draft-ietf-ace-oscore-profile.xml

<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<!DOCTYPE rfc [
 <!ENTITY nbsp    "&#160;">
 <!ENTITY zwsp   "&#8203;">
 <!ENTITY nbhy   "&#8209;">
 <!ENTITY wj     "&#8288;">
]>

<rfc xmlns:xi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XInclude" ipr="trust200902" docName="draft-ietf-ace-oscore-profile-19" number="9203" obsoletes="" updates="" submissionType="IETF" category="std" consensus="true" xml:lang="en" tocInclude="true" sortRefs="true" symRefs="true" version="3">

  <!-- xml2rfc v2v3 conversion 2.39.0 -->
  <front>

 <!-- [rfced] Please note that the title of the document has been updated
as follows.  Acronyms have been expanded per Section 3.6 of RFC 7322
("RFC Style Guide"). Please let us know of any concerns.

Original
 OSCORE Profile of the Authentication and Authorization for Constrained
                         Environments Framework

Current:
   The Object Security for Constrained RESTful Environments (OSCORE)
    Profile of the Authentication and Authorization for Constrained
                      Environments (ACE) Framework
Göran: Fine
-->


    <title abbrev="OSCORE Profile of ACE">The Object Security for Constrained RESTful Environments (OSCORE) Profile of the Authentication and Authorization for Constrained Environments (ACE) Framework</title>
    <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9203"/>
    <author initials="F." surname="Palombini" fullname="Francesca Palombini">
      <organization>Ericsson AB</organization>
      <address>
        <email>francesca.palombini@ericsson.com</email>
      </address>
    </author>
    <author fullname="Ludwig Seitz" initials="L." surname="Seitz">
      <organization>Combitech</organization>
      <address>
        <postal>
          <street>Djäknegatan 31</street>
          <city>Malmö</city>
          <code>211 35</code>
          <country>Sweden</country>
        </postal>
        <email>ludwig.seitz@combitech.com</email>
      </address>
    </author>
    <author fullname="Göran Selander" initials="G." surname="Selander">
      <organization>Ericsson AB</organization>
      <address>
        <email>goran.selander@ericsson.com</email>
      </address>
    </author>
    <author fullname="Martin Gunnarsson" initials="M." surname="Gunnarsson">
      <organization>RISE</organization>
      <address>
        <postal>
          <street>Scheelevägen 17</street>
          <city>Lund</city>
          <code>22370</code>
          <country>Sweden</country>
        </postal>
        <email>martin.gunnarsson@ri.se</email>

      </address>
    </author>
    <date year="2022" month="March" />
    <area>Security</area>
    <workgroup>ACE</workgroup>

<!-- [rfced] Please insert any keywords (beyond those that appear in
the title) for use on https://www.rfc-editor.org/search.

Göran: Inserted below, copied from 9200.
-->

<keyword>CoAP</keyword>
<keyword>OAuth 2.0</keyword>
<keyword>Access Control</keyword>
<keyword>Authorization</keyword>
<keyword>Internet of Things</keyword>

    <abstract>
      <t>
        This document specifies a profile for the Authentication and Authorization for Constrained Environments (ACE) framework.  It utilizes Object Security for Constrained RESTful Environments (OSCORE) to provide communication security and proof-of-possession for a key owned by the client and bound to an OAuth 2.0 access token.
      </t>
    </abstract>
  </front>
  <middle>
<!--[rfced] FYI, the text rendering of the <tt> element was changed
in Sept. 2021 (xml2rfc release 3.10.0). <tt> no longer yields quotation
marks in the text rendering. In light of this, please review and let us
know if you want to make any changes (e.g., add quotation marks that
would be in all 3 output formats). For example:

Original text (where <tt> was used in the source):
   The master secret and the identifier of the OSCORE_Input_Material
   MUST be communicated as the "ms" and "id" field in the "osc" field in
   the "cnf" parameter of the access token response.

Current text:
   The Master Secret and the identifier of the OSCORE_Input_Material
   MUST be communicated as the ms and id field in the osc field in the
   cnf parameter of the access token response.

Note: <tt> yields fixed-width font in the HTML and PDF files.

This alternative diff file has been provided so that you can review
changes without the noise of the quotation marks being removed due
to this change to the rendering of <tt>:
https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9203-alt-diff.html

Göran: Aligned with other drafts of the cluster we will keep the use of <tt>
-->

    <section anchor="introduction" numbered="true" toc="default">
      <name>Introduction</name>
      <t>
        This document specifies the <tt>coap_oscore</tt> profile of the ACE framework <xref target="RFC9200" format="default"/>.  In this profile, a client (C) and a resource server (RS) use the Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP) <xref target="RFC7252" format="default"/> to communicate.  The client uses an access token, bound to a symmetric key (the proof-of-possession (PoP) key) to authorize its access to the resource server.  Note that this profile uses a symmetric-crypto-based scheme, where the symmetric secret is used as input material for keying material derivation.  In order to provide communication security and PoP, the client and resource server use Object Security for Constrained RESTful Environments (OSCORE) as defined in <xref target="RFC8613" format="default"/>.  Note that the PoP is not achieved through a dedicated protocol element but rather occurs after the first message exchange using OSCORE.
      </t>
      <t>
        OSCORE specifies how to use CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE) <xref target="RFC9052" format="default"/> <xref target="RFC9053" format="default"/> to secure CoAP messages.
        Note that OSCORE can be used to secure CoAP messages, as well as HTTP and combinations of HTTP and CoAP; a profile of ACE similar to the one described in this document, with the difference of using HTTP instead of CoAP as the communication protocol, could be specified analogously to this one.
      </t>
      <section anchor="terminology" numbered="true" toc="default">
        <name>Terminology</name>
        <t>
    The key words "<bcp14>MUST</bcp14>", "<bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14>", "<bcp14>REQUIRED</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHALL</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHALL
    NOT</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHOULD NOT</bcp14>", "<bcp14>RECOMMENDED</bcp14>", "<bcp14>NOT RECOMMENDED</bcp14>",
    "<bcp14>MAY</bcp14>", and "<bcp14>OPTIONAL</bcp14>" in this document are to be interpreted as
    described in BCP&nbsp;14 <xref target="RFC2119"/> <xref target="RFC8174"/>
    when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.
        </t>
        <t>
          Certain security-related terms such as "authentication", "authorization", "confidentiality", "(data) integrity", "Message Authentication Code (MAC)", "Hash-based Message Authentication Code (HMAC)", and "verify" are taken from <xref target="RFC4949" format="default"/>.
        </t>
        <t>
          RESTful terminology follows HTTP <xref target="RFC7231" format="default"/>.
        </t>
        <t>
          Readers are expected to be familiar with the terms and concepts defined in OSCORE <xref target="RFC8613" format="default"/>, such as "security context" and "Recipient ID".
        </t>
        <t>
          Terminology for entities in the architecture is defined in OAuth 2.0 <xref target="RFC6749" format="default"/>, such as client (C), resource server (RS), and authorization server (AS). It is assumed in this document that a given resource on a specific RS is associated to a unique AS.
        </t>
        <t>
          Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR) <xref target="RFC8949" format="default"/> and Concise Data Definition Language (CDDL) <xref target="RFC8610" format="default"/> are used in this document. CDDL predefined type names, especially "bstr" for CBOR byte strings and "tstr" for CBOR text strings, are used extensively in this document.
        </t>
        <t>
          Note that the term "endpoint" is used as in <xref target="RFC9200" format="default"/>, following its OAuth definition, which is to denote resources such as token and introspect at the AS and authz-info at the RS.

	  The CoAP definition, which is "[a]n entity participating in the CoAP protocol" <xref target="RFC7252" format="default"/>, is not used in this document.
        </t>
        <t>
          Examples throughout this document are expressed in CBOR diagnostic notation without the tag and value abbreviations.
        </t>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section numbered="true" toc="default">
      <name>Protocol Overview</name>
      <t>
        This section gives an overview of how to use the ACE Framework <xref target="RFC9200" format="default"/> to secure the communication between a client and a resource server using OSCORE <xref target="RFC8613" format="default"/>. The parameters needed by the client to negotiate the use of this profile with the AS, as well as the OSCORE setup process, are described in detail in the following sections.
      </t>
      <t>
        The RS maintains a collection of OSCORE security contexts with associated authorization information for all the clients that it is communicating with. The
        authorization information is maintained as policy that is used as input to processing requests from those clients.
      </t>
      <t>
        This profile requires a client to retrieve an access token from the AS for the resource it wants to access on an RS, by sending an access token request to the token endpoint, as specified in <xref target="RFC9200" sectionFormat="of" section="5.8"/>. The access token request and response <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be confidentiality protected and ensure authenticity.  The use of OSCORE between the client and AS is <bcp14>RECOMMENDED</bcp14> in this profile, to reduce the number of libraries the client has to support, but other protocols fulfilling the security requirements defined in <xref target="RFC9200" sectionFormat="of" section="5"/> <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> alternatively be used, such as TLS <xref target="RFC8446" format="default"/> or DTLS <xref target="RFC9147" format="default"/>.
      </t>
      <t>
        Once the client has retrieved the access token, it generates a nonce N1, as defined in this document (see <xref target="nonce1" format="default"/>). The client also generates its own OSCORE Recipient ID, ID1 (see <xref target="RFC8613" sectionFormat="of" section="3.1"/>), for use with the keying material associated to the RS. The client posts the token N1 and its Recipient ID to the RS using the authz-info endpoint and mechanisms specified in <xref target="RFC9200" sectionFormat="of" section="5.8"/> and Content-Format = application/ace+cbor. When using this profile, the communication with the authz-info endpoint is not protected, except for the update of access rights.
      </t>
      <t>
        If the access token is valid, the RS replies to this request with a 2.01 (Created) response with Content-Format = application/ace+cbor, which contains a nonce N2 and its newly generated OSCORE Recipient ID, ID2, for use with the keying material associated to the client. Moreover, the server concatenates the input salt received in the token, N1, and N2 to obtain the Master Salt of the OSCORE security context (see <xref target="RFC8613" sectionFormat="of" section="3"/>).
        The RS then derives the complete security context associated with the received token from the Master Salt; the OSCORE Recipient ID generated by the client (set as its OSCORE Sender ID); its own OSCORE Recipient ID; plus the parameters received in the access token from the AS, following <xref target="RFC8613" sectionFormat="of" section="3.2"/>.
      </t>
      <t>
        In a similar way, after receiving the nonce N2, the client concatenates the input salt N1 and N2 to obtain the Master Salt of the OSCORE security context. The client then derives the complete security context from the Master Salt; the OSCORE Recipient ID generated by the RS (set as its OSCORE Sender ID); its own OSCORE Recipient ID; plus the parameters received from the AS.
      </t>
      <t>
        Finally, the client starts the communication with the RS by sending a request protected with OSCORE to the RS. If the request is successfully verified, the server stores the complete security context state that is ready for use in protecting messages and uses it in the response, and in further communications with the client, until token deletion due to, for example, expiration. This security context is discarded when a token (whether the same or a different one) is used to successfully derive a new security context for that client.
      </t>
      <t>
        The use of nonces N1 and N2 during the exchange prevents the reuse of an
        Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data (AEAD) nonce/key pair
        for two different messages. Reuse might otherwise occur when the
        client and RS derive a new security context from an existing (non-expired)
        access token, as might occur when either party has just rebooted, and that might lead to loss of both confidentiality and integrity.
        Instead, by using the exchanged nonces N1 and N2 as part of the Master Salt, the request to the authz-info endpoint posting the same token results in a different security context, by OSCORE construction, since even though the Master Secret, Sender ID, and Recipient ID are the same, the Master Salt is different (see <xref target="RFC8613" sectionFormat="of" section="3.2.1"/>). If the exchanged nonces were reused, a node reusing a non-expired old token would be susceptible to on-path attackers provoking the creation of an OSCORE message using an old AEAD key and nonce.
      </t>
      <t>

<!--[rfced] Regarding "OSCORE security input material",
because the term "OSCORE Input Material" is used elsewhere
in the document, is it correct to simply remove "security" from
this term (2 instances)?  Or, do you want to rephrase otherwise
(e.g., "secure OSCORE Input Material")?

Original:
   After the whole message exchange has taken place, the client can
   contact the AS to request an update of its access rights, sending a
   similar request to the token endpoint that also includes an
   identifier so that the AS can find the correct OSCORE security input
   material it has previously shared with the client. This specific
   identifier, encoded as a byte string, is assigned by the AS to be
   unique in the sets of its OSCORE security input materials, and is not
   used as input material to derive the full OSCORE Security Context.

Perhaps (using "OSCORE Input Material"):
   After the whole message exchange has taken place, the client can
   contact the AS to request an update of its access rights, sending a
   similar request to the token endpoint that also includes an
   identifier so that the AS can find the correct OSCORE Input
   Material it has previously shared with the client.  This specific
   identifier, encoded as a byte string, is assigned by the AS to be
   unique in the sets of its OSCORE Input Materials, and it is
   not used as input material to derive the full OSCORE Security
   Context.

GS: Good.
-->

        After the whole message exchange has taken place, the client can contact the AS to request an update of its access rights, sending a similar request to the token endpoint that also includes an identifier so that the AS can find the correct OSCORE security input material it has previously shared with the client. This specific identifier, encoded as a byte string, is assigned by the AS to be unique in the sets of its OSCORE security input materials, and it is not used as input material to derive the full OSCORE security context.
      </t>
      <t>
        An overview of the profile flow for the OSCORE profile is given in <xref target="prof-overview" format="default"/>. The names of messages coincide with those of <xref target="RFC9200" format="default"/> when applicable.
      </t>
      <figure anchor="prof-overview">
        <name>Protocol Overview</name>
        <artwork name="" type="" align="left" alt=""><![CDATA[
   C                            RS                   AS
   |                            |                     |
   | ----- POST /token  ----------------------------> |
   |                            |                     |
   | <---------------------------- Access Token ----- |
   |                           + Access Information   |
   | ---- POST /authz-info ---> |                     |
   |   (access_token, N1, ID1)  |                     |
   |                            |                     |
   | <- 2.01 Created (N2, ID2)- |                     |
   |                            |                     |
 /Sec Context             /Sec Context                |
   derivation/              derivation/               |
   |                            |                     |
   | ---- OSCORE Request -----> |                     |
   |                            |                     |
   |                    /proof-of-possession          |
   |                    Sec Context storage/          |
   |                            |                     |
   | <--- OSCORE Response ----- |                     |
   |                            |                     |
/proof-of-possession            |                     |
Sec Context storage/            |                     |
   |                            |                     |
   | ---- OSCORE Request -----> |                     |
   |                            |                     |
   | <--- OSCORE Response ----- |                     |
   |                            |                     |
   |           ...              |                     |
        ]]></artwork>
      </figure>
    </section>
    <section anchor="client-as" numbered="true" toc="default">
      <name>Client-AS Communication</name>
      <t>
        The following subsections describe the details of the POST request and response to the token endpoint between the client and AS. <xref target="RFC8613" sectionFormat="of" section="3.2"/> defines how to derive a security context based on a shared Master Secret and a set of other parameters, established between the client and server, which the client receives from the AS in this exchange.  The PoP key included in the response from the AS <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be used as a Master Secret in OSCORE.
      </t>
      <section anchor="c-as" numbered="true" toc="default">
        <name>C-to-AS: POST to Token Endpoint</name>
        <t>
          The client-to-AS request is specified in <xref target="RFC9200" sectionFormat="of" section="5.8.1"/>.
        </t>
        <t>
          The client must send this POST request to the token endpoint over a secure channel that guarantees authentication, message integrity, and confidentiality (see <xref target="introsp" format="default"/>).
        </t>
        <t>
          An example of such a request is shown in <xref target="ex0" format="default"/>.
        </t>
        <figure anchor="ex0">
          <name>Example C-to-AS POST /token Request for an Access Token Bound to a Symmetric Key</name>

<!-- [rfced] Please review the "type" attribute of each sourcecode element
in the XML file to ensure correctness. If the current list of preferred
values for "type" (https://www.rfc-editor.org/materials/sourcecode-types.txt)
does not contain an applicable type, then feel free to let us know. Also, it
is acceptable to leave the "type" attribute not set.

Göran: Now changed to intended typing. Most figures are CoAP messages in which case I set the figure type="", although the payload should be cbor.
-->
        <sourcecode name="" type=""><![CDATA[
    Header: POST (Code=0.02)
    Uri-Host: "as.example.com"
    Uri-Path: "token"
    Content-Format: application/ace+cbor
    Payload:
    {
      / audience / 5 : "tempSensor4711",
         / scope / 9 : "read"
    }
          ]]></sourcecode>
        </figure>

        <t>
          If the client wants to update its access rights without changing an existing OSCORE security context, it <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> include a <tt>req_cnf</tt> object in its POST request to the token endpoint, with the <tt>kid</tt> field carrying a CBOR byte string containing the OSCORE Input Material identifier (assigned as discussed in <xref target="as-c" format="default"/>). This identifier, together with other information such as audience (see <xref target="RFC9200" sectionFormat="of" section="5.8.1"/>), can be used by the AS to determine the shared secret bound to the proof-of-possession token; therefore, it <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> identify a symmetric key that was previously generated by the AS as a shared secret for the communication between the client and the RS. The AS <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> verify that the received value identifies a proof-of-possession key that has previously been issued to the requesting client. If that is not the case, the client-to-AS request <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be declined with the error code <tt>invalid_request</tt> as defined in <xref target="RFC9200" sectionFormat="of" section="5.8.3"/>.
        </t>
        <t>
          An example of such a request is shown in <xref target="ex7" format="default"/>.
        </t>
        <figure anchor="ex7">
          <name>Example C-to-AS POST /token Request for Updating Rights to an Access Token Bound to a Symmetric Key</name>
          <sourcecode name="" type=""><![CDATA[
    Header: POST (Code=0.02)
    Uri-Host: "as.example.com"
    Uri-Path: "token"
    Content-Format: application/ace+cbor
    Payload:
    {
      / audience / 5 : "tempSensor4711",
         / scope / 9 : "write",
       / req_cnf / 4 : {
             / kid / 2 : h'01'
      }
    }
          ]]></sourcecode>
        </figure>
      </section>
      <section anchor="as-c" numbered="true" toc="default">
        <name>AS-to-C: Access Token</name>
        <t>
          After verifying the POST request to the token endpoint and that the client is authorized to obtain an access token corresponding to its access token request, the AS responds as defined in <xref target="RFC9200" sectionFormat="of" section="5.8.2"/>. If the client request was invalid, or not authorized, the AS returns an error response as described in <xref target="RFC9200" sectionFormat="of" section="5.8.3"/>.
        </t>
        <t>
          The AS can signal that the use of OSCORE is <bcp14>REQUIRED</bcp14> for a specific access token by including the <tt>ace_profile</tt> parameter with the value <tt>coap_oscore</tt> in the access token response.  This means that the client <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> use OSCORE towards all resource servers for which this access token is valid, and follow <xref target="oscore-setup" format="default"/> to derive the security context to run OSCORE.
Usually, it is assumed that constrained devices will be preconfigured with the necessary profile, so that this kind of profile signaling can be omitted.	
        </t>
        <t>
          Moreover, the AS <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> send the following data:
        </t>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>a Master Secret</li>
          <li>an identifier of the OSCORE Input Material</li>
        </ul>
        <t>
          Additionally, the AS <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> send the following data, in the same response.
        </t>


<!--[rfced] In RFC-to-be 9053 (draft-ietf-cose-rfc8152bis-algs-12),
Section 5.1 (not Section 3.1) discusses HKDF; is an update needed
to the text below? Please refer to the document in AUTH48:
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9053.html>.

Original:
   an HMAC-based key derivation function (HKDF, [RFC5869]) algorithm,
   see section 3.1 of [I-D.ietf-cose-rfc8152bis-algs]

Perhaps:
   an HMAC-based key derivation function (HKDF) algorithm [RFC5869];
   see Section 5.1 of [RFC9053].

Göran: COSE does not have a register for HKDF so we are using the HMAC algorithm values, which is the reason for referencing section section 3.1. Clarification included below.
-->

        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>a context identifier</li>
          <li>an AEAD algorithm</li>
          <li>an HMAC-based key derivation function (HKDF) algorithm <xref target="RFC5869" format="default"/>; specified by the HMAC algorithm value, see <xref target="RFC9053" sectionFormat="of" section="3.1"/></li>
          <li>a salt</li>
          <li>the OSCORE version number</li>
        </ul>
        <t>
          This data is transported in the OSCORE_Input_Material. The OSCORE_Input_Material is a CBOR map object, defined in <xref target="oscore-sec-ctx" format="default"/>. This object is transported in the <tt>cnf</tt> parameter of the access token response, as defined in <xref target="RFC9201" sectionFormat="of" section="3.2"/>, as the value of a field named <tt>osc</tt>, which is registered in Sections <xref target="osc-cwt" format="counter"/> and <xref target="osc-jwt" format="counter"/>.
        </t>
        <t>
          The AS <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> assign an identifier to the context (context identifier). This identifier is used as ID Context in the OSCORE context as described in <xref target="RFC8613" sectionFormat="of" section="3.1"/>. If assigned, these parameters <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be communicated as the <tt>contextId</tt> field in the OSCORE_Input_Material. The application needs to consider that this identifier is sent in the clear and may reveal information about the endpoints, as mentioned in <xref target="RFC8613" sectionFormat="of" section="12.8"/>.
        </t>
        <t>	
          The Master Secret and the identifier of the OSCORE_Input_Material <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be communicated as the <tt>ms</tt> and <tt>id</tt> field in the <tt>osc</tt> field in the <tt>cnf</tt> parameter of the access token response.

<!--[rfced] FYI, we rephrased the opening of this sentence to
improve readability.  Please let us know if you prefer otherwise.
(Side note: this text shows the <tt> change to quotation marks as
described above.)

Original:
   If included, the
   AEAD algorithm is sent in the "alg" parameter in the
   OSCORE_Input_Material; the HKDF algorithm in the "hkdf" parameter of
   the OSCORE_Input_Material; a salt in the "salt" parameter of the
   OSCORE_Input_Material; and the OSCORE version in the "version"
   parameter of the OSCORE_Input_Material.

Current:
   If included, the
   following are sent: the AEAD algorithm in the alg parameter in the
   OSCORE_Input_Material; the HKDF algorithm in the hkdf parameter of
   the OSCORE_Input_Material; a salt in the salt parameter of the
   OSCORE_Input_Material; and the OSCORE version in the version
   parameter of the OSCORE_Input_Material.

Göran: Good.
-->
	
          If included, the following are sent: the AEAD algorithm in the <tt>alg</tt> parameter in the OSCORE_Input_Material; the HKDF algorithm in the <tt>hkdf</tt> parameter of the OSCORE_Input_Material; a salt in the <tt>salt</tt> parameter of the OSCORE_Input_Material; and the OSCORE version in the <tt>version</tt> parameter of the OSCORE_Input_Material.
        </t>
        <t>
        	The same parameters <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be included in the claims associated with the access token.
          The OSCORE Master Secret <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be encrypted by the authorization server so that only the resource server can decrypt it (see <xref target="RFC9200" sectionFormat="of" section="6.1"/>). The use of a CBOR Web Token (CWT) protected with COSE_Encrypt/COSE_Encrypt0 as specified in <xref target="RFC8392" format="default"/> is <bcp14>RECOMMENDED</bcp14> in this profile. If the token is a CWT, the same OSCORE_Input_Material structure defined above <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be placed in the <tt>osc</tt> field of the <tt>cnf</tt> claim of this token.
        </t>
        <t>
          The AS <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> send a different OSCORE_Input_Material (and therefore different access tokens) to different authorized clients, in order for the RS to differentiate between clients.
        </t>
        <t>
          <xref target="ex1" format="default"/> shows an example of an AS response. The access token has been truncated for readability.
        </t>
        <figure anchor="ex1">
          <name>Example AS-to-C Access Token Response with an OSCORE Profile</name>
          <sourcecode name="" type=""><![CDATA[
    Header: Created (Code=2.01)
    Content-Type: application/ace+cbor
    Payload:
    {
      / access_token / 1 : h'8343a1010aa2044c53 ...
       (remainder of access token (CWT) omitted for brevity)',
      / ace_profile / 38 : / coap_oscore / 2,
        / expires_in / 2 : 3600,
               / cnf / 8 : {
                 / osc / 4 : {
                    / id / 0 : h'01',
                    / ms / 2 : h'f9af838368e353e78888e1426bd94e6f'
        }
      }
    }
          ]]></sourcecode>
        </figure>
        <t>
          <xref target="ex2" format="default"/> shows an example CWT Claims Set, including the relevant OSCORE parameters in the <tt>cnf</tt> claim.
        </t>
        <figure anchor="ex2">
          <name>Example CWT Claims Set with OSCORE Parameters</name>
         <sourcecode name="" type="cbor"><![CDATA[
{
    / aud / 3 : "tempSensorInLivingRoom",
    / iat / 6 : 1360189224,
    / exp / 4 : 1360289224,
  / scope / 9 :  "temperature_g firmware_p",
    / cnf / 8 : {
      / osc / 4 : {
         / id / 0 : h'01',
         / ms / 2 : h'f9af838368e353e78888e1426bd94e6f'
    }
  }
}

          ]]></sourcecode>
        </figure>
        <t>
          The same CWT Claims Set as in <xref target="ex2" format="default"/>, using the value abbreviations defined in <xref target="RFC9200" format="default"/> and <xref target="RFC8747" format="default"/> and encoded in CBOR, is shown in <xref target="ex2-cbor" format="default"/>. The bytes in hexadecimal are reported in the first column, while their corresponding CBOR meaning is reported after the <tt>#</tt> sign on the second column, for readability.
        </t>
<!--[rfced] Please review the values in Figure 6 as per your note
regarding IANA-assigned values, and let us know if any updates are
needed.

Göran: IANA-assigned values of osc, id and ms matches Figure 6.
-->

        <figure anchor="ex2-cbor">
          <name>Example CWT Claims Set with OSCORE Parameters Using CBOR Encoding</name>
          <sourcecode name="" type="cbor"><![CDATA[
A5                              # map(5)
   03                           # unsigned(3)
   76                           # text(22)
      74656D7053656E736F72496E4C6976696E67526F6F6D
                                # "tempSensorInLivingRoom"
   06                           # unsigned(6)
   1A 5112D728                  # unsigned(1360189224)
   04                           # unsigned(4)
   1A 51145DC8                  # unsigned(1360289224)
   09                           # unsigned(9)
   78 18                        # text(24)
      74656D70657261747572655F67206669726D776172655F70
                                # "temperature_g firmware_p"
   08                           # unsigned(8)
      A1                        # map(1)
         04                     # unsigned(4)
            A2                  # map(2)
               00               # unsigned(0)
               41               # bytes(1)
                  01            # "\u0001"
               02               # unsigned(2)
               50               # bytes(16)
                  F9AF838368E353E78888E1426BD94E6F
                                # "\xF9\xAF\x83 etc. "
          ]]></sourcecode>
        </figure>
        <t>
          If the client has requested an update to its access rights using the same OSCORE security context, which is valid and authorized, the AS <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> omit the <tt>cnf</tt> parameter in the response and <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> carry the OSCORE Input Material identifier in the <tt>kid</tt> field in the <tt>cnf</tt> claim of the token. This identifier needs to be included in the token in order for the RS to identify the correct OSCORE Input Material.
        </t>
        <t>
          <xref target="ex5" format="default"/> shows an example of such an AS response. The access token has been truncated for readability.
        </t>
        <figure anchor="ex5">
          <name>Example AS-to-C Access Token Response with an OSCORE Profile for the Update of Access Rights</name>
          <sourcecode name="" type=""><![CDATA[
    Header: Created (Code=2.01)
    Content-Type: application/ace+cbor
    Payload:
    {
      / access_token / 1 : h'8343a1010aa2044c53 ...
       (remainder of access token (CWT) omitted for brevity)',
      / ace_profile / 38 : / coap_oscore / 2,
        / expires_in / 2 : 3600
    }
          ]]></sourcecode>
        </figure>
        <t>
          <xref target="ex6" format="default"/> shows an example CWT Claims Set that contains the necessary OSCORE parameters in the <tt>cnf</tt> claim for the update of access rights.
        </t>
        <figure anchor="ex6">
          <name>Example CWT Claims Set with OSCORE Parameters for the Update of Access Rights</name>
         <sourcecode name="" type="cbor"><![CDATA[
  {
      / aud / 3 : "tempSensorInLivingRoom",
      / iat / 6 : 1360189224,
      / exp / 4 : 1360289224,
    / scope / 9 :  "temperature_h",
      / cnf / 8 : {
        / kid / 2 : h'01'
    }
  }
          ]]></sourcecode>
        </figure>
        <!-- Client rejecting OSCORE_Security_Context if invalid <- This is not done as the client does not verify the token, so it would be easy for an attacker to interrupt ACE by just injecting unexisting fields.
        <t>
          When receiving the access token response, the client <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> verify the OSCORE_Security_Context. If any of the expected parameters in the OSCORE_Security_Context is missing (e.g. any of the mandatory parameters from the AS), or if any parameters received in the OSCORE_Security_Context is unrecognized, the client <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> continue processing, and <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> attempt to retrieve a new token from the AS.
        <t>

        Göran: This comment can be deleted. As stated, the client cannot verify the token since it is typically encrypted for the RS. For that reason, the injection attacks does not make sense here. If the token or security context is not valid, that will be detected by the access request not being granted.
        -->

        <section anchor="oscore-sec-ctx" numbered="true" toc="default">
          <name>The OSCORE_Input_Material</name>
          <t>
            An OSCORE_Input_Material is an object that represents the input material to derive an OSCORE security context, i.e., the local set of information elements necessary to carry out the cryptographic operations in OSCORE (<xref target="RFC8613" sectionFormat="of" section="3.1"/>). In particular, the OSCORE_Input_Material is defined to be serialized and transported between nodes, as specified by this document, but it can also be used by other specifications if needed. The OSCORE_Input_Material can be encoded as either a JSON object or a CBOR map. The set of common parameters that can appear in an OSCORE_Input_Material can be found in the IANA "OSCORE Security Context Parameters" registry (<xref target="sec-ctx-params-reg" format="default"/>), defined for extensibility, and the initial set of parameters defined in this document is specified below.
            All parameters are optional.
            <xref target="key-labels" format="default"/> provides a summary of the OSCORE_Input_Material parameters defined in this section.
          </t>
          <table anchor="key-labels" align="center">
            <name>OSCORE_Input_Material Parameters</name>
            <thead>
              <tr>
                <th align="left">name</th>
                <th align="left">CBOR label</th>
                <th align="left">CBOR type</th>
                <th align="left">registry</th>
                <th align="left">description</th>
              </tr>
            </thead>
            <tbody>
              <tr>
                <td align="left">id</td>
                <td align="left">0</td>
                <td align="left">byte string</td>
                <td align="left"/>
                <td align="left">OSCORE Input Material identifier</td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td align="left">version</td>
                <td align="left">1</td>
                <td align="left">unsigned integer</td>
                <td align="left"/>
                <td align="left">OSCORE version</td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td align="left">ms</td>
                <td align="left">2</td>
                <td align="left">byte string</td>
                <td align="left"/>
                <td align="left">OSCORE Master Secret value</td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td align="left">hkdf</td>
                <td align="left">3</td>
                <td align="left">text string / integer</td>
                <td align="left">
                  <xref target="COSE.Algorithms" format="default"/> values (HMAC-based)</td>
                <td align="left">OSCORE HKDF value</td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td align="left">alg</td>
                <td align="left">4</td>
                <td align="left">text string / integer</td>
                <td align="left">
                  <xref target="COSE.Algorithms" format="default"/> values (AEAD)</td>
                <td align="left">OSCORE AEAD Algorithm value</td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td align="left">salt</td>
                <td align="left">5</td>
                <td align="left">byte string</td>
                <td align="left"/>
                <td align="left">an input to OSCORE Master Salt value</td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td align="left">contextId</td>
                <td align="left">6</td>
                <td align="left">byte string</td>
                <td align="left"/>
                <td align="left">OSCORE ID Context value</td>
              </tr>
            </tbody>
          </table>
          <dl newline="false" spacing="normal">
            <dt>id:</dt>
            <dd>
                This parameter identifies the OSCORE_Input_Material and is encoded as a byte string.
                In JSON, the <tt>id</tt> value is a base64-encoded byte string.
                In CBOR, the <tt>id</tt> type is a byte string, and it has label 0.
              </dd>
            <dt>version:</dt>
            <dd>
                This parameter identifies the OSCORE version number, which is an unsigned integer. For more information about this field, see <xref target="RFC8613" sectionFormat="of" section="5.4"/>.
                In JSON, the <tt>version</tt> value is an integer.
                In CBOR, the <tt>version</tt> type is an integer, and it has label 1.
              </dd>
            <dt>ms:</dt>
            <dd>
                This parameter identifies the OSCORE Master Secret value, which is a byte string. For more information about this field, see <xref target="RFC8613" sectionFormat="of" section="3.1"/>.
                In JSON, the <tt>ms</tt> value is a base64-encoded byte string.
                In CBOR, the <tt>ms</tt> type is byte string, and it has label 2.
              </dd>
            <dt>hkdf:</dt>
            <dd>
                This parameter identifies the OSCORE HKDF Algorithm. For more information about this field, see <xref target="RFC8613" sectionFormat="of" section="3.1"/>.
                The values used <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be registered in the IANA "COSE Algorithms" registry (see <xref target="COSE.Algorithms" format="default"/>) and <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be HMAC-based HKDF algorithms (see <xref target="RFC9053" sectionFormat="of" section="3.1"/>). The value can be either the integer or the text-string value of the HMAC-based HKDF algorithm in the "COSE Algorithms" registry.
                In JSON, the <tt>hkdf</tt> value is a case-sensitive ASCII string or an integer.
                In CBOR, the <tt>hkdf</tt> type is a text string or integer, and it has label 3.
              </dd>
            <dt>alg:</dt>
            <dd>
                This parameter identifies the OSCORE AEAD Algorithm. For more information about this field, see <xref target="RFC8613" sectionFormat="of" section="3.1"/>.
                The values used <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be registered in the IANA "COSE Algorithms" registry (see <xref target="COSE.Algorithms" format="default"/>) and <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be AEAD algorithms. The value can be either the integer or the text-string value of the HMAC-based HKDF algorithm in the "COSE Algorithms" registry.
                In JSON, the <tt>alg</tt> value is a case-sensitive ASCII string or an integer.
                In CBOR, the <tt>alg</tt> type is a text string or integer, and it has label 4.
              </dd>
            <dt>salt:</dt>
            <dd>
                This parameter identifies an input to the OSCORE Master Salt value, which is a byte string. For more information about this field, see <xref target="RFC8613" sectionFormat="of" section="3.1"/>.
                In JSON, the <tt>salt</tt> value is a base64-encoded byte string.
                In CBOR, the <tt>salt</tt> type is a byte string, and it has label 5.
              </dd>
              <dt>contextId:</dt>	
            <dd>
                This parameter identifies the security context as a byte string. This identifier is used as OSCORE ID Context. For more information about this field, see <xref target="RFC8613" sectionFormat="of" section="3.1"/>.
                In JSON, the <tt>contextID</tt> value is a base64-encoded byte string.
                In CBOR, the <tt>contextID</tt> type is a byte string, and it has label 6.
              </dd>
          </dl>
          <t>
            An example of JSON OSCORE_Input_Material is given in <xref target="JSON-osc" format="default"/>.
          </t>
          <figure anchor="JSON-osc">
            <name>Example JSON OSCORE_Input_Material</name>
            <sourcecode name="" type="json"><![CDATA[
        "osc" : {
          "alg" : "AES-CCM-16-64-128",
           "id" : b64'AQ=='
           "ms" : b64'+a+Dg2jjU+eIiOFCa9lObw'
        }
            ]]></sourcecode>
          </figure>
          <t>
            The CDDL grammar describing the CBOR OSCORE_Input_Material is shown in <xref target="CDDL-osc" format="default"/>.
          </t>

<!--[rfced] In Section 3.2.1, we notice that the last figure (after
Figure 9) that describes the CDDL grammar for the CBOR
OSCORE_Input_Material does not have a title or figure number.
Would you like to add a title and make this Figure 10? If so,
please provide the desired text.

Göran: Done
-->
          <figure anchor="CDDL-osc">
            <name>CDDL grammar of the OSCORE_Input_Material</name>
            <sourcecode name="" type="cddl"><![CDATA[
OSCORE_Input_Material = {
    ? 0 => bstr,              ; id
    ? 1 => int,               ; version
    ? 2 => bstr,              ; ms
    ? 3 => tstr / int,        ; hkdf
    ? 4 => tstr / int,        ; alg
    ? 5 => bstr,              ; salt
    ? 6 => bstr,              ; contextId
    * int / tstr => any
}
            ]]></sourcecode>
          </figure>
        </section>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="c-rs1" numbered="true" toc="default">
      <name>Client-RS Communication</name>
      <t>
        The following subsections describe the details of the POST request and response to the authz-info endpoint between the client and RS. The client generates a nonce N1 and an identifier ID1 that is unique in the sets of its own Recipient IDs and posts them together with the token that includes the materials (e.g., OSCORE parameters) received from the AS to the RS. The RS then generates a nonce N2 and an identifier ID2 that is unique in the sets of its own Recipient IDs and uses <xref target="RFC8613" sectionFormat="of" section="3.2"/> to derive a security context based on a shared Master Secret, the two exchanged nonces, and the two identifiers, established between the client and server. The exchanged nonces and identifiers are encoded as a CBOR byte string if CBOR is used and as a base64 string if JSON is used. This security context is used to protect all future communication between the client and RS using OSCORE, as long as the access token is valid.
      </t>
      <!--      <t>
        Note that the proof-of-possession required to bind the access token to the
        client is implicitly performed by generating the shared OSCORE Security Context using
        the pop-key as master secret, for both client and RS.  An attacker
        using a stolen token will not be able to generate a valid OSCORE context and
        thus not be able to prove possession of the pop-key.

      Göran: This comment can be deleted. The text is correct, but no reason to state since knowledge about OAuth 2.0 is assumed.
      </t> -->

      <t>
        Note that the RS and client authenticate each other
        by generating the shared OSCORE security context using
        the PoP key as the Master Secret.  An attacker
        posting a valid token to the RS will not be able to generate a valid OSCORE security context and
        thus will not be able to prove possession of the PoP key. Additionally, the mutual authentication is only achieved after the client has successfully verified a response from the RS protected with the generated OSCORE security context.
      </t>
      <section anchor="c-rs" numbered="true" toc="default">
        <name>C-to-RS: POST to authz-info Endpoint</name>
        <t>
          The client <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> generate a nonce value N1 that is very unlikely to have been previously used with the same input keying material. The use of a 64-bit long random number as the nonce's value is <bcp14>RECOMMENDED</bcp14> in this profile. The client <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> store the nonce N1 as long as the response from the RS is not received and the access token related to it is still valid (to the best of the client's knowledge).
        </t>
        <t>
          The client generates its own Recipient ID, ID1, for the OSCORE security context that it is establishing with the RS. By generating its own Recipient ID, the client makes sure that it does not collide with any of its Recipient IDs, nor with any other identifier ID1 if the client is executing this exchange with a different RS at the same time.
        </t>
        <t>
          The client <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> use CoAP and the authorization information resource as described in <xref target="RFC9200" sectionFormat="of" section="5.8.1"/> to transport the token, N1, and ID1 to the RS.
        </t>
        <t>
          Note that the use of the payload and the Content-Format is different from what is described in <xref target="RFC9200" sectionFormat="of" section="5.8.1"/>, which only transports the token without any CBOR wrapping. In this profile, the client <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> wrap the token, N1, and ID1 in a CBOR map.

<!--[rfced] In RFC 9200, "application/ace+cbor" is defined in 8.15
and registered in the "CoAP Content-Formats" registry in 8.16.
How should the section number here be updated?

Original:
   The client MUST use the Content-Format
   "application/ace+cbor" defined in section 8.14 of
   [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz].

Göran: Done. (8.16 is the Content-Format definition.)
-->
The client <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> use the Content-Format application/ace+cbor defined in <xref target="RFC9200" sectionFormat="of" section="8.16"/>. The client <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> include the access token using the <tt>access_token</tt> parameter; N1 using the <tt>nonce1</tt> parameter defined in <xref target="nonce1" format="default"/>; and ID1 using the <tt>ace_client_recipientid</tt> parameter defined in <xref target="id1" format="default"/>.
        </t>
        <t>
          The communication with the authz-info endpoint does not have to be protected, except for the update of access rights case described below.
        </t>
        <t>
          Note that a client may be required to repost the access token in order to complete a request, since an RS may delete a stored access token (and associated security context) at any time, for example, due to all storage space being consumed. This situation is detected by the client when it receives an AS Request Creation Hints response. Reposting the same access token will result in deriving a new OSCORE security context to be used with the RS, as different exchanged nonces will be used.
        </t>
        <t>
          The client may also choose to repost the access token in order to update its OSCORE security context. In that case, the client and the RS will exchange newly generated nonces, renegotiate identifiers, and derive new keying material. The client and RS might decide to keep the same identifiers or renew them during the renegotiation.
        </t>
        <t>
          <xref target="ex3" format="default"/> shows an example of the request sent from the client to the RS. The access token has been truncated for readability.
        </t>
        <figure anchor="ex3">
          <name>Example C-to-RS POST /authz-info Request Using CWT</name>
          <sourcecode name="" type=""><![CDATA[
      Header: POST (Code=0.02)
      Uri-Host: "rs.example.com"
      Uri-Path: "authz-info"
      Content-Format: application/ace+cbor
      Payload:
        {
                     / access_token / 1 : h'8343a1010aa2044c53 ...
       (remainder of access token (CWT) omitted for brevity)',
                          / nonce1 / 40 : h'018a278f7faab55a',
          / ace_client_recipientid / 43 : h'1645'
        }
          ]]></sourcecode>
        </figure>
        <t>
          If the client has already posted a valid token, has already established a security association with the RS, and wants to update its access rights, the client can do so by posting the new token (retrieved from the AS and containing the update of access rights) to the /authz-info endpoint. The client <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> protect the request using the OSCORE security context established during the first token exchange. The client <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> only send the <tt>access_token</tt> field in the CBOR map in the payload; no nonce or identifier is sent. After proper verification (see <xref target="rs-c" format="default"/>), the RS will replace the old token with the new one, maintaining the same security context.
        </t>
        <section anchor="nonce1" numbered="true" toc="default">
          <name>The Nonce 1 Parameter</name>
          <t>
             The <tt>nonce1</tt> parameter <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be sent from the client to the RS, together with the access token, if the ACE profile used is <tt>coap_oscore</tt>, and the message is not an update of access rights, protected with an existing OSCORE security context.  The parameter is encoded as a byte string for
   CBOR-based interactions and as a string (base64-encoded binary) for
   JSON-based interactions. This parameter is registered in <xref target="iana-nonces-ids" format="default"/>.
          </t>
        </section>
        <section anchor="id1" numbered="true" toc="default">
          <name>The ace_client_recipientid Parameter</name>
          <t>
             The <tt>ace_client_recipientid</tt> parameter <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be sent from the client to the RS, together with the access token, if the ACE profile used is <tt>coap_oscore</tt>, and the message is not an update of access rights, protected with an existing OSCORE security context.  The parameter is encoded as a byte string for
   CBOR-based interactions and as a string (base64-encoded binary) for
   JSON-based interactions. This parameter is registered in <xref target="iana-nonces-ids" format="default"/>.
          </t>
        </section>
      </section>
      <section anchor="rs-c" numbered="true" toc="default">
        <name>RS-to-C: 2.01 (Created)</name>
        <t>
          The RS <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> follow the procedures defined in <xref target="RFC9200" sectionFormat="of" section="5.8.1"/>: the RS must verify the validity of the token. If the token is valid, the RS must respond to the POST request with 2.01 (Created).

<!--[rfced] For consistency, we updated one instance of "id1" to be
"ID1" in the text below.  If this update is not correct, please
let us know.

Original:
   If the token is valid but is associated
   to claims that the RS cannot process (e.g., an unknown scope), or if
   any of the expected parameters is missing (e.g., any of the mandatory
   parameters from the AS or the identifier "id1")...

Current:
   If the token is valid but is associated
   to claims that the RS cannot process (e.g., an unknown scope), or if
   any of the expected parameters is missing (e.g., any of the mandatory
   parameters from the AS or the identifier "ID1")...

Göran: Thanks
-->
	  If the token is valid but is associated to claims that the RS cannot process (e.g., an unknown scope), or if any of the expected parameters are missing (e.g., any of the mandatory parameters from the AS or the identifier ID1), or if any parameters received in the <tt>osc</tt> field are unrecognized, the RS must respond with an error response code equivalent to the CoAP code 4.00 (Bad Request). In the latter two cases, the RS may provide additional information in the error response, in order to clarify what went wrong.
          The RS may make an introspection request (see <xref target="RFC9200" sectionFormat="of" section="5.9.1"/>) to validate the token before responding to the POST request to the authz-info endpoint.
        </t>
        <t>
          Additionally, the RS <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> generate a nonce N2 that is very unlikely to have been previously used with the same input keying material and its own Recipient ID, ID2. The RS makes sure that ID2 does not collide with any of its Recipient IDs. The RS <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> ensure that ID2 is different from the value received in the <tt>ace_client_recipientid</tt> parameter. The RS sends N2 and ID2 within the 2.01 (Created) response. The payload of the 2.01 (Created) response <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be a CBOR map containing the <tt>nonce2</tt> parameter defined in <xref target="nonce2" format="default"/>, set to N2, and the <tt>ace_server_recipientid</tt> parameter defined in <xref target="id2" format="default"/>, set to ID2. The use of a 64-bit long random number as the nonce's value is <bcp14>RECOMMENDED</bcp14> in this profile.

<!--[rfced] In RFC 9200, "application/ace+cbor" is defined in 8.15
and registered in the "CoAP Content-Formats" registry in 8.16.
How should the section number here be updated?

Original:
   The RS MUST use the Content-Format "application/
   ace+cbor" defined in section 8.14 of [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz].

Göran: As above
-->

	  The RS <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> use the Content-Format application/ace+cbor defined in <xref target="RFC9200" sectionFormat="of" section="8.16"/>.
        </t>
        <!--
        <t>
        	Note that, when using this profile, an identifier of the token (e.g., the cti for a CWT) is not transported in the payload of this request, as section 5.8.1 of <xref target="I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz"/> allows.
        </t>

        Göran: This comment can be deleted. It is clear from the profile that the cti claim is not used.
-->

        <t>
          <xref target="ex4" format="default"/> shows an example of the response sent from the RS to the client.
        </t>
        <figure anchor="ex4">
          <name>Example RS-to-C 2.01 (Created) Response</name>
          <sourcecode name="" type=""><![CDATA[
      Header: Created (Code=2.01)
      Content-Format: application/ace+cbor
      Payload:
        {
                          / nonce2 / 42 : h'25a8991cd700ac01',
          / ace_server_recipientid / 44 : h'0000'
        }
          ]]></sourcecode>
        </figure>
        <t>
          As specified in <xref target="RFC9200" sectionFormat="of" section="5.8.3"/>, the RS must notify the client with an error response with code 4.01 (Unauthorized) for any long running request before terminating the session, when the access token expires.
        </t>
        <t>
          If the RS receives the token in an OSCORE-protected message, it means that the client is requesting an update of access rights. The RS <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> ignore any nonce and identifiers in the request, if any were sent. The RS <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> check that the <tt>kid</tt> of the <tt>cnf</tt> claim of the new access token matches the identifier of the OSCORE Input Material of the context used to protect the message. If that is the case, the RS <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> overwrite the old token and associate the new token to the security context identified by the <tt>kid</tt> value in the <tt>cnf</tt> claim. The RS <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> respond with a 2.01 (Created) response protected with the same security context, with no payload. If any verification fails, the RS <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> respond with a 4.01 (Unauthorized) error response.
        </t>
        <t>
          As specified in <xref target="RFC9200" sectionFormat="of" section="5.8.1"/>, when receiving an updated access token with updated authorization information from the client (see <xref target="c-as" format="default"/>), it is recommended that the RS overwrites the previous token; that is, only the latest authorization information in the token received by the RS is valid. This simplifies the process needed by the RS to keep track of authorization information for a given client.
        </t>
        <section anchor="nonce2" numbered="true" toc="default">
          <name>The Nonce 2 Parameter</name>
          <t>
             The <tt>nonce2</tt> parameter <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be sent from the RS to the client if the ACE profile used is <tt>coap_oscore</tt> and the message is not a response to an update of access rights, protected with an existing OSCORE security context. The parameter is encoded as a byte string for
   CBOR-based interactions and as a string (base64-encoded binary) for
   JSON-based interactions. This parameter is registered in <xref target="iana-nonces-ids" format="default"/>
          </t>
        </section>
        <section anchor="id2" numbered="true" toc="default">
          <name>The ace_server_recipientid Parameter</name>
          <t>
             The <tt>ace_server_recipientid</tt> parameter <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be sent from the RS to the client if the ACE profile used is <tt>coap_oscore</tt> and the message is not a response to an update of access rights, protected with an existing OSCORE security context. The parameter is encoded as a byte string for
   CBOR-based interactions and as a string (base64-encoded binary) for
   JSON-based interactions. This parameter is registered in <xref target="iana-nonces-ids" format="default"/>
          </t>
        </section>
      </section>
      <section anchor="oscore-setup" numbered="true" toc="default">
        <name>OSCORE Setup</name>
        <t>
          Once the 2.01 (Created) response is received from the RS, following the POST request to authz-info endpoint, the client <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> extract the bstr nonce N2 from the <tt>nonce2</tt> parameter in the CBOR map in the payload of the response. Then, the client <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> set the Master Salt of the security context created to communicate with the RS to the concatenation of salt, N1, and N2 in this order: Master Salt = salt | N1 | N2, where | denotes byte string concatenation, salt is the CBOR byte string received from the AS in <xref target="as-c" format="default"/>, and N1 and N2 are the two nonces encoded as CBOR byte strings.  An example of Master Salt construction using CBOR encoding is given in <xref target="ms-ex" format="default"/>.
        </t>
        <figure anchor="ms-ex">
          <name>Example of Master Salt Construction Using CBOR Encoding</name>
         <sourcecode name="" type=""><![CDATA[
N1, N2 and input salt expressed in CBOR diagnostic notation:
      nonce1 = h'018a278f7faab55a'
      nonce2 = h'25a8991cd700ac01'
      input salt = h'f9af838368e353e78888e1426bd94e6f'

N1, N2 and input salt as CBOR encoded byte strings:
      nonce1 = 0x48018a278f7faab55a
      nonce2 = 0x4825a8991cd700ac01
      input salt = 0x50f9af838368e353e78888e1426bd94e6f

Master Salt = 0x50 f9af838368e353e78888e1426bd94e6f
                48 018a278f7faab55a 48 25a8991cd700ac01
          ]]></sourcecode>
        </figure>
        <t>
          If JSON is used instead of CBOR, the Master Salt of the security context is the base64 encoding of the concatenation of the same parameters, each of them prefixed by their size, encoded in 1 byte. When using JSON, the nonces and input salt have a maximum size of 255 bytes. An example of Master Salt construction using base64 encoding is given in <xref target="ms-ex-2" format="default"/>.
        </t>
        <figure anchor="ms-ex-2">
          <name>Example of Master Salt Construction Using Base64 Encoding</name>

<!--rfced] Note that we lowercased "Base64" throughout the text for
consistency with other RFCs. May we also lowercase "Base64" in
Figure 13?

Also, should a comma be inserted after "N2" to match use of the
serial comma in the running text (note that we would apply
this update to the other figures as well, if desired)?

Original:
   N1, N2 and input salt values:
      nonce1 = 0x018a278f7faab55a (8 bytes)
      nonce2 = 0x25a8991cd700ac01 (8 bytes)
      input salt = 0xf9af838368e353e78888e1426bd94e6f (16 bytes)

   Input to Base64 encoding: 0x10 f9af838368e353e78888e1426bd94e6f
                            08 018a278f7faab55a 08 25a8991cd700ac01

Perhaps:
   N1, N2, and input salt values:
      nonce1 = 0x018a278f7faab55a (8 bytes)
      nonce2 = 0x25a8991cd700ac01 (8 bytes)
      input salt = 0xf9af838368e353e78888e1426bd94e6f (16 bytes)

   Input to base64 encoding: 0x10 f9af838368e353e78888e1426bd94e6f
                            08 018a278f7faab55a 08 25a8991cd700ac01

Göran: Fine to lowercase Base64 except in captions, as done. Please insert comma accordingly where missing.
-->
         <sourcecode name="" type=""><![CDATA[
N1, N2, and input salt values:
      nonce1 = 0x018a278f7faab55a (8 bytes)
      nonce2 = 0x25a8991cd700ac01 (8 bytes)
      input salt = 0xf9af838368e353e78888e1426bd94e6f (16 bytes)

Input to base64 encoding: 0x10 f9af838368e353e78888e1426bd94e6f
                            08 018a278f7faab55a 08 25a8991cd700ac01

Master Salt = b64'EPmvg4No41PniIjhQmvZTm8IAYonj3+qtVoIJaiZHNcArAE='
          ]]></sourcecode>
        </figure>
        <t>
           The client <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> set the Sender ID to the <tt>ace_server_recipientid</tt> received in <xref target="rs-c" format="default"/> and set the Recipient ID to the <tt>ace_client_recipientid</tt> sent in <xref target="c-rs" format="default"/>. The client <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> set the Master Secret from the parameter received from the AS in <xref target="as-c" format="default"/>. The client <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> set the AEAD algorithm, ID Context, HKDF, and OSCORE version from the parameters received from the AS in <xref target="as-c" format="default"/>, if present. In case an optional parameter is omitted, the default value <bcp14>SHALL</bcp14> be used as described in Sections <xref target="RFC8613" sectionFormat="bare" section="3.2"/> and <xref target="RFC8613" sectionFormat="bare" section="5.4"/> of <xref target="RFC8613" format="default"/>. After that, the client <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> derive the complete security context following <xref target="RFC8613" sectionFormat="of" section="3.2.1"/>. From this point on, the client <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> use this security context to communicate with the RS when accessing the resources as specified by the authorization information.
        </t>
        <t>
          If any of the expected parameters are missing (e.g., any of the mandatory parameters from the AS or the RS), or if <tt>ace_client_recipientid</tt> equals <tt>ace_server_recipientid</tt> (and as a consequence, the Sender and Recipient Keys derived would be equal; see <xref target="RFC8613" sectionFormat="of" section="3.3"/>), then the client <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> stop the exchange and <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> derive the security context. The client <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> restart the exchange, to get the correct security material.
        </t>
        <t>
          The client then uses this security context to send requests to the RS using OSCORE.
        </t>
        <t>
          After sending the 2.01 (Created) response, the RS <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> set the Master Salt of the security context created to communicate with the client to the concatenation of salt, N1, and N2 in the same way described above. An example of Master Salt construction using CBOR encoding is given in <xref target="ms-ex" format="default"/> and using base64 encoding is given in <xref target="ms-ex-2" format="default"/>. The RS <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> set the Sender ID from the <tt>ace_client_recipientid</tt> received in <xref target="c-rs" format="default"/> and set the Recipient ID from the <tt>ace_server_recipientid</tt> sent in <xref target="rs-c" format="default"/>. The RS <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> set the Master Secret from the parameter received from the AS and forwarded by the client in the access token in <xref target="c-rs" format="default"/> after validation of the token as specified in <xref target="rs-c" format="default"/>. The RS <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> set the AEAD algorithm, ID Context, HKDF, and OSCORE version from the parameters received from the AS and forwarded by the client in the access token in <xref target="c-rs" format="default"/> after validation of the token as specified in <xref target="rs-c" format="default"/>, if present. In case an optional parameter is omitted, the default value <bcp14>SHALL</bcp14> be used as described in Sections <xref target="RFC8613" sectionFormat="bare" section="3.2"/> and <xref target="RFC8613" sectionFormat="bare" section="5.4"/> of <xref target="RFC8613" format="default"/>. After that, the RS <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> derive the complete security context following <xref target="RFC8613" sectionFormat="of" section="3.2.1"/> and <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> associate this security context with the authorization information from the access token.
        </t>
        <t>
          The RS then uses this security context to verify requests and send responses to the client using OSCORE. If OSCORE verification fails, error responses are used, as specified in <xref target="RFC8613" sectionFormat="of" section="8"/>. Additionally, if OSCORE verification succeeds, the verification of access rights is performed as described in <xref target="tok-ver" format="default"/>. The RS <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> use the security context after the related token has expired and <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> respond with an unprotected 4.01 (Unauthorized) error message to
requests received that correspond to a security context with an expired
token.
        </t>
        <t>
          Note that the ID Context can be assigned by the AS, communicated and set in both the RS and client after the exchange specified in this profile is executed. Subsequently, the client and RS can update their ID Context by running a mechanism such as the one defined in <xref target="RFC8613" sectionFormat="of" section="B.2"/> if they both support it and are configured to do so. In that case, the ID Context in the OSCORE security context will not match the <tt>contextId</tt> parameter of the corresponding OSCORE_Input_Material. Running Appendix <xref target="RFC8613" sectionFormat="bare" section="B.2"/> results in the keying material being updated in the security contexts of the client and RS; this same result can also be achieved by the client reposting the access token to the unprotected /authz-info endpoint at the RS, as described in <xref target="c-rs" format="default"/>, but without updating the ID Context.
        </t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="tok-ver" numbered="true" toc="default">
        <name>Access Rights Verification</name>
        <t>
          The RS <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> follow the procedures defined in <xref target="RFC9200" sectionFormat="of" section="5.8.2"/>: if an RS receives an OSCORE-protected request from a client, then the RS processes it according to <xref target="RFC8613" format="default"/>. If OSCORE verification succeeds, and the target resource
          requires authorization, the RS retrieves the authorization information using the access token associated to the security context. The RS then must verify that the authorization information covers the resource and the action requested.
        </t>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="introsp" numbered="true" toc="default">
      <name>Secure Communication with AS</name>
      <t>
        As specified in the ACE framework (<xref target="RFC9200" sectionFormat="of" section="5.9"/>), the requesting entity (RS and/or client) and the AS communicates via the introspection or token endpoint. The use of CoAP and OSCORE <xref target="RFC8613" format="default"/> for this communication is <bcp14>RECOMMENDED</bcp14> in this profile; other protocols fulfilling the security requirements defined in <xref target="RFC9200" sectionFormat="of" section="5"/> (such as HTTP and DTLS or TLS) <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> be used instead.
      </t>
      <t>
        If OSCORE is used, the requesting entity and the AS are expected to have preestablished security contexts in place.  How these security contexts are established is out of scope for this profile.  Furthermore, the requesting entity and the AS communicate through the introspection endpoint as specified in <xref target="RFC9200" sectionFormat="of" section="5.9"/> and through the token endpoint as specified in <xref target="RFC9200" sectionFormat="of" section="5.8"/>.
      </t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="sec-ctx-discard" numbered="true" toc="default">
      <name>Discarding the Security Context</name>
      <t>
        There are a number of scenarios where a client or RS needs to discard the OSCORE security context and acquire a new one.
      </t>
      <t>
        The client <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> discard the current security context associated with an RS when any of the following occurs:
      </t>
      <ul spacing="normal">
        <li> the sequence number space ends. </li>
        <li> the access token associated with the context becomes invalid due to, for example, expiration. </li>
        <li> the client receives a number of 4.01 Unauthorized responses to OSCORE requests using the same security context. The exact number needs to be specified by the application. </li>
        <li> the client receives a new nonce in the 2.01 (Created) response (see <xref target="rs-c" format="default"/>) to a POST request to the authz-info endpoint, when reposting a (non-expired) token associated to the existing context. </li>
      </ul>
      <t>
        The RS <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> discard the current security context associated with a client when any of the following occurs:
      </t>
      <ul spacing="normal">
        <li> the sequence number space ends. </li>
        <li> the access token associated with the context expires. </li>
        <li> the client has successfully replaced the current security context with a newer one by posting an access token to the unprotected /authz-info endpoint at the RS, e.g., by reposting the same token, as specified in <xref target="c-rs" format="default"/>.</li>
      </ul>
      <t>
        Whenever one more access token is successfully posted to the RS, and a new security context is derived between the client and RS, messages in transit that were protected with the previous security context might not pass verification, as the old context is discarded. That means that messages sent shortly before the client posts one more access tokens to the RS might not successfully reach the destination. Analogously, implementations may want to cancel CoAP observations at the RS registered before the security context is replaced, or conversely, they will need to implement a mechanism to ensure that those observations are to be protected with the newly derived security context.
      </t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="sec-cons" numbered="true" toc="default">
      <name>Security Considerations</name>
      <t>
        This document specifies a profile for the ACE framework
        <xref target="RFC9200" format="default"/>.  Thus, the general security
        considerations from the framework also apply to this profile.
      </t>
      <t>
        Furthermore, the general security considerations of OSCORE <xref target="RFC8613" format="default"/> also apply to this specific
        use of the OSCORE protocol.
      </t>
      <t>
        As previously stated, the proof of possession in this profile is performed by both parties verifying that they have established the same security context, as specified in <xref target="oscore-setup" format="default"/>, which means that both the OSCORE request and the OSCORE response passes verification.
        RS authentication requires both that the client trusts the AS and that the OSCORE response from the RS passes verification.
      </t>
      <t>
        OSCORE is designed to secure point-to-point communication,
        providing a secure binding between the request and the response(s).
        Thus, the basic OSCORE protocol is not intended for use in
        point-to-multipoint communication (e.g., multicast, publish-subscribe).
        Implementers of this profile should make sure that their use case
        corresponds to the expected use of OSCORE, to prevent weakening the
        security assurances provided by OSCORE.
      </t>
      <t>
        Since the use of nonces N1 and N2 during the exchange guarantees uniqueness of AEAD keys and nonces, it is <bcp14>REQUIRED</bcp14> that the exchanged nonces are not reused with the same input keying material even in case of reboots. The exchange of 64-bit random nonces is <bcp14>RECOMMENDED</bcp14> in this document.


<!-- [rfced] FYI, we have used the <sup> element for superscript in
Section 7; please review. If this output is not desired, please
let us know.

Note: In the HTML and PDF files, it appears as superscript.
In the text output, <sup> generates a^b.

Original:
   Considering the birthday paradox, the average collision for
   each nonce will happen after 2^32 messages, which is
   considerably more token provisioned than would be
   expected for intended applications.

Current:
   See Section 7 (paragraph 5) in the output files.

Göran: Fine, thanks.
-->


Considering the birthday paradox, the average collision for each nonce will happen after 2<sup>32</sup> messages, which is considerably more token provisionings than would be expected for intended applications. If applications use something else, such as a counter, they need to guarantee that reboot and loss of state on either node does not provoke reuse.
        If that is not guaranteed, nodes are susceptible to reuse of AEAD (nonce, key) pairs, especially since an on-path attacker can cause the use of a previously exchanged client nonce N1 for security context establishment by replaying the corresponding client-to-server message.
      </t>
      <t>
        In this profile, it is <bcp14>RECOMMENDED</bcp14> that the RS maintains a single access token for each client. The use of multiple access tokens for a single client increases the strain on the resource server as it must consider every access token and calculate the actual permissions of the client. Also, tokens indicating different or disjoint permissions from each other may lead the server to enforce wrong permissions. If one of the access tokens expires earlier than others, the resulting permissions may offer insufficient protection. Developers <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> avoid using multiple access tokens for the same client.
      </t>
      <t>
        If a single OSCORE Input Material is used with multiple RSs, the RSs can impersonate the client to one of the other RSs and impersonate another RS to the client. If a Master Secret is used with several clients, the clients can impersonate RS to one of the other clients. Similarly, if symmetric keys are used to integrity protect the token between AS and RS and the token can be used with multiple RSs, the RSs can impersonate AS to one of the other RSs. If the token key is used for any other communication between the RSs and AS, the RSs can impersonate each other to the AS.
      </t>
    </section>
    <section numbered="true" toc="default">
      <name>Privacy Considerations</name>
      <t>
        This document specifies a profile for the ACE framework
        <xref target="RFC9200" format="default"/>.  Thus, the general privacy
        considerations from the framework also apply to this profile.
      </t>
      <t>
        As this document uses OSCORE, the privacy considerations from
	<xref target="RFC8613" format="default"/> apply here as well.
      </t>
      <t>
      	An unprotected response to an unauthorized request may disclose information about the resource server and/or its existing relationship with the client. It is advisable to include as little information as possible in an unencrypted response. When an OSCORE security context already exists between the client and the resource server, more detailed information may be included.
      </t>
      <t>
        The token is sent in the clear to the authz-info endpoint, so if a client uses the same single token from multiple locations with multiple resource servers, it can risk being tracked by the token's value even when the access token is encrypted.
      </t>
      <t>
        The nonces exchanged in the request and response to the authz-info endpoint are also sent in the clear, so using random nonces is best for privacy (as opposed to, e.g., a counter, which might leak some information about the client).
      </t>
      <t>
        The identifiers used in OSCORE, negotiated between the client and RS, are privacy sensitive (see <xref target="RFC8613" sectionFormat="of" section="12.8"/>) and could reveal information about the client, or they may be used for correlating requests from one client.
      </t>
      <t>
      	Note that some information might still leak after OSCORE is established, due to observable message sizes, the source, and the destination addresses.
      </t>
    </section>
    <section numbered="true" toc="default">
      <name>IANA Considerations</name>
      <section numbered="true" toc="default">
        <name>ACE Profile Registry</name>
        <t>The following registration has been made in the "ACE Profiles"
        registry following the procedure specified in <xref target="RFC9200" sectionFormat="of" section="8.8"/>:</t>

	<dl spacing="compact">
          <dt>Name:</dt><dd> coap_oscore</dd>
          <dt>Description:</dt><dd>Profile for using OSCORE to secure communication
        between constrained nodes using the Authentication and Authorization
        for Constrained Environments framework.</dd>
          <dt>CBOR Value:</dt><dd>2</dd>
          <dt>Reference:</dt><dd>RFC 9203</dd>
        </dl>
      </section>

      <section anchor="iana-nonces-ids" numbered="true" toc="default">
        <name>OAuth Parameters Registry</name>
        <t>The following registrations have been made in the "OAuth Parameters"
        registry <xref target="IANA.OAuthParameters" format="default"/> following the procedure specified in <xref target="RFC6749" sectionFormat="of" section="11.2"/>:</t>
	
        <dl spacing="compact">
          <dt>Parameter name:</dt><dd>nonce1</dd>
          <dt>Parameter usage location:</dt><dd>client-rs request</dd>
          <dt>Change Controller:</dt><dd>IETF</dd>
          <dt>Specification Document(s):</dt><dd>RFC 9203</dd>
        </dl>
        <dl spacing="compact">
          <dt>Parameter name:</dt><dd>nonce2</dd>
          <dt>Parameter usage location:</dt><dd>rs-client response</dd>
          <dt>Change Controller:</dt><dd>IETF</dd>
          <dt>Specification Document(s):</dt><dd>RFC 9203</dd>
        </dl>
        <dl spacing="compact">
          <dt>Parameter name:</dt><dd>ace_client_recipientid</dd>
          <dt>Parameter usage location:</dt><dd>client-rs request</dd>
          <dt>Change Controller:</dt><dd>IETF</dd>
          <dt>Specification Document(s):</dt><dd>RFC 9203</dd>
        </dl>
        <dl spacing="compact">
          <dt>Parameter name:</dt><dd>ace_server_recipientid</dd>
          <dt>Parameter usage location:</dt><dd>rs-client response</dd>
          <dt>Change Controller:</dt><dd>IETF</dd>
          <dt>Specification Document(s):</dt><dd>RFC 9203</dd>
        </dl>
      </section>
      <section numbered="true" toc="default">
        <name>OAuth Parameters CBOR Mappings Registry</name>
        <t>The following registrations have been made in the "OAuth Parameters CBOR Mappings"
        registry following the procedure specified in <xref target="RFC9200" sectionFormat="of" section="8.10"/>:</t>
        <dl spacing="compact" indent="12">
          <dt>Name:</dt><dd>nonce1</dd>
          <dt>CBOR Key:</dt><dd>40</dd>
          <dt>Value Type:</dt><dd>bstr</dd>
          <dt>Reference:</dt><dd>RFC 9203</dd>
	  <dt>Original Specification:</dt><dd>RFC 9203</dd>
        </dl>
        <dl spacing="compact" indent="12">
          <dt>Name:</dt><dd>nonce2</dd>
          <dt>CBOR Key:</dt><dd>42</dd>
          <dt>Value Type:</dt><dd>bstr</dd>
          <dt>Reference:</dt><dd>RFC 9203</dd>
	  <dt>Original Specification:</dt><dd>RFC 9203</dd>
        </dl>
        <dl spacing="compact" indent="12">
          <dt>Name:</dt><dd>ace_client_recipientid</dd>
          <dt>CBOR Key:</dt><dd>43</dd>
          <dt>Value Type:</dt><dd>bstr</dd>
          <dt>Reference:</dt><dd>RFC 9203</dd>
	  <dt>Original Specification:</dt><dd>RFC 9203</dd>
        </dl>
        <dl spacing="compact" indent="12">
          <dt>Name:</dt><dd>ace_server_recipientid</dd>
          <dt>CBOR Key:</dt><dd>44</dd>
          <dt>Value Type:</dt><dd>bstr</dd>
          <dt>Reference:</dt><dd>RFC 9203</dd>
	  <dt>Original Specification:</dt><dd>RFC 9203</dd>
        </dl>
      </section>
      <section anchor="sec-ctx-params-reg" numbered="true" toc="default">
        <name>OSCORE Security Context Parameters Registry</name>
        <t>
          IANA has created a new registry entitled "OSCORE Security Context Parameters".
          The registration procedure depends on range of CBOR label values, following <xref target="RFC8126" format="default"/>.
          Guidelines for the experts are provided in <xref target="review" format="default"/>.
        </t>
        <t>
          The columns of the registry are:
        </t>
        <dl newline="false" spacing="normal">
          <dt>Name:</dt>
          <dd>
              The JSON name requested (e.g., "ms").
              Because a core goal of this document is for the resulting representations to be compact, it is <bcp14>RECOMMENDED</bcp14> that the name be short.
              This name is case sensitive.
              Names may not match other registered names in a case-insensitive manner unless the designated experts determine that there is a compelling reason to allow an exception.
              The name is not used in the CBOR encoding.
            </dd>
          <dt>CBOR Label:</dt>
<!--[rfced] In Section 9.4, the ranges for registration procedures are described,
but they do not match the IANA registry, which shows "Expert Review" only.
(https://www.iana.org/assignments/ace/ace.xhtml#oscore-security-context-parameters).
Which on is correct? i.e.,
Should the IANA registry be updated, or should this document be updated?

Original:
      Integer values between -256 and 255
      and strings of length 1 are designated as Standards Track Document
      required.  Integer values from -65536 to -257 and from 256 to
      65535 and strings of length 2 are designated as Specification
      Required.  Integer values greater than 65535 and strings of length
      greater than 2 are designated as expert review.  Integer values
      less than -65536 are marked as private use.


Either way, may this sentence be removed? It seems redundant with the text above.

Original:
   It should be noted that in addition to the expert
   review, some portions of the registry require a specification,
   potentially on standards track, be supplied as well.


Göran: Unfortunately, the IANA registry is not correct and needs to be updated according to the description below. I'll contact IANA on this.
-->
          <dd>
              The value to be used to identify this name.
              Map key labels <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be unique.
              The label can be a positive integer, a negative integer, or a string.
              Integer values between -256 and 255 and strings of length 1 are designated as Standards Track document required.
              Integer values from -65536 to -257 and from 256 to 65535 and strings of length 2 are designated as Specification Required.
              Integer values greater than 65535 and strings of length greater than 2 are designated as Expert Review.
              Integer values less than -65536 are marked as Private Use.
            </dd>
          <dt>CBOR Type:</dt>
          <dd>
              This field contains the CBOR type for the field.
            </dd>
          <dt>Registry:</dt>
          <dd>
              This field denotes the registry that values may come from, if one exists.
            </dd>
          <dt>Description:</dt>
          <dd>
              This field contains a brief description for the field.
            </dd>
          <dt>Reference:</dt>
          <dd>
              This contains a pointer to the public specification for the field, if one exists.
            </dd>
        </dl>
        <t>
          This registry has been initially populated by the values in <xref target="key-labels" format="default"/>.
<!--[rfced] Re: OSCORE Security Context Parameters
This sentence does not match with the IANA registry (https://www.iana.org/assignments/ace). Should RFC 8613 be added to the Reference column in the IANA registry, or should
this sentence be altered?

Original:
   The specification column for all of these entries will be this
   document and [RFC8613].

Current:
   The Reference column for all of these entries is this document and
   [RFC8613].

Göran: I can't see any need for referencing any other document, and changed accordingly.
-->

          The Reference column for all of these entries is this document.
        </t>
      </section>

      <section anchor="osc-cwt" numbered="true" toc="default">
        <name>CWT Confirmation Methods Registry</name>
        <t>The following registration has been made in the "CWT Confirmation Methods" registry <xref target="IANA.CWTConfirmationMethods" format="default"/> following the procedure specified in <xref target="RFC8747" sectionFormat="of" section="7.2.1"/>:</t>
        <dl spacing="compact">
          <dt>Confirmation Method Name:</dt><dd>osc</dd>
          <dt>Confirmation Method Description:</dt><dd>OSCORE_Input_Material carrying the parameters for using OSCORE per-message security with implicit key confirmation</dd>
	  <dt>JWT Confirmation Method Name:</dt><dd>osc</dd>
          <dt>Confirmation Key:</dt><dd>4</dd>
          <dt>Confirmation Value Type(s):</dt><dd>map</dd>
          <dt>Change Controller:</dt><dd>IETF</dd>
          <dt>Specification Document(s):</dt><dd><xref target="oscore-sec-ctx" format="default"/> of RFC 9203</dd>
        </dl>
      </section>
      <section anchor="osc-jwt" numbered="true" toc="default">
        <name>JWT Confirmation Methods Registry</name>
        <t>The following registration has been made in the "JWT Confirmation Methods" registry <xref target="IANA.JWTConfirmationMethods" format="default"/> following the procedure specified in <xref target="RFC7800" sectionFormat="of" section="6.2.1"/>:</t>
        <dl spacing="compact">
          <dt>Confirmation Method Value:</dt><dd>osc</dd>
          <dt>Confirmation Method Description:</dt><dd>OSCORE_Input_Material carrying the parameters for using OSCORE per-message security with implicit key confirmation</dd>
          <dt>Change Controller:</dt><dd>IETF</dd>
          <dt>Specification Document(s):</dt><dd><xref target="oscore-sec-ctx" format="default"/> of RFC 9203</dd>
        </dl>
      </section>
      <section anchor="review" numbered="true" toc="default">
        <name>Expert Review Instructions</name>
        <t>
          The IANA registry established in this document is defined to use the Expert Review registration policy.
          This section gives some general guidelines for what the experts should be looking for, but they are being designated as experts for a reason, so they should be given substantial latitude.
        </t>
        <t>
          Expert reviewers should take into consideration the following points:
        </t>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>
              Point squatting should be discouraged. Reviewers are encouraged to get sufficient information for registration requests to ensure that the usage is not going to duplicate one that is already registered and that the point is likely to be used in deployments. The zones tagged as Private Use are intended for testing purposes and closed environments. Code points in other ranges should not be assigned for testing.
            </li>
          <li>
              Specifications are required for the Standards Track range of point assignment.
              Specifications should exist for specification required ranges, but early assignment before a specification is available is considered to be permissible. Specifications are needed for the First Come First Served range if they are expected to be used outside of closed environments in an interoperable way. When specifications are not provided, the description provided needs to have sufficient information to identify what the point is being used for.
            </li>
          <li>
              Experts should take into account the expected usage of fields when approving point assignment.
              The fact that there is a range for Standards Track documents does not mean that a Standards Track document cannot have points assigned outside of that range.
              The length of the encoded value should be weighed against how many code points of that length are left, the size of device it will be used on, and the number of code points left that encode to that size.
            </li>
        </ul>
      </section>
    </section>
  </middle>
  <back>
    <references>
      <name>References</name>
      <references>
        <name>Normative References</name>

<xi:include href="https://xml2rfc.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.8613.xml"/>

<!-- [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz-43] is companion document RFC 9200 -->
<!--[KC] Updated the title per the diff file (9/3/21)-->
<reference anchor='RFC9200' target='https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9200'>
<front>
<title>Authentication and Authorization for Constrained Environments (ACE) Using the OAuth 2.0 Framework (ACE-OAuth)</title>
<author initials='L' surname='Seitz' fullname='Ludwig Seitz'>
<organization />
</author>
<author initials='G' surname='Selander' fullname='Goeran Selander'>
<organization />
</author>
<author initials='E' surname='Wahlstroem' fullname='Erik Wahlstroem'>
<organization />
</author>
<author initials='S' surname='Erdtman' fullname='Samuel Erdtman'>
<organization />
</author>
<author initials='H' surname='Tschofenig' fullname='Hannes Tschofenig'>
<organization />
</author>
<date year='2021' month='September' />
</front>
<seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-ietf-ace-oscore-profile-latest"/>
</reference>


<!-- [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-params] in companion document RFC 9201 -->
<!--[KC] Updated the title per the diff (9/3/21) -->
<reference anchor='RFC9201' target='https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9201'>
<front>
<title>Additional OAuth Parameters for Authentication and Authorization for Constrained Environments (ACE)</title>
<author initials='L' surname='Seitz' fullname='Ludwig Seitz'>
<organization />
</author>
<date year='2021' month='September' />
</front>
<seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9201"/>
<seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC9201"/>
</reference>

<xi:include href="https://xml2rfc.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.8949.xml"/>
<xi:include href="https://xml2rfc.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.8392.xml"/>
<xi:include href="https://xml2rfc.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.2119.xml"/>
<xi:include href="https://xml2rfc.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.7252.xml"/>

<!-- [I-D.ietf-cose-rfc8152bis-struct] in AUTH48*R state; companion document RFC 9052; note that this doc is part of C416 -->
<reference anchor='RFC9052' target='https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9052'>
<front>
<title>CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE): Structures and Process</title>
<author initials='J' surname='Schaad' fullname='Jim Schaad'>
<organization />
</author>
<date year='2022' month='March' /> <!-- TBD -->
</front>
<seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9052"/>
<seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC9052"/>
</reference>


<!-- [I-D.ietf-cose-rfc8152bis-algs] in AUTH48*R state; companion document
RFC 9053. Note that this doc is part of C416 -->
<reference anchor='RFC9053' target='https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9053'>
<front>
<title>CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE): Initial Algorithms</title>
<author initials='J' surname='Schaad' fullname='Jim Schaad'>
<organization />
</author>
<date year='2022' month='March' /><!-- TBD -->
</front>
<seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9053"/>
<seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC9053"/>
</reference>

<xi:include href="https://xml2rfc.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.8174.xml"/>
<xi:include href="https://xml2rfc.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.8610.xml"/>
<xi:include href="https://xml2rfc.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.5869.xml"/>


<!-- [IANA.OAuthParameters] The URL below is correct -->
        <reference anchor="IANA.OAuthParameters" target="https://www.iana.org/assignments/oauth-parameters">
          <front>
            <title>OAuth Parameters</title>
            <author>
              <organization>IANA</organization>
            </author>
            <date/>
          </front>
        </reference>

        <reference anchor="IANA.CWTConfirmationMethods" target="https://www.iana.org/assignments/cwt">
          <front>
            <title>CWT Confirmation Methods</title>
            <author>
              <organization>IANA</organization>
            </author>
            <date/>
          </front>
        </reference>

        <reference anchor="IANA.JWTConfirmationMethods" target="https://www.iana.org/assignments/jwt">
          <front>
            <title>JWT Confirmation Methods</title>
            <author>
              <organization>IANA</organization>
            </author>
            <date/>
          </front>
        </reference>

        <reference anchor="COSE.Algorithms" target="https://www.iana.org/assignments/cose">
          <front>
            <title>COSE Algorithms</title>
            <author>
              <organization>IANA</organization>
            </author>
            <date/>
          </front>
        </reference>
      </references>
      <references>
        <name>Informative References</name>

<xi:include href="https://xml2rfc.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.8747.xml"/>
<xi:include href="https://xml2rfc.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.7800.xml"/>
<xi:include href="https://xml2rfc.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.4949.xml"/>
<xi:include href="https://xml2rfc.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.6749.xml"/>
<xi:include href="https://xml2rfc.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.7231.xml"/>
<xi:include href="https://xml2rfc.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.8126.xml"/>

<!-- [I-D.ietf-tls-dtls13] in AUTH48*R; note that this doc is part of C321 (RFC-to-be 9147) -->
<reference anchor='RFC9147' target='https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9147'>
<front>
<title>The Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) Protocol Version 1.3</title>
<author initials='E' surname='Rescorla' fullname='Eric Rescorla'>
<organization />
</author>
<author initials='H' surname='Tschofenig' fullname='Hannes Tschofenig'>
<organization />
</author>
<author initials='N' surname='Modadugu' fullname='Nagendra Modadugu'>
<organization />
</author>
<date year='2022' month='March'/><!-- TBD -->
</front>
<seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9147"/>
<seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC9147"/>
</reference>


<xi:include href="https://xml2rfc.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.8446.xml"/>

      </references>
    </references>
    <section numbered="true" toc="default">
      <name>Profile Requirements</name>
      <t>
        This section lists the specifications of this profile based on the requirements of the framework, as requested in <xref target="RFC9200" sectionFormat="of" section="C"/>.
      </t>

<!--[rfced] In the following sentence, is a word missing after "in"
(or does "in" refer to "Not specified")?

Original:
   Optionally, define new methods for the client to discover the
   necessary permissions and AS for accessing a resource, different
   from the one proposed in: Not specified

Göran: Added missing reference.
-->


 <ul spacing="normal">
        <li>
            Optionally, define new methods for the client to discover the
            necessary permissions and AS for accessing a resource, different
            from the one proposed in <xref target="RFC9200" format="default"/>: Not specified
          </li>
        <li>
            Optionally, specify new grant types: Not specified
          </li>
        <li>
            Optionally, define the use of client certificates as client
            credential type: Not specified
          </li>
        <li>
            Specify the communication protocol the client and RS must use: CoAP
          </li>
        <li>
            Specify the security protocol the client and RS must use to
            protect their communication: OSCORE
          </li>
        <li>
            Specify how the client and the RS mutually authenticate: Implicitly by possession of a common OSCORE security context. Note that the mutual authentication is not completed before the client has verified an OSCORE response using this security context.
          </li>
        <li>
            Specify the proof-of-possession protocol(s) and how to select one,
            if several are available.  Also specify which key types (e.g.,
            symmetric/asymmetric) are supported by a specific proof-of-
            possession protocol: OSCORE algorithms; preestablished symmetric keys
          </li>
        <li>
            Specify a unique ace_profile identifier: coap_oscore
          </li>
        <li>
            If introspection is supported, specify the communication and
            security protocol for introspection: HTTP/CoAP (+ TLS/DTLS/OSCORE)
          </li>
        <li>
            Specify the communication and security protocol for interactions
            between client and AS: HTTP/CoAP (+ TLS/DTLS/OSCORE)
          </li>
        <li>
            Specify if/how the authz-info endpoint is protected, including how
            error responses are protected: Not protected
          </li>
        <li>
            Optionally, define methods of token transport other than the authz-info
            endpoint: Not defined
          </li>
      </ul>

    </section>
    <section numbered="false" toc="default">
      <name>Acknowledgments</name>
      <t>
        The authors wish to thank <contact fullname="Jim Schaad"/> and <contact fullname="Marco Tiloca"/> for the substantial input to this document, as well as <contact fullname="Elwyn Davies"/>, <contact fullname="Linda Dunbar"/>, <contact fullname="Roman Danyliw"/>, <contact fullname="Martin Duke"/>, <contact fullname="Lars Eggert"/>, <contact fullname="Murray Kucherawy"/>, and <contact fullname="Zaheduzzaman Sarker"/> for their reviews and feedback. Special thanks to the responsible area director <contact fullname="Benjamin Kaduk"/> for his extensive review and contributed text.
        <contact fullname="Ludwig Seitz"/> worked on this document as part of the CelticNext projects CyberWI and CRITISEC with funding from Vinnova.
        The work on this document has been partly supported also by the H2020 project SIFIS-Home (Grant agreement 952652).
      </t>
    </section>


<!-- [rfced] Please review the "Inclusive Language" portion of the online
Style Guide <https://www.rfc-editor.org/styleguide/part2/#inclusive_language>
and let us know if any changes are needed.

In particular, please consider whether "master" should be updated.

Göran: The use of "master" follow from RFC8613.
 -->

<!-- [rfced] Throughout the text, the following terminology appears to be used
inconsistently. Please review these occurrences and let us know if/how they
may be made consistent.

re-POST (2) vs. reposting (4)
    Note: are these terms the same? If so, we suggest using "repost" for
          consistency.

Security Context (60) vs. security context (10)
    Note: May we lowercase this term to match use in RFC 8613 and the
          C442 companion documents?

FYI: to match the companion documents and references (especially
RFC 8613), we updated the case of the following terms as shown:

   ACE profile
   base64
   Master Secret
   OSCORE version
   resource server
   sequence number

Göran: Changed to repost and lower case security context. The other terms look fine.
-->

<!--[rfced] We notice some author comments in the XML file. Please
review and let us know if anything should be incorporated into
the text. Note that we will delete all comments prior to publication.

Göran: Author comments reviewed, no changes needed.
-->

  </back>
</rfc>