"Scarce resources and infinite uses for said resources lies at the heart of the study of economics and the economic problem. With climate change at its peak, CPRs or Common pool resources are at their most vulnerable and exposed to the problem of overuse. This paper carries out a comparison between the two most well-known solutions for the management of Common pool resources (Hardin’s ‘Tragedy of the Commons’ and Ostrom’s ‘Collective Action’) and the two most well-established resolutions for internalizing externalities (‘Pigouvian Tax’ and the ‘Coase Theorem’). The purpose of this comparison is to explore the link between the Nobel Prize winning research of both Elinor Ostrom and Ronald Coase. Ostrom’s research highlights a set of principals existing where CPRs are being managed, collectively, successfully. Out of those, two can be easily linked with Coase’s solution for internalizing externalities with the use of voluntary-bargaining. I wish to apply the tool of voluntary-bargaining for resolving non-violent conflict that may arise within communities that govern CPRs collectively. Through this research we use a Netlogo model to show that government intervention is not a sustainable solution for CPR management. Ostrom’s collective action is the most effective and efficient solution but disagreements may rise as the resource is owned collectively. Coase’s Bargaining solution, which originally deals with externalities, can be slightly modified to facilitate low-cost, non-violent conflict resolution within individuals/members of a certain community. "
The NetLogo Graphical User Interface of the Model:
Version of NetLogo: NetLogo 6.1.0
Semester Created: Fall 2019