From 470c7c8f032852a43cda5621f56d10f43851ffaf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: theagora Date: Wed, 10 Apr 2024 10:05:40 +0800 Subject: [PATCH] =?UTF-8?q?0x27=20Patch=20Build=20VOL.39=20=C2=A9=20MMXXIV?= =?UTF-8?q?=2036e5bec?= MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit --- c2/index.html | 80 +- c2/page10/index.html | 80 +- c2/page11/index.html | 80 +- c2/page12/index.html | 80 +- c2/page13/index.html | 80 +- c2/page14/index.html | 80 +- c2/page15/index.html | 80 +- c2/page16/index.html | 80 +- c2/page17/index.html | 80 +- c2/page18/index.html | 80 +- c2/page19/index.html | 80 +- c2/page2/index.html | 80 +- c2/page20/index.html | 80 +- c2/page21/index.html | 80 +- c2/page22/index.html | 80 +- c2/page23/index.html | 40 + c2/page3/index.html | 80 +- c2/page4/index.html | 80 +- c2/page5/index.html | 80 +- c2/page6/index.html | 80 +- c2/page7/index.html | 80 +- c2/page8/index.html | 80 +- c2/page9/index.html | 80 +- columns.xml | 2 +- feed.xml | 2 +- heros.xml | 2 +- hkers.xml | 1505 +++++++---------- .../2024-03-11-trial-of-jimmy-lai-day-42.html | 191 +++ .../2024-03-12-trial-of-jimmy-lai-day-43.html | 199 +++ .../2024-03-13-trial-of-jimmy-lai-day-44.html | 240 +++ .../2024-03-14-trial-of-jimmy-lai-day-45.html | 165 ++ .../2024-03-15-trial-of-jimmy-lai-day-46.html | 212 +++ hkers/index.html | 116 +- 33 files changed, 2562 insertions(+), 1872 deletions(-) create mode 100644 hkers/2024-03-11-trial-of-jimmy-lai-day-42.html create mode 100644 hkers/2024-03-12-trial-of-jimmy-lai-day-43.html create mode 100644 hkers/2024-03-13-trial-of-jimmy-lai-day-44.html create mode 100644 hkers/2024-03-14-trial-of-jimmy-lai-day-45.html create mode 100644 hkers/2024-03-15-trial-of-jimmy-lai-day-46.html diff --git a/c2/index.html b/c2/index.html index 7b02de6e..cc3406cb 100644 --- a/c2/index.html +++ b/c2/index.html @@ -66,6 +66,22 @@
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【香港保衛戰當年今日・十】

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diff --git a/columns.xml b/columns.xml index ead924d3..ab2a19a2 100644 --- a/columns.xml +++ b/columns.xml @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -Jekyll2024-04-08T11:19:07+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/columns.xmlThe Republic of Agora | ColumnsUNITE THE PUBLIC ♢ VOL.39 © MMXXIV学科有什么用？2024-02-14T12:00:00+08:002024-02-14T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/columns/what-is-the-use-of-subjects<p>我的外甥牛牛是一名初三学生，一直困惑学习没什么动力，最近尤其明显，经过和他讨论，我觉得可能更本质的问题是他不知道为什么要学习，同时也不知道这些学科有什么用。</p> +Jekyll2024-04-10T10:04:50+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/columns.xmlThe Republic of Agora | ColumnsUNITE THE PUBLIC ♢ VOL.39 © MMXXIV学科有什么用？2024-02-14T12:00:00+08:002024-02-14T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/columns/what-is-the-use-of-subjects<p>我的外甥牛牛是一名初三学生，一直困惑学习没什么动力，最近尤其明显，经过和他讨论，我觉得可能更本质的问题是他不知道为什么要学习，同时也不知道这些学科有什么用。</p> <!--more--> diff --git a/feed.xml b/feed.xml index db863034..479fb6f8 100644 --- a/feed.xml +++ b/feed.xml @@ -1 +1 @@ -Jekyll2024-04-08T11:19:07+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/feed.xmlThe Republic of AgoraUNITE THE PUBLIC ♢ VOL.39 © MMXXIV \ No newline at end of file +Jekyll2024-04-10T10:04:50+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/feed.xmlThe Republic of AgoraUNITE THE PUBLIC ♢ VOL.39 © MMXXIV \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/heros.xml b/heros.xml index be278b03..4e6feea6 100644 --- a/heros.xml +++ b/heros.xml @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -Jekyll2024-04-08T11:19:07+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/heros.xmlThe Republic of Agora | HerosUNITE THE PUBLIC ♢ VOL.39 © MMXXIV成为无治主义者2023-12-23T12:00:00+08:002023-12-23T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/heros/CatherineMalabou-a1_c-being-an-anarchist<blockquote> +Jekyll2024-04-10T10:04:50+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/heros.xmlThe Republic of Agora | HerosUNITE THE PUBLIC ♢ VOL.39 © MMXXIV成为无治主义者2023-12-23T12:00:00+08:002023-12-23T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/heros/CatherineMalabou-a1_c-being-an-anarchist<blockquote> <p>“任何潜入无意识核心的女性或男性，都会自然而然地成为无治主义者。” <!--more--></p> <h4 id="jacques-lesage-de-la-haye">——Jacques Lesage de la Haye</h4> diff --git a/hkers.xml b/hkers.xml index 74213b31..9d42a6df 100644 --- a/hkers.xml +++ b/hkers.xml @@ -1,4 +1,195 @@ -Jekyll2024-04-08T11:19:07+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers.xmlThe Republic of Agora | HkersUNITE THE PUBLIC ♢ VOL.39 © MMXXIVChina In Sub-Saharan Africa2024-03-14T12:00:00+08:002024-03-14T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/china-in-sub-saharan-africa<p><em>Chinese development financing in sub-Saharan Africa has sought, among other aims, to bolster Beijing’s supply chain resilience and dual port maritime strength. While this may enhance its ability to raise geopolitical tensions or conduct territorial expansion, complications remain around the execution of such a strategy.</em></p> +Jekyll2024-04-10T10:04:50+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers.xmlThe Republic of Agora | HkersUNITE THE PUBLIC ♢ VOL.39 © MMXXIV【黎智英案・審訊第卌六日】2024-03-15T12:00:00+08:002024-03-15T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/trial-of-jimmy-lai-day-46<ul> + <li>李宇軒指英國登報眾籌餘款供「攬炒巴」等人辦活動、安排見英議員及監察區選</li> +</ul> + +<excerpt /> + +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/HjXOWhI.png" alt="image01" /></p> + +<p>【獨媒報導】壹傳媒創辦人黎智英及3間蘋果公司被控串謀勾結外國勢力及串謀刊印煽動刊物等罪，案件今（15日）於高院（移師西九龍法院）踏入第46日審訊。「十二港人」之一李宇軒繼續以「從犯證人」身份出庭作供。李談及2019年7月第二次的眾籌，是有關英國的「中英聯合聲明登報」計劃及相關活動，當時認識了主要搞手「攬炒巴」劉祖廸。據銀行紀錄，該次眾籌錄得餘款約20萬英鎊，李供稱用以支付「攬炒巴」在英國籌辦活動和遊行的開支，採取實報實銷制。部份餘款則用於向「Whitehouse Consultancy」支付顧問費，而該公司曾安排「攬炒巴」等人會見英國國會議員、動用人脈來港監察2019年區議會選舉，並與「香港監察」創辦人羅傑斯持續合作。此外，李指「攬炒巴」等人曾經研究簽署《中英聯合聲明》的新聞圖片版權問題，另一名同案被告陳梓華聲稱可以在與黎智英食飯時查問，「嗰時 for some reasons，我覺得佢同《蘋果》有啲關係。」後來陳告訴李「張相OK喇」，《蘋果》職員亦授權他們使用相關新聞圖片。</p> + +<p>「十二港人」之一李宇軒第三天以「從犯證人」身份出庭作供。李早前提及，在2019年6月G20峰會舉行之前，為了爭取國際關注香港的示威活動，遂發起眾籌及籌備在不同國家報紙登頭版廣告計劃。期間案中另一名被告陳梓華經 Telegram 接觸李，並以「T」的身份與李商討墊支廣告費，惟李當時並未知道「T」名叫陳梓華。</p> + +<h4 id="李宇軒兩間墊支的公司非經營登廣告業務-理應盡快還錢">李宇軒：兩間墊支的公司非經營登廣告業務 理應盡快還錢</h4> + +<p>控方問及G20登報計劃結束之後，李宇軒與T商討還款的細節。李宇軒供稱，他與 T 在7月的時候，就還款事宜在 Telegram 上溝通，大概意思是「T嗰邊」墊支過登報費，李問可以怎樣還款，T則說要安排一下。</p> + +<p>李前天提到，等待還款安排期間，T曾告訴他「上頭嘅人」對於「拖住嚿錢」感到不安，於是雙方簽訂借據。控方今追問，T有否告訴李，「上頭嘅人」實際上是指哪些人。李指沒有。</p> + +<p>控方又問，T有否告訴李，為何「上頭嘅人」感到不安。李則指，因為墊支登廣告的公司「唔 suppose 係做登廣告嘅業務」，所以李理應盡快還款，以免「唔關公司本身業務嘅嘢喺度拖住」，不過他表示：「唔記得係我咁樣諗，定係佢同我講佢咁樣諗。」</p> + +<p>李其後承認這是他的假設，因為籌辦G20登報的一般都是社運組織，「以我知道，Lais Hotel 和 Dico（力高）都唔係一啲 activist 嘅 organisation。」</p> + +<h4 id="李宇軒簽借據時首次得知t真名為陳梓華">李宇軒：簽借據時首次得知T真名為陳梓華</h4> + +<p>李早前作供又指，他與T相約到金鐘力寶中心的一間咖啡店簽署借據，作為一個臨時措施（stop gap measure）。李今再解釋，若T手上有一份借據，T便可以跟「上面嘅人」說：「嗱，依家有 promissory note，條數一定會還嘅。」</p> + +<p>法官李運騰問李是否記得借據上的「收款人」一欄寫什麼。李則表示記得有類似「收款人」一欄，但是不記得內容是什麼。他又指，合共有4個人在借據上簽名，包括他、T 和兩名見證人，期間「拎咗身份證出嚟畀大家睇」，但他不記得需否寫下身份證號碼。</p> + +<p>李表示，在該次簽借據的過程中，是首次得知T真名叫陳梓華。</p> + +<h4 id="李宇軒確認經chartwell-holding戶口還款156萬-惟陳梓華未有談及公司背景">李宇軒確認經Chartwell Holding戶口還款156萬 惟陳梓華未有談及公司背景</h4> + +<p>控方展示李的銀行戶口紀錄，顯示李在2019年8月1日把100萬元轉帳至 Chartwell Holding，其後8月2日再次把約55.9萬元轉帳至 Chartwell Holding。李確認兩筆款項是用以清還有關G20登報的費用。</p> + +<p>控方問李，陳梓華向他提供 Chartwell Holding 的戶口資料時，有否談及這間公司的背景。李回答沒有。</p> + +<h4 id="李宇軒稱登報計劃15萬餘款捐給612基金">李宇軒稱登報計劃15萬餘款捐給612基金</h4> + +<p>控方指，據G20登報計劃的收支列表，該次錄得15萬港元餘款，問李當時如何處理這些餘款。李稱：「捐咗畀612。」控方追問「612」是什麼意思，李回答：「啫係612基金。」他又解釋，因為登報計劃有一筆餘款，「唔可以落袋」，因此後來將這筆餘款捐給612基金。控方再追問612基金是用作什麼目的，李僅指：「支援 legal fee 嘅。」</p> + +<p>控方其後問，612基金的全名是否「612人道支援基金」。李表示：「啱啱你幫我記得起佢全名，我淨係記得612。」</p> + +<p>被問到為何選擇捐給612基金，陳表示他理解612基金其中一項工作是支援被捕人士的法律開支，「咁係完全合法嘅，同埋我理解公眾唔會反對嘅」，所以當他們有一筆餘款時，「唔知做咩咁，同埋擔心有人唔知係咪袋咗自己袋」，所以便決定捐出。</p> + +<p>控方問李有否就眾籌計劃接受過任何傳媒訪問。李表示記得在其中一次眾籌期間，《蘋果》曾經採訪過眾籌團隊，不過他不記得是6月那次眾籌，還是7月那次眾籌。</p> + +<h4 id="李宇軒指2019年7月參與英國登報眾籌計劃-攬炒巴有份">李宇軒指2019年7月參與英國登報眾籌計劃 「攬炒巴」有份</h4> + +<p>李接著談及2019年7月的另一次眾籌計劃，是有關在英國登廣告的活動。他記得當時有一個人將「攬炒巴」介紹給他認識，「因為攬炒巴想喺英國嗰邊去搞眾籌登報，同埋相關嘅事。」李指，因為對方知道他籌辦G20登報眾籌「係幾成功」，所以便邀請他幫手「睇吓攬炒巴喺 crowdfund 嗰度有冇嘢可以幫到手」。</p> + +<p>李表示，當時知道「攬炒巴」即是「連登」討論區上一個帳號「我要攬炒」，「而連登上面男仔係叫『巴打』嘅」，所以「攬炒巴」便是這一個帳號。</p> + +<p>李稱，後來他知道「攬炒巴」即是劉祖廸，因為大約在2019年尾至2020年初，陳梓華和「攬炒巴」與他曾經在網上平台 Jitsi 進行線上會議。</p> + +<p>至於李在是次眾籌的角色，李稱主要都是幫手處理眾籌。其他參與者包括「攬炒巴」、一個叫「Always」的人、向他介紹「攬炒巴」的人，以及後來有 Jack Hazlewood，其他參與者則記不起。他指是次活動「主要係攬炒巴嗰邊嘅人搞」，據他所知，運作模式與G20登報計劃相若，有的人處理眾籌，有的人聯絡報館，有的人設計廣告。</p> + +<h4 id="李宇軒指蘋果專欄作家jack-hazlewood借出銀行戶口接收眾籌款項">李宇軒指《蘋果》專欄作家Jack Hazlewood借出銀行戶口接收眾籌款項</h4> + +<p>李指，該次英國眾籌登報是關於1984年簽署的《中英聯合聲明》，而當時「攬炒巴」希望以此作為主題。</p> + +<p>就眾籌方法，李指在第一次就G20登報眾籌時使用的平台「GoGetFund」，手續費頗貴，當時籌到接近700萬元，但是卻扣除了50至60萬元手續費。於是他們找了另一個眾籌平台「gofundme.com」，可以選擇不給予貼士或手續費。</p> + +<p>李指，不過在「攬炒巴嗰邊嘅人」當中，沒有人願意借出自己的銀行戶口作為眾籌的收款人。李當時認為，因為他在第一次眾籌時已經使用了其個人戶口，「即使再嚟多次，都唔會增加我嘅風險」，於是決定借出他的渣打銀行戶口去接收眾籌款項。惟後來李發現，「gofundme.com」規定款項必須經由英國開設的英鎊戶口接收，他不記得在陳梓華還是另一名群組成員的介紹下，最終認識了 Jack Hazlewood，對方亦同意借出銀行戶口。後來李知道 Jack Hazlewood 是「《蘋果》嘅寫手」。</p> + +<p>控方追問李提到的「風險」是什麼意思。李指是被指控「洗黑錢」的風險，雖然他有妥善保存所有關於眾籌的單據，能夠證明到他不是「洗黑錢」，「但中間有畀人懷疑洗黑錢同埋凍結戶口的風險。」</p> + +<h4 id="李宇軒陳梓華聲稱與黎智英食飯後-獲允使用蘋果新聞圖片">李宇軒：陳梓華聲稱與黎智英食飯後 獲允使用《蘋果》新聞圖片</h4> + +<p>李續指：「後來我又知陳梓華識 Mark Simon 同肥佬黎」，當法庭翻譯主任把「肥佬黎」翻譯成「Fatty Lai」時，李補充道：「Sorry，黎智英。」</p> + +<p>李提到「攬炒巴」想使用當年簽署《中英聯合聲明》的新聞圖片，即是中方代表與時任英國首相戴卓爾夫人握手的相片。有組員留意到《蘋果》網站上有這一張相片，陳梓華聲稱會去問《蘋果日報》，李說：「嗰時 for some reasons，我覺得佢同《蘋果》有啲關係，之前我唔記得佢幾時暗示過。」</p> + +<p>李轉述陳當時稱：「等佢（陳）下個禮拜四，咁佢去同唔記得『黎生』定係『肥佬黎』食飯嗰陣，佢（陳）就會問佢（黎）。」李表示：「嗰陣時我知，原來佢（陳）可以去同黎生食飯。跟住過咗禮拜四之後，T（陳梓華）就話：『張相OK喇。』」李稱，其後與《蘋果》職員經過一輪正式的電郵溝通，他們便可以使用高清版的新聞圖片。</p> + +<p>控方展示一份《蘋果》報導〈遊行被圍捕險洩身份 攬炒巴死裏逃生 帶署歷警暴 拒保後返英〉，版面下方含有眾籌網站截圖，顯示計劃名稱是「中英聯合聲明登報」。李確認。</p> + +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/OGbFYsS.png" alt="image02" /> +▲ 網路截圖（資料圖片）</p> + +<h4 id="李宇軒稱第二次登報活動中再度墊支-控方指事後有餘款約20萬英鎊">李宇軒稱第二次登報活動中再度墊支 控方指事後有餘款約20萬英鎊</h4> + +<p>李指第一次的G20登報與第二次的「中英聯合聲明登報」眾籌，同樣遇到未能立即動用籌得款項的問題，所以李需要協助墊支。</p> + +<p>控方展示李的銀行戶口紀錄，可見李在2019年7月19日至25日期間，先後向《旗幟晚報》（Evening Standard）、《衛報》（The Guardian）、台灣《自由時報》等合共6間媒體公司轉帳。李表示不肯定台灣《自由時報》那一次轉帳是關於「中英聯合聲明登報」計劃，還是第三次的眾籌活動，但其餘5間媒體公司的轉帳則確認有關。控方指，若果把台灣《自由時報》計算在內，李合共墊支了約10萬英鎊，即130萬港元。李確認。</p> + +<p>控方續指，李的銀行戶口紀錄顯示，Jack Henry Hazlewood 在2019年8月9日轉帳了約30.8萬英鎊給李。控方要求李確認第二次的登報活動錄得餘款約20萬英鎊，惟李表示不記得金額，但他相信控方的推論是正確。李亦記得該些餘款均存放在他的銀行戶口內。</p> + +<h4 id="李宇軒指眾籌餘款用以支付英國活動開支-實報實銷">李宇軒指眾籌餘款用以支付英國活動開支 實報實銷</h4> + +<p>被問到如何處理這一筆餘款，李指「一路攬炒巴嗰邊呢，就將佢（餘款）用喺佢同英國相關嘅嘢度」，例如他們舉辦一個支持香港的集會，可能涉及零星開支，例如泊車費，那便會動用「中英聯合聲明登報」的餘款來支付。李指實際操作是有人先墊支，事後給他單據，他便會向相關人士還款。</p> + +<p>法官杜麗冰問李是否認識報銷開支的人士，李則表示不知道，並指：「只要攬炒巴嗰邊彈一個人嚟，話『呢個人係關事嘅，你 reimburse 佢啦』，咁我就會 reimburse。」李又指：「Whatever 佢寫咩，佢話係咩就係咩」，有點似「攬炒巴」批核相關開支，而李就像一個司庫般償還款項。</p> + +<h4 id="李宇軒除舉辦活動外-眾籌餘款用於顧問費">李宇軒：除舉辦活動外 眾籌餘款用於顧問費</h4> + +<p>控方再次問李有關餘款的用途，李補充指除了用於舉辦英國相關的活動之外，還會用於支付顧問費、籌辦一些支持香港的遊行和支付網絡伺服器的費用等等。</p> + +<p>控方問李所指的「遊行」是支持香港什麼，李僅回答：「民主。」</p> + +<p>就剛才提及的「顧問費」，李指涉及兩間顧問公司，其中一間為「89up」，以他所知是比較集中於媒體範疇的顧問公司，後來他們覺得「89up」在政治方面較弱，於是轉用另一間顧問公司「Whitehouse Consultancy」。李特別強調，這間「Whitehouse Consultancy」與美國的白宮無關，純粹因為老闆名叫 Chris Whitehouse。</p> + +<h4 id="李宇軒指顧問公司安排攬炒巴會見英議員監察區議會選舉等">李宇軒指顧問公司安排「攬炒巴」會見英議員、監察區議會選舉等</h4> + +<p>控方遂追問關於「Whitehouse Consultancy」的性質和活動。李指這間公司曾經安排過「攬炒巴喺英國嘅 members」去會見英國國會議員，後來在2019年11月香港區議會選舉期間，「佢哋有幫手去用佢哋嘅人脈搵咗一啲人去監選」。李續指，到後期直至2020年，這間公司一直與「香港監察」的羅傑斯（Benedict Rogers）合作，也有一次協助前港督彭定康（Chris Patten）處理一個聯署行動。</p> + +<p>控方追問該次聯署行動的目的，李指當時是2020年5月，有消息傳出香港會訂立《國安法》，「嗰個聯署就係話表達 concern」，尤其在英國角度，他們會認為《國安法》與《中英聯合聲明》不一致。</p> + +<p>控方又問會見英國國會議員的目的是什麼。李指是有關當時對香港人權民主問題的關注。</p> + +<h4 id="李宇軒戶口紀錄顯示曾轉帳至兩間顧問公司">李宇軒戶口紀錄顯示曾轉帳至兩間顧問公司</h4> + +<p>控方展示李的銀行戶口紀錄，可見他分別於2019年7月23日、8月15日和8月21日，向顧問公司「89up」支付1.3萬元港幣、9,663英鎊和12,375英鎊。李確認他使用眾籌的餘款來支付上述顧問費。他又舉例指，「攬炒巴」在英國與「89up」合作，「佢哋租咗一架大巴士，喺倫敦度周圍走。」</p> + +<p>至於「Whitehouse Consultancy」，李的銀行戶口紀錄顯示他分別在2019年11月29日、12月31日和2020年2月4日，向「The Whitehouse Consultancy Limited」轉帳9,500英鎊、14,750英鎊和15,492.85英鎊。</p> + +<p>案件下周一續審。</p> + +<hr /> + +<p>案件編號：HCCC51/2022</p>獨媒報導李宇軒指英國登報眾籌餘款供「攬炒巴」等人辦活動、安排見英議員及監察區選【黎智英案・審訊第卌五日】2024-03-14T12:00:00+08:002024-03-14T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/trial-of-jimmy-lai-day-45<ul> + <li>財務文件顯示眾志參與G20登報 李宇軒估計周庭有份聯絡《朝日新聞》</li> +</ul> + +<excerpt /> + +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/eF3UgIi.png" alt="image01" /></p> + +<p>【獨媒報導】壹傳媒創辦人黎智英及3間蘋果公司被控串謀勾結外國勢力及串謀刊印煽動刊物等罪，案件今（14日）於高院（移師西九龍法院）踏入第45日審訊。控方傳召「十二港人」之一李宇軒，以「從犯證人」身份出庭作供。控方提問繼續圍繞2019年6月G20峰會前夕的登報計劃，以及相關財務紀錄。李確認他向台灣《蘋果日報》、《南德意志報》、《紐約時報》、《泰晤士報》和三份南韓報紙等，分別支付了登報廣告費用，款額逾385萬港元。其中《朝日新聞》和歐洲版 POLITICO 的發票均顯示上款為「Demosisto（香港眾志）」，李估計當時的眾志成員周庭有份聯絡《朝日新聞》，因為估計只有她懂得日文。而《紐約時報》的發票顯示上款除了李宇軒之外，還有「Anna Kwok」，李相信當時他與「Anna Kwok」一同聯絡報館，惟控方未有就「Anna Kwok」的身份提問。</p> + +<p>「十二港人」之一李宇軒第二天以「從犯證人」身份出庭作供。李昨日提及，在2019年6月G20峰會舉行之前，為了爭取國際關注香港的示威活動，遂發起眾籌及籌備在不同國家報紙登頭版廣告計劃。期間案中另一名被告陳梓華經 Telegram 接觸李，並以「T」的身份與李商討墊支廣告費，惟李當時並未知道「T」名叫陳梓華。</p> + +<h4 id="李宇軒指陳梓華後來介紹mark-simon給他認識">李宇軒指陳梓華後來介紹Mark Simon給他認識</h4> + +<p>控方展示兩封由「T」轉發給李宇軒的電郵，可見電郵原初發送者為「Terrie Lam」。李指當時T把《華盛頓郵報》的廣告費收據，由「Terrie Lam」的電郵轉發給他。</p> + +<p>控方指其中一個電郵提及一個名叫「Mark」的人。李表示當他收到這封電郵時，並不知道 Mark 是誰，但「其後我知道呢個係 Mark Simon」，因為在不遲於2019年9月的時候， T 把 Mark Simon 介紹給他認識。</p> + +<h4 id="李宇軒相信以自己信用卡支付日本時報廣告費">李宇軒相信以自己信用卡支付《日本時報》廣告費</h4> + +<p>控方提及刊登於《日本時報》的G20廣告，李指《日本時報》是當年G20峰會會場內會派發的報紙，並確認上述廣告是其中一份在日本報紙刊登的廣告。</p> + +<p>控方展示由《日本時報》發出的發票，以及收據，並指這是從李的住所檢取的，顯示某人在2019年6月28日以信用卡支付了200萬日圓廣告費。李表示，若果他沒有記錯的話，應該是使用了他的信用卡付款，不過需要翻查信用卡紀錄確認。</p> + +<p>控方後來向李出示他的信用卡交易紀錄，惟未見任何有關《日本時報》的交易。李遂對於是否由他的信用卡支付廣告費表示不肯定。</p> + +<h4 id="李宇軒指陳梓華起初聲稱會處理台蘋廣告費-惟後來要求他自行處理">李宇軒指陳梓華起初聲稱會處理台蘋廣告費 惟後來要求他自行處理</h4> + +<p>控方提到於2019年6月28日刊於台灣《蘋果日報》的廣告，寫有「港台同行 唇亡齒寒」。發票顯示李須於2019年7月5日或之前繳付120萬元新台幣廣告費。另一份匯款申請表顯示，李宇軒在7月15日申請以台幣匯率匯款307,692.31元港幣。李的銀行戶口紀錄顯示，廣告費最後在7月16日付清。</p> + +<p>李確認發票上的付款期限是7月5日，但因為當時 T 告訴他：「佢同埋佢嗰邊會 handle 嘅，即係有關俾錢嗰樣嘢，佢都會搞掂」，所以李一開始收到發票後並未有理會。</p> + +<p>直至廣告刊出之後，「咁後來冇人去追我數」，當時他亦不知道自己收到的文件是要求他付款的發票，「咁我覺得 T 嗰邊已經搞掂咗條數喇。」</p> + +<p>可是大約7月的時候，「T 就話，你都係找返台灣《蘋果》呢條數啦。」李續指，既然 T 叫他付款，「咁我就嗱嗱臨找咗條數囉」，因此他在7月15日遞交匯款申請表，最終於7月16日付清廣告費。</p> + +<h4 id="紐約時報發票顯示anna-kwok參與落廣告">《紐約時報》發票顯示「Anna Kwok」參與落廣告</h4> + +<p>控方展示在2019年6月27日刊登於《南德意志報》（Süddeutsche Zeitung）的G20廣告。李表示記得在登報計劃中，只在一份德國報紙登廣告，所以確認是《南德意志報》。李確認他就此廣告支付了85,300歐元，即大約67萬港元。</p> + +<p>控方另展示兩份刊登於《紐約時報》的G20廣告，日期均是2019年6月28日。就第一份廣告，李的銀行戶口紀錄顯示，他於6月26日向《紐約時報》支付了83,752美元。</p> + +<p>法官李運騰留意到，《紐約時報》發票抬頭除了寫有李宇軒的英文名字 Li Yu Hin 之外，還有另一個名字 Anna Kwok，並澄清向報館落單的人是否李。李回答，他相信他本人和 Anna Kwok 一同負責向《紐約時報》落廣告，至於為何發票上出現兩個名字，李表示不知道。控方庭上未有就 Anna Kwok 的身份提問。</p> + +<p>李官表示，純粹好奇一問，李在聯絡報館期間使用了真實姓名，是否代表 Telegram 群組成員知道他的真實姓名。李回答不是，因為他只曾向報館提供真實姓名，所以報館可能知道他的真名，如果相關文件透過電郵被轉發或副本抄送至其他有份聯絡報館的人時，該些人便會知道他的真名。</p> + +<p>至於另一份在《紐約時報》刊登的G20廣告，李確認支付了36,000美元。</p> + +<h4 id="朝日新聞發票顯示客戶為香港眾志-李宇軒估計周庭有份聯絡報館">《朝日新聞》發票顯示客戶為香港眾志 李宇軒估計周庭有份聯絡報館</h4> + +<p>控方展示於2019年6月28日刊登於《朝日新聞》的廣告，並向李出示相關發票，客戶名稱寫有「Demosisto」，要求支付700萬日圓。控方問這個客戶是誰、為何會出現在發票上。李指它是「眾志」，「因為眾志入面有人去負責搵 Asahi Shimbun（《朝日新聞》）」，但是他不知道該人是否 Telegram 群組的成員之一。</p> + +<p>控方問李所指的「眾志」是否一個政治團體，李僅回答：「以我理解，淨係得一個眾志。」控方追問是哪一位眾志成員負責聯絡《朝日新聞》，李表示：「我唔直接知道，但我 speculation（估計）係周庭。」他補充：「因為，我 speculation 係，得佢一個識講日文。」</p> + +<p>李的銀行個人戶口紀錄顯示，在同年6月27日有一筆700萬日圓的支帳紀錄，李確認這是有關登報的廣告費。控方問李當時如何收到上述發票，李則稱不記得，因為在籌備登報計劃期間，有些人負責聯絡不同報館，包括《朝日新聞》，他相信一些負責聯絡報館的人，「喺畀錢嘅時候彈咗張單俾我」，即是上述抬頭為「Demosisto」的發票。</p> + +<h4 id="李宇軒確認由他支付南韓英國西班牙等報廣告費">李宇軒確認由他支付南韓、英國、西班牙等報廣告費</h4> + +<p>就南韓報紙，李宇軒指當時一共在三份南韓報紙登廣告，分別是《韓國日報》（한국 일보）、《朝鮮日報》（조선일보）和《東亞日報》（동아일보），並確認上述三份報紙廣告費合共是8,325萬韓圜。</p> + +<p>就《泰晤士報》（The UK Times）刊登的廣告，李的信用卡交易紀錄顯示他支付了27,195英鎊，即大約275,763.90港元。李確認相關紀錄。</p> + +<p>就西班牙報紙《世界報》（El Mundo），李確認他支付了2萬歐羅。</p> + +<p>就加拿大報紙《環球郵報》（The Globe and Mail），李確認發票上要求他繳付的金額是84,750元加幣，不過實際上廣告費只是75,000元加幣，他當時告訴報館職員自己不是身處加拿大，問對方可否免除增值稅（value added tax），對方表示不用支付增值稅，所以李最終只繳付了75,000元加幣。</p> + +<p>控方最後展示由歐洲版 POLITICO 發出的發票，抬頭是「Demosisto」，需就2019年6月27至29日期間刊登網上廣告繳付5,000歐羅。李確認他向 POLITICO 支付了5,000歐羅，並確認 POLITICO 的公司總部位於比利時，但是該G20廣告是網上的廣告。</p> + +<p>案件明日續審。</p> + +<hr /> + +<p>案件編號：HCCC51/2022</p>獨媒報導財務文件顯示眾志參與G20登報 李宇軒估計周庭有份聯絡《朝日新聞》China In Sub-Saharan Africa2024-03-14T12:00:00+08:002024-03-14T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/china-in-sub-saharan-africa<p><em>Chinese development financing in sub-Saharan Africa has sought, among other aims, to bolster Beijing’s supply chain resilience and dual port maritime strength. While this may enhance its ability to raise geopolitical tensions or conduct territorial expansion, complications remain around the execution of such a strategy.</em></p> <excerpt /> @@ -52,7 +243,260 @@ <hr /> -<p><strong>Benedict Hamlyn</strong> is a geopolitical specialist. Benedict currently works as Gatehouse Advisory Partners’ Network/Source Manager having joined as an Associate. He is responsible for strategically enabling client delivery by engaging and managing the expert network of 2,500 individuals across the globe.</p>Benedict HamlynChinese development financing in sub-Saharan Africa has sought, among other aims, to bolster Beijing’s supply chain resilience and dual port maritime strength. While this may enhance its ability to raise geopolitical tensions or conduct territorial expansion, complications remain around the execution of such a strategy.Government Use Of Deepfakes2024-03-12T12:00:00+08:002024-03-12T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/government-use-of-deepfakes<p><em>What questions should governments ask — and who in government should be asking them — when a deepfake is being considered?</em></p> +<p><strong>Benedict Hamlyn</strong> is a geopolitical specialist. Benedict currently works as Gatehouse Advisory Partners’ Network/Source Manager having joined as an Associate. He is responsible for strategically enabling client delivery by engaging and managing the expert network of 2,500 individuals across the globe.</p>Benedict HamlynChinese development financing in sub-Saharan Africa has sought, among other aims, to bolster Beijing’s supply chain resilience and dual port maritime strength. While this may enhance its ability to raise geopolitical tensions or conduct territorial expansion, complications remain around the execution of such a strategy.【黎智英案・審訊第卌四日】2024-03-13T12:00:00+08:002024-03-13T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/trial-of-jimmy-lai-day-44<ul> + <li>李宇軒出庭作供：為爭取國際關注香港示威 發起眾籌及G20登報計劃</li> + <li>紀錄顯示兩間公司墊支G20登報費 李宇軒：陳梓華稱「上頭」憂走數故簽借據</li> +</ul> + +<excerpt /> + +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/XXQlo6M.png" alt="image01" /></p> + +<p>【獨媒報導】壹傳媒創辦人黎智英及3間蘋果公司被控串謀勾結外國勢力及串謀刊印煽動刊物等罪，案件今（13日）於高院（移師西九龍法院）踏入第44日審訊。控方傳召「十二港人」之一李宇軒，以「從犯證人」身份出庭作供，相隔逾一年再度在法庭露面。李供稱，在2019年6月G20峰會舉行之前，他與其他市民在 Telegram 群組討論在多國報紙刊登廣告，「因為當時喺香港已經有幾次好有畫面嘅示威場面」，所以眾人希望「將個關注同 momentum（運動的氣勢）帶到去國際舞台，去攞國際嘅支持」，遂開始眾籌廣告費。公開財務紀錄顯示，該次眾籌計劃籌得逾673萬元。李指，由於籌得款項需時轉帳至其銀行個人戶口，所以未能立即動用款項支付廣告費。案中另一名串謀者、被告陳梓華當時聯絡他商討墊支事宜，二人始相識，李稱：「佢（陳）去問過 uncle 或者其他人，咁佢就話嗰度可以動用到五球（500萬元）啦」，控方追問「uncle」是指誰人，李則指陳並未有提及，「可能泛指一啲男人或者其他人」，而非有血緣關係的親戚。</p> + +<h4 id="李宇軒已認罪-惟需等待黎智英審訊結果-相隔2年半尚未判刑">李宇軒已認罪 惟需等待黎智英審訊結果 相隔2年半尚未判刑</h4> + +<p>前《蘋果日報》主筆楊清奇昨日完成作供。控方今早開始傳召「十二港人」之一李宇軒出庭，以「從犯證人」身份作供。李身穿深藍色厚褸，戴黑色粗框眼鏡，由三名懲教人員帶領下，從法庭特別通道進入法庭。李在證人台手持聖經，以基督教形式宣誓。在作供期間，李不時在庭內四處張望，並曾經望向被告欄。</p> + +<p>李宇軒於2021年8月19日在高院承認「串謀勾結外國或者境外勢力危害國家安全」罪；他另被控的「串謀協助罪犯罪」及「無牌管有彈藥罪」則存檔於法庭，獲不提證供起訴。李其後分別於2022年1月3日、5月3日和9月16日出席提訊，惟因為需等待黎智英的審訊結果才處理判刑，李認罪至今相隔逾2年6個月，仍尚未判刑。李是次出庭作供，是自2022年9月提訊以來，首次再度在法庭露面。</p> + +<h4 id="李宇軒確認已承認勾結控罪">李宇軒確認已承認「勾結」控罪</h4> + +<p>控方代表、副刑事檢控專員周天行先作主問。李確認他曾接受大學教育，懂得中文和英文。控方指，不爭議的是李在2020年8月被警方以「串謀勾結外國勢力危害國家安全」等罪拘捕。李表示：「我冇爭議。」</p> + +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/98zaItN.png" alt="image02" /> +▲ 副刑事檢控專員 周天行（左）</p> + +<p>控方續指，李在2021年3月24日被控「串謀勾結外國勢力危害國家安全」罪，該控罪指李連同黎智英、Mark Simon、陳梓華和「攬炒巴」劉祖廸等人，在2020年7月1日至2021年2月15日，一同串謀勾結外國勢力危害國家安全。李表示：「具體3月幾多號唔記得，不過係咁上下。」控方續指，李於同年7月7日在裁判法院承認「串謀勾結」控罪，而他另外面對的「串謀協助罪犯罪」及「無牌管有彈藥罪」則存檔於法庭。李確認，不過不記得具體日子。</p> + +<h4 id="李宇軒指備登報計劃期間認識陳梓華-商討墊支廣告費">李宇軒指備登報計劃期間認識陳梓華 商討墊支廣告費</h4> + +<p>控方指陳梓華是控罪的串謀者之一，並問李是否認識陳。李表示認識陳，若果他沒記錯的話，二人在2019年6月首次在 Telegram 認識，當時他並不知道陳的名字叫陳梓華，因陳以「T」的身份與他溝通。</p> + +<p>李指，當時G20峰會將於2019年6月下旬在日本舉行，在6月上旬或中旬的時候，有一些香港市民，包括他和陳梓華，打算在不同報紙登廣告，「就傾緊一個有關登報嘅 idea」，於是眾人就在一個 Telegram 群組參與討論。</p> + +<p>李形容：「大家喺個 group 度好 supportive of 呢個 idea，因為當時喺香港已經有幾次好有畫面嘅示威場面」，所以眾人希望「將個關注同 momentum（運動的氣勢）帶到去國際舞台，去攞國際嘅支持」。由於他們希望登報廣告能夠「ride on G20」（乘著G20的時機），「所以啲廣告想盡量喺G20開會之前就出晒」，而錢銀問題則想在此前解決好。</p> + +<p>李解釋，由於眾籌結束後，本來想透過「PayPal」將款項轉帳至其個人戶口，惟不知為何「PayPal」戶口被凍結，遂轉用「Stripe」將款項轉帳至其渣打銀行的個人帳戶，而相關轉帳手續需時，所以他未能立即動用所籌得的款項，「所以我用晒自己戶口啲積蓄，大概墊咗三球幾（300萬元），但係就唔夠墊支啲廣告費，所以就有頭先講嘅 money issue。」</p> + +<p>李指嚴格來說，他理應在廣告刊出之前三日便需向報館繳清廣告費。就在他需要就廣告費向報館「找數」的時候，「T」經 Telegram 的私人對話聯絡李。經「T」查證李不夠錢支付廣告費之後，「T」聲稱會找「佢哋嗰邊啲人」幫忙墊支。至於「佢哋嗰邊啲人」是指什麼人，李指「T」當時並未有說清楚。在6月的時候，李只知道曾墊支的有 Lais Hotel Property Limited 和力高。據控方開案陳詞，兩間公司分別由 Mark Simon 和黎智英持有。</p> + +<h4 id="李宇軒表示當時支持香港的民主運動-登報計劃為了爭取國際關注">李宇軒表示當時支持香港的民主運動 登報計劃為了爭取國際關注</h4> + +<p>控方問「登報計劃」是什麼。李回答：「係眾籌、盡量搵多啲國際報紙登廣告，而啲廣告係有關當時香港嘅民主運動嘅」，目的是提高國際對於當時香港民主運動的關注。</p> + +<p>法官李運騰問李是否支持當時的運動，李表示：「係，當時我係支持。」李官又問，登報計劃是為了爭取國際社會的支持，李回答：「我同意。」</p> + +<p>李稱當時使用眾籌平台「GoGetFunding」，至於當時呼籲市民捐款時使用的字眼，他表示不記得具體字眼，只記得大概是希望「去畀當時嘅國際社會知道，當時嘅香港示威活動發生咩事」。</p> + +<h4 id="李宇軒指眾籌超額完成-事後與陳梓華親身見面">李宇軒指眾籌超額完成 事後與陳梓華親身見面</h4> + +<p>控方問李當時有否在 Telegram 群組宣傳眾籌計劃。李表示以他所知，Telegram 群組內其中一名用戶，在「連登」討論區有一個帳號叫「家樂牌通心粉」，當時該帳戶「就本來已經好 hit」、「有好多人關注㗎喇」，而「家樂牌通心粉」在「連登」轉載上述眾籌網站，所以令更多人知道眾籌計劃。</p> + +<p>被問到當時眾籌的目標金額，李表示不記得，「不過我記得個 target 無爆咗，所以最尾大概籌咗七球幾（逾700萬）」，所以他相信當時的眾籌目標是低於700萬。</p> + +<p>李供稱，在登報計劃完結之後，他與陳梓華曾經相約在金鐘太古廣場親身單獨見面，因陳想將一些匯款通知交給他，會面結束之後，陳隨即返回附近的辦公室。李解釋：「喺佢（陳）知道咗我需要幫手墊支，然後佢幫手墊咗幾次支，之後佢就要畀 remittance advice，所以就去見面喇。」</p> + +<h4 id="李宇軒陳梓華稱可找uncle協助墊支廣告費-惟未說明所指誰人">李宇軒：陳梓華稱可找「uncle」協助墊支廣告費 惟未說明所指誰人</h4> + +<p>控方問李，陳梓華首次聯絡他的時候，是如何介紹自己的。李則表示：「我唔記得，mostly likely 佢冇介紹自己。」</p> + +<p>李亦表示，他不記得與陳對話的具體內容，不過大概意思是，「佢（陳）問我大概要墊支幾多，之後佢就話會諗計」；相隔不久後，陳傳來回覆，大概意思是：「佢去問過 uncle 或者其他人，咁佢就話嗰度可以動用到五球（500萬元）啦，咁有需要嘅時候就可以搵佢喇。」李補充，陳曾提及「當然係墊支，所以之後要畀返佢」，但他不記得陳何時說過上述說話。</p> + +<p>控方追問李，陳有否向他提及「Uncle」實際上是指誰人。李說：「冇，除咗我理解佢講嘅『uncle』唔一定係 blood uncle（有血緣關係的叔叔），而係可能泛指一啲男人或者其他人。」</p> + +<h4 id="李宇軒指其角色是提出登報主意操作眾籌戶口和管理帳目">李宇軒指其角色是提出登報主意、操作眾籌戶口和管理帳目</h4> + +<p>被問到李在登報計劃中的角色，李表示「我係其中一個 bring up 呢個 idea 嘅人，同埋我係實際上操作嗰個眾籌戶口嘅人」；此外，他後來有協助墊支，以及「有份 keep 條數」，因為眾籌戶口是以他的電郵開設的。</p> + +<p>控方又問到陳梓華的角色，李指「我諗佢（陳）係其中一個 bring up 呢個 idea 嘅人」，他亦有幫忙聯絡報紙和墊支。</p> + +<h4 id="李宇軒透露以化名tong-lo身份公開登報財務紀錄">李宇軒透露以化名「Tong Lo」身份公開登報財務紀錄</h4> + +<p>控方向李展示登報計劃的公開財務紀錄，題為「Income and expenditure statement《眾籌G20各國報章頭版公開信》」，由2019年6月25日至7月2日。李確認他們曾向17間報館公司支付廣告費，但不一定是17份報紙。李亦確認他們登廣告的報紙遍及13個國家。</p> + +<p>財務紀錄亦顯示，在眾籌平台「GoGetFund」籌得超過670萬元，在「PayPal」則籌得2.6萬元，合共約673萬元。而廣告費則合共約602.3萬元，扣除手續費之後，眾籌計劃錄得盈餘約15萬元。李確認。</p> + +<p>財務紀錄下方的署名是「Tong Lo」並附有簽名，李稱：「係我嘅 pseudo name（化名）。」另一個署名是「Tong M Man」，李則稱是一個會計師。</p> + +<p>翻查報導，李宇軒與另外11人在2020年8月被內地水警截獲，同年12月與其中7人一同被判「偷越邊境罪成」，2021年3月在內地服刑完畢，隨即被移交至本港警方。</p> + +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/R133f0E.png" alt="image03" /></p> + +<p>【獨媒報導】壹傳媒創辦人黎智英及3間蘋果公司被控串謀勾結外國勢力及串謀刊印煽動刊物等罪，案件今（13日）於高院（移師西九龍法院）踏入第44日審訊。控方傳召「十二港人」之一李宇軒，以「從犯證人」身份出庭作供，相隔逾一年再度在法庭露面。李供稱他在2019年6月籌備在G20前夕在不同國家的報紙登頭版廣告，控方在庭上展示多份G20廣告的付款和匯款紀錄，顯示《衛報》、《晚郵報》和《華盛頓郵報》的廣告費用，分別由 Lais Hotel Property Limited 和力高顧問有限公司墊支。李憶述，在等待還款安排期間，另一名被告陳梓華聲稱：「『上頭嘅人』有壓力，想做啲嘢確保嗰筆錢會返番去」，於是雙方簽訂借據以防李「走數」。後來陳叫李透過一間公司的銀行戶口還錢，李遂歸還了156萬元。</p> + +<p>控方今早開始傳召「十二港人」之一李宇軒出庭，以「從犯證人」身份作供。李身穿白色恤衫和深藍色厚褸，戴黑色粗框眼鏡，由三名懲教人員帶領下，從法庭特別通道進入法庭，期間不時望向旁聽席。</p> + +<p>李早上供稱，2019年6月G20峰會舉行之前，為了爭取國際關注香港的示威活動，遂發起眾籌和在不同國家報紙登頭版廣告計劃。李當時遇到錢銀問題，案中另一名被告陳梓華以「T」的身份經 Telegram 與他溝通，協助墊支廣告費，惟他當時並未知道「T」名叫陳梓華。</p> + +<h4 id="庭上展示多國廣告-包括巴黎日報澳洲人報">庭上展示多國廣告 包括《巴黎日報》、《澳洲人報》</h4> + +<p>控方提及其中一份刊登廣告的《巴黎日報》，李確認並以標準的法語讀出《巴黎日報》的法語名稱「Le Parisien」。控方指廣告上有以法語寫成的「向送中條例說不」，李則指相關句子的英語翻譯應該是「No to the project of Extradition Bill to China」，而非「No to the Extradition Bill to China」。</p> + +<p>李提到，當時《巴黎日報》的廣告費應該不是21,600歐羅，而是18,000歐羅，因為 T 聲稱「唔小心以為要畀埋 VAT（增值稅）」；至於發票上為何標註一粒星及「overpay」，李表示不知道，因為從「T」手上收到這份文件時已經有。</p> + +<p>控方提到另一個登報廣告例子，刊於意大利的《晚郵報》（Corrierre Della Sera）。李確認文件顯示的廣告版本有刊登過。</p> + +<p>控方展一份含有韓語的廣告，寫有「홍콩을 도와 주 세요」（請援助香港）和「STAND WITH HONG KONG AT G20」。李確認相關廣告有刊登，但是不肯定是哪一份報紙，因為他們不只在一份韓國報紙登廣告。</p> + +<p>另一份刊登在《澳洲人報》（The Australian）的廣告，同樣寫有「STAND WITH HONG KONG AT G20」。控方展示由《澳洲人報》在6月26日發出的發票，上款是一名叫 Anson Cheung 的人。李表示不知他是誰，也不記得為何上款寫他的名字，但估計他可能是其中一個負責聯絡 The Australian 的人。</p> + +<h4 id="文件顯示-mark-simon-名下公司代李宇軒支付衛報廣告費">文件顯示 Mark Simon 名下公司代李宇軒支付《衛報》廣告費</h4> + +<p>控方提到《衛報》（The Guardian）有刊登廣告，並展示相關發票，匯款紀錄顯示 Lais Hotel Property Limited 代表李宇軒向《衛報》支付18,000英磅廣告費。控方問李，「T」有否告訴他為什麼會用這間公司來支付費用，李回答沒有，當時也沒有向「T」查問。據控方開案陳詞，Lais Hotel Property Limited 由黎智英的私人助手 Mark Simon 持有。</p> + +<p>控方提到李在今天早上作供時，轉述「T」聲稱有一些「uncle」可以動用到500萬元墊支，問以上做法是否有關。此時辯方代表大律師 Marc Corlett 打斷，就控方的提問方式提出關注，因涉及揣測和傳聞證供（hearsay）。法官杜麗冰亦指，李剛才已經回答了陳梓華未談及原因。法官李運騰指，證人已經說了他尋求資金，然後他得到金錢來支付廣告費，就是這樣，質疑控方還有什麼想問。控方最終不就此發問。</p> + +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/TEHanlu.png" alt="image04" /> +▲ 代表黎智英的資深大律師 彭耀鴻（左）、大律師 Marc Corlett（右）</p> + +<p>控方續展示在2019年6月28日刊登於法國《世界報》（Le Monde）的G20廣告，惟未有提及廣告費由誰支付。</p> + +<h4 id="黎智英名下力高顧問公司支付意大利報紙廣告費">黎智英名下力高顧問公司支付意大利報紙廣告費</h4> + +<p>另一份發票是由 RCS Media Group 發出的，李指這是有關向意大利《晚郵報》（Corriere Della Sera）支付的2萬元歐羅。付款紀錄顯示，力高顧問有限公司（Dico Consultants Limited）在2019年6月29日向 RCS Media Group 支付了廣告費用。據控方開案陳詞，力高是由黎智英持有的公司。</p> + +<p>控方問李，「T」有否向他談及力高。李指沒有。控方再問，「T」有否在任何時候向他談及過力高。李表示：「以我記憶所及，冇，除咗呢張 invoice 係畀我嘅。所以 Dico 條數就要加埋去 T 嗰邊嘅人，有關 T 嗰邊嘅人找過嘅數，所以最尾要還返錢嘅時候就要還埋呢條數。」</p> + +<h4 id="李宇軒稱專心處理眾籌-故不記得誰人設計和草擬g20廣告">李宇軒稱專心處理眾籌 故不記得誰人設計和草擬G20廣告</h4> + +<p>控方展示刊登於《華盛頓郵報》的廣告期間，法官李素蘭問及廣告是由誰人草擬。李表示：「我唔清楚，因為我冇參與去設計呢啲廣告」，他亦沒有參與撰寫相關文字。他指，當時群組成員表示想登報，所以有的人去聯絡報紙，有的人去設計廣告和撰寫文字，「我去咗搞 crowdfund，所以我唔係好清楚其他組員去咗做啲乜。」</p> + +<p>被問到有多少人參與G20登報計劃，李表示不清楚，「因為我當時專心做緊 crowdfund 嘅嘢，至於 group 入面有幾多人，我唔清楚。」</p> + +<h4 id="李宇軒轉述t聲稱有上面嘅人擔心拖數-雙方簽借據">李宇軒轉述T聲稱「有上面嘅人」擔心拖數 雙方簽借據</h4> + +<p>至於參與處理眾籌的人，李稱：「我諗有我、accountant 去睇嗰條數，有『家樂牌通心粉』（在連登討論區）出嗰個 post 啦，另外有我同 T 嗰邊墊支過啲錢啦，係同錢有關嘅就係呢啲喇。」</p> + +<p>控方又問「T嗰邊」涉及多少人。李稱：「至少有 T，同埋有一個叫『Banker』嘅⋯⋯我唔知係咪一個人嚟。」他指後來有「簽借據」事宜，其時「T嗰邊」便再涉及多4至5個人。</p> + +<p>法官李運騰要求李闡述什麼是「簽借據」事件。李則指，在2019年7月的時候，他曾向 T 查詢歸還墊支款項的方法，而T則表示「等佢嗰邊嘅人 arrange 吓」。在等待期間，T 聲稱「有上面嘅人唔係好 comfortable with 我拖住呢舊錢」，惟李認為這是因為 T 尚未提供一個讓他還錢的帳戶。</p> + +<p>李續指：「As a stop gap measure（臨時方案），佢（T）就約咗我去金鐘嘅 Lippo Centre」，在一間咖啡店見面，T 並安排了兩名見證人，一個是 T 一方的見證人，另一個是李一方的見證人，「咁就簽咗一份 promissory note，嗰份文件真係用 promissory note 呢隻字。」</p> + +<p>李指，借據內容是「我爭 T 錢，個金額啱啱係G20佢嗰邊找嗰條數」，大概是156萬港元。他憶述雙方簽署了借據之後，T安排了一間律師樓的人員接收這份借據，不過李並不知道是哪一間律師樓，因為有一或兩個人拿了文件後，「我見佢行咗去𨋢口就上去喇。」</p> + +<h4 id="李宇軒轉述t稱簽借據為了擺平上頭嘅人">李宇軒轉述T稱簽借據為了擺平「上頭嘅人」</h4> + +<p>李轉述T當時聲稱：「呢張 promissory note 係備用嘅啫，因為係用嚟擺平佢當時講嘅『佢上頭嘅人』，嗰啲『上頭嘅人』有壓力，想做啲嘢確保嗰筆錢會返番去。」李轉述，既然有一張借據，「T 就可以同佢哋講有張 promissory note，所以唔使驚會走數喇。」</p> + +<p>李續指，T 後來提供了一個 Chartwell 戶口，叫他經這間公司的戶口歸還款項，所以他把156萬元還給 Chartwell，並把還款的匯款通知書交給 T，自此之後 T 便沒有再提起借據事宜。據控方開案陳詞，李被指向 Chartwell Holding Limited 的公司戶口還款，以避免黎的身份曝光。</p> + +<p>李表示，當他剛才說簽借據時涉及多4至5個人，就是包括兩名見證人和一個接收文件的律師樓人員，「我就係講緊呢啲人。」</p> + +<p>控方另展示《華盛頓郵報》廣告費的付款紀錄，顯示 Lais Hotel Property Limited 支付了85,050美元。李稱這紀錄是由 T 交給他的。</p> + +<p>李宇軒作供未完，案件明日續審。</p> + +<hr /> + +<p>案件編號：HCCC51/2022</p>獨媒報導李宇軒出庭作供：為爭取國際關注香港示威 發起眾籌及G20登報計劃 紀錄顯示兩間公司墊支G20登報費 李宇軒：陳梓華稱「上頭」憂走數故簽借據【黎智英案・審訊第卌三日】2024-03-12T12:00:00+08:002024-03-12T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/trial-of-jimmy-lai-day-43<ul> + <li>楊清奇：黎智英向報紙設下「鳥籠」 編採人員享一定自主但不得超越框架</li> +</ul> + +<excerpt /> + +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/IISEe8t.png" alt="image01" /></p> + +<p>【獨媒報導】壹傳媒創辦人黎智英及3間蘋果公司被控串謀勾結外國勢力及串謀刊印煽動刊物等罪，案件今（12日）於高院（移師西九龍法院）踏入第43日審訊。前《蘋果日報》主筆楊清奇，繼續以「從犯證人」身份出庭作供。楊提到傳媒為了吸引特定讀者群，都會有自己的立場，而黎設下了《蘋果》的基本立場，「就好似 set 定咗個鳥籠嘅，咁採編人員喺鳥籠入面有一定嘅自主，有一定嘅自主，有一定嘅採編自主權，但唔可以超過呢個框架，就唔可以超過呢個鳥籠」，所以難以回答《蘋果》是否有編採自主。控辯雙方皆完成提問，楊作供完畢。控方透露下一名證人為李宇軒，將安排於明日出庭作供。</p> + +<p>前《蘋果日報》主筆楊清奇（筆名李平）第七天以「從犯證人」身份出庭作供。代表黎智英的資深大律師彭耀鴻開始盤問。</p> + +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/DXq59sA.png" alt="image02" /> +▲ 資深大律師 彭耀鴻（中）、大律師 Marc Corlett（右）</p> + +<h4 id="辯方指訊息顯示楊清奇拒絕黎智英提議">辯方指訊息顯示楊清奇拒絕黎智英提議</h4> + +<p>在辯方的提問下，楊確認民主制度是良好的，極權制度則是不好的，而民主制度是包含公平的選舉、新聞自由和言論自由，所以《蘋果》論壇版選取文章有三個主要原則，包括「支持政治上的民主」、「支持經濟上的市場化」和「不支持港獨」。楊並確認這些原則是由前任編輯訂下，同事之間都會採用，而且「唔需要日日去講嘅」。</p> + +<p>辯方展示黎智英與楊清奇之間的訊息，黎在2019年9月3日向楊說：「李平兄，看了單偉建先生的文章後請回電。謝謝。」楊後來表示「成1800字，又長又臭，都係玩自欺欺人」，「單先生的文章是老生常談，一個特首連請辭的自由都冇，談何民主進步？論壇版未擬採用。謝謝。」</p> + +<p>辯方指上述訊息可見黎提議楊閱讀單的文章，惟楊拒絕黎的提議。楊則指「唔係一個咁簡單嘅 reject」，因為當時他與黎有使用其他溝通渠道，黎亦有透過時任副社長陳沛敏聯絡他，所以庭上展示的 WhatsApp 訊息只是一部份，並非全部。</p> + +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/Bwy32yd.png" alt="image03" /> +▲ 前《蘋果日報》執行總編輯 林文宗（左）、副社長 陳沛敏（右）</p> + +<p>辯方續指，但是楊能夠對於黎所提議的文章，坦誠地提出自己的觀點。楊確認。</p> + +<h4 id="楊清奇除了提出特定主題-一般不會干預作者選題和觀點">楊清奇：除了提出特定主題 一般不會干預作者選題和觀點</h4> + +<p>辯方指，評論文章寫什麼內容是由作者自行決定。楊則指不一定，有時是他向作者提議特定寫作主題，不過除了這種情況以外，文章內容都是由作者決定。</p> + +<p>辯方遂展示楊清奇與高橋之間的 WhatsApp 訊息紀錄。高橋於2020年12月5日向楊表示：「下週還是要寫王毅發言與日本傳媒的無知無恥。請理解。」楊翌日表示：「選題與觀點，我們一般不干預。但如果較多讀者不認同，就需要換作者。謝謝🙏」</p> + +<p>辯方問，是否正如上述訊息所說，《蘋果》一般不會干預作者的選題和觀點。楊確認，但同時指出下一句「但如果較多讀者不認同，就需要換作者」，就如黎智英般，如果編輯的工作表現不合他心意，便會換人。</p> + +<p>辯方另展示2020年12月10日的訊息，楊與高橋談及「美國已死總統」用字，期間楊提議高橋可考慮評論有關新聞，但同時強調：「我說過，我們一般不會干預選題。寫不寫，如何寫，你自己決定。」</p> + +<p>辯方問楊，這種不干預的做法是否適用於所有論壇版作者。楊表示：「講『係』呢，係唔夠準確嘅」，因為事實上他當時已經正在作出干預，他跟高橋說如果文章不符合《蘋果》的立場，可能要換作者，「文章如果唔符合《蘋果》嘅立場，到時候被炒嘅可能係我喇！」不過辯方追問，「寫不寫，如何寫」是由高橋決定，楊則指相關決定是從政治角度出發。</p> + +<h4 id="楊清奇指文章有審批-若倡港獨及明顯違法不會刊登若擦邊球則可登">楊清奇指文章有審批 若倡港獨及明顯違法不會刊登、若擦邊球則可登</h4> + +<p>辯方指，當報紙不合讀者口味時，讀者可以轉看另一份報紙，其實《蘋果》也是提供讀者想看的內容。楊則指，報紙一方面要照顧讀者口味，另一方面都要堅持自己的政治立場和觀點。</p> + +<p>辯方續指，《蘋果》對於評論作者和文章不會有審批。惟楊表示：「有一個批准嘅，至少都要我睇過覺得OK先可以（刊出）嘅。」</p> + +<p>辯方指，這是當然的，如果文章提倡港獨的話，楊便不會刊登。楊確認。辯方續指，如果文章提倡非法行為，也不會獲准刊登。楊回答：「如果係好明顯違法嘅就唔會（刊登）」，但正如他早前提及，「如果擦邊球又符合《蘋果》立場嘅，又避開嗰個違法嘅，就會用。」</p> + +<p>辯方其後問楊是否同意，「擦邊球」是為了避免觸犯法律，同時又能遵守《蘋果》論壇版揀選評論文章的原則。楊同意。辯方又指楊並不會故意地觸犯法律。楊確認。</p> + +<h4 id="楊清奇確認曾邀請曾鈺成任志剛和曾俊華撰文">楊清奇確認曾邀請曾鈺成、任志剛和曾俊華撰文</h4> + +<p>楊清奇早前證供提及，曾經在2016年與黎智英和陳沛敏討論作者名單。辯方展示2018年4月，楊與陳之間的 WhatsApp 對話紀錄，並指當時曾經討論邀請前民建聯立法會主席曾鈺成、行政會議成員任志剛和前財政司司長曾俊華撰文。楊確認。</p> + +<h4 id="辯方指論壇版作者觀點未必相同-王崑義文章刊出後捱罵">辯方指論壇版作者觀點未必相同 王崑義文章刊出後捱罵</h4> + +<p>楊清奇確認論壇版的作者之中，並非所有人都抱持同一觀點。辯方舉例指台灣國際戰略學會理事長王崑義的文章〈港台「聯手抗中」恐是南柯一夢〉，對於制裁的看法有所不同。楊表示他作為編輯處於尷尬位置，通常他在邀稿的時候，作者跟他所說的，與作者最終寫出來的文章是不同的，「但我又好難食言唔用佢嘅稿」，如果當天論壇版沒有稿件，「就要開天窗咁滯。」</p> + +<p>楊又提到，當年王崑義的文章刊出之後，《蘋果》「畀人鬧嘅」，有讀者更加寫信給黎智英，後來黎將信件轉交給他。</p> + +<p>辯方另展示楊清奇與王崑義之間的電郵，可見楊邀請王撰效分析美國大選的影響，包括拜登入主白宮對台美關係的影響。楊在庭上一度說：「我好奇怪，律師先生你係點樣拎到我嘅私人電郵。」彭耀鴻指這是控方給予辯方律師團隊的，而控方有責任將所有相關材料交給辯方，又強調辯方並沒有入侵楊的電腦。楊說：「我都唔知控方係幾時、點樣攞到。」彭耀鴻則笑說：「那你要去問張先生（律政司助理刑事檢控專員張卓勤）了。」</p> + +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/1etfEWb.png" alt="image04" /> +▲ 高級檢控官 吳加悅（左）、助理刑事檢控專員 張卓勤（右）</p> + +<p>辯方問楊為何會邀請王崑義撰文。楊回答因為王是台灣著名的學者，雖然其觀點未必符合《蘋果》，「但都係可以自圓其說嘅。」</p> + +<h4 id="辯方指黎智英在飯局沒有提制裁-楊清奇堅稱有">辯方指黎智英在飯局沒有提「制裁」 楊清奇堅稱有</h4> + +<p>楊早前作供提及在2020年6月黎住所的飯局中，黎表示不怕被捕，若果被捕就「更加證明到中國和香港政府對人權嘅打壓」，並相信美國、英國同歐洲係唔會坐視不理，楊並轉述黎認為只有實施制裁，才能有助改善香港的人權狀況。</p> + +<p>辯方提議黎可能沒有提及制裁，黎可能提及美國、英國和歐洲會回應及採取行動，但是他沒有提到「制裁」兩字。惟楊不同意，又堅稱：「我肯定佢有（提及制裁）嘅。」</p> + +<p>辯方又提到，警方在2021年6月24日與楊進行的錄影會面中，問及「飯盒會」做些什麼，而楊當時回答「坐底傾吓」工作上遇到什麼難題需要黎「出面解決」。楊在庭上確認。</p> + +<h4 id="辯方評論文章非為批評而批評">辯方：評論文章非「為批評而批評」</h4> + +<p>辯方指，控方早前向楊展示一系列的評論文章，部份對香港特區和中央政府帶有批判性，但這些批判是為了指出施政上的不足，希望政府可以改善施政，避免重蹈覆轍。楊同意。</p> + +<p>辯方續指，所以庭上展示的評論文章不是「為了批評而批評」。楊回答：「可以咁講嘅。」</p> + +<h4 id="黎智英要求楊清奇撰文反駁另一人文章-楊拒絕後撰訊息供黎向對方交代">黎智英要求楊清奇撰文反駁另一人文章 楊拒絕後撰訊息供黎向對方交代</h4> + +<p>控方覆問時，就單偉建文章的議題，展示楊清奇與陳沛敏之間的訊息紀錄。陳於2019年9月向楊說，她電郵轉寄了一篇文章給楊，而黎想楊以筆名李平撰文反駁該文章。楊回覆陳：「啲垃圾真的要出要駁？港共搵多幾條友咁搞，論壇版就俾人玩殘」、「同老闆溝通過，但最終覺得唔值駁，都係唔出」。</p> + +<p>楊相信黎智英應該認識單偉建，「其實黎生都覺得文章嘅觀點唔係咁好，但又想照出佢嘅文章，所以又要我用文章嚟反駁佢」，但楊認為若果經常要反駁他人文章，「論壇版好快俾人玩殘咗。」</p> + +<p>楊續指：「但黎生要畀作者一個交代，但又唔可以好似私人溝通講嘅咁冇禮貌啦」，所以後來楊撰寫了一則訊息評價單的文章，說明為何決定不刊登及顯示這是編輯的決定，以供黎將該訊息轉發給單，即是：「單先生的文章是老生常談，一個特首連請辭的自由都冇，談何民主進步？論壇版未擬採用。謝謝。」</p> + +<h4 id="楊清奇黎智英設立鳥籠-員工有一定自主但不能超越框架">楊清奇：黎智英設立「鳥籠」 員工有一定自主但不能超越框架</h4> + +<p>控方問及編採自主時，楊表示：「對於編採自主，其實我係有好深嘅感觸同體會。我從事傳媒工作三十幾年，咁都喺五間報紙、電視台打過工。我感受喺互聯網掀起之後，傳統媒體沒落之後，採編自主幾乎就成為一個神話嚟嘅。」楊指因為傳媒為了吸引特定的讀者群，都會有自己的立場。</p> + +<p>楊引用一個政治術語「鳥籠政治」來形容《蘋果》和類似報紙的採編自主，稱為「鳥籠自主」。楊指：「黎先生 set 咗《蘋果》嘅基本立場，就好似 set 定咗個鳥籠嘅，咁採編人員喺鳥籠入面有一定嘅自主，有一定嘅自主，有一定嘅採編自主權，但唔可以超過呢個框架，就唔可以超過呢個鳥籠，所以唔可以簡單講有冇採編自主。」</p> + +<p>控方追問，由黎設下的「鳥籠」，是否與黎所給予的指示有關？楊確認。</p> + +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/a21wrmR.png" alt="image05" /> +▲ 黎智英（資料圖片）</p> + +<p>就王崑義的文章，在法官杜麗冰提問下，楊清奇指黎智英曾經將讀者的來信，透過秘書轉交給他，但因為黎智英未有直接地批評王崑義，所以「呢個係我後來再去搵佢寫稿嘅原因之一」。</p> + +<p>楊清奇作供完畢。控方其後替下一名證人李宇軒，向法庭申請「提犯令」。案件明日續審。</p> + +<hr /> + +<p>案件編號：HCCC51/2022</p>獨媒報導楊清奇：黎智英向報紙設下「鳥籠」 編採人員享一定自主但不得超越框架Government Use Of Deepfakes2024-03-12T12:00:00+08:002024-03-12T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/government-use-of-deepfakes<p><em>What questions should governments ask — and who in government should be asking them — when a deepfake is being considered?</em></p> <excerpt /> @@ -387,43 +831,141 @@ <p><strong>Si Horne</strong> is the Chief of the General Staff’s Visiting Fellow at the Royal United Services Institute. An Army Emergency Medicine doctor, he has supported operations in Northern Ireland, Iraq, Afghanistan, Sierra Leone and South Sudan as well as serving as the Emergency Medicine lead for the Army.</p> -<p><strong>Ian Gurney</strong> is a British Army Medical Officer and has served in Cyprus, Northern Ireland, Iraq, Afghanistan and South Sudan (UN Tour).</p>Si Horne and Ian GurneyWith enthusiasm for Defence Engagement seemingly waning, how can Defence ensure that it is contributing to UK influence around the globe?Forward Defense2024-03-11T12:00:00+08:002024-03-11T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/forward-defense<p><em>Russia’s February 2022 invasion of Ukraine triggered the bloodiest war in Europe since World War II and raised significant questions about the United States’ role in Europe.</em></p> +<p><strong>Ian Gurney</strong> is a British Army Medical Officer and has served in Cyprus, Northern Ireland, Iraq, Afghanistan and South Sudan (UN Tour).</p>Si Horne and Ian GurneyWith enthusiasm for Defence Engagement seemingly waning, how can Defence ensure that it is contributing to UK influence around the globe?【黎智英案・審訊第卌二日】2024-03-11T12:00:00+08:002024-03-11T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/trial-of-jimmy-lai-day-42<ul> + <li>楊清奇：黎智英認為美國趁習近平弱勢時轉變對華政策、落井下石是好時機</li> +</ul> <excerpt /> -<p>This report examines U.S. force posture in Europe — including the military capabilities, personnel, infrastructure, and agreements that support defense operations and plans — and makes recommendations for future U.S. posture. It finds that the United States needs a robust, long-term military force posture in Europe, focused on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) eastern flank, to deter future Russian aggression.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/8EtMi8U.png" alt="image01" /></p> -<p>First, the United States needs a robust, long-term military force posture in Europe, focused on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) eastern flank, to deter future Russian aggression. Russia will likely remain a dangerous threat to the United States and Europe over the next several years. Russian president Vladimir Putin retains the political will and intentions to expand Russian power abroad, and Russia is reconstituting its military capabilities with help from China, Iran, and North Korea. A significant downsizing of U.S. forces in Europe could severely weaken deterrence and embolden a revanchist Russia.</p> +<p>【獨媒報導】壹傳媒創辦人黎智英及3間蘋果公司被控串謀勾結外國勢力及串謀刊印煽動刊物等罪，案件今（11日）於高院（移師西九龍法院）踏入第42日審訊。前《蘋果日報》主筆楊清奇，繼續以「從犯證人」身份出庭作供。楊早前證供提及，2018年時任總統彭斯演講時提及美國對華政策，黎認為「美國反檯」，自此政治立場變得激進。楊表示以他的理解，黎認為國家主席習近平「係比較弱勢」，美國在這個時機轉變對華政策，是一個好時機，訊息紀錄亦顯示，黎曾向楊稱「是趁中國弱乘機落井下石」。楊又指黎曾經是一個成功的商人，辦報紙時擅長把握形勢和讀者的需要，當時見到美國對華政策的改變，都會調整報紙立場。楊指在2019年反修例期間，《蘋果》經常以「今日上街，明日上街」作為標題，並在報導和評論中落實「和勇不分」和「不譴責、不割蓆、不篤灰」原則。</p> -<p>Second, the United States should permanently station a U.S. Army armored brigade combat team (ABCT) in Poland to strengthen deterrence and reassure the United States’ Eastern European allies in response to a long-term Russian threat. Shifting the current rotational ABCT from Operation Atlantic Resolve to a permanent presence in Poland should be part of a 4+2 posture in Europe. This posture would include four U.S. brigade combat teams (BCTs) — three forward-stationed BCTs in Poland, Italy, and Germany, along with one rotational BCT in Romania — and two divisional headquarters, in Germany and Poland.</p> +<p>前《蘋果日報》主筆楊清奇（筆名李平）第六天以「從犯證人」身份出庭作供。控方代表、助理刑事檢控專員張卓勤繼續主問。</p> -<p>Third, the U.S. Army should remain a bulwark for deterrence in Europe. A war against China in the Indo-Pacific will likely center on air and naval operations. However, some ground forces — from the U.S. Marine Corps, U.S. Army, and allies and partners — will be helpful for both deterrence and warfighting, including on the Korean peninsula.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/s5bxOG9.png" alt="image02" /> +▲ 高級檢控官 吳加悅（左）、助理刑事檢控專員 張卓勤（右）</p> -<p>In examining U.S. posture in Europe, this study asks three main questions. What are the main security threats in Europe for the United States and its allies? What are U.S. interests in Europe? What is the appropriate U.S. force posture in Europe? In answering these questions, this study comes to several broad conclusions.</p> +<h4 id="蘋果論壇版曾刊登有關加拿大救生艇文章-楊清奇指香港監察關注港人權">《蘋果》論壇版曾刊登有關加拿大救生艇文章 楊清奇指「香港監察」關注港人權</h4> -<h4 id="enduring-us-interests-in-europe">Enduring U.S. Interests in Europe</h4> +<p>控方向楊清奇展示數篇曾刊登於《蘋果》的評論文章，其中一篇在2020年11月24日刊登於報紙論壇版的文章〈加拿大加入救生艇計劃〉，由「香港監察」高級政策顧問 Sam Goodman 撰寫。</p> -<p>The United States has several enduring interests in Europe. They include protecting the U.S. homeland and the security of the American people from threats based in Europe, including from Russia; promoting and expanding economic prosperity and opportunity; realizing and defending the democratic values at the heart of the American way of life; and defending and supporting the United States’ European allies. While some U.S. politicians and pundits have questioned the value of NATO, U.S. interests in Europe remain significant and enduring. Still, a number of European governments need to increase defense spending in light of the precarious security environment. Numerous NATO countries (especially those on NATO’s eastern flank) spend over 2 percent of their gross domestic product on defense, such as Poland (3.9 percent), Estonia (2.73 percent), Lithuania (2.54 percent), Finland (2.45 percent), and the United Kingdom (2.07 percent). But some others do not.</p> +<p>楊表示記得這篇文章是由同事交給他的，相信 Sam Goodman 提供了中英文版本。控方遂展示時任英文版主筆盧峯（馮偉光）與楊清奇之間的訊息紀錄，盧峯指「香港監察」創辦人羅傑斯（Benedict Rogers）轉交其同事 Sam Goodman 的文章，並提供了中英文版本。盧峯並表示英文版會刊登，問楊清奇是否有興趣在中文論壇版刊登。</p> -<h4 id="persistent-russian-threat">Persistent Russian Threat</h4> +<p>楊表示，以他所知羅傑斯是「香港監察」的負責人，其文章曾被刊登於《蘋果》英文版，中文版則沒有印象。控方遂展示羅傑斯的文章〈Aversion to Beijing’s bellicose diplomacy is escalating in Europe（歐洲對北京戰狼外交政策反感俱增）〉，刊登於《蘋果》英文版網站。楊指「佢個機構都係比較關注香港人權嘅」，至於羅傑斯的寫作角度，楊則稱沒有留意他的文章，未能回答到此問題。</p> -<p>Russia will likely remain a significant and dangerous threat to the United States and NATO. Russia likely does not pose an immediate conventional threat to NATO. Over the next several years, however, there are several factors that could change the military balance in Europe. The United States could become overstretched with a war against China in the Indo-Pacific, North Korea on the Korean Peninsula, or Iran or terrorist groups in the Middle East. In addition, Russia could continue to rebuild its military over the next several years with help from China, Iran, North Korea, and other countries. A Russian military victory in Ukraine — or even significant Russian military advances on the battlefield — would also increase the Russian threat.</p> +<h4 id="楊清奇稱對方鄺頌晴寫作角度無印象">楊清奇稱對方鄺頌晴寫作角度無印象</h4> -<h4 id="forward-defense-posture">Forward Defense Posture</h4> +<p>控方續展示由鄺頌晴（Glacier Kwong）撰寫的文章〈Why people reckon upon Germany speaking up against human rights violations〉，在2021年1月28日刊於《蘋果》英文版網站。</p> -<p>The United States should take several steps to enhance its posture in Europe over the next several years in ways that are sustainable and affordable:</p> +<p>楊表示「我唔認識呢個作者嘅」，只是間中見到她的文章在英文版刊出。至於鄺的寫作角度，楊亦表示「無特別印象」。</p> -<ul> - <li> - <p><strong>Ground:</strong> The United States should adopt a 4+2 posture beginning in 2025 that consists of four U.S. BCTs — in Poland, Italy, Germany, and Romania — and two headquarters, in Germany and Poland. This force posture would involve eventually shifting from a rotational to a permanent ABCT in Poland to strengthen deterrence against a revanchist Russia.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Air:</strong> The United States should maintain all seven forward-deployed fighter squadrons currently based in Europe and add an additional F-16 squadron to Spangdahlem Air Base.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Maritime:</strong> The United States should continue its current naval presence in the Baltic Sea region to deter Russian aggression and strengthen interoperability with allies and partners. In addition, the U.S. Navy should supplement existing NATO anti-submarine warfare capabilities by developing and deploying additional systems to the region.</p> - </li> - <li> +<h4 id="楊清奇指前眾新聞主筆楊健興支持新聞自由">楊清奇指前《眾新聞》主筆楊健興支持新聞自由</h4> + +<p>控方提及已停運的《眾新聞》前主筆楊健興所撰寫的文章〈National Security Law targets small but hits big〉，在2021年3月31日刊登於《蘋果》英文版網站。</p> + +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/dhgmnRP.png" alt="image03" /> +▲ 楊健興（資料圖片）</p> + +<p>楊清奇指，楊健興是當時的記協主席，在《蘋果》中文論壇版是自由撰稿人，他一般會就新聞事件邀請楊健興撰稿，「佢係好強調新聞自由，好支持新聞自由」。楊清奇亦確認，根據「飯盒會」會議紀錄重點，黎曾同意邀請《立場新聞》、《眾新聞》和《端傳媒》等網媒寫手撰文。他補充，上述楊健興的英文文章並不是由中文論壇版的文章翻譯而成的。</p> + +<p>控方另展示由 Joseph Long 撰寫的〈A growing threat〉和 Michael Cox 撰寫的〈Time for UK to bring HSBC to heel〉。楊表示不認識這兩名作者。</p> + +<h4 id="楊清奇指桑普較激進支持港獨-蘋果論壇只採用不涉港獨文章">楊清奇指桑普較激進、支持港獨 《蘋果》論壇只採用不涉港獨文章</h4> + +<p>控方問及桑普，楊指他「係屬於激進啲」，他知道桑普在網上發表的文章都是支持港獨，但因為《蘋果》論壇版不支持港獨，所以他們採用桑普的文章是不會談及港獨。</p> + +<p>至於李兆富（Simon Lee），楊指他的文章多數與經濟有關，會用經濟學的角度去分析社會問題和政治問題。楊又表示，對於李的文章，「其實我啲同事同讀者都會覺得悶」，所以沒有文章令他印象深刻。</p> + +<p>控方問到李的寫作角度，楊指「佢政治立場都好明顯係支持民主派」，而且李的觀點與黎的觀點都很一致，所以黎有找他負責處理 Twitter 帳戶。</p> + +<h4 id="楊清奇指安裕支持民主派-國安法生效後憂紅線間中停稿">楊清奇指安裕支持民主派 國安法生效後憂紅線、間中停稿</h4> + +<p>控方提及已故作家李怡因年紀大而減產，並問楊知不知道黎智英是否認識李怡。楊則指李怡曾經是《蘋果》的主筆，「黎先生冇理由唔識佢嘅。」</p> + +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/QQoME5h.png" alt="image04" /> +▲ 李怡（已歿）</p> + +<p>控方另提及錢志健，楊指錢曾經是《蘋果》的專欄作家，但是「我係取消咗佢專欄嘅」。他記不起取消專欄的原因，只記得在大概2018年發生。楊指在2019年，《蘋果》論壇版基本上已沒有錢志健的文章，但後來《國安法》生效，論壇版不夠作者撰文，因此錢有時投稿，楊曾經用過一至兩次。</p> + +<p>另一名作者、資深新聞工作者安裕（姜國元），楊指他是很著名的專欄作家，惟《國安法》生效之後，「間唔中話要停稿、請假，佢都係對《國安法》劃出咗一條紅線有擔憂。」楊又指，安裕很熟悉美國政治，所以其文章除了涉及香港情況之外，還會涉及美國。至於安裕的寫作角度，楊指：「簡單嚟講，佢都係支持民主派嘅。」</p> + +<h4 id="楊清奇指黎認為西方對中共制裁不會緩和肯定制裁成效">楊清奇指黎認為西方對中共制裁不會緩和、肯定制裁成效</h4> + +<p>關於黎智英的個人觀點，控方展示兩篇黎發表於個人專欄「成敗樂一笑」的文章。其中一篇為〈時間就是武器〉，楊引述當中一段，黎指不相信美國等西方國家對中共的制裁會緩和下來，中共與美國等西方國家關係的關係大勢已去，暫時是無法逆轉的。楊指以上是黎對中美關係形勢的判斷。</p> + +<p>就另一篇文章〈大時代即將來臨〉，楊清奇引述其中一段：「中美關係惡化，是十年八載解決不了的問題，期間中國企業投資停滯，將是個大隱憂。很明顯，中共與美國對抗造成的經濟和政治損失，實在來得太大，甚至大到觸發成為對中共政權認受性的挑戰。保不住經濟，中共將保不住政權。與美國對抗造成的實質和信心創傷，預示中共將大禍臨頭。」楊表示據他理解，黎在以上段落肯定了制裁的成效。</p> + +<h4 id="楊清奇黎智英認為美國趁習近平弱勢時落井下石是好時機">楊清奇：黎智英認為美國趁習近平弱勢時落井下石是好時機</h4> + +<p>楊早前證供提及，時任美國副總統彭斯於2018年10月在哈特遜研究所（Hudson Institute）發表演講時提及美國對華政策，黎當時認為演講內容意味「美國反檯」，以楊的觀察，自此黎的政治立場轉趨激進。</p> + +<p>控方展示黎智英與楊清奇之間的訊息，楊在同年10月5日向黎傳送彭斯演講翻譯全文。黎其後表示：「剛聽了彭斯演講、反檯，美國帶領西方日本等國重新調整中國政策明顯不過了，這是針對習現在弱勢而來的。時機正好！」楊其後表示：「美中現在不是貿易戰，是全面開戰咁」，黎回應：「是趁中國弱乘機落井下石。」</p> + +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/Las1PAd.png" alt="image05" /> +▲ 黎智英（資料圖片）</p> + +<p>楊庭上解釋，黎之所以說「時機正好」，是因為他認為國家主席習近平「係比較弱勢」，美國在這個時機轉變對華政策，而「呢個時機係好嘅」。</p> + +<p>控方追問楊是指什麼「時機」、要做什麼。楊則引述黎的訊息「是趁中國弱乘機落井下石」，亦正如他撰寫及傳送給黎的社評標題：〈【蘋論】美國發宣戰檄文 香港挺身撞槍口〉。楊指：「2019年發生嘅反修例事件，就係撞正個槍口。」</p> + +<h4 id="楊清奇指黎智英擅長把握形勢和讀者需要-而調整報紙立場">楊清奇指黎智英擅長把握形勢和讀者需要 而調整報紙立場</h4> + +<p>控方再追問「撞正個槍口」是什麼意思。楊引述「美國發宣戰檄文 香港挺身撞槍口」，指「美國舉槍對住中國嘅時候，香港就挺身擋住個槍口，自己送一個目標畀美國打」。</p> + +<p>控方問以上觀點與黎智英有何關係。楊表示正如他早前作供時所說，他認為黎曾經是一個成功的商人，擅長把握市場和顧客的需求，當黎辦報紙的時候，他一樣擅長把握形勢和讀者的需要，當時見到美國對華政策的改變，都會調整報紙立場。</p> + +<p>法官李運騰追問以上是為了什麼目的。楊表示，未有與黎討論過目的，但是以他觀察《蘋果》報紙的變化，他認為在反修例期間，「《蘋果》立場嘅激進係眾所周知啦，新聞報導就成日見到『上街』呢兩個字嘅，我覺得唔係好嘅標題」，因為「成日見到『今日上街，明日上街，今日又上街，明日又上街』，我唔覺得係好嘅標題」。</p> + +<h4 id="楊清奇指蘋果新聞報導落實和勇不分和不譴責不割蓆不篤灰">楊清奇指《蘋果》新聞報導落實「和勇不分」和「不譴責、不割蓆、不篤灰」</h4> + +<p>楊又提到黎的專欄文章經常呼籲人上街，從黎的專欄和《蘋果》的報導可見，對於「和勇不分」這口號，黎和整個《蘋果》都「比較寬容、比較支持嘅」。</p> + +<p>楊補充，「和勇不分」主要有三個「不」，包括「不譴責、不割蓆、不篤灰」，從《蘋果》的報導和評論來看，「係落實咗呢三個『不』嘅。」</p> + +<p>控方問到，《國安法》生效之後，《蘋果》以上立場有否改變。楊則表示當時沒有收到任何指示，「基本上冇再提『三不』嘅，但都冇話過立場改變。」</p> + +<p>控方表示主問完畢。代表黎智英的資深大律師彭耀鴻表示，需時整理盤問方向，申請押後至明天才開始盤問，獲法官批准。</p> + +<hr /> + +<p>案件編號：HCCC51/2022</p>獨媒報導楊清奇：黎智英認為美國趁習近平弱勢時轉變對華政策、落井下石是好時機Forward Defense2024-03-11T12:00:00+08:002024-03-11T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/forward-defense<p><em>Russia’s February 2022 invasion of Ukraine triggered the bloodiest war in Europe since World War II and raised significant questions about the United States’ role in Europe.</em></p> + +<excerpt /> + +<p>This report examines U.S. force posture in Europe — including the military capabilities, personnel, infrastructure, and agreements that support defense operations and plans — and makes recommendations for future U.S. posture. It finds that the United States needs a robust, long-term military force posture in Europe, focused on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) eastern flank, to deter future Russian aggression.</p> + +<p>First, the United States needs a robust, long-term military force posture in Europe, focused on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) eastern flank, to deter future Russian aggression. Russia will likely remain a dangerous threat to the United States and Europe over the next several years. Russian president Vladimir Putin retains the political will and intentions to expand Russian power abroad, and Russia is reconstituting its military capabilities with help from China, Iran, and North Korea. A significant downsizing of U.S. forces in Europe could severely weaken deterrence and embolden a revanchist Russia.</p> + +<p>Second, the United States should permanently station a U.S. Army armored brigade combat team (ABCT) in Poland to strengthen deterrence and reassure the United States’ Eastern European allies in response to a long-term Russian threat. Shifting the current rotational ABCT from Operation Atlantic Resolve to a permanent presence in Poland should be part of a 4+2 posture in Europe. This posture would include four U.S. brigade combat teams (BCTs) — three forward-stationed BCTs in Poland, Italy, and Germany, along with one rotational BCT in Romania — and two divisional headquarters, in Germany and Poland.</p> + +<p>Third, the U.S. Army should remain a bulwark for deterrence in Europe. A war against China in the Indo-Pacific will likely center on air and naval operations. However, some ground forces — from the U.S. Marine Corps, U.S. Army, and allies and partners — will be helpful for both deterrence and warfighting, including on the Korean peninsula.</p> + +<p>In examining U.S. posture in Europe, this study asks three main questions. What are the main security threats in Europe for the United States and its allies? What are U.S. interests in Europe? What is the appropriate U.S. force posture in Europe? In answering these questions, this study comes to several broad conclusions.</p> + +<h4 id="enduring-us-interests-in-europe">Enduring U.S. Interests in Europe</h4> + +<p>The United States has several enduring interests in Europe. They include protecting the U.S. homeland and the security of the American people from threats based in Europe, including from Russia; promoting and expanding economic prosperity and opportunity; realizing and defending the democratic values at the heart of the American way of life; and defending and supporting the United States’ European allies. While some U.S. politicians and pundits have questioned the value of NATO, U.S. interests in Europe remain significant and enduring. Still, a number of European governments need to increase defense spending in light of the precarious security environment. Numerous NATO countries (especially those on NATO’s eastern flank) spend over 2 percent of their gross domestic product on defense, such as Poland (3.9 percent), Estonia (2.73 percent), Lithuania (2.54 percent), Finland (2.45 percent), and the United Kingdom (2.07 percent). But some others do not.</p> + +<h4 id="persistent-russian-threat">Persistent Russian Threat</h4> + +<p>Russia will likely remain a significant and dangerous threat to the United States and NATO. Russia likely does not pose an immediate conventional threat to NATO. Over the next several years, however, there are several factors that could change the military balance in Europe. The United States could become overstretched with a war against China in the Indo-Pacific, North Korea on the Korean Peninsula, or Iran or terrorist groups in the Middle East. In addition, Russia could continue to rebuild its military over the next several years with help from China, Iran, North Korea, and other countries. A Russian military victory in Ukraine — or even significant Russian military advances on the battlefield — would also increase the Russian threat.</p> + +<h4 id="forward-defense-posture">Forward Defense Posture</h4> + +<p>The United States should take several steps to enhance its posture in Europe over the next several years in ways that are sustainable and affordable:</p> + +<ul> + <li> + <p><strong>Ground:</strong> The United States should adopt a 4+2 posture beginning in 2025 that consists of four U.S. BCTs — in Poland, Italy, Germany, and Romania — and two headquarters, in Germany and Poland. This force posture would involve eventually shifting from a rotational to a permanent ABCT in Poland to strengthen deterrence against a revanchist Russia.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Air:</strong> The United States should maintain all seven forward-deployed fighter squadrons currently based in Europe and add an additional F-16 squadron to Spangdahlem Air Base.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Maritime:</strong> The United States should continue its current naval presence in the Baltic Sea region to deter Russian aggression and strengthen interoperability with allies and partners. In addition, the U.S. Navy should supplement existing NATO anti-submarine warfare capabilities by developing and deploying additional systems to the region.</p> + </li> + <li> <p><strong>Prepositioned Equipment and Munitions Stockpiles:</strong> The United States should bolster its prepositioned equipment and munitions stocks in Europe to enhance the readiness of U.S. forces. While the Army Prepositioned Stock 2 has been somewhat augmented by funding from the European Deterrence Initiative, the U.S. Army should take additional steps to improve the readiness of this equipment and the forces overseeing it.</p> </li> <li> @@ -7903,915 +8445,4 @@ Simon 嘅，但都唔想連累 Simon 受無妄之災。國安震懾之下找個 <hr /> -<p>案件編號：HCCC51/2022</p>獨媒報導林榮基赴台擺頭版 陳沛敏：係我嘅決定，因有新聞價值、持獨家照片者要求Europe’s Marines For Future2024-02-05T12:00:00+08:002024-02-05T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/europes-marines-for-future<p><em>In the early 20th century, following the Battle of Gallipoli in which entrenched Turkish forces inflicted considerable losses on a more powerful allied army and fleet, the future of amphibious warfare was called into question by many thinkers and practitioners. Not long after, then-Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal was proclaiming “a Marine Corps for the next 500 years” in the wake of the U.S victory at Iwo Jima.</em> <excerpt></excerpt> <em>This turnaround in fortunes was in no small part driven by reformers who recognized that retaining the underlying utility that amphibious forces provide in terms of both tactical and strategic mobility demanded changes to their underlying concepts of employment as well as tactics, techniques, and procedures. Underpinning this transformation was an effort to define role of amphibious forces as an enabling capability for the fleet itself rather than merely one that was enabled by the rest of the force.</em></p> - -<p>Europe’s amphibious forces are at a similar inflection point when they will have to define their role in the future combat operating environment. These forces, which have traditionally represented a mechanism through which rapid reaction could be delivered on both Europe’s own maritime flanks and at reach, will be presented with two challenges. At sea, the challenge of anti-access/area denial capabilities will hold the shipping that supports amphibious forces at risk. On land, organizations such as the British 3 Commando Brigade and the Dutch Korps Mariniers will have their ability to concentrate for tactical effect contested by adversary militaries organized to deliver large volumes of fires on rapid cycles, cued in by unmanned aerial vehicles. As light forces without their own organic short-range air defense systems (beyond man-portable air defenses), European marines will face considerable challenges in this context.</p> - -<p>This need not, however, represent a basis for surrendering the tactical and operational opportunities that amphibious forces provide a joint force. In many respects, the contribution of forces that can exploit the entirety of the littoral as a maneuver space will be of ever greater importance if peer competitors such as Russia are to be denied the opportunity to operate as they would prefer to do on narrow linear fronts in theatres such as the Baltic and NATO’s northern flank.</p> - -<p>However, to deliver continued tactical and operational utility, forces such as the Royal Marines will have to resolve an underlying challenge. To survive they will, among other things, have to become an increasingly distributed force. However, distribution brings with it inherent challenges in terms of both sustaining a force and delivering meaningful effects on the battlefield. Of course, this dynamic is not unique to amphibious forces as distribution is becoming more important across the board. However, the question is how forces that are both distributed and inherently light can continue to be effective.</p> - -<p>In a recent report, my coauthor and I argue that European marine forces (including the Royal Marines) can deliver considerable utility if they subsume their concepts of operations within the traditional maritime functions of strike and securing sea control. Our premise is that there is a basis for closer alignment between marine organizations and fleets (in particular fleets traditionally optimized for sea denial in littoral spaces) as well as between emerging concepts of operations within marine organizations on both sides of the Atlantic. Recognizing this can help resolve the “dispersal dilemma” and can, moreover, allow marines to help resolve a growing spatial separation between fleets that operate at reach and joint forces.</p> - -<p>Both littoral-oriented fleets and evolving amphibious forces such as the U.S. Marine Corps can deliver capable strike capabilities — something that is as relevant to disruption inland from the littoral as it is to tasks such as sea denial in the Indo-Pacific. However, strike-centric operations need to be enabled by surveillance and reconnaissance inland, as well as by shaping operations that influence an opponent to behave in ways that maximize his vulnerability. It is here that European marine forces redesigned to operate as a distributed raiding capability can offer the greatest value. In effect, then, there is an inherent complementarity between light European marine forces, which must of necessity operate in a distributed manner, and strike-centric forces that can generate fires from the littoral. These forces would thus evolve into the forward edge of a single archipelagic capability encompassing fires distributed in the littoral and smaller coastal combatants. European marines employed in this way would become a critical enabler for any effort to deliver effects inland from the littoral.</p> - -<h3 id="change-drivers-and-opportunities">Change: Drivers and Opportunities</h3> - -<p>During the Cold War, European marine forces such as the Royal Marines and the Korps Mariniers were expected to provide a rapid reaction capability on Europe’s northern flank. Structured and equipped as light infantry, these forces would represent the vanguard element of an amphibious force that would include the U.S. Marine Corps. This force would, itself, be reinforced by the Norwegian army as the state mobilized based on its conscription system.</p> - -<p>Today, important elements of this vision would prove difficult to replicate. First, though a credible and dangerous sea denial challenge existed in the 1980s as well, the threat has evolved. The processing power to fuse data from multiple sensor types and from multiple sources has developed in tandem with the emergence of supersonic and hypersonic anti-ship cruise missiles such as the P-800 and the Zircon. The proliferation of different sensor types as well as the means to cue them will make hiding on the surface increasingly difficult, while faster missiles reduce the salvo sizes needed to penetrate an air defense screen. To be sure, Russia has struggled to engage dynamic targets in the conflict in Ukraine, but it should be assumed that it will improve in this regard. Similarly, a combination of more capable man-portable air defenses and longer-ranged air defense systems will challenge insertion using helicopters in many cases. All of this was in evidence in the early days of the conflict in Ukraine, when the reconnaissance elements of the Russian Black Sea Fleet’s 810th Naval Infantry Brigade encountered stiff resistance near Odessa when they attempted insertion by both sea and air. This does not mean that amphibious insertion is impossible, but it will occur under increasingly contested conditions.</p> - -<p>Secondly, lodgments ashore will become increasingly difficult to defend. This is not exactly a new issue and has been a challenge for amphibious forces historically. Examples such as the Falklands War illustrate how vulnerable a force that gradually builds up combat power ashore can be to air attack. However, the air and missile threat will become more complex for a number of reasons. First, increased precision means that tools such as short-range ballistic missiles can be used effectively as tactical tools. Secondly, armed and surveillance drones such as Russia’s Okhotnik and China’s GJ-11 can provide adversaries with a relatively simple means of generating very low observable air power. Third, opponents can generate large volumes of less-precise standoff by equipping dumb bombs with glide kits as the Russians have with the FAB-500. Finally, supporting assets will be occupied with tasks such as self-protection, the defense of carrier groups, and, in the case of aircraft, suppression of air defense — all of which means that external defensive counter-air cannot always be relied upon.</p> - -<h3 id="opportunities">Opportunities</h3> - -<p>There are a number of reasons to believe that the ability to exploit the maneuverability of amphibious forces in the littoral can be both sustained and exploited to good effect. On the likely fronts where a Russian force might advance into Europe, Russia would enjoy the advantage of operating on narrow fronts where firepower, electronic warfare assets, and air defense systems can be concentrated to devastating effect. In Estonia, for example, NATO forces might face Russian forces on a front of roughly 50 kilometers.</p> - -<p>Should Russia meet the targets that it has set itself under the aegis of Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu’s planned force design, it will field a force of 1.5 million that includes 10 new divisions in two new military districts. Such a force would almost certainly be of variable quality, much like the current three-tiered Russian force structure in Ukraine (divided between disposable units, line infantry, and high-quality assault infantry). The force described would, however, generate considerable combat mass. A Russian force thus constituted could, for example, fix NATO forces on multiple points on the alliance’s frontier with Russia while concentrating its higher quality.</p> - -<p>As illustrated in the campaign for the Donbas in July 2022, when Russian forces are able to concentrate in this manner, they can generate fires on a scale and with a level of responsiveness that would impose considerable attrition on defenders (at one point, Ukrainian forces in the Donbas were losing 200 men a day). Narrow fronts allow a Russian force to saturate its line of advance with drones such as the Orlan-10, which can allow Russian forces to cue in fires in as little time as three minutes from initial observation. While ground- and air-based precision strike assets can disrupt the lines of communication and supply upon which such a Russian force depends, Russian forces have adapted to systems such as the High Mobility Artillery Rocket System and, moreover, would be able to concentrate a considerable portion of their surveillance and strike assets to detecting and destroying ground based systems in a congested theatre. As illustrated by Russia’s use of Iskander missiles to destroy individual Ukrainian surface-to-air missile systems, when Russian forces believe that a capability is sufficiently important they can devote disproportionately costly resources to engaging it. In Ukraine, the size of the frontline has complicated Russian efforts to responsively engage Western strike assets but this may be a simpler task on many of the fronts where Russian and NATO forces would be likely to meet.</p> - -<p>The geometry of the battlefield can, however, be expanded considerably if the littoral is treated as a space from which inland strike can be generated. Estonia, for example, has 2,222 islands while Norway has, by some estimates, over 200,000. Strike platforms such as the High Mobility Artillery Rocket System and the Navy Marine Expeditionary Ship Interdiction System, both of which will likely feature heavily in the U.S. Marine Corps’ future force design, can thus be considerably more survivable if they can operate both on continental main lands and offshore. While the utility of concepts such as Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations has largely been discussed in the context of the Indo-Pacific, the same concepts can enable an allied force to fight the deep battle more effectively in the European theatre by operating from a wider range of positions. Not only would this complicate the challenge of surveillance for Russian forces by expanding the area that must be surveyed severalfold, but it would also introduce a requirement for platform specialization and complicate the use of some intelligence and surveillance assets, since drones built to operate overland are less stable and survivable in the maritime domain due to climatic conditions.</p> - -<p>There is a second opportunity in the European littoral, revolving around the existing surface fleets of new NATO members in theatres like the Baltic. Historically, nations such as Finland and Sweden built their navies for sea denial against what was presumed to be a superior Russian naval force in the Baltic Sea. While the continuing threat posed by the Russian navy in the Baltic should not be understated, it is nonetheless the case that this force will likely be heavily overmatched against NATO — meaning that the original function of sea denial that underpinned these fleets is no longer relevant. However, small missile-equipped platforms such as the Hamina-class fast attack craft and the Visby-class corvette, which are optimized to operate in shallow waters and equipped with dual use missiles such as the Swedish-made RGB-III, can just as easily form the core of a forward postured element of a NATO maritime component where their function would be delivering strikes inland from a narrow sea like the Baltic. The demand signal for such vessels from the wider force would be considerably less significant than for vessels like frigates and destroyers, which will also be required for blue water functions such as anti-submarine warfare and task group protection, and they would represent both smaller and less appealing targets for Russian shore-based sea denial systems than would larger, more expensive allied platforms. The navies of new allies could thus retain their littoral-oriented role in narrow seas but in a forward posture that would considerably complicate Russian planning on the maritime flanks of an invasion.</p> - -<p>At the operational level, the ability to posture strike platforms such as those envisioned within the U.S. Marine Corps’ Force Design 2030 in areas such as northern Norway during a crisis would also impose dilemmas on Russian theater-level planning. Such systems would pose a considerable threat to facilities such as Severomorsk and would necessarily need to be engaged. Yet resourcing an effort against them would likely strip Russia’s other fronts of critical assault units (primarily from the Airborne Forces and 200th Arctic Brigade) since the ability to execute cold weather operations is not held across the force. Moreover, such forces would have to advance on narrow fronts and difficult terrain where, if they cannot suppress allied forces by sheer weight of fire and surveillance saturation, they would prove highly vulnerable, much as the Russian army was in its initial assault on Kyiv. The posturing of strike platforms can thus enable operational dislocation and — if an opponent cannot easily track them — can reinforce deterrence. As an example of how an inability to track allied assets has contributed to deterrence in the past, we might consider NATO’s exercise Ocean Venture, which saw allied maritime platforms go emissions-dark in the High North, much to the consternation of Soviet planners.</p> - -<h3 id="european-maritime-forces">European Maritime Forces</h3> - -<p>Thus far, this article has discussed European naval capabilities as well as systems likely to be held within the U.S. Marine Corps. Restructured European marine forces can add considerable value to the framework described.</p> - -<p>The challenge for European marine forces is that they can no longer function as conventional light infantry brigades. However, they can provide a crucial offer to strike-capable partner forces, namely the capacity to both identify targets inland and to dislocate and fix adversary forces in ways that enable strike-centric components to be used to good effect.</p> - -<p>To this end, the Royal Marines envision restructuring the traditional commando company into 12-man strike teams. Such teams, if enabled to operate along the depth of an opponent’s frontage, can represent a considerable force multiplier for strike-centric partner forces.</p> - -<p>The ability to operate at depth can be enabled by the fact that the maritime maneuver space is effectively parallel to an opponent’s likely line of advance. If enabled by surface maneuver platforms with sufficient reach and low observability, this can enable the insertion of strike teams at depths that other force elements might not always be able to achieve. This would presume a shift in design philosophy, with surface maneuver craft and not surface connectors representing the force’s primary maneuver capability. The latter would require characteristics such as low observability, which necessarily comes at the expense of carrying capacity. Moreover, such platforms could be enabled with their own strike capabilities. We might consider, as an example, how Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps has equipped British-made Bladerunner speed boats with missiles.</p> - -<p>While observation in the littoral represents a considerable challenge, adversary sensor networks are inherently dependent on radar given the narrow fields of regard that other modes of detection such as electro-optical sensors allow. Efforts to beat radar through both low observability and the use of decoys and countermeasures to exacerbate the effect of climatic conditions such as super refraction (which generates false positives) can make an entire maritime network less effective. Sufficiently versatile vessels could also be equipped with Short Ranged Air Defense capabilities — something that China has emplaced on the 42-meter Type 022 catamaran. Notably, Sweden’s navy and marines appear to already be making this shift with planned surface maneuver vessels equipped with NEMO mortars. Fired from the littoral, such mortars can in principle be used against targets at depth (at least near coastal areas) because they can bypass an opposing army’s front line.</p> - -<p>The cost of a shift emphasizing surface maneuver would come in terms of both size and overall carrying capacity once requirements such as low observability are accounted for, making it necessary for marine forces to rely on light vehicles such as the Polaris MRZR. On the one hand, it might be argued that this introduces a gap between marines and land components as the latter’s equipment cannot be easily moved. While true at one level, this would also introduce complementarities in other areas. Marine forces thus equipped can, for example, as easily interoperate with units such as the British Army’s Deep Reconnaissance Strike Brigade as part of a whole-of-force effort to win the deep battle. Forces do not always have to be interoperable to be complementary.</p> - -<p>There is some evidence to suggest that distributed light raiding units operating at depth can be a considerable force multiplier. Russian doctrine presumes a ratio of 12 infantry to one when operating against special forces in rear areas, meaning that such forces can tie down assets of disproportionate value. The ability of Ukrainian infantry equipped with Next-generation Light Anti-tank Weapons to tie down Russian armor to enable their destruction by artillery represents another example. Exercises such as Green Dagger reinforce this. In the context of Green Dagger, a force comprising 40 Commando and the Korps Mariniers operated ahead of 7th Marine Regiment against a U.S. Marine Corps opposing force. 40 Commando was divided up into 12-person strike teams that operated ahead of a light defensive screen. The presence of distributed raiding strike teams of marines posed considerable challenges to the opposing U.S. commander, who could not distribute his forces without raising the risk of raiding but was exposed to fires if he chose to concentrate to both better defend against raiding and to overrun a fairly light Royal Marine defensive screen. In effect, there is an inherent complementarity between distributed light forces and strike-centric ones including those in littoral spaces.</p> - -<p>The former can operate at depths and in ways that enable the latter while the weight of fire that strike-centric forces at sea in the littoral can bring to bear allows distributed vanguard elements to generate effects without concentrating. Removing the requirement to concentrate in turn reduces the need for the build-up of capabilities that can support a conventionally structured brigade, which, as discussed, are inherently vulnerable. Moreover, distributed small teams have certain other advantages. They can deploy intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance platforms with credible sensor payloads at short ranges, which is critical as large longer-ranged systems are inherently vulnerable. Moreover, smaller units can benefit from solutions such as multispectral concealment that are viable even in the current operating environment but do not scale due to the costs involved.</p> - -<h3 id="conclusions">Conclusions</h3> - -<p>In many ways, things must change in order to stay the same. The utility of maneuver on and from the littoral remains an important part of the solution to the challenge of Russian combat power in Europe, much as it was during the Cold War. However, the methods by which effects such as operational dislocation and tactical disruption are achieved will need to change.</p> - -<p>The ability to generate long-range strike both from offshore islands and maritime platforms can help to resolve the challenge of generating concentrated effects with distributed forces. This has relevance both to the application of U.S. Marine Corps concepts of operations in the European theatre but also for how littoral-oriented European coastal fleets might be used in a NATO context.</p> - -<p>European marine forces will to a great extent need to frame their future utility in relation to these trends. They have considerable opportunities to add value to strike-centric concepts of operations for littoral maneuver and early experimentation by the Royal Marines would appear to validate this. This will, however, require shifts in how forces like the Royal Marines are structured and equipped (some of which are underway) and how their employment is conceived. It will also require a wider allied effort to align concepts of operations among both allied marine forces and littoral-oriented navies.</p> - -<p>A viable concept of littoral maneuver can help reduce the possibility of a growing spatial gap between fleets operating at reach with strategic capabilities such as cruise missiles and other elements of the joint force and ensure that both marines and maritime forces more broadly can contribute to a multidomain deep battle.</p> - -<hr /> - -<p><strong>Sidharth Kaushal</strong> is the Research Fellow of Sea Power in RUSI. His research covers the impact of technology on maritime doctrine in the 21st century and the role of sea power in a state’s grand strategy. Sidharth holds a doctorate in International Relations from the London School of Economics, where his research examined the ways in which strategic culture shapes the contours of a nation’s grand strategy.</p>Sidharth KaushalIn the early 20th century, following the Battle of Gallipoli in which entrenched Turkish forces inflicted considerable losses on a more powerful allied army and fleet, the future of amphibious warfare was called into question by many thinkers and practitioners. Not long after, then-Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal was proclaiming “a Marine Corps for the next 500 years” in the wake of the U.S victory at Iwo Jima.【黎智英案・審訊第廿二日】2024-02-02T12:00:00+08:002024-02-02T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/trial-of-jimmy-lai-day-22<ul> - <li>張劍虹作供完畢 歷時約12天 下午將傳召前副社長陳沛敏</li> - <li>前副社長陳沛敏：黎智英有鮮明價值 佔中後「企得前咗」 娛樂新聞減少</li> -</ul> - -<excerpt /> - -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/Pbfc5hi.png" alt="image01" /></p> - -<p>【獨媒報導】壹傳媒創辦人黎智英及3間蘋果公司被控串謀勾結外國勢力及串謀刊印煽動刊物等罪，案件今（2日）於高院（移師西九龍法院）踏入第22日審訊。控方完成覆問前《蘋果日報》社長張劍虹，結束歷時約12日的證供，接著另一名以「從犯證人」身份出庭作供的是前副社長陳沛敏。法官杜麗冰指，由於職員需要約20至25分鐘作安排，以將陳沛敏帶上庭，故押後至下午續審。</p> - -<h4 id="張劍虹形容國安法後-黎言論冇咁露骨">張劍虹形容國安法後 黎言論「冇咁露骨」</h4> - -<p>另外，辯方昨完成盤問張劍虹，今早確認沒有進一步提問。控方遂進行覆問。</p> - -<p>有關2021年4月21日的WhatsApp訊息，張劍虹向楊清奇傳來《大公報》文章截圖，當中圈出一句「直言要外國聯合制裁以致推翻國家執政黨」，張問：「主筆，你印象中我們社評有寫過這些？」楊回覆：「國安法出台前可能有」，張回覆：「出台前就不算違法」。楊續說：「出台後連老闆都唔提」，張回覆：「是」。</p> - -<p>張表示《國安法》生效之後，黎智英撰文及受訪時的言論，「冇之前國安法生效前寫得咁露骨架喇，啫係比較肯定外國制裁對阻止中國打壓香港嘅自由民主人權嘅效力咁啦。」當楊清奇說「出台後連老闆都唔提」，張理解意思是黎的言論「冇話好露骨咁話要制裁、制裁、制裁」，所以張表示同意楊。</p> - -<h4 id="黎智英不在數個高層群組之中-張高層可較自由表達意見">黎智英不在數個高層群組之中 張：高層可較自由表達意見</h4> - -<p>辯方早前提及因應國安法，《蘋果》高層設立了不同聊天群組，包括「國安法應變委員會」、「報紙敏感廣告小組」和「應變小組」，而張亦確認黎智英並不是上述群組成員之一。</p> - -<p>控方今要求張澄清原因，張解釋如果黎加入群組的話，「我哋咩都唔洗傾架喇，因為全部都係由呀黎生決定哂」，但若果高層可在自己的群組中討論，「黎生唔喺度呢，大家都free 啲表達意見，睇吓係咪真係好有需要話俾黎生。」他同意這些群組的目的並不是決策，而是討論敏感議題，讓高層之間能坦白表達意見，之後才向黎表達。</p> - -<p>辯方早前盤問時提到，在2020年7月4日，張劍虹把一份廣告初稿傳給前《蘋果》副社長陳沛敏，問：「有光時句子廣告，你點睇？」陳則回覆已咨詢內部法律顧問，而該廣告最終使用另外一個八字標語，而棄用「光時」。控方今展示一份廣告，可見一個楓葉圖案、「在加港人全力撐」、「五大訴求，缺一不可」、「光復香港，時代革命」，張確認當時談論的是這一份廣告。</p> - -<h4 id="控方將報紙顯示日期和頁數條欄放大-指有光時口號">控方將報紙顯示日期和頁數條欄放大 指有「光時」口號</h4> - -<p>控方展示2020年7月5日及8日的《蘋果日報》港聞版，並在電腦中將報紙頂部顯示日期和頁數的條欄放大，指出背景圖片顯示到旗幟上的「光復香港，時代革命」口號。</p> - -<p>法官李運騰留意到該條欄連續兩日都有顯示「兩制蓋棺」，張劍虹解釋，所有國安法的報導都會擺在此條欄下，國安法生效當天，《蘋果》頭版也是以「兩制蓋棺」作標題，因為按照黎智英的標準，國安法使一國兩制「玩完」，所以決定使用此字眼。</p> - -<p>至於使用「光時」口號是誰人的主意，張表示不記得，但分工上港聞版是由陳沛敏負責，而該「光時」口號其實是一張新聞圖片。</p> - -<h4 id="信件顯示律政司否認警方邀請張劍虹做控方證人">信件顯示律政司否認警方邀請張劍虹做控方證人</h4> - -<p>辯方昨日提及2021年11月，張劍虹獲警方探監之後，決定轉做控方證人，並解聘原本代表他的羅拔臣律師事務所。而其新聘的劉陳律師事務所於12月16日去信律政司，表明在警方邀請之下，有意做控方證人。</p> - -<p>控方今問張知不知道，律政司在12月17日去信回覆劉陳律師事務所，稱警方並沒有邀請過其當事人。張表示「我唔清楚」，又指不知道該信件的存在。</p> - -<p>控方表示覆問完畢。法官杜麗冰指，得悉職員需要約20至25分鐘作流程上安排，以將陳沛敏帶上庭，故決定押後至下午續審。</p> - -<p>法官向張說，他已作供完畢，現可以離開法庭。張表示：「係，知道」，然後從證人座位站起身，向法官席鞠躬，之後張由懲教人員帶領下循特別通道離開法庭。</p> - -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/Qy45Pkb.png" alt="image02" /></p> - -<p>【獨媒報導】壹傳媒創辦人黎智英及3間蘋果公司被控串謀勾結外國勢力及串謀刊印煽動刊物等罪，案件今（2日）於高院（移師西九龍法院）踏入第22日審訊。前《蘋果日報》社長張劍虹早上完成歷時約12天的證供，前副社長陳沛敏下午以「從犯證人」身份出庭作供。被問到《蘋果》是否一份政治性的報紙，陳表示：「我會覺得《蘋果》嗰個創辦人會有好鮮明嘅價值」，支持香港發展民主政制，另外也會尊重自由、人權這些價值，同時會重視市場反應。控方提到2014年佔中運動，陳指《蘋果》每天都會報導，黎智英亦親身參與運動，「成日去金鐘嗰度（佔領區）坐囉」。運動結束後，她指《蘋果》的娛樂新聞減少，黎的國際知名度增加，「我哋同事之間覺得佢喺社會運動度企得前咗囉」。</p> - -<h4 id="陳沛敏稱1996年加入蘋果-曾於2016年確診第三期癌症">陳沛敏稱1996年加入《蘋果》 曾於2016年確診第三期癌症</h4> - -<p>已承認「串謀勾結外國勢力危害國家安全」控罪的前《蘋果日報》副社長陳沛敏，以「從犯證人」身份出庭作供。其丈夫、被控「串謀發布煽動刊物」的前《立場新聞》總編輯鍾沛權，亦有到庭旁聽。</p> - -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/hxnYT2H.png" alt="image03" /> -▲ 前《立場新聞》總編輯鍾沛權（左二）</p> - -<p>陳身穿杏色上衣、淺藍色褸，蓄平蔭和冬菇頭，由兩名女懲教人員經職員通道帶進法庭，她以天主教形式宣誓。陳作供期間，黎智英亦透過耳機專心地聆聽。</p> - -<p>控方代表、助理刑事檢控專員張卓勤先作主問，陳確認案發時任職《蘋果日報》副社長。壹傳媒大樓於2020年8月被警方搜查，至2021年6月17日再度被搜，而她當天亦被拘捕，之後獲警方擔保。直至同年7月21日，她在住所樓下再度被捕，其後被正式控告「串謀發布煽動刊物」和「串謀勾結外國勢力危害國家安全」罪。陳早前承認「串謀勾結外國勢力危害國家安全」，另一控罪則存檔法庭，現時正還柙等候判刑。陳確認。</p> - -<p>個人背景方面，陳確認她在香港土生土長，大學主修工商管理，曾經在《資本雜誌》和《星島日報》工作。她離開《星島》之後，於1996年12月加入《蘋果日報》，任職高級記者。其時《蘋果日報》已發行了約一年多。</p> - -<p>陳供稱，她其後獲晉升至首席記者、採訪主任和副總編輯，最終升為副社長。陳供稱她主要負責本地新聞，但當發生一些極端的國際事件，例如3.11日本大地震，她也會協助國際版。</p> - -<p>陳提及，她在2015年曾是總編輯，但工作了一年多之後，她在2016年確診患癌症，「嗰陣時都三期尾，要做手術、化療啦」，因此申請病假、停工了7個月。她續指，後來於2017年復工時，擔心自己的健康狀況和癌症會復發，所以跟上司張劍虹表示擔心承受不到總編輯的工作壓力。當時《蘋果》副社長退休，該職位出現空缺，在張的同意下，陳接手副社長職位，因「副社長比較副手啲，唔洗承受咁大壓力」，張亦容許陳下午才上班，工作至晚上8時便下班，「變咗夜晚黑工作可以交俾其他同事完成。」</p> - -<h4 id="陳沛敏蘋果創辦人有鮮明價值-同時著重市場">陳沛敏：《蘋果》創辦人有鮮明價值 同時著重市場</h4> - -<p>控方問陳，會否形容《蘋果日報》是一份政治性的報紙，還是她會形容為非政治性報紙。陳表示：「一係咁講，我會覺得《蘋果》嗰個創辦人會有好鮮明嘅價值」，支持香港發展民主政制，另外也會尊重自由、人權這些價值；不過與此同時，創辦人也會著重市場對這份報紙是否支持，例如娛樂新聞能否吸引到讀者。</p> - -<p>就陳個人而言，她表示：「我唔否認著重新聞嘅娛樂性，不過與此同時，都會著重揭發醜聞嘅大新聞。我覺得呢啲新聞牽涉利益衝突」，例如時任財政司司長梁錦松偷步買車事件。</p> - -<p>控方問陳，她提及的「創辦人」是否就是黎智英，陳確認。控方續指，黎在本案中是第一被告，不過陳可以自行選擇在作供時稱呼「第一被告」或是「黎先生」，並問她意下如何。陳則表示：「黎生簡單啲」。</p> - -<h4 id="陳沛敏稱佔中後在公司見到黎智英機會增加">陳沛敏稱佔中後在公司見到黎智英機會增加</h4> - -<p>陳供稱，在任職初期，她會不時見到黎在公司出現，但沒有機會跟他單獨傾談和參與正式會議。被問到黎在公司出現次數，陳表示她經常外出採訪，所以不知道。</p> - -<p>控方指，2014年香港發生「佔中」，問陳是否有多些機會在公司見到黎智英。陳確認：「多咗機會」，可能在一些偶發性會議中見到，「有時佢會召集會議，講佢一啲經營嘅理念。」</p> - -<p>陳又提到曾有一段時間，黎希望發展網媒，又指有一段時間「佢會覺得紙媒會沒落，佢要我哋可能好多時要諗新聞嘅畫面，畫啲動畫呀」，形容「嗰時黎生好著緊要加動畫」。</p> - -<p>控方問及《蘋果》在哪一年開始引入「動新聞」，陳憶述她於2013年擔任副總編輯，在2至3年後《蘋果》創立「動新聞」，但她不肯定確實年份。</p> - -<h4 id="陳表示蘋果每天報導佔中新聞">陳表示《蘋果》每天報導佔中新聞</h4> - -<p>陳沛敏確認，在佔中運動期間，她是《蘋果》的副總編輯，負責靜態新聞。陳表示在整個佔中時期，《蘋果》每天都有報導與事件相關的新聞，紙媒及網媒均有，數量屬於多。</p> - -<h4 id="陳指佔中時黎智英成日去金鐘坐同事認為他喺社會運動企得前咗">陳指佔中時黎智英「成日去金鐘坐」同事認為他「喺社會運動企得前咗」</h4> - -<p>陳沛敏又指，在一些偶然召集的會議中，黎亦可能有談及佔中的話題，「因為黎生有親自參與呢場運動，黎生有去現場參與。」陳指，會議出席者包括採訪主任等「中高層」同事，他們作為記者，而當黎「本身成為一個新聞」的時候，同事都會想問黎有關情況。</p> - -<p>陳解釋，黎之所以成為新聞，是因他「試過一段時間，成日去金鐘嗰度（佔領區）坐囉」，當時算是一名公眾人物。陳形容黎在2014年之前，是「一個都幾多人識嘅人」，一般認知他為「一個傳媒老闆」、「《蘋果日報》老闆」。控方問到，2014年之後黎的形象是否一樣，陳表示：「我唔可以好科學咁講，一般大眾對佢認知有冇改變」，但「我哋同事之間覺得佢喺社會運動度企得前咗囉，我會咁形容」。</p> - -<h4 id="陳指2014年後黎在國際層面相對上出咗名啲-佔中後娛樂新聞減少">陳指2014年後黎在國際層面「相對上出咗名啲」 佔中後娛樂新聞減少</h4> - -<p>陳形容黎在2014年之前「相對冇咁多國際上嘅人認識」，但在2014年後，他在國際層面上「應該係相對上出咗名啲」。</p> - -<p>陳稱在佔中事件後，《蘋果》娛樂新聞的版面減少，而較少聽到「狗仔隊」有新聞。</p> - -<p>陳亦稱記得張劍虹大約於2014年佔中後期至完結期間，「放過一個幾長嘅假」，因為「嗰陣時佢話身體有啲問題。」</p> - -<h4 id="陳同意蘋果有報導2016年旺角暴動新聞">陳同意《蘋果》有報導2016年旺角暴動新聞</h4> - -<p>控方另問，《蘋果》是否有報導2016年旺角暴動事件，陳同意有。但控方指事件不是歷時數天，所以不作深究。</p> - -<p>另外，陳同意她自2017年至案發時的2021年6月，一直為副社長的身份，需要負責紙媒。她簡述工作流程包括參與「鋤報會」、編輯前及印刷前的會議。她一般會向社長張劍虹匯報。陳解釋，紙媒有時會將電子版的新聞組合，或者改變當中的焦點角度並出版。</p> - -<p>案件下周一（2月5日）續審。</p> - -<hr /> - -<p>案件編號：HCCC51/2022</p>獨媒報導張劍虹作供完畢 歷時約12天 下午將傳召前副社長陳沛敏 前副社長陳沛敏：黎智英有鮮明價值 佔中後「企得前咗」 娛樂新聞減少Conflict Zones2024-02-02T12:00:00+08:002024-02-02T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/conflict-zones<p><em>In the third installment of the 2024 Global Forecast — A World Dividing — CSIS experts offer their views on what to expect on the battlefield in 2024, from the outlook for Ukraine to critical questions about the long-term consequences of the Israel-Hamas conflict.</em></p> - -<excerpt /> - -<h2 id="the-outlook-for-ukraine">The Outlook for Ukraine</h2> - -<h3 id="three-futures-for-the-war-in-ukraine-the-good-the-bad-and-the-ugly">Three Futures for the War in Ukraine: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly</h3> - -<blockquote> - <h4 id="mark-f-cancian">Mark F. Cancian</h4> - <h4 id="senior-adviser-international-security-program">Senior Adviser, International Security Program</h4> -</blockquote> - -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Ukrainian and Russian commanders face the problem of World War I on the Western front. To achieve victory, they need to break through the defensive zone and get “to the green fields beyond,” but that may be out of reach with existing capabilities.</code></em></strong></p> - -<p>Last year, the path forward in Ukraine was clear: train Ukrainian forces, equip them with highly effective Western weapons, and unleash them in a counteroffensive that would push Russian forces back. Unfortunately, Ukraine got hung up in the Russian defensive zone and liberated little territory. Now, stalemate has settled in. What lies ahead for 2024? Here are three scenarios: the good — Ukraine rebuilds for another offensive and regains some lost territory; the bad — Western aid declines, leading to Ukrainian military deterioration and eventual collapse; and the ugly — a continuing stalemate on the current front lines.</p> - -<h4 id="scenario-1">SCENARIO 1</h4> -<h4 id="the-good--continued-aid-and-renewed-military-operations">The Good — Continued Aid and Renewed Military Operations</h4> - -<p>As the war enters its third year, Ukrainian officials are pleading for continued support. President Volodymyr Zelensky recently came to Washington in person to argue his case, and Ukrainian domestic support for the war continues to be strong. The Ukrainian people are committed to liberating their territory.</p> - -<p>In the United States, despite opposition from elements in Congress, aid for Ukraine continues to have strong bipartisan support in Congress and with the American people, though both are getting discouraged. There is guarded optimism about a deal that includes increased border security for the Republicans and aid to Ukraine for the Democrats.</p> - -<p>Militarily, Ukrainian forces have learned a lot about the Russian defensive system and now know what to expect. In a scenario in which Ukraine is able to continue fighting effectively, it will need weapons to replace losses, which continued military aid will provide. Most of all, its forces will need training. Last year, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) established training programs from basic skills to battalion-level maneuvers to meet this need. Re-equipped and better-trained Ukrainian forces might crack the Russian lines. Ukrainian troops have beaten Russian forces before and retaken half of the territory they lost since February 2022.</p> - -<p>For this approach to be viable, Ukraine needs a theory of victory to guide its military operations and counter rising war fatigue among its supporters. How does it plan to win? This theory of victory could take many forms: a series of limited counterattacks against Russian weak points that collectively regain the lost territory, a battle of attrition that wears Russia down, or a focus on long-range strikes that squeeze Russia, particularly Crimea. Whatever the theory, Ukraine needs to lay it out convincingly.</p> - -<h4 id="scenario-2">SCENARIO 2</h4> -<h4 id="the-bad--aid-reductions-and-military-decline">The Bad — Aid Reductions and Military Decline</h4> - -<p>U.S. aid to Ukraine is in the balance. A strong contingent in Congress, backed by former president Donald Trump and some think tanks, seeks to end aid. So far, they have succeeded.</p> - -<p>In a scenario where U.S. support dramatically diminishes or ends altogether, Ukraine’s future looks bleak, as laid out in a recent CSIS commentary. Ukrainian military capabilities will decline gradually. Over time, Ukraine will face increasing difficulty making local attacks to capitalize on Russian vulnerabilities, and eventually, it will struggle to contain Russian advances. Collapse would be inevitable. Before then, Ukraine would likely agree to a Russian-dictated peace to prevent catastrophic losses of territory.</p> - -<h4 id="scenario-3">SCENARIO 3</h4> -<h4 id="the-ugly--continued-stalemate">The Ugly — Continued Stalemate</h4> - -<p>The front lines have changed little in the past 14 months despite hundreds of thousands of casualties. A continued stalemate on the ground is a highly likely scenario. Stalemate does not mean nothing happens; local ground assaults, long-range strikes, air attacks on infrastructure, and Ukraine’s dominance in the Black Sea will continue. Stalemate does mean that the front lines will not move much. Both sides have created formidable defensive zones with mines, trenches, strong points, and anti-tank obstacles. Ukrainian and Russian commanders face the problem of World War I on the Western front. To achieve victory, they need to break through the defensive zone and get “to the green fields beyond,” but that may be out of reach with existing capabilities.</p> - -<p>Ukraine and its supporters have continually hoped for a game-changing weapon that would break the stalemate. Javelin missiles, the High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS), the Patriot missile defense system, M1 tanks, and Leopard tanks have all been touted as game changers, but none have brought victory even as each has added to Ukraine’s overall military capabilities.</p> - -<p>The next highly anticipated weapon is the F-16 fighter jet. Indeed, Ukraine has pointed to a lack of air support as a key reason for the counteroffensive’s lack of success. Although F-16s might arrive before the end of the year, their numbers will be small (maybe 24), and the vast supporting capabilities available to NATO air forces — airborne early warning, electronic countermeasures aircraft, joint command and control — will be unavailable to the Ukrainians. The F-16s will not do for Ukraine what U.S. airpower did against Iraq, Serbia, Afghanistan, and Libya. Success, if it comes, will result from a combination of weapons and munitions, training of forces, and the people’s determination.</p> - -<h4 id="looking-ahead">Looking Ahead</h4> - -<p>The optimism of 2023 has faded. There is always hope that negotiations will achieve what military forces could not, but the brutal truth is that facts on the ground drive peace settlements. Two of the three scenarios outlined here are Russian victories. A reduction in military aid (the bad scenario) would bring a clear Russian victory. Any peace Russia negotiates while its military power is ascendent would inevitably be unfavorable. Russia would demand not just holding on to the territory it currently occupies but also, possibly, other concessions like amnesty for war crimes and renunciation of reparations.</p> - -<h3 id="europes-surprisingly-resilient-support-for-ukraine-will-be-tested-in-2024">Europe’s Surprisingly Resilient Support for Ukraine Will Be Tested in 2024</h3> - -<blockquote> - <h4 id="max-bergmann">Max Bergmann</h4> - <h4 id="director-europe-russia-and-eurasia-program-and-stuart-center-in-euro-atlantic-and-northern-european-studies">Director, Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program and Stuart Center in Euro-Atlantic and Northern European Studies</h4> -</blockquote> - -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Thus, while Europe is stepping up, it will need to do considerably more for both Ukraine and its own defense forces in 2024. That will require Europe taking extraordinary measures at the EU and national levels to ensure Ukraine is able to hold back Russian forces.</code></em></strong></p> - -<p>Europe’s fierce response to Russia’s aggression in Ukraine surprised many. As Russian tanks rolled into Ukraine, Europeans were shocked to see one of their capitals under attack. This prompted an unprecedented response, with Europe providing substantial military aid, welcoming millions of Ukrainian refugees, and establishing a robust sanctions regime. Perhaps just as remarkable, today, after nearly two years of war and a major energy shock, European support for Ukraine remains robust. Yet signs of strain are emerging that may prevent Europe from living up to its rhetoric to support Ukraine “as long as it takes.”</p> - -<p>With the war becoming a protracted conflict and Russia looking to go back on the offensive, Europe will need to create new instruments and funding mechanisms to support Ukraine, especially if the United States stops sending aid. The sense of political urgency that existed in 2022 has faded. Now with Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s Hungary becoming a major difficulty, along with German-led demands for a European-wide return to tight fiscal policy, European support for Ukraine may be far below what is needed.</p> - -<p>It is easy to forget how surprisingly strong Europe’s response to the war has been. Prior to the invasion, U.S. officials working on sanctions policy believed they would have to pull Europe along, as they did in response to Russia’s seizure of Crimea in 2014. Yet the EU sanctions response, such as pushing for an oil embargo and adopting sanctions against Russia’s central bank, often caught Washington by surprise. European countries, including the European Union itself, also took unprecedented steps to provide military support to Ukraine. Countries like Germany and Sweden provided lethal aid to a country in conflict for the first time, and the European Union used its European Peace Facility fund to provide Ukraine with lethal assistance. Europe is now collectively providing more support than the United States to Ukraine. The clear threat posed by Russia prompted historic steps from Sweden and Finland to join the NATO alliance. Defense spending also dramatically increased across the continent, with Germany leading the way with the announcement of a new €100 billion Zeitenwende defense fund.</p> - -<p>European support for Ukraine remains high despite the war causing significant economic hardship in Europe. Russian president Vladimir Putin’s throttling of gas deliveries into Europe and the destruction of the Nord Stream pipelines caused an energy crisis with Europeans seeing a dramatic increase in prices. The situation led to significant inflation and undermined European economic competitiveness. Yet European leaders reacted with remarkable speed, such as by buying liquefied natural gas and rapidly building new infrastructure. Remarkably, European citizens also responded by cutting their energy demand by 15–20 percent, turning down the thermostat and putting on sweaters. There is no clearer example of steadfast European support than in Germany, where in the wake of a German constitutional court ruling that prompted German leaders to cut €17 billion from its budget, funding for Ukraine was protected.</p> - -<p>But there are challenges ahead. First, the dynamic of the war in Ukraine has changed. In 2022 and 2023, European militaries were providing Ukraine with older equipment from their militaries, but now that equipment is mostly gone. Europe has little equipment on hand to give, which is problematic because it means if the United States stops providing military aid, Europe will be unable to fill the gap. It also means that for Europe to maintain support to Ukraine, it will have to buy new equipment from its defense industries. Not only will this be more expensive, but it also requires Europeans do more to coordinate their efforts, something European defense ministries struggle to do. As a result, production lines to aid Ukraine and refill European warehouses are not yet running at full speed.</p> - -<p>Second, Prime Minister Orbán has demonstrated a willingness to block EU support for Ukraine. At the European Council summit in December 2023, Orbán agreed to abstain on the decision to begin ascension negotiations with Ukraine, the next step on Ukraine’s road to EU membership. The European Union had just released more than €10 billion in funds for Hungary that it was holding for rule-of-law violations. However, despite receiving the funds, Orbán noted that he still opposed Ukraine moving toward membership and that there would be many opportunities to block Ukraine’s membership in the future. The next day, Orbán blocked the European Union from providing €50 billion in support for Ukraine. EU leaders were ultimately successful in pressuring Orbán to sign on to the €50 billion financial support to Ukraine at a special February 1 European Council summit. But with Ukraine still needing more military support from the European Union, the European Union and Ukraine’s Hungary problem has not gone away. The need for unanimity for major policy and funding decisions will continue to give Orbán significant leverage and ability to hold Ukrainian funding hostage.</p> - -<p>Third, and perhaps an even more acute challenge, is the return of austerity economics to the European Union. Last year’s ruling of the German constitutional court that the German government was violating its constitutional requirement to have a balanced budget has led to immediate budget cuts, despite Germany suffering from a major deficit of infrastructure investment. Moreover, the EU Stability and Growth Pact, which sets rules for the national budgets of eurozone countries, returned on January 1, 2024, after being suspended in response to the pandemic. While the pact was amended to give governments more flexibility, the reinstitution of the pact will still put pressure on European governments to cut spending, making additional outlays for defense of Ukraine more difficult. Germany, for instance, has kept its funding for Ukraine at the national level but is now opposing increases to the European Peace Facility, which is used to support Ukraine.</p> - -<p>Thus, while Europe is stepping up, it will need to do considerably more for both Ukraine and its own defense forces in 2024. That will require Europe taking extraordinary measures at the EU and national levels to ensure Ukraine is able to hold back Russian forces.</p> - -<h3 id="putins-efforts-to-divide-the-west">Putin’s Efforts to Divide the West</h3> - -<blockquote> - <h4 id="maria-snegovaya">Maria Snegovaya</h4> - <h4 id="senior-fellow-europe-russia-and-eurasia-program">Senior Fellow, Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program</h4> -</blockquote> - -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">The ongoing political polarization preventing the Western political mainstream from reaching consensus on essential questions, diffuse power structures, and multiple political chokepoints provide a favorable dynamic for the Kremlin to achieve its goals, especially if its propagandist campaigns are successful in convincing Western audiences the war is too costly for them domestically.</code></em></strong></p> - -<p>The most recent Ukrainian counteroffensive in the second half of 2023 has exposed Ukraine’s military vulnerabilities on the one hand and Russia’s strengthened defense capabilities on the other. Among the top challenges facing Ukraine is speedy and uninterrupted access to Western military equipment and technology. Ukrainians also require reconstruction support from the West, which is vital to shore up their morale and bring back some of the millions of exiled citizens. Russia, on the contrary, has ramped up domestic arms production, increased the number of volunteers to fight in the war, and successfully continued its sanctions circumvention efforts. Absent consistent large-scale economic and military assistance from the West, Russia might gain a significant military advantage over Ukraine in 2024.</p> - -<p>Provision of support to Ukraine depends on Western ability to maintain unity. However, by late 2023 this unity had started to crumble. In total, newly committed aid by allies dropped by almost 90 percent between August and October 2023 compared to the same period in 2022. Of the 42 previous Ukrainian country donors, only 20 committed new aid packages between October and December 2023, the lowest number since the start of the war. Ukraine is also becoming hostage to partisan battles in the West, as its support has increasingly been contested in both the European Union and the United States.</p> - -<p>The Kremlin is hoping to exploit these partisan dynamics and further undermine support for Ukraine in the West by using tools such as gas dependencies, investments and oligarchs, disinformation, intelligence and spies, and support for populist parties. Some of these tools are analyzed below.</p> - -<h4 id="energy-leverage">Energy Leverage</h4> - -<p>Since the start of the war, the Kremlin has attempted to undermine Western unity through its energy tools. In preparation for the war, Russian state-controlled energy giant Gazprom gradually reduced gas supplies to Europe. By mid-2022, the European Union was experiencing a 60 percent drop in Russian gas deliveries compared to mid-2021. Russia coupled gas supply reductions with high-volume information campaigns as its state-linked media broadcasted fights and protests breaking out in Europe due to high energy prices. Gazprom also released ads threatening to freeze Europe.</p> - -<p>To replace Russian gas, Europe hiked imports of liquefied natural gas from other countries while slashing gas use. The loss of Russia’s cheap natural gas was particularly consequential for Germany, one of its main consumers. Supply disruptions pushed up electricity prices, forcing Berlin to spend billions of euros to ease the burden of rising bills and deepening Germany’s budget crisis. High costs of hydrocarbons prompted German chemical giant BASF to cut jobs and stop its share buybacks. As a result, Germany experienced a minor recession in 2023, becoming the world’s worst-performing major developed economy and the only G7 economy to contract.</p> - -<p>However, besides Germany, the drag on EU economic activity was not as deep as expected when Russia’s invasion of Ukraine began and the first comprehensive sanctions took place. Moreover, gas prices returned to prewar levels in 2023. At least in the short term, the European Union has successfully adapted and accumulated substantial natural gas inventories sufficient to survive winter 2023. It seems Gazprom, rather than the European Union, took the greatest blow from its own actions by losing much of the European markets and undermining its own geopolitical relevance.</p> - -<h4 id="information-leverage">Information Leverage</h4> - -<p>In early 2022, the Kremlin’s disinformation strategy failed to sell its pro-war narratives in the West. The U.S. administration’s strategy of disclosing classified intel contributed to exposing Russia’s propagandist efforts. Western public opinion almost uniformly sided with Ukraine.</p> - -<p>Russia subsequently adapted its information strategy to emphasize domestic costs of the war for the West. Thus, comparing to the early months of war, later in 2022, Russia-linked accounts on Twitter had reduced mentions of Nazis and NATO, replacing them with complaints about energy and cost of living. In France, the Kremlin-backed disinformation effort pushed the talking points that Western sanctions against Russia have damaged the economy through a decline in trade and left the country at risk of falling into the deepest social and economic crisis, and that the supply of arms to Ukraine has undermined the country’s ability to defend itself. This approach has worked much better for Russia. As measured by the popularity of those narratives in Western domestic debates, claims that the West’s support for Ukraine is too costly or too risky have found much more fertile ground with Western audiences by playing to pocket-book concerns and war fatigue rather than historical or geopolitical grievances.</p> - -<p>Another disinformation effort is aimed at presenting Western support for Ukraine as futile or hypocritical. A recent BBC study found thousands of fake accounts on TikTok spreading false claims about senior Ukrainian officials and their relatives, presenting them as obsessed with money and uncaring about the war effort. Russian diplomats and Kremlin-linked media platforms are also spreading accusations that the West has a double standard about civilian casualties when it comes to Ukraine and Gaza.</p> - -<h4 id="political-leverage">Political Leverage</h4> - -<p>For years, Russia’s influence in Europe and the United States has relied on its links to non-mainstream populist political actors. At the start of the 2022 war, this leverage seemed to have disappeared when many European populists shifted their stances following their voters’ uniform condemnation of Putin and embrace of Ukraine. Most notably, Matteo Salvini’s Lega and Giorgia Meloni’s Fratelli d’Italia parties both flipped their stances to adopt more pro-Europe, pro-U.S., and anti-Russia positions. The intensity of condemnation, however, varied, with some parties presenting others as being at least partially responsible for the war along with Russia.</p> - -<p>In recent months, however, old and new populist parties have become more critical of support for Ukraine. On the left, the newly elected Slovakian government led by Prime Minister Robert Fico in early November 2023 rejected a draft plan to donate rockets and ammunition to Kyiv, while prominent German politician Sahra Wagenknecht announced plans to launch a new party opposing sanctions against Russia and arms supplies to Ukraine.</p> - -<p>On the right, former U.S. president Donald Trump, who leads in the 2024 Republican primaries, has offered more scrutiny on military budgets, as his supporters in Congress blocked funding to the bill that included aid for Ukraine. France’s National Rally and Germany’s Alternative for Germany are growing in popularity, presenting the war in Ukraine as a waste of European resources. In the Netherlands, the recent victory of the far-right Party for Freedom (PVV), which offered to halt military and financial support for Ukraine, threatens the assistance of the fifth-largest EU aid provider to Ukraine. But the main proponent of lifting Western sanctions against Russia and blocking aid for Ukraine is Hungary’s far-right prime minister Viktor Orbán. He has adopted a successful strategy of threatening to block European financial aid for Ukraine and Ukraine’s EU accession unless the European Commission unblocks frozen funds for Hungary. The commission’s recent caving into his blackmail sets a dangerous precedent, which other actors might soon pick up.</p> - -<h4 id="will-the-western-coalition-stick-together">Will the Western Coalition Stick Together?</h4> - -<p>In the coming months, the Kremlin is likely to continue using energy, political, and informational tools along the lines discussed here. At the core of Putin’s strategy is identifying the points of discord in the West and amplifying them with a goal of complicating Western ability to sustain consistent support for Ukraine. The ongoing political polarization preventing the Western political mainstream from reaching consensus on essential questions, diffuse power structures, and multiple political chokepoints provide a favorable dynamic for the Kremlin to achieve its goals, especially if its propagandist campaigns are successful in convincing Western audiences the war is too costly for them domestically.</p> - -<p>It appears the Western tide is turning for Ukraine. But the problem goes beyond the Kremlin’s aptitude to exploit Western divisions. Broadly speaking, Ukraine is suffering from the West’s inability to understand the existential importance of the war for its own survival and its policymakers’ continued lack of strategy for ensuring victory. Since early 2022, the West has offered Ukraine just enough military aid to survive but not enough to threaten Russia with defeat, which has allowed the Kremlin time to improve its military positions and undermine popular support for Ukraine in the West. The current situation generates multiple fissures in the West, which — if the past is any indication — the Kremlin will prove very apt at exploiting.</p> - -<h3 id="ukraines-future-depends-on-a-vibrant-private-sector">Ukraine’s Future Depends on a Vibrant Private Sector</h3> - -<blockquote> - <h4 id="romina-bandura">Romina Bandura</h4> - <h4 id="senior-fellow-project-on-prosperity-and-development-and-project-on-us-leadership-in-development">Senior Fellow, Project on Prosperity and Development and Project on U.S. Leadership in Development</h4> -</blockquote> - -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Ukraine’s future depends on the outcomes on the battlefield as much as on the economic front.</code></em></strong></p> - -<p>The private sector is the main motor of growth of any functioning market economy, creating jobs; introducing new products, services, and processes; and transferring technology and know-how. In particular, small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) represent 90 percent of all business activity worldwide and contribute over 50 percent of global employment. Companies are also major sources of tax revenue for governments, helping fund public services. This is the case in Ukraine, where the private sector — comprising approximately 1.6 million individual entrepreneurs, 400,000 SMEs, and 500 large enterprises — contributes significantly to the economy and society at large.</p> - -<p>Unfortunately, the war has affected businesses across sectors of the Ukrainian economy, damaging facilities and logistics routes and disrupting supply chains, leading to sales losses and unemployment. Ukraine is fighting as much a military war against Russia as an economic war. The enemy is trying not only to occupy land, wipe out physical infrastructure, and inflict mass civilian casualties but also to cripple the economy, targeting critical industries including transport and logistics, agriculture, energy, digital, and the defense industrial base. Ukraine’s future depends on the outcomes on the battlefield as much as on the economic front.</p> - -<p>Despite the war, the private sector has exhibited remarkable resilience. According to the American Chamber of Commerce’s September 2023 Ukraine survey, even one and a half years into the conflict, 98 percent of its member companies were still operational in Ukraine. Although GDP fell by nearly 30 percent in 2022, it is forecast to grow by 3.5 percent in 2023, partly due to the resilient information technology (IT) sector and the rerouting of exports. Since the war started, Ukraine attracted more than $500 million in new investments, according to data by UkraineInvest, the country’s investment promotion agency. These new investments are taking place in regions that are not under active combat, such as the western and central parts of the country. A large portion of Ukraine — close to 85 percent of its territory — is unoccupied, where businesses can operate and grow. The Global Business for Ukraine’s investment map showcases 146 investment-ready projects totaling $4.9 billion. On the other hand, large reconstruction projects in the east and southeast of Ukraine (regions that have been heavily destroyed) will probably have to wait until the war is over.</p> - -<p>Ukraine’s allies and partners are supporting Ukraine’s right to defend itself by providing military aid. Through humanitarian and budgetary assistance — which pays the salaries of soldiers, pensioners, and teachers and finances essential public services — they are also helping the economy stay afloat. However, only a small part of this aid is being directed to help current businesses and attract new investors. Moreover, the war continues, and a political settlement is unlikely anytime soon. This complicates the situation of the private sector. Donor countries will continue supporting Ukraine, but these amounts will likely decline over time and fulfill only part of the country’s financial needs. The international community needs to work with the government of Ukraine to spur business and attract new investments into the country so they can create jobs and generate tax revenues. International financial institutions (IFIs) and development finance institutions (DFIs) could do more in this area, even amid the war.</p> - -<p>Ukrainian businesses have many financing needs at the moment, in particular equity investments. The capital needs are immense. The destruction of manufacturing facilities, logistical lines, and supply chains has forced some companies to rebuild their business models from scratch. Some companies were able to adapt to the war, but in many cases they require capital. The impact that new capital can produce in this environment is enormous.</p> - -<p>IFIs and donors are exploring new finance mechanisms to support the private sector in Ukraine. They are also providing technical and legal advice on how to reform laws (e.g., the public-private partnership law) and important institutions so Ukraine can become “investor-ready.” However, as they approach operations in Ukraine, they need to be more creative, coordinated, and willing to take risks. They must devise new instruments to leverage private capital for smaller projects that could provide demonstration effects for other investors. Although these institutions are doing incredible work to support the economy, they have not adapted their business model to operate more creatively in a war zone.</p> - -<p>IFIs and DFIs could set up new finance vehicles, such as investment funds where donors would provide a first-loss tranche to attract other investors. These funds could potentially be funded by using frozen Russian central bank assets worth $300 billion, or the interest proceeds, which in Europe amount to $3 billion a year. In addition, DFIs could ramp up existing risk mitigation mechanisms such as loan portfolio guarantees, which would help existing businesses access finance at reasonable rates. One example is the support that the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC) is lending to the Bank Lviv. Although these amounts are small, this instrument could be expanded. Additionally, a more coordinated and scalable political risk (or war risk) insurance mechanism may create the confidence needed for private sector investments to flow in Ukraine. The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) is working on such a scheme, but it is still not operational.</p> - -<p>Investors also want to see more significant governance and economic reforms in Ukraine to improve the business climate in the country. This includes turbocharging anti-corruption efforts, devising a clear strategy to restructure state-owned enterprises and inefficient businesses, and de-oligarchizing the economy. This reform agenda must align with the conditions under Ukraine’s EU accession process to ensure harmonization with EU laws and standards.</p> - -<p>Fighting corruption is paramount if Ukraine wants to attract investments and join the European family. Society at large considers corruption as the number two problem in the country after the war, according to a recent survey. The latest edition of Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index shows that Ukraine still scores poorly at 36 points out of 100 (half of France’s score and 18 points behind Poland). However, Ukraine has made strong inroads in the fight against corruption, including increased criminal proceedings against suspected perpetrators, judiciary reforms, a competitive selection process for the heads of the main anti-corruption agencies, and improvements in public procurement. This is an area where the international community can play a critical role, providing both advice and pressure for reforms. Ukrainian civil society and independent journalists are important allies in this fight. Ukraine still has a long road ahead but must keep this momentum.</p> - -<p>Ukraine’s future membership in the European Union is also a big incentive for investors. Ukraine’s entry into the European Union will provide companies with enough confidence that there is a level playing field for doing business in the country. Moreover, it will give companies access to more than 40 million consumers in Ukraine, with an added 450 million consumers in the European Union. Recent investor surveys point out that access to the EU market and EU product quality and standards are key to future business opportunities in Ukraine.</p> - -<p>Ukraine has huge investment potential given its low-cost skilled labor, a market size of more than 40 million consumers, and proximity to the EU market. There are many business opportunities in sectors such as oil and gas, strategic minerals, IT, and agriculture. Ukraine also has the potential to become a manufacturing hub for its neighborhood, reaching more than 800 million consumers.</p> - -<p>As Ukraine moves away from its Soviet past and looks toward a bright economic future, developing a strong and vibrant private sector will provide tax revenues, jobs, and economic security. The international community can help provide more predictability and stability for companies operating in Ukraine and create innovative mechanisms to attract private capital. It might be risky to invest in Ukraine during wartime, but not investing is a larger missed opportunity. Ukrainians cannot wait until a peace settlement is reached. With the prospect that economic assistance will not last forever, the international community needs to find ways to make the economy more self-sufficient. The time to act is now.</p> - -<h3 id="a-bumpy-road-on-burden-sharing-nato-and-ukraine-in-2024">A Bumpy Road on Burden Sharing: NATO and Ukraine in 2024</h3> - -<blockquote> - <h4 id="kathleen-j-mcinnis">Kathleen J. McInnis</h4> - <h4 id="senior-fellow-international-security-program-and-director-smart-women-smart-power-initiative">Senior Fellow, International Security Program, and Director, Smart Women, Smart Power Initiative</h4> -</blockquote> - -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">It is hard to overstate how important a Ukrainian victory — or, at the very least, a Russian loss — is for U.S. and Western interests, broadly defined. Yet it is also hard to overstate how important the issue of allied spending on defense and security (or lack thereof) is to Washington policymakers, some of whom now question why the United States — rather than Europe — must continue supporting Ukraine.</code></em></strong></p> - -<p>The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) turns 75 in 2024, and the allies will meet in the summer in Washington, D.C., to mark the occasion. A key question on many observers’ minds is, How will NATO manage what is arguably one of the biggest crises in European security in the alliance’s history — the Russian war against Ukraine? The answer to that question will, for many, inform perceptions of the utility and purpose of the alliance for both current and emerging threats to the Euro-Atlantic region. Of course, crystal balls are inherently foggy; rather than predict a specific answer, it is far better to think about what factors are likely to inform such allied decisions at NATO’s 75th anniversary summit.</p> - -<p>First of all, despite the fact that the war in Ukraine is affecting all NATO members, Ukraine itself is not a NATO member state. This is a point of frustration for several central and eastern European countries in particular, many of which waged an intense but ultimately unsuccessful diplomatic campaign for Ukraine to be invited to join the alliance in the run-up to the 2023 NATO Vilnius summit. As the logic went, inviting Ukraine to join NATO would be a way to force a cessation of hostilities, as many observers believe that Putin’s Russia does not want to want to wage war against NATO itself. The counterargument to Ukrainian NATO membership was that it would have immediately committed NATO and its member states to a major war with Russia. A half measure was instead agreed at Vilnius; among other things, Ukraine was promised membership in the future, as conditions allow, but without all the strings normally attached to the membership accession processes. But the bottom line remains that Ukraine is not a NATO ally.</p> - -<p>As a consequence, NATO’s responses to the Ukraine crisis are primarily inwardly focused. One major area of work addresses preparing the alliance to deter and defend against a Russian attack on NATO territories (among other threats) through a series of reorganized war plans. Another key area focuses on encouraging members to spend at least 2 percent of their GDP on defense programs. And still another addresses reexamining the NATO defense industrial base after shortfalls in basic areas like ammunition have become apparent. As for Ukraine, NATO will continue to aid the war-torn country through humanitarian assistance, nonlethal aid, and capacity-building measures. Allies will continue providing both lethal and nonlethal aid, assuming their domestic politics allow for it.</p> - -<p>As for domestic politics, therein lies the rub. It is hard to overstate how important a Ukrainian victory — or, at the very least, a Russian loss — is for U.S. and Western interests, broadly defined. Yet it is also hard to overstate how important the issue of allied spending on defense and security (or lack thereof) is to Washington policymakers, some of whom now question why the United States — rather than Europe — must continue supporting Ukraine.</p> - -<p>Concerns about “burden sharing” are as old as the alliance itself. The need for Europe to spend more on defense has been routinely expressed across U.S. administrations for decades. Prior to departing the Pentagon, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates argued to the allies that if they did not spend more on defense, future presidents would have a hard time making the case to continue investing in NATO. At the NATO summit in Vilnius in 2023, U.S. senator Ashley Tillis argued that burden sharing is the most critical issue before the alliance today. Yet, as of 2022, only seven European NATO states had spent 2 percent or more of their GDP on defense. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that the world is where it is: the United States is frustrated that Europe does not put its money where its mouth is, and Europe is frustrated with being repeatedly browbeaten over the subject and with a U.S. presidential contender who, if elected, might attempt to pull the United States out of NATO altogether.</p> - -<p>The debate and related concerns about defense spending have been — and are — grounded in real concerns about what it takes to meaningfully defend allied territory and interests, especially as the alliance faces a Russian bear with a growing geopolitical appetite. But the problem with evaluating burden sharing against defense spending is that it turns what should be a strategic-level discussion among allies about what they can and should do to meet shared challenges into a transactional, nickel-and-dime issue of cost sharing. Because the value of NATO is being reduced to a discussion over dollars and euros, the broader strategic utility of the NATO alliance for U.S. interests is being lost. And Ukraine now hangs in the balance.</p> - -<h3 id="the-future-of-congressional-support-for-ukraine">The Future of Congressional Support for Ukraine</h3> - -<blockquote> - <h4 id="elizabeth-hoffman">Elizabeth Hoffman</h4> - <h4 id="fellow-and-director-of-congressional-and-government-affairs">Fellow and Director of Congressional and Government Affairs</h4> -</blockquote> - -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">A decisive defeat of the Russian military is in the interest of the United States. Therefore, Congress should act quickly to provide Ukraine with the needed support to accomplish this goal. The longer assistance is delayed, the harder it will be to secure a Ukrainian victory and the more money and lives will be lost in the long run.</code></em></strong></p> - -<p>On February 24, 2022, millions watched in disbelief as Russia launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Within two weeks, the U.S. Congress passed legislation allocating nearly $14 billion in support of Ukraine. Nearly two years later, the urgency in Washington seems to have evaporated. Meanwhile, Ukrainians continue to die on the front lines. Sirens continue to wail, warning citizens of incoming missiles, and mothers continue to search for their children abducted by Russian forces. Ukrainians are left to wonder, Will the world’s most powerful democracy abandon us in our darkest hour? Each passing day that Congress fails to approve additional assistance weakens the position of the Ukrainians, both militarily and politically.</p> - -<p>Despite waning urgency, bipartisan support in Congress for continued U.S. assistance to Ukraine remains strong. Looking at the voting patterns in the House of Representatives, where support for assistance to Ukraine is more fragile, opposition has grown slightly, but not significantly, over the past two years. Parsing out members’ positions on Ukraine can be challenging since aid has often been part of broader packages. However, three key votes can help inform the trends on support for Ukraine.</p> - -<p>The first stand-alone vote on assistance to Ukraine occurred in May 2022 when Congress took up a $39.4 billion package. Prior votes on assistance were part of larger legislative packages that garnered opposition for reasons notwithstanding assistance to Ukraine. This bill passed the House overwhelmingly by a vote of 368–57 and the Senate by a vote of 86–11. The next stand-alone votes on assistance to Ukraine did not occur until the House took up the fiscal year 2024 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA). During consideration of the NDAA, Representative Marjorie Taylor Greene offered an amendment to eliminate $300 million in assistance to Ukraine. The amendment failed by a vote of 341–89. Representative Matt Gaetz offered an amendment to prohibit all U.S. security assistance to Ukraine, which failed by an even wider margin, 358–70. Using the Greene and Gaetz amendment votes as a marker, a solid majority of the 221 members that make up the House Republican Conference continue to support U.S. assistance to Ukraine.</p> - -<p>While these vote trends tell a more positive story than what is often portrayed in the media, worries over declining support are not misplaced, particularly as the United States embarks on a hotly contested and emotionally fraught presidential campaign cycle. While U.S. president Joseph Biden is a strong supporter of continued assistance to Ukraine, many congressional Republicans feel the administration has failed to lay out a clear strategy to support victory. According to a November 2023 Gallup poll, a plurality — 41 percent — of Americans feel the United States is doing too much to support Ukraine, with 33 percent saying the United States is doing the right amount and 25 percent stating the United States is not doing enough. After February 24, 2022, President Biden did not formally address the nation again on the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine until October 2023. The president and other supporters of continued assistance to Ukraine should continue to make the case to voters about why supporting a decisive Ukrainian victory is in the interest of the United States.</p> - -<p>Their argument should be one of principles and self-interest. On principles, the case is straightforward: Russian president Vladimir Putin — an unelected dictator — invaded a sovereign nation in an attempt to overthrow Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelensky, who was elected by the citizens of Ukraine in a free and fair election. During the course of this invasion, Russian soldiers brutally and systematically massacred noncombatant civilians. One need only stand in front of the memorial marking the mass grave in Bucha to learn of children as young as four years old being killed by the Russians. Ukrainian authorities have identified at least 16,000 children abducted by Russia since the start of the war, though they worry the true number may be far greater. The extensive documentation leaves little room to doubt Russia has committed and continues to commit crimes against humanity. Furthermore, should Putin seize control of broad swaths of Ukrainian territory, this sends the message to other dictators with expansionist ideations — such as Xi Jinping in China — that one need only to outlast the short attention span of the world’s democracies to achieve their goals.</p> - -<p>However, the reasons to support Ukraine go beyond the moral imperative of the conflict. Analysis of the $113 billion appropriated to support Ukraine shows much of that money has gone to modernize U.S. weapons stockpiles, reinvigorate the U.S. defense industrial base, and invest in U.S. military personnel. Aid appropriated in the supplemental spending bills for Ukraine provided nearly half a billion dollars for Lockheed Martin to surge production of the High-Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) in the town of Camden, Arkansas — a welcome economic boost. Similar infusions of spending have benefited towns across the United States, including Lima, Ohio, where Abrams tanks are produced, and Ocala, Florida, and Troy, Alabama, which are home to Javelin missile factories.</p> - -<p>In addition to the economic boon for the defense industrial base, U.S. business stands to benefit from the transformation and reconstruction of Ukraine. A World Bank estimate from March 2023 places the cost of rebuilding Ukraine at $411 billion. Continued U.S. support for Ukraine will ensure U.S. companies and businesses are welcomed to participate in the effort. Emphasizing pocketbook issues such as job creation and economic growth potential is especially important in a consequential election year.</p> - -<p>Absent leadership in the White House, it is up to members of Congress to clearly articulate to their constituents why it is imperative to continue to support Ukraine’s victory. The moral argument is clear. However, politicians need to appeal to the self-interest of the American public as well. A decisive defeat of the Russian military is in the interest of the United States. Therefore, Congress should act quickly to provide Ukraine with the needed support to accomplish this goal. The longer assistance is delayed, the harder it will be to secure a Ukrainian victory and the more money and lives will be lost in the long run.</p> - -<h2 id="assessing-the-fallout-consequences-of-the-israel-hamas-war">Assessing the Fallout: Consequences of the Israel-Hamas War</h2> - -<h3 id="long-term-implications-of-the-israel-hamas-war">Long-Term Implications of the Israel-Hamas War</h3> - -<blockquote> - <h4 id="eliot-a-cohen">Eliot A. Cohen</h4> - <h4 id="arleigh-a-burke-chair-in-strategy">Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy</h4> -</blockquote> - -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">For Israel, in the years ahead, every day will be October 8 but with the fear that it is October 6. Isreal’s sense of security after decades of limited conflict with its neighbors has been shattered.</code></em></strong></p> - -<p>Earthquakes have aftershocks,” a veteran Israeli intelligence officer told a CSIS delegation on a recent visit to that country, “and sometimes the aftershocks are more important than the earthquake.” He spoke wisely.</p> - -<p>For Israel, this was a transformative event, every bit as much as the Six-Day War in 1967 or the 1973 Yom Kippur War. On October 7, 2023, Israel suffered an attack of unparalleled barbarity as thousands of Hamas fighters, led by the elite Nukhba forces and followed by the less disciplined Qassam Brigades and finally mobs of Gazans, attacked at over two dozen points along the frontier. During the initial fighting, 1,200 Israelis, 900 of them civilians, including children and invalids, were slaughtered; men and women were raped and mutilated; and hundreds were taken hostage.</p> - -<p>For Israel, in the years ahead, every day will be October 8 but with the fear that it is October 6. Isreal’s sense of security after decades of limited conflict with its neighbors has been shattered. The existential question is on the table because Israel soon entered a war on multiple fronts including on its northern border, as Hezbollah joined in the fight in a limited way; on the West Bank; and even further afield.</p> - -<p>Israel will now no longer trust in its ability to detect and preempt threats; instead it will seek to prevent them. Israeli political and military leaders will be much more ready than in the past to initiate conflict if they think that by doing so they can reduce the possibility of another day like that one, or worse. It will arm itself more intensively and wage war with a kind of disciplined aggression it has not shown in some time. It will not crumble or weaken because it has shown itself to be a resilient society; it is wounded, enraged, and determined.</p> - -<p>One of the most interesting features of this war has been the muted public reactions of many governments around the world, even in the face of protests and demonstrations in the streets. Israel’s Arab partners, including Egypt, Jordan, the United Arab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia, quietly share their fears and hatred of Hamas, itself an outgrowth of the Muslim Brotherhood. They will not openly support Israel’s actions, though they will do so quietly. The global war against extreme versions of Islamism never really ended, but it has now come back and with a vengeance. Moderate Muslim states are also going to find themselves on the front line.</p> - -<p>For Iran, the war has been a huge, if perilous, success. Its strategy of building a ring of enemies around Israel — to include Hamas (which it helped arm and train), Hezbollah in Lebanon (far more heavily equipped than Hamas), various Shiite militias in Syria that can attack Israel on the Golan Heights, and the Houthis in Yemen — seems to be working. The purpose may not be to destroy Israel in one blow but rather to weaken it in a series of wars, as Iran itself is protected by the nuclear deterrent it seeks to acquire.</p> - -<p>There is, however, considerable danger of over-reach. The Houthi attacks on Red Sea shipping invite a U.S.-led response. Whether through tit-for-tat escalation or because of a decision to make a larger point, the day may well come when the United States, with or without its allies, attacks not only the Houthis but their Iranian advisers and logistics as well. Neighbors probably fear Iran more than ever and will be willing to be quiet partners in counterstrikes against it.</p> - -<p>The possibility, therefore, exists for a substantial regional war in the near future. It could come about because of an Israeli preventive war against Hezbollah or merely escalation of the fighting along the current border. It might begin in an attempt by Hezbollah to emulate Hamas with a similar strategy of building up its forces along the Israeli frontier and striking suddenly. Or it could come about through an escalation of U.S. strikes on Iranian targets in Yemen and retaliation by Iran against Persian Gulf shipping, creating a broader conflict.</p> - -<p>Finally, the alignment of states on the Israel-Hamas war is revealing. Russia and China are more or less openly supporting Hamas and Iran; the United States and its allies are supporting Israel. It is the same set of opposing coalitions as in the Russia-Ukraine war and, with some adjustments, the increasing tensions in the South China Sea.</p> - -<p>The upshot is that when Hamas terrorists stormed across the fence dividing them from Israel and began the slaughter of civilians, they accelerated the division of the world into opposing blocs. They brought to the fore the challenges posed to liberal democracies in confronting enemies who openly embrace extreme brutality directed against civilians, as Russia has in Ukraine. This war is not entirely separable from other conflicts in which the United States is an interested and committed party, and it may turn out to be a trigger for other, even more devastating conflicts in the Levant, the Persian Gulf, and beyond.</p> - -<h3 id="can-israel-learn-from-us-wars-in-iraq-and-afghanistan">Can Israel Learn from U.S. Wars in Iraq and Afghanistan?</h3> - -<blockquote> - <h4 id="daniel-byman">Daniel Byman</h4> - <h4 id="senior-fellow-transnational-threats-project">Senior Fellow, Transnational Threats Project</h4> -</blockquote> - -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Israel, however, faces a different challenge in Gaza than the United States did in Iraq or Afghanistan — in many ways, a much harder one.</code></em></strong></p> - -<p>As a shocked Israel prepared to respond to the October 7, 2023, Hamas terrorist attack, the most devastating in Israel’s history, U.S. president Joe Biden offered some sober advice: “After 9/11, we were enraged in the United States. And while we sought justice and got justice, we also made mistakes.” Looking back at the U.S. wars on terrorism in Afghanistan and Iraq, Biden, along with many American strategists, urged Israel to heed the lessons the United States won so dearly and avoid the many mistakes made along the way.</p> - -<p>Lessons from Afghanistan and Iraq are extensive and still being compiled, but how relevant are they to Israel’s situation with Hamas? As might be expected, some apply more than others, and a few do not apply at all.</p> - -<p>The U.S. counterinsurgency model, as embodied in documents like Joint Publication 3-24, Counterinsurgency, stresses the political side of counterinsurgency. In both Iraq and Afghanistan, the United States focused largely on defeating Saddam Hussein’s regime and the Taliban but less on what should replace them, resulting in sustained — and, in the case of the Taliban in Afghanistan, successful — insurgencies. Establishing a legitimate and competent government after military victory is vital, as this ensures support from the people and allows law enforcement and social services to function. All this requires empowering local partners, who will bear the brunt of the fighting. In Afghanistan, the United States lost 2,443 troops, while the Afghan military lost at least 66,000, to say nothing of the tens of thousands of Afghan civilian casualties. Strong local partners and successful governance, in turn, ensure popular support. As Chinese leader Mao Zedong famously argued, the guerrillas must swim in the sea of the people, and if the people are against the guerrillas, then their end is certain.</p> - -<p>In the aftermath of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the United States now prefers to avoid long wars and accept that some level of risk is inevitable. The U.S. preference is to conduct shorter counterterrorism-focused efforts rather than grinding occupations that require decades of effort. When sustained insurgencies must be fought, the United States seeks to work with local governments, warlords, or other partners, supporting them with training and, at times, airstrikes or other limited military support.</p> - -<p>Some of these lessons are applicable to Israel’s current war with Hamas. Most importantly, Israel must develop a long-term political strategy for Gaza. As Raphael Cohen has argued, the current situation has grown, in part, out of</p> - -<blockquote> - <p>Israel’s decades-long failed strategy of “mowing the grass” in Gaza — which attempted to both contain and deter Hamas in Gaza, while simultaneously not addressing any of the underlying economic and political conditions that had helped bring Hamas into power and keep it there.</p> -</blockquote> - -<p>Israel, however, faces a different challenge in Gaza than the United States did in Iraq or Afghanistan — in many ways, a much harder one. Geography poses the first problem. Gaza is on Israel’s doorstep, while the United States has the luxury of distance. What happened in Baghdad or Kabul did not pose an immediate threat to the U.S. homeland. Israel cannot wash its hands of Gaza as the United States eventually did with Afghanistan.</p> - -<p>Historically, Israel has had a less solutionist approach than the United States. It sees Palestinian hatred as almost inevitable, and the Second Intifada and the 2005 Gaza withdrawal proved to many Israelis that concessions to Palestinian leaders would be met with violence (though the truth is far more complex). The latest Hamas attack, made in the aftermath of what Israel saw as an accommodating approach to Hamas in Gaza, will reinforce this view. Thus, Israelis believe a political approach designed to win over the Palestinian people is doomed to fail.</p> - -<p>Israel also lacks local partners who might govern Gaza and serve Israeli interests. In Afghanistan and Iraq, numerous local leaders sought to work with the United States against the insurgents (even as they were often critical of U.S. policies), and they had genuine support among many communities in these countries. Israel will find few, if any, Palestinians willing to work with it, in part because its policies have steadily undermined the more pro-peace Palestinian Authority, convincing many Palestinians that Israel will respond only to force.</p> - -<p>Finally, Israel must engage in military operations in a saturated media environment, with widespread transparency regarding civilian casualties, destruction of infrastructure in Gaza, and other horrors of war. In Iraq and Afghanistan, the battlefields were remote, and much of the fighting occurred when social media was in its infancy. Now the genuine destructiveness of the Israeli response (worsened by widespread misinformation) is there for all to see, eroding international support for Israel, including in the United States.</p> - -<p>Biden and other U.S. leaders are right to urge caution on Israel and to encourage Israeli security officials to understand what the United States has learned in its various wars on terrorism. But the Israeli war on Hamas has its own characteristics, many of which are far more difficult than what the United States faced in Afghanistan or Iraq. As a result, Israel will learn its own lessons — and make its own mistakes.</p> - -<h3 id="a-different-two-state-solution">A Different Two-State Solution</h3> - -<blockquote> - <h4 id="jon-b-alterman">Jon B. Alterman</h4> - <h4 id="senior-vice-president-zbigniew-brzezinski-chair-in-global-security-and-geostrategy-and-director-middle-east-program">Senior Vice President, Zbigniew Brzezinski Chair in Global Security and Geostrategy, and Director, Middle East Program</h4> -</blockquote> - -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Israelis may fantasize about a divorce from Palestinians, but their actions for three-quarters of a century have made that increasingly impossible.</code></em></strong></p> - -<p>With violence between Palestinians and Israelis at its highest levels in decades, voices again have risen in favor of a two-state solution. The idea — a Jewish homeland and an Arab one carved out of Mandatory Palestine — dates back to the United Nations’ 1947 partition plan, but it has seemed increasingly remote. In the weeks before October 7, the growing consensus was that the window for a two-state solution had closed. The current violence has persuaded many that the idea needs to be revived.</p> - -<p>Indeed it does, but doing so will require the redefinition of some terms — for starters, “two,” and “state,” and “solution.”</p> - -<h4 id="two">Two</h4> - -<p>Let’s start with “two.” Seventy-five years of history have intertwined the fates of Arabs and Jews far more than had ever been contemplated. Not only has Jewish settlement extended deep into formerly Arab areas, but the 20 percent of Israeli citizens who are non-Jewish Arabs have come to think of their Palestinian-ness (and Israeli-ness) in complex and connected ways. Resources, not least water, are inextricably linked, but even things as mundane as wireless spectrum are completely intertwined. Israelis may fantasize about a divorce from Palestinians, but their actions for three-quarters of a century have made that increasingly impossible.</p> - -<p>Palestinians have been enveloped in that process, too. The Palestinian economy has become deeply integrated with the Israeli economy, even as permission to work in Israel is unreliable. Just last summer, Israel was the destination for 90 percent of Palestinian exports and the source of 58 percent of its imports. While Palestine certainly needs a more diversified economy and set of trade ties, building it all from scratch without taking advantage of Israeli infrastructure and ports, not to mention the technical skills for things like managing the money supply and credit markets, will make the task infinitely harder.</p> - -<p>Each side has ample evidence from the past 30 years of how hard arm’s length cooperation is. Palestinians note that Israeli security forces not only have continually burst into areas of supposed Palestinian self-rule but also have been lax on vigilante settlers who seek to be a law unto themselves. Not unreasonably, they see Israeli businesspeople taking advantage of Palestine as a captive market to their own advantage and at the expense of Palestinian interests.</p> - -<p>Israelis have complained that Palestinian security cooperation has always been grudging and incomplete, and they blame poor Palestinian economic performance on corruption and incompetence rather than Israeli exploitation.</p> - -<p>Rather than more separation, however, the anti-dote to these complaints is greater integration, albeit with outside enforcement. A multinational endeavor with Israelis and Palestinians at its core, with the active participation of Americans, Europeans, regional governments, and others, will be awkward at first. But giving Palestinians and Israelis greater visibility into each other’s actions will give greater confidence. Equally important will be noting when cooperation is not forthcoming, also giving greater confidence that agreements cannot be ignored without consequence.</p> - -<h4 id="state">State</h4> - -<p>This is where “state” needs to be redefined. What will emerge is something less than a Westphalian state with complete control over what happens within its borders, and not just for Palestinians. Israel will also need to open its decisionmaking to justify some of its actions to others, and to consider the broader implications of actions it principally targets at its own citizens. The European Union has shown much of this is possible, but what will be required here will be more intrusive and less consensual.</p> - -<h4 id="solution">Solution</h4> - -<p>All of this will be messy, which brings us to the last problem in this trilogy: the “solution.” One might object that what is described here is not a solution at all, because it will require sustained engagement and struggle from two parties who were largely estranged before the massacres of October 7, and are even more estranged in their aftermath.</p> - -<p>Adding to the challenge, each side is convinced that sizeable constituencies on the other side ultimately seek domination and not coexistence. While this reality cannot be willed away, much less ignored, one thing is especially encouraging. That is, through more than three decades of polling, it is clear how dynamic the support for coexistence has been, and therefore how dynamic the support can be. It responds to conditions, and it responds to actions. There is little question that, right now, it is close to bottom, and there is tremendous upward potential.</p> - -<p>A strategy of this sort will be unacceptable to both sides, at least initially. It is not what they have been fighting for over the last 75 years, and it feels inadequate. Even so, it gives us a new construct to work from, and a new construct is necessary. For decades, most of Israel’s peace negotiations were built around the idea of “land for peace.” But what was successful with Egypt did not work with Syria, and it certainly did not work with Palestine. Israel has both political and security reasons to move away from that formula. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is determined to preserve Israeli communities scattered throughout historic Judea and Samaria, in areas designated for a future Palestinian state. He speaks derisively of the potential emergence of “Hamastan” and “Fatahstan” on Israel’s borders, and he vows to block it. On these issues, there is a fair amount of Israeli unity.</p> - -<p>And at the same time, Palestinians look at the fragmented ink blots of “Area A” on the West Bank, supposedly under full Palestinian control yet largely at the mercy of Israeli decisions. Palestinians have come to regard the Oslo agreement of 1993 as a ruse that left them powerless, dominated, and immiserated. Israel’s cordon around Gaza, and its actions over the last three months inside of it, reinforces Palestinians’ despair.</p> - -<p>Rethinking the terms of what a two-state solution might look like will not be satisfying. Each side feels it gave the other a chance through the Oslo Accords, only to see the depth of its adversary’s hostility. Events of the last three months have convinced even more that the other side has no respect for human life. This is no basis on which to build a partnership.</p> - -<p>But the two sides surely have shared interests, not least the desire to create a future of greater security, prosperity, and freedom for their children. Seventy-five years of fighting has not gotten either side what it wanted. Thinking through ways to enlarge definitions and introduce outside monitors will not end conflict, but it could go a long way to end bloodshed.</p> - -<h3 id="the-new-forever-wars">The New Forever Wars</h3> - -<blockquote> - <h4 id="natasha-hall">Natasha Hall</h4> - <h4 id="senior-fellow-middle-east-program">Senior Fellow, Middle East Program</h4> -</blockquote> - -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Unless the United States commits to rigorous diplomacy to resolve conflicts and properly manage crises, especially those like the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, where the United States has unique leverage, these forever wars will spiral.</code></em></strong></p> - -<p>The world is awash with seemingly endless conflicts. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict exemplifies the most common variety: a local conflict that simmers with sporadic, unpredictable, and devastating surges in violence. Despite this growing trend, the United States has tried to narrowly focus on great power competition, particularly with China. But just as in the Cold War, those local conflicts are where global competition is most likely to play out.</p> - -<p>Since the U.S. invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, the left and right in the United States have advocated for an end to “forever wars.” But in the sunset of unsuccessful U.S. forays in the Middle East, another kind of forever war is emerging and threatens to affect U.S. interests for the next two decades. Local and civil wars, like the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, are dramatically increasing in number, intensity, and length around the world. While 2023 saw the highest number of violent conflicts since World War II, 2022 saw more battlefield deaths than any year since 1994. These crises have nearly tripled in duration since 2005.</p> - -<p>U.S. foreign policy tends to sidestep the drivers of these conflicts and their discontents. In an effort to downsize its approach to peripheral regions like the Middle East, the United States has instead focused on encouraging deals between strongmen and dealing with crises through increasingly anemic humanitarian aid. Even in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, where the United States has been an integral actor for decades, the U.S. government has sidelined Palestinians in favor of elite bargains with Arab states, otherwise known as the Abraham Accords. The United States and its Western allies have then dealt with the Palestinians through aid. As seen in the October 7 Hamas attack on Israel and the subsequent Israeli offensive on Gaza, the strategy is not working.</p> - -<p>While Gaza is the most dramatic example of this failure in 2023, it is hardly the only one. From Yemen and Syria to East Africa, protracted conflicts and fragile states have become vectors for instability. The United States deals with all these protracted crises in a similar way but with even less interest, seeing them as more peripheral or even irrelevant to great power competition. Nevertheless, in many ways these conflicts will challenge the narrow U.S. response to great power competition. The instability they create spills across borders and distracts the United States. The vulnerability inherent in protracted crises allows others to take advantage, and the U.S. response or lack of response provides an avenue for enemies to criticize U.S. hypocrisy or ineptitude.</p> - -<p>Reignited conflicts have the power to quickly inflame an unstable region. The escalation in Gaza exemplifies the potential ripple effect of localized violence. As the war in Gaza escalated, the regime under Syrian president Bashar al-Assad stepped up attacks in northwestern Syria, and Iranian-backed militants launched attacks on bases and facilities housing U.S. personnel in Iraq and Syria — 130 attacks in under three months — injuring dozens of service members. In a globalized world, local events can quickly have global consequences. Houthi attacks on shipping vessels forced several major shipping lines — representing 60 percent of global trade — and oil giants like BP to suspend their services through the Red Sea. The attacks eventually forced the United States to strike targets in Yemen. Each of these events has its own destabilizing consequences, and all of them are distracting from the issues the U.S. government wants to focus on.</p> - -<p>The United States’ great power competitors also gain from these protracted crises in different ways. Both Russia and China gain from U.S. distraction and redirection of U.S. resources. Russia will gain directly from U.S. efforts to provide military support to Israel as it diverts attention and resources from Ukraine. Putin also gains by directly intervening in many of these local conflicts, which the United States considers less strategic. In Sudan, Russia reaps the benefits of the country’s gold and continues to push for a naval base in the Red Sea. In Syria, Putin’s support for a struggling Assad won Russia an air base and warm-water port to expand its influence in the Middle East, Africa, and Europe.</p> - -<p>China and Russia are also able to manipulate the United States’ chosen path for managing these crises: aid. For aid workers, China’s support of North Korea and Russia’s support of Syria have made principled and adequate humanitarian responses nearly impossible. As aid workers struggling with aid diversion in North Korea said in 2018, “If China and Russia were not supporting the Kim regime behind the scenes, then . . . foreign aid groups would have much more bargaining power.” In Syria, the Assad regime egregiously diverts aid with little to no accountability as a result of Russia’s protection. China and Russia have since expanded these protections to other states in Africa, making conflict management through humanitarian aid even less feasible.</p> - -<p>Indirectly, Russia and China gain from arguing the United States is hypocritical and ineffective on the world stage. For many countries in the Global South, support for Ukraine waned because of U.S. double standards in Iraq and Israel. For these countries, the United States’ inconsistent application of norms in the name of national interests excuses them from violating those same rules occasionally. While China and Russia may protect a state’s ability to impede aid and commit violence, for 153 countries at the UN General Assembly, the United States is doing the same for Israel at the UN Security Council.</p> - -<p>Unless the United States commits to rigorous diplomacy to resolve conflicts and properly manage crises, especially those like the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, where the United States has unique leverage, these forever wars will spiral. The compounding damage to U.S. interests is likely to be long lasting. To combat it, the U.S. government would do well to view the challenge as Franklin D. Roosevelt saw it in 1941:</p> - -<blockquote> - <p>We must recognize that the hostilities in Europe, in Africa, and in Asia are all parts of a single world conflict. . . . Our strategy of self-defense must be a global strategy which takes account of every front and takes advantage of every opportunity to contribute to our total security.</p> -</blockquote> - -<h3 id="how-will-israeli-tech-emerge-from-the-gaza-conflict">How Will Israeli Tech Emerge from the Gaza Conflict?</h3> - -<blockquote> - <h4 id="emily-harding">Emily Harding</h4> - <h4 id="director-intelligence-national-security-and-technology-program-and-deputy-director-international-security-program">Director, Intelligence, National Security, and Technology Program, and Deputy Director, International Security Program</h4> -</blockquote> - -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">War is by its nature disruptive — to life, business, and society. The longer the war, the greater the economic hit. Israel’s tech sector must once again prove resilient enough to recover and reengage with the global economy.</code></em></strong></p> - -<p>The tragic toll of Hamas’s October 7 attacks can be counted in lives lost and homes destroyed, but a second-order effect lurks on the horizon: a damaged Israeli economy and a potentially massive disruption to Israel’s tech sector. That tech sector has served as an economic engine for Israel and an innovation engine for the globe. While Israeli tech has weathered recent conflicts well, the extent of this mobilization and a weaker economic context are likely to significantly delay, if not disrupt, Israeli tech.</p> - -<p>Workforce disruptions are the main driver of potential economic impact. In response to the October 7 attack, the Israel Defense Forces mobilized 360,000 reservists, approximately 4 percent of Israel’s total population. This marks one of the largest mobilizations in Israel’s history, eclipsed only by the 400,000 reservists called up during the 1973 Yom Kippur War. In contrast, Israel’s most significant recent mobilizations were the 2014 Gaza War, with 75,000 reservists, and the 2006 Second Lebanon War, with 89,000 reservists.</p> - -<p>The dent in the workforce is far greater than the call-up of reserves: at the height of the disruption, this conflict removed an estimated 764,000 Israelis, or 18 percent of the total workforce, between reserve mobilization, evacuations near the Gazan and Lebanese borders, and school closures requiring parental care at home. Recent estimates suggest that as of December, an estimated 500,000 Israelis, or 12 percent of the workforce, are still not working.</p> - -<p>The mobilization has likely hit tech start-ups harder than average, given staff at start-ups skew young and much of Israel’s tech sector sprang out of skills gained in service with the IDF. According to a survey conducted by Start-Up Nation Policy Institute (SNPI), an estimated 15–20 percent of tech sector employees were mobilized, and 25 percent of company respondents reported experiencing a shortage of personnel. According to Avi Eyal of Entrée Capital, 10–30 percent of start-up employees mobilized, representing a substantial reduction in staff and a prolonged break in innovation, project development, and client servicing. Start-ups tend to operate on a skeleton staff, making them less resilient to prolonged staff disruption.</p> - -<p>Tech disruption will have an outsize impact on Israel’s economy. Israel’s tech sector represents around 18–20 percent of GDP in contrast to 9.3 percent in the United States and 6 percent in the European Union. High-tech products constitute around 50 percent of Israel’s exports. Further, foreign direct investment in the Israeli tech sector is critical, and much of that funding may be in peril. As of late October, approximately 40 percent of surveyed tech firms experienced disruptions in their financing efforts, with many investment agreements either canceled or placed on hold.</p> - -<p>Even if the labor gap is temporary and the reservists demobilize in weeks rather than months, some disruptions may be irreparable. A recent Israel Innovation Authority and SNPI survey revealed more than 70 percent of start-ups surveyed delayed or abandoned new orders and projects. This was primarily due to challenges in conducting pilots and clinical trials, progressing research and development initiatives, and exporting and importing essential products. Those disruptions are on top of signs the sector was already weakening following Israel’s domestic political unrest. Reports from December indicate Israeli start-ups only raised $1.3 billion between October and December, a 46 percent drop from the same time the year before, marking a new six-year low in Israeli start-up funding.</p> - -<p>The overall economic impact could be double that of previous conflicts. The Bank of Israel has determined the 2014 Gaza War reduced Israel’s GDP by 0.4 percent, and the Second Lebanon War by 0.5 percent. The estimate for the current conflict is 0.7 percent for 2023. In December, the Bank of Israel once again revised downward the growth projections for 2024, from 3 percent before October 7 to 2 percent.</p> - -<p>On the positive side, advances like using the cloud to deliver products have made Israeli tech more resilient, and recent history suggests a bounce back is possible. In 2014 tech bounced back robustly as venture capital investments steadily increased from $2.9 billion in 2014 to $5.6 billion in 2016. But just as the conflict in 2014 was different from that in 2023, the world economy has also changed. Bloomberg predicted an escalation in the conflict — like recent Houthi attacks on ships in the Red Sea — could send global oil prices soaring. Global growth could drop to 1.7 percent, an estimated $1 trillion off global output. The global economy is still feeling the effects of a war in Ukraine, monetary policy is tighter, and there is continuing uncertainty surrounding the multitude of elections in 2024. Conditions will be more challenging for a quick bounce back this time around.</p> - -<p>Israel is wisely acting fast to bolster the tech sector. As of early January, the Israel Innovation Authority (IIA) had begun to deploy $100 million in emergency aid for start-ups. The New York Times reported that chip giant Intel announced it would proceed with a planned $25 billion investment to expand a factory in southern Israel, having received a $3.2 billion grant from the government. For the economy more broadly, Israel has slowly tried to fill the labor gap by increasing the number of foreign workers in the country, with more than 12,000 foreign workers arriving as of December.</p> - -<p>War is by its nature disruptive — to life, business, and society. The longer the war, the greater the economic hit. Israel’s tech sector must once again prove resilient enough to recover and reengage with the global economy. It is telling the world it is ready to do just that. Early in the conflict, the IIA started a new campaign with this tag line: “Israeli tech delivers. NO MATTER WHAT.”</p> - -<hr /> - -<p><strong>Mark F. Cancian</strong> (colonel, USMCR, ret.) is a senior adviser with the CSIS International Security Program. In the military, Colonel Cancian spent over three decades in the U.S. Marine Corps, active and reserve, serving as an infantry, artillery, and civil affairs officer and on overseas tours in Vietnam, Desert Storm, and Iraq (twice).</p> - -<p><strong>Max Bergmann</strong> is the director of the Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program and the Stuart Center in Euro-Atlantic and Northern European Studies at CSIS.</p> - -<p><strong>Maria Snegovaya</strong> is a senior fellow for Russia and Eurasia with the Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program at CSIS and a postdoctoral fellow in Georgetown University’s Walsh School of Foreign Service. She studies Russia’s domestic and foreign policy, as well as democratic backsliding in post-communist Europe and the tactics used by Russian actors and proxies who exploit these dynamics in the region.</p> - -<p><strong>Romina Bandura</strong> is a senior fellow with the Project on Prosperity and Development and the Project on U.S. Leadership in Development at CSIS. Her current research focuses on the future of work in developing countries and the United States’ economic engagement in the developing world.</p> - -<p><strong>Kathleen J. McInnis</strong> is a senior fellow and director of the Smart Women, Smart Power Initiative at CSIS. Her research areas include the intersection of gender and national security; global security strategy; defense policy; and transatlantic security.</p> - -<p><strong>Elizabeth Hoffman</strong> currently serves as the director of congressional and government affairs and fellow at CSIS.</p> - -<p><strong>Eliot A. Cohen</strong> is the Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy at CSIS and the Robert E. Osgood Professor at Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), where he has taught since 1990.</p> - -<p><strong>Daniel Byman</strong> is a senior fellow with the Transnational Threats Project at CSIS. He is the foreign policy editor for Lawfare and a part-time senior adviser to the Department of State on the International Security Advisory Board.</p> - -<p><strong>Jon B. Alterman</strong> is a senior vice president, holds the Zbigniew Brzezinski Chair in Global Security and Geostrategy, and is director of the Middle East Program at CSIS.</p> - -<p><strong>Natasha Hall</strong> is a senior fellow with the Middle East Program at CSIS. Natasha has over 15 years of experience as an analyst, researcher, and practitioner in complex humanitarian emergencies and conflict-affected areas with a specialty in the Middle East.</p> - -<p><strong>Emily Harding</strong> is director of the Intelligence, National Security, and Technology (INT) Program and deputy director with the International Security Program at CSIS. As the head of the INT Program, she provides thought leadership on the most critical issues facing intelligence professionals and on the future of intelligence work.</p> - -<p><strong>Craig Cohen</strong> is executive vice president at CSIS, a bipartisan think tank in Washington, D.C. In this role, he serves as deputy to the president and CEO, responsible for overseeing and helping to achieve all aspects of the Center’s strategic, programmatic, operational, outreach, fundraising, and financial goals, including recruitment of new program directors to CSIS.</p> - -<p><strong>Alexander Kisling</strong> is vice president of communications at CSIS, where he works alongside the chief communications officer to direct the Center’s press, digital and social media, and other external engagement efforts. He also oversees the Center’s broadcasting and publications functions.</p>Mark F. Cancian, et al.In the third installment of the 2024 Global Forecast — A World Dividing — CSIS experts offer their views on what to expect on the battlefield in 2024, from the outlook for Ukraine to critical questions about the long-term consequences of the Israel-Hamas conflict.【黎智英案・審訊第廿一日】2024-02-01T12:00:00+08:002024-02-01T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/trial-of-jimmy-lai-day-21<ul> - <li>張劍虹認警員赴收押所探訪數小時 翌日突表示願做控方證人 辯方質疑被游說</li> -</ul> - -<excerpt /> - -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/f4ozB3M.png" alt="image01" /></p> - -<p>【獨媒報導】壹傳媒創辦人黎智英及3間蘋果公司被控串謀勾結外國勢力及串謀刊印煽動刊物等罪，案件今（1日）於高院（移師西九龍法院）踏入第21日審訊。認罪候判的前《蘋果日報》社長張劍虹，繼續以「從犯證人」身份出庭作供。辯方盤問時透露，2021年11月一名警署警長到荔枝角收押所要求會見張，會面長達約6小時。翌日該警長連同另一名偵緝警員再度造訪，而張在該次會面中突然提出有說話想向警方講，以及想成為控方證人。其後張轉換律師代表，並去信律政司表達意願。辯方質疑，警長游說張做控方證人，惟張否認，堅稱會面純粹談論荔枝角的生活和運動。他又補充：「因為我睇完個判詞之後，自己開始去諗，想講返個事實出嚟囉。」</p> - -<h4 id="辯方透露警署警長到收押所會見張劍虹-長達6小時">辯方透露警署警長到收押所會見張劍虹 長達6小時</h4> - -<p>辯方指，張劍虹於2021年11月5日向高院申請保釋，即日遭法官李素蘭拒絕，而拒絕保釋理由於11月10日以書面形式頒布。至11月11日，一名警署警長前往荔枝角羈押所探訪張劍虹，並把書面判詞送達給張劍虹。張確認。</p> - -<p>辯方指根據紀錄，當天警長與張於荔枝角會面長達6小時。張表示不太記得該次會面歷時多久，只記得「係好耐啦」。辯方追問，是否由早上10時直至下午4時？張表示大概是，因為當日早上約10時親友探訪完畢，「之後有人通知我有警察嚟搵我」，會面中間沒有午飯時間，會見完才返回監倉吃飯。</p> - -<p>辯方質疑，一份只有10頁紙的判決理由書，警署警長理應不需要很長時間解釋。張則表示警長沒有替他解釋該理由書，乃由他自行閱讀。</p> - -<h4 id="張劍虹確認向警方提出有說話想講及想做控方證人-之後轉換律師代表">張劍虹確認向警方提出「有說話想講」及想做控方證人 之後轉換律師代表</h4> - -<p>辯方續指11月12日，警長再度前往荔枝角收押所會見張，並且聯同另一名偵緝警員8315。辯方指，張在偵緝警員8315面前，突然表示他有說話想向警方講，以及想成為控方證人。張確認。</p> - -<p>辯方續指，此後張辭退原本的事務律師行羅拔臣（同為黎智英的代表律師行），然後聘用新的事務律師行，而新的律師代表於12月16日去信律政司，指稱警方邀請張出任控方證人。張僅稱：「呢個我唔清楚。」</p> - -<p>辯方遂展示律師行信件，當中張的律師代表透露，經公務探訪和索取當事人指示後，律師得悉警方邀請張出任控方證人，而張確認若果控方有需要的話，他會準備做控方證人及向控方提供協助。</p> - -<p>辯方質疑，張此前一直在警署錄影會面保持緘默，但在2021年11月12日會見警員之後，卻決定出任控方證人。在法官李運騰的澄清下，張確認該些錄影會面是在他未被落案起訴之前進行的，而他當時正行使緘默權。</p> - -<h4 id="張劍虹稱與警會面數小時僅談論荔枝角生活-辯方質疑警游說做控方證人">張劍虹稱與警會面數小時僅談論荔枝角生活 辯方質疑警游說做控方證人</h4> - -<p>辯方問張，警署警長有否游說他做控方證人，張說：「冇。」辯方追問，在如此長時間的面談中，張與警員談論了什麼。張表示：「喺荔枝角嘅生活呀、運動呀嗰啲嘢，都係嗰啲普通嘢，冇乜嘢。」辯方遂質疑，雙方花了數個小時，僅僅談論關於張在荔枝角的生活？張確認：「係，主要係講呢啲嘢。」辯方再問，警署警長並非張的朋友，當時雙方僅第一次見面，張同意。他補充：「因為我睇完個判詞之後，自己開始去諗，想講返個事實出嚟囉。但我冇同嗰個警員講我呢個諗法。」</p> - -<p>辯方提議，張決定做控方證人，是因為警署警長的說話，問張是否同意。張斷言否認：「唔同意。」</p> - -<h4 id="張劍虹確認撰寫誓章時相信蘋果合法地營運">張劍虹確認撰寫誓章時相信《蘋果》合法地營運</h4> - -<p>辯方昨日提到張劍虹向高院申請保釋時，向法庭提交了一份誓章。辯方今再展示誓章內容，張當時稱相信《蘋果日報》會持續合法地營運下去，而黎智英被捕之後，高層明白難以完全釋除員工疑慮，他只能盡量提醒員工謹慎和不要情緒化。張又指，若果員工因工作關係而面對法律程序，壹傳媒集團會提供法律援助，但張當時認為可能性不大。張確認上述是當時信念。</p> - -<p>對於張在全體員工大會發言稱：「唔代表我哋褪軚，《蘋果日報》冇褪軚空間」，他在誓章中解釋意思是指《蘋果》會繼續如常運作，核心價值和信念原則不變。辯方問張在撰寫誓章時是否相信，《蘋果》一直合法地營運，不曾違反法律，而且所持守的核心價值和原則是完全合法（perfectly lawful）。張確認，並稱當時提醒同事工作時盡量不要情緒化。</p> - -<h4 id="張劍虹黎智英被起訴還柙後-高層將黎的敏感文章和影片下架">張劍虹：黎智英被起訴還柙後 高層將黎的敏感文章和影片下架</h4> - -<p>張又提到，在國安法生效之前，他們「一路以嚟按住黎生嘅指示去做」；國安法生效之後，「黎生一直表示佢唔驚，會繼續去抗爭啦，所以佢開咗Live Chat，繼續講佢要講嘅嘢」，惟一眾管理層員工都很擔心國安法的影響，於是成立一些國安法應變群組、舉辦法律座談會，希望在紅線之內去工作。</p> - -<p>張續指，直至黎於2020年12月被正式落案控告國安法及還柙之後，他們便將黎的敏感文章和影片都下架，「至到我講呢番說話時（撰寫誓章內容），一路都希望蘋果日報做緊嘅嘢係合符法律嘅。」</p> - -<p>辯方問是否核心價值和信念不變，但行動會隨時勢改變，例如有些文章在國安法之前不違法，但在國安法生效之後便要下架。張確認，並指戴耀廷和黎智英涉及國安法的文章均有下架。張特別提到，不過即使國安法生效，黎生的「成敗樂一笑」專欄文章和Live Chat 影片，「我哋冇辦法將佢哋下架，因為佢係老闆嘅文章吖嘛。」他又說：「我哋冇辦法去阻止黎生去發表成敗樂一笑同Live Chat影片嘅。」</p> - -<p>法官李運騰追問，黎首次被捕直至被正式控告期間，其專欄文章和Live Chat影片是否仍然可以在《蘋果》網站見到？張確認。</p> - -<h4 id="辯方指國安法生效後-編採政策有重大轉變-避免觸犯國安法">辯方指國安法生效後 編採政策有重大轉變 避免觸犯國安法</h4> - -<p>李官再問，在國安法生效前後，編採政策有沒有任何改變？張表示「唔會有咩好大改變」。不過，辯方則指編採政策有重大改變，因任何文章和影片都不能違反國安法，問張是否同意。張僅表示當時不太清楚「紅線喺邊」，所以記憶中編採政策上轉變不是很大。</p> - -<p>但張亦指曾經舉辦內部法律座談會，並轉述律師講過，若報導有人上街持「光時」旗，只要不是提出主張，便沒有問題。他同意辯方所指，相關政策是為了盡量避免違反國安法，不過他認為黎智英的專欄文章和Live Chat節目則由其本人決定。</p> - -<h4 id="張劍虹過往兩度涉藐視法庭程序-事後舉辦員工內部法律座談會">張劍虹過往兩度涉藐視法庭程序 事後舉辦員工內部法律座談會</h4> - -<p>辯方續引述誓章內容，當中張否認參與串謀犯罪計劃之中，也表明從來無意作出危害國家安全的行為。張確認，但亦承認他在資深大律師和法律團隊的代表下，早前已經承認了控罪。他又確認其法律代表來自一間受人敬重的律師行。</p> - -<p>誓章另外提到，張過往曾兩度牽涉藐視法庭程序，他解釋事後有作出補救措施，包括舉辦員工內部法律座談會，以防止同類事件再次發生。辯方指，上述做法與因應國安法而舉辦座談會相似，均為了避免觸犯法律。張同意。被問到這做法有否獲得黎的支持和認可，張表示：「有架呢個。」</p> - -<p>翻查資料，《蘋果日報》在2013年大角嘴夫婦被肢解一案進入法律程序後，派出記者到監獄採訪夫婦的兒子、疑兇周凱亮，並刊登報導，當時擔任總編輯的張劍虹承認藐視法庭。《壹週刊》於1997年在一宗有陪審團的民事訴訟案件期間，刊出有關律師費的報導，被指可能造成審訊不公，當時張任職《壹傳媒》總編輯，承認藐視法庭罪。兩案均被判罰款。</p> - -<h4 id="辯方稱報導大陸負面新聞-是為了促進透明度和改善管治">辯方稱報導大陸負面新聞 是為了促進透明度和改善管治</h4> - -<p>辯方另展示WhatsApp 群組「Index」對話，群組成員只得黎智英、張劍虹和筆名盧峯的馮偉光。2020年7月10日紀錄顯示，黎智英談及有關大陸的報導不是去「踢爆」，而是透過大數據去找出問題，然後「以數據事實糾正」。</p> - -<p>辯方指由此可見，《蘋果》報導有關大陸的負面新聞，目的是為了促進中國政府透明度和改善管治。惟張不同意。</p> - -<h4 id="辯方黎智英沒有說過做到俾人冚為止-張否認">辯方：黎智英沒有說過「做到俾人冚為止」 張否認</h4> - -<p>張昨日提及，2021年4月底到獄中探訪黎時，他曾向黎提及員工擔心《蘋果》會「過唔到七一」，並請示黎，黎當時回應：「點解要自己執咗佢？不如做到俾人冚為止啦。」張今確認該次探訪中，同場還有黎的兩名兒子。</p> - -<p>辯方指出，黎根本沒有說過該番說話。張不同意，堅稱黎有說過。他又憶述黎另外吩咐他，叫行政總監黃偉強將黎私人掛在公司的黃永玉畫作搬走，「因為黎生話呢啲畫係值錢嘅。」</p> - -<p>辯方問張知不知道，自2021年3月起，黎已開始就應否關閉壹傳媒旗下的不同子公司，積極地咨詢董事局意見。張表示沒印象，僅記得黎在2021年2月或之前指示過要處理台灣《蘋果日報》的虧損。</p> - -<p>辯方指出，黎智英與張劍虹及所有同事之間，從來沒有一個串謀犯罪計劃去發布煽動性文章，問張是否同意。張表示「唔同意」。</p> - -<p>案件明日續審。</p> - -<hr /> - -<p>案件編號：HCCC51/2022</p>獨媒報導張劍虹認警員赴收押所探訪數小時 翌日突表示願做控方證人 辯方質疑被游說Asym. Use Of Maritime Forces2024-02-01T12:00:00+08:002024-02-01T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/asymmetric-use-of-maritime-forces<p><em>The question that this paper seeks to answer is how Allied maritime power can best contribute to competition with Russia.</em></p> - -<excerpt /> - -<p>While considerable attention has been paid to how unwanted Russian actions in the maritime domain can be deterred, less has been paid to the maritime contribution to deterrence more broadly defined. The authors argue that this is a gap in the literature that needs to be filled, since the maritime domain remains an area of overwhelming Allied advantage. The function of this paper is to contribute to discussions of how actions at sea can translate into strategic effects on land in the context of the European theatre.</p> - -<p>NATO’s application of maritime power can better translate into strategic effects with three subtle changes: firstly, through the creation of an environment that forces Russia to expend resources on capabilities needed to deny the open ocean to NATO navies; secondly, the employment of maritime forces can serve as a war termination tool by increasing the costs of a protracted conflict in tandem with ground forces, which deny short-term gains; and finally, because many of the platforms which Russia employs for sub-strategic nuclear use are either maritime or, like strategic bombers, can be impacted from the sea with conventional capabilities, a maritime threat to the bulk of Russia’s sub-strategic launch capability can considerably alter perceptions of a favourable strategic balance.</p> - -<p>This paper outlines a strategy for how Allied maritime power could be employed to create costly capability requirements for Russia, in order to offset the country’s competitive edge in other domains. The paper’s key findings are:</p> - -<ul> - <li> - <p>Russia views the maritime domain as critical to the strategic balance – in other words, the capacity to both strike an adversary’s homeland and deflect strikes on Russia itself. Its view of the role of its navy is one that de-emphasises purely naval functions such as seizing sea control.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>The capabilities that Russia needs to perform both functions are among those which it will find most difficult to generate.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>By investing in maritime capabilities such as long-range precision strike and operating at a higher tempo on Russia’s extended periphery, the members of NATO can impose opportunity costs on Russia’s military. Investments in deflecting Allied maritime power will prove unavoidable for Russia, and will divert critical resources from its recapitalisation of other joint capabilities.</p> - </li> -</ul> - -<p>NATO should, however, recognise its own shortfalls, including the subset of challenges related to military capacity. Firstly, capabilities needed to compete effectively with the Russian Federation in the medium term will be required in a 10-year timeframe, which is shorter than procurement times for most major programmes. The second likely concern is a lack of platforms to hold strike assets, and this also needs to be mitigated. In addition, different approaches to anti-submarine warfare could expand the threat envelope for opponents and mitigate the Alliance’s own potential shortfalls in this area.</p> - -<p>Crucially, the question in each instance will be whether the capabilities developed will impose more costs than those required to develop them in the first place. It is conceivable that even marginal investments in the areas described will impose disproportionately costly adaptations on Russia.</p> - -<p>The sources informing this paper included desk research on Allied and Russian capabilities, as well as an examination of Russian military literature to identify areas where Russian authors perceive their nation to be vulnerable in the maritime domain.</p> - -<h3 id="introduction">Introduction</h3> - -<p>The question of how Allied maritime power should be employed against a continental rival spurred considerable debate during the Cold War. Some saw the maritime preponderance of the Alliance as an asymmetrical advantage which might be used to offset Soviet advantages on the ground. Others, by contrast, emphasised the centrality of deterrence through denial against the Red Army, which remained the sword arm of Soviet power (as Russian ground forces remain to this day), and contended that the primary function of maritime power should be to contain Russian threats to sea lines of communication at chokepoints such as the Greenland–Iceland–UK (GIUK) Gap.</p> - -<p>Today, the Russian challenge bears certain similarities with, though is not identical to, that posed by the USSR. Russia remains primarily a land power with a more limited capacity for power projection at sea. This having been said, the Russian navy, officially known as the Military Maritime Fleet (Voyenno-Morskoi Flot, or VMF), does play an important role in Russia’s overarching approach to competition and conflict. In competition, the VMF is expected to support limited power projection, as it did in Syria through the provision of logistical lift and long-range precision strikes. As competition escalates, the VMF plays three core roles:</p> - -<ul> - <li> - <p>Limiting the threat to the Russian homeland and in particular its defence industry, command and control (C2) nodes and nuclear-capable platforms. The VMF is expected to achieve this both through an active effort to disrupt threats from the maritime direction at reach and with a layered defence close to Russian shores.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Conducting long-range conventional strikes against the territory of hostile states.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Maintaining a portion of Russia’s tactical and strategic nuclear throw-weight</p> - </li> -</ul> - -<p>In effect, the Russian state views the sea as critical to shaping the strategic balance within which general purpose forces are used. Rather than naval combat per se, the purpose of Russian sea power is to ensure that the Russian state can compete and engage in conflict safely and effectively. To be sure, this is by no means the only function of Russian sea power, but it is central and has been demonstrated in the use of Russia’s Black Sea Fleet in the ongoing conflict with Ukraine. In Ukraine, the key contributions of the Black Sea Fleet – long-range Kalibr strikes and an ongoing blockade – are not central to Russia’s goal of destroying the Ukrainian army (though strikes can contribute to missions such as interdiction). What the fleet has contributed, however, is a level of economic damage that will shape both Ukraine’s capacity to confront Russia in the long term and its post-war stability. With its deployment in the Mediterranean before the war, the fleet was likely intended to act in a deterrent role vis-à-vis NATO by serving both as a tripwire and a symbol. In effect, its role has been not to secure sea control, but to provide strategic shaping for land forces.</p> - -<p>In the context of both the new Strategic Concept and the Deterrence and Defence of the Euro-Atlantic Area framework, how should Allied maritime power best reinforce the goals set out for NATO, which focus on reinforcing the Alliance’s capacity for territorial defence within Europe and the more broadly defined growing competition with Russia? The assertion of this paper is that the focus can, in principle, be on committing Russia to an unsustainable posture in the maritime domain that detracts from its more lethal land aspirations. The Alliance has avenues through which, by exacerbating pervasive Russian fears regarding threats in the maritime domain, it can both reinforce general deterrence and force the VMF to adapt in ways that impose opportunity costs on it in other areas.</p> - -<p>A core function of Allied maritime power, though by no means an exclusive one, can be its use as a means of shaping Russian perceptions of the strategic balance, as opposed to the military balance. (The latter might be understood as the ability to impact targets of critical national significance at depth, as distinct from fielded forces.) Specifically, by shaping Russian leaders’ perceptions of the relative risks involved in escalation, as well as the conditions under which war termination would occur, maritime power can complement an overarching strategic focus on both competition and deterrence by denial. Rather than contributing directly to denial, the function of maritime power would be indirect – by forcing Russia to commit to its own defences in the maritime domain, it would divert critical Russian resources to tasks that the Alliance deems less threatening. Furthermore, in a crisis or a conflict, this would complement deterrence by denial. Denial has the primary role of preventing an opponent from achieving an outcome rapidly and, while important, in a conflict this merely sets the conditions for war termination to be achieved by other means. Failing this, an opponent that is initially frustrated can double down on its objectives, particularly if it perceives there to be avenues by which it can win through exhaustion. A case in point would be Russia’s ongoing conflict in Ukraine, where, upon being frustrated in its initial approach, Russia shifted to a strategy of attrition.</p> - -<p>The approach outlined above is comparable to the Allied maritime strategies adopted in the late 1980s, in terms of their strategic logic of identifying and playing on existing Russian fears, and their emphasis on maritime power as a tool of war termination. However, a different set of tools can be employed operationally to obviate some of the challenges inherent in replicating this strategy today, among them the difficulty of operating forward in defended bastions, particularly with current submarine numbers, and the escalatory risks of doing so. At the operational level, Allied maritime power will be most effective if it is capable of delivering effects at reach and if it can complicate some of the challenges that Russia faces with respect to engaging dynamic targets. This is distinct from the maritime strategy of the 1980s, which envisioned operating as closely as possible to defended Russian bastions.</p> - -<p>In effect, a core function of Allied maritime power ought not to be deterrence by denial but the diversion of Russian capability and the cultivation of a favourable strategic balance. Though this can serve the overarching goal of general deterrence, it is distinct from deterrence understood as the use of specific threats or instruments to dissuade specific actions. The authors argue that this framing can usefully act as a baseline through which the employment of Allied capabilities in theatres such as the High North can be contextualised, as well as a means of better understanding the interrelationships between the individual regions which collectively form the maritime periphery of European NATO.</p> - -<p>Throughout this paper, the authors utilise a combination of methods to validate their argument, which includes an analysis of Russian military journals to ascertain where Russian officers perceive themselves to be facing capability gaps, as well as research into the capabilities that Russia and the Alliance currently field.</p> - -<h4 id="the-enduring-russian-threat">The Enduring Russian Threat</h4> - -<p>Although Russia will, in all likelihood, pose a limited conventional threat to the Alliance for up to a decade, due both to its losses and to its ongoing commitments in Ukraine, this could change once the country has reconstituted its land forces.</p> - -<p>In 2023, it was reported that the Russian state would allocate 40% of its federal budget to defence, and the Russian regime intended to increase the size of its army by 400,000 recruits. While it remains to be seen whether the Russian state is capable of sustaining an increased rate of military expenditure over the medium to long term, it should be noted that there is limited historical evidence for the argument that it cannot do so. States facing considerable economic pressures have nonetheless maintained levels of spending that, proportionately speaking, match Russia’s: Iran, for example, maintained a defence budget which represented 4–5% of its GDP over the course of the Trump administration’s “maximum pressure” campaign. Indeed, even during the 1990s, Russia itself typically spent at least 3% of its GDP on defence for most of the decade. It is therefore plausible that Russia will maintain its current levels of military expenditure, representing around 5% of its GDP, in the face of economic circumstances which, though negative and characterised by sluggish forecasted growth, are not nearly as bad as those of the 1990s, with the country’s GDP falling by 45% between 1989 and 1998. For Europe, this creates the challenge of deterring a competitor which, though it remains plagued by qualitative inefficiencies, can generate and replace forces at a scale which European nations will presently struggle to match – a challenge which will become more acute as the US has to allocate an ever-growing proportion of its resources to competition with a peer competitor in the Indo-Pacific.</p> - -<p>The emergence of a larger, if less sophisticated, Russian threat on the ground could coincide with a greater emphasis on the use of nuclear brinkmanship as a tool of statecraft. While there has been no explicit shift in Russian nuclear policy, statements both by figures within the regime, such as Nikolai Patrushev, and by academics, such as Sergei Karaganov, suggest that this is at least being debated. Certainly, there is precedent for this – Russia’s 2000 nuclear doctrine for example, conceived of a large set of scenarios to which nuclear weapons could be relevant. Moreover, as the US grapples with extended nuclear deterrence against two nuclear peers by 2030, the nuclear balance underpinning existing Western deterrence will have shifted.</p> - -<p>It is thus not inconceivable (though admittedly not certain) that in a decade, Russia will pose a renewed conventional threat backed by an arsenal that is sufficiently large and diversified to be able to provide it with flexible nuclear options that the Alliance lacks. Alternatively, Russia might opt for a strategic posture not unlike that which nations such as North Korea and Pakistan opted for in the face of conventional overmatch: combining aggressive sub-threshold competition with the use of nuclear weapons as a backstop against escalation to a conventional war that Russia cannot win. Russia might base a future force posture around sub-kiloton nuclear weapons which are less likely to trigger a strategic nuclear exchange if used. In this eventuality, Russia could combine brinkmanship within Europe and destabilisation on NATO’s southern flank to pressure the continent.</p> - -<p>The reconstitution of NATO’s own forces to meet the requirements of both deterrence and competition within this context will be shaped by relative uncertainty about the contours of Russia’s own trajectory. This paper, supported by the Royal Navy Strategic Studies Centre, seeks to answer a subordinate strategic question – what should the role be of the Alliance’s navies in strategic competition with Russia? The answer to this question will shape the contours of how both the Royal Navy and navies within NATO will evolve in the face of what could well be a long-term Russian threat.</p> - -<p>The authors propose that, irrespective of its trajectory, Russia is likely to rely on its assets in the maritime domain for two things:</p> - -<ul> - <li> - <p>Shaping the strategic balance, defined in Russian thinking as the relative throw-weight in both conventional and nuclear terms that two nations or alliances can deliver against each other’s homelands. In Russian parlance strategic forces are treated as distinct from general purpose (military) forces, though some capabilities, like ballistic missiles, can play both roles.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Holding adversary maritime platforms capable of carrying long-range strike capabilities at reach.</p> - </li> -</ul> - -<p>In some ways, this mirrors Cold War thinking about the maritime domain as being integrally intertwined with the nuclear balance. In the post-Cold War era, however, Russian leaders (including President Putin) have evinced a belief that many tasks which were previously only achievable with nuclear weapons can now be achieved with conventional precision-strike assets. Since long-range theatre-level strike assets (and kinetic defences against them) are easiest to move on large vessels, they remain a largely (though not exclusively) maritime capability in both Russia and the West.</p> - -<p>A considerable body of literature exists to suggest that perceptions of the strategic balance influence coercive dynamics across the spectrum of competition. Moreover, to the extent that many of Russia’s most viable pathways to generating a credible future force structure rest on a favourable strategic balance, a threat to this would at a minimum require adaptation by Russia. Since many of the plausible adaptations for which Russia could opt are inherently capital intensive, this will impose resource trade-offs on Russian planners.</p> - -<p>In view of this, the authors contend that one of the primary vectors through which naval forces can deliver competitive overmatch regarding Russia is by fielding long-range land attack capabilities against which Russia will have to field additional defences. If this is combined with multiple launch vectors, the cost and expense of defence will undercut Russia’s potential future force designs and compel it to implement a series of force design choices that are counterproductive.</p> - -<p>In many ways, what this paper is proposing is that the navies of NATO play a role in a modern variant of flexible response. Part of the solution to the Alliance’s deterrence requirements will be recapitalising the ground forces that represent a key pillar of deterrence on the Alliance’s eastern flank. The defence plans of nations such as Poland, which include the purchase of both the Korean K239 Chunmoo multiple-launch rocket system and the US-made M142 High Mobility Artillery Rocket System, stand out as a case in point. However, it is worth noting that the success of such plans will be contingent on the maintenance of stores of munitions and spares, as well as the ability of Alliance members to crew equipment. Maintaining the political capital to deliver equipment to forces on a sustained basis is a challenge within democracies, even in the face of acute threats.</p> - -<p>Maritime forces can play three important roles in this context. First, in peacetime, their employment can impose a requirement on Russia to expend resources on capabilities needed to deny the open ocean to NATO navies. This is viewed as a pressing requirement for the VMF and Russian aerospace forces, but one for which they have limited resources. Secondly, the employment of maritime forces can serve as a war termination tool by increasing the risks attendant on a protracted conflict in tandem with ground forces, which deny short-term gains. Finally, because many of the platforms which Russia employs for both strategic and sub-strategic nuclear use are either maritime or, like strategic bombers, can be impacted from the sea with conventional capabilities, a maritime threat to the bulk of Russia’s sub-strategic launch capability could considerably alter perceptions of a favourable strategic balance.</p> - -<p>Notably, this does not represent the full spectrum of functions which maritime power can play – the roles of navies can encompass a range of tasks, such as containing rival navies and providing armies with strategic mobility. This paper is more narrowly focused on those areas where maritime power can be applied asymmetrically as an offset to an opponent’s potential advantages in other areas, and as a tool for generating competitive advantages.</p> - -<p>The main hypothesis of this paper is that in order to impose an asymmetry of cost on Russia, as well as to reinforce deterrence, Allied maritime power should not be framed in terms of deterrence by denial. Rather, its role should be viewed in terms of the strategic functions of pre-war shaping and war termination in the event that deterrence fails. Central to this will be two things: the ability to strike inland at reach; and the capacity to exacerbate Russia’s challenges with respect to generating ISR, and operating and contesting in the maritime domain beyond its coastal defensive zones. Underpinning the proposed approach to the employment of Allied maritime power is a focus on adversary concerns, rather than an effort to match capabilities. This is drawn from the tradition of competitive strategies innovated by figures such as Andrew Marshall at the Pentagon’s Office of Net Assessment in the 1970s. This paper discusses how Allied planning for the use of maritime power in the context of European deterrence can be placed within the context of a competitive strategies framework. This is distinct from threat-based planning insofar as it takes as its starting point the assumption that adversary investments can be shaped rather than merely countered. Secondly, given its long-term focus, a perspective based on competitive strategies emphasises exploiting asymmetry, exacerbating bottlenecks in an opponent’s capabilities rather than overmatching specific military threats directly.</p> - -<p>The paper is composed of four chapters, each of which will build towards a broad set of proposed lines of action for NATO navies. Chapter I focuses on Russia’s views of the primary threats that it faces from the maritime domain, and the opportunities that might emerge from a closer integration of these fears into Allied and national planning. Chapter II focuses on naval dynamics on NATO’s northern flank as a case study. Chapters III and IV examine the emerging opportunities for Allied planning in this area and the practical impediments – in both capability and policy terms – to the adoption of a “competitive strategies” approach to the application of Allied maritime power in competition with Russia, as well as the ways in which these might be overcome.</p> - -<p>The authors reviewed a combination of sources, including Russian military literature and academic analysis of the maritime balance between NATO and Russia, as part of their research for this paper. In addition, one of the authors has direct experience of operating in two different navies within the Alliance.</p> - -<h3 id="i-russian-threats-and-allied-opportunities">I. Russian Threats and Allied Opportunities</h3> - -<p>While Russia views itself as possessing some opportunities within the maritime domain, Russian strategists tend to frame it as a threat vector. This is relatively understandable given the country’s traditional weaknesses in this domain. Broadly speaking, Russian literature evinces several potential concerns within the maritime domain:</p> - -<ul> - <li> - <p>The use of the maritime domain as a launch vector for adversary long-range precision fires against the Russian homeland.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Efforts by rivals to challenge Russia’s ability to exploit its resource base within the maritime domain, particularly in the High North and Arctic.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Threats to Russia’s second-strike strategic nuclear capability.</p> - </li> -</ul> - -<p>The first concern can be nested within a broader set of Russian concerns regarding the risk of a precision-strike campaign against the Russian homeland conducted on multiple axes. The fear that Russia could effectively be paralysed by Western long-range precision strike capabilities emerged partially as the result of a specific reading of the conflicts of the 1990s. A key lesson of the first Gulf War and the Balkan Wars derived by figures such as the then Soviet deputy chief of general staff of the armed forces, General Makhmut Gareev, and the deputy commander of the Soviet Navy, Admiral Ivan Kapitanets, was the notion that precision strike made it possible to paralyse a state’s capacity to mount an effective military response by simultaneously targeting the depth of an opponent’s territory. Though not an exclusively naval function, it has been assumed by several Russian strategists that naval platforms will represent a crucial launch vector for the long-range precision strike threat. This is a reasonable assumption, as the size of missiles such as the Tomahawk Land Attack Missile (TLAM) makes launching them from platforms other than naval more complex (though not impossible).</p> - -<p>Certain maritime platforms also have a second advantage which is of particular concern to Russian military writers: their capacity to launch strikes at close range, which would leave Russia with limited early warning. This specific threat is of course particular to certain types of launch platforms such as SSN and SSGN submarines, which can, in principle, remain undetected and strike from positions close to Russian shores at short notice. The present Russian concern regarding air and missile threats mirrors those voiced during the Soviet era, when genuine concerns about being subjected to a nuclear first strike were compounded by inter-organisational dynamics. A combination of factors contributed to this, among them the strategic culture, which created pervasive fears of surprise attack, and organisational dynamics within the USSR that saw organisations such as the Soviet Air Defence Forces competing for resources, which they could do more effectively when they could make the case that an external threat justified their needs.</p> - -<p>Contemporary Russian thinking about an aerospace assault is somewhat broader and assumes simultaneous strikes against C2 nodes, critical infrastructure airfields and nuclear assets. Russian theorists presume that the launch of missiles moving at different speeds, such as UAV decoys and cruise missiles, can be sequenced to provide a coordinated time on top or convergent effect. This is certainly technically achievable – Russia has coordinated the use of Shahed-136 loitering munitions and Kalibr cruise missiles in this way, and Iran combined cruise missiles and UAVs in its 2019 strikes on Abqaiq and Khurais.</p> - -<p>Unsurprisingly, then, priorities such as air defence have featured heavily in recent Russian procurement. For example, under the state armament programme for 2020, the Russian Federation was expected to procure 56 S-400 division sets, which, at a cost of $200 million per battery, would be comparable to a carrier programme. Moreover, Russia has placed an ever-greater emphasis on building and fielding the precision strike capabilities needed to conduct offensive counter-air missions against targets such as airbases. This has been combined with efforts to recapitalise Russia’s capacity for airborne situational awareness in areas such as the High North. In addition to deploying assets such as the MiG-31BM to the region, Russia maintains at least three S-300 and S-400 regiments under its Northern Fleet Joint Strategic Command, along with the Murmansk-BN electronic warfare complex and a growing radar network in areas such as Kotelny (see Figure 1).</p> - -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/bMq9i3s.png" alt="image01" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 1: Russia’s Radar Coverage in the High North.</strong> Source: Sidharth Kaushal et al., The Balance of Power Between Russia and NATO in the Arctic and High North, RUSI Whitehall Paper 100 (Milton Park: Taylor &amp; Francis, 2022), p. 74.</em></p> - -<p>The second major Russian concern which emerges primarily from the maritime domain is the fear that Russia’s SSBN bastions can be penetrated. This was an especially pressing consideration for the Soviet Union during the late Cold War, and drove considerable investments in securing the USSR’s bastions in the High North. Today, factors such as the melting of polar ice caps that will allow greater access to the area will exacerbate this concern, as the growth in merchant traffic is likely to mask any increased military presence, making it more difficult for Russia to produce its recognised maritime picture and deter would-be ingressors into its historical bastions. This issue has been noted by, among others, Admiral Nikolai Yemenov, commander-in-chief of the VMF.</p> - -<p>The ability of Russia to maintain situational awareness in the undersea domain represents another bottleneck in capacity and capability. Much of the responsibility for the task of maintaining sub-surface domain awareness falls to the Main Directorate of Deep-Sea Research (Glavnoye Upravlenie Glubokovodnikh Issledovanii, or GUGI). This organisation has historically depended on a highly specialised cadre of hydronauts for its operations, drawn from the ranks of the VMF via the 29th Separate Submarine brigade. It also relies on several special purpose submarines, such as the deep-diving submarine Losharik, which is launched from the Belgorod, a specially adapted stretched Oscar-class submarine. Under the leadership of Vice-Admiral Aleksei Burilichev, the GUGI took on several additional tasks, including the testing of the Poseidon nuclear torpedo. On the one hand, this represented a budgetary advantage, but it simultaneously represented a cost in terms of both submariners’ time and the use of its platforms. Currently, the organisation likely faces more tasks than its platforms and personnel can manage, with its duties including undersea surveillance, the management of Harmony (Russia’s analogue to the US Integrated Undersea Surveillance System), and more offensive functions such as espionage. This strain on availability of platforms was further compounded by a 2019 fire on the Losharik. Russia’s current emphasis on less survivable but also less costly platforms, such as the intelligence ship Yantar, and the search for autonomous solutions, may reflect these challenges. These approaches could bear fruit, but capabilities such as autonomous underwater vehicles are likely to demand investments in areas such as high-end microelectronics, which Russia can only procure at cost and at some sanctions risk to vendors.</p> - -<p>Finally, there is the risk of a distant blockade of the Russian Federation’s maritime lines of communication, which will be exacerbated by the use of “grey” shipping that can be legally interdicted in peacetime for lack of adequate insurance or flag verification, among other things. Russia is in some ways especially vulnerable to blockade. Its trade-to-GDP ratio is currently higher than that of most Western nations, and the majority of this trade is carried by sea. Though land-based infrastructure and transhipment through neutral ports can mitigate this vulnerability to an extent, it can do so only inefficiently and, moreover, at a cost in both money and material. For example, a proposed North–South Corridor moving Russian goods to the Indian Ocean via Iran would both be a high-risk investment (which is why it must be state-backed) and involve goods passing through volatile regions and states such as Azerbaijan, with which both Russia and Iran have a fraught relationship. Some Russian authors have voiced concerns that the Russian state’s increasing reliance on grey shipping will create vulnerabilities to peacetime interdiction. In a conflict scenario, much of Russia’s energy exports, among other things, will depend on sea lines of communication.</p> - -<p>Because of the need to meet requirements such as protecting bastions and sea lines of communication, as well as contributing to objectives such as offensive counter-air missions, the VMF has secured a sizeable proportion of Russia’s defence budget over the last decades: it received a 26% allocation under the last state armament plan, as compared to 14% for ground forces. Despite this fiscal allocation, the ability of Russia’s ageing maritime sector to meet the demands placed on it is in question. The recent budget announcement that more than a third of Russia’s total budget expenditure in 2024 will go to defence will not ease this, as the main emphasis of this increase is focused on the delivery of victory in Ukraine, meaning that predominantly the land environment and the Army will benefit.</p> - -<h4 id="the-trade-offs-facing-russia">The Trade-Offs Facing Russia</h4> - -<p>Some challenges are easier for Russia to mitigate than others. While Russia can achieve sea denial and a degree of sea control in its coastal seas, contesting freedom of action out to 1,000 km and beyond will be difficult and costly for a country that must also rebuild its forces on land. For example, Russia has struggled to build its Pion and Lotos satellite constellations and thus has limited situational awareness at reach.</p> - -<p>The issue for Russia is twofold. First, as previously noted, platform development in the maritime domain is inherently capital intensive, and this is especially true for those platforms that are needed to contest more distant waters. While it is difficult to ascertain the costs of platforms such as the Ilyushin Il-38 aircraft or the Yasen-class submarine with a high degree of certainty (though public figures do exist for the Yasen), proxy indicators can be utilised. For example, during the Cold War the CIA used a methodology which focused on the relative costs of platforms, rather than on their absolute costs. Essentially, the relative production cost of two different systems was established using Western analogues. Though imperfect, the assumption underpinning this mode of comparison was that while the absolute costs of two different platforms might vary across states, the relative costs were more stable and dependant on physical characteristics such as tonnage and power density (for vessels) or factors such as weight and speed (for aircraft), and because factors such as labour costs that might impact absolute costs would not impact relative costs. Using this rubric, the costs of the platforms needed for Russia to contest areas beyond its immediate close seas are prohibitive. For example, a Yasen-class submarine should cost roughly as much as the armour organic to a force such as the First Guards Tank Army.</p> - -<p>A second factor worth considering is how much a given system depends on foreign inputs, including machine tooling and microelectronics. In this case, there is likely to be a direct correlation between the reach of a platform or effector and its dependence on imports. Effectors such as long-range missiles depend on Western inputs to achieve precision at reach. Similarly, the larger the platform, the more it is likely to require in terms of resources such as machine tooling, much of which is imported. Estimating sophistication is a relatively imprecise art, though more is now known about the degree to which certain effectors (in particular missiles) rely on Western capabilities. One proxy, borrowed from civilian economics, is to use the average GDP of countries that produce a given product as a barometer of its sophistication and thus its reliance on high-tech imports if the country producing the product falls below the average. The percentage of industrial capacity in areas where Russia has external dependencies on which a given area of military spending draws is another measure which can be employed. By these metrics, capabilities such as SSNs, strategic bombers, long-range strike capabilities and air defence systems are all likely to be demanding in terms of external inputs.</p> - -<p>Maintenance costs are another area of interest. During the Cold War it was presumed (correctly) that the poor quality of Soviet aircraft maintenance meant that the through-life costs of Soviet aircraft would exceed those of their Western counterparts in absolute terms, even if their capital costs did not. This is more likely to be true the more sophisticated the platform, thus impacting naval and air platforms in particular.</p> - -<p>Finally, we might consider personnel. More sophisticated platforms tend to draw on skilled personnel, both for manufacture and subsequent manning. To the extent that skilled and educated personnel represent a capability bottleneck which will be exacerbated by emigration, platforms drawing on such individuals will compete with other elements of the force that require skilled personnel. This could include, for example, operators for air defences and C2 systems such as Akatsia-M. Of course, defence could outcompete other sectors for remaining skilled personnel, but only at the cost of creating distortions elsewhere. While Russia has embraced the integration of autonomous and uncrewed systems into all aspects of warfare throughout its operations in Ukraine, it retains a lack of trust towards machines and full autonomy. It continues to fund research into AI but, again, it is not a world leader in this field and therefore lags behind the West in these areas which could potentially solve some of the crewing issues faced by militaries around the globe.</p> - -<p>Overall, Russia has shown a great deal of sensitivity to the maritime domain as a threat vector, and its leadership has displayed a willingness to expend considerable resources on attempting to secure the nation’s maritime flanks. However, this represents an opportunity cost for the rest of the Russian military in several ways. First, maritime platforms are inherently capital intensive and require inputs in precisely those areas where Russia has considerable weaknesses. Moreover, maintaining capabilities such as air defences sufficient to close off Russia’s maritime approaches requires Russia to strip them from other tasks.</p> - -<p>Even with this level of expenditure, significant challenges remain for Russia. One Russian analyst has suggested that the Russian armed forces had a third of the resources needed to secure the country’s maritime approaches, while considerable debates have taken place within Russia regarding the need for power projection platforms. Furthermore, gaps remain in Russia’s air and sea denial capabilities in areas such as the High North.</p> - -<h3 id="ii-case-study-naval-dynamics-on-natos-northern-flank">II. Case Study: Naval Dynamics on NATO’s Northern Flank</h3> - -<p>The Russian position in the High North is a useful case study. While Russia has invested considerable effort in reinforcing its military position in the region, it nonetheless faces certain critical gaps in capability that could prove to be enduring. If Russia were to invest in resolving these challenges, it would necessarily have to do so at the expense of other parts of its force structure.</p> - -<p>Though not identical to its Soviet predecessor, the VMF’s conception of its role, including in this region, is similar. A primary wartime function of the Soviet fleet was the defence of SSBNs in their bastions, because the leadership of the USSR perceived the balance of nuclear power at the end of a conflict to be a critical determinant of bargaining power at the point of conflict termination. The assumptions underpinning this concept remain for Russia today. To this end, the Soviets organised their fleet for the defence of three zones: a coastal defence zone within 200 km of Russia’s shores; a near seas zone within 1,000 km; and a far seas zone up to 2,000 km from Russia. At a minimum, Russian forces should be able to dominate the coastal defence zone and achieve sea denial in the near seas and far seas zones. Russian strategists do not, however, perceive their role in purely reactive terms – one way in which Soviet SSNs were to contribute to shaping war termination dynamics was by actively hunting adversary SSBNs. Today, Russia views the balances which will determine the circumstances of war termination as including adversary conventional long-range precision strike capabilities, given the increased lethality of the latter against command nodes, logistical facilities and nuclear assets themselves. As such, at a minimum it will be a standing requirement for Russian naval forces in the High North and Arctic both to prevent platforms capable of holding long-range strike capabilities from entering into the Arctic, including denial of access to the oceans directly abutting it (from where long-range strike capabilities can be launched with limited warning), and to eliminate adversary platforms on the open oceans where possible. The ability of Russia’s forces to achieve this, however, may be constrained.</p> - -<p>The first area in which Russia will face considerable capability gaps in the High North is anti-submarine warfare (ASW). Though Russia’s Northern Fleet Joint Strategic Command maintains a sizeable force of both conventional and nuclear attack submarines, its capacity for defensive ASW is somewhat more constrained. Russia’s fleet of 44 Ilyushin Il-38N and Tupolev Tu-142 maritime patrol aircraft, though not small by any standard, is split between the Northern Fleet Joint Strategic Command and the Pacific Fleet. Moreover, it is considerably more limited than the maritime patrol aircraft force that Russian planners intended to have at their disposal – the VMF had aspired to field 30 Il-38Ns by 2020, in addition to its fleet of Tu-142s. Factors such as readiness must be taken into account, and there are certain trends which will compound the problems posed by the lack of airborne surveillance.</p> - -<p>Secondly, the Russian surface fleet’s capacity to support ASW is also becoming increasingly constrained. The Udaloy II-class destroyer – the backbone of the Soviet Navy’s and then the VMF’s surface ASW capabilities – is likely reaching the point of obsolescence. While new surface platforms such as the Admiral Gorshkov-class frigate can provide a newer and more capable replacement, Russia’s production of the Gorshkov class has faced considerable delays, driven by both the limitations of Russia’s indigenous shipbuilding base and its loss of access to gas turbine engines (which it procured from Ukraine) after 2014. Compounding this are considerable overruns in the repair and refit of existing vessels such as the Kirov-class cruiser Admiral Nakhimov. Russia can continue to build vessels such as the Gorshkov-class frigates, but it will face capacity constraints. To cite one example, the Russian effort to develop combined diesel and gas engines to replace Ukrainian imports has delivered eventual success, but Russia is restricted to the production of two such engines a year, and even this rate of production may prove difficult to sustain. A major bottleneck will be capacity at Russian shipyards, which are currently running at capacity. Compounding this is the need for import substitution: the Kolomna D49 diesel engine which forms part of the M55R power unit includes several imported components that will be increasingly difficult for Russia to procure in the face of export controls. Given that the engines on naval vessels are subject to a wear rate when they are at sea, spare part restrictions can also impact the operational tempo of existing vessels. Sanctions evasion is of course possible, but this imposes additional fiscal costs on already expensive programmes. Finally, wider challenges faced by Russian civilian shipbuilding mean that civilian and military projects may, to an extent, compete for the same resources, particularly with respect to personnel.</p> - -<p>Thirdly, the airbases upon which Russian assets rely – assets such as the Tu-22M3 bomber and the Il-38N, which are crucial to denying access to surface vessels and submarines respectively – are vulnerable to air attack, as was recently demonstrated in the Ukrainian attacks on the Engels airbase. The size of the fixed-wing aircraft being deployed from these bases makes the use of hardened air shelters or dispersion impractical. While some security can be provided using airbases deeper within Russia, this comes at a cost in terms of presence and endurance (and many of these airbases can be threatened from other vectors). Russia can mitigate these challenges, but only through the employment of a robust regional air defence network. It currently maintains such a network in the form of three S-300 and S-400 regiments under OSK Sever. In addition to this, the Northern Fleet Joint Strategic Command maintains an electronic warfare centre at Severomorsk, which controls electronic warfare complexes such as the Murmansk-BN and the Krasukha-4.</p> - -<p>There are several ways in which this picture can become considerably more complex for Russia. First, the changing climate in the High North might considerably expand the areas which the VMF must survey and thus deny to adversary assets. In particular, changes that make seasonal circumpolar navigation easier for subsurface assets will complicate the task of ASW in the High North and Arctic. Similar changes will also make ingress by submarines into the Arctic from the east possible to a degree that was not previously viable, both by Russian adversaries (NATO) and, potentially in the future, by China, which will complicate the water space further for Russia. Moreover, detecting submarines in the region will be complicated by factors such as the increase in temperature of the Arctic Ocean and changes in salinity that will affect sound channels, greater ambient oceanic noise due to increases in oceanic wildlife, open-ocean storms (where there used to be ice), and increases in the movement of sea ice as the ice cap breaks up.</p> - -<p>A second risk to Russia’s conceived approach to oceanic defence is posed by the increasing range of strike assets. For example, the common hypersonic glide body intended for use by the US Army and Navy has a 4,000 km range, which would allow it to have an effect over much of western Russia from the Norwegian Sea. Moreover, strike platforms such as hypersonics and land attack cruise missiles, which exist at the high end of the cost continuum, are joined by considerably cheaper long-range strike assets. As an example, consider one-way attack UAVs, such as the Iranian-made Shahed-136, which have a theoretical range of 2,000 km. While limited in terms of sensors and payload, such munitions can be of use against soft targets such as administrative buildings, or targets which are inherently incendiary such as fuel or munitions stocks. At least one recent Russian study has noted that the munitions expenditure involved in engaging UAVs as well as the detection challenges they pose represent serious air defence challenges. The challenge of range for the VMF is that it forces the VMF to sortie out to engage platforms which can pose a threat from well beyond Russia’s bastions, and thus places a higher premium on Tier 1 platforms that can operate on open oceans.</p> - -<p>A third risk facing Russia is that of the changing strategic geography of the northern flank spurred by NATO’s enlargement. First, this will spur a convergence between regions such as the Baltic and the High North. This challenge is inextricable from that of range. A sufficiently long-ranged strike munition such as the TLAM could impact many of the same regions from either the Norwegian Sea or the Baltic Sea, but the proximity to Russia of the latter region relative to the former means that strikes from within the Baltic Sea could occur with limited warning times, while missiles fired from further afield could arrive as a follow-on capability. This creates multiple avenues for convergent strikes from multiple vectors. Though Russia can more easily deny parts of the Baltic Sea with ground-based missiles in Kaliningrad, this is less true of the littorals of nations such as Sweden. Much of Russia’s capacity for denial depends on closing the straits of Denmark, which will prove difficult if NATO vessels are posturing in a crisis short of war, especially when a number of NATO members are on the other side of the straits. Secondly, the proximity of NATO’s northern flank to Russian strategic bastions means that strike capabilities which might have been classed as tactical can have a strategic effect. An ATACMS (Army Tactical Missile System) missile in Finland, for example, has strategic ramifications, as does an aircraft which might have been viewed as a tactical capability. If contending purely with ground-based assets, this might actually incentivise Russia to pre-empt before platforms can be dispersed. A maritime dimension to deterrence can remove this incentive by introducing strike assets which cannot be as easily pre-empted.</p> - -<p>Finally, there is the risk that the Alliance can enforce a distant blockade on the Russian Federation, which must still move energy from areas such as the Arctic through chokepoints in both the east (in the form of the Bering Strait) and the west (through the GIUK Gap). Overland alternatives do exist, but their capacity is likely to be considerably constrained. Moreover, most overland methods of circumventing a blockade, such as pipelines or routes to alternative terminals, are resource-intensive endeavours.</p> - -<p>To be sure, Russia can mitigate each of these challenges. It is not yet clear that NATO has the capacity to present the Russian leadership with the challenges that its maritime doctrine is partially based around mitigating. However, it is the authors’ contention that the Alliance has avenues through which to adapt its maritime posture in a 10-year timeframe in order to present Russia with an asymmetrical offset to the advantages that it may enjoy on land in terms of both mass and proximity to likely theatres. Moreover, the development of these avenues can force Russia into disproportionately costly mitigations, which will impose opportunity costs elsewhere.</p> - -<h3 id="iii-emerging-opportunities-for-allied-planning">III. Emerging Opportunities for Allied Planning</h3> - -<p>The challenge that Russia faces in the maritime domain can be summarised as follows. In order to be strategically secure enough to pursue a full spectrum of competitive actions including escalation to local and regional conflict, Russia must deny the maritime domain out to 1,000 km. All of the platforms and enablers that might allow Russia to achieve this are, by their nature, inherently complex. The surveillance and reconnaissance needed to cue conventional missiles at reach have thus far not been developed by Russia, while aerial and maritime platforms operating at long distances do so at considerable risk. As such, to the extent that the Alliance can expand the area over which Russia must achieve sea denial in order to protect itself against long-range strikes, it can shape the contours of Russian force regeneration. It can achieve this primarily in two ways:</p> - -<ul> - <li> - <p>By expanding its long-range land attack capability.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>By operating on new vectors that Russia has not historically had to defend.</p> - </li> -</ul> - -<p>First, the assets of Alliance members can be postured in ways that incentivise Russian responses at reach. For example, exercises at or just beyond the Russian near seas zone focused specifically on strike, comparable to exercises such as Formidable Shield (which focuses on Integrated Air and Missile Defence), would in all likelihood compel responses. We might, for example, consider the relationship between NATO’s Trident Juncture and the scale of Russia’s Ocean Shield exercises, which consistently track one another. This is an asymmetrical challenge for Russia, which is operating fewer and older hulls, but it would also compel Russian leaders to plan in terms of their existing fears regarding strikes from the northern vector.</p> - -<p>Given that Russia views this challenge in multi-theatre terms, sequencing exercises by NATO and those conducted by member states such as the US in the Indo-Pacific could act as a forcing function to compel even larger-scale responses by Russia. This was the case during the Cold War, when the Soviet Navy felt compelled to stage multi-theatre exercises, such as Okean, to demonstrate its ability to operate across theatres. The cost of such activity in both human terms and platform wear can have an indirect effect on Russia’s ability to project power elsewhere, especially in a context where recent state armament plans have prioritised surface vessels with limited endurance, and given the age and reliability issues facing many larger platforms.</p> - -<p>There are other ways for the Alliance to increase the strain on Russian forces that are constrained by both vessel age and human capital. For example, forward activity by Allied SSNs, particularly on transpolar routes, would create an imperative to maintain more persistent surveillance over a considerably wider area. Russian efforts to maintain situational awareness in these areas would be non-discretionary, both because of the importance of these zones for patrolling SSBNs and because Russia’s air defences over the central Arctic are relatively sparse, underscoring the risk of key air defence radar being suppressed by submarine-launched cruise missiles to open the way for other platforms.</p> - -<p>Lastly, sea control at key chokepoints could be underscored through exercises which emphasise interdiction for other reasons. For example, exercises framed in terms of the need to interdict threats to critical infrastructure or to counter illicit activity would, if conducted at or near strategic chokepoints, have an implicit effect in terms of messaging. Unlike larger-scale exercises, which often take years to plan, such activity could be conducted on a more routine basis.</p> - -<h3 id="iv-practical-impediments-to-a-competitive-strategies-approach-and-ways-to-overcome-them">IV. Practical Impediments to a “Competitive Strategies” Approach and Ways to Overcome Them</h3> - -<p>There are several challenges inherent in an approach that is designed to compete in the way described above. Among them are potential risks to strategic stability and the positions of different NATO Alliance members with regard to a forward-leaning maritime posture.</p> - -<p>The first risk, that strategic stability could be upended if Russia perceives a risk to its own critical capabilities, is one that political leaders across the Alliance would understandably wish to avoid. There are several ways in which this risk might manifest itself. First, a Russia that perceived risks to its C2 (including its nuclear C2), second strike or other critical capabilities might well have incentives to escalate early in a crisis. Secondly, the nature of certain elements of a competitive strategy, such as the forward posturing of subsurface assets, could lead to challenges such as the loss of communications and thus control; this issue arose during the Cold War when American SSNs such as the Gato conducted operations near the Soviet coastline, an activity that carried inherent escalatory risk.</p> - -<p>The first challenge, while real, can also be stabilising in certain respects. If, as a precondition for military action, Russia had to posture forces in a way that insured it against a crippling first strike, this would, in principle, limit its avenues for limited military action. Any escalation would need to be accompanied by a set of actions which in turn would make it difficult for the Russian leadership to communicate limited intent, and would thus only be justifiable in extremis. Moreover, it should be noted that the very proximity of NATO’s borders to Russia and the possibility of long-range strike being surged in a crisis creates a pre-emptive logic for Russia irrespective of maritime strategy. Indeed, the relative viability of suppressing targets such as aircraft on the ground, given the concentration of Allied aircraft in generally unhardened airbases, would incentivise this. The relative difficulty of pre-emptively suppressing maritime platforms with conventional capabilities except when in port would remove some incentives for conventional pre-emption which might exist against ground-based platforms.</p> - -<p>Secondly, it is worth noting that the authors are not suggesting that in an escalating crisis, Western states should opt to engage in strikes against the Russian homeland on the scale that Russia fears. Rather, the proposition is that uncertainty regarding whether this might occur, if engendered in peacetime, can have a positive competitive effect. Perhaps most importantly, however, it is already the case that Russia appears intent on developing a range of capabilities, such as the Poseidon nuclear torpedo and the Avangard hypersonic glide vehicle, which are built to insure it against a crippling first strike. If this is indeed the case, then it is not obvious that instability is avoidable. Rather, what appears more likely to be shaped by Western policy is the degree to which Russia invests in such capabilities, rather than taking other avenues.</p> - -<p>The second challenge – namely, Alliance cohesion – is considerable, especially in areas such as the High North, where some members of the Alliance are likely to be heavily invested in regional stability for entirely understandable reasons. It should be noted that this would not necessarily be the first instance in which debates over Allied posture have proved divisive; NATO’s shift to a flexible response posture and the later adoption of the Follow-on Forces Attack doctrine were also accompanied by controversy.</p> - -<p>There are several avenues which might be pursued as mitigations. First, in the vein of NATO’s Harmel formula, deterrence can be combined with engagement, whereby reciprocal de-escalatory actions by Russia can be matched in kind. For example, the tempo of Allied SSN activity in the High North might be linked to Russian activity near Allied undersea cables. Linking activity with engagement can allay some Allied fears. Secondly, some of the capabilities described would impact the High North even if not postured in the region on a long-term basis. Maritime platforms hosting strike assets such as hypersonics, for example, can pose a theoretical threat from well beyond areas such as the Norwegian Sea. As such, they need not be persistently forward postured, and their intermittent presence need be viewed no differently from the occasional deployments of strategic bombers to the region. Since the mobility of air and maritime assets allows for relatively rapid posturing, the Russian leadership is likely to view the balance of precision strike capabilities as being determined by the number of missiles each side possesses, rather than those regionally postured. Thus, forward deployment in ways that pose a challenge to Alliance cohesion may in many instances be unnecessary. This would not be equally true of other activities, such as subsurface activity along the Northern Sea Route; however, such activity is likely to involve a limited subset of Allied navies in any instance.</p> - -<p>A subset of challenges relates to military capacity. In many of the areas described, including long-range strike capabilities and subsurface assets, members of the Alliance will face their own considerable shortfalls in capacity. To use an example, the UK currently has a single launch vector for deep strikes inland from the maritime domain – namely the TLAM launched from the Astute-class submarine. This challenge will likely be compounded by the eventuality that a large proportion of the capabilities fielded by the US will be reallocated to the Indo-Pacific theatre to contend with an increasingly capable People’s Liberation Army Navy. The Alliance will also face shortfalls in other areas, such as submarines capable of operating under ice, and limitations to the human capital available across Allied navies.</p> - -<p>It should be noted, however, that considering the present operating circumstances which Russia faces, it is likely that capabilities needed to compete effectively with the Russian Federation in the medium term will be needed in a 10-year timeframe and beyond. As such, Allied maritime capabilities can be viewed in the same vein as virtually any other category of capability, such as munitions – while present shortfalls in production capacity are real, there is a window in which they might be rectified.</p> - -<p>A relatively quick way in which members of the Alliance could increase Russian uncertainty regarding the scale of the precision-strike threat is by experimenting with the use of air defence interceptors in a dual-capable role. This has already been the case with the SM-2 and SM-6 missiles, and while there are many technical reasons why interceptors may not be the best means of striking targets at reach, the fact that Russian planners already presume that they will play this role means that they will have to be factored into planning regarding the strike threat to soft-skinned targets.</p> - -<p>The containerisation of subsonic munitions both by Russia and more recently by the US Marine Corps suggests that at least some strike assets could be emplaced on non-dedicated platforms in a crisis, or deployed ashore in an escalating crisis. This would also be the case for attritable one-way attack UAVs, which can be containerised in larger numbers. Though unlikely to pose a threat to hardened targets, such capabilities are regarded by Russia as posing a credible threat to targets such as airfields, on which strategic capabilities such as ASW aircraft and bombers are based.</p> - -<p>Launch platforms for bespoke capabilities such as hypersonics are likely to pose more of a challenge, given the lengths of the strike cells needed. Presently, only the US Navy’s payload-module-equipped Virginia-class submarines could plausibly carry long-range hypersonic missiles, and any competitive approach in Europe will depend on the presence of at least some of these assets within European waters. This being said, there are relatively few targets that are either so heavily hardened or so fleeting that they demand the use of a hypersonic missile. In a 10-year timeframe, this could change, as European navies such as the Royal Navy seek to integrate hypersonics on future platforms such as the SSN(R). The fact that ground-based versions of naval hypersonics which fit within 40-foot container-sized launchers are also being developed holds out the option of deploying missiles ashore from amphibious shipping, rather than firing them from vessels. If concerns regarding emissions and heat can be mitigated, container-based hypersonics can also be integrated on non-bespoke platforms. As an example, we might consider how the Israeli Lora SRBM has been containerised and operated from a non-dedicated vessel.</p> - -<p>Given that Russian defence planning is programmed on a 10-year basis, the choices that the Russian state makes for investments out to a 10-year time horizon are dependent on the force structures that it may expect to face. With respect to the missiles themselves, the primary barrier will be R&amp;D costs, and there is some reason to believe that a model comparable to the F-35 – with manufacturing distributed, but intellectual property held by states that have moved ahead of the pack – should be the basis for work on hypersonics envisioned via the AUKUS (Australia, UK and US) defence partnership.</p> - -<p>Forward SSN operations could prove much more challenging, given that most SSN fleets are unlikely to grow in the next decade, and the demand on the US Navy in the Indo-Pacific is likely to increase. Past the next decade, this challenge may be alleviated somewhat, but this is uncertain. Uncrewed solutions may offer an offset to limited hulls, and uncrewed capabilities have the potential to be used in similar roles, but with a different concept of employment to the standard SSNs of today. First, autonomous vessels can be used for forward surveillance, and have already been used in this capacity by states such as China. While this poses a risk of platforms being captured, it also allows for intelligence gathering without the escalatory risks that the use of crewed assets near hostile shores posed during the Cold War. Moreover, the task of tracking subsurface contacts, whether crewed or not, would be one that imposes burdens on Russian ASW assets.</p> - -<p>Beyond this, uncrewed capabilities can be used for tasks such as forward minelaying, and as active sonar emitters in forward positions, which can enable passive detection by more valuable crewed platforms. This is important since one of the reasons that SSNs need other platforms to perform wide area searches is that they cannot afford to emit themselves. Rather than operating in an anti-SSBN role, NATO’s SSNs could act as a forward perimeter. This could impose dilemmas on Russia when viewed in conjunction with the imperative that long-range strike creates for Russian SSNs to sortie beyond their bastions: if strike creates imperatives for SSNs and SSGNs to be utilised in risk-acceptant ways, mines and uncrewed capabilities teamed with smaller numbers of crewed platforms will be able to ambush them in forward positions. The resultant dilemma is one that Russian planners will not easily contend with in a crisis. On the other hand, the complexities of communicating underwater make the direct control of uncrewed underwater vehicles as armed complements to crewed submarines difficult.</p> - -<p>Crucially, however, the question in each instance will be whether the capabilities developed can impose more costs than those required to develop them in the first place. In this, the Alliance will have the advantage of knowing that Russia will have to develop mitigations premised on a worst-case scenario. As illustrated by Russian literature that consistently overemphasises the scale at which the Alliance can generate long-range strikes, and by both Russian and Soviet responses to prior changes in Alliance posture, it is conceivable that even marginal investments in the areas described will impose disproportionately costly adaptations on Russia.</p> - -<h3 id="conclusion">Conclusion</h3> - -<p>NATO’s reactive application of maritime power does not currently translate into strategic effects, but with three subtle changes it could. Firstly, it could do so through the creation of an environment that forces Russia to expend resources on capabilities needed to deny the open ocean to NATO navies; secondly, the employment of maritime forces can serve as a war termination tool by increasing the costs of a protracted conflict in tandem with ground forces, which deny short-term gains; and finally, because many of the platforms which Russia uses for sub-strategic nuclear use are either maritime or, like strategic bombers, can be impacted from the sea with conventional capabilities, a maritime threat to the bulk of Russia’s sub-strategic launch capability can considerably alter perceptions of a favourable strategic balance.</p> - -<p>Maritime power has historically been an asymmetrical advantage for the Alliance vis-à-vis Russia, and it can continue to play this role. Russia’s concepts for defending its maritime periphery commit it to a posture which can only be sustained by platforms that are capital intensive – precisely the type of capability that Russia is least well-situated to generate. By investing in capabilities in areas such as long-range strike, the Alliance can exacerbate the challenges which Russia faces. This, in turn, means that the way Allied maritime power is conceived should be a function of what can be delivered ashore from the sea (which is what Russian leaders primarily worry about), rather than seizing sea control per se.</p> - -<p>Russia has several concerns about the use of maritime that could be exploited by NATO. Firstly, there is the threat to Russia’s second-strike capability. Russia views the use of the maritime domain as a launch vector for adversary long-range precision fires into the heart of the Russian homeland, including critical national infrastructure, airbases and strategic strike capabilities. It has therefore sought to improve surface-to-air missile coverage and situational awareness through increased radar sites across the High North in an effort to detect and deter potential aggression from this vector. Secondly, Russia’s traditional concerns regarding the safety of its second strike may be exacerbated by the impact of climate change. Thirdly, Russia fears the risk of a distant blockade of the Russian Federation’s maritime lines of communication, not only in the Baring Strait/GIUK Gap but also in the Baltic, the Black Sea and into the Pacific. Overland import/export routes are costly and rely on good relationships with neighbouring nations, something that cannot be guaranteed, and therefore lacks potential investors. This is further exacerbated by the use of grey shipping, which has ways of being legally interdicted in peacetime. Without steady access to engines and spares, Russia’s ability to maintain its fleets and maritime squadrons will be significantly called into question, leaving the maritime areas open to further exploitation.</p> - -<p>These concerns can be exploited by NATO to create strategic advantages. The Alliance can use a threat to shift the strategic balance in its favour in several ways:</p> - -<ul> - <li> - <p>By shaping Russian leaders’ pre-conflict assessments of their ability (or lack thereof) to control a conflict.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>By shifting the allocation of scarce resources towards costly mitigations such as air defences and platforms capable of contesting distant seas.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>By setting the conditions for war termination if deterrence fails and initial denial is achieved on the ground.</p> - </li> -</ul> - -<p>The fear of Allied maritime power has historically provoked counter-reactions by Russia. As a lack of response would imply a weakening in Russia’s stance internally, a response to any NATO action is typically thought necessary. These counter-reactions are financially costly and increase the strain on Russian forces, which are constrained by both vessel age and human capital. The cost of such activity in both human terms and platform wear can have an indirect effect on Russia’s ability to project power elsewhere. The forward posturing of Allied subsurface assets and circumpolar transits represent two avenues through which this kind of outcome might be achieved.</p> - -<p>NATO should, however, recognise its own shortfalls, including the subset of challenges related to military capacity. In many of the areas described, including long-range strike capabilities and subsurface assets, members of the Alliance will face their own considerable shortfalls in capacity. There are certain ways in which the Alliance can rationalise its approach to producing precision strike capabilities. The first might be an emphasis on commonality of capabilities – something already visible in initiatives to increase the Alliance’s capacity in areas such as air defence. Allied efforts to co-produce existing effectors rather than develop multiple independent types could yield considerable efficiencies; the emphasis of AUKUS Pillar 2 on fielding hypersonics could serve as the first step for a wider Allied effort in this regard. The Alliance will also face shortfalls in other areas that will necessitate the preparation of their navies to operate on a warfighting basis against a well-defined threat. Capabilities needed to compete effectively with the Russian Federation in the medium term will need to be fielded in a 10-year timeframe and beyond.</p> - -<p>The second likely concern – a lack of platforms to hold strike assets – could be mitigated in several ways, including through the containerisation of subsonic munitions.</p> - -<p>Thirdly, different approaches to ASW could expand the threat envelope for opponents. Though hardly a panacea, uncrewed solutions such as uncrewed underwater vehicles can be used for tasks such as emplacing mines in forward positions within bastions, as well as for forward surveillance. A combination of the machine learning tools that make low-frequency active sonar (previously too riddled with false positives to be used as a tactical asset) a viable means of detection at reach could allow a combination of distant platforms used for detection to cue in more attritable ones in their final approach, without the requirement to risk SSNs forward.</p> - -<p>In each instance, the key consideration will be whether capabilities developed can impose more costs than those required to develop them in the first place, which should be the key determinant of Allied policy in the maritime domain.</p> - -<hr /> - -<p><strong>Sidharth Kaushal</strong> is the Research Fellow of Sea Power in RUSI. His research covers the impact of technology on maritime doctrine in the 21st century and the role of sea power in a state’s grand strategy. Sidharth holds a doctorate in International Relations from the London School of Economics, where his research examined the ways in which strategic culture shapes the contours of a nation’s grand strategy.</p> - -<p><strong>René Balletta</strong> is the inaugural First Sea Lord’s Visiting Fellow at RUSI. He is a career Warfare Officer and has spent the majority of his 32 years in the service at sea in a variety of surface platforms that include frigates, destroyers, amphibious assault ships, aircraft carriers and the Royal Yacht. He has been involved in maritime operations across the globe from the NATO-led naval blockade off the Former-Yugoslavia in 1993, through to anti-piracy operations off the Horn of Africa in 1996; from support operations to land forces in Afghanistan in 2003, through to sitting on the gunline off Libya in 2011. He holds an MA in International Relations from the Sorbonne and an MSc in Strategy, Leadership and Management from the French War College in Paris, and in 2020 he was elected as the Hudson Fellow at St Antony’s College, Oxford. His research interests include national resilience, sanctions enforcement, maritime security, Franco-British relations and defence themes in the Indo-Pacific.</p>Sidharth Kaushal and René BallettaThe question that this paper seeks to answer is how Allied maritime power can best contribute to competition with Russia. \ No newline at end of file +<p>案件編號：HCCC51/2022</p>獨媒報導林榮基赴台擺頭版 陳沛敏：係我嘅決定，因有新聞價值、持獨家照片者要求 \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/hkers/2024-03-11-trial-of-jimmy-lai-day-42.html b/hkers/2024-03-11-trial-of-jimmy-lai-day-42.html new file mode 100644 index 00000000..b2585614 --- /dev/null +++ b/hkers/2024-03-11-trial-of-jimmy-lai-day-42.html @@ -0,0 +1,191 @@ + + + + + + + + + + 【黎智英案・審訊第卌二日】 · The Republic of Agora + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +
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【黎智英案・審訊第卌二日】

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獨媒報導 | 2024.03.11

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  • 楊清奇：黎智英認為美國趁習近平弱勢時轉變對華政策、落井下石是好時機
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【獨媒報導】壹傳媒創辦人黎智英及3間蘋果公司被控串謀勾結外國勢力及串謀刊印煽動刊物等罪，案件今（11日）於高院（移師西九龍法院）踏入第42日審訊。前《蘋果日報》主筆楊清奇，繼續以「從犯證人」身份出庭作供。楊早前證供提及，2018年時任總統彭斯演講時提及美國對華政策，黎認為「美國反檯」，自此政治立場變得激進。楊表示以他的理解，黎認為國家主席習近平「係比較弱勢」，美國在這個時機轉變對華政策，是一個好時機，訊息紀錄亦顯示，黎曾向楊稱「是趁中國弱乘機落井下石」。楊又指黎曾經是一個成功的商人，辦報紙時擅長把握形勢和讀者的需要，當時見到美國對華政策的改變，都會調整報紙立場。楊指在2019年反修例期間，《蘋果》經常以「今日上街，明日上街」作為標題，並在報導和評論中落實「和勇不分」和「不譴責、不割蓆、不篤灰」原則。

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前《蘋果日報》主筆楊清奇（筆名李平）第六天以「從犯證人」身份出庭作供。控方代表、助理刑事檢控專員張卓勤繼續主問。

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image02 +▲ 高級檢控官 吳加悅（左）、助理刑事檢控專員 張卓勤（右）

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《蘋果》論壇版曾刊登有關加拿大救生艇文章 楊清奇指「香港監察」關注港人權

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控方向楊清奇展示數篇曾刊登於《蘋果》的評論文章，其中一篇在2020年11月24日刊登於報紙論壇版的文章〈加拿大加入救生艇計劃〉，由「香港監察」高級政策顧問 Sam Goodman 撰寫。

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楊表示記得這篇文章是由同事交給他的，相信 Sam Goodman 提供了中英文版本。控方遂展示時任英文版主筆盧峯（馮偉光）與楊清奇之間的訊息紀錄，盧峯指「香港監察」創辦人羅傑斯（Benedict Rogers）轉交其同事 Sam Goodman 的文章，並提供了中英文版本。盧峯並表示英文版會刊登，問楊清奇是否有興趣在中文論壇版刊登。

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楊表示，以他所知羅傑斯是「香港監察」的負責人，其文章曾被刊登於《蘋果》英文版，中文版則沒有印象。控方遂展示羅傑斯的文章〈Aversion to Beijing’s bellicose diplomacy is escalating in Europe（歐洲對北京戰狼外交政策反感俱增）〉，刊登於《蘋果》英文版網站。楊指「佢個機構都係比較關注香港人權嘅」，至於羅傑斯的寫作角度，楊則稱沒有留意他的文章，未能回答到此問題。

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楊清奇稱對方鄺頌晴寫作角度無印象

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控方續展示由鄺頌晴（Glacier Kwong）撰寫的文章〈Why people reckon upon Germany speaking up against human rights violations〉，在2021年1月28日刊於《蘋果》英文版網站。

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楊表示「我唔認識呢個作者嘅」，只是間中見到她的文章在英文版刊出。至於鄺的寫作角度，楊亦表示「無特別印象」。

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楊清奇指前《眾新聞》主筆楊健興支持新聞自由

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控方提及已停運的《眾新聞》前主筆楊健興所撰寫的文章〈National Security Law targets small but hits big〉，在2021年3月31日刊登於《蘋果》英文版網站。

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image03 +▲ 楊健興（資料圖片）

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楊清奇指，楊健興是當時的記協主席，在《蘋果》中文論壇版是自由撰稿人，他一般會就新聞事件邀請楊健興撰稿，「佢係好強調新聞自由，好支持新聞自由」。楊清奇亦確認，根據「飯盒會」會議紀錄重點，黎曾同意邀請《立場新聞》、《眾新聞》和《端傳媒》等網媒寫手撰文。他補充，上述楊健興的英文文章並不是由中文論壇版的文章翻譯而成的。

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控方另展示由 Joseph Long 撰寫的〈A growing threat〉和 Michael Cox 撰寫的〈Time for UK to bring HSBC to heel〉。楊表示不認識這兩名作者。

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楊清奇指桑普較激進、支持港獨 《蘋果》論壇只採用不涉港獨文章

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控方問及桑普，楊指他「係屬於激進啲」，他知道桑普在網上發表的文章都是支持港獨，但因為《蘋果》論壇版不支持港獨，所以他們採用桑普的文章是不會談及港獨。

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至於李兆富（Simon Lee），楊指他的文章多數與經濟有關，會用經濟學的角度去分析社會問題和政治問題。楊又表示，對於李的文章，「其實我啲同事同讀者都會覺得悶」，所以沒有文章令他印象深刻。

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控方問到李的寫作角度，楊指「佢政治立場都好明顯係支持民主派」，而且李的觀點與黎的觀點都很一致，所以黎有找他負責處理 Twitter 帳戶。

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楊清奇指安裕支持民主派 國安法生效後憂紅線、間中停稿

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控方提及已故作家李怡因年紀大而減產，並問楊知不知道黎智英是否認識李怡。楊則指李怡曾經是《蘋果》的主筆，「黎先生冇理由唔識佢嘅。」

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image04 +▲ 李怡（已歿）

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控方另提及錢志健，楊指錢曾經是《蘋果》的專欄作家，但是「我係取消咗佢專欄嘅」。他記不起取消專欄的原因，只記得在大概2018年發生。楊指在2019年，《蘋果》論壇版基本上已沒有錢志健的文章，但後來《國安法》生效，論壇版不夠作者撰文，因此錢有時投稿，楊曾經用過一至兩次。

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另一名作者、資深新聞工作者安裕（姜國元），楊指他是很著名的專欄作家，惟《國安法》生效之後，「間唔中話要停稿、請假，佢都係對《國安法》劃出咗一條紅線有擔憂。」楊又指，安裕很熟悉美國政治，所以其文章除了涉及香港情況之外，還會涉及美國。至於安裕的寫作角度，楊指：「簡單嚟講，佢都係支持民主派嘅。」

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楊清奇指黎認為西方對中共制裁不會緩和、肯定制裁成效

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關於黎智英的個人觀點，控方展示兩篇黎發表於個人專欄「成敗樂一笑」的文章。其中一篇為〈時間就是武器〉，楊引述當中一段，黎指不相信美國等西方國家對中共的制裁會緩和下來，中共與美國等西方國家關係的關係大勢已去，暫時是無法逆轉的。楊指以上是黎對中美關係形勢的判斷。

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就另一篇文章〈大時代即將來臨〉，楊清奇引述其中一段：「中美關係惡化，是十年八載解決不了的問題，期間中國企業投資停滯，將是個大隱憂。很明顯，中共與美國對抗造成的經濟和政治損失，實在來得太大，甚至大到觸發成為對中共政權認受性的挑戰。保不住經濟，中共將保不住政權。與美國對抗造成的實質和信心創傷，預示中共將大禍臨頭。」楊表示據他理解，黎在以上段落肯定了制裁的成效。

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楊清奇：黎智英認為美國趁習近平弱勢時落井下石是好時機

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楊早前證供提及，時任美國副總統彭斯於2018年10月在哈特遜研究所（Hudson Institute）發表演講時提及美國對華政策，黎當時認為演講內容意味「美國反檯」，以楊的觀察，自此黎的政治立場轉趨激進。

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控方展示黎智英與楊清奇之間的訊息，楊在同年10月5日向黎傳送彭斯演講翻譯全文。黎其後表示：「剛聽了彭斯演講、反檯，美國帶領西方日本等國重新調整中國政策明顯不過了，這是針對習現在弱勢而來的。時機正好！」楊其後表示：「美中現在不是貿易戰，是全面開戰咁」，黎回應：「是趁中國弱乘機落井下石。」

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image05 +▲ 黎智英（資料圖片）

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楊庭上解釋，黎之所以說「時機正好」，是因為他認為國家主席習近平「係比較弱勢」，美國在這個時機轉變對華政策，而「呢個時機係好嘅」。

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控方追問楊是指什麼「時機」、要做什麼。楊則引述黎的訊息「是趁中國弱乘機落井下石」，亦正如他撰寫及傳送給黎的社評標題：〈【蘋論】美國發宣戰檄文 香港挺身撞槍口〉。楊指：「2019年發生嘅反修例事件，就係撞正個槍口。」

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楊清奇指黎智英擅長把握形勢和讀者需要 而調整報紙立場

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控方再追問「撞正個槍口」是什麼意思。楊引述「美國發宣戰檄文 香港挺身撞槍口」，指「美國舉槍對住中國嘅時候，香港就挺身擋住個槍口，自己送一個目標畀美國打」。

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控方問以上觀點與黎智英有何關係。楊表示正如他早前作供時所說，他認為黎曾經是一個成功的商人，擅長把握市場和顧客的需求，當黎辦報紙的時候，他一樣擅長把握形勢和讀者的需要，當時見到美國對華政策的改變，都會調整報紙立場。

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法官李運騰追問以上是為了什麼目的。楊表示，未有與黎討論過目的，但是以他觀察《蘋果》報紙的變化，他認為在反修例期間，「《蘋果》立場嘅激進係眾所周知啦，新聞報導就成日見到『上街』呢兩個字嘅，我覺得唔係好嘅標題」，因為「成日見到『今日上街，明日上街，今日又上街，明日又上街』，我唔覺得係好嘅標題」。

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楊清奇指《蘋果》新聞報導落實「和勇不分」和「不譴責、不割蓆、不篤灰」

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楊又提到黎的專欄文章經常呼籲人上街，從黎的專欄和《蘋果》的報導可見，對於「和勇不分」這口號，黎和整個《蘋果》都「比較寬容、比較支持嘅」。

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楊補充，「和勇不分」主要有三個「不」，包括「不譴責、不割蓆、不篤灰」，從《蘋果》的報導和評論來看，「係落實咗呢三個『不』嘅。」

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控方問到，《國安法》生效之後，《蘋果》以上立場有否改變。楊則表示當時沒有收到任何指示，「基本上冇再提『三不』嘅，但都冇話過立場改變。」

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控方表示主問完畢。代表黎智英的資深大律師彭耀鴻表示，需時整理盤問方向，申請押後至明天才開始盤問，獲法官批准。

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案件編號：HCCC51/2022

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+ + + + diff --git a/hkers/2024-03-12-trial-of-jimmy-lai-day-43.html b/hkers/2024-03-12-trial-of-jimmy-lai-day-43.html new file mode 100644 index 00000000..e37f8dbc --- /dev/null +++ b/hkers/2024-03-12-trial-of-jimmy-lai-day-43.html @@ -0,0 +1,199 @@ + + + + + + + + + + 【黎智英案・審訊第卌三日】 · The Republic of Agora + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +
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【黎智英案・審訊第卌三日】

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獨媒報導 | 2024.03.12

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  • 楊清奇：黎智英向報紙設下「鳥籠」 編採人員享一定自主但不得超越框架
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【獨媒報導】壹傳媒創辦人黎智英及3間蘋果公司被控串謀勾結外國勢力及串謀刊印煽動刊物等罪，案件今（12日）於高院（移師西九龍法院）踏入第43日審訊。前《蘋果日報》主筆楊清奇，繼續以「從犯證人」身份出庭作供。楊提到傳媒為了吸引特定讀者群，都會有自己的立場，而黎設下了《蘋果》的基本立場，「就好似 set 定咗個鳥籠嘅，咁採編人員喺鳥籠入面有一定嘅自主，有一定嘅自主，有一定嘅採編自主權，但唔可以超過呢個框架，就唔可以超過呢個鳥籠」，所以難以回答《蘋果》是否有編採自主。控辯雙方皆完成提問，楊作供完畢。控方透露下一名證人為李宇軒，將安排於明日出庭作供。

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前《蘋果日報》主筆楊清奇（筆名李平）第七天以「從犯證人」身份出庭作供。代表黎智英的資深大律師彭耀鴻開始盤問。

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image02 +▲ 資深大律師 彭耀鴻（中）、大律師 Marc Corlett（右）

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辯方指訊息顯示楊清奇拒絕黎智英提議

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在辯方的提問下，楊確認民主制度是良好的，極權制度則是不好的，而民主制度是包含公平的選舉、新聞自由和言論自由，所以《蘋果》論壇版選取文章有三個主要原則，包括「支持政治上的民主」、「支持經濟上的市場化」和「不支持港獨」。楊並確認這些原則是由前任編輯訂下，同事之間都會採用，而且「唔需要日日去講嘅」。

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辯方展示黎智英與楊清奇之間的訊息，黎在2019年9月3日向楊說：「李平兄，看了單偉建先生的文章後請回電。謝謝。」楊後來表示「成1800字，又長又臭，都係玩自欺欺人」，「單先生的文章是老生常談，一個特首連請辭的自由都冇，談何民主進步？論壇版未擬採用。謝謝。」

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辯方指上述訊息可見黎提議楊閱讀單的文章，惟楊拒絕黎的提議。楊則指「唔係一個咁簡單嘅 reject」，因為當時他與黎有使用其他溝通渠道，黎亦有透過時任副社長陳沛敏聯絡他，所以庭上展示的 WhatsApp 訊息只是一部份，並非全部。

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image03 +▲ 前《蘋果日報》執行總編輯 林文宗（左）、副社長 陳沛敏（右）

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辯方續指，但是楊能夠對於黎所提議的文章，坦誠地提出自己的觀點。楊確認。

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楊清奇：除了提出特定主題 一般不會干預作者選題和觀點

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辯方指，評論文章寫什麼內容是由作者自行決定。楊則指不一定，有時是他向作者提議特定寫作主題，不過除了這種情況以外，文章內容都是由作者決定。

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辯方遂展示楊清奇與高橋之間的 WhatsApp 訊息紀錄。高橋於2020年12月5日向楊表示：「下週還是要寫王毅發言與日本傳媒的無知無恥。請理解。」楊翌日表示：「選題與觀點，我們一般不干預。但如果較多讀者不認同，就需要換作者。謝謝🙏」

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辯方問，是否正如上述訊息所說，《蘋果》一般不會干預作者的選題和觀點。楊確認，但同時指出下一句「但如果較多讀者不認同，就需要換作者」，就如黎智英般，如果編輯的工作表現不合他心意，便會換人。

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辯方另展示2020年12月10日的訊息，楊與高橋談及「美國已死總統」用字，期間楊提議高橋可考慮評論有關新聞，但同時強調：「我說過，我們一般不會干預選題。寫不寫，如何寫，你自己決定。」

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辯方問楊，這種不干預的做法是否適用於所有論壇版作者。楊表示：「講『係』呢，係唔夠準確嘅」，因為事實上他當時已經正在作出干預，他跟高橋說如果文章不符合《蘋果》的立場，可能要換作者，「文章如果唔符合《蘋果》嘅立場，到時候被炒嘅可能係我喇！」不過辯方追問，「寫不寫，如何寫」是由高橋決定，楊則指相關決定是從政治角度出發。

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楊清奇指文章有審批 若倡港獨及明顯違法不會刊登、若擦邊球則可登

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辯方指，當報紙不合讀者口味時，讀者可以轉看另一份報紙，其實《蘋果》也是提供讀者想看的內容。楊則指，報紙一方面要照顧讀者口味，另一方面都要堅持自己的政治立場和觀點。

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辯方續指，《蘋果》對於評論作者和文章不會有審批。惟楊表示：「有一個批准嘅，至少都要我睇過覺得OK先可以（刊出）嘅。」

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辯方指，這是當然的，如果文章提倡港獨的話，楊便不會刊登。楊確認。辯方續指，如果文章提倡非法行為，也不會獲准刊登。楊回答：「如果係好明顯違法嘅就唔會（刊登）」，但正如他早前提及，「如果擦邊球又符合《蘋果》立場嘅，又避開嗰個違法嘅，就會用。」

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辯方其後問楊是否同意，「擦邊球」是為了避免觸犯法律，同時又能遵守《蘋果》論壇版揀選評論文章的原則。楊同意。辯方又指楊並不會故意地觸犯法律。楊確認。

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楊清奇確認曾邀請曾鈺成、任志剛和曾俊華撰文

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楊清奇早前證供提及，曾經在2016年與黎智英和陳沛敏討論作者名單。辯方展示2018年4月，楊與陳之間的 WhatsApp 對話紀錄，並指當時曾經討論邀請前民建聯立法會主席曾鈺成、行政會議成員任志剛和前財政司司長曾俊華撰文。楊確認。

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辯方指論壇版作者觀點未必相同 王崑義文章刊出後捱罵

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楊清奇確認論壇版的作者之中，並非所有人都抱持同一觀點。辯方舉例指台灣國際戰略學會理事長王崑義的文章〈港台「聯手抗中」恐是南柯一夢〉，對於制裁的看法有所不同。楊表示他作為編輯處於尷尬位置，通常他在邀稿的時候，作者跟他所說的，與作者最終寫出來的文章是不同的，「但我又好難食言唔用佢嘅稿」，如果當天論壇版沒有稿件，「就要開天窗咁滯。」

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楊又提到，當年王崑義的文章刊出之後，《蘋果》「畀人鬧嘅」，有讀者更加寫信給黎智英，後來黎將信件轉交給他。

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辯方另展示楊清奇與王崑義之間的電郵，可見楊邀請王撰效分析美國大選的影響，包括拜登入主白宮對台美關係的影響。楊在庭上一度說：「我好奇怪，律師先生你係點樣拎到我嘅私人電郵。」彭耀鴻指這是控方給予辯方律師團隊的，而控方有責任將所有相關材料交給辯方，又強調辯方並沒有入侵楊的電腦。楊說：「我都唔知控方係幾時、點樣攞到。」彭耀鴻則笑說：「那你要去問張先生（律政司助理刑事檢控專員張卓勤）了。」

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image04 +▲ 高級檢控官 吳加悅（左）、助理刑事檢控專員 張卓勤（右）

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辯方問楊為何會邀請王崑義撰文。楊回答因為王是台灣著名的學者，雖然其觀點未必符合《蘋果》，「但都係可以自圓其說嘅。」

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辯方指黎智英在飯局沒有提「制裁」 楊清奇堅稱有

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楊早前作供提及在2020年6月黎住所的飯局中，黎表示不怕被捕，若果被捕就「更加證明到中國和香港政府對人權嘅打壓」，並相信美國、英國同歐洲係唔會坐視不理，楊並轉述黎認為只有實施制裁，才能有助改善香港的人權狀況。

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辯方提議黎可能沒有提及制裁，黎可能提及美國、英國和歐洲會回應及採取行動，但是他沒有提到「制裁」兩字。惟楊不同意，又堅稱：「我肯定佢有（提及制裁）嘅。」

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辯方又提到，警方在2021年6月24日與楊進行的錄影會面中，問及「飯盒會」做些什麼，而楊當時回答「坐底傾吓」工作上遇到什麼難題需要黎「出面解決」。楊在庭上確認。

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辯方：評論文章非「為批評而批評」

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辯方指，控方早前向楊展示一系列的評論文章，部份對香港特區和中央政府帶有批判性，但這些批判是為了指出施政上的不足，希望政府可以改善施政，避免重蹈覆轍。楊同意。

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辯方續指，所以庭上展示的評論文章不是「為了批評而批評」。楊回答：「可以咁講嘅。」

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黎智英要求楊清奇撰文反駁另一人文章 楊拒絕後撰訊息供黎向對方交代

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控方覆問時，就單偉建文章的議題，展示楊清奇與陳沛敏之間的訊息紀錄。陳於2019年9月向楊說，她電郵轉寄了一篇文章給楊，而黎想楊以筆名李平撰文反駁該文章。楊回覆陳：「啲垃圾真的要出要駁？港共搵多幾條友咁搞，論壇版就俾人玩殘」、「同老闆溝通過，但最終覺得唔值駁，都係唔出」。

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楊相信黎智英應該認識單偉建，「其實黎生都覺得文章嘅觀點唔係咁好，但又想照出佢嘅文章，所以又要我用文章嚟反駁佢」，但楊認為若果經常要反駁他人文章，「論壇版好快俾人玩殘咗。」

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楊續指：「但黎生要畀作者一個交代，但又唔可以好似私人溝通講嘅咁冇禮貌啦」，所以後來楊撰寫了一則訊息評價單的文章，說明為何決定不刊登及顯示這是編輯的決定，以供黎將該訊息轉發給單，即是：「單先生的文章是老生常談，一個特首連請辭的自由都冇，談何民主進步？論壇版未擬採用。謝謝。」

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楊清奇：黎智英設立「鳥籠」 員工有一定自主但不能超越框架

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控方問及編採自主時，楊表示：「對於編採自主，其實我係有好深嘅感觸同體會。我從事傳媒工作三十幾年，咁都喺五間報紙、電視台打過工。我感受喺互聯網掀起之後，傳統媒體沒落之後，採編自主幾乎就成為一個神話嚟嘅。」楊指因為傳媒為了吸引特定的讀者群，都會有自己的立場。

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楊引用一個政治術語「鳥籠政治」來形容《蘋果》和類似報紙的採編自主，稱為「鳥籠自主」。楊指：「黎先生 set 咗《蘋果》嘅基本立場，就好似 set 定咗個鳥籠嘅，咁採編人員喺鳥籠入面有一定嘅自主，有一定嘅自主，有一定嘅採編自主權，但唔可以超過呢個框架，就唔可以超過呢個鳥籠，所以唔可以簡單講有冇採編自主。」

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控方追問，由黎設下的「鳥籠」，是否與黎所給予的指示有關？楊確認。

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image05 +▲ 黎智英（資料圖片）

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就王崑義的文章，在法官杜麗冰提問下，楊清奇指黎智英曾經將讀者的來信，透過秘書轉交給他，但因為黎智英未有直接地批評王崑義，所以「呢個係我後來再去搵佢寫稿嘅原因之一」。

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楊清奇作供完畢。控方其後替下一名證人李宇軒，向法庭申請「提犯令」。案件明日續審。

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案件編號：HCCC51/2022

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+ + + + diff --git a/hkers/2024-03-13-trial-of-jimmy-lai-day-44.html b/hkers/2024-03-13-trial-of-jimmy-lai-day-44.html new file mode 100644 index 00000000..03c1ade6 --- /dev/null +++ b/hkers/2024-03-13-trial-of-jimmy-lai-day-44.html @@ -0,0 +1,240 @@ + + + + + + + + + + 【黎智英案・審訊第卌四日】 · The Republic of Agora + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +
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【黎智英案・審訊第卌四日】

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獨媒報導 | 2024.03.13

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  • 李宇軒出庭作供：為爭取國際關注香港示威 發起眾籌及G20登報計劃
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  • 紀錄顯示兩間公司墊支G20登報費 李宇軒：陳梓華稱「上頭」憂走數故簽借據
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【獨媒報導】壹傳媒創辦人黎智英及3間蘋果公司被控串謀勾結外國勢力及串謀刊印煽動刊物等罪，案件今（13日）於高院（移師西九龍法院）踏入第44日審訊。控方傳召「十二港人」之一李宇軒，以「從犯證人」身份出庭作供，相隔逾一年再度在法庭露面。李供稱，在2019年6月G20峰會舉行之前，他與其他市民在 Telegram 群組討論在多國報紙刊登廣告，「因為當時喺香港已經有幾次好有畫面嘅示威場面」，所以眾人希望「將個關注同 momentum（運動的氣勢）帶到去國際舞台，去攞國際嘅支持」，遂開始眾籌廣告費。公開財務紀錄顯示，該次眾籌計劃籌得逾673萬元。李指，由於籌得款項需時轉帳至其銀行個人戶口，所以未能立即動用款項支付廣告費。案中另一名串謀者、被告陳梓華當時聯絡他商討墊支事宜，二人始相識，李稱：「佢（陳）去問過 uncle 或者其他人，咁佢就話嗰度可以動用到五球（500萬元）啦」，控方追問「uncle」是指誰人，李則指陳並未有提及，「可能泛指一啲男人或者其他人」，而非有血緣關係的親戚。

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李宇軒已認罪 惟需等待黎智英審訊結果 相隔2年半尚未判刑

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前《蘋果日報》主筆楊清奇昨日完成作供。控方今早開始傳召「十二港人」之一李宇軒出庭，以「從犯證人」身份作供。李身穿深藍色厚褸，戴黑色粗框眼鏡，由三名懲教人員帶領下，從法庭特別通道進入法庭。李在證人台手持聖經，以基督教形式宣誓。在作供期間，李不時在庭內四處張望，並曾經望向被告欄。

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李宇軒於2021年8月19日在高院承認「串謀勾結外國或者境外勢力危害國家安全」罪；他另被控的「串謀協助罪犯罪」及「無牌管有彈藥罪」則存檔於法庭，獲不提證供起訴。李其後分別於2022年1月3日、5月3日和9月16日出席提訊，惟因為需等待黎智英的審訊結果才處理判刑，李認罪至今相隔逾2年6個月，仍尚未判刑。李是次出庭作供，是自2022年9月提訊以來，首次再度在法庭露面。

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李宇軒確認已承認「勾結」控罪

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控方代表、副刑事檢控專員周天行先作主問。李確認他曾接受大學教育，懂得中文和英文。控方指，不爭議的是李在2020年8月被警方以「串謀勾結外國勢力危害國家安全」等罪拘捕。李表示：「我冇爭議。」

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image02 +▲ 副刑事檢控專員 周天行（左）

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控方續指，李在2021年3月24日被控「串謀勾結外國勢力危害國家安全」罪，該控罪指李連同黎智英、Mark Simon、陳梓華和「攬炒巴」劉祖廸等人，在2020年7月1日至2021年2月15日，一同串謀勾結外國勢力危害國家安全。李表示：「具體3月幾多號唔記得，不過係咁上下。」控方續指，李於同年7月7日在裁判法院承認「串謀勾結」控罪，而他另外面對的「串謀協助罪犯罪」及「無牌管有彈藥罪」則存檔於法庭。李確認，不過不記得具體日子。

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李宇軒指備登報計劃期間認識陳梓華 商討墊支廣告費

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控方指陳梓華是控罪的串謀者之一，並問李是否認識陳。李表示認識陳，若果他沒記錯的話，二人在2019年6月首次在 Telegram 認識，當時他並不知道陳的名字叫陳梓華，因陳以「T」的身份與他溝通。

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李指，當時G20峰會將於2019年6月下旬在日本舉行，在6月上旬或中旬的時候，有一些香港市民，包括他和陳梓華，打算在不同報紙登廣告，「就傾緊一個有關登報嘅 idea」，於是眾人就在一個 Telegram 群組參與討論。

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李形容：「大家喺個 group 度好 supportive of 呢個 idea，因為當時喺香港已經有幾次好有畫面嘅示威場面」，所以眾人希望「將個關注同 momentum（運動的氣勢）帶到去國際舞台，去攞國際嘅支持」。由於他們希望登報廣告能夠「ride on G20」（乘著G20的時機），「所以啲廣告想盡量喺G20開會之前就出晒」，而錢銀問題則想在此前解決好。

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李解釋，由於眾籌結束後，本來想透過「PayPal」將款項轉帳至其個人戶口，惟不知為何「PayPal」戶口被凍結，遂轉用「Stripe」將款項轉帳至其渣打銀行的個人帳戶，而相關轉帳手續需時，所以他未能立即動用所籌得的款項，「所以我用晒自己戶口啲積蓄，大概墊咗三球幾（300萬元），但係就唔夠墊支啲廣告費，所以就有頭先講嘅 money issue。」

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李指嚴格來說，他理應在廣告刊出之前三日便需向報館繳清廣告費。就在他需要就廣告費向報館「找數」的時候，「T」經 Telegram 的私人對話聯絡李。經「T」查證李不夠錢支付廣告費之後，「T」聲稱會找「佢哋嗰邊啲人」幫忙墊支。至於「佢哋嗰邊啲人」是指什麼人，李指「T」當時並未有說清楚。在6月的時候，李只知道曾墊支的有 Lais Hotel Property Limited 和力高。據控方開案陳詞，兩間公司分別由 Mark Simon 和黎智英持有。

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李宇軒表示當時支持香港的民主運動 登報計劃為了爭取國際關注

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控方問「登報計劃」是什麼。李回答：「係眾籌、盡量搵多啲國際報紙登廣告，而啲廣告係有關當時香港嘅民主運動嘅」，目的是提高國際對於當時香港民主運動的關注。

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法官李運騰問李是否支持當時的運動，李表示：「係，當時我係支持。」李官又問，登報計劃是為了爭取國際社會的支持，李回答：「我同意。」

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李稱當時使用眾籌平台「GoGetFunding」，至於當時呼籲市民捐款時使用的字眼，他表示不記得具體字眼，只記得大概是希望「去畀當時嘅國際社會知道，當時嘅香港示威活動發生咩事」。

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李宇軒指眾籌超額完成 事後與陳梓華親身見面

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控方問李當時有否在 Telegram 群組宣傳眾籌計劃。李表示以他所知，Telegram 群組內其中一名用戶，在「連登」討論區有一個帳號叫「家樂牌通心粉」，當時該帳戶「就本來已經好 hit」、「有好多人關注㗎喇」，而「家樂牌通心粉」在「連登」轉載上述眾籌網站，所以令更多人知道眾籌計劃。

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被問到當時眾籌的目標金額，李表示不記得，「不過我記得個 target 無爆咗，所以最尾大概籌咗七球幾（逾700萬）」，所以他相信當時的眾籌目標是低於700萬。

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李供稱，在登報計劃完結之後，他與陳梓華曾經相約在金鐘太古廣場親身單獨見面，因陳想將一些匯款通知交給他，會面結束之後，陳隨即返回附近的辦公室。李解釋：「喺佢（陳）知道咗我需要幫手墊支，然後佢幫手墊咗幾次支，之後佢就要畀 remittance advice，所以就去見面喇。」

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李宇軒：陳梓華稱可找「uncle」協助墊支廣告費 惟未說明所指誰人

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控方問李，陳梓華首次聯絡他的時候，是如何介紹自己的。李則表示：「我唔記得，mostly likely 佢冇介紹自己。」

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李亦表示，他不記得與陳對話的具體內容，不過大概意思是，「佢（陳）問我大概要墊支幾多，之後佢就話會諗計」；相隔不久後，陳傳來回覆，大概意思是：「佢去問過 uncle 或者其他人，咁佢就話嗰度可以動用到五球（500萬元）啦，咁有需要嘅時候就可以搵佢喇。」李補充，陳曾提及「當然係墊支，所以之後要畀返佢」，但他不記得陳何時說過上述說話。

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控方追問李，陳有否向他提及「Uncle」實際上是指誰人。李說：「冇，除咗我理解佢講嘅『uncle』唔一定係 blood uncle（有血緣關係的叔叔），而係可能泛指一啲男人或者其他人。」

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李宇軒指其角色是提出登報主意、操作眾籌戶口和管理帳目

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被問到李在登報計劃中的角色，李表示「我係其中一個 bring up 呢個 idea 嘅人，同埋我係實際上操作嗰個眾籌戶口嘅人」；此外，他後來有協助墊支，以及「有份 keep 條數」，因為眾籌戶口是以他的電郵開設的。

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控方又問到陳梓華的角色，李指「我諗佢（陳）係其中一個 bring up 呢個 idea 嘅人」，他亦有幫忙聯絡報紙和墊支。

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李宇軒透露以化名「Tong Lo」身份公開登報財務紀錄

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控方向李展示登報計劃的公開財務紀錄，題為「Income and expenditure statement《眾籌G20各國報章頭版公開信》」，由2019年6月25日至7月2日。李確認他們曾向17間報館公司支付廣告費，但不一定是17份報紙。李亦確認他們登廣告的報紙遍及13個國家。

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財務紀錄亦顯示，在眾籌平台「GoGetFund」籌得超過670萬元，在「PayPal」則籌得2.6萬元，合共約673萬元。而廣告費則合共約602.3萬元，扣除手續費之後，眾籌計劃錄得盈餘約15萬元。李確認。

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財務紀錄下方的署名是「Tong Lo」並附有簽名，李稱：「係我嘅 pseudo name（化名）。」另一個署名是「Tong M Man」，李則稱是一個會計師。

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翻查報導，李宇軒與另外11人在2020年8月被內地水警截獲，同年12月與其中7人一同被判「偷越邊境罪成」，2021年3月在內地服刑完畢，隨即被移交至本港警方。

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【獨媒報導】壹傳媒創辦人黎智英及3間蘋果公司被控串謀勾結外國勢力及串謀刊印煽動刊物等罪，案件今（13日）於高院（移師西九龍法院）踏入第44日審訊。控方傳召「十二港人」之一李宇軒，以「從犯證人」身份出庭作供，相隔逾一年再度在法庭露面。李供稱他在2019年6月籌備在G20前夕在不同國家的報紙登頭版廣告，控方在庭上展示多份G20廣告的付款和匯款紀錄，顯示《衛報》、《晚郵報》和《華盛頓郵報》的廣告費用，分別由 Lais Hotel Property Limited 和力高顧問有限公司墊支。李憶述，在等待還款安排期間，另一名被告陳梓華聲稱：「『上頭嘅人』有壓力，想做啲嘢確保嗰筆錢會返番去」，於是雙方簽訂借據以防李「走數」。後來陳叫李透過一間公司的銀行戶口還錢，李遂歸還了156萬元。

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控方今早開始傳召「十二港人」之一李宇軒出庭，以「從犯證人」身份作供。李身穿白色恤衫和深藍色厚褸，戴黑色粗框眼鏡，由三名懲教人員帶領下，從法庭特別通道進入法庭，期間不時望向旁聽席。

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李早上供稱，2019年6月G20峰會舉行之前，為了爭取國際關注香港的示威活動，遂發起眾籌和在不同國家報紙登頭版廣告計劃。李當時遇到錢銀問題，案中另一名被告陳梓華以「T」的身份經 Telegram 與他溝通，協助墊支廣告費，惟他當時並未知道「T」名叫陳梓華。

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庭上展示多國廣告 包括《巴黎日報》、《澳洲人報》

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控方提及其中一份刊登廣告的《巴黎日報》，李確認並以標準的法語讀出《巴黎日報》的法語名稱「Le Parisien」。控方指廣告上有以法語寫成的「向送中條例說不」，李則指相關句子的英語翻譯應該是「No to the project of Extradition Bill to China」，而非「No to the Extradition Bill to China」。

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李提到，當時《巴黎日報》的廣告費應該不是21,600歐羅，而是18,000歐羅，因為 T 聲稱「唔小心以為要畀埋 VAT（增值稅）」；至於發票上為何標註一粒星及「overpay」，李表示不知道，因為從「T」手上收到這份文件時已經有。

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控方提到另一個登報廣告例子，刊於意大利的《晚郵報》（Corrierre Della Sera）。李確認文件顯示的廣告版本有刊登過。

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控方展一份含有韓語的廣告，寫有「홍콩을 도와 주 세요」（請援助香港）和「STAND WITH HONG KONG AT G20」。李確認相關廣告有刊登，但是不肯定是哪一份報紙，因為他們不只在一份韓國報紙登廣告。

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另一份刊登在《澳洲人報》（The Australian）的廣告，同樣寫有「STAND WITH HONG KONG AT G20」。控方展示由《澳洲人報》在6月26日發出的發票，上款是一名叫 Anson Cheung 的人。李表示不知他是誰，也不記得為何上款寫他的名字，但估計他可能是其中一個負責聯絡 The Australian 的人。

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文件顯示 Mark Simon 名下公司代李宇軒支付《衛報》廣告費

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控方提到《衛報》（The Guardian）有刊登廣告，並展示相關發票，匯款紀錄顯示 Lais Hotel Property Limited 代表李宇軒向《衛報》支付18,000英磅廣告費。控方問李，「T」有否告訴他為什麼會用這間公司來支付費用，李回答沒有，當時也沒有向「T」查問。據控方開案陳詞，Lais Hotel Property Limited 由黎智英的私人助手 Mark Simon 持有。

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控方提到李在今天早上作供時，轉述「T」聲稱有一些「uncle」可以動用到500萬元墊支，問以上做法是否有關。此時辯方代表大律師 Marc Corlett 打斷，就控方的提問方式提出關注，因涉及揣測和傳聞證供（hearsay）。法官杜麗冰亦指，李剛才已經回答了陳梓華未談及原因。法官李運騰指，證人已經說了他尋求資金，然後他得到金錢來支付廣告費，就是這樣，質疑控方還有什麼想問。控方最終不就此發問。

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image04 +▲ 代表黎智英的資深大律師 彭耀鴻（左）、大律師 Marc Corlett（右）

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控方續展示在2019年6月28日刊登於法國《世界報》（Le Monde）的G20廣告，惟未有提及廣告費由誰支付。

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黎智英名下力高顧問公司支付意大利報紙廣告費

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另一份發票是由 RCS Media Group 發出的，李指這是有關向意大利《晚郵報》（Corriere Della Sera）支付的2萬元歐羅。付款紀錄顯示，力高顧問有限公司（Dico Consultants Limited）在2019年6月29日向 RCS Media Group 支付了廣告費用。據控方開案陳詞，力高是由黎智英持有的公司。

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控方問李，「T」有否向他談及力高。李指沒有。控方再問，「T」有否在任何時候向他談及過力高。李表示：「以我記憶所及，冇，除咗呢張 invoice 係畀我嘅。所以 Dico 條數就要加埋去 T 嗰邊嘅人，有關 T 嗰邊嘅人找過嘅數，所以最尾要還返錢嘅時候就要還埋呢條數。」

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李宇軒稱專心處理眾籌 故不記得誰人設計和草擬G20廣告

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控方展示刊登於《華盛頓郵報》的廣告期間，法官李素蘭問及廣告是由誰人草擬。李表示：「我唔清楚，因為我冇參與去設計呢啲廣告」，他亦沒有參與撰寫相關文字。他指，當時群組成員表示想登報，所以有的人去聯絡報紙，有的人去設計廣告和撰寫文字，「我去咗搞 crowdfund，所以我唔係好清楚其他組員去咗做啲乜。」

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被問到有多少人參與G20登報計劃，李表示不清楚，「因為我當時專心做緊 crowdfund 嘅嘢，至於 group 入面有幾多人，我唔清楚。」

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李宇軒轉述T聲稱「有上面嘅人」擔心拖數 雙方簽借據

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至於參與處理眾籌的人，李稱：「我諗有我、accountant 去睇嗰條數，有『家樂牌通心粉』（在連登討論區）出嗰個 post 啦，另外有我同 T 嗰邊墊支過啲錢啦，係同錢有關嘅就係呢啲喇。」

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控方又問「T嗰邊」涉及多少人。李稱：「至少有 T，同埋有一個叫『Banker』嘅⋯⋯我唔知係咪一個人嚟。」他指後來有「簽借據」事宜，其時「T嗰邊」便再涉及多4至5個人。

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法官李運騰要求李闡述什麼是「簽借據」事件。李則指，在2019年7月的時候，他曾向 T 查詢歸還墊支款項的方法，而T則表示「等佢嗰邊嘅人 arrange 吓」。在等待期間，T 聲稱「有上面嘅人唔係好 comfortable with 我拖住呢舊錢」，惟李認為這是因為 T 尚未提供一個讓他還錢的帳戶。

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李續指：「As a stop gap measure（臨時方案），佢（T）就約咗我去金鐘嘅 Lippo Centre」，在一間咖啡店見面，T 並安排了兩名見證人，一個是 T 一方的見證人，另一個是李一方的見證人，「咁就簽咗一份 promissory note，嗰份文件真係用 promissory note 呢隻字。」

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李指，借據內容是「我爭 T 錢，個金額啱啱係G20佢嗰邊找嗰條數」，大概是156萬港元。他憶述雙方簽署了借據之後，T安排了一間律師樓的人員接收這份借據，不過李並不知道是哪一間律師樓，因為有一或兩個人拿了文件後，「我見佢行咗去𨋢口就上去喇。」

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李宇軒轉述T稱簽借據為了擺平「上頭嘅人」

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李轉述T當時聲稱：「呢張 promissory note 係備用嘅啫，因為係用嚟擺平佢當時講嘅『佢上頭嘅人』，嗰啲『上頭嘅人』有壓力，想做啲嘢確保嗰筆錢會返番去。」李轉述，既然有一張借據，「T 就可以同佢哋講有張 promissory note，所以唔使驚會走數喇。」

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李續指，T 後來提供了一個 Chartwell 戶口，叫他經這間公司的戶口歸還款項，所以他把156萬元還給 Chartwell，並把還款的匯款通知書交給 T，自此之後 T 便沒有再提起借據事宜。據控方開案陳詞，李被指向 Chartwell Holding Limited 的公司戶口還款，以避免黎的身份曝光。

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李表示，當他剛才說簽借據時涉及多4至5個人，就是包括兩名見證人和一個接收文件的律師樓人員，「我就係講緊呢啲人。」

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控方另展示《華盛頓郵報》廣告費的付款紀錄，顯示 Lais Hotel Property Limited 支付了85,050美元。李稱這紀錄是由 T 交給他的。

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李宇軒作供未完，案件明日續審。

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案件編號：HCCC51/2022

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+ + + + diff --git a/hkers/2024-03-14-trial-of-jimmy-lai-day-45.html b/hkers/2024-03-14-trial-of-jimmy-lai-day-45.html new file mode 100644 index 00000000..6bb7b185 --- /dev/null +++ b/hkers/2024-03-14-trial-of-jimmy-lai-day-45.html @@ -0,0 +1,165 @@ + + + + + + + + + + 【黎智英案・審訊第卌五日】 · The Republic of Agora + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +
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【黎智英案・審訊第卌五日】

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獨媒報導 | 2024.03.14

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  • 財務文件顯示眾志參與G20登報 李宇軒估計周庭有份聯絡《朝日新聞》
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【獨媒報導】壹傳媒創辦人黎智英及3間蘋果公司被控串謀勾結外國勢力及串謀刊印煽動刊物等罪，案件今（14日）於高院（移師西九龍法院）踏入第45日審訊。控方傳召「十二港人」之一李宇軒，以「從犯證人」身份出庭作供。控方提問繼續圍繞2019年6月G20峰會前夕的登報計劃，以及相關財務紀錄。李確認他向台灣《蘋果日報》、《南德意志報》、《紐約時報》、《泰晤士報》和三份南韓報紙等，分別支付了登報廣告費用，款額逾385萬港元。其中《朝日新聞》和歐洲版 POLITICO 的發票均顯示上款為「Demosisto（香港眾志）」，李估計當時的眾志成員周庭有份聯絡《朝日新聞》，因為估計只有她懂得日文。而《紐約時報》的發票顯示上款除了李宇軒之外，還有「Anna Kwok」，李相信當時他與「Anna Kwok」一同聯絡報館，惟控方未有就「Anna Kwok」的身份提問。

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「十二港人」之一李宇軒第二天以「從犯證人」身份出庭作供。李昨日提及，在2019年6月G20峰會舉行之前，為了爭取國際關注香港的示威活動，遂發起眾籌及籌備在不同國家報紙登頭版廣告計劃。期間案中另一名被告陳梓華經 Telegram 接觸李，並以「T」的身份與李商討墊支廣告費，惟李當時並未知道「T」名叫陳梓華。

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李宇軒指陳梓華後來介紹Mark Simon給他認識

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控方展示兩封由「T」轉發給李宇軒的電郵，可見電郵原初發送者為「Terrie Lam」。李指當時T把《華盛頓郵報》的廣告費收據，由「Terrie Lam」的電郵轉發給他。

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控方指其中一個電郵提及一個名叫「Mark」的人。李表示當他收到這封電郵時，並不知道 Mark 是誰，但「其後我知道呢個係 Mark Simon」，因為在不遲於2019年9月的時候， T 把 Mark Simon 介紹給他認識。

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李宇軒相信以自己信用卡支付《日本時報》廣告費

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控方提及刊登於《日本時報》的G20廣告，李指《日本時報》是當年G20峰會會場內會派發的報紙，並確認上述廣告是其中一份在日本報紙刊登的廣告。

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控方展示由《日本時報》發出的發票，以及收據，並指這是從李的住所檢取的，顯示某人在2019年6月28日以信用卡支付了200萬日圓廣告費。李表示，若果他沒有記錯的話，應該是使用了他的信用卡付款，不過需要翻查信用卡紀錄確認。

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控方後來向李出示他的信用卡交易紀錄，惟未見任何有關《日本時報》的交易。李遂對於是否由他的信用卡支付廣告費表示不肯定。

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李宇軒指陳梓華起初聲稱會處理台蘋廣告費 惟後來要求他自行處理

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控方提到於2019年6月28日刊於台灣《蘋果日報》的廣告，寫有「港台同行 唇亡齒寒」。發票顯示李須於2019年7月5日或之前繳付120萬元新台幣廣告費。另一份匯款申請表顯示，李宇軒在7月15日申請以台幣匯率匯款307,692.31元港幣。李的銀行戶口紀錄顯示，廣告費最後在7月16日付清。

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李確認發票上的付款期限是7月5日，但因為當時 T 告訴他：「佢同埋佢嗰邊會 handle 嘅，即係有關俾錢嗰樣嘢，佢都會搞掂」，所以李一開始收到發票後並未有理會。

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直至廣告刊出之後，「咁後來冇人去追我數」，當時他亦不知道自己收到的文件是要求他付款的發票，「咁我覺得 T 嗰邊已經搞掂咗條數喇。」

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可是大約7月的時候，「T 就話，你都係找返台灣《蘋果》呢條數啦。」李續指，既然 T 叫他付款，「咁我就嗱嗱臨找咗條數囉」，因此他在7月15日遞交匯款申請表，最終於7月16日付清廣告費。

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《紐約時報》發票顯示「Anna Kwok」參與落廣告

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控方展示在2019年6月27日刊登於《南德意志報》（Süddeutsche Zeitung）的G20廣告。李表示記得在登報計劃中，只在一份德國報紙登廣告，所以確認是《南德意志報》。李確認他就此廣告支付了85,300歐元，即大約67萬港元。

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控方另展示兩份刊登於《紐約時報》的G20廣告，日期均是2019年6月28日。就第一份廣告，李的銀行戶口紀錄顯示，他於6月26日向《紐約時報》支付了83,752美元。

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法官李運騰留意到，《紐約時報》發票抬頭除了寫有李宇軒的英文名字 Li Yu Hin 之外，還有另一個名字 Anna Kwok，並澄清向報館落單的人是否李。李回答，他相信他本人和 Anna Kwok 一同負責向《紐約時報》落廣告，至於為何發票上出現兩個名字，李表示不知道。控方庭上未有就 Anna Kwok 的身份提問。

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李官表示，純粹好奇一問，李在聯絡報館期間使用了真實姓名，是否代表 Telegram 群組成員知道他的真實姓名。李回答不是，因為他只曾向報館提供真實姓名，所以報館可能知道他的真名，如果相關文件透過電郵被轉發或副本抄送至其他有份聯絡報館的人時，該些人便會知道他的真名。

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至於另一份在《紐約時報》刊登的G20廣告，李確認支付了36,000美元。

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《朝日新聞》發票顯示客戶為香港眾志 李宇軒估計周庭有份聯絡報館

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控方展示於2019年6月28日刊登於《朝日新聞》的廣告，並向李出示相關發票，客戶名稱寫有「Demosisto」，要求支付700萬日圓。控方問這個客戶是誰、為何會出現在發票上。李指它是「眾志」，「因為眾志入面有人去負責搵 Asahi Shimbun（《朝日新聞》）」，但是他不知道該人是否 Telegram 群組的成員之一。

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控方問李所指的「眾志」是否一個政治團體，李僅回答：「以我理解，淨係得一個眾志。」控方追問是哪一位眾志成員負責聯絡《朝日新聞》，李表示：「我唔直接知道，但我 speculation（估計）係周庭。」他補充：「因為，我 speculation 係，得佢一個識講日文。」

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李的銀行個人戶口紀錄顯示，在同年6月27日有一筆700萬日圓的支帳紀錄，李確認這是有關登報的廣告費。控方問李當時如何收到上述發票，李則稱不記得，因為在籌備登報計劃期間，有些人負責聯絡不同報館，包括《朝日新聞》，他相信一些負責聯絡報館的人，「喺畀錢嘅時候彈咗張單俾我」，即是上述抬頭為「Demosisto」的發票。

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李宇軒確認由他支付南韓、英國、西班牙等報廣告費

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就南韓報紙，李宇軒指當時一共在三份南韓報紙登廣告，分別是《韓國日報》（한국 일보）、《朝鮮日報》（조선일보）和《東亞日報》（동아일보），並確認上述三份報紙廣告費合共是8,325萬韓圜。

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就《泰晤士報》（The UK Times）刊登的廣告，李的信用卡交易紀錄顯示他支付了27,195英鎊，即大約275,763.90港元。李確認相關紀錄。

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就西班牙報紙《世界報》（El Mundo），李確認他支付了2萬歐羅。

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就加拿大報紙《環球郵報》（The Globe and Mail），李確認發票上要求他繳付的金額是84,750元加幣，不過實際上廣告費只是75,000元加幣，他當時告訴報館職員自己不是身處加拿大，問對方可否免除增值稅（value added tax），對方表示不用支付增值稅，所以李最終只繳付了75,000元加幣。

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控方最後展示由歐洲版 POLITICO 發出的發票，抬頭是「Demosisto」，需就2019年6月27至29日期間刊登網上廣告繳付5,000歐羅。李確認他向 POLITICO 支付了5,000歐羅，並確認 POLITICO 的公司總部位於比利時，但是該G20廣告是網上的廣告。

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案件明日續審。

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案件編號：HCCC51/2022

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+ + + + diff --git a/hkers/2024-03-15-trial-of-jimmy-lai-day-46.html b/hkers/2024-03-15-trial-of-jimmy-lai-day-46.html new file mode 100644 index 00000000..b231e8e5 --- /dev/null +++ b/hkers/2024-03-15-trial-of-jimmy-lai-day-46.html @@ -0,0 +1,212 @@ + + + + + + + + + + 【黎智英案・審訊第卌六日】 · The Republic of Agora + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +
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【黎智英案・審訊第卌六日】

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獨媒報導 | 2024.03.15

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  • 李宇軒指英國登報眾籌餘款供「攬炒巴」等人辦活動、安排見英議員及監察區選
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【獨媒報導】壹傳媒創辦人黎智英及3間蘋果公司被控串謀勾結外國勢力及串謀刊印煽動刊物等罪，案件今（15日）於高院（移師西九龍法院）踏入第46日審訊。「十二港人」之一李宇軒繼續以「從犯證人」身份出庭作供。李談及2019年7月第二次的眾籌，是有關英國的「中英聯合聲明登報」計劃及相關活動，當時認識了主要搞手「攬炒巴」劉祖廸。據銀行紀錄，該次眾籌錄得餘款約20萬英鎊，李供稱用以支付「攬炒巴」在英國籌辦活動和遊行的開支，採取實報實銷制。部份餘款則用於向「Whitehouse Consultancy」支付顧問費，而該公司曾安排「攬炒巴」等人會見英國國會議員、動用人脈來港監察2019年區議會選舉，並與「香港監察」創辦人羅傑斯持續合作。此外，李指「攬炒巴」等人曾經研究簽署《中英聯合聲明》的新聞圖片版權問題，另一名同案被告陳梓華聲稱可以在與黎智英食飯時查問，「嗰時 for some reasons，我覺得佢同《蘋果》有啲關係。」後來陳告訴李「張相OK喇」，《蘋果》職員亦授權他們使用相關新聞圖片。

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「十二港人」之一李宇軒第三天以「從犯證人」身份出庭作供。李早前提及，在2019年6月G20峰會舉行之前，為了爭取國際關注香港的示威活動，遂發起眾籌及籌備在不同國家報紙登頭版廣告計劃。期間案中另一名被告陳梓華經 Telegram 接觸李，並以「T」的身份與李商討墊支廣告費，惟李當時並未知道「T」名叫陳梓華。

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李宇軒：兩間墊支的公司非經營登廣告業務 理應盡快還錢

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控方問及G20登報計劃結束之後，李宇軒與T商討還款的細節。李宇軒供稱，他與 T 在7月的時候，就還款事宜在 Telegram 上溝通，大概意思是「T嗰邊」墊支過登報費，李問可以怎樣還款，T則說要安排一下。

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李前天提到，等待還款安排期間，T曾告訴他「上頭嘅人」對於「拖住嚿錢」感到不安，於是雙方簽訂借據。控方今追問，T有否告訴李，「上頭嘅人」實際上是指哪些人。李指沒有。

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控方又問，T有否告訴李，為何「上頭嘅人」感到不安。李則指，因為墊支登廣告的公司「唔 suppose 係做登廣告嘅業務」，所以李理應盡快還款，以免「唔關公司本身業務嘅嘢喺度拖住」，不過他表示：「唔記得係我咁樣諗，定係佢同我講佢咁樣諗。」

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李其後承認這是他的假設，因為籌辦G20登報的一般都是社運組織，「以我知道，Lais Hotel 和 Dico（力高）都唔係一啲 activist 嘅 organisation。」

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李宇軒：簽借據時首次得知T真名為陳梓華

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李早前作供又指，他與T相約到金鐘力寶中心的一間咖啡店簽署借據，作為一個臨時措施（stop gap measure）。李今再解釋，若T手上有一份借據，T便可以跟「上面嘅人」說：「嗱，依家有 promissory note，條數一定會還嘅。」

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法官李運騰問李是否記得借據上的「收款人」一欄寫什麼。李則表示記得有類似「收款人」一欄，但是不記得內容是什麼。他又指，合共有4個人在借據上簽名，包括他、T 和兩名見證人，期間「拎咗身份證出嚟畀大家睇」，但他不記得需否寫下身份證號碼。

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李表示，在該次簽借據的過程中，是首次得知T真名叫陳梓華。

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李宇軒確認經Chartwell Holding戶口還款156萬 惟陳梓華未有談及公司背景

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控方展示李的銀行戶口紀錄，顯示李在2019年8月1日把100萬元轉帳至 Chartwell Holding，其後8月2日再次把約55.9萬元轉帳至 Chartwell Holding。李確認兩筆款項是用以清還有關G20登報的費用。

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控方問李，陳梓華向他提供 Chartwell Holding 的戶口資料時，有否談及這間公司的背景。李回答沒有。

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李宇軒稱登報計劃15萬餘款捐給612基金

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控方指，據G20登報計劃的收支列表，該次錄得15萬港元餘款，問李當時如何處理這些餘款。李稱：「捐咗畀612。」控方追問「612」是什麼意思，李回答：「啫係612基金。」他又解釋，因為登報計劃有一筆餘款，「唔可以落袋」，因此後來將這筆餘款捐給612基金。控方再追問612基金是用作什麼目的，李僅指：「支援 legal fee 嘅。」

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控方其後問，612基金的全名是否「612人道支援基金」。李表示：「啱啱你幫我記得起佢全名，我淨係記得612。」

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被問到為何選擇捐給612基金，陳表示他理解612基金其中一項工作是支援被捕人士的法律開支，「咁係完全合法嘅，同埋我理解公眾唔會反對嘅」，所以當他們有一筆餘款時，「唔知做咩咁，同埋擔心有人唔知係咪袋咗自己袋」，所以便決定捐出。

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控方問李有否就眾籌計劃接受過任何傳媒訪問。李表示記得在其中一次眾籌期間，《蘋果》曾經採訪過眾籌團隊，不過他不記得是6月那次眾籌，還是7月那次眾籌。

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李宇軒指2019年7月參與英國登報眾籌計劃 「攬炒巴」有份

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李接著談及2019年7月的另一次眾籌計劃，是有關在英國登廣告的活動。他記得當時有一個人將「攬炒巴」介紹給他認識，「因為攬炒巴想喺英國嗰邊去搞眾籌登報，同埋相關嘅事。」李指，因為對方知道他籌辦G20登報眾籌「係幾成功」，所以便邀請他幫手「睇吓攬炒巴喺 crowdfund 嗰度有冇嘢可以幫到手」。

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李表示，當時知道「攬炒巴」即是「連登」討論區上一個帳號「我要攬炒」，「而連登上面男仔係叫『巴打』嘅」，所以「攬炒巴」便是這一個帳號。

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李稱，後來他知道「攬炒巴」即是劉祖廸，因為大約在2019年尾至2020年初，陳梓華和「攬炒巴」與他曾經在網上平台 Jitsi 進行線上會議。

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至於李在是次眾籌的角色，李稱主要都是幫手處理眾籌。其他參與者包括「攬炒巴」、一個叫「Always」的人、向他介紹「攬炒巴」的人，以及後來有 Jack Hazlewood，其他參與者則記不起。他指是次活動「主要係攬炒巴嗰邊嘅人搞」，據他所知，運作模式與G20登報計劃相若，有的人處理眾籌，有的人聯絡報館，有的人設計廣告。

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李宇軒指《蘋果》專欄作家Jack Hazlewood借出銀行戶口接收眾籌款項

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李指，該次英國眾籌登報是關於1984年簽署的《中英聯合聲明》，而當時「攬炒巴」希望以此作為主題。

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就眾籌方法，李指在第一次就G20登報眾籌時使用的平台「GoGetFund」，手續費頗貴，當時籌到接近700萬元，但是卻扣除了50至60萬元手續費。於是他們找了另一個眾籌平台「gofundme.com」，可以選擇不給予貼士或手續費。

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李指，不過在「攬炒巴嗰邊嘅人」當中，沒有人願意借出自己的銀行戶口作為眾籌的收款人。李當時認為，因為他在第一次眾籌時已經使用了其個人戶口，「即使再嚟多次，都唔會增加我嘅風險」，於是決定借出他的渣打銀行戶口去接收眾籌款項。惟後來李發現，「gofundme.com」規定款項必須經由英國開設的英鎊戶口接收，他不記得在陳梓華還是另一名群組成員的介紹下，最終認識了 Jack Hazlewood，對方亦同意借出銀行戶口。後來李知道 Jack Hazlewood 是「《蘋果》嘅寫手」。

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控方追問李提到的「風險」是什麼意思。李指是被指控「洗黑錢」的風險，雖然他有妥善保存所有關於眾籌的單據，能夠證明到他不是「洗黑錢」，「但中間有畀人懷疑洗黑錢同埋凍結戶口的風險。」

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李宇軒：陳梓華聲稱與黎智英食飯後 獲允使用《蘋果》新聞圖片

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李續指：「後來我又知陳梓華識 Mark Simon 同肥佬黎」，當法庭翻譯主任把「肥佬黎」翻譯成「Fatty Lai」時，李補充道：「Sorry，黎智英。」

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李提到「攬炒巴」想使用當年簽署《中英聯合聲明》的新聞圖片，即是中方代表與時任英國首相戴卓爾夫人握手的相片。有組員留意到《蘋果》網站上有這一張相片，陳梓華聲稱會去問《蘋果日報》，李說：「嗰時 for some reasons，我覺得佢同《蘋果》有啲關係，之前我唔記得佢幾時暗示過。」

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李轉述陳當時稱：「等佢（陳）下個禮拜四，咁佢去同唔記得『黎生』定係『肥佬黎』食飯嗰陣，佢（陳）就會問佢（黎）。」李表示：「嗰陣時我知，原來佢（陳）可以去同黎生食飯。跟住過咗禮拜四之後，T（陳梓華）就話：『張相OK喇。』」李稱，其後與《蘋果》職員經過一輪正式的電郵溝通，他們便可以使用高清版的新聞圖片。

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控方展示一份《蘋果》報導〈遊行被圍捕險洩身份 攬炒巴死裏逃生 帶署歷警暴 拒保後返英〉，版面下方含有眾籌網站截圖，顯示計劃名稱是「中英聯合聲明登報」。李確認。

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image02 +▲ 網路截圖（資料圖片）

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李宇軒稱第二次登報活動中再度墊支 控方指事後有餘款約20萬英鎊

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李指第一次的G20登報與第二次的「中英聯合聲明登報」眾籌，同樣遇到未能立即動用籌得款項的問題，所以李需要協助墊支。

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控方展示李的銀行戶口紀錄，可見李在2019年7月19日至25日期間，先後向《旗幟晚報》（Evening Standard）、《衛報》（The Guardian）、台灣《自由時報》等合共6間媒體公司轉帳。李表示不肯定台灣《自由時報》那一次轉帳是關於「中英聯合聲明登報」計劃，還是第三次的眾籌活動，但其餘5間媒體公司的轉帳則確認有關。控方指，若果把台灣《自由時報》計算在內，李合共墊支了約10萬英鎊，即130萬港元。李確認。

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控方續指，李的銀行戶口紀錄顯示，Jack Henry Hazlewood 在2019年8月9日轉帳了約30.8萬英鎊給李。控方要求李確認第二次的登報活動錄得餘款約20萬英鎊，惟李表示不記得金額，但他相信控方的推論是正確。李亦記得該些餘款均存放在他的銀行戶口內。

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李宇軒指眾籌餘款用以支付英國活動開支 實報實銷

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被問到如何處理這一筆餘款，李指「一路攬炒巴嗰邊呢，就將佢（餘款）用喺佢同英國相關嘅嘢度」，例如他們舉辦一個支持香港的集會，可能涉及零星開支，例如泊車費，那便會動用「中英聯合聲明登報」的餘款來支付。李指實際操作是有人先墊支，事後給他單據，他便會向相關人士還款。

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法官杜麗冰問李是否認識報銷開支的人士，李則表示不知道，並指：「只要攬炒巴嗰邊彈一個人嚟，話『呢個人係關事嘅，你 reimburse 佢啦』，咁我就會 reimburse。」李又指：「Whatever 佢寫咩，佢話係咩就係咩」，有點似「攬炒巴」批核相關開支，而李就像一個司庫般償還款項。

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李宇軒：除舉辦活動外 眾籌餘款用於顧問費

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控方再次問李有關餘款的用途，李補充指除了用於舉辦英國相關的活動之外，還會用於支付顧問費、籌辦一些支持香港的遊行和支付網絡伺服器的費用等等。

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控方問李所指的「遊行」是支持香港什麼，李僅回答：「民主。」

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就剛才提及的「顧問費」，李指涉及兩間顧問公司，其中一間為「89up」，以他所知是比較集中於媒體範疇的顧問公司，後來他們覺得「89up」在政治方面較弱，於是轉用另一間顧問公司「Whitehouse Consultancy」。李特別強調，這間「Whitehouse Consultancy」與美國的白宮無關，純粹因為老闆名叫 Chris Whitehouse。

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李宇軒指顧問公司安排「攬炒巴」會見英議員、監察區議會選舉等

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控方遂追問關於「Whitehouse Consultancy」的性質和活動。李指這間公司曾經安排過「攬炒巴喺英國嘅 members」去會見英國國會議員，後來在2019年11月香港區議會選舉期間，「佢哋有幫手去用佢哋嘅人脈搵咗一啲人去監選」。李續指，到後期直至2020年，這間公司一直與「香港監察」的羅傑斯（Benedict Rogers）合作，也有一次協助前港督彭定康（Chris Patten）處理一個聯署行動。

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控方追問該次聯署行動的目的，李指當時是2020年5月，有消息傳出香港會訂立《國安法》，「嗰個聯署就係話表達 concern」，尤其在英國角度，他們會認為《國安法》與《中英聯合聲明》不一致。

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控方又問會見英國國會議員的目的是什麼。李指是有關當時對香港人權民主問題的關注。

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李宇軒戶口紀錄顯示曾轉帳至兩間顧問公司

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控方展示李的銀行戶口紀錄，可見他分別於2019年7月23日、8月15日和8月21日，向顧問公司「89up」支付1.3萬元港幣、9,663英鎊和12,375英鎊。李確認他使用眾籌的餘款來支付上述顧問費。他又舉例指，「攬炒巴」在英國與「89up」合作，「佢哋租咗一架大巴士，喺倫敦度周圍走。」

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至於「Whitehouse Consultancy」，李的銀行戶口紀錄顯示他分別在2019年11月29日、12月31日和2020年2月4日，向「The Whitehouse Consultancy Limited」轉帳9,500英鎊、14,750英鎊和15,492.85英鎊。

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案件下周一續審。

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案件編號：HCCC51/2022

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China In Sub-Saharan Africa

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【黎智英案・審訊第卌六日】

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Benedict Hamlyn | 2024.03.14
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Chinese development financing in sub-Saharan Africa has sought, among other aims, to bolster Beijing’s supply chain resilience and dual port maritime strength. While this may enhance its ability to raise geopolitical tensions or conduct territorial expansion, complications remain around the execution of such a strategy.

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獨媒報導 | 2024.03.15
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  • 李宇軒指英國登報眾籌餘款供「攬炒巴」等人辦活動、安排見英議員及監察區選
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Diplomacy Through Defence

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China In Sub-Saharan Africa

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Si Horne and Ian Gurney | 2024.03.12
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With enthusiasm for Defence Engagement seemingly waning, how can Defence ensure that it is contributing to UK influence around the globe?

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Benedict Hamlyn | 2024.03.14
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Chinese development financing in sub-Saharan Africa has sought, among other aims, to bolster Beijing’s supply chain resilience and dual port maritime strength. While this may enhance its ability to raise geopolitical tensions or conduct territorial expansion, complications remain around the execution of such a strategy.

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Forward Defense

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【黎智英案・審訊第卌四日】

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Seth G. Jones, et al. | 2024.03.11
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Russia’s February 2022 invasion of Ukraine triggered the bloodiest war in Europe since World War II and raised significant questions about the United States’ role in Europe.

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獨媒報導 | 2024.03.13
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  • 李宇軒出庭作供：為爭取國際關注香港示威 發起眾籌及G20登報計劃
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  • 紀錄顯示兩間公司墊支G20登報費 李宇軒：陳梓華稱「上頭」憂走數故簽借據
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【黎智英案・審訊第四十日】

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Government Use Of Deepfakes

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獨媒報導 | 2024.03.07
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  • 楊清奇指黎智英慷慨向員工派股票 但用人「殘忍」頻換高層
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  • 楊清奇指專欄文「擦邊」避國安法 例如諷刺官說不怕制裁如「夜行吹哨」
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Daniel Byman, et al. | 2024.03.12
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What questions should governments ask — and who in government should be asking them — when a deepfake is being considered?

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War Clouds Over India?

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Diplomacy Through Defence

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Samir Tata | 2024.03.06
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While wars elsewhere hold the world’s attention, a new conflict may be on the cards along the Line of Actual Control between India and China in Eastern Ladakh.

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Si Horne and Ian Gurney | 2024.03.12
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With enthusiasm for Defence Engagement seemingly waning, how can Defence ensure that it is contributing to UK influence around the globe?

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China Outpacing U.S. DIB

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Forward Defense

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Seth G. Jones and Alexander Palmer | 2024.03.06
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China’s defense industrial base is moving to a wartime footing, while the United States is largely in a peacetime stance. Absent urgent changes, the United States risks weakening deterrence and undermining its warfighting capabilities against China and other competitors.

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Seth G. Jones, et al. | 2024.03.11
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Russia’s February 2022 invasion of Ukraine triggered the bloodiest war in Europe since World War II and raised significant questions about the United States’ role in Europe.

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