order to negotiate a secure communication.  Furthermore, the RS
      MUST be able to determine whether an AS has the authority to issue
      access tokens itself.  This is usually configured out of band but
      could also be performed through an online lookup mechanism,
      provided that it is also secured in the same way.

   C-RS
      The initial communication between the client and the resource
      server cannot be secured in general, since the RS is not in
      possession of on access token for that client, which would carry
      the necessary parameters.  If both parties support DTLS without
      client authentication, it is RECOMMENDED to use this mechanism for
      protecting the initial communication.  After the client has
      successfully transmitted the access token to the RS, a secure
      communication protocol MUST be established between the client and
      RS for the actual resource request.  This protocol MUST provide
      confidentiality, integrity, and replay protection, as well as a
      binding between requests and responses.  This requires that the
      client learned either the RS's public key or received a symmetric
      proof-of-possession key bound to the access token from the AS.
      The RS must have learned either the client's public key, a shared
      symmetric key from the claims in the token, or an introspection
      request.  Since ACE does not provide profile negotiation between
      the C and RS, the client MUST have learned what profile the RS
      supports (e.g., from the AS or preconfigured) and initiated the
      communication accordingly.

6.6.  Token Freshness and Expiration

   An RS that is offline faces the problem of clock drift.  Since it
   cannot synchronize its clock with the AS, it may be tricked into
   accepting old access tokens that are no longer valid or have been
   compromised.  In order to prevent this, an RS may use the nonce-based
   mechanism ("cnonce") defined in Section 5.3 to ensure freshness of an
   Access Token subsequently presented to this RS.

   Another problem with clock drift is that evaluating the standard
   token expiration claim "exp" can give unpredictable results.

   Acceptable ranges of clock drift are highly dependent on the concrete
   application.  Important factors are how long access tokens are valid
   and how critical timely expiration of the access token is.

   The expiration mechanism implemented by the "exi" claim, based on the
   first time the RS sees the token, was defined to provide a more
   predictable alternative.  The "exi" approach has some drawbacks that
   need to be considered:

   *  A malicious client may hold back tokens with the "exi" claim in
      order to prolong their lifespan.

   *  If an RS loses state (e.g., due to an unscheduled reboot), it may
      lose the current values of counters tracking the "exi" claims of
      tokens it is storing.

   The first drawback is inherent to the deployment scenario and the
   "exi" solution.  It can therefore not be mitigated without requiring
   the RS be online at times.  The second drawback can be mitigated by
   regularly storing the value of "exi" counters to persistent memory.

6.7.  Combining Profiles

   There may be use cases where different transport and security
   protocols are allowed for the different interactions, and, if that is
   not explicitly covered by an existing profile, it corresponds to
   combining profiles into a new one.  For example, a new profile could
   specify that a previously defined MQTT-TLS profile is used between
   the client and the RS in combination with a previously defined CoAP-
   DTLS profile for interactions between the client and the AS.  The new
   profile that combines existing profiles MUST specify how the existing
   profiles' security requirements remain satisfied.  Therefore, any
   profile MUST clearly specify its security requirements and MUST
   document if its security depends on the combination of various
   protocol interactions.

6.8.  Unprotected Information

   Communication with the authz-info endpoint, as well as the various
   error responses defined in this framework, potentially includes
   sending information over an unprotected channel.  These messages may
   leak information to an adversary or may be manipulated by active
   attackers to induce incorrect behavior.  For example, error responses
   for requests to the authorization information endpoint can reveal
   information about an otherwise opaque access token to an adversary
   who has intercepted this token.

   As far as error messages are concerned, this framework is written
   under the assumption that, in general, the benefits of detailed error
   messages outweigh the risk due to information leakage.  For
   particular use cases where this assessment does not apply, detailed
   error messages can be replaced by more generic ones.

   In some scenarios, it may be possible to protect the communication
   with the authz-info endpoint (e.g., through DTLS with only server-
   side authentication).  In cases where this is not possible, it is
   RECOMMENDED to use encrypted CWTs or tokens that are opaque
   references and need to be subjected to introspection by the RS.

   If the initial Unauthorized Resource Request message (see
   Section 5.2) is used, the client MUST make sure that it is not
   sending sensitive content in this request.  While GET and DELETE
   requests only reveal the target URI of the resource, POST and PUT
   requests would reveal the whole payload of the intended operation.

   Since the client is not authenticated at the point when it is
   submitting an access token to the authz-info endpoint, attackers may
   be pretending to be a client and trying to trick an RS to use an
   obsolete profile that in turn specifies a vulnerable security
   mechanism via the authz-info endpoint.  Such an attack would require
   a valid access token containing an "ace_profile" claim requesting the
   use of said obsolete profile.  Resource owners should update the
   configuration of their RSs to prevent them from using such obsolete
   profiles.

6.9.  Identifying Audiences

   The "aud" claim, as defined in [RFC7519], and the equivalent
   "audience" parameter from [RFC8693] are intentionally vague on how to
   match the audience value to a specific RS.  This is intended to allow
   application-specific semantics to be used.  This section attempts to
   give some general guidance for the use of audiences in constrained
   environments.

   URLs are not a good way of identifying mobile devices that can switch
   networks and thus be associated with new URLs.  If the audience
   represents a single RS and asymmetric keys are used, the RS can be
   uniquely identified by a hash of its public key.  If this approach is
   used, it is RECOMMENDED to apply the procedure from Section 3 of
   [RFC6920].

   If the audience addresses a group of resource servers, the mapping of
   a group identifier to an individual RS has to be provisioned to each
   RS before the group-audience is usable.  Managing dynamic groups
   could be an issue if any RS is not always reachable when the groups'
   memberships change.  Furthermore, issuing access tokens bound to
   symmetric proof-of-possession keys that apply to a group-audience is
   problematic, as an RS that is in possession of the access token can
   impersonate the client towards the other RSs that are part of the
   group.  It is therefore NOT RECOMMENDED to issue access tokens bound
   to a group-audience and symmetric proof-of possession keys.

   Even the client must be able to determine the correct values to put
   into the "audience" parameter in order to obtain a token for the
   intended RS.  Errors in this process can lead to the client
   inadvertently obtaining a token for the wrong RS.  The correct values
   for "audience" can either be provisioned to the client as part of its
   configuration or dynamically looked up by the client in some
   directory.  In the latter case, the integrity and correctness of the
   directory data must be assured.  Note that the "audience" hint
   provided by the RS as part of the AS Request Creation Hints
   (Section 5.3) is not typically source authenticated and integrity
   protected and should therefore not be treated a trusted value.

6.10.  Denial of Service Against or with Introspection

   The optional introspection mechanism provided by OAuth and supported
   in the ACE framework allows for two types of attacks that need to be
   considered by implementers.

   First, an attacker could perform a denial-of-service attack against
   the introspection endpoint at the AS in order to prevent validation
   of access tokens.  To maintain the security of the system, an RS that
   is configured to use introspection MUST NOT allow access based on a
   token for which it couldn't reach the introspection endpoint.

   Second, an attacker could use the fact that an RS performs
   introspection to perform a denial-of-service attack against that RS
   by repeatedly sending tokens to its authz-info endpoint that require
   an introspection call.  The RS can mitigate such attacks by
   implementing rate limits on how many introspection requests they
   perform in a given time interval for a certain client IP address
   submitting tokens to /authz-info.  When that limit has been reached,
   incoming requests from that address are rejected for a certain amount
   of time.  A general rate limit on the introspection requests should
   also be considered in order to mitigate distributed attacks.

7.  Privacy Considerations

   Implementers and users should be aware of the privacy implications of
   the different possible deployments of this framework.

   The AS is in a very central position and can potentially learn
   sensitive information about the clients requesting access tokens.  If
   the client credentials grant is used, the AS can track what kind of
   access the client intends to perform.  With other grants, this can be
   prevented by the resource owner.  To do so, the resource owner needs
   to bind the grants it issues to anonymous, ephemeral credentials that
   do not allow the AS to link different grants and thus different
   access token requests by the same client.

   The claims contained in a token can reveal privacy-sensitive
   information about the client and the RS to any party having access to
   them (whether by processing the content of a self-contained token or
   by introspection).  The AS SHOULD be configured to minimize the
   information about clients and RSs disclosed in the tokens it issues.

   If tokens are only integrity protected and not encrypted, they may
   reveal information to attackers listening on the wire or be able to
   acquire the access tokens in some other way.  In the case of CWTs,
   the token may, e.g., reveal the audience, the scope, and the
   confirmation method used by the client.  The latter may reveal the
   identity of the device or application running the client.  This may
   be linkable to the identity of the person using the client (if there
   is a person and not a machine-to-machine interaction).

   Clients using asymmetric keys for proof of possession should be aware
   of the consequences of using the same key pair for proof of
   possession towards different RSs.  A set of colluding RSs or an
   attacker able to obtain the access tokens will be able to link the
   requests or even to determine the client's identity.

   An unprotected response to an unauthorized request (see Section 5.3)
   may disclose information about the RS and/or its existing
   relationship with the C.  It is advisable to include as little
   information as possible in an unencrypted response.  Even the
   absolute URI of the AS may reveal sensitive information about the
   service that the RS provides.  Developers must ensure that the RS
   does not disclose information that has an impact on the privacy of
   the stakeholders in the AS Request Creation Hints.  They may choose
   to use a different mechanism for the discovery of the AS if
   necessary.  If means of encrypting communication between the C and RS
   already exist, more detailed information may be included with an
   error response to provide the C with sufficient information to react
   on that particular error.

8.  IANA Considerations

   This document creates several registries with a registration policy
   of Expert Review; guidelines to the experts are given in
   Section 8.17.

8.1.  ACE Authorization Server Request Creation Hints

   This specification establishes the IANA "ACE Authorization Server
   Request Creation Hints" registry.

   The columns of the registry are:

   Name:  The name of the parameter.

   CBOR Key:  CBOR map key for the parameter.  Different ranges of
      values use different registration policies [RFC8126].  Integer
      values from -256 to 255 are designated as Standards Action.
      Integer values from -65536 to -257 and from 256 to 65535 are
      designated as Specification Required.  Integer values greater than
      65535 are designated as Expert Review.  Integer values less than
      -65536 are marked as Private Use.

   Value Type:  The CBOR data types allowable for the values of this
      parameter.

   Reference:  This contains a pointer to the public specification of
      the Request Creation Hint abbreviation, if one exists.

   This registry has been initially populated by the values in Table 1.
   The Reference column for all of these entries is this document.

8.2.  CoRE Resource Types

   IANA has registered a new Resource Type (rt=) Link Target Attribute
   in the "Resource Type (rt=) Link Target Attribute Values" subregistry
   under the "Constrained RESTful Environments (CoRE) Parameters"
   [IANA.CoreParameters] registry:

   Value:  "ace.ai"
   Description:  ACE-OAuth authz-info endpoint resource.
   Reference:  RFC 9200

   Specific ACE-OAuth profiles can use this common resource type for
   defining their profile-specific discovery processes.

8.3.  OAuth Extensions Errors

   This specification registers the following error values in the OAuth
   Extensions Error registry [IANA.OAuthExtensionsErrorRegistry].

   Error name:  "unsupported_pop_key"
   Error usage location:  token error response
   Related protocol extension:  RFC 9200
   Change Controller:  IETF
   Specification document(s):  Section 5.8.3 of RFC 9200

   Error name:  "incompatible_ace_profiles"
   Error usage location:  token error response
   Related protocol extension:  RFC 9200
   Change Controller:  IETF
   Specification document(s):  Section 5.8.3 of RFC 9200

8.4.  OAuth Error Code CBOR Mappings

   This specification establishes the IANA "OAuth Error Code CBOR
   Mappings" registry.

   The columns of the registry are:

   Name:  The OAuth Error Code name, refers to the name in Section 5.2
      of [RFC6749], e.g., "invalid_request".

   CBOR Value:  CBOR abbreviation for this error code.  Integer values
      less than -65536 are marked as Private Use; all other values use
      the registration policy Expert Review [RFC8126].

   Reference:  This contains a pointer to the public specification of
      the error code abbreviation, if one exists.

   Original Specification:  This contains a pointer to the public
      specification of the error code, if one exists.

   This registry has been initially populated by the values in Table 3.
   The Reference column for all of these entries is this document.

8.5.  OAuth Grant Type CBOR Mappings

   This specification establishes the IANA "OAuth Grant Type CBOR
   Mappings" registry.

   The columns of this registry are:

   Name:  The name of the grant type, as specified in Section 1.3 of
      [RFC6749].

   CBOR Value:  CBOR abbreviation for this grant type.  Integer values
      less than -65536 are marked as Private Use; all other values use
      the registration policy Expert Review [RFC8126].

   Reference:  This contains a pointer to the public specification of
      the grant type abbreviation, if one exists.

   Original Specification:  This contains a pointer to the public
      specification of the grant type, if one exists.

   This registry has been initially populated by the values in Table 4.
   The Reference column for all of these entries is this document.

8.6.  OAuth Access Token Types

   This section registers the following new token type in the "OAuth
   Access Token Types" registry [IANA.OAuthAccessTokenTypes].

   Type name:  "PoP"
   Additional Token Endpoint Response Parameters:  "cnf", "rs_cnf" (see
      Section 3.1 of [RFC8747] Section 3.2 of [RFC9201]).
   HTTP Authentication Scheme(s):  N/A
   Change Controller:  IETF
   Specification document(s):  RFC 9200

8.7.  OAuth Access Token Type CBOR Mappings

   This specification establishes the IANA "OAuth Access Token Type CBOR
   Mappings" registry.

   The columns of this registry are:

   Name:  The name of the token type, as registered in the "OAuth Access
      Token Types" registry, e.g., "Bearer".

   CBOR Value:  CBOR abbreviation for this token type.  Integer values
      less than -65536 are marked as Private Use; all other values use
      the registration policy Expert Review [RFC8126].

   Reference:  This contains a pointer to the public specification of
      the OAuth token type abbreviation, if one exists.

   Original Specification:  This contains a pointer to the public
      specification of the OAuth token type, if one exists.

8.7.1.  Initial Registry Contents

   Name:  "Bearer"
   Value:  1
   Reference:  RFC 9200
   Original Specification:  [RFC6749]

   Name:  "PoP"
   Value:  2
   Reference:  RFC 9200
   Original Specification:  RFC 9200

8.8.  ACE Profiles

   This specification establishes the IANA "ACE Profile" registry.

   The columns of this registry are:

   Name:  The name of the profile to be used as the value of the profile
      attribute.

   Description:  Text giving an overview of the profile and the context
      it is developed for.

   CBOR Value:  CBOR abbreviation for this profile name.  Different
      ranges of values use different registration policies [RFC8126].
      Integer values from -256 to 255 are designated as Standards
      Action.  Integer values from -65536 to -257 and from 256 to 65535
      are designated as Specification Required.  Integer values greater
      than 65535 are designated as Expert Review.  Integer values less
      than -65536 are marked as Private Use.

   Reference:  This contains a pointer to the public specification of
      the profile abbreviation, if one exists.

8.9.  OAuth Parameters

   This specification registers the following parameter in the "OAuth
   Parameters" registry [IANA.OAuthParameters]:

   Name:  "ace_profile"
   Parameter Usage Location:  token response
   Change Controller:  IETF
   Reference:  Sections 5.8.2 and 5.8.4.3 of RFC 9200

8.10.  OAuth Parameters CBOR Mappings

   This specification establishes the IANA "OAuth Parameters CBOR
   Mappings" registry.

   The columns of this registry are:

   Name:  The OAuth Parameter name, refers to the name in the OAuth
      parameter registry, e.g., "client_id".

   CBOR Key:  CBOR map key for this parameter.  Integer values less than
      -65536 are marked as Private Use; all other values use the
      registration policy Expert Review [RFC8126].

   Value Type:  The allowable CBOR data types for values of this
      parameter.

   Reference:  This contains a pointer to the public specification of
      the OAuth parameter abbreviation, if one exists.

   Original Specification  This contains a pointer to the public
      specification of the OAuth parameter, if one exists.

   This registry has been initially populated by the values in Table 5.
   The Reference column for all of these entries is this document.

8.11.  OAuth Introspection Response Parameters

   This specification registers the following parameters in the OAuth
   Token Introspection Response registry
   [IANA.TokenIntrospectionResponse].

   Name:  "ace_profile"
   Description:  The ACE profile used between the client and RS.
   Change Controller:  IETF
   Reference:  Section 5.9.2 of RFC 9200

   Name:  "cnonce"

   Description:  "client-nonce".  A nonce previously provided to the AS
      by the RS via the client.  Used to verify token freshness when the
      RS cannot synchronize its clock with the AS.

   Change Controller:  IETF

   Reference:  Section 5.9.2 of RFC 9200

   Name  "cti"
   Description  "CWT ID".  The identifier of a CWT as defined in
      [RFC8392].
   Change Controller  IETF
   Reference  Section 5.9.2 of RFC 9200

   Name:  "exi"
   Description:  "Expires in".  Lifetime of the token in seconds from
      the time the RS first sees it.  Used to implement a weaker form of
      token expiration for devices that cannot synchronize their
      internal clocks.
   Change Controller:  IETF
   Reference:  Section 5.9.2 of RFC 9200

8.12.  OAuth Token Introspection Response CBOR Mappings

   This specification establishes the IANA "OAuth Token Introspection
   Response CBOR Mappings" registry.

   The columns of this registry are:

   Name:  The OAuth Parameter name, refers to the name in the OAuth
      parameter registry, e.g., "client_id".

   CBOR Key:  CBOR map key for this parameter.  Integer values less than
      -65536 are marked as Private Use; all other values use the
      registration policy Expert Review [RFC8126].

   Value Type:  The allowable CBOR data types for values of this
      parameter.

   Reference:  This contains a pointer to the public specification of
      the introspection response parameter abbreviation, if one exists.

   Original Specification  This contains a pointer to the public
      specification of the OAuth Token Introspection parameter, if one
      exists.

   This registry has been initially populated by the values in Table 6.
   The Reference column for all of these entries is this document.

   Note that the mappings of parameters corresponding to claim names
   intentionally coincide with the CWT claim name mappings from
   [RFC8392].

8.13.  JSON Web Token Claims

   This specification registers the following new claims in the JSON Web
   Token (JWT) registry of JSON Web Token Claims
   [IANA.JsonWebTokenClaims]:

   Claim Name:  "ace_profile"
   Claim Description:  The ACE profile a token is supposed to be used
      with.
   Change Controller:  IETF
   Reference:  Section 5.10 of RFC 9200

   Claim Name:  "cnonce"
   Claim Description:  "client-nonce".  A nonce previously provided to
      the AS by the RS via the client.  Used to verify token freshness
      when the RS cannot synchronize its clock with the AS.
   Change Controller:  IETF
   Reference:  Section 5.10 of RFC 9200

   Claim Name:  "exi"
   Claim Description:  "Expires in".  Lifetime of the token in seconds
      from the time the RS first sees it.  Used to implement a weaker
      form of token expiration for devices that cannot synchronize their
      internal clocks.
   Change Controller:  IETF
   Reference:  Section 5.10.3 of RFC 9200

8.14.  CBOR Web Token Claims

   This specification registers the following new claims in the "CBOR
   Web Token (CWT) Claims" registry [IANA.CborWebTokenClaims].

   Claim Name:  "ace_profile"
   Claim Description:  The ACE profile a token is supposed to be used
      with.
   JWT Claim Name:  "ace_profile"
   Claim Key:  38
   Claim Value Type(s):  integer
   Change Controller:  IETF
   Specification Document(s):  Section 5.10 of RFC 9200

   Claim Name:  "cnonce"
   Claim Description:  The client-nonce sent to the AS by the RS via the
      client.
   JWT Claim Name:  "cnonce"
   Claim Key:  39
   Claim Value Type(s):  byte string
   Change Controller:  IETF
   Specification Document(s):  Section 5.10 of RFC 9200

   Claim Name:  "exi"
   Claim Description:  The expiration time of a token measured from when
      it was received at the RS in seconds.
   JWT Claim Name:  "exi"
   Claim Key:  40
   Claim Value Type(s):  unsigned integer
   Change Controller:  IETF
   Specification Document(s):  Section 5.10.3 of RFC 9200

   Claim Name:  "scope"
   Claim Description:  The scope of an access token, as defined in
      [RFC6749].
   JWT Claim Name:  "scope"
   Claim Key:  9
   Claim Value Type(s):  byte string or text string
   Change Controller:  IETF
   Specification Document(s):  Section 4.2 of [RFC8693]

8.15.  Media Type Registration

   This specification registers the "application/ace+cbor" media type
   for messages of the protocols defined in this document carrying
   parameters encoded in CBOR.  This registration follows the procedures
   specified in [RFC6838].

   Type name:  application

   Subtype name:  ace+cbor

   Required parameters:  N/A

   Optional parameters:  N/A

   Encoding considerations:  Must be encoded as a CBOR map containing
      the protocol parameters defined in RFC 9200.

   Security considerations:  See Section 6 of RFC 9200

   Interoperability considerations:  N/A

   Published specification:  RFC 9200

   Applications that use this media type:  The type is used by
      authorization servers, clients, and resource servers that support
      the ACE framework with CBOR encoding, as specified in RFC 9200.

   Fragment identifier considerations:  N/A

   Additional information:  N/A

   Person & email address to contact for further information:  IESG <ies
      g@ietf.org>

   Intended usage:  COMMON

   Restrictions on usage:  none

   Author:  Ludwig Seitz <ludwig.seitz@combitech.se>

   Change controller:  IETF

8.16.  CoAP Content-Formats

   The following entry has been registered in the "CoAP Content-Formats"
   registry:

   Media Type:  application/ace+cbor
   Encoding:  -
   ID:  19
   Reference:  RFC 9200

8.17.  Expert Review Instructions

   All of the IANA registries established in this document are defined
   to use a registration policy of Expert Review.  This section gives
   some general guidelines for what the experts should be looking for,
   but they are being designated as experts for a reason, so they should
   be given substantial latitude.

   Expert Reviewers should take into consideration the following points:

   *  Point squatting should be discouraged.  Reviewers are encouraged
      to get sufficient information for registration requests to ensure
      that the usage is not going to duplicate one that is already
      registered and that the point is likely to be used in deployments.
      The zones tagged as Private Use are intended for testing purposes
      and closed environments; code points in other ranges should not be
      assigned for testing.

   *  Specifications are needed for the first-come, first-serve range if
      they are expected to be used outside of closed environments in an
      interoperable way.  When specifications are not provided, the
      description provided needs to have sufficient information to
      identify what the point is being used for.

   *  Experts should take into account the expected usage of fields when
      approving point assignment.  The fact that there is a range for
      Standards Track documents does not mean that a Standards Track
      document cannot have points assigned outside of that range.  The
      length of the encoded value should be weighed against how many
      code points of that length are left, i.e., the size of device it
      will be used on.

   *  Since a high degree of overlap is expected between these
      registries and the contents of the OAuth parameters
      [IANA.OAuthParameters] registries, experts should require new
      registrations to maintain alignment with parameters from OAuth
      that have comparable functionality.  Deviation from this alignment
      should only be allowed if there are functional differences that
      are motivated by the use case and that cannot be easily or
      efficiently addressed by comparable OAuth parameters.

9.  References

9.1.  Normative References

   [IANA.CborWebTokenClaims]
              IANA, "CBOR Web Token (CWT) Claims",
              <https://www.iana.org/assignments/cwt>.

   [IANA.CoreParameters]
              IANA, "Constrained RESTful Environments (CoRE)
              Parameters",
              <https://www.iana.org/assignments/core-parameters>.

   [IANA.JsonWebTokenClaims]
              IANA, "JSON Web Token Claims",
              <https://www.iana.org/assignments/jwt>.

   [IANA.OAuthAccessTokenTypes]
              IANA, "OAuth Access Token Types",
              <https://www.iana.org/assignments/oauth-parameters>.

   [IANA.OAuthExtensionsErrorRegistry]
              IANA, "OAuth Extensions Errors",
              <https://www.iana.org/assignments/oauth-parameters>.

   [IANA.OAuthParameters]
              IANA, "OAuth Parameters",
              <https://www.iana.org/assignments/oauth-parameters>.

   [IANA.TokenIntrospectionResponse]
              IANA, "OAuth Token Introspection Response",
              <https://www.iana.org/assignments/oauth-parameters>.

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.

   [RFC3986]  Berners-Lee, T., Fielding, R., and L. Masinter, "Uniform
              Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax", STD 66,
              RFC 3986, DOI 10.17487/RFC3986, January 2005,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3986>.

   [RFC4648]  Josefsson, S., "The Base16, Base32, and Base64 Data
              Encodings", RFC 4648, DOI 10.17487/RFC4648, October 2006,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4648>.

   [RFC6347]  Rescorla, E. and N. Modadugu, "Datagram Transport Layer
              Security Version 1.2", RFC 6347, DOI 10.17487/RFC6347,
              January 2012, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6347>.

   [RFC6749]  Hardt, D., Ed., "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework",
              RFC 6749, DOI 10.17487/RFC6749, October 2012,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6749>.

   [RFC6750]  Jones, M. and D. Hardt, "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization
              Framework: Bearer Token Usage", RFC 6750,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC6750, October 2012,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6750>.

   [RFC6838]  Freed, N., Klensin, J., and T. Hansen, "Media Type
              Specifications and Registration Procedures", BCP 13,
              RFC 6838, DOI 10.17487/RFC6838, January 2013,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6838>.

   [RFC6920]  Farrell, S., Kutscher, D., Dannewitz, C., Ohlman, B.,
              Keranen, A., and P. Hallam-Baker, "Naming Things with
              Hashes", RFC 6920, DOI 10.17487/RFC6920, April 2013,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6920>.

   [RFC7252]  Shelby, Z., Hartke, K., and C. Bormann, "The Constrained
              Application Protocol (CoAP)", RFC 7252,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC7252, June 2014,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7252>.

   [RFC7519]  Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web Token
              (JWT)", RFC 7519, DOI 10.17487/RFC7519, May 2015,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7519>.

   [RFC7662]  Richer, J., Ed., "OAuth 2.0 Token Introspection",
              RFC 7662, DOI 10.17487/RFC7662, October 2015,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7662>.

   [RFC8126]  Cotton, M., Leiba, B., and T. Narten, "Guidelines for
              Writing an IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26,
              RFC 8126, DOI 10.17487/RFC8126, June 2017,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8126>.

   [RFC8152]  Schaad, J., "CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE)",
              RFC 8152, DOI 10.17487/RFC8152, July 2017,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8152>.

   [RFC8174]  Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
              2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
              May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.

   [RFC8392]  Jones, M., Wahlstroem, E., Erdtman, S., and H. Tschofenig,
              "CBOR Web Token (CWT)", RFC 8392, DOI 10.17487/RFC8392,
              May 2018, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8392>.

   [RFC8610]  Birkholz, H., Vigano, C., and C. Bormann, "Concise Data
              Definition Language (CDDL): A Notational Convention to
              Express Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR) and
              JSON Data Structures", RFC 8610, DOI 10.17487/RFC8610,
              June 2019, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8610>.

   [RFC8693]  Jones, M., Nadalin, A., Campbell, B., Ed., Bradley, J.,
              and C. Mortimore, "OAuth 2.0 Token Exchange", RFC 8693,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC8693, January 2020,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8693>.

   [RFC8747]  Jones, M., Seitz, L., Selander, G., Erdtman, S., and H.
              Tschofenig, "Proof-of-Possession Key Semantics for CBOR
              Web Tokens (CWTs)", RFC 8747, DOI 10.17487/RFC8747, March
              2020, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8747>.

   [RFC8949]  Bormann, C. and P. Hoffman, "Concise Binary Object
              Representation (CBOR)", STD 94, RFC 8949,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC8949, December 2020,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8949>.

   [RFC9201]  Seitz, L., "Additional OAuth Parameters for Authentication
              and Authorization in Constrained Environments (ACE)",
              RFC 9201, DOI 10.17487/RFC9201, March 2022,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9201>.

9.2.  Informative References

   [BLE]      Bluetooth Special Interest Group, "Core Specification
              5.3", Section 4.4, July 2021,
              <https://www.bluetooth.com/specifications/bluetooth-core-
              specification/>.

   [DCAF]     Gerdes, S., Bergmann, O., and C. Bormann, "Delegated CoAP
              Authentication and Authorization Framework (DCAF)", Work
              in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-gerdes-ace-dcaf-
              authorize-04, 19 October 2015,
              <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-gerdes-ace-
              dcaf-authorize-04>.

   [Margi10impact]
              Margi, C., de Oliveira, B., de Sousa, G., Simplicio Jr,
              M., Barreto, P., Carvalho, T., Naeslund, M., and R. Gold,
              "Impact of Operating Systems on Wireless Sensor Networks
              (Security) Applications and Testbeds", Proceedings of the
              19th International Conference on Computer Communications
              and Networks, DOI 10.1109/ICCCN.2010.5560028, August 2010,
              <https://doi.org/10.1109/ICCCN.2010.5560028>.

   [MQTT5.0]  Banks, A., Briggs, E., Borgendale, K., and R. Gupta, "MQTT
              Version 5.0", OASIS Standard, March 2019,
              <https://docs.oasis-open.org/mqtt/mqtt/v5.0/mqtt-
              v5.0.html>.

   [OAUTH-RPCC]
              Seitz, L., Erdtman, S., and M. Tiloca, "Raw-Public-Key and
              Pre-Shared-Key as OAuth client credentials", Work in
              Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-erdtman-oauth-rpcc-00, 21
              November 2017, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/
              draft-erdtman-oauth-rpcc-00>.

   [POP-KEY-DIST]
              Bradley, J., Hunt, P., Jones, M., Tschofenig, H., and M.
              Meszaros, "OAuth 2.0 Proof-of-Possession: Authorization
              Server to Client Key Distribution", Work in Progress,
              Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-oauth-pop-key-distribution-07,
              27 March 2019, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/
              draft-ietf-oauth-pop-key-distribution-07>.

   [RFC4949]  Shirey, R., "Internet Security Glossary, Version 2",
              FYI 36, RFC 4949, DOI 10.17487/RFC4949, August 2007,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4949>.

   [RFC6690]  Shelby, Z., "Constrained RESTful Environments (CoRE) Link
              Format", RFC 6690, DOI 10.17487/RFC6690, August 2012,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6690>.

   [RFC6819]  Lodderstedt, T., Ed., McGloin, M., and P. Hunt, "OAuth 2.0
              Threat Model and Security Considerations", RFC 6819,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC6819, January 2013,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6819>.

   [RFC7009]  Lodderstedt, T., Ed., Dronia, S., and M. Scurtescu, "OAuth
              2.0 Token Revocation", RFC 7009, DOI 10.17487/RFC7009,
              August 2013, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7009>.

   [RFC7228]  Bormann, C., Ersue, M., and A. Keranen, "Terminology for
              Constrained-Node Networks", RFC 7228,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC7228, May 2014,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7228>.

   [RFC7231]  Fielding, R., Ed. and J. Reschke, Ed., "Hypertext Transfer
              Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Semantics and Content", RFC 7231,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC7231, June 2014,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7231>.

   [RFC7521]  Campbell, B., Mortimore, C., Jones, M., and Y. Goland,
              "Assertion Framework for OAuth 2.0 Client Authentication
              and Authorization Grants", RFC 7521, DOI 10.17487/RFC7521,
              May 2015, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7521>.

   [RFC7540]  Belshe, M., Peon, R., and M. Thomson, Ed., "Hypertext
              Transfer Protocol Version 2 (HTTP/2)", RFC 7540,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC7540, May 2015,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7540>.

   [RFC7591]  Richer, J., Ed., Jones, M., Bradley, J., Machulak, M., and
              P. Hunt, "OAuth 2.0 Dynamic Client Registration Protocol",
              RFC 7591, DOI 10.17487/RFC7591, July 2015,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7591>.

   [RFC7641]  Hartke, K., "Observing Resources in the Constrained
              Application Protocol (CoAP)", RFC 7641,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC7641, September 2015,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7641>.

   [RFC7744]  Seitz, L., Ed., Gerdes, S., Ed., Selander, G., Mani, M.,
              and S. Kumar, "Use Cases for Authentication and
              Authorization in Constrained Environments", RFC 7744,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC7744, January 2016,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7744>.

   [RFC7959]  Bormann, C. and Z. Shelby, Ed., "Block-Wise Transfers in
              the Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP)", RFC 7959,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC7959, August 2016,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7959>.

   [RFC8252]  Denniss, W. and J. Bradley, "OAuth 2.0 for Native Apps",
              BCP 212, RFC 8252, DOI 10.17487/RFC8252, October 2017,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8252>.

   [RFC8259]  Bray, T., Ed., "The JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) Data
              Interchange Format", STD 90, RFC 8259,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC8259, December 2017,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8259>.

   [RFC8414]  Jones, M., Sakimura, N., and J. Bradley, "OAuth 2.0
              Authorization Server Metadata", RFC 8414,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC8414, June 2018,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8414>.

   [RFC8446]  Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
              Version 1.3", RFC 8446, DOI 10.17487/RFC8446, August 2018,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8446>.

   [RFC8516]  Keranen, A., ""Too Many Requests" Response Code for the
              Constrained Application Protocol", RFC 8516,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC8516, January 2019,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8516>.

   [RFC8613]  Selander, G., Mattsson, J., Palombini, F., and L. Seitz,
              "Object Security for Constrained RESTful Environments
              (OSCORE)", RFC 8613, DOI 10.17487/RFC8613, July 2019,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8613>.

   [RFC8628]  Denniss, W., Bradley, J., Jones, M., and H. Tschofenig,
              "OAuth 2.0 Device Authorization Grant", RFC 8628,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC8628, August 2019,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8628>.

   [RFC9000]  Iyengar, J., Ed. and M. Thomson, Ed., "QUIC: A UDP-Based
              Multiplexed and Secure Transport", RFC 9000,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC9000, May 2021,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9000>.

   [RFC9147]  Rescorla, E., Tschofenig, H., and N. Modadugu, "The
              Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) Protocol Version
              1.3", RFC 9147, DOI 10.17487/RFC9147, March 2022,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9147>.

   [RFC9202]  Gerdes, S., Bergmann, O., Bormann, C., Selander, G., and
              L. Seitz, "Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS)
              Profile for Authentication and Authorization for
              Constrained Environments (ACE)", RFC 9202,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC9202, March 2022,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9202>.

   [RFC9203]  Palombini, F., Seitz, L., Selander, G., and M. Gunnarsson,
              "The Object Security for Constrained RESTful Environments
              (OSCORE) Profile of the Authentication and Authorization
              for Constrained Environments (ACE) Framework", RFC 9203,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC9203, March 2022,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9203>.

Appendix A.  Design Justification

   This section provides further insight into the design decisions of
   the solution documented in this document.  Section 3 lists several
   building blocks and briefly summarizes their importance.  The
   justification for offering some of those building blocks, as opposed
   to using OAuth 2.0 as is, is given below.

   Common IoT constraints are:

   Low Power Radio:
      Many IoT devices are equipped with a small battery that needs to
      last for a long time.  For many constrained wireless devices, the
      highest energy cost is associated to transmitting or receiving
      messages (roughly by a factor of 10 compared to AES)
      [Margi10impact].  It is therefore important to keep the total
      communication overhead low, including minimizing the number and
      size of messages sent and received, which has an impact of choice
      on the message format and protocol.  By using CoAP over UDP and
      CBOR-encoded messages, some of these aspects are addressed.
      Security protocols contribute to the communication overhead and
      can, in some cases, be optimized.  For example, authentication and
      key establishment may, in certain cases where security
      requirements allow, be replaced by the provisioning of security
      context by a trusted third party, using transport or application-
      layer security.

   Low CPU Speed:
      Some IoT devices are equipped with processors that are
      significantly slower than those found in most current devices on
      the Internet.  This typically has implications on what timely
      cryptographic operations a device is capable of performing, which
      in turn impacts, e.g., protocol latency.  Symmetric key
      cryptography may be used instead of the computationally more
      expensive public key cryptography where the security requirements
      so allow, but this may also require support for trusted, third-
      party-assisted secret key establishment using transport- or
      application-layer security.

   Small Amount of Memory:
      Microcontrollers embedded in IoT devices are often equipped with
      only a small amount of RAM and flash memory, which places
      limitations on what kind of processing can be performed and how
      much code can be put on those devices.  To reduce code size, fewer
      and smaller protocol implementations can be put on the firmware of
      such a device.  In this case, CoAP may be used instead of HTTP,
      symmetric-key cryptography may be used instead of public-key
      cryptography, and CBOR may be used instead of JSON.  An
      authentication and key establishment protocol, e.g., the DTLS
      handshake, in comparison with assisted key establishment, also
      have an impact on memory and code footprints.

   User Interface Limitations:
      Protecting access to resources is both an important security as
      well as privacy feature.  End users and enterprise customers may
      not want to give access to the data collected by their IoT device
      or to functions it may offer to third parties.  Since the
      classical approach of requesting permissions from end users via a
      rich user interface does not work in many IoT deployment
      scenarios, these functions need to be delegated to user-controlled
      devices that are better suitable for such tasks, such as
      smartphones and tablets.

   Communication Constraints:
      In certain constrained settings, an IoT device may not be able to
      communicate with a given device at all times.  Devices may be
      sleeping or just disconnected from the Internet because of general
      lack of connectivity in the area for cost or security reasons,
      e.g., to avoid an entry point for denial-of-service attacks.

      The communication interactions this framework builds upon (as
      shown graphically in Figure 1) may be accomplished using a variety
      of different protocols, and not all parts of the message flow are
      used in all applications due to the communication constraints.
      Deployments making use of CoAP are expected, but this framework is
      not limited to them.  Other protocols, such as HTTP or Bluetooth
      Smart communication, that do not necessarily use IP could also be
      used.  The latter raises the need for application-layer security
      over the various interfaces.

   In the light of these constraints, we have made the following design
   decisions:

   CBOR, COSE, CWT:
      When using this framework, it is RECOMMENDED to use CBOR [RFC8949]
      as the data format.  Where CBOR data needs to be protected, the
      use of COSE [RFC8152] is RECOMMENDED.  Furthermore, where self-
      contained tokens are needed, it is RECOMMENDED to use CWT
      [RFC8392].  These measures aim at reducing the size of messages
      sent over the wire, the RAM size of data objects that need to be
      kept in memory, and the size of libraries that devices need to
      support.

   CoAP:
      When using this framework, it is RECOMMENDED to use CoAP [RFC7252]
      instead of HTTP.  This does not preclude the use of other
      protocols specifically aimed at constrained devices, e.g.,
      Bluetooth Low Energy (see Section 3.2).  This aims again at
      reducing the size of messages sent over the wire, the RAM size of
      data objects that need to be kept in memory, and the size of
      libraries that devices need to support.

   Access Information:
      This framework defines the name "Access Information" for data
      concerning the RS that the AS returns to the client in an access
      token response (see Section 5.8.2).  This aims at enabling
      scenarios where a powerful client supporting multiple profiles
      needs to interact with an RS for which it does not know the
      supported profiles and the raw public key.

   Proof of Possession:
      This framework makes use of proof-of-possession tokens, using the
      "cnf" claim [RFC8747].  A request parameter "cnf" and a Response
      parameter "cnf", both having a value space semantically and
      syntactically identical to the "cnf" claim, are defined for the
      token endpoint to allow requesting and stating confirmation keys.
      This aims at making token theft harder.  Token theft is
      specifically relevant in constrained use cases, as communication
      often passes through middleboxes, which could be able to steal
      bearer tokens and use them to gain unauthorized access.

   Authz-Info endpoint:
      This framework introduces a new way of providing access tokens to
      an RS by exposing an authz-info endpoint to which access tokens
      can be POSTed.  This aims at reducing the size of the request
      message and the code complexity at the RS.  The size of the
      request message is problematic, since many constrained protocols
      have severe message size limitations at the physical layer (e.g.,
      in the order of 100 bytes).  This means that larger packets get
      fragmented, which in turn combines badly with the high rate of
      packet loss and the need to retransmit the whole message if one
      packet gets lost.  Thus, separating sending of the request and
      sending of the access tokens helps to reduce fragmentation.

   Client Credentials Grant:
      In this framework, the use of the client credentials grant is
      RECOMMENDED for machine-to-machine communication use cases, where
      manual intervention of the resource owner to produce a grant token
      is not feasible.  The intention is that the resource owner would
      instead prearrange authorization with the AS based on the client's
      own credentials.  The client can then (without manual
      intervention) obtain access tokens from the AS.

   Introspection:
      In this framework, the use of access token introspection is
      RECOMMENDED in cases where the client is constrained in a way that
      it cannot easily obtain new access tokens (i.e., it has
      connectivity issues that prevent it from communicating with the
      AS).  In that case, it is RECOMMENDED to use a long-term token
      that could be a simple reference.  The RS is assumed to be able to
      communicate with the AS and can therefore perform introspection in
      order to learn the claims associated with the token reference.
      The advantage of such an approach is that the resource owner can
      change the claims associated to the token reference without having
      to be in contact with the client, thus granting or revoking access
      rights.

Appendix B.  Roles and Responsibilities

   Resource Owner
      *  Make sure that the RS is registered at the AS.  This includes
         making known to the AS which profiles, token_type, scopes, and
         key types (symmetric/asymmetric) the RS supports.  Also making
         it known to the AS which audience(s) the RS identifies itself
         with.

      *  Make sure that clients can discover the AS that is in charge of
         the RS.

      *  If the client-credentials grant is used, make sure that the AS
         has the necessary, up-to-date access control policies for the
         RS.

   Requesting Party
      *  Make sure that the client is provisioned the necessary
         credentials to authenticate to the AS.

      *  Make sure that the client is configured to follow the security
         requirements of the requesting party when issuing requests
         (e.g., minimum communication security requirements or trust
         anchors).

      *  Register the client at the AS.  This includes making known to
         the AS which profiles, token_types, and key types (symmetric/
         asymmetric) for the client.

   Authorization Server
      *  Register the RS and manage corresponding security contexts.

      *  Register clients and authentication credentials.

      *  Allow resource owners to configure and update access control
         policies related to their registered RSs.

      *  Expose the token endpoint to allow clients to request tokens.

      *  Authenticate clients that wish to request a token.

      *  Process a token request using the authorization policies
         configured for the RS.

      *  Optionally, expose the introspection endpoint that allows RSs
         to submit token introspection requests.

      *  If providing an introspection endpoint, authenticate RSs that
         wish to get an introspection response.

      *  If providing an introspection endpoint, process token
         introspection requests.

      *  Optionally, handle token revocation.

      *  Optionally, provide discovery metadata.  See [RFC8414].

      *  Optionally, handle refresh tokens.

   Client
      *  Discover the AS in charge of the RS that is to be targeted with
         a request.

      *  Submit the token request (see step (A) of Figure 1).

         -  Authenticate to the AS.

         -  Optionally (if not preconfigured), specify which RS, which
            resource(s), and which action(s) the request(s) will target.

         -  If raw public keys (RPKs) or certificates are used, make
            sure the AS has the right RPK or certificate for this
            client.

      *  Process the access token and Access Information (see step (B)
         of Figure 1).

         -  Check that the Access Information provides the necessary
            security parameters (e.g., PoP key or information on
            communication security protocols supported by the RS).

         -  Safely store the proof-of-possession key.

         -  If provided by the AS, safely store the refresh token.

      *  Send the token and request to the RS (see step (C) of
         Figure 1).

         -  Authenticate towards the RS (this could coincide with the
            proof-of-possession process).

         -  Transmit the token as specified by the AS (default is to the
            authz-info endpoint; alternative options are specified by
            profiles).

         -  Perform the proof-of-possession procedure as specified by
            the profile in use (this may already have been taken care of
            through the authentication procedure).

      *  Process the RS response (see step (F) of Figure 1) of the RS.

   Resource Server
      *  Expose a way to submit access tokens.  By default, this is the
         authz-info endpoint.

      *  Process an access token.

         -  Verify the token is from a recognized AS.

         -  Check the token's integrity.

         -  Verify that the token applies to this RS.

         -  Check that the token has not expired (if the token provides
            expiration information).

         -  Store the token so that it can be retrieved in the context
            of a matching request.

         Note: The order proposed here is not normative; any process
         that arrives at an equivalent result can be used.  A noteworthy
         consideration is whether one can use cheap operations early on
         to quickly discard nonapplicable or invalid tokens before
         performing expensive cryptographic operations (e.g., doing an
         expiration check before verifying a signature).

      *  Process a request.

         -  Set up communication security with the client.

         -  Authenticate the client.

         -  Match the client against existing tokens.

         -  Check that tokens belonging to the client actually authorize
            the requested action.

         -  Optionally, check that the matching tokens are still valid,
            using introspection (if this is possible.)

      *  Send a response following the agreed upon communication
         security mechanism(s).

      *  Safely store credentials, such as raw public keys, for
         authentication or proof-of-possession keys linked to access
         tokens.

Appendix C.  Requirements on Profiles

   This section lists the requirements on profiles of this framework for
   the convenience of profile designers.

   *  Optionally, define new methods for the client to discover the
      necessary permissions and AS for accessing a resource different
      from the one proposed in Sections 5.1 and 4

   *  Optionally, specify new grant types (Section 5.4).

   *  Optionally, define the use of client certificates as client
      credential type (Section 5.5).

   *  Specify the communication protocol the client and RS must use
      (e.g., CoAP) (Sections 5 and 5.8.4.3).

   *  Specify the security protocol the client and RS must use to
      protect their communication (e.g., OSCORE or DTLS).  This must
      provide encryption and integrity and replay protection
      (Section 5.8.4.3).

   *  Specify how the client and the RS mutually authenticate
      (Section 4).

   *  Specify the proof-of-possession protocol(s) and how to select one
      if several are available.  Also specify which key types (e.g.,
      symmetric/asymmetric) are supported by a specific proof-of-
      possession protocol (Section 5.8.4.2).

   *  Specify a unique "ace_profile" identifier (Section 5.8.4.3).

   *  If introspection is supported, specify the communication and
      security protocol for introspection (Section 5.9).

   *  Specify the communication and security protocol for interactions
      between the client and AS.  This must provide encryption,
      integrity protection, replay protection, and a binding between
      requests and responses (Sections 5 and 5.8).

   *  Specify how/if the authz-info endpoint is protected, including how
      error responses are protected (Section 5.10.1).

   *  Optionally, define other methods of token transport than the
      authz-info endpoint (Section 5.10.1).

Appendix D.  Assumptions on AS Knowledge about the C and RS

   This section lists the assumptions on what an AS should know about a
   client and an RS in order to be able to respond to requests to the
   token and introspection endpoints.  How this information is
   established is out of scope for this document.

   *  The identifier of the client or RS.

   *  The profiles that the client or RS supports.

   *  The scopes that the RS supports.

   *  The audiences that the RS identifies with.

   *  The key types (e.g., pre-shared symmetric key, raw public key, key
      length, and other key parameters) that the client or RS supports.

   *  The types of access tokens the RS supports (e.g., CWT).

   *  If the RS supports CWTs, the COSE parameters for the crypto
      wrapper (e.g., algorithm, key-wrap algorithm, and key-length) that
      the RS supports.

   *  The expiration time for access tokens issued to this RS (unless
      the RS accepts a default time chosen by the AS).

   *  The symmetric key shared between the client and AS (if any).

   *  The symmetric key shared between the RS and AS (if any).

   *  The raw public key of the client or RS (if any).

   *  Whether the RS has synchronized time (and thus is able to use the
      "exp" claim) or not.

Appendix E.  Differences to OAuth 2.0

   This document adapts OAuth 2.0 to be suitable for constrained
   environments.  This section lists the main differences from the
   normative requirements of OAuth 2.0.

   Use of TLS
      OAuth 2.0 requires the use of TLS to protect the communication
      between the AS and client when requesting an access token, between
      the client and RS when accessing a resource, and between the AS
      and RS if introspection is used.  This framework requires similar
      security properties but does not require that they be realized
      with TLS.  See Section 5.

   Cardinality of "grant_type" parameter
      In client-to-AS requests using OAuth 2.0, the "grant_type"
      parameter is required (per [RFC6749]).  In this framework, this
      parameter is optional.  See Section 5.8.1.

   Encoding of "scope" parameter
      In client-to-AS requests using OAuth 2.0, the "scope" parameter is
      string encoded (per [RFC6749]).  In this framework, this parameter
      may also be encoded as a byte string.  See Section 5.8.1.

   Cardinality of "token_type" parameter
      In AS-to-client responses using OAuth 2.0, the "token_type"
      parameter is required (per [RFC6749]).  In this framework, this
      parameter is optional.  See Section 5.8.2.

   Access token retention
      In OAuth 2.0, the access token may be sent with every request to
      the RS.  The exact use of access tokens depends on the semantics
      of the application and the session management concept it uses.  In
      this framework, the RS must be able to store these tokens for
      later use.  See Section 5.10.1.

Appendix F.  Deployment Examples

   There is a large variety of IoT deployments, as is indicated in
   Appendix A, and this section highlights a few common variants.  This
   section is not normative but illustrates how the framework can be
   applied.

   For each of the deployment variants, there are a number of possible
   security setups between clients, resource servers, and authorization
   servers.  The main focus in the following subsections is on how
   authorization of a client request for a resource hosted by an RS is
   performed.  This requires the security of the requests and responses
   between the clients and the RS to be considered.

   Note: CBOR diagnostic notation is used for examples of requests and
   responses.

F.1.  Local Token Validation

   In this scenario, the case where the resource server is offline is
   considered, i.e., it is not connected to the AS at the time of the
   access request.  This access procedure involves steps (A), (B), (C),
   and (F) of Figure 1.

   Since the resource server must be able to verify the access token
   locally, self-contained access tokens must be used.

   This example shows the interactions between a client, the
   authorization server, and a temperature sensor acting as a resource
   server.  Message exchanges A and B are shown in Figure 11.

   A:  The client first generates a public-private key pair used for
       communication security with the RS.

       The client sends a CoAP POST request to the token endpoint at the
       AS.  The security of this request can be transport or application
       layer.  It is up the communication security profile to define.
       In the example, it is assumed that both the client and AS have
       performed mutual authentication, e.g., via DTLS.  The request
       contains the public key of the client and the "audience"
       parameter set to "tempSensorInLivingRoom", a value that the
       temperature sensor identifies itself with.  The AS evaluates the
       request and authorizes the client to access the resource.

   B:  The AS responds with a 2.05 (Content) response containing the
       Access Information, including the access token.  The PoP access
       token contains the public key of the client, and the Access
       Information contains the public key of the RS.  For communication
       security, this example uses DTLS RawPublicKey between the client
       and the RS.  The issued token will have a short validity time,
       i.e., "exp" close to "iat", in order to mitigate attacks using
       stolen client credentials.  The token includes claims, such as
       "scope", with the authorized access that an owner of the
       temperature device can enjoy.  In this example, the "scope" claim
       issued by the AS informs the RS that the owner of the token that
       can prove the possession of a key is authorized to make a GET
       request against the /temperature resource and a POST request on
       the /firmware resource.  Note that the syntax and semantics of
       the "scope" claim are application specific.

       Note: In this example, it is assumed that the client knows what
       resource it wants to access and is therefore able to request
       specific "audience" and "scope" claims for the access token.

            Authorization
     Client    Server
       |         |
       |<=======>| DTLS Connection Establishment
       |         |   and mutual authentication
       |         |
   A:  +-------->| Header: POST (Code=0.02)
       |  POST   | Uri-Path:"token"
       |         | Content-Format: application/ace+cbor
       |         | Payload: <Request-Payload>
       |         |
   B:  |<--------+ Header: 2.05 Content
       |  2.05   | Content-Format: application/ace+cbor
       |         | Payload: <Response-Payload>
       |         |

       Figure 11: Token Request and Response Using Client Credentials

   The information contained in the Request-Payload and the Response-
   Payload is shown in Figure 12.  Note that the parameter "rs_cnf" from
   [RFC9201] is used to inform the client about the resource server's
   public key.

   Request-Payload :
   {
     / audience / 5 : "tempSensorInLivingRoom",
     / client_id / 24 : "myclient",
     / req_cnf / 4 : {
       / COSE_Key / 1 : {
         / kid / 2 : b64'1Bg8vub9tLe1gHMzV76e',
         / kty / 1 : 2 / EC2 /,
         / crv / -1 : 1 / P-256 /,
         / x / -2 : b64'f83OJ3D2xF1Bg8vub9tLe1gHMzV76e8Tus9uPHvRVEU',
         / y / -3 : b64'x_FEzRu9m36HLN_tue659LNpXW6pCyStikYjKIWI5a0'
       }
     }
   }

   Response-Payload :
   {
     / access_token / 1 : b64'0INDoQEKoQVNKkXfb7xaWqMT'/ .../,
     / rs_cnf / 41 : {
       / COSE_Key / 1 : {
         / kid / 2 : b64'c29tZSBwdWJsaWMga2V5IGlk',
         / kty / 1 : 2 / EC2 /,
         / crv / -1 : 1 / P-256 /,
         / x / -2   : b64'MKBCTNIcKUSDii11ySs3526iDZ8AiTo7Tu6KPAqv7D4',
         / y / -3   : b64'4Etl6SRW2YiLUrN5vfvVHuhp7x8PxltmWWlbbM4IFyM'
       }
     }
   }

              Figure 12: Request and Response Payload Details

   The content of the access token is shown in Figure 13.

   {
     / aud / 3 : "tempSensorInLivingRoom",
     / iat / 6 : 1563451500,
     / exp / 4 : 1563453000,
     / scope / 9 :  "temperature_g firmware_p",
     / cnf / 8 : {
       / COSE_Key / 1 : {
         / kid / 2 : b64'1Bg8vub9tLe1gHMzV76e',
         / kty / 1 : 2 / EC2 /,
         / crv / -1 : 1 / P-256 /,
         / x / -2 : b64'f83OJ3D2xF1Bg8vub9tLe1gHMzV76e8Tus9uPHvRVEU',
         / y / -3 : b64'x_FEzRu9m36HLN_tue659LNpXW6pCyStikYjKIWI5a0'
       }
     }
   }

         Figure 13: Access Token Including Public Key of the Client

   Messages C and F are shown in Figures 14 and 15.

   C:  The client then sends the PoP access token to the authz-info
       endpoint at the RS.  This is a plain CoAP POST request, i.e., no
       transport or application-layer security is used between the
       client and RS since the token is integrity protected between the
       AS and RS.  The RS verifies that the PoP access token was created
       by a known and trusted AS, which it applies to this RS, and that
       it is valid.  The RS caches the security context together with
       authorization information about this client contained in the PoP
       access token.

              Resource
    Client     Server
       |         |
   C:  +-------->| Header: POST (Code=0.02)
       |  POST   | Uri-Path:"authz-info"
       |         | Payload: 0INDoQEKoQVN ...
       |         |
       |<--------+ Header: 2.04 Changed
       |  2.04   |
       |         |

               Figure 14: Access Token Provisioning to the RS

   The client and the RS runs the DTLS handshake using the raw public
   keys established in steps B and C.

   The client sends a CoAP GET request to /temperature on the RS over
   DTLS.  The RS verifies that the request is authorized based on
   previously established security context.

   F:  The RS responds over the same DTLS channel with a CoAP 2.05
      Content response containing a resource representation as payload.

              Resource
    Client     Server
       |         |
       |<=======>| DTLS Connection Establishment
       |         |   using Raw Public Keys
       |         |
       +-------->| Header: GET (Code=0.01)
       | GET     | Uri-Path: "temperature"
       |         |
       |         |
       |         |
   F:  |<--------+ Header: 2.05 Content
       | 2.05    | Payload: <sensor value>
       |         |

         Figure 15: Resource Request and Response Protected by DTLS

F.2.  Introspection Aided Token Validation

   In this deployment scenario, it is assumed that a client is not able
   to access the AS at the time of the access request, whereas the RS is
   assumed to be connected to the back-end infrastructure.  Thus, the RS
   can make use of token introspection.  This access procedure involves
   steps (A)-(F) of Figure 1 but assumes steps (A) and (B) have been
   carried out during a phase when the client had connectivity to the
   AS.

   Since the client is assumed to be offline, at least for a certain
   period of time, a preprovisioned access token has to be long lived.
   Since the client is constrained, the token will not be self-contained
   (i.e., not a CWT) but instead just a reference.  The resource server
   uses its connectivity to learn about the claims associated to the
   access token by using introspection, which is shown in the example
   below.

   In the example, interactions between an offline client (key fob), an
   RS (online lock), and an AS is shown.  It is assumed that there is a
   provisioning step where the client has access to the AS.  This
   corresponds to message exchanges A and B, which are shown in
   Figure 16.

   Authorization consent from the resource owner can be preconfigured,
   but it can also be provided via an interactive flow with the resource
   owner.  An example of this for the key fob case could be that the
   resource owner has a connected car, and buys a generic key to use
   with the car.  To authorize the key fob, the owner connects it to a
   computer that then provides the UI for the device.  After that, OAuth
   2.0 implicit flow can be used to authorize the key for the car at the
   car manufacturers AS.

   Note: In this example, the client does not know the exact door it
   will be used to access since the token request is not sent at the
   time of access.  So the "scope" and "audience" parameters are set
   quite wide to start with, while tailored values narrowing down the
   claims to the specific RS being accessed can be provided to that RS
   during an introspection step.

   A:  The client sends a CoAP POST request to the token endpoint at the
       AS.  The request contains the "audience" parameter set to
       "PACS1337" (Physical Access System (PACS)), a value that
       identifies the physical access control system to which the
       individual doors are connected.  The AS generates an access token
       as an opaque string, which it can match to the specific client
       and the targeted audience.  It furthermore generates a symmetric
       proof-of-possession key.  The communication security and
       authentication between the client and AS is assumed to have been
       provided at the transport layer (e.g., via DTLS) using a pre-
       shared security context (pre-shared key (PSK), RPK, or
       certificate).

   B:  The AS responds with a CoAP 2.05 Content response, containing as
       payload the Access Information, including the access token and
       the symmetric proof-of-possession key.  Communication security
       between the C and RS will be DTLS and PreSharedKey.  The PoP key
       is used as the PreSharedKey.

   Note: In this example, we are using a symmetric key for a multi-RS
   audience, which is not recommended normally (see Section 6.9).
   However, in this case, the risk is deemed to be acceptable, since all
   the doors are part of the same physical access control system;
   therefore, the risk of a malicious RS impersonating the client
   towards another RS is low.

            Authorization
    Client     Server
       |         |
       |<=======>| DTLS Connection Establishment
       |         |   and mutual authentication
       |         |
   A:  +-------->| Header: POST (Code=0.02)
       |  POST   | Uri-Path:"token"
       |         | Content-Format: application/ace+cbor
       |         | Payload: <Request-Payload>
       |         |
   B:  |<--------+ Header: 2.05 Content
       |         | Content-Format: application/ace+cbor
       |  2.05   | Payload: <Response-Payload>
       |         |

       Figure 16: Token Request and Response Using Client Credentials

   The information contained in the Request-Payload and the Response-
   Payload is shown in Figure 17.

   Request-Payload:
   {
     / client_id / 24 : "keyfob",
     / audience / 5   : "PACS1337"
   }

   Response-Payload:
   {
     / access_token / 1 : b64'VGVzdCB0b2tlbg==',
     / cnf / 8 : {
       / COSE_Key / 1 : {
         / kid / 2 : b64'c29tZSBwdWJsaWMga2V5IGlk',
         / kty / 1 : 4 / Symmetric /,
         / k / -1  : b64'ZoRSOrFzN_FzUA5XKMYoVHyzff5oRJxl-IXRtztJ6uE'
       }
     }
   }

         Figure 17: Request and Response Payload for the C Offline

   In this case, the access token is just an opaque byte string
   referencing the authorization information at the AS.

   C:  Next, the client POSTs the access token to the authz-info
       endpoint in the RS.  This is a plain CoAP request, i.e., no DTLS
       between the client and RS.  Since the token is an opaque string,
       the RS cannot verify it on its own, and thus defers to respond to
       the client with a status code until after step E.

   D:  The RS sends the token to the introspection endpoint on the AS
       using a CoAP POST request.  In this example, the RS and AS are
       assumed to have performed mutual authentication using a pre-
       shared security context (PSK, RPK, or certificate) with the RS
       acting as the DTLS client.

   E:  The AS provides the introspection response (2.05 Content)
       containing parameters about the token.  This includes the
       confirmation key ("cnf") parameter that allows the RS to verify
       the client's proof of possession in step F.  Note that our
       example in Figure 19 assumes a preestablished key (e.g., one used
       by the client and the RS for a previous token) that is now only
       referenced by its key identifier "kid".

       After receiving message E, the RS responds to the client's POST
       in step C with the CoAP response code 2.01 (Created).

              Resource
     Client    Server
       |         |
   C:  +-------->| Header: POST (T=CON, Code=0.02)
       |  POST   | Uri-Path:"authz-info"
       |         | Payload: b64'VGVzdCB0b2tlbg=='
       |         |
       |         |     Authorization
       |         |       Server
       |         |          |
       |      D: +--------->| Header: POST (Code=0.02)
       |         |  POST    | Uri-Path: "introspect"
       |         |          | Content-Format: application/ace+cbor
       |         |          | Payload: <Request-Payload>
       |         |          |
       |      E: |<---------+ Header: 2.05 Content
       |         |  2.05    | Content-Format: application/ace+cbor
       |         |          | Payload: <Response-Payload>
       |         |          |
       |         |
       |<--------+ Header: 2.01 Created
       |  2.01   |
       |         |

              Figure 18: Token Introspection for the C Offline

   The information contained in the Request-Payload and the Response-
   Payload is shown in Figure 19.

   Request-Payload:
   {
     / token /     11 : b64'VGVzdCB0b2tlbg==',
     / client_id / 24 : "FrontDoor"
   }

   Response-Payload:
   {
     / active / 10 : true,
     / aud /     3 : "lockOfDoor4711",
     / scope /   9 : "open close",
     / iat /     6 : 1563454000,
     / cnf /     8 : {
            / kid / 3 : b64'c29tZSBwdWJsaWMga2V5IGlk'
     }
   }

         Figure 19: Request and Response Payload for Introspection

   The client uses the symmetric PoP key to establish a DTLS
   PreSharedKey secure connection to the RS.  The CoAP request PUT is
   sent to the uri-path /state on the RS, changing the state of the door
   to locked.

   F:  The RS responds with an appropriate response over the secure DTLS
       channel.

              Resource
     Client    Server
       |         |
       |<=======>| DTLS Connection Establishment
       |         |   using Pre Shared Key
       |         |
       +-------->| Header: PUT (Code=0.03)
       | PUT     | Uri-Path: "state"
       |         | Payload: <new state for the lock>
       |         |
   F:  |<--------+ Header: 2.04 Changed
       | 2.04    | Payload: <new state for the lock>
       |         |

        Figure 20: Resource Request and Response Protected by OSCORE

Acknowledgments

   This document is a product of the ACE Working Group of the IETF.

   Thanks to Eve Maler for her contributions to the use of OAuth 2.0 and
   Unlicensed Mobile Access (UMA) in IoT scenarios, Robert Taylor for
   his discussion input, and Malisa Vucinic for his input on the
   predecessors of this proposal.

   Thanks to the authors of "[POP-KEY-DIST]OAuth 2.0
   Proof-of-Possession: Authorization Server to Client Key Distribution"
   [POP-KEY-DIST], from where parts of the security considerations where
   copied.

   Thanks to Stefanie Gerdes, Olaf Bergmann, and Carsten Bormann for
   contributing their work on AS discovery from "Delegated CoAP
   Authentication and Authorization Framework (DCAF)" [DCAF] (see
   Section 5.1) and the considerations on multiple access tokens.

   Thanks to Jim Schaad and Mike Jones for their comprehensive reviews.

   Thanks to Benjamin Kaduk for his input on various questions related
   to this work.

   Thanks to Cigdem Sengul for some very useful review comments.

   Thanks to Carsten Bormann for contributing the text for the CoRE
   Resource Type registry.

   Thanks to Roman Danyliw for suggesting Appendix E (including its
   contents).

   Ludwig Seitz and Göran Selander worked on this document as part of
   the CelticPlus project CyberWI, with funding from Vinnova.  Ludwig
   Seitz has also received further funding for this work by Vinnova in
   the context of the CelticNext project CRITISEC.

Authors' Addresses

   Ludwig Seitz
   Combitech
   Djäknegatan 31
   SE-211 35 Malmö
   Sweden

   Email: ludwig.seitz@combitech.com


   Göran Selander
   Ericsson
   Faroegatan 6
   SE-164 80 Kista
   Sweden

   Email: goran.selander@ericsson.com


   Erik Wahlstroem
   Sweden

   Email: erik@wahlstromstekniska.se


   Samuel Erdtman
   Spotify AB
   Birger Jarlsgatan 61, 4tr
   SE-113 56 Stockholm
   Sweden

   Email: erdtman@spotify.com


   Hannes Tschofenig
   Arm Ltd.
   6067 Absam
   Austria

   Email: Hannes.Tschofenig@arm.com