From d3747deab4565c079dd440244975946a021b0888 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: theagora Date: Sat, 28 Dec 2024 11:49:24 +0800 Subject: [PATCH] =?UTF-8?q?0x30=20Patch=20Build=20VOL.48=20=C2=A9=20MMXXV?= =?UTF-8?q?=2068d7cad?= MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit --- c2/index.html | 100 +- c2/page10/index.html | 100 +- c2/page11/index.html | 100 +- c2/page12/index.html | 100 +- c2/page13/index.html | 100 +- c2/page14/index.html | 100 +- c2/page15/index.html | 100 +- c2/page16/index.html | 100 +- c2/page17/index.html | 100 +- c2/page18/index.html | 100 +- c2/page19/index.html | 100 +- c2/page2/index.html | 100 +- c2/page20/index.html | 100 +- c2/page21/index.html | 100 +- c2/page22/index.html | 100 +- c2/page23/index.html | 100 +- c2/page24/index.html | 100 +- c2/page25/index.html | 100 +- c2/page26/index.html | 100 +- c2/page27/index.html | 100 +- c2/page28/index.html | 100 +- c2/page29/index.html | 100 +- c2/page3/index.html | 100 +- c2/page30/index.html | 100 +- c2/page31/index.html | 100 +- c2/page32/index.html | 100 +- c2/page33/index.html | 100 +- c2/page34/index.html | 100 +- c2/page35/index.html | 100 +- c2/page36/index.html | 100 +- c2/page37/index.html | 100 +- c2/page38/index.html | 56 + c2/page4/index.html | 100 +- c2/page5/index.html | 100 +- c2/page6/index.html | 100 +- c2/page7/index.html | 100 +- c2/page8/index.html | 100 +- c2/page9/index.html | 100 +- columns.xml | 2 +- feed.xml | 2 +- heros.xml | 2 +- hkers.xml | 13226 +++++++--------- ...2024-12-02-trial-of-jimmy-lai-day-100.html | 215 + ...2024-12-03-trial-of-jimmy-lai-day-101.html | 223 + ...4-12-04-north-korean-troops-in-russia.html | 155 + ...2024-12-04-trial-of-jimmy-lai-day-102.html | 222 + hkers/2024-12-05-peace-through-agency.html | 135 + ...2024-12-05-trial-of-jimmy-lai-day-103.html | 244 + ...2024-12-06-trial-of-jimmy-lai-day-104.html | 212 + hkers/index.html | 124 +- 50 files changed, 9430 insertions(+), 9088 deletions(-) create mode 100644 hkers/2024-12-02-trial-of-jimmy-lai-day-100.html create mode 100644 hkers/2024-12-03-trial-of-jimmy-lai-day-101.html create mode 100644 hkers/2024-12-04-north-korean-troops-in-russia.html create mode 100644 hkers/2024-12-04-trial-of-jimmy-lai-day-102.html create mode 100644 hkers/2024-12-05-peace-through-agency.html create mode 100644 hkers/2024-12-05-trial-of-jimmy-lai-day-103.html create mode 100644 hkers/2024-12-06-trial-of-jimmy-lai-day-104.html diff --git a/c2/index.html b/c2/index.html index 7b1e1ca5..56054e9b 100644 --- a/c2/index.html +++ b/c2/index.html @@ -68,200 +68,200 @@
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【香港保衛戰當年今日・十五】

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diff --git a/columns.xml b/columns.xml index 616d0b03..d08e5bea 100644 --- a/columns.xml +++ b/columns.xml @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -Jekyll2024-12-26T09:15:02+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/columns.xmlThe Republic of Agora | ColumnsUNITE THE PUBLIC ♢ VOL.48 © MMXXV“权力不得世袭”2024-10-09T12:00:00+08:002024-10-09T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/columns/power-shall-not-be-hereditary<p>“辛亥革命”爆发一百多年了，但人们对其的认识仍存分歧。就“辛亥革命”是成功，还是失败了，就有分歧。在我看来，这不能一概而论，“辛亥革命”有多重目标，有些目标成功，而有些目标则失败了。</p> +Jekyll2024-12-28T11:48:03+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/columns.xmlThe Republic of Agora | ColumnsUNITE THE PUBLIC ♢ VOL.48 © MMXXV“权力不得世袭”2024-10-09T12:00:00+08:002024-10-09T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/columns/power-shall-not-be-hereditary<p>“辛亥革命”爆发一百多年了，但人们对其的认识仍存分歧。就“辛亥革命”是成功，还是失败了，就有分歧。在我看来，这不能一概而论，“辛亥革命”有多重目标，有些目标成功，而有些目标则失败了。</p> <!--more--> diff --git a/feed.xml b/feed.xml index 342ccad1..fa035ccb 100644 --- a/feed.xml +++ b/feed.xml @@ -1 +1 @@ -Jekyll2024-12-26T09:15:02+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/feed.xmlThe Republic of AgoraUNITE THE PUBLIC ♢ VOL.48 © MMXXV \ No newline at end of file +Jekyll2024-12-28T11:48:03+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/feed.xmlThe Republic of AgoraUNITE THE PUBLIC ♢ VOL.48 © MMXXV \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/heros.xml b/heros.xml index 646b1219..529ec4e3 100644 --- a/heros.xml +++ b/heros.xml @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -Jekyll2024-12-26T09:15:02+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/heros.xmlThe Republic of Agora | HerosUNITE THE PUBLIC ♢ VOL.48 © MMXXV我们心怀新世界2024-12-07T12:00:00+08:002024-12-07T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/heros/TekosinaAnarsist-a1_l-we-carry-a-new-world-on-our-hearts<p>在阿萨德家族统治数十年后，今天我们醒来时，叙利亚已经没有了正常运作的中央政府。叙利亚政府已经倒台。</p> +Jekyll2024-12-28T11:48:03+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/heros.xmlThe Republic of Agora | HerosUNITE THE PUBLIC ♢ VOL.48 © MMXXV我们心怀新世界2024-12-07T12:00:00+08:002024-12-07T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/heros/TekosinaAnarsist-a1_l-we-carry-a-new-world-on-our-hearts<p>在阿萨德家族统治数十年后，今天我们醒来时，叙利亚已经没有了正常运作的中央政府。叙利亚政府已经倒台。</p> <!--more--> diff --git a/hkers.xml b/hkers.xml index d43323fa..b38bc7ec 100644 --- a/hkers.xml +++ b/hkers.xml @@ -1,12100 +1,10960 @@ -Jekyll2024-12-26T09:15:02+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers.xmlThe Republic of Agora | HkersUNITE THE PUBLIC ♢ VOL.48 © MMXXVEurope And The Sahel2024-12-04T12:00:00+08:002024-12-04T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/europe-and-the-sahel<p><em>Widespread instability and the growing influence of China and Russia has increased the strategic importance of the Sahel to European security. A reset in relations between Europe and the region is direly needed.</em></p> +Jekyll2024-12-28T11:48:03+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers.xmlThe Republic of Agora | HkersUNITE THE PUBLIC ♢ VOL.48 © MMXXV【黎智英案・審訊第 104 日】2024-12-06T12:00:00+08:002024-12-06T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/trial-of-jimmy-lai-day-104<ul> + <li>黎智英曾草擬公開信 預計國安法生效、一旦入獄後發布</li> +</ul> <excerpt /> -<h3 id="introduction">Introduction</h3> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/MnmIHNL.png" alt="iamge01" /></p> -<p>The Sahel is acquiring a new importance due to recent events that have exponentially increased its capacity to influence the stability and security of the Mediterranean. It is an inhospitable area that is often discussed interchangeably with North Africa. But the Sahel and North Africa are quite distinct and are facing different realities, making it difficult to formulate a single strategy for both regions. North Africa will likely continue its current trajectory of closer integration with Europe, while the Sahel will continue to lag behind in terms of modernization, integration, security and stability, and economic development. The Sahel, therefore, currently requires the most attention from both the European Union and NATO, as well as from southern European nations.</p> +<p>【獨媒報導】壹傳媒創辦人黎智英及3間蘋果公司被控串謀勾結外國勢力及串謀刊印煽動刊物等罪，今（6日）於高院（移師西九龍法院）踏入第104日審訊，黎智英第12日作供。辯方圍繞黎的意圖提問，開始進入國安法生效之後的7月1日。黎當日早上向數名泛民及員工傳送訊息，指國安法條文「辣到離譜」、「香港將無法治無自由，政府行政無法無天，我們寸步難移，動彈不得」，形容「香港已死」。黎稱知道國安法生效之後，呼籲制裁變了刑事罪行，他否認有繼續相關行為，「這樣做是自殺式的（It’s suicidal to do so）。」</p> -<h3 id="the-sahel">The Sahel</h3> +<p>訊息紀錄顯示，黎曾向其教父兼《華爾街日報》編輯 Bill McGurn 提交文章「來自香港監獄的信（Letter from a Hong Kong Jail）」，一旦入獄後供外媒發布，但其後改變主意。信件有兩段談及黎向美國人說的話、希望美國人不要忘記香港人，惟黎否認請求外國制裁、封鎖或敵對行為。</p> -<p>The first difficulty in addressing the multiple challenges facing the region lies in defining its boundaries. Sahel means “edge” or “coast” in Arabic, and from this point of view, the Sahel would be a 5,000 kilometer strip stretching from the Atlantic Ocean to the Red Sea. But these boundaries have no cultural, historical, or economic meaning and include 12 very different countries. For this reason, it is more usual to use the term to refer to a group of five countries with common historical, economic, cultural, and social characteristics: Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger. Historically, these areas were part of the great Sahelian empires based on trans-Saharan trade. They were subsequently colonized by France, which left a common political and cultural legacy. This legacy currently coexists with the fundamental role of Islam as the majority religion throughout the region.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/0Db558V.png" alt="iamge02" /> +▲ （資料圖片）</p> -<p>In 2014, the five countries established the G5 Sahel, born as a result of the conviction of these governments (and of European pressure) about the need to jointly implement a comprehensive approach to ensure the conditions for peace, development, security, and governance. In 2017, a joint force was added to the organization to coordinate counterterrorism efforts, aiming to curb the expansion of armed groups that seriously threaten regional security. The efficacy of this organization is uncertain now, since three of its five founding members have left it, but officially the organization has not been dissolved.</p> +<h4 id="國安法生效後李兆富退出管理twitter-黎否認立法後呼籲制裁">國安法生效後李兆富退出管理Twitter 黎否認立法後呼籲制裁</h4> -<p>There are also other partially Sahelian states geographically — such as Algeria, Nigeria, and Senegal — which, despite their different historical experiences and current situations, influence the evolution of Sahelian developments.</p> +<p>2020年6月30日晚國安法生效，昨日黎提到他晚上9時許便睡覺。辯方指，負責管理黎 Twitter 帳戶的李兆富於7月1日凌晨約3時傳送訊息給黎，提出交由其他人管理Twitter帳戶會較好（But it’d be better if your presence on Twitter will be managed by someone else.），並向黎道歉（I am really sorry）。</p> -<h4 id="the-challenges">The Challenges</h4> +<p>辯方指，黎相隔一段時間，於7月1日早上接近7時回覆李，表示會與其助手 Mark Simon 商討其他人選。黎亦向李提到：「我剛讀了國安法細節，它們非常嚴厲，是對香港法治和自由的嚴重攻擊，很傷心，香港已死。你保持低調是正確的，我們數天後再談吧。這是很嚴重的事情。」（Simon, I just read the details of National Security Law. They are very draconian and a severe attack on HK’s rule of law and freedom. So sad. HK is dead. You’re right to stay low profile. A couple of days later let’s talk a bit more. This is really serious stuff. Cheers, Jimmy）</p> -<p>The Sahel is one of the least habitable regions in the world. It has been characterized by a combination of great political instability, little economic development, and very unfavorable environmental conditions, the latter of which has exacerbated the unstable political context and driven migratory flows toward Europe. The lack of instruments to respond to these challenges has long been a source of structural weakness, resulting in a dependency on contributions from the United Nations, the European Union, or third countries. But perhaps the most worrying element is the Sahel’s position as the world epicenter of jihadist terrorism, an issue that has increased in severity since 2016. Not only is it fertile ground for recruiting rootless and disaffected youth into terrorism, but it also provides safe havens for terrorist organizations to plan and launch international attacks. Al Qaeda and the Islamic State are expanding violently in the region and the Sahel suffered 47 percent of all terrorism-related deaths worldwide in 2023.</p> +<p>辯方指黎向李說「保持低調是正確的」，為何李想低調？黎指「因為很危險。」辯方指國安法生效之前，黎很多時提及制裁，但國安法生效之後，黎是否知道已變了刑事罪行？黎同意，並稱所以他說國安法嚴厲。辯方接著問黎有否繼續呼籲制裁？黎稱：「沒有，這樣做是自殺式的（It’s suicidal to do so）。」</p> -<p>The crises already known to have been lurking in the Sahel for more than a decade are, however, entering a new stage due to two main reasons: the domestic political climate and the regional impact of the war in Ukraine.</p> +<p>辯方展出黎與Mark Simon之間的訊息，Mark Simon 指，因李替黎管理Twitter一事被曝光，李感到不開心。黎則向Mark Simon 坦承是他告訴別人，因為想將功勞歸予李。</p> -<p>The political climate in the G5 Sahel has become more volatile in the last three years with the success of a series of military coups: in Mali in August 2020 and May 2021, in Burkina Faso in September 2022, and in Niger in July 2023. The latter is perhaps the most significant because it happened following the military coup in Mali in 2021, where French troops on the ground as part of Operation Barkhane were forced to conduct an accelerated withdrawal. Paris then decided to move its operational center to Niger, becoming the focal point for a renewed security partnership in the Sahel based on lessons learned from previous failures. The Nigerien government was also keen to host other European forces to counter Islamist insurgent groups linked to Al Qaeda and the Islamic State — so much so that the European Union decided to organize a three-year mission to train the Nigerien army. Niger had thus become the focal point of security efforts in the region.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/pfICVov.png" alt="iamge03" /> +▲ 黎智英</p> -<p>After the 2023 coup, however, this delicate balance has shifted. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) — the main regional organization — has been unable to respond effectively, showing its weakness and causing Burkina Faso, Guinea, and Mali to leave its ranks. The G5 Sahel has also been abandoned by its own members. In December 2023, Burkina Faso and Niger announced their withdrawal from the G5 Sahel joint military force, echoing Mali’s departure in May 2022, while Mauritania and Chad have accepted these sovereign decisions. The military juntas of Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger have also signed a new security agreement under the name of Alliance of the Sahel States (AES), whose priority will be the fight against terrorism. Outside the continent, France is consolidating a military withdrawal that began in Mali in 2022, continuing in Burkina Faso and more recently in Niger, although it maintains operations in Chad.</p> +<h4 id="黎向多名泛民傳送訊息指國安法非常嚴厲-香港已死">黎向多名泛民傳送訊息指國安法非常嚴厲 「香港已死」</h4> -<p>The United States, for its part, has tried to maintain military collaboration with Niger, where it has built one of the largest drone bases on the continent in Agadez. And yet, despite U.S. wishes and after months of tensions, Niger’s ruling military council announced that it was ending the agreement that allowed U.S. forces to be based in the country. Among the disagreements between the two governments was the desire of Niger to supply Iran with uranium and work more closely with Russian military forces. The United States had completed its military withdrawal from the country by early August 2024, a blow to its counterterrorism effort — and to the broader security situation in the Sahel.</p> +<p>辯方指，黎將李兆富的說話轉述給 Mark Simon 之後，黎也向Mark 提到：「國安法細節剛公布，它們非常嚴厲，是對香港法治和自由的嚴重攻擊，很傷心，香港已死！」（The details of National Security Law just came out. They’re very draconian and a severe attack on HK’s rule of law and freedom. So sad. HK is dead!）</p> -<p>Secondly, Russia’s military offensive against Ukraine is having a significant impact on the region. For one, it has decreased food security, exacerbating the harsh living conditions of Sahelians with rising wheat, fuel, and fertilizer prices. The energy crisis in Europe due to the war has also heightened Europe’s need to strengthen its partnership with African countries, whose natural resources attract them. Thus, in July 2022, Algeria, Niger, and Nigeria signed a memorandum of understanding for the formalization of the Trans-Saharan gas pipeline, which could have great potential for the transportation of gas supplies to Europe.</p> +<p>辯方指，黎同日向民主黨創黨主席李柱銘傳送類似的訊息：「國安法細節剛公布，條文非常嚴厲，是對香港法治和自由的嚴重攻擊，很傷心，香港已死！」（The details of National Security Law just came out. The terms are very draconian and is a severe attack on HK’s rule of law and freedom. So sad. HK is dead.）</p> -<p>But the war in Ukraine has also made the Sahel more permeable to international influence efforts. In fact, it has grown in prominence within the framework of strategic competition, with the growing influence of Russia and China potentially challenging the security of NATO and the European Union.</p> +<p>辯方問黎為何向不同人傳送相同的東西？黎表示：「因為這是我當時的想法。」</p> -<p>Although relations between Russia and the Sahelian countries were established decades ago during the Cold War, today the presence of the Wagner Group in Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger stands out. Its presence has been demonstrated in the last three years through participation in antiterrorist operations and support to the armed forces of some countries in the area. Since the outbreak of the war in Ukraine, Moscow has continued to expand its influence in the Sahel, as shown through the Africa-Russia summit held in July 2023. That said, the death of the head of the Wagner Group, Yevgeny Prigozhin, has led Moscow to create a new military structure under the Ministry of Defense called Africa Corps, with which it intends to replace Wagner’s mercenaries.</p> +<p>辯方指，黎智英亦向民主黨何俊仁傳送訊息：「看了國安法細節簡直辣到離譜，香港將無法治無自由，政府行政完全無法無天，我們寸步難移，動彈不得，我們真的要想清楚以後的策略。」黎亦向同是民主黨的李永達傳送一模一樣的訊息。</p> -<p>China’s presence, on the other hand, is more linked to the economic sphere and to the Sahel’s natural resources. China’s state-owned companies operate in Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, and Niger. Mali potentially has one of the world’s largest lithium reserves, and the Chinese company Ganfeng Lithium has invested heavily in the country. China is the second-largest investor in Niger, with projects led by PetroChina (a subsidiary of China National Petroleum Corporation) and China National Nuclear Corporation. Investments in the oil sector in Chad have also been significant and have made the Chadian army one of the best equipped forces in Africa. And some reports suggest that China would be willing to use the conflicts in the Sahel to test its weapons products, although it seems more plausible to think that it will prioritize the protection of its interests in the region.</p> +<p>黎也有向陳沛敏傳送訊息：「沛敏，看了國安法細節嚇了一跳，辣到離譜，香港將無法治和自由，政府行政無法無天，泛民寸步難移，動彈不得，先要想好策略對付，不容魯莽。」</p> -<p>This growing influence and presence of Russia and China fuels the idea that the countries of the Sahel — along with those in North Africa — are aligning more closely with these two powers, or at least that they want to reinvigorate their foreign policy autonomy vis-à-vis the West in line with that of other countries of the “Global South.” In both cases, this is connected to the relative decline of the influence of Western powers in the region.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/iVcdaM4.png" alt="iamge04" /> +▲ 陳沛敏</p> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">This growing influence and presence of Russia and China fuels the idea that the countries of the Sahel — along with those in North Africa — are aligning more closely with these two powers, or at least that they want to reinvigorate their foreign policy autonomy vis-à-vis the West in line with that of other countries of the “Global South.”</code></em></strong></p> +<h4 id="黎指管理層對國安法很小心-相信有研究條文">黎指管理層對國安法很小心 相信有研究條文</h4> -<h3 id="the-european-union">The European Union</h3> +<p>辯方指，黎於7月1日向林文宗傳送類似訊息。林回覆時提到國安法不止惡，還很嚴厲，「我們也要好好研究當中對付傳媒的條文」。辯方問黎，管理層和黎自己有研究嗎？黎相信管理層有研究，因他們對於國安法的影響很小心，至於他自己，則等待他們的研究結果。</p> -<p>After the coup d’état in Niger, the president of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, stated in her last State of the Union address to the European Parliament that the European Union should engage more with African countries. She stated that Europe had to show the same unity of purpose toward Africa as it has shown toward Ukraine, focusing on cooperation with legitimate governments and regional organizations. The president further accused Russia of sowing chaos in the Sahel and stated that military coups destabilize the region, making it prone to the risk of terrorism.</p> +<p>黎亦稱，在國安法之前，他曾有一次出席張劍虹安排的國安法研討會。至於黎沒有出席的研討會，辯方問其他人事後有否轉述討論內容給黎？黎則稱認為沒有需要，因其他人都知道他會很謹慎。</p> -<p>The European Union’s concerns about developments beyond the Mediterranean directly impacting the continent’s security and prosperity are not new. But the results of its actions have been disappointing, perhaps because of tactical errors in its approach or inadequate attention paid to the issue.</p> +<h4 id="黎國安法前撰信-預計入獄後供外媒發布">黎國安法前撰信 預計入獄後供外媒發布</h4> -<p>For years, the perceived risks emanating from the Sahel have generally remained low due to the intangible nature of many of them and the belief that they were somehow under the control of the intervening countries in North Africa. These are countries with which Brussels cooperates under the European Neighborhood Policy, with programs in a wide range of sectors, such as democratic and economic development, rule of law, and migration. The Sahel region was therefore perceived by European policymakers as largely a remote desert area prone to drought and in need of infrastructure and humanitarian aid.</p> +<p>辯方指，黎的教父兼《華爾街日報》編輯 Bill McGurn，在2020年7月1日早上7時傳送一篇黎的文章「來自香港監獄的信（Letter from a Hong Kong Jail）」。McGurn 指黎在較早前傳送了此文章給他，並提醒黎若有任何地方需要修改，現在便要提出，「我相信會很有力。」</p> -<p>Since the fall of Muammar al-Qaddafi’s regime in Libya in 2011 and the ensuing security crisis in Mali, however, Europe accelerated the process of expanding the borders of its immediate southern neighborhood into the Sahel. It committed more spending, launched more development and stabilization programs, and intensified its external military presence in Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger, which were beginning to be seen as part of the “gateway to Europe” — a source of dangerous population growth, unwanted migration, and violent extremism, not to mention the favored territory of Russian mercenaries.</p> +<p>黎的信開首提到：「如果你正在讀這封信，代表我正在監獄裡，拜中國共產黨司法所賜。」（If you are reading this, it means I am in jail, courtesy of Chinese Communist justice.）</p> -<p>In 2011, the European Union became involved in the Sahel with the adoption of the EU Sahel Strategy (2011–2020), which was reinforced in 2015 with the Regional Action Plan for the Sahel. These two strategies had a strong militarized approach focused on security. But Brussels also opened new embassies in the region, and an EU high representative for the Sahel was appointed to demonstrate continued diplomatic engagement. The European Union additionally became a founding member of the Sahel Alliance in 2017, pledging to coordinate international development spending in the region.</p> +<p>「但是我有很棒的同伴。相比起在外面，我在這裡更自由。一旦當權者將捍衛真相和法治打成罪行時，哪裡應是一個誠實的人的容身之處呢？」（But I am in excellent company. In some ways I am freer here than I was outside. When authorities make it a crime to stand up for truth and the rule of law, where else should an honest man be?）</p> -<p>But the expected results were not adequately achieved and the European Union decided to move away from a preeminently security-oriented approach to a more integrated intervention, adopting the EU Integrated Sahel Strategy 2021. This was formulated at a time when most of the current crises had not yet emerged. Indeed, migration flows were fairly under control, political instability in the Sahel was not yet fueled by the ensuing succession of coups, the presence of the Wagner Group was not yet threatening the region, and the European Union was not facing a war on its eastern border. The strategy today must cope with a different and more hostile situation than initially planned.</p> +<p>黎又提到：「我是一個老人。發生在我身上的事並不重要。未來是屬於年輕人的。大部份香港年輕人未曾活在英國殖民統治底下，或是被中共直接統治，但是他們知道自由是什麼，而他們亦知道北京的主子堅決地不讓他們享受自由。香港新一代人從共產主義得到第一身教訓，而他們永不會接受它。」（I am an old man. What happens to me does not matter. The future belongs to the young. Most of Hong Kong’s young never lived under British colonial rule or direct Communist rule. But they know what freedom is, and they are learning that their masters in Beijing are determined they will never taste it.The rising Hong Kong generation is getting a first hand lesson in Communism, and they will never accept it.）</p> -<p>In general, EU policies toward the Sahel have sought to satisfy different interests: to solve the migration issue for the countries bordering the Mediterranean with long-term development programs in the region, to support the French military efforts over the last decade, and to introduce a European dimension to the security and development sector in the region. But the European Union has proven itself not yet ready to respond in all of these dimensions. This lack of European success must be coupled with the unilateral French stance in the Sahel, which has caused considerable frustration among European partners and seems to have had a fragmenting effect on European efforts in the region. More recently, successive military coups in Burkina Faso, Mali, and especially Niger have imposed a limit on the Europeans’ military response capacity. And the latest worrying decision made by EU member states was to not extend the fifth mandate of the European Union Training Mission in Mali (EUTM Mali) beyond May 18, 2024, although it was due to expire in January 2025. The reason given was the evolving political and security situation and consultations with the Malian authorities.</p> +<p>「所以我的朋友例如美國可以做什麼？主要需記住的事，就是我們，手無寸鐵的香港人民，正在同一陣線、為了相同的原則而抗爭。如果中國是如此對待香港人——在中國歷史上創造出最繁盛和創新的社會的人們——你能想像到中國會更好地對待你們嗎？尤其是她在權力中崛起？」（So what can our friends like America do? The main thing to remember is that we the people of Hong Kong, unarmed as we are, are fighting on the same side for the same principles. If China is going to treat Hong Kong people this way – people who produced the most prosperous and innovative society in China history – can you really imagine that China will treat you any better, especially as it grows in power?）</p> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">In general, EU policies toward the Sahel have sought to satisfy different interests: to solve the migration issue for the countries bordering the Mediterranean with long-term development programs in the region, to support the French military efforts over the last decade, and to introduce a European dimension to the security and development sector in the region.</code></em></strong></p> +<p>「我一直欽佩美國，我的美國朋友，我現在處於牢房裡說這些話。我們在香港正受到中國輾壓，因為我們與你們的價值觀一致。當我們需要幫助的關頭，請不要忘記你的朋友。」（I have always admired America. To my American friends, I now say this from my jail cell. We in Hong Kong are being crushed by China because we share your values. Please do not forget your friends in our hour of need.）</p> -<p>European governments are reluctant to support undemocratic governments because they undermine Europe’s own priorities, in particular that of advancing democracy. But at the same time, shutting down security support leaves the door open for other actors — such as the Wagner Group — to fill the void and offer support to governments in the aftermath of coups. For now, there seems to be no “good” for Europe in the Sahel. And yet, despite the current paralysis, the region remains of strategic importance to the European Union.</p> +<p>辯方問黎，他與McGurn之間是否知道黎會坐牢？黎表示這只是他的預計。被問到是否想在他入獄後發布文章，黎表示他有這樣的意圖，但是他其後吩咐 Mark Simon 不要發布。黎亦確認，該信件所述反映他當時真誠相信的想法，而他是在7月1日之前撰寫。</p> -<h3 id="nato">NATO</h3> +<p>辯方提到，信件有兩段談及黎向美國人說的話、想他們做什麼。黎確認，但他否認請求外國制裁、封鎖或敵對行為。</p> -<p>NATO’s southern flank has always existed, although it has been considered strategically secondary to its eastern flank. NATO’s southern members have historically been most concerned about security issues in the Mediterranean and its adjacent regions; they have also been among the most vocal advocates for NATO to pay more attention to its southern neighborhood. However, there is room for improvement in terms of the cohesion of the alliance’s approach, to the extent that, at times, the Mediterranean has become an area of competition rather than coordination among NATO’s southern members. It should not be forgotten that NATO is an alliance of sovereign countries, some of which have permanent interests in the south. That is why NATO accepted the UN Security Council’s invitation to protect civilians in Libya in 2011: it was reflecting French and Italian interests in North Africa. Similarly, in 2012, regional interests were at play when it was decided at the Chicago Summit to erect a southward-oriented missile shield for the alliance. Ultimately, it is the member states that decide to project stability in the south — bilaterally, regionally, or through the European Union, the United Nations, or NATO.</p> +<h4 id="訊息稱中共癲咗-黎國安法超乎預期地嚴厲">訊息稱「中共癲咗」 黎：國安法超乎預期地嚴厲</h4> -<p>In general, NATO has not been very explicit in addressing risks emanating from the Sahel region. It was only in 2016 that the alliance formally launched the so-called 360° approach, which addresses threats from all fronts and ensures a focused and tailored response. Thanks to the political commitment of countries such as Spain and Italy, NATO began to adopt — at least theoretically — this global vision that valued all its borders with equal concern. Since then, NATO has tried to reformulate its policies toward the southern region according to the notion of “stability projection,” with the idea of contributing to a stable environment in NATO’s vicinity by increasing regional understanding and situational awareness and by supporting capacity building in partner countries.</p> +<p>辯方指，2020年7月1日早上黎亦向陳沛敏提到：「今天我去籌款站幫忙籌款，不派海報，你認為怎樣？」陳回覆：「其實如果你是想公開現身作為一種姿態，海報不派也不會影響效用果。」黎回覆：「好，我就去籌站幫手籌款一陣照個相就走。中共癲咗，我們也得重新策劃以後做法。劍虹已有方案。」</p> -<p>The most recent NATO Parliamentary Assembly regional outlook reports have identified the security environment in North Africa and the Sahel as among the key trends that will shape the future. They point to the importance of the region because of its geographical proximity to Europe, as well as its cultural, social, economic, postcolonial, and migratory links. In addition, the latest strategic concept adopted in Madrid in 2022 confirmed the alliance’s commitment to work with its partners in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) and Sahel regions “to address shared security threats,” including war, terrorism, and the growing challenges related to climate change — a commitment that would be reaffirmed at the summit in Vilnius the year after. A few months later, the secretary-general appointed an independent group of experts whose findings of a “comprehensive and deep reflection process” on the southern flank were reflected in a report published in May. The report laid the ground for “an action plan for a stronger, more strategic and result-oriented approach toward our southern neighborhood,” including the Sahel area, an idea that managed to be incorporated into the Washington Summit Declaration of 2024. It should also be noted that the declaration refers to new efforts in the fight against terrorism and the identification of key areas for long-term effort, one of which is undoubtedly the Sahel. The Washington summit also produced the establishment of a special representative for the southern neighborhood, a position to which Spanish deputy assistant secretary general for political affairs and security policy Javier Colomina was appointed shortly thereafter.</p> +<p>辯方問黎為何說「中共癲咗」，黎稱因為國安法超乎預期地嚴厲。辯方提到，黎早前供稱，認為國安法不會如期實施，以及條文不會太嚴厲。黎確認，並重申這是他的一廂情願。</p> -<p>All this aside, the Eastern flank is still considered by the allies the immediate and primary challenge to NATO, while in the long term the Indo-Pacific is beginning to stand out. As a result, the alliance’s political and military leeway to the southern flank risks being limited. What does seem to be clear among the allies, however, is that the increasing instability in the Sahel makes it necessary to consider that a southward-oriented NATO strategy should not necessarily stop at the Mediterranean and its immediate areas of influence. Beyond the Maghreb, Africa is an integral part of the European and transatlantic security calculus.</p> +<p>有關遊行期間派發海報一事，辯方提到6月29日訊息顯示，黎向民主黨李永達表示會在七一籌款街站派發3,000張海報。至7月1日，黎與張劍虹、羅偉光、林文宗和陳沛敏等管理層商討應否在街站派發海報，他們分別以訊息回覆黎時，均不建議派海報。黎確認，因為國安法實施，他們要求自己謹慎行事。辯方指，最終決定是街站不派發海報；黎則稱不是他的決定，當時有人告訴他，相信是民主派。</p> -<p>But an extension of the security space beyond the Mediterranean and North Africa would imply closer cooperation with regional institutions and partner countries. Countries like Senegal and Nigeria could be important in NATO’s effort to “project stability” to the south. But from an operational point of view, NATO’s global engagement has obvious limits. It is therefore important to distinguish between the idea of NATO’s role in the Global South and the alliance’s role as a forum for the discussion of broader strategic concerns and policy coordination. From a political point of view, NATO’s southern flank can extend as far as the allies agree to take it.</p> +<h4 id="黎稱國安法後很小心-知道提制裁可囚終身">黎稱國安法後「很小心」 知道提制裁可囚終身</h4> -<p>When it comes to challenges such as terrorism, instability, and the migration crisis affecting Europe, NATO is not and should not be the first responder. National authorities, the European Union, and ad hoc coalitions should lead the way. Maritime, humanitarian, and low-intensity counterterrorism issues are indeed particularly promising scenarios for NATO-EU cooperation. Practical and effective collaborative strategies already exist, as demonstrated by the support provided by NATO’s Operation Sea Guardian to the European Union’s Operation Sophia, which aims to disrupt criminal networks of smugglers and traffickers operating in the Mediterranean. However, several other crises in the area have not been addressed through NATO-EU cooperation, exemplified by the current situation in Libya.</p> +<p>辯方提到，黎在2020年6月接受史丹福大學胡佛研究所（Hoover Institution）訪問時，稱美國應該在香港絕望之前便制裁和懲罰中國，問黎在國安法實施之後，有否提倡相關主張？黎表示沒有再想過，但是強調他必定會知道提出制裁是犯法，「我對此很小心。」辯方問黎知不知道這是可以懲罰的罪行？黎表示：「可以是終身（監禁）。」</p> -<p>Planning for the long term in a manner that builds on the alliance’s strengths and is sustainable over time is thus an urgent need — even if this amounts to a relatively modest effort.</p> +<h4 id="黎受訪稱以一種不同的方式抗爭-否認意指非法手段">黎受訪稱以「一種不同的方式」抗爭 否認意指非法手段</h4> -<h3 id="national-interests">National Interests</h3> +<p>2020年7月2日美聯社刊出黎智英的專訪。黎向記者稱：「我的希望持續了很久，塑造了今天的我。」（The hope I had (in Hong Kong) lasted for a long time, it made me who I am today）。黎確認說過這句話。</p> -<p>In an increasingly unstable international environment in which a Global South is ascending regardless of Western diplomatic pressure, organizations such as the European Union and NATO are limited in their ability to influence countries beyond the West on security and defense issues. But in the Sahel, there is perhaps still room for them. In the Sahel in particular, governments have traditionally given more importance to relations and cooperation with states, such as France, Italy, and Spain, than relations with multilateral organizations.</p> +<p>報導引述黎稱會繼續為民主抗爭，但是現在要以「一種不同的方式」進行（Lai said he will continue fighting for democracy, but it will now have to be in a “very different way.”）。黎確認他曾說過「為民主抗爭」。</p> -<h4 id="france">France</h4> +<p>辯方又問，「一種不同的方式」是什麼意思。黎指：「我意思是這會不同，有新的法律，所以我們的行動應該改變，我們的態度應該改變。」辯方追問有什麼不同。黎說當日只是國安法生效第二日，僅說會十分不同，但他提到：「我還未放棄為民主抗爭，但是這將會是十分不同，所以我們才需要改變。」辯方問黎是否意指使用非法手段抗爭？黎說：「不是，所以我才會說不同。」</p> -<p>The current wave of postcolonial African — and, specifically, Sahelian — unease with France may have originated in 2014, when France launched Operation Barkhane to fight jihadism in several countries in the region, starting with Mali. The operation lasted eight years, and although it achieved military successes on the ground, it prevented the collapse of Mali’s government and territorial integrity against a jihadist threat coming mainly from the north of the country. Its continued presence also created resentment and a focal point for growing public discontent with France. A wave of pan-Africanism, centered on anti-Westernism, has been on the rise, mobilizing sectors of the military and political elites in the Sahel countries and highlighting anti-French sentiment as a lever to seize power.</p> +<h4 id="黎受訪稱不會離開-不但令自己蒙羞也使蘋果失信於人">黎受訪稱不會離開 「不但令自己蒙羞，也使《蘋果》失信於人」</h4> -<p>More than any other country, France has been exposed in Africa because of its military footprint and its adoption of measures perceived as neocolonial. It is the only former colonial power with a wide range of bases from Senegal to Djibouti, via Gabon, the Ivory Coast, and Chad. Since the independence of these countries, Paris has carried out more than 50 military operations or interventions on the continent. However, given the size of the region, its objectives were too ambitious for such a small military force, and this military solution was only a “band-aid” that failed to address the structural weaknesses of regional states. Seen from this perspective, France is reaping the consequences of its interventionism in Africa and its failure to successfully curb terrorism.</p> +<p>美聯社報導引述黎稱：「我要視乎有多少人留在抗爭陣營中」，補充指很多人會被新法律嚇怕。（“We will have to see how many of us are left in the fighting camp,” he said, adding that many will be frightened away by the new law.）黎稱：「我們要站起來，成為運動團結的支柱，以及香港公義的氣節。」（“We will have to stand up and be the backbone of the movement’s integrity, and the integrity of Hong Kong’s justice,” he said.）</p> -<p>Hence, when powers like Russia, with no colonial history in the region, offered aid in fighting jihadism, they were welcomed, even if they were financed by appropriating part of the natural wealth of the Sahel countries. This is what French president Emmanuel Macron described as “the baroque alliance of the pseudo-Pan-Africanists and the new imperialists.” Reflecting on the above mistakes, Macron has expressed the desire to develop a relationship with Sahelian states “without paternalism or weaknesses,” warning that the recent string of coups in the region entails “a risk of weakening the West and especially Europe.” That is why Paris bet on Niger — but the partnership has not worked out.</p> +<p>黎解釋，上述說話意思是留下來抗爭的人，會成為運動團結的支柱，而「運動團結的支柱」（backbone of the movement’s integrity）是指未有放棄的人。</p> -<p>France, however, will likely continue to have a military and diplomatic presence in Africa because it has (primarily geostrategic) interests to preserve. Moreover, France signed the Quirinale Treaty with Italy in 2021, which reflects a will to bet on reinforced bilateral cooperation, the effects of which have begun to be visible in the Sahel. It should be noted that this cooperation does not apply to North Africa, a region in which Rome and Paris have each developed deep ties with local elites, even if this has involved engaging in a struggle for influence that has benefited certain oligarchies.</p> +<p>報導指黎拒絕闡述民主運動會怎樣繼續，只說需要討論如何前進。（Lai declined to elaborate on how the pro-democracy movement will continue, saying that discussions are needed on how to move forward.）辯方問黎跟誰人討論，黎說那些留下來抗爭的人。</p> -<h4 id="italy">Italy</h4> +<p>報導引述黎說：「我不能（離開），如果我離開，不但令自己蒙羞，也使《蘋果》失信於人，我會削弱民主運動的團結⋯⋯有些事情我一定要負責任。」（“I cannot (leave). If I leave, not only do I disgrace myself, I’d discredit Apple Daily, I’d undermine the solidarity of the democratic movement,” he said. “It’s something I have to take responsibility for.”）</p> -<p>Italy is another major European player in the Sahel, with a strategy reflecting a “return” to Africa. The focus on the Sahel fits into a more general reorientation of Italian foreign policy — in line with its European partners — manifested by an increase in diplomatic activities, including the opening of new embassies, and an involvement in bilateral military operations and European cooperation.</p> +<p>黎在庭上確認曾說上述言論。辯方指黎當時因為刑事恐嚇案的保釋條件而不能離開香港，並且曾向高院申請離港，但是被拒絕，辯方呈上相關判決理由。黎確認自己不能離開香港，並提到「任何其他方式也不行。」在辯方追問下，黎進一步解釋：「我是說我不能夠離開香港，但是如果我想離開香港，我總有方法⋯⋯你知道，一些非法途徑⋯⋯」黎最後同意他並沒有意圖如此做。</p> -<p>Niger has so far been the clearest representation of Italy’s new activities in the area, mainly because of its position as a transit country for migratory flows from sub-Saharan Africa. In its bilateral engagement, for example, Italy reinforced the contingent of its project MISIN (Missione Italiana di Supporto in Niger), which has been present in the country since 2018. Italy has also increased its support of European initiatives in the region, for instance by holding key positions on the ground during European missions and by appointing Emanuela del Re as EU high representative for the Sahel.</p> +<h4 id="李兆富請辭8小時之後-黎稱李會繼續管理-twitter-帳戶">李兆富請辭8小時之後 黎稱李會繼續管理 Twitter 帳戶</h4> -<p>However, Italy’s engagement with the Sahel is not without attention to the political and security dynamics of North African countries. The links between the protracted conflict in Libya and the destabilization of the Sahel have long been a subject of debate in Italy, for example. This has manifested in the widespread adoption of the “wider Mediterranean” — an area of interest encompassing countries from West Africa to the Horn of Africa, including the Sahel — into Italian policy. At the European level, Italian engagement is also reflected in the recent creation of the “One Desert Initiative” committee, with Italy as the interlocutor between the European Union, Libya, and the Sahel. Thus, Italy’s new involvement in the Sahel, built through new bilateral proposals and greater leadership within European initiatives, also represents an important search for legitimacy, not only with African partners but also with European ones.</p> +<p>辯方指，2020年7月1日上午約11時，即李兆富提出請辭約8小時之後，Mark Simon 向黎發送訊息：「我正跟他（李兆富）溝通。我會盡我所能協助他。（I’m communicating with him now. I will do all I can for him.）」黎回覆：「他現在起將會繼續管理我的Twitter 。如果他返回美國，他可以在那裡替我管理帳戶，所以不需要找其他人了。（He’s going to continue to manage my Twitter for now. If he goes back to US he can manage it there for me. So no need to find someone else now.）」Mark Simon 指：「他（李）說他會做 Twitter 多幾星期，他將於7月8日返回美國，但他在當地可以繼續做一段時間。我告訴他只要留在美國便應該沒有問題，如果有人問起，我們會說他已沒有做。」</p> -<p>The latest impulse has been the presentation of the “Piano Mattei per l’Africa” initiative as a new model for Italy’s cooperation with the continent and, in particular, with the Sahel. It consists of three pillars: immigration control, regional development with investment in various productive sectors, and cooperation in the field of energy. It was presented at the Italy-Africa Summit organized by the government in January 2024 as the inaugural event of its upcoming presidency of the G7. However, it was precisely the Sahel countries that decided not to participate in the summit.</p> +<p>辯方另展示黎與李之間的訊息，李提出請辭之後，黎依然繼續傳送新聞及資料給李。而黎的Twitter帳戶在7月1日仍有發布帖文。黎稱帖文是出自李的手筆。</p> -<p>Given Italy’s ambitions and efforts in the Sahel, NATO’s decision to choose the Spanish Colomina as representative of the southern neighborhood was very badly received by the Meloni government, which sent a letter of protest to Secretary General Stoltenberg. But Italy has not given up the game and will resume efforts to push for an Italian candidacy for the post with the new NATO secretary general, Mark Rutte.</p> +<p>辯方問，黎收到李的請辭之後，有改變主意嗎？黎指李身在美國，若他在當地管理帳戶，會使他較心安。辯方指訊息使用「返回美國」字眼，是否代表李來自美國？黎同意，並指李在美國有個家庭。黎提到李在國安法生效之前已離開香港，惟法官李運騰引述 Mark Simon 的訊息提及李「將於7月8日返回美國」。辯方則表示會要求控方作進一步披露，關於李的出境紀錄。</p> -<h4 id="spain">Spain</h4> +<p>李官又問及，李是否本案「串謀者」之一？控方確認，指李是「串謀發布煽動刊物」及「串謀勾結外國勢力」兩罪的串謀者。</p> -<p>Spain could become a leading force on behalf of Europe in the Sahel. In fact, some international actors have spurred Spain on to play a larger role and increase cooperation in the region. In October 2023, Spain and the United States inaugurated the first meeting of the U.S.-Spain Working Group on the Sahel, which highlights the urgency of addressing the critical situation in the region and the role that Spain could play.</p> +<h4 id="黎指國安法不透明不清楚紅線">黎指國安法不透明、不清楚紅線</h4> -<p>Madrid has consistently promoted and defended the need to devote more attention to the Mediterranean and surrounding areas, promoting cooperation frameworks and building trust between partners. But Spain’s main priority and concern is the Maghreb and, in particular, the spiral of tension between Morocco and Algeria, both fundamental countries with which Spain works bilaterally.</p> +<p>控方指，黎智英在2020年7月1日接受《霍士新聞》（Fox News）訪問，並庭上播放相關片段。黎表示會留在香港直至最後一刻，「不，我不能離開，如果我離開，我令自己蒙羞，我令《蘋果日報》名譽受損，我也損害民主運動的團結。（“I can’t go away, if I go away, I disgrace myself, I discredit Apple Daily, I also undermine the solidarity of the democratic movement.”）」主持人指他曾被捕數次，所涉罪名或能判終身監禁。黎回應稱不知道將會發生什麼事，「但當政府不尊重法律，你不會知道紅線在哪。」他又批評政府不理會人民，既然不知道紅線在哪，便不會予以理會。</p> -<p>Spain is the only EU member state that has been in every civilian and military mission deployed in Africa since 2003. In some missions, such as EUTM-Mali, Spanish soldiers have accounted for nearly 60 percent of the total number of troops deployed. Spain has also played an important role in two international coalitions for the region: the Coalition for the Sahel, which has addressed security, governance, and development issues, and the Alliance for the Sahel, whose assembly it chaired for three years until July 2023.</p> +<p>辯方引述黎稱「你不會知道紅線在哪」，黎確認並指「國安法下沒有紅線，它是非常不透明（opaque）。」辯方指，黎既已知道國安法之下請求制裁是超越「紅線」，那麼他口中的「紅線」是指什麼呢？黎僅指，就國安法而言，真的不知道什麼會是犯法。</p> -<p>However, unlike other major countries such as France, Germany, Italy, or Poland, Spain does not have a summit at the political level that reinforces its role with the African continent — beyond bilateral meetings or other bodies such as the G5 Sahel — despite the fact that Spain is the only European country that maintains a land border with Africa.</p> +<p>案件下星期一（9日）續審。</p> -<p>Therefore, despite having shown initiative and sometimes leadership capacity in this part of the planet and despite having supported the French and international military presence there, Spain has not managed to establish itself as a leading military actor in the Sahel. It was reluctant to extend the support provided by its armed forces to the Barkhane operation beyond logistical support, and it was absent from the Takuba special force entirely. And yet, the image of Spain’s presence in this region is generally positive — mainly because it has not played a colonial role in it.</p> +<hr /> -<p>For the last 15 years, Spain has done invaluable work for the improvement of West Africa and the Sahel, strengthening the capabilities of some countries in the region and strengthening international cooperation. It has done so in multiple areas and initiatives, establishing its own format in its relations with countries such as Mauritania. However, in recent years it has been unable to expand its role in parallel with the new needs that have arisen. This has meant that other European countries, such as Germany or Denmark — with fewer direct interests and less influence in the region — have filled the void left by Spain.</p> +<p>案件編號：HCCC51/2022</p>獨媒報導黎智英曾草擬公開信 預計國安法生效、一旦入獄後發布【黎智英案・審訊第 103 日】2024-12-05T12:00:00+08:002024-12-05T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/trial-of-jimmy-lai-day-103<ul> + <li>黎智英：不想籲員工「抗爭到底」因「他們的人生比《蘋果日報》更加重要」</li> +</ul> -<p>The good news is that Spain does not want to leave the Sahel behind. In addition to the aforementioned bilateral cooperation with the United States, Spain launched a series of new projects in Mauritania in 2024 with the support of the European Union. These include the development of green hydrogen and a broader strengthening of the partnership between Mauritania and the European Union, which will also serve as an engine for the stability of the Sahel.</p> +<excerpt /> -<h3 id="conclusion">Conclusion</h3> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/sn4x0wN.png" alt="iamge01" /></p> -<p>The challenges emanating from the Sahel are growing more complex, and international attention devoted to the region has risen exponentially. European states must reflect on their existing policies, which are often inadequately adapted to local challenges, and move beyond an agenda focused primarily on containing threats instead of on addressing structural problems. Given the complexity of the current situation — the entire security architecture built over the last decade that was contingent on external support having collapsed in the last year — a reset in relations between Europe and the Sahel is direly needed.</p> +<p>【獨媒報導】壹傳媒創辦人黎智英及3間蘋果公司被控串謀勾結外國勢力及串謀刊印煽動刊物等罪，今（5日）於高院（移師西九龍法院）踏入第103日審訊，黎智英第11日作供。辯方提問圍繞《國安法》生效前黎的意圖，提到2020年6月18日，黎在《蘋果日報》25週年慶祝活動中向員工發言：「無人會迫到你哋做烈士」，籲員工：「攞住對自己嘅良知，攞住對社會嘅良知去做。」當辯方問黎有否籲員工去「抗爭到底」時，黎表示：「我沒有如此說過⋯⋯而且我不想這樣做⋯⋯因為他們的人生比《蘋果日報》更加重要。」</p> -<p>A new geopolitical framework is emerging in the region where Europe and the West increasingly seem out of place. This situation seems to be leading southern European countries, mainly France, Italy, and Spain, to review their policies toward the region while prioritizing bilateral efforts ahead of multilateral ones.</p> +<h4 id="黎否認文章引起憎恨-稱僅陳述事實">黎否認文章引起憎恨 稱僅陳述事實</h4> -<p>This approach is a mistake, given the complexity of the challenges emanating from the Sahel. A better solution would be for these countries to set aside rivalry among themselves and coordinate to address the challenges emanating from the Sahel. France, Italy, and Spain are well known in the region and can work together to coordinate agendas, particularly as all have the tacit support of the European Union and NATO. At the same time, both the European Union and NATO could take advantage of the potential coordinated effort of these three countries to harmonize their strategies toward the region, thus reducing intra-European power struggles and increasing efficiency.</p> +<p>辯方展示黎的專欄「成敗樂一笑」文章，於2020年6月15日刊登的〈窒息中的香港人 逃亡還是抗爭〉。當中稱「國安法不僅把香港變成沒有自由法治的一般大陸城市，甚至會是新疆一樣恐怖籠罩下的集中營，怎不令香港人害怕」，辯方問黎當時是否已知道《國安法》內容？黎則估計說法只是基於坊間的傳言，因當時有很多有關《國安法》的報導和意見，所有人都關注。</p> -<p>France, Italy, and Spain should also coordinate with the United States, which remains concerned about instability in the Sahel. Given the mediocre results of EU and NATO efforts in the region, the United States has recently been trying to approach southern European countries individually to find effective solutions to specific countries and challenges. With the assistance of NATO’s new southern neighborhood representative, it is time for Paris, Rome, and Madrid to engage in coordinated talks with Washington to try to find new solutions for the Sahel, again leaving aside the perceived competition between them.</p> +<p>辯方引述控方指控稱，黎在文章將英國稱呼為「前宗主國」，是意圖引起市民對政府的憎恨。黎隨即指這是事實。辯方重申這是控方的指控，問黎為何如此寫。黎指因為美國取消了香港特殊地位之後，英國履行了前宗主國的責任，賦予300萬名持有BNO護照的香港人赴英定居的權利。</p> -<hr /> +<p>辯方問黎，有否在文章中間接地請求外國制裁，黎否認，重申他只是陳述事實。辯方又指，黎在文章形容「無恥無信的政權」。黎稱是指中國政權，但他否認有意引起市民對中國政府憎恨，「我只是陳述事實⋯⋯《基本法》賦予我們的已化為烏有。」</p> -<p><strong>Carlota G. Encina</strong> is a non-resident senior associate with the Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.; a senior analyst for the United States and transatlantic relations at the Elcano Royal Institute, a Spanish think tank; and a lecturer in international relations.</p>Carlota G. EncinaWidespread instability and the growing influence of China and Russia has increased the strategic importance of the Sahel to European security. A reset in relations between Europe and the region is direly needed.【黎智英案・審訊第 99 日】2024-11-29T12:00:00+08:002024-11-29T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/trial-of-jimmy-lai-day-99<ul> - <li>黎智英明言希望美國推制裁 以阻止國安法 惟稱僅願望未必發生</li> -</ul> +<p>辯方續指文章指稱「我們的教育制度變成了洗腦機器」，問黎有何根據？黎則稱他在文章中已說明了根據，又提到現在所有教科書，甚至圖書館的書，均受到審查。辯方提醒黎只需集中在2020年6月的情況。黎解釋，當時所有事來得非常迫切，而他有權提出相關例子。</p> -<excerpt /> +<p>辯方指，黎在文章中提及自己被控刑事恐嚇的案件，遭控方要求禁止出境，稱：「誰會在國安風頭火勢之下承受政治風險？我們律政司司長鄭若驊不是斬釘截鐵地說，國安法不設追溯期，是大話連篇嗎？」黎庭上稱這是他的個人意見，並無意引起對司法機關的憎恨。辯方大律師關文渭提到處理該案的法官為法官李運騰。李官隨即否認，並指刑事恐嚇案是裁判法院的案件，並非由他處理，更提到自己曾在高院批出黎的保釋。</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/YKRDME2.png" alt="iamge01" /></p> +<p>辯方問黎有否在這裡意圖引起憎恨？黎稱沒有意圖引起市民憎恨司法機關，他只是陳述《國安法》所帶來的政治壓力，「而且我的案件很具政治性，沒有人想承受風險。」法官杜麗冰表示不明白，文章提到的案件是關於刑事恐嚇而非政治。黎解釋：「因為我本人已具政治性，不是我的案件。⋯⋯你知道，別人以政治的目光看待我⋯⋯」</p> -<p>【獨媒報導】壹傳媒創辦人黎智英及3間蘋果公司被控串謀勾結外國勢力及串謀刊印煽動刊物等罪，今（29日）於高院（移師西九龍法院）踏入第99日審訊，黎智英第七日作供。2020年5月28日，即有新聞報導人大準備推行港版國安法的時候，黎向同案被告陳梓華傳送訊息：「更多嚴苛的制裁將出自特朗普，希望是今個週末。」黎稱在訊息表達個人願望而非事實，並認為若美國推行制裁，中國會重新考慮是否推行國安法，但他不認為必然發生，只是一個願望。在法官提問下，黎同意希望制裁措施出台，因時間緊迫，希望制裁愈早出台愈好。</p> +<p>在法官李素蘭追問下，黎表示他的想法並非憑空出現，當時閱讀不同文章和報導，有相關印象，而他是基於這些印象來撰寫文章。</p> -<p>另外，陳梓華曾指稱黎動用了大量人脈以及媒體資源去協助初選舉行，「我諗我係少數人知道當初初選一直以嚟構思嘅係黎智英。」但當辯方問黎在訊息中為何會形容初選為「奇蹟」，黎卻似乎混淆初選和區議會選舉，兩度回答因為「大勝」。黎亦堅稱從沒有與陳討論過初選的事宜，並不關注事態發展。</p> +<h4 id="黎稱對攬炒巴不感興趣-沒留意其與國際線有關">黎稱對攬炒巴不感興趣 沒留意其與國際線有關</h4> -<h4 id="黎否認在會議提及初選-指攬炒巴居英不可能參選">黎否認在會議提及初選 指攬炒巴居英不可能參選</h4> +<p>辯方展示2020年6月15日《蘋果》「隔牆有耳」欄目，題為〈中共威脅全球民主自由 攬炒巴加入國際聯軍反抗〉，其時是黎在壹傳媒大樓會見陳梓華的前一日。黎同意可能從報導標題得知「攬炒巴」劉祖廸加入國際線。辯方問黎在2020年6月的時候，有否留意到一個叫 IPAC 的組織？黎否認，重申在法庭上才首次聽聞 IPAC。</p> -<p>在辯方大律師關文渭的主問下，繼續圍繞同案另一被告陳梓華的證供，牽涉「串謀勾結外國勢力」控罪。</p> +<p>辯方問「重光團隊」（Stand with Hong Kong，簡稱 SWHK）又有否聽過？黎亦說沒有聽過，即使他可能曾聽過，但是沒有印象。法官杜麗冰追問，黎剛才說有聽過 SWHK 嗎？黎解釋，因為李兆富替 Twitter 帖文加上的標籤（hashtag）含有「Stand with Hong Kong」，但他未有留意或對此留下印象。</p> -<p>2020年1月11日，黎智英在台灣陽明山別墅，與陳梓華、「攬炒巴」劉祖廸和一名女子見面及交談。陳梓華早前指稱，黎在會上談及初選，並問劉祖廸會否嘗試參選，又表示「佢（黎）本人會幫啲政治素人，去幫佢哋做傳媒曝光，同埋經濟上支持佢哋，只要佢哋肯去參選。」</p> +<p>辯方另展示2020年10月24日的《蘋果》報導〈遊行被圍捕險洩身份 攬炒巴死裏逃生 帶署歷警暴 拒保後返英〉。辯方問黎，在2020年1月台灣陽明山會見「攬炒巴」劉祖廸的時候，是否知道劉某程度上與國際線有關？黎則稱當時未有太留意這個人，沒有深入想過。黎亦稱只曾瞥一眼上述報導。</p> -<p>黎則稱他不可能問劉會否參選立法會，因劉當時居於英國倫敦。法官李素蘭問，黎如何得知劉居於倫敦？黎引述劉在會面時表示在倫敦工作，工作性質與梁振英一樣，都是從事測量行業。</p> +<blockquote> + <p>Enjoyed spending time with @lukedepulford. Keep fighting together🔥 https://t.co/lFmXqHrkm4 — Finn Lau 劉祖廸 (@finnlau_cd) October 11, 2020</p> +</blockquote> -<p>法官杜麗冰問，若然劉居於倫敦，而不是在香港，黎又如何期望劉去影響勇武派？黎則表示，他不是叫劉去領導勇武派，而是叫他游說勇武派，因劉擁有很大的影響力。</p> +<p>法官李運騰追問，黎認為國際線是重要，而這些報導是關於國際線，黎不會有興趣看看報導內容是什麼嗎？黎稱自己讀到報導時僅留意劉一個人，多於國際線，又稱自己對劉從不感興趣，除了籲他運用影響力平息勇武派暴力之外。</p> -<p>法官李運騰問，黎到底是想劉做勇武派的領袖、還是意見領袖（KOL）？黎則指，運動無領袖導致了街頭暴力不受控制，因此認為需要有一個領袖團隊。在追問下，黎稱劉在「連登」很有影響力，猶如一個「精神領袖」，而他只是請求劉運用其影響力去令勇武派平息暴力。他又指自己從不瀏覽「連登」，只是從報紙上得知「連登」。</p> +<p>法官李素蘭一度問黎是否認識報導中顯示的外國政治人物，當中包括被指稱為「共謀者」的時任日本議員菅野志櫻里。黎則稱不認識任何一人。</p> -<p>有關陳引述黎稱會資助政治素人參與初選，辯方問黎有否在會議上談及初選。黎否認，並稱從沒觸及這個話題。</p> +<h4 id="黎稱不一定會如期實施-其後說倘國安法實施香港會死">黎稱「不一定會如期實施」 其後說倘國安法實施香港會死</h4> -<p>黎又指，在該次會面之後，便沒有再與劉聯絡過，包括親身會面和透過電子通訊。</p> +<p>2020年6月18日，張劍虹向黎傳送新華社的網站文章，當中指《港區國安法》對四類危害國家安全的犯罪行為和刑事責任作出明確決定，包括分裂國家、顛覆國家政權、恐怖活動和勾結外國勢力危害國家安全。黎回覆：「是的，沒新意。現在是通過時間而已」，又表示：「我看不一定會如期實施。」</p> -<h4 id="陳梓華稱向黎匯報李宇軒劉祖廸同意支持國際線-黎否認">陳梓華稱向黎匯報李宇軒劉祖廸同意支持國際線 黎否認</h4> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/l5wRVAL.png" alt="iamge02" /> +▲ 前《蘋果日報》社長 張劍虹</p> -<p>陳梓華供稱，陽明山會議翌日，他與已故台灣民運人士施明德見面，當晚在酒店與劉祖廸跟李宇軒進行線上會議，將會見黎智英的內容告知李。陳續稱，線上會議結束之後，他透過WhatsApp Call 聯絡黎，陳告訴黎：「Andy（李宇軒）同劉祖廸都同意喺國際線上面跟隨你嘅行動。」</p> +<p>黎庭上解釋，雖然當時《國安法》條文未公開，之所以說「沒新意」，是因為從當時的報導和傳言，對於《國安法》有粗略理解。至於「我看不一定會如期實施」，黎則表示是一廂情願（wishful thinking）。</p> -<p>黎今稱，他不知道有這個線上會議，也沒有參與。對於陳稱曾向黎匯報李宇軒和劉祖廸均同意支持國際線，黎否認有此對話，因他當時不知道李宇軒，直至閱讀新聞和在庭上才知道這個人。</p> +<p>辯方指同日，黎向李兆富傳送訊息，指香港立《國安法》後，是否取消特殊地位也沒有分別。黎庭上解釋，因為《國安法》實施之後，香港便會「死掉」，當時是回應李兆富的訊息。</p> -<h4 id="黎智英否認出面調停美國線爭拗">黎智英否認出面調停美國線爭拗</h4> +<p>同日，黎的 Twitter 帳戶發布帖文：「Whether or not the world imposes sanctions on #China and revocation of #HK’s special status as an autonomous region depends on the objective standard, ie if the #NSL is imposed, #1C2S is dead and it leaves the world with no other options.」黎稱帖文乃由李兆富撰寫，他亦不知道「1C2S」是什麼意思。</p> -<p>陳供稱，他在2020年1月底再次聯絡黎，告知黎，劉祖廸「唔想打議會線，但係喺國際線上面，就會全力開火。」惟黎則表示，不認為這次通話曾存在，因為劉是否在國際線上，從不是自己所關注的事項。</p> +<p>辯方指，黎曾向張劍虹稱「我看不一定會如期實施」，兩日前黎亦曾向陳梓華說《國安法》不會太嚴厲，為何現在又說若通過《國安法》香港會死掉？黎則解釋，根據李兆富的訊息，顯示立法程序會繼續，說話背景已經完全不同。</p> -<p>陳另供稱，他在通話中向黎提及「當時有條日本線，就係李宇軒打嘅」。黎則反駁，他從沒聽聞過李宇軒或任何關於日本的事情。</p> +<h4 id="黎向員工稱無人會迫到你哋做烈士-否認籲員工戰鬥">黎向員工稱「無人會迫到你哋做烈士」 否認籲員工戰鬥</h4> -<p>陳亦稱，當時美國線由劉祖廸、李宇軒和Shirley Ho帶頭，但他們與當地的港人組織「有啲拗撬」，所以希望黎智英出面調停，而黎則叫陳聯絡Mark Simon。</p> +<p>辯方指2020年6月18日，壹傳媒大樓舉辦《蘋果日報》25週年慶祝活動，並在庭上當日影片，黎智英身旁是張劍虹和前動新聞平台總監張志偉。黎向一眾員工發言稱：「都未曾試過風調雨順㗎。一係就話我哋血腥八卦，一係就呢個封殺廣告，一係就畀人攻擊。到依家呢，就《國安法》都嚟埋，都唔知點樣做喇真係。就靠你哋去做喇。」黎表示只要求一件事：「你哋對住《國安法》嘅做法就係，你哋用返你哋對自己嘅責任，對社會嘅責任，對你哋家庭嘅責任去做呢份工作，無人會迫你哋點樣去做，無人會迫到你哋做烈士。」黎籲員工：「攞住對自己嘅良知，攞住對社會嘅良知去做」，而他不會叫員工怎樣去做，又笑說：「《蘋果日報》到今日，做到咁樣樣，係你哋造成嘅，唔關我事㗎吓」，影片傳來笑聲和鼓掌聲。黎笑言：「《國安法》嚟唔關我事」，最後表示欣賞一眾員工付出，寄語大家繼續努力。</p> -<p>辯方問黎知不知道美國線的領袖是劉祖廸、李宇軒和Shirley Ho。黎則否認，並稱從沒與陳討論美國線事宜，「所以這必定是他捏造出來。（So this must be a fabrication by him.）」黎亦否認陳希望他出面調停，反問：「我不認識他們（美國線）任何一個，又如何出面調停？」他並否認曾叫 Mark Simon 協助調停。</p> +<p>辯方指，黎在2020年6月10日接受《自由亞洲電台》訪問時稱：「每一個人要做自己嘅選擇，但係我哋必然會有好多人選擇留喺度抗爭，而我會同呢啲人一齊抗爭到底。」然而8日之後卻向員工說「無人會迫到你哋做烈士」，兩種說法有沒有矛盾。黎稱沒有矛盾，因他在慶祝活動發言所指的是員工的人生，但他受訪時所談論的是自己的人生，「我沒有理所當然地認為我可以談論他們的人生⋯⋯他們理應為自己的人生去做選擇。」</p> -<h4 id="陳梓華傳送初選消息-黎從沒討論初選沒關注事態發展">陳梓華傳送初選消息 黎：從沒討論初選、沒關注事態發展</h4> +<p>辯方又問黎有否籲員工去「抗爭到底」？黎表示：「我沒有如此說過⋯⋯而且我不想這樣做⋯⋯因為他們的人生比《蘋果日報》更加重要。」</p> -<p>2020年2月26日，陳梓華向黎智英傳送「眾志聯盟」的出選名單，新西派出朱凱廸、新東派出何桂藍、九東派出黃之鋒、梁凱晴做「Plan B」、九西派出張崑陽、港島派出羅冠聰、超區則派出岑敖暉。</p> +<p>辯方問黎，截至2020年6月18日，他與《蘋果》管理層之間，有沒有任何共識去「抗爭到底」？黎否認，並稱從來沒有談論這些。</p> -<p>黎當時回覆陳：「我們要著手處理，如果初選有認受性，他們也必須參與。且看看事態發展如何。（Thanks. We’ve to work on them. But if the primary has legitimacy, they will have to join. Let’s see.）」陳回覆：「我會盡力處理它。（I will try my best to work on it.）」、「至少不會讓他們拖累。（At least not to let them ruin it.）」陳庭上解釋，黎智英當時希望令到眾志聯盟名單上的人士參與初選，以及受到初選的約束。</p> +<p>辯方問黎，是否認為控方會基於《國安法》之前的行為而起訴他。黎不肯定，但自言一直想法樂觀，想著最好的情況。辯方提到《國安法》沒有追溯效力。黎僅回應：「我希望是如此。」</p> -<p>黎則表示，從沒有與陳討論過初選的事宜，自己也從沒接觸上述名單上的人士，或者叫他們參與初選。他稱不認識朱凱廸和何桂藍，但是私下認識黃之鋒和張崑陽，羅冠聰和岑敖暉則是點頭之交。他強調當時不在意初選的事宜。</p> +<h4 id="對談節目稱若特朗普實施制裁將得到美國人民支持-黎否認請求制裁">對談節目稱若特朗普實施制裁將得到美國人民支持 黎否認請求制裁</h4> -<p>辯方問黎知不知道初選在2020年7月的時候舉行，黎稱不知道。有份審理初選47人案的法官李運騰提到，《蘋果日報》當時有大量關於初選的報導，而根據初選案的指控，《蘋果》提供了平台舉行初選論壇。黎則回應，自己沒有關注事件發展，他當然他是知道有初選，但重申沒有與陳討論過。法官李素蘭質疑，陳當時只是突然向黎提起初選（So out of the blue）？黎同意，並指陳可能認為初選重要，所以傳送相關消息給他。</p> +<p>辯方指，黎於2020年6月18日在美國智庫 Acton Institute 節目，與美國神父 Robert Sirico 對談。黎稱經過新冠肺炎疫情之後，西方國家不再信任中國，並以審慎的態度與中國貿易，加上中國經濟變得衰弱，是一個好時機去改變中國。黎指，若然特朗普推行一連串的制裁和懲罰措施，會得到很多美國人民的支持，因為新冠疫情導致很多美國人喪失親友、企業倒閉和蒙受金錢損失等等，他們對於中國憤憤不平，必定會支持制裁中國。</p> -<h4 id="黎直至庭上才知道與李宇軒牽涉同一案件">黎：直至庭上才知道與李宇軒牽涉同一案件</h4> +<p>黎庭上否認在對談中請求美國制裁或懲罰中國，又指他在對談中是舉例說明中國應該給人民言論自由。</p> -<p>辯方指，黎於2020年8月10日首次被拘捕，而在同一天，李宇軒也警方以勾結外國勢力罪拘捕。在數星期之後，李在中國水域被內地當局拘捕。黎表示有看過相關新聞，記得當時並非還柙當中。辯方問黎當時是否知道，李宇軒跟他牽涉同一宗案件。黎則稱不知道，直至在庭上才知道。</p> +<h4 id="黎否認說過若自己被捕美英唔會坐視不理">黎否認說過若自己被捕美英「唔會坐視不理」</h4> -<h4 id="曾轉讓離岸公司予陳梓華-黎否認是推動制裁的報酬">曾轉讓離岸公司予陳梓華 黎否認是推動制裁的「報酬」</h4> +<p>楊清奇早前作供提及在2020年6月黎住所的飯局中，黎向在座人士稱不怕被捕，若果被捕就「更加證明到中國和香港政府對人權嘅打壓」，並相信「美國、英國同歐洲係唔會坐視不理」。楊又引述黎稱只有實施制裁，才能有助改善香港的人權狀況。</p> -<p>陳梓華早前供稱，在2020年1月，Mark Simon將一間在英屬維爾京群島註冊的公司 LACOCK 及一個匯豐銀行本地戶口，轉讓給陳。他後來得悉文件上的簽名屬於黎智英，又稱這是黎智英和 Mark Simon 給他的「報酬（reward）」。</p> +<p>黎在庭上否認說過上述言論，又稱自己不會傲慢自大到說自己被捕的話會引起國際關注。</p> -<p>辯方問黎是否記得 LACOCK，黎稱不知道，他只知道其私人公司「力高顧問有限公司」。</p> +<p>辯方另展示2020年6月20日的 Twitter 帖文：「Although there are more details but it doesn’t come with a deadline. Why the delay? Sanctions and condemnations from all over the world certain create the pressure. There might also be divide within the #CCP holding it back as well.」</p> -<p>LACOCK文件顯示直至2019年11月30日，戶口存款為8萬元，至2020年2月7日，銀行扣除辦理轉讓的200元手續費之後，存款最終為79,800元。</p> +<p>法官李運騰指，帖文所說的東西，似乎與黎智英向張劍虹所表達的「一廂情願」一致，但是似乎與李兆富的訊息、稱《國安法》進程繼續的說法有矛盾，然而李兆富撰寫帖文的時候，是否巧合地與黎的想法一致？黎則指，可能李了解他的想法，所以如此撰寫帖文。</p> -<p>黎稱，相信是因為當時陳梓華向 Mark Simon 投訴無法開設銀行戶口，所以便轉讓了這間離岸公司及銀行戶口給陳。辯方隨即指，轉讓的不只是銀行戶口，還有戶口內的8萬元。黎僅指，「對，這是銀行戶口，當然有款項。」</p> +<p>辯方指，訊息紀錄顯示，李兆富的草擬帖文中並沒有「Sanctions」和「condemnations」的字眼，但是最終發布的帖文卻含有上述字眼，然而根據紀錄，黎在帖文發布翌日下午才回覆同意帖文內容。</p> -<p>辯方追問，可能在黎眼中8萬元並不是大數目，但是就一般香港人而言，8萬元可能是一筆大數目，問黎有否將該8萬元，作為陳請求外國制裁的回報？黎否認，並稱從沒有要求陳請求外國制裁，他只是要求他協助聯絡勇武派，以平息暴力，而該筆錢也不是一個「報酬」。他又指，陳投訴不能開設銀行戶口，而Mark Simon 只是出於好心才會幫助陳。</p> +<h4 id="受訪稱國安法實施是香港的死期-黎稱真誠相信">受訪稱國安法實施是「香港的死期」 黎稱真誠相信</h4> -<p>黎稱，Mark Simon進行轉讓手續之前並未有徵求他的批准，但是他是同意這件事情，因此有在文件上簽名。</p> +<p>辯方指，2020年6月23日，《蘋果》發布報導〈【港版國安法】黎智英接受日本雜誌專訪：國安法實施就是「香港的死期」〉，指黎智英接受日本《FACTA》月刊訪問，引述黎稱「一旦港版國安法正式實施，公平、公義社會瞬間瓦解，當香港變成人治的社會，那就是香港的死期」。</p> -<p>根據控辯雙方承認事實，在2018年4月26日至2020年1月13日之間，黎智英、Mark Simon 和前壹傳媒財務總裁周達權是 LACOCK 銀行戶口的授權簽署人。由2020年1月14日開始，該銀行戶口唯一授權簽署人轉為陳梓華。</p> +<p>辯方指，當時黎尚未有機會看《國安法》內容。黎同意，他解釋其言論只是表達將會發生什麼的概念。黎亦同意報導準確地反映他的想法，而他真誠相信該些想法。</p> -<h4 id="黎轉發美國內部消息予陳-含制裁內容-黎稱只關注暴力升級">黎轉發美國內部消息予陳 含制裁內容 黎稱只關注暴力升級</h4> +<h4 id="twitter帖文稱中共及其傀儡應受罰-黎稱出自李兆富手筆">Twitter帖文稱中共及其傀儡應受罰 黎稱出自李兆富手筆</h4> -<p>2020年4月5日，英國駐港澳前總領事郭明瀚（Jim Cunningham）向黎智英傳送美國政府的內部消息，並要求黎保密。訊息稱美國政府關注示威者日益升級的暴力，包括炸彈（I was told the US is very concerned about new violence from demonstrators, increased threats from bombs/IEDs），若有導致警察或市民死亡的話，便會使美國政府、國會和輿論疏遠運動，內部人士亦認同暴力對反修例運動構成嚴重威脅，既刺激北京亦失去美國政府的支持。</p> +<p>辯方展示黎 Twitter 帳戶於2020年6月23日發布的帖文，他轉發王丹的帖文，並加上評論：「#CCP has a trade war with Americans, legal battle with Canadians, fist fight with Indians, psychological warfare against Taiwanese, and street fight with #HKers. Soon it will exhaust itself to death.」黎否認撰寫帖文，相信是李兆富翻譯王丹的帖文及發表。辯方指對話紀錄顯示，黎和李之間在6月22至23日期間並沒有傳送任何訊息。黎同意，指發布上述帖文是李的主意。</p> -<p>黎其後向陳梓華轉發相關訊息，並叫陳保密。黎庭上解釋，因為他關注示威者日漸升級的暴力，以及警方的暴力，所以轉發訊息給陳。辯方追問，訊息亦含有制裁的內容。黎則稱，他將整段訊息轉發時，不能刪除有關制裁的內容。他稱轉發目的純粹讓陳知道美國關注香港示威暴力升級。</p> +<p>辯方指2020年6月24日，黎的帳戶發布帖文：「#CarrieLam said countries offering #HKers right of abode and proposing sanctions are hypocrites. But the Lams are British nations. Perhaps the #CCP should consider asking the Lams to relinquish their foreign citizenship.」</p> -<p>陳又稱，他很想將美國的內部消息轉發給劉祖廸和李宇軒，於是致電黎徵詢其同意，而黎回覆不要複製貼上（copy and paste），只需把相關消息告知劉祖廸和李宇軒。惟黎否認有相關對話，也不知道李宇軒的Telegram 帳號是「rip」。他亦稱不記得當時有沒有示威者使用炸彈。</p> +<p>辯方另展示黎的帳戶於2020年6月26日發布的五則帖文，分別為：</p> -<h4 id="黎曾嘗試安排陳梓華等人赴台見唐鳳-黎否認與政治有關">黎曾嘗試安排陳梓華等人赴台見唐鳳 黎否認與政治有關</h4> +<blockquote> + <p>「@HawleyMO thank you for #StandingwithHongKong. #CCPChina and its puppets should be punished for violating the rightful freedom of #HKers.」</p> +</blockquote> -<p>辯方指2020年5月，黎智英向陳梓華轉發訊息，顯示黎聯絡台灣《蘋果日報》社長陳裕鑫，嘗試安排「逆權運動年輕人陣營」到台灣，與時任台灣行政院政務委員唐鳳和中華文化協會見面。陳早前供稱，當時SWHK內部討論過發展台灣線，而黎問他們想不想見唐鳳和中華文化協會。</p> +<blockquote> + <p>「When you are forbidden from doing business simply because of your political opinion, it is no longer the free market, the free society we once cherished. This is how #CCP’s influence slowly murdered #HongKong’s autonomy」</p> +</blockquote> -<p>黎則在庭上反駁，不明白為何陳會牽扯到唐鳳的政治立場上，因唐鳳是一名資訊科技天才，而不是一名示威或政治運動的專家。</p> +<blockquote> + <p>「IFJ did a good job to expose #CCPChina’s attempts to whitewash itself from the horrendous human rights violation. The truth will always prevail. @IFJGlobal」(轉載國際記者聯盟的報告 The China Story: Reshaping the World’s Media）</p> +</blockquote> -<p>辯方澄清，從訊息可見，當時是黎問陳想不想見唐鳳。黎則回應，他不會將唐鳳與任何政見或政治的事宜聯繫上，因唐鳳只是一名資訊科技天才。</p> +<blockquote> + <p>「Only terrorists will make such offer. @JustinTrudeau must stand resolutely against #CCP’s bullying. 120 years ago the fanatics of Qing Dynasty did the same thing against foreign nationals in China. It was the beginning of the end of the absolute monarchy.」</p> +</blockquote> -<p>黎又提到，唐鳳在疫情期間編寫了一個程式，用來追蹤病毒走勢，以保護市民免受病毒感染，令其非常受歡迎，形容唐鳳是一個傳奇。法官李運騰問黎，但是陳並不是對病毒有興趣。黎則表示不知道，僅指可能陳想與傳奇人物見面。</p> +<blockquote> + <p>「#CCP thinks Australia is dependent on China and the disease is keeping everyone busy. No. The world is beginning to decouple from this opaque and corrupt regime by shifting the global supply chain.」</p> +</blockquote> -<p>至於中華文化協會，黎指它不是一個政府機構，只是一個關於藝術和文化的組織，沒有牽涉香港的事務。黎相信陳後來未有成行，因為疫情期間的隔離政策。</p> +<p>黎表示，雖然帖文所述與他當時的想法一致，但是行文方式並不像他，相信是出自李的手筆。被問到「decouple」的意思，黎指即是「切斷連繫」和「切割」的意思。</p> -<h4 id="黎稱沒想過自己會觸犯國安法-堅持留在香港面對">黎稱沒想過自己會觸犯國安法 堅持留在香港面對</h4> +<h4 id="黎即使自己是特別個案也不理-這是頂天立地的時候">黎即使自己是特別個案也不理 「這是頂天立地的時候」</h4> -<p>辯方指2020年5月21日，黎智英向陳梓華傳送人大公布實施「港版國安法」的報導，並說：「仆街打到嚟喇！」陳回覆黎：「黎前輩：事情至今，已經難以逆轉形勢，我唯一擔心是你與Martin及你們家人的自身安全，萬事請以自身安全與事業存續為首要考慮。國安法主要針對境外內勇武人士，港獨份子及煽惑群眾人士。你務必謹慎。」</p> +<p>辯方展示黎與張劍虹之間於2020年6月28日的訊息對話，二人談及黎未能出境赴台灣，張劍虹指待黎在8月官司結束之後，便可以出境。張劍虹提到：「消息至今仍然是沒有追溯期」，黎說：「就是我是特別個案，我也不理了，這是頂天立地的時候，其他不重要了」，張說：「上帝會保守老闆你的，每天都為你祈禱」，黎說：「謝謝，我亦相信上主會幫我，所以我無憂無慮，一往直前。」</p> -<p>辯方問，黎為何認為國安法會影響到陳？黎稱因為陳是示威者之一。法官李運騰指陳的訊息提及「國安法主要針對境外內勇武人士，港獨份子及煽惑群眾人士」，問是否因為陳認為黎會墮入上述三個類別，所以如此說。黎則稱不知道，陳純粹提到這三類人。法官李素蘭問，陳會否認為黎會墮入「煽惑群眾人士」這一類別？黎表示，當時沒有進一步思考訊息的意思，對陳的說話不在意。</p> +<p>辯方問訊息中提到的「個案」是指什麼案件，惟黎表示不記得。辯方遂提醒黎，他涉刑事恐嚇《東方》記者的案件，於2020年9月被裁定罪名不成立。辯方問黎為何說「就是我是特別個案」，為何認為自己的案件特別。黎稱因為自己是在政治範疇的敏感人物。</p> -<p>訊息紀錄顯示，黎其後回覆陳：「我們不要擔心個人安危。一旦站出來爭取自由，便要準備作戰至最後一刻，我們雖然未必會勝利，但必須堅持下去。不用擔心。更好的日子即將來臨（Let’s not worry about personal security. Once came out to join the fight for freedom one is prepared to fight to the last. We may not win but must persist. Don’t worry. Better days will come.）。」</p> +<p>辯方指，2020年6月28日黎與 Mark Simon 在訊息中商討線上會議時間，與會者包括張劍虹、時任動新聞總監張志偉和黎私人公司的職員 Lucia。黎稱 Lucia 有份製作網上節目「Live Chat with Jimmy Lai」，並指提議開設節目者另有其人，相信是 Mark Simon 和李兆富。</p> -<p>法官杜麗冰指，當陳梓華提到國安法針對的三類人時，為何會回覆「我們不要擔心個人安危」，若然黎認為自己不會墮入法網，為何當時不回覆：「不用擔心，我不會墮入該三個類別」之類。</p> +<h4 id="黎曾向張劍虹稱金盤洗手不再抗爭無可能">黎曾向張劍虹稱：金盤洗手不再抗爭無可能</h4> -<p>黎則回應：「因為我不會好像你這樣思考」，又說：「你是在把說話塞進我的口。」他表示，當時沒有為意陳所關注的三類人士，他只關注自己和李柱銘及其家人的自身安全。</p> +<p>辯方指2020年6月29日，張劍虹向黎傳送《蘋果》報導〈【港版國安法】葉國謙稱「金盤洗手」不會追究 陳智思警告市民勿越紅線〉，並說：「老闆加油，蘋果加油，香港加油」，黎回覆：「但願如此，但手（金）盤洗手不再抗爭無可能，煮到埋嚟就食，無所謂，謝謝。」</p> -<p>法官李運騰問，黎當時有否擔心自己會觸犯國安法？黎表示沒有想過。李官再問，是否代表國安法生效之後，黎會繼續做他一直在做的事情？黎說：「我會堅持留在香港，和面對它。」</p> +<p>黎庭上解釋，他當時認為香港不可能停止抗爭、不可能放棄，《國安法》亦不是一個終結，不過自己當時過於樂觀。</p> -<p>陳梓華其後回覆黎，說：「我沒有退後的餘地，我亦有責任盡量保留最多的力量。我也不會放棄。如果你們都倒下了，我會是最後一個站著的人。最好的即將來臨（There is no turning back for me and I do have a sense of duty to conserve our forces as much as possible. I won’t give up too. If all of you fall, I will be the last man standing. The best is yet to come.）。」</p> +<p>黎與張的訊息亦提及時事評論員劉細良，黎稱他認識劉，與劉曾經對談約四次，準確次數不記得，話題關於《國安法》實施後會發生什麼事。</p> -<p>黎指從訊息可見，陳打算繼續堅持抗爭，參與在地運動。辯方指訊息提到保留「力量」，黎認為「力量」意思是陳的同儕，包括勇武派和年輕人。</p> +<h4 id="黎否認說服陳繼續戰鬥-強調不會叫他自殺">黎否認說服陳繼續戰鬥 強調不會叫他「自殺」</h4> -<h4 id="黎明言希望美國制裁-以阻止國安法">黎明言希望美國制裁 以阻止國安法</h4> +<p>辯方提及，陳梓華作供期間被法官李運騰問到，陳是否有意干犯《國安法》。陳當時回答：「視乎有咩人喺身邊。」李官接著問陳，是否一旦有其他人同行，便會去干犯《國安法》。陳回答，當他與黎在2020年6月會面時，他感到恐懼，表示想退縮，但是被黎說服了，所以繼續做一直所做的事。</p> -<p>辯方指，黎於2020年5月28日向陳傳送一條連結，惟該連結現已不能開啟，無法知道網站內容是什麼；黎並說：「剛剛見到，特朗普將推出更嚴苛的制裁，希望是今個週末。（Just saw it. More draconian sanctions were coming from Trump, hopefully this weekend）」</p> +<p>辯方問黎有否說服陳繼續？黎堅稱沒有，並自言一直提醒別人謹慎、不要觸犯《國安法》罪行，包括朋友和同事，所以對於關係不太親近的陳，他更加沒有可能說服陳去做相反的事情。黎又形容陳的說法荒謬，強調自己從沒叫他做任何事情，反問：「我會叫他做什麼？難道自殺嗎？」</p> -<p>黎表示，他希望特朗普會盡力阻止國安法通過，透過對中國實施制裁。辯方問黎在訊息中是表達事實還是個人願望。黎稱是願望。辯方問黎為何認為制裁能夠阻止國安法通過。黎則稱這是阻止國安法通過的唯一可能性，因此他才會說這是「願望」。他不認為必然發生，只是一個願望。辯方問，透過制裁來阻止國安法背後的原理是什麼。黎僅指，中國會重新考慮是否推行國安法。</p> +<p>黎並否認叫陳請求外國對中國實施制裁，重申一直以來只叫他跟勇武派溝通以平息暴力。黎亦否認要求陳繼續戰鬥，「這從不是我們之間的話題。」</p> -<p>辯方問，黎在訊息中使用的字眼是「More draconian sanctions」，是否代表此前已經有嚴苛的制裁，而黎希望有「更多」制裁措施？黎則表示，無法得知美國是否會推出更多制裁措施，而美國最後也沒有制裁。但他其後指，「more draconian」意思是「更具毀滅性（more damaging）」。</p> +<p>案件明日續審。</p> -<p>法官李運騰問，黎使用「hopefully」這個字眼，是否代表他希望制裁措施出台？黎同意，又指時間緊迫，有這樣的願望。李官又問，是否代表黎希望制裁愈早出台愈好？黎同意。</p> +<hr /> -<h4 id="陳梓華傳送重光計劃眾籌資料給黎智英">陳梓華傳送「重光計劃」眾籌資料給黎智英</h4> +<p>案件編號：HCCC51/2022</p>獨媒報導黎智英：不想籲員工「抗爭到底」因「他們的人生比《蘋果日報》更加重要」Peace Through Agency2024-12-05T12:00:00+08:002024-12-05T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/peace-through-agency<p><em>With the return of Donald Trump imminent and President Volodymyr Zelensky’s proposal of NATO security guarantees for Ukraine’s unoccupied territories on the table, attention has turned to how peace might be made to end Russia’s invasion.</em></p> -<p>2020年5月28日，陳梓華向黎智英傳送一條「連登」討論區連結，題為「【突發】攬炒過後是晨曦！攬炒團隊《重光香港計劃》眾籌上線！」。陳早前供稱，當時SWHK的資金即將耗盡，決定舉辦眾籌，把連結傳送給黎，是「因為要報告返俾佢知我哋做過啲咩」，並希望黎智英能夠幫手宣傳眾籌計劃。</p> +<excerpt /> -<p>惟黎在庭上稱，相信陳只是純粹讓他知道相關消息，又指從沒與陳談論過渡性貸款的事宜。</p> +<p>Russia’s war in Ukraine is an assault on values and democracy as much as a battle for territory. Whatever President-elect Donald Trump might like to think, the war will not end through territorial concessions, since Vladimir Putin is unlikely to be satisfied only with pieces of Ukraine. And believing that the war is about Ukraine’s attachment to territory alone represents a narrow, somewhat statist view that is out of sync with the country’s contemporary character.</p> -<h4 id="陳梓華赴壹傳媒大樓-黎指陳擔心身份曝光">陳梓華赴壹傳媒大樓 黎指陳擔心身份曝光</h4> +<p>Ukraine has changed in a dramatic way since its independence from the embers of the Soviet Union in 1991, more than 70 years after it first declared its independence with the invasion of the Bolsheviks in late 1917. The next stage in a process of gradually asserting its interests was the Orange Revolution, which delivered a government independent of Russia’s interests in 2004. The revolution of dignity followed 10 years later, leading to the ousting of the pro-Moscow President Viktor Yanukovych and the reinstatement of the 2004 constitution. In 2019, President Petro Poroshenko, who had replaced Yanukovych, was defeated at the polls by Volodymyr Zelensky, and the rest is history.</p> -<p>2020年6月16日，陳梓華到達將軍澳壹傳媒大樓與黎智英會面，該次是第六次見面。陳早前供稱，因為黎希望避開所有傳媒鏡頭，故陳由黎的私人司機接載往壹傳媒大樓，「擔心俾人見到佢同年輕嘅抗爭者有聯繫」。</p> +<p>But what is not history is Ukraine’s attachment to democracy. “Ukrainians have a voice”, says the country’s Nobel peace laureate Oleksandra Matviichuk, “and they won’t accept peace being made without them”. In this way, Ukraine is no different to South Africa, or any other country where peace has stuck – locals require agency, and the best that international actors can do is to uniformly pressure the parties to the table.</p> -<p>辯方問，當日壹傳媒大樓外面有沒有記者？黎笑言：「外面不知道，但裡面有很多。」黎又反駁指，擔心傳媒鏡頭的是陳，所以才會安排私人司機在另一處接載他到大樓，陳亦要求經後門進入大樓而不經正門，並且不想接觸到大樓內的記者。黎又提到過往陳到他的家食飯，陳也會問及如何避開住宅外的記者，擔心身份被曝光。辯方問，當時有否關於陳的新聞報導？黎稱不記得。</p> +<p>Yet a consistent feature of the last Trump and the current Biden administrations in the US is their disregard for the interests of their allies. The US proved, in cutting and running from Afghanistan, that it is just too big and careless to take on board the interests of others.</p> -<h4 id="黎稱會面僅關於劉祖廸在英國受襲一事">黎稱會面僅關於劉祖廸在英國受襲一事</h4> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Believing that the war is about Ukraine’s attachment to territory alone represents a narrow, somewhat statist view that is out of sync with the country’s contemporary character</code></em></strong></p> -<p>黎指，該次會面是因為劉祖廸在英國被人襲擊，故陳想見面討論事件。黎引述陳認為襲擊是中國政府安排的；惟黎跟陳說不是，這不像是中國政府的操作，認為純粹是打劫；陳則不認為是打劫，這是陳來大樓見黎的原因。黎稱，除了劉祖廸受襲事件之外，便沒有其他重要的事情討論過。</p> +<p>From the time of the talks with the Taliban in Qatar (under Trump, which excluded the government of Afghanistan) to the abandonment of Kabul to the Taliban (under Biden), there is a constant thread. Locals don’t have agency, or at least local allies don’t have agency in the face of geopolitical interests.</p> -<p>黎又憶述，當陳提起劉祖廸時，黎說他認為劉不是一個「有效的領袖（effective leader）」，因他的「兄弟姐妹」均在前線對抗警察，可是他卻留在倫敦，然而一名領袖不應該遠離險境。</p> +<p>But cutting and running in this way was not cost-free.</p> -<p>法官李運騰指，黎稱在2020年1月台灣會見劉的時候，沒有打算叫他成為領袖，只是想他運用其影響力，可是到了6月的時候，黎卻說劉不是一個有效的領袖，問為何會突然這樣談論劉。黎肯定是陳首先提起劉，因劉受襲一事，所以陳提起他。</p> +<p>If there is a lesson to be learnt from Afghanistan, it is in the consequences and interconnectedness of foreign policy actions. It is no coincidence that Putin invaded Ukraine (again) in February 2022 just six months after Washington left Kabul in a chaotic and duplicitous manner that could hardly have deterred a watching Moscow.</p> -<h4 id="黎否認說過將蘋果由本地傳媒變成國際傳媒">黎否認說過將《蘋果》由本地傳媒變成國際傳媒</h4> +<p>But let us return to the present, and the prospect of ending what has become a grim war of attrition inexorably grinding up Ukrainian civilians and territory as much as Russian soldiers and equipment.</p> -<p>陳梓華早前供稱，黎在會面期間稱國安法不會太過嚴厲。黎今認為陳的說法正確，因他不認為中國想摧毀香港。</p> +<p>There is a risk, in Matviichuk’s words, that “without security guarantees, Russia will use the peace simply to prepare for the next round of war”. Any peace treaty has to recognise past failures, such as the Budapest Memorandum signed in 1994, which supposedly prevented Russia, the US and the UK from threatening or using military force or economic coercion against Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan, “except in self-defence or otherwise in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations”.</p> -<p>陳供稱，黎指當時《蘋果日報》不斷虧蝕，所以需要商業上的支持；又指黎推行英文版需要大量資金。黎則指自己可能有說過《蘋果》虧蝕，因為當時的確蝕了很多錢，但是英文版需要大量資金的說法不真確，因成本很低，所以才會推行。</p> +<p>As a result, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine gave up their nuclear weapons. Subsequent events have demonstrated that security guarantees are both critical and problematic, since NATO membership – the most useful guarantee against further Russian aggression – is subject to the political whims of Hungary, Slovakia and other governments that will probably, on current form, veto Kyiv’s application.</p> -<p>陳供稱，黎說：「呢個英文版相當於一個國際版，就係俾外國人睇嘅。雖然係蝕錢，但係對於佢嚟講好有價值。」黎則指自己當時不可能說英文版蝕錢，因英文版只推行了兩星期，不可能期望它能夠賺錢。</p> +<p>Moreover, as Matviichuk reminds us, Ukraine will not simply “give up” on its people in the occupied territories in the east and Crimea. “Under occupation means living in a ‘grey zone’”, she says, “without rights, no tools to defend themselves, and meaning a constant fear of torture, rape, murder, disappearance, forced migration to camps. Occupation makes human suffering invisible, but it does not mean that it is not happening”.</p> -<p>陳又稱黎說：「如果《蘋果日報》有英文版嘅話，就可以好直接同埋好快咁俾到一手資訊，去俾外國嘅枱底人睇到，咁佢哋可以作出更加有利黎智英政治理念嘅判斷。」惟黎指陳的證供不是真實，因「枱底人」不是他會使用的詞語，而且英文版是給所有人看的，而非僅僅給「枱底人」看。</p> +<p>Nor is it possible for Ukraine simply to forget these Russian atrocities against civilians. “Only this week Russia launched an Intercontinental Ballistic Missile – or ICBM”, she notes, “against a peaceful civilian city. They have also attacked our energy system, leaving many uncertain how they will survive the winter. But we are still waiting to hear the response, the criticism, of the international community”.</p> -<p>陳又引述黎說，英文版可以令《蘋果》由一個本地傳媒變成國際傳媒，「咁喺國際上面就更加有國際話語權，同埋會有更加多人關注。」惟黎稱自己不可能這樣說，因不可能在英文版推行短短兩星期內，將《蘋果》變成國際媒體。法官李運騰追問黎有否說過相關言論。黎表示當然不記得，但是如果他有說過的話，也只是期望或是抱負，多於談論事實。</p> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">For Ukraine, this war is yet another phase in its people’s long struggle for statehood against Russian imperialism, a commitment to values and agency that they are not likely to willingly trade</code></em></strong></p> -<h4 id="黎否認籲swhk在文宣線和國際線上繼續做-稱做法不負責任">黎否認籲SWHK在文宣線和國際線上「繼續做」 稱做法不負責任</h4> +<p>For the Nobel laureate, peace is not about trading territory, but “about people”, since it is “immoral not to speak about people”. For Ukraine, this war is yet another phase in its people’s long struggle for statehood against Russian imperialism, a commitment to values and agency that they are not likely to willingly trade, or at least certainly not for long.</p> -<p>陳梓華供稱，黎在會面時說：「國安法雷聲大、雨點小」。黎同意，這是他當時的想法。至於陳引述黎稱「會以身作則，會繼續喺唔同嘅媒體上面呼籲制裁同埋關注」，黎則反駁，說出這樣的言論是很荒謬，因他沒提及制裁，他亦一直叫員工小心行事。</p> +<p>As former President Viktor Yushchenko, who led the Orange Revolution in peeling away Russia’s grip on Ukraine 20 years ago, said in an interview with one of the authors, “An integral part of Ukrainian identity is to fight for our freedom and democracy, our own language and culture. This is why Ukrainians will never submit to Moscow’s brutal imperialism and tyranny.”</p> -<p>陳供稱，黎籲他叫 SWHK 其他人在文宣線和國際線上「繼續做」，以及要支持初選。惟黎重申，他從沒與SWHK有交雜，而且呼籲其他人繼續做的話是太不負責任。他亦否認叫陳或SWHK支持初選。</p> +<p>Those trying to cut a deal with Putin cannot expect Kyiv to go along with a version of Taliban redux. Kyiv is, after all, not Kabul, and Ukrainians are not Afghans.</p> -<p>陳又稱，黎問他為何不加入「對華政策跨國議會聯盟」（簡稱 IPAC），「佢（黎）覺得 IPAC 好重要，一定要有呢啲國際支持，先會有用。」惟黎否認，並稱當時不知道IPAC，也不知道「攬炒團隊」，直至在庭上才首次知道這兩個組織。</p> +<hr /> -<p>對於陳指稱黎說可以幫到年青人，「佢（黎）話佢已經同美國嗰邊傾緊」，黎亦否認。黎指會面歷時大約一小時，因為當時非常忙碌，這是他和陳最後一次見面。</p> +<p><strong>Ray Hartley</strong> is the Research Director of the Brenthurst Foundation.</p> -<h4 id="黎訊息指初選是奇蹟-惟庭上混淆區選">黎訊息指初選是奇蹟 惟庭上混淆區選</h4> +<p><strong>Greg Mills</strong> heads the Johannesburg-based Brenthurst Foundation, established in 2005 by the Oppenheimer family to strengthen African economic performance.</p>Ray Hartley and Greg MillsWith the return of Donald Trump imminent and President Volodymyr Zelensky’s proposal of NATO security guarantees for Ukraine’s unoccupied territories on the table, attention has turned to how peace might be made to end Russia’s invasion.【黎智英案・審訊第 102 日】2024-12-04T12:00:00+08:002024-12-04T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/trial-of-jimmy-lai-day-102<ul> + <li>袁弓夷拍片稱示威有人被謀殺強姦 黎智英批常誇大其辭 不予信任</li> +</ul> -<p>辯方指，2020年7月12日初選之後，陳在通訊軟件Signal向黎說，「感謝你為初選所做的一切，這是香港歷史上重要的一頁（Hi Jimmy, thanks for everything on the primary election. It’s remarkable on our HK history.）。」黎回覆：「這是一個奇蹟！（It’s a miracle!）」陳回覆：「毋庸置疑！（No doubt!）」，並問：「你的案件今日順利嗎？（Is your case going well today?）」</p> +<excerpt /> -<p>陳梓華曾指稱黎動用了大量人脈以及媒體資源去協助初選舉行，「我諗我係少數人知道當初初選一直以嚟構思嘅係黎智英。」但當辯方問黎為何會形容初選為「奇蹟」？黎指因為是「大勝（landslide victory）」。辯方問黎是否知道初選是關於什麼。黎稱知道，並重複稱當時「大勝」。法官李運騰指，現在說的是初選，而不是區議會選舉。黎才說，因為所有人都參與其中。</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/dHqhGXB.png" alt="iamge01" /></p> -<hr /> +<p>【獨媒報導】壹傳媒創辦人黎智英及3間蘋果公司被控串謀勾結外國勢力及串謀刊印煽動刊物等罪，今（4日）於高院（移師西九龍法院）踏入第102日審訊，黎智英第十日作供。辯方圍繞黎的意圖提問，當中提及《蘋果》曾發布袁弓夷的影片，袁稱反修例中有人被謀殺和強姦，而黎在 Twitter 轉載影片。不過黎稱經過數次接觸後，認為袁常誇大其辭、又想與他攀關係，感到不舒服故疏遠他。2020年6月11日，袁向黎傳送語音訊息，稱自己翌日會見時任美國國際宗教自由大使 Sam Brownback，打算向對方提出制裁夏寶龍，冀黎協助聯絡天主教香港教區榮休主教陳日君樞機，冀得到陳的支持和寫信。黎當時回覆指樞機答應的機會不大，但可以嘗試聯絡。黎在庭上稱事實上沒有替袁聯絡樞機，「因為我不相信這個人。」</p> -<p>案件編號：HCCC51/2022</p>獨媒報導黎智英明言希望美國推制裁 以阻止國安法 惟稱僅願望未必發生【黎智英案・審訊第 98 日】2024-11-28T12:00:00+08:002024-11-28T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/trial-of-jimmy-lai-day-98<ul> - <li>黎智英否認曾說「推爆個政府」、「國際力量」 稱不知道陳梓華與國際線有關連</li> - <li>黎智英：冀透過制裁推翻中共想法「比荒謬更荒謬」 反指和平示威才是「最強大的游說」</li> -</ul> +<p>此外，辯方播放黎的受訪片段，黎表示自己準備面對「坐監嘅犧牲」，辯方問當黎所做的事變得不合法，還會否繼續？黎說：「不，不是不合法，我只是準備好面對後果。」法官李素蘭追問，黎理應做了非法的事，才會坐監？黎卻表示：「我不覺得我做過違法的事情，但是我在監獄已有四年。」</p> -<excerpt /> +<h4 id="李宇軒稱經陳梓華找到蘋果寫手-jack-hazlewood-借出戶口收眾籌款項">李宇軒稱經陳梓華找到《蘋果》寫手 Jack Hazlewood 借出戶口收眾籌款項</h4> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/resaO5b.png" alt="iamge01" /></p> +<p>李宇軒早前供稱，2019年7月的「中英聯合聲明登報眾籌」，即第二次眾籌，使用了另一個眾籌平台「gofundme.com」，惟後來發現該平台規定款項必須經由英國開設的英鎊戶口接收，後來經陳梓華找到《蘋果》寫手 Jack Hazlewood 借出銀行戶口。</p> -<p>【獨媒報導】壹傳媒創辦人黎智英及3間蘋果公司被控串謀勾結外國勢力及串謀刊印煽動刊物等罪，今（28日）於高院（移師西九龍法院）踏入第98日審訊，黎智英第六日作供。同案被告、從犯證人陳梓華曾供稱，在2019年11月曾與黎智英會面，引述黎認為區議會選舉民主派大勝之後，「佢（黎）覺得嚟緊應該結合議會嘅力量、街頭嘅力量，同國際嘅力量，先可以延續呢個反修例運動嘅熱情，同埋推爆個政府，push it to the edge，去逼迫個政府去回應市民訴求。」黎智英今否認說過相關言論，因「國際力量」從不在自己的腦海裡，也並非自己會使用的言辭。他亦否認說過「推爆個政府」，強調：「這不是我會說的東西，這不是我。」</p> +<p>黎庭上稱不認識 Jack Hazlewood，亦從沒聽聞他的名字。辯方遂展示他的 WhatsApp 訊息紀錄，顯示 Jack Hazlewood 於2020年5月31日傳送一份文章的 PDF 檔案給黎。黎稱不能開啟 PDF 檔案，Jack Hazlewood 遂傳送3張文章的截圖給黎。黎庭上卻回應：「這些人對我而言就如一種滋擾，通常這樣介紹自己，傳送一些東西給我，要求我們刊登⋯⋯我便回覆交由編輯決定。」</p> -<p>控方指控之一是黎向陳梓華下達指示，而陳再傳達指示予李宇軒、「攬炒巴」劉祖廸等人參與國際游說。黎則表示，他當時相信陳是勇武人士的領袖，並信任陳有能力呼籲勇武派克制，惟一直也不知道陳梓華與國際線有關連。至於為何在 WhatsApp 傳送《香港人權與民主法案》的消息給陳，黎則稱純粹向陳提供資訊，沒有其他原因。</p> +<p>法官杜麗冰問，既然黎稱這些訊息是滋擾、不想收到這些訊息，為何不直接無視它？黎表示不知道。杜官又問，為何黎向 Jack Hazlewood 說會轉發他的截圖？黎僅指他可能之前跟對方溝通過，「可能我說我會轉發，然後睡覺，翌日醒來便忘記了。」法官李運騰追問，但是黎在訊息表明「我會現在轉發」；黎則表示不知道。</p> -<h4 id="黎傳送香港人權與民主法案給陳梓華-黎僅提供資訊">黎傳送《香港人權與民主法案》給陳梓華 黎：僅提供資訊</h4> +<p>當黎再被問 Jack Hazlewood 是否協助李宇軒轉帳款項，黎反問：「我怎樣知道？」，稱不熟悉這些名字，可能 Jack Hazlewood 曾經替《蘋果》撰文一至兩次，但他不知道。</p> -<p>在辯方大律師關文渭的主問下，黎昨日回應另一名從犯證人陳梓華的證供，談及二人之間在2019年7月及11月的會面。今日辯方繼續圍繞陳梓華的證供提問。</p> +<h4 id="黎稱不知道jack-hazlewood-惟辯方指黎曾轉發其帖文">黎稱不知道Jack Hazlewood 惟辯方指黎曾轉發其帖文</h4> -<p>辯方展示2019年11月15日的訊息紀錄，黎傳送香港民主委員會（Hong Kong Democracy Council）的 Twitter 截圖給陳，當中提及《香港人權與民主法案》。黎亦在訊息表示，美國議會即將表決，沒有理由不通過法案，形容這是一個非常棒的消息。</p> +<p>辯方展示黎於2020年5月31日的 Twitter 帖文，顯示他轉發 Jack Hazlewood 的帖文，並說：「Mr @JackHHazlewood thanks for advocating for Apple English edition. Certainly we need more subscribers so we can be financially viable. Having subscribers from all over the world will also sent #CCP a clear and strong message that the world is watching.」</p> -<p>陳梓華當時供稱，黎之所以傳送以上訊息給他，是因為黎「想證明國際嘅力量係好重要，同埋美國並沒有離棄或者係唔理香港發生緊咩事」。惟黎今在庭上則稱，相信當時純粹向陳提供資訊，沒有其他原因，又稱自己平時向很多人傳送資訊。</p> +<p>辯方又指訊息紀錄亦顯示黎曾將 Jack Hazlewood 相關截圖轉發給李兆富。黎則回應，帖文的內容是完全不同的話題，關於宣傳《蘋果》英文版，而非 Jack Hazlewood 在訊息所述的東西。</p> -<h4 id="黎指陳梓華熟悉勇武派內部板塊">黎指陳梓華熟悉勇武派內部板塊</h4> +<p>法官杜麗冰問黎有否閱讀過 Jack Hazlewood 傳來的文章。黎堅稱他肯定沒有，只是當時對方傳送了三張截圖，他以為是緊急事情，所以才會轉發，「如果我快要睡覺，我不會閱讀任何東西。」</p> -<p>辯方另展示2019年11月16日的訊息，黎智英向陳轉發一則中大校友通訊，當中提及「各類車的司機已經是黑衣人，不是中大職員」、「校內情況惡劣，建築物被破壞，飯堂關門，住在宿舍的師生缺糧」等。黎問陳：「Wetland (Wayland)，你知道這些黑衣人到底是謝（誰）人嗎？謝謝。」陳回覆：「不同組別人士，由屠龍及 Black Boc 等隊伍為首，形成的一幫沒有紀律人士」、「他們希望霸佔中大作據點。」</p> +<h4 id="黎曾轉發jack-hazlewood帖文-感謝宣傳蘋果英文版">黎曾轉發Jack Hazlewood帖文 感謝宣傳蘋果英文版</h4> -<p>同年11月17日，陳向黎傳送訊息，叫黎特別留意數隊勇武小隊，包括「屠龍、中移動、閃燈、蜘蛛、V小隊、毒蛇、粉紅、Pink Team」，指他們帶領著不能接受的暴力升級，而《蘋果》曾訪問其中三隊，以及其中一隊的領袖「Max」，他正在理大衝突中領導防守。</p> +<p>辯方又展示黎與張志偉之間的訊息，張於2020年5月31日傳送兩張 Twitter 截圖，指 Jack Hazlewood 和羅傑斯（Benedict Rogers）分別宣傳《蘋果》英文版。</p> -<p>辯方問黎為何傳送有關中大的訊息給陳，黎則稱，當時留意到那些「神秘」的年輕人，不肯定陳是否認識他們，所以向他提問。黎又表示，只聽聞過「屠龍」，而其他小隊的名字則未聽過，從陳的訊息可見他熟悉勇武人士的內部板塊。</p> +<p>黎於同日傳送 Jack Hazlewood 在 Twitter 的另一則帖文截圖，當中稱在外國人在香港以外的地方未能下載《蘋果》手機應用程式。黎並吩咐張盡快解決問題。張回覆「收到」。被問到當時是否已經知道 Jack Hazlewood 這個名字，黎稱沒有留意。</p> -<p>辯方展示2019年11月19日的訊息，黎與陳討論警方團封理大事件是否「警方的陰謀」、「這局面其實很易設計」、「理工在城市，警方封了路就無法逃脫」，又指警方「把我最精銳的人一網打盡，希望昨天逃出來的都是勇武精銳份子」。二人亦討論警方部署是否屬「圍點打援」。黎確認訊息內容，並指陳清楚事態發展。</p> +<p>辯方問，陳梓華有否向黎提起 Jack Hazlewood 這個人？黎說沒有，並重申除了要求陳平息暴力之外，便沒有與陳討論其他事情。辯方引述李宇軒的證供，指在籌備中英聯合聲明登報期間，Jack Hazlewood 的聯絡方法乃由李宗澤（Wilson Li）提供。黎稱不知道。</p> -<h4 id="黎相信陳梓華是勇武派領袖有能力平息暴力">黎：相信陳梓華是勇武派領袖、有能力平息暴力</h4> +<h4 id="黎否認增加個人影響力若說垃圾說話影響力有何重要">黎否認增加個人影響力：若說垃圾說話，影響力有何重要？</h4> -<p>辯方接著展示2020年11月20日的訊息，黎告知陳，美國參議院一致通過支持香港示威者的措施（Senate Unanimously Approves Measures Backing Hong Kong Protesters）；陳當時回覆已經得悉相關消息，希望該措施能向政府施壓。</p> +<p>辯方問黎對《紐約時報》的取態如何。黎指《紐約時報》是進步自由派（progressive liberal），他們總是對特朗普及其所屬的共和黨有負面評價，但是黎並不苟同。</p> -<p>黎在庭上稱，當時尚未知道措施的內容，只知道是支援香港示威者的措施，並與制裁沒有關係。他又稱當當時沒有想過制裁的事宜。</p> +<p>辯方提及陳梓華供稱黎聲稱想增加個人影響力，黎否認。辯方追問黎為何替《紐約時報》撰文。黎稱因為希望接觸到更多人，希望自己的信息接觸到愈多人愈好。黎又反問：「如果我說了一些垃圾說話，我的影響力又有何重要呢？⋯⋯我的影響力並不重要，如果我說一些愚蠢的話。」</p> -<p>訊息紀錄顯示，2019年區選之前，陳向黎提及「聽說小樺被捕了」，又稱：「我已經呼籲大家24日前別生事。」</p> +<p>辯方指，黎於2020年6月3日在 Twitter 發布帖文：「Overseas fellows and Americans, please subscribe to our Apple Daily English edition. Your subscription is more than only the financial help, but it is political protection for us against #CCP crackdown.」</p> -<p>黎在庭上表示，當時相信陳有能力叫示威者不要生事，因為他相信陳是勇武人士的領袖，而且他信任陳，所以才會託陳呼籲勇武派克制。昨日黎供稱，當李柱銘介紹陳時，形容陳為「勇武派之中的保守派」。黎稱直至2019年11月，他仍然相信陳能夠有效地平息街頭暴力。</p> +<p>黎解釋若然海外學者和美國人為香港發聲的話，外國的政客便需要聆聽，又指「我們」可以是指香港人和《蘋果》。被問到為何要特別提及美國人，黎指因為美國人最具影響力。</p> -<h4 id="黎否認提倡區選後結合國際力量否認曾說推爆個政府">黎否認提倡區選後結合國際力量、否認曾說「推爆個政府」</h4> +<h4 id="黎稱袁弓夷想攀關係經常誇大其辭">黎稱袁弓夷想攀關係、經常誇大其辭</h4> -<p>陳梓華曾供稱，他在2019年11月27日，獲安排在黎智英的座駕上會面，該座駕停泊在法院對面。陳稱他向黎表示聯絡不到勇武派領袖，惟黎稱不緊要，因他「大致掌握勇武派嘅資料同動向」。</p> +<p>辯方提到，現被國安處通緝的袁弓夷曾拍片響應「一人一信救香港」，影片於2020年5月29日至6月1日在《蘋果》平台播放。黎在 Twitter 亦有轉載影片，並稱期望特朗普實施制裁。袁在影片中呼籲外國投資者從香港撤資，又稱反修例示威中有人被謀殺和強姦。黎則稱沒有看過影片，也沒有參與製作，如今在庭上觀看後，認為袁的說法誇張，自己不認同。至於他轉載影片，他則承認當時是疏忽。</p> -<p>黎在庭上解釋，相信他是從張崑陽及其朋友得到勇武派的資訊，因曾經與他們吃飯，理解張是就讀港大的學生領袖，而其朋友是參與前線示威的大學生。陳指稱黎對張的評價好高。黎確認，因閱讀過張的文章，認為寫得很好。</p> +<p>黎表示，與袁接觸幾次之後，「我有點感到不舒服，我感覺到他總是想與我攀關係」，由於對此感到不舒服，所以後來疏遠他。</p> -<p>陳供稱黎談及區議會選舉大勝，「佢（黎）覺得嚟緊應該結合議會嘅力量、街頭嘅力量，同國際嘅力量，先可以延續呢個反修例運動嘅熱情，同埋推爆個政府，push it to the edge，去逼迫個政府去回應市民訴求。」</p> +<p>辯方指，袁乘機前往美國華盛頓之前，曾問黎有沒有東西想袁幫忙，黎回覆沒有任何提議。黎確認，因為當時對他感到不舒服，又指袁沒有告訴他要去美國做什麼。被問到這感覺從何而來，黎估計這是日積月累，他看了袁的影片之後，發覺部份言論並非事實，情況並非如他口中那麼極端。</p> -<p>黎今在庭上稱，他有可能談及過區議會大勝和延續運動的熱情，因為當年區選結果真的很好。至於結合議會力量、街頭力量和國際力量，黎指自己可能講過議會力量和街頭力量，但是否認講過國際力量，因他從沒想過國際線的事宜。</p> +<p>辯方聞言後，引述黎較早前卻說沒看過袁的影片，要求黎解釋。黎稱不記得有否看過，並重申他感覺到袁總是想與他攀關係，對此感到不舒服，又指袁經常誇大其辭。法官李運騰則提醒辯方是在盤問黎。</p> -<p>黎其後補充，他當時不認為陳梓華與國際線有任何關係，而且「國際線」並不是他會使用的措辭。辯方問，若然黎認為陳與國際線無關，為何會傳送 HKDC 的資訊給陳。黎則稱因為陳是示威者的領袖，又稱一直也不知道陳與國際線有關連。</p> +<h4 id="黎曾告訴張劍虹小心袁弓夷-質疑袁隱藏背後動機">黎曾告訴張劍虹小心袁弓夷 質疑袁隱藏背後動機</h4> -<p>至於「推爆個政府」，黎亦否認說過：「這不是我會說的東西。」辯方問黎有否說過類似的說話？黎同樣否認：「這不是我會說的東西，這不是我。」</p> +<p>辯方展示黎與時任《蘋果》社長張劍虹之間的訊息，當中提及一篇訪問。黎不記得是哪一篇訪問，但他確認有告訴張要提防袁這個人，因他對袁感到不舒服。黎在訊息中告訴張「他（袁）是郭文貴的人」，黎解釋意思是袁與郭有關。被問到郭文貴在紐約做了什麼，黎稱不知道他做了什麼，但是：「我只是有個印象，可能他是個騙子。」</p> -<p>陳梓華亦稱在車上與黎討論過眾籌事宜，黎則否認：「我從不會談論到眾籌，這是他們的事。」</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/kqJsMc3.png" alt="iamge02" /> +▲ 前《蘋果日報》社長 張劍虹</p> -<h4 id="黎只是希望勇武派能在自己的社群內建立領袖">黎：只是希望勇武派能在自己的社群內建立領袖</h4> +<p>黎亦在訊息中告訴張「他（袁）想與我合作反共」。黎解釋，郭理應對抗中共政權，可是事實不然，而袁卻想與郭合作。黎又指他告訴張，他不認同及不接受袁，質疑袁有隱藏的議程或背後動機，而未有表露出來，因此著張要提防袁。</p> -<p>陳又供稱，黎想建立一個結合議會力量、街頭力量和國際力量的領袖團隊。黎則肯定自己從沒有這樣說過，因國際線從不在他的腦海中，而且他的想法只是希望勇武派能在自己的社群內建立領袖。</p> +<p>訊息亦顯示張劍虹說不用害怕《國安法》，黎解釋張的意思是若中共內鬥的話，《國安法》便不會很嚴厲，但最終結果證明他估計錯誤。</p> -<p>黎又質疑，在車上15分鐘的會面，陳梓華好像把它說成是一段很長的對話。</p> +<p>辯方問，若然黎認為《國安法》不會很嚴厲，那黎便不需要呼籲外國制裁，那麼黎當時有否繼續呼籲制裁？黎表示當時有繼續呼籲制裁。辯方追問原因。黎回答指「《國安法》不會很嚴厲」只是他的臆測，如果《國安法》不會嚴厲的話，他認為他不會繼續呼籲制裁。</p> -<p>辯方問黎是否認識本土派陣營中任何人。黎表示，本土派並非他會想接觸的人士，因他一直以來都反對港獨。</p> +<p>法官李運騰提到，袁的影片發布一星期之後，才有上述黎與張劍虹之間的訊息，問黎有否要求將袁的影片從《蘋果》網站刪除。黎則表示他未足以警覺到想起袁的影片，他對影片沒有很深的印象。法官杜麗冰指黎聲稱不認同該影片。黎同意，因為影片含有不實和誇大的說法。</p> -<p>黎亦否認在會面中向陳談及請求外國實施制裁、封鎖和敵對行動，因為這些都是脫離會面主題的話題。而且他與陳沒有達成任何可行動的協議，因他認為沒有需要，他一直以來只是希望陳能平息前線的暴力。</p> +<p>杜官問黎，誰人介紹袁弓夷給他認識？黎稱袁會在 YouTube 發布影片，何俊仁曾提議邀請袁弓夷及其女兒袁彌明一起吃晚飯，相信還有邀請袁彌明的丈夫。黎又稱認識袁彌明很長時間，因她亦有參與民主運動。</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/g2ie55G.png" alt="image02" /></p> +<h4 id="袁弓夷曾要求黎協助聯絡陳日君-以支持制裁夏寶龍-黎稱沒協助問">袁弓夷曾要求黎協助聯絡陳日君 以支持制裁夏寶龍 黎稱沒協助問</h4> -<p>【獨媒報導】壹傳媒創辦人黎智英及3間蘋果公司被控串謀勾結外國勢力及串謀刊印煽動刊物等罪，今（28日）於高院（移師西九龍法院）踏入第98日審訊，黎智英第六日作供。他稱2019年12月的時候仍強烈希望勇武派可以建立領袖團隊，以平息街頭暴力，於是透過同案被告陳梓華來聯絡「攬炒巴」劉祖廸，因理解劉有很大影響力，追隨者包括勇武派。2020年1月，黎在台北陽明山別墅首次與劉見面，陳早前供稱黎在會上表示想培養劉做政治明星，又提及「支爆」；黎則反駁指說法荒謬可笑，質疑陳編造故事，又指「支爆」是由劉祖廸首先提出。</p> +<p>辯方指，袁弓夷在2020年6月11日向黎傳送語音訊息，稱自己翌日會見時任美國國際宗教自由大使 Sam Brownback，對方負責宗教自由，而夏寶龍「呢條友又燒教堂，又拆十字架」，袁稱需要得到天主教香港教區榮休主教陳日君樞機的支持，並寫信給 Sam Brownback 或時任美國國務卿蓬佩奧，講述夏寶龍犯了宗教罪行，「應該要馬上制裁」，冀黎可以協助聯絡樞機。黎亦以語音回覆袁，指樞機答應的機會不大，「佢唔熟你嘅話，佢會好謹慎嘅」，但是黎表示即管幫袁問問，惟他相信樞機不會答應。</p> -<p>陳曾指稱，黎在會議上提及這一代人未必可以實現「推翻中共」。黎今在庭上反問：「香港人可以推翻中共政府？⋯⋯我沒有瘋癲到思考這些瘋狂的事情。」黎又指若然希望透過制裁或封鎖措施來推翻中共政府，是「比荒謬更荒謬」。</p> +<p>辯方問黎，回覆袁之後，有否協助他問陳日君樞機？黎回答：「沒有，因為我不相信這個人。」辯方又指，袁其後傳送一連串訊息給黎，惟黎並未有回覆。黎確認，並說：「我不認為我曾費神看過。」他稱他沒有理會袁，「因為我不相信他，我不想與他有聯繫。」</p> -<h4 id="黎指攬炒巴在年輕人之中影響力很大-追隨者包括勇武人士">黎指「攬炒巴」在年輕人之中影響力很大 追隨者包括勇武人士</h4> +<h4 id="黎稱自己對袁冷淡-傳送針對袁負面評價-惟袁不夠敏感">黎稱自己對袁冷淡 傳送針對袁負面評價 惟袁不夠敏感</h4> -<p>辯方大律師關文渭就黎智英與「攬炒巴」劉祖廸的相識經過提問。2019年12月4日的訊息紀錄顯示，另一被告陳梓華向黎提及一名叫「攬炒」的人。黎則表示當時未曾閱讀「攬炒」寫的文章、未曾聽過他說話，但知道「攬炒」對陳的影響很大。黎亦相信自己當時未聽過「攬炒團隊」，因他沒有留意。</p> +<p>辯方指，黎在一日之前，即2020年6月10日，以通訊軟件 Signal 向袁傳送一篇時事評論員梁啟智對袁的評價節錄，「見咁多人推介袁爸爸條片，即管襟入去睇吓。Sorry，睇咗一半，完全睇唔到落去，個推論亂到離晒大譜」、「一開口鬧泛民，第一個開嘅係李國能⋯⋯李國能幾時做咗泛民？然後又話 Martin Lee，仲講起草基本法開始就讓步⋯⋯成個 CFA 係 Martin Lee 爭取返嚟，八九民運之後仲辭埋草委，讓乜步？然後又開袋住先，問題係袋住先咪就係泛民否決咗囉。咁都可以用嚟鬧泛民？」、「呢啲直頭係 misinformation，虛假信息來的。我真係覺得黃絲圈對信息確切的要求唔見得比藍絲圈高好多。」</p> -<blockquote> - <p>Tagged by @Ray_WongHKI</p> -</blockquote> +<p>辯方問黎為何傳送相關評價給袁？黎說是讓袁知道相關評語，「這是一種我不需要自己說任何話便能拒絕他的做法」，「你知道，使用其他人的評價。」</p> -<blockquote> - <p>As most of the pro-democracy activists are in prison or/and being charged under the NSL, I see no meaning in going out to vote this Sunday.</p> -</blockquote> +<p>辯方指，不過翌日袁依然傳送訊息給黎，要求黎協助取得陳日君樞機的支持，問黎知不知道原因。黎則表示：「我只能說這個人不夠敏感。」辯方追問，袁未能理解黎的暗示嗎？黎同意，「你可以從我的訊息看到，我當時非常冷淡。」</p> -<blockquote> - <p>Please join our campaign! Make a photo with the hashtag #Releasemycandidate pic.twitter.com/mLbnSD6fQz</p> -</blockquote> +<h4 id="黎稱愛中國文化人民但不愛中國政府">黎稱愛中國文化人民但不愛中國政府</h4> -<blockquote> - <p>— Finn Lau 劉祖廸 (@finnlau_cd) December 17, 2021</p> -</blockquote> +<p>辯方展示黎與李兆富之間於2020年6月6日的訊息，黎稱要集中制裁中國政府，惟辯方指，黎較早前主張制裁對象應集中在中國官員，要求黎解釋為何說法有變？黎則理解「中國」和「中國政府（China government）」是一樣，均破壞了香港。</p> -<p>陳早前供稱，他與黎於2019年11月在座駕見面之後，二人曾在電話通話，陳指黎留意到「攬炒團隊發展得好好」，並要求陳聯絡「喺國際線上面、文宣線上面比較出名嘅『攬炒巴』」。</p> +<p>辯方問黎：「你愛中國嗎？」黎表示，以中國作為一個國家（as a country）而言，包含她的文化和人民，「當然我愛她。」可是以中國作為一個受共產黨統治的國家（as a state that is ruled by the communist party）而言，他不認為他愛中國，因為這個國家的價值觀與他的價值觀有抵觸。</p> -<p>辯方問，「攬炒巴」的話題為何開始出現。黎表示，他當時強烈希望勇武派能建立領袖團隊，認為「攬炒團隊」有能力協助達成。他又稱，透過傳媒首次得悉「攬炒巴」這個人，而陳亦指「攬炒巴」有號召力。惟他否認說過「喺國際線上面、文宣線上面比較出名嘅『攬炒巴』」，因他從沒想過和談及「國際線」和「文宣線」。</p> +<p>在辯方提問下，黎表示他愛中國、但不愛中國政府，直至現在也是。辯方繼而追問，黎剛才又何以說「中國」和「中國政府」都一樣？黎僅表示他當時只是回答辯方的問題，當時他口中的「中國」就是「中國政府」（China as a state）。</p> -<p>黎表示不知道「攬炒巴」在運動中的角色，但是知道他在年輕人之中影響力很大，有很多追隨者，包括勇武人士。</p> +<h4 id="受訪稱有份通過國安法的官員海外銀行戶口存有貪污金錢-黎認屬猜測">受訪稱有份通過國安法的官員海外銀行戶口存有貪污金錢 黎認屬猜測</h4> -<h4 id="介紹羅傑斯給陳梓華-黎稱純粹想陳會見值得見面的人">介紹羅傑斯給陳梓華 黎稱純粹想陳會見值得見面的人</h4> +<p>2020年6月10日，黎接受史丹福大學胡佛研究所（Hoover Institution）訪問時，稱香港需要國際，尤其是美國，去協助制裁中國，「現在是制裁中國的最佳時機，去迫使中國更好地管束自己的行為，與普世價值接軌，使世界和平。」黎庭上解釋，因為中國的行為和價值觀與西方有衝突，所以才會有貿易戰。</p> -<p>辯方指2019年12月20日，身在英國的陳在訊息中問黎，在英國可以會見什麼人；黎則建議陳會見「香港監察」創辦人羅傑斯（Benedict Rogers）和英國議員 Lord David Alton，並稱可以幫陳安排。</p> +<p>黎在受訪時指，美國應該在香港絕望之前便制裁和懲罰中國，「如果中國不放棄訂立《國安法》，香港無論如何都會被破壞，若撤回香港的特殊經濟地位，即管去做，因為怎樣也好都是無意義的。」黎庭上解釋，希望《國安法》能夠減弱或暫緩實施，他當時立場依然是反對取消香港特殊經濟地位；如果香港實施《國安法》的話，香港便會被破壞，屆時取消香港特殊地位與否，也變得亳無意義。</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/NgX7TSk.png" alt="image03" /> -▲ Lord David Alton（左）、Benedict Rogers（右）</p> +<p>黎受訪時另提到，美國應該凍結中國貪污官員在西方國家的銀行戶口，那些戶口有大量金錢，而那些有份打壓香港的官員，「應該在個人層面感受自己行為所帶來的痛苦。」（“I think those who are involved in this oppression should personally feel the pain of their action.”）</p> -<p>陳梓華早前供稱，黎「想我識多啲人，方便我將來參加國際游說嘅工作」。惟黎今反駁，從來沒有想過國際游說的事宜，介紹羅傑斯純粹想陳會見一些值得見面的人，因羅傑斯為香港做了很多事。而 Lord Alton 處理BNO政策，也是為香港做事，與羅傑斯關係密切，二人均想與年輕人溝通。</p> +<p>黎解釋，他認為有份通過《國安法》的官員，在海外銀行戶口存有涉及貪污的金錢。法官杜麗冰問黎是否猜測？黎同意是猜測。</p> -<p>黎認為與二人會面對陳有好處，黎稱當時知道可以透過陳來聯絡「攬炒巴」，以協助平息街頭暴力，又指如果請求陳梓華平息暴力，有需要協助他，讓他知道得更加多，因此安排他會見羅傑斯和 Lord Alton ，對香港和對陳個人而言均有好處。</p> +<p>黎在訪問中說，如果外國制裁中國的話，香港會是中國與外國貿易的唯一渠道。黎解釋因為香港是國際金融中心，他說這句話的時候，以為《國安法》不會實施，所以才會如此說。</p> -<h4 id="黎否認羅傑斯郭明瀚等人為其代理人">黎否認羅傑斯、郭明瀚等人為其代理人</h4> +<p>辯方問黎，會否繼續抗爭，即使這樣做變得不合法？黎回答他不會在違法的基礎上抗爭，因為這樣的話便會被拘捕。黎接著提到：「如今在《國安法》之下，抗爭是不可能的，現在為香港抗爭已無意義，已經萬劫不復。（“… it’s beyond redemption.”）」辯方提醒黎，現在只需集中在案發當時的想法，而不是現在的想法。黎聞言表示，只是嘗試回答辯方的問題，「因為我不會再抗爭了，這是沒有用的。（“… because I won’t be fighting anymore. It’s useless.”）」</p> -<p>辯方向黎展示控方開案陳詞，當中指羅傑斯、英國駐港澳前總領事郭明瀚（Jim Cunningham）和 Mark Simon 是黎的「代理人」。</p> +<h4 id="黎不覺得做過違法事-但在監獄已有四年">黎：不覺得做過違法事 但在監獄已有四年</h4> -<p>黎否認羅傑斯和郭明瀚是他的代理人。至於 Mark Simon，黎同意他是其助手，也是其代理人。惟黎不認為身為共和黨黨員的 Mark Simon 是美國政府或共和黨的代理人，因他只處理黎的私人事務，二人的交流裡從未牽涉共和黨的事宜。</p> +<p>辯方播放2020年6月10日黎接受《自由亞洲電台》訪問的片段，他稱：「我好耐已經決定咗唔諗後果，如果我每一件事，我諗後果，我都做唔到嘅，我每講一句話，我都諗後果，我係做唔到㗎喇。恐慌呢樣嘢已經唔喺我意識裡面喇。如果我真係要為咗呢度最後犧牲，無論係坐監嘅犧牲，甚至乎冇咗條命都好，我都願意㗎，我都冇選擇㗎。」</p> -<p>黎指，會見時任美國副總統彭斯和時任美國國務卿蓬佩奧，均由美國國務院前資深顧問 Christian Whiton 安排，因黎聘請了他作為顧問，安排會見美國議員和官員等，而非由 Mark Simon 安排。黎亦否認 Christian Whiton 是其代理人，並指他亦非美國政府的代理人。</p> +<p>辯方問黎，他在節目中說準備「犧牲」，換言之當他所做的事變得不合法，還會否繼續？黎說：「不，不是不合法，我只是預計將會面對後果。」辯方追問，那為何黎提到「坐監嘅犧牲」？黎僅說：「我現時正在監獄。」法官李素蘭追問，黎理應做了非法的事，才會坐監？黎卻表示：「我不覺得我做過違法的事情，但是我在監獄已有四年。」</p> -<blockquote> - <p>The arrest of @JimmyLaiApple in Hong Kong is deeply offensive &amp; an affront to freedom loving people around the world. When I met w/ Jimmy Lai @WhiteHouse, I was inspired by his stand for democracy &amp; the rights &amp; autonomy that were promised to the people of Hong Kong by Beijing. pic.twitter.com/ZwioCrvNb7 — Mike Pence (@Mike_Pence) August 10, 2020</p> -</blockquote> +<p>黎亦在節目中稱：「如果你係愛呢個地方，你亦覺得冇咗呢個地方好可惜，我哋真係要團結一致，去做最後嘅抗爭去保住，香港呢個家園，我係願意同你一齊抗爭落去。或者有啲人，『算數啦，過去佢嚟到，我哋做大陸人囉，無自由，我有得食，有得住，有得歡樂，我咪算囉。』我亦唔怪你，每一個人要做自己嘅選擇，但係我哋必然會有好多人選擇留喺度抗爭，而我會同呢啲人一齊抗爭到底。」播畢影片之後，旁聽席有人拍手。</p> -<h4 id="黎當時認為攬炒巴身份敏感">黎：當時認為攬炒巴身份敏感</h4> +<p>辯方問黎，黎是否會繼續抗爭，即使抗爭變得不合法。黎說，如果抗爭變成不合法，便無論如何都沒有空間抗爭，說像香港現時的情況，沒有人會出來抗爭。辯方則提醒黎，不是要集中現今情況。</p> -<p>陳供稱，他在2019年12月31日與黎智英再度會面。黎表示，因陳赴英國會見劉祖廸，他希望知道二人的會面情況，所以安排是次見面。</p> +<p>辯方又問，黎說會跟其他人一起抗爭到底，但是他是否認識這些人？黎表示不知道，就如他不會認識所有參與遊行的200萬人。</p> -<p>法官李素蘭指，二人的訊息僅稱呼劉祖廸為「guest」，問原因為何。黎相信，陳當時希望盡量保密，因他們之間均認為劉祖廸是一個身份敏感的人，因理解他是勇武派的領袖。黎又指當時「攬炒巴」的真實身份尚未公開，甚至在台北陽明山會面時，劉也拒絕回答他的姓名。黎在後來才知道「攬炒巴」姓名是劉祖廸。</p> +<p>案件明日續審。</p> -<p>就12月31日的會面內容，陳梓華供稱「當時呢國際線上係好亂嘅，有唔同嘅聲音」，而黎認為年青人「喺度搶緊個話語權」。不過黎今反駁，他從沒有與陳談論任何有關國際線的事情，而且「話語權」並非他會使用的字詞，「我甚至不知道這個字詞的完整意思，這是他（陳）的言詞。」黎並否認在會面中提及制裁、封鎖、敵對行動和「攬炒」。</p> +<p>散庭後，保安將涉嫌拍手的女旁聽人士帶入庭外的房間，有兩名軍裝警員向她調查。直至下午約4時58分，約7至8名警員把女士帶離法院，約十多名軍裝警員到場設立封鎖線，步行至對面馬路後，便不准市民尾隨。有記者問在場警員是否拘捕及是否涉及任何控罪，警員僅稱純粹帶走該名女士及會放行。</p> -<h4 id="黎理解攬炒有如殉道">黎：理解「攬炒」有如「殉道」</h4> +<hr /> -<p>辯方問黎，在2019年12月的時候，對「攬炒」有什麼理解。黎表示，「攬炒」就好像「殉道（martyrdom）」般，透過犧牲自己來破壞敵方，就如損害雙方般。</p> +<p>案件編號：HCCC51/2022</p>獨媒報導袁弓夷拍片稱示威有人被謀殺強姦 黎智英批常誇大其辭 不予信任N. Korean Troops In Russia2024-12-04T12:00:00+08:002024-12-04T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/north-korean-troops-in-russia<p><em>Why did North Korea decide to deploy its troops to Ukraine? Pyongyang appears to be concerned that Trump’s electoral victory could restrict its opportunity to become a critical part of Russia’s Eurasian security architecture and to cement its status as a nuclear power.</em></p> -<p>辯方指，黎智英在2020年1月8日，即在台北陽明山別墅會面之前，向陳梓華傳送一篇裴倫德（Luke de Pulford）刊登於《蘋果日報》網站的文章，當中對「無領袖運動」提出數項關注。陳回覆稱他看過文章，認為可以幫助到他說服那些「頑固的領袖」；黎亦指文章值得閱讀，而「攬炒巴」劉祖廸也應該看。</p> +<excerpt /> -<blockquote> - <p>Heading back to London.</p> -</blockquote> +<p>The details of North Korea’s troop deployments to Russia will likely become clearer over time. However, the repercussions are clear: the North Korean army’s participation in the war will dramatically increase Russia–North Korea cooperation.</p> -<blockquote> - <p>Thank you #HK for letting us share in your unforgettable victory.</p> -</blockquote> +<p>But why did North Korea suddenly take this step? There have been several occasions during the Ukraine war when Russia has been on the defensive. However, the recent situation does not seem particularly difficult for Russia. The true answer is to be found in North Korea’s own strategic objectives: Pyongyang appears to want to reshape the geopolitical landscape on the Korean Peninsula.</p> -<blockquote> - <p>香港人, 加油 🇬🇧🇭🇰 pic.twitter.com/4uwUb4D71D</p> -</blockquote> +<p>Since the Eighth Communist Party Congress in 2021, North Korea’s foreign strategy can be described as a “New Cold War Structure Utilisation Strategy”, which consists of an effort to refashion the geopolitical landscape on the Korean Peninsula. The beginning of this was the improvement of Pyongyang’s relations with Beijing by taking advantage of the rising tensions between the US and China. North Korea also strengthened its relationship with Moscow after Russia’s all-out invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. To all intents and purposes, Pyongyang viewed the rising US–China strategic competition and the Russo-Ukrainian war as a strategic opportunity.</p> -<blockquote> - <p>— Luke de Pulford (@lukedepulford) November 25, 2019</p> -</blockquote> +<p>North Korean leader Kim Jong-un’s perception of the international situation is evident in his 2021 and 2022 “State of the Nation” addresses, in which he referred to the current international situation as a “New Cold War” and as a period of “multi-polarisation”. As seen from Pyongyang, the country’s old weakness of being overly dependent on China could be offset by better relations with Russia, thereby creating a trilateral relationship which may amount to the best international political situation for North Korea since the end of the Cold War in the late 1980s. This has the added advantage of providing Kim with the ability to rely on both China and Russia to diminish the importance of the UN sanctions regime on North Korea and effectively paralyse any international effort to monitor breaches of these sanctions.</p> -<p>黎則稱，傳送文章給陳純粹是因認為文章很好，能夠幫助到陳。辯方問黎，為何提議劉祖廸應該閱讀該文章。黎則稱，認為文章的觀點很好、有說服力，而且正是他當時準備向劉祖廸說的東西。</p> +<p>Seen from this perspective, the prospect of Donald Trump’s electoral triumph, which already seemed very real in October, was dreaded in Pyongyang because it was clear that Trump was determined to bring about at least a ceasefire in Ukraine, and if this resulted in the end of the war in Ukraine, the future of North Korea’s relations with Russia would be uncertain. Kim’s policy of “strategic diversification” would have come to nothing.</p> -<p>黎否認推薦裴倫德的文章是因為文中談及國際游說，並重申會見劉的目的只是希望他能夠協助成立勇武派的領袖團隊。</p> +<p>Moscow and Pyongyang clearly discussed the deployment well before the US election. Yet it is instructive to note that the official justification for North Korea’s entry into the war was the Ukrainian incursion into Russian territory in Kursk. This provided Russia with the excuse to invoke Article 4 in the newly-concluded Russia–North Korea security treaty; the Russian government chose to claim that the Ukrainian army’s advance into Kursk had created a “state of war” in which Russia’s territory was “invaded” from Ukraine, thereby activating the mutual defence provisions of the Russian-North Korean treaty. Of course, it was Russia that invaded Ukraine first, and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is a clear violation of Article 2, Paragraph 4 of the UN Charter, which prohibits the use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of other states. However, neither Moscow nor Pyongyang is bothered by such niceties.</p> -<h4 id="黎否認陽明山別墅會議上要求攬炒巴做任何事">黎否認陽明山別墅會議上要求攬炒巴做任何事</h4> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">The participation of large numbers of North Korean regular troops, especially combat troops, in the Russo-Ukrainian war means that the conflict has turned into an international one</code></em></strong></p> -<p>2020年1月11日，黎智英在台灣陽明山的別墅舉行飯局。黎起初邀請台灣已故民運人士施明德出席，惟後來施臨時表示不能出席。黎稱施是著名的革命人士，對他認識很深。由於黎認為施是有見地的人（a wiseman），相信他能夠說一些對陳有啟發的東西，所以安排施與陳見面。辯方問，施有否參與國際游說或國際前線？黎說沒有，因施已年紀老邁，而且已退出政壇（out of the picture）。</p> +<p>The North Korean regime is likely to extract financial compensation for the lives of its soldiers that it has now sent into the Russian meat grinder. However, the most significant advantage for Pyongyang is that what it perceives as the entrenchment of a Cold War conflict structure serves its purposes because it makes the resolution of the North Korean issue virtually impossible.</p> -<p>黎稱在晚飯之前，他與陳梓華、「攬炒巴」劉祖廸和一名女子見面及交談。黎稱無法記起當時的討論內容，但是他主要談及理大一役之後，勇武派有需要組成領袖團隊，以減少暴力。至於劉祖廸，黎指他發言不多，予人印象他願意接受建議，是一個少言和謹慎的人，不會說多過自己所需說的話。</p> +<h3 id="international-political-implications-of-russian-troops-deployed-in-north-korea">International Political Implications of Russian Troops Deployed in North Korea</h3> -<p>辯方問黎有否在會議上要求劉做任何事。黎稱沒有，並指連他問劉叫什麼名字，劉也不肯回答，更何況叫他做事。他亦沒有問劉來自哪裡，因他當時已經知道劉來自倫敦。</p> +<p>The dispatch of North Korean troops may not have a significant impact on the war situation between Russia and Ukraine. Still, considering the level of North Korea–Russia cooperation, the war will likely cause changes in international relations. The participation of large numbers of North Korean regular troops, especially combat troops, in the Russo-Ukrainian war means that the conflict has turned into an international one. The participation of North Korean forces and the corresponding level of demand from Ukraine for South Korea’s support will also increase in direct proportion to one another. And if the nature of the war changes to an international one, the level of NATO’s involvement will increase, and the threat of a Russian nuclear attack will become more acute.</p> -<p>黎表示，他有可能談及區選和中國監控人民，但是沒有談及國際游說和眾籌，因脫離了討論的主題。</p> +<p>To start with, the dispatch of North Korean troops is a clear sign that North Korea and Russia are joining forces on the anti-US front and that North Korea could become one of the core countries in the non-Western Eurasian security structure that Russia has vowed to build.</p> -<h4 id="黎稱在庭上才首次得悉攬炒團隊">黎稱在庭上才首次得悉「攬炒團隊」</h4> +<p>It is still unclear what the Eurasian security structure promoted by Russia entails. Still, if North Korea, as a country with nuclear weapons, participates in this structure, there is a concern that this will create a new nuclear state alliance that also encompasses Belarus, where Russia’s tactical nuclear weapons have already been deployed, and Iran, whose nuclear ambitions are growing.</p> -<p>早前陳梓華供稱，他在會面初頭簡介劉祖廸的過往工作，包括「中英聯合聲明登報團隊」、「攬炒團隊」、組織外國議員到香港作區選監選團等。惟黎庭上否認會上有相關對話，也沒有聽聞過「中英聯合聲明登報團隊」和「攬炒團隊」等，在庭上才首次得悉。</p> +<p>Moreover, it is fully anticipated that, in return for its military participation, North Korea will demand to join the Russian-led Collective Security Organisation, as well as other international organisations such as the BRICS or the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, and Russia will no longer be able to dither on such membership applications. Should these steps be taken, they will likely increase North Korea’s status and role in the anti-US or anti-Western camp under a multipolar order, which could be an opportunity for North Korea to break out of its diplomatic isolation.</p> -<p>陳供稱，黎在會議上問劉，為何劉的眾籌可以達到如此龐大規模。黎今在庭上反駁，他並不知道劉有份眾籌，就算自己有提及眾籌，也只是概括地作出評論、稱讚眾籌做得好。惟他否認帶起眾籌的話題，也沒有提及過渡性貸款。</p> +<p>In addition, there is a concern that North Korea’s status as an “unofficial” nuclear state could be established as a fact, leading to a crisis in the international non-proliferation regime. The trend is already apparent. In September this year, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov publicly stated that Moscow viewed the notion of “denuclearising” North Korea as a “closed matter”, claiming that Russia understood Pyongyang’s logic of relying on nuclear weapons as the foundation of its defence.</p> -<p>陳稱他曾提及李宇軒（Andy Li）在2019年12月到訪美國。惟黎否認在會上聽過李的名字，直至在庭上才知道這個人。</p> +<p>The Russia–North Korea New Treaty specifies in its Article 10 “cooperation” between the two countries concerning “peaceful nuclear energy”. If Russia proceeds with nuclear energy cooperation with North Korea – which has violated the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and developed nuclear weapons – this will constitute an approval of North Korea’s possession of atomic weapons. The creation of a new Russian-led nuclear alliance or even Moscow’s acquiescence in North Korea’s nuclear development will pose a threat to the international non-proliferation regime that has been maintained since the end of the Cold War.</p> -<h4 id="陳梓華稱黎想培養攬炒巴做政治明星-黎反駁荒謬可笑">陳梓華稱黎想培養攬炒巴做政治明星 黎反駁：荒謬可笑</h4> +<h3 id="impact-on-security-in-northeast-asia-and-the-korean-peninsula">Impact on Security in Northeast Asia and the Korean Peninsula</h3> -<p>陳亦指稱黎在會上表示想培養劉做政治明星，並稱可以資助他一萬磅生活費。黎今表示說法荒謬可笑（farcical），因為人性神秘莫測，難以改變一個人的性格，若然有人說要培養某個人成為政治明星的話是荒謬的，「（那個人）不是無知，就是高傲自大，這是不可能的。」</p> +<p>The dispatch of North Korean troops implies a direct link between matters on the Korean Peninsula and the Russo-Ukrainian war. The more pressure that is exerted on Russia in Ukraine, the more opportunities will be created for North Korea, making the Korean Peninsula more susceptible to the effects of the current European war. In particular, with North Korea’s growing leverage over Russia, there is concern about the direct impact of the close relationship between the two countries. Even in the case of conventional armaments, the high degree of complementarity between the weapon systems operated by North Korea and Russia suggests that the synergy in the two countries’ cooperation will be very high. Russia possesses all the core technologies for the development of strategic and tactical nuclear weapons, which North Korea claims to have developed but has not yet completed.</p> -<p>辯方問黎是否認為不能夠培養劉成為政治明星。黎則表示，認為陳梓華在憶述事件期間編造故事，因要培養劉做政治明星的說法是愚蠢和荒謬的。</p> +<p>Furthermore, the fact that the North Korean army’s deployment to Russia is justified by Article 4 of the Russia–North Korea Security Treaty, which refers to a mutual security guarantee, must mean that – at least in principle - the same collective security article could be invoked by Moscow to justify a greater Russian involvement in any potential future conflict on the Korean Peninsula. Thus, Russia and North Korea, functioning as a de facto military alliance, could face off against the South Korea–US alliance, increasing the nuclear-based character of such a potential future confrontation. This will further strengthen North Korea’s current position of defining inter-Korean relations as “hostile relations between two countries” (it is no accident that North Korea’s constitution has recently been modified to include precisely such a definition) and will inevitably lead to a prolonged period of political and military tension on the Korean Peninsula.</p> -<p>陳供稱，黎在會上指：「應該識多啲枱底人，而唔係一直喺度識啲枱面人，例如 Rick Scott、Ted Cruz、Tod Young，呢啲係老泛民本身就已經有 connection。」黎今否認，並重申會議中沒有談及任何有關國際游說的事宜。黎亦否認在會面中提及經濟封鎖、制裁等話題。</p> +<p>In addition, the dispatch of troops could become a new channel for North Korea to earn foreign currency and an essential opportunity for the North Korean military to gain combat experience. This will considerably increase the security threat to South Korea. In particular, Pyongyang’s accumulation of technology and expertise in operating inexpensive and effective weapon systems such as drones will lead to a different practical threat. At the same time, it should also be admitted that the dispatch of North Korean combat troops could be an opportunity to assess the combat effectiveness and training level of the North Korean military, which would be of interest to South Korea and the militaries of many Western countries.</p> -<p>陳供稱，黎舉例指前政務司司長陳方安生和前美國眾議院議長佩洛西，在彼此年輕的時候便開始認識，這些長遠的關係對於國際游說便很有用。黎今表示不知道二人互相認識，他亦沒有提及二人。</p> +<h3 id="outlook-and-challenges">Outlook and Challenges</h3> -<blockquote> - <p>On one side, you have a repressive regime crushing democratic freedoms in #HongKong. On the other, you have young people speaking out for freedom &amp; democratic reforms. Proud to stand with @RepMcGovern in support of today’s bipartisan votes showing the House’s commitment to HK. pic.twitter.com/fmwA6KkR7b — Nancy Pelosi (@SpeakerPelosi) October 16, 2019</p> -</blockquote> +<p>However, it is necessary to consider that the ripple effect of North Korea’s appearance on a European battlefield will vary, depending on North Korean troops’ participation method.</p> -<h4 id="黎稱支爆乃攬炒巴首先提出">黎稱「支爆」乃攬炒巴首先提出</h4> +<p>The most direct and explicit method is for North Korean combat troops to participate in the war as an independent operational authority. This is likely to change the nature of the war to an international one, and it is also a method that will require Russia to pay a higher future political and economic price for North Korea’s involvement.</p> -<p>陳梓華曾供稱，黎在會上提及長遠而言應該爭取國際認同，讓外國實施禁運、制裁及向政府施壓，然後香港要團結不同板塊，再結合民間力量，才能達至「支爆」。</p> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">The dispatch of troops could become a new channel for North Korea to earn foreign currency and an essential opportunity for the North Korean military to gain combat experience</code></em></strong></p> -<p>黎在庭上反稱，「支爆」是由劉祖廸首先提出。他稱在那時才首次聽聞這個字詞，他即場問劉什麼是「支爆」，劉解釋指「中國的內爆」。黎相信劉對中國有很多思考，並且嘗試預計將來會發生的事。黎稱，他當時回應劉，指中國花費大量金錢在監視和控制人民，所以支出比其他國家更多。</p> +<p>Alternatively, the North Korean regime may choose to reduce the burden of escalation by having its troops participate in the war as part of the Russian military or as individuals in a “private military company” such as the Wagner Group. However, if the recent report that Kim Young-bok – the deputy chief of staff of the General Staff of the Korean People’s Army – is in charge of the North Korean troops deployed to Russia is accurate, it is likely that the North Korean troops will not be content with participating in the war as individuals.</p> -<p>陳梓華稱，黎認為應團結議會、海外組織、街頭力量、國際線及商人。對此，黎反駁指：「我從沒有這樣的想法，這是他（陳）自己的想法，然後把說話塞進我的口。」</p> +<p>The challenge facing Seoul and all Western governments is that, in the short term, there are limited means to effectively restrain the North Korean military’s participation in the war or to punish Pyongyang for it. Therefore, governments need to take a longer-term view and rely on experience and diplomatic assets accumulated since the end of the Cold War to produce workable responses.</p> -<p>陳曾引述黎向劉說：「『國際游說唔係好似你哋咁樣做。』」惟黎反駁指，當時他並不知道劉等人參與國際游說，不可能說過相關言論。</p> +<p>For example, after the fall of the Soviet Union, Russia’s position on the Korean peninsula was the most pragmatic among the four surrounding powers; it simply re-adjusted its relationship with North Korea to a normal state relationship, notwithstanding Pyongyang’s accusations that Moscow was “selling off” its interest to the “US dollar”. Needless to say, relations between Russia and the West are likely to remain frosty for a considerable time after the Russo-Ukrainian war. Still, Russia’s relationship with the West does not necessarily have to be a reason for South Korea and Russia to live in hostility.</p> -<h4 id="黎指冀透過制裁或封鎖來推翻中共政府的想法比荒謬更荒謬">黎指冀透過制裁或封鎖來推翻中共政府的想法「比荒謬更荒謬」</h4> +<p>Thus, it remains crucial for South Korea to present a vision for the post-war relationship with Russia. Undoubtedly, it won’t be easy to significantly improve relations with China and Russia in the short term. Yet, it is imperative to establish policy measures that can restrain China–Russia–North Korea relations. Seoul also needs to consider a roundabout approach, leveraging its relations with Central Asian countries that are closely linked to China and Russia.</p> -<p>陳曾引述黎在會上說，這一代人未必可以實現到推翻中共，「佢希望以劉祖廸牽頭嘅攬炒團隊，同呢班年青人，可以接棒。」</p> +<p>Yet none of this obviates the need, in the short term, to continue warning the international community about the risks to global security that the deployment of North Korean troops poses. It is equally important for Seoul to lay out its own “red lines” regarding the cooperation between Russia and North Korea. In particular, Seoul needs to reiterate Russia’s international responsibility as a permanent member of the UN Security Council and as a NPT “P5” member, and to continue raising global awareness about the transfer of advanced military technology, including nuclear weapons, that the Moscow–Pyongyang relationship entails.</p> -<p>黎今在庭上反問：「香港人可以推翻中共政府？」，接著說：「我沒有瘋癲到思考這些瘋狂的事情。」</p> +<hr /> -<p>辯方問黎，會議上有否談論到推翻中共的方法。黎僅指，推翻中共政府的想法，是完全不切實際的（out of dimension of any discussions），又指若然希望透過制裁或封鎖措施來推翻中共政府，「我認為是比荒謬更荒謬。（“I think it’s more than ridiculous.”）」</p> +<p><strong>Choi Yonghwan</strong> is a senior research fellow at South Korea’s Institute for National Security Strategy (INSS). He also serves as a standing member of the Advisory Committee on Democratic Peace and Unification.</p>Choi YonghwanWhy did North Korea decide to deploy its troops to Ukraine? Pyongyang appears to be concerned that Trump’s electoral victory could restrict its opportunity to become a critical part of Russia’s Eurasian security architecture and to cement its status as a nuclear power.Europe And The Sahel2024-12-04T12:00:00+08:002024-12-04T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/europe-and-the-sahel<p><em>Widespread instability and the growing influence of China and Russia has increased the strategic importance of the Sahel to European security. A reset in relations between Europe and the region is direly needed.</em></p> -<p>黎：若市民和平地示威、站於道德高地 便可獲國際社會同情和支持 乃「最強大的游說」</p> +<excerpt /> -<p>黎認為，當香港人和平地示威，得到國際社會的支持，便能夠拯救到香港，避免受到中國侵害自由。被問到國際社會可以做到什麼，黎指當國際支持是壓倒性的，中國作決定時便必須予以考慮。他補充，「支持」是概括性的概念，並不是指特定行動，可以是國際壓力、言論或行為。</p> +<h3 id="introduction">Introduction</h3> -<p>法官李運騰和李素蘭先後追問，若如黎較早前所供稱，從沒想過國際游說的事宜，又如何得到國際的支持呢？黎認為，如果市民能和平地示威、站於道德高地，便可以得到國際社會的同情，又指國際社會與香港人價值觀一致，如果香港人追求相關價值的話，國際社會會認為香港人也是在替他們追求。</p> +<p>The Sahel is acquiring a new importance due to recent events that have exponentially increased its capacity to influence the stability and security of the Mediterranean. It is an inhospitable area that is often discussed interchangeably with North Africa. But the Sahel and North Africa are quite distinct and are facing different realities, making it difficult to formulate a single strategy for both regions. North Africa will likely continue its current trajectory of closer integration with Europe, while the Sahel will continue to lag behind in terms of modernization, integration, security and stability, and economic development. The Sahel, therefore, currently requires the most attention from both the European Union and NATO, as well as from southern European nations.</p> -<p>辯方提到，當一般人聽到「國際游說」時，會聯想到涉及「說服」。黎則回應，如果香港人站在道德高地上示威，並獲得國際社會的支持的話，「我認為這是我們最強大的游說。」黎續指，如果只是與外國議員和官員對話，而欠缺廣大市民站在一起，也是沒有用。</p> +<h3 id="the-sahel">The Sahel</h3> -<p>辯方問，當黎會見時任美國副總統彭斯和時任美國國務卿蓬佩奧的時候，是否正在屬於「國際游說」？黎回答可以算是（kind of），去請求他們為香港發聲。</p> +<p>The first difficulty in addressing the multiple challenges facing the region lies in defining its boundaries. Sahel means “edge” or “coast” in Arabic, and from this point of view, the Sahel would be a 5,000 kilometer strip stretching from the Atlantic Ocean to the Red Sea. But these boundaries have no cultural, historical, or economic meaning and include 12 very different countries. For this reason, it is more usual to use the term to refer to a group of five countries with common historical, economic, cultural, and social characteristics: Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger. Historically, these areas were part of the great Sahelian empires based on trans-Saharan trade. They were subsequently colonized by France, which left a common political and cultural legacy. This legacy currently coexists with the fundamental role of Islam as the majority religion throughout the region.</p> -<p>案件明日續審。</p> +<p>In 2014, the five countries established the G5 Sahel, born as a result of the conviction of these governments (and of European pressure) about the need to jointly implement a comprehensive approach to ensure the conditions for peace, development, security, and governance. In 2017, a joint force was added to the organization to coordinate counterterrorism efforts, aiming to curb the expansion of armed groups that seriously threaten regional security. The efficacy of this organization is uncertain now, since three of its five founding members have left it, but officially the organization has not been dissolved.</p> -<hr /> +<p>There are also other partially Sahelian states geographically — such as Algeria, Nigeria, and Senegal — which, despite their different historical experiences and current situations, influence the evolution of Sahelian developments.</p> -<p>案件編號：HCCC51/2022</p>獨媒報導黎智英否認曾說「推爆個政府」、「國際力量」 稱不知道陳梓華與國際線有關連 黎智英：冀透過制裁推翻中共想法「比荒謬更荒謬」 反指和平示威才是「最強大的游說」China In The Euro-Atlantic2024-11-28T12:00:00+08:002024-11-28T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/china-in-the-euro-atlantic<p><em>This paper outlines the likely scope of a putative presence of the People’s Liberation Army Navy in and around the Euro-Atlantic in the next 15 years and the nature of the foreign policy it will support.</em></p> +<h4 id="the-challenges">The Challenges</h4> -<excerpt /> +<p>The Sahel is one of the least habitable regions in the world. It has been characterized by a combination of great political instability, little economic development, and very unfavorable environmental conditions, the latter of which has exacerbated the unstable political context and driven migratory flows toward Europe. The lack of instruments to respond to these challenges has long been a source of structural weakness, resulting in a dependency on contributions from the United Nations, the European Union, or third countries. But perhaps the most worrying element is the Sahel’s position as the world epicenter of jihadist terrorism, an issue that has increased in severity since 2016. Not only is it fertile ground for recruiting rootless and disaffected youth into terrorism, but it also provides safe havens for terrorist organizations to plan and launch international attacks. Al Qaeda and the Islamic State are expanding violently in the region and the Sahel suffered 47 percent of all terrorism-related deaths worldwide in 2023.</p> -<p>China is becoming an ever-more prominent actor in the global maritime commons, emerging as a key player in sectors such as global shipping. China is also gradually expanding its military footprint outside its region and developing the capacity for power projection at reach. For policymakers in the Euro-Atlantic, this raises the prospect of a Chinese military presence in the region and its environs (such as the South Atlantic and the Arctic). This paper seeks to outline the likely scope of a People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) putative presence in and around the Euro-Atlantic in the next 15 years and the nature of the foreign policy it will support.</p> +<p>The crises already known to have been lurking in the Sahel for more than a decade are, however, entering a new stage due to two main reasons: the domestic political climate and the regional impact of the war in Ukraine.</p> -<h3 id="key-findings">Key Findings</h3> +<p>The political climate in the G5 Sahel has become more volatile in the last three years with the success of a series of military coups: in Mali in August 2020 and May 2021, in Burkina Faso in September 2022, and in Niger in July 2023. The latter is perhaps the most significant because it happened following the military coup in Mali in 2021, where French troops on the ground as part of Operation Barkhane were forced to conduct an accelerated withdrawal. Paris then decided to move its operational center to Niger, becoming the focal point for a renewed security partnership in the Sahel based on lessons learned from previous failures. The Nigerien government was also keen to host other European forces to counter Islamist insurgent groups linked to Al Qaeda and the Islamic State — so much so that the European Union decided to organize a three-year mission to train the Nigerien army. Niger had thus become the focal point of security efforts in the region.</p> -<ul> - <li> - <p>While there is some rationale for a PLAN presence in the Euro-Atlantic and its environs, the challenges of maintaining an extra-regional military presence at any scale will limit its scope. China’s blue-water capabilities are still nascent and even after likely growth, resourcing either a rotational or permanent deployment of PLAN capabilities will impose challenging force structure trade-offs on a navy that already faces the daunting task of competing in both the Pacific and Indian oceans.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Despite this, the bottlenecks in key Chinese supply chains that begin in the Atlantic may provide incentives for a future Chinese leader to decide that a military presence at scale is warranted – such a choice will probably not be made in the medium term (10–15 years). Much of China’s military activity, including defence engagement, is likely to be Phase 0 shaping to set the conditions if such a shift is chosen.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>While China will represent a very limited military challenge in the region, it is likely to seek coercive options towards Europe. Beijing’s most likely foreign policy towards Europe would combine elements of coercion and engagement, since China needs the European market, but seeks a degree of leverage.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>China has several coercive options that leverage maritime power. Its central role in port infrastructure and support to Russia’s economy and military are two options that it might leverage. While many of these options either do not involve the PLAN, or involve it primarily as a supporting element, they can have second-order ramifications for European navies.</p> - </li> -</ul> +<p>After the 2023 coup, however, this delicate balance has shifted. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) — the main regional organization — has been unable to respond effectively, showing its weakness and causing Burkina Faso, Guinea, and Mali to leave its ranks. The G5 Sahel has also been abandoned by its own members. In December 2023, Burkina Faso and Niger announced their withdrawal from the G5 Sahel joint military force, echoing Mali’s departure in May 2022, while Mauritania and Chad have accepted these sovereign decisions. The military juntas of Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger have also signed a new security agreement under the name of Alliance of the Sahel States (AES), whose priority will be the fight against terrorism. Outside the continent, France is consolidating a military withdrawal that began in Mali in 2022, continuing in Burkina Faso and more recently in Niger, although it maintains operations in Chad.</p> -<p>Although a future PLAN presence should not be a basis for strategic distraction from the core tasks of Europe’s navies in terms of deterring Russia, its shaping activities in the region should be monitored and where possible constrained.</p> +<p>The United States, for its part, has tried to maintain military collaboration with Niger, where it has built one of the largest drone bases on the continent in Agadez. And yet, despite U.S. wishes and after months of tensions, Niger’s ruling military council announced that it was ending the agreement that allowed U.S. forces to be based in the country. Among the disagreements between the two governments was the desire of Niger to supply Iran with uranium and work more closely with Russian military forces. The United States had completed its military withdrawal from the country by early August 2024, a blow to its counterterrorism effort — and to the broader security situation in the Sahel.</p> -<h3 id="introduction">Introduction</h3> +<p>Secondly, Russia’s military offensive against Ukraine is having a significant impact on the region. For one, it has decreased food security, exacerbating the harsh living conditions of Sahelians with rising wheat, fuel, and fertilizer prices. The energy crisis in Europe due to the war has also heightened Europe’s need to strengthen its partnership with African countries, whose natural resources attract them. Thus, in July 2022, Algeria, Niger, and Nigeria signed a memorandum of understanding for the formalization of the Trans-Saharan gas pipeline, which could have great potential for the transportation of gas supplies to Europe.</p> -<p>In 2019, NATO’s then Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg voiced concerns that although “there’s no way that NATO will move into the South China Sea … we have to address the fact that China is coming closer to us, investing heavily in infrastructure”. The prospect of China moving into the Euro-Atlantic area poses new questions for the UK and its partners in the region. Given that China has not yet emerged as a major defence and security actor in the Atlantic (although it wields considerable economic influence), policymakers and ministries of defence will benefit from an understanding of the potential scope of China’s regional ambitions, and their ramifications.</p> +<p>But the war in Ukraine has also made the Sahel more permeable to international influence efforts. In fact, it has grown in prominence within the framework of strategic competition, with the growing influence of Russia and China potentially challenging the security of NATO and the European Union.</p> -<p>To explore China’s likely approach to the Euro-Atlantic, this paper’s analysis is based on some assumptions about the principles driving China’s foreign policy. These are derived from public statements and published scholarship.</p> +<p>Although relations between Russia and the Sahelian countries were established decades ago during the Cold War, today the presence of the Wagner Group in Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger stands out. Its presence has been demonstrated in the last three years through participation in antiterrorist operations and support to the armed forces of some countries in the area. Since the outbreak of the war in Ukraine, Moscow has continued to expand its influence in the Sahel, as shown through the Africa-Russia summit held in July 2023. That said, the death of the head of the Wagner Group, Yevgeny Prigozhin, has led Moscow to create a new military structure under the Ministry of Defense called Africa Corps, with which it intends to replace Wagner’s mercenaries.</p> -<p>The nature of China’s engagement in the Euro-Atlantic is apparent more from its conflicting economic imperatives than its modest military presence. The capacity of the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) for sustained power projection remains limited. However, China has strong incentives to maintain stable relations with states whose markets partly sustain its investment-led, export-dependent economy. There are also reasons for China to pursue coercive leverage over European states that have, to some extent, cooperated with US efforts to economically contain China (most notably through exercising control over key technologies, such as semiconductors). An assessment of how Beijing might balance these conflicting imperatives and the emerging military implications of its approach will help European leaders avoid either complacency or overreaction. The Royal Navy Strategic Studies Centre and the Centre for Strategic Studies of the French Navy (CESM) have supported this project, conducted by RUSI and the Council on Geostrategy. The project examines how China may evolve as a power in the Euro-Atlantic. The research for this paper, conducted in July 2024, involved a review of existing literature on China’s capabilities and wider geostrategic imperatives.</p> +<p>China’s presence, on the other hand, is more linked to the economic sphere and to the Sahel’s natural resources. China’s state-owned companies operate in Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, and Niger. Mali potentially has one of the world’s largest lithium reserves, and the Chinese company Ganfeng Lithium has invested heavily in the country. China is the second-largest investor in Niger, with projects led by PetroChina (a subsidiary of China National Petroleum Corporation) and China National Nuclear Corporation. Investments in the oil sector in Chad have also been significant and have made the Chadian army one of the best equipped forces in Africa. And some reports suggest that China would be willing to use the conflicts in the Sahel to test its weapons products, although it seems more plausible to think that it will prioritize the protection of its interests in the region.</p> -<p>There are several trajectories that China’s foreign policy in the Euro-Atlantic may take, each of which corresponds to a different set of naval priorities. It might opt for an increasingly coercive approach, aimed at fixing US and European assets in the region and thus giving it more of a free hand in the Indo-Pacific. This approach has been advocated by members of China’s military and analytical communities. It might entail the deployment of forces in the Atlantic at a scale sufficient to occupy the attention of a meaningful number of US forces and to give European states pause on their commitments to the Indo-Pacific. More explicit support to Russia than has been offered by China thus far might also constitute a coercive approach.</p> +<p>This growing influence and presence of Russia and China fuels the idea that the countries of the Sahel — along with those in North Africa — are aligning more closely with these two powers, or at least that they want to reinvigorate their foreign policy autonomy vis-à-vis the West in line with that of other countries of the “Global South.” In both cases, this is connected to the relative decline of the influence of Western powers in the region.</p> -<p>At the other end of the spectrum is the view, espoused by others in China, that Europe’s consumer economies represent “the endpoints” for many of the infrastructure projects that form part of the Belt and Road Initiative – a large number of which would serve the primary role of linking Chinese producers with European markets (since few other markets in Eurasia are of a comparable scale). While strategic engagement in the Euro-Atlantic is part of this view of China’s priorities, the main focus is not to alienate European states. To do so would drive them to coordinate with the US more closely, which incentivises non-military forms of regional engagement.</p> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">This growing influence and presence of Russia and China fuels the idea that the countries of the Sahel — along with those in North Africa — are aligning more closely with these two powers, or at least that they want to reinvigorate their foreign policy autonomy vis-à-vis the West in line with that of other countries of the “Global South.”</code></em></strong></p> -<p>These are not mutually exclusive options, as coercion and engagement can form complementary strands of a state’s foreign policy. However, a nakedly coercive foreign policy makes engagement more difficult.</p> +<h3 id="the-european-union">The European Union</h3> -<p>This paper contends that dissuasion is the foreign policy that Beijing is most likely to embark on in the Atlantic. China needs the markets of Europe, given its own structural export surpluses, which will prove difficult to export elsewhere. However, China’s latent capacity for coercion can serve as a useful means of dissuading policies that directly impact China’s interests in its immediate periphery. It is thus likely that China’s foreign policy in the Euro-Atlantic will attempt to maintain a constructive relationship with Europe (eschewing some aggressive foreign policy tools) while attempting to ensure that the principles on which the relationship rest are amenable to Beijing’s interests, particularly with respect to European policies in the Indo-Pacific.</p> +<p>After the coup d’état in Niger, the president of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, stated in her last State of the Union address to the European Parliament that the European Union should engage more with African countries. She stated that Europe had to show the same unity of purpose toward Africa as it has shown toward Ukraine, focusing on cooperation with legitimate governments and regional organizations. The president further accused Russia of sowing chaos in the Sahel and stated that military coups destabilize the region, making it prone to the risk of terrorism.</p> -<p>The direct military ramifications of a strategy of dissuasion are likely to be limited in the short to medium term. While there are some reasons for China to seek a military presence in the vicinity of the Euro-Atlantic area (for example, in the Arctic and South Atlantic), there are considerable practical limitations, which are likely to prove enduring. China is likely to engage in what Western military parlance would term “Phase 0 shaping activities” in the South Atlantic and potentially also the Arctic. Phase 0 activities would be designed to cultivate regional influence, habituate the PLAN to longer deployments, and set the conditions for a more substantial presence in the longer term. Naval presence and activities, such as joint exercises with Russia, might also be used as a means of signalling to Europe China’s capacity to indirectly play a more significant security role in the Euro-Atlantic. For example, China might provide more explicit military and economic support to Russia as one way of seeking to reinforce a strategy of dissuasion.</p> +<p>The European Union’s concerns about developments beyond the Mediterranean directly impacting the continent’s security and prosperity are not new. But the results of its actions have been disappointing, perhaps because of tactical errors in its approach or inadequate attention paid to the issue.</p> -<p>The main conclusion of the paper is that for Europe’s navies, the presence of the PLAN in the Atlantic is a relatively distant and low-probability concern, but that growing Chinese interests in the region will lead to an increase in activity, which should at this stage be monitored and matched as an economy-of-force effort. In the long term, China may become increasingly dependent on sea lines of communication (SLOCs) in the South Atlantic and may have the capacity to commit significant resources to their protection. Similarly, its footprint in the Arctic might grow, for reasons that are discussed in the paper. While it is not likely that China’s presence will materialise until well beyond the next decade, it is a contingency to plan for, and the shaping activity that might enable this eventual development should be monitored. In the period most relevant to national defence reviews, the most significant consideration from a security standpoint is the Sino-Russian relationship in the High North and beyond, which might have more direct military ramifications in Europe.</p> +<p>For years, the perceived risks emanating from the Sahel have generally remained low due to the intangible nature of many of them and the belief that they were somehow under the control of the intervening countries in North Africa. These are countries with which Brussels cooperates under the European Neighborhood Policy, with programs in a wide range of sectors, such as democratic and economic development, rule of law, and migration. The Sahel region was therefore perceived by European policymakers as largely a remote desert area prone to drought and in need of infrastructure and humanitarian aid.</p> -<p>The paper has three chapters. Chapter I describes the underlying assumptions about China’s foreign policy drivers on which the assessment of its military engagement with the Euro-Atlantic is based. Chapter II provides further detail on Beijing’s strategic imperatives in the Euro-Atlantic that have a plausible maritime dimension. Chapter III describes the employment and potential limitations of China’s naval power in the Euro-Atlantic. The paper concludes with a discussion of the implications of a Chinese presence in the Euro-Atlantic for European navies.</p> +<p>Since the fall of Muammar al-Qaddafi’s regime in Libya in 2011 and the ensuing security crisis in Mali, however, Europe accelerated the process of expanding the borders of its immediate southern neighborhood into the Sahel. It committed more spending, launched more development and stabilization programs, and intensified its external military presence in Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger, which were beginning to be seen as part of the “gateway to Europe” — a source of dangerous population growth, unwanted migration, and violent extremism, not to mention the favored territory of Russian mercenaries.</p> -<h3 id="i-assumptions-about-drivers-for-chinas-foreign-policy">I. Assumptions About Drivers for China’s Foreign Policy</h3> +<p>In 2011, the European Union became involved in the Sahel with the adoption of the EU Sahel Strategy (2011–2020), which was reinforced in 2015 with the Regional Action Plan for the Sahel. These two strategies had a strong militarized approach focused on security. But Brussels also opened new embassies in the region, and an EU high representative for the Sahel was appointed to demonstrate continued diplomatic engagement. The European Union additionally became a founding member of the Sahel Alliance in 2017, pledging to coordinate international development spending in the region.</p> -<p>The assessments in this paper are based on a number of underlying assumptions for the next decade. The first is that the US will increasingly prioritise strategic competition with China. This will involve a rebalancing of US military capabilities towards the Indo-Pacific, potentially leaving gaps in the European security architecture. The 2022 Indo-Pacific Strategy released by President Joe Biden’s administration, for example, explicitly states an intention to “renew our focus on innovation to ensure the U.S. military can operate in rapidly evolving threat environments” in the Indo-Pacific region. It is likely that the US Indo-Pacific Command, which already absorbs 60% of critical capabilities, such as nuclear attack submarines, will see its allocation of naval assets grow. One outcome of this refocusing is that, much like the British and German fleets before the First World War, the US Navy and the PLAN might fix much of the other’s naval power in static opposition within a single region, ironically limiting the extra-regional footprints of both global aspirants. Both navies may seek to maintain an extra-regional presence to secure lines of communication and, in the case of China, to potentially fix US resources elsewhere. However, the very fragility of the regional balance of power will limit each navy’s slack capacity for deployment elsewhere.</p> +<p>But the expected results were not adequately achieved and the European Union decided to move away from a preeminently security-oriented approach to a more integrated intervention, adopting the EU Integrated Sahel Strategy 2021. This was formulated at a time when most of the current crises had not yet emerged. Indeed, migration flows were fairly under control, political instability in the Sahel was not yet fueled by the ensuing succession of coups, the presence of the Wagner Group was not yet threatening the region, and the European Union was not facing a war on its eastern border. The strategy today must cope with a different and more hostile situation than initially planned.</p> -<p>The second assumption is that, to the greatest extent possible, China will remain committed to securing its supply chains and maintaining market access. Beijing’s economic plan hinges on a delicate balancing act: constructing a trade framework that supports regime security and self-sufficiency while fostering in other countries greater economic dependence on it. China’s trajectory of economic growth is heavily reliant on expanding its share of global manufacturing, a strategy which necessitates sustained increases in both production capacity and global market penetration. Beijing recognises the vulnerability of its economic model to external disruptions and will continue to pursue strategies to mitigate these risks.</p> +<p>In general, EU policies toward the Sahel have sought to satisfy different interests: to solve the migration issue for the countries bordering the Mediterranean with long-term development programs in the region, to support the French military efforts over the last decade, and to introduce a European dimension to the security and development sector in the region. But the European Union has proven itself not yet ready to respond in all of these dimensions. This lack of European success must be coupled with the unilateral French stance in the Sahel, which has caused considerable frustration among European partners and seems to have had a fragmenting effect on European efforts in the region. More recently, successive military coups in Burkina Faso, Mali, and especially Niger have imposed a limit on the Europeans’ military response capacity. And the latest worrying decision made by EU member states was to not extend the fifth mandate of the European Union Training Mission in Mali (EUTM Mali) beyond May 18, 2024, although it was due to expire in January 2025. The reason given was the evolving political and security situation and consultations with the Malian authorities.</p> -<p>The third assumption is that China’s efforts to reduce its dependence on external markets and technology through initiatives such as the “dual circulation” economy and “Made in China 2025” are unlikely to fully materialise by 2032. However, if this changes, it will affect the likelihood of a coercive foreign policy in the Euro-Atlantic by setting the economic incentive structures of China and European states at odds. Although these initiatives are aimed at mitigating reliance on foreign technologies and markets, China remains deeply integrated in the international systems from which it seeks to partially detach, and its growing role in some sectors (such as electric vehicles and solar panels) will also create new dependencies on suppliers in regions such as West Africa.</p> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">In general, EU policies toward the Sahel have sought to satisfy different interests: to solve the migration issue for the countries bordering the Mediterranean with long-term development programs in the region, to support the French military efforts over the last decade, and to introduce a European dimension to the security and development sector in the region.</code></em></strong></p> -<p>The fourth assumption is that Beijing will be heavily influenced by status concerns as well as security interests. The two may significantly overlap since global acceptance of China as a rule-setter in key regions will aid its economic and security interests. As China continues to rise on the global stage, Beijing will be increasingly motivated by the desire to be recognised as a great power and to shape international norms and institutions in the image of the values and interests of the Communist Party of China (CCP). Evidence for this desire to be a rule-setter rather than a rule-follower is apparent in initiatives such as the Global Development Initiative (2021), the Global Security Initiative (2022) and the Global Civilisation Initiative (2023).</p> +<p>European governments are reluctant to support undemocratic governments because they undermine Europe’s own priorities, in particular that of advancing democracy. But at the same time, shutting down security support leaves the door open for other actors — such as the Wagner Group — to fill the void and offer support to governments in the aftermath of coups. For now, there seems to be no “good” for Europe in the Sahel. And yet, despite the current paralysis, the region remains of strategic importance to the European Union.</p> -<p>Many of the instruments that China will apply to deliver this engagement are non-military, although a limited military presence can serve several aims for China. These include enabling certain forms of engagement (such as coordination on non-traditional security threats) and supporting China’s scientific establishment, as well as the efforts of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to generate maritime domain awareness and setting the conditions for a more ambitious military posture, should political and military circumstances require it.</p> +<h3 id="nato">NATO</h3> -<h3 id="ii-chinas-strategic-interests-in-the-euro-atlantic">II. China’s Strategic Interests in the Euro-Atlantic</h3> +<p>NATO’s southern flank has always existed, although it has been considered strategically secondary to its eastern flank. NATO’s southern members have historically been most concerned about security issues in the Mediterranean and its adjacent regions; they have also been among the most vocal advocates for NATO to pay more attention to its southern neighborhood. However, there is room for improvement in terms of the cohesion of the alliance’s approach, to the extent that, at times, the Mediterranean has become an area of competition rather than coordination among NATO’s southern members. It should not be forgotten that NATO is an alliance of sovereign countries, some of which have permanent interests in the south. That is why NATO accepted the UN Security Council’s invitation to protect civilians in Libya in 2011: it was reflecting French and Italian interests in North Africa. Similarly, in 2012, regional interests were at play when it was decided at the Chicago Summit to erect a southward-oriented missile shield for the alliance. Ultimately, it is the member states that decide to project stability in the south — bilaterally, regionally, or through the European Union, the United Nations, or NATO.</p> -<p>China has several major areas of strategic interest in the Euro-Atlantic and adjoining regions to which its position in the maritime domain may be relevant. These are:</p> +<p>In general, NATO has not been very explicit in addressing risks emanating from the Sahel region. It was only in 2016 that the alliance formally launched the so-called 360° approach, which addresses threats from all fronts and ensures a focused and tailored response. Thanks to the political commitment of countries such as Spain and Italy, NATO began to adopt — at least theoretically — this global vision that valued all its borders with equal concern. Since then, NATO has tried to reformulate its policies toward the southern region according to the notion of “stability projection,” with the idea of contributing to a stable environment in NATO’s vicinity by increasing regional understanding and situational awareness and by supporting capacity building in partner countries.</p> -<ul> - <li> - <p>Securing SLOCs and access to critical resources.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Maintaining market access to Europe.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Protecting Chinese overseas interests.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Maintaining the capacity to put pressure on the US and other Western states on “exterior lines”.</p> - </li> -</ul> +<p>The most recent NATO Parliamentary Assembly regional outlook reports have identified the security environment in North Africa and the Sahel as among the key trends that will shape the future. They point to the importance of the region because of its geographical proximity to Europe, as well as its cultural, social, economic, postcolonial, and migratory links. In addition, the latest strategic concept adopted in Madrid in 2022 confirmed the alliance’s commitment to work with its partners in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) and Sahel regions “to address shared security threats,” including war, terrorism, and the growing challenges related to climate change — a commitment that would be reaffirmed at the summit in Vilnius the year after. A few months later, the secretary-general appointed an independent group of experts whose findings of a “comprehensive and deep reflection process” on the southern flank were reflected in a report published in May. The report laid the ground for “an action plan for a stronger, more strategic and result-oriented approach toward our southern neighborhood,” including the Sahel area, an idea that managed to be incorporated into the Washington Summit Declaration of 2024. It should also be noted that the declaration refers to new efforts in the fight against terrorism and the identification of key areas for long-term effort, one of which is undoubtedly the Sahel. The Washington summit also produced the establishment of a special representative for the southern neighborhood, a position to which Spanish deputy assistant secretary general for political affairs and security policy Javier Colomina was appointed shortly thereafter.</p> -<h4 id="securing-sea-lines-of-communication">Securing Sea Lines of Communication</h4> +<p>All this aside, the Eastern flank is still considered by the allies the immediate and primary challenge to NATO, while in the long term the Indo-Pacific is beginning to stand out. As a result, the alliance’s political and military leeway to the southern flank risks being limited. What does seem to be clear among the allies, however, is that the increasing instability in the Sahel makes it necessary to consider that a southward-oriented NATO strategy should not necessarily stop at the Mediterranean and its immediate areas of influence. Beyond the Maghreb, Africa is an integral part of the European and transatlantic security calculus.</p> -<p>While energy supplies that traverse the Indian Ocean have historically been an area of focus for Chinese strategists, a number of critical Chinese supply chains have bottlenecks in the Atlantic. For example, 98% of China’s cobalt is imported, with the majority from the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). Cobalt plays a vital role in several industrial processes, including oil refining. Similarly, much of China’s manganese, used in the production of steel and anodes for lithium-ion batteries, is procured from South Africa, Gabon and Ghana. This can have long-term military ramifications. Despite the fears of Chinese strategists, the prospect of a US blockade of the Strait of Malacca has always been remote: it would also have an impact on countries within the cordon (and the PLAN would inflict considerable attrition on any enforcing vessels). Many of China’s avenues to securing other key inputs, such as cobalt, are far more fragile.</p> +<p>But an extension of the security space beyond the Mediterranean and North Africa would imply closer cooperation with regional institutions and partner countries. Countries like Senegal and Nigeria could be important in NATO’s effort to “project stability” to the south. But from an operational point of view, NATO’s global engagement has obvious limits. It is therefore important to distinguish between the idea of NATO’s role in the Global South and the alliance’s role as a forum for the discussion of broader strategic concerns and policy coordination. From a political point of view, NATO’s southern flank can extend as far as the allies agree to take it.</p> -<p>The efforts of the US and its allies to control flows of key industrial and military inputs that must cross the South Atlantic in a conflict are, in theory, more militarily achievable. The US Navy could constrain flows of these inputs with a close blockade in more militarily permissive waters. Whether the US has an appetite to enforce such a cordon on distant neutral states is debatable, especially as this would also rob the US Navy of resources it would need in the Pacific. However, it would seem logical that a country that has spent decades treating the “Malacca dilemma” as a real concern should be equally worried about the prospects of such a blockade. It should perhaps not be surprising, therefore, that the PLAN is reportedly seeking bases capable of hosting its aircraft carriers in West African states such as Gabon and Equatorial Guinea, and that it has conducted visible naval exercises with Russia and South Africa. Chinese military authors have posited that aircraft carriers have an important role in protecting SLOCs and a carrier strike group acting as a fleet in being need not be preponderant to significantly complicate SLOC interdiction.</p> +<p>When it comes to challenges such as terrorism, instability, and the migration crisis affecting Europe, NATO is not and should not be the first responder. National authorities, the European Union, and ad hoc coalitions should lead the way. Maritime, humanitarian, and low-intensity counterterrorism issues are indeed particularly promising scenarios for NATO-EU cooperation. Practical and effective collaborative strategies already exist, as demonstrated by the support provided by NATO’s Operation Sea Guardian to the European Union’s Operation Sophia, which aims to disrupt criminal networks of smugglers and traffickers operating in the Mediterranean. However, several other crises in the area have not been addressed through NATO-EU cooperation, exemplified by the current situation in Libya.</p> -<p>Nonetheless, there are a number of alternative and arguably less risky methods of supply-chain derisking available to China, including diversification and stockpiling – the same approach China applies to oil. Moreover, in a conflict, the precedence taken by military production over civilian consumption and the ability of a sophisticated economy to engage in import substitution is typically a limiting factor on the immediate impact of a blockade. Short of imposing something analogous to the Navicert system on vessels leaving African ports, it is unclear how the US Navy could impose a blockade, since most shipping to China occurs on vessels that are not Chinese-flagged. It is entirely plausible that the assertions of the Chinese military community regarding the need for “far seas protection” reflect institutional beliefs and interests of the PLAN rather than China’s strategy. If this is the case, it might well be that these interests will not translate into a military presence adjacent to the Euro-Atlantic, with some questioning the evidence that China has indeed sought a base in West Africa.</p> +<p>Planning for the long term in a manner that builds on the alliance’s strengths and is sustainable over time is thus an urgent need — even if this amounts to a relatively modest effort.</p> -<p>At a minimum, however, a plausible rationale for a military presence does exist and China has reportedly already set up military infrastructure, such as telemetry stations in Kenya. If the naval protection of SLOCs becomes a core mission for China, this would place sizeable Chinese forces within the Atlantic. On balance, this paper argues that this is unlikely to occur until well beyond the next decade, but efforts to set the conditions for a Chinese naval presence in the Atlantic, should a future leader opt to create one, may be visible during the next 15 years.</p> +<h3 id="national-interests">National Interests</h3> -<h4 id="maintaining-market-access-to-europe">Maintaining Market Access to Europe</h4> +<p>In an increasingly unstable international environment in which a Global South is ascending regardless of Western diplomatic pressure, organizations such as the European Union and NATO are limited in their ability to influence countries beyond the West on security and defense issues. But in the Sahel, there is perhaps still room for them. In the Sahel in particular, governments have traditionally given more importance to relations and cooperation with states, such as France, Italy, and Spain, than relations with multilateral organizations.</p> -<p>Market access to the consumption-led economies of Europe represents a second area of focus for China. The country has invested substantially in efforts to increase its connectivity across Eurasia through the Belt and Road Initiative, and the ability to move finished goods to European markets is likely to remain a significant driver of Chinese foreign policy, especially as its investment-led economic model will make it difficult to shift to a consumption-led economy.</p> +<h4 id="france">France</h4> -<p>Strategic investments in port infrastructure in Europe, including Piraeus in Greece and Hamburg in Germany, as well as ports in countries such as Egypt, give Chinese companies a controlling share in a number of critical maritime nodes, with Chinese firms owning or having a stake in all 15 of the world’s busiest ports. Chinese firms are deploying sophisticated logistics management platforms such as LOGINK, which already has agreements with at least 24 ports, and security inspection equipment manufactured by Nuctech. These technologies provide unprecedented opportunity for covert gathering of intelligence about maritime traffic, trade flows, cargo data and even biometric information of individuals working at ports. In principle, there are sound commercial reasons for China’s port investments and they do not necessarily provide Beijing with control over operations. However, a central position in global transport networks can be employed as a coercive instrument. Port operators are bound by national laws and cannot easily refuse services on political grounds, but countries can exercise other forms of control over their companies and capital. Consider, for example, recent US restrictions on the ability of US nationals to work with Chinese companies in key sectors. Moreover, coercive activity can be presented as administrative procedure, as was the case during China’s 2010 rare earths embargo on Japan (under the aegis of production issues) and its embargo on Norwegian salmon after the latter hosted the dissident Liu Xiabo (under the aegis of health inspections, conducted repeatedly until the produce rotted).</p> +<p>The current wave of postcolonial African — and, specifically, Sahelian — unease with France may have originated in 2014, when France launched Operation Barkhane to fight jihadism in several countries in the region, starting with Mali. The operation lasted eight years, and although it achieved military successes on the ground, it prevented the collapse of Mali’s government and territorial integrity against a jihadist threat coming mainly from the north of the country. Its continued presence also created resentment and a focal point for growing public discontent with France. A wave of pan-Africanism, centered on anti-Westernism, has been on the rise, mobilizing sectors of the military and political elites in the Sahel countries and highlighting anti-French sentiment as a lever to seize power.</p> -<p>Economic entanglement, even if not designed explicitly for coercion, can create latent coercive tools – consider how networks such as SWIFT (Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunications – the leading provider of secure financial messaging services) have been weaponised against Russia and Iran. The dominance of Chinese companies, such as engineering giant ZPMC, in providing critical port equipment such as ship-to-shore cranes, enhances Beijing’s potential influence over port operations. For navies, a major consideration is likely to be that, for many deployments, routine resupply of non-sensitive goods depends on suppliers operating through civilian ports.</p> +<p>More than any other country, France has been exposed in Africa because of its military footprint and its adoption of measures perceived as neocolonial. It is the only former colonial power with a wide range of bases from Senegal to Djibouti, via Gabon, the Ivory Coast, and Chad. Since the independence of these countries, Paris has carried out more than 50 military operations or interventions on the continent. However, given the size of the region, its objectives were too ambitious for such a small military force, and this military solution was only a “band-aid” that failed to address the structural weaknesses of regional states. Seen from this perspective, France is reaping the consequences of its interventionism in Africa and its failure to successfully curb terrorism.</p> -<h4 id="protecting-chinese-overseas-interests">Protecting Chinese Overseas Interests</h4> +<p>Hence, when powers like Russia, with no colonial history in the region, offered aid in fighting jihadism, they were welcomed, even if they were financed by appropriating part of the natural wealth of the Sahel countries. This is what French president Emmanuel Macron described as “the baroque alliance of the pseudo-Pan-Africanists and the new imperialists.” Reflecting on the above mistakes, Macron has expressed the desire to develop a relationship with Sahelian states “without paternalism or weaknesses,” warning that the recent string of coups in the region entails “a risk of weakening the West and especially Europe.” That is why Paris bet on Niger — but the partnership has not worked out.</p> -<p>The protection of China’s overseas interests, including the considerable number of Chinese nationals who work abroad, is also an increasingly important goal, the salience of which was illustrated by events such as the 2011 non-combatant evacuation operation for Chinese nationals in Libya carried out by the PLAN.</p> +<p>France, however, will likely continue to have a military and diplomatic presence in Africa because it has (primarily geostrategic) interests to preserve. Moreover, France signed the Quirinale Treaty with Italy in 2021, which reflects a will to bet on reinforced bilateral cooperation, the effects of which have begun to be visible in the Sahel. It should be noted that this cooperation does not apply to North Africa, a region in which Rome and Paris have each developed deep ties with local elites, even if this has involved engaging in a struggle for influence that has benefited certain oligarchies.</p> -<p>Other overseas interests include exploration for resources in international waters, which falls under the purview of the State Oceanic Administration. In the past decade, Chinese authors have highlighted the fact that there was scope for China to increase the number of applications it made to the International Seabed Authority for mining rights in the Atlantic, with a specific focus on metallic sulphides in the South Atlantic. China has recently concluded its first deep-sea expedition in the Atlantic, in which the State Oceanic Administration’s research ship Shenyai Yihao (which can operate a range of submersibles) played a leading role. China has also conducted a number of scientific expeditions in the Atlantic in the past decade, with a particular focus on the South Atlantic. A number of Chinese scholars and analysts have also expressed interest in resource extraction in areas such as the Arctic, which, although not part of the Euro-Atlantic, have a symbiotic relationship with it, particularly since several NATO members are Arctic states. Activity in the Arctic can serve a range of aims, including setting the conditions for access to seabed resources in international waters and generating usable data to support navigation that Chinese entities, including the PLA, can leverage.</p> +<h4 id="italy">Italy</h4> -<p>China has committed significant resources to scientific activity in the Arctic, coordinated through the State Oceanic Administration, but which the PLA supports with personnel. The PLA is also represented on China’s Polar advisory committee. To date, China has completed 13 scientific expeditions to the region, employing platforms such as the polar icebreaker Xuelong-2, and its share of research outputs related to the region is growing rapidly. In addition, China has sought to increase its regional access through investments in infrastructure, including an abortive bid by China Communications Construction Company to construct airports in Greenland.</p> +<p>Italy is another major European player in the Sahel, with a strategy reflecting a “return” to Africa. The focus on the Sahel fits into a more general reorientation of Italian foreign policy — in line with its European partners — manifested by an increase in diplomatic activities, including the opening of new embassies, and an involvement in bilateral military operations and European cooperation.</p> -<p>Thus far, however, China has worked primarily (but not exclusively) through Russia, an approach that dovetails with Russia’s own aspirations to become a primary goods provider in the Indo-Pacific. For example, in 2021 Russia articulated plans to fill gaps in the Chinese coal sector left by China’s decision to embargo Australian coal. Much of Russia’s coal mining occurs in the Arctic and the country maintains coal mines in geopolitically sensitive Svalbard, Norway. Similarly, since 2014, Russia has relied on China for financial support to underpin its efforts to tap its liquefied natural gas (LNG) reserves in the Arctic and, in February 2021, Novatek (Russia’s second-largest gas producer) and China’s investment company Shenergy Group signed a deal to ship several million tonnes of LNG from Russia’s now-sanctioned Arctic LNG-2 project to the Yamal peninsula in northwest Siberia for onward transit to China. Despite this, China’s embrace of Russian hydrocarbons remains lukewarm. Although coal exports from Russia have risen, nearby Indonesia has been the primary beneficiary of China’s frictions with Australia, while Arctic LNG-2 has had to suspend operations due to a paucity of tankers following Western sanctions. Moreover, China’s foreign policy aspirations to be regarded as a “near Arctic” state have roused suspicions in Moscow.</p> +<p>Niger has so far been the clearest representation of Italy’s new activities in the area, mainly because of its position as a transit country for migratory flows from sub-Saharan Africa. In its bilateral engagement, for example, Italy reinforced the contingent of its project MISIN (Missione Italiana di Supporto in Niger), which has been present in the country since 2018. Italy has also increased its support of European initiatives in the region, for instance by holding key positions on the ground during European missions and by appointing Emanuela del Re as EU high representative for the Sahel.</p> -<h4 id="maintaining-pressure-on-western-states-exterior-lines">Maintaining Pressure on Western States’ Exterior Lines</h4> +<p>However, Italy’s engagement with the Sahel is not without attention to the political and security dynamics of North African countries. The links between the protracted conflict in Libya and the destabilization of the Sahel have long been a subject of debate in Italy, for example. This has manifested in the widespread adoption of the “wider Mediterranean” — an area of interest encompassing countries from West Africa to the Horn of Africa, including the Sahel — into Italian policy. At the European level, Italian engagement is also reflected in the recent creation of the “One Desert Initiative” committee, with Italy as the interlocutor between the European Union, Libya, and the Sahel. Thus, Italy’s new involvement in the Sahel, built through new bilateral proposals and greater leadership within European initiatives, also represents an important search for legitimacy, not only with African partners but also with European ones.</p> -<p>The idea of expanding strategic space on exterior lines is a common feature of Chinese analytical discourse. China is, as mentioned, likely to seek latent coercive levers to apply to Europe, if only to shape European behaviour regarding its own interests in Asia. China’s foreign policy, however, beyond its immediate environs, has thus far largely (but not exclusively) eschewed military coercion. While not averse to flexing the state’s economic muscle (for example when then Premier Wen Jiabao cancelled trade talks with France in 2007 after the latter hosted the Dalai Lama, or cutting off imports from Lithuania in 2021 over the latter’s decision to open a Taiwan Representative Office), China has by and large limited its coercive statecraft to economics and has been judicious in its use of non-military coercive tools.</p> +<p>The latest impulse has been the presentation of the “Piano Mattei per l’Africa” initiative as a new model for Italy’s cooperation with the continent and, in particular, with the Sahel. It consists of three pillars: immigration control, regional development with investment in various productive sectors, and cooperation in the field of energy. It was presented at the Italy-Africa Summit organized by the government in January 2024 as the inaugural event of its upcoming presidency of the G7. However, it was precisely the Sahel countries that decided not to participate in the summit.</p> -<p>Several Chinese analysts suggest that maritime presence in the Atlantic should be part of a strategy of operating on exterior lines and a means of relieving pressure in East Asia, although there is a lack of consensus to some degree on whether such a strategy should be militarised. Some advocate a cautious approach, emphasising geo-economics and investments in port infrastructure in which the PLAN should focus on multilateral engagement and cooperation with European states on non-traditional security threats such as piracy – partly as a means of countering the narrative that it represents a threat. Other Chinese analysts, such as Hu Bo of Beijing University, have called for a force of two to three carrier strike groups to be deployed beyond East Asia to “pin down” US assets that might be deployed to the region. Similarly, China’s premier doctrinal publication, The Science of Military Strategy, calls for aircraft carriers to be deployed to protect Chinese SLOCs. By and large, discussions of operating on exterior lines tend to focus on the Indian Ocean and Central Pacific. However, and as discussed in subsequent sections of this paper, the practicalities of operating in the Atlantic will limit possibilities for the PLAN over the next decade. Advocates of a larger presence in the Atlantic do consider the prospect of a more prominent role for Chinese “escort forces” in the region in the future but appear to recognise that the PLAN’s presence will be limited for the foreseeable future.</p> +<p>Given Italy’s ambitions and efforts in the Sahel, NATO’s decision to choose the Spanish Colomina as representative of the southern neighborhood was very badly received by the Meloni government, which sent a letter of protest to Secretary General Stoltenberg. But Italy has not given up the game and will resume efforts to push for an Italian candidacy for the post with the new NATO secretary general, Mark Rutte.</p> -<p>The idea of operating on exterior lines may also be relevant to China’s nuclear deterrent. While China’s ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) would struggle to break out of the First Island Chain in a crisis, the Arctic in theory offers a safe bastion and an energy efficient route for submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) such as the JL-3 (successor to China’s current SLBM) to reach the US, leading the Pentagon to raise the prospect of Chinese submarines operating in the Arctic. However, the practicalities of operating in the Arctic make this a highly questionable means of increasing the survivability of China’s second-strike capabilities, for reasons which are explored in greater depth in the next chapter.</p> +<h4 id="spain">Spain</h4> -<p>In practice, the PLAN’s presence in both the Euro-Atlantic and its immediate peripheries (the Arctic and South Atlantic) is for the next decade likely to be relatively modest, but the deployment of such a limited presence to set the conditions for a more significant presence beyond the next decade should not be overlooked. Moreover, while China may not have a direct regional security presence, it can have an indirect impact on the security environment in the Supreme Allied Commander Europe’s (SACEUR) Area of Responsibility in ways that bear considering, primarily through its relationship with Russia.</p> +<p>Spain could become a leading force on behalf of Europe in the Sahel. In fact, some international actors have spurred Spain on to play a larger role and increase cooperation in the region. In October 2023, Spain and the United States inaugurated the first meeting of the U.S.-Spain Working Group on the Sahel, which highlights the urgency of addressing the critical situation in the region and the role that Spain could play.</p> -<h3 id="iii-chinas-blue-water-navy-as-a-foreign-policy-instrument">III. China’s Blue-Water Navy as a Foreign Policy Instrument</h3> +<p>Madrid has consistently promoted and defended the need to devote more attention to the Mediterranean and surrounding areas, promoting cooperation frameworks and building trust between partners. But Spain’s main priority and concern is the Maghreb and, in particular, the spiral of tension between Morocco and Algeria, both fundamental countries with which Spain works bilaterally.</p> -<p>The past three decades have seen China grow as a maritime power, moving from a regional power, built for contingencies related to Taiwan and the South China Sea, into a more expeditionary force. A continued build-up of maritime capability meant that, by 2022, the PLAN had more hulls than the US Navy. Nonetheless, the US Navy remains the largest in terms of gross tonnage, while the PLAN is still in the process of moving from a regional force with a large number of smaller vessels towards a blue-water navy.</p> +<p>Spain is the only EU member state that has been in every civilian and military mission deployed in Africa since 2003. In some missions, such as EUTM-Mali, Spanish soldiers have accounted for nearly 60 percent of the total number of troops deployed. Spain has also played an important role in two international coalitions for the region: the Coalition for the Sahel, which has addressed security, governance, and development issues, and the Alliance for the Sahel, whose assembly it chaired for three years until July 2023.</p> -<p>This ambition has been manifested in projects such as the Type 055 cruiser (equipped with a higher vertical launch system capacity than the US Navy’s Ticonderoga-class, since its individual cells are larger), and the Type 076 landing helicopter assault (LHA) carrier, which may be equipped with CATOBAR (catapult launchers). Similarly, the People’s Liberation Army Navy Marine Corps (PLANMC) has grown five-fold in the past decade, with an explicitly stated focus on expeditionary missions. Notably, contingencies involving Taiwan remain the preserve of the People’s Liberation Army Ground Force (PLAGF), which controls the six heavy amphibious brigades in the Eastern Theatre Command and retained this despite the growth of the PLANMC. Moreover, since 2015 the PLA has added “far seas protection” to the list of the PLAN’s missions. It seems clear, then, that China desires the capacity to project power beyond its environs, but the answers to the questions of where, to what end and to what extent are less clear.</p> +<p>However, unlike other major countries such as France, Germany, Italy, or Poland, Spain does not have a summit at the political level that reinforces its role with the African continent — beyond bilateral meetings or other bodies such as the G5 Sahel — despite the fact that Spain is the only European country that maintains a land border with Africa.</p> -<p>It should be noted that despite its substantial growth, the PLAN still has relatively limited (although rapidly growing) blue-water capabilities. For example, the force fields fewer major surface combatants (vessels of destroyer size or larger) than the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) – the PLAN operates 31 destroyers and cruisers to the JMSDF’s 36 destroyers. The PLAN also fields four Type 075 landing helicopter docks (LHDs) in support of its marine corps. It is likely that the PLAN will also grow rapidly, but it will have significant regional commitments even within the First Island Chain, given the scale of the area the chain encompasses. For example, the Spratly Islands are 1,200 kilometres from China’s nearest land-based airfields on Hainan Island off China’s south coast. Moreover, most contemporary Chinese discussions of PLAN activity beyond the First Island Chain tend to focus on the Pacific and Indian Oceans, where establishing a militarily significant naval presence will prove highly resource intensive.</p> +<p>Therefore, despite having shown initiative and sometimes leadership capacity in this part of the planet and despite having supported the French and international military presence there, Spain has not managed to establish itself as a leading military actor in the Sahel. It was reluctant to extend the support provided by its armed forces to the Barkhane operation beyond logistical support, and it was absent from the Takuba special force entirely. And yet, the image of Spain’s presence in this region is generally positive — mainly because it has not played a colonial role in it.</p> -<h4 id="practical-limitations-of-chinas-naval-power">Practical Limitations of China’s Naval Power</h4> +<p>For the last 15 years, Spain has done invaluable work for the improvement of West Africa and the Sahel, strengthening the capabilities of some countries in the region and strengthening international cooperation. It has done so in multiple areas and initiatives, establishing its own format in its relations with countries such as Mauritania. However, in recent years it has been unable to expand its role in parallel with the new needs that have arisen. This has meant that other European countries, such as Germany or Denmark — with fewer direct interests and less influence in the region — have filled the void left by Spain.</p> -<p>In principle, the fact that most of the several critical materials on which China relies, including cobalt and magnesium, come from a limited number of West and South African providers, including the DRC, Gabon and South Africa, provides a cogent rationale for a Chinese presence in the Atlantic, which would be entirely consistent with the logic of far-seas protection. That Equatorial Guinea and Gabon are states that China has reportedly approached to secure a facility large enough to house an aircraft carrier would also be consistent with the logic of SLOC protection.</p> +<p>The good news is that Spain does not want to leave the Sahel behind. In addition to the aforementioned bilateral cooperation with the United States, Spain launched a series of new projects in Mauritania in 2024 with the support of the European Union. These include the development of green hydrogen and a broader strengthening of the partnership between Mauritania and the European Union, which will also serve as an engine for the stability of the Sahel.</p> -<p>However, there would be several impediments to the emergence of a standing PLAN presence in the Atlantic. The most obvious is the fact that in the Atlantic the PLAN would be operating at considerable distances from the wellsprings of Chinese power and in an area where the US and its allies militarily dominate – a fact acknowledged by most Chinese strategists.</p> +<h3 id="conclusion">Conclusion</h3> -<p>It could be argued (as have analysts such as Bo) that China can secure its major aims at reach by creating a distant fleet in being large enough to make the US enforcement of a blockade unfeasibly costly (especially if the US were also confronting China in East Asia). Indeed, it is precisely the difficulty of managing both a distant blockade and events in the First Island Chain (which, as several studies have noted, is not viable) that would, in theory, incentivise the US to focus on bottlenecks. Such bottlenecks include China’s access to materials that come from a small number of states where a close blockade could be more readily enforced given the absence of a Chinese naval or anti-access threat beyond the Indo-Pacific.</p> +<p>The challenges emanating from the Sahel are growing more complex, and international attention devoted to the region has risen exponentially. European states must reflect on their existing policies, which are often inadequately adapted to local challenges, and move beyond an agenda focused primarily on containing threats instead of on addressing structural problems. Given the complexity of the current situation — the entire security architecture built over the last decade that was contingent on external support having collapsed in the last year — a reset in relations between Europe and the Sahel is direly needed.</p> -<p>The issue with this reasoning, as discussed, is that the immediate demands of balancing commitments within China’s region and outside it are considerations for China as well. Despite its rapid recent growth, the PLAN has a limited blue-water fleet (it fields just eight Type 055 cruisers, for example). This will change in due course, but even a much larger PLAN fielding the six aircraft carriers that China aspires to have by 2035 will be bound by the logic of force structuring. Factors such as vessel maintenance cycles and workup periods impact all navies, and experience suggests that perhaps half of the PLAN’s notional future carrier fleet will be at sea at any given time. The forward deployment of a carrier battlegroup, particularly one that includes the nine escort cruisers, frigates and destroyers discussed by Chinese analysts, would imply that China would have to make considerable sacrifices to its force availability in East Asia. Similarly, China’s fleet of Type 075 and Type 076 LHDs and LHAs, although growing in number, is still small relative to the scale of some of the tasks required by the PLAN in the First Island Chain.</p> +<p>A new geopolitical framework is emerging in the region where Europe and the West increasingly seem out of place. This situation seems to be leading southern European countries, mainly France, Italy, and Spain, to review their policies toward the region while prioritizing bilateral efforts ahead of multilateral ones.</p> -<p>Platforms such as the Type 093 nuclear-powered attack submarine (SSN) could be used as an alternative to surface vessels for deployments beyond the First Island Chain because they are both more self-sustaining and have limited prospects of escaping the First Island Chain in a conflict (and so have bounded utility in this theatre, where China’s diesel electric submarines are more useful). However the Type 093 is relatively noisy, which, it has been suggested, appears to be a function of its propulsion systems and deficiencies in its anechoic coating, and this would limit its military utility. Since the prospective bases which might give the PLAN access to the Atlantic are likely to be in Africa, there is also a political dimension to the issue which must be considered. SSN deployments, although not strictly speaking contrary to the Treaty of Pelindaba (which declares Africa a nuclear weapons-free zone), would also create political complications for both China and the host nation. That said, there may be other rationales for extended deployments, including habituating Chinese submariners to longer periods at sea, which is presently a challenge as illustrated by the mental health issues that extended deployments are causing among Chinese submariners who are not used to them. The logic of using extended rotational deployments as a means of exposing the PLAN to the rigours of sustained activity at sea would also apply to surface vessels, but it would suggest deployments comparable to the UK’s periodic carrier strike group deployments to the Indo-Pacific, rather than a standing presence. These deployments, should they occur, would have diplomatic significance – and would represent a means for European navies to gain situational awareness of the PLAN – but their military significance in the Euro-Atlantic would be limited.</p> +<p>This approach is a mistake, given the complexity of the challenges emanating from the Sahel. A better solution would be for these countries to set aside rivalry among themselves and coordinate to address the challenges emanating from the Sahel. France, Italy, and Spain are well known in the region and can work together to coordinate agendas, particularly as all have the tacit support of the European Union and NATO. At the same time, both the European Union and NATO could take advantage of the potential coordinated effort of these three countries to harmonize their strategies toward the region, thus reducing intra-European power struggles and increasing efficiency.</p> -<p>The ability of the PLAN to operate from bases in states such as Gabon and Equatorial Guinea – and presumably hold at risk US platforms – would require a degree of willingness on the part of these states to take risks on behalf of China in both establishing bases and allowing their use. In the short to medium term, this level of risk acceptance is unlikely in what are largely transactional relationships. While the concept of the PLAN using dual-use commercial facilities to resupply distant vessels has been considered by the PLAN as a more non-committal option through which to rely on prospective partners, this is more useful to enable deployments in support of diplomacy and engagement than it is to sustain credible naval forces. It is relatively unlikely, for example, that volatile goods, such as munitions, can be stored in civilian ports for long, even if neutral ports could be used for refuelling in wartime. While the pursuit of bases by the PLAN cannot be ruled out, it is unclear whether these facilities would have a significant military role. The risk of SLOC interdiction could in the final instance be offset by other means, including stockpiling and overland transport of goods to ports in third countries to which the US is not constraining access for onward transport. In effect, the problem of resourcing a distant blockade would remain for the US, and the use of the PLAN to protect Atlantic SLOCs appears unlikely to be viable for some time.</p> +<p>France, Italy, and Spain should also coordinate with the United States, which remains concerned about instability in the Sahel. Given the mediocre results of EU and NATO efforts in the region, the United States has recently been trying to approach southern European countries individually to find effective solutions to specific countries and challenges. With the assistance of NATO’s new southern neighborhood representative, it is time for Paris, Rome, and Madrid to engage in coordinated talks with Washington to try to find new solutions for the Sahel, again leaving aside the perceived competition between them.</p> -<p>Similarly, the prospects for a Chinese SSBN bastion in the Arctic are constrained by several factors. First, the PLAN does not currently operate SSBNs capable of operating under ice, although its future Type 095 SSN and Type 096 SSBN may be able to do so. Thus far, however, the only indicators of this are academic research, which is inconclusive. Even if this is the case, the Type 096 (for which construction began in the early 2020s) will only be fielded in numbers necessary to ensure a consistent presence at sea by the end of this decade. Second, following the arrival of the first Type 096, the PLAN would need to spend additional years habituating its submariners to operations under ice (which relatively few NATO navies, such as the US Navy and Royal Navy, can do). Third, Chinese SSBNs would need to transit chokepoints such as the Bering Strait to enter the Arctic, meaning that a survivable presence would require at least one SSBN out of a planned fleet of six to be permanently in the Arctic (meaning, in effect, that the majority of the fleet would need to be committed to resourcing this mission). This would also mean that Russian support would be vital to sustain China’s undersea deterrent since Russia is the only non-Western state with experience operating submarines under ice – a strategic commitment neither nation indicated a desire to undertake. And fourth, an Arctic SSBN presence is considerably more complex to deliver than China’s other means of assuring its second strike. China is currently placing multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles, which permit a missile to deliver multiple nuclear warheads to different targets on road-mobile DF-41 ICBMs. This has the effect of ensuring that even a small number of missiles which survive a first strike can both deliver a large number of warheads and pose a complex problem to missile defences. China is also expanding its number of missile silos, increasing the number of targets that the US would need to strike to cripple its arsenal. These palliatives are far more readily achievable than an under-ice SSBN patrol.</p> +<hr /> -<p>It is likely, then, that within the next 15 years, material constraints on the PLAN will make a military presence capable of supporting Chinese interests in a high-intensity scenario either in the Euro-Atlantic or its environs unlikely. It is still plausible, however, that China is attempting to create optionality for itself and set the conditions for a more expansive presence, should this be deemed desirable and feasible. But this is unlikely to be the case for well over a decade.</p> +<p><strong>Carlota G. Encina</strong> is a non-resident senior associate with the Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.; a senior analyst for the United States and transatlantic relations at the Elcano Royal Institute, a Spanish think tank; and a lecturer in international relations.</p>Carlota G. EncinaWidespread instability and the growing influence of China and Russia has increased the strategic importance of the Sahel to European security. A reset in relations between Europe and the region is direly needed.【黎智英案・審訊第 101 日】2024-12-03T12:00:00+08:002024-12-03T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/trial-of-jimmy-lai-day-101<ul> + <li>黎智英認國安法生效前 受訪倡外國制裁阻通過 稱不能等待條文出爐後才反對</li> +</ul> -<h4 id="other-potential-uses-of-chinas-maritime-power">Other Potential Uses of China’s Maritime Power</h4> +<excerpt /> -<p>There are other functions that naval and maritime power can fulfil for China in the Euro-Atlantic.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/2REPF07.png" alt="iamge01" /></p> -<p><em>Diplomatic Signalling</em></p> +<p>【獨媒報導】壹傳媒創辦人黎智英及3間蘋果公司被控串謀勾結外國勢力及串謀刊印煽動刊物等罪，今（3日）於高院（移師西九龍法院）踏入第101日審訊，黎智英第九日作供。辯方圍繞黎的意圖提問，針對《文匯報》報導指稱黎「為美國打仗」、「為其美國主子說話」，黎否認，並強調香港示威與美國沒有關係，其言論是想證明香港人的價值觀與美國人一致。辯方在庭上播放黎在《國安法》生效之前的受訪片段，黎稱美國應對中國官員實施制裁、凍結銀行帳戶，以及停止向中國輸出技術等，又稱相信特朗普是有信用的人。他在庭上確認提倡制裁，希望阻止中國實施《國安法》。</p> -<p>Naval activity can be used as a tool of diplomatic signalling for both Europe and other actors. As noted, China has conducted several joint exercises with the Russian navy in the previous decade, including the 2017 Naval Interaction exercises in the Baltic Sea, exercises in the Mediterranean and more recent exercises with the Russian and South African navies on the periphery of the Atlantic. A PLAN Type 052D guided missile destroyer also took part in Russia’s Navy Day celebrations in St Petersburg in July 2024. One aim of joint exercises with Russia may be to signal China’s capacity to play a more significant and not entirely welcome role in Europe, should European states become more engaged in the Indo-Pacific. While not wishing to stoke paranoia, this paper notes that the coincidence of a Chinese exercise in Belarus at the same time as the NATO Summit in July 2024 and on the back of the participation of several European states in RIMPAC 24 (Rim of the Pacific Exercise, the world’s largest international maritime exercise) could be seen as exactly the kind of behaviour that best illustrates this scenario. It may be intended to signal China’s capacity to insert itself into the European security environment if European states play a larger role in the Pacific.</p> +<h4 id="黎稱沒與美國退休軍官討論核武-因核武比喻美國人擁有的價值">黎稱沒與美國退休軍官討論核武 因核武比喻美國人擁有的價值</h4> -<p><em>The PLAN as a Supporting Arm in the Euro-Atlantic</em></p> +<p>辯方大律師關文渭繼續主問，就黎智英的意圖提問。昨日提到，黎於2019年7月10日出席美國智庫「保衛民主基金會」（Foundation for Defense of Democracies，簡稱FDD）公開對談。他當時稱美國有「道德權威（moral authority）」，其支持猶如「核武（nuclear weapon）」。黎又指：「他們（中國）好像沒有任何武器便上戰場，當你使用核武的話，只需一分鐘便可擺平他們。」（“It’s like they’re like going to the battle without any weapon, and you have the nuclear weapon you can finish them in a minute.”）辯方今播放相關片段。</p> -<p>Importantly, naval activity would in this instance not be China’s primary threat to Europe – rather it would represent a relatively costly signal of China’s potential willingness to employ other tools that may be more immediately consequential. While China is unlikely to have considerable local military strength in the Euro-Atlantic over the next 15 years, it can have an indirect impact on the security of the region. For example, China could reinforce Russia’s capacity to generate export revenue. Russia still relies on Protection and Indemnity (P&amp;I) Club-insured shipping for the transfer of 45% of the vessels carrying hydrocarbons from terminals in the Baltic Sea. Russia’s continued reliance on vessels that depend on Western insurers and thus probably obey the oil price cap, and the decrepitude of the vessels in Russia’s “shadow fleet”, all point to the limits, as a means of sanctions evasion, of any Russian effort to substitute its shadow fleet for international carriers that are exposed to Western pressure. The environmental risks that older vessels pose could also be a legal basis for their eventual denied access to ports and key straits. If the major bottleneck is a lack of available seaworthy ships, Chinese state-owned oil tankers might offer Russia a means of transporting oil at above price-cap rates, particularly since the two largest global operators of oil tankers are Chinese. So far, China’s financial institutions have shied away from transactions that might fall foul of these sanctions – given the exposure of Chinese banks trading in dollars and euros to international sanctions. However, Russia’s growing reliance on Chinese-made dual-use goods and its trade deficit with China mean that transactions in renminbi would give Russia access to a currency for which it has increasing use, despite it being less tradeable than the US dollar. China could also collaborate with Russia in the production of commercial shipping for Russian state-owned firms – a possibility floated by the head of Russia’s VTB Bank Andrey Kostin as a means of clearing the backlogs in Russia’s Zvezda shipyard – or China could sell excess capacity to third-party carriers dealing in Russian oil.</p> +<p>辯方問，黎說「我們正在敵方陣營替你們打仗（we are fighting your war in your enemy camp）」，是什麼意思。黎指「我們」是指香港和示威者，正如他之前所說，冷戰是一埸價值之爭，而香港人與美國價值觀一致，因此若然香港與中國對戰，那代表香港與美國屬同一陣線。</p> -<p>China’s military support for Russia could also take more direct forms. The idea that Chinese shipyards could provide Russia’s navy with capacity was, apparently, hinted at by Vice Admiral Sergei Avakyants, then head of Russia’s Pacific Fleet, after joint exercises between the Russian navy and the PLAN. Avakyants suggested that the proportion of modern PLAN vessels allocated to exercises with the Russian Pacific Fleet partly reflected a desire to advertise China’s shipbuilding capabilities. While this assessment may or may not have been accurate, it is often the case that military support that begins as covert or partially deniable assistance escalates to more direct forms over time. Additionally, it is notable that China has recently announced that it will sell the Type 052 destroyer internationally, since few Chinese partners other than Russia have a rationale for procuring the vessel, or the funds to do so.</p> +<p>辯方問黎有否與美國前副國防部長 Paul Wolfowitz 和退休軍官 Jack Keane 討論過核武？黎稱沒有，因他只是以「核武」比喻美國人所擁有的價值。</p> -<p><em>China’s Presence in Africa</em></p> +<h4 id="辯方指黎說很想cia影響我們時在笑-黎同意從來沒有這種事">辯方指黎說「很想CIA影響我們」時在笑 黎同意：從來沒有這種事</h4> -<p>Chinese and Western security interests may well clash in third-party states where China seeks a growing security footprint. To some extent this may have already occurred. In July 2024, Italian authorities interned a Chinese vessel carrying Wing Loong UAVs to Libya’s General Khalifa Haftar, in contravention of the UN arms embargo on Libya. The reality of Chinese-operated ports on Europe’s immediate periphery may make similar interdictions more difficult to achieve in the future. China also has a growing security presence in states such as the DRC, where it has supplied the government with CH-4 UAVs to fight rebel forces, and the Chinese aeronautics company, China National Aero-Technology Import &amp; Export Corporation, has offered to supply the DRC with J-10 aircraft. If longstanding Chinese investment (which comes with fewer political strings than Western alternatives) is combined with more lenient terms, military support between China and Russia could, unchecked, leave both countries with an even greater level of control over Western economy supply chains than they currently enjoy. China can support such activity through the provision of advise and assist missions and by acting as an alternative partner to Western states on issues such as counterpiracy, as it has with Nigeria.</p> +<p>辯方昨日提到，黎於2020年5月接受台灣節目《鄉民來衝康》的訪問，當他被問到有沒有CIA（美國中央情報局）影響香港的示威，他說：「我們很想 CIA，我很想美國影響我們，我很想英國影響我們，我很想外國影響我們，他們的支持是我們唯一能夠撐下去的，外國的勢力是現在我們非常需要，讓我們撐下去的。」辯方今在庭上播放相關片段。</p> -<p><em>Sabotage</em></p> +<p>辯方指，從畫面可見黎說以上說話時正在笑。黎同意，「因為從來都沒有這種事。」</p> -<p>There is also potential for Chinese limited and deniable coercive activity in the Euro-Atlantic, in tandem with Russia. Consider, for example, the alleged sabotage of the Balticconnector pipeline (a natural gas pipeline between Finland and Estonia) by the NewNew Polar Bear (a vessel registered in China owned by several Russian and Chinese commercial entities) which appears to have dragged its anchor over the pipeline. Chinese survey ships and commercial companies associated with the cable industry or deep sea mining could step up activity near submarine cables in the Atlantic in areas with a lighter NATO presence, such as the Azores Fibre Optic System, and near connections from West Africa such as the Cabo Verde node. The surveying activity being conducted by the Ministry of National Resources could certainly support this, particularly since data gathered must be shared with the PLA. However, there are several impediments to the option of sabotage activity in the Atlantic. China is itself seeking to become a major, if not quite monopolistic, provider of cable services linking European companies to East Asia – a concern that led the US to force China Telecom out of the consortium building the SEA-ME-WE-6 cable (an optical fibre submarine communications cable system that carries telecommunications between Singapore and France) in 2023. Notably, China chose to bankroll an alternative cable linking Asia and Europe (Europe–Middle East–Asia, known as the EMA). Any suggestion of China’s involvement in sabotage would make it considerably easier to build a political consensus for excluding Chinese companies from sensitive projects in the Euro-Atlantic.</p> +<h4 id="黎否認為美國打仗否認美國是主子">黎否認「為美國打仗」、否認美國是「主子」</h4> -<p>Unlike Russia, China has not invested heavily in the specialised military equipment needed to target infrastructure, such as cables at depths that make repair difficult, although civil capabilities such as uncrewed underwater vehicles, built for exploring the seabed, could be used in a military capacity.</p> +<p>辯方展示《文匯報》報導〈肥黎默認「為美打仗」 政界批賣港禍國〉，當中引述黎在受訪時提及「中美新冷戰」，並指：「多名立法會議員昨日接受香港文匯報訪問時批評，美國一心箝制中國發展，而黎智英則為其美國主子說話，以各種手段破壞香港社會秩序，其賣港行為令人髮指。」</p> -<p>While it is not possible to entirely exclude sabotage as a tool of dissuasion, it remains relatively unlikely.</p> +<p>辯方引述報導指黎變相承認香港的反政府事件是「為美國打仗」，問黎這說法是否真確。黎否認，並指香港的示威與美國沒有關係；而他在「保衛民主基金會」中說「我們正在敵方陣營替你們打仗」，是用比喻手法來說明香港示威是爭取價值，而該些價值觀與美國的一致。辯方追問黎是否「為美國打仗」，黎回答：「不是，我們不是為美國打仗，我們是為自己而戰」，以避免中國侵害香港的自由，並重申香港示威是爭取與美國一致的價值。</p> -<p><em>Transfer of Data</em></p> +<p>辯方引述報導形容「黎智英則為其美國主子說話」，黎則否認，並稱其言論是想證明香港人的價值觀與美國人一致，強調香港人和美國人沒有實質的關係。辯方追問黎，美國是否他的主子？黎否認。</p> -<p>A more significant challenge is the prospect of China becoming a key provider of services related to the transfer of data, which can be employed for intelligence gathering. The latter contingency would, however, only become an extreme consideration if China became a monopolistic actor in the cable market, and with Chinese companies such as HMN Tech (which provides submarine network system solutions) currently holding a 10% market share, this is some way off, although ensuring this remains the case is a policy consideration for Western states.</p> +<h4 id="黎稱聽過中國內爆但未聞支爆">黎稱聽過「中國內爆」但未聞「支爆」</h4> -<p>While the PLA can support foreign policy aims in the Euro-Atlantic and its environs that are contrary to European interests, it is these policies themselves rather than the military presence involved in them that are the major concern. For the most part, the PLA will be a supporting element in the Euro-Atlantic, reinforcing Chinese foreign policy aims as a tool of military signalling and engagement. These functions can, however, set the conditions for a more militarily credible presence in the long term, and the evolution of the PLAN’s footprint should be monitored.</p> +<p>法官李素蘭重提昨日證供，引述黎提到如果中國經濟內爆的話，中國政府的統治正當性便會崩塌。黎解釋，其意思是中國政府的統治正當性是來自經濟發展，但是如果經濟崩潰的話，中國政府便會失去統治正當性，國家主席習近平亦可能要下台，並強調他只是作出預測和臆測。</p> -<h3 id="conclusions-and-lessons-for-european-navies">Conclusions and Lessons for European Navies</h3> +<p>法官李素蘭問黎，「你是在2019年9月作出預測，這說法正確嗎？」黎確認。法官李素蘭繼而指，黎在當時已撰文提及中國內爆，然而黎作供關於2020年1月11日的陽明山會議時，卻聲稱「支爆」這字詞是由「攬炒巴」劉祖廸在會議上首先提出，質疑黎聲稱當時從沒聽過「支爆」的說法。黎同意，他當時從未聽聞「支爆」一字，正確的字眼應是「中國內爆」（China implosion），而「支爆」和「支那」是一種古老的方式談論「中國」，如果今時今日有人使用這字詞，對方不會明白意思。</p> -<p>For European navies, the direct military threat posed by the growing Chinese presence in the Atlantic will be low for at least the next 15 years. Moreover, most Chinese activity relevant to the Atlantic will occur just beyond the peripheries of the Euro-Atlantic, off West Africa, in the South Atlantic, and the Arctic. The key consideration for Europe’s navies will be how much capacity they allocate to hedging against the prospective evolution of China’s Atlantic posture, given the resource demands of contending with other acute threats.</p> +<p>由於是次審訊語言為英文，庭上就「支爆」的英語翻譯為「China implosion」，與「中國內爆」的英語翻譯相同。因此黎解釋自己未曾聽聞「支爆（China implosion）」之後，不諳中文的法官李素蘭表示仍然不明白，並重複問題，質疑黎早已撰文提及「中國內爆」（同樣譯作「China implosion」），卻稱未曾聽過「支爆」的說法。</p> -<p>There appears to be no consensus from Beijing on requirements for a significant military presence in the Atlantic, although considerable attention is paid to the question of expanding “strategic space” in other ways. While China faces tangible risks to some of its supply lines in the Atlantic, there is little that it can do to rectify this challenge in military terms in the medium term. Moreover, there are non-military means by which China can mitigate risk, including diversification, stockpiling and rerouting goods. It is conceivable, however, that the PLAN could pursue rotational deployments in the South Atlantic within the next two decades as a means of both setting the conditions for a more substantial presence in the longer term and habituating the force to operations at reach.</p> +<p>黎則重申他未曾聽聞「支爆」，他只提及過「中國內爆（China implosion）」，若從英語翻譯過來即是「中國爆」，然而「支爆」則是一種過於古老的方式去說「中國」，他從未聽過有人如此說「支那」、「支爆」，現今人們聽到不會明白是什麼意思。</p> -<p>In all likelihood, much of the activity that this entails will effectively amount to Phase 0 shaping activity in areas adjoining (but not part of) SACEUR’s Area of Responsibility, including the South Atlantic and the Arctic. Port visits by PLAN vessels, maritime data acquisition, military cooperation on non-traditional security issues, and defence engagement in the form of arms sales can, collectively, set the conditions for the PLAN to secure access in areas such as the South Atlantic. While these pursuits are not immediately threatening, they do accord to the importance of European navies remaining engaged in regions that many of them may wish to de-emphasise to refocus resources on the much more pressing challenge of deterrence regarding Russia. While the prioritisation of acute threats represents a rational choice, an economy-of-force effort to match China’s Phase 0 activity should be retained as an economy-of-force task. This need not always involve the deployment of assets – in the Gulf of Guinea, for example, the Anglo-French MDAD-GoG (Maritime Domain Awareness Trade-Gulf of Guinea) has arguably been the most useful European contribution to the safety of regional shipping. Frameworks allowing for the pooling and rotational commitment of ships to tasks such as engagement might also be a means for European navies to manage competing commitments with limited force structures, and this might be a role for the Anglo-French Combined Joint Expeditionary Force, which has lost its original rationale (resourcing expeditionary commitments comparable to the 2011 intervention in Libya).</p> +<p>辯方大律師關文渭介入並解釋，「支那（Shina）」本來是日本使用的詞語去形容「中國」，是一個帶貶損和貶意的詞語，也是一個古老的詞語，今時今日很少人使用。</p> -<p>Operating in proximity to the PLAN may also offer it information-gathering opportunities, much as was the case in 2021 when the activities of Chinese Type 093 SSNs near the UK’s carrier strike group revealed (or at a minimum provided the opportunity to verify) a number of details regarding the platform’s acoustic signatures. This represents not only an information-gathering opportunity, but potentially also a constraint on Chinese activity in the Atlantic if this activity raises the prospect of sensitive data regarding deployed vessels being gathered.</p> +<p>法官杜麗冰問，所以黎的意思是他曾經聽聞「中國內爆」，但是未曾聽過「支爆」。黎同意，所以當劉祖廸說「支爆」時，他表示不明白，要求劉解釋，但是黎確認自己有撰文提及「中國內爆」。</p> -<p>In contrast to China’s limited naval presence, China’s engagement on the peripheries of the Euro-Atlantic could have immediate effects. For example, deeper Chinese engagement with Russia as a means of derisking some of China’s own supply lines and pressuring European states cannot be ruled out. In economic terms, China can substantially increase Russia’s capacity to generate revenue both through China’s own deeper engagement with Russian hydrocarbons extraction in the Arctic and by enabling Russia to circumvent oil price caps without having to rely on an old and relatively small fleet of dark ships (unregistered and uninsured vessels that have turned off or disabled their automatic identification systems).</p> +<h4 id="國安法消息傳出翌日-提出開設twitter-黎冀讓世界知道香港發生什麼事">國安法消息傳出翌日 提出開設Twitter 黎：冀讓世界知道香港發生什麼事</h4> -<p>In military terms, China’s capacity to serial-produce vessels such as the Type 052D represents the last plausible avenue through which Russia could generate a blue-water surface capability. While China’s engagement with Russian hydrocarbons remains relatively cautious, there are sound reasons for this to change, including the fact that Russia offers China a means of hedging against the Malacca dilemma. Moreover, China’s export of dual-use military goods to Russia illustrates a willingness in principle to engage in defence exports.</p> +<p>辯方指2020年5月21日，黎向時任《蘋果》副社長陳沛敏傳送《香港01》的新聞，有關人大擬在港實施《國安法》，黎並說：「仆街打到嚟喇！」翌日即2020年5月22日，黎向李兆富傳送訊息，稱有見人大打算通過在香港實施《國安法》，現在是設立 Twitter 帳戶的好時機。辯方問黎何以這樣說。黎指開設 Twitter 是想讓世界知道香港發生什麼事。</p> -<p>These possibilities do not change any of NATO’s core missions, but they do mean that planning for deterrence with regard to Russia should include the possibility that in areas where Russia is currently assessed to have relatively dim prospects (such as long-term growth and the size of its surface fleet), Chinese support is one of the few means that could enable Russia in the near future.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/DXjywsB.png" alt="iamge02" /> +▲ 前《蘋果日報》執行總編輯 林文宗（左）、副社長 陳沛敏（右）</p> -<p>In effect, the optimal direct response for Europe’s navies to a PLAN with a limited but gradually expanding Euro-Atlantic footprint should be one premised on mirroring the non-committal but potentially useful Phase 0 shaping activities that the PLAN itself appears to be undertaking. It should further set the conditions to constrain a more assertive China if need be, without overreacting to a prospect that may never materialise.</p> +<p>辯方追問，當時《國安法》條文尚未公開，問黎何以得知《國安法》內容。黎則指憑當時的新聞報導得知《國安法》將會取代香港現行的法律制度。黎認為《國安法》會凌駕《基本法》和法治。</p> -<hr /> +<h4 id="twitter-帖文標籤magnitskyact-黎稱出自李兆富之手只有粗略理解">Twitter 帖文標籤「#MagnitskyAct」 黎稱出自李兆富之手、只有粗略理解</h4> -<p><strong>Sidharth Kaushal</strong> is Research Fellow for Sea Power at RUSI. His research at RUSI covers the impact of technology on maritime doctrine in the 21st century, and the role of sea power in a state’s grand strategy.</p> +<p>辯方展示2020年5月23日的訊息紀錄，陳沛敏向黎智英傳送一張人大政協委員的合照，相中眾人手持「支持國安立法 護航一國兩制」橫額，陳並稱：「Will they be on the list?」黎問：「What do you mean? Thanks」，陳回覆：「賣港賊，制裁名單？」黎表示：「I see. Good suggest.」陳續表示：「張相和唐英年的發言 disgusted many Hong Kong people」，黎其後稱：「I’ve already put them on my Twitter: should US government put these people (on) the sanction list?」</p> -<p><strong>René Balletta</strong> was the First Sea Lord’s Visiting Fellow at RUSI until August 2024. He has served much of his career at sea in a variety of surface platforms that include frigates, destroyers, amphibious assault ships and aircraft carriers.</p> +<p>辯方指，黎同日將同一張人大政協委員合照傳送給李兆富，問原因為何。黎稱是因應陳沛敏的提議，他認為是很好的提議，所以傳送給李兆富，供他在 Twitter 發布。</p> -<p><strong>Philip Shetler-Jones</strong> is a Senior Research Fellow in the International Security research team at RUSI. His current research is concentrated on Indo-Pacific security. His recent publications have focused on the defence policy of Japan, attitudes of China to NATO, and narratives about the defence of Taiwan.</p> +<p>辯方指，黎的 Twitter 帳戶同日發布帖文，顯示人大政協委員合照，並加上字句：「Should US government put them on the sanction list? #MagnitskyAct」黎稱帖文是因應陳沛敏的提議，發布合照是因為相中的人大政協委員削弱香港的自由。</p> -<p><strong>Elizabeth Lindley</strong> is an analyst of politics of the People’s Republic of China, Chinese foreign policy, and cross-strait relations. She has a degree in Chinese Studies (First Class Hons) from the University of Cambridge, which included advanced Mandarin study in Taipei.</p>Sidharth Kaushal, et al.This paper outlines the likely scope of a putative presence of the People’s Liberation Army Navy in and around the Euro-Atlantic in the next 15 years and the nature of the foreign policy it will support.【黎智英案・審訊第 97 日】2024-11-27T12:00:00+08:002024-11-27T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/trial-of-jimmy-lai-day-97<ul> - <li>陳梓華指稱黎智英欲領導勇武派 黎反駁：荒誕可笑、不可能這樣說</li> -</ul> +<p>辯方問黎當時知道《國安法》是關於什麼嗎？黎表示知道得不詳細，但從新聞報導，他得悉《國安法》將會是一個凌駕《基本法》和法治的法律，以及會是嚴厲的法律。辯方追問黎何以得知《國安法》削弱法治？黎指當時市內有很多輿論，包括民主派和作家。</p> -<excerpt /> +<p>辯方提到帖文內有標籤「#MagnitskyAct」，黎則稱是由李兆富加上的。辯方問黎當時明白「Magnitsky Act」是什麼嗎？黎稱不明白詳情，但是從表面上來看，這個詞是關於制裁。黎又稱自己對「Magnitsky Act」只有粗略的理解，而且一般而言不會在意李兆富加入的標籤。</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/EAtyQtX.png" alt="image01" /></p> +<h4 id="蘋果發起一人一信救香港-黎用盡所有必要的手段去阻止國安法實施">《蘋果》發起「一人一信救香港」 黎：用盡所有必要的手段去阻止國安法實施</h4> -<p>【獨媒報導】壹傳媒創辦人黎智英及3間蘋果公司被控串謀勾結外國勢力及串謀刊印煽動刊物等罪，今（27日）於高院（移師西九龍法院）踏入第97日審訊，黎智英第五日作供。另一名從犯證人陳梓華曾引述黎指勇武需要減少暴力，否則會使運動失去道德高地，又形容黎「想領導或主導勇武派」。黎否認，反指：「這是荒誕可笑的，我沒有可能這樣說」，「若我說出這樣的話是愚蠢的，這是自以為是的。」他又指那些年輕人不會聆聽任何人，故此不可能聆聽像他這樣的人。</p> +<p>辯方指2020年5月24日《蘋果》頭版發起「一人一信救香港」行動。黎稱目的是阻止《國安法》實施，因《國安法》對香港具破壞性。</p> -<p>此外，法官針對黎 Twitter 推文含有標籤「#StandWithHongKong」提問，黎則指是李兆富負責編輯和加入標籤，當時純粹理解這串字是代表「支持香港」的立場，認為與「重光團隊（Stand With Hong Kong）」無關。他又重申在庭上才首次得知「重光團隊」的存在。</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/ycUHxF9.png" alt="iamge03" /></p> -<h4 id="張劍虹稱黎在飯盒會下達編採指示-黎否認">張劍虹稱黎在飯盒會下達編採指示 黎否認</h4> +<p>陳沛敏曾供稱不認同做法，並且同日以 WhatsApp 傳送黃之鋒的 Facebook 帖文截圖給黎。黃在帖文稱「睇到真係覺得有啲骨痹同埋肉麻」，指香港不應要求別國的總統去拯救香港。</p> -<p>就首項控罪「串謀刊印、發布、出售、要約出售、分發、展示或複製煽動刊物」，控方指稱黎智英透過舉行「飯盒會」來下達編採指示。「從犯證人」、時任《蘋果》社長張劍虹曾供稱，在「飯盒會」裡，所有出席者會坐下來吃飯盒，期間黎會談及對時局的看法、其政治取態，以及下達《蘋果日報》的編採政策。</p> +<p>黎當時回覆表示：「他（黃）說了什麼並不重要，這是看待美國和目前議題的不同觀點，我不認同他，任何東西可以幫助到我們的話都應該去用。我知道很多人都不認同這行動，包括李柱銘，但是在危機面前我們不能裝作謹慎和聰明，勇敢是唯一出路！現時已沒有其他方法對付中共了。」（“What he says doesn’t matter. That’s a very different view of looking at US and the matter at hand. I don’t agree with him, whatever we can secure to help us we must use now. I know a lot of people don’t agree with this including Martin, but now is time crisis we can’t pretend to be careful and clever. The only way is to be brave! There’s no other way to deal with CCP now.”）</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/woUU6Rq.png" alt="image02" /> +<p>黎庭上解釋，當時處於危急關頭，所以他認為要用盡所有必要的方法去阻止《國安法》實施，但他知道陳沛敏和張劍虹均不認同「一人一信」做法。辯方問黎會否視這些訊息為給予陳沛敏指示？黎說不會，「我只是回覆她，這裡沒有任何指示。」</p> + +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/qt6lFsz.png" alt="image04" /> ▲ 前《蘋果日報》社長 張劍虹</p> -<p>黎今在庭上否認張的說法，反指「飯盒會」的形式是出席者向他提問，然後他解答問題。黎續指，會議歷時約15至20分鐘，大部份時間都是沉默，因為大家都在吃飯，即使有人說話，話題也不是關於報紙，而是一些無關重要的事情。他指並不是如張所稱的情況，「我們正在吃飯，不會有任何認真的事情要說，當你吃飯的時候是不會說話的。」</p> +<p>辯方問到，當時陳沛敏和張劍虹均不認同「一人一信救香港」，黎又如何發起行動？黎表示：「因為我是老闆。」他其後表示，當時提出這行動的同事必定認同這行動，並舉例指時任動新聞總監張志偉認同。張在本案中沒有被起訴。</p> -<p>黎指，當大家吃完飯盒之後，每名出席者會輪流向他發問或提出意見，而他會回答問題。辯方問，情形是否好像「問答環節」和討論？黎同意。</p> +<h4 id="黎指李兆富提議twitter上載信件照片及標註特朗普-惟最終沒有實行">黎指李兆富提議Twitter上載信件照片及標註特朗普 惟最終沒有實行</h4> -<h4 id="黎蘋果從不需要編採指示-因核心價值與港人一致">黎：《蘋果》從不需要編採指示 因核心價值與港人一致</h4> +<p>黎指，由於當時正值疫情，郵寄實體信件的話可能需時一個月，所以李兆富提議在 Twitter 上載信件，然後標註特朗普的帳戶，但是黎相信最後沒有實行，因他記不起有人上載信件照片及標註特朗普。</p> -<p>辯方又問，黎有否在會議上談及編採指示？黎稱沒有，因《蘋果》從不需要任何編採指示，也不需要訓練員工，因為他相信員工所抱持的核心價值與香港人一致，相關價值包括言論自由、遊行自由、宗教自由、民主和法治。</p> +<p>辯方遂展示「一人一信救香港」頭版，當中提到「三大方法向特朗普表達訴求」，包括 Twitter、Facebook 和白宮聯署。黎確認三種方法均不需要經過《蘋果》便能做到。法官李運騰問黎是否不會知道讀者最終有否採用 Twitter 的方法。黎同意，因上載信件的照片到 Twitter 毋須經過《蘋果》。</p> -<p>法官杜麗冰則指，編採指示與核心價值是兩回事，而黎曾經提及《蘋果》應該報導《南華早報》不會報導的新聞，屬於編採指示多於核心價值。黎僅重申，《蘋果》需要符合（coincident with）香港人的價值，而他從不需要開口下達編採指示。</p> +<p>辯方追問，為何上載信件照片到 Twitter 並標註特朗普最終未有實行？黎則表示不記得原因，起初他提出實體信件較震撼，可是後來他們收集到信件之後，並沒有拍照及標註特朗普，他記不起有如此做過。</p> -<p>法官李運騰問：「那報導角度又如何呢？」，黎則指交由記者自行判斷，因他認為不可能指示記者的報導角度，每人的寫作風格都不同。</p> +<p>黎亦確認，頭版上的信件樣本是 Mark Simon 基於黎的理念而撰寫出來。</p> -<h4 id="報導稱黎向蓬佩奧談及制裁-黎對報導內容沒有懷疑">報導稱黎向蓬佩奧談及制裁 黎對報導內容沒有懷疑</h4> +<h4 id="黎國安法破壞香港言論自由-作為老闆應承擔所有責任">黎：國安法破壞香港言論自由 作為老闆應承擔所有責任</h4> -<p>辯方指2019年7月，黎智英赴美國會見時任副總統彭斯。黎確認，並指當時沒有記者在場。辯方續指，黎在同日會見時任美國國務卿蓬佩奧。黎亦確認，指雖然其私人助手 Mark Simon 陪同他前往會見地點，但是他不被容許進入，因此需留在外面等候，而他自己則單獨與蓬佩奧見面。</p> +<p>辯方提到，黎於2020年5月25日重新擔任壹傳媒集團主席，他早前證供亦解釋：「《國安法》之後，如果《蘋果》發生了任何事，我希望我會是完全承擔責任的那一個人。」辯方問，黎說會承擔責任，是否與這個「一人一信救香港」行動有關？黎則表示，承擔責任是概括的說法。</p> -<blockquote> - <p>The arrest of @JimmyLaiApple in Hong Kong is deeply offensive &amp; an affront to freedom loving people around the world. When I met w/ Jimmy Lai @WhiteHouse, I was inspired by his stand for democracy &amp; the rights &amp; autonomy that were promised to the people of Hong Kong by Beijing. pic.twitter.com/ZwioCrvNb7 — Mike Pence (@Mike_Pence) August 10, 2020</p> -</blockquote> +<p>辯方追問黎是為了什麼事情承擔責任？黎指即將來臨的《國安法》，使傳媒生意非常危險，「作為老闆，我理應承擔所有責任，面對這些危險。」辯方問為什麼形容為「危險」？黎指：「因為我們大概都知道《國安法》是什麼，我們大概都知道《國安法》是嚴厲的，它會對香港的言論自由帶來破壞。」</p> -<p>張劍虹早前供稱，黎智英出席何俊仁主持的網上節目「細說中南海」後，曾致電吩咐他報導節目內容及「做大佢」；其後《蘋果》刊登相關報導，指黎在節目中談及與蓬佩奧會面，蓬佩奧問黎：「美國可以怎樣做？」黎則回答美國可以實施制裁，讓中國官員知道其所作所為會有後果。</p> +<h4 id="黎受訪及twitter均倡制裁中國官員凍結帳戶-冀阻國安法通過">黎受訪及Twitter均倡制裁中國官員、凍結帳戶 冀阻國安法通過</h4> -<p>黎在庭上被問到有否向蓬佩奧提及制裁，黎起初稱：「其實我未曾提及制裁，如果我沒記錯的話。」回到香港之後，除了在何俊仁的節目之外，黎不知道自己有否跟任何人談及該次會面的事。</p> +<p>辯方庭上播放《霍士新聞》片段，黎於2020年5月26日受訪時稱美國應對中國官員實施制裁、凍結銀行帳戶，以及停止向中國輸出技術等。辯方問黎是否提倡制裁？黎同意。辯方繼而問，當黎說停止向中國輸出技術時，黎是否提倡封鎖和敵對行動？黎則指這是制裁而非敵對行動。</p> -<p>不過其後黎改稱，他不清楚自己有否說過，但是如果《蘋果》的報導引述他說過「美國應該實施制裁，使打壓示威者的人知道有後果」的話，那麼他應該有跟蓬佩奧討論過。法官李運騰問，所以黎對於報導內容沒有懷疑？黎同意。</p> +<p>辯方展示黎與張劍虹之間的訊息紀錄，張引述時事評論員桑普在D100節目中稱美國將會實施制裁；黎則回應張，指這不足以阻嚇中國，而他期望見到更嚴厲的制裁。辯方問黎說不足以阻嚇中國是什麼意思。黎表示當時認為制裁力度不足夠去阻止中國訂立國安法。至於「更嚴厲的制裁」，黎稱只是表達自己意見，他當時正觀望有沒有其他措施。</p> -<h4 id="twitter含標籤standwithhongkong黎稱沒問李兆富-庭上首次聽聞重光團隊">Twitter含標籤「#StandWithHongKong」黎稱沒問李兆富 庭上首次聽聞重光團隊</h4> +<p>辯方展示2020年5月27日黎發布的 Twitter 帖文，他轉發《霍士新聞》的影片連結，並說：「Thank you @MariaBartiromo for being so caring about me and about #HKers. We will continue our #FightforFreedom. #CCPChina must change or it will be a threat to the freedom of the rest of the world. We must do what it takes and what we can.」</p> -<p>辯方展示2020年8月21日的 Twitter：</p> +<p>同日黎的帳戶發布另一則帖文：「There should be sanctions on #CCPChina officials who violate universal value of human rights. Nations should stop exporting technology #CCPChina must play by the international rules.」黎相信帖文是出自他手筆。辯方問黎為何會說應該向中國官員實施制裁？黎說因為制裁可以阻止《國安法》實施。</p> -<blockquote> - <p>「President @realDonaldTrump calls me a brave man. I am flattered. But I am not brave enough to stand against the whole world like #Xi. I only #StandWithHongKong #StandwithTaiwan」</p> -</blockquote> +<p>辯方展示同日另一則帖文：「The most effective sanction you can impose is to freeze Chinese officials’ bank accounts in US. Expose how corrupted they are. Your action will be much appreciated not only by #Hkers, but also the Chinese who suppressed by #CCP and every soul aspired to be free.」</p> -<p>黎表示推文由他草擬，之後由李兆富編輯及標註特朗普，因為他不懂標註特朗普。</p> +<p>辯方展示同日另一則帖文，黎分享《彭博》文章〈U.S. Weighs Sanctions on Chinese Officials, Firms Over Hong Kong〉，並加上字句：「Mr. President @realDonaldTrump. You’re a man of his words. You said if China passes the national security act there will be serious consequences.」</p> -<p>法官李運騰問到，推文中有一個標籤（hashtag）「#StandWithHongKong」，是一個單字，中間沒有空格。黎則指這是出自李兆富之手，因他不懂加標籤。法官杜麗冰問，但是李兆富理應不會添加一些黎不認同的內容。黎同意，並指李會加一些籠統的說法。</p> +<h4 id="黎認國安法前受訪倡外國制裁-稱不能等待條文後出爐才反對">黎認國安法前受訪倡外國制裁 稱不能等待條文後出爐才反對</h4> -<p>辯方問黎在2020年8月的時候，有沒有留意到「重光團隊（Stand With Hong Kong）」這個組織。黎不認為自己有留意，並問：「是否陳梓華的組織？」法官杜麗冰問黎有否在後來知道這組織。黎則稱在庭上才首次知道。</p> +<p>辯方另展示黎與張劍虹之間的訊息，於2020年5月27日，黎提及美國制裁中國官員和企業的話，將會是對中國經濟「打擊」。被問到「打擊（blow）」是什麼意思，黎稱即是「打（the hit）」、「輾壓（the crush）」及「制裁官員和企業」。辯方問為了什麼目的？黎表示他理解特朗普對中國官員實施制裁是為了阻止《國安法》；至於為何要制裁中國企業，他則稱不知道。</p> -<p>法官杜麗冰又問黎當時有否問李兆富「#StandWithHongKong」是什麼意思。黎表示沒有，因他不知道什麼是標籤。法官李素蘭追問：「不會好奇？」黎稱不會感到好奇，因這對於他來說不是非常重要的東西。</p> +<p>2020年5月28日黎智英接受《彭博》訪問，主持人問黎為何認為時任美國總統特朗普是「香港的最後希望」？黎引述特朗普說過如果香港實施《國安法》，「他會做一些認真的事（“he would do something serious”）」，但是他不知道特朗普相關措施會有多嚴厲。他促請美國實施制裁，相信特朗普是守信用的人，希望特朗普能在週末對中國實施嚴厲的制裁。</p> -<h4 id="黎稱當時理解standwithhongkong代表支持香港的立場-非某個團體">黎稱當時理解「#StandWithHongKong」代表支持香港的立場 非某個團體</h4> +<p>黎表示，他認為美國最有效的制裁措施是凍結中國高官的外地銀行戶口，因為他們有大量貪污的錢（corrupted money）儲存在美國和歐洲的銀行戶口裡。</p> -<p>辯方問，黎當時沒有留意到「Stand With Hong Kong」是一個團體嗎？黎同意，當時純粹理解這串字是代表「支持香港」，就如另一個標籤「#StandwithTaiwan」代表「支持台灣」，然而「Stand with Taiwan」並非一個團體。他認為這些標籤就如一個籠統的立場，代表支持香港或台灣。</p> +<p>黎確認上述說話反映他當時所真誠相信的想法。辯方提到，主持人說其時黎尚未有機會看到《國安法》條文，直至6月30日實施的晚上，為何不等待實際條文出爐，之後才反對它？黎在節目中回答，不能夠等待，世界應該阻止《國安法》通過。辯方問黎當時為何如此說。黎說不能等待條文公開，因外國需要對中國作出反應。</p> -<p>黎又指，通常李兆富發布推文之後，便不會再閱讀該推文，因此不會留意李新增了什麼標籤，並重申標籤對他而言不是重要的東西。</p> +<p>辯方另播放《英國廣播公司》（BBC）的訪問片段，黎引述特朗普稱，若然中國實施港區《國安法》的話會有「嚴重後果」，又指美國單憑說話是不足夠，還要有實際行動。辯方問黎口中的「行動」是什麼意思。黎說是制裁，即請求美國對中國實施最嚴厲的制裁。</p> -<p>辯方又問黎當時知不知道一個叫李宇軒的人。黎則稱，當他從新聞得悉李嘗試跨越邊境到台灣時，才首次聽聞李的名字。</p> +<p>案件明天續審。</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/6k7nccG.png" alt="image03" /> -▲ 李宇軒</p> +<hr /> -<p>黎後來補充，他不認為李兆富加入標籤「#StandWithHongKong」的時候，是指涉李宇軒的組織「重光團隊」，重申這個標籤與「重光團隊」無關。辯方問李有否向黎提及「重光團隊」，黎稱從沒有。</p> +<p>案件編號：HCCC51/2022</p>獨媒報導黎智英認國安法生效前 受訪倡外國制裁阻通過 稱不能等待條文出爐後才反對【黎智英案・審訊第 100 日】2024-12-02T12:00:00+08:002024-12-02T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/trial-of-jimmy-lai-day-100<ul> + <li>黎指中美冷戰屬價值之爭 以「核武」比喻道德權威 官問怎樣「一分鐘便可擺平」</li> +</ul> -<h4 id="黎稱高層物色社論寫手不會徵詢他意見-聘用後才通知他">黎稱高層物色社論寫手不會徵詢他意見 聘用後才通知他</h4> +<excerpt /> -<p>關於《蘋果》社評（《蘋論》）的撰寫人，張劍虹早前供稱寫手須經黎的批准才能聘用，包括馮偉光（筆名盧峯）、顏純鈎（筆名方圓）和楊清奇（筆名李平）。黎則在庭上稱不知自己有否「批准」，但是張劍虹、陳沛敏等高層揀選寫手之後，便會通知他。</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/Qa6dJ94.png" alt="iamge01" /></p> -<p>黎又指，高層物色寫手時並不會徵詢他的意見，但是決定寫手人選時便會通知他，他也不會反對，「我沒有收到任何請示，他們只是通知我。」他亦否認陳沛敏所稱，總編輯羅偉光對於黎所揀選的社論寫手沒有反對的餘地，又稱自己從沒有提議或揀選社評寫手。</p> +<p>【獨媒報導】壹傳媒創辦人黎智英及3間蘋果公司被控串謀勾結外國勢力及串謀刊印煽動刊物等罪，今（2日）於高院（移師西九龍法院）踏入第100日審訊，黎智英第八日作供。黎於2019年7月參與美國智庫「保衛民主基金會」公開對談，期間稱美國政府有「道德權威」，好比「核武」，因此香港極需要美國的支持。黎庭上強調，中美之間的「戰爭」並不牽涉武器，乃價值上的爭鋒，並否認提倡冷戰。法官杜麗冰一度問黎，他稱「他們好像沒有任何武器便上戰場，當你使用核武的話，只需一分鐘便可擺平他們」，是什麼意思。黎則稱他並非意指真實的核武，他只是使用誇張手法表達，以及將道德權威比喻為核武。法官李素蘭追問，黎為何會以「核武」作為比喻？黎聞言則笑指：「如果我選擇另一些比喻的話，你也會問我相同的問題。」</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/ZRNN9KK.png" alt="image04" /> -▲ 前《蘋果日報》執行總編輯 林文宗（左）、前《蘋果日報》副社長 陳沛敏（右）</p> +<h4 id="黎稱給予陳梓華的金錢從不牽涉報酬成份">黎稱給予陳梓華的金錢從不牽涉「報酬」成份</h4> -<p>楊清奇曾供稱，作為《蘋果》社論的寫手，「我哋都明白，要跟從報館嘅基本立場，啫係要留意黎智英先生嘅立場。」黎同意說法，下屬知道他反對港獨，便不應觸碰這個話題。</p> +<p>辯方大律師關文渭繼續主問，圍繞黎與另一被告陳梓華之間的金錢往來。辯方展示2019年10月11日陳梓華的銀行帳戶紀錄，可見一筆144,100港元的支票存入款項。財務文件顯示該14萬元是給予陳梓華舉辦展覽的贊助。黎則稱當時沒有留意詳情便簽名，並指 Mark Simon 提供相關資料。</p> -<h4 id="黎稱推薦桑普因其文章寫得好-悉倡港獨後決定不起用">黎稱推薦桑普因其文章寫得好 悉倡港獨後決定不起用</h4> +<p>辯方另展示支票紀錄，顯示由黎持有的力高顧問有限公司，在2020年2月底，以支票形式把80,273元存入陳梓華的戶口。陳早前供稱，黎智英支付他英國和台北之旅的費用，合共約6萬元，而其餘款項是林姓女示威者的開支。</p> -<p>陳沛敏曾供稱，黎曾向張劍虹提議邀請時評作家桑普在論壇版撰寫專欄，但是因為張告知桑普提倡港獨，所以最終決定不起用他。辯方問及原因，黎指因為若有任何寫手提倡港獨，《蘋果》都不應該聘用，而自己當初推薦桑普是因為閱讀過他的文章，認為寫得很好。</p> +<p>黎則表示對這8萬元不知情，也沒有牽涉其中。被問到力高的銀行戶口有多少個授權簽署人，黎則稱不知道。黎另被問到如何向陳支付旅程的開支，黎亦稱不知道，可能是 Mark Simon 以支票形式歸還給陳。黎又稱，Mark Simon 會作出決定，並不需要經他的同意才能批出該筆款項。</p> -<p>辯方指，黎還柙之後，張劍虹曾到監獄探訪黎四至五次，問黎在該段期間，有否要求張找桑普撰文。黎說沒有，因為桑普提倡港獨，而且探訪時不會談及這些事情，因在還柙期間這些事情變得無關重要。</p> +<p>辯方另提及，黎早前否認轉讓離岸公司 LACOCK 是作為給予陳的「報酬」。黎堅稱，與陳梓華之間的金錢往來中，從來沒有牽涉「報酬」的性質。</p> -<p>張亦供稱，黎推薦顏純鈎替《蘋果》論壇版或副刊撰文，因他認為顏對中國十分了解。黎同意。黎憶述，張劍虹曾與他討論邀請顏的事宜，但他不記得是張問顏每週寫一篇社論好不好，還是張提議顏每週寫一篇。</p> +<h4 id="黎否認陳梓華提及成立流亡政府和軍隊">黎否認陳梓華提及成立流亡政府和軍隊</h4> -<h4 id="黎否認發布煽動刊物-指下屬發布文章從不需要經他的批准">黎否認發布煽動刊物 指下屬發布文章從不需要經他的批准</h4> +<p>李宇軒作供時，提到陳梓華透露他領導一隊勇武隊，以及有一處地方儲存物資，其小隊亦涉及製作爆炸品的「科學實驗」。李亦提到，陳曾評論一宗大埔開槍事件，以及討論成立流亡政府和軍隊、找以色列軍隊協助訓練勇武。</p> -<p>辯方就「串謀發布煽動刊物」罪作總結，問黎有否如控罪所稱，串謀張劍虹、陳沛敏、羅偉光、林文宗、馮偉光和楊清奇等人，發布具煽動意圖的刊物。黎否認，指他們發布文章之前從不需要經他的批准。被問到事實上有否同意他們發布，黎則指他們從未徵求自己的同意。黎又指：「我從沒想過他們會發布任何煽動性的東西，他們發布的所有文章應是合法的。」</p> +<p>不過黎在庭上稱，在與陳的溝通之中，陳從沒向他提及上述事情，陳也沒提及自己牽涉該宗大埔開槍事件。</p> -<p>辯方接著問黎，有沒有意圖利用《蘋果》來發布文章，使人憎恨政府、企圖改變現有政制或引起居民之間的不滿情緒等。黎否認：「從不。」</p> +<h4 id="黎twitter轉發ipac推文-惟堅稱不知道ipac">黎Twitter轉發IPAC推文 惟堅稱不知道IPAC</h4> -<h4 id="黎替g20文宣登報墊支156萬元-稱沒留意收款人身份不關注團隊名稱">黎替G20文宣登報墊支156萬元 稱沒留意收款人身份、不關注團隊名稱</h4> +<p>辯方接著圍繞黎的 Twitter（現稱X）提問。辯方指黎在2020年5月22日開設Twitter帳戶，問黎當時是否知道「對華政策跨國議會聯盟」（Inter-Parliamentary Alliance on China，簡稱 IPAC）。黎稱不知道，也沒有與負責管理帳戶的李兆富討論過 IPAC，而黎亦稱自己對 IPAC 不感興趣。</p> -<p>辯方接著圍繞其中一項牽涉陳梓華和李宇軒的「串謀勾結外國勢力」罪提問。</p> +<p>辯方指，黎在2020年6月13日在 Twitter 轉發一則《華爾街日報》的文章〈Global Coalition of Legislators Faces Challenges Countering China〉，當中提及不同國家的議員組成聯盟 IPAC，以應付中國帶來的挑戰。黎並加上評論：「It is encouraging to see leaders from different nationalities and ideological backgrounds to join force @ipcglobal to tackle the world’s most urgent geopolitical challenge #CCP, a belligerent regime imposes distorted values on its people and others.」</p> -<p>辯方指根據訊息紀錄，2019年6月底，時任立法會議員郭榮鏗向黎傳送有關G20登報眾籌的宣傳，黎向郭表示會捐出10萬元。其後 Mark Simon 透過訊息告知黎，由於眾籌已達標，所以不能再捐款，後來眾籌款項已超過670萬元。</p> +<p>黎則稱整個推文都是由李兆富準備，而他在發布之前可能只曾瞥一眼（had a glance）。辯方指從黎與李之間的訊息紀錄可見，在該推文發布之前，二人從未提及過 IPAC 或《華爾街日報》。黎確認。</p> -<p>「從犯證人」陳梓華曾供稱，2019年6月G20峰會全球文宣登報計劃遇到資金問題，故他嘗試經李柱銘聯絡黎智英，後來聯絡到 Mark Simon。最終 Mark Simon 及黎一方墊支了約150萬元，其餘廣告費則由李宇軒墊支。</p> +<h4 id="黎稱信任李兆富-幾乎全部批准發布-官質疑李事前理應曾徵詢黎">黎稱信任李兆富 幾乎全部批准發布 官質疑李事前理應曾徵詢黎</h4> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/9X8H6Lc.png" alt="image05" /> -▲ （資料圖片）</p> +<p>辯方問，李有否得到黎的同意才發布上述推文。黎則稱，每當李兆富傳送草擬推文給他，他幾乎都會批准，而他只會粗略過目。辯方追問，黎如何批准李發布？黎則稱他信任李，因李是他的徒弟（mentee），替他工作了很長時間，所以認為李知道自己想要的是什麼，後來李不需要得到他的批准也可以自行決定發布。</p> -<p>辯方指，Mark Simon 向黎傳送訊息，轉述李柱銘指眾籌登報遇到問題，他們直至7月2日之前都不能從眾籌平台支取籌得款項，因此李問黎能否向G20登報團隊提供500萬元過渡性貸款，並指他們會在7月4日歸還款項。（“Jimmy, I just heard from Martin. The fundraising for the newspaper ads has one major problem. They don’t have access to all the funds until July 2. As such Martin is asking if we can do a bridge loan of Hong Kong dollar 5 million to the group. We would get our money back by July 4th.”）</p> +<p>法官杜麗冰追問，黎聲稱推文發布之前沒有過目，只依賴李的理解，可是這是黎自己的 Twitter 帳戶，李必然事先知道黎的理解，才會使用他的帳戶來發布相關帖文，例如李會問黎「這樣發布IPAC是否合適」之類。黎否認，並重申帳戶是由李負責管理。黎強調當時沒有留意 IPAC，也未有問李有關 IPAC 的事宜。</p> -<p>Mark Simon 向黎表示，明白為何登報團隊未能收取眾籌款項及背後的理由，而這亦有道理的，希望黎能提出建議。（“I do understand the rationale of why they can’t get the money and it is legitimate. Please advise”）</p> +<h4 id="黎稱不知道避風港法案不知道知道羅傑斯和裴倫德與ipac有關">黎稱不知道「避風港法案」、不知道知道羅傑斯和裴倫德與IPAC有關</h4> -<p>辯方展示電郵紀錄，指 Mark Simon 在6月27日指示黎私人公司「力高」的秘書墊支登報費用，並且以李宇軒（Li Yu Hin）的名義。辯方問黎當時有否留意是以另一人的名義付款，以及該人的身份。黎表示：「沒有，我為何要留意？」，又指沒有人告訴他會以李宇軒的名義付款。</p> +<p>至於國安法生效之後，辯方展示黎於2020年7月17日的推文：「#HongKong #SafeHarborAct and #PeoplesFreedomandChoiceAct are good wherewithals to our resistance movement. Salute all former CGs and State Dept staff for caring about this place we call home.」。辯方指根據黎與李兆富之間的 WhatsApp，二人在推文發布之前，並沒有提及過《香港避風港法案》（Hong Kong Safe Harbor Act）和《香港人自由和選擇法》（Hong Kong People’s Freedom and Choice Act）。黎在庭上表示，從不知道「避風港法案」，直至在法庭上才知道。至於推文中的標籤（hashtag），黎稱肯定是李兆富加入的。</p> -<p>辯方指，最終黎在該次登報計劃中，合共墊支了156萬元，問黎有否留意付款人是誰。黎表示：「沒有，這是 Mark Simon 的責任，而不是我的責任。」</p> +<p>辯方另展示2020年7月22日的推文，乃轉發 IPAC 的推文。惟黎庭上稱當時沒有留意 IPAC，當李兆富徵詢他的時候，他可能只是瞥了一眼，又稱當時不關注 IPAC 這類組織，因為與他沒有任何關係。</p> -<p>黎表示，他記得後來 Mark Simon 告知他，該筆款項已全數歸還。辯方遂展示訊息紀錄，Mark Simon 向黎指國際登報團隊已全數歸還款項：「Also, the Fight For Freedom Group, ones we helped with international ads last time, has paid us back in full.」</p> +<p>法官李運騰指，當時是7月22日，換言之《國安法》已經生效，問黎是否有興趣知道國際社會怎樣回應《國安法》生效？黎同意，他認為國際社會應提供支持，以保護香港的自由免受侵蝕，但他只是希望。被問到希望社會提供怎樣的支持，黎則稱沒有想過。</p> -<p>辯方提到訊息中的「Fight For Freedom Group」，惟黎表示：「我不知道，我不在乎，該團隊的名字並非我所關注的事情。」辯方問黎不關注該團隊的性質嗎？黎表示不關注，並反問為什麼要關注。</p> +<p>辯方指，黎在2020年8月14日轉發 IPAC 的一則推文，並標註了羅傑斯和標籤「#IPAC」，其時是黎首次被捕四日之後。惟黎稱不記得自己有見過這個推文。黎否認知道羅傑斯（Benedict Rogers）和裴倫德（Luke de Pulford）與 IPAC 有關。</p> -<h4 id="mark-simon-向黎指所有墊支款項已歸還">Mark Simon 向黎指所有墊支款項已歸還</h4> +<h4 id="推文向攬炒巴致敬及標註standwithhongkong-黎稱不知攬炒巴與swhk關係">推文向攬炒巴致敬及標註「#StandwithHongKong」 黎稱不知攬炒巴與SWHK關係</h4> -<p>另一名「從犯證人」李宇軒曾供稱，2019年8月的第三次眾籌活動中籌得約180萬美元，由於眾籌平台規定要用美國當地的美元戶口來接收眾籌款項，所以在陳梓華的協助下，找來了 Mark Simon 借出美國的銀行戶口收取款項，扣除墊支款項之後，餘款便轉帳至「The Project Hong Kong Trust」的戶口。</p> +<p>辯方展示2020年10月24日黎的推文，當中標註「攬炒巴」劉祖廸的帳戶：「I salute to @finnlau_cd. At only 26, he has the wisdom knowing exactly when and what the right role to play. He inspired his peers in his former role, and he’ll do it this time. The outside world support is very important. #StandwithHongKong」</p> -<p>辯方展示11月16日，Mark Simon 向黎傳訊息，指所有替國際倡議所墊支的款項已經歸還，並存入了Mark Simon 在美國的銀行戶口。（“Jimmy, Just wanted to let you know that all monies that were used for the international ad campaign are now back with us. They had sent to a US account where it sat, under my control, but banks just cleared its movement &amp; now with you.”）</p> +<p>黎稱他記得有份草擬此推文，其後傳送給李兆富。最終發布的推文含有標籤「#StandwithHongKong」，黎稱是由李加上。法官李素蘭問黎，當時知不知道劉祖廸與「重光團隊」（Stand with Hong Kong，簡稱 SWHK）的關係。黎稱不知道，沒有人告訴過他，他也沒有思考過兩者之間的關係。</p> -<h4 id="陳梓華稱2019年7月首次與黎見面-辯方呈結帳紀錄證10月">陳梓華稱2019年7月首次與黎見面 辯方呈結帳紀錄證10月</h4> +<p>黎稱，他當時閱讀了《蘋果》於2020年10月24日的中文報導「遊行被圍捕險洩身份 攬炒巴死裏逃生 帶署歷警暴 拒保後返英」，然後草擬上述推文，惟報導中未有提及劉與「重光團隊」的關係，他並沒有深入思考兩者關係。辯方提到報紙版面載有「Stand with Hong Kong until dawn」的廣告，惟黎當時認為這是一句口號，而不知道「Stand with Hong Kong」是一個組織。</p> -<p>辯方接著圍繞陳梓華的證供提問。陳梓華早前供稱，他於2019年7月獲李柱銘邀請，到位於中環、由何俊仁胞弟何俊麒經營的日本料理餐廳出席飯局，該次是黎首次與陳親身見面。</p> +<p>黎稱，向劉致敬是因為他的勇氣，而劉的年紀（26歲）乃從報導中得知。推文提及劉的「過去角色」以及他「這次會去做」，黎解釋意思是劉過去在「連登」擔當精神領袖，而他將會進行游說爭取國際支持香港。</p> -<p>不過辯方針對該次見面的日子提出另一說法，指黎智英的信用卡結帳紀錄顯示，黎於2019年10月18日向該日本餐廳支付853.1元，因此黎與陳首次見面應是10月，而非陳所稱的7月。黎確認相關紀錄。</p> +<p>報導提及劉曾在一次未經批准集結中被捕，日子是2020年1月1日。黎則稱當時未有閱讀整篇報導，後來從陳梓華口中才知道此事。辯方展示陳梓華在2020年1月2日的訊息，陳向黎說，劉遇上麻煩事，所以旅程需延誤。</p> -<p>陳梓華稱，他到達餐廳後，黎基於保安理由而要求收起他的手機，隨後陳的手機交由餐廳職員保管。黎今指，收起手機的做法是李柱銘提出，因為李認為即使手機在關閉狀態下，也可以被不知名人士竊聽他們的討論內容，形容李一直以來都很謹慎，凡出席會議時都會收起手機。</p> +<h4 id="黎否認串謀陳梓華李宇軒和攬炒巴等人請求外國制裁">黎否認串謀陳梓華、李宇軒和攬炒巴等人請求外國制裁</h4> -<h4 id="黎冀透過陳梓華籲前線克制平息暴力">黎：冀透過陳梓華籲前線克制、平息暴力</h4> +<p>辯方總結串謀勾結外國勢力罪，問黎有否串謀或同意陳梓華，請求外國對中國實施制裁、封鎖或敵對行為。黎稱他除了要求陳跟勇武派溝通以平息暴力之外，便從來沒要求陳做任何事情。黎亦否認串謀或同意 Mark Simon 和劉祖廸請求外國制裁。</p> -<p>黎稱，李柱銘之所以介紹陳梓華給他認識，是因為李知道他關注年輕人的激進思想和示威前線的暴力，希望藉邀請陳參與飯局，讓年輕人明白暴力是有損運動及他們應該克制。當時他理解陳是前線示威者的領袖。</p> +<p>至於被控方指稱為「串謀者」的李宇軒、時任日本議員菅野志櫻里和協助在全球各地推動馬格尼茨基人權問責法（Magnitsky Act）的英國金融家 Bill Browder，黎則稱當時未聽聞過他們的名字，直至在庭上才聽過。</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/hbWY8mh.png" alt="image06" /> -▲ 李柱銘</p> +<h4 id="黎指新冷戰屬價值之爭-以核武比喻道德權威-官問為何以核武為比喻">黎指新冷戰屬價值之爭 以「核武」比喻道德權威 官問為何以「核武」為比喻</h4> -<p>黎表示不記得飯局的詳細討論內容，只記得陳梓華嘗試解釋前線年輕人的想法，而黎自己則嘗試叫他們克制。黎又指，其後他與陳有過一連串的會面和溝通，目的都是希望透過陳向勇武派傳話，使年輕人能夠平息暴力（pacified）。</p> +<p>辯方指，黎智英於2019年7月赴美會見時任美國副總統彭斯和時任美國國務卿蓬佩奧之後，在7月10日與「保衛民主基金會」（Foundation for Defense of Democracies，簡稱FDD）的資深副主席 Johnathan Schanzer 進行公開對談，並向黎展示對談錄音謄本。當時黎強調反修例是「最後一戰」，而香港人的反抗是道德力量的戰爭，又指美國政府有「道德權威（moral authority）」，其支持是「核武（nuclear weapon）」，因此香港極需要美國的支持。黎形容中國與美國之間進入「新冷戰」，是關乎價值的鬥爭，而香港正在「前線」，他最後指，美國不能只說不做，同時亦要以行動支持香港人。</p> -<p>黎又稱，一直稱呼陳為 Wayland，並不知道他的中文姓名，因此當警方首次問及「陳梓華」時，他表示不認識這個人。</p> +<p>辯方問黎說「新冷戰」和「核武」是什麼意思？黎則指這是一種比喻，意思是美國人的道德權威好比「核武」，強調中美之間的「戰爭」並不牽涉武器。辯方問黎是否提倡中美冷戰？黎表示，他當時乃指出特朗普政府與中國已經形成和正在進行冷戰；「當然我支持與中國冷戰」，惟他否認提倡冷戰。而「戰爭」是價值上的爭鋒，而非使用武器的戰爭。</p> -<h4 id="黎否認向陳梓華談及自己與mark-simon的關係">黎否認向陳梓華談及自己與Mark Simon的關係</h4> +<p>黎表示，他認為美國應該用道德權威作為武器，來與中國對戰。被問到「道德權威」意思是什麼，黎指「道德權威」是「正義、公義和公平，以及活在真實和正確的事情之中」，而這與中國有別。</p> -<p>陳梓華曾供稱，黎在飯局中指 Mark Simon 每日都會聯絡他，亦會向他匯報。黎則在庭上稱，不記得自己有如此說過，況且 Mark Simon 一直與陳聯絡，實沒有需要向陳提及自己與 Mark Simon 之間的關係。黎其後確認自己沒有這樣說過，因為除了過渡貸款一事之外，他沒有需要在陳面前談及 Mark Simon。</p> +<p>法官杜麗冰指，黎在對談中聲稱：「他們好像沒有任何武器便上戰場，當你使用核武的話，只需一分鐘便可擺平他們。」（“It’s like they’re like going to the battle without any weapon, and you have the nuclear weapon you can finish them in a minute.”）如果正如黎所稱「核武」的意思是「道德權威」的話，怎樣以「道德權威」在一分鐘內擺平？黎重申以上言論只是比喻。惟杜官表示不明白。黎則回應，他並非意指真實的核武，他只是使用誇張手法表達，以及將道德權威比喻為核武。黎亦解釋，中國有真實的核武，但是他們沒有道德權威。</p> -<p>陳梓華曾供稱：「當我開始嘗試介紹自己嘅時候，好快就畀黎智英打斷咗，佢話唔使介紹喇，佢話 Mark Simon 已經話畀我聽，佢已經係咁𠵱查過我。」黎則在庭上稱，陳的說法不是真的，因為從訊息紀錄可見，他在會面之前並不認識陳。</p> +<p>法官李素蘭追問，黎為何會以「核武」作為比喻？黎聞言則笑指：「如果我選擇另一些比喻的話，你也會問我相同的問題。」</p> -<h4 id="黎不認為陳梓華是暴力人士">黎：不認為陳梓華是暴力人士</h4> +<p>法官李素蘭又問，該對談影片在網上廣播，黎會否認為觀眾會從字面的意思理解「核武」？黎解釋，他在節目中指中國沒有「核武」，可是現實裡中國的確有核武，所以他提及的「核武」意思就是「道德權威」。</p> -<p>至於對陳梓華的印象，黎不認為陳是暴力的人，這印象來自李柱銘的介紹，因為自己被視為較保守的人，陳既然是經李介紹的，理應不會是暴力的人。再者，黎憑對話感到陳不是暴力的人。</p> +<h4 id="黎否認文章提倡中美貿易戰">黎否認文章提倡中美貿易戰</h4> -<p>法官李素蘭則質疑，黎一方面說陳是「前線的年輕人」一方面說他不是暴力的人，說法有矛盾。黎僅回應，陳是前線的人，但他不是暴力，所以才會叫他向勇武人士轉達要克制的信息。</p> +<p>辯方另展示黎於2019年9月30日，刊登於《華爾街日報》的文章〈There’s Hope for Freedom, Even in China〉。</p> -<h4 id="陳梓華引述黎飯局發言-部份言論黎否認說過">陳梓華引述黎飯局發言 部份言論黎否認說過</h4> +<p>辯方問黎有否提倡中美貿易戰？黎則指他撰寫文章的時候，特朗普政府與中國之間的貿易戰已經發生，因此否認自己提倡貿易戰。黎表示，他在文章中稱希望美國與中國交涉時能夠連繫到價值層面，是因為他認為這樣的話能夠改變中國，使中國加入普世的核心價值體系。</p> -<p>辯方指，黎於2019年11月12日向陳傳送訊息，指一名男子在馬鞍山天橋上被黑衣人點火，使他感到害怕（dreaded），並指勇武派應該有人領導，並提議在翌日的會面中詳細討論。</p> +<p>法官杜麗冰則指，當黎使用「西方核心價值」這詞語的時候，便代表該些價值不是「普世」，因為世界上有很多國家，不只西方國家。黎認同，但是該些價值在世界貿易之中會交換，包括法治和透明度。</p> -<p>黎確認，翌日他住宅舉行飯局，出席者包括陳梓華、何俊仁、李永達和林卓廷。這是黎與陳第二次親身見面。黎稱邀請陳出席，是為了介紹他給其他人認識，並讓陳解釋前線的想法等。</p> +<p>辯方問黎，是否認為當美國與中國交涉時連繫到人權和核心價值，就會令中國讓步？黎同意。法官李運騰指，當黎撰寫文章的時候，美國與中國交涉時還未連繫上人權和價值議題。黎同意，並指中美兩國只是在對抗。李官追問，黎是否希望兩國交涉時連繫上人權和價值議題，增加貿易戰的另一面向？黎同意。</p> -<p>陳供稱，黎就當時的反修例運動發表意見，「佢（黎）覺得勇武派冇組織、冇分寸，然後愈嚟愈濫用暴力，如果搞出咗人命嘅話，咁整個運動就會失去道德高地去對抗香港政府，從而亦都會失去國際嘅支持。」黎表示不記得自己這樣說過，但是確實反映他當時的想法。</p> +<h4 id="文章提及中國經濟內爆-黎嘗試舉例說明若經濟爆破政府統治正當性隨之崩塌">文章提及「中國經濟內爆」 黎：嘗試舉例說明若經濟爆破政府統治正當性隨之崩塌</h4> -<p>陳亦引述黎稱勇武需要減少暴力，應採取「和平、理性、非暴力」手段。黎同意如此說過，至於「黃藍係政見，黑白係良知」，他稱自己有可能說過。</p> +<p>李官又指，文章提到「如果中國經濟內爆（If China’s economy implodes）」，問黎撰寫文章時有沒有與其他人討論過？黎則表示沒有與任何人討論，他在文章中的意思是，當中國經濟內爆的話，中國政府的統治正當性也會崩塌。</p> -<p>陳又指黎說：「有啲嘅底線，佢需要堅守嘅」，黎表示整個飯局不只他一人說話，何俊仁、林卓廷也有參與討論。</p> +<p>李官追問黎是否發明「中國經濟內爆」這個概念，還是從其他人的文章讀來或從其他人口中聽來？黎回答，他只是嘗試舉例說明，當中國經濟爆破，其政府的統治正當性也會隨之崩塌，因為中國政府的統治正當性一直建基於經濟發展。他亦指，不排除有人曾經提出過這個概念，可是他撰寫這篇文章之時，並未有閱讀過其他相關文章。</p> -<p>陳另引述黎稱：「佢話如果年青人做唔到嘅嘢，佢可以以傳媒嘅力量做到」，黎則不認自己有這樣說過，因為這脫離了討論主題。</p> +<p>黎同意，他相信當中國接受國際貿易的核心價值時，便能夠改變中國，並補充指之所以有貿易戰，是因為有價值觀上的差異。</p> -<p>至於陳稱黎說過：「《蘋果日報》唔係要報道啲勇武，只要唔報道佢哋，佢哋嘅影響力已經會細咗好多。」黎則否認，因這不是他當時的想法，據他記憶，《蘋果日報》從來都不是飯局討論的話題。他亦否認提及過「五大訴求」，因與討論離題。</p> +<p>辯方另展示黎在2020年2月19日刊登於《華爾街日報》的文章，其時正值新冠疫情爆發。辯方指，黎在文章中形容美國是自由和開放，又指中美缺乏互信，貿易戰是源於信任問題，問黎想在文章帶出什麼信息。黎則指「純粹讓事實說話」。被問到有否意圖要求美國去做任何事情，黎稱沒有。</p> -<h4 id="黎否認想領導勇武派這是荒誕可笑的">黎否認想領導勇武派：「這是荒誕可笑的」</h4> +<h4 id="受訪稱很想cia美國影響我們-黎利用謠言">受訪稱「很想CIA、美國影響我們」 黎：利用謠言</h4> -<p>辯方提到，陳曾形容黎「想領導或主導勇武派」。黎隨即否認，「這是荒誕可笑的（farcical），我沒有可能這樣說」，「若我說出這樣的話是愚蠢的，這是自以為是的（presumptuous）。」</p> +<p>辯方指，黎於2020年5月接受台灣節目「鄉民來衝康」的訪問，他曾說：「我們很想 CIA，我很想美國影響我們，我很想英國影響我們，我很想外國影響我們，他們的支持是我們唯一能夠撐下去的，外國的勢力是現在我們非常需要，讓我們撐下去的。」</p> -<p>黎續指，那些年輕人不聆聽任何人，單是要他們平息暴力已是非常困難，反問：「我是誰呢？」，並重申：「若說出這樣的話是非常瘋狂的。」辯方回應：「你不再年輕了。」</p> +<p>黎庭上回應：「我們需要美國的影響，我們需要英國的影響。」被問到什麼影響，黎則指意思是美國和英國對香港的支持，而他們的支持是香港撐下去的唯一方法。他又指，當時被問到香港示威有否受到 CIA（美國中央情報局）的影響，所以他才會如此回答。</p> -<p>辯方問黎有否在飯局中說過想領導勇武派，黎聞言反問：「我會說出這樣的話嗎？這是荒謬的⋯⋯我不是年輕人了。」</p> +<p>法官杜麗冰問，為何黎會說需要 CIA 的影響？黎則指，因為當時有很多謠言，指 CIA 叫人出來參與示威、香港的示威是由 CIA 指示等。黎反覆強調這些謠言並不是真實的，所以他受訪時說希望 CIA 影響他們，乃利用該謠言來表示希望美國能影響他們。</p> -<p>黎亦否認在飯局中提及制裁、封鎖和敵對行動，也否認提及佩洛西、彭斯和蓬佩奧，因當晚討論僅圍繞勇武派、暴力和反修例運動。</p> +<h4 id="黎強調沒有任何外國影響香港的示威-官質疑怎樣保證">黎強調沒有任何外國影響香港的示威 官質疑怎樣保證</h4> -<h4 id="黎經歷理大失利-應建立領袖團隊奪回話語權">黎：經歷理大失利 應建立領袖團隊奪回話語權</h4> +<p>黎強調，當時從沒有任何外國勢力影響香港的示威，「如果有任何外國影響的話，那便是他們的支持。」辯方繼而追問，當時的示威有沒有受到美國的影響？黎回答：「完全沒有，我可以保證。」</p> -<p>2019年11月24日民主派在區選中大勝，黎向陳發訊息，稱當日是「美妙的一天」，並指：「自從理大失著，我也這樣想，現在是組織領袖團隊的時候，我星期三與泛民大佬傾好後，請你找幾位同儕一同商討，可以嗎？」</p> +<p>法官李素蘭追問，「你說你可以保證，你可以怎樣保證？」黎則指，如果有任何外國的影響，人們會知道。黎又指，正如他在節目中說，「美國怎樣叫200萬人出來示威？」，反問：「如果美國能叫200萬人出來示威，如果他們能這樣做的話，那為什麼他們不在內地做同樣的事情？」</p> -<p>黎解釋，經歷理大事件、多人被捕之後，認識正是適當時候建立領袖團隊，奪回對運動的話語權。黎其後安排與陳在其座駕上見面，希望聆聽陳的說法。</p> +<p>辯方指，黎受訪時稱「外國的勢力是現在我們非常需要」，問黎是什麼意思。黎則指，「外國勢力」就是國際社會的支持，即是任何可以令運動持續的「支持」。法官李運騰問，「支持」是以什麼形式？黎指，可以是「為我們發聲，為我們跟中國對話，為我們向中國交涉，甚至為我們而譴責中國」。</p> <p>案件明日續審。</p> <hr /> -<p>案件編號：HCCC51/2022</p>獨媒報導陳梓華指稱黎智英欲領導勇武派 黎反駁：荒誕可笑、不可能這樣說Allied Export Controls2024-11-26T12:00:00+08:002024-11-26T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/allied-export-controls<p><em>There is a fierce debate in the United States and among its allies about the impacts of export controls, and nowhere is that debate more heated than in the semiconductor equipment manufacturing industry.</em> <excerpt></excerpt> <em>Too often, however, this debate occurs without any grounding in real-world data or relevant historical Chinese policy context. This paper seeks to provide some of that grounding through a combination of Chinese policy document analysis and new financial and market share data for leading semiconductor equipment firms in China, the United States, Japan, and the Netherlands. What follows are a set of 10 key judgments based on the author’s analysis.</em></p> +<p>案件編號：HCCC51/2022</p>獨媒報導黎指中美冷戰屬價值之爭 以「核武」比喻道德權威 官問怎樣「一分鐘便可擺平」【黎智英案・審訊第 99 日】2024-11-29T12:00:00+08:002024-11-29T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/trial-of-jimmy-lai-day-99<ul> + <li>黎智英明言希望美國推制裁 以阻止國安法 惟稱僅願望未必發生</li> +</ul> -<h4 id="1-chinas-ambitions-for-eliminating-dependence-on-foreign-semiconductor-manufacturing-equipment-started-long-before-americas-expanded-usage-of-technology-export-controls">1. China’s ambitions for eliminating dependence on foreign semiconductor manufacturing equipment started long before America’s expanded usage of technology export controls.</h4> +<excerpt /> -<p>The first and most important argument among critics of U.S. export controls is that they weaken U.S. technology leadership by incentivizing China to eliminate U.S. technology from its semiconductor supply chain. However, reducing dependence on foreign semiconductor and semiconductor manufacturing equipment suppliers was official Chinese policy before the Trump administration’s April 2018 export controls restricting sales of U.S.-designed chips to ZTE, a Chinese telecommunications firm, launched the new era of semiconductor export controls. “The Roadmap of Major Technical Domains for Made in China 2025,” which was published in September 2015 and covered semiconductors and other sectors, included goals such as “replacement of imports with Chinese-made products basically achieved in key industries” by 2025. It set specific targets and deadlines for the degree of market share that Chinese companies were supposed to reach and by what date. Targets for the semiconductor manufacturing equipment sector include the following:</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/YKRDME2.png" alt="iamge01" /></p> -<ul> - <li> - <p>50 percent localization rate of 90–32 nanometer (nm) process equipment before 2020</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>50 percent localization of 90 nm lithography machines before 2020</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>30 percent localization rate of 20–14 nm process equipment before 2025</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Domestic production of immersion deep ultraviolet (DUV) lithography machines before 2025</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Domestic production of extreme ultraviolet (EUV) lithography equipment before 2030</p> - </li> -</ul> +<p>【獨媒報導】壹傳媒創辦人黎智英及3間蘋果公司被控串謀勾結外國勢力及串謀刊印煽動刊物等罪，今（29日）於高院（移師西九龍法院）踏入第99日審訊，黎智英第七日作供。2020年5月28日，即有新聞報導人大準備推行港版國安法的時候，黎向同案被告陳梓華傳送訊息：「更多嚴苛的制裁將出自特朗普，希望是今個週末。」黎稱在訊息表達個人願望而非事實，並認為若美國推行制裁，中國會重新考慮是否推行國安法，但他不認為必然發生，只是一個願望。在法官提問下，黎同意希望制裁措施出台，因時間緊迫，希望制裁愈早出台愈好。</p> -<p>As the Made in China 2025 technical document roadmap stated, “meeting domestic market demand, improving the self-sufficiency rate of integrated circuit products, meeting national security needs, and occupying the strategic product market have always been the greatest demand and driving force for the development of the integrated circuit industry.”</p> +<p>另外，陳梓華曾指稱黎動用了大量人脈以及媒體資源去協助初選舉行，「我諗我係少數人知道當初初選一直以嚟構思嘅係黎智英。」但當辯方問黎在訊息中為何會形容初選為「奇蹟」，黎卻似乎混淆初選和區議會選舉，兩度回答因為「大勝」。黎亦堅稱從沒有與陳討論過初選的事宜，並不關注事態發展。</p> -<p>Even earlier policies, though less well resourced, sought to dramatically reduce use of foreign semiconductors and semiconductor manufacturing equipment. For example, the 2006 “Medium Long Range Plan for the Development of Science and Technology” explicitly called for self-sufficiency in semiconductor technologies and initiated so-called “mega projects” to drive toward that goal.</p> +<h4 id="黎否認在會議提及初選-指攬炒巴居英不可能參選">黎否認在會議提及初選 指攬炒巴居英不可能參選</h4> -<p>For more than a decade, China’s government has provided lavish subsidies in the form of tax breaks, free land, government grants, and equity infusions to a number of Chinese semiconductor equipment companies. Naura, one of China’s leading domestic semiconductor manufacturing equipment companies received $1.3 billion in state support in 2021, even before the imposition of the Biden administration’s export controls. AMEC, another leading Chinese semiconductor equipment company, received a similar equity investment from the “Big Fund” in 2015. Simply put, China’s goal of semiconductor equipment industry localization and robust policy support predated any modern effort to impose meaningful export controls on China’s chip fabrication capabilities.</p> +<p>在辯方大律師關文渭的主問下，繼續圍繞同案另一被告陳梓華的證供，牽涉「串謀勾結外國勢力」控罪。</p> -<h4 id="2-there-is-not-a-simple-relationship-between-export-controls-and-chinas-rate-of-technological-progress-chinas-greatest-progress-came-in-sectors-with-no-export-controls">2. There is not a simple relationship between export controls and China’s rate of technological progress. China’s greatest progress came in sectors with no export controls.</h4> +<p>2020年1月11日，黎智英在台灣陽明山別墅，與陳梓華、「攬炒巴」劉祖廸和一名女子見面及交談。陳梓華早前指稱，黎在會上談及初選，並問劉祖廸會否嘗試參選，又表示「佢（黎）本人會幫啲政治素人，去幫佢哋做傳媒曝光，同埋經濟上支持佢哋，只要佢哋肯去參選。」</p> -<p>A September 2024 analysis by Bernstein Research, an equity research firm, included a review of China’s semiconductor self-sufficiency goals from the 2015 roadmap and found that “China has made impressive progress and likely will beat the ‘Made in China 2025’ targets for integrated circuit (IC) Design and Manufacturing, but may miss the goals for IC equipment and Materials.” As the Bernstein analysis shows, the rate of China’s progress toward self-sufficiency is best predicted by the market and technological complexities of each semiconductor market segment, not by the extent to which export controls were applied. It is certainly not the case that the segments in which China has made the most progress — or even devoted the most resources — are the areas in which the United States has applied export controls most forcefully.</p> +<p>黎則稱他不可能問劉會否參選立法會，因劉當時居於英國倫敦。法官李素蘭問，黎如何得知劉居於倫敦？黎引述劉在會面時表示在倫敦工作，工作性質與梁振英一樣，都是從事測量行業。</p> -<p>That there is not a simple relationship between export controls and China’s technological progress should be obvious given that China has made rapid progress in other technological domains — such as solar cells and electric vehicles (EVs) — where the United States applied no export controls and in some cases actively supported the rise of a Chinese supply chain. The United States applied no export controls in the case of the equipment used to manufacture silicon solar cells, yet today China dominates both production of solar cells and production of the equipment used to make them. This equipment is in many ways similar to (though less sophisticated than) the equipment used to make and process silicon wafers for semiconductors. In fact, one Chinese company, Naura, is a domestic leader in both manufacturing equipment for both solar cells and semiconductors. The biggest difference in Chinese outcomes between those two industries is not the presence or absence of export controls but the far greater technological complexity of producing semiconductor manufacturing equipment.</p> +<p>法官杜麗冰問，若然劉居於倫敦，而不是在香港，黎又如何期望劉去影響勇武派？黎則表示，他不是叫劉去領導勇武派，而是叫他游說勇武派，因劉擁有很大的影響力。</p> -<p>The EV maker Tesla made a major push into Chinese manufacturing in late 2018, launching deep partnerships with many local Chinese suppliers, such as battery-maker CATL. As a November 2024 commentary in a major Chinese state-run newspaper stated:</p> +<p>法官李運騰問，黎到底是想劉做勇武派的領袖、還是意見領袖（KOL）？黎則指，運動無領袖導致了街頭暴力不受控制，因此認為需要有一個領袖團隊。在追問下，黎稱劉在「連登」很有影響力，猶如一個「精神領袖」，而他只是請求劉運用其影響力去令勇武派平息暴力。他又指自己從不瀏覽「連登」，只是從報紙上得知「連登」。</p> -<blockquote> - <p>Tesla’s rapid growth in sales, fueled by its technological and branding advantages and backed by China’s massive consumer market, has driven the rapid development of upstream and downstream supply chains. Today, the localization rate of parts for Tesla’s Shanghai Gigafactory exceeds 95%, with more than 60 suppliers integrated into Tesla’s global supply chain.</p> -</blockquote> +<p>有關陳引述黎稱會資助政治素人參與初選，辯方問黎有否在會議上談及初選。黎否認，並稱從沒觸及這個話題。</p> -<p>The Chinese EV supply chain, which Tesla helped dramatically increase in both scale and technological sophistication, is now also supplying Tesla’s competitors. Defections of Tesla-trained skilled employees are also a challenge. An April 2024 New York Times report claimed that most of Tesla’s early Chinese employees now work at competing Chinese firms. In a January Tesla earnings call, Tesla CEO Elon Musk said “The Chinese car companies are the most competitive car companies in the world. . . . Frankly, I think if there are not trade barriers established, they will pretty much demolish most other companies in the world.”</p> +<p>黎又指，在該次會面之後，便沒有再與劉聯絡過，包括親身會面和透過電子通訊。</p> -<p>The point here is not to suggest with unwarranted certainty that export controls would have definitively prevented China’s rise in the solar and EV industries. Rather, it is to caution the reader against relying too heavily on cursory anecdotal evidence to reach conclusions about when export controls do or do not work and what the counterfactual outcome would have been if export controls were or were not applied. Much depends upon the state of the global market landscape, the complexity of the controlled technology, the current technological sophistication of the targeted country, the design of the export control regulations, and the robustness of the controls’ implementation and enforcement. Only a detailed analysis can hope to reach anything approaching insight.</p> +<h4 id="陳梓華稱向黎匯報李宇軒劉祖廸同意支持國際線-黎否認">陳梓華稱向黎匯報李宇軒劉祖廸同意支持國際線 黎否認</h4> -<h4 id="3-semiconductor-export-controls--as-implemented-thus-far--have-in-different-ways-and-at-different-times-both-helped-and-hindered-chinese-firms">3. Semiconductor export controls — as implemented thus far — have in different ways and at different times both helped and hindered Chinese firms.</h4> +<p>陳梓華供稱，陽明山會議翌日，他與已故台灣民運人士施明德見面，當晚在酒店與劉祖廸跟李宇軒進行線上會議，將會見黎智英的內容告知李。陳續稱，線上會議結束之後，他透過WhatsApp Call 聯絡黎，陳告訴黎：「Andy（李宇軒）同劉祖廸都同意喺國際線上面跟隨你嘅行動。」</p> -<p>Just as foreign firms have supported Chinese competitor growth in solar cells and EVs in the absence of export controls, so have they done in semiconductor manufacturing. The major semiconductor manufacturing equipment providers all have major service businesses, where, among other things, they train customer companies on how to get the most out of their equipment. Prior to the October 2022 changes in U.S. export controls, this could include assisting with the facility planning, installation, repairs, and operational troubleshooting of equipment as part of advanced chip manufacturing operations. Industry sources told CSIS that this sometimes included contract research and development (R&amp;D) of advanced node semiconductor process technology on behalf of or in partnership with Chinese clients. At least as of November 2024, this is still legal in the case of providing support to Chinese legacy chip manufacturing operations.</p> +<p>黎今稱，他不知道有這個線上會議，也沒有參與。對於陳稱曾向黎匯報李宇軒和劉祖廸均同意支持國際線，黎否認有此對話，因他當時不知道李宇軒，直至閱讀新聞和在庭上才知道這個人。</p> -<p>By contrast, earlier U.S. export controls meaningfully reversed progress in some segments of the Chinese semiconductor sector, such as NAND memory manufacturing and smartphone chip design, though the durability of those setbacks, even if temporary, will depend on many factors. More recent export controls have also made life harder in many ways for Chinese semiconductor equipment firms, who can no longer legally obtain U.S. subcomponents or technical expertise.</p> +<h4 id="黎智英否認出面調停美國線爭拗">黎智英否認出面調停美國線爭拗</h4> -<p>Thus, it is simply wrong to say that export controls always, in isolation, accelerate Chinese technological indigenization and that making it easier for U.S. firms to export will always slow Chinese indigenization.</p> +<p>陳供稱，他在2020年1月底再次聯絡黎，告知黎，劉祖廸「唔想打議會線，但係喺國際線上面，就會全力開火。」惟黎則表示，不認為這次通話曾存在，因為劉是否在國際線上，從不是自己所關注的事項。</p> -<p>At the same time, it is unambiguously the case that the United States’ use of semiconductor export controls, beginning with ZTE in April 2018, made a massive impression on both political and corporate leaders in China. Speeches at the time by Chinese leadership, including General Secretary Xi Jinping, indicate that ZTE was viewed as a turning point and justified China’s aggressive pursuit of “self-reliance” in science and technology. Pony Ma, the chairman of Tencent, one of China’s largest technology firms, said in May 2018, “The recent ZTE incident made us see clearly that no matter how advanced our mobile payment is, without mobile devices, without microchips and operating systems, we can’t compete competently.”</p> +<p>陳另供稱，他在通話中向黎提及「當時有條日本線，就係李宇軒打嘅」。黎則反駁，他從沒聽聞過李宇軒或任何關於日本的事情。</p> -<p>The evidence goes beyond talk to specific actions. China made significant changes to its semiconductor policy in the years following ZTE, and China’s central government directed local governments to “do everything in their power” to promote the semiconductor sector. Some Chinese companies also took drastic measures to respond after ZTE. For example, Nikkei Asia reported that Yangtze Memory Technologies Corporation (YMTC) — one of China’s most advanced semiconductor manufacturers — began a full-blown de-Americanization campaign in 2019 involving the full-time work of more than 800 staff (both YMTC and its suppliers). This included the establishment of multiple new major partnerships with domestic Chinese equipment producers. Of note, at the time when YMTC began this de-Americanization initiative, no significant U.S. export controls applied to the company. YMTC began their work based on fear of future controls, not the reality of current ones.</p> +<p>陳亦稱，當時美國線由劉祖廸、李宇軒和Shirley Ho帶頭，但他們與當地的港人組織「有啲拗撬」，所以希望黎智英出面調停，而黎則叫陳聯絡Mark Simon。</p> -<p>Combined, this provides strong evidence that the export controls did increase the desire of both the Chinese government and Chinese companies to increase the capabilities of local semiconductor equipment providers, but that is not the same thing as saying that export controls caused accelerated indigenization, which depends upon more than just desire.</p> +<p>辯方問黎知不知道美國線的領袖是劉祖廸、李宇軒和Shirley Ho。黎則否認，並稱從沒與陳討論美國線事宜，「所以這必定是他捏造出來。（So this must be a fabrication by him.）」黎亦否認陳希望他出面調停，反問：「我不認識他們（美國線）任何一個，又如何出面調停？」他並否認曾叫 Mark Simon 協助調停。</p> -<h4 id="4-the-biden-administrations-2022-export-controls-strengthened-a-policy-approach-to-semiconductor-equipment-controls-that-began-in-2019-during-the-first-trump-administration">4. The Biden administration’s 2022 export controls strengthened a policy approach to semiconductor equipment controls that began in 2019 during the first Trump administration.</h4> +<h4 id="陳梓華傳送初選消息-黎從沒討論初選沒關注事態發展">陳梓華傳送初選消息 黎：從沒討論初選、沒關注事態發展</h4> -<p>As with chip export controls, the first Trump administration launched the U.S. government’s modern approach to semiconductor manufacturing equipment export controls. According to reporting by Reuters, the U.S. government successfully persuaded the Dutch government in July 2019 to cancel the export license of EUV lithography equipment to SMIC, China’s most advanced logic chip foundry. In December 2020, SMIC was added to the U.S. Department of Commerce’s Entity List, prohibiting the company from buying certain kinds of U.S. equipment, specifically, “items uniquely required for production of semiconductors at advanced technology nodes (10 nanometers and below, including extreme ultraviolet technology).”</p> +<p>2020年2月26日，陳梓華向黎智英傳送「眾志聯盟」的出選名單，新西派出朱凱廸、新東派出何桂藍、九東派出黃之鋒、梁凱晴做「Plan B」、九西派出張崑陽、港島派出羅冠聰、超區則派出岑敖暉。</p> -<p>In October 2022, the Biden administration significantly expanded U.S. export controls on semiconductor manufacturing equipment, including not only Entity List and end-use restrictions but also some country-wide export controls that applied to China as a whole (including a use of the U.S. persons rule). Just as importantly, the Biden administration made some of these controls more multilateral in nature, engagingJapan and the Netherlands to overhaul their export control policies for advanced semiconductor manufacturing equipment. Even though these controls did not entirely align with U.S. controls, this was important to ensure that Dutch and Japanese companies did not provide China with alternative sources for the items that the United States was no longer willing to sell.</p> +<p>黎當時回覆陳：「我們要著手處理，如果初選有認受性，他們也必須參與。且看看事態發展如何。（Thanks. We’ve to work on them. But if the primary has legitimacy, they will have to join. Let’s see.）」陳回覆：「我會盡力處理它。（I will try my best to work on it.）」、「至少不會讓他們拖累。（At least not to let them ruin it.）」陳庭上解釋，黎智英當時希望令到眾志聯盟名單上的人士參與初選，以及受到初選的約束。</p> -<h4 id="5-chinese-semiconductor-equipment-firms-started-very-small-but-have-grown-rapidly-however-this-rapid-growth-occurred-both-before-and-after-export-controls-and-took-place-during-a-period-of-massive-chinese-equipment-demand-growth">5. Chinese semiconductor equipment firms started very small but have grown rapidly. However, this rapid growth occurred both before and after export controls and took place during a period of massive Chinese equipment demand growth.</h4> +<p>黎則表示，從沒有與陳討論過初選的事宜，自己也從沒接觸上述名單上的人士，或者叫他們參與初選。他稱不認識朱凱廸和何桂藍，但是私下認識黃之鋒和張崑陽，羅冠聰和岑敖暉則是點頭之交。他強調當時不在意初選的事宜。</p> -<p>China’s domestic semiconductor manufacturing equipment industry has long been both small and technologically inferior to the global state of the art. To understand the growth trajectory of the Chinese semiconductor manufacturing equipment sector, CSIS gathered market data on how China’s global semiconductor manufacturing equipment market share has changed over time across both supply and demand (see Table 1).</p> +<p>辯方問黎知不知道初選在2020年7月的時候舉行，黎稱不知道。有份審理初選47人案的法官李運騰提到，《蘋果日報》當時有大量關於初選的報導，而根據初選案的指控，《蘋果》提供了平台舉行初選論壇。黎則回應，自己沒有關注事件發展，他當然他是知道有初選，但重申沒有與陳討論過。法官李素蘭質疑，陳當時只是突然向黎提起初選（So out of the blue）？黎同意，並指陳可能認為初選重要，所以傳送相關消息給他。</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/mL9mPYr.png" alt="image01" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Table 1: Chinese Semiconductor Equipment Global Supply and Demand Share.</strong> Sources: CSIS Analysis; Semiconductor Equipment Association of Japan; “Semiconductor Equipment Database,” TechInsights.</em></p> +<h4 id="黎直至庭上才知道與李宇軒牽涉同一案件">黎：直至庭上才知道與李宇軒牽涉同一案件</h4> -<p>China has grown as both a supplier and as a buyer of semiconductor manufacturing equipment over the past 15 years. And while Chinese firms have in aggregate increased China’s share of global supply, they remain quite small in comparison to foreign firms, providing only 3.2 percent of the equipment (by dollar value) globally and 9.6 percent of the equipment purchased by customers operating in China in 2023 (see Figure 1). Some industry sources, such as the research firm Sanford Bernstein, estimate that the Chinese domestic market share captured by Chinese equipment providers (aka Chinese self-sufficiency) is 15 percent. Whether the true figure is closer to 9.6 percent or 15 percent, the equipment that Chinese firms sell remains almost exclusively confined to legacy nodes and remains far behind the global state of the art. However, industry sources have told CSIS that Chinese equipment has grown in competitiveness compared with the legacy node equipment sold by leading global suppliers.</p> +<p>辯方指，黎於2020年8月10日首次被拘捕，而在同一天，李宇軒也警方以勾結外國勢力罪拘捕。在數星期之後，李在中國水域被內地當局拘捕。黎表示有看過相關新聞，記得當時並非還柙當中。辯方問黎當時是否知道，李宇軒跟他牽涉同一宗案件。黎則稱不知道，直至在庭上才知道。</p> -<p>Until the Biden administration’s October 2022 export controls, it was generally legal to sell critical subcomponents or expert consulting services to Chinese equipment firms, assisting with their growth in both sales and technological knowhow. In addition to voluntary foreign support, Chinese firms have benefitted from industrial espionage that has included state-backed cyberattacks on equipment companies. Chinese equipment firms have also benefitted from hundreds of billions of dollars in government investments, tax credits, and subsidies.</p> +<h4 id="曾轉讓離岸公司予陳梓華-黎否認是推動制裁的報酬">曾轉讓離岸公司予陳梓華 黎否認是推動制裁的「報酬」</h4> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/13VHUhA.png" alt="image02" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 1: Global Semiconductor Manufacturing Equipment Supply and Demand by Region, 2023 ($USD, million).</strong> Source: CSIS Analysis; and “Semiconductor Equipment Database,” TechInsights.</em></p> +<p>陳梓華早前供稱，在2020年1月，Mark Simon將一間在英屬維爾京群島註冊的公司 LACOCK 及一個匯豐銀行本地戶口，轉讓給陳。他後來得悉文件上的簽名屬於黎智英，又稱這是黎智英和 Mark Simon 給他的「報酬（reward）」。</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/BmXwXib.png" alt="image03" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 2: Semiconductor Equipment Demand by Region, 2008–2023.</strong> Source: <a href="https://www.seaj.or.jp/english/statistics/index.html">“Statistical Data,” Semiconductor Equipment Association of Japan</a>.</em></p> +<p>辯方問黎是否記得 LACOCK，黎稱不知道，他只知道其私人公司「力高顧問有限公司」。</p> -<h4 id="6-rd-expenditures-by-chinese-semiconductor-firms-have-grown-explosively-though-the-rate-of-growth-has-decreased-somewhat-since-2021">6. R&amp;D expenditures by Chinese semiconductor firms have grown explosively, though the rate of growth has decreased somewhat since 2021.</h4> +<p>LACOCK文件顯示直至2019年11月30日，戶口存款為8萬元，至2020年2月7日，銀行扣除辦理轉讓的200元手續費之後，存款最終為79,800元。</p> -<p>Using public financial filings, CSIS has collected R&amp;D expenditure data from the eight largest publicly traded Chinese semiconductor equipment firms (see Figure 3).</p> +<p>黎稱，相信是因為當時陳梓華向 Mark Simon 投訴無法開設銀行戶口，所以便轉讓了這間離岸公司及銀行戶口給陳。辯方隨即指，轉讓的不只是銀行戶口，還有戶口內的8萬元。黎僅指，「對，這是銀行戶口，當然有款項。」</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/sbrV214.png" alt="image04" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 3: Chinese Semiconductor Equipment Firms’ Annual R&amp;D Expense &amp; Growth Rates.</strong> Source: CSIS analysis; and corporate financial disclosures.</em></p> +<p>辯方追問，可能在黎眼中8萬元並不是大數目，但是就一般香港人而言，8萬元可能是一筆大數目，問黎有否將該8萬元，作為陳請求外國制裁的回報？黎否認，並稱從沒有要求陳請求外國制裁，他只是要求他協助聯絡勇武派，以平息暴力，而該筆錢也不是一個「報酬」。他又指，陳投訴不能開設銀行戶口，而Mark Simon 只是出於好心才會幫助陳。</p> -<p>As the above data shows, the Chinese semiconductor equipment industry started out with comparatively low R&amp;D expenditure but has shown extraordinary growth since the beginning of the Made in China 2025 policy era in 2015. Relative growth rates of R&amp;D have slowed in the industry over the past two years, but growth in absolute terms remains very high. This data is not consistent with a simple story of “export controls caused a boom in the Chinese semiconductor manufacturing equipment industry” and instead shows that annual growth rates were very high both before and after the United States began imposing export controls.</p> +<p>黎稱，Mark Simon進行轉讓手續之前並未有徵求他的批准，但是他是同意這件事情，因此有在文件上簽名。</p> -<p>One plausible interpretation of the data is that U.S. and Dutch export controls in the 2018–2020 period increased desire among both the Chinese government and Chinese equipment customers in strengthening the local equipment industry, but they did so without making it more difficult for Chinese firms to obtain help — even from U.S. experts and equipment subcomponent providers. The export controls of 2022 and 2023 may have further increased interest among the Chinese government and customers, but such interest and ability to productively absorb additional investment was already nearly maxed out.</p> +<p>根據控辯雙方承認事實，在2018年4月26日至2020年1月13日之間，黎智英、Mark Simon 和前壹傳媒財務總裁周達權是 LACOCK 銀行戶口的授權簽署人。由2020年1月14日開始，該銀行戶口唯一授權簽署人轉為陳梓華。</p> -<p>However, the export controls of 2022 and 2023 also took extensive steps (e.g., extensive application of the Foreign Direct Product Rule and the U.S. persons rule, multilateralization of the controls) to make it more difficult for Chinese firms to obtain foreign help in advancing the reliability and competitiveness of their technology. Thus, the pace of revenue and R&amp;D expenditure growth among Chinese equipment providers slowed somewhat (while remaining high in absolute terms). Again, this is a plausible interpretation that is consistent with the available data, but the available data is not sufficient in and of itself to definitively state that this is the correct interpretation.</p> +<h4 id="黎轉發美國內部消息予陳-含制裁內容-黎稱只關注暴力升級">黎轉發美國內部消息予陳 含制裁內容 黎稱只關注暴力升級</h4> -<p>Another plausible interpretation for slowing pace of growth — discussed in the next section — is that Chinese customers for semiconductor manufacturing equipment dramatically accelerated equipment purchases in an effort to stockpile equipment in anticipation of future export controls and that this surge of foreign imports stockpiling temporarily reduced demand growth for domestic equipment (while not changing China’s long-term commitment to end reliance on imports).</p> +<p>2020年4月5日，英國駐港澳前總領事郭明瀚（Jim Cunningham）向黎智英傳送美國政府的內部消息，並要求黎保密。訊息稱美國政府關注示威者日益升級的暴力，包括炸彈（I was told the US is very concerned about new violence from demonstrators, increased threats from bombs/IEDs），若有導致警察或市民死亡的話，便會使美國政府、國會和輿論疏遠運動，內部人士亦認同暴力對反修例運動構成嚴重威脅，既刺激北京亦失去美國政府的支持。</p> -<p>There are some limitations in the R&amp;D data, as not all of the companies are exclusively focused on the semiconductor equipment industry. Naura, for example, has lithium battery and photovoltaic business units which industry sources told CSIS are responsible for about 18 percent of the firm’s revenue (and presumably comprised a comparable share of its R&amp;D for at least some period), but these are not broken out in the firm’s public financial reporting. Additionally, there are important Chinese semiconductor equipment firms that are not included in this analysis, such as Shanghai Microelectronics Equipment (SMEE) and Huawei’s recently established semiconductor equipment subsidiaries, because they do report such data publicly.</p> +<p>黎其後向陳梓華轉發相關訊息，並叫陳保密。黎庭上解釋，因為他關注示威者日漸升級的暴力，以及警方的暴力，所以轉發訊息給陳。辯方追問，訊息亦含有制裁的內容。黎則稱，他將整段訊息轉發時，不能刪除有關制裁的內容。他稱轉發目的純粹讓陳知道美國關注香港示威暴力升級。</p> -<p>The absence of Huawei’s semiconductor equipment subsidiaries, in particular, could be an important missing source of data. Huawei’s private investment in R&amp;D and the semiconductor equipment that it produces for its own secret network of chip manufacturers would not be captured in any of the data sources used in this report. In October 2023, the Dutch newspaper NRC, citing anonymous ASML employees, reported that an employee who stole significant semiconductor manufacturing equipment technology secrets moved to China and now works for Huawei. This suggests that Huawei is making a significant investment in lithography equipment, as does a 2022 Huawei patent filed under the name “Extreme Ultraviolet (EUV) Lithography.”</p> +<p>陳又稱，他很想將美國的內部消息轉發給劉祖廸和李宇軒，於是致電黎徵詢其同意，而黎回覆不要複製貼上（copy and paste），只需把相關消息告知劉祖廸和李宇軒。惟黎否認有相關對話，也不知道李宇軒的Telegram 帳號是「rip」。他亦稱不記得當時有沒有示威者使用炸彈。</p> -<p>While these complications mean that the specific R&amp;D values as presented have an error bar, the overall trajectory characterized is likely close to the reality of the Chinese semiconductor equipment industry as a whole.</p> +<h4 id="黎曾嘗試安排陳梓華等人赴台見唐鳳-黎否認與政治有關">黎曾嘗試安排陳梓華等人赴台見唐鳳 黎否認與政治有關</h4> -<h4 id="7-in-the-20162024-period-leading-us-and-international-semiconductor-equipment-firms-continued-to-demonstrate-strong-chinese-revenue-growth-after-imposition-of-increasingly-strict-export-controls">7. In the 2016–2024 period, leading U.S. and international semiconductor equipment firms continued to demonstrate strong Chinese revenue growth after imposition of increasingly strict export controls.</h4> +<p>辯方指2020年5月，黎智英向陳梓華轉發訊息，顯示黎聯絡台灣《蘋果日報》社長陳裕鑫，嘗試安排「逆權運動年輕人陣營」到台灣，與時任台灣行政院政務委員唐鳳和中華文化協會見面。陳早前供稱，當時SWHK內部討論過發展台灣線，而黎問他們想不想見唐鳳和中華文化協會。</p> -<p>The top three U.S. semiconductor manufacturing equipment providers are Applied Materials, Lam Research, and KLA Corporation. Together with ASML of the Netherlands and Tokyo Electron and Advantest of Japan, they comprise the six largest semiconductor equipment providers in the world by revenue. In their financial reports, these firms report the share of their revenue derived from China (not including Taiwan).</p> +<p>黎則在庭上反駁，不明白為何陳會牽扯到唐鳳的政治立場上，因唐鳳是一名資訊科技天才，而不是一名示威或政治運動的專家。</p> -<p>CSIS extracted and aggregated this data to show that these firms have grown revenue in China both before and after the United States began imposing export controls on semiconductor manufacturing equipment. For the top three U.S. providers, Chinese revenue growth outperformed growth in the rest of the world every year in the 2016–2024E period.</p> +<p>辯方澄清，從訊息可見，當時是黎問陳想不想見唐鳳。黎則回應，他不會將唐鳳與任何政見或政治的事宜聯繫上，因唐鳳只是一名資訊科技天才。</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/XpUyOQK.png" alt="image05" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 4: Top Three U.S. Semiconductor Manufacturing Equipment Firms’ Revenue.</strong> Source: CSIS Analysis; and company 10-K/10-Q financial disclosures.</em></p> +<p>黎又提到，唐鳳在疫情期間編寫了一個程式，用來追蹤病毒走勢，以保護市民免受病毒感染，令其非常受歡迎，形容唐鳳是一個傳奇。法官李運騰問黎，但是陳並不是對病毒有興趣。黎則表示不知道，僅指可能陳想與傳奇人物見面。</p> -<p>Similarly, ASML, the Dutch lithography equipment firm, also saw dramatic growth in sales of equipment to China that exceeded growth in the rest of the world.</p> +<p>至於中華文化協會，黎指它不是一個政府機構，只是一個關於藝術和文化的組織，沒有牽涉香港的事務。黎相信陳後來未有成行，因為疫情期間的隔離政策。</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/rd3GmYV.png" alt="image06" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 5: ASML Equipment Revenue in China and Rest of World.</strong> Source: CSIS analysis; and company 10-K/10-Q financial disclosures.</em></p> +<h4 id="黎稱沒想過自己會觸犯國安法-堅持留在香港面對">黎稱沒想過自己會觸犯國安法 堅持留在香港面對</h4> -<p>Finally, the same is true of Tokyo Electron and Advantest, the two leading Japanese equipment providers. Both saw superior performance in China compared with the rest of the world.</p> +<p>辯方指2020年5月21日，黎智英向陳梓華傳送人大公布實施「港版國安法」的報導，並說：「仆街打到嚟喇！」陳回覆黎：「黎前輩：事情至今，已經難以逆轉形勢，我唯一擔心是你與Martin及你們家人的自身安全，萬事請以自身安全與事業存續為首要考慮。國安法主要針對境外內勇武人士，港獨份子及煽惑群眾人士。你務必謹慎。」</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/mOLIeZf.png" alt="image07" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 6: Tokyo Electron and Advantest Revenue in China and Rest of World.</strong> Source: CSIS analysis; and company financial disclosures.</em></p> +<p>辯方問，黎為何認為國安法會影響到陳？黎稱因為陳是示威者之一。法官李運騰指陳的訊息提及「國安法主要針對境外內勇武人士，港獨份子及煽惑群眾人士」，問是否因為陳認為黎會墮入上述三個類別，所以如此說。黎則稱不知道，陳純粹提到這三類人。法官李素蘭問，陳會否認為黎會墮入「煽惑群眾人士」這一類別？黎表示，當時沒有進一步思考訊息的意思，對陳的說話不在意。</p> -<p>The most likely explanation for this is that Chinese firms have shifted their purchases of international equipment earlier so that they occurred prior to expected future export controls (which the U.S. government has maintained since 2022 will be updated annually). Just as Huawei built up a U.S. chip stockpile equivalent to multiple years of demand during a period prior to U.S. export control loopholes being closed, Chinese semiconductor manufacturers have acquired a stockpile of U.S. and other foreign equipment in anticipation of strengthened export controls coming in the near future.</p> +<p>訊息紀錄顯示，黎其後回覆陳：「我們不要擔心個人安危。一旦站出來爭取自由，便要準備作戰至最後一刻，我們雖然未必會勝利，但必須堅持下去。不用擔心。更好的日子即將來臨（Let’s not worry about personal security. Once came out to join the fight for freedom one is prepared to fight to the last. We may not win but must persist. Don’t worry. Better days will come.）。」</p> -<p>This “pulling demand forward” interpretation is the one that many executives in the semiconductor equipment industry have evidently reached. In July 2024, both the CEO of ASML and the CEO of ASM said during investor earnings calls that Chinese semiconductor manufacturers would likely decrease purchases of equipment soon, as they have struggled to “digest” all of the accelerated purchases of equipment and spare parts that they have made, effectively confirming that many tools that have been sold to China are still likely awaiting installation and remain unused. Similarly, in August 2024, a Lam Research executive likewise described “inventory stocking” behavior among Chinese customers over the past several years.</p> +<p>法官杜麗冰指，當陳梓華提到國安法針對的三類人時，為何會回覆「我們不要擔心個人安危」，若然黎認為自己不會墮入法網，為何當時不回覆：「不用擔心，我不會墮入該三個類別」之類。</p> -<h4 id="8-export-controls-changed-the-composition-of-equipment-demand-both-technologically-decreasing-the-technological-sophistication-of-demand-in-china-and-geographically-shifting-more-demand-outside-of-china-but-likely-did-not-change-the-overall-demand-trajectory">8. Export controls changed the composition of equipment demand both technologically (decreasing the technological sophistication of demand in China) and geographically (shifting more demand outside of China) but likely did not change the overall demand trajectory.</h4> +<p>黎則回應：「因為我不會好像你這樣思考」，又說：「你是在把說話塞進我的口。」他表示，當時沒有為意陳所關注的三類人士，他只關注自己和李柱銘及其家人的自身安全。</p> -<p>Decades before the Trump administration’s April 2018 export controls on ZTE ushered in the modern era of semiconductor export controls, the U.S. policy goal for exports of semiconductor manufacturing equipment to China was already to restrict sales of advanced equipment to trusted U.S. allies and partners while allowing the sale of older, less advanced equipment to China. A 2002 U.S. government policy review of semiconductor technology exports to China stated this explicitly. Neither the Trump administration nor the Biden administration fundamentally changed this approach at a high level. Both administrations continued to allow the sale of legacy equipment, though they increased restrictions on sales of advanced equipment exports. In the case of the Biden administration, it also communicated an intent to end the “sliding scale” approach that allowed the sophistication of equipment exports to China to advance, but on a multiyear delay from the global state of the art.</p> +<p>法官李運騰問，黎當時有否擔心自己會觸犯國安法？黎表示沒有想過。李官再問，是否代表國安法生效之後，黎會繼續做他一直在做的事情？黎說：「我會堅持留在香港，和面對它。」</p> -<p>As such, China has continued to be a large and growing market for equipment exports even after the more recent export controls, but Chinese firms have changed their focus from a rush to compete at the most advanced semiconductor technological nodes to maximizing both domestic self-sufficiency and global leadership in legacy chip production. China was likely to pursue a massive expansion of chip production capacity regardless of U.S. actions, but the export controls helped ensure that this capacity did not drive the U.S. and allies toward a strategic dependence on China for the most technologically advanced chips, such as those that power AI systems or high-end smartphones.</p> +<p>陳梓華其後回覆黎，說：「我沒有退後的餘地，我亦有責任盡量保留最多的力量。我也不會放棄。如果你們都倒下了，我會是最後一個站著的人。最好的即將來臨（There is no turning back for me and I do have a sense of duty to conserve our forces as much as possible. I won’t give up too. If all of you fall, I will be the last man standing. The best is yet to come.）。」</p> -<p>Moreover, the overall demand for semiconductor manufacturing equipment fundamentally depends on the overall demand for manufactured chips. As the demand for advanced chips grows, that demand will translate into demand for advanced equipment. And if China is not in a position to purchase advanced equipment, then the purchase and production will instead take place outside of China. The chief financial officer of ASML, Roger Dassen, said this explicitly during ASML’s July 2024 earnings call with investment analysts:</p> +<p>黎指從訊息可見，陳打算繼續堅持抗爭，參與在地運動。辯方指訊息提到保留「力量」，黎認為「力量」意思是陳的同儕，包括勇武派和年輕人。</p> -<blockquote> - <p>. . . the way we look at the demand for our tools is not from a specific geography. In this case, China. We look at — and that’s the way we model our sales medium term and long term. We look at what is the global demand for wafers and whether those wafers are being produced in country X or country Y, at the end of the day, it doesn’t matter. And I think that is very important to recognize in looking at your model. We don’t have a specific China element in our models. It is the global demand for wafers that drives our modeling.</p> -</blockquote> +<h4 id="黎明言希望美國制裁-以阻止國安法">黎明言希望美國制裁 以阻止國安法</h4> -<p>Accordingly, U.S. and allied controls did not so much destroy demand as change its composition. China is buying fewer advanced tools than it would have otherwise and is instead purchasing more legacy tools. The advanced tools that would have been sold to China have instead been sold to places like the United States, Taiwan, South Korea, Japan, and Europe. Likewise, given that many foreign players are wary of investing in legacy nodes due to fears of Chinese overcapacity, the tools are being largely sold to China for those production lines, not elsewhere. Chinese firms are also likely attempting to use many “node-agnostic” or “backwards compatible” equipment tools not subject to a control to bolster their advanced node efforts.</p> +<p>辯方指，黎於2020年5月28日向陳傳送一條連結，惟該連結現已不能開啟，無法知道網站內容是什麼；黎並說：「剛剛見到，特朗普將推出更嚴苛的制裁，希望是今個週末。（Just saw it. More draconian sanctions were coming from Trump, hopefully this weekend）」</p> -<h4 id="9-increased-application-of-semiconductor-equipment-export-controls-coincided-with-and-likely-caused-us-equipment-firms-to-ensure-that-sales-to-china-did-not-ship-from-the-united-states-andor-were-manufactured-outside-the-united-states">9. Increased application of semiconductor equipment export controls coincided with and likely caused U.S. equipment firms to ensure that sales to China did not ship from the United States and/or were manufactured outside the United States.</h4> +<p>黎表示，他希望特朗普會盡力阻止國安法通過，透過對中國實施制裁。辯方問黎在訊息中是表達事實還是個人願望。黎稱是願望。辯方問黎為何認為制裁能夠阻止國安法通過。黎則稱這是阻止國安法通過的唯一可能性，因此他才會說這是「願望」。他不認為必然發生，只是一個願望。辯方問，透過制裁來阻止國安法背後的原理是什麼。黎僅指，中國會重新考慮是否推行國安法。</p> -<p>CSIS has produced an estimate of the Chinese semiconductor equipment revenue of each of the top three U.S. semiconductor equipment companies by taking their topline revenue from China and subtracting the share reported as services and non-semiconductor equipment businesses (e.g., display, printed circuit board inspection). This figure would include any semiconductor manufacturing equipment sales to China from these three firms shipped from any of their facilities worldwide, whether those facilities are in the United States or elsewhere.</p> +<p>辯方問，黎在訊息中使用的字眼是「More draconian sanctions」，是否代表此前已經有嚴苛的制裁，而黎希望有「更多」制裁措施？黎則表示，無法得知美國是否會推出更多制裁措施，而美國最後也沒有制裁。但他其後指，「more draconian」意思是「更具毀滅性（more damaging）」。</p> -<p>U.S. trade data provided by the International Trade Commission (ITC) reports the dollar value of all U.S. exports based on six-digit North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) codes. The NAICS Code for “Semiconductor Machinery Manufacturing” is 333242, which covers all front-end semiconductor manufacturing equipment. CSIS collected ITC trade data for all U.S. exports of 333242 goods to China. This figure includes any semiconductor manufacturing equipment sales made from U.S. soil, whether those sales are made by U.S.-owned or internationally owned firms. In practice, the top three U.S. semiconductor manufacturing equipment companies — Applied Materials, Lam Research, and KLA Corporation — tend to dominate 333242 exports to nearly all countries.</p> +<p>法官李運騰問，黎使用「hopefully」這個字眼，是否代表他希望制裁措施出台？黎同意，又指時間緊迫，有這樣的願望。李官又問，是否代表黎希望制裁愈早出台愈好？黎同意。</p> -<p>Based on these two datasets, one could see that U.S. equipment sales to China by U.S. firms have increasingly become exported from non-U.S. countries since 2016 and especially after 2019 (see Figure 7).</p> +<h4 id="陳梓華傳送重光計劃眾籌資料給黎智英">陳梓華傳送「重光計劃」眾籌資料給黎智英</h4> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/JmJpwEK.png" alt="image08" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 7: Comparing Firm-reported Equipment Sales to China with U.S.-China Equipment Exports Data.</strong> Source: CSIS analysis; <a href="https://dataweb.usitc.gov/">“DataWeb,” U.S. International Trade Commission</a>; and 10-K/10-Q reports.</em></p> +<p>2020年5月28日，陳梓華向黎智英傳送一條「連登」討論區連結，題為「【突發】攬炒過後是晨曦！攬炒團隊《重光香港計劃》眾籌上線！」。陳早前供稱，當時SWHK的資金即將耗盡，決定舉辦眾籌，把連結傳送給黎，是「因為要報告返俾佢知我哋做過啲咩」，並希望黎智英能夠幫手宣傳眾籌計劃。</p> -<p>From 2016 to 2020, the ratio of sales to exports grew 34 percent, from 1.1 to 1.5. However, from 2021 to 2024, the ratio nearly doubled, from 1.6 to 3.1. In other words, exports to China and sales to China used to be nearly identical, but sales overwhelmingly outgrew exports in the post-2020 period, the same period when the United States adopted significantly stricter export controls. Industry sources told CSIS that much of the change was originally due to U.S. firms seeking to legally avoid export controls that — in the absence of strict usage of the Foreign Direct Product Rule — only applied to exports from U.S. soil. This interpretation is consistent with the remarks of KLA CEO Rick Wallace, who discussed how some versions of U.S. semiconductor equipment export controls did not apply to U.S. companies manufacturing their equipment abroad and shipping from abroad during the company’s 2020 Q3 earnings call. The exchange is important and worth quoting at length:</p> +<p>惟黎在庭上稱，相信陳只是純粹讓他知道相關消息，又指從沒與陳談論過渡性貸款的事宜。</p> -<blockquote> - <p><strong>Question:</strong> Regarding the Department of Commerce ruling, and I know it’s still very early, and I’m sure you’re awaiting clarity on how broader now the rules will be pursued. But if you think about what’s been written to date, the major ruling is for manufacturing in the U.S. and considering you do make tools and assemble tools offshore, is your first interpretation that you will not be impacted in terms of shipping into China based on kind of what you read today?</p> -</blockquote> +<h4 id="陳梓華赴壹傳媒大樓-黎指陳擔心身份曝光">陳梓華赴壹傳媒大樓 黎指陳擔心身份曝光</h4> -<blockquote> - <p><strong>Rick Wallace:</strong> Our understanding at this point is, this will impact the tools that are manufactured in the U.S., which are manufactured for us in California. We have three major manufacturing sites; Israel, Singapore and here. So there is a potential impact depending on the customer. And our final understanding of the ruling that [is that it] will impact tools that come out of California.</p> -</blockquote> +<p>2020年6月16日，陳梓華到達將軍澳壹傳媒大樓與黎智英會面，該次是第六次見面。陳早前供稱，因為黎希望避開所有傳媒鏡頭，故陳由黎的私人司機接載往壹傳媒大樓，「擔心俾人見到佢同年輕嘅抗爭者有聯繫」。</p> -<p>In short, export controls that do not include strict implementation and enforcement of the Foreign Direct Product Rule or U.S. persons rule can incentivize U.S. firms to move production offshore, costing the United States manufacturing jobs. In recent years, U.S. semiconductor manufacturing equipment firms have doubled-down and expanded their non-U.S. manufacturing operations. Both KLA Corporation and Applied Materials have committed to major expansions of their Singapore manufacturing facilities, while LAM Research has built out its largest manufacturing site in Malaysia.</p> +<p>辯方問，當日壹傳媒大樓外面有沒有記者？黎笑言：「外面不知道，但裡面有很多。」黎又反駁指，擔心傳媒鏡頭的是陳，所以才會安排私人司機在另一處接載他到大樓，陳亦要求經後門進入大樓而不經正門，並且不想接觸到大樓內的記者。黎又提到過往陳到他的家食飯，陳也會問及如何避開住宅外的記者，擔心身份被曝光。辯方問，當時有否關於陳的新聞報導？黎稱不記得。</p> -<p>In quantitative terms, this is one of the most striking effects of the export controls as implemented thus far, and it clearly illustrates the risk that countries take by applying export controls that do not apply extraterritorially in industries where off-shoring some or all production is relatively easy. As one Japanese business executive stated, his company will “develop duplicate supply chains — one for the U.S.-led economic bloc and one for [the] China-led bloc.”</p> +<h4 id="黎稱會面僅關於劉祖廸在英國受襲一事">黎稱會面僅關於劉祖廸在英國受襲一事</h4> -<p>Industry sources told CSIS that, more recently, both U.S. and international semiconductor equipment companies are being required by their Chinese customers to remove all U.S. citizens from their supply chain and ship from outside the United States when selling to China.</p> +<p>黎指，該次會面是因為劉祖廸在英國被人襲擊，故陳想見面討論事件。黎引述陳認為襲擊是中國政府安排的；惟黎跟陳說不是，這不像是中國政府的操作，認為純粹是打劫；陳則不認為是打劫，這是陳來大樓見黎的原因。黎稱，除了劉祖廸受襲事件之外，便沒有其他重要的事情討論過。</p> -<p>This fact shows that there is really no turning back from the export control path that the United States and its allies have gone down. Half measures incur nearly all of the costs of an aggressive export control policy — in terms of incentivizing U.S. firm outsourcing, foreign substitution, and Chinese indigenous investment — while delivering comparatively few of the strategic benefits.</p> +<p>黎又憶述，當陳提起劉祖廸時，黎說他認為劉不是一個「有效的領袖（effective leader）」，因他的「兄弟姐妹」均在前線對抗警察，可是他卻留在倫敦，然而一名領袖不應該遠離險境。</p> -<h4 id="10-there-is-no-change-in-us-or-allied-policy-that-will-persuade-the-chinese-government-and-chinese-firms-to-abandon-their-semiconductor-equipment-de-americanization-and-decoupling-efforts-however-the-united-states-can-take-steps-to-make-those-efforts-more-difficult-and-to-extract-more-strategic-benefits-in-semiconductor-and-ai-competition">10. There is no change in U.S. or allied policy that will persuade the Chinese government and Chinese firms to abandon their semiconductor equipment de-Americanization and decoupling efforts. However, the United States can take steps to make those efforts more difficult and to extract more strategic benefits in semiconductor and AI competition.</h4> +<p>法官李運騰指，黎稱在2020年1月台灣會見劉的時候，沒有打算叫他成為領袖，只是想他運用其影響力，可是到了6月的時候，黎卻說劉不是一個有效的領袖，問為何會突然這樣談論劉。黎肯定是陳首先提起劉，因劉受襲一事，所以陳提起他。</p> -<p>Critics of export controls oftentimes make two related arguments. First, revenues from China can be reinvested in R&amp;D and thus contribute to increased U.S. technological competitiveness, including against Chinese firms. Second, prohibiting exports increases willingness on the part of Chinese firms and the Chinese government to invest in competitors to U.S. firms, decreasing U.S. technological competitiveness.</p> +<h4 id="黎否認說過將蘋果由本地傳媒變成國際傳媒">黎否認說過將《蘋果》由本地傳媒變成國際傳媒</h4> -<p>However, these arguments assume that the strategic approach of the Chinese government and Chinese firms depends solely or primarily upon U.S. actions, which is contradicted by the review of Chinese policy at the beginning of this paper and from the experience of the EV and solar industries.</p> +<p>陳梓華早前供稱，黎在會面期間稱國安法不會太過嚴厲。黎今認為陳的說法正確，因他不認為中國想摧毀香港。</p> -<p>Consider a thought experiment: What would be the likely policy response of the Chinese government if the United States decided to begin unrestricted exports of nuclear submarines to China? U.S. nuclear submarines are widely regarded as the best in the world, and China’s spies have long devoted major efforts to stealing U.S. submarine technology secrets.</p> +<p>陳供稱，黎指當時《蘋果日報》不斷虧蝕，所以需要商業上的支持；又指黎推行英文版需要大量資金。黎則指自己可能有說過《蘋果》虧蝕，因為當時的確蝕了很多錢，但是英文版需要大量資金的說法不真確，因成本很低，所以才會推行。</p> -<p>Presumably, therefore, China would leap at the chance to buy U.S. nuclear submarines on the open market. And, under the logic of the above two arguments — increased U.S. revenue and decreased Chinese investment — these sales would increase, not decrease, the U.S. technological advantage in nuclear submarine technology. Are American policymakers fools for using export controls to block nuclear submarine sales to China?</p> +<p>陳供稱，黎說：「呢個英文版相當於一個國際版，就係俾外國人睇嘅。雖然係蝕錢，但係對於佢嚟講好有價值。」黎則指自己當時不可能說英文版蝕錢，因英文版只推行了兩星期，不可能期望它能夠賺錢。</p> -<p>Of course not.</p> +<p>陳又稱黎說：「如果《蘋果日報》有英文版嘅話，就可以好直接同埋好快咁俾到一手資訊，去俾外國嘅枱底人睇到，咁佢哋可以作出更加有利黎智英政治理念嘅判斷。」惟黎指陳的證供不是真實，因「枱底人」不是他會使用的詞語，而且英文版是給所有人看的，而非僅僅給「枱底人」看。</p> -<p>Even if a hypothetical reckless U.S. president and Congress were to allow China to buy as many submarines as U.S. firms could make, China would never accept that this state of affairs is likely to continue on a permanent basis. China would obviously take the submarines they could get and reverse engineer the technology as fast as possible and transfer that technology to their domestic submarine industry, which they would continue to financially support. The increased revenue from R&amp;D for U.S. firms is not going to make nearly as much of a difference as China’s hands-on opportunity to reverse engineer U.S. technology. Neither would the lost sales among Chinese submarine manufacturers decrease China’s commitment to supporting a domestic industry. This is not to even mention the grave risks to national security of a hypothetical Chinese navy equipped with U.S.-built nuclear submarines.</p> +<p>陳又引述黎說，英文版可以令《蘋果》由一個本地傳媒變成國際傳媒，「咁喺國際上面就更加有國際話語權，同埋會有更加多人關注。」惟黎稱自己不可能這樣說，因不可能在英文版推行短短兩星期內，將《蘋果》變成國際媒體。法官李運騰追問黎有否說過相關言論。黎表示當然不記得，但是如果他有說過的話，也只是期望或是抱負，多於談論事實。</p> -<p>This admittedly extreme thought experiment bears consideration because, while some in the West question whether semiconductor manufacturing equipment deserves to be viewed as a strategic technology of major importance to national security, China’s leaders do not. This belief is evident not only in words but also the deeds, whether that be Chinese state-backed espionage against equipment firms, aggressive reverse engineering of purchased Western equipment, or the astonishing amount of financial resources dedicated to indigenization.</p> +<h4 id="黎否認籲swhk在文宣線和國際線上繼續做-稱做法不負責任">黎否認籲SWHK在文宣線和國際線上「繼續做」 稱做法不負責任</h4> -<p>There is simply no policy that the United States could articulate that would persuade China to abandon its goals of de-Americanization and decoupling in the semiconductor equipment sector. As the United States and allied governments consider reforms to semiconductor equipment controls, they should focus less on how to change China’s goals and more on how to make achieving those goals as expensive and complicated as possible.</p> +<p>陳梓華供稱，黎在會面時說：「國安法雷聲大、雨點小」。黎同意，這是他當時的想法。至於陳引述黎稱「會以身作則，會繼續喺唔同嘅媒體上面呼籲制裁同埋關注」，黎則反駁，說出這樣的言論是很荒謬，因他沒提及制裁，他亦一直叫員工小心行事。</p> -<hr /> +<p>陳供稱，黎籲他叫 SWHK 其他人在文宣線和國際線上「繼續做」，以及要支持初選。惟黎重申，他從沒與SWHK有交雜，而且呼籲其他人繼續做的話是太不負責任。他亦否認叫陳或SWHK支持初選。</p> -<p><strong>Gregory C. Allen</strong> is the director of the Wadhwani AI Center at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C.</p>Gregory C. AllenThere is a fierce debate in the United States and among its allies about the impacts of export controls, and nowhere is that debate more heated than in the semiconductor equipment manufacturing industry.U.S. Immigration Policy2024-11-25T12:00:00+08:002024-11-25T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/us-immigration-policy<p><em>Critical sectors of the U.S. economy remain badly understaffed. Additionally, because of the U.S. industrial policies creating positions in targeted industries and an aging workforce tied to specific career paths, shortages are set to become more dire in the medium term.</em> <excerpt></excerpt> <em>This report counters the argument that if more people enter the United States, fewer resources will be left for those already here. Immigrants create more benefits than costs while putting the country in a more globally competitive position. Lifting barriers to immigration would improve Americans’ ability to find affordable housing, medical care, and groceries and create the workforce needed both in the near term and in the long run.</em></p> +<p>陳又稱，黎問他為何不加入「對華政策跨國議會聯盟」（簡稱 IPAC），「佢（黎）覺得 IPAC 好重要，一定要有呢啲國際支持，先會有用。」惟黎否認，並稱當時不知道IPAC，也不知道「攬炒團隊」，直至在庭上才首次知道這兩個組織。</p> -<h3 id="introduction">Introduction</h3> +<p>對於陳指稱黎說可以幫到年青人，「佢（黎）話佢已經同美國嗰邊傾緊」，黎亦否認。黎指會面歷時大約一小時，因為當時非常忙碌，這是他和陳最後一次見面。</p> -<p>“Give me your tired, your poor, your huddled masses yearning to breathe free.” These words, inscribed on the Statue of Liberty pedestal, tell the world that people searching for new lives and new opportunities are welcome in the United States. Indeed, foreigners becoming part of the country’s economic success has been a constant throughout U.S. history. Immigrants have been confident in their ability to pursue a better life in the United States. Insights from U.S. labor markets also show that immigration is essential to the country’s wealth and security; it has been a boon to a growing U.S. economy in dire need of additional workers. Their contributions benefit all Americans and provide the key to a better life for them and their families.</p> +<h4 id="黎訊息指初選是奇蹟-惟庭上混淆區選">黎訊息指初選是奇蹟 惟庭上混淆區選</h4> -<p>Despite migrants’ importance, immigration remains a fraught issue in the U.S. political system. The last successful overhaul of U.S. policy was almost 40 years ago. Despite the influx of proposals and debate, optimism for immigration reform remains unlikely. Rather than address the details of immigration law reform, this paper explores the current state of the U.S. economy and the role migrants can play.</p> +<p>辯方指，2020年7月12日初選之後，陳在通訊軟件Signal向黎說，「感謝你為初選所做的一切，這是香港歷史上重要的一頁（Hi Jimmy, thanks for everything on the primary election. It’s remarkable on our HK history.）。」黎回覆：「這是一個奇蹟！（It’s a miracle!）」陳回覆：「毋庸置疑！（No doubt!）」，並問：「你的案件今日順利嗎？（Is your case going well today?）」</p> -<p>The U.S. labor market cooled in the first half of 2024, but critical sectors remain badly understaffed. Additionally, because of U.S. industrial policies creating positions in targeted industries and an aging workforce tied to specific career paths, shortages are set to become more dire in the medium term. These shortages will affect the affordability of necessities, including housing, medical care, and groceries. The situation will worsen without a drastic increase in the number of available workers, and changes to U.S. immigration policy are the most effective pathways to that end. As policymakers face considerable domestic economic challenges, it is worth remembering that the country’s best tool is letting the huddled masses in.</p> +<p>陳梓華曾指稱黎動用了大量人脈以及媒體資源去協助初選舉行，「我諗我係少數人知道當初初選一直以嚟構思嘅係黎智英。」但當辯方問黎為何會形容初選為「奇蹟」？黎指因為是「大勝（landslide victory）」。辯方問黎是否知道初選是關於什麼。黎稱知道，並重複稱當時「大勝」。法官李運騰指，現在說的是初選，而不是區議會選舉。黎才說，因為所有人都參與其中。</p> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">The U.S. labor market cooled in the first half of 2024, but critical sectors remain badly understaffed . . . shortages will affect the affordability of necessities, including housing, medical care, and groceries.</code></em></strong></p> +<hr /> -<h3 id="overview">Overview</h3> +<p>案件編號：HCCC51/2022</p>獨媒報導黎智英明言希望美國推制裁 以阻止國安法 惟稱僅願望未必發生【黎智英案・審訊第 98 日】2024-11-28T12:00:00+08:002024-11-28T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/trial-of-jimmy-lai-day-98<ul> + <li>黎智英否認曾說「推爆個政府」、「國際力量」 稱不知道陳梓華與國際線有關連</li> + <li>黎智英：冀透過制裁推翻中共想法「比荒謬更荒謬」 反指和平示威才是「最強大的游說」</li> +</ul> -<p>Three main factors contribute to positive economic growth: people, capital, and technology. The upside hopes for growth-fostering technologies like artificial intelligence (AI) and quantum computing are significant, as are the expectations for future reductions in interest rates. But the labor market cannot be ignored. Moreover, given how tight the U.S. labor market is, there are signs that it is contributing to inflation and hindering U.S. gross domestic product (GDP) growth. While hiring rates are slowing and the overall tightness of the labor market may unwind, the labor shortage described in the following four case studies remains acute. The sectors explored in these case studies are central to U.S. prosperity, which is why ameliorating these shortages will be key to continued U.S. economic growth.</p> +<excerpt /> -<p>To help the U.S. economy achieve its greatest potential, jobs must be filled. Physically demanding in-person roles are facing shortfalls, including in construction, healthcare, transportation, and food production. These demanding roles could be filled with increases in legal immigration, supporting U.S. growth, ensuring a higher degree of affordability, and mitigating additional inflationary pressures.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/resaO5b.png" alt="iamge01" /></p> -<h4 id="demography">Demography</h4> +<p>【獨媒報導】壹傳媒創辦人黎智英及3間蘋果公司被控串謀勾結外國勢力及串謀刊印煽動刊物等罪，今（28日）於高院（移師西九龍法院）踏入第98日審訊，黎智英第六日作供。同案被告、從犯證人陳梓華曾供稱，在2019年11月曾與黎智英會面，引述黎認為區議會選舉民主派大勝之後，「佢（黎）覺得嚟緊應該結合議會嘅力量、街頭嘅力量，同國際嘅力量，先可以延續呢個反修例運動嘅熱情，同埋推爆個政府，push it to the edge，去逼迫個政府去回應市民訴求。」黎智英今否認說過相關言論，因「國際力量」從不在自己的腦海裡，也並非自己會使用的言辭。他亦否認說過「推爆個政府」，強調：「這不是我會說的東西，這不是我。」</p> -<p>The domestic birth rate is insufficient to address the labor shortages already emerging in the U.S. economy. The U.S. fertility rate has been decreasing since the 2008 financial crisis, dropping almost 23 percent between 2007 and 2022. Birth rates are now below the replacement rate and are unlikely to return to that rate anytime soon (Figure 1).</p> +<p>控方指控之一是黎向陳梓華下達指示，而陳再傳達指示予李宇軒、「攬炒巴」劉祖廸等人參與國際游說。黎則表示，他當時相信陳是勇武人士的領袖，並信任陳有能力呼籲勇武派克制，惟一直也不知道陳梓華與國際線有關連。至於為何在 WhatsApp 傳送《香港人權與民主法案》的消息給陳，黎則稱純粹向陳提供資訊，沒有其他原因。</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/dlSdT7n.png" alt="image01" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 1: U.S. Fertility Rate, 1960–2022.</strong> Source: <a href="https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/SPDYNTFRTINUSA">“Fertility Rate, Total for the United States,” Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis</a>.</em></p> +<h4 id="黎傳送香港人權與民主法案給陳梓華-黎僅提供資訊">黎傳送《香港人權與民主法案》給陳梓華 黎：僅提供資訊</h4> -<p>The average U.S. fertility rate was 1.67 children per woman as of 2022, far below the 2.1 children necessary to sustain a population. Yet the United States is faring better than many other developed countries. Germany’s rate was around 1.46 children per woman in 2022, and Japan’s was 1.26 children per woman in 2023. Italy, in turn, is in a tougher spot, with only 1.24 children per woman as of 2022. South Korea’s birth rate, a very low 0.78 children per woman, is expected to fall further. Out of the Group of Seven (G7) nations, only France boasts a higher rate than the United States, at around 1.79 children per woman. However, the French rate — which is falling, like that of every other nation mentioned above — is still not enough to stabilize the population (Figure 2).</p> +<p>在辯方大律師關文渭的主問下，黎昨日回應另一名從犯證人陳梓華的證供，談及二人之間在2019年7月及11月的會面。今日辯方繼續圍繞陳梓華的證供提問。</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/Aa95Gjs.png" alt="image02" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 2: Comparison of Fertility Rates, 1960–2022.</strong> Source: <a href="https://fred.stlouisfed.org/categories/33512">“Fertility Rate,” Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis</a>.</em></p> +<p>辯方展示2019年11月15日的訊息紀錄，黎傳送香港民主委員會（Hong Kong Democracy Council）的 Twitter 截圖給陳，當中提及《香港人權與民主法案》。黎亦在訊息表示，美國議會即將表決，沒有理由不通過法案，形容這是一個非常棒的消息。</p> -<p>As a result, the United States, along with many developed countries, is aging (Figure 3). The proportion of the U.S. population over 65 increased at the fastest rate ever between 2010 and 2020. In 2020, one in six people in the United States was 65 or older. The median age in the United States increased from 37.2 years in 2010 to 38.4 years in 2019 — a trend that shows no signs of slowing, driven by aging baby boomers. Dr. Luke Rogers, chief of the Census Bureau’s Population Estimates Branch, highlighted the fact that no other age group witnessed a significant increase alongside the 65-and-older age group. In fact, the 18-and-below age group was smaller in 2019 than in 2010. Working-age adults, by nature of their role in society, produce more than they consume and serve as a source of financial support to the nonworking population, chiefly through tax contributions to public transfer programs, as well as direct private transfers.</p> +<p>陳梓華當時供稱，黎之所以傳送以上訊息給他，是因為黎「想證明國際嘅力量係好重要，同埋美國並沒有離棄或者係唔理香港發生緊咩事」。惟黎今在庭上則稱，相信當時純粹向陳提供資訊，沒有其他原因，又稱自己平時向很多人傳送資訊。</p> -<p>The rate at which the U.S. population is aging is also outpacing the growth of the working-age population, posing a significant threat to the economic future of the United States. The U.S. dependency ratio, which is the ratio of Americans under 15 or over 65 to the working population, reveals this issue clearly. In 2010, the U.S. dependency ratio sat at 49, meaning that there were 49 dependents for every 100 working-age Americans. By 2019, the ratio grew to 53.7 dependents per 100 working-age Americans, driven by the growth in the 65-and-older population.</p> +<h4 id="黎指陳梓華熟悉勇武派內部板塊">黎指陳梓華熟悉勇武派內部板塊</h4> -<p>The shrinking workforce as a proportion of the population will pose significant problems for the U.S. economy if these concerns are not addressed promptly to ensure existing labor shortages do not continue to grow and that future shortages are addressed preemptively. The reality is that the productive segments of the population — namely, the workforce — contribute most significantly to the economy through their labor, consumption, and contribution to public services through taxation. In comparison, the labor force participation rate for those over 65 was only 24.5 percent in September 2024 due to the high number of retirees. Moreover, retirees do not contribute income taxes while simultaneously consuming less and being a greater burden on public services. Effectively addressing the impacts of an aging workforce depends on using immigration to ameliorate labor shortages, sustain U.S. economic growth, and improve the affordability of critical services.</p> +<p>辯方另展示2019年11月16日的訊息，黎智英向陳轉發一則中大校友通訊，當中提及「各類車的司機已經是黑衣人，不是中大職員」、「校內情況惡劣，建築物被破壞，飯堂關門，住在宿舍的師生缺糧」等。黎問陳：「Wetland (Wayland)，你知道這些黑衣人到底是謝（誰）人嗎？謝謝。」陳回覆：「不同組別人士，由屠龍及 Black Boc 等隊伍為首，形成的一幫沒有紀律人士」、「他們希望霸佔中大作據點。」</p> -<h4 id="the-us-labor-market">The U.S. Labor Market</h4> +<p>同年11月17日，陳向黎傳送訊息，叫黎特別留意數隊勇武小隊，包括「屠龍、中移動、閃燈、蜘蛛、V小隊、毒蛇、粉紅、Pink Team」，指他們帶領著不能接受的暴力升級，而《蘋果》曾訪問其中三隊，以及其中一隊的領袖「Max」，他正在理大衝突中領導防守。</p> -<p>In 2024, tightness in the U.S. labor market could be seen across economic indicators, with an unemployment rate of 4.1 percent and only 1.861 million people collecting unemployment in late September 2024 (Figure 3). At the same time, data from the Job Openings and Labor Turnover Survey (JOLTS), collected by the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), indicated that there were 8.04 million open jobs in August 2024, meaning that there were almost 6.2 million more open jobs than people collecting unemployment (Figure 4). Prior to the Covid-19 pandemic, that figure would have been an all-time record. The high number of open jobs in the wake of the pandemic may be attributed to the fiscal and monetary policy stimulus response to Covid-19. But now that four years have passed since the beginning of the pandemic, the high number of open jobs may be an ongoing risk for the labor market, especially since many open jobs are in physically demanding in-person roles. Meanwhile, the number of people collecting unemployment represents only around 1.1 percent of the labor force — one of the lowest percentages in U.S. history (Figure 5).</p> +<p>辯方問黎為何傳送有關中大的訊息給陳，黎則稱，當時留意到那些「神秘」的年輕人，不肯定陳是否認識他們，所以向他提問。黎又表示，只聽聞過「屠龍」，而其他小隊的名字則未聽過，從陳的訊息可見他熟悉勇武人士的內部板塊。</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/uftIZq3.png" alt="image03" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 3: U.S. Unemployment Rate, 2000–2024.</strong> Source: <a href="https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/UNRATE">“Unemployment Rate,” Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis</a>.</em></p> +<p>辯方展示2019年11月19日的訊息，黎與陳討論警方團封理大事件是否「警方的陰謀」、「這局面其實很易設計」、「理工在城市，警方封了路就無法逃脫」，又指警方「把我最精銳的人一網打盡，希望昨天逃出來的都是勇武精銳份子」。二人亦討論警方部署是否屬「圍點打援」。黎確認訊息內容，並指陳清楚事態發展。</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/MTd8vJW.png" alt="image04" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 4: U.S. Job Openings, 2000–2024.</strong> Source: <a href="https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/JTSJOL">“Job Openings: Total Nonfarm,” Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis</a>.</em></p> +<h4 id="黎相信陳梓華是勇武派領袖有能力平息暴力">黎：相信陳梓華是勇武派領袖、有能力平息暴力</h4> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/XkLJWB1.png" alt="image05" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 5: Continuing Jobless Claims, 2000–2024.</strong> Source: <a href="https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/CCSA">“Continued Claims (Insured Unemployment),” Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis</a>.</em></p> +<p>辯方接著展示2020年11月20日的訊息，黎告知陳，美國參議院一致通過支持香港示威者的措施（Senate Unanimously Approves Measures Backing Hong Kong Protesters）；陳當時回覆已經得悉相關消息，希望該措施能向政府施壓。</p> -<p>The tightness in the labor market is most pronounced for roles that are physically demanding and require an in-person presence to fulfill the job’s core functions. In other words, whereas many analysts, consultants, and knowledge workers can do their jobs remotely, this is not true for professions that require hands-on activities. Four industries at the top of this list are construction, healthcare, childcare, and food production.</p> +<p>黎在庭上稱，當時尚未知道措施的內容，只知道是支援香港示威者的措施，並與制裁沒有關係。他又稱當當時沒有想過制裁的事宜。</p> -<h3 id="case-studies">Case Studies</h3> +<p>訊息紀錄顯示，2019年區選之前，陳向黎提及「聽說小樺被捕了」，又稱：「我已經呼籲大家24日前別生事。」</p> -<p>To reveal some of the economic potential that a lack of labor hinders, the following case studies explore four physically demanding in-person roles.</p> +<p>黎在庭上表示，當時相信陳有能力叫示威者不要生事，因為他相信陳是勇武人士的領袖，而且他信任陳，所以才會託陳呼籲勇武派克制。昨日黎供稱，當李柱銘介紹陳時，形容陳為「勇武派之中的保守派」。黎稱直至2019年11月，他仍然相信陳能夠有效地平息街頭暴力。</p> -<h4 id="construction">Construction</h4> +<h4 id="黎否認提倡區選後結合國際力量否認曾說推爆個政府">黎否認提倡區選後結合國際力量、否認曾說「推爆個政府」</h4> -<p>Despite high interest and mortgage rates, there are massive unmet labor market needs in construction. In August 2024, there were 370,000 open construction jobs, according to JOLTS data (Figure 6). But why is construction so hot with such a high cost of capital, and what is the outlook when interest rates fall?</p> +<p>陳梓華曾供稱，他在2019年11月27日，獲安排在黎智英的座駕上會面，該座駕停泊在法院對面。陳稱他向黎表示聯絡不到勇武派領袖，惟黎稱不緊要，因他「大致掌握勇武派嘅資料同動向」。</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/ibRuCvX.png" alt="image06" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 6: U.S. Construction Job Openings, 2000–2024.</strong> Source: <a href="https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/JTS2300JOL">“Job Openings: Construction,” Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis</a>.</em></p> +<p>黎在庭上解釋，相信他是從張崑陽及其朋友得到勇武派的資訊，因曾經與他們吃飯，理解張是就讀港大的學生領袖，而其朋友是參與前線示威的大學生。陳指稱黎對張的評價好高。黎確認，因閱讀過張的文章，認為寫得很好。</p> -<p>Far more job openings are expected in the construction field in the aftermath of the bipartisan Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act (IIJA). The IIJA is one of the largest investments in infrastructure in the history of the United States, but job shortages have hindered progress for many IIJA projects. A 2022 survey of major companies involved in these projects showed that 91 percent of construction firms were struggling to fill open positions that conduct much of the on-site construction, especially in manual craftwork labor. With expectations that the IIJA will create 175,000 new construction jobs per year, immigration can help address some of this shortage.</p> +<p>陳供稱黎談及區議會選舉大勝，「佢（黎）覺得嚟緊應該結合議會嘅力量、街頭嘅力量，同國際嘅力量，先可以延續呢個反修例運動嘅熱情，同埋推爆個政府，push it to the edge，去逼迫個政府去回應市民訴求。」</p> -<p>The untapped potential in construction stems from broad strength across the U.S. labor force. There are more Americans on nonfarm payrolls than ever before, and wages rose by almost $7 per hour between February 2020 and September 2024. Overall, there are more workers on payrolls today than in the history of the United States, and they are making more money than ever before (Figure 7). But high mortgage rates and limited housing options have caused rents to rise, adding inflationary pressures across the U.S. economy and keeping year-on-year consumer price index (CPI) inflation rates elevated. This presents a challenge for the Federal Reserve as it seeks to restore an environment of low, stable prices for reducing interest rates.</p> +<p>黎今在庭上稱，他有可能談及過區議會大勝和延續運動的熱情，因為當年區選結果真的很好。至於結合議會力量、街頭力量和國際力量，黎指自己可能講過議會力量和街頭力量，但是否認講過國際力量，因他從沒想過國際線的事宜。</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/uHNYaEK.png" alt="image07" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 7: Total U.S. Nonfarm Payrolls, 1990–2024.</strong> Source: <a href="https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/PAYEMS">“All Employees, Total Nonfarm,” Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis</a>.</em></p> +<p>黎其後補充，他當時不認為陳梓華與國際線有任何關係，而且「國際線」並不是他會使用的措辭。辯方問，若然黎認為陳與國際線無關，為何會傳送 HKDC 的資訊給陳。黎則稱因為陳是示威者的領袖，又稱一直也不知道陳與國際線有關連。</p> -<p>During the second quarter of 2024, the rental vacancy rate was only 6.6 percent (Figure 8). Prior to the Covid-19 pandemic, a lower vacancy rate had not been seen since the second quarter of 1985.</p> +<p>至於「推爆個政府」，黎亦否認說過：「這不是我會說的東西。」辯方問黎有否說過類似的說話？黎同樣否認：「這不是我會說的東西，這不是我。」</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/9LpGXcD.png" alt="image08" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 8: U.S. Rental Vacancies, 1956–2024.</strong> Source: <a href="https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/RRVRUSQ156N">“Rental Vacancy Rate in the United States,” Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis</a>.</em></p> +<p>陳梓華亦稱在車上與黎討論過眾籌事宜，黎則否認：「我從不會談論到眾籌，這是他們的事。」</p> -<p>In addition to a tight U.S. rental market, sales of existing homes were sluggish in 2023 and the first half of 2024 as new housing starts remained relatively low. As a result, home prices have continued to rise. Plus, interest rates are at the highest levels in decades. With the prospect of lower interest rates and mortgage rates over the next couple of years, housing demand and associated sticker prices could rise even further — a situation greatly exacerbated by an already tight construction labor market that could experience tremendous and rapid growth in labor demand.</p> +<h4 id="黎只是希望勇武派能在自己的社群內建立領袖">黎：只是希望勇武派能在自己的社群內建立領袖</h4> -<p>Because the owner’s equivalent rent component of the CPI is about 25 percent of the total CPI and about 33 percent of the core CPI, ensuring sufficient construction labor to meet needs within the U.S. economy is critical for mitigating inflationary pressures across the economy.</p> +<p>陳又供稱，黎想建立一個結合議會力量、街頭力量和國際力量的領袖團隊。黎則肯定自己從沒有這樣說過，因國際線從不在他的腦海中，而且他的想法只是希望勇武派能在自己的社群內建立領袖。</p> -<h4 id="healthcare">Healthcare</h4> +<p>黎又質疑，在車上15分鐘的會面，陳梓華好像把它說成是一段很長的對話。</p> -<p>Expectations of labor market shortfalls in healthcare have existed for some time, but demographic shifts of an aging population in the United States are exacerbating already severe shortfalls in the healthcare field. For many years, the BLS has forecasted that healthcare fields will see some of the greatest labor market growth the past ten years. But with an extremely tight labor market as a backdrop, the challenge of filling those roles is greater than ever.</p> +<p>辯方問黎是否認識本土派陣營中任何人。黎表示，本土派並非他會想接觸的人士，因他一直以來都反對港獨。</p> -<p>The BLS Occupational Outlook Handbook from Fall 2024 reflects that 5 of the top 10 projected fastest-growing occupations between 2023 and 2033 are in healthcare, including nurse practitioners (no. 3), medical and health service managers (no. 6), epidemiologists (no. 20), physical therapy assistants (no. 9), and occupational therapy assistants (no. 11). Also among the top 20 occupations are home health and personal care aides (no. 14) and substance abuse, behavioral disorder, and mental health counselors (no. 19).</p> +<p>黎亦否認在會面中向陳談及請求外國實施制裁、封鎖和敵對行動，因為這些都是脫離會面主題的話題。而且他與陳沒有達成任何可行動的協議，因他認為沒有需要，他一直以來只是希望陳能平息前線的暴力。</p> -<p>In August 2024, there were 1,394,000 openings in healthcare and social assistance (Figure 9). This figure alone almost eclipses the 1.861 million people the U.S. Department of Labor reported were collecting unemployment benefits in late September 2024. U.S. surgeon general Vivek Murthy has highlighted that this shortage is expected to increase over time to around 3 million low-wage healthcare workers by 2027 and 140,000 physicians by 2033.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/g2ie55G.png" alt="image02" /></p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/0eNQzsZ.png" alt="image09" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 9: U.S. Healthcare and Social Assistance Job Openings, 2000–2024.</strong> Source: <a href="https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/JTU6200JOL">“Job Openings: Health Care and Social Assistance,” Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis</a>.</em></p> +<p>【獨媒報導】壹傳媒創辦人黎智英及3間蘋果公司被控串謀勾結外國勢力及串謀刊印煽動刊物等罪，今（28日）於高院（移師西九龍法院）踏入第98日審訊，黎智英第六日作供。他稱2019年12月的時候仍強烈希望勇武派可以建立領袖團隊，以平息街頭暴力，於是透過同案被告陳梓華來聯絡「攬炒巴」劉祖廸，因理解劉有很大影響力，追隨者包括勇武派。2020年1月，黎在台北陽明山別墅首次與劉見面，陳早前供稱黎在會上表示想培養劉做政治明星，又提及「支爆」；黎則反駁指說法荒謬可笑，質疑陳編造故事，又指「支爆」是由劉祖廸首先提出。</p> -<p>The healthcare worker shortage is unlikely to subside without intervention. As it stands, the number of U.S. medical students is insufficient to address the shortage despite increased applications and enrollment in the aftermath of the Covid-19 pandemic. One in five physicians in the United States is foreign born and educated, representing a 30 percent increase since 2004. The significant lack of funding for residencies further contributes to the difficulty in training enough physicians to address the shortage. The final element is that the demographic shift within the United States and the aging population will only increase demand for healthcare over time, with no end to the shortage in sight, barring a concerted effort to address it. Immigration for low-wage healthcare workers and physicians could help alleviate these issues, improving access to healthcare while medical education reform takes place.</p> +<p>陳曾指稱，黎在會議上提及這一代人未必可以實現「推翻中共」。黎今在庭上反問：「香港人可以推翻中共政府？⋯⋯我沒有瘋癲到思考這些瘋狂的事情。」黎又指若然希望透過制裁或封鎖措施來推翻中共政府，是「比荒謬更荒謬」。</p> -<p>The aging U.S. population and labor market shortfalls in healthcare are translating into increased inflationary pressures and costs for U.S. consumers, which can be seen in the CPI. The base years for the U.S. CPI are 1982–84. The total basket of goods for consumers rose as an index from 100 in 1982–84 to almost 315 in September 2024 (Figure 10). However, while all consumer prices have tripled since the early 1980 base years, the medical care cost index has risen from 100 to almost 566 — a more than fivefold increase in costs (Figure 10). With generational churn and a higher proportion of elderly residents, the costs for medical care are at risk of rising further and will be exacerbated by ongoing and potentially worsening shortfalls in the healthcare professions.</p> +<h4 id="黎指攬炒巴在年輕人之中影響力很大-追隨者包括勇武人士">黎指「攬炒巴」在年輕人之中影響力很大 追隨者包括勇武人士</h4> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/W9Dozad.png" alt="image10" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 10: Total CPI Inflation and Medical Care CPI Inflation.</strong> Source: <a href="https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/CPIAUCSL">“Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers: All Items in U.S. City Average,” Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis</a>.</em></p> +<p>辯方大律師關文渭就黎智英與「攬炒巴」劉祖廸的相識經過提問。2019年12月4日的訊息紀錄顯示，另一被告陳梓華向黎提及一名叫「攬炒」的人。黎則表示當時未曾閱讀「攬炒」寫的文章、未曾聽過他說話，但知道「攬炒」對陳的影響很大。黎亦相信自己當時未聽過「攬炒團隊」，因他沒有留意。</p> -<h4 id="transportation">Transportation</h4> +<blockquote> + <p>Tagged by @Ray_WongHKI</p> +</blockquote> -<p>Transportation is a key sector both inside and outside U.S. cities. Workers in this sector transport people or cargo by land, air, sea, pipeline, or rail. A labor shortage in this sector fundamentally hurts U.S. growth through negative impacts on urban public transport, on the consistency of just-in-time inventory supply chains, and even on U.S. capacity to export or import. As a by-product, labor shortages also affect the accessibility of goods for consumers, especially in rural and inland areas of the United States.</p> +<blockquote> + <p>As most of the pro-democracy activists are in prison or/and being charged under the NSL, I see no meaning in going out to vote this Sunday.</p> +</blockquote> -<p>Transportation has been linked quite closely with economic performance, as shown in past research by the U.S. Bureau of Transportation Statistics. The Transportation Services Index (TSI) measures monthly freight and passenger transportation services, with proof that movement on the freight TSI usually occurs prior to changes in the economy. Similarly, GDP and freight TSI tend to move simultaneously to varying magnitudes, again cementing the importance of transportation to the U.S. economy.</p> +<blockquote> + <p>Please join our campaign! Make a photo with the hashtag #Releasemycandidate pic.twitter.com/mLbnSD6fQz</p> +</blockquote> -<p>On a broader level, JOLTS data in the transportation, warehousing, and utilities sectors show 359,000 job openings in August 2024 (Figure 11).</p> +<blockquote> + <p>— Finn Lau 劉祖廸 (@finnlau_cd) December 17, 2021</p> +</blockquote> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/sp8wsyx.png" alt="image11" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 11: U.S. Transportation, Warehousing, and Utilities Job Openings, 2000–2024.</strong> Source: <a href="https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/JTU480099JOL">“Job Openings: Transportation, Warehousing, and Utilities,” Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis</a>.</em></p> +<p>陳早前供稱，他與黎於2019年11月在座駕見面之後，二人曾在電話通話，陳指黎留意到「攬炒團隊發展得好好」，並要求陳聯絡「喺國際線上面、文宣線上面比較出名嘅『攬炒巴』」。</p> -<p>More importantly, the transportation workforce is aging, with 24.3 percent of all transportation workers aged 55 or older, compared to an average of 23.2 percent across all industries. Certain modes of transportation show more alarming signs of aging, with the percentage of workers aged 55 or older at 30.8 percent for water transport, 27.9 percent for trucking, and 27.8 percent for air transport. Transit workers are also aging rapidly, with 37.9 percent aged 55 or older. All these transportation modes are aging faster than the national average.</p> +<p>辯方問，「攬炒巴」的話題為何開始出現。黎表示，他當時強烈希望勇武派能建立領袖團隊，認為「攬炒團隊」有能力協助達成。他又稱，透過傳媒首次得悉「攬炒巴」這個人，而陳亦指「攬炒巴」有號召力。惟他否認說過「喺國際線上面、文宣線上面比較出名嘅『攬炒巴』」，因他從沒想過和談及「國際線」和「文宣線」。</p> -<p>For transportation as a whole, the most alarming aspect of the aging workforce is the severe lack of younger workers to replace those who are aging. As it stands across the entire sector, only 12.7 percent of all workers are aged 16–24, with some modes, such as transit, having only 2 percent of workers aged 16–24. These signs cumulatively point to an existing labor shortage, which will only increase in severity as the workforce continues to age. Crucially, as many transportation workers near retirement age without younger workers to replace them, the sector will struggle with vacancies in the short term, exacerbating the labor shortage.</p> +<p>黎表示不知道「攬炒巴」在運動中的角色，但是知道他在年輕人之中影響力很大，有很多追隨者，包括勇武人士。</p> -<p>Going forward, an estimated 1.3 million jobs will need to be filled every year in the transportation sector between 2021 and 2026. Currently, immigrants play a key role in transportation, providing essential services to U.S. citizens and making up an estimated 20.6 percent of the transportation workforce. Providing more pathways to legal immigration to address labor shortages in the transportation industry can play a role in maintaining the affordability of both goods and transportation services. In 2023, a survey conducted by the American Transportation Research Institute showed that motor carriers’ second-largest concern was driver shortages, which has been high on the list of concerns for several years, topping it in 2018.</p> +<h4 id="介紹羅傑斯給陳梓華-黎稱純粹想陳會見值得見面的人">介紹羅傑斯給陳梓華 黎稱純粹想陳會見值得見面的人</h4> -<p>The IIJA also holds some potential for transportation job creation with the construction of new railways and roads. Naturally, transportation workers are needed to operate much of the infrastructure as well as support these projects during their construction. The IIJA estimates about 100,000 new jobs in transportation and material moving are created each year, outlining the need for novel solutions and immigration reform to address a shortage that will not decrease in the medium to long term.</p> +<p>辯方指2019年12月20日，身在英國的陳在訊息中問黎，在英國可以會見什麼人；黎則建議陳會見「香港監察」創辦人羅傑斯（Benedict Rogers）和英國議員 Lord David Alton，並稱可以幫陳安排。</p> -<p>The overall transportation CPI has been rising rapidly in the aftermath of the Covid-19 pandemic across all modes of transportation, hitting directly at household finances. These higher costs drive up wholesale producer inflation across industries and sectors that rely on transportation, which eventually reach consumers, driving up consumer inflation. This is clear when considering the significant price increases in transportation services that have taken place in recent decades. The CPI for all items rose from an index of 100 in 1982–84 to almost 315 in September 2024. In the meantime, the index for transportation services rose to over 436 in September 2024, representing a fourfold increase from the index in 1982–84.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/NgX7TSk.png" alt="image03" /> +▲ Lord David Alton（左）、Benedict Rogers（右）</p> -<h4 id="agriculture-and-food-production">Agriculture and Food Production</h4> +<p>陳梓華早前供稱，黎「想我識多啲人，方便我將來參加國際游說嘅工作」。惟黎今反駁，從來沒有想過國際游說的事宜，介紹羅傑斯純粹想陳會見一些值得見面的人，因羅傑斯為香港做了很多事。而 Lord Alton 處理BNO政策，也是為香港做事，與羅傑斯關係密切，二人均想與年輕人溝通。</p> -<p>The United States has also suffered from acute labor shortages in the agriculture and food production industries, with archaic and restrictive immigration laws contributing to the shortage. Farms are struggling to fill an estimated 1.5–2 million positions per year. For example, 56 percent of California farmers stated that they were having difficulty filling jobs.</p> +<p>黎認為與二人會面對陳有好處，黎稱當時知道可以透過陳來聯絡「攬炒巴」，以協助平息街頭暴力，又指如果請求陳梓華平息暴力，有需要協助他，讓他知道得更加多，因此安排他會見羅傑斯和 Lord Alton ，對香港和對陳個人而言均有好處。</p> -<p>These acute shortages reduce productivity, incentivize imports to replace decreasing domestic production, and hinder U.S. food security. Most importantly for the U.S. public, these labor shortages have a direct impact on grocery and food prices, with food inflation in 2022 reaching the highest levels since 1979. The imperative to modernize and expand the agricultural workforce through immigration reform becomes clear.</p> +<h4 id="黎否認羅傑斯郭明瀚等人為其代理人">黎否認羅傑斯、郭明瀚等人為其代理人</h4> -<p>A lack of growth in crop production is also coinciding with more demand than ever for fresh fruits and vegetables, with growing shares being imported. This deficit has expanded significantly over the last two decades, as 42.7 percent of fresh fruit in 2019 was imported to the United States rather than produced domestically, compared to 20.1 percent in 2000. Vegetables show a similar deficit, as 13.3 percent were imported into the United States in 2000 compared to 31.9 percent in 2019. In large part, the main beneficiaries of decreasing U.S. farm productivity and increasing U.S. produce demand have been Mexico and Canada, which now dominate fresh produce and meat imports into the United States.</p> +<p>辯方向黎展示控方開案陳詞，當中指羅傑斯、英國駐港澳前總領事郭明瀚（Jim Cunningham）和 Mark Simon 是黎的「代理人」。</p> -<p>Immigrants already make up 73 percent of the total farming workforce in the United States, more than any other economic sector. As a result, the agriculture industry suffers disproportionately when legal immigration is significantly restricted. The lack of legal immigration leads farmers to a dilemma between accepting production cuts and crop losses or resorting to undocumented migrants. Due to the lack of legal migrant labor, an estimated 48 percent of the U.S. farming workforce consists of undocumented migrants, which signifies the unworkable nature of existing immigration laws for many within the agriculture sector.</p> +<p>黎否認羅傑斯和郭明瀚是他的代理人。至於 Mark Simon，黎同意他是其助手，也是其代理人。惟黎不認為身為共和黨黨員的 Mark Simon 是美國政府或共和黨的代理人，因他只處理黎的私人事務，二人的交流裡從未牽涉共和黨的事宜。</p> -<p>Another significant concern is the rise in the average age of the immigrant workforce in agriculture due to the lack of young immigrants joining the field to replace aging workers. Between 2006 and 2021, the immigrant farm workforce aged seven years, dragging up the average age of the agricultural workforce. In contrast, the average age of U.S.-born farmworkers remained constant over the same period. With immigrants making up the majority of farmworkers, not addressing this issue could exacerbate the labor shortage.</p> +<p>黎指，會見時任美國副總統彭斯和時任美國國務卿蓬佩奧，均由美國國務院前資深顧問 Christian Whiton 安排，因黎聘請了他作為顧問，安排會見美國議員和官員等，而非由 Mark Simon 安排。黎亦否認 Christian Whiton 是其代理人，並指他亦非美國政府的代理人。</p> -<p>This shortage extends beyond farms to other key junctions within the food supply chain. In 2020, immigrants made up 21 percent of the overall food industry workforce, excluding restaurants but including transportation, animal and crop production, retail, food production, and food wholesale. In certain key states, these levels are exacerbated. For instance, 65 percent of the agriculture workforce in California consists of immigrants. Alaska and Nebraska have similar figures in their seafood and meat processing industries, respectively.</p> +<blockquote> + <p>The arrest of @JimmyLaiApple in Hong Kong is deeply offensive &amp; an affront to freedom loving people around the world. When I met w/ Jimmy Lai @WhiteHouse, I was inspired by his stand for democracy &amp; the rights &amp; autonomy that were promised to the people of Hong Kong by Beijing. pic.twitter.com/ZwioCrvNb7 — Mike Pence (@Mike_Pence) August 10, 2020</p> +</blockquote> -<p>The labor shortage then directly affects food prices, with prices already rising due to major supply chain disruptions resulting from Covid-19 and the Russian invasion of Ukraine, one of the world’s major grain producers. In the United States, food prices increased by 11.2 percent between September 2021 and September 2022, in large part due to the aforementioned shocks, which increased agricultural commodity pricing, especially for corn and wheat. However, these price increases have not stopped, with around a 6 percent increase between 2022 and 2023. On a wider scale, between 2019 and 2023, food prices increased by around 25 percent due to Covid-19, the war in Ukraine, and immigration. A recent report by Texas A&amp;M International University showed that increased immigrant worker admittance directly relates to lower prices for poultry, meat, eggs, dairy, fruits, and vegetables.</p> +<h4 id="黎當時認為攬炒巴身份敏感">黎：當時認為攬炒巴身份敏感</h4> -<h3 id="immigration-policys-role">Immigration Policy’s Role</h3> +<p>陳供稱，他在2019年12月31日與黎智英再度會面。黎表示，因陳赴英國會見劉祖廸，他希望知道二人的會面情況，所以安排是次見面。</p> -<h4 id="overview-of-us-immigration-law-for-the-case-study-sectors">Overview of U.S. Immigration Law for the Case Study Sectors</h4> +<p>法官李素蘭指，二人的訊息僅稱呼劉祖廸為「guest」，問原因為何。黎相信，陳當時希望盡量保密，因他們之間均認為劉祖廸是一個身份敏感的人，因理解他是勇武派的領袖。黎又指當時「攬炒巴」的真實身份尚未公開，甚至在台北陽明山會面時，劉也拒絕回答他的姓名。黎在後來才知道「攬炒巴」姓名是劉祖廸。</p> -<p>Three of the sectors included in this study would benefit in particular from H-2 (temporary worker) visa reform: transportation, construction, and agriculture. Seasonal demand plays a significant role in these sectors. By contrast, healthcare likely requires H-1B (skilled worker) visa reform, especially in the context of the impending physician shortage and the high-skilled nature of the healthcare industry.</p> +<p>就12月31日的會面內容，陳梓華供稱「當時呢國際線上係好亂嘅，有唔同嘅聲音」，而黎認為年青人「喺度搶緊個話語權」。不過黎今反駁，他從沒有與陳談論任何有關國際線的事情，而且「話語權」並非他會使用的字詞，「我甚至不知道這個字詞的完整意思，這是他（陳）的言詞。」黎並否認在會面中提及制裁、封鎖、敵對行動和「攬炒」。</p> -<p>The H-2 visa category is split into H-2A (temporary agricultural worker) and H-2B (temporary nonagricultural worker) visas, which allow employers to apply for foreign nonimmigrant workers to satisfy seasonal demands. The H-2A visa operates independently with its own application process and allocation exclusively for the agricultural sector. While the H-2A program does not cap the number of visas allocated, often there are fewer visas than jobs certified by the Department of Labor for H-2A due to inadequate U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) processing resources. Also, the strict country eligibility requirements have expanded over time, from 28 countries in 2008 to 87 countries in 2024.</p> +<h4 id="黎理解攬炒有如殉道">黎：理解「攬炒」有如「殉道」</h4> -<p>In fiscal year 2023, 372,000 jobs were certified for the H-2A visa, but USCIS issued only around 298,000 H-2A visas. The visas are highly concentrated within the farming industry, with 600 farms accounting for 70 percent of all H-2A jobs, highlighting issues that certain farm employers may have in certifying and applying for visas given USCIS’ shortcomings in issuing them effectively. Another H-2A issue is the high level of noncompliance with regulations among some farms, with the Department of Labor finding that 70 percent of the 1,000 farms investigated had failed to comply with regulations.</p> +<p>辯方問黎，在2019年12月的時候，對「攬炒」有什麼理解。黎表示，「攬炒」就好像「殉道（martyrdom）」般，透過犧牲自己來破壞敵方，就如損害雙方般。</p> -<p>The H-2B visa, by contrast, can apply across many seasonal sectors, including restaurants, hospitality, transportation, maintenance, janitorial services, and more. However, there is a cap on the number of H-2B visas allocated. The H-2B visa had 88 eligible countries as of August 2024, one more than the number of H-2A countries. The cap is divided into 33,000 visas for each half of the fiscal year, totaling 66,000. Historically, demand has varied, with some years seeing demand below supply. However, recent years have seen demand exceed the supply of visas, with ad hoc measures being used to increase the cap for the current fiscal year. For example, in fiscal year 2024, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) increased the cap twice to meet demand, making 85,432 additional visas available and highlighting the insufficiency of the existing H-2B cap. The labor market has changed significantly since the H-2B visa cap was set in 1986, making it necessary to reconsider the sectors eligible for the visa and the size of the cap.</p> +<p>辯方指，黎智英在2020年1月8日，即在台北陽明山別墅會面之前，向陳梓華傳送一篇裴倫德（Luke de Pulford）刊登於《蘋果日報》網站的文章，當中對「無領袖運動」提出數項關注。陳回覆稱他看過文章，認為可以幫助到他說服那些「頑固的領袖」；黎亦指文章值得閱讀，而「攬炒巴」劉祖廸也應該看。</p> -<p>The length of H-2A and H-2B visas can range from three to ten months for the initial employment term, with the possibility to extend the visa to three years. It is also possible to apply for an initial three-year period if the employment is considered a “one-time occurrence.” After three years, the worker must leave the United States for an uninterrupted three months before reapplying for an H-2 visa, which potentially causes issues for employers in finding temporary replacements or aggregating their workforce over periods to avoid worker shortages.</p> +<blockquote> + <p>Heading back to London.</p> +</blockquote> -<p>The H-1B visa category has an annual cap of 65,000 new visas each fiscal year. However, an additional 20,000 petitions for individuals with a master’s degree or higher from a U.S. institution are exempt from this cap. The relevant applicant occupation eligibility criteria include theoretical and practical application of highly specialized knowledge and a minimum of a bachelor’s degree or higher in the specific field (or its equivalent). H-1B specialty occupation workers are granted an initial stay of up to three years. This period may be extended but generally cannot exceed a total of six years.</p> +<blockquote> + <p>Thank you #HK for letting us share in your unforgettable victory.</p> +</blockquote> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/WrM8X9q.png" alt="image12" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Table 1: U.S. Visas Relevant to Critical Sectors .</strong> Source: <a href="https://www.uscis.gov/">“U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services”</a>.</em></p> +<blockquote> + <p>香港人, 加油 🇬🇧🇭🇰 pic.twitter.com/4uwUb4D71D</p> +</blockquote> -<h4 id="role-of-immigration-in-us-economic-security">Role of Immigration in U.S. Economic Security</h4> +<blockquote> + <p>— Luke de Pulford (@lukedepulford) November 25, 2019</p> +</blockquote> -<p>Industrial policy has emerged as a key tool in the U.S. arsenal to support economic growth and direct investments in industries key to national security. However, labor shortages could upend these investments’ ability to deploy manufacturing operations effectively. The IIJA, the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA), and the CHIPS and Science Act are all set to bolster U.S. economic security by targeting sectors essential to American life — infrastructure, green technologies, and semiconductors — and creating scores of open positions. A recent report from the University of Massachusetts Amherst’s Political Economy Research Institute (PERI) analyzes labor supply, demand, and potential shortages stemming from recent U.S. industrial policy initiatives. The report identifies 48 occupations expected to see significant increases in demand due to direct job creation from these investments. Of these, 20 occupations are projected to experience labor shortages, leading to an anticipated overall shortage of nearly 1.1 million workers if the investments reach their full potential without a corresponding increase in the number of newly qualified workers.</p> +<p>黎則稱，傳送文章給陳純粹是因認為文章很好，能夠幫助到陳。辯方問黎，為何提議劉祖廸應該閱讀該文章。黎則稱，認為文章的觀點很好、有說服力，而且正是他當時準備向劉祖廸說的東西。</p> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Industrial policy has emerged as a key tool in the U.S. arsenal to support economic growth and direct investments in industries key to national security. However, labor shortages could upend these investments’ ability to deploy manufacturing operations effectively.</code></em></strong></p> +<p>黎否認推薦裴倫德的文章是因為文中談及國際游說，並重申會見劉的目的只是希望他能夠協助成立勇武派的領袖團隊。</p> -<p>The IIJA’s promise of renewed U.S. manufacturing and infrastructure could be resting on shaky ground. The construction sector is already facing challenges. A recent survey by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce revealed that 88 percent of commercial construction contractors are experiencing moderate-to-high levels of difficulty in finding skilled workers. Additionally, over one-third of the contractors surveyed had to decline work because of labor shortages. The Association of Builders and Contractors, a trade group representing the commercial and industrial construction sector, estimates there will be 500,000 unfilled construction jobs in 2024. According to Moody’s Analytics, the IIJA will result in 872,000 additional jobs by the fourth quarter of 2025. Notably, over half of these new positions (461,000) will be in the construction industry.</p> +<h4 id="黎否認陽明山別墅會議上要求攬炒巴做任何事">黎否認陽明山別墅會議上要求攬炒巴做任何事</h4> -<p>Policies targeting climate change in the IRA — such as tax credits for wind and solar power, investments in electric vehicle charging infrastructure, and grants to reduce pollution in disadvantaged communities — will create 537,000 jobs annually over the next decade. When it comes to the CHIPS and Science Act, the Semiconductor Industry Association (SIA) anticipates the semiconductor industry workforce will expand by nearly 115,000 jobs by 2030, increasing from around 345,000 jobs today to approximately 460,000 by the end of the decade, which reflects growth of 33 percent. However, SIA also estimates that about 67,000 of these new positions — or 58 percent of the projected job growth (and 80 percent of the projected increase in technical roles) — may go unfilled at current rates of degree completion.</p> +<p>2020年1月11日，黎智英在台灣陽明山的別墅舉行飯局。黎起初邀請台灣已故民運人士施明德出席，惟後來施臨時表示不能出席。黎稱施是著名的革命人士，對他認識很深。由於黎認為施是有見地的人（a wiseman），相信他能夠說一些對陳有啟發的東西，所以安排施與陳見面。辯方問，施有否參與國際游說或國際前線？黎說沒有，因施已年紀老邁，而且已退出政壇（out of the picture）。</p> -<h3 id="policy-recommendations">Policy Recommendations</h3> +<p>黎稱在晚飯之前，他與陳梓華、「攬炒巴」劉祖廸和一名女子見面及交談。黎稱無法記起當時的討論內容，但是他主要談及理大一役之後，勇武派有需要組成領袖團隊，以減少暴力。至於劉祖廸，黎指他發言不多，予人印象他願意接受建議，是一個少言和謹慎的人，不會說多過自己所需說的話。</p> -<p>The U.S. labor market is struggling to fill physically demanding in-person roles. Increased legal immigration with targeted labor market policies could help fill open roles that employers are struggling to fill. Without obtaining the labor required, the U.S. economy is unlikely to function at its full potential. Moreover, additional workers would likely reduce inflationary pressures while boosting corporate profits. In addition, while the U.S. labor market has cooled, critical economic sectors still face acute shortages that endanger key aspects of American life. Opening U.S. immigration pathways would mitigate these shortages and support the country’s economic competitiveness.</p> +<p>辯方問黎有否在會議上要求劉做任何事。黎稱沒有，並指連他問劉叫什麼名字，劉也不肯回答，更何況叫他做事。他亦沒有問劉來自哪裡，因他當時已經知道劉來自倫敦。</p> -<ul> - <li> - <p><strong>Increase H-2A noncompliance costs and use funds to enhance USCIS processing capabilities.</strong> The H-2A visa suffers from two contradicting problems. First, noncompliance rates are high, as 70 percent of farms investigated fail to comply with regulations. Secondly, USCIS fails to allocate the certified number of visas: only around 80 percent of certified visas were distributed in 2023. The second issue relates to USCIS staffing and capabilities. The agency simply does not have the means to process these necessary applications and faces increasingly worsening backlogs that threaten the integrity of the U.S. legal immigration system. The issue can be mitigated by allocating additional funding to the agency, which can be obtained, in part, by more robust noncompliance fines.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Ease restrictions on extension and renewal processes for temporary worker visas.</strong> The initial duration for both the H-2A and H-2B visas can vary from three to ten months, with the option to extend up to three years. In cases where the employment qualifies as a “one-time occurrence,” an initial three-year visa may be granted. After completing the three-year term, the worker must depart the United States for a continuous period of three months before they can reapply for an H-2 visa. The need to apply for an initial extension after three to ten months, as well as the significant barriers to renewal, renders the workforce landscape too volatile for employers in need of labor while reducing the attractiveness of applying to work in the United States for prospective employees. U.S. immigration authorities should explore doing away with the one-time-occurrence requirement to grant the initial three-year visa and lift current barriers on extensions.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Avoid imposing barriers to work opportunities for foreign students.</strong> Between 2015 and 2020, a slew of tentative pieces of legislation and executive orders aimed to place extraordinary restrictions on the ability of foreign students to enter the U.S. workforce through H-1B visas, endangering multiple sectors’ ability to acquire workers, including healthcare. These measures include eliminating optional practical training (OPT) and requiring students to work outside the United States for a decade, imposing high salary thresholds for H-1B eligibility, and directing consular officers to consider the “Buy American and Hire American” executive order when deciding to grant a visa. In short, these measures are meant to break the link between international students and their ability to be employed in the United States after graduation. These kinds of measures exacerbate worker shortages in the U.S. economy, add undue volatility in key sectors, and ultimately upend Americans’ ability to find essential services such as medical care.</p> - </li> -</ul> +<p>黎表示，他有可能談及區選和中國監控人民，但是沒有談及國際游說和眾籌，因脫離了討論的主題。</p> -<h3 id="conclusion">Conclusion</h3> +<h4 id="黎稱在庭上才首次得悉攬炒團隊">黎稱在庭上才首次得悉「攬炒團隊」</h4> -<p>As geopolitical tensions flare up and economic security concerns take center stage in policy considerations, Washington has striven to prop up sources of U.S. national strength. For instance, policymakers have embraced industrial policy to secure the nation’s energy landscape, public infrastructure, and advanced technology ecosystem. However, opening legal immigration pathways — historically a critical feature of U.S. competitiveness — has been ignored. Policymakers would do well to remember the parting words of President Ronald Reagan near the end of this term: “Unique among nations, we draw our people — our strength — from every country and every corner of the world. And by doing so we continuously renew and enrich our nation.”</p> +<p>早前陳梓華供稱，他在會面初頭簡介劉祖廸的過往工作，包括「中英聯合聲明登報團隊」、「攬炒團隊」、組織外國議員到香港作區選監選團等。惟黎庭上否認會上有相關對話，也沒有聽聞過「中英聯合聲明登報團隊」和「攬炒團隊」等，在庭上才首次得悉。</p> -<p>Instead, at a time when the U.S. economy badly needs additional workers in physically demanding in-person roles, politics have become increasingly hostile to the huddled masses who have historically enriched the United States. This report counters the argument that if more people enter the United States, fewer resources will be left for those already here. Immigrants create more benefits than costs while putting the country in a more globally competitive position. Lifting barriers to immigration would improve Americans’ ability to find affordable housing, medical care, and groceries and create the workforce needed both in the near term and in the long run.</p> +<p>陳供稱，黎在會議上問劉，為何劉的眾籌可以達到如此龐大規模。黎今在庭上反駁，他並不知道劉有份眾籌，就算自己有提及眾籌，也只是概括地作出評論、稱讚眾籌做得好。惟他否認帶起眾籌的話題，也沒有提及過渡性貸款。</p> -<hr /> +<p>陳稱他曾提及李宇軒（Andy Li）在2019年12月到訪美國。惟黎否認在會上聽過李的名字，直至在庭上才知道這個人。</p> -<p><strong>Thibault Denamiel</strong> is a fellow with the Economics Program and Scholl Chair in International Business at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C.</p> +<h4 id="陳梓華稱黎想培養攬炒巴做政治明星-黎反駁荒謬可笑">陳梓華稱黎想培養攬炒巴做政治明星 黎反駁：荒謬可笑</h4> -<p><strong>William A. Reinsch</strong> is senior adviser with the Economics Program and Scholl Chair in International Business at CSIS.</p> +<p>陳亦指稱黎在會上表示想培養劉做政治明星，並稱可以資助他一萬磅生活費。黎今表示說法荒謬可笑（farcical），因為人性神秘莫測，難以改變一個人的性格，若然有人說要培養某個人成為政治明星的話是荒謬的，「（那個人）不是無知，就是高傲自大，這是不可能的。」</p> -<p><strong>Jason Schenker</strong> is a nonresident affiliate with the Economics Program and Scholl Chair in International Business at CSIS.</p> +<p>辯方問黎是否認為不能夠培養劉成為政治明星。黎則表示，認為陳梓華在憶述事件期間編造故事，因要培養劉做政治明星的說法是愚蠢和荒謬的。</p> -<p><strong>Dhari Al-Saleh</strong> is a former intern with the Economics Program and Scholl Chair in International Business at CSIS.</p>Thibault Denamiel, et al.Critical sectors of the U.S. economy remain badly understaffed. Additionally, because of the U.S. industrial policies creating positions in targeted industries and an aging workforce tied to specific career paths, shortages are set to become more dire in the medium term.UK FATF Mutual Evaluation2024-11-25T12:00:00+08:002024-11-25T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/uk-fatf-mutual-evaluation<p><em>At the first meeting of the UK Financial Action Task Force (FATF) Mutual Evaluation, experts discussed how the UK can best prepare for its upcoming FATF evaluation in 2027.</em></p> +<p>陳供稱，黎在會上指：「應該識多啲枱底人，而唔係一直喺度識啲枱面人，例如 Rick Scott、Ted Cruz、Tod Young，呢啲係老泛民本身就已經有 connection。」黎今否認，並重申會議中沒有談及任何有關國際游說的事宜。黎亦否認在會面中提及經濟封鎖、制裁等話題。</p> -<excerpt /> +<p>陳供稱，黎舉例指前政務司司長陳方安生和前美國眾議院議長佩洛西，在彼此年輕的時候便開始認識，這些長遠的關係對於國際游說便很有用。黎今表示不知道二人互相認識，他亦沒有提及二人。</p> -<h3 id="introduction">Introduction</h3> +<blockquote> + <p>On one side, you have a repressive regime crushing democratic freedoms in #HongKong. On the other, you have young people speaking out for freedom &amp; democratic reforms. Proud to stand with @RepMcGovern in support of today’s bipartisan votes showing the House’s commitment to HK. pic.twitter.com/fmwA6KkR7b — Nancy Pelosi (@SpeakerPelosi) October 16, 2019</p> +</blockquote> -<p>Every decade or so, countries are assessed on their technical compliance with the Recommendations of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) on money laundering, terrorist financing and proliferation financing and on the effectiveness of the measures that they have put in place. The on-site visit for the UK’s next evaluation is scheduled for August 2027 and preparations will begin in earnest in 2025. While the UK has generally been regarded as having a robust legal and regulatory framework, FATF’s increasing focus on the effectiveness of a country in managing money laundering, terrorist financing and proliferation financing risks means that technical compliance with the Recommendations alone is not enough.</p> +<h4 id="黎稱支爆乃攬炒巴首先提出">黎稱「支爆」乃攬炒巴首先提出</h4> -<p>The UK’s last evaluation, in 2018, was positive overall, however, some areas of significant weakness were identified. The UK has sought to address these over the last decade, but has it done enough? How will the UK fare when it comes to its effectiveness ratings? How will the changes in methodology for this round of evaluations impact the assessment of the UK? What about new areas, such as the FATF’s recommendations on virtual assets and the strengthening of its recommendations on asset recovery?</p> +<p>陳梓華曾供稱，黎在會上提及長遠而言應該爭取國際認同，讓外國實施禁運、制裁及向政府施壓，然後香港要團結不同板塊，再結合民間力量，才能達至「支爆」。</p> -<p>To help answer these questions, the Centre for Finance and Security (CFS) at RUSI has established a UK FATF Taskforce, bringing together a small group of experts to explore these areas and provide practical recommendations on how the UK can best prepare for its upcoming evaluation.</p> +<p>黎在庭上反稱，「支爆」是由劉祖廸首先提出。他稱在那時才首次聽聞這個字詞，他即場問劉什麼是「支爆」，劉解釋指「中國的內爆」。黎相信劉對中國有很多思考，並且嘗試預計將來會發生的事。黎稱，他當時回應劉，指中國花費大量金錢在監視和控制人民，所以支出比其他國家更多。</p> -<p>The Taskforce held its first meeting in October 2024. The discussion was divided into two parts. First, Taskforce members reflected on the UK’s 2018 mutual evaluation, some of the areas of weakness that were identified, and the extent to which progress had been made by the UK in the intervening years. Second, the group discussed some of the major global challenges over the last decade and what impact those could potentially have on the UK’s evaluation. Given the overlap between these two areas, this report sets out the themes that emerged during the Taskforce meeting, rather than being a narrative description of the points raised by participants. While there was some discussion about changes to some of the technical requirements of FATF’s Recommendations, such as the standards on virtual assets, this will be covered in more detail in the second Taskforce meeting. Although the Taskforce’s remit focuses on the UK’s fifth round evaluation, many of the points raised will be relevant for other jurisdictions as they contemplate their next mutual evaluations.</p> +<p>陳梓華稱，黎認為應團結議會、海外組織、街頭力量、國際線及商人。對此，黎反駁指：「我從沒有這樣的想法，這是他（陳）自己的想法，然後把說話塞進我的口。」</p> -<h3 id="the-direction-of-travel-since-2018">The Direction of Travel since 2018</h3> +<p>陳曾引述黎向劉說：「『國際游說唔係好似你哋咁樣做。』」惟黎反駁指，當時他並不知道劉等人參與國際游說，不可能說過相關言論。</p> -<p>There was broad consensus in the group that the UK’s 2018 mutual evaluation was better than could have been expected and, for some, better than the UK deserved. The months of hard work and organisation in the lead-up to the evaluation enabled the UK to present a coherent and persuasive narrative to the assessors. This was rewarded with the headline that the “UK takes top spot in fight against dirty money” and much was made of the UK’s, at the time, world-leading ranking in compliance with the FATF standards.</p> +<h4 id="黎指冀透過制裁或封鎖來推翻中共政府的想法比荒謬更荒謬">黎指冀透過制裁或封鎖來推翻中共政府的想法「比荒謬更荒謬」</h4> -<p>Members of the Taskforce did not doubt the UK government’s continued public commitment to tackling financial crime: participants pointed to the two Economic Crime Plans that previous governments had issued; legislative changes, including much-needed reforms to Companies House; and increased investment in the UK’s response, for example through the Economic Crime Levy. This, together with the UK’s global lead in the response to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, suggests that the UK will again have the basis from which to craft a strong narrative to the assessors in 2027.</p> +<p>陳曾引述黎在會上說，這一代人未必可以實現到推翻中共，「佢希望以劉祖廸牽頭嘅攬炒團隊，同呢班年青人，可以接棒。」</p> -<p>That said, it is clear that there are a number of potential pitfalls for the UK. These can be broadly grouped into two themes. First, participants discussed the overall application of the risk-based approach in the UK, from the National Risk Assessment (NRA) to risk-based supervision and the application of risk-based preventative measures. Second, participants identified specific areas where they felt that there had been little progress since the 2018 mutual evaluation, including enforcement, the role of the financial intelligence unit (FIU), and public–private partnerships (PPPs).</p> +<p>黎今在庭上反問：「香港人可以推翻中共政府？」，接著說：「我沒有瘋癲到思考這些瘋狂的事情。」</p> -<h3 id="the-changing-global-context">The Changing Global Context</h3> +<p>辯方問黎，會議上有否談論到推翻中共的方法。黎僅指，推翻中共政府的想法，是完全不切實際的（out of dimension of any discussions），又指若然希望透過制裁或封鎖措施來推翻中共政府，「我認為是比荒謬更荒謬。（“I think it’s more than ridiculous.”）」</p> -<p>All participants acknowledged the significant global changes and challenges over the decade since the UK’s last evaluation. Of these, Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 has had the most impact on the UK’s response to illicit finance. The design, implementation and enforcement of sanctions against Russia have dominated the work of policymakers, regulators and regulated institutions. While acknowledging the point made above, that the UK’s response to the invasion of Ukraine may feed into a positive narrative for the evaluation, some Taskforce members felt that the increased focus on sanctions implementation had hindered the ability of the UK to make progress on anti-money laundering (AML) and counterterrorist financing (CTF), particularly in the application of the risk-based approach by supervisors and institutions. This is primarily because of the resources – at both levels – that have had to pivot towards compliance with sanctions regulations rather than AML/CTF, but also because of the difference in the type of regime, one being risk-based and the other being more rules-based.</p> +<p>黎：若市民和平地示威、站於道德高地 便可獲國際社會同情和支持 乃「最強大的游說」</p> -<p>The impact of the post-2022 sanctions on Russia was also felt to have had a similar knock-on impact on resourcing of law enforcement, with efforts directed towards kleptocracy and sanctions evasion rather than areas like international corruption. From a purely technical perspective, only targeted financial sanctions under the UN’s sanctions regime are within scope of the FATF (that is, sanctions associated with proliferation financing activity). Therefore, Russia sanctions, or indeed other autonomous sanctions regimes, are outside the scope of the FATF’s assessments, and robust and effective implementation of these type of sanctions does not necessarily buy you any credit with the FATF.</p> +<p>黎認為，當香港人和平地示威，得到國際社會的支持，便能夠拯救到香港，避免受到中國侵害自由。被問到國際社會可以做到什麼，黎指當國際支持是壓倒性的，中國作決定時便必須予以考慮。他補充，「支持」是概括性的概念，並不是指特定行動，可以是國際壓力、言論或行為。</p> -<p>While the full-scale invasion of Ukraine may have dominated the past few years, there have been other developments which have had an impact on the application of AML/CTF controls, such as regulatory changes in the UK. The consumer duty requirements of the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) were given as one example of this, where there needs to be a balance between effective measures to prevent financial crime and good outcomes for consumers, recognising that these two principles can, occasionally, come into conflict. While banks and others have had to manage the implementation of multiple new sanctions, the significant global attention on the issue of fraud has also demanded much of their time and attention, further “squeezing” the available time and resourcing for tackling AML/CTF.</p> +<p>法官李運騰和李素蘭先後追問，若如黎較早前所供稱，從沒想過國際游說的事宜，又如何得到國際的支持呢？黎認為，如果市民能和平地示威、站於道德高地，便可以得到國際社會的同情，又指國際社會與香港人價值觀一致，如果香港人追求相關價值的話，國際社會會認為香港人也是在替他們追求。</p> -<h3 id="the-uks-understanding-of-the-risks-to-which-it-is-exposed">The UK’s Understanding of the Risks to which it is Exposed</h3> +<p>辯方提到，當一般人聽到「國際游說」時，會聯想到涉及「說服」。黎則回應，如果香港人站在道德高地上示威，並獲得國際社會的支持的話，「我認為這是我們最強大的游說。」黎續指，如果只是與外國議員和官員對話，而欠缺廣大市民站在一起，也是沒有用。</p> -<p>FATF’s assessment of effectiveness of the risk-based approach, as set out in its Immediate Outcome 1 (IO1), requires that countries not only understand their risks, but also take action to combat those risks where appropriate.</p> +<p>辯方問，當黎會見時任美國副總統彭斯和時任美國國務卿蓬佩奧的時候，是否正在屬於「國際游說」？黎回答可以算是（kind of），去請求他們為香港發聲。</p> -<p>Almost all participants felt that there was poor and inconsistent understanding of the UK’s risks at all levels, particularly in terms of the UK’s role as one of the world’s most significant global financial centres. The UK’s NRA, last published in 2020, was given as an example of this, being described as somewhat haphazard and of limited use to its target audience. The UK’s approach to identifying risk was also seen as very much reactive rather than proactive and, while noting the size and complexity of the UK’s exposure to financial crime risks, it was felt that other jurisdictions prioritised keeping their understanding of risks and threats up to date and sharing that information on a timely basis with supervisors and regulated institutions to inform the application of the risk-based approach.</p> +<p>案件明日續審。</p> -<p>It was also felt, however, that the 2018 mutual evaluation itself did not acknowledge the scale and extent of the threats facing the UK, leading to what many felt was a more positive outcome than the UK deserved and/or that assessors may not have focused enough on some of the higher-risk areas, including the overarching risks associated with the UK’s role as a global financial centre. This is a topic that will be discussed further in the second Taskforce meeting.</p> +<hr /> -<h3 id="risk-based-supervision">Risk-based Supervision</h3> +<p>案件編號：HCCC51/2022</p>獨媒報導黎智英否認曾說「推爆個政府」、「國際力量」 稱不知道陳梓華與國際線有關連 黎智英：冀透過制裁推翻中共想法「比荒謬更荒謬」 反指和平示威才是「最強大的游說」China In The Euro-Atlantic2024-11-28T12:00:00+08:002024-11-28T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/china-in-the-euro-atlantic<p><em>This paper outlines the likely scope of a putative presence of the People’s Liberation Army Navy in and around the Euro-Atlantic in the next 15 years and the nature of the foreign policy it will support.</em></p> -<p>The application of effective and risk-based AML/CTF supervision in the UK formed a significant part of the Taskforce’s discussions. Participants felt that the lack of a coherent and robust understanding of risks extended beyond the NRA, to include supervisors and regulated institutions as well. This was discussed particularly in the context of risk-based supervision. For example, some participants expressed the view that the FCA’s supervision of financial institutions was too focused on the systemically important banks, rather than on other parts of the financial system that may present significant vulnerabilities, such as new entrants to the market who may have poor AML/CTF controls and expose the UK to higher risk.</p> +<excerpt /> -<p>It was felt that supervisors may not have the confidence to apply a truly risk-based approach to supervision, the proper application of which would require supervisors to deprioritise areas, whether industry sectors or specific services and products. The FCA, and indeed other supervisors, may not be willing to do this or to be seen to be doing this. Linked to this point, and maybe a consequence of it, some Taskforce members felt that the FCA had recently been moving away from a risk-based approach to supervision and towards more of a formal and technical approach, driven by a large number of data requests to firms (not limited to AML/CTF but also extending to sanctions and fraud). As a result of this, regulated entities may not be encouraged to take a risk-based approach to preventative measures. This, in turn, can lead to unintended consequences, such as de-risking.</p> +<p>China is becoming an ever-more prominent actor in the global maritime commons, emerging as a key player in sectors such as global shipping. China is also gradually expanding its military footprint outside its region and developing the capacity for power projection at reach. For policymakers in the Euro-Atlantic, this raises the prospect of a Chinese military presence in the region and its environs (such as the South Atlantic and the Arctic). This paper seeks to outline the likely scope of a People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) putative presence in and around the Euro-Atlantic in the next 15 years and the nature of the foreign policy it will support.</p> -<p>While much of the discussion focused on AML/CTF supervision of the financial sector, participants also acknowledged broader issues with supervision in other sectors, particularly supervision by the Professional Body Supervisors (PBSs) responsible for the legal and accountancy sectors. Improvements were introduced after the mixed assessment in the 2018 evaluation, with the establishment of the Office for Professional Body Anti-Money Laundering Supervisors (OPBAS). This was intended to bring consistency and drive improvement in standards of supervision across the 22 legal and accountancy PBSs. While participants acknowledged the positive impact of OPBAS to date, it was still felt that there were weaknesses in the performance of some of the PBSs, as evidenced by recent publications from OPBAS itself.</p> +<h3 id="key-findings">Key Findings</h3> -<p>In 2023, the government consulted on reforms to the structure of supervision in the UK and, in particular, on the extent to which there should be consolidation of the PBSs and the statutory supervisors in order to improve the effectiveness of the UK’s regime. The timing of the government’s consultation means that it is likely that the UK will be in some sort of transition phase by the time of the next mutual evaluation, at least as it relates to the supervision of the professional services. As a result, the UK may struggle to evidence the required level of effectiveness in supervisory outcomes to the FATF assessors, and consideration needs to be given to what type of data can be provided to assessors while the system is in a state of flux.</p> +<ul> + <li> + <p>While there is some rationale for a PLAN presence in the Euro-Atlantic and its environs, the challenges of maintaining an extra-regional military presence at any scale will limit its scope. China’s blue-water capabilities are still nascent and even after likely growth, resourcing either a rotational or permanent deployment of PLAN capabilities will impose challenging force structure trade-offs on a navy that already faces the daunting task of competing in both the Pacific and Indian oceans.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Despite this, the bottlenecks in key Chinese supply chains that begin in the Atlantic may provide incentives for a future Chinese leader to decide that a military presence at scale is warranted – such a choice will probably not be made in the medium term (10–15 years). Much of China’s military activity, including defence engagement, is likely to be Phase 0 shaping to set the conditions if such a shift is chosen.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>While China will represent a very limited military challenge in the region, it is likely to seek coercive options towards Europe. Beijing’s most likely foreign policy towards Europe would combine elements of coercion and engagement, since China needs the European market, but seeks a degree of leverage.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>China has several coercive options that leverage maritime power. Its central role in port infrastructure and support to Russia’s economy and military are two options that it might leverage. While many of these options either do not involve the PLAN, or involve it primarily as a supporting element, they can have second-order ramifications for European navies.</p> + </li> +</ul> -<p>While the methodology changes for the fifth round of evaluations will be a focus for the next Taskforce meeting, specific changes to the IOs relating to supervision (IO3 and IO4) were also raised as part of the discussion. The previous assessment methodology (which the UK was assessed under in 2018) combined the assessment of supervision of financial institutions and non-financial institutions into one IO (IO3). The UK was rated as only being moderately effective in relation to this IO in 2018, although it is not significantly out of step with its international peers; no country received the top rating (“highly effective”) and only a handful received a rating of “substantially effective”.</p> +<p>Although a future PLAN presence should not be a basis for strategic distraction from the core tasks of Europe’s navies in terms of deterring Russia, its shaping activities in the region should be monitored and where possible constrained.</p> -<p>Under the new methodology that will be used in 2027, countries will receive separate ratings for the effectiveness of supervision in the financial (IO3) and non-financial sectors (IO4). However, the reformulated IO3 and IO4 will extend beyond just considering the effectiveness of supervision to include the effectiveness of the preventative measures put into place by regulated entities.12 These changes may have a number of implications for the UK’s assessment. First, the lack of progress on addressing the weaknesses that the FATF assessors identified on supervision of the legal and accountancy sectors in 2018 may be more clearly called out now that it is considered as its own separate IO. On the other hand,Under the new methodology that will be used in 2027, countries will receive separate ratings for the effectiveness of supervision in the financial (IO3) and non-financial sectors (IO4). However, the reformulated IO3 and IO4 will extend beyond just considering the effectiveness of supervision to include the effectiveness of the preventative measures put into place by regulated entities. These changes may have a number of implications for the UK’s assessment. First, the lack of progress on addressing the weaknesses that the FATF assessors identified on supervision of the legal and accountancy sectors in 2018 may be more clearly called out now that it is considered as its own separate IO. On the other hand, combining the assessment of effectiveness to include both supervision and preventative measures into one score may mean that deficiencies in supervision will be ignored and/or negated by a more positive relative assessment of preventative measures.</p> +<h3 id="introduction">Introduction</h3> -<h3 id="three-areas-of-concern">Three Areas of Concern</h3> +<p>In 2019, NATO’s then Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg voiced concerns that although “there’s no way that NATO will move into the South China Sea … we have to address the fact that China is coming closer to us, investing heavily in infrastructure”. The prospect of China moving into the Euro-Atlantic area poses new questions for the UK and its partners in the region. Given that China has not yet emerged as a major defence and security actor in the Atlantic (although it wields considerable economic influence), policymakers and ministries of defence will benefit from an understanding of the potential scope of China’s regional ambitions, and their ramifications.</p> -<p>When reflecting on the 2018 evaluation and looking ahead to the next evaluation, participants raised three further areas of concern: enforcement; the role of the UK FIU; and the UK’s approach to PPPs.</p> +<p>To explore China’s likely approach to the Euro-Atlantic, this paper’s analysis is based on some assumptions about the principles driving China’s foreign policy. These are derived from public statements and published scholarship.</p> -<h4 id="enforcement">Enforcement</h4> +<p>The nature of China’s engagement in the Euro-Atlantic is apparent more from its conflicting economic imperatives than its modest military presence. The capacity of the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) for sustained power projection remains limited. However, China has strong incentives to maintain stable relations with states whose markets partly sustain its investment-led, export-dependent economy. There are also reasons for China to pursue coercive leverage over European states that have, to some extent, cooperated with US efforts to economically contain China (most notably through exercising control over key technologies, such as semiconductors). An assessment of how Beijing might balance these conflicting imperatives and the emerging military implications of its approach will help European leaders avoid either complacency or overreaction. The Royal Navy Strategic Studies Centre and the Centre for Strategic Studies of the French Navy (CESM) have supported this project, conducted by RUSI and the Council on Geostrategy. The project examines how China may evolve as a power in the Euro-Atlantic. The research for this paper, conducted in July 2024, involved a review of existing literature on China’s capabilities and wider geostrategic imperatives.</p> -<p>While the UK was described in 2018 as “routinely and aggressively” investigating and prosecuting money laundering, the assessors did highlight that it was not clear whether the level of prosecutions and convictions in relation to high-end money laundering were consistent with the UK’s risks. Taskforce members felt that enforcement in this area continued to be a challenge for the UK, pointing to the lack of standalone money laundering prosecutions. Participants felt that there remains a lack of skills, expertise and/or resources for law enforcement to investigate high-value cases, including cases of trade-based money laundering. These, however, are the types of cases that the FATF assessors should expect to see the UK authorities prosecuting, especially given the threats to which the UK is exposed and the size and complexity of its financial services sector.</p> +<p>There are several trajectories that China’s foreign policy in the Euro-Atlantic may take, each of which corresponds to a different set of naval priorities. It might opt for an increasingly coercive approach, aimed at fixing US and European assets in the region and thus giving it more of a free hand in the Indo-Pacific. This approach has been advocated by members of China’s military and analytical communities. It might entail the deployment of forces in the Atlantic at a scale sufficient to occupy the attention of a meaningful number of US forces and to give European states pause on their commitments to the Indo-Pacific. More explicit support to Russia than has been offered by China thus far might also constitute a coercive approach.</p> -<h4 id="the-role-of-the-fiu">The Role of the FIU</h4> +<p>At the other end of the spectrum is the view, espoused by others in China, that Europe’s consumer economies represent “the endpoints” for many of the infrastructure projects that form part of the Belt and Road Initiative – a large number of which would serve the primary role of linking Chinese producers with European markets (since few other markets in Eurasia are of a comparable scale). While strategic engagement in the Euro-Atlantic is part of this view of China’s priorities, the main focus is not to alienate European states. To do so would drive them to coordinate with the US more closely, which incentivises non-military forms of regional engagement.</p> -<p>In the 2018 mutual evaluation, the UK’s FIU was singled out for criticism by the assessors. The 2018 report states that “the UKFIU suffers from a lack of available resources (human and IT) and analytical capability which is a serious concern considering similar issues were raised over a decade ago in the UK’s previous FATF mutual evaluation”. Taskforce members felt that little had changed with regards to the UK FIU since the last evaluation; a concern, given the comments in the 2018 evaluation about how longstanding the issues were at that point.</p> +<p>These are not mutually exclusive options, as coercion and engagement can form complementary strands of a state’s foreign policy. However, a nakedly coercive foreign policy makes engagement more difficult.</p> -<p>Consistent with the finding in 2018, a number of Taskforce members highlighted that the UK FIU is not well regarded overseas, with delays in responding to requests for information and a lack of effective data sharing. While this is, in part, reflective of broader issues with cross-border information sharing, it is a weakness identified by the previous evaluation that does not seem to have been addressed by the UK to date.</p> +<p>This paper contends that dissuasion is the foreign policy that Beijing is most likely to embark on in the Atlantic. China needs the markets of Europe, given its own structural export surpluses, which will prove difficult to export elsewhere. However, China’s latent capacity for coercion can serve as a useful means of dissuading policies that directly impact China’s interests in its immediate periphery. It is thus likely that China’s foreign policy in the Euro-Atlantic will attempt to maintain a constructive relationship with Europe (eschewing some aggressive foreign policy tools) while attempting to ensure that the principles on which the relationship rest are amenable to Beijing’s interests, particularly with respect to European policies in the Indo-Pacific.</p> -<h4 id="the-uks-approach-to-ppps">The UK’s Approach to PPPs</h4> +<p>The direct military ramifications of a strategy of dissuasion are likely to be limited in the short to medium term. While there are some reasons for China to seek a military presence in the vicinity of the Euro-Atlantic area (for example, in the Arctic and South Atlantic), there are considerable practical limitations, which are likely to prove enduring. China is likely to engage in what Western military parlance would term “Phase 0 shaping activities” in the South Atlantic and potentially also the Arctic. Phase 0 activities would be designed to cultivate regional influence, habituate the PLAN to longer deployments, and set the conditions for a more substantial presence in the longer term. Naval presence and activities, such as joint exercises with Russia, might also be used as a means of signalling to Europe China’s capacity to indirectly play a more significant security role in the Euro-Atlantic. For example, China might provide more explicit military and economic support to Russia as one way of seeking to reinforce a strategy of dissuasion.</p> -<p>In the 2018 evaluation, the UK’s PPP, the Joint Money Laundering Intelligence Taskforce (JMLIT) was described as “an innovative model for public/private information sharing that has generated very positive results since its inception in 2015 and is considered to be an example of best practice”. While this could be fairly said in 2018, members of the Taskforce felt that other countries had managed to accelerate progress of their own PPPs, whereas JMLIT was felt to have stalled in comparison. While the lack of progress in JMLIT may not necessarily count against the UK in its assessment, it was felt that the UK was unlikely to get any continued credit for its efforts in PPPs and that this could harm the narrative of the UK as a world leader in tackling financial crime.</p> +<p>The main conclusion of the paper is that for Europe’s navies, the presence of the PLAN in the Atlantic is a relatively distant and low-probability concern, but that growing Chinese interests in the region will lead to an increase in activity, which should at this stage be monitored and matched as an economy-of-force effort. In the long term, China may become increasingly dependent on sea lines of communication (SLOCs) in the South Atlantic and may have the capacity to commit significant resources to their protection. Similarly, its footprint in the Arctic might grow, for reasons that are discussed in the paper. While it is not likely that China’s presence will materialise until well beyond the next decade, it is a contingency to plan for, and the shaping activity that might enable this eventual development should be monitored. In the period most relevant to national defence reviews, the most significant consideration from a security standpoint is the Sino-Russian relationship in the High North and beyond, which might have more direct military ramifications in Europe.</p> -<h3 id="conclusion">Conclusion</h3> +<p>The paper has three chapters. Chapter I describes the underlying assumptions about China’s foreign policy drivers on which the assessment of its military engagement with the Euro-Atlantic is based. Chapter II provides further detail on Beijing’s strategic imperatives in the Euro-Atlantic that have a plausible maritime dimension. Chapter III describes the employment and potential limitations of China’s naval power in the Euro-Atlantic. The paper concludes with a discussion of the implications of a Chinese presence in the Euro-Atlantic for European navies.</p> -<p>Participants generally felt that the UK would perform well in its next mutual evaluation, not least because of the ability of the machinery of the UK government to spring into action, but that it would be challenging to receive as glowing an evaluation as in 2018. A broader point was made that the dynamic of the discussion between a country’s delegation and the assessment team can influence the outcome of the evaluation. The likelihood of the UK repeating its success of 2018 could well be determined, therefore, by the makeup and experience of the assessment team. However, a well-organised and thorough approach by the UK authorities would also likely mean that the UK performs well.</p> +<h3 id="i-assumptions-about-drivers-for-chinas-foreign-policy">I. Assumptions About Drivers for China’s Foreign Policy</h3> -<p>A second meeting of the Taskforce is planned for spring 2025 to discuss the FATF’s new methodology for the fifth round of assessments and how the UK might fare under the revised criteria, including the implementation of the FATF standards in relation to virtual assets and virtual asset service providers, and the progress the UK has made as it relates to areas of the FATF’s recent priorities, such as asset recovery and non-profit organisations.</p> +<p>The assessments in this paper are based on a number of underlying assumptions for the next decade. The first is that the US will increasingly prioritise strategic competition with China. This will involve a rebalancing of US military capabilities towards the Indo-Pacific, potentially leaving gaps in the European security architecture. The 2022 Indo-Pacific Strategy released by President Joe Biden’s administration, for example, explicitly states an intention to “renew our focus on innovation to ensure the U.S. military can operate in rapidly evolving threat environments” in the Indo-Pacific region. It is likely that the US Indo-Pacific Command, which already absorbs 60% of critical capabilities, such as nuclear attack submarines, will see its allocation of naval assets grow. One outcome of this refocusing is that, much like the British and German fleets before the First World War, the US Navy and the PLAN might fix much of the other’s naval power in static opposition within a single region, ironically limiting the extra-regional footprints of both global aspirants. Both navies may seek to maintain an extra-regional presence to secure lines of communication and, in the case of China, to potentially fix US resources elsewhere. However, the very fragility of the regional balance of power will limit each navy’s slack capacity for deployment elsewhere.</p> -<hr /> +<p>The second assumption is that, to the greatest extent possible, China will remain committed to securing its supply chains and maintaining market access. Beijing’s economic plan hinges on a delicate balancing act: constructing a trade framework that supports regime security and self-sufficiency while fostering in other countries greater economic dependence on it. China’s trajectory of economic growth is heavily reliant on expanding its share of global manufacturing, a strategy which necessitates sustained increases in both production capacity and global market penetration. Beijing recognises the vulnerability of its economic model to external disruptions and will continue to pursue strategies to mitigate these risks.</p> -<p><strong>Kathryn Westmore</strong> is a Senior Research Fellow at the Centre for Finance and Security at RUSI. She leads the Financial Crime Policy Programme, which tracks the implementation and evolution of anti-financial crime policy both in the UK and globally.</p>Kathryn WestmoreAt the first meeting of the UK Financial Action Task Force (FATF) Mutual Evaluation, experts discussed how the UK can best prepare for its upcoming FATF evaluation in 2027.【黎智英案・審訊第 96 日】2024-11-25T12:00:00+08:002024-11-25T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/trial-of-jimmy-lai-day-96<ul> - <li>黎智英：倘真相煽動他人憎恨政府 依然會報導 不認為構成罪行</li> -</ul> +<p>The third assumption is that China’s efforts to reduce its dependence on external markets and technology through initiatives such as the “dual circulation” economy and “Made in China 2025” are unlikely to fully materialise by 2032. However, if this changes, it will affect the likelihood of a coercive foreign policy in the Euro-Atlantic by setting the economic incentive structures of China and European states at odds. Although these initiatives are aimed at mitigating reliance on foreign technologies and markets, China remains deeply integrated in the international systems from which it seeks to partially detach, and its growing role in some sectors (such as electric vehicles and solar panels) will also create new dependencies on suppliers in regions such as West Africa.</p> -<excerpt /> +<p>The fourth assumption is that Beijing will be heavily influenced by status concerns as well as security interests. The two may significantly overlap since global acceptance of China as a rule-setter in key regions will aid its economic and security interests. As China continues to rise on the global stage, Beijing will be increasingly motivated by the desire to be recognised as a great power and to shape international norms and institutions in the image of the values and interests of the Communist Party of China (CCP). Evidence for this desire to be a rule-setter rather than a rule-follower is apparent in initiatives such as the Global Development Initiative (2021), the Global Security Initiative (2022) and the Global Civilisation Initiative (2023).</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/uYHl7q5.png" alt="image01" /></p> +<p>Many of the instruments that China will apply to deliver this engagement are non-military, although a limited military presence can serve several aims for China. These include enabling certain forms of engagement (such as coordination on non-traditional security threats) and supporting China’s scientific establishment, as well as the efforts of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to generate maritime domain awareness and setting the conditions for a more ambitious military posture, should political and military circumstances require it.</p> -<p>【獨媒報導】壹傳媒創辦人黎智英及3間蘋果公司被控串謀勾結外國勢力及串謀刊印煽動刊物等罪，今（25日）於高院（移師西九龍法院）踏入第96日審訊，黎智英第四日作供。2020年5月《蘋果》推英文版新聞，同案被告張劍虹和楊清奇曾供稱黎希望透過英文版讓美國人了解香港情況、「希望美國政府採取更強硬嘅措施」，例如制裁或敵對行動。黎則否認，因「制裁」和「敵對行動」均是他很少使用的詞語。此外，張劍虹稱黎一直以來下達的編採指示包括報導關於美國制裁、抗爭和示威的新聞，黎則反駁稱自己從沒談及制裁，「所以他虛構證供。（“… so he made it up.”）」</p> +<h3 id="ii-chinas-strategic-interests-in-the-euro-atlantic">II. China’s Strategic Interests in the Euro-Atlantic</h3> -<p>辯方一度問黎，若然報導真相會煽動市民憎恨政府，是否仍會報導？黎表示會，因為這是真相；他稱不認為會構成罪行，又指：「如果這是罪行的話，我們當時便不會報導，我們所做的只是合法地報導。」</p> +<p>China has several major areas of strategic interest in the Euro-Atlantic and adjoining regions to which its position in the maritime domain may be relevant. These are:</p> -<h4 id="黎智英南華早報忽視中國的負面新聞">黎智英：《南華早報》忽視中國的負面新聞</h4> +<ul> + <li> + <p>Securing SLOCs and access to critical resources.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Maintaining market access to Europe.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Protecting Chinese overseas interests.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Maintaining the capacity to put pressure on the US and other Western states on “exterior lines”.</p> + </li> +</ul> -<p>辯方大律師關文渭繼續圍繞《蘋果》英文版提問。他播放一段2020年5月13日的錄音，當中黎提議選取一些中國大陸新聞和文章，當黎提及「反對派」時，一把男聲補充說：「維權人士」，黎認同並舉例指被囚18年的企業家任志強、大學教授或《方方日記》等，「每日好似花絮咁，譯一段嘢」，使英文版成為「一個 alternative to (South China) Morning Post，關於大陸嘅新聞」，又形容《南華早報》的新聞是「大宣傳」。</p> +<h4 id="securing-sea-lines-of-communication">Securing Sea Lines of Communication</h4> -<p>辯方續展示2020年5月10日的「English news」群組訊息，黎稱：「我們揀選寫手時，我們不需要向外國人平衡這裡的不同顏色的政見，我們只需要集中在《蘋果》的香港觀點和黃營的普遍觀點。」（“When we choose writers we don’t have to think about giving foreigners a balanced view of what happens here of every different colors, we only concentrate in our Apple Daily HK view, a general view of the yellow side.”）黎又指：「我們不是要嘗試平衡報導，而是要報導保護香港一方的觀點。這是世界需要知道的聲音。」（“We are not trying to strike a balance but the point of view of the people on the side of protecting HK. This is the voice the world wants to know.”）</p> +<p>While energy supplies that traverse the Indian Ocean have historically been an area of focus for Chinese strategists, a number of critical Chinese supply chains have bottlenecks in the Atlantic. For example, 98% of China’s cobalt is imported, with the majority from the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). Cobalt plays a vital role in several industrial processes, including oil refining. Similarly, much of China’s manganese, used in the production of steel and anodes for lithium-ion batteries, is procured from South Africa, Gabon and Ghana. This can have long-term military ramifications. Despite the fears of Chinese strategists, the prospect of a US blockade of the Strait of Malacca has always been remote: it would also have an impact on countries within the cordon (and the PLAN would inflict considerable attrition on any enforcing vessels). Many of China’s avenues to securing other key inputs, such as cobalt, are far more fragile.</p> -<p>黎解釋，《蘋果》英文版是有限的，每天只有約20篇新聞，正如他早前提及的「鳥籠」，每間傳媒都有一套價值觀，在報導新聞時確保與相關價值觀一致，並要知道自己想要的是什麼，在選材時找一些符合自己價值觀的新聞。辯方問《蘋果》英文版會否報導中國的好消息？黎說不會。辯方接著問誰會報導中國的好消息？黎說《南華早報》。</p> +<p>The efforts of the US and its allies to control flows of key industrial and military inputs that must cross the South Atlantic in a conflict are, in theory, more militarily achievable. The US Navy could constrain flows of these inputs with a close blockade in more militarily permissive waters. Whether the US has an appetite to enforce such a cordon on distant neutral states is debatable, especially as this would also rob the US Navy of resources it would need in the Pacific. However, it would seem logical that a country that has spent decades treating the “Malacca dilemma” as a real concern should be equally worried about the prospects of such a blockade. It should perhaps not be surprising, therefore, that the PLAN is reportedly seeking bases capable of hosting its aircraft carriers in West African states such as Gabon and Equatorial Guinea, and that it has conducted visible naval exercises with Russia and South Africa. Chinese military authors have posited that aircraft carriers have an important role in protecting SLOCs and a carrier strike group acting as a fleet in being need not be preponderant to significantly complicate SLOC interdiction.</p> -<p>至於訊息中「保護香港一方的觀點」（“the point of view of the people on the side of protecting HK”），黎指可理解為「黃營」，而相反一方可理解為「藍營」，即支持政府或支持中國的人。法官李素蘭聞言問，是否代表「黃營」即是「反政府」和「反中國」？黎雖然同意，但是他表示自己不會形容「黃營」為「反政府」和「反中國」，反而會形容為「對政府和中國較具批判性」。</p> +<p>Nonetheless, there are a number of alternative and arguably less risky methods of supply-chain derisking available to China, including diversification and stockpiling – the same approach China applies to oil. Moreover, in a conflict, the precedence taken by military production over civilian consumption and the ability of a sophisticated economy to engage in import substitution is typically a limiting factor on the immediate impact of a blockade. Short of imposing something analogous to the Navicert system on vessels leaving African ports, it is unclear how the US Navy could impose a blockade, since most shipping to China occurs on vessels that are not Chinese-flagged. It is entirely plausible that the assertions of the Chinese military community regarding the need for “far seas protection” reflect institutional beliefs and interests of the PLAN rather than China’s strategy. If this is the case, it might well be that these interests will not translate into a military presence adjacent to the Euro-Atlantic, with some questioning the evidence that China has indeed sought a base in West Africa.</p> -<p>至於訊息中「這是世界需要知道的聲音」，黎解釋這樣說是因為疫情令全世界對中國有負面印象，英文版的新聞可以保護他們、使他們免於受到中國所帶來的危險，包括病毒。黎智英又指，《南華早報》忽視很多中國的負面新聞，例如有關經濟發展的負面數據。</p> +<p>At a minimum, however, a plausible rationale for a military presence does exist and China has reportedly already set up military infrastructure, such as telemetry stations in Kenya. If the naval protection of SLOCs becomes a core mission for China, this would place sizeable Chinese forces within the Atlantic. On balance, this paper argues that this is unlikely to occur until well beyond the next decade, but efforts to set the conditions for a Chinese naval presence in the Atlantic, should a future leader opt to create one, may be visible during the next 15 years.</p> -<h4 id="訊息稱冀英文版成為我們與美國政治的槓桿-黎稱冀外國讀者能替香港發聲">訊息稱冀英文版「成為我們與美國政治的槓桿」 黎稱冀外國讀者能替香港發聲</h4> +<h4 id="maintaining-market-access-to-europe">Maintaining Market Access to Europe</h4> -<p>黎其後在英文版群組中稱：「請努力量（盡）快推動這事，現在很多美國大媒體要訪問我是想撐我哋，是時候走向美國讀者，讓他們的存在成為我們與美國政治的槓桿，是很大支持柱樑。」</p> +<p>Market access to the consumption-led economies of Europe represents a second area of focus for China. The country has invested substantially in efforts to increase its connectivity across Eurasia through the Belt and Road Initiative, and the ability to move finished goods to European markets is likely to remain a significant driver of Chinese foreign policy, especially as its investment-led economic model will make it difficult to shift to a consumption-led economy.</p> -<p>黎庭上解釋，如果外國的讀者閱讀《蘋果》英文版的話，便會為香港發聲，他認為屆時外國政客會聆聽相關聲音。被問到為何認為外國支持是重要，黎指因為在香港裡他們沒有任何支持，而外國社會和外國讀者的支持是他們僅有的東西。</p> +<p>Strategic investments in port infrastructure in Europe, including Piraeus in Greece and Hamburg in Germany, as well as ports in countries such as Egypt, give Chinese companies a controlling share in a number of critical maritime nodes, with Chinese firms owning or having a stake in all 15 of the world’s busiest ports. Chinese firms are deploying sophisticated logistics management platforms such as LOGINK, which already has agreements with at least 24 ports, and security inspection equipment manufactured by Nuctech. These technologies provide unprecedented opportunity for covert gathering of intelligence about maritime traffic, trade flows, cargo data and even biometric information of individuals working at ports. In principle, there are sound commercial reasons for China’s port investments and they do not necessarily provide Beijing with control over operations. However, a central position in global transport networks can be employed as a coercive instrument. Port operators are bound by national laws and cannot easily refuse services on political grounds, but countries can exercise other forms of control over their companies and capital. Consider, for example, recent US restrictions on the ability of US nationals to work with Chinese companies in key sectors. Moreover, coercive activity can be presented as administrative procedure, as was the case during China’s 2010 rare earths embargo on Japan (under the aegis of production issues) and its embargo on Norwegian salmon after the latter hosted the dissident Liu Xiabo (under the aegis of health inspections, conducted repeatedly until the produce rotted).</p> -<p>被問到支持香港什麼，黎指是支持香港的爭取自由和民主運動。辯方接著問，反修例運動有否獲得外國的支持？黎起初稱「沒有，從不」，但是其後修正說法，指在2019年4月運動醞釀期間，外國透過新聞報導及有西方政治人物為香港發聲來支持運動，包括美國和英國的政治人物和組織。法官李運騰問IPAC（「對華政策跨國議會聯盟」，英文：Inter-Parliamentary Alliance on China）是否其中之一。黎則表示：「我從未得知 IPAC 的存在」，後來才知道。</p> +<p>Economic entanglement, even if not designed explicitly for coercion, can create latent coercive tools – consider how networks such as SWIFT (Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunications – the leading provider of secure financial messaging services) have been weaponised against Russia and Iran. The dominance of Chinese companies, such as engineering giant ZPMC, in providing critical port equipment such as ship-to-shore cranes, enhances Beijing’s potential influence over port operations. For navies, a major consideration is likely to be that, for many deployments, routine resupply of non-sensitive goods depends on suppliers operating through civilian ports.</p> -<h4 id="黎曾構思邀美副總統彭斯訂閱英文版-惟最終不成功">黎曾構思邀美副總統彭斯訂閱英文版 惟最終不成功</h4> +<h4 id="protecting-chinese-overseas-interests">Protecting Chinese Overseas Interests</h4> -<p>辯方展示黎於2020年5月10日傳送給 Mark Simon 的訊息：「Imaging if we can get Mike Pence to subscribe to Apple Daily app! The publicity and respect it command would arouse much support for us. I know it’s almost impossible to pull it off. But can try?」（「試想像若果我們能使彭斯訂閱蘋果，相關宣傳和尊重會為我們帶來很多支持。我知道這是幾乎沒可能，但可以一試？」）</p> +<p>The protection of China’s overseas interests, including the considerable number of Chinese nationals who work abroad, is also an increasingly important goal, the salience of which was illustrated by events such as the 2011 non-combatant evacuation operation for Chinese nationals in Libya carried out by the PLAN.</p> -<p>黎今解釋，如果美國副總統訂閱《蘋果》英文版的話，其聲望可以使更加多人關注《蘋果》，但他亦補充，他在訊息裡表示這是幾乎不可能，純粹嘗試。</p> +<p>Other overseas interests include exploration for resources in international waters, which falls under the purview of the State Oceanic Administration. In the past decade, Chinese authors have highlighted the fact that there was scope for China to increase the number of applications it made to the International Seabed Authority for mining rights in the Atlantic, with a specific focus on metallic sulphides in the South Atlantic. China has recently concluded its first deep-sea expedition in the Atlantic, in which the State Oceanic Administration’s research ship Shenyai Yihao (which can operate a range of submersibles) played a leading role. China has also conducted a number of scientific expeditions in the Atlantic in the past decade, with a particular focus on the South Atlantic. A number of Chinese scholars and analysts have also expressed interest in resource extraction in areas such as the Arctic, which, although not part of the Euro-Atlantic, have a symbiotic relationship with it, particularly since several NATO members are Arctic states. Activity in the Arctic can serve a range of aims, including setting the conditions for access to seabed resources in international waters and generating usable data to support navigation that Chinese entities, including the PLA, can leverage.</p> -<p>辯方指，兩日後 Mark Simon 回覆。黎確認，指這個嘗試最終不成功，因為美國的保安政策。</p> +<p>China has committed significant resources to scientific activity in the Arctic, coordinated through the State Oceanic Administration, but which the PLA supports with personnel. The PLA is also represented on China’s Polar advisory committee. To date, China has completed 13 scientific expeditions to the region, employing platforms such as the polar icebreaker Xuelong-2, and its share of research outputs related to the region is growing rapidly. In addition, China has sought to increase its regional access through investments in infrastructure, including an abortive bid by China Communications Construction Company to construct airports in Greenland.</p> -<h4 id="黎否認曾向張劍虹和楊清奇談及制裁或敵對行動-因很少使用相關字眼">黎否認曾向張劍虹和楊清奇談及制裁或敵對行動 因很少使用相關字眼</h4> +<p>Thus far, however, China has worked primarily (but not exclusively) through Russia, an approach that dovetails with Russia’s own aspirations to become a primary goods provider in the Indo-Pacific. For example, in 2021 Russia articulated plans to fill gaps in the Chinese coal sector left by China’s decision to embargo Australian coal. Much of Russia’s coal mining occurs in the Arctic and the country maintains coal mines in geopolitically sensitive Svalbard, Norway. Similarly, since 2014, Russia has relied on China for financial support to underpin its efforts to tap its liquefied natural gas (LNG) reserves in the Arctic and, in February 2021, Novatek (Russia’s second-largest gas producer) and China’s investment company Shenergy Group signed a deal to ship several million tonnes of LNG from Russia’s now-sanctioned Arctic LNG-2 project to the Yamal peninsula in northwest Siberia for onward transit to China. Despite this, China’s embrace of Russian hydrocarbons remains lukewarm. Although coal exports from Russia have risen, nearby Indonesia has been the primary beneficiary of China’s frictions with Australia, while Arctic LNG-2 has had to suspend operations due to a paucity of tankers following Western sanctions. Moreover, China’s foreign policy aspirations to be regarded as a “near Arctic” state have roused suspicions in Moscow.</p> -<p>前《蘋果》主筆兼論壇版主管楊清奇早前證供稱，2020年5月曾到黎的住宅出席飯局，黎在席上稱希望開設《蘋果》英文版，幫助美國人更加了解香港情況，「希望美國政府採取更強硬嘅措施，咁《蘋果》英文版有多啲呢啲內容，咁美國政府就可以做嘢。」當被問到相關行動是什麼時，楊稱：「當時講得最多係制裁。」</p> +<h4 id="maintaining-pressure-on-western-states-exterior-lines">Maintaining Pressure on Western States’ Exterior Lines</h4> -<p>黎今在庭上表示，「我不記得有否講過這些說話，但是有可能我講過類似的說話。」黎亦稱，他不會知道美國政府會採取什麼行動或措施，因他不是美國政府。</p> +<p>The idea of expanding strategic space on exterior lines is a common feature of Chinese analytical discourse. China is, as mentioned, likely to seek latent coercive levers to apply to Europe, if only to shape European behaviour regarding its own interests in Asia. China’s foreign policy, however, beyond its immediate environs, has thus far largely (but not exclusively) eschewed military coercion. While not averse to flexing the state’s economic muscle (for example when then Premier Wen Jiabao cancelled trade talks with France in 2007 after the latter hosted the Dalai Lama, or cutting off imports from Lithuania in 2021 over the latter’s decision to open a Taiwan Representative Office), China has by and large limited its coercive statecraft to economics and has been judicious in its use of non-military coercive tools.</p> -<p>另外，張劍虹早前作供稱，黎於2020年5月指示他們發起「一人一信救香港」，希望時任美國總統特朗普施壓，阻止港區國安法通過，例如透過採取敵對行動。當控方追問敵對行動是什麼時，張稱：「啫係黎生講嘅 sanction 或其他敵對行動」，並堅稱黎的確有使用「制裁」一字，但不記得是用中文還是英文。</p> +<p>Several Chinese analysts suggest that maritime presence in the Atlantic should be part of a strategy of operating on exterior lines and a means of relieving pressure in East Asia, although there is a lack of consensus to some degree on whether such a strategy should be militarised. Some advocate a cautious approach, emphasising geo-economics and investments in port infrastructure in which the PLAN should focus on multilateral engagement and cooperation with European states on non-traditional security threats such as piracy – partly as a means of countering the narrative that it represents a threat. Other Chinese analysts, such as Hu Bo of Beijing University, have called for a force of two to three carrier strike groups to be deployed beyond East Asia to “pin down” US assets that might be deployed to the region. Similarly, China’s premier doctrinal publication, The Science of Military Strategy, calls for aircraft carriers to be deployed to protect Chinese SLOCs. By and large, discussions of operating on exterior lines tend to focus on the Indian Ocean and Central Pacific. However, and as discussed in subsequent sections of this paper, the practicalities of operating in the Atlantic will limit possibilities for the PLAN over the next decade. Advocates of a larger presence in the Atlantic do consider the prospect of a more prominent role for Chinese “escort forces” in the region in the future but appear to recognise that the PLAN’s presence will be limited for the foreseeable future.</p> -<p>黎今在庭上表示：「我不知道為何我會這樣跟他說話，因為沒有任何理由我會這樣跟他說話。」他堅稱自己沒有明確談及敵對行動（hostility），「因為敵對行動是一個我很少使用的詞語。」同樣，他亦稱甚少使用「制裁」一詞。</p> +<p>The idea of operating on exterior lines may also be relevant to China’s nuclear deterrent. While China’s ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) would struggle to break out of the First Island Chain in a crisis, the Arctic in theory offers a safe bastion and an energy efficient route for submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) such as the JL-3 (successor to China’s current SLBM) to reach the US, leading the Pentagon to raise the prospect of Chinese submarines operating in the Arctic. However, the practicalities of operating in the Arctic make this a highly questionable means of increasing the survivability of China’s second-strike capabilities, for reasons which are explored in greater depth in the next chapter.</p> -<h4 id="黎同意若報導真相會煽動憎恨政府依然報導">黎同意若報導真相會煽動憎恨政府依然報導</h4> +<p>In practice, the PLAN’s presence in both the Euro-Atlantic and its immediate peripheries (the Arctic and South Atlantic) is for the next decade likely to be relatively modest, but the deployment of such a limited presence to set the conditions for a more significant presence beyond the next decade should not be overlooked. Moreover, while China may not have a direct regional security presence, it can have an indirect impact on the security environment in the Supreme Allied Commander Europe’s (SACEUR) Area of Responsibility in ways that bear considering, primarily through its relationship with Russia.</p> -<p>辯方指，《蘋果》英文版於2020年5月31日正式面世，創刊宣傳提到港版國安法已成定局，英文版旨在維護新聞自由和報導真相，並包含標語：「一日一《蘋果》，假新聞遠離我（an Apple a day keeps the fake news away）」，黎表示文章非出自其手筆，但是他同意文章內容，正如《蘋果》1995年創刊時的口號：「一日一蘋果，無人呃到我。」</p> +<h3 id="iii-chinas-blue-water-navy-as-a-foreign-policy-instrument">III. China’s Blue-Water Navy as a Foreign Policy Instrument</h3> -<p>辯方問黎，若然報導真相會煽動市民憎恨政府，是否仍會報導？黎表示會，因為這是真相。辯方接著問，黎當時知不知道這可以構成罪行。黎不認為會構成罪行，又指：「如果這是罪行的話，我們當時便不會報導，我們所做的只是合法地報導。」</p> +<p>The past three decades have seen China grow as a maritime power, moving from a regional power, built for contingencies related to Taiwan and the South China Sea, into a more expeditionary force. A continued build-up of maritime capability meant that, by 2022, the PLAN had more hulls than the US Navy. Nonetheless, the US Navy remains the largest in terms of gross tonnage, while the PLAN is still in the process of moving from a regional force with a large number of smaller vessels towards a blue-water navy.</p> -<h4 id="黎提議運用大數據-因可以更客觀地反映中國的真實面貌">黎提議運用大數據 因可以更客觀地反映中國的真實面貌</h4> +<p>This ambition has been manifested in projects such as the Type 055 cruiser (equipped with a higher vertical launch system capacity than the US Navy’s Ticonderoga-class, since its individual cells are larger), and the Type 076 landing helicopter assault (LHA) carrier, which may be equipped with CATOBAR (catapult launchers). Similarly, the People’s Liberation Army Navy Marine Corps (PLANMC) has grown five-fold in the past decade, with an explicitly stated focus on expeditionary missions. Notably, contingencies involving Taiwan remain the preserve of the People’s Liberation Army Ground Force (PLAGF), which controls the six heavy amphibious brigades in the Eastern Theatre Command and retained this despite the growth of the PLANMC. Moreover, since 2015 the PLA has added “far seas protection” to the list of the PLAN’s missions. It seems clear, then, that China desires the capacity to project power beyond its environs, but the answers to the questions of where, to what end and to what extent are less clear.</p> -<p>辯方另展示 WhatsApp 群組「Index」對話，群組成員只有黎、張劍虹和筆名盧峯的馮偉光。2020年7月10日紀錄顯示，黎智英談及坊間有關中國大陸的說法不正確、有很多誇大了的負面報導，《蘋果》可以透過大數據去找出問題，讓數據說話，並澄清事實。</p> +<p>It should be noted that despite its substantial growth, the PLAN still has relatively limited (although rapidly growing) blue-water capabilities. For example, the force fields fewer major surface combatants (vessels of destroyer size or larger) than the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) – the PLAN operates 31 destroyers and cruisers to the JMSDF’s 36 destroyers. The PLAN also fields four Type 075 landing helicopter docks (LHDs) in support of its marine corps. It is likely that the PLAN will also grow rapidly, but it will have significant regional commitments even within the First Island Chain, given the scale of the area the chain encompasses. For example, the Spratly Islands are 1,200 kilometres from China’s nearest land-based airfields on Hainan Island off China’s south coast. Moreover, most contemporary Chinese discussions of PLAN activity beyond the First Island Chain tend to focus on the Pacific and Indian Oceans, where establishing a militarily significant naval presence will prove highly resource intensive.</p> -<p>黎解釋，有的對於中國的報導較負面，只抽取負面一面來放大，他認為大數據可以更客觀地反映中國的真實面貌，又指人們不僅僅對於新聞有興趣，對於例如日常生活、娛樂等資訊，這些均能夠反映中國的面貌。</p> +<h4 id="practical-limitations-of-chinas-naval-power">Practical Limitations of China’s Naval Power</h4> -<p>黎續指，運用大數據可以達至新聞的客觀性，他曾嘗試找專家實行大數據分析，但是未等到分析結果，他便於8月被捕，並且基於技術原因，大數據分析結果最終沒有出爐。</p> +<p>In principle, the fact that most of the several critical materials on which China relies, including cobalt and magnesium, come from a limited number of West and South African providers, including the DRC, Gabon and South Africa, provides a cogent rationale for a Chinese presence in the Atlantic, which would be entirely consistent with the logic of far-seas protection. That Equatorial Guinea and Gabon are states that China has reportedly approached to secure a facility large enough to house an aircraft carrier would also be consistent with the logic of SLOC protection.</p> -<h4 id="黎否認下達指示報導制裁新聞-質疑張劍虹捏造證供">黎否認下達指示報導制裁新聞 質疑張劍虹捏造證供</h4> +<p>However, there would be several impediments to the emergence of a standing PLAN presence in the Atlantic. The most obvious is the fact that in the Atlantic the PLAN would be operating at considerable distances from the wellsprings of Chinese power and in an area where the US and its allies militarily dominate – a fact acknowledged by most Chinese strategists.</p> -<p>辯方指，2020年8月8日黎智英向群組說：「劍虹，盧峯，我們新聞數目太少，沒有 critical mass（群聚效應）吸引讀者，應想想辦法增加。或可增加一些財經新聞？但時事新聞肯（定）要增加。謝謝。」馮偉光回覆：「明白，正逐步增加，有重大新聞如美國制裁林鄭會即時增加幾條。」</p> +<p>It could be argued (as have analysts such as Bo) that China can secure its major aims at reach by creating a distant fleet in being large enough to make the US enforcement of a blockade unfeasibly costly (especially if the US were also confronting China in East Asia). Indeed, it is precisely the difficulty of managing both a distant blockade and events in the First Island Chain (which, as several studies have noted, is not viable) that would, in theory, incentivise the US to focus on bottlenecks. Such bottlenecks include China’s access to materials that come from a small number of states where a close blockade could be more readily enforced given the absence of a Chinese naval or anti-access threat beyond the Indo-Pacific.</p> -<p>辯方問，從馮的回覆可見，群組有否共識在增加新聞時，包含關於制裁的新聞？黎則重申，他從沒提及制裁，只有提及群聚效應（critical mass），並說英文新聞不夠，需要擴張英文版規模，而他相信馮只是舉例指出已增加了新聞數量。</p> +<p>The issue with this reasoning, as discussed, is that the immediate demands of balancing commitments within China’s region and outside it are considerations for China as well. Despite its rapid recent growth, the PLAN has a limited blue-water fleet (it fields just eight Type 055 cruisers, for example). This will change in due course, but even a much larger PLAN fielding the six aircraft carriers that China aspires to have by 2035 will be bound by the logic of force structuring. Factors such as vessel maintenance cycles and workup periods impact all navies, and experience suggests that perhaps half of the PLAN’s notional future carrier fleet will be at sea at any given time. The forward deployment of a carrier battlegroup, particularly one that includes the nine escort cruisers, frigates and destroyers discussed by Chinese analysts, would imply that China would have to make considerable sacrifices to its force availability in East Asia. Similarly, China’s fleet of Type 075 and Type 076 LHDs and LHAs, although growing in number, is still small relative to the scale of some of the tasks required by the PLAN in the First Island Chain.</p> -<p>至於張劍虹稱黎一直以來下達的編採指示包括報導關於美國制裁、抗爭和示威的新聞，黎則反駁稱自己從沒談及制裁，「所以他虛構證供。（“… so he made it up.”）」辯方展示2020年8月26日的訊息，黎在群組中傳送有關拜登的新聞，向馮偉光表示不認為英文版要包含國際新聞，因其他媒體也會報導，而《蘋果》英文版應集中在中國內地的新聞。馮偉光其後表示，會即日起停止報導國際新聞。</p> +<p>Platforms such as the Type 093 nuclear-powered attack submarine (SSN) could be used as an alternative to surface vessels for deployments beyond the First Island Chain because they are both more self-sustaining and have limited prospects of escaping the First Island Chain in a conflict (and so have bounded utility in this theatre, where China’s diesel electric submarines are more useful). However the Type 093 is relatively noisy, which, it has been suggested, appears to be a function of its propulsion systems and deficiencies in its anechoic coating, and this would limit its military utility. Since the prospective bases which might give the PLAN access to the Atlantic are likely to be in Africa, there is also a political dimension to the issue which must be considered. SSN deployments, although not strictly speaking contrary to the Treaty of Pelindaba (which declares Africa a nuclear weapons-free zone), would also create political complications for both China and the host nation. That said, there may be other rationales for extended deployments, including habituating Chinese submariners to longer periods at sea, which is presently a challenge as illustrated by the mental health issues that extended deployments are causing among Chinese submariners who are not used to them. The logic of using extended rotational deployments as a means of exposing the PLAN to the rigours of sustained activity at sea would also apply to surface vessels, but it would suggest deployments comparable to the UK’s periodic carrier strike group deployments to the Indo-Pacific, rather than a standing presence. These deployments, should they occur, would have diplomatic significance – and would represent a means for European navies to gain situational awareness of the PLAN – but their military significance in the Euro-Atlantic would be limited.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/sgsKqfx.png" alt="image02" /> -▲ 前《蘋果日報》社長 張劍虹</p> +<p>The ability of the PLAN to operate from bases in states such as Gabon and Equatorial Guinea – and presumably hold at risk US platforms – would require a degree of willingness on the part of these states to take risks on behalf of China in both establishing bases and allowing their use. In the short to medium term, this level of risk acceptance is unlikely in what are largely transactional relationships. While the concept of the PLAN using dual-use commercial facilities to resupply distant vessels has been considered by the PLAN as a more non-committal option through which to rely on prospective partners, this is more useful to enable deployments in support of diplomacy and engagement than it is to sustain credible naval forces. It is relatively unlikely, for example, that volatile goods, such as munitions, can be stored in civilian ports for long, even if neutral ports could be used for refuelling in wartime. While the pursuit of bases by the PLAN cannot be ruled out, it is unclear whether these facilities would have a significant military role. The risk of SLOC interdiction could in the final instance be offset by other means, including stockpiling and overland transport of goods to ports in third countries to which the US is not constraining access for onward transport. In effect, the problem of resourcing a distant blockade would remain for the US, and the use of the PLAN to protect Atlantic SLOCs appears unlikely to be viable for some time.</p> -<h4 id="黎自言不懂用twitter-李兆富負責管理發推文和追蹤其他帳戶-包括特朗普">黎自言不懂用Twitter 李兆富負責管理、發推文和追蹤其他帳戶 包括特朗普</h4> +<p>Similarly, the prospects for a Chinese SSBN bastion in the Arctic are constrained by several factors. First, the PLAN does not currently operate SSBNs capable of operating under ice, although its future Type 095 SSN and Type 096 SSBN may be able to do so. Thus far, however, the only indicators of this are academic research, which is inconclusive. Even if this is the case, the Type 096 (for which construction began in the early 2020s) will only be fielded in numbers necessary to ensure a consistent presence at sea by the end of this decade. Second, following the arrival of the first Type 096, the PLAN would need to spend additional years habituating its submariners to operations under ice (which relatively few NATO navies, such as the US Navy and Royal Navy, can do). Third, Chinese SSBNs would need to transit chokepoints such as the Bering Strait to enter the Arctic, meaning that a survivable presence would require at least one SSBN out of a planned fleet of six to be permanently in the Arctic (meaning, in effect, that the majority of the fleet would need to be committed to resourcing this mission). This would also mean that Russian support would be vital to sustain China’s undersea deterrent since Russia is the only non-Western state with experience operating submarines under ice – a strategic commitment neither nation indicated a desire to undertake. And fourth, an Arctic SSBN presence is considerably more complex to deliver than China’s other means of assuring its second strike. China is currently placing multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles, which permit a missile to deliver multiple nuclear warheads to different targets on road-mobile DF-41 ICBMs. This has the effect of ensuring that even a small number of missiles which survive a first strike can both deliver a large number of warheads and pose a complex problem to missile defences. China is also expanding its number of missile silos, increasing the number of targets that the US would need to strike to cripple its arsenal. These palliatives are far more readily achievable than an under-ice SSBN patrol.</p> -<p>辯方指，黎於2020年5月開設個人 Twitter（現稱X）帳戶，並於5月22日發布首個推文。黎指該 Twitter 帳戶是由李兆富（筆名利世民）管理。辯方遂展示李的薪金紀錄，黎確認李當時的職位是集團行政總裁助理（Assistant to Group CEO）。</p> +<p>It is likely, then, that within the next 15 years, material constraints on the PLAN will make a military presence capable of supporting Chinese interests in a high-intensity scenario either in the Euro-Atlantic or its environs unlikely. It is still plausible, however, that China is attempting to create optionality for itself and set the conditions for a more expansive presence, should this be deemed desirable and feasible. But this is unlikely to be the case for well over a decade.</p> -<p>辯方問黎會怎樣形容自己與李之間的關係，黎指：「他幾乎就像我的徒弟（mentee），我們互相認識很久。」黎稱，早在2014年之前，李開始替《蘋果》撰寫專欄文章時，他們便互相認識。黎並指，李是信奉自由市場的經濟學者，二人開始討論事情，而李後來變成好像他的徒弟般。</p> +<h4 id="other-potential-uses-of-chinas-maritime-power">Other Potential Uses of China’s Maritime Power</h4> -<p>黎指，李會替黎選材和發布推文，因他自己不懂使用 Twitter；李亦會根據自己的個人判斷而替黎的帳戶追蹤其他帳戶。黎相信其帳戶之所以追蹤時任美國總統特朗普，也是因為李的緣故，因為他自己不懂如何追蹤其他帳戶。被問到是否知道自己的帳戶追蹤了誰，黎則稱不知道，因有太多人。</p> +<p>There are other functions that naval and maritime power can fulfil for China in the Euro-Atlantic.</p> -<p>法官李運騰問，李追蹤其他帳戶之前須否得到黎的批准。黎則指起初須要得到他的批准，但是因為信任李，所以後來李自行處理。</p> +<p><em>Diplomatic Signalling</em></p> -<p>辯方指從訊息紀錄可見，開設 Twitter 的意念是由其私人助手 Mark Simon 提議。黎同意。</p> +<p>Naval activity can be used as a tool of diplomatic signalling for both Europe and other actors. As noted, China has conducted several joint exercises with the Russian navy in the previous decade, including the 2017 Naval Interaction exercises in the Baltic Sea, exercises in the Mediterranean and more recent exercises with the Russian and South African navies on the periphery of the Atlantic. A PLAN Type 052D guided missile destroyer also took part in Russia’s Navy Day celebrations in St Petersburg in July 2024. One aim of joint exercises with Russia may be to signal China’s capacity to play a more significant and not entirely welcome role in Europe, should European states become more engaged in the Indo-Pacific. While not wishing to stoke paranoia, this paper notes that the coincidence of a Chinese exercise in Belarus at the same time as the NATO Summit in July 2024 and on the back of the participation of several European states in RIMPAC 24 (Rim of the Pacific Exercise, the world’s largest international maritime exercise) could be seen as exactly the kind of behaviour that best illustrates this scenario. It may be intended to signal China’s capacity to insert itself into the European security environment if European states play a larger role in the Pacific.</p> -<h4 id="黎否認開設twitter為了增加個人影響力">黎否認開設Twitter為了增加個人影響力</h4> +<p><em>The PLAN as a Supporting Arm in the Euro-Atlantic</em></p> -<p>楊清奇早前證供提到，黎在飯局中稱有意設立 Twitter 帳戶，籲在座人士提供新聞和評論，供他在 Twitter 發表，「佢希望通過呢個社交媒體，擴大佢嘅影響力，擴大《蘋果日報》嘅影響力。」</p> +<p>Importantly, naval activity would in this instance not be China’s primary threat to Europe – rather it would represent a relatively costly signal of China’s potential willingness to employ other tools that may be more immediately consequential. While China is unlikely to have considerable local military strength in the Euro-Atlantic over the next 15 years, it can have an indirect impact on the security of the region. For example, China could reinforce Russia’s capacity to generate export revenue. Russia still relies on Protection and Indemnity (P&amp;I) Club-insured shipping for the transfer of 45% of the vessels carrying hydrocarbons from terminals in the Baltic Sea. Russia’s continued reliance on vessels that depend on Western insurers and thus probably obey the oil price cap, and the decrepitude of the vessels in Russia’s “shadow fleet”, all point to the limits, as a means of sanctions evasion, of any Russian effort to substitute its shadow fleet for international carriers that are exposed to Western pressure. The environmental risks that older vessels pose could also be a legal basis for their eventual denied access to ports and key straits. If the major bottleneck is a lack of available seaworthy ships, Chinese state-owned oil tankers might offer Russia a means of transporting oil at above price-cap rates, particularly since the two largest global operators of oil tankers are Chinese. So far, China’s financial institutions have shied away from transactions that might fall foul of these sanctions – given the exposure of Chinese banks trading in dollars and euros to international sanctions. However, Russia’s growing reliance on Chinese-made dual-use goods and its trade deficit with China mean that transactions in renminbi would give Russia access to a currency for which it has increasing use, despite it being less tradeable than the US dollar. China could also collaborate with Russia in the production of commercial shipping for Russian state-owned firms – a possibility floated by the head of Russia’s VTB Bank Andrey Kostin as a means of clearing the backlogs in Russia’s Zvezda shipyard – or China could sell excess capacity to third-party carriers dealing in Russian oil.</p> -<p>黎今庭上指，他開設 Twitter 帳戶的目的，是讓更多人更容易地知道香港發生什麼事，並跟進香港的情況。辯方問黎有否想過為了增加個人影響力。黎則否認，指開設 Twitter 帳戶不是為了增加個人影響力，而是想讓人們知道香港最新情況。他又表示：「我沒有想過個人影響力，我並不是那種專橫（presumptuous）的人。」</p> +<p>China’s military support for Russia could also take more direct forms. The idea that Chinese shipyards could provide Russia’s navy with capacity was, apparently, hinted at by Vice Admiral Sergei Avakyants, then head of Russia’s Pacific Fleet, after joint exercises between the Russian navy and the PLAN. Avakyants suggested that the proportion of modern PLAN vessels allocated to exercises with the Russian Pacific Fleet partly reflected a desire to advertise China’s shipbuilding capabilities. While this assessment may or may not have been accurate, it is often the case that military support that begins as covert or partially deniable assistance escalates to more direct forms over time. Additionally, it is notable that China has recently announced that it will sell the Type 052 destroyer internationally, since few Chinese partners other than Russia have a rationale for procuring the vessel, or the funds to do so.</p> -<p>對於控方案情指稱黎開設 Twitter 是為了增加個人在國際上的影響力，黎則重申：「我從沒考慮過自己的影響力，因為這是專橫的（presumptuous）。」他又表示，甚至到現在他也沒有這種想法，「我只是嘗試告知人們發生了什麼事。」</p> +<p><em>China’s Presence in Africa</em></p> -<p>辯方又問，黎又是否想透過 Twitter 來增加《蘋果》的影響力？黎則指：「這是我的個人 Twitter，我不知道為什麼這與《蘋果》有任何關係。」黎並確認《蘋果》有自己的 Twitter 帳戶。</p> +<p>Chinese and Western security interests may well clash in third-party states where China seeks a growing security footprint. To some extent this may have already occurred. In July 2024, Italian authorities interned a Chinese vessel carrying Wing Loong UAVs to Libya’s General Khalifa Haftar, in contravention of the UN arms embargo on Libya. The reality of Chinese-operated ports on Europe’s immediate periphery may make similar interdictions more difficult to achieve in the future. China also has a growing security presence in states such as the DRC, where it has supplied the government with CH-4 UAVs to fight rebel forces, and the Chinese aeronautics company, China National Aero-Technology Import &amp; Export Corporation, has offered to supply the DRC with J-10 aircraft. If longstanding Chinese investment (which comes with fewer political strings than Western alternatives) is combined with more lenient terms, military support between China and Russia could, unchecked, leave both countries with an even greater level of control over Western economy supply chains than they currently enjoy. China can support such activity through the provision of advise and assist missions and by acting as an alternative partner to Western states on issues such as counterpiracy, as it has with Nigeria.</p> -<p>辯方展示黎的 Twitter 截圖，顯示 IPAC 裴倫德和「重光團隊」（SWHK）的帳戶在黎的推文下留言。黎則表示沒有留意留言。</p> +<p><em>Sabotage</em></p> -<p>辯方展示黎與李兆富之間的訊息，顯示黎把草擬的推文傳送給李，然後李修改了一些字眼，但意思維持不變，或者李提出修改建議。黎確認，又指最終發布的推文中的標籤（hashtag），是由李加上的，「因為我不懂怎麼加 hashtag。」</p> +<p>There is also potential for Chinese limited and deniable coercive activity in the Euro-Atlantic, in tandem with Russia. Consider, for example, the alleged sabotage of the Balticconnector pipeline (a natural gas pipeline between Finland and Estonia) by the NewNew Polar Bear (a vessel registered in China owned by several Russian and Chinese commercial entities) which appears to have dragged its anchor over the pipeline. Chinese survey ships and commercial companies associated with the cable industry or deep sea mining could step up activity near submarine cables in the Atlantic in areas with a lighter NATO presence, such as the Azores Fibre Optic System, and near connections from West Africa such as the Cabo Verde node. The surveying activity being conducted by the Ministry of National Resources could certainly support this, particularly since data gathered must be shared with the PLA. However, there are several impediments to the option of sabotage activity in the Atlantic. China is itself seeking to become a major, if not quite monopolistic, provider of cable services linking European companies to East Asia – a concern that led the US to force China Telecom out of the consortium building the SEA-ME-WE-6 cable (an optical fibre submarine communications cable system that carries telecommunications between Singapore and France) in 2023. Notably, China chose to bankroll an alternative cable linking Asia and Europe (Europe–Middle East–Asia, known as the EMA). Any suggestion of China’s involvement in sabotage would make it considerably easier to build a political consensus for excluding Chinese companies from sensitive projects in the Euro-Atlantic.</p> -<h4 id="黎否認在slack討論編採指示">黎否認在Slack討論編採指示</h4> +<p>Unlike Russia, China has not invested heavily in the specialised military equipment needed to target infrastructure, such as cables at depths that make repair difficult, although civil capabilities such as uncrewed underwater vehicles, built for exploring the seabed, could be used in a military capacity.</p> -<p>辯方接著就「飯盒會」提問。控方案情指稱黎透過舉行「飯盒會」，向《蘋果》管理層下達編採指示。</p> +<p>While it is not possible to entirely exclude sabotage as a tool of dissuasion, it remains relatively unlikely.</p> -<p>黎早前證供提到，他在2014年辭去壹傳媒集團主席並退休，但是因為集團業績倒退，故他在2018年重返集團工作。黎形容當時公司士氣低落，因為公司業務正在衰退，很多員工害怕公司會倒閉。</p> +<p><em>Transfer of Data</em></p> -<p>辯方展示黎與時任動新聞平台總監張志偉的訊息紀錄，黎確認當時張進行一個內部問卷調查，旨在尋求改善《蘋果》動新聞影片的質素。</p> +<p>A more significant challenge is the prospect of China becoming a key provider of services related to the transfer of data, which can be employed for intelligence gathering. The latter contingency would, however, only become an extreme consideration if China became a monopolistic actor in the cable market, and with Chinese companies such as HMN Tech (which provides submarine network system solutions) currently holding a 10% market share, this is some way off, although ensuring this remains the case is a policy consideration for Western states.</p> -<p>辯方另展示訊息紀錄，顯示黎與員工商討舉行「飯盒會」的時間和地點。黎確認首次「飯盒會」是在2018年8月舉行，出席的人士均是公司中高層員工，包括張劍虹、陳沛敏等。</p> +<p>While the PLA can support foreign policy aims in the Euro-Atlantic and its environs that are contrary to European interests, it is these policies themselves rather than the military presence involved in them that are the major concern. For the most part, the PLA will be a supporting element in the Euro-Atlantic, reinforcing Chinese foreign policy aims as a tool of military signalling and engagement. These functions can, however, set the conditions for a more militarily credible presence in the long term, and the evolution of the PLAN’s footprint should be monitored.</p> -<p>此外，張劍虹證供指稱黎會在通訊軟件 Slack 群組中發布編採指示。惟黎則在庭上否認，並稱從來沒有在 Slack 討論編採指示。</p> +<h3 id="conclusions-and-lessons-for-european-navies">Conclusions and Lessons for European Navies</h3> -<p>辯方在庭上展示《蘋果》員工的 Slack 群組紀錄截圖，並要求黎按時序逐一確認。不過，控方代表、副刑事檢控專員周天行則質疑相關紀錄是否完整，有可能部份紀錄被刪除，以及次序掉亂。法官則關注，若然控方質疑辯方呈上的紀錄的話，黎需要在庭上逐一檢視及確認，所需時間將會很長。</p> +<p>For European navies, the direct military threat posed by the growing Chinese presence in the Atlantic will be low for at least the next 15 years. Moreover, most Chinese activity relevant to the Atlantic will occur just beyond the peripheries of the Euro-Atlantic, off West Africa, in the South Atlantic, and the Arctic. The key consideration for Europe’s navies will be how much capacity they allocate to hedging against the prospective evolution of China’s Atlantic posture, given the resource demands of contending with other acute threats.</p> -<p>案件周三（27日）續審。</p> +<p>There appears to be no consensus from Beijing on requirements for a significant military presence in the Atlantic, although considerable attention is paid to the question of expanding “strategic space” in other ways. While China faces tangible risks to some of its supply lines in the Atlantic, there is little that it can do to rectify this challenge in military terms in the medium term. Moreover, there are non-military means by which China can mitigate risk, including diversification, stockpiling and rerouting goods. It is conceivable, however, that the PLAN could pursue rotational deployments in the South Atlantic within the next two decades as a means of both setting the conditions for a more substantial presence in the longer term and habituating the force to operations at reach.</p> -<hr /> +<p>In all likelihood, much of the activity that this entails will effectively amount to Phase 0 shaping activity in areas adjoining (but not part of) SACEUR’s Area of Responsibility, including the South Atlantic and the Arctic. Port visits by PLAN vessels, maritime data acquisition, military cooperation on non-traditional security issues, and defence engagement in the form of arms sales can, collectively, set the conditions for the PLAN to secure access in areas such as the South Atlantic. While these pursuits are not immediately threatening, they do accord to the importance of European navies remaining engaged in regions that many of them may wish to de-emphasise to refocus resources on the much more pressing challenge of deterrence regarding Russia. While the prioritisation of acute threats represents a rational choice, an economy-of-force effort to match China’s Phase 0 activity should be retained as an economy-of-force task. This need not always involve the deployment of assets – in the Gulf of Guinea, for example, the Anglo-French MDAD-GoG (Maritime Domain Awareness Trade-Gulf of Guinea) has arguably been the most useful European contribution to the safety of regional shipping. Frameworks allowing for the pooling and rotational commitment of ships to tasks such as engagement might also be a means for European navies to manage competing commitments with limited force structures, and this might be a role for the Anglo-French Combined Joint Expeditionary Force, which has lost its original rationale (resourcing expeditionary commitments comparable to the 2011 intervention in Libya).</p> -<p>案件編號：HCCC51/2022</p>獨媒報導黎智英：倘真相煽動他人憎恨政府 依然會報導 不認為構成罪行【黎智英案・審訊第 95 日】2024-11-22T12:00:00+08:002024-11-22T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/trial-of-jimmy-lai-day-95<ul> - <li>黎智英：疫情現反中情緒 良機設英文版 利用中國負面新聞</li> -</ul> +<p>Operating in proximity to the PLAN may also offer it information-gathering opportunities, much as was the case in 2021 when the activities of Chinese Type 093 SSNs near the UK’s carrier strike group revealed (or at a minimum provided the opportunity to verify) a number of details regarding the platform’s acoustic signatures. This represents not only an information-gathering opportunity, but potentially also a constraint on Chinese activity in the Atlantic if this activity raises the prospect of sensitive data regarding deployed vessels being gathered.</p> -<excerpt /> +<p>In contrast to China’s limited naval presence, China’s engagement on the peripheries of the Euro-Atlantic could have immediate effects. For example, deeper Chinese engagement with Russia as a means of derisking some of China’s own supply lines and pressuring European states cannot be ruled out. In economic terms, China can substantially increase Russia’s capacity to generate revenue both through China’s own deeper engagement with Russian hydrocarbons extraction in the Arctic and by enabling Russia to circumvent oil price caps without having to rely on an old and relatively small fleet of dark ships (unregistered and uninsured vessels that have turned off or disabled their automatic identification systems).</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/e9vmYOE.png" alt="image01" /></p> +<p>In military terms, China’s capacity to serial-produce vessels such as the Type 052D represents the last plausible avenue through which Russia could generate a blue-water surface capability. While China’s engagement with Russian hydrocarbons remains relatively cautious, there are sound reasons for this to change, including the fact that Russia offers China a means of hedging against the Malacca dilemma. Moreover, China’s export of dual-use military goods to Russia illustrates a willingness in principle to engage in defence exports.</p> -<p>【獨媒報導】壹傳媒創辦人黎智英及3間蘋果公司被控串謀勾結外國勢力及串謀刊印煽動刊物等罪，今（22日）於高院（移師西九龍法院）踏入第95日審訊，黎智英第三日作供。黎否認其個人專欄文章煽惑他人使用暴力，他視自己為「和理非」，提倡「和勇不分」是希望把勇武派吸納入「和理非」陣營，使他們在「和理非」的影響下能克制，減少暴力行為和停止暴力升級，最終變得完全和平。至於《蘋果》英文版，黎認為可以爭取美國人知道香港狀況，並使他們為香港發聲，但他認為外國人為香港發聲並不代表干預香港。他確認曾在群組中說：「在疫情肆虐後掀起的反中情緒，這些是美國人最需要看」，由於疫情關係，人們出現反中情緒，而這是一個良機去利用他們不滿情緒。黎又指，外國人在南華早報看不到負面的中國新聞，認為這是一個好機會去創辦《蘋果》英文版，報導及利用中國的負面新聞。</p> +<p>These possibilities do not change any of NATO’s core missions, but they do mean that planning for deterrence with regard to Russia should include the possibility that in areas where Russia is currently assessed to have relatively dim prospects (such as long-term growth and the size of its surface fleet), Chinese support is one of the few means that could enable Russia in the near future.</p> -<p>同案被告、已承認串謀勾結外國勢力罪的馮偉光（筆名盧峯）今亦到場旁聽，獲安排坐在屬於延伸庭的第二庭，觀看正庭的實時直播。他身穿藍綠色格仔恤衫、深藍色西裝褸，戴啡色框眼鏡，在被告欄內受三名懲教人員看管。黎作供期間，馮不時低頭抄寫筆記。</p> +<p>In effect, the optimal direct response for Europe’s navies to a PLAN with a limited but gradually expanding Euro-Atlantic footprint should be one premised on mirroring the non-committal but potentially useful Phase 0 shaping activities that the PLAN itself appears to be undertaking. It should further set the conditions to constrain a more assertive China if need be, without overreacting to a prospect that may never materialise.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/6zSfsvy.png" alt="image02" /> -▲ 馮偉光</p> +<hr /> -<h4 id="專欄文章提及游說-黎否認要求外國實施制裁或封鎖">專欄文章提及「游說」 黎否認要求外國實施制裁或封鎖</h4> +<p><strong>Sidharth Kaushal</strong> is Research Fellow for Sea Power at RUSI. His research at RUSI covers the impact of technology on maritime doctrine in the 21st century, and the role of sea power in a state’s grand strategy.</p> -<p>就首項控罪「串謀刊印、發布、出售、要約出售、分發、展示或複製煽動刊物」，控方指控《蘋果》在2019年4月至2020年5月期間，共發布161篇具煽動意圖的文章，涵蓋新聞報導、評論文章，以及黎的個人專欄「成敗樂一笑」文章。</p> +<p><strong>René Balletta</strong> was the First Sea Lord’s Visiting Fellow at RUSI until August 2024. He has served much of his career at sea in a variety of surface platforms that include frigates, destroyers, amphibious assault ships and aircraft carriers.</p> -<p>辯方今早繼續向黎展示其個人專欄「成敗樂一笑」於2019年10月27日發布的文章〈美國人想對我們說的話〉。文章開首稱：「這幾天身在美國，難以抽身撰寫專欄，公司手足反問我是否可解答一些疑問，造就以下答問。」黎確認當時著時任《蘋果》副社長陳沛敏構思十條問題，關於香港當時情況和華盛頓游說之旅，供他以問答形式撰寫專欄文章，因此「手足」是指陳沛敏。</p> +<p><strong>Philip Shetler-Jones</strong> is a Senior Research Fellow in the International Security research team at RUSI. His current research is concentrated on Indo-Pacific security. His recent publications have focused on the defence policy of Japan, attitudes of China to NATO, and narratives about the defence of Taiwan.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/Mme7rhA.png" alt="image03" /> -▲ 前《蘋果日報》執行總編輯 林文宗（左）、前《蘋果日報》副社長 陳沛敏（右）</p> +<p><strong>Elizabeth Lindley</strong> is an analyst of politics of the People’s Republic of China, Chinese foreign policy, and cross-strait relations. She has a degree in Chinese Studies (First Class Hons) from the University of Cambridge, which included advanced Mandarin study in Taipei.</p>Sidharth Kaushal, et al.This paper outlines the likely scope of a putative presence of the People’s Liberation Army Navy in and around the Euro-Atlantic in the next 15 years and the nature of the foreign policy it will support.【黎智英案・審訊第 97 日】2024-11-27T12:00:00+08:002024-11-27T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/trial-of-jimmy-lai-day-97<ul> + <li>陳梓華指稱黎智英欲領導勇武派 黎反駁：荒誕可笑、不可能這樣說</li> +</ul> -<p>其中第十道問題「香港人還可以做甚麼爭取美國及國際社會支持？」黎在文章中回答：「要得到外國人支持，就要不斷游說。加上傳媒報道，讓他們了解我們的道德、勇氣、良知，讓他們在生活上發聲，支持只會越來越大，不會減少的，只要我們做好本份，以道德力量感動他們的良知。」</p> +<excerpt /> -<p>黎供稱，「不斷游說」的意思是強調反修例運動非暴力和堅持，他稱文章字句反映他所想的事實和他內心真實想法，並無任何敵意或意圖去煽動仇恨。黎否認「游說」是指要求外國實施制裁或封鎖，因當時香港還未出現相關討論。他亦否認控方所指文章意圖引起對中央和特區政府的憎恨。</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/EAtyQtX.png" alt="image01" /></p> -<h4 id="休庭至下午讓黎閱讀餘下文章">休庭至下午讓黎閱讀餘下文章</h4> +<p>【獨媒報導】壹傳媒創辦人黎智英及3間蘋果公司被控串謀勾結外國勢力及串謀刊印煽動刊物等罪，今（27日）於高院（移師西九龍法院）踏入第97日審訊，黎智英第五日作供。另一名從犯證人陳梓華曾引述黎指勇武需要減少暴力，否則會使運動失去道德高地，又形容黎「想領導或主導勇武派」。黎否認，反指：「這是荒誕可笑的，我沒有可能這樣說」，「若我說出這樣的話是愚蠢的，這是自以為是的。」他又指那些年輕人不會聆聽任何人，故此不可能聆聽像他這樣的人。</p> -<p>黎在庭上閱讀每篇文章需時數分鐘，昨日法官關注進度，問辯方能否一次過就五篇文章提問，惟黎表示當他讀到第五篇文章時，便會忘記頭四篇文章的內容。</p> +<p>此外，法官針對黎 Twitter 推文含有標籤「#StandWithHongKong」提問，黎則指是李兆富負責編輯和加入標籤，當時純粹理解這串字是代表「支持香港」的立場，認為與「重光團隊（Stand With Hong Kong）」無關。他又重申在庭上才首次得知「重光團隊」的存在。</p> -<p>直至今天，辯方指黎能夠在法官不在席下，在庭上一次過閱讀餘下12篇文章，然後下午回答問題。法官杜麗冰遂押後至下午續審，讓黎留在庭內證人台閱讀文章，期間允許控辯雙方法律團隊和公眾人士逗留在庭內，惟要求他們安靜，否則職員會要求他們離開。</p> +<h4 id="張劍虹稱黎在飯盒會下達編採指示-黎否認">張劍虹稱黎在飯盒會下達編採指示 黎否認</h4> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/Vly98bV.png" alt="image04" /> -▲ 法官杜麗冰</p> +<p>就首項控罪「串謀刊印、發布、出售、要約出售、分發、展示或複製煽動刊物」，控方指稱黎智英透過舉行「飯盒會」來下達編採指示。「從犯證人」、時任《蘋果》社長張劍虹曾供稱，在「飯盒會」裡，所有出席者會坐下來吃飯盒，期間黎會談及對時局的看法、其政治取態，以及下達《蘋果日報》的編採政策。</p> -<h4 id="黎智英否認所有文章具煽動意圖-惟承認其中一篇部份字句冒犯性並致歉">黎智英否認所有文章具煽動意圖 惟承認其中一篇部份字句冒犯性並致歉</h4> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/woUU6Rq.png" alt="image02" /> +▲ 前《蘋果日報》社長 張劍虹</p> -<p>午休之後，辯方指黎已閱讀12篇文章，並問黎這些文章之中，有沒有任何一篇具有控方所指稱的煽動意圖。黎說沒有，他本人亦沒有任何煽動意圖，「我只是評論正在發生的事，處理輿論，和預測後果是什麼。」</p> +<p>黎今在庭上否認張的說法，反指「飯盒會」的形式是出席者向他提問，然後他解答問題。黎續指，會議歷時約15至20分鐘，大部份時間都是沉默，因為大家都在吃飯，即使有人說話，話題也不是關於報紙，而是一些無關重要的事情。他指並不是如張所稱的情況，「我們正在吃飯，不會有任何認真的事情要說，當你吃飯的時候是不會說話的。」</p> -<p>不過黎主動提到，他留意到〈2020年和勇一起撐下去〉一文中，他評論一名少女向警察講粗口，但如今看來，他認為自己受到當時的氛圍影響，才會作出具冒犯性的評論，他承認是「品味低俗（bad taste）」，感到後悔並為此道歉。</p> +<p>黎指，當大家吃完飯盒之後，每名出席者會輪流向他發問或提出意見，而他會回答問題。辯方問，情形是否好像「問答環節」和討論？黎同意。</p> -<p>該文章提到，黎看到一個十四、五歲戴口罩的少女，大喊：「黑警死全家！」和「香港差佬，X 你老母」，他當時對何俊仁說：「有這樣的後生，我哋冇得輸。」黎並在文中稱：「有這樣疾惡如仇的優秀勇敢年輕人，香港真是塊福地。」</p> +<h4 id="黎蘋果從不需要編採指示-因核心價值與港人一致">黎：《蘋果》從不需要編採指示 因核心價值與港人一致</h4> -<h4 id="黎智英區議會民主派大勝能給年輕人希望-以致減少街頭暴力">黎智英：區議會民主派大勝能給年輕人希望 以致減少街頭暴力</h4> +<p>辯方又問，黎有否在會議上談及編採指示？黎稱沒有，因《蘋果》從不需要任何編採指示，也不需要訓練員工，因為他相信員工所抱持的核心價值與香港人一致，相關價值包括言論自由、遊行自由、宗教自由、民主和法治。</p> -<p>就2019年12月22日的文章〈我們堅持下去才有希望〉，黎亦否認煽動暴力。他指2019年11月區議會中民主派大勝，能夠給予年輕人希望，如果所有人團結的話，能夠形成強大的政治力量並給年輕人希望，使他們減少街頭上的暴力。</p> +<p>法官杜麗冰則指，編採指示與核心價值是兩回事，而黎曾經提及《蘋果》應該報導《南華早報》不會報導的新聞，屬於編採指示多於核心價值。黎僅重申，《蘋果》需要符合（coincident with）香港人的價值，而他從不需要開口下達編採指示。</p> -<p>對於有示威者用汽油彈或槍械，黎表示：「我懷疑這些可怕的暴力是出自滲透者（penetrators）之手，有人當時告訴我。」他指這是非常危險，所以必須提防。</p> +<p>法官李運騰問：「那報導角度又如何呢？」，黎則指交由記者自行判斷，因他認為不可能指示記者的報導角度，每人的寫作風格都不同。</p> -<p>黎在文章中籲「勇武手足們」考慮陳日君樞機的意見，他解釋，陳樞機曾說過運動需有領袖和有組織，便能減少暴力情況；如果依賴「無大台」的自發行動的話，有時候暴力會超越界線。他指：「暴力是壞，當它超出界線的時候更壞」，所以要確保它受到控制。</p> +<h4 id="報導稱黎向蓬佩奧談及制裁-黎對報導內容沒有懷疑">報導稱黎向蓬佩奧談及制裁 黎對報導內容沒有懷疑</h4> -<h4 id="文章引用邱吉爾二戰名言-黎智英只想鼓勵人們自救團結一致地反抗-沒提及暴力">文章引用邱吉爾二戰名言 黎智英：只想鼓勵人們自救、團結一致地反抗 沒提及暴力</h4> +<p>辯方指2019年7月，黎智英赴美國會見時任副總統彭斯。黎確認，並指當時沒有記者在場。辯方續指，黎在同日會見時任美國國務卿蓬佩奧。黎亦確認，指雖然其私人助手 Mark Simon 陪同他前往會見地點，但是他不被容許進入，因此需留在外面等候，而他自己則單獨與蓬佩奧見面。</p> -<p>2019年12月29日的文章〈反極權 台灣更不用怕〉中，黎指「香港年青人掀起一場轟轟烈烈的逆權運動」、「年輕人抗爭衝突更勇武」等，他否認煽動暴力，反指自己只是說出事實，它就是這樣發生，並沒有煽動任何東西。</p> +<blockquote> + <p>The arrest of @JimmyLaiApple in Hong Kong is deeply offensive &amp; an affront to freedom loving people around the world. When I met w/ Jimmy Lai @WhiteHouse, I was inspired by his stand for democracy &amp; the rights &amp; autonomy that were promised to the people of Hong Kong by Beijing. pic.twitter.com/ZwioCrvNb7 — Mike Pence (@Mike_Pence) August 10, 2020</p> +</blockquote> -<p>2020年1月5日〈2020年和勇一起撐下去〉，文中提及老師和校長「因言入罪」，「我們和勇派必須挺身而出，一起反抗。」黎表示這裡雖然提倡「和勇不分」，但是不代表呼籲和平的人變得暴力，相反勇武派應該加入和平的行列，又指自己並不是呼籲以暴力的手段反抗。</p> +<p>張劍虹早前供稱，黎智英出席何俊仁主持的網上節目「細說中南海」後，曾致電吩咐他報導節目內容及「做大佢」；其後《蘋果》刊登相關報導，指黎在節目中談及與蓬佩奧會面，蓬佩奧問黎：「美國可以怎樣做？」黎則回答美國可以實施制裁，讓中國官員知道其所作所為會有後果。</p> -<p>就2020年2月9日的文章〈武漢瘟疫 中共喪鐘〉，當中指「我們就像醫護人員一樣群起反抗」。黎否認煽動暴力，因醫護人員並沒有使用暴力。</p> +<p>黎在庭上被問到有否向蓬佩奧提及制裁，黎起初稱：「其實我未曾提及制裁，如果我沒記錯的話。」回到香港之後，除了在何俊仁的節目之外，黎不知道自己有否跟任何人談及該次會面的事。</p> -<p>文章亦指：「要是傷亡滿目瘡痍，人民面對瘟疫死亡的威脅，極權便變得不可怕了。瘟疫死亡的威脅，讓我們忘記了對極權的恐懼，十四億人民齊向中共發出憤怒的獅子吼！」辯方問，黎是否提議以暴力反抗？黎則指人們只是呼喊、發聲，當中並沒有任何暴力。</p> - -<p>就2020年3月29日的文章〈我們最光輝的時刻〉，黎引用英國前首相邱吉爾在二戰期間在議會發表的演說。黎今否認意圖煽動他人對特區政府使用暴力。辯方則指，邱吉爾的言論是涉及英國與德國之間的戰事，而戰事牽涉暴力。惟黎指香港並沒有戰事，他引用邱吉爾的句子，只是想鼓勵人們自救、團結一致地反抗，並沒有提及暴力，而他一直都堅持使用和平手段抗爭。</p> - -<p>法官李運騰指問題是反抗的對象是什麼，問黎是要反抗什麼。黎回答是要反抗中國政府對香港自由的侵害。</p> - -<h4 id="黎智英非支持勇武-提倡和勇不分旨在吸納勇武派-減少暴力">黎智英：非支持勇武 提倡「和勇不分」旨在吸納勇武派 減少暴力</h4> - -<p>就2020年4月26日的〈專橫暴政打壓，我們氣魄不滅〉，黎提及他、李卓人、楊森和李柱銘等民主派涉非法集結被捕，「和理非的大部份香港人抗爭意志被嚇窒了，小撮的勇武派便失去了市民眾志成城的維護和支持，衝擊暴力的士氣和勇氣被削弱，中共便輕易制服這幫人，我們整個運動儘管不是完結，也畫上休止符了。」</p> - -<p>辯方問黎有否嘗試英雄化一小撮勇武派？黎則表示沒有，他只是想說當局拘捕李卓人、楊森等人一事，試圖阻嚇「和理非」示威人士上街，結果剩下來的人只得勇武派，那麼整個運動便會失去士氣。</p> - -<p>黎確認他視自己為「和理非」，他稱自己並不是支持勇武派，而是嘗試透過提倡「和勇不分」，把他們吸納入「和理非」陣營，使他們在「和理非」的影響下能克制，減少暴力行為和停止暴力升級，最終變得完全和平。</p> - -<p>辯方另問及「煲底見」意思，黎則指這是來自勇武派的字句，起初他們使用這字句，後來所有人都使用。辯方問「煲底」是否指立法會大樓示威區，惟黎表示不知道，以他的理解「煲底見」意思是「相見直至最後一刻（let’s see each other until the end）」。黎亦否認使用「抗爭」一詞的意思是煽惑暴力。</p> - -<h4 id="黎智英希望爭取美國的政客注意到香港的情況和需要">黎智英：希望爭取美國的政客注意到香港的情況和需要</h4> - -<p>辯方接著圍繞《蘋果》英文版提問，並展示美國國務院前資深顧問Christian Whiton的訊息，提議《蘋果》應創辦英文版報紙。惟黎智英表示：「我覺得這是瘋狂的主意，因為這樣做太高成本了。」</p> - -<p>辯方另展示作家馮睎乾於2020年5月10日的專欄文章〈不撐蘋果的100萬人〉，當中提到《蘋果》增值的方法包括「八卦式公義」和「國際文宣線」。</p> - -<p>黎智英確認他於同日創立WhatsApp 群組「English news」，群組成員有張劍虹、陳沛敏、羅偉光、張志偉等人，筆名盧峯的馮偉光後來才加入群組。黎在群組中說：「今日馮睎乾提議出英譯新聞電子版諗得過，反正現在翻譯網站翻譯成本低而快。」</p> - -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/wK4e865.png" alt="image05" /> -▲ 前《蘋果日報》社長 張劍虹</p> - -<p>辯方其後展示黎與私人助手Mark Simon之間的訊息，後者指「（英文版）這是一個機會去爭取美國人和外國人支持香港，爭取支持是其中一種做法，這會是龐大的經濟和政治支援。」（This gives us an opportunity to capture the support of Americans or foreigners who want to support HK, find supporting us is one of the ways to do it. That would be tremendous financial and political support.）黎在庭上解釋，希望爭取美國的政客注意到香港的情況和需要，因為外國的支持對於香港非常重要。黎又指，透過引起外國人和外國媒體的關注，使外國的政客能為香港發聲，是十分重要，他只是想讓更加多人知道香港發生了什麼事。</p> - -<h4 id="黎智英外國人為香港發聲並不代表干預香港-外國政府可以與中國政府溝通">黎智英：外國人為香港發聲並不代表干預香港 外國政府可以與中國政府溝通</h4> - -<p>辯方問，請求外國人為香港發聲是否等於請求外國干預香港。黎指可能如此理解，但是他認為外國人為香港發聲並不代表干預香港，因為外國可以通過外交渠道與中國當局對話，改善香港情況。</p> +<p>不過其後黎改稱，他不清楚自己有否說過，但是如果《蘋果》的報導引述他說過「美國應該實施制裁，使打壓示威者的人知道有後果」的話，那麼他應該有跟蓬佩奧討論過。法官李運騰問，所以黎對於報導內容沒有懷疑？黎同意。</p> -<p>黎指，外國關注、發聲以及在外交層面與中國溝通之所以重要，是因為當時即將來臨的國安法帶來危機感，當時有報導指國安法即將實施，但他尚未知道條文內容。</p> +<h4 id="twitter含標籤standwithhongkong黎稱沒問李兆富-庭上首次聽聞重光團隊">Twitter含標籤「#StandWithHongKong」黎稱沒問李兆富 庭上首次聽聞重光團隊</h4> -<p>Mark Simon的訊息中提到「經濟和政治支援」，黎指經濟支援方面，訂閱者需付費，這可以帶來金錢收入；政治支援方面，黎指外國讀者閱讀英文版新聞之後，會為香港發聲，外國的政客會聆聽他們的聲音，使政客也為香港發聲。</p> +<p>辯方展示2020年8月21日的 Twitter：</p> -<p>至於「政治保護」，辯方問黎認為外國政府可以如何保護一個中國的地區。黎則指外國政府可以與中國政府溝通。黎亦確認英文版的主要對象是美國人，因為他們是最重要的。</p> +<blockquote> + <p>「President @realDonaldTrump calls me a brave man. I am flattered. But I am not brave enough to stand against the whole world like #Xi. I only #StandWithHongKong #StandwithTaiwan」</p> +</blockquote> -<h4 id="黎智英疫情現反中情緒-良機設英文版利用中國負面新聞">黎智英：疫情現反中情緒 良機設英文版利用中國負面新聞</h4> +<p>黎表示推文由他草擬，之後由李兆富編輯及標註特朗普，因為他不懂標註特朗普。</p> -<p>辯方指，黎於2020年5月13日向英文版群組發訊息：「我越想越覺得英文版應該着重大陸新聞，專題和文章花絮等。在疫情肆虐後掀起的反中情緒，這些是美國人最需要看。我們把大陸方面內容質量做到最好尤其重要，訂閱我們的都會是有識之士，對新聞要求比一般人高。我們的目標是提供外國人在南華早報看不到的中國新聞，打破南早在這方面的壟斷。」</p> +<p>法官李運騰問到，推文中有一個標籤（hashtag）「#StandWithHongKong」，是一個單字，中間沒有空格。黎則指這是出自李兆富之手，因他不懂加標籤。法官杜麗冰問，但是李兆富理應不會添加一些黎不認同的內容。黎同意，並指李會加一些籠統的說法。</p> -<p>就「在疫情肆虐後掀起的反中情緒，這些是美國人最需要看」一句，黎表示他的意思是由於疫情關係，人們出現反中情緒，而這是一個良機去捕捉（catch）他們的不滿情緒（emotional tut）。</p> +<p>辯方問黎在2020年8月的時候，有沒有留意到「重光團隊（Stand With Hong Kong）」這個組織。黎不認為自己有留意，並問：「是否陳梓華的組織？」法官杜麗冰問黎有否在後來知道這組織。黎則稱在庭上才首次知道。</p> -<h4 id="黎智英真誠地希望打破南華早報壟斷">黎智英：真誠地希望打破南華早報壟斷</h4> +<p>法官杜麗冰又問黎當時有否問李兆富「#StandWithHongKong」是什麼意思。黎表示沒有，因他不知道什麼是標籤。法官李素蘭追問：「不會好奇？」黎稱不會感到好奇，因這對於他來說不是非常重要的東西。</p> -<p>被問到「打破南早在這方面的壟斷」一句，黎說：「我真誠地希望如此。」辯方問黎，有什麼中國新聞是外國人在南華早報看不到的。黎認為是一些負面的中國新聞，例如失業率和很多內地的示威暴動，它們沒有被報導，而黎認為這是一個好機會去創辦《蘋果》英文版，在反中情緒高漲時利用（capitalise）中國的負面新聞。</p> +<h4 id="黎稱當時理解standwithhongkong代表支持香港的立場-非某個團體">黎稱當時理解「#StandWithHongKong」代表支持香港的立場 非某個團體</h4> -<p>法官李素蘭問到：「但是《南華早報》並不是香港唯一的英文報紙。」黎則笑言，不把另一份英文報紙即《英文虎報》視為「報紙」，因為他們沒有影響力，只是從其他新聞複製而成。</p> +<p>辯方問，黎當時沒有留意到「Stand With Hong Kong」是一個團體嗎？黎同意，當時純粹理解這串字是代表「支持香港」，就如另一個標籤「#StandwithTaiwan」代表「支持台灣」，然而「Stand with Taiwan」並非一個團體。他認為這些標籤就如一個籠統的立場，代表支持香港或台灣。</p> -<p>案件下周一續審。</p> +<p>黎又指，通常李兆富發布推文之後，便不會再閱讀該推文，因此不會留意李新增了什麼標籤，並重申標籤對他而言不是重要的東西。</p> -<hr /> +<p>辯方又問黎當時知不知道一個叫李宇軒的人。黎則稱，當他從新聞得悉李嘗試跨越邊境到台灣時，才首次聽聞李的名字。</p> -<p>案件編號：HCCC51/2022</p>獨媒報導黎智英：疫情現反中情緒 良機設英文版 利用中國負面新聞【黎智英案・審訊第 94 日】2024-11-21T12:00:00+08:002024-11-21T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/trial-of-jimmy-lai-day-94<ul> - <li>黎智英否認曾叫陳沛敏製作「制裁名單」</li> - <li>楊清奇以「鳥籠自主」比喻編採自主 黎智英反駁：從來沒設任何限制或鳥籠</li> -</ul> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/6k7nccG.png" alt="image03" /> +▲ 李宇軒</p> -<excerpt /> +<p>黎後來補充，他不認為李兆富加入標籤「#StandWithHongKong」的時候，是指涉李宇軒的組織「重光團隊」，重申這個標籤與「重光團隊」無關。辯方問李有否向黎提及「重光團隊」，黎稱從沒有。</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/6quP2BX.png" alt="image01" /></p> +<h4 id="黎稱高層物色社論寫手不會徵詢他意見-聘用後才通知他">黎稱高層物色社論寫手不會徵詢他意見 聘用後才通知他</h4> -<p>【獨媒報導】壹傳媒創辦人黎智英及3間蘋果公司被控串謀勾結外國勢力及串謀刊印煽動刊物等罪，今（21日）於高院（移師西九龍法院）續審，黎智英第二日作供，針對前《蘋果日報》副社長陳沛敏的證供反駁，並重申他是「提議」而非下達「指示」。2019年6月9日一百萬人參與反送中大遊行，黎向陳說「為勇敢的香港人乾杯」會是很好的頭版標題，惟陳最終沒有採用，翌日頭版標題為〈香港人漂亮的固執 1,030,000〉，而陳沒有因為未採用他的提議而受罰。7.1佔領立會之後，黎傳訊息「盡量大做特做令年輕人獲得同情」；黎則強調其意思並非下達編採指示，只是跟陳一起討論事件，並沒有要求她做任何事。</p> +<p>關於《蘋果》社評（《蘋論》）的撰寫人，張劍虹早前供稱寫手須經黎的批准才能聘用，包括馮偉光（筆名盧峯）、顏純鈎（筆名方圓）和楊清奇（筆名李平）。黎則在庭上稱不知自己有否「批准」，但是張劍虹、陳沛敏等高層揀選寫手之後，便會通知他。</p> -<p>此外，陳曾稱黎要求她製作一份「制裁名單」，惟黎否認，稱由於他不懂使用 Signal 的轉發訊息功能，所以直接將消息人士的訊息「複製和貼上」（copy and paste），傳送給朋友，未有留意到訊息裡含有「制裁名單（shit list）」的字句，直至在法庭上才首次知道。</p> +<p>黎又指，高層物色寫手時並不會徵詢他的意見，但是決定寫手人選時便會通知他，他也不會反對，「我沒有收到任何請示，他們只是通知我。」他亦否認陳沛敏所稱，總編輯羅偉光對於黎所揀選的社論寫手沒有反對的餘地，又稱自己從沒有提議或揀選社評寫手。</p> -<h4 id="多次轉發香港監察羅傑斯文章給陳沛敏-黎智英稱讓她決定採用與否">多次轉發「香港監察」羅傑斯文章給陳沛敏 黎智英稱讓她決定採用與否</h4> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/ZRNN9KK.png" alt="image04" /> +▲ 前《蘋果日報》執行總編輯 林文宗（左）、前《蘋果日報》副社長 陳沛敏（右）</p> -<p>首被告黎智英昨日起開始作供，他針對前《蘋果》社長張劍虹的證供提出反駁；今日他在辯方大律師關文渭主問下，針對前《蘋果》副社長陳沛敏的證供作出反駁。</p> +<p>楊清奇曾供稱，作為《蘋果》社論的寫手，「我哋都明白，要跟從報館嘅基本立場，啫係要留意黎智英先生嘅立場。」黎同意說法，下屬知道他反對港獨，便不應觸碰這個話題。</p> -<p>黎智英和陳沛敏之間的 WhatsApp 對話紀錄顯示，黎多次將「香港監察」創辦人羅傑斯的文章或新聞稿轉發給陳，陳供稱，每當有羅傑斯和「香港監察」的新聞稿，黎便會轉發給她，形容黎「似乎好重視 Benedict Rogers 同埋佢個機構嘅事」。</p> +<h4 id="黎稱推薦桑普因其文章寫得好-悉倡港獨後決定不起用">黎稱推薦桑普因其文章寫得好 悉倡港獨後決定不起用</h4> -<blockquote> - <p>I call on the world to act to save Hong Kong, to put pressure on Carrie Lam to pull back from the brink, demand an end to impunity for police barbarity, to impose targeted Magnitsky sanctions on those responsible for torture #HongKongProtest #StandwithHK #DemocracyForHK @hk_watch pic.twitter.com/vh07uKOCO2 — Benedict Rogers 羅傑斯 (@benedictrogers) November 12, 2019</p> -</blockquote> +<p>陳沛敏曾供稱，黎曾向張劍虹提議邀請時評作家桑普在論壇版撰寫專欄，但是因為張告知桑普提倡港獨，所以最終決定不起用他。辯方問及原因，黎指因為若有任何寫手提倡港獨，《蘋果》都不應該聘用，而自己當初推薦桑普是因為閱讀過他的文章，認為寫得很好。</p> -<p>黎今供稱，轉發羅傑斯的文章純粹是因為純粹想讓陳沛敏知道，看看對她是否有用，如果文章對她來說有意思，便可以採用，又稱交由陳決定是否採用。黎又指，陳從不向他匯報最終採用與否。</p> +<p>辯方指，黎還柙之後，張劍虹曾到監獄探訪黎四至五次，問黎在該段期間，有否要求張找桑普撰文。黎說沒有，因為桑普提倡港獨，而且探訪時不會談及這些事情，因在還柙期間這些事情變得無關重要。</p> -<h4 id="佔領立會後向陳沛敏稱盡量大做特做令年輕人獲得同情-黎否認下指示">佔領立會後向陳沛敏稱「盡量大做特做令年輕人獲得同情」 黎否認下指示</h4> +<p>張亦供稱，黎推薦顏純鈎替《蘋果》論壇版或副刊撰文，因他認為顏對中國十分了解。黎同意。黎憶述，張劍虹曾與他討論邀請顏的事宜，但他不記得是張問顏每週寫一篇社論好不好，還是張提議顏每週寫一篇。</p> -<p>2020年7月1日示威者在七一佔領立法會，事後黎智英向前動新聞總監張志偉傳送訊息：「Nick，很好。年輕人衝（擊）立法會事（件）令我心情沈（沉）重，你們認為泛民善後工作有什麼該做令運動可以持續？好彩市民對年輕人闖立法院會是多少有些體諒，損害可能不太大。你們認為呢？謝謝。」陳回覆：「收到」，黎其後回覆：「是，要再做。明天是否集中做年輕人的心聲，盡量為他們在這件事上爭取市民諒解和支持，得以平反？謝謝。」、「盡量大做特做令年輕人獲得同情」等。</p> +<h4 id="黎否認發布煽動刊物-指下屬發布文章從不需要經他的批准">黎否認發布煽動刊物 指下屬發布文章從不需要經他的批准</h4> -<p>黎供稱，因為他關注佔領立會事件，可能影響到整個反修例運動，所以傳送上述訊息給陳，但強調沒有下編採指示，只是跟陳一起討論事件，並沒有要求她做任何事。</p> +<p>辯方就「串謀發布煽動刊物」罪作總結，問黎有否如控罪所稱，串謀張劍虹、陳沛敏、羅偉光、林文宗、馮偉光和楊清奇等人，發布具煽動意圖的刊物。黎否認，指他們發布文章之前從不需要經他的批准。被問到事實上有否同意他們發布，黎則指他們從未徵求自己的同意。黎又指：「我從沒想過他們會發布任何煽動性的東西，他們發布的所有文章應是合法的。」</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/OMrLLnm.png" alt="image02" /> -▲ 黎智英（資料圖片）</p> +<p>辯方接著問黎，有沒有意圖利用《蘋果》來發布文章，使人憎恨政府、企圖改變現有政制或引起居民之間的不滿情緒等。黎否認：「從不。」</p> -<p>對於「盡量大做特做令年輕人獲得同情」一句，黎表示雖然它看起來可以被理解為「指示」，但是他本意並非下達指示，因為他希望報導能著眼於年輕人的想法。</p> +<h4 id="黎替g20文宣登報墊支156萬元-稱沒留意收款人身份不關注團隊名稱">黎替G20文宣登報墊支156萬元 稱沒留意收款人身份、不關注團隊名稱</h4> -<p>辯方提及黎昨日證供表明反對暴力，黎確認，但是他認為佔領立會事件不屬「嚴重暴力」，未有導致人命傷亡，只是導致財產損壞。「如果我不是認為這是負面事件的話，我便不會要求他們去解釋，以爭取香港市民同情」，「我認為他們做錯了事，所以有需要解釋，以爭取香港市民支持，使運動不會被破壞。」但他重申，這是「提議」而非「指示」。</p> +<p>辯方接著圍繞其中一項牽涉陳梓華和李宇軒的「串謀勾結外國勢力」罪提問。</p> -<p>黎又說：「我一直都關注年輕人、激進主義。」希望年輕人能汲取教訓，日後能以和平、非暴力方式示威。</p> +<p>辯方指根據訊息紀錄，2019年6月底，時任立法會議員郭榮鏗向黎傳送有關G20登報眾籌的宣傳，黎向郭表示會捐出10萬元。其後 Mark Simon 透過訊息告知黎，由於眾籌已達標，所以不能再捐款，後來眾籌款項已超過670萬元。</p> -<h4 id="提議百萬遊行頭版標題為勇敢的香港人乾杯-終未被採用-黎指沒因而懲罰陳沛敏">提議百萬遊行頭版標題「為勇敢的香港人乾杯」 終未被採用 黎指沒因而懲罰陳沛敏</h4> +<p>「從犯證人」陳梓華曾供稱，2019年6月G20峰會全球文宣登報計劃遇到資金問題，故他嘗試經李柱銘聯絡黎智英，後來聯絡到 Mark Simon。最終 Mark Simon 及黎一方墊支了約150萬元，其餘廣告費則由李宇軒墊支。</p> -<p>2019年6月9日超過一百萬人參與反送中大遊行。黎向陳轉發前《蘋果日報》社長、著名作家董橋的訊息「Jimmy，你和你的報紙的努力沒有白費！為勇敢的香港人乾杯！」，並說：「沛敏，董橋以上說，為勇敢香港人乾！會是個好標題，請看是否適合，謝謝。」陳則回覆：「好的，我們研究一下，或用地道的語言表達這意思。」</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/9X8H6Lc.png" alt="image05" /> +▲ （資料圖片）</p> -<p>黎今表示，他當時認為董橋的句子是好句子，所以轉發訊息給陳，又指這不是「指示」，因為訊息不涉任何需要報導的東西，只是一個標題。</p> +<p>辯方指，Mark Simon 向黎傳送訊息，轉述李柱銘指眾籌登報遇到問題，他們直至7月2日之前都不能從眾籌平台支取籌得款項，因此李問黎能否向G20登報團隊提供500萬元過渡性貸款，並指他們會在7月4日歸還款項。（“Jimmy, I just heard from Martin. The fundraising for the newspaper ads has one major problem. They don’t have access to all the funds until July 2. As such Martin is asking if we can do a bridge loan of Hong Kong dollar 5 million to the group. We would get our money back by July 4th.”）</p> -<p>2019年6月10日的《蘋果日報》頭版，標題為〈香港人漂亮的固執 1,030,000〉。換言之，陳並未採用黎的提議。辯方問她有否因而被懲罰，黎說沒有。</p> +<p>Mark Simon 向黎表示，明白為何登報團隊未能收取眾籌款項及背後的理由，而這亦有道理的，希望黎能提出建議。（“I do understand the rationale of why they can’t get the money and it is legitimate. Please advise”）</p> -<h4 id="陳沛敏指黎智英提出製作制裁名單-黎否認">陳沛敏指黎智英提出製作制裁名單 黎否認</h4> +<p>辯方展示電郵紀錄，指 Mark Simon 在6月27日指示黎私人公司「力高」的秘書墊支登報費用，並且以李宇軒（Li Yu Hin）的名義。辯方問黎當時有否留意是以另一人的名義付款，以及該人的身份。黎表示：「沒有，我為何要留意？」，又指沒有人告訴他會以李宇軒的名義付款。</p> -<p>2020年7月14日，時任美國總統特朗普正式簽署《香港自治法》（Hong Kong Autonomy Act），法案授權美國政府制裁有份損害香港自治權的中國及香港官員。</p> +<p>辯方指，最終黎在該次登報計劃中，合共墊支了156萬元，問黎有否留意付款人是誰。黎表示：「沒有，這是 Mark Simon 的責任，而不是我的責任。」</p> -<p>翌日黎智英以 WhatsApp 向陳沛敏傳送相關行政命令內文，以及相關白宮網站連結。黎的訊息亦包含一句：「I’d say we should work up a shit list on those involved in censorship, which can include intimidation.」陳早前供稱，根據訊息前文後理，她理解黎的意思是要製作「制裁名單」，不過與同事商討之後，她認為很難在新聞中建議一些制裁對象，所以最終未有落實黎的提議。</p> +<p>黎表示，他記得後來 Mark Simon 告知他，該筆款項已全數歸還。辯方遂展示訊息紀錄，Mark Simon 向黎指國際登報團隊已全數歸還款項：「Also, the Fight For Freedom Group, ones we helped with international ads last time, has paid us back in full.」</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/apnAuJP.png" alt="image03" /> -▲ 前《蘋果日報》執行總編輯 林文宗（左）、前《蘋果日報》副社長 陳沛敏（右）</p> +<p>辯方提到訊息中的「Fight For Freedom Group」，惟黎表示：「我不知道，我不在乎，該團隊的名字並非我所關注的事情。」辯方問黎不關注該團隊的性質嗎？黎表示不關注，並反問為什麼要關注。</p> -<p>黎今稱，不記得從誰人收到這個訊息，但是肯定該人是來自特朗普政府或白宮有關的人，因為訊息用字「很外國」，「這不是我會用的措辭。」黎解釋，在《國安法》生效之前，他轉用通訊軟件 Signal，由於他不懂使用 Signal 的轉發訊息功能，所以直接將消息人士的訊息「複製和貼上」（copy and paste），傳送給朋友。</p> +<h4 id="mark-simon-向黎指所有墊支款項已歸還">Mark Simon 向黎指所有墊支款項已歸還</h4> -<p>黎否認在任何時候要求陳沛敏構思和製作「制裁名單」，他又稱訊息太長，未有仔細閱讀，甚至乎不知道訊息裡含有「shit list」那段字，直至在法庭上才首次知道。至於傳送給陳的原因，黎稱認為該訊息是重要及有新聞價值。</p> +<p>另一名「從犯證人」李宇軒曾供稱，2019年8月的第三次眾籌活動中籌得約180萬美元，由於眾籌平台規定要用美國當地的美元戶口來接收眾籌款項，所以在陳梓華的協助下，找來了 Mark Simon 借出美國的銀行戶口收取款項，扣除墊支款項之後，餘款便轉帳至「The Project Hong Kong Trust」的戶口。</p> -<p>辯方展示黎智英分別與民主黨前主席胡志偉、何俊仁、李永達、前工黨主席李卓人、林卓廷等訊息紀錄，顯示黎曾向上述泛民人士傳送相同的訊息。黎確認。</p> +<p>辯方展示11月16日，Mark Simon 向黎傳訊息，指所有替國際倡議所墊支的款項已經歸還，並存入了Mark Simon 在美國的銀行戶口。（“Jimmy, Just wanted to let you know that all monies that were used for the international ad campaign are now back with us. They had sent to a US account where it sat, under my control, but banks just cleared its movement &amp; now with you.”）</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/rP4aWNx.png" alt="image04" /> -▲ 黎智英（左）、李永達（右）</p> +<h4 id="陳梓華稱2019年7月首次與黎見面-辯方呈結帳紀錄證10月">陳梓華稱2019年7月首次與黎見面 辯方呈結帳紀錄證10月</h4> -<p>辯方一度問黎有否叫李永達製作「制裁名單」？黎否認，笑言：「這會是荒謬的。」黎又指紀錄可見，很明顯地他先傳送該段訊息給泛民朋友，之後才傳送給陳；假如他想叫陳製作「制裁名單」的話，他理應第一個傳送給陳，惟事實不是如此。</p> +<p>辯方接著圍繞陳梓華的證供提問。陳梓華早前供稱，他於2019年7月獲李柱銘邀請，到位於中環、由何俊仁胞弟何俊麒經營的日本料理餐廳出席飯局，該次是黎首次與陳親身見面。</p> -<p>辯方又指黎曾傳送給《蘋果》前總編輯羅偉光，惟黎表示不記得。</p> +<p>不過辯方針對該次見面的日子提出另一說法，指黎智英的信用卡結帳紀錄顯示，黎於2019年10月18日向該日本餐廳支付853.1元，因此黎與陳首次見面應是10月，而非陳所稱的7月。黎確認相關紀錄。</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/Bz3u6g3.png" alt="image05" /> -▲ 前《蘋果》總編輯 羅偉光</p> +<p>陳梓華稱，他到達餐廳後，黎基於保安理由而要求收起他的手機，隨後陳的手機交由餐廳職員保管。黎今指，收起手機的做法是李柱銘提出，因為李認為即使手機在關閉狀態下，也可以被不知名人士竊聽他們的討論內容，形容李一直以來都很謹慎，凡出席會議時都會收起手機。</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/rQGK2Cz.png" alt="image06" /></p> +<h4 id="黎冀透過陳梓華籲前線克制平息暴力">黎：冀透過陳梓華籲前線克制、平息暴力</h4> -<p>【獨媒報導】壹傳媒創辦人黎智英及3間蘋果公司被控串謀勾結外國勢力及串謀刊印煽動刊物等罪，今（21日）於高院（移師西九龍法院）續審，黎智英第二日作供，針對前《蘋果日報》副社長陳沛敏和前主筆楊清奇的證供提出反駁。其中楊作供時曾以「鳥籠自主」來形容《蘋果》的採編自主，指：「黎先生 set 咗《蘋果》嘅基本立場，就好似 set 定咗個鳥籠嘅」，因此員工有一定的自主，但不能越過框架。黎在庭上反駁，堅稱：「我從來沒設任何限制或鳥籠。」但他理解楊有此比喻，是因為每間媒體各自有一套價值體系要遵守，使其立場貫徹，就《蘋果日報》而言，「反民主」、「反自由」乃屬於「鳥籠」以外的範圍。</p> +<p>黎稱，李柱銘之所以介紹陳梓華給他認識，是因為李知道他關注年輕人的激進思想和示威前線的暴力，希望藉邀請陳參與飯局，讓年輕人明白暴力是有損運動及他們應該克制。當時他理解陳是前線示威者的領袖。</p> -<h4 id="黎智英稱只曾向楊清奇推薦區家麟和顏純鈎">黎智英稱只曾向楊清奇推薦區家麟和顏純鈎</h4> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/hbWY8mh.png" alt="image06" /> +▲ 李柱銘</p> -<p>黎指，前《蘋果》主筆楊清奇（筆名李平）乃接手已故作家李怡擔任主筆兼論壇版主管，此前並不認識楊。</p> +<p>黎表示不記得飯局的詳細討論內容，只記得陳梓華嘗試解釋前線年輕人的想法，而黎自己則嘗試叫他們克制。黎又指，其後他與陳有過一連串的會面和溝通，目的都是希望透過陳向勇武派傳話，使年輕人能夠平息暴力（pacified）。</p> -<p>楊清奇作供時曾稱，黎在2018年起轉趨激進，他此後推薦的評論作者「立場都係比較激進」，並舉例指黎推薦過資深傳媒人區家麟和旅美作家「一劍飄塵」。</p> +<p>黎又稱，一直稱呼陳為 Wayland，並不知道他的中文姓名，因此當警方首次問及「陳梓華」時，他表示不認識這個人。</p> -<p>不過黎智英表示，他推薦作者的準則是他們必須在評論政治和經濟時寫得好。他稱，因為看過區家麟的文章，認為寫得很好，所以向楊推薦區。此外，黎表示他亦曾經推薦顏純鈎。</p> +<h4 id="黎否認向陳梓華談及自己與mark-simon的關係">黎否認向陳梓華談及自己與Mark Simon的關係</h4> -<p>至於「一劍飄塵」，黎稱從來沒有推薦他，反指是楊清奇自己邀請他撰文。黎稱，他只是閱讀了「一劍飄塵」的專欄文章，認為寫得很好，所以正面評價、稱讚他，但是沒有推薦他做寫手。</p> +<p>陳梓華曾供稱，黎在飯局中指 Mark Simon 每日都會聯絡他，亦會向他匯報。黎則在庭上稱，不記得自己有如此說過，況且 Mark Simon 一直與陳聯絡，實沒有需要向陳提及自己與 Mark Simon 之間的關係。黎其後確認自己沒有這樣說過，因為除了過渡貸款一事之外，他沒有需要在陳面前談及 Mark Simon。</p> -<h4 id="黎智英否認設任何限制或鳥籠-惟媒體須遵守各自價值體系">黎智英否認設任何限制或鳥籠 惟媒體須遵守各自價值體系</h4> +<p>陳梓華曾供稱：「當我開始嘗試介紹自己嘅時候，好快就畀黎智英打斷咗，佢話唔使介紹喇，佢話 Mark Simon 已經話畀我聽，佢已經係咁𠵱查過我。」黎則在庭上稱，陳的說法不是真的，因為從訊息紀錄可見，他在會面之前並不認識陳。</p> -<p>楊清奇作供時曾以「鳥籠自主」來形容《蘋果》的採編自主，指：「黎先生 set 咗《蘋果》嘅基本立場，就好似 set 定咗個鳥籠嘅，咁採編人員喺鳥籠入面有一定嘅自主，有一定嘅自主，有一定嘅採編自主權，但唔可以超過呢個框架，就唔可以超過呢個鳥籠，所以唔可以簡單講有冇採編自主。」</p> +<h4 id="黎不認為陳梓華是暴力人士">黎：不認為陳梓華是暴力人士</h4> -<p>黎智英今在庭上反駁：「我從來沒設任何限制或鳥籠。」他認為，楊之所以使用「鳥籠自主」這個比喻，是因為每間媒體各自有一套價值體系要遵守，使其立場貫徹，「你不會見到《星島日報》或《東方日報》說一些支持反修例和示威的說話，更遑論《大公》、《文匯》。」他指傳媒生意是傳播新聞和評論，背後有一套價值體系在他們思想和心中。</p> +<p>至於對陳梓華的印象，黎不認為陳是暴力的人，這印象來自李柱銘的介紹，因為自己被視為較保守的人，陳既然是經李介紹的，理應不會是暴力的人。再者，黎憑對話感到陳不是暴力的人。</p> -<p>法官杜麗冰指，黎曾提及《紐約時報》和 CNN 均是反對特朗普，如果某人替某媒體工作，便要遵守該套價值觀，換言之《紐約時報》和 CNN 的「鳥籠」就是反對特朗普？黎智英同意，他指《紐約時報》和 CNN 是進步派（progressive），所以反對屬於保守派的特朗普，形容反對特朗普的取態是「自由主義的鳥籠（a bird cage of liberalism）」。</p> +<p>法官李素蘭則質疑，黎一方面說陳是「前線的年輕人」一方面說他不是暴力的人，說法有矛盾。黎僅回應，陳是前線的人，但他不是暴力，所以才會叫他向勇武人士轉達要克制的信息。</p> -<p>辯方問到，那麼有員工撰文「反民主」、「反人權」，便會屬於鳥籠以外的範圍？黎智英同意，並指這情況永遠不會發生（“That would never happen.”）。</p> +<h4 id="陳梓華引述黎飯局發言-部份言論黎否認說過">陳梓華引述黎飯局發言 部份言論黎否認說過</h4> -<h4 id="黎智英稱曾邀請曾鈺成撰文-惟對方拒絕">黎智英稱曾邀請曾鈺成撰文 惟對方拒絕</h4> +<p>辯方指，黎於2019年11月12日向陳傳送訊息，指一名男子在馬鞍山天橋上被黑衣人點火，使他感到害怕（dreaded），並指勇武派應該有人領導，並提議在翌日的會面中詳細討論。</p> -<p>辯方問，《蘋果》是否曾經嘗試邀請建制派人士撰寫評論文章。黎表示，他們打算擴張專欄版，所以製作了一份打算邀請的作者名單，但是名單上屬於「鳥籠」之外的人只有民建聯前立法會主席曾鈺成，除此之外，其他作者包括李柱銘和戴耀廷都屬「鳥籠」之內。至於名單上的任志剛，黎則指任崇尚自由市場，所以認為其取態屬於「鳥籠」之內。</p> +<p>黎確認，翌日他住宅舉行飯局，出席者包括陳梓華、何俊仁、李永達和林卓廷。這是黎與陳第二次親身見面。黎稱邀請陳出席，是為了介紹他給其他人認識，並讓陳解釋前線的想法等。</p> -<p>黎表示他認識曾鈺成，有時會交談，所以曾經親自邀請曾鈺成，但是對方拒絕了。此外，任志剛、曾俊華等亦拒絕了邀請。而陳沛敏成功邀請到林和立撰文，惟已故歷史學者余英時當時則因為年紀大而拒絕邀請。黎又指，練乙錚和已故作家李怡本來便替《蘋果》撰寫專欄文章。</p> +<p>陳供稱，黎就當時的反修例運動發表意見，「佢（黎）覺得勇武派冇組織、冇分寸，然後愈嚟愈濫用暴力，如果搞出咗人命嘅話，咁整個運動就會失去道德高地去對抗香港政府，從而亦都會失去國際嘅支持。」黎表示不記得自己這樣說過，但是確實反映他當時的想法。</p> -<h4 id="黎智英否認個人專欄文章意圖引起憎恨">黎智英否認個人專欄文章意圖引起憎恨</h4> +<p>陳亦引述黎稱勇武需要減少暴力，應採取「和平、理性、非暴力」手段。黎同意如此說過，至於「黃藍係政見，黑白係良知」，他稱自己有可能說過。</p> -<p>控方指控《蘋果》在2019年4月至2020年5月期間，共發布161篇具煽動意圖的文章，涵蓋新聞報導、評論文章，以及黎的個人專欄「成敗樂一笑」文章。</p> +<p>陳又指黎說：「有啲嘅底線，佢需要堅守嘅」，黎表示整個飯局不只他一人說話，何俊仁、林卓廷也有參與討論。</p> -<p>辯方向黎展示三篇「成敗樂一笑」專欄文章，〈請站出來保住最後防線〉、〈諗移⺠定諗遊行〉及〈為自己和下一代 阻擋香港沉淪〉，黎在庭上逐一閱讀，每篇文章需時數分鐘。</p> +<p>陳另引述黎稱：「佢話如果年青人做唔到嘅嘢，佢可以以傳媒嘅力量做到」，黎則不認自己有這樣說過，因為這脫離了討論主題。</p> -<p>控方指稱〈請站出來保住最後防線〉有意引起市民憎恨政府和司法機關。黎則否認，反稱自己只是推演一旦修例通過的後果。他亦否認控方所稱，文章意圖引起市民對司法機關的憎恨，反稱「整篇文章都沒有憎恨」，他的意圖只是推測若然修例通過的後果。</p> +<p>至於陳稱黎說過：「《蘋果日報》唔係要報道啲勇武，只要唔報道佢哋，佢哋嘅影響力已經會細咗好多。」黎則否認，因這不是他當時的想法，據他記憶，《蘋果日報》從來都不是飯局討論的話題。他亦否認提及過「五大訴求」，因與討論離題。</p> -<p>就〈諗移⺠定諗遊行〉，黎提及：「香港被劃分在中國的地圖內，香港人的命運便被掌控在京官權力的範圍內，土生土長視香港為家園的香港人，卻是對這塊土地沒有半點兒話事權，被蔑視被離間被摒棄想說要自主，卻被說成是『港獨』，現在 DQ 你，將來修訂了「逃犯條例」還可以隨時拉你鎖你，多神奇的權力，多神聖的地圖啊！」</p> +<h4 id="黎否認想領導勇武派這是荒誕可笑的">黎否認想領導勇武派：「這是荒誕可笑的」</h4> -<p>黎否認文章意圖激使讀者憎恨中央政府，反稱只是利用例子來呼籲市民上街遊行，嘗試讓市民明白為何他們要出來示威，去阻止修例。</p> +<p>辯方提到，陳曾形容黎「想領導或主導勇武派」。黎隨即否認，「這是荒誕可笑的（farcical），我沒有可能這樣說」，「若我說出這樣的話是愚蠢的，這是自以為是的（presumptuous）。」</p> -<h4 id="黎智英否認文章意圖激使讀者不守法只是呼籲遊行">黎智英否認文章意圖激使讀者不守法：只是呼籲遊行</h4> +<p>黎續指，那些年輕人不聆聽任何人，單是要他們平息暴力已是非常困難，反問：「我是誰呢？」，並重申：「若說出這樣的話是非常瘋狂的。」辯方回應：「你不再年輕了。」</p> -<p>就〈為自己和下一代 阻擋香港沉淪〉，黎在文章提及：「你要跟中共講法律，你從火星來的嗎？你不要太天真太簡單，修訂《逃犯條例》就是要奪去香港的法治，拿住大陸那套『陽光司法』在港任拉任鎖肆虐橫行。不要這樣傻，中共法律永遠官字兩個口，法律不外是他們的行政手段來的。」文章亦提及「六四屠城」，指倘修例通過的話，同樣情況也可能在香港重演，倘香港被斷送給中央的「陽光司法」控制下，「香港無形中成為了集中營」，呼籲市民上街遊行發聲。</p> +<p>辯方問黎有否在飯局中說過想領導勇武派，黎聞言反問：「我會說出這樣的話嗎？這是荒謬的⋯⋯我不是年輕人了。」</p> -<p>黎解釋，文章提及1989年北京「六四屠城」，是因為如果香港沒有法治的話，便會變成內地。他否認控方指稱文章意圖引起憎恨中央及特區政府，重申文章沒有任何憎恨，他只是嘗試說服讀者，如果不上街示威、阻些修例通過的話，會有什麼可預見的後果，從而呼籲市民上街。</p> +<p>黎亦否認在飯局中提及制裁、封鎖和敵對行動，也否認提及佩洛西、彭斯和蓬佩奧，因當晚討論僅圍繞勇武派、暴力和反修例運動。</p> -<p>對於控方另一個指控，指稱文章有意激使人們透過非法手段來改變香港現制，黎則反駁稱文章沒有提及任何違法手段，「我呼籲他們示威，以維持香港的既有制度。」</p> +<h4 id="黎經歷理大失利-應建立領袖團隊奪回話語權">黎：經歷理大失利 應建立領袖團隊奪回話語權</h4> -<p>控方另指控文章意圖激使讀者不守法，黎則反駁：「我沒有叫他們不遵守法律，我只是呼籲他們去遊行，在香港這是合法的。」他亦指文章沒有任何句子叫人違法。</p> +<p>2019年11月24日民主派在區選中大勝，黎向陳發訊息，稱當日是「美妙的一天」，並指：「自從理大失著，我也這樣想，現在是組織領袖團隊的時候，我星期三與泛民大佬傾好後，請你找幾位同儕一同商討，可以嗎？」</p> -<p>辯方問黎，2019年6月9日有沒有參與任何遊行。黎表示有。</p> +<p>黎解釋，經歷理大事件、多人被捕之後，認識正是適當時候建立領袖團隊，奪回對運動的話語權。黎其後安排與陳在其座駕上見面，希望聆聽陳的說法。</p> <p>案件明日續審。</p> <hr /> -<p>案件編號：HCCC51/2022</p>獨媒報導黎智英否認曾叫陳沛敏製作「制裁名單」 楊清奇以「鳥籠自主」比喻編採自主 黎智英反駁：從來沒設任何限制或鳥籠Soviet Lessons Recalled2024-11-21T12:00:00+08:002024-11-21T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/soviet-lessons-recalled<p><em>This paper argues that Chinese Communist Party (CCP) political institutions, the CCP’s practical behavior, and continued veneration of Marxism-Leninism in the CCP constitution highlight the Soviet model’s deep influence on Beijing. As such, lessons from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) can help us understand the CCP’s approach to governance today.</em></p> - -<excerpt /> +<p>案件編號：HCCC51/2022</p>獨媒報導陳梓華指稱黎智英欲領導勇武派 黎反駁：荒誕可笑、不可能這樣說Allied Export Controls2024-11-26T12:00:00+08:002024-11-26T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/allied-export-controls<p><em>There is a fierce debate in the United States and among its allies about the impacts of export controls, and nowhere is that debate more heated than in the semiconductor equipment manufacturing industry.</em> <excerpt></excerpt> <em>Too often, however, this debate occurs without any grounding in real-world data or relevant historical Chinese policy context. This paper seeks to provide some of that grounding through a combination of Chinese policy document analysis and new financial and market share data for leading semiconductor equipment firms in China, the United States, Japan, and the Netherlands. What follows are a set of 10 key judgments based on the author’s analysis.</em></p> -<p>Soviet-origin governing institutions and processes exert enduring influence on the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Its substantially imported political structure arguably has at least as much practical impact on Beijing’s behavior as the ideology it also imported from Moscow. While the PRC is not a carbon copy of the USSR, Soviet lessons still have much to teach observers about Chinese governance.</p> +<h4 id="1-chinas-ambitions-for-eliminating-dependence-on-foreign-semiconductor-manufacturing-equipment-started-long-before-americas-expanded-usage-of-technology-export-controls">1. China’s ambitions for eliminating dependence on foreign semiconductor manufacturing equipment started long before America’s expanded usage of technology export controls.</h4> -<p>PRC policy shifts over the past two decades have reinforced the relevance of these lessons, and the increased opacity of the Chinese political system makes it necessary to exploit all available tools to assess its behavior. The Soviet experience illuminates, for instance, the impact of the Leninist apparatus on PRC regime behavior, the challenges for understanding China, and the future of its political system. Key insights include the following:</p> +<p>The first and most important argument among critics of U.S. export controls is that they weaken U.S. technology leadership by incentivizing China to eliminate U.S. technology from its semiconductor supply chain. However, reducing dependence on foreign semiconductor and semiconductor manufacturing equipment suppliers was official Chinese policy before the Trump administration’s April 2018 export controls restricting sales of U.S.-designed chips to ZTE, a Chinese telecommunications firm, launched the new era of semiconductor export controls. “The Roadmap of Major Technical Domains for Made in China 2025,” which was published in September 2015 and covered semiconductors and other sectors, included goals such as “replacement of imports with Chinese-made products basically achieved in key industries” by 2025. It set specific targets and deadlines for the degree of market share that Chinese companies were supposed to reach and by what date. Targets for the semiconductor manufacturing equipment sector include the following:</p> <ul> <li> - <p>The Leninist system’s functional requirements substantially account for China’s conservative departure in recent years.</p> + <p>50 percent localization rate of 90–32 nanometer (nm) process equipment before 2020</p> </li> <li> - <p>The PRC system is opaque by design, with information deployed solely to advance the party-state’s current goals.</p> + <p>50 percent localization of 90 nm lithography machines before 2020</p> </li> <li> - <p>China will ultimately transition from Leninist rule but under unpredictable circumstances and probably only after many more years.</p> + <p>30 percent localization rate of 20–14 nm process equipment before 2025</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Domestic production of immersion deep ultraviolet (DUV) lithography machines before 2025</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Domestic production of extreme ultraviolet (EUV) lithography equipment before 2030</p> </li> </ul> -<p>The Soviet model is not China’s destiny; it is only one of several factors that have shaped PRC history and will continue to influence its future. Nonetheless, understanding it is indispensable to making sense of China’s behavior and prospects for change.</p> +<p>As the Made in China 2025 technical document roadmap stated, “meeting domestic market demand, improving the self-sufficiency rate of integrated circuit products, meeting national security needs, and occupying the strategic product market have always been the greatest demand and driving force for the development of the integrated circuit industry.”</p> -<h3 id="the-leninist-system">The Leninist System</h3> +<p>Even earlier policies, though less well resourced, sought to dramatically reduce use of foreign semiconductors and semiconductor manufacturing equipment. For example, the 2006 “Medium Long Range Plan for the Development of Science and Technology” explicitly called for self-sufficiency in semiconductor technologies and initiated so-called “mega projects” to drive toward that goal.</p> -<p>The CCP embraces a Leninist apparatus that exhibits strong continuity with the party-state transferred to Beijing by the Bolsheviks and the Soviet Union between the early 1920s and 1950s. Vladimir Ilyich Lenin pioneered its operating norms before the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution and led the system’s improvisational build-out during its early years in power. Other Soviet leaders, especially Joseph Stalin, contributed to its development.</p> +<p>For more than a decade, China’s government has provided lavish subsidies in the form of tax breaks, free land, government grants, and equity infusions to a number of Chinese semiconductor equipment companies. Naura, one of China’s leading domestic semiconductor manufacturing equipment companies received $1.3 billion in state support in 2021, even before the imposition of the Biden administration’s export controls. AMEC, another leading Chinese semiconductor equipment company, received a similar equity investment from the “Big Fund” in 2015. Simply put, China’s goal of semiconductor equipment industry localization and robust policy support predated any modern effort to impose meaningful export controls on China’s chip fabrication capabilities.</p> -<p>Leninist regimes — especially the surviving communist states (China, North Korea, Laos, Vietnam, and Cuba) and the two former European ones established principally through indigenous struggle (the USSR and Yugoslavia) — represent a category of authoritarianism with characteristic institutions and processes that manifest recurring patterns of behavior. (The Leninist regimes of other East European communist states were largely external creations that ended with the USSR’s demise.) All authoritarian regimes are repressive, and some practices of Leninist regimes are common among them, but most of them are not Leninist.</p> +<h4 id="2-there-is-not-a-simple-relationship-between-export-controls-and-chinas-rate-of-technological-progress-chinas-greatest-progress-came-in-sectors-with-no-export-controls">2. There is not a simple relationship between export controls and China’s rate of technological progress. China’s greatest progress came in sectors with no export controls.</h4> -<p>A Leninist system features an authoritarian regime in which the ruling elite monopolizes political power in the name of a revolutionary ideology through a highly articulated party structure that parallels, penetrates, and dominates the state at all levels and extends to workplaces, residential areas, and local institutions. Party members are subject to strict discipline and ideological indoctrination, regardless of whether they work in the party apparatus or, like most, outside it.</p> +<p>A September 2024 analysis by Bernstein Research, an equity research firm, included a review of China’s semiconductor self-sufficiency goals from the 2015 roadmap and found that “China has made impressive progress and likely will beat the ‘Made in China 2025’ targets for integrated circuit (IC) Design and Manufacturing, but may miss the goals for IC equipment and Materials.” As the Bernstein analysis shows, the rate of China’s progress toward self-sufficiency is best predicted by the market and technological complexities of each semiconductor market segment, not by the extent to which export controls were applied. It is certainly not the case that the segments in which China has made the most progress — or even devoted the most resources — are the areas in which the United States has applied export controls most forcefully.</p> -<p>In its struggle to seize and then hold power, the Bolshevik Party pioneered hallmark institutions long familiar to outside observers: a Central Committee, a secretariat with specialized departments (e.g., propaganda, personnel, and internal discipline), and a supreme leadership body at the very center commonly known as the Politburo — all mirrored at subordinate levels.</p> +<p>That there is not a simple relationship between export controls and China’s technological progress should be obvious given that China has made rapid progress in other technological domains — such as solar cells and electric vehicles (EVs) — where the United States applied no export controls and in some cases actively supported the rise of a Chinese supply chain. The United States applied no export controls in the case of the equipment used to manufacture silicon solar cells, yet today China dominates both production of solar cells and production of the equipment used to make them. This equipment is in many ways similar to (though less sophisticated than) the equipment used to make and process silicon wafers for semiconductors. In fact, one Chinese company, Naura, is a domestic leader in both manufacturing equipment for both solar cells and semiconductors. The biggest difference in Chinese outcomes between those two industries is not the presence or absence of export controls but the far greater technological complexity of producing semiconductor manufacturing equipment.</p> -<p>From the capital to the most distant locality, a Leninist party controls leadership appointments and transfers not merely within itself and the state but also among the military and security forces, the economy, academia, the media, the arts, religious institutions, social organizations, and beyond. Classic Soviet operational practices — such as centralization, mobilization, united front operations, and cadre self-criticism — endure in China. A ruling Leninist regime always seeks to maintain robustly coercive security services that are loyal, first and foremost, to the party itself. It also exhibits high levels of intervention in the economy, ranging widely from state capitalism to command economics. Control of the economy is as important to party dominance as it is to overall national strength or the popular welfare.</p> +<p>The EV maker Tesla made a major push into Chinese manufacturing in late 2018, launching deep partnerships with many local Chinese suppliers, such as battery-maker CATL. As a November 2024 commentary in a major Chinese state-run newspaper stated:</p> -<p>The foundations of CCP ideology also came from Moscow. This body of thought combined a Marxist, class-based economic interpretation of history progressing inexorably toward utopia, Lenin’s own theoretical revisions to Marxism, and, crucial to governance, his advocacy of an elite revolutionary party’s unique role in leading the masses. To a ruling communist party, Marxism-Leninism’s single greatest ideological value may well be in granting the secular equivalent of divine right rule through its role as the sole interpreter of “laws” of history.</p> +<blockquote> + <p>Tesla’s rapid growth in sales, fueled by its technological and branding advantages and backed by China’s massive consumer market, has driven the rapid development of upstream and downstream supply chains. Today, the localization rate of parts for Tesla’s Shanghai Gigafactory exceeds 95%, with more than 60 suppliers integrated into Tesla’s global supply chain.</p> +</blockquote> -<p>Karl Marx’s thoughts on social and economic justice remained enormously appealing, but it was Lenin’s ruthless pragmatism that enabled communist regimes to seize and hold onto power. Chinese communists learned from Moscow that although the content of the ideology could vary substantially, its mere existence was functionally vital to the party’s survival. It is telling that while communist regimes around the world have extensively revised their ideologies, they have been less liberal in modifying core structures, norms, and processes.</p> +<p>The Chinese EV supply chain, which Tesla helped dramatically increase in both scale and technological sophistication, is now also supplying Tesla’s competitors. Defections of Tesla-trained skilled employees are also a challenge. An April 2024 New York Times report claimed that most of Tesla’s early Chinese employees now work at competing Chinese firms. In a January Tesla earnings call, Tesla CEO Elon Musk said “The Chinese car companies are the most competitive car companies in the world. . . . Frankly, I think if there are not trade barriers established, they will pretty much demolish most other companies in the world.”</p> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">It is telling that while communist regimes around the world have extensively revised their ideologies, they have been less liberal in modifying core structures, norms, and processes.</code></em></strong></p> +<p>The point here is not to suggest with unwarranted certainty that export controls would have definitively prevented China’s rise in the solar and EV industries. Rather, it is to caution the reader against relying too heavily on cursory anecdotal evidence to reach conclusions about when export controls do or do not work and what the counterfactual outcome would have been if export controls were or were not applied. Much depends upon the state of the global market landscape, the complexity of the controlled technology, the current technological sophistication of the targeted country, the design of the export control regulations, and the robustness of the controls’ implementation and enforcement. Only a detailed analysis can hope to reach anything approaching insight.</p> -<p>The leadership’s ability to require all party members to embrace its shifting interpretations of reality was and remains an indispensable component of rule. Among the tools at the top leader’s disposal, command of the ideology is a brass ring of power, enabling him not only to legitimize shifting priorities but also suppress opposition and impose unity. Pity the poor Chinese communist who, over a long membership, has been expected to accept unconditionally the “scientific” need for, variously, a Soviet command economy, the Great Leap Forward, the Cultural Revolution, “reform and opening,” and now a New Era of economic statism and intensified political control.</p> +<h4 id="3-semiconductor-export-controls--as-implemented-thus-far--have-in-different-ways-and-at-different-times-both-helped-and-hindered-chinese-firms">3. Semiconductor export controls — as implemented thus far — have in different ways and at different times both helped and hindered Chinese firms.</h4> -<p>No notion of limited government constrains a Leninist party. Like the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), CCP official doctrine explicitly extols the concentration of power in its hands and rejects external restraints. Through the party’s penetration of the state, society, and the economy, it can mobilize markedly disparate powers to advance its goals. Its core ruling institutions tend to be very durable: The Central Committee is now over a century old, and the CCP itself has governed all of China for over 75 years. Central Party officials operate within longstanding administrative norms, draw on time-tested doctrine, and have the luxury of long-term planning horizons.</p> +<p>Just as foreign firms have supported Chinese competitor growth in solar cells and EVs in the absence of export controls, so have they done in semiconductor manufacturing. The major semiconductor manufacturing equipment providers all have major service businesses, where, among other things, they train customer companies on how to get the most out of their equipment. Prior to the October 2022 changes in U.S. export controls, this could include assisting with the facility planning, installation, repairs, and operational troubleshooting of equipment as part of advanced chip manufacturing operations. Industry sources told CSIS that this sometimes included contract research and development (R&amp;D) of advanced node semiconductor process technology on behalf of or in partnership with Chinese clients. At least as of November 2024, this is still legal in the case of providing support to Chinese legacy chip manufacturing operations.</p> -<p>Unfettered by legal or normative limits to the regime’s reach into society or abroad, expedience in the service of the party is the North Star of decisionmaking at all levels. Political interests and vulnerabilities are always front and center in internal deliberations, reflecting the CCP’s origin story — it understands subversion all too well — and the internal surveillance system’s daily reminders of threats great and small.</p> +<p>By contrast, earlier U.S. export controls meaningfully reversed progress in some segments of the Chinese semiconductor sector, such as NAND memory manufacturing and smartphone chip design, though the durability of those setbacks, even if temporary, will depend on many factors. More recent export controls have also made life harder in many ways for Chinese semiconductor equipment firms, who can no longer legally obtain U.S. subcomponents or technical expertise.</p> -<p>Therefore, a ruling Leninist party like China’s is permanently on alert to threats to its power. It is paranoid by design. This is in part ideological (e.g., the assumed hostility of “counterrevolutionary” forces at home and capitalist countries abroad) but is more a habit of rule in a system that brooks no challenge. Like most Leninist party-states, the CCP eschews an independent civil society and seeks to dominate all institutions. A Leninist party seeks not merely its survival but its unbroken monopoly on power.</p> +<p>Thus, it is simply wrong to say that export controls always, in isolation, accelerate Chinese technological indigenization and that making it easier for U.S. firms to export will always slow Chinese indigenization.</p> -<p>Like all political systems, Leninist regimes can adapt to changing circumstances to a considerable extent without losing their essential characteristics. Yugoslavia, driven by existential threat, managed to sustain significant economic and social liberalization. Understanding tensions and tendencies within the Leninist model nonetheless helps explain why China has experienced a historic conservative shift over the past 20 years toward reinforced centralization, sweeping internal discipline campaigns, ideological orthodoxy, and suppression of civil society.</p> +<p>At the same time, it is unambiguously the case that the United States’ use of semiconductor export controls, beginning with ZTE in April 2018, made a massive impression on both political and corporate leaders in China. Speeches at the time by Chinese leadership, including General Secretary Xi Jinping, indicate that ZTE was viewed as a turning point and justified China’s aggressive pursuit of “self-reliance” in science and technology. Pony Ma, the chairman of Tencent, one of China’s largest technology firms, said in May 2018, “The recent ZTE incident made us see clearly that no matter how advanced our mobile payment is, without mobile devices, without microchips and operating systems, we can’t compete competently.”</p> -<p>Observers naturally contrast these policies with those of the preceding “reform and opening” period, which Deng Xiaoping launched in 1978. Deng was, in fact, no less committed to Leninist rule, as he demonstrated brutally on June 4, 1989. Amid the rubble of the Cultural Revolution in the late 1970s, however, desperation to save the party-state drove him and his peers to radical experimentation: agricultural decollectivization, the gradual introduction of market forces, and a retreat of the party from the average citizen’s daily life. While democracy was never on offer, the changes at the time were remarkable and exhibited a surprising tolerance for risk to Leninist prerogatives.</p> +<p>The evidence goes beyond talk to specific actions. China made significant changes to its semiconductor policy in the years following ZTE, and China’s central government directed local governments to “do everything in their power” to promote the semiconductor sector. Some Chinese companies also took drastic measures to respond after ZTE. For example, Nikkei Asia reported that Yangtze Memory Technologies Corporation (YMTC) — one of China’s most advanced semiconductor manufacturers — began a full-blown de-Americanization campaign in 2019 involving the full-time work of more than 800 staff (both YMTC and its suppliers). This included the establishment of multiple new major partnerships with domestic Chinese equipment producers. Of note, at the time when YMTC began this de-Americanization initiative, no significant U.S. export controls applied to the company. YMTC began their work based on fear of future controls, not the reality of current ones.</p> -<p>While reform and opening delivered on growth and revitalization, it also diluted the system’s controls, reduced discipline, and unleashed pressures for liberalization. The Tiananmen Square crackdown put a halt to official consideration of political change, but continued economic reform and attendant societal developments in the 1990s and 2000s further undermined the Leninist system.</p> +<p>Combined, this provides strong evidence that the export controls did increase the desire of both the Chinese government and Chinese companies to increase the capabilities of local semiconductor equipment providers, but that is not the same thing as saying that export controls caused accelerated indigenization, which depends upon more than just desire.</p> -<p>Once reform and opening propelled China to a certain level of wealth and power, however, the arguments for further gambling with party equities were bound to encounter increasing opposition. The principal forces behind this counterreformation were internal to the CCP, organic, and flowed from longstanding discomfort with the political effects of reform and perceptions of a shifting cost-benefit ratio. This resistance began to coalesce well before Xi Jinping’s 2012 ascent to power. As Professor Susan Shirk argues in her important volume Overreach: How China Derailed Its Peaceful Rise, the process likely began in earnest no later than the mid-2000s.</p> +<h4 id="4-the-biden-administrations-2022-export-controls-strengthened-a-policy-approach-to-semiconductor-equipment-controls-that-began-in-2019-during-the-first-trump-administration">4. The Biden administration’s 2022 export controls strengthened a policy approach to semiconductor equipment controls that began in 2019 during the first Trump administration.</h4> -<p>For governments that represent themselves as innately progressive, communist regimes are, in practice, notably conservative and intolerant. The CPSU’s Leninist threat perceptions extended far beyond the conventional political sphere, so it was logical that the Kremlin would reject not merely explicit opposition but also unsanctioned manifestations of ethnic identity, religious faith, women’s and other human rights, sexual identity, artistic creativity, intellectual exploration, and economic activity.</p> +<p>As with chip export controls, the first Trump administration launched the U.S. government’s modern approach to semiconductor manufacturing equipment export controls. According to reporting by Reuters, the U.S. government successfully persuaded the Dutch government in July 2019 to cancel the export license of EUV lithography equipment to SMIC, China’s most advanced logic chip foundry. In December 2020, SMIC was added to the U.S. Department of Commerce’s Entity List, prohibiting the company from buying certain kinds of U.S. equipment, specifically, “items uniquely required for production of semiconductors at advanced technology nodes (10 nanometers and below, including extreme ultraviolet technology).”</p> -<p>China’s reform and opening period affirmed that some liberalization in all these areas was possible under a Leninist system. Nonetheless, limits always remained in place; the control apparatus never disappeared, and the party elite ultimately united against a growing threat to the system’s very existence. Conservatism and intolerance in today’s China reflect not merely Xi Jinping’s whim but the same logic that drove Soviet behavior.</p> +<p>In October 2022, the Biden administration significantly expanded U.S. export controls on semiconductor manufacturing equipment, including not only Entity List and end-use restrictions but also some country-wide export controls that applied to China as a whole (including a use of the U.S. persons rule). Just as importantly, the Biden administration made some of these controls more multilateral in nature, engagingJapan and the Netherlands to overhaul their export control policies for advanced semiconductor manufacturing equipment. Even though these controls did not entirely align with U.S. controls, this was important to ensure that Dutch and Japanese companies did not provide China with alternative sources for the items that the United States was no longer willing to sell.</p> -<p>Recognizing the PRC party-state as a familiar political model, in fact, helps deepen understanding of Xi Jinping himself. Xi is the ultimate company man. However much his tumultuous youth informs his views, his professional life has been one of a decades-long ascent through a complex, established institution. Xi is the product and beneficiary of a distinct bureaucratic culture. His comparators are not revolutionaries like Vladimir Lenin, Mao Zedong, or Deng Xiaoping but leaders who came of age under ruling Leninist orders — say, Leonid Brezhnev or Jiang Zemin. The former were innovators: often visionary, necessarily iconoclastic. The latter were creatures of established bureaucracies in which institutional interests and preservation of the system were paramount. While not necessarily the gray apparatchiks of Western fancy, neither were these bureaucratic autocrats likely to challenge the fundamentals of a system that defined their very perceptions of threat.</p> +<h4 id="5-chinese-semiconductor-equipment-firms-started-very-small-but-have-grown-rapidly-however-this-rapid-growth-occurred-both-before-and-after-export-controls-and-took-place-during-a-period-of-massive-chinese-equipment-demand-growth">5. Chinese semiconductor equipment firms started very small but have grown rapidly. However, this rapid growth occurred both before and after export controls and took place during a period of massive Chinese equipment demand growth.</h4> -<p>National power, wealth, and popular welfare are important to Leninist leaders, but internal dominance — not mere survival — ultimately takes precedence. No liberal democracies and comparatively few authoritarian systems judge policy by such a broad scope of aspirations for regime control. China’s affirmation of a statist economy at the July 2024 Third Central Committee Plenum makes sense in this context, and it is unlikely that Beijing’s subsequent stimulus measures will represent a fundamental change to this course.</p> +<p>China’s domestic semiconductor manufacturing equipment industry has long been both small and technologically inferior to the global state of the art. To understand the growth trajectory of the Chinese semiconductor manufacturing equipment sector, CSIS gathered market data on how China’s global semiconductor manufacturing equipment market share has changed over time across both supply and demand (see Table 1).</p> -<p>Indeed, it is entirely reasonable that the CCP today willingly takes a pass on the higher growth rates genuine market reforms could yield, correctly recognizing them as intrinsically dangerous politically. A systemic rebalancing of the economy to favor consumption is off the table for the same reason. If Beijing doubles down on state control, technology, and officially sanctioned innovation as economic drivers, it is largely because the regime’s political imperatives rule out structural alternatives.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/mL9mPYr.png" alt="image01" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Table 1: Chinese Semiconductor Equipment Global Supply and Demand Share.</strong> Sources: CSIS Analysis; Semiconductor Equipment Association of Japan; “Semiconductor Equipment Database,” TechInsights.</em></p> -<p>Meanwhile, Beijing’s leftist shift has deepened the conformism typical of Leninist systems. From 1978, reform and opening gradually introduced greater willingness among leaders at all levels to take risks to promote growth, then their primary goal. Party members today operate in a climate of sharply reduced risk tolerance and appreciate that everything is political again — or could be at any time.</p> - -<p>Xi’s perpetual anti-corruption campaign has raised the stakes for all leaders and penalizes not merely malfeasance but also failure to perceive and implement the Center’s will — itself harder to divine than before, with security in myriad forms having been prioritized to the same extent as economic development. At the very time subordinate officials are under pressure to obey and please, economic malaise robs them of tools to satisfy their political masters and increases the chances that poor local performance will invite punishment.</p> +<p>China has grown as both a supplier and as a buyer of semiconductor manufacturing equipment over the past 15 years. And while Chinese firms have in aggregate increased China’s share of global supply, they remain quite small in comparison to foreign firms, providing only 3.2 percent of the equipment (by dollar value) globally and 9.6 percent of the equipment purchased by customers operating in China in 2023 (see Figure 1). Some industry sources, such as the research firm Sanford Bernstein, estimate that the Chinese domestic market share captured by Chinese equipment providers (aka Chinese self-sufficiency) is 15 percent. Whether the true figure is closer to 9.6 percent or 15 percent, the equipment that Chinese firms sell remains almost exclusively confined to legacy nodes and remains far behind the global state of the art. However, industry sources have told CSIS that Chinese equipment has grown in competitiveness compared with the legacy node equipment sold by leading global suppliers.</p> -<p>Striking the optimal balance between power and the requirements of governing an immense, diverse, and relatively open society is a constant challenge for today’s CCP. Over a decade into the Xi era, the average Han citizen (though decidedly not their fellow Tibetan and Uyghur citizens) remains freer and more affluent than they were in the early days of reform and opening, to say nothing of the high noon of Maoism. So far, Beijing still appears to understand that applying crude mobilization and control techniques to its ethnic majority is less likely to yield the regime’s goals.</p> +<p>Until the Biden administration’s October 2022 export controls, it was generally legal to sell critical subcomponents or expert consulting services to Chinese equipment firms, assisting with their growth in both sales and technological knowhow. In addition to voluntary foreign support, Chinese firms have benefitted from industrial espionage that has included state-backed cyberattacks on equipment companies. Chinese equipment firms have also benefitted from hundreds of billions of dollars in government investments, tax credits, and subsidies.</p> -<p>Beijing nonetheless appears willing to accept a balance that involves substantial economic and social costs: A vibrant national economy for its own sake is unacceptable, dissatisfied elites strive to move themselves and their wealth abroad, and the treatment of the Uyghurs confirms the party’s willingness to revive totalitarianism as necessary.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/13VHUhA.png" alt="image02" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 1: Global Semiconductor Manufacturing Equipment Supply and Demand by Region, 2023 ($USD, million).</strong> Source: CSIS Analysis; and “Semiconductor Equipment Database,” TechInsights.</em></p> -<p>A reversion to reform and opening is unlikely. Barring a successful leadership challenge (rare in established Leninist systems) or ill health, Xi Jinping is in charge indefinitely — and, if anything, his views will grow more illiberal as he ages. Moreover, while Beijing faces many difficulties, it is unlikely to confront challenges anytime soon on the scale that necessitated and enabled Deng Xiaoping’s great gamble. Barring extraordinary developments, today’s CCP will remain in a defensive crouch for the foreseeable future and respond to challenges conservatively to protect its Leninist order.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/BmXwXib.png" alt="image03" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 2: Semiconductor Equipment Demand by Region, 2008–2023.</strong> Source: <a href="https://www.seaj.or.jp/english/statistics/index.html">“Statistical Data,” Semiconductor Equipment Association of Japan</a>.</em></p> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Barring extraordinary developments, today’s CCP will remain in a defensive crouch for the foreseeable future and respond to challenges conservatively to protect its Leninist order.</code></em></strong></p> +<h4 id="6-rd-expenditures-by-chinese-semiconductor-firms-have-grown-explosively-though-the-rate-of-growth-has-decreased-somewhat-since-2021">6. R&amp;D expenditures by Chinese semiconductor firms have grown explosively, though the rate of growth has decreased somewhat since 2021.</h4> -<h3 id="confused-observers">Confused Observers</h3> +<p>Using public financial filings, CSIS has collected R&amp;D expenditure data from the eight largest publicly traded Chinese semiconductor equipment firms (see Figure 3).</p> -<p>Opacity, disinformation, and foreign influence operations are enduring PRC practices with deep Soviet roots that have long impaired comprehension of China. An understanding of the mechanisms of governance Moscow transferred to the Chinese communists helps illuminate this area as well.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/sbrV214.png" alt="image04" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 3: Chinese Semiconductor Equipment Firms’ Annual R&amp;D Expense &amp; Growth Rates.</strong> Source: CSIS analysis; and corporate financial disclosures.</em></p> -<p>Under Lenin’s leadership, propaganda was always a strategic asset in pursuing control of the Russian state. Formalizing party practice, the Bolsheviks established a propaganda department within the Central Committee soon after they seized power. The CCP today retains propaganda organs at all levels of administration, and the shaping of public opinion and suppression of dissent are obligations for all party members. Soviet principles for the operation of these bodies and the regime as a whole remain very much alive. Leninist parties are highly secretive by norm and regulation. The party does not see itself as obliged to keep its own citizens — much less foreigners — informed of its intent. Control of popular opinion is its top public relations goal; transparency is innately suspect.</p> +<p>As the above data shows, the Chinese semiconductor equipment industry started out with comparatively low R&amp;D expenditure but has shown extraordinary growth since the beginning of the Made in China 2025 policy era in 2015. Relative growth rates of R&amp;D have slowed in the industry over the past two years, but growth in absolute terms remains very high. This data is not consistent with a simple story of “export controls caused a boom in the Chinese semiconductor manufacturing equipment industry” and instead shows that annual growth rates were very high both before and after the United States began imposing export controls.</p> -<p>Reflecting their Soviet heritage, Chinese propaganda organs are under no obligation to respect truth or consistency. They are not subject to legislative, judicial, or media oversight. As CCP entities, their priorities, unsurprisingly, are party rule and advancement of party goals. Also copying Bolshevik practice, Chinese official rhetoric is freighted with ideological pronouncements that can be variously obscure, ambiguous, and (as necessary) dishonest. Even what appear to be routine statements can stump party members and long-term observers.</p> +<p>One plausible interpretation of the data is that U.S. and Dutch export controls in the 2018–2020 period increased desire among both the Chinese government and Chinese equipment customers in strengthening the local equipment industry, but they did so without making it more difficult for Chinese firms to obtain help — even from U.S. experts and equipment subcomponent providers. The export controls of 2022 and 2023 may have further increased interest among the Chinese government and customers, but such interest and ability to productively absorb additional investment was already nearly maxed out.</p> -<p>China’s ruling party habitually speaks of its place in the world in triumphalist terms. Short foreign attention spans, especially in democracies, guarantee Beijing has international audiences that are periodically refreshed. Out of practice since the Soviet Union’s demise, overseas observers are less likely today to recognize Xi Jinping’s dramatic assertions of PRC ascendance as (at least in part) echoes of Mao’s claims to leadership of the “third world” and Lenin’s celebration of the Bolshevik spark to the global revolution. This is how Leninist parties speak to the world and, just as importantly, themselves.</p> +<p>However, the export controls of 2022 and 2023 also took extensive steps (e.g., extensive application of the Foreign Direct Product Rule and the U.S. persons rule, multilateralization of the controls) to make it more difficult for Chinese firms to obtain foreign help in advancing the reliability and competitiveness of their technology. Thus, the pace of revenue and R&amp;D expenditure growth among Chinese equipment providers slowed somewhat (while remaining high in absolute terms). Again, this is a plausible interpretation that is consistent with the available data, but the available data is not sufficient in and of itself to definitively state that this is the correct interpretation.</p> -<p>Leninist propaganda also obfuscates by repurposing liberal references to serve authoritarianism. Thus, like the USSR before it, the PRC avers that its repressive system is democratic — indeed, more perfectly so than Western liberal democracies. Beijing represents itself as a champion of human rights, but the CCP categorically rejects universal rights (such as those of speech or assembly) that China has nominally embraced in international covenants and, for that matter, its own state constitution (as opposed to the party constitution). While the party extols its commitment to sexual equality, for example, Xi Jinping in October 2023 used the All-China Women’s Federation meeting to exhort Chinese women to marry and have babies. In the world at large, an autocratic, mercantilist China improbably represents itself as the champion of a “democratic” global order and free trade.</p> +<p>Another plausible interpretation for slowing pace of growth — discussed in the next section — is that Chinese customers for semiconductor manufacturing equipment dramatically accelerated equipment purchases in an effort to stockpile equipment in anticipation of future export controls and that this surge of foreign imports stockpiling temporarily reduced demand growth for domestic equipment (while not changing China’s long-term commitment to end reliance on imports).</p> -<p>Denial of information is also a powerful tool for shaping opinion at home and abroad. While the PRC remains more open today than the USSR was for most of its history (or China itself was 40 years ago), restrictions on data, always robust, have sharply revived in recent years. Foreign businesses, academics, and others have found it increasingly difficult to access previously available information. Meanwhile, Beijing has sharply reduced Western media presence in China, removing critical reporting about the PRC from the front page in many markets and enhancing the ability of CCP-originated stories to shape public opinion.</p> +<p>There are some limitations in the R&amp;D data, as not all of the companies are exclusively focused on the semiconductor equipment industry. Naura, for example, has lithium battery and photovoltaic business units which industry sources told CSIS are responsible for about 18 percent of the firm’s revenue (and presumably comprised a comparable share of its R&amp;D for at least some period), but these are not broken out in the firm’s public financial reporting. Additionally, there are important Chinese semiconductor equipment firms that are not included in this analysis, such as Shanghai Microelectronics Equipment (SMEE) and Huawei’s recently established semiconductor equipment subsidiaries, because they do report such data publicly.</p> -<p>An additional inheritance from the USSR is interference in other countries’ internal affairs. The creation of the CCP was itself an exercise in covert Soviet external operations: Comintern agents helped organize the Chinese Communist Party’s 1921 underground founding congress in Shanghai and provided indispensable funding, equipment, and expertise during the CCP’s early years. For their largesse, the Bolsheviks exacted strict obedience from what was at the time merely the Chinese branch of the Moscow-centered world communist movement. Soviet interference in other countries’ internal affairs extended around the world and continued throughout the USSR’s history, varying in content and intensity. While Leninist states have no more of a monopoly on foreign interference than they do on misleading state propaganda, they are noteworthy for the formal institutional and normative drivers of these activities and the absence of restrictions on them.</p> +<p>The absence of Huawei’s semiconductor equipment subsidiaries, in particular, could be an important missing source of data. Huawei’s private investment in R&amp;D and the semiconductor equipment that it produces for its own secret network of chip manufacturers would not be captured in any of the data sources used in this report. In October 2023, the Dutch newspaper NRC, citing anonymous ASML employees, reported that an employee who stole significant semiconductor manufacturing equipment technology secrets moved to China and now works for Huawei. This suggests that Huawei is making a significant investment in lithography equipment, as does a 2022 Huawei patent filed under the name “Extreme Ultraviolet (EUV) Lithography.”</p> -<p>This is yet another area in which ideology flavors and justifies behavior: styling itself as the sole interpreter of “scientific” historic forces, a Leninist party operates with a deep sense of exceptionalism. It observes international rules and norms only insofar as they advance the leadership’s goals. The law is no more a constraint on the party’s overseas behavior than it is at home.</p> +<p>While these complications mean that the specific R&amp;D values as presented have an error bar, the overall trajectory characterized is likely close to the reality of the Chinese semiconductor equipment industry as a whole.</p> -<p>Observers therefore cannot be surprised that there is an unbroken link between, say, PRC direction of communist insurgents in colonial Malaya in the 1950s and Beijing’s contemporary efforts to manipulate democratic elections and local media around the world. All have been directed by enduring CCP institutions to shape an international order to Beijing’s liking.</p> +<h4 id="7-in-the-20162024-period-leading-us-and-international-semiconductor-equipment-firms-continued-to-demonstrate-strong-chinese-revenue-growth-after-imposition-of-increasingly-strict-export-controls">7. In the 2016–2024 period, leading U.S. and international semiconductor equipment firms continued to demonstrate strong Chinese revenue growth after imposition of increasingly strict export controls.</h4> -<p>While never an unvarnished success, China’s influence operations over time have promoted a positive view of the PRC in many countries and certainly obscured understanding of its intent and ambitions in others. Xi Jinping has substantially invigorated foreign influence operations but remained within the orthodox boundaries of the system CCP founders accepted from Moscow a century ago.</p> +<p>The top three U.S. semiconductor manufacturing equipment providers are Applied Materials, Lam Research, and KLA Corporation. Together with ASML of the Netherlands and Tokyo Electron and Advantest of Japan, they comprise the six largest semiconductor equipment providers in the world by revenue. In their financial reports, these firms report the share of their revenue derived from China (not including Taiwan).</p> -<h3 id="russias-past-and-chinas-future">Russia’s Past and China’s Future</h3> +<p>CSIS extracted and aggregated this data to show that these firms have grown revenue in China both before and after the United States began imposing export controls on semiconductor manufacturing equipment. For the top three U.S. providers, Chinese revenue growth outperformed growth in the rest of the world every year in the 2016–2024E period.</p> -<p>The Soviet Union’s history can also help observers anticipate aspects of the PRC’s future. The demise of the USSR confirmed that communist regimes are not immortal. The CCP’s party-state could nonetheless rule China for an extended period yet, and the system is unlikely to end the same way the Soviet one did.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/XpUyOQK.png" alt="image05" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 4: Top Three U.S. Semiconductor Manufacturing Equipment Firms’ Revenue.</strong> Source: CSIS Analysis; and company 10-K/10-Q financial disclosures.</em></p> -<p>Leninist systems are extremely tough and can survive tremendous internal and external abuse. In countries where such regimes arose through indigenous struggle, the mortal vulnerability has been internal elite discord, not foreign pressure or popular revolt. Indeed, the peaceful collapse of the USSR along republic lines was arguably one of the least likely major political events of the twentieth century.</p> +<p>Similarly, ASML, the Dutch lithography equipment firm, also saw dramatic growth in sales of equipment to China that exceeded growth in the rest of the world.</p> -<p>If North Korea and Cuba have survived the decades after coming off the Soviet dole, surely the USSR, with all its advantages, could have muddled on longer had it not been for the unintended consequences of Mikhail Gorbachev’s reformist zeal. The assertion that U.S. pressure was the principal driver of the USSR’s demise is unfounded. A more conventional general secretary would have exploited the foreign threat to extend the system’s life — albeit at further cost to prosperity and human rights.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/rd3GmYV.png" alt="image06" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 5: ASML Equipment Revenue in China and Rest of World.</strong> Source: CSIS analysis; and company 10-K/10-Q financial disclosures.</em></p> -<p>The CCP is unlikely to follow the CPSU’s road to oblivion, if for no other reason than that Beijing is obsessed with the lessons of the Soviet collapse and on watch to prevent its replication. Moreover, China’s party-state has assets Gorbachev’s did not — in particular, a massive economy that is likely to grow well into the future, even if at a slower rate. When China eventually transitions from Leninist rule, it will be via a different route than the one the Soviet Union took.</p> +<p>Finally, the same is true of Tokyo Electron and Advantest, the two leading Japanese equipment providers. Both saw superior performance in China compared with the rest of the world.</p> -<p>The USSR’s collapse nonetheless can still be helpful to anticipating change in China.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/mOLIeZf.png" alt="image07" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 6: Tokyo Electron and Advantest Revenue in China and Rest of World.</strong> Source: CSIS analysis; and company financial disclosures.</em></p> -<p>First, surprises happen. The demise of the Soviet Union in 1991 was not remotely inevitable and could have been avoided at many points. Nonetheless, it did happen, despite the best intentions of the Soviet leadership and, until quite late in the process, the loyalty of the military and security forces. History is replete with political change driven by surprise, confusion, and compounded errors. This almost certainly will apply to CCP dominance someday. One of the biggest questions, perhaps, is whether it will occur through a sudden convulsion or prolonged evolutionary processes. For now, this is unknowable — though the evolutionary route seems unlikely in the years immediately ahead.</p> +<p>The most likely explanation for this is that Chinese firms have shifted their purchases of international equipment earlier so that they occurred prior to expected future export controls (which the U.S. government has maintained since 2022 will be updated annually). Just as Huawei built up a U.S. chip stockpile equivalent to multiple years of demand during a period prior to U.S. export control loopholes being closed, Chinese semiconductor manufacturers have acquired a stockpile of U.S. and other foreign equipment in anticipation of strengthened export controls coming in the near future.</p> -<p>Another insight from the Soviet experience is that the diversity of party membership ensures there is a huge range of perspectives within the ruling class once citizens perceive a genuine prospect for systemic change. Leninist parties’ conceit that they are elite revolutionary vanguards contributes to foreign misunderstanding on this point. In fact, with nearly 100 million members, the CCP is second only to India’s ruling Bharatiya Janata Party as the world’s largest political party. China’s Soviet-style “mass” organizations — such as those for workers, women, and young people — link yet hundreds of millions more to the CCP. Despite a daunting appearance of uniformity in thought and goals, the party’s faithful in fact represent a huge cross-section of the PRC’s 1.4 billion people.</p> +<p>This “pulling demand forward” interpretation is the one that many executives in the semiconductor equipment industry have evidently reached. In July 2024, both the CEO of ASML and the CEO of ASM said during investor earnings calls that Chinese semiconductor manufacturers would likely decrease purchases of equipment soon, as they have struggled to “digest” all of the accelerated purchases of equipment and spare parts that they have made, effectively confirming that many tools that have been sold to China are still likely awaiting installation and remain unused. Similarly, in August 2024, a Lam Research executive likewise described “inventory stocking” behavior among Chinese customers over the past several years.</p> -<p>As long as a ruling Leninist party remains a well-lubricated, disciplined operation, most citizens “go along to get along.” When a serious prospect for change augers, however, the diversity lurking behind party control, personal self-interest, and ideology’s wall of sound can become evident. In the case of the CPSU, a huge, apparently monolithic party disintegrated in less than seven years, with many of its members joining the range of political parties that emerged. Suggesting similar diversity in China, foreigners who lived there in the 1990s and 2000s often encountered communists who in private articulated sharp dissatisfaction with CCP rule for a range of reasons. Those people are still there, and it is difficult to believe others aren’t joining them — however much their public behavior currently suggests otherwise.</p> +<h4 id="8-export-controls-changed-the-composition-of-equipment-demand-both-technologically-decreasing-the-technological-sophistication-of-demand-in-china-and-geographically-shifting-more-demand-outside-of-china-but-likely-did-not-change-the-overall-demand-trajectory">8. Export controls changed the composition of equipment demand both technologically (decreasing the technological sophistication of demand in China) and geographically (shifting more demand outside of China) but likely did not change the overall demand trajectory.</h4> -<p>Regardless of its bravado, China’s Leninist system displays ample awareness that its survival depends on perpetual vigilance. Whether it be stock market instability, mishandling of a pandemic, or protesters holding up blank sheets of paper, the CCP needs to treat every surprise as a potential threat to the entire system.</p> +<p>Decades before the Trump administration’s April 2018 export controls on ZTE ushered in the modern era of semiconductor export controls, the U.S. policy goal for exports of semiconductor manufacturing equipment to China was already to restrict sales of advanced equipment to trusted U.S. allies and partners while allowing the sale of older, less advanced equipment to China. A 2002 U.S. government policy review of semiconductor technology exports to China stated this explicitly. Neither the Trump administration nor the Biden administration fundamentally changed this approach at a high level. Both administrations continued to allow the sale of legacy equipment, though they increased restrictions on sales of advanced equipment exports. In the case of the Biden administration, it also communicated an intent to end the “sliding scale” approach that allowed the sophistication of equipment exports to China to advance, but on a multiyear delay from the global state of the art.</p> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Whether it be stock market instability, mishandling of a pandemic, or protesters holding up blank sheets of paper, the CCP needs to treat every surprise as a potential threat to the entire system.</code></em></strong></p> +<p>As such, China has continued to be a large and growing market for equipment exports even after the more recent export controls, but Chinese firms have changed their focus from a rush to compete at the most advanced semiconductor technological nodes to maximizing both domestic self-sufficiency and global leadership in legacy chip production. China was likely to pursue a massive expansion of chip production capacity regardless of U.S. actions, but the export controls helped ensure that this capacity did not drive the U.S. and allies toward a strategic dependence on China for the most technologically advanced chips, such as those that power AI systems or high-end smartphones.</p> -<h3 id="conclusion">Conclusion</h3> +<p>Moreover, the overall demand for semiconductor manufacturing equipment fundamentally depends on the overall demand for manufactured chips. As the demand for advanced chips grows, that demand will translate into demand for advanced equipment. And if China is not in a position to purchase advanced equipment, then the purchase and production will instead take place outside of China. The chief financial officer of ASML, Roger Dassen, said this explicitly during ASML’s July 2024 earnings call with investment analysts:</p> -<p>The adoption of the Soviet model by communist parties around the world was never a simple cookie-cutter process. As parties came to power, local histories, circumstances, and interests profoundly shaped the new regimes. There was considerable variation in Leninist practice; the PRC’s ruling party is not the identical twin of the USSR’s.</p> +<blockquote> + <p>. . . the way we look at the demand for our tools is not from a specific geography. In this case, China. We look at — and that’s the way we model our sales medium term and long term. We look at what is the global demand for wafers and whether those wafers are being produced in country X or country Y, at the end of the day, it doesn’t matter. And I think that is very important to recognize in looking at your model. We don’t have a specific China element in our models. It is the global demand for wafers that drives our modeling.</p> +</blockquote> -<p>It has been important for CCP rule that China’s pre-1949 political history was overwhelmingly authoritarian, its philosophies skewed toward hierarchy and control, and its culture conservative. These conditions provided fertile soil for communist rule in general and the particular nature of the Chinese Leninist state.</p> +<p>Accordingly, U.S. and allied controls did not so much destroy demand as change its composition. China is buying fewer advanced tools than it would have otherwise and is instead purchasing more legacy tools. The advanced tools that would have been sold to China have instead been sold to places like the United States, Taiwan, South Korea, Japan, and Europe. Likewise, given that many foreign players are wary of investing in legacy nodes due to fears of Chinese overcapacity, the tools are being largely sold to China for those production lines, not elsewhere. Chinese firms are also likely attempting to use many “node-agnostic” or “backwards compatible” equipment tools not subject to a control to bolster their advanced node efforts.</p> -<p>Those conditions did not, however, preordain CCP rule as we know it. It is significant that the party’s founders modeled themselves not on just any Western Marxist party but on one of the most ruthless. The CCP’s internal wiring chart today, its practical behavior, and the continued veneration of Marxism-Leninism in the Party Constitution make abundantly clear that the Soviet model still deeply informs PRC governance.</p> +<h4 id="9-increased-application-of-semiconductor-equipment-export-controls-coincided-with-and-likely-caused-us-equipment-firms-to-ensure-that-sales-to-china-did-not-ship-from-the-united-states-andor-were-manufactured-outside-the-united-states">9. Increased application of semiconductor equipment export controls coincided with and likely caused U.S. equipment firms to ensure that sales to China did not ship from the United States and/or were manufactured outside the United States.</h4> -<hr /> +<p>CSIS has produced an estimate of the Chinese semiconductor equipment revenue of each of the top three U.S. semiconductor equipment companies by taking their topline revenue from China and subtracting the share reported as services and non-semiconductor equipment businesses (e.g., display, printed circuit board inspection). This figure would include any semiconductor manufacturing equipment sales to China from these three firms shipped from any of their facilities worldwide, whether those facilities are in the United States or elsewhere.</p> -<p><strong>Ford Hart</strong> is a former U.S. diplomat who worked on Chinese and Soviet affairs. His final assignment was as U.S. Consul General to Hong Kong and Macau.</p>Ford HartThis paper argues that Chinese Communist Party (CCP) political institutions, the CCP’s practical behavior, and continued veneration of Marxism-Leninism in the CCP constitution highlight the Soviet model’s deep influence on Beijing. As such, lessons from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) can help us understand the CCP’s approach to governance today.Defense Investment Review2024-11-21T12:00:00+08:002024-11-21T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/defense-investment-review<p><em>The Department of Defense (DOD) has become concerned that critical technologies are insufficiently capitalized to support national security. Global private capital investors have been allocating resources toward software-heavy capabilities, such as e-commerce and software as a service, leaving funding gaps for critical components and capabilities where investors perceive greater risk.</em> <excerpt></excerpt> <em>DOD’s new Office of Strategic Capital (OSC) was set up to address this challenge by catalyzing investments in cutting-edge technologies to support the development and maturation of critical components and capabilities. To do this, OSC aims to go beyond direct contract and grant funding to leverage various financing tools used by U.S. government agencies outside DOD. This report provides an overview of these alternative funding mechanisms. By examining these financing tools and their ongoing use, DOD may better prepare to effectively leverage alternative financing toward national security aims.</em></p> +<p>U.S. trade data provided by the International Trade Commission (ITC) reports the dollar value of all U.S. exports based on six-digit North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) codes. The NAICS Code for “Semiconductor Machinery Manufacturing” is 333242, which covers all front-end semiconductor manufacturing equipment. CSIS collected ITC trade data for all U.S. exports of 333242 goods to China. This figure includes any semiconductor manufacturing equipment sales made from U.S. soil, whether those sales are made by U.S.-owned or internationally owned firms. In practice, the top three U.S. semiconductor manufacturing equipment companies — Applied Materials, Lam Research, and KLA Corporation — tend to dominate 333242 exports to nearly all countries.</p> -<h3 id="introduction">Introduction</h3> +<p>Based on these two datasets, one could see that U.S. equipment sales to China by U.S. firms have increasingly become exported from non-U.S. countries since 2016 and especially after 2019 (see Figure 7).</p> -<p>The United States faces increasing technological competition from adversaries around the globe as its strategic rivals — particularly China — accelerate the development, production, and scaling of critical technologies. The Department of Defense (DOD) strives to achieve technological advantage through various tools that focus most frequently on new acquisition approaches, organizations dedicated to innovation, and direct funding of contracts. There is new urgency around technological research and development (R&amp;D), particularly for emerging technologies, as strategic competitors have made clear through documents and public statements that they intend to accelerate their work in emerging technologies. Given that most development of emerging technology is now funded through private capital, U.S. policymakers have the task of jump-starting progress in areas critical to U.S. national security. This presents a challenge to U.S. policymakers, who must galvanize private sector investment without the coercive tools or centralized economy that competitors such as China or Russia use when crafting and executing industrial strategy.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/JmJpwEK.png" alt="image08" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 7: Comparing Firm-reported Equipment Sales to China with U.S.-China Equipment Exports Data.</strong> Source: CSIS analysis; <a href="https://dataweb.usitc.gov/">“DataWeb,” U.S. International Trade Commission</a>; and 10-K/10-Q reports.</em></p> -<p>DOD founded the Office of Strategic Capital (OSC) in December 2022 to solve a persistent and increasingly important question: how can the government ensure “the future warfighter has the capabilities they need by attracting and scaling private capital to critical technologies for national security?” To support this goal, OSC received $49 million in appropriations and $984 million in budget authority in the fiscal year (FY) 2024 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA). As DOD and OSC navigate this terrain, they can look to other U.S. agencies and departments that have gone beyond direct funding to use alternative funding mechanisms, including a variety of debt and equity tools, and that have operated such programs for decades.</p> +<p>From 2016 to 2020, the ratio of sales to exports grew 34 percent, from 1.1 to 1.5. However, from 2021 to 2024, the ratio nearly doubled, from 1.6 to 3.1. In other words, exports to China and sales to China used to be nearly identical, but sales overwhelmingly outgrew exports in the post-2020 period, the same period when the United States adopted significantly stricter export controls. Industry sources told CSIS that much of the change was originally due to U.S. firms seeking to legally avoid export controls that — in the absence of strict usage of the Foreign Direct Product Rule — only applied to exports from U.S. soil. This interpretation is consistent with the remarks of KLA CEO Rick Wallace, who discussed how some versions of U.S. semiconductor equipment export controls did not apply to U.S. companies manufacturing their equipment abroad and shipping from abroad during the company’s 2020 Q3 earnings call. The exchange is important and worth quoting at length:</p> -<p>Government organizations making use of alternative funding mechanisms that can help crowd in private capital include the Department of Commerce and Department of Energy (DOE), the Small Business Administration (SBA), the Export-Import Bank of the United States (EXIM), and the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC) and its predecessor, the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC). While several reports discuss these agencies, their missions, and their funding tools, there is a lack of literature summarizing the various non-direct funding tools. To fill that gap, this report pulls together publicly available data on investments made by these government agencies and departments, with a specific focus on investments that align with the 14 critical technologies DOD has identified as vital to national security.</p> +<blockquote> + <p><strong>Question:</strong> Regarding the Department of Commerce ruling, and I know it’s still very early, and I’m sure you’re awaiting clarity on how broader now the rules will be pursued. But if you think about what’s been written to date, the major ruling is for manufacturing in the U.S. and considering you do make tools and assemble tools offshore, is your first interpretation that you will not be impacted in terms of shipping into China based on kind of what you read today?</p> +</blockquote> -<p>Like the other agencies mentioned, DOD seeks to attract more capital to critical technologies through strong and consistent demand signals, financing, and innovative use of alternative funding mechanisms. In the past two decades, private capital markets have targeted software investments instead of hardware, as they typically generate a greater and more rapid return on investment. Capital has flowed to e-commerce and software as a service (SaaS) and away from deep technology relevant to national security. In 2006, venture capitalists invested 55 percent of funds in software and 45 percent in hardware, but by 2017 that balance had shifted significantly to 92 percent in software and only 8 percent in hardware. More recent data suggests that this trend continued through the Covid-19 pandemic. As of 2023, $66.6 billion in venture capital funding went to software, while only $6.3 billion went to hardware. Companies made this choice because software has lower barriers to entry, less risk, and higher profit margins. This trend accentuates the need for DOD to look for new tools to mobilize private sector capital into investments it deems critical for national security priorities.</p> +<blockquote> + <p><strong>Rick Wallace:</strong> Our understanding at this point is, this will impact the tools that are manufactured in the U.S., which are manufactured for us in California. We have three major manufacturing sites; Israel, Singapore and here. So there is a potential impact depending on the customer. And our final understanding of the ruling that [is that it] will impact tools that come out of California.</p> +</blockquote> -<p>DOD must grapple with the same challenge as the rest of the U.S. government in this domain, which is how to influence investment in transformative technologies and sectors critical to national security in ways that are commercially viable and do not distort the market. The alternative finance mechanisms covered in this report also work toward that goal.</p> +<p>In short, export controls that do not include strict implementation and enforcement of the Foreign Direct Product Rule or U.S. persons rule can incentivize U.S. firms to move production offshore, costing the United States manufacturing jobs. In recent years, U.S. semiconductor manufacturing equipment firms have doubled-down and expanded their non-U.S. manufacturing operations. Both KLA Corporation and Applied Materials have committed to major expansions of their Singapore manufacturing facilities, while LAM Research has built out its largest manufacturing site in Malaysia.</p> -<h4 id="overview-and-definitions">Overview and Definitions</h4> +<p>In quantitative terms, this is one of the most striking effects of the export controls as implemented thus far, and it clearly illustrates the risk that countries take by applying export controls that do not apply extraterritorially in industries where off-shoring some or all production is relatively easy. As one Japanese business executive stated, his company will “develop duplicate supply chains — one for the U.S.-led economic bloc and one for [the] China-led bloc.”</p> -<p>In this paper, the authors look at how five federal credit agencies have used different kinds of funding mechanisms over the last 20 years in their quest to generate innovation: the SBA, DFC, EXIM, DOE, and Department of Commerce. The goal of this research is to create foundational knowledge on these programs and offer insights into how DOD, including the newly created OSC, could use these tools.</p> +<p>Industry sources told CSIS that, more recently, both U.S. and international semiconductor equipment companies are being required by their Chinese customers to remove all U.S. citizens from their supply chain and ship from outside the United States when selling to China.</p> -<p>The team evaluated a range of investment mechanisms from cases of loans, loan guarantees, loan portfolio guarantees, equity financing, export financing, and investment funds to funding through acts of Congress, such as the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) and the Creating Helpful Incentives to Produce Semiconductors (CHIPS) and Science Act. Each agency has some flexibility in the use of its financial instruments — for example, setting interest rates on debt financing or establishing the length of tenors.</p> +<p>This fact shows that there is really no turning back from the export control path that the United States and its allies have gone down. Half measures incur nearly all of the costs of an aggressive export control policy — in terms of incentivizing U.S. firm outsourcing, foreign substitution, and Chinese indigenous investment — while delivering comparatively few of the strategic benefits.</p> -<p>This analysis uses the following definitions for each financial tool and explains how agencies deploy it:</p> +<h4 id="10-there-is-no-change-in-us-or-allied-policy-that-will-persuade-the-chinese-government-and-chinese-firms-to-abandon-their-semiconductor-equipment-de-americanization-and-decoupling-efforts-however-the-united-states-can-take-steps-to-make-those-efforts-more-difficult-and-to-extract-more-strategic-benefits-in-semiconductor-and-ai-competition">10. There is no change in U.S. or allied policy that will persuade the Chinese government and Chinese firms to abandon their semiconductor equipment de-Americanization and decoupling efforts. However, the United States can take steps to make those efforts more difficult and to extract more strategic benefits in semiconductor and AI competition.</h4> -<ul> - <li> - <p><strong>Loans:</strong> A federal agency offers debt financing with set terms on tenors (length of repayment) and rates (set at the U.S. Treasury rate or a widely used benchmark). Loans are typically disbursed and repaid in dollar denominations and may be referred to as direct loans or debt financing.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Loan guarantees:</strong> A federal agency assumes the debt obligation if the borrower defaults. A government agency can also purchase the debt from the lending financial institution and take responsibility for the loan.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Loan portfolio guarantees:</strong> A federal credit agency guarantees a portfolio of loans, which enables the guaranteed party to scale up its lending activities to qualifying borrowers. Guarantees are typically provided to local banks to lend to micro, small, and medium-sized enterprises.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Equity financing:</strong> Equity authority is the ability of the U.S. government to make investments in companies either directly by buying a percentage of the company or indirectly through funds that invest in those companies.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Export financing:</strong> Government agencies can provide financing to suppliers (exporters) trading with overseas buyers (importers). Export finance allows suppliers to access working capital while they wait for buyers to pay invoices.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Investment funds:</strong> U.S. government agencies can invest debt and equity into emerging market private equity funds to help address the shortfall of private equity capital or into investment funds in critical technologies where there are financing gaps.</p> - </li> -</ul> +<p>Critics of export controls oftentimes make two related arguments. First, revenues from China can be reinvested in R&amp;D and thus contribute to increased U.S. technological competitiveness, including against Chinese firms. Second, prohibiting exports increases willingness on the part of Chinese firms and the Chinese government to invest in competitors to U.S. firms, decreasing U.S. technological competitiveness.</p> -<p>This analysis focuses on investments that align most closely with DOD’s 14 critical technology areas, which include biotechnology, quantum science, future-generation wireless technology, advanced materials, trusted artificial intelligence (AI) and autonomy, integrated network systems of systems, microelectronics, space technology, renewable energy generation and storage, advanced computing and software, human-machine interfaces, directed energy, hypersonics, and integrated sensing and cyber. Several sources use the North American Industrial Classification System (NAICS) to identify critical technology areas, with the downside that such categories are construed broadly, often combining cutting-edge technologies with commonplace consumer goods. Each agency invests in a cross section of sectors beyond the 14 critical technology areas; however, this analysis focuses exclusively on areas of overlap with DOD.</p> +<p>However, these arguments assume that the strategic approach of the Chinese government and Chinese firms depends solely or primarily upon U.S. actions, which is contradicted by the review of Chinese policy at the beginning of this paper and from the experience of the EV and solar industries.</p> -<p>This analysis pulls open-source data on each of the federal credit agencies from annual financial reports and databases from each of the agencies covered, as well as from the federal government-wide website USAspending.gov. The site is “the official open data source of federal spending information, including information about federal awards such as contracts, grants, and loans.” This report is not intended to be a review of non-DOD agencies or their use of funding mechanisms to achieve their goals, but it may offer useful insights for those agencies as well as DOD.</p> +<p>Consider a thought experiment: What would be the likely policy response of the Chinese government if the United States decided to begin unrestricted exports of nuclear submarines to China? U.S. nuclear submarines are widely regarded as the best in the world, and China’s spies have long devoted major efforts to stealing U.S. submarine technology secrets.</p> -<h3 id="us-international-development-finance-corporation">U.S. International Development Finance Corporation</h3> +<p>Presumably, therefore, China would leap at the chance to buy U.S. nuclear submarines on the open market. And, under the logic of the above two arguments — increased U.S. revenue and decreased Chinese investment — these sales would increase, not decrease, the U.S. technological advantage in nuclear submarine technology. Are American policymakers fools for using export controls to block nuclear submarine sales to China?</p> -<h4 id="overview">Overview</h4> +<p>Of course not.</p> -<p>DFC is the U.S. government’s development finance institution. DFC assumed the functions of OPIC and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID)’s Development Credit Authority (DCA) through Congress’s Better Utilization of Investments Leading to Development (BUILD) Act. The BUILD Act increased DFC’s exposure cap to $60 billion, doubling OPIC’s former $29 billion exposure cap. DFC officially launched operations in December 2019.</p> +<p>Even if a hypothetical reckless U.S. president and Congress were to allow China to buy as many submarines as U.S. firms could make, China would never accept that this state of affairs is likely to continue on a permanent basis. China would obviously take the submarines they could get and reverse engineer the technology as fast as possible and transfer that technology to their domestic submarine industry, which they would continue to financially support. The increased revenue from R&amp;D for U.S. firms is not going to make nearly as much of a difference as China’s hands-on opportunity to reverse engineer U.S. technology. Neither would the lost sales among Chinese submarine manufacturers decrease China’s commitment to supporting a domestic industry. This is not to even mention the grave risks to national security of a hypothetical Chinese navy equipped with U.S.-built nuclear submarines.</p> -<p>In addition to its mandate to prioritize less-developed countries, DFC gives preference to projects involving U.S. persons as project sponsors or participants, as well as projects in countries complying with international trade obligations and embracing private enterprise. In its selection of projects, DFC considers factors such as environmental and social impact, workers’ rights, human rights, and compliance with U.S. sanctions. DFC also seeks to complement — not compete with — the private sector by mobilizing private sector capital. DFC currently prioritizes the energy, healthcare, financial inclusion, food security and agriculture, technology and infrastructure, and water and sanitation sectors.</p> +<p>This admittedly extreme thought experiment bears consideration because, while some in the West question whether semiconductor manufacturing equipment deserves to be viewed as a strategic technology of major importance to national security, China’s leaders do not. This belief is evident not only in words but also the deeds, whether that be Chinese state-backed espionage against equipment firms, aggressive reverse engineering of purchased Western equipment, or the astonishing amount of financial resources dedicated to indigenization.</p> -<p>The CSIS study team examined four DFC financial products: direct loans, loan guarantees, equity financing, and investment funds. DFC guarantee and loan sizes range from $1 million to $1 billion. DFC typically can lend up to 50 percent of the project cost but may consider somewhat higher participation in the case of an expansion of an existing profitable foreign enterprise or for projects with significant offtake agreements. Loan or guarantee tenor is usually between 5 and 15 years but can go up to 25 years. DFC can provide direct loans to clients who lack a funding source of their own or do not have access to commercial lending sources and require DFC to arrange physical disbursement of funds. DFC disburses funds directly from the Department of the Treasury and lends them to an eligible borrower. DFC also provides direct loans in the form of investment guarantees funded by certificates of participation in the U.S. fixed-income debt capital markets. DFC also can provide loan guarantees to clients that have an independent funding source or are independent funding sources (e.g., financial institutions) but are unable to provide funding without risk mitigation by DFC.</p> +<p>There is simply no policy that the United States could articulate that would persuade China to abandon its goals of de-Americanization and decoupling in the semiconductor equipment sector. As the United States and allied governments consider reforms to semiconductor equipment controls, they should focus less on how to change China’s goals and more on how to make achieving those goals as expensive and complicated as possible.</p> -<p>Examples of DFC debt financing, loan guarantees, and loan portfolio guarantees include the following:</p> +<hr /> -<ul> - <li> - <p>In 2021, DFC provided $300 million in debt financing (direct loan) to Africa Data Centres Holdings Limited to support the development of critical information and communications technology (ICT) infrastructure in Kenya, South Africa, and other DFC-eligible countries.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>In 2021, DFC announced a $267 million guarantee to Smart RJ Concessionária de Iluminação Pública SPE S.A. to support the modernization of the public lighting system and installation and management of smart city infrastructure in the city of Rio de Janeiro.</p> - </li> -</ul> +<p><strong>Gregory C. Allen</strong> is the director of the Wadhwani AI Center at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C.</p>Gregory C. AllenThere is a fierce debate in the United States and among its allies about the impacts of export controls, and nowhere is that debate more heated than in the semiconductor equipment manufacturing industry.U.S. Immigration Policy2024-11-25T12:00:00+08:002024-11-25T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/us-immigration-policy<p><em>Critical sectors of the U.S. economy remain badly understaffed. Additionally, because of the U.S. industrial policies creating positions in targeted industries and an aging workforce tied to specific career paths, shortages are set to become more dire in the medium term.</em> <excerpt></excerpt> <em>This report counters the argument that if more people enter the United States, fewer resources will be left for those already here. Immigrants create more benefits than costs while putting the country in a more globally competitive position. Lifting barriers to immigration would improve Americans’ ability to find affordable housing, medical care, and groceries and create the workforce needed both in the near term and in the long run.</em></p> -<p>DFC also provides financial support to emerging market investment funds. DFC selects funds for investment by evaluating the fund’s strategy, management team, track record, fundraising capabilities, and fund terms. In 2019, DFC provided $50 million in financing to the Meridiam Infrastructure Africa Fund. Meridiam was expected to make up to 10 infrastructure investments across Africa, primarily in the renewable energy, transportation, and environmental sectors.</p> +<h3 id="introduction">Introduction</h3> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/ayS2MOz.png" alt="image01" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 1: Active DFC Projects by Sector, through FY 2021 Q3.</strong> Source: <a href="https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R47006">Shayerah I. Akhtar and Nick M. Brown, U.S. International Development Finance Corporation: Overview and Issues, CRS Report No. R47006 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, January 2022)</a>, based on data from <a href="https://www.dfc.gov/what-we-do/active-projects">DFC</a>.</em></p> +<p>“Give me your tired, your poor, your huddled masses yearning to breathe free.” These words, inscribed on the Statue of Liberty pedestal, tell the world that people searching for new lives and new opportunities are welcome in the United States. Indeed, foreigners becoming part of the country’s economic success has been a constant throughout U.S. history. Immigrants have been confident in their ability to pursue a better life in the United States. Insights from U.S. labor markets also show that immigration is essential to the country’s wealth and security; it has been a boon to a growing U.S. economy in dire need of additional workers. Their contributions benefit all Americans and provide the key to a better life for them and their families.</p> -<p>Through the BUILD Act, the DFC also has a new financial tool in the form of equity financing. Investments in equity are limited to (1) 30 percent of the total project and (2) a total of 35 percent of the DFC’s total investment exposure, up to $21 billion. In addition to adhering to the same requirements to obtain debt financing, equity financing applicants must demonstrate a strong business model, solid revenue, potential for scale, an experienced management team, and good corporate governance.</p> +<p>Despite migrants’ importance, immigration remains a fraught issue in the U.S. political system. The last successful overhaul of U.S. policy was almost 40 years ago. Despite the influx of proposals and debate, optimism for immigration reform remains unlikely. Rather than address the details of immigration law reform, this paper explores the current state of the U.S. economy and the role migrants can play.</p> -<h4 id="funding">Funding</h4> +<p>The U.S. labor market cooled in the first half of 2024, but critical sectors remain badly understaffed. Additionally, because of U.S. industrial policies creating positions in targeted industries and an aging workforce tied to specific career paths, shortages are set to become more dire in the medium term. These shortages will affect the affordability of necessities, including housing, medical care, and groceries. The situation will worsen without a drastic increase in the number of available workers, and changes to U.S. immigration policy are the most effective pathways to that end. As policymakers face considerable domestic economic challenges, it is worth remembering that the country’s best tool is letting the huddled masses in.</p> -<p>DFC is funded through a corporate capital account (CCA) consisting of appropriations and collections. DFC appropriations designate a portion of CCA collections that may be retained for operating expenses, and excess collections are credited to the Department of the Treasury. DFC’s activities are demand driven (usage depends on commercial interest and the availability of bankable projects), but the agency seeks to attract applications with outreach, business development, calls for proposal, and action through administration initiatives, partnerships, and policies, such as the G7’s Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment, the Quad (a partnership among the governments of Australia, India, Japan, and the United States), and the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity (an economic framework covering climate, technology, anticorruption, and trade among the United States and 13 partner countries in the Indo-Pacific). In FY 2023, DFC committed $9.1 billion, up from $7.4 billion in FY 2022 and $6.7 billion in FY 2021</p> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">The U.S. labor market cooled in the first half of 2024, but critical sectors remain badly understaffed . . . shortages will affect the affordability of necessities, including housing, medical care, and groceries.</code></em></strong></p> -<h4 id="governance">Governance</h4> +<h3 id="overview">Overview</h3> -<p>DFC is led by a nine-member board of directors comprising a chief executive officer, four other U.S. government officials (the secretary of state, who is the chairperson of the board; the USAID administrator, who is the vice chairperson; the secretary of the treasury; and the secretary of commerce) or their designees, and four nongovernment members (for three-year terms, renewable once). All board positions are presidentially appointed and subject to Senate confirmation. All DFC powers are vested in the board, which provides direction and general oversight and approves major DFC decisions. The CEO acts on the board’s direction. The board meets quarterly, and a quorum is five members. Other DFC officers include the deputy CEO (also a Senate-confirmed, presidentially appointed position), chief risk officer, chief development officer, and inspector general (IG).</p> +<p>Three main factors contribute to positive economic growth: people, capital, and technology. The upside hopes for growth-fostering technologies like artificial intelligence (AI) and quantum computing are significant, as are the expectations for future reductions in interest rates. But the labor market cannot be ignored. Moreover, given how tight the U.S. labor market is, there are signs that it is contributing to inflation and hindering U.S. gross domestic product (GDP) growth. While hiring rates are slowing and the overall tightness of the labor market may unwind, the labor shortage described in the following four case studies remains acute. The sectors explored in these case studies are central to U.S. prosperity, which is why ameliorating these shortages will be key to continued U.S. economic growth.</p> -<p>Investments totaling more than $50 million go to the board for approval; transactions below that amount are approved by a credit committee internal to DFC. All investments of $10 million or in specified countries require congressional notification to oversight committees (the House Foreign Affairs Committee and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee).</p> +<p>To help the U.S. economy achieve its greatest potential, jobs must be filled. Physically demanding in-person roles are facing shortfalls, including in construction, healthcare, transportation, and food production. These demanding roles could be filled with increases in legal immigration, supporting U.S. growth, ensuring a higher degree of affordability, and mitigating additional inflationary pressures.</p> -<h4 id="investments">Investments</h4> +<h4 id="demography">Demography</h4> -<p>Given that DFC invests primarily in low- and lower-middle-income countries and does not invest in defense-related industries, many of DFC’s and OPIC’s (its predecessor) investments do not align with DOD’s 14 critical technology areas or its supply chains. However, the team identified DOD-DFC alignment in renewable energy, data, ICT, and biotechnology investments. DFC investments in these sectors began in 2010, and the total amount invested was $4,112,092,249.</p> +<p>The domestic birth rate is insufficient to address the labor shortages already emerging in the U.S. economy. The U.S. fertility rate has been decreasing since the 2008 financial crisis, dropping almost 23 percent between 2007 and 2022. Birth rates are now below the replacement rate and are unlikely to return to that rate anytime soon (Figure 1).</p> -<p>Renewable energy accounts for most investments, at more than 88 percent of total investments aligned with DOD criteria, for a total of 63 of 71 identified projects. Much of DFC support for the renewable energy sector is geared toward constructing solar photovoltaic (PV) plants to provide renewable energy solutions to households, agribusinesses, educational institutions, and solar manufacturing plants.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/dlSdT7n.png" alt="image01" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 1: U.S. Fertility Rate, 1960–2022.</strong> Source: <a href="https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/SPDYNTFRTINUSA">“Fertility Rate, Total for the United States,” Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis</a>.</em></p> -<p>DFC and OPIC have also provided financing for four data-related projects for data centers and support for businesses and three ICT projects that financed cell phone tower constructions, telecom asset acquisitions, and the expansion of wireless businesses.</p> +<p>The average U.S. fertility rate was 1.67 children per woman as of 2022, far below the 2.1 children necessary to sustain a population. Yet the United States is faring better than many other developed countries. Germany’s rate was around 1.46 children per woman in 2022, and Japan’s was 1.26 children per woman in 2023. Italy, in turn, is in a tougher spot, with only 1.24 children per woman as of 2022. South Korea’s birth rate, a very low 0.78 children per woman, is expected to fall further. Out of the Group of Seven (G7) nations, only France boasts a higher rate than the United States, at around 1.79 children per woman. However, the French rate — which is falling, like that of every other nation mentioned above — is still not enough to stabilize the population (Figure 2).</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/we9Zv2o.png" alt="image02" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 2: Active DFC Financing for Critical Technology Investment by Sector, FY 2012–FY 2023 Q3.</strong> Source: DFC.gov and CSIS analysis.</em></p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/Aa95Gjs.png" alt="image02" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 2: Comparison of Fertility Rates, 1960–2022.</strong> Source: <a href="https://fred.stlouisfed.org/categories/33512">“Fertility Rate,” Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis</a>.</em></p> -<p>OPIC and DFC also focused their financial support in DOD sectors focused on critical technologies in Africa and Asia. Africa is the predominant recipients of OPIC and DFC financing, and India receives the most financial support overall.</p> +<p>As a result, the United States, along with many developed countries, is aging (Figure 3). The proportion of the U.S. population over 65 increased at the fastest rate ever between 2010 and 2020. In 2020, one in six people in the United States was 65 or older. The median age in the United States increased from 37.2 years in 2010 to 38.4 years in 2019 — a trend that shows no signs of slowing, driven by aging baby boomers. Dr. Luke Rogers, chief of the Census Bureau’s Population Estimates Branch, highlighted the fact that no other age group witnessed a significant increase alongside the 65-and-older age group. In fact, the 18-and-below age group was smaller in 2019 than in 2010. Working-age adults, by nature of their role in society, produce more than they consume and serve as a source of financial support to the nonworking population, chiefly through tax contributions to public transfer programs, as well as direct private transfers.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/zmPqrTp.png" alt="image03" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 3: Active DFC Financing for Critical Technology Regional Financial Support, FY 2012–FY 2023 Q3.</strong> Source: DFC.gov and CSIS analysis.</em></p> +<p>The rate at which the U.S. population is aging is also outpacing the growth of the working-age population, posing a significant threat to the economic future of the United States. The U.S. dependency ratio, which is the ratio of Americans under 15 or over 65 to the working population, reveals this issue clearly. In 2010, the U.S. dependency ratio sat at 49, meaning that there were 49 dependents for every 100 working-age Americans. By 2019, the ratio grew to 53.7 dependents per 100 working-age Americans, driven by the growth in the 65-and-older population.</p> -<p>When considered by commitment level, direct loans were the most prevalent tool used to support critical technology sectors. That said, commitment level is only one method for measuring the potential impact of assistance. Other measures, such as direct equity investment and ownership stake rather than repayment requirement, may have an outsized influence relative to their comparatively small commitment level.</p> +<p>The shrinking workforce as a proportion of the population will pose significant problems for the U.S. economy if these concerns are not addressed promptly to ensure existing labor shortages do not continue to grow and that future shortages are addressed preemptively. The reality is that the productive segments of the population — namely, the workforce — contribute most significantly to the economy through their labor, consumption, and contribution to public services through taxation. In comparison, the labor force participation rate for those over 65 was only 24.5 percent in September 2024 due to the high number of retirees. Moreover, retirees do not contribute income taxes while simultaneously consuming less and being a greater burden on public services. Effectively addressing the impacts of an aging workforce depends on using immigration to ameliorate labor shortages, sustain U.S. economic growth, and improve the affordability of critical services.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/StUjPBQ.png" alt="image04" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 4: Active DFC Financing for Critical Technology Areas by Mechanism, FY 2012–FY 2023.</strong> Source: DFC.gov and CSIS analysis based on data from <a href="https://www.dfc.gov/what-we-do/active-projects">DFC</a>.</em></p> +<h4 id="the-us-labor-market">The U.S. Labor Market</h4> -<h3 id="export-import-bank-of-the-united-states">Export-Import Bank of the United States</h3> +<p>In 2024, tightness in the U.S. labor market could be seen across economic indicators, with an unemployment rate of 4.1 percent and only 1.861 million people collecting unemployment in late September 2024 (Figure 3). At the same time, data from the Job Openings and Labor Turnover Survey (JOLTS), collected by the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), indicated that there were 8.04 million open jobs in August 2024, meaning that there were almost 6.2 million more open jobs than people collecting unemployment (Figure 4). Prior to the Covid-19 pandemic, that figure would have been an all-time record. The high number of open jobs in the wake of the pandemic may be attributed to the fiscal and monetary policy stimulus response to Covid-19. But now that four years have passed since the beginning of the pandemic, the high number of open jobs may be an ongoing risk for the labor market, especially since many open jobs are in physically demanding in-person roles. Meanwhile, the number of people collecting unemployment represents only around 1.1 percent of the labor force — one of the lowest percentages in U.S. history (Figure 5).</p> -<h4 id="overview-1">Overview</h4> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/uftIZq3.png" alt="image03" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 3: U.S. Unemployment Rate, 2000–2024.</strong> Source: <a href="https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/UNRATE">“Unemployment Rate,” Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis</a>.</em></p> -<p>EXIM has been the U.S. export credit agency since 1934, helping U.S. exporters that work in challenging and risky markets obtain financing by covering the credit and country risks the private sector is unable or unwilling to accept. EXIM offers the following financing tools: protecting exporters against nonpayment risk by foreign customers, offering support for U.S. companies selling services overseas, backing exporters’ loans from private banks to finance materials and labor, and providing financing to foreign buyers for projects, transportation, and U.S. export sales financing.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/MTd8vJW.png" alt="image04" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 4: U.S. Job Openings, 2000–2024.</strong> Source: <a href="https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/JTSJOL">“Job Openings: Total Nonfarm,” Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis</a>.</em></p> -<p>The bank has several loan guarantee products. EXIM loan guarantees cover 100 percent of the loan principal and accrued interest and are available for medium-term (up to five years) and long-term (over seven years) repayment, which is usually determined by transaction size. Loan guarantees are also available for short-term loans.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/XkLJWB1.png" alt="image05" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 5: Continuing Jobless Claims, 2000–2024.</strong> Source: <a href="https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/CCSA">“Continued Claims (Insured Unemployment),” Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis</a>.</em></p> -<p>EXIM’s medium- and long-term loan guarantees offer competitive term financing from lenders when it is otherwise unavailable from commercial banks, with terms generally up to 10 years. These products provide financing for international buyers of U.S. capital goods and related services (not consumer goods), risk mitigation for a transaction with a particular buyer, more secure entry to emerging markets, longer repayment terms, flexible lender financing options backed by EXIM’s guarantee, and coverage for 100 percent of commercial and political risks.</p> +<p>The tightness in the labor market is most pronounced for roles that are physically demanding and require an in-person presence to fulfill the job’s core functions. In other words, whereas many analysts, consultants, and knowledge workers can do their jobs remotely, this is not true for professions that require hands-on activities. Four industries at the top of this list are construction, healthcare, childcare, and food production.</p> -<p>EXIM also offers working capital loan guarantees. This product provides financing to exporters to help with cash flow to fulfill sales orders and take on new business abroad. EXIM provides a 90 percent loan-backing guarantee to the lender, decreasing repayment risk and thereby increasing the lender’s willingness to extend a loan. With an expanded borrowing base, small business exporters can borrow more with the same collateral. Further, the guarantee can cover both multiple export sales and individual contracts. EXIM can guarantee both revolving and transaction-specific facilities, and there is no minimum or maximum transaction amount.</p> +<h3 id="case-studies">Case Studies</h3> -<p>Before approving certain transactions, EXIM considers the economic impact of a particular transaction and the environmental effects. EXIM also has a statutory mandate to support small business. Small business authorizations in FY 2022 totaled $1.537 billion, representing 29.3 percent of total authorizations. In FY 2022, 1,589 transactions were authorized for the direct benefit of small business exporters, which amounted to 88.3 percent of total transactions.</p> +<p>To reveal some of the economic potential that a lack of labor hinders, the following case studies explore four physically demanding in-person roles.</p> -<p>EXIM has to comply with congressional mandates requiring minimum awards distribution for the following programs: the Small Business Mandate, Sub-Saharan Africa Mandate, Environmentally Beneficial Goods and Services Mandate, and Program on China and Transformational Exports Mandate.</p> +<h4 id="construction">Construction</h4> -<h4 id="funding-1">Funding</h4> +<p>Despite high interest and mortgage rates, there are massive unmet labor market needs in construction. In August 2024, there were 370,000 open construction jobs, according to JOLTS data (Figure 6). But why is construction so hot with such a high cost of capital, and what is the outlook when interest rates fall?</p> -<p>EXIM is considered a self-financing agency, which means that it collects funds from credit program customers and uses these funds to offset, or pay back, EXIM’s appropriation to the Department of the Treasury. For FY 2022, EXIM authorized $5.242 billion in loan guarantees and insurance and no direct loan in support of an estimated $10.557 billion in U.S. export sales.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/ibRuCvX.png" alt="image06" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 6: U.S. Construction Job Openings, 2000–2024.</strong> Source: <a href="https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/JTS2300JOL">“Job Openings: Construction,” Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis</a>.</em></p> -<h4 id="governance-1">Governance</h4> +<p>Far more job openings are expected in the construction field in the aftermath of the bipartisan Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act (IIJA). The IIJA is one of the largest investments in infrastructure in the history of the United States, but job shortages have hindered progress for many IIJA projects. A 2022 survey of major companies involved in these projects showed that 91 percent of construction firms were struggling to fill open positions that conduct much of the on-site construction, especially in manual craftwork labor. With expectations that the IIJA will create 175,000 new construction jobs per year, immigration can help address some of this shortage.</p> -<p>A five-member board of directors leads the bank. Members are presidentially appointed and Senate confirmed. The bank’s president and first vice president serve, respectively, as the board’s chair and vice chair. The board needs a quorum of at least three members to conduct business, such as to approve transactions above a certain threshold (now $25 million), make policies, and delegate authority. The 2019 reauthorization provided alternative procedures in the event of a quorum lapse. An Advisory Committee and a Sub-Saharan Africa Advisory Committee support the board.</p> +<p>The untapped potential in construction stems from broad strength across the U.S. labor force. There are more Americans on nonfarm payrolls than ever before, and wages rose by almost $7 per hour between February 2020 and September 2024. Overall, there are more workers on payrolls today than in the history of the United States, and they are making more money than ever before (Figure 7). But high mortgage rates and limited housing options have caused rents to rise, adding inflationary pressures across the U.S. economy and keeping year-on-year consumer price index (CPI) inflation rates elevated. This presents a challenge for the Federal Reserve as it seeks to restore an environment of low, stable prices for reducing interest rates.</p> -<h4 id="investments-1">Investments</h4> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/uHNYaEK.png" alt="image07" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 7: Total U.S. Nonfarm Payrolls, 1990–2024.</strong> Source: <a href="https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/PAYEMS">“All Employees, Total Nonfarm,” Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis</a>.</em></p> -<p>The authors assessed EXIM transactions from 2007 to 2023 that aligned most closely with DOD’s 14 critical technologies. An estimated 711 transactions used EXIM’s working capital and medium- to long-term guarantee products. In that time, EXIM approved $3,458,276,775 and disbursed $2,771,404,019. ICT-related NAICS codes relevant to FutureG (transformative 5G and future-generation wireless networking technologies), as well as present- and previous-generation communications technologies, were associated with the highest volume of assistance (Figure 5).</p> +<p>During the second quarter of 2024, the rental vacancy rate was only 6.6 percent (Figure 8). Prior to the Covid-19 pandemic, a lower vacancy rate had not been seen since the second quarter of 1985.</p> -<p>EXIM uses a mix of insurance, loan guarantees, and direct loans, which is not included in this analysis (Figure 6).</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/9LpGXcD.png" alt="image08" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 8: U.S. Rental Vacancies, 1956–2024.</strong> Source: <a href="https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/RRVRUSQ156N">“Rental Vacancy Rate in the United States,” Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis</a>.</em></p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/KX8dKIH.png" alt="image05" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 5: EXIM Financing to Critical Technology Sectors, FY 2007–FY 2022.</strong> Source: EXIM dataset and CSIS analysis.</em></p> +<p>In addition to a tight U.S. rental market, sales of existing homes were sluggish in 2023 and the first half of 2024 as new housing starts remained relatively low. As a result, home prices have continued to rise. Plus, interest rates are at the highest levels in decades. With the prospect of lower interest rates and mortgage rates over the next couple of years, housing demand and associated sticker prices could rise even further — a situation greatly exacerbated by an already tight construction labor market that could experience tremendous and rapid growth in labor demand.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/rQwyxnq.png" alt="image06" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 6: EXIM Financing to Critical Technology Sectors by Mechanism, FY 2007–FY 2022.</strong> Source: EXIM dataset and CSIS analysis.</em></p> +<p>Because the owner’s equivalent rent component of the CPI is about 25 percent of the total CPI and about 33 percent of the core CPI, ensuring sufficient construction labor to meet needs within the U.S. economy is critical for mitigating inflationary pressures across the economy.</p> -<p>Of the EXIM assistance spending for critical technology sectors, $307 million faced cancellation before or after disbursement (Figure 7). This research did not reveal the causes behind the cancellations. In addition, EXIM recently launched the China and Transformational Exports Program (CTEP) to maintain the United States’ position as a leading exporter in several critical technology areas.</p> +<h4 id="healthcare">Healthcare</h4> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/m7q7icz.png" alt="image07" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 7: EXIM Financing to Critical Technology Areas by Status, FY 2007–FY 2022.</strong> Source: EXIM dataset and CSIS analysis.</em></p> +<p>Expectations of labor market shortfalls in healthcare have existed for some time, but demographic shifts of an aging population in the United States are exacerbating already severe shortfalls in the healthcare field. For many years, the BLS has forecasted that healthcare fields will see some of the greatest labor market growth the past ten years. But with an extremely tight labor market as a backdrop, the challenge of filling those roles is greater than ever.</p> -<h3 id="small-business-administration">Small Business Administration</h3> +<p>The BLS Occupational Outlook Handbook from Fall 2024 reflects that 5 of the top 10 projected fastest-growing occupations between 2023 and 2033 are in healthcare, including nurse practitioners (no. 3), medical and health service managers (no. 6), epidemiologists (no. 20), physical therapy assistants (no. 9), and occupational therapy assistants (no. 11). Also among the top 20 occupations are home health and personal care aides (no. 14) and substance abuse, behavioral disorder, and mental health counselors (no. 19).</p> -<h4 id="overview-2">Overview</h4> +<p>In August 2024, there were 1,394,000 openings in healthcare and social assistance (Figure 9). This figure alone almost eclipses the 1.861 million people the U.S. Department of Labor reported were collecting unemployment benefits in late September 2024. U.S. surgeon general Vivek Murthy has highlighted that this shortage is expected to increase over time to around 3 million low-wage healthcare workers by 2027 and 140,000 physicians by 2033.</p> -<p>The SBA, established in 1953, is an independent federal agency that supports small enterprises through counsel, aid, and investment. The SBA has a range of policy tools to invest in small businesses. This analysis focuses on the agency’s 7(a) and 504 loan programs. These programs do not comprise the entirety of the SBA’s loan authorities; however, they capture the SBA’s long-term financial tools to support domestic business growth and innovation. Additional investment tools include the SBA’s Small Business Investment Companies, which is a privately owned investment company licensed by the SBA and backed by the agency that lends low-cost government capital to invest in U.S. small businesses.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/0eNQzsZ.png" alt="image09" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 9: U.S. Healthcare and Social Assistance Job Openings, 2000–2024.</strong> Source: <a href="https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/JTU6200JOL">“Job Openings: Health Care and Social Assistance,” Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis</a>.</em></p> -<p>The SBA’s 7(a) loan guarantee program encourages lenders to provide loans to enterprises otherwise unable to receive capital on “reasonable terms and conditions.” The 7(a) program is the SBA’s primary loan program and houses several subprograms, which collectively guarantee loans that can be used toward acquiring short- and long-term working capital, refinancing debt, improving facilities, purchasing equipment, and covering paychecks in times of crisis.</p> +<p>The healthcare worker shortage is unlikely to subside without intervention. As it stands, the number of U.S. medical students is insufficient to address the shortage despite increased applications and enrollment in the aftermath of the Covid-19 pandemic. One in five physicians in the United States is foreign born and educated, representing a 30 percent increase since 2004. The significant lack of funding for residencies further contributes to the difficulty in training enough physicians to address the shortage. The final element is that the demographic shift within the United States and the aging population will only increase demand for healthcare over time, with no end to the shortage in sight, barring a concerted effort to address it. Immigration for low-wage healthcare workers and physicians could help alleviate these issues, improving access to healthcare while medical education reform takes place.</p> -<p>For a small business applicant to be eligible for SBA’s 7(a) loan, it must be located in the United States, be a for-profit operating business, qualify within SBA’s size requirements, demonstrate a need for the desired credit, and have lender certification that financing is unavailable without SBA assistance. The SBA will then require the lender to consider the applicant’s ability to reasonably repay the loan based on the applicant’s history and potential for profitability. If the lender approves, the SBA will cover up to 90 percent of the loan’s value.</p> +<p>The aging U.S. population and labor market shortfalls in healthcare are translating into increased inflationary pressures and costs for U.S. consumers, which can be seen in the CPI. The base years for the U.S. CPI are 1982–84. The total basket of goods for consumers rose as an index from 100 in 1982–84 to almost 315 in September 2024 (Figure 10). However, while all consumer prices have tripled since the early 1980 base years, the medical care cost index has risen from 100 to almost 566 — a more than fivefold increase in costs (Figure 10). With generational churn and a higher proportion of elderly residents, the costs for medical care are at risk of rising further and will be exacerbated by ongoing and potentially worsening shortfalls in the healthcare professions.</p> -<p>SBA’s 7(a) loan terms depend on the lending institution and the recipient. SBA 7(a) loans have a $3.75 million cap, and the interest rate varies based on the lender selecting a base rate that gradually changes based on the loan value and maturity.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/W9Dozad.png" alt="image10" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 10: Total CPI Inflation and Medical Care CPI Inflation.</strong> Source: <a href="https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/CPIAUCSL">“Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers: All Items in U.S. City Average,” Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis</a>.</em></p> -<h4 id="funding-2">Funding</h4> +<h4 id="transportation">Transportation</h4> -<p>SBA’s 7(a) program is funded through congressional appropriations and by fees and collections of its loan guarantees. In the rare event a loan recipient defaults or fails to repay on time, SBA will require additional allocations to support its programs. From 2014 to 2020, the SBA subsidized only $99 million of its loan guarantees — all of which occurred in 2020 amid the Covid-19 pandemic. In FY 2023, the SBA’s 7(a) program received $35 billion to support its activities.</p> +<p>Transportation is a key sector both inside and outside U.S. cities. Workers in this sector transport people or cargo by land, air, sea, pipeline, or rail. A labor shortage in this sector fundamentally hurts U.S. growth through negative impacts on urban public transport, on the consistency of just-in-time inventory supply chains, and even on U.S. capacity to export or import. As a by-product, labor shortages also affect the accessibility of goods for consumers, especially in rural and inland areas of the United States.</p> -<h4 id="governance-2">Governance</h4> +<p>Transportation has been linked quite closely with economic performance, as shown in past research by the U.S. Bureau of Transportation Statistics. The Transportation Services Index (TSI) measures monthly freight and passenger transportation services, with proof that movement on the freight TSI usually occurs prior to changes in the economy. Similarly, GDP and freight TSI tend to move simultaneously to varying magnitudes, again cementing the importance of transportation to the U.S. economy.</p> -<p>The agency’s appointed administrator governs the SBA’s 7(a) program on a statutory basis. However, the process is governed by the SBA’s Loan Guaranty Processing Center, which screens applications submitted by lenders through the Electronic Loan Processing/Servicing website, which is available through the SBA One interface. The center processes applications sent by lending institutions that do not have delegated authority to make 7(a) loans without prior governmental approval.</p> +<p>On a broader level, JOLTS data in the transportation, warehousing, and utilities sectors show 359,000 job openings in August 2024 (Figure 11).</p> -<h4 id="investments-2">Investments</h4> - -<p>SBA 7(a) applicants and awardees align with several of DOD’s 14 critical technology areas. The following chart depicts the share capital guaranteed by the SBA 7(a) loans in critical technology areas categorized based on the NAICS.</p> - -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/4CAoaVu.png" alt="image08" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 8: SBA Financing to Critical Sectors by Year, FY 2010–FY 2023.</strong> Source: SBA FOIA datasets and CSIS analysis.</em></p> - -<p>From 2010 to 2023, SBA’s computing allocations dominated the 7(a) program’s coverage, with approximately $3 billion in computing-related loans. These figures should not be taken to mean that computing-related loans are going solely toward scaling up advanced computing software highlighted by DOD. However, they demonstrate the SBA’s interest in these applicants and the organization’s efforts to incentivize capital to flow into these businesses.</p> - -<p>High technology and biotechnologies follow computing in terms of the SBA 7(a) program’s investments, although the difference between those two and computing remains stark. High-technology coverage throughout 2010–23 was approximately $830 million, and biotechnology was about $330 million. High technology captures a range of R&amp;D activities including nanotechnologies, scientific instrument manufacturing, and laboratory-related obligations. Biotechnology covers a myriad of medicinal and pharmaceutical applications.</p> - -<p>In contrast to EXIM, computing is the largest beneficiary of SBA assistance in critical technology sectors. The second-largest category, high technology, includes a wide range of R&amp;D and cannot easily be assigned to a single critical technology area (Figure 9). Lender programs, including general 504 lenders programs, certified lenders programs, and preferred lenders programs for 7a loans, were the most prominent source of SBA assistance for investments in critical technology sectors (Figure 10).</p> - -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/AnemVz2.png" alt="image09" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 9: SBA Financing to Critical Technology Sectors, FY 1991–FY 2023.</strong> Source: SBA FOIA datasets and CSIS analysis.</em></p> - -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/GRvKSOM.png" alt="image10" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 10: SBA Financing to Critical Technology Sectors by Mechanism, FY 1991–FY 2023.</strong> Source: SBA FOIA datasets and CSIS analysis.</em></p> - -<p>In most cases, SBA was repaid in full. However, $1.6 billion of SBA assistance was cancelled, and $600 million was charged off during the covered period (Figure 11). Reasons for assistance cancellation were not identified in the course of research.</p> - -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/CgW7d2A.png" alt="image11" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 11: SBA Financing to Critical Technology Sectors by Status, FY 1991–FY 2023.</strong> Source: SBA FOIA datasets and CSIS analysis.</em></p> - -<h3 id="department-of-energy">Department of Energy</h3> - -<p><strong><em>Title 17 Program and ATVM Program</em></strong></p> - -<h4 id="overview-3">Overview</h4> - -<p>The DOE’s Title 17 Energy Infrastructure Reinvestment (EIR) Program was established by the Energy Policy Act of 2005 and has financed projects under different loan authorities. The EIR Program is under Section 1706 of Title 17 and was incorporated in a 2023 update to implement provisions of the IRA. EIR projects support reinvestment in communities throughout the United States where existing energy infrastructure has been challenged by market forces, resource depletion, age, technology advancements, or the broader energy transition. This infrastructure might include power plants, fossil fuel extraction sites, transmission systems, fossil fuel pipelines, refineries, or other energy facilities that have ceased to operate or that continue to operate but could benefit from improvements to reduce greenhouse gas emissions or pollution.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/sp8wsyx.png" alt="image11" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 11: U.S. Transportation, Warehousing, and Utilities Job Openings, 2000–2024.</strong> Source: <a href="https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/JTU480099JOL">“Job Openings: Transportation, Warehousing, and Utilities,” Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis</a>.</em></p> -<p>The EIR guarantees loans to projects that retool, repower, repurpose, or replace energy infrastructure that has ceased operations, or projects that enable operating energy infrastructure to avoid, reduce, utilize, or sequester air pollutants or anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases.</p> +<p>More importantly, the transportation workforce is aging, with 24.3 percent of all transportation workers aged 55 or older, compared to an average of 23.2 percent across all industries. Certain modes of transportation show more alarming signs of aging, with the percentage of workers aged 55 or older at 30.8 percent for water transport, 27.9 percent for trucking, and 27.8 percent for air transport. Transit workers are also aging rapidly, with 37.9 percent aged 55 or older. All these transportation modes are aging faster than the national average.</p> -<p>The Advanced Technology Vehicles Manufacturing Loan Program (ATVM) provides loans to support the manufacture of eligible advanced technology vehicles and qualifying components, including newly authorized modes from the Bipartisan Infrastructure Deal. This program covers light-duty vehicles; medium- and heavy-duty vehicles; trains or locomotives; maritime vessels, including offshore wind support vessels; aircraft; and hyperloop.</p> +<p>For transportation as a whole, the most alarming aspect of the aging workforce is the severe lack of younger workers to replace those who are aging. As it stands across the entire sector, only 12.7 percent of all workers are aged 16–24, with some modes, such as transit, having only 2 percent of workers aged 16–24. These signs cumulatively point to an existing labor shortage, which will only increase in severity as the workforce continues to age. Crucially, as many transportation workers near retirement age without younger workers to replace them, the sector will struggle with vacancies in the short term, exacerbating the labor shortage.</p> -<h4 id="funding-3">Funding</h4> +<p>Going forward, an estimated 1.3 million jobs will need to be filled every year in the transportation sector between 2021 and 2026. Currently, immigrants play a key role in transportation, providing essential services to U.S. citizens and making up an estimated 20.6 percent of the transportation workforce. Providing more pathways to legal immigration to address labor shortages in the transportation industry can play a role in maintaining the affordability of both goods and transportation services. In 2023, a survey conducted by the American Transportation Research Institute showed that motor carriers’ second-largest concern was driver shortages, which has been high on the list of concerns for several years, topping it in 2018.</p> -<p>The IRA appropriated $5 billion through September 30, 2026, to carry out the EIR program with a limitation on commitments to guarantee loans with a total principal amount of less than $250 billion. The IRA removed the $25 billion cap on ATVM loan authority and appropriated $3 billion in credit subsidies to support these loans.</p> +<p>The IIJA also holds some potential for transportation job creation with the construction of new railways and roads. Naturally, transportation workers are needed to operate much of the infrastructure as well as support these projects during their construction. The IIJA estimates about 100,000 new jobs in transportation and material moving are created each year, outlining the need for novel solutions and immigration reform to address a shortage that will not decrease in the medium to long term.</p> -<h4 id="governance-3">Governance</h4> +<p>The overall transportation CPI has been rising rapidly in the aftermath of the Covid-19 pandemic across all modes of transportation, hitting directly at household finances. These higher costs drive up wholesale producer inflation across industries and sectors that rely on transportation, which eventually reach consumers, driving up consumer inflation. This is clear when considering the significant price increases in transportation services that have taken place in recent decades. The CPI for all items rose from an index of 100 in 1982–84 to almost 315 in September 2024. In the meantime, the index for transportation services rose to over 436 in September 2024, representing a fourfold increase from the index in 1982–84.</p> -<p>The administration of the DOE EIR program is under the statutory purview of the secretary of energy. The secretary delegates this authority to the leadership of the DOE’s Loan Programs Office, which manages the ATVM program. The office has seven divisions: Loan Origination, Outreach and Business Development, Portfolio Management, Technical and Environmental, Risk Management, Management and Operations, and Legal.</p> +<h4 id="agriculture-and-food-production">Agriculture and Food Production</h4> -<h4 id="investments-3">Investments</h4> +<p>The United States has also suffered from acute labor shortages in the agriculture and food production industries, with archaic and restrictive immigration laws contributing to the shortage. Farms are struggling to fill an estimated 1.5–2 million positions per year. For example, 56 percent of California farmers stated that they were having difficulty filling jobs.</p> -<p>A major area of focus for DOE’s Title 17 programs is developing PV solar power in the United States (Figure 12). Currently, there are four Midwestern projects that the DOE guarantees either entirely or partially. The total value of these projects is approximately $16.9 billion (Figure 13).</p> +<p>These acute shortages reduce productivity, incentivize imports to replace decreasing domestic production, and hinder U.S. food security. Most importantly for the U.S. public, these labor shortages have a direct impact on grocery and food prices, with food inflation in 2022 reaching the highest levels since 1979. The imperative to modernize and expand the agricultural workforce through immigration reform becomes clear.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/PHTYwuL.png" alt="image12" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 12: DOE Financing to Critical Technology Sectors, FY 2009–FY 2023.</strong> Source: LPO Portfolio Projects, FAADS, and CSIS analysis.</em></p> +<p>A lack of growth in crop production is also coinciding with more demand than ever for fresh fruits and vegetables, with growing shares being imported. This deficit has expanded significantly over the last two decades, as 42.7 percent of fresh fruit in 2019 was imported to the United States rather than produced domestically, compared to 20.1 percent in 2000. Vegetables show a similar deficit, as 13.3 percent were imported into the United States in 2000 compared to 31.9 percent in 2019. In large part, the main beneficiaries of decreasing U.S. farm productivity and increasing U.S. produce demand have been Mexico and Canada, which now dominate fresh produce and meat imports into the United States.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/tuZy9td.png" alt="image13" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 13: DOE Loan Value by Start Year, FY 2008–FY 2023.</strong> Source: LPO Portfolio Projects, FAADS, and CSIS analysis.</em></p> +<p>Immigrants already make up 73 percent of the total farming workforce in the United States, more than any other economic sector. As a result, the agriculture industry suffers disproportionately when legal immigration is significantly restricted. The lack of legal immigration leads farmers to a dilemma between accepting production cuts and crop losses or resorting to undocumented migrants. Due to the lack of legal migrant labor, an estimated 48 percent of the U.S. farming workforce consists of undocumented migrants, which signifies the unworkable nature of existing immigration laws for many within the agriculture sector.</p> -<p>Full or partial loan guarantees are the most frequent tool of DOE Title 17 assistance, although direct loans are the preferred mechanism for ATVM assistance (Figure 14). Active projects make up the bulk of DOE’s portfolio, which is unsurprising given the recently enabled lending as part of the IRA (Figure 15).</p> +<p>Another significant concern is the rise in the average age of the immigrant workforce in agriculture due to the lack of young immigrants joining the field to replace aging workers. Between 2006 and 2021, the immigrant farm workforce aged seven years, dragging up the average age of the agricultural workforce. In contrast, the average age of U.S.-born farmworkers remained constant over the same period. With immigrants making up the majority of farmworkers, not addressing this issue could exacerbate the labor shortage.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/bz4CgXo.png" alt="image14" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 14: DOE Financing to Critical Technology Sectors by Mechanism, FY 2008–FY 2023.</strong> Source: LPO Portfolio Projects, FAADS, and CSIS analysis.</em></p> +<p>This shortage extends beyond farms to other key junctions within the food supply chain. In 2020, immigrants made up 21 percent of the overall food industry workforce, excluding restaurants but including transportation, animal and crop production, retail, food production, and food wholesale. In certain key states, these levels are exacerbated. For instance, 65 percent of the agriculture workforce in California consists of immigrants. Alaska and Nebraska have similar figures in their seafood and meat processing industries, respectively.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/weeKFH7.png" alt="image15" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 15: DOE Financing to Critical Technology Areas by Status, FY 2008–FY 2023.</strong> Source: LPO Portfolio Projects, FAADS, and CSIS analysis.</em></p> +<p>The labor shortage then directly affects food prices, with prices already rising due to major supply chain disruptions resulting from Covid-19 and the Russian invasion of Ukraine, one of the world’s major grain producers. In the United States, food prices increased by 11.2 percent between September 2021 and September 2022, in large part due to the aforementioned shocks, which increased agricultural commodity pricing, especially for corn and wheat. However, these price increases have not stopped, with around a 6 percent increase between 2022 and 2023. On a wider scale, between 2019 and 2023, food prices increased by around 25 percent due to Covid-19, the war in Ukraine, and immigration. A recent report by Texas A&amp;M International University showed that increased immigrant worker admittance directly relates to lower prices for poultry, meat, eggs, dairy, fruits, and vegetables.</p> -<h3 id="department-of-commerce">Department of Commerce</h3> +<h3 id="immigration-policys-role">Immigration Policy’s Role</h3> -<p><strong><em>IRA and CHIPS Act</em></strong></p> +<h4 id="overview-of-us-immigration-law-for-the-case-study-sectors">Overview of U.S. Immigration Law for the Case Study Sectors</h4> -<p>President Joe Biden signed the IRA into law in August 2022, providing funding opportunities through various departments, including the Department of Commerce, to accelerate the U.S. energy transition. Most of the Department of Commerce’s funding will be allocated through grants, direct spending, contracts, cooperative agreements, and technical assistance to support coastal communities and resilience efforts as well as weather and climate forecasting. At the time of writing, it was unclear how the IRA, through the Department of Commerce, would support the climate-related areas in DOD’s 14 critical technologies.</p> +<p>Three of the sectors included in this study would benefit in particular from H-2 (temporary worker) visa reform: transportation, construction, and agriculture. Seasonal demand plays a significant role in these sectors. By contrast, healthcare likely requires H-1B (skilled worker) visa reform, especially in the context of the impending physician shortage and the high-skilled nature of the healthcare industry.</p> -<p>The CHIPS Act of 2022 provides financial incentives, including loans and funds, for the domestic manufacture of semiconductors and the conduct of related research and development. The CHIPS Act will allocate $280 billion over the next 10 years. The Department of Commerce is looking to crowd in capital to finance rebuilding the domestic semiconductor industry and will provide loans and loan guarantees. Their effort is not to fully fund the production of chips or the construction of an entire fabrication facility. The Department of Commerce designed a new process to call for and assess proposals and to award the loans and loan guarantees, basing this on lessons and observations from the private equity industry.</p> +<p>The H-2 visa category is split into H-2A (temporary agricultural worker) and H-2B (temporary nonagricultural worker) visas, which allow employers to apply for foreign nonimmigrant workers to satisfy seasonal demands. The H-2A visa operates independently with its own application process and allocation exclusively for the agricultural sector. While the H-2A program does not cap the number of visas allocated, often there are fewer visas than jobs certified by the Department of Labor for H-2A due to inadequate U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) processing resources. Also, the strict country eligibility requirements have expanded over time, from 28 countries in 2008 to 87 countries in 2024.</p> -<p>CHIPS Act money comes with guardrails, particularly as the financial support will go toward industries critical to national security. Each funding recipient must enter into a “required agreement” with the Department of Commerce that governs the use of the CHIPS funding, putting in place certain restrictions. For instance, recipients or their affiliates will be prohibited from transactions in the semiconductor industry in countries of concern, including but not limited to China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia, for 10 years. Joint research or technology licensing is also prohibited with these countries. The guardrails are outlined in the Final Rule, Transaction Prohibition, and Technology Prohibition.</p> +<p>In fiscal year 2023, 372,000 jobs were certified for the H-2A visa, but USCIS issued only around 298,000 H-2A visas. The visas are highly concentrated within the farming industry, with 600 farms accounting for 70 percent of all H-2A jobs, highlighting issues that certain farm employers may have in certifying and applying for visas given USCIS’ shortcomings in issuing them effectively. Another H-2A issue is the high level of noncompliance with regulations among some farms, with the Department of Labor finding that 70 percent of the 1,000 farms investigated had failed to comply with regulations.</p> -<p>Domestic and international companies have undergone a process outlined by the Department of Commerce to apply for funds, which includes a letter of interest, requests for proposals, and a proposal review. The department has received more than 500 statements of interest and more than 100 preapplications and full applications since it began accepting them in March 2023. The department has made this an interactive process and essentially has no single criterion or project it is looking for; rather it is looking for proposals that are economically viable and that have a national security angle. The application process also includes an evaluation, preliminary term sheets, due diligence, and funding awards.</p> +<p>The H-2B visa, by contrast, can apply across many seasonal sectors, including restaurants, hospitality, transportation, maintenance, janitorial services, and more. However, there is a cap on the number of H-2B visas allocated. The H-2B visa had 88 eligible countries as of August 2024, one more than the number of H-2A countries. The cap is divided into 33,000 visas for each half of the fiscal year, totaling 66,000. Historically, demand has varied, with some years seeing demand below supply. However, recent years have seen demand exceed the supply of visas, with ad hoc measures being used to increase the cap for the current fiscal year. For example, in fiscal year 2024, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) increased the cap twice to meet demand, making 85,432 additional visas available and highlighting the insufficiency of the existing H-2B cap. The labor market has changed significantly since the H-2B visa cap was set in 1986, making it necessary to reconsider the sectors eligible for the visa and the size of the cap.</p> -<h4 id="funding-4">Funding</h4> +<p>The length of H-2A and H-2B visas can range from three to ten months for the initial employment term, with the possibility to extend the visa to three years. It is also possible to apply for an initial three-year period if the employment is considered a “one-time occurrence.” After three years, the worker must leave the United States for an uninterrupted three months before reapplying for an H-2 visa, which potentially causes issues for employers in finding temporary replacements or aggregating their workforce over periods to avoid worker shortages.</p> -<p>Through the IRA, the Department of Commerce manages a $2.6 billion framework to invest in coastal resilience, $400 million specifically for tribal priorities and benefiting coastal and Great Lakes communities, and additional investments to improve weather and climate data and services. Through the CHIPS Act, it is expected to oversee $50 billion to revitalize the domestic semiconductor industry and reshore supply chains back to the United States, including $39 billion for manufacturing incentives and $11 billion for R&amp;D programs.</p> +<p>The H-1B visa category has an annual cap of 65,000 new visas each fiscal year. However, an additional 20,000 petitions for individuals with a master’s degree or higher from a U.S. institution are exempt from this cap. The relevant applicant occupation eligibility criteria include theoretical and practical application of highly specialized knowledge and a minimum of a bachelor’s degree or higher in the specific field (or its equivalent). H-1B specialty occupation workers are granted an initial stay of up to three years. This period may be extended but generally cannot exceed a total of six years.</p> -<h4 id="governance-4">Governance</h4> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/WrM8X9q.png" alt="image12" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Table 1: U.S. Visas Relevant to Critical Sectors .</strong> Source: <a href="https://www.uscis.gov/">“U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services”</a>.</em></p> -<p>The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration will manage all of the climate-related work. The Department of Commerce’s newly created CHIPS Program Office oversees CHIPS Act funding.</p> +<h4 id="role-of-immigration-in-us-economic-security">Role of Immigration in U.S. Economic Security</h4> -<h4 id="investments-4">Investments</h4> +<p>Industrial policy has emerged as a key tool in the U.S. arsenal to support economic growth and direct investments in industries key to national security. However, labor shortages could upend these investments’ ability to deploy manufacturing operations effectively. The IIJA, the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA), and the CHIPS and Science Act are all set to bolster U.S. economic security by targeting sectors essential to American life — infrastructure, green technologies, and semiconductors — and creating scores of open positions. A recent report from the University of Massachusetts Amherst’s Political Economy Research Institute (PERI) analyzes labor supply, demand, and potential shortages stemming from recent U.S. industrial policy initiatives. The report identifies 48 occupations expected to see significant increases in demand due to direct job creation from these investments. Of these, 20 occupations are projected to experience labor shortages, leading to an anticipated overall shortage of nearly 1.1 million workers if the investments reach their full potential without a corresponding increase in the number of newly qualified workers.</p> -<p>For the CHIPS Act, the Department of Commerce announced for the first time the signing of a nonbinding preliminary memorandum of terms (PMT) to a funding applicant on December 11, 2023. BAE Systems Electronic Systems is expected to receive $35 million in federal incentives to support the modernization of the company’s Microelectronics Center, a mature-node production facility in Nashua, New Hampshire. The project will replace aging tools and quadruple the production of chips necessary for critical defense programs, including the F-35 fighter jet program. The Department of Commerce announced the second PMT on February 19, 2024, to GlobalFoundries to provide $1.5 billion in direct funding to improve domestic supply chain resilience, strengthen competitiveness in current-generation and mature-node semiconductor production, and support economic and national security priorities, at time of drafting.</p> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Industrial policy has emerged as a key tool in the U.S. arsenal to support economic growth and direct investments in industries key to national security. However, labor shortages could upend these investments’ ability to deploy manufacturing operations effectively.</code></em></strong></p> -<h3 id="cross-cutting-insights">Cross-Cutting Insights</h3> +<p>The IIJA’s promise of renewed U.S. manufacturing and infrastructure could be resting on shaky ground. The construction sector is already facing challenges. A recent survey by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce revealed that 88 percent of commercial construction contractors are experiencing moderate-to-high levels of difficulty in finding skilled workers. Additionally, over one-third of the contractors surveyed had to decline work because of labor shortages. The Association of Builders and Contractors, a trade group representing the commercial and industrial construction sector, estimates there will be 500,000 unfilled construction jobs in 2024. According to Moody’s Analytics, the IIJA will result in 872,000 additional jobs by the fourth quarter of 2025. Notably, over half of these new positions (461,000) will be in the construction industry.</p> -<p>DOD’s efforts to develop and maintain technological advantage over its strategic rivals requires investments in technology, which have most frequently focused on direct funding of contracts. OSC’s mission is to expand the range of financing mechanisms that can be used to invest in cutting-edge technologies, with a particular focus on encouraging investment in DOD’s 14 critical technology areas. To do this, OSC aims to go beyond direct contract and grant funding to use a variety of financing tools employed by U.S. government agencies outside of DOD.</p> +<p>Policies targeting climate change in the IRA — such as tax credits for wind and solar power, investments in electric vehicle charging infrastructure, and grants to reduce pollution in disadvantaged communities — will create 537,000 jobs annually over the next decade. When it comes to the CHIPS and Science Act, the Semiconductor Industry Association (SIA) anticipates the semiconductor industry workforce will expand by nearly 115,000 jobs by 2030, increasing from around 345,000 jobs today to approximately 460,000 by the end of the decade, which reflects growth of 33 percent. However, SIA also estimates that about 67,000 of these new positions — or 58 percent of the projected job growth (and 80 percent of the projected increase in technical roles) — may go unfilled at current rates of degree completion.</p> -<p>Through a systematic look across the whole of U.S. government, the authors examined these funding mechanisms and how they have been used. An analysis of this research reveals the following insights, which may be of use to OSC as it seeks to crowd in capital for strategic impact:</p> +<h3 id="policy-recommendations">Policy Recommendations</h3> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/mjpZShF.png" alt="image16" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 16: Financing to Critical Technology Sectors by Status.</strong> Source: Agency datasets and CSIS analysis. DOE datasets FY 2008–FY 2023, EXIM dataset FY 2007–FY 2022, SBA datasets FY 1991–FY 2023, DFC dataset FY 2012–FY 2023 Q3.</em></p> +<p>The U.S. labor market is struggling to fill physically demanding in-person roles. Increased legal immigration with targeted labor market policies could help fill open roles that employers are struggling to fill. Without obtaining the labor required, the U.S. economy is unlikely to function at its full potential. Moreover, additional workers would likely reduce inflationary pressures while boosting corporate profits. In addition, while the U.S. labor market has cooled, critical economic sectors still face acute shortages that endanger key aspects of American life. Opening U.S. immigration pathways would mitigate these shortages and support the country’s economic competitiveness.</p> <ul> <li> - <p><strong>Prepare to manage the challenge of perceived “failure” when investments do not yield returns.</strong> The portfolio investment approach typical of venture capital, where some investments do not pay off, represents a cultural challenge. The pervasive culture of compliance, while crucial for ensuring that the government meets requirements and follows existing protocols, presents a challenge for the inherently risky nature of portfolio investments. In undertaking the portfolio investment approach typical of venture capital, DOD must accept healthy risk from the outset and prepare to champion the successes of certain investments while accepting that not all will yield desired returns. Given the urgency of fueling critical technologies investment, DOD should prepare to communicate the advantages of alternative funding approaches both externally and to its workforce.</p> - - <p>As shown in Figure 16, loan cancellations or reductions through charge-offs will happen, but “failure” seems to be the exception. The exact portion of loans that will be repaid is difficult to calculate. For the DOE Title 17 program, 81 percent of its loans by value are still active, and the EXIM bank does not differentiate between ongoing or repaid loans for the 91 percent of loans that have not been cancelled. With those caveats in mind, across programs 6 to 14 percent of loans (when summed together totaling $5.7 billion of $76.1 billion) were cancelled when weighted by face value. Even when considering other negative outcomes, such as a loan not being disbursed or the government only partially recovering the loan via a charge-off, only 6 to 21 percent of loans experienced negative outcomes. Although this analysis captures only a fraction of alternative financing — specifically, programs directly relevant to DOD’s 14 critical technologies — these ranges give a sense of the level of failure tolerance necessary when employing financial assistance and that the portfolio outcomes for all of the studied programs are positive.</p> + <p><strong>Increase H-2A noncompliance costs and use funds to enhance USCIS processing capabilities.</strong> The H-2A visa suffers from two contradicting problems. First, noncompliance rates are high, as 70 percent of farms investigated fail to comply with regulations. Secondly, USCIS fails to allocate the certified number of visas: only around 80 percent of certified visas were distributed in 2023. The second issue relates to USCIS staffing and capabilities. The agency simply does not have the means to process these necessary applications and faces increasingly worsening backlogs that threaten the integrity of the U.S. legal immigration system. The issue can be mitigated by allocating additional funding to the agency, which can be obtained, in part, by more robust noncompliance fines.</p> </li> <li> - <p><strong>Understand the role of market signaling.</strong> It is not merely the magnitude of financing that will determine the success of DOD to crowd in private capital investments in DOD-relevant technologies. Rather, clear communication of DOD priorities and identification of private sector projects that meet DOD’s needs can attract attention from private capital investors, regardless of the size of investment. If DOD signals its interest in particular critical technologies projects and sources, this holds great potential to generate private capital investment. Therefore, DOD should consider concentrating its efforts on efficient investments in key private sector innovations and openly communicate these decisions rather than concern itself with the amount of capital required. In showing a clear indication of interest, regardless of magnitude, DOD can guide private capital investors in their understanding of DOD priorities and increase investor confidence in their potential return on investment.</p> + <p><strong>Ease restrictions on extension and renewal processes for temporary worker visas.</strong> The initial duration for both the H-2A and H-2B visas can vary from three to ten months, with the option to extend up to three years. In cases where the employment qualifies as a “one-time occurrence,” an initial three-year visa may be granted. After completing the three-year term, the worker must depart the United States for a continuous period of three months before they can reapply for an H-2 visa. The need to apply for an initial extension after three to ten months, as well as the significant barriers to renewal, renders the workforce landscape too volatile for employers in need of labor while reducing the attractiveness of applying to work in the United States for prospective employees. U.S. immigration authorities should explore doing away with the one-time-occurrence requirement to grant the initial three-year visa and lift current barriers on extensions.</p> </li> <li> - <p><strong>Develop appropriate reporting systems to establish effective monitoring and evaluation of investments.</strong> Current tracking tools are limited. The government-wide Federal Assistance Award Data System (FAADS) database includes useful information but does not capture key inputs or outcome variables — namely, the economic sector or loan outcome. DOD should carefully consider useful metrics it will employ to assess and manage its portfolio. By establishing these metrics early, DOD can prepare to collect the necessary data to evaluate program performance. DOE, DFC, and EXIM have developed and published key metrics that could serve as examples for DOD’s development of open-source tracking systems. Publishing key metrics on programmatic developments would both enhance transparency and ensure the department’s investments are systematically assessed.</p> + <p><strong>Avoid imposing barriers to work opportunities for foreign students.</strong> Between 2015 and 2020, a slew of tentative pieces of legislation and executive orders aimed to place extraordinary restrictions on the ability of foreign students to enter the U.S. workforce through H-1B visas, endangering multiple sectors’ ability to acquire workers, including healthcare. These measures include eliminating optional practical training (OPT) and requiring students to work outside the United States for a decade, imposing high salary thresholds for H-1B eligibility, and directing consular officers to consider the “Buy American and Hire American” executive order when deciding to grant a visa. In short, these measures are meant to break the link between international students and their ability to be employed in the United States after graduation. These kinds of measures exacerbate worker shortages in the U.S. economy, add undue volatility in key sectors, and ultimately upend Americans’ ability to find essential services such as medical care.</p> </li> </ul> -<hr /> +<h3 id="conclusion">Conclusion</h3> -<p><strong>Erin Murphy</strong> is deputy director for the Chair on India and Emerging Asia Economics and senior fellow for Emerging Asia Economics at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). She has spent her career in several public and private sector roles, including as an analyst on Asian political and foreign policy issues at the Central Intelligence Agency, director for the Indo-Pacific at the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation, founder and principal of her boutique advisory firm focused on Myanmar, and an English teacher with the Japan Exchange and Teaching (JET) Program in Saga, Japan.</p> +<p>As geopolitical tensions flare up and economic security concerns take center stage in policy considerations, Washington has striven to prop up sources of U.S. national strength. For instance, policymakers have embraced industrial policy to secure the nation’s energy landscape, public infrastructure, and advanced technology ecosystem. However, opening legal immigration pathways — historically a critical feature of U.S. competitiveness — has been ignored. Policymakers would do well to remember the parting words of President Ronald Reagan near the end of this term: “Unique among nations, we draw our people — our strength — from every country and every corner of the world. And by doing so we continuously renew and enrich our nation.”</p> -<p><strong>Cynthia R. Cook</strong> is director of the Defense-Industrial Initiatives Group and a senior fellow with the Defense and Security Department at CSIS. She is widely published on defense acquisition policy and organization, the defense industrial base, new technology development, and weapon systems production and sustainment. Dr. Cook is a member of the editorial board for the Defense Acquisition Research Journal and is an adjunct professor at the Pardee RAND Graduate School.</p> +<p>Instead, at a time when the U.S. economy badly needs additional workers in physically demanding in-person roles, politics have become increasingly hostile to the huddled masses who have historically enriched the United States. This report counters the argument that if more people enter the United States, fewer resources will be left for those already here. Immigrants create more benefits than costs while putting the country in a more globally competitive position. Lifting barriers to immigration would improve Americans’ ability to find affordable housing, medical care, and groceries and create the workforce needed both in the near term and in the long run.</p> -<p><strong>Emily Harding</strong> is director of the Intelligence, National Security, and Technology (INT) Program and vice president of the Defense and Security Department (DSD) at CSIS. As the head of the INT Program, she provides thought leadership on the most critical issues facing intelligence professionals and on the future of intelligence work. As vice president of DSD, she is responsible for leading a team of world-renowned scholars providing policy solutions that shape national security.</p> +<hr /> -<p><strong>Gregory Sanders</strong> is deputy director and senior fellow with the Defense-Industrial Initiatives Group at CSIS, where he manages a research team that analyzes data on U.S. government contract spending and other budget and acquisition issues. He employs data visualization and other ways to use complex data collections to create succinct and innovative tables, charts, and maps. His recent research focuses on contract spending by major government departments, contingency contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan, and European and Asian defense budgets.</p> +<p><strong>Thibault Denamiel</strong> is a fellow with the Economics Program and Scholl Chair in International Business at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C.</p> -<p><strong>Nicholas Velazquez</strong> was a research assistant with the Defense-Industrial Initiatives Group at CSIS.</p> +<p><strong>William A. Reinsch</strong> is senior adviser with the Economics Program and Scholl Chair in International Business at CSIS.</p> -<p><strong>Julia Dickson</strong> is a research associate for the Defense and Security Department at CSIS. Her research interests include cybersecurity, cybercrime, and the role of technology in conflict.</p> +<p><strong>Jason Schenker</strong> is a nonresident affiliate with the Economics Program and Scholl Chair in International Business at CSIS.</p> -<p><strong>Maeve Sockwell</strong> was an intern with the Defense-Industrial Initiatives Group at CSIS.</p>Erin L. Murphy, et al.The Department of Defense (DOD) has become concerned that critical technologies are insufficiently capitalized to support national security. Global private capital investors have been allocating resources toward software-heavy capabilities, such as e-commerce and software as a service, leaving funding gaps for critical components and capabilities where investors perceive greater risk.【黎智英案・審訊第 93 日】2024-11-20T12:00:00+08:002024-11-20T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/trial-of-jimmy-lai-day-93<ul> - <li>黎智英親自作供 稱反對暴力和港獨</li> - <li>曾籲報導勿針對特朗普 黎智英：是「提議」而非編採指示</li> -</ul> +<p><strong>Dhari Al-Saleh</strong> is a former intern with the Economics Program and Scholl Chair in International Business at CSIS.</p>Thibault Denamiel, et al.Critical sectors of the U.S. economy remain badly understaffed. Additionally, because of the U.S. industrial policies creating positions in targeted industries and an aging workforce tied to specific career paths, shortages are set to become more dire in the medium term.UK FATF Mutual Evaluation2024-11-25T12:00:00+08:002024-11-25T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/uk-fatf-mutual-evaluation<p><em>At the first meeting of the UK Financial Action Task Force (FATF) Mutual Evaluation, experts discussed how the UK can best prepare for its upcoming FATF evaluation in 2027.</em></p> <excerpt /> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/FEvY0GB.png" alt="image01" /></p> +<h3 id="introduction">Introduction</h3> -<p>【獨媒報導】壹傳媒創辦人黎智英及3間蘋果公司被控串謀勾結外國勢力及串謀刊印煽動刊物等罪，控方早前舉證完畢，3名國安法指定法官裁定黎3項控罪表證成立，黎選擇作供，押後至今天（20日）於高院（移師西九龍法院）續審。黎以英語作供，他稱在六四之後創辦《壹週刊》，認為作為商人有需要涉足資訊自由範疇，「因為你擁有愈多資訊，你便知道得愈多，那麼你便愈自由。」後來，黎因為擴展生意業務而成立《蘋果日報》。就其個人和《蘋果》的立場，黎稱反對任何形式的暴力，亦認為「港獨」是陰謀。對於張劍虹早前證供指《蘋果》在2014年「佔中」之後立場轉趨激進，黎智英則不同意，因這份報紙一向關注運動，只是因為2014年社運行動增多，所以他們要跟進事態發展，使報紙看起來較活躍。</p> +<p>Every decade or so, countries are assessed on their technical compliance with the Recommendations of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) on money laundering, terrorist financing and proliferation financing and on the effectiveness of the measures that they have put in place. The on-site visit for the UK’s next evaluation is scheduled for August 2027 and preparations will begin in earnest in 2025. While the UK has generally been regarded as having a robust legal and regulatory framework, FATF’s increasing focus on the effectiveness of a country in managing money laundering, terrorist financing and proliferation financing risks means that technical compliance with the Recommendations alone is not enough.</p> -<h4 id="3罪表證成立-黎智英選擇親自作供">3罪表證成立 黎智英選擇親自作供</h4> +<p>The UK’s last evaluation, in 2018, was positive overall, however, some areas of significant weakness were identified. The UK has sought to address these over the last decade, but has it done enough? How will the UK fare when it comes to its effectiveness ratings? How will the changes in methodology for this round of evaluations impact the assessment of the UK? What about new areas, such as the FATF’s recommendations on virtual assets and the strengthening of its recommendations on asset recovery?</p> -<p>被告依次為：黎智英（74歲）、蘋果日報有限公司、蘋果日報印刷有限公司及蘋果互聯網有限公司。</p> +<p>To help answer these questions, the Centre for Finance and Security (CFS) at RUSI has established a UK FATF Taskforce, bringing together a small group of experts to explore these areas and provide practical recommendations on how the UK can best prepare for its upcoming evaluation.</p> -<p>首被告黎智英由懲教人員押解往法院應訊。他身穿白色恤衫、淺綠色毛衣、卡其色西裝外套、戴上黑色粗框眼鏡，被帶入被告欄時向親友及旁聽人士揮手，又相手合十。黎的妻子、子女和天主教香港教區榮休主教陳日君樞機亦有到場旁聽，他們一同在家屬席就坐。等待開庭期間，黎一直與親友們相視而笑。</p> +<p>The Taskforce held its first meeting in October 2024. The discussion was divided into two parts. First, Taskforce members reflected on the UK’s 2018 mutual evaluation, some of the areas of weakness that were identified, and the extent to which progress had been made by the UK in the intervening years. Second, the group discussed some of the major global challenges over the last decade and what impact those could potentially have on the UK’s evaluation. Given the overlap between these two areas, this report sets out the themes that emerged during the Taskforce meeting, rather than being a narrative description of the points raised by participants. While there was some discussion about changes to some of the technical requirements of FATF’s Recommendations, such as the standards on virtual assets, this will be covered in more detail in the second Taskforce meeting. Although the Taskforce’s remit focuses on the UK’s fifth round evaluation, many of the points raised will be relevant for other jurisdictions as they contemplate their next mutual evaluations.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/1ximYZ1.png" alt="image02" /> -▲ 黎智英妻子 李韻琴（左）、天主教香港教區榮休主教 陳日君樞機（右）</p> +<h3 id="the-direction-of-travel-since-2018">The Direction of Travel since 2018</h3> -<p>案件於今年1月開審，控方先後轉召張劍虹、陳沛敏、楊清奇、李宇軒和陳梓華出庭以「從犯證人」身份作供。控方於6月舉證完畢。</p> +<p>There was broad consensus in the group that the UK’s 2018 mutual evaluation was better than could have been expected and, for some, better than the UK deserved. The months of hard work and organisation in the lead-up to the evaluation enabled the UK to present a coherent and persuasive narrative to the assessors. This was rewarded with the headline that the “UK takes top spot in fight against dirty money” and much was made of the UK’s, at the time, world-leading ranking in compliance with the FATF standards.</p> -<p>代表黎的資深大律師彭耀鴻作中段陳詞，要求法庭裁定所有控罪表證不成立。惟3名國安法指定法官最終裁定黎3項控罪表證成立。</p> +<p>Members of the Taskforce did not doubt the UK government’s continued public commitment to tackling financial crime: participants pointed to the two Economic Crime Plans that previous governments had issued; legislative changes, including much-needed reforms to Companies House; and increased investment in the UK’s response, for example through the Economic Crime Levy. This, together with the UK’s global lead in the response to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, suggests that the UK will again have the basis from which to craft a strong narrative to the assessors in 2027.</p> -<p>其後黎透過辯方表示選擇親自作供，另擬傳召一名專家證人就社交軟件 Signal 作供，預料辯方案情需時約30個工作天。由於3名法官在8及9月均有其他案件要處理，未能立即聽取黎的證供。經商討後，最終押後至今日續審。</p> +<p>That said, it is clear that there are a number of potential pitfalls for the UK. These can be broadly grouped into two themes. First, participants discussed the overall application of the risk-based approach in the UK, from the National Risk Assessment (NRA) to risk-based supervision and the application of risk-based preventative measures. Second, participants identified specific areas where they felt that there had been little progress since the 2018 mutual evaluation, including enforcement, the role of the financial intelligence unit (FIU), and public–private partnerships (PPPs).</p> -<p>案件廣受大批本地及國際媒體關注，縱使今早轉涼及下雨，早上約8時許起，約40至50名傳媒代表已開始排隊輪候記者籌。另外，自昨日中午起，有市民冒雨在法院外排隊，輪候公眾旁聽籌，至今早隊伍約有100人。</p> +<h3 id="the-changing-global-context">The Changing Global Context</h3> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/Soenvg8.png" alt="image03" /></p> +<p>All participants acknowledged the significant global changes and challenges over the decade since the UK’s last evaluation. Of these, Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 has had the most impact on the UK’s response to illicit finance. The design, implementation and enforcement of sanctions against Russia have dominated the work of policymakers, regulators and regulated institutions. While acknowledging the point made above, that the UK’s response to the invasion of Ukraine may feed into a positive narrative for the evaluation, some Taskforce members felt that the increased focus on sanctions implementation had hindered the ability of the UK to make progress on anti-money laundering (AML) and counterterrorist financing (CTF), particularly in the application of the risk-based approach by supervisors and institutions. This is primarily because of the resources – at both levels – that have had to pivot towards compliance with sanctions regulations rather than AML/CTF, but also because of the difference in the type of regime, one being risk-based and the other being more rules-based.</p> -<h4 id="黎供稱六四後感恐懼-成立壹週刊冀著力資訊自由">黎供稱六四後感恐懼 成立《壹週刊》冀著力資訊自由</h4> +<p>The impact of the post-2022 sanctions on Russia was also felt to have had a similar knock-on impact on resourcing of law enforcement, with efforts directed towards kleptocracy and sanctions evasion rather than areas like international corruption. From a purely technical perspective, only targeted financial sanctions under the UN’s sanctions regime are within scope of the FATF (that is, sanctions associated with proliferation financing activity). Therefore, Russia sanctions, or indeed other autonomous sanctions regimes, are outside the scope of the FATF’s assessments, and robust and effective implementation of these type of sanctions does not necessarily buy you any credit with the FATF.</p> -<p>黎在3名懲教人員的監督之下，步出被告欄，前往庭內的證人台就坐，期間一度望向公眾席。他先拿起聖經，以天主教形式宣誓，其後開始以英語作供。在作供期間，3名懲教人員全程坐在他背後看守。黎亦全程戴著耳機。</p> +<p>While the full-scale invasion of Ukraine may have dominated the past few years, there have been other developments which have had an impact on the application of AML/CTF controls, such as regulatory changes in the UK. The consumer duty requirements of the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) were given as one example of this, where there needs to be a balance between effective measures to prevent financial crime and good outcomes for consumers, recognising that these two principles can, occasionally, come into conflict. While banks and others have had to manage the implementation of multiple new sanctions, the significant global attention on the issue of fraud has also demanded much of their time and attention, further “squeezing” the available time and resourcing for tackling AML/CTF.</p> -<p>在辯方大律師關文渭的主問下，黎供稱，他原本擁有一間成衣公司「佐丹奴（Giordano）」，但是他在1989年把公司賣出，因為如果不這樣做的話，設在內地的分店便需要關閉。他稱，他在六四之後，開始成立傳媒公司、創辦《壹週刊》，因他感到恐懼，認為好像他那般的商人需涉足資訊自由的範疇，「因為你擁有愈多資訊，你便知道得愈多，那麼你便愈自由。」黎亦表示，他首次參與政治是關於六四。後來，黎因為擴展生意業務而成立《蘋果日報》。</p> +<h3 id="the-uks-understanding-of-the-risks-to-which-it-is-exposed">The UK’s Understanding of the Risks to which it is Exposed</h3> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/Ilg69C7.png" alt="image04" /> -▲ 辯方大律師 關文渭</p> +<p>FATF’s assessment of effectiveness of the risk-based approach, as set out in its Immediate Outcome 1 (IO1), requires that countries not only understand their risks, but also take action to combat those risks where appropriate.</p> -<h4 id="黎智英反對暴力及港獨">黎智英：反對暴力及港獨</h4> +<p>Almost all participants felt that there was poor and inconsistent understanding of the UK’s risks at all levels, particularly in terms of the UK’s role as one of the world’s most significant global financial centres. The UK’s NRA, last published in 2020, was given as an example of this, being described as somewhat haphazard and of limited use to its target audience. The UK’s approach to identifying risk was also seen as very much reactive rather than proactive and, while noting the size and complexity of the UK’s exposure to financial crime risks, it was felt that other jurisdictions prioritised keeping their understanding of risks and threats up to date and sharing that information on a timely basis with supervisors and regulated institutions to inform the application of the risk-based approach.</p> -<p>被問到《蘋果》的核心價值是什麼，黎指《蘋果》的核心價值其實與香港人懷有的核心價值相同，包括法治、示威自由、言論自由、宗教自由和遊行自由。</p> +<p>It was also felt, however, that the 2018 mutual evaluation itself did not acknowledge the scale and extent of the threats facing the UK, leading to what many felt was a more positive outcome than the UK deserved and/or that assessors may not have focused enough on some of the higher-risk areas, including the overarching risks associated with the UK’s role as a global financial centre. This is a topic that will be discussed further in the second Taskforce meeting.</p> -<p>被問到是否支持暴力，黎表示：「我一向都反對任何形式的暴力。」而《蘋果》的立場亦一樣。</p> +<h3 id="risk-based-supervision">Risk-based Supervision</h3> -<p>黎繼而被問到對於「港獨」和「台獨」的立場，黎表示他一向認為提倡香港獨立是一個陰謀，因那些人務求使其他人掉入陷阱，亦同意「港獨」想法「太瘋狂」。黎稱他經常要求同事不要在報導中談及「港獨」，《蘋果》也不會容許鼓吹「港獨」的人士參與報章工作。</p> +<p>The application of effective and risk-based AML/CTF supervision in the UK formed a significant part of the Taskforce’s discussions. Participants felt that the lack of a coherent and robust understanding of risks extended beyond the NRA, to include supervisors and regulated institutions as well. This was discussed particularly in the context of risk-based supervision. For example, some participants expressed the view that the FCA’s supervision of financial institutions was too focused on the systemically important banks, rather than on other parts of the financial system that may present significant vulnerabilities, such as new entrants to the market who may have poor AML/CTF controls and expose the UK to higher risk.</p> -<h4 id="黎智英蘋果與香港人擁有相同價值">黎智英：《蘋果》與香港人擁有相同價值</h4> +<p>It was felt that supervisors may not have the confidence to apply a truly risk-based approach to supervision, the proper application of which would require supervisors to deprioritise areas, whether industry sectors or specific services and products. The FCA, and indeed other supervisors, may not be willing to do this or to be seen to be doing this. Linked to this point, and maybe a consequence of it, some Taskforce members felt that the FCA had recently been moving away from a risk-based approach to supervision and towards more of a formal and technical approach, driven by a large number of data requests to firms (not limited to AML/CTF but also extending to sanctions and fraud). As a result of this, regulated entities may not be encouraged to take a risk-based approach to preventative measures. This, in turn, can lead to unintended consequences, such as de-risking.</p> -<p>關文渭向黎智英出示剪報，題為〈蘋果日報：我們屬於香港〉，在1995年6月20日刊登於《蘋果日報》報章，為創刊社論。內容提及，在資訊透明的今天，只要《蘋果》讀者支持普選，不管面對多大壓力，《蘋果》員工必定堅持下去。黎稱，這句子顯示《蘋果》與香港人擁有相同價值，並且站在一起。</p> +<p>While much of the discussion focused on AML/CTF supervision of the financial sector, participants also acknowledged broader issues with supervision in other sectors, particularly supervision by the Professional Body Supervisors (PBSs) responsible for the legal and accountancy sectors. Improvements were introduced after the mixed assessment in the 2018 evaluation, with the establishment of the Office for Professional Body Anti-Money Laundering Supervisors (OPBAS). This was intended to bring consistency and drive improvement in standards of supervision across the 22 legal and accountancy PBSs. While participants acknowledged the positive impact of OPBAS to date, it was still felt that there were weaknesses in the performance of some of the PBSs, as evidenced by recent publications from OPBAS itself.</p> -<p>該文章亦稱《蘋果》不會容忍任何限制自由，黎指這代表到《蘋果》的原則。辯方問到，《蘋果》沒有提供任何員工培訓或指引，怎樣確保到他們的立場是與港人和《蘋果》一致呢？黎則相信員工都是香港人，很自然地會與《蘋果》站在一起。</p> +<p>In 2023, the government consulted on reforms to the structure of supervision in the UK and, in particular, on the extent to which there should be consolidation of the PBSs and the statutory supervisors in order to improve the effectiveness of the UK’s regime. The timing of the government’s consultation means that it is likely that the UK will be in some sort of transition phase by the time of the next mutual evaluation, at least as it relates to the supervision of the professional services. As a result, the UK may struggle to evidence the required level of effectiveness in supervisory outcomes to the FATF assessors, and consideration needs to be given to what type of data can be provided to assessors while the system is in a state of flux.</p> -<h4 id="張劍虹早前稱佔中後蘋果轉趨激進-黎智英反駁一向關注運動">張劍虹早前稱佔中後《蘋果》轉趨激進 黎智英反駁一向關注運動</h4> +<p>While the methodology changes for the fifth round of evaluations will be a focus for the next Taskforce meeting, specific changes to the IOs relating to supervision (IO3 and IO4) were also raised as part of the discussion. The previous assessment methodology (which the UK was assessed under in 2018) combined the assessment of supervision of financial institutions and non-financial institutions into one IO (IO3). The UK was rated as only being moderately effective in relation to this IO in 2018, although it is not significantly out of step with its international peers; no country received the top rating (“highly effective”) and only a handful received a rating of “substantially effective”.</p> -<p>辯方提及《蘋果》前社長張劍虹早前作供，稱《蘋果》在2014年「佔中」之前主要聚焦「狗仔隊」和娛樂新聞，但是2014年之後，「好似成為一間反政府、對抗中央嘅一個報紙。」</p> +<p>Under the new methodology that will be used in 2027, countries will receive separate ratings for the effectiveness of supervision in the financial (IO3) and non-financial sectors (IO4). However, the reformulated IO3 and IO4 will extend beyond just considering the effectiveness of supervision to include the effectiveness of the preventative measures put into place by regulated entities.12 These changes may have a number of implications for the UK’s assessment. First, the lack of progress on addressing the weaknesses that the FATF assessors identified on supervision of the legal and accountancy sectors in 2018 may be more clearly called out now that it is considered as its own separate IO. On the other hand,Under the new methodology that will be used in 2027, countries will receive separate ratings for the effectiveness of supervision in the financial (IO3) and non-financial sectors (IO4). However, the reformulated IO3 and IO4 will extend beyond just considering the effectiveness of supervision to include the effectiveness of the preventative measures put into place by regulated entities. These changes may have a number of implications for the UK’s assessment. First, the lack of progress on addressing the weaknesses that the FATF assessors identified on supervision of the legal and accountancy sectors in 2018 may be more clearly called out now that it is considered as its own separate IO. On the other hand, combining the assessment of effectiveness to include both supervision and preventative measures into one score may mean that deficiencies in supervision will be ignored and/or negated by a more positive relative assessment of preventative measures.</p> -<p>黎智英則不同意，因這份報紙一向關注爭取自由的運動，在2014年之前也有持續報導有關六四遊行的新聞，只是因為2014年社會運動事件增加，所以他們需要跟進事態發展，報導便增多，因而看起來好像較之前活躍。黎亦確認他在「佔中」期間曾被拘捕，該次是他第一次被捕。</p> +<h3 id="three-areas-of-concern">Three Areas of Concern</h3> -<p>《蘋果》前主筆楊清奇早前作供時提到，彭斯（Mike Pence）於2018年10月發表演講時提及美國對華政策，黎當時認為演講內容意味「美國反枱」，因此楊覺得由那時候開始，「黎先生嘅政治立場就變得激進啲。」黎智英則表示，不懂得如何回應，因他與楊清奇甚少交談，也幾乎未曾在論壇版撰文，不知道楊對自己的印象從何而來，「如果說我激進，我一直以來都是激進。」</p> +<p>When reflecting on the 2018 evaluation and looking ahead to the next evaluation, participants raised three further areas of concern: enforcement; the role of the UK FIU; and the UK’s approach to PPPs.</p> -<p>首項「串謀勾結外國或者境外勢力危害國家安全罪」指，黎智英、蘋果日報有限公司、蘋果日報印刷有限公司及蘋果互聯網有限公司，於2020年7月1日至2021年6月24日（包括首尾兩日），在香港與其他人一同串謀，請求外國或者境外機構、組織、人員實施對香港特別行政區或者中華人民共和國進行制裁、封鎖或者採取其他敵對行動。</p> +<h4 id="enforcement">Enforcement</h4> -<p>另一項「串謀勾結外國或者境外勢力危害國家安全」罪，指黎智英於2020年7月1日至今年2月15日間，與 Mark Simon、陳梓華、李宇軒、劉祖廸及其他人串謀，請求外國或境外機構、組織、人員，實施對中國或香港進行制裁、封鎖或者採取其他敵對行動。</p> +<p>While the UK was described in 2018 as “routinely and aggressively” investigating and prosecuting money laundering, the assessors did highlight that it was not clear whether the level of prosecutions and convictions in relation to high-end money laundering were consistent with the UK’s risks. Taskforce members felt that enforcement in this area continued to be a challenge for the UK, pointing to the lack of standalone money laundering prosecutions. Participants felt that there remains a lack of skills, expertise and/or resources for law enforcement to investigate high-value cases, including cases of trade-based money laundering. These, however, are the types of cases that the FATF assessors should expect to see the UK authorities prosecuting, especially given the threats to which the UK is exposed and the size and complexity of its financial services sector.</p> -<p>「串謀刊印、發布、出售、要約出售、分發、展示或複製煽動刊物」罪指，黎智英、蘋果日報有限公司、蘋果日報印刷有限公司及蘋果互聯網有限公司於2019年4月1日至2021年6月24日（包括首尾兩日），在香港與其他人一同串謀刊印、發布、出售、要約出售、分發、展示及／或複製煽動刊物，具意圖：</p> +<h4 id="the-role-of-the-fiu">The Role of the FIU</h4> -<blockquote> - <p>a) 引起憎恨或藐視中央或香港特別行政區政府或激起對其離叛</p> -</blockquote> +<p>In the 2018 mutual evaluation, the UK’s FIU was singled out for criticism by the assessors. The 2018 report states that “the UKFIU suffers from a lack of available resources (human and IT) and analytical capability which is a serious concern considering similar issues were raised over a decade ago in the UK’s previous FATF mutual evaluation”. Taskforce members felt that little had changed with regards to the UK FIU since the last evaluation; a concern, given the comments in the 2018 evaluation about how longstanding the issues were at that point.</p> -<blockquote> - <p>b) 激起香港居民企圖不循合法途徑促致改變其他在香港的依法制定的事項</p> -</blockquote> +<p>Consistent with the finding in 2018, a number of Taskforce members highlighted that the UK FIU is not well regarded overseas, with delays in responding to requests for information and a lack of effective data sharing. While this is, in part, reflective of broader issues with cross-border information sharing, it is a weakness identified by the previous evaluation that does not seem to have been addressed by the UK to date.</p> -<blockquote> - <p>c) 引起對香港司法的憎恨、藐視或激起對其離叛</p> -</blockquote> +<h4 id="the-uks-approach-to-ppps">The UK’s Approach to PPPs</h4> -<blockquote> - <p>d) 引起香港居民間的不滿或離叛</p> -</blockquote> +<p>In the 2018 evaluation, the UK’s PPP, the Joint Money Laundering Intelligence Taskforce (JMLIT) was described as “an innovative model for public/private information sharing that has generated very positive results since its inception in 2015 and is considered to be an example of best practice”. While this could be fairly said in 2018, members of the Taskforce felt that other countries had managed to accelerate progress of their own PPPs, whereas JMLIT was felt to have stalled in comparison. While the lack of progress in JMLIT may not necessarily count against the UK in its assessment, it was felt that the UK was unlikely to get any continued credit for its efforts in PPPs and that this could harm the narrative of the UK as a world leader in tackling financial crime.</p> -<blockquote> - <p>e) 煽惑他人使用暴力</p> -</blockquote> +<h3 id="conclusion">Conclusion</h3> -<blockquote> - <p>f) 慫使他人不守法或不服從合法命令。</p> -</blockquote> +<p>Participants generally felt that the UK would perform well in its next mutual evaluation, not least because of the ability of the machinery of the UK government to spring into action, but that it would be challenging to receive as glowing an evaluation as in 2018. A broader point was made that the dynamic of the discussion between a country’s delegation and the assessment team can influence the outcome of the evaluation. The likelihood of the UK repeating its success of 2018 could well be determined, therefore, by the makeup and experience of the assessment team. However, a well-organised and thorough approach by the UK authorities would also likely mean that the UK performs well.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/aOOsOgM.png" alt="image05" /></p> +<p>A second meeting of the Taskforce is planned for spring 2025 to discuss the FATF’s new methodology for the fifth round of assessments and how the UK might fare under the revised criteria, including the implementation of the FATF standards in relation to virtual assets and virtual asset service providers, and the progress the UK has made as it relates to areas of the FATF’s recent priorities, such as asset recovery and non-profit organisations.</p> -<p>【獨媒報導】壹傳媒創辦人黎智英及3間蘋果公司被控串謀勾結外國勢力及串謀刊印煽動刊物等罪，控方早前舉證完畢，3名國安法指定法官裁定黎3項控罪表證成立，黎選擇作供，押後至今天（20日）於高院（移師西九龍法院）續審。黎首度親自作供，他表示自己從不是政黨成員，而視自己為一個商人和社運人士。3名同案被告張劍虹、陳沛敏和楊清奇曾以「從犯證人」身份作供，黎反駁他們的部份證供。黎稱他與張劍虹並不是朋友，從不談論私事，質疑張供稱的對話沒發生。此外，在《國安法》即將生效之前，黎曾透過訊息籲員工勿針對特朗普，他稱因不能一方面要求他援助香港，另一方面卻與他對著幹，但否認這是「編採指示」，反指是屬於提議。</p> +<hr /> -<h4 id="曾捐2萬英鎊給香港監察-黎智英做有意義的事">曾捐2萬英鎊給「香港監察」 黎智英：做有意義的事</h4> +<p><strong>Kathryn Westmore</strong> is a Senior Research Fellow at the Centre for Finance and Security at RUSI. She leads the Financial Crime Policy Programme, which tracks the implementation and evolution of anti-financial crime policy both in the UK and globally.</p>Kathryn WestmoreAt the first meeting of the UK Financial Action Task Force (FATF) Mutual Evaluation, experts discussed how the UK can best prepare for its upcoming FATF evaluation in 2027.【黎智英案・審訊第 96 日】2024-11-25T12:00:00+08:002024-11-25T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/trial-of-jimmy-lai-day-96<ul> + <li>黎智英：倘真相煽動他人憎恨政府 依然會報導 不認為構成罪行</li> +</ul> -<p>就兩項串謀勾結外國勢力罪，控方在開案陳詞時展示了一幅黎智英的「國際連繫圖」，顯示黎認識美國、英國、台灣等地的政治人物，當中更包括美國前總統特朗普、台灣前總統蔡英文和前港督彭定康等。</p> +<excerpt /> -<p>黎智英的代表大律師關文渭今向黎出示該圖表，黎智英是否認識該些人物。就圖中的英國線，其中一人是「香港監察」創辦人羅傑斯（Benedict Rogers），黎表示他與羅傑斯互相認識，對方在數年前被拒進入香港境內，有時別人會要求他刊登羅傑斯的文章。黎在英國的時候曾與他親身見面。</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/uYHl7q5.png" alt="image01" /></p> -<blockquote> - <p>I call on the world to act to save Hong Kong, to put pressure on Carrie Lam to pull back from the brink, demand an end to impunity for police barbarity, to impose targeted Magnitsky sanctions on those responsible for torture #HongKongProtest #StandwithHK #DemocracyForHK @hk_watch pic.twitter.com/vh07uKOCO2 — Benedict Rogers 羅傑斯 (@benedictrogers) November 12, 2019</p> -</blockquote> +<p>【獨媒報導】壹傳媒創辦人黎智英及3間蘋果公司被控串謀勾結外國勢力及串謀刊印煽動刊物等罪，今（25日）於高院（移師西九龍法院）踏入第96日審訊，黎智英第四日作供。2020年5月《蘋果》推英文版新聞，同案被告張劍虹和楊清奇曾供稱黎希望透過英文版讓美國人了解香港情況、「希望美國政府採取更強硬嘅措施」，例如制裁或敵對行動。黎則否認，因「制裁」和「敵對行動」均是他很少使用的詞語。此外，張劍虹稱黎一直以來下達的編採指示包括報導關於美國制裁、抗爭和示威的新聞，黎則反駁稱自己從沒談及制裁，「所以他虛構證供。（“… so he made it up.”）」</p> -<p>黎曾轉帳一些錢2萬元英鎊給「香港監察」，黎解釋：「我認為我在做有意義的事，因他支持香港」，所以決定捐款。</p> +<p>辯方一度問黎，若然報導真相會煽動市民憎恨政府，是否仍會報導？黎表示會，因為這是真相；他稱不認為會構成罪行，又指：「如果這是罪行的話，我們當時便不會報導，我們所做的只是合法地報導。」</p> -<h4 id="黎智英不敢稱呼彭定康為朋友">黎智英：不敢稱呼彭定康為朋友</h4> +<h4 id="黎智英南華早報忽視中國的負面新聞">黎智英：《南華早報》忽視中國的負面新聞</h4> -<p>至英國線另一人為「對華政策跨國議會聯盟」（IPAC）創辦人裴倫德（Luke de Pulford），惟黎表示：「我從未跟他討論過任何事」，包括政治事務。他稱，當裴倫德傳送文章給他時，他立即轉發文章給陳沛敏或羅偉光，「老實說，我從未閱讀該些文章。」至於文章涉及的 IPAC，黎稱：「我從不知道 IPAC」，又稱「我第一次聽聞 IPAC 的時候是在法庭上」，即李宇軒的證供。</p> +<p>辯方大律師關文渭繼續圍繞《蘋果》英文版提問。他播放一段2020年5月13日的錄音，當中黎提議選取一些中國大陸新聞和文章，當黎提及「反對派」時，一把男聲補充說：「維權人士」，黎認同並舉例指被囚18年的企業家任志強、大學教授或《方方日記》等，「每日好似花絮咁，譯一段嘢」，使英文版成為「一個 alternative to (South China) Morning Post，關於大陸嘅新聞」，又形容《南華早報》的新聞是「大宣傳」。</p> -<blockquote> - <p>Today we launch #IPAC#standtogether pic.twitter.com/bt19tb3bVB — Inter-Parliamentary Alliance on China (IPAC) (@ipacglobal) June 4, 2020</p> -</blockquote> +<p>辯方續展示2020年5月10日的「English news」群組訊息，黎稱：「我們揀選寫手時，我們不需要向外國人平衡這裡的不同顏色的政見，我們只需要集中在《蘋果》的香港觀點和黃營的普遍觀點。」（“When we choose writers we don’t have to think about giving foreigners a balanced view of what happens here of every different colors, we only concentrate in our Apple Daily HK view, a general view of the yellow side.”）黎又指：「我們不是要嘗試平衡報導，而是要報導保護香港一方的觀點。這是世界需要知道的聲音。」（“We are not trying to strike a balance but the point of view of the people on the side of protecting HK. This is the voice the world wants to know.”）</p> -<p>至於前港督彭定康，黎說：「他稱呼我為朋友，但是我不敢稱呼他為朋友，因為他是前港督。」二人曾經親身見面，但是沒有直接聯絡，通常是透過陳方安生和羅傑斯聯絡，為免彭定康拒絕黎的要求時感到尷尬。</p> +<p>黎解釋，《蘋果》英文版是有限的，每天只有約20篇新聞，正如他早前提及的「鳥籠」，每間傳媒都有一套價值觀，在報導新聞時確保與相關價值觀一致，並要知道自己想要的是什麼，在選材時找一些符合自己價值觀的新聞。辯方問《蘋果》英文版會否報導中國的好消息？黎說不會。辯方接著問誰會報導中國的好消息？黎說《南華早報》。</p> -<h4 id="黎認識蔡英文-對方視會面為公關會面">黎認識蔡英文 對方視會面為「公關會面」</h4> +<p>至於訊息中「保護香港一方的觀點」（“the point of view of the people on the side of protecting HK”），黎指可理解為「黃營」，而相反一方可理解為「藍營」，即支持政府或支持中國的人。法官李素蘭聞言問，是否代表「黃營」即是「反政府」和「反中國」？黎雖然同意，但是他表示自己不會形容「黃營」為「反政府」和「反中國」，反而會形容為「對政府和中國較具批判性」。</p> -<p>黎稱他認識蔡英文時，她還未是總統，當時黎打算在創辦台灣《蘋果日報》。他通常透過江春男聯絡蔡，會談及台灣政策，例如黎告訴蔡關閉核電廠會是錯誤決定，對方亦會問及香港市民的普遍意見。黎形容，對於蔡而言，與他見面就如與傳媒之間的「公關會面」，這些討論都是無關痛癢，沒有實質內容。</p> +<p>至於訊息中「這是世界需要知道的聲音」，黎解釋這樣說是因為疫情令全世界對中國有負面印象，英文版的新聞可以保護他們、使他們免於受到中國所帶來的危險，包括病毒。黎智英又指，《南華早報》忽視很多中國的負面新聞，例如有關經濟發展的負面數據。</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/P4nOiQA.png" alt="image06" /> -▲ 蔡英文</p> +<h4 id="訊息稱冀英文版成為我們與美國政治的槓桿-黎稱冀外國讀者能替香港發聲">訊息稱冀英文版「成為我們與美國政治的槓桿」 黎稱冀外國讀者能替香港發聲</h4> -<p>至於江春男，黎指他是著名作家，就像蔡英文的「左右手」。江在陳水扁做總統的時代擔任國安會副秘書長，但黎認識他的時候，理解他已經沒有任何職位。</p> +<p>黎其後在英文版群組中稱：「請努力量（盡）快推動這事，現在很多美國大媒體要訪問我是想撐我哋，是時候走向美國讀者，讓他們的存在成為我們與美國政治的槓桿，是很大支持柱樑。」</p> -<p>黎稱，他曾將美國前副國防部長 Paul Wolfowitz 和退休軍官 Jack Keane，經江春男介紹給蔡英文，因為想讓台灣了解特朗普政府如何看待台灣議題，而台灣是唯一一個有民主的華人地方。</p> +<p>黎庭上解釋，如果外國的讀者閱讀《蘋果》英文版的話，便會為香港發聲，他認為屆時外國政客會聆聽相關聲音。被問到為何認為外國支持是重要，黎指因為在香港裡他們沒有任何支持，而外國社會和外國讀者的支持是他們僅有的東西。</p> -<h4 id="黎智英稱不認識特朗普本人-未曾聯絡">黎智英稱不認識特朗普本人 未曾聯絡</h4> +<p>被問到支持香港什麼，黎指是支持香港的爭取自由和民主運動。辯方接著問，反修例運動有否獲得外國的支持？黎起初稱「沒有，從不」，但是其後修正說法，指在2019年4月運動醞釀期間，外國透過新聞報導及有西方政治人物為香港發聲來支持運動，包括美國和英國的政治人物和組織。法官李運騰問IPAC（「對華政策跨國議會聯盟」，英文：Inter-Parliamentary Alliance on China）是否其中之一。黎則表示：「我從未得知 IPAC 的存在」，後來才知道。</p> -<p>就美國線而言，控方指稱黎智英與時任美國總統特朗普有聯繫。黎則表示：「我不覺得他認識我」，亦表示不認識特朗普本人，沒有直接或經其他人接觸過特朗普，也沒有收過任何來自特朗普的訊息。</p> +<h4 id="黎曾構思邀美副總統彭斯訂閱英文版-惟最終不成功">黎曾構思邀美副總統彭斯訂閱英文版 惟最終不成功</h4> -<p>聯繫圖亦包括時任美國副總統彭斯，惟黎稱他該次與彭斯見面，只是握手，然後再沒有其他交流。他稱2019年到訪華盛頓，是為了會見參眾兩院的議員，告訴他們香港發生什麼事，而黎事前並不知道將要會見彭斯，因行程是由美國國務院前資深顧問 Christian Whiton 安排。</p> +<p>辯方展示黎於2020年5月10日傳送給 Mark Simon 的訊息：「Imaging if we can get Mike Pence to subscribe to Apple Daily app! The publicity and respect it command would arouse much support for us. I know it’s almost impossible to pull it off. But can try?」（「試想像若果我們能使彭斯訂閱蘋果，相關宣傳和尊重會為我們帶來很多支持。我知道這是幾乎沒可能，但可以一試？」）</p> -<blockquote> - <p>The arrest of @JimmyLaiApple in Hong Kong is deeply offensive &amp; an affront to freedom loving people around the world. When I met w/ Jimmy Lai @WhiteHouse, I was inspired by his stand for democracy &amp; the rights &amp; autonomy that were promised to the people of Hong Kong by Beijing. pic.twitter.com/ZwioCrvNb7 — Mike Pence (@Mike_Pence) August 10, 2020</p> -</blockquote> +<p>黎今解釋，如果美國副總統訂閱《蘋果》英文版的話，其聲望可以使更加多人關注《蘋果》，但他亦補充，他在訊息裡表示這是幾乎不可能，純粹嘗試。</p> -<p>被問到該次會面中，有否要求美國政府做任何事，黎則表示：「我不會夠膽要求副總統去做任何事情」，他只是告知彭斯香港發生的示威事件，並請求他為香港發聲、支持香港，而沒有叫他做任何事情。</p> +<p>辯方指，兩日後 Mark Simon 回覆。黎確認，指這個嘗試最終不成功，因為美國的保安政策。</p> -<p>至於時任國務卿蓬佩奧，黎與他在2019年7月曾見面。黎稱與彭斯的情況一樣，他並沒有要求對方做任何事情，只籲他為香港發聲。</p> +<h4 id="黎否認曾向張劍虹和楊清奇談及制裁或敵對行動-因很少使用相關字眼">黎否認曾向張劍虹和楊清奇談及制裁或敵對行動 因很少使用相關字眼</h4> -<p>就時任美國眾議院議長佩洛西，黎稱李柱銘帶他去見她，實際上他不認識佩洛西，佩洛西也不認識他。在該次會面中，黎稱主要是李柱銘和佩洛西交談，而他只是聆聽，惟他不明白二人之間的對話內容。</p> +<p>前《蘋果》主筆兼論壇版主管楊清奇早前證供稱，2020年5月曾到黎的住宅出席飯局，黎在席上稱希望開設《蘋果》英文版，幫助美國人更加了解香港情況，「希望美國政府採取更強硬嘅措施，咁《蘋果》英文版有多啲呢啲內容，咁美國政府就可以做嘢。」當被問到相關行動是什麼時，楊稱：「當時講得最多係制裁。」</p> -<blockquote> - <p>So pleased to welcome Jimmy Lai, Martin Lee and Janet Pang to the U.S. Capitol. My full support and admiration goes to those who have taken to the streets week after week in non-violent protest to fight for democracy and the rule of law in #HongKong. pic.twitter.com/maeTwTR8eV — Nancy Pelosi (@SpeakerPelosi) October 22, 2019</p> -</blockquote> +<p>黎今在庭上表示，「我不記得有否講過這些說話，但是有可能我講過類似的說話。」黎亦稱，他不會知道美國政府會採取什麼行動或措施，因他不是美國政府。</p> -<h4 id="黎智英稱從不捐款給美國政治人物-只捐款給美國智庫和宗教組織">黎智英稱從不捐款給美國政治人物 只捐款給美國智庫和宗教組織</h4> +<p>另外，張劍虹早前作供稱，黎於2020年5月指示他們發起「一人一信救香港」，希望時任美國總統特朗普施壓，阻止港區國安法通過，例如透過採取敵對行動。當控方追問敵對行動是什麼時，張稱：「啫係黎生講嘅 sanction 或其他敵對行動」，並堅稱黎的確有使用「制裁」一字，但不記得是用中文還是英文。</p> -<p>黎稱，美國國務院前資深顧問 Christian Whiton 是透過其私人助手 Mark Simon 介紹而認識，因他認識美國的議員，所以該次華盛頓之行便是靠他將黎介紹給議員。</p> +<p>黎今在庭上表示：「我不知道為何我會這樣跟他說話，因為沒有任何理由我會這樣跟他說話。」他堅稱自己沒有明確談及敵對行動（hostility），「因為敵對行動是一個我很少使用的詞語。」同樣，他亦稱甚少使用「制裁」一詞。</p> -<p>至於美國退休軍官 Jack Keane，黎則稱是在聚會中認識。美國前副國防部長 Paul Wolfowitz，則因為黎有意在緬甸投資生意，所以聘請他擔任投資顧問，因而認識。銀行紀錄顯示黎曾向 Paul Wolfowitz 支付顧問費。</p> +<h4 id="黎同意若報導真相會煽動憎恨政府依然報導">黎同意若報導真相會煽動憎恨政府依然報導</h4> -<p>辯方問黎有否向任何人提供金錢，以圖影響美國的政策。黎表示沒有，他從不捐款給美國政治人物，他只會捐款給美國智庫和宗教組織。</p> +<p>辯方指，《蘋果》英文版於2020年5月31日正式面世，創刊宣傳提到港版國安法已成定局，英文版旨在維護新聞自由和報導真相，並包含標語：「一日一《蘋果》，假新聞遠離我（an Apple a day keeps the fake news away）」，黎表示文章非出自其手筆，但是他同意文章內容，正如《蘋果》1995年創刊時的口號：「一日一蘋果，無人呃到我。」</p> -<h4 id="日本議員菅野志櫻里被列為串謀者之一-黎智英從未聽過她名字不懂日文">日本議員菅野志櫻里被列為串謀者之一 黎智英：從未聽過她名字、不懂日文</h4> +<p>辯方問黎，若然報導真相會煽動市民憎恨政府，是否仍會報導？黎表示會，因為這是真相。辯方接著問，黎當時知不知道這可以構成罪行。黎不認為會構成罪行，又指：「如果這是罪行的話，我們當時便不會報導，我們所做的只是合法地報導。」</p> -<p>辯方問，在該「國際聯繫圖」中所述的人物，黎有否嘗試透過他們去影響外國對中國和香港的政策。黎表示從沒有。被問到有否請求任何人對抗中國和香港。黎亦回答從來沒有。</p> +<h4 id="黎提議運用大數據-因可以更客觀地反映中國的真實面貌">黎提議運用大數據 因可以更客觀地反映中國的真實面貌</h4> -<p>李宇軒早前證供提及日本議員菅野志櫻里，控方亦將她列為本案的串謀者之一。惟黎今稱他從沒聽過她的名字，因為他不懂日文，連她是女性也不知道。</p> +<p>辯方另展示 WhatsApp 群組「Index」對話，群組成員只有黎、張劍虹和筆名盧峯的馮偉光。2020年7月10日紀錄顯示，黎智英談及坊間有關中國大陸的說法不正確、有很多誇大了的負面報導，《蘋果》可以透過大數據去找出問題，讓數據說話，並澄清事實。</p> -<blockquote> - <p>今、私の方では野党議員中心に呼びかけてます。政党や会派に縛られず、1人の日本の国会議員として、世界と連帯し、基本的人権の尊重と法の支配という普遍の価値を守ろう。#HongKong pic.twitter.com/aa7zaxAD1R — 菅野志桜里 (@ShioriYamao) May 27, 2020</p> -</blockquote> +<p>黎解釋，有的對於中國的報導較負面，只抽取負面一面來放大，他認為大數據可以更客觀地反映中國的真實面貌，又指人們不僅僅對於新聞有興趣，對於例如日常生活、娛樂等資訊，這些均能夠反映中國的面貌。</p> -<h4 id="黎稱透過mark-simon捐款給香港政黨">黎稱透過Mark Simon捐款給香港政黨</h4> +<p>黎續指，運用大數據可以達至新聞的客觀性，他曾嘗試找專家實行大數據分析，但是未等到分析結果，他便於8月被捕，並且基於技術原因，大數據分析結果最終沒有出爐。</p> -<p>關於黎的私人助手 Mark Simon，黎稱他是唯一一個替自己處理私人事務的人，聘用他超過20年。黎亦會透過 Mark Simon 進行股票交易、捐款給香港政黨，包括民主黨、公民黨、「長毛」梁國雄等，因此銀行紀錄顯示在2013至2020年期間，黎與 Mark Simon 有合共86次交易。惟他稱從沒捐款給香港以外的政黨。</p> +<h4 id="黎否認下達指示報導制裁新聞-質疑張劍虹捏造證供">黎否認下達指示報導制裁新聞 質疑張劍虹捏造證供</h4> -<p>黎亦表示，雖然他有捐款給美國智庫，但是每年只有2至5萬美元，認為是微不足道，更遑論影響美國的政策，「如果想透過那麼少的捐款而要求得到回報，便太瘋狂了。」</p> +<p>辯方指，2020年8月8日黎智英向群組說：「劍虹，盧峯，我們新聞數目太少，沒有 critical mass（群聚效應）吸引讀者，應想想辦法增加。或可增加一些財經新聞？但時事新聞肯（定）要增加。謝謝。」馮偉光回覆：「明白，正逐步增加，有重大新聞如美國制裁林鄭會即時增加幾條。」</p> -<p>黎稱，他與 Mark Simon 甚少談論政治，只知道他是美國共和黨香港分部的成員，但不認為他與美國政府有連繫。</p> +<p>辯方問，從馮的回覆可見，群組有否共識在增加新聞時，包含關於制裁的新聞？黎則重申，他從沒提及制裁，只有提及群聚效應（critical mass），並說英文新聞不夠，需要擴張英文版規模，而他相信馮只是舉例指出已增加了新聞數量。</p> -<h4 id="黎智英視自己為商人和社運人士">黎智英：視自己為商人和社運人士</h4> +<p>至於張劍虹稱黎一直以來下達的編採指示包括報導關於美國制裁、抗爭和示威的新聞，黎則反駁稱自己從沒談及制裁，「所以他虛構證供。（“… so he made it up.”）」辯方展示2020年8月26日的訊息，黎在群組中傳送有關拜登的新聞，向馮偉光表示不認為英文版要包含國際新聞，因其他媒體也會報導，而《蘋果》英文版應集中在中國內地的新聞。馮偉光其後表示，會即日起停止報導國際新聞。</p> -<p>辯方問黎是否任何政黨的成員，黎表示從來不是，「我視自己為一個商人和社運人士（activist）。」辯方追問為何黎認為自己是行動者，黎稱因為他參與示威和一些社會事件。</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/sgsKqfx.png" alt="image02" /> +▲ 前《蘋果日報》社長 張劍虹</p> -<p>另外，黎確認他在2020年5月，即《國安法》生效之前約一個月，擔任集團主席，包括掌管編採範疇，因他想為整個公司負責任。黎其後解釋，「如果有任何證據顯示《蘋果》荼毒港人思想，我便需要承擔責任」，「《國安法》之後，如果《蘋果》發生了任何事，我希望我會是完全承擔責任的那一個人。」他表示自己是作為一個「領袖」去承擔責任。</p> +<h4 id="黎自言不懂用twitter-李兆富負責管理發推文和追蹤其他帳戶-包括特朗普">黎自言不懂用Twitter 李兆富負責管理、發推文和追蹤其他帳戶 包括特朗普</h4> -<h4 id="黎智英無意圖無能力荼毒港人思想">黎智英：無意圖、無能力荼毒港人思想</h4> +<p>辯方指，黎於2020年5月開設個人 Twitter（現稱X）帳戶，並於5月22日發布首個推文。黎指該 Twitter 帳戶是由李兆富（筆名利世民）管理。辯方遂展示李的薪金紀錄，黎確認李當時的職位是集團行政總裁助理（Assistant to Group CEO）。</p> -<p>就控方案情指稱黎是「重光團隊」（Stand With Hong Kong）的「金主」，黎在庭上稱「我沒有任何政治主張，我與 SWHK 沒有任何聯繫」，如果他與 SWHK 有任何聯繫，那只限於提供貸款，使他們能夠在報章賣廣告。</p> +<p>辯方問黎會怎樣形容自己與李之間的關係，黎指：「他幾乎就像我的徒弟（mentee），我們互相認識很久。」黎稱，早在2014年之前，李開始替《蘋果》撰寫專欄文章時，他們便互相認識。黎並指，李是信奉自由市場的經濟學者，二人開始討論事情，而李後來變成好像他的徒弟般。</p> -<p>控方開案陳詞又指《蘋果日報》荼毒讀者思想。但黎則表示他不知道「荼毒思想」是什麼意思，「我只是對於一些已然發生的事情作出評論」，他亦說：「單憑我寫的東西，我不認為我有能力去荼毒香港市民的思想。」黎同時否認有任何意圖去荼毒港人思想。</p> +<p>黎指，李會替黎選材和發布推文，因他自己不懂使用 Twitter；李亦會根據自己的個人判斷而替黎的帳戶追蹤其他帳戶。黎相信其帳戶之所以追蹤時任美國總統特朗普，也是因為李的緣故，因為他自己不懂如何追蹤其他帳戶。被問到是否知道自己的帳戶追蹤了誰，黎則稱不知道，因有太多人。</p> -<h4 id="張劍虹曾供稱不可向黎說不-黎我從來沒有說過他不可以說不">張劍虹曾供稱不可向黎說「不」 黎：我從來沒有說過他不可以說「不」</h4> +<p>法官李運騰問，李追蹤其他帳戶之前須否得到黎的批准。黎則指起初須要得到他的批准，但是因為信任李，所以後來李自行處理。</p> -<p>張劍虹作供時指，黎是一個「不可以向他說不」的老闆。黎今在庭上反駁：「我不明白為何他沒有權利說不，我從來沒有說過他不可以說不。」黎續指：「我一直以來總是客氣，我從不下達命令，我總是問他會否做某些事，按照他的決定。」</p> +<p>辯方指從訊息紀錄可見，開設 Twitter 的意念是由其私人助手 Mark Simon 提議。黎同意。</p> -<p>辯方問到，黎有沒有遇過任何情況，當他要求張劍虹做某些事時，張拒絕或沒有照做。黎則指張是行政總裁，所以他很少要求張做事，故記不起有否發生過上述情況；但是即使張沒有執行到他所交代的工作，他也不會知道，因他不會跟進進度。</p> +<h4 id="黎否認開設twitter為了增加個人影響力">黎否認開設Twitter為了增加個人影響力</h4> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/hWqNVJZ.png" alt="image07" /> -▲ 前《蘋果日報》社長 張劍虹</p> +<p>楊清奇早前證供提到，黎在飯局中稱有意設立 Twitter 帳戶，籲在座人士提供新聞和評論，供他在 Twitter 發表，「佢希望通過呢個社交媒體，擴大佢嘅影響力，擴大《蘋果日報》嘅影響力。」</p> -<h4 id="黎智英稱總編輯換人並非他的決定">黎智英稱總編輯換人並非他的決定</h4> +<p>黎今庭上指，他開設 Twitter 帳戶的目的，是讓更多人更容易地知道香港發生什麼事，並跟進香港的情況。辯方問黎有否想過為了增加個人影響力。黎則否認，指開設 Twitter 帳戶不是為了增加個人影響力，而是想讓人們知道香港最新情況。他又表示：「我沒有想過個人影響力，我並不是那種專橫（presumptuous）的人。」</p> -<p>陳沛敏亦曾在作供期間形容黎是「比較強勢」的老闆。黎智英在庭上回應：「我認為，如果她將我的性格演繹為我的管理風格，她是正確」，他自言有很強的性格；但是如果說他強迫下屬執行工作的話，他並不同意。</p> +<p>對於控方案情指稱黎開設 Twitter 是為了增加個人在國際上的影響力，黎則重申：「我從沒考慮過自己的影響力，因為這是專橫的（presumptuous）。」他又表示，甚至到現在他也沒有這種想法，「我只是嘗試告知人們發生了什麼事。」</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/1bFMVz9.png" alt="image08" /> -▲ 前《蘋果日報》執行總編輯 林文宗（左）、前《蘋果日報》副社長 陳沛敏（右）</p> +<p>辯方又問，黎又是否想透過 Twitter 來增加《蘋果》的影響力？黎則指：「這是我的個人 Twitter，我不知道為什麼這與《蘋果》有任何關係。」黎並確認《蘋果》有自己的 Twitter 帳戶。</p> -<p>楊清奇則在作供時指黎若遇到員工「唔啱佢心意，好快就換人」，在楊任職《蘋果》23年期，他記得換了七至八次總編緝。黎則指，在過去二十多年來，如果總編輯有轉換，那不會是他的決定，他不會干預該些決定，而且他稱總編輯只換過三次。</p> +<p>辯方展示黎的 Twitter 截圖，顯示 IPAC 裴倫德和「重光團隊」（SWHK）的帳戶在黎的推文下留言。黎則表示沒有留意留言。</p> -<h4 id="黎智英林榮基赴台做頭條乃陳沛敏的決定">黎智英：林榮基赴台做頭條乃陳沛敏的決定</h4> +<p>辯方展示黎與李兆富之間的訊息，顯示黎把草擬的推文傳送給李，然後李修改了一些字眼，但意思維持不變，或者李提出修改建議。黎確認，又指最終發布的推文中的標籤（hashtag），是由李加上的，「因為我不懂怎麼加 hashtag。」</p> -<p>辯方展示黎智英與張劍虹之間的 WhatsApp 對話，黎指前政務司司長陳方安生會見時任美國副總統彭斯是「大新聞」，並要求張將新聞做到「最大效果」，張回覆「老闆，早安，收到。謝謝」。黎同意以上訊息屬於編採指示，除了這次之外，只曾指示過張發起「一人一信救香港」行動。</p> +<h4 id="黎否認在slack討論編採指示">黎否認在Slack討論編採指示</h4> -<p>辯方另提及黎在2019年4月向張發訊息：「林榮基因逃犯法例昨天到台灣避難，我們已有獨家照片和報導，現在欠他的訪問，不知台灣是否有人知他下落。謝謝。」黎則不認為這訊息屬於編採指示，因為當時張身處台灣，只是想打聽當地有沒有人知道林榮基的下落，只是一種方便的做法。</p> +<p>辯方接著就「飯盒會」提問。控方案情指稱黎透過舉行「飯盒會」，向《蘋果》管理層下達編採指示。</p> -<p>林榮基赴台的新聞後來在2019年4月27日實體報紙的頭條。張劍虹曾供稱，這是因為他向陳沛敏轉達黎智英想以此新聞作為頭版；惟陳沛敏則表示「係我嘅決定」。黎智英今在庭上指這是陳沛敏的決定。</p> +<p>黎早前證供提到，他在2014年辭去壹傳媒集團主席並退休，但是因為集團業績倒退，故他在2018年重返集團工作。黎形容當時公司士氣低落，因為公司業務正在衰退，很多員工害怕公司會倒閉。</p> -<h4 id="黎智英與張劍虹非朋友-從不談及私事">黎智英：與張劍虹非朋友 從不談及私事</h4> +<p>辯方展示黎與時任動新聞平台總監張志偉的訊息紀錄，黎確認當時張進行一個內部問卷調查，旨在尋求改善《蘋果》動新聞影片的質素。</p> -<p>辯方指，張似乎是一個獲得黎信賴的同事，問黎與張劍虹是否朋友。黎隨即表示不是，「我們從不談及私事，我幾乎從沒與他單獨吃午飯」，即使一起吃午飯，也只會談論公事。</p> +<p>辯方另展示訊息紀錄，顯示黎與員工商討舉行「飯盒會」的時間和地點。黎確認首次「飯盒會」是在2018年8月舉行，出席的人士均是公司中高層員工，包括張劍虹、陳沛敏等。</p> -<p>至於陳沛敏，黎智英說：「她是我的朋友」，二人也是同事關係，在公事以外有私交。而楊清奇，黎表示「我甚少與他見面」，形容雙方是「非常遙遠的關係」。辯方提到楊曾到黎的大宅吃飯，黎則指，有一次他邀請不同的寫手到他家，希望邀請他們撰文評論中國時事，而楊只是其中一名獲邀者。</p> +<p>此外，張劍虹證供指稱黎會在通訊軟件 Slack 群組中發布編採指示。惟黎則在庭上否認，並稱從來沒有在 Slack 討論編採指示。</p> -<p>張劍虹曾供稱，黎於2019年7月赴美國會見時任副總統彭斯、時任美國國務卿蓬佩奧和美國國家安全顧問 John Bolton，回港後與他談論該次會面，又形容黎「幾雀躍」。黎智英則在庭上反駁：「我從沒有跟張談及我的個人事務。」</p> +<p>辯方在庭上展示《蘋果》員工的 Slack 群組紀錄截圖，並要求黎按時序逐一確認。不過，控方代表、副刑事檢控專員周天行則質疑相關紀錄是否完整，有可能部份紀錄被刪除，以及次序掉亂。法官則關注，若然控方質疑辯方呈上的紀錄的話，黎需要在庭上逐一檢視及確認，所需時間將會很長。</p> -<p>張劍虹亦供稱，黎曾告訴他直播節目「Live Chat with Jimmy Lai」邀請到美國退休軍官 Jack Keane 做嘉賓，張表達憂慮，惟黎回應：「佢哋（中共）咁搞我，我一定去到盡㗎，我冇得褪㗎。」黎今在庭上反駁：「我從沒有與張談及 Jack Keane。我從沒有與他討論我的私事。」黎指 Jack Keane 是他的好友，他是否邀請對方出席節目，與張毫無關係，「我不明白我為何要跟他（張）討論。」</p> +<p>案件周三（27日）續審。</p> -<h4 id="控方案情指黎透過飯盒會下達編採指示-黎智英飯盒會關於業務發展">控方案情指黎透過「飯盒會」下達編採指示 黎智英：飯盒會關於業務發展</h4> +<hr /> -<p>至於「飯盒會」，控方案情指稱黎透過召開「飯盒會」，向《蘋果》高層下達編採指示。黎今稱，「飯盒會」是關於將《蘋果》轉型至網上媒體，屬於「業務發展會議」，而且除了《蘋果》之外，他與其他部門每隔六星期亦會開一次「飯盒會」。</p> +<p>案件編號：HCCC51/2022</p>獨媒報導黎智英：倘真相煽動他人憎恨政府 依然會報導 不認為構成罪行【黎智英案・審訊第 95 日】2024-11-22T12:00:00+08:002024-11-22T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/trial-of-jimmy-lai-day-95<ul> + <li>黎智英：疫情現反中情緒 良機設英文版 利用中國負面新聞</li> +</ul> -<p>張劍虹的證供指稱黎智英的編採指示之一是提倡「和勇不分」。黎則表示，他記得自己曾撰文提及「和勇不分」，但是如果指稱他在「飯盒會」中提及「和勇不分」的話，「我會有懷疑，因為飯盒會是關於業務發展。」但他不能百份百肯定自己有否說過。</p> +<excerpt /> -<h4 id="黎智英籲員工勿針對特朗普-因不能一方面要求援助另一方面卻對著幹">黎智英籲員工勿針對特朗普 因不能一方面要求援助另一方面卻對著幹</h4> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/e9vmYOE.png" alt="image01" /></p> -<p>2020年6月2日，黎智英向台灣《蘋果》時任社長陳裕鑫發訊息，籲：「請國際組同事不要跟紐約時報及CNN針對川普，我們蘋果卻要靠川普政府支持保命，這樣做不太好。」相同訊息轉發至張劍虹。</p> +<p>【獨媒報導】壹傳媒創辦人黎智英及3間蘋果公司被控串謀勾結外國勢力及串謀刊印煽動刊物等罪，今（22日）於高院（移師西九龍法院）踏入第95日審訊，黎智英第三日作供。黎否認其個人專欄文章煽惑他人使用暴力，他視自己為「和理非」，提倡「和勇不分」是希望把勇武派吸納入「和理非」陣營，使他們在「和理非」的影響下能克制，減少暴力行為和停止暴力升級，最終變得完全和平。至於《蘋果》英文版，黎認為可以爭取美國人知道香港狀況，並使他們為香港發聲，但他認為外國人為香港發聲並不代表干預香港。他確認曾在群組中說：「在疫情肆虐後掀起的反中情緒，這些是美國人最需要看」，由於疫情關係，人們出現反中情緒，而這是一個良機去利用他們不滿情緒。黎又指，外國人在南華早報看不到負面的中國新聞，認為這是一個好機會去創辦《蘋果》英文版，報導及利用中國的負面新聞。</p> -<p>黎解釋，這與「一人一信救香港」的意念相似，他當時相信時任美國總統特朗普會出手阻止《國安法》在香港生效，「如果《國安法》生效的話，《蘋果日報》便會完蛋。」</p> +<p>同案被告、已承認串謀勾結外國勢力罪的馮偉光（筆名盧峯）今亦到場旁聽，獲安排坐在屬於延伸庭的第二庭，觀看正庭的實時直播。他身穿藍綠色格仔恤衫、深藍色西裝褸，戴啡色框眼鏡，在被告欄內受三名懲教人員看管。黎作供期間，馮不時低頭抄寫筆記。</p> -<p>辯方追問，黎認為特朗普會做什麼來阻止《國安法》通過。黎起初稱「特朗普會知道他該怎樣做」，後來在追問下，黎表示他不知道，也不能夠知道，「可能是對中國發出呼籲，對習近平發出呼籲，什麼也好。」</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/6zSfsvy.png" alt="image02" /> +▲ 馮偉光</p> -<p>法官李運騰問黎會否視上述訊息為「編採指示」。黎表示：「我不認為它是編採指示。」他又說：「我當時提議這樣做（針對川普）不太好，這不是一個指示。」黎亦解釋，如果他們一方面發起「一人一信救香港」，呼籲特朗普援助，另一方面卻與特朗普對著幹，便會自相矛盾。</p> +<h4 id="專欄文章提及游說-黎否認要求外國實施制裁或封鎖">專欄文章提及「游說」 黎否認要求外國實施制裁或封鎖</h4> -<p>黎指，一直以來他覺得《蘋果》的國際版取態沒有問題，但是直到2020年6月香港踏入關鍵時刻，需要要求特朗普阻止《國安法》。辯方問為何《國安法》會影響到《蘋果》。黎說：「因為在《國安法》之下，我們沒有辦法去營運一間獨立媒體。往後發生的事件亦證明了我是對的。」辯方隨即指往後發生的事件與本案控罪時段無關，這是一個刑事審訊而不是政治審訊，籲黎將案發時段以外的事件拋諸腦後。</p> +<p>就首項控罪「串謀刊印、發布、出售、要約出售、分發、展示或複製煽動刊物」，控方指控《蘋果》在2019年4月至2020年5月期間，共發布161篇具煽動意圖的文章，涵蓋新聞報導、評論文章，以及黎的個人專欄「成敗樂一笑」文章。</p> -<p>黎接著說：「如果《國安法》生效的話，將會是香港言論自由的終結。」《蘋果》能夠生存下去的機會渺芒，所以希望特朗普能做一些事阻止《國安法》。</p> +<p>辯方今早繼續向黎展示其個人專欄「成敗樂一笑」於2019年10月27日發布的文章〈美國人想對我們說的話〉。文章開首稱：「這幾天身在美國，難以抽身撰寫專欄，公司手足反問我是否可解答一些疑問，造就以下答問。」黎確認當時著時任《蘋果》副社長陳沛敏構思十條問題，關於香港當時情況和華盛頓游說之旅，供他以問答形式撰寫專欄文章，因此「手足」是指陳沛敏。</p> -<h4 id="黎智英twitter帳戶由李兆富管理-包括追蹤其他人">黎智英：Twitter帳戶由李兆富管理 包括追蹤其他人</h4> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/Mme7rhA.png" alt="image03" /> +▲ 前《蘋果日報》執行總編輯 林文宗（左）、前《蘋果日報》副社長 陳沛敏（右）</p> -<p>控方開案陳詞指稱，黎智英的 Twitter 帳戶追蹤53個帳戶，包括時任美國副總統彭斯、時任美國國務卿蓬佩奧、時任台灣總統蔡英文、SWHK 和羅傑斯等。黎則稱，Twitter 帳戶是由李兆富（筆名利世民）替他開設、發帖和管理，追蹤別人帳戶也是由李負責，「我不知道怎樣追蹤。」</p> +<p>其中第十道問題「香港人還可以做甚麼爭取美國及國際社會支持？」黎在文章中回答：「要得到外國人支持，就要不斷游說。加上傳媒報道，讓他們了解我們的道德、勇氣、良知，讓他們在生活上發聲，支持只會越來越大，不會減少的，只要我們做好本份，以道德力量感動他們的良知。」</p> -<h4 id="黎否認獄中指示員工照原來咁做-因國安法已生效猶如叫他們自殺">黎否認獄中指示員工「照原來咁做」 因國安法已生效猶如「叫他們自殺」</h4> +<p>黎供稱，「不斷游說」的意思是強調反修例運動非暴力和堅持，他稱文章字句反映他所想的事實和他內心真實想法，並無任何敵意或意圖去煽動仇恨。黎否認「游說」是指要求外國實施制裁或封鎖，因當時香港還未出現相關討論。他亦否認控方所指文章意圖引起對中央和特區政府的憎恨。</p> -<p>黎智英於2020年12月開始還柙。張劍虹供稱，他在探監期間向黎請示「《蘋果日報》點樣運作落去」，當時黎說：「唔使怕，繼續做，繼續做落去，照原來咁做。」</p> +<h4 id="休庭至下午讓黎閱讀餘下文章">休庭至下午讓黎閱讀餘下文章</h4> -<p>黎今在庭上反駁，事前他得悉兩名兒子當天會來探望他，可是張臨時說要加入，黎當時以為張有緊要事想問他，結果三人一同探訪，但是張卻沒有任何問題，只是說了一些不重要的事情，而探訪時間只有15分鐘，「沒有時間去講其他事了。」黎稱他當時失去耐性，「為何你奪走我兒子的時間？」他稱該次探訪中沒有下達任何指示。</p> +<p>黎在庭上閱讀每篇文章需時數分鐘，昨日法官關注進度，問辯方能否一次過就五篇文章提問，惟黎表示當他讀到第五篇文章時，便會忘記頭四篇文章的內容。</p> -<p>黎稱，他曾寫信給《蘋果》員工，籲他們不要冒險，可是如果他下達指示叫他們「唔使怕，繼續做，繼續做落去，照原來咁做」，換言之就是叫他們冒險，並不合理，可是他不記得實際上自己有否如此說。他表示，他可能有說過「唔使怕，繼續做」，但是不會是「照原來咁做」，因《國安法》已經生效，如果叫員工「照原來咁做」的話，「我是在叫他們自殺。」</p> +<p>直至今天，辯方指黎能夠在法官不在席下，在庭上一次過閱讀餘下12篇文章，然後下午回答問題。法官杜麗冰遂押後至下午續審，讓黎留在庭內證人台閱讀文章，期間允許控辯雙方法律團隊和公眾人士逗留在庭內，惟要求他們安靜，否則職員會要求他們離開。</p> -<hr /> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/Vly98bV.png" alt="image04" /> +▲ 法官杜麗冰</p> -<p>案件編號：HCCC51/2022</p>獨媒報導黎智英親自作供 稱反對暴力和港獨 曾籲報導勿針對特朗普 黎智英：是「提議」而非編採指示Taiwan Strait Crisis To Europe2024-11-20T12:00:00+08:002024-11-20T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/taiwan-strait-crisis-to-europe<p><em>This report examines which US capabilities will be most relevant in a potential Taiwan crisis, as well as which are of utility both in Europe and in a Taiwan contingency.</em></p> +<h4 id="黎智英否認所有文章具煽動意圖-惟承認其中一篇部份字句冒犯性並致歉">黎智英否認所有文章具煽動意圖 惟承認其中一篇部份字句冒犯性並致歉</h4> -<excerpt /> +<p>午休之後，辯方指黎已閱讀12篇文章，並問黎這些文章之中，有沒有任何一篇具有控方所指稱的煽動意圖。黎說沒有，他本人亦沒有任何煽動意圖，「我只是評論正在發生的事，處理輿論，和預測後果是什麼。」</p> -<p>There is an emergent policy consensus within the US that the period from 2027 to the early 2030s represents one of acute danger for Taiwan. This view was captured by former Commander US Indo-Pacific Command Admiral Philip Davidson, who predicted that an invasion of Taiwan by China is possible by 2027, a view echoed by other senior figures.</p> +<p>不過黎主動提到，他留意到〈2020年和勇一起撐下去〉一文中，他評論一名少女向警察講粗口，但如今看來，他認為自己受到當時的氛圍影響，才會作出具冒犯性的評論，他承認是「品味低俗（bad taste）」，感到後悔並為此道歉。</p> -<p>If the US must commit substantial forces to deterrence or defence in the Indo- Pacific, this will have significant second-order effects within Europe. By the end of this decade, the partial reconstitution of Russian forces is likely, as is the growth of Russian capacity with respect to capabilities, such as nuclear submarines, which have not been impacted by the conflict in Ukraine.</p> +<p>該文章提到，黎看到一個十四、五歲戴口罩的少女，大喊：「黑警死全家！」和「香港差佬，X 你老母」，他當時對何俊仁說：「有這樣的後生，我哋冇得輸。」黎並在文中稱：「有這樣疾惡如仇的優秀勇敢年輕人，香港真是塊福地。」</p> -<p>This report examines which US capabilities will be most relevant in an Indo- Pacific contingency, as well as which capabilities among these are fungible – that is, of utility both in Europe and in a Taiwan contingency. Its purpose is to identify areas where gaps are most likely to emerge in Europe’s defensive posture as a consequence of the potential reallocation of US capabilities. Its major findings are that:</p> +<h4 id="黎智英區議會民主派大勝能給年輕人希望-以致減少街頭暴力">黎智英：區議會民主派大勝能給年輕人希望 以致減少街頭暴力</h4> -<ul> - <li> - <p>To a large extent, the question of how an invasion of Taiwan might impact deterrence in Europe depends on US military strategy in the Indo-Pacific. A denial-orientated strategy creates far fewer gaps in a two-theatre posture than one that requires extensive strikes on the Chinese mainland, and is also likely to be more feasible militarily.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>The suppression of enemy air defences (SEAD) involves very different capabilities in the two regions, as the critical assets that China will need to defend its amphibious shipping will be defended by air and maritime platforms, rather than by ground-based transport erector launchers. Munitions such as the AARGM, which are optimised against elusive targets, can be allocated to European defence if policy allows for it and if European air forces are adequately prepared for SEAD, without undermining the US in Asia.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Integrated air and missile defence represents an especially fungible capability, and one that will be heavily strained by a two-theatre scenario. This is, however, more true of systems that enable tactical ballistic missile defence (BMD) and defence against air-breathing threats than it is for upper tier systems that enable theatre-level BMD. Russia’s lack of capability in intermediate-range ballistic missiles or medium-range ballistic missiles, and the time it would take to develop and scale these, mean that the Russian and Chinese missile arsenals present different problem sets.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Resilient C4ISR and the organisational capital to enable its employment are a concern across both theatres.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>While land forces are a less fungible capability, many of the enablers on which they depend, in terms of airlift and sealift as well as air defences, may be drawn on in the Pacific.</p> - </li> -</ul> +<p>就2019年12月22日的文章〈我們堅持下去才有希望〉，黎亦否認煽動暴力。他指2019年11月區議會中民主派大勝，能夠給予年輕人希望，如果所有人團結的話，能夠形成強大的政治力量並給年輕人希望，使他們減少街頭上的暴力。</p> -<h3 id="introduction">Introduction</h3> +<p>對於有示威者用汽油彈或槍械，黎表示：「我懷疑這些可怕的暴力是出自滲透者（penetrators）之手，有人當時告訴我。」他指這是非常危險，所以必須提防。</p> -<p>Over recent years, predictions have been made by several senior US figures, including the former US Commander Indo-Pacific Command Admiral Philip Davidson and CIA Director William Burns, that China is likely to either invade Taiwan by 2027 or, at a minimum, wishes to have the option of doing so. This prediction, the so-called “Davidson Window”, has been reinforced by analysis that suggests that the period between the mid-2020s and the early 2030s represents one of acute vulnerability for Taiwan. One of the major factors behind this assessment is the fact that US capabilities in several key areas will reach a nadir in the late 2020s as older aircraft, surface vessels and submarines are retired, with replacement rates resulting in capability gaps that will not be filled until well into the 2030s.</p> +<p>黎在文章中籲「勇武手足們」考慮陳日君樞機的意見，他解釋，陳樞機曾說過運動需有領袖和有組織，便能減少暴力情況；如果依賴「無大台」的自發行動的話，有時候暴力會超越界線。他指：「暴力是壞，當它超出界線的時候更壞」，所以要確保它受到控制。</p> -<p>This could mean, as some have argued, that the US will lack the capacity by itself to deter a peer and a near-peer competitor (China and Russia) simultaneously. If true, this would have considerable second-order effects on the deterrence of Russia in Europe if Russia either coordinated action with China or acted opportunistically during a crisis in Asia. While it is difficult to forecast with any certainty Russian decision-making during a hypothetical conflict over Taiwan, and much depends on the course of Russia’s war in Ukraine, there would be at least one structural incentive for Moscow to attempt to reorder Europe’s political arrangements during a clash in the Indo-Pacific. Russia could enjoy a transient window of military advantage over European states that face critical shortfalls in areas such as integrated air and missile defence (IAMD) and munitions stockpiles – even though longer-term trends would suggest its prospects for competing militarily with NATO are dim. Declining powers that face a combination of short-term opportunity and long-term decline tend to be especially risk acceptant. But this does not mean that a crisis in East Asia will automatically have second-order effects in Europe, as this will be determined by many contingent factors. Nevertheless, there are grounds for an assessment of the minimal capabilities required to maintain conventional deterrence within Europe in a context of US resources being severely overstretched.</p> +<h4 id="文章引用邱吉爾二戰名言-黎智英只想鼓勵人們自救團結一致地反抗-沒提及暴力">文章引用邱吉爾二戰名言 黎智英：只想鼓勵人們自救、團結一致地反抗 沒提及暴力</h4> -<p>Irrespective of how likely the prospect of a war in East Asia in the late 2020s might be, identifying which capability gaps could emerge within the European theatre if there were such a war can help to assess both those areas where the dependence of NATO on US capabilities represents an immediate point of fragility in the Alliance’s defence posture, and which dependencies can be offset by Europe on a longer-term basis.</p> +<p>2019年12月29日的文章〈反極權 台灣更不用怕〉中，黎指「香港年青人掀起一場轟轟烈烈的逆權運動」、「年輕人抗爭衝突更勇武」等，他否認煽動暴力，反指自己只是說出事實，它就是這樣發生，並沒有煽動任何東西。</p> -<p>This is important because not all military capability is fungible – that is, of utility both in Europe and in a Taiwan contingency. Factors such as the geography of a theatre and the operational plans that underpin a deterrent posture in each theatre have considerable salience. For example, it is unclear whether armour and multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) have as much utility in a Sino-American conflict – a primarily maritime theatre – as they do in Europe (although both capabilities have a role in each theatre). It is for this reason that leaders have historically often engaged in target- or component-specific balancing – attempting to offset the component of an opponent’s power deemed most threatening to them, rather than the full suite of capabilities.</p> +<p>2020年1月5日〈2020年和勇一起撐下去〉，文中提及老師和校長「因言入罪」，「我們和勇派必須挺身而出，一起反抗。」黎表示這裡雖然提倡「和勇不分」，但是不代表呼籲和平的人變得暴力，相反勇武派應該加入和平的行列，又指自己並不是呼籲以暴力的手段反抗。</p> -<p>This bears consideration for several reasons. First, although there has been much discussion of potential US overstretch in the event of a two-war scenario, there is room for a more detailed discussion regarding precisely in which areas the US would find itself most heavily strained. Second, individual combatant commands typically draw up regional plans which, although not isolated from a wider global context (especially since the adoption of the 2018 National Defense Strategy), are primarily informed by regional considerations. In a context where historical two-war planning assumptions had been replaced by one-major-war assumptions, the question of competition for resources, both among combatant commands and between the US’s NATO and other commitments, could be safely ignored. This is no longer the case. In this regard, open source academic work can contribute to an understanding of the shared dependencies of individual combatant commands, as planning for multiple theatres again becomes de rigueur. Third, while European members of NATO and organisations such as SHAPE (Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe) do have access to US planning assumptions to inform NATO’s Concept for Deterrence and Defence of the Euro-Atlantic Area (DDA) family of plans, the very complexity of such plans makes assessing regional requirements complex in its own right, and leaves minimal spare capacity for secondary assessments about how dynamics in the Indo-Pacific might impact Europe. As such, a discussion of the interrelationships between theatre-level strategies can be informed by a wider public discussion.</p> +<p>就2020年2月9日的文章〈武漢瘟疫 中共喪鐘〉，當中指「我們就像醫護人員一樣群起反抗」。黎否認煽動暴力，因醫護人員並沒有使用暴力。</p> -<p>This Whitehall Report summarises the findings from several roundtables held by RUSI in London in December 2023 with subject matter experts from a number of allied countries, focusing on European deterrence. It also summarises the results from formal combat modelling using tools such as Monte Carlo simulations, and desk-based analysis of historical analogous case studies and operations. The report does not seek to assess the precise quantity of any individual capability required in either Europe or the Indo-Pacific (although plausible estimates are used throughout). Rather, the report focuses on the question of how fungible specific capabilities are, and as a result how likely competing demand signals for their deployment would be.</p> +<p>文章亦指：「要是傷亡滿目瘡痍，人民面對瘟疫死亡的威脅，極權便變得不可怕了。瘟疫死亡的威脅，讓我們忘記了對極權的恐懼，十四億人民齊向中共發出憤怒的獅子吼！」辯方問，黎是否提議以暴力反抗？黎則指人們只是呼喊、發聲，當中並沒有任何暴力。</p> -<p>Chapter I examines the requirement from the Indo-Pacific in order to identify which US capabilities will be most critical in the event of a Taiwan contingency. Chapter II details the impact of this demand signal on the Allied posture in Europe. Its purpose is to examine which of the capabilities most needed in the Pacific are also relevant to European deterrence, and where the absence of US capabilities in Europe is both most likely and most impactful in the event of an Indo-Pacific contingency. The report concludes with a summary of the areas in which capabilities are likely to be rapidly exhausted by a contingency spanning two theatres and where they can be rationally allocated across two theatres without generating overstretch.</p> +<p>就2020年3月29日的文章〈我們最光輝的時刻〉，黎引用英國前首相邱吉爾在二戰期間在議會發表的演說。黎今否認意圖煽動他人對特區政府使用暴力。辯方則指，邱吉爾的言論是涉及英國與德國之間的戰事，而戰事牽涉暴力。惟黎指香港並沒有戰事，他引用邱吉爾的句子，只是想鼓勵人們自救、團結一致地反抗，並沒有提及暴力，而他一直都堅持使用和平手段抗爭。</p> -<h3 id="i-what-determines-the-demand-signal-in-the-indo-pacific">I. What Determines the Demand Signal in the Indo-Pacific?</h3> +<p>法官李運騰指問題是反抗的對象是什麼，問黎是要反抗什麼。黎回答是要反抗中國政府對香港自由的侵害。</p> -<p>This chapter focuses on the contours of a future conflict over Taiwan. It seeks to identify the specific US military capabilities that will be in greatest demand in the Pacific should such a conflict occur. It also aims to establish a basis for comparing the resource demands of the European and Indo-Pacific theatres.</p> +<h4 id="黎智英非支持勇武-提倡和勇不分旨在吸納勇武派-減少暴力">黎智英：非支持勇武 提倡「和勇不分」旨在吸納勇武派 減少暴力</h4> -<p>The question of which US assets will be most heavily stretched by the occurrence of two simultaneous conflicts in the Indo-Pacific and Europe will be determined by several key variables. Among them are:</p> +<p>就2020年4月26日的〈專橫暴政打壓，我們氣魄不滅〉，黎提及他、李卓人、楊森和李柱銘等民主派涉非法集結被捕，「和理非的大部份香港人抗爭意志被嚇窒了，小撮的勇武派便失去了市民眾志成城的維護和支持，衝擊暴力的士氣和勇氣被削弱，中共便輕易制服這幫人，我們整個運動儘管不是完結，也畫上休止符了。」</p> -<ul> - <li> - <p>The preferred Chinese strategy.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>The preferred US response.</p> - </li> -</ul> +<p>辯方問黎有否嘗試英雄化一小撮勇武派？黎則表示沒有，他只是想說當局拘捕李卓人、楊森等人一事，試圖阻嚇「和理非」示威人士上街，結果剩下來的人只得勇武派，那麼整個運動便會失去士氣。</p> -<p>The approach taken by China’s leaders to achieve any eventual military resolution of the Taiwan Strait question will be a major determinant of the options available to US decision-makers and thus the demands placed on their resources. There are several options available to China regarding Taiwan: a full-scale invasion; a blockade; or a limited-aims seizure of a specific outlying island, such as Qemoy or Matsu.</p> +<p>黎確認他視自己為「和理非」，他稱自己並不是支持勇武派，而是嘗試透過提倡「和勇不分」，把他們吸納入「和理非」陣營，使他們在「和理非」的影響下能克制，減少暴力行為和停止暴力升級，最終變得完全和平。</p> -<p>This report restricts its focus to a full-scale invasion for two reasons. First, this is the scenario most frequently discussed in the context of the purported “Davidson Window”. Second, there are few (if any) cases of states achieving decisive effects through either a blockade or a limited aim. While the authors regard the focus on a full-scale invasion to be defensible, it does narrow the focus of the report. It should also be noted that the report focuses specifically on the conventional balance. The subject of how China’s growing nuclear arsenal will impact deterrence in both theatres will, however, be the focus of subsequent RUSI research.</p> +<p>辯方另問及「煲底見」意思，黎則指這是來自勇武派的字句，起初他們使用這字句，後來所有人都使用。辯方問「煲底」是否指立法會大樓示威區，惟黎表示不知道，以他的理解「煲底見」意思是「相見直至最後一刻（let’s see each other until the end）」。黎亦否認使用「抗爭」一詞的意思是煽惑暴力。</p> -<p>Second, there is the question of the US preferred response. While this cannot be ascertained with certainty, the feasibility of various options is easier to scope. It looks increasingly unlikely that the original aims of concepts such as AirSea Battle in 2010, which would have seen the US conduct strikes at scale against the Chinese mainland, are viable. Some estimates suggest that a strike campaign to both blind China’s C4ISR and disrupt its major bases could, for example, require up to 28,000 precision-guided munitions for initial strikes and could – based on campaigns such as Operation Desert Storm – involve the targeting of 40,000 aim points. Not only is the sustainability of such a campaign questionable in terms of munitions stocks alone, but the ability of the US Navy and US Air Force (USAF) to maintain the required operational tempo to achieve it is debatable, if one assumes that the risk from China’s long-range strike capabilities means that forces must operate from greater distances. The likely expansion of China’s nuclear arsenal, and the fact that at least some elements of this arsenal will share both bases and command-and-control (C2) structures, will act as constraints in any strike campaign against the mainland. Nuclear weapons do not necessarily make a nation’s territory inviolable, but they do have the effect of making an opponent’s targeting decisions slower and more deliberate – which runs contrary to the tempo of activity required by a strike campaign at large scale.</p> +<h4 id="黎智英希望爭取美國的政客注意到香港的情況和需要">黎智英：希望爭取美國的政客注意到香港的情況和需要</h4> -<p>As such, it is presumed that the most viable approach likely to be available to the US is achieving sea denial within the Taiwan Strait. Since the loss of a considerable part of its amphibious lift capability would necessarily condemn a Chinese invasion to failure, the US does not necessarily need to strike the mainland at scale to defeat an invasion. The cost in munitions and the escalatory risk inherent in sea denial are considerably more manageable. A denial campaign need not eschew strikes on the mainland, but these strikes would probably occur on a more limited scale and only when necessary to enable attacks on China’s amphibious assets.</p> +<p>辯方接著圍繞《蘋果》英文版提問，並展示美國國務院前資深顧問Christian Whiton的訊息，提議《蘋果》應創辦英文版報紙。惟黎智英表示：「我覺得這是瘋狂的主意，因為這樣做太高成本了。」</p> -<p>Third, the position of states such as Japan will be of considerable significance. While support in line with the obligations Japan accepted under the 1997 US–Japan defence guidelines is likely, deeper involvement by Japan would have considerable effects, given that the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) fields what is still the region’s largest force of destroyers (other than that of the US Navy), as well as 22 attack submarines.</p> +<p>辯方另展示作家馮睎乾於2020年5月10日的專欄文章〈不撐蘋果的100萬人〉，當中提到《蘋果》增值的方法包括「八卦式公義」和「國際文宣線」。</p> -<h4 id="resource-demands-of-a-taiwan-invasion">Resource Demands of a Taiwan Invasion</h4> +<p>黎智英確認他於同日創立WhatsApp 群組「English news」，群組成員有張劍虹、陳沛敏、羅偉光、張志偉等人，筆名盧峯的馮偉光後來才加入群組。黎在群組中說：「今日馮睎乾提議出英譯新聞電子版諗得過，反正現在翻譯網站翻譯成本低而快。」</p> -<p><em>The Opening Stage of an Invasion</em></p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/wK4e865.png" alt="image05" /> +▲ 前《蘋果日報》社長 張劍虹</p> -<p>Any Chinese assault on Taiwan would be preceded both by political indicators and by a joint firepower strike operation combining ballistic missiles, cruise missiles and fixed-wing aircraft in both suppressive and attack roles against airbases, surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems and command nodes on both Taiwan and, in all likelihood, US airbases such as Kadena in Japan. A People’s Liberation Army (PLA) joint firepower strike operation is closely modelled on USAF operations during the Gulf War and would probably comprise functionally similar elements, although it is likely that the initial deep penetration provided by the F-117 would instead be provided by short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) such as the DF-15, and hypersonic glide vehicles such as the DF-17.</p> +<p>辯方其後展示黎與私人助手Mark Simon之間的訊息，後者指「（英文版）這是一個機會去爭取美國人和外國人支持香港，爭取支持是其中一種做法，這會是龐大的經濟和政治支援。」（This gives us an opportunity to capture the support of Americans or foreigners who want to support HK, find supporting us is one of the ways to do it. That would be tremendous financial and political support.）黎在庭上解釋，希望爭取美國的政客注意到香港的情況和需要，因為外國的支持對於香港非常重要。黎又指，透過引起外國人和外國媒體的關注，使外國的政客能為香港發聲，是十分重要，他只是想讓更加多人知道香港發生了什麼事。</p> -<p><em>China’s Amphibious Capabilities</em></p> +<h4 id="黎智英外國人為香港發聲並不代表干預香港-外國政府可以與中國政府溝通">黎智英：外國人為香港發聲並不代表干預香港 外國政府可以與中國政府溝通</h4> -<p>A Chinese amphibious assault on Taiwan could then develop in several ways. The PLA could opt for an assault on a relatively broad front involving all or most of the 14 or so beaches on Taiwan that can support a landing at battalion scale or larger. This would have the advantage of imposing uncertainty regarding where to concentrate defending Taiwanese troops, much as the choice of five landing beaches and elaborate preceding deception operations set the conditions for Operation Overlord. Taiwan’s beaches are relatively narrow, and the PLA’s amphibious doctrine calls for combined arms battalions (the basic unit of force of the People’s Liberation Army Ground Force (PLAGF) and the People’s Liberation Army Navy Marine Corps (PLANMC)) to occupy 2–4 km in the assault, making an attack on multiple axes likely given the constrained geography of each individual landing site. That said, it should be noted that even if comparable in success to the 1991 Gulf War, a PLA joint firepower operation would last for several weeks and take more than a week to achieve air superiority (based on the air campaign during Desert Storm), giving Taiwan’s defenders time to prepare approaches to the island with several hundred mines in a short timeframe (assuming that Taiwan’s minelayers and submarines are not destroyed in port early). The People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) fields a robust force of more than 40 mine countermeasure vessels, but these ships would have limited organic defences against surviving Taiwanese anti-ship cruise missile (ASCM) batteries. This in turn could incentivise an invasion plan that focuses on a smaller subset of beaches requiring fewer Q-routes (safe routes through minefields), making it less susceptible to disruption if too many mine countermeasure vessels are sunk in any one channel.</p> +<p>辯方問，請求外國人為香港發聲是否等於請求外國干預香港。黎指可能如此理解，但是他認為外國人為香港發聲並不代表干預香港，因為外國可以通過外交渠道與中國當局對話，改善香港情況。</p> -<p>Nevertheless, the PLAN will in the immediate term face limitations in terms of dedicated amphibious lift capabilities. China has the capability to field nine Type 071 landing platform docks, which can carry 65 armoured vehicles, as well as a further four Type 075 landing helicopter docks (LHDs), which can support amphibious assault with assault craft launched from their well decks and can also carry vertical lift assets (and, in the future, vertical take-off and landing UAVs). In addition, the PLAN fields a larger number of older amphibious vessels, such as the Type 072A and the Type 072III, which can carry 250 troops and 10 armoured vehicles each. Collectively, the PLAN fields 49 landing ship tanks across the Eastern and Southern theatre commands, with 57 across the force. Given that the PLAN built four Type 075s between 2019 and 2024, it is likely that it could expand its fleet of LHDs to roughly double by the end of the decade. However, even accounting for a considerable expansion, the size of an initial assault wave would be limited, given that even the Type 075 LHD could in principle carry most (but not all) of a PLA combined arms battalion’s armour, vehicles and troops. A battalion’s organic capabilities must nevertheless be carried on multiple vessels, and so the landing of a single battalion is expected to occur in several waves. Even a larger future PLAN amphibious lift capability would, then, have limited excess capacity relative to the magnitude of its tasks, and the loss of a portion of the force would condemn an invasion to failure.</p> +<p>黎指，外國關注、發聲以及在外交層面與中國溝通之所以重要，是因為當時即將來臨的國安法帶來危機感，當時有報導指國安法即將實施，但他尚未知道條文內容。</p> -<p>It has been pointed out that a focus on dedicated landing vessels may substantially undervalue the PLAN’s aggregate strength because it ignores China’s efforts to prepare its civilian shipping industry to support amphibious operations in the Taiwan Strait. When China’s dual-use civilian vessels are incorporated into an analysis, the PLAN’s aggregate freight capacity almost trebles to 1.1 million tons. Based on assumptions derived from previous amphibious operations, this would imply an aggregate capability to move around 12 combined arms brigades across the Taiwan Strait in a single wave – in effect, all the amphibious-capable brigades of the PLANMC and the PLAGF.</p> +<p>Mark Simon的訊息中提到「經濟和政治支援」，黎指經濟支援方面，訂閱者需付費，這可以帶來金錢收入；政治支援方面，黎指外國讀者閱讀英文版新聞之後，會為香港發聲，外國的政客會聆聽他們的聲音，使政客也為香港發聲。</p> -<p>There are, however, outstanding questions regarding the use of non-dedicated vessels for sealift, although the PLAN does appear to be testing their potential for assault roles in exercises. Among them is whether such vessels are more suited to functions for joint logistics rather than the shore, which still appears to be the primary role for which the PLAN is rehearsing. The possibility that civilian vessels could considerably expand China’s amphibious lift therefore cannot be excluded. On balance, however, the loss of a significant part of an already limited fleet of dedicated amphibious vessels should condemn an invasion to failure, as these vessels will be critical to the success of an initial assault wave.</p> +<p>至於「政治保護」，辯方問黎認為外國政府可以如何保護一個中國的地區。黎則指外國政府可以與中國政府溝通。黎亦確認英文版的主要對象是美國人，因為他們是最重要的。</p> -<p><em>Airborne Forces in an Island Landing Campaign</em></p> +<h4 id="黎智英疫情現反中情緒-良機設英文版利用中國負面新聞">黎智英：疫情現反中情緒 良機設英文版利用中國負面新聞</h4> -<p>The People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) could also play a role in any amphibious assault, but only if China’s joint firepower operation succeeds. The PLAAF’s Airborne Corps comprises six combined arms brigades and one special operations forces brigade, supported by a fleet of 31 Y-20 transport aircraft and 20 Russian-made IL-76 airlifters, and a larger number of light Y-9 aircraft. These airborne brigades and their constituent battalions are equipped with the ZBD-03 armoured fighting vehicle (AFV) and both the 122-mm PL-96 and the 107-mm PH-63 MLRS. An airborne brigade’s table of organisation and equipment is comparable to that of a PLA medium combined arms brigade. There are, however, considerable differences between individual brigades. The 127th, 128th and 131st Brigades, for example, appear to be light motorised units equipped with all-terrain vehicles and can be paradropped. In addition, the 130th Combined Arms Brigade is air-assault capable and supported by roughly 41 Z-8KA, Z-9WZ and Z-10 utility, transport and attack helicopters. The heavier brigades equipped with the ZBD-03 AFV would probably be moved by IL-76 or Y-20 and would thus require motorised and air-assault units to have secured access to an airfield. In addition, the PLAGF fields two air-assault brigades that have exercised in tandem with the PLAAF Airborne Corps since 2021. According to PLA textbook The Science of Campaigns, airborne forces can support preliminary operations, such as deception and decapitation, or can enable the operational dislocation of an opponent through landings in depth and assault operations, where they would be a first echelon force tasked with seizing beach-heads. The Science of Campaigns is, however, realistic about the limitations of airborne assault, noting that absolute air superiority is required to enable airborne assaults, and that they should be treated as an essentially discretionary activity to be supported by four waves of attack aircraft for every one wave of transport. In effect, for airborne units to land freely, the PLAN and PLAAF require the ability to operate freely over Taiwanese airspace to an extent that would allow the suppression of both pop-up SAM threats and man-portable air defence systems (MANPADs). If this is lacking, it will prove difficult to seize airfields long enough for the heavier elements of a force to move, as illustrated by the Russian Airborne Forces at Hostomel.</p> +<p>辯方指，黎於2020年5月13日向英文版群組發訊息：「我越想越覺得英文版應該着重大陸新聞，專題和文章花絮等。在疫情肆虐後掀起的反中情緒，這些是美國人最需要看。我們把大陸方面內容質量做到最好尤其重要，訂閱我們的都會是有識之士，對新聞要求比一般人高。我們的目標是提供外國人在南華早報看不到的中國新聞，打破南早在這方面的壟斷。」</p> -<p><em>The Determinants of Success for Attacker and Defender</em></p> +<p>就「在疫情肆虐後掀起的反中情緒，這些是美國人最需要看」一句，黎表示他的意思是由於疫情關係，人們出現反中情緒，而這是一個良機去捕捉（catch）他們的不滿情緒（emotional tut）。</p> -<p>Even accounting for civilian lift and airborne forces, a considerably larger PLA first wave would be small relative to the Taiwanese armed forces, which would field a 90,000-strong defending land force. The historical average force-on-force ratio (1941–2002) for successful amphibious assaults is 1:5.29. There are notable exceptions, including the fall of Crete (1940) and the assault on Saipan (1944). In each of these cases, the success of the assault was enabled primarily by absolute air superiority on the side of the attacker. It is thus not unreasonable to conclude that anything short of air supremacy is a defeat condition for a PLA amphibious assault. Moreover, the small size of the force relative to the defender means that even limited losses of amphibious vessels can condemn an invasion to failure.</p> +<h4 id="黎智英真誠地希望打破南華早報壟斷">黎智英：真誠地希望打破南華早報壟斷</h4> -<p>As such, the dominant consideration will be whether the PLAN and the PLAAF can both secure air supremacy around Taiwan (at least for a time) and protect amphibious vessels against non-aerial methods of attack (mines and submarines).</p> +<p>被問到「打破南早在這方面的壟斷」一句，黎說：「我真誠地希望如此。」辯方問黎，有什麼中國新聞是外國人在南華早報看不到的。黎認為是一些負面的中國新聞，例如失業率和很多內地的示威暴動，它們沒有被報導，而黎認為這是一個好機會去創辦《蘋果》英文版，在反中情緒高漲時利用（capitalise）中國的負面新聞。</p> -<p>The first determinant will be whether the PLA is able to create an effective joint engagement zone (JEZ) in and around the Taiwan Strait to minimise the effects of cruise missile attacks on its dedicated amphibious vessels, which will remain crucial to ultimate success, even if augmented with civilian shipping. The PLAN currently fields 33 theatre air-defence vessels, such as the Type 052D guided missile destroyer (DDG) and the Type 055, and could field up to 50 by the end of the decade, based on the construction rates achieved by China in recent years. Vessels such as the Type 052D are equipped with the Type 346A active electronically scanned array antenna (AESA) radar and can carry long-range SAMs such as the HHQ-9, as well as shorter-range 16-km HHQ-6 missiles. China’s Type 055 cruiser is also equipped with an AESA and can quad pack shorter-range HHQ-6 SAMs in some of its 112 vertical launching system cells. Vessels such as the Type 052D and the Type 055 would likely be deployed in surface action groups (SAGs) both in the Taiwan Strait and east of Taiwan to create a layered air-defence network. Of particular significance to the PLAN would be closing off channels such as the Bashi Channel and northern approaches to the Taiwan Strait, through which ASCMs can travel without prior deconfliction with Taiwan’s own air defences.</p> +<p>法官李素蘭問到：「但是《南華早報》並不是香港唯一的英文報紙。」黎則笑言，不把另一份英文報紙即《英文虎報》視為「報紙」，因為他們沒有影響力，只是從其他新聞複製而成。</p> -<p>In addition, the PLAAF is likely to fly patrols over the Taiwan Strait. Since the mid-2000s, Chinese fighters such as the J-10, J-11 and J-16 have fielded the PL-12, an air-to-air missile (AAM) with a profile comparable to the AIM-120, which probably uses an imported seeker from the Russian R-77 AAM. This interceptor will probably be replaced by the PL-15, a longer-range missile with an onboard AESA radar comparable to the AIM-120C/D AAM. While not primarily built for cruise missile intercept in the vein of the Russian MIG-31, these aircraft can contribute to defensive counter-air missions in and around the Taiwan Strait.</p> +<p>案件下周一續審。</p> -<p>By contrast, many of China’s ground-based SAMs would have limited utility in protecting amphibious vessels. While the notional range of a system such as the HQ-9 SAM theoretically allows it to cover most of the Taiwan Strait, in practice constraining factors such as the limitations imposed on radar by the curvature of the Earth when tracking low altitude targets will come into play. Airborne Warning and Control Systems (AWACS) such as the KJ-2000 could be used to provide line of sight, but as illustrated by the Russian air campaign in Ukraine, AWACS can be vulnerable to electronic attack and, by virtue of being large high-flying aircraft, can also be intercepted at long distances by the long-range SAMs on US DDGs. Russia also struggles to cue ground-based air defence systems with its A-50 Mainstay AWACS due to the fact that data transfers are mediated by combined arms army headquarters, a problem that may also be inherent in PLA C2, in which a joint theatre command plays a central role. That said, Russian air defences in Ukraine have scored very long-range intercepts against low-flying aircraft cued by S-band radar, such as the Podolet-K1 radar, as well as by passive coherent location, and it is likely that Chinese ground-based SAMs can rely on their own onboard radar to conduct engagements based on less detailed feeds.</p> +<hr /> -<p>While this is possible, it is unlikely to be a reliable mechanism for defeating low-flying ASCMs. As such, the utility of long-range SAMs such as HQ-9 and S-400 for maritime air defence is likely to be attenuated. Shorter-range systems, such as the 40-km HQ-16 SAM, are of even more limited utility, although these systems will play an important role in protecting amphibious vessels from being struck in port, either by Taiwanese systems such as the Hsiung Feng-II anti-ship missile system, or by US standoff munitions.</p> +<p>案件編號：HCCC51/2022</p>獨媒報導黎智英：疫情現反中情緒 良機設英文版 利用中國負面新聞【黎智英案・審訊第 94 日】2024-11-21T12:00:00+08:002024-11-21T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/trial-of-jimmy-lai-day-94<ul> + <li>黎智英否認曾叫陳沛敏製作「制裁名單」</li> + <li>楊清奇以「鳥籠自主」比喻編採自主 黎智英反駁：從來沒設任何限制或鳥籠</li> +</ul> -<p>China could attempt to secure islands such as Penghu ahead of an assault on Taiwan and build them into air-defence bastions, although their limited space and mountainous geography, as well as their proximity to the mainland (and thus a range of attack vectors), are complicating factors. Notably, as recently as a decade ago the PLA doctrinally subdivided zones of responsibility for SAM fighter aircraft and vessels and emphasised SAM ambushes and point defence for ground-based air-defence systems. While this might have changed, the limitations of China’s capacity to integrate the different service level air-defence capabilities that drove this delineation may persist. Even if cued by a US-style cooperative engagement capability, the PLAAF ground-based air-defence systems would depend on maritime and air assets for cueing and could not play an independent role.</p> +<excerpt /> -<p>If a Chinese integrated air defence system (IADS) comprising primarily maritime and air elements performs robustly, the number of cruise missiles required to inflict crippling damage on an invading fleet will be substantial. For example, a 2009 RAND study calculated that roughly 52 out of a notional force of 100 PLA amphibious vessels, which China was assumed to have by 2020 (larger, it turns out, than the PLAN today possesses, but perhaps a realistic figure for 2027–30), would need to be sunk or mission killed to prevent the PLA from concentrating roughly 60,000 troops on Taiwan over several trips. The historical average hit rate for cruise missiles against defended targets is around 0.26, and it is likely that, at least for larger vessels, more than one ASCM will be required to achieve either a mission kill or a sinking. A success rate of 80% is also the peak rate achieved by the land-based Ukrainian IADS against missiles such as the Kalibr and the KH-101 cruise missile around Kyiv. Some studies suggest the effectiveness of an Aegis-like system against cruise missiles is probably higher, with vessels enjoying a single-shot probability of kill (SSPK) of 0.95, though this may not be realistic under combat conditions. Moreover, there are factors other than active defence that are relevant. For example, soft-kill measures against missile seekers with the aim of either jamming or spoofing them are likely to increase in effectiveness as a conflict progresses, since the PLAN will be exposed to the seeker frequencies of US missiles. The PLA will use maritime militia vessels as decoys to generate maritime clutter.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/6quP2BX.png" alt="image01" /></p> -<p><em>Drawing on US Capabilities</em></p> +<p>【獨媒報導】壹傳媒創辦人黎智英及3間蘋果公司被控串謀勾結外國勢力及串謀刊印煽動刊物等罪，今（21日）於高院（移師西九龍法院）續審，黎智英第二日作供，針對前《蘋果日報》副社長陳沛敏的證供反駁，並重申他是「提議」而非下達「指示」。2019年6月9日一百萬人參與反送中大遊行，黎向陳說「為勇敢的香港人乾杯」會是很好的頭版標題，惟陳最終沒有採用，翌日頭版標題為〈香港人漂亮的固執 1,030,000〉，而陳沒有因為未採用他的提議而受罰。7.1佔領立會之後，黎傳訊息「盡量大做特做令年輕人獲得同情」；黎則強調其意思並非下達編採指示，只是跟陳一起討論事件，並沒有要求她做任何事。</p> -<p>As such, even a strategy focused on the relatively modest goal of sea denial would see a significant section of US anti-surface warfare capabilities drawn to the region. It is not inconceivable that up to 1,000 ASCMs would be required by the US and Taiwan to cripple an invasion fleet. The US plans to export 400 Harpoon ASCMs to Taiwan and will field 450 long-range anti-ship missiles (LRASMs) by the end of the decade, along with older Harpoon ASCMs and joint air-to-surface standoff missiles (JASSMs), which potentially have anti-ship functionality. However, the utility of the JASSM as an anti-ship missile is open to debate, while stocks of Harpoon will be nearing the end of their service lives, resulting in the US facing a shortfall.</p> +<p>此外，陳曾稱黎要求她製作一份「制裁名單」，惟黎否認，稱由於他不懂使用 Signal 的轉發訊息功能，所以直接將消息人士的訊息「複製和貼上」（copy and paste），傳送給朋友，未有留意到訊息裡含有「制裁名單（shit list）」的字句，直至在法庭上才首次知道。</p> -<p>Other anti-ship options are also possible, including the SM-6, the Naval Strike Missile (in service with the US Marine Corps) and Maritime Strike Tomahawk. This adds considerable capacity as, to use one example, 825 SM-6 missiles have been delivered to the US Navy to date. However, many of these systems are dual use (SM-6 is also an air-defence asset, while Tomahawk has a land-attack role), so their employment as anti-ship missiles involves trade-offs in an environment where US vessels will come under heavy attack from the PLA’s missile arsenal.</p> +<h4 id="多次轉發香港監察羅傑斯文章給陳沛敏-黎智英稱讓她決定採用與否">多次轉發「香港監察」羅傑斯文章給陳沛敏 黎智英稱讓她決定採用與否</h4> -<p><em>Limiting Factors</em></p> +<p>首被告黎智英昨日起開始作供，他針對前《蘋果》社長張劍虹的證供提出反駁；今日他在辯方大律師關文渭主問下，針對前《蘋果》副社長陳沛敏的證供作出反駁。</p> -<p>Launch platforms and tempo of activity represent a particularly acute limiting factor, given the risks that platforms such as vessels and aircraft take if they operate within a Chinese anti-access area-denial system comprised of long-range strike assets such as the DF-17 hypersonic boost glide missile and the DF-21D anti-ship ballistic missile (although the range of cruise missiles such as the LRASM mitigates these risks somewhat). The tempo at which successful strikes would need to be delivered would strain the US military, but this will be compounded if aircraft such as the F/A-18 (one of the platforms on which the LRASM is carried) have to take off from greater distances and rely on enablers such as tankers, against which the PLA is optimising fighter aircraft such as the J-20 to conduct long-range intercepts.</p> +<p>黎智英和陳沛敏之間的 WhatsApp 對話紀錄顯示，黎多次將「香港監察」創辦人羅傑斯的文章或新聞稿轉發給陳，陳供稱，每當有羅傑斯和「香港監察」的新聞稿，黎便會轉發給她，形容黎「似乎好重視 Benedict Rogers 同埋佢個機構嘅事」。</p> -<p><em>Other Options</em></p> +<blockquote> + <p>I call on the world to act to save Hong Kong, to put pressure on Carrie Lam to pull back from the brink, demand an end to impunity for police barbarity, to impose targeted Magnitsky sanctions on those responsible for torture #HongKongProtest #StandwithHK #DemocracyForHK @hk_watch pic.twitter.com/vh07uKOCO2 — Benedict Rogers 羅傑斯 (@benedictrogers) November 12, 2019</p> +</blockquote> -<p>Anti-ship missiles are not the only means of sinking vessels available to the US and Taiwan. Although the relatively shallow waters of the Taiwan Strait are not optimal for nuclear attack submarines (SSNs), attack submarines such as the Seawolf class are built to operate in shallow waters if necessary. Moreover, the layout of an air-defence screen for a Chinese landing force would probably require at least some Chinese surface combatants to operate in what PLA doctrine describes as a “forward-edge” defence role beyond the first island chain, in which SSNs are likely to be considerably more lethal.</p> +<p>黎今供稱，轉發羅傑斯的文章純粹是因為純粹想讓陳沛敏知道，看看對她是否有用，如果文章對她來說有意思，便可以採用，又稱交由陳決定是否採用。黎又指，陳從不向他匯報最終採用與否。</p> -<p>More modern Chinese ships, such as the Type 055, are equipped with credible sensor suites, including both hull-mounted and towed array sonar, as well as the capacity to host two Z-20F helicopters, and some Chinese scholars argue that the assumption that the PLAN’s surface vessels are vulnerable to submarines is incorrect. The PLAN also fields the region’s largest fleet of anti-submarine warfare (ASW) frigates, such as the Type 054A/B along with 76 Type 056 corvettes, which can be used as active emitters, given their relative expendability, although active sonar has its own limitations. China still maintains a relatively limited number of key assets, such as the Y-8Q maritime patrol aircraft (MPA), and the limited evidence of China exercising the coordinated use of ASW assets through synthetic training of MPA crews is showing a growing emphasis on realism. While the PLAN likely has excellent situational awareness in certain areas such as the South China Sea, where it maintains a robust network of sensors, beyond the first island chain it probably faces limitations. These include limited numbers of MPAs, a relative lack of high-endurance helicopters (although this gap is now being filled by the Z-18F) and noisy SSNs, which will be uncompetitive beyond the first island chain. Recent studies examining the difficulties Chinese submariners face on longer deployments also highlight a degree of institutional inexperience. There are, however, offsetting US challenges – namely the fact that, by 2027, the US submarine fleet is likely to reach a nadir in terms of the number of boats at its disposal (with the US Navy likely to field 48 boats at the end of the decade, despite a formal requirement for 66). This force will need to track and contain China’s own SSKs (diesel-electric submarines specialised for anti-submarine duties) and SSNs, in addition to performing offensive functions.</p> +<h4 id="佔領立會後向陳沛敏稱盡量大做特做令年輕人獲得同情-黎否認下指示">佔領立會後向陳沛敏稱「盡量大做特做令年輕人獲得同情」 黎否認下指示</h4> -<p>The dynamics and specific characteristics of a Sino-American competition below the waves cannot easily be addressed in detail – the key inputs are too sensitive to approach with open source analysis. However, the determinants of success for each side can more readily be discussed.</p> +<p>2020年7月1日示威者在七一佔領立法會，事後黎智英向前動新聞總監張志偉傳送訊息：「Nick，很好。年輕人衝（擊）立法會事（件）令我心情沈（沉）重，你們認為泛民善後工作有什麼該做令運動可以持續？好彩市民對年輕人闖立法院會是多少有些體諒，損害可能不太大。你們認為呢？謝謝。」陳回覆：「收到」，黎其後回覆：「是，要再做。明天是否集中做年輕人的心聲，盡量為他們在這件事上爭取市民諒解和支持，得以平反？謝謝。」、「盡量大做特做令年輕人獲得同情」等。</p> -<p><em>Determinants of US Subsea Success</em></p> +<p>黎供稱，因為他關注佔領立會事件，可能影響到整個反修例運動，所以傳送上述訊息給陳，但強調沒有下編採指示，只是跟陳一起討論事件，並沒有要求她做任何事。</p> -<p>For the US, the employment of SSNs would probably serve several purposes – deep strike, attacks on PLAN SAGs and controlling chokepoints through which the PLA’s SSKs and SSNs might seek transit, and direct attacks on an amphibious force. In addition, SSN operations in the South China Sea might represent a means of diverting Chinese resources. The key constraint that the US will face is that with the exception of deep strike and the elimination of an outer layer of SAGs, many of the missions that SSNs will perform may also require them to transit chokepoints such as the Bashi Channel, over which the PLA could plausibly have early air and naval control, while shallower transit routes will likely be mined by the PLAN’s own submarines. The constraint of geography does not necessarily mean that submarine activity will stop, but it can certainly be slowed if SSNs need to account for minefields and SQ-5 active sonobuoys, laid by both MPAs and Z-18 helicopters. While the ability of the PLAN to detect quiet SSNs is likely to be limited, it should be noted that combat modelling from the Cold War era suggests that in constrained and heavily mined waters the attrition rates of even a force that enjoys a considerable advantage in quietness will be difficult to sustain over time.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/OMrLLnm.png" alt="image02" /> +▲ 黎智英（資料圖片）</p> -<p>Additionally, even successful submarine campaigns have high attrition rates – for example, during the Second World War the US Navy lost 52 of the 248 submarines it deployed to the Pacific, in what is generally regarded as one of history’s most successful submarine campaigns. At least some attrition should be anticipated, irrespective of US advantages, which will lead to a demand for the reallocation of SSNs from elsewhere.</p> +<p>對於「盡量大做特做令年輕人獲得同情」一句，黎表示雖然它看起來可以被理解為「指示」，但是他本意並非下達指示，因為他希望報導能著眼於年輕人的想法。</p> -<p>On the other side of the ledger, the US Navy will need to bottle the PLAN’s fleet of SSKs and SSNs within the first island chain to protect its own surface forces in the Pacific from the PLAN’s 48 SSKs and six SSNs. While the Type 093 SSN is still a noisy platform relative to Western and Russian analogues, the PLAN’s SSKs are both quiet and, in the case of the newer Type 039C class, equipped with air-independent propulsion, which increases endurance. China faces constraints, including a requirement for its submarines to transit the same limited number of chokepoints to attack forces beyond the first island chain. However, if the US faces a requirement to track multiple contacts in a crisis escalating to conflict (during which submarines cannot be engaged at chokepoints) this will prove resource intensive. For example, three MPAs are required to maintain a single aircraft on station over a 12-hour period, and once an MPA makes contact with a submarine, tracking it often requires either a surface vessel or a submarine to be devoted to the task over an extended period – spreading resources thin in the early stages of a conflict.</p> +<p>辯方提及黎昨日證供表明反對暴力，黎確認，但是他認為佔領立會事件不屬「嚴重暴力」，未有導致人命傷亡，只是導致財產損壞。「如果我不是認為這是負面事件的話，我便不會要求他們去解釋，以爭取香港市民同情」，「我認為他們做錯了事，所以有需要解釋，以爭取香港市民支持，使運動不會被破壞。」但他重申，這是「提議」而非「指示」。</p> -<p><em>Air Supremacy Over the Taiwan Strait</em></p> +<p>黎又說：「我一直都關注年輕人、激進主義。」希望年輕人能汲取教訓，日後能以和平、非暴力方式示威。</p> -<p>In the air, the degree to which the US and its allies view air superiority over the Taiwan Strait as a prerequisite for operational success will be a major consideration. In theory, the PLA has a greater requirement for air supremacy than any US-led coalition. Since the PLA is unlikely to achieve a 3:1 numerical advantage on the ground early in an assault, airpower, both fixed wing and helicopters, will be a crucial force multiplier. This is noted in a number of Chinese publications on the subject of amphibious assault, which stress the importance of capabilities such as LHDs, which can launch both helicopters and vertical take-off and landing UAVs to augment fixed-wing aircraft. It is acknowledged, however, that the range of capabilities that can enable beyond-visual-range engagements will mean that control of the air will probably be temporally and spatially bounded. The PLAAF has been steadily improving its direct-attack capabilities over the past two decades. The J-10 series is equipped with the K/JDC01A targeting and laser designator pod to enable the use of precision-guided munitions, and China’s Flanker derivative, the J-16, is equipped with the YINGS-III pod, which is a rough analogue to the USAF’s Sniper Advanced Targeting Pod. In addition, helicopters of the PLAGF, such as the Z-10 and Z-19, can contribute to the suppression of shore-based defences.</p> +<h4 id="提議百萬遊行頭版標題為勇敢的香港人乾杯-終未被採用-黎指沒因而懲罰陳沛敏">提議百萬遊行頭版標題「為勇敢的香港人乾杯」 終未被採用 黎指沒因而懲罰陳沛敏</h4> -<p>All of this depends, however, on the ability of the PLAAF and the PLAN to achieve at least temporary air supremacy over the Taiwan Strait and any likely landing sites. The survival of Taiwan’s air defences as at least a “pop-up” threat, as well as the ability of the US Navy and USAF to mount offensive counter-air operations over the Strait would, in principle, be sufficient to deny the PLAAF the freedom of action needed to deliver a breakthrough, much in the way that Ukraine was able to deny the VKS (Russian Aerospace Forces) air superiority for the first two years of the war in Ukraine. This depends, however, on the ability of the US Navy and USAF to sustain a tempo of activity and level of attrition necessary to give the People’s Liberation Army Naval Air Force (PLANAF) and the PLAAF an incentive to limit their operations over the Strait, while themselves being forced to operate at greater ranges due to the land-based missile threat. In 2015, research conducted by RAND suggested that the likelihood of the US achieving either air superiority or a victory sufficient to drive the PLAAF from the Taiwan Strait would be constrained if the distance from which platforms would need to operate increased, as it necessarily would if the tempo of US air sorties was lowered by the requirement to keep aircraft carriers out of range of the DF-17 and DF-21D. This in turn might lead to the inference that an offensive counter-air campaign cannot be effective unless the sortie rates of the PLAAF and the PLANAF are also lowered, necessitating strikes on the Chinese mainland and an enabling suppression of enemy air defences (SEAD) effort. For example, capabilities such as cruise missile submarines (SSGNs) equipped with the US Navy’s new hypersonic glide vehicle might be used to create gaps in the Chinese IADS, which aircraft could temporarily exploit, provided that they receive real-time targeting data from offboard sources.</p> +<p>2019年6月9日超過一百萬人參與反送中大遊行。黎向陳轉發前《蘋果日報》社長、著名作家董橋的訊息「Jimmy，你和你的報紙的努力沒有白費！為勇敢的香港人乾杯！」，並說：「沛敏，董橋以上說，為勇敢香港人乾！會是個好標題，請看是否適合，謝謝。」陳則回覆：「好的，我們研究一下，或用地道的語言表達這意思。」</p> -<p><em>Air Defence</em></p> +<p>黎今表示，他當時認為董橋的句子是好句子，所以轉發訊息給陳，又指這不是「指示」，因為訊息不涉任何需要報導的東西，只是一個標題。</p> -<p>Even if pervasive ISR can be delivered, the types of missiles likely to penetrate an IADS without robust enablement (such as the US hypersonic Dark Eagle) are likely to be scarce, relative to their targets. Limited SEAD using expensive munitions such as the Dark Eagle (which will be launched from Virginia-class SSGNs if cued by offboard sources) might open gaps in an IADS to enable the use of slower long-range standoff capabilities such as the Tomahawk Land Attack Missile or strategic bombers to suppress airbases. While disrupting air activity is likely to be important, any effort to achieve this on a consistent basis would require US aircraft to sortie even further than they would need to in the context of offensive/defensive counter-air (OCA/DCA) missions over Taiwan, as some elements of an air defence network would be inland. Moreover, the amount of payload required to cause irreparable damage to an airbase is considerable. For example, Shayrat Airbase in Homs, Syria was made functional again in just a day despite being hit with 58 cruise missiles. In this context, a SEAD and strike campaign to disrupt the 32 PLAAF airbases within 800 km of Taiwan would be functionally indistinguishable from AirSea Battle as originally envisioned, and thus as difficult to resource. An air and naval force that can conduct such a campaign can achieve the much more modest goal of OCA/DCA over Taiwan (which would probably condemn an invasion to failure) with relative ease, making strikes inland at large scale superfluous, given how critical air superiority is to the PLA.</p> +<p>2019年6月10日的《蘋果日報》頭版，標題為〈香港人漂亮的固執 1,030,000〉。換言之，陳並未採用黎的提議。辯方問她有否因而被懲罰，黎說沒有。</p> -<p>Assessments regarding the tempo of activity required to achieve a successful DCA effort can be contested if the object of the effort is presumed to be air denial. First, the figures that were deemed to determine success in previous analysis were based on air superiority, not denial per se, and thus set a high bar for the levels of attrition the US Navy and USAF need to inflict (and thus the number of sorties required). Successful air-denial campaigns such as North Vietnam’s defence of Hanoi during the Vietnam War and the Egyptian defence during the early days of the Yom Kippur War in 1973 inflicted considerably less attrition – roughly 4% per sortie in each case – before air operations were either temporarily deemed prohibitively difficult or had to be enabled in ways that reduced the overall tempo of activity to the point of operational ineffectiveness.</p> +<h4 id="陳沛敏指黎智英提出製作制裁名單-黎否認">陳沛敏指黎智英提出製作制裁名單 黎否認</h4> -<p>Second, the impact of Taiwan’s own SAM network, comprised of systems such as Patriot and the TK-III, must also be considered. This network could certainly be crippled early in a conflict, particularly if its constituent sensors emitted to defend high-value targets against ballistic missiles, but elements could also be conserved to present a pop-up threat to aircraft near likely landing sites. The US Navy’s own SAGs would also likely be able to inflict attrition on PLA aircraft from beyond the first island chain. Although the effective range of SAM systems such as the SM-2 and SM-6 will be constrained by factors such as target altitude, they are likely to inflict attrition on PLA fast air, especially as the latter moves beyond the first island chain to engage tankers and AWACS.</p> +<p>2020年7月14日，時任美國總統特朗普正式簽署《香港自治法》（Hong Kong Autonomy Act），法案授權美國政府制裁有份損害香港自治權的中國及香港官員。</p> -<p>An additional reason for a focus on denial over the Taiwan Strait is that the ISR required to sustain attacks on the mainland cannot be assured, although steps are being taken to make it more resilient.</p> +<p>翌日黎智英以 WhatsApp 向陳沛敏傳送相關行政命令內文，以及相關白宮網站連結。黎的訊息亦包含一句：「I’d say we should work up a shit list on those involved in censorship, which can include intimidation.」陳早前供稱，根據訊息前文後理，她理解黎的意思是要製作「制裁名單」，不過與同事商討之後，她認為很難在新聞中建議一些制裁對象，所以最終未有落實黎的提議。</p> -<p>The US operates a diverse list of ISR capabilities in the air and in space. In the air, both autonomous systems and crewed aircraft, such as the U-2, can provide rapidly deployable reconnaissance. In 2019, the USAF was reported to have “425 manned and unmanned aircraft of 14 different types” at its disposal for data collection, although not all of these will necessarily be survivable in a hostile IADS.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/apnAuJP.png" alt="image03" /> +▲ 前《蘋果日報》執行總編輯 林文宗（左）、前《蘋果日報》副社長 陳沛敏（右）</p> -<p>The vast ISR infrastructures in space are constantly being diversified to meet the new realities of the space age – the emergence of commercial actors and the continuous threat against space systems. The US National Reconnaissance Office is responsible for spy satellites, and is already working on a more proliferated infrastructure, which may hint at the placement of satellites in different orbits to cover different purposes. While satellites in higher orbits (such as Medium Earth Orbit, from 2,000 km and above) can cover wider regions, satellites in lower orbits (low earth orbit (LEO), below 2,000 km) can provide more detailed and perhaps more tactically relevant information.</p> +<p>黎今稱，不記得從誰人收到這個訊息，但是肯定該人是來自特朗普政府或白宮有關的人，因為訊息用字「很外國」，「這不是我會用的措辭。」黎解釋，在《國安法》生效之前，他轉用通訊軟件 Signal，由於他不懂使用 Signal 的轉發訊息功能，所以直接將消息人士的訊息「複製和貼上」（copy and paste），傳送給朋友。</p> -<p>However, the availability of persistent ISR against elusive targets cannot be assumed. US dependence on space assets and pervasive ISR more broadly presents a potential weakness. The PLA is growing increasingly reliant on its own space weapons, including in the targeting realm. Moreover, many of the large, fixed-wing ISR assets on which the US’s way of war has depended thus far will not be survivable in the Pacific.</p> +<p>黎否認在任何時候要求陳沛敏構思和製作「制裁名單」，他又稱訊息太長，未有仔細閱讀，甚至乎不知道訊息裡含有「shit list」那段字，直至在法庭上才首次知道。至於傳送給陳的原因，黎稱認為該訊息是重要及有新聞價值。</p> -<p><em>Space Warfare Aspects</em></p> +<p>辯方展示黎智英分別與民主黨前主席胡志偉、何俊仁、李永達、前工黨主席李卓人、林卓廷等訊息紀錄，顯示黎曾向上述泛民人士傳送相同的訊息。黎確認。</p> -<p>Space systems – the satellite in orbit, the ground station on Earth and the signals in between – are all vulnerable to attack. In terms of disrupting ISR assets, satellites could be interfered with temporarily or permanently through laser dazzling or a cyber attack. At the extreme end of the spectrum, the satellite could be permanently damaged through a high-altitude nuclear explosion or a kinetic kill through either a co-orbital weapon or a direct-ascent anti-satellite missile. China’s capabilities in that realm are not entirely clear, partly because they have not yet been demonstrated in a war. According to Chinese reports, however, a successful laser blinding test of a Chinese satellite at 600 km altitude was carried out as early as 2005. It is unclear whether this technology has since been used against non-Chinese assets. China also has the capability to kinetically destroy satellites – at least in LEO. Permanent interference with systems – either through a close proximity manoeuvre, a kinetic kill or a nuclear detonation, is theoretically possible, and in the case of China, practically possible as well, although these operations have mixed tactical utility. As such, a complete denial of ISR in the Pacific should not be assumed. Even so, the pervasive ISR needed to track transport erector launchers (TELs), which can move at relatively short notice (typically 15 minutes after a launch), will be difficult to achieve.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/rP4aWNx.png" alt="image04" /> +▲ 黎智英（左）、李永達（右）</p> -<p>The proliferation of commercial assets might add some resilience to surveillance networks. The US Space Force has made it clear that it wants to work more closely with commercial providers. Even if the PLA managed to destroy several sovereign ISR satellites, the number of missiles required would create so much debris that Chinese space assets in that orbit would most likely be adversely affected as well. For example, in 2024 the US Space Force published a commercial space strategy outlining how collaboration with the commercial space sector was going to be integrated in the future. The Space Force had already begun experimenting with a so-called “Space Tactical Layer”, which would integrate commercial satellite images “to improve battlespace awareness and expand its beyond-line-of-sight targeting capability”.</p> +<p>辯方一度問黎有否叫李永達製作「制裁名單」？黎否認，笑言：「這會是荒謬的。」黎又指紀錄可見，很明顯地他先傳送該段訊息給泛民朋友，之後才傳送給陳；假如他想叫陳製作「制裁名單」的話，他理應第一個傳送給陳，惟事實不是如此。</p> -<p>Therefore, while the challenge of counter-space capabilities does not imply a complete denial of information, the level of low-latency ISR required to sustain a full-scale strike campaign against elusive targets is unlikely to be available. Strikes on the Chinese mainland will likely be a component of any US campaign, but their scale and tempo will probably be limited.</p> +<p>辯方又指黎曾傳送給《蘋果》前總編輯羅偉光，惟黎表示不記得。</p> -<p><em>Summary</em></p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/Bz3u6g3.png" alt="image05" /> +▲ 前《蘋果》總編輯 羅偉光</p> -<p>If the more modest aim of denying the PLAN and the PLAAF freedom of the skies is the primary operational aim, many of the challenges associated with tracking elusive targets inland and projecting power are less salient. Moreover, the tyranny of distance is less relevant if the US Navy and USAF are primarily operating either over the Taiwan Strait or as carriers of standoff missiles. To be clear, this report is not arguing that the US will necessarily achieve with ease the tempo of activity required to deny the PLA air superiority, merely that attacks on the mainland will not be determinative of their ability to do so.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/rQGK2Cz.png" alt="image06" /></p> -<h3 id="ii-implications-for-europe">II. Implications for Europe</h3> +<p>【獨媒報導】壹傳媒創辦人黎智英及3間蘋果公司被控串謀勾結外國勢力及串謀刊印煽動刊物等罪，今（21日）於高院（移師西九龍法院）續審，黎智英第二日作供，針對前《蘋果日報》副社長陳沛敏和前主筆楊清奇的證供提出反駁。其中楊作供時曾以「鳥籠自主」來形容《蘋果》的採編自主，指：「黎先生 set 咗《蘋果》嘅基本立場，就好似 set 定咗個鳥籠嘅」，因此員工有一定的自主，但不能越過框架。黎在庭上反駁，堅稱：「我從來沒設任何限制或鳥籠。」但他理解楊有此比喻，是因為每間媒體各自有一套價值體系要遵守，使其立場貫徹，就《蘋果日報》而言，「反民主」、「反自由」乃屬於「鳥籠」以外的範圍。</p> -<p>This chapter focuses on how the resource demands placed on the US in a Taiwan Strait contingency might affect conventional deterrence in Europe. Per the NATO Strategic Concept and the DDA family of plans, the Alliance must prepare for war at large scale on its eastern flank. A low-probability, high-impact contingency, which might focus contingency planning, would be a full-scale Russian invasion of the Baltic states, which has been discussed in some detail. Moreover, while some might challenge the realism of the Baltic case, it is still useful as a means of stress-testing European capabilities and baselining requirements for high-end warfighting in the event of a commitment of US capabilities elsewhere.</p> +<h4 id="黎智英稱只曾向楊清奇推薦區家麟和顏純鈎">黎智英稱只曾向楊清奇推薦區家麟和顏純鈎</h4> -<p>This chapter does not seek to provide an exhaustive overview of every aspect of a potential clash between NATO and Russia, nor their specific dynamics. These details are highly contingent. Rather, its purpose is to examine how chosen US and Chinese strategies in the Indo-Pacific might have an impact upon specific sub-components of the aggregate military balance in Europe.</p> +<p>黎指，前《蘋果》主筆楊清奇（筆名李平）乃接手已故作家李怡擔任主筆兼論壇版主管，此前並不認識楊。</p> -<p>The discussion covers several areas. First, it analyses the impact of an Indo-Pacific campaign on the capacity of NATO to support a SEAD campaign in Europe. This is a clear priority, given that airpower represents the Alliance’s most viable means of offsetting the challenge of Russian combat mass on the ground. With more than 2,000 fourth-generation combat aircraft across the Alliance (excluding the US), European NATO has, in principle, the capacity to inflict a level of attrition comparable to that achieved in 1991 in Iraq, where allied airpower inflicted 24% attrition on the Republican Guard before it made contact with coalition ground forces. This depends, however, on the ability to attrit a dense multilayered Russian IADS built to preclude precisely this eventuality, and the success or failure of a campaign in Europe will depend in no small measure on whether this is achieved.</p> +<p>楊清奇作供時曾稱，黎在2018年起轉趨激進，他此後推薦的評論作者「立場都係比較激進」，並舉例指黎推薦過資深傳媒人區家麟和旅美作家「一劍飄塵」。</p> -<p>Second, the availability of air and missile defences is examined, for several reasons. One reason is that Russian military scholarship has over the past decades placed a considerable emphasis on “non-contact warfare” – the ability to see and strike in depth. Russia views long-range strike as vital, both to its efforts to limit the impact of NATO airpower through suppression on the ground and to its ability to force war termination on favourable terms by targeting critical national infrastructure (CNI). Moreover, the threat of ballistic missiles at key chokepoints, such as railheads and bridges, will be a limiting factor for the rapid deployment of ground forces, as well as for the tempo of air activity.</p> +<p>不過黎智英表示，他推薦作者的準則是他們必須在評論政治和經濟時寫得好。他稱，因為看過區家麟的文章，認為寫得很好，所以向楊推薦區。此外，黎表示他亦曾經推薦顏純鈎。</p> -<p>Russia’s submarine fleet will play several functions in any conflict, acting not only as part of any strike campaign, with its new Yasen-class SSGNs, but also as a threat to allied sea lines of communication and CNI. The ability of NATO to contain the Northern Fleet is thus the third priority area on which this chapter focuses.</p> +<p>至於「一劍飄塵」，黎稱從來沒有推薦他，反指是楊清奇自己邀請他撰文。黎稱，他只是閱讀了「一劍飄塵」的專欄文章，認為寫得很好，所以正面評價、稱讚他，但是沒有推薦他做寫手。</p> -<p>Finally, the chapter examines the impact of an Indo-Pacific contingency on the land component of Supreme Allied Commander Europe’s (SACEUR) forces within the NATO area of responsibility, given the centrality of combat on the ground to deterring Russia, and since the land domain may be an area where trade-offs and resource constraints can most easily be avoided.</p> +<h4 id="黎智英否認設任何限制或鳥籠-惟媒體須遵守各自價值體系">黎智英否認設任何限制或鳥籠 惟媒體須遵守各自價值體系</h4> -<h4 id="potential-differences-between-sead-across-regions">Potential Differences Between SEAD Across Regions</h4> +<p>楊清奇作供時曾以「鳥籠自主」來形容《蘋果》的採編自主，指：「黎先生 set 咗《蘋果》嘅基本立場，就好似 set 定咗個鳥籠嘅，咁採編人員喺鳥籠入面有一定嘅自主，有一定嘅自主，有一定嘅採編自主權，但唔可以超過呢個框架，就唔可以超過呢個鳥籠，所以唔可以簡單講有冇採編自主。」</p> -<p>The degree to which SEAD in each region is dependent on the same sets of enablers is, fundamentally, a function of the chosen US approach in the Indo-Pacific. This stems from the fact that, in the early stages of a conflict over Taiwan, the IADS protecting an invasion force will be primarily comprised of maritime theatre air-defence platforms such as the Type 055 and Type 052D, as well as aircraft. Although the ability of the PLAN and the PLAAF to form a single JEZ is disputed, it is reasonable to assume that the PLA will accomplish similar effects to the Russian army’s SAM systems and the aircraft of the VKS in Ukraine. While China fields an increasingly robust array of ground-based SAM systems, including the indigenous HQ-9 and the Russian S-400, the degree to which these systems could provide coverage to a PLAN force from the Chinese mainland is likely to be limited, for reasons discussed in Chapter I and briefly restated here.</p> +<p>黎智英今在庭上反駁：「我從來沒設任何限制或鳥籠。」他認為，楊之所以使用「鳥籠自主」這個比喻，是因為每間媒體各自有一套價值體系要遵守，使其立場貫徹，「你不會見到《星島日報》或《東方日報》說一些支持反修例和示威的說話，更遑論《大公》、《文匯》。」他指傳媒生意是傳播新聞和評論，背後有一套價值體系在他們思想和心中。</p> -<p>Against low-flying targets such as cruise missiles, the radar horizon is still a factor that prevents missiles from being used at their theoretical maximum ranges. While capabilities such as AWACS can be used to cue ground-based SAM systems, the difficulties of doing so have been outlined in Chapter I. Additionally, these systems are large, difficult to hide and at the time of writing limited in number and likely to be targets for any US OCA campaign, as well as for strike assets built specifically to penetrate a Chinese IADS from standoff distances.</p> +<p>法官杜麗冰指，黎曾提及《紐約時報》和 CNN 均是反對特朗普，如果某人替某媒體工作，便要遵守該套價值觀，換言之《紐約時報》和 CNN 的「鳥籠」就是反對特朗普？黎智英同意，他指《紐約時報》和 CNN 是進步派（progressive），所以反對屬於保守派的特朗普，形容反對特朗普的取態是「自由主義的鳥籠（a bird cage of liberalism）」。</p> -<p>This in turn means that SEAD in the Taiwan Strait is not primarily a function of finding and engaging elusive targets such as TELs. Rather, SEAD is largely synonymous with anti-surface warfare and OCA. If the picket of destroyers and cruisers protecting an invasion force suffers substantial losses and if PLA aircraft, including AWACS, cannot freely operate over the Strait, the amphibious vessels on which an invasion defends are much less defensible, with the probability of successful cruise missile strikes against them rising to 0.4–0.8. The challenge is not that targets are elusive, but rather that they are exceedingly well defended. Chinese analysts’ assumptions, for example, are that sinking a modern destroyer requires a combination of six ASCMs flying at different speeds and altitudes, as well as an anti-ship ballistic missile. Notably, these assessments are often based on overwhelming hard-kill systems and typically do not account for the fact that vessels have robust soft-kill mechanisms, including jamming and deployable digital radio frequency memory decoys.</p> +<p>辯方問到，那麼有員工撰文「反民主」、「反人權」，便會屬於鳥籠以外的範圍？黎智英同意，並指這情況永遠不會發生（“That would never happen.”）。</p> -<p>By contrast, SEAD in the European context is primarily a function of the ability to suppress or destroy a layered network of elusive and mobile ground-based SAM systems. The outer layer of this network comprises shorter-range systems such as the SA-11 and the SA-15, with longer-range systems such as the SA-20/23 (S-300-PMU-2/S-300VM) and the SA-21 (S-400) positioned to the rear. Longer-range systems, by virtue of being able to emit, allow shorter-range systems to engage without turning on their own radar. Furthermore, systems such as the SA-22 Pantsir can act as shorter-range point defences against incoming munitions and UAVs.</p> +<h4 id="黎智英稱曾邀請曾鈺成撰文-惟對方拒絕">黎智英稱曾邀請曾鈺成撰文 惟對方拒絕</h4> -<p>This description, while a simplification, captures an inherent challenge of contending with the Russian IADS. To safely and consistently engage long-range SAM systems in rear areas, a larger number of elusive targets that form the outer layer of the network must first be destroyed. However, the task of attacking those short- and medium-range systems at the front edge of the IADS is greatly complicated by the presence of the long-range systems that enable short-range systems to engage without emitting. The long-range ISR platforms that enable the mapping and targeting of SAM systems in an IADS, such as the E-3 AWACS and E-8 JSTARS (Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System), are at risk of being engaged at extended distances by SAM systems such as the S-400. While missiles such as the 40N6 cannot be consistently cued at their maximum ranges (400 km) against low-flying aircraft (although they can intermittently conduct engagements at very long ranges), they can effectively engage larger targets at the extent of their range. Moreover, anti-radiation missiles designed for SEAD, such as the AGM-88 HARM, are both vulnerable to attrition by point defences and less effective when their target radars do not have to emit because they are receiving external cueing. As a consequence, they can be expended in unsustainable numbers. In the 1999 air war over Kosovo, for example, the Alliance expended 815 AGM-88 HARMs against a much weaker opponent. The resulting requirement is for munitions with both the low-radar cross-section needed to penetrate an IADS and the sophisticated seekers (typically either dual-mode or millimetric wave radar) needed to engage mobile targets when they have stopped emitting. Munitions in this category include the AARGM-ER and the SPEAR 3.</p> +<p>辯方問，《蘋果》是否曾經嘗試邀請建制派人士撰寫評論文章。黎表示，他們打算擴張專欄版，所以製作了一份打算邀請的作者名單，但是名單上屬於「鳥籠」之外的人只有民建聯前立法會主席曾鈺成，除此之外，其他作者包括李柱銘和戴耀廷都屬「鳥籠」之內。至於名單上的任志剛，黎則指任崇尚自由市場，所以認為其取態屬於「鳥籠」之內。</p> -<p>Largely, then, SEAD in the Indo-Pacific need not draw on the same munitions and enablers as SEAD/DEAD in Europe. The latter will depend on allied fleets of fifth-generation aircraft (which are the only air capability that can be employed at acceptable risk against an IADS) being equipped with sufficient stocks of munitions such as the ARRGM-ER, built to track elusive TEL and radar (TELAR) and mobile radar systems. These munitions have limited utility against SAGs, given their smaller payloads and the comparatively short distances from which they must be launched. While the functionality of munitions such as the AARGM-ER against ships has in theory been proven, the payload of the missile does not correspond to those needed to either inflict a mission kill on or sink a major surface combatant. Top attack against a vessel’s radar might be considered, but even a low-radar cross-section missile is vulnerable to being engaged by the point defence systems on a ship if it travels relatively high to engage a radar. Moreover, the launch ranges of the AARGM-ER would require aircraft carrying them to fly in areas where they are not only at risk from destroyers themselves but are also likely to engage in air-to-air combat with the PLAN and the PLAAF. In this context, the AARGM-ER will compete for rail space with air-to-air interceptors.</p> +<p>黎表示他認識曾鈺成，有時會交談，所以曾經親自邀請曾鈺成，但是對方拒絕了。此外，任志剛、曾俊華等亦拒絕了邀請。而陳沛敏成功邀請到林和立撰文，惟已故歷史學者余英時當時則因為年紀大而拒絕邀請。黎又指，練乙錚和已故作家李怡本來便替《蘋果》撰寫專欄文章。</p> -<p>The requirement to support two SEAD campaigns need not necessarily impose an unacceptable munition strain on the US if it supports allies in both Europe and the Indo-Pacific. However, this does not take into account the several other aspects of a credible SEAD capability currently lacking in European air forces, including the need to prioritise training for SEAD missions over other competencies. A purely materiel-focused deduction that could be drawn, however, is that the various gaps in European SEAD capability platforms and training represent a more acute issue than munitions, given the inherent differences in SEAD across the two theatres.</p> +<h4 id="黎智英否認個人專欄文章意圖引起憎恨">黎智英否認個人專欄文章意圖引起憎恨</h4> -<p>There are several caveats worth noting. First, the above analysis is entirely premised on the assumption that sea denial, rather than overmatch, is the chosen US approach. In this context, the determinant of success is ultimately the ability to set the conditions for sinking enough amphibious vessels to make an invasion unviable, not to comprehensively defeat the PLA to force China’s leaders to negotiate. If it is deemed that war termination requires the ability to escalate against the Chinese mainland, for example because the PLA responds to failure by shifting to a blockade or a strategic bombardment, the same munitions and aircraft needed for SEAD in Europe will also be required in the Indo-Pacific. However, for the reasons outlined in Chapter I, it is deemed unlikely that this will be a viable option.</p> +<p>控方指控《蘋果》在2019年4月至2020年5月期間，共發布161篇具煽動意圖的文章，涵蓋新聞報導、評論文章，以及黎的個人專欄「成敗樂一笑」文章。</p> -<p>Second, there will probably be ground-based SAM systems set up on islands such as the Pescadores if the PLA takes them, meaning that the suppression of systems such as the HQ-9 and the HQ-16 will not be entirely irrelevant.</p> +<p>辯方向黎展示三篇「成敗樂一笑」專欄文章，〈請站出來保住最後防線〉、〈諗移⺠定諗遊行〉及〈為自己和下一代 阻擋香港沉淪〉，黎在庭上逐一閱讀，每篇文章需時數分鐘。</p> -<p>A maritime SEAD campaign will draw on stocks of other capabilities such as ASCMs and submarines, among other things, all of which will be important in Europe. Although limited in size and complexity, Russian surface combatants can pose a threat at operational ranges from positions near their bastions, such as Kaliningrad, using 3M-14 Kalibr cruise missiles. While unlikely to be decisive, this could well result in a political demand to engage Russian surface combatants within well-defended bastions from which they launch cruise missiles that will draw on limited stocks of ASCMs, as well as capabilities such as SSKs and SSNs. While exact stocks of anti-ship missiles held by European states are unknown, several European navies have temporarily plugged the gap in this capability. Interestingly, one of the most pressing gaps that a US SEAD/DEAD campaign in the Pacific might create in Europe is a gap in surface lethality in the maritime domain.</p> +<p>控方指稱〈請站出來保住最後防線〉有意引起市民憎恨政府和司法機關。黎則否認，反稱自己只是推演一旦修例通過的後果。他亦否認控方所稱，文章意圖引起市民對司法機關的憎恨，反稱「整篇文章都沒有憎恨」，他的意圖只是推測若然修例通過的後果。</p> -<h4 id="iamd-a-capacity-challenge-across-the-board">IAMD: A Capacity Challenge Across the Board</h4> +<p>就〈諗移⺠定諗遊行〉，黎提及：「香港被劃分在中國的地圖內，香港人的命運便被掌控在京官權力的範圍內，土生土長視香港為家園的香港人，卻是對這塊土地沒有半點兒話事權，被蔑視被離間被摒棄想說要自主，卻被說成是『港獨』，現在 DQ 你，將來修訂了「逃犯條例」還可以隨時拉你鎖你，多神奇的權力，多神聖的地圖啊！」</p> -<p>IAMD represents a capability that is especially fungible and likely to be in high demand across the Indo-Pacific and the Euro-Atlantic. Russian and Chinese concepts for future warfare envision long-range precision strike playing a prominent role, although Russia tends to accord a more prominent role to countervalue targeting than does China. Illustrative of the prominence of deep strike in Russian concepts of operations is the fact that Russia had by 2023 expended over 5,000 cruise and ballistic missiles in the war in Ukraine.</p> +<p>黎否認文章意圖激使讀者憎恨中央政府，反稱只是利用例子來呼籲市民上街遊行，嘗試讓市民明白為何他們要出來示威，去阻止修例。</p> -<p>In Europe, Russia faces a larger target set with considerably more strategic depth. Unlike the Indo-Pacific, the European theatre has far more airfields from which NATO’s jets or aircraft can operate, making near-complete airbase suppression, as contemplated by the PLA in the Pacific, nearly impossible for Russia to achieve. Within 500 km of Russian-held territory, however, the threat is more acute, and will require the use of airfields in the west of SACEUR’s area of responsibility and thus increase the Alliance’s reliance on tanker aircraft. There are also individual points of failure within allied air forces. For example, Automatic Logistics Information System terminals, which enable the mission planning and logistical support on which the F-35 depends, are held at a limited number of airbases, many of which have undergone public and expensive conversions to host the F-35. Moreover, Russia’s doctrinal commitment to striking CNI as a means of forcing de-escalation would probably impose competition for resources between NATO as an alliance and those nations that must ultimately make voluntary contributions to its air defences. The logic of Alliance-level planning would incentivise the protection of military assets, which in turn would enable the prosecution of an effective war effort. But national political imperatives may dictate otherwise, creating a risk of competition for scarce IAMD assets. In the close battle, Russia can generate a dense multi-tiered threat comprising short-range ballistic missiles such as the 9M723, cruise missiles, loitering munitions and fixed-wing aircraft launching unguided glide bombs such as the FAB-500.</p> +<h4 id="黎智英否認文章意圖激使讀者不守法只是呼籲遊行">黎智英否認文章意圖激使讀者不守法：只是呼籲遊行</h4> -<p>While the air threat is a challenge across both theatres, there are differences between the IAMD requirements that bear consideration. Russia does not field a credible intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM), having cancelled the RS-26 in 2017, and it would struggle to increase IRBM production in less than a decade, given its production rates for more mature SRBMs. As such, beyond 500 km the Russian threat is effectively a cruise missile threat. This means that certain interceptor types, including exoatmospheric and high endoatmospheric interceptors, such as the SM-3IIA and systems such as THAAD (Terminal High Altitude Area Defense), are far more relevant to the Indo-Pacific than they are to Europe – although, as will be discussed, longer-range ballistic missile defence (BMD) systems will be of use in Europe to a degree.</p> +<p>就〈為自己和下一代 阻擋香港沉淪〉，黎在文章提及：「你要跟中共講法律，你從火星來的嗎？你不要太天真太簡單，修訂《逃犯條例》就是要奪去香港的法治，拿住大陸那套『陽光司法』在港任拉任鎖肆虐橫行。不要這樣傻，中共法律永遠官字兩個口，法律不外是他們的行政手段來的。」文章亦提及「六四屠城」，指倘修例通過的話，同樣情況也可能在香港重演，倘香港被斷送給中央的「陽光司法」控制下，「香港無形中成為了集中營」，呼籲市民上街遊行發聲。</p> -<p>The primary BMD challenge facing Europe is SRBMs. Although the KH-47M2 Kinzhal can be used at operational depth, doing so risks the bomber or fighter aircraft carrying it. Russia is developing IRBMs, but the development cycle for missiles typically exceeds a decade, and further time elapses before they are fielded in numbers. In the first year of the war in Ukraine, Russia fired 700 Iskander SRBMs (135 in the first month), and in 2023 appeared to be producing cruise and ballistic missiles at a rate of 40 per month. The 9M723, which can dispense six radar decoys in its terminal phase, is a challenging SRBM to intercept, and the task is likely to require millimetric wave seekers such as the Ka-band seeker of the PAC-3 or the Aster-30 Block 1NT. This will create a considerable demand for hit-to-kill interceptors, although this demand will be bounded by the duration of a SEAD campaign, after which missile launchers can be more readily attacked before missile launch.</p> +<p>黎解釋，文章提及1989年北京「六四屠城」，是因為如果香港沒有法治的話，便會變成內地。他否認控方指稱文章意圖引起憎恨中央及特區政府，重申文章沒有任何憎恨，他只是嘗試說服讀者，如果不上街示威、阻些修例通過的話，會有什麼可預見的後果，從而呼籲市民上街。</p> -<p><em>Expenditure Rates</em></p> +<p>對於控方另一個指控，指稱文章有意激使人們透過非法手段來改變香港現制，黎則反駁稱文章沒有提及任何違法手段，「我呼籲他們示威，以維持香港的既有制度。」</p> -<p>Expenditure rates on interceptors are dependent on several factors, including shot doctrine and the rate at which launchers can be engaged before launch by aircraft and ground-based weapons, which is likely to increase as the IADS protecting them is diminished. For example, a two-shot doctrine (independently firing two interceptors for any given target) and a “shoot–look–shoot” doctrine, in which a second interceptor is only employed if the first fails, see 2 and 1.1 interceptors fired per target respectively to achieve a 0.99 probability of kill (Pk), while other studies suggest considerably more, with up to eight interceptors needed for certainty of kill with an SSPK of 0.5 (although this assumes a low SSPK, and very demanding criteria for success). Applied to the European theatre, more modest assumptions could still mean a requirement for anywhere between 770 and 1,400 hit-to-kill interceptors in the first month of a conflict if Russia expends Iskander at the rate it has in Ukraine. While the US current production rate for PAC-3 MSE interceptors is 500 per year, with an aspiration for 870, this capacity will be drawn on by a number of commitments, including the ongoing war in Ukraine, foreign military sales and the Indo-Pacific. In 2022, the US entire stock of PAC-3 MSE was 1,600 interceptors. However, over time the effects of a successful SEAD campaign should make launchers considerably vulnerable to pre-launch interception and would, moreover, undercut the ground campaign that ballistic missiles support. There is no automatic reason to assume a SEAD campaign will succeed, of course, but if it does not, the problem facing the Alliance is wider than the missile threat.</p> +<p>控方另指控文章意圖激使讀者不守法，黎則反駁：「我沒有叫他們不遵守法律，我只是呼籲他們去遊行，在香港這是合法的。」他亦指文章沒有任何句子叫人違法。</p> -<p>There is considerable risk of capacity strains with respect to hit-to-kill interceptors. There are, however, differences between the European and Indo-Pacific theatres in this respect. Longer-range interceptors such as the SM-2 and the Aster-30 Block1NT can be relevant in each context, but to very different degrees. In Europe, there are no IRBM or medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) threats against which longer-range interceptors will be prerequisites. What long-range hit-to-kill interceptors could provide, however, is a means of considerably reducing the point defence burden. Even a marginally resourced first layer against SRBMs can considerably reduce the burden on point defences. This is partly a function of the fact that early interception can prevent the deployment of countermeasures and partly the fact that shot doctrines, which conserve interceptors, are more viable in a layered defensive system. As a notional example, the requirement for shorter-range defences can be reduced by 75% from the ability to engage half the incoming targets with an outer defensive layer, at a cost which is in aggregate lower than a single-layer system. What this means in practice is that the rate of expenditure of a European IAMD network against ballistic targets could be improved substantially by a relatively limited number of longer-range hit-to-kill interceptors, even if these interceptors had less than the 0.8 Pk typically required of air-defence systems. In the Pacific, capabilities such as the SM-3IIA will be a primary mode of defence against medium- and intermediate-range targets, against which point defences will have more constrained utility. The vessels that field them will also defend themselves against MRBMs, such as the DF-21D, over the course of a campaign. In effect, the need for a first layer of longer-range hit-to-kill interceptors in Europe may be more modest than in the Pacific, insofar as its role is reducing an otherwise unmanageable strain on shorter-range interceptors.</p> +<p>辯方問黎，2019年6月9日有沒有參與任何遊行。黎表示有。</p> -<p><em>Interceptor Platforms</em></p> +<p>案件明日續審。</p> -<p>These interceptors are often (but not always) held on maritime platforms, and the availability of such an outer layer would require destroyers and frigates to be equipped with requisite interceptors and postured forward in areas such as the Baltic Sea, at some risk to themselves. This also limits the reach of an outer air-defence layer away from coastal areas. Moreover, many of the destroyers that carry longer-range hit-to-kill interceptors are US vessels, such as the Arleigh Burke class. Several European navies, including the Royal Navy, Italy’s Marina Militare and France’s Marine Nationale, are investing in longer-range hit-to-kill systems such as the Aster-30 Block1NT, but the question of how much capacity will exist by 2027 is still open. In effect, capacity gaps in European tactical BMD can be filled without the procurement of a potentially unrealisable magazine of interceptors, but only if the likely absence of US Aegis destroyers and their interceptors can be offset.</p> +<hr /> -<p>Alternatively, European states will need to find ways to deliver the number of interceptors required to achieve point defence against short-range ballistic targets. In principle, the initiative by Germany, Romania, the Netherlands and Spain to procure 1,000 PAC-2 GEM-T interceptors (which are not hit to kill but can be used against ballistic targets) and Germany’s procurement of up to 600 PAC-3 MSE interceptors would, if realised, meet the requirement against an initial ballistic missile salvo comparable to that seen in Ukraine (although only the PAC-3 is a hit-to-kill interceptor optimised for BMD). However, this would depend on sensors supporting tactical BMD having enough range to support a shoot–look–shoot approach (a challenge, since no European NATO member fields longer-range BMD radar such as the AN-TPY-2, which would allow lower-tier defences to focus on likely vectors of attack, enabling a more efficient shot doctrine).</p> +<p>案件編號：HCCC51/2022</p>獨媒報導黎智英否認曾叫陳沛敏製作「制裁名單」 楊清奇以「鳥籠自主」比喻編採自主 黎智英反駁：從來沒設任何限制或鳥籠Soviet Lessons Recalled2024-11-21T12:00:00+08:002024-11-21T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/soviet-lessons-recalled<p><em>This paper argues that Chinese Communist Party (CCP) political institutions, the CCP’s practical behavior, and continued veneration of Marxism-Leninism in the CCP constitution highlight the Soviet model’s deep influence on Beijing. As such, lessons from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) can help us understand the CCP’s approach to governance today.</em></p> -<p>In contrast to BMD interceptors, which may be required to differing degrees (depending on their range), blast fragmentation interceptors are likely to be in considerably higher demand in both theatres. Both Russia and China maintain large cruise missile arsenals and, in the case of Russia, cruise missiles have been augmented with cheaper analogues, such as the Shahed-136, which are less capable but must still be engaged. Moreover, blast fragmentation interceptors are also expended against uncrewed aerial systems and loitering munitions. Interceptors such as the AIM-120 AMRAAM, which are common to both aircraft and ground-based air defence systems such as NASAMs, are likely to see heavy demands from both the Pacific and the Euro-Atlantic. Any US air activity in the Indo-Pacific, irrespective of whether it aims for the more modest goal of air denial, which this report argues to be optimal, or for more expansive aims, will necessarily use considerable numbers of blast fragmentation interceptors. For European states, aircraft – and in particular those aircraft that cannot be immediately committed to ground support missions – will be a crucial component of any air defence effort against cruise missiles and one-way attack munitions. In addition, air-to-air combat against the VKS is likely to be a feature of any European conflict, even if the VKS might be expected to operate in a conservative way within the safety of its own IADS. It then follows that, particularly where European systems rely on blast fragmentation interceptors made in the US, these missiles may become a scarce asset, in demand across both the European and Indo-Pacific theatres.</p> +<excerpt /> -<p>Counter-rocket, artillery and mortar (C-RAM) systems and V-SHORAD (very short-range air defence) systems will be in demand to differing degrees in both theatres. Given the likely importance of vertical lift to the PLA’s efforts to generate superior firepower over any beach-head, as well as the role of platforms such as the Ka-52 in supporting Russian efforts to contain allied armour, MANPADS such as Stinger are likely to be in relatively high demand in both theatres. In Ukraine, for example, the US Department of Defense has donated a third of its arsenal of Stinger missiles. The PLA, for its part, fields 270 Z-10 and Z-19 attack helicopters. The Z-10s are a rough (albeit lightly armoured) analogue to the US Apache and are equipped with 16 anti-tank guided missiles. Keeping these systems at bay without employing SAMs intended for more expensive targets will be of considerable importance. Unlike heavier systems, MANPADS can probably be moved to Taiwan rapidly and at scale in a crisis, as was the case in Ukraine. There are a number of European producers of MANPADS, and reliance on US capabilities that may be moved to Taiwan would not be a bottleneck in itself. However, the ability to scale production and secure critical inputs would require both industrial capacity and the ability to ensure that different Western producers are not competing for the same components.</p> +<p>Soviet-origin governing institutions and processes exert enduring influence on the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Its substantially imported political structure arguably has at least as much practical impact on Beijing’s behavior as the ideology it also imported from Moscow. While the PRC is not a carbon copy of the USSR, Soviet lessons still have much to teach observers about Chinese governance.</p> -<p>C-RAM has, historically, been more important in the context of Europe than in Asia, given the centrality of fires to the Russian way of war – which saw, for example, the Russian armed forces expend up to 38,000 artillery rounds a day in the second year of the war in Ukraine. By contrast, the relatively limited fires capabilities of the PLA’s amphibious assault forces would likely see them relying on air and naval support to generate firepower. A PLAGF combined arms brigade, for example, contains a single artillery battalion, compared with the three in a Russian Motor Rifle Brigade. The three PLA group armies across Taiwan also field an artillery brigade each, equipped with 300-mm PHL-03 and PHC-191 MLRS systems that can target Taiwan’s west coast from the mainland. Even so, the sheer weight of land-based artillery fire in the initial period of an invasion of Taiwan is likely to be dwarfed by the volumes of fire expended in the European theatre. Certainly, some C-RAM systems, such as Phalanx, have utility as a means of defending installations against UAVs, but in general UAVs can be engaged by cheaper means, such as anti-aircraft artillery fire. As such, mobile and survivable C-RAM remains more relevant to the European theatre than to the Indo-Pacific.</p> +<p>PRC policy shifts over the past two decades have reinforced the relevance of these lessons, and the increased opacity of the Chinese political system makes it necessary to exploit all available tools to assess its behavior. The Soviet experience illuminates, for instance, the impact of the Leninist apparatus on PRC regime behavior, the challenges for understanding China, and the future of its political system. Key insights include the following:</p> -<h4 id="asw-a-major-capability-gap">ASW: A Major Capability Gap</h4> +<ul> + <li> + <p>The Leninist system’s functional requirements substantially account for China’s conservative departure in recent years.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>The PRC system is opaque by design, with information deployed solely to advance the party-state’s current goals.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>China will ultimately transition from Leninist rule but under unpredictable circumstances and probably only after many more years.</p> + </li> +</ul> -<p>The allied approach to ASW in Europe is to a substantial degree dependent on US assets. First, the tracking of a single contact typically requires the coordination of several systems, including MPAs, frigates and SSNs which must, respectively, localise and then tail a contact. It typically takes three MPAs to maintain one MPA on station at any given time over a 12-hour period. Currently, European MPA fleets are relatively small – at the time of writing, the UK fields five P-8 Poseidon aircraft and Norway a further eight, while France and Germany field 11 upgraded Atlantique aircraft and P-8As respectively. Portugal also fields a fleet of older P-3 Orion aircraft. This is a limited but not completely insufficient number of platforms for manning a chokepoint such as the Greenland–Iceland–UK (GIUK) Gap, particularly in terms of the relative overmatch that the Alliance enjoys in theatres such as the Baltic Sea, where Russia currently operates a very limited submarine force, comprising a single Kilo class (although SSKs from other fleets could be moved to the Baltic in a crisis). A more significant issue will be the availability of key systems stocks such as multi-static sonobuoys, given the substantial dependence on US systems. A barrier in the GIUK Gap, for example, would need to be seeded with 15,000 DIFAR and DICASS sonobuoys, which would be reseeded every eight hours (although newer MAC sonobuoys have greater coverage, reducing the number required by half).</p> +<p>The Soviet model is not China’s destiny; it is only one of several factors that have shaped PRC history and will continue to influence its future. Nonetheless, understanding it is indispensable to making sense of China’s behavior and prospects for change.</p> -<p>Once a contact is made by, for example, an MPA, a submarine is typically tracked over long distances by another SSN. The limited size of allied SSN fleets will make this a challenge in the absence of US assets, which is likely if the US Navy faces a trough in submarine capacity in the 2030s. While it enjoys considerable advantages in comparison with the PLAN’s much noisier nuclear submarines, the US Navy’s SSN will not necessarily have major advantages over quieter SSKs, such as the Type 039C, in littoral waters of areas such as the South China Sea, where advantages such as endurance are of less significance. It is likely that clearing the South China Sea of Chinese submarines and surface vessels will be crucial to ensuring that US surface assets operating in the western Pacific do not do so at unacceptable risk from PLAN platforms operating on interior lines. In this instance, the US Navy could opt to simply cover chokepoints such as the Bashi Channel and the island of Mindanao and bottle in Chinese assets (a less resource-intensive task). But if the PLAAF seizes local air superiority sufficient to allow China’s own MPAs to operate over these chokepoints (at least for a time), this will probably involve both risks and losses. It should be noted that even historically successful submarine campaigns have involved high loss rates. For example, the US Navy lost 20% of its submarine fleet in the Pacific theatre during the Second World War, despite enjoying considerable advantages over the Imperial Japanese Navy. It is thus not inconceivable that the Pacific, which since 2015 has drawn 60% of the US’s SSNs, will demand an even larger part of the SSN force in a conflict. The position of the JMSDF, which operates a fleet of 10 quiet Soryu-class SSKs (among other vessels), will be an important factor in determining precisely how acute the demand for US submarines is in the Pacific.</p> +<h3 id="the-leninist-system">The Leninist System</h3> -<p>In Europe, the Russian Northern Fleet currently possesses 14 SSNs and SSGNs, of which a relatively large number can be surged in a conflict. By 2030, Russia aspires to field six Yasen-class submarines across its Northern and Pacific fleets. This increase, if achieved, will potentially be offset by the retirement of older Victor III- and Sierra-class submarines still in service, and will not necessarily represent a quantitative increase in fleet capacity. Qualitatively, however, this would entail a step change in the threat facing NATO, given that the Yasen is comparable in quietness to newer Western submarines and capable of launching supersonic and hypersonic missiles such as the 3M22 Zircon.</p> +<p>The CCP embraces a Leninist apparatus that exhibits strong continuity with the party-state transferred to Beijing by the Bolsheviks and the Soviet Union between the early 1920s and 1950s. Vladimir Ilyich Lenin pioneered its operating norms before the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution and led the system’s improvisational build-out during its early years in power. Other Soviet leaders, especially Joseph Stalin, contributed to its development.</p> -<p><em>Potential Shortfalls</em></p> +<p>Leninist regimes — especially the surviving communist states (China, North Korea, Laos, Vietnam, and Cuba) and the two former European ones established principally through indigenous struggle (the USSR and Yugoslavia) — represent a category of authoritarianism with characteristic institutions and processes that manifest recurring patterns of behavior. (The Leninist regimes of other East European communist states were largely external creations that ended with the USSR’s demise.) All authoritarian regimes are repressive, and some practices of Leninist regimes are common among them, but most of them are not Leninist.</p> -<p>Assuming a partial or complete absence of US capacity, NATO would probably face considerable shortfalls in several areas, including stockpiles to enable MPA operations and available SSNs to tail Russian contacts. Collectively, the UK and France field 16 SSNs, which is more than Russia’s Northern Fleet, but a focus on persistent deployment rather than surge capacity means that the part of this force that can be made available at short notice is more limited than for a comparably sized Russian force. This could change, particularly because Russia appears intent on maintaining persistent deployments of SSGNs in the Western hemisphere (which will absorb at least four Yasen-class SSNs to keep one on station at any time and have an impact on readiness). However, not maintaining surge capacity would represent a break with Russian and Soviet practice, and some effort to do so should be assumed.</p> +<p>A Leninist system features an authoritarian regime in which the ruling elite monopolizes political power in the name of a revolutionary ideology through a highly articulated party structure that parallels, penetrates, and dominates the state at all levels and extends to workplaces, residential areas, and local institutions. Party members are subject to strict discipline and ideological indoctrination, regardless of whether they work in the party apparatus or, like most, outside it.</p> -<p>Western SSNs are required for additional functions such as deep strike and forward operations at sea in otherwise denied maritime spaces. In the absence of a significant number of US SSNs in theatre, then, the requirement of tailing the part of its SSN fleet that Russia does choose to surge in a crisis could create a shortfall in available SSNs, which could impact both strike operations at depth and ASW operations. Moreover, it is not clear that there will be enough SSNs to meet the task of tailing alone.</p> +<p>In its struggle to seize and then hold power, the Bolshevik Party pioneered hallmark institutions long familiar to outside observers: a Central Committee, a secretariat with specialized departments (e.g., propaganda, personnel, and internal discipline), and a supreme leadership body at the very center commonly known as the Politburo — all mirrored at subordinate levels.</p> -<p>This latter challenge can be offset in several ways. SSNs do not have to be tailed by other SSNs, and both surface vessels and SSKs can also play this role. The former, however, operate at considerable risk against SSGNs, given their own often relatively limited air defences, while the latter have limited endurance and speed relative to their quarry. Once NATO is covering an ASW barrier in the GIUK Gap this may matter less – this barrier is likely to be covered by a large number of vessels, as many European states field ASW frigates. However, in a crisis leading to conflict before a Maritime Component Command can be stood up, the difficulty of tailing contacts without engaging them could dislocate naval forces in the theatre. This, in turn, could create the space for other maritime threats, such as the use of special-purpose submarines such as the X-Ray and the Paltus to disrupt critical maritime infrastructure.</p> +<p>From the capital to the most distant locality, a Leninist party controls leadership appointments and transfers not merely within itself and the state but also among the military and security forces, the economy, academia, the media, the arts, religious institutions, social organizations, and beyond. Classic Soviet operational practices — such as centralization, mobilization, united front operations, and cadre self-criticism — endure in China. A ruling Leninist regime always seeks to maintain robustly coercive security services that are loyal, first and foremost, to the party itself. It also exhibits high levels of intervention in the economy, ranging widely from state capitalism to command economics. Control of the economy is as important to party dominance as it is to overall national strength or the popular welfare.</p> -<p>Ultimately, Russian threats in the maritime domain are ancillary to those on land. The Russian navy exists to support the army, and if European capability gaps in other areas are filled, the maritime domain may have less significance. Nonetheless, the Alliance’s ability to contain subsurface threats will partially determine Russian assessments of the aggregate balance of forces, and gaps in this area will prove particularly acute.</p> +<p>The foundations of CCP ideology also came from Moscow. This body of thought combined a Marxist, class-based economic interpretation of history progressing inexorably toward utopia, Lenin’s own theoretical revisions to Marxism, and, crucial to governance, his advocacy of an elite revolutionary party’s unique role in leading the masses. To a ruling communist party, Marxism-Leninism’s single greatest ideological value may well be in granting the secular equivalent of divine right rule through its role as the sole interpreter of “laws” of history.</p> -<h4 id="the-land-component-the-capabilities-are-available-but-not-the-enablers">The Land Component: The Capabilities are Available, But Not the Enablers</h4> +<p>Karl Marx’s thoughts on social and economic justice remained enormously appealing, but it was Lenin’s ruthless pragmatism that enabled communist regimes to seize and hold onto power. Chinese communists learned from Moscow that although the content of the ideology could vary substantially, its mere existence was functionally vital to the party’s survival. It is telling that while communist regimes around the world have extensively revised their ideologies, they have been less liberal in modifying core structures, norms, and processes.</p> -<p>In principle, land power should be the most non-fungible US strategic capability in a two-war scenario. While there is certainly a land component to any conceivable Indo-Pacific conflict, the conditions for success or failure are likely to be set at sea and in the air. Since any Chinese approach to Taiwan must presume air and naval superiority, given the low likelihood of the PLA achieving local preponderance at its beach-heads, if Chinese forces do land on Taiwan and achieve a breakout it will be because they were enabled by these two factors. If this is the case, there is little evidence that additional support to a Taiwan ground component could be flowed into the island. Equally, if the conditions for substantial US ground forces to flow into Taiwan can be set in the air and at sea, this would be synonymous with the failure of a Chinese invasion in any case, as any disembarked force would necessarily be cut off from the mainland.</p> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">It is telling that while communist regimes around the world have extensively revised their ideologies, they have been less liberal in modifying core structures, norms, and processes.</code></em></strong></p> -<p>This is not because land forces are irrelevant in a Taiwan contingency. Considerable historical data suggests that a well-entrenched land component can hold an invading force in an island assault under conditions of numerical inferiority and inferiority in the air and at sea, and that attackers often require a more than 3:1 preponderance in land forces. On Okinawa in April 1945, for example, entrenched Japanese forces held for three months against a US force that outnumbered them 5:1, with the US Tenth Army expending 2.4 million shells in the battle. It can thus certainly be argued that the ability of the Taiwan land component to both contest an initial beach-head and protract a conflict sets the conditions for effective denial in the air and at sea by buying time for US forces. Many of the capabilities relevant to a land war in Europe, such as guided MLRS, V-SHORAD and tube artillery, would certainly be relevant in this context.</p> +<p>The leadership’s ability to require all party members to embrace its shifting interpretations of reality was and remains an indispensable component of rule. Among the tools at the top leader’s disposal, command of the ideology is a brass ring of power, enabling him not only to legitimize shifting priorities but also suppress opposition and impose unity. Pity the poor Chinese communist who, over a long membership, has been expected to accept unconditionally the “scientific” need for, variously, a Soviet command economy, the Great Leap Forward, the Cultural Revolution, “reform and opening,” and now a New Era of economic statism and intensified political control.</p> -<p>However, the success of any land battle would be largely predicated on the assets already in Taiwan when a conflict broke out. Assuming the PLAN and the PLAAF are able to achieve a level of air superiority sufficient to enable an outnumbered assault force to break out of its beach-heads (the only context in which a protracted land battle can occur), this would preclude any additional land forces from being surged into the theatre, as some have argued they might be. For example, the US Navy can, in principle, support the insertion of heavy armour into Taiwan with its ship-to-shore connector, but with a 25-nautical-mile radius, doing so under conditions of adversary air superiority would entail amphibious vessels taking unacceptable levels of risk for the insertion of relatively small amounts of armour. Access to ports, which can be utilised by strategic sealift assets, would also be unlikely under these circumstances. It might be argued that, in due course, a successful US effort to roll back the PLAN and the PLAAF could enable land forces to be flowed into pockets of the theatre still held by Taiwan’s forces, to enable the PLAGF to be progressively rolled back on the island – in a manner comparable to the US Army and Republic of Korea army’s defence and breakout from the Pusan Perimeter in September 1940. However, if the PLA does secure a level of air superiority sufficient to prevent its forces from being stopped either at its beach-heads or in the littoral and to allow the subsequent seizure of a port to allow the flow of non-amphibious units, there will be little time for reinforcement. In amphibious assaults over the course of the last century, when a force that did not enjoy numerical preponderance at the outset of the assault succeeded, it typicall did so in less than a month. This broadly reflects the fact that if the numerically inferior force could not be defeated at its beach-heads, it was enabled to succeed by a level of air and naval superiority that caused the defence to collapse rapidly. The only exception to this was the Battle of Iwo Jima, which lasted for a month but in which air and naval power did not play a decisive role in routing the defence. Even if Chinese forces took a month to seize a major Taiwan seaport to enable the flow of follow-on forces, it would probably be longer than this before the US could safely surge land forces into the theatre. In effect, then, if the PLA’s air superiority is sufficient to prevent a numerically inferior force from being beaten on the beaches, a Taiwan defence will collapse before the conditions for reinforcements to enter the theatre can be set.</p> +<p>No notion of limited government constrains a Leninist party. Like the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), CCP official doctrine explicitly extols the concentration of power in its hands and rejects external restraints. Through the party’s penetration of the state, society, and the economy, it can mobilize markedly disparate powers to advance its goals. Its core ruling institutions tend to be very durable: The Central Committee is now over a century old, and the CCP itself has governed all of China for over 75 years. Central Party officials operate within longstanding administrative norms, draw on time-tested doctrine, and have the luxury of long-term planning horizons.</p> -<p>This is not to suggest that the PLA will necessarily secure the level of air and sea superiority needed to enable a successful invasion. Rather, the argument is that the crux of any defence of Taiwan will be denying it this superiority. If this is achieved, it is likely that Taiwan’s forces can mount a successful forward defence of likely landing sites on the island, making a protracted defence and the subsequent flow of US forces superfluous. If not, the battle will likely end before either of these things can be considered.</p> +<p>Unfettered by legal or normative limits to the regime’s reach into society or abroad, expedience in the service of the party is the North Star of decisionmaking at all levels. Political interests and vulnerabilities are always front and center in internal deliberations, reflecting the CCP’s origin story — it understands subversion all too well — and the internal surveillance system’s daily reminders of threats great and small.</p> -<p>This does, in principle, mean that assets such as MLRS equipped with cluster munitions and land-centric capabilities such as heavy armour would be likely to be free for the European theatre, where they have far greater relevance against a primarily ground-based Russian threat, in tandem with the forces already under V Corps in Poland. The scope and scale of this threat will depend on a number of factors, among which are the question of whether Russia can free its forces from their existing commitments in Ukraine, and whether the Russian military can achieve its aspiration to stand up two new military districts and 14 new divisions, in accordance with the plans laid out by former defence minister Sergei Shoigu. This will prove challenging, as Russia has expended much of its stock of Soviet-era equipment and has, since 2008, shuttered many of the training academies for its officer corps as part of former defence minister Anatoly Serdyukov’s reforms. Nevertheless, the pace of Russian reconstitution in many areas makes the availability of a Russian ground force comparable to the one that invaded Ukraine on 24 February 2022 plausible enough to bear consideration.</p> +<p>Therefore, a ruling Leninist party like China’s is permanently on alert to threats to its power. It is paranoid by design. This is in part ideological (e.g., the assumed hostility of “counterrevolutionary” forces at home and capitalist countries abroad) but is more a habit of rule in a system that brooks no challenge. Like most Leninist party-states, the CCP eschews an independent civil society and seeks to dominate all institutions. A Leninist party seeks not merely its survival but its unbroken monopoly on power.</p> -<p>Specific land capabilities, such as deep-strike missiles like the PrSM and the ATACMS, may have greater cross-theatre relevance, as they can be used to strike vessels in port or even to contribute to counter-airbase missions. However, while the possession of these missiles by Taiwan at the outset of a conflict may be relevant, it is unlikely that the US will be able to ship additional missiles to Taiwan under contested conditions, and most ground-based fires, with the exception of the US Army’s intermediate-range hypersonics, largely lack the reach to strike China from anywhere else in the first island chain.</p> +<p>Like all political systems, Leninist regimes can adapt to changing circumstances to a considerable extent without losing their essential characteristics. Yugoslavia, driven by existential threat, managed to sustain significant economic and social liberalization. Understanding tensions and tendencies within the Leninist model nonetheless helps explain why China has experienced a historic conservative shift over the past 20 years toward reinforced centralization, sweeping internal discipline campaigns, ideological orthodoxy, and suppression of civil society.</p> -<p>The major bottlenecks in the deployment of the US Army to Europe would probably be in the areas of air defence and logistical support. Since the US Army is responsible for air defence as a function of the Key West Agreement, it would likely see its air-defence capabilities entirely consumed by a Pacific war. Any US Army deployment to Europe would thus depend on the availability of adequate European air defences (without which ground forces could not deploy).</p> +<p>Observers naturally contrast these policies with those of the preceding “reform and opening” period, which Deng Xiaoping launched in 1978. Deng was, in fact, no less committed to Leninist rule, as he demonstrated brutally on June 4, 1989. Amid the rubble of the Cultural Revolution in the late 1970s, however, desperation to save the party-state drove him and his peers to radical experimentation: agricultural decollectivization, the gradual introduction of market forces, and a retreat of the party from the average citizen’s daily life. While democracy was never on offer, the changes at the time were remarkable and exhibited a surprising tolerance for risk to Leninist prerogatives.</p> -<p>US strategic sealift would necessarily be strained by a Pacific deployment, and some of this capability will be provided by the US Army. At the time of writing, there is limited European capacity to provide strategic sealift, as the movement of US forces across the Atlantic has largely been a US activity. NATO maintains a sealift consortium, to which 11 countries contribute 15 vessels, but this represents a limited capability. Airlift may represent another means of providing inter-theatre mobility to US forces, as during the Cold War, although this will likely only partially mitigate bottlenecks in mobility.</p> +<p>While reform and opening delivered on growth and revitalization, it also diluted the system’s controls, reduced discipline, and unleashed pressures for liberalization. The Tiananmen Square crackdown put a halt to official consideration of political change, but continued economic reform and attendant societal developments in the 1990s and 2000s further undermined the Leninist system.</p> -<p>In effect, while many components of US land power may in principle remain available for use in Europe – if policy allows – even in the face of an Indo-Pacific contingency, this depends to a considerable degree on the ability of European states to fill gaps in key enablers that allow a ground force to both cross the Atlantic and remain safe against a range of air and missile threats while in theatre.</p> +<p>Once reform and opening propelled China to a certain level of wealth and power, however, the arguments for further gambling with party equities were bound to encounter increasing opposition. The principal forces behind this counterreformation were internal to the CCP, organic, and flowed from longstanding discomfort with the political effects of reform and perceptions of a shifting cost-benefit ratio. This resistance began to coalesce well before Xi Jinping’s 2012 ascent to power. As Professor Susan Shirk argues in her important volume Overreach: How China Derailed Its Peaceful Rise, the process likely began in earnest no later than the mid-2000s.</p> -<h3 id="conclusions-manageable-but-growing-cracks">Conclusions: Manageable But Growing Cracks</h3> +<p>For governments that represent themselves as innately progressive, communist regimes are, in practice, notably conservative and intolerant. The CPSU’s Leninist threat perceptions extended far beyond the conventional political sphere, so it was logical that the Kremlin would reject not merely explicit opposition but also unsanctioned manifestations of ethnic identity, religious faith, women’s and other human rights, sexual identity, artistic creativity, intellectual exploration, and economic activity.</p> -<p>The findings in this report suggest that while there will undoubtedly be resource constraints within Europe during a decade of acute risk in the Pacific, these constraints should be parsed, given that not all assets are fungible. This is not to suggest that major capability gaps do not exist within European militaries, nor that they must not be closed. But a more granular analysis of these gaps can help identify immediate priority areas.</p> +<p>China’s reform and opening period affirmed that some liberalization in all these areas was possible under a Leninist system. Nonetheless, limits always remained in place; the control apparatus never disappeared, and the party elite ultimately united against a growing threat to the system’s very existence. Conservatism and intolerance in today’s China reflect not merely Xi Jinping’s whim but the same logic that drove Soviet behavior.</p> -<p>In certain areas, the analysis for this report produced counterintuitive findings. In particular, despite airpower and air-defence assets being in high demand across the European and Indo-Pacific theatres, the munition and interceptor types required were not in all instances pulled in two directions by conflicting demand signals. In particular, SEAD munitions such as the AARGM-ER may have limited relevance to a Pacific campaign. This largely stems from the fact that strikes against the Chinese mainland at a scale that might alter the balance of power over Taiwan are not only increasingly unviable, but also superfluous, insofar as mutual air denial over Taiwan and the ability to target destroyers and cruisers, as well as the amphibious vessels they protect in and around the island, are potentially sufficient to enable the failure of a Chinese invasion. If, as some have argued, the US prioritises resourcing allied efforts as part of its deterrent, resourcing European SEAD efforts (which are currently constrained less by platforms than by munitions) is achievable by the US without undermining an Indo-Pacific campaign. As discussed in Chapter II, meaningful European gaps also exist in areas other than munitions – but material gaps may prove easiest to fill.</p> +<p>Recognizing the PRC party-state as a familiar political model, in fact, helps deepen understanding of Xi Jinping himself. Xi is the ultimate company man. However much his tumultuous youth informs his views, his professional life has been one of a decades-long ascent through a complex, established institution. Xi is the product and beneficiary of a distinct bureaucratic culture. His comparators are not revolutionaries like Vladimir Lenin, Mao Zedong, or Deng Xiaoping but leaders who came of age under ruling Leninist orders — say, Leonid Brezhnev or Jiang Zemin. The former were innovators: often visionary, necessarily iconoclastic. The latter were creatures of established bureaucracies in which institutional interests and preservation of the system were paramount. While not necessarily the gray apparatchiks of Western fancy, neither were these bureaucratic autocrats likely to challenge the fundamentals of a system that defined their very perceptions of threat.</p> -<p>Air and missile defence is, similarly, a constrained capability, although some constraints are more acute than others. Available IAMD systems and capacity in terms of both hit-to-kill interceptors and blast fragmentation warheads are available to a limited degree in Europe. Unlike in the Pacific, however, the Russian ballistic threat is limited to a part of the theatre, and will be attenuated over time as a SEAD campaign takes effect. Moreover, capacity limitations can be mitigated through the more effective layering of defences against SRBMs. In the Pacific, by contrast, BMD is likely to be a persistent resource demand. Stocks of blast fragmentation interceptors needed for both air-to-air and cruise missile defence will be a resource heavily strained by a Pacific contingency.</p> +<p>National power, wealth, and popular welfare are important to Leninist leaders, but internal dominance — not mere survival — ultimately takes precedence. No liberal democracies and comparatively few authoritarian systems judge policy by such a broad scope of aspirations for regime control. China’s affirmation of a statist economy at the July 2024 Third Central Committee Plenum makes sense in this context, and it is unlikely that Beijing’s subsequent stimulus measures will represent a fundamental change to this course.</p> -<p>In the maritime domain, surface lethality and ASW emerge as major European capability gaps, which is perhaps unsurprising given the maritime dimensions of the Pacific contingency to which US assets would be drawn.</p> +<p>Indeed, it is entirely reasonable that the CCP today willingly takes a pass on the higher growth rates genuine market reforms could yield, correctly recognizing them as intrinsically dangerous politically. A systemic rebalancing of the economy to favor consumption is off the table for the same reason. If Beijing doubles down on state control, technology, and officially sanctioned innovation as economic drivers, it is largely because the regime’s political imperatives rule out structural alternatives.</p> -<p>While the US Army capabilities most relevant to the land domain do not necessarily have great relevance to an Indo-Pacific contingency, many of the enablers needed to move these assets to make US capabilities operational would probably need to be provided by European states.</p> +<p>Meanwhile, Beijing’s leftist shift has deepened the conformism typical of Leninist systems. From 1978, reform and opening gradually introduced greater willingness among leaders at all levels to take risks to promote growth, then their primary goal. Party members today operate in a climate of sharply reduced risk tolerance and appreciate that everything is political again — or could be at any time.</p> -<p>In effect, then, the task of preparing for the Davidson Window in Europe should be seen as one of filling specific gaps in capacity as rapidly as possible, while others can be covered on a longer-term basis. To be sure, it is desirable for a number of reasons that European states mobilise the capacity to replicate the full spectrum of capabilities and enablers for which they currently rely on the US. Assuming that not all these capabilities can be delivered in a decade, however, there are specific areas to which resources should be targeted on an immediate basis. This report has sought to shed light on which areas might represent vulnerabilities. These areas should be targeted with urgency.</p> +<p>Xi’s perpetual anti-corruption campaign has raised the stakes for all leaders and penalizes not merely malfeasance but also failure to perceive and implement the Center’s will — itself harder to divine than before, with security in myriad forms having been prioritized to the same extent as economic development. At the very time subordinate officials are under pressure to obey and please, economic malaise robs them of tools to satisfy their political masters and increases the chances that poor local performance will invite punishment.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/Atoyf6j.png" alt="image01" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Table 1: Summary of the Relative Risk of US Overstretch in Individual Areas.</strong> Source: The authors.</em></p> +<p>Striking the optimal balance between power and the requirements of governing an immense, diverse, and relatively open society is a constant challenge for today’s CCP. Over a decade into the Xi era, the average Han citizen (though decidedly not their fellow Tibetan and Uyghur citizens) remains freer and more affluent than they were in the early days of reform and opening, to say nothing of the high noon of Maoism. So far, Beijing still appears to understand that applying crude mobilization and control techniques to its ethnic majority is less likely to yield the regime’s goals.</p> -<hr /> +<p>Beijing nonetheless appears willing to accept a balance that involves substantial economic and social costs: A vibrant national economy for its own sake is unacceptable, dissatisfied elites strive to move themselves and their wealth abroad, and the treatment of the Uyghurs confirms the party’s willingness to revive totalitarianism as necessary.</p> -<p><strong>Sidharth Kaushal</strong> is the Senior Research Fellow, Sea Power in the Military Sciences research team at RUSI. His research covers the impact of technology on maritime doctrine in the 21st century and the role of sea power in a state’s grand strategy.</p> +<p>A reversion to reform and opening is unlikely. Barring a successful leadership challenge (rare in established Leninist systems) or ill health, Xi Jinping is in charge indefinitely — and, if anything, his views will grow more illiberal as he ages. Moreover, while Beijing faces many difficulties, it is unlikely to confront challenges anytime soon on the scale that necessitated and enabled Deng Xiaoping’s great gamble. Barring extraordinary developments, today’s CCP will remain in a defensive crouch for the foreseeable future and respond to challenges conservatively to protect its Leninist order.</p> -<p><strong>Juliana Suess</strong> is the former Research Fellow and Policy Lead on Space Security in the Military Sciences research team at RUSI. Her research interests include global space governance, counterspace capabilities and space warfare.</p>Sidharth Kaushal and Juliana SuessThis report examines which US capabilities will be most relevant in a potential Taiwan crisis, as well as which are of utility both in Europe and in a Taiwan contingency.Defence Procurement Success2024-11-20T12:00:00+08:002024-11-20T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/defence-procurement-success<p><em>GCAP’s management involves five innovations that should drive success in its technology development and timeline. They also have the potential to transform the UK approach to major development, production and support programmes – if government is willing to change how it approaches project financing.</em></p> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Barring extraordinary developments, today’s CCP will remain in a defensive crouch for the foreseeable future and respond to challenges conservatively to protect its Leninist order.</code></em></strong></p> -<excerpt /> +<h3 id="confused-observers">Confused Observers</h3> -<p>On 8 November, the UK government announced its continued commitment to the Global Combat Air Programme (GCAP). The announcement was likely a relief to Japan and Italy, the UK’s treaty partners in the programme. GCAP – and the Future Combat Air System (FCAS) programme of which it is a part – promises to take UK combat air and industrial capability into the sixth generation of combat jet platforms.</p> +<p>Opacity, disinformation, and foreign influence operations are enduring PRC practices with deep Soviet roots that have long impaired comprehension of China. An understanding of the mechanisms of governance Moscow transferred to the Chinese communists helps illuminate this area as well.</p> -<h3 id="government-military-and-industry-as-one-team">Government, Military and Industry as One Team</h3> +<p>Under Lenin’s leadership, propaganda was always a strategic asset in pursuing control of the Russian state. Formalizing party practice, the Bolsheviks established a propaganda department within the Central Committee soon after they seized power. The CCP today retains propaganda organs at all levels of administration, and the shaping of public opinion and suppression of dissent are obligations for all party members. Soviet principles for the operation of these bodies and the regime as a whole remain very much alive. Leninist parties are highly secretive by norm and regulation. The party does not see itself as obliged to keep its own citizens — much less foreigners — informed of its intent. Control of popular opinion is its top public relations goal; transparency is innately suspect.</p> -<p>GCAP from its inception involved a government-industry team rather than the traditional adversarial model. The GCAP announcement at the Farnborough air show in 2018 presented a team of the MoD and the RAF alongside four core companies. BAE Systems, Rolls Royce, Leonardo and MBDA – to generate a new aircraft and its weapons. This was a broader and earlier grouping than had been used in the 1980s with Eurofighter Typhoon, and a strong contrast even with recent naval practice in which the Navy first works out its requirement and only then goes to industry to find the best supplier. As Vice Admiral Paul Marshall told the House of Commons Defence Committee in 2023:</p> +<p>Reflecting their Soviet heritage, Chinese propaganda organs are under no obligation to respect truth or consistency. They are not subject to legislative, judicial, or media oversight. As CCP entities, their priorities, unsurprisingly, are party rule and advancement of party goals. Also copying Bolshevik practice, Chinese official rhetoric is freighted with ideological pronouncements that can be variously obscure, ambiguous, and (as necessary) dishonest. Even what appear to be routine statements can stump party members and long-term observers.</p> -<blockquote> - <p>“When we have a programme or project in the concept phase, that is done by the Navy Command Headquarters development team. They take the concept and work out the requirements that the Navy needs to meet the threats of the future. Once those requirements are set, what normally happens is that it is passed to a delivery team to get on with the business of full design and implementation.”</p> -</blockquote> +<p>China’s ruling party habitually speaks of its place in the world in triumphalist terms. Short foreign attention spans, especially in democracies, guarantee Beijing has international audiences that are periodically refreshed. Out of practice since the Soviet Union’s demise, overseas observers are less likely today to recognize Xi Jinping’s dramatic assertions of PRC ascendance as (at least in part) echoes of Mao’s claims to leadership of the “third world” and Lenin’s celebration of the Bolshevik spark to the global revolution. This is how Leninist parties speak to the world and, just as importantly, themselves.</p> -<p>Two lines of logic underpin the MoD’s new approach in Team Tempest. The first logic was that one purpose of the strategy was sustaining and developing UK industrial capability in the combat air domain. This capability primarily lay in four companies that had survived decades of industrial consolidation. The second logic was that the approach offered the prospect of better integrating and exploiting the expertise of government and industry: the MoD with its understanding of future threats and their nature, and industry with its knowledge of technology, engineering and manufacturing.</p> +<p>Leninist propaganda also obfuscates by repurposing liberal references to serve authoritarianism. Thus, like the USSR before it, the PRC avers that its repressive system is democratic — indeed, more perfectly so than Western liberal democracies. Beijing represents itself as a champion of human rights, but the CCP categorically rejects universal rights (such as those of speech or assembly) that China has nominally embraced in international covenants and, for that matter, its own state constitution (as opposed to the party constitution). While the party extols its commitment to sexual equality, for example, Xi Jinping in October 2023 used the All-China Women’s Federation meeting to exhort Chinese women to marry and have babies. In the world at large, an autocratic, mercantilist China improbably represents itself as the champion of a “democratic” global order and free trade.</p> -<p>We acknowledge that government-industry partnering in defence is not entirely new. But even the Carrier Alliance had been preceded by a formal competition between BAE Systems and Thales. The nearest thing to the partnering approach to what was first called Tempest may be the relationship between the government, Rolls Royce and other firms in the Submarine Delivery Agency on submarine nuclear reactors. Thus, the expansion of this approach beyond the immediate industrial concerns around the nuclear deterrent is new.</p> +<p>Denial of information is also a powerful tool for shaping opinion at home and abroad. While the PRC remains more open today than the USSR was for most of its history (or China itself was 40 years ago), restrictions on data, always robust, have sharply revived in recent years. Foreign businesses, academics, and others have found it increasingly difficult to access previously available information. Meanwhile, Beijing has sharply reduced Western media presence in China, removing critical reporting about the PRC from the front page in many markets and enhancing the ability of CCP-originated stories to shape public opinion.</p> -<h3 id="securing-industry-funding-for-early-stage-work">Securing Industry Funding for Early-Stage Work</h3> +<p>An additional inheritance from the USSR is interference in other countries’ internal affairs. The creation of the CCP was itself an exercise in covert Soviet external operations: Comintern agents helped organize the Chinese Communist Party’s 1921 underground founding congress in Shanghai and provided indispensable funding, equipment, and expertise during the CCP’s early years. For their largesse, the Bolsheviks exacted strict obedience from what was at the time merely the Chinese branch of the Moscow-centered world communist movement. Soviet interference in other countries’ internal affairs extended around the world and continued throughout the USSR’s history, varying in content and intensity. While Leninist states have no more of a monopoly on foreign interference than they do on misleading state propaganda, they are noteworthy for the formal institutional and normative drivers of these activities and the absence of restrictions on them.</p> -<p>Selecting key partners could be seen as encouraging corporate complacency, but this risk was mitigated by the readiness of the firms to invest significant sums of their own money in the early work without formal assurance of development, let alone production. The companies have not formally revealed their individual spending, but in total it has been around £800 million, compared to the government’s contribution of around £2 billion. The need to recover this funding, along with recognition that production will be shared across the three partners and that exports will be essential to sustain industrial capability long-term, is a major incentive for companies to avoid slacking.</p> +<p>This is yet another area in which ideology flavors and justifies behavior: styling itself as the sole interpreter of “scientific” historic forces, a Leninist party operates with a deep sense of exceptionalism. It observes international rules and norms only insofar as they advance the leadership’s goals. The law is no more a constraint on the party’s overseas behavior than it is at home.</p> -<p>The dedication of corporate funding was feasible given more than 13 years of firm government signalling of an intention to maintain the national combat air industrial capability. This had been part of the Labour government’s Defence Industrial Strategy of 2005, which led to the Taranis uncrewed stealthy vehicle and the exploration of collaboration on an aircraft with France. The Conservatives’ 2015 Strategic Defence and Security Review stated:</p> +<p>Observers therefore cannot be surprised that there is an unbroken link between, say, PRC direction of communist insurgents in colonial Malaya in the 1950s and Beijing’s contemporary efforts to manipulate democratic elections and local media around the world. All have been directed by enduring CCP institutions to shape an international order to Beijing’s liking.</p> -<blockquote> - <p>“We will invest in the next generation of combat aircraft technology, in partnership with our defence aerospace industry and our closest allies. We are working with the US to build and support the F35 Lightning. We will work with France to develop our Unmanned Combat Air System programme, and collaborate on complex weapons.”</p> -</blockquote> +<p>While never an unvarnished success, China’s influence operations over time have promoted a positive view of the PRC in many countries and certainly obscured understanding of its intent and ambitions in others. Xi Jinping has substantially invigorated foreign influence operations but remained within the orthodox boundaries of the system CCP founders accepted from Moscow a century ago.</p> -<p>These words emerged publicly as the Future Combat Air Systems Technology Initiative and launched the commitment to joint MoD and private sector investment.</p> +<h3 id="russias-past-and-chinas-future">Russia’s Past and China’s Future</h3> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">GCAP is conceived both as an initially defined project in its own right (a crewed aircraft) and as a platform that will be designed to evolve and spirally develop over time</code></em></strong></p> +<p>The Soviet Union’s history can also help observers anticipate aspects of the PRC’s future. The demise of the USSR confirmed that communist regimes are not immortal. The CCP’s party-state could nonetheless rule China for an extended period yet, and the system is unlikely to end the same way the Soviet one did.</p> -<p>Thus, the Team Tempest model in the Combat Air Strategy emerged after years of discussions on how best to sustain UK industrial capabilities in the broad field of combat air. It was far from being a spur of the moment choice, and reflected an MoD recognition that:</p> +<p>Leninist systems are extremely tough and can survive tremendous internal and external abuse. In countries where such regimes arose through indigenous struggle, the mortal vulnerability has been internal elite discord, not foreign pressure or popular revolt. Indeed, the peaceful collapse of the USSR along republic lines was arguably one of the least likely major political events of the twentieth century.</p> -<blockquote> - <p>“The UK’s ability to choose how we deliver our future requirements (including maintenance and upgrade of current systems) is dependent on maintaining access to a dynamic and innovative industrial base.”</p> -</blockquote> +<p>If North Korea and Cuba have survived the decades after coming off the Soviet dole, surely the USSR, with all its advantages, could have muddled on longer had it not been for the unintended consequences of Mikhail Gorbachev’s reformist zeal. The assertion that U.S. pressure was the principal driver of the USSR’s demise is unfounded. A more conventional general secretary would have exploited the foreign threat to extend the system’s life — albeit at further cost to prosperity and human rights.</p> -<h3 id="novel-collaborative-decision-making-structures">Novel Collaborative Decision-Making Structures</h3> +<p>The CCP is unlikely to follow the CPSU’s road to oblivion, if for no other reason than that Beijing is obsessed with the lessons of the Soviet collapse and on watch to prevent its replication. Moreover, China’s party-state has assets Gorbachev’s did not — in particular, a massive economy that is likely to grow well into the future, even if at a slower rate. When China eventually transitions from Leninist rule, it will be via a different route than the one the Soviet Union took.</p> -<p>The UK has participated in many collaborative aircraft projects, but a negative feature of even Typhoon was the limited authority of the government and corporate structures that were supposed to manage and deliver the project. Subsequently decision-making was often slow.</p> +<p>The USSR’s collapse nonetheless can still be helpful to anticipating change in China.</p> -<p>With GCAP, the emphasis is on empowered structures and streamlined decision-making processes. The three governments were able to agree quickly on a treaty-based GCAP International Government Organisation with the legal and political powers needed to be able to manage the project from the customer side. Its commercial delivery structure – bringing together the top-level industrial players – is understood to be largely settled, with a formal announcement expected by the end of this year.</p> +<p>First, surprises happen. The demise of the Soviet Union in 1991 was not remotely inevitable and could have been avoided at many points. Nonetheless, it did happen, despite the best intentions of the Soviet leadership and, until quite late in the process, the loyalty of the military and security forces. History is replete with political change driven by surprise, confusion, and compounded errors. This almost certainly will apply to CCP dominance someday. One of the biggest questions, perhaps, is whether it will occur through a sudden convulsion or prolonged evolutionary processes. For now, this is unknowable — though the evolutionary route seems unlikely in the years immediately ahead.</p> -<p>The capacity of these bodies to make choices quickly without having to send everything back to national capitals and company headquarters will be exposed only during the operation of the project, but certainly the intention in 2024 is that the joint executive bodies should be able to proceed at pace in order to keep the project on track.</p> +<p>Another insight from the Soviet experience is that the diversity of party membership ensures there is a huge range of perspectives within the ruling class once citizens perceive a genuine prospect for systemic change. Leninist parties’ conceit that they are elite revolutionary vanguards contributes to foreign misunderstanding on this point. In fact, with nearly 100 million members, the CCP is second only to India’s ruling Bharatiya Janata Party as the world’s largest political party. China’s Soviet-style “mass” organizations — such as those for workers, women, and young people — link yet hundreds of millions more to the CCP. Despite a daunting appearance of uniformity in thought and goals, the party’s faithful in fact represent a huge cross-section of the PRC’s 1.4 billion people.</p> -<p>Japan is a new collaborative partner for the UK, but GCAP is a key element in a strengthening of UK–Japan security relations that dates back to at least 2013. UK Typhoons exercised with Japanese counterparts in 2016, and Theresa May visited Japan as prime minister in 2017. All this was accompanied by company-to-company discussions among the key players. Thus, when the formal announcement of an Italy–Japan–UK aircraft programme was made in 2022, many political, military and industrial preparations had already been made.</p> +<p>As long as a ruling Leninist party remains a well-lubricated, disciplined operation, most citizens “go along to get along.” When a serious prospect for change augers, however, the diversity lurking behind party control, personal self-interest, and ideology’s wall of sound can become evident. In the case of the CPSU, a huge, apparently monolithic party disintegrated in less than seven years, with many of its members joining the range of political parties that emerged. Suggesting similar diversity in China, foreigners who lived there in the 1990s and 2000s often encountered communists who in private articulated sharp dissatisfaction with CCP rule for a range of reasons. Those people are still there, and it is difficult to believe others aren’t joining them — however much their public behavior currently suggests otherwise.</p> -<h3 id="development-for-the-unknown-spiral-development-in-action">Development for the Unknown: Spiral Development in Action</h3> +<p>Regardless of its bravado, China’s Leninist system displays ample awareness that its survival depends on perpetual vigilance. Whether it be stock market instability, mishandling of a pandemic, or protesters holding up blank sheets of paper, the CCP needs to treat every surprise as a potential threat to the entire system.</p> -<p>A further feature of GCAP is its conception as an initially defined project in its own right (a crewed aircraft), and also a platform that will be designed to evolve and spirally develop over time. There will thus be no single declaration of Full Operational Capability because the final “full” stage of the platform is unknown. Moreover, that platform is to be part of a wider and only partially defined evolving system of equipment and capabilities under the FCAS umbrella. Thus, the aim for 2035 is for a minimum viable product that can deal effectively with threats in the 2035–2040 timeframe, but which will be capable of regular, perhaps even continuous improvements.</p> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Whether it be stock market instability, mishandling of a pandemic, or protesters holding up blank sheets of paper, the CCP needs to treat every surprise as a potential threat to the entire system.</code></em></strong></p> -<p>In terms of industrial motivation, spiral development offers an appealing base for the export potential of GCAP. All the companies are aware that the long-term sustainment of their combat air capabilities will not be satisfied by demand from the three core countries alone: exports will be necessary, and the UK government is clear that exporting needs to be a key element of its defence industrial strategy.</p> +<h3 id="conclusion">Conclusion</h3> -<p>There is nothing innovative about thinking of an aircraft as part of a wider system: the Spitfires and Hurricanes that were so effective in the Battle of Britain owed much of their effectiveness to the radar, communication and ground-based fighter control direction that made up the air defence system of the time. Moreover, the idea of “spiral development” is pretty much the same as the concept of “incremental acquisition” that was prominent in defence procurement earlier in the millennium. However, that idea was little implemented, in part because of customer reluctance to compromise on requirements when access to funding for future improvements was uncertain.</p> +<p>The adoption of the Soviet model by communist parties around the world was never a simple cookie-cutter process. As parties came to power, local histories, circumstances, and interests profoundly shaped the new regimes. There was considerable variation in Leninist practice; the PRC’s ruling party is not the identical twin of the USSR’s.</p> -<p>A key consideration for how effectively spiral development can operate will be the availability of early funding to build in the key enablers of advances, not least strength, space and electric power in the platform as well the ease of upgrading software.</p> +<p>It has been important for CCP rule that China’s pre-1949 political history was overwhelmingly authoritarian, its philosophies skewed toward hierarchy and control, and its culture conservative. These conditions provided fertile soil for communist rule in general and the particular nature of the Chinese Leninist state.</p> -<h3 id="significantly-enhancing-the-use-of-digital-engineering">Significantly Enhancing the Use of Digital Engineering</h3> +<p>Those conditions did not, however, preordain CCP rule as we know it. It is significant that the party’s founders modeled themselves not on just any Western Marxist party but on one of the most ruthless. The CCP’s internal wiring chart today, its practical behavior, and the continued veneration of Marxism-Leninism in the Party Constitution make abundantly clear that the Soviet model still deeply informs PRC governance.</p> -<p>Finally, a key enabler of affordability and speed of delivery will be digital engineering (DE). While largely a technology matter, DE also has organisational implications, not least in the form of company and governmental relationships with the Military Aviation Authority (MAA).</p> +<hr /> -<p>The practice of designing aircraft in a computerised, digital environment is not new. All modern civil and military equipment is designed first on a computer using engineers’ expertise to inform how different elements will interact. Digital simulations enable a digital-twin aircraft to be operated by humans in a simulated “cockpit” and environment. Tests with a real system then evaluate how this simulation data corresponds with reality. However, as the documentary film about the competition for the F-35 contract between Lockheed Martin and Boeing illustrates, while these tests often confirmed the simulation data, some unexpected faults emerged. This was over 25 years ago. As time has passed, the computing capacity of simulations has dramatically improved, and so has the data base for generating high fidelity environments in benign and contested scenarios.</p> +<p><strong>Ford Hart</strong> is a former U.S. diplomat who worked on Chinese and Soviet affairs. His final assignment was as U.S. Consul General to Hong Kong and Macau.</p>Ford HartThis paper argues that Chinese Communist Party (CCP) political institutions, the CCP’s practical behavior, and continued veneration of Marxism-Leninism in the CCP constitution highlight the Soviet model’s deep influence on Beijing. As such, lessons from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) can help us understand the CCP’s approach to governance today.Defense Investment Review2024-11-21T12:00:00+08:002024-11-21T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/defense-investment-review<p><em>The Department of Defense (DOD) has become concerned that critical technologies are insufficiently capitalized to support national security. Global private capital investors have been allocating resources toward software-heavy capabilities, such as e-commerce and software as a service, leaving funding gaps for critical components and capabilities where investors perceive greater risk.</em> <excerpt></excerpt> <em>DOD’s new Office of Strategic Capital (OSC) was set up to address this challenge by catalyzing investments in cutting-edge technologies to support the development and maturation of critical components and capabilities. To do this, OSC aims to go beyond direct contract and grant funding to leverage various financing tools used by U.S. government agencies outside DOD. This report provides an overview of these alternative funding mechanisms. By examining these financing tools and their ongoing use, DOD may better prepare to effectively leverage alternative financing toward national security aims.</em></p> -<p>This development in data quality and quantity and processing speed is especially important in the combat air sector because of the time and costs taken up by real-world testing and flying. The US’s transparency on many defence matters enables a sense of the scale of what “testing” has involved to date. This is apparent in a 2018 statement by Vice Admiral Mat Winter, F-35 Program Executive Officer:</p> +<h3 id="introduction">Introduction</h3> -<blockquote> - <p>“Since the first flight of AA-1 in 2006, the developmental flight test program has operated for more than 11 years mishap-free, conducting more than 9,200 sorties, accumulating over 17,000 flight hours, and executing more than 65,000 test points to verify the design, durability, software, sensors, weapons capability and performance for all three F-35 variants.”</p> -</blockquote> +<p>The United States faces increasing technological competition from adversaries around the globe as its strategic rivals — particularly China — accelerate the development, production, and scaling of critical technologies. The Department of Defense (DOD) strives to achieve technological advantage through various tools that focus most frequently on new acquisition approaches, organizations dedicated to innovation, and direct funding of contracts. There is new urgency around technological research and development (R&amp;D), particularly for emerging technologies, as strategic competitors have made clear through documents and public statements that they intend to accelerate their work in emerging technologies. Given that most development of emerging technology is now funded through private capital, U.S. policymakers have the task of jump-starting progress in areas critical to U.S. national security. This presents a challenge to U.S. policymakers, who must galvanize private sector investment without the coercive tools or centralized economy that competitors such as China or Russia use when crafting and executing industrial strategy.</p> -<p>The average sortie lasted less than two hours. Over the 11 years, more than 16 sorties were flown a week. These numbers give some sense of both the time and money that could be saved if development could be done largely online rather than in the air.</p> +<p>DOD founded the Office of Strategic Capital (OSC) in December 2022 to solve a persistent and increasingly important question: how can the government ensure “the future warfighter has the capabilities they need by attracting and scaling private capital to critical technologies for national security?” To support this goal, OSC received $49 million in appropriations and $984 million in budget authority in the fiscal year (FY) 2024 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA). As DOD and OSC navigate this terrain, they can look to other U.S. agencies and departments that have gone beyond direct funding to use alternative funding mechanisms, including a variety of debt and equity tools, and that have operated such programs for decades.</p> -<p>The vision associated with DE is that a large amount of testing will be done online at great speed and low cost. Computers can operate “flights” on a 24-hours a day basis if need be. Sub-system testing, which is usually less expensive, can be done both online and on the ground. But the role of flight testing should be massively reduced, generating significant savings.</p> +<p>Government organizations making use of alternative funding mechanisms that can help crowd in private capital include the Department of Commerce and Department of Energy (DOE), the Small Business Administration (SBA), the Export-Import Bank of the United States (EXIM), and the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC) and its predecessor, the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC). While several reports discuss these agencies, their missions, and their funding tools, there is a lack of literature summarizing the various non-direct funding tools. To fill that gap, this report pulls together publicly available data on investments made by these government agencies and departments, with a specific focus on investments that align with the 14 critical technologies DOD has identified as vital to national security.</p> -<p>All defence systems must have an approved Safety Case. In the case of aircraft, arrangements need the approval of the MoD’s safety authorities including the MAA. This suggests that safety and certification people should be involved throughout development, as opposed to being asked for cooperation late in the day (as was the case, for example, with the Ajax armoured vehicle programme).</p> +<p>Like the other agencies mentioned, DOD seeks to attract more capital to critical technologies through strong and consistent demand signals, financing, and innovative use of alternative funding mechanisms. In the past two decades, private capital markets have targeted software investments instead of hardware, as they typically generate a greater and more rapid return on investment. Capital has flowed to e-commerce and software as a service (SaaS) and away from deep technology relevant to national security. In 2006, venture capitalists invested 55 percent of funds in software and 45 percent in hardware, but by 2017 that balance had shifted significantly to 92 percent in software and only 8 percent in hardware. More recent data suggests that this trend continued through the Covid-19 pandemic. As of 2023, $66.6 billion in venture capital funding went to software, while only $6.3 billion went to hardware. Companies made this choice because software has lower barriers to entry, less risk, and higher profit margins. This trend accentuates the need for DOD to look for new tools to mobilize private sector capital into investments it deems critical for national security priorities.</p> -<p>Another major impact of advanced DE is that it will enable numerous engineers to work on different aspects of the system simultaneously as simulation data on the mutually dependent components is shared, analysed and acted upon at much greater speed. As one key programme manager confirmed to us, this process – from simulation data to design alternations that result from it and from implementation to a model to re-run a simulation – would have taken months in the last significant UK combat air programme. Today, it can be done overnight, as the simulation alternates designs automatically to improve. In the case of GCAP, there is the prospect of a long working day for the humans involved, as those ending their day in Japan can be succeeded by staff in Italy and the UK.</p> - -<p>Development is far from the only area where DE could be a key enabler. The potential reach of DE is extraordinary. BAE Systems is already invested in digital manufacturing, robotic assembly, and training support for those doing skilled manual work. Additive manufacturing is a sub-element in DE, as are computer-controlled machine tools. It could thus cut manufacturing time and increase product reliability. In-service modification and spiral development would be quicker and easier with DE. Building data-collecting sensors into systems would support longer usage rates for platforms and enable condition-based maintenance rather than time- or usage-based maintenance. Many modern civil aircraft engines are already fitted with such sensors (linked to computers analysing their results). These mean that engine companies can take on profitable availability contracts.</p> - -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Advanced digital engineering will enable numerous engineers to work on different aspects of a system simultaneously as data on the mutually dependent components is shared, analysed and acted upon at much greater speed</code></em></strong></p> - -<p>DE is the clear direction of travel for much of manufacturing. For GCAP, expanding the boundaries of DE is key to holding costs down and delivering an aircraft for 2035: it could and should be rewarding but also inevitably risky. Significantly, it is a field which US defence companies, not least Boeing, Lockheed Martin and Northrop Grumman are actively exploring. Because of the hundreds of sub-contractors that will need to be captured within the GCAP DE tent, the expertise they acquire can be applied on other manufacturing projects, both military and civil. Subject to respect for companies’ intellectual property, the government could work to diffuse GCAP-origin DE experiences to other industrial sectors beyond aerospace. This could enable progress, especially in productivity growth, under the government’s industrial ambitions as laid out in its Green Paper of October 2024.</p> +<p>DOD must grapple with the same challenge as the rest of the U.S. government in this domain, which is how to influence investment in transformative technologies and sectors critical to national security in ways that are commercially viable and do not distort the market. The alternative finance mechanisms covered in this report also work toward that goal.</p> -<p>However, this will require resources and skill. For instance, a highly secure information infrastructure that enables DE is pivotal. Clearly, information on GCAP’s digital twin and its performance in a countless number of combat scenarios will be highly prized, with state and perhaps corporate bodies focused on accessing it. A key to its GCAP capability is keeping that information safe. This has significant implications for the organisations that handle this data, including security clearances, establishing processes, and having the necessary IT infrastructure to handle data securely and at great speed. Skill is also an important factor. Government and industry alike will need to muster the necessary talent to maintain and develop DE capabilities. GCAP is conceptualised as an open-platform system that seeks to enable seamless integration of mission-specific FCAS capabilities from a multitude of suppliers. These suppliers must also be able to recruit the people required for the new digital working environment that they cannot grow themselves. Thus, government and industrial primes will need to produce a skill spill-over to make the FCAS system work.</p> +<h4 id="overview-and-definitions">Overview and Definitions</h4> -<p>All this has consequences for the financial approach to GCAP. Historically, major defence development programmes start cheap and then build up. The DE element of GCAP means that significant initial costs of computing, staff recruitment and training and model development have to be incurred. Investment in a highly secure information storage, processing and communication system is needed early. What this means in UK terms is that Treasury approval for higher than usual early costs is needed. It is a matter of approving a “spend to save” strategy, which clearly involves risk. But DE could then play a pivotal role in materialising the cost reduction and increases in speed.</p> +<p>In this paper, the authors look at how five federal credit agencies have used different kinds of funding mechanisms over the last 20 years in their quest to generate innovation: the SBA, DFC, EXIM, DOE, and Department of Commerce. The goal of this research is to create foundational knowledge on these programs and offer insights into how DOD, including the newly created OSC, could use these tools.</p> -<h3 id="conclusions">Conclusions</h3> +<p>The team evaluated a range of investment mechanisms from cases of loans, loan guarantees, loan portfolio guarantees, equity financing, export financing, and investment funds to funding through acts of Congress, such as the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) and the Creating Helpful Incentives to Produce Semiconductors (CHIPS) and Science Act. Each agency has some flexibility in the use of its financial instruments — for example, setting interest rates on debt financing or establishing the length of tenors.</p> -<p>The five areas of innovation in GCAP should be seen holistically as a transformational approach to defence acquisition:</p> +<p>This analysis uses the following definitions for each financial tool and explains how agencies deploy it:</p> <ul> <li> - <p>Government-industry partnering from the outset.</p> + <p><strong>Loans:</strong> A federal agency offers debt financing with set terms on tenors (length of repayment) and rates (set at the U.S. Treasury rate or a widely used benchmark). Loans are typically disbursed and repaid in dollar denominations and may be referred to as direct loans or debt financing.</p> </li> <li> - <p>Securing access to significant industrial cost contributions for the early stages.</p> + <p><strong>Loan guarantees:</strong> A federal agency assumes the debt obligation if the borrower defaults. A government agency can also purchase the debt from the lending financial institution and take responsibility for the loan.</p> </li> <li> - <p>Bringing in a novel collaborative partner and setting up customer and industry delivery structures to facilitate timely decision-making.</p> + <p><strong>Loan portfolio guarantees:</strong> A federal credit agency guarantees a portfolio of loans, which enables the guaranteed party to scale up its lending activities to qualifying borrowers. Guarantees are typically provided to local banks to lend to micro, small, and medium-sized enterprises.</p> </li> <li> - <p>Starting from a minimum viable capability while envisaging spiral development.</p> + <p><strong>Equity financing:</strong> Equity authority is the ability of the U.S. government to make investments in companies either directly by buying a percentage of the company or indirectly through funds that invest in those companies.</p> </li> <li> - <p>Pushing the boundaries of digital engineering to reduce the time and cost of development and production.</p> + <p><strong>Export financing:</strong> Government agencies can provide financing to suppliers (exporters) trading with overseas buyers (importers). Export finance allows suppliers to access working capital while they wait for buyers to pay invoices.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Investment funds:</strong> U.S. government agencies can invest debt and equity into emerging market private equity funds to help address the shortfall of private equity capital or into investment funds in critical technologies where there are financing gaps.</p> </li> </ul> -<p>This will require persistent teamworking across government departments, among multiple businesses and between government and the private sector. But each offers the prospect of lowering costs and flattening the tendency towards increased inter-generational aircraft costs first pointed out by Norman Augustine more than 40 years ago.</p> +<p>This analysis focuses on investments that align most closely with DOD’s 14 critical technology areas, which include biotechnology, quantum science, future-generation wireless technology, advanced materials, trusted artificial intelligence (AI) and autonomy, integrated network systems of systems, microelectronics, space technology, renewable energy generation and storage, advanced computing and software, human-machine interfaces, directed energy, hypersonics, and integrated sensing and cyber. Several sources use the North American Industrial Classification System (NAICS) to identify critical technology areas, with the downside that such categories are construed broadly, often combining cutting-edge technologies with commonplace consumer goods. Each agency invests in a cross section of sectors beyond the 14 critical technology areas; however, this analysis focuses exclusively on areas of overlap with DOD.</p> -<p>The case for this approach rests on the simple observation that different things should be bought in different ways. There is no doubt that GCAP will require a mindset change from those in Defence Equipment &amp; Support whose instinct is that the only way to secure value is through competitive tendering, passing as much risk as possible to the private supplier, and relying primarily on contracted commitments to assure delivery. Also, for teaming to be effective, there will be a need for government technical expertise to be available, not least on the design and meaning of digital and real-world tests. To be specific, the GCAP approach is particularly relevant for projects in which national operational independence is valued and there is little or no scope for sustained competition within the country.</p> +<p>This analysis pulls open-source data on each of the federal credit agencies from annual financial reports and databases from each of the agencies covered, as well as from the federal government-wide website USAspending.gov. The site is “the official open data source of federal spending information, including information about federal awards such as contracts, grants, and loans.” This report is not intended to be a review of non-DOD agencies or their use of funding mechanisms to achieve their goals, but it may offer useful insights for those agencies as well as DOD.</p> -<p>The elements of this approach give real hope for effective cost control: incentivising industry by securing early significant company investments, focusing government and industrial delivery structures on pace regarding decisions, defining a realistic but militarily adequate requirement from the outset and, perhaps above all, investing in DE to speed development, reduce risks and lower costs.</p> +<h3 id="us-international-development-finance-corporation">U.S. International Development Finance Corporation</h3> -<p>Successive UK governments have shown that they can talk the talk on defence industrial matters, and their defence industrial partners have expressed confidence in their potential. Maintaining the momentum of GCAP will require all concerned to show that they can also walk the walk.</p> +<h4 id="overview">Overview</h4> -<hr /> +<p>DFC is the U.S. government’s development finance institution. DFC assumed the functions of OPIC and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID)’s Development Credit Authority (DCA) through Congress’s Better Utilization of Investments Leading to Development (BUILD) Act. The BUILD Act increased DFC’s exposure cap to $60 billion, doubling OPIC’s former $29 billion exposure cap. DFC officially launched operations in December 2019.</p> -<p><strong>Trevor Taylor</strong> is Director of the Defence, Industries &amp; Society Programme and Professorial Fellow in Defence management at RUSI where he has worked since 2009. He also works regularly on a consultancy basis for the Institute of Security Governance which is based at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, CA.</p> +<p>In addition to its mandate to prioritize less-developed countries, DFC gives preference to projects involving U.S. persons as project sponsors or participants, as well as projects in countries complying with international trade obligations and embracing private enterprise. In its selection of projects, DFC considers factors such as environmental and social impact, workers’ rights, human rights, and compliance with U.S. sanctions. DFC also seeks to complement — not compete with — the private sector by mobilizing private sector capital. DFC currently prioritizes the energy, healthcare, financial inclusion, food security and agriculture, technology and infrastructure, and water and sanitation sectors.</p> -<p><strong>Linus Terhorst</strong> is a Research Analyst at the Defence, Industries &amp; Society Programme where he works on defence procurement and industrial strategy questions and innovation management in defence.</p>Trevor Taylor and Linus TerhorstGCAP’s management involves five innovations that should drive success in its technology development and timeline. They also have the potential to transform the UK approach to major development, production and support programmes – if government is willing to change how it approaches project financing.【初選47人案・判刑】2024-11-19T12:00:00+08:002024-11-19T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-sentence<ul> - <li>李予信冀大眾關注案件 藉判詞思考社會走向</li> - <li>清晨逾200人排隊旁聽 有公眾指罵大媽為「排隊黨」</li> - <li>戴耀廷囚10年 其餘44人囚4年2個月至7年9個月</li> - <li>戴耀廷等4名組織者被列「首要分子」區諾軒趙家賢任證人獲一半減刑</li> - <li>所有參選人被列「積極參加者」 發起「墨落無悔」3名抗爭派量刑最重</li> - <li>林景楠任證人囚5年2個月 官無就作供減刑：對控方毫無幫助</li> - <li>官：不接受被告稱涉案計劃註定失敗 61萬投票市民不如此認為</li> - <li>法官指11名認罪被告有真誠悔意 當局評估是否提早釋放時會考慮</li> - <li>何桂藍發帖：歷史由有意志者書寫 人人可定義香港</li> - <li>專訪吳政亨：我以「傻」為榮</li> - <li>陳寶瑩：呢個係冤獄，一日都唔應該坐</li> - <li>呂智恆養母判刑後舉標語 涉公眾地方行為不檢被捕</li> - <li>判刑後長毛致信太太：未因言行悔疚、爭取民主並沒有錯</li> - <li>陳文敏指量刑貼近國安法三級制 料律政司上訴難度大</li> - <li>多國發聲明關注 外交部：無端指責、干涉中國內政</li> - <li>民建聯抗議美國抹黑 領事館未有派代表接信</li> -</ul> +<p>The CSIS study team examined four DFC financial products: direct loans, loan guarantees, equity financing, and investment funds. DFC guarantee and loan sizes range from $1 million to $1 billion. DFC typically can lend up to 50 percent of the project cost but may consider somewhat higher participation in the case of an expansion of an existing profitable foreign enterprise or for projects with significant offtake agreements. Loan or guarantee tenor is usually between 5 and 15 years but can go up to 25 years. DFC can provide direct loans to clients who lack a funding source of their own or do not have access to commercial lending sources and require DFC to arrange physical disbursement of funds. DFC disburses funds directly from the Department of the Treasury and lends them to an eligible borrower. DFC also provides direct loans in the form of investment guarantees funded by certificates of participation in the U.S. fixed-income debt capital markets. DFC also can provide loan guarantees to clients that have an independent funding source or are independent funding sources (e.g., financial institutions) but are unable to provide funding without risk mitigation by DFC.</p> -<excerpt /> +<p>Examples of DFC debt financing, loan guarantees, and loan portfolio guarantees include the following:</p> -<h3 id="李予信冀大眾關注案件-藉判詞思考社會走向">李予信冀大眾關注案件 藉判詞思考社會走向</h3> +<ul> + <li> + <p>In 2021, DFC provided $300 million in debt financing (direct loan) to Africa Data Centres Holdings Limited to support the development of critical information and communications technology (ICT) infrastructure in Kenya, South Africa, and other DFC-eligible countries.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>In 2021, DFC announced a $267 million guarantee to Smart RJ Concessionária de Iluminação Pública SPE S.A. to support the modernization of the public lighting system and installation and management of smart city infrastructure in the city of Rio de Janeiro.</p> + </li> +</ul> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/v6WRMZD.png" alt="image01" /></p> +<p>DFC also provides financial support to emerging market investment funds. DFC selects funds for investment by evaluating the fund’s strategy, management team, track record, fundraising capabilities, and fund terms. In 2019, DFC provided $50 million in financing to the Meridiam Infrastructure Africa Fund. Meridiam was expected to make up to 10 infrastructure investments across Africa, primarily in the renewable energy, transportation, and environmental sectors.</p> -<p>【獨媒報導】民主派47人案今日將會進行判刑，亦是香港首宗顛覆國家政權罪案件，大批市民通宵排隊。同為被告之一、早前獲判無罪的李予信凌晨5點前到達隊伍，他認除了此案，現在都有不同案件發生，關乎社會開放度、新聞、集結及參政等自由，希望大眾關心：「我覺得呢啲案件嘅判決同結論好需要大家深思、表達感受，思考指向緊社會未來發展去乜嘢方向」。他希望大家好好細讀判詞對社會的影響：「呢個係我好渴望大家一齊去諗嘅一樣嘢。」</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/ayS2MOz.png" alt="image01" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 1: Active DFC Projects by Sector, through FY 2021 Q3.</strong> Source: <a href="https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R47006">Shayerah I. Akhtar and Nick M. Brown, U.S. International Development Finance Corporation: Overview and Issues, CRS Report No. R47006 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, January 2022)</a>, based on data from <a href="https://www.dfc.gov/what-we-do/active-projects">DFC</a>.</em></p> -<h4 id="批評排隊黨濫用制度">批評「排隊黨」濫用制度</h4> +<p>Through the BUILD Act, the DFC also has a new financial tool in the form of equity financing. Investments in equity are limited to (1) 30 percent of the total project and (2) a total of 35 percent of the DFC’s total investment exposure, up to $21 billion. In addition to adhering to the same requirements to obtain debt financing, equity financing applicants must demonstrate a strong business model, solid revenue, potential for scale, an experienced management team, and good corporate governance.</p> -<p>司法機構公布，將安排一共404張公眾人士入庭籌，其中正庭僅設5席，其餘399個旁聽席分布在其他延伸庭。傳媒在正庭及延伸庭則獲分配共71個座位。李予信表示從新聞得知排隊情況及正庭位置很少，抵達時間與過往相若，他又認為「排隊黨」的情況若屬實將十分不理想，「完全abuse（濫用）緊公眾席呢個制度。」</p> +<h4 id="funding">Funding</h4> -<p>被問到自己近況，他表示「都係咁」：「我覺得呢幾年都係處於比較平和啲、嚴謹啲嘅狀態，冇乜大起伏，我都係做緊自己要做嘅嘢。」</p> +<p>DFC is funded through a corporate capital account (CCA) consisting of appropriations and collections. DFC appropriations designate a portion of CCA collections that may be retained for operating expenses, and excess collections are credited to the Department of the Treasury. DFC’s activities are demand driven (usage depends on commercial interest and the availability of bankable projects), but the agency seeks to attract applications with outreach, business development, calls for proposal, and action through administration initiatives, partnerships, and policies, such as the G7’s Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment, the Quad (a partnership among the governments of Australia, India, Japan, and the United States), and the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity (an economic framework covering climate, technology, anticorruption, and trade among the United States and 13 partner countries in the Indo-Pacific). In FY 2023, DFC committed $9.1 billion, up from $7.4 billion in FY 2022 and $6.7 billion in FY 2021</p> -<p>他表示排隊期間會看書，分享最近在看藝術治療的書籍，關於創傷處理和韌性建立，覺得社會經歷集體創傷，值得思考如何建立生活動力。</p> +<h4 id="governance">Governance</h4> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/PrsR87F.png" alt="image02" /></p> +<p>DFC is led by a nine-member board of directors comprising a chief executive officer, four other U.S. government officials (the secretary of state, who is the chairperson of the board; the USAID administrator, who is the vice chairperson; the secretary of the treasury; and the secretary of commerce) or their designees, and four nongovernment members (for three-year terms, renewable once). All board positions are presidentially appointed and subject to Senate confirmation. All DFC powers are vested in the board, which provides direction and general oversight and approves major DFC decisions. The CEO acts on the board’s direction. The board meets quarterly, and a quorum is five members. Other DFC officers include the deputy CEO (also a Senate-confirmed, presidentially appointed position), chief risk officer, chief development officer, and inspector general (IG).</p> -<h4 id="冀在囚者好好活下去">冀在囚者好好活下去</h4> +<p>Investments totaling more than $50 million go to the board for approval; transactions below that amount are approved by a credit committee internal to DFC. All investments of $10 million or in specified countries require congressional notification to oversight committees (the House Foreign Affairs Committee and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee).</p> -<p>李卓人妻子鄧燕娥及姨仔鄧燕梨亦在隊伍之中，他們表示來支持吳敏兒等全部被告，鄧燕娥表示對一個多星期前曾探訪吳，引述她對判決結果「隨遇而安」。鄧表示大約一個月探望她一次，形容她大部分時間很堅強。鄧燕娥希望各被告無論如何都要堅強，「無論結果點都要好好活下去」。</p> +<h4 id="investments">Investments</h4> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/jUvIInb.png" alt="image03" /> -▲ 張文龍</p> +<p>Given that DFC invests primarily in low- and lower-middle-income countries and does not invest in defense-related industries, many of DFC’s and OPIC’s (its predecessor) investments do not align with DOD’s 14 critical technology areas or its supply chains. However, the team identified DOD-DFC alignment in renewable energy, data, ICT, and biotechnology investments. DFC investments in these sectors began in 2010, and the total amount invested was $4,112,092,249.</p> -<p>前葵青區議會副主席張文龍表示認識大部分被告，他希望對被告說「出面有好多人等緊同佢哋一齊食飯，一齊重聚。」他表示知道近幾星期不少被告精神狀態差，希望他們努力面對。他直言擔心「前輩級」被告，聽過他們對生活、經濟上的憂慮，不過相信他們這幾年找到方法面對。他表示上月尾探望過譚凱邦，「見到佢身體都ok」，不過一直受些皮膚問題困擾，臨近宣判心情有點緊張。</p> +<p>Renewable energy accounts for most investments, at more than 88 percent of total investments aligned with DOD criteria, for a total of 63 of 71 identified projects. Much of DFC support for the renewable energy sector is geared toward constructing solar photovoltaic (PV) plants to provide renewable energy solutions to households, agribusinesses, educational institutions, and solar manufacturing plants.</p> -<h4 id="前區議員評估刑期唔樂觀">前區議員評估刑期「唔樂觀」</h4> +<p>DFC and OPIC have also provided financing for four data-related projects for data centers and support for businesses and three ICT projects that financed cell phone tower constructions, telecom asset acquisitions, and the expansion of wireless businesses.</p> -<p>前荃灣區議員陳劍琴凌晨5時許到場，她特別關注被告張可森、岑敖暉、王百羽、劉澤鋒、譚凱邦、朱凱廸，並想跟他們說「頂住呀」，但認為刑期「唔樂觀」，因此案不關乎被告的政治光譜如何，僅李予信及劉偉聰脫罪，律政司亦向劉偉聰提出上訴。她上周曾探訪多名被告，形容他們狀態「都精神嘅」，但指部分被告臨近判刑日子「心情越差，狀態唔好」，亦有部分被告認為「終於可以有一個確實嘅日子」，因過去數年牆內外的人無止境地等待，「起碼心裡面有嗰譜」。</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/we9Zv2o.png" alt="image02" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 2: Active DFC Financing for Critical Technology Investment by Sector, FY 2012–FY 2023 Q3.</strong> Source: DFC.gov and CSIS analysis.</em></p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/3LLKHaW.png" alt="image04" /> -▲ 葉寶琳</p> +<p>OPIC and DFC also focused their financial support in DOD sectors focused on critical technologies in Africa and Asia. Africa is the predominant recipients of OPIC and DFC financing, and India receives the most financial support overall.</p> -<p>因為612基金案曾被國安處拘捕的葉寶琳亦在隊伍之中，她表示和很多被告都是認識多年的朋友：「無論點都好，我哋都應該陪住佢哋同埋等佢哋出嚟。」她表示最近有探望部份被告，形容「佢哋好多都係好堅強，好平安，都鼓勵咗我哋牆外嘅人」。</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/zmPqrTp.png" alt="image03" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 3: Active DFC Financing for Critical Technology Regional Financial Support, FY 2012–FY 2023 Q3.</strong> Source: DFC.gov and CSIS analysis.</em></p> -<h3 id="清晨逾200人排隊旁聽-有公眾指罵大媽為排隊黨">清晨逾200人排隊旁聽 有公眾指罵大媽為「排隊黨」</h3> +<p>When considered by commitment level, direct loans were the most prevalent tool used to support critical technology sectors. That said, commitment level is only one method for measuring the potential impact of assistance. Other measures, such as direct equity investment and ownership stake rather than repayment requirement, may have an outsized influence relative to their comparatively small commitment level.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/Z7KydzH.png" alt="image05" /></p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/StUjPBQ.png" alt="image04" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 4: Active DFC Financing for Critical Technology Areas by Mechanism, FY 2012–FY 2023.</strong> Source: DFC.gov and CSIS analysis based on data from <a href="https://www.dfc.gov/what-we-do/active-projects">DFC</a>.</em></p> -<p>【獨媒報導】初選47人案在今早10時判刑，司法機構共設404個公眾席，惟僅5人可進入正庭，餘下公眾需在延伸區域看電視直播。有公眾三日前起到法院外輪候，惟隊伍首13位的大部份人均戴上口罩，亦未回應記者，被其他旁聽人士質疑為「排隊黨」。</p> +<h3 id="export-import-bank-of-the-united-states">Export-Import Bank of the United States</h3> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/NsPc55m.png" alt="image06" /></p> +<h4 id="overview-1">Overview</h4> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/vN3mscl.png" alt="image07" /></p> +<p>EXIM has been the U.S. export credit agency since 1934, helping U.S. exporters that work in challenging and risky markets obtain financing by covering the credit and country risks the private sector is unable or unwilling to accept. EXIM offers the following financing tools: protecting exporters against nonpayment risk by foreign customers, offering support for U.S. companies selling services overseas, backing exporters’ loans from private banks to finance materials and labor, and providing financing to foreign buyers for projects, transportation, and U.S. export sales financing.</p> -<p>(05:45) 有數批戴口罩中年女士前來排隊，每批約5至7人。及後每相隔數分鐘，陸續再有中年人士成群結隊前來排隊。截至早上7時，西九裁判法院門外已超過200人排隊輪候旁聽。期間，多名旁聽人士以粗口指罵其中一名女子，斥她是「雞頭」，負責安排人「收錢」排隊。記者向她詢問排隊原因、旁聽的案件等，她未有回應。</p> +<p>The bank has several loan guarantee products. EXIM loan guarantees cover 100 percent of the loan principal and accrued interest and are available for medium-term (up to five years) and long-term (over seven years) repayment, which is usually determined by transaction size. Loan guarantees are also available for short-term loans.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/fvKrS6q.png" alt="image08" /></p> +<p>EXIM’s medium- and long-term loan guarantees offer competitive term financing from lenders when it is otherwise unavailable from commercial banks, with terms generally up to 10 years. These products provide financing for international buyers of U.S. capital goods and related services (not consumer goods), risk mitigation for a transaction with a particular buyer, more secure entry to emerging markets, longer repayment terms, flexible lender financing options backed by EXIM’s guarantee, and coverage for 100 percent of commercial and political risks.</p> -<p>警方稱因應行動關係，介乎深旺道及荔枝角道的一段東京街及附近的通州街，交通會比較繁忙。警方呼籲市民在今天早上繁忙時間，避免駕車前往該區範圍。</p> +<p>EXIM also offers working capital loan guarantees. This product provides financing to exporters to help with cash flow to fulfill sales orders and take on new business abroad. EXIM provides a 90 percent loan-backing guarantee to the lender, decreasing repayment risk and thereby increasing the lender’s willingness to extend a loan. With an expanded borrowing base, small business exporters can borrow more with the same collateral. Further, the guarantee can cover both multiple export sales and individual contracts. EXIM can guarantee both revolving and transaction-specific facilities, and there is no minimum or maximum transaction amount.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/JvJHOy3.png" alt="image09" /></p> +<p>Before approving certain transactions, EXIM considers the economic impact of a particular transaction and the environmental effects. EXIM also has a statutory mandate to support small business. Small business authorizations in FY 2022 totaled $1.537 billion, representing 29.3 percent of total authorizations. In FY 2022, 1,589 transactions were authorized for the direct benefit of small business exporters, which amounted to 88.3 percent of total transactions.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/MdONJD0.png" alt="image10" /></p> +<p>EXIM has to comply with congressional mandates requiring minimum awards distribution for the following programs: the Small Business Mandate, Sub-Saharan Africa Mandate, Environmentally Beneficial Goods and Services Mandate, and Program on China and Transformational Exports Mandate.</p> -<p>(07:59) 警方今早分別將雷玉蓮、社民連曾健成、黃浩銘及周嘉發從隊伍中帶走，到封鎖區或封鎖線內截查搜袋，四人其後放行。周嘉發袋中的紙張被翻閱，他表示社民連之前在47人案做過簡單抗議，預料警方擔心再有示威。他表示今天到場是為了向社民連被告梁國雄、岑子杰等被告聊表心意。</p> +<h4 id="funding-1">Funding</h4> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/VIxe1PB.png" alt="image11" /></p> +<p>EXIM is considered a self-financing agency, which means that it collects funds from credit program customers and uses these funds to offset, or pay back, EXIM’s appropriation to the Department of the Treasury. For FY 2022, EXIM authorized $5.242 billion in loan guarantees and insurance and no direct loan in support of an estimated $10.557 billion in U.S. export sales.</p> -<p>(09:11) 多國領事在隊伍之中。美國領事代表指美國希望北京和港府停止檢控政治犯，因為他們做的事情是其他市民希望做的，表達意見和表達參與政治的渴望，及捍衛人權。他表示領事每次都會旁聽，表示欣賞港府維持公開審訊，認為旁聽是重要的。歐盟領事則表示來表達對案件的關心，表示公開透明審訊十分重要。</p> +<h4 id="governance-1">Governance</h4> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/LBtNfkJ.png" alt="image12" /></p> +<p>A five-member board of directors leads the bank. Members are presidentially appointed and Senate confirmed. The bank’s president and first vice president serve, respectively, as the board’s chair and vice chair. The board needs a quorum of at least three members to conduct business, such as to approve transactions above a certain threshold (now $25 million), make policies, and delegate authority. The 2019 reauthorization provided alternative procedures in the event of a quorum lapse. An Advisory Committee and a Sub-Saharan Africa Advisory Committee support the board.</p> -<p>(09:15) 天主教香港教區榮休主教陳日君樞機在前立法會議員何秀蘭陪同下到達西九龍裁判法院。</p> +<h4 id="investments-1">Investments</h4> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/EkjtxZr.png" alt="image13" /></p> +<p>The authors assessed EXIM transactions from 2007 to 2023 that aligned most closely with DOD’s 14 critical technologies. An estimated 711 transactions used EXIM’s working capital and medium- to long-term guarantee products. In that time, EXIM approved $3,458,276,775 and disbursed $2,771,404,019. ICT-related NAICS codes relevant to FutureG (transformative 5G and future-generation wireless networking technologies), as well as present- and previous-generation communications technologies, were associated with the highest volume of assistance (Figure 5).</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/yBQ0Xbx.png" alt="image14" /></p> +<p>EXIM uses a mix of insurance, loan guarantees, and direct loans, which is not included in this analysis (Figure 6).</p> -<p>(09:30) 早上9時許，市民趙女士身穿自己設計的黑色T恤，上面印有「香港」、「47」及金句字眼。她表示共印製了47件，望派發給被告家屬。她被警方截查、登記個人資料後獲放行。趙女士指警方拍攝了衣服設計，以及詢問她帶同多件衣服的原因，她回應稱是安慰。趙女士又引述警方指，進入法庭或要有所配合，又提醒她不要展示有政治訊息的衣服或標語。</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/KX8dKIH.png" alt="image05" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 5: EXIM Financing to Critical Technology Sectors, FY 2007–FY 2022.</strong> Source: EXIM dataset and CSIS analysis.</em></p> -<p>(09:50)在10時開庭前，被告之一的鄒家成透過社交媒體發文指，活着需要希望，沒有希望根本難以堅持，並強調活在不安的環境，我們更要心存希望。他又指，對於刑期絕不樂觀，但自己看見希望，「因為即使重獲自由之日仍相當遙遠，我們總算看到終點」。</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/rQwyxnq.png" alt="image06" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 6: EXIM Financing to Critical Technology Sectors by Mechanism, FY 2007–FY 2022.</strong> Source: EXIM dataset and CSIS analysis.</em></p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/Yq4rTNr.png" alt="image15" /></p> +<p>Of the EXIM assistance spending for critical technology sectors, $307 million faced cancellation before or after disbursement (Figure 7). This research did not reveal the causes behind the cancellations. In addition, EXIM recently launched the China and Transformational Exports Program (CTEP) to maintain the United States’ position as a leading exporter in several critical technology areas.</p> -<p>(09:56) 案中被告之一被告呂智恆的養母Elsa，她與友人步入法院後，折返門外並舉起紙牌，紙牌上寫有「神同在，God is with you」，警員隨即要求她收起。</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/m7q7icz.png" alt="image07" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 7: EXIM Financing to Critical Technology Areas by Status, FY 2007–FY 2022.</strong> Source: EXIM dataset and CSIS analysis.</em></p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/fBW1m7T.png" alt="image16" /></p> +<h3 id="small-business-administration">Small Business Administration</h3> -<p>前民間人權陣線陳皓桓今早9時到場排隊，前面已有數百人排隊，他表示雖然職員已經截龍，但仍會繼續在場以示支持及同行。對於判刑，他感到悲觀，因為看不到輕判的跡象，不過對於被告、家屬和朋友而言，對算是一種「解脫」，因為被告已經被囚禁3年8個月，「完全唔知判到幾時，幾時出返嚟，終於知道有個日子，無論幾多年，起碼知道日子」。至於案件的意義，他認為政府和法庭應思考判案對全球港人、以至社會政治經濟有多大影響，特別是60萬曾參與初選投票的港人。</p> +<h4 id="overview-2">Overview</h4> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/iSGEAZM.png" alt="image17" /></p> +<p>The SBA, established in 1953, is an independent federal agency that supports small enterprises through counsel, aid, and investment. The SBA has a range of policy tools to invest in small businesses. This analysis focuses on the agency’s 7(a) and 504 loan programs. These programs do not comprise the entirety of the SBA’s loan authorities; however, they capture the SBA’s long-term financial tools to support domestic business growth and innovation. Additional investment tools include the SBA’s Small Business Investment Companies, which is a privately owned investment company licensed by the SBA and backed by the agency that lends low-cost government capital to invest in U.S. small businesses.</p> -<p>今早才到達的漫畫家尊子說，料未能進入正庭旁聽，但仍希望看看現場氣氛和朋友。他指眾被告雖身處獄中，但消息很靈通，「知道出面嘅人好support佢哋，我見到嘅（被告）都（狀態）OK，都好清楚目前香港情況、世界嘅情況，唔需要大家擔心。」他又笑說「唔夠膽估、唔想估」被告刑期，僅希望案件有「冇咁壞嘅結果」，亦希望大家關注此「大案」之餘，亦會關注其他案件，例如蘋果案。</p> +<p>The SBA’s 7(a) loan guarantee program encourages lenders to provide loans to enterprises otherwise unable to receive capital on “reasonable terms and conditions.” The 7(a) program is the SBA’s primary loan program and houses several subprograms, which collectively guarantee loans that can be used toward acquiring short- and long-term working capital, refinancing debt, improving facilities, purchasing equipment, and covering paychecks in times of crisis.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/YBkrSe8.png" alt="image18" /></p> +<p>For a small business applicant to be eligible for SBA’s 7(a) loan, it must be located in the United States, be a for-profit operating business, qualify within SBA’s size requirements, demonstrate a need for the desired credit, and have lender certification that financing is unavailable without SBA assistance. The SBA will then require the lender to consider the applicant’s ability to reasonably repay the loan based on the applicant’s history and potential for profitability. If the lender approves, the SBA will cover up to 90 percent of the loan’s value.</p> -<p>(10:18) 警方向在場人士表示，因為法院已派出所有旁聽籌，呼籲市民自行離開。民主黨前主席劉慧卿未能成功入庭，她表示十分遺憾，但認為其黨友會理解。</p> +<p>SBA’s 7(a) loan terms depend on the lending institution and the recipient. SBA 7(a) loans have a $3.75 million cap, and the interest rate varies based on the lender selecting a base rate that gradually changes based on the loan value and maturity.</p> -<p>(10:34) 法庭宣判各人刑期。</p> +<h4 id="funding-2">Funding</h4> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/94Q8Rzk.png" alt="image19" /></p> +<p>SBA’s 7(a) program is funded through congressional appropriations and by fees and collections of its loan guarantees. In the rare event a loan recipient defaults or fails to repay on time, SBA will require additional allocations to support its programs. From 2014 to 2020, the SBA subsidized only $99 million of its loan guarantees — all of which occurred in 2020 amid the Covid-19 pandemic. In FY 2023, the SBA’s 7(a) program received $35 billion to support its activities.</p> -<p>(11:45) 初選47人案今早於西九龍裁判法院判刑，明早同一地點將續審蘋果案，壹傳媒集團創辦人黎智英將出庭自辯。在今早約11時45分，即初選47人案散庭後不久，已有約40人在法院門外排隊等候旁聽，當中包括亦有排隊旁聽47人案的「女長毛」雷玉蓮、曾涉違《維護國家安全條例》煽動罪的李盈姿及社民連成員曾健成。另外，現場已有疑似數名「排隊黨」，當記者問及審訊案件，他們均知悉正輪候黎智英案件，但當進一步問及黎的控罪是甚麼，他們則搖頭，不作回覆。</p> +<h4 id="governance-2">Governance</h4> -<h3 id="戴耀廷囚10年-其餘44人囚4年2個月至7年9個月">戴耀廷囚10年 其餘44人囚4年2個月至7年9個月</h3> +<p>The agency’s appointed administrator governs the SBA’s 7(a) program on a statutory basis. However, the process is governed by the SBA’s Loan Guaranty Processing Center, which screens applications submitted by lenders through the Electronic Loan Processing/Servicing website, which is available through the SBA One interface. The center processes applications sent by lending institutions that do not have delegated authority to make 7(a) loans without prior governmental approval.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/1v6LDqA.png" alt="image20" /></p> +<h4 id="investments-2">Investments</h4> -<p>【獨媒報導】47人涉組織及參與民主派初選，被控「串謀顛覆國家政權」罪，其中31人認罪，16人不認罪受審，除李予信及劉偉聰之外，餘下14人皆被裁定罪成。45人今（19日）於高院（移師西九龍法院）判刑。被指為組織者的戴耀廷認罪，判囚10年。其餘44人判囚4年2個月至7年9個月。刑期最重的為不認罪的鄒家成，判囚7年9個月。散庭後，黃之鋒被帶回囚室期間，高呼：「我愛香港，拜拜！」何桂藍得悉刑期後，向旁聽席舉起姆指手勢。有家屬在聞判期間哭泣。</p> +<p>SBA 7(a) applicants and awardees align with several of DOD’s 14 critical technology areas. The following chart depicts the share capital guaranteed by the SBA 7(a) loans in critical technology areas categorized based on the NAICS.</p> -<p>約10時許，女被告先被懲教帶入庭內，何桂藍身穿粉紅色外套、白色上衣。男被告其後被帶入欄內，其中馮達浚與袁嘉蔚均穿上紅色利物浦球衣；張可森則向親友作出「OK」手勢。曾以「從犯證人」身份作供的區諾軒、趙家賢和鍾錦麟，則被約6至7名懲教人員重重包圍，與其他被告分隔開來。</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/4CAoaVu.png" alt="image08" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 8: SBA Financing to Critical Sectors by Year, FY 2010–FY 2023.</strong> Source: SBA FOIA datasets and CSIS analysis.</em></p> -<p>甫開庭，3名國安法指定法官表示判詞一共有82頁，不會在庭上讀出，只會宣布各人刑期。稍後會在司法機構網頁上載完整判刑理由。簡短書面判刑結果則派發給在場被告、控辯雙方律師團隊和傳媒。當何桂藍得悉自己刑期後，向親友擺出「好」手勢。</p> +<p>From 2010 to 2023, SBA’s computing allocations dominated the 7(a) program’s coverage, with approximately $3 billion in computing-related loans. These figures should not be taken to mean that computing-related loans are going solely toward scaling up advanced computing software highlighted by DOD. However, they demonstrate the SBA’s interest in these applicants and the organization’s efforts to incentivize capital to flow into these businesses.</p> -<p>記者於正庭內所見，旁聽席的第一及二行均預留給法律團隊人士，第三及四行則是記者席，而第五及六行才是預留給被告家屬。</p> +<p>High technology and biotechnologies follow computing in terms of the SBA 7(a) program’s investments, although the difference between those two and computing remains stark. High-technology coverage throughout 2010–23 was approximately $830 million, and biotechnology was about $330 million. High technology captures a range of R&amp;D activities including nanotechnologies, scientific instrument manufacturing, and laboratory-related obligations. Biotechnology covers a myriad of medicinal and pharmaceutical applications.</p> -<h4 id="以下為各被告的刑期">以下為各被告的刑期：</h4> +<p>In contrast to EXIM, computing is the largest beneficiary of SBA assistance in critical technology sectors. The second-largest category, high technology, includes a wide range of R&amp;D and cannot easily be assigned to a single critical technology area (Figure 9). Lender programs, including general 504 lenders programs, certified lenders programs, and preferred lenders programs for 7a loans, were the most prominent source of SBA assistance for investments in critical technology sectors (Figure 10).</p> -<ul> - <li>戴耀廷：120個月</li> - <li>區諾軒：81個月</li> - <li>趙家賢：84個月</li> - <li>鍾錦麟：73個月</li> - <li>吳政亨：87個月</li> - <li>袁嘉蔚：51個月</li> - <li>梁晃維：59個月</li> - <li>鄭達鴻：78個月</li> - <li>徐子見：50個月</li> - <li>楊雪盈：78個月</li> - <li>彭卓棋：78個月</li> - <li>岑子杰：51個月</li> - <li>毛孟靜：50個月</li> - <li>何啟明：79個月</li> - <li>馮達浚：53個月</li> - <li>黃碧雲：78個月</li> - <li>劉澤鋒：53個月</li> - <li>黃之鋒：56個月</li> - <li>譚文豪：50個月</li> - <li>李嘉達：51個月</li> - <li>譚得志：53個月</li> - <li>胡志偉：53個月</li> - <li>施德來：79個月</li> - <li>朱凱廸：53個月</li> - <li>張可森：59個月</li> - <li>黃子悅：53個月</li> - <li>伍健偉：67個月</li> - <li>尹兆堅：56個月</li> - <li>郭家麒：50個月</li> - <li>吳敏兒：53個月</li> - <li>譚凱邦：51個月</li> - <li>何桂藍：84個月</li> - <li>劉頴匡：53個月</li> - <li>楊岳橋：61個月</li> - <li>陳志全：78個月</li> - <li>鄒家成：93個月</li> - <li>林卓廷：81個月</li> - <li>范國威：50個月</li> - <li>呂智恆：51個月</li> - <li>梁國雄：81個月</li> - <li>林景楠：62個月</li> - <li>柯耀林：79個月</li> - <li>岑敖暉：54個月</li> - <li>王百羽：51個月</li> - <li>余慧明：81個月</li> -</ul> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/AnemVz2.png" alt="image09" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 9: SBA Financing to Critical Technology Sectors, FY 1991–FY 2023.</strong> Source: SBA FOIA datasets and CSIS analysis.</em></p> -<p>認罪的31人包括：戴耀廷、區諾軒、趙家賢、鍾錦麟、袁嘉蔚、梁晃維、徐子見、岑子杰、毛孟靜、馮達浚、劉澤鋒、黃之鋒、譚文豪、李嘉達、譚得志、胡志偉、朱凱廸、張可森、黃子悅、尹兆堅、郭家麒、吳敏兒、譚凱邦、劉頴匡、楊岳橋、范國威、呂智恆、岑敖暉、王百羽、伍健偉及林景楠。</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/GRvKSOM.png" alt="image10" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 10: SBA Financing to Critical Technology Sectors by Mechanism, FY 1991–FY 2023.</strong> Source: SBA FOIA datasets and CSIS analysis.</em></p> -<p>不認罪16人包括：鄭達鴻、楊雪盈、彭卓棋、何啟明、劉偉聰、黃碧雲、施德來、何桂藍、陳志全、鄒家成、林卓廷、梁國雄、柯耀林、李予信、余慧明及吳政亨。其中劉偉聰和李予信被裁定罪名不成立。律政司隨即針對劉偉聰的無罪裁決上訴，並在回覆傳媒查詢時確認沒有就李予信提出上訴。</p> +<p>In most cases, SBA was repaid in full. However, $1.6 billion of SBA assistance was cancelled, and $600 million was charged off during the covered period (Figure 11). Reasons for assistance cancellation were not identified in the course of research.</p> -<p>民主派初選於2020年7月舉行，事後政府宣布立法會選舉延後一年。55名組織及參與初選者於2021年1月6日被捕，同年3月1日被落案起訴，指他們在2020年7月1日至2021年1月7日，以無差別否決預算案等非法手段，嚴重干擾、阻撓、破壞特區政權機關依法履行職能。</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/CgW7d2A.png" alt="image11" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 11: SBA Financing to Critical Technology Sectors by Status, FY 1991–FY 2023.</strong> Source: SBA FOIA datasets and CSIS analysis.</em></p> -<p>案件2023年2月6日正式開審，由指定法官陳慶偉、李運騰及陳仲衡審理，是《國安法》後最大規模的案件，亦是「串謀顛覆國家政權」罪首案。審期原定90天，但最終橫跨十個月、歷時118天。認罪的區諾軒、趙家賢、鍾錦麟和林景楠4人以「從犯證人」身分為控方作供，另12名被告親自作供或傳召辯方證人。</p> +<h3 id="department-of-energy">Department of Energy</h3> -<p>根據《國安法》第22條，一旦顛覆國家政權罪成，「首要或罪行重大」可處10年以上至終身監禁；「積極參加」可判監3至10年；「其他參加」則判監3年以下、拘役或管制。</p> +<p><strong><em>Title 17 Program and ATVM Program</em></strong></p> -<h3 id="戴耀廷等4名組織者被列首要分子區諾軒趙家賢任證人獲一半減刑">戴耀廷等4名組織者被列「首要分子」區諾軒趙家賢任證人獲一半減刑</h3> +<h4 id="overview-3">Overview</h4> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/kQLTI1B.png" alt="image21" /></p> +<p>The DOE’s Title 17 Energy Infrastructure Reinvestment (EIR) Program was established by the Energy Policy Act of 2005 and has financed projects under different loan authorities. The EIR Program is under Section 1706 of Title 17 and was incorporated in a 2023 update to implement provisions of the IRA. EIR projects support reinvestment in communities throughout the United States where existing energy infrastructure has been challenged by market forces, resource depletion, age, technology advancements, or the broader energy transition. This infrastructure might include power plants, fossil fuel extraction sites, transmission systems, fossil fuel pipelines, refineries, or other energy facilities that have ceased to operate or that continue to operate but could benefit from improvements to reduce greenhouse gas emissions or pollution.</p> -<p>【獨媒報導】47人涉組織及參與民主派初選，被控「串謀顛覆國家政權」罪，其中31人認罪，16人不認罪受審，除李予信及劉偉聰之外，餘下14人皆被裁定罪成。45人今（19日）於高院（移師西九龍法院）判刑。法官指，案中4名組織者包括戴耀廷、區諾軒、趙家賢及鍾錦麟，屬罪行中的「首要分子」級別，法例指明最低刑期為10年監禁。法官指，首3人的量刑起點為15年監禁。法官提到，戴耀廷在本案中是「幕後主腦（mastermind behind）」。至於任「從犯證人」區諾軒及趙家賢，則因認罪並作供協助控方，各獲一半減刑。法官另接納趙家賢或被戴耀廷誤導了計劃的合法性，額外減刑3個月。</p> +<p>The EIR guarantees loans to projects that retool, repower, repurpose, or replace energy infrastructure that has ceased operations, or projects that enable operating energy infrastructure to avoid, reduce, utilize, or sequester air pollutants or anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases.</p> -<blockquote> - <h3 id="1戴耀廷">1）戴耀廷</h3> -</blockquote> +<p>The Advanced Technology Vehicles Manufacturing Loan Program (ATVM) provides loans to support the manufacture of eligible advanced technology vehicles and qualifying components, including newly authorized modes from the Bipartisan Infrastructure Deal. This program covers light-duty vehicles; medium- and heavy-duty vehicles; trains or locomotives; maritime vessels, including offshore wind support vessels; aircraft; and hyperloop.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/80Ovo7p.png" alt="image22" /></p> +<h4 id="funding-3">Funding</h4> -<h4 id="法官指戴耀廷是幕後主腦屬首要分子以15年為起點">法官指戴耀廷是「幕後主腦」屬首要分子以15年為起點</h4> +<p>The IRA appropriated $5 billion through September 30, 2026, to carry out the EIR program with a limitation on commitments to guarantee loans with a total principal amount of less than $250 billion. The IRA removed the $25 billion cap on ATVM loan authority and appropriated $3 billion in credit subsidies to support these loans.</p> -<p>被指為組織者的戴耀廷判囚10年，法官指，戴並非僅僅是35+計劃的發起人，更是初選的組織者，屬於「幕後主腦（mastermind behind）」，其文章引起民主派的注意。因此法官將戴納入「首要分子」級別。法官不同意戴稱沒有打算將「攬炒十步曲」作為政治行動的藍圖，因他在數月內發表一系列相關文章，因此不難追蹤其漸進的思想。法官認為，實質上戴提倡了一場革命。</p> +<h4 id="governance-3">Governance</h4> -<p>法官亦指，雖然戴未必是初選或立法會選舉的候選人，但他為有意行使計劃下否決權的人，提供不可或缺的平台。戴為了成功，亦同意吳政亨的「三投三不投」計劃。戴在初選後並未停止參與計劃，當區諾軒退出時，戴只是表示自己需要暫時休息。</p> +<p>The administration of the DOE EIR program is under the statutory purview of the secretary of energy. The secretary delegates this authority to the leadership of the DOE’s Loan Programs Office, which manages the ATVM program. The office has seven divisions: Loan Origination, Outreach and Business Development, Portfolio Management, Technical and Environmental, Risk Management, Management and Operations, and Legal.</p> -<p>在評估戴的罪責時，法官只會考慮2020年7月1日之前的事實作為背景。法官指，「首要分子」的最低刑期為10年監禁，最高刑期為終身監禁。法官考慮戴的角色後，認為適當的量刑起點是15年監禁。唯一求情因素是戴及早認罪，因此獲三分一減刑，判囚10年。</p> +<h4 id="investments-3">Investments</h4> -<p>法官亦提到，兩名主要組織者對計劃的成功抱有樂觀態度。組織者花費大量時間及金錢舉行記者會、協調會議及選舉論壇，同時亦發起眾籌。</p> +<p>A major area of focus for DOE’s Title 17 programs is developing PV solar power in the United States (Figure 12). Currently, there are four Midwestern projects that the DOE guarantees either entirely or partially. The total value of these projects is approximately $16.9 billion (Figure 13).</p> -<blockquote> - <h3 id="2區諾軒從犯證人">2）區諾軒（從犯證人）</h3> -</blockquote> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/PHTYwuL.png" alt="image12" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 12: DOE Financing to Critical Technology Sectors, FY 2009–FY 2023.</strong> Source: LPO Portfolio Projects, FAADS, and CSIS analysis.</em></p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/ME0epzY.png" alt="image23" /></p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/tuZy9td.png" alt="image13" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 13: DOE Loan Value by Start Year, FY 2008–FY 2023.</strong> Source: LPO Portfolio Projects, FAADS, and CSIS analysis.</em></p> -<h4 id="法官指區諾軒不及戴耀廷激進-另指其證供關鍵">法官指區諾軒不及戴耀廷激進 另指其證供關鍵</h4> +<p>Full or partial loan guarantees are the most frequent tool of DOE Title 17 assistance, although direct loans are the preferred mechanism for ATVM assistance (Figure 14). Active projects make up the bulk of DOE’s portfolio, which is unsurprising given the recently enabled lending as part of the IRA (Figure 15).</p> -<p>同被指為組織者、在案中擔任「從犯證人」的區諾軒，法官指他作為組織者之一，其證供屬「關鍵（crucial）」，在合併所有證供後，能夠有系統及邏輯地向法庭提供事件的全貌。在罪責方面，法官認為區作為組織者，其參與程度與戴耀廷大致相同。區在計劃開始階段已參與其中，儘管他不像戴般「激進（radical）」，但量刑起點同為15年監禁。</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/bz4CgXo.png" alt="image14" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 14: DOE Financing to Critical Technology Sectors by Mechanism, FY 2008–FY 2023.</strong> Source: LPO Portfolio Projects, FAADS, and CSIS analysis.</em></p> -<p>法官考慮到區作為控方證人，他所提供的證據的重要性，故給予一半減刑。另外，區得知香港及中國的官員對計劃「示警」後，區隨即退出計劃；區亦嘗試游說趙家賢退出計劃。法官亦考慮到，區對法律的無知，以及他過去對公共服務有貢獻，最後因應上述因素，決定再給予5%減刑，總刑期為6年9個月。</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/weeKFH7.png" alt="image15" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 15: DOE Financing to Critical Technology Areas by Status, FY 2008–FY 2023.</strong> Source: LPO Portfolio Projects, FAADS, and CSIS analysis.</em></p> -<blockquote> - <h3 id="3趙家賢從犯證人">3）趙家賢（從犯證人）</h3> -</blockquote> +<h3 id="department-of-commerce">Department of Commerce</h3> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/KqAcuwc.png" alt="image24" /></p> +<p><strong><em>IRA and CHIPS Act</em></strong></p> -<h4 id="法官接納趙家賢被戴耀廷誤導計劃合法性">法官接納趙家賢被戴耀廷誤導計劃合法性</h4> +<p>President Joe Biden signed the IRA into law in August 2022, providing funding opportunities through various departments, including the Department of Commerce, to accelerate the U.S. energy transition. Most of the Department of Commerce’s funding will be allocated through grants, direct spending, contracts, cooperative agreements, and technical assistance to support coastal communities and resilience efforts as well as weather and climate forecasting. At the time of writing, it was unclear how the IRA, through the Department of Commerce, would support the climate-related areas in DOD’s 14 critical technologies.</p> -<p>被指為組織者、在案中擔任「從犯證人」的趙家賢，他在交付階段及時認罪，並為控方提供證據。法官指，趙的證供獲法庭接納，亦協助法庭達成裁決。</p> +<p>The CHIPS Act of 2022 provides financial incentives, including loans and funds, for the domestic manufacture of semiconductors and the conduct of related research and development. The CHIPS Act will allocate $280 billion over the next 10 years. The Department of Commerce is looking to crowd in capital to finance rebuilding the domestic semiconductor industry and will provide loans and loan guarantees. Their effort is not to fully fund the production of chips or the construction of an entire fabrication facility. The Department of Commerce designed a new process to call for and assess proposals and to award the loans and loan guarantees, basing this on lessons and observations from the private equity industry.</p> -<p>法官不同意趙在串謀中只屬於「積極參加者」，反而認為他是「首要分子」，因他作為組織者之一。考慮到趙的重要角色及參與程度，法官以15年為量刑起點。法官亦有考慮計劃的非暴力性質。法官指趙及時認罪並協助控方，因此給予一半減刑。</p> +<p>CHIPS Act money comes with guardrails, particularly as the financial support will go toward industries critical to national security. Each funding recipient must enter into a “required agreement” with the Department of Commerce that governs the use of the CHIPS funding, putting in place certain restrictions. For instance, recipients or their affiliates will be prohibited from transactions in the semiconductor industry in countries of concern, including but not limited to China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia, for 10 years. Joint research or technology licensing is also prohibited with these countries. The guardrails are outlined in the Final Rule, Transaction Prohibition, and Technology Prohibition.</p> -<p>法官接納趙可能被戴耀廷誤導，故認為計劃合法性，因此減刑3個月。惟法官拒絕接納辯方指，計劃客觀上沒有可能實行，因政府可以及時阻止這個公開的計劃。法官量刑時，已考慮被告無法控制的原因，令計劃無法進一步繼續及成功。</p> +<p>Domestic and international companies have undergone a process outlined by the Department of Commerce to apply for funds, which includes a letter of interest, requests for proposals, and a proposal review. The department has received more than 500 statements of interest and more than 100 preapplications and full applications since it began accepting them in March 2023. The department has made this an interactive process and essentially has no single criterion or project it is looking for; rather it is looking for proposals that are economically viable and that have a national security angle. The application process also includes an evaluation, preliminary term sheets, due diligence, and funding awards.</p> -<p>法官最後考慮到被告親友、其選區太古城街坊為趙所撰的求情信，以及趙過往的公共服務。法官認為趙致力在港推廣調解，亦積極擔任區議員，因此同意他有良好品格，再給予3個月減刑，總刑期為7年。</p> +<h4 id="funding-4">Funding</h4> -<blockquote> - <h3 id="4鍾錦麟從犯證人">4）鍾錦麟（從犯證人）</h3> -</blockquote> +<p>Through the IRA, the Department of Commerce manages a $2.6 billion framework to invest in coastal resilience, $400 million specifically for tribal priorities and benefiting coastal and Great Lakes communities, and additional investments to improve weather and climate data and services. Through the CHIPS Act, it is expected to oversee $50 billion to revitalize the domestic semiconductor industry and reshore supply chains back to the United States, including $39 billion for manufacturing incentives and $11 billion for R&amp;D programs.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/nfTE6UW.png" alt="image25" /></p> +<h4 id="governance-4">Governance</h4> -<h4 id="法官指其參與程度不及戴耀廷等3人">法官指其參與程度不及戴耀廷等3人</h4> +<p>The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration will manage all of the climate-related work. The Department of Commerce’s newly created CHIPS Program Office oversees CHIPS Act funding.</p> -<p>為「從犯證人」的鍾錦麟，法官不同意辯方指他屬「積極參加者」，反而認為屬「首要分子」，因他為組織者之一，但參與程度不如戴、區及趙。法官決定以12年監禁為量刑起點。由於鍾認罪及協助控方，因此給予45%減刑。他另因對法律的無知及過往參與公共服務，獲減刑3個月，總刑期為6年1個月。</p> +<h4 id="investments-4">Investments</h4> -<p>根據《國安法》第22條，一旦顛覆國家政權罪成，「首要或罪行重大」可處10年以上至終身監禁；「積極參加」可判監3至10年；「其他參加」則判監3年以下、拘役或管制。</p> +<p>For the CHIPS Act, the Department of Commerce announced for the first time the signing of a nonbinding preliminary memorandum of terms (PMT) to a funding applicant on December 11, 2023. BAE Systems Electronic Systems is expected to receive $35 million in federal incentives to support the modernization of the company’s Microelectronics Center, a mature-node production facility in Nashua, New Hampshire. The project will replace aging tools and quadruple the production of chips necessary for critical defense programs, including the F-35 fighter jet program. The Department of Commerce announced the second PMT on February 19, 2024, to GlobalFoundries to provide $1.5 billion in direct funding to improve domestic supply chain resilience, strengthen competitiveness in current-generation and mature-node semiconductor production, and support economic and national security priorities, at time of drafting.</p> -<h3 id="所有參選人被列積極參加者-發起墨落無悔3名抗爭派量刑最重">所有參選人被列「積極參加者」 發起「墨落無悔」3名抗爭派量刑最重</h3> +<h3 id="cross-cutting-insights">Cross-Cutting Insights</h3> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/EJ1BNx8.png" alt="image26" /></p> +<p>DOD’s efforts to develop and maintain technological advantage over its strategic rivals requires investments in technology, which have most frequently focused on direct funding of contracts. OSC’s mission is to expand the range of financing mechanisms that can be used to invest in cutting-edge technologies, with a particular focus on encouraging investment in DOD’s 14 critical technology areas. To do this, OSC aims to go beyond direct contract and grant funding to use a variety of financing tools employed by U.S. government agencies outside of DOD.</p> -<p>【獨媒報導】47人涉組織及參與民主派初選，被控「串謀顛覆國家政權」罪，其中31人認罪，16人不認罪受審，除李予信及劉偉聰，其餘14人罪成，45人今（19日）判刑。法官指，若計劃最終完全實行的話，其不良後果深遠，嚴重程度比得上推翻香港特區政府。法官亦指，初選參選人在計劃中有重要角色，他們支持計劃亦積極參與，若沒有他們根本無法進行，因此所有參選人均被法官納入「積極參加者」級別。根據法例，「積極參加者」可處3至10年監禁。本案15名「抗爭派」中，發起「墨落無悔」聲明的3人，包括鄒家成、梁晃維及張可森，為量刑最重，法官以8年監禁為量刑起點，並指他們協助計劃成功。其他被告則以7年監禁為起點。由於鄒家成受審後定罪，沒有認罪減刑，只因誤解法律減3個月，故他為眾被告中刑期最重。</p> +<p>Through a systematic look across the whole of U.S. government, the authors examined these funding mechanisms and how they have been used. An analysis of this research reveals the following insights, which may be of use to OSC as it seeks to crowd in capital for strategic impact:</p> -<p>以下為抗爭派15人的判刑理由及刑期：</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/mjpZShF.png" alt="image16" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 16: Financing to Critical Technology Sectors by Status.</strong> Source: Agency datasets and CSIS analysis. DOE datasets FY 2008–FY 2023, EXIM dataset FY 2007–FY 2022, SBA datasets FY 1991–FY 2023, DFC dataset FY 2012–FY 2023 Q3.</em></p> -<blockquote> - <h3 id="鄒家成">鄒家成</h3> -</blockquote> +<ul> + <li> + <p><strong>Prepare to manage the challenge of perceived “failure” when investments do not yield returns.</strong> The portfolio investment approach typical of venture capital, where some investments do not pay off, represents a cultural challenge. The pervasive culture of compliance, while crucial for ensuring that the government meets requirements and follows existing protocols, presents a challenge for the inherently risky nature of portfolio investments. In undertaking the portfolio investment approach typical of venture capital, DOD must accept healthy risk from the outset and prepare to champion the successes of certain investments while accepting that not all will yield desired returns. Given the urgency of fueling critical technologies investment, DOD should prepare to communicate the advantages of alternative funding approaches both externally and to its workforce.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/9Kr4AvR.png" alt="image27" /></p> + <p>As shown in Figure 16, loan cancellations or reductions through charge-offs will happen, but “failure” seems to be the exception. The exact portion of loans that will be repaid is difficult to calculate. For the DOE Title 17 program, 81 percent of its loans by value are still active, and the EXIM bank does not differentiate between ongoing or repaid loans for the 91 percent of loans that have not been cancelled. With those caveats in mind, across programs 6 to 14 percent of loans (when summed together totaling $5.7 billion of $76.1 billion) were cancelled when weighted by face value. Even when considering other negative outcomes, such as a loan not being disbursed or the government only partially recovering the loan via a charge-off, only 6 to 21 percent of loans experienced negative outcomes. Although this analysis captures only a fraction of alternative financing — specifically, programs directly relevant to DOD’s 14 critical technologies — these ranges give a sense of the level of failure tolerance necessary when employing financial assistance and that the portfolio outcomes for all of the studied programs are positive.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Understand the role of market signaling.</strong> It is not merely the magnitude of financing that will determine the success of DOD to crowd in private capital investments in DOD-relevant technologies. Rather, clear communication of DOD priorities and identification of private sector projects that meet DOD’s needs can attract attention from private capital investors, regardless of the size of investment. If DOD signals its interest in particular critical technologies projects and sources, this holds great potential to generate private capital investment. Therefore, DOD should consider concentrating its efforts on efficient investments in key private sector innovations and openly communicate these decisions rather than concern itself with the amount of capital required. In showing a clear indication of interest, regardless of magnitude, DOD can guide private capital investors in their understanding of DOD priorities and increase investor confidence in their potential return on investment.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Develop appropriate reporting systems to establish effective monitoring and evaluation of investments.</strong> Current tracking tools are limited. The government-wide Federal Assistance Award Data System (FAADS) database includes useful information but does not capture key inputs or outcome variables — namely, the economic sector or loan outcome. DOD should carefully consider useful metrics it will employ to assess and manage its portfolio. By establishing these metrics early, DOD can prepare to collect the necessary data to evaluate program performance. DOE, DFC, and EXIM have developed and published key metrics that could serve as examples for DOD’s development of open-source tracking systems. Publishing key metrics on programmatic developments would both enhance transparency and ensure the department’s investments are systematically assessed.</p> + </li> +</ul> -<p>鄒家成為案中刑期最重的被告。法官指，他為新界西參選人，現正就七一暴動案服刑61個月及15天。鄒雖然並非計劃組織者或「首要分子」，但他為「墨落無悔」聲明的發起人。法官認為，「墨落無悔」或許不會為計劃增添太多作用，不過鄒盡力綑綁參與者以確保成功。法官強調，「墨落無悔」聲明確實是令本案更嚴重的因素。法官採納8年監禁為量刑起點，因他對法律無知扣減3個月，但他受審後定罪，沒有其他減刑，總刑期為7年9個月，與暴動案分期執行。</p> +<hr /> -<blockquote> - <h3 id="梁晃維">梁晃維</h3> -</blockquote> +<p><strong>Erin Murphy</strong> is deputy director for the Chair on India and Emerging Asia Economics and senior fellow for Emerging Asia Economics at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). She has spent her career in several public and private sector roles, including as an analyst on Asian political and foreign policy issues at the Central Intelligence Agency, director for the Indo-Pacific at the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation, founder and principal of her boutique advisory firm focused on Myanmar, and an English teacher with the Japan Exchange and Teaching (JET) Program in Saga, Japan.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/cmvhUM1.png" alt="image28" /></p> +<p><strong>Cynthia R. Cook</strong> is director of the Defense-Industrial Initiatives Group and a senior fellow with the Defense and Security Department at CSIS. She is widely published on defense acquisition policy and organization, the defense industrial base, new technology development, and weapon systems production and sustainment. Dr. Cook is a member of the editorial board for the Defense Acquisition Research Journal and is an adjunct professor at the Pardee RAND Graduate School.</p> -<p>法官指，港島區的梁晃維是「墨落無悔」聲明的起草人之一，他亦有出席港島區協調會議、選舉論壇及抗爭派記者會。法官考慮到梁草擬聲明，屬於較積極主動角色，因此以8年監禁為量刑起點。法官因他認罪減刑三分一，再因誤解計劃合法性，給予3個月減刑；另考慮他參與公共服務，減刑2個月，總刑期為4年11個月。</p> +<p><strong>Emily Harding</strong> is director of the Intelligence, National Security, and Technology (INT) Program and vice president of the Defense and Security Department (DSD) at CSIS. As the head of the INT Program, she provides thought leadership on the most critical issues facing intelligence professionals and on the future of intelligence work. As vice president of DSD, she is responsible for leading a team of world-renowned scholars providing policy solutions that shape national security.</p> -<blockquote> - <h3 id="張可森">張可森</h3> -</blockquote> +<p><strong>Gregory Sanders</strong> is deputy director and senior fellow with the Defense-Industrial Initiatives Group at CSIS, where he manages a research team that analyzes data on U.S. government contract spending and other budget and acquisition issues. He employs data visualization and other ways to use complex data collections to create succinct and innovative tables, charts, and maps. His recent research focuses on contract spending by major government departments, contingency contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan, and European and Asian defense budgets.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/rU2F2EM.png" alt="image29" /></p> +<p><strong>Nicholas Velazquez</strong> was a research assistant with the Defense-Industrial Initiatives Group at CSIS.</p> -<p>就參選新界西的張可森，法官指他與梁晃維及鄒家成一同發起「墨落無悔」聲明，他亦出席本土抗爭派的記者會。惟法官接納張並非組織者，亦不是計劃的發起人，因此將他納入「積極參加者」，但他所比起一般參與者做得更多。</p> +<p><strong>Julia Dickson</strong> is a research associate for the Defense and Security Department at CSIS. Her research interests include cybersecurity, cybercrime, and the role of technology in conflict.</p> -<p>法官指，「墨落無悔」聲明是綑綁參與者以免違背計劃，張與其他發起人承諾確保計劃成功。他為這個重大的計劃提供協助。法官決定以8年監禁為量刑起點，認罪扣減三分一，再因對法律無知及參與公共服務，分別減刑3個月及2個月，總刑期為4年11個月。</p> +<p><strong>Maeve Sockwell</strong> was an intern with the Defense-Industrial Initiatives Group at CSIS.</p>Erin L. Murphy, et al.The Department of Defense (DOD) has become concerned that critical technologies are insufficiently capitalized to support national security. Global private capital investors have been allocating resources toward software-heavy capabilities, such as e-commerce and software as a service, leaving funding gaps for critical components and capabilities where investors perceive greater risk.【黎智英案・審訊第 93 日】2024-11-20T12:00:00+08:002024-11-20T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/trial-of-jimmy-lai-day-93<ul> + <li>黎智英親自作供 稱反對暴力和港獨</li> + <li>曾籲報導勿針對特朗普 黎智英：是「提議」而非編採指示</li> +</ul> -<p>法官提到，從張的求情信可見，他展現了真誠的悔意，相信懲教署未來會在評估是否批准提早釋放的時候，將這點納入考慮。</p> +<excerpt /> -<blockquote> - <h3 id="何桂藍">何桂藍</h3> -</blockquote> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/FEvY0GB.png" alt="image01" /></p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/riWyMLz.jpeg" alt="image30" /></p> +<p>【獨媒報導】壹傳媒創辦人黎智英及3間蘋果公司被控串謀勾結外國勢力及串謀刊印煽動刊物等罪，控方早前舉證完畢，3名國安法指定法官裁定黎3項控罪表證成立，黎選擇作供，押後至今天（20日）於高院（移師西九龍法院）續審。黎以英語作供，他稱在六四之後創辦《壹週刊》，認為作為商人有需要涉足資訊自由範疇，「因為你擁有愈多資訊，你便知道得愈多，那麼你便愈自由。」後來，黎因為擴展生意業務而成立《蘋果日報》。就其個人和《蘋果》的立場，黎稱反對任何形式的暴力，亦認為「港獨」是陰謀。對於張劍虹早前證供指《蘋果》在2014年「佔中」之後立場轉趨激進，黎智英則不同意，因這份報紙一向關注運動，只是因為2014年社運行動增多，所以他們要跟進事態發展，使報紙看起來較活躍。</p> -<p>為新界東選區的何桂藍，她曾任職記者，罪成後沒有任何求情陳詞。法官考慮其角色後，以7年監禁為量刑起點。她受審後定罪及無求情，故沒有減刑，判囚7年。</p> +<h4 id="3罪表證成立-黎智英選擇親自作供">3罪表證成立 黎智英選擇親自作供</h4> -<blockquote> - <h3 id="余慧明">余慧明</h3> -</blockquote> +<p>被告依次為：黎智英（74歲）、蘋果日報有限公司、蘋果日報印刷有限公司及蘋果互聯網有限公司。</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/5ObZoao.png" alt="image31" /></p> +<p>首被告黎智英由懲教人員押解往法院應訊。他身穿白色恤衫、淺綠色毛衣、卡其色西裝外套、戴上黑色粗框眼鏡，被帶入被告欄時向親友及旁聽人士揮手，又相手合十。黎的妻子、子女和天主教香港教區榮休主教陳日君樞機亦有到場旁聽，他們一同在家屬席就坐。等待開庭期間，黎一直與親友們相視而笑。</p> -<p>就衞生服務界的余慧明，她被捕前為註冊護士，於醫管局任職。法官指，雖然余是計劃的「遲來者（latercomer）」，沒有參與協調會議或選舉論壇，但不會因此降低量刑起點。法官解釋，因《國安法》實施前的行為只是作為背景，再加上余在初選後仍然活躍發聲。法官認為，余在本案中為「積極參加者」，以7年監禁為量刑起點，因她可能誤解法律減刑3個月。但她受審後定罪，以及沒有其他減刑因素，總刑期為6年9個月。</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/1ximYZ1.png" alt="image02" /> +▲ 黎智英妻子 李韻琴（左）、天主教香港教區榮休主教 陳日君樞機（右）</p> -<blockquote> - <h3 id="伍健偉">伍健偉</h3> -</blockquote> +<p>案件於今年1月開審，控方先後轉召張劍虹、陳沛敏、楊清奇、李宇軒和陳梓華出庭以「從犯證人」身份作供。控方於6月舉證完畢。</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/Lhyu8h2.png" alt="image32" /></p> +<p>代表黎的資深大律師彭耀鴻作中段陳詞，要求法庭裁定所有控罪表證不成立。惟3名國安法指定法官最終裁定黎3項控罪表證成立。</p> -<p>為新界西選區的伍健偉，他在求情信中提及不會為自己相信的價值而道歉，除了認罪之外沒有其他求情原因。法官採納7年監禁為量刑起點，因應他遲認罪，即開審當天才認罪，給予20%扣減，總刑期為5年7個月。</p> +<p>其後黎透過辯方表示選擇親自作供，另擬傳召一名專家證人就社交軟件 Signal 作供，預料辯方案情需時約30個工作天。由於3名法官在8及9月均有其他案件要處理，未能立即聽取黎的證供。經商討後，最終押後至今日續審。</p> -<blockquote> - <h3 id="黃之鋒">黃之鋒</h3> -</blockquote> +<p>案件廣受大批本地及國際媒體關注，縱使今早轉涼及下雨，早上約8時許起，約40至50名傳媒代表已開始排隊輪候記者籌。另外，自昨日中午起，有市民冒雨在法院外排隊，輪候公眾旁聽籌，至今早隊伍約有100人。</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/ktNPPyf.png" alt="image33" /></p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/Soenvg8.png" alt="image03" /></p> -<p>就參選九龍東的黃之鋒，法官接納他屬「積極參加者」，他同意一旦成功在立法會當選，將會無差別否決財政預算案。法官以7年監禁為量刑起點，因認罪獲三分一扣減。但由於黃沒有提及自己誤解法律，因此不會獲這方面的扣減。另外，黃過往有多項刑事紀錄，因此不會被視為良好品格，在無其他減刑下，他共囚4年8個月。</p> +<h4 id="黎供稱六四後感恐懼-成立壹週刊冀著力資訊自由">黎供稱六四後感恐懼 成立《壹週刊》冀著力資訊自由</h4> -<blockquote> - <h3 id="岑敖暉">岑敖暉</h3> -</blockquote> +<p>黎在3名懲教人員的監督之下，步出被告欄，前往庭內的證人台就坐，期間一度望向公眾席。他先拿起聖經，以天主教形式宣誓，其後開始以英語作供。在作供期間，3名懲教人員全程坐在他背後看守。黎亦全程戴著耳機。</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/31B2ghA.png" alt="image34" /></p> +<p>在辯方大律師關文渭的主問下，黎供稱，他原本擁有一間成衣公司「佐丹奴（Giordano）」，但是他在1989年把公司賣出，因為如果不這樣做的話，設在內地的分店便需要關閉。他稱，他在六四之後，開始成立傳媒公司、創辦《壹週刊》，因他感到恐懼，認為好像他那般的商人需涉足資訊自由的範疇，「因為你擁有愈多資訊，你便知道得愈多，那麼你便愈自由。」黎亦表示，他首次參與政治是關於六四。後來，黎因為擴展生意業務而成立《蘋果日報》。</p> -<p>至於超區的岑敖暉，法官指他為「積極參加者」，並以7年監禁為量刑起點。法官指他及時認罪及有悔意，給予三分一減刑；另因其妻子及同事在求情信提及他參與公共服務，額外減刑2個月，總刑期為4年半。</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/Ilg69C7.png" alt="image04" /> +▲ 辯方大律師 關文渭</p> -<p>法官提到，檢視岑的求情文件之後，接受岑有真誠悔意，現已改過自新，相信懲教等當局評估是否提早釋放時，會考慮到這方面。</p> +<h4 id="黎智英反對暴力及港獨">黎智英：反對暴力及港獨</h4> -<blockquote> - <h3 id="朱凱廸">朱凱廸</h3> -</blockquote> +<p>被問到《蘋果》的核心價值是什麼，黎指《蘋果》的核心價值其實與香港人懷有的核心價值相同，包括法治、示威自由、言論自由、宗教自由和遊行自由。</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/yMLbLb0.png" alt="image35" /></p> +<p>被問到是否支持暴力，黎表示：「我一向都反對任何形式的暴力。」而《蘋果》的立場亦一樣。</p> -<p>至於參選新界西的朱凱廸，法官採納7年監禁為量刑起點，因他認罪扣減三分一，再因他對法律無知減刑3個月。但由於他過往有兩項刑事紀錄，因此不會考慮其過往服務再給予減刑，他的總刑期為4年5個月。</p> +<p>黎繼而被問到對於「港獨」和「台獨」的立場，黎表示他一向認為提倡香港獨立是一個陰謀，因那些人務求使其他人掉入陷阱，亦同意「港獨」想法「太瘋狂」。黎稱他經常要求同事不要在報導中談及「港獨」，《蘋果》也不會容許鼓吹「港獨」的人士參與報章工作。</p> -<blockquote> - <h3 id="馮達浚">馮達浚</h3> -</blockquote> +<h4 id="黎智英蘋果與香港人擁有相同價值">黎智英：《蘋果》與香港人擁有相同價值</h4> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/WnUKE8d.png" alt="image36" /></p> +<p>關文渭向黎智英出示剪報，題為〈蘋果日報：我們屬於香港〉，在1995年6月20日刊登於《蘋果日報》報章，為創刊社論。內容提及，在資訊透明的今天，只要《蘋果》讀者支持普選，不管面對多大壓力，《蘋果》員工必定堅持下去。黎稱，這句子顯示《蘋果》與香港人擁有相同價值，並且站在一起。</p> -<p>就參選九龍西的馮達浚，法官指他為「積極參加者」，他同意一旦成功在立法會當選，將會無差別否決財政預算案。法官以7年監禁為量刑起點，因他認罪給予三分一減刑，以及因他對法律無知減刑3個月，總刑期為4年5個月。</p> +<p>該文章亦稱《蘋果》不會容忍任何限制自由，黎指這代表到《蘋果》的原則。辯方問到，《蘋果》沒有提供任何員工培訓或指引，怎樣確保到他們的立場是與港人和《蘋果》一致呢？黎則相信員工都是香港人，很自然地會與《蘋果》站在一起。</p> -<blockquote> - <h3 id="劉頴匡">劉頴匡</h3> -</blockquote> +<h4 id="張劍虹早前稱佔中後蘋果轉趨激進-黎智英反駁一向關注運動">張劍虹早前稱佔中後《蘋果》轉趨激進 黎智英反駁一向關注運動</h4> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/spsY9Rd.png" alt="image37" /></p> +<p>辯方提及《蘋果》前社長張劍虹早前作供，稱《蘋果》在2014年「佔中」之前主要聚焦「狗仔隊」和娛樂新聞，但是2014年之後，「好似成為一間反政府、對抗中央嘅一個報紙。」</p> -<p>為新界東選區的劉頴匡，他現正就七一立法會暴動案服刑54個月及20天。法官在本案中將他納入為「積極參加者」，並以7年監禁為量刑起點，認罪扣減三分一，再因對法律的無知減刑3個月，總刑期為4年5個月。法官認為本案與暴動案沒有直接關係，因此刑期不會同期執行。</p> +<p>黎智英則不同意，因這份報紙一向關注爭取自由的運動，在2014年之前也有持續報導有關六四遊行的新聞，只是因為2014年社會運動事件增加，所以他們需要跟進事態發展，報導便增多，因而看起來好像較之前活躍。黎亦確認他在「佔中」期間曾被拘捕，該次是他第一次被捕。</p> -<p>法官提到，劉的朋友和前僱主對他高度評價，劉在庭上陳詞時具說服力，他願意承擔責任，表達了悔意，承諾不會再犯。法官相信懲教等當局會留意到他的轉變，在評估是否提早釋放時納入考慮。</p> +<p>《蘋果》前主筆楊清奇早前作供時提到，彭斯（Mike Pence）於2018年10月發表演講時提及美國對華政策，黎當時認為演講內容意味「美國反枱」，因此楊覺得由那時候開始，「黎先生嘅政治立場就變得激進啲。」黎智英則表示，不懂得如何回應，因他與楊清奇甚少交談，也幾乎未曾在論壇版撰文，不知道楊對自己的印象從何而來，「如果說我激進，我一直以來都是激進。」</p> -<blockquote> - <h3 id="黃子悅">黃子悅</h3> -</blockquote> +<p>首項「串謀勾結外國或者境外勢力危害國家安全罪」指，黎智英、蘋果日報有限公司、蘋果日報印刷有限公司及蘋果互聯網有限公司，於2020年7月1日至2021年6月24日（包括首尾兩日），在香港與其他人一同串謀，請求外國或者境外機構、組織、人員實施對香港特別行政區或者中華人民共和國進行制裁、封鎖或者採取其他敵對行動。</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/wkgEVmZ.png" alt="image38" /></p> +<p>另一項「串謀勾結外國或者境外勢力危害國家安全」罪，指黎智英於2020年7月1日至今年2月15日間，與 Mark Simon、陳梓華、李宇軒、劉祖廸及其他人串謀，請求外國或境外機構、組織、人員，實施對中國或香港進行制裁、封鎖或者採取其他敵對行動。</p> -<p>為新界西選區的黃子悅，現正就一宗暴動案服刑37個月。法官指她為「積極參加者」，以7年監禁為量刑起點，認罪扣減三分一，再因對法律無知減刑3個月。法官表示，本案與暴動案並無關聯，因此不會同期執行，總刑期為4年5個月。黃在求情信中解釋她過往患上的情緒病患，並表示會為自己所作所為承受後果。法官表示，相信懲教當局在考慮是否提早釋放時會考慮以上因素。</p> +<p>「串謀刊印、發布、出售、要約出售、分發、展示或複製煽動刊物」罪指，黎智英、蘋果日報有限公司、蘋果日報印刷有限公司及蘋果互聯網有限公司於2019年4月1日至2021年6月24日（包括首尾兩日），在香港與其他人一同串謀刊印、發布、出售、要約出售、分發、展示及／或複製煽動刊物，具意圖：</p> <blockquote> - <h3 id="袁嘉蔚">袁嘉蔚</h3> + <p>a) 引起憎恨或藐視中央或香港特別行政區政府或激起對其離叛</p> </blockquote> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/2qLqI2E.png" alt="image39" /></p> - -<p>法官指港島區的袁嘉蔚有參與協調會議、選舉論壇及抗爭派記者會，亦簽署「墨落無悔」聲明。法官以7年監禁為量刑起點，考慮到她及時認罪，因此給予三分一減刑；另因她可能誤解計劃合法性，額外給予3個月減刑。法官亦指，袁由2020年1月起從事公共服務，因此獲2個月減刑，總刑期為4年3個月。</p> - <blockquote> - <h3 id="李嘉達">李嘉達</h3> + <p>b) 激起香港居民企圖不循合法途徑促致改變其他在香港的依法制定的事項</p> </blockquote> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/4sXwpoW.png" alt="image40" /></p> - -<p>參與九龍東的李嘉達，法官指他屬於「積極參加者」，他同意一旦成功在立法會當選，將會無差別否決財政預算案。法官以7年監禁為量刑起點，因認罪減刑三分一，再因對法律無知及過往任區議員的貢獻，分別減刑3個月及2個月，總刑期為4年3個月。</p> +<blockquote> + <p>c) 引起對香港司法的憎恨、藐視或激起對其離叛</p> +</blockquote> <blockquote> - <h3 id="王百羽">王百羽</h3> + <p>d) 引起香港居民間的不滿或離叛</p> </blockquote> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/yfH3H1c.png" alt="image41" /></p> +<blockquote> + <p>e) 煽惑他人使用暴力</p> +</blockquote> -<p>就超區的王百羽，法官指他為「積極參加者」，並以7年監禁為量刑起點。他認罪可獲減刑三分一，並因他可能誤解法律而減刑3個月，再因他參與公共服務及獲親友求情，減刑兩個月，總刑期為4年3個月。</p> +<blockquote> + <p>f) 慫使他人不守法或不服從合法命令。</p> +</blockquote> -<p>法官提到，與岑敖暉的情況相似，接受王現已改過自新，相信懲教等當局評估是否提早釋放時，會考慮到這方面。</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/aOOsOgM.png" alt="image05" /></p> -<h3 id="林景楠任證人囚5年2個月-官無就作供減刑對控方毫無幫助">林景楠任證人囚5年2個月 官無就作供減刑：對控方毫無幫助</h3> +<p>【獨媒報導】壹傳媒創辦人黎智英及3間蘋果公司被控串謀勾結外國勢力及串謀刊印煽動刊物等罪，控方早前舉證完畢，3名國安法指定法官裁定黎3項控罪表證成立，黎選擇作供，押後至今天（20日）於高院（移師西九龍法院）續審。黎首度親自作供，他表示自己從不是政黨成員，而視自己為一個商人和社運人士。3名同案被告張劍虹、陳沛敏和楊清奇曾以「從犯證人」身份作供，黎反駁他們的部份證供。黎稱他與張劍虹並不是朋友，從不談論私事，質疑張供稱的對話沒發生。此外，在《國安法》即將生效之前，黎曾透過訊息籲員工勿針對特朗普，他稱因不能一方面要求他援助香港，另一方面卻與他對著幹，但否認這是「編採指示」，反指是屬於提議。</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/L1fBhXX.png" alt="image42" /></p> +<h4 id="曾捐2萬英鎊給香港監察-黎智英做有意義的事">曾捐2萬英鎊給「香港監察」 黎智英：做有意義的事</h4> -<p>【獨媒報導】47人涉組織及參與民主派初選，被控「串謀顛覆國家政權」罪，其中31人認罪，16人不認罪受審，除李予信及劉偉聰，其餘14人罪成，45人今（19日）判刑。被告林景楠在開審前認罪，並作為控方證人，他要求法庭考慮判社會服務令。惟法官拒絕，並指其證供對控方案情毫無幫助（added nothing to the prosecution case），並難以在裁決理由書中引用。法官最終沒有就他作供給予減刑，只因他派發防疫物資等減刑，他被判囚5年2個月。在非抗爭派中，楊岳橋的量刑起點最高，為8年監禁。法官指在公民黨參加35+計劃期間，楊擔當領導及積極角色。</p> +<p>就兩項串謀勾結外國勢力罪，控方在開案陳詞時展示了一幅黎智英的「國際連繫圖」，顯示黎認識美國、英國、台灣等地的政治人物，當中更包括美國前總統特朗普、台灣前總統蔡英文和前港督彭定康等。</p> -<p>以下為非抗爭派被告的判刑理由及刑期：</p> +<p>黎智英的代表大律師關文渭今向黎出示該圖表，黎智英是否認識該些人物。就圖中的英國線，其中一人是「香港監察」創辦人羅傑斯（Benedict Rogers），黎表示他與羅傑斯互相認識，對方在數年前被拒進入香港境內，有時別人會要求他刊登羅傑斯的文章。黎在英國的時候曾與他親身見面。</p> <blockquote> - <h3 id="楊岳橋">楊岳橋</h3> + <p>I call on the world to act to save Hong Kong, to put pressure on Carrie Lam to pull back from the brink, demand an end to impunity for police barbarity, to impose targeted Magnitsky sanctions on those responsible for torture #HongKongProtest #StandwithHK #DemocracyForHK @hk_watch pic.twitter.com/vh07uKOCO2 — Benedict Rogers 羅傑斯 (@benedictrogers) November 12, 2019</p> </blockquote> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/7v7wixJ.png" alt="image43" /></p> +<p>黎曾轉帳一些錢2萬元英鎊給「香港監察」，黎解釋：「我認為我在做有意義的事，因他支持香港」，所以決定捐款。</p> -<p>就新界西選區的楊岳橋，法官指無法接受辯方提出，法庭量刑時應考慮楊屬於較低的範疇。考慮到楊在公民黨的地位，法官毫不懷疑公民黨參與計劃期間，楊擔當領導及積極角色。因此法官以8年監禁為起點，因此就他認罪及被捕後與警方合作，給予三分一減刑。另考慮到他長期為公共服務，給予3個月減刑，總刑期為5年1個月。法官補充，得悉楊的母親身體轉差及後去世，但沒有額外減刑。法官最後提到，相信其重犯機會低，並且相信懲教署能夠在考慮是否提早釋放時能將此因素納入考慮。</p> +<h4 id="黎智英不敢稱呼彭定康為朋友">黎智英：不敢稱呼彭定康為朋友</h4> + +<p>至英國線另一人為「對華政策跨國議會聯盟」（IPAC）創辦人裴倫德（Luke de Pulford），惟黎表示：「我從未跟他討論過任何事」，包括政治事務。他稱，當裴倫德傳送文章給他時，他立即轉發文章給陳沛敏或羅偉光，「老實說，我從未閱讀該些文章。」至於文章涉及的 IPAC，黎稱：「我從不知道 IPAC」，又稱「我第一次聽聞 IPAC 的時候是在法庭上」，即李宇軒的證供。</p> <blockquote> - <h3 id="吳政亨">吳政亨</h3> + <p>Today we launch #IPAC#standtogether pic.twitter.com/bt19tb3bVB — Inter-Parliamentary Alliance on China (IPAC) (@ipacglobal) June 4, 2020</p> </blockquote> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/twrPVFb.png" alt="image44" /></p> +<p>至於前港督彭定康，黎說：「他稱呼我為朋友，但是我不敢稱呼他為朋友，因為他是前港督。」二人曾經親身見面，但是沒有直接聯絡，通常是透過陳方安生和羅傑斯聯絡，為免彭定康拒絕黎的要求時感到尷尬。</p> -<p>法官指，吳政亨既非組織者亦非候選人。當他發起「三投三不投」計劃時，他尚未是35+計劃的一份子。吳與戴耀廷接觸及溝通後，才成為35+計劃的一份子，而其他參與者並未知道吳的身份。</p> +<h4 id="黎認識蔡英文-對方視會面為公關會面">黎認識蔡英文 對方視會面為「公關會面」</h4> -<p>法官留意到，在《國安法》實施後，吳仍繼續擁護「攬炒」思想，即破壞政府的職能，以讓政府遵守五大訴求。另外，吳還願意繼續推動計劃，並向他人施壓，確保初選獲勝的人才可以參選立法會。吳更在《蘋果日報》刊登廣告，敦促初選落敗者不要參選立法會。</p> +<p>黎稱他認識蔡英文時，她還未是總統，當時黎打算在創辦台灣《蘋果日報》。他通常透過江春男聯絡蔡，會談及台灣政策，例如黎告訴蔡關閉核電廠會是錯誤決定，對方亦會問及香港市民的普遍意見。黎形容，對於蔡而言，與他見面就如與傳媒之間的「公關會面」，這些討論都是無關痛癢，沒有實質內容。</p> -<p>法官認為，吳屬於「積極參加者」，並以7年半監禁作為起點。法官考慮到，吳並非追求個人利益，而計劃亦不涉暴力。法官接納吳可能受戴耀廷誤導計劃合法性，因此給予3個月減刑。由於吳不認罪，亦沒有其他扣減，因此判囚7年3個月。</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/P4nOiQA.png" alt="image06" /> +▲ 蔡英文</p> -<blockquote> - <h3 id="林景楠">林景楠</h3> -</blockquote> +<p>至於江春男，黎指他是著名作家，就像蔡英文的「左右手」。江在陳水扁做總統的時代擔任國安會副秘書長，但黎認識他的時候，理解他已經沒有任何職位。</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/wZZWte9.png" alt="image45" /></p> +<p>黎稱，他曾將美國前副國防部長 Paul Wolfowitz 和退休軍官 Jack Keane，經江春男介紹給蔡英文，因為想讓台灣了解特朗普政府如何看待台灣議題，而台灣是唯一一個有民主的華人地方。</p> -<p>判詞提到，林現年36歲，職業為一名商人，已婚並育有3名子女。辯方求情時主張林應被歸類為「其他參與者」，因他曾向警方錄取2份「無損權益口供」。辯方亦要求法庭考慮判處社會服務令。</p> +<h4 id="黎智英稱不認識特朗普本人-未曾聯絡">黎智英稱不認識特朗普本人 未曾聯絡</h4> -<p>不過法官認為林所干犯的控罪性質非常嚴重，社服令並非恰當刑罰，而他錄取的2份口供對本案幫助不大，因當中只談及林自己在計劃中的參與；他在庭上的證供亦對控方案情毫無幫助（added nothing to the prosecution case），並難以在裁決理由書中引用，因此法官拒絕替他索取社服令報告。</p> +<p>就美國線而言，控方指稱黎智英與時任美國總統特朗普有聯繫。黎則表示：「我不覺得他認識我」，亦表示不認識特朗普本人，沒有直接或經其他人接觸過特朗普，也沒有收過任何來自特朗普的訊息。</p> -<p>考慮到林的參與程度，法官採用監禁7年為量刑起點，由於他在開審前才認罪，所以只能獲得20%扣減；再考慮到他對法律無知而犯案、在疫情期間提供防護性裝具，因此分別減刑3個月及2個月，最終刑期為5年2個月。</p> +<p>聯繫圖亦包括時任美國副總統彭斯，惟黎稱他該次與彭斯見面，只是握手，然後再沒有其他交流。他稱2019年到訪華盛頓，是為了會見參眾兩院的議員，告訴他們香港發生什麼事，而黎事前並不知道將要會見彭斯，因行程是由美國國務院前資深顧問 Christian Whiton 安排。</p> <blockquote> - <h3 id="鄭達鴻">鄭達鴻</h3> + <p>The arrest of @JimmyLaiApple in Hong Kong is deeply offensive &amp; an affront to freedom loving people around the world. When I met w/ Jimmy Lai @WhiteHouse, I was inspired by his stand for democracy &amp; the rights &amp; autonomy that were promised to the people of Hong Kong by Beijing. pic.twitter.com/ZwioCrvNb7 — Mike Pence (@Mike_Pence) August 10, 2020</p> </blockquote> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/hIxHyyS.png" alt="image46" /></p> +<p>被問到該次會面中，有否要求美國政府做任何事，黎則表示：「我不會夠膽要求副總統去做任何事情」，他只是告知彭斯香港發生的示威事件，並請求他為香港發聲、支持香港，而沒有叫他做任何事情。</p> -<p>為港島選區的鄭達鴻，法官指他有出席協調會議及選舉論壇，因此以7年監禁為量刑起點。由於他尚未成為合資格的律師，亦無法律經驗，故法官接納鄭受他人誤導以為計劃合法，給予3個月減刑。另因他長期公共服務減刑3個月，總刑期為6年半。</p> +<p>至於時任國務卿蓬佩奧，黎與他在2019年7月曾見面。黎稱與彭斯的情況一樣，他並沒有要求對方做任何事情，只籲他為香港發聲。</p> + +<p>就時任美國眾議院議長佩洛西，黎稱李柱銘帶他去見她，實際上他不認識佩洛西，佩洛西也不認識他。在該次會面中，黎稱主要是李柱銘和佩洛西交談，而他只是聆聽，惟他不明白二人之間的對話內容。</p> <blockquote> - <h3 id="徐子見">徐子見</h3> + <p>So pleased to welcome Jimmy Lai, Martin Lee and Janet Pang to the U.S. Capitol. My full support and admiration goes to those who have taken to the streets week after week in non-violent protest to fight for democracy and the rule of law in #HongKong. pic.twitter.com/maeTwTR8eV — Nancy Pelosi (@SpeakerPelosi) October 22, 2019</p> </blockquote> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/QxCLvpj.png" alt="image47" /></p> - -<p>為港島選區的徐子見，法官指他是該選區唯一沒有簽署「墨落無悔」聲明的人，但他曾出席協調會議及選舉論壇。法官決定以7年監禁為量刑起點，認罪扣減三分一，再因可能誤解法律及長期公共服務，各減刑3個月。雖然徐患有骨刺、慢性胰臟炎及糖尿病等，但不代表他無法在獄中獲得適當的治療，因此不會因其健康狀況給予額外減刑。他的總刑期為4年2個月。</p> +<h4 id="黎智英稱從不捐款給美國政治人物-只捐款給美國智庫和宗教組織">黎智英稱從不捐款給美國政治人物 只捐款給美國智庫和宗教組織</h4> -<blockquote> - <h3 id="楊雪盈">楊雪盈</h3> -</blockquote> +<p>黎稱，美國國務院前資深顧問 Christian Whiton 是透過其私人助手 Mark Simon 介紹而認識，因他認識美國的議員，所以該次華盛頓之行便是靠他將黎介紹給議員。</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/KDdSfvl.png" alt="image48" /></p> +<p>至於美國退休軍官 Jack Keane，黎則稱是在聚會中認識。美國前副國防部長 Paul Wolfowitz，則因為黎有意在緬甸投資生意，所以聘請他擔任投資顧問，因而認識。銀行紀錄顯示黎曾向 Paul Wolfowitz 支付顧問費。</p> -<p>同為港島選區的楊雪盈，法官指她有出席協調會議及選舉論壇，以7年監禁為量刑起點。她因誤解法律獲減刑3個月，而且作為區議員參與公共服務、在本地文化上的貢獻，再獲減刑3個月。由於她受審後定罪再無其他減刑，總刑期為6年半。</p> +<p>辯方問黎有否向任何人提供金錢，以圖影響美國的政策。黎表示沒有，他從不捐款給美國政治人物，他只會捐款給美國智庫和宗教組織。</p> -<blockquote> - <h3 id="彭卓棋">彭卓棋</h3> -</blockquote> +<h4 id="日本議員菅野志櫻里被列為串謀者之一-黎智英從未聽過她名字不懂日文">日本議員菅野志櫻里被列為串謀者之一 黎智英：從未聽過她名字、不懂日文</h4> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/nsjYpny.png" alt="image49" /></p> +<p>辯方問，在該「國際聯繫圖」中所述的人物，黎有否嘗試透過他們去影響外國對中國和香港的政策。黎表示從沒有。被問到有否請求任何人對抗中國和香港。黎亦回答從來沒有。</p> -<p>為港島選區的彭卓棋，他曾建立「香港青年創業聯盟」，協助青年到大灣區創業。法官在本案中以7年監禁為量刑起點，因他可能誤解法律減刑3個月。另外，法官留意到「香港基本法基金會」主席葉國華為彭撰寫求情信，指他被起訴後參與向中小學生推廣《基本法》、《國安法》及「一國兩制」原則。因此，法官就其義工服務給予3個月減刑，總刑期為6年半。</p> +<p>李宇軒早前證供提及日本議員菅野志櫻里，控方亦將她列為本案的串謀者之一。惟黎今稱他從沒聽過她的名字，因為他不懂日文，連她是女性也不知道。</p> <blockquote> - <h3 id="岑子杰">岑子杰</h3> + <p>今、私の方では野党議員中心に呼びかけてます。政党や会派に縛られず、1人の日本の国会議員として、世界と連帯し、基本的人権の尊重と法の支配という普遍の価値を守ろう。#HongKong pic.twitter.com/aa7zaxAD1R — 菅野志桜里 (@ShioriYamao) May 27, 2020</p> </blockquote> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/EUybWfh.png" alt="image50" /></p> +<h4 id="黎稱透過mark-simon捐款給香港政黨">黎稱透過Mark Simon捐款給香港政黨</h4> -<p>為九龍西選區的岑子杰，法官指他同意一旦成功在立法會當選，將會無差別否決財政預算案。因此以7年監禁為起點，認罪扣減三分一，再因誤解法律及公共服務，分別減刑3個月及2個月，總刑期為4年3個月。</p> +<p>關於黎的私人助手 Mark Simon，黎稱他是唯一一個替自己處理私人事務的人，聘用他超過20年。黎亦會透過 Mark Simon 進行股票交易、捐款給香港政黨，包括民主黨、公民黨、「長毛」梁國雄等，因此銀行紀錄顯示在2013至2020年期間，黎與 Mark Simon 有合共86次交易。惟他稱從沒捐款給香港以外的政黨。</p> -<blockquote> - <h3 id="毛孟靜">毛孟靜</h3> -</blockquote> +<p>黎亦表示，雖然他有捐款給美國智庫，但是每年只有2至5萬美元，認為是微不足道，更遑論影響美國的政策，「如果想透過那麼少的捐款而要求得到回報，便太瘋狂了。」</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/ebBoy8U.png" alt="image51" /></p> +<p>黎稱，他與 Mark Simon 甚少談論政治，只知道他是美國共和黨香港分部的成員，但不認為他與美國政府有連繫。</p> -<p>為九龍西選區的毛孟靜，法官指她為「積極參加者」，她亦同意一旦成功在立法會當選，將會無差別否決財政預算案。因此以7年監禁為起點，認罪扣減三分一，再因誤解法律及公共服務，分別減刑3個月及3個月，總刑期為4年2個月。法官提到，雖然她求情指丈夫身體情況變差，但這並不構成減刑因素。</p> +<h4 id="黎智英視自己為商人和社運人士">黎智英：視自己為商人和社運人士</h4> -<blockquote> - <h3 id="何啟明">何啟明</h3> -</blockquote> +<p>辯方問黎是否任何政黨的成員，黎表示從來不是，「我視自己為一個商人和社運人士（activist）。」辯方追問為何黎認為自己是行動者，黎稱因為他參與示威和一些社會事件。</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/XPFRcW5.png" alt="image52" /></p> +<p>另外，黎確認他在2020年5月，即《國安法》生效之前約一個月，擔任集團主席，包括掌管編採範疇，因他想為整個公司負責任。黎其後解釋，「如果有任何證據顯示《蘋果》荼毒港人思想，我便需要承擔責任」，「《國安法》之後，如果《蘋果》發生了任何事，我希望我會是完全承擔責任的那一個人。」他表示自己是作為一個「領袖」去承擔責任。</p> -<p>為九龍西選區的何啟明，法官指他屬「積極參加者」，他同意一旦成功在立法會當選，將會無差別否決財政預算案。因此以7年監禁為起點，並因誤解法律及公共服務，分別減刑3個月及2個月，總刑期為6年7個月。他受審後罪成沒有其他減刑。</p> +<h4 id="黎智英無意圖無能力荼毒港人思想">黎智英：無意圖、無能力荼毒港人思想</h4> -<blockquote> - <h3 id="黃碧雲">黃碧雲</h3> -</blockquote> +<p>就控方案情指稱黎是「重光團隊」（Stand With Hong Kong）的「金主」，黎在庭上稱「我沒有任何政治主張，我與 SWHK 沒有任何聯繫」，如果他與 SWHK 有任何聯繫，那只限於提供貸款，使他們能夠在報章賣廣告。</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/GJxVx3m.png" alt="image53" /></p> +<p>控方開案陳詞又指《蘋果日報》荼毒讀者思想。但黎則表示他不知道「荼毒思想」是什麼意思，「我只是對於一些已然發生的事情作出評論」，他亦說：「單憑我寫的東西，我不認為我有能力去荼毒香港市民的思想。」黎同時否認有任何意圖去荼毒港人思想。</p> -<p>為九龍西選區的黃碧雲，辯方求情指其政治取態屬溫和務實，而她在串謀中亦沒有任何計劃或直接角色，因此應該將她列入「其他參加者」。惟法庭認為其角色屬「積極參加者」，她同意一旦成功在立法會當選，將會無差別否決財政預算案。法官以7年監禁為起點，因誤解法律及公共服務，分別減刑3個月及3個月，總刑期為6年半。她受審後定罪沒有其他減刑。</p> +<h4 id="張劍虹曾供稱不可向黎說不-黎我從來沒有說過他不可以說不">張劍虹曾供稱不可向黎說「不」 黎：我從來沒有說過他不可以說「不」</h4> -<blockquote> - <h3 id="劉澤鋒">劉澤鋒</h3> -</blockquote> +<p>張劍虹作供時指，黎是一個「不可以向他說不」的老闆。黎今在庭上反駁：「我不明白為何他沒有權利說不，我從來沒有說過他不可以說不。」黎續指：「我一直以來總是客氣，我從不下達命令，我總是問他會否做某些事，按照他的決定。」</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/SsIVPOs.png" alt="image54" /></p> +<p>辯方問到，黎有沒有遇過任何情況，當他要求張劍虹做某些事時，張拒絕或沒有照做。黎則指張是行政總裁，所以他很少要求張做事，故記不起有否發生過上述情況；但是即使張沒有執行到他所交代的工作，他也不會知道，因他不會跟進進度。</p> -<p>為九龍西選區的劉澤鋒，辯方指他在初選落敗後，已沒有參與計劃，他亦沒有任何政治影響力。法官認為他屬於「積極參加者」，他同意一旦成功在立法會當選，將會無差別否決財政預算案。因此以7年監禁為起點，並因認罪減刑三分一、誤解法律減刑3個月，總刑期為4年5個月。</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/hWqNVJZ.png" alt="image07" /> +▲ 前《蘋果日報》社長 張劍虹</p> -<blockquote> - <h3 id="譚文豪">譚文豪</h3> -</blockquote> +<h4 id="黎智英稱總編輯換人並非他的決定">黎智英稱總編輯換人並非他的決定</h4> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/rylrSxq.png" alt="image55" /></p> +<p>陳沛敏亦曾在作供期間形容黎是「比較強勢」的老闆。黎智英在庭上回應：「我認為，如果她將我的性格演繹為我的管理風格，她是正確」，他自言有很強的性格；但是如果說他強迫下屬執行工作的話，他並不同意。</p> -<p>為九龍東選區的譚文豪，法官認為他屬於「積極參加者」，他同意一旦成功在立法會當選，將會無差別否決財政預算案。因此以7年監禁為起點，因認罪減刑三分一，再因誤解法律及公共服務，分別減刑3個月及3個月，總刑期為4年2個月。</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/1bFMVz9.png" alt="image08" /> +▲ 前《蘋果日報》執行總編輯 林文宗（左）、前《蘋果日報》副社長 陳沛敏（右）</p> -<blockquote> - <h3 id="譚得志">譚得志</h3> -</blockquote> +<p>楊清奇則在作供時指黎若遇到員工「唔啱佢心意，好快就換人」，在楊任職《蘋果》23年期，他記得換了七至八次總編緝。黎則指，在過去二十多年來，如果總編輯有轉換，那不會是他的決定，他不會干預該些決定，而且他稱總編輯只換過三次。</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/10K6wVl.png" alt="image56" /></p> +<h4 id="黎智英林榮基赴台做頭條乃陳沛敏的決定">黎智英：林榮基赴台做頭條乃陳沛敏的決定</h4> -<p>為九龍東選區的譚得志，法官認為他屬於「積極參加者」，他同意一旦成功在立法會當選，將會無差別否決財政預算案。因此以7年監禁為起點，認罪減刑三分一。辯方指譚就另一煽動案的言論，與初選有關，故兩案應該一同審理。法官考慮到譚已服畢該案刑期，因此減刑3個月，以反映兩案整體性，總刑期為4年5個月。</p> +<p>辯方展示黎智英與張劍虹之間的 WhatsApp 對話，黎指前政務司司長陳方安生會見時任美國副總統彭斯是「大新聞」，並要求張將新聞做到「最大效果」，張回覆「老闆，早安，收到。謝謝」。黎同意以上訊息屬於編採指示，除了這次之外，只曾指示過張發起「一人一信救香港」行動。</p> -<blockquote> - <h3 id="胡志偉">胡志偉</h3> -</blockquote> +<p>辯方另提及黎在2019年4月向張發訊息：「林榮基因逃犯法例昨天到台灣避難，我們已有獨家照片和報導，現在欠他的訪問，不知台灣是否有人知他下落。謝謝。」黎則不認為這訊息屬於編採指示，因為當時張身處台灣，只是想打聽當地有沒有人知道林榮基的下落，只是一種方便的做法。</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/nsZOtl1.png" alt="image57" /></p> +<p>林榮基赴台的新聞後來在2019年4月27日實體報紙的頭條。張劍虹曾供稱，這是因為他向陳沛敏轉達黎智英想以此新聞作為頭版；惟陳沛敏則表示「係我嘅決定」。黎智英今在庭上指這是陳沛敏的決定。</p> -<p>同為九龍東選區的胡志偉，法官認為他屬於「積極參加者」，他同意一旦成功在立法會當選，將會無差別否決財政預算案。因此以7年監禁為起點，認罪減刑三分一，並因誤解法律減刑3個月，總刑期為4年5個月。法官不同意辯方指，胡在其他案件因良好品格獲減刑，代表他在本案中同樣可以。</p> +<h4 id="黎智英與張劍虹非朋友-從不談及私事">黎智英：與張劍虹非朋友 從不談及私事</h4> -<blockquote> - <h3 id="施德來">施德來</h3> -</blockquote> +<p>辯方指，張似乎是一個獲得黎信賴的同事，問黎與張劍虹是否朋友。黎隨即表示不是，「我們從不談及私事，我幾乎從沒與他單獨吃午飯」，即使一起吃午飯，也只會談論公事。</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/c87R9DS.png" alt="image58" /></p> +<p>至於陳沛敏，黎智英說：「她是我的朋友」，二人也是同事關係，在公事以外有私交。而楊清奇，黎表示「我甚少與他見面」，形容雙方是「非常遙遠的關係」。辯方提到楊曾到黎的大宅吃飯，黎則指，有一次他邀請不同的寫手到他家，希望邀請他們撰文評論中國時事，而楊只是其中一名獲邀者。</p> -<p>至於九龍東選區的施德來，法官認為他屬於「積極參加者」，他同意一旦成功在立法會當選，將會無差別否決財政預算案。法官以7年監禁為起點，考慮到他誤解法律及公共服務，分別減刑3個月及2個月，但受審後定罪無其他扣減，總刑期為6年7個月。</p> +<p>張劍虹曾供稱，黎於2019年7月赴美國會見時任副總統彭斯、時任美國國務卿蓬佩奧和美國國家安全顧問 John Bolton，回港後與他談論該次會面，又形容黎「幾雀躍」。黎智英則在庭上反駁：「我從沒有跟張談及我的個人事務。」</p> -<blockquote> - <h3 id="尹兆堅">尹兆堅</h3> -</blockquote> +<p>張劍虹亦供稱，黎曾告訴他直播節目「Live Chat with Jimmy Lai」邀請到美國退休軍官 Jack Keane 做嘉賓，張表達憂慮，惟黎回應：「佢哋（中共）咁搞我，我一定去到盡㗎，我冇得褪㗎。」黎今在庭上反駁：「我從沒有與張談及 Jack Keane。我從沒有與他討論我的私事。」黎指 Jack Keane 是他的好友，他是否邀請對方出席節目，與張毫無關係，「我不明白我為何要跟他（張）討論。」</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/nc4uPvW.png" alt="image59" /></p> +<h4 id="控方案情指黎透過飯盒會下達編採指示-黎智英飯盒會關於業務發展">控方案情指黎透過「飯盒會」下達編採指示 黎智英：飯盒會關於業務發展</h4> -<p>新界西選區的尹兆堅，法官指他屬於「積極參加者」，他同意一旦成功在立法會當選，將會無差別否決財政預算案。法官以7年監禁為起點，認罪扣減三分一，總刑期為4年8個月。</p> +<p>至於「飯盒會」，控方案情指稱黎透過召開「飯盒會」，向《蘋果》高層下達編採指示。黎今稱，「飯盒會」是關於將《蘋果》轉型至網上媒體，屬於「業務發展會議」，而且除了《蘋果》之外，他與其他部門每隔六星期亦會開一次「飯盒會」。</p> -<blockquote> - <h3 id="郭家麒">郭家麒</h3> -</blockquote> +<p>張劍虹的證供指稱黎智英的編採指示之一是提倡「和勇不分」。黎則表示，他記得自己曾撰文提及「和勇不分」，但是如果指稱他在「飯盒會」中提及「和勇不分」的話，「我會有懷疑，因為飯盒會是關於業務發展。」但他不能百份百肯定自己有否說過。</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/Q5p72K8.png" alt="image60" /></p> +<h4 id="黎智英籲員工勿針對特朗普-因不能一方面要求援助另一方面卻對著幹">黎智英籲員工勿針對特朗普 因不能一方面要求援助另一方面卻對著幹</h4> -<p>考慮到郭的參與程度，法官採用監禁7年為起點，因及時認罪及配合警方調查而扣減三分一刑期，再考慮他誤解法律而扣減3個月，亦因其長期服務社會而額外扣減3個月，此外看不到任何進一步減刑理由，因此判囚4年2個月。法官特別提到，相信郭的重犯機會低，並且相信懲教署能夠在考慮是否提早釋放時能將此因素納入考慮。</p> +<p>2020年6月2日，黎智英向台灣《蘋果》時任社長陳裕鑫發訊息，籲：「請國際組同事不要跟紐約時報及CNN針對川普，我們蘋果卻要靠川普政府支持保命，這樣做不太好。」相同訊息轉發至張劍虹。</p> -<blockquote> - <h3 id="吳敏兒">吳敏兒</h3> -</blockquote> +<p>黎解釋，這與「一人一信救香港」的意念相似，他當時相信時任美國總統特朗普會出手阻止《國安法》在香港生效，「如果《國安法》生效的話，《蘋果日報》便會完蛋。」</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/cvSrMoX.png" alt="image61" /></p> +<p>辯方追問，黎認為特朗普會做什麼來阻止《國安法》通過。黎起初稱「特朗普會知道他該怎樣做」，後來在追問下，黎表示他不知道，也不能夠知道，「可能是對中國發出呼籲，對習近平發出呼籲，什麼也好。」</p> -<p>為新界西選區的吳敏兒，辯方指她參與程度低，沒有出席協調會議或記者會，只是出席選舉論壇，加上她落敗後已沒有參與其中。法官以7年監禁為起點，認罪扣減三分一，亦因對法律誤解減刑3個月，總刑期為4年5個月。法官提到，吳在手寫求情信中表示自己犯了很嚴重的法律，相信懲教署日後考慮提早釋放的機會時，會將她的歉意納入考慮。</p> +<p>法官李運騰問黎會否視上述訊息為「編採指示」。黎表示：「我不認為它是編採指示。」他又說：「我當時提議這樣做（針對川普）不太好，這不是一個指示。」黎亦解釋，如果他們一方面發起「一人一信救香港」，呼籲特朗普援助，另一方面卻與特朗普對著幹，便會自相矛盾。</p> -<blockquote> - <h3 id="譚凱邦">譚凱邦</h3> -</blockquote> +<p>黎指，一直以來他覺得《蘋果》的國際版取態沒有問題，但是直到2020年6月香港踏入關鍵時刻，需要要求特朗普阻止《國安法》。辯方問為何《國安法》會影響到《蘋果》。黎說：「因為在《國安法》之下，我們沒有辦法去營運一間獨立媒體。往後發生的事件亦證明了我是對的。」辯方隨即指往後發生的事件與本案控罪時段無關，這是一個刑事審訊而不是政治審訊，籲黎將案發時段以外的事件拋諸腦後。</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/rEUI6YJ.png" alt="image62" /></p> +<p>黎接著說：「如果《國安法》生效的話，將會是香港言論自由的終結。」《蘋果》能夠生存下去的機會渺芒，所以希望特朗普能做一些事阻止《國安法》。</p> -<p>為新界西選區的譚凱邦，他指自己患上皮膚問題，有時需要入院治療。但法官認為並不會造成額外的困難，因此不能證明進一步減刑是合理。法官以7年監禁為起點，認罪扣減三分一，亦因對法律誤解減刑3個月，以及其對環境及動物的社區工作減刑兩個月，總刑期為4年3個月。</p> +<h4 id="黎智英twitter帳戶由李兆富管理-包括追蹤其他人">黎智英：Twitter帳戶由李兆富管理 包括追蹤其他人</h4> -<blockquote> - <h3 id="陳志全">陳志全</h3> -</blockquote> +<p>控方開案陳詞指稱，黎智英的 Twitter 帳戶追蹤53個帳戶，包括時任美國副總統彭斯、時任美國國務卿蓬佩奧、時任台灣總統蔡英文、SWHK 和羅傑斯等。黎則稱，Twitter 帳戶是由李兆富（筆名利世民）替他開設、發帖和管理，追蹤別人帳戶也是由李負責，「我不知道怎樣追蹤。」</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/BD1OhgQ.png" alt="image63" /></p> +<h4 id="黎否認獄中指示員工照原來咁做-因國安法已生效猶如叫他們自殺">黎否認獄中指示員工「照原來咁做」 因國安法已生效猶如「叫他們自殺」</h4> -<p>就新界西選區的陳志全，辯方指他並無親身出席協調會議或記者會，在選舉論壇中亦很少發言。法官以7年監禁為量刑起點，就對法律誤解及公共服務各減刑3個月，總刑期為6年半。</p> +<p>黎智英於2020年12月開始還柙。張劍虹供稱，他在探監期間向黎請示「《蘋果日報》點樣運作落去」，當時黎說：「唔使怕，繼續做，繼續做落去，照原來咁做。」</p> -<blockquote> - <h3 id="林卓廷">林卓廷</h3> -</blockquote> +<p>黎今在庭上反駁，事前他得悉兩名兒子當天會來探望他，可是張臨時說要加入，黎當時以為張有緊要事想問他，結果三人一同探訪，但是張卻沒有任何問題，只是說了一些不重要的事情，而探訪時間只有15分鐘，「沒有時間去講其他事了。」黎稱他當時失去耐性，「為何你奪走我兒子的時間？」他稱該次探訪中沒有下達任何指示。</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/KPosNGJ.png" alt="image64" /></p> +<p>黎稱，他曾寫信給《蘋果》員工，籲他們不要冒險，可是如果他下達指示叫他們「唔使怕，繼續做，繼續做落去，照原來咁做」，換言之就是叫他們冒險，並不合理，可是他不記得實際上自己有否如此說。他表示，他可能有說過「唔使怕，繼續做」，但是不會是「照原來咁做」，因《國安法》已經生效，如果叫員工「照原來咁做」的話，「我是在叫他們自殺。」</p> -<p>就新界西選區的林卓廷，辯方指其參與度低，並無出席協調會議及簽署「墨落無悔」聲明，亦無提及要否決財政預算案。法官以7年為監禁量刑起點，因他對法律誤解減刑3個月，但因受審後定罪無減刑，總刑期為6年9個月。</p> +<hr /> -<blockquote> - <h3 id="范國威">范國威</h3> -</blockquote> +<p>案件編號：HCCC51/2022</p>獨媒報導黎智英親自作供 稱反對暴力和港獨 曾籲報導勿針對特朗普 黎智英：是「提議」而非編採指示Taiwan Strait Crisis To Europe2024-11-20T12:00:00+08:002024-11-20T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/taiwan-strait-crisis-to-europe<p><em>This report examines which US capabilities will be most relevant in a potential Taiwan crisis, as well as which are of utility both in Europe and in a Taiwan contingency.</em></p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/YF5UXjt.png" alt="image65" /></p> +<excerpt /> -<p>就新界西選區的范國威，辯方指他沒有參加計劃或組織角色，應該被納入「其他參加者」。辯方亦求情指，范的父親已離世，亦有家人身患重病。范撰寫求情信表明後悔，法官指希望懲教署考慮給予減刑時，留意到其態度。法官以7年監禁為起點，認罪扣減三分一，再因他對法律誤解及公共服務，各減刑3個月，總刑期為4年2個月。</p> +<p>There is an emergent policy consensus within the US that the period from 2027 to the early 2030s represents one of acute danger for Taiwan. This view was captured by former Commander US Indo-Pacific Command Admiral Philip Davidson, who predicted that an invasion of Taiwan by China is possible by 2027, a view echoed by other senior figures.</p> -<blockquote> - <h3 id="呂智恆">呂智恆</h3> -</blockquote> +<p>If the US must commit substantial forces to deterrence or defence in the Indo- Pacific, this will have significant second-order effects within Europe. By the end of this decade, the partial reconstitution of Russian forces is likely, as is the growth of Russian capacity with respect to capabilities, such as nuclear submarines, which have not been impacted by the conflict in Ukraine.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/blxlBDn.png" alt="image66" /></p> +<p>This report examines which US capabilities will be most relevant in an Indo- Pacific contingency, as well as which capabilities among these are fungible – that is, of utility both in Europe and in a Taiwan contingency. Its purpose is to identify areas where gaps are most likely to emerge in Europe’s defensive posture as a consequence of the potential reallocation of US capabilities. Its major findings are that:</p> -<p>就新界西選區的呂智恆，辯方指他參與程度少，應該被列入「其他參加者」級別。他亦因對政治的天真而參與計劃，當時希望政府能夠改善社會問題。辯方亦指，呂在定罪後沒有辦法再任職社工，他現已感後悔。法官肯定他有真誠悔意，相信懲教署考慮減刑時會注意到。法官認為，呂屬於「積極參加者」，並以7年監禁為起點，認罪扣減三分一，另因對法律誤解及公共服務，各減刑3個月及2個月，總刑期為4年3個月。</p> +<ul> + <li> + <p>To a large extent, the question of how an invasion of Taiwan might impact deterrence in Europe depends on US military strategy in the Indo-Pacific. A denial-orientated strategy creates far fewer gaps in a two-theatre posture than one that requires extensive strikes on the Chinese mainland, and is also likely to be more feasible militarily.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>The suppression of enemy air defences (SEAD) involves very different capabilities in the two regions, as the critical assets that China will need to defend its amphibious shipping will be defended by air and maritime platforms, rather than by ground-based transport erector launchers. Munitions such as the AARGM, which are optimised against elusive targets, can be allocated to European defence if policy allows for it and if European air forces are adequately prepared for SEAD, without undermining the US in Asia.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Integrated air and missile defence represents an especially fungible capability, and one that will be heavily strained by a two-theatre scenario. This is, however, more true of systems that enable tactical ballistic missile defence (BMD) and defence against air-breathing threats than it is for upper tier systems that enable theatre-level BMD. Russia’s lack of capability in intermediate-range ballistic missiles or medium-range ballistic missiles, and the time it would take to develop and scale these, mean that the Russian and Chinese missile arsenals present different problem sets.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Resilient C4ISR and the organisational capital to enable its employment are a concern across both theatres.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>While land forces are a less fungible capability, many of the enablers on which they depend, in terms of airlift and sealift as well as air defences, may be drawn on in the Pacific.</p> + </li> +</ul> -<blockquote> - <h3 id="梁國雄">梁國雄</h3> -</blockquote> +<h3 id="introduction">Introduction</h3> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/OfZp7Wb.png" alt="image67" /></p> +<p>Over recent years, predictions have been made by several senior US figures, including the former US Commander Indo-Pacific Command Admiral Philip Davidson and CIA Director William Burns, that China is likely to either invade Taiwan by 2027 or, at a minimum, wishes to have the option of doing so. This prediction, the so-called “Davidson Window”, has been reinforced by analysis that suggests that the period between the mid-2020s and the early 2030s represents one of acute vulnerability for Taiwan. One of the major factors behind this assessment is the fact that US capabilities in several key areas will reach a nadir in the late 2020s as older aircraft, surface vessels and submarines are retired, with replacement rates resulting in capability gaps that will not be filled until well into the 2030s.</p> -<p>就新界西選區的梁國雄，辯方認為他屬於「其他參加者」，因沒有重大參與度。法官不同意辯方指，梁有良好品格，因他過往有刑事紀錄。法官以7年監禁為量刑起點，因他誤解法律減刑3個月，他受審後定罪沒有其他扣減，共囚6年9個月。</p> +<p>This could mean, as some have argued, that the US will lack the capacity by itself to deter a peer and a near-peer competitor (China and Russia) simultaneously. If true, this would have considerable second-order effects on the deterrence of Russia in Europe if Russia either coordinated action with China or acted opportunistically during a crisis in Asia. While it is difficult to forecast with any certainty Russian decision-making during a hypothetical conflict over Taiwan, and much depends on the course of Russia’s war in Ukraine, there would be at least one structural incentive for Moscow to attempt to reorder Europe’s political arrangements during a clash in the Indo-Pacific. Russia could enjoy a transient window of military advantage over European states that face critical shortfalls in areas such as integrated air and missile defence (IAMD) and munitions stockpiles – even though longer-term trends would suggest its prospects for competing militarily with NATO are dim. Declining powers that face a combination of short-term opportunity and long-term decline tend to be especially risk acceptant. But this does not mean that a crisis in East Asia will automatically have second-order effects in Europe, as this will be determined by many contingent factors. Nevertheless, there are grounds for an assessment of the minimal capabilities required to maintain conventional deterrence within Europe in a context of US resources being severely overstretched.</p> -<blockquote> - <h3 id="柯耀林">柯耀林</h3> -</blockquote> +<p>Irrespective of how likely the prospect of a war in East Asia in the late 2020s might be, identifying which capability gaps could emerge within the European theatre if there were such a war can help to assess both those areas where the dependence of NATO on US capabilities represents an immediate point of fragility in the Alliance’s defence posture, and which dependencies can be offset by Europe on a longer-term basis.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/nF4jvHg.png" alt="image68" /></p> +<p>This is important because not all military capability is fungible – that is, of utility both in Europe and in a Taiwan contingency. Factors such as the geography of a theatre and the operational plans that underpin a deterrent posture in each theatre have considerable salience. For example, it is unclear whether armour and multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) have as much utility in a Sino-American conflict – a primarily maritime theatre – as they do in Europe (although both capabilities have a role in each theatre). It is for this reason that leaders have historically often engaged in target- or component-specific balancing – attempting to offset the component of an opponent’s power deemed most threatening to them, rather than the full suite of capabilities.</p> -<p>最後就新界西選區的柯耀林，辯方指他應該屬於「其他參加者」，因他在計劃中的行為和平，在選舉論壇的發言有限，其影響力也有限。法官以7年監禁為起點，就誤解法律及公共服務各減刑3個月及2個月，他受審後定罪沒有其他減刑，總刑期為6年7個月。</p> +<p>This bears consideration for several reasons. First, although there has been much discussion of potential US overstretch in the event of a two-war scenario, there is room for a more detailed discussion regarding precisely in which areas the US would find itself most heavily strained. Second, individual combatant commands typically draw up regional plans which, although not isolated from a wider global context (especially since the adoption of the 2018 National Defense Strategy), are primarily informed by regional considerations. In a context where historical two-war planning assumptions had been replaced by one-major-war assumptions, the question of competition for resources, both among combatant commands and between the US’s NATO and other commitments, could be safely ignored. This is no longer the case. In this regard, open source academic work can contribute to an understanding of the shared dependencies of individual combatant commands, as planning for multiple theatres again becomes de rigueur. Third, while European members of NATO and organisations such as SHAPE (Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe) do have access to US planning assumptions to inform NATO’s Concept for Deterrence and Defence of the Euro-Atlantic Area (DDA) family of plans, the very complexity of such plans makes assessing regional requirements complex in its own right, and leaves minimal spare capacity for secondary assessments about how dynamics in the Indo-Pacific might impact Europe. As such, a discussion of the interrelationships between theatre-level strategies can be informed by a wider public discussion.</p> -<h3 id="官不接受被告稱涉案計劃註定失敗-61萬投票市民不如此認為">官：不接受被告稱涉案計劃註定失敗 61萬投票市民不如此認為</h3> +<p>This Whitehall Report summarises the findings from several roundtables held by RUSI in London in December 2023 with subject matter experts from a number of allied countries, focusing on European deterrence. It also summarises the results from formal combat modelling using tools such as Monte Carlo simulations, and desk-based analysis of historical analogous case studies and operations. The report does not seek to assess the precise quantity of any individual capability required in either Europe or the Indo-Pacific (although plausible estimates are used throughout). Rather, the report focuses on the question of how fungible specific capabilities are, and as a result how likely competing demand signals for their deployment would be.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/TbwhmAY.png" alt="image69" /></p> +<p>Chapter I examines the requirement from the Indo-Pacific in order to identify which US capabilities will be most critical in the event of a Taiwan contingency. Chapter II details the impact of this demand signal on the Allied posture in Europe. Its purpose is to examine which of the capabilities most needed in the Pacific are also relevant to European deterrence, and where the absence of US capabilities in Europe is both most likely and most impactful in the event of an Indo-Pacific contingency. The report concludes with a summary of the areas in which capabilities are likely to be rapidly exhausted by a contingency spanning two theatres and where they can be rationally allocated across two theatres without generating overstretch.</p> -<p>【獨媒報導】47人涉組織及參與民主派初選，被控「串謀顛覆國家政權」罪，其中31人認罪，16人不認罪受審，除李予信及劉偉聰之外，餘下14人皆被裁定罪成。45人今（19日）於高院（移師西九龍法院）判刑。3名國安法指定法官頒下書面判刑理由，當中回應辯方求情時提出的法律爭議，考慮到本案控罪是「串謀顛覆國家政權」罪，法官認為《國安法》第22條的刑罰分級制雖有參考價值，但是並不完全適用。辯方另提到涉案計劃註定失敗，惟法官則認為不應猜測，但是可以肯定的是所有參與者均用盡努力希望令涉案計劃成功，當時亦從未有人提及計劃不可能實現，而61萬名有份投票的市民亦不認為是如此。法官指初選的競選者是涉案計劃之中的重要人物，沒有他們，涉案計劃便不可能開始，他們支持及積極參與在這計劃之中，因此應被歸類為「積極參與者」。</p> +<h3 id="i-what-determines-the-demand-signal-in-the-indo-pacific">I. What Determines the Demand Signal in the Indo-Pacific?</h3> -<h4 id="戴耀廷等部份被告質疑刑罰分級制不適用-官裁不應硬性地套用">戴耀廷等部份被告質疑刑罰分級制不適用 官裁不應硬性地套用</h4> +<p>This chapter focuses on the contours of a future conflict over Taiwan. It seeks to identify the specific US military capabilities that will be in greatest demand in the Pacific should such a conflict occur. It also aims to establish a basis for comparing the resource demands of the European and Indo-Pacific theatres.</p> -<p>根據《國安法》第22條，一旦顛覆國家政權罪成，「首要分子或罪行重大」可判處10年以上至終身監禁；「積極參加」可判監3至10年；「其他參加」則判監3年以下、拘役或者管制。</p> +<p>The question of which US assets will be most heavily stretched by the occurrence of two simultaneous conflicts in the Indo-Pacific and Europe will be determined by several key variables. Among them are:</p> -<p>法官在判刑理由中先處理法律爭議，在求情階段，部份被告質疑刑罰分級制不適用於本案，其中代表戴耀廷的資深大律師黃繼明、代表袁嘉蔚和馮達浚的資深大律師祁志等，爭議被告被控「串謀顛覆國家政權」罪，是以串謀罪、而非《國安法》罪行定罪，故此刑期分級制不適用。控方則指，經1983年的修例，立法原意是容許法庭針對「企圖」、「串謀」和「煽惑」罪行的刑罰，與實質作出的罪行相等，因此本案的「串謀顛覆國家政權」罪刑罰應跟從《國安法》第22條的刑罰分級制。</p> +<ul> + <li> + <p>The preferred Chinese strategy.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>The preferred US response.</p> + </li> +</ul> -<p>不過判詞指，《刑事罪行條例》第159C條指「串謀」罪行的最高刑罰，與實質罪行的最高刑罰相同，當中只提及「最高刑罰」。經考慮案例，以及本案控罪是「串謀顛覆國家政權」罪，法官認為《國安法》第22條的刑罰分級制雖有參考價值，但是並不完全適用（should not be strictly applicable）在本案，因第159C條的用字清晰不含糊，只提及「最高刑罰」。然而法官強調，無論如何，這並不會窒礙法庭考慮立法機關怎樣看罪行的嚴重性。</p> +<p>The approach taken by China’s leaders to achieve any eventual military resolution of the Taiwan Strait question will be a major determinant of the options available to US decision-makers and thus the demands placed on their resources. There are several options available to China regarding Taiwan: a full-scale invasion; a blockade; or a limited-aims seizure of a specific outlying island, such as Qemoy or Matsu.</p> -<p>此外，控方曾經引用今年3月才立法的《維護國安條例》，當中第109(a)條指「如任何人被裁定串謀犯任何《香港國安法》所訂罪行(國安法罪行)，則《香港國安法》下關於該項國安法罪行的罰則的條文，亦適用於該項串謀犯罪的罰則」，要求法庭考慮串謀干犯國安罪行的刑罰分級制立法原意。</p> +<p>This report restricts its focus to a full-scale invasion for two reasons. First, this is the scenario most frequently discussed in the context of the purported “Davidson Window”. Second, there are few (if any) cases of states achieving decisive effects through either a blockade or a limited aim. While the authors regard the focus on a full-scale invasion to be defensible, it does narrow the focus of the report. It should also be noted that the report focuses specifically on the conventional balance. The subject of how China’s growing nuclear arsenal will impact deterrence in both theatres will, however, be the focus of subsequent RUSI research.</p> -<p>不過，法官指《維護國安條例》是一個在本港立法機構制訂的本地法，惟《香港國安法》屬於全國性法律、在北京全國人大代表大會立法，兩者的立法機構層次不同，邏輯上難以將本地法律用來確認全國性法律的立法原意。再者，《維護國安條例》立法時，已明確表明條文沒有追溯力，因此法官認為控方所引用的《維護國安條例》第109(a)條對本案幫助不大。</p> +<p>Second, there is the question of the US preferred response. While this cannot be ascertained with certainty, the feasibility of various options is easier to scope. It looks increasingly unlikely that the original aims of concepts such as AirSea Battle in 2010, which would have seen the US conduct strikes at scale against the Chinese mainland, are viable. Some estimates suggest that a strike campaign to both blind China’s C4ISR and disrupt its major bases could, for example, require up to 28,000 precision-guided munitions for initial strikes and could – based on campaigns such as Operation Desert Storm – involve the targeting of 40,000 aim points. Not only is the sustainability of such a campaign questionable in terms of munitions stocks alone, but the ability of the US Navy and US Air Force (USAF) to maintain the required operational tempo to achieve it is debatable, if one assumes that the risk from China’s long-range strike capabilities means that forces must operate from greater distances. The likely expansion of China’s nuclear arsenal, and the fact that at least some elements of this arsenal will share both bases and command-and-control (C2) structures, will act as constraints in any strike campaign against the mainland. Nuclear weapons do not necessarily make a nation’s territory inviolable, but they do have the effect of making an opponent’s targeting decisions slower and more deliberate – which runs contrary to the tempo of activity required by a strike campaign at large scale.</p> -<h4 id="被告求情稱計劃註定失敗-官所有參與者均用盡努力希望成功">被告求情稱計劃註定失敗 官：所有參與者均用盡努力希望成功</h4> +<p>As such, it is presumed that the most viable approach likely to be available to the US is achieving sea denial within the Taiwan Strait. Since the loss of a considerable part of its amphibious lift capability would necessarily condemn a Chinese invasion to failure, the US does not necessarily need to strike the mainland at scale to defeat an invasion. The cost in munitions and the escalatory risk inherent in sea denial are considerably more manageable. A denial campaign need not eschew strikes on the mainland, but these strikes would probably occur on a more limited scale and only when necessary to enable attacks on China’s amphibious assets.</p> -<p>辯方求情亦提到，「干預、阻撓、削弱特區政府功能」的後果，非常視乎涉案計劃是否能夠實現；他們力陳，即使初選勝出者沒有被「DQ」、立法會選舉沒有因疫情而延期，涉案計劃也註定失敗，因計劃參與者未能確保爭奪到足夠議席。</p> +<p>Third, the position of states such as Japan will be of considerable significance. While support in line with the obligations Japan accepted under the 1997 US–Japan defence guidelines is likely, deeper involvement by Japan would have considerable effects, given that the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) fields what is still the region’s largest force of destroyers (other than that of the US Navy), as well as 22 attack submarines.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/55lPYhx.png" alt="image70" /> -▲ 2020年7月31日，政府宣布押後2021年立法會選舉。</p> +<h4 id="resource-demands-of-a-taiwan-invasion">Resource Demands of a Taiwan Invasion</h4> -<p>不過，法官認為，涉案計劃最終會否成功，並不由法庭自行作出猜測，但是可以肯定的是所有參與者均用盡努力希望令涉案計劃成功。從證據可見，兩名主要組織者均對於計劃感到樂觀，他們動用大量時間和金錢來舉行記者會、協調會議和選舉論壇，又委託民調機構、眾籌計劃等。一些獨立人士招募義工來協助計劃。各初選競選者組成選舉團隊、認真設計和構思選舉單張；他們亦收集選舉提名、提交選舉按金，以上種種行動均顯示所有初選參與者都希望能夠成功舉行到初選。</p> +<p><em>The Opening Stage of an Invasion</em></p> -<p>此外，對於萬一有人被取消資格，他們亦有詳細討論「Plan B」制度，顯示他們考慮及討論過所有可能發生的情況。除了參與初選的人之外，沒有參與初選、但發起「三投三不投」的被告吳政亨，則投放大量金錢賣廣告。</p> +<p>Any Chinese assault on Taiwan would be preceded both by political indicators and by a joint firepower strike operation combining ballistic missiles, cruise missiles and fixed-wing aircraft in both suppressive and attack roles against airbases, surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems and command nodes on both Taiwan and, in all likelihood, US airbases such as Kadena in Japan. A People’s Liberation Army (PLA) joint firepower strike operation is closely modelled on USAF operations during the Gulf War and would probably comprise functionally similar elements, although it is likely that the initial deep penetration provided by the F-117 would instead be provided by short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) such as the DF-15, and hypersonic glide vehicles such as the DF-17.</p> -<h4 id="官61萬名投票市民亦不認為計劃絕對不能實現">官：61萬名投票市民亦不認為計劃絕對不能實現</h4> +<p><em>China’s Amphibious Capabilities</em></p> -<p>法官認為，若非疫情緣故導致2021年的立法會選舉延期，涉案計劃並不是註定失敗。當初選投票日在7月11及12日舉行時，從沒有人提及過這計劃純綷「學術操作」（no more than an academic exercise），或者說計劃絕對不能實現，「61萬名普通市民亦不認為是如此。」</p> +<p>A Chinese amphibious assault on Taiwan could then develop in several ways. The PLA could opt for an assault on a relatively broad front involving all or most of the 14 or so beaches on Taiwan that can support a landing at battalion scale or larger. This would have the advantage of imposing uncertainty regarding where to concentrate defending Taiwanese troops, much as the choice of five landing beaches and elaborate preceding deception operations set the conditions for Operation Overlord. Taiwan’s beaches are relatively narrow, and the PLA’s amphibious doctrine calls for combined arms battalions (the basic unit of force of the People’s Liberation Army Ground Force (PLAGF) and the People’s Liberation Army Navy Marine Corps (PLANMC)) to occupy 2–4 km in the assault, making an attack on multiple axes likely given the constrained geography of each individual landing site. That said, it should be noted that even if comparable in success to the 1991 Gulf War, a PLA joint firepower operation would last for several weeks and take more than a week to achieve air superiority (based on the air campaign during Desert Storm), giving Taiwan’s defenders time to prepare approaches to the island with several hundred mines in a short timeframe (assuming that Taiwan’s minelayers and submarines are not destroyed in port early). The People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) fields a robust force of more than 40 mine countermeasure vessels, but these ships would have limited organic defences against surviving Taiwanese anti-ship cruise missile (ASCM) batteries. This in turn could incentivise an invasion plan that focuses on a smaller subset of beaches requiring fewer Q-routes (safe routes through minefields), making it less susceptible to disruption if too many mine countermeasure vessels are sunk in any one channel.</p> -<p>法官指，正如每宗涉及顛覆國家政權案件般，若要計劃成功，組織者和參與者均有一些困難需要克服，因此法官拒絕接納「計劃註定失敗」的說法，以及不會判處較輕刑罰。</p> +<p>Nevertheless, the PLAN will in the immediate term face limitations in terms of dedicated amphibious lift capabilities. China has the capability to field nine Type 071 landing platform docks, which can carry 65 armoured vehicles, as well as a further four Type 075 landing helicopter docks (LHDs), which can support amphibious assault with assault craft launched from their well decks and can also carry vertical lift assets (and, in the future, vertical take-off and landing UAVs). In addition, the PLAN fields a larger number of older amphibious vessels, such as the Type 072A and the Type 072III, which can carry 250 troops and 10 armoured vehicles each. Collectively, the PLAN fields 49 landing ship tanks across the Eastern and Southern theatre commands, with 57 across the force. Given that the PLAN built four Type 075s between 2019 and 2024, it is likely that it could expand its fleet of LHDs to roughly double by the end of the decade. However, even accounting for a considerable expansion, the size of an initial assault wave would be limited, given that even the Type 075 LHD could in principle carry most (but not all) of a PLA combined arms battalion’s armour, vehicles and troops. A battalion’s organic capabilities must nevertheless be carried on multiple vessels, and so the landing of a single battalion is expected to occur in several waves. Even a larger future PLAN amphibious lift capability would, then, have limited excess capacity relative to the magnitude of its tasks, and the loss of a portion of the force would condemn an invasion to failure.</p> -<h4 id="官接受部份被告被戴耀廷誤導而相信初選不違法">官接受部份被告被戴耀廷誤導而相信初選不違法</h4> +<p>It has been pointed out that a focus on dedicated landing vessels may substantially undervalue the PLAN’s aggregate strength because it ignores China’s efforts to prepare its civilian shipping industry to support amphibious operations in the Taiwan Strait. When China’s dual-use civilian vessels are incorporated into an analysis, the PLAN’s aggregate freight capacity almost trebles to 1.1 million tons. Based on assumptions derived from previous amphibious operations, this would imply an aggregate capability to move around 12 combined arms brigades across the Taiwan Strait in a single wave – in effect, all the amphibious-capable brigades of the PLANMC and the PLAGF.</p> -<p>部份被告聲稱，基於戴耀廷多次重申初選不違法，所以他們當時真誠誤信涉案謀劃為合法。法官表示，就部份被告而言，接受他們有上述說法；但是就戴耀廷和楊岳橋而言，法官不接受他們基於對法律無知而犯案，因二人是律師，加上二人堅決地執行涉案計劃。法官又指，涉案計劃在他們眼中是合法與否，並無關宏旨，他們的而且確曾向其他人推銷涉案計劃。</p> +<p>There are, however, outstanding questions regarding the use of non-dedicated vessels for sealift, although the PLAN does appear to be testing their potential for assault roles in exercises. Among them is whether such vessels are more suited to functions for joint logistics rather than the shore, which still appears to be the primary role for which the PLAN is rehearsing. The possibility that civilian vessels could considerably expand China’s amphibious lift therefore cannot be excluded. On balance, however, the loss of a significant part of an already limited fleet of dedicated amphibious vessels should condemn an invasion to failure, as these vessels will be critical to the success of an initial assault wave.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/t2fPuG8.png" alt="image71" /> -▲ 楊岳橋</p> +<p><em>Airborne Forces in an Island Landing Campaign</em></p> -<p>法官指，戴耀廷主張極端的「攬炒十步曲」，雖然他在求情信中聲稱從來無意以該十步曲作為其政治行動藍圖，但是該文章的確作出該主張。不論如何，戴在數個月以來持續發表文章，其進取思想有跡可尋。實質上，戴是提倡了一場革命。法官另指，楊岳橋在公民黨記者會中使用強烈措辭，可見他亦非常進取。</p> +<p>The People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) could also play a role in any amphibious assault, but only if China’s joint firepower operation succeeds. The PLAAF’s Airborne Corps comprises six combined arms brigades and one special operations forces brigade, supported by a fleet of 31 Y-20 transport aircraft and 20 Russian-made IL-76 airlifters, and a larger number of light Y-9 aircraft. These airborne brigades and their constituent battalions are equipped with the ZBD-03 armoured fighting vehicle (AFV) and both the 122-mm PL-96 and the 107-mm PH-63 MLRS. An airborne brigade’s table of organisation and equipment is comparable to that of a PLA medium combined arms brigade. There are, however, considerable differences between individual brigades. The 127th, 128th and 131st Brigades, for example, appear to be light motorised units equipped with all-terrain vehicles and can be paradropped. In addition, the 130th Combined Arms Brigade is air-assault capable and supported by roughly 41 Z-8KA, Z-9WZ and Z-10 utility, transport and attack helicopters. The heavier brigades equipped with the ZBD-03 AFV would probably be moved by IL-76 or Y-20 and would thus require motorised and air-assault units to have secured access to an airfield. In addition, the PLAGF fields two air-assault brigades that have exercised in tandem with the PLAAF Airborne Corps since 2021. According to PLA textbook The Science of Campaigns, airborne forces can support preliminary operations, such as deception and decapitation, or can enable the operational dislocation of an opponent through landings in depth and assault operations, where they would be a first echelon force tasked with seizing beach-heads. The Science of Campaigns is, however, realistic about the limitations of airborne assault, noting that absolute air superiority is required to enable airborne assaults, and that they should be treated as an essentially discretionary activity to be supported by four waves of attack aircraft for every one wave of transport. In effect, for airborne units to land freely, the PLAN and PLAAF require the ability to operate freely over Taiwanese airspace to an extent that would allow the suppression of both pop-up SAM threats and man-portable air defence systems (MANPADs). If this is lacking, it will prove difficult to seize airfields long enough for the heavier elements of a force to move, as illustrated by the Russian Airborne Forces at Hostomel.</p> -<h4 id="官需考慮國安法前言行-以考慮串謀嚴重性及各人角色">官：需考慮《國安法》前言行 以考慮串謀嚴重性及各人角色</h4> +<p><em>The Determinants of Success for Attacker and Defender</em></p> -<p>戴耀廷的代表大律師曾力陳，法庭量刑時不應考慮被告在《國安法》生效之前的言行，因當時並不違法。法官表示，接受被告當初協議所作的事並不違法，直至《國安法》生效之後才變成違法，可是他們繼續留在該協議之中，並繼續參與涉案計劃。雖然控罪時期從2020年7月1日才開始，但是法庭不會完全不考慮7月1日之前發生的事情，因為需要評估涉案串謀的嚴重性和廣泛性，以及各人在計劃中的角色。不過法官強調，被告不會因為《國安法》生效之前的言行而受罰。</p> +<p>Even accounting for civilian lift and airborne forces, a considerably larger PLA first wave would be small relative to the Taiwanese armed forces, which would field a 90,000-strong defending land force. The historical average force-on-force ratio (1941–2002) for successful amphibious assaults is 1:5.29. There are notable exceptions, including the fall of Crete (1940) and the assault on Saipan (1944). In each of these cases, the success of the assault was enabled primarily by absolute air superiority on the side of the attacker. It is thus not unreasonable to conclude that anything short of air supremacy is a defeat condition for a PLA amphibious assault. Moreover, the small size of the force relative to the defender means that even limited losses of amphibious vessels can condemn an invasion to failure.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/lSdJBOE.png" alt="image72" /> -▲ 戴耀廷</p> +<p>As such, the dominant consideration will be whether the PLAN and the PLAAF can both secure air supremacy around Taiwan (at least for a time) and protect amphibious vessels against non-aerial methods of attack (mines and submarines).</p> -<h4 id="初選的競選者應被歸類為積極參與者">初選的競選者應被歸類為「積極參與者」</h4> +<p>The first determinant will be whether the PLA is able to create an effective joint engagement zone (JEZ) in and around the Taiwan Strait to minimise the effects of cruise missile attacks on its dedicated amphibious vessels, which will remain crucial to ultimate success, even if augmented with civilian shipping. The PLAN currently fields 33 theatre air-defence vessels, such as the Type 052D guided missile destroyer (DDG) and the Type 055, and could field up to 50 by the end of the decade, based on the construction rates achieved by China in recent years. Vessels such as the Type 052D are equipped with the Type 346A active electronically scanned array antenna (AESA) radar and can carry long-range SAMs such as the HHQ-9, as well as shorter-range 16-km HHQ-6 missiles. China’s Type 055 cruiser is also equipped with an AESA and can quad pack shorter-range HHQ-6 SAMs in some of its 112 vertical launching system cells. Vessels such as the Type 052D and the Type 055 would likely be deployed in surface action groups (SAGs) both in the Taiwan Strait and east of Taiwan to create a layered air-defence network. Of particular significance to the PLAN would be closing off channels such as the Bashi Channel and northern approaches to the Taiwan Strait, through which ASCMs can travel without prior deconfliction with Taiwan’s own air defences.</p> -<p>部份被告求情時稱，本案涉及的《國安法》第22(3)條（嚴重干擾、阻撓、破壞中央政權機關或者香港特區政權機關依法履行職能），嚴重性比第22(1)、(2)、(3)條為低，包括「推翻、破壞中國憲法所確立的中國根本制度」、「推翻中央或特區政權」和「攻擊、破壞香港特區政權機關履職場所及其設施」。惟法官不接納此說法，因罪行的嚴重性取決於很多因素，包括計劃規模、執行方式和手段、涉及人數、潛在損害和實際後果等。</p> +<p>In addition, the PLAAF is likely to fly patrols over the Taiwan Strait. Since the mid-2000s, Chinese fighters such as the J-10, J-11 and J-16 have fielded the PL-12, an air-to-air missile (AAM) with a profile comparable to the AIM-120, which probably uses an imported seeker from the Russian R-77 AAM. This interceptor will probably be replaced by the PL-15, a longer-range missile with an onboard AESA radar comparable to the AIM-120C/D AAM. While not primarily built for cruise missile intercept in the vein of the Russian MIG-31, these aircraft can contribute to defensive counter-air missions in and around the Taiwan Strait.</p> -<p>就本案而言，法官指初選的競選者是涉案計劃之中的重要人物，沒有他們，涉案計劃便不可能開始，他們支持及積極參與在這計劃之中，因此應被歸類為「積極參與者」。若計劃持續執行直到結尾，所帶來的負面後果可以很深遠，比顛覆特區政權有過之而無不及。</p> +<p>By contrast, many of China’s ground-based SAMs would have limited utility in protecting amphibious vessels. While the notional range of a system such as the HQ-9 SAM theoretically allows it to cover most of the Taiwan Strait, in practice constraining factors such as the limitations imposed on radar by the curvature of the Earth when tracking low altitude targets will come into play. Airborne Warning and Control Systems (AWACS) such as the KJ-2000 could be used to provide line of sight, but as illustrated by the Russian air campaign in Ukraine, AWACS can be vulnerable to electronic attack and, by virtue of being large high-flying aircraft, can also be intercepted at long distances by the long-range SAMs on US DDGs. Russia also struggles to cue ground-based air defence systems with its A-50 Mainstay AWACS due to the fact that data transfers are mediated by combined arms army headquarters, a problem that may also be inherent in PLA C2, in which a joint theatre command plays a central role. That said, Russian air defences in Ukraine have scored very long-range intercepts against low-flying aircraft cued by S-band radar, such as the Podolet-K1 radar, as well as by passive coherent location, and it is likely that Chinese ground-based SAMs can rely on their own onboard radar to conduct engagements based on less detailed feeds.</p> -<h3 id="法官指11名認罪被告有真誠悔意-當局評估是否提早釋放時會考慮">法官指11名認罪被告有真誠悔意 當局評估是否提早釋放時會考慮</h3> +<p>While this is possible, it is unlikely to be a reliable mechanism for defeating low-flying ASCMs. As such, the utility of long-range SAMs such as HQ-9 and S-400 for maritime air defence is likely to be attenuated. Shorter-range systems, such as the 40-km HQ-16 SAM, are of even more limited utility, although these systems will play an important role in protecting amphibious vessels from being struck in port, either by Taiwanese systems such as the Hsiung Feng-II anti-ship missile system, or by US standoff munitions.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/nQcB15D.png" alt="image73" /></p> +<p>China could attempt to secure islands such as Penghu ahead of an assault on Taiwan and build them into air-defence bastions, although their limited space and mountainous geography, as well as their proximity to the mainland (and thus a range of attack vectors), are complicating factors. Notably, as recently as a decade ago the PLA doctrinally subdivided zones of responsibility for SAM fighter aircraft and vessels and emphasised SAM ambushes and point defence for ground-based air-defence systems. While this might have changed, the limitations of China’s capacity to integrate the different service level air-defence capabilities that drove this delineation may persist. Even if cued by a US-style cooperative engagement capability, the PLAAF ground-based air-defence systems would depend on maritime and air assets for cueing and could not play an independent role.</p> -<p>【獨媒報導】47人涉組織及參與民主派初選，被控「串謀顛覆國家政權」罪，其中31人認罪，16人不認罪受審，除李予信及劉偉聰，其餘14人罪成，45人被判囚4年2個月至10年。法官在判詞提到，其中11名被告展現真誠悔意，相信當局未來評估是否批准提早釋放時，會納入考慮。代表岑子杰的辯方提到，在《維護國家安全條例》生效後，《監獄規則》有所修改，因此岑並未能獲得減刑。惟法官指，減刑是由懲教署署長決定，而非法庭考慮之列。</p> +<p>If a Chinese integrated air defence system (IADS) comprising primarily maritime and air elements performs robustly, the number of cruise missiles required to inflict crippling damage on an invading fleet will be substantial. For example, a 2009 RAND study calculated that roughly 52 out of a notional force of 100 PLA amphibious vessels, which China was assumed to have by 2020 (larger, it turns out, than the PLAN today possesses, but perhaps a realistic figure for 2027–30), would need to be sunk or mission killed to prevent the PLA from concentrating roughly 60,000 troops on Taiwan over several trips. The historical average hit rate for cruise missiles against defended targets is around 0.26, and it is likely that, at least for larger vessels, more than one ASCM will be required to achieve either a mission kill or a sinking. A success rate of 80% is also the peak rate achieved by the land-based Ukrainian IADS against missiles such as the Kalibr and the KH-101 cruise missile around Kyiv. Some studies suggest the effectiveness of an Aegis-like system against cruise missiles is probably higher, with vessels enjoying a single-shot probability of kill (SSPK) of 0.95, though this may not be realistic under combat conditions. Moreover, there are factors other than active defence that are relevant. For example, soft-kill measures against missile seekers with the aim of either jamming or spoofing them are likely to increase in effectiveness as a conflict progresses, since the PLAN will be exposed to the seeker frequencies of US missiles. The PLA will use maritime militia vessels as decoys to generate maritime clutter.</p> -<p>翻查報導，《維護國家安全條例》於今年3月生效，並對《監管釋囚條例》及《監獄規則》作出修訂，列明若囚犯是被裁定犯危害國家安全的罪行而服刑，除非懲教署署長信納提早釋放或減刑不會不利國家安全，否則不得將囚犯的個案轉介予監管釋囚委員會考慮，或不得獲減刑。</p> +<p><em>Drawing on US Capabilities</em></p> -<p>11名認罪被告獲法官指有悔意，相信當局未來評估是否批准提早釋放時，會納入考慮。</p> +<p>As such, even a strategy focused on the relatively modest goal of sea denial would see a significant section of US anti-surface warfare capabilities drawn to the region. It is not inconceivable that up to 1,000 ASCMs would be required by the US and Taiwan to cripple an invasion fleet. The US plans to export 400 Harpoon ASCMs to Taiwan and will field 450 long-range anti-ship missiles (LRASMs) by the end of the decade, along with older Harpoon ASCMs and joint air-to-surface standoff missiles (JASSMs), which potentially have anti-ship functionality. However, the utility of the JASSM as an anti-ship missile is open to debate, while stocks of Harpoon will be nearing the end of their service lives, resulting in the US facing a shortfall.</p> -<h4 id="以下為法官就抗爭派5人有悔意的判詞">以下為法官就抗爭派5人有悔意的判詞：</h4> +<p>Other anti-ship options are also possible, including the SM-6, the Naval Strike Missile (in service with the US Marine Corps) and Maritime Strike Tomahawk. This adds considerable capacity as, to use one example, 825 SM-6 missiles have been delivered to the US Navy to date. However, many of these systems are dual use (SM-6 is also an air-defence asset, while Tomahawk has a land-attack role), so their employment as anti-ship missiles involves trade-offs in an environment where US vessels will come under heavy attack from the PLA’s missile arsenal.</p> -<p><strong>張可森：展現真誠悔意</strong></p> +<p><em>Limiting Factors</em></p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/G8EQBLr.png" alt="image74" /></p> +<p>Launch platforms and tempo of activity represent a particularly acute limiting factor, given the risks that platforms such as vessels and aircraft take if they operate within a Chinese anti-access area-denial system comprised of long-range strike assets such as the DF-17 hypersonic boost glide missile and the DF-21D anti-ship ballistic missile (although the range of cruise missiles such as the LRASM mitigates these risks somewhat). The tempo at which successful strikes would need to be delivered would strain the US military, but this will be compounded if aircraft such as the F/A-18 (one of the platforms on which the LRASM is carried) have to take off from greater distances and rely on enablers such as tankers, against which the PLA is optimising fighter aircraft such as the J-20 to conduct long-range intercepts.</p> -<p><strong>岑敖暉：有真誠悔意，已成為不同的人（a different person than before）</strong></p> +<p><em>Other Options</em></p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/mmhfuXy.png" alt="image75" /></p> +<p>Anti-ship missiles are not the only means of sinking vessels available to the US and Taiwan. Although the relatively shallow waters of the Taiwan Strait are not optimal for nuclear attack submarines (SSNs), attack submarines such as the Seawolf class are built to operate in shallow waters if necessary. Moreover, the layout of an air-defence screen for a Chinese landing force would probably require at least some Chinese surface combatants to operate in what PLA doctrine describes as a “forward-edge” defence role beyond the first island chain, in which SSNs are likely to be considerably more lethal.</p> -<p><strong>劉頴匡：接受他願意承擔全部責任、表達悔意及承諾不再犯法</strong></p> +<p>More modern Chinese ships, such as the Type 055, are equipped with credible sensor suites, including both hull-mounted and towed array sonar, as well as the capacity to host two Z-20F helicopters, and some Chinese scholars argue that the assumption that the PLAN’s surface vessels are vulnerable to submarines is incorrect. The PLAN also fields the region’s largest fleet of anti-submarine warfare (ASW) frigates, such as the Type 054A/B along with 76 Type 056 corvettes, which can be used as active emitters, given their relative expendability, although active sonar has its own limitations. China still maintains a relatively limited number of key assets, such as the Y-8Q maritime patrol aircraft (MPA), and the limited evidence of China exercising the coordinated use of ASW assets through synthetic training of MPA crews is showing a growing emphasis on realism. While the PLAN likely has excellent situational awareness in certain areas such as the South China Sea, where it maintains a robust network of sensors, beyond the first island chain it probably faces limitations. These include limited numbers of MPAs, a relative lack of high-endurance helicopters (although this gap is now being filled by the Z-18F) and noisy SSNs, which will be uncompetitive beyond the first island chain. Recent studies examining the difficulties Chinese submariners face on longer deployments also highlight a degree of institutional inexperience. There are, however, offsetting US challenges – namely the fact that, by 2027, the US submarine fleet is likely to reach a nadir in terms of the number of boats at its disposal (with the US Navy likely to field 48 boats at the end of the decade, despite a formal requirement for 66). This force will need to track and contain China’s own SSKs (diesel-electric submarines specialised for anti-submarine duties) and SSNs, in addition to performing offensive functions.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/J2GPRw7.png" alt="image76" /></p> +<p>The dynamics and specific characteristics of a Sino-American competition below the waves cannot easily be addressed in detail – the key inputs are too sensitive to approach with open source analysis. However, the determinants of success for each side can more readily be discussed.</p> -<p><strong>黃子悅：她解釋情緒病情況、願意承擔責任</strong></p> +<p><em>Determinants of US Subsea Success</em></p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/yUK1bTR.png" alt="image77" /></p> +<p>For the US, the employment of SSNs would probably serve several purposes – deep strike, attacks on PLAN SAGs and controlling chokepoints through which the PLA’s SSKs and SSNs might seek transit, and direct attacks on an amphibious force. In addition, SSN operations in the South China Sea might represent a means of diverting Chinese resources. The key constraint that the US will face is that with the exception of deep strike and the elimination of an outer layer of SAGs, many of the missions that SSNs will perform may also require them to transit chokepoints such as the Bashi Channel, over which the PLA could plausibly have early air and naval control, while shallower transit routes will likely be mined by the PLAN’s own submarines. The constraint of geography does not necessarily mean that submarine activity will stop, but it can certainly be slowed if SSNs need to account for minefields and SQ-5 active sonobuoys, laid by both MPAs and Z-18 helicopters. While the ability of the PLAN to detect quiet SSNs is likely to be limited, it should be noted that combat modelling from the Cold War era suggests that in constrained and heavily mined waters the attrition rates of even a force that enjoys a considerable advantage in quietness will be difficult to sustain over time.</p> -<p><strong>王百羽：接受他已改過自新（a changed man）</strong></p> +<p>Additionally, even successful submarine campaigns have high attrition rates – for example, during the Second World War the US Navy lost 52 of the 248 submarines it deployed to the Pacific, in what is generally regarded as one of history’s most successful submarine campaigns. At least some attrition should be anticipated, irrespective of US advantages, which will lead to a demand for the reallocation of SSNs from elsewhere.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/Yk3xQDz.png" alt="image78" /></p> +<p>On the other side of the ledger, the US Navy will need to bottle the PLAN’s fleet of SSKs and SSNs within the first island chain to protect its own surface forces in the Pacific from the PLAN’s 48 SSKs and six SSNs. While the Type 093 SSN is still a noisy platform relative to Western and Russian analogues, the PLAN’s SSKs are both quiet and, in the case of the newer Type 039C class, equipped with air-independent propulsion, which increases endurance. China faces constraints, including a requirement for its submarines to transit the same limited number of chokepoints to attack forces beyond the first island chain. However, if the US faces a requirement to track multiple contacts in a crisis escalating to conflict (during which submarines cannot be engaged at chokepoints) this will prove resource intensive. For example, three MPAs are required to maintain a single aircraft on station over a 12-hour period, and once an MPA makes contact with a submarine, tracking it often requires either a surface vessel or a submarine to be devoted to the task over an extended period – spreading resources thin in the early stages of a conflict.</p> -<p><strong>朱凱廸：展現真誠悔意</strong></p> +<p><em>Air Supremacy Over the Taiwan Strait</em></p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/Wz9xJkd.png" alt="image79" /></p> +<p>In the air, the degree to which the US and its allies view air superiority over the Taiwan Strait as a prerequisite for operational success will be a major consideration. In theory, the PLA has a greater requirement for air supremacy than any US-led coalition. Since the PLA is unlikely to achieve a 3:1 numerical advantage on the ground early in an assault, airpower, both fixed wing and helicopters, will be a crucial force multiplier. This is noted in a number of Chinese publications on the subject of amphibious assault, which stress the importance of capabilities such as LHDs, which can launch both helicopters and vertical take-off and landing UAVs to augment fixed-wing aircraft. It is acknowledged, however, that the range of capabilities that can enable beyond-visual-range engagements will mean that control of the air will probably be temporally and spatially bounded. The PLAAF has been steadily improving its direct-attack capabilities over the past two decades. The J-10 series is equipped with the K/JDC01A targeting and laser designator pod to enable the use of precision-guided munitions, and China’s Flanker derivative, the J-16, is equipped with the YINGS-III pod, which is a rough analogue to the USAF’s Sniper Advanced Targeting Pod. In addition, helicopters of the PLAGF, such as the Z-10 and Z-19, can contribute to the suppression of shore-based defences.</p> -<h4 id="以下為法官就非抗爭派6人有悔意的判詞">以下為法官就非抗爭派6人有悔意的判詞：</h4> +<p>All of this depends, however, on the ability of the PLAAF and the PLAN to achieve at least temporary air supremacy over the Taiwan Strait and any likely landing sites. The survival of Taiwan’s air defences as at least a “pop-up” threat, as well as the ability of the US Navy and USAF to mount offensive counter-air operations over the Strait would, in principle, be sufficient to deny the PLAAF the freedom of action needed to deliver a breakthrough, much in the way that Ukraine was able to deny the VKS (Russian Aerospace Forces) air superiority for the first two years of the war in Ukraine. This depends, however, on the ability of the US Navy and USAF to sustain a tempo of activity and level of attrition necessary to give the People’s Liberation Army Naval Air Force (PLANAF) and the PLAAF an incentive to limit their operations over the Strait, while themselves being forced to operate at greater ranges due to the land-based missile threat. In 2015, research conducted by RAND suggested that the likelihood of the US achieving either air superiority or a victory sufficient to drive the PLAAF from the Taiwan Strait would be constrained if the distance from which platforms would need to operate increased, as it necessarily would if the tempo of US air sorties was lowered by the requirement to keep aircraft carriers out of range of the DF-17 and DF-21D. This in turn might lead to the inference that an offensive counter-air campaign cannot be effective unless the sortie rates of the PLAAF and the PLANAF are also lowered, necessitating strikes on the Chinese mainland and an enabling suppression of enemy air defences (SEAD) effort. For example, capabilities such as cruise missile submarines (SSGNs) equipped with the US Navy’s new hypersonic glide vehicle might be used to create gaps in the Chinese IADS, which aircraft could temporarily exploit, provided that they receive real-time targeting data from offboard sources.</p> -<p><strong>楊岳橋：接受重犯機會低</strong></p> +<p><em>Air Defence</em></p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/iDRIqTA.png" alt="image80" /></p> +<p>Even if pervasive ISR can be delivered, the types of missiles likely to penetrate an IADS without robust enablement (such as the US hypersonic Dark Eagle) are likely to be scarce, relative to their targets. Limited SEAD using expensive munitions such as the Dark Eagle (which will be launched from Virginia-class SSGNs if cued by offboard sources) might open gaps in an IADS to enable the use of slower long-range standoff capabilities such as the Tomahawk Land Attack Missile or strategic bombers to suppress airbases. While disrupting air activity is likely to be important, any effort to achieve this on a consistent basis would require US aircraft to sortie even further than they would need to in the context of offensive/defensive counter-air (OCA/DCA) missions over Taiwan, as some elements of an air defence network would be inland. Moreover, the amount of payload required to cause irreparable damage to an airbase is considerable. For example, Shayrat Airbase in Homs, Syria was made functional again in just a day despite being hit with 58 cruise missiles. In this context, a SEAD and strike campaign to disrupt the 32 PLAAF airbases within 800 km of Taiwan would be functionally indistinguishable from AirSea Battle as originally envisioned, and thus as difficult to resource. An air and naval force that can conduct such a campaign can achieve the much more modest goal of OCA/DCA over Taiwan (which would probably condemn an invasion to failure) with relative ease, making strikes inland at large scale superfluous, given how critical air superiority is to the PLA.</p> -<p><strong>郭家麒：接受重犯機會低</strong></p> +<p>Assessments regarding the tempo of activity required to achieve a successful DCA effort can be contested if the object of the effort is presumed to be air denial. First, the figures that were deemed to determine success in previous analysis were based on air superiority, not denial per se, and thus set a high bar for the levels of attrition the US Navy and USAF need to inflict (and thus the number of sorties required). Successful air-denial campaigns such as North Vietnam’s defence of Hanoi during the Vietnam War and the Egyptian defence during the early days of the Yom Kippur War in 1973 inflicted considerably less attrition – roughly 4% per sortie in each case – before air operations were either temporarily deemed prohibitively difficult or had to be enabled in ways that reduced the overall tempo of activity to the point of operational ineffectiveness.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/jasTJk5.png" alt="image81" /></p> +<p>Second, the impact of Taiwan’s own SAM network, comprised of systems such as Patriot and the TK-III, must also be considered. This network could certainly be crippled early in a conflict, particularly if its constituent sensors emitted to defend high-value targets against ballistic missiles, but elements could also be conserved to present a pop-up threat to aircraft near likely landing sites. The US Navy’s own SAGs would also likely be able to inflict attrition on PLA aircraft from beyond the first island chain. Although the effective range of SAM systems such as the SM-2 and SM-6 will be constrained by factors such as target altitude, they are likely to inflict attrition on PLA fast air, especially as the latter moves beyond the first island chain to engage tankers and AWACS.</p> -<p><strong>吳敏兒：承認違法、承擔責任及表達歉意</strong></p> +<p>An additional reason for a focus on denial over the Taiwan Strait is that the ISR required to sustain attacks on the mainland cannot be assured, although steps are being taken to make it more resilient.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/6Ko58tx.png" alt="image82" /></p> +<p>The US operates a diverse list of ISR capabilities in the air and in space. In the air, both autonomous systems and crewed aircraft, such as the U-2, can provide rapidly deployable reconnaissance. In 2019, the USAF was reported to have “425 manned and unmanned aircraft of 14 different types” at its disposal for data collection, although not all of these will necessarily be survivable in a hostile IADS.</p> -<p><strong>范國威：接受他對犯法感後悔、並選擇認罪</strong></p> +<p>The vast ISR infrastructures in space are constantly being diversified to meet the new realities of the space age – the emergence of commercial actors and the continuous threat against space systems. The US National Reconnaissance Office is responsible for spy satellites, and is already working on a more proliferated infrastructure, which may hint at the placement of satellites in different orbits to cover different purposes. While satellites in higher orbits (such as Medium Earth Orbit, from 2,000 km and above) can cover wider regions, satellites in lower orbits (low earth orbit (LEO), below 2,000 km) can provide more detailed and perhaps more tactically relevant information.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/PXqOpci.png" alt="image83" /></p> +<p>However, the availability of persistent ISR against elusive targets cannot be assumed. US dependence on space assets and pervasive ISR more broadly presents a potential weakness. The PLA is growing increasingly reliant on its own space weapons, including in the targeting realm. Moreover, many of the large, fixed-wing ISR assets on which the US’s way of war has depended thus far will not be survivable in the Pacific.</p> -<p><strong>呂智恆：有真誠悔意</strong></p> +<p><em>Space Warfare Aspects</em></p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/lxmj5qp.png" alt="image84" /></p> +<p>Space systems – the satellite in orbit, the ground station on Earth and the signals in between – are all vulnerable to attack. In terms of disrupting ISR assets, satellites could be interfered with temporarily or permanently through laser dazzling or a cyber attack. At the extreme end of the spectrum, the satellite could be permanently damaged through a high-altitude nuclear explosion or a kinetic kill through either a co-orbital weapon or a direct-ascent anti-satellite missile. China’s capabilities in that realm are not entirely clear, partly because they have not yet been demonstrated in a war. According to Chinese reports, however, a successful laser blinding test of a Chinese satellite at 600 km altitude was carried out as early as 2005. It is unclear whether this technology has since been used against non-Chinese assets. China also has the capability to kinetically destroy satellites – at least in LEO. Permanent interference with systems – either through a close proximity manoeuvre, a kinetic kill or a nuclear detonation, is theoretically possible, and in the case of China, practically possible as well, although these operations have mixed tactical utility. As such, a complete denial of ISR in the Pacific should not be assumed. Even so, the pervasive ISR needed to track transport erector launchers (TELs), which can move at relatively short notice (typically 15 minutes after a launch), will be difficult to achieve.</p> -<h3 id="何桂藍發帖歷史由有意志者書寫-人人可定義香港">何桂藍發帖：歷史由有意志者書寫 人人可定義香港</h3> +<p>The proliferation of commercial assets might add some resilience to surveillance networks. The US Space Force has made it clear that it wants to work more closely with commercial providers. Even if the PLA managed to destroy several sovereign ISR satellites, the number of missiles required would create so much debris that Chinese space assets in that orbit would most likely be adversely affected as well. For example, in 2024 the US Space Force published a commercial space strategy outlining how collaboration with the commercial space sector was going to be integrated in the future. The Space Force had already begun experimenting with a so-called “Space Tactical Layer”, which would integrate commercial satellite images “to improve battlespace awareness and expand its beyond-line-of-sight targeting capability”.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/4bBvT2X.png" alt="image85" /></p> +<p>Therefore, while the challenge of counter-space capabilities does not imply a complete denial of information, the level of low-latency ISR required to sustain a full-scale strike campaign against elusive targets is unlikely to be available. Strikes on the Chinese mainland will likely be a component of any US campaign, but their scale and tempo will probably be limited.</p> -<p>【獨媒報導】初選案今早判刑，不認罪的前記者何桂藍被判囚7年。何在判刑後於Facebook專頁以中、英文發文，回顧自己由2019年反修例運動至接受審訊時的所思所想。她形容，自己所參與的2020年的民主派初選是「香港最後一次自由公正的選舉」，而她選擇不認罪，是為了捍衛61萬港人的政治表態。</p> +<p><em>Summary</em></p> -<p>何又說，痛苦很難，甚至不可能分擔，但意志則可以真正穿透牆內外；她相信無人可以定義「香港係咩」，但人人都可以拓闊「香港可以係咩」：「我嘅選擇同行動就係我對『香港可以係咩』嘅回答。」</p> +<p>If the more modest aim of denying the PLAN and the PLAAF freedom of the skies is the primary operational aim, many of the challenges associated with tracking elusive targets inland and projecting power are less salient. Moreover, the tyranny of distance is less relevant if the US Navy and USAF are primarily operating either over the Taiwan Strait or as carriers of standoff missiles. To be clear, this report is not arguing that the US will necessarily achieve with ease the tempo of activity required to deny the PLA air superiority, merely that attacks on the mainland will not be determinative of their ability to do so.</p> -<p>在初選中參選新界東選區的何桂藍曾任職記者，在初選案中受審後被裁定罪成。法官在判辭形容，何是「擁有最激進政見的參與者之一」，何參選是望將香港現行制度「連根拔起」、反對「一國兩制」，無疑意圖令特區陷入完全停頓並「破局」。何沒有任何求情陳詞，法官考慮其角色後，以7年監禁為量刑起點，並因她是受審後定罪及無求情，故沒有減刑，判囚7年。</p> +<h3 id="ii-implications-for-europe">II. Implications for Europe</h3> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/RXnauhm.png" alt="image86" /> -▲ 初選案判刑日，法院外。</p> +<p>This chapter focuses on how the resource demands placed on the US in a Taiwan Strait contingency might affect conventional deterrence in Europe. Per the NATO Strategic Concept and the DDA family of plans, the Alliance must prepare for war at large scale on its eastern flank. A low-probability, high-impact contingency, which might focus contingency planning, would be a full-scale Russian invasion of the Baltic states, which has been discussed in some detail. Moreover, while some might challenge the realism of the Baltic case, it is still useful as a means of stress-testing European capabilities and baselining requirements for high-end warfighting in the event of a commitment of US capabilities elsewhere.</p> -<h4 id="何初選是香港最後一次自由公平的選舉-惟案件令人放棄民主希望">何：初選是香港「最後一次自由公平的選舉」 惟案件令人放棄民主希望</h4> +<p>This chapter does not seek to provide an exhaustive overview of every aspect of a potential clash between NATO and Russia, nor their specific dynamics. These details are highly contingent. Rather, its purpose is to examine how chosen US and Chinese strategies in the Indo-Pacific might have an impact upon specific sub-components of the aggregate military balance in Europe.</p> -<p>在文中，何桂藍先用英文回顧自己對2019年反修例運動的印象。何說，她記得人們參與反修例運動，是因為目睹了不公和壓迫，從而生起無法阻擋的衝動去表態及抗爭，並渴望與彼此建立聯繫。於是，港人汲取過去的失敗，花額外的努力進行溝通，小心翼翼不讓謠言從內部撕裂運動；而當社會制度一層接一層的崩潰，「我們超越恐懼，成為真正的公民社會，每個人都在實踐公民身份的真正含義。」</p> +<p>The discussion covers several areas. First, it analyses the impact of an Indo-Pacific campaign on the capacity of NATO to support a SEAD campaign in Europe. This is a clear priority, given that airpower represents the Alliance’s most viable means of offsetting the challenge of Russian combat mass on the ground. With more than 2,000 fourth-generation combat aircraft across the Alliance (excluding the US), European NATO has, in principle, the capacity to inflict a level of attrition comparable to that achieved in 1991 in Iraq, where allied airpower inflicted 24% attrition on the Republican Guard before it made contact with coalition ground forces. This depends, however, on the ability to attrit a dense multilayered Russian IADS built to preclude precisely this eventuality, and the success or failure of a campaign in Europe will depend in no small measure on whether this is achieved.</p> -<p>她續說，但當政權剝奪人們抗議的權利，「我哋」轉向另一條道路爭取回應，亦即選舉。她形容，自己參加的2020年的民主派初選，是香港「最後一次自由公平的選舉」；她因此被起訴，但選擇不認罪，是為了捍衛61萬投票港人的政治表態。她形容，本案是香港的轉捩點，「港人被恐嚇至沉默，被迫放棄民主的希望」。</p> +<p>Second, the availability of air and missile defences is examined, for several reasons. One reason is that Russian military scholarship has over the past decades placed a considerable emphasis on “non-contact warfare” – the ability to see and strike in depth. Russia views long-range strike as vital, both to its efforts to limit the impact of NATO airpower through suppression on the ground and to its ability to force war termination on favourable terms by targeting critical national infrastructure (CNI). Moreover, the threat of ballistic missiles at key chokepoints, such as railheads and bridges, will be a limiting factor for the rapid deployment of ground forces, as well as for the tempo of air activity.</p> -<p>何指，控方的指控不單是在「歪曲事實」，更在迫使被告否定過去的經歷，令團結、共同體、連繫、誠實的對話等等成為「烏托邦的夢想」，而非真實存在的事物。但她選擇對抗，以證明這些聯繫是已經實現並繼續存在；她過去的見證和經歷的事，構成和定義了她的身份，她要定義自己是誰。</p> +<p>Russia’s submarine fleet will play several functions in any conflict, acting not only as part of any strike campaign, with its new Yasen-class SSGNs, but also as a threat to allied sea lines of communication and CNI. The ability of NATO to contain the Northern Fleet is thus the third priority area on which this chapter focuses.</p> -<h4 id="何歷史係自由有意志嘅人書寫">何：歷史係自由有意志嘅人書寫</h4> +<p>Finally, the chapter examines the impact of an Indo-Pacific contingency on the land component of Supreme Allied Commander Europe’s (SACEUR) forces within the NATO area of responsibility, given the centrality of combat on the ground to deterring Russia, and since the land domain may be an area where trade-offs and resource constraints can most easily be avoided.</p> -<p>何桂藍在文章後段轉用中文，講述她對痛苦和自由的理解。她認為，痛苦很難，甚至不可能分擔，但意志則可以真正穿透牆內外。她又指，苦難令「我哋」的共同體出現，但無法成長，因此每個個體都要思考「自己本身想點」，選擇和承擔自由。</p> +<h4 id="potential-differences-between-sead-across-regions">Potential Differences Between SEAD Across Regions</h4> -<p>她說，「歷史唔係由贏者書寫，而係自由有意志嘅人書寫」，又指無人可以定義「香港係咩」，但人人都可以拓闊「香港可以係咩」：「係，會遇到好多限制同阻力，但正正係喺同現實碰撞先會知自己咩料，透過反覆嘅自我懷疑，先會淬煉出真正嘅執著。」</p> +<p>The degree to which SEAD in each region is dependent on the same sets of enablers is, fundamentally, a function of the chosen US approach in the Indo-Pacific. This stems from the fact that, in the early stages of a conflict over Taiwan, the IADS protecting an invasion force will be primarily comprised of maritime theatre air-defence platforms such as the Type 055 and Type 052D, as well as aircraft. Although the ability of the PLAN and the PLAAF to form a single JEZ is disputed, it is reasonable to assume that the PLA will accomplish similar effects to the Russian army’s SAM systems and the aircraft of the VKS in Ukraine. While China fields an increasingly robust array of ground-based SAM systems, including the indigenous HQ-9 and the Russian S-400, the degree to which these systems could provide coverage to a PLAN force from the Chinese mainland is likely to be limited, for reasons discussed in Chapter I and briefly restated here.</p> -<h3 id="專訪吳政亨我以傻為榮">專訪吳政亨：我以「傻」為榮</h3> +<p>Against low-flying targets such as cruise missiles, the radar horizon is still a factor that prevents missiles from being used at their theoretical maximum ranges. While capabilities such as AWACS can be used to cue ground-based SAM systems, the difficulties of doing so have been outlined in Chapter I. Additionally, these systems are large, difficult to hide and at the time of writing limited in number and likely to be targets for any US OCA campaign, as well as for strike assets built specifically to penetrate a Chinese IADS from standoff distances.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/oyXqNUW.png" alt="image87" /></p> +<p>This in turn means that SEAD in the Taiwan Strait is not primarily a function of finding and engaging elusive targets such as TELs. Rather, SEAD is largely synonymous with anti-surface warfare and OCA. If the picket of destroyers and cruisers protecting an invasion force suffers substantial losses and if PLA aircraft, including AWACS, cannot freely operate over the Strait, the amphibious vessels on which an invasion defends are much less defensible, with the probability of successful cruise missile strikes against them rising to 0.4–0.8. The challenge is not that targets are elusive, but rather that they are exceedingly well defended. Chinese analysts’ assumptions, for example, are that sinking a modern destroyer requires a combination of six ASCMs flying at different speeds and altitudes, as well as an anti-ship ballistic missile. Notably, these assessments are often based on overwhelming hard-kill systems and typically do not account for the fact that vessels have robust soft-kill mechanisms, including jamming and deployable digital radio frequency memory decoys.</p> -<p>【獨媒報導】歷時三年半，這宗《國安法》實施後最大規模的案件終於判刑。最初被指為案件「重要份子」之一的「三投三不投」發起人吳政亨，被判囚7年3個月。</p> +<p>By contrast, SEAD in the European context is primarily a function of the ability to suppress or destroy a layered network of elusive and mobile ground-based SAM systems. The outer layer of this network comprises shorter-range systems such as the SA-11 and the SA-15, with longer-range systems such as the SA-20/23 (S-300-PMU-2/S-300VM) and the SA-21 (S-400) positioned to the rear. Longer-range systems, by virtue of being able to emit, allow shorter-range systems to engage without turning on their own radar. Furthermore, systems such as the SA-22 Pantsir can act as shorter-range point defences against incoming munitions and UAVs.</p> -<p>「Hope for the best, prepare for the worst.」判刑前一周，在荔枝角收押所待了逾三年半的吳政亨一臉淡定，兩三句交待近況後，反問起探訪者的日常。印象之中，這幾年間他一直如此，甚少顯露負面情緒，也從未抱怨鐵窗內的生活。最大的變化，是瘦了差不多15公斤，幸好獄中規律的生活也令他健康狀況好轉。</p> +<p>This description, while a simplification, captures an inherent challenge of contending with the Russian IADS. To safely and consistently engage long-range SAM systems in rear areas, a larger number of elusive targets that form the outer layer of the network must first be destroyed. However, the task of attacking those short- and medium-range systems at the front edge of the IADS is greatly complicated by the presence of the long-range systems that enable short-range systems to engage without emitting. The long-range ISR platforms that enable the mapping and targeting of SAM systems in an IADS, such as the E-3 AWACS and E-8 JSTARS (Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System), are at risk of being engaged at extended distances by SAM systems such as the S-400. While missiles such as the 40N6 cannot be consistently cued at their maximum ranges (400 km) against low-flying aircraft (although they can intermittently conduct engagements at very long ranges), they can effectively engage larger targets at the extent of their range. Moreover, anti-radiation missiles designed for SEAD, such as the AGM-88 HARM, are both vulnerable to attrition by point defences and less effective when their target radars do not have to emit because they are receiving external cueing. As a consequence, they can be expended in unsustainable numbers. In the 1999 air war over Kosovo, for example, the Alliance expended 815 AGM-88 HARMs against a much weaker opponent. The resulting requirement is for munitions with both the low-radar cross-section needed to penetrate an IADS and the sophisticated seekers (typically either dual-mode or millimetric wave radar) needed to engage mobile targets when they have stopped emitting. Munitions in this category include the AARGM-ER and the SPEAR 3.</p> -<p>過去三年，《獨媒》與這名在政圈中「完完全全的無名氏」保持聯絡，了解他的成長經歷、政治啟蒙、獄中生活等等。吳政亨提到，自己在1997年前已隨家人移民澳洲，成年後才回到香港工作，並因2014年雨傘運動而對這地方改觀。</p> +<p>Largely, then, SEAD in the Indo-Pacific need not draw on the same munitions and enablers as SEAD/DEAD in Europe. The latter will depend on allied fleets of fifth-generation aircraft (which are the only air capability that can be employed at acceptable risk against an IADS) being equipped with sufficient stocks of munitions such as the ARRGM-ER, built to track elusive TEL and radar (TELAR) and mobile radar systems. These munitions have limited utility against SAGs, given their smaller payloads and the comparatively short distances from which they must be launched. While the functionality of munitions such as the AARGM-ER against ships has in theory been proven, the payload of the missile does not correspond to those needed to either inflict a mission kill on or sink a major surface combatant. Top attack against a vessel’s radar might be considered, but even a low-radar cross-section missile is vulnerable to being engaged by the point defence systems on a ship if it travels relatively high to engage a radar. Moreover, the launch ranges of the AARGM-ER would require aircraft carrying them to fly in areas where they are not only at risk from destroyers themselves but are also likely to engage in air-to-air combat with the PLAN and the PLAAF. In this context, the AARGM-ER will compete for rail space with air-to-air interceptors.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/UUd5EhP.png" alt="image88" /> -▲ 吳政亨從獄中寄出的部分信件。</p> +<p>The requirement to support two SEAD campaigns need not necessarily impose an unacceptable munition strain on the US if it supports allies in both Europe and the Indo-Pacific. However, this does not take into account the several other aspects of a credible SEAD capability currently lacking in European air forces, including the need to prioritise training for SEAD missions over other competencies. A purely materiel-focused deduction that could be drawn, however, is that the various gaps in European SEAD capability platforms and training represent a more acute issue than munitions, given the inherent differences in SEAD across the two theatres.</p> -<p>入獄之後，他一度自學法律，並且選擇不認罪。可曾覺得自己有點「傻」？吳反問「傻」的定義：「對我嚟講，『傻』只係代表『唔計到盡』同埋『唔自私』。係呢個定義之下，我認我係『傻』，我亦為自己嘅『傻』而覺得光榮。某程度上，我亦希望呢個世界多啲呢種『傻』人。」</p> +<p>There are several caveats worth noting. First, the above analysis is entirely premised on the assumption that sea denial, rather than overmatch, is the chosen US approach. In this context, the determinant of success is ultimately the ability to set the conditions for sinking enough amphibious vessels to make an invasion unviable, not to comprehensively defeat the PLA to force China’s leaders to negotiate. If it is deemed that war termination requires the ability to escalate against the Chinese mainland, for example because the PLA responds to failure by shifting to a blockade or a strategic bombardment, the same munitions and aircraft needed for SEAD in Europe will also be required in the Indo-Pacific. However, for the reasons outlined in Chapter I, it is deemed unlikely that this will be a viable option.</p> -<p>他明言，至今從未為自己的抉擇而後悔：「我真心相信呢件係正確嘅事，係我想做嘅事，亦係我需要做嘅事。當一個人真心地有呢種信念時，其實要堅持並不困難。」</p> +<p>Second, there will probably be ground-based SAM systems set up on islands such as the Pescadores if the PLA takes them, meaning that the suppression of systems such as the HQ-9 and the HQ-16 will not be entirely irrelevant.</p> -<p>（編按：吳政亨在初選案中選擇不認罪，今年5月被裁定罪成。法官稱，留意到在《國安法》實施後，吳仍繼續擁護「攬炒」思想，即破壞政府的職能，以讓政府遵守五大訴求；另外，吳還願意繼續推動計劃，並向他人施壓，確保初選獲勝的人才可以參選立法會。吳更在《蘋果日報》刊登廣告，敦促初選落敗者不要參選立法會。</p> +<p>A maritime SEAD campaign will draw on stocks of other capabilities such as ASCMs and submarines, among other things, all of which will be important in Europe. Although limited in size and complexity, Russian surface combatants can pose a threat at operational ranges from positions near their bastions, such as Kaliningrad, using 3M-14 Kalibr cruise missiles. While unlikely to be decisive, this could well result in a political demand to engage Russian surface combatants within well-defended bastions from which they launch cruise missiles that will draw on limited stocks of ASCMs, as well as capabilities such as SSKs and SSNs. While exact stocks of anti-ship missiles held by European states are unknown, several European navies have temporarily plugged the gap in this capability. Interestingly, one of the most pressing gaps that a US SEAD/DEAD campaign in the Pacific might create in Europe is a gap in surface lethality in the maritime domain.</p> -<p>法官認為，吳屬於「積極參加者」，並以7年半監禁作為起點。法官考慮到，吳並非追求個人利益，而計劃亦不涉暴力。法官接納吳可能受戴耀廷誤導計劃合法性，因此給予3個月減刑。由於吳不認罪，亦沒有其他扣減，因此判囚7年3個月。）</p> +<h4 id="iamd-a-capacity-challenge-across-the-board">IAMD: A Capacity Challenge Across the Board</h4> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/KFikAXv.png" alt="image89" /> -▲ 2024年11月19日，澳洲駐港總領事Gareth Williams到法院旁聽初選案判刑，並向傳媒稱到庭是為了支持澳洲公民吳政亨。</p> +<p>IAMD represents a capability that is especially fungible and likely to be in high demand across the Indo-Pacific and the Euro-Atlantic. Russian and Chinese concepts for future warfare envision long-range precision strike playing a prominent role, although Russia tends to accord a more prominent role to countervalue targeting than does China. Illustrative of the prominence of deep strike in Russian concepts of operations is the fact that Russia had by 2023 expended over 5,000 cruise and ballistic missiles in the war in Ukraine.</p> -<h4 id="1997年前移民澳洲-視香港為功利社會">1997年前：移民澳洲 視香港為功利社會</h4> +<p>In Europe, Russia faces a larger target set with considerably more strategic depth. Unlike the Indo-Pacific, the European theatre has far more airfields from which NATO’s jets or aircraft can operate, making near-complete airbase suppression, as contemplated by the PLA in the Pacific, nearly impossible for Russia to achieve. Within 500 km of Russian-held territory, however, the threat is more acute, and will require the use of airfields in the west of SACEUR’s area of responsibility and thus increase the Alliance’s reliance on tanker aircraft. There are also individual points of failure within allied air forces. For example, Automatic Logistics Information System terminals, which enable the mission planning and logistical support on which the F-35 depends, are held at a limited number of airbases, many of which have undergone public and expensive conversions to host the F-35. Moreover, Russia’s doctrinal commitment to striking CNI as a means of forcing de-escalation would probably impose competition for resources between NATO as an alliance and those nations that must ultimately make voluntary contributions to its air defences. The logic of Alliance-level planning would incentivise the protection of military assets, which in turn would enable the prosecution of an effective war effort. But national political imperatives may dictate otherwise, creating a risk of competition for scarce IAMD assets. In the close battle, Russia can generate a dense multi-tiered threat comprising short-range ballistic missiles such as the 9M723, cruise missiles, loitering munitions and fixed-wing aircraft launching unguided glide bombs such as the FAB-500.</p> -<p>入獄那年，吳政亨42歲，現在是46歲。在2021年1月6日被捕之前，並沒有太多人聽過他的名字，皆因他並非初選參加者，亦沒有政黨背景，僅僅因為曾發起「三投三不投」，在新聞報道中出現過一兩次。</p> +<p>While the air threat is a challenge across both theatres, there are differences between the IAMD requirements that bear consideration. Russia does not field a credible intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM), having cancelled the RS-26 in 2017, and it would struggle to increase IRBM production in less than a decade, given its production rates for more mature SRBMs. As such, beyond 500 km the Russian threat is effectively a cruise missile threat. This means that certain interceptor types, including exoatmospheric and high endoatmospheric interceptors, such as the SM-3IIA and systems such as THAAD (Terminal High Altitude Area Defense), are far more relevant to the Indo-Pacific than they are to Europe – although, as will be discussed, longer-range ballistic missile defence (BMD) systems will be of use in Europe to a degree.</p> -<p>據吳自述，他在香港出生，本身從事金融業。他既是香港公民，亦持澳洲國籍——1992年，他讀完中二後便隨家人移民澳洲，離開的原因和許多香港人一樣，因為三年前在中國發生的那一件大事。</p> +<p>The primary BMD challenge facing Europe is SRBMs. Although the KH-47M2 Kinzhal can be used at operational depth, doing so risks the bomber or fighter aircraft carrying it. Russia is developing IRBMs, but the development cycle for missiles typically exceeds a decade, and further time elapses before they are fielded in numbers. In the first year of the war in Ukraine, Russia fired 700 Iskander SRBMs (135 in the first month), and in 2023 appeared to be producing cruise and ballistic missiles at a rate of 40 per month. The 9M723, which can dispense six radar decoys in its terminal phase, is a challenging SRBM to intercept, and the task is likely to require millimetric wave seekers such as the Ka-band seeker of the PAC-3 or the Aster-30 Block 1NT. This will create a considerable demand for hit-to-kill interceptors, although this demand will be bounded by the duration of a SEAD campaign, after which missile launchers can be more readily attacked before missile launch.</p> -<p>年少的吳政亨享受澳洲的生活方式，也不太留戀香港。他說不喜歡香港那種「功利」的感覺，無論是事業、才能、讀書、揀偶，一切都仿佛是以錢作為量度標準。</p> +<p><em>Expenditure Rates</em></p> -<p>強調自己討厭「功利」的吳政亨，畢業後卻投身進金融行業。他解釋，自己讀書時主修數學和精算，結果被一份對沖基金交易員（Hudge Fund Trader）的招聘廣告吸引住目光：「所要嘅能力同興趣，好似為我度身訂造咁。」</p> +<p>Expenditure rates on interceptors are dependent on several factors, including shot doctrine and the rate at which launchers can be engaged before launch by aircraft and ground-based weapons, which is likely to increase as the IADS protecting them is diminished. For example, a two-shot doctrine (independently firing two interceptors for any given target) and a “shoot–look–shoot” doctrine, in which a second interceptor is only employed if the first fails, see 2 and 1.1 interceptors fired per target respectively to achieve a 0.99 probability of kill (Pk), while other studies suggest considerably more, with up to eight interceptors needed for certainty of kill with an SSPK of 0.5 (although this assumes a low SSPK, and very demanding criteria for success). Applied to the European theatre, more modest assumptions could still mean a requirement for anywhere between 770 and 1,400 hit-to-kill interceptors in the first month of a conflict if Russia expends Iskander at the rate it has in Ukraine. While the US current production rate for PAC-3 MSE interceptors is 500 per year, with an aspiration for 870, this capacity will be drawn on by a number of commitments, including the ongoing war in Ukraine, foreign military sales and the Indo-Pacific. In 2022, the US entire stock of PAC-3 MSE was 1,600 interceptors. However, over time the effects of a successful SEAD campaign should make launchers considerably vulnerable to pre-launch interception and would, moreover, undercut the ground campaign that ballistic missiles support. There is no automatic reason to assume a SEAD campaign will succeed, of course, but if it does not, the problem facing the Alliance is wider than the missile threat.</p> -<p>他形容，這份工作就如「職業賭徒」，也忙碌得足以佔據他每日的24小時。2008年，他因工作需要而回到香港，而當時對香港的印象仍然是「功利」——直到2014年，這個印象才徹底扭轉。</p> +<p>There is considerable risk of capacity strains with respect to hit-to-kill interceptors. There are, however, differences between the European and Indo-Pacific theatres in this respect. Longer-range interceptors such as the SM-2 and the Aster-30 Block1NT can be relevant in each context, but to very different degrees. In Europe, there are no IRBM or medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) threats against which longer-range interceptors will be prerequisites. What long-range hit-to-kill interceptors could provide, however, is a means of considerably reducing the point defence burden. Even a marginally resourced first layer against SRBMs can considerably reduce the burden on point defences. This is partly a function of the fact that early interception can prevent the deployment of countermeasures and partly the fact that shot doctrines, which conserve interceptors, are more viable in a layered defensive system. As a notional example, the requirement for shorter-range defences can be reduced by 75% from the ability to engage half the incoming targets with an outer defensive layer, at a cost which is in aggregate lower than a single-layer system. What this means in practice is that the rate of expenditure of a European IAMD network against ballistic targets could be improved substantially by a relatively limited number of longer-range hit-to-kill interceptors, even if these interceptors had less than the 0.8 Pk typically required of air-defence systems. In the Pacific, capabilities such as the SM-3IIA will be a primary mode of defence against medium- and intermediate-range targets, against which point defences will have more constrained utility. The vessels that field them will also defend themselves against MRBMs, such as the DF-21D, over the course of a campaign. In effect, the need for a first layer of longer-range hit-to-kill interceptors in Europe may be more modest than in the Pacific, insofar as its role is reducing an otherwise unmanageable strain on shorter-range interceptors.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/8Irzp9O.png" alt="image90" /> -▲ 2002年，吳政亨在澳洲新南威爾斯大學畢業。（圖由受訪者提供）</p> +<p><em>Interceptor Platforms</em></p> -<h4 id="2014年金鐘的眼淚">2014年：金鐘的眼淚</h4> +<p>These interceptors are often (but not always) held on maritime platforms, and the availability of such an outer layer would require destroyers and frigates to be equipped with requisite interceptors and postured forward in areas such as the Baltic Sea, at some risk to themselves. This also limits the reach of an outer air-defence layer away from coastal areas. Moreover, many of the destroyers that carry longer-range hit-to-kill interceptors are US vessels, such as the Arleigh Burke class. Several European navies, including the Royal Navy, Italy’s Marina Militare and France’s Marine Nationale, are investing in longer-range hit-to-kill systems such as the Aster-30 Block1NT, but the question of how much capacity will exist by 2027 is still open. In effect, capacity gaps in European tactical BMD can be filled without the procurement of a potentially unrealisable magazine of interceptors, but only if the likely absence of US Aegis destroyers and their interceptors can be offset.</p> -<p>吳政亨說，2014年不完全是自己的政治啟蒙。在這之前，他會思考政治、會思考對與錯，會思考公民的權利和義務；不過，他甚少與至親以外的人談論政見，亦曾經以為香港人對政治不感興趣，因而覺得「搵錢更實際」。</p> +<p>Alternatively, European states will need to find ways to deliver the number of interceptors required to achieve point defence against short-range ballistic targets. In principle, the initiative by Germany, Romania, the Netherlands and Spain to procure 1,000 PAC-2 GEM-T interceptors (which are not hit to kill but can be used against ballistic targets) and Germany’s procurement of up to 600 PAC-3 MSE interceptors would, if realised, meet the requirement against an initial ballistic missile salvo comparable to that seen in Ukraine (although only the PAC-3 is a hit-to-kill interceptor optimised for BMD). However, this would depend on sensors supporting tactical BMD having enough range to support a shoot–look–shoot approach (a challenge, since no European NATO member fields longer-range BMD radar such as the AN-TPY-2, which would allow lower-tier defences to focus on likely vectors of attack, enabling a more efficient shot doctrine).</p> -<p>2014年9月28日，吳政亨在金鐘流下許多眼淚。他說當下才發現：「原來一直以來，膚淺而功利嘅係我自己，唔係香港人。」後來一段日子，他下班後總會步行到金鐘，為自修室裡的學生補習數學，週末則會去「瞓馬路」。</p> +<p>In contrast to BMD interceptors, which may be required to differing degrees (depending on their range), blast fragmentation interceptors are likely to be in considerably higher demand in both theatres. Both Russia and China maintain large cruise missile arsenals and, in the case of Russia, cruise missiles have been augmented with cheaper analogues, such as the Shahed-136, which are less capable but must still be engaged. Moreover, blast fragmentation interceptors are also expended against uncrewed aerial systems and loitering munitions. Interceptors such as the AIM-120 AMRAAM, which are common to both aircraft and ground-based air defence systems such as NASAMs, are likely to see heavy demands from both the Pacific and the Euro-Atlantic. Any US air activity in the Indo-Pacific, irrespective of whether it aims for the more modest goal of air denial, which this report argues to be optimal, or for more expansive aims, will necessarily use considerable numbers of blast fragmentation interceptors. For European states, aircraft – and in particular those aircraft that cannot be immediately committed to ground support missions – will be a crucial component of any air defence effort against cruise missiles and one-way attack munitions. In addition, air-to-air combat against the VKS is likely to be a feature of any European conflict, even if the VKS might be expected to operate in a conservative way within the safety of its own IADS. It then follows that, particularly where European systems rely on blast fragmentation interceptors made in the US, these missiles may become a scarce asset, in demand across both the European and Indo-Pacific theatres.</p> -<p>如今的他承認，自己當時對社會運動的想法實在過於理想化。在「拆大台」、示威者衝擊立法會玻璃、退聯等連串事件發生之前，他還未意識到「和理非」和「勇武」、「泛民」和「本土」之間的紛爭，比想像中嚴重。打從這一個時間點起，他覺得自己需要、也可以「做一啲嘢」。</p> +<p>Counter-rocket, artillery and mortar (C-RAM) systems and V-SHORAD (very short-range air defence) systems will be in demand to differing degrees in both theatres. Given the likely importance of vertical lift to the PLA’s efforts to generate superior firepower over any beach-head, as well as the role of platforms such as the Ka-52 in supporting Russian efforts to contain allied armour, MANPADS such as Stinger are likely to be in relatively high demand in both theatres. In Ukraine, for example, the US Department of Defense has donated a third of its arsenal of Stinger missiles. The PLA, for its part, fields 270 Z-10 and Z-19 attack helicopters. The Z-10s are a rough (albeit lightly armoured) analogue to the US Apache and are equipped with 16 anti-tank guided missiles. Keeping these systems at bay without employing SAMs intended for more expensive targets will be of considerable importance. Unlike heavier systems, MANPADS can probably be moved to Taiwan rapidly and at scale in a crisis, as was the case in Ukraine. There are a number of European producers of MANPADS, and reliance on US capabilities that may be moved to Taiwan would not be a bottleneck in itself. However, the ability to scale production and secure critical inputs would require both industrial capacity and the ability to ensure that different Western producers are not competing for the same components.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/CW1p2Ha.png" alt="image91" /> -▲ 吳政亨每次上庭，都有親友旁聽。圖為親友在過去三年半保存下來的部分旁聽籌。</p> +<p>C-RAM has, historically, been more important in the context of Europe than in Asia, given the centrality of fires to the Russian way of war – which saw, for example, the Russian armed forces expend up to 38,000 artillery rounds a day in the second year of the war in Ukraine. By contrast, the relatively limited fires capabilities of the PLA’s amphibious assault forces would likely see them relying on air and naval support to generate firepower. A PLAGF combined arms brigade, for example, contains a single artillery battalion, compared with the three in a Russian Motor Rifle Brigade. The three PLA group armies across Taiwan also field an artillery brigade each, equipped with 300-mm PHL-03 and PHC-191 MLRS systems that can target Taiwan’s west coast from the mainland. Even so, the sheer weight of land-based artillery fire in the initial period of an invasion of Taiwan is likely to be dwarfed by the volumes of fire expended in the European theatre. Certainly, some C-RAM systems, such as Phalanx, have utility as a means of defending installations against UAVs, but in general UAVs can be engaged by cheaper means, such as anti-aircraft artillery fire. As such, mobile and survivable C-RAM remains more relevant to the European theatre than to the Indo-Pacific.</p> -<h4 id="2019年連登仔李伯盧">2019年：「連登仔」李伯盧</h4> +<h4 id="asw-a-major-capability-gap">ASW: A Major Capability Gap</h4> -<p>傘運之後，社運氣氛一度沉寂，直至2019年反修例運動爆發，香港翻天覆地改變。於是，吳政亨以網名「李伯盧」，在網上討論區連登開設帳戶——他笑言自己走在時代末端：「但如果有人以『連登仔』稱呼我嘅話，我會覺得係一個榮耀。」</p> +<p>The allied approach to ASW in Europe is to a substantial degree dependent on US assets. First, the tracking of a single contact typically requires the coordination of several systems, including MPAs, frigates and SSNs which must, respectively, localise and then tail a contact. It typically takes three MPAs to maintain one MPA on station at any given time over a 12-hour period. Currently, European MPA fleets are relatively small – at the time of writing, the UK fields five P-8 Poseidon aircraft and Norway a further eight, while France and Germany field 11 upgraded Atlantique aircraft and P-8As respectively. Portugal also fields a fleet of older P-3 Orion aircraft. This is a limited but not completely insufficient number of platforms for manning a chokepoint such as the Greenland–Iceland–UK (GIUK) Gap, particularly in terms of the relative overmatch that the Alliance enjoys in theatres such as the Baltic Sea, where Russia currently operates a very limited submarine force, comprising a single Kilo class (although SSKs from other fleets could be moved to the Baltic in a crisis). A more significant issue will be the availability of key systems stocks such as multi-static sonobuoys, given the substantial dependence on US systems. A barrier in the GIUK Gap, for example, would need to be seeded with 15,000 DIFAR and DICASS sonobuoys, which would be reseeded every eight hours (although newer MAC sonobuoys have greater coverage, reducing the number required by half).</p> -<p>「李伯盧」取自英文單詞 liberal 的音譯。一年多之間，他發了超過80個帖文，主題多圍繞當下的社運和政治事件；2020年民主派初選期間，「李伯盧」亦發起「三不投」的倡議，呼籲選民參與聯署。</p> +<p>Once a contact is made by, for example, an MPA, a submarine is typically tracked over long distances by another SSN. The limited size of allied SSN fleets will make this a challenge in the absence of US assets, which is likely if the US Navy faces a trough in submarine capacity in the 2030s. While it enjoys considerable advantages in comparison with the PLAN’s much noisier nuclear submarines, the US Navy’s SSN will not necessarily have major advantages over quieter SSKs, such as the Type 039C, in littoral waters of areas such as the South China Sea, where advantages such as endurance are of less significance. It is likely that clearing the South China Sea of Chinese submarines and surface vessels will be crucial to ensuring that US surface assets operating in the western Pacific do not do so at unacceptable risk from PLAN platforms operating on interior lines. In this instance, the US Navy could opt to simply cover chokepoints such as the Bashi Channel and the island of Mindanao and bottle in Chinese assets (a less resource-intensive task). But if the PLAAF seizes local air superiority sufficient to allow China’s own MPAs to operate over these chokepoints (at least for a time), this will probably involve both risks and losses. It should be noted that even historically successful submarine campaigns have involved high loss rates. For example, the US Navy lost 20% of its submarine fleet in the Pacific theatre during the Second World War, despite enjoying considerable advantages over the Imperial Japanese Navy. It is thus not inconceivable that the Pacific, which since 2015 has drawn 60% of the US’s SSNs, will demand an even larger part of the SSN force in a conflict. The position of the JMSDF, which operates a fleet of 10 quiet Soryu-class SSKs (among other vessels), will be an important factor in determining precisely how acute the demand for US submarines is in the Pacific.</p> -<p>所謂的「三不投」是指：不投反對初選的人、不投不參與初選的人和不投在初選落選的人。這亦是被指控干犯「串謀顛覆國家政權」罪的主因。</p> +<p>In Europe, the Russian Northern Fleet currently possesses 14 SSNs and SSGNs, of which a relatively large number can be surged in a conflict. By 2030, Russia aspires to field six Yasen-class submarines across its Northern and Pacific fleets. This increase, if achieved, will potentially be offset by the retirement of older Victor III- and Sierra-class submarines still in service, and will not necessarily represent a quantitative increase in fleet capacity. Qualitatively, however, this would entail a step change in the threat facing NATO, given that the Yasen is comparable in quietness to newer Western submarines and capable of launching supersonic and hypersonic missiles such as the 3M22 Zircon.</p> -<p>吳政亨坦承，當時並沒想過自己會因此而被捕——「但如果我被捕，只可能係因為《國安法》。因為我係奉公守法嘅一個人，一直做嘅嘢都係依法而行。」</p> +<p><em>Potential Shortfalls</em></p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/BywlF5c.png" alt="image92" /> -▲ 2020年6月，吳政亨設街站宣傳「三投三不投」。（資料圖片）</p> +<p>Assuming a partial or complete absence of US capacity, NATO would probably face considerable shortfalls in several areas, including stockpiles to enable MPA operations and available SSNs to tail Russian contacts. Collectively, the UK and France field 16 SSNs, which is more than Russia’s Northern Fleet, but a focus on persistent deployment rather than surge capacity means that the part of this force that can be made available at short notice is more limited than for a comparably sized Russian force. This could change, particularly because Russia appears intent on maintaining persistent deployments of SSGNs in the Western hemisphere (which will absorb at least four Yasen-class SSNs to keep one on station at any time and have an impact on readiness). However, not maintaining surge capacity would represent a break with Russian and Soviet practice, and some effort to do so should be assumed.</p> -<h4 id="2021年顛覆認知後的反思">2021年：顛覆認知後的反思</h4> +<p>Western SSNs are required for additional functions such as deep strike and forward operations at sea in otherwise denied maritime spaces. In the absence of a significant number of US SSNs in theatre, then, the requirement of tailing the part of its SSN fleet that Russia does choose to surge in a crisis could create a shortfall in available SSNs, which could impact both strike operations at depth and ASW operations. Moreover, it is not clear that there will be enough SSNs to meet the task of tailing alone.</p> -<p>2021年1月6日，吳政亨和其餘52人被指因組織或參與民主派初選，涉嫌違反《港區國安法》被捕。他形容，當日清晨到其處所進行拘捕的國安處人員顯得隆重其事，甚至對於他登上警車後，仍沒有他被捕的新聞出現而感到驚奇。不過吳政亨當時心想：「傳媒報漏咗我呢啲二打六，有乜咁出奇？」</p> +<p>This latter challenge can be offset in several ways. SSNs do not have to be tailed by other SSNs, and both surface vessels and SSKs can also play this role. The former, however, operate at considerable risk against SSGNs, given their own often relatively limited air defences, while the latter have limited endurance and speed relative to their quarry. Once NATO is covering an ASW barrier in the GIUK Gap this may matter less – this barrier is likely to be covered by a large number of vessels, as many European states field ASW frigates. However, in a crisis leading to conflict before a Maritime Component Command can be stood up, the difficulty of tailing contacts without engaging them could dislocate naval forces in the theatre. This, in turn, could create the space for other maritime threats, such as the use of special-purpose submarines such as the X-Ray and the Paltus to disrupt critical maritime infrastructure.</p> -<p>兩天後他才知道，自己是案件中被歸納為組織及策劃的五名「重要份子」之一。如果不是整件事如此切身，他大概會忍唔住笑出聲——「唔 L 係呀嘛？」但當下他除了爆粗，已不知道該說甚麼。</p> +<p>Ultimately, Russian threats in the maritime domain are ancillary to those on land. The Russian navy exists to support the army, and if European capability gaps in other areas are filled, the maritime domain may have less significance. Nonetheless, the Alliance’s ability to contain subsurface threats will partially determine Russian assessments of the aggregate balance of forces, and gaps in this area will prove particularly acute.</p> -<p>吳政亨形容，這件事顛覆了他對許多事情的認知，令他不得不重新再作思考。以家人為例，以前他們擔心他的安危、勸他保護好自己時，吳總是不太理會，認為他們過度憂慮；但被捕之後，他開始反思：會否家人才是旁觀者清？他有否自私地無視了家人的感受？</p> +<h4 id="the-land-component-the-capabilities-are-available-but-not-the-enablers">The Land Component: The Capabilities are Available, But Not the Enablers</h4> -<p>他沒有定論。還柙初期，來探望吳政亨的朋友不算太多，倒是家人反覆前來探望，令他覺得不好意思。他肯定自己做的許多事情，都不是家人所希望的：「但咁代唔代表，佢哋有權去阻止我做呢？我又唔覺得佢哋有權。」</p> +<p>In principle, land power should be the most non-fungible US strategic capability in a two-war scenario. While there is certainly a land component to any conceivable Indo-Pacific conflict, the conditions for success or failure are likely to be set at sea and in the air. Since any Chinese approach to Taiwan must presume air and naval superiority, given the low likelihood of the PLA achieving local preponderance at its beach-heads, if Chinese forces do land on Taiwan and achieve a breakout it will be because they were enabled by these two factors. If this is the case, there is little evidence that additional support to a Taiwan ground component could be flowed into the island. Equally, if the conditions for substantial US ground forces to flow into Taiwan can be set in the air and at sea, this would be synonymous with the failure of a Chinese invasion in any case, as any disembarked force would necessarily be cut off from the mainland.</p> -<p>「我愛我家人，我亦相信佢哋愛我。但我哋未必係以對方想要嘅方式去愛。而拒絕對方想要嘅方式去愛，算唔算自私呢？我答唔到。」</p> +<p>This is not because land forces are irrelevant in a Taiwan contingency. Considerable historical data suggests that a well-entrenched land component can hold an invading force in an island assault under conditions of numerical inferiority and inferiority in the air and at sea, and that attackers often require a more than 3:1 preponderance in land forces. On Okinawa in April 1945, for example, entrenched Japanese forces held for three months against a US force that outnumbered them 5:1, with the US Tenth Army expending 2.4 million shells in the battle. It can thus certainly be argued that the ability of the Taiwan land component to both contest an initial beach-head and protract a conflict sets the conditions for effective denial in the air and at sea by buying time for US forces. Many of the capabilities relevant to a land war in Europe, such as guided MLRS, V-SHORAD and tube artillery, would certainly be relevant in this context.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/njqv0vt.png" alt="image93" /> -▲ 2021年3月3日，初選案首次提堂第三日早上，吳政亨（灰衫黑外套者）與同案被告劉澤鋒在荔枝角收押所步上警車，前往法院。（資料圖片）</p> +<p>However, the success of any land battle would be largely predicated on the assets already in Taiwan when a conflict broke out. Assuming the PLAN and the PLAAF are able to achieve a level of air superiority sufficient to enable an outnumbered assault force to break out of its beach-heads (the only context in which a protracted land battle can occur), this would preclude any additional land forces from being surged into the theatre, as some have argued they might be. For example, the US Navy can, in principle, support the insertion of heavy armour into Taiwan with its ship-to-shore connector, but with a 25-nautical-mile radius, doing so under conditions of adversary air superiority would entail amphibious vessels taking unacceptable levels of risk for the insertion of relatively small amounts of armour. Access to ports, which can be utilised by strategic sealift assets, would also be unlikely under these circumstances. It might be argued that, in due course, a successful US effort to roll back the PLAN and the PLAAF could enable land forces to be flowed into pockets of the theatre still held by Taiwan’s forces, to enable the PLAGF to be progressively rolled back on the island – in a manner comparable to the US Army and Republic of Korea army’s defence and breakout from the Pusan Perimeter in September 1940. However, if the PLA does secure a level of air superiority sufficient to prevent its forces from being stopped either at its beach-heads or in the littoral and to allow the subsequent seizure of a port to allow the flow of non-amphibious units, there will be little time for reinforcement. In amphibious assaults over the course of the last century, when a force that did not enjoy numerical preponderance at the outset of the assault succeeded, it typicall did so in less than a month. This broadly reflects the fact that if the numerically inferior force could not be defeated at its beach-heads, it was enabled to succeed by a level of air and naval superiority that caused the defence to collapse rapidly. The only exception to this was the Battle of Iwo Jima, which lasted for a month but in which air and naval power did not play a decisive role in routing the defence. Even if Chinese forces took a month to seize a major Taiwan seaport to enable the flow of follow-on forces, it would probably be longer than this before the US could safely surge land forces into the theatre. In effect, then, if the PLA’s air superiority is sufficient to prevent a numerically inferior force from being beaten on the beaches, a Taiwan defence will collapse before the conditions for reinforcements to enter the theatre can be set.</p> -<h4 id="還柙前拍攝香港風景-入獄後發佈改詞作品">還柙前拍攝香港風景 入獄後發佈改詞作品</h4> +<p>This is not to suggest that the PLA will necessarily secure the level of air and sea superiority needed to enable a successful invasion. Rather, the argument is that the crux of any defence of Taiwan will be denying it this superiority. If this is achieved, it is likely that Taiwan’s forces can mount a successful forward defence of likely landing sites on the island, making a protracted defence and the subsequent flow of US forces superfluous. If not, the battle will likely end before either of these things can be considered.</p> -<p>同年2月28日，包括吳政亨在內的47名被捕者被正式落案起訴，罪名是「串謀顛覆國家政權」。經過一連四天馬拉松式聆訊，他和大多數被告的保釋申請均被拒絕，須即時還柙。後來吳政亨再申請保釋覆核亦遭拒絕，直至判刑日，他在荔枝角收押所還柙逾1,350天。</p> +<p>This does, in principle, mean that assets such as MLRS equipped with cluster munitions and land-centric capabilities such as heavy armour would be likely to be free for the European theatre, where they have far greater relevance against a primarily ground-based Russian threat, in tandem with the forces already under V Corps in Poland. The scope and scale of this threat will depend on a number of factors, among which are the question of whether Russia can free its forces from their existing commitments in Ukraine, and whether the Russian military can achieve its aspiration to stand up two new military districts and 14 new divisions, in accordance with the plans laid out by former defence minister Sergei Shoigu. This will prove challenging, as Russia has expended much of its stock of Soviet-era equipment and has, since 2008, shuttered many of the training academies for its officer corps as part of former defence minister Anatoly Serdyukov’s reforms. Nevertheless, the pace of Russian reconstitution in many areas makes the availability of a Russian ground force comparable to the one that invaded Ukraine on 24 February 2022 plausible enough to bear consideration.</p> -<p>被捕後至還柙前的一段日子，吳政亨如常地生活，只是多了到香港不同地方拍攝風景。他開始研究攝影，想趁尚有自由，留下多些紀錄和紀念。</p> +<p>Specific land capabilities, such as deep-strike missiles like the PrSM and the ATACMS, may have greater cross-theatre relevance, as they can be used to strike vessels in port or even to contribute to counter-airbase missions. However, while the possession of these missiles by Taiwan at the outset of a conflict may be relevant, it is unlikely that the US will be able to ship additional missiles to Taiwan under contested conditions, and most ground-based fires, with the exception of the US Army’s intermediate-range hypersonics, largely lack the reach to strike China from anywhere else in the first island chain.</p> -<p>他還在網上發佈了以被捕一事為靈感的改詞作品《初選被拉的岑敖暉與關尚義》。原本是隨便寫寫，沒想到許多人因此誤以為他喜歡研究歌詞，寫信給他時紛紛附上各式各樣的歌詞——吳附上一個滴汗的笑哈哈公仔，「澄清」他其實較喜歡自己作詞，也因為怕在潛意識裡抄襲了他人風格，故從不敢太仔細研究別人的作品。</p> +<p>The major bottlenecks in the deployment of the US Army to Europe would probably be in the areas of air defence and logistical support. Since the US Army is responsible for air defence as a function of the Key West Agreement, it would likely see its air-defence capabilities entirely consumed by a Pacific war. Any US Army deployment to Europe would thus depend on the availability of adequate European air defences (without which ground forces could not deploy).</p> -<p>在澳洲生活時，他曾為自己的樂隊和獨立歌手寫詞，亦有為當地教會寫原創音樂劇，後來因為工作太忙碌，才逐漸放下這項興趣。不過在還柙期間，他先後透過關注組發佈兩曲，包括《聖誕應該快樂》和《上杉達也》。兩首歌均由吳的牆外朋友作曲，再以「0243」填詞法將旋律交給吳，讓他在未能「聽」到旋律的情況下填詞。</p> +<p>US strategic sealift would necessarily be strained by a Pacific deployment, and some of this capability will be provided by the US Army. At the time of writing, there is limited European capacity to provide strategic sealift, as the movement of US forces across the Atlantic has largely been a US activity. NATO maintains a sealift consortium, to which 11 countries contribute 15 vessels, but this represents a limited capability. Airlift may represent another means of providing inter-theatre mobility to US forces, as during the Cold War, although this will likely only partially mitigate bottlenecks in mobility.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/zyBBPMx.png" alt="image94" /> -▲ 吳政亨入獄前使用的手機殼，表面開始發霉，其中一角亦已剝落。</p> +<p>In effect, while many components of US land power may in principle remain available for use in Europe – if policy allows – even in the face of an Indo-Pacific contingency, this depends to a considerable degree on the ability of European states to fill gaps in key enablers that allow a ground force to both cross the Atlantic and remain safe against a range of air and missile threats while in theatre.</p> -<h4 id="獄中讀小說自學法律-做運動改善健康">獄中讀小說自學法律 做運動改善健康</h4> +<h3 id="conclusions-manageable-but-growing-cracks">Conclusions: Manageable But Growing Cracks</h3> -<p>除了填（作）詞，吳政亨還有數不清的興趣。從睇波打高爾夫球滑雪，到唱歌辯論捉棋都喜歡，不過他最喜歡的是思考。曾有人寄了一道號稱「史上最難邏輯題」給他，讓他和囚友花上好幾天，才成功解謎。</p> +<p>The findings in this report suggest that while there will undoubtedly be resource constraints within Europe during a decade of acute risk in the Pacific, these constraints should be parsed, given that not all assets are fungible. This is not to suggest that major capability gaps do not exist within European militaries, nor that they must not be closed. But a more granular analysis of these gaps can help identify immediate priority areas.</p> -<p>而他入獄後「解鎖」的新興趣，是讀小說和做運動。還柙期間，他在獄中沒有工作，每天不斷看書和思考（貼切啲其實是「發吽哣」）。從前，他較常看工具書或實用性書籍，但入獄後看多了小說，陳浩基、沈從文、朱少麟、Michael Lewis⋯⋯「可能是因為看書時可以抽離一下現實，不用面對眼前的四堵牆。」</p> +<p>In certain areas, the analysis for this report produced counterintuitive findings. In particular, despite airpower and air-defence assets being in high demand across the European and Indo-Pacific theatres, the munition and interceptor types required were not in all instances pulled in two directions by conflicting demand signals. In particular, SEAD munitions such as the AARGM-ER may have limited relevance to a Pacific campaign. This largely stems from the fact that strikes against the Chinese mainland at a scale that might alter the balance of power over Taiwan are not only increasingly unviable, but also superfluous, insofar as mutual air denial over Taiwan and the ability to target destroyers and cruisers, as well as the amphibious vessels they protect in and around the island, are potentially sufficient to enable the failure of a Chinese invasion. If, as some have argued, the US prioritises resourcing allied efforts as part of its deterrent, resourcing European SEAD efforts (which are currently constrained less by platforms than by munitions) is achievable by the US without undermining an Indo-Pacific campaign. As discussed in Chapter II, meaningful European gaps also exist in areas other than munitions – but material gaps may prove easiest to fill.</p> -<p>除了小說，他也讀歷史、法律、哲學、漫畫等等。之所以會讀法律書，是因為吳政亨在入獄初期一度想過自辯。沒法律底子的他托律師朋友送入基礎書籍和案例文件，從零開始學習。可法律畢竟是一門專業，那段時間一問起他的學習情況，他就鄒眉說要看漫畫「減壓」，最終還是選擇了聘請律師應付審訊。</p> +<p>Air and missile defence is, similarly, a constrained capability, although some constraints are more acute than others. Available IAMD systems and capacity in terms of both hit-to-kill interceptors and blast fragmentation warheads are available to a limited degree in Europe. Unlike in the Pacific, however, the Russian ballistic threat is limited to a part of the theatre, and will be attenuated over time as a SEAD campaign takes effect. Moreover, capacity limitations can be mitigated through the more effective layering of defences against SRBMs. In the Pacific, by contrast, BMD is likely to be a persistent resource demand. Stocks of blast fragmentation interceptors needed for both air-to-air and cruise missile defence will be a resource heavily strained by a Pacific contingency.</p> -<p>至於運動方面，因為獄中可做的事有限，吳像許多囚友般開始健身。除了在放風時段踢毽或跑步，他也會做掌上壓和仰臥起坐等訓練，成功減去近15公斤。獄中生活規律，他的健康狀況亦有好轉。入獄之前，他的血液內肝酵素經常超標，但在獄中體檢時已經回復正常。</p> +<p>In the maritime domain, surface lethality and ASW emerge as major European capability gaps, which is perhaps unsurprising given the maritime dimensions of the Pacific contingency to which US assets would be drawn.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/xMip1tR.png" alt="image95" /> -▲ 還柙期間，吳政亨一度因鎖骨斷裂，要入院進行手術。事後，他的肩膊位置多了一條數厘米長的疤痕。圖為他曾在獄中閱讀的《沈從文短篇小說選》。</p> +<p>While the US Army capabilities most relevant to the land domain do not necessarily have great relevance to an Indo-Pacific contingency, many of the enablers needed to move these assets to make US capabilities operational would probably need to be provided by European states.</p> -<h4 id="初期探訪者不多-榮幸與政治犯以朋友相稱">初期探訪者不多 榮幸與「政治犯」以朋友相稱</h4> +<p>In effect, then, the task of preparing for the Davidson Window in Europe should be seen as one of filling specific gaps in capacity as rapidly as possible, while others can be covered on a longer-term basis. To be sure, it is desirable for a number of reasons that European states mobilise the capacity to replicate the full spectrum of capabilities and enablers for which they currently rely on the US. Assuming that not all these capabilities can be delivered in a decade, however, there are specific areas to which resources should be targeted on an immediate basis. This report has sought to shed light on which areas might represent vulnerabilities. These areas should be targeted with urgency.</p> -<p>獄中生活規律，吳政亨每日的作息都是重複的：早上7時起床，然後放風、食早餐，拜山（親友探訪），食午餐，發呆，食晚餐，踢竇，檢查緊急鐘，晚上10時關燈睡覺。</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/Atoyf6j.png" alt="image01" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Table 1: Summary of the Relative Risk of US Overstretch in Individual Areas.</strong> Source: The authors.</em></p> -<p>在期望管理下，他不覺得鐵窗生活真的很苦，「人生嘅嘢，好又係咁過，唔好又係咁過」。但唯一一次他顯得有點失落，是提起沒太多朋友到收押所探訪他的時候。他坦言，本來身邊政見不同的朋友就比政見相同的多，而入獄之後，來探訪他的人也不多——大概是想避免和他有接觸。</p> +<hr /> -<p>入獄初期，吳亦曾在親友探訪時段時發脾氣：「但後來發現，當一啲當時本來已唔情唔願嘅人，終於唔再勉強或装扮，真正離開我嘅生命之後，我嘅心情反而平復咗落嚟。」時至今日，他自認為情緒比入獄前想像的好，並形容在獄中最大的得著，是認識許多新朋友，包括同案或其他政治案件的被告。</p> +<p><strong>Sidharth Kaushal</strong> is the Senior Research Fellow, Sea Power in the Military Sciences research team at RUSI. His research covers the impact of technology on maritime doctrine in the 21st century and the role of sea power in a state’s grand strategy.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/NpKdY5A.png" alt="image96" /> -▲ 作為「公眾人物」，吳政亨在幾年間一直被獨立囚禁，與一般囚友交集不多。（資料圖片）</p> +<p><strong>Juliana Suess</strong> is the former Research Fellow and Policy Lead on Space Security in the Military Sciences research team at RUSI. Her research interests include global space governance, counterspace capabilities and space warfare.</p>Sidharth Kaushal and Juliana SuessThis report examines which US capabilities will be most relevant in a potential Taiwan crisis, as well as which are of utility both in Europe and in a Taiwan contingency.Defence Procurement Success2024-11-20T12:00:00+08:002024-11-20T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/defence-procurement-success<p><em>GCAP’s management involves five innovations that should drive success in its technology development and timeline. They also have the potential to transform the UK approach to major development, production and support programmes – if government is willing to change how it approaches project financing.</em></p> -<h4 id="不原諒從犯證人-拒認罪因堅信自己無犯法">不原諒從犯證人 拒認罪因堅信自己無犯法</h4> +<excerpt /> -<p>這段時間讓吳政亨最傷心、最難以接受，是知道有同案被告任控方證人的時候。他說無法原諒他們：「我亦自信我有資格去講呢句『唔原諒』。」</p> +<p>On 8 November, the UK government announced its continued commitment to the Global Combat Air Programme (GCAP). The announcement was likely a relief to Japan and Italy, the UK’s treaty partners in the programme. GCAP – and the Future Combat Air System (FCAS) programme of which it is a part – promises to take UK combat air and industrial capability into the sixth generation of combat jet platforms.</p> -<p>（編按：除了戴耀廷，案中其餘三名組織者，區諾軒、趙家賢及鍾錦麟均選擇擔任「從犯證人」。法官指，區的證供屬「關鍵（crucial）」，趙的證供亦協助法庭達成裁決，三人最終各獲減免45%至50%刑期。）</p> +<h3 id="government-military-and-industry-as-one-team">Government, Military and Industry as One Team</h3> -<p>在初選案中，吳選擇不認罪。他透過關注組發表文章，講述自己在認罪與不認罪之間的考慮和猶疑；他說要考慮的因素太多，包括勝算、刑期、社會關注、個人生理及心理質素等；但他亦因為「絕對不認為」自己犯了罪，因此「我恐懼，但我不退」。</p> +<p>GCAP from its inception involved a government-industry team rather than the traditional adversarial model. The GCAP announcement at the Farnborough air show in 2018 presented a team of the MoD and the RAF alongside four core companies. BAE Systems, Rolls Royce, Leonardo and MBDA – to generate a new aircraft and its weapons. This was a broader and earlier grouping than had been used in the 1980s with Eurofighter Typhoon, and a strong contrast even with recent naval practice in which the Navy first works out its requirement and only then goes to industry to find the best supplier. As Vice Admiral Paul Marshall told the House of Commons Defence Committee in 2023:</p> -<p>關於堅持的動力，他沒有確實答案。「如果你問我，我係唔係自細都係一個事事都好堅持嘅人，我可以講你知，一定唔係。細個讀書，有興趣啲科我會考得好好，但無興趣嘅科我可以考到不知所謂。」</p> +<blockquote> + <p>“When we have a programme or project in the concept phase, that is done by the Navy Command Headquarters development team. They take the concept and work out the requirements that the Navy needs to meet the threats of the future. Once those requirements are set, what normally happens is that it is passed to a delivery team to get on with the business of full design and implementation.”</p> +</blockquote> -<p>「如果要我估，點解自己會堅持到，我認為係因為我做呢個決定，係經過深思熟慮嘅：唔係意氣用事，唔係為勢所逼，亦唔係為攞一時嘅鎂光燈。可以好肯定講，我無後悔過，亦相信我永遠唔會後悔律政司所指控我所做過嘅行為。我真誠相信，我所做嘅嘢無犯法。我正在盡全力希望喺法庭內證明呢一點。」</p> +<p>Two lines of logic underpin the MoD’s new approach in Team Tempest. The first logic was that one purpose of the strategy was sustaining and developing UK industrial capability in the combat air domain. This capability primarily lay in four companies that had survived decades of industrial consolidation. The second logic was that the approach offered the prospect of better integrating and exploiting the expertise of government and industry: the MoD with its understanding of future threats and their nature, and industry with its knowledge of technology, engineering and manufacturing.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/CB92KIw.png" alt="image97" /> -▲ 2024年6月26日，初選案第二個求情日，吳政亨在庭上向律師團隊提供指示。</p> +<p>We acknowledge that government-industry partnering in defence is not entirely new. But even the Carrier Alliance had been preceded by a formal competition between BAE Systems and Thales. The nearest thing to the partnering approach to what was first called Tempest may be the relationship between the government, Rolls Royce and other firms in the Submarine Delivery Agency on submarine nuclear reactors. Thus, the expansion of this approach beyond the immediate industrial concerns around the nuclear deterrent is new.</p> -<p>毋用過份悲觀 無人能預知未來</p> +<h3 id="securing-industry-funding-for-early-stage-work">Securing Industry Funding for Early-Stage Work</h3> -<p>「有沒有後悔」這道問題，我久不久就會問他一遍，生怕他的答案會隨時間改變。不過，他的說法始終如一。至於是否值得，他反問：「我自己覺得值得唔夠咩？點解要理人點睇？」</p> +<p>Selecting key partners could be seen as encouraging corporate complacency, but this risk was mitigated by the readiness of the firms to invest significant sums of their own money in the early work without formal assurance of development, let alone production. The companies have not formally revealed their individual spending, but in total it has been around £800 million, compared to the government’s contribution of around £2 billion. The need to recover this funding, along with recognition that production will be shared across the three partners and that exports will be essential to sustain industrial capability long-term, is a major incentive for companies to avoid slacking.</p> -<p>在初選案裁決前，過去幾年所有涉及《國安法》的案件，定罪率是100%。再加上認罪可扣減三份一刑期的前提下，選擇不認罪、拒絕否定過去的自己，是否有點「傻」？喜歡辯論的吳政亨，首先反問「傻」的定義：「首先我假設『傻』係『理智』嘅相反啦。但我發覺，太多人講嘅所謂『理智』，其實同『自私』差别唔大。」</p> +<p>The dedication of corporate funding was feasible given more than 13 years of firm government signalling of an intention to maintain the national combat air industrial capability. This had been part of the Labour government’s Defence Industrial Strategy of 2005, which led to the Taranis uncrewed stealthy vehicle and the exploration of collaboration on an aircraft with France. The Conservatives’ 2015 Strategic Defence and Security Review stated:</p> -<p>「對我嚟講，『傻』只係代表『唔計到盡』同埋『唔自私』。係呢個定義之下，我認我係『傻』，我亦為自己嘅『傻』而覺得光榮。某程度上，我亦希望呢個世界多啲呢種『傻』人。」</p> +<blockquote> + <p>“We will invest in the next generation of combat aircraft technology, in partnership with our defence aerospace industry and our closest allies. We are working with the US to build and support the F35 Lightning. We will work with France to develop our Unmanned Combat Air System programme, and collaborate on complex weapons.”</p> +</blockquote> -<p>身處獄中的人總是在猜想未來。誰能夠保釋？誰最早出獄？最長的刑期有多長？⋯⋯至2024年11月19日，歷時近四年的初選案終有判刑結果。法官以7年半為量刑起點，以誤解法律為由減刑3個月，判處吳政亨監禁7年3個月。若扣減還柙日子，吳料會在2028年出獄。</p> +<p>These words emerged publicly as the Future Combat Air Systems Technology Initiative and launched the commitment to joint MoD and private sector investment.</p> -<p>他日離開狹窄的囚室，他希望見到一個怎樣的香港？吳政亨的答法很「李伯盧」。他保持著一種對未來開放的「liberal」想法，並盼大家不要過份悲觀：「好多人傾向假定現況會不斷永續，老士啲講句，變幻才是永恆。」</p> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">GCAP is conceived both as an initially defined project in its own right (a crewed aircraft) and as a platform that will be designed to evolve and spirally develop over time</code></em></strong></p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/kEUNPuw.png" alt="image98" /></p> +<p>Thus, the Team Tempest model in the Combat Air Strategy emerged after years of discussions on how best to sustain UK industrial capabilities in the broad field of combat air. It was far from being a spur of the moment choice, and reflected an MoD recognition that:</p> -<h3 id="陳寶瑩呢個係冤獄一日都唔應該坐">陳寶瑩：呢個係冤獄，一日都唔應該坐</h3> +<blockquote> + <p>“The UK’s ability to choose how we deliver our future requirements (including maintenance and upgrade of current systems) is dependent on maintaining access to a dynamic and innovative industrial base.”</p> +</blockquote> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/38oFW3Y.png" alt="image99" /></p> +<h3 id="novel-collaborative-decision-making-structures">Novel Collaborative Decision-Making Structures</h3> -<p>【獨媒報導】初選47人案今早判刑，被定罪的45人刑期由50個月至120個月不等。一眾被告家屬及親友難掩悲痛，其中「長毛」梁國雄判囚81個月，其太太、社民連主席陳寶瑩在近11時在警方護送下離開法庭，她表示「呢個係冤獄，一日都唔應該坐」，並一度哽咽，又認為只要所做的事是合情合法合理，都不應被恐懼嚇怕。</p> +<p>The UK has participated in many collaborative aircraft projects, but a negative feature of even Typhoon was the limited authority of the government and corporate structures that were supposed to manage and deliver the project. Subsequently decision-making was often slow.</p> -<p>陳寶瑩在法庭外被警方包圍下高呼：「想講都冇得講，呢個係冤獄嚟！」她之後在較空曠地方向記者表示，對判刑早有準備，沒有驚喜及驚嚇，但認為「呢個係冤獄，一日都唔應該坐」，強調他們的做法是合情合理，反問何罪之有。她之後一度哽咽，被問及會否上訴，她表示要與律師商量。對於判刑如何影響日後爭取民主，陳寶瑩就指大家都明白現時表達不同意見都要預備付出代價，但相信只要所做的事是合情合法合理，都不應被恐懼嚇怕。</p> +<p>With GCAP, the emphasis is on empowered structures and streamlined decision-making processes. The three governments were able to agree quickly on a treaty-based GCAP International Government Organisation with the legal and political powers needed to be able to manage the project from the customer side. Its commercial delivery structure – bringing together the top-level industrial players – is understood to be largely settled, with a formal announcement expected by the end of this year.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/fU5p6Bc.png" alt="image100" /></p> +<p>The capacity of these bodies to make choices quickly without having to send everything back to national capitals and company headquarters will be exposed only during the operation of the project, but certainly the intention in 2024 is that the joint executive bodies should be able to proceed at pace in order to keep the project on track.</p> -<h4 id="黃于喬曾預計更重刑期">黃于喬：曾預計更重刑期</h4> +<p>Japan is a new collaborative partner for the UK, but GCAP is a key element in a strengthening of UK–Japan security relations that dates back to at least 2013. UK Typhoons exercised with Japanese counterparts in 2016, and Theresa May visited Japan as prime minister in 2017. All this was accompanied by company-to-company discussions among the key players. Thus, when the formal announcement of an Italy–Japan–UK aircraft programme was made in 2022, many political, military and industrial preparations had already been made.</p> -<p>認罪的劉頴匡被判囚4年5個月，其女友黃于喬Emilia向記者表示，刑期符合預期之內，因此心情平靜，沒有特別失落或驚訝。兩人曾經預計過更嚴重的刑期。黃表示，劉終於獲得刑期的答案，不用再感焦慮，認為他會感到「relieved（解脫）」：「而家判咗佢個心會定少少。」</p> +<h3 id="development-for-the-unknown-spiral-development-in-action">Development for the Unknown: Spiral Development in Action</h3> -<p>至於會否上訴，黃表示要待探訪時與劉商討。黃亦表示，「2021年至到而家好似上演咗一場大戲」，她認為現時「只係戲嘅中段，終點而家睇唔到，有生之年可能都睇唔到」，但她會繼續盡力支援劉，亦會好好生活等待對方出獄。</p> +<p>A further feature of GCAP is its conception as an initially defined project in its own right (a crewed aircraft), and also a platform that will be designed to evolve and spirally develop over time. There will thus be no single declaration of Full Operational Capability because the final “full” stage of the platform is unknown. Moreover, that platform is to be part of a wider and only partially defined evolving system of equipment and capabilities under the FCAS umbrella. Thus, the aim for 2035 is for a minimum viable product that can deal effectively with threats in the 2035–2040 timeframe, but which will be capable of regular, perhaps even continuous improvements.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/zKe0ado.png" alt="image101" /></p> +<p>In terms of industrial motivation, spiral development offers an appealing base for the export potential of GCAP. All the companies are aware that the long-term sustainment of their combat air capabilities will not be satisfied by demand from the three core countries alone: exports will be necessary, and the UK government is clear that exporting needs to be a key element of its defence industrial strategy.</p> -<h4 id="陳皓桓盼律政司不上訴">陳皓桓：盼律政司不上訴</h4> +<p>There is nothing innovative about thinking of an aircraft as part of a wider system: the Spitfires and Hurricanes that were so effective in the Battle of Britain owed much of their effectiveness to the radar, communication and ground-based fighter control direction that made up the air defence system of the time. Moreover, the idea of “spiral development” is pretty much the same as the concept of “incremental acquisition” that was prominent in defence procurement earlier in the millennium. However, that idea was little implemented, in part because of customer reluctance to compromise on requirements when access to funding for future improvements was uncertain.</p> -<p>前民間人權陣線召集人陳皓桓在判刑後表示，無論判刑是4年抑或10年，對曾參與初選投票和2019年反修例運動的人而言，都是一種打壓，因為所有被告均在行使《基本法》賦予的權利，法庭早前裁定有罪，所有人「唯有接受呢件事」。他又表示律政司以往一直認為這類案件判刑「唔夠多」，他希望律政司不上訴，盡快讓事件解決，亦令關押已久的被告「盡快出返嚟」。</p> +<p>A key consideration for how effectively spiral development can operate will be the availability of early funding to build in the key enablers of advances, not least strength, space and electric power in the platform as well the ease of upgrading software.</p> -<p>天主教香港教區榮休主教陳日君樞機未回應記者提問，僅在登車離開前與陳皓桓相擁。</p> +<h3 id="significantly-enhancing-the-use-of-digital-engineering">Significantly Enhancing the Use of Digital Engineering</h3> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/Yu2Yh5d.png" alt="image102" /></p> +<p>Finally, a key enabler of affordability and speed of delivery will be digital engineering (DE). While largely a technology matter, DE also has organisational implications, not least in the form of company and governmental relationships with the Military Aviation Authority (MAA).</p> -<p>「女長毛」雷玉蓮在聞得判刑後難掩傷心，落淚離開法庭，她向記者表示判刑太重，她想向被告表示「撐住，我哋會等你」。</p> +<p>The practice of designing aircraft in a computerised, digital environment is not new. All modern civil and military equipment is designed first on a computer using engineers’ expertise to inform how different elements will interact. Digital simulations enable a digital-twin aircraft to be operated by humans in a simulated “cockpit” and environment. Tests with a real system then evaluate how this simulation data corresponds with reality. However, as the documentary film about the competition for the F-35 contract between Lockheed Martin and Boeing illustrates, while these tests often confirmed the simulation data, some unexpected faults emerged. This was over 25 years ago. As time has passed, the computing capacity of simulations has dramatically improved, and so has the data base for generating high fidelity environments in benign and contested scenarios.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/7s5qyAf.png" alt="image103" /></p> +<p>This development in data quality and quantity and processing speed is especially important in the combat air sector because of the time and costs taken up by real-world testing and flying. The US’s transparency on many defence matters enables a sense of the scale of what “testing” has involved to date. This is apparent in a 2018 statement by Vice Admiral Mat Winter, F-35 Program Executive Officer:</p> -<h4 id="呂智恆養母散庭後舉牌義人得生-惡人必亡">呂智恆養母散庭後舉牌「義人得生 惡人必亡」</h4> +<blockquote> + <p>“Since the first flight of AA-1 in 2006, the developmental flight test program has operated for more than 11 years mishap-free, conducting more than 9,200 sorties, accumulating over 17,000 flight hours, and executing more than 65,000 test points to verify the design, durability, software, sensors, weapons capability and performance for all three F-35 variants.”</p> +</blockquote> -<p>認罪的社工呂智恆被判囚4年3個月，其養母Elsa離開法院時舉起寫上「義人得生 惡人必亡」的紙牌。她隨即被數名警員帶上警車，期間她緊捉車門激動哭喊：「佢係好人嚟㗎！點解要坐監呀！全部都係好人嚟㗎！」警員見狀即大聲要求她停止，並強行關上車門。</p> +<p>The average sortie lasted less than two hours. Over the 11 years, more than 16 sorties were flown a week. These numbers give some sense of both the time and money that could be saved if development could be done largely online rather than in the air.</p> -<p>她今早入庭時曾舉起寫有「神同在，God is with you」的紙牌，警員隨即要求她收起。</p> +<p>The vision associated with DE is that a large amount of testing will be done online at great speed and low cost. Computers can operate “flights” on a 24-hours a day basis if need be. Sub-system testing, which is usually less expensive, can be done both online and on the ground. But the role of flight testing should be massively reduced, generating significant savings.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/sBVmqLO.png" alt="image104" /></p> +<p>All defence systems must have an approved Safety Case. In the case of aircraft, arrangements need the approval of the MoD’s safety authorities including the MAA. This suggests that safety and certification people should be involved throughout development, as opposed to being asked for cooperation late in the day (as was the case, for example, with the Ajax armoured vehicle programme).</p> -<p>黃碧雲被法庭判處6年6個月監禁。其舊同事周小姐得悉判刑結果後激動落淚，她認為案件的判刑比想象中重，「無論（判處）幾多都好，都唔會係一個合理嘅判刑。」</p> +<p>Another major impact of advanced DE is that it will enable numerous engineers to work on different aspects of the system simultaneously as simulation data on the mutually dependent components is shared, analysed and acted upon at much greater speed. As one key programme manager confirmed to us, this process – from simulation data to design alternations that result from it and from implementation to a model to re-run a simulation – would have taken months in the last significant UK combat air programme. Today, it can be done overnight, as the simulation alternates designs automatically to improve. In the case of GCAP, there is the prospect of a long working day for the humans involved, as those ending their day in Japan can be succeeded by staff in Italy and the UK.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/vlv3POx.png" alt="image105" /></p> +<p>Development is far from the only area where DE could be a key enabler. The potential reach of DE is extraordinary. BAE Systems is already invested in digital manufacturing, robotic assembly, and training support for those doing skilled manual work. Additive manufacturing is a sub-element in DE, as are computer-controlled machine tools. It could thus cut manufacturing time and increase product reliability. In-service modification and spiral development would be quicker and easier with DE. Building data-collecting sensors into systems would support longer usage rates for platforms and enable condition-based maintenance rather than time- or usage-based maintenance. Many modern civil aircraft engines are already fitted with such sensors (linked to computers analysing their results). These mean that engine companies can take on profitable availability contracts.</p> -<p>前屯門區議會副主席黃丹晴表示，朋友仍在獄中，心中有一定難過，但坦言刑期比預計為少，他形容在今日不幸的香港，是稍有感到「放鬆啲」的事。他又指，被告「唔係做傷天害理嘅事」，只求在法律中尋找公義，「原來係犯法嘅，喺呢刻香港，係無奈要接受嘅事。」</p> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Advanced digital engineering will enable numerous engineers to work on different aspects of a system simultaneously as data on the mutually dependent components is shared, analysed and acted upon at much greater speed</code></em></strong></p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/2N5ngUq.png" alt="image106" /></p> +<p>DE is the clear direction of travel for much of manufacturing. For GCAP, expanding the boundaries of DE is key to holding costs down and delivering an aircraft for 2035: it could and should be rewarding but also inevitably risky. Significantly, it is a field which US defence companies, not least Boeing, Lockheed Martin and Northrop Grumman are actively exploring. Because of the hundreds of sub-contractors that will need to be captured within the GCAP DE tent, the expertise they acquire can be applied on other manufacturing projects, both military and civil. Subject to respect for companies’ intellectual property, the government could work to diffuse GCAP-origin DE experiences to other industrial sectors beyond aerospace. This could enable progress, especially in productivity growth, under the government’s industrial ambitions as laid out in its Green Paper of October 2024.</p> -<h4 id="毛孟靜丈夫有判刑結果是一種解脫">毛孟靜丈夫：有判刑結果是「一種解脫」</h4> +<p>However, this will require resources and skill. For instance, a highly secure information infrastructure that enables DE is pivotal. Clearly, information on GCAP’s digital twin and its performance in a countless number of combat scenarios will be highly prized, with state and perhaps corporate bodies focused on accessing it. A key to its GCAP capability is keeping that information safe. This has significant implications for the organisations that handle this data, including security clearances, establishing processes, and having the necessary IT infrastructure to handle data securely and at great speed. Skill is also an important factor. Government and industry alike will need to muster the necessary talent to maintain and develop DE capabilities. GCAP is conceptualised as an open-platform system that seeks to enable seamless integration of mission-specific FCAS capabilities from a multitude of suppliers. These suppliers must also be able to recruit the people required for the new digital working environment that they cannot grow themselves. Thus, government and industrial primes will need to produce a skill spill-over to make the FCAS system work.</p> -<p>民主派前議員毛孟靜被判囚50個月，她的丈夫Philip Bowring說，妻子還柙近四年已是很長的一段時間，終於有判刑結果是「一種解脫」，「我們已等待了很長時間（“We have been waiting a long time.”）」，亦相信妻子不久後就能出獄。他又指她精神不俗（in good spirit），並指「we will survive」。至於出獄後會否和毛一同離港，他稱未有計劃。</p> +<p>All this has consequences for the financial approach to GCAP. Historically, major defence development programmes start cheap and then build up. The DE element of GCAP means that significant initial costs of computing, staff recruitment and training and model development have to be incurred. Investment in a highly secure information storage, processing and communication system is needed early. What this means in UK terms is that Treasury approval for higher than usual early costs is needed. It is a matter of approving a “spend to save” strategy, which clearly involves risk. But DE could then play a pivotal role in materialising the cost reduction and increases in speed.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/Vl5x8jA.png" alt="image107" /></p> +<h3 id="conclusions">Conclusions</h3> -<p>中午約12時半，被告區諾軒、彭卓棋的代表律師行律師謝偉俊步出法院，被問及其對判刑的看法，他不作回覆，「暫時冇，no comment。」</p> +<p>The five areas of innovation in GCAP should be seen holistically as a transformational approach to defence acquisition:</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/0eLNorM.png" alt="image108" /></p> +<ul> + <li> + <p>Government-industry partnering from the outset.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Securing access to significant industrial cost contributions for the early stages.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Bringing in a novel collaborative partner and setting up customer and industry delivery structures to facilitate timely decision-making.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Starting from a minimum viable capability while envisaging spiral development.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Pushing the boundaries of digital engineering to reduce the time and cost of development and production.</p> + </li> +</ul> -<p>下午5時，兩輛「鐵甲威龍」及一輛普通囚車駕離西九法院，逾30名警員面向旁聽隊伍戒備，警告市民不要呼叫口號，「一嗌口號即刻帶上車」。女長毛雷玉蓮則在隊伍頭位，她高舉拳頭，目送囚車離開。</p> +<p>This will require persistent teamworking across government departments, among multiple businesses and between government and the private sector. But each offers the prospect of lowering costs and flattening the tendency towards increased inter-generational aircraft costs first pointed out by Norman Augustine more than 40 years ago.</p> -<h3 id="呂智恆養母判刑後舉標語-涉公眾地方行為不檢被捕">呂智恆養母判刑後舉標語 涉公眾地方行為不檢被捕</h3> +<p>The case for this approach rests on the simple observation that different things should be bought in different ways. There is no doubt that GCAP will require a mindset change from those in Defence Equipment &amp; Support whose instinct is that the only way to secure value is through competitive tendering, passing as much risk as possible to the private supplier, and relying primarily on contracted commitments to assure delivery. Also, for teaming to be effective, there will be a need for government technical expertise to be available, not least on the design and meaning of digital and real-world tests. To be specific, the GCAP approach is particularly relevant for projects in which national operational independence is valued and there is little or no scope for sustained competition within the country.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/5MGJJrQ.png" alt="image109" /></p> +<p>The elements of this approach give real hope for effective cost control: incentivising industry by securing early significant company investments, focusing government and industrial delivery structures on pace regarding decisions, defining a realistic but militarily adequate requirement from the outset and, perhaps above all, investing in DE to speed development, reduce risks and lower costs.</p> -<p>【獨媒報導】初選47人案昨日（19日）判刑，被定罪的45人刑期由4年2個月至10年不等。其中被告之一的社工呂智恆判囚4年3個月，其養母Elsa在離開法院時舉起寫上「義人得生 惡人必亡」的紙牌，隨即被數名警員帶上警車。警方表示昨日以涉嫌「在公眾地方行為不檢」拘捕一名60歲女子，她已獲准保釋候查，須於12月下旬向警方報到。</p> +<p>Successive UK governments have shown that they can talk the talk on defence industrial matters, and their defence industrial partners have expressed confidence in their potential. Maintaining the momentum of GCAP will require all concerned to show that they can also walk the walk.</p> -<p>呂智恆養母Elsa昨日在進入法庭後，曾舉起寫有「神同在，God is with you」的紙牌，警員隨即要求她收起。在宣布判刑後，Elsa再次在法院正門舉起寫上「義人得生 惡人必亡」的紙牌，多名警員即上前收起紙牌，並帶他登上警車。期間她緊捉車門激動哭喊：「佢係好人嚟㗎！點解要坐監呀！全部都係好人嚟㗎！」警員見狀即大聲要求她停止，並強行關上車門。</p> +<hr /> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/glmirAO.png" alt="image110" /> -▲ （資料圖片）</p> +<p><strong>Trevor Taylor</strong> is Director of the Defence, Industries &amp; Society Programme and Professorial Fellow in Defence management at RUSI where he has worked since 2009. He also works regularly on a consultancy basis for the Institute of Security Governance which is based at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, CA.</p> -<p>警方表示，昨日（19日）在長沙灣通州街一法院執勤期間，一名女子在通州街公眾地方手持一塊標語招貼，擾亂公眾秩序。經初步調查後，該名60歲本地女子涉嫌「在公眾地方行為不檢」被捕，案件交由深水埗警區重案組第一隊跟進。</p> +<p><strong>Linus Terhorst</strong> is a Research Analyst at the Defence, Industries &amp; Society Programme where he works on defence procurement and industrial strategy questions and innovation management in defence.</p>Trevor Taylor and Linus TerhorstGCAP’s management involves five innovations that should drive success in its technology development and timeline. They also have the potential to transform the UK approach to major development, production and support programmes – if government is willing to change how it approaches project financing.【初選47人案・判刑】2024-11-19T12:00:00+08:002024-11-19T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-sentence<ul> + <li>李予信冀大眾關注案件 藉判詞思考社會走向</li> + <li>清晨逾200人排隊旁聽 有公眾指罵大媽為「排隊黨」</li> + <li>戴耀廷囚10年 其餘44人囚4年2個月至7年9個月</li> + <li>戴耀廷等4名組織者被列「首要分子」區諾軒趙家賢任證人獲一半減刑</li> + <li>所有參選人被列「積極參加者」 發起「墨落無悔」3名抗爭派量刑最重</li> + <li>林景楠任證人囚5年2個月 官無就作供減刑：對控方毫無幫助</li> + <li>官：不接受被告稱涉案計劃註定失敗 61萬投票市民不如此認為</li> + <li>法官指11名認罪被告有真誠悔意 當局評估是否提早釋放時會考慮</li> + <li>何桂藍發帖：歷史由有意志者書寫 人人可定義香港</li> + <li>專訪吳政亨：我以「傻」為榮</li> + <li>陳寶瑩：呢個係冤獄，一日都唔應該坐</li> + <li>呂智恆養母判刑後舉標語 涉公眾地方行為不檢被捕</li> + <li>判刑後長毛致信太太：未因言行悔疚、爭取民主並沒有錯</li> + <li>陳文敏指量刑貼近國安法三級制 料律政司上訴難度大</li> + <li>多國發聲明關注 外交部：無端指責、干涉中國內政</li> + <li>民建聯抗議美國抹黑 領事館未有派代表接信</li> +</ul> -<p>警方又強調，市民表達訴求時，必須遵守法律，並在符合國家安全、公共安全、公共秩序，以及不會損害他人的權利和自由的前提下，和平有序地表達意見。如有任何違法行為，警方必會果斷執法，以維持公共秩序及保障公共安全。</p> +<excerpt /> -<h3 id="判刑後長毛致信太太未因言行悔疚爭取民主並沒有錯">判刑後長毛致信太太：未因言行悔疚、爭取民主並沒有錯</h3> +<h3 id="李予信冀大眾關注案件-藉判詞思考社會走向">李予信冀大眾關注案件 藉判詞思考社會走向</h3> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/fPj2U1Y.png" alt="image111" /></p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/v6WRMZD.png" alt="image01" /></p> -<p>【獨媒報導】初選47人案中，45名罪成的被告昨日（19日）判刑，其中前社民連立法會議員梁國雄（長毛）被判監6年9個月（81個月）。昨晚社民連專頁刊出他去信太太、現社民連主席陳寶瑩，指其厄運是「由於政治逼害的牢獄」，並未因過往的言行悔疚，爭取民主並沒有錯。長毛亦感激太太過去三年的奔波照顧，望能在自由的天地相聚相愛。</p> +<p>【獨媒報導】民主派47人案今日將會進行判刑，亦是香港首宗顛覆國家政權罪案件，大批市民通宵排隊。同為被告之一、早前獲判無罪的李予信凌晨5點前到達隊伍，他認除了此案，現在都有不同案件發生，關乎社會開放度、新聞、集結及參政等自由，希望大眾關心：「我覺得呢啲案件嘅判決同結論好需要大家深思、表達感受，思考指向緊社會未來發展去乜嘢方向」。他希望大家好好細讀判詞對社會的影響：「呢個係我好渴望大家一齊去諗嘅一樣嘢。」</p> -<p>社民連專頁昨刊出長毛致太太陳寶瑩家書，信中先感激對方三年來的探訪照顧，為其事情奔波。他指望能與陳寶瑩於自由的天地相聚相愛，一同遊歷彼此嚮往的地方，感嘆若非隔著鐵窗說「我愛你」「那該多好！」遺憾未能一如以往般「無拘無束相愛」。</p> +<h4 id="批評排隊黨濫用制度">批評「排隊黨」濫用制度</h4> -<p>他在信中指「現在的厄運，是由於政治逼害的牢獄」，對因過往的言行而繫獄並無悔疚。梁國雄指從七十年代開始參與政治運動及社會抗爭，出於的是一種改變社會不公義不合理的願望。他重申爭取民主及實現社會主義「並沒有錯」。最後梁國雄望太太保重，各人平安。</p> +<p>司法機構公布，將安排一共404張公眾人士入庭籌，其中正庭僅設5席，其餘399個旁聽席分布在其他延伸庭。傳媒在正庭及延伸庭則獲分配共71個座位。李予信表示從新聞得知排隊情況及正庭位置很少，抵達時間與過往相若，他又認為「排隊黨」的情況若屬實將十分不理想，「完全abuse（濫用）緊公眾席呢個制度。」</p> -<p>梁國雄在審訊中選擇不作供，法庭在裁定其罪成的理由中指，雖然梁未有出席任何協調會議，但有派代表出席，相信他會關注。此外，社民連曾發表爭取全面否決權的立場書，梁國雄亦有轉發帖文，指不論民主派議席是否過半，皆應否決預算案爭取政府回應五大訴求。</p> +<p>被問到自己近況，他表示「都係咁」：「我覺得呢幾年都係處於比較平和啲、嚴謹啲嘅狀態，冇乜大起伏，我都係做緊自己要做嘅嘢。」</p> -<h3 id="陳文敏指量刑貼近國安法三級制-料律政司上訴難度大">陳文敏指量刑貼近國安法三級制 料律政司上訴難度大</h3> +<p>他表示排隊期間會看書，分享最近在看藝術治療的書籍，關於創傷處理和韌性建立，覺得社會經歷集體創傷，值得思考如何建立生活動力。</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/7SzWSjX.png" alt="image112" /></p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/PrsR87F.png" alt="image02" /></p> -<p>【獨媒報導】初選47人案昨日判刑，量刑孰輕孰重引起不同討論。港大法律學院前客座教授陳文敏今早在商台節目表示，即使法院不採用《國安法》量刑三級制，但仍然有做參考，法官「巧妙」將刑期貼近框架。他認為即使律政司指法庭錯用法律原則，但對量刑結果「完全無分別」，上訴會變成純技術討論。若果純粹認為刑罰「不足夠」而提出上訴，他相信難度很高，律政司必須證明判刑「嚴重不足」。</p> +<h4 id="冀在囚者好好活下去">冀在囚者好好活下去</h4> -<p>保安局局長昨日在判刑數小時後見記者，提到法庭判刑是「重判」，而整體已合適地反映罪行嚴重性。不過他同時留有「尾巴」，稱會在研究判詞後，考慮是否對個別被告的刑期提出上訴。</p> +<p>李卓人妻子鄧燕娥及姨仔鄧燕梨亦在隊伍之中，他們表示來支持吳敏兒等全部被告，鄧燕娥表示對一個多星期前曾探訪吳，引述她對判決結果「隨遇而安」。鄧表示大約一個月探望她一次，形容她大部分時間很堅強。鄧燕娥希望各被告無論如何都要堅強，「無論結果點都要好好活下去」。</p> -<h4 id="稱法官量刑巧妙">稱法官量刑「巧妙」</h4> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/jUvIInb.png" alt="image03" /> +▲ 張文龍</p> -<p>到底上訴空間有多大？港大法律學院前客座教授陳文敏在商台《在晴朗的一天出發》表示，今次判刑焦點落在三名法官沒有套用《國安法》量刑三級制，法庭「做咗少少改動」，接納辯方陳詞指「串謀」並非國安法罪行而是普通刑法罪行，三級制不完全適用。不過他指出法庭並無完全摒棄不考慮，而是作為量刑起點的參考，只是沒有硬性跟足，量刑結果接近三級制。他形容法官的做法是「好巧妙」，「就算話佢錯，結果都係無分別」。</p> +<p>前葵青區議會副主席張文龍表示認識大部分被告，他希望對被告說「出面有好多人等緊同佢哋一齊食飯，一齊重聚。」他表示知道近幾星期不少被告精神狀態差，希望他們努力面對。他直言擔心「前輩級」被告，聽過他們對生活、經濟上的憂慮，不過相信他們這幾年找到方法面對。他表示上月尾探望過譚凱邦，「見到佢身體都ok」，不過一直受些皮膚問題困擾，臨近宣判心情有點緊張。</p> -<h4 id="15年起點-即使減至7年絕對唔輕">15年起點 即使減至7年「絕對唔輕」</h4> +<h4 id="前區議員評估刑期唔樂觀">前區議員評估刑期「唔樂觀」</h4> -<p>不跟從三級制，最大分別是判刑沒有下限的框架，對於部份「首要份子」的最終刑期為7年，效果上低於框架下限的10年。陳文敏指出在這方面，法庭亦「好小心」，數名「首要份子」的刑期起點均為15年，再按個別情況扣減，例如轉做控方證人。他認為判刑結果「四平八穩」，因為「首要份子」的刑期「唔會多唔會少」，其他被告的刑期亦無一低於3年。</p> +<p>前荃灣區議員陳劍琴凌晨5時許到場，她特別關注被告張可森、岑敖暉、王百羽、劉澤鋒、譚凱邦、朱凱廸，並想跟他們說「頂住呀」，但認為刑期「唔樂觀」，因此案不關乎被告的政治光譜如何，僅李予信及劉偉聰脫罪，律政司亦向劉偉聰提出上訴。她上周曾探訪多名被告，形容他們狀態「都精神嘅」，但指部分被告臨近判刑日子「心情越差，狀態唔好」，亦有部分被告認為「終於可以有一個確實嘅日子」，因過去數年牆內外的人無止境地等待，「起碼心裡面有嗰譜」。</p> -<p>陳文敏認為律政司的上訴理據幾乎只得一個，就是提出法院錯用量刑原則，「唔應該用普通法，應該用國安法」。他表示即使成立，「有咩分別呢？結果完全無分別」，律政司的上訴或者變為純技術討論，當然律政司亦可以提出作為日後案件案例，但對47人案的判刑實際影響不大。若果律政司純粹以「刑罰不足夠」提出上訴，陳文敏認為「難度好高」，因為要證明判刑「嚴重不足」，他強調15年刑期起點即使減至7年，亦「絕對唔輕」，而認罪減刑也是過往案例容許的因素，相信上訴難度相當高。</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/3LLKHaW.png" alt="image04" /> +▲ 葉寶琳</p> -<h4 id="法官或同情部分被告-惟對懲教署無約束力">法官或同情部分被告 惟對懲教署無約束力</h4> +<p>因為612基金案曾被國安處拘捕的葉寶琳亦在隊伍之中，她表示和很多被告都是認識多年的朋友：「無論點都好，我哋都應該陪住佢哋同埋等佢哋出嚟。」她表示最近有探望部份被告，形容「佢哋好多都係好堅強，好平安，都鼓勵咗我哋牆外嘅人」。</p> -<p>另外法官昨日在判詞特別提出11名被告有真誠悔意，希望當局日後作酌情考慮。陳文敏認為反映法官對部分被告較多同情，不過很明顯權力不在法院，法官不能作出考慮亦不能作出干涉。他指出法官的想法對懲教署無約束力，只能做參考，更何況相關提早釋放的決定，似乎是由國安委決定的。</p> +<h3 id="清晨逾200人排隊旁聽-有公眾指罵大媽為排隊黨">清晨逾200人排隊旁聽 有公眾指罵大媽為「排隊黨」</h3> -<h3 id="多國發聲明關注-外交部無端指責干涉中國內政">多國發聲明關注 外交部：無端指責、干涉中國內政</h3> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/Z7KydzH.png" alt="image05" /></p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/DZzt7dX.png" alt="image113" /></p> +<p>【獨媒報導】初選47人案在今早10時判刑，司法機構共設404個公眾席，惟僅5人可進入正庭，餘下公眾需在延伸區域看電視直播。有公眾三日前起到法院外輪候，惟隊伍首13位的大部份人均戴上口罩，亦未回應記者，被其他旁聽人士質疑為「排隊黨」。</p> -<p>【獨媒報導】民主派初選案昨日判刑，世界各國領袖亦聚首進行G20峰會，各國對案件的取態備受關注。美國國務院凌晨發表聲明，強烈譴責事件，並形容判刑是「不公（unjust）」和「嚴苛（harsh）」，促請立即無條件釋放45名被告。國務院將會對多名官員施加簽證限制，但未有透露確實對象。英國透過副國務大臣衛倩婷發聲明批評判刑，而首相施紀賢昨日在G20峰會與習近平會見並握手，當施紀賢被記者問會否譴責判刑，他兩度拒絕。</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/NsPc55m.png" alt="image06" /></p> -<p>港府昨傍晚在同一份聲明一次過反駁，指留意到近日美西方國家、反華組織、反華政客、外國媒體等就包括初選案在內的不同案件，作出惡意攻擊和抹黑。發言人又指，港府堅決嚴厲打擊危害國家安全的行為和活動，必須時刻警惕危害國家安全風險，「不能好了傷口便忘了痛，更不可容許傷口再被挖開，讓香港再受難忘的痛」。</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/vN3mscl.png" alt="image07" /></p> -<h4 id="cecc促撤經貿辦禮待">CECC促撤經貿辦禮待</h4> +<p>(05:45) 有數批戴口罩中年女士前來排隊，每批約5至7人。及後每相隔數分鐘，陸續再有中年人士成群結隊前來排隊。截至早上7時，西九裁判法院門外已超過200人排隊輪候旁聽。期間，多名旁聽人士以粗口指罵其中一名女子，斥她是「雞頭」，負責安排人「收錢」排隊。記者向她詢問排隊原因、旁聽的案件等，她未有回應。</p> -<p>美國國務院在聲明表示法庭對初選案的判刑嚴苛，將會侵蝕外界對香港司法制度的信心，以及傷害香港的國際聲譽。美方會繼續監察港區國安法實施情況，並呼籲北京和港府停止利用國安法噤聲民間政見。</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/fvKrS6q.png" alt="image08" /></p> -<p>美國國會及行政當局中國委員會（CECC）昨日在聲明敦促拜登政府實施多項制裁，特別指出這場政治檢控發生的同時，為數不少的美國商界行政總裁正與香港官員享受美酒佳餚，被游說在港做更多投資。CECC表示，香港經貿辦一直在壓制本地和海外異見擔當角色，例如協助中國政府向美國做政府宣傳，委員會促進國會通過撤銷香港駐美經貿辦特權。</p> +<p>警方稱因應行動關係，介乎深旺道及荔枝角道的一段東京街及附近的通州街，交通會比較繁忙。警方呼籲市民在今天早上繁忙時間，避免駕車前往該區範圍。</p> -<h4 id="英國未指違反中英聯合聲明">英國未指違反《中英聯合聲明》</h4> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/JvJHOy3.png" alt="image09" /></p> -<p>至於英國方面，首相施紀賢拒絕譴責判刑，英政府由負責亞太事務的英國副國務大臣 Catherine West（衛倩婷）發聲明，中國在香港施加《國安法》，侵蝕了香港人的權利和自由，而判刑清楚表明，香港當局利用《國安法》，刑事化異議聲音的行為。聲明又指，英國將始終支持香港人民，所有國家都應履行國際義務，以保護這些基本權利。聲明的字眼溫和，未有如保守黨執政期間，不時批評中方和港府行為違反《中英聯合聲明》。</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/MdONJD0.png" alt="image10" /></p> -<p>初選案被告之一吳政亨是澳洲公民，澳洲外長黃英賢（Penny Wong）發聲明指，對澳洲公民吳政亨和案中其他成員的判決表示深切關注，並會繼續關注吳政亨的福祉，同時已向中國及香港政府表達對國安法廣泛運用，並牽涉澳洲公民表達強烈反對。澳洲政府又呼籲中國停止對表達自由、集會自由、媒體及公民社會的壓逼。</p> +<p>(07:59) 警方今早分別將雷玉蓮、社民連曾健成、黃浩銘及周嘉發從隊伍中帶走，到封鎖區或封鎖線內截查搜袋，四人其後放行。周嘉發袋中的紙張被翻閱，他表示社民連之前在47人案做過簡單抗議，預料警方擔心再有示威。他表示今天到場是為了向社民連被告梁國雄、岑子杰等被告聊表心意。</p> -<h4 id="外交部無端指責干涉中國內政">外交部：無端指責、干涉中國內政</h4> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/VIxe1PB.png" alt="image11" /></p> -<p>中國外交部則在昨日例行記者會反駁，香港是法治社會，有法必依、違法必究，是基本原則，任何人都不能打著民主的旗號從事違法活動，並企圖逃脫法律制裁。發言人林劍表示，個別西方國家一面無視中國的司法程序、維護自身國家安全的事實，單方面對香港法院公正實施《國安法》無端指責。中央政府堅定支持香港特區維護國家安全，依法懲治各類危害國家安全的活動，堅決反對個別西方國家藉有關司法個案，干涉中國內政，抹黑和破壞香港法治。</p> +<p>(09:11) 多國領事在隊伍之中。美國領事代表指美國希望北京和港府停止檢控政治犯，因為他們做的事情是其他市民希望做的，表達意見和表達參與政治的渴望，及捍衛人權。他表示領事每次都會旁聽，表示欣賞港府維持公開審訊，認為旁聽是重要的。歐盟領事則表示來表達對案件的關心，表示公開透明審訊十分重要。</p> -<h3 id="民建聯抗議美國抹黑-領事館未有派代表接信">民建聯抗議美國抹黑 領事館未有派代表接信</h3> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/LBtNfkJ.png" alt="image12" /></p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/Zwh9pyI.png" alt="image114" /></p> +<p>(09:15) 天主教香港教區榮休主教陳日君樞機在前立法會議員何秀蘭陪同下到達西九龍裁判法院。</p> -<p>【獨媒報導】「47人案」昨日（19日）判刑，美國政府今日（20日）凌晨發表聲明譴責判刑針對香港民主領袖，要求港府無條件釋放所有政治犯，並宣佈對《港區國安法》的相關官員實施新一輪的簽證限制。民建聯副主席、立法會議員周浩鼎和陳學鋒連同十餘名民建聯成員今日下午到美國領事館門外示威，譴責美國干預中國內政，又高叫口號抗議，示威持續約15分鐘，在場有警員戒備。陳學鋒表示準備了請願信，惟領事館未有代表接信，請願信最終放在領事館門前地上。</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/EkjtxZr.png" alt="image13" /></p> -<p>民建聯一行13人今日下午到美國領事館外示威，他們展開印有「強烈譴責美國 抹黑香港法治 干涉中國內政」的橫幅，又舉起「Enough is enough！Say NO to US interference」、「司法不容外國踐踏」等標語。</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/yBQ0Xbx.png" alt="image14" /></p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/ZiFPyhB.png" alt="image115" /> -▲ 左起：陳學鋒、周浩鼎</p> +<p>(09:30) 早上9時許，市民趙女士身穿自己設計的黑色T恤，上面印有「香港」、「47」及金句字眼。她表示共印製了47件，望派發給被告家屬。她被警方截查、登記個人資料後獲放行。趙女士指警方拍攝了衣服設計，以及詢問她帶同多件衣服的原因，她回應稱是安慰。趙女士又引述警方指，進入法庭或要有所配合，又提醒她不要展示有政治訊息的衣服或標語。</p> -<p>陳學鋒和周浩鼎分別以中文和英文讀出譴責聲明。陳學鋒表示，民建聯強烈譴責美方對「47人案」所發表的聲明和制裁，認為美方此舉無疑是公然干預中國內政和抹黑香港司法體系。他強調，香港法院一直以公平公正的原則審理案件，《基本法》及《香港人權法案》保障所有被告有公平接受審訊的權利，指法庭判刑時是嚴格根據證據、法律規定及原則。</p> +<p>(09:50)在10時開庭前，被告之一的鄒家成透過社交媒體發文指，活着需要希望，沒有希望根本難以堅持，並強調活在不安的環境，我們更要心存希望。他又指，對於刑期絕不樂觀，但自己看見希望，「因為即使重獲自由之日仍相當遙遠，我們總算看到終點」。</p> -<p>對於「47人案」的判刑，陳學鋒稱危害國家安全在任何國家都屬重罪，昨日的判刑是彰顯「法治公義」，向社會傳遞明確信號，警惕市民，任何試圖破壞國家安全的行為，都會受到法律的嚴懲。</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/Yq4rTNr.png" alt="image15" /></p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/315RjeS.png" alt="image116" /></p> +<p>(09:56) 案中被告之一被告呂智恆的養母Elsa，她與友人步入法院後，折返門外並舉起紙牌，紙牌上寫有「神同在，God is with you」，警員隨即要求她收起。</p> -<h4 id="稱香港進入新時代-冀西方勿戴有色眼鏡">稱香港進入「新時代」 冀西方勿戴有色眼鏡</h4> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/fBW1m7T.png" alt="image16" /></p> -<p>不少西方國家在《港區國安法》實施後，因認為國安法損害香港民主、法治和自治，對香港進行制裁。陳學鋒反駁有關說法，並以「西方一些反華勢力不停詆毀香港的司法制度」形容相關情況，又反指包括美國在內的部份西方國家對於國安案件的審判標準更為嚴格。他認為西方國家經常「無端指責」港區國安法，並再三強調任何國家以政治力量干預香港司法程序都是破壞法治的行為，應該予以譴責。</p> +<p>前民間人權陣線陳皓桓今早9時到場排隊，前面已有數百人排隊，他表示雖然職員已經截龍，但仍會繼續在場以示支持及同行。對於判刑，他感到悲觀，因為看不到輕判的跡象，不過對於被告、家屬和朋友而言，對算是一種「解脫」，因為被告已經被囚禁3年8個月，「完全唔知判到幾時，幾時出返嚟，終於知道有個日子，無論幾多年，起碼知道日子」。至於案件的意義，他認為政府和法庭應思考判案對全球港人、以至社會政治經濟有多大影響，特別是60萬曾參與初選投票的港人。</p> -<p>發言末段，陳學鋒讚揚香港在國安法和23條立法後形成了「雙法雙機制」，香港亦進入了「良政善治」的「新時代」。他冀西方國家不要以「有色眼鏡」看待香港事務，呼籲以公平公正態度與香港合作。</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/iSGEAZM.png" alt="image17" /></p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/vyY9Gar.png" alt="image117" /></p> +<p>今早才到達的漫畫家尊子說，料未能進入正庭旁聽，但仍希望看看現場氣氛和朋友。他指眾被告雖身處獄中，但消息很靈通，「知道出面嘅人好support佢哋，我見到嘅（被告）都（狀態）OK，都好清楚目前香港情況、世界嘅情況，唔需要大家擔心。」他又笑說「唔夠膽估、唔想估」被告刑期，僅希望案件有「冇咁壞嘅結果」，亦希望大家關注此「大案」之餘，亦會關注其他案件，例如蘋果案。</p> -<h4 id="一行人拉banner影大合照">一行人拉banner影大合照</h4> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/YBkrSe8.png" alt="image18" /></p> -<p>民建聯示威期間，美國領事館並沒有派代表出席，僅有領事館的外判保安職員在場監察。陳學鋒本打算向領事館遞交請願信，但因領事館未有派出代表接信而作罷，只好與示威期間一直「黑面」的周浩鼎於領事館門外合照後將請願信放置於領事館外的行人路上，待美方代表接收，「由於美國總領館係冇人出嚟接信嘅，我哋都會放喺佢門口嘅」。</p> +<p>(10:18) 警方向在場人士表示，因為法院已派出所有旁聽籌，呼籲市民自行離開。民主黨前主席劉慧卿未能成功入庭，她表示十分遺憾，但認為其黨友會理解。</p> -<hr /> +<p>(10:34) 法庭宣判各人刑期。</p> -<p>案件編號：HCCC69-70/2022</p>獨媒報導李予信冀大眾關注案件 藉判詞思考社會走向 清晨逾200人排隊旁聽 有公眾指罵大媽為「排隊黨」 戴耀廷囚10年 其餘44人囚4年2個月至7年9個月 戴耀廷等4名組織者被列「首要分子」區諾軒趙家賢任證人獲一半減刑 所有參選人被列「積極參加者」 發起「墨落無悔」3名抗爭派量刑最重 林景楠任證人囚5年2個月 官無就作供減刑：對控方毫無幫助 官：不接受被告稱涉案計劃註定失敗 61萬投票市民不如此認為 法官指11名認罪被告有真誠悔意 當局評估是否提早釋放時會考慮 何桂藍發帖：歷史由有意志者書寫 人人可定義香港 專訪吳政亨：我以「傻」為榮 陳寶瑩：呢個係冤獄，一日都唔應該坐 呂智恆養母判刑後舉標語 涉公眾地方行為不檢被捕 判刑後長毛致信太太：未因言行悔疚、爭取民主並沒有錯 陳文敏指量刑貼近國安法三級制 料律政司上訴難度大 多國發聲明關注 外交部：無端指責、干涉中國內政 民建聯抗議美國抹黑 領事館未有派代表接信Semiconductor Mfg. Equipment2024-11-19T12:00:00+08:002024-11-19T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/semiconductor-manufacturing-equipment<p><em>This report argues that existing controls incentivize China to minimize reliance on U.S. semiconductor manufacturing equipment by indigenizing development of tools and increasing purchases from third-country suppliers, which ultimately hinders U.S. technology leadership.</em></p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/94Q8Rzk.png" alt="image19" /></p> -<excerpt /> +<p>(11:45) 初選47人案今早於西九龍裁判法院判刑，明早同一地點將續審蘋果案，壹傳媒集團創辦人黎智英將出庭自辯。在今早約11時45分，即初選47人案散庭後不久，已有約40人在法院門外排隊等候旁聽，當中包括亦有排隊旁聽47人案的「女長毛」雷玉蓮、曾涉違《維護國家安全條例》煽動罪的李盈姿及社民連成員曾健成。另外，現場已有疑似數名「排隊黨」，當記者問及審訊案件，他們均知悉正輪候黎智英案件，但當進一步問及黎的控罪是甚麼，他們則搖頭，不作回覆。</p> -<p>Export controls on semiconductor manufacturing equipment (SME) represent a key focus of ongoing U.S. government efforts to “choke off” China’s access to leading-edge semiconductors. The United States, along with allies such as the Netherlands and Japan, is a global leader in production and R&amp;D for chipmaking tools. By imposing uniquely broad and unilateral controls on U.S. toolmakers’ access to the Chinese market, however, the U.S. government has turbocharged Chinese efforts to wean off all U.S. SME due to growing concerns about the reliability and trustworthiness of U.S. companies. In this way, expanding U.S. trade restrictions are facilitating the “design-out” of U.S. toolmakers in Chinese semiconductor supply chains in favor of domestic and third-country (i.e., non-U.S. and non-Chinese) companies. This growing trend in China’s market, the world’s largest for semiconductor manufacturing, threatens the long-term leadership of the United States in SME by diverting revenue (and R&amp;D investment) away from U.S. industry. As a result, current U.S. export controls risk jeopardizing the economic and national security of the United States by hindering U.S. companies’ market share and accelerating China’s relative technological gains. This report, the second in a series on U.S. semiconductor export controls, outlines the importance of SME to chip markets, key types of tools being designed-out, and the rapid growth of Chinese toolmakers. It also evaluates how toolmakers based in third countries have leveraged U.S. unilateral controls to win new business with Chinese customers. The report argues that the United States should limit further unilateral controls on SME sales and consider new incentives for allies to create multilateral export regimes, which could mitigate some of the negative impacts of current controls on U.S. companies.</p> +<h3 id="戴耀廷囚10年-其餘44人囚4年2個月至7年9個月">戴耀廷囚10年 其餘44人囚4年2個月至7年9個月</h3> -<h3 id="introduction">Introduction</h3> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/1v6LDqA.png" alt="image20" /></p> -<p>With geopolitical competition intensifying, U.S. economic security policy has undergone significant changes. Primarily, the United States has expanded economic security measures to take new defensive actions around critical and emerging technologies (CETs). Such efforts center on denying China access to key foundational technologies — particularly advanced semiconductors that support dual-use applications such as artificial intelligence (AI).</p> +<p>【獨媒報導】47人涉組織及參與民主派初選，被控「串謀顛覆國家政權」罪，其中31人認罪，16人不認罪受審，除李予信及劉偉聰之外，餘下14人皆被裁定罪成。45人今（19日）於高院（移師西九龍法院）判刑。被指為組織者的戴耀廷認罪，判囚10年。其餘44人判囚4年2個月至7年9個月。刑期最重的為不認罪的鄒家成，判囚7年9個月。散庭後，黃之鋒被帶回囚室期間，高呼：「我愛香港，拜拜！」何桂藍得悉刑期後，向旁聽席舉起姆指手勢。有家屬在聞判期間哭泣。</p> -<p>The administrations of Presidents Donald Trump and Joe Biden have expanded economic security measures regarding China’s access to CETs. Export controls are an increasingly common tool in U.S. economic security efforts, and National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan has called them a “new strategic asset in the U.S. and allied toolkit.” Under the Biden administration, the federal government has implemented two major rounds of semiconductor export controls, one in October 2022 and a second in October 2023. Additional controls may be forthcoming as the United States aims to use trade restrictions to deny China access to leading-edge semiconductors, thus limiting China’s ability to develop military and dual-use technologies such as advanced AI systems.</p> +<p>約10時許，女被告先被懲教帶入庭內，何桂藍身穿粉紅色外套、白色上衣。男被告其後被帶入欄內，其中馮達浚與袁嘉蔚均穿上紅色利物浦球衣；張可森則向親友作出「OK」手勢。曾以「從犯證人」身份作供的區諾軒、趙家賢和鍾錦麟，則被約6至7名懲教人員重重包圍，與其他被告分隔開來。</p> -<p>The potential benefits of such a strategy to economic and national security are obvious. They include maintaining technological superiority for modern military capabilities and intelligence gathering. Washington sees clear, legitimate risks associated with the proliferation of highly advanced semiconductors among its adversaries. A sensible U.S. export control policy focused on preserving technological superiority is a measured response.</p> +<p>甫開庭，3名國安法指定法官表示判詞一共有82頁，不會在庭上讀出，只會宣布各人刑期。稍後會在司法機構網頁上載完整判刑理由。簡短書面判刑結果則派發給在場被告、控辯雙方律師團隊和傳媒。當何桂藍得悉自己刑期後，向親友擺出「好」手勢。</p> -<p>Export controls, however, are a double-edged sword. When a nation decides to implement controls, it effectively restricts its companies’ market share. If controls negatively affect a nation’s technological champions, policymakers may inadvertently compromise their country’s status as a long-term technology leader. The loss in sales decreases these tech champions’ revenue and, in some cases, redirects it to foreign competitors, potentially reducing future investments in innovation for key U.S. firms.</p> +<p>記者於正庭內所見，旁聽席的第一及二行均預留給法律團隊人士，第三及四行則是記者席，而第五及六行才是預留給被告家屬。</p> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Washington sees clear, legitimate risks associated with the proliferation of highly advanced semiconductors among its adversaries. A sensible U.S. export control policy focused on preserving technological superiority is a measured response.</code></em></strong></p> +<h4 id="以下為各被告的刑期">以下為各被告的刑期：</h4> -<p>If the relative costs imposed on China’s technological progression and the corresponding benefits to U.S. national security outweigh the costs to U.S. industry and innovation, then Washington may well view these impacts as a necessary price. However, China’s semiconductor ecosystem — through its own strategies and through government support — has managed to undermine the effectiveness of many of the controls meant to keep Chinese firms behind their Western counterparts. For one, Chinese companies have found ways to access U.S. technology by circumventing controls. These efforts have been widely written about and include using overseas shell companies to purchase controlled products, as well as leveraging domestic technology trading networks to redirect technology via firms that are exempt from controls.</p> +<ul> + <li>戴耀廷：120個月</li> + <li>區諾軒：81個月</li> + <li>趙家賢：84個月</li> + <li>鍾錦麟：73個月</li> + <li>吳政亨：87個月</li> + <li>袁嘉蔚：51個月</li> + <li>梁晃維：59個月</li> + <li>鄭達鴻：78個月</li> + <li>徐子見：50個月</li> + <li>楊雪盈：78個月</li> + <li>彭卓棋：78個月</li> + <li>岑子杰：51個月</li> + <li>毛孟靜：50個月</li> + <li>何啟明：79個月</li> + <li>馮達浚：53個月</li> + <li>黃碧雲：78個月</li> + <li>劉澤鋒：53個月</li> + <li>黃之鋒：56個月</li> + <li>譚文豪：50個月</li> + <li>李嘉達：51個月</li> + <li>譚得志：53個月</li> + <li>胡志偉：53個月</li> + <li>施德來：79個月</li> + <li>朱凱廸：53個月</li> + <li>張可森：59個月</li> + <li>黃子悅：53個月</li> + <li>伍健偉：67個月</li> + <li>尹兆堅：56個月</li> + <li>郭家麒：50個月</li> + <li>吳敏兒：53個月</li> + <li>譚凱邦：51個月</li> + <li>何桂藍：84個月</li> + <li>劉頴匡：53個月</li> + <li>楊岳橋：61個月</li> + <li>陳志全：78個月</li> + <li>鄒家成：93個月</li> + <li>林卓廷：81個月</li> + <li>范國威：50個月</li> + <li>呂智恆：51個月</li> + <li>梁國雄：81個月</li> + <li>林景楠：62個月</li> + <li>柯耀林：79個月</li> + <li>岑敖暉：54個月</li> + <li>王百羽：51個月</li> + <li>余慧明：81個月</li> +</ul> -<p>Beyond circumvention efforts, U.S. export controls have helped facilitate a farther-reaching unintended consequence: China has set its domestic semiconductor ecosystem on a path toward removing U.S. technology altogether. Chinese government and commercial actors have deployed two key long-term strategies to create ex-U.S. supply chains for semiconductor technologies across the value chain. These strategies, which represent the focus of this series of papers by the CSIS Economics Program and Scholl Chair in International Business, include the following:</p> +<p>認罪的31人包括：戴耀廷、區諾軒、趙家賢、鍾錦麟、袁嘉蔚、梁晃維、徐子見、岑子杰、毛孟靜、馮達浚、劉澤鋒、黃之鋒、譚文豪、李嘉達、譚得志、胡志偉、朱凱廸、張可森、黃子悅、尹兆堅、郭家麒、吳敏兒、譚凱邦、劉頴匡、楊岳橋、范國威、呂智恆、岑敖暉、王百羽、伍健偉及林景楠。</p> -<ol> - <li> - <p>Design-out: supplanting existing U.S. and allied semiconductor technologies with comparable technologies, from either</p> +<p>不認罪16人包括：鄭達鴻、楊雪盈、彭卓棋、何啟明、劉偉聰、黃碧雲、施德來、何桂藍、陳志全、鄒家成、林卓廷、梁國雄、柯耀林、李予信、余慧明及吳政亨。其中劉偉聰和李予信被裁定罪名不成立。律政司隨即針對劉偉聰的無罪裁決上訴，並在回覆傳媒查詢時確認沒有就李予信提出上訴。</p> - <p>a. Chinese firms; or</p> +<p>民主派初選於2020年7月舉行，事後政府宣布立法會選舉延後一年。55名組織及參與初選者於2021年1月6日被捕，同年3月1日被落案起訴，指他們在2020年7月1日至2021年1月7日，以無差別否決預算案等非法手段，嚴重干擾、阻撓、破壞特區政權機關依法履行職能。</p> - <p>b. third-country (non-U.S. and non-Chinese) firms</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Design-around: developing new technologies that do away with an entire category of controlled technology in the semiconductor supply chain</p> - </li> -</ol> +<p>案件2023年2月6日正式開審，由指定法官陳慶偉、李運騰及陳仲衡審理，是《國安法》後最大規模的案件，亦是「串謀顛覆國家政權」罪首案。審期原定90天，但最終橫跨十個月、歷時118天。認罪的區諾軒、趙家賢、鍾錦麟和林景楠4人以「從犯證人」身分為控方作供，另12名被告親自作供或傳召辯方證人。</p> -<h3 id="design-out-and-design-around">Design-Out and Design-Around</h3> +<p>根據《國安法》第22條，一旦顛覆國家政權罪成，「首要或罪行重大」可處10年以上至終身監禁；「積極參加」可判監3至10年；「其他參加」則判監3年以下、拘役或管制。</p> -<p>As discussed in the Economics Program and Scholl Chair in International Business’s introductory report in this series, which covers advanced packaging, China is rapidly accelerating the design-out of U.S. technologies from semiconductor supply chains in response to existing — and in anticipation of future — U.S. export controls. It has pursued this goal, in part, by increasingly adopting domestic firms’ technologies. China’s semiconductor industry has rapidly pivoted toward made-in-China technology over the last few years, facilitated by expanded government investment and other incentives, as well as preferential procurement practices by Chinese semiconductor companies.</p> +<h3 id="戴耀廷等4名組織者被列首要分子區諾軒趙家賢任證人獲一半減刑">戴耀廷等4名組織者被列「首要分子」區諾軒趙家賢任證人獲一半減刑</h3> -<p>There is also evidence of increased Chinese adoption of third-country suppliers within semiconductor supply chains. For instance, competitors from Japan, the Netherlands, Taiwan, Israel, and South Korea have increasingly leveraged China’s chip market as a growth engine, winning new Chinese customers and increasing existing customers’ wallet share as the impacts of U.S. export controls constrain the competitiveness of U.S. companies. This third-country design-out threat potentially shifts semiconductor industry leadership toward foreign competitors, some of whom offer China the very technologies U.S. companies are barred from selling.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/kQLTI1B.png" alt="image21" /></p> -<p>In addition, China is looking to design around U.S. export controls — in other words, innovate to achieve advanced semiconductor capabilities using approaches not modeled on U.S. technologies. Importantly, this trend means China is beginning to innovate rather than copy foreign technology in the chip industry. As discussed in the packaging report, a shift away from a “fast-follower” approach toward a more innovative approach would represent a key change in U.S.-China technological competition — one that potentially threatens long-term U.S. innovation leadership.</p> +<p>【獨媒報導】47人涉組織及參與民主派初選，被控「串謀顛覆國家政權」罪，其中31人認罪，16人不認罪受審，除李予信及劉偉聰之外，餘下14人皆被裁定罪成。45人今（19日）於高院（移師西九龍法院）判刑。法官指，案中4名組織者包括戴耀廷、區諾軒、趙家賢及鍾錦麟，屬罪行中的「首要分子」級別，法例指明最低刑期為10年監禁。法官指，首3人的量刑起點為15年監禁。法官提到，戴耀廷在本案中是「幕後主腦（mastermind behind）」。至於任「從犯證人」區諾軒及趙家賢，則因認罪並作供協助控方，各獲一半減刑。法官另接納趙家賢或被戴耀廷誤導了計劃的合法性，額外減刑3個月。</p> -<p>It would be one thing if China’s design-out and design-around strategies affected only leading-edge semiconductor technologies, which are the primary targets of U.S. export controls. However, China’s pivot away from U.S. technology has affected not only the leading edge but also foundational, or “trailing-edge,” semiconductor technologies. Chinese and third-country firms want to avoid dealing with the high regulatory and financial burdens of U.S. export controls, which are complex, stricter than other nations’ in coverage and enforcement, and fast evolving. As a result, Chinese and foreign companies selling to the Chinese market are newly incentivized to avoid using U.S. technology where possible. Additionally, the ambiguity of the controls means that firms may opt to overcomply with export regulations and avoid selling or purchasing U.S. technologies — even if the products technically fall outside of the controls — for fear of dealing with costly litigation.</p> +<blockquote> + <h3 id="1戴耀廷">1）戴耀廷</h3> +</blockquote> -<p>The United States, for its part, looks to press forward with stricter controls. This threat of stricter controls, in turn, encourages China to design out and design around other U.S. technologies to hedge against future regulations. In this way, tightening unilateral U.S. export controls is having a ripple effect across the Chinese — and global — semiconductor ecosystem, threatening to undermine U.S. leadership and leverage in the sector.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/80Ovo7p.png" alt="image22" /></p> -<h3 id="overview">Overview</h3> +<h4 id="法官指戴耀廷是幕後主腦屬首要分子以15年為起點">法官指戴耀廷是「幕後主腦」屬首要分子以15年為起點</h4> -<p><strong><em>Semiconductor Manufacturing Equipment</em></strong></p> +<p>被指為組織者的戴耀廷判囚10年，法官指，戴並非僅僅是35+計劃的發起人，更是初選的組織者，屬於「幕後主腦（mastermind behind）」，其文章引起民主派的注意。因此法官將戴納入「首要分子」級別。法官不同意戴稱沒有打算將「攬炒十步曲」作為政治行動的藍圖，因他在數月內發表一系列相關文章，因此不難追蹤其漸進的思想。法官認為，實質上戴提倡了一場革命。</p> -<p>This paper focuses on China’s design-out and design-around strategies related to semiconductor manufacturing equipment (SME) — the machines critical to making chips. China’s access to such equipment has become increasingly important to its national semiconductor ambitions as expanding U.S. and allied export controls limit Chinese access to leading global chip manufacturers such as Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC), Samsung, and Intel.</p> +<p>法官亦指，雖然戴未必是初選或立法會選舉的候選人，但他為有意行使計劃下否決權的人，提供不可或缺的平台。戴為了成功，亦同意吳政亨的「三投三不投」計劃。戴在初選後並未停止參與計劃，當區諾軒退出時，戴只是表示自己需要暫時休息。</p> -<p>SME is a strong example of the design-out issue. Chinese companies are increasingly replacing U.S. producers one-to-one in Chinese semiconductor manufacturing facilities, or fabs. As procurement practices in Chinese fabs shift toward an anywhere-but-the-United-States approach, SME sales are also shifting toward third-country toolmakers.</p> +<p>在評估戴的罪責時，法官只會考慮2020年7月1日之前的事實作為背景。法官指，「首要分子」的最低刑期為10年監禁，最高刑期為終身監禁。法官考慮戴的角色後，認為適當的量刑起點是15年監禁。唯一求情因素是戴及早認罪，因此獲三分一減刑，判囚10年。</p> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">SME is a strong example of the design-out issue. Chinese companies are increasingly replacing U.S. producers one-to-one in Chinese semiconductor manufacturing facilities, or fabs.</code></em></strong></p> +<p>法官亦提到，兩名主要組織者對計劃的成功抱有樂觀態度。組織者花費大量時間及金錢舉行記者會、協調會議及選舉論壇，同時亦發起眾籌。</p> -<p>The United States would benefit economically and strategically from continuing to sell some SME technology to China. These benefits do not apply to technologies that are highly specific to advanced dual-use technology and cannot be acquired elsewhere or rapidly developed domestically. For example, ASML’s sales of extreme ultraviolet (EUV) lithography provide a choke point for Chinese technological advancement into fabrication processes like 3 nanometers (nm) and is a prime example of the power of export controls. But for less niche and non-sole-sourced tools, unilateral and broad export controls risk U.S. technology champions losing out on revenue while China maintains its access to the same technology, either via industry indigenization efforts or shifting purchases to third countries.</p> +<blockquote> + <h3 id="2區諾軒從犯證人">2）區諾軒（從犯證人）</h3> +</blockquote> -<p>This paper explores why SME is important to semiconductor technological innovation, what types of U.S. SME are facing design-out and design-around risks, and what implications those risks carry for U.S. economic and national security.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/ME0epzY.png" alt="image23" /></p> -<h4 id="why-is-semiconductor-manufacturing-equipment-important">Why Is Semiconductor Manufacturing Equipment Important?</h4> +<h4 id="法官指區諾軒不及戴耀廷激進-另指其證供關鍵">法官指區諾軒不及戴耀廷激進 另指其證供關鍵</h4> -<p>Making semiconductors is impossible without a wide array of specialized, highly advanced machinery. Each manufacturing plant, or fab, contains an average of 1,200 multi-million-dollar tools — all of which are critical to chip production. This group of tools transforms a thin piece of crystalline silicon or other semiconducting material into a fabricated wafer containing billions — if not trillions — of nanometric transistors precisely etched onto a tiny surface area (often just 300 millimeters). Capital expenditures (CapEx) on SME constitute an estimated 75 percent of total CapEx on fab construction, and some tools reach the size of a double-decker bus, costing upward of $150 million.</p> +<p>同被指為組織者、在案中擔任「從犯證人」的區諾軒，法官指他作為組織者之一，其證供屬「關鍵（crucial）」，在合併所有證供後，能夠有系統及邏輯地向法庭提供事件的全貌。在罪責方面，法官認為區作為組織者，其參與程度與戴耀廷大致相同。區在計劃開始階段已參與其中，儘管他不像戴般「激進（radical）」，但量刑起點同為15年監禁。</p> -<p>Semiconductor fabrication, both for leading-edge process nodes and mature chip technologies, is one of the most complex manufacturing processes on the planet — in large part due to the machinery required. For instance, ASML’s EUV lithography devices have been called “the most complicated machine humans have built.” As a result, advancements in SME technology have historically represented a key driver of semiconductor industry innovation. High-quality SME is also critical to the economics of scaled production, as any imprecision in a finished chip’s structure or composition can affect performance and reduce a fab’s production yield. All this means that a fab’s access to tools is a leading determinant of how competitive its technology is on a global scale.</p> +<p>法官考慮到區作為控方證人，他所提供的證據的重要性，故給予一半減刑。另外，區得知香港及中國的官員對計劃「示警」後，區隨即退出計劃；區亦嘗試游說趙家賢退出計劃。法官亦考慮到，區對法律的無知，以及他過去對公共服務有貢獻，最後因應上述因素，決定再給予5%減刑，總刑期為6年9個月。</p> -<p>SME is often divided into front-end equipment used in wafer fabrication and processing, such as lithography, etch, deposition, and cleaning, and back-end equipment used for assembly, packaging, dicing, bonding, and testing. Because the advanced packaging brief covers assembly and packaging equipment, this brief focuses on fabrication and test equipment in evaluating design-out and design-around risks.</p> +<blockquote> + <h3 id="3趙家賢從犯證人">3）趙家賢（從犯證人）</h3> +</blockquote> -<p>Four types of SME across front-end and back-end equipment are under significant threat of design-out: (1) deposition, (2) etching, (3) process control, and (4) testing. While discussions of the semiconductor supply chain often group testing with assembly and packaging, the authors include testing within SME here for two reasons: First, testing plays a key role in front-end wafer fabrication (as well as in back-end processes like assembly and packaging), as it takes place continually throughout the production life cycle. Second, the design-out and design-around dynamics of testing equipment are more like those of chipmaking tools rather than those of assembly or packaging technologies. As in the areas of etching, deposition, and process control, the United States is home to leading competitors in testing equipment, which are facing design-out risks from foreign manufacturers. For these reasons, testing is included as part of SME in this report.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/KqAcuwc.png" alt="image24" /></p> -<p>The following section introduces each category of SME as well as the key U.S. and global players associated with it. The primary takeaway is that U.S. manufacturers, alongside competitors primarily from U.S.-allied countries such as Japan and the Netherlands, have historically held leading shares of global equipment markets — particularly for chipmaking technologies at the leading edge. This leadership underscores the high stakes of any shift in global market share because of U.S. export controls. U.S. companies have much revenue and technological leadership to lose to new Chinese companies — as well as Dutch, Japanese, Israeli, German, and other foreign firms, many of which are well positioned in equipment markets to grab a share of the U.S. market.</p> +<h4 id="法官接納趙家賢被戴耀廷誤導計劃合法性">法官接納趙家賢被戴耀廷誤導計劃合法性</h4> -<h4 id="deposition">Deposition</h4> +<p>被指為組織者、在案中擔任「從犯證人」的趙家賢，他在交付階段及時認罪，並為控方提供證據。法官指，趙的證供獲法庭接納，亦協助法庭達成裁決。</p> -<p>The deposition process involves specialized tools depositing thin films of conducting, isolating, or semiconducting materials on the wafer. Deposition takes place throughout the fabrication stage and often occurs in multiple sequential iterations along with processes such as photolithography and etching. It plays a key role in enabling miniaturization in semiconductors, as it can create protective barriers to prevent atomic-level interference. Deposition can also help strengthen or weaken an electric field and connect transistors with other devices and power sources.</p> +<p>法官不同意趙在串謀中只屬於「積極參加者」，反而認為他是「首要分子」，因他作為組織者之一。考慮到趙的重要角色及參與程度，法官以15年為量刑起點。法官亦有考慮計劃的非暴力性質。法官指趙及時認罪並協助控方，因此給予一半減刑。</p> -<p>There are various types of deposition used in wafer fabrication. U.S. companies such as Lam, Applied Materials, Plasma-Therm, and Veeco are key players across most types of deposition tools. The two areas discussed in depth here are epitaxy and atomic layer deposition, given their potential for design-out by Chinese supply chains.</p> +<p>法官接納趙可能被戴耀廷誤導，故認為計劃合法性，因此減刑3個月。惟法官拒絕接納辯方指，計劃客觀上沒有可能實行，因政府可以及時阻止這個公開的計劃。法官量刑時，已考慮被告無法控制的原因，令計劃無法進一步繼續及成功。</p> -<p>Epitaxy — also known as “epi” — involves depositing a near-perfect crystalline layer directly on top of the wafer substrate. Epitaxy growth typically occurs during the beginning of the wafer fabrication process, following wafer polishing and preceding the sequences of lithography, etching, and other deposition processes. Adding an epitaxial layer helps fabs better control doping wafers with impurities and can introduce a different material than that used in wafer “bulk” materials. As a result, epitaxy facilitates more effective electron transmission, a key goal in advanced chipmaking.</p> +<p>法官最後考慮到被告親友、其選區太古城街坊為趙所撰的求情信，以及趙過往的公共服務。法官認為趙致力在港推廣調解，亦積極擔任區議員，因此同意他有良好品格，再給予3個月減刑，總刑期為7年。</p> -<p>Epitaxy innovation plays an important role in the ongoing evolution of both chip fabrication and advanced packaging. Epitaxy is important to nonclassical wafer substrates (i.e., nonsilicon) such as gallium arsenide (GaAs), gallium nitride (GaN), and silicon carbide (SiC), which play a key role in critical technologies such as aerospace and defense applications and electric vehicles. An emerging technology within the field of epitaxy is remote epitaxy. Remote epitaxy is the growth of a thin epitaxial layer that is aligned — but not in contact — with the substrate. This technique has a plethora of applications in advanced packaging, particularly three-dimensional (3D) packaging designs, in which multiple chips are stacked to enhance bandwidth while reducing power consumption and footprint.</p> +<blockquote> + <h3 id="4鍾錦麟從犯證人">4）鍾錦麟（從犯證人）</h3> +</blockquote> -<p>The epitaxy equipment market includes tools used for metal-organic chemical vapor deposition, high-temperature chemical vapor deposition, and molecular beam epitaxy. Leading suppliers are based in Germany, the United States, and Japan — as well as China. Key companies in terms of 2020 market share include Germany’s Aixtron, the United States’ Veeco, China’s Advanced Micro-Fabrication Equipment Inc., China (AMEC), and Japan’s Tokyo Electron (TEL).</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/nfTE6UW.png" alt="image25" /></p> -<p>Atomic layer deposition (ALD) is an advanced type of chemical vapor deposition (CVD) that adds layers consisting of a single atom of thickness onto a wafer. It is key to leading-edge chip designs due to the importance of controlling layer thickness and composition in fabricating advanced chips, whose features are small enough that the industry is running up against the physical limits of miniaturization. There are two key types of ALD: thermal ALD and plasma-enhanced ALD (PEALD). Whereas the former relies solely on chemical precursors to deposit the atomic layer, PEALD uses plasma to provide reaction energy for the process, enabling greater control over film characteristics.</p> +<h4 id="法官指其參與程度不及戴耀廷等3人">法官指其參與程度不及戴耀廷等3人</h4> -<p>Netherlands-based ASM is the leader in ALD, particularly PEALD, holding above 50 percent of the market, according to investor materials. Additional key suppliers include Japan’s Kokusai, TEL, and Optorun, as well as the United States’ Lam Research. As of 2020, China’s Naura had a “negligible” share.</p> +<p>為「從犯證人」的鍾錦麟，法官不同意辯方指他屬「積極參加者」，反而認為屬「首要分子」，因他為組織者之一，但參與程度不如戴、區及趙。法官決定以12年監禁為量刑起點。由於鍾認罪及協助控方，因此給予45%減刑。他另因對法律的無知及過往參與公共服務，獲減刑3個月，總刑期為6年1個月。</p> -<h4 id="etching">Etching</h4> +<p>根據《國安法》第22條，一旦顛覆國家政權罪成，「首要或罪行重大」可處10年以上至終身監禁；「積極參加」可判監3至10年；「其他參加」則判監3年以下、拘役或管制。</p> -<p>The etching process involves carving a precise pattern onto the wafer by selectively removing layers of material using either liquid or gas chemicals. Etching takes the pattern created during photolithography — during which a light selectively removes parts of a photoresist coating based on a photomask design — and applies this pattern permanently to the material layer below. Etching occurs multiple times in fabrication and creates a complex pattern of cavities where the thin film layer has been removed.</p> +<h3 id="所有參選人被列積極參加者-發起墨落無悔3名抗爭派量刑最重">所有參選人被列「積極參加者」 發起「墨落無悔」3名抗爭派量刑最重</h3> -<p>There are two main types of etching tools: dry and wet. Dry etching tools use gases to engrave the wafer and are necessary to create the circuitry on leading-edge chips. Atomic layer etching tools are particularly important for advanced process node production due to their greater control and precision. Wet etching, which uses liquid chemicals to engrave the wafer, is less common than dry etching for advanced process nodes due to the challenges of creating complex structures. However, it is cheaper and less risky, making it commonly used to clean wafers. Because etching also plays a key role in mature chip technologies, both dry and wet etching tools are critical to semiconductor manufacturing.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/EJ1BNx8.png" alt="image26" /></p> -<p>The United States and Japan are the world’s leading suppliers of etching equipment, followed by China and South Korea. Lam Research, Applied Materials, and KLA all have strong shares in global dry and wet etching markets. Japan’s TEL, Hitachi, and Screen are other notable players. South Korea-based SEMES represents a growing wet etching player. Finally, in China, AMEC, Naura, and Kingsemi are notable small providers of etching tools.</p> +<p>【獨媒報導】47人涉組織及參與民主派初選，被控「串謀顛覆國家政權」罪，其中31人認罪，16人不認罪受審，除李予信及劉偉聰，其餘14人罪成，45人今（19日）判刑。法官指，若計劃最終完全實行的話，其不良後果深遠，嚴重程度比得上推翻香港特區政府。法官亦指，初選參選人在計劃中有重要角色，他們支持計劃亦積極參與，若沒有他們根本無法進行，因此所有參選人均被法官納入「積極參加者」級別。根據法例，「積極參加者」可處3至10年監禁。本案15名「抗爭派」中，發起「墨落無悔」聲明的3人，包括鄒家成、梁晃維及張可森，為量刑最重，法官以8年監禁為量刑起點，並指他們協助計劃成功。其他被告則以7年監禁為起點。由於鄒家成受審後定罪，沒有認罪減刑，只因誤解法律減3個月，故他為眾被告中刑期最重。</p> -<h4 id="process-control">Process Control</h4> +<p>以下為抗爭派15人的判刑理由及刑期：</p> -<p>Process control refers to using monitoring tools in semiconductor manufacturing to ensure quality control. It takes place concurrently with other stages of fabrication and involves metrics like the purity of wafer materials, transistor dimensions, and chip conductivity. As chip dimensions get smaller, variations at the molecular level represent a larger share of an integrated circuit’s dimensions, making process control increasingly important in fabrication. Ongoing industry shifts, like the switch from single patterning to multiple patterning and from planar to 3D transistors, mean that variations increasingly come from the material quality or the deposition process, calling for more advanced control tools.</p> +<blockquote> + <h3 id="鄒家成">鄒家成</h3> +</blockquote> -<p>Process control is important to both advanced and mature node production, as it has a key impact on yield. Wafer production yield, or the percentage of individual chips (dies) per wafer that make it through the final probe testing stage, is a critical metric for fabs due to their high per-unit operating costs. Process control technology helps enable a higher yield, thus improving profitability by minimizing wasted output.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/9Kr4AvR.png" alt="image27" /></p> -<p>Key types of semiconductor process control technologies include photomask inspection and repair tools, process monitoring equipment, wafer inspection equipment, and wafer-level inspection packaging tools. U.S. companies hold strong market share across all key types of tools. Notable U.S. players include Applied Materials, KLA, Keithley Instruments, Keysight Technologies, Onto Innovation, Nanotronics, and Thermo Fisher. Japan and Germany are home to most leading competitors, such as Lasertec, Rigaku, and Screen in Japan and Zeiss and Bruker in Germany. Chinese players are smaller and include Shanghai Micro Electronics Equipment (SMEE), Jingce, and Raintree.</p> +<p>鄒家成為案中刑期最重的被告。法官指，他為新界西參選人，現正就七一暴動案服刑61個月及15天。鄒雖然並非計劃組織者或「首要分子」，但他為「墨落無悔」聲明的發起人。法官認為，「墨落無悔」或許不會為計劃增添太多作用，不過鄒盡力綑綁參與者以確保成功。法官強調，「墨落無悔」聲明確實是令本案更嚴重的因素。法官採納8年監禁為量刑起點，因他對法律無知扣減3個月，但他受審後定罪，沒有其他減刑，總刑期為7年9個月，與暴動案分期執行。</p> -<p>While various players compete across the entire process control ecosystem, individual markets are often highly concentrated among a few players. For instance, the market for wafer-level packaging inspection tools is dominated by one U.S. and one Israeli firm. As a result, the impact of export controls on a single company’s positioning can have a significant effect on global market shares.</p> +<blockquote> + <h3 id="梁晃維">梁晃維</h3> +</blockquote> -<h4 id="testing">Testing</h4> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/cmvhUM1.png" alt="image28" /></p> -<p>Semiconductor testing occurs at multiple stages during fabrication and packaging, helping ensure defective chips do not make it into final packages. Chips go through up to six stages of testing: (1) wafer acceptance, (2) wafer sort, (3) wafer-level burn-in, (4) package test, (5) burn-in test, and (6) testing at the system level. Testing equipment has taken on increased importance and industry value as the cost of testing devices and the potential losses associated with manufacturing defective dice have risen in response to advances in chip design and applications such as advanced graphics processing units, which are commonly used to train AI models.</p> +<p>法官指，港島區的梁晃維是「墨落無悔」聲明的起草人之一，他亦有出席港島區協調會議、選舉論壇及抗爭派記者會。法官考慮到梁草擬聲明，屬於較積極主動角色，因此以8年監禁為量刑起點。法官因他認罪減刑三分一，再因誤解計劃合法性，給予3個月減刑；另考慮他參與公共服務，減刑2個月，總刑期為4年11個月。</p> -<p>Key types of semiconductor testing tools include burn-in test equipment, handlers and probes, linear and discrete testing tools, and system-on-a-chip testing equipment. Japanese and U.S. firms hold leading market shares in different parts of the industry. Notable Japanese companies include Advantest, Tesec, and Accretech. U.S. players include Teradyne, National Instruments, and Cohu. South Korean firms such as UniTest and DI Corporation are also key participants. Chinese capabilities have historically been more limited.</p> +<blockquote> + <h3 id="張可森">張可森</h3> +</blockquote> -<h3 id="how-the-ear-impacts-us-and-foreign-toolmakers">How the EAR Impacts U.S. and Foreign Toolmakers</h3> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/rU2F2EM.png" alt="image29" /></p> -<p>The Commerce Department’s October 7, 2022, rules, implemented under the Export Administration Regulations (EAR), require licensing of U.S. equipment and persons involved in certain types of chip manufacturing. Affected technologies include equipment used in the production of “logic chips with non-planar transistor architectures . . . of 16nm or 14nm, or below; DRAM memory chips of 18nm half-pitch or less; [and] NAND flash memory chips with 128 layers or more.” The regulation’s October 2023 updates tighten controls to include some older technologies, such as immersion deep ultraviolet (DUV) lithography.</p> +<p>就參選新界西的張可森，法官指他與梁晃維及鄒家成一同發起「墨落無悔」聲明，他亦出席本土抗爭派的記者會。惟法官接納張並非組織者，亦不是計劃的發起人，因此將他納入「積極參加者」，但他所比起一般參與者做得更多。</p> -<p>Products newly subject to the EAR include both items in the United States and “all U.S. origin items wherever located.” This inclusion means that U.S.-based multinational companies producing SME (not to mention other semiconductor technologies) cannot avoid the controls when selling to China, even when relying on factories abroad.</p> +<p>法官指，「墨落無悔」聲明是綑綁參與者以免違背計劃，張與其他發起人承諾確保計劃成功。他為這個重大的計劃提供協助。法官決定以8年監禁為量刑起點，認罪扣減三分一，再因對法律無知及參與公共服務，分別減刑3個月及2個月，總刑期為4年11個月。</p> -<p>For companies based outside the United States, determining whether the EAR applies is more complex. Foreign-made items may be subject to the EAR in two ways: (1) falling under a U.S. foreign direct product rule (FDPR) or (2) exceeding the de minimis threshold of “controlled” U.S.-origin content. Ostensibly, both rules apply the U.S. controls extraterritorially, leveraging the frequent presence of U.S. technology in third-country products.</p> +<p>法官提到，從張的求情信可見，他展現了真誠的悔意，相信懲教署未來會在評估是否批准提早釋放的時候，將這點納入考慮。</p> <blockquote> - <h4 id="foreign-direct-product-rules"><code class="highlighter-rouge">Foreign Direct Product Rules</code></h4> + <h3 id="何桂藍">何桂藍</h3> </blockquote> -<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">FDPRs apply the EAR to foreign-made items if they are the “direct product” of certain types of U.S.-origin equipment, software, or other technology, and are destined for designated countries. Specifically, FDPRs empower the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) to require licenses for exports of certain foreign-made products if listed U.S. technology was directly used to produce them or produce key parts of the plants that were used to manufacture the products, such as a tool or a piece of software — even if a controlled U.S. component or system does not appear in the product.</code></em></p> - -<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Three FDPRs limit Chinese access to semiconductor technologies: the Entity List (EL), Advanced Computing, and Supercomputer FDPRs. These FDPRs differ in terms of the products, companies, and countries that they cover. The EL FDPR, introduced in May 2020 by the Trump administration, applies U.S. export controls to products destined for hundreds of Chinese (and other foreign) companies and their subsidiaries. These restrictions vary based on the products involved as well as the type of EL classification applicable to the purchaser company. Their reach has continued to grow as the U.S. Department of Commerce has added Chinese firms to the EL. The Advanced Computing FDPR applies the EAR to a narrower range of products meeting certain performance parameters and based on the destination country rather than the destination company. Originally aimed at China, the Advanced Computing FDPR has expanded the list of destination countries to include the countries China likely uses to avoid controls, such as Kazakhstan and Mongolia. Finally, the Supercomputer FDPR applies a country and end-use scope to encompass any items subject to the EAR that are used to produce supercomputers, which are defined based on compute capacity and system dimensions.</code></em></p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/riWyMLz.jpeg" alt="image30" /></p> -<p>The FDPRs and de minimis rules aim to limit the ability of third-country suppliers (who face less strict export controls from their governments) to replace U.S. suppliers in Chinese markets. However, their current efficacy in this regard is questionable. Multiple U.S. SME companies told CSIS that these restrictions are not stopping foreign toolmakers from replacing them in Chinese fabs, a complaint that has also been raised to U.S. officials. While public evidence supporting this trend remains limited, a New York Federal Reserve study from April 2024 on the impacts of U.S. semiconductor export controls showed that non-U.S. firms that sell to Chinese semiconductor companies experienced “higher revenues and profitability . . . following the inclusion of the Chinese targets in the U.S. export control lists.”</p> +<p>為新界東選區的何桂藍，她曾任職記者，罪成後沒有任何求情陳詞。法官考慮其角色後，以7年監禁為量刑起點。她受審後定罪及無求情，故沒有減刑，判囚7年。</p> <blockquote> - <h4 id="de-minimis-rules"><code class="highlighter-rouge">De Minimis Rules</code></h4> + <h3 id="余慧明">余慧明</h3> </blockquote> -<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">De minimis rules apply the EAR based on the inclusion of U.S.-origin controlled inputs in foreign-exported goods destined for specific countries. Notably, unlike the FDPRs, use of de minimis rules requires that the exported goods directly contain products produced in the United States that fall under the EAR. This differs from the FDPR’s broader threshold of goods being the “direct product” of certain U.S.-origin technologies or inputs (that do not need to be included in the actual goods being shipped). In cases where the shipment of the U.S. inputs to the final country destination by themselves (i.e., when not incorporated into a final product) would require a license, a de minimis calculation is necessary for the foreign export of the product that contains the inputs. Depending on the type of product and country destination, different de minimis thresholds — or the minimum percentage of U.S.-origin controlled items as a share of “fair market value” at which the EAR applies (typically 10 or 25 percent) — are relevant to the specific good. If the good exceeds the relevant de minimis threshold, an export waiver is required, pursuant to the EAR. For some products (e.g., certain lithography tools), a zero percent de minimis threshold applies, meaning that inclusion of any U.S.-origin controlled input automatically applies the EAR.</code></em></p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/5ObZoao.png" alt="image31" /></p> -<p>Notably, the United States has been relatively hesitant to apply the FDPR to foreign exports of semiconductor technology due to the rule’s negative perception among U.S. allies. Allied governments and companies have sharply criticized the FDPR as an overreach of U.S. export control authority. During recent discussions in which the United States threatened to expand application of the FDPR, foreign governments reportedly said they would not cooperate with enforcement of this application, potentially threatening FDPR expansion. Although the U.S. government is reportedly preparing an expansion to the FDPR and EL that would increase restrictions on foreign exports, a Reuters report indicated that category A:5 countries — which include Japan, the Netherlands, and South Korea — would be exempt from the expanded FDPR. The exclusion of countries home to leading toolmakers like ASML and Tokyo Electron belies the U.S. government’s continued hesitation to use the FDPR on key allies in the semiconductor supply chain.</p> +<p>就衞生服務界的余慧明，她被捕前為註冊護士，於醫管局任職。法官指，雖然余是計劃的「遲來者（latercomer）」，沒有參與協調會議或選舉論壇，但不會因此降低量刑起點。法官解釋，因《國安法》實施前的行為只是作為背景，再加上余在初選後仍然活躍發聲。法官認為，余在本案中為「積極參加者」，以7年監禁為量刑起點，因她可能誤解法律減刑3個月。但她受審後定罪，以及沒有其他減刑因素，總刑期為6年9個月。</p> -<p>Enforcement of extraterritorial applications of the EAR is also a challenge. For semiconductor controls, enforcement challenges are exacerbated by needing to know the node process for which the technology is used, in order to determine whether the extraterritorial rules apply. As an example, SME used in the production of “advanced-node integrated circuits” does not have a de minimis level in terms of U.S. content, whereas SME for less mature chipmaking does. For shipments of finished chips, the node process is self-evident, based on the exported product itself. However, for SME and other inputs, the type of process node manufactured using the product may be less transparent to suppliers. For instance, the same types of etch equipment may be used in a wide range of process nodes, a practice known in the industry as “CapEx recycling.” Therefore, suppliers could unintentionally sell some tools used for advanced nodes to Chinese customers, as these customers can lie about the process node they are using the tools for. Additionally, the burden falls on the company to determine whether the foreign-made item is subject to the EAR, further challenging enforcement.</p> +<blockquote> + <h3 id="伍健偉">伍健偉</h3> +</blockquote> -<p>Interestingly, the New York Federal Reserve study described an increase in revenues for third-country firms despite including firms ostensibly subject to the extraterritorial restrictions (via FDPR or de minimis) in its data set. The authors admitted that this had the potential to bias “estimates towards finding a decline in revenues by non-U.S. firms that sell to Chinese targets.”</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/Lhyu8h2.png" alt="image32" /></p> -<p>These findings suggest that the United States is applying the EAR less restrictively to third-country firms than U.S. firms, even where the FDPR or de minimis restrictions are meant to apply — another indication of potential challenges facing enforcement.</p> +<p>為新界西選區的伍健偉，他在求情信中提及不會為自己相信的價值而道歉，除了認罪之外沒有其他求情原因。法官採納7年監禁為量刑起點，因應他遲認罪，即開審當天才認罪，給予20%扣減，總刑期為5年7個月。</p> -<p>Even when fully enforced, FDPR and de minimis requirements are potentially avoidable by removing U.S. technologies from supply chains. Industry participants reported to CSIS that the EAR is incentivizing foreign toolmakers to minimize the use of U.S. technologies, services, and personnel in supply chains to avoid restricted trade with China. For example, one individual noted that a Japanese toolmaker was removing U.S. components from its supply chains and publicizing its products as outside U.S. EAR authority — a practice the individual suggested was widespread across SME markets globally. Reports of these supply chain shifts suggest that, at least for some third-country toolmakers, reliance on U.S. technology is low enough to make avoiding the existing FDPR and de minimis thresholds possible.</p> +<blockquote> + <h3 id="黃之鋒">黃之鋒</h3> +</blockquote> -<p>In 2023, the Netherlands and Japan adopted their own export controls following U.S. diplomatic efforts. However, these restrictions remain less stringent than U.S. controls in terms of end use and servicing personnel, giving Japanese and Dutch companies greater ability to sell to Chinese customers and provide on-the-ground support. Additionally, other key supplier countries such as South Korea, Israel, and Germany have not adopted similar export controls. Under the existing set of international export controls, foreign toolmakers continue to face significantly weaker restrictions on access to the Chinese market than U.S. companies.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/ktNPPyf.png" alt="image33" /></p> -<p>A final risk of the current EAR in terms of creating unequal market access for U.S. and foreign companies is overcompliance. As one public commentator argued to BIS,</p> +<p>就參選九龍東的黃之鋒，法官接納他屬「積極參加者」，他同意一旦成功在立法會當選，將會無差別否決財政預算案。法官以7年監禁為量刑起點，因認罪獲三分一扣減。但由於黃沒有提及自己誤解法律，因此不會獲這方面的扣減。另外，黃過往有多項刑事紀錄，因此不會被視為良好品格，在無其他減刑下，他共囚4年8個月。</p> <blockquote> - <p>The October 7 IFR is so complex that only a small group of people with significant experience in the EAR and semiconductors can fully understand the rulemaking . . . Many small and medium enterprises, or even large foreign multinationals, not highly versed in these details will either not know if they are following the rule, or out of an abundance of caution, “over-comply” by restricting legitimate exports and trade not otherwise subject to these rules.</p> + <h3 id="岑敖暉">岑敖暉</h3> </blockquote> -<p>While the October 2023 update simplifies calculations and identifies flags to help companies determine compliance, challenges remain in terms of understanding the breadth of the restrictions, which are highly technical and continually evolving.</p> - -<p>In other words, the EAR’s complexity and ambiguity risk encouraging U.S. toolmakers to pull back from Chinese markets — even in places where they are not legally required to do so. For instance, the previously mentioned New York Federal Reserve study also showed that U.S. firms were more likely to terminate relations with Chinese customers following the export controls, even with those not directly targeted by the controls, and less likely to form new Chinese customer relationships — potentially due to concerns about unintentionally violating restrictions. This risk of overcompliance also makes it more likely that third-country companies will design out U.S. companies, facilities, and personnel, even in areas not covered by export controls, to ensure they avoid the regulations.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/31B2ghA.png" alt="image34" /></p> -<h3 id="chinese-firms-designing-out-us-firms-in-sme">Chinese Firms Designing Out U.S. Firms in SME</h3> +<p>至於超區的岑敖暉，法官指他為「積極參加者」，並以7年監禁為量刑起點。法官指他及時認罪及有悔意，給予三分一減刑；另因其妻子及同事在求情信提及他參與公共服務，額外減刑2個月，總刑期為4年半。</p> -<p>As U.S. economic and national security policy has become more stringent, Chinese businesses and policymakers have accelerated the semiconductor industry’s shift away from U.S. inputs. China’s SME industry historically has failed to achieve technological parity with foreign toolmakers due to factors such as the smaller size of its companies and, as a result, its reduced capacity to invest in research and development (R&amp;D). Instead of buying domestic, leading Chinese chipmakers such as Semiconductor Manufacturing International Corporation (SMIC), Hua Hong Semiconductor, and Yangtze Memory Technologies (YMTC) have sought out the most advanced chipmaking technology available — which is often of U.S. origin. For instance, Applied Materials, KLA, and Lam Research all held large market shares in Chinese chip markets as of 2022. That same year, China’s SME localization rate (the share of tools produced domestically) was 21 percent. A 2021 report by Georgetown’s Center for Security and Emerging Technology estimated a localization rate of just 8 percent.</p> +<p>法官提到，檢視岑的求情文件之後，接受岑有真誠悔意，現已改過自新，相信懲教等當局評估是否提早釋放時，會考慮到這方面。</p> -<p>However, strong evidence suggests that China’s procurement approach has shifted since late 2022, with the removal of U.S. technology emerging as a primary industry objective. In 2023, China’s SME localization rate nearly doubled year over year to reach 40 percent. A South China Morning Post article recently reported that the “unwritten rule” for Chinese fabs was 70 percent self-sufficiency (made in China) in SME and that firms were achieving “significant progress” for key types of chipmaking equipment, with the exceptions of lithography, ion implantation, and inspection and metrology (parts of process control).</p> +<blockquote> + <h3 id="朱凱廸">朱凱廸</h3> +</blockquote> -<p>This design-out trend results from increasing top-down pressure from government officials and growing bottom-up commercial incentives for Chinese companies to minimize exposure to present — and future — U.S. regulatory actions. In the SME space, China’s semiconductor industry is pursuing design-out through two main approaches: (1) increased procurement from and investment in Chinese toolmakers and (2) replacement of U.S. SME technology with products from third-country firms.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/yMLbLb0.png" alt="image35" /></p> -<p>An April 2024 quote in the Financial Times by a YMTC investor neatly summarizes China’s general design-out strategy for SME:</p> +<p>至於參選新界西的朱凱廸，法官採納7年監禁為量刑起點，因他認罪扣減三分一，再因他對法律無知減刑3個月。但由於他過往有兩項刑事紀錄，因此不會考慮其過往服務再給予減刑，他的總刑期為4年5個月。</p> <blockquote> - <p>If Chinese companies have equipment that can be used, [YMTC] will use it. If not, it will see if countries other than the US can sell to it. . . . If that doesn’t work, YMTC will develop it together with the supplier.</p> + <h3 id="馮達浚">馮達浚</h3> </blockquote> -<h4 id="design-out-via-chinese-toolmakers">Design-Out via Chinese Toolmakers</h4> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/WnUKE8d.png" alt="image36" /></p> -<p>In China, the export controls from October 7, 2022, accelerated a joint government-industry effort to build a domestic semiconductor supply chain for chipmaking equipment. De-Americanizing Chinese semiconductor supply chains has been a Chinese objective for decades. However, Chinese firms frequently ignored this top-down policy goal and sourced large shares of chipmaking equipment from abroad, including from U.S.-based companies.</p> +<p>就參選九龍西的馮達浚，法官指他為「積極參加者」，他同意一旦成功在立法會當選，將會無差別否決財政預算案。法官以7年監禁為量刑起點，因他認罪給予三分一減刑，以及因他對法律無知減刑3個月，總刑期為4年5個月。</p> -<p>The Trump administration’s April 2018 imposition of sanctions and export controls on ZTE represented a major turning point in pushing China to take steps toward reducing U.S. reliance, particularly for semiconductors. These efforts went into overdrive following the October 7 export controls, which created immediate existential challenges for the Chinese semiconductor industry’s access to key technologies. As a result, the controls catalyzed a coordinated response by both government and private sector entities. Central, provincial, and local government entities — as well as chipmaking firms such as Huawei, SMIC, YMTC, Hua Hong, and others — have rapidly expanded efforts to replace U.S. chipmaking technology with technology from Chinese suppliers. Nowhere in the industry has this shift been clearer than in SME.</p> +<blockquote> + <h3 id="劉頴匡">劉頴匡</h3> +</blockquote> -<p>Top-down government efforts focus on putting pressure on domestic chipmakers to procure Chinese SME. For instance, some companies told CSIS that Chinese customers are facing mandates from government officials to buy most chipmaking equipment from an approved “white list” of domestic companies. These sourcing goals can overrule traditional business performance metrics such as yield, benefitting Chinese toolmakers even in cases where quality is lower relative to U.S. firms. China is also investing heavily in SME production and innovation, including via the $47.5 billion third phase of its so-called Big Fund and by increasing industry involvement in state-backed research.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/spsY9Rd.png" alt="image37" /></p> -<p>At a bottom-up commercial level, Chinese fabs increasingly see advantages to using Chinese chipmaking tools wherever possible. Chinese firms have diversified supply chains away from U.S. and other foreign suppliers to mitigate risks associated with current export controls — as well as the threat of future controls. For instance, leading foundries such as YMTC are increasingly collaborating with leading Chinese toolmakers to access replacement parts and help Chinese companies quickly develop SME technology. Chinese private investors are also increasingly investing in semiconductor companies, including toolmakers, attracted by public investment and the growing preference for Chinese suppliers.</p> +<p>為新界東選區的劉頴匡，他現正就七一立法會暴動案服刑54個月及20天。法官在本案中將他納入為「積極參加者」，並以7年監禁為量刑起點，認罪扣減三分一，再因對法律的無知減刑3個月，總刑期為4年5個月。法官認為本案與暴動案沒有直接關係，因此刑期不會同期執行。</p> -<p>Based on publicly available data and interviews with industry participants, the CSIS Economics Program and Scholl Chair in International Business identified evidence of the design-out phenomenon taking place in at least four types of SME: (1) deposition, (2) etching, (3) process control, and (4) testing. These areas receive less attention than EUV lithography but nonetheless represent key technologies in the semiconductor manufacturing process. Notably, it is tougher to establish “choke points” using U.S. export controls for these areas than, for example, lithography tools and advanced metrology tools, meaning there are fewer obstacles to Chinese and third-country companies replacing U.S. technologies in Chinese fabs.</p> +<p>法官提到，劉的朋友和前僱主對他高度評價，劉在庭上陳詞時具說服力，他願意承擔責任，表達了悔意，承諾不會再犯。法官相信懲教等當局會留意到他的轉變，在評估是否提早釋放時納入考慮。</p> -<p>Two chipmaking equipment companies in particular — Naura Technology Group and AMEC — have been the largest beneficiaries of increased investment and innovation in Chinese SME supply chains. These companies represent the best evidence of the design-out of U.S. companies via Chinese suppliers. Other key players include lithography developer SMEE, etching and glue developer Kingsemi, and test equipment provider Jingce. Chinese SME firms increasingly include smaller start-ups taking advantage of new openings in the domestic market, such as Shanghai-based Crystal Growth and Energy Equipment, which went public in early 2023.</p> +<blockquote> + <h3 id="黃子悅">黃子悅</h3> +</blockquote> -<p>Table 1 summarizes key players in the Chinese SME space, their product focus areas, and historical global leaders based in the United States and its allies.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/wkgEVmZ.png" alt="image38" /></p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/gY3bR1A.png" alt="image01" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Table 1: Product Portfolio of Chinese Original Equipment Manufacturer.</strong> Source: <a href="https://thechinaproject.com/2023/06/15/semiconductor-export-controls-a-catalyst-for-chinese-development/">Kyriakos Petrakakos, “U.S. Semiconductor Export Controls Might Actually Give China the Edge,” The China Project, June 15, 2023</a>.</em></p> +<p>為新界西選區的黃子悅，現正就一宗暴動案服刑37個月。法官指她為「積極參加者」，以7年監禁為量刑起點，認罪扣減三分一，再因對法律無知減刑3個月。法官表示，本案與暴動案並無關聯，因此不會同期執行，總刑期為4年5個月。黃在求情信中解釋她過往患上的情緒病患，並表示會為自己所作所為承受後果。法官表示，相信懲教當局在考慮是否提早釋放時會考慮以上因素。</p> -<p>The growing revenues of Chinese toolmakers offer key evidence of the design-out phenomenon. The Chinese consultancy CINNO Research released a 2023 analysis showing that the revenues of China’s 10 largest SME companies increased by 39 percent in the first half of the year compared to the previous period in 2022. AMEC, for its part, saw a 32 percent rise in sales in 2023. Company executives identified strong demand from domestic firms as a key driver of growth. In August 2023, AMEC’s chairman and CEO announced his firm had developed a road map to replace foreign-produced tools with domestic alternatives. Naura saw its 2023 revenues increase by around 50 percent year over year. As with AMEC, reports attribute Naura’s rapid growth to China’s desire to remove U.S. inputs from the domestic semiconductor fabrication market. AMEC and Naura are no exception — a wide variety of Chinese toolmakers have seen explosive domestic sales growth in the two years since the U.S. export controls.</p> +<blockquote> + <h3 id="袁嘉蔚">袁嘉蔚</h3> +</blockquote> -<p>There is also evidence of Chinese toolmakers winning market share away from U.S. companies, indicating that growing Chinese revenues are not just the result of top-line Chinese market growth. Historically, Chinese toolmakers could secure only a small share of key equipment markets, even within China. From January to August 2023, however, local manufacturers won 47 percent of all machinery equipment tenders from Chinese foundries, according to an analysis by Huatai Securities. An August 2023 article by the South China Morning Post reported that AMEC’s share of one type of etching equipment is expected to hit 60 percent “in the near future,” increasing from 24 percent in October 2022 — attributed to the fact that “once-dominant US chip equipment maker Lam Research saw its mainland sales drop sharply.” Notably, many U.S. toolmakers are still seeing increasing sales to China due to surging industry growth. However, companies told CSIS that this growth is significantly below what it would otherwise be in the absence of design-out practices.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/2qLqI2E.png" alt="image39" /></p> -<p>Beyond the observable increases in revenue and market share, reporting suggests that the Chinese semiconductor industry is publicly showing great enthusiasm for locally produced semiconductor tools and components. In March 2024, SEMICON China, a major semiconductor industry conference held in Shanghai, saw increased participation of domestic tool manufacturers and the notable absence of rival U.S. firms. Reuters also reported that several domestic Chinese semiconductor equipment companies leaned into marketing strategies encouraging Chinese fabs to buy local at SEMICON: “More [Chinese] manufacturing facilities are willing to use materials prescribed by Chinese firms, a trend that has certainly been accelerated by U.S. sanctions.” The report mentions that while Chinese domestic firms may produce semiconductor manufacturing tools and components of slightly lesser quality, China is quickly catching up to its foreign counterparts. Furthermore, Chinese semiconductor products are sold at significantly cheaper prices than those of rival firms in other countries.</p> +<p>法官指港島區的袁嘉蔚有參與協調會議、選舉論壇及抗爭派記者會，亦簽署「墨落無悔」聲明。法官以7年監禁為量刑起點，考慮到她及時認罪，因此給予三分一減刑；另因她可能誤解計劃合法性，額外給予3個月減刑。法官亦指，袁由2020年1月起從事公共服務，因此獲2個月減刑，總刑期為4年3個月。</p> -<h4 id="design-out-via-third-country-toolmakers">Design-Out via Third-Country Toolmakers</h4> +<blockquote> + <h3 id="李嘉達">李嘉達</h3> +</blockquote> -<p>There has been significant reporting on Chinese tools replacing U.S. tools in the Chinese market. However, less attention has been paid thus far to the other strategy enabling China’s design-out: the increased substitution of tools from third countries — or countries other than the United States and China — in place of U.S. technology.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/4sXwpoW.png" alt="image40" /></p> -<p>While Chinese buyers are increasingly apt to buy from domestic toolmakers, China is still a large buyer of foreign-made tools. Foreign SME helps fulfill technological capabilities not yet developed in China’s market and provides a helpful blueprint for Chinese firms developing new tools. Since early 2023, Chinese fabs have gone on a shopping spree, amassing tools from both domestic and foreign suppliers. The most recent data, as of the first quarter of 2024, suggest that Chinese buying represents an unprecedented 45 percent of revenue for major Western toolmakers, nearly double the share of revenue recorded a year prior (see Figures 1 and 2). Some of this revenue is going to U.S. toolmakers. According to fiscal year 2023 financials, China still represents the largest geographic share of sales for Applied Materials, KLA, and Lam Research. In fact, the dramatic investment boom in China’s semiconductor industry and practices like equipment stocking in case of future restrictions have helped some U.S. toolmakers grow in the near term.</p> +<p>參與九龍東的李嘉達，法官指他屬於「積極參加者」，他同意一旦成功在立法會當選，將會無差別否決財政預算案。法官以7年監禁為量刑起點，因認罪減刑三分一，再因對法律無知及過往任區議員的貢獻，分別減刑3個月及2個月，總刑期為4年3個月。</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/UnZ0Qw7.png" alt="image02" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 1: Global Semiconductor Equipment Market Revenues by Region, 2019–Present.</strong> Source: <a href="https://www.semi.org/en/products-services/market-data/manufacturing-monitor">SEMI, “Semiconductor Manufacturing Monitor,” October 11, 2024</a>.</em></p> +<blockquote> + <h3 id="王百羽">王百羽</h3> +</blockquote> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/fPXjfqo.png" alt="image03" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 2: Sales to China for Select U.S. and Foreign Toolmakers, 2015–23.</strong> Source: <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-07-17/us-considers-tougher-trade-rules-against-companies-in-chip-crackdown-on-china">Mackenzie Hawkins, Ian King, and Takashi Mochikuzi, “US Floats Tougher Trade Rules to Rein in China Chip Industry,” Bloomberg.com, July 17, 2024</a>.</em></p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/yfH3H1c.png" alt="image41" /></p> -<p>However, there is evidence that China is increasingly redirecting business away from U.S. firms to non-U.S. foreign companies as part of its design-out strategy. CSIS Scholl Chair conversations with SME industry participants revealed reports that Chinese customers are increasingly selecting third-country toolmakers — such as firms based in Japan, Israel, South Korea, Germany, the Netherlands, and Taiwan — over U.S. companies in procurement decisions. Specifically, several U.S. toolmakers told CSIS they rapidly lost share to third-country suppliers in Chinese foundries subsequent to the export regulations, which is unsurprising in the context of explicit rhetoric by Chinese companies indicating a growing preference for third-country purchases. As the previously mentioned YMTC investor noted, the second option after sourcing from China is “countries other than the U.S.”</p> +<p>就超區的王百羽，法官指他為「積極參加者」，並以7年監禁為量刑起點。他認罪可獲減刑三分一，並因他可能誤解法律而減刑3個月，再因他參與公共服務及獲親友求情，減刑兩個月，總刑期為4年3個月。</p> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">China is increasingly redirecting business away from U.S. firms to non-U.S. foreign companies as part of its design-out strategy.</code></em></strong></p> +<p>法官提到，與岑敖暉的情況相似，接受王現已改過自新，相信懲教等當局評估是否提早釋放時，會考慮到這方面。</p> -<p>This trend, in part, reflects the unique limits the EAR places on U.S. firms compared to foreign companies. As previously discussed, companies can sell chipmaking equipment that U.S. companies — whose products are by definition “U.S. origin items” — cannot. Although the United States worked trilaterally in early 2023 to convince the Netherlands and Japan to adopt new controls on advanced chipmaking technologies, these rules do not equate to U.S. controls. Dutch and Japanese restrictions are less stringent than the EL (a regulatory concept they lack a close equivalent to) and do not list China as a country of concern, creating substantial coverage gaps. Additionally, Dutch and Japanese companies can keep personnel on site in China. This servicing ability provides a source of revenue and is a comparative advantage in SME, as toolmakers typically deploy teams of servicers within customers’ fabs.</p> +<h3 id="林景楠任證人囚5年2個月-官無就作供減刑對控方毫無幫助">林景楠任證人囚5年2個月 官無就作供減刑：對控方毫無幫助</h3> -<p>Even for technologies the EAR does not encompass, there are reports that Chinese fabs are selecting third-country suppliers over their U.S. competitors. This trend may owe, in part, to U.S. companies overcomplying for fear of unintentionally violating export controls. In the United States, companies such as Applied Materials have faced criminal investigations for alleged violations of export controls, so it is unsurprising that other firms (particularly smaller businesses) would want to avoid these risks, even at risk of overcompliance.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/L1fBhXX.png" alt="image42" /></p> -<p>More importantly, Chinese firms have started seeing U.S. suppliers as higher-risk options compared to third-country suppliers. Tightening U.S. export controls has created a perception in Chinese markets that U.S. suppliers are not a reliable long-term procurement solution. Chinese fabs are concerned both about the repercussions of violating existing controls — either knowingly or unknowingly — and mitigating exposure to stricter U.S. export controls in the future. This view encourages Chinese fabs to turn to third-country toolmakers — at least until domestic supply develops sufficiently to avoid buying foreign technology altogether.</p> +<p>【獨媒報導】47人涉組織及參與民主派初選，被控「串謀顛覆國家政權」罪，其中31人認罪，16人不認罪受審，除李予信及劉偉聰，其餘14人罪成，45人今（19日）判刑。被告林景楠在開審前認罪，並作為控方證人，他要求法庭考慮判社會服務令。惟法官拒絕，並指其證供對控方案情毫無幫助（added nothing to the prosecution case），並難以在裁決理由書中引用。法官最終沒有就他作供給予減刑，只因他派發防疫物資等減刑，他被判囚5年2個月。在非抗爭派中，楊岳橋的量刑起點最高，為8年監禁。法官指在公民黨參加35+計劃期間，楊擔當領導及積極角色。</p> -<p>This shift has both contributed to and been accelerated by growing efforts by third-country suppliers to win business away from U.S. competitors in Chinese markets — sometimes leveraging the U.S. export restrictions as a competitive advantage. In certain cases, industry participants described instances of foreign suppliers explicitly advertising their non-U.S. inputs (an indication they were not subject to the EAR) to attract new Chinese buyers or highlighting regulatory risks as reasons to select them over their U.S. competitors. For instance, some third-country firms raised concerns about future U.S. restrictions as reasons for Chinese businesses to choose them over U.S. firms.</p> +<p>以下為非抗爭派被告的判刑理由及刑期：</p> -<p>Industry events like SEMICON China 2024 also demonstrate the new competitiveness of third-country firms. Whereas U.S. firms were absent, other foreign sellers were not. Japanese tool firms, according to a report, kept a strong presence at SEMICON. Per the same report, Chinese demand for certain Japanese products is still strong, as Japanese companies have been rewarded with increased orders from Chinese firms, especially for noncontrolled products enabling leading-edge production. This sales increase is apparent in Japanese trade data. Japanese exports of SME and related tools to China reached $3.32 billion in the first quarter of 2024, an 82 percent year-over-year increase. There have even been reports that Japanese industry groups are arranging trips for Chinese chipmakers to explore “core opportunities in Japan’s semiconductor equipment and materials industry,” with a focus on getting around U.S. export controls.</p> +<blockquote> + <h3 id="楊岳橋">楊岳橋</h3> +</blockquote> -<p>While CSIS has identified some preliminary evidence of third-country design-out taking place, there remains a shortage of publicly available data to estimate the extent of the phenomenon — specifically, detailed data from U.S. and third-country toolmakers on market share losses and gains in China. Some industry participants noted that U.S. and foreign companies hesitate to describe design-out trends due to concerns about investor perceptions. Even so, the trend represents the important and largely overlooked impact of increasingly broad and unilateral U.S. export controls that target China.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/7v7wixJ.png" alt="image43" /></p> -<h3 id="chinese-firms-designing-around-us-firms-in-sme">Chinese Firms Designing Around U.S. Firms in SME</h3> +<p>就新界西選區的楊岳橋，法官指無法接受辯方提出，法庭量刑時應考慮楊屬於較低的範疇。考慮到楊在公民黨的地位，法官毫不懷疑公民黨參與計劃期間，楊擔當領導及積極角色。因此法官以8年監禁為起點，因此就他認罪及被捕後與警方合作，給予三分一減刑。另考慮到他長期為公共服務，給予3個月減刑，總刑期為5年1個月。法官補充，得悉楊的母親身體轉差及後去世，但沒有額外減刑。法官最後提到，相信其重犯機會低，並且相信懲教署能夠在考慮是否提早釋放時能將此因素納入考慮。</p> -<p>SME has fewer examples of the design-around strategy — or innovating Chinese technologies to circumvent the need for U.S. technologies — compared to advanced packaging. This is, in large part, because the United States and allied countries have a strong lead over China in manufacturing chipmaking tools, making it harder for Chinese companies to develop innovations that sidestep or “leapfrog” U.S. capabilities in the space.</p> +<blockquote> + <h3 id="吳政亨">吳政亨</h3> +</blockquote> -<p>That said, one Chinese SME innovation bears mentioning in the context of design-around strategies. Increasingly, China is adopting new strategies to use older lithography equipment to achieve the same capabilities as EUV lithography, which represents a key chokepoint for Chinese lead-edge chip manufacturing. EUV machines — exclusively produced by the Dutch company ASML — are considered essential to the production of advanced chips, and exports to China have been highly limited since the Dutch government imposed restrictions on EUV shipments in 2019. However, in March 2024, Huawei and its chipmaking partner SiCarrier patented a technology known as self-aligned quadruple patterning (SAQP), which may allow them to produce the same chips as ASML’s EUV machines in a novel way. By using older DUV lithography equipment and additional etching to increase transistor density, China reportedly has the necessary capabilities for 5nm fabrication, an advancement beyond the 7nm process that SMIC provided for the Mate 60 Pro smartphone.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/twrPVFb.png" alt="image44" /></p> -<p>Industry analysts believe China still needs EUV machines in the long run to reach 3nm capabilities — the leading edge in commercial production, as of this report, as pairing DUV with technologies like SAQP may represent a technological cul-de-sac in terms of achieving transistor density beyond 5nm. As a result, China is also investing heavily in attempts to develop EUV lithography domestically via efforts by companies such as Naura and Huawei. These attempts to develop EUV represent an additional example of Chinese toolmakers designing out U.S. and allies’ technology.</p> +<p>法官指，吳政亨既非組織者亦非候選人。當他發起「三投三不投」計劃時，他尚未是35+計劃的一份子。吳與戴耀廷接觸及溝通後，才成為35+計劃的一份子，而其他參與者並未知道吳的身份。</p> -<h3 id="security-impacts-of-sme-controls">Security Impacts of SME Controls</h3> +<p>法官留意到，在《國安法》實施後，吳仍繼續擁護「攬炒」思想，即破壞政府的職能，以讓政府遵守五大訴求。另外，吳還願意繼續推動計劃，並向他人施壓，確保初選獲勝的人才可以參選立法會。吳更在《蘋果日報》刊登廣告，敦促初選落敗者不要參選立法會。</p> -<p>The effects of U.S. export controls on the SME industry will shape the future of U.S.-China strategic competition in semiconductors. Chipmaking tools are not only a key driver of advanced semiconductor capabilities but also an industry area where the United States currently leads in market share and innovation. According to 2022 estimates by the Semiconductor Industry Association and Boston Consulting Group, U.S. value-added activity made up 47 percent of the global SME market, along with 26 percent for Japan, 18 percent for the European Union, 3 percent for South Korea, and only 3 percent for China. China is the largest importer of U.S. chipmaking tools in the world and is far from self-reliant. It is reasonable that the United States would seek to use its leverage in SME to ensure leadership over its leading strategic competitor in a key dual-use technology.</p> +<p>法官認為，吳屬於「積極參加者」，並以7年半監禁作為起點。法官考慮到，吳並非追求個人利益，而計劃亦不涉暴力。法官接納吳可能受戴耀廷誤導計劃合法性，因此給予3個月減刑。由於吳不認罪，亦沒有其他扣減，因此判囚7年3個月。</p> -<p>However, current export controls could undermine the innovation leadership of the U.S. SME companies that created this leverage in the first place. The Trump and Biden administrations’ efforts to control advanced chip capabilities have catalyzed a transformative shift away from U.S. technology in China but have failed to stop access to many controlled technologies due to widely documented smuggling efforts such as transshipments via third countries and domestic technology trading networks. Moreover, policymakers have not reckoned with the fact that China’s domestic semiconductor ecosystem is already making large strides toward replicating technologies previously supplied by U.S. toolmakers — aside from a few technological chokepoints, most notably EUV lithography.</p> +<blockquote> + <h3 id="林景楠">林景楠</h3> +</blockquote> -<p>Chinese — and to a lesser but still important extent third-country — toolmakers are poised to be the primary beneficiaries of China’s ongoing shift away from U.S. chipmaking equipment. The primary losers of this transition therefore are U.S. toolmakers, who increasingly find themselves excluded from parts of the world’s leading SME market. Importantly, the extent of this exclusion from Chinese markets is broader than that imposed by the export controls themselves due to multifaceted, interrelated trends such as Chinese companies hedging against future U.S. regulatory actions and overall declining trust in U.S. suppliers in Chinese markets.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/wZZWte9.png" alt="image45" /></p> -<p>In some cases, the financial impacts of export controls on U.S. toolmakers are already visible. The best available evidence of this trend is the previously mentioned April 2024 New York Federal Reserve study, which stated that export control announcements were associated with negative impacts on market capitalization and revenues for affected U.S. companies. Specifically, export controls preceded a 2.5 percent abnormal decline in stock price and an 8.6 percent decline in revenue. Negative impacts on market capitalization have also taken place following the launch of criminal investigations related to export control violations. Shares of Applied Materials fell by as much as 8.3 percent following a November 2023 report that the company faces a criminal investigation regarding tools sold to SMIC. Shares of KLA and Lam Research also fell during the probe.</p> +<p>判詞提到，林現年36歲，職業為一名商人，已婚並育有3名子女。辯方求情時主張林應被歸類為「其他參與者」，因他曾向警方錄取2份「無損權益口供」。辯方亦要求法庭考慮判處社會服務令。</p> -<p>The top-line growth of the Chinese market should not obscure the potential impacts of design-out on long-term U.S. SME revenues. Some U.S. toolmakers have seen growing sales to China because overall Chinese fab spending has soared in the last two years. This short-term sales growth belies the underlying dynamic: market share is increasingly shifting toward Chinese and third-country competitors even as the market as a whole grows. This trend will likely expand as Chinese firms like Naura and AMEC broaden their toolmaking capabilities. While the Chinese SME market “pie” is getting larger, the U.S. share is shrinking.</p> +<p>不過法官認為林所干犯的控罪性質非常嚴重，社服令並非恰當刑罰，而他錄取的2份口供對本案幫助不大，因當中只談及林自己在計劃中的參與；他在庭上的證供亦對控方案情毫無幫助（added nothing to the prosecution case），並難以在裁決理由書中引用，因此法官拒絕替他索取社服令報告。</p> -<p>This decline in market share means the ultimate losers in the current export regime are U.S. economic and national security. SME markets are capital intensive and have fast-paced product development cycles, much like their foundry and integrated device manufacturer customers in the chip fabrication world. These features mean that market leadership historically has been concentrated among a small group of multinationals who are able to invest large sums in research and development and globalized manufacturing footprints. Lost revenues and market share can therefore have significant long-term effects on the ability of toolmakers to remain competitive in the future. When U.S. SME companies are increasingly sidelined in Chinese acquisition of chipmaking technology, these same companies lose access to R&amp;D dollars to support future innovation leadership.</p> +<p>考慮到林的參與程度，法官採用監禁7年為量刑起點，由於他在開審前才認罪，所以只能獲得20%扣減；再考慮到他對法律無知而犯案、在疫情期間提供防護性裝具，因此分別減刑3個月及2個月，最終刑期為5年2個月。</p> -<p>Diminishing share in the Chinese market for U.S. toolmakers also means the U.S. government loses data on Chinese fab investment and technological capabilities. Historically, U.S. companies selling to China have offered a source of insight into China’s semiconductor industry, particularly in terms of understanding the microelectronics capabilities available to Chinese defense and dual-use technologies. However, diverted market share to Chinese and third-country firms risks undermining this source of intelligence. The surprise release of Huawei’s Mate 60 Pro in 2023 provides just one example of how Chinese semiconductor advancements increasingly take place under the radar of U.S. intelligence. The risk of design-around innovation represents a particularly pressing concern, as increased Chinese innovation could result in novel technology advancements occurring without advanced U.S. awareness.</p> +<blockquote> + <h3 id="鄭達鴻">鄭達鴻</h3> +</blockquote> -<p>Imposing these export controls has clear costs for U.S. economic and national security. It is therefore worth considering ways the United States can achieve the benefits of export controls while minimizing costs.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/hIxHyyS.png" alt="image46" /></p> -<h3 id="conclusion-and-policy-recommendations">Conclusion and Policy Recommendations</h3> +<p>為港島選區的鄭達鴻，法官指他有出席協調會議及選舉論壇，因此以7年監禁為量刑起點。由於他尚未成為合資格的律師，亦無法律經驗，故法官接納鄭受他人誤導以為計劃合法，給予3個月減刑。另因他長期公共服務減刑3個月，總刑期為6年半。</p> -<p>China’s ongoing effort to reduce dependency on U.S. SME marks a significant change to previous Chinese industrial policy targets. Although China is still far from self-sufficient in chipmaking tools, its new trajectory represents an important step toward long-term semiconductor industry decoupling goals. Increasingly broad and unilateral export controls are creating strong political and economic incentives for Chinese fabs to design out and around U.S. firms’ technology, with important long-term implications for U.S.-China technology competition.</p> +<blockquote> + <h3 id="徐子見">徐子見</h3> +</blockquote> -<p>This trend is unlikely to reverse entirely, even if the United States relaxes export controls. China has demonstrated progress in developing SME capabilities and is likely to continue down this path. While Chinese indigenization achievements to date have focused on mature processes, future progress at the leading edge is increasingly likely for Chinese toolmakers.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/QxCLvpj.png" alt="image47" /></p> -<p>Despite these changes, the United States can refine its export control regime to better balance national security and economic interests. A crucial step is to better understand how and where existing controls hurt U.S. companies. Conducting a survey of U.S. toolmakers through the Department of Commerce could provide valuable insights into market share shifts and competitive dynamics in global chip markets related to U.S. export controls. The survey could gather metrics like the share of Chinese tenders won by U.S. toolmakers relative to Chinese and third-country suppliers. It could also address the extent to which U.S. mature tools are being designed out, beyond the leading-edge tools that the controls target.</p> +<p>為港島選區的徐子見，法官指他是該選區唯一沒有簽署「墨落無悔」聲明的人，但他曾出席協調會議及選舉論壇。法官決定以7年監禁為量刑起點，認罪扣減三分一，再因可能誤解法律及長期公共服務，各減刑3個月。雖然徐患有骨刺、慢性胰臟炎及糖尿病等，但不代表他無法在獄中獲得適當的治療，因此不會因其健康狀況給予額外減刑。他的總刑期為4年2個月。</p> -<p>Past semiconductor industry feedback on Department of Commerce surveys has been mixed, with concerns about confidentiality and business sensitivity. Therefore, the Department of Commerce must carefully communicate any new data collection efforts to ensure transparency and highlight the benefits for U.S. companies in shaping future export policies. If the survey provides evidence that current U.S. export controls have significant adverse impacts on U.S. toolmakers, the next step would be to consider how to mitigate these impacts. The current approach, which results in U.S. companies losing market share to Chinese and third-country competitors, is unsustainable — particularly considering how Chinese circumvention efforts arguably undercut the controls’ national security objectives.</p> +<blockquote> + <h3 id="楊雪盈">楊雪盈</h3> +</blockquote> -<p>A key limitation of the existing controls is the failure of the United States to implement them multilaterally. Talks of a full trilateral agreement with the Netherlands and Japan reportedly broke down over inclusion of technologies such as memory and mature logic chips in controls on chipmaking equipment. Any unilateral U.S. export control decision would fuel a growing view in Chinese markets that U.S. semiconductor companies are uniquely risky partners for Chinese companies — even relative to firms based in U.S. allies such as Japan and the Netherlands. The more the United States moves without allied support to control Chinese technology, the more it risks making its firms uncompetitive with allies’ firms.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/KDdSfvl.png" alt="image48" /></p> -<p>The United States must determine how to position its national security partners — not just Japan and the Netherlands but also South Korea, Germany, Israel, Taiwan, and potentially others — on more equal footing in terms of limiting trade of semiconductor manufacturing technologies with China. This strategy could involve a combination of the following three approaches:</p> +<p>同為港島選區的楊雪盈，法官指她有出席協調會議及選舉論壇，以7年監禁為量刑起點。她因誤解法律獲減刑3個月，而且作為區議員參與公共服務、在本地文化上的貢獻，再獲減刑3個月。由於她受審後定罪再無其他減刑，總刑期為6年半。</p> -<ol> - <li> - <p>Expand the application of FDPR and de minimis requirements within the U.S. controls to more effectively stop import substitution by third countries.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Apply increased economic or geopolitical pressure on allied countries to expand their own export controls.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Reduce the bounds of U.S. export controls to bring them back in line with multilateral agreements (e.g., the Wassenaar Arrangement).</p> - </li> -</ol> +<blockquote> + <h3 id="彭卓棋">彭卓棋</h3> +</blockquote> -<p>The third option, by itself, seems highly unlikely. Any loosening of U.S. trade restrictions appears prohibitively challenging given bipartisan anxieties about China, particularly during an election year. The approach also could fail to stem Chinese companies’ redirection of market share to third countries, as rolling back U.S. controls may not be enough to undo the loss of trust in U.S. firms within Chinese chip markets.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/nsjYpny.png" alt="image49" /></p> -<p>The U.S. government is focused on the first two options: (1) expanding the extraterritorial reach of the U.S. EAR and (2) convincing U.S. allies to implement more closely aligned controls. Expanding the FDPR and de minimis restrictions could limit sales of third-country technologies, but doing so risks further upsetting allies and accelerating efforts to remove U.S. technology and labor from third-country supply chains. This trade-off limits the effectiveness of U.S. plans to add to FDPRs. The Biden administration is reportedly planning to expand the FDPR’s product scope and add 120 new Chinese companies to the EL, effectively widening the EL FDPR’s destination coverage. But, as previously mentioned, the rule is not expected to apply to category A:5 countries, which include the Netherlands, Japan, and South Korea, undercutting its effectiveness in limiting third-country exports of key chipmaking tools. While an expanded FDPR would affect other countries and territories involved in chip supply chains, such as Israel, Singapore, and Taiwan, the impact on SME markets would likely be limited to specific niches or stages of fabrication.</p> +<p>為港島選區的彭卓棋，他曾建立「香港青年創業聯盟」，協助青年到大灣區創業。法官在本案中以7年監禁為量刑起點，因他可能誤解法律減刑3個月。另外，法官留意到「香港基本法基金會」主席葉國華為彭撰寫求情信，指他被起訴後參與向中小學生推廣《基本法》、《國安法》及「一國兩制」原則。因此，法官就其義工服務給予3個月減刑，總刑期為6年半。</p> -<p>The second option — greater multilateralization — is more promising. However, U.S. allies still have strong incentives not to impose restrictions that are comparable with the U.S. controls, as toolmakers are significant and influential economic actors in countries like the Netherlands, Japan, and South Korea. To get around these obstacles, U.S. regulators should consider an expanded menu of carrots and sticks. The current strategy of appealing to shared national security concerns has clearly been unsuccessful. Allied governments have reportedly been unconvinced by justifications for the controls in terms of China’s People’s Liberation Army capabilities, in part because of very different perceptions among key partners (e.g., the European Union) of the extent to which China poses (or does not pose) a national security threat. Some form of mutual benefit, such as via shared intelligence or economic opportunities, might therefore be necessary to convince allies to cooperate.</p> +<blockquote> + <h3 id="岑子杰">岑子杰</h3> +</blockquote> -<p>Regardless of what incentives are on offer, the United States likely must loosen some restrictions to achieve multilateralization. These reductions could focus on contentious areas such as memory chip production and nodes like 14nm and 16nm, which the semiconductor industry rarely considers “advanced.” A narrower approach could better ground national security arguments for multilateralization, which resonate with allies for some technologies (e.g., tools for fabricating 7nm logic chips) more than others (e.g., tools for fabricating 128-layer NAND flash memory chips).</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/EUybWfh.png" alt="image50" /></p> -<p>Loosening restrictions to enable greater multilateralization could be paired with efforts to improve enforcement of existing controls and stem circumvention efforts, which continue to blunt the controls’ effectiveness at slowing China’s technology development. Combining these efforts provides one way to apply continued pressure on China’s chip industry (and reduce domestic political pushback) while mitigating some of the controls’ negative economic repercussions via greater cooperation with allies.</p> +<p>為九龍西選區的岑子杰，法官指他同意一旦成功在立法會當選，將會無差別否決財政預算案。因此以7年監禁為起點，認罪扣減三分一，再因誤解法律及公共服務，分別減刑3個月及2個月，總刑期為4年3個月。</p> -<p>Finally, the United States, even if it does not pursue a loosening of the existing controls, could return to a strategic mindset of the “sliding scale” approach in designing future export control policy. This shift could help signal to the Chinese market that the United States is not pursuing full-scale decoupling of its technology ecosystem from China’s and that it remains interested in doing business in technologies outside of the leading edge. This shift may be even more useful in convincing U.S. allies that U.S. companies will not be further restricted unilaterally and unpredictably from access to China’s markets, helping secure their role as trusted and reliable participants in globalized technology supply chains.</p> +<blockquote> + <h3 id="毛孟靜">毛孟靜</h3> +</blockquote> -<p>Although U.S. toolmakers are key players in today’s semiconductor markets, U.S. leadership did not develop in a vacuum and is not guaranteed indefinitely. China remains a critical and growing market for semiconductor fabrication, so export restrictions may have far-reaching adverse impacts on U.S. SME companies. If there is one recurring theme in writing policy related to semiconductors, it is that details matter. The U.S. government must take care to design future semiconductor export controls in ways deeply attuned to the nuances of semiconductor competitive dynamics, where one small change often has powerful ripple effects across global supply chains. Export controls must not jeopardize the complex web of factors underlying U.S. market leadership in semiconductors. Otherwise, the controls risk undermining the advantages the United States has in its important technology competition with China.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/ebBoy8U.png" alt="image51" /></p> -<hr /> +<p>為九龍西選區的毛孟靜，法官指她為「積極參加者」，她亦同意一旦成功在立法會當選，將會無差別否決財政預算案。因此以7年監禁為起點，認罪扣減三分一，再因誤解法律及公共服務，分別減刑3個月及3個月，總刑期為4年2個月。法官提到，雖然她求情指丈夫身體情況變差，但這並不構成減刑因素。</p> -<p><strong>William Alan Reinsch</strong> is senior adviser with the Economics Program and Scholl Chair in International Business at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS).</p> +<blockquote> + <h3 id="何啟明">何啟明</h3> +</blockquote> -<p><strong>Jack Whitney</strong> is a former research intern with the CSIS Economics Program and Scholl Chair in International Business and a strategy consultant in EY-Parthenon’s Government &amp; Public Sector.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/XPFRcW5.png" alt="image52" /></p> -<p><strong>Matthew Schleich</strong> is a former research assistant with the CSIS Economics Program and Scholl Chair in International Business. He currently works as a foreign affairs officer in the U.S. Department of State’s Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation.</p>William Alan Reinsch, et al.This report argues that existing controls incentivize China to minimize reliance on U.S. semiconductor manufacturing equipment by indigenizing development of tools and increasing purchases from third-country suppliers, which ultimately hinders U.S. technology leadership.【初選47人案・判刑前夕】2024-11-18T12:00:00+08:002024-11-18T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-pre-sentence<ul> - <li>西九疑現「排隊黨」 記者連問隊頭13人無一回應</li> - <li>西九外「點人數」警方稱要檢視維持秩序警力 拒回應會否清走空櫈</li> - <li>百歲大黃伯連續兩晚排通宵盼見「受難朋友」 林進嘆僅5公眾可入正庭「非常可惜」</li> - <li>致歉、無悔、不求情——45名罪成被告，判刑前的陳詞</li> -</ul> +<p>為九龍西選區的何啟明，法官指他屬「積極參加者」，他同意一旦成功在立法會當選，將會無差別否決財政預算案。因此以7年監禁為起點，並因誤解法律及公共服務，分別減刑3個月及2個月，總刑期為6年7個月。他受審後罪成沒有其他減刑。</p> -<excerpt /> +<blockquote> + <h3 id="黃碧雲">黃碧雲</h3> +</blockquote> -<h3 id="西九疑現排隊黨-記者連問隊頭13人無一回應">西九疑現「排隊黨」 記者連問隊頭13人無一回應</h3> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/GJxVx3m.png" alt="image53" /></p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/LsGRMV0.png" alt="image01" /></p> +<p>為九龍西選區的黃碧雲，辯方求情指其政治取態屬溫和務實，而她在串謀中亦沒有任何計劃或直接角色，因此應該將她列入「其他參加者」。惟法庭認為其角色屬「積極參加者」，她同意一旦成功在立法會當選，將會無差別否決財政預算案。法官以7年監禁為起點，因誤解法律及公共服務，分別減刑3個月及3個月，總刑期為6年半。她受審後定罪沒有其他減刑。</p> -<p>【獨媒報導】初選47人案將於周二（11月19日）判刑，昨晚（11月16日）距離開審仍有三天，西九龍裁判法院門外疑出現「排隊黨」。《獨媒》記者今早到場，隊伍有13人自攜櫈坐下排隊，大部份人均戴上口罩。記者逐一向排隊者詢問排隊原因、旁聽的案件等，全部未獲回應。排第14的是「女長毛」雷玉蓮，她稱「示威咗咁多年咁多次，我未曾試過排隊呢，要排兩三日嘅，我都係第一次」，斥「排隊黨」行為「鼠竊狗偷」。人稱「姨婆」的旁聽常客亦趕到場排隊，斥「排隊黨」行為多餘。</p> +<blockquote> + <h3 id="劉澤鋒">劉澤鋒</h3> +</blockquote> -<h4 id="隊頭大部分人戴上口罩未回應記者問題">隊頭大部分人戴上口罩、未回應記者問題</h4> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/SsIVPOs.png" alt="image54" /></p> -<p>47名民主派被控「串謀顛覆國家政權」罪，其中31人認罪，16人不認罪受審，只有劉偉聰及李予信2人罪名不成立，餘下14人則被判罪名成立，包括鄭達鴻、楊雪盈、彭卓棋、何啟明、黃碧雲、施德來、何桂藍、陳志全、鄒家成、林卓廷、梁國雄、柯耀林、余慧明及吳政亨，45人早前已分批完成求情。</p> +<p>為九龍西選區的劉澤鋒，辯方指他在初選落敗後，已沒有參與計劃，他亦沒有任何政治影響力。法官認為他屬於「積極參加者」，他同意一旦成功在立法會當選，將會無差別否決財政預算案。因此以7年監禁為起點，並因認罪減刑三分一、誤解法律減刑3個月，總刑期為4年5個月。</p> -<p>昨日晚上開始，已有人到場排隊輪候旁聽席，《獨媒》記者今早到場，逐一訪問隊伍的13人，全部人不作回應，部分人更撐起雨傘向外遮擋。截至下午約一時，排隊人數增至約20人。下午約2時許，約20名警方到場使用金屬架設立「阻車器」，以防止車輛進入封鎖範圍。</p> +<blockquote> + <h3 id="譚文豪">譚文豪</h3> +</blockquote> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/6K6kk6l.png" alt="image02" /></p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/rylrSxq.png" alt="image55" /></p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/eFm2dRx.png" alt="image03" /></p> +<p>為九龍東選區的譚文豪，法官認為他屬於「積極參加者」，他同意一旦成功在立法會當選，將會無差別否決財政預算案。因此以7年監禁為起點，因認罪減刑三分一，再因誤解法律及公共服務，分別減刑3個月及3個月，總刑期為4年2個月。</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/hGj0vua.png" alt="image04" /></p> +<blockquote> + <h3 id="譚得志">譚得志</h3> +</blockquote> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/AtjsInB.png" alt="image05" /></p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/10K6wVl.png" alt="image56" /></p> -<h4 id="雷玉蓮斥排隊黨行為鼠竊狗偷">雷玉蓮斥排隊黨行為「鼠竊狗偷」</h4> +<p>為九龍東選區的譚得志，法官認為他屬於「積極參加者」，他同意一旦成功在立法會當選，將會無差別否決財政預算案。因此以7年監禁為起點，認罪減刑三分一。辯方指譚就另一煽動案的言論，與初選有關，故兩案應該一同審理。法官考慮到譚已服畢該案刑期，因此減刑3個月，以反映兩案整體性，總刑期為4年5個月。</p> -<p>今早10時45分，「女長毛」雷玉蓮到場排隊，排第14位。她向《獨媒》表示，從網上得知有人排隊，故在進食早餐前便急忙前來，匆忙下亦忘帶藥物，稱「示威咗咁多年咁多次，我未曾試過排隊呢，要排兩三日嘅，我都係第一次。」</p> +<blockquote> + <h3 id="胡志偉">胡志偉</h3> +</blockquote> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/rc99IrK.png" alt="image06" /></p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/nsZOtl1.png" alt="image57" /></p> -<p>雷玉蓮質疑隊頭者「究竟佢哋嚟做啲乜嘢呢，識唔識被告人呢」，認為他們是「排隊黨」，斥其行為「鼠竊狗偷」，「今日我親眼見到排隊黨，我真係覺得冇得救㗎啦，你又唔識被告人，我哋都話嚟支持我哋啲戰友啦，入邊啲人都係我哋識嘅。」</p> +<p>同為九龍東選區的胡志偉，法官認為他屬於「積極參加者」，他同意一旦成功在立法會當選，將會無差別否決財政預算案。因此以7年監禁為起點，認罪減刑三分一，並因誤解法律減刑3個月，總刑期為4年5個月。法官不同意辯方指，胡在其他案件因良好品格獲減刑，代表他在本案中同樣可以。</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/cRZoQbb.png" alt="image07" /> -▲ 雷玉蓮</p> +<blockquote> + <h3 id="施德來">施德來</h3> +</blockquote> -<p>雷玉蓮特意帶同蓮花燈到場，入黑會燈著，寓意「佢哋生命好光輝，照亮緊每一個香港人嘅心」，亦稱「希望上天有仁慈嘅心，能夠判輕啲，亦都希望無論邊個對與錯，今日已經成為一個定局，希望佢哋能夠早日出返嚟，同佢哋屋企人見面。」</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/c87R9DS.png" alt="image58" /></p> -<h4 id="姨婆排隊黨行為多餘">「姨婆」：「排隊黨」行為多餘</h4> +<p>至於九龍東選區的施德來，法官認為他屬於「積極參加者」，他同意一旦成功在立法會當選，將會無差別否決財政預算案。法官以7年監禁為起點，考慮到他誤解法律及公共服務，分別減刑3個月及2個月，但受審後定罪無其他扣減，總刑期為6年7個月。</p> -<p>人稱「姨婆」的旁聽常客，今午一時許到場，她本打算今晚到場排隊，惟稱「估唔到咁早，琴晚已經有人講出嚟」。她質疑「排隊黨」的行為，「排到又點啫，排到攞到錢，俾錢嗰啲人，我唔知佢咩心理啦，我哋都會見到佢哋㗎，我哋都會知道嗰個結果㗎」，指其行為「多餘」。她不擔心天氣，「落雨咪溚下雨、避雨」，「雖然聽落去好似好戇居，但係唔覺得㗎，我哋兩日咋嘛，唔係好辛苦，但係嗰啲幾年啦，都比我哋更辛苦。」</p> +<blockquote> + <h3 id="尹兆堅">尹兆堅</h3> +</blockquote> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/HeyKzwn.png" alt="image08" /> -▲ 「姨婆」</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/nc4uPvW.png" alt="image59" /></p> -<p>另一名到場排隊的市民CC（化名），同樣是在網上看到排隊情況後到場，她同樣批評「排隊黨」，「佢地會輪班，佢地搵人嚟好容易姐，我哋唔會呀嘛。我地係自己過嚟嘅，點樣捱到幾晚通宵呢？」CC曾多次聽審，明言認得部分「排隊黨」一士，「通常（星期）二、四過嚟係大叔，通常一、三、五過嚟係大媽」，指他們取得籌號後，發送籌號圖片給「蛇頭」後就會離開法院，認為「排隊黨」目的是阻礙市民旁聽。</p> +<p>新界西選區的尹兆堅，法官指他屬於「積極參加者」，他同意一旦成功在立法會當選，將會無差別否決財政預算案。法官以7年監禁為起點，認罪扣減三分一，總刑期為4年8個月。</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/ZrZliZB.png" alt="image09" /> -▲ 市民CC</p> +<blockquote> + <h3 id="郭家麒">郭家麒</h3> +</blockquote> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/ptO7lTp.png" alt="image10" /> -▲ 午後，前排的排隊人士有至少兩人「換更」</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/Q5p72K8.png" alt="image60" /></p> -<h3 id="西九外點人數警方稱要檢視維持秩序警力-拒回應會否清走空櫈">西九外「點人數」警方稱要檢視維持秩序警力 拒回應會否清走空櫈</h3> +<p>考慮到郭的參與程度，法官採用監禁7年為起點，因及時認罪及配合警方調查而扣減三分一刑期，再考慮他誤解法律而扣減3個月，亦因其長期服務社會而額外扣減3個月，此外看不到任何進一步減刑理由，因此判囚4年2個月。法官特別提到，相信郭的重犯機會低，並且相信懲教署能夠在考慮是否提早釋放時能將此因素納入考慮。</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/eLvZkvz.png" alt="image11" /></p> +<blockquote> + <h3 id="吳敏兒">吳敏兒</h3> +</blockquote> -<p>【獨媒報導】初選47人案將於明日（19日）判刑，西九龍裁判法院外在開庭前三日已出現旁聽人龍，包括為數十多人的「排隊黨」。《獨媒》記者繼昨日後，今早11時再到法院外視察，暫時有約有41人排隊，不過隊頭的疑似13人「排隊黨」就增加至16人，隊尾亦出現6人疑為「排隊黨」。另外，警方曾在中午12時點算在場排隊人數，在場警員回覆《獨媒》查詢指，點人數是因為要衡量現場人數，檢視需要派出多少警力維持秩序，但就不可以透露會否清走沒有人或暫時離座的空櫈。</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/cvSrMoX.png" alt="image61" /></p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/ecUUNys.png" alt="image12" /></p> +<p>為新界西選區的吳敏兒，辯方指她參與程度低，沒有出席協調會議或記者會，只是出席選舉論壇，加上她落敗後已沒有參與其中。法官以7年監禁為起點，認罪扣減三分一，亦因對法律誤解減刑3個月，總刑期為4年5個月。法官提到，吳在手寫求情信中表示自己犯了很嚴重的法律，相信懲教署日後考慮提早釋放的機會時，會將她的歉意納入考慮。</p> -<p>西九昨日已出現疑似「排隊黨」，隊伍首13人自攜櫈坐下排隊，大部人均戴上口罩，《獨媒》曾逐一向他們詢問排隊原因、旁聽的案件等，但全部未獲回應。本來排第14、現時排第17的「女長毛」雷玉蓮向《獨媒》指，本身向公司請假兩天排隊旁聽，但沒有預計到有「排隊黨」提早前來，便臨時再請假提早來到法院排隊。她又指今早8時曾因腳痛離開隊伍，返公司取回藥物，但得悉警方點人數的消息後便立即回到隊伍當中。</p> +<blockquote> + <h3 id="譚凱邦">譚凱邦</h3> +</blockquote> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/l2eKCeI.png" alt="image13" /> -▲ 雷玉蓮</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/rEUI6YJ.png" alt="image62" /></p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/a20i7sf.png" alt="image14" /> -▲ 葉小姐</p> +<p>為新界西選區的譚凱邦，他指自己患上皮膚問題，有時需要入院治療。但法官認為並不會造成額外的困難，因此不能證明進一步減刑是合理。法官以7年監禁為起點，認罪扣減三分一，亦因對法律誤解減刑3個月，以及其對環境及動物的社區工作減刑兩個月，總刑期為4年3個月。</p> -<h4 id="市民反映有人疑插隊">市民反映有人疑插隊</h4> +<blockquote> + <h3 id="陳志全">陳志全</h3> +</blockquote> -<p>有排隊市民亦向《獨媒》反映有疑似插隊的情況，葉小姐指本來於隊伍後的一名男子，不久後便出前在隊伍前方：「我次次數（蓮姐前面）都冇16人，但佢哋話有16人。她爭表示，早已預見會發生荒謬情況，但仍希望見證事件的進展，強調「因為佢哋為咗我發言」。她亦表示將留守隊伍，直至明日派籌。</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/BD1OhgQ.png" alt="image63" /></p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/qOKrXOB.png" alt="image15" /></p> +<p>就新界西選區的陳志全，辯方指他並無親身出席協調會議或記者會，在選舉論壇中亦很少發言。法官以7年監禁為量刑起點，就對法律誤解及公共服務各減刑3個月，總刑期為6年半。</p> -<p>另一名排隊市民黃小姐亦表示，曾經有人向警察投訴該名男子插隊，警察表示會處理，但最後不了了之。她指：「我哋想有一個公平競爭，佢哋搵人換更唔緊要，但係希望佢哋唔好再插隊。」</p> +<blockquote> + <h3 id="林卓廷">林卓廷</h3> +</blockquote> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/JWA3E8H.png" alt="image16" /></p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/KPosNGJ.png" alt="image64" /></p> -<h4 id="路上設防車輛衝擊設備">路上設防車輛衝擊設備</h4> +<p>就新界西選區的林卓廷，辯方指其參與度低，並無出席協調會議及簽署「墨落無悔」聲明，亦無提及要否決財政預算案。法官以7年為監禁量刑起點，因他對法律誤解減刑3個月，但因受審後定罪無減刑，總刑期為6年9個月。</p> -<p>警方派出大量警力在場佈防，法院門外有多輛警車停泊，包括一輛「劍齒虎」裝甲車，警方在法院周圍亦架起多個帳篷，多名警員穿上戰術背心駐守並截查行人。另外，警方在法院附近路口和巴士站設置防止車輛衝擊的設備，市民上落巴士及過馬路時需刻意避開。</p> +<blockquote> + <h3 id="范國威">范國威</h3> +</blockquote> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/LKL6KeP.png" alt="image17" /></p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/YF5UXjt.png" alt="image65" /></p> -<p>下午近3時45分，國安處總警司李桂華帶隊，與十多人在西九龍裁判法院外巡視旁聽市民排隊狀況，至隊尾時逗留約30秒，之後原路折返。</p> +<p>就新界西選區的范國威，辯方指他沒有參加計劃或組織角色，應該被納入「其他參加者」。辯方亦求情指，范的父親已離世，亦有家人身患重病。范撰寫求情信表明後悔，法官指希望懲教署考慮給予減刑時，留意到其態度。法官以7年監禁為起點，認罪扣減三分一，再因他對法律誤解及公共服務，各減刑3個月，總刑期為4年2個月。</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/7B5wMAI.png" alt="image18" /></p> +<blockquote> + <h3 id="呂智恆">呂智恆</h3> +</blockquote> -<p>在記者區方面，暫時有48間媒體張貼排隊牌。日前《科大編委》表示其排隊牌被破壞棄置於草叢，原本位置由《文匯報》取代。《獨媒》今日發現，現時隊伍中有兩張「香港文匯報」的排隊牌，分別排第30及第35，其中後者更寫上「新調」字眼，至於《科大編委》的排隊牌亦重新掛上，排第42，並寫上「我哋本身星期五掛咗牌俾人拆咗」。</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/blxlBDn.png" alt="image66" /></p> -<h3 id="百歲大黃伯連續兩晚排通宵盼見受難朋友-林進嘆僅5公眾可入正庭非常可惜">百歲大黃伯連續兩晚排通宵盼見「受難朋友」 林進嘆僅5公眾可入正庭「非常可惜」</h3> +<p>就新界西選區的呂智恆，辯方指他參與程度少，應該被列入「其他參加者」級別。他亦因對政治的天真而參與計劃，當時希望政府能夠改善社會問題。辯方亦指，呂在定罪後沒有辦法再任職社工，他現已感後悔。法官肯定他有真誠悔意，相信懲教署考慮減刑時會注意到。法官認為，呂屬於「積極參加者」，並以7年監禁為起點，認罪扣減三分一，另因對法律誤解及公共服務，各減刑3個月及2個月，總刑期為4年3個月。</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/TNfthdK.png" alt="image19" /></p> +<blockquote> + <h3 id="梁國雄">梁國雄</h3> +</blockquote> -<p>【獨媒報導】初選47人案明早判刑，有公眾提早兩日起在法院外輪候公眾人士入庭籌。截止今午4時半，有48人在場排隊，包括現年100歲的社運支持者「大黃伯」及前元朗區議員林進。不過司法機構公布，正庭僅有5個旁聽座位，意味著大部分人連續兩晚通宵排隊後，仍未必能進入法庭。</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/OfZp7Wb.png" alt="image67" /></p> -<p>有未能入正庭的人士繼續排隊。撐拐杖的大黃伯則說，希望能「見吓啲受難的朋友」，並表示會在截的士回家食藥後，晚上再回來排隊。案中被告伍健偉的「戰友」林進則坦言正庭公眾席數量遠比想像中少，感到非常可惜，但亦無能為力：「佢哋（初選案被告）受咗咁多苦難，坐咗三年半，我哋陪埋佢最後呢一刻都做唔到。」</p> +<p>就新界西選區的梁國雄，辯方認為他屬於「其他參加者」，因沒有重大參與度。法官不同意辯方指，梁有良好品格，因他過往有刑事紀錄。法官以7年監禁為量刑起點，因他誤解法律減刑3個月，他受審後定罪沒有其他扣減，共囚6年9個月。</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/qFtnsdd.png" alt="image20" /> -▲ 警方昨日起加強西九龍裁判法院一帶巡邏，包括派出派遣反恐部隊和使用無人機。</p> +<blockquote> + <h3 id="柯耀林">柯耀林</h3> +</blockquote> -<p>大黃伯表示旁聽的主要目的是「想見吓啲受難嘅朋友」，又指「唔知仲有幾多日、有冇機會見佢哋？」</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/nF4jvHg.png" alt="image68" /></p> -<p>司法機構公布，將於明早派發404張公眾人士入庭籌，當中僅5張是正庭座位。昨日已到場的「姨婆」料未能入正庭，但她認為供公眾看庭內情況直播的延伸庭，與正庭僅有一牆之隔，仍能支持初選案的被告，讓他們得知「仍有人沒有忘記他們」。</p> +<p>最後就新界西選區的柯耀林，辯方指他應該屬於「其他參加者」，因他在計劃中的行為和平，在選舉論壇的發言有限，其影響力也有限。法官以7年監禁為起點，就誤解法律及公共服務各減刑3個月及2個月，他受審後定罪沒有其他減刑，總刑期為6年7個月。</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/gD29qgl.png" alt="image21" /> -▲ 旁聽常客「姨婆」</p> +<h3 id="官不接受被告稱涉案計劃註定失敗-61萬投票市民不如此認為">官：不接受被告稱涉案計劃註定失敗 61萬投票市民不如此認為</h3> -<p>佔中時為人認識的大黃伯，昨夜凌晨一時多到西九裁判法院通宵排隊，今早回家吃藥後再回到法院門外。下午3時許，大黃伯在同行男子陪同下，撐着拐杖離開排隊隊伍，打算截的士回家食藥，並稱會再晚上再回來排隊。</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/TbwhmAY.png" alt="image69" /></p> -<p>大黃伯表示，來法院旁聽初選案的主要目的，是「見吓啲受難的朋友，想望望佢哋受咗監獄之苦後變成點呢？」他自言年紀老邁：「唔知仲有幾多日、有冇機會見佢哋？所以想見多佢哋一面。」</p> +<p>【獨媒報導】47人涉組織及參與民主派初選，被控「串謀顛覆國家政權」罪，其中31人認罪，16人不認罪受審，除李予信及劉偉聰之外，餘下14人皆被裁定罪成。45人今（19日）於高院（移師西九龍法院）判刑。3名國安法指定法官頒下書面判刑理由，當中回應辯方求情時提出的法律爭議，考慮到本案控罪是「串謀顛覆國家政權」罪，法官認為《國安法》第22條的刑罰分級制雖有參考價值，但是並不完全適用。辯方另提到涉案計劃註定失敗，惟法官則認為不應猜測，但是可以肯定的是所有參與者均用盡努力希望令涉案計劃成功，當時亦從未有人提及計劃不可能實現，而61萬名有份投票的市民亦不認為是如此。法官指初選的競選者是涉案計劃之中的重要人物，沒有他們，涉案計劃便不可能開始，他們支持及積極參與在這計劃之中，因此應被歸類為「積極參與者」。</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/Dfp25dA.png" alt="image22" /> -▲ 大黃伯</p> +<h4 id="戴耀廷等部份被告質疑刑罰分級制不適用-官裁不應硬性地套用">戴耀廷等部份被告質疑刑罰分級制不適用 官裁不應硬性地套用</h4> -<p>案中被告伍健偉的「戰友」、前「天水連線」元朗區議員林進昨午已到場，排約第30位。對於僅有5名公眾可進入正庭旁聽，林進坦言人數遠比想像中少：「初頭諗住如果有廿張飛，都仲有幾張入到去（正庭），因為前面全部都係排隊黨，依家結論係一張都冇。」他感到非常可惜，但亦無能為力，指在延伸席的旁聽市民只可以透過電視機觀看直播，即案中被告不會知道有哪些朋友在場。</p> +<p>根據《國安法》第22條，一旦顛覆國家政權罪成，「首要分子或罪行重大」可判處10年以上至終身監禁；「積極參加」可判監3至10年；「其他參加」則判監3年以下、拘役或者管制。</p> -<p>林指，當初想法是即使要連續兩晚排通宵，都希望能到正庭見伍健偉一面。但既然沒機會取得正庭的公眾席籌，等待已變得「冇乜意思」：「嚟就一定會嚟，但（今晚）未必會通宵。」又表示，伍健偉已經「預備好接受所有的事情」，亦預計伍的情況會比其他類似參與程度的被告更為嚴重，但認為「佢係諗過、度過先咁樣做，其他人只可以無條件咁支持」。</p> +<p>法官在判刑理由中先處理法律爭議，在求情階段，部份被告質疑刑罰分級制不適用於本案，其中代表戴耀廷的資深大律師黃繼明、代表袁嘉蔚和馮達浚的資深大律師祁志等，爭議被告被控「串謀顛覆國家政權」罪，是以串謀罪、而非《國安法》罪行定罪，故此刑期分級制不適用。控方則指，經1983年的修例，立法原意是容許法庭針對「企圖」、「串謀」和「煽惑」罪行的刑罰，與實質作出的罪行相等，因此本案的「串謀顛覆國家政權」罪刑罰應跟從《國安法》第22條的刑罰分級制。</p> -<h3 id="致歉無悔不求情45名罪成被告判刑前的陳詞">致歉、無悔、不求情——45名罪成被告，判刑前的陳詞</h3> +<p>不過判詞指，《刑事罪行條例》第159C條指「串謀」罪行的最高刑罰，與實質罪行的最高刑罰相同，當中只提及「最高刑罰」。經考慮案例，以及本案控罪是「串謀顛覆國家政權」罪，法官認為《國安法》第22條的刑罰分級制雖有參考價值，但是並不完全適用（should not be strictly applicable）在本案，因第159C條的用字清晰不含糊，只提及「最高刑罰」。然而法官強調，無論如何，這並不會窒礙法庭考慮立法機關怎樣看罪行的嚴重性。</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/oAfCNTl.png" alt="image23" /></p> +<p>此外，控方曾經引用今年3月才立法的《維護國安條例》，當中第109(a)條指「如任何人被裁定串謀犯任何《香港國安法》所訂罪行(國安法罪行)，則《香港國安法》下關於該項國安法罪行的罰則的條文，亦適用於該項串謀犯罪的罰則」，要求法庭考慮串謀干犯國安罪行的刑罰分級制立法原意。</p> -<p>【獨媒報導】47名組織及參與初選的民主派被控「串謀顛覆國家政權」案，自2021年3月首度提堂，今年5月裁定45人罪成，將於明日（19日）迎來判刑。</p> +<p>不過，法官指《維護國安條例》是一個在本港立法機構制訂的本地法，惟《香港國安法》屬於全國性法律、在北京全國人大代表大會立法，兩者的立法機構層次不同，邏輯上難以將本地法律用來確認全國性法律的立法原意。再者，《維護國安條例》立法時，已明確表明條文沒有追溯力，因此法官認為控方所引用的《維護國安條例》第109(a)條對本案幫助不大。</p> -<p>這宗《國安法》實施後最大規模的案件，涵蓋一眾政治光譜和世代各異的議員、律師、社運人士、政治素人，當中32人還柙至今超過3年8個月。有辯方大狀在庭上力陳，案中被告是法官「永遠不會在被告欄見到的人」，他們是社會的領袖，懷着良好意願參選，非為私利，只是《國安法》後突然變成非法，原本爭取權力監察政權，一夜之間變成了顛覆。</p> +<h4 id="被告求情稱計劃註定失敗-官所有參與者均用盡努力希望成功">被告求情稱計劃註定失敗 官：所有參與者均用盡努力希望成功</h4> -<p>過去3年8個月，有人在獄中喪親，亦有人結婚、生子，望能盡快與家人團聚。公民黨、職工盟等已解散，多人表明不再從政，不少被告亦失去專業資格，在獄中進修，盼以另一種方式，繼續服務社會。</p> +<p>辯方求情亦提到，「干預、阻撓、削弱特區政府功能」的後果，非常視乎涉案計劃是否能夠實現；他們力陳，即使初選勝出者沒有被「DQ」、立法會選舉沒有因疫情而延期，涉案計劃也註定失敗，因計劃參與者未能確保爭奪到足夠議席。</p> -<p>面對最高終身監禁的刑罰，有人選擇不求情，有人則反思過去，為昔日言行道歉。有人堅持不為信念道歉，表明無悔、毋怨，及對香港的抱負、民主的期許：「即使今日我為爭取民主而身陷囹圄，但我仍然相信，這個『為人民服務的民選政府』終有一天必將降臨香港」；「我堅信人民大於國家，人權高於政權」；「長夜終盡，黎明將至，民主終將再次得勝」；「只要我還活着，締造更美好的香港永遠都會是我的終生抱負」；「或許我唯一犯下的錯誤，就是我太愛香港。」</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/55lPYhx.png" alt="image70" /> +▲ 2020年7月31日，政府宣布押後2021年立法會選舉。</p> -<p>各人尚餘多久重獲自由還未知曉，在案件判刑之際，《獨媒》為讀者整合各人求情、陳情的內容。</p> +<p>不過，法官認為，涉案計劃最終會否成功，並不由法庭自行作出猜測，但是可以肯定的是所有參與者均用盡努力希望令涉案計劃成功。從證據可見，兩名主要組織者均對於計劃感到樂觀，他們動用大量時間和金錢來舉行記者會、協調會議和選舉論壇，又委託民調機構、眾籌計劃等。一些獨立人士招募義工來協助計劃。各初選競選者組成選舉團隊、認真設計和構思選舉單張；他們亦收集選舉提名、提交選舉按金，以上種種行動均顯示所有初選參與者都希望能夠成功舉行到初選。</p> -<h4 id="45名罪成被告量刑立場">45名罪成被告量刑立場</h4> +<p>此外，對於萬一有人被取消資格，他們亦有詳細討論「Plan B」制度，顯示他們考慮及討論過所有可能發生的情況。除了參與初選的人之外，沒有參與初選、但發起「三投三不投」的被告吳政亨，則投放大量金錢賣廣告。</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/l9ckHNI.png" alt="image24" /></p> +<h4 id="官61萬名投票市民亦不認為計劃絕對不能實現">官：61萬名投票市民亦不認為計劃絕對不能實現</h4> -<p>根據《國安法》第22條，一旦顛覆國家政權罪成，「首要分子或罪行重大」可判處10年以上至終身監禁；「積極參加」可判監3至10年；「其他參加」則判監3年以下、拘役或者管制。</p> +<p>法官認為，若非疫情緣故導致2021年的立法會選舉延期，涉案計劃並不是註定失敗。當初選投票日在7月11及12日舉行時，從沒有人提及過這計劃純綷「學術操作」（no more than an academic exercise），或者說計劃絕對不能實現，「61萬名普通市民亦不認為是如此。」</p> -<p>到底各被告被歸類為哪個級別，是今次判刑焦點，不過有辯方質疑分級制根本不適用。代表戴耀廷的資深大律師黃繼明、代表袁嘉蔚和馮達浚的資深大律師祁志等，均爭議被告被控「串謀顛覆國家政權」罪，是以串謀罪、而非《國安法》罪行定罪，刑期分級制不適用，有待法官裁定。有辯方另爭議，法庭量刑時，不應考慮被告《國安法》前的言行，不過法官已表明拒絕接納。</p> +<p>法官指，正如每宗涉及顛覆國家政權案件般，若要計劃成功，組織者和參與者均有一些困難需要克服，因此法官拒絕接納「計劃註定失敗」的說法，以及不會判處較輕刑罰。</p> -<p>此外，有辯方大狀指本案不涉武力手段、亦不涉推翻中國根本制度等，是顛覆罪行中最輕微，不應視為「罪行重大」；又指法庭不應採納過高的量刑起點，否則便沒有空間處理其他更嚴重的罪行，例如造成人命傷亡、企圖綁架議員等。</p> +<h4 id="官接受部份被告被戴耀廷誤導而相信初選不違法">官接受部份被告被戴耀廷誤導而相信初選不違法</h4> -<p>至於減刑因素，包括及時認罪可獲三分一扣減（不過呂世瑜案確立認罪扣減不得超過刑期下限，有被告或未能獲全數扣減），另4名從犯證人區諾軒、趙家賢、鍾錦麟、林景楠亦指其證供對控方有幫助，可獲更多扣減，甚至可按《國安法》第33條揭發他人犯罪、自動放棄犯罪等而降低刑罰等級。</p> +<p>部份被告聲稱，基於戴耀廷多次重申初選不違法，所以他們當時真誠誤信涉案謀劃為合法。法官表示，就部份被告而言，接受他們有上述說法；但是就戴耀廷和楊岳橋而言，法官不接受他們基於對法律無知而犯案，因二人是律師，加上二人堅決地執行涉案計劃。法官又指，涉案計劃在他們眼中是合法與否，並無關宏旨，他們的而且確曾向其他人推銷涉案計劃。</p> -<p>此外，多名辯方律師求情時均提到，涉案謀劃存有不確定性、甚至不可能實現，法庭不應基於假設性後果判刑；而被告在案發後逾半年始被捕，更可見謀劃無對國安造成危害。有辯方亦強調，計劃公開進行，各人當時真誠誤信謀劃為合法，基於對法律無知才犯案。另有部分被告曾涉其他集結案、甚至暴動案服刑，辯方望法官考慮整體量刑而減刑，避免壓毀性刑罰；多人亦望法庭考慮他們對社會的貢獻，但法官明言，部分已於以往案件考慮，不能循環再用。</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/t2fPuG8.png" alt="image71" /> +▲ 楊岳橋</p> -<h4 id="我們的孩子我們的大人">「我們的孩子，我們的大人」</h4> +<p>法官指，戴耀廷主張極端的「攬炒十步曲」，雖然他在求情信中聲稱從來無意以該十步曲作為其政治行動藍圖，但是該文章的確作出該主張。不論如何，戴在數個月以來持續發表文章，其進取思想有跡可尋。實質上，戴是提倡了一場革命。法官另指，楊岳橋在公民黨記者會中使用強烈措辭，可見他亦非常進取。</p> -<p>當被告欄內坐滿律師、議員、社工、大學教師，不少辯方律師在陳詞時，均力陳本案被告並非一般罪犯。代表袁嘉蔚和馮達浚的資深大律師祁志，指本案不少被告出身中產或勞工階層，努力令自己變得更好，他們是「我們的同事，我們的孩子，我們的大人，我們的人民，並非一般罪犯」。</p> +<h4 id="官需考慮國安法前言行-以考慮串謀嚴重性及各人角色">官：需考慮《國安法》前言行 以考慮串謀嚴重性及各人角色</h4> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/FtQL3bN.png" alt="image25" /> -▲ 袁嘉蔚</p> +<p>戴耀廷的代表大律師曾力陳，法庭量刑時不應考慮被告在《國安法》生效之前的言行，因當時並不違法。法官表示，接受被告當初協議所作的事並不違法，直至《國安法》生效之後才變成違法，可是他們繼續留在該協議之中，並繼續參與涉案計劃。雖然控罪時期從2020年7月1日才開始，但是法庭不會完全不考慮7月1日之前發生的事情，因為需要評估涉案串謀的嚴重性和廣泛性，以及各人在計劃中的角色。不過法官強調，被告不會因為《國安法》生效之前的言行而受罰。</p> -<p>祁志又說，本案是這個司法管轄區從未聽聞，案中被告是法官「永遠不會在被告欄見到的人」，他們被指以非法手段求變，實是望透過選票進入議會，「這些人告訴法庭他們是出於良好動機而犯案，這是其他判刑所不會聽到」。他又說，當搶劫犯運用暴力手段偷竊，販毒者從他人痛苦賺取利益，危駕者為他人帶來巨大傷害，但法庭從逾百日的審訊和聆訊，會得知本案被告均是民主社會、或相對民主社會的領袖，他們真誠相信多元主義，望以和平手段服務社會，是有學識、表達和思考能力高的人。</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/lSdJBOE.png" alt="image72" /> +▲ 戴耀廷</p> -<p>祁志又說，馮達浚成長於有多元辯論和選舉文化的香港，當時提出反對不僅合法，也是人們生活和政治的基石，通識教育亦是教育制度重要一環，年輕人被訓練問問題，也被鼓勵思考和辯論，但《國安法》後，這樣的情況結束，「爭取權力監察政權，一夜之間變成了顛覆」。</p> +<h4 id="初選的競選者應被歸類為積極參與者">初選的競選者應被歸類為「積極參與者」</h4> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/jHz3iDM.png" alt="image26" /> -▲ 馮達浚</p> +<p>部份被告求情時稱，本案涉及的《國安法》第22(3)條（嚴重干擾、阻撓、破壞中央政權機關或者香港特區政權機關依法履行職能），嚴重性比第22(1)、(2)、(3)條為低，包括「推翻、破壞中國憲法所確立的中國根本制度」、「推翻中央或特區政權」和「攻擊、破壞香港特區政權機關履職場所及其設施」。惟法官不接納此說法，因罪行的嚴重性取決於很多因素，包括計劃規模、執行方式和手段、涉及人數、潛在損害和實際後果等。</p> -<p>代表鄒家成和呂智恆的大律師陳世傑也說，本案被告是好人，只是不幸在錯誤的地點和時間出現，他們來自不同界別，包括醫生、律師、社工等等，懷着良好意願參選、非為私利，但《國安法》後突然全變成非法。</p> +<p>就本案而言，法官指初選的競選者是涉案計劃之中的重要人物，沒有他們，涉案計劃便不可能開始，他們支持及積極參與在這計劃之中，因此應被歸類為「積極參與者」。若計劃持續執行直到結尾，所帶來的負面後果可以很深遠，比顛覆特區政權有過之而無不及。</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/Ki5tIRT.png" alt="image27" /> -▲ 鄒家成</p> +<h3 id="法官指11名認罪被告有真誠悔意-當局評估是否提早釋放時會考慮">法官指11名認罪被告有真誠悔意 當局評估是否提早釋放時會考慮</h3> -<p>陳續說，各人並非真正意義上的罪犯，望法庭能法外開恩，「在這宗案，寬容是有必要的」；又指接受違反《國安法》須判處阻嚇性刑罰，但本案阻嚇性效果已是眾所周知，眾被告心靈受創，「我們現在需要的，是法庭判處『療癒式刑罰』」，令被告和社會可從創傷中復原。</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/nQcB15D.png" alt="image73" /></p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/qmbtRwm.png" alt="image28" /> -▲ 呂智恆</p> +<p>【獨媒報導】47人涉組織及參與民主派初選，被控「串謀顛覆國家政權」罪，其中31人認罪，16人不認罪受審，除李予信及劉偉聰，其餘14人罪成，45人被判囚4年2個月至10年。法官在判詞提到，其中11名被告展現真誠悔意，相信當局未來評估是否批准提早釋放時，會納入考慮。代表岑子杰的辯方提到，在《維護國家安全條例》生效後，《監獄規則》有所修改，因此岑並未能獲得減刑。惟法官指，減刑是由懲教署署長決定，而非法庭考慮之列。</p> -<blockquote> - <h3 id="被指組織者5人">被指組織者（5人）</h3> -</blockquote> +<p>翻查報導，《維護國家安全條例》於今年3月生效，並對《監管釋囚條例》及《監獄規則》作出修訂，列明若囚犯是被裁定犯危害國家安全的罪行而服刑，除非懲教署署長信納提早釋放或減刑不會不利國家安全，否則不得將囚犯的個案轉介予監管釋囚委員會考慮，或不得獲減刑。</p> -<h4 id="戴耀廷倡以3年為起點">戴耀廷倡以3年為起點</h4> +<p>11名認罪被告獲法官指有悔意，相信當局未來評估是否批准提早釋放時，會納入考慮。</p> -<p>回到被告自身，各人候審或還柙逾3年半，各選擇不同方式面對判刑。有人表示深切反省，為昔日行為道歉；有人指其證供對法庭有用，求減刑更多；有人重述參選初衷，表示不知違法。除此以外，有人表明無悔、無怨；亦有人選擇不求情。</p> +<h4 id="以下為法官就抗爭派5人有悔意的判詞">以下為法官就抗爭派5人有悔意的判詞：</h4> -<p>45名罪成被告中，5名被指為組織者。控方曾表明，「35+計劃」組織者不屬「首要分子」是有違常理。不過代表戴耀廷的資深大律師黃繼明認為，戴是「其他參加者」，法庭應採納3年為量刑起點，考慮及時認罪等扣減至2年。他指有人或認為建議「太有野心甚至大膽」，但考慮相關法律原則和戴的個人情況，刑期屬合適，指戴在《國安法》前的行為合法，而《國安法》生效後角色有限，涉案「非法手段」為無差別否決預算案，但戴不會參選立法會和投票，也無法控制或指示其他人這樣做，並非「首要分子」。不過法官拒絕接納戴《國安法》前行為與罪責無關、及他在《國安法》後只有很少或沒有角色，反問若戴為「其他參加者」，那誰是「首要分子」和「積極參加者」？</p> +<p><strong>張可森：展現真誠悔意</strong></p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/rhiMhYf.png" alt="image29" /> -▲ 戴耀廷</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/G8EQBLr.png" alt="image74" /></p> -<p>辯方另呈上港大法律學院講座教授陳弘毅、港大法律學院講座首席講師張達明、蘇穎智牧師及戴耀廷本人撰寫的求情信，讚揚戴對港大和社會的貢獻，又力陳「非暴力」是他一生堅信的信念，他真誠誤信否決預算案沒有違法，甚至「誤導了自己」，而他做犯案非為個人利益，而是出於畢生對法治和民主的堅定決心，望運用憲制權力爭取普選。</p> +<p><strong>岑敖暉：有真誠悔意，已成為不同的人（a different person than before）</strong></p> -<h4 id="區諾軒等3從犯證人求減刑一半">區諾軒等3從犯證人求減刑一半</h4> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/mmhfuXy.png" alt="image75" /></p> -<p>至於另3名組織者區諾軒、趙家賢和鍾錦麟，均是從犯證人，曾於庭上作供，辯方望獲得額外扣減。代表區諾軒的大律師陳慕賢指，區在《國安法》後曾嘗試與當局溝通，其後退出初選，並成功游說趙家賢退出，望法庭考慮他協助控方案情，減刑一半。法官李運騰曾問會否要求更多扣減，區諾軒在位上以雙臂做交叉手勢；法官再問辯方是否指區是「超級金手指」，辯方稱沒相關指示，區遂用力點頭，雙手抱拳。法官李運騰也一度指，辯方或說「沒有區諾軒的證供，控方基本上不會有他們的案情」，被告欄即傳來「yes」，不過區諾軒向法官和鄒家成雙手打交叉，又與鄒隔空交談，並不住搖頭。</p> +<p><strong>劉頴匡：接受他願意承擔全部責任、表達悔意及承諾不再犯法</strong></p> -<p>前民主動力召集人趙家賢，其代表大律師利琛，則指趙盡所能協助控方，可獲「超級金手指」的66%減刑。法官表明不同意，指要承受個人風險作供才算「超級金手指」，辯方遂改要求減刑40%至55%。辯方又指，趙於2020年5月才獲邀加入初選，7月已退出，僅負責行政和執行工作，加上為控方提供有用資訊，可採納「積極參加者」較高量刑起點，再按《國安法》第33條減刑。不過法官質疑，有證供指趙較早階段已加入初選，辯方同意。</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/J2GPRw7.png" alt="image76" /></p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/sZRuzsV.png" alt="image30" /> -▲ 趙家賢、區諾軒</p> +<p><strong>黃子悅：她解釋情緒病情況、願意承擔責任</strong></p> -<p>至於前民主動力副召集人鍾錦麟，大律師陳慕賢同要求減刑一半。法官明言，鍾的證供沒有區諾軒的那麼有用，辯方回應是因鍾的參與程度有限，鍾已盡所能協助控方，亦加強了控方案情。</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/yUK1bTR.png" alt="image77" /></p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/jMoCqFo.png" alt="image31" /> -▲ 鍾錦麟</p> +<p><strong>王百羽：接受他已改過自新（a changed man）</strong></p> -<h4 id="吳政亨一直堅信自由民主">吳政亨：一直堅信自由民主</h4> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/Yk3xQDz.png" alt="image78" /></p> -<p>至於發起「三投三不投」聯署的吳政亨，大律師石書銘表示，雖然控方指他為組織者之一，但隨證供披露，可見他不僅不是組織者，甚至不是積極參加者，他是自行發起「三投三不投」，過程中除戴耀廷外無與其他被告溝通，角色僅屬輔助。辯方又指，吳從未提倡否決預算案，只關注初選及爭取35+，亦真誠相信戴稱否決預算案不違法，他無參與協調會議、沒有參選更不會投票否決，屬於「其他參加者」。</p> +<p><strong>朱凱廸：展現真誠悔意</strong></p> -<p>庭上又讀出吳政亨的求情信，吳提到1978年在香港出生，13歲隨父母移民澳洲，「一直堅信自由民主原則」，認為社會分歧需通過文明民主方式處理，而由於「權力使人腐敗，絕對權力則使人絕對腐敗」，他相信公平公正選舉最能有效防止權力成為暴政，亦因此支持香港民主運動。</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/Wz9xJkd.png" alt="image79" /></p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/yzuBIaY.png" alt="image32" /> -▲ 吳政亨</p> +<h4 id="以下為法官就非抗爭派6人有悔意的判詞">以下為法官就非抗爭派6人有悔意的判詞：</h4> -<p>吳續指，一直對民主陣營持續內鬥痛心，認為處理的最佳方法是初選，因此對初選「無限嚮往」。雖然他在政治世界是局外人，但他相信自己有權利甚至義務為實現這夢想盡一分力，遂發起「三投三不投」聯署。吳自言在整個初選中一直是「局外人」，故對控方指控他是組織者「感到非常驚訝」，並強調由始至終「我支持初選從來都僅是為了初選本身」，他從無要求參選人承諾否決預算案，甚至不認為可取，因害怕引起民主陣營爭議，威脅初選的實現。</p> +<p><strong>楊岳橋：接受重犯機會低</strong></p> -<blockquote> - <h3 id="參與者抗爭派15人">參與者——抗爭派（15人）</h3> -</blockquote> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/iDRIqTA.png" alt="image80" /></p> -<p>至於其餘40名罪成的初選參與者，亦來自不同世代、不同光譜。當中15人曾出席抗爭派記者會或發抗爭派聲明，自稱為「抗爭派」。他們大多均歸類自己為「積極參加者」。</p> +<p><strong>郭家麒：接受重犯機會低</strong></p> -<h4 id="何桂藍無求情黃之鋒無寫求情信">何桂藍無求情、黃之鋒無寫求情信</h4> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/jasTJk5.png" alt="image81" /></p> -<p>其中何桂藍沒有求情陳詞，黃之鋒亦沒有親自撰寫求情信。代表黃的大律師李國威，僅呈上黃母、牧師和老師的求情信，指黃望在服刑後放下過去，改過自新。法官指那是其他人代表黃說的話，辯方同意黃無撰寫求情信，指這是其選擇，而黃希望在本案後重新開始。</p> +<p><strong>吳敏兒：承認違法、承擔責任及表達歉意</strong></p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/OPKxLqW.png" alt="image33" /> -▲ 何桂藍</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/6Ko58tx.png" alt="image82" /></p> -<h4 id="梁晃維締造更美好香港是終生抱負">梁晃維：締造更美好香港是終生抱負</h4> +<p><strong>范國威：接受他對犯法感後悔、並選擇認罪</strong></p> -<p>發起「墨落無悔」聲明的梁晃維、鄒家成、張可森3人，代表梁晃維的資深大律師彭耀鴻指，梁是「積極參加者」，但「墨落無悔」於《國安法》生效前發布，只是重申已達成的共識，法庭不應考慮。法官質疑聲明其後沒有撤回，辯方回應梁並非公然違法，而是對法律無知；又指本案顛覆非常獨特，被告犯案非為個人私利，而是出於良好動機，望以合法手段令特首回應民意。</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/PXqOpci.png" alt="image83" /></p> -<p>辯方又指，梁還柙3年進行反省，承認案發時部分言行不成熟，望就此道歉，亦明白作出違法行為須承擔責任。庭上讀出他親撰的求情信節錄，梁提及生於九七一代如「被詛咒的孩子」，每個人生新階段都會遇上香港的重大事件，如沙士、雨傘運動、反修例運動和疫情，深感命運與香港緊緊相連。梁又說，香港自2019年面對困境，許多人感到迷失，「但我從來沒有對香港或香港人失去信心」，「憑我們對這片土地的熱愛，以及前人所承傳下來的精神，我相信香港能繼續逆風而行，克服當前挑戰和未知困難。只要我還活着，締造更美好的香港永遠都會是我的終生抱負」。</p> +<p><strong>呂智恆：有真誠悔意</strong></p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/gQjHVC8.png" alt="image34" /> -▲ （資料圖片）</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/lxmj5qp.png" alt="image84" /></p> -<h4 id="鄒家成縱身陷囹圄仍信民選政府終降臨香港">鄒家成：縱身陷囹圄仍信民選政府終降臨香港</h4> +<h3 id="何桂藍發帖歷史由有意志者書寫-人人可定義香港">何桂藍發帖：歷史由有意志者書寫 人人可定義香港</h3> -<p>至於鄒家成，大律師陳世傑同指他屬「積極參加者」，指他在案中非關鍵人物、可有可無，對計劃無真正幫助；他雖發起「墨落無悔」，但聲明屬多餘。鄒家成又呈上求情信，提到15歲時首次參與七一遊行，深深為人們對公義的追求及對弱勢的關懷所震撼，成為他關心社會、積極參與公民事務的契機。2014年雨傘運動，鄒不時到場支持，指運動令他相信透過公民參與，有改變社會、推動公義的能力。</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/4bBvT2X.png" alt="image85" /></p> -<p>鄒續指，他參政望為民發聲，實現真正民主化，由始至終「我根本無意違反《國安法》，亦想像不了參選本身原來已構成危害國安」。《國安法》生效後他一度想退選，但自覺身為政治人物肩負對人民的責任而繼續，「我懼怕，倘若連參選人都臨陣退縮，香港只會被恐懼的情緒籠罩，公民社會一沉百踩。我不忍心退選，我無法離群眾而去」。鄒指他初心始終不變，依然相信民主與公羲、關懷弱者，依然希望香港變得更好，亦始終深信民住的價值：「即使今日我為爭取民主而身陷囹圄，但我仍然相信，這個『為人民服務的民選政府』終有一天必將降臨香港。」鄒又說，獄中數年他努力讀書、修身修心，雖不知何時重獲自由，但盼出獄時能自豪說：「這些年我都沒有枉過。」</p> +<p>【獨媒報導】初選案今早判刑，不認罪的前記者何桂藍被判囚7年。何在判刑後於Facebook專頁以中、英文發文，回顧自己由2019年反修例運動至接受審訊時的所思所想。她形容，自己所參與的2020年的民主派初選是「香港最後一次自由公正的選舉」，而她選擇不認罪，是為了捍衛61萬港人的政治表態。</p> -<h4 id="張可森以家庭為中心愛妻育兒">張可森：以家庭為中心、愛妻育兒</h4> +<p>何又說，痛苦很難，甚至不可能分擔，但意志則可以真正穿透牆內外；她相信無人可以定義「香港係咩」，但人人都可以拓闊「香港可以係咩」：「我嘅選擇同行動就係我對『香港可以係咩』嘅回答。」</p> -<p>至於張可森，其大律師伍頴珊指他屬「積極參加者」，他現正修讀中大文化研究博士學位，還柙期間父親離世、兒子出生，張對未能與妻子和兒子相處感到悲痛後悔。張亦親撰求情信，提及在獄中的30歲生日得以冷靜思過，如今他明白案中計劃一旦實行到底所衍生的嚴重性，並深刻反省，認為審議預算案是立法會議員的責任，關乎廣大市民生活，不應作為政治工具，亦不應藉此危害國安。張明白到當下的情況及懲處，是必須學會承擔的後果，盼能盡快完成博士學位，不負家人期盼：「當事情告一段落後，我將會以家庭作為人生中心，投入全副精神照顧高堂，並且一如我妻愛我般愛我妻，與她協力養育兒子成人。」</p> +<p>在初選中參選新界東選區的何桂藍曾任職記者，在初選案中受審後被裁定罪成。法官在判辭形容，何是「擁有最激進政見的參與者之一」，何參選是望將香港現行制度「連根拔起」、反對「一國兩制」，無疑意圖令特區陷入完全停頓並「破局」。何沒有任何求情陳詞，法官考慮其角色後，以7年監禁為量刑起點，並因她是受審後定罪及無求情，故沒有減刑，判囚7年。</p> -<h4 id="岑敖暉譴責過去言行盼回家與妻共度時光">岑敖暉：譴責過去言行、盼回家與妻共度時光</h4> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/RXnauhm.png" alt="image86" /> +▲ 初選案判刑日，法院外。</p> -<p>同提到反省和後悔的，包括參選超級區議會的岑敖暉。其求情信提到自還柙起自願進行單獨囚禁，經反思後，發現他過去參與政治背後的原因並非看起來那樣光采，他過去被憤怒充滿，有時更演變成仇恨或怨恨，驅使他作出某些政治行為、修辭和言論。岑說，妻子的愛令他慢慢意識到憤怒或仇恨，絕不能將他帶去任何美好、有建設性或充滿愛的地方，他明白以否決預算案作為政治手段，不僅嚴重破壞、干擾和阻撓人們生活及政府機關履行職能，亦會危害國安，離他當初的政治願景更遠。他譴責自己過去的言行，亦對還柙後無法再服務公眾、令他們失望，深深後悔和抱歉。</p> +<h4 id="何初選是香港最後一次自由公平的選舉-惟案件令人放棄民主希望">何：初選是香港「最後一次自由公平的選舉」 惟案件令人放棄民主希望</h4> -<p>岑指，與妻子分隔逾3年，但愛意無隨時間流逝而減退，反而日益深厚和強烈，「我現時內心每一刻最大的願望，就是回到我們一起建立的家，與她共度所有時光，這是我這個魯莽和愚蠢的人，對她無條件的愛和支持所能做的回報」。他又指，明白犯下嚴重罪行，長期監禁是無可避免，願接受其過錯帶來的所有後果，只望刑期不會剝奪他改過和向家人彌補過錯的機會。</p> +<p>在文中，何桂藍先用英文回顧自己對2019年反修例運動的印象。何說，她記得人們參與反修例運動，是因為目睹了不公和壓迫，從而生起無法阻擋的衝動去表態及抗爭，並渴望與彼此建立聯繫。於是，港人汲取過去的失敗，花額外的努力進行溝通，小心翼翼不讓謠言從內部撕裂運動；而當社會制度一層接一層的崩潰，「我們超越恐懼，成為真正的公民社會，每個人都在實踐公民身份的真正含義。」</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/GWKlS5F.png" alt="image35" /> -▲ 岑敖暉</p> +<p>她續說，但當政權剝奪人們抗議的權利，「我哋」轉向另一條道路爭取回應，亦即選舉。她形容，自己參加的2020年的民主派初選，是香港「最後一次自由公平的選舉」；她因此被起訴，但選擇不認罪，是為了捍衛61萬投票港人的政治表態。她形容，本案是香港的轉捩點，「港人被恐嚇至沉默，被迫放棄民主的希望」。</p> -<h4 id="王百羽獄中瘦20公斤-感激家人不離不棄">王百羽獄中瘦20公斤 感激家人不離不棄</h4> +<p>何指，控方的指控不單是在「歪曲事實」，更在迫使被告否定過去的經歷，令團結、共同體、連繫、誠實的對話等等成為「烏托邦的夢想」，而非真實存在的事物。但她選擇對抗，以證明這些聯繫是已經實現並繼續存在；她過去的見證和經歷的事，構成和定義了她的身份，她要定義自己是誰。</p> -<p>同參選超區的王百羽，求情信則感激家人不離不棄，形容他們是「天下間最好的父母」、「家人是我最珍視的寶物」，又指疫情期間未能親自照料，只能獨自擔心卻無能為力，令他很大反思，「我非常渴望能早日回家、擁抱家人，好好地盡孝道，孝順父母。」辯方讀出求情信和談及其家人時，王百羽雙眼通紅，數度以手和紙巾拭淚。</p> +<h4 id="何歷史係自由有意志嘅人書寫">何：歷史係自由有意志嘅人書寫</h4> -<p>大律師黃俊嘉又指，王來自勞動階層，是家中第一名入讀大學的成員，父母對他非常自豪。他畢業於科大計算機科學及工程學系，從事資訊科技工作，2019年當選元朗區議員，會議出席率100%，並因繁重工作壓力巨大，患有高血壓，需服藥控制，王對因本案而無法服務居民感到深深抱歉。辯方指王還柙3年，體重減了20公斤，望獲釋後繼續以其專業服務社會。</p> +<p>何桂藍在文章後段轉用中文，講述她對痛苦和自由的理解。她認為，痛苦很難，甚至不可能分擔，但意志則可以真正穿透牆內外。她又指，苦難令「我哋」的共同體出現，但無法成長，因此每個個體都要思考「自己本身想點」，選擇和承擔自由。</p> -<h4 id="劉頴匡如知參選入獄不會參加">劉頴匡：如知參選入獄不會參加</h4> +<p>她說，「歷史唔係由贏者書寫，而係自由有意志嘅人書寫」，又指無人可以定義「香港係咩」，但人人都可以拓闊「香港可以係咩」：「係，會遇到好多限制同阻力，但正正係喺同現實碰撞先會知自己咩料，透過反覆嘅自我懷疑，先會淬煉出真正嘅執著。」</p> -<p>沒有律師代表的劉頴匡，則指他參選目的是望進入立會，為像他一樣以暴動罪被捕的示威者發聲，否決預算案對他來說並非重點、也不重要，他亦曾表明不相信35+是可能。劉庭上讀出女友黃于喬撰寫的求情信，黃指以劉的天資和才能，本能走一條「正常」的路，但他選擇從政，非為一己私利，而是出於對社會關懷、對民主化追求、望為港貢獻，不料因本案身陷囹圄，「人生最黃金時期」於獄中渡過。黃指與劉相識十年，當中3年多隔着監獄高牆，而她仍每日風雨不改探望，正因不認為他是「作奸犯科、偷呃拐騙」的罪犯，而是值得她繼續關心和付出的人。黃又指，劉過去未曾妄想顛覆國家，而無論現在或將來，他亦不再是當初天真的少年，不再妄想能投身政治改變社會、不會再沾邊任何可能被定性為危害國安的行為，只盼盡快重獲自由。</p> +<h3 id="專訪吳政亨我以傻為榮">專訪吳政亨：我以「傻」為榮</h3> -<p>劉亦呈上親撰的求情信，提到被教導成為一個關心和參與社會的好公民，並盡力做好自己的角色，但最後卻入獄。他指自2013投身社區服務，相信透過基層服務和倡議可令心愛的城市變得更好。劉自言認罪是因他承認知悉並同意戴耀廷提出的議程，但此議程從非他競選的重點，而他真誠相信初選不違法，如果知道參加初選會入獄，「我不會參加，而是選擇其他方式令社會變得更好」。劉最後指，他現時30歲，服刑不僅是懲罰他，亦是懲罰他所愛的人，對一直照顧自己的女友感到愧疚。他明白除政治外有很多其他方式貢獻社會，望能盡快履行作為男友和香港公民的責任。</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/oyXqNUW.png" alt="image87" /></p> -<h4 id="伍健偉稱無悔長夜終盡黎明將至民主終將再次得勝">伍健偉稱無悔：長夜終盡，黎明將至，民主終將再次得勝</h4> +<p>【獨媒報導】歷時三年半，這宗《國安法》實施後最大規模的案件終於判刑。最初被指為案件「重要份子」之一的「三投三不投」發起人吳政亨，被判囚7年3個月。</p> -<p>有被告表明無悔，亦為五大訴求作出辯護，不過被法官打斷指屬政治演說。沒有律師代表、自行陳詞的前天水連線元朗區議員伍健偉，<a href="https://www.inmediahk.net/node/社運/【初選47人案】伍健偉親自陳情確認無悔意-選擇留港兌現承諾-與港人齊上齊落">提到「35+計劃」是在陽光底下進行、眾所周知的計劃</a>，要達致進入立法會無差別否決財政預算案，單靠47個被告無可能完成，而是需要廣大香港市民的授權，當時61萬市民冒法律風險投票，作為代議士有責任保護市民。伍又說，「五大訴求」合情合理、無被法庭裁定違法，政府是「不為」而非「不能」，惟法官打斷指並非表達政見場合。（<a href="https://www.inmediahk.net/node/社運/【初選47人案】伍健偉陳情全文：長夜終盡，黎明將至，民主終將再次得勝">伍健偉求情信全文</a>）</p> +<p>「Hope for the best, prepare for the worst.」判刑前一周，在荔枝角收押所待了逾三年半的吳政亨一臉淡定，兩三句交待近況後，反問起探訪者的日常。印象之中，這幾年間他一直如此，甚少顯露負面情緒，也從未抱怨鐵窗內的生活。最大的變化，是瘦了差不多15公斤，幸好獄中規律的生活也令他健康狀況好轉。</p> -<p>伍續說，暴動是人民無被聽見的聲音，案發時街頭激烈衝突已持續長時間，他不希望有人受傷、被捕，甚至犧牲生命，因此參與初選，認為有義務繼承他們信念。他被捕前無打算離開香港，願為過去所有言行負責，但他不會為與選民所共享的信念和價值道歉，不可辜負人民信任。</p> +<p>過去三年，《獨媒》與這名在政圈中「完完全全的無名氏」保持聯絡，了解他的成長經歷、政治啟蒙、獄中生活等等。吳政亨提到，自己在1997年前已隨家人移民澳洲，成年後才回到香港工作，並因2014年雨傘運動而對這地方改觀。</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/Y6ZKdca.png" alt="image36" /> -▲ 伍健偉</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/UUd5EhP.png" alt="image88" /> +▲ 吳政亨從獄中寄出的部分信件。</p> -<p>法官李運騰問，伍健偉是否沒有悔意？伍答「無錯」，指作為政治人物，期許自己要有承擔、竭盡所能，留守到最後一刻，「所以我並唔後悔，我選擇留喺香港，我需要兌現我莊嚴嘅承諾，同香港人齊上齊落」。伍指未來打算放低政治人物身分，但仍望盡力留在香港貢獻社會，並引前終審法官包致金指：「There is no reason to leave if things are good, and if things are bad, there are more reasons to stay.」</p> +<p>入獄之後，他一度自學法律，並且選擇不認罪。可曾覺得自己有點「傻」？吳反問「傻」的定義：「對我嚟講，『傻』只係代表『唔計到盡』同埋『唔自私』。係呢個定義之下，我認我係『傻』，我亦為自己嘅『傻』而覺得光榮。某程度上，我亦希望呢個世界多啲呢種『傻』人。」</p> -<p>伍又說，港人只要抱持自救互助精神，理性思考，行公義、好憐憫、存謙卑的心，記錄過去真相，活在真實的當下，為未來做好真誠的準備，香港未來將重拾光明，香港人的理想定會實現。他最後說，絕對權力必帶來絕對腐敗，「長夜終盡，黎明將至，民主終將再次得勝。」法官陳慶偉最後指，由於伍較遲認罪和沒有悔意，減刑折扣明顯會較他人少，伍表示完全明白。</p> +<p>他明言，至今從未為自己的抉擇而後悔：「我真心相信呢件係正確嘅事，係我想做嘅事，亦係我需要做嘅事。當一個人真心地有呢種信念時，其實要堅持並不困難。」</p> -<h4 id="余慧明仍信投票改秩序無錯唯一錯誤或太愛香港">余慧明：仍信投票改秩序無錯、唯一錯誤或「太愛香港」</h4> +<p>（編按：吳政亨在初選案中選擇不認罪，今年5月被裁定罪成。法官稱，留意到在《國安法》實施後，吳仍繼續擁護「攬炒」思想，即破壞政府的職能，以讓政府遵守五大訴求；另外，吳還願意繼續推動計劃，並向他人施壓，確保初選獲勝的人才可以參選立法會。吳更在《蘋果日報》刊登廣告，敦促初選落敗者不要參選立法會。</p> -<p>參選衞生服務界的余慧明，求情信提及一切源自2019年反修例運動，當時100萬港人和平上街反修例，聲音卻不獲聆聽，引致激烈的街頭抗爭。余指不欲再看到示威者再犧牲和被捕，加上政府未能預防新冠疫情爆發，故望參選立法會，增加議價能力，改變死局，但此舉被指控為顛覆國家政權，是其他民主國家聞所未聞。</p> +<p>法官認為，吳屬於「積極參加者」，並以7年半監禁作為起點。法官考慮到，吳並非追求個人利益，而計劃亦不涉暴力。法官接納吳可能受戴耀廷誤導計劃合法性，因此給予3個月減刑。由於吳不認罪，亦沒有其他扣減，因此判囚7年3個月。）</p> -<p>余續說，法庭裁決提到「五大訴求」是空中樓閣，但當中包括落實《基本法》承諾的雙普選，反問「如果政府視落實《基本法》23條是憲制責任，難道落實雙普選不是一樣嗎？」，又指「即使到現在，我仍然認為透過在立法會投票，改變既定秩序並沒有錯，或許我唯一犯下的錯誤，就是我太愛香港。」法官陳慶偉聞言亦打斷，指這並非求情信，是政治演說，着辯方不要在其法庭發表，又指看不到任何悔意。辯方一度指，本案涉及政治，如被告對所做的表達悔意，或被人質疑他們信念是否真誠，法官陳慶偉則說：那就不要求情，你不用求情，那沒有問題。」</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/KFikAXv.png" alt="image89" /> +▲ 2024年11月19日，澳洲駐港總領事Gareth Williams到法院旁聽初選案判刑，並向傳媒稱到庭是為了支持澳洲公民吳政亨。</p> -<p>代表余慧明的大律師石書銘亦陳詞指，余是年輕、有同情心的理想主義者，她大學時以醫療服務為志業，先後成為註冊護士和深切治療部護士，再轉到醫管局總部工作，望令更多病人受惠。石指，余組織工會和參選僅為服務公眾，她一直倡以非暴力和合法手段向政府施壓，惟本案後很大機會不能再任護士，已付出代價。而余所屬的衞生服務界與其他區不同，沒有協調會議和論壇、亦無討論35+後要做什麼，余基本上獨自行事，屬「積極參加者」較低級別或「其他參加者」。</p> +<h4 id="1997年前移民澳洲-視香港為功利社會">1997年前：移民澳洲 視香港為功利社會</h4> -<h4 id="袁嘉蔚獄中成婚馮達浚向泛民等道歉">袁嘉蔚獄中成婚、馮達浚向泛民等道歉</h4> +<p>入獄那年，吳政亨42歲，現在是46歲。在2021年1月6日被捕之前，並沒有太多人聽過他的名字，皆因他並非初選參加者，亦沒有政黨背景，僅僅因為曾發起「三投三不投」，在新聞報道中出現過一兩次。</p> -<p>至於袁嘉蔚，其代表資深大律師祁志指她是年輕的理想主義者，一生為人善良、樂於助人，對社會有抱負，任田灣區議員；而她的人生因被還柙而改寫，如今正在更生的路上，最近更在獄中成婚，望及早服刑完畢組織家庭。祁志又指，袁參選是望取得合法權力，《國安法》生效後不久已被DQ，參與程度低，亦真誠相信行為是合法。</p> +<p>據吳自述，他在香港出生，本身從事金融業。他既是香港公民，亦持澳洲國籍——1992年，他讀完中二後便隨家人移民澳洲，離開的原因和許多香港人一樣，因為三年前在中國發生的那一件大事。</p> -<p>祁志同代表馮達浚，形容他是理想主義者，畢業自拔萃男書院，受雨傘運動觸動服務社區，2019年參選區議員失敗，但繼續懷有理想為社區工作付出所有，他不是街頭抗爭者、也不暴力，只是一個熱心和幼稚的年輕人。馮亦撰求情信，指自己還柙3年已反省和改變，現時已不在意特首會否下台，並望向他曾經非常不禮貌對待的泛民、他的團隊、家人等道歉，對困擾社會感到後悔。馮亦獲浸大新聞系前高級講師呂秉權等撰求情信，指他對干犯《國安法》感後悔。</p> +<p>年少的吳政亨享受澳洲的生活方式，也不太留戀香港。他說不喜歡香港那種「功利」的感覺，無論是事業、才能、讀書、揀偶，一切都仿佛是以錢作為量度標準。</p> -<h4 id="李嘉達難再任社工黃子悅真誠誤信合法">李嘉達難再任社工、黃子悅真誠誤信合法</h4> +<p>強調自己討厭「功利」的吳政亨，畢業後卻投身進金融行業。他解釋，自己讀書時主修數學和精算，結果被一份對沖基金交易員（Hudge Fund Trader）的招聘廣告吸引住目光：「所要嘅能力同興趣，好似為我度身訂造咁。」</p> -<p>就前觀塘區議員李嘉達，大律師陳德昌認為他屬「積極參加者」較低級別，望以3年至6年半為量刑起點。陳指李在內地出生，3歲時來港定居，在工人階層家庭成長，港大社工系畢業後成註冊社工，並進修表達藝術治療碩士學位。2019年，李目睹年青人感無力沮喪，遂決定成為區議員，望影響更多人；當選後望投身更大政治舞台改變現況，遂參與初選，事後回看屬錯誤。</p> +<p>他形容，這份工作就如「職業賭徒」，也忙碌得足以佔據他每日的24小時。2008年，他因工作需要而回到香港，而當時對香港的印象仍然是「功利」——直到2014年，這個印象才徹底扭轉。</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/oo7lNrX.png" alt="image37" /> -▲ 李嘉達</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/8Irzp9O.png" alt="image90" /> +▲ 2002年，吳政亨在澳洲新南威爾斯大學畢業。（圖由受訪者提供）</p> -<p>辯方呈上41封來自李本人、女友、家人、老師、服務對象等求情信，指李還柙逾3年已付上代價，其女友曾提議結婚，但他望對方等待自己出獄，以辦正式婚禮，還柙期間其祖母亦離世。而李被定罪後難再任社工，但有非政府機構願在李獲釋後聘請他。陳德昌最後提到，當天與李會面時，李提及自兩年前認罪後，一直未有離開過赤柱監獄，他當天往法院途上，看到外面樹木翠綠、陽光燦爛、天空蔚藍，一切令人提起精神。陳德昌指感到驚訝，因自己不時會到赤柱，卻從沒留意，並指李已改變，他表明會離開政治，邁向人生新階段，繼續服務社會。李庭上聞言一度流下眼淚。</p> +<h4 id="2014年金鐘的眼淚">2014年：金鐘的眼淚</h4> -<p>而就黃子悅，大律師潘志明指她是本案最年輕的被告，雖在理大暴動案保釋期間犯本案，但兩案時間相近，望法庭考慮整體量刑原則，部分刑期分期執行，又指她真誠誤信計劃合法，非刻意犯法，屬「積極參加者」。至於朱凱廸，辯方指採納書面陳詞，沒有補充。</p> +<p>吳政亨說，2014年不完全是自己的政治啟蒙。在這之前，他會思考政治、會思考對與錯，會思考公民的權利和義務；不過，他甚少與至親以外的人談論政見，亦曾經以為香港人對政治不感興趣，因而覺得「搵錢更實際」。</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/BHnSZim.png" alt="image38" /> -▲ 黃子悅</p> +<p>2014年9月28日，吳政亨在金鐘流下許多眼淚。他說當下才發現：「原來一直以來，膚淺而功利嘅係我自己，唔係香港人。」後來一段日子，他下班後總會步行到金鐘，為自修室裡的學生補習數學，週末則會去「瞓馬路」。</p> -<h4 id="楊岳橋作為大律師犯法感難堪後悔未拒參與">楊岳橋：作為大律師犯法感難堪、後悔未拒參與</h4> +<p>如今的他承認，自己當時對社會運動的想法實在過於理想化。在「拆大台」、示威者衝擊立法會玻璃、退聯等連串事件發生之前，他還未意識到「和理非」和「勇武」、「泛民」和「本土」之間的紛爭，比想像中嚴重。打從這一個時間點起，他覺得自己需要、也可以「做一啲嘢」。</p> -<p>抗爭派以外，多名被告均是傳統民主派，曾參與政治和公共服務多年，亦獲不少前高官、議員等撰寫求情信。不少人表明，日後不會再從政。</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/CW1p2Ha.png" alt="image91" /> +▲ 吳政亨每次上庭，都有親友旁聽。圖為親友在過去三年半保存下來的部分旁聽籌。</p> -<p>公民黨共5人被控，當中李予信罪脫，鄭達鴻罪成，楊岳橋等3人則認罪。就時任黨魁楊岳橋，資深大律師蔡維邦指他90年代舉家移民加拿大，在當地大學畢業後，因熱愛中國文化歷史，在北京修讀法學碩士，2009年成為大律師，2016年當選立法會議員。蔡指從立法會投票紀錄可見，楊並非主張阻撓議會運作或立場激進的議員，而他被捕不久已退出公民黨，並籲公民黨解散。蔡又提到，楊早於2021年9月表達認罪意向，並在警方邀請下提供證人口供，顯示他完全的悔意。</p> +<h4 id="2019年連登仔李伯盧">2019年：「連登仔」李伯盧</h4> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/B7BdLRF.png" alt="image39" /> -▲ 楊岳橋</p> +<p>傘運之後，社運氣氛一度沉寂，直至2019年反修例運動爆發，香港翻天覆地改變。於是，吳政亨以網名「李伯盧」，在網上討論區連登開設帳戶——他笑言自己走在時代末端：「但如果有人以『連登仔』稱呼我嘅話，我會覺得係一個榮耀。」</p> -<p>楊又親撰求情信，稱作為一名大律師，為自己干犯刑事罪行感到難堪，並指從政原望令香港變得更好，但案發時受社會氣氛和政治理念相似的政治人物影響，他對反政府盲目和天真的熱情，令當時政治情況惡化。楊稱對未有拒絕參與否決預算案的謀劃感後悔，亦對其行為導致部分黨友參與此無望及錯誤的計劃，為他們及家人帶來巨大焦慮，感到非常抱歉，直言犯案是完全愚蠢和錯誤，他明白須接受懲罰。楊指日後不會再涉足公共事務，望法庭考慮他曾以其微小方式貢獻社會。</p> +<p>「李伯盧」取自英文單詞 liberal 的音譯。一年多之間，他發了超過80個帖文，主題多圍繞當下的社運和政治事件；2020年民主派初選期間，「李伯盧」亦發起「三不投」的倡議，呼籲選民參與聯署。</p> -<p>辯方認為，楊的量刑起點應為「積極參加者」3至10年刑期的中間。法官質疑為何不是最高級別，辯方回應，公民黨記者會在《國安法》生效前舉行，而雖然楊當時為黨魁，但他年資較淺，只是黨的發言人，不是黨內主要推手，惟法官表明不會接受這方面陳詞。</p> +<p>所謂的「三不投」是指：不投反對初選的人、不投不參與初選的人和不投在初選落選的人。這亦是被指控干犯「串謀顛覆國家政權」罪的主因。</p> -<h4 id="譚文豪向社會各界及中央政府真誠道歉">譚文豪：向社會各界及中央政府真誠道歉</h4> +<p>吳政亨坦承，當時並沒想過自己會因此而被捕——「但如果我被捕，只可能係因為《國安法》。因為我係奉公守法嘅一個人，一直做嘅嘢都係依法而行。」</p> -<p>至於譚文豪，資深大律師何沛謙同指他屬「積極參加者」，望法庭考慮他對香港的貢獻和真誠悔意而減刑。辯方求情指，譚出身草根，靠努力成為民航機師，2016年放棄機師工作從政，並非為個人名利或榮譽，也從沒有意圖成為激進政客，只想回饋社會，令香港成為更好的地方；譚過去亦曾多次贊成政府撥款，更獲政府官員私信感謝。辯方又指，譚辭任立法會議員和退黨後，已完全離開政壇，他還柙逾3年，望能建立新生活，望彌補與龍鳳胎子女、妻子和母親相處的時間。譚開設的茶餐廳於疫情結業，他正修讀會計和企業管理課程，望裝備自己尋找新職涯。</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/BywlF5c.png" alt="image92" /> +▲ 2020年6月，吳政亨設街站宣傳「三投三不投」。（資料圖片）</p> -<p>辯方又指，譚及早認罪，並於2021年下半年自願錄口供，提及如果知道會犯法，「我係絕對唔會參加呢個初選」，辯方強調他當時不知道「紅線」在哪裡，並非公然違法。庭上又讀出譚親撰的求情信，提及望向法庭表達，「我對過去的言行深感悔疚，希望公開向香港社會各界以及中央政府真誠道歉」。</p> +<h4 id="2021年顛覆認知後的反思">2021年：顛覆認知後的反思</h4> -<h4 id="郭家麒獲張超雄等撰求情信-指主張和平曾阻示威者衝擊">郭家麒獲張超雄等撰求情信 指主張和平曾阻示威者衝擊</h4> +<p>2021年1月6日，吳政亨和其餘52人被指因組織或參與民主派初選，涉嫌違反《港區國安法》被捕。他形容，當日清晨到其處所進行拘捕的國安處人員顯得隆重其事，甚至對於他登上警車後，仍沒有他被捕的新聞出現而感到驚奇。不過吳政亨當時心想：「傳媒報漏咗我呢啲二打六，有乜咁出奇？」</p> -<p>就郭家麒，資深大律師蔡維邦同指他是最早一批認罪被告，他有原則、願意奉獻、具同理心，無考慮「攬炒」亦不支持港獨，望以「積極參加者」較低程度為量刑起點。郭獲前運輸及房屋局副局長邱誠武、前立法會議員石禮謙及張超雄撰求情信，張指郭主張和平，2019年七一曾在立法會玻璃門前阻止示威者衝擊大樓，因而受傷，8月環球時報記者付國豪在機場被示威者綑綁和襲擊時，郭亦到場阻止。郭亦親撰求情信，提及出身草根，八十年代成為醫生，在學時目睹工人受傷，成立香港工人健康中心，奉獻空餘時間促進弱勢福祉。</p> +<p>兩天後他才知道，自己是案件中被歸納為組織及策劃的五名「重要份子」之一。如果不是整件事如此切身，他大概會忍唔住笑出聲——「唔 L 係呀嘛？」但當下他除了爆粗，已不知道該說甚麼。</p> -<p>辯方指，郭自1994年至2007年任中西區區議員，2004年當選立法會議員，曾獲委任為醫管局成員；而他在公民黨解散前已退黨，出獄後望繼續行醫，退出政治，沒有重犯機會，望法庭考慮他犯案完全與性格不符。不過法官不認同，質疑本案串謀持續多月，郭必然對參選作詳細考慮。</p> +<p>吳政亨形容，這件事顛覆了他對許多事情的認知，令他不得不重新再作思考。以家人為例，以前他們擔心他的安危、勸他保護好自己時，吳總是不太理會，認為他們過度憂慮；但被捕之後，他開始反思：會否家人才是旁觀者清？他有否自私地無視了家人的感受？</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/pfljZow.png" alt="image40" /> -▲ （資料圖片）</p> +<p>他沒有定論。還柙初期，來探望吳政亨的朋友不算太多，倒是家人反覆前來探望，令他覺得不好意思。他肯定自己做的許多事情，都不是家人所希望的：「但咁代唔代表，佢哋有權去阻止我做呢？我又唔覺得佢哋有權。」</p> -<h4 id="辯方指鄭達鴻僅跟黨立場">辯方指鄭達鴻僅跟黨立場</h4> +<p>「我愛我家人，我亦相信佢哋愛我。但我哋未必係以對方想要嘅方式去愛。而拒絕對方想要嘅方式去愛，算唔算自私呢？我答唔到。」</p> -<p>鄭達鴻是唯一一名並非立法會議員的公民黨罪成被告，資深大律師潘熙認為他屬「其他參加者」，指他角色相對輕微，只是跟從黨的立場，而他報名參選後被DQ，其後宣布退黨、自願停用社交媒體，亦無再參與政治事務，他誤信初選合法才犯案。潘熙又指，鄭曾任8年區議員，一直希望成為立法會議員，他參與涉案謀劃並非為個人私利，而是望服務公眾及改善基層生活，望法庭考慮他參與公共服務多年而減刑。</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/njqv0vt.png" alt="image93" /> +▲ 2021年3月3日，初選案首次提堂第三日早上，吳政亨（灰衫黑外套者）與同案被告劉澤鋒在荔枝角收押所步上警車，前往法院。（資料圖片）</p> -<h4 id="胡志偉尹兆堅獲前高官張炳良羅致光等撰求情信">胡志偉、尹兆堅獲前高官張炳良、羅致光等撰求情信</h4> +<h4 id="還柙前拍攝香港風景-入獄後發佈改詞作品">還柙前拍攝香港風景 入獄後發佈改詞作品</h4> -<p>民主黨則有4人被控，其中胡志偉和尹兆堅認罪，黃碧雲及林卓廷均被裁定罪成。就時任民主黨主席胡志偉，大律師郭子丰表示，胡最多只是「積極參加者」的較低級別，無證據他組織涉案謀劃，只是透過參與論壇、街站等作和應，而他於論壇曾反問難道「起醫院、起學校我哋都要反對咩」，顯示他當時對「攬炒」和無差別否決財案有保留。</p> +<p>同年2月28日，包括吳政亨在內的47名被捕者被正式落案起訴，罪名是「串謀顛覆國家政權」。經過一連四天馬拉松式聆訊，他和大多數被告的保釋申請均被拒絕，須即時還柙。後來吳政亨再申請保釋覆核亦遭拒絕，直至判刑日，他在荔枝角收押所還柙逾1,350天。</p> -<p>辯方又指，胡參與公共政治事務逾30年，獲前運房局局長張炳良、副局長邱誠武及前勞福局局長羅致光3人撰寫求情信，指胡溫和、理性、務實，以人民和社會的最大利益為先，他亦曾獲政府頒授榮譽勳章及委任加入中央政策組等，顯示政府視他為可靠的人。辯方指，根據胡的背景、品格和多年政治信念，他並非蓄意危害國安的激進政治人物，案發時真誠誤信運用否決權屬合法；又指謀劃成功的機會極微，因民主黨議員對預算案如何投票無最終決定權。</p> +<p>被捕後至還柙前的一段日子，吳政亨如常地生活，只是多了到香港不同地方拍攝風景。他開始研究攝影，想趁尚有自由，留下多些紀錄和紀念。</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/JW6ZXqa.png" alt="image41" /> -▲ （資料圖片）</p> +<p>他還在網上發佈了以被捕一事為靈感的改詞作品《初選被拉的岑敖暉與關尚義》。原本是隨便寫寫，沒想到許多人因此誤以為他喜歡研究歌詞，寫信給他時紛紛附上各式各樣的歌詞——吳附上一個滴汗的笑哈哈公仔，「澄清」他其實較喜歡自己作詞，也因為怕在潛意識裡抄襲了他人風格，故從不敢太仔細研究別人的作品。</p> -<p>至於尹兆堅，大律師莫彥婷指他無出席選舉論壇、無簽署「墨落無悔」，他投身公共服務近20年，1994年成為註冊社工，2004年起四度當選區議員，2016年當選立法會議員，曾成功爭取殘疾人士2元乘車優惠和長者生活津貼等。而尹是出色的廚師，出獄後打算於國際人權組織「世界中央廚房」任職。尹另獲前勞工及福利局局長蕭偉強、羅致光，及前運輸及房屋局局長張炳良撰求情信，指他熱心勢助弱勢，可信有禮、和平理性，就勞工福利政等策有良好交流。</p> +<p>在澳洲生活時，他曾為自己的樂隊和獨立歌手寫詞，亦有為當地教會寫原創音樂劇，後來因為工作太忙碌，才逐漸放下這項興趣。不過在還柙期間，他先後透過關注組發佈兩曲，包括《聖誕應該快樂》和《上杉達也》。兩首歌均由吳的牆外朋友作曲，再以「0243」填詞法將旋律交給吳，讓他在未能「聽」到旋律的情況下填詞。</p> -<h4 id="辯方指林卓廷黃碧雲屬其他參加者">辯方指林卓廷、黃碧雲屬「其他參加者」</h4> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/zyBBPMx.png" alt="image94" /> +▲ 吳政亨入獄前使用的手機殼，表面開始發霉，其中一角亦已剝落。</p> -<p>林卓廷和黃碧雲則同由大律師沈士文代表，沈指二人沒有出席任何協調會議、無簽署「墨落無悔」、政綱無提否決預算案，參與程度低，屬「其他參加者」。他並指，二人定罪是因胡志偉的言論，以及從林卓廷搜出的論壇筆記，及黃碧雲在選舉論壇的發言。但針對後者，沈指她是在論壇被激進派「逼到牆角」，受壓下才提及否決預算案。</p> +<h4 id="獄中讀小說自學法律-做運動改善健康">獄中讀小說自學法律 做運動改善健康</h4> -<p>就兩人背景，沈指林卓廷是傳統民主黨黨員，從不激進，而民主黨支持一國兩制和香港回歸中國，亦常與政府合作。林曾任區議員和立法會議員，推動「反圍標」運動，獲受助居民撰求情信，投票紀錄也顯示他非常勤奮，贊成多於反對。林亦獲民主黨前主席何俊仁、劉慧卿等撰求情信。</p> +<p>除了填（作）詞，吳政亨還有數不清的興趣。從睇波打高爾夫球滑雪，到唱歌辯論捉棋都喜歡，不過他最喜歡的是思考。曾有人寄了一道號稱「史上最難邏輯題」給他，讓他和囚友花上好幾天，才成功解謎。</p> -<p>至於黃碧雲是加州大學洛杉磯分校政治科學博士，曾於理大任多年講師，2012起任九西立法會議員，2020年立會選舉延期後無被DQ，但自願辭職，無再參與政治。前運輸及房屋局局長張炳良等為黃撰寫求情信，指她屬2019年「對抗式政治」的受害者，犯案與本性不符；又指2010年政改方案獲黃支持下通過，顯示她溫和務實，望香港循序漸進實現民主化，她在撥款議案亦與政府合作。</p> +<p>而他入獄後「解鎖」的新興趣，是讀小說和做運動。還柙期間，他在獄中沒有工作，每天不斷看書和思考（貼切啲其實是「發吽哣」）。從前，他較常看工具書或實用性書籍，但入獄後看多了小說，陳浩基、沈從文、朱少麟、Michael Lewis⋯⋯「可能是因為看書時可以抽離一下現實，不用面對眼前的四堵牆。」</p> -<h4 id="梁國雄雖成階下囚但毋怨堅信人民大於國家">梁國雄：雖成階下囚但毋怨、堅信人民大於國家</h4> +<p>除了小說，他也讀歷史、法律、哲學、漫畫等等。之所以會讀法律書，是因為吳政亨在入獄初期一度想過自辯。沒法律底子的他托律師朋友送入基礎書籍和案例文件，從零開始學習。可法律畢竟是一門專業，那段時間一問起他的學習情況，他就鄒眉說要看漫畫「減壓」，最終還是選擇了聘請律師應付審訊。</p> -<p>至於社民連，岑子杰認罪，梁國雄則被裁罪成。就梁國雄，資深大律師潘熙採納書面陳詞，社民連則在Facebook發布梁國雄的陳情書，梁提到自70年代起參與政治運動和社會抗爭，是出於改變社會不公的願望，他從沒放棄爭取民主自由、實現社會主義，「一路走來近50年，黑髮變白頭，長毛成短毛，自由人淪為階下囚，我都是秉持這個理念行事」。</p> +<p>至於運動方面，因為獄中可做的事有限，吳像許多囚友般開始健身。除了在放風時段踢毽或跑步，他也會做掌上壓和仰臥起坐等訓練，成功減去近15公斤。獄中生活規律，他的健康狀況亦有好轉。入獄之前，他的血液內肝酵素經常超標，但在獄中體檢時已經回復正常。</p> -<p>梁指參與35+初選是因多年切身體驗，必須在立法會中與志同道合者取得過半數議席，才有足夠壓力令政府推行惠及民生的社會政策，而「五大訴求」中實行雙普選更是其身體力行多年的目標。梁又指，認為議員否決預算案乃《基本法》訂明的憲制權力，行政長官面臨下台的憲制危機，必須經歷兩次立法會選舉的民意授權，議員兩次行使否決權是民意依歸，只是彰顯200萬遊行市民民意。</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/xMip1tR.png" alt="image95" /> +▲ 還柙期間，吳政亨一度因鎖骨斷裂，要入院進行手術。事後，他的肩膊位置多了一條數厘米長的疤痕。圖為他曾在獄中閱讀的《沈從文短篇小說選》。</p> -<p>梁最後指，「權力歸於人民」是他終生信守的理念，從政的基礎，更是《中國憲法》對人民的莊嚴承諾，「今天我雖然成為階下囚，但我毋怨。我堅信人民大於國家，人權高於政權，惟願港人莫失莫忘，爭取民主，守護公義！」</p> +<h4 id="初期探訪者不多-榮幸與政治犯以朋友相稱">初期探訪者不多 榮幸與「政治犯」以朋友相稱</h4> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/WYjohAp.png" alt="image42" /> -▲ 岑子杰、梁國雄</p> +<p>獄中生活規律，吳政亨每日的作息都是重複的：早上7時起床，然後放風、食早餐，拜山（親友探訪），食午餐，發呆，食晚餐，踢竇，檢查緊急鐘，晚上10時關燈睡覺。</p> -<h4 id="岑子杰獲區諾軒撰求情信">岑子杰獲區諾軒撰求情信</h4> +<p>在期望管理下，他不覺得鐵窗生活真的很苦，「人生嘅嘢，好又係咁過，唔好又係咁過」。但唯一一次他顯得有點失落，是提起沒太多朋友到收押所探訪他的時候。他坦言，本來身邊政見不同的朋友就比政見相同的多，而入獄之後，來探訪他的人也不多——大概是想避免和他有接觸。</p> -<p>就岑子杰，大律師郭憬憲認為其罪責屬最輕，並讀出區諾軒撰寫的求情信，提及望法庭考慮岑的政治取向輕判，指岑是九西協調會議上反對無差別否決預算案的關鍵人物，對於阻止無差別否決成為該區共識具決定性作用。區又形容岑是非暴力的人，在2019年組織公眾活動時與警方合作。</p> +<p>入獄初期，吳亦曾在親友探訪時段時發脾氣：「但後來發現，當一啲當時本來已唔情唔願嘅人，終於唔再勉強或装扮，真正離開我嘅生命之後，我嘅心情反而平復咗落嚟。」時至今日，他自認為情緒比入獄前想像的好，並形容在獄中最大的得著，是認識許多新朋友，包括同案或其他政治案件的被告。</p> -<h4 id="辯方倡譚得志為其他參加者">辯方倡譚得志為「其他參加者」</h4> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/NpKdY5A.png" alt="image96" /> +▲ 作為「公眾人物」，吳政亨在幾年間一直被獨立囚禁，與一般囚友交集不多。（資料圖片）</p> -<p>至於人民力量，時任主席陳志全，大律師馬維騉指他沒有出席初選記者會，也無參與協調會議，屬「積極參加者」較低程度。他又指，陳獲其妹妹、配偶及前政府官員撰求情信，望法庭考慮他是一名勤奮盡責的立法會議員，積極替性小眾利益發聲。</p> +<h4 id="不原諒從犯證人-拒認罪因堅信自己無犯法">不原諒從犯證人 拒認罪因堅信自己無犯法</h4> -<p>就時任副主席快必譚得志，大律師梁寶琳主張他是「其他參加者」，指他雖有簽署「墨落無悔」，但擺街站、參與論壇，呼籲投票等是一般選舉會做的事；又強調初選是開放予所有人參加的民主選舉，譚主動參與不構成他屬「積極參加」。</p> +<p>這段時間讓吳政亨最傷心、最難以接受，是知道有同案被告任控方證人的時候。他說無法原諒他們：「我亦自信我有資格去講呢句『唔原諒』。」</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/bzvRD70.png" alt="image43" /> -▲ 陳志全、譚得志</p> +<p>（編按：除了戴耀廷，案中其餘三名組織者，區諾軒、趙家賢及鍾錦麟均選擇擔任「從犯證人」。法官指，區的證供屬「關鍵（crucial）」，趙的證供亦協助法庭達成裁決，三人最終各獲減免45%至50%刑期。）</p> -<p>辯方又指，譚擁有基督教研究和神學兩個碩士學位，曾任電台主持逾20年，而他被捕後已退出人民力量，在初選亦只排名第四，再沒有機會重返政壇，他還柙逾3年已付上代價；作為基督徒的他，現在每天都讀《懺悔錄》，嘗試學習和懺悔。</p> +<p>在初選案中，吳選擇不認罪。他透過關注組發表文章，講述自己在認罪與不認罪之間的考慮和猶疑；他說要考慮的因素太多，包括勝算、刑期、社會關注、個人生理及心理質素等；但他亦因為「絕對不認為」自己犯了罪，因此「我恐懼，但我不退」。</p> -<h4 id="施德來已退出民協何啟明盼專注教會事奉">施德來已退出民協、何啟明盼專注教會事奉</h4> +<p>關於堅持的動力，他沒有確實答案。「如果你問我，我係唔係自細都係一個事事都好堅持嘅人，我可以講你知，一定唔係。細個讀書，有興趣啲科我會考得好好，但無興趣嘅科我可以考到不知所謂。」</p> -<p>至於民協，就時任主席施德來，大律師黃廷光指他是註冊社工，育有一名9歲兒子，2008年加入民協，2016年當選黃大仙區議員及成為民協主席，不同政府部門曾發信表揚他的貢獻，而他本案後已辭任主席和退出民協，亦無法再任社工，抱負破滅。辯方指他於獄中報讀都大心理學課程，望裝備自己，服刑完畢後以其他崗位貢獻社會，屬「積極參加者」的中至低級別。</p> +<p>「如果要我估，點解自己會堅持到，我認為係因為我做呢個決定，係經過深思熟慮嘅：唔係意氣用事，唔係為勢所逼，亦唔係為攞一時嘅鎂光燈。可以好肯定講，我無後悔過，亦相信我永遠唔會後悔律政司所指控我所做過嘅行為。我真誠相信，我所做嘅嘢無犯法。我正在盡全力希望喺法庭內證明呢一點。」</p> -<p>至於時任副主席何啟明，大律師阮偉明望判監3年以下。他指何出身草根，為虔誠基督徒，以基督精神幫助貧窮和有需要人士，他2015年加入民協，被捕後持續服務社區，包括跟進保育深水埗主教山配水庫。何過去數年在神學院修讀基督教研究碩士課程，本案後打算遠離政治，專注教會事奉。辯方又呈上何父母、兄弟、女友、前民協主席馮檢基等求情信，馮指對何服務弱勢社群的熱情和投入印象深刻。阮偉明望法庭接納，何本質上是一個好人，他出於良好動機、具高尚目的而犯案，望成為立法會議員，令香港成為更好的地方，現已對行為深切反省。</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/CB92KIw.png" alt="image97" /> +▲ 2024年6月26日，初選案第二個求情日，吳政亨在庭上向律師團隊提供指示。</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/XynzUdq.png" alt="image44" /> -▲ （資料圖片）</p> +<p>毋用過份悲觀 無人能預知未來</p> -<h4 id="吳敏兒犯案是人生最大錯誤與政治劃清界線">吳敏兒：犯案是人生最大錯誤、與政治劃清界線</h4> +<p>「有沒有後悔」這道問題，我久不久就會問他一遍，生怕他的答案會隨時間改變。不過，他的說法始終如一。至於是否值得，他反問：「我自己覺得值得唔夠咩？點解要理人點睇？」</p> -<p>前職工盟主席吳敏兒，資深大律師李志喜指她在初選落敗，是新界西其中一個最不成功的候選人，而她落敗後繼續工會工作，協助工人渡過疫情，與政治劃清界線，職工盟亦已解散，不會重犯，望法庭考慮她為「其他參加者」或「積極參加者」。</p> +<p>在初選案裁決前，過去幾年所有涉及《國安法》的案件，定罪率是100%。再加上認罪可扣減三份一刑期的前提下，選擇不認罪、拒絕否定過去的自己，是否有點「傻」？喜歡辯論的吳政亨，首先反問「傻」的定義：「首先我假設『傻』係『理智』嘅相反啦。但我發覺，太多人講嘅所謂『理智』，其實同『自私』差别唔大。」</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/gWQbbiv.png" alt="image45" /> -▲ 吳敏兒</p> +<p>「對我嚟講，『傻』只係代表『唔計到盡』同埋『唔自私』。係呢個定義之下，我認我係『傻』，我亦為自己嘅『傻』而覺得光榮。某程度上，我亦希望呢個世界多啲呢種『傻』人。」</p> -<p>吳又親撰求情信，提到曾擔任空中服務員，成立英航香港機艙服務員工會，並於2016年當選職工盟主席，夢想有更好的勞工法律保障工人權益。吳自言參選僅望推動社會進步，令工人能分享經濟成果，從沒意圖顛覆國家，她被捕始知干犯《國安法》，對此感到震驚，形容犯案是「人生最大的錯誤」，就此真誠致歉。</p> +<p>身處獄中的人總是在猜想未來。誰能夠保釋？誰最早出獄？最長的刑期有多長？⋯⋯至2024年11月19日，歷時近四年的初選案終有判刑結果。法官以7年半為量刑起點，以誤解法律為由減刑3個月，判處吳政亨監禁7年3個月。若扣減還柙日子，吳料會在2028年出獄。</p> -<h4 id="范國威獲黃宏發撰求情信譚凱邦不再倡環保議題">范國威獲黃宏發撰求情信、譚凱邦不再倡環保議題</h4> +<p>他日離開狹窄的囚室，他希望見到一個怎樣的香港？吳政亨的答法很「李伯盧」。他保持著一種對未來開放的「liberal」想法，並盼大家不要過份悲觀：「好多人傾向假定現況會不斷永續，老士啲講句，變幻才是永恆。」</p> -<p>新民主同盟的范國威，大律師吳靄儀指范在美國修讀藝術，對政治感興趣，自2000年起擔任21年西貢區議員，並曾任立法會議員6年。范獲西貢區議會前主席吳仕福、前立法局主席黃宏發及多名街坊撰求情信，讚揚他務實無私，對地區民生很大貢獻。其女兒亦形容他為「每個女生所能渴求的最好的父親」。辯方指范望將本案一切抛諸腦後，與家人相處，望視他為「其他參加者」或「積極參加者」較低程度。</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/kEUNPuw.png" alt="image98" /></p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/h4cTmVT.png" alt="image46" /> -▲ 范國威（右二）、譚凱邦（右一）</p> +<h3 id="陳寶瑩呢個係冤獄一日都唔應該坐">陳寶瑩：呢個係冤獄，一日都唔應該坐</h3> -<p>同屬新民主同盟、並創辦「環保觸覺」的譚凱邦，大律師馬維騉指，譚曾任兩屆馬灣區議員，他一直視環保議題為首要議程，參與初選目的並非顛覆政府，而是望進入議會，為環保發聲，並獲前天文台台長林超英等撰求情信，肯定他對環保議題的付出。辯方又指，譚在初選屬「陪跑」，於新西初選得票最低，望考慮他參與程度低，屬「其他參加者」或「積極參加者」較低程度。</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/38oFW3Y.png" alt="image99" /></p> -<p>辯方又指，譚還柙期間修讀建築管理課程，決心不會重返政治，包括不再倡環保議題，以免牽涉政治；又指譚還柙期間受感染，手腳皮膚潰爛，望法庭能基於人道原因酌情減刑。</p> +<p>【獨媒報導】初選47人案今早判刑，被定罪的45人刑期由50個月至120個月不等。一眾被告家屬及親友難掩悲痛，其中「長毛」梁國雄判囚81個月，其太太、社民連主席陳寶瑩在近11時在警方護送下離開法庭，她表示「呢個係冤獄，一日都唔應該坐」，並一度哽咽，又認為只要所做的事是合情合法合理，都不應被恐懼嚇怕。</p> -<h4 id="毛孟靜望與丈夫度時光">毛孟靜望與丈夫度時光</h4> +<p>陳寶瑩在法庭外被警方包圍下高呼：「想講都冇得講，呢個係冤獄嚟！」她之後在較空曠地方向記者表示，對判刑早有準備，沒有驚喜及驚嚇，但認為「呢個係冤獄，一日都唔應該坐」，強調他們的做法是合情合理，反問何罪之有。她之後一度哽咽，被問及會否上訴，她表示要與律師商量。對於判刑如何影響日後爭取民主，陳寶瑩就指大家都明白現時表達不同意見都要預備付出代價，但相信只要所做的事是合情合法合理，都不應被恐懼嚇怕。</p> -<p>就前區政聯盟召集人柯耀林，大律師葉海琅指他參與公共服務多年，自2003年起三度當選區議員，2008年亦獲政府表揚就公共服務的貢獻。而他非常溫和保守，參與程度較其他被告為低，初選得票率低，不足1%，涉案屬「不幸」，獲不同政治光譜的區議員撰寫求情信。不過法官質疑，柯曾簽署「墨落無悔」、出席選舉論壇、派發選舉單張、聘請選舉經理，難言參與較他人少。</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/fU5p6Bc.png" alt="image100" /></p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/HBsboFG.png" alt="image47" /> -▲ 毛孟靜</p> +<h4 id="黃于喬曾預計更重刑期">黃于喬：曾預計更重刑期</h4> -<p>就前立法會議員毛孟靜，大律師黃雅斌指她任議員前曾長年從事傳媒行業及教育，接受她有一定程度參與，但她不曾向人施壓，亦對否決預算案有保留，明白對公眾造成的潛在危害，有真誠悔意，望以監禁5至6年為量刑起點。辯方又呈上多封同事、街坊等求情信，前立法會議員石禮謙指二人即使政治立場不同，但毛總是願意交流意見，融樂會亦讚揚毛對少數族裔的貢獻。毛亦撰信真誠道歉，表示望與丈夫度過餘下時光。</p> +<p>認罪的劉頴匡被判囚4年5個月，其女友黃于喬Emilia向記者表示，刑期符合預期之內，因此心情平靜，沒有特別失落或驚訝。兩人曾經預計過更嚴重的刑期。黃表示，劉終於獲得刑期的答案，不用再感焦慮，認為他會感到「relieved（解脫）」：「而家判咗佢個心會定少少。」</p> -<h4 id="楊雪盈稱誤墮法網愚蠢徐子見父親離世">楊雪盈稱誤墮法網愚蠢、徐子見父親離世</h4> +<p>至於會否上訴，黃表示要待探訪時與劉商討。黃亦表示，「2021年至到而家好似上演咗一場大戲」，她認為現時「只係戲嘅中段，終點而家睇唔到，有生之年可能都睇唔到」，但她會繼續盡力支援劉，亦會好好生活等待對方出獄。</p> -<p>此外，另有不隸屬於傳統民主黨派的被告。就前灣仔區議會主席楊雪盈，代表大律師張耀良指她屬「其他參加者」，辯方呈上32封求情信，包括前南區區議會副主席司馬文、香港戲劇協會會長馮祿德、藝術發展局前委員張秉權等，望顯示楊服務社區、熱心文藝和動保等多個面向，司馬文亦形容楊為溫和民主派。楊又親撰求情信，自言出身基層，醉心文藝，為社會貢獻是一生夢寐以求的事；而她一直無黨無派，參選單純望將議題和初心帶去立法會跟進，誤信初選無牴觸《國安法》才參加，誤墮法網「實在愚蠢」。</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/zKe0ado.png" alt="image101" /></p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/jYHPEao.png" alt="image48" /> -▲ 楊雪盈</p> +<h4 id="陳皓桓盼律政司不上訴">陳皓桓：盼律政司不上訴</h4> -<p>辯方指楊毫不激進，有良好動機，參選只望令社區變得更好，望法庭以「新角度」審視其案情。惟法官陳慶偉質疑，辯方是否指楊不應被定罪、沒有悔意，又指辯方似是上訴而非求情。</p> +<p>前民間人權陣線召集人陳皓桓在判刑後表示，無論判刑是4年抑或10年，對曾參與初選投票和2019年反修例運動的人而言，都是一種打壓，因為所有被告均在行使《基本法》賦予的權利，法庭早前裁定有罪，所有人「唯有接受呢件事」。他又表示律政司以往一直認為這類案件判刑「唔夠多」，他希望律政司不上訴，盡快讓事件解決，亦令關押已久的被告「盡快出返嚟」。</p> -<p>至於前東區區議員徐子見，辯方同指屬「其他參加者」，指他為政治素人，無任何政治聯繫，亦從無表達激進政治理念，罪責最低。辯方指徐患有慢性病，育有一名26歲兒子，他最近離婚，父親亦於他還柙期間離世。多名街坊撰寫求情信，提到徐曾免費維修電器、免費剪髮、鼓勵長者接種疫苗等，是身體力行的人；徐亦親撰求情信稱明白罪行嚴重性，望對受影響的人深切道歉。</p> +<p>天主教香港教區榮休主教陳日君樞機未回應記者提問，僅在登車離開前與陳皓桓相擁。</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/VeAXX50.png" alt="image49" /> -▲ 徐子見</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/Yu2Yh5d.png" alt="image102" /></p> -<h4 id="辯方指彭卓棋被捕後推廣基本法維護國安">辯方指彭卓棋被捕後推廣《基本法》、維護國安</h4> +<p>「女長毛」雷玉蓮在聞得判刑後難掩傷心，落淚離開法庭，她向記者表示判刑太重，她想向被告表示「撐住，我哋會等你」。</p> -<p>就前南區區議員彭卓棋，大律師盧敏儀指他基於對新法無知而犯案，而彭案發時僅25至26歲，無政治聯繫，誤信通知民主動力移除政綱，已足以確保不違法。辯方又指，彭具持續的愛國聯繫、熱心服務國家，曾推廣年輕人到大灣區創業，自2022年5月又受僱於「香港基本法基金會」，維護國安和推廣《基本法》，犯案是與其良好品格相違。</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/7s5qyAf.png" alt="image103" /></p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/57m732J.png" alt="image50" /> -▲ 彭卓棋</p> +<h4 id="呂智恆養母散庭後舉牌義人得生-惡人必亡">呂智恆養母散庭後舉牌「義人得生 惡人必亡」</h4> -<p>不過法官拒絕接納彭曾撤回政綱，並質疑彭初選時以極端激進言辭反對政府和國家，被捕後改為到推廣基本法的組織工作，「除了指他事實上是一名機會主義者，如何能看出其行為是一致？」，又指辯方陳詞形容彭為「機會主義者」，這或是他另一次投機，彭是「一個偽裝成愛國者的機會主義者」。辯方引述認識彭多年的朋友、老師等求情信，指可反映他的性格，不過法官再質疑，辯方求情明顯與法庭裁決及彭在初選的形象不同，明言難以接納。</p> +<p>認罪的社工呂智恆被判囚4年3個月，其養母Elsa離開法院時舉起寫上「義人得生 惡人必亡」的紙牌。她隨即被數名警員帶上警車，期間她緊捉車門激動哭喊：「佢係好人嚟㗎！點解要坐監呀！全部都係好人嚟㗎！」警員見狀即大聲要求她停止，並強行關上車門。</p> -<h4 id="劉澤鋒讀會計課程呂智恆失社工資格">劉澤鋒讀會計課程、呂智恆失社工資格</h4> +<p>她今早入庭時曾舉起寫有「神同在，God is with you」的紙牌，警員隨即要求她收起。</p> -<p>就前學聯抗爭者支援基金主席劉澤鋒，大律師黃錦娟指他生於廣州草根家庭，案發時剛畢業於樹仁大學，為政治素人，參選是望服務他熱愛的社區，即香港和香港人。辯方望法庭考慮劉僅報名參加初選、簽署「墨落無悔」、參加選舉論壇等，並於初選落敗，角色輕微，誤信謀劃合法，屬「其他參加者」或「積極參加者」較低級別。辯方又指，劉獲認識多年的友人、同學、牧師等撰求情信，指他樂於助人、熱心服務弱勢，曾發起協助無家者的計劃等；而劉還柙逾3年沒有放棄自己，修讀中大會計課程，成績不俗，望日後進修輔導、管理及運動治療等課程，繼續以知識服務社會。</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/sBVmqLO.png" alt="image104" /></p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/vMIGdvj.png" alt="image51" /> -▲ 劉澤鋒</p> +<p>黃碧雲被法庭判處6年6個月監禁。其舊同事周小姐得悉判刑結果後激動落淚，她認為案件的判刑比想象中重，「無論（判處）幾多都好，都唔會係一個合理嘅判刑。」</p> -<p>就參選新東的社工呂智恆，大律師陳世傑指，呂角色次要，從無意圖推翻政權、只是企圖阻礙運作，對法律無知而犯案，望接納為「其他參加者」或「積極參加者」較低程度；又指他十分善良，是具天真理念的政治新人，望法庭判刑時展示憐憫，令呂盡快重投社會。</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/vlv3POx.png" alt="image105" /></p> -<p>呂親撰求情信，提及幾經挫折實現夢想志向成為社工，但因本案而失去社工資格。呂提到他出身單親家庭，童年在不同人家寄居、曾被迫做童工和失學，至中四被領養，獲養母無私的愛和包容，後成為社工。2019年發生反修例引起的民主運動，他心痛多人輕生、失蹤，深感這代青年絕望感遠超他童年所受痛苦。</p> +<p>前屯門區議會副主席黃丹晴表示，朋友仍在獄中，心中有一定難過，但坦言刑期比預計為少，他形容在今日不幸的香港，是稍有感到「放鬆啲」的事。他又指，被告「唔係做傷天害理嘅事」，只求在法律中尋找公義，「原來係犯法嘅，喺呢刻香港，係無奈要接受嘅事。」</p> -<p>呂指，他參加初選為了由人民授權行使否決權，「以非常無奈和間接的方式罷免特首，希望當權者回應民意」；他當時無知地相信議員行使否決權是合法，現已明白否決對政權帶來衝擊和影響運作是錯誤想法，感到後悔抱歉。呂指保釋後數年經常失眠和感到巨大壓力，倒數入獄的日子參與教會事奉、做義工，回收麵包分給露宿者、單親家庭等，又為基層兒童義務補習。他不敢低估刑期，但會心存盼望，期望未來報答親恩和服務弱勢社群。</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/2N5ngUq.png" alt="image106" /></p> -<h4 id="林景楠參選是中計受海外勢力渲染成反中亂港分子">林景楠：參選是中計、受海外勢力渲染成反中亂港分子</h4> +<h4 id="毛孟靜丈夫有判刑結果是一種解脫">毛孟靜丈夫：有判刑結果是「一種解脫」</h4> -<p>至於唯一一名任從犯證人的參與者被告，阿布泰國生活百貨創辦人林景楠，大律師范凱傑指他遲參選，亦不曾出席協調會議和初選記者會、沒有簽「墨落無悔」，屬「其他參加者」，又指林錄取口供和成為控方證人，其證供有用，可獲50%減刑。不過法官質疑，證供主要談及林本人的參與，他雖提到出席沈旭暉主持的協調會議，但沈並非本案共謀者、亦無因此被捕；法庭在裁決時也完全無依賴林的證供。辯方亦望為林索取社會服務令報告，惟法官明言是不現實、不合理，拒絕辯方要求，並指林於開審當天才認罪，只能減刑20%。</p> +<p>民主派前議員毛孟靜被判囚50個月，她的丈夫Philip Bowring說，妻子還柙近四年已是很長的一段時間，終於有判刑結果是「一種解脫」，「我們已等待了很長時間（“We have been waiting a long time.”）」，亦相信妻子不久後就能出獄。他又指她精神不俗（in good spirit），並指「we will survive」。至於出獄後會否和毛一同離港，他稱未有計劃。</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/4ucmzrI.png" alt="image52" /> -▲ 林景楠</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/Vl5x8jA.png" alt="image107" /></p> -<p>庭上讀出林景楠親撰的求情信節錄，林提到候審時通過接觸不同觀點的資訊，明白當初參選是「非常幼稚及愚蠢」的行為，「中了其他別有用心的國家、團體和人的計謀」；又指透過深切反省，意識到自己要為2019年起的社會撕裂負不少責任，因他是「黃色經濟圈領頭者」。林又引述國家主席習近平七一講話，指「香港不能亂也亂不起」，林指深切反思後發現很多港人包括自己，「一直受到很多海外勢力或網絡傳媒的渲染，間接成為反中亂港的一分子」，因此他主動聯絡國安處認罪，因認罪才是最真誠的認錯。他感謝控方讓他成為證人，「讓我可以把我的所知所聞一一供出」。</p> +<p>中午約12時半，被告區諾軒、彭卓棋的代表律師行律師謝偉俊步出法院，被問及其對判刑的看法，他不作回覆，「暫時冇，no comment。」</p> -<p>林最後真誠向中央政府、特區政府，尤其香港海關和警隊及所有受他影響的市民真誠道歉，望法庭讓他履行作為父親的責任，陪伴三個孩子成長，及予他機會，重新投入中港泰三地，用實際行動抓住香港由治及興的機會，說好香港和國家故事，促進一帶一路，為香港和國家出力。</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/0eLNorM.png" alt="image108" /></p> -<p>案件將於明日（19日）判刑，辯方的求情陳詞是否被法官採納仍是未知數，但各人在庭上的發言、所撰的求情信，已留下歷史的印記。</p> +<p>下午5時，兩輛「鐵甲威龍」及一輛普通囚車駕離西九法院，逾30名警員面向旁聽隊伍戒備，警告市民不要呼叫口號，「一嗌口號即刻帶上車」。女長毛雷玉蓮則在隊伍頭位，她高舉拳頭，目送囚車離開。</p> -<hr /> +<h3 id="呂智恆養母判刑後舉標語-涉公眾地方行為不檢被捕">呂智恆養母判刑後舉標語 涉公眾地方行為不檢被捕</h3> -<p>案件編號：HCCC69-70/2022</p>獨媒報導西九疑現「排隊黨」 記者連問隊頭13人無一回應 西九外「點人數」警方稱要檢視維持秩序警力 拒回應會否清走空櫈 百歲大黃伯連續兩晚排通宵盼見「受難朋友」 林進嘆僅5公眾可入正庭「非常可惜」 致歉、無悔、不求情——45名罪成被告，判刑前的陳詞Retying The Caucasian Knot2024-11-18T12:00:00+08:002024-11-18T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/retying-the-caucasian-knot<p><em>This paper explores the challenge to Russia’s established position in the South Caucasus as the region undergoes significant change.</em></p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/5MGJJrQ.png" alt="image109" /></p> -<excerpt /> +<p>【獨媒報導】初選47人案昨日（19日）判刑，被定罪的45人刑期由4年2個月至10年不等。其中被告之一的社工呂智恆判囚4年3個月，其養母Elsa在離開法院時舉起寫上「義人得生 惡人必亡」的紙牌，隨即被數名警員帶上警車。警方表示昨日以涉嫌「在公眾地方行為不檢」拘捕一名60歲女子，她已獲准保釋候查，須於12月下旬向警方報到。</p> -<p>Russia and the Euro-Atlantic community now find that their reach exceeds their grasp in terms of their ability to shape the regional order in the South Caucasus. Both remain regionally influential, but their leverage to drive developments is eroding as the South Caucasus is affected by multipolar international politics. The rise of multipolarity is being promoted by the increasing role of a broad set of external actors – most of all Turkey, Iran and China – engaging in the South Caucasus, and by strengthening links between the region and Asia, the Middle East and Central Asia, links that are supplementing the region’s established ties to the US, Europe and Russia. In this context, there is increased local agency in relation to external partnerships (reinforced by a turn to illiberal domestic politics), and waning attraction both to Russian and Euro-Atlantic integration projects.</p> +<p>呂智恆養母Elsa昨日在進入法庭後，曾舉起寫有「神同在，God is with you」的紙牌，警員隨即要求她收起。在宣布判刑後，Elsa再次在法院正門舉起寫上「義人得生 惡人必亡」的紙牌，多名警員即上前收起紙牌，並帶他登上警車。期間她緊捉車門激動哭喊：「佢係好人嚟㗎！點解要坐監呀！全部都係好人嚟㗎！」警員見狀即大聲要求她停止，並強行關上車門。</p> -<p>As a result of these changes, Russia has lost its position of pre-eminence, which rested primarily on tying together its security interests with the region’s protracted conflicts. Over the past 30 years, Moscow has leveraged these conflicts to give it a central geopolitical role, which it has used to promote a regional status quo to its advantage and to create a Gordian knot of interwoven obstacles and interests to hinder efforts at Euro-Atlantic integration. The war in Ukraine has played a part in undercutting Moscow’s position in the South Caucasus, but Russia’s long-term relative decline as new actors have entered the region, power shifts within the South Caucasus itself (notably the rise of Azerbaijan), and changing Russian regional interests are the main factors challenging Moscow’s established role.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/glmirAO.png" alt="image110" /> +▲ （資料圖片）</p> -<p>Russia is now seeking to adapt to the new regional situation. It is attempting to establish its role as the leading, but no longer exclusive, external actor in the South Caucasus by reconfiguring its position. This involves a rebalancing of bilateral relations, broadening its range of policy tools (notably in the areas of transport and communications) from a previous reliance on security, and being ready to countenance an expanded presence for other external actors, notably regional powers – principally Iran, Turkey and, increasingly, China – while remaining opposed to the US and the EU.</p> +<p>警方表示，昨日（19日）在長沙灣通州街一法院執勤期間，一名女子在通州街公眾地方手持一塊標語招貼，擾亂公眾秩序。經初步調查後，該名60歲本地女子涉嫌「在公眾地方行為不檢」被捕，案件交由深水埗警區重案組第一隊跟進。</p> -<p>In the absence of a Euro-Atlantic security commitment capable of challenging Russia in the South Caucasus, the policies of enlargement (eventual NATO and EU membership) have lost traction. The Euro-Atlantic community now risks being marginalised in an increasingly competitive regional environment. If it is to undercut Russia’s effort to build a new position – to retie the Caucasian knot – and retain a significant regional role, it will need to develop approaches capable of responding to and shaping the new South Caucasus geopolitics and geo-economics.</p> +<p>警方又強調，市民表達訴求時，必須遵守法律，並在符合國家安全、公共安全、公共秩序，以及不會損害他人的權利和自由的前提下，和平有序地表達意見。如有任何違法行為，警方必會果斷執法，以維持公共秩序及保障公共安全。</p> -<h3 id="introduction">Introduction</h3> +<h3 id="判刑後長毛致信太太未因言行悔疚爭取民主並沒有錯">判刑後長毛致信太太：未因言行悔疚、爭取民主並沒有錯</h3> -<p>Russia is facing a key moment in its post-Soviet position in the South Caucasus (Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia). Since the mid-2000s, geopolitical competition between Russia and the Euro-Atlantic community has emerged as a defining issue shaping the regional order. Using security policy – including direct military action – as its primary tool, Russia was able to establish itself both as the main arbiter in conflict resolution and central to the balance of power in the South Caucasus. On this basis, Russia was able to limit NATO and EU enlargement policies, while at the same time seeking to advance its own integration project.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/fPj2U1Y.png" alt="image111" /></p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/YmknXoW.png" alt="image01" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 1: Political and Military Map of the South Caucasus.</strong> Source: Labrang/Wikimedia. Edited by RUSI.</em></p> +<p>【獨媒報導】初選47人案中，45名罪成的被告昨日（19日）判刑，其中前社民連立法會議員梁國雄（長毛）被判監6年9個月（81個月）。昨晚社民連專頁刊出他去信太太、現社民連主席陳寶瑩，指其厄運是「由於政治逼害的牢獄」，並未因過往的言行悔疚，爭取民主並沒有錯。長毛亦感激太太過去三年的奔波照顧，望能在自由的天地相聚相愛。</p> -<p>As a result, the South Caucasus became an internally and externally fragmented region (see Figure 1). Countries were divided domestically and regionally by protracted conflicts – Nagorno-Karabakh was contested between Azerbaijan and Armenia, and conflicts emerged over the regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia in Georgia. Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia also developed differing foreign and security policy trajectories and built diverse allegiances. Azerbaijan adopted policies of balancing and neutrality, Georgia aspired to join the EU and NATO, and Armenia became Russia’s ally within the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU). Russia has sought to manipulate and deepen these divisions to give itself a central regional role. In recent years, as President Vladimir Putin has developed a more assertive policy of rebuilding Russia as a “great power”, the South Caucasus has become integral to the Kremlin’s wider ambitions of dominating the Black Sea, and projecting power into the Middle East and the Mediterranean.</p> +<p>社民連專頁昨刊出長毛致太太陳寶瑩家書，信中先感激對方三年來的探訪照顧，為其事情奔波。他指望能與陳寶瑩於自由的天地相聚相愛，一同遊歷彼此嚮往的地方，感嘆若非隔著鐵窗說「我愛你」「那該多好！」遺憾未能一如以往般「無拘無束相愛」。</p> -<p>The pre-eminence that Russia has established in the South Caucasus over the past three decades is now being eroded by far-reaching shifts in the international regional and domestic environments. These changes have the potential to create a new regional order. A variety of international actors – China, Iran, Israel, the Gulf states and India, among others – has entered the region, offering new diplomatic and political, trade and investment, and security relations, and providing alternatives to both Russia and the Euro-Atlantic community. The governments of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia have sought to widen their space for political action by developing foreign policies to engage with new international actors and to escape from the geopolitical competition between Russia and the West. Together, these developments have diminished the significance of Russia’s security leverage, notably in respect to the contest over Nagorno-Karabakh as Azerbaijan and Armenia seek to finalise a peace agreement, and shifted the South Caucasus towards alternative agendas for trade, connectivity and strengthening multipolarity.</p> +<p>他在信中指「現在的厄運，是由於政治逼害的牢獄」，對因過往的言行而繫獄並無悔疚。梁國雄指從七十年代開始參與政治運動及社會抗爭，出於的是一種改變社會不公義不合理的願望。他重申爭取民主及實現社會主義「並沒有錯」。最後梁國雄望太太保重，各人平安。</p> -<p>This paper explores the challenge to Russia’s established position in the South Caucasus as the region undergoes significant change, and analyses Moscow’s effort to craft a new regional approach. The findings of the paper are drawn from three principal sources. A review of secondary literature on regional developments in the South Caucasus was supplemented by a workshop conducted in Tbilisi, Georgia, in April 2024 that brought together leading experts on regional issues. In addition, interviews were conducted, in confidence, with officials from the US, the EU and the UK in Washington, DC, Brussels, London, Tbilisi and Yerevan between February and May 2024.</p> +<p>梁國雄在審訊中選擇不作供，法庭在裁定其罪成的理由中指，雖然梁未有出席任何協調會議，但有派代表出席，相信他會關注。此外，社民連曾發表爭取全面否決權的立場書，梁國雄亦有轉發帖文，指不論民主派議席是否過半，皆應否決預算案爭取政府回應五大訴求。</p> -<p>The paper has three chapters. Chapter I examines how in the post-Soviet decades Russia established itself as the leading external actor in the South Caucasus. Chapter II analyses how Russia’s regional position is being challenged, notably by the wars over Ukraine and Nagorno-Karabakh, the appearance of new international actors in the South Caucasus, and by the shift of regional governments to pursuing foreign policies of multi-alignment, made possible by multipolarity, and often in conjunction with increasingly illiberal domestic politics. Chapter III considers the implications of these changes for Russia’s regional position and sets out how Moscow has sought to respond to these shifts to retain a leading role. The paper concludes with the implications of the changes in Russia’s position and the wider shifts in the South Caucasus for the policies of the Euro-Atlantic community.</p> +<h3 id="陳文敏指量刑貼近國安法三級制-料律政司上訴難度大">陳文敏指量刑貼近國安法三級制 料律政司上訴難度大</h3> -<h3 id="i-russias-south-caucasus-strategy">I. Russia’s South Caucasus Strategy</h3> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/7SzWSjX.png" alt="image112" /></p> -<p>The South Caucasus has historically played a key role in Moscow’s broader strategic thinking. The conquest of the North and South Caucasus was central to Russian imperial ambitions and involved a prolonged and ultimately triumphant struggle for control over the region with the Ottoman and Persian empires between the 18th and 20th centuries. The defeat of the Ottomans was at the heart of the wider Russian plan to establish dominance in the Black Sea region, including extending state boundaries through the territories of contemporary Ukraine, and expanding influence into the Balkans, as well as through the Caucasus.</p> +<p>【獨媒報導】初選47人案昨日判刑，量刑孰輕孰重引起不同討論。港大法律學院前客座教授陳文敏今早在商台節目表示，即使法院不採用《國安法》量刑三級制，但仍然有做參考，法官「巧妙」將刑期貼近框架。他認為即使律政司指法庭錯用法律原則，但對量刑結果「完全無分別」，上訴會變成純技術討論。若果純粹認為刑罰「不足夠」而提出上訴，他相信難度很高，律政司必須證明判刑「嚴重不足」。</p> -<p>This strategic goal of expanding control over the Caucasus was a stepping-stone for Russia to extend its reach into the Middle East and the Mediterranean, notably as it sought naval access to the world’s oceans beyond the limits of its northern ports. During the Soviet era (1922–91), Moscow applied a similar strategic logic to the region, while also seeing the South Caucasus as a buffer zone to the conflicts of the Middle East and, during the Cold War, the threat posed by NATO to the south.</p> +<p>保安局局長昨日在判刑數小時後見記者，提到法庭判刑是「重判」，而整體已合適地反映罪行嚴重性。不過他同時留有「尾巴」，稱會在研究判詞後，考慮是否對個別被告的刑期提出上訴。</p> -<h4 id="post-soviet-south-caucasus-engagement">Post-Soviet South Caucasus Engagement</h4> +<h4 id="稱法官量刑巧妙">稱法官量刑「巧妙」</h4> -<p>With the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the emergence of the independent states of Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia, Russia initially shifted away from viewing the South Caucasus as integral to its security policy. The new Russian leadership under President Boris Yeltsin focused instead on a Euro-Atlantic vector in its external ties, while its neighbours were a much lower priority. A series of civil wars in the South Caucasus – over Abkhazia and South Ossetia in Georgia and Nagorno-Karabakh in Azerbaijan – involved elements of Russia’s security forces and led Moscow to develop a new security engagement in the region around the deployment of Russian-led “peacekeeping operations”. These missions served to freeze the violence, rather than resolve the conflicts, and opened the way for Moscow to manage, as well as manipulate, the conflicts in subsequent years, including the opportunity to influence regional issues.</p> +<p>到底上訴空間有多大？港大法律學院前客座教授陳文敏在商台《在晴朗的一天出發》表示，今次判刑焦點落在三名法官沒有套用《國安法》量刑三級制，法庭「做咗少少改動」，接納辯方陳詞指「串謀」並非國安法罪行而是普通刑法罪行，三級制不完全適用。不過他指出法庭並無完全摒棄不考慮，而是作為量刑起點的參考，只是沒有硬性跟足，量刑結果接近三級制。他形容法官的做法是「好巧妙」，「就算話佢錯，結果都係無分別」。</p> -<p>From the mid-1990s, growing violent instability in the North Caucasus, notably in Chechnya, drew Russia into a more southern-oriented security and military posture, and promoted a refocus of its foreign and security policy onto the immediate neighbourhood. Notwithstanding the withdrawal of some Russian military facilities from the South Caucasus in the 1990s and early 2000s, notably from Georgia and Azerbaijan, Moscow retained a border guard and military presence in Armenia. This positioning reflected the long-term view in Moscow of the South Caucasus as a buffer to instability from the south and a means to balance Turkey’s regional aspirations.</p> +<h4 id="15年起點-即使減至7年絕對唔輕">15年起點 即使減至7年「絕對唔輕」</h4> -<p>The growing threat of Islamist terrorism in Russia’s North Caucasus and the launch of the second Chechen war by Putin in 1999 led Russia to strengthen further its military and security focus on both the North and South Caucasus. It was, however, the emergence of growing Euro-Atlantic engagement in the region that led Russia increasingly to instrumentalise protracted conflicts as leverage in an emerging geopolitical struggle with the West.</p> +<p>不跟從三級制，最大分別是判刑沒有下限的框架，對於部份「首要份子」的最終刑期為7年，效果上低於框架下限的10年。陳文敏指出在這方面，法庭亦「好小心」，數名「首要份子」的刑期起點均為15年，再按個別情況扣減，例如轉做控方證人。他認為判刑結果「四平八穩」，因為「首要份子」的刑期「唔會多唔會少」，其他被告的刑期亦無一低於3年。</p> -<p>During Putin’s initial period as Russia’s president (2000–08), and in particular during his second term (2004–08), Russia moved away from cooperative security approaches to regional conflict management, notably through the OSCE, to giving primacy to its own bilateral engagements. Moscow sought to balance betweenArmenia and Azerbaijan over the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, including through the supply of weapons to both sides. Russian repositioning around Georgia’s protracted conflicts accelerated following the November 2003 Rose Revolution that brought to power in Tbilisi a government seeking closer ties to NATO and the EU. Increasingly, Moscow backed the separatist leaderships of the two breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia in opposition to Georgia.</p> +<p>陳文敏認為律政司的上訴理據幾乎只得一個，就是提出法院錯用量刑原則，「唔應該用普通法，應該用國安法」。他表示即使成立，「有咩分別呢？結果完全無分別」，律政司的上訴或者變為純技術討論，當然律政司亦可以提出作為日後案件案例，但對47人案的判刑實際影響不大。若果律政司純粹以「刑罰不足夠」提出上訴，陳文敏認為「難度好高」，因為要證明判刑「嚴重不足」，他強調15年刑期起點即使減至7年，亦「絕對唔輕」，而認罪減刑也是過往案例容許的因素，相信上訴難度相當高。</p> -<h4 id="russia-and-euro-atlantic-regional-competition">Russia and Euro-Atlantic Regional Competition</h4> +<h4 id="法官或同情部分被告-惟對懲教署無約束力">法官或同情部分被告 惟對懲教署無約束力</h4> -<p>The August 2008 Russia–Georgia war, following the April NATO Bucharest Summit Declaration that Georgia (and Ukraine) would join the Alliance in the future, marked the onset of full-scale geopolitical confrontation in the South Caucasus. Russia’s use of military force was designed to demonstrate that it was unwilling to countenance Euro-Atlantic integration in territories it considered its backyard.</p> +<p>另外法官昨日在判詞特別提出11名被告有真誠悔意，希望當局日後作酌情考慮。陳文敏認為反映法官對部分被告較多同情，不過很明顯權力不在法院，法官不能作出考慮亦不能作出干涉。他指出法官的想法對懲教署無約束力，只能做參考，更何況相關提早釋放的決定，似乎是由國安委決定的。</p> -<p>The return of Putin as president in 2012 marked a new phase of Russian policy towards the South Caucasus. The region became fully integrated into Putin’s growing great power ambitions for Russia, and the confrontation with the Euro-Atlantic community. Russia’s military action against Georgia in 2008 directly challenged the Euro-Atlantic community by suggesting that it would need to be ready for war with Russia if it sought to advance membership in European organisations for countries in the South Caucasus. Through this positioning, Putin aimed to maintain a regional status quo favourable to Russia.</p> +<h3 id="多國發聲明關注-外交部無端指責干涉中國內政">多國發聲明關注 外交部：無端指責、干涉中國內政</h3> -<p>While Russia’s security position has been its trump card in the South Caucasus, Moscow has developed other interlinked policy approaches, both to coerce and attract the region. As geopolitical competition with the Euro-Atlantic community strengthened after 2008, Russia increasingly sought to integrate the South Caucasus more closely as part of its efforts to create a “sphere of privileged interests” across the territory of the former Soviet Union. Russia aimed to counter Euro-Atlantic integration efforts through its own integration agenda, focused on the EAEU and the CSTO. Ultimately, only Armenia agreed to join the EAEU – it was already a member of the CSTO – when Russia leveraged Armenia’s security dependence to pressure it to reject an EU association agreement in 2013.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/DZzt7dX.png" alt="image113" /></p> -<p>Moscow’s policy mix has been tailored to the countries of the region. With Georgia, the Kremlin has used a stick-and-carrot approach. Initially, Moscow relied on economic coercion and disinformation, while leveraging the protracted conflicts (including periodically raising the prospect of annexing South Ossetia), and the threat of further coercive and even military action against Tbilisi following the 2008 war. With the adoption by the Georgian government of a policy to normalise relations with Russia from 2012, and in particular as the ruling Georgian Dream Party has grown increasingly authoritarian in its domestic policies, leading to a deterioration of ties with the Euro-Atlantic community, Moscow has offered visa liberalisation, the resumption of direct flights between the two countries, increased tourism and the importance of a trade relationship.</p> +<p>【獨媒報導】民主派初選案昨日判刑，世界各國領袖亦聚首進行G20峰會，各國對案件的取態備受關注。美國國務院凌晨發表聲明，強烈譴責事件，並形容判刑是「不公（unjust）」和「嚴苛（harsh）」，促請立即無條件釋放45名被告。國務院將會對多名官員施加簽證限制，但未有透露確實對象。英國透過副國務大臣衛倩婷發聲明批評判刑，而首相施紀賢昨日在G20峰會與習近平會見並握手，當施紀賢被記者問會否譴責判刑，他兩度拒絕。</p> -<p>With Armenia, Moscow has employed a different approach. It has provided security guarantees through Armenia’s CSTO membership and the presence of Russian military and border guard facilities. Moscow has also offered Armenia favourable economic terms. It has sought to advance Russian investment in the energy and other sectors, while membership of the EAEU has provided Armenia with access to a large market.</p> +<p>港府昨傍晚在同一份聲明一次過反駁，指留意到近日美西方國家、反華組織、反華政客、外國媒體等就包括初選案在內的不同案件，作出惡意攻擊和抹黑。發言人又指，港府堅決嚴厲打擊危害國家安全的行為和活動，必須時刻警惕危害國家安全風險，「不能好了傷口便忘了痛，更不可容許傷口再被挖開，讓香港再受難忘的痛」。</p> -<p>In the case of Azerbaijan, Russia has been ready to accommodate flexibility as long as Baku has eschewed seeking NATO or EU membership, while at the same time pledging good neighbourly relations. This has been achieved through the conclusion of a series of partnership agreements over the past two decades (notably the partnership agreement in February 2022), and building cooperation in key economic areas, critically energy.</p> +<h4 id="cecc促撤經貿辦禮待">CECC促撤經貿辦禮待</h4> -<p>Over the past two decades, Russia has sought to use its pre-eminent security position, supported by other policies, to limit the three South Caucasian republics’ options for external economic and security ties. The aim of these approaches has been to isolate the South Caucasus strategically while tying it ever closer to Russia. Entangling the conflicts of the South Caucasus with Russian security interests has created a Gordian knot for the Euro-Atlantic community in the region which, in the absence of a readiness to challenge Russia directly for fear of escalation to military confrontation and even war, has been unable to advance substantially its integration efforts.</p> +<p>美國國務院在聲明表示法庭對初選案的判刑嚴苛，將會侵蝕外界對香港司法制度的信心，以及傷害香港的國際聲譽。美方會繼續監察港區國安法實施情況，並呼籲北京和港府停止利用國安法噤聲民間政見。</p> -<h4 id="russia-as-a-great-power-and-the-south-caucasus">Russia as a Great Power and the South Caucasus</h4> +<p>美國國會及行政當局中國委員會（CECC）昨日在聲明敦促拜登政府實施多項制裁，特別指出這場政治檢控發生的同時，為數不少的美國商界行政總裁正與香港官員享受美酒佳餚，被游說在港做更多投資。CECC表示，香港經貿辦一直在壓制本地和海外異見擔當角色，例如協助中國政府向美國做政府宣傳，委員會促進國會通過撤銷香港駐美經貿辦特權。</p> -<p>As competition with the Euro-Atlantic community intensified, the South Caucasus became part of Russia’s broader ambition to project its power around and across the Black Sea. In a return to Russia’s grand strategy towards the South Caucasus, Moscow’s regional engagement was linked to the wider goal of projecting power into the Black Sea region and beyond, into the eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East, as Russia became involved in the conflicts in Syria and Libya. After the 2008 Russo-Georgian War, Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea and its intervention in eastern Ukraine, the military and security dimensions of the South Caucasus were strengthened through enhancing the network of Russian military bases in Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Armenia (see Figure 1), and promoting the integration of these facilities with the regional network of Russian military facilities.</p> +<h4 id="英國未指違反中英聯合聲明">英國未指違反《中英聯合聲明》</h4> -<h4 id="russias-growing-dominance-of-the-south-caucasus">Russia’s Growing Dominance of the South Caucasus</h4> +<p>至於英國方面，首相施紀賢拒絕譴責判刑，英政府由負責亞太事務的英國副國務大臣 Catherine West（衛倩婷）發聲明，中國在香港施加《國安法》，侵蝕了香港人的權利和自由，而判刑清楚表明，香港當局利用《國安法》，刑事化異議聲音的行為。聲明又指，英國將始終支持香港人民，所有國家都應履行國際義務，以保護這些基本權利。聲明的字眼溫和，未有如保守黨執政期間，不時批評中方和港府行為違反《中英聯合聲明》。</p> -<p>By the 2020s, Russia appeared to have largely achieved dominance in the South Caucasus. Moscow’s approach to the region had effectively halted Euro-Atlantic integration while gradually strengthening its own position. In 2020, when Azerbaijan launched the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War, Russia aimed to advance its regional role with the introduction of “peacekeepers” into the conflict, something it had sought for over 20 years. These developments led to interpretations that Russia was consolidating its regional pre-eminence. In fact, the South Caucasus was already experiencing a set of interrelated shifts that have together undermined the regional position that Russia built up in the post-Soviet period.</p> +<p>初選案被告之一吳政亨是澳洲公民，澳洲外長黃英賢（Penny Wong）發聲明指，對澳洲公民吳政亨和案中其他成員的判決表示深切關注，並會繼續關注吳政亨的福祉，同時已向中國及香港政府表達對國安法廣泛運用，並牽涉澳洲公民表達強烈反對。澳洲政府又呼籲中國停止對表達自由、集會自由、媒體及公民社會的壓逼。</p> -<h3 id="ii-russia-challenged-in-the-south-caucasus">II. Russia Challenged in the South Caucasus</h3> +<h4 id="外交部無端指責干涉中國內政">外交部：無端指責、干涉中國內政</h4> -<p>In recent years, the foundations of Moscow’s dominant regional position, built in the context of geopolitical and geo-economic competition with the Euro-Atlantic community, have been challenged by three interlinked developments.</p> +<p>中國外交部則在昨日例行記者會反駁，香港是法治社會，有法必依、違法必究，是基本原則，任何人都不能打著民主的旗號從事違法活動，並企圖逃脫法律制裁。發言人林劍表示，個別西方國家一面無視中國的司法程序、維護自身國家安全的事實，單方面對香港法院公正實施《國安法》無端指責。中央政府堅定支持香港特區維護國家安全，依法懲治各類危害國家安全的活動，堅決反對個別西方國家藉有關司法個案，干涉中國內政，抹黑和破壞香港法治。</p> -<p>First, the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War (2020 and 2023) created a new regional balance of force and the emergence of economic and connectivity opportunities that have undercut security agendas. Second, a set of external actors has entered the region, providing alternatives to Moscow, Brussels and Washington, and tying the South Caucasus more closely to the Middle East, central Eurasia and Asia. Third, Russia’s war in Ukraine initially led to a questioning of Moscow’s ability to project security and military force in the region, while the prolonged nature of the war has reinforced hedging strategies by countries in the region unsure of who will ultimately be victorious. Together, these developments are promoting foreign and security policies of multi-alignment in the South Caucasus, as regional governments seek to develop multiple external partners to balance and hedge against the dominance of Russia and the Euro-Atlantic community.</p> +<h3 id="民建聯抗議美國抹黑-領事館未有派代表接信">民建聯抗議美國抹黑 領事館未有派代表接信</h3> -<h4 id="the-second-nagorno-karabakh-war">The Second Nagorno-Karabakh War</h4> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/Zwh9pyI.png" alt="image114" /></p> -<p>The most significant development within the South Caucasus region has been Azerbaijan’s military actions in 2020 and 2023 to take back territory occupied by Armenia following the First Nagorno-Karabakh War (1988–94), and ultimately to reclaim control over the Nagorno-Karabakh region itself. As a result, Azerbaijan has emerged as the regional agenda setter and has attracted Russia’s interest.</p> +<p>【獨媒報導】「47人案」昨日（19日）判刑，美國政府今日（20日）凌晨發表聲明譴責判刑針對香港民主領袖，要求港府無條件釋放所有政治犯，並宣佈對《港區國安法》的相關官員實施新一輪的簽證限制。民建聯副主席、立法會議員周浩鼎和陳學鋒連同十餘名民建聯成員今日下午到美國領事館門外示威，譴責美國干預中國內政，又高叫口號抗議，示威持續約15分鐘，在場有警員戒備。陳學鋒表示準備了請願信，惟領事館未有代表接信，請願信最終放在領事館門前地上。</p> -<p>For Armenia, there has been a deterioration in the Armenia–Russia alliance as a result of Russia’s failure to restrain Azerbaijan in 2020 and the inability – and possibly unwillingness – of Russian “peacekeepers” to prevent the seizure of the whole of Nagorno-Karabakh in 2023. This led to the flight of the ethnic Armenian population amid claims of ethnic cleansing – along with a perception that Moscow is more interested in developing a close relationship with Baku.</p> +<p>民建聯一行13人今日下午到美國領事館外示威，他們展開印有「強烈譴責美國 抹黑香港法治 干涉中國內政」的橫幅，又舉起「Enough is enough！Say NO to US interference」、「司法不容外國踐踏」等標語。</p> -<p>Armenia has signalled publicly that it is ready to shift away from its reliance on Russian security guarantees and seek closer relations with others, notably the US and the EU (especially France). Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan has indicated that Armenia has suspended its participation in the CSTO – having previously indicated that it would leave the organisation – although he has not closed the door to a future relationship, and Russian border guards have been removed from Yerevan airport. With the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict resolved by military force, Russia is no longer able to leverage its role as a mediator, while the prospect of a peace agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan, potentially also leading to Armenia–Turkey normalisation, will further reduce Moscow’s ability to leverage its security role. With the war in Ukraine also redefining Russian regional interests, Moscow has begun to reshape its approach to the South Caucasus.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/ZiFPyhB.png" alt="image115" /> +▲ 左起：陳學鋒、周浩鼎</p> -<h4 id="emerging-international-actors-in-the-south-caucasus">Emerging International Actors in the South Caucasus</h4> +<p>陳學鋒和周浩鼎分別以中文和英文讀出譴責聲明。陳學鋒表示，民建聯強烈譴責美方對「47人案」所發表的聲明和制裁，認為美方此舉無疑是公然干預中國內政和抹黑香港司法體系。他強調，香港法院一直以公平公正的原則審理案件，《基本法》及《香港人權法案》保障所有被告有公平接受審訊的權利，指法庭判刑時是嚴格根據證據、法律規定及原則。</p> -<p>While the period since 2008 has been marked by geopolitical competition between Russia and the Euro-Atlantic community in the South Caucasus, states within the region are increasingly reaching out to a wider network of partners to help them to manage geopolitical competition and expand economic opportunities.</p> +<p>對於「47人案」的判刑，陳學鋒稱危害國家安全在任何國家都屬重罪，昨日的判刑是彰顯「法治公義」，向社會傳遞明確信號，警惕市民，任何試圖破壞國家安全的行為，都會受到法律的嚴懲。</p> -<p><em>Turkey</em></p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/315RjeS.png" alt="image116" /></p> -<p>The growing influence of Turkey has relied to a significant degree on its strategic alliance with Azerbaijan and the coordinated approach that the two countries have taken to Armenia and the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, as well as energy projects. Since 1992, they have forged close military, diplomatic and economic ties. Turkey has notably provided Azerbaijan with important military capacities and training. This relationship was central to the 2020 Second Nagorno-Karabakh War, in which Turkish military technologies played an important role, but even more significant was the ability of Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan to balance diplomatic efforts by Putin to shape the outcomes of the conflict to Russia’s advantage. Since then, Turkey and Azerbaijan have coordinated efforts to position the South Caucasus as the gateway to the Middle Corridor, which links Europe through the Caspian region to Central Asia and western parts of China, and to accelerate work on this initiative.</p> +<h4 id="稱香港進入新時代-冀西方勿戴有色眼鏡">稱香港進入「新時代」 冀西方勿戴有色眼鏡</h4> -<p>Although Azerbaijan is Turkey’s key regional ally, Turkey has been exploring deeper ties with Georgia, reflecting the country’s key transit role for energy, transport and trade. Turkey identifies relations with Georgia as a “strategic partnership”, supports its territorial integrity and does not recognise claims by Abkhazia and South Ossetia for independence. Turkey is Georgia’s leading trade partner, ahead of Russia and China, and Ankara views Georgia as a critical partner in its plans for the development and expansion of the Middle Corridor. Turkey has also sought to develop its security ties to Georgia, including as part of a trilateral format with Azerbaijan, and has been a supporter of closer ties between NATO and Georgia. Turkey’s role has also been important as part of a broader strengthening in relations between the South Caucasus and Middle Eastern countries that has included rising trade and deepening diplomatic ties, notably with Saudi Arabia, but also with Iraq and Jordan (as well as Iran and Israel).</p> +<p>不少西方國家在《港區國安法》實施後，因認為國安法損害香港民主、法治和自治，對香港進行制裁。陳學鋒反駁有關說法，並以「西方一些反華勢力不停詆毀香港的司法制度」形容相關情況，又反指包括美國在內的部份西方國家對於國安案件的審判標準更為嚴格。他認為西方國家經常「無端指責」港區國安法，並再三強調任何國家以政治力量干預香港司法程序都是破壞法治的行為，應該予以譴責。</p> -<p><em>Iran</em></p> +<p>發言末段，陳學鋒讚揚香港在國安法和23條立法後形成了「雙法雙機制」，香港亦進入了「良政善治」的「新時代」。他冀西方國家不要以「有色眼鏡」看待香港事務，呼籲以公平公正態度與香港合作。</p> -<p>Iran does not have the levels of regional influence achieved by Russia and Turkey, in part reflecting its strategic view of the South Caucasus as a buffer region. Tehran’s approach has been focused on preventing overspill from the region into Iran. It hopes to balance the influence of regional rivals (Turkey and Russia) and ensure that the South Caucasus does not become a base of operations for states seen as hostile to Tehran (principally the US and Israel). As the third regional neighbouring state it has, nonetheless, built ties with Armenia, while managing a complex and occasionally confrontational relationship with Azerbaijan.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/vyY9Gar.png" alt="image117" /></p> -<p>As the South Caucasus has begun to open to greater connectivity, gaining access to Iran’s trade and transport routes has risen in importance. Tehran has developed a more forward-leaning foreign policy towards the South Caucasus and has sought to improve its relationship with Azerbaijan and adopt a more balanced approach to the countries in the region. This has led to an emergent closer relationship with Georgia.</p> +<h4 id="一行人拉banner影大合照">一行人拉banner影大合照</h4> -<p>Along with Russia and Turkey, Iran shares an interest in limiting the role of the Euro-Atlantic community in the South Caucasus, and Tehran has supported efforts to advance the “3 + 3” South Caucasus Regional Cooperation Platform format, aimed at bringing together Iran, Turkey, Russia and the South Caucasus countries. Iran has also recognised the strategic importance of efforts to shape a new regional transportation network as part of a peace agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Crucially, Tehran has opposed efforts to open the so-called Zangezur Corridor, the proposed transport link between Azerbaijan and its exclave Nakhchivan across the southern Armenian region of Syunik, fearing it would impede its trade links northwards and strengthen Turkey’s regional position, even when this has led to friction with Russia.</p> +<p>民建聯示威期間，美國領事館並沒有派代表出席，僅有領事館的外判保安職員在場監察。陳學鋒本打算向領事館遞交請願信，但因領事館未有派出代表接信而作罷，只好與示威期間一直「黑面」的周浩鼎於領事館門外合照後將請願信放置於領事館外的行人路上，待美方代表接收，「由於美國總領館係冇人出嚟接信嘅，我哋都會放喺佢門口嘅」。</p> -<p>Despite strains in the Iran–Russia relationship, there has been a strategic convergence between Tehran and Moscow as a result of the Ukraine war, which is being formalised through a proposed partnership treaty that will include regional security issues, alongside a free-trade agreement to link the EAEU to Iran. Iran’s evolving engagement in the South Caucasus, and notably its cooperation with Russia in the area of transport, form an important element of the growing alignment between the two countries.</p> +<hr /> -<p><em>Israel and the Gulf States</em></p> +<p>案件編號：HCCC69-70/2022</p>獨媒報導李予信冀大眾關注案件 藉判詞思考社會走向 清晨逾200人排隊旁聽 有公眾指罵大媽為「排隊黨」 戴耀廷囚10年 其餘44人囚4年2個月至7年9個月 戴耀廷等4名組織者被列「首要分子」區諾軒趙家賢任證人獲一半減刑 所有參選人被列「積極參加者」 發起「墨落無悔」3名抗爭派量刑最重 林景楠任證人囚5年2個月 官無就作供減刑：對控方毫無幫助 官：不接受被告稱涉案計劃註定失敗 61萬投票市民不如此認為 法官指11名認罪被告有真誠悔意 當局評估是否提早釋放時會考慮 何桂藍發帖：歷史由有意志者書寫 人人可定義香港 專訪吳政亨：我以「傻」為榮 陳寶瑩：呢個係冤獄，一日都唔應該坐 呂智恆養母判刑後舉標語 涉公眾地方行為不檢被捕 判刑後長毛致信太太：未因言行悔疚、爭取民主並沒有錯 陳文敏指量刑貼近國安法三級制 料律政司上訴難度大 多國發聲明關注 外交部：無端指責、干涉中國內政 民建聯抗議美國抹黑 領事館未有派代表接信Semiconductor Mfg. Equipment2024-11-19T12:00:00+08:002024-11-19T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/semiconductor-manufacturing-equipment<p><em>This report argues that existing controls incentivize China to minimize reliance on U.S. semiconductor manufacturing equipment by indigenizing development of tools and increasing purchases from third-country suppliers, which ultimately hinders U.S. technology leadership.</em></p> -<p>After Turkey, Israel has been Azerbaijan’s most important external partner in military, investment and diplomatic support. Azerbaijan has looked to Israel to provide it with key military capabilities, as well as technologies to advance its ambitions to move its economy away from reliance on hydrocarbon production. Azerbaijan has become a significant energy supplier to Israel. Israel has, on the other hand, had modest relations with Georgia and Armenia, and its engagement in the South Caucasus has served primarily to reinforce Baku’s international options and capabilities, rather than to play a regional role. At the same time, Iran’s concern about a potential Israeli security presence in Azerbaijan has fed into Tehran’s broader foreign and military approach to the South Caucasus, notably into an effort to weaken Baku through support for Armenia.</p> +<excerpt /> -<p>Building on their established links to Azerbaijan, Gulf states are increasingly looking to the South Caucasus for investment and trade opportunities, particularly in the energy and transportation sectors.</p> +<p>Export controls on semiconductor manufacturing equipment (SME) represent a key focus of ongoing U.S. government efforts to “choke off” China’s access to leading-edge semiconductors. The United States, along with allies such as the Netherlands and Japan, is a global leader in production and R&amp;D for chipmaking tools. By imposing uniquely broad and unilateral controls on U.S. toolmakers’ access to the Chinese market, however, the U.S. government has turbocharged Chinese efforts to wean off all U.S. SME due to growing concerns about the reliability and trustworthiness of U.S. companies. In this way, expanding U.S. trade restrictions are facilitating the “design-out” of U.S. toolmakers in Chinese semiconductor supply chains in favor of domestic and third-country (i.e., non-U.S. and non-Chinese) companies. This growing trend in China’s market, the world’s largest for semiconductor manufacturing, threatens the long-term leadership of the United States in SME by diverting revenue (and R&amp;D investment) away from U.S. industry. As a result, current U.S. export controls risk jeopardizing the economic and national security of the United States by hindering U.S. companies’ market share and accelerating China’s relative technological gains. This report, the second in a series on U.S. semiconductor export controls, outlines the importance of SME to chip markets, key types of tools being designed-out, and the rapid growth of Chinese toolmakers. It also evaluates how toolmakers based in third countries have leveraged U.S. unilateral controls to win new business with Chinese customers. The report argues that the United States should limit further unilateral controls on SME sales and consider new incentives for allies to create multilateral export regimes, which could mitigate some of the negative impacts of current controls on U.S. companies.</p> -<p><em>China and Central Asia</em></p> +<h3 id="introduction">Introduction</h3> -<p>China’s presence in the South Caucasus has been growing through trade and tourism, as well as infrastructure projects. The new international interest in transport corridors through the South Caucasus, in part created by the wars in Ukraine and the Middle East, has increased China’s engagement in the region as it seeks to develop “the Great Silk Road” as part of its global Belt and Road Initiative. The award to a Chinese-led consortium of a contract to build the Anaklia deepwater port in Georgia is a particular focus for Beijing as part of its effort to build transport infrastructure connecting China’s economy to European markets.</p> +<p>With geopolitical competition intensifying, U.S. economic security policy has undergone significant changes. Primarily, the United States has expanded economic security measures to take new defensive actions around critical and emerging technologies (CETs). Such efforts center on denying China access to key foundational technologies — particularly advanced semiconductors that support dual-use applications such as artificial intelligence (AI).</p> -<p>The pull of China in relation to economic and trade issues is also drawing the countries of the South Caucasus to the east in their external relations, as efforts to develop the Middle Corridor accelerate. While the central approach of China in the South Caucasus appears to be geo-economic, its growing interest in Georgia has been linked to the erosion of democratic practices through rising elite corruption, while also being seen to reinforce the broader regional shift of foreign policy – away from the Euro-Atlantic community.</p> +<p>The administrations of Presidents Donald Trump and Joe Biden have expanded economic security measures regarding China’s access to CETs. Export controls are an increasingly common tool in U.S. economic security efforts, and National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan has called them a “new strategic asset in the U.S. and allied toolkit.” Under the Biden administration, the federal government has implemented two major rounds of semiconductor export controls, one in October 2022 and a second in October 2023. Additional controls may be forthcoming as the United States aims to use trade restrictions to deny China access to leading-edge semiconductors, thus limiting China’s ability to develop military and dual-use technologies such as advanced AI systems.</p> -<p>To cement its developing regional role, China has sought to conclude “strategic agreements” with Georgia and Azerbaijan. Baku has made the most significant shift to the east, even raising the prospect of joining regional formats, and President Ilham Aliyev has attended the Central Asia head of state consultative meetings, as well as forging bilateral and minilateral ties with countries across that region. The transport connectivity agenda is, however, exerting a pull on all the South Caucasus countries, pushing them to develop ties linking the Black and Caspian Sea regions.</p> +<p>The potential benefits of such a strategy to economic and national security are obvious. They include maintaining technological superiority for modern military capabilities and intelligence gathering. Washington sees clear, legitimate risks associated with the proliferation of highly advanced semiconductors among its adversaries. A sensible U.S. export control policy focused on preserving technological superiority is a measured response.</p> -<p><em>India and Pakistan</em></p> +<p>Export controls, however, are a double-edged sword. When a nation decides to implement controls, it effectively restricts its companies’ market share. If controls negatively affect a nation’s technological champions, policymakers may inadvertently compromise their country’s status as a long-term technology leader. The loss in sales decreases these tech champions’ revenue and, in some cases, redirects it to foreign competitors, potentially reducing future investments in innovation for key U.S. firms.</p> -<p>India and Pakistan are relatively minor international actors in the region, but India has been increasing its arms sales, notably becoming a primary supplier to Armenia, while Pakistan has concluded defence agreements with Azerbaijan. Pakistan has sought to track India’s growing regional ties as an extension of their bilateral rivalry. Relations with the South Caucasus also reflect India’s long-term plans to build new trade and transport routes from South Asia across Eurasia to Europe, linking the region to the Gulf and the Indian Ocean. These new ties are becoming the basis for competing groupings, with India seeking to cooperate with Iran and Armenia, and Pakistan looking to partner with Turkey and Azerbaijan.</p> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Washington sees clear, legitimate risks associated with the proliferation of highly advanced semiconductors among its adversaries. A sensible U.S. export control policy focused on preserving technological superiority is a measured response.</code></em></strong></p> -<h4 id="the-south-caucasus-as-a-multipolar-region">The South Caucasus as a Multipolar Region</h4> +<p>If the relative costs imposed on China’s technological progression and the corresponding benefits to U.S. national security outweigh the costs to U.S. industry and innovation, then Washington may well view these impacts as a necessary price. However, China’s semiconductor ecosystem — through its own strategies and through government support — has managed to undermine the effectiveness of many of the controls meant to keep Chinese firms behind their Western counterparts. For one, Chinese companies have found ways to access U.S. technology by circumventing controls. These efforts have been widely written about and include using overseas shell companies to purchase controlled products, as well as leveraging domestic technology trading networks to redirect technology via firms that are exempt from controls.</p> -<p>The emergence of a multitude of international actors in the South Caucasus is changing the region’s international environment. While Russia and the Euro-Atlantic community remain key reference points, reflecting their continuing regional strategic weight, new actors are offering additional security, economic and transport relationships. Minilateral formats are emerging to reflect new partnerships and blending of interests, and some South Caucasus states are looking to participate in larger multilateral formats, including the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, the BRICS (Azerbaijan announced its application to join in August 2024), and the Organization of Turkic States.</p> +<p>Beyond circumvention efforts, U.S. export controls have helped facilitate a farther-reaching unintended consequence: China has set its domestic semiconductor ecosystem on a path toward removing U.S. technology altogether. Chinese government and commercial actors have deployed two key long-term strategies to create ex-U.S. supply chains for semiconductor technologies across the value chain. These strategies, which represent the focus of this series of papers by the CSIS Economics Program and Scholl Chair in International Business, include the following:</p> -<p>For countries in the region, this approach to external ties is driven by two main interests. First, governments are pursuing balancing approaches to serve as counterweights to external integration projects that seek to curtail the position and interests of domestic elites, whether it is via Russia’s efforts to shape pro-Moscow regimes or the Euro-Atlantic community’s democracy, human rights and rule of law agenda challenging illiberal and kleptocratic regimes. Second, the broadening of external contacts has enabled countries in the South Caucasus to increase their leverage, and notably to hedge their dominant bilateral ties to Russia and the Euro-Atlantic community, in order to improve their bargaining position.</p> +<ol> + <li> + <p>Design-out: supplanting existing U.S. and allied semiconductor technologies with comparable technologies, from either</p> -<p>The development of this dimension of regional politics is, however, also a source for new instability in the region, with countries now linked to various disputes and competition beyond the South Caucasus, for example the tensions between Turkey and Israel over Gaza and Lebanon have unsettled their ties to Azerbaijan. It is also difficult for external actors to develop a stable approach to the region, as the regional governments are able to switch external partners and play them against each other to secure better offers.</p> + <p>a. Chinese firms; or</p> -<h4 id="russias-war-in-ukraine">Russia’s War in Ukraine</h4> + <p>b. third-country (non-U.S. and non-Chinese) firms</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Design-around: developing new technologies that do away with an entire category of controlled technology in the semiconductor supply chain</p> + </li> +</ol> -<p>Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 created shock waves across the South Caucasus. Initially, Russia pulled forces from the region to reinforce its struggling troops in Ukraine. As Moscow faced difficulties in overcoming Ukrainian forces, questions were raised in the region about the effectiveness of Russia as a military and security actor. The war also increased external pressure on the governments in the South Caucasus to take sides in the conflict, including through observing Western sanctions on Russia.</p> +<h3 id="design-out-and-design-around">Design-Out and Design-Around</h3> -<p>Georgia, concerned about the Russian threat to its own territories, distanced itself from Kyiv and refused to apply sanctions. Azerbaijan sought to maintain its policy of balancing, providing limited support to Ukraine, agreeing to supply extra gas volumes to Europe as it sought to diversify its energy markets, and emphasised its crucial geographic position at the heart of the Middle Corridor as an alternative to Russian transit routes. At the same time, Baku sought to maintain its strategic relationship with Moscow. Armenia, given its reliance on Moscow and questions about the effectiveness of Russian forces and the ability of Russia’s defence industry to supply weapons, began to recalibrate its security partnership with Russia.</p> +<p>As discussed in the Economics Program and Scholl Chair in International Business’s introductory report in this series, which covers advanced packaging, China is rapidly accelerating the design-out of U.S. technologies from semiconductor supply chains in response to existing — and in anticipation of future — U.S. export controls. It has pursued this goal, in part, by increasingly adopting domestic firms’ technologies. China’s semiconductor industry has rapidly pivoted toward made-in-China technology over the last few years, facilitated by expanded government investment and other incentives, as well as preferential procurement practices by Chinese semiconductor companies.</p> -<p>As the Ukraine war has continued, the impact of the conflict on the South Caucasus has shifted. With considerable uncertainty about the outcome of the war, all three South Caucasus states have sought to avoid being too overtly tied to one side and have pursued different balancing options. There is also concern that if Russia is victorious in Ukraine, it may then look to strengthen its control over the South Caucasus as the next step in efforts to expand Russia’s regional power, and so the prudent approach is to avoid taking sides.</p> +<p>There is also evidence of increased Chinese adoption of third-country suppliers within semiconductor supply chains. For instance, competitors from Japan, the Netherlands, Taiwan, Israel, and South Korea have increasingly leveraged China’s chip market as a growth engine, winning new Chinese customers and increasing existing customers’ wallet share as the impacts of U.S. export controls constrain the competitiveness of U.S. companies. This third-country design-out threat potentially shifts semiconductor industry leadership toward foreign competitors, some of whom offer China the very technologies U.S. companies are barred from selling.</p> -<p>At the same time, the Ukraine war has reshaped Russia’s own interests in the South Caucasus. As a result of the war and Western sanctions, the South Caucasus has become critical to Russia’s efforts to reorient trade and communications away from Europe. This has led Moscow to rebalance its regional relations, with Baku becoming central to Russia’s regional transportation plans.</p> +<p>In addition, China is looking to design around U.S. export controls — in other words, innovate to achieve advanced semiconductor capabilities using approaches not modeled on U.S. technologies. Importantly, this trend means China is beginning to innovate rather than copy foreign technology in the chip industry. As discussed in the packaging report, a shift away from a “fast-follower” approach toward a more innovative approach would represent a key change in U.S.-China technological competition — one that potentially threatens long-term U.S. innovation leadership.</p> -<h3 id="iii-russias-repositioning-in-the-south-caucasus">III. Russia’s Repositioning in the South Caucasus</h3> +<p>It would be one thing if China’s design-out and design-around strategies affected only leading-edge semiconductor technologies, which are the primary targets of U.S. export controls. However, China’s pivot away from U.S. technology has affected not only the leading edge but also foundational, or “trailing-edge,” semiconductor technologies. Chinese and third-country firms want to avoid dealing with the high regulatory and financial burdens of U.S. export controls, which are complex, stricter than other nations’ in coverage and enforcement, and fast evolving. As a result, Chinese and foreign companies selling to the Chinese market are newly incentivized to avoid using U.S. technology where possible. Additionally, the ambiguity of the controls means that firms may opt to overcomply with export regulations and avoid selling or purchasing U.S. technologies — even if the products technically fall outside of the controls — for fear of dealing with costly litigation.</p> -<p>Faced with the current shifts across the region, Russia has sought to craft a new balance of policies so that it can reposition itself and remain at the heart of the South Caucasus regional order.</p> +<p>The United States, for its part, looks to press forward with stricter controls. This threat of stricter controls, in turn, encourages China to design out and design around other U.S. technologies to hedge against future regulations. In this way, tightening unilateral U.S. export controls is having a ripple effect across the Chinese — and global — semiconductor ecosystem, threatening to undermine U.S. leadership and leverage in the sector.</p> -<h4 id="security-policy">Security Policy</h4> +<h3 id="overview">Overview</h3> -<p>Despite the emergence of new policy tools, Moscow continues to use security issues to shape the region towards its interests. The ongoing occupation of Abkhazia and South Ossetia and their steady integration into Russia remains a defining point in Moscow’s regional position. As the relationship between Georgia and the Euro-Atlantic community has frayed, as Tbilisi has adopted increasingly anti-democratic domestic policies and continued to develop ties with Russia, Moscow has rebalanced its approach from threat to inducement around the protracted Abkhaz and South Ossetian conflict. Before the Georgian elections on 26 October 2024 Moscow hinted that it would be ready to help Tbilisi “normalise” relations with the two breakaway regions.</p> +<p><strong><em>Semiconductor Manufacturing Equipment</em></strong></p> -<p>At the same time, the fact that the Euro-Atlantic community has not been prepared to challenge Russian military occupation of Abkhazia and South Ossetia directly signals to the wider region the limit of EU/NATO regional commitment. While Russia’s policy towards Georgia remains a clear indication that Moscow will not countenance Euro-Atlantic integration in the region, its ability to bind the wider region through security ties has, however, corroded, notably with the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and the subsequent shift by Armenia towards a broader range of security partners.</p> +<p>This paper focuses on China’s design-out and design-around strategies related to semiconductor manufacturing equipment (SME) — the machines critical to making chips. China’s access to such equipment has become increasingly important to its national semiconductor ambitions as expanding U.S. and allied export controls limit Chinese access to leading global chip manufacturers such as Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC), Samsung, and Intel.</p> -<p>Since its defeat in the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War, Armenia has signalled strong dissatisfaction with the Russian security guarantee, and there has been an escalation of negative rhetoric regarding Moscow’s role. Yerevan has taken steps on the margins of its security relationship with Moscow to underline its discontent, opened to a wider range of external relationships, including with the Euro-Atlantic community, and begun to rebuild its military through partnerships with Europe, India and the US. While Armenia may be able to “navigate a path away from Russia” through diversifying its security partnerships, there are real limits on how far Armenia can push, at least in the medium term. It has become clear since 2020 that Russian security protection does not extend to actions by Azerbaijan. However, ultimately, only Moscow is willing to give security guarantees to Armenia when it believes it remains vulnerable to other external threats, notably from Turkey, and there continues to be security interdependence between Russia and Armenia. Moscow may also be ready to threaten more direct responses to Armenia if it veers far from Russian interests.</p> +<p>SME is a strong example of the design-out issue. Chinese companies are increasingly replacing U.S. producers one-to-one in Chinese semiconductor manufacturing facilities, or fabs. As procurement practices in Chinese fabs shift toward an anywhere-but-the-United-States approach, SME sales are also shifting toward third-country toolmakers.</p> -<p>Azerbaijan has sought to diminish Russia’s security leverage, notably through a commitment over several decades to building ties to other military partners (Turkey and Israel). But an equally important element of managing the Russian security threat has been Baku’s decision to eschew EU and NATO integration – a decision taken to a significant degree in light of the lesson of the 2008 Russo-Georgian War that the Euro-Atlantic community is not ready to challenge Russia militarily in the region. To underline that it does not seek to break away completely from Russia, Azerbaijan has sought to identify a positive agenda of alternative policy areas for cooperation with Russia where it can shape a partnership in its interests.</p> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">SME is a strong example of the design-out issue. Chinese companies are increasingly replacing U.S. producers one-to-one in Chinese semiconductor manufacturing facilities, or fabs.</code></em></strong></p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/6BEfo31.png" alt="image02" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 2: Key South Caucasus Transport Routes.</strong> Source: Tanvir Anjum Adib/Wikimedia. Edited by RUSI.</em></p> +<p>The United States would benefit economically and strategically from continuing to sell some SME technology to China. These benefits do not apply to technologies that are highly specific to advanced dual-use technology and cannot be acquired elsewhere or rapidly developed domestically. For example, ASML’s sales of extreme ultraviolet (EUV) lithography provide a choke point for Chinese technological advancement into fabrication processes like 3 nanometers (nm) and is a prime example of the power of export controls. But for less niche and non-sole-sourced tools, unilateral and broad export controls risk U.S. technology champions losing out on revenue while China maintains its access to the same technology, either via industry indigenization efforts or shifting purchases to third countries.</p> -<h4 id="transport-and-communications">Transport and Communications</h4> +<p>This paper explores why SME is important to semiconductor technological innovation, what types of U.S. SME are facing design-out and design-around risks, and what implications those risks carry for U.S. economic and national security.</p> -<p>Moscow’s most important policy shift regarding the changing political and economic dynamics of the South Caucasus is the new emphasis given to the region as a zone for trade and communications (see Figure 2). The breakdown of ties with the Euro-Atlantic community, the imposition of sanctions and the closing of some markets has effectively forced Russia to reorient its economic policy on a north–south axis, away from the previous east–west axis. Moscow’s efforts to reorient its external economic relations, as part of the wider shift in its foreign and security relations brought about by the Ukraine war, are already having significant results, as trade along a north–south axis, notably with Iran and India, has increased substantially in recent years.</p> +<h4 id="why-is-semiconductor-manufacturing-equipment-important">Why Is Semiconductor Manufacturing Equipment Important?</h4> -<p>In this context, the key project for Russia is the International North–South Transit Corridor (INSTC), a series of rail, ship and road routes connecting Russia to Iran and its Gulf ports and beyond, to South and East Asia. The most promising route goes through Azerbaijan, the only country that borders both Russia and Iran, and which already has a railway connecting Russia and Iran. While the INSTC has been on the drawing board since 2005, it has gained new impetus since the war in Ukraine and Western efforts to isolate Russia economically. In May 2023, Russia and Iran agreed to complete, by 2027, the construction of a railway from the Iran–Azerbaijan border, at Astara, to Rasht in northern Iran, which represents the last missing rail link to connect St Petersburg to the Gulf. Realisation of the INSTC is a strategic goal for Moscow, supported by Iran and India, but Russia is likely to be the main funder of any new infrastructure, in view of its pressing need to bypass Western sanctions.</p> +<p>Making semiconductors is impossible without a wide array of specialized, highly advanced machinery. Each manufacturing plant, or fab, contains an average of 1,200 multi-million-dollar tools — all of which are critical to chip production. This group of tools transforms a thin piece of crystalline silicon or other semiconducting material into a fabricated wafer containing billions — if not trillions — of nanometric transistors precisely etched onto a tiny surface area (often just 300 millimeters). Capital expenditures (CapEx) on SME constitute an estimated 75 percent of total CapEx on fab construction, and some tools reach the size of a double-decker bus, costing upward of $150 million.</p> -<p>The focus on connectivity in the South Caucasus is giving Russia a new direction for its security policy. Russia is aiming to assert a security role in the South Caucasus transport network to unblock the regional transport network on its terms and, thereby, provide Moscow with important regional leverage. For this reason, the Zangezur Corridor has become a particular focus for Russian diplomacy and a key interest in the wider Armenia–Azerbaijan peace negotiations.</p> +<p>Semiconductor fabrication, both for leading-edge process nodes and mature chip technologies, is one of the most complex manufacturing processes on the planet — in large part due to the machinery required. For instance, ASML’s EUV lithography devices have been called “the most complicated machine humans have built.” As a result, advancements in SME technology have historically represented a key driver of semiconductor industry innovation. High-quality SME is also critical to the economics of scaled production, as any imprecision in a finished chip’s structure or composition can affect performance and reduce a fab’s production yield. All this means that a fab’s access to tools is a leading determinant of how competitive its technology is on a global scale.</p> -<p>Citing provisions on Russian security personnel managing the land corridor in the 2020 Armenia–Azerbaijan ceasefire agreement brokered by Moscow, the Kremlin insists on its presence along the corridor. If it were able to exert influence on the region’s transport networks, Moscow would gain new leverage over the countries of the South Caucasus, including Georgia, which currently is the main axis for north–south trade. Russia has sought to channel negotiations on transport links into the 2021 tripartite commission on this issue that it convenes with Armenia and Azerbaijan, and into key bilateral formats.</p> +<p>SME is often divided into front-end equipment used in wafer fabrication and processing, such as lithography, etch, deposition, and cleaning, and back-end equipment used for assembly, packaging, dicing, bonding, and testing. Because the advanced packaging brief covers assembly and packaging equipment, this brief focuses on fabrication and test equipment in evaluating design-out and design-around risks.</p> -<h4 id="pivot-to-azerbaijan-monitoring-georgia">Pivot to Azerbaijan, Monitoring Georgia</h4> +<p>Four types of SME across front-end and back-end equipment are under significant threat of design-out: (1) deposition, (2) etching, (3) process control, and (4) testing. While discussions of the semiconductor supply chain often group testing with assembly and packaging, the authors include testing within SME here for two reasons: First, testing plays a key role in front-end wafer fabrication (as well as in back-end processes like assembly and packaging), as it takes place continually throughout the production life cycle. Second, the design-out and design-around dynamics of testing equipment are more like those of chipmaking tools rather than those of assembly or packaging technologies. As in the areas of etching, deposition, and process control, the United States is home to leading competitors in testing equipment, which are facing design-out risks from foreign manufacturers. For these reasons, testing is included as part of SME in this report.</p> -<p>A third key component of Moscow’s evolving policy towards the South Caucasus is a deepened partnership with Baku. Azerbaijan has emerged as the leading regional state as a result of its military successes against Armenia, its ability to build a latticework of external partners, and its balancing policy towards Russia. Indeed, Azerbaijan is now essential for Russia in terms of energy exports and its transport links to Iran. The Kremlin has stressed that Azerbaijan is a “stable” partner in the region, and has spoken of the bilateral relationship in warm terms as having an “alliance” character.</p> +<p>The following section introduces each category of SME as well as the key U.S. and global players associated with it. The primary takeaway is that U.S. manufacturers, alongside competitors primarily from U.S.-allied countries such as Japan and the Netherlands, have historically held leading shares of global equipment markets — particularly for chipmaking technologies at the leading edge. This leadership underscores the high stakes of any shift in global market share because of U.S. export controls. U.S. companies have much revenue and technological leadership to lose to new Chinese companies — as well as Dutch, Japanese, Israeli, German, and other foreign firms, many of which are well positioned in equipment markets to grab a share of the U.S. market.</p> -<p>Azerbaijan has been able to use its newfound regional leverage to bypass Russia’s efforts to manipulate regional conflicts – ignoring Russia’s demands over Nagorno-Karabakh, forcing the withdrawal of Russian peacekeepers, and sidelining Moscow’s role in mediating the Armenia–Azerbaijan relationship – all while maintaining a degree of support for Ukraine. But Baku has lined up behind Russia on Moscow’s interests where they largely align with those of Azerbaijan. Together with Russia, Azerbaijan has been critical of Armenia’s efforts to reach out to the Euro-Atlantic community, and it has opposed the deployment of an EU border-monitoring mission to the region. Azerbaijan is also publicly supporting Russia’s position on transport corridors across Armenia, even if there are suspicions that Baku would also be keen to leave Russia out of the route.</p> +<h4 id="deposition">Deposition</h4> -<p>While Azerbaijan is now Russia’s main regional partner, Moscow is paying close attention to contemporary developments within Georgia. Since the Rose Revolution, Georgia has been the anchor of the Euro-Atlantic community’s regional engagement, and in 2023, the EU granted Tbilisi candidate status. However, despite movement on some bureaucratic processes, the integration of Georgia into the Euro-Atlantic community has been effectively frozen following the 2008 Russo-Georgian War, reflecting the reluctance of the US and its European allies to challenge directly Moscow’s security commitment to Abkhazia and South Ossetia.</p> +<p>The deposition process involves specialized tools depositing thin films of conducting, isolating, or semiconducting materials on the wafer. Deposition takes place throughout the fabrication stage and often occurs in multiple sequential iterations along with processes such as photolithography and etching. It plays a key role in enabling miniaturization in semiconductors, as it can create protective barriers to prevent atomic-level interference. Deposition can also help strengthen or weaken an electric field and connect transistors with other devices and power sources.</p> -<p>Since the Georgian Dream political party – established and led by the billionaire Bidzina Ivanishvili – entered government in Tbilisi in 2012, Georgia has followed a twin-track policy of seeking to advance NATO and EU memberships while also pursuing a policy of gradual normalisation with Moscow. With Euro-Atlantic integration unable to make real progress and with the turn to increasingly authoritarian domestic politics in Georgia in recent years, the relationship between Tbilisi, Washington and Brussels has deteriorated significantly.</p> +<p>There are various types of deposition used in wafer fabrication. U.S. companies such as Lam, Applied Materials, Plasma-Therm, and Veeco are key players across most types of deposition tools. The two areas discussed in depth here are epitaxy and atomic layer deposition, given their potential for design-out by Chinese supply chains.</p> -<p>At the same time, the normalisation process with Russia has continued, even in the difficult context of the war in Ukraine. While there is little evidence that Russia has driven the breakdown in ties between Georgia and the Euro-Atlantic community, Moscow has opportunistically sought to benefit. The Georgian government has also given the impression that it is ready to move closer to Moscow if the US and Europe continue to set democracy and human rights conditions that are unacceptable to Georgian Dream.</p> +<p>Epitaxy — also known as “epi” — involves depositing a near-perfect crystalline layer directly on top of the wafer substrate. Epitaxy growth typically occurs during the beginning of the wafer fabrication process, following wafer polishing and preceding the sequences of lithography, etching, and other deposition processes. Adding an epitaxial layer helps fabs better control doping wafers with impurities and can introduce a different material than that used in wafer “bulk” materials. As a result, epitaxy facilitates more effective electron transmission, a key goal in advanced chipmaking.</p> -<p>Against this background, the October 2024 parliamentary elections were seen as a critical test of Georgia’s future. With Georgian Dream claiming victory in the disputed elections, relations with the Euro-Atlantic community appear set to deteriorate further. Following the election, the US and European countries called for an investigation into how it was conducted and, in particular, the steps taken ahead of the vote by the ruling party to ensure its victory. US President Joe Biden publicly raised concerns about the decline of democracy in Georgia.</p> +<p>Epitaxy innovation plays an important role in the ongoing evolution of both chip fabrication and advanced packaging. Epitaxy is important to nonclassical wafer substrates (i.e., nonsilicon) such as gallium arsenide (GaAs), gallium nitride (GaN), and silicon carbide (SiC), which play a key role in critical technologies such as aerospace and defense applications and electric vehicles. An emerging technology within the field of epitaxy is remote epitaxy. Remote epitaxy is the growth of a thin epitaxial layer that is aligned — but not in contact — with the substrate. This technique has a plethora of applications in advanced packaging, particularly three-dimensional (3D) packaging designs, in which multiple chips are stacked to enhance bandwidth while reducing power consumption and footprint.</p> -<p>At the same time, having offered ahead of the election to facilitate Georgia’s territorial disputes as a means to promote support for Georgian Dream, Moscow will need to demonstrate that it can deliver progress on a new relationship between Georgia and the two breakaway regions that will satisfy Tbilisi. Given Moscow’s strategic investment in the nominal independence of these regions, the prospects of significant shifts over the status of Abkhazia and South Ossetia are, however, slim, likely placing an important check on how far Russia–Georgia rapprochement can advance. The Georgian government may well move closer to Russia to test Moscow’s offer, but is likely to continue to pursue multi-alignment in its foreign and security policies rather than joining Russia’s regional organisations such as the CSTO or the EAEU.</p> +<p>The epitaxy equipment market includes tools used for metal-organic chemical vapor deposition, high-temperature chemical vapor deposition, and molecular beam epitaxy. Leading suppliers are based in Germany, the United States, and Japan — as well as China. Key companies in terms of 2020 market share include Germany’s Aixtron, the United States’ Veeco, China’s Advanced Micro-Fabrication Equipment Inc., China (AMEC), and Japan’s Tokyo Electron (TEL).</p> -<h4 id="economic-and-trade-relations">Economic and Trade Relations</h4> +<p>Atomic layer deposition (ALD) is an advanced type of chemical vapor deposition (CVD) that adds layers consisting of a single atom of thickness onto a wafer. It is key to leading-edge chip designs due to the importance of controlling layer thickness and composition in fabricating advanced chips, whose features are small enough that the industry is running up against the physical limits of miniaturization. There are two key types of ALD: thermal ALD and plasma-enhanced ALD (PEALD). Whereas the former relies solely on chemical precursors to deposit the atomic layer, PEALD uses plasma to provide reaction energy for the process, enabling greater control over film characteristics.</p> -<p>As an economic actor, Russia remains vital for the countries of the South Caucasus. Indeed, sanctions on Russia over its invasion of Ukraine have strengthened interdependence between Russia (and, via the EAEU, Belarus and Central Asia) and the countries of the region. The Ukraine war is having far-reaching impacts on the geo-economics of the South Caucasus, with the region’s role as an energy and trade corridor becoming even more significant, notably for Russia.</p> +<p>Netherlands-based ASM is the leader in ALD, particularly PEALD, holding above 50 percent of the market, according to investor materials. Additional key suppliers include Japan’s Kokusai, TEL, and Optorun, as well as the United States’ Lam Research. As of 2020, China’s Naura had a “negligible” share.</p> -<p>Georgia serves as an example for Moscow of how – despite the political tensions between the two governments over the occupied territories – economic cooperation has a positive impact on relations. Indeed, trade with Russia has continued to be strong in recent years. Since 2021, Georgia’s economic dependence on Russia has increased, with some sectors reliant on the Russian market. For example, in 2023, wine exports to Russia increased 5% on the previous year, with the Russian market taking 65% of Georgian wine exports, the highest level since 2013. Although there is widespread Georgian public distrust and even hostility to Russia, views on closer economic relations are mixed.</p> +<h4 id="etching">Etching</h4> -<p>For Armenia, despite the political rhetoric about souring ties, economic relations continue to flourish, with a notable rise in exports following the onset of the Ukraine war – widely seen as a result of Armenia (alongside Georgia) becoming a route to Russia for goods that avoided sanctions. Russia is Armenia’s largest trading partner, with an overall foreign trade volume in 2023 of more than 35% and notably 49.6% of Armenia’s imports coming from Russia. In 2022, the volume of trade between Armenia and Russia nearly doubled, a trend that continued through 2023 and the first months of 2024. In 2023, Russia’s over 35% share of the country’s foreign trade contrasted with the EU’s 13%. Russian companies also have considerable investments in Armenia, notably owning key parts of the energy sector and the railways, and make a substantial contribution through taxes to the national budget.</p> +<p>The etching process involves carving a precise pattern onto the wafer by selectively removing layers of material using either liquid or gas chemicals. Etching takes the pattern created during photolithography — during which a light selectively removes parts of a photoresist coating based on a photomask design — and applies this pattern permanently to the material layer below. Etching occurs multiple times in fabrication and creates a complex pattern of cavities where the thin film layer has been removed.</p> -<p>For Azerbaijan, which has sought to diversity its economic as well as security policy, economic ties with Russia are following a similar trajectory to its neighbours. In 2023, trade between Azerbaijan and Moscow was reported to have risen by 17.5%. Bilateral energy trade has also developed in recent years.</p> +<p>There are two main types of etching tools: dry and wet. Dry etching tools use gases to engrave the wafer and are necessary to create the circuitry on leading-edge chips. Atomic layer etching tools are particularly important for advanced process node production due to their greater control and precision. Wet etching, which uses liquid chemicals to engrave the wafer, is less common than dry etching for advanced process nodes due to the challenges of creating complex structures. However, it is cheaper and less risky, making it commonly used to clean wafers. Because etching also plays a key role in mature chip technologies, both dry and wet etching tools are critical to semiconductor manufacturing.</p> -<h4 id="cooperation-with-regional-powers">Cooperation with Regional Powers</h4> +<p>The United States and Japan are the world’s leading suppliers of etching equipment, followed by China and South Korea. Lam Research, Applied Materials, and KLA all have strong shares in global dry and wet etching markets. Japan’s TEL, Hitachi, and Screen are other notable players. South Korea-based SEMES represents a growing wet etching player. Finally, in China, AMEC, Naura, and Kingsemi are notable small providers of etching tools.</p> -<p>It would appear that Russia has implicitly accepted that it can no longer maintain primacy in the South Caucasus and that other, notably regional, powers will have roles. The Russian regionalisation policy aims at intensifying dialogue, coordination and interaction with the main regional powers engaged in the South Caucasus. Moscow has, however, tried to maintain a regional leadership position through seeking to manage informal cooperation – and competition – with Turkey and Iran. Iran has become a key ally for Russia on the international stage and both countries share an interest in developing closer ties and north–south trade links. On 25 December 2023, the EAEU signed a free-trade agreement with Iran that will eliminate customs duties on almost 90% of goods, thereby linking Russia’s regional economic integration initiative to its efforts to build a wider bloc of friendly countries beyond the post-Soviet space. While Turkey and Russia cooperate and compete in various theatres (often articulated through tactical alliances), including in the South Caucasus, they share an interest in establishing a new regional strategic equilibrium around a potential peace settlement of the Armenia–Azerbaijan confrontation.</p> +<h4 id="process-control">Process Control</h4> -<p>Institutionally, Russia supports the 3 + 3 South Caucasus Regional Cooperation Platform format, which sets the stage for the direct participation of Iran and Turkey in determining the future of the region – although Georgia has, to date, boycotted the grouping. Speaking at the October 2024 meeting of the 3 + 3 format, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov indicated that Armenia and Azerbaijan should use the platform to negotiate their peace agreement.</p> +<p>Process control refers to using monitoring tools in semiconductor manufacturing to ensure quality control. It takes place concurrently with other stages of fabrication and involves metrics like the purity of wafer materials, transistor dimensions, and chip conductivity. As chip dimensions get smaller, variations at the molecular level represent a larger share of an integrated circuit’s dimensions, making process control increasingly important in fabrication. Ongoing industry shifts, like the switch from single patterning to multiple patterning and from planar to 3D transistors, mean that variations increasingly come from the material quality or the deposition process, calling for more advanced control tools.</p> -<h4 id="the-armeniaazerbaijan-peace-settlement">The Armenia–Azerbaijan Peace Settlement</h4> +<p>Process control is important to both advanced and mature node production, as it has a key impact on yield. Wafer production yield, or the percentage of individual chips (dies) per wafer that make it through the final probe testing stage, is a critical metric for fabs due to their high per-unit operating costs. Process control technology helps enable a higher yield, thus improving profitability by minimizing wasted output.</p> -<p>A resolution of the bitter Armenia–Azerbaijan relationship through a peace agreement and subsequent process of normalisation stands at the centre of the potential transformation of the South Caucasus. Agreement between Baku and Yerevan would open the region for investment in transport, trade, energy and communications projects, unlock closed borders, and create some of the conditions for Armenia–Turkey normalisation. The nature of an agreement would also have a profound impact on the balance of power within the South Caucasus. For these reasons, the negotiations between Armenia and Azerbaijan have become a focus of external actors, with Russia, the EU (notably France and Germany) and the US jockeying for influence and a role in the negotiations.</p> +<p>Key types of semiconductor process control technologies include photomask inspection and repair tools, process monitoring equipment, wafer inspection equipment, and wafer-level inspection packaging tools. U.S. companies hold strong market share across all key types of tools. Notable U.S. players include Applied Materials, KLA, Keithley Instruments, Keysight Technologies, Onto Innovation, Nanotronics, and Thermo Fisher. Japan and Germany are home to most leading competitors, such as Lasertec, Rigaku, and Screen in Japan and Zeiss and Bruker in Germany. Chinese players are smaller and include Shanghai Micro Electronics Equipment (SMEE), Jingce, and Raintree.</p> -<p>With Azerbaijan’s victory in its two military campaigns in 2020 and 2023 to reclaim the occupied territories and the Nagorno-Karabakh region, Russia’s previous leverage around the protracted conflict collapsed as the OSCE Minsk Group process (the diplomatic mechanism established in 1992 to facilitate negotiations to end the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh under the co-chairmanship of the US, Russia and France) was marginalised, Moscow’s leverage as the leading arms supplier to both sides evaporated, and Baku sought to move negotiations between different formats and ultimately to push successfully for direct bilateral Armenia–Azerbaijan contacts as the way forward to exclude third parties (principally Russia, the US and the EU).</p> +<p>While various players compete across the entire process control ecosystem, individual markets are often highly concentrated among a few players. For instance, the market for wafer-level packaging inspection tools is dominated by one U.S. and one Israeli firm. As a result, the impact of export controls on a single company’s positioning can have a significant effect on global market shares.</p> -<p>With the departure of Russian “peacekeepers” from Nagorno-Karabakh in April 2024, as well as pressure on the Russian relationship with Armenia, Moscow’s ability to use security to shape developments on the ground has been undermined. Instead, it has sought to reposition itself diplomatically to shape developments so that an eventual peace agreement would also serve Russian interests.</p> +<h4 id="testing">Testing</h4> -<p>Moscow’s goals have been to ensure that Russia has a central role in any agreements about the future shape and management of land transport and communications infrastructure in the South Caucasus, that the Euro-Atlantic community is marginalised, and that the region’s immediate neighbours (Russia, Turkey and Iran) emerge as the key regional arbiters – with Moscow in the lead role. Russia has sought to insert itself into the key issue of a transport corridor across Armenia and to ensure that the INSTC, which is vital to its ability to build economic and trade links to the south, goes ahead. Moscow views a role in these areas as critical to ensuring its regional influence, notably in the Armenia–Azerbaijan relationship.</p> +<p>Semiconductor testing occurs at multiple stages during fabrication and packaging, helping ensure defective chips do not make it into final packages. Chips go through up to six stages of testing: (1) wafer acceptance, (2) wafer sort, (3) wafer-level burn-in, (4) package test, (5) burn-in test, and (6) testing at the system level. Testing equipment has taken on increased importance and industry value as the cost of testing devices and the potential losses associated with manufacturing defective dice have risen in response to advances in chip design and applications such as advanced graphics processing units, which are commonly used to train AI models.</p> -<p>The partnership with Azerbaijan has become central to Russia’s efforts to advance this agenda – notably as the transatlantic community has increasingly aligned to support Armenia, leading to growing tensions with Baku. In August 2024, the visit of Russian Security Council Secretary Sergey Shoigu to Baku underlined how the variety of Russian regional interests are now being channelled through the bilateral relationship. In a meeting with President Aliyev, Shoigu highlighted the intersection of the peace negotiations, the development of the INSTC and the future agenda of the 3 + 3 format to manage the stabilisation of the South Caucasus, with efforts to prevent Western “meddling” in the region.</p> +<p>Key types of semiconductor testing tools include burn-in test equipment, handlers and probes, linear and discrete testing tools, and system-on-a-chip testing equipment. Japanese and U.S. firms hold leading market shares in different parts of the industry. Notable Japanese companies include Advantest, Tesec, and Accretech. U.S. players include Teradyne, National Instruments, and Cohu. South Korean firms such as UniTest and DI Corporation are also key participants. Chinese capabilities have historically been more limited.</p> -<h3 id="conclusion-russia-retying-the-caucasian-knot">Conclusion: Russia Retying the Caucasian Knot?</h3> +<h3 id="how-the-ear-impacts-us-and-foreign-toolmakers">How the EAR Impacts U.S. and Foreign Toolmakers</h3> -<p>For most of the past two hundred years, Russia has pursued relatively stable strategic goals in relation to the South Caucasus region. At the core, Russia has focused on binding the region to itself, as a buffer zone against external encroachment. In more expansionist foreign policy phases, such as since the turn of the 21st century under Putin, the region has been seen as integral to ambitions to extend Russia’s influence and control in the Black Sea and Caspian Sea regions, as well as the Middle East. At such times, the territories and peoples of the South Caucasus have also often been viewed by Moscow as part of a wider Russian world.</p> +<p>The Commerce Department’s October 7, 2022, rules, implemented under the Export Administration Regulations (EAR), require licensing of U.S. equipment and persons involved in certain types of chip manufacturing. Affected technologies include equipment used in the production of “logic chips with non-planar transistor architectures . . . of 16nm or 14nm, or below; DRAM memory chips of 18nm half-pitch or less; [and] NAND flash memory chips with 128 layers or more.” The regulation’s October 2023 updates tighten controls to include some older technologies, such as immersion deep ultraviolet (DUV) lithography.</p> -<p>With the South Caucasus undergoing a transformation, notably as result of geopolitical and geo-economic trends towards multipolarity, Russia’s regional role is displaying elements of continuity, but is increasingly characterised by change. Much of the analysis of the region sees Russia as experiencing a “managed decline” or loss of hegemony because of this process of change. The analysis in this paper, however, points to a different conclusion. Moscow is attempting to refashion its position through a renewed regional approach – seeking to retie the Caucasian knot to ensure a continuing central role for Russia in the South Caucasus, retain close links to countries in the region, and marginalise the Euro-Atlantic community.</p> +<p>Products newly subject to the EAR include both items in the United States and “all U.S. origin items wherever located.” This inclusion means that U.S.-based multinational companies producing SME (not to mention other semiconductor technologies) cannot avoid the controls when selling to China, even when relying on factories abroad.</p> -<p>Over the past two decades, geopolitical competition with the Euro-Atlantic community in the region has been the key challenge to Russia’s ability to achieve its longstanding strategic goals. In this struggle, the Kremlin has deployed security policy as Russia’s trump card. Up until 2020, it was customary to assume that Russia’s goal in the South Caucasus was to use its security advantage to preserve a favourable status quo. Moscow’s current policy towards the region reflects a shift in some respects from this approach and indicates a changed significance of the South Caucasus in Russia’s strategic calculus.</p> +<p>For companies based outside the United States, determining whether the EAR applies is more complex. Foreign-made items may be subject to the EAR in two ways: (1) falling under a U.S. foreign direct product rule (FDPR) or (2) exceeding the de minimis threshold of “controlled” U.S.-origin content. Ostensibly, both rules apply the U.S. controls extraterritorially, leveraging the frequent presence of U.S. technology in third-country products.</p> -<p>Moscow has recognised that the changes in the international politics of the South Caucasus towards multipolarity have provided opportunities for the countries in the region to pursue policies of multi-alignment. This has meant that Russia can no longer approach the region as though it remains part of the post-Soviet space where it has an exclusive role, and some of its past policy levers have lost traction – notably in respect to the Armenia–Azerbaijan conflict. At the same time, the breakdown of ties with Europe and the US has forced Moscow to seek to reorient its foreign and economic ties south and east.</p> +<blockquote> + <h4 id="foreign-direct-product-rules"><code class="highlighter-rouge">Foreign Direct Product Rules</code></h4> +</blockquote> -<p>Russia now looks on the South Caucasus not just as a buffer against the Euro-Atlantic community and a means to strengthen its power projection ambitions in the Black Sea and the Middle East, but also as a vital link to Iran, as well as the location of potential southern routes to access markets and build political and security ties across Eurasia. Russia is therefore rebalancing and realigning its policies to continue to be a central regional player in the South Caucasus, even if this requires a shift from its previous reliance on security policy and the ambition to exclude other external powers from the region.</p> +<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">FDPRs apply the EAR to foreign-made items if they are the “direct product” of certain types of U.S.-origin equipment, software, or other technology, and are destined for designated countries. Specifically, FDPRs empower the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) to require licenses for exports of certain foreign-made products if listed U.S. technology was directly used to produce them or produce key parts of the plants that were used to manufacture the products, such as a tool or a piece of software — even if a controlled U.S. component or system does not appear in the product.</code></em></p> -<p>Moscow is today willing to accommodate and even cooperate with other international actors, notably Iran, China and even Turkey, in the South Caucasus, and it has also adapted by developing new and varied bilateral ties with the three South Caucasian states to shape the regional agenda, particularly on economic and transport issues. However, the Kremlin remains focused on blocking Euro-Atlantic integration efforts in the region, and is willing to work with other regional powers to advance this goal. Indeed, Moscow is now looking to develop its new approach in the South Caucasus as part of a larger Eurasian security initiative, driven, together with China, Iran and other partners, as a counter-West bloc.</p> +<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Three FDPRs limit Chinese access to semiconductor technologies: the Entity List (EL), Advanced Computing, and Supercomputer FDPRs. These FDPRs differ in terms of the products, companies, and countries that they cover. The EL FDPR, introduced in May 2020 by the Trump administration, applies U.S. export controls to products destined for hundreds of Chinese (and other foreign) companies and their subsidiaries. These restrictions vary based on the products involved as well as the type of EL classification applicable to the purchaser company. Their reach has continued to grow as the U.S. Department of Commerce has added Chinese firms to the EL. The Advanced Computing FDPR applies the EAR to a narrower range of products meeting certain performance parameters and based on the destination country rather than the destination company. Originally aimed at China, the Advanced Computing FDPR has expanded the list of destination countries to include the countries China likely uses to avoid controls, such as Kazakhstan and Mongolia. Finally, the Supercomputer FDPR applies a country and end-use scope to encompass any items subject to the EAR that are used to produce supercomputers, which are defined based on compute capacity and system dimensions.</code></em></p> -<p>Moscow is also experiencing real challenges in forging a new approach to the South Caucasus. It is having to contend with an increasingly complex region in which not only is there a diversity of other, often competitive, external actors, but also the governments of the region have a new degree of agency in developing their foreign relationships. As a result, Moscow is facing resistance to its efforts to insert itself within the central issues that could reshape the regional order, notably the Armenia–Azerbaijan peace agreement and the associated initiatives to open the region’s transport network.</p> +<p>The FDPRs and de minimis rules aim to limit the ability of third-country suppliers (who face less strict export controls from their governments) to replace U.S. suppliers in Chinese markets. However, their current efficacy in this regard is questionable. Multiple U.S. SME companies told CSIS that these restrictions are not stopping foreign toolmakers from replacing them in Chinese fabs, a complaint that has also been raised to U.S. officials. While public evidence supporting this trend remains limited, a New York Federal Reserve study from April 2024 on the impacts of U.S. semiconductor export controls showed that non-U.S. firms that sell to Chinese semiconductor companies experienced “higher revenues and profitability . . . following the inclusion of the Chinese targets in the U.S. export control lists.”</p> -<p>Faced with the prospect of being marginalised from the peace process, Putin made a rare state visit to Baku in August 2024 to promote Moscow’s regional role. The visit was marked by positive words, photo opportunities and commitments to cooperation (notably on the INSTC). Putin appeared, however, unable to reverse the steps that have seen Russia pushed out from its former regional role. Critically, since the early 1990s, Russia – together with the US and Europe – has been at the centre of diplomatic efforts to resolve the Armenia–Azerbaijan conflict. Since 2020 and the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War, Baku has, however, managed to exclude major third parties from discussions, even turning to Kazakhstan to host peace negotiations.</p> +<blockquote> + <h4 id="de-minimis-rules"><code class="highlighter-rouge">De Minimis Rules</code></h4> +</blockquote> -<p>During his visit to Baku, Putin indicated, with a degree of desperation, that he would “be happy” to serve as a regional peacemaker, but neither Baku nor Yerevan has responded positively. At the same time, the decision of Armenia and Azerbaijan to exclude the issue of the Zangezur Corridor from discussions on a peace agreement struck a direct blow to Moscow’s efforts to reinsert itself between the two countries, leading to further, unsuccessful Russian diplomatic efforts.</p> +<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">De minimis rules apply the EAR based on the inclusion of U.S.-origin controlled inputs in foreign-exported goods destined for specific countries. Notably, unlike the FDPRs, use of de minimis rules requires that the exported goods directly contain products produced in the United States that fall under the EAR. This differs from the FDPR’s broader threshold of goods being the “direct product” of certain U.S.-origin technologies or inputs (that do not need to be included in the actual goods being shipped). In cases where the shipment of the U.S. inputs to the final country destination by themselves (i.e., when not incorporated into a final product) would require a license, a de minimis calculation is necessary for the foreign export of the product that contains the inputs. Depending on the type of product and country destination, different de minimis thresholds — or the minimum percentage of U.S.-origin controlled items as a share of “fair market value” at which the EAR applies (typically 10 or 25 percent) — are relevant to the specific good. If the good exceeds the relevant de minimis threshold, an export waiver is required, pursuant to the EAR. For some products (e.g., certain lithography tools), a zero percent de minimis threshold applies, meaning that inclusion of any U.S.-origin controlled input automatically applies the EAR.</code></em></p> -<p>Russia’s South Caucasus policies are thus at a key moment. Moscow has recognised the importance of the shifts taking place in the region and is taking action to try to ensure that it remains a key regional player. Despite the advantages that Russia has as a consequence of history and geography and the country’s strong security policies, it is nevertheless facing a struggle to reposition itself in the South Caucasus. There is a real prospect that the Kremlin’s efforts to forge a renewed regional role may prove unsuccessful, and Moscow may emerge from the process of realignment a significantly reduced regional force. The high-level political engagement in the region, notably signalled by Putin’s visit to Baku, suggests, however, that the Kremlin is prepared to commit significant political capital to ensure that Russia remains a leading regional actor, and to show that Moscow is not ready to accept a diminished role.</p> +<p>Notably, the United States has been relatively hesitant to apply the FDPR to foreign exports of semiconductor technology due to the rule’s negative perception among U.S. allies. Allied governments and companies have sharply criticized the FDPR as an overreach of U.S. export control authority. During recent discussions in which the United States threatened to expand application of the FDPR, foreign governments reportedly said they would not cooperate with enforcement of this application, potentially threatening FDPR expansion. Although the U.S. government is reportedly preparing an expansion to the FDPR and EL that would increase restrictions on foreign exports, a Reuters report indicated that category A:5 countries — which include Japan, the Netherlands, and South Korea — would be exempt from the expanded FDPR. The exclusion of countries home to leading toolmakers like ASML and Tokyo Electron belies the U.S. government’s continued hesitation to use the FDPR on key allies in the semiconductor supply chain.</p> -<h4 id="implications-for-the-euro-atlantic-community">Implications for the Euro-Atlantic Community</h4> +<p>Enforcement of extraterritorial applications of the EAR is also a challenge. For semiconductor controls, enforcement challenges are exacerbated by needing to know the node process for which the technology is used, in order to determine whether the extraterritorial rules apply. As an example, SME used in the production of “advanced-node integrated circuits” does not have a de minimis level in terms of U.S. content, whereas SME for less mature chipmaking does. For shipments of finished chips, the node process is self-evident, based on the exported product itself. However, for SME and other inputs, the type of process node manufactured using the product may be less transparent to suppliers. For instance, the same types of etch equipment may be used in a wide range of process nodes, a practice known in the industry as “CapEx recycling.” Therefore, suppliers could unintentionally sell some tools used for advanced nodes to Chinese customers, as these customers can lie about the process node they are using the tools for. Additionally, the burden falls on the company to determine whether the foreign-made item is subject to the EAR, further challenging enforcement.</p> -<p>The changing geopolitics of the South Caucasus and Russia’s shifting regional approach pose a challenge for the Euro-Atlantic community. Over the past two decades, the prospect of eventual EU and NATO integration has been the main policy framework to build support and attract regional states. The approach marries values – in support of human rights, rule of law and democratisation – with a geopolitical approach to counter Russia and its integration offer, notably through access to European markets and financial assistance.</p> +<p>Interestingly, the New York Federal Reserve study described an increase in revenues for third-country firms despite including firms ostensibly subject to the extraterritorial restrictions (via FDPR or de minimis) in its data set. The authors admitted that this had the potential to bias “estimates towards finding a decline in revenues by non-U.S. firms that sell to Chinese targets.”</p> -<p>Since 2008, Moscow has, however, been able to thwart Euro-Atlantic integration through its dominance of regional security politics. Unwilling to challenge Russia’s security trump card, the Euro-Atlantic community has officially followed an open-door policy for NATO and EU membership for Georgia, and maintained a readiness to advance ties to Azerbaijan and Armenia if there is an opportunity. In reality, the EU and NATO tracks have effectively been stalled, even in the case of Georgia, which has been at the forefront of building ties.</p> +<p>These findings suggest that the United States is applying the EAR less restrictively to third-country firms than U.S. firms, even where the FDPR or de minimis restrictions are meant to apply — another indication of potential challenges facing enforcement.</p> -<p>With shifts in the international politics of the South Caucasus, a policy built on “strategic patience” is well past its expiry date. The changes that have affected the South Caucasus have shifted the region from being an exclusively European security region, as it was in the decades after the collapse of the Soviet Union, to one increasingly linked to the Middle East, South Asia and China. The countries of the South Caucasus now have alternative partners to the Euro-Atlantic community (and Russia), notably for trade, infrastructure investment and business, but also for the supply of weapons and for diplomatic ties. While these ties may lack the potential of Euro-Atlantic integration, they offer immediate and tangible gains, especially in comparison to the promise of a bright future of EU and NATO membership that never seems to quite arrive.</p> +<p>Even when fully enforced, FDPR and de minimis requirements are potentially avoidable by removing U.S. technologies from supply chains. Industry participants reported to CSIS that the EAR is incentivizing foreign toolmakers to minimize the use of U.S. technologies, services, and personnel in supply chains to avoid restricted trade with China. For example, one individual noted that a Japanese toolmaker was removing U.S. components from its supply chains and publicizing its products as outside U.S. EAR authority — a practice the individual suggested was widespread across SME markets globally. Reports of these supply chain shifts suggest that, at least for some third-country toolmakers, reliance on U.S. technology is low enough to make avoiding the existing FDPR and de minimis thresholds possible.</p> -<p>The links to other external actors generally also come without the formal conditionality attached by the Euro-Atlantic community. The development of multipolarity has, in this way, reinforced the ability of local elites to advance illiberalism. As a result, Russian-style authoritarian politics has taken hold in Georgia and is consolidated in Azerbaijan, while democratisation remains fragile and vulnerable in Armenia. With this shift, the idea that the region will become part of the Euro-Atlantic community through eventual EU and NATO membership looks unrealistic.</p> +<p>In 2023, the Netherlands and Japan adopted their own export controls following U.S. diplomatic efforts. However, these restrictions remain less stringent than U.S. controls in terms of end use and servicing personnel, giving Japanese and Dutch companies greater ability to sell to Chinese customers and provide on-the-ground support. Additionally, other key supplier countries such as South Korea, Israel, and Germany have not adopted similar export controls. Under the existing set of international export controls, foreign toolmakers continue to face significantly weaker restrictions on access to the Chinese market than U.S. companies.</p> -<p>This presents a dilemma for the Euro-Atlantic community: either continue to criticise non-democratic governments and risk them shifting orientation to Russia and others, or try to retain engagement but then face working with regimes that do not reflect Western values. In either option, Euro-Atlantic integration will struggle to advance. In recent years, Georgia has represented this challenge most starkly. The adoption of increasingly antidemocratic practices by Georgian Dream, the ruling party, and the cultivation of a diversity of external ties have seen a withdrawal of Euro-Atlantic security and economic support. After decades of effort to advance Tbilisi as the key Euro-Atlantic partner in the South Caucasus, Georgia was largely absent from the Washington NATO Summit Communique in 2024. An EU report on Georgia’s progress towards membership that appeared immediately after the October 2024 election appeared to indicate that the membership process was effectively frozen.</p> +<p>A final risk of the current EAR in terms of creating unequal market access for U.S. and foreign companies is overcompliance. As one public commentator argued to BIS,</p> -<p>As the Euro-Atlantic position has weakened in Georgia, there has been an effort to pivot to Armenia, including supplying security assistance and even military equipment. This will add little to Armenia’s overall defence and deterrence, but the shift risks being seen as taking sides within the region, further accelerating the militarisation of the South Caucasus and contributing to the emergence of a new round of internal divisions just as the prospects of a new regional settlement are emerging. In any case, Armenia’s prospects for Euro-Atlantic integration will be constrained by the same developments that have affected the other countries of the region – Russia’s readiness to use its range of policies, and centrally its willingness to use security and military tools, to prevent Euro-Atlantic enlargement, and the appearance of attractive alternative international partners.</p> +<blockquote> + <p>The October 7 IFR is so complex that only a small group of people with significant experience in the EAR and semiconductors can fully understand the rulemaking . . . Many small and medium enterprises, or even large foreign multinationals, not highly versed in these details will either not know if they are following the rule, or out of an abundance of caution, “over-comply” by restricting legitimate exports and trade not otherwise subject to these rules.</p> +</blockquote> -<p>The risks for the Euro-Atlantic community of failing to find an effective means of engagement in the region are highlighted by Azerbaijan. Having turned away from Euro-Atlantic integration, Baku has been able to consolidate its authoritarian political order and reclaim the occupied territories and Nagorno-Karabakh, employing approaches that have led to ethnic cleansing. Euro-Atlantic actors appear largely powerless regarding either development. Indeed, Europe has been keen to develop closer energy and transport links to Azerbaijan, even as Baku has followed this domestic and foreign policy course.</p> +<p>While the October 2023 update simplifies calculations and identifies flags to help companies determine compliance, challenges remain in terms of understanding the breadth of the restrictions, which are highly technical and continually evolving.</p> -<p>The Euro-Atlantic community must now look at the emerging regional realities and craft a regional policy capable of influencing contemporary developments. Given the broader confrontation with Russia, weakening Moscow’s presence in the South Caucasus and disrupting its efforts to rebuild a new regional position for itself should be at the heart of a regional strategy for the Euro-Atlantic community. A key emphasis should be on countering Moscow’s efforts to position itself in the regional trade and communications infrastructure to support its war effort and reinforce its strategic partnership with Iran.</p> +<p>In other words, the EAR’s complexity and ambiguity risk encouraging U.S. toolmakers to pull back from Chinese markets — even in places where they are not legally required to do so. For instance, the previously mentioned New York Federal Reserve study also showed that U.S. firms were more likely to terminate relations with Chinese customers following the export controls, even with those not directly targeted by the controls, and less likely to form new Chinese customer relationships — potentially due to concerns about unintentionally violating restrictions. This risk of overcompliance also makes it more likely that third-country companies will design out U.S. companies, facilities, and personnel, even in areas not covered by export controls, to ensure they avoid the regulations.</p> -<p>The focus of Western policy should be on strengthening the sovereignty and independence of regional states and their ability to balance Russia through multi-alignment (in which context the Euro-Atlantic community can remain a leading partner), and to undermine Russia’s efforts to control them or to shepherd them into regional and international formats (such as the 3 + 3 and the BRICS) that exclude Europe and the US. This approach should also include supporting and investing in projects such as the Middle Corridor that will help economic diversification and promote external investment, while seeking to constrain projects that strengthen the Russia–Iran north–south axis and enable Moscow to reshape regional trade and transport around its own agenda.</p> +<h3 id="chinese-firms-designing-out-us-firms-in-sme">Chinese Firms Designing Out U.S. Firms in SME</h3> -<p>Supporting the Armenia–Azerbaijan peace process, including measures to build trust and confidence to overcome the legacy of conflict, will be critical, as this agreement is central to opening the region. To play such a role, the Euro-Atlantic community will need to be more effective in balancing its approaches with Armenia and Azerbaijan. Rebuilding a political relationship with Baku, which is increasingly the regional agenda-setter, to go beyond energy cooperation will be a necessary step to balance Moscow–Baku ties. If peace can be achieved, there will also be opportunities to advance regional cooperation among the South Caucasus countries, which Russia has effectively undercut to date, and which can help to balance Moscow’s policies by strengthening regional balancing.</p> +<p>As U.S. economic and national security policy has become more stringent, Chinese businesses and policymakers have accelerated the semiconductor industry’s shift away from U.S. inputs. China’s SME industry historically has failed to achieve technological parity with foreign toolmakers due to factors such as the smaller size of its companies and, as a result, its reduced capacity to invest in research and development (R&amp;D). Instead of buying domestic, leading Chinese chipmakers such as Semiconductor Manufacturing International Corporation (SMIC), Hua Hong Semiconductor, and Yangtze Memory Technologies (YMTC) have sought out the most advanced chipmaking technology available — which is often of U.S. origin. For instance, Applied Materials, KLA, and Lam Research all held large market shares in Chinese chip markets as of 2022. That same year, China’s SME localization rate (the share of tools produced domestically) was 21 percent. A 2021 report by Georgetown’s Center for Security and Emerging Technology estimated a localization rate of just 8 percent.</p> -<p>While domestic political forces more favourable to the West may re-emerge in the countries of the South Caucasus, the geopolitical and geo-economic context in the region militates against the Euro-Atlantic integration model regaining traction, with its interdependent security, normative and economic elements. Russia has begun to adapt its approach to the South Caucasus as the region undergoes change, and so must the West. Support for democracy and human rights should be pursued, where realistic, but its prioritisation will need to be balanced with the geopolitical imperative of building relationships to counter Russia and its major allies.</p> +<p>However, strong evidence suggests that China’s procurement approach has shifted since late 2022, with the removal of U.S. technology emerging as a primary industry objective. In 2023, China’s SME localization rate nearly doubled year over year to reach 40 percent. A South China Morning Post article recently reported that the “unwritten rule” for Chinese fabs was 70 percent self-sufficiency (made in China) in SME and that firms were achieving “significant progress” for key types of chipmaking equipment, with the exceptions of lithography, ion implantation, and inspection and metrology (parts of process control).</p> -<p>Enhancing coordination with Turkey on regional issues should be a priority. Ankara is continuing to strengthen its South Caucasus interests and engagement as part of a broader strategy reaching to Central Asia and across the Black Sea. An opening of the South Caucasus would inevitably see an even greater Turkish presence. As a NATO member, Turkey is uniquely placed to strengthen regional security that aligns with the wider interests of the Euro-Atlantic community, if common cause can be promoted.</p> +<p>This design-out trend results from increasing top-down pressure from government officials and growing bottom-up commercial incentives for Chinese companies to minimize exposure to present — and future — U.S. regulatory actions. In the SME space, China’s semiconductor industry is pursuing design-out through two main approaches: (1) increased procurement from and investment in Chinese toolmakers and (2) replacement of U.S. SME technology with products from third-country firms.</p> -<p>Without a readiness to adapt, the Euro-Atlantic community is likely to face a growing regional marginalisation and the prospect that Russia will be able to reposition itself, while the countries of the South Caucasus are likely to be drawn increasingly into regional and international groupings that exclude the US and Europe. To challenge Russia effectively and to rebuild regional influence, the Euro-Atlantic community will need to recalibrate its policies and move beyond approaches that have lost the ability to shape regional developments effectively.</p> +<p>An April 2024 quote in the Financial Times by a YMTC investor neatly summarizes China’s general design-out strategy for SME:</p> -<p>This will involve difficult trade-offs, including working with non-democratic regimes. It will also mean being ready to acknowledge that the South Caucasus is unlikely to be part of a wider Europe, and so should be approached through the sort of foreign and security policy frameworks that are applied to other such parts of the world, rather than through integration. While such a shift will be challenging, Russia is at a uniquely vulnerable moment in the South Caucasus as the region undergoes far-reaching change. Although Russia is already active in repairing its position, the Euro-Atlantic community nevertheless has an opportunity to help facilitate a regional realignment that could substantially constrain Moscow.</p> +<blockquote> + <p>If Chinese companies have equipment that can be used, [YMTC] will use it. If not, it will see if countries other than the US can sell to it. . . . If that doesn’t work, YMTC will develop it together with the supplier.</p> +</blockquote> -<hr /> +<h4 id="design-out-via-chinese-toolmakers">Design-Out via Chinese Toolmakers</h4> -<p><strong>Neil Melvin</strong> is Director of the International Security research group at RUSI. Prior to joining RUSI, he was Director of the Armed Conflict and Conflict Management Programme and then Director of Research at the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). He has held senior adviser positions in the OSCE and the Energy Charter. He has published widely on the international and security politics of the South Caucasus.</p>Neil MelvinThis paper explores the challenge to Russia’s established position in the South Caucasus as the region undergoes significant change.Project Atom 20242024-11-18T12:00:00+08:002024-11-18T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/project-atom-2024<p><em>There is a growing risk that U.S. adversaries might resort to nuclear use in a regional conflict. To help address for this threat, the Project on Nuclear Issues invited a group of experts to develop competing strategies for responding to strategic deterrence failure.</em></p> +<p>In China, the export controls from October 7, 2022, accelerated a joint government-industry effort to build a domestic semiconductor supply chain for chipmaking equipment. De-Americanizing Chinese semiconductor supply chains has been a Chinese objective for decades. However, Chinese firms frequently ignored this top-down policy goal and sourced large shares of chipmaking equipment from abroad, including from U.S.-based companies.</p> -<excerpt /> +<p>The Trump administration’s April 2018 imposition of sanctions and export controls on ZTE represented a major turning point in pushing China to take steps toward reducing U.S. reliance, particularly for semiconductors. These efforts went into overdrive following the October 7 export controls, which created immediate existential challenges for the Chinese semiconductor industry’s access to key technologies. As a result, the controls catalyzed a coordinated response by both government and private sector entities. Central, provincial, and local government entities — as well as chipmaking firms such as Huawei, SMIC, YMTC, Hua Hong, and others — have rapidly expanded efforts to replace U.S. chipmaking technology with technology from Chinese suppliers. Nowhere in the industry has this shift been clearer than in SME.</p> -<h3 id="introduction">Introduction</h3> +<p>Top-down government efforts focus on putting pressure on domestic chipmakers to procure Chinese SME. For instance, some companies told CSIS that Chinese customers are facing mandates from government officials to buy most chipmaking equipment from an approved “white list” of domestic companies. These sourcing goals can overrule traditional business performance metrics such as yield, benefitting Chinese toolmakers even in cases where quality is lower relative to U.S. firms. China is also investing heavily in SME production and innovation, including via the $47.5 billion third phase of its so-called Big Fund and by increasing industry involvement in state-backed research.</p> -<blockquote> - <h4 id="heather-williams-reja-younis-and-lachlan-mackenzie">Heather Williams, Reja Younis, and Lachlan MacKenzie</h4> -</blockquote> +<p>At a bottom-up commercial level, Chinese fabs increasingly see advantages to using Chinese chipmaking tools wherever possible. Chinese firms have diversified supply chains away from U.S. and other foreign suppliers to mitigate risks associated with current export controls — as well as the threat of future controls. For instance, leading foundries such as YMTC are increasingly collaborating with leading Chinese toolmakers to access replacement parts and help Chinese companies quickly develop SME technology. Chinese private investors are also increasingly investing in semiconductor companies, including toolmakers, attracted by public investment and the growing preference for Chinese suppliers.</p> -<p>There is a growing risk that the United States and its allies could face scenarios in which one or more adversaries might resort to nuclear weapons use in a regional conflict. This risk is especially evident in Russian strategic theory and doctrine, which envisions regional deterrence as complementing global deterrence. Some Russian military experts see the potential use of nonstrategic nuclear weapons for “de-escalation of military actions and their termination on conditions favorable to the Russian Federation,” or “a demonstration to the enemy of resolve to defend [Russia’s] interests by escalating the use of nuclear weapons (tactical) and forcing him to forego further aggression by the threat of use of strategic nuclear weapons.” Statements by North Korean leader Kim Jong-Un indicate that the country’s nuclear arsenal is also intended for deterrence in a regional conflict, such as a potential decapitation strike. Moreover, China has been rapidly expanding its nuclear arsenal for both military reasons and to gain geopolitical leverage, as argued by Tong Zhao, such as upholding its “core interests” in Taiwan.</p> +<p>Based on publicly available data and interviews with industry participants, the CSIS Economics Program and Scholl Chair in International Business identified evidence of the design-out phenomenon taking place in at least four types of SME: (1) deposition, (2) etching, (3) process control, and (4) testing. These areas receive less attention than EUV lithography but nonetheless represent key technologies in the semiconductor manufacturing process. Notably, it is tougher to establish “choke points” using U.S. export controls for these areas than, for example, lithography tools and advanced metrology tools, meaning there are fewer obstacles to Chinese and third-country companies replacing U.S. technologies in Chinese fabs.</p> -<p>Due to these growing risks of regional crisis escalation with potential for nuclear use, U.S. decisionmakers are revisiting the concept of intra-war deterrence, which is about influencing enemy actions during an ongoing conflict. The risks of deterrence failure have been a focal point in the testimony of recent U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM) commanders, including Admiral Charles Richard, who noted in 2020 that STRATCOM conducted analysis into the risks of strategic deterrence failure, and General Anthony Cotton, who said, “We must be ready if deterrence fails” in testimony in February 2024. Intra-war deterrence operates on the premise that in an active conflict, threats can be leveraged to shape an adversary’s actions and set boundaries on the intensity and nature of military engagement. This concept underpinned much Cold War strategic thinking. One fundamental challenge of intra-war deterrence is how to balance deterrence objectives with war-fighting objectives. As W. Andrew Terrill writes regarding the mismatch of these objectives, “a state pursuing such [an intra-war] policy is waging war against another nation while seeking to prevent its opponent from responding with all of the weapons that it possesses. Such a task is . . . challenging since both sides usually seek to use as much of their capabilities as possible to optimize their chances of victory.”</p> +<p>Two chipmaking equipment companies in particular — Naura Technology Group and AMEC — have been the largest beneficiaries of increased investment and innovation in Chinese SME supply chains. These companies represent the best evidence of the design-out of U.S. companies via Chinese suppliers. Other key players include lithography developer SMEE, etching and glue developer Kingsemi, and test equipment provider Jingce. Chinese SME firms increasingly include smaller start-ups taking advantage of new openings in the domestic market, such as Shanghai-based Crystal Growth and Energy Equipment, which went public in early 2023.</p> -<p>To assist in this thinking and to develop actionable insights for the U.S. policy and strategy communities, the Project on Nuclear Issues (PONI) invited a group of experts to develop competing strategies for responding to strategic deterrence failure. This study revives a concept and approach that the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) developed a decade ago to review U.S. nuclear strategy and posture for 2025–2050. The project’s current contributors were each asked to respond to a scenario involving near-simultaneous battlefield nuclear use by Russia and China. The strategies focused on four specific themes: strategic objectives, assurance to allies, military responses, and non-kinetic responses. The strategies demonstrate agreement on key issues, such as the importance of deterring conventional aggression and the relevance of non-kinetic responses to adversary nuclear use. But the strategies also highlight important areas of disagreement about the relative importance and feasibility of assuring allies, at least relative to other strategic objectives; the advisability of a nuclear versus conventional response to deterrence failure; and what “winning” in a strategic deterrence failure scenario would look like. While many people may disagree with these positions, PONI welcomes a diverse range of views, which can help foster a robust debate. CSIS does not take an institutional view, and the views presented here are those of the individual contributors.</p> +<p>Table 1 summarizes key players in the Chinese SME space, their product focus areas, and historical global leaders based in the United States and its allies.</p> -<p>After providing an overview of the authors’ competing strategies, this chapter presents the project’s guiding assumptions and analytic framework. This introductory analysis then distills three principles for intra-war deterrence: establishing (or maintaining) regional deterrence, restoring assurance, and planning precrisis for intra-war deterrence. These principles capture areas of consensus among the strategies while also engaging with areas of disagreement in order to identify which policy options are best suited for the current strategic environment.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/gY3bR1A.png" alt="image01" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Table 1: Product Portfolio of Chinese Original Equipment Manufacturer.</strong> Source: <a href="https://thechinaproject.com/2023/06/15/semiconductor-export-controls-a-catalyst-for-chinese-development/">Kyriakos Petrakakos, “U.S. Semiconductor Export Controls Might Actually Give China the Edge,” The China Project, June 15, 2023</a>.</em></p> -<h4 id="competing-strategies-for-intra-war-deterrence">Competing Strategies for Intra-War Deterrence</h4> +<p>The growing revenues of Chinese toolmakers offer key evidence of the design-out phenomenon. The Chinese consultancy CINNO Research released a 2023 analysis showing that the revenues of China’s 10 largest SME companies increased by 39 percent in the first half of the year compared to the previous period in 2022. AMEC, for its part, saw a 32 percent rise in sales in 2023. Company executives identified strong demand from domestic firms as a key driver of growth. In August 2023, AMEC’s chairman and CEO announced his firm had developed a road map to replace foreign-produced tools with domestic alternatives. Naura saw its 2023 revenues increase by around 50 percent year over year. As with AMEC, reports attribute Naura’s rapid growth to China’s desire to remove U.S. inputs from the domestic semiconductor fabrication market. AMEC and Naura are no exception — a wide variety of Chinese toolmakers have seen explosive domestic sales growth in the two years since the U.S. export controls.</p> -<p>As a foundation for Project Atom’s analysis, PONI provided the authors a scenario that features concurrent nuclear aggression from the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and Russia. The scenario, set in 2027, is predicated on the following assumptions:</p> +<p>There is also evidence of Chinese toolmakers winning market share away from U.S. companies, indicating that growing Chinese revenues are not just the result of top-line Chinese market growth. Historically, Chinese toolmakers could secure only a small share of key equipment markets, even within China. From January to August 2023, however, local manufacturers won 47 percent of all machinery equipment tenders from Chinese foundries, according to an analysis by Huatai Securities. An August 2023 article by the South China Morning Post reported that AMEC’s share of one type of etching equipment is expected to hit 60 percent “in the near future,” increasing from 24 percent in October 2022 — attributed to the fact that “once-dominant US chip equipment maker Lam Research saw its mainland sales drop sharply.” Notably, many U.S. toolmakers are still seeing increasing sales to China due to surging industry growth. However, companies told CSIS that this growth is significantly below what it would otherwise be in the absence of design-out practices.</p> -<ul> - <li> - <p>Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin remain the leaders of the PRC and Russia, respectively.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>The PRC and Russia have not relinquished their territorial claims — that is, the PRC continues to pursue “reunification” with Taiwan, and Russia maintains its claims on annexed Ukrainian territory.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>The war in Ukraine continues as a stalemate. Western aid for Ukraine continues.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Western sanctions damage the Russian economy and drive continued economic cooperation between Russia and the PRC.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Russia manages to partially rebuild its conventional military despite low GDP growth, related financial challenges, and ongoing fighting.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>PRC GDP growth stabilizes between 3 and 4 percent, compared to the United States’ approximately 2 percent. The two economies remain deeply intertwined.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>The United States and its allies proceed with their planned defense modernization and preparedness efforts. The United States forward deploys additional forces to Europe and the Indo-Pacific.</p> - </li> -</ul> +<p>Beyond the observable increases in revenue and market share, reporting suggests that the Chinese semiconductor industry is publicly showing great enthusiasm for locally produced semiconductor tools and components. In March 2024, SEMICON China, a major semiconductor industry conference held in Shanghai, saw increased participation of domestic tool manufacturers and the notable absence of rival U.S. firms. Reuters also reported that several domestic Chinese semiconductor equipment companies leaned into marketing strategies encouraging Chinese fabs to buy local at SEMICON: “More [Chinese] manufacturing facilities are willing to use materials prescribed by Chinese firms, a trend that has certainly been accelerated by U.S. sanctions.” The report mentions that while Chinese domestic firms may produce semiconductor manufacturing tools and components of slightly lesser quality, China is quickly catching up to its foreign counterparts. Furthermore, Chinese semiconductor products are sold at significantly cheaper prices than those of rival firms in other countries.</p> -<p>By March 2027 in this scenario, Taiwan’s domestic political landscape has shifted decisively against reunification. In response to pro-independence statements from Taiwanese presidential candidates, PRC officials begin to publicly discuss using military force to achieve reunification. In the ensuing weeks, the U.S. intelligence community observes the beginnings of a PRC military buildup in Fujian Province.</p> +<h4 id="design-out-via-third-country-toolmakers">Design-Out via Third-Country Toolmakers</h4> -<p>Around the same time as this buildup, Xi and Putin host a summit at which Putin voices support for the PRC’s position on Taiwan. The two leaders announce joint naval drills in the Pacific to coincide with Russian conventional and nuclear exercises near Russia’s Western borders in mid-May.</p> +<p>There has been significant reporting on Chinese tools replacing U.S. tools in the Chinese market. However, less attention has been paid thus far to the other strategy enabling China’s design-out: the increased substitution of tools from third countries — or countries other than the United States and China — in place of U.S. technology.</p> -<p>In preparation for what they consider an imminent threat, the United States and its allies signal that “wars of conquest will be punished” and bolster their defensive postures through expanded forward deployments and elevated readiness levels in both Europe and the Indo-Pacific. In the weeks preceding the joint PRC-Russian exercise, a Ukrainian offensive makes significant gains and threatens Russian control of Crimea.</p> +<p>While Chinese buyers are increasingly apt to buy from domestic toolmakers, China is still a large buyer of foreign-made tools. Foreign SME helps fulfill technological capabilities not yet developed in China’s market and provides a helpful blueprint for Chinese firms developing new tools. Since early 2023, Chinese fabs have gone on a shopping spree, amassing tools from both domestic and foreign suppliers. The most recent data, as of the first quarter of 2024, suggest that Chinese buying represents an unprecedented 45 percent of revenue for major Western toolmakers, nearly double the share of revenue recorded a year prior (see Figures 1 and 2). Some of this revenue is going to U.S. toolmakers. According to fiscal year 2023 financials, China still represents the largest geographic share of sales for Applied Materials, KLA, and Lam Research. In fact, the dramatic investment boom in China’s semiconductor industry and practices like equipment stocking in case of future restrictions have helped some U.S. toolmakers grow in the near term.</p> -<p>On May 14, the joint PRC-Russian naval exercise begins in the Western Pacific. The following day, the PRC begins missile strikes on Taiwan in preparation for a full-scale invasion. On May 16, Russia conducts conventional missile strikes against Polish transportation infrastructure. Xi and Putin release statements justifying their own actions and supporting the other’s.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/UnZ0Qw7.png" alt="image02" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 1: Global Semiconductor Equipment Market Revenues by Region, 2019–Present.</strong> Source: <a href="https://www.semi.org/en/products-services/market-data/manufacturing-monitor">SEMI, “Semiconductor Manufacturing Monitor,” October 11, 2024</a>.</em></p> -<p>NATO promptly invokes Article 5, and the United States and its allies begin highly successful conventional campaigns against the PRC and Russia. In the Indo-Pacific, U.S. and allied forces interdict PRC landing craft before they reach Taiwan. Heavy People’s Liberation Army (PLA) casualties prompt limited anti-mobilization protests across China. In Europe, Polish and Lithuanian forces push into Kaliningrad Oblast and threaten to seize Kaliningrad City. NATO states begin to deploy forces to Ukraine, while Ukrainian forces advance with NATO assistance and prepare for an invasion of Crimea.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/fPXjfqo.png" alt="image03" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 2: Sales to China for Select U.S. and Foreign Toolmakers, 2015–23.</strong> Source: <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-07-17/us-considers-tougher-trade-rules-against-companies-in-chip-crackdown-on-china">Mackenzie Hawkins, Ian King, and Takashi Mochikuzi, “US Floats Tougher Trade Rules to Rein in China Chip Industry,” Bloomberg.com, July 17, 2024</a>.</em></p> -<p>On June 2, Russia strikes Polish transportation infrastructure and NATO forces threatening Kaliningrad with low-yield (&lt; 10 kt) nuclear weapons, inflicting approximately 1,000 casualties (including some Americans). Putin warns NATO of “total annihilation” if it does not cease its “aggression.” On June 3, the PRC conducts a 50 kt nuclear strike on a U.S. naval base in the Philippines, resulting in 15,000 casualties. Xi Jinping warns that “Anyone aiding the splitists in Taiwan . . . will face the wrath of a people determined to rejuvenate their nation at any cost.”</p> +<p>However, there is evidence that China is increasingly redirecting business away from U.S. firms to non-U.S. foreign companies as part of its design-out strategy. CSIS Scholl Chair conversations with SME industry participants revealed reports that Chinese customers are increasingly selecting third-country toolmakers — such as firms based in Japan, Israel, South Korea, Germany, the Netherlands, and Taiwan — over U.S. companies in procurement decisions. Specifically, several U.S. toolmakers told CSIS they rapidly lost share to third-country suppliers in Chinese foundries subsequent to the export regulations, which is unsurprising in the context of explicit rhetoric by Chinese companies indicating a growing preference for third-country purchases. As the previously mentioned YMTC investor noted, the second option after sourcing from China is “countries other than the U.S.”</p> -<h4 id="comparing-strategies-for-intra-war-deterrence">Comparing Strategies for Intra-War Deterrence</h4> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">China is increasingly redirecting business away from U.S. firms to non-U.S. foreign companies as part of its design-out strategy.</code></em></strong></p> -<p>The PONI team provided experts with four framing assumptions and respective guiding questions as an analytical framework, which are discussed later in this introduction. This report contains five chapters, each of which constitutes a distinct strategy for intra-war deterrence. A comparison of the strategies across the analytical framework is provided in Tables 1–4; discussion of the framing assumptions then follows.</p> +<p>This trend, in part, reflects the unique limits the EAR places on U.S. firms compared to foreign companies. As previously discussed, companies can sell chipmaking equipment that U.S. companies — whose products are by definition “U.S. origin items” — cannot. Although the United States worked trilaterally in early 2023 to convince the Netherlands and Japan to adopt new controls on advanced chipmaking technologies, these rules do not equate to U.S. controls. Dutch and Japanese restrictions are less stringent than the EL (a regulatory concept they lack a close equivalent to) and do not list China as a country of concern, creating substantial coverage gaps. Additionally, Dutch and Japanese companies can keep personnel on site in China. This servicing ability provides a source of revenue and is a comparative advantage in SME, as toolmakers typically deploy teams of servicers within customers’ fabs.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/YNVe0OD.png" alt="image01" /> -<em>▲ Table 1: Comparing Strategies for Intra-War Deterrence — U.S. Strategic Objectives</em></p> +<p>Even for technologies the EAR does not encompass, there are reports that Chinese fabs are selecting third-country suppliers over their U.S. competitors. This trend may owe, in part, to U.S. companies overcomplying for fear of unintentionally violating export controls. In the United States, companies such as Applied Materials have faced criminal investigations for alleged violations of export controls, so it is unsurprising that other firms (particularly smaller businesses) would want to avoid these risks, even at risk of overcompliance.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/SEs7pgx.png" alt="image02" /> -<em>▲ Table 2: Comparing Strategies for Intra-War Deterrence — Assuring Allies</em></p> +<p>More importantly, Chinese firms have started seeing U.S. suppliers as higher-risk options compared to third-country suppliers. Tightening U.S. export controls has created a perception in Chinese markets that U.S. suppliers are not a reliable long-term procurement solution. Chinese fabs are concerned both about the repercussions of violating existing controls — either knowingly or unknowingly — and mitigating exposure to stricter U.S. export controls in the future. This view encourages Chinese fabs to turn to third-country toolmakers — at least until domestic supply develops sufficiently to avoid buying foreign technology altogether.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/M3vYNnZ.png" alt="image03" /> -<em>▲ Table 3: Comparing Strategies for Intra-War Deterrence — Military Response Options</em></p> +<p>This shift has both contributed to and been accelerated by growing efforts by third-country suppliers to win business away from U.S. competitors in Chinese markets — sometimes leveraging the U.S. export restrictions as a competitive advantage. In certain cases, industry participants described instances of foreign suppliers explicitly advertising their non-U.S. inputs (an indication they were not subject to the EAR) to attract new Chinese buyers or highlighting regulatory risks as reasons to select them over their U.S. competitors. For instance, some third-country firms raised concerns about future U.S. restrictions as reasons for Chinese businesses to choose them over U.S. firms.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/gD1348E.png" alt="image04" /> -<em>▲ Table 4: Comparing Strategies for Intra-War Deterrence — Non-Kinetic Response Options</em></p> +<p>Industry events like SEMICON China 2024 also demonstrate the new competitiveness of third-country firms. Whereas U.S. firms were absent, other foreign sellers were not. Japanese tool firms, according to a report, kept a strong presence at SEMICON. Per the same report, Chinese demand for certain Japanese products is still strong, as Japanese companies have been rewarded with increased orders from Chinese firms, especially for noncontrolled products enabling leading-edge production. This sales increase is apparent in Japanese trade data. Japanese exports of SME and related tools to China reached $3.32 billion in the first quarter of 2024, an 82 percent year-over-year increase. There have even been reports that Japanese industry groups are arranging trips for Chinese chipmakers to explore “core opportunities in Japan’s semiconductor equipment and materials industry,” with a focus on getting around U.S. export controls.</p> -<h4 id="framing-assumptions">Framing Assumptions</h4> +<p>While CSIS has identified some preliminary evidence of third-country design-out taking place, there remains a shortage of publicly available data to estimate the extent of the phenomenon — specifically, detailed data from U.S. and third-country toolmakers on market share losses and gains in China. Some industry participants noted that U.S. and foreign companies hesitate to describe design-out trends due to concerns about investor perceptions. Even so, the trend represents the important and largely overlooked impact of increasingly broad and unilateral U.S. export controls that target China.</p> -<p><em>U.S. STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES</em></p> +<h3 id="chinese-firms-designing-around-us-firms-in-sme">Chinese Firms Designing Around U.S. Firms in SME</h3> -<p><strong>Assumption #1:</strong> In the event that strategic deterrence fails and an adversary has used a single or multiple nuclear weapons, the United States will be forced to confront competing priorities to uphold security commitments to allies, manage further escalation, and resolve the conflict on terms favorable to the United States. The adversaries may assume they have more at stake in a regional crisis than the United States and thereby question U.S. resolve. This raises the following questions with regard to U.S. strategic objectives in the event of strategic deterrence failure:</p> +<p>SME has fewer examples of the design-around strategy — or innovating Chinese technologies to circumvent the need for U.S. technologies — compared to advanced packaging. This is, in large part, because the United States and allied countries have a strong lead over China in manufacturing chipmaking tools, making it harder for Chinese companies to develop innovations that sidestep or “leapfrog” U.S. capabilities in the space.</p> -<ul> - <li> - <p>In what ways, if any, did the United States fail to demonstrate resolve and commitment to its strategic objectives in the lead-up to nuclear use? Why did deterrence fail? Could anything have been done to prevent strategic deterrence failure?</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>What are the United States’ core objectives in this scenario, and how should the United States prioritize its strategic objectives? Is one area of operations more important than another in this scenario?</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>What does “winning” look like? How would the United States know if deterrence has been “restored”?</p> - </li> -</ul> +<p>That said, one Chinese SME innovation bears mentioning in the context of design-around strategies. Increasingly, China is adopting new strategies to use older lithography equipment to achieve the same capabilities as EUV lithography, which represents a key chokepoint for Chinese lead-edge chip manufacturing. EUV machines — exclusively produced by the Dutch company ASML — are considered essential to the production of advanced chips, and exports to China have been highly limited since the Dutch government imposed restrictions on EUV shipments in 2019. However, in March 2024, Huawei and its chipmaking partner SiCarrier patented a technology known as self-aligned quadruple patterning (SAQP), which may allow them to produce the same chips as ASML’s EUV machines in a novel way. By using older DUV lithography equipment and additional etching to increase transistor density, China reportedly has the necessary capabilities for 5nm fabrication, an advancement beyond the 7nm process that SMIC provided for the Mate 60 Pro smartphone.</p> -<p>Identifying and prioritizing strategic objectives will be critical following adversary nuclear use, and this will require understanding why deterrence failed. Authors reached different conclusions on this point. Ford, on one hand, concludes that deterrence failed because of adversary perceptions about U.S. credibility that had built up over years. He argues that there may have been nothing that U.S. policymakers could have done to deter adversary aggression in the immediate run-up to the crisis. Panda, on the other hand, points to the swift defeat of adversary conventional forces as a primary driver of escalation, adding that the adversary may believe that limited nuclear use can deter the United States from further involvement. Weaver suggests that the United States may have failed to credibly signal its resolve to defend its allies and partners but acknowledges that deterrence failure may have alternatively stemmed from adversary miscalculations about their abilities to fight and win conventional conflicts against the United States and its partners.</p> +<p>Industry analysts believe China still needs EUV machines in the long run to reach 3nm capabilities — the leading edge in commercial production, as of this report, as pairing DUV with technologies like SAQP may represent a technological cul-de-sac in terms of achieving transistor density beyond 5nm. As a result, China is also investing heavily in attempts to develop EUV lithography domestically via efforts by companies such as Naura and Huawei. These attempts to develop EUV represent an additional example of Chinese toolmakers designing out U.S. and allies’ technology.</p> -<p>While the authors agree about the importance of avoiding full-scale nuclear war following deterrence failure, they disagree about the relevance and prioritization of other strategic objectives. Sisson, for example, identifies only two U.S. strategic objectives: preventing general nuclear war and preventing further nuclear detonations of any type in any location. Similarly, Panda writes that “no objective should be greater for the president of the United States than ensuring that the survival of the country is not threatened by the prospect of uncontrollable escalation into a general nuclear war.” Ford and Gibbons also both list avoiding nuclear war as the primary U.S. objective but identify a range of secondary strategic objectives, including denying the adversary battlefield victory, denying the adversary any advantage specifically from having used nuclear weaponry, and maintaining alliance relationships. Conversely, Weaver lists four strategic objectives: (1) restoring the territorial status quo ante; (2) restoring nuclear deterrence; (3) avoiding general nuclear war; and (4) denying the adversary any benefit from nuclear use.</p> +<h3 id="security-impacts-of-sme-controls">Security Impacts of SME Controls</h3> -<p><em>ASSURING ALLIES</em></p> +<p>The effects of U.S. export controls on the SME industry will shape the future of U.S.-China strategic competition in semiconductors. Chipmaking tools are not only a key driver of advanced semiconductor capabilities but also an industry area where the United States currently leads in market share and innovation. According to 2022 estimates by the Semiconductor Industry Association and Boston Consulting Group, U.S. value-added activity made up 47 percent of the global SME market, along with 26 percent for Japan, 18 percent for the European Union, 3 percent for South Korea, and only 3 percent for China. China is the largest importer of U.S. chipmaking tools in the world and is far from self-reliant. It is reasonable that the United States would seek to use its leverage in SME to ensure leadership over its leading strategic competitor in a key dual-use technology.</p> -<p><strong>Assumption #2:</strong> The United States will remain committed to allies’ security and their vital national interests in the event of strategic deterrence failure. For example, if NATO Article 5 is invoked, the United States will respond. Therefore, at least one U.S. objective (from above) will be continuing to assure and demonstrate credibility and resolve to allies. Partners, however, remain in a somewhat ambiguous position in the event of direct military attacks or nuclear strikes. This raises the following questions with regard to allies and partners in the event of strategic deterrence failure:</p> +<p>However, current export controls could undermine the innovation leadership of the U.S. SME companies that created this leverage in the first place. The Trump and Biden administrations’ efforts to control advanced chip capabilities have catalyzed a transformative shift away from U.S. technology in China but have failed to stop access to many controlled technologies due to widely documented smuggling efforts such as transshipments via third countries and domestic technology trading networks. Moreover, policymakers have not reckoned with the fact that China’s domestic semiconductor ecosystem is already making large strides toward replicating technologies previously supplied by U.S. toolmakers — aside from a few technological chokepoints, most notably EUV lithography.</p> -<ul> - <li> - <p>What are the risks — and their likelihoods and potential consequences — of allies questioning U.S. credibility in the event of strategic deterrence failure?</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>What will be allies’ security concerns in the event of strategic deterrence failure? What role might certain allies and partners play in a response?</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>How can the United States signal resolve to allies in the event of strategic deterrence failure? How does this differ from signaling resolve to non-treaty partners?</p> - </li> -</ul> +<p>Chinese — and to a lesser but still important extent third-country — toolmakers are poised to be the primary beneficiaries of China’s ongoing shift away from U.S. chipmaking equipment. The primary losers of this transition therefore are U.S. toolmakers, who increasingly find themselves excluded from parts of the world’s leading SME market. Importantly, the extent of this exclusion from Chinese markets is broader than that imposed by the export controls themselves due to multifaceted, interrelated trends such as Chinese companies hedging against future U.S. regulatory actions and overall declining trust in U.S. suppliers in Chinese markets.</p> -<p>Based on their differing assessments about the most pressing U.S. strategic objectives, the authors disagree about the importance and feasibility of assuring allies following adversary nuclear use. Panda argues that, given that any U.S. president is likely to prioritize protecting the U.S. homeland above all, severe damage to U.S. credibility is a forgone conclusion in the event of strategic deterrence failure. He writes that the United States would face “insurmountable” assurance and credibility challenges following nuclear use and that “it is highly likely that following strategic deterrence failure, allied perceptions of the credibility of the United States would suffer drastically.” Sisson suggests that the defense of Ukraine and Taiwan should be a primary U.S. war aim but maintains that avoiding further nuclear use of any type should be the United States’ first objective.</p> +<p>In some cases, the financial impacts of export controls on U.S. toolmakers are already visible. The best available evidence of this trend is the previously mentioned April 2024 New York Federal Reserve study, which stated that export control announcements were associated with negative impacts on market capitalization and revenues for affected U.S. companies. Specifically, export controls preceded a 2.5 percent abnormal decline in stock price and an 8.6 percent decline in revenue. Negative impacts on market capitalization have also taken place following the launch of criminal investigations related to export control violations. Shares of Applied Materials fell by as much as 8.3 percent following a November 2023 report that the company faces a criminal investigation regarding tools sold to SMIC. Shares of KLA and Lam Research also fell during the probe.</p> -<p>Ford, Gibbons, and Weaver, on the other hand, argue that assuring allies should be one of the United States’ primary strategic objectives. Ford and Gibbons both suggest that a nuclear response to deterrence failure is not necessary to reassure allies. Ford writes that the United States is not obligated to use any specific weapons in defense of its allies, as long as it does effectively defend them against aggression. He also argues that that, on the facts of the scenario, “continuing to prosecute a successful conventional campaign” and deny the adversary any benefits from nuclear weapons use “should represent an optimal answer from U.S. allies’ perspectives.” Weaver offers that the U.S. response that deters further aggression while avoiding uncontrollable escalation will be the optimal response from an allied perspective.</p> +<p>The top-line growth of the Chinese market should not obscure the potential impacts of design-out on long-term U.S. SME revenues. Some U.S. toolmakers have seen growing sales to China because overall Chinese fab spending has soared in the last two years. This short-term sales growth belies the underlying dynamic: market share is increasingly shifting toward Chinese and third-country competitors even as the market as a whole grows. This trend will likely expand as Chinese firms like Naura and AMEC broaden their toolmaking capabilities. While the Chinese SME market “pie” is getting larger, the U.S. share is shrinking.</p> -<p><em>MILITARY RESPONSE OPTIONS</em></p> +<p>This decline in market share means the ultimate losers in the current export regime are U.S. economic and national security. SME markets are capital intensive and have fast-paced product development cycles, much like their foundry and integrated device manufacturer customers in the chip fabrication world. These features mean that market leadership historically has been concentrated among a small group of multinationals who are able to invest large sums in research and development and globalized manufacturing footprints. Lost revenues and market share can therefore have significant long-term effects on the ability of toolmakers to remain competitive in the future. When U.S. SME companies are increasingly sidelined in Chinese acquisition of chipmaking technology, these same companies lose access to R&amp;D dollars to support future innovation leadership.</p> -<p><strong>Assumption #3:</strong> The president will consider a combination of kinetic and non-kinetic response options in the event of strategic deterrence failure. Options might include the use — or explicit threatened use — of nuclear weapons, naval deployments, or boots on the ground. This raises the following questions with regard to military response options in the event of deterrence failure:</p> +<p>Diminishing share in the Chinese market for U.S. toolmakers also means the U.S. government loses data on Chinese fab investment and technological capabilities. Historically, U.S. companies selling to China have offered a source of insight into China’s semiconductor industry, particularly in terms of understanding the microelectronics capabilities available to Chinese defense and dual-use technologies. However, diverted market share to Chinese and third-country firms risks undermining this source of intelligence. The surprise release of Huawei’s Mate 60 Pro in 2023 provides just one example of how Chinese semiconductor advancements increasingly take place under the radar of U.S. intelligence. The risk of design-around innovation represents a particularly pressing concern, as increased Chinese innovation could result in novel technology advancements occurring without advanced U.S. awareness.</p> -<ul> - <li> - <p>What would be the president’s military options in the event of strategic deterrence failure? Which of these options would you recommend to the president?</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>What are the risks associated with a military response?</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>What are the signaling objectives of military response options? How will these options contribute to conflict termination on terms favorable to the United States?</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>In the event of strategic deterrence failure, how strictly should the United States observe the law of armed conflict (i.e., principles of proportionality and discrimination)? How much should it influence the strategy?</p> - </li> -</ul> +<p>Imposing these export controls has clear costs for U.S. economic and national security. It is therefore worth considering ways the United States can achieve the benefits of export controls while minimizing costs.</p> -<p>While the authors agree on the need for some form of military response to adversary nuclear use, their proposed responses differ significantly. Panda, Ford, and Gibbons each recommend conventional responses to adversary nuclear use. Gibbons and Panda endorse conventional strikes against the adversaries’ forces that were directly responsible for nuclear strikes against U.S. partners and allies. Though he argues that the United States needs to be prepared to use nuclear weapons if the adversaries were to use them again, Ford suggests that U.S. and allied forces should “fight through” adversary nuclear use here and continue their already successful conventional campaigns with slight changes in posture to better prepare for the possibility of further adversary nuclear use.</p> +<h3 id="conclusion-and-policy-recommendations">Conclusion and Policy Recommendations</h3> -<p>Weaver is the only author to propose a nuclear response. He concludes that a conventional response would be problematic for several reasons, including that it may simply encourage adversaries to escalate further.</p> +<p>China’s ongoing effort to reduce dependency on U.S. SME marks a significant change to previous Chinese industrial policy targets. Although China is still far from self-sufficient in chipmaking tools, its new trajectory represents an important step toward long-term semiconductor industry decoupling goals. Increasingly broad and unilateral export controls are creating strong political and economic incentives for Chinese fabs to design out and around U.S. firms’ technology, with important long-term implications for U.S.-China technology competition.</p> -<p>Sisson proposes the most restrained response to adversary nuclear use. She suggests that, to avoid further escalation, U.S. and allied forces should cease offensive military operations and look instead to hold the line against further adversary aggression and rely on non-kinetic options.</p> +<p>This trend is unlikely to reverse entirely, even if the United States relaxes export controls. China has demonstrated progress in developing SME capabilities and is likely to continue down this path. While Chinese indigenization achievements to date have focused on mature processes, future progress at the leading edge is increasingly likely for Chinese toolmakers.</p> -<p><em>NON-KINETIC RESPONSE OPTIONS</em></p> +<p>Despite these changes, the United States can refine its export control regime to better balance national security and economic interests. A crucial step is to better understand how and where existing controls hurt U.S. companies. Conducting a survey of U.S. toolmakers through the Department of Commerce could provide valuable insights into market share shifts and competitive dynamics in global chip markets related to U.S. export controls. The survey could gather metrics like the share of Chinese tenders won by U.S. toolmakers relative to Chinese and third-country suppliers. It could also address the extent to which U.S. mature tools are being designed out, beyond the leading-edge tools that the controls target.</p> -<p><strong>Assumption #4:</strong> The U.S. political and military leadership would consider non-kinetic response options across the diplomacy-information-military-economics (DIME) spectrum. Many of these capabilities might overlap across domains, and the authors were given discretion to decide what are military versus diplomatic, information, economic, or other non-kinetic response options. Possibilities such as economic sanctions, building international pressure, or information operations would likely be part of the U.S. response to a strategic deterrence failure. This raises the following questions with regard to non-kinetic response options in the event of deterrence failure:</p> +<p>Past semiconductor industry feedback on Department of Commerce surveys has been mixed, with concerns about confidentiality and business sensitivity. Therefore, the Department of Commerce must carefully communicate any new data collection efforts to ensure transparency and highlight the benefits for U.S. companies in shaping future export policies. If the survey provides evidence that current U.S. export controls have significant adverse impacts on U.S. toolmakers, the next step would be to consider how to mitigate these impacts. The current approach, which results in U.S. companies losing market share to Chinese and third-country competitors, is unsustainable — particularly considering how Chinese circumvention efforts arguably undercut the controls’ national security objectives.</p> -<ul> +<p>A key limitation of the existing controls is the failure of the United States to implement them multilaterally. Talks of a full trilateral agreement with the Netherlands and Japan reportedly broke down over inclusion of technologies such as memory and mature logic chips in controls on chipmaking equipment. Any unilateral U.S. export control decision would fuel a growing view in Chinese markets that U.S. semiconductor companies are uniquely risky partners for Chinese companies — even relative to firms based in U.S. allies such as Japan and the Netherlands. The more the United States moves without allied support to control Chinese technology, the more it risks making its firms uncompetitive with allies’ firms.</p> + +<p>The United States must determine how to position its national security partners — not just Japan and the Netherlands but also South Korea, Germany, Israel, Taiwan, and potentially others — on more equal footing in terms of limiting trade of semiconductor manufacturing technologies with China. This strategy could involve a combination of the following three approaches:</p> + +<ol> <li> - <p>What would be the president’s non-kinetic options in the event of strategic deterrence failure? Which of these options would you recommend to the president?</p> + <p>Expand the application of FDPR and de minimis requirements within the U.S. controls to more effectively stop import substitution by third countries.</p> </li> <li> - <p>What are the risks associated with a non-kinetic response?</p> + <p>Apply increased economic or geopolitical pressure on allied countries to expand their own export controls.</p> </li> <li> - <p>What are signaling objectives of non-kinetic response options? How will these options contribute to conflict termination on terms favorable to the United States?</p> + <p>Reduce the bounds of U.S. export controls to bring them back in line with multilateral agreements (e.g., the Wassenaar Arrangement).</p> </li> -</ul> +</ol> -<p>The authors generally agreed about the importance of non-kinetic measures in responding to adversary nuclear use. One area of commonality was the importance of non-kinetic deterrence efforts prior to nuclear use during the crisis. Most suggested some form of information warfare or targeted messaging to accompany their proposed military responses, as well as non-kinetic military measures and economic retaliation. Weaver, for example, proposes information operations to maximize international backlash to adversary nuclear use and convince the Russian and Chinese people that their governments’ actions risk large-scale nuclear war, as well as measures to impose economic costs on Russia and China. Ford, Gibbons, Sisson, and Panda each suggest cyberattacks against adversary forces, as well as economic retaliation. Moreover, Gibbons, Sisson, and Panda advocate for diplomatic messaging to the international community to build a coalition condemning Russian and Chinese nuclear use. Panda proposes intelligence declassification as a tool to counter adversaries’ information operations.</p> +<p>The third option, by itself, seems highly unlikely. Any loosening of U.S. trade restrictions appears prohibitively challenging given bipartisan anxieties about China, particularly during an election year. The approach also could fail to stem Chinese companies’ redirection of market share to third countries, as rolling back U.S. controls may not be enough to undo the loss of trust in U.S. firms within Chinese chip markets.</p> -<h4 id="three-principles-for-intra-war-deterrence-in-a-two-peer-environment">Three Principles for Intra-War Deterrence in a Two-Peer Environment</h4> +<p>The U.S. government is focused on the first two options: (1) expanding the extraterritorial reach of the U.S. EAR and (2) convincing U.S. allies to implement more closely aligned controls. Expanding the FDPR and de minimis restrictions could limit sales of third-country technologies, but doing so risks further upsetting allies and accelerating efforts to remove U.S. technology and labor from third-country supply chains. This trade-off limits the effectiveness of U.S. plans to add to FDPRs. The Biden administration is reportedly planning to expand the FDPR’s product scope and add 120 new Chinese companies to the EL, effectively widening the EL FDPR’s destination coverage. But, as previously mentioned, the rule is not expected to apply to category A:5 countries, which include the Netherlands, Japan, and South Korea, undercutting its effectiveness in limiting third-country exports of key chipmaking tools. While an expanded FDPR would affect other countries and territories involved in chip supply chains, such as Israel, Singapore, and Taiwan, the impact on SME markets would likely be limited to specific niches or stages of fabrication.</p> -<p>Based on the expert papers, the PONI team identified three broad principles for thinking about and planning for intra-war deterrence in a two-peer environment. At the outset, however, it is worth observing that intra-war deterrence is highly context dependent, and many of the recommendations of these papers might not be applicable to other intra-war deterrence scenarios, to include whether to respond with nuclear or conventional weapons and how to assure allies. The stakes will depend on the context. In the scenario provided here, what is at stake is allies’ sovereignty and security and U.S. global leadership, but these must be balanced with the stakes of escalation, which could include further humanitarian consequences depending on whether conventional or nuclear weapons are used.</p> +<p>The second option — greater multilateralization — is more promising. However, U.S. allies still have strong incentives not to impose restrictions that are comparable with the U.S. controls, as toolmakers are significant and influential economic actors in countries like the Netherlands, Japan, and South Korea. To get around these obstacles, U.S. regulators should consider an expanded menu of carrots and sticks. The current strategy of appealing to shared national security concerns has clearly been unsuccessful. Allied governments have reportedly been unconvinced by justifications for the controls in terms of China’s People’s Liberation Army capabilities, in part because of very different perceptions among key partners (e.g., the European Union) of the extent to which China poses (or does not pose) a national security threat. Some form of mutual benefit, such as via shared intelligence or economic opportunities, might therefore be necessary to convince allies to cooperate.</p> -<p><em>INTRA-WAR DETERRENCE REQUIRES REGIONAL DETERRENCE</em></p> +<p>Regardless of what incentives are on offer, the United States likely must loosen some restrictions to achieve multilateralization. These reductions could focus on contentious areas such as memory chip production and nodes like 14nm and 16nm, which the semiconductor industry rarely considers “advanced.” A narrower approach could better ground national security arguments for multilateralization, which resonate with allies for some technologies (e.g., tools for fabricating 7nm logic chips) more than others (e.g., tools for fabricating 128-layer NAND flash memory chips).</p> -<p>In these scenarios, America’s adversaries are acting on the belief that they have more at stake in the region than the United States. Ford describes the strategic challenge: “Both of these failures [are] likely derived from assumptions in Moscow and Beijing, not that Western leaders lacked the capacity to respond effectively, but that they lacked the will . . . . It is the primary task of intra-war deterrence here to convince them that this, too, was a misapprehension.” As demonstrated by all of the papers in this volume, the United States will need a diverse and flexible tool kit, to include regional nuclear capabilities and conceal/reveal capabilities.</p> +<p>Loosening restrictions to enable greater multilateralization could be paired with efforts to improve enforcement of existing controls and stem circumvention efforts, which continue to blunt the controls’ effectiveness at slowing China’s technology development. Combining these efforts provides one way to apply continued pressure on China’s chip industry (and reduce domestic political pushback) while mitigating some of the controls’ negative economic repercussions via greater cooperation with allies.</p> -<p>While only one of the papers calls for the United States to respond with nuclear weapons, nearly all of the authors acknowledge the importance of the United States having a breadth of nuclear response options. For Panda, this is largely tied to assuring allies because “it is highly likely that following strategic deterrence failure, allied perceptions of the credibility of the United States would suffer drastically unless Washington opted for nuclear use in kind,” although he expresses concerns with risks of escalation. For Ford, amid a conventional response, “U.S. nuclear weapon storage vaults at relevant European airfields should also be readied for potential operations, and any existing plans for weapon dispersal to additional airfields that do not involve actual DCA attack assets should be implemented.”</p> +<p>Finally, the United States, even if it does not pursue a loosening of the existing controls, could return to a strategic mindset of the “sliding scale” approach in designing future export control policy. This shift could help signal to the Chinese market that the United States is not pursuing full-scale decoupling of its technology ecosystem from China’s and that it remains interested in doing business in technologies outside of the leading edge. This shift may be even more useful in convincing U.S. allies that U.S. companies will not be further restricted unilaterally and unpredictably from access to China’s markets, helping secure their role as trusted and reliable participants in globalized technology supply chains.</p> -<p>These and other points make a case for the United States to improve its regional deterrence posture through increased regional capabilities and flexible options in order to prepare for a proportionate nuclear response in a limited-use scenario. U.S. policymakers should strive to diversify U.S. nuclear forces through investments in new regional capabilities so that the president will have a broader range of credible options, particularly if an adversary threatens limited nuclear attacks. The capabilities should be survivable, lower yield, and responsive and effective across a spectrum of targets. Strategic deterrence is, and should remain, the primary mission of the U.S. nuclear force, and the triad is essential to the success of that mission. These capabilities will play a deterrence function not only during a crisis but also beforehand, as argued by Weaver:</p> +<p>Although U.S. toolmakers are key players in today’s semiconductor markets, U.S. leadership did not develop in a vacuum and is not guaranteed indefinitely. China remains a critical and growing market for semiconductor fabrication, so export restrictions may have far-reaching adverse impacts on U.S. SME companies. If there is one recurring theme in writing policy related to semiconductors, it is that details matter. The U.S. government must take care to design future semiconductor export controls in ways deeply attuned to the nuances of semiconductor competitive dynamics, where one small change often has powerful ripple effects across global supply chains. Export controls must not jeopardize the complex web of factors underlying U.S. market leadership in semiconductors. Otherwise, the controls risk undermining the advantages the United States has in its important technology competition with China.</p> -<blockquote> - <p>If the effect of selecting a nonnuclear response to adversary nuclear escalation is to convince the adversary that the United States is so concerned about uncontrolled escalation that it fears responding in kind, then a U.S. nonnuclear response could actually increase the risk of eventual uncontrolled escalation. This may seem counterintuitive, but if a U.S. nonnuclear response to adversary limited nuclear use results in encouraging further adversary nuclear escalation, then the U.S. nuclear responses that may eventually be required to achieve U.S. objectives are likely to be larger in scale and more provocative in their effects. This could well make uncontrolled escalation more likely.</p> -</blockquote> +<hr /> -<p>Another option for re-establishing deterrence would be relying on conceal/reveal capabilities, such as demonstrating a previously unknown capability amid a crisis to inspire the adversary to exert caution. As described by Weaver, “There is a potential role here for the calculated revelation of capabilities the adversary was previously unaware of that have potentially decisive military effects (‘You didn’t tell me they could do that. What else don’t I know?’).” Conceal/reveal capabilities could also offer U.S. decisionmakers more flexibility in a crisis, as well as having a powerful deterrence impact when needed most to de-escalate a crisis.</p> +<p><strong>William Alan Reinsch</strong> is senior adviser with the Economics Program and Scholl Chair in International Business at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS).</p> -<p><em>RESTORING DETERRENCE REQUIRES RESTORING ASSURANCE</em></p> +<p><strong>Jack Whitney</strong> is a former research intern with the CSIS Economics Program and Scholl Chair in International Business and a strategy consultant in EY-Parthenon’s Government &amp; Public Sector.</p> -<p>As multiple authors identify, a strategic deterrence failure could inspire a crisis of confidence among U.S. allies and partners. While some of the papers in this volume call for reconsidering U.S. security commitments to allies in a crisis, this would be a mistake for both short- and long-term reasons. Amid the ongoing conflict, the United States would need allies to fight through a scenario such as the one outlined in one or both theaters. While Ford argues that the Indo-Pacific theater is the more important of the two, he notes that “a Western loss in the European theater” would still be “a disaster.” For him, “[j]ust as the United States prioritized defending Europe from the Nazis in World War II without backing off against Japan in the Pacific, even if the United States must now prioritize East Asia in certain ways, it should not abandon Europe.” Ford, for example, points to the importance of European allies in leading on conventional fighting and re-establishing deterrence in one theater while the United States focuses on the Indo-Pacific. For Weaver, “If U.S. responses to initial Russian or Chinese escalation make clear that the United States is willing to engage in a competition in dire risk-taking, and that Russia and China must also fear potential uncontrolled escalation, allies are likely to be reassured in the near term.” Over the long term, alliance structures would be an essential component for any eventual peace settlement and post-conflict international order, assuming a U.S. objective is to maintain global leadership, as argued in nearly all of these papers.</p> +<p><strong>Matthew Schleich</strong> is a former research assistant with the CSIS Economics Program and Scholl Chair in International Business. He currently works as a foreign affairs officer in the U.S. Department of State’s Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation.</p>William Alan Reinsch, et al.This report argues that existing controls incentivize China to minimize reliance on U.S. semiconductor manufacturing equipment by indigenizing development of tools and increasing purchases from third-country suppliers, which ultimately hinders U.S. technology leadership.【初選47人案・判刑前夕】2024-11-18T12:00:00+08:002024-11-18T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-pre-sentence<ul> + <li>西九疑現「排隊黨」 記者連問隊頭13人無一回應</li> + <li>西九外「點人數」警方稱要檢視維持秩序警力 拒回應會否清走空櫈</li> + <li>百歲大黃伯連續兩晚排通宵盼見「受難朋友」 林進嘆僅5公眾可入正庭「非常可惜」</li> + <li>致歉、無悔、不求情——45名罪成被告，判刑前的陳詞</li> +</ul> -<p>Gibbons points to an additional value of maintaining and assuring allies: they can play a crucial role in generating international condemnation aimed at deterring further nuclear use by the adversaries:</p> +<excerpt /> -<blockquote> - <p>Allies and partners have a significant role to play in the messaging following nuclear use. They must unite in loudly and publicly condemning the nuclear attacks and should do so repeatedly. They should communicate that using nuclear weapons in these scenarios was unacceptable and neither nation will gain from using these weapons. These messages are key to reestablishing the nuclear taboo following nuclear use.</p> -</blockquote> +<h3 id="西九疑現排隊黨-記者連問隊頭13人無一回應">西九疑現「排隊黨」 記者連問隊頭13人無一回應</h3> -<p>Gibbons goes on to make the case for U.S. policymakers to immediately engage the U.S. public on the importance of allies, for example. The United States could also develop an engagement plan for deepening planning and consultations with allies on potential battlefield nuclear use and opportunistic aggression scenarios. A series of mini tabletop exercises could begin familiarizing allied and U.S. government officials across the interagency, including at the Department of State, the National Security Council, and the Department of Defense (including combatant commands) with how deterrence works and how battlefield nuclear use might impact both conventional campaigns and deterrence dynamics.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/LsGRMV0.png" alt="image01" /></p> -<p><em>INTRA-WAR DETERRENCE WILL DEPEND ON PRECRISIS PLANNING AND DECISIONS</em></p> +<p>【獨媒報導】初選47人案將於周二（11月19日）判刑，昨晚（11月16日）距離開審仍有三天，西九龍裁判法院門外疑出現「排隊黨」。《獨媒》記者今早到場，隊伍有13人自攜櫈坐下排隊，大部份人均戴上口罩。記者逐一向排隊者詢問排隊原因、旁聽的案件等，全部未獲回應。排第14的是「女長毛」雷玉蓮，她稱「示威咗咁多年咁多次，我未曾試過排隊呢，要排兩三日嘅，我都係第一次」，斥「排隊黨」行為「鼠竊狗偷」。人稱「姨婆」的旁聽常客亦趕到場排隊，斥「排隊黨」行為多餘。</p> -<p>Finally, intra-war deterrence will largely depend on precrisis decisions and planning. These comprise decisions and actions taken with adversaries, allies, domestic audiences, and wider international ones. Examples include dialogue with allies about crisis communication and decisionmaking, conceal/reveal capabilities, and establishing thresholds and threats (i.e., do not bluff). There are at least two main areas where the United States can focus on intra-war deterrence planning before a crisis begins: strategic communications, particularly with international audiences, and wargaming.</p> +<h4 id="隊頭大部分人戴上口罩未回應記者問題">隊頭大部分人戴上口罩、未回應記者問題</h4> -<p>Shaping narratives and messaging before and during crises will be essential. Such messages will need to be tailored to multiple audiences: allies (focusing on assurance), domestic audiences (focused on the importance of U.S. alliances, and in support of achieving U.S. military responses to adversarial limited nuclear use), international audiences (aimed to “make the adversary a pariah,” as Weaver argues), and adversarial domestic audiences (meant to foment a facts-based public consensus). When facing a crisis involving potential limited nuclear use, strategic communication must be multifaceted. Messages must be tailored to diverse audiences (allies, the U.S. public, the international community, adversary leadership, and their citizens) and adapted for each stage of the crisis, including preemptive communication. For example, before a crisis, messages aimed at the U.S. population should focus on the importance of alliances. As Gibbons argues, “Before any potential conflict — and frankly, right now — the U.S. government, especially the president, should aim to better educate the public about the history of U.S. alliance relationships and their benefits.” Precrisis messaging to Americans could also focus, for example, on reassuring the U.S. public about U.S. commitment to deterrence and the limited nature of any potential nuclear response.</p> +<p>47名民主派被控「串謀顛覆國家政權」罪，其中31人認罪，16人不認罪受審，只有劉偉聰及李予信2人罪名不成立，餘下14人則被判罪名成立，包括鄭達鴻、楊雪盈、彭卓棋、何啟明、黃碧雲、施德來、何桂藍、陳志全、鄒家成、林卓廷、梁國雄、柯耀林、余慧明及吳政亨，45人早前已分批完成求情。</p> -<p>Precrisis engagement with international audiences (particularly the Global South and “non-aligned” states) was raised in several analyses. Gibbons writes:</p> +<p>昨日晚上開始，已有人到場排隊輪候旁聽席，《獨媒》記者今早到場，逐一訪問隊伍的13人，全部人不作回應，部分人更撐起雨傘向外遮擋。截至下午約一時，排隊人數增至約20人。下午約2時許，約20名警方到場使用金屬架設立「阻車器」，以防止車輛進入封鎖範圍。</p> -<blockquote> - <p>It is worth emphasizing here that improving U.S. and allied relations with states within the Global South before this notional conflict in 2027 is paramount. Though the international community broadly supported the 2022 UN General Assembly resolution condemning Russia’s attack on Ukraine, there have been fewer governments that have unilaterally condemned the attack or Russia’s nuclear saber-rattling, even among members of the Treaty on the Prohibition on Nuclear Weapons, a treaty that explicitly bans nuclear threats.</p> -</blockquote> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/6K6kk6l.png" alt="image02" /></p> -<p>A second priority for precrisis intra-war deterrence will be more wargaming. One way to address this challenge is with more wargames through all stages of escalation, as highlighted in Weaver’s paper in particular. But Sisson also writes, “Each phase of a scenario exercises the thought processes involved in aligning military operations with war aims, and war aims with strategic objectives, under conditions in which some variables that might affect the likelihood of success are foreseeable and controllable and some are not.” Variations of these aims, objectives, and conditions can be explored through wargaming or other exercising. One particular scenario that would be worth exploring is coordination among allies, which is somewhat ambiguous in the scenario used for this study. Even with additional gaming and empirical data, however, there will be limits on knowledge about what happens after nuclear use and how to re-establish strategic deterrence.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/eFm2dRx.png" alt="image03" /></p> -<p>As Weaver argues, “Detailed wargaming and simulation is needed to analyze the ways in which limited nuclear use by both sides affect the course of twenty-first-century conflict and escalation dynamics across a range of scenarios and strategic circumstances. Without such analysis, U.S. efforts to identify the range of nuclear options needed to address limited nuclear escalation will risk missing key insights.” More comprehensive wargaming of the central problem could require asking these same questions across a set of plausible scenarios that span the range of key strategic circumstances the United States might face. Examples of other scenarios that should be examined using the Project Atom 2024 methodology include</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/hGj0vua.png" alt="image04" /></p> -<ul> - <li> - <p>Conflict with Russia while deterring Chinese opportunistic aggression</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Conflict with China while deterring Russian opportunistic aggression</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Conflict with Russia and China in which the United States is winning conventionally in one theater and losing in the other when deterrence of limited nuclear use fails</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Conflict with Russia and China in which the United States is losing conventionally in both theaters when deterrence of limited nuclear use fails</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>The full range of scenarios farther into the future when China is a nuclear peer</p> - </li> -</ul> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/AtjsInB.png" alt="image05" /></p> -<p>It is worth acknowledging that even with additional gaming and empirical data, there will be limits on knowledge about what happens after nuclear use and how to re-establish strategic deterrence. However, analysis of additional scenarios and circumstances would likely produce new and important insights regarding the four key issues addressed in this project, to include opportunities for de-escalation and identifying off-ramps.</p> +<h4 id="雷玉蓮斥排隊黨行為鼠竊狗偷">雷玉蓮斥排隊黨行為「鼠竊狗偷」</h4> -<p>There are a host of other opportunities for strengthening intra-war deterrence before a crisis begins. The United States and its allies may have to be prepared to fight and operate in a chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear (CBRN) environment, which will require troop protection, equipment, and training. These preparations could also serve a deterrent function by demonstrating U.S. commitment to prevailing in defense of its allies, even in a CBRN environment.</p> +<p>今早10時45分，「女長毛」雷玉蓮到場排隊，排第14位。她向《獨媒》表示，從網上得知有人排隊，故在進食早餐前便急忙前來，匆忙下亦忘帶藥物，稱「示威咗咁多年咁多次，我未曾試過排隊呢，要排兩三日嘅，我都係第一次。」</p> -<h4 id="conclusion">Conclusion</h4> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/rc99IrK.png" alt="image06" /></p> -<p>To state the obvious, contemplating how to respond to nuclear weapons use and strategic deterrence failure is deeply uncomfortable. Such a scenario could involve hundreds of thousands (perhaps millions) of casualties, environmental disasters, and the potential for further damage. Indeed, Sisson’s paper starts with the assumption that any nuclear detonation could quickly escalate to civilization-threatening general nuclear war. Ideally, the international community would condemn such attacks and impose heavy costs. But the United States also needs to be prepared to restore deterrence and end the conflict on terms favorable to the United States and its allies. In many of these scenarios, allies’ sovereignty is at stake.</p> +<p>雷玉蓮質疑隊頭者「究竟佢哋嚟做啲乜嘢呢，識唔識被告人呢」，認為他們是「排隊黨」，斥其行為「鼠竊狗偷」，「今日我親眼見到排隊黨，我真係覺得冇得救㗎啦，你又唔識被告人，我哋都話嚟支持我哋啲戰友啦，入邊啲人都係我哋識嘅。」</p> -<p>This report’s recommendations point to an urgent need for renewed engagement among policymakers and publics on nuclear issues. The stakes could not be higher, as it is the risk of repeated nuclear exchanges as well as the United States’ global leadership and credibility that are on the line. More regional nuclear capabilities will give U.S. planners more rungs on the escalation ladder for restoring deterrence without resorting to large-scale exchanges. They will also give the U.S. president more options in the event of a horrific scenario such as the one outlined here. A future U.S. president must be willing and able to employ nuclear weapons in response to a strategic deterrence failure scenario — and will therefore require flexible, limited options to navigate a scenario of limited nuclear use effectively. Whether a conventional or nuclear response to adversary nuclear use will be more effective in re-establishing deterrence and achieving U.S. objectives will depend on adversary motivations and the specific context of deterrence failure; while a nuclear response may be appropriate in certain scenarios, the same response could be unnecessary and escalatory in others. It is critical, however, that a U.S. president be able to employ whatever military response they determine to be most effective. The United States may therefore benefit from a more diverse nuclear force with a wider range of theater nuclear capabilities. Strategic investments in modernizing, diversifying, and enhancing the resilience of existing deterrent forces will strengthen deterrence and help avoid intra-war deterrence scenarios in the first place. By anticipating scenarios in which adversaries escalate regionally, potentially concurrently, the United States and its allies can strengthen deterrence and reduce the likelihood of adversaries exploiting perceived weaknesses. Preparing for multiple scenarios is not about seeking war but about enhancing deterrence to prevent it altogether.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/cRZoQbb.png" alt="image07" /> +▲ 雷玉蓮</p> -<p>In addition to these capability considerations, U.S. decisionmakers can start laying the groundwork now for intra-war deterrence, to include increased and improved wargaming and tabletop exercises, including with allies. And U.S. military and strategic planners, along with policymakers, must immediately consider the question of how to restore assurance alongside deterrence.</p> +<p>雷玉蓮特意帶同蓮花燈到場，入黑會燈著，寓意「佢哋生命好光輝，照亮緊每一個香港人嘅心」，亦稱「希望上天有仁慈嘅心，能夠判輕啲，亦都希望無論邊個對與錯，今日已經成為一個定局，希望佢哋能夠早日出返嚟，同佢哋屋企人見面。」</p> -<h3 id="challenges-of-deterrence-and-security-upon-nuclear-use">Challenges of Deterrence and Security upon Nuclear Use</h3> +<h4 id="姨婆排隊黨行為多餘">「姨婆」：「排隊黨」行為多餘</h4> -<blockquote> - <h4 id="christopher-a-ford">Christopher A. Ford</h4> -</blockquote> +<p>人稱「姨婆」的旁聽常客，今午一時許到場，她本打算今晚到場排隊，惟稱「估唔到咁早，琴晚已經有人講出嚟」。她質疑「排隊黨」的行為，「排到又點啫，排到攞到錢，俾錢嗰啲人，我唔知佢咩心理啦，我哋都會見到佢哋㗎，我哋都會知道嗰個結果㗎」，指其行為「多餘」。她不擔心天氣，「落雨咪溚下雨、避雨」，「雖然聽落去好似好戇居，但係唔覺得㗎，我哋兩日咋嘛，唔係好辛苦，但係嗰啲幾年啦，都比我哋更辛苦。」</p> -<p><em>The following pages respond to questions posed by the organizers of Project Atom 2024.</em></p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/HeyKzwn.png" alt="image08" /> +▲ 「姨婆」</p> -<h4 id="us-strategic-objectives">U.S. Strategic Objectives</h4> +<p>另一名到場排隊的市民CC（化名），同樣是在網上看到排隊情況後到場，她同樣批評「排隊黨」，「佢地會輪班，佢地搵人嚟好容易姐，我哋唔會呀嘛。我地係自己過嚟嘅，點樣捱到幾晚通宵呢？」CC曾多次聽審，明言認得部分「排隊黨」一士，「通常（星期）二、四過嚟係大叔，通常一、三、五過嚟係大媽」，指他們取得籌號後，發送籌號圖片給「蛇頭」後就會離開法院，認為「排隊黨」目的是阻礙市民旁聽。</p> -<p><em>ASSESSING DETERRENCE’S “FAILURE”</em></p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/ZrZliZB.png" alt="image09" /> +▲ 市民CC</p> -<p>The locus of deterrence “failure” here may lie not so much in the specific run-up to the crisis outlined in Project Atom 2024, but potentially years earlier. In this scenario, U.S. and allied leaders were stepping up their military preparedness before war broke out, and were very clear publicly that “wars of conquest will be punished.” Western posture and policy statements, in their own terms, left little basis for U.S. adversaries’ apparent conclusion either that: (a) the United States would not contest aggression in the first place; or (b) the United States could be frightened into intra-war concessions by adversaries’ use of nuclear weapons.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/ptO7lTp.png" alt="image10" /> +▲ 午後，前排的排隊人士有至少兩人「換更」</p> -<p>Rather, irrespective of what the United States declared in the run-up to war, U.S. adversaries seem to have assumed that the United States and its allies were: averse to war in general; incapable of waging war effectively or on a sustained basis; and sufficiently afraid of nuclear escalation that Beijing and Moscow could enjoy the benefits of aggression without facing prohibitive risk. This assumption would appear to be rooted not in assessments of specific Western actions undertaken in this scenario, but rather in antecedent beliefs, accumulated over time, about fundamental weaknesses and risk-aversion in Western leadership and societies, coupled — presumably — with the conclusion that the aggressors could draw upon greater resources of martial seriousness and societal stamina in waging war, and that the stakes involved in each theater favored the nearer, “hungrier” power over the distant and more diffident United States and its weak and degenerate local friends.</p> +<h3 id="西九外點人數警方稱要檢視維持秩序警力-拒回應會否清走空櫈">西九外「點人數」警方稱要檢視維持秩序警力 拒回應會否清走空櫈</h3> -<p>Deterrence of this aggression, in other words, arguably failed in Project Atom 2024 much the same way that deterrence of Russia’s 2022 attack on Ukraine failed not in 2021–22 but in 2014 — when Vladimir Putin, observing Western reactions to his annexation of Crimea and invasion of the Donbas, seems to have concluded that they would not react forcefully “next time” either. In the scenario presented here, the failure was twofold: the United States and its allies failed to deter Russia and China from undertaking wars of conventional military aggression, and then further failed in deterring them from using nuclear weapons when things on the battlefield began to go bad. Both of these failures likely derived from assumptions in Moscow and Beijing not that Western leaders lacked the capacity to respond effectively, but that they lacked the will — and hence were more tied to general and longer-term adversary assessments than to specific U.S. or allied posture and signaling failures in the run-up to the crisis.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/eLvZkvz.png" alt="image11" /></p> -<p>If so, this suggests that the efficacy of deterrence lies not only in clear military postures and public messaging, but also in an adversary’s underlying, longer-term assumptions about the character, motivation, and sociopolitical support enjoyed by those adopting such postures and sending such signals. If the adversary power has concluded that one is fundamentally timid and conflict averse — or simply unable to wage a war with resolution and commitment anyway — that adversary is less likely to be deterred by short-term precrisis signals even if they do, on their face, convey admirable resolution.</p> +<p>【獨媒報導】初選47人案將於明日（19日）判刑，西九龍裁判法院外在開庭前三日已出現旁聽人龍，包括為數十多人的「排隊黨」。《獨媒》記者繼昨日後，今早11時再到法院外視察，暫時有約有41人排隊，不過隊頭的疑似13人「排隊黨」就增加至16人，隊尾亦出現6人疑為「排隊黨」。另外，警方曾在中午12時點算在場排隊人數，在場警員回覆《獨媒》查詢指，點人數是因為要衡量現場人數，檢視需要派出多少警力維持秩序，但就不可以透露會否清走沒有人或暫時離座的空櫈。</p> -<p>Nevertheless, the more immediate problem for Western leaders in this situation lies not in addressing such deeper challenges but in managing escalation risks and restoring deterrence now that bullets have started flying.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/ecUUNys.png" alt="image12" /></p> -<p>If U.S. adversaries assumed that the West’s sociopolitical weakness and fears of nuclear escalation would preclude its responding effectively to conventional aggression by a nuclear-armed great power in this scenario, of course, they were wrong. Since they also seem to have assumed that even their very limited tactical use of nuclear weaponry would scare the United States into abandoning its response to their aggression, it is the primary task of intra-war deterrence here to convince them that this, too, was a misapprehension. To the degree that the United States can do this, it has a chance not merely to manage this scenario, but also to help shape U.S. adversaries’ more general perceptions of the United States in ways that will enable maintaining deterrence once peace is restored. (After all, it is much less plausible to argue that a country will not fight you next time when it has just surprised you, this time, by demonstrating that it actually will.)</p> +<p>西九昨日已出現疑似「排隊黨」，隊伍首13人自攜櫈坐下排隊，大部人均戴上口罩，《獨媒》曾逐一向他們詢問排隊原因、旁聽的案件等，但全部未獲回應。本來排第14、現時排第17的「女長毛」雷玉蓮向《獨媒》指，本身向公司請假兩天排隊旁聽，但沒有預計到有「排隊黨」提早前來，便臨時再請假提早來到法院排隊。她又指今早8時曾因腳痛離開隊伍，返公司取回藥物，但得悉警方點人數的消息後便立即回到隊伍當中。</p> -<p><em>CORE U.S. OBJECTIVES IN THIS SCENARIO</em></p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/l2eKCeI.png" alt="image13" /> +▲ 雷玉蓮</p> -<p>Given the potentially existential implications, the first U.S. objective here is to avoid escalation to a full-scale nuclear exchange with either Russia or China. It would be a mistake, however, to conclude from this that the best way to achieve this requires backing down, or that this is the United States’ only important objective. On the contrary, making no response to the Russian and Chinese use of nuclear weapons in this scenario — or acting in a way that would reward such use with terrified Western de-escalation and hence cede theater-level advantage (or even victory) to the aggressor or convince that aggressor that the United States was abandoning its commitments to its allies — may actually increase the risk of broader war and even a full-scale exchange sooner or later, more than would a response of judicious firmness that denies them such benefits and makes clear that the United States stands with its friends and is not entirely unwilling to turn up the heat further.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/a20i7sf.png" alt="image14" /> +▲ 葉小姐</p> -<p>The United States has at least two second-order, but nonetheless extremely important, objectives in this scenario. First, it has an incentive to deny Russia and China victory in these regional conflicts (even in conventional terms) and to make good on U.S. commitments to its allies, because were the United States to lose or weaken those alliances, this would open the door to untold future revisionist aggression and upend the international order upon which U.S. prosperity and that of the United States’ most important international trading and security partners depends.</p> +<h4 id="市民反映有人疑插隊">市民反映有人疑插隊</h4> -<p>Second, the United States has an incentive to deny Russia and China not just victory in general, but also victory through the use of nuclear weapons in particular. Rewarding their attempt at nuclear coercion would presumably lead to more aggressive employment of such approaches by Russia and China in the future, hence leading to more wars and greater risks of a full-scale nuclear exchange. Rewarding such coercion and aggression, moreover — and demonstrating the inability of U.S. alliance structures to deter them — would also encourage defensive nuclear proliferation to (and perhaps future offensive nuclear-facilitated coercion by) others as well.</p> +<p>有排隊市民亦向《獨媒》反映有疑似插隊的情況，葉小姐指本來於隊伍後的一名男子，不久後便出前在隊伍前方：「我次次數（蓮姐前面）都冇16人，但佢哋話有16人。她爭表示，早已預見會發生荒謬情況，但仍希望見證事件的進展，強調「因為佢哋為咗我發言」。她亦表示將留守隊伍，直至明日派籌。</p> -<p><em>PRIORITIZING THEATERS</em></p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/qOKrXOB.png" alt="image15" /></p> -<p>A more difficult question is whether, in this scenario, the United States should prioritize one theater over the other. They present different military-operational situations, with the conflict against Russia being primarily a land war and that against China emphasizing naval power projection, although both would require significant air power. For this reason, each region is likely to draw most heavily upon somewhat different mixes of U.S. military capabilities and assets. It is conceivable, therefore, that the United States might not face unmanageably stark prioritization choices.</p> +<p>另一名排隊市民黃小姐亦表示，曾經有人向警察投訴該名男子插隊，警察表示會處理，但最後不了了之。她指：「我哋想有一個公平競爭，佢哋搵人換更唔緊要，但係希望佢哋唔好再插隊。」</p> -<p>Nevertheless, if the United States were forced to choose between concentrating upon Europe and concentrating upon the Indo-Pacific, Washington should prioritize the latter. Even if Russia succeeds in carving out for itself some kind of neo-tsarist imperium in Eastern Europe, Moscow lacks the economic, demographic, and material resources to hold it over the medium-to-long term, especially if confronted by strong and sophisticated adversaries. An allied loss in the Polish-Lithuanian theater in this scenario would be devastating, but even then, a sufficiently alarmed, angry, and resolute Europe could likely still — even alone — present Russia with just such a set of adversaries if it really wished to. Accordingly, the odds of the entire continent falling under the Kremlin’s sway — as well as the odds of Russia maintaining a new empire over the long term — seem low.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/JWA3E8H.png" alt="image16" /></p> -<p>By contrast, the implications of a Chinese victory in the Indo-Pacific seem more systemically problematic. Such a victory would very likely lead not merely to the bankruptcy of existing U.S. alliance guarantees, resulting in the Americans’ expulsion from the region — de facto, if not necessarily de jure (or at least not at first) — but also the creation of a Sinocentric imperium in East Asia. Nor would this new authoritarian Chinese regional order likely be particularly short lived. In contrast to the declining state of Russia, and despite some recent economic headwinds and the longer-term specter of demographic decline, China would not lack the manpower, military capabilities, or economic resources necessary to dominate its new network of tributary vassals. Between the two “theater-defeat” scenarios, therefore, from the perspective of the international order and the United States’ future role therein, an Indo-Pacific loss is probably the more traumatic and irreversible.</p> +<h4 id="路上設防車輛衝擊設備">路上設防車輛衝擊設備</h4> -<p>Nevertheless, in saying that the United States should, in extremis, prioritize the Indo-Pacific theater, this paper is not suggesting that the United States should abandon efforts to protect its European allies in the Russia scenario. Prioritizing one thing need not mean euthanizing the other. Indeed, any failure to stand by NATO would likely have significant adverse consequences in the Indo-Pacific, whose leaders would be watching the war in Europe carefully as a window into their own ability to rely upon the United States when things become difficult. Just as the United States prioritized defending Europe from the Nazis in World War II without backing off in the war against Japan in the Pacific, even if the United States must now prioritize East Asia in certain ways, it should not abandon Europe.</p> +<p>警方派出大量警力在場佈防，法院門外有多輛警車停泊，包括一輛「劍齒虎」裝甲車，警方在法院周圍亦架起多個帳篷，多名警員穿上戰術背心駐守並截查行人。另外，警方在法院附近路口和巴士站設置防止車輛衝擊的設備，市民上落巴士及過馬路時需刻意避開。</p> -<p><em>WHAT COUNTS AS “WINNING”?</em></p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/LKL6KeP.png" alt="image17" /></p> -<p>As the great power committed to maintaining the existing system of international order against revisionist challengers, and as the leading state in the two alliance systems challenged by opportunistic authoritarian aggression, the United States has a “theory of victory” requirement here of denying Russia and China the achievement of their own theories of victory. In Europe, for example, this means preserving Poland, Lithuania, and Ukraine as sovereign independent states, and as countries enjoying close security ties to the United States. In Asia, this means similarly preserving Taiwan’s autonomy and keeping the United States’ free democratic allies in Australia, Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines from having to become vassal states of the Middle Kingdom. As a status quo power facing revisionist aggression, the fundamental victory requirement for the United States here is thus simply that its adversaries do not “win.”</p> +<p>下午近3時45分，國安處總警司李桂華帶隊，與十多人在西九龍裁判法院外巡視旁聽市民排隊狀況，至隊尾時逗留約30秒，之後原路折返。</p> -<p>To be sure, a broader and more satisfying sort of U.S. victory would see the threat of revisionist aggression from Moscow and Beijing recede (or end?) more broadly, rather than having those powers simply “put back in their place,” thereafter remaining as wounded and aggrieved states looking for future vengeance. Indeed, given the nature of the two authoritarian regimes in question, it is possible that the clear military defeat of either one could shatter its brittle internal legitimacy narrative and lead to regime collapse.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/7B5wMAI.png" alt="image18" /></p> -<p>That said, the United States should not assume that such regime collapse would end revisionist threats. After all, both polities have strong and vicious hyper-nationalist elements strongly committed to dark and semi-paranoid anti-Western discourse. Moreover, there is no guarantee that either Vladimir Putin or Xi Jinping would be replaced by rulers any less committed to violent international self-aggrandizement. Nevertheless, even if further revisionism could not be precluded by the replacement of the current government, the very fact of a decisive defeat could help reinforce future deterrence messages, especially to the degree that this defeat “felt” more like a consequence of the regime having overreached by striking out abroad than like the fruits of a nefarious Western conspiracy to conquer or subvert the state.</p> +<p>在記者區方面，暫時有48間媒體張貼排隊牌。日前《科大編委》表示其排隊牌被破壞棄置於草叢，原本位置由《文匯報》取代。《獨媒》今日發現，現時隊伍中有兩張「香港文匯報」的排隊牌，分別排第30及第35，其中後者更寫上「新調」字眼，至於《科大編委》的排隊牌亦重新掛上，排第42，並寫上「我哋本身星期五掛咗牌俾人拆咗」。</p> -<p>To be sure, after a Western victory in either theater, it might be difficult to tell whether deterrence had truly been “restored,” for each regime might react to such a setback with a policy of tactical retrenchment — that is, effectively accepting only a temporary armistice in order to buy time in which to reprovision, reequip, and prepare to resume hostilities on better terms. Yet deterrence is always provisional and conditional, as it is contingent upon the deterring party’s success in maintaining concrete capabilities (and a perceived willingness to use them) sufficient to persuade a would-be aggressor, each and every day, that “today is not the day.” In this sense, the belligerent powers are not the only ones with agency here. Even a mere armistice would also give the United States and its allies a chance to be better prepared for a potential resumption of hostilities, and hence better able to deter the aggressors. In the face of revisionist moves against the geopolitical status quo, an approach that defeats the aggressor’s initial thrust, returns all players to the territorial status quo ante, and buys time in which the United States can further shore up its alliances and prepare to counter any further attacks looks more like victory than loss.</p> +<h3 id="百歲大黃伯連續兩晚排通宵盼見受難朋友-林進嘆僅5公眾可入正庭非常可惜">百歲大黃伯連續兩晚排通宵盼見「受難朋友」 林進嘆僅5公眾可入正庭「非常可惜」</h3> -<p>As suggested above, moreover, the aggressor’s prior defeat at U.S. hands might itself help to redress the longer-term deterrence problem rooted in adversary assumptions about Western sociopolitical weakness. Rather than being presumed to be a soft and fundamentally weak-willed adversary, the United States would thereafter be “the folks who thrashed you last time, even though you used nuclear weapons.” With a track record of martial success against twenty-first-century near-peer adversaries — and with no less capacity than before to actually use nuclear weapons against future aggression if this is needed — the United States would thus be better positioned to ensure future deterrence than it is now.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/TNfthdK.png" alt="image19" /></p> -<h4 id="assuring-allies">Assuring Allies</h4> +<p>【獨媒報導】初選47人案明早判刑，有公眾提早兩日起在法院外輪候公眾人士入庭籌。截止今午4時半，有48人在場排隊，包括現年100歲的社運支持者「大黃伯」及前元朗區議員林進。不過司法機構公布，正庭僅有5個旁聽座位，意味著大部分人連續兩晚通宵排隊後，仍未必能進入法庭。</p> -<p><em>QUESTIONS ABOUT U.S. CREDIBILITY</em></p> +<p>有未能入正庭的人士繼續排隊。撐拐杖的大黃伯則說，希望能「見吓啲受難的朋友」，並表示會在截的士回家食藥後，晚上再回來排隊。案中被告伍健偉的「戰友」林進則坦言正庭公眾席數量遠比想像中少，感到非常可惜，但亦無能為力：「佢哋（初選案被告）受咗咁多苦難，坐咗三年半，我哋陪埋佢最後呢一刻都做唔到。」</p> -<p>In general, there are two levels of U.S. credibility about which U.S. allies have reason to be concerned in this scenario, with the second being of more significance than the first. The first level is whether the United States would be willing to risk a direct clash with a great power adversary, in any form, were it to move against its allies. Here the allies ought to have little doubt about U.S. credibility, for in this scenario the United States not only did respond to aggression against its allies by throwing its conventional forces into the fray against the aggressors, but also responded effectively enough that it led to dramatic setbacks for the aggressors.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/qFtnsdd.png" alt="image20" /> +▲ 警方昨日起加強西九龍裁判法院一帶巡邏，包括派出派遣反恐部隊和使用無人機。</p> -<p>The second level of allied concern is whether U.S. nuclear extended deterrence will remain available in the event that an adversary uses nuclear weapons against it — that is, whether the United States would be willing to use nuclear weapons in such a conflict if needed. This is a game-theoretical challenge dating back to the early years of the Cold War, which materialized once the Soviets acquired a strategic nuclear arsenal to counterpose against the U.S. one, and it raises a question to which no truly definitive answer has ever been given. In a context in which adversary nuclear weapons hold major U.S. cities at risk, to what degree would a U.S. president really be willing to “lose New York to save Hamburg”? On this level, the present scenario confronts the United States with a clear challenge: how much risk of nuclear escalation against the U.S. homeland should the United States be willing to accept in responding to an aggressor’s use of nuclear weapons against its forces and allies in theaters thousands of miles away?</p> +<p>大黃伯表示旁聽的主要目的是「想見吓啲受難嘅朋友」，又指「唔知仲有幾多日、有冇機會見佢哋？」</p> -<p>This is a challenging question to which no a priori answer is likely possible, as much would depend upon the specific battlefield circumstances, the geopolitical and political contexts, and the personalities of the leaders in question. To judge from U.S. deterrence policy over many decades, however, the answer to the question is “definitely some.” Nonetheless, U.S. intestinal fortitude in this regard is presumably not infinite. The United States was clearly willing to accept considerable risk of escalation to a full-scale nuclear exchange in order to deter Soviet aggression against its allies in Europe during the Cold War. Yet the United States also seems to have recognized that there was an inherent degree of non-credibility in a promise, in effect, to destroy the world in order to “save” (for instance) Hamburg from the Red Army.</p> +<p>司法機構公布，將於明早派發404張公眾人士入庭籌，當中僅5張是正庭座位。昨日已到場的「姨婆」料未能入正庭，但她認為供公眾看庭內情況直播的延伸庭，與正庭僅有一牆之隔，仍能支持初選案的被告，讓他們得知「仍有人沒有忘記他們」。</p> -<p>In response to this problem, the United States and its allies developed three answers that went beyond relying exclusively upon potentially homeland-imperiling U.S. strategic brinkmanship: (a) the British and French invested in their own nuclear weapons programs; (b) the United States adopted a “nuclear-sharing” policy under which it would provide nuclear gravity bombs for delivery by key NATO allies in time of war (while preserving U.S. control of such devices in peacetime); and (c) the United States deployed a variety of theater- and shorter-range nuclear delivery systems that would give it more options to respond to aggression without the stark choice between surrender and jumping all the way up the escalation ladder to a strategic exchange. Together, these choices added considerable operational flexibility to the collective NATO nuclear tool kit, enhancing deterrence without making nuclear use so casually thinkable that the United States would be tempted to engage in it absent the gravest of provocations.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/gD29qgl.png" alt="image21" /> +▲ 旁聽常客「姨婆」</p> -<p>Today, by contrast, only the first of the United States’ three Cold War–era responses (British and French weapons) really remains viable, though even then in a form considerably attenuated since Cold War days and not optimized for theater-type engagements of this sort in any event. The second response (NATO’s nuclear-sharing policy) has been allowed to atrophy into a fairly noncredible operational capability that would be difficult to employ in a full-scale conflict, is vulnerable to both nuclear and conventional preemption, and which (at least until sizeable numbers of dual-capable F-35 aircraft come online) would have difficulty surviving and ensuring mission-completion against serious air defenses.</p> +<p>佔中時為人認識的大黃伯，昨夜凌晨一時多到西九裁判法院通宵排隊，今早回家吃藥後再回到法院門外。下午3時許，大黃伯在同行男子陪同下，撐着拐杖離開排隊隊伍，打算截的士回家食藥，並稱會再晚上再回來排隊。</p> -<p>As for the third response, the United States no longer has any effective U.S. nuclear assets designed for, devoted to, and deployed for theater-level nuclear missions. It does have a low-yield option in the form of the W76-2 warhead, but that device rides on a strategic delivery system, the Trident D5 submarine-launched ballistic missile. The United States has no flexible, theater-range nuclear systems to array against the considerable Russian and Chinese arsenals of diverse and flexible theater-range systems. This makes it harder to reassure our allies that we really would be there (in a nuclear sense) for their “Hamburg” — as well as harder to convince (and hence deter) the would-be aggressor.</p> +<p>大黃伯表示，來法院旁聽初選案的主要目的，是「見吓啲受難的朋友，想望望佢哋受咗監獄之苦後變成點呢？」他自言年紀老邁：「唔知仲有幾多日、有冇機會見佢哋？所以想見多佢哋一面。」</p> -<p>This is the basic challenge of the second-level question of nuclear use. It is surely possible for nuclear weapons to be too “usable,” and overquick resort to such tools could be catastrophic. Yet it is also possible for nuclear weapons use to be too hard to contemplate, for to find it truly “unthinkable” would be to invite aggression that cannot be deterred or combatted by purely conventional means. Deterrence policy is thus about finding the “Goldilocks point” — or, more elegantly, the Aristotelean Mean — between these bad answers. In the present scenario, however, the United States would surely be more able both to deter and to respond to aggression if it had more theater-range options.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/Dfp25dA.png" alt="image22" /> +▲ 大黃伯</p> -<p>Now that nuclear weapons have been used in this scenario, this second-level question of nuclear use moves to the forefront. Fortunately, the facts of the scenario so far do not quite precipitate the most challenging dilemma, so it matters less that the United States lacks the more flexible theater-range nuclear options it needs.</p> +<p>案中被告伍健偉的「戰友」、前「天水連線」元朗區議員林進昨午已到場，排約第30位。對於僅有5名公眾可進入正庭旁聽，林進坦言人數遠比想像中少：「初頭諗住如果有廿張飛，都仲有幾張入到去（正庭），因為前面全部都係排隊黨，依家結論係一張都冇。」他感到非常可惜，但亦無能為力，指在延伸席的旁聽市民只可以透過電視機觀看直播，即案中被告不會知道有哪些朋友在場。</p> -<p>Presumably, U.S. allies have no special interest in the United States using nuclear weapons per se: their interest lies in being defended against aggression by whatever means are necessary — not excluding nuclear weaponry, but not necessarily employing it either. Indeed, at various points over the years, some allies have expressed concern that the United States might perhaps be too quick to use such weapons, particularly where such employment in theater would occur on their soil. (Over NATO’s history, U.S. defense planners have struggled incessantly with simultaneous European demands that the United States (a) be entirely ready to wage a nuclear war on their behalf and (b) not be too eager to do so, especially not in Europe. The equilibrium point between these demands is not always easily found.) Most likely, however, U.S. allies’ primary concern here is quite singular. Their fear is only that the United States might fail to use nuclear weapons in circumstances in which there is no way to protect the allies’ own existential security interests other than by using nuclear weapons.</p> +<p>林指，當初想法是即使要連續兩晚排通宵，都希望能到正庭見伍健偉一面。但既然沒機會取得正庭的公眾席籌，等待已變得「冇乜意思」：「嚟就一定會嚟，但（今晚）未必會通宵。」又表示，伍健偉已經「預備好接受所有的事情」，亦預計伍的情況會比其他類似參與程度的被告更為嚴重，但認為「佢係諗過、度過先咁樣做，其他人只可以無條件咁支持」。</p> -<p>Through this lens, a critical question is whether this scenario is “one of those cases.” And in this regard, the scenario could be said not yet to present such a need. So far, the conventional situation does not seem to be one in which vital U.S. or allied interests are threatened in ways that would require U.S. nuclear use. On the contrary, the United States and its allies seem to be prevailing without it. The primary, existential question from the perspective of allied second-level (nuclear) assurance, therefore, has arguably thus not yet been raised. After all, it would presumably do little harm to the United States’ reputation among its allies as an extended deterrence protector — and might even enhance its reputation for responsible nuclear statesmanship — if Washington were to decline to use nuclear weapons where it did not need to use them.</p> +<h3 id="致歉無悔不求情45名罪成被告判刑前的陳詞">致歉、無悔、不求情——45名罪成被告，判刑前的陳詞</h3> -<p>Instead, the remaining question here is whether a U.S. or allied nuclear response might be needed to the Russian or Chinese nuclear attacks simply because they were nuclear attacks. To this question, under these facts, reasonable people may disagree. Some might argue in the affirmative — claiming, in effect, that we “need” to use nuclear weapons to protect the credibility, to ally and aggressor alike, of the “nuclear” aspect of extended deterrence even when the United States does not need to use nuclear weapons for any actual operational military purpose in a war it is already winning.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/oAfCNTl.png" alt="image23" /></p> -<p>This paper, however, contends that on the current facts of this scenario, the United States does not yet need to use nuclear weaponry. The extended deterrence the United States provides to its allies has never been an exclusively nuclear insurance policy against aggression. Instead, it has been an inclusively nuclear one. It combines all elements of available military power that are required to deter aggression and to defeat it should deterrence fail. That is, the United States has promised to defend its allies by whatever means are necessary, but it has not promised to use any specific form of military power unless that form is necessary. This is not some U.S. analogue to the mindless automaticity of the old Soviet (and now Russian) “Dead Hand” nuclear launch system. Rather, it is an ironclad promise to the United States’ best friends of effective defense — not of U.S. nuclear use per se and no matter what.</p> +<p>【獨媒報導】47名組織及參與初選的民主派被控「串謀顛覆國家政權」案，自2021年3月首度提堂，今年5月裁定45人罪成，將於明日（19日）迎來判刑。</p> -<p>In this author’s view, a fundamental allied loss of trust in the credibility of the U.S. alliance guarantee would therefore probably not arise unless and until either (a) battlefield circumstances changed in ways that presented an ally with the prospect of catastrophic defeat absent U.S. nuclear use, and the United States did not then use nuclear weapons, or (b) the United States reacted to Sino-Russian nuclear use by retreat or some other measure of capitulation. Otherwise, remaining unintimidated and continuing to prosecute a successful conventional campaign — “fighting through” the adversary’s nuclear use in theater, as it were — should represent an optimal answer from the perspective of U.S. allies.</p> +<p>這宗《國安法》實施後最大規模的案件，涵蓋一眾政治光譜和世代各異的議員、律師、社運人士、政治素人，當中32人還柙至今超過3年8個月。有辯方大狀在庭上力陳，案中被告是法官「永遠不會在被告欄見到的人」，他們是社會的領袖，懷着良好意願參選，非為私利，只是《國安法》後突然變成非法，原本爭取權力監察政權，一夜之間變成了顛覆。</p> -<p>In this scenario, at least, it is possible that some allies would wish the United States to use nuclear weapons against Russia and/or China, while others surely would prefer that we did not. On the whole, however, it would likely be less costly to alliance solidarity for the United States to continue to win the conventional conflict fighting alongside its allies without using nuclear weapons than it would for the United States to use such weapons (especially on European soil) when it was not absolutely clear it needed to do so.</p> +<p>過去3年8個月，有人在獄中喪親，亦有人結婚、生子，望能盡快與家人團聚。公民黨、職工盟等已解散，多人表明不再從政，不少被告亦失去專業資格，在獄中進修，盼以另一種方式，繼續服務社會。</p> -<p><em>ALLIED SECURITY CONCERNS</em></p> +<p>面對最高終身監禁的刑罰，有人選擇不求情，有人則反思過去，為昔日言行道歉。有人堅持不為信念道歉，表明無悔、毋怨，及對香港的抱負、民主的期許：「即使今日我為爭取民主而身陷囹圄，但我仍然相信，這個『為人民服務的民選政府』終有一天必將降臨香港」；「我堅信人民大於國家，人權高於政權」；「長夜終盡，黎明將至，民主終將再次得勝」；「只要我還活着，締造更美好的香港永遠都會是我的終生抱負」；「或許我唯一犯下的錯誤，就是我太愛香港。」</p> -<p>The security concerns of U.S. allies in this scenario are fourfold, deriving from their situations as relatively militarily weak states close to a powerful revisionist great-power predator that is eager to carve out a more expansive sphere of influence or empire for itself in the world. First and most fundamentally, U.S. allies’ security concern is an existential one: they must avoid the loss of their autonomy and independence as sovereign peoples. Beyond this, and deriving from this core concern, U.S. allies have a second security interest in avoiding the loss of their ties to other countries able and willing to assist them in meeting such primary security needs. Most of all, this means preserving military ties to the United States, but it also entails preserving their more general ability to leverage bilateral relationships or collective security institutions to meet security needs.</p> +<p>各人尚餘多久重獲自由還未知曉，在案件判刑之際，《獨媒》為讀者整合各人求情、陳情的內容。</p> -<p>A third allied security concern is more prosaic, but still significant. Each ally has a security interest in keeping the military forces of its local great-power predator as far from its own borders as possible. Moreover, irrespective of immediate border threats, allies have a security interest in limiting that predator’s deployment of long-range fires, aviation assets, naval power-projection capabilities, and other military tools capable of threatening that ally’s forces, facilities, or critical infrastructure from afar.</p> +<h4 id="45名罪成被告量刑立場">45名罪成被告量刑立場</h4> -<p>More indirectly, U.S. allies have a fourth security interest in avoiding deep entanglement in economic, natural resource–centered, technological, supply chain, financial, or other relationships of dependency with either of the two great-power predators involved in this scenario. Such relationships may, or may not, provide immediate benefits (e.g., inexpensive goods, cheap energy, or corporate profits), but such ties are strategically debilitating and inimical to maintaining the sovereign independence that is each ally’s first-order existential concern. Such relationships give leverage over that ally by allowing the other power to administer rewards and punishments in ways that reduce the ally’s autonomy, undermine its ability to maintain a credible deterrent against aggression, and weaken relationships with third parties that are important to preserving its core security interests. (The existence of such relationships also likely contributes to adversary assumptions underlying the deep sociopolitical failure of deterrence discussed earlier: a country mired in structural dependency upon an aggressor will probably be assumed less likely to fight it.)</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/l9ckHNI.png" alt="image24" /></p> -<p><em>SIGNALING RESOLVE</em></p> +<p>根據《國安法》第22條，一旦顛覆國家政權罪成，「首要分子或罪行重大」可判處10年以上至終身監禁；「積極參加」可判監3至10年；「其他參加」則判監3年以下、拘役或者管制。</p> -<p>Once deterrence has failed — or more challengingly, failed doubly, as in this scenario where both aggression and nuclear weapons use have occurred — the United States will likely have passed the point at which policy pronouncements and deterrence-related consultations with its allies can, alone, signal sufficient resolve. At this point, what counts most are U.S. actions and how adversaries understand them.</p> +<p>到底各被告被歸類為哪個級別，是今次判刑焦點，不過有辯方質疑分級制根本不適用。代表戴耀廷的資深大律師黃繼明、代表袁嘉蔚和馮達浚的資深大律師祁志等，均爭議被告被控「串謀顛覆國家政權」罪，是以串謀罪、而非《國安法》罪行定罪，刑期分級制不適用，有待法官裁定。有辯方另爭議，法庭量刑時，不應考慮被告《國安法》前的言行，不過法官已表明拒絕接納。</p> -<p>In this respect, perhaps the most important signal the United States could send is to not slow or alter its activities against aggressor forces in the two theaters, except when such steps may be needed to preserve ongoing operations in a potentially nuclear environment. To this end, all relevant U.S. (and NATO) conventional assets should be readied to operate in a radiological-nuclear combat environment as quickly as possible, with ground assets dispersing to widely scattered field dispositions and air assets moving to dispersal airfields. This could also include the issuance of detection and protective gear, medical countermeasures, and relevant decontamination equipment, as well as surging radiation-hazard first responder units and medical personnel forward.</p> +<p>此外，有辯方大狀指本案不涉武力手段、亦不涉推翻中國根本制度等，是顛覆罪行中最輕微，不應視為「罪行重大」；又指法庭不應採納過高的量刑起點，否則便沒有空間處理其他更嚴重的罪行，例如造成人命傷亡、企圖綁架議員等。</p> -<p>Dispersing conventional capabilities — not merely land and naval units near the zone of operations but also aircraft from vulnerable bases to a wider variety of auxiliary dispersed locations, including those dual-capable aircraft (DCA) that would be needed for nuclear attack missions (i.e., unilateral U.S. assets in East Asia and NATO nuclear-sharing aircraft in Europe) — would also demonstrate resolve, unity, and collective preparedness. U.S. nuclear weapon storage vaults at relevant European airfields should also be readied for potential operations, and any existing plans for weapon dispersal to additional airfields that do not involve actual DCA attack assets should be implemented. (Care should be taken, however, not to fly NATO DCAs en masse to weapon storage airfields or to fly DCA from such airfields, lest Russia mistake this for an attack in progress.) Every effort should be made to keep these precautions from slowing the pace of combat operations against the Russian forces, which should not stop, though some impact might be unavoidable. (The scenario gives us notably little detail about the operational implications of the Russian and Chinese nuclear strikes.)</p> +<p>至於減刑因素，包括及時認罪可獲三分一扣減（不過呂世瑜案確立認罪扣減不得超過刑期下限，有被告或未能獲全數扣減），另4名從犯證人區諾軒、趙家賢、鍾錦麟、林景楠亦指其證供對控方有幫助，可獲更多扣減，甚至可按《國安法》第33條揭發他人犯罪、自動放棄犯罪等而降低刑罰等級。</p> -<p>The signals sent by these efforts are intended, together, to demonstrate in concrete form that (i) NATO will not give up in the face of nuclear provocations and (ii) NATO is quite prepared for the possibility of escalation. Beyond the theaters in question, moreover, U.S. and allied leaders in both Europe and the Indo-Pacific should make clear their intention to isolate the aggressors’ economies as completely as possible from the global economy (e.g., impeding Chinese oil shipments through the Indian Ocean and the Strait of Malacca, and ending all Russian resource exports) for the duration of their wars of aggression. This may help create additional incentives for moderation.</p> +<p>此外，多名辯方律師求情時均提到，涉案謀劃存有不確定性、甚至不可能實現，法庭不應基於假設性後果判刑；而被告在案發後逾半年始被捕，更可見謀劃無對國安造成危害。有辯方亦強調，計劃公開進行，各人當時真誠誤信謀劃為合法，基於對法律無知才犯案。另有部分被告曾涉其他集結案、甚至暴動案服刑，辯方望法官考慮整體量刑而減刑，避免壓毀性刑罰；多人亦望法庭考慮他們對社會的貢獻，但法官明言，部分已於以往案件考慮，不能循環再用。</p> -<p>The alert level of U.S. strategic nuclear forces would also need to be elevated, with vulnerable bomber assets dispersing to auxiliary airfields, and with portions of the force perhaps even beginning rotating in-air readiness patrols (though not flying on headings that could be mistaken for attack trajectories either toward Russia or toward China). U.S. intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) would remain on ready-to-launch alert, with logistics support crews immediately providing extra supplies of diesel fuel to ICBM bases and individual silos to prepare them to sustain alert operations during a potentially prolonged crisis in which reliance upon local peacetime power grids might be precluded by sabotage or cyberattack.</p> +<h4 id="我們的孩子我們的大人">「我們的孩子，我們的大人」</h4> -<p>Meanwhile, serviceable in-port nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) — not only in the United States but also in Britain and France — should muster their crews and put to sea as quickly as possible. Emergency notice should also be given to operators of critical infrastructure facilities in the United States, Europe, and East Asia, encouraging or directing them to implement whatever protective protocols they might have to defend against Russian and/or Chinese cyberattacks, and to move to insulate their systems as much as possible from the internet (even at financial cost or loss in operational efficiency) and prepare themselves to implement emergency service restoration or reconstitution plans.</p> +<p>當被告欄內坐滿律師、議員、社工、大學教師，不少辯方律師在陳詞時，均力陳本案被告並非一般罪犯。代表袁嘉蔚和馮達浚的資深大律師祁志，指本案不少被告出身中產或勞工階層，努力令自己變得更好，他們是「我們的同事，我們的孩子，我們的大人，我們的人民，並非一般罪犯」。</p> -<p><em>THE CRITICAL IMPORTANCE OF MESSAGE</em></p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/FtQL3bN.png" alt="image25" /> +▲ 袁嘉蔚</p> -<p>While these preparatory steps are important in their own right, they are also critical to the U.S. messaging strategy. To understand the importance of getting U.S. strategic signaling right, it should be remembered that the Russian and Chinese nuclear attacks in this scenario were notably limited. They hit only things in theater that were of tactical operational relevance, for instance, striking only a very small number of targets despite both adversaries possessing a huge numerical advantage in theater delivery systems. Moreover, they refrained from hitting anything in the U.S. homeland or that was of arguable strategic importance to the United States. This suggests that U.S. adversaries are themselves carefully considering escalation risks, and that they do fear provoking a large-scale nuclear response. If they understand that their nuclear use has not intimidated the United States and that the United States is indeed comfortable with escalation despite their previous assumptions to the contrary — but that, at the same time, U.S. war aims are limited, being confined only to restoring the status quo ante — the United States may have a chance to restore deterrence.</p> +<p>祁志又說，本案是這個司法管轄區從未聽聞，案中被告是法官「永遠不會在被告欄見到的人」，他們被指以非法手段求變，實是望透過選票進入議會，「這些人告訴法庭他們是出於良好動機而犯案，這是其他判刑所不會聽到」。他又說，當搶劫犯運用暴力手段偷竊，販毒者從他人痛苦賺取利益，危駕者為他人帶來巨大傷害，但法庭從逾百日的審訊和聆訊，會得知本案被告均是民主社會、或相對民主社會的領袖，他們真誠相信多元主義，望以和平手段服務社會，是有學識、表達和思考能力高的人。</p> -<p>Accordingly, these concrete military moves would be accompanied by full-spectrum public messaging — including by the president directly — making three key points:</p> +<p>祁志又說，馮達浚成長於有多元辯論和選舉文化的香港，當時提出反對不僅合法，也是人們生活和政治的基石，通識教育亦是教育制度重要一環，年輕人被訓練問問題，也被鼓勵思考和辯論，但《國安法》後，這樣的情況結束，「爭取權力監察政權，一夜之間變成了顛覆」。</p> -<ol> - <li> - <p>First, the United States would make clear that these nuclear-preparatory steps are indeed underway and that Washington is demonstrating in concrete ways the United States’ ironclad commitment to protecting the sovereignty and independence of its military allies by whatever means necessary.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Second, the United States would make equally clear that under the current circumstances, U.S. nuclear weapons use is not yet necessary. U.S. messaging would stress that, while Russia and China’s nuclear use was the result of tactical desperation as their wars of aggression began to falter, the United States itself faces no such desperate circumstances. On the contrary, despite the United States’ strong preference to avoid using nuclear weapons and its willingness to use them if its adversaries force it to, the United States is currently prevailing in the conventional fight and intends to continue with that winning approach for so long as its adversaries’ fixation upon aggression makes it necessary to resist them in order to protect the security and independence of free sovereign peoples. Washington would also make clear that it remains entirely prepared and ready to use nuclear weapons itself if Russia or China leave it no choice, and the United States would warn them not to test its resolve by using nuclear weapons a second time.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Third, the United States would make explicit that its war aims in this conventional fight are quite limited. The United States do not seek to inflict a “strategic loss” or regime change upon either Russia or China, but rather merely stop their wars of aggression. If they stop that aggression, the United States would have no more need to fight them.</p> - </li> -</ol> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/jHz3iDM.png" alt="image26" /> +▲ 馮達浚</p> -<p><em>TREATY VERSUS NON-TREATY PARTNERS</em></p> +<p>代表鄒家成和呂智恆的大律師陳世傑也說，本案被告是好人，只是不幸在錯誤的地點和時間出現，他們來自不同界別，包括醫生、律師、社工等等，懷着良好意願參選、非為私利，但《國安法》後突然全變成非法。</p> -<p>Much of this above-mentioned activity would be aimed primarily at protecting and reassuring U.S. military allies, as they would undoubtedly be the United States’ highest priority. Moves that would reassure those treaty allies would likely have some impact in reassuring non-treaty partners as well, but this would be merely a secondary, rather than primary, benefit.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/Ki5tIRT.png" alt="image27" /> +▲ 鄒家成</p> -<h4 id="military-response-options">Military Response Options</h4> +<p>陳續說，各人並非真正意義上的罪犯，望法庭能法外開恩，「在這宗案，寬容是有必要的」；又指接受違反《國安法》須判處阻嚇性刑罰，但本案阻嚇性效果已是眾所周知，眾被告心靈受創，「我們現在需要的，是法庭判處『療癒式刑罰』」，令被告和社會可從創傷中復原。</p> -<p><em>U.S. MILITARY OPTIONS</em></p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/qmbtRwm.png" alt="image28" /> +▲ 呂智恆</p> -<p>The foregoing pages have already made clear the optimal immediate U.S. military responses to the current scenario: the United States should continue winning the conventional fight without employing nuclear weapons itself, while posturing itself to be ready for nuclear use if adversary nuclear threats or other military circumstances require. The United States would retain the option to do more, of course, and — depending how things develop — might well indeed still need to do so in the face of further Russian or Chinese provocations (e.g., massive U.S. battlefield reverses or a second instance of adversary nuclear use). Absent such further need, however, discretion should remain the better part of valor.</p> +<blockquote> + <h3 id="被指組織者5人">被指組織者（5人）</h3> +</blockquote> -<p><em>WHAT IF THEY USE NUCLEAR WEAPONS AGAIN?</em></p> +<h4 id="戴耀廷倡以3年為起點">戴耀廷倡以3年為起點</h4> -<p>In the event that U.S. adversaries chose to use nuclear weapons a second time, the United States — as it will have signaled that it was ready to do — should be prepared to cross the nuclear threshold itself. At least initially, the key would be to find a type and level of U.S. nuclear response appropriate to the delicate task of (a) signaling undiminished resolve and of (b) not jumping so much further up the proverbial escalation ladder that things spiral out of control.</p> +<p>回到被告自身，各人候審或還柙逾3年半，各選擇不同方式面對判刑。有人表示深切反省，為昔日行為道歉；有人指其證供對法庭有用，求減刑更多；有人重述參選初衷，表示不知違法。除此以外，有人表明無悔、無怨；亦有人選擇不求情。</p> -<p>In this regard, one possibility would be to have a deployed SSBN in the Atlantic and one in the Pacific launch Trident missiles with reduced-yield W76-2 nuclear warheads toward two targets. (If the United States had the capability to do this, and reasonable confidence that its adversaries could see and understand that this is what the United States was doing, these weapons should also be launched on depressed ballistic trajectories clearly incapable of hitting strategic targets deep in the adversaries’ homelands.) These four targets, two in Russia and two in China, would be chosen on the basis of being military locations consistent with legitimate targeting under the law of armed conflict (LOAC), and the destruction of which would have a real impact upon adversary military operations in each theater, but without inflicting massive civilian casualties and without directly posing what could be seen as an existential threat to either ruling regime. Choosing these targets would need to be done relatively quickly, and carefully, but there would be at least some time for careful selection, informed not only by military analysis but also careful assessment of adversary leadership psychology and domestic political dynamics.</p> +<p>45名罪成被告中，5名被指為組織者。控方曾表明，「35+計劃」組織者不屬「首要分子」是有違常理。不過代表戴耀廷的資深大律師黃繼明認為，戴是「其他參加者」，法庭應採納3年為量刑起點，考慮及時認罪等扣減至2年。他指有人或認為建議「太有野心甚至大膽」，但考慮相關法律原則和戴的個人情況，刑期屬合適，指戴在《國安法》前的行為合法，而《國安法》生效後角色有限，涉案「非法手段」為無差別否決預算案，但戴不會參選立法會和投票，也無法控制或指示其他人這樣做，並非「首要分子」。不過法官拒絕接納戴《國安法》前行為與罪責無關、及他在《國安法》後只有很少或沒有角色，反問若戴為「其他參加者」，那誰是「首要分子」和「積極參加者」？</p> -<p>The point in these attacks would be affirmatively to cross the “nuclear threshold,” including by hitting targets in the adversaries’ homelands — not merely to raise the ante somewhat for purposes of coercive bargaining, but also because, as Willie Sutton might have put it, that is where the targets are, as well as because the United States would prefer not to set off nuclear weapons on its allies’ territory if it can avoid it — while yet doing so in ways that adversary observers would be less likely to mistake for any sort of strategic attack and that signaled U.S. continuing commitment to a great degree of restraint. The U.S. president should also announce these launches publicly, making clear that this is a carefully limited theater action responding directly to these adversaries’ nuclear use and demonstrating that the United States will neither yield to their intimidation nor be provoked into overreaction, and that U.S. commitment to protecting its military allies remains undimmed. (Afterward, moreover, U.S. officials would publicly present the rationale for choosing those targets and that means of attack, also making clear how this decision was consistent with longstanding LOAC principles of necessity, proportionality, distinction, and humanity.)</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/rhiMhYf.png" alt="image29" /> +▲ 戴耀廷</p> -<p><em>THE RISKS</em></p> +<p>辯方另呈上港大法律學院講座教授陳弘毅、港大法律學院講座首席講師張達明、蘇穎智牧師及戴耀廷本人撰寫的求情信，讚揚戴對港大和社會的貢獻，又力陳「非暴力」是他一生堅信的信念，他真誠誤信否決預算案沒有違法，甚至「誤導了自己」，而他做犯案非為個人利益，而是出於畢生對法治和民主的堅定決心，望運用憲制權力爭取普選。</p> -<p>This has already been covered, or at least implied, in the paragraphs above. The primary risk lies in the danger that the United States fails to find the optimal Goldilocks point between the extremes as it tries to simultaneously (a) persuade allies and adversaries alike of U.S. seriousness and martial resolution and (b) not signal so much readiness or eagerness for escalation that the adversary feels provoked into catastrophic preemptive moves. Secondary risks also exist, among them the possibility either that some ally “opts out” of the conflict for fear of escalatory consequences, or that it “opts in” with too much enthusiasm by unilaterally taking steps that end up provokingadversary escalation rather than deterring it.</p> +<h4 id="區諾軒等3從犯證人求減刑一半">區諾軒等3從犯證人求減刑一半</h4> -<p><em>THE LOAC</em></p> +<p>至於另3名組織者區諾軒、趙家賢和鍾錦麟，均是從犯證人，曾於庭上作供，辯方望獲得額外扣減。代表區諾軒的大律師陳慕賢指，區在《國安法》後曾嘗試與當局溝通，其後退出初選，並成功游說趙家賢退出，望法庭考慮他協助控方案情，減刑一半。法官李運騰曾問會否要求更多扣減，區諾軒在位上以雙臂做交叉手勢；法官再問辯方是否指區是「超級金手指」，辯方稱沒相關指示，區遂用力點頭，雙手抱拳。法官李運騰也一度指，辯方或說「沒有區諾軒的證供，控方基本上不會有他們的案情」，被告欄即傳來「yes」，不過區諾軒向法官和鄒家成雙手打交叉，又與鄒隔空交談，並不住搖頭。</p> -<p>The United States has long made clear its belief that the LOAC does apply to the use of all forms of weaponry in wartime, including nuclear weapons. Washington has also made clear in recent years its intention to abide by those rules in the event of conflict, even nuclear conflict. Despite U.S. commitment to such legal constraints, however, LOAC principles — if properly understood as U.S. officials have indeed carefully outlined them, and as generations of operational lawyers in the U.S. armed services have been trained on them — should not be a significant impediment to sound U.S. or allied strategy in this scenario.</p> +<p>前民主動力召集人趙家賢，其代表大律師利琛，則指趙盡所能協助控方，可獲「超級金手指」的66%減刑。法官表明不同意，指要承受個人風險作供才算「超級金手指」，辯方遂改要求減刑40%至55%。辯方又指，趙於2020年5月才獲邀加入初選，7月已退出，僅負責行政和執行工作，加上為控方提供有用資訊，可採納「積極參加者」較高量刑起點，再按《國安法》第33條減刑。不過法官質疑，有證供指趙較早階段已加入初選，辯方同意。</p> -<p>There is no question that the use of nuclear weapons is not illegal under the LOAC when the very existence of a state is threatened — this being a formulation that the International Court of Justice (ICJ) accepted in its 1996 advisory opinion on the topic — and the present scenario of aggressor use of nuclear weapons against Poland and the Philippines would certainly seem to raise such concerns. Nor would the LOAC rule out U.S. or other allied nuclear use in defending an ally from such attack as a matter of course, as the right of self-defense recognized by Article 51 of the United Nations Charter does not preclude collective self-defense. The law would not permit simply any nuclear response, of course. Nevertheless, under such quasi-existential circumstances the logic of compelling “military necessity” should permit judicious nuclear counter-strikes — both to prevent allied defeat in a growing conventional conflict and to dissuade further (and potentially full-scale) nuclear escalation by the aggressor — even if such strikes entailed considerable civilian casualties.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/sZRuzsV.png" alt="image30" /> +▲ 趙家賢、區諾軒</p> -<p>LOAC principles are thus unlikely to be an obstacle to a careful and prudent response to the current scenario, even if that response turned out to involve U.S. or allied use of nuclear weaponry. The LOAC would preclude using a U.S. nuclear weapon directly to target Russian or Chinese civilians, of course, and U.S. and allied commanders would need to take feasible precautions to limit civilian damage (e.g., being as precise in their targeting as is feasible under the circumstances and using weapons of yield no greater than needed to accomplish the military objective). Yet it is hard to imagine military circumstances in this scenario giving rise to any need to do more than what a clear-eyed analysis of necessity and proportionality would permit.</p> +<p>至於前民主動力副召集人鍾錦麟，大律師陳慕賢同要求減刑一半。法官明言，鍾的證供沒有區諾軒的那麼有用，辯方回應是因鍾的參與程度有限，鍾已盡所能協助控方，亦加強了控方案情。</p> -<h4 id="non-kinetic-response-options">Non-Kinetic Response Options</h4> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/jMoCqFo.png" alt="image31" /> +▲ 鍾錦麟</p> -<p>To the degree that non-kinetic options might exist that could affect the ability of Russian or Chinese forces to operate effectively in the specific theater wars described in this scenario, such activity might well contribute usefully to prosecution of the conflict below the level of U.S. or allied nuclear escalation. This might include, for instance: pursuing cyber or electronic warfare (EW) degradation of air defense activity or battlefield command, control, and communications (C3) networks; jamming or spoofing of adversary positioning, navigation, and timing (PNT) communications for engaged combatants; launching cyberattacks on infrastructure or transportation capabilities that directly contribute to the fight in theater; or jamming or otherwise engaging space assets in connection specifically with their support to theater operations. If means were available to degrade adversary nuclear C3, but only in the context of theater operations such as the two nuclear attacks that already occurred, this would likely also be a useful contribution to the fight, helping make further regional strikes more difficult.</p> +<h4 id="吳政亨一直堅信自由民主">吳政亨：一直堅信自由民主</h4> -<p>At least initially, however, care should be taken to avoid non-kinetic measures that might be interpreted as having existential implications. This could include, for instance, attacks upon Russian or Chinese space assets that support strategically critical functions such as national nuclear C3, cyberattacks upon critical infrastructure not associated with the specific military theater of operations, or perhaps even — given the paranoid and potentially fragile nature of the regimes in question — the dramatic stepping up of Information Operations (IO) or public diplomacy messaging that could be interpreted as encouraging regime change in Moscow and Beijing.</p> +<p>至於發起「三投三不投」聯署的吳政亨，大律師石書銘表示，雖然控方指他為組織者之一，但隨證供披露，可見他不僅不是組織者，甚至不是積極參加者，他是自行發起「三投三不投」，過程中除戴耀廷外無與其他被告溝通，角色僅屬輔助。辯方又指，吳從未提倡否決預算案，只關注初選及爭取35+，亦真誠相信戴稱否決預算案不違法，他無參與協調會議、沒有參選更不會投票否決，屬於「其他參加者」。</p> -<h4 id="conclusion-1">Conclusion</h4> +<p>庭上又讀出吳政亨的求情信，吳提到1978年在香港出生，13歲隨父母移民澳洲，「一直堅信自由民主原則」，認為社會分歧需通過文明民主方式處理，而由於「權力使人腐敗，絕對權力則使人絕對腐敗」，他相信公平公正選舉最能有效防止權力成為暴政，亦因此支持香港民主運動。</p> -<p>This scenario certainly presents challenging questions. For this author, however, the particular fact pattern of Russian and Chinese nuclear weapons use outlined in Project Atom 2024 does not have to drive the United States to nuclear use itself, at least not yet. The United States must continue to stand by its allies and ensure that they are defended against aggression, while denying the aggressors any advantage from their choice to cross the nuclear threshold. Nevertheless, since (and for so long as) the United States is winning both wars without using nuclear weaponry, it should continue to do so, while yet making it very clear that it is prepared to escalate to nuclear use — and indeed actually ensuring that it is thus prepared — if the aggressors leave the United States no choice. With the moderate war aims appropriate to a status quo power seeking to defeat aggression but not to remake the world in its image, the United States has the chance here to confound Sino-Russian aggression, rebuild a strong deterrent posture, prove to its allies that it indeed does stand with them when bullets start to fly, and demonstrate reassuringly temperate nuclear statesmanship, all at the same time.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/yzuBIaY.png" alt="image32" /> +▲ 吳政亨</p> -<h3 id="washingtons-response-to-nuclear-use-against-us-allies">Washington’s Response to Nuclear Use against U.S. Allies</h3> +<p>吳續指，一直對民主陣營持續內鬥痛心，認為處理的最佳方法是初選，因此對初選「無限嚮往」。雖然他在政治世界是局外人，但他相信自己有權利甚至義務為實現這夢想盡一分力，遂發起「三投三不投」聯署。吳自言在整個初選中一直是「局外人」，故對控方指控他是組織者「感到非常驚訝」，並強調由始至終「我支持初選從來都僅是為了初選本身」，他從無要求參選人承諾否決預算案，甚至不認為可取，因害怕引起民主陣營爭議，威脅初選的實現。</p> <blockquote> - <h4 id="rebecca-davis-gibbons">Rebecca Davis Gibbons</h4> + <h3 id="參與者抗爭派15人">參與者——抗爭派（15人）</h3> </blockquote> -<h4 id="introduction-1">Introduction</h4> +<p>至於其餘40名罪成的初選參與者，亦來自不同世代、不同光譜。當中15人曾出席抗爭派記者會或發抗爭派聲明，自稱為「抗爭派」。他們大多均歸類自己為「積極參加者」。</p> -<p>The circumstances of nuclear use described in the proposed 2027 scenario are unprecedented. The notional attacks would not only break an 82-year taboo concerning nuclear use in warfare, but nuclear weapons have never been used in conflict against other nuclear-armed states. These novel circumstances combined with the high stakes for all parties involved present U.S. policymakers with significant challenges in determining how to respond. Ideally, Washington would lead a course of action that would illustrate U.S. resolve and credibility to its allies and partners, avoid nuclear escalation, and demonstrate that nuclear use does not result in attackers achieving their strategic goals.</p> +<h4 id="何桂藍無求情黃之鋒無寫求情信">何桂藍無求情、黃之鋒無寫求情信</h4> -<p>The analysis below argues that the primary U.S. objective, if the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the Russian Federation (RF) use nuclear weapons in the context of conflicts over Ukraine and Taiwan, is to manage and prevent escalation up to a major nuclear exchange. Secondary — though still vitally important — objectives include maintaining alliance relationships, ending the conflicts on favorable terms, and ensuring that the international community does not perceive nuclear use as benefitting the attackers. The United States and its allies should take several actions, militarily and diplomatically, to prevent these conflicts in the first place, and failing this, be ready to address the first instance of nuclear use since World War II in a manner that does not lead to a broader nuclear war.</p> +<p>其中何桂藍沒有求情陳詞，黃之鋒亦沒有親自撰寫求情信。代表黃的大律師李國威，僅呈上黃母、牧師和老師的求情信，指黃望在服刑後放下過去，改過自新。法官指那是其他人代表黃說的話，辯方同意黃無撰寫求情信，指這是其選擇，而黃希望在本案後重新開始。</p> -<h4 id="us-strategic-objectives-1">U.S. Strategic Objectives</h4> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/OPKxLqW.png" alt="image33" /> +▲ 何桂藍</p> -<p>The following section explores why deterrence failed and what the United States can do to prevent these deterrence failures, before presenting the U.S. strategic objectives in the scenario.</p> +<h4 id="梁晃維締造更美好香港是終生抱負">梁晃維：締造更美好香港是終生抱負</h4> -<p><em>WHY DID DETERRENCE FAIL?</em></p> +<p>發起「墨落無悔」聲明的梁晃維、鄒家成、張可森3人，代表梁晃維的資深大律師彭耀鴻指，梁是「積極參加者」，但「墨落無悔」於《國安法》生效前發布，只是重申已達成的共識，法庭不應考慮。法官質疑聲明其後沒有撤回，辯方回應梁並非公然違法，而是對法律無知；又指本案顛覆非常獨特，被告犯案非為個人私利，而是出於良好動機，望以合法手段令特首回應民意。</p> -<p>In the notional 2027 scenario, the initial failure of conventional deterrence is the most consequential failure. Both adversaries used nuclear weapons because they instigated imprudent conventional conflicts against U.S. allies and partners.</p> +<p>辯方又指，梁還柙3年進行反省，承認案發時部分言行不成熟，望就此道歉，亦明白作出違法行為須承擔責任。庭上讀出他親撰的求情信節錄，梁提及生於九七一代如「被詛咒的孩子」，每個人生新階段都會遇上香港的重大事件，如沙士、雨傘運動、反修例運動和疫情，深感命運與香港緊緊相連。梁又說，香港自2019年面對困境，許多人感到迷失，「但我從來沒有對香港或香港人失去信心」，「憑我們對這片土地的熱愛，以及前人所承傳下來的精神，我相信香港能繼續逆風而行，克服當前挑戰和未知困難。只要我還活着，締造更美好的香港永遠都會是我的終生抱負」。</p> -<p>The purpose of nuclear use in both theaters appears to be twofold: (1) demonstrating the high stakes with which the adversaries view the conflicts and (2) terminating the war by deterring the United States and its allies from continuing to fight due to Western fears of additional nuclear attacks.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/gQjHVC8.png" alt="image34" /> +▲ （資料圖片）</p> -<p>The best way to prevent these competitors from resorting to nuclear attacks is to ensure that a strong and credible U.S. deterrent posture — integrating nuclear and conventional capabilities — prevents both from initiating aggression against allies and partners in the first place. The United States and its allies could have taken several political and military steps to improve this posture prior to 2027 when the proposed nuclear attacks occur. A deterrence failure would likely result from an adversary questioning the U.S. political commitment to its allies and partners. It is thus helpful to review signals the United States has sent in recent years that were intended to strengthen credibility, but which may have been misinterpreted.</p> +<h4 id="鄒家成縱身陷囹圄仍信民選政府終降臨香港">鄒家成：縱身陷囹圄仍信民選政府終降臨香港</h4> -<p>The U.S. government, in June of 2024, began to publicly signal its military plan to aid Taiwan’s defense. Admiral Samuel Paparo, head of U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, described the “Hellscape” strategy for defending Taiwan to a Washington Post columnist. Paparo explained that the “U.S. military would deploy thousands of unmanned submarines, unmanned surface ships and aerial drones to flood the area and give Taiwanese, U.S. and partner forces time to mount a full response.” He continued, “I want to turn the Taiwan Strait into an unmanned hellscape using a number of classified capabilities.” International media sources reported on Paparo’s remarks widely, serving a deterrent function for the United States.</p> +<p>至於鄒家成，大律師陳世傑同指他屬「積極參加者」，指他在案中非關鍵人物、可有可無，對計劃無真正幫助；他雖發起「墨落無悔」，但聲明屬多餘。鄒家成又呈上求情信，提到15歲時首次參與七一遊行，深深為人們對公義的追求及對弱勢的關懷所震撼，成為他關心社會、積極參與公民事務的契機。2014年雨傘運動，鄒不時到場支持，指運動令他相信透過公民參與，有改變社會、推動公義的能力。</p> -<p>Admiral Paparo, however, also warned that the U.S. industrial base would need to increase its production of drones and other capabilities to implement this plan. Along the same lines, in 2023, a retired U.S. general questioned whether the U.S. military would be ready to defend Taiwan. This skeptical public rhetoric and an inability to attain necessary levels of readiness — something the Chinese government would surely learn from intelligence gathering — could contribute to deterrence failure by creating doubt about both U.S. resolve and U.S. military readiness for such an operation.</p> +<p>鄒續指，他參政望為民發聲，實現真正民主化，由始至終「我根本無意違反《國安法》，亦想像不了參選本身原來已構成危害國安」。《國安法》生效後他一度想退選，但自覺身為政治人物肩負對人民的責任而繼續，「我懼怕，倘若連參選人都臨陣退縮，香港只會被恐懼的情緒籠罩，公民社會一沉百踩。我不忍心退選，我無法離群眾而去」。鄒指他初心始終不變，依然相信民主與公羲、關懷弱者，依然希望香港變得更好，亦始終深信民住的價值：「即使今日我為爭取民主而身陷囹圄，但我仍然相信，這個『為人民服務的民選政府』終有一天必將降臨香港。」鄒又說，獄中數年他努力讀書、修身修心，雖不知何時重獲自由，但盼出獄時能自豪說：「這些年我都沒有枉過。」</p> -<p>Politically, there are reasons for the PRC to doubt the United States’ commitment to defending Taiwan due to the U.S. policy of strategic ambiguity. The United States terminated its Mutual Defense Treaty with Taiwan (the Republic of China or ROC) in 1979 when it formally recognized the PRC. Since then, U.S. relations with Taiwan have been based on the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act. The act obligates the United States to provide Taiwan “with defense articles and defense services” to allow the island “to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability” and “to maintain the capacity of the United States to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or the social or economic system, of the people on Taiwan.” The act created a policy of strategic ambiguity regarding U.S. defense of Taiwan. Despite this policy, President Biden has spoken strongly of U.S. support for Taiwan’s defense on four separate occasions. Following these statements, White House officials emphasized that U.S. policy regarding Taiwan remained the same, presumably to avoid raising tensions with China. Making a “mistake” about U.S. support for Taiwan four different times likely has sent a strong signal of U.S. intentions to the PRC. It will be important to see how the next president speaks about Taiwan, as their words will send important messages to Chinese leadership about the U.S. defense of Taiwan. It is worth noting, however, regardless of presidential rhetoric, that as long as the policy of strategic ambiguity is in place, there is room for Chinese leaders to question the U.S. commitment to assisting Taiwan’s defense.</p> +<h4 id="張可森以家庭為中心愛妻育兒">張可森：以家庭為中心、愛妻育兒</h4> -<p>Beyond uncertainty regarding Washington’s military and political pledges to Taiwan, any Chinese attacks on Taiwan could stem from an assumption by President Xi that the stakes are higher for the PRC than for the United States. With Taiwan just over eighty miles from mainland China and the PRC increasingly asserting its dominance in the East and South China Seas, it is unsurprising that Chinese leaders would assume that the island of Taiwan matters more to Beijing than to Washington. The assumption that the United States and its Pacific allies have lower stakes in the region could lead Xi to calculate, first, that he could get away with annexing Taiwan by force, and second, that nuclear use could stop the United States from continuing to defend Taiwan in a crisis if the annexation does not go as planned.</p> +<p>至於張可森，其大律師伍頴珊指他屬「積極參加者」，他現正修讀中大文化研究博士學位，還柙期間父親離世、兒子出生，張對未能與妻子和兒子相處感到悲痛後悔。張亦親撰求情信，提及在獄中的30歲生日得以冷靜思過，如今他明白案中計劃一旦實行到底所衍生的嚴重性，並深刻反省，認為審議預算案是立法會議員的責任，關乎廣大市民生活，不應作為政治工具，亦不應藉此危害國安。張明白到當下的情況及懲處，是必須學會承擔的後果，盼能盡快完成博士學位，不負家人期盼：「當事情告一段落後，我將會以家庭作為人生中心，投入全副精神照顧高堂，並且一如我妻愛我般愛我妻，與她協力養育兒子成人。」</p> -<p>Turning to the European theater, the deterrence failure dates to at least 2014, when the RF annexed Crimea. Based on the West’s limited response to that action, Putin determined that it was worth attempting to take the rest of Ukraine by force in 2022. He did not anticipate Ukraine’s ability to resist the invasion or the support Kyiv would receive from the West. As Ukraine was not a member of the alliance, NATO’s Article 5 commitment did not apply, but members of NATO responded to the attack with intelligence, supplies, and funding. The level of NATO unity surrounding Ukraine and the increases in defense spending among alliance members are intended to send a strong deterrent message to Putin regarding further aggression, but if Moscow were in a desperate gamble to split the alliance and to reduce the West’s support for Ukraine in a conventional conflict, then additional attacks could not be ruled out.</p> +<h4 id="岑敖暉譴責過去言行盼回家與妻共度時光">岑敖暉：譴責過去言行、盼回家與妻共度時光</h4> -<p>Finally, while preventing the conventional attacks in the first place is key to preventing the subsequent instances of nuclear use, this scenario does involve nuclear deterrence failures. The adversaries likely hoped that crossing the nuclear threshold would compel the United States and its allies to stop fighting. They may have doubts about whether the United States would employ nuclear weapons in regional conflicts.</p> +<p>同提到反省和後悔的，包括參選超級區議會的岑敖暉。其求情信提到自還柙起自願進行單獨囚禁，經反思後，發現他過去參與政治背後的原因並非看起來那樣光采，他過去被憤怒充滿，有時更演變成仇恨或怨恨，驅使他作出某些政治行為、修辭和言論。岑說，妻子的愛令他慢慢意識到憤怒或仇恨，絕不能將他帶去任何美好、有建設性或充滿愛的地方，他明白以否決預算案作為政治手段，不僅嚴重破壞、干擾和阻撓人們生活及政府機關履行職能，亦會危害國安，離他當初的政治願景更遠。他譴責自己過去的言行，亦對還柙後無法再服務公眾、令他們失望，深深後悔和抱歉。</p> -<p><em>WHAT CAN BE DONE TO AVOID THESE DETERRENCE FAILURES?</em></p> +<p>岑指，與妻子分隔逾3年，但愛意無隨時間流逝而減退，反而日益深厚和強烈，「我現時內心每一刻最大的願望，就是回到我們一起建立的家，與她共度所有時光，這是我這個魯莽和愚蠢的人，對她無條件的愛和支持所能做的回報」。他又指，明白犯下嚴重罪行，長期監禁是無可避免，願接受其過錯帶來的所有後果，只望刑期不會剝奪他改過和向家人彌補過錯的機會。</p> -<p>The U.S. military must prioritize the acquisitions required for the Hellscape plan and for follow-on military action in the region. In addition, the United States needs to find a way to sell Taiwan the military hardware required to defend itself from a PRC attack. If the United States does not provide what Taiwan needs in a timely fashion, it signals a lack of political resolve on the part of the United States and undermines Taiwanese military readiness. As (or if) the United States takes these steps to increase U.S. and Taiwanese readiness between 2024 and 2027, U.S. military leaders should project greater public confidence than they have to date about their ability to aid Taiwan’s defense.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/GWKlS5F.png" alt="image35" /> +▲ 岑敖暉</p> -<p>Short of altering the U.S. policy of “strategic ambiguity” regarding Taiwan’s status, there are several ways the United States could message its resolve to maintain the status quo. First, more statements like those made by President Biden about his intention to defend Taiwan — even if they must be clarified after the fact — are better than saying nothing or being dismissive of the issue.</p> +<h4 id="王百羽獄中瘦20公斤-感激家人不離不棄">王百羽獄中瘦20公斤 感激家人不離不棄</h4> -<p>Second, top U.S. leaders should make clear to all audiences that the United States has long been a Pacific power and will continue to be one into the future. U.S. stakes in the region are significant: the United States has several allies and partners in the Pacific, maintains key military bases in the region, and benefits from the substantial percentage of global trade transported through the region’s waters. The United States has demonstrated its commitment to the Pacific in recent years with AUKUS, the trilateral security pact with Australia and the United Kingdom, and the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue with Australia, India, and Japan. U.S. leaders should not concede that the PRC has more of a stake in the region, and particularly in Taiwan, than the United States.</p> +<p>同參選超區的王百羽，求情信則感激家人不離不棄，形容他們是「天下間最好的父母」、「家人是我最珍視的寶物」，又指疫情期間未能親自照料，只能獨自擔心卻無能為力，令他很大反思，「我非常渴望能早日回家、擁抱家人，好好地盡孝道，孝順父母。」辯方讀出求情信和談及其家人時，王百羽雙眼通紅，數度以手和紙巾拭淚。</p> -<p>Third, U.S. leaders should reiterate several talking points regarding Taiwan, both domestically and to the broader international community, to highlight why the United States seeks to maintain the status quo. One set of messages should emphasize what could occur if Taiwan loses its autonomy and becomes part of the PRC. Taiwan is a liberal democracy and a fundamental economic partner to the West. In particular, Taiwan is the world’s foremost supplier of semiconductors and advanced semiconductors, which are necessary for cell phones, computers, cars, and military hardware. If Taiwan were to be swallowed up by its large communist neighbor, this vitally important industry would be under Chinese control. The United States could lose access to the advanced semiconductors necessary for its defense.</p> +<p>大律師黃俊嘉又指，王來自勞動階層，是家中第一名入讀大學的成員，父母對他非常自豪。他畢業於科大計算機科學及工程學系，從事資訊科技工作，2019年當選元朗區議員，會議出席率100%，並因繁重工作壓力巨大，患有高血壓，需服藥控制，王對因本案而無法服務居民感到深深抱歉。辯方指王還柙3年，體重減了20公斤，望獲釋後繼續以其專業服務社會。</p> -<p>Another set of messages should address the PRC’s unlawful claim to Taiwan. There is no history of the PRC controlling the island. The Taiwanese are a mix of indigenous and ethnic Chinese people, some of whom have lived on the island for centuries, well before the PRC existed as a nation-state. The PRC claiming that it has a right to this island is akin to modern colonialism. In sum, the United States and its allies must make clear that taking Taiwan by force is an illegal and illegitimate action.</p> +<h4 id="劉頴匡如知參選入獄不會參加">劉頴匡：如知參選入獄不會參加</h4> -<p>There are also several steps the United States could take to strengthen its relationship with the Philippines and deter a potential attack on the island nation. The United States could do more to emphasize the importance of its partnership with the Philippines by assisting President Ferdinand R. Marcos Jr. with his domestic and international priorities, countering the Chinese disinformation campaigns in the country, providing additional military assistance, and engaging in more joint military exercises in the region.</p> +<p>沒有律師代表的劉頴匡，則指他參選目的是望進入立會，為像他一樣以暴動罪被捕的示威者發聲，否決預算案對他來說並非重點、也不重要，他亦曾表明不相信35+是可能。劉庭上讀出女友黃于喬撰寫的求情信，黃指以劉的天資和才能，本能走一條「正常」的路，但他選擇從政，非為一己私利，而是出於對社會關懷、對民主化追求、望為港貢獻，不料因本案身陷囹圄，「人生最黃金時期」於獄中渡過。黃指與劉相識十年，當中3年多隔着監獄高牆，而她仍每日風雨不改探望，正因不認為他是「作奸犯科、偷呃拐騙」的罪犯，而是值得她繼續關心和付出的人。黃又指，劉過去未曾妄想顛覆國家，而無論現在或將來，他亦不再是當初天真的少年，不再妄想能投身政治改變社會、不會再沾邊任何可能被定性為危害國安的行為，只盼盡快重獲自由。</p> -<p>Moving to the European theater, the RF’s initial attack on Ukraine in February 2022 appears to have been a strategic blunder as it created an enemy on its border, united NATO members against Russia, and caused many European nations to increase defense spending. If at some point in the future, the RF attacks Poland or another NATO member, then there must have been some change of circumstances that made Putin question NATO unity in the face of nuclear use on NATO soil. Alternately, a nuclear attack could be a desperate attempt to stop NATO from supporting Ukraine’s defense.</p> +<p>劉亦呈上親撰的求情信，提到被教導成為一個關心和參與社會的好公民，並盡力做好自己的角色，但最後卻入獄。他指自2013投身社區服務，相信透過基層服務和倡議可令心愛的城市變得更好。劉自言認罪是因他承認知悉並同意戴耀廷提出的議程，但此議程從非他競選的重點，而他真誠相信初選不違法，如果知道參加初選會入獄，「我不會參加，而是選擇其他方式令社會變得更好」。劉最後指，他現時30歲，服刑不僅是懲罰他，亦是懲罰他所愛的人，對一直照顧自己的女友感到愧疚。他明白除政治外有很多其他方式貢獻社會，望能盡快履行作為男友和香港公民的責任。</p> -<p>Finally, Washington must signal its ability and willingness to employ nuclear weapons in these theaters, if necessary, to defend its allies. Signaling comes in a variety of forms, from guidance documents, presidential rhetoric, weapons movement, and exercises that employ these weapons. While the United States under the Biden administration has been wise to avoid the type of belligerent nuclear rhetoric coming from its Russian counterparts, future administrations can privately message their willingness to defend allies using all available options.</p> +<h4 id="伍健偉稱無悔長夜終盡黎明將至民主終將再次得勝">伍健偉稱無悔：長夜終盡，黎明將至，民主終將再次得勝</h4> -<p><em>WHAT DOES WINNING LOOK LIKE?</em></p> +<p>有被告表明無悔，亦為五大訴求作出辯護，不過被法官打斷指屬政治演說。沒有律師代表、自行陳詞的前天水連線元朗區議員伍健偉，<a href="https://www.inmediahk.net/node/社運/【初選47人案】伍健偉親自陳情確認無悔意-選擇留港兌現承諾-與港人齊上齊落">提到「35+計劃」是在陽光底下進行、眾所周知的計劃</a>，要達致進入立法會無差別否決財政預算案，單靠47個被告無可能完成，而是需要廣大香港市民的授權，當時61萬市民冒法律風險投票，作為代議士有責任保護市民。伍又說，「五大訴求」合情合理、無被法庭裁定違法，政府是「不為」而非「不能」，惟法官打斷指並非表達政見場合。（<a href="https://www.inmediahk.net/node/社運/【初選47人案】伍健偉陳情全文：長夜終盡，黎明將至，民主終將再次得勝">伍健偉求情信全文</a>）</p> -<p>The United States has several immediate and long-term strategic objectives in the proposed scenario. Before outlining those goals, it is worth emphasizing exactly what is at stake in this conflict. The PRC and RF crossing the nuclear threshold means that the world has come significantly closer to nuclear war, and with it, a nuclear exchange ending millions of lives, the loss of societies, and even the risk of human civilization on the planet. Any U.S. leader considering how to address this scenario must have that grave reality — however remote — in mind.</p> +<p>伍續說，暴動是人民無被聽見的聲音，案發時街頭激烈衝突已持續長時間，他不希望有人受傷、被捕，甚至犧牲生命，因此參與初選，認為有義務繼承他們信念。他被捕前無打算離開香港，願為過去所有言行負責，但他不會為與選民所共享的信念和價值道歉，不可辜負人民信任。</p> -<p>The primary objective in this scenario is to prevent nuclear escalation, whereby the United States and either the PRC, the RF, or both engage in escalating tit-for-tat nuclear attacks that result in a large-scale exchange of nuclear weapons. This is the primary goal because such nuclear exchanges would destroy societies, lead to millions of deaths, and cause widespread environmental devastation. Even if that outcome appears unlikely from the limited notional scenario, the circumstances are so unprecedented and the possibility of large-scale nuclear exchange so dire that avoiding large-scale nuclear escalation must be considered the goal that supersedes all others.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/Y6ZKdca.png" alt="image36" /> +▲ 伍健偉</p> -<p>Secondary objectives include the following:</p> +<p>法官李運騰問，伍健偉是否沒有悔意？伍答「無錯」，指作為政治人物，期許自己要有承擔、竭盡所能，留守到最後一刻，「所以我並唔後悔，我選擇留喺香港，我需要兌現我莊嚴嘅承諾，同香港人齊上齊落」。伍指未來打算放低政治人物身分，但仍望盡力留在香港貢獻社會，並引前終審法官包致金指：「There is no reason to leave if things are good, and if things are bad, there are more reasons to stay.」</p> -<ul> - <li> - <p>Reestablishing the pre-conflict status quo with the PRC and Taiwan and returning Ukraine to its pre-2022 borders.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Demonstrating U.S. credibility to its allies and partners. This is especially important in terms of nuclear nonproliferation goals. If allies no longer perceive Washington as a trusted security partner, they may consider developing their own indigenous nuclear weapons programs. For example, some leaders in the Republic of Korea (ROK) have called for the country to develop nuclear weapons, and a small number have done so in Japan as well. Polls of the ROK public have found that a majority supports an indigenous nuclear program. Polling of Eastern European publics also indicated support for indigenous nuclear programs in the weeks following the RF’s 2022 attack on Ukraine.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Maintaining the Philippines as an ally in the Pacific, to include the use of its military bases.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Maintaining freedom of movement for all states within the Pacific Ocean.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Reestablishing the taboo against first nuclear use.</p> - </li> -</ul> +<p>伍又說，港人只要抱持自救互助精神，理性思考，行公義、好憐憫、存謙卑的心，記錄過去真相，活在真實的當下，為未來做好真誠的準備，香港未來將重拾光明，香港人的理想定會實現。他最後說，絕對權力必帶來絕對腐敗，「長夜終盡，黎明將至，民主終將再次得勝。」法官陳慶偉最後指，由於伍較遲認罪和沒有悔意，減刑折扣明顯會較他人少，伍表示完全明白。</p> -<p>The inability to achieve any of these important secondary goals means the loss of U.S. global leadership. U.S. allies and partners are key enablers in promoting favorable rules, norms, and institutions within the international system. The PRC and the RF, along with Belarus, Iran, and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), are increasingly forming a bloc determined to undermine U.S. global influence. If the U.S. response to this conflict were to cause the perception that the United States is not a dependable ally or partner, it would be a strategic win for the so-called Axis of Upheaval.</p> +<h4 id="余慧明仍信投票改秩序無錯唯一錯誤或太愛香港">余慧明：仍信投票改秩序無錯、唯一錯誤或「太愛香港」</h4> -<h4 id="assuring-allies-1">Assuring Allies</h4> +<p>參選衞生服務界的余慧明，求情信提及一切源自2019年反修例運動，當時100萬港人和平上街反修例，聲音卻不獲聆聽，引致激烈的街頭抗爭。余指不欲再看到示威者再犧牲和被捕，加上政府未能預防新冠疫情爆發，故望參選立法會，增加議價能力，改變死局，但此舉被指控為顛覆國家政權，是其他民主國家聞所未聞。</p> -<p>After the nuclear attacks on the territories of allies, other allies and partners will closely watch to see how Washington responds. U.S. leaders will need to address the immediate challenge of the attacks and the ongoing conflicts, while also considering how their actions affect alliance relationships in the immediate and longer term.</p> +<p>余續說，法庭裁決提到「五大訴求」是空中樓閣，但當中包括落實《基本法》承諾的雙普選，反問「如果政府視落實《基本法》23條是憲制責任，難道落實雙普選不是一樣嗎？」，又指「即使到現在，我仍然認為透過在立法會投票，改變既定秩序並沒有錯，或許我唯一犯下的錯誤，就是我太愛香港。」法官陳慶偉聞言亦打斷，指這並非求情信，是政治演說，着辯方不要在其法庭發表，又指看不到任何悔意。辯方一度指，本案涉及政治，如被告對所做的表達悔意，或被人質疑他們信念是否真誠，法官陳慶偉則說：那就不要求情，你不用求情，那沒有問題。」</p> -<p><em>WHAT ARE THE RISKS — INCLUDING THEIR LIKELIHOOD AND CONSEQUENCES — OF ALLIES QUESTIONING U.S. CREDIBILITY IN THE EVENT OF STRATEGIC DETERRENCE FAILURE?</em></p> +<p>代表余慧明的大律師石書銘亦陳詞指，余是年輕、有同情心的理想主義者，她大學時以醫療服務為志業，先後成為註冊護士和深切治療部護士，再轉到醫管局總部工作，望令更多病人受惠。石指，余組織工會和參選僅為服務公眾，她一直倡以非暴力和合法手段向政府施壓，惟本案後很大機會不能再任護士，已付出代價。而余所屬的衞生服務界與其他區不同，沒有協調會議和論壇、亦無討論35+後要做什麼，余基本上獨自行事，屬「積極參加者」較低級別或「其他參加者」。</p> -<p>It is fair to assume that the publics and elites within allied nations will perceive the nuclear attacks by the PRC and RF as deterrence failures, but it is also important to note that both states used nuclear weapons in this notional scenario when they were losing conventional conflicts against the United States and its allies. Nuclear use stemmed from a place of adversary weakness and was meant to undermine U.S. resolve to keep fighting and to illustrate the high stakes of the conflict for the PRC and RF.</p> +<h4 id="袁嘉蔚獄中成婚馮達浚向泛民等道歉">袁嘉蔚獄中成婚、馮達浚向泛民等道歉</h4> -<p>Given Putin’s behavior over the past decade, it is possible, and perhaps even likely, that U.S. allies and partners will emphasize the RF’s taboo-breaking decision to conduct a nuclear attack more than they will blame the United States for the deterrence failure. For example, Putin already has defied several international rules and norms when it comes to respecting national sovereignty, upholding sanctions against proliferating nations, and using chemical weapons against perceived enemies of the state. Moreover, his strategic mistake in invading Ukraine in 2022 and his administration’s persistent nuclear saber-rattling since may result in NATO leaders questioning Putin’s rationality. The theory of nuclear deterrence relies on leaders behaving rationally, so can the United States be blamed for not deterring an actor who may not be rational?</p> +<p>至於袁嘉蔚，其代表資深大律師祁志指她是年輕的理想主義者，一生為人善良、樂於助人，對社會有抱負，任田灣區議員；而她的人生因被還柙而改寫，如今正在更生的路上，最近更在獄中成婚，望及早服刑完畢組織家庭。祁志又指，袁參選是望取得合法權力，《國安法》生效後不久已被DQ，參與程度低，亦真誠相信行為是合法。</p> -<p>The PRC’s nuclear use presents a different and perhaps more complex challenge. The Philippines is not under the protection of U.S. extended nuclear deterrence per the 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty, and yet in a Pacific conflict, the nation would become a target as the United States operates out of its military bases. A potential nuclear attack on a Philippine military base would likely provoke public backlash toward the United States, especially among Filipinos aligned with the political faction of former president Rodrigo Duterte. Some Philippine leaders have already expressed concerns that U.S. military forces on their islands make them a potential target of a nuclear attack. Maintaining this partnership after an attack may be difficult without extending the U.S. nuclear umbrella.</p> +<p>祁志同代表馮達浚，形容他是理想主義者，畢業自拔萃男書院，受雨傘運動觸動服務社區，2019年參選區議員失敗，但繼續懷有理想為社區工作付出所有，他不是街頭抗爭者、也不暴力，只是一個熱心和幼稚的年輕人。馮亦撰求情信，指自己還柙3年已反省和改變，現時已不在意特首會否下台，並望向他曾經非常不禮貌對待的泛民、他的團隊、家人等道歉，對困擾社會感到後悔。馮亦獲浸大新聞系前高級講師呂秉權等撰求情信，指他對干犯《國安法》感後悔。</p> -<p><em>HOW CAN THE UNITED STATES SIGNAL RESOLVE TO ALLIES IN THE EVENT OF STRATEGIC DETERRENCE FAILURE? WHAT WILL BE ALLIES’ SECURITY CONCERNS IN THE EVENT OF STRATEGIC DETERRENCE FAILURE? WHAT ROLE MIGHT CERTAIN ALLIES AND PARTNERS PLAY IN A RESPONSE?</em></p> +<h4 id="李嘉達難再任社工黃子悅真誠誤信合法">李嘉達難再任社工、黃子悅真誠誤信合法</h4> -<p>The most important means of signaling resolve is for the United States to continue prosecuting the respective conflicts and to respond to the nuclear attacks. Continuing the fight means that military forces may have to operate in spite of, and even in, radiation-contaminated environments.</p> +<p>就前觀塘區議員李嘉達，大律師陳德昌認為他屬「積極參加者」較低級別，望以3年至6年半為量刑起點。陳指李在內地出生，3歲時來港定居，在工人階層家庭成長，港大社工系畢業後成註冊社工，並進修表達藝術治療碩士學位。2019年，李目睹年青人感無力沮喪，遂決定成為區議員，望影響更多人；當選後望投身更大政治舞台改變現況，遂參與初選，事後回看屬錯誤。</p> -<p>In the hours after nuclear use, the focus in the White House will be learning as much as possible about the attacks and assessing its response. This will be a tense, high-stress period, but Washington will want to make allies aware of its plans. Ideally, NATO’s Nuclear Planning Group would have discussed responses to RF or PRC nuclear use well before the beginning of this hypothetical conflict in 2027. The public response to the Russian attack should be presented as a NATO response.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/oo7lNrX.png" alt="image37" /> +▲ 李嘉達</p> -<p>A key aspect of demonstrating credible resolve is maintaining public support for U.S. responses to the attacks; reminding the U.S. public of the strategic importance of its alliances will be vital to this support. News of nuclear use on allies in the Indo-Pacific and Europe will shock the U.S. public; many could fear nuclear detonations would occur on U.S. territory. As a result, securing public support in the United States for military action in defense of allies and partners following the attacks may be challenging. NATO expanded in a period when most Americans no longer worried about European security or nuclear war; the public salience of the alliance and of U.S. alliance commitments is likely much lower than it was during the Cold War.</p> +<p>辯方呈上41封來自李本人、女友、家人、老師、服務對象等求情信，指李還柙逾3年已付上代價，其女友曾提議結婚，但他望對方等待自己出獄，以辦正式婚禮，還柙期間其祖母亦離世。而李被定罪後難再任社工，但有非政府機構願在李獲釋後聘請他。陳德昌最後提到，當天與李會面時，李提及自兩年前認罪後，一直未有離開過赤柱監獄，他當天往法院途上，看到外面樹木翠綠、陽光燦爛、天空蔚藍，一切令人提起精神。陳德昌指感到驚訝，因自己不時會到赤柱，卻從沒留意，並指李已改變，他表明會離開政治，邁向人生新階段，繼續服務社會。李庭上聞言一度流下眼淚。</p> -<p>Before any potential conflict — and frankly, right now — the U.S. government, especially the president, should aim to better educate the public about the history of U.S. alliance relationships and their benefits. When it comes to most public discussions of U.S. allies today, there is too much talk about free-riding and too little about how U.S. economic, security, and political interests benefit from maintaining strong relations with its 30-plus treaty allies. Existing research from political science suggests that the U.S. public is more likely to support military action on behalf of formal allies than nonformal allies (such as Taiwan), so public education about Taiwan is also important. Current scholarship also indicates that support for allies among the U.S. public is based on “elite cues,” so leaders need to be providing positive talking points about U.S. allies if they want to build public support for military action.</p> +<p>而就黃子悅，大律師潘志明指她是本案最年輕的被告，雖在理大暴動案保釋期間犯本案，但兩案時間相近，望法庭考慮整體量刑原則，部分刑期分期執行，又指她真誠誤信計劃合法，非刻意犯法，屬「積極參加者」。至於朱凱廸，辯方指採納書面陳詞，沒有補充。</p> -<p>Following the use of nuclear weapons in this scenario, allies will have several concerns. Any countries targeted or immediately impacted by the nuclear use will need immediate assistance addressing the medical emergencies caused by the nuclear detonation. Allies could also be fearful of follow-on attacks; they will expect the United States to respond strongly to protect them.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/BHnSZim.png" alt="image38" /> +▲ 黃子悅</p> -<p>Allies and partners have a significant role to play in the messaging following nuclear use. They must unite in loudly and publicly condemning the nuclear attacks and should do so repeatedly. They should communicate that using nuclear weapons in these scenarios was unacceptable and neither nation will gain from using these weapons. These messages are key to reestablishing the nuclear taboo following nuclear use.</p> +<h4 id="楊岳橋作為大律師犯法感難堪後悔未拒參與">楊岳橋：作為大律師犯法感難堪、後悔未拒參與</h4> -<h4 id="military-response-options-1">Military Response Options</h4> +<p>抗爭派以外，多名被告均是傳統民主派，曾參與政治和公共服務多年，亦獲不少前高官、議員等撰寫求情信。不少人表明，日後不會再從政。</p> -<p>The most challenging question facing the U.S. president after nuclear use by the PRC and the RF is how to respond to the nuclear attacks. The following section offers options for a military response that aligns with the strategic goals discussed in the section on U.S. strategic priorities.</p> +<p>公民黨共5人被控，當中李予信罪脫，鄭達鴻罪成，楊岳橋等3人則認罪。就時任黨魁楊岳橋，資深大律師蔡維邦指他90年代舉家移民加拿大，在當地大學畢業後，因熱愛中國文化歷史，在北京修讀法學碩士，2009年成為大律師，2016年當選立法會議員。蔡指從立法會投票紀錄可見，楊並非主張阻撓議會運作或立場激進的議員，而他被捕不久已退出公民黨，並籲公民黨解散。蔡又提到，楊早於2021年9月表達認罪意向，並在警方邀請下提供證人口供，顯示他完全的悔意。</p> -<p><em>WHAT WOULD BE THE PRESIDENT’S MILITARY OPTIONS IN THE EVENT OF STRATEGIC DETERRENCE FAILURE? WHICH OF THESE OPTIONS WOULD YOU RECOMMEND TO THE PRESIDENT?</em></p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/B7BdLRF.png" alt="image39" /> +▲ 楊岳橋</p> -<p>Following the Chinese and Russian nuclear attacks, the president will hear many arguments that they must respond with nuclear weapons to signal strength and resolve. Some advisors will argue that responding without nuclear weapons will lead the adversaries to counter with another round of nuclear use. Others will warn that adversaries will perceive a nuclear response as escalatory and set the world on a dangerous path of nuclear exchange.</p> +<p>楊又親撰求情信，稱作為一名大律師，為自己干犯刑事罪行感到難堪，並指從政原望令香港變得更好，但案發時受社會氣氛和政治理念相似的政治人物影響，他對反政府盲目和天真的熱情，令當時政治情況惡化。楊稱對未有拒絕參與否決預算案的謀劃感後悔，亦對其行為導致部分黨友參與此無望及錯誤的計劃，為他們及家人帶來巨大焦慮，感到非常抱歉，直言犯案是完全愚蠢和錯誤，他明白須接受懲罰。楊指日後不會再涉足公共事務，望法庭考慮他曾以其微小方式貢獻社會。</p> -<p>Recommendations for the U.S. response to this notional scenario are based on the following assumptions:</p> +<p>辯方認為，楊的量刑起點應為「積極參加者」3至10年刑期的中間。法官質疑為何不是最高級別，辯方回應，公民黨記者會在《國安法》生效前舉行，而雖然楊當時為黨魁，但他年資較淺，只是黨的發言人，不是黨內主要推手，惟法官表明不會接受這方面陳詞。</p> -<p><strong>Assumption 1: Leaders may be unable to control nuclear escalation.</strong> Responding to the initial nuclear attacks with a U.S. or NATO nuclear attack makes it more likely that the United States will find itself engaging in tit-for-tat nuclear exchanges than if it does not initially respond with nuclear weapons. Once this contest of nerves begins, it could be exceedingly difficult to stop. Even if both sides do not want to escalate, in the fog of war, circumstances may add escalation pressures. For example, misinterpretations about the goals of adversary nuclear attacks (such as regime change or undermining command and control centers) could lead to escalation.</p> +<h4 id="譚文豪向社會各界及中央政府真誠道歉">譚文豪：向社會各界及中央政府真誠道歉</h4> -<p>Alternatively, nuclear-armed states could face other types of accidents, mistakes, or misinterpretations that could lead to nuclear use. There are several historical examples of such mistakes. For instance, during the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, an errant U2 pilot, an accidentally inserted nuclear attack training tape, and even a black bear in Duluth, Minnesota, could have led to a nuclear war that neither side wanted. Additionally, leaders below the commander in chief could conduct unauthorized attacks that could lead to further escalation.</p> +<p>至於譚文豪，資深大律師何沛謙同指他屬「積極參加者」，望法庭考慮他對香港的貢獻和真誠悔意而減刑。辯方求情指，譚出身草根，靠努力成為民航機師，2016年放棄機師工作從政，並非為個人名利或榮譽，也從沒有意圖成為激進政客，只想回饋社會，令香港成為更好的地方；譚過去亦曾多次贊成政府撥款，更獲政府官員私信感謝。辯方又指，譚辭任立法會議員和退黨後，已完全離開政壇，他還柙逾3年，望能建立新生活，望彌補與龍鳳胎子女、妻子和母親相處的時間。譚開設的茶餐廳於疫情結業，他正修讀會計和企業管理課程，望裝備自己尋找新職涯。</p> -<p>Some may argue that the theater nuclear use is far from a strategic nuclear exchange and does not present a risk of all-out nuclear war. In this argument, there is a clear and meaningful line between theater (or tactical) nuclear weapons and strategic nuclear weapons. It assumes that leaders could use tactical weapons but remain “below” the strategic threshold. There is little evidence to know whether this is true, and it could be a very costly and dangerous assumption to make. This argument of a clear demarcation between tactical and strategic weapons also has the unintended consequences of reifying three categories of weapons: conventional weapons, theater nuclear weapons, and strategic nuclear weapons. Whether intentional or not, this argument leads to the appearance that theater nuclear weapons are acceptable and thus more usable. And while smaller nuclear weapons do less damage, the damage is still significant and indicates a violation of a long-standing taboo. Furthermore, it is not clear if other leaders share the same assumption that there is a clear divide between employing theater and strategic weapons.</p> +<p>辯方又指，譚及早認罪，並於2021年下半年自願錄口供，提及如果知道會犯法，「我係絕對唔會參加呢個初選」，辯方強調他當時不知道「紅線」在哪裡，並非公然違法。庭上又讀出譚親撰的求情信，提及望向法庭表達，「我對過去的言行深感悔疚，希望公開向香港社會各界以及中央政府真誠道歉」。</p> -<p>In sum, significant destruction could occur if both sides begin employing nuclear weapons. This is unprecedented territory, and no one can predict with certainty what will happen. The potential destruction caused by nuclear escalation poses too great of a risk to make the ex ante assumption that leaders can fully manage this risk.</p> +<h4 id="郭家麒獲張超雄等撰求情信-指主張和平曾阻示威者衝擊">郭家麒獲張超雄等撰求情信 指主張和平曾阻示威者衝擊</h4> -<p><strong>Assumption 2: Military responses that lead to public humiliation of Putin and Xi are not likely to lead to preferred U.S. objectives.</strong> Considering the few checks on their decisionmaking, their regional and global ambitions, and their obsessions with legacy, it worth considering how to minimize actions that serve to humiliate Xi and Putin. For this reason, the West should explore finding the right balance between responses that are conducted in the open and those that can be conducted with plausible deniability.</p> +<p>就郭家麒，資深大律師蔡維邦同指他是最早一批認罪被告，他有原則、願意奉獻、具同理心，無考慮「攬炒」亦不支持港獨，望以「積極參加者」較低程度為量刑起點。郭獲前運輸及房屋局副局長邱誠武、前立法會議員石禮謙及張超雄撰求情信，張指郭主張和平，2019年七一曾在立法會玻璃門前阻止示威者衝擊大樓，因而受傷，8月環球時報記者付國豪在機場被示威者綑綁和襲擊時，郭亦到場阻止。郭亦親撰求情信，提及出身草根，八十年代成為醫生，在學時目睹工人受傷，成立香港工人健康中心，奉獻空餘時間促進弱勢福祉。</p> -<p><strong>Assumption 3: To be deterred from further escalation, Xi and Putin must be fearful of follow-on actions.</strong> If the United States does not respond strongly to the nuclear attack, it will confirm that Xi and Putin were correct that the United States has lower stakes in both regions relative to the PRC and RF. The responses to the attack must be costly in terms of destruction of adversary capabilities — though not necessarily with nuclear weapons — and indicate that more attacks could follow.</p> +<p>辯方指，郭自1994年至2007年任中西區區議員，2004年當選立法會議員，曾獲委任為醫管局成員；而他在公民黨解散前已退黨，出獄後望繼續行醫，退出政治，沒有重犯機會，望法庭考慮他犯案完全與性格不符。不過法官不認同，質疑本案串謀持續多月，郭必然對參選作詳細考慮。</p> -<p><strong>Policy recommendation:</strong> Given the extreme danger of beginning a process of nuclear exchange with U.S. adversaries and the fact that the adversaries may use nuclear weapons again regardless of U.S. and allied action, it is prudent to retaliate with punishing nonnuclear responses that are both public and clandestine. The United States should conduct timely and precise conventional attacks on adversary military bases or installations to degrade their military capabilities. Targeting should not include command and control capabilities, which could be perceived as escalatory. Moreover, these attacks should be reported to the public. This strong conventional response signals both that nuclear use will be punished and that the United States does not need to resort to nuclear use to do considerable damage to the adversary’s military capabilities. At the same time, the U.S. should signal its readiness to conduct limited nuclear operations, if necessary, by moving dual-capable aircraft and submarines to the regions.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/pfljZow.png" alt="image40" /> +▲ （資料圖片）</p> -<p>The United States should accompany these conventional attacks with clear assurances both in public and private that the United States does not seek regime change in the PRC or the RF. While in general the United States would prefer fewer authoritarian governments, in this conflict scenario, making adversaries believe their lives and governments are at risk could lead to further nuclear escalation. As prospect theory informs us, those in the domain of losses — as China and Russia would be in this scenario — are willing to take great risks. The United States simply seeks a reversion to the pre-conflict status quo. If either foreign leader assesses that regime change is a goal of the West, the conflict could quickly escalate.</p> +<h4 id="辯方指鄭達鴻僅跟黨立場">辯方指鄭達鴻僅跟黨立場</h4> -<p>In addition to these conventional attacks, the United States should consider clandestine operations employing special forces teams that would degrade adversary military capabilities. These attacks do not need to be as immediate as the conventional attacks, but they should surprise the adversaries in terms of the damage done. If there are novel capabilities not employed by the West previously, this would be a suitable time to use them. The goal of these nonpublic attacks is to degrade enemy capabilities and demonstrate U.S. capabilities to adversary leadership with the plausible deniability of secret operations. PRC and RF leaders will not be forced to discuss these attacks in public and thus the potential humiliation or backlash that could come from these attacks is less likely. In other words, these operations should do serious damage while allowing Putin and Xi to save face. Once these actions have taken place, the United States should offer off-ramps to the RF and the PRC, while also making clear that the United States will continue fighting and may have to resort to nuclear use.</p> +<p>鄭達鴻是唯一一名並非立法會議員的公民黨罪成被告，資深大律師潘熙認為他屬「其他參加者」，指他角色相對輕微，只是跟從黨的立場，而他報名參選後被DQ，其後宣布退黨、自願停用社交媒體，亦無再參與政治事務，他誤信初選合法才犯案。潘熙又指，鄭曾任8年區議員，一直希望成為立法會議員，他參與涉案謀劃並非為個人私利，而是望服務公眾及改善基層生活，望法庭考慮他參與公共服務多年而減刑。</p> -<p><em>WHAT ARE THE RISKS ASSOCIATED WITH A MILITARY RESPONSE?</em></p> +<h4 id="胡志偉尹兆堅獲前高官張炳良羅致光等撰求情信">胡志偉、尹兆堅獲前高官張炳良、羅致光等撰求情信</h4> -<p>The most significant immediate risk is nuclear escalation. Other risks include the PRC and RF retaliating against the U.S. homeland and allies by other means, including conventional, cyber, or space attacks. The risks of not responding, however, include a loss of U.S. credibility, a breakdown in the U.S. alliance system, and a further weakening of the rules-based global order. Moreover, perceptions of “successful” use of nuclear weapons could increase proliferation pressures around the world.</p> +<p>民主黨則有4人被控，其中胡志偉和尹兆堅認罪，黃碧雲及林卓廷均被裁定罪成。就時任民主黨主席胡志偉，大律師郭子丰表示，胡最多只是「積極參加者」的較低級別，無證據他組織涉案謀劃，只是透過參與論壇、街站等作和應，而他於論壇曾反問難道「起醫院、起學校我哋都要反對咩」，顯示他當時對「攬炒」和無差別否決財案有保留。</p> -<h4 id="non-kinetic-response-options-1">Non-Kinetic Response Options</h4> +<p>辯方又指，胡參與公共政治事務逾30年，獲前運房局局長張炳良、副局長邱誠武及前勞福局局長羅致光3人撰寫求情信，指胡溫和、理性、務實，以人民和社會的最大利益為先，他亦曾獲政府頒授榮譽勳章及委任加入中央政策組等，顯示政府視他為可靠的人。辯方指，根據胡的背景、品格和多年政治信念，他並非蓄意危害國安的激進政治人物，案發時真誠誤信運用否決權屬合法；又指謀劃成功的機會極微，因民主黨議員對預算案如何投票無最終決定權。</p> -<p>In addition to military responses to nuclear use, there are several other means by which the United States and its allies can pursue the primary and secondary strategic goals discussed previously. The president, with allies, should take non-kinetic actions against the RF and PRC to punish the use of nuclear weapons and demonstrate the costly repercussions of nuclear use. These actions should be taken along with the military responses described above. Potential non-kinetic responses include the following:</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/JW6ZXqa.png" alt="image41" /> +▲ （資料圖片）</p> -<p><strong>Financial punishments:</strong> The United States could utilize the tools of the global financial system to hurt the PRC and RF economies. These tools may have limited utility in 2027, however, as both countries have worked to limit, to the extent possible, their economic vulnerabilities. Additional use of these tools may be necessary, but they will further the decoupling of adversaries from the global economic system led by the United States.</p> +<p>至於尹兆堅，大律師莫彥婷指他無出席選舉論壇、無簽署「墨落無悔」，他投身公共服務近20年，1994年成為註冊社工，2004年起四度當選區議員，2016年當選立法會議員，曾成功爭取殘疾人士2元乘車優惠和長者生活津貼等。而尹是出色的廚師，出獄後打算於國際人權組織「世界中央廚房」任職。尹另獲前勞工及福利局局長蕭偉強、羅致光，及前運輸及房屋局局長張炳良撰求情信，指他熱心勢助弱勢，可信有禮、和平理性，就勞工福利政等策有良好交流。</p> -<p><strong>Cyberattacks:</strong> The United States should consider conducting cyberattacks on the adversaries that are initially limited and measured, but which signal the possibility of pursuing attacks with greater effect if the conflict continues. This action does risk a dangerous escalation of cyber conflict — also unprecedented to date — so these actions must be calibrated very carefully. Attacks should avoid military command and control capabilities or otherwise blinding the adversary in such a way that they misinterpret the attacks as being the prelude to a larger attack.</p> +<h4 id="辯方指林卓廷黃碧雲屬其他參加者">辯方指林卓廷、黃碧雲屬「其他參加者」</h4> -<p><strong>Diplomatic statements:</strong> In the days and weeks following the nuclear attacks, U.S. and allied leaders should make strong statements to all audiences — foreign and domestic — about how the PRC and RF have broken a long-standing taboo in international relations. In addition, Washington should work with allies and all other like-minded states to write and publicize a unified statement of condemnation from leaders around the world (with as diverse a geographic grouping as possible). In addition, a UN General Assembly resolution, such as the one following Russia’s attack on Ukraine in 2022, would help send the message that the international community disapproves of the nuclear use. These condemnations may not affect RF and PRC actions in the immediate term, but the lack of global condemnation following the first nuclear use since World War II would undermine the nuclear taboo moving forward.</p> +<p>林卓廷和黃碧雲則同由大律師沈士文代表，沈指二人沒有出席任何協調會議、無簽署「墨落無悔」、政綱無提否決預算案，參與程度低，屬「其他參加者」。他並指，二人定罪是因胡志偉的言論，以及從林卓廷搜出的論壇筆記，及黃碧雲在選舉論壇的發言。但針對後者，沈指她是在論壇被激進派「逼到牆角」，受壓下才提及否決預算案。</p> -<p>In making public statements about the nuclear attacks, the United States and its allies must consider how other members of the international community will perceive nuclear use — namely, was it successful for the attackers? The most important message to convey will be that nuclear attacks do not allow states to succeed in territorial aggrandizement. The existing global nuclear order has dealt with many challenges to date, and this nuclear use would be a grave one, but there are indications that the order would be able to survive this challenge.</p> +<p>就兩人背景，沈指林卓廷是傳統民主黨黨員，從不激進，而民主黨支持一國兩制和香港回歸中國，亦常與政府合作。林曾任區議員和立法會議員，推動「反圍標」運動，獲受助居民撰求情信，投票紀錄也顯示他非常勤奮，贊成多於反對。林亦獲民主黨前主席何俊仁、劉慧卿等撰求情信。</p> -<p>It is worth emphasizing here that improving U.S. and allied relations with states within the Global South before this notional conflict in 2027 is paramount. Though the international community broadly supported the 2022 UN General Assembly resolution condemning Russia’s attack on Ukraine, there have been fewer governments that have unilaterally condemned the attack or Russia’s nuclear saber-rattling, even among members of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, a treaty that explicitly bans nuclear threats.</p> +<p>至於黃碧雲是加州大學洛杉磯分校政治科學博士，曾於理大任多年講師，2012起任九西立法會議員，2020年立會選舉延期後無被DQ，但自願辭職，無再參與政治。前運輸及房屋局局長張炳良等為黃撰寫求情信，指她屬2019年「對抗式政治」的受害者，犯案與本性不符；又指2010年政改方案獲黃支持下通過，顯示她溫和務實，望香港循序漸進實現民主化，她在撥款議案亦與政府合作。</p> -<h4 id="conclusion-2">Conclusion</h4> +<h4 id="梁國雄雖成階下囚但毋怨堅信人民大於國家">梁國雄：雖成階下囚但毋怨、堅信人民大於國家</h4> -<p>The notional 2027 scenario discussed in this paper would pose significant challenges to U.S. leadership in the immediate and longer term. At best, the 82-year-old nuclear taboo is broken but further nuclear escalation is prevented. The United States is able to end both conflicts on favorable terms that punish the adversary’s militaries for nuclear use. Taiwan remains an autonomous democracy with a strong economy. Allies and partners remain committed to their security arrangements with the United States. Competition between the United States and both powers continues, but the PRC and RF are chastened. The message is clear that the use of nuclear weapons is not a means of achieving geopolitical goals, and the norm against their use is maintained.</p> +<p>至於社民連，岑子杰認罪，梁國雄則被裁罪成。就梁國雄，資深大律師潘熙採納書面陳詞，社民連則在Facebook發布梁國雄的陳情書，梁提到自70年代起參與政治運動和社會抗爭，是出於改變社會不公的願望，他從沒放棄爭取民主自由、實現社會主義，「一路走來近50年，黑髮變白頭，長毛成短毛，自由人淪為階下囚，我都是秉持這個理念行事」。</p> -<p>The worst outcome is almost too horrible to imagine but must be contemplated: large nuclear exchanges that devastate massive swaths of nations on all sides of the conflict.</p> +<p>梁指參與35+初選是因多年切身體驗，必須在立法會中與志同道合者取得過半數議席，才有足夠壓力令政府推行惠及民生的社會政策，而「五大訴求」中實行雙普選更是其身體力行多年的目標。梁又指，認為議員否決預算案乃《基本法》訂明的憲制權力，行政長官面臨下台的憲制危機，必須經歷兩次立法會選舉的民意授權，議員兩次行使否決權是民意依歸，只是彰顯200萬遊行市民民意。</p> -<p>Somewhere in the middle of these extremes, a large nuclear conflict is averted, but the use of nuclear weapons and the resulting fear of being targeted make allies and partners reconsider whether they want to be in a defensive alliance. In a world with fewer allies and partners, Washington would lose a great deal of influence to shape the norms and institutions that make up the global order. This outcome likely would hasten the end of any remaining notion of a U.S.-led global order.</p> +<p>梁最後指，「權力歸於人民」是他終生信守的理念，從政的基礎，更是《中國憲法》對人民的莊嚴承諾，「今天我雖然成為階下囚，但我毋怨。我堅信人民大於國家，人權高於政權，惟願港人莫失莫忘，爭取民主，守護公義！」</p> -<p>Because so much is at stake, the most significant takeaway from this analysis is the importance of trying to deter such conflict in the first place. As described above, there are several ways in which the United States can improve readiness and signal its resolve. Once nuclear weapons are used in war, one cannot predict how conflict will escalate. Because nuclear weapons present an existential threat to humanity, there is nothing more important than avoiding nuclear war.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/WYjohAp.png" alt="image42" /> +▲ 岑子杰、梁國雄</p> -<h3 id="presidential-prudence-and-responding-to-strategic-deterrence-failure">Presidential Prudence and Responding to Strategic Deterrence Failure</h3> +<h4 id="岑子杰獲區諾軒撰求情信">岑子杰獲區諾軒撰求情信</h4> -<blockquote> - <h4 id="ankit-panda">Ankit Panda</h4> -</blockquote> +<p>就岑子杰，大律師郭憬憲認為其罪責屬最輕，並讀出區諾軒撰寫的求情信，提及望法庭考慮岑的政治取向輕判，指岑是九西協調會議上反對無差別否決預算案的關鍵人物，對於阻止無差別否決成為該區共識具決定性作用。區又形容岑是非暴力的人，在2019年組織公眾活動時與警方合作。</p> -<p>U.S. presidents, their advisers, and military planners must take seriously the possibility of limited nuclear use by adversaries in a range of plausible future contingencies. Resorting to the first use of nuclear weapons may appear attractive to U.S. adversaries as a means of seeking undeniable military and political advantage while simultaneously communicating exceptional resolve, risk acceptance, and stakes. In this way, the detonation of one — or multiple — nuclear weapons with deliberately lower yields on strictly military targets in the course of a conventional war or an intense crisis could compel the president of the United States, in their capacity as commander-in-chief, to weigh several risky response options, none of which may be particularly optimal across the full set of U.S. national objectives as articulated in peacetime.</p> +<h4 id="辯方倡譚得志為其他參加者">辯方倡譚得志為「其他參加者」</h4> -<p>As Thomas Schelling observed in 1961, reflecting contemporaneously on the Berlin crisis (1958–1961), intense crises between nuclear-armed adversaries are usefully conceived of as games of competitive risk-taking, where the military effects of nuclear use may be a secondary consideration to the resolve conveyed. “We should plan for a war of nerve, of demonstration, and of bargaining, not of tactical target destruction,” Schelling observed. He added that should the United States resort to the use of nuclear weapons against Soviet military targets over Berlin, “destroying the target is incidental to the message the detonation conveys to the Soviet leadership.” For Schelling, prevailing in the crisis over Berlin would require “impress[ing] the Soviet leadership with the risk of general war — a war that may occur whether we or they intend it or not.” Limited nuclear use — or limited nuclear war — thus was an option meant specifically to communicate to the Soviet Union that the United States would be willing to tolerate exceptionally high risks to achieve the political ends it sought at the time. Today, military planners contemplating limited nuclear use may believe that target choice is more than an incidental matter; however, impressing on the adversary the prospect of an uncontrollable lurch toward Armageddon will remain central to such a choice. Adversaries need not be irrational or deliberately seeking nuclear escalation to contemplate such actions; all it may take for limited nuclear use to be attractive is that adversary leaders see that step as being less bad than the alternatives, which may include conventional defeat.</p> +<p>至於人民力量，時任主席陳志全，大律師馬維騉指他沒有出席初選記者會，也無參與協調會議，屬「積極參加者」較低程度。他又指，陳獲其妹妹、配偶及前政府官員撰求情信，望法庭考慮他是一名勤奮盡責的立法會議員，積極替性小眾利益發聲。</p> -<p>Schelling’s prescriptions, written in 1961, may appear somewhat uncontroversial to U.S. audiences familiar with the history of the Cold War and U.S. interests in central Europe in the 1960s. Yet it is not inconceivable that should Russia, China, or North Korea choose in the twenty-first century to rationally resort to limited, nuclear first-use, their calculations will rest on a similar logic. Just as a U.S. president might have resorted to a nuclear detonation to convey a greater stake in the fate of Berlin to the Soviet leadership in 1961, so too might Russian president Vladimir Putin, Chinese leader Xi Jinping, or North Korean leader Kim Jong Un seek to “impress” on a U.S. president that running a risk of a general — possibly spasmodic — nuclear war over nuclear strikes on military targets is simply a risk not worth running. This logic underscoring the potential appeal of limited nuclear use is essentially deductive. To be sure, any nuclear use by U.S. adversaries would represent a world-altering event and the unambiguous manifestation of what U.S. deterrence planners consider “strategic deterrence failure,” but there remains a meaningful difference between successful war termination between nuclear-armed adversaries following limited nuclear use and war termination after a large-scale nuclear exchange. This difference may, quite literally, be measured in the millions-of-human-lives lost.</p> +<p>就時任副主席快必譚得志，大律師梁寶琳主張他是「其他參加者」，指他雖有簽署「墨落無悔」，但擺街站、參與論壇，呼籲投票等是一般選舉會做的事；又強調初選是開放予所有人參加的民主選舉，譚主動參與不構成他屬「積極參加」。</p> -<p>The Project Atom study asks its authors to consider a particularly sobering scenario of limited nuclear use. U.S. adversaries — specifically, Russia and China — escalate to limited nuclear use in order to compel the United States to back away from continuing military action. In the scenario assigned to the authors, both Russia and China resort to nuclear first-use, paired with signals designed to convey their willingness to run greater risks than the United States. In the scenario, both Beijing and Moscow reference each other’s military actions, including the other’s nuclear strikes, and a strong collusive logic appears to drive each adversary’s willingness to run risks. While such a scenario may not cohere to how subject matter experts versed in the decisionmaking and bureaucratic idiosyncrasies of the Russian and Chinese political systems might conceive of pathways to limited nuclear use by those states, it represents something close to a worst-case scenario for strategic deterrence failure manifesting in near-simultaneous nuclear use by two near-peer U.S. adversaries in different theaters. Notably, the scenario also features a resort to nuclear use by both adversaries following exceptional U.S. and allied conventional successes: in Europe, the United States’ NATO allies successfully seize a substantial portion of Russia’s Kaliningrad Oblast and, in the Indo-Pacific, the United States successfully interdicts an amphibious invasion force destined for Taiwan.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/bzvRD70.png" alt="image43" /> +▲ 陳志全、譚得志</p> -<p>Given the problem described above and the prescribed scenario, this paper answers the query posed by the Project Atom study — namely, how the United States should respond to limited nuclear use — by centering the role of the U.S. president in nuclear decisionmaking. U.S. presidents, despite their limited briefings on U.S. nuclear capabilities and policies in peacetime, are unlikely to reason about matters of intra-war deterrence, escalation control, and war termination in a real crisis in the same manner that nuclear strategists writing about these matters in peacetime from their comfortable perches at research institutes might. Put simply, presidents are likely to be inordinately fearful of general nuclear war in the aftermath of limited nuclear use and averse to the possibility of even a single nuclear warhead detonating on U.S. territory. This may be the case even if presidential advisers and intelligence assessments do not necessarily ascribe a high probability to further nuclear escalation in the prescribed scenario. Given that the president is solely imbued with the authority to issue valid and legal orders to release nuclear weapons, any analysis of likely and plausible U.S. response options must center how current and future presidents may weigh response options. Despite however many options are in place or requirements provided in peacetime, a U.S. president cannot be compelled by their military advisers to seek any particular course of action in a given crisis. Given this, this paper largely argues that should Russia and China resort to partially collusive, deliberate, limited nuclear use in simultaneous crises, as specified in the Project Atom scenario, most plausible U.S. presidents — individuals who are overwhelmingly likely to be politicians, unversed in the finer points of nuclear strategy — will likely be compelled to stand down instead of engaging in competitive nuclear risk-taking. These men and women, whoever they may be, are overwhelmingly likely to find themselves worrying about the prospect of general nuclear war — or the “final failure” — as John F. Kennedy once did at the height of the Cuban Missile Crisis.</p> +<p>辯方又指，譚擁有基督教研究和神學兩個碩士學位，曾任電台主持逾20年，而他被捕後已退出人民力量，在初選亦只排名第四，再沒有機會重返政壇，他還柙逾3年已付上代價；作為基督徒的他，現在每天都讀《懺悔錄》，嘗試學習和懺悔。</p> -<p>If this is true, there is little doubt that several self-professed U.S. national objectives as articulated in peacetime would come under substantial stress, with potentially far-reaching consequences for U.S. grand strategy and foreign policy. This is ultimately the cost of strategic deterrence failure and why the United States must take the prospect of averting any nuclear use anywhere seriously. Other scenarios, including those featuring opportunistic limited nuclear use by one peer, may lead a president to accept greater risks, but this is outside of the scope of this study. As this essay will discuss, prudent planning for such failure can ensure that a U.S. president that may choose to avoid running the risk of nuclear escalation remains able to seek a world after strategic deterrence failure that is somewhat favorable for the United States. This can also be a world where the consequences of having resorted to limited nuclear use do not entail strategic victory for Russia and China, but rather a narrow, costly, pyrrhic victory.</p> +<h4 id="施德來已退出民協何啟明盼專注教會事奉">施德來已退出民協、何啟明盼專注教會事奉</h4> -<h4 id="fundamental-questions-for-the-united-states">Fundamental Questions for the United States</h4> +<p>至於民協，就時任主席施德來，大律師黃廷光指他是註冊社工，育有一名9歲兒子，2008年加入民協，2016年當選黃大仙區議員及成為民協主席，不同政府部門曾發信表揚他的貢獻，而他本案後已辭任主席和退出民協，亦無法再任社工，抱負破滅。辯方指他於獄中報讀都大心理學課程，望裝備自己，服刑完畢後以其他崗位貢獻社會，屬「積極參加者」的中至低級別。</p> -<p>In reasoning about possible responses to strategic deterrence failure manifesting in limited nuclear use, U.S. leaders, advisers, and planners must be clear about the key national objectives and their relative levels of priority. In the event of strategic deterrence failure, the chief U.S. objective should be to ensure the avoidance of a general, unlimited nuclear war that could lead to fundamentally unacceptable levels of damage against the U.S. homeland as a result of adversary counterforce or countervalue strikes. Democratically elected U.S. presidents, charged by voters with defending the homeland, are likely to consider any nuclear attacks on U.S. territory as tantamount to unacceptable damage. Despite the somewhat methodical Cold War origins of this terminology, in the context of the given scenario, presidents are unlikely to be persuaded by their military advisers that the United States can ride out limited nuclear strikes and continue to exist as it did precrisis. This consideration presents an obvious and uncomfortable source of friction with U.S. assurances to allies as delivered in peacetime, a matter to which we will return later in this essay.</p> +<p>至於時任副主席何啟明，大律師阮偉明望判監3年以下。他指何出身草根，為虔誠基督徒，以基督精神幫助貧窮和有需要人士，他2015年加入民協，被捕後持續服務社區，包括跟進保育深水埗主教山配水庫。何過去數年在神學院修讀基督教研究碩士課程，本案後打算遠離政治，專注教會事奉。辯方又呈上何父母、兄弟、女友、前民協主席馮檢基等求情信，馮指對何服務弱勢社群的熱情和投入印象深刻。阮偉明望法庭接納，何本質上是一個好人，他出於良好動機、具高尚目的而犯案，望成為立法會議員，令香港成為更好的地方，現已對行為深切反省。</p> -<p>Avoiding general kinetic damage against the homeland in the course of an ongoing war should thus be a key consideration for the president and should be prioritized above all other considerations, including, in the context of the scenario, supporting Taiwanese and Ukrainian objectives, supporting NATO and East Asian allies, and generally preserving the international order. These goals will remain operative but are fundamentally secondary to the survival and protection of the U.S. homeland. Because strategic deterrence failure of any magnitude is likely to be a world-altering event, it is quite likely that the precise circumstances of initial adversary nuclear use should cause a reassessment of key U.S. objectives. While the prescriptions that follow will make for unsettling reading in allied capitals, they should not be taken as a recommendation for the United States to exit the business of extended deterrence altogether. There are several plausible limited nuclear use scenarios that do not feature collusion as outlined in the Project Atom scenario where U.S. presidents may be substantially more willing to run risks in the defense of allies, but the scenario at hand here presents a particularly devilish predicament: the possibility of follow-on collusion by Moscow and Beijing in a general nuclear war against the United States.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/XynzUdq.png" alt="image44" /> +▲ （資料圖片）</p> -<p>That said, strategic deterrence failure should not paralyze the United States in its ability to respond entirely. While restoring the territorial status quo ex ante in both Europe and the Indo-Pacific in the given scenario may not be possible at acceptable levels of cost to the United States, Washington should nevertheless seek to dissuade and deter further adversary nuclear use and terminate conflict on terms that would be deemed acceptable, if not entirely favorable. Critically, following strategic deterrence failure, U.S. adversaries will be correct in their assessment that their stakes — over Ukraine and Taiwan, respectively — are greater than those of the United States given the objectives articulated above. This is especially likely to be the case if Putin and Xi resorted to nuclear use out of desperation to preserve their political control and out of a belief that maintaining their territorial integrity requires running the risk of a nuclear exchange over these territories. Even if U.S. grand strategy and decades of investment in a global order that seeks to proscribe aggressive territorial revisionism may be at risk, many presidents may nevertheless opt for prudence in averting escalation.</p> +<h4 id="吳敏兒犯案是人生最大錯誤與政治劃清界線">吳敏兒：犯案是人生最大錯誤、與政治劃清界線</h4> -<p>While the president’s advisers might point out that Russia and China, like the United States, would also be fearful of a general nuclear war — undoubtedly correctly — and that the U.S. nuclear force is survivable to the point of assuring their destruction should escalation prove uncontrollable, prudent presidential leadership would still have to consider the stepwise process of escalation after a U.S. nuclear response. As a result, the prioritization of the survival of the United States as a key national objective is likely to prompt such a prudent president to abstain from responses that could heighten the probability of a general nuclear war.</p> +<p>前職工盟主席吳敏兒，資深大律師李志喜指她在初選落敗，是新界西其中一個最不成功的候選人，而她落敗後繼續工會工作，協助工人渡過疫情，與政治劃清界線，職工盟亦已解散，不會重犯，望法庭考慮她為「其他參加者」或「積極參加者」。</p> -<p>Nevertheless, the president should be ready to employ the full array of tools from across the diplomacy-information-military-economics (DIME) spectrum to achieve the above-stated U.S. objectives as well as possible. Many of these steps can be planned for and conceived of well outside the immediate confines of a crisis, including the crises specified in the Project Atom scenario.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/gWQbbiv.png" alt="image45" /> +▲ 吳敏兒</p> -<p>Preventing adversary nuclear use and strategic deterrence failure will rest on manifesting in the mind of adversarial leaders the prospect of intolerable costs should they proceed, while simultaneously conveying that nuclear use is unlikely to confer tactical or strategic benefit. For both Putin and Xi, the most substantial cost likely relates to their personal political control over their respective states. While the United States should not unambiguously indicate that any nuclear use would lead to an end of their regimes, its declaratory signaling should maintain calculated ambiguity while conveying that catastrophic costs would ensue. While deterrence should prioritize a willingness to hold at risk what adversaries value most, threatening the personal political control or broader regime security of nuclear-armed great power adversaries is unlikely to advance U.S. interests — either in the scenario at hand or in general terms. Issuing such signals, by contrast, is likely to powerfully disabuse adversaries of any deliberate restraint that may still seem valuable after their limited nuclear use, rendering the prospect of follow-on uncontrollable escalation far more likely. In essence, such signaling by the United States would have the effect of further heightening the stakes for adversarial leaders to essentially existential levels concerning their personal political control. Successful war termination for the United States following limited nuclear use will require forbearance on such messaging. A practical problem for the United States, however, will be its noisy domestic political environment, where prominent political figures, including lawmakers from the president’s own party and the opposition, will likely issue calls for regime change or at least the removal of these leaders. U.S. adversaries will likely be unable to disentangle this “noise” from the “signal” of deliberate presidential messaging and assurances.</p> +<p>吳又親撰求情信，提到曾擔任空中服務員，成立英航香港機艙服務員工會，並於2016年當選職工盟主席，夢想有更好的勞工法律保障工人權益。吳自言參選僅望推動社會進步，令工人能分享經濟成果，從沒意圖顛覆國家，她被捕始知干犯《國安法》，對此感到震驚，形容犯案是「人生最大的錯誤」，就此真誠致歉。</p> -<p>At higher levels of escalation — particularly, follow-on strikes initiated by Russia and China — U.S. messaging could adopt the position that general nuclear war is a real possibility and would mean the effective end of Putin’s and Xi’s political control. The United States should simultaneously seek to maintain a robust set of flexible and responsive conventional capabilities, including capabilities forward-deployed to both Europe and the Indo-Pacific. It should also seek to enable its allies and partners in the regions to proffer similar capabilities while ensuring integrated military planning and operations with these allies. Critically, U.S. messaging in the course of a crisis prior to strategic deterrence failure should be contingent: emphasizing that consequences will befall adversaries should they choose to transgress the nuclear threshold, but that, by contrast, those same consequences will not befall adversaries should they choose to abstain from nuclear employment.</p> +<h4 id="范國威獲黃宏發撰求情信譚凱邦不再倡環保議題">范國威獲黃宏發撰求情信、譚凱邦不再倡環保議題</h4> -<h4 id="us-strategic-objectives-2">U.S. Strategic Objectives</h4> +<p>新民主同盟的范國威，大律師吳靄儀指范在美國修讀藝術，對政治感興趣，自2000年起擔任21年西貢區議員，並曾任立法會議員6年。范獲西貢區議會前主席吳仕福、前立法局主席黃宏發及多名街坊撰求情信，讚揚他務實無私，對地區民生很大貢獻。其女兒亦形容他為「每個女生所能渴求的最好的父親」。辯方指范望將本案一切抛諸腦後，與家人相處，望視他為「其他參加者」或「積極參加者」較低程度。</p> -<p>It is useful to reflect on the factors inherent in the scenario that appear to precipitate a resort by both Russia and China to limited nuclear use. In the scenario, the most critical cause of strategic deterrence failure appears to be the result of two factors. First, leaders in both Russia and China, fearing conventional defeat and having experienced substantial conventional setbacks, are likely primed to reach into their nuclear holsters. Successful conventional denial, in other words, prompts these leaders to view nuclear weapons as a useful offset — for tactical, strategic, and psychological reasons. Second, both Putin and Xi appear to believe — probably correctly — that nuclear use will powerfully convey both their resolve and the substantial asymmetry in stakes that exists for them versus the United States.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/h4cTmVT.png" alt="image46" /> +▲ 范國威（右二）、譚凱邦（右一）</p> -<p>They may further believe that despite professed U.S. diplomatic and other assurances to allies in peacetime, a U.S. president in wartime may be deterred from employing disproportionate force, including through the use of nuclear weapons, if necessary, due to the prospect of uncontrollable escalation. Within the confines of the scenario, deterrence failure may have been averted through protracted conventional warfighting, even if this would entail substantial costs to the armed forces of the United States and its allies. Swift conventional success by the United States and its allies appears to have been a powerful motivator for both Russia and China to reach for their nuclear holsters. Deterrence failure in the scenario in no small part appears to be intertwined with both Putin and Xi fundamentally miscalculating the odds of conventional victory.</p> +<p>同屬新民主同盟、並創辦「環保觸覺」的譚凱邦，大律師馬維騉指，譚曾任兩屆馬灣區議員，他一直視環保議題為首要議程，參與初選目的並非顛覆政府，而是望進入議會，為環保發聲，並獲前天文台台長林超英等撰求情信，肯定他對環保議題的付出。辯方又指，譚在初選屬「陪跑」，於新西初選得票最低，望考慮他參與程度低，屬「其他參加者」或「積極參加者」較低程度。</p> -<p>In both the Indo-Pacific and Europe, the United States’ core objectives prior to strategic deterrence failure are to deter significant escalation, to preserve the territorial status quo, to reassure its allies, and to preserve the international norm against territorial conquest. Following strategic deterrence failure, no objective should be greater for the U.S. president than ensuring that the survival of the country is not threatened by the prospect of uncontrollable escalation into a general nuclear war.</p> +<p>辯方又指，譚還柙期間修讀建築管理課程，決心不會重返政治，包括不再倡環保議題，以免牽涉政治；又指譚還柙期間受感染，手腳皮膚潰爛，望法庭能基於人道原因酌情減刑。</p> -<p>Victory for the United States within the presented scenario is far from straightforward despite the formidable conventional successes of allied forces in Europe and U.S. forces in the Indo-Pacific. A president and their expert advisers may disagree on the precise contours of victory in a crisis like the one envisaged in the scenario — just as President Kennedy and many of the key ExComm members (with the exception of George Ball) disagreed about the advisability of the Jupiter deal in the final days of the Cuban Missile Crisis. After strategic deterrence failure, a president may be rendered exceptionally sober by the prospect of general nuclear war — what Kennedy called the “final failure” — and be willing to take exceptional steps to seek prompt war termination, even on terms that would have been nominally unacceptable to that same president prior to adversary nuclear use.</p> +<h4 id="毛孟靜望與丈夫度時光">毛孟靜望與丈夫度時光</h4> -<p>On the contrary, should a president choose to accept the risk of further nuclear escalation and retaliate in kind — either with nuclear weapons or a massive conventional attack — victory could amount to a decision by the adversary to seek termination of the conflict to avoid further damage to their nations or their political control. Because this latter option is far more contingent and depends on variables that may be fundamentally unknowable in the midst of a crisis (such as Putin’s and Xi’s proximal risk acceptance), it bears substantially greater risks. Should the U.S. president seek to sue for war termination following adversary nuclear use, there likely would be severe, unprecedented, and — from the vantage point of peacetime — intolerable consequences to how the United States’ capability to project power globally, to reassure allies at a distance, and to hold global leadership would be perceived. In such an event, the casualty would largely be the United States’ extended deterrence guarantees; a U.S. president would have palpably demonstrated that they are unwilling to run the risk of a nuclear war that could cause damage to the homeland to back its allies. But, in general, the United States would be able to maintain robust deterrence of adversaries for other scenarios, such as attacks on U.S. territory itself. The potentially fatal blow to the U.S. system of extended deterrence thus further underscores the severity of any strategic deterrence failure scenario involving limited nuclear use, but especially the collusive scenario articulated in Project Atom. As mentioned earlier, this analysis should not be taken as a repudiation of extended deterrence, but instead as an appraisal of the challenges to sustaining U.S. allied commitments in the aftermath of the precise limited nuclear use scenario at hand. Even if the course of action recommended here may heighten the probability of allied nuclear proliferation, this outcome — with its many uncertainties — may be preferable to inviting greater escalation by resorting to reciprocal nuclear attacks.</p> +<p>就前區政聯盟召集人柯耀林，大律師葉海琅指他參與公共服務多年，自2003年起三度當選區議員，2008年亦獲政府表揚就公共服務的貢獻。而他非常溫和保守，參與程度較其他被告為低，初選得票率低，不足1%，涉案屬「不幸」，獲不同政治光譜的區議員撰寫求情信。不過法官質疑，柯曾簽署「墨落無悔」、出席選舉論壇、派發選舉單張、聘請選舉經理，難言參與較他人少。</p> -<h4 id="assuring-allies-2">Assuring Allies</h4> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/HBsboFG.png" alt="image47" /> +▲ 毛孟靜</p> -<p>The risks of allies questioning U.S. credibility in the event of strategic deterrence failure are substantial and likely insurmountable in the context of the scenario provided if Washington pursues a course of action that prioritizes its own national survival and immunity from nuclear attack. Allied leaders and a U.S. president will likely have a divergent sense of risk acceptance following strategic deterrence failure. For the presidents of the Philippines and Poland, in particular, nuclear use on their territories will be seen as a cataclysmic deterrence failure verging on an existential threat. For the United States, that same assessment would not hold, but the possibility of further damage in a general nuclear war would likely cause any prudent U.S. president to weigh the trade-off in supporting allies and averting damage to the homeland.</p> +<p>就前立法會議員毛孟靜，大律師黃雅斌指她任議員前曾長年從事傳媒行業及教育，接受她有一定程度參與，但她不曾向人施壓，亦對否決預算案有保留，明白對公眾造成的潛在危害，有真誠悔意，望以監禁5至6年為量刑起點。辯方又呈上多封同事、街坊等求情信，前立法會議員石禮謙指二人即使政治立場不同，但毛總是願意交流意見，融樂會亦讚揚毛對少數族裔的貢獻。毛亦撰信真誠道歉，表示望與丈夫度過餘下時光。</p> -<p>There are likely conventional options that the president could adopt to inflict military costs on adversaries for nuclear use that would maintain an acceptable level of risk of follow-on nuclear escalation, but these may be insufficient for allied leaders and publics that could be motivated to see a U.S. nuclear response out of a desire for retributive damage against Russia and China. As a result, it is highly likely that following strategic deterrence failure, allied perceptions of the credibility of the United States would suffer drastically unless Washington opted for nuclear use in kind, which would present substantial risks and is unlikely to be preferable to the alternatives presented to most plausible presidents. As much as expert advisers to any president might profess support for U.S. alliances in peacetime, they might find that in the heart of a bona fide nuclear crisis, concerns about credibility are simply unpersuasive to a president concerned first and foremost with averting a pathway to nuclear war. This was precisely the predicament that arose in the final days of the Cuban Missile Crisis, when several ExComm members were opposed to Kennedy’s willingness to contemplate an off-ramp by way of withdrawing U.S. intermediate-range missiles deployed to Turkey, a NATO ally. Notably, adversary limited nuclear use against allies may be unlikely to prompt the same kind of national outrage and fervor that drove the United States to run risks in the aftermath of the Pearl Harbor (1941) and September 11 (2001) attacks on the homeland. The sole exception may be the Chinese strike specified in the scenario, which hits a U.S. naval base and presumably results in the deaths of thousands of U.S. servicemembers. This could encourage a president to accept greater risks in responding to China, though likely still well under the nuclear threshold.</p> +<h4 id="楊雪盈稱誤墮法網愚蠢徐子見父親離世">楊雪盈稱誤墮法網愚蠢、徐子見父親離世</h4> -<p>A president may further inquire how best to signal resolve to U.S. allies throughout the crisis. They may then be told that the most effective means of signaling resolve to allies would be to meet adversary nuclear use with some form of proportionate nuclear use. There are substantial risks to this, however. First, a proportionate response in the eyes of U.S. military planners may be interpreted as escalatory by the adversary and, therefore, potentially could prompt further escalation. Second, by employing nuclear weapons, the United States would concede substantial normative credibility that could be valuable in shaping global diplomatic narratives in a post-conflict environment (including with nonaligned states). The United States could aim to signal resolve to allies by inflicting calibrated, proportionate damage against adversary forces implicated in the nuclear strikes described in the scenario with its conventional forces. This is unlikely to sufficiently convey resolve as allies may not find a conventional response to nuclear use on their territory as satisfactory. While allies may not be uniform in this assessment of a conventional response, U.S. experts and officials, in consultations with allies, from East Asia to Europe, repeatedly contend with demands that nuclear use be met with nuclear retaliation.</p> +<p>此外，另有不隸屬於傳統民主黨派的被告。就前灣仔區議會主席楊雪盈，代表大律師張耀良指她屬「其他參加者」，辯方呈上32封求情信，包括前南區區議會副主席司馬文、香港戲劇協會會長馮祿德、藝術發展局前委員張秉權等，望顯示楊服務社區、熱心文藝和動保等多個面向，司馬文亦形容楊為溫和民主派。楊又親撰求情信，自言出身基層，醉心文藝，為社會貢獻是一生夢寐以求的事；而她一直無黨無派，參選單純望將議題和初心帶去立法會跟進，誤信初選無牴觸《國安法》才參加，誤墮法網「實在愚蠢」。</p> -<h4 id="military-response-options-2">Military Response Options</h4> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/jYHPEao.png" alt="image48" /> +▲ 楊雪盈</p> -<p>There are four basic categories of military response that could be considered in the course of the Project Atom scenario. First, a U.S. president could choose to forgo all military options and focus solely on war termination by diplomatic means. Second, a U.S. president could opt for a conventional response — either one designed to inflict tailored, proportionate damage, or one designed to disproportionately retaliate for nuclear use without employing nuclear weapons. Third, a U.S. president could opt for a nuclear response designed to inflict tailored, proportionate damage. Finally, a U.S. president could opt to seek escalation dominance and up the ante with significant nuclear use while communicating to the adversary U.S. resolve to escalate further should it be necessary to accomplish U.S. and allied objectives.</p> +<p>辯方指楊毫不激進，有良好動機，參選只望令社區變得更好，望法庭以「新角度」審視其案情。惟法官陳慶偉質疑，辯方是否指楊不應被定罪、沒有悔意，又指辯方似是上訴而非求情。</p> -<p>Of these options, the first and second will hold the greatest practical appeal for any prudent U.S. president, who is unlikely to be versed in the strategic rationales for an in-kind or escalatory nuclear response and more concerned with preserving the safety, integrity, and survival of the United States itself. The first option may be unappealing, however, due to it appearing tantamount to complete strategic defeat. (Presidents may consider their own political legacies in weighing responses too.) Following strategic deterrence failure, there is likely an extremely low probability that the United States can, at acceptable levels of risk to the homeland, optimize for all its core strategic objectives, including reassuring its allies. As a result, a prescription for the president could be two-fold. First, they should opt for a limited conventional strike against the nonstrategic and regional nuclear force units involved in the strikes against Poland and the Philippines. At the same time, the president should employ a diplomatic strategy that seeks to persuade these allies as to the inadvisability of a nuclear response, which could beget further nuclear use against their territories (including against nonmilitary targets or military targets more proximal to population centers).</p> +<p>至於前東區區議員徐子見，辯方同指屬「其他參加者」，指他為政治素人，無任何政治聯繫，亦從無表達激進政治理念，罪責最低。辯方指徐患有慢性病，育有一名26歲兒子，他最近離婚，父親亦於他還柙期間離世。多名街坊撰寫求情信，提到徐曾免費維修電器、免費剪髮、鼓勵長者接種疫苗等，是身體力行的人；徐亦親撰求情信稱明白罪行嚴重性，望對受影響的人深切道歉。</p> -<p>While allies may be unpersuaded and motivated by a retributive logic demanding nuclear use, it is equally possible that internal fissures within allied governments and domestic political forces may support U.S. goals in persuading allies of the sufficiency of a conventional response. To deter further nuclear use by adversaries, the president should be willing to allude to intolerable and extreme consequences while underscoring to the broader world that the United States differentiates itself from Russia and China in viewing nuclear weapons as tools of last resort for truly extreme circumstances — not as a mere offset to the possibility of conventional defeat, as Moscow and Beijing have demonstrated in the scenario.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/VeAXX50.png" alt="image49" /> +▲ 徐子見</p> -<p>Critics may counter that Russia and China resorted to nuclear use precisely because of U.S. and allied conventional military successes — and so why should a conventional response deter further nuclear use? The answer to this question rests on the logic of nuclear use by both countries in the first place. If both leaders crossed the nuclear Rubicon out of a belief that a single instance of limited nuclear use would paralyze the United States into inaction, the willingness to continue conventional military operations would disabuse them of this notion. By “fighting through” nuclear use and continuing to inflict costs without relying on nuclear weapons, the United States would deny Moscow and Beijing the political benefits of their limited nuclear use. Should Russia and China seek to deprive the United States of this option, they may be forced to opt for additional nuclear strikes against U.S. and allied forces, significantly raising the prospects of a total war across two hemispheres alongside the prospect of general nuclear war with the United States. If Putin and Xi remain rational, they may see no benefit in upping the ante in this game of competitive risk-taking, and instead may seek to minimize their further losses while retaining political control.</p> +<h4 id="辯方指彭卓棋被捕後推廣基本法維護國安">辯方指彭卓棋被捕後推廣《基本法》、維護國安</h4> -<p>The reason for not recommending that the president seek a tailored nuclear response or adopt an escalation dominance mindset and seek to escalate with nuclear weapons is because both options present substantial drawbacks and an unacceptable level of risk of a general nuclear war that would be most ruinous to the United States. Even assuming a small probability of escalation by the adversary should be sobering for a president given the consequences that could ensue. In the case of a tailored nuclear response option, U.S. adversaries may fail to be deterred if they continue to believe that their stakes in resolving their short-term territorial conquests are greater than those of the United States. Putin and Xi would, in their own minds, likely be willing to believe this — especially if they see the stakes in the crises as having now grown to encompass their own political survivals and legacies. If this is the case, a tailored, proportionate U.S. nuclear response, even if correctly interpreted as proportionate by U.S. adversaries, may beget further adversary nuclear use. Neither Putin nor Xi may choose to escalate in the types of targets they choose to hold at risk — keeping retaliation confined to military targets — but could continue strikes on NATO and Philippine territory by focusing on military targets. The collusive logic that is at play in the scenario could also influence this decisionmaking as both Moscow and Beijing may understand that their continued choice to participate in a game of competitive nuclear risk-taking will force the United States to contend with the challenge of waging a general nuclear war simultaneously against both powers. Hewing to the damage-limiting principles that have guided U.S. nuclear strategy for decades simultaneously against Russia and China would be largely unfeasible, even if survivable U.S. systems could inflict massive damage in punishment against both aggressors. A collusive all-out nuclear attack by Russia and China against the United States with their surviving forces would still result in the practical end of U.S. civilization and society.</p> +<p>就前南區區議員彭卓棋，大律師盧敏儀指他基於對新法無知而犯案，而彭案發時僅25至26歲，無政治聯繫，誤信通知民主動力移除政綱，已足以確保不違法。辯方又指，彭具持續的愛國聯繫、熱心服務國家，曾推廣年輕人到大灣區創業，自2022年5月又受僱於「香港基本法基金會」，維護國安和推廣《基本法》，犯案是與其良好品格相違。</p> -<p>An escalation dominance approach, meanwhile, would succeed in conveying U.S. resolve and likely persuade Xi and Putin that their assumptions about U.S. stakes in these conflicts may be incorrect. However, a substantial use of nuclear weapons by the United States against military targets in Russia and China runs a serious risk of generating concerns in both states about the possibility of their forces remaining intact and about the viability of their regimes themselves. Without robust means of communication with the national or senior military leadership of both countries, which cannot be taken for granted, the United States may be unable to assure Russia and China that its choice to opt for nuclear escalation was not the precursor to a massive, damage-limiting counterforce campaign or a broader war of regime change. Fear of either outcome will encourage both Putin and Xi to contemplate larger-scale nuclear use. Because U.S. and allied combined military posture in the Indo-Pacific and Europe will also consist in the scenario timeframe of precise, conventional munitions, adversaries will have to also account for the possibility of massive, supplemental, conventional counterforce strikes. This option, while appealing for what it might convey about U.S. credibility to adversaries and allies alike, generates the greatest possibility of massive adversary nuclear use, which would result in unacceptable damage to the U.S. homeland. It would not be advisable for a president to run these risks immediately; instead, they should seek to maximize U.S. goals through the nonnuclear means articulated above, at least initially.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/57m732J.png" alt="image50" /> +▲ 彭卓棋</p> -<p>There is a meaningful difference between the preceding two options in terms of how they might prompt reactions from Russia and China. Russia, which is known to incorporate a degree of counterforce targeting itself, may be more willing than China to run greater risks by attempting to destroy U.S. nuclear forces preemptively. In the 2028 timeframe specified in the Project Atom scenario, China’s nuclear forces will remain quantitatively inferior to those of the United States, and Chinese leaders would likely be deterred by the prospect of assured U.S. retaliation. As a result, it is substantially more likely that, even if opting for escalation dominance, U.S.-China nuclear exchanges could take place across several steps before either side considers massive nuclear strikes against the other. Despite this, Chinese leaders may remain pathologically vulnerable to fears of a disarming U.S. counterforce strike; these fears could be compounded by 2028 with the deployment of additional missile defense and conventional long-range strike assets in the Indo-Pacific.</p> +<p>不過法官拒絕接納彭曾撤回政綱，並質疑彭初選時以極端激進言辭反對政府和國家，被捕後改為到推廣基本法的組織工作，「除了指他事實上是一名機會主義者，如何能看出其行為是一致？」，又指辯方陳詞形容彭為「機會主義者」，這或是他另一次投機，彭是「一個偽裝成愛國者的機會主義者」。辯方引述認識彭多年的朋友、老師等求情信，指可反映他的性格，不過法官再質疑，辯方求情明顯與法庭裁決及彭在初選的形象不同，明言難以接納。</p> -<p>Regardless of U.S. objectives, it will be in the interest of the United States to have adversaries remain less concerned about the possibility of a massive, damage-limiting first strike than about limited retaliation (either nuclear or conventional). Additionally, the United States should endeavor to avoid feeding adversary expectations that it seeks to end their political control or regimes. The key to successful war termination will differ with regard to both Russia and China. For China and Xi, inflicting substantial enough damage to the People’s Liberation Army’s conventional and amphibious landing forces to render seizing and controlling Taiwan unfeasible will confer bargaining leverage. With Russia, the United States and NATO may try to use seized territory in Kaliningrad to sue for war termination with Putin. If either Putin or Xi begin to exhibit particular psychological pathologies indicating irrational risk acceptance (which cannot be ruled out), these assumptions may not hold, and the United States may be forced to contemplate greater escalation than might otherwise be prudent. Given the impossibility of predicting irrational decisionmaking pathologies in a serious nuclear crisis, further elaboration on this point will not be provided, though it does bear consideration.</p> +<h4 id="劉澤鋒讀會計課程呂智恆失社工資格">劉澤鋒讀會計課程、呂智恆失社工資格</h4> -<p>U.S. planners must also consider the law of armed conflict. Adversaries will expect a U.S. nuclear or conventional response to adhere to publicly stated prewar principles, which include an emphasis on counterforce targeting and compliance with the law of armed conflict. This should rule out adversary expectations of countervalue strikes (deliberate attacks against major urban population centers and other nonmilitary targets). However, this will likely also heighten adversary fears about a possible damage-limiting strike against their nuclear forces, command and control, and other enabling capabilities. While the United States will be unable to disabuse adversaries of its long-stated interests in damage limitation, to the extent possible, any U.S. nuclear or substantial kinetic response should be accompanied by assurances that it does not seek to destroy adversary nuclear forces or sever adversary national leadership from key military functions. To this end, a response should be accompanied by public and private messaging (if feasible) designed to indicate tailored punishment against military units implicated in the execution of nuclear strikes. There is no reason the United States should deliberately seek to eschew the law of armed conflict in navigating responses to the scenario at hand.</p> +<p>就前學聯抗爭者支援基金主席劉澤鋒，大律師黃錦娟指他生於廣州草根家庭，案發時剛畢業於樹仁大學，為政治素人，參選是望服務他熱愛的社區，即香港和香港人。辯方望法庭考慮劉僅報名參加初選、簽署「墨落無悔」、參加選舉論壇等，並於初選落敗，角色輕微，誤信謀劃合法，屬「其他參加者」或「積極參加者」較低級別。辯方又指，劉獲認識多年的友人、同學、牧師等撰求情信，指他樂於助人、熱心服務弱勢，曾發起協助無家者的計劃等；而劉還柙逾3年沒有放棄自己，修讀中大會計課程，成績不俗，望日後進修輔導、管理及運動治療等課程，繼續以知識服務社會。</p> -<h4 id="non-kinetic-response-options-2">Non-Kinetic Response Options</h4> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/vMIGdvj.png" alt="image51" /> +▲ 劉澤鋒</p> -<p>The president would have a wide array of non-kinetic options available in the event of strategic deterrence failure. Choices would include broad diplomatic messaging to allies, partners, and the nonaligned world aimed at obtaining unconditional condemnation of Russia and China for resorting to the first use of nuclear weapons in war in more than 80 years. The president could simultaneously marshal U.S. diplomatic resources to seek a broad, international coalition condemning both countries. It is likely that certain nonaligned states or states more aligned with Russia and China would opt to blame the United States for Russian and Chinese nuclear use, citing well-trodden narratives built up over years by Moscow and Beijing about U.S. alliances, military posture, and other factors. The United States should be ready to actively counter this, including by declassifying intelligence as much as possible to demonstrate that nuclear use was a result of desperation for both Putin and Xi. Given the severity of the scenario and the implications for U.S. interests, the president should be willing to authorize broad declassification that would serve these ends, even at the cost of possibly compromising sensitive sources and methods.</p> +<p>就參選新東的社工呂智恆，大律師陳世傑指，呂角色次要，從無意圖推翻政權、只是企圖阻礙運作，對法律無知而犯案，望接納為「其他參加者」或「積極參加者」較低程度；又指他十分善良，是具天真理念的政治新人，望法庭判刑時展示憐憫，令呂盡快重投社會。</p> -<p>Practically, the United States would likely also seek to enhance international economic sanctions, but the efficacy of these sanctions is likely to be limited; in anticipation of a decision to employ nuclear weapons, Putin and Xi would likely have expected such a response and have been undeterred by the prospect, as their limited nuclear use exhibits. Other non-kinetic options could include cyber operations against both Russia and China. These could be carried out for a range of objectives, including sowing a narrative within both countries that seeks to convey to the Russian and Chinese people the erratic character of their national leadership; seeking intelligence on likely follow-on military action following deterrence failure; and, finally, undermining Russian and Chinese military operations. Out of caution, the president should ensure that U.S. offensive cyber operations, to the extent feasible, do not affect Russian or Chinese assertive political control over their own nuclear — or broader military — forces. In general, cyber operations, if detected, could prove escalatory. The president should be particularly cautious about authorizing operations aimed at penetrating sensitive systems related to strategic situational awareness or command and control, which could raise the fears in both states about non-kinetic interference in their nuclear forces either as an end in itself or as a precursor to broader counterforce strikes.</p> +<p>呂親撰求情信，提及幾經挫折實現夢想志向成為社工，但因本案而失去社工資格。呂提到他出身單親家庭，童年在不同人家寄居、曾被迫做童工和失學，至中四被領養，獲養母無私的愛和包容，後成為社工。2019年發生反修例引起的民主運動，他心痛多人輕生、失蹤，深感這代青年絕望感遠超他童年所受痛苦。</p> -<p>A chief purpose of U.S. non-kinetic efforts should be to maintain the normative higher ground, which will be valuable in a post-conflict environment with allies, partners, and nonaligned states alike. Even if allied governments view U.S. credibility as having taken a fatal hit following a decision to resort to a nonnuclear response, allied publics may be more readily persuaded by a U.S. choice to respond in a more limited fashion, particularly if Washington is able to make the case that opting for more escalatory responses would likely have resulted in nuclear strikes on their territories (and further nuclear strikes, in the case of Poland and the Philippines). For Russia and China, however, U.S. non-kinetic measures will largely be peripheral in shaping their cost-benefit calculations on further escalation.</p> +<p>呂指，他參加初選為了由人民授權行使否決權，「以非常無奈和間接的方式罷免特首，希望當權者回應民意」；他當時無知地相信議員行使否決權是合法，現已明白否決對政權帶來衝擊和影響運作是錯誤想法，感到後悔抱歉。呂指保釋後數年經常失眠和感到巨大壓力，倒數入獄的日子參與教會事奉、做義工，回收麵包分給露宿者、單親家庭等，又為基層兒童義務補習。他不敢低估刑期，但會心存盼望，期望未來報答親恩和服務弱勢社群。</p> -<h4 id="conclusion-3">Conclusion</h4> +<h4 id="林景楠參選是中計受海外勢力渲染成反中亂港分子">林景楠：參選是中計、受海外勢力渲染成反中亂港分子</h4> -<p>It should be acknowledged that from the vantage point of peacetime in 2024, the above-stated analysis does not make for particularly encouraging reading. One does not need to have read this assessment of the scenario and U.S. response options to conclude that the strategic deterrence scenario presented likely portends “defeat” for the United States. However, this defeat should be construed narrowly: the United States likely fails to compel Russia and China away from seeking their territorial revisionist goals at substantial cost, but ultimately survives as a nation and polity to restore and seek influence in a post-conflict world. Writing about potential nuclear crises demands an abundance of imagination, and U.S. policymakers and planners should be clear-eyed about the possibilities that would remain for the country in a post-strategic deterrence failure world.</p> +<p>至於唯一一名任從犯證人的參與者被告，阿布泰國生活百貨創辦人林景楠，大律師范凱傑指他遲參選，亦不曾出席協調會議和初選記者會、沒有簽「墨落無悔」，屬「其他參加者」，又指林錄取口供和成為控方證人，其證供有用，可獲50%減刑。不過法官質疑，證供主要談及林本人的參與，他雖提到出席沈旭暉主持的協調會議，但沈並非本案共謀者、亦無因此被捕；法庭在裁決時也完全無依賴林的證供。辯方亦望為林索取社會服務令報告，惟法官明言是不現實、不合理，拒絕辯方要求，並指林於開審當天才認罪，只能減刑20%。</p> -<p>The centrality of presidential decisionmaking about nuclear crises represents both a strength and a weakness in the analysis above. It is a strength because it contends with the often-heard dictum that military plans “never survive first contact with the enemy” — partly because reality is complex and inherently unpredictable, but also because the ineffable idiosyncrasies of presidential decisionmaking can only become known under the psychological and emotional stress of a real crisis. However, the choice to center the president and presidential guidance also represents an analytical limitation in reasoning about U.S. responses to limited nuclear use because it is inherently impossible to account for the various personalities that may one day be asked to reason about matters of nuclear war.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/4ucmzrI.png" alt="image52" /> +▲ 林景楠</p> -<p>Finally, for U.S. allies, this scenario presents the crystallization of long-held anxieties about extended deterrence. Indeed, as much as U.S. policymakers may see peacetime assurance demands from allies as a leaky sieve, they are born of well-placed anxieties about extended deterrence failing under extreme circumstances. Allied fears in this regard are not entirely misplaced and there are indeed scenarios, at the worst-case end of the spectrum, involving collusion by the United States’ two great power, near-peer, nuclear-armed adversaries that will bend and possibly break assurances made in peacetime. The Project Atom scenario could be one such example. Analytically, however, this should not condemn extended deterrence to the status of a bluff. Instead, the United States and its allies should be ready to consult, plan, and game out various strategic deterrence failure scenarios to ensure that they can be averted in the first place. For instance, in the provided scenario, it appears that escalation to nuclear use by Russia in the European theater was driven by Polish and Lithuanian conventional operations into Kaliningrad without a central decision by NATO or broader consultations with the United States. Ensuring coordination and strategic synchronicity between the United States and its allies will be key to avoiding the worst in high-intensity conventional crises. Finally, beyond the working- and expert-level tracks, U.S. assurances must be supplemented by high-level political engagement with allies, underscoring in particular the special role of the president in U.S. nuclear decisionmaking.</p> +<p>庭上讀出林景楠親撰的求情信節錄，林提到候審時通過接觸不同觀點的資訊，明白當初參選是「非常幼稚及愚蠢」的行為，「中了其他別有用心的國家、團體和人的計謀」；又指透過深切反省，意識到自己要為2019年起的社會撕裂負不少責任，因他是「黃色經濟圈領頭者」。林又引述國家主席習近平七一講話，指「香港不能亂也亂不起」，林指深切反思後發現很多港人包括自己，「一直受到很多海外勢力或網絡傳媒的渲染，間接成為反中亂港的一分子」，因此他主動聯絡國安處認罪，因認罪才是最真誠的認錯。他感謝控方讓他成為證人，「讓我可以把我的所知所聞一一供出」。</p> -<p>Above all, this analysis should also underscore the essential importance of averting strategic deterrence failure in the first place. The hard choices U.S. nuclear-armed adversaries could force upon the United States by resorting to limited nuclear use are ones no president should be asked to consider.</p> +<p>林最後真誠向中央政府、特區政府，尤其香港海關和警隊及所有受他影響的市民真誠道歉，望法庭讓他履行作為父親的責任，陪伴三個孩子成長，及予他機會，重新投入中港泰三地，用實際行動抓住香港由治及興的機會，說好香港和國家故事，促進一帶一路，為香港和國家出力。</p> -<h3 id="basis-and-elements-of-a-strategy-for-multiparty-intra-war-nuclear-deterrence">Basis and Elements of a Strategy for Multiparty, Intra-War Nuclear Deterrence</h3> +<p>案件將於明日（19日）判刑，辯方的求情陳詞是否被法官採納仍是未知數，但各人在庭上的發言、所撰的求情信，已留下歷史的印記。</p> -<blockquote> - <h4 id="melanie-w-sisson">Melanie W. Sisson</h4> -</blockquote> +<hr /> -<p>Though much is known about nuclear explosions — their physics, their mechanics, their effects — very little is known about their use as weapons of war. History provides analysts a single war in which nuclear weapons were detonated, and a small number of occasions in which decisionmakers are known to have seriously contemplated their use. This record is thin gruel upon which to make compelling inferences, or from which to draw solid conclusions.</p> +<p>案件編號：HCCC69-70/2022</p>獨媒報導西九疑現「排隊黨」 記者連問隊頭13人無一回應 西九外「點人數」警方稱要檢視維持秩序警力 拒回應會否清走空櫈 百歲大黃伯連續兩晚排通宵盼見「受難朋友」 林進嘆僅5公眾可入正庭「非常可惜」 致歉、無悔、不求情——45名罪成被告，判刑前的陳詞Retying The Caucasian Knot2024-11-18T12:00:00+08:002024-11-18T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/retying-the-caucasian-knot<p><em>This paper explores the challenge to Russia’s established position in the South Caucasus as the region undergoes significant change.</em></p> -<p>A paucity of empirical data, however, is not evidence that nuclear weapons cannot — or will never — be used again. Nor does it exempt civilian policymakers and military practitioners from the responsibility of preparing to make choices about nuclear employment.</p> +<excerpt /> -<p>Policymakers confronting a situation in which they find it necessary to consider whether, when, which, and how many nuclear weapons to use will have to answer questions that are at once philosophical and practical, moral and material, urgent and permanent. If they are of stable temperament and rational inclination, then policymakers will seek methodical ways with which to weigh the value of nuclear restraint against that of nuclear action. Such approaches will produce clarity in defining strategic objectives and war aims, intellectual empathy for the adversary’s decision calculus, and creativity in the operational art of designing alternative military courses of action.</p> +<p>Russia and the Euro-Atlantic community now find that their reach exceeds their grasp in terms of their ability to shape the regional order in the South Caucasus. Both remain regionally influential, but their leverage to drive developments is eroding as the South Caucasus is affected by multipolar international politics. The rise of multipolarity is being promoted by the increasing role of a broad set of external actors – most of all Turkey, Iran and China – engaging in the South Caucasus, and by strengthening links between the region and Asia, the Middle East and Central Asia, links that are supplementing the region’s established ties to the US, Europe and Russia. In this context, there is increased local agency in relation to external partnerships (reinforced by a turn to illiberal domestic politics), and waning attraction both to Russian and Euro-Atlantic integration projects.</p> -<p>Scenario analysis is one method for comparing the advantages and disadvantages of alternative courses of action and, for strategists and planners, serves the same purpose as practice does for teams in any discipline: it doesn’t make perfect, but it does make progress. Each phase of a scenario exercises the thought processes involved in aligning military operations with war aims, and war aims with strategic objectives, under conditions in which some variables that might affect the likelihood of success are foreseeable and controllable, and some are not. In this way, scenarios pull assumptions to the surface, inspect their implications, and then test courses of action for consistency of logic, fidelity to principle, and resiliency to changes in condition.</p> +<p>As a result of these changes, Russia has lost its position of pre-eminence, which rested primarily on tying together its security interests with the region’s protracted conflicts. Over the past 30 years, Moscow has leveraged these conflicts to give it a central geopolitical role, which it has used to promote a regional status quo to its advantage and to create a Gordian knot of interwoven obstacles and interests to hinder efforts at Euro-Atlantic integration. The war in Ukraine has played a part in undercutting Moscow’s position in the South Caucasus, but Russia’s long-term relative decline as new actors have entered the region, power shifts within the South Caucasus itself (notably the rise of Azerbaijan), and changing Russian regional interests are the main factors challenging Moscow’s established role.</p> -<p>Scenario analyses, however, are abstractions of reality accompanied by storytelling — theory, reasoning, and argumentation. This is especially true for nuclear scenarios. There is, therefore, special risk in attending too much to a scenario’s mechanics and not enough to the concepts and commitments it calls into question. If nuclear war does move from being a possibility to being a reality, whatever the specifics, there is no evading the fact that what policymakers will be deciding is which and how many humans will not survive, or if any will survive at all.</p> +<p>Russia is now seeking to adapt to the new regional situation. It is attempting to establish its role as the leading, but no longer exclusive, external actor in the South Caucasus by reconfiguring its position. This involves a rebalancing of bilateral relations, broadening its range of policy tools (notably in the areas of transport and communications) from a previous reliance on security, and being ready to countenance an expanded presence for other external actors, notably regional powers – principally Iran, Turkey and, increasingly, China – while remaining opposed to the US and the EU.</p> -<h4 id="analytic-assumptions">Analytic Assumptions</h4> +<p>In the absence of a Euro-Atlantic security commitment capable of challenging Russia in the South Caucasus, the policies of enlargement (eventual NATO and EU membership) have lost traction. The Euro-Atlantic community now risks being marginalised in an increasingly competitive regional environment. If it is to undercut Russia’s effort to build a new position – to retie the Caucasian knot – and retain a significant regional role, it will need to develop approaches capable of responding to and shaping the new South Caucasus geopolitics and geo-economics.</p> -<p>The strategy developed here is premised on analysis of a two-theater, two-adversary, two intra-war nuclear launch scenario (referred to throughout as “the scenario”). Where information is not available — either because it does not exist or because it is not specified in the scenario — the strategy relies on a set of reasonable assumptions. Some assumptions are about the dynamics of nuclear war, because there hasn’t been one from which to draw historical evidence. Some are about decisionmaking in the United States, about which relatively much is known in general, but nothing at all in the context of a two-theater war that involves nuclear use. Other assumptions are made about the scenario’s adversaries, because little information about their respective decisionmaking processes is available in the scenario itself.</p> +<h3 id="introduction">Introduction</h3> -<p>There is no standard definition of what elevates nuclear use from being limited nuclear war to being general — “all-out” — nuclear war. In the 1960s, the U.S. government planned for its nuclear forces to be of a size and quality to be able to execute a retaliatory strike that would destroy “between 20 and 25 per cent of the enemy’s civilian population and between 50 and 75 per cent of his industrial capacity.” Applying this measure to the scenario means that general nuclear war would produce the immediate deaths of approximately 376–469 million people. A recent study by climate scientists calculates that if the belligerents in the scenario detonated sufficient warheads to achieve this mutual 25 percent casualty rate, then follow-on deaths from post-nuclear famine would reach approximately 2.5 billion people within two years.</p> +<p>Russia is facing a key moment in its post-Soviet position in the South Caucasus (Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia). Since the mid-2000s, geopolitical competition between Russia and the Euro-Atlantic community has emerged as a defining issue shaping the regional order. Using security policy – including direct military action – as its primary tool, Russia was able to establish itself both as the main arbiter in conflict resolution and central to the balance of power in the South Caucasus. On this basis, Russia was able to limit NATO and EU enlargement policies, while at the same time seeking to advance its own integration project.</p> -<p>In the absence of any less arbitrary threshold, this strategy defines the lower bound of general nuclear war as the detonation by any one state of the number of nuclear weapons needed to produce a total yield sufficient to kill 25 percent of a belligerent’s population. Detonations that occur below that threshold constitute limited, not general, nuclear war. The strategy similarly assumes, based on the above, that general nuclear war in the scenario would destroy modern civilization and might even constitute a species-extinction event for much of biological life on earth, including humans. It assumes that governments would cease to function, and that there would be no meaning attached to the idea of nationhood, as individuals and collectives would instead be left to struggle to survive. In other words, the strategy assumes that the costs of general nuclear war are so extremely negative that they far exceed any benefits derived from the defeat and unconditional surrender of the adversary.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/YmknXoW.png" alt="image01" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 1: Political and Military Map of the South Caucasus.</strong> Source: Labrang/Wikimedia. Edited by RUSI.</em></p> -<p>The strategy also is built upon the recognition that there is no empirical basis upon which to make predictions about the dynamics of nuclear war. Specifically, once nuclear exchange has begun, there is no fact-based reason to presume that the likelihood of de-escalation, or of controlled escalation, is greater than the likelihood of unrestrained escalation. The strategy therefore assumes that all nuclear detonations have an unknown probability of creating an escalatory spiral, regardless of variation in their specific features — for example their type, location, yield, casualty rate, and so forth. Even relaxing this assumption and allowing the likelihood of escalation to general nuclear war to be low instead of unknown does not change the basic inequality. The magnitude of the costs of general nuclear war are so great that even very small probability estimates produce very large negative results — ones so destructive that they dwarf any possible positive results of victory.</p> +<p>As a result, the South Caucasus became an internally and externally fragmented region (see Figure 1). Countries were divided domestically and regionally by protracted conflicts – Nagorno-Karabakh was contested between Azerbaijan and Armenia, and conflicts emerged over the regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia in Georgia. Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia also developed differing foreign and security policy trajectories and built diverse allegiances. Azerbaijan adopted policies of balancing and neutrality, Georgia aspired to join the EU and NATO, and Armenia became Russia’s ally within the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU). Russia has sought to manipulate and deepen these divisions to give itself a central regional role. In recent years, as President Vladimir Putin has developed a more assertive policy of rebuilding Russia as a “great power”, the South Caucasus has become integral to the Kremlin’s wider ambitions of dominating the Black Sea, and projecting power into the Middle East and the Mediterranean.</p> -<h4 id="us-strategic-objectives-3">U.S. Strategic Objectives</h4> +<p>The pre-eminence that Russia has established in the South Caucasus over the past three decades is now being eroded by far-reaching shifts in the international regional and domestic environments. These changes have the potential to create a new regional order. A variety of international actors – China, Iran, Israel, the Gulf states and India, among others – has entered the region, offering new diplomatic and political, trade and investment, and security relations, and providing alternatives to both Russia and the Euro-Atlantic community. The governments of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia have sought to widen their space for political action by developing foreign policies to engage with new international actors and to escape from the geopolitical competition between Russia and the West. Together, these developments have diminished the significance of Russia’s security leverage, notably in respect to the contest over Nagorno-Karabakh as Azerbaijan and Armenia seek to finalise a peace agreement, and shifted the South Caucasus towards alternative agendas for trade, connectivity and strengthening multipolarity.</p> -<p>The strategy presented here assumes that U.S. policymakers are rational actors. This means they are sensitive to the costs, benefits, and probabilities of various courses of action and base their choice of action on estimates of expected value: the net positive or negative effect on U.S. interests produced by the outcome of each course of action, multiplied by that outcome’s probability of occurring. The strategy also assumes that U.S. decisionmakers assess that the extreme costs of general nuclear war exceed any potential benefits derived from the adversary’s total destruction, and that they are aware that the detonation of any nuclear weapon has the potential to result in an escalatory cycle that ultimately produces general nuclear war.</p> +<p>This paper explores the challenge to Russia’s established position in the South Caucasus as the region undergoes significant change, and analyses Moscow’s effort to craft a new regional approach. The findings of the paper are drawn from three principal sources. A review of secondary literature on regional developments in the South Caucasus was supplemented by a workshop conducted in Tbilisi, Georgia, in April 2024 that brought together leading experts on regional issues. In addition, interviews were conducted, in confidence, with officials from the US, the EU and the UK in Washington, DC, Brussels, London, Tbilisi and Yerevan between February and May 2024.</p> -<p>Within the set of nonnuclear outcomes, the strategy assumes that policymakers consider the benefits of conventional victory to be greater than those of a negotiated settlement, and that both are greater than the benefits of total defeat. It also assumes policymakers judge the value of maximalist victory — the unconditional surrender of the adversary — and of a negotiated settlement to be greater than the costs of conventional war because, in the absence of this assumption, the incentive would be for the United States to withdraw.</p> +<p>The paper has three chapters. Chapter I examines how in the post-Soviet decades Russia established itself as the leading external actor in the South Caucasus. Chapter II analyses how Russia’s regional position is being challenged, notably by the wars over Ukraine and Nagorno-Karabakh, the appearance of new international actors in the South Caucasus, and by the shift of regional governments to pursuing foreign policies of multi-alignment, made possible by multipolarity, and often in conjunction with increasingly illiberal domestic politics. Chapter III considers the implications of these changes for Russia’s regional position and sets out how Moscow has sought to respond to these shifts to retain a leading role. The paper concludes with the implications of the changes in Russia’s position and the wider shifts in the South Caucasus for the policies of the Euro-Atlantic community.</p> -<p>The expected values produced by these combinations of probabilities, costs, and benefits mean that U.S. policymakers will prefer all nonnuclear outcomes to all nuclear outcomes (Table 1).</p> +<h3 id="i-russias-south-caucasus-strategy">I. Russia’s South Caucasus Strategy</h3> -<p>In the absence of information to the contrary, this strategy assumes that the scenario’s adversarial decisionmakers also are rational actors whose choices reflect their estimates of expected value. This assumption, however, does not require the adversaries to arrive at the same rank ordering of preferences over outcomes as the United States.</p> +<p>The South Caucasus has historically played a key role in Moscow’s broader strategic thinking. The conquest of the North and South Caucasus was central to Russian imperial ambitions and involved a prolonged and ultimately triumphant struggle for control over the region with the Ottoman and Persian empires between the 18th and 20th centuries. The defeat of the Ottomans was at the heart of the wider Russian plan to establish dominance in the Black Sea region, including extending state boundaries through the territories of contemporary Ukraine, and expanding influence into the Balkans, as well as through the Caucasus.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/fHthMgu.png" alt="image05" /> -<em>▲ Table 1: Assumed U.S. Preferences over Outcomes</em></p> +<p>This strategic goal of expanding control over the Caucasus was a stepping-stone for Russia to extend its reach into the Middle East and the Mediterranean, notably as it sought naval access to the world’s oceans beyond the limits of its northern ports. During the Soviet era (1922–91), Moscow applied a similar strategic logic to the region, while also seeing the South Caucasus as a buffer zone to the conflicts of the Middle East and, during the Cold War, the threat posed by NATO to the south.</p> -<p>In general, preference hierarchies can be classified as one of two types. Type-1 actors estimate that the costs of general nuclear war exceed any benefits derived from the adversary’s total destruction, whether by nuclear or conventional means. A Type-1 actor will therefore prefer all nonuse outcomes to all nuclear-use outcomes.</p> +<h4 id="post-soviet-south-caucasus-engagement">Post-Soviet South Caucasus Engagement</h4> -<p>Type-2 actors do not consider the costs of general nuclear war to exceed any benefits derived from the adversary’s total destruction, whether by nuclear or conventional means. A Type-2 actor can therefore prefer one or more nuclear-use outcomes to one or more nonuse outcomes. One possibility in the scenario, for example, is that one or both of the adversaries assesses that the expected value of general nuclear war is equal to or greater than the expected value of a defeat that requires conceding their political objectives and surrendering (Table 2).</p> +<p>With the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the emergence of the independent states of Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia, Russia initially shifted away from viewing the South Caucasus as integral to its security policy. The new Russian leadership under President Boris Yeltsin focused instead on a Euro-Atlantic vector in its external ties, while its neighbours were a much lower priority. A series of civil wars in the South Caucasus – over Abkhazia and South Ossetia in Georgia and Nagorno-Karabakh in Azerbaijan – involved elements of Russia’s security forces and led Moscow to develop a new security engagement in the region around the deployment of Russian-led “peacekeeping operations”. These missions served to freeze the violence, rather than resolve the conflicts, and opened the way for Moscow to manage, as well as manipulate, the conflicts in subsequent years, including the opportunity to influence regional issues.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/ev8PYwk.png" alt="image06" /> -<em>▲ Table 2: Example Rank Ordering of Rational Type-2 Adversary Preferences over Conflict Outcomes</em></p> +<p>From the mid-1990s, growing violent instability in the North Caucasus, notably in Chechnya, drew Russia into a more southern-oriented security and military posture, and promoted a refocus of its foreign and security policy onto the immediate neighbourhood. Notwithstanding the withdrawal of some Russian military facilities from the South Caucasus in the 1990s and early 2000s, notably from Georgia and Azerbaijan, Moscow retained a border guard and military presence in Armenia. This positioning reflected the long-term view in Moscow of the South Caucasus as a buffer to instability from the south and a means to balance Turkey’s regional aspirations.</p> -<p>If either adversary is a Type-2 actor, and it concludes that the United States has maximalist war aims and estimates the probability of conventional loss to be high, then this preference ordering makes the Type-2 adversary more likely than a Type-1 adversary to initiate nuclear war, and very unlikely to exercise restraint in waging it. Other preference orderings are possible, though for all rank order profiles the key differentiator between adversary type is the relative value placed on nuclear-nonuse outcomes compared to nuclear-use outcomes.</p> +<p>The growing threat of Islamist terrorism in Russia’s North Caucasus and the launch of the second Chechen war by Putin in 1999 led Russia to strengthen further its military and security focus on both the North and South Caucasus. It was, however, the emergence of growing Euro-Atlantic engagement in the region that led Russia increasingly to instrumentalise protracted conflicts as leverage in an emerging geopolitical struggle with the West.</p> -<p>This strategy makes assumptions about the United States, as outlined above, that define it as a Type-1 actor. This classification might be incorrect. Even if it is correct at conflict initiation, policymaker views might change once war is underway; so long as decisionmaking is driven by humans, the decisions they make will be vulnerable to variations caused by the full range of human biases, frailties, emotions, and impulses. Nonetheless, the United States is assumed here to be a firmly Type-1 actor because this assumption is consistent with the scenario’s emphasis on seeking to deter, rather than to fight, nuclear war. The strategy does not make the same assumption about the adversaries and instead accepts the possibility that each might be either Type-1 or Type-2 — not for lack of hope that they are the former and not the latter, but rather to account for the uncertainty that they are.</p> +<p>During Putin’s initial period as Russia’s president (2000–08), and in particular during his second term (2004–08), Russia moved away from cooperative security approaches to regional conflict management, notably through the OSCE, to giving primacy to its own bilateral engagements. Moscow sought to balance betweenArmenia and Azerbaijan over the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, including through the supply of weapons to both sides. Russian repositioning around Georgia’s protracted conflicts accelerated following the November 2003 Rose Revolution that brought to power in Tbilisi a government seeking closer ties to NATO and the EU. Increasingly, Moscow backed the separatist leaderships of the two breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia in opposition to Georgia.</p> -<p>The assumed expected value calculations and resultant rank order establish preventing general nuclear war as the primary U.S. strategic objective. The secondary U.S. strategic objective is for there to be no additional nuclear detonation, of any type or yield, anywhere. This secondary objective is responsive to the horrific effects that all nuclear detonations have on humans, other animal species, and their habitats, and to the risk that additional nuclear launches might escalate to general nuclear war.</p> +<h4 id="russia-and-euro-atlantic-regional-competition">Russia and Euro-Atlantic Regional Competition</h4> -<p>In the scenario, the United States has joined wars in two theaters after adversarial attacks on allies and partners. U.S. political objectives and war aims in both regions are twofold: to demonstrate intolerance for wars of choice and to retain the sovereignty and autonomy of U.S. allies and partners. Because policymakers cannot eliminate the possibility that the adversaries are Type-2 actors, and because the primary U.S. strategic objective is to achieve a nonuse outcome, U.S. warfighting strategy must start from the premise that for all belligerents there is a set of possible, acceptable political outcomes short of maximalism that they can accept. Seeking such an outcome requires implementing a U.S. warfighting strategy that uses diplomatic, economic, and military measures to communicate that the United States does not seek regime change or societal collapse. The strategy must also demonstrate nuclear restraint by not engaging in tit-for-tat nuclear actions, including posture, alert, or deployment changes.</p> +<p>The August 2008 Russia–Georgia war, following the April NATO Bucharest Summit Declaration that Georgia (and Ukraine) would join the Alliance in the future, marked the onset of full-scale geopolitical confrontation in the South Caucasus. Russia’s use of military force was designed to demonstrate that it was unwilling to countenance Euro-Atlantic integration in territories it considered its backyard.</p> -<h4 id="assuring-allies-3">Assuring Allies</h4> +<p>The return of Putin as president in 2012 marked a new phase of Russian policy towards the South Caucasus. The region became fully integrated into Putin’s growing great power ambitions for Russia, and the confrontation with the Euro-Atlantic community. Russia’s military action against Georgia in 2008 directly challenged the Euro-Atlantic community by suggesting that it would need to be ready for war with Russia if it sought to advance membership in European organisations for countries in the South Caucasus. Through this positioning, Putin aimed to maintain a regional status quo favourable to Russia.</p> -<p>U.S. political objectives need to be supported, and its warfighting operations aided, by local allies in both regions in the scenario. Alliance discipline in communicating limited war aims is essential; inconsistent and mixed messages will undermine the ability of the United States to credibly signal both nuclear restraint and its desire to reach a mutually acceptable, negotiated settlement.</p> +<p>While Russia’s security position has been its trump card in the South Caucasus, Moscow has developed other interlinked policy approaches, both to coerce and attract the region. As geopolitical competition with the Euro-Atlantic community strengthened after 2008, Russia increasingly sought to integrate the South Caucasus more closely as part of its efforts to create a “sphere of privileged interests” across the territory of the former Soviet Union. Russia aimed to counter Euro-Atlantic integration efforts through its own integration agenda, focused on the EAEU and the CSTO. Ultimately, only Armenia agreed to join the EAEU – it was already a member of the CSTO – when Russia leveraged Armenia’s security dependence to pressure it to reject an EU association agreement in 2013.</p> -<p>As adversary confusion and the likelihood of misperception of U.S. intent increase, so does the likelihood of adversary nuclear use regionally and, ultimately, the likelihood of escalation to general nuclear war. The United States cannot impose signaling consistency upon its allies and partners, but they should regularly be reminded that mixed messages increase the risks of adversary nuclear use and escalation.</p> +<p>Moscow’s policy mix has been tailored to the countries of the region. With Georgia, the Kremlin has used a stick-and-carrot approach. Initially, Moscow relied on economic coercion and disinformation, while leveraging the protracted conflicts (including periodically raising the prospect of annexing South Ossetia), and the threat of further coercive and even military action against Tbilisi following the 2008 war. With the adoption by the Georgian government of a policy to normalise relations with Russia from 2012, and in particular as the ruling Georgian Dream Party has grown increasingly authoritarian in its domestic policies, leading to a deterioration of ties with the Euro-Atlantic community, Moscow has offered visa liberalisation, the resumption of direct flights between the two countries, increased tourism and the importance of a trade relationship.</p> -<p>In the scenario, U.S. allies across and within the two theaters differ in their reasons for entering into conflict, in the type and extent of the material contributions they make, and in their respective war’s immediate effects on their interests. Some allies might be dissatisfied with non-maximalist U.S. political objectives and wish to press for the adversaries to surrender on allied terms. The United States should attempt to address this objection by reinforcing that the purpose of limiting possible actions (e.g., nuclear use or nonuse) is to protect the alliances’ shared interest in averting the least favorable conflict outcomes: concession to the adversaries’ maximalist demands, or an uncontrolled escalatory spiral that begins with nuclear detonations, perhaps on allied territories, and that ultimately leads to general nuclear war.</p> +<p>With Armenia, Moscow has employed a different approach. It has provided security guarantees through Armenia’s CSTO membership and the presence of Russian military and border guard facilities. Moscow has also offered Armenia favourable economic terms. It has sought to advance Russian investment in the energy and other sectors, while membership of the EAEU has provided Armenia with access to a large market.</p> -<p>Allies might also take the view that the unwillingness of the United States to make nuclear threats or to use nuclear weapons on their behalf undermines long-standing U.S. policies of extended deterrence, and therefore increases their risk of being a victim of a nuclear strike. This misperceives key features of the post-detonation environment. In the first instance, the United States’ nonuse strategic objectives render as equivalent the security interests of U.S. allies and of the United States itself — nonuse is definitionally an “extended” objective. In the second, an environment in which an adversary has used conventional and nuclear weapons to attack a U.S. ally is one in which U.S. extended nuclear deterrence — adversary inaction produced by the threat of nuclear consequence — has failed.</p> +<p>In the case of Azerbaijan, Russia has been ready to accommodate flexibility as long as Baku has eschewed seeking NATO or EU membership, while at the same time pledging good neighbourly relations. This has been achieved through the conclusion of a series of partnership agreements over the past two decades (notably the partnership agreement in February 2022), and building cooperation in key economic areas, critically energy.</p> -<p>The possible reasons for detonating a U.S. nuclear weapon thereafter are three: to punish the adversary; as an element of a strategy to try to reassure allies by demonstrating that the United States will use nuclear weapons on their behalf; or as one element of a strategy aimed at deterring adversaries from additional nuclear use. Policymakers cannot be confident that the likelihood of producing these effects is greater than the likelihood of producing an escalatory spiral ending in general nuclear war. Because the primary U.S. objective of this strategy is to prevent general nuclear war, this risk of escalation means that the United States cannot use a nuclear weapon to punish the adversary, to try to assure allies, or to try to establish U.S. credibility and, on that basis, implement a new strategy of deterrence. This does not mean that the United States is not committed to its allies and their vital national security interests during the war. It does mean, however, that the United States’ obligation to defend them is addressed by the ongoing conventional fight and the strategic U.S. objectives of preventing additional nuclear detonation and general nuclear war.</p> +<p>Over the past two decades, Russia has sought to use its pre-eminent security position, supported by other policies, to limit the three South Caucasian republics’ options for external economic and security ties. The aim of these approaches has been to isolate the South Caucasus strategically while tying it ever closer to Russia. Entangling the conflicts of the South Caucasus with Russian security interests has created a Gordian knot for the Euro-Atlantic community in the region which, in the absence of a readiness to challenge Russia directly for fear of escalation to military confrontation and even war, has been unable to advance substantially its integration efforts.</p> -<h4 id="military-response-options-3">Military Response Options</h4> +<h4 id="russia-as-a-great-power-and-the-south-caucasus">Russia as a Great Power and the South Caucasus</h4> -<p>Achieving a nuclear nonuse outcome is commonly discussed under the rubric of intra-war deterrence. In this scenario, deterrence is applicable because military defeat of the adversaries is not possible. No matter how powerful and effective U.S. diplomatic, political, economic, and military measures are, they cannot render the adversary (or adversaries) incapable of continuing to fight: their nuclear arsenals will remain available for use even under conditions of international isolation, economic collapse, and conventional military defeat.</p> +<p>As competition with the Euro-Atlantic community intensified, the South Caucasus became part of Russia’s broader ambition to project its power around and across the Black Sea. In a return to Russia’s grand strategy towards the South Caucasus, Moscow’s regional engagement was linked to the wider goal of projecting power into the Black Sea region and beyond, into the eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East, as Russia became involved in the conflicts in Syria and Libya. After the 2008 Russo-Georgian War, Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea and its intervention in eastern Ukraine, the military and security dimensions of the South Caucasus were strengthened through enhancing the network of Russian military bases in Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Armenia (see Figure 1), and promoting the integration of these facilities with the regional network of Russian military facilities.</p> -<p>Strategies of deterrence seek to alter adversary perceptions of the likelihood and magnitude of the benefits of an action in relation to the likelihood and magnitude of its costs. This assumes the actor is sensitive to costs, and that it has principles, people, objects, or assets that it values and prefers not to lose.</p> +<h4 id="russias-growing-dominance-of-the-south-caucasus">Russia’s Growing Dominance of the South Caucasus</h4> -<p>The logic of deterrence, however, does not capture the full set of possible motivations for an adversary’s nonuse of nuclear weapons. An actor might choose to exercise nuclear restraint for one or some combination of at least seven reasons (Table 3).</p> +<p>By the 2020s, Russia appeared to have largely achieved dominance in the South Caucasus. Moscow’s approach to the region had effectively halted Euro-Atlantic integration while gradually strengthening its own position. In 2020, when Azerbaijan launched the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War, Russia aimed to advance its regional role with the introduction of “peacekeepers” into the conflict, something it had sought for over 20 years. These developments led to interpretations that Russia was consolidating its regional pre-eminence. In fact, the South Caucasus was already experiencing a set of interrelated shifts that have together undermined the regional position that Russia built up in the post-Soviet period.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/M7FHeKM.png" alt="image07" /> -<em>▲ Table 3: Possible Reasons for Adversary Nuclear Nonuse and its Applicability in the Near-Term, Two-Theater, Intra-War Nuclear Use Scenario</em></p> +<h3 id="ii-russia-challenged-in-the-south-caucasus">II. Russia Challenged in the South Caucasus</h3> -<p>Moral or ethical compunction and fear of technical failure can be considered if not impossible then at least highly unlikely to inhibit an actor from nuclear use in any conflict scenario in which that actor has already successfully detonated at least one nuclear weapon. In the scenario, it also is reasonable to assume that none of the belligerents is likely to assess that any one of them has the capability to mount a meaningfully protective defense against a concerted nuclear campaign. The United States therefore can seek to deter additional nuclear use through the threat of cost imposition — a strategy of conventional or nuclear deterrence — or it can seek to convince the adversaries to pursue a mutually acceptable, negotiated, political settlement.</p> +<p>In recent years, the foundations of Moscow’s dominant regional position, built in the context of geopolitical and geo-economic competition with the Euro-Atlantic community, have been challenged by three interlinked developments.</p> -<p>In the scenario, U.S. adversaries first used conventional war to achieve political aims despite the threat of substantial resistance, continued to fight despite a decreasing likelihood of prevailing, then escalated horizontally by attacking a U.S. defense treaty ally, and finally escalated again vertically through the detonation of a nuclear weapon. The scenario does not contain sufficient information to make any analytically sound inferences about how or why the initial U.S. warfighting strategy failed to deter the adversaries from nuclear use. This strategy therefore interprets these behaviors as indicating that the scenario adversaries are highly cost tolerant, a characteristic that decreases the likelihood that strategies of deterrence through threats of cost-imposition will be effective.</p> +<p>First, the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War (2020 and 2023) created a new regional balance of force and the emergence of economic and connectivity opportunities that have undercut security agendas. Second, a set of external actors has entered the region, providing alternatives to Moscow, Brussels and Washington, and tying the South Caucasus more closely to the Middle East, central Eurasia and Asia. Third, Russia’s war in Ukraine initially led to a questioning of Moscow’s ability to project security and military force in the region, while the prolonged nature of the war has reinforced hedging strategies by countries in the region unsure of who will ultimately be victorious. Together, these developments are promoting foreign and security policies of multi-alignment in the South Caucasus, as regional governments seek to develop multiple external partners to balance and hedge against the dominance of Russia and the Euro-Atlantic community.</p> -<p>The strategy assumes that in both theaters the initial U.S. conventional warfighting strategy was to impose conventional costs meaningful enough and substantial enough either to eliminate the adversary’s ability to continue to fight conventionally or to convince it to sue for peace — that is, to deter it from carrying on fighting. The scenario describes the war as ongoing, meaning that the United States has been unable to destroy the adversary’s conventional capabilities or to threaten the type and severity of costs that would convince it to abandon its war aims. Given that both adversaries detonated a nuclear weapon during the war, moreover, the conventional costs the United States imposed, and those it threatened, also were demonstrably not effective at deterring intra-war nuclear use.</p> +<h4 id="the-second-nagorno-karabakh-war">The Second Nagorno-Karabakh War</h4> -<p>It is possible that the United States would eventually identify and be able to threaten conventional costs that could hurt the adversary sufficiently in a way it didn’t anticipate and thereby deter further nuclear use or persuade it to concede. Pursuing such a strategy of deterrence, however, is high in uncertainty and, therefore, also in risk. It is not possible to know prior to making the threat or imposing the consequence that it will have the desired effect. Each such attempt has some probability of resulting in escalation to further adversary nuclear use, and there is no way to know if that probability is high or low. Even if the quality of intelligence assessments and other information about the disposition and preference of the adversaries is quite high, such information cannot eliminate uncertainty about the adversary’s likely course of action.</p> +<p>The most significant development within the South Caucasus region has been Azerbaijan’s military actions in 2020 and 2023 to take back territory occupied by Armenia following the First Nagorno-Karabakh War (1988–94), and ultimately to reclaim control over the Nagorno-Karabakh region itself. As a result, Azerbaijan has emerged as the regional agenda setter and has attracted Russia’s interest.</p> -<p>The effects produced by the threat of nuclear cost imposition in a strategy of intra-war deterrence are similarly uncertain. This approach risks cultivating the adversaries’ belief that they might be able to achieve their strategic or political objectives by engaging in nuclear brinkmanship and escalation.</p> +<p>For Armenia, there has been a deterioration in the Armenia–Russia alliance as a result of Russia’s failure to restrain Azerbaijan in 2020 and the inability – and possibly unwillingness – of Russian “peacekeepers” to prevent the seizure of the whole of Nagorno-Karabakh in 2023. This led to the flight of the ethnic Armenian population amid claims of ethnic cleansing – along with a perception that Moscow is more interested in developing a close relationship with Baku.</p> -<p>The risk of encouraging rather than deterring adversary nuclear use applies equally to threats to and attacks on the adversaries’ nuclear infrastructure, via conventional kinetic or cyber weapons, including on units or sites from which a tactical nuclear strike has been launched. Such an action would not only run the risk of initiating an escalatory spiral, but the possible colocation of tactical with strategic nuclear weapons also means that strikes meant as limited retaliations might be misconstrued as strategic first strikes intended to deplete the adversary’s second-strike capability. In this scenario such a perception would therefore be expected to increase the likelihood that an adversary would launch a nuclear weapon, and perhaps execute a massive attack, possibly against nuclear assets or civilian targets in the U.S. homeland.</p> +<p>Armenia has signalled publicly that it is ready to shift away from its reliance on Russian security guarantees and seek closer relations with others, notably the US and the EU (especially France). Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan has indicated that Armenia has suspended its participation in the CSTO – having previously indicated that it would leave the organisation – although he has not closed the door to a future relationship, and Russian border guards have been removed from Yerevan airport. With the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict resolved by military force, Russia is no longer able to leverage its role as a mediator, while the prospect of a peace agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan, potentially also leading to Armenia–Turkey normalisation, will further reduce Moscow’s ability to leverage its security role. With the war in Ukraine also redefining Russian regional interests, Moscow has begun to reshape its approach to the South Caucasus.</p> -<p>U.S. warfighting aims in each region therefore will be limited and focal. In both regions, U.S. warfighting strategy should use conventional forces to try to prevent either adversary from advancing the current lines of contact as described in the scenario, but not to advance the line of contact itself. All kinetic and cyber actions should target only adversary military units and assets. Attacks on the adversaries’ homelands should include only those military units and assets that have been directly engaged in conventional kinetic or confirmed cyber-warfighting activity, and all U.S. military actions should adhere to international humanitarian law. To the extent possible, the United States and allied forces should execute operational concepts that minimize the military utility of adversary tactical nuclear weapons.</p> +<h4 id="emerging-international-actors-in-the-south-caucasus">Emerging International Actors in the South Caucasus</h4> -<p>If an adversary does detonate another nuclear weapon anywhere, then the U.S. intra-war deterrence strategy has failed, and the president will have to assess current conditions and decide whether to continue to fight conventionally or to concede. The United States should not respond with its own use of a nuclear weapon in theater or elsewhere, given the possibility of escalation to general nuclear war. This is true even if the adversary launches one or more nuclear weapons against nuclear assets, industrial facilities, or civilian centers in the U.S. homeland. If the homeland strike is limited, the adversary still cannot be certain that the United States will not use its nuclear weapons in the future and therefore might still be deterred. The president would therefore, again, have to assess current conditions and decide whether to continue to fight conventionally or to concede. If the homeland strike exceeds the lower bound of general nuclear war (an explosive yield that kills 25 percent of the U.S. population), then the United States, insofar as it exists, destroys much but gains nothing by sending a salvo in return.</p> +<p>While the period since 2008 has been marked by geopolitical competition between Russia and the Euro-Atlantic community in the South Caucasus, states within the region are increasingly reaching out to a wider network of partners to help them to manage geopolitical competition and expand economic opportunities.</p> -<h4 id="non-kinetic-response-options-3">Non-Kinetic Response Options</h4> +<p><em>Turkey</em></p> -<p>This strategy assumes that diplomatic and economic instruments — e.g., severe reprimands, changes in standing and status in international institutions, the imposition of economic sanctions, and other restrictions on adversaries’ abilities to participate in the global economy and to access the international financial system — were imposed as part of the initial U.S. warfighting effort. Given that both adversaries detonated a nuclear weapon during the war, the non-kinetic costs the United States imposed and those it threatened were not effective at deterring intra-war nuclear use. Even if the United States did not immediately implement the full retinue of available measures, the adversaries’ initial nuclear detonations suggest that threatening to impose more such costs is likely to have little persuasive effect.</p> +<p>The growing influence of Turkey has relied to a significant degree on its strategic alliance with Azerbaijan and the coordinated approach that the two countries have taken to Armenia and the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, as well as energy projects. Since 1992, they have forged close military, diplomatic and economic ties. Turkey has notably provided Azerbaijan with important military capacities and training. This relationship was central to the 2020 Second Nagorno-Karabakh War, in which Turkish military technologies played an important role, but even more significant was the ability of Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan to balance diplomatic efforts by Putin to shape the outcomes of the conflict to Russia’s advantage. Since then, Turkey and Azerbaijan have coordinated efforts to position the South Caucasus as the gateway to the Middle Corridor, which links Europe through the Caspian region to Central Asia and western parts of China, and to accelerate work on this initiative.</p> -<p>Non-kinetic responses should, nonetheless, continue to be elements of the ongoing U.S. warfighting strategy. They are useful insofar as they hinder the adversaries’ kinetic warfighting capacity, and the United States can use the possibility of relaxing these consequences in efforts to convince the adversaries that a mutually acceptable, negotiated, political settlement is possible.</p> +<p>Although Azerbaijan is Turkey’s key regional ally, Turkey has been exploring deeper ties with Georgia, reflecting the country’s key transit role for energy, transport and trade. Turkey identifies relations with Georgia as a “strategic partnership”, supports its territorial integrity and does not recognise claims by Abkhazia and South Ossetia for independence. Turkey is Georgia’s leading trade partner, ahead of Russia and China, and Ankara views Georgia as a critical partner in its plans for the development and expansion of the Middle Corridor. Turkey has also sought to develop its security ties to Georgia, including as part of a trilateral format with Azerbaijan, and has been a supporter of closer ties between NATO and Georgia. Turkey’s role has also been important as part of a broader strengthening in relations between the South Caucasus and Middle Eastern countries that has included rising trade and deepening diplomatic ties, notably with Saudi Arabia, but also with Iraq and Jordan (as well as Iran and Israel).</p> -<h4 id="war-termination-on-favorable-terms">War Termination on Favorable Terms</h4> +<p><em>Iran</em></p> -<p>This strategy is based upon the rational calculation that, in this scenario, the overriding U.S. strategic objective must be to preserve a future in which humans can live in some form of society that permits more than the base struggle for near-term survival. It therefore confines the definition of war termination on favorable terms to those that govern the present moment, not those that might protect U.S. interests beyond it. There is no way to anticipate what U.S. interests after these wars will be, or what geopolitical structures might further them.</p> +<p>Iran does not have the levels of regional influence achieved by Russia and Turkey, in part reflecting its strategic view of the South Caucasus as a buffer region. Tehran’s approach has been focused on preventing overspill from the region into Iran. It hopes to balance the influence of regional rivals (Turkey and Russia) and ensure that the South Caucasus does not become a base of operations for states seen as hostile to Tehran (principally the US and Israel). As the third regional neighbouring state it has, nonetheless, built ties with Armenia, while managing a complex and occasionally confrontational relationship with Azerbaijan.</p> -<p>The temptation when formulating alternative strategies based on nuclear war scenarios like the one considered here is to recommend courses of action that include U.S. nuclear use on the basis that there is some chance that it will succeed in convincing the adversary to do what the United States wishes — to argue, that is, that it just might work. This is precisely the temptation that policymakers must resist. No attachment to any political ideology, nor any idea of nationhood, can justify knowingly endangering humankind. This must certainly be true for any political ideology or nation that purports to hold sacred the inalienable rights of all human beings. What could be more contrary to this commitment than risking nuclear holocaust for entire societies of people who had no direct authorship in the policies of their governments?</p> +<p>As the South Caucasus has begun to open to greater connectivity, gaining access to Iran’s trade and transport routes has risen in importance. Tehran has developed a more forward-leaning foreign policy towards the South Caucasus and has sought to improve its relationship with Azerbaijan and adopt a more balanced approach to the countries in the region. This has led to an emergent closer relationship with Georgia.</p> -<p>The urge to destroy adversary governments in such a situation would no doubt be powerful, but it is intolerable under any circumstance to risk the extinction of the human species in order to do so. Nuclear decisionmaking cannot be driven by pride or vengeance, or by the fear that, if the worst comes and the United States perishes, then so too do the values and principles that produced it. Nuclear decisionmaking must instead be guided by the conviction that liberal thought will reemerge, and by the imperative of preserving a world in which that is possible.</p> +<p>Along with Russia and Turkey, Iran shares an interest in limiting the role of the Euro-Atlantic community in the South Caucasus, and Tehran has supported efforts to advance the “3 + 3” South Caucasus Regional Cooperation Platform format, aimed at bringing together Iran, Turkey, Russia and the South Caucasus countries. Iran has also recognised the strategic importance of efforts to shape a new regional transportation network as part of a peace agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Crucially, Tehran has opposed efforts to open the so-called Zangezur Corridor, the proposed transport link between Azerbaijan and its exclave Nakhchivan across the southern Armenian region of Syunik, fearing it would impede its trade links northwards and strengthen Turkey’s regional position, even when this has led to friction with Russia.</p> -<h3 id="if-deterrence-fails">If Deterrence Fails</h3> +<p>Despite strains in the Iran–Russia relationship, there has been a strategic convergence between Tehran and Moscow as a result of the Ukraine war, which is being formalised through a proposed partnership treaty that will include regional security issues, alongside a free-trade agreement to link the EAEU to Iran. Iran’s evolving engagement in the South Caucasus, and notably its cooperation with Russia in the area of transport, form an important element of the growing alignment between the two countries.</p> -<p><strong><em>Analyzing U.S. Options for Responding to Adversary Limited Nuclear Use</em></strong></p> +<p><em>Israel and the Gulf States</em></p> -<blockquote> - <h4 id="gregory-weaver">Gregory Weaver</h4> -</blockquote> +<p>After Turkey, Israel has been Azerbaijan’s most important external partner in military, investment and diplomatic support. Azerbaijan has looked to Israel to provide it with key military capabilities, as well as technologies to advance its ambitions to move its economy away from reliance on hydrocarbon production. Azerbaijan has become a significant energy supplier to Israel. Israel has, on the other hand, had modest relations with Georgia and Armenia, and its engagement in the South Caucasus has served primarily to reinforce Baku’s international options and capabilities, rather than to play a regional role. At the same time, Iran’s concern about a potential Israeli security presence in Azerbaijan has fed into Tehran’s broader foreign and military approach to the South Caucasus, notably into an effort to weaken Baku through support for Armenia.</p> -<p>The decision to focus Project Atom 2024 on the issue of how the United States should respond to limited nuclear deterrence failure in a conflict with a peer nuclear adversary was both wise and timely. Wise because doing so helps address key gaps in U.S. strategy development. Timely because the rise of China as a second peer nuclear adversary, and the increasing strategic alignment of Russia and China, create a heightened risk of collaborative or opportunistic aggression in two theaters that requires the development of a strategy and associated enabling capabilities to address this problem.</p> +<p>Building on their established links to Azerbaijan, Gulf states are increasingly looking to the South Caucasus for investment and trade opportunities, particularly in the energy and transportation sectors.</p> -<p>Most nongovernmental analyses of the problem of war with a nuclear-armed adversary focus, understandably, on how to deter the initiation of such a conflict or on deterring nuclear escalation in such a conflict. Successful deterrence avoids the much uglier problem of what to do if deterrence fails.</p> +<p><em>China and Central Asia</em></p> -<p>Focusing on deterrence alone, however, fails to address the very difficult problem of how the United States and its allies and partners can protect their vital interests while avoiding uncontrolled escalation to large-scale nuclear war when the adversary has already escalated to the limited use of nuclear weapons. Focusing on deterrence alone fails to address the complex task of thinking through the military and non-kinetic response options the United States and its allies and partners might require to achieve their objectives while avoiding uncontrolled escalation. Moreover, by failing to identify the range of response options required, perhaps through multiple instances of limited nuclear weapons employment by both sides, such deterrence-focused analysis also risks failing to identify the capabilities required to provide such options credibly and effectively. Finally, the process of thinking through how to address limited nuclear deterrence failure somewhat counterintuitively provides important insights into how to enhance deterrence of both war and limited nuclear escalation in war that an analytic focus on deterrence alone is unlikely to provide.</p> +<p>China’s presence in the South Caucasus has been growing through trade and tourism, as well as infrastructure projects. The new international interest in transport corridors through the South Caucasus, in part created by the wars in Ukraine and the Middle East, has increased China’s engagement in the region as it seeks to develop “the Great Silk Road” as part of its global Belt and Road Initiative. The award to a Chinese-led consortium of a contract to build the Anaklia deepwater port in Georgia is a particular focus for Beijing as part of its effort to build transport infrastructure connecting China’s economy to European markets.</p> -<p>Analysis of how to respond to limited nuclear deterrence failure is inherently scenario dependent for a number of reasons. The stakes of the two sides in a conflict have a significant impact on the war aims of the combatants and on their willingness to escalate and counter-escalate in pursuit of those aims. The political circumstances, particularly regarding issues of alliance cohesion and the internal politics of the combatants, also shape the options of both sides. The military circumstances are of course a critical factor in shaping the two sides’ strategic and operational objectives and the military means available to pursue them. Analyses must address a range of questions, including: Who is winning or losing, and why and how? Is one side asymmetrically vulnerable to limited nuclear escalation? Could horizontal escalation alter the military situation to one side’s advantage? Does one side have an endurance advantage in an extended conflict?</p> +<p>The pull of China in relation to economic and trade issues is also drawing the countries of the South Caucasus to the east in their external relations, as efforts to develop the Middle Corridor accelerate. While the central approach of China in the South Caucasus appears to be geo-economic, its growing interest in Georgia has been linked to the erosion of democratic practices through rising elite corruption, while also being seen to reinforce the broader regional shift of foreign policy – away from the Euro-Atlantic community.</p> -<p>Of course, were the United States to find itself engaged either in a conflict with one nuclear peer while seeking to deter opportunistic aggression by the other, or in simultaneous conflicts with both Russia and China, the interaction of these scenario-specific factors would be far more complex to assess and far more challenging to address.</p> +<p>To cement its developing regional role, China has sought to conclude “strategic agreements” with Georgia and Azerbaijan. Baku has made the most significant shift to the east, even raising the prospect of joining regional formats, and President Ilham Aliyev has attended the Central Asia head of state consultative meetings, as well as forging bilateral and minilateral ties with countries across that region. The transport connectivity agenda is, however, exerting a pull on all the South Caucasus countries, pushing them to develop ties linking the Black and Caspian Sea regions.</p> -<p>Project Atom 2024 asked its participants to conduct their analyses in the context of a single 2027 scenario involving two regional conflicts with Russia and China simultaneously. Thus, this paper addresses only that scenario, providing analysis of the four key issue areas identified by the project’s designers:</p> +<p><em>India and Pakistan</em></p> -<ol> - <li> - <p>U.S. Strategic Objectives If Strategic Deterrence Fails</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Assuring Allies after Strategic Deterrence Failure</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Military Response Options after Strategic Deterrence Failure</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Non-Kinetic Response Options after Strategic Deterrence Failure</p> - </li> -</ol> +<p>India and Pakistan are relatively minor international actors in the region, but India has been increasing its arms sales, notably becoming a primary supplier to Armenia, while Pakistan has concluded defence agreements with Azerbaijan. Pakistan has sought to track India’s growing regional ties as an extension of their bilateral rivalry. Relations with the South Caucasus also reflect India’s long-term plans to build new trade and transport routes from South Asia across Eurasia to Europe, linking the region to the Gulf and the Indian Ocean. These new ties are becoming the basis for competing groupings, with India seeking to cooperate with Iran and Armenia, and Pakistan looking to partner with Turkey and Azerbaijan.</p> -<p>As the reader will see, this two-conflict scenario presents U.S. strategists with a complex set of issues. However, a more comprehensive analysis of the overarching two nuclear-armed adversary problem would require asking these same questions across a set of plausible scenarios that span the range of key strategic circumstances the United States might face. Examples of other scenarios that should be examined using the Project Atom 2024 methodology include:</p> +<h4 id="the-south-caucasus-as-a-multipolar-region">The South Caucasus as a Multipolar Region</h4> -<ul> - <li> - <p>Conflict with Russia while deterring Chinese opportunistic aggression</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Conflict with China while deterring Russian opportunistic aggression</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Conflict with Russia and China in which the United States is winning conventionally in one theater and losing in the other when deterrence of limited nuclear use fails</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Conflict with Russia and China in which the United States is losing conventionally in both theaters when deterrence of limited nuclear use fails</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>The full range of scenarios farther into the future when China is a nuclear peer</p> - </li> -</ul> +<p>The emergence of a multitude of international actors in the South Caucasus is changing the region’s international environment. While Russia and the Euro-Atlantic community remain key reference points, reflecting their continuing regional strategic weight, new actors are offering additional security, economic and transport relationships. Minilateral formats are emerging to reflect new partnerships and blending of interests, and some South Caucasus states are looking to participate in larger multilateral formats, including the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, the BRICS (Azerbaijan announced its application to join in August 2024), and the Organization of Turkic States.</p> -<p>There are bound to be additional important insights from analysis of these alternative scenarios that are needed to formulate a comprehensive U.S. strategy for this problem set.</p> +<p>For countries in the region, this approach to external ties is driven by two main interests. First, governments are pursuing balancing approaches to serve as counterweights to external integration projects that seek to curtail the position and interests of domestic elites, whether it is via Russia’s efforts to shape pro-Moscow regimes or the Euro-Atlantic community’s democracy, human rights and rule of law agenda challenging illiberal and kleptocratic regimes. Second, the broadening of external contacts has enabled countries in the South Caucasus to increase their leverage, and notably to hedge their dominant bilateral ties to Russia and the Euro-Atlantic community, in order to improve their bargaining position.</p> -<h4 id="the-scenario-in-question">The Scenario in Question</h4> +<p>The development of this dimension of regional politics is, however, also a source for new instability in the region, with countries now linked to various disputes and competition beyond the South Caucasus, for example the tensions between Turkey and Israel over Gaza and Lebanon have unsettled their ties to Azerbaijan. It is also difficult for external actors to develop a stable approach to the region, as the regional governments are able to switch external partners and play them against each other to secure better offers.</p> -<p>Project Atom 2024 posits a 2027 scenario in which the United States and its allies and partners face collaborative aggression by Russia and China in two theaters simultaneously. The scenario postulates that, despite collaborative Russian-Chinese aggression, U.S. and allied conventional forces far outperform Russian and Chinese conventional forces, almost immediately putting Russia and China in very difficult strategic circumstances 8–10 days after conflict initiation in both theaters. The scenario results in a dire strategic situation in which both Russia and China have initiated limited nuclear escalation, seemingly in response to losing the conventional conflicts they initiated.</p> +<h4 id="russias-war-in-ukraine">Russia’s War in Ukraine</h4> -<p>As noted earlier, U.S. objectives and potential response options in such a situation would be highly dependent on the specific political-military circumstances of a conflict. In the case of this scenario, however, several key facts regarding the strategic situation are unclear:</p> +<p>Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 created shock waves across the South Caucasus. Initially, Russia pulled forces from the region to reinforce its struggling troops in Ukraine. As Moscow faced difficulties in overcoming Ukrainian forces, questions were raised in the region about the effectiveness of Russia as a military and security actor. The war also increased external pressure on the governments in the South Caucasus to take sides in the conflict, including through observing Western sanctions on Russia.</p> -<ul> - <li> - <p>Has the defeat of the Chinese landing force negated China’s ability to invade Taiwan, and for how long?</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>How long will it take Polish forces to seize the city of Kaliningrad and the rest of Kaliningrad oblast?</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>How much have Russian nuclear strikes damaged NATO’s ability to reinforce Poland and the Baltic states, and to seize Kaliningrad?</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>How many Russian ground forces are where? Along the Baltic states’ borders? In Kaliningrad? In Belarus?</p> - </li> -</ul> +<p>Georgia, concerned about the Russian threat to its own territories, distanced itself from Kyiv and refused to apply sanctions. Azerbaijan sought to maintain its policy of balancing, providing limited support to Ukraine, agreeing to supply extra gas volumes to Europe as it sought to diversify its energy markets, and emphasised its crucial geographic position at the heart of the Middle Corridor as an alternative to Russian transit routes. At the same time, Baku sought to maintain its strategic relationship with Moscow. Armenia, given its reliance on Moscow and questions about the effectiveness of Russian forces and the ability of Russia’s defence industry to supply weapons, began to recalibrate its security partnership with Russia.</p> -<p>Pointing out these uncertainties is not intended as a criticism of the scenario. But the fact that such details regarding the range of strategic circumstances the United States might face have such a significant effect on the analysis of the central problem does raise an issue for future analysis: How much understanding of the potential impacts of limited nuclear use on the course of a theater conflict between nuclear-armed adversaries is required to formulate an effective strategy for the potential range of such contingencies? It is likely that experts are reaching the end of what they can learn about this central question without detailed wargaming and simulation of twenty-first-century theater warfare that includes the limited use of nuclear weapons by one or both sides in the conflict.</p> +<p>As the Ukraine war has continued, the impact of the conflict on the South Caucasus has shifted. With considerable uncertainty about the outcome of the war, all three South Caucasus states have sought to avoid being too overtly tied to one side and have pursued different balancing options. There is also concern that if Russia is victorious in Ukraine, it may then look to strengthen its control over the South Caucasus as the next step in efforts to expand Russia’s regional power, and so the prudent approach is to avoid taking sides.</p> -<p>Project Atom 2024 is a first step in this direction, as it effectively examines the issues regarding what to do in the wake of limited nuclear deterrence failure by asking the right first-order questions at the unclassified level. But that is not enough. The Department of Defense needs to take up the challenge of a campaign of wargaming and simulation that will provide the necessary analytic basis for informed strategy development and military capability requirements identification.</p> +<p>At the same time, the Ukraine war has reshaped Russia’s own interests in the South Caucasus. As a result of the war and Western sanctions, the South Caucasus has become critical to Russia’s efforts to reorient trade and communications away from Europe. This has led Moscow to rebalance its regional relations, with Baku becoming central to Russia’s regional transportation plans.</p> -<p>What follows is an analysis of the four key issue areas in the scenario provided.</p> +<h3 id="iii-russias-repositioning-in-the-south-caucasus">III. Russia’s Repositioning in the South Caucasus</h3> -<h4 id="us-strategic-objectives-if-strategic-deterrence-fails">U.S. Strategic Objectives If Strategic Deterrence Fails</h4> +<p>Faced with the current shifts across the region, Russia has sought to craft a new balance of policies so that it can reposition itself and remain at the heart of the South Caucasus regional order.</p> -<p>For the purposes of this analysis, it is assumed that the U.S. stake in both theater conflicts is sufficient for the United States to risk large-scale nuclear war. Whether either adversary perceives this to be true, however, is unclear. Stakes sufficient to take this risk clearly involve vital national security interests. The United States has historically perceived the sovereignty and security of its NATO allies as meeting this test. The purposeful ambiguity regarding whether the United States would intervene to defend Taiwan against Chinese military aggression makes it less certain that Taiwanese security meets this threshold, though the impact of the forcible incorporation of Taiwan into the People’s Republic of China on U.S. economic interests and U.S. alliances in Asia could well rise to a vital national interest.</p> +<h4 id="security-policy">Security Policy</h4> -<p>Before identifying potential U.S. strategic objectives in this scenario, it is useful to consider for a moment why deterrence of limited nuclear use failed in both theaters and whether there was something that the United States could have done to enhance deterrence of such nuclear use. While the scenario does not provide sufficient information to determine the answers to these questions with much confidence, it does at least hint at Russian and Chinese motivations for crossing the nuclear threshold.</p> +<p>Despite the emergence of new policy tools, Moscow continues to use security issues to shape the region towards its interests. The ongoing occupation of Abkhazia and South Ossetia and their steady integration into Russia remains a defining point in Moscow’s regional position. As the relationship between Georgia and the Euro-Atlantic community has frayed, as Tbilisi has adopted increasingly anti-democratic domestic policies and continued to develop ties with Russia, Moscow has rebalanced its approach from threat to inducement around the protracted Abkhaz and South Ossetian conflict. Before the Georgian elections on 26 October 2024 Moscow hinted that it would be ready to help Tbilisi “normalise” relations with the two breakaway regions.</p> -<p>In both theaters, the adversaries’ unexpectedly poor conventional military performance puts them in fairly dire strategic circumstances very early in the conflict. In Europe, the combined effect of Russia’s failure to make any significant inroads into the Baltic states while simultaneously failing to stop the NATO offensive into Kaliningrad and eliciting direct NATO military intervention in Ukraine could hardly be worse. In Asia, the destruction of China’s invasion fleet before it can reach Taiwan denies the Chinese leadership their primary objective and is followed by internal unrest in opposition to the war. Limited nuclear escalation in both theaters offers some prospect of terminating the conflicts on terms Russia and China can accept, but the scenario does not describe Russian or Chinese intent. Neither adversary pairs their limited nuclear escalation with clear coercive political-military demands, making the purpose of their escalation unclear.</p> +<p>At the same time, the fact that the Euro-Atlantic community has not been prepared to challenge Russian military occupation of Abkhazia and South Ossetia directly signals to the wider region the limit of EU/NATO regional commitment. While Russia’s policy towards Georgia remains a clear indication that Moscow will not countenance Euro-Atlantic integration in the region, its ability to bind the wider region through security ties has, however, corroded, notably with the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and the subsequent shift by Armenia towards a broader range of security partners.</p> -<p>It is tempting to say that the United States failed to clearly and credibly communicate its stake in defending its allies and partners in both theaters. However, it is also possible that the Russian and Chinese leaderships miscalculated not about U.S. will to intervene but rather regarding the ability of Russian and Chinese conventional forces to achieve their objectives even in the face of U.S. intervention if they both attacked at roughly the same time.</p> +<p>Since its defeat in the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War, Armenia has signalled strong dissatisfaction with the Russian security guarantee, and there has been an escalation of negative rhetoric regarding Moscow’s role. Yerevan has taken steps on the margins of its security relationship with Moscow to underline its discontent, opened to a wider range of external relationships, including with the Euro-Atlantic community, and begun to rebuild its military through partnerships with Europe, India and the US. While Armenia may be able to “navigate a path away from Russia” through diversifying its security partnerships, there are real limits on how far Armenia can push, at least in the medium term. It has become clear since 2020 that Russian security protection does not extend to actions by Azerbaijan. However, ultimately, only Moscow is willing to give security guarantees to Armenia when it believes it remains vulnerable to other external threats, notably from Turkey, and there continues to be security interdependence between Russia and Armenia. Moscow may also be ready to threaten more direct responses to Armenia if it veers far from Russian interests.</p> -<p>There are four U.S. strategic objectives that should be pursued in both theater conflicts.</p> +<p>Azerbaijan has sought to diminish Russia’s security leverage, notably through a commitment over several decades to building ties to other military partners (Turkey and Israel). But an equally important element of managing the Russian security threat has been Baku’s decision to eschew EU and NATO integration – a decision taken to a significant degree in light of the lesson of the 2008 Russo-Georgian War that the Euro-Atlantic community is not ready to challenge Russia militarily in the region. To underline that it does not seek to break away completely from Russia, Azerbaijan has sought to identify a positive agenda of alternative policy areas for cooperation with Russia where it can shape a partnership in its interests.</p> -<p>The first is to restore or maintain the territorial status quo ante. This means that no NATO or Taiwanese territory remains under Russian or Chinese control (respectively) at the end of the conflict. This constitutes a fundamental denial of Russia and Chinese strategic objectives.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/6BEfo31.png" alt="image02" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 2: Key South Caucasus Transport Routes.</strong> Source: Tanvir Anjum Adib/Wikimedia. Edited by RUSI.</em></p> -<p>The second U.S. strategic objective should be to restore deterrence of further nuclear use by Russia or China. Doing so would enable the United States and its allies and partners to continue to pursue the first strategic objective at lower risk and with a lower level of violence.</p> +<h4 id="transport-and-communications">Transport and Communications</h4> -<p>The third U.S. strategic objective in both conflicts should be to avoid uncontrolled nuclear escalation. This means deterring large-scale nuclear escalation by Russia and China even if restoring deterrence of further limited nuclear use is unachievable.</p> +<p>Moscow’s most important policy shift regarding the changing political and economic dynamics of the South Caucasus is the new emphasis given to the region as a zone for trade and communications (see Figure 2). The breakdown of ties with the Euro-Atlantic community, the imposition of sanctions and the closing of some markets has effectively forced Russia to reorient its economic policy on a north–south axis, away from the previous east–west axis. Moscow’s efforts to reorient its external economic relations, as part of the wider shift in its foreign and security relations brought about by the Ukraine war, are already having significant results, as trade along a north–south axis, notably with Iran and India, has increased substantially in recent years.</p> -<p>The fourth U.S. strategic objective should be to demonstrate that the adversaries’ limited nuclear escalation did not result in any meaningful political-military gains. Achieving this objective in one theater could enhance the achievement of the U.S. objectives mentioned above in the second theater. It would also arguably enhance deterrence of future aggression and escalation.</p> +<p>In this context, the key project for Russia is the International North–South Transit Corridor (INSTC), a series of rail, ship and road routes connecting Russia to Iran and its Gulf ports and beyond, to South and East Asia. The most promising route goes through Azerbaijan, the only country that borders both Russia and Iran, and which already has a railway connecting Russia and Iran. While the INSTC has been on the drawing board since 2005, it has gained new impetus since the war in Ukraine and Western efforts to isolate Russia economically. In May 2023, Russia and Iran agreed to complete, by 2027, the construction of a railway from the Iran–Azerbaijan border, at Astara, to Rasht in northern Iran, which represents the last missing rail link to connect St Petersburg to the Gulf. Realisation of the INSTC is a strategic goal for Moscow, supported by Iran and India, but Russia is likely to be the main funder of any new infrastructure, in view of its pressing need to bypass Western sanctions.</p> -<p>The scenario’s description of the Ukraine conflict complicates the establishment of further clear U.S. strategic objectives consistent with the four above objectives. The scenario posits that some eastern NATO allies have begun deploying forces into Ukraine, and NATO airpower is now flying support missions for Ukrainian forces on the offensive in preparation for the liberation of Crimea “within weeks.”</p> +<p>The focus on connectivity in the South Caucasus is giving Russia a new direction for its security policy. Russia is aiming to assert a security role in the South Caucasus transport network to unblock the regional transport network on its terms and, thereby, provide Moscow with important regional leverage. For this reason, the Zangezur Corridor has become a particular focus for Russian diplomacy and a key interest in the wider Armenia–Azerbaijan peace negotiations.</p> -<p>It is not clear, however, what U.S. territorial objectives should be in the Ukraine conflict post Russian nuclear use. Combined NATO-Ukraine forces pressing to drive Russian forces from all Ukrainian territory might make restoring deterrence of Russian nuclear use significantly more difficult and could increase the risk of uncontrolled escalation. A less risky, but still ambitious, option would be to demand Russian withdrawal from all Ukrainian territory that Russia has seized since the February 2022 invasion in exchange for NATO withdrawal from the portions of Kaliningrad it now occupies. However, this would leave Russia in control of Crimea.</p> +<p>Citing provisions on Russian security personnel managing the land corridor in the 2020 Armenia–Azerbaijan ceasefire agreement brokered by Moscow, the Kremlin insists on its presence along the corridor. If it were able to exert influence on the region’s transport networks, Moscow would gain new leverage over the countries of the South Caucasus, including Georgia, which currently is the main axis for north–south trade. Russia has sought to channel negotiations on transport links into the 2021 tripartite commission on this issue that it convenes with Armenia and Azerbaijan, and into key bilateral formats.</p> -<p>Regardless of which U.S. objective is chosen regarding Ukraine, U.S. objectives should clearly include termination of all fighting between NATO/Ukraine and Russia, consistent with the achievement of the other U.S. strategic objectives identified above.</p> +<h4 id="pivot-to-azerbaijan-monitoring-georgia">Pivot to Azerbaijan, Monitoring Georgia</h4> -<p>What is the relative priority of this set of potential U.S. strategic objectives in this strategic context?</p> +<p>A third key component of Moscow’s evolving policy towards the South Caucasus is a deepened partnership with Baku. Azerbaijan has emerged as the leading regional state as a result of its military successes against Armenia, its ability to build a latticework of external partners, and its balancing policy towards Russia. Indeed, Azerbaijan is now essential for Russia in terms of energy exports and its transport links to Iran. The Kremlin has stressed that Azerbaijan is a “stable” partner in the region, and has spoken of the bilateral relationship in warm terms as having an “alliance” character.</p> -<p>Restoring the territorial status quo ante (with a possible modification regarding Ukraine) while avoiding uncontrolled escalation are undoubtedly the two most important objectives. Achieving these two objectives in both theaters would amount to “victory.” Immediately restoring deterrence of nuclear use is not necessary to “win” the conflicts, but doing so would reduce both the cost and the risk of doing so. Achieving the two most important objectives would also arguably result in achieving the fourth objective of denying U.S. adversaries any significant political-military gain through their nuclear escalation, thereby enhancing future deterrence of war and escalation in war.</p> +<p>Azerbaijan has been able to use its newfound regional leverage to bypass Russia’s efforts to manipulate regional conflicts – ignoring Russia’s demands over Nagorno-Karabakh, forcing the withdrawal of Russian peacekeepers, and sidelining Moscow’s role in mediating the Armenia–Azerbaijan relationship – all while maintaining a degree of support for Ukraine. But Baku has lined up behind Russia on Moscow’s interests where they largely align with those of Azerbaijan. Together with Russia, Azerbaijan has been critical of Armenia’s efforts to reach out to the Euro-Atlantic community, and it has opposed the deployment of an EU border-monitoring mission to the region. Azerbaijan is also publicly supporting Russia’s position on transport corridors across Armenia, even if there are suspicions that Baku would also be keen to leave Russia out of the route.</p> -<p>In the scenario, there is no clear indication of whether success in one theater is more important to the United States than in the other theater. However, one thing is clear: U.S. and allied successes in achieving their objectives in one theater would be likely to affect the decision calculus of the adversary in the other theater regarding further nuclear escalation.</p> +<p>While Azerbaijan is now Russia’s main regional partner, Moscow is paying close attention to contemporary developments within Georgia. Since the Rose Revolution, Georgia has been the anchor of the Euro-Atlantic community’s regional engagement, and in 2023, the EU granted Tbilisi candidate status. However, despite movement on some bureaucratic processes, the integration of Georgia into the Euro-Atlantic community has been effectively frozen following the 2008 Russo-Georgian War, reflecting the reluctance of the US and its European allies to challenge directly Moscow’s security commitment to Abkhazia and South Ossetia.</p> -<h4 id="assuring-allies-after-strategic-deterrence-failure">Assuring Allies after Strategic Deterrence Failure</h4> +<p>Since the Georgian Dream political party – established and led by the billionaire Bidzina Ivanishvili – entered government in Tbilisi in 2012, Georgia has followed a twin-track policy of seeking to advance NATO and EU memberships while also pursuing a policy of gradual normalisation with Moscow. With Euro-Atlantic integration unable to make real progress and with the turn to increasingly authoritarian domestic politics in Georgia in recent years, the relationship between Tbilisi, Washington and Brussels has deteriorated significantly.</p> -<p>The second key issue noted by the Project Atom 2024 designers involves how the United States can assure its allies and partners in the wake of a failure to deter limited nuclear escalation by an adversary. This is indeed an important question, as one potential adversary motivation to escalate is to shatter U.S.-led alliance cohesion. Maintaining such cohesion is critically important to the achievement of the highest priority U.S. strategic objectives in both theaters. Thus, effectively assuring U.S. allies after strategic deterrence failure is in effect an enabler of the primary war aims of the United States should a nuclear-armed adversary choose to escalate.</p> +<p>At the same time, the normalisation process with Russia has continued, even in the difficult context of the war in Ukraine. While there is little evidence that Russia has driven the breakdown in ties between Georgia and the Euro-Atlantic community, Moscow has opportunistically sought to benefit. The Georgian government has also given the impression that it is ready to move closer to Moscow if the US and Europe continue to set democracy and human rights conditions that are unacceptable to Georgian Dream.</p> -<p>Assuring allies in the immediate aftermath of adversary nuclear use, particularly if they have been the target of such use, is more complex than assurance while deterring first use. Allies might be concerned the United States will not respond forcefully enough to either restore deterrence and/or continue to defend their vital interests for fear that the conflict might escalate out of control and put the U.S. homeland at risk. Conversely, allies might fear that the U.S. response to adversary nuclear escalation will elicit further adversary nuclear escalation in the theater, putting the allies at increased risk.</p> +<p>Against this background, the October 2024 parliamentary elections were seen as a critical test of Georgia’s future. With Georgian Dream claiming victory in the disputed elections, relations with the Euro-Atlantic community appear set to deteriorate further. Following the election, the US and European countries called for an investigation into how it was conducted and, in particular, the steps taken ahead of the vote by the ruling party to ensure its victory. US President Joe Biden publicly raised concerns about the decline of democracy in Georgia.</p> -<p>Despite these legitimate concerns, allies and partners in both theaters have no credible alternatives to U.S. nuclear extended deterrence commitments. In NATO, the only non-U.S. nuclear weapons capabilities are French and British. Other NATO allies are unlikely to see those forces as credible alternatives to U.S. nuclear forces in the wake of limited nuclear deterrence failure given the vast superiority of Russian nuclear forces over those of the United Kingdom and France combined. In Asia, there are no existing alternatives to U.S. nuclear weapons capabilities whatsoever.</p> +<p>At the same time, having offered ahead of the election to facilitate Georgia’s territorial disputes as a means to promote support for Georgian Dream, Moscow will need to demonstrate that it can deliver progress on a new relationship between Georgia and the two breakaway regions that will satisfy Tbilisi. Given Moscow’s strategic investment in the nominal independence of these regions, the prospects of significant shifts over the status of Abkhazia and South Ossetia are, however, slim, likely placing an important check on how far Russia–Georgia rapprochement can advance. The Georgian government may well move closer to Russia to test Moscow’s offer, but is likely to continue to pursue multi-alignment in its foreign and security policies rather than joining Russia’s regional organisations such as the CSTO or the EAEU.</p> -<p>If U.S. responses to initial Russian or Chinese escalation make clear that the United States is willing to engage in a competition in dire risk-taking, and that Russia and China must also fear potential uncontrolled escalation, allies are likely to be reassured in the near term. The greatest fear of allies who rely on U.S. extended nuclear deterrence is that in extremis the United States will be unwilling to risk strikes on the United States homeland to defend them. A decisive early demonstration that this fear is unfounded would bolster allies’ confidence and potentially convince U.S. adversaries that they had miscalculated about the U.S. stake in the conflict, as well as about U.S. political will to defend that stake resolutely.</p> +<h4 id="economic-and-trade-relations">Economic and Trade Relations</h4> -<p>However, if the U.S. responses result in further Russian or Chinese nuclear use against U.S. allies and partners, allied confidence will likely go down. Once deterrence has failed — as evidenced by limited adversary nuclear use against U.S. allies or partners — allies will want to be reassured about our ability to defend them against such attacks, not just deter them.</p> - -<p>Decisions about how to respond to limited nuclear deterrence failure will be about how best to achieve U.S. (and allied) political-military objectives while avoiding uncontrolled escalation. If the United States succeeds in achieving its objectives while avoiding uncontrolled escalation, allies are likely to be assured. And those U.S. response decisions may need to be made too quickly to allow for extensive consultation if they are to be effective. For example, if an adversary escalates to limited nuclear use in an effort to coerce war termination on terms it can accept because it is decisively losing the conventional war, how long can we expect them to wait to see if their coercive use has had the desired effect before they decide to escalate further?</p> - -<h4 id="military-response-options-after-strategic-deterrence-failure">Military Response Options after Strategic Deterrence Failure</h4> - -<p>The third key issue raised by the Project Atom 2024 designers involves the range of potential U.S. military responses to adversary limited nuclear escalation. The relevant range of such military options will be a direct function of the political-military objectives they are designed to achieve or support.</p> - -<p>A recap of the U.S. strategic objectives identified above allows one to identify sub-objectives and military options to achieve them:</p> +<p>As an economic actor, Russia remains vital for the countries of the South Caucasus. Indeed, sanctions on Russia over its invasion of Ukraine have strengthened interdependence between Russia (and, via the EAEU, Belarus and Central Asia) and the countries of the region. The Ukraine war is having far-reaching impacts on the geo-economics of the South Caucasus, with the region’s role as an energy and trade corridor becoming even more significant, notably for Russia.</p> -<p><em>RESTORE OR MAINTAIN THE TERRITORIAL STATUS QUO ANTE</em></p> +<p>Georgia serves as an example for Moscow of how – despite the political tensions between the two governments over the occupied territories – economic cooperation has a positive impact on relations. Indeed, trade with Russia has continued to be strong in recent years. Since 2021, Georgia’s economic dependence on Russia has increased, with some sectors reliant on the Russian market. For example, in 2023, wine exports to Russia increased 5% on the previous year, with the Russian market taking 65% of Georgian wine exports, the highest level since 2013. Although there is widespread Georgian public distrust and even hostility to Russia, views on closer economic relations are mixed.</p> -<p><strong>Potential Sub-Objective:</strong> Restore U.S. or allied conventional superiority following limited adversary nuclear strikes on key U.S. or allied conventional forces.</p> +<p>For Armenia, despite the political rhetoric about souring ties, economic relations continue to flourish, with a notable rise in exports following the onset of the Ukraine war – widely seen as a result of Armenia (alongside Georgia) becoming a route to Russia for goods that avoided sanctions. Russia is Armenia’s largest trading partner, with an overall foreign trade volume in 2023 of more than 35% and notably 49.6% of Armenia’s imports coming from Russia. In 2022, the volume of trade between Armenia and Russia nearly doubled, a trend that continued through 2023 and the first months of 2024. In 2023, Russia’s over 35% share of the country’s foreign trade contrasted with the EU’s 13%. Russian companies also have considerable investments in Armenia, notably owning key parts of the energy sector and the railways, and make a substantial contribution through taxes to the national budget.</p> -<p><strong>Potential Military Options:</strong> Depends on the exact nature of the military impact of adversary nuclear use and the adversary’s own vulnerability to U.S. response options. Analysis is required to understand the range of potential targets this objective and sub-objective might dictate and to determine whether currently planned military capabilities enable effective strikes on such targets on operationally relevant timelines.</p> +<p>For Azerbaijan, which has sought to diversity its economic as well as security policy, economic ties with Russia are following a similar trajectory to its neighbours. In 2023, trade between Azerbaijan and Moscow was reported to have risen by 17.5%. Bilateral energy trade has also developed in recent years.</p> -<p><em>RESTORE DETERRENCE OF FURTHER NUCLEAR USE BY RUSSIA AND CHINA</em></p> +<h4 id="cooperation-with-regional-powers">Cooperation with Regional Powers</h4> -<p><strong>Potential Sub-Objective:</strong> Convince adversary that their nuclear escalation was a dire miscalculation regarding how the United States would respond and that further adversary escalation will fail to achieve their objectives while increasing the risk of uncontrolled escalation.</p> +<p>It would appear that Russia has implicitly accepted that it can no longer maintain primacy in the South Caucasus and that other, notably regional, powers will have roles. The Russian regionalisation policy aims at intensifying dialogue, coordination and interaction with the main regional powers engaged in the South Caucasus. Moscow has, however, tried to maintain a regional leadership position through seeking to manage informal cooperation – and competition – with Turkey and Iran. Iran has become a key ally for Russia on the international stage and both countries share an interest in developing closer ties and north–south trade links. On 25 December 2023, the EAEU signed a free-trade agreement with Iran that will eliminate customs duties on almost 90% of goods, thereby linking Russia’s regional economic integration initiative to its efforts to build a wider bloc of friendly countries beyond the post-Soviet space. While Turkey and Russia cooperate and compete in various theatres (often articulated through tactical alliances), including in the South Caucasus, they share an interest in establishing a new regional strategic equilibrium around a potential peace settlement of the Armenia–Azerbaijan confrontation.</p> -<p><strong>Potential Military Options:</strong> Must exceed either the level of violence or the strategic impact that the adversary anticipated — likely difficult to know with confidence — in order to shake their confidence in their ability to gauge how the United States might respond to further escalation. There is a potential role here for the calculated revelation of capabilities of which the adversary was previously unaware that have potentially decisive military effects (“You didn’t tell me they could do that. What else don’t I know?”).</p> +<p>Institutionally, Russia supports the 3 + 3 South Caucasus Regional Cooperation Platform format, which sets the stage for the direct participation of Iran and Turkey in determining the future of the region – although Georgia has, to date, boycotted the grouping. Speaking at the October 2024 meeting of the 3 + 3 format, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov indicated that Armenia and Azerbaijan should use the platform to negotiate their peace agreement.</p> -<p><em>AVOID UNCONTROLLED NUCLEAR ESCALATION</em></p> +<h4 id="the-armeniaazerbaijan-peace-settlement">The Armenia–Azerbaijan Peace Settlement</h4> -<p><strong>Potential Sub-Objective:</strong> Convince adversary that U.S. nuclear responses and conventional operations are being conducted in pursuit of limited war aims that do not constitute an immediate threat to state survival and do not constitute the initiation of a large-scale counterforce attack designed to negate their strategic nuclear deterrent.</p> +<p>A resolution of the bitter Armenia–Azerbaijan relationship through a peace agreement and subsequent process of normalisation stands at the centre of the potential transformation of the South Caucasus. Agreement between Baku and Yerevan would open the region for investment in transport, trade, energy and communications projects, unlock closed borders, and create some of the conditions for Armenia–Turkey normalisation. The nature of an agreement would also have a profound impact on the balance of power within the South Caucasus. For these reasons, the negotiations between Armenia and Azerbaijan have become a focus of external actors, with Russia, the EU (notably France and Germany) and the US jockeying for influence and a role in the negotiations.</p> -<p><strong>Potential Military Options:</strong> Avoid strikes that threaten the adversary’s ability to detect nuclear attacks, command and control their nuclear forces, etc. Pair messaging about the purpose of the U.S. response with promises of U.S. restraint if Russia or China were to cease nuclear use.</p> +<p>With Azerbaijan’s victory in its two military campaigns in 2020 and 2023 to reclaim the occupied territories and the Nagorno-Karabakh region, Russia’s previous leverage around the protracted conflict collapsed as the OSCE Minsk Group process (the diplomatic mechanism established in 1992 to facilitate negotiations to end the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh under the co-chairmanship of the US, Russia and France) was marginalised, Moscow’s leverage as the leading arms supplier to both sides evaporated, and Baku sought to move negotiations between different formats and ultimately to push successfully for direct bilateral Armenia–Azerbaijan contacts as the way forward to exclude third parties (principally Russia, the US and the EU).</p> -<p><em>DEMONSTRATE ADVERSARY LIMITED NUCLEAR ESCALATION DID NOT RESULT IN MEANINGFUL POLITICAL-MILITARY GAINS</em></p> +<p>With the departure of Russian “peacekeepers” from Nagorno-Karabakh in April 2024, as well as pressure on the Russian relationship with Armenia, Moscow’s ability to use security to shape developments on the ground has been undermined. Instead, it has sought to reposition itself diplomatically to shape developments so that an eventual peace agreement would also serve Russian interests.</p> -<p><strong>Potential Sub-Objectives:</strong> Send a message to the adversary in the second theater of conflict that limited nuclear escalation is unlikely to have the coercive effects they seek. Send a message to future potential adversaries that there is no nuclear coercive offramp from failed conventional aggression against the United States and its allies.</p> +<p>Moscow’s goals have been to ensure that Russia has a central role in any agreements about the future shape and management of land transport and communications infrastructure in the South Caucasus, that the Euro-Atlantic community is marginalised, and that the region’s immediate neighbours (Russia, Turkey and Iran) emerge as the key regional arbiters – with Moscow in the lead role. Russia has sought to insert itself into the key issue of a transport corridor across Armenia and to ensure that the INSTC, which is vital to its ability to build economic and trade links to the south, goes ahead. Moscow views a role in these areas as critical to ensuring its regional influence, notably in the Armenia–Azerbaijan relationship.</p> -<p><strong>Potential Military Options:</strong> Almost all the options noted above could serve this purpose if effective in denying the adversary their objectives and in making clear that further nuclear escalation increases the risk of uncontrolled escalation. The nature and extent of U.S. and allied resolve must be messaged appropriately.</p> +<p>The partnership with Azerbaijan has become central to Russia’s efforts to advance this agenda – notably as the transatlantic community has increasingly aligned to support Armenia, leading to growing tensions with Baku. In August 2024, the visit of Russian Security Council Secretary Sergey Shoigu to Baku underlined how the variety of Russian regional interests are now being channelled through the bilateral relationship. In a meeting with President Aliyev, Shoigu highlighted the intersection of the peace negotiations, the development of the INSTC and the future agenda of the 3 + 3 format to manage the stabilisation of the South Caucasus, with efforts to prevent Western “meddling” in the region.</p> -<p><em>TERMINATION OF FIGHTING BETWEEN NATO/UKRAINE AND RUSSIA, CONSISTENT WITH ACHIEVEMENT OF OTHER U.S. STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES</em></p> +<h3 id="conclusion-russia-retying-the-caucasian-knot">Conclusion: Russia Retying the Caucasian Knot?</h3> -<p><strong>Potential Sub-Objective:</strong> Create facts on the ground that provide negotiating leverage that enables termination of the Ukraine conflict.</p> +<p>For most of the past two hundred years, Russia has pursued relatively stable strategic goals in relation to the South Caucasus region. At the core, Russia has focused on binding the region to itself, as a buffer zone against external encroachment. In more expansionist foreign policy phases, such as since the turn of the 21st century under Putin, the region has been seen as integral to ambitions to extend Russia’s influence and control in the Black Sea and Caspian Sea regions, as well as the Middle East. At such times, the territories and peoples of the South Caucasus have also often been viewed by Moscow as part of a wider Russian world.</p> -<p><strong>Potential Military Options:</strong> Seize more or all of Kaliningrad to use as a bargaining chip. Escalate level of NATO military intervention in Ukraine conflict.</p> +<p>With the South Caucasus undergoing a transformation, notably as result of geopolitical and geo-economic trends towards multipolarity, Russia’s regional role is displaying elements of continuity, but is increasingly characterised by change. Much of the analysis of the region sees Russia as experiencing a “managed decline” or loss of hegemony because of this process of change. The analysis in this paper, however, points to a different conclusion. Moscow is attempting to refashion its position through a renewed regional approach – seeking to retie the Caucasian knot to ensure a continuing central role for Russia in the South Caucasus, retain close links to countries in the region, and marginalise the Euro-Atlantic community.</p> -<p>There are several key issues associated with the military response options outlined above that need to be taken into account.</p> +<p>Over the past two decades, geopolitical competition with the Euro-Atlantic community in the region has been the key challenge to Russia’s ability to achieve its longstanding strategic goals. In this struggle, the Kremlin has deployed security policy as Russia’s trump card. Up until 2020, it was customary to assume that Russia’s goal in the South Caucasus was to use its security advantage to preserve a favourable status quo. Moscow’s current policy towards the region reflects a shift in some respects from this approach and indicates a changed significance of the South Caucasus in Russia’s strategic calculus.</p> -<p><em>NUCLEAR OR NONNUCLEAR RESPONSE?</em></p> +<p>Moscow has recognised that the changes in the international politics of the South Caucasus towards multipolarity have provided opportunities for the countries in the region to pursue policies of multi-alignment. This has meant that Russia can no longer approach the region as though it remains part of the post-Soviet space where it has an exclusive role, and some of its past policy levers have lost traction – notably in respect to the Armenia–Azerbaijan conflict. At the same time, the breakdown of ties with Europe and the US has forced Moscow to seek to reorient its foreign and economic ties south and east.</p> -<p>The first of these is whether the U.S. military responses to Russian or Chinese nuclear use should be nuclear or nonnuclear. If the objective of the U.S. military response is to restore deterrence of nuclear use, then there are several problems with a nonnuclear response. First, if the purpose of the adversary’s escalation was to coerce war termination on terms they can accept because they are decisively losing the conventional war, then a nonnuclear response may convince them that they simply need to hit the United States harder in pursuit of their objective. Further, they may conclude that it safe to escalate because the United States is reluctant to respond in kind for fear of uncontrolled escalation. Second, if restoring deterrence requires that the United States respond in a more severe way than anticipated by the adversary in order to convince them that they cannot be confident in predicting future U.S. responses to further escalation, then a nonnuclear response is less likely to meet this criterion.</p> +<p>Russia now looks on the South Caucasus not just as a buffer against the Euro-Atlantic community and a means to strengthen its power projection ambitions in the Black Sea and the Middle East, but also as a vital link to Iran, as well as the location of potential southern routes to access markets and build political and security ties across Eurasia. Russia is therefore rebalancing and realigning its policies to continue to be a central regional player in the South Caucasus, even if this requires a shift from its previous reliance on security policy and the ambition to exclude other external powers from the region.</p> -<p>If the U.S. objective is to restore U.S. or allied conventional superiority following limited adversary nuclear strikes, then the decision to respond with nuclear or nonnuclear weapons should hinge in part on which response is most likely to be more militarily effective. Increasing the range of relevant targets susceptible to a U.S. nuclear or nonnuclear response option would increase the range of options available to the president.</p> +<p>Moscow is today willing to accommodate and even cooperate with other international actors, notably Iran, China and even Turkey, in the South Caucasus, and it has also adapted by developing new and varied bilateral ties with the three South Caucasian states to shape the regional agenda, particularly on economic and transport issues. However, the Kremlin remains focused on blocking Euro-Atlantic integration efforts in the region, and is willing to work with other regional powers to advance this goal. Indeed, Moscow is now looking to develop its new approach in the South Caucasus as part of a larger Eurasian security initiative, driven, together with China, Iran and other partners, as a counter-West bloc.</p> -<p>Finally, for the U.S. objective of avoiding uncontrolled nuclear escalation, at first glance it might seem that nonnuclear military response options may be preferred. And in some circumstances this would be true. However, if the effect of selecting a nonnuclear response to adversary nuclear escalation is to convince the adversary that the United States is so concerned about uncontrolled escalation that it fears responding in kind, then a U.S. nonnuclear response could actually increase the risk of eventual uncontrolled escalation. This may seem counterintuitive, but if a U.S. nonnuclear response to adversary limited nuclear use results in encouraging further adversary nuclear escalation, then the U.S. nuclear responses that may eventually be required to achieve U.S. objectives are likely to be larger in scale and more provocative in their effects. This could well make uncontrolled escalation more likely.</p> +<p>Moscow is also experiencing real challenges in forging a new approach to the South Caucasus. It is having to contend with an increasingly complex region in which not only is there a diversity of other, often competitive, external actors, but also the governments of the region have a new degree of agency in developing their foreign relationships. As a result, Moscow is facing resistance to its efforts to insert itself within the central issues that could reshape the regional order, notably the Armenia–Azerbaijan peace agreement and the associated initiatives to open the region’s transport network.</p> -<p><em>STRIKE RUSSIAN OR CHINESE TERRITORY WITH NUCLEAR WEAPONS?</em></p> +<p>Faced with the prospect of being marginalised from the peace process, Putin made a rare state visit to Baku in August 2024 to promote Moscow’s regional role. The visit was marked by positive words, photo opportunities and commitments to cooperation (notably on the INSTC). Putin appeared, however, unable to reverse the steps that have seen Russia pushed out from its former regional role. Critically, since the early 1990s, Russia – together with the US and Europe – has been at the centre of diplomatic efforts to resolve the Armenia–Azerbaijan conflict. Since 2020 and the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War, Baku has, however, managed to exclude major third parties from discussions, even turning to Kazakhstan to host peace negotiations.</p> -<p>The second key issue regarding U.S. military responses to adversary limited nuclear use involves whether to strike targets on Russian or Chinese territory with nuclear weapons given the potentially escalatory nature of such action. On the one hand, strikes on the adversary’s homeland would cross a potential firebreak against uncontrolled escalation. On the other hand, making the adversary’s territory a sanctuary from U.S. limited nuclear responses could create a potentially decisive asymmetry in the ability of the two sides to achieve relevant military effects with nuclear weapons. A limited U.S. nuclear response (or a credibly communicated threat) that makes clear that Russian or Chinese territory will not be a sanctuary if the adversary continues to escalate could be effective in restoring deterrence following adversary first use. This decision in particular will be highly scenario dependent.</p> +<p>During his visit to Baku, Putin indicated, with a degree of desperation, that he would “be happy” to serve as a regional peacemaker, but neither Baku nor Yerevan has responded positively. At the same time, the decision of Armenia and Azerbaijan to exclude the issue of the Zangezur Corridor from discussions on a peace agreement struck a direct blow to Moscow’s efforts to reinsert itself between the two countries, leading to further, unsuccessful Russian diplomatic efforts.</p> -<p><em>RANGE OF AVAILABLE NUCLEAR OPTIONS</em></p> +<p>Russia’s South Caucasus policies are thus at a key moment. Moscow has recognised the importance of the shifts taking place in the region and is taking action to try to ensure that it remains a key regional player. Despite the advantages that Russia has as a consequence of history and geography and the country’s strong security policies, it is nevertheless facing a struggle to reposition itself in the South Caucasus. There is a real prospect that the Kremlin’s efforts to forge a renewed regional role may prove unsuccessful, and Moscow may emerge from the process of realignment a significantly reduced regional force. The high-level political engagement in the region, notably signalled by Putin’s visit to Baku, suggests, however, that the Kremlin is prepared to commit significant political capital to ensure that Russia remains a leading regional actor, and to show that Moscow is not ready to accept a diminished role.</p> -<p>The effectiveness of U.S. military response options in the wake of adversary limited nuclear escalation will in part be a function of the range of available nuclear options available to the U.S. president. Identifying future nuclear force and capability requirements first requires development of a future strategy for addressing the two-peer nuclear threat environment, a strategy that is likely to create new operational requirements for nuclear and conventional forces. But strategy development alone is not enough. Detailed wargaming and simulation is needed to analyze the ways in which limited nuclear use by both sides potentially affects the course of twenty-first-century conflict and escalation dynamics across a range of scenarios and strategic circumstances. Without such analysis, U.S. efforts to identify the range of nuclear options needed to address limited nuclear escalation will risk missing key insights.</p> +<h4 id="implications-for-the-euro-atlantic-community">Implications for the Euro-Atlantic Community</h4> -<p><em>HOW TO MESSAGE U.S. INTENT AND WAR AIMS PAIRED WITH A GIVEN MILITARY RESPONSE</em></p> +<p>The changing geopolitics of the South Caucasus and Russia’s shifting regional approach pose a challenge for the Euro-Atlantic community. Over the past two decades, the prospect of eventual EU and NATO integration has been the main policy framework to build support and attract regional states. The approach marries values – in support of human rights, rule of law and democratisation – with a geopolitical approach to counter Russia and its integration offer, notably through access to European markets and financial assistance.</p> -<p>As Thomas Schelling first made clear in his book Strategy of Conflict, there are certain strategic circumstances in which deterrence or the avoidance of further escalation can only be achieved if one pairs a credible threat of military response with a credible promise of restraint that provides the adversary with an acceptable, if not desirable, offramp. Given the clear role of coercive limited nuclear use in Russian strategy and doctrine, and the potential for China to adopt a similar strategy and practice when it soon acquires the necessary nuclear capabilities, the United States must determine how it will formulate and implement this pairing of threat with promise to deter such limited nuclear use. This includes not only ensuring that U.S. nuclear forces have the requisite range of capabilities to make the threat element credible and effective, but also determining what forms of restraint the United States is willing to promise and how to make such promises credible and effective in the context of a high-intensity theater conflict in which nuclear weapons have already been employed.</p> +<p>Since 2008, Moscow has, however, been able to thwart Euro-Atlantic integration through its dominance of regional security politics. Unwilling to challenge Russia’s security trump card, the Euro-Atlantic community has officially followed an open-door policy for NATO and EU membership for Georgia, and maintained a readiness to advance ties to Azerbaijan and Armenia if there is an opportunity. In reality, the EU and NATO tracks have effectively been stalled, even in the case of Georgia, which has been at the forefront of building ties.</p> -<p><em>RECOMMENDED MILITARY RESPONSE OPTIONS</em></p> +<p>With shifts in the international politics of the South Caucasus, a policy built on “strategic patience” is well past its expiry date. The changes that have affected the South Caucasus have shifted the region from being an exclusively European security region, as it was in the decades after the collapse of the Soviet Union, to one increasingly linked to the Middle East, South Asia and China. The countries of the South Caucasus now have alternative partners to the Euro-Atlantic community (and Russia), notably for trade, infrastructure investment and business, but also for the supply of weapons and for diplomatic ties. While these ties may lack the potential of Euro-Atlantic integration, they offer immediate and tangible gains, especially in comparison to the promise of a bright future of EU and NATO membership that never seems to quite arrive.</p> -<p>The final step in a scenario-based analysis of this central problem is making recommendations regarding U.S. military responses to Russian and Chinese nuclear escalation in this scenario.</p> +<p>The links to other external actors generally also come without the formal conditionality attached by the Euro-Atlantic community. The development of multipolarity has, in this way, reinforced the ability of local elites to advance illiberalism. As a result, Russian-style authoritarian politics has taken hold in Georgia and is consolidated in Azerbaijan, while democratisation remains fragile and vulnerable in Armenia. With this shift, the idea that the region will become part of the Euro-Atlantic community through eventual EU and NATO membership looks unrealistic.</p> -<p>Regarding Russian escalation, the United States should simultaneously pursue its objectives of restoring the territorial status quo ante, reestablishing deterrence of further nuclear use, and restoring U.S. and allied conventional superiority following limited Russian nuclear strikes. This could be done by executing low-yield nuclear strikes on key military targets in Kaliningrad paired with clear messaging that Russia must halt further nuclear use and that U.S. war aims are limited to restoring the territorial status quo ante vis-à-vis NATO (and possibly a return to the pre-February 2022 borders in Ukraine). However, should Russia escalate with further nuclear use, U.S. war aims might change, and U.S. military responses will become more severe.</p> +<p>This presents a dilemma for the Euro-Atlantic community: either continue to criticise non-democratic governments and risk them shifting orientation to Russia and others, or try to retain engagement but then face working with regimes that do not reflect Western values. In either option, Euro-Atlantic integration will struggle to advance. In recent years, Georgia has represented this challenge most starkly. The adoption of increasingly antidemocratic practices by Georgian Dream, the ruling party, and the cultivation of a diversity of external ties have seen a withdrawal of Euro-Atlantic security and economic support. After decades of effort to advance Tbilisi as the key Euro-Atlantic partner in the South Caucasus, Georgia was largely absent from the Washington NATO Summit Communique in 2024. An EU report on Georgia’s progress towards membership that appeared immediately after the October 2024 election appeared to indicate that the membership process was effectively frozen.</p> -<p>Regarding China, assuming Chinese forces are no longer capable of conducting a Taiwan invasion due to U.S. and allied conventional actions, simultaneously pursuing the U.S. objectives of restoring deterrence and restoring U.S. and allied conventional superiority following limited Chinese nuclear strikes (as the territorial status quo ante already is intact) could be an appropriate course of action. This could take the form of a U.S. response in kind on three of the militarized islands in the South China Sea: Mischief Reef, Subi Reef, and Fiery Cross. Such strikes would not affect the Chinese mainland and, given the U.S. position on territorial disputes in the South China Sea, would not constitute attacks on Chinese territory. This response would make clear that the United States will neither tolerate, nor be disadvantaged by, Chinese limited nuclear use. These strikes should be paired with clear messaging that U.S. war aims are limited to defending Taiwan and our regional allies and to achieving an immediate ceasefire. However, it should be kept in mind that should China escalate with further nuclear use, U.S. war aims might change and the Chinese mainland may not be a sanctuary.</p> +<p>As the Euro-Atlantic position has weakened in Georgia, there has been an effort to pivot to Armenia, including supplying security assistance and even military equipment. This will add little to Armenia’s overall defence and deterrence, but the shift risks being seen as taking sides within the region, further accelerating the militarisation of the South Caucasus and contributing to the emergence of a new round of internal divisions just as the prospects of a new regional settlement are emerging. In any case, Armenia’s prospects for Euro-Atlantic integration will be constrained by the same developments that have affected the other countries of the region – Russia’s readiness to use its range of policies, and centrally its willingness to use security and military tools, to prevent Euro-Atlantic enlargement, and the appearance of attractive alternative international partners.</p> -<h4 id="non-kinetic-response-options-after-strategic-deterrence-failure">Non-Kinetic Response Options after Strategic Deterrence Failure</h4> +<p>The risks for the Euro-Atlantic community of failing to find an effective means of engagement in the region are highlighted by Azerbaijan. Having turned away from Euro-Atlantic integration, Baku has been able to consolidate its authoritarian political order and reclaim the occupied territories and Nagorno-Karabakh, employing approaches that have led to ethnic cleansing. Euro-Atlantic actors appear largely powerless regarding either development. Indeed, Europe has been keen to develop closer energy and transport links to Azerbaijan, even as Baku has followed this domestic and foreign policy course.</p> -<p>There is a wide array of potential non-kinetic response options to adversary limited nuclear use in this scenario that could further the achievement of the U.S. strategic objectives identified above. The most important of these are the following (in descending order):</p> +<p>The Euro-Atlantic community must now look at the emerging regional realities and craft a regional policy capable of influencing contemporary developments. Given the broader confrontation with Russia, weakening Moscow’s presence in the South Caucasus and disrupting its efforts to rebuild a new regional position for itself should be at the heart of a regional strategy for the Euro-Atlantic community. A key emphasis should be on countering Moscow’s efforts to position itself in the regional trade and communications infrastructure to support its war effort and reinforce its strategic partnership with Iran.</p> -<ol> - <li> - <p>Messaging in support of achieving the purposes of U.S. military responses to adversary limited nuclear use. How this might be done has been discussed above. Formulating this kind of messaging should become part of both the political-military planning process and the presidential decision-support process.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Information actions designed to make the adversary a pariah for having been the first to violate the nuclear taboo since 1945. The purpose of this is to make it difficult, if not impossible, for third parties to side with Russia or China in the wake of their nuclear escalation, and to affect the Russian and Chinese leaderships’ decision calculus regarding further escalation.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Information actions designed to convince both elements of Russian and Chinese political and military leadership, and the Russian and Chinese populations, that their leaders’ actions are risking large-scale nuclear war and the destruction of their nations in a failing pursuit of nonessential objectives. The purpose of this is to put pressure on the leadership to terminate the conflict.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Economic actions designed to make clear that the longer the adversaries continue the war, the more long term the economic damage they will incur. This also serves the purpose of pressuring their leaderships to terminate the conflict, though it is not clear that such economic effects can be imposed on a timeline sufficient to affect relatively near-term adversary decisionmaking.</p> - </li> -</ol> +<p>The focus of Western policy should be on strengthening the sovereignty and independence of regional states and their ability to balance Russia through multi-alignment (in which context the Euro-Atlantic community can remain a leading partner), and to undermine Russia’s efforts to control them or to shepherd them into regional and international formats (such as the 3 + 3 and the BRICS) that exclude Europe and the US. This approach should also include supporting and investing in projects such as the Middle Corridor that will help economic diversification and promote external investment, while seeking to constrain projects that strengthen the Russia–Iran north–south axis and enable Moscow to reshape regional trade and transport around its own agenda.</p> -<h4 id="impact-of-the-law-of-armed-conflict-on-us-military-responses">Impact of the Law of Armed Conflict on U.S. Military Responses</h4> +<p>Supporting the Armenia–Azerbaijan peace process, including measures to build trust and confidence to overcome the legacy of conflict, will be critical, as this agreement is central to opening the region. To play such a role, the Euro-Atlantic community will need to be more effective in balancing its approaches with Armenia and Azerbaijan. Rebuilding a political relationship with Baku, which is increasingly the regional agenda-setter, to go beyond energy cooperation will be a necessary step to balance Moscow–Baku ties. If peace can be achieved, there will also be opportunities to advance regional cooperation among the South Caucasus countries, which Russia has effectively undercut to date, and which can help to balance Moscow’s policies by strengthening regional balancing.</p> -<p>Finally, Project Atom 2024 asked how U.S. policy, when U.S. nuclear planning and operations comply with the law of armed conflict, might affect U.S. military responses in this scenario. Compliance with the law of armed conflict poses no insurmountable barriers to the United States developing effective military response options in support of the array of potential strategic objectives identified in this paper.</p> +<p>While domestic political forces more favourable to the West may re-emerge in the countries of the South Caucasus, the geopolitical and geo-economic context in the region militates against the Euro-Atlantic integration model regaining traction, with its interdependent security, normative and economic elements. Russia has begun to adapt its approach to the South Caucasus as the region undergoes change, and so must the West. Support for democracy and human rights should be pursued, where realistic, but its prioritisation will need to be balanced with the geopolitical imperative of building relationships to counter Russia and its major allies.</p> -<h4 id="conclusion-4">Conclusion</h4> +<p>Enhancing coordination with Turkey on regional issues should be a priority. Ankara is continuing to strengthen its South Caucasus interests and engagement as part of a broader strategy reaching to Central Asia and across the Black Sea. An opening of the South Caucasus would inevitably see an even greater Turkish presence. As a NATO member, Turkey is uniquely placed to strengthen regional security that aligns with the wider interests of the Euro-Atlantic community, if common cause can be promoted.</p> -<p>The insights derived from this analysis make clear that there is a need to move beyond thinking only about how to deter aggression and subsequent escalation in wars with multiple nuclear-armed adversaries in the twenty-first century. The failure of deterrence of limited nuclear use would create extremely dangerous circumstances, but there are plausible ways to achieve U.S. and allied strategic objectives without automatically triggering large-scale nuclear war.</p> +<p>Without a readiness to adapt, the Euro-Atlantic community is likely to face a growing regional marginalisation and the prospect that Russia will be able to reposition itself, while the countries of the South Caucasus are likely to be drawn increasingly into regional and international groupings that exclude the US and Europe. To challenge Russia effectively and to rebuild regional influence, the Euro-Atlantic community will need to recalibrate its policies and move beyond approaches that have lost the ability to shape regional developments effectively.</p> -<p>Having said that, there is a need to expand the scope of the initial Project Atom 2024 analysis to address the full range of plausible scenarios and strategic circumstances in which the United States and its allies and partners might face the challenge of responding to a failure to deter limited nuclear use in a theater conflict with Russia or China. In the scenario addressed here, the United States and its allies find themselves rapidly and decisively winning the conventional war in both theaters simultaneously. As a result, Russian and Chinese nuclear escalation seems to be motivated by a desire to terminate the conflicts on terms they can accept before U.S. and allied conventional success further worsens the outcome. This is a very different strategic circumstance than a scenario in which an adversary is winning the conventional conflict and seeks to secure rapid victory through limited nuclear escalation, or one in which the United States is forced to consider limited nuclear first use to prevent a decisive conventional military defeat. Analysis of those and other scenarios and circumstances would likely produce new and important insights regarding the four key issues addressed in this project.</p> +<p>This will involve difficult trade-offs, including working with non-democratic regimes. It will also mean being ready to acknowledge that the South Caucasus is unlikely to be part of a wider Europe, and so should be approached through the sort of foreign and security policy frameworks that are applied to other such parts of the world, rather than through integration. While such a shift will be challenging, Russia is at a uniquely vulnerable moment in the South Caucasus as the region undergoes far-reaching change. Although Russia is already active in repairing its position, the Euro-Atlantic community nevertheless has an opportunity to help facilitate a regional realignment that could substantially constrain Moscow.</p> <hr /> -<p><strong>Heather Williams</strong> is the director of the Project on Nuclear Issues and a senior fellow in the International Security Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS).</p> - -<p><strong>Reja Younis</strong> is the associate fellow with the Project on Nuclear Issues in the International Security Program at CSIS, where she leads research on nuclear deterrence issues, nuclear strategy, and emerging technologies.</p> - -<p><strong>Lachlan MacKenzie</strong> is a research associate with the Project on Nuclear Issues in the International Security Program at CSIS.</p> - -<p><strong>Christopher Ford</strong> is professor of International Relations and Strategic Studies at Missouri State University’s Graduate School of Defense and Strategic Studies and a visiting fellow at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University.</p> - -<p><strong>Rebecca Davis Gibbons</strong> is senior associate (non-resident) with the Project on Nuclear Issues at CSIS and an assistant professor of political science at the University of Southern Maine.</p> - -<p><strong>Ankit Panda</strong> is the Stanton senior fellow in the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. His research interests include nuclear strategy, escalation, missiles and missile defense, space security, and U.S. alliances.</p> - -<p><strong>Melanie W. Sisson</strong> is a fellow in the Foreign Policy program’s Strobe Talbott Center for Security, Strategy, and Technology where she researches the use of the armed forces in international politics, strategies of deterrence, U.S. national security strategy, defense policy, and defense applications of emerging technologies.</p> +<p><strong>Neil Melvin</strong> is Director of the International Security research group at RUSI. Prior to joining RUSI, he was Director of the Armed Conflict and Conflict Management Programme and then Director of Research at the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). He has held senior adviser positions in the OSCE and the Energy Charter. He has published widely on the international and security politics of the South Caucasus.</p>Neil MelvinThis paper explores the challenge to Russia’s established position in the South Caucasus as the region undergoes significant change.Project Atom 20242024-11-18T12:00:00+08:002024-11-18T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/project-atom-2024<p><em>There is a growing risk that U.S. adversaries might resort to nuclear use in a regional conflict. To help address for this threat, the Project on Nuclear Issues invited a group of experts to develop competing strategies for responding to strategic deterrence failure.</em></p> -<p><strong>Gregory Weaver</strong> is the principal of Strategy to Plans LLC. Prior to this, he was deputy director for strategic stability on the Joint Chiefs of Staff Directorate for Strategic Plans and Policy (J5).</p>Heather Williams, et al.There is a growing risk that U.S. adversaries might resort to nuclear use in a regional conflict. To help address for this threat, the Project on Nuclear Issues invited a group of experts to develop competing strategies for responding to strategic deterrence failure.UK Sanctions On Russia2024-11-15T12:00:00+08:002024-11-15T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/uk-sanctions-on-russia<p><em>This report presents findings from the second meeting of the UK Sanctions Implementation and Strategy Taskforce, held in October 2024.</em> <excerpt></excerpt> <em>The discussion aimed to identify opportunities to optimise the use of existing sanctions regimes and enhance the effectiveness of sanctions as a strategic tool. Members provided a list of recommendations for the UK to develop a strategy which not only sends a clear signal of UK priorities, but also has a tangible impact.</em></p> +<excerpt /> <h3 id="introduction">Introduction</h3> -<p>Following Brexit, the UK had an opportunity to develop its independent sanctions framework to address the evolving geopolitical landscape and its own foreign policy messaging. This framework included a broader range of thematic and geographic sanctions regimes, targeting issues such as corruption, human rights abuses and cyber activities, while countering threats to international peace and security. In an attempt to give substance to this vision, in February 2024, the UK published its first Sanctions Strategy, outlining its approach to ensuring that sanctions are effective, giving the UK more influence in the world, and helping to “keep Britain safe”.</p> - -<p>In June 2024, RUSI’s Centre for Finance and Security set up the UK Sanctions Implementation and Strategy Taskforce, made up of 50 former UK and other government officials, senior sanctions executives from the financial sector and industry, and academics, from the UK and elsewhere. The first meeting highlighted a series of implementation challenges, such as: resourcing and expertise; engagement with industry; alignment with international partners; and the lack of a clear set of objectives for the UK’s sanctions policy. Notably, while Russia has become the focus of the UK’s sanctions response, the Taskforce also emphasised the need for a more comprehensive and flexible approach beyond Russia alone.</p> - -<p>This report presents findings from the second Taskforce meeting, which was held in October 2024. The discussion aimed to identify opportunities to optimise the use of existing sanctions regimes and enhance the effectiveness of sanctions as a strategic tool. Members provided a list of recommendations for the UK to develop a strategy which not only sends a clear signal of UK priorities, but also has a tangible impact. None of the comments made by the Taskforce members are attributable.</p> - -<h3 id="thematic-sanctions">Thematic Sanctions</h3> - -<p>The Taskforce first discussed ways to increase the effectiveness of the UK’s thematic regimes, which had been described in the previous meeting as mostly “presentational” and lacking clear criteria and vision. The discussion focused on three regimes: Global Anti-Corruption (GAC) sanctions; Global Human Rights (GHR) sanctions; and cyber sanctions.</p> - -<h3 id="global-anti-corruption-sanctions">Global Anti-Corruption Sanctions</h3> - -<p>The Taskforce recognised the steps the UK has taken to address corruption through its GAC sanctions regime. However, discussions highlighted gaps in the current approach that hinder its legitimacy and credibility, mostly linked to the lack of clarity regarding the criteria and purpose for which these sanctions are deployed, and the strategy for their use.</p> - -<p>Members reiterated the risk of sanctions targeting corruption in name only without being accompanied by genuine disruption of related networks and criminal enforcement. They described the GAC regime as an “uncomfortable fit” between sanctions and criminal enforcement, with sanctions being prioritised over the actual targeting of corruption. One Taskforce member pointed to the EU’s misappropriation sanctions regimes as a useful cautionary tale for anti-corruption sanctions. Introduced in 2011 to target corruption and financial misappropriation by government officials in Egypt and Tunisia, these sanctions regimes struggled to achieve tangible results, securing no convictions and becoming the subject of political disputes. The failure of these regimes, according to Taskforce members, resulted from a lack of criminal enforcement efforts due to limited resources and political will.</p> +<blockquote> + <h4 id="heather-williams-reja-younis-and-lachlan-mackenzie">Heather Williams, Reja Younis, and Lachlan MacKenzie</h4> +</blockquote> -<p>The Taskforce warned that without robust investigations, prosecutions and confiscations of the proceeds of corruption accompanying the rollout of anti-corruption sanctions, the GAC regime might face a similar fate and lack credibility. To ensure this does not happen, members recommended appropriate resourcing of law enforcement agencies, and stronger coordination between government agencies responsible for sanctions enforcement and criminal prosecutions. They also argued that better processes for listing and delisting would be useful for more targeted action against corrupt individuals.</p> +<p>There is a growing risk that the United States and its allies could face scenarios in which one or more adversaries might resort to nuclear weapons use in a regional conflict. This risk is especially evident in Russian strategic theory and doctrine, which envisions regional deterrence as complementing global deterrence. Some Russian military experts see the potential use of nonstrategic nuclear weapons for “de-escalation of military actions and their termination on conditions favorable to the Russian Federation,” or “a demonstration to the enemy of resolve to defend [Russia’s] interests by escalating the use of nuclear weapons (tactical) and forcing him to forego further aggression by the threat of use of strategic nuclear weapons.” Statements by North Korean leader Kim Jong-Un indicate that the country’s nuclear arsenal is also intended for deterrence in a regional conflict, such as a potential decapitation strike. Moreover, China has been rapidly expanding its nuclear arsenal for both military reasons and to gain geopolitical leverage, as argued by Tong Zhao, such as upholding its “core interests” in Taiwan.</p> -<p>Another Taskforce member stressed the disparity between the UK’s efforts to combat corruption at home and its actions abroad. Noting the UK’s recent decline in international rankings such as Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index, they argued that the lack of focus on domestic corruption weakens the UK’s credibility in the global fight against corruption and its sanctions response.</p> +<p>Due to these growing risks of regional crisis escalation with potential for nuclear use, U.S. decisionmakers are revisiting the concept of intra-war deterrence, which is about influencing enemy actions during an ongoing conflict. The risks of deterrence failure have been a focal point in the testimony of recent U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM) commanders, including Admiral Charles Richard, who noted in 2020 that STRATCOM conducted analysis into the risks of strategic deterrence failure, and General Anthony Cotton, who said, “We must be ready if deterrence fails” in testimony in February 2024. Intra-war deterrence operates on the premise that in an active conflict, threats can be leveraged to shape an adversary’s actions and set boundaries on the intensity and nature of military engagement. This concept underpinned much Cold War strategic thinking. One fundamental challenge of intra-war deterrence is how to balance deterrence objectives with war-fighting objectives. As W. Andrew Terrill writes regarding the mismatch of these objectives, “a state pursuing such [an intra-war] policy is waging war against another nation while seeking to prevent its opponent from responding with all of the weapons that it possesses. Such a task is . . . challenging since both sides usually seek to use as much of their capabilities as possible to optimize their chances of victory.”</p> -<p>To increase international credibility, Taskforce members suggested complementing anti-corruption sanctions, measures to tackle domestic corruption, and criminal enforcement with capacity-building in target countries, particularly in the Global South. One member from civil society cautioned that a failure to cooperate with local justice systems could result in sanctions being perceived as neocolonial, undermining their legitimacy and impact.</p> +<p>To assist in this thinking and to develop actionable insights for the U.S. policy and strategy communities, the Project on Nuclear Issues (PONI) invited a group of experts to develop competing strategies for responding to strategic deterrence failure. This study revives a concept and approach that the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) developed a decade ago to review U.S. nuclear strategy and posture for 2025–2050. The project’s current contributors were each asked to respond to a scenario involving near-simultaneous battlefield nuclear use by Russia and China. The strategies focused on four specific themes: strategic objectives, assurance to allies, military responses, and non-kinetic responses. The strategies demonstrate agreement on key issues, such as the importance of deterring conventional aggression and the relevance of non-kinetic responses to adversary nuclear use. But the strategies also highlight important areas of disagreement about the relative importance and feasibility of assuring allies, at least relative to other strategic objectives; the advisability of a nuclear versus conventional response to deterrence failure; and what “winning” in a strategic deterrence failure scenario would look like. While many people may disagree with these positions, PONI welcomes a diverse range of views, which can help foster a robust debate. CSIS does not take an institutional view, and the views presented here are those of the individual contributors.</p> -<h3 id="global-human-rights-sanctions">Global Human Rights Sanctions</h3> +<p>After providing an overview of the authors’ competing strategies, this chapter presents the project’s guiding assumptions and analytic framework. This introductory analysis then distills three principles for intra-war deterrence: establishing (or maintaining) regional deterrence, restoring assurance, and planning precrisis for intra-war deterrence. These principles capture areas of consensus among the strategies while also engaging with areas of disagreement in order to identify which policy options are best suited for the current strategic environment.</p> -<p>The Taskforce also discussed GHR sanctions, which have become a prominent aspect of the UK’s independent sanctions regime, particularly through the Global Human Rights Sanctions Regulations 2020. GHR sanctions allow the UK to target individuals and entities involved in serious human rights violations by freezing their assets and restricting their travel. While recognising the value of these sanctions in principle, Taskforce members noted that the sanctions were far from realising their full potential.</p> +<h4 id="competing-strategies-for-intra-war-deterrence">Competing Strategies for Intra-War Deterrence</h4> -<p>One primary concern raised by Taskforce members was that human rights sanctions often do not serve their intended purpose of deterrence, but are instead adopted as a form of punishment. The discussions highlighted that, similarly to GAC sanctions, GHR sanctions often operate in a vacuum, without the support of additional efforts to promote human rights globally. Some participants suggested including GHR sanctions in a broader human rights strategy, combining them, for instance, with diplomatic efforts and criminal prosecution of human rights abuses.</p> +<p>As a foundation for Project Atom’s analysis, PONI provided the authors a scenario that features concurrent nuclear aggression from the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and Russia. The scenario, set in 2027, is predicated on the following assumptions:</p> -<p>Taskforce members from the legal sector also noted that these kinds of sanctions are in place indefinitely, with little evidence that they influence the behaviour of the targeted individuals or regimes. This situation, combined with a lack of clear criteria for lifting human rights sanctions or explanation of the reasoning behind designations, raises questions about the long-term purpose and effectiveness of these sanctions, and risks reducing their overall legitimacy. Taskforce members stressed the need to gather more data on the impact of GHR sanctions on the ground, for instance by establishing collaboration with local organisations to assess whether the sanctions were providing accountability for human rights abusers or deterring further abuses.</p> +<ul> + <li> + <p>Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin remain the leaders of the PRC and Russia, respectively.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>The PRC and Russia have not relinquished their territorial claims — that is, the PRC continues to pursue “reunification” with Taiwan, and Russia maintains its claims on annexed Ukrainian territory.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>The war in Ukraine continues as a stalemate. Western aid for Ukraine continues.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Western sanctions damage the Russian economy and drive continued economic cooperation between Russia and the PRC.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Russia manages to partially rebuild its conventional military despite low GDP growth, related financial challenges, and ongoing fighting.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>PRC GDP growth stabilizes between 3 and 4 percent, compared to the United States’ approximately 2 percent. The two economies remain deeply intertwined.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>The United States and its allies proceed with their planned defense modernization and preparedness efforts. The United States forward deploys additional forces to Europe and the Indo-Pacific.</p> + </li> +</ul> -<h3 id="cyber-sanctions">Cyber Sanctions</h3> +<p>By March 2027 in this scenario, Taiwan’s domestic political landscape has shifted decisively against reunification. In response to pro-independence statements from Taiwanese presidential candidates, PRC officials begin to publicly discuss using military force to achieve reunification. In the ensuing weeks, the U.S. intelligence community observes the beginnings of a PRC military buildup in Fujian Province.</p> -<p>Cyber sanctions have also emerged as a growing area of focus for the UK, particularly as cybercrime and state-sponsored cyber activities have become more prevalent. These sanctions aim to disrupt the financial operations of cyber-criminals and state-backed actors involved in malicious cyber activities.</p> +<p>Around the same time as this buildup, Xi and Putin host a summit at which Putin voices support for the PRC’s position on Taiwan. The two leaders announce joint naval drills in the Pacific to coincide with Russian conventional and nuclear exercises near Russia’s Western borders in mid-May.</p> -<p>Taskforce members noted that compliance with cyber sanctions is not particularly complex for financial institutions (FIs) in terms of screening, but that challenges arise with tracing the broader criminal networks involved in cybercrime. Similarly to GAR and GHR sanctions, the key challenge was the lack of criteria clarifying what it takes for a specific network to be sanctioned. Some members noted that the more cyber sanctions designations there are, the easier it is for the industry to learn and comply. However, for cyber sanctions, as well as for other lists, designations are often the result of the work of pressure groups or the gathering of information found in the public domain, which can be altered. Participants noted that this made it difficult for the private sector to understand why sanctions targeted some groups rather than others. Some Taskforce members from the private sector also argued that FIs do not operate in an active intelligence-sharing community within the sector, with banks only seeing data at their disposal and becoming overreliant on information in the public domain.</p> +<p>In preparation for what they consider an imminent threat, the United States and its allies signal that “wars of conquest will be punished” and bolster their defensive postures through expanded forward deployments and elevated readiness levels in both Europe and the Indo-Pacific. In the weeks preceding the joint PRC-Russian exercise, a Ukrainian offensive makes significant gains and threatens Russian control of Crimea.</p> -<p>According to the Taskforce, any information that authorities can provide will make a difference. An example of new approaches to mitigating this challenge is the US Office of Foreign Assets Control’s move to add IP and virtual wallet addresses to sanctions designation details; FIs can input these addresses into their compliance systems to support their efforts to unveil the networks involved.</p> +<p>On May 14, the joint PRC-Russian naval exercise begins in the Western Pacific. The following day, the PRC begins missile strikes on Taiwan in preparation for a full-scale invasion. On May 16, Russia conducts conventional missile strikes against Polish transportation infrastructure. Xi and Putin release statements justifying their own actions and supporting the other’s.</p> -<p>Members of the Taskforce also stressed the legal and operational grey areas for insurers. They noted that insurers may face conflicting obligations: on the one hand, they may be required to pay claims to clients affected by ransomware, but on the other hand, if they identify a designated entity to be behind a ransomware attack, they must avoid making payments because that would violate sanctions. To overcome this issue, the Taskforce recommended the UK issues clearer guidelines on how insurers should handle claims related to ransomware attacks, and share best practices on how to identify and prevent cyber-related sanctions violations.</p> +<p>NATO promptly invokes Article 5, and the United States and its allies begin highly successful conventional campaigns against the PRC and Russia. In the Indo-Pacific, U.S. and allied forces interdict PRC landing craft before they reach Taiwan. Heavy People’s Liberation Army (PLA) casualties prompt limited anti-mobilization protests across China. In Europe, Polish and Lithuanian forces push into Kaliningrad Oblast and threaten to seize Kaliningrad City. NATO states begin to deploy forces to Ukraine, while Ukrainian forces advance with NATO assistance and prepare for an invasion of Crimea.</p> -<h3 id="geographic-sanctions">Geographic Sanctions</h3> +<p>On June 2, Russia strikes Polish transportation infrastructure and NATO forces threatening Kaliningrad with low-yield (&lt; 10 kt) nuclear weapons, inflicting approximately 1,000 casualties (including some Americans). Putin warns NATO of “total annihilation” if it does not cease its “aggression.” On June 3, the PRC conducts a 50 kt nuclear strike on a U.S. naval base in the Philippines, resulting in 15,000 casualties. Xi Jinping warns that “Anyone aiding the splitists in Taiwan . . . will face the wrath of a people determined to rejuvenate their nation at any cost.”</p> -<p>The Taskforce discussed strategies to enhance the effectiveness of the UK’s country-specific sanctions. Members emphasised the importance of maintaining a balanced approach, ensuring that the focus on Russia does not overshadow other critical sanctions regimes, such as those applied to North Korea and Iran. These states continue to pose significant global security threats through their illicit activities and development of nuclear and other weapons programmes. However, the implementation and enforcement of related sanctions regimes have seen reduced focus in recent years.</p> +<h4 id="comparing-strategies-for-intra-war-deterrence">Comparing Strategies for Intra-War Deterrence</h4> -<p>Taskforce members identified common challenges related to the current geographic regimes. First, they pointed out the persistence across multiple regimes of similar sanctions-evasion practices. For instance, North Korea’s continued use of ship-to-ship oil transfers, flag-hopping, smuggling, and collaboration with other sanctioned countries enable it to evade sanctions and sustain the development of its nuclear weapons programme, while also serving as a blueprint for other sanctioned jurisdictions, such as Russia. According to participants, the cessation of the UN Panel of Experts on North Korea, which previously played a key role in monitoring and reporting on suspicions of sanctions evasion, has also weakened oversight and enforcement, and increased evading activities. Taskforce members agreed that there was an opportunity for the UK to assume a leadership role in ensuring that sanctions violations are properly monitored and addressed. They suggested: expanding sanctions designations to cover individuals and entities involved in facilitating partnerships among sanctioned jurisdictions; ensuring the adequate coordination of geographically divided desks within UK government departments; and implementing measures to cut off access to shared resources and illicit networks.</p> +<p>The PONI team provided experts with four framing assumptions and respective guiding questions as an analytical framework, which are discussed later in this introduction. This report contains five chapters, each of which constitutes a distinct strategy for intra-war deterrence. A comparison of the strategies across the analytical framework is provided in Tables 1–4; discussion of the framing assumptions then follows.</p> -<p>Second, as regimes such as North Korea and Russia progressively disengage from Western financial and corporate ecosystems to avoid sanctions, there are fewer opportunities to disrupt evasion activities through the compliance efforts of Western businesses. Some Taskforce members from the insurance community emphasised that overcompliance by the private sector may exacerbate this issue. They noted that, while some government officials view overcompliance as a positive trend that keeps businesses away from high-risk activities, those officials neglect the resulting unintended consequences, such as the creation of parallel structures by sanctioned entities outside the scope of G7 regulatory oversight. Members cited the growing role of Russia’s shadow fleet as an example of this. The oil price cap (OPC) was designed to leverage the fact that 90% of the world’s ocean-going tonnage was insured by Protection and Indemnity (P&amp;I) Clubs in the International Group, all of which are based in G7 countries, and the clubs could therefore police the sanctions. However, Russia has moved away from Western services through the development of the shadow fleet, which now reportedly transports 90% of Russian crude oil, beyond Western oversight. Taskforce members recommended that the UK expand the designations of vessels involved in violations of the OPC to strengthen the enforcement of maritime sanctions.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/YNVe0OD.png" alt="image01" /> +<em>▲ Table 1: Comparing Strategies for Intra-War Deterrence — U.S. Strategic Objectives</em></p> -<p>Furthermore, representatives from the P&amp;I insurance community noted that they are largely unconcerned with North Korean sanctions, because vessels associated with the country rarely enter Western ports or rely on major Western insurers. However, this leads to a knowledge gap within the insurance and shipping sectors, where companies have little direct experience dealing with North Korea’s maritime operations, and may therefore be ill-prepared to address the sophisticated evasion techniques being used.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/SEs7pgx.png" alt="image02" /> +<em>▲ Table 2: Comparing Strategies for Intra-War Deterrence — Assuring Allies</em></p> -<p>Third, the current system relies heavily on private data providers for information to conduct sanctions screening, without a guarantee of the accuracy of the data they provide. The absence of centralised oversight or clear competency in the management of entity-screening systems means that many organisations may be operating with outdated or incomplete information, reducing the overall effectiveness of sanctions. Taskforce members reiterated the need for the UK government to expand its collaboration with industry and provide more information about sanctioned entities and suspected involved actors, to support compliance in the private sector, reflecting the national security priority placed on the use of sanctions. To address this, a Taskforce member suggested exploring opportunities for industry secondments, where experienced professionals from the private sector could work within government agencies to improve mutual understanding of industry-specific challenges. Such initiatives could bridge the gap between government and industry, accelerating the development of more effective sanctions policies and improving compliance across sectors.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/M3vYNnZ.png" alt="image03" /> +<em>▲ Table 3: Comparing Strategies for Intra-War Deterrence — Military Response Options</em></p> -<p>Fourth, participants stressed challenges in the enforcement of geographic sanctions similar to those found in the enforcement of thematic regimes. According to one participant, the issue with enforcement is rooted in the lack of proactivity in investigations – the launch of an investigation is often reliant on self-reporting – and the number and amount of fines imposed, which do not act as a deterrent in comparison to the cost of compliance. Members recommended a speedier upscaling and expansion of the remit and resources of agencies responsible for enforcing sanctions. To achieve this, the UK should consider a more collaborative and unified approach to improve information sharing; an increase in resources across the whole sanctions architecture; and greater engagement with industry.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/gD1348E.png" alt="image04" /> +<em>▲ Table 4: Comparing Strategies for Intra-War Deterrence — Non-Kinetic Response Options</em></p> -<p>Fifth, consistent with the point raised for GAC/GHR sanctions, the Taskforce noted that the UK should lay out a clear series of actions required for the wind-down of sanctions for geographic regimes. While the grounds for which sanctions were adopted against actors such as Russia remain active, planning for the eventuality of a wind-down or an offramp helps to avoid the unintended consequences of overly extended sanctions. Ensuring that sanctions are well-targeted and calibrated, both in the short and the long term, will help maintain the UK’s credibility and the strategic effectiveness of sanctions in achieving a behavioural change in their targets.</p> +<h4 id="framing-assumptions">Framing Assumptions</h4> -<h3 id="recommendations">Recommendations</h3> +<p><em>U.S. STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES</em></p> -<p>To improve the credibility and legitimacy of the UK’s thematic and geographic sanctions regimes, Taskforce members provided the following recommendations:</p> +<p><strong>Assumption #1:</strong> In the event that strategic deterrence fails and an adversary has used a single or multiple nuclear weapons, the United States will be forced to confront competing priorities to uphold security commitments to allies, manage further escalation, and resolve the conflict on terms favorable to the United States. The adversaries may assume they have more at stake in a regional crisis than the United States and thereby question U.S. resolve. This raises the following questions with regard to U.S. strategic objectives in the event of strategic deterrence failure:</p> -<ol> +<ul> <li> - <p><strong>Strengthen and unify the UK government architecture.</strong> Effective sanctions implementation and enforcement require greater coordination between the various government departments involved, including the FCDO, the Treasury and the Home Office – and, where relevant, intelligence services. A more unified approach is needed to ensure that sanctions are implemented consistently across departments and that existing programmes are aligned. The UK should consider developing an integrated sanctions “agency” model that would address any inter-institutional competitiveness, gaps and/or opportunities for miscommunication; improve information-sharing; and simplify reporting obligations for the private sector.</p> + <p>In what ways, if any, did the United States fail to demonstrate resolve and commitment to its strategic objectives in the lead-up to nuclear use? Why did deterrence fail? Could anything have been done to prevent strategic deterrence failure?</p> </li> <li> - <p><strong>Expand and review the list of designated entities and individuals.</strong> The processes and criteria for listing individuals and entities under both thematic and geographic regimes should be reviewed, to ensure sanctions meet the intended goals and are reaching the right targets. The UK should also continue broadening its sanctions on entities and individuals, particularly those involved in facilitating sanctions evasion. This includes targeting and sharing information with the private sector on shell companies, financial intermediaries and other entities that play a role in efforts to circumvent sanctions beyond the Western ecosystem.</p> + <p>What are the United States’ core objectives in this scenario, and how should the United States prioritize its strategic objectives? Is one area of operations more important than another in this scenario?</p> </li> <li> - <p><strong>Provide more and better data.</strong> The UK government should focus on improving the quality and accessibility of data used in its sanctions regimes. This includes providing FIs and other private sector actors with up-to-date and accurate data, incorporating newer data points such as IP and virtual wallet addresses. Additional training and capacity building should be offered to both government agencies and private sector firms, particularly smaller companies, to ensure their expertise in managing the increasing volume and complexity of data involved in sanctions enforcement.</p> + <p>What does “winning” look like? How would the United States know if deterrence has been “restored”?</p> </li> +</ul> + +<p>Identifying and prioritizing strategic objectives will be critical following adversary nuclear use, and this will require understanding why deterrence failed. Authors reached different conclusions on this point. Ford, on one hand, concludes that deterrence failed because of adversary perceptions about U.S. credibility that had built up over years. He argues that there may have been nothing that U.S. policymakers could have done to deter adversary aggression in the immediate run-up to the crisis. Panda, on the other hand, points to the swift defeat of adversary conventional forces as a primary driver of escalation, adding that the adversary may believe that limited nuclear use can deter the United States from further involvement. Weaver suggests that the United States may have failed to credibly signal its resolve to defend its allies and partners but acknowledges that deterrence failure may have alternatively stemmed from adversary miscalculations about their abilities to fight and win conventional conflicts against the United States and its partners.</p> + +<p>While the authors agree about the importance of avoiding full-scale nuclear war following deterrence failure, they disagree about the relevance and prioritization of other strategic objectives. Sisson, for example, identifies only two U.S. strategic objectives: preventing general nuclear war and preventing further nuclear detonations of any type in any location. Similarly, Panda writes that “no objective should be greater for the president of the United States than ensuring that the survival of the country is not threatened by the prospect of uncontrollable escalation into a general nuclear war.” Ford and Gibbons also both list avoiding nuclear war as the primary U.S. objective but identify a range of secondary strategic objectives, including denying the adversary battlefield victory, denying the adversary any advantage specifically from having used nuclear weaponry, and maintaining alliance relationships. Conversely, Weaver lists four strategic objectives: (1) restoring the territorial status quo ante; (2) restoring nuclear deterrence; (3) avoiding general nuclear war; and (4) denying the adversary any benefit from nuclear use.</p> + +<p><em>ASSURING ALLIES</em></p> + +<p><strong>Assumption #2:</strong> The United States will remain committed to allies’ security and their vital national interests in the event of strategic deterrence failure. For example, if NATO Article 5 is invoked, the United States will respond. Therefore, at least one U.S. objective (from above) will be continuing to assure and demonstrate credibility and resolve to allies. Partners, however, remain in a somewhat ambiguous position in the event of direct military attacks or nuclear strikes. This raises the following questions with regard to allies and partners in the event of strategic deterrence failure:</p> + +<ul> <li> - <p><strong>Improve public-private collaboration.</strong> Regular consultations with FIs, technology companies and other private sector actors are essential to ensure that sanctions are effectively implemented and that their design has the best chance of success. The UK government should establish a formal mechanism for ongoing dialogue with the private sector, focusing on emerging challenges such as cyber sanctions and ransomware, and ensuring that companies have the guidance they need to comply with sanctions regulations.</p> + <p>What are the risks — and their likelihoods and potential consequences — of allies questioning U.S. credibility in the event of strategic deterrence failure?</p> </li> <li> - <p><strong>Balance domestic and international efforts.</strong> The UK government must align its domestic efforts with its international actions. This includes strengthening domestic anti-corruption laws, frameworks and enforcement mechanisms to complement the GAC regime. The UK should also focus on diplomatic engagement and capacity-building initiatives in strategic jurisdictions, such as providing training to law enforcement agencies or supporting the development of local anti-corruption frameworks, recognising that sanctions are one tool in a wider foreign policy toolbox.</p> + <p>What will be allies’ security concerns in the event of strategic deterrence failure? What role might certain allies and partners play in a response?</p> </li> <li> - <p><strong>Enhance sanctions enforcement capabilities.</strong> Enforcement of sanctions has been inconsistent, with significant gaps in the UK’s ability to investigate and prosecute sanctions violations. The UK government should introduce clearer enforcement guidelines, similar to the framework established under the Bribery Act, to ensure penalties for sanctions violations are appropriate and proportional and focus on genuine sanctions evaders rather than low-hanging fruit. Furthermore, the UK government must increase funding and resources to enable more effective investigations and prosecutions.</p> + <p>How can the United States signal resolve to allies in the event of strategic deterrence failure? How does this differ from signaling resolve to non-treaty partners?</p> </li> +</ul> + +<p>Based on their differing assessments about the most pressing U.S. strategic objectives, the authors disagree about the importance and feasibility of assuring allies following adversary nuclear use. Panda argues that, given that any U.S. president is likely to prioritize protecting the U.S. homeland above all, severe damage to U.S. credibility is a forgone conclusion in the event of strategic deterrence failure. He writes that the United States would face “insurmountable” assurance and credibility challenges following nuclear use and that “it is highly likely that following strategic deterrence failure, allied perceptions of the credibility of the United States would suffer drastically.” Sisson suggests that the defense of Ukraine and Taiwan should be a primary U.S. war aim but maintains that avoiding further nuclear use of any type should be the United States’ first objective.</p> + +<p>Ford, Gibbons, and Weaver, on the other hand, argue that assuring allies should be one of the United States’ primary strategic objectives. Ford and Gibbons both suggest that a nuclear response to deterrence failure is not necessary to reassure allies. Ford writes that the United States is not obligated to use any specific weapons in defense of its allies, as long as it does effectively defend them against aggression. He also argues that that, on the facts of the scenario, “continuing to prosecute a successful conventional campaign” and deny the adversary any benefits from nuclear weapons use “should represent an optimal answer from U.S. allies’ perspectives.” Weaver offers that the U.S. response that deters further aggression while avoiding uncontrollable escalation will be the optimal response from an allied perspective.</p> + +<p><em>MILITARY RESPONSE OPTIONS</em></p> + +<p><strong>Assumption #3:</strong> The president will consider a combination of kinetic and non-kinetic response options in the event of strategic deterrence failure. Options might include the use — or explicit threatened use — of nuclear weapons, naval deployments, or boots on the ground. This raises the following questions with regard to military response options in the event of deterrence failure:</p> + +<ul> <li> - <p><strong>Enhance maritime enforcement.</strong> Given Russia’s and North Korea’s reliance on maritime sanctions evasion tactics, the UK government should invest in better maritime tracking systems, and coordinate with international partners to improve enforcement in key shipping lanes. It should prioritise targeted actions against vessels involved in ship-to-ship transfers and flag-hopping, along with secondary sanctions on facilitators of these activities. The UK government should ensure it takes a leadership role in the newly formed Multilateral Sanctions Monitoring Team, leveraging its expertise in key areas such as maritime sanctions and financial services in support of this renewed initiative.</p> + <p>What would be the president’s military options in the event of strategic deterrence failure? Which of these options would you recommend to the president?</p> </li> <li> - <p><strong>Combine sanctions with criminal enforcement.</strong> To ensure the effectiveness of sanctions, they must be deployed together with additional tools, such as robust criminal justice responses. Sanctions should be accompanied by more investigations, prosecutions and confiscations of criminal proceeds. Law enforcement agencies such as the Combating Kleptocracy Cell should intensify their efforts to prosecute money laundering and corruption offences, together with sanctions evasion offences.</p> + <p>What are the risks associated with a military response?</p> </li> <li> - <p><strong>Improve monitoring and impact assessment.</strong> The UK government should invest in monitoring and evaluation mechanisms to assess the impact of its sanctions regimes. For instance, the FCDO could collaborate with international partners and local organisations to gather data on the effects of sanctions on the ground. Regular assessments can both help to ensure that sanctions are achieving their intended outcomes and inform decisions about whether they should remain in place or whether new ones should be adopted.</p> + <p>What are the signaling objectives of military response options? How will these options contribute to conflict termination on terms favorable to the United States?</p> </li> <li> - <p><strong>Establish a roadmap for lifting sanctions.</strong> The UK government should develop a framework for reviewing and potentially rolling back sanctions. This framework should include specific benchmarks for compliance, such as changes in the behaviour of the targeted individuals or regimes. Sanctions should be seen as a tool for encouraging behavioural change, not just as a punishment. Any wind-down needs to be coordinated with international partners to avoid creating loopholes or undermining the overall sanctions regime. This is applicable across all sanctions regimes to ensure that sanctions have a clear endgame that compels targets to change their behaviour in exchange for sanctions relief.</p> + <p>In the event of strategic deterrence failure, how strictly should the United States observe the law of armed conflict (i.e., principles of proportionality and discrimination)? How much should it influence the strategy?</p> </li> -</ol> +</ul> -<p>The Taskforce agreed that sanctions have become a preferred tool in the UK’s foreign policy arsenal, particularly in the wake of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. However, as the scope and complexity of sanctions continues to expand, the Taskforce was clear that the UK government must ensure that the entirety of its sanctions regimes remain effective. By implementing the recommendations outlined in this report, the UK government can enhance the effectiveness of its thematic and geographic sanctions, ensuring that they achieve real impact in both disrupting illicit activities and promoting international security. Failure to address these issues risks reducing the UK’s sanctions regime to a largely symbolic tool, rather than one that drives meaningful change on the global stage.</p> +<p>While the authors agree on the need for some form of military response to adversary nuclear use, their proposed responses differ significantly. Panda, Ford, and Gibbons each recommend conventional responses to adversary nuclear use. Gibbons and Panda endorse conventional strikes against the adversaries’ forces that were directly responsible for nuclear strikes against U.S. partners and allies. Though he argues that the United States needs to be prepared to use nuclear weapons if the adversaries were to use them again, Ford suggests that U.S. and allied forces should “fight through” adversary nuclear use here and continue their already successful conventional campaigns with slight changes in posture to better prepare for the possibility of further adversary nuclear use.</p> -<hr /> +<p>Weaver is the only author to propose a nuclear response. He concludes that a conventional response would be problematic for several reasons, including that it may simply encourage adversaries to escalate further.</p> -<p><strong>Gonzalo Saiz</strong> is a Research Fellow at the Centre for Finance and Security at RUSI, focusing on sanctions and counter-threat finance. His research focuses on sanctions implementation, circumvention and evasion tactics, and sanctions enforcement, primarily through SIFMANet (Sanctions and Illicit Finance Monitoring and Analysis Network). Gonzalo’s reseach on counter-threat finance includes work on the abuse of non-profit organisations for terrorist financing, crime-enabled terrorist financing, and the financing of right-wing extremism.</p> +<p>Sisson proposes the most restrained response to adversary nuclear use. She suggests that, to avoid further escalation, U.S. and allied forces should cease offensive military operations and look instead to hold the line against further adversary aggression and rely on non-kinetic options.</p> -<p><strong>Maria Nizzero</strong> is a Research Fellow at the Centre for Finance and Security at RUSI. Her research examines the UK, EU and global financial crime landscape, asset recovery and sanctions, and the foreign policy dimension of illicit finance. Maria holds a PhD in International Public Law and International Relations from the Universitat Pompeu Fabra in Barcelona, where she was an Associate Professor for four years, teaching EU Politics and Institutions.</p>Gonzalo Saiz and Maria NizzeroThis report presents findings from the second meeting of the UK Sanctions Implementation and Strategy Taskforce, held in October 2024.U.S. Public Diplomacy Now2024-11-14T12:00:00+08:002024-11-14T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/us-public-diplomacy-now<p><em>The United States needs to rethink public diplomacy in an era dominated by great-power competition. U.S. public diplomacy must work harder than ever to showcase the superior attractiveness and value of the United States and its policies over competing alternatives.</em></p> +<p><em>NON-KINETIC RESPONSE OPTIONS</em></p> -<excerpt /> +<p><strong>Assumption #4:</strong> The U.S. political and military leadership would consider non-kinetic response options across the diplomacy-information-military-economics (DIME) spectrum. Many of these capabilities might overlap across domains, and the authors were given discretion to decide what are military versus diplomatic, information, economic, or other non-kinetic response options. Possibilities such as economic sanctions, building international pressure, or information operations would likely be part of the U.S. response to a strategic deterrence failure. This raises the following questions with regard to non-kinetic response options in the event of deterrence failure:</p> -<p>China and Russia leverage technology, social media, and big data as tools to deceptively present information for hostile purposes. The United States must embrace a bold approach to public diplomacy to protect the ideas, values, electoral processes, and all the elements that make a free and open society possible and prevent it from becoming a casualty in the information war.</p> +<ul> + <li> + <p>What would be the president’s non-kinetic options in the event of strategic deterrence failure? Which of these options would you recommend to the president?</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>What are the risks associated with a non-kinetic response?</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>What are signaling objectives of non-kinetic response options? How will these options contribute to conflict termination on terms favorable to the United States?</p> + </li> +</ul> -<h3 id="from-cold-war-to-information-war-the-evolution-of-us-public-diplomacy">From Cold War to Information War: The Evolution of U.S. Public Diplomacy</h3> +<p>The authors generally agreed about the importance of non-kinetic measures in responding to adversary nuclear use. One area of commonality was the importance of non-kinetic deterrence efforts prior to nuclear use during the crisis. Most suggested some form of information warfare or targeted messaging to accompany their proposed military responses, as well as non-kinetic military measures and economic retaliation. Weaver, for example, proposes information operations to maximize international backlash to adversary nuclear use and convince the Russian and Chinese people that their governments’ actions risk large-scale nuclear war, as well as measures to impose economic costs on Russia and China. Ford, Gibbons, Sisson, and Panda each suggest cyberattacks against adversary forces, as well as economic retaliation. Moreover, Gibbons, Sisson, and Panda advocate for diplomatic messaging to the international community to build a coalition condemning Russian and Chinese nuclear use. Panda proposes intelligence declassification as a tool to counter adversaries’ information operations.</p> -<p>Discussions of U.S. public diplomacy over the last two decades are often framed around its “failures,” what’s “wrong” with it, what a “mess” it is, and its diminishing returns. The solution is not reorganizing U.S. government institutions or simply increasing congressional appropriations. Rather, it involves refocusing the collective perspective on how the U.S. government should think about public diplomacy in an era dominated by great-power competition. A comprehensive “all of the above” approach to public diplomacy is more appropriate for countering authoritarian states in the context of the Information Age.</p> +<h4 id="three-principles-for-intra-war-deterrence-in-a-two-peer-environment">Three Principles for Intra-War Deterrence in a Two-Peer Environment</h4> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">A comprehensive “all of the above” approach to public diplomacy is more appropriate for countering authoritarian states in the context of the Information Age.</code></em></strong></p> +<p>Based on the expert papers, the PONI team identified three broad principles for thinking about and planning for intra-war deterrence in a two-peer environment. At the outset, however, it is worth observing that intra-war deterrence is highly context dependent, and many of the recommendations of these papers might not be applicable to other intra-war deterrence scenarios, to include whether to respond with nuclear or conventional weapons and how to assure allies. The stakes will depend on the context. In the scenario provided here, what is at stake is allies’ sovereignty and security and U.S. global leadership, but these must be balanced with the stakes of escalation, which could include further humanitarian consequences depending on whether conventional or nuclear weapons are used.</p> -<p>Edmund Gullion coined the term “public diplomacy” in 1965, but deliberate engagements with international audiences had become a prominent component of U.S. peacetime foreign policy since the beginning of the Cold War (see Box 1). Initial policy was focused on a bipolar world order, with the Cold War aligning nations between the United States and the Soviet Union. The goal of bipolar public diplomacy was to “win the hearts and minds” in favor of Western values: representative democracy, free speech, religious freedom, gender equality, and capitalistic economies over the only other option — communism.</p> +<p><em>INTRA-WAR DETERRENCE REQUIRES REGIONAL DETERRENCE</em></p> -<p>Following the end of the Cold War, the Clinton administration disbanded many of the institutions at the core of U.S. public diplomacy. The U.S. Information Agency (USIA), created by President Dwight D. Eisenhower in 1953 as an independent agency to promote U.S. values overseas through information programs, was dissolved in 1999. Many components of the USIA’s public diplomacy were transferred to the Department of State, while an independent Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG) was tasked with overseeing international broadcasting networks like Voice of America.</p> +<p>In these scenarios, America’s adversaries are acting on the belief that they have more at stake in the region than the United States. Ford describes the strategic challenge: “Both of these failures [are] likely derived from assumptions in Moscow and Beijing, not that Western leaders lacked the capacity to respond effectively, but that they lacked the will . . . . It is the primary task of intra-war deterrence here to convince them that this, too, was a misapprehension.” As demonstrated by all of the papers in this volume, the United States will need a diverse and flexible tool kit, to include regional nuclear capabilities and conceal/reveal capabilities.</p> -<p>The 9/11 terrorist attacks marked the re-securitization of public diplomacy as the United States sought to “win the hearts and minds of Muslims” across the Muslim world. Like the post–Cold War era, however, there were few media alternatives for audiences in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, Libya, Yemen, or Somalia.</p> +<p>While only one of the papers calls for the United States to respond with nuclear weapons, nearly all of the authors acknowledge the importance of the United States having a breadth of nuclear response options. For Panda, this is largely tied to assuring allies because “it is highly likely that following strategic deterrence failure, allied perceptions of the credibility of the United States would suffer drastically unless Washington opted for nuclear use in kind,” although he expresses concerns with risks of escalation. For Ford, amid a conventional response, “U.S. nuclear weapon storage vaults at relevant European airfields should also be readied for potential operations, and any existing plans for weapon dispersal to additional airfields that do not involve actual DCA attack assets should be implemented.”</p> -<p>In 2018, the Trump administration rebranded the BBG as the U.S. Agency for Global Media (USAGM), an independent federal agency that oversees and broadcasts news and information about the United States and the world internationally.</p> +<p>These and other points make a case for the United States to improve its regional deterrence posture through increased regional capabilities and flexible options in order to prepare for a proportionate nuclear response in a limited-use scenario. U.S. policymakers should strive to diversify U.S. nuclear forces through investments in new regional capabilities so that the president will have a broader range of credible options, particularly if an adversary threatens limited nuclear attacks. The capabilities should be survivable, lower yield, and responsive and effective across a spectrum of targets. Strategic deterrence is, and should remain, the primary mission of the U.S. nuclear force, and the triad is essential to the success of that mission. These capabilities will play a deterrence function not only during a crisis but also beforehand, as argued by Weaver:</p> -<p>The Department of State and the USAGM sought to maintain credibility with international audiences as new technologies emerged, allowing other voices to compete with U.S. efforts to promote Western norms and institutions globally.</p> +<blockquote> + <p>If the effect of selecting a nonnuclear response to adversary nuclear escalation is to convince the adversary that the United States is so concerned about uncontrolled escalation that it fears responding in kind, then a U.S. nonnuclear response could actually increase the risk of eventual uncontrolled escalation. This may seem counterintuitive, but if a U.S. nonnuclear response to adversary limited nuclear use results in encouraging further adversary nuclear escalation, then the U.S. nuclear responses that may eventually be required to achieve U.S. objectives are likely to be larger in scale and more provocative in their effects. This could well make uncontrolled escalation more likely.</p> +</blockquote> + +<p>Another option for re-establishing deterrence would be relying on conceal/reveal capabilities, such as demonstrating a previously unknown capability amid a crisis to inspire the adversary to exert caution. As described by Weaver, “There is a potential role here for the calculated revelation of capabilities the adversary was previously unaware of that have potentially decisive military effects (‘You didn’t tell me they could do that. What else don’t I know?’).” Conceal/reveal capabilities could also offer U.S. decisionmakers more flexibility in a crisis, as well as having a powerful deterrence impact when needed most to de-escalate a crisis.</p> + +<p><em>RESTORING DETERRENCE REQUIRES RESTORING ASSURANCE</em></p> + +<p>As multiple authors identify, a strategic deterrence failure could inspire a crisis of confidence among U.S. allies and partners. While some of the papers in this volume call for reconsidering U.S. security commitments to allies in a crisis, this would be a mistake for both short- and long-term reasons. Amid the ongoing conflict, the United States would need allies to fight through a scenario such as the one outlined in one or both theaters. While Ford argues that the Indo-Pacific theater is the more important of the two, he notes that “a Western loss in the European theater” would still be “a disaster.” For him, “[j]ust as the United States prioritized defending Europe from the Nazis in World War II without backing off against Japan in the Pacific, even if the United States must now prioritize East Asia in certain ways, it should not abandon Europe.” Ford, for example, points to the importance of European allies in leading on conventional fighting and re-establishing deterrence in one theater while the United States focuses on the Indo-Pacific. For Weaver, “If U.S. responses to initial Russian or Chinese escalation make clear that the United States is willing to engage in a competition in dire risk-taking, and that Russia and China must also fear potential uncontrolled escalation, allies are likely to be reassured in the near term.” Over the long term, alliance structures would be an essential component for any eventual peace settlement and post-conflict international order, assuming a U.S. objective is to maintain global leadership, as argued in nearly all of these papers.</p> + +<p>Gibbons points to an additional value of maintaining and assuring allies: they can play a crucial role in generating international condemnation aimed at deterring further nuclear use by the adversaries:</p> <blockquote> - <h4 id="box-1-what-is-public-diplomacy"><code class="highlighter-rouge">Box 1. What Is Public Diplomacy?</code></h4> + <p>Allies and partners have a significant role to play in the messaging following nuclear use. They must unite in loudly and publicly condemning the nuclear attacks and should do so repeatedly. They should communicate that using nuclear weapons in these scenarios was unacceptable and neither nation will gain from using these weapons. These messages are key to reestablishing the nuclear taboo following nuclear use.</p> </blockquote> -<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">A challenge in any effort to revamp public diplomacy lies in the fact that there are multiple definitions of the term and competing understandings of what activities fall under its umbrella. A traditional understanding of the term might only include state-to-state activities. More broadly defined, U.S. public diplomacy also encompasses official messaging from the Department of State and the White House; U.S. international broadcasting via USAGM, Voice of America, and Radio Free Europe; and other soft power tools, military operations, and covert actions.</code></em></p> +<p>Gibbons goes on to make the case for U.S. policymakers to immediately engage the U.S. public on the importance of allies, for example. The United States could also develop an engagement plan for deepening planning and consultations with allies on potential battlefield nuclear use and opportunistic aggression scenarios. A series of mini tabletop exercises could begin familiarizing allied and U.S. government officials across the interagency, including at the Department of State, the National Security Council, and the Department of Defense (including combatant commands) with how deterrence works and how battlefield nuclear use might impact both conventional campaigns and deterrence dynamics.</p> -<p>U.S. public diplomacy today faces a fundamentally different landscape than it has ever encountered since its inception: a highly digitalized, multipolar world order where audiences can choose where they get their information and what they believe, all in the palm of their hands. Today’s market diversification provides audiences with many choices, including numerous countries with actively engaging foreign ministries and their state-sponsored news networks. Audiences are no longer passive consumers of whatever is available — they get to choose where they invest their time and attention. There are fewer gatekeepers to instant information. Videos, images, and articles no longer have to pass through a newspaper editor or network producer to reach an audience. A caveat, however, is that deepfakes, propaganda, and other forms of unverified information also have direct lines to mass audiences.</p> +<p><em>INTRA-WAR DETERRENCE WILL DEPEND ON PRECRISIS PLANNING AND DECISIONS</em></p> -<p>This means U.S. public diplomacy must work harder than ever to showcase the superior attractiveness and value of the United States and its policies over competing alternatives. To do this, policymakers and practitioners must reframe their thinking from what public diplomacy was to what it needs to be in the coming century, which will likely be dominated by superpower competition between the United States, China, and Russia. They must refocus on multipolar public diplomacy and fill leadership voids in this space. In other words, the United States needs to reorient public diplomacy policy as a tool of relativity.</p> +<p>Finally, intra-war deterrence will largely depend on precrisis decisions and planning. These comprise decisions and actions taken with adversaries, allies, domestic audiences, and wider international ones. Examples include dialogue with allies about crisis communication and decisionmaking, conceal/reveal capabilities, and establishing thresholds and threats (i.e., do not bluff). There are at least two main areas where the United States can focus on intra-war deterrence planning before a crisis begins: strategic communications, particularly with international audiences, and wargaming.</p> -<p>Effective public diplomacy will require appropriate levels of congressional funding and more effective use of that money. As the United States has decreased spending on public diplomacy, China and Russia continue to invest heavily in sophisticated propaganda in the developing world. The underlying goal of the U.S. effort should be not just to make the United States the most attractive and desirable country in the world but to position it as the “partner of choice” in competition with other vying players. Reputational security achieved through public diplomacy is undervalued, as reflected in underinvestment.</p> +<p>Shaping narratives and messaging before and during crises will be essential. Such messages will need to be tailored to multiple audiences: allies (focusing on assurance), domestic audiences (focused on the importance of U.S. alliances, and in support of achieving U.S. military responses to adversarial limited nuclear use), international audiences (aimed to “make the adversary a pariah,” as Weaver argues), and adversarial domestic audiences (meant to foment a facts-based public consensus). When facing a crisis involving potential limited nuclear use, strategic communication must be multifaceted. Messages must be tailored to diverse audiences (allies, the U.S. public, the international community, adversary leadership, and their citizens) and adapted for each stage of the crisis, including preemptive communication. For example, before a crisis, messages aimed at the U.S. population should focus on the importance of alliances. As Gibbons argues, “Before any potential conflict — and frankly, right now — the U.S. government, especially the president, should aim to better educate the public about the history of U.S. alliance relationships and their benefits.” Precrisis messaging to Americans could also focus, for example, on reassuring the U.S. public about U.S. commitment to deterrence and the limited nature of any potential nuclear response.</p> -<h3 id="from-values-to-interests-in-public-diplomacy">From Values to Interests in Public Diplomacy</h3> +<p>Precrisis engagement with international audiences (particularly the Global South and “non-aligned” states) was raised in several analyses. Gibbons writes:</p> -<p>If the United States is to refocus its public diplomacy policy, the central purpose of multipolar public diplomacy must be building alliances. Current U.S. policy underpins the “marketplace of ideas,” which focuses on values and norm-building. The issue is that when the United States advocates for and institutionalizes its values, it often neglects the divergent values held by foreign audiences. Strategic communication is not unidirectional; it is imperative to listen to counterparts when shaping the United States’ image and to avoid actions that contradict the desired perception. This is why the United States continuously struggles to improve its image and reputation in the Middle East. Large majorities in nine Middle Eastern countries report feeling that “the West doesn’t respect Muslim values, nor show concern for the Islamic and Muslim worlds.”</p> +<blockquote> + <p>It is worth emphasizing here that improving U.S. and allied relations with states within the Global South before this notional conflict in 2027 is paramount. Though the international community broadly supported the 2022 UN General Assembly resolution condemning Russia’s attack on Ukraine, there have been fewer governments that have unilaterally condemned the attack or Russia’s nuclear saber-rattling, even among members of the Treaty on the Prohibition on Nuclear Weapons, a treaty that explicitly bans nuclear threats.</p> +</blockquote> -<p>Instead, multipolar public diplomacy is underpinned by the “marketplace of loyalties,” which focuses on interests. In this framework, states can work together to pursue their individual and common goals despite contradicting value sets. This is illustrated by the cooperation between the United States and the Soviet Union during World War II. Based on a shared interest in defeating Nazi Germany, two world powers vying for dominance were able to work together for a common goal that benefited both of their interests, despite disagreements on political and economic values. Likewise, the United States’ relationship with Saudi Arabia is a modern example. The two countries have markedly different value sets, yet based on mutual security, economic, and energy interests, they work together for mutual advantage, even in the face of starkly contrasting values and continuous tension. The killing of Washington Post columnist Jamal Khashoggi in 2018 is an example of a value-based difference that tested but did not break the U.S.-Saudi relationship, which is underpinned by common geopolitical interests.</p> +<p>A second priority for precrisis intra-war deterrence will be more wargaming. One way to address this challenge is with more wargames through all stages of escalation, as highlighted in Weaver’s paper in particular. But Sisson also writes, “Each phase of a scenario exercises the thought processes involved in aligning military operations with war aims, and war aims with strategic objectives, under conditions in which some variables that might affect the likelihood of success are foreseeable and controllable and some are not.” Variations of these aims, objectives, and conditions can be explored through wargaming or other exercising. One particular scenario that would be worth exploring is coordination among allies, which is somewhat ambiguous in the scenario used for this study. Even with additional gaming and empirical data, however, there will be limits on knowledge about what happens after nuclear use and how to re-establish strategic deterrence.</p> -<p>Two-way, mutually beneficial relationships that advance respective interests — not values — must drive the U.S. alliance-building for the remainder of the twenty-first century. Per Richard Haass, “Foreign policy is not about virtue signaling; it is about advancing interests. Prioritizing and compartmentalizing are essential.” This is not to say that the United States should give up on promoting democratic values — quite the contrary. U.S. public diplomacy needs to create reputational security by being genuine, authentic, and consistent. However, given the democratic backsliding over the last two decades and the rise of regimes that do not share Western values regarding universal human rights, the cost of pursuing global democratization and a liberal world order is growing exponentially. The United States’ political, social, and economic capital simply cannot afford to re-democratize the international system while also fending off power advances by China and Russia. It becomes a cost-benefit analysis, where interests offer a greater potential for cross-cultural engagement, dialogue, and cooperation than do values.</p> +<p>As Weaver argues, “Detailed wargaming and simulation is needed to analyze the ways in which limited nuclear use by both sides affect the course of twenty-first-century conflict and escalation dynamics across a range of scenarios and strategic circumstances. Without such analysis, U.S. efforts to identify the range of nuclear options needed to address limited nuclear escalation will risk missing key insights.” More comprehensive wargaming of the central problem could require asking these same questions across a set of plausible scenarios that span the range of key strategic circumstances the United States might face. Examples of other scenarios that should be examined using the Project Atom 2024 methodology include</p> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">U.S. public diplomacy needs to create reputational security by being genuine, authentic, and consistent.</code></em></strong></p> +<ul> + <li> + <p>Conflict with Russia while deterring Chinese opportunistic aggression</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Conflict with China while deterring Russian opportunistic aggression</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Conflict with Russia and China in which the United States is winning conventionally in one theater and losing in the other when deterrence of limited nuclear use fails</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Conflict with Russia and China in which the United States is losing conventionally in both theaters when deterrence of limited nuclear use fails</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>The full range of scenarios farther into the future when China is a nuclear peer</p> + </li> +</ul> -<p>Likewise, the rise of a “post-truth” reality, marked by information overload and rampant disinformation, has created a social ecosystem that significantly bottlenecks the marketplace of ideas. The best ideas do not always rise to the top; even those that do are not always accepted as the best. At a time when the philosophical applicability of the “marketplace of ideas” is failing, the “marketplace of loyalties” offers a viable alternative. The underlying premise of refocusing U.S. public diplomacy is that this new approach focuses on making the United States the partner of choice over China or Russia, based on its superior ability to deliver on the interests of foreign audiences and governments.</p> +<p>It is worth acknowledging that even with additional gaming and empirical data, there will be limits on knowledge about what happens after nuclear use and how to re-establish strategic deterrence. However, analysis of additional scenarios and circumstances would likely produce new and important insights regarding the four key issues addressed in this project, to include opportunities for de-escalation and identifying off-ramps.</p> -<h3 id="the-centrality-of-emerging-technology">The Centrality of Emerging Technology</h3> +<p>There are a host of other opportunities for strengthening intra-war deterrence before a crisis begins. The United States and its allies may have to be prepared to fight and operate in a chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear (CBRN) environment, which will require troop protection, equipment, and training. These preparations could also serve a deterrent function by demonstrating U.S. commitment to prevailing in defense of its allies, even in a CBRN environment.</p> -<p>Information is the currency of the new world order, so to compete in a multipolar landscape, U.S. public diplomacy must be competitive in telling its narratives to the rest of the world. Technology and buy-in from tech companies are important elements in formulating a public diplomacy strategy suitable for the twenty-first century. The importance of diplomatic ties to and collaboration with tech companies is evidenced by the soaring number of countries that have established dedicated diplomatic missions to Silicon Valley in the San Francisco Bay Area. Luckily, the United States and its private sector already outcompete both China and Russia in technology development, so it simply comes down to leveraging the public and private resources already at play while combating adversarial attempts to weaponize the same technological advances. But how can technology help U.S. public diplomacy in a multipolar world order?</p> +<h4 id="conclusion">Conclusion</h4> -<p>First, technology can provide greater internet access. The United States needs to be able to deliver its content to audiences, even in countries that control or restrict access. Therefore, technology that provides increased access is invaluable. For example, Starlink’s mobile broadband satellite system provides access across the African continent. Likewise, USAGM’s Open Technology Fund programs, which provide virtual private networks and censorship-circumvention tools, are steps in this direction. For example, the agency has worked with nthLink, Psiphon, and Lantern since the outbreak of the Ukraine conflict in 2014 to provide Russians with greater access to Western media.</p> +<p>To state the obvious, contemplating how to respond to nuclear weapons use and strategic deterrence failure is deeply uncomfortable. Such a scenario could involve hundreds of thousands (perhaps millions) of casualties, environmental disasters, and the potential for further damage. Indeed, Sisson’s paper starts with the assumption that any nuclear detonation could quickly escalate to civilization-threatening general nuclear war. Ideally, the international community would condemn such attacks and impose heavy costs. But the United States also needs to be prepared to restore deterrence and end the conflict on terms favorable to the United States and its allies. In many of these scenarios, allies’ sovereignty is at stake.</p> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">The United States needs to be able to deliver its content to audiences, even in countries that control or restrict access. Therefore, technology that provides increased access is invaluable.</code></em></strong></p> +<p>This report’s recommendations point to an urgent need for renewed engagement among policymakers and publics on nuclear issues. The stakes could not be higher, as it is the risk of repeated nuclear exchanges as well as the United States’ global leadership and credibility that are on the line. More regional nuclear capabilities will give U.S. planners more rungs on the escalation ladder for restoring deterrence without resorting to large-scale exchanges. They will also give the U.S. president more options in the event of a horrific scenario such as the one outlined here. A future U.S. president must be willing and able to employ nuclear weapons in response to a strategic deterrence failure scenario — and will therefore require flexible, limited options to navigate a scenario of limited nuclear use effectively. Whether a conventional or nuclear response to adversary nuclear use will be more effective in re-establishing deterrence and achieving U.S. objectives will depend on adversary motivations and the specific context of deterrence failure; while a nuclear response may be appropriate in certain scenarios, the same response could be unnecessary and escalatory in others. It is critical, however, that a U.S. president be able to employ whatever military response they determine to be most effective. The United States may therefore benefit from a more diverse nuclear force with a wider range of theater nuclear capabilities. Strategic investments in modernizing, diversifying, and enhancing the resilience of existing deterrent forces will strengthen deterrence and help avoid intra-war deterrence scenarios in the first place. By anticipating scenarios in which adversaries escalate regionally, potentially concurrently, the United States and its allies can strengthen deterrence and reduce the likelihood of adversaries exploiting perceived weaknesses. Preparing for multiple scenarios is not about seeking war but about enhancing deterrence to prevent it altogether.</p> -<p>Second, technology can provide improved techniques for telling the United States’ story. Even the most credible and authentic narratives can fail if they are not persuasive or never reach their intended audience. Leveraging new technologies to enhance the storytelling context of U.S. public diplomacy, elicit emotional responses, and achieve persuasive outcomes will be vital for outperforming competing narratives from China and Russia. This can range from artificial intelligence to virtual reality, augmented reality, mixed reality, or infotainment.</p> +<p>In addition to these capability considerations, U.S. decisionmakers can start laying the groundwork now for intra-war deterrence, to include increased and improved wargaming and tabletop exercises, including with allies. And U.S. military and strategic planners, along with policymakers, must immediately consider the question of how to restore assurance alongside deterrence.</p> -<p>Third, technology can aid in countering state-sponsored disinformation and influence operations. U.S. public diplomacy cannot operate on its own merits alone. It must leverage emerging technology to identify, track, counter, and discredit narratives and false information spread through Chinese and Russian active measures. This requires interagency cooperation through initiatives like the Department of State’s Global Engagement Center (GEC), as well as public-private partnerships with the tech sector, like Facebook’s election integrity program, to employ rapid alert detection networks to identify artificial amplification, deepfakes, content coordination, etc. The European External Action Service (EEAS), for example, employs a rapid alert system to detect disinformation and coordinate multistate responses through the Emergency Response Coordination Centre, EEAS Situation Room, G7 Rapid Response Mechanism, and NATO.</p> +<h3 id="challenges-of-deterrence-and-security-upon-nuclear-use">Challenges of Deterrence and Security upon Nuclear Use</h3> -<h3 id="who-is-the-audience-of-a-refocused-public-diplomacy">Who Is the Audience of a Refocused Public Diplomacy?</h3> +<blockquote> + <h4 id="christopher-a-ford">Christopher A. Ford</h4> +</blockquote> -<p>To enhance the competitive edge of U.S. public diplomacy over the next century, the conceptual focus on “foreign audiences” should be broadened operationally to include a range of foreign actors: corporations, nongovernmental organizations, cities, diasporas, influencers, and more. The Department of State’s Office of Global Partnerships is a model for partnering U.S. government staff and resources with nontraditional partners across business, philanthropy, and community organizations that could be mirrored within the Office of Policy, Planning, and Resources (R/PPR).</p> +<p><em>The following pages respond to questions posed by the organizers of Project Atom 2024.</em></p> -<p>Additionally, U.S. public diplomacy suffers from a lack of engagement with the domestic public. While Americans frequently see headlines about how China and Russia challenge the United States abroad, they often lack substantive knowledge of how the U.S. government is working to compete in this shifting world order. As public opinion influences both political representation and appropriations, better engaging and informing U.S. residents about the efforts and successes of public diplomacy is crucial for securing public support, congressional recruitment, and greater influence in interagency cooperation.</p> +<h4 id="us-strategic-objectives">U.S. Strategic Objectives</h4> -<p>The Smith-Mundt Modernization Act of 2012 allowed for greater transparency and access to materials intended for foreign audiences but maintained restrictions on their use for influencing domestic U.S. public opinion. Further revisions to the act should consider eliminating outdated policies and rethinking U.S. public diplomacy’s domestic engagement strategy.</p> +<p><em>ASSESSING DETERRENCE’S “FAILURE”</em></p> -<h3 id="achieving-public-diplomacy-goals-in-the-coming-decades">Achieving Public Diplomacy Goals in the Coming Decades</h3> +<p>The locus of deterrence “failure” here may lie not so much in the specific run-up to the crisis outlined in Project Atom 2024, but potentially years earlier. In this scenario, U.S. and allied leaders were stepping up their military preparedness before war broke out, and were very clear publicly that “wars of conquest will be punished.” Western posture and policy statements, in their own terms, left little basis for U.S. adversaries’ apparent conclusion either that: (a) the United States would not contest aggression in the first place; or (b) the United States could be frightened into intra-war concessions by adversaries’ use of nuclear weapons.</p> -<p>Refocusing U.S. public diplomacy’s purview requires a whole-of-government approach, interagency exercises to expose resource gaps, and designing a grand strategy that outlines responsibilities and costs associated with expanding capacity. This requires five key first steps to compete in the coming multipolar world. These span leadership, cooperation, evaluation, purpose, and training.</p> +<p>Rather, irrespective of what the United States declared in the run-up to war, U.S. adversaries seem to have assumed that the United States and its allies were: averse to war in general; incapable of waging war effectively or on a sustained basis; and sufficiently afraid of nuclear escalation that Beijing and Moscow could enjoy the benefits of aggression without facing prohibitive risk. This assumption would appear to be rooted not in assessments of specific Western actions undertaken in this scenario, but rather in antecedent beliefs, accumulated over time, about fundamental weaknesses and risk-aversion in Western leadership and societies, coupled — presumably — with the conclusion that the aggressors could draw upon greater resources of martial seriousness and societal stamina in waging war, and that the stakes involved in each theater favored the nearer, “hungrier” power over the distant and more diffident United States and its weak and degenerate local friends.</p> -<h4 id="1-consistency-in-leadership-and-strategy">1. Consistency in Leadership and Strategy</h4> +<p>Deterrence of this aggression, in other words, arguably failed in Project Atom 2024 much the same way that deterrence of Russia’s 2022 attack on Ukraine failed not in 2021–22 but in 2014 — when Vladimir Putin, observing Western reactions to his annexation of Crimea and invasion of the Donbas, seems to have concluded that they would not react forcefully “next time” either. In the scenario presented here, the failure was twofold: the United States and its allies failed to deter Russia and China from undertaking wars of conventional military aggression, and then further failed in deterring them from using nuclear weapons when things on the battlefield began to go bad. Both of these failures likely derived from assumptions in Moscow and Beijing not that Western leaders lacked the capacity to respond effectively, but that they lacked the will — and hence were more tied to general and longer-term adversary assessments than to specific U.S. or allied posture and signaling failures in the run-up to the crisis.</p> -<p>U.S. public diplomacy has been self-sabotaged out of the gate for over 20 years by a lack of consistent leadership. The position of the undersecretary for public diplomacy and public affairs (R) was vacant 44 percent of the 22 years between 1999 and 2021 (over nine and a half years), with nine congressional appointees filling the office the other 56 percent of the time (just over 12 years). This lack of institutional continuity has prevented the development of an organized and coherent strategy for implementation across the Department of State, let alone the entire U.S. government. This inconsistency has contributed to China and Russia outperforming the United States in the information and influence domain over the last two decades. If the United States is serious about competing with China and Russia in this space, the White House must prioritize quickly filling this critical office with qualified personnel. However, given the broken Senate confirmation process, creating a role that bypasses the lengthy process would be beneficial.</p> +<p>If so, this suggests that the efficacy of deterrence lies not only in clear military postures and public messaging, but also in an adversary’s underlying, longer-term assumptions about the character, motivation, and sociopolitical support enjoyed by those adopting such postures and sending such signals. If the adversary power has concluded that one is fundamentally timid and conflict averse — or simply unable to wage a war with resolution and commitment anyway — that adversary is less likely to be deterred by short-term precrisis signals even if they do, on their face, convey admirable resolution.</p> -<p>That said, in the United States, the executive branch cannot bypass the legislative branch if reputational security advancements are to be achieved. If the Senate confirmation process cannot be streamlined, it is critical for congressional leadership to better address authorizations and appropriations related to public diplomacy.</p> +<p>Nevertheless, the more immediate problem for Western leaders in this situation lies not in addressing such deeper challenges but in managing escalation risks and restoring deterrence now that bullets have started flying.</p> -<p>In contrast, leaders like Xi Jinping in China and Vladimir Putin in Russia can arbitrarily redirect national resources at will.</p> +<p>If U.S. adversaries assumed that the West’s sociopolitical weakness and fears of nuclear escalation would preclude its responding effectively to conventional aggression by a nuclear-armed great power in this scenario, of course, they were wrong. Since they also seem to have assumed that even their very limited tactical use of nuclear weaponry would scare the United States into abandoning its response to their aggression, it is the primary task of intra-war deterrence here to convince them that this, too, was a misapprehension. To the degree that the United States can do this, it has a chance not merely to manage this scenario, but also to help shape U.S. adversaries’ more general perceptions of the United States in ways that will enable maintaining deterrence once peace is restored. (After all, it is much less plausible to argue that a country will not fight you next time when it has just surprised you, this time, by demonstrating that it actually will.)</p> -<h4 id="2-centrality-of-leadership-in-interagency-cooperation">2. Centrality of Leadership in Interagency Cooperation</h4> +<p><em>CORE U.S. OBJECTIVES IN THIS SCENARIO</em></p> -<p>U.S. public diplomacy during the Cold War was successful because the USIA was the centralized leader of U.S. government information and influence efforts, with direct access to the White House and the National Security Council. Today, the lack of influential leadership in public diplomacy weakens the U.S. government’s effectiveness in the information domain. Edward R. Murrow, the late director of the USIA, recommended that “public diplomacy be in at the takeoff of foreign policies, not just at the occasional crash landing.” The absence of a prominent agency leader also reduces attention from senior-level policymakers in both the executive and legislative branches.</p> +<p>Given the potentially existential implications, the first U.S. objective here is to avoid escalation to a full-scale nuclear exchange with either Russia or China. It would be a mistake, however, to conclude from this that the best way to achieve this requires backing down, or that this is the United States’ only important objective. On the contrary, making no response to the Russian and Chinese use of nuclear weapons in this scenario — or acting in a way that would reward such use with terrified Western de-escalation and hence cede theater-level advantage (or even victory) to the aggressor or convince that aggressor that the United States was abandoning its commitments to its allies — may actually increase the risk of broader war and even a full-scale exchange sooner or later, more than would a response of judicious firmness that denies them such benefits and makes clear that the United States stands with its friends and is not entirely unwilling to turn up the heat further.</p> -<p>There is no point in creating a new USIA, as that would be an unhelpful bureaucratic reorganization. However, giving the White House and the National Security Council authority over a singular organization or agency, as the USIA once had when it participated in White House cabinet and National Security Council meetings, would clarify, harmonize, and centralize U.S. government efforts, increasing the efficiency of interagency cooperation and resource allocation. Positioning the GEC as the dedicated central hub, for example, would be ideal, as it is Department of State-focused but enjoys more operational cooperation and buy-in from the national security and intelligence communities than R/PPR. This would require official interagency memoranda of agreement directing other agencies and departments to be accountable to the GEC. It would also necessitate more funding — for example, liaisons to the GEC, GEC liaisons to the tech world, and additional billets within the GEC for analysts, supervisors, and possibly their own software programmers.</p> +<p>The United States has at least two second-order, but nonetheless extremely important, objectives in this scenario. First, it has an incentive to deny Russia and China victory in these regional conflicts (even in conventional terms) and to make good on U.S. commitments to its allies, because were the United States to lose or weaken those alliances, this would open the door to untold future revisionist aggression and upend the international order upon which U.S. prosperity and that of the United States’ most important international trading and security partners depends.</p> -<p>Another way to achieve greater impact is by doubling down on performance measurement in U.S. public diplomacy. This would allow practitioners to demonstrate its effectiveness and value as a security tool to policymakers in Congress and the White House. The work done by R/PPR’s Research and Evaluation Unit is the first step in institutionalizing performance measurements across U.S. public diplomacy. However, it is important to stress that psychological and sociological influences are slow processes. No social science programming can yield comprehensive results in a matter of weeks, months, or even years. Policymakers need to understand that public diplomacy measurement and evaluation is a cumulative process, with trends revealing themselves over the course of years, decades, or even generations. Assessment expectations within an annual budget cycle, for example, will do little more than illustrate the fact that individual and societal influence is far from instantaneous. There must be a willingness to consider the compounding evidence of comprehensive mixed-methods research over time.</p> +<p>Second, the United States has an incentive to deny Russia and China not just victory in general, but also victory through the use of nuclear weapons in particular. Rewarding their attempt at nuclear coercion would presumably lead to more aggressive employment of such approaches by Russia and China in the future, hence leading to more wars and greater risks of a full-scale nuclear exchange. Rewarding such coercion and aggression, moreover — and demonstrating the inability of U.S. alliance structures to deter them — would also encourage defensive nuclear proliferation to (and perhaps future offensive nuclear-facilitated coercion by) others as well.</p> -<h4 id="3-efficiency-of-dollars-spent">3. Efficiency of Dollars Spent</h4> +<p><em>PRIORITIZING THEATERS</em></p> -<p>Furthermore, the United States does not need to outspend China or Russia in this domain; instead, it must allocate resources and efforts more efficiently. Audience analysis and segmentation are ideal methods to achieve this. The key is to win over moderate and persuadable audiences, so the greatest resources should be focused on countries and regions not already aligned exclusively with China or Russia. This should begin with countries of strategic geopolitical interest to the United States that are being actively courted by either country. For example, Panama was one of China’s first Belt and Road Initiative partners, and the influx of Chinese investments influenced the outcome of Panamanian elections and legislative votes in favor of China’s economic and security priorities over those of the United States. Similarly, the popularity of the Arabic-language RT (Russia’s international news network) has influenced public perception of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in North Africa and the Middle East.</p> +<p>A more difficult question is whether, in this scenario, the United States should prioritize one theater over the other. They present different military-operational situations, with the conflict against Russia being primarily a land war and that against China emphasizing naval power projection, although both would require significant air power. For this reason, each region is likely to draw most heavily upon somewhat different mixes of U.S. military capabilities and assets. It is conceivable, therefore, that the United States might not face unmanageably stark prioritization choices.</p> -<p>While an in-depth strategic analysis by regional experts is required to develop a comprehensive list of countries of strategic geopolitical interest to the United States, numerous natural-mineral-rich countries in the Global South are being lobbied by both Chinese and Russian public and private sectors. Some key examples include the following:</p> +<p>Nevertheless, if the United States were forced to choose between concentrating upon Europe and concentrating upon the Indo-Pacific, Washington should prioritize the latter. Even if Russia succeeds in carving out for itself some kind of neo-tsarist imperium in Eastern Europe, Moscow lacks the economic, demographic, and material resources to hold it over the medium-to-long term, especially if confronted by strong and sophisticated adversaries. An allied loss in the Polish-Lithuanian theater in this scenario would be devastating, but even then, a sufficiently alarmed, angry, and resolute Europe could likely still — even alone — present Russia with just such a set of adversaries if it really wished to. Accordingly, the odds of the entire continent falling under the Kremlin’s sway — as well as the odds of Russia maintaining a new empire over the long term — seem low.</p> -<ul> - <li> - <p><strong>Africa:</strong> Zimbabwe (platinum group metals and lithium), the Democratic Republic of the Congo (copper, cobalt, lithium, and petroleum), Mali (iron, lead, chromium, nickel, lithium, and uranium), Guinea (iron and uranium), Mozambique (iron, titanium, graphite, and copper), South Africa (iron, platinum, manganese, and uranium), and Zambia (copper, cobalt, and platinum group metals).</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>South America:</strong> Bolivia (petroleum), Chile (lithium and copper), Mexico (iron, copper, and zinc), Peru (iron, manganese, and copper), Jamaica (iron, copper, and zinc), the Dominican Republic (copper, nickel, and zinc), Guatemala (iron, nickel, and zinc), and Panama (access to the canal).</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Asia:</strong> India (iron, manganese, graphite, zinc, and copper), Uzbekistan (petroleum, uranium, copper, and zinc), Indonesia (nickel, cobalt, and copper), Kazakhstan (manganese, uranium, iron, copper, zinc, and petroleum), Kyrgyzstan (iron, manganese, petroleum, and zinc), Malaysia (iron, manganese, copper, and bauxite), and Tajikistan (iron, uranium, petroleum, and zinc).</p> - </li> -</ul> +<p>By contrast, the implications of a Chinese victory in the Indo-Pacific seem more systemically problematic. Such a victory would very likely lead not merely to the bankruptcy of existing U.S. alliance guarantees, resulting in the Americans’ expulsion from the region — de facto, if not necessarily de jure (or at least not at first) — but also the creation of a Sinocentric imperium in East Asia. Nor would this new authoritarian Chinese regional order likely be particularly short lived. In contrast to the declining state of Russia, and despite some recent economic headwinds and the longer-term specter of demographic decline, China would not lack the manpower, military capabilities, or economic resources necessary to dominate its new network of tributary vassals. Between the two “theater-defeat” scenarios, therefore, from the perspective of the international order and the United States’ future role therein, an Indo-Pacific loss is probably the more traumatic and irreversible.</p> -<h4 id="4-purpose-as-informer-or-persuader">4. Purpose as Informer or Persuader</h4> +<p>Nevertheless, in saying that the United States should, in extremis, prioritize the Indo-Pacific theater, this paper is not suggesting that the United States should abandon efforts to protect its European allies in the Russia scenario. Prioritizing one thing need not mean euthanizing the other. Indeed, any failure to stand by NATO would likely have significant adverse consequences in the Indo-Pacific, whose leaders would be watching the war in Europe carefully as a window into their own ability to rely upon the United States when things become difficult. Just as the United States prioritized defending Europe from the Nazis in World War II without backing off in the war against Japan in the Pacific, even if the United States must now prioritize East Asia in certain ways, it should not abandon Europe.</p> -<p>Reinforcing institutional mission sets is also vital. The goal of U.S. public diplomacy might be compared to counterinsurgency’s purpose of winning the “hearts and minds” during military conflict. In the Information Age, public diplomacy should aim to build the United States’ credibility with global audiences. USAGM has spent decades cultivating a reputation for credibility with its various networks, serving as a transparent and objective news outlet. The agency needs to retain its editorial independence to remain a recognized international source of fact-based journalism.</p> +<p><em>WHAT COUNTS AS “WINNING”?</em></p> -<p>As Nicholas J. Cull argues, “international broadcasting is powerful but works best at arm’s length.” This necessitates codified barriers to operational interference from the White House or Congress. Politics must stay out of USAGM for it to remain attractive to foreign audiences as a reliable source of information. On the other hand, as a central branch of the executive government, the Department of State should remain the primary tool of political advocacy in advancing the United States’ narratives to the rest of the world. The Department of State is the central hub for engaging, through various soft power means, in persuasive communication that articulates the attractiveness of U.S. policies and engagement.</p> +<p>As the great power committed to maintaining the existing system of international order against revisionist challengers, and as the leading state in the two alliance systems challenged by opportunistic authoritarian aggression, the United States has a “theory of victory” requirement here of denying Russia and China the achievement of their own theories of victory. In Europe, for example, this means preserving Poland, Lithuania, and Ukraine as sovereign independent states, and as countries enjoying close security ties to the United States. In Asia, this means similarly preserving Taiwan’s autonomy and keeping the United States’ free democratic allies in Australia, Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines from having to become vassal states of the Middle Kingdom. As a status quo power facing revisionist aggression, the fundamental victory requirement for the United States here is thus simply that its adversaries do not “win.”</p> -<h4 id="5-advanced-training-and-professional-development">5. Advanced Training and Professional Development</h4> +<p>To be sure, a broader and more satisfying sort of U.S. victory would see the threat of revisionist aggression from Moscow and Beijing recede (or end?) more broadly, rather than having those powers simply “put back in their place,” thereafter remaining as wounded and aggrieved states looking for future vengeance. Indeed, given the nature of the two authoritarian regimes in question, it is possible that the clear military defeat of either one could shatter its brittle internal legitimacy narrative and lead to regime collapse.</p> -<p>Lastly, communication is a skills-based profession, yet most foreign service officers and many public diplomacy officers are not highly trained communication practitioners. The State Department should model high-level training and strategically oriented professional development programs with academic partners, like the Defense Department’s program for mid-career public affairs officers (PAOs) at San Diego State University’s School of Journalism and Media Studies. This curriculum provides PAOs with advanced theoretical knowledge and practical skills in campaign planning, implementation, and measurement. It also trains PAOs to serve as strategic counselors to commanding officers.</p> +<p>That said, the United States should not assume that such regime collapse would end revisionist threats. After all, both polities have strong and vicious hyper-nationalist elements strongly committed to dark and semi-paranoid anti-Western discourse. Moreover, there is no guarantee that either Vladimir Putin or Xi Jinping would be replaced by rulers any less committed to violent international self-aggrandizement. Nevertheless, even if further revisionism could not be precluded by the replacement of the current government, the very fact of a decisive defeat could help reinforce future deterrence messages, especially to the degree that this defeat “felt” more like a consequence of the regime having overreached by striking out abroad than like the fruits of a nefarious Western conspiracy to conquer or subvert the state.</p> -<p>Experienced public diplomacy officers need similar advanced training and professional development to build industry-led skill sets in campaign planning and implementation, program development, audience analysis, measurement, and evaluation, and counseling senior foreign service officers, ambassadors, and policymakers.</p> +<p>To be sure, after a Western victory in either theater, it might be difficult to tell whether deterrence had truly been “restored,” for each regime might react to such a setback with a policy of tactical retrenchment — that is, effectively accepting only a temporary armistice in order to buy time in which to reprovision, reequip, and prepare to resume hostilities on better terms. Yet deterrence is always provisional and conditional, as it is contingent upon the deterring party’s success in maintaining concrete capabilities (and a perceived willingness to use them) sufficient to persuade a would-be aggressor, each and every day, that “today is not the day.” In this sense, the belligerent powers are not the only ones with agency here. Even a mere armistice would also give the United States and its allies a chance to be better prepared for a potential resumption of hostilities, and hence better able to deter the aggressors. In the face of revisionist moves against the geopolitical status quo, an approach that defeats the aggressor’s initial thrust, returns all players to the territorial status quo ante, and buys time in which the United States can further shore up its alliances and prepare to counter any further attacks looks more like victory than loss.</p> -<p>Options for collaboration with academia include specialized programs in public diplomacy at institutions such as the University of Southern California’s Annenberg School for Communication and Journalism, Syracuse University’s Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, Oklahoma State University’s School of Global Studies, and George Washington University’s School of Media and Public Affairs. Another option is to pair the Foreign Service Institute and R/PPR with academic and research partners, facilitated through the Office of Global Partnerships’ Diplomacy Lab program.</p> +<p>As suggested above, moreover, the aggressor’s prior defeat at U.S. hands might itself help to redress the longer-term deterrence problem rooted in adversary assumptions about Western sociopolitical weakness. Rather than being presumed to be a soft and fundamentally weak-willed adversary, the United States would thereafter be “the folks who thrashed you last time, even though you used nuclear weapons.” With a track record of martial success against twenty-first-century near-peer adversaries — and with no less capacity than before to actually use nuclear weapons against future aggression if this is needed — the United States would thus be better positioned to ensure future deterrence than it is now.</p> -<p>As the U.S. government seeks to contain its adversaries’ influence and geopolitical impact, it is critical to consider lessons from the twentieth century. Public diplomacy was a novel tool that helped tip the Cold War stalemate in the United States’ favor. The White House and Congress must prioritize investments in public diplomacy’s capacity to become a competitive tool in the international information ecosystem and reconsider what twenty-first-century public diplomacy requires for effective global strategic communications. The undersecretary for public diplomacy and public affairs (R) and USAGM’s lack of centrality in the national security community will continue to handcuff U.S. government efforts if inaction persists. Meanwhile, the United States will watch as China and Russia continue to build alliances across the globe and fortify their legitimacy as superpowers.</p> +<h4 id="assuring-allies">Assuring Allies</h4> -<hr /> +<p><em>QUESTIONS ABOUT U.S. CREDIBILITY</em></p> -<p><strong>Daniel F. Runde</strong> is a senior vice president, director of the Project on Prosperity and Development, and holds the William A. Schreyer Chair in Global Analysis at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C.</p> +<p>In general, there are two levels of U.S. credibility about which U.S. allies have reason to be concerned in this scenario, with the second being of more significance than the first. The first level is whether the United States would be willing to risk a direct clash with a great power adversary, in any form, were it to move against its allies. Here the allies ought to have little doubt about U.S. credibility, for in this scenario the United States not only did respond to aggression against its allies by throwing its conventional forces into the fray against the aggressors, but also responded effectively enough that it led to dramatic setbacks for the aggressors.</p> -<p><strong>Phillip Arceneaux</strong> is an assistant professor of strategic communication at Miami University.</p>Daniel F. Runde and Phillip ArceneauxThe United States needs to rethink public diplomacy in an era dominated by great-power competition. U.S. public diplomacy must work harder than ever to showcase the superior attractiveness and value of the United States and its policies over competing alternatives.Countering China And Russia2024-11-14T12:00:00+08:002024-11-14T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/countering-china-and-russia<p><em>This brief lays an ana­lytic foundation for considering gender analyses, and Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) programs, as strategic enablers for accomplishing key Department of Defense (DoD) priorities.</em> <excerpt></excerpt> <em>In order to do so, it first explores the gendered dimensions of authoritarianism and deterrence and then discerns a number of specific ways that WPS programs can be leveraged to give the DoD strategic advantages in critical theaters. CSIS stress-tested these concepts through a tabletop exercise designed to illuminate the conditions under which planners might assess that a gender-informed strategic approach would generate meaningful advantage for the United States. The brief concludes with recommendations for how the DoD might generate enterprise-wide momentum toward meaningfully leveraging WPS tools and incorporating gender perspectives in key processes.</em></p> +<p>The second level of allied concern is whether U.S. nuclear extended deterrence will remain available in the event that an adversary uses nuclear weapons against it — that is, whether the United States would be willing to use nuclear weapons in such a conflict if needed. This is a game-theoretical challenge dating back to the early years of the Cold War, which materialized once the Soviets acquired a strategic nuclear arsenal to counterpose against the U.S. one, and it raises a question to which no truly definitive answer has ever been given. In a context in which adversary nuclear weapons hold major U.S. cities at risk, to what degree would a U.S. president really be willing to “lose New York to save Hamburg”? On this level, the present scenario confronts the United States with a clear challenge: how much risk of nuclear escalation against the U.S. homeland should the United States be willing to accept in responding to an aggressor’s use of nuclear weapons against its forces and allies in theaters thousands of miles away?</p> -<h3 id="introduction">Introduction</h3> +<p>This is a challenging question to which no a priori answer is likely possible, as much would depend upon the specific battlefield circumstances, the geopolitical and political contexts, and the personalities of the leaders in question. To judge from U.S. deterrence policy over many decades, however, the answer to the question is “definitely some.” Nonetheless, U.S. intestinal fortitude in this regard is presumably not infinite. The United States was clearly willing to accept considerable risk of escalation to a full-scale nuclear exchange in order to deter Soviet aggression against its allies in Europe during the Cold War. Yet the United States also seems to have recognized that there was an inherent degree of non-credibility in a promise, in effect, to destroy the world in order to “save” (for instance) Hamburg from the Red Army.</p> -<p>Deterrence — essentially, utilizing instruments of power to convince an adversary to refrain from taking a particular course of action — is a core aspect of the United States’ strategy to halt the advance of authoritarian regimes across multiple domains. In order to better organize the DoD’s deterrent posture, the 2022 National Defense Strategy (NDS) puts forward an intriguing construct: tailored, integrated deterrence. Integrated deterrence is, at its core, a way of reminding the DoD about the fundamentals of deterrence: namely, that it is a psychological calculation rather than a particular widget or program. In order for an adversary to be deterred, it must believe that a course of action that it is considering is not worth pursuing. The key components of strategies that dissuade adversaries from undesirable activities are capabilities, such as the actual military and other elements of national power, and credibility, namely demonstrations of the political will to act in the event a red line is crossed.</p> +<p>In response to this problem, the United States and its allies developed three answers that went beyond relying exclusively upon potentially homeland-imperiling U.S. strategic brinkmanship: (a) the British and French invested in their own nuclear weapons programs; (b) the United States adopted a “nuclear-sharing” policy under which it would provide nuclear gravity bombs for delivery by key NATO allies in time of war (while preserving U.S. control of such devices in peacetime); and (c) the United States deployed a variety of theater- and shorter-range nuclear delivery systems that would give it more options to respond to aggression without the stark choice between surrender and jumping all the way up the escalation ladder to a strategic exchange. Together, these choices added considerable operational flexibility to the collective NATO nuclear tool kit, enhancing deterrence without making nuclear use so casually thinkable that the United States would be tempted to engage in it absent the gravest of provocations.</p> -<p>The central challenge before the DoD — and the U.S. government more broadly — is to better tailor its deterrent strategies through more creative employment of military ways and means. This requires a better understanding of the psychologies of power and vulnerabilities within adversary regimes. In other words, building deterrence strategies that actually affect the psychological calculations of most U.S. adversary authoritarian regimes requires taking a much more serious look at their power structures and concepts of power, both of which are heavily gendered.</p> +<p>Today, by contrast, only the first of the United States’ three Cold War–era responses (British and French weapons) really remains viable, though even then in a form considerably attenuated since Cold War days and not optimized for theater-type engagements of this sort in any event. The second response (NATO’s nuclear-sharing policy) has been allowed to atrophy into a fairly noncredible operational capability that would be difficult to employ in a full-scale conflict, is vulnerable to both nuclear and conventional preemption, and which (at least until sizeable numbers of dual-capable F-35 aircraft come online) would have difficulty surviving and ensuring mission-completion against serious air defenses.</p> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">The central challenge before the DoD — and the U.S. government more broadly — is to better tailor its deterrent strategies through more creative employment of military ways and means.</code></em></strong></p> +<p>As for the third response, the United States no longer has any effective U.S. nuclear assets designed for, devoted to, and deployed for theater-level nuclear missions. It does have a low-yield option in the form of the W76-2 warhead, but that device rides on a strategic delivery system, the Trident D5 submarine-launched ballistic missile. The United States has no flexible, theater-range nuclear systems to array against the considerable Russian and Chinese arsenals of diverse and flexible theater-range systems. This makes it harder to reassure our allies that we really would be there (in a nuclear sense) for their “Hamburg” — as well as harder to convince (and hence deter) the would-be aggressor.</p> -<h3 id="gender-as-a-conceptual-lens">Gender as a Conceptual Lens</h3> +<p>This is the basic challenge of the second-level question of nuclear use. It is surely possible for nuclear weapons to be too “usable,” and overquick resort to such tools could be catastrophic. Yet it is also possible for nuclear weapons use to be too hard to contemplate, for to find it truly “unthinkable” would be to invite aggression that cannot be deterred or combatted by purely conventional means. Deterrence policy is thus about finding the “Goldilocks point” — or, more elegantly, the Aristotelean Mean — between these bad answers. In the present scenario, however, the United States would surely be more able both to deter and to respond to aggression if it had more theater-range options.</p> -<p>“Gender” does not mean “women”; rather, gender is a way to express and promulgate core notions of identity and power at individual and structural levels. “Gender” as a conceptual lens is not limited to women and women’s representation. Although women often play important roles in challenging authoritarian power structures — as recent events in Iran demonstrate — they do so in opposition to the reactionary gender roles prescribed for all citizens by authoritarian regimes. While women are often drivers for thinking about gendered aspects of security questions — if not catalysts for social change — analytically focusing on one gender misses the bigger societal and structural pictures of which gender is a key part.</p> +<p>Now that nuclear weapons have been used in this scenario, this second-level question of nuclear use moves to the forefront. Fortunately, the facts of the scenario so far do not quite precipitate the most challenging dilemma, so it matters less that the United States lacks the more flexible theater-range nuclear options it needs.</p> -<blockquote> - <h4 id="methodology"><code class="highlighter-rouge">Methodology</code></h4> -</blockquote> +<p>Presumably, U.S. allies have no special interest in the United States using nuclear weapons per se: their interest lies in being defended against aggression by whatever means are necessary — not excluding nuclear weaponry, but not necessarily employing it either. Indeed, at various points over the years, some allies have expressed concern that the United States might perhaps be too quick to use such weapons, particularly where such employment in theater would occur on their soil. (Over NATO’s history, U.S. defense planners have struggled incessantly with simultaneous European demands that the United States (a) be entirely ready to wage a nuclear war on their behalf and (b) not be too eager to do so, especially not in Europe. The equilibrium point between these demands is not always easily found.) Most likely, however, U.S. allies’ primary concern here is quite singular. Their fear is only that the United States might fail to use nuclear weapons in circumstances in which there is no way to protect the allies’ own existential security interests other than by using nuclear weapons.</p> -<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">To understand how WPS and gender-related approaches might help illuminate more effective approaches to building tailored, integrated deterrence strategies, CSIS initiated a multipronged project that incorporated a mixed methods analytic approach in its research design. Over the course of one year, CSIS</code></em></p> +<p>Through this lens, a critical question is whether this scenario is “one of those cases.” And in this regard, the scenario could be said not yet to present such a need. So far, the conventional situation does not seem to be one in which vital U.S. or allied interests are threatened in ways that would require U.S. nuclear use. On the contrary, the United States and its allies seem to be prevailing without it. The primary, existential question from the perspective of allied second-level (nuclear) assurance, therefore, has arguably thus not yet been raised. After all, it would presumably do little harm to the United States’ reputation among its allies as an extended deterrence protector — and might even enhance its reputation for responsible nuclear statesmanship — if Washington were to decline to use nuclear weapons where it did not need to use them.</p> -<ul> - <li> - <p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">convened six working groups with leading gender, regional, and strategy experts;</code></em></p> - </li> - <li> - <p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">conducted dozens of research interviews;</code></em></p> - </li> - <li> - <p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">traveled to both U.S. Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM) and U.S. European Command (EUCOM) theaters to engage with experts and planners at operational or theater levels; and</code></em></p> - </li> - <li> - <p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">designed, ran, and analyzed a tabletop exercise to “stress test” and validate insights derived from working group discussions, interviews, and study trips.</code></em></p> - </li> -</ul> +<p>Instead, the remaining question here is whether a U.S. or allied nuclear response might be needed to the Russian or Chinese nuclear attacks simply because they were nuclear attacks. To this question, under these facts, reasonable people may disagree. Some might argue in the affirmative — claiming, in effect, that we “need” to use nuclear weapons to protect the credibility, to ally and aggressor alike, of the “nuclear” aspect of extended deterrence even when the United States does not need to use nuclear weapons for any actual operational military purpose in a war it is already winning.</p> -<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Research interviews were conducted utilizing a grounded theory approach; that is, theory was designed based on the information shared by interlocutors. In this case, participants were asked to share their views of the major problems they grappled with on a daily basis without reference to gender or WPS efforts. Theories on the utility of gender analytic approaches and WPS programs were constructed afterward.</code></em></p> +<p>This paper, however, contends that on the current facts of this scenario, the United States does not yet need to use nuclear weaponry. The extended deterrence the United States provides to its allies has never been an exclusively nuclear insurance policy against aggression. Instead, it has been an inclusively nuclear one. It combines all elements of available military power that are required to deter aggression and to defeat it should deterrence fail. That is, the United States has promised to defend its allies by whatever means are necessary, but it has not promised to use any specific form of military power unless that form is necessary. This is not some U.S. analogue to the mindless automaticity of the old Soviet (and now Russian) “Dead Hand” nuclear launch system. Rather, it is an ironclad promise to the United States’ best friends of effective defense — not of U.S. nuclear use per se and no matter what.</p> -<h3 id="what-do-authoritarians-want">What Do Authoritarians Want?</h3> +<p>In this author’s view, a fundamental allied loss of trust in the credibility of the U.S. alliance guarantee would therefore probably not arise unless and until either (a) battlefield circumstances changed in ways that presented an ally with the prospect of catastrophic defeat absent U.S. nuclear use, and the United States did not then use nuclear weapons, or (b) the United States reacted to Sino-Russian nuclear use by retreat or some other measure of capitulation. Otherwise, remaining unintimidated and continuing to prosecute a successful conventional campaign — “fighting through” the adversary’s nuclear use in theater, as it were — should represent an optimal answer from the perspective of U.S. allies.</p> -<p>What do authoritarians want? The short answer: power. They use gender scripts and repertoires to consolidate and maintain power; however, in so doing, they offer the United States opportunities to fracture, exploit, or contradict those scripts in ways that serve deterrent strategies. Authoritarian scripts often involve the repression of women and marginalized gender groups and the simultaneous promotion of what it means to be a desirable and powerful man, which may reflect both how authoritarian regimes acquire power and what they believe power is.</p> +<p>In this scenario, at least, it is possible that some allies would wish the United States to use nuclear weapons against Russia and/or China, while others surely would prefer that we did not. On the whole, however, it would likely be less costly to alliance solidarity for the United States to continue to win the conventional conflict fighting alongside its allies without using nuclear weapons than it would for the United States to use such weapons (especially on European soil) when it was not absolutely clear it needed to do so.</p> -<h3 id="russia-gender-and-women">Russia, Gender, and Women</h3> +<p><em>ALLIED SECURITY CONCERNS</em></p> -<p>Women’s equality is written into Russia’s constitution, and women in Russia occupy a relatively more equal social position than their counterparts in other authoritarian contexts. Yet, as of 2024, it is clear that Vladimir Putin’s brand of authoritarianism relies on strict differentiation between men and women. Russian women occupy a significant place in the labor market, and, in general, they are more educated than Russian men, but the legal and social differentiation of men and women has increased in Russia since the February 2022 invasion of Ukraine. Feminist activists and gender equality advocates have been vocal opponents of the invasion.</p> +<p>The security concerns of U.S. allies in this scenario are fourfold, deriving from their situations as relatively militarily weak states close to a powerful revisionist great-power predator that is eager to carve out a more expansive sphere of influence or empire for itself in the world. First and most fundamentally, U.S. allies’ security concern is an existential one: they must avoid the loss of their autonomy and independence as sovereign peoples. Beyond this, and deriving from this core concern, U.S. allies have a second security interest in avoiding the loss of their ties to other countries able and willing to assist them in meeting such primary security needs. Most of all, this means preserving military ties to the United States, but it also entails preserving their more general ability to leverage bilateral relationships or collective security institutions to meet security needs.</p> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">The legal and social differentiation of men and women has increased in Russia since the February 2022 invasion of Ukraine.</code></em></strong></p> +<p>A third allied security concern is more prosaic, but still significant. Each ally has a security interest in keeping the military forces of its local great-power predator as far from its own borders as possible. Moreover, irrespective of immediate border threats, allies have a security interest in limiting that predator’s deployment of long-range fires, aviation assets, naval power-projection capabilities, and other military tools capable of threatening that ally’s forces, facilities, or critical infrastructure from afar.</p> -<p>In the Soviet era, Russian laws supported gender equality, but then, as now, women’s social role was heavily centered on their childbearing and childrearing capacity. Although many women held jobs outside the home, they were banned from professions that might threaten their reproductive health, and pronatalist policies featured heavily in Soviet economic plans. Indeed, especially today, Russian women are encouraged to bear children to counter the nation’s declining birth rate — a statistic associated with decreased competitiveness in the global economy. Cloaked in the language of “traditional values,” Moscow’s sustained campaign against lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and queer (LGBTQ+) rights can also be understood in light of its pronatalist stance.</p> +<p>More indirectly, U.S. allies have a fourth security interest in avoiding deep entanglement in economic, natural resource–centered, technological, supply chain, financial, or other relationships of dependency with either of the two great-power predators involved in this scenario. Such relationships may, or may not, provide immediate benefits (e.g., inexpensive goods, cheap energy, or corporate profits), but such ties are strategically debilitating and inimical to maintaining the sovereign independence that is each ally’s first-order existential concern. Such relationships give leverage over that ally by allowing the other power to administer rewards and punishments in ways that reduce the ally’s autonomy, undermine its ability to maintain a credible deterrent against aggression, and weaken relationships with third parties that are important to preserving its core security interests. (The existence of such relationships also likely contributes to adversary assumptions underlying the deep sociopolitical failure of deterrence discussed earlier: a country mired in structural dependency upon an aggressor will probably be assumed less likely to fight it.)</p> -<p>This emphasis on “traditional values” has not always been a part of Vladimir Putin’s political arsenal. He began emphasizing cultural traditionalism (and restrictive gender roles for men and women) toward the end of his second term as president (2007–2008) and ramped up the rhetoric significantly after returning to the presidency in 2012. Along with his performance of virile masculine virtues in public spaces and photo opportunities, Putin began drawing starker lines of contrast between Russian “civilization” and the West. The close connections and affinity between Putin’s regime and the Russian army — an organization notorious for the brutality not only of its battlefield tactics, but also of its barracks culture — further underlined the importance of aggressive, “macho” behavior in legitimizing Putin’s abrogation of political opposition. Since the invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the violence of the war and domestic violence have been mutually reinforcing.</p> +<p><em>SIGNALING RESOLVE</em></p> -<p>These restrictive visions of gender cut across Russia’s many social, ethnic, and cultural divides. In places where support for Putin might be limited because of his regime’s actions in the past — Chechnya, for example — promoting this version of violent, dominating masculinity is a way to consolidate support in certain quarters (and divide potential opposition by casting the regime’s role in “natural” and “nonpolitical” terms). Public memory of the chaos of the 1990s makes calls for order (even if restrictive) appealing across Russia.</p> +<p>Once deterrence has failed — or more challengingly, failed doubly, as in this scenario where both aggression and nuclear weapons use have occurred — the United States will likely have passed the point at which policy pronouncements and deterrence-related consultations with its allies can, alone, signal sufficient resolve. At this point, what counts most are U.S. actions and how adversaries understand them.</p> -<h3 id="china-gender-and-women">China, Gender, and Women</h3> +<p>In this respect, perhaps the most important signal the United States could send is to not slow or alter its activities against aggressor forces in the two theaters, except when such steps may be needed to preserve ongoing operations in a potentially nuclear environment. To this end, all relevant U.S. (and NATO) conventional assets should be readied to operate in a radiological-nuclear combat environment as quickly as possible, with ground assets dispersing to widely scattered field dispositions and air assets moving to dispersal airfields. This could also include the issuance of detection and protective gear, medical countermeasures, and relevant decontamination equipment, as well as surging radiation-hazard first responder units and medical personnel forward.</p> -<p>Women in twentieth and twenty-first century China have found their social and legal position highly dependent on the internal politics of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP): despite robust official rhetoric about communism’s equality principles, men remain socially and legally advantaged over women. As of 2024, under the leadership of Xi Jinping, China is undergoing a period of rising discrimination against women and inequality between men and women. Indeed, the CCP has been intensifying its crackdown on feminist activists and is increasingly reliant on the subjugation of women to maintain its hold on power. This is evident in the proliferation of unchecked gender-based violence, emphasis on “harmony” in response to dissent, and the performance of stereotypical masculinity by Xi and other high-ranking officials.</p> +<p>Dispersing conventional capabilities — not merely land and naval units near the zone of operations but also aircraft from vulnerable bases to a wider variety of auxiliary dispersed locations, including those dual-capable aircraft (DCA) that would be needed for nuclear attack missions (i.e., unilateral U.S. assets in East Asia and NATO nuclear-sharing aircraft in Europe) — would also demonstrate resolve, unity, and collective preparedness. U.S. nuclear weapon storage vaults at relevant European airfields should also be readied for potential operations, and any existing plans for weapon dispersal to additional airfields that do not involve actual DCA attack assets should be implemented. (Care should be taken, however, not to fly NATO DCAs en masse to weapon storage airfields or to fly DCA from such airfields, lest Russia mistake this for an attack in progress.) Every effort should be made to keep these precautions from slowing the pace of combat operations against the Russian forces, which should not stop, though some impact might be unavoidable. (The scenario gives us notably little detail about the operational implications of the Russian and Chinese nuclear strikes.)</p> -<p>Rising economic uncertainty in China in the early 2020s has been accompanied by new policies pushing women into traditional roles of wife and mother in the home and making it far more difficult for women to obtain a divorce. Concern over a “masculinity crisis” has led to crackdowns on certain kinds of popular music, clothing, and other forms of expression deemed too “feminine” for Chinese men. At the same time, official rhetoric in support of Xi Jinping has focused on his paternal and masculine qualities, painting him as an ideal type of husband and father. Mirroring the CCP’s characterization of the Chinese state as a familial unit, this rhetoric makes space both for increasing the centralization of power in the CCP and for collectively enduring potential economic downturns. Sexist elements of Confucianism tend to replace the more egalitarian language of Marxism in these displays.</p> +<p>The signals sent by these efforts are intended, together, to demonstrate in concrete form that (i) NATO will not give up in the face of nuclear provocations and (ii) NATO is quite prepared for the possibility of escalation. Beyond the theaters in question, moreover, U.S. and allied leaders in both Europe and the Indo-Pacific should make clear their intention to isolate the aggressors’ economies as completely as possible from the global economy (e.g., impeding Chinese oil shipments through the Indian Ocean and the Strait of Malacca, and ending all Russian resource exports) for the duration of their wars of aggression. This may help create additional incentives for moderation.</p> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">As of 2024, under the leadership of Xi Jinping, China is undergoing a period of rising discrimination against women and inequality between men and women.</code></em></strong></p> +<p>The alert level of U.S. strategic nuclear forces would also need to be elevated, with vulnerable bomber assets dispersing to auxiliary airfields, and with portions of the force perhaps even beginning rotating in-air readiness patrols (though not flying on headings that could be mistaken for attack trajectories either toward Russia or toward China). U.S. intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) would remain on ready-to-launch alert, with logistics support crews immediately providing extra supplies of diesel fuel to ICBM bases and individual silos to prepare them to sustain alert operations during a potentially prolonged crisis in which reliance upon local peacetime power grids might be precluded by sabotage or cyberattack.</p> -<p>At the same time, China’s economic uncertainty will be directly impacted by women’s choices. Decades of the infamous one-child policy have produced severely declining birthrates in China, threatening a demographic contraction that will likely lead to greater instability. Efforts to both encourage and shame women into marriage and childbearing have had little discernible effect thus far, and, among younger generations, women — and to a lesser extent even men — express solidarity with feminism and gender equality. Most significantly, Chinese women were at the forefront of protests in China against the CCP’s draconian Covid-19 policies. The CCP’s campaign to shut down feminist dissent networks was only partially successful, as their previous anti-dissent campaigns focused on the threat of male dissenters. Women’s criticism of the regime poses a more complicated threat to the CCP’s dominance of the political discourse in China, in part because of the efforts the CCP has made to exclude them from the political realm and because of the growing popularity of feminist ideas among ordinary young women.</p> +<p>Meanwhile, serviceable in-port nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) — not only in the United States but also in Britain and France — should muster their crews and put to sea as quickly as possible. Emergency notice should also be given to operators of critical infrastructure facilities in the United States, Europe, and East Asia, encouraging or directing them to implement whatever protective protocols they might have to defend against Russian and/or Chinese cyberattacks, and to move to insulate their systems as much as possible from the internet (even at financial cost or loss in operational efficiency) and prepare themselves to implement emergency service restoration or reconstitution plans.</p> -<p>In other words, as Xi strengthens his grip on power in Beijing, the CCP is fomenting concerns that boys are being “feminized,” and it has chosen not to place women in CCP leadership positions, a move that appears to contradict decades of Chinese policy promoting gender equality. Indeed, Beijing’s vision of a strong China now includes returning women to traditional gender roles — such as pushing them into marriage and childbirth — and cracking down on feminist activism. Much more directly, the Xinjiang crackdown has an extremely strong gendered element — specifically the elimination of Uyghur masculinity and the mass sterilization of women, combined with the imposition of Han men on Uyghur households.</p> +<p><em>THE CRITICAL IMPORTANCE OF MESSAGE</em></p> -<h3 id="a-dictators-gender-playbook">A Dictator’s Gender Playbook</h3> +<p>While these preparatory steps are important in their own right, they are also critical to the U.S. messaging strategy. To understand the importance of getting U.S. strategic signaling right, it should be remembered that the Russian and Chinese nuclear attacks in this scenario were notably limited. They hit only things in theater that were of tactical operational relevance, for instance, striking only a very small number of targets despite both adversaries possessing a huge numerical advantage in theater delivery systems. Moreover, they refrained from hitting anything in the U.S. homeland or that was of arguable strategic importance to the United States. This suggests that U.S. adversaries are themselves carefully considering escalation risks, and that they do fear provoking a large-scale nuclear response. If they understand that their nuclear use has not intimidated the United States and that the United States is indeed comfortable with escalation despite their previous assumptions to the contrary — but that, at the same time, U.S. war aims are limited, being confined only to restoring the status quo ante — the United States may have a chance to restore deterrence.</p> -<p>Both Beijing and Moscow are weaponizing aspects of gender to advance their own strategic aims — and in somewhat similar ways. Indeed, there almost appears to be a gender-oriented “Dictator’s Playbook” with the following elements:</p> +<p>Accordingly, these concrete military moves would be accompanied by full-spectrum public messaging — including by the president directly — making three key points:</p> -<ul> - <li> - <p>Women support national strength by serving as wives and mothers within the politically stabilizing institution of marriage</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Western ideas about sexuality are a threat to national strength</p> - </li> +<ol> <li> - <p>Power means domination over other countries</p> + <p>First, the United States would make clear that these nuclear-preparatory steps are indeed underway and that Washington is demonstrating in concrete ways the United States’ ironclad commitment to protecting the sovereignty and independence of its military allies by whatever means necessary.</p> </li> <li> - <p>Young people are weaker than the generation the leaders came from, especially young men, and a demographic crisis looms without change</p> + <p>Second, the United States would make equally clear that under the current circumstances, U.S. nuclear weapons use is not yet necessary. U.S. messaging would stress that, while Russia and China’s nuclear use was the result of tactical desperation as their wars of aggression began to falter, the United States itself faces no such desperate circumstances. On the contrary, despite the United States’ strong preference to avoid using nuclear weapons and its willingness to use them if its adversaries force it to, the United States is currently prevailing in the conventional fight and intends to continue with that winning approach for so long as its adversaries’ fixation upon aggression makes it necessary to resist them in order to protect the security and independence of free sovereign peoples. Washington would also make clear that it remains entirely prepared and ready to use nuclear weapons itself if Russia or China leave it no choice, and the United States would warn them not to test its resolve by using nuclear weapons a second time.</p> </li> <li> - <p>Women in power are deceitful and threatening</p> + <p>Third, the United States would make explicit that its war aims in this conventional fight are quite limited. The United States do not seek to inflict a “strategic loss” or regime change upon either Russia or China, but rather merely stop their wars of aggression. If they stop that aggression, the United States would have no more need to fight them.</p> </li> -</ul> +</ol> -<p>These gender-driven positions are spilling over into the politics and strategic priorities of third-party states. As elites in Georgia, for example, are expanding cooperation with both Moscow and Beijing, they are simultaneously targeting women political leaders and rolling back progress on gender equity. Conversely, upward of 60,000 Ukrainian women have been on the front lines of the country’s war against Moscow, enhancing the resilience and resistance capabilities of Ukraine overall in the face of an overwhelming adversary. Interviews on the ground in Ukraine in August 2023 suggested that investments in civil society — and in particular women’s groups — since 2014 helped create a sufficiently prodemocratic Ukrainian identity that, in turn, contributed to a ferocious national will to fight. In Iran, which engages in gender apartheid, a powerful protest movement has been challenging the authority and legitimacy of the Ayatollah’s radical Islamic regime — a protest movement that was sparked and carried forward by women and girls.</p> +<p><em>TREATY VERSUS NON-TREATY PARTNERS</em></p> -<p>The question is: If U.S. adversaries are using similar gender-conservative playbooks, what might these gendered activities mean for U.S. strategy broadly, and for tailored, integrated deterrence specifically? In other words, gender appears to represent a critical societal fault line for contemporary authoritarian regimes — and a key, if perhaps underappreciated, mechanism for mobilizing prodemocratic forces and national will to fight. This leads to an interesting proposition: might gender-related tools, and primarily those associated with the WPS toolkit, provide the United States and the DoD with key vectors for tailoring its integrated deterrence strategies.</p> +<p>Much of this above-mentioned activity would be aimed primarily at protecting and reassuring U.S. military allies, as they would undoubtedly be the United States’ highest priority. Moves that would reassure those treaty allies would likely have some impact in reassuring non-treaty partners as well, but this would be merely a secondary, rather than primary, benefit.</p> -<h3 id="strategic-concepts-using-wps-and-gender-analyses-as-strategic-enablers-for-building-competitive-advantage">Strategic Concepts: Using WPS and Gender Analyses as Strategic Enablers for Building Competitive Advantage</h3> +<h4 id="military-response-options">Military Response Options</h4> -<p>As one interlocutor over the course of the study noted: given the manifold strategic advantages that WPS programs and capabilities can present for the United States, it may be time for the DoD enterprise writ large to consider gender as a significant dimension of competition rather than as a set of abstract concepts. While a number of components, for example INDOPACOM, have already taken and are promulgating this conceptual approach, the concept of gender as a domain needs to be understood throughout all of the DoD’s echelons.</p> +<p><em>U.S. MILITARY OPTIONS</em></p> -<p>If gender is a dimension of competition, WPS tools then logically become a DoD strategic enabler — that is, a mechanism for more effective accomplishment of DoD activities and priorities. Accordingly, by considering the interrelated problems of strategic competition and tailored, integrated deterrence within a gender perspective, this brief underscores a number of ways that the DoD can leverage WPS as a strategic enabler to build advantages:</p> +<p>The foregoing pages have already made clear the optimal immediate U.S. military responses to the current scenario: the United States should continue winning the conventional fight without employing nuclear weapons itself, while posturing itself to be ready for nuclear use if adversary nuclear threats or other military circumstances require. The United States would retain the option to do more, of course, and — depending how things develop — might well indeed still need to do so in the face of further Russian or Chinese provocations (e.g., massive U.S. battlefield reverses or a second instance of adversary nuclear use). Absent such further need, however, discretion should remain the better part of valor.</p> -<ul> - <li> - <p><strong>WPS as a flanking maneuver.</strong> China and Russia have both ceded this space by ignoring WPS initiatives — that is, by not participating in decisionmaking processes to elevate women’s engagement in peace, political, and security discussions. As a result, this gives the United States, and the DoD specifically, opportunities to outflank Chinese and Russian activities in the Eurasian and Indo-Pacific theaters, if not globally.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>WPS as a mechanism to expand the competitive space.</strong> WPS represents unique opportunities to interact and engage with partner and allied nations in a theater that is entirely absent China’s participation. For instance, WPS opens pathways for enhanced dialogue between the United States and say, Japan, via Track 1.5 dialogues that have positive externalities that span beyond the WPS mission. To that end, WPS represents a key vector for shaping allied and partner perceptions that is presently underutilized.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>WPS as a mechanism for crisis assurance and communication on other non-WPS national security matters.</strong> Among democratic states, WPS creates positive spaces that are often viewed as not politically controversial. Accordingly, the United States ought to consider how WPS spaces might create vectors for communicating broader policy messages to key allies and partners in theater.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>WPS and gender as a strategic offset vis-à-vis Russia’s numerical superiority in a warfighting context.</strong> A recent CSIS report found that “European states are likely to face significant challenges conducting large-scale combat missions, particularly in such areas as heavy maneuver forces, naval combatants, and support capabilities such as logistics and fire support.” Much like during the Cold War, Russia has a vast supply of manpower that it is willing to expend on the front lines in Ukraine (and elsewhere). During the Cold War, that numerical advantage was offset by U.S. and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) nuclear weapons. As it is unlikely that the United States will want to utilize nuclear weapons in a contemporary contingency unless absolutely necessary, U.S. allies and partners in the EUCOM area of responsibility (AOR) must be able to call upon their entire populations to resist and deter Russian aggression.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>WPS and gender as a tool for societal resilience vis-à-vis an expansionist Russia.</strong> As one strategy expert noted, “deterrence is ” In other words, the ability of a society to withstand attacks by aggressors is a key aspect of deterrence strategies, and it informs issues like continuity of governance and operations planning. As discovered during a research trip in August 2023, women’s groups in Ukraine were — and are — critical in building national-level societal cohesion and resistance to authoritarian aggression. Designing gender-informed strategic offsets and societal resilience strategies requires incorporating gender perspectives centrally into national security and societal resilience planning and preparedness operations, rather than as an afterthought.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Gender treatment as a key strategic competition indicator or warning.</strong> Democratic backsliding in order to cater to authoritarian regimes such as China and Russia is almost always accompanied by gender-based harassment and the undermining of women’s rights. Given that almost all contemporary authoritarian regimes double down on these gender-based playbooks, it is worth exploring how the utilization of gender by U.S. allies, partners, and adversaries can inform indicators and warnings about regime trajectories.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Women fighters as strategic assets.</strong> Much as women in Ukraine have been critical on the front lines in the war against Russia, Kurdish women’s units were fierce fighters against the Islamic State. Further, the reputational damage to misogynistic Islamic State fighters being forced to fight — and lose — to women made such women’s units strategic rather than tactical assets. This suggests the need to more meaningfully consider the utility of women and women’s units within combat formations to create military advantage.</p> - </li> -</ul> - -<p>It is worth underscoring that these concepts are primarily focused on women and the application of the WPS toolkit. However, given that many contemporary authoritarian regimes use a militaristic, misogynistic version of masculinity to consolidate and promulgate power, considerable further work should be done to understand how different masculinities and different genders might intersect with efforts to implement NDS objectives and tailor deterrent strategies.</p> - -<h3 id="testing-the-utility-of-wps-informed-approaches-in-dod-scenarios-through-tabletop-exercises">Testing the Utility of WPS-Informed Approaches in DoD Scenarios through Tabletop Exercises</h3> - -<p>What might applying these concepts in practice look like? How might a WPS or gender-forward approach modify approaches to operations, activities, and investments (OAIs) in key theaters? And do practitioners agree with the premise that such WPS-informed approaches might generate strategic advantage for the United States? To discern answers to these questions, CSIS designed a series of tabletop exercises (TTXs) that allowed players to develop new OAIs associated with global competition against China and Russia. The following insights were gained through that activity.</p> - -<p>First, according to player assessments, gender-linked OAIs produced greater advantages in long-term competition. As one participant noted, “if you have one country or society that is willing to mobilize 100 percent of its people and one that is only willing to mobilize 49 percent of its people, one’s got a big advantage over the other.” In the words of another player, “the quantity that our adversaries have when it comes to an actual contingency . . . given their numerical superiority, just the mass they can throw at these problems . . . ensuring that all of society and our allies and partners [are] able to mobilize, to resist and to deter, [to] defend all these things is going to be essential.”</p> - -<p>Second, there was no meaningful difference between the treatments with respect to escalation risk. In other words, players believed that gender-informed competition mechanisms and OAIs constituted a net positive. Gender-informed competition, especially activities that linked civil society groups and showed that U.S. partners had a great capacity to mobilize diverse constituencies, supported integrated deterrence and campaigning.</p> - -<p>During the TTX discussion, participants ultimately concluded that U.S. adversaries, particularly China, were likely to view any action as escalatory by virtue of the fact that Beijing is likely to be hostile to any form of increased U.S. activity. Escalation might therefore be better conceived as a given rather than something to be avoided. Further, one participant noted that the United States might do well to design activities that would force adversaries to respond. A number of participants maintained that a command post exercise that tested whole-of-society mobilization in the INDOPACOM AOR might be one useful way to do this while simultaneously building capacity.</p> - -<p>The discussion of escalation led to contemplating whether supporting women’s groups might lead to authoritarian backlash. Women’s groups, and women individually, are often targets for repression and retaliation; in any number of instances when women rise in status under authoritarian regimes, conspiracy theories circulate that their power is a result of U.S. backing. In order to minimize such risk, efforts to engage women and women’s groups should be treated carefully and with the overall intention to do no harm.</p> - -<p>Third, there was no major difference with respect to how players assessed long-term competitive effects and regional prioritization for OAIs between the two treatments. Both treatments saw groups prioritize preparing partners as the optimal long-term strategy in support of integrated deterrence and campaigning (48 percent in gender-linked OAI treatments, 45 percent in non-gender-linked treatments). Regionally, across the treatments players focused on activities in INDOPACOM (75 percent in gender-linked OAI treatments, 67 percent in non-gender-linked treatments). Last, there was a similar distribution with respect to complementary interagency activity. Across both treatments, players emphasized combining military competition with diplomacy and measures designed to inform and influence targeted populations.</p> - -<p>The only meaningful difference between treatments was with respect to intelligence. In treatments with gender-linked OAIs, players appear to have assessed that working with civil society groups gave them increased situational awareness, as they less frequently selected intelligence activities. This is likely due to a sense that WPS-linked activities helped them better understand the operational environment.</p> +<p><em>WHAT IF THEY USE NUCLEAR WEAPONS AGAIN?</em></p> -<p>In other words, what became apparent from the TTX is that planners assess that WPS has a key role to play in great power competition. This is because WPS can help mobilize diverse constituencies in partner states (capacity) and increase the ability of the United States to counter malign actions in the gray zone (capability) — especially since the United States is often blind to adversary operations designed to hijack civil society. WPS represents a way to more effectively counter authoritarian strategies to compete with, if not undermine, U.S. positioning and leadership.</p> +<p>In the event that U.S. adversaries chose to use nuclear weapons a second time, the United States — as it will have signaled that it was ready to do — should be prepared to cross the nuclear threshold itself. At least initially, the key would be to find a type and level of U.S. nuclear response appropriate to the delicate task of (a) signaling undiminished resolve and of (b) not jumping so much further up the proverbial escalation ladder that things spiral out of control.</p> -<h3 id="applying-the-insights-the-european-and-pacific-deterrence-initiatives">Applying the Insights: The European and Pacific Deterrence Initiatives</h3> +<p>In this regard, one possibility would be to have a deployed SSBN in the Atlantic and one in the Pacific launch Trident missiles with reduced-yield W76-2 nuclear warheads toward two targets. (If the United States had the capability to do this, and reasonable confidence that its adversaries could see and understand that this is what the United States was doing, these weapons should also be launched on depressed ballistic trajectories clearly incapable of hitting strategic targets deep in the adversaries’ homelands.) These four targets, two in Russia and two in China, would be chosen on the basis of being military locations consistent with legitimate targeting under the law of armed conflict (LOAC), and the destruction of which would have a real impact upon adversary military operations in each theater, but without inflicting massive civilian casualties and without directly posing what could be seen as an existential threat to either ruling regime. Choosing these targets would need to be done relatively quickly, and carefully, but there would be at least some time for careful selection, informed not only by military analysis but also careful assessment of adversary leadership psychology and domestic political dynamics.</p> -<p>The European Deterrence Initiative (EDI) and the Pacific Deterrence Initiative (PDI) are flagship programs designed to better organize DoD programs and capabilities intended to communicate U.S. and partner red lines to Moscow and Beijing, respectively. Because they are also theater-specific programs with dedicated congressional authorization, oversight, and funding levels, they provide key insights into how the DoD implements its deterrence strategies over multiple fiscal years. Critically, gender and WPS are rarely, if ever, referenced in discussions about EDI and PDI — which creates opportunities for usefully reconsidering how such approaches might inform OAIs for the EUCOM and INDOPACOM theaters. Combining insights from all the research conducted over the course of the study, some ideas for recalibrating PDI and EDI investments with a gender-informed approach emerge:</p> +<p>The point in these attacks would be affirmatively to cross the “nuclear threshold,” including by hitting targets in the adversaries’ homelands — not merely to raise the ante somewhat for purposes of coercive bargaining, but also because, as Willie Sutton might have put it, that is where the targets are, as well as because the United States would prefer not to set off nuclear weapons on its allies’ territory if it can avoid it — while yet doing so in ways that adversary observers would be less likely to mistake for any sort of strategic attack and that signaled U.S. continuing commitment to a great degree of restraint. The U.S. president should also announce these launches publicly, making clear that this is a carefully limited theater action responding directly to these adversaries’ nuclear use and demonstrating that the United States will neither yield to their intimidation nor be provoked into overreaction, and that U.S. commitment to protecting its military allies remains undimmed. (Afterward, moreover, U.S. officials would publicly present the rationale for choosing those targets and that means of attack, also making clear how this decision was consistent with longstanding LOAC principles of necessity, proportionality, distinction, and humanity.)</p> -<ul> - <li> - <p><strong>Exercising.</strong> Within INDOPACOM, the DoD could increase the number of exercises with partner units that have a higher number of women entering their ranks — such as the Japanese Self-Defense Forces and Philippine forces during the annual Balikatan exercise — to show how to build partner capacity while signaling the expanding role of women in defense, something China will struggle to match.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Increased presence.</strong> The DoD can use permanent and rotational forces to demonstrate to allies and partners in theater the power and utility of women in combat, as well as in combat support and combat service support Likewise, both Moscow and Beijing are utilizing regressive gender roles as mechanisms for consolidating state power. The United States might consider using its increased forward presence to demonstrate other more democratic and meritocratic gender roles that can undermine adversary morale and cohesion.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Network-building.</strong> The DoD can work with women’s groups in countries like Papua New Guinea to build information-gathering mechanisms for monitoring Chinese economic coercion and infrastructure projects that are damaging to the region. Doing so might simultaneously empower women within local societies and create new mechanisms for countering China’s economic expansionism and elite capture strategies.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Posture and military construction.</strong> As the United States adjusts its posture in the EUCOM and INDOPACOM theaters, choices of where and how bases and facilities are constructed will have effects on local Conducting a gender analysis, and understanding local gender dynamics, can help inform strategies for using military construction monies in a manner that will engender the greatest level of local support for U.S. presence.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Enhanced prepositioning.</strong> A key aspect of EDI and PDI is the forward stationing of key equipment and materiel that could be utilized in a crisis or contingency. Host nation support — that is, the ability of a given country to support U.S. forces during peacetime and war — includes a nation’s ability to ensure that U.S. forces are able to land, access such equipment, and move in a crisis. Considering women and women’s networks more centrally in prepositioning and host nation support activities may build complementarity between EDI or PDI and building whole-of-society resistance and resilience strategies.</p> - </li> -</ul> +<p><em>THE RISKS</em></p> -<h3 id="conclusions-and-recommendations">Conclusions and Recommendations</h3> +<p>This has already been covered, or at least implied, in the paragraphs above. The primary risk lies in the danger that the United States fails to find the optimal Goldilocks point between the extremes as it tries to simultaneously (a) persuade allies and adversaries alike of U.S. seriousness and martial resolution and (b) not signal so much readiness or eagerness for escalation that the adversary feels provoked into catastrophic preemptive moves. Secondary risks also exist, among them the possibility either that some ally “opts out” of the conflict for fear of escalatory consequences, or that it “opts in” with too much enthusiasm by unilaterally taking steps that end up provokingadversary escalation rather than deterring it.</p> -<p>War is a centrally human endeavor; gender is a core aspect of individual identity and of the human experience. Omitting gender, and gender perspectives, from defense planning and operations creates enormous blind spots toward adversary weaknesses and opportunities with allies and partners. If the DoD is to build its deterrent strategies in a tailored manner, considering gender more centrally in its war and defense planning is essential. A number of recommendations flow from the above analysis:</p> +<p><em>THE LOAC</em></p> -<ul> - <li> - <p><strong>Additional resources.</strong> Many of the applications of WPS for tailored, integrated deterrence purposes as outlined above are conceptual rather than resource That said, the current funding levels for WPS activities — particularly those involving allies and partners — is unlikely to be sufficient for these purposes. It is outside the scope of this brief to develop a concrete budgetary recommendation; partnering with Congress, the DoD should establish a WPS/Strategic Competition pilot fund for actioning these activities that includes an assessment of the resources required to increase their scale.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Leverage gender advisers.</strong> The DoD has established a cadre of gender advisers (GENADs) across its command structures. In addition to the WPS-related training, education, and partner support work these GENADs perform, components should bring them into key planning and other processes to ensure that their perspective and ideas can be integrated into operational and strategic approaches.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>A broader gender lens.</strong> While women and women’s issues are often the starting point for considerations of gender, at the end of the day “gender” also includes how men view Do men living under repressive authoritarian regimes in Russia, China, or Iran agree with the policies of gender apartheid — and the promotion of hollow, militaristic versions of “manliness”? How do women in these societies relate to men? What are men’s own aspirations and how do they realize them?</p> - </li> -</ul> +<p>The United States has long made clear its belief that the LOAC does apply to the use of all forms of weaponry in wartime, including nuclear weapons. Washington has also made clear in recent years its intention to abide by those rules in the event of conflict, even nuclear conflict. Despite U.S. commitment to such legal constraints, however, LOAC principles — if properly understood as U.S. officials have indeed carefully outlined them, and as generations of operational lawyers in the U.S. armed services have been trained on them — should not be a significant impediment to sound U.S. or allied strategy in this scenario.</p> -<p>Taking the WPS agenda forward toward countering and deterring authoritarian regimes requires situating women within the broader societal context of which men are a part. Considering gender and WPS in this way is not to “weaponize” or “militarize” these toolkits. Rather, it is a way to acknowledge that women have been, and will be, decisive when it comes to countering authoritarian expansionism. Women are active, and at times critical, agents in both war and peace; smart strategy will better incorporate women — and all genders — more fully into the tailored deterrence strategies needed to prevent war from occurring. Many authoritarian adversaries are weaponizing gender against U.S. interests; it is past time for the U.S. government, and the DoD within it, to develop sufficiently gender-informed responses. Viewed in this light, applying a gender perspective to the problem of strategic competition is a necessary step toward accomplishing the UN-supported vision for Women, Peace, and Security.</p> +<p>There is no question that the use of nuclear weapons is not illegal under the LOAC when the very existence of a state is threatened — this being a formulation that the International Court of Justice (ICJ) accepted in its 1996 advisory opinion on the topic — and the present scenario of aggressor use of nuclear weapons against Poland and the Philippines would certainly seem to raise such concerns. Nor would the LOAC rule out U.S. or other allied nuclear use in defending an ally from such attack as a matter of course, as the right of self-defense recognized by Article 51 of the United Nations Charter does not preclude collective self-defense. The law would not permit simply any nuclear response, of course. Nevertheless, under such quasi-existential circumstances the logic of compelling “military necessity” should permit judicious nuclear counter-strikes — both to prevent allied defeat in a growing conventional conflict and to dissuade further (and potentially full-scale) nuclear escalation by the aggressor — even if such strikes entailed considerable civilian casualties.</p> -<hr /> +<p>LOAC principles are thus unlikely to be an obstacle to a careful and prudent response to the current scenario, even if that response turned out to involve U.S. or allied use of nuclear weaponry. The LOAC would preclude using a U.S. nuclear weapon directly to target Russian or Chinese civilians, of course, and U.S. and allied commanders would need to take feasible precautions to limit civilian damage (e.g., being as precise in their targeting as is feasible under the circumstances and using weapons of yield no greater than needed to accomplish the military objective). Yet it is hard to imagine military circumstances in this scenario giving rise to any need to do more than what a clear-eyed analysis of necessity and proportionality would permit.</p> -<p><strong>Kathleen J. McInnis</strong> is a senior fellow and director of the Smart Women, Smart Power Initiative at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C.</p> +<h4 id="non-kinetic-response-options">Non-Kinetic Response Options</h4> -<p><strong>Benjamin Jensen</strong> is a senior fellow in the Futures Lab in the Defense and Security Department at CSIS.</p> +<p>To the degree that non-kinetic options might exist that could affect the ability of Russian or Chinese forces to operate effectively in the specific theater wars described in this scenario, such activity might well contribute usefully to prosecution of the conflict below the level of U.S. or allied nuclear escalation. This might include, for instance: pursuing cyber or electronic warfare (EW) degradation of air defense activity or battlefield command, control, and communications (C3) networks; jamming or spoofing of adversary positioning, navigation, and timing (PNT) communications for engaged combatants; launching cyberattacks on infrastructure or transportation capabilities that directly contribute to the fight in theater; or jamming or otherwise engaging space assets in connection specifically with their support to theater operations. If means were available to degrade adversary nuclear C3, but only in the context of theater operations such as the two nuclear attacks that already occurred, this would likely also be a useful contribution to the fight, helping make further regional strikes more difficult.</p> -<p><strong>Audrey Aldisert</strong> is a research associate in the Defense and Security Department at CSIS.</p> +<p>At least initially, however, care should be taken to avoid non-kinetic measures that might be interpreted as having existential implications. This could include, for instance, attacks upon Russian or Chinese space assets that support strategically critical functions such as national nuclear C3, cyberattacks upon critical infrastructure not associated with the specific military theater of operations, or perhaps even — given the paranoid and potentially fragile nature of the regimes in question — the dramatic stepping up of Information Operations (IO) or public diplomacy messaging that could be interpreted as encouraging regime change in Moscow and Beijing.</p> -<p><strong>Alexis Day</strong> is an associate director of the Smart Women, Smart Power Initiative at CSIS.</p>Kathleen McInnis, et al.This brief lays an ana­lytic foundation for considering gender analyses, and Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) programs, as strategic enablers for accomplishing key Department of Defense (DoD) priorities.Build A Future Force For UA2024-11-14T12:00:00+08:002024-11-14T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/build-a-future-force-for-ukraine<p><em>Ending the war and establishing lasting peace in Ukraine is impossible without implementing practical measures to deter potential future waves of Russian aggression. Crafting an effective deterrence strategy, however, presents its own unique challenges.</em></p> +<h4 id="conclusion-1">Conclusion</h4> -<excerpt /> +<p>This scenario certainly presents challenging questions. For this author, however, the particular fact pattern of Russian and Chinese nuclear weapons use outlined in Project Atom 2024 does not have to drive the United States to nuclear use itself, at least not yet. The United States must continue to stand by its allies and ensure that they are defended against aggression, while denying the aggressors any advantage from their choice to cross the nuclear threshold. Nevertheless, since (and for so long as) the United States is winning both wars without using nuclear weaponry, it should continue to do so, while yet making it very clear that it is prepared to escalate to nuclear use — and indeed actually ensuring that it is thus prepared — if the aggressors leave the United States no choice. With the moderate war aims appropriate to a status quo power seeking to defeat aggression but not to remake the world in its image, the United States has the chance here to confound Sino-Russian aggression, rebuild a strong deterrent posture, prove to its allies that it indeed does stand with them when bullets start to fly, and demonstrate reassuringly temperate nuclear statesmanship, all at the same time.</p> -<p>The recent US elections have created a new political reality that will impact global stability in the coming years, including the Russian war in Ukraine. While Donald Trump’s stated goal of ending the war quickly resonates with Ukrainians, achieving a lasting peace requires selecting the right strategies and resources to ensure sustainable results. Apart from dealing with immediate challenges on the battlefield, given Vladimir Putin’s obsession with Ukraine, any solution that lacks this lasting impact risks disastrous consequences, as Russia could recover, rearm, and reignite the conflict.</p> +<h3 id="washingtons-response-to-nuclear-use-against-us-allies">Washington’s Response to Nuclear Use against U.S. Allies</h3> -<p>Defining long-term security arrangements for Ukraine requires a comprehensive set of military and strategic measures for maintaining stability and defending Ukraine’s territory, society, economy and rule of law against future foreign aggression. Such measures are widely seen as critical to Ukraine’s post-war recovery and to preventing future escalations.</p> +<blockquote> + <h4 id="rebecca-davis-gibbons">Rebecca Davis Gibbons</h4> +</blockquote> -<p>This topic is especially challenging to address while Ukraine’s immediate security remains under severe threat. After enduring nearly three years of active war, Ukraine still needs ongoing support for operations, including additional weapons, funding and domestic mobilisation. Meanwhile, the support from international partners shows signs of wavering, and in the US, assistance to Ukraine has become a point of contentious political debate. With uncertainties around how and when Ukraine will emerge from this war, within what borders and in what economic state, it is understandably difficult to plan for its long-term security.</p> +<h4 id="introduction-1">Introduction</h4> -<p>However, long-term strategising remains essential, as lacking a clear security vision creates a void that complicates any future planning. Without this long-term perspective, doubts may arise about Ukraine’s prospects, potentially impacting international support even if its territory is liberated. So long as Russia remains under Putin’s regime, the existential threat to Ukraine will persist, driven by Putin’s personal fixation on the country which may push him beyond rational limits. While some observers suggest that Ukraine should pursue territorial concessions as a path to compromise, this approach misunderstands the existential nature of the conflict. For Putin, territory is not the ultimate goal – ending Ukraine’s sovereignty and independence is. Concessions would not end hostilities but instead encourage further aggression, as they would fail to address the core motives driving Putin’s actions.</p> +<p>The circumstances of nuclear use described in the proposed 2027 scenario are unprecedented. The notional attacks would not only break an 82-year taboo concerning nuclear use in warfare, but nuclear weapons have never been used in conflict against other nuclear-armed states. These novel circumstances combined with the high stakes for all parties involved present U.S. policymakers with significant challenges in determining how to respond. Ideally, Washington would lead a course of action that would illustrate U.S. resolve and credibility to its allies and partners, avoid nuclear escalation, and demonstrate that nuclear use does not result in attackers achieving their strategic goals.</p> -<p>NATO membership offers a natural path forward. Once active hostilities conclude, Ukraine’s admission to NATO will be crucial to stabilising the region. Ukraine must, however, be treated not merely as a security liability but as an asset. Structuring and strengthening Ukraine’s defences will make this discussion more feasible, as a robust new NATO member will strengthen the alliance.</p> +<p>The analysis below argues that the primary U.S. objective, if the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the Russian Federation (RF) use nuclear weapons in the context of conflicts over Ukraine and Taiwan, is to manage and prevent escalation up to a major nuclear exchange. Secondary — though still vitally important — objectives include maintaining alliance relationships, ending the conflicts on favorable terms, and ensuring that the international community does not perceive nuclear use as benefitting the attackers. The United States and its allies should take several actions, militarily and diplomatically, to prevent these conflicts in the first place, and failing this, be ready to address the first instance of nuclear use since World War II in a manner that does not lead to a broader nuclear war.</p> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Under current conditions, with limitations on weapon types and their use, Ukraine is fighting a war that NATO would never choose to fight</code></em></strong></p> +<h4 id="us-strategic-objectives-1">U.S. Strategic Objectives</h4> -<p>One crucial assumption is that Putin will refrain from attacking Ukraine if Russia lacks either the resources or the likelihood of success. Although the first condition may be difficult to ensure indefinitely, the second can be achieved. Should Ukraine possess or have access to sufficient defensive capabilities to thwart any future invasion, this would significantly reduce the likelihood of renewed aggression. This approach, often called “deterrence by denial”, would serve as an effective defence.</p> +<p>The following section explores why deterrence failed and what the United States can do to prevent these deterrence failures, before presenting the U.S. strategic objectives in the scenario.</p> -<p>Other forms of deterrence may be less optimal. For instance, “deterrence by punishment” appears limited in impact. Russia is already incurring staggering losses in the current conflict, allocating over 40% of its state budget to the war and losing close to 700,000 troops as casualties, thousands of weapon systems, and most of its Black Sea fleet. For most regimes, such losses would be unsustainable, but for Putin, they do not appear to have impacted his commitment to the war. To force a resolution, the Kremlin would need to lose strategically – not merely in manpower or equipment, but through a fundamental military failure.</p> +<p><em>WHY DID DETERRENCE FAIL?</em></p> -<p>Recognising the importance of deterrence, the Ukrainian government has incorporated this strategy into its national military framework, known as the “Victory Plan”. While largely classified, key elements were outlined by President Volodymyr Zelensky in the Verkhovna Rada on 16 October 2024, with “Deterrence” as a central theme addressing long-term security. Zelensky proposed a “strategic non-nuclear deterrence package” within Ukraine, aimed at providing a robust defence against potential Russian aggression. According to Zelensky, “the deterrence package ensures that Russia faces a choice: engage in diplomacy or see its war machine dismantled. Peace through strength”.</p> +<p>In the notional 2027 scenario, the initial failure of conventional deterrence is the most consequential failure. Both adversaries used nuclear weapons because they instigated imprudent conventional conflicts against U.S. allies and partners.</p> -<p>The focus should be on building a force capable of repelling future aggression and ensuring that, if Russia attacks, it will face defeat on the battlefield. Such a capability must not only be developed but also maintained at a high state of readiness. It should be evident to Russia that any attack would lead to decisive failure, thereby preventing it from trying.</p> +<p>The purpose of nuclear use in both theaters appears to be twofold: (1) demonstrating the high stakes with which the adversaries view the conflicts and (2) terminating the war by deterring the United States and its allies from continuing to fight due to Western fears of additional nuclear attacks.</p> -<p>The effectiveness of such deterrence must also be evident to the people of Ukraine, allied governments, and the international business community. Confidence in Ukraine’s military potential should be strong enough to assure investors that they can safely conduct business in the country. The only way to sustain such a force in the long term is to match it with a strong economy. In this respect, the example of South Korea is particularly relevant. Despite the absence of a peace agreement with the North, the deterrent capability of military power has provided the security necessary for sustained social and economic growth.</p> +<p>The best way to prevent these competitors from resorting to nuclear attacks is to ensure that a strong and credible U.S. deterrent posture — integrating nuclear and conventional capabilities — prevents both from initiating aggression against allies and partners in the first place. The United States and its allies could have taken several political and military steps to improve this posture prior to 2027 when the proposed nuclear attacks occur. A deterrence failure would likely result from an adversary questioning the U.S. political commitment to its allies and partners. It is thus helpful to review signals the United States has sent in recent years that were intended to strengthen credibility, but which may have been misinterpreted.</p> -<p>Building such a force will be a significant challenge. First, it must deter a Russian force that, despite multiple failures in Ukraine, remains large in numbers. Second, any ceasefire would give Russia the opportunity to rebuild its military capabilities, potentially enhancing its strike power. Russia, after all, spares no resources in producing weapons, with at least 40% of its state budget currently allocated to the military.</p> +<p>The U.S. government, in June of 2024, began to publicly signal its military plan to aid Taiwan’s defense. Admiral Samuel Paparo, head of U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, described the “Hellscape” strategy for defending Taiwan to a Washington Post columnist. Paparo explained that the “U.S. military would deploy thousands of unmanned submarines, unmanned surface ships and aerial drones to flood the area and give Taiwanese, U.S. and partner forces time to mount a full response.” He continued, “I want to turn the Taiwan Strait into an unmanned hellscape using a number of classified capabilities.” International media sources reported on Paparo’s remarks widely, serving a deterrent function for the United States.</p> -<p>The costs of building a credible deterrent force are easy to underestimate. Simply sending older Western equipment to Ukraine will not achieve the necessary deterrent effect. Only competitive capabilities will suffice. For example, the current provision of older F-16s to Ukraine is inadequate to deny Russian air superiority over the frontlines due to outdated radars and missiles. As a result, Russia continues to dominate the airspace in close proximity to the battlefield.</p> +<p>Admiral Paparo, however, also warned that the U.S. industrial base would need to increase its production of drones and other capabilities to implement this plan. Along the same lines, in 2023, a retired U.S. general questioned whether the U.S. military would be ready to defend Taiwan. This skeptical public rhetoric and an inability to attain necessary levels of readiness — something the Chinese government would surely learn from intelligence gathering — could contribute to deterrence failure by creating doubt about both U.S. resolve and U.S. military readiness for such an operation.</p> -<p>The value of tactical air superiority cannot be overstated. Today, Ukraine faces significant challenges in dealing with Russia’s gliding bombs, missiles, and long-range drones. A competitive air force is as essential for Ukraine as it is for any NATO country preparing for war. With NATO membership, these costs could be shared – especially for high-cost capabilities like aviation. Without it membership, Ukraine will have to build and sustain them on its own.</p> +<p>Politically, there are reasons for the PRC to doubt the United States’ commitment to defending Taiwan due to the U.S. policy of strategic ambiguity. The United States terminated its Mutual Defense Treaty with Taiwan (the Republic of China or ROC) in 1979 when it formally recognized the PRC. Since then, U.S. relations with Taiwan have been based on the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act. The act obligates the United States to provide Taiwan “with defense articles and defense services” to allow the island “to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability” and “to maintain the capacity of the United States to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or the social or economic system, of the people on Taiwan.” The act created a policy of strategic ambiguity regarding U.S. defense of Taiwan. Despite this policy, President Biden has spoken strongly of U.S. support for Taiwan’s defense on four separate occasions. Following these statements, White House officials emphasized that U.S. policy regarding Taiwan remained the same, presumably to avoid raising tensions with China. Making a “mistake” about U.S. support for Taiwan four different times likely has sent a strong signal of U.S. intentions to the PRC. It will be important to see how the next president speaks about Taiwan, as their words will send important messages to Chinese leadership about the U.S. defense of Taiwan. It is worth noting, however, regardless of presidential rhetoric, that as long as the policy of strategic ambiguity is in place, there is room for Chinese leaders to question the U.S. commitment to assisting Taiwan’s defense.</p> -<p>Planning for a future force cannot be based on today’s operational environment. Under current conditions, with limitations on weapon types and their use, Ukraine is fighting a war that NATO would never choose to fight. NATO’s strategy would rely on overwhelming airpower and deep strikes to weaken enemy forces before they reached the frontline. Instead, Ukraine is meeting Russian forces at their strongest, at the front. Lacking adequate air and long-range firepower, Ukraine is compelled to compensate with the lives of its people – at least until a more effective operational model is established. Addressing the shortcomings of the current model is crucial not only for immediate success but also for ensuring future security. Delaying this effort results in the tragic loss of lives on a daily basis, underscoring the urgent need for decisive action. This painful reality demands immediate attention and cannot be overlooked.</p> +<p>Beyond uncertainty regarding Washington’s military and political pledges to Taiwan, any Chinese attacks on Taiwan could stem from an assumption by President Xi that the stakes are higher for the PRC than for the United States. With Taiwan just over eighty miles from mainland China and the PRC increasingly asserting its dominance in the East and South China Seas, it is unsurprising that Chinese leaders would assume that the island of Taiwan matters more to Beijing than to Washington. The assumption that the United States and its Pacific allies have lower stakes in the region could lead Xi to calculate, first, that he could get away with annexing Taiwan by force, and second, that nuclear use could stop the United States from continuing to defend Taiwan in a crisis if the annexation does not go as planned.</p> -<p>The costs of building this force could be significantly reduced by leveraging Ukraine’s industrial capabilities, implementing leasing arrangements, and creating international funds with contributions from multiple donors for specific programmes. Ukraine has the potential to close a massive capability gap if its industrial base is engaged in full. Unlike Western defence industries, Ukraine’s industry is operating on a war footing, with many factories running 24/7 and bureaucratic red tape kept to a minimum.</p> +<p>Turning to the European theater, the deterrence failure dates to at least 2014, when the RF annexed Crimea. Based on the West’s limited response to that action, Putin determined that it was worth attempting to take the rest of Ukraine by force in 2022. He did not anticipate Ukraine’s ability to resist the invasion or the support Kyiv would receive from the West. As Ukraine was not a member of the alliance, NATO’s Article 5 commitment did not apply, but members of NATO responded to the attack with intelligence, supplies, and funding. The level of NATO unity surrounding Ukraine and the increases in defense spending among alliance members are intended to send a strong deterrent message to Putin regarding further aggression, but if Moscow were in a desperate gamble to split the alliance and to reduce the West’s support for Ukraine in a conventional conflict, then additional attacks could not be ruled out.</p> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Strategically planning Ukraine’s future military force, anticipating evolving trends, and conducting rapid assessments is not just essential for Ukraine’s survival; it is critical for the security of Western allies as well</code></em></strong></p> +<p>Finally, while preventing the conventional attacks in the first place is key to preventing the subsequent instances of nuclear use, this scenario does involve nuclear deterrence failures. The adversaries likely hoped that crossing the nuclear threshold would compel the United States and its allies to stop fighting. They may have doubts about whether the United States would employ nuclear weapons in regional conflicts.</p> -<p>However, cost is not the only challenge. In accepting that deterrent capabilities must be competitive, the ongoing need for adaptation and innovation becomes crucial. The speed of technological advancement today is unprecedented. Innovation teams on all sides of the war are working tirelessly, introducing new measures and countermeasures. Technologies such as computer vision, electronic warfare, and long-range communications are poised to profoundly influence future military concepts and capabilities, and we have yet to see how these will ultimately shape weapon systems. The successful implementation of these technologies on the battlefield could render many older weapons and doctrines obsolete, a trend already visible in the current war. Ukraine’s future force must remain competitive in this rapidly evolving operational environment, which makes long-term predictions difficult.</p> +<p><em>WHAT CAN BE DONE TO AVOID THESE DETERRENCE FAILURES?</em></p> -<p>For example, small and medium-sized unmanned platforms are challenging the concept of air superiority, operating beyond the reach of traditional aviation and air defence. At the same time, electronic warfare has significantly impacted the effectiveness of these platforms. Current developments in computer vision aim to make these systems immune to electronic warfare, while counter-air drones are being designed to present a new challenge to drone warfare itself. All of these systems are part of an evolving operational landscape, competing for battlefield dominance.</p> +<p>The U.S. military must prioritize the acquisitions required for the Hellscape plan and for follow-on military action in the region. In addition, the United States needs to find a way to sell Taiwan the military hardware required to defend itself from a PRC attack. If the United States does not provide what Taiwan needs in a timely fashion, it signals a lack of political resolve on the part of the United States and undermines Taiwanese military readiness. As (or if) the United States takes these steps to increase U.S. and Taiwanese readiness between 2024 and 2027, U.S. military leaders should project greater public confidence than they have to date about their ability to aid Taiwan’s defense.</p> -<p>Keeping up the pace of adaptation and technological development is now a critical requirement to remain relevant. Unfortunately, many Western developers and governments have not yet achieved the necessary speed. For example, procurement and export control systems, designed for peacetime conditions, are ill-suited to the fast-paced demands of modern warfare. These bureaucratic hurdles prevent too many innovative platforms from being deployed effectively in the field. Western militaries and governments should not view this as a minor delay in aiding Ukraine. Rather, lengthy supply chains and slow adaptation cycles risk rendering critical platforms obsolete before they can be competitive.</p> +<p>Short of altering the U.S. policy of “strategic ambiguity” regarding Taiwan’s status, there are several ways the United States could message its resolve to maintain the status quo. First, more statements like those made by President Biden about his intention to defend Taiwan — even if they must be clarified after the fact — are better than saying nothing or being dismissive of the issue.</p> -<p>After assessing the ongoing war, former US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Mark Milley, co-authored an article warning that the US military is not keeping pace with the fast-changing nature of modern warfare, and this issue is likely even more pronounced in European militaries. Now is the time for faster research and development, more rapid prototyping, and quicker delivery to the battlefield. The multiyear cycles traditionally required for new weapons must be viewed as an unaffordable luxury of the past.</p> +<p>Second, top U.S. leaders should make clear to all audiences that the United States has long been a Pacific power and will continue to be one into the future. U.S. stakes in the region are significant: the United States has several allies and partners in the Pacific, maintains key military bases in the region, and benefits from the substantial percentage of global trade transported through the region’s waters. The United States has demonstrated its commitment to the Pacific in recent years with AUKUS, the trilateral security pact with Australia and the United Kingdom, and the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue with Australia, India, and Japan. U.S. leaders should not concede that the PRC has more of a stake in the region, and particularly in Taiwan, than the United States.</p> -<p>Strategically planning Ukraine’s future military force, anticipating evolving trends, and conducting rapid assessments is not just essential for Ukraine’s survival; it is critical for the security of Western allies as well. The urgent need to innovate and collaborate in defence capabilities cannot be overstated. Only by embracing change and acting decisively can the West ensure that this conflict does not become a harbinger of greater crises in the future.</p> +<p>Third, U.S. leaders should reiterate several talking points regarding Taiwan, both domestically and to the broader international community, to highlight why the United States seeks to maintain the status quo. One set of messages should emphasize what could occur if Taiwan loses its autonomy and becomes part of the PRC. Taiwan is a liberal democracy and a fundamental economic partner to the West. In particular, Taiwan is the world’s foremost supplier of semiconductors and advanced semiconductors, which are necessary for cell phones, computers, cars, and military hardware. If Taiwan were to be swallowed up by its large communist neighbor, this vitally important industry would be under Chinese control. The United States could lose access to the advanced semiconductors necessary for its defense.</p> -<hr /> +<p>Another set of messages should address the PRC’s unlawful claim to Taiwan. There is no history of the PRC controlling the island. The Taiwanese are a mix of indigenous and ethnic Chinese people, some of whom have lived on the island for centuries, well before the PRC existed as a nation-state. The PRC claiming that it has a right to this island is akin to modern colonialism. In sum, the United States and its allies must make clear that taking Taiwan by force is an illegal and illegitimate action.</p> -<p><strong>Andriy Zagorodnyuk</strong> is the Chairman of the Centre for Defence Strategies. He previously headed the Ukraine MOD’s Reform Projects Office, was appointed as an adviser to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, and served as his country’s Defence Minister between 2019 and 2020.</p>Andriy ZagorodnyukEnding the war and establishing lasting peace in Ukraine is impossible without implementing practical measures to deter potential future waves of Russian aggression. Crafting an effective deterrence strategy, however, presents its own unique challenges.Power And Planet2024-11-13T12:00:00+08:002024-11-13T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/power-and-planet<p><em>In July 2024, CSIS’s Energy Security and Climate Change Program, in collaboration with the Scholl Chair in International Business, hosted a one-day trade and climate simulation game titled Power and Planet. The focus was on how players representing key nations make decisions at the intersection of climate and trade policy to reduce emissions, boost economic opportunity, and ensure security.</em></p> +<p>There are also several steps the United States could take to strengthen its relationship with the Philippines and deter a potential attack on the island nation. The United States could do more to emphasize the importance of its partnership with the Philippines by assisting President Ferdinand R. Marcos Jr. with his domestic and international priorities, countering the Chinese disinformation campaigns in the country, providing additional military assistance, and engaging in more joint military exercises in the region.</p> -<excerpt /> +<p>Moving to the European theater, the RF’s initial attack on Ukraine in February 2022 appears to have been a strategic blunder as it created an enemy on its border, united NATO members against Russia, and caused many European nations to increase defense spending. If at some point in the future, the RF attacks Poland or another NATO member, then there must have been some change of circumstances that made Putin question NATO unity in the face of nuclear use on NATO soil. Alternately, a nuclear attack could be a desperate attempt to stop NATO from supporting Ukraine’s defense.</p> -<p>The game explored the geopolitical and economic dynamics that arise when a bloc of developed countries establishes a climate club. Will such a club drive greater global cooperation on emissions as it expands, or will it trigger trade wars, creating a bleaker outlook for long-term climate outcomes? How do economic, environmental, geopolitical, or security considerations shape players’ priorities?</p> +<p>Finally, Washington must signal its ability and willingness to employ nuclear weapons in these theaters, if necessary, to defend its allies. Signaling comes in a variety of forms, from guidance documents, presidential rhetoric, weapons movement, and exercises that employ these weapons. While the United States under the Biden administration has been wise to avoid the type of belligerent nuclear rhetoric coming from its Russian counterparts, future administrations can privately message their willingness to defend allies using all available options.</p> -<p>This report documents the game and how participants navigated the one-day simulation. It outlines the game’s setup, turn-by-turn progression, and key takeaways for policymakers. Additionally, the authors examine the game’s limitations and propose areas for further research.</p> +<p><em>WHAT DOES WINNING LOOK LIKE?</em></p> -<h3 id="game-structure-and-rules">Game Structure and Rules</h3> +<p>The United States has several immediate and long-term strategic objectives in the proposed scenario. Before outlining those goals, it is worth emphasizing exactly what is at stake in this conflict. The PRC and RF crossing the nuclear threshold means that the world has come significantly closer to nuclear war, and with it, a nuclear exchange ending millions of lives, the loss of societies, and even the risk of human civilization on the planet. Any U.S. leader considering how to address this scenario must have that grave reality — however remote — in mind.</p> -<p>Each player was assigned to one of three teams: G7+ (representing the Group of Seven countries along with Australia and South Korea), China, or emerging markets. Each player assumed the role of a government leader tasked with achieving their country’s ambitions for climate, economics, and security. Twenty-five experts from the climate and trade communities participated, representing a diverse mix of academic and civil society institutions, private companies, foreign embassies, and trade associations.</p> +<p>The primary objective in this scenario is to prevent nuclear escalation, whereby the United States and either the PRC, the RF, or both engage in escalating tit-for-tat nuclear attacks that result in a large-scale exchange of nuclear weapons. This is the primary goal because such nuclear exchanges would destroy societies, lead to millions of deaths, and cause widespread environmental devastation. Even if that outcome appears unlikely from the limited notional scenario, the circumstances are so unprecedented and the possibility of large-scale nuclear exchange so dire that avoiding large-scale nuclear escalation must be considered the goal that supersedes all others.</p> -<p>During the game, each participant represented a country or, in the case of China, a political or administrative entity. The three teams were as follows:</p> +<p>Secondary objectives include the following:</p> <ul> <li> - <p><strong>G7+ team.</strong> Each of the 11 participants represented each G7 country (except Italy), Australia, and South Korea. The U.S. delegation had three players, acting as the president, the special presidential envoy for climate, and Congress. And European Union was represented by one player.</p> + <p>Reestablishing the pre-conflict status quo with the PRC and Taiwan and returning Ukraine to its pre-2022 borders.</p> </li> <li> - <p><strong>Emerging markets team.</strong> The nine participants represented Brazil, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Turkey, and Vietnam.</p> + <p>Demonstrating U.S. credibility to its allies and partners. This is especially important in terms of nuclear nonproliferation goals. If allies no longer perceive Washington as a trusted security partner, they may consider developing their own indigenous nuclear weapons programs. For example, some leaders in the Republic of Korea (ROK) have called for the country to develop nuclear weapons, and a small number have done so in Japan as well. Polls of the ROK public have found that a majority supports an indigenous nuclear program. Polling of Eastern European publics also indicated support for indigenous nuclear programs in the weeks following the RF’s 2022 attack on Ukraine.</p> </li> <li> - <p><strong>China team.</strong> The five participants represented the following political authorities and administrative entities: Chinese president Xi Jinping and the Politburo Standing Committee of the Chinese Communist Party; the National Development and Reform Commission and the National Energy Administration; the Ministry of Ecology and Environment; the Ministry of Commerce, Ministry of Finance, People’s Bank of China, State Administration of Taxation, Security Regulatory Commission, and Banking and Insurance Regulatory Commission; and provincial and local governments.</p> + <p>Maintaining the Philippines as an ally in the Pacific, to include the use of its military bases.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Maintaining freedom of movement for all states within the Pacific Ocean.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Reestablishing the taboo against first nuclear use.</p> </li> </ul> -<p>Participants received individual motivations outlining objectives to pursue and defensive interests to protect, both within their team’s deliberations and in the broader game context. They were asked to make decisions consistent with that guidance but to be creative in how they realized their goals.</p> +<p>The inability to achieve any of these important secondary goals means the loss of U.S. global leadership. U.S. allies and partners are key enablers in promoting favorable rules, norms, and institutions within the international system. The PRC and the RF, along with Belarus, Iran, and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), are increasingly forming a bloc determined to undermine U.S. global influence. If the U.S. response to this conflict were to cause the perception that the United States is not a dependable ally or partner, it would be a strategic win for the so-called Axis of Upheaval.</p> -<p>The game covered a five-year time frame from 2027 to 2032 and consisted of three rounds, each lasting between one and one-and-a-half hours. The first round began with instructions to the G7+ to establish a climate club in the first turn. Over the next two turns, exogenous geopolitical and climate conditions continued to worsen as global temperatures passed key global targets, climate-associated extreme events negatively affected different regions, and geopolitical tensions worsened.</p> +<h4 id="assuring-allies-1">Assuring Allies</h4> -<p>Teams were assigned separate rooms to strategize, deliberate, and set policies. Teams could submit action forms to make official communications or announce policy decisions. These were publicly announced to all other teams and the game’s moderators (Control). In addition to central moderators, each room had a facilitator answering questions and announcing updates from Control. Control could amend the scenario at any time to introduce events that could shift game dynamics, such as the reestablishment of the World Trade Organization (WTO) Appellate Body.</p> +<p>After the nuclear attacks on the territories of allies, other allies and partners will closely watch to see how Washington responds. U.S. leaders will need to address the immediate challenge of the attacks and the ongoing conflicts, while also considering how their actions affect alliance relationships in the immediate and longer term.</p> -<p>Except for the first hour and the last 30 minutes of the game, when teams deliberated over their opening and closing strategies, written bilateral communications and in-person bilateral and multilateral meetings were allowed between teams. Participants were free to take action independently of their team by submitting individual action forms. There was no limit to the number of forms participants could table per round, though all were encouraged to stay within the scope of trade, economic, and climate policy actions. They were also blocked from declaring war or resorting to kinetic military action.</p> +<p><em>WHAT ARE THE RISKS — INCLUDING THEIR LIKELIHOOD AND CONSEQUENCES — OF ALLIES QUESTIONING U.S. CREDIBILITY IN THE EVENT OF STRATEGIC DETERRENCE FAILURE?</em></p> -<p>Each team started the game with a score assigned by Control representing their collective standing in 2027 across four categories: economy, emissions, domestic political support, and allies (i.e., the level of cohesion within the group). Control updated the scores after each round based on how each team’s actions had affected these four categories, and facilitators privately distributed these to team members. Teams could choose which categories they wished to prioritize through their actions, consistent with their internal motivations, but they were instructed to consider the long-term effects beyond the game’s five-year time frame. For example, they had no obligation to implement dramatic emissions cuts within five years, as establishing credible long-term climate policies was sufficient to realize climate ambitions, though potentially at the expense of economic outcomes or domestic political support.</p> +<p>It is fair to assume that the publics and elites within allied nations will perceive the nuclear attacks by the PRC and RF as deterrence failures, but it is also important to note that both states used nuclear weapons in this notional scenario when they were losing conventional conflicts against the United States and its allies. Nuclear use stemmed from a place of adversary weakness and was meant to undermine U.S. resolve to keep fighting and to illustrate the high stakes of the conflict for the PRC and RF.</p> -<p>Each round was followed by a 30-minute break enabling teams to regroup and participants to address personal business, as well as a 30-minute adjudication session in which all teams reconvened in the main meeting room to receive an update on game progress from Control. The day ended with a one-hour hotwash for organizers to reflect on the decisions participants made throughout the game and for participants to share feedback on the game’s overall design and conduct.</p> +<p>Given Putin’s behavior over the past decade, it is possible, and perhaps even likely, that U.S. allies and partners will emphasize the RF’s taboo-breaking decision to conduct a nuclear attack more than they will blame the United States for the deterrence failure. For example, Putin already has defied several international rules and norms when it comes to respecting national sovereignty, upholding sanctions against proliferating nations, and using chemical weapons against perceived enemies of the state. Moreover, his strategic mistake in invading Ukraine in 2022 and his administration’s persistent nuclear saber-rattling since may result in NATO leaders questioning Putin’s rationality. The theory of nuclear deterrence relies on leaders behaving rationally, so can the United States be blamed for not deterring an actor who may not be rational?</p> -<h3 id="game-progression-and-key-events">Game Progression and Key Events</h3> +<p>The PRC’s nuclear use presents a different and perhaps more complex challenge. The Philippines is not under the protection of U.S. extended nuclear deterrence per the 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty, and yet in a Pacific conflict, the nation would become a target as the United States operates out of its military bases. A potential nuclear attack on a Philippine military base would likely provoke public backlash toward the United States, especially among Filipinos aligned with the political faction of former president Rodrigo Duterte. Some Philippine leaders have already expressed concerns that U.S. military forces on their islands make them a potential target of a nuclear attack. Maintaining this partnership after an attack may be difficult without extending the U.S. nuclear umbrella.</p> -<h4 id="round-1-club-formation-and-reactions">Round 1: Club Formation and Reactions</h4> +<p><em>HOW CAN THE UNITED STATES SIGNAL RESOLVE TO ALLIES IN THE EVENT OF STRATEGIC DETERRENCE FAILURE? WHAT WILL BE ALLIES’ SECURITY CONCERNS IN THE EVENT OF STRATEGIC DETERRENCE FAILURE? WHAT ROLE MIGHT CERTAIN ALLIES AND PARTNERS PLAY IN A RESPONSE?</em></p> -<p>The first round, set in 2027, was devoted to establishing a G7+ climate club and immediate reactions from other participants. The G7+ team was tasked with reaching an agreement on the nature of their climate club within the first hour, while other teams considered their engagement strategies. The emerging markets team made preemptive announcements, expressing concern that wealthy nations would unilaterally impose border measures and undermine multilateral efforts to reduce emissions. They called on the G7+ to adopt collective strategies that accounted for their past emissions and developing countries’ need for financial support and technology for mitigation. China echoed these sentiments, offering support for the emerging markets’ position and inviting an open bilateral discussion.</p> +<p>The most important means of signaling resolve is for the United States to continue prosecuting the respective conflicts and to respond to the nuclear attacks. Continuing the fight means that military forces may have to operate in spite of, and even in, radiation-contaminated environments.</p> -<p>The G7+ announced the creation of a climate club with the following features:</p> +<p>In the hours after nuclear use, the focus in the White House will be learning as much as possible about the attacks and assessing its response. This will be a tense, high-stress period, but Washington will want to make allies aware of its plans. Ideally, NATO’s Nuclear Planning Group would have discussed responses to RF or PRC nuclear use well before the beginning of this hypothetical conflict in 2027. The public response to the Russian attack should be presented as a NATO response.</p> -<ul> - <li> - <p><strong>Carbon-free economy goal.</strong> Members commit to achieving a carbon-free economy by 2050.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Carbon accounting.</strong> Members gradually implement value chain accounting across all economic sectors.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Carbon border measures.</strong> Each member establishes its own carbon border measure, such as the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) for the European Union or carbon tariffs for the United States under the Foreign Pollution Fee Act.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Internal trade exemption.</strong> Members assign no climate-related border measures internally, pending the negotiation of an internal green marketplace.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Technology transfers.</strong> Members make technology transfers to low- and lower-middle-income countries wishing to join the club.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Shared oversight.</strong> All members participate in oversight and decisionmaking.</p> - </li> -</ul> +<p>A key aspect of demonstrating credible resolve is maintaining public support for U.S. responses to the attacks; reminding the U.S. public of the strategic importance of its alliances will be vital to this support. News of nuclear use on allies in the Indo-Pacific and Europe will shock the U.S. public; many could fear nuclear detonations would occur on U.S. territory. As a result, securing public support in the United States for military action in defense of allies and partners following the attacks may be challenging. NATO expanded in a period when most Americans no longer worried about European security or nuclear war; the public salience of the alliance and of U.S. alliance commitments is likely much lower than it was during the Cold War.</p> -<p>China criticized the proposal as vague and likely to undermine global trading rules for protectionist purposes. However, the China team refrained from taking adversarial action, instead calling for more details from the G7+ about the climate club. Meanwhile, China, Brazil, and India announced they would begin discussions on creating a global carbon accounting system open to all countries. The round closed with the United States and Canada communicating Mexico’s decision to join the club.</p> +<p>Before any potential conflict — and frankly, right now — the U.S. government, especially the president, should aim to better educate the public about the history of U.S. alliance relationships and their benefits. When it comes to most public discussions of U.S. allies today, there is too much talk about free-riding and too little about how U.S. economic, security, and political interests benefit from maintaining strong relations with its 30-plus treaty allies. Existing research from political science suggests that the U.S. public is more likely to support military action on behalf of formal allies than nonformal allies (such as Taiwan), so public education about Taiwan is also important. Current scholarship also indicates that support for allies among the U.S. public is based on “elite cues,” so leaders need to be providing positive talking points about U.S. allies if they want to build public support for military action.</p> -<h4 id="round-2-expansion-attempts-and-emerging-market-responses">Round 2: Expansion Attempts and Emerging Market Responses</h4> +<p>Following the use of nuclear weapons in this scenario, allies will have several concerns. Any countries targeted or immediately impacted by the nuclear use will need immediate assistance addressing the medical emergencies caused by the nuclear detonation. Allies could also be fearful of follow-on attacks; they will expect the United States to respond strongly to protect them.</p> -<p>The second round, covering the period of 2028–2029, unfolded as a battle for influence over emerging markets between the G7+ and China, with China scoring some early wins. Talks between China, Brazil, and India on establishing a global carbon accounting system gained momentum as all remaining BRICS members and Saudi Arabia joined. In response, the G7+ offered to collaborate by sharing data and discussing potential common standards.</p> +<p>Allies and partners have a significant role to play in the messaging following nuclear use. They must unite in loudly and publicly condemning the nuclear attacks and should do so repeatedly. They should communicate that using nuclear weapons in these scenarios was unacceptable and neither nation will gain from using these weapons. These messages are key to reestablishing the nuclear taboo following nuclear use.</p> -<p>In addition, China released a three-pronged strategy designed to counter the G7+ club:</p> +<h4 id="military-response-options-1">Military Response Options</h4> -<ul> - <li> - <p>Reserve the right to “respond appropriately” to any discriminatory measures.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Invest RMB 10 trillion over 10 years to speed up the decarbonization of China’s economy.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Launch the Inclusive Green Belt, focused on a fair accounting mechanism for carbon, technology sharing for climate challenges, and promoting free trade in environmental goods and services.</p> - </li> -</ul> +<p>The most challenging question facing the U.S. president after nuclear use by the PRC and the RF is how to respond to the nuclear attacks. The following section offers options for a military response that aligns with the strategic goals discussed in the section on U.S. strategic priorities.</p> -<p>China later secured the backing of India, Russia, Saudi Arabia, and South Africa to pursue a joint dispute settlement case at the WTO against U.S. carbon border tariffs. This decision prompted Control to announce the reestablishment of the WTO Appellate Body based on a coin toss.</p> +<p><em>WHAT WOULD BE THE PRESIDENT’S MILITARY OPTIONS IN THE EVENT OF STRATEGIC DETERRENCE FAILURE? WHICH OF THESE OPTIONS WOULD YOU RECOMMEND TO THE PRESIDENT?</em></p> -<p>However, China’s momentum soon slowed. Crucially, no country chose to join the Inclusive Green Belt. While Russia responded positively to that proposal, China instead started bilateral negotiations on nuclear cooperation and a 30-year gas supply agreement aiming to reduce Chinese coal dependence.</p> +<p>Following the Chinese and Russian nuclear attacks, the president will hear many arguments that they must respond with nuclear weapons to signal strength and resolve. Some advisors will argue that responding without nuclear weapons will lead the adversaries to counter with another round of nuclear use. Others will warn that adversaries will perceive a nuclear response as escalatory and set the world on a dangerous path of nuclear exchange.</p> -<p>In contrast, the G7+ successfully enticed Mexico and Turkey to join its climate club, though it had to concede to their demands for preferential conditions. To further strengthen the club, the United States announced a USD 1 trillion fund offering grants and submarket loads for climate investments — exclusively accessible to club members.</p> +<p>Recommendations for the U.S. response to this notional scenario are based on the following assumptions:</p> -<p>Courted on both sides, emerging markets sought to strengthen their negotiating power by leveraging their collective resources. Brazil, Indonesia, Vietnam, and South Africa came together to form the Organization of Critical Minerals Exporters (OCME) to promote inclusive, fair, sustainable, and stable critical minerals markets. In the process, OCME even attracted Australia and Canada to join its ranks.</p> +<p><strong>Assumption 1: Leaders may be unable to control nuclear escalation.</strong> Responding to the initial nuclear attacks with a U.S. or NATO nuclear attack makes it more likely that the United States will find itself engaging in tit-for-tat nuclear exchanges than if it does not initially respond with nuclear weapons. Once this contest of nerves begins, it could be exceedingly difficult to stop. Even if both sides do not want to escalate, in the fog of war, circumstances may add escalation pressures. For example, misinterpretations about the goals of adversary nuclear attacks (such as regime change or undermining command and control centers) could lead to escalation.</p> -<p>Toward the end of the round, members of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries Plus (OPEC+) coordinated to undermine the green transition within the G7+. They released large quantities of oil into the market, aiming to slow the growth of electric vehicles (EVs) and stall investment in critical minerals. Officially, OPEC+ presented this as a move to ease the global cost of living.</p> +<p>Alternatively, nuclear-armed states could face other types of accidents, mistakes, or misinterpretations that could lead to nuclear use. There are several historical examples of such mistakes. For instance, during the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, an errant U2 pilot, an accidentally inserted nuclear attack training tape, and even a black bear in Duluth, Minnesota, could have led to a nuclear war that neither side wanted. Additionally, leaders below the commander in chief could conduct unauthorized attacks that could lead to further escalation.</p> -<h4 id="round-3-final-negotiations-and-outcomes">Round 3: Final Negotiations and Outcomes</h4> +<p>Some may argue that the theater nuclear use is far from a strategic nuclear exchange and does not present a risk of all-out nuclear war. In this argument, there is a clear and meaningful line between theater (or tactical) nuclear weapons and strategic nuclear weapons. It assumes that leaders could use tactical weapons but remain “below” the strategic threshold. There is little evidence to know whether this is true, and it could be a very costly and dangerous assumption to make. This argument of a clear demarcation between tactical and strategic weapons also has the unintended consequences of reifying three categories of weapons: conventional weapons, theater nuclear weapons, and strategic nuclear weapons. Whether intentional or not, this argument leads to the appearance that theater nuclear weapons are acceptable and thus more usable. And while smaller nuclear weapons do less damage, the damage is still significant and indicates a violation of a long-standing taboo. Furthermore, it is not clear if other leaders share the same assumption that there is a clear divide between employing theater and strategic weapons.</p> -<p>The third and final round, covering 2030–2032, did not bring any realignment among the teams. The G7+ solidified its climate club by achieving three key milestones. First, it finalized a major internal agreement on the green marketplace, tackling tariffs and nontariff barriers to establish a free market for environmental goods and services, public procurement options, conformity assessment and standards, nondiscriminatory access to incentives programs, and critical minerals. Second, the group tackled inflation concerns by reallocating tariff revenue toward cost transfers, home retrofitting for higher efficiency, and clean vehicles and electricity subsidies. Lastly, the G7+ anchored Turkey into the club, largely through an EU commitment to accelerate Turkey’s accession talks and South Korea’s pledge to invest in Turkey’s nuclear and EV sectors.</p> +<p>In sum, significant destruction could occur if both sides begin employing nuclear weapons. This is unprecedented territory, and no one can predict with certainty what will happen. The potential destruction caused by nuclear escalation poses too great of a risk to make the ex ante assumption that leaders can fully manage this risk.</p> -<p>However, the G7+ could not prevent Mexico from leaving the club as inflationary pressures and declining economic opportunities within the club prompted its exit. Additionally, a joint EU-U.S. offer granting OCME members access to climate funds in exchange for preferential access to critical minerals went unanswered.</p> +<p><strong>Assumption 2: Military responses that lead to public humiliation of Putin and Xi are not likely to lead to preferred U.S. objectives.</strong> Considering the few checks on their decisionmaking, their regional and global ambitions, and their obsessions with legacy, it worth considering how to minimize actions that serve to humiliate Xi and Putin. For this reason, the West should explore finding the right balance between responses that are conducted in the open and those that can be conducted with plausible deniability.</p> -<p>China, meanwhile, toughened its opposition to the G7+ club by imposing an export ban on all critical minerals processing technologies. However, China failed to gain traction in emerging markets despite pledging up to RMB 10 trillion in foreign direct investment to countries that would join the Inclusive Green Belt and remove tariffs on Chinese green goods. Additionally, the global carbon accounting discussions from the first and second rounds seemed to stall or fall by the wayside.</p> +<p><strong>Assumption 3: To be deterred from further escalation, Xi and Putin must be fearful of follow-on actions.</strong> If the United States does not respond strongly to the nuclear attack, it will confirm that Xi and Putin were correct that the United States has lower stakes in both regions relative to the PRC and RF. The responses to the attack must be costly in terms of destruction of adversary capabilities — though not necessarily with nuclear weapons — and indicate that more attacks could follow.</p> -<p>Among emerging markets, cohesion dissolved as each country pursued its national interests, choosing to negotiate bilaterally — either with other emerging markets or with other teams. India agreed to double its imports of Russian oil and gas in exchange for Indian investment into the Russian energy sector along with enhanced cooperation on decarbonization between the two countries. India further secured public financing from Saudi Arabia for domestic climate and energy transition projects, while Saudi Arabia negotiated a uranium deal with the United States and Australia to facilitate the Gulf region’s development of nuclear energy. OCME welcomed India, Japan, and South Korea within its ranks as “trusted processing and recycling centers,” but no other multilateral agreements emerged.</p> +<p><strong>Policy recommendation:</strong> Given the extreme danger of beginning a process of nuclear exchange with U.S. adversaries and the fact that the adversaries may use nuclear weapons again regardless of U.S. and allied action, it is prudent to retaliate with punishing nonnuclear responses that are both public and clandestine. The United States should conduct timely and precise conventional attacks on adversary military bases or installations to degrade their military capabilities. Targeting should not include command and control capabilities, which could be perceived as escalatory. Moreover, these attacks should be reported to the public. This strong conventional response signals both that nuclear use will be punished and that the United States does not need to resort to nuclear use to do considerable damage to the adversary’s military capabilities. At the same time, the U.S. should signal its readiness to conduct limited nuclear operations, if necessary, by moving dual-capable aircraft and submarines to the regions.</p> -<h3 id="scoring-progression">Scoring Progression</h3> +<p>The United States should accompany these conventional attacks with clear assurances both in public and private that the United States does not seek regime change in the PRC or the RF. While in general the United States would prefer fewer authoritarian governments, in this conflict scenario, making adversaries believe their lives and governments are at risk could lead to further nuclear escalation. As prospect theory informs us, those in the domain of losses — as China and Russia would be in this scenario — are willing to take great risks. The United States simply seeks a reversion to the pre-conflict status quo. If either foreign leader assesses that regime change is a goal of the West, the conflict could quickly escalate.</p> -<p>As the day progressed, each team dealt with advances and setbacks, and its scores in the four categories (economy, political support, emissions, and allies) shifted accordingly. The formation of a climate club by the G7+ team in round 1 improved its members’ emissions outlook, raising their emissions score from 2 to 4. By contrast, the club engendered the threat of trade restrictions and geopolitical hostility, lowering the team’s economy score from 6 to 4 and political support score from 5 to 3. China and emerging markets also saw bleak economic outcomes, with the club’s border adjustments and tariffs creating an economic burden for nonmember states. Round 2 saw general improvements for the G7+ and China teams, with the G7+ team expanding its alliance and China presenting a clear alternative to the G7-led climate club. The emerging markets team, however, was left with worsening natural disasters and inadequate financial commitments, reducing its political, economic, and allied scores.</p> +<p>In addition to these conventional attacks, the United States should consider clandestine operations employing special forces teams that would degrade adversary military capabilities. These attacks do not need to be as immediate as the conventional attacks, but they should surprise the adversaries in terms of the damage done. If there are novel capabilities not employed by the West previously, this would be a suitable time to use them. The goal of these nonpublic attacks is to degrade enemy capabilities and demonstrate U.S. capabilities to adversary leadership with the plausible deniability of secret operations. PRC and RF leaders will not be forced to discuss these attacks in public and thus the potential humiliation or backlash that could come from these attacks is less likely. In other words, these operations should do serious damage while allowing Putin and Xi to save face. Once these actions have taken place, the United States should offer off-ramps to the RF and the PRC, while also making clear that the United States will continue fighting and may have to resort to nuclear use.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/loZ92Lb.png" alt="image01" /> -<em>▲ Table 1: Progression of Scores by Team and Round</em></p> +<p><em>WHAT ARE THE RISKS ASSOCIATED WITH A MILITARY RESPONSE?</em></p> -<h3 id="team-analysis">Team Analysis</h3> +<p>The most significant immediate risk is nuclear escalation. Other risks include the PRC and RF retaliating against the U.S. homeland and allies by other means, including conventional, cyber, or space attacks. The risks of not responding, however, include a loss of U.S. credibility, a breakdown in the U.S. alliance system, and a further weakening of the rules-based global order. Moreover, perceptions of “successful” use of nuclear weapons could increase proliferation pressures around the world.</p> -<p><strong>G7+ team.</strong> The G7+ team proved particularly fractious due to the large number of participants and their diverse domestic approaches to climate policy. Internal differences kept the club from policy alignment. Early on, the EU and U.S. players retreated to separate rooms to coordinate their positions, a practice they continued at regular intervals. These divided sessions slowed overall club negotiations as each prioritized the management of their internal cohesion. The U.S. and EU policy proposals were also in conflict, as the United States had no internal carbon price to secure its climate goals, while the European Union was attached to its emissions trading system, which forced other members to mediate.</p> +<h4 id="non-kinetic-response-options-1">Non-Kinetic Response Options</h4> -<p>Ultimately, the European Union and the United States reached an ungainly compromise and agreed on the main terms and benefits of the club, which they reluctantly extended to the rest of the group. However, the European Union stressed that its agreement was contingent on establishing a shared financing mechanism and access to U.S. subsidies in later rounds, which virtually halted the club’s implementation until all details were finalized in the late stages of the game.</p> +<p>In addition to military responses to nuclear use, there are several other means by which the United States and its allies can pursue the primary and secondary strategic goals discussed previously. The president, with allies, should take non-kinetic actions against the RF and PRC to punish the use of nuclear weapons and demonstrate the costly repercussions of nuclear use. These actions should be taken along with the military responses described above. Potential non-kinetic responses include the following:</p> -<p>Consumed by internal negotiations throughout the game, the G7+ had little bandwidth to devote to a coherent outreach strategy for membership candidates — or even to consider how its proposals might appeal to them. Unable to tolerate China’s presence within the club, the United States clearly defined the group’s collective stance toward China, though the group’s lack of coordination was evident in the absence of cohesive messaging inside meetings.</p> +<p><strong>Financial punishments:</strong> The United States could utilize the tools of the global financial system to hurt the PRC and RF economies. These tools may have limited utility in 2027, however, as both countries have worked to limit, to the extent possible, their economic vulnerabilities. Additional use of these tools may be necessary, but they will further the decoupling of adversaries from the global economic system led by the United States.</p> -<p><strong>The China team.</strong> The team’s structure was designed to mirror the decisionmaking processes that shape energy and climate policies in China. Each player represented a specific government entity. However, such internal dynamics were largely muted during the gameplay, as players were not assertive in their assigned roles. Instead, the team took a collaborative approach and deferred to the president/politburo when making major decisions. This pattern persisted when a different player assumed the presidency later in the game for logistical reasons.</p> +<p><strong>Cyberattacks:</strong> The United States should consider conducting cyberattacks on the adversaries that are initially limited and measured, but which signal the possibility of pursuing attacks with greater effect if the conflict continues. This action does risk a dangerous escalation of cyber conflict — also unprecedented to date — so these actions must be calibrated very carefully. Attacks should avoid military command and control capabilities or otherwise blinding the adversary in such a way that they misinterpret the attacks as being the prelude to a larger attack.</p> -<p>In the early stages of the game, players spent significant time aligning their views on two key points: the state of energy and climate in China and the government’s priorities and redlines. Once the team reached a consensus, it acted as a unified block in international proceedings. No player deviated from the agenda during meetings with foreign representatives, the group consulted internally before and after each meeting, and no actions were taken without the group’s consent.</p> +<p><strong>Diplomatic statements:</strong> In the days and weeks following the nuclear attacks, U.S. and allied leaders should make strong statements to all audiences — foreign and domestic — about how the PRC and RF have broken a long-standing taboo in international relations. In addition, Washington should work with allies and all other like-minded states to write and publicize a unified statement of condemnation from leaders around the world (with as diverse a geographic grouping as possible). In addition, a UN General Assembly resolution, such as the one following Russia’s attack on Ukraine in 2022, would help send the message that the international community disapproves of the nuclear use. These condemnations may not affect RF and PRC actions in the immediate term, but the lack of global condemnation following the first nuclear use since World War II would undermine the nuclear taboo moving forward.</p> -<p>Although players were keen to use China’s strengths in technology and state-driven international finance during negotiations, they took a cautious approach, avoiding proposals that might harm China’s economic security. Only in the final turn did China act on its stated opposition to the G7+ club by raising export controls on critical minerals technology. Their other initiatives to compete with the G7+ for global leadership, such as the Inclusive Green Belt and global carbon accounting schemes, stalled.</p> +<p>In making public statements about the nuclear attacks, the United States and its allies must consider how other members of the international community will perceive nuclear use — namely, was it successful for the attackers? The most important message to convey will be that nuclear attacks do not allow states to succeed in territorial aggrandizement. The existing global nuclear order has dealt with many challenges to date, and this nuclear use would be a grave one, but there are indications that the order would be able to survive this challenge.</p> -<p><strong>The emerging markets team.</strong> In the initial stages of the game, India and South Africa sought to lead a preemptive strategy to deter or at least mitigate the impact of the anticipated G7+ climate club. However, discussions broke down due to competing national interests. Turkey’s economic ties with Europe, as well as Mexico’s trade relationship with the United States, made them more conciliatory toward the G7+, culminating in their decision to join the G7+ club. However, Mexico later withdrew after determining the cost of membership was too high. By contrast, Indonesia and Vietnam were wary of antagonizing or overly depending on China, which hindered unification efforts.</p> +<p>It is worth emphasizing here that improving U.S. and allied relations with states within the Global South before this notional conflict in 2027 is paramount. Though the international community broadly supported the 2022 UN General Assembly resolution condemning Russia’s attack on Ukraine, there have been fewer governments that have unilaterally condemned the attack or Russia’s nuclear saber-rattling, even among members of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, a treaty that explicitly bans nuclear threats.</p> -<p>Natural resources also played a major role for players on the emerging markets team, as seen in the establishment of the OCME. Russia, meanwhile, pursued a natural gas and nuclear agreement with China, though its primary strategy was disruption. Russia used its cyber capabilities and natural resources to sow discord, particularly within the G7+, and to deter any actions that might threaten demand for its hydrocarbon exports. By the end of the game, the emerging markets team was too fragmented to resemble a cohesive economic bloc.</p> +<h4 id="conclusion-2">Conclusion</h4> -<h3 id="key-outcomes-and-insights">Key Outcomes and Insights</h3> +<p>The notional 2027 scenario discussed in this paper would pose significant challenges to U.S. leadership in the immediate and longer term. At best, the 82-year-old nuclear taboo is broken but further nuclear escalation is prevented. The United States is able to end both conflicts on favorable terms that punish the adversary’s militaries for nuclear use. Taiwan remains an autonomous democracy with a strong economy. Allies and partners remain committed to their security arrangements with the United States. Competition between the United States and both powers continues, but the PRC and RF are chastened. The message is clear that the use of nuclear weapons is not a means of achieving geopolitical goals, and the norm against their use is maintained.</p> -<p><strong>The outcomes highlighted the risks of a trade-based climate strategy.</strong> The game ended with escalating trade tensions, a worsening economic outlook for many countries, and only a modest increase in global ambitions for climate change. Despite mounting pressure from the public and increasingly visible climate effects, players prioritized economic and geopolitical goals over emissions reductions. Throughout the simulation, U.S.-China relations remained distant, and even the threat of a trade war failed to inspire rapprochement on carbon accounting standards, green development spending, or a common approach to climate and trade. The potential benefits of joining the G7+ climate club were not compelling enough to attract major emitters such as India, Brazil, or Indonesia.</p> +<p>The worst outcome is almost too horrible to imagine but must be contemplated: large nuclear exchanges that devastate massive swaths of nations on all sides of the conflict.</p> -<p><strong>Ambiguity prevented teams from taking decisive action in early rounds.</strong> As China and the emerging markets awaited details about the nascent club, they cautioned the G7+ against adopting protectionist measures but did not oppose the creation of a climate club outright or threaten direct retaliation. This left the G7+ team relatively free to act without external pressure. Most notably, China and the emerging markets failed to unite around a credible alternative to the G7+ effort. This could reflect a lack of appetite for climate clubs, or it could stem from emerging markets hedging their bets between potentially attractive options. In any case, the G7+ team appeared too preoccupied with its internal divisions to capitalize on opportunities to bring large emitters from the emerging markets team (such as Brazil, India, or Indonesia) into the fold or pressure China to increase its internal ambitions for climate.</p> +<p>Somewhere in the middle of these extremes, a large nuclear conflict is averted, but the use of nuclear weapons and the resulting fear of being targeted make allies and partners reconsider whether they want to be in a defensive alliance. In a world with fewer allies and partners, Washington would lose a great deal of influence to shape the norms and institutions that make up the global order. This outcome likely would hasten the end of any remaining notion of a U.S.-led global order.</p> -<p><strong>Economic imperatives appeared to have a stabilizing effect on Chinese decisionmaking.</strong> Appearing hesitant to jeopardize economic opportunities through retaliatory measures, the China team explored alternative options ranging from warning the G7+ against discriminatory measures to engaging with emerging markets in various formats and appealing to the WTO. When these efforts failed, China finally opted for retaliation, the scope of which was narrow, focusing on critical minerals and WTO litigation. The China team calculated that persistent macroeconomic difficulties would make it unfeasible to sustain a large-scale trade war that could compromise other priorities, including national security and climate goals.</p> +<p>Because so much is at stake, the most significant takeaway from this analysis is the importance of trying to deter such conflict in the first place. As described above, there are several ways in which the United States can improve readiness and signal its resolve. Once nuclear weapons are used in war, one cannot predict how conflict will escalate. Because nuclear weapons present an existential threat to humanity, there is nothing more important than avoiding nuclear war.</p> -<p><strong>Geopolitical considerations, as well as regional and economic proximity, strongly influenced decisionmaking.</strong> After the G7+ formally established its club, the United States and Canada swiftly approached Mexico, and the European Union approached Turkey. These moves seemed low risk and logical given the nations’ geographic proximity, political ties, and significant trade flows. By contrast, India was never directly courted to join either the G7+ club or China’s Inclusive Green Belt. The country’s ambivalent geopolitical positioning, as well as its low-ambition trade and climate mitigation policies, may have acted as deterrents.</p> +<h3 id="presidential-prudence-and-responding-to-strategic-deterrence-failure">Presidential Prudence and Responding to Strategic Deterrence Failure</h3> -<p>Notably, both Mexico and Turkey sought access to the G7+ club in a manner that would permit continued Chinese investment in their economies. They requested that goods produced by Chinese companies on their soil, like BYD EVs, not be excluded from the internal green marketplace. Meanwhile, bilateral deals — such as those between China and Russia, Russia and India, or Saudi Arabia and the United States — aligned with existing geopolitical and sectoral relationships.</p> +<blockquote> + <h4 id="ankit-panda">Ankit Panda</h4> +</blockquote> -<p><strong>Trade liberalization and energy supplies were the most effective tools for driving collaboration and realignment.</strong> Both the G7+ and China made technology transfer and investment central to their efforts to entice other countries to cooperate, but they met with little success. Attempts by China and the emerging markets to exert influence through tighter controls on critical minerals or fossil fuels were also of limited influence. In contrast, trade liberalization played a significant role in supporting and dissuading club membership. Access to the green marketplace was key in attracting Mexico and Turkey to the G7+ club, while market access for Chinese green goods deterred emerging markets from embracing the Inclusive Green Belt. Energy supply played a significant role in bilateral deals between teams but was not a driver for clubs.</p> +<p>U.S. presidents, their advisers, and military planners must take seriously the possibility of limited nuclear use by adversaries in a range of plausible future contingencies. Resorting to the first use of nuclear weapons may appear attractive to U.S. adversaries as a means of seeking undeniable military and political advantage while simultaneously communicating exceptional resolve, risk acceptance, and stakes. In this way, the detonation of one — or multiple — nuclear weapons with deliberately lower yields on strictly military targets in the course of a conventional war or an intense crisis could compel the president of the United States, in their capacity as commander-in-chief, to weigh several risky response options, none of which may be particularly optimal across the full set of U.S. national objectives as articulated in peacetime.</p> -<h3 id="lessons-for-policymakers">Lessons for Policymakers</h3> +<p>As Thomas Schelling observed in 1961, reflecting contemporaneously on the Berlin crisis (1958–1961), intense crises between nuclear-armed adversaries are usefully conceived of as games of competitive risk-taking, where the military effects of nuclear use may be a secondary consideration to the resolve conveyed. “We should plan for a war of nerve, of demonstration, and of bargaining, not of tactical target destruction,” Schelling observed. He added that should the United States resort to the use of nuclear weapons against Soviet military targets over Berlin, “destroying the target is incidental to the message the detonation conveys to the Soviet leadership.” For Schelling, prevailing in the crisis over Berlin would require “impress[ing] the Soviet leadership with the risk of general war — a war that may occur whether we or they intend it or not.” Limited nuclear use — or limited nuclear war — thus was an option meant specifically to communicate to the Soviet Union that the United States would be willing to tolerate exceptionally high risks to achieve the political ends it sought at the time. Today, military planners contemplating limited nuclear use may believe that target choice is more than an incidental matter; however, impressing on the adversary the prospect of an uncontrollable lurch toward Armageddon will remain central to such a choice. Adversaries need not be irrational or deliberately seeking nuclear escalation to contemplate such actions; all it may take for limited nuclear use to be attractive is that adversary leaders see that step as being less bad than the alternatives, which may include conventional defeat.</p> -<p><strong>Clear policy communication is paramount in multilateral negotiations — both in the run-up to a major policy pronouncement and upon its enactment.</strong> Slow, cautious play characterized the game’s opening turns as all three teams appeared unsure of how to proceed or respond. After the G7+ and China teams published their proposals, they spent considerable time dispelling misunderstandings and clarifying their terms. Without clearly articulated goals and terms, club members had little opportunity to market membership to large emitters or potential geopolitical allies.</p> +<p>Schelling’s prescriptions, written in 1961, may appear somewhat uncontroversial to U.S. audiences familiar with the history of the Cold War and U.S. interests in central Europe in the 1960s. Yet it is not inconceivable that should Russia, China, or North Korea choose in the twenty-first century to rationally resort to limited, nuclear first-use, their calculations will rest on a similar logic. Just as a U.S. president might have resorted to a nuclear detonation to convey a greater stake in the fate of Berlin to the Soviet leadership in 1961, so too might Russian president Vladimir Putin, Chinese leader Xi Jinping, or North Korean leader Kim Jong Un seek to “impress” on a U.S. president that running a risk of a general — possibly spasmodic — nuclear war over nuclear strikes on military targets is simply a risk not worth running. This logic underscoring the potential appeal of limited nuclear use is essentially deductive. To be sure, any nuclear use by U.S. adversaries would represent a world-altering event and the unambiguous manifestation of what U.S. deterrence planners consider “strategic deterrence failure,” but there remains a meaningful difference between successful war termination between nuclear-armed adversaries following limited nuclear use and war termination after a large-scale nuclear exchange. This difference may, quite literally, be measured in the millions-of-human-lives lost.</p> -<p><strong>Climate clubs are contingent on flexible mechanisms that accommodate diverse national interests.</strong> The G7+ team struggled to overcome its members’ disparate policy approaches but struck compromises to clinch an ambitious agreement based on long-term decarbonization. For example, the European Union exempted U.S. products from CBAM, even in the absence of a U.S. carbon market, in exchange for access to Inflation Reduction Act–style subsidies and expanded trade in green goods. The members also did not create a unified border measure, instead allowing each country to follow its national preference. Flexibility was crucial in expanding the club in later turns, as demonstrated in Mexico’s and Turkey’s attempts to protect Chinese investment in their territories.</p> +<p>The Project Atom study asks its authors to consider a particularly sobering scenario of limited nuclear use. U.S. adversaries — specifically, Russia and China — escalate to limited nuclear use in order to compel the United States to back away from continuing military action. In the scenario assigned to the authors, both Russia and China resort to nuclear first-use, paired with signals designed to convey their willingness to run greater risks than the United States. In the scenario, both Beijing and Moscow reference each other’s military actions, including the other’s nuclear strikes, and a strong collusive logic appears to drive each adversary’s willingness to run risks. While such a scenario may not cohere to how subject matter experts versed in the decisionmaking and bureaucratic idiosyncrasies of the Russian and Chinese political systems might conceive of pathways to limited nuclear use by those states, it represents something close to a worst-case scenario for strategic deterrence failure manifesting in near-simultaneous nuclear use by two near-peer U.S. adversaries in different theaters. Notably, the scenario also features a resort to nuclear use by both adversaries following exceptional U.S. and allied conventional successes: in Europe, the United States’ NATO allies successfully seize a substantial portion of Russia’s Kaliningrad Oblast and, in the Indo-Pacific, the United States successfully interdicts an amphibious invasion force destined for Taiwan.</p> -<p><strong>Climate clubs must be aggressively marketed to emerging markets and geopolitical allies.</strong> Neither the G7+ team nor the China team succeeded in attracting development economies to their club. This failure appears to stem from a lack of coordination among emerging markets as well as the one-size-fits-all approaches of the G7+ and China. Participants did not form any transactional arrangements, such as exchanging access to critical minerals for industrial investment or market access.</p> +<p>Given the problem described above and the prescribed scenario, this paper answers the query posed by the Project Atom study — namely, how the United States should respond to limited nuclear use — by centering the role of the U.S. president in nuclear decisionmaking. U.S. presidents, despite their limited briefings on U.S. nuclear capabilities and policies in peacetime, are unlikely to reason about matters of intra-war deterrence, escalation control, and war termination in a real crisis in the same manner that nuclear strategists writing about these matters in peacetime from their comfortable perches at research institutes might. Put simply, presidents are likely to be inordinately fearful of general nuclear war in the aftermath of limited nuclear use and averse to the possibility of even a single nuclear warhead detonating on U.S. territory. This may be the case even if presidential advisers and intelligence assessments do not necessarily ascribe a high probability to further nuclear escalation in the prescribed scenario. Given that the president is solely imbued with the authority to issue valid and legal orders to release nuclear weapons, any analysis of likely and plausible U.S. response options must center how current and future presidents may weigh response options. Despite however many options are in place or requirements provided in peacetime, a U.S. president cannot be compelled by their military advisers to seek any particular course of action in a given crisis. Given this, this paper largely argues that should Russia and China resort to partially collusive, deliberate, limited nuclear use in simultaneous crises, as specified in the Project Atom scenario, most plausible U.S. presidents — individuals who are overwhelmingly likely to be politicians, unversed in the finer points of nuclear strategy — will likely be compelled to stand down instead of engaging in competitive nuclear risk-taking. These men and women, whoever they may be, are overwhelmingly likely to find themselves worrying about the prospect of general nuclear war — or the “final failure” — as John F. Kennedy once did at the height of the Cuban Missile Crisis.</p> -<p><strong>Trade has the potential to drive, as well as deter, climate action.</strong> Conventional climate club designs feature a common border measure to encourage nonmembers to join and adopt emissions targets. This is precisely what drove Mexico and Turkey to seek accession to the G7+ club. Yet trade policy considerations also complicated the search for solutions. The debate over the nature and extent of the border measure almost derailed the formation of the G7+ club, as the European Union and the United States disagreed on whether to adhere to WTO rules for raising border adjustments or selectively liberalize trade within the club. Later in the game, China’s demand for tariff-free treatment of its exports as a condition for participating in its Inclusive Green Belt deterred emerging markets from joining.</p> +<p>If this is true, there is little doubt that several self-professed U.S. national objectives as articulated in peacetime would come under substantial stress, with potentially far-reaching consequences for U.S. grand strategy and foreign policy. This is ultimately the cost of strategic deterrence failure and why the United States must take the prospect of averting any nuclear use anywhere seriously. Other scenarios, including those featuring opportunistic limited nuclear use by one peer, may lead a president to accept greater risks, but this is outside of the scope of this study. As this essay will discuss, prudent planning for such failure can ensure that a U.S. president that may choose to avoid running the risk of nuclear escalation remains able to seek a world after strategic deterrence failure that is somewhat favorable for the United States. This can also be a world where the consequences of having resorted to limited nuclear use do not entail strategic victory for Russia and China, but rather a narrow, costly, pyrrhic victory.</p> -<h3 id="priorities-for-future-research">Priorities for Future Research</h3> +<h4 id="fundamental-questions-for-the-united-states">Fundamental Questions for the United States</h4> -<p><strong>Improve modeling of climate-focused trade mechanisms.</strong> A key shortfall in this game was the inability to model or quantitatively understand the economic, trade, emissions, and political stakes of different decisions. Participants had to reason about decisions using intuition or by asking questions of Control. They were also limited in their ability to compare options or grapple with the outcomes of different actions. Although policymakers in the real world face substantial uncertainty in the outcomes of their decisions, they must enter negotiations with some quantitative understanding of how to achieve their climate and economic goals.</p> +<p>In reasoning about possible responses to strategic deterrence failure manifesting in limited nuclear use, U.S. leaders, advisers, and planners must be clear about the key national objectives and their relative levels of priority. In the event of strategic deterrence failure, the chief U.S. objective should be to ensure the avoidance of a general, unlimited nuclear war that could lead to fundamentally unacceptable levels of damage against the U.S. homeland as a result of adversary counterforce or countervalue strikes. Democratically elected U.S. presidents, charged by voters with defending the homeland, are likely to consider any nuclear attacks on U.S. territory as tantamount to unacceptable damage. Despite the somewhat methodical Cold War origins of this terminology, in the context of the given scenario, presidents are unlikely to be persuaded by their military advisers that the United States can ride out limited nuclear strikes and continue to exist as it did precrisis. This consideration presents an obvious and uncomfortable source of friction with U.S. assurances to allies as delivered in peacetime, a matter to which we will return later in this essay.</p> -<p><strong>Understand the priorities of emerging markets in climate and trade negotiations.</strong> Future research on climate clubs should focus on devising a coherent approach that enables the identification and harmonization of the diverse and often conflicting security, climate, and economic priorities of emerging market and developing economies (EMDEs). Research could explore how climate clubs can tailor membership incentives, such as market access, technology transfer, and political support, to attract EMDE participation. This could alleviate the shortcomings of the narrow, one-size-fits-all approaches observed in this simulation.</p> +<p>Avoiding general kinetic damage against the homeland in the course of an ongoing war should thus be a key consideration for the president and should be prioritized above all other considerations, including, in the context of the scenario, supporting Taiwanese and Ukrainian objectives, supporting NATO and East Asian allies, and generally preserving the international order. These goals will remain operative but are fundamentally secondary to the survival and protection of the U.S. homeland. Because strategic deterrence failure of any magnitude is likely to be a world-altering event, it is quite likely that the precise circumstances of initial adversary nuclear use should cause a reassessment of key U.S. objectives. While the prescriptions that follow will make for unsettling reading in allied capitals, they should not be taken as a recommendation for the United States to exit the business of extended deterrence altogether. There are several plausible limited nuclear use scenarios that do not feature collusion as outlined in the Project Atom scenario where U.S. presidents may be substantially more willing to run risks in the defense of allies, but the scenario at hand here presents a particularly devilish predicament: the possibility of follow-on collusion by Moscow and Beijing in a general nuclear war against the United States.</p> -<p><strong>Develop a standardized and adaptable global carbon accounting framework.</strong> Lack of consensus on carbon accounting standards and other evaluative criteria emerged as a major obstacle to cooperation during the simulation. Future research should focus on identifying carbon accounting procedures that meet enough needs to become standardized, such as accounting for data access and validation procedures. Proactive multilateral engagement is critical to effectively integrating these global standards into trade negotiations and carbon border mechanisms.</p> +<p>That said, strategic deterrence failure should not paralyze the United States in its ability to respond entirely. While restoring the territorial status quo ex ante in both Europe and the Indo-Pacific in the given scenario may not be possible at acceptable levels of cost to the United States, Washington should nevertheless seek to dissuade and deter further adversary nuclear use and terminate conflict on terms that would be deemed acceptable, if not entirely favorable. Critically, following strategic deterrence failure, U.S. adversaries will be correct in their assessment that their stakes — over Ukraine and Taiwan, respectively — are greater than those of the United States given the objectives articulated above. This is especially likely to be the case if Putin and Xi resorted to nuclear use out of desperation to preserve their political control and out of a belief that maintaining their territorial integrity requires running the risk of a nuclear exchange over these territories. Even if U.S. grand strategy and decades of investment in a global order that seeks to proscribe aggressive territorial revisionism may be at risk, many presidents may nevertheless opt for prudence in averting escalation.</p> -<p><strong>Identify and navigate geopolitical and security redlines in climate negotiations.</strong> The simulation illustrated that bilateral and multilateral agreements that align with existing geopolitical relationships or shared economic and security interests have higher rates of success. Future research should focus on identifying geopolitical and security redlines that hinder climate negotiations, as well as the ways climate clubs can mitigate these obstacles through measures such as public diplomacy, economic incentives, and security guarantees.</p> +<p>While the president’s advisers might point out that Russia and China, like the United States, would also be fearful of a general nuclear war — undoubtedly correctly — and that the U.S. nuclear force is survivable to the point of assuring their destruction should escalation prove uncontrollable, prudent presidential leadership would still have to consider the stepwise process of escalation after a U.S. nuclear response. As a result, the prioritization of the survival of the United States as a key national objective is likely to prompt such a prudent president to abstain from responses that could heighten the probability of a general nuclear war.</p> -<hr /> +<p>Nevertheless, the president should be ready to employ the full array of tools from across the diplomacy-information-military-economics (DIME) spectrum to achieve the above-stated U.S. objectives as well as possible. Many of these steps can be planned for and conceived of well outside the immediate confines of a crisis, including the crises specified in the Project Atom scenario.</p> -<p><strong>Joseph Majkut</strong> is the director of the Energy Security and Climate Change Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C.</p> +<p>Preventing adversary nuclear use and strategic deterrence failure will rest on manifesting in the mind of adversarial leaders the prospect of intolerable costs should they proceed, while simultaneously conveying that nuclear use is unlikely to confer tactical or strategic benefit. For both Putin and Xi, the most substantial cost likely relates to their personal political control over their respective states. While the United States should not unambiguously indicate that any nuclear use would lead to an end of their regimes, its declaratory signaling should maintain calculated ambiguity while conveying that catastrophic costs would ensue. While deterrence should prioritize a willingness to hold at risk what adversaries value most, threatening the personal political control or broader regime security of nuclear-armed great power adversaries is unlikely to advance U.S. interests — either in the scenario at hand or in general terms. Issuing such signals, by contrast, is likely to powerfully disabuse adversaries of any deliberate restraint that may still seem valuable after their limited nuclear use, rendering the prospect of follow-on uncontrollable escalation far more likely. In essence, such signaling by the United States would have the effect of further heightening the stakes for adversarial leaders to essentially existential levels concerning their personal political control. Successful war termination for the United States following limited nuclear use will require forbearance on such messaging. A practical problem for the United States, however, will be its noisy domestic political environment, where prominent political figures, including lawmakers from the president’s own party and the opposition, will likely issue calls for regime change or at least the removal of these leaders. U.S. adversaries will likely be unable to disentangle this “noise” from the “signal” of deliberate presidential messaging and assurances.</p> -<p><strong>Guillaume Ferlet</strong> is an external consultant on trade and climate issues with CSIS.</p> +<p>At higher levels of escalation — particularly, follow-on strikes initiated by Russia and China — U.S. messaging could adopt the position that general nuclear war is a real possibility and would mean the effective end of Putin’s and Xi’s political control. The United States should simultaneously seek to maintain a robust set of flexible and responsive conventional capabilities, including capabilities forward-deployed to both Europe and the Indo-Pacific. It should also seek to enable its allies and partners in the regions to proffer similar capabilities while ensuring integrated military planning and operations with these allies. Critically, U.S. messaging in the course of a crisis prior to strategic deterrence failure should be contingent: emphasizing that consequences will befall adversaries should they choose to transgress the nuclear threshold, but that, by contrast, those same consequences will not befall adversaries should they choose to abstain from nuclear employment.</p> -<p><strong>William Reinsch</strong> holds the Scholl Chair in International Business at CSIS.</p>Joseph Majkut, et al.In July 2024, CSIS’s Energy Security and Climate Change Program, in collaboration with the Scholl Chair in International Business, hosted a one-day trade and climate simulation game titled Power and Planet. The focus was on how players representing key nations make decisions at the intersection of climate and trade policy to reduce emissions, boost economic opportunity, and ensure security.Collaborative AI Governance2024-11-13T12:00:00+08:002024-11-13T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/collaborative-ai-governance<p><em>The UK and Canada, leveraging their strengths as trusted middle powers, are well-positioned to lead in setting global AI standards, fostering ethical, responsible and innovative AI governance.</em></p> +<h4 id="us-strategic-objectives-2">U.S. Strategic Objectives</h4> -<excerpt /> +<p>It is useful to reflect on the factors inherent in the scenario that appear to precipitate a resort by both Russia and China to limited nuclear use. In the scenario, the most critical cause of strategic deterrence failure appears to be the result of two factors. First, leaders in both Russia and China, fearing conventional defeat and having experienced substantial conventional setbacks, are likely primed to reach into their nuclear holsters. Successful conventional denial, in other words, prompts these leaders to view nuclear weapons as a useful offset — for tactical, strategic, and psychological reasons. Second, both Putin and Xi appear to believe — probably correctly — that nuclear use will powerfully convey both their resolve and the substantial asymmetry in stakes that exists for them versus the United States.</p> -<p>AI has moved out of the academic sphere and is rapidly becoming a “general-purpose” technology with a significant impact on industry, government and society. As a result, there is an urgent need to develop a cross-sectoral environment for AI within countries to attract foreign direct investment, and actively participate in global trade and meet both economic and national security goals.</p> +<p>They may further believe that despite professed U.S. diplomatic and other assurances to allies in peacetime, a U.S. president in wartime may be deterred from employing disproportionate force, including through the use of nuclear weapons, if necessary, due to the prospect of uncontrollable escalation. Within the confines of the scenario, deterrence failure may have been averted through protracted conventional warfighting, even if this would entail substantial costs to the armed forces of the United States and its allies. Swift conventional success by the United States and its allies appears to have been a powerful motivator for both Russia and China to reach for their nuclear holsters. Deterrence failure in the scenario in no small part appears to be intertwined with both Putin and Xi fundamentally miscalculating the odds of conventional victory.</p> -<p>However, in parallel to the technological investment in and development of this capability, robust governance systems must be in place to ensure the development and application of AI is trustworthy.</p> +<p>In both the Indo-Pacific and Europe, the United States’ core objectives prior to strategic deterrence failure are to deter significant escalation, to preserve the territorial status quo, to reassure its allies, and to preserve the international norm against territorial conquest. Following strategic deterrence failure, no objective should be greater for the U.S. president than ensuring that the survival of the country is not threatened by the prospect of uncontrollable escalation into a general nuclear war.</p> -<p>These levels of trust, predictability and protection are particularly important at a time when collaboration between global powers and economies of a lesser magnitude is vital, but when different forms of regulation may be better suited to smaller economies and political structures. Moreover, the so-called “rules-based order” that once governed global interactions is now inconsistently applied. This presents a unique opportunity for like-minded middle economies to unite and collectively set the highest standards for AI’s ethical and responsible use in ways that uphold their strong commitment to democratic principles, human rights and freedoms.</p> +<p>Victory for the United States within the presented scenario is far from straightforward despite the formidable conventional successes of allied forces in Europe and U.S. forces in the Indo-Pacific. A president and their expert advisers may disagree on the precise contours of victory in a crisis like the one envisaged in the scenario — just as President Kennedy and many of the key ExComm members (with the exception of George Ball) disagreed about the advisability of the Jupiter deal in the final days of the Cuban Missile Crisis. After strategic deterrence failure, a president may be rendered exceptionally sober by the prospect of general nuclear war — what Kennedy called the “final failure” — and be willing to take exceptional steps to seek prompt war termination, even on terms that would have been nominally unacceptable to that same president prior to adversary nuclear use.</p> -<p>In times of global uncertainty, the UK and Canada have consistently been viewed as trusted partners and “safe pairs of hands”. Both countries have respected political systems, strong higher education institutions, a shared monarchy, similarities in the legal and regulatory regimes, and military alliances (NATO and the “Five Eyes”). While many middle economies wait for powers like the US and the EU to set data and AI standards rules in the digital world, progress has been slow. Therefore, taking stock of the milestones and progress achieved in countries such as Canada and the UK is crucial, as well as considering the formation of a coalition of middle economies to set and influence global standards in this area.</p> +<p>On the contrary, should a president choose to accept the risk of further nuclear escalation and retaliate in kind — either with nuclear weapons or a massive conventional attack — victory could amount to a decision by the adversary to seek termination of the conflict to avoid further damage to their nations or their political control. Because this latter option is far more contingent and depends on variables that may be fundamentally unknowable in the midst of a crisis (such as Putin’s and Xi’s proximal risk acceptance), it bears substantially greater risks. Should the U.S. president seek to sue for war termination following adversary nuclear use, there likely would be severe, unprecedented, and — from the vantage point of peacetime — intolerable consequences to how the United States’ capability to project power globally, to reassure allies at a distance, and to hold global leadership would be perceived. In such an event, the casualty would largely be the United States’ extended deterrence guarantees; a U.S. president would have palpably demonstrated that they are unwilling to run the risk of a nuclear war that could cause damage to the homeland to back its allies. But, in general, the United States would be able to maintain robust deterrence of adversaries for other scenarios, such as attacks on U.S. territory itself. The potentially fatal blow to the U.S. system of extended deterrence thus further underscores the severity of any strategic deterrence failure scenario involving limited nuclear use, but especially the collusive scenario articulated in Project Atom. As mentioned earlier, this analysis should not be taken as a repudiation of extended deterrence, but instead as an appraisal of the challenges to sustaining U.S. allied commitments in the aftermath of the precise limited nuclear use scenario at hand. Even if the course of action recommended here may heighten the probability of allied nuclear proliferation, this outcome — with its many uncertainties — may be preferable to inviting greater escalation by resorting to reciprocal nuclear attacks.</p> -<p>Both countries are navigating their roles as middle powers in the global AI race, which is dominated by the US, the EU and China. Ranked third (UK) and fifth (Canada) in the 2024 top 10 countries leading in AI research and technology, with a market value of $21 billion for the UK and 144 generative AI-related startups in Canada, and scores of 38.1 (UK) and 34 (Canada) in the leading 20 AI countries in 2023 by research capacity, these countries have significant potential to collaborate on AI governance and the establishment of trustworthy and responsible AI cooperation. Demis Hassabis and Geoffrey Hinton, two thought leaders in AI research and practice, are both British, with Hinton having spent a significant part of his career in Canada – which is also home to other leading global AI scholars like Yoshua Bengio.</p> +<h4 id="assuring-allies-2">Assuring Allies</h4> -<h3 id="canada-and-the-uks-progress-and-existing-challenges">Canada and the UK’s Progress and Existing Challenges</h3> +<p>The risks of allies questioning U.S. credibility in the event of strategic deterrence failure are substantial and likely insurmountable in the context of the scenario provided if Washington pursues a course of action that prioritizes its own national survival and immunity from nuclear attack. Allied leaders and a U.S. president will likely have a divergent sense of risk acceptance following strategic deterrence failure. For the presidents of the Philippines and Poland, in particular, nuclear use on their territories will be seen as a cataclysmic deterrence failure verging on an existential threat. For the United States, that same assessment would not hold, but the possibility of further damage in a general nuclear war would likely cause any prudent U.S. president to weigh the trade-off in supporting allies and averting damage to the homeland.</p> -<p>Progress in data privacy and protection in the UK is an excellent example of progressive national efforts in the data-driven and digitalised world. These efforts have already resulted in comprehensive legislative frameworks like the Data Protection Act 2018 and UK-GDPR, both of which align with the EU’s GDPR to safeguard personal data across various sectors. The UK has also made progress in sector-specific privacy advancements, particularly in health informatics, with initiatives such as NHS Digital implementing stricter controls on patient data access through the Data Security and Protection Toolkit. Innovations like the UK National Data Strategy and the UK National AI Strategy highlight the government’s commitment to ensuring the responsible use of data while fostering innovation in digital services and AI applications. The Alan Turing Institute, which is the UK’s National Institute for Data Science and AI, focuses on advancing world-class research and applying it to national and global challenges, developing skills and training for the future, and driving informed public conversation. The Ada Lovelace Institute develops research, policy and practice to ensure that data and AI is used and harnessed in ways that maximise social wellbeing and put technology at the service of humanity.</p> +<p>There are likely conventional options that the president could adopt to inflict military costs on adversaries for nuclear use that would maintain an acceptable level of risk of follow-on nuclear escalation, but these may be insufficient for allied leaders and publics that could be motivated to see a U.S. nuclear response out of a desire for retributive damage against Russia and China. As a result, it is highly likely that following strategic deterrence failure, allied perceptions of the credibility of the United States would suffer drastically unless Washington opted for nuclear use in kind, which would present substantial risks and is unlikely to be preferable to the alternatives presented to most plausible presidents. As much as expert advisers to any president might profess support for U.S. alliances in peacetime, they might find that in the heart of a bona fide nuclear crisis, concerns about credibility are simply unpersuasive to a president concerned first and foremost with averting a pathway to nuclear war. This was precisely the predicament that arose in the final days of the Cuban Missile Crisis, when several ExComm members were opposed to Kennedy’s willingness to contemplate an off-ramp by way of withdrawing U.S. intermediate-range missiles deployed to Turkey, a NATO ally. Notably, adversary limited nuclear use against allies may be unlikely to prompt the same kind of national outrage and fervor that drove the United States to run risks in the aftermath of the Pearl Harbor (1941) and September 11 (2001) attacks on the homeland. The sole exception may be the Chinese strike specified in the scenario, which hits a U.S. naval base and presumably results in the deaths of thousands of U.S. servicemembers. This could encourage a president to accept greater risks in responding to China, though likely still well under the nuclear threshold.</p> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">There is a unique opportunity for like-minded middle economies to unite and collectively set the highest standards for AI’s ethical and responsible use</code></em></strong></p> +<p>A president may further inquire how best to signal resolve to U.S. allies throughout the crisis. They may then be told that the most effective means of signaling resolve to allies would be to meet adversary nuclear use with some form of proportionate nuclear use. There are substantial risks to this, however. First, a proportionate response in the eyes of U.S. military planners may be interpreted as escalatory by the adversary and, therefore, potentially could prompt further escalation. Second, by employing nuclear weapons, the United States would concede substantial normative credibility that could be valuable in shaping global diplomatic narratives in a post-conflict environment (including with nonaligned states). The United States could aim to signal resolve to allies by inflicting calibrated, proportionate damage against adversary forces implicated in the nuclear strikes described in the scenario with its conventional forces. This is unlikely to sufficiently convey resolve as allies may not find a conventional response to nuclear use on their territory as satisfactory. While allies may not be uniform in this assessment of a conventional response, U.S. experts and officials, in consultations with allies, from East Asia to Europe, repeatedly contend with demands that nuclear use be met with nuclear retaliation.</p> -<p>Canadian progress in AI ethics and regulation is also worthy of note. Canada has been at the forefront of promoting ethical AI through the Pan-Canadian Artificial Intelligence Strategy and Algorithmic Impact Assessment tools. In 2018, as Ontario’s Information and Privacy Commissioner, Dr Ann Cavoukian introduced the seven foundational principles of “Privacy by Design”. These principles directly informed the development of the EU’s GDPR. Currently, the Canadian government is actively working on regulations – including the proposed AI and Data Act (AIDA) – to ensure transparency, fairness and accountability in developing and using AI systems. Canada’s strength in AI research, notably through the Canadian Institute for Advanced Research and Center for International Governance Innovation, has positioned the country as a global leader in AI ethics and governance, encouraging responsible innovation. Programmes including the Vector Institute (Ontario) and Mila (Quebec AI Institute) contribute significantly to research on ethical AI and developing tools for assessing algorithmic fairness.</p> +<h4 id="military-response-options-2">Military Response Options</h4> -<p>The key challenge lies in integrating these ethical standards into broader legal frameworks and ensuring uniform implementation across provinces, particularly given Canada’s decentralised governance. There are also significant concerns regarding the ethical use of AI in public services, such as law enforcement, where algorithmic bias and surveillance risks must be carefully managed. Balancing the rapid development of AI technologies with ethical considerations and privacy preservation remains a complex and ongoing issue, particularly as AI systems become more pervasive in sectors like healthcare, education and finance. Despite progress on ethical frameworks, the lack of comprehensive national AI legislation presents hurdles in ensuring consistent oversight across industries.</p> +<p>There are four basic categories of military response that could be considered in the course of the Project Atom scenario. First, a U.S. president could choose to forgo all military options and focus solely on war termination by diplomatic means. Second, a U.S. president could opt for a conventional response — either one designed to inflict tailored, proportionate damage, or one designed to disproportionately retaliate for nuclear use without employing nuclear weapons. Third, a U.S. president could opt for a nuclear response designed to inflict tailored, proportionate damage. Finally, a U.S. president could opt to seek escalation dominance and up the ante with significant nuclear use while communicating to the adversary U.S. resolve to escalate further should it be necessary to accomplish U.S. and allied objectives.</p> -<h3 id="current-collaborations-and-joint-efforts">Current Collaborations and Joint Efforts</h3> +<p>Of these options, the first and second will hold the greatest practical appeal for any prudent U.S. president, who is unlikely to be versed in the strategic rationales for an in-kind or escalatory nuclear response and more concerned with preserving the safety, integrity, and survival of the United States itself. The first option may be unappealing, however, due to it appearing tantamount to complete strategic defeat. (Presidents may consider their own political legacies in weighing responses too.) Following strategic deterrence failure, there is likely an extremely low probability that the United States can, at acceptable levels of risk to the homeland, optimize for all its core strategic objectives, including reassuring its allies. As a result, a prescription for the president could be two-fold. First, they should opt for a limited conventional strike against the nonstrategic and regional nuclear force units involved in the strikes against Poland and the Philippines. At the same time, the president should employ a diplomatic strategy that seeks to persuade these allies as to the inadvisability of a nuclear response, which could beget further nuclear use against their territories (including against nonmilitary targets or military targets more proximal to population centers).</p> -<p>This progress notwithstanding, challenges remain, particularly in balancing innovation with compliance, as industries such as health informatics seek more flexible use of personal data while maintaining privacy. The issue of cross-border data flows post-Brexit presents regulatory complexities, especially with potential data adequacy rulings from the EU. The rapid advancement of AI and big data analytics in sectors like finance and healthcare tests the limits of existing frameworks, prompting ongoing discussions about updating privacy laws to cover emerging technologies like AI-driven decision-making systems and biometric data usage.</p> +<p>While allies may be unpersuaded and motivated by a retributive logic demanding nuclear use, it is equally possible that internal fissures within allied governments and domestic political forces may support U.S. goals in persuading allies of the sufficiency of a conventional response. To deter further nuclear use by adversaries, the president should be willing to allude to intolerable and extreme consequences while underscoring to the broader world that the United States differentiates itself from Russia and China in viewing nuclear weapons as tools of last resort for truly extreme circumstances — not as a mere offset to the possibility of conventional defeat, as Moscow and Beijing have demonstrated in the scenario.</p> -<p>Canada and the UK have been actively fostering collaboration on AI-related initiatives. For example, in 2019, the UK-Canada AI Initiative was launched to fund collaborative research projects between the two countries. This initiative focuses on AI’s application in areas like health and environmental sustainability and on the ethical challenges posed by AI technologies. The goal is to leverage the AI expertise of both countries while promoting research that aligns with their shared values of transparency, fairness and privacy protection. The 2024 UK-Canada science of AI safety partnership serves as another collaborative initiative.</p> +<p>Critics may counter that Russia and China resorted to nuclear use precisely because of U.S. and allied conventional military successes — and so why should a conventional response deter further nuclear use? The answer to this question rests on the logic of nuclear use by both countries in the first place. If both leaders crossed the nuclear Rubicon out of a belief that a single instance of limited nuclear use would paralyze the United States into inaction, the willingness to continue conventional military operations would disabuse them of this notion. By “fighting through” nuclear use and continuing to inflict costs without relying on nuclear weapons, the United States would deny Moscow and Beijing the political benefits of their limited nuclear use. Should Russia and China seek to deprive the United States of this option, they may be forced to opt for additional nuclear strikes against U.S. and allied forces, significantly raising the prospects of a total war across two hemispheres alongside the prospect of general nuclear war with the United States. If Putin and Xi remain rational, they may see no benefit in upping the ante in this game of competitive risk-taking, and instead may seek to minimize their further losses while retaining political control.</p> -<p>The UK and Canada are both active internationally in advocating for the responsible use of AI. They are co-signatories of the 2019 OECD AI Principles, the 2022–2024 Council of Europe AI Convention drafting group, the 2023 G7 Ministers’ Statement, the 2023 Bletchley Declaration and the 2024 Seoul Ministerial Declaration. They have also both participated in the Global Partnership on Artificial Intelligence. This multilateral engagement runs in parallel with national legislative frameworks such as the Pan-Canadian Artificial Intelligence Strategy and the UK National AI Strategy, both of which are oriented towards building AI ecosystems that prioritise ethical standards, transparency and fairness.</p> +<p>The reason for not recommending that the president seek a tailored nuclear response or adopt an escalation dominance mindset and seek to escalate with nuclear weapons is because both options present substantial drawbacks and an unacceptable level of risk of a general nuclear war that would be most ruinous to the United States. Even assuming a small probability of escalation by the adversary should be sobering for a president given the consequences that could ensue. In the case of a tailored nuclear response option, U.S. adversaries may fail to be deterred if they continue to believe that their stakes in resolving their short-term territorial conquests are greater than those of the United States. Putin and Xi would, in their own minds, likely be willing to believe this — especially if they see the stakes in the crises as having now grown to encompass their own political survivals and legacies. If this is the case, a tailored, proportionate U.S. nuclear response, even if correctly interpreted as proportionate by U.S. adversaries, may beget further adversary nuclear use. Neither Putin nor Xi may choose to escalate in the types of targets they choose to hold at risk — keeping retaliation confined to military targets — but could continue strikes on NATO and Philippine territory by focusing on military targets. The collusive logic that is at play in the scenario could also influence this decisionmaking as both Moscow and Beijing may understand that their continued choice to participate in a game of competitive nuclear risk-taking will force the United States to contend with the challenge of waging a general nuclear war simultaneously against both powers. Hewing to the damage-limiting principles that have guided U.S. nuclear strategy for decades simultaneously against Russia and China would be largely unfeasible, even if survivable U.S. systems could inflict massive damage in punishment against both aggressors. A collusive all-out nuclear attack by Russia and China against the United States with their surviving forces would still result in the practical end of U.S. civilization and society.</p> -<h3 id="how-can-canada-and-the-uk-make-a-difference">How Can Canada and the UK Make a Difference?</h3> +<p>An escalation dominance approach, meanwhile, would succeed in conveying U.S. resolve and likely persuade Xi and Putin that their assumptions about U.S. stakes in these conflicts may be incorrect. However, a substantial use of nuclear weapons by the United States against military targets in Russia and China runs a serious risk of generating concerns in both states about the possibility of their forces remaining intact and about the viability of their regimes themselves. Without robust means of communication with the national or senior military leadership of both countries, which cannot be taken for granted, the United States may be unable to assure Russia and China that its choice to opt for nuclear escalation was not the precursor to a massive, damage-limiting counterforce campaign or a broader war of regime change. Fear of either outcome will encourage both Putin and Xi to contemplate larger-scale nuclear use. Because U.S. and allied combined military posture in the Indo-Pacific and Europe will also consist in the scenario timeframe of precise, conventional munitions, adversaries will have to also account for the possibility of massive, supplemental, conventional counterforce strikes. This option, while appealing for what it might convey about U.S. credibility to adversaries and allies alike, generates the greatest possibility of massive adversary nuclear use, which would result in unacceptable damage to the U.S. homeland. It would not be advisable for a president to run these risks immediately; instead, they should seek to maximize U.S. goals through the nonnuclear means articulated above, at least initially.</p> -<p>Building on a long history of collaboration between the UK and Canada in emerging technologies, shared values and similarities in political cultures and the diversity of their populations, as well as the novel approaches and practices established and implemented in both countries, joint efforts could be enhanced in the following areas:</p> +<p>There is a meaningful difference between the preceding two options in terms of how they might prompt reactions from Russia and China. Russia, which is known to incorporate a degree of counterforce targeting itself, may be more willing than China to run greater risks by attempting to destroy U.S. nuclear forces preemptively. In the 2028 timeframe specified in the Project Atom scenario, China’s nuclear forces will remain quantitatively inferior to those of the United States, and Chinese leaders would likely be deterred by the prospect of assured U.S. retaliation. As a result, it is substantially more likely that, even if opting for escalation dominance, U.S.-China nuclear exchanges could take place across several steps before either side considers massive nuclear strikes against the other. Despite this, Chinese leaders may remain pathologically vulnerable to fears of a disarming U.S. counterforce strike; these fears could be compounded by 2028 with the deployment of additional missile defense and conventional long-range strike assets in the Indo-Pacific.</p> -<h4 id="data-governance-and-data-protection">Data Governance and Data Protection</h4> +<p>Regardless of U.S. objectives, it will be in the interest of the United States to have adversaries remain less concerned about the possibility of a massive, damage-limiting first strike than about limited retaliation (either nuclear or conventional). Additionally, the United States should endeavor to avoid feeding adversary expectations that it seeks to end their political control or regimes. The key to successful war termination will differ with regard to both Russia and China. For China and Xi, inflicting substantial enough damage to the People’s Liberation Army’s conventional and amphibious landing forces to render seizing and controlling Taiwan unfeasible will confer bargaining leverage. With Russia, the United States and NATO may try to use seized territory in Kaliningrad to sue for war termination with Putin. If either Putin or Xi begin to exhibit particular psychological pathologies indicating irrational risk acceptance (which cannot be ruled out), these assumptions may not hold, and the United States may be forced to contemplate greater escalation than might otherwise be prudent. Given the impossibility of predicting irrational decisionmaking pathologies in a serious nuclear crisis, further elaboration on this point will not be provided, though it does bear consideration.</p> -<p>Both countries could build a bilateral data governance framework that enhances data protection while facilitating secure data sharing for research, public health, and economic growth. This would ensure that data governance aligns with ethical standards and that personal data is protected across both countries while enabling the flow of information critical to innovation and commerce.</p> +<p>U.S. planners must also consider the law of armed conflict. Adversaries will expect a U.S. nuclear or conventional response to adhere to publicly stated prewar principles, which include an emphasis on counterforce targeting and compliance with the law of armed conflict. This should rule out adversary expectations of countervalue strikes (deliberate attacks against major urban population centers and other nonmilitary targets). However, this will likely also heighten adversary fears about a possible damage-limiting strike against their nuclear forces, command and control, and other enabling capabilities. While the United States will be unable to disabuse adversaries of its long-stated interests in damage limitation, to the extent possible, any U.S. nuclear or substantial kinetic response should be accompanied by assurances that it does not seek to destroy adversary nuclear forces or sever adversary national leadership from key military functions. To this end, a response should be accompanied by public and private messaging (if feasible) designed to indicate tailored punishment against military units implicated in the execution of nuclear strikes. There is no reason the United States should deliberately seek to eschew the law of armed conflict in navigating responses to the scenario at hand.</p> -<p>For example, the US–EU Privacy Shield Framework offers a reference point for cross-border data governance. Although invalidated in 2020, it was initially designed to facilitate data transfers while ensuring compliance with stringent privacy laws on both sides of the Atlantic. A UK–Canada data governance initiative could draw lessons from this experience to build a framework that maintains high data privacy standards without impeding cross-border innovation and AI research.</p> +<h4 id="non-kinetic-response-options-2">Non-Kinetic Response Options</h4> -<h4 id="development-of-cybersecurity-and-defence-against-hybrid-informational-threats">Development of Cybersecurity and Defence Against Hybrid Informational Threats</h4> +<p>The president would have a wide array of non-kinetic options available in the event of strategic deterrence failure. Choices would include broad diplomatic messaging to allies, partners, and the nonaligned world aimed at obtaining unconditional condemnation of Russia and China for resorting to the first use of nuclear weapons in war in more than 80 years. The president could simultaneously marshal U.S. diplomatic resources to seek a broad, international coalition condemning both countries. It is likely that certain nonaligned states or states more aligned with Russia and China would opt to blame the United States for Russian and Chinese nuclear use, citing well-trodden narratives built up over years by Moscow and Beijing about U.S. alliances, military posture, and other factors. The United States should be ready to actively counter this, including by declassifying intelligence as much as possible to demonstrate that nuclear use was a result of desperation for both Putin and Xi. Given the severity of the scenario and the implications for U.S. interests, the president should be willing to authorize broad declassification that would serve these ends, even at the cost of possibly compromising sensitive sources and methods.</p> -<p>Joint investments in cybersecurity systems include cooperation on AI-driven threat detection, defensive measures against cyberattacks and developing countermeasures to combat disinformation and hybrid attacks. This could involve research collaborations between top universities in both countries, pooling expertise to create cutting-edge tools that protect national digital infrastructure.</p> +<p>Practically, the United States would likely also seek to enhance international economic sanctions, but the efficacy of these sanctions is likely to be limited; in anticipation of a decision to employ nuclear weapons, Putin and Xi would likely have expected such a response and have been undeterred by the prospect, as their limited nuclear use exhibits. Other non-kinetic options could include cyber operations against both Russia and China. These could be carried out for a range of objectives, including sowing a narrative within both countries that seeks to convey to the Russian and Chinese people the erratic character of their national leadership; seeking intelligence on likely follow-on military action following deterrence failure; and, finally, undermining Russian and Chinese military operations. Out of caution, the president should ensure that U.S. offensive cyber operations, to the extent feasible, do not affect Russian or Chinese assertive political control over their own nuclear — or broader military — forces. In general, cyber operations, if detected, could prove escalatory. The president should be particularly cautious about authorizing operations aimed at penetrating sensitive systems related to strategic situational awareness or command and control, which could raise the fears in both states about non-kinetic interference in their nuclear forces either as an end in itself or as a precursor to broader counterforce strikes.</p> -<p>Australia and Singapore’s cybersecurity cooperation is a strong example of two countries collaborating to enhance cyber defences. Under their Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, Australia and Singapore signed a Memorandum of Understanding in 2017 to cooperate on cybersecurity initiatives. This partnership includes joint cyber threat exercises, collaboration on cyber capacity building, sharing good practice on cybersecurity governance, and developing common frameworks for cyber risk management. The UK and Canada could adopt a similar model by establishing a formal cybersecurity cooperation framework focusing on joint threat intelligence sharing, collaborative defence against cyberattacks, and coordinated responses to disinformation and hybrid informational threats.</p> +<p>A chief purpose of U.S. non-kinetic efforts should be to maintain the normative higher ground, which will be valuable in a post-conflict environment with allies, partners, and nonaligned states alike. Even if allied governments view U.S. credibility as having taken a fatal hit following a decision to resort to a nonnuclear response, allied publics may be more readily persuaded by a U.S. choice to respond in a more limited fashion, particularly if Washington is able to make the case that opting for more escalatory responses would likely have resulted in nuclear strikes on their territories (and further nuclear strikes, in the case of Poland and the Philippines). For Russia and China, however, U.S. non-kinetic measures will largely be peripheral in shaping their cost-benefit calculations on further escalation.</p> -<h4 id="investment-in-ai-startups-and-innovation">Investment in AI Startups and Innovation</h4> +<h4 id="conclusion-3">Conclusion</h4> -<p>The AI ecosystem in the UK and Canada is thriving, with solid support for startups and innovation hubs. The UK’s Alan Turing Institute and Canada’s Vector Institute are global leaders in AI research, and both countries have numerous AI startups working on cutting-edge innovations. Earlier this year, Innovate UK invited UK companies developing AI for improving healthcare to apply to join its Global Incubator Programme in collaboration with MaRS Discovery District in Toronto, Canada. However, more can be done to foster cross-border investment and collaboration in this space. A bilateral initiative to increase investment in AI startups could include creating joint AI venture capital funds, protection for creator rights and intellectual property, support for incubators, and cross-border mentorship programmes.</p> +<p>It should be acknowledged that from the vantage point of peacetime in 2024, the above-stated analysis does not make for particularly encouraging reading. One does not need to have read this assessment of the scenario and U.S. response options to conclude that the strategic deterrence scenario presented likely portends “defeat” for the United States. However, this defeat should be construed narrowly: the United States likely fails to compel Russia and China away from seeking their territorial revisionist goals at substantial cost, but ultimately survives as a nation and polity to restore and seek influence in a post-conflict world. Writing about potential nuclear crises demands an abundance of imagination, and U.S. policymakers and planners should be clear-eyed about the possibilities that would remain for the country in a post-strategic deterrence failure world.</p> -<p>Franco-German AI collaboration is a prime example of bilateral cooperation aimed at fostering innovation. By signing the Aachen Treaty in 2019, the two countries solidified their collaboration in research and digital transformation.</p> +<p>The centrality of presidential decisionmaking about nuclear crises represents both a strength and a weakness in the analysis above. It is a strength because it contends with the often-heard dictum that military plans “never survive first contact with the enemy” — partly because reality is complex and inherently unpredictable, but also because the ineffable idiosyncrasies of presidential decisionmaking can only become known under the psychological and emotional stress of a real crisis. However, the choice to center the president and presidential guidance also represents an analytical limitation in reasoning about U.S. responses to limited nuclear use because it is inherently impossible to account for the various personalities that may one day be asked to reason about matters of nuclear war.</p> -<h4 id="fostering-responsible-ai-talent-and-establishing-educational-exchange-projects">Fostering Responsible AI Talent and Establishing Educational Exchange Projects</h4> +<p>Finally, for U.S. allies, this scenario presents the crystallization of long-held anxieties about extended deterrence. Indeed, as much as U.S. policymakers may see peacetime assurance demands from allies as a leaky sieve, they are born of well-placed anxieties about extended deterrence failing under extreme circumstances. Allied fears in this regard are not entirely misplaced and there are indeed scenarios, at the worst-case end of the spectrum, involving collusion by the United States’ two great power, near-peer, nuclear-armed adversaries that will bend and possibly break assurances made in peacetime. The Project Atom scenario could be one such example. Analytically, however, this should not condemn extended deterrence to the status of a bluff. Instead, the United States and its allies should be ready to consult, plan, and game out various strategic deterrence failure scenarios to ensure that they can be averted in the first place. For instance, in the provided scenario, it appears that escalation to nuclear use by Russia in the European theater was driven by Polish and Lithuanian conventional operations into Kaliningrad without a central decision by NATO or broader consultations with the United States. Ensuring coordination and strategic synchronicity between the United States and its allies will be key to avoiding the worst in high-intensity conventional crises. Finally, beyond the working- and expert-level tracks, U.S. assurances must be supplemented by high-level political engagement with allies, underscoring in particular the special role of the president in U.S. nuclear decisionmaking.</p> -<p>As AI continues to grow, the need for a skilled AI workforce has become critical. The UK and Canada are home to world-class universities and AI research institutions that have already made strides in educating the next generation of AI talent. However, the demand for responsible AI practitioners is rising, and there is room for deeper cooperation in building the skills pipeline.</p> +<p>Above all, this analysis should also underscore the essential importance of averting strategic deterrence failure in the first place. The hard choices U.S. nuclear-armed adversaries could force upon the United States by resorting to limited nuclear use are ones no president should be asked to consider.</p> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">The UK and Canada could build a bilateral data governance framework that enhances data protection while facilitating secure data sharing for research, public health, and economic growth</code></em></strong></p> +<h3 id="basis-and-elements-of-a-strategy-for-multiparty-intra-war-nuclear-deterrence">Basis and Elements of a Strategy for Multiparty, Intra-War Nuclear Deterrence</h3> -<p>The MIT-IBM Watson AI Lab is an example of collaboration between academia and industry on AI. Through this partnership, researchers from both institutions work together on AI research, focusing on responsible AI development.</p> +<blockquote> + <h4 id="melanie-w-sisson">Melanie W. Sisson</h4> +</blockquote> -<h4 id="enhancing-healthcare-and-public-health-systems-with-trustworthy-ai">Enhancing Healthcare and Public Health Systems with Trustworthy AI</h4> +<p>Though much is known about nuclear explosions — their physics, their mechanics, their effects — very little is known about their use as weapons of war. History provides analysts a single war in which nuclear weapons were detonated, and a small number of occasions in which decisionmakers are known to have seriously contemplated their use. This record is thin gruel upon which to make compelling inferences, or from which to draw solid conclusions.</p> -<p>Canada and the UK have advanced healthcare systems and have increasingly adopted AI to improve healthcare delivery, particularly during the Covid-19 pandemic. AI technologies in healthcare can enhance diagnostics, predict patient outcomes, and streamline public health responses. However, AI’s use in healthcare must be carefully regulated to ensure it is trustworthy, ethical and aligned with public trust.</p> +<p>A paucity of empirical data, however, is not evidence that nuclear weapons cannot — or will never — be used again. Nor does it exempt civilian policymakers and military practitioners from the responsibility of preparing to make choices about nuclear employment.</p> -<p>Canadian-French health cooperation, including the Future of Healthcare using Artificial Intelligence mission, is focused on establishing industrial R&amp;D collaboration opportunities (specifically for technology co-development validation and adaption) in the digital health sector, and has been designed to promote discussions on commercialisation-oriented R&amp;D collaboration opportunities.</p> +<p>Policymakers confronting a situation in which they find it necessary to consider whether, when, which, and how many nuclear weapons to use will have to answer questions that are at once philosophical and practical, moral and material, urgent and permanent. If they are of stable temperament and rational inclination, then policymakers will seek methodical ways with which to weigh the value of nuclear restraint against that of nuclear action. Such approaches will produce clarity in defining strategic objectives and war aims, intellectual empathy for the adversary’s decision calculus, and creativity in the operational art of designing alternative military courses of action.</p> -<h3 id="towards-a-deeper-future-ukcanada-cooperative-initiative-on-ai">Towards a Deeper Future UK–Canada Cooperative Initiative on AI</h3> +<p>Scenario analysis is one method for comparing the advantages and disadvantages of alternative courses of action and, for strategists and planners, serves the same purpose as practice does for teams in any discipline: it doesn’t make perfect, but it does make progress. Each phase of a scenario exercises the thought processes involved in aligning military operations with war aims, and war aims with strategic objectives, under conditions in which some variables that might affect the likelihood of success are foreseeable and controllable, and some are not. In this way, scenarios pull assumptions to the surface, inspect their implications, and then test courses of action for consistency of logic, fidelity to principle, and resiliency to changes in condition.</p> -<p>A proposed cooperative initiative must grow to encompass more countries than just the UK and Canada. It must include other leading middle economies that are deeply committed to these issues and working to develop national capacities for AI- and data-driven systems. Such a cooperation framework could serve as a model for establishing bilateral agreements and enhancing collaboration among other middle economies within the G20 and beyond. It could also encourage countries like the Netherlands, Australia, South Korea, New Zealand and Japan to strengthen their efforts in developing ethical frameworks for responsible and efficient AI governance.</p> +<p>Scenario analyses, however, are abstractions of reality accompanied by storytelling — theory, reasoning, and argumentation. This is especially true for nuclear scenarios. There is, therefore, special risk in attending too much to a scenario’s mechanics and not enough to the concepts and commitments it calls into question. If nuclear war does move from being a possibility to being a reality, whatever the specifics, there is no evading the fact that what policymakers will be deciding is which and how many humans will not survive, or if any will survive at all.</p> -<hr /> +<h4 id="analytic-assumptions">Analytic Assumptions</h4> -<p><strong>Ann Fitz-Gerald</strong> is a Professor of International Security and the Director of the Balsillie School of International Affairs in Waterloo, Canada.</p> +<p>The strategy developed here is premised on analysis of a two-theater, two-adversary, two intra-war nuclear launch scenario (referred to throughout as “the scenario”). Where information is not available — either because it does not exist or because it is not specified in the scenario — the strategy relies on a set of reasonable assumptions. Some assumptions are about the dynamics of nuclear war, because there hasn’t been one from which to draw historical evidence. Some are about decisionmaking in the United States, about which relatively much is known in general, but nothing at all in the context of a two-theater war that involves nuclear use. Other assumptions are made about the scenario’s adversaries, because little information about their respective decisionmaking processes is available in the scenario itself.</p> -<p><strong>Carsten Maple</strong> is a Professor of Cyber Systems Engineering at the University of Warwick’s Cyber Security Centre.</p> +<p>There is no standard definition of what elevates nuclear use from being limited nuclear war to being general — “all-out” — nuclear war. In the 1960s, the U.S. government planned for its nuclear forces to be of a size and quality to be able to execute a retaliatory strike that would destroy “between 20 and 25 per cent of the enemy’s civilian population and between 50 and 75 per cent of his industrial capacity.” Applying this measure to the scenario means that general nuclear war would produce the immediate deaths of approximately 376–469 million people. A recent study by climate scientists calculates that if the belligerents in the scenario detonated sufficient warheads to achieve this mutual 25 percent casualty rate, then follow-on deaths from post-nuclear famine would reach approximately 2.5 billion people within two years.</p> -<p><strong>Halyna Padalko</strong> is a PhD student in Computer Science at the National Aerospace University (KhAI) and a Fellow at the Balsillie School of International Affairs.</p>Ann M. Fitz-Gerald, et al.The UK and Canada, leveraging their strengths as trusted middle powers, are well-positioned to lead in setting global AI standards, fostering ethical, responsible and innovative AI governance.Build Civic Tech2024-11-13T12:00:00+08:002024-11-13T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/build-civic-tech<p><em>As technology continues to shape society, it’s essential for tech leaders to recognize their role in strengthening democracy. This report highlights the urgent need to integrate civic knowledge and responsibility into STEM education and careers.</em></p> +<p>In the absence of any less arbitrary threshold, this strategy defines the lower bound of general nuclear war as the detonation by any one state of the number of nuclear weapons needed to produce a total yield sufficient to kill 25 percent of a belligerent’s population. Detonations that occur below that threshold constitute limited, not general, nuclear war. The strategy similarly assumes, based on the above, that general nuclear war in the scenario would destroy modern civilization and might even constitute a species-extinction event for much of biological life on earth, including humans. It assumes that governments would cease to function, and that there would be no meaning attached to the idea of nationhood, as individuals and collectives would instead be left to struggle to survive. In other words, the strategy assumes that the costs of general nuclear war are so extremely negative that they far exceed any benefits derived from the defeat and unconditional surrender of the adversary.</p> -<excerpt /> +<p>The strategy also is built upon the recognition that there is no empirical basis upon which to make predictions about the dynamics of nuclear war. Specifically, once nuclear exchange has begun, there is no fact-based reason to presume that the likelihood of de-escalation, or of controlled escalation, is greater than the likelihood of unrestrained escalation. The strategy therefore assumes that all nuclear detonations have an unknown probability of creating an escalatory spiral, regardless of variation in their specific features — for example their type, location, yield, casualty rate, and so forth. Even relaxing this assumption and allowing the likelihood of escalation to general nuclear war to be low instead of unknown does not change the basic inequality. The magnitude of the costs of general nuclear war are so great that even very small probability estimates produce very large negative results — ones so destructive that they dwarf any possible positive results of victory.</p> -<p>There is an urgent need to strengthen civic knowledge, skills, and engagement across all ages, including adults. This includes those who study and work in STEM fields. Technology plays an increasingly central role in our lives and society, in ways that are both constructive and destructive. Tech innovators must understand the concept of civic responsibility inherent in “we the people,” and think critically about the impact of the work they do. At the same time, we need to inspire tech and science experts to help ensure that decisions by government, at all levels and across all three branches, are informed.</p> +<h4 id="us-strategic-objectives-3">U.S. Strategic Objectives</h4> -<p>This report focuses on the integration of civic knowledge and responsibility into STEM education and careers, and how individuals in STEM fields can and must hold institutions accountable and move us toward a more perfect union. Reinvigorating civics knowledge and civic skills has become a national and economic security imperative. The urgency requires reaching not just K-12 students but also adults. This report also offers actionable recommendations for businesses and government, and other organizations committed to equipping employees, partners, and associates with essential civic knowledge and skills.</p> +<p>The strategy presented here assumes that U.S. policymakers are rational actors. This means they are sensitive to the costs, benefits, and probabilities of various courses of action and base their choice of action on estimates of expected value: the net positive or negative effect on U.S. interests produced by the outcome of each course of action, multiplied by that outcome’s probability of occurring. The strategy also assumes that U.S. decisionmakers assess that the extreme costs of general nuclear war exceed any potential benefits derived from the adversary’s total destruction, and that they are aware that the detonation of any nuclear weapon has the potential to result in an escalatory cycle that ultimately produces general nuclear war.</p> -<h3 id="introduction">Introduction</h3> +<p>Within the set of nonnuclear outcomes, the strategy assumes that policymakers consider the benefits of conventional victory to be greater than those of a negotiated settlement, and that both are greater than the benefits of total defeat. It also assumes policymakers judge the value of maximalist victory — the unconditional surrender of the adversary — and of a negotiated settlement to be greater than the costs of conventional war because, in the absence of this assumption, the incentive would be for the United States to withdraw.</p> -<p>Compared to any other period of human history, the pace of technological advancement over the last few decades is unmatched. The era we currently find ourselves in is marked by exponential growth in areas such as biotechnology, the internet, data analytics, quantum computing, machine learning, and artificial intelligence (AI). Each of these holds the power to change the world completely, for better or for worse.</p> +<p>The expected values produced by these combinations of probabilities, costs, and benefits mean that U.S. policymakers will prefer all nonnuclear outcomes to all nuclear outcomes (Table 1).</p> -<p>Humanity and technology are inextricably linked. The 2023 National Cyber Workforce and Education Strategy aptly states, “technology itself does not have a value system; rather, it carries the values of its owners and operators.”</p> +<p>In the absence of information to the contrary, this strategy assumes that the scenario’s adversarial decisionmakers also are rational actors whose choices reflect their estimates of expected value. This assumption, however, does not require the adversaries to arrive at the same rank ordering of preferences over outcomes as the United States.</p> -<p>The release of AI technology widely available to the public has highlighted that today’s technology can be used both as a tool and as a weapon. It is vital to encourage developments that promote innovation while intentionally maximizing the potential for technologies to be used in positive ways. Foundational to this goal is the need to strengthen civic responsibility, respect for the rule of law, and an understanding of the role of government — and, most importantly, the role of citizens — in a healthy democracy. That is the function of civics education.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/fHthMgu.png" alt="image05" /> +<em>▲ Table 1: Assumed U.S. Preferences over Outcomes</em></p> -<p>CivxNow defines civics as “the lifelong process that makes people into informed and engaged members of their communities — which range from schools and towns or neighborhoods to the whole nation and even the world.” Today, civics education is crucial for understanding and addressing the broader implications of technology. It must be provided at all education levels — K–12, colleges and universities, and even for adults. Strengthening civic knowledge and skills can help build system and societal resilience against tech-enabled threats, actively counter divisiveness and cynicism in society by reinvigorating shared aspirations and empowering citizens, and even strengthen workforce cohesion. Beyond that, incorporating civics concepts into science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) education and the technology sector can better position our democracy to benefit from all that technology offers.</p> +<p>In general, preference hierarchies can be classified as one of two types. Type-1 actors estimate that the costs of general nuclear war exceed any benefits derived from the adversary’s total destruction, whether by nuclear or conventional means. A Type-1 actor will therefore prefer all nonuse outcomes to all nuclear-use outcomes.</p> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Today, civics education is crucial for understanding and addressing the broader implications of technology. It must be provided at all education levels — K–12, colleges and universities, and even for adults.</code></em></strong></p> +<p>Type-2 actors do not consider the costs of general nuclear war to exceed any benefits derived from the adversary’s total destruction, whether by nuclear or conventional means. A Type-2 actor can therefore prefer one or more nuclear-use outcomes to one or more nonuse outcomes. One possibility in the scenario, for example, is that one or both of the adversaries assesses that the expected value of general nuclear war is equal to or greater than the expected value of a defeat that requires conceding their political objectives and surrendering (Table 2).</p> -<p>This is the goal of the Defending Democratic Institutions (DDI) project’s Civics in STEM initiative. As part of this effort, DDI has already hosted two private roundtables — on June 17 and July 23, 2024 — bringing together distinguished leaders from the private sector, government, and academia. These discussions explored why incorporating civics education into STEM is critical for society, as well as the challenges and strategies associated with promoting civics within the technology sector.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/ev8PYwk.png" alt="image06" /> +<em>▲ Table 2: Example Rank Ordering of Rational Type-2 Adversary Preferences over Conflict Outcomes</em></p> -<p>By embedding civics education into STEM curricula, we help ensure that future innovators are not only skilled in their technical disciplines but also equipped with the knowledge and values necessary to contribute to a just, inclusive, and democratic society. This integration bridges the gap between technical expertise and policy, helping to ensure that the innovations of tomorrow are guided by principles and policies that strengthen democracy and uphold ethical standards.</p> +<p>If either adversary is a Type-2 actor, and it concludes that the United States has maximalist war aims and estimates the probability of conventional loss to be high, then this preference ordering makes the Type-2 adversary more likely than a Type-1 adversary to initiate nuclear war, and very unlikely to exercise restraint in waging it. Other preference orderings are possible, though for all rank order profiles the key differentiator between adversary type is the relative value placed on nuclear-nonuse outcomes compared to nuclear-use outcomes.</p> -<h3 id="background">Background</h3> +<p>This strategy makes assumptions about the United States, as outlined above, that define it as a Type-1 actor. This classification might be incorrect. Even if it is correct at conflict initiation, policymaker views might change once war is underway; so long as decisionmaking is driven by humans, the decisions they make will be vulnerable to variations caused by the full range of human biases, frailties, emotions, and impulses. Nonetheless, the United States is assumed here to be a firmly Type-1 actor because this assumption is consistent with the scenario’s emphasis on seeking to deter, rather than to fight, nuclear war. The strategy does not make the same assumption about the adversaries and instead accepts the possibility that each might be either Type-1 or Type-2 — not for lack of hope that they are the former and not the latter, but rather to account for the uncertainty that they are.</p> -<p>The unparalleled pace of technological advancements in recent history has often caught us off guard, leading to a growing recognition of the need to include ethical and policy considerations alongside technological innovation.</p> +<p>The assumed expected value calculations and resultant rank order establish preventing general nuclear war as the primary U.S. strategic objective. The secondary U.S. strategic objective is for there to be no additional nuclear detonation, of any type or yield, anywhere. This secondary objective is responsive to the horrific effects that all nuclear detonations have on humans, other animal species, and their habitats, and to the risk that additional nuclear launches might escalate to general nuclear war.</p> -<p>Rapid technological development has significantly impacted U.S. democracy in both positive and negative ways. Technology has enabled increased voter engagement, enhanced transparency, efficient communication, and the rapid dissemination of information. Yet, it has also contributed to a growing digital divide, rampant misinformation and disinformation, and mounting cybersecurity threats.</p> +<p>In the scenario, the United States has joined wars in two theaters after adversarial attacks on allies and partners. U.S. political objectives and war aims in both regions are twofold: to demonstrate intolerance for wars of choice and to retain the sovereignty and autonomy of U.S. allies and partners. Because policymakers cannot eliminate the possibility that the adversaries are Type-2 actors, and because the primary U.S. strategic objective is to achieve a nonuse outcome, U.S. warfighting strategy must start from the premise that for all belligerents there is a set of possible, acceptable political outcomes short of maximalism that they can accept. Seeking such an outcome requires implementing a U.S. warfighting strategy that uses diplomatic, economic, and military measures to communicate that the United States does not seek regime change or societal collapse. The strategy must also demonstrate nuclear restraint by not engaging in tit-for-tat nuclear actions, including posture, alert, or deployment changes.</p> -<p>At the societal level, the internet has enabled unprecedented connectivity, yet it has also contributed to a disconnect between the individual and their respective communities. Social media has empowered civil society and historically marginalized groups, revolutionizing social movements and increasing accessibility to information. However, it has helped enable the rise of tribalism and deepened polarization. Similarly, while there will be many benefits from embedding AI into our daily lives, we must remain aware of both the visible and unforeseen implications, which may carry significant consequences.</p> +<h4 id="assuring-allies-3">Assuring Allies</h4> -<p><em>“Cyberspace is composed of not only technology and protocols but also people. People are an integral part of cyberspace, both in creating and using it. In less than a generation, technology has transformed our daily lives …. We rely on [it] for our national security, economic development, and innovation. More than any other domain — air, space, sea, or land — people conceived of and created cyberspace and will continue to improve it.”</em></p> -<blockquote> - <h4 id="kemba-walden-former-national-cyber-director">Kemba Walden, Former National Cyber Director</h4> -</blockquote> +<p>U.S. political objectives need to be supported, and its warfighting operations aided, by local allies in both regions in the scenario. Alliance discipline in communicating limited war aims is essential; inconsistent and mixed messages will undermine the ability of the United States to credibly signal both nuclear restraint and its desire to reach a mutually acceptable, negotiated settlement.</p> -<p>Given the double-edged nature of technological innovation, it is important to incorporate civics education to ensure that technology’s impact on society is understood and responsibly managed. Over the past several years, there has been a growing emphasis on including ethics in STEM education. (See, e.g., the work of roundtable participants listed in Appendix A.) Civics, particularly the concept of civic responsibility, can provide an important “why” to that ethics discussion. Democracy only works if individuals understand their obligations as part of “we the people.”</p> +<p>As adversary confusion and the likelihood of misperception of U.S. intent increase, so does the likelihood of adversary nuclear use regionally and, ultimately, the likelihood of escalation to general nuclear war. The United States cannot impose signaling consistency upon its allies and partners, but they should regularly be reminded that mixed messages increase the risks of adversary nuclear use and escalation.</p> -<p>Civic knowledge and skills should not be limited to students interested in the social sciences; they should be considered essential for those working in the technology sector. Integrating key civics concepts, such as civic responsibility, into STEM education and the tech sector can challenge students and professionals alike to think critically about their responsibilities regarding the work they either hope to do or are already doing. Hopefully, this will inspire them to contribute constructively to their workplaces, communities, nation, and world.</p> +<p>In the scenario, U.S. allies across and within the two theaters differ in their reasons for entering into conflict, in the type and extent of the material contributions they make, and in their respective war’s immediate effects on their interests. Some allies might be dissatisfied with non-maximalist U.S. political objectives and wish to press for the adversaries to surrender on allied terms. The United States should attempt to address this objection by reinforcing that the purpose of limiting possible actions (e.g., nuclear use or nonuse) is to protect the alliances’ shared interest in averting the least favorable conflict outcomes: concession to the adversaries’ maximalist demands, or an uncontrolled escalatory spiral that begins with nuclear detonations, perhaps on allied territories, and that ultimately leads to general nuclear war.</p> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Integrating key civics concepts, such as civic responsibility, into STEM education and the tech sector can challenge students and professionals alike to think critically about their responsibilities regarding the work they either hope to do or are already doing.</code></em></strong></p> +<p>Allies might also take the view that the unwillingness of the United States to make nuclear threats or to use nuclear weapons on their behalf undermines long-standing U.S. policies of extended deterrence, and therefore increases their risk of being a victim of a nuclear strike. This misperceives key features of the post-detonation environment. In the first instance, the United States’ nonuse strategic objectives render as equivalent the security interests of U.S. allies and of the United States itself — nonuse is definitionally an “extended” objective. In the second, an environment in which an adversary has used conventional and nuclear weapons to attack a U.S. ally is one in which U.S. extended nuclear deterrence — adversary inaction produced by the threat of nuclear consequence — has failed.</p> -<p>Having individuals who are both tech savvy and policy sensitive is a prerequisite for developing effective laws, policies, and norms to guide our democracy in an increasingly tech-driven world. Bringing civics concepts into STEM training can help drive more informed policies around the development and use of technology by building a pipeline of technology-oriented individuals interested in public service, the military, and even private sector work that provides a sense of mission.</p> +<p>The possible reasons for detonating a U.S. nuclear weapon thereafter are three: to punish the adversary; as an element of a strategy to try to reassure allies by demonstrating that the United States will use nuclear weapons on their behalf; or as one element of a strategy aimed at deterring adversaries from additional nuclear use. Policymakers cannot be confident that the likelihood of producing these effects is greater than the likelihood of producing an escalatory spiral ending in general nuclear war. Because the primary U.S. objective of this strategy is to prevent general nuclear war, this risk of escalation means that the United States cannot use a nuclear weapon to punish the adversary, to try to assure allies, or to try to establish U.S. credibility and, on that basis, implement a new strategy of deterrence. This does not mean that the United States is not committed to its allies and their vital national security interests during the war. It does mean, however, that the United States’ obligation to defend them is addressed by the ongoing conventional fight and the strategic U.S. objectives of preventing additional nuclear detonation and general nuclear war.</p> -<p>“Inspired to Serve,” the report of the National Commission on Military, National, and Public Service, made reinvigorating civics its number one recommendation for inspiring young people to serve:</p> +<h4 id="military-response-options-3">Military Response Options</h4> -<blockquote> - <p>Widespread and effective civic education is an essential requirement for fostering a culture of service in which Americans can identify how their own strengths, skills, and interests could contribute to the public good by addressing needs in their communities and Nation. When 22 percent of American adults cannot name any of the three branches of government, it is well past time for the country to take action.</p> -</blockquote> +<p>Achieving a nuclear nonuse outcome is commonly discussed under the rubric of intra-war deterrence. In this scenario, deterrence is applicable because military defeat of the adversaries is not possible. No matter how powerful and effective U.S. diplomatic, political, economic, and military measures are, they cannot render the adversary (or adversaries) incapable of continuing to fight: their nuclear arsenals will remain available for use even under conditions of international isolation, economic collapse, and conventional military defeat.</p> -<p>STEM education has rightly been viewed over the last several decades as a national security imperative. Yet, teaching civics is also a national security imperative. Integrating civics concepts into STEM is critical as society and technology continue to evolve together. The last several decades have seen a decline in civics education that has left too many without a clear understanding of the importance of democracy, the rule of law, or their role in it. This gap exists beyond STEM fields but is particularly consequential for individuals who will help shape innovation moving forward.</p> +<p>Strategies of deterrence seek to alter adversary perceptions of the likelihood and magnitude of the benefits of an action in relation to the likelihood and magnitude of its costs. This assumes the actor is sensitive to costs, and that it has principles, people, objects, or assets that it values and prefers not to lose.</p> -<p>The future of technology will play a pivotal role in determining whether societies evolve toward greater democracy or slide into authoritarianism. Take AI as an example. AI has the potential to enhance democratic processes by enabling more efficient governance, increasing transparency, and empowering citizens through better access to information. Yet, if AI is left unchecked or misused, it could easily concentrate power in the hands of a few, enabling surveillance, manipulation, and control on an unprecedented scale.</p> +<p>The logic of deterrence, however, does not capture the full set of possible motivations for an adversary’s nonuse of nuclear weapons. An actor might choose to exercise nuclear restraint for one or some combination of at least seven reasons (Table 3).</p> -<p>An expert in one of our roundtable discussions highlighted the importance of securing market democracy, warning that without public action, big data and AI could lead to a drift toward “totalitarian surveillance [and] oppression.” If the public does not actively shape industrial and government policy “toward [ensuring] diversity, competition, and every individual having a voice,” the system risks tilting in the opposite direction, following the models of Russia and China. Technological advances could instead be used for surveillance, censorship, and repression. China is already exporting this model globally through its Belt and Road Initiative. Its recent sale of Huawei surveillance equipment to Uganda’s military regime is an example of moving a nation toward a surveillance society. The governance structures we establish today will be critical in ensuring that technology serves as a force for democratic empowerment rather than a tool for authoritarian control.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/M7FHeKM.png" alt="image07" /> +<em>▲ Table 3: Possible Reasons for Adversary Nuclear Nonuse and its Applicability in the Near-Term, Two-Theater, Intra-War Nuclear Use Scenario</em></p> -<p>AI is already being used to refine social media and content algorithms, keeping users engaged in a continuous stream of personalized content. While this may not always be harmful, increasingly personalized feeds can lead to more segmented thinking, the extremization of opinions, and, in some cases, heightened polarization that could escalate into violence. Furthermore, according to Harvard Business Review, AI has the potential to exacerbate existing biases in data, including those against minorities. A 2024 National Academies of Science, Engineering, and Medicine study on facial recognition points out multiple examples of where the systems have misidentified innocent Black Americans, causing them to be arrested. Further, a criminal justice algorithm used in Broward County, Florida, was found to be twice as likely to mislabel African American defendants as “high risk” compared to White defendants.</p> +<p>Moral or ethical compunction and fear of technical failure can be considered if not impossible then at least highly unlikely to inhibit an actor from nuclear use in any conflict scenario in which that actor has already successfully detonated at least one nuclear weapon. In the scenario, it also is reasonable to assume that none of the belligerents is likely to assess that any one of them has the capability to mount a meaningfully protective defense against a concerted nuclear campaign. The United States therefore can seek to deter additional nuclear use through the threat of cost imposition — a strategy of conventional or nuclear deterrence — or it can seek to convince the adversaries to pursue a mutually acceptable, negotiated, political settlement.</p> -<p>Our choices now — both at home and as a global society — will influence whether AI becomes a catalyst for a more open, participatory society or a mechanism for exacerbating injustice and reinforcing autocratic regimes. Understanding the role of governance and governance structures is crucial, as these structures, institutions, and processes will have a huge impact on the outcomes.</p> +<p>In the scenario, U.S. adversaries first used conventional war to achieve political aims despite the threat of substantial resistance, continued to fight despite a decreasing likelihood of prevailing, then escalated horizontally by attacking a U.S. defense treaty ally, and finally escalated again vertically through the detonation of a nuclear weapon. The scenario does not contain sufficient information to make any analytically sound inferences about how or why the initial U.S. warfighting strategy failed to deter the adversaries from nuclear use. This strategy therefore interprets these behaviors as indicating that the scenario adversaries are highly cost tolerant, a characteristic that decreases the likelihood that strategies of deterrence through threats of cost-imposition will be effective.</p> -<p><em>“We can look at what is happening to society as a result of innovation, and right now, around the AI conversations, there is a sense of we should build what we can, not what we should.… You can’t put the genie back in the bottle, but you can help people holding the bottle understand what the implications may be. The important question to address is: How do we empower people to better understand what the implications are and what role they can play?”</em></p> -<blockquote> - <h4 id="jen-ellis-founder-nextjensecurity">Jen Ellis, Founder, NextJenSecurity</h4> -</blockquote> +<p>The strategy assumes that in both theaters the initial U.S. conventional warfighting strategy was to impose conventional costs meaningful enough and substantial enough either to eliminate the adversary’s ability to continue to fight conventionally or to convince it to sue for peace — that is, to deter it from carrying on fighting. The scenario describes the war as ongoing, meaning that the United States has been unable to destroy the adversary’s conventional capabilities or to threaten the type and severity of costs that would convince it to abandon its war aims. Given that both adversaries detonated a nuclear weapon during the war, moreover, the conventional costs the United States imposed, and those it threatened, also were demonstrably not effective at deterring intra-war nuclear use.</p> -<h3 id="how-did-we-get-here">How Did We Get Here?</h3> +<p>It is possible that the United States would eventually identify and be able to threaten conventional costs that could hurt the adversary sufficiently in a way it didn’t anticipate and thereby deter further nuclear use or persuade it to concede. Pursuing such a strategy of deterrence, however, is high in uncertainty and, therefore, also in risk. It is not possible to know prior to making the threat or imposing the consequence that it will have the desired effect. Each such attempt has some probability of resulting in escalation to further adversary nuclear use, and there is no way to know if that probability is high or low. Even if the quality of intelligence assessments and other information about the disposition and preference of the adversaries is quite high, such information cannot eliminate uncertainty about the adversary’s likely course of action.</p> -<p>The launch of Sputnik by the Soviet Union in 1957 had a profound impact on the United States, particularly on its education system, leading to a dramatic shift toward STEM education. The shock of Sputnik created a sense of urgency, motivating policymakers, educators, and students to prioritize STEM. Numerous public awareness campaigns highlighted the importance of scientific achievement and encouraged a generation of young people to pursue careers in STEM.</p> +<p>The effects produced by the threat of nuclear cost imposition in a strategy of intra-war deterrence are similarly uncertain. This approach risks cultivating the adversaries’ belief that they might be able to achieve their strategic or political objectives by engaging in nuclear brinkmanship and escalation.</p> -<p>In 1958, Congress passed the National Defense Education Act, providing substantial federal funding for STEM education. The act aimed to produce more scientists, engineers, and mathematicians to help the United States maintain its technological superiority and enhance national security. On May 10, 1950, U.S. president Harry S. Truman signed the National Science Foundation Act, creating the first federal agency dedicated to supporting education and fundamental research across all scientific disciplines. Since this pivot, the U.S. education system has undergone significant curriculum reforms to emphasize STEM subjects and create a more technically skilled and scientifically literate workforce.</p> +<p>The risk of encouraging rather than deterring adversary nuclear use applies equally to threats to and attacks on the adversaries’ nuclear infrastructure, via conventional kinetic or cyber weapons, including on units or sites from which a tactical nuclear strike has been launched. Such an action would not only run the risk of initiating an escalatory spiral, but the possible colocation of tactical with strategic nuclear weapons also means that strikes meant as limited retaliations might be misconstrued as strategic first strikes intended to deplete the adversary’s second-strike capability. In this scenario such a perception would therefore be expected to increase the likelihood that an adversary would launch a nuclear weapon, and perhaps execute a massive attack, possibly against nuclear assets or civilian targets in the U.S. homeland.</p> -<p>These curriculum reforms extended beyond K–12 and into higher education. The launch of Sputnik led to increased support for higher education institutions in the form of funding for research and development programs in STEM fields, leading to the expansion of graduate programs and the establishment of new research facilities.</p> +<p>U.S. warfighting aims in each region therefore will be limited and focal. In both regions, U.S. warfighting strategy should use conventional forces to try to prevent either adversary from advancing the current lines of contact as described in the scenario, but not to advance the line of contact itself. All kinetic and cyber actions should target only adversary military units and assets. Attacks on the adversaries’ homelands should include only those military units and assets that have been directly engaged in conventional kinetic or confirmed cyber-warfighting activity, and all U.S. military actions should adhere to international humanitarian law. To the extent possible, the United States and allied forces should execute operational concepts that minimize the military utility of adversary tactical nuclear weapons.</p> -<p>The focus on STEM education had several implications for civics education in the United States, as the Sputnik-induced shift initially diverted attention and, ultimately, resources from it. As noted in a 2020 commentary, in the decades following Sputnik’s launch, the desire to maintain superiority in STEM-related fields remained a priority as the world grew more connected and complex. Over time, this resulted in less class time and fewer resources available for civics education.</p> +<p>If an adversary does detonate another nuclear weapon anywhere, then the U.S. intra-war deterrence strategy has failed, and the president will have to assess current conditions and decide whether to continue to fight conventionally or to concede. The United States should not respond with its own use of a nuclear weapon in theater or elsewhere, given the possibility of escalation to general nuclear war. This is true even if the adversary launches one or more nuclear weapons against nuclear assets, industrial facilities, or civilian centers in the U.S. homeland. If the homeland strike is limited, the adversary still cannot be certain that the United States will not use its nuclear weapons in the future and therefore might still be deterred. The president would therefore, again, have to assess current conditions and decide whether to continue to fight conventionally or to concede. If the homeland strike exceeds the lower bound of general nuclear war (an explosive yield that kills 25 percent of the U.S. population), then the United States, insofar as it exists, destroys much but gains nothing by sending a salvo in return.</p> -<p>Other factors have likely contributed to this dynamic. For instance, STEM metrics and outcomes can be easily and uniformly tracked across different countries, reinforcing and intensifying competition between nations. Moreover, civics education is sometimes viewed as a subjective, politically sensitive area of study. It is also difficult for the general public to conceptualize, internalize, and actively prioritize the importance of a good civics education, which means there is less public pressure for it. In comparison, STEM fields appear straightforward, apolitical, and noncontroversial.</p> +<h4 id="non-kinetic-response-options-3">Non-Kinetic Response Options</h4> -<p>In recent decades, the difference in career paths and salaries in STEM versus non-STEM fields has substantially changed. When high school students and college freshmen consider their career paths, STEM fields often offer a clearer sense of direction — leading to roles like doctors and software engineers — frequently with attractive salaries. In contrast, the career path in civics is less defined, though equally important, which may partly explain the increasing preference for STEM among younger generations.</p> +<p>This strategy assumes that diplomatic and economic instruments — e.g., severe reprimands, changes in standing and status in international institutions, the imposition of economic sanctions, and other restrictions on adversaries’ abilities to participate in the global economy and to access the international financial system — were imposed as part of the initial U.S. warfighting effort. Given that both adversaries detonated a nuclear weapon during the war, the non-kinetic costs the United States imposed and those it threatened were not effective at deterring intra-war nuclear use. Even if the United States did not immediately implement the full retinue of available measures, the adversaries’ initial nuclear detonations suggest that threatening to impose more such costs is likely to have little persuasive effect.</p> -<h4 id="the-current-state-of-play-in-civics-education">The Current State of Play in Civics Education</h4> +<p>Non-kinetic responses should, nonetheless, continue to be elements of the ongoing U.S. warfighting strategy. They are useful insofar as they hinder the adversaries’ kinetic warfighting capacity, and the United States can use the possibility of relaxing these consequences in efforts to convince the adversaries that a mutually acceptable, negotiated, political settlement is possible.</p> -<p>The last several decades have seen a drastic decline in civics education in the United States, which has left too many without a clear understanding of the importance of democracy or their role in it. A report by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce Foundation found that “more than 70% of Americans fail a basic civics literacy quiz on topics like the three branches of government, the number of Supreme Court justices, and other basic functions of our democracy.” According to the National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP), in 2022, 22 percent of eighth-graders “scored at or above the NAEP Proficient level in civics.” The 2023 Annenberg Civics Knowledge Survey also found that many adults did not know what rights the First Amendment protected, and only 65 percent of respondents could name the three branches of government.</p> +<h4 id="war-termination-on-favorable-terms">War Termination on Favorable Terms</h4> -<p>Funding for civics remains an ongoing issue. Federal funding for K–12 STEM education is roughly $50 per student, while funding for civics is closer to 50 cents. The lack of funding and attention paid to the humanities affects higher education as well. Facing budget constraints, many public universities target humanities and liberal arts programs first in their attempts to balance their budgets. At private universities, prestige and lack of tangible vocational benefits seem to have played a role in this trend. Other factors also contribute to this trend, such as the perceived value of a humanities-centered education and job prospects after graduation. This trend transcends borders. According to Ben Goldstein, “humanities and social science fields without a clear pre-professional connection — disciplines classifiable as ‘qualitative academia’ — have been falling out of favor worldwide. Between 2015 and 2018, the share of bachelors, masters, and doctoral degrees awarded in humanities fields fell 5%, 11%, and 9% respectively on average throughout the OECD, with drops of varying proportions detected in 24 of the 36 OECD countries.”</p> +<p>This strategy is based upon the rational calculation that, in this scenario, the overriding U.S. strategic objective must be to preserve a future in which humans can live in some form of society that permits more than the base struggle for near-term survival. It therefore confines the definition of war termination on favorable terms to those that govern the present moment, not those that might protect U.S. interests beyond it. There is no way to anticipate what U.S. interests after these wars will be, or what geopolitical structures might further them.</p> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Funding for civics remains an ongoing issue. Federal funding for K–12 STEM education is roughly $50 per student, while funding for civics is closer to 50 cents.</code></em></strong></p> +<p>The temptation when formulating alternative strategies based on nuclear war scenarios like the one considered here is to recommend courses of action that include U.S. nuclear use on the basis that there is some chance that it will succeed in convincing the adversary to do what the United States wishes — to argue, that is, that it just might work. This is precisely the temptation that policymakers must resist. No attachment to any political ideology, nor any idea of nationhood, can justify knowingly endangering humankind. This must certainly be true for any political ideology or nation that purports to hold sacred the inalienable rights of all human beings. What could be more contrary to this commitment than risking nuclear holocaust for entire societies of people who had no direct authorship in the policies of their governments?</p> -<p>The decline of civics education is matched by a decline of trust in U.S. democracy and democratic institutions, such as the U.S. Congress and the justice system. A 2024 Gallup poll found that only 28 percent of U.S. adults are “satisfied” with how democracy is working in the United States — a new 40-year low. A similar poll found that only 9 percent of U.S. adults have a “great deal” or “quite a lot” of confidence in the U.S. Congress and 30 percent have a “great deal” or “quite a lot” of confidence in the U.S. Supreme Court. Similarly, the 2022 Annenberg Civics Knowledge Survey found that nearly 7 in 10 people (67 percent) agreed with the statement that the Supreme Court “gets too messed up in politics,” an increase of 12 percent since 2019. In 2024, another poll found that “7 in 10 Americans think the high court’s justices are more influenced by ideology.” This perspective is not limited to the highest courts. For example, a 2023 survey by the National Center for State Courts found that 61 percent of respondents believed state courts are “political.”</p> +<p>The urge to destroy adversary governments in such a situation would no doubt be powerful, but it is intolerable under any circumstance to risk the extinction of the human species in order to do so. Nuclear decisionmaking cannot be driven by pride or vengeance, or by the fear that, if the worst comes and the United States perishes, then so too do the values and principles that produced it. Nuclear decisionmaking must instead be guided by the conviction that liberal thought will reemerge, and by the imperative of preserving a world in which that is possible.</p> -<h4 id="meeting-an-urgent-need--civics-for-adults">Meeting an Urgent Need — Civics for Adults</h4> +<h3 id="if-deterrence-fails">If Deterrence Fails</h3> -<p>Democracy depends on informed and engaged citizens. Americans today live in one of the most polarized eras in our nation’s history, a pattern that continues to grow exponentially due to information operations by foreign adversaries, declining trust in our democratic institutions, and a lack of civic understanding of how to engage effectively with our democracy. With civics education having been underresourced and undervalued for decades, we now see a resulting lack of civic knowledge and skills that has left many adults ill equipped to fulfill their essential roles within our democracy.</p> +<p><strong><em>Analyzing U.S. Options for Responding to Adversary Limited Nuclear Use</em></strong></p> -<p>K–12 and higher education reform are critical to rebuilding a foundation of civics knowledge but require significant time to implement before we see results. Given the urgency of the issues, we cannot wait for this long-term investment. There is an immediate need to remedy the current civics knowledge gap among adults.</p> +<blockquote> + <h4 id="gregory-weaver">Gregory Weaver</h4> +</blockquote> -<p>Empowering adults with civics knowledge can strengthen democratic participation and counter the growing influence of misinformation, enabling a more resilient and informed electorate. In the technology sector, where professionals are shaping the digital infrastructure of society, understanding the values and aspirations of democracy and the responsibility of individuals in a democracy is even more crucial.</p> +<p>The decision to focus Project Atom 2024 on the issue of how the United States should respond to limited nuclear deterrence failure in a conflict with a peer nuclear adversary was both wise and timely. Wise because doing so helps address key gaps in U.S. strategy development. Timely because the rise of China as a second peer nuclear adversary, and the increasing strategic alignment of Russia and China, create a heightened risk of collaborative or opportunistic aggression in two theaters that requires the development of a strategy and associated enabling capabilities to address this problem.</p> -<p>In May 2022, CSIS launched its Civics at Work (CaW) initiative, a partnership with leading civics groups, national security practitioners, and business leaders looking to reinvigorate civics literacy as a national and economic security imperative, both through their respective workforces and in their larger communities. Business leaders, in particular, are optimally positioned to take on this role. As leaders, employers, community members, and patriots, businesses must be at the heart of any effort to reinvigorate the public’s civics awareness and engagement. Commerce, innovation, and U.S. competitiveness all depend on a healthy democracy and continuing commitment to the rule of law. Civics literacy is a fundamental part of a successful and thriving community, and businesses have a unique ability to contribute by investing in their workforces. Furthermore, a Harvard Business Review paper notes that free markets rely on free and stable political systems to thrive, which can be reinforced through stronger civics education.</p> +<p>Most nongovernmental analyses of the problem of war with a nuclear-armed adversary focus, understandably, on how to deter the initiation of such a conflict or on deterring nuclear escalation in such a conflict. Successful deterrence avoids the much uglier problem of what to do if deterrence fails.</p> -<p>Importantly, because people today trust their employers more than the government or the media, companies remain one of the few institutions with broad public support and are equipped with the “resources, political power, incentives, and responsibility” to help protect democracy. In another Harvard Business Review white paper, BET Networks president Scott Mills notes that companies also recognize the need to foster environments where employees from diverse backgrounds can collaborate and communicate effectively. As such, skills such as strong collaboration, clear and regular communication, compromise, and mutual respect — areas that can be strengthened by increasing civic skills such as civil discourse and renewing a sense of shared aspirations — are crucial for creating these successful business environments.</p> +<p>Focusing on deterrence alone, however, fails to address the very difficult problem of how the United States and its allies and partners can protect their vital interests while avoiding uncontrolled escalation to large-scale nuclear war when the adversary has already escalated to the limited use of nuclear weapons. Focusing on deterrence alone fails to address the complex task of thinking through the military and non-kinetic response options the United States and its allies and partners might require to achieve their objectives while avoiding uncontrolled escalation. Moreover, by failing to identify the range of response options required, perhaps through multiple instances of limited nuclear weapons employment by both sides, such deterrence-focused analysis also risks failing to identify the capabilities required to provide such options credibly and effectively. Finally, the process of thinking through how to address limited nuclear deterrence failure somewhat counterintuitively provides important insights into how to enhance deterrence of both war and limited nuclear escalation in war that an analytic focus on deterrence alone is unlikely to provide.</p> -<p>The private sector plays a critical role in its ability to leverage investment for good — directing financial resources toward initiatives that not only generate profits but also contribute to society. This approach aligns with global policies aimed at mitigating risks associated with new and emerging technologies while also addressing the need to move from a first-to-market mentality to a best-to-market imperative. In this context, the business case for promoting civics education has never been stronger or more critical.</p> +<p>Analysis of how to respond to limited nuclear deterrence failure is inherently scenario dependent for a number of reasons. The stakes of the two sides in a conflict have a significant impact on the war aims of the combatants and on their willingness to escalate and counter-escalate in pursuit of those aims. The political circumstances, particularly regarding issues of alliance cohesion and the internal politics of the combatants, also shape the options of both sides. The military circumstances are of course a critical factor in shaping the two sides’ strategic and operational objectives and the military means available to pursue them. Analyses must address a range of questions, including: Who is winning or losing, and why and how? Is one side asymmetrically vulnerable to limited nuclear escalation? Could horizontal escalation alter the military situation to one side’s advantage? Does one side have an endurance advantage in an extended conflict?</p> -<p><em>“Teaching the discipline of law to those seeking technical graduate degrees in cybersecurity has been highly rewarding. The students are usually intimidated to begin the class but then embrace the study as they begin to understand the “system” of the rule of law in our country - the Separation of Powers; the role of courts; the distinction between legislation and regulation; etc. I am convinced that we can and must cultivate a commitment within science and technology communities to understand the rule of law, to embrace it, to defend it and proselytize about it.”</em></p> -<blockquote> - <h4 id="dan-sutherland-professor-of-cybersecurity-law-and-policy-george-washington-university">Dan Sutherland, Professor of Cybersecurity Law and Policy, George Washington University</h4> -</blockquote> +<p>Of course, were the United States to find itself engaged either in a conflict with one nuclear peer while seeking to deter opportunistic aggression by the other, or in simultaneous conflicts with both Russia and China, the interaction of these scenario-specific factors would be far more complex to assess and far more challenging to address.</p> -<p>As part of CaW, DDI developed Civics for Adults: An Implementation Guide for Businesses, Civics for Adults: A Guide for Civics Content Providers, and hosted discussions on how civics can promote the role of businesses in U.S. democracy. The first business leader to sign up to participate in CSIS’s CaW was Brad Smith, president of Microsoft. During a January 2021 CSIS program on the importance of equipping STEM students with civics education, Smith said:</p> +<p>Project Atom 2024 asked its participants to conduct their analyses in the context of a single 2027 scenario involving two regional conflicts with Russia and China simultaneously. Thus, this paper addresses only that scenario, providing analysis of the four key issue areas identified by the project’s designers:</p> -<blockquote> - <p>Technology has become a multidisciplinary activity and every engineer at a company like Microsoft needs a bigger dose of the liberal arts and civics in particular … and what is true at a place like Microsoft is true across the tech sector …. At the end of the day, the heart of our society is our democratic foundation and therefore civics education always has to be at the heart of this multidisciplinary approach.</p> -</blockquote> +<ol> + <li> + <p>U.S. Strategic Objectives If Strategic Deterrence Fails</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Assuring Allies after Strategic Deterrence Failure</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Military Response Options after Strategic Deterrence Failure</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Non-Kinetic Response Options after Strategic Deterrence Failure</p> + </li> +</ol> -<h4 id="ongoing-challenges">Ongoing Challenges</h4> +<p>As the reader will see, this two-conflict scenario presents U.S. strategists with a complex set of issues. However, a more comprehensive analysis of the overarching two nuclear-armed adversary problem would require asking these same questions across a set of plausible scenarios that span the range of key strategic circumstances the United States might face. Examples of other scenarios that should be examined using the Project Atom 2024 methodology include:</p> -<p>Incorporating civics concepts into the STEM and tech worlds faces several ongoing challenges, primarily stemming from a disconnect between scientific and policy communities. Yet, a grasp of how our system works is essential for those entering technology and science-oriented fields; governmental decisions not only directly influence innovation and discovery, but, perhaps even more importantly, directly affect implementation. Teaching scientists and engineers that considering social impact and learning about taking a scientific or engineering concept from idea to use requires understanding — and, quite possibly, acting within a civics context — in order to achieve success; this should be an important aspect of science and engineering education.</p> +<ul> + <li> + <p>Conflict with Russia while deterring Chinese opportunistic aggression</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Conflict with China while deterring Russian opportunistic aggression</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Conflict with Russia and China in which the United States is winning conventionally in one theater and losing in the other when deterrence of limited nuclear use fails</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Conflict with Russia and China in which the United States is losing conventionally in both theaters when deterrence of limited nuclear use fails</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>The full range of scenarios farther into the future when China is a nuclear peer</p> + </li> +</ul> -<p>Bridging the gap between “techies” and policymakers is difficult, as it entails encouraging technologists to navigate the nuanced “gray areas” of societal and policy issues, as well as the equally challenging task of teaching policy professionals that there can be clear right and wrong answers in technical realms. Failure to do so means failed public policy due to a mismatch between legislators and regulators intents and what is technically feasible. It also means failure of scientists and engineers to take into account societal issues as they design the technology. Teaching the two communities to be speak a common language is thus really important for society’s health and wellbeing.</p> +<p>There are bound to be additional important insights from analysis of these alternative scenarios that are needed to formulate a comprehensive U.S. strategy for this problem set.</p> -<p>For example, a potential use case could be the accreditation requirements of the British Computer Society (BCS) in the United Kingdom. Founded in 1957, BCS is a charity dedicated to “[raising] standards of competence and conduct across the IT industry.” To achieve this, BCS provides a wide range of accreditation, qualification, and certification services for IT professionals, higher education programs, and at-home education. Due to its international recognition, BCS accreditations and qualifications are highly sought after by employers in the IT sector and academic programs.</p> +<h4 id="the-scenario-in-question">The Scenario in Question</h4> -<p>To obtain official BCS accreditation, programs and courses must satisfy BCS’s “Criteria for Accreditation.” One such criterion is “the ability to [recognize] the legal, social, ethical and professional issues involved in the exploitation of computer technology and be guided by the adoption of appropriate professional, ethical and legal practices.”</p> +<p>Project Atom 2024 posits a 2027 scenario in which the United States and its allies and partners face collaborative aggression by Russia and China in two theaters simultaneously. The scenario postulates that, despite collaborative Russian-Chinese aggression, U.S. and allied conventional forces far outperform Russian and Chinese conventional forces, almost immediately putting Russia and China in very difficult strategic circumstances 8–10 days after conflict initiation in both theaters. The scenario results in a dire strategic situation in which both Russia and China have initiated limited nuclear escalation, seemingly in response to losing the conventional conflicts they initiated.</p> -<p>The BCS use case has been studied to assess its effectiveness in implementing a nationwide ethics requirement in educational curricula. A study by Tom McEwan and Sandra Cairncross from Edinburgh Napier University notes some challenges in implementing BCS’s Legal, Social, Ethical and Professional Issues (LSEPIs) criteria in higher education. In their paper, the authors observed that “technically-oriented undergraduate students are often reluctant to engage with [BCS’s] ‘Legal, Social, Ethical and Professional Issues (LSEPI).’” They further noted that, after a decade of increasingly relaxed social and ethical standards in certain media, such as widespread illegal downloading of music, video, and software, many current UK undergraduates “appear to have an increasingly cavalier attitude to intellectual property in digital media” despite receiving BCS training.</p> +<p>As noted earlier, U.S. objectives and potential response options in such a situation would be highly dependent on the specific political-military circumstances of a conflict. In the case of this scenario, however, several key facts regarding the strategic situation are unclear:</p> -<p>While this is just one paper examining the efficacy of BCS’s LSEPI requirements, it presents a mixed picture. The requirements are well intentioned and capable of being implemented on a national scale, but they still encounter many of the same challenges faced by traditional general education and undergraduate requirements in the United Kingdom. Fundamentally, the results may point toward the importance of instilling a sense of civic responsibility to help explain why students should care about ethics.</p> +<ul> + <li> + <p>Has the defeat of the Chinese landing force negated China’s ability to invade Taiwan, and for how long?</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>How long will it take Polish forces to seize the city of Kaliningrad and the rest of Kaliningrad oblast?</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>How much have Russian nuclear strikes damaged NATO’s ability to reinforce Poland and the Baltic states, and to seize Kaliningrad?</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>How many Russian ground forces are where? Along the Baltic states’ borders? In Kaliningrad? In Belarus?</p> + </li> +</ul> -<p>Another challenge lies in educating teachers on how to integrate civics into STEM curricula. Education schools are not adequately preparing teachers to teach civics, let alone equipping STEM teachers to integrate civics concepts into their lessons. Political polarization exacerbates the challenge. For example, a study by Daniela Kruel DiGiacomo et al. found that only 28 percent of teachers believe parents would support them teaching about contemporary elections, even though 81 percent report that doing so would help meet state curriculum standards. This impacts both the content teachers feel comfortable covering and the overall quality of civics education students receive. Additionally, the same study found that schools lack training for teachers on handling polarization, largely due to insufficient administrative support. As a result, 92 percent of teachers said they will “shut down” student discussions on contentious topics to avoid partisan conflicts, rather than encouraging constructive dialogue and working on civil discourse.</p> +<p>Pointing out these uncertainties is not intended as a criticism of the scenario. But the fact that such details regarding the range of strategic circumstances the United States might face have such a significant effect on the analysis of the central problem does raise an issue for future analysis: How much understanding of the potential impacts of limited nuclear use on the course of a theater conflict between nuclear-armed adversaries is required to formulate an effective strategy for the potential range of such contingencies? It is likely that experts are reaching the end of what they can learn about this central question without detailed wargaming and simulation of twenty-first-century theater warfare that includes the limited use of nuclear weapons by one or both sides in the conflict.</p> -<p>Moreover, an expert in one of our roundtable discussions noted the ongoing challenge of engaging some first-generation students, and other minorities that are underrepresented in STEM fields, with civics because they often feel disenfranchised by the very system we ask them to study and value. A potential solution could be to emphasize that civics can empower them to become effective agents of change, helping to dismantle barriers and injustices that prevent more students from advancing in STEM careers.</p> +<p>Project Atom 2024 is a first step in this direction, as it effectively examines the issues regarding what to do in the wake of limited nuclear deterrence failure by asking the right first-order questions at the unclassified level. But that is not enough. The Department of Defense needs to take up the challenge of a campaign of wargaming and simulation that will provide the necessary analytic basis for informed strategy development and military capability requirements identification.</p> -<p>Moreover, the binary thinking often characteristic of STEM fields — and the focus on solving technical problems — leads many to avoid political discourse and civic engagement, mistakenly believing it doesn’t apply to them. Many in the field are drawn to STEM subjects precisely to avoid the messiness of civil society, preferring a world seen through the binary lens of 0s and 1s. Teaching STEM students that it is not only acceptable to engage in discussions that involve ethics and values, but that it is in fact necessary and valuable in developing acceptable technical solutions to societal problems, is thus critical.</p> +<p>What follows is an analysis of the four key issue areas in the scenario provided.</p> -<p>Understanding the variety of motivations of tech professionals is important. An expert in one of our roundtable discussions described the four Ps of motivation guiding people in the field: protection, prestige, patriotism, and puzzle-solving. The challenge — and the opportunity — lies in finding the commonality between those motivations and being civically literate.</p> +<h4 id="us-strategic-objectives-if-strategic-deterrence-fails">U.S. Strategic Objectives If Strategic Deterrence Fails</h4> -<p>Finally, incentives within the business world are not always in sync with broader societal good. While corporate responsibilities lie with shareholders and employees, the right decision for business is not always seen as aligned with what’s best for society. Framing democracy as a business asset is a critical step in aligning private sector incentives with public good. Although the tension between societal good and corporate responsibilities is an issue that we will continue to grapple with, there are numerous cases in which the private sector leverages its influence to safeguard democracy and incentivize civic-minded investment. These companies recognize the importance of civics education as a business imperative and have incorporated it into their programs, demonstrating the societal impact of technology and its alignment with democratic principles.</p> +<p>For the purposes of this analysis, it is assumed that the U.S. stake in both theater conflicts is sufficient for the United States to risk large-scale nuclear war. Whether either adversary perceives this to be true, however, is unclear. Stakes sufficient to take this risk clearly involve vital national security interests. The United States has historically perceived the sovereignty and security of its NATO allies as meeting this test. The purposeful ambiguity regarding whether the United States would intervene to defend Taiwan against Chinese military aggression makes it less certain that Taiwanese security meets this threshold, though the impact of the forcible incorporation of Taiwan into the People’s Republic of China on U.S. economic interests and U.S. alliances in Asia could well rise to a vital national interest.</p> -<h3 id="conclusion-and-recommendations">Conclusion and Recommendations</h3> +<p>Before identifying potential U.S. strategic objectives in this scenario, it is useful to consider for a moment why deterrence of limited nuclear use failed in both theaters and whether there was something that the United States could have done to enhance deterrence of such nuclear use. While the scenario does not provide sufficient information to determine the answers to these questions with much confidence, it does at least hint at Russian and Chinese motivations for crossing the nuclear threshold.</p> -<p>Democracy is neither invincible nor inevitable. It can only be sustained by a civically informed and engaged citizenry that comes together with a common purpose. However, this fundamental prerequisite is threatened by the decades-long decline in civics education, which has left Americans lacking the skills to fulfill their essential role in moving us toward a more perfect union.</p> +<p>In both theaters, the adversaries’ unexpectedly poor conventional military performance puts them in fairly dire strategic circumstances very early in the conflict. In Europe, the combined effect of Russia’s failure to make any significant inroads into the Baltic states while simultaneously failing to stop the NATO offensive into Kaliningrad and eliciting direct NATO military intervention in Ukraine could hardly be worse. In Asia, the destruction of China’s invasion fleet before it can reach Taiwan denies the Chinese leadership their primary objective and is followed by internal unrest in opposition to the war. Limited nuclear escalation in both theaters offers some prospect of terminating the conflicts on terms Russia and China can accept, but the scenario does not describe Russian or Chinese intent. Neither adversary pairs their limited nuclear escalation with clear coercive political-military demands, making the purpose of their escalation unclear.</p> -<p>As we move to reinvigorate civics education, we cannot afford to leave anyone behind. We cannot settle for reaching only those who are already interested in government and the role of the individual in a democracy. We must find ways to also engage those whose interests lie in more technological and scientific fields. And we must reach adults as well as students.</p> +<p>It is tempting to say that the United States failed to clearly and credibly communicate its stake in defending its allies and partners in both theaters. However, it is also possible that the Russian and Chinese leaderships miscalculated not about U.S. will to intervene but rather regarding the ability of Russian and Chinese conventional forces to achieve their objectives even in the face of U.S. intervention if they both attacked at roughly the same time.</p> -<p>The challenges we face today — polarization, misinformation, and a lack of trust in our institutions — underscore the urgent need for a reinvigorated focus on civics education. As democracy’s survival hinges upon informed participation, it is essential that education systems empower citizens to understand their role in shaping our more perfect union. Nowhere is this more important than in the STEM and tech world. Science and technology have an undisputed influence on society, and the decisions made by tech professionals shape not only the future of innovation but also the fabric of society and its democratic institutions.</p> +<p>There are four U.S. strategic objectives that should be pursued in both theater conflicts.</p> -<p>Infusing civics concepts into STEM education can ensure that the next generation of technologists understands that they have a civic responsibility to think about the societal impact of their innovations. This interdisciplinary approach is key to preparing a workforce that is technically skilled and civically engaged, including engagement in the development of norms, policies, and laws.</p> +<p>The first is to restore or maintain the territorial status quo ante. This means that no NATO or Taiwanese territory remains under Russian or Chinese control (respectively) at the end of the conflict. This constitutes a fundamental denial of Russia and Chinese strategic objectives.</p> -<p>Integrating civics concepts into the STEM and tech world is not just an educational priority — it is a democratic imperative. As technology continues to shape the world, those at the forefront of innovation must be equipped with the civic knowledge and ethical grounding to guide their work responsibly. And those making governance decisions must be equally prepared to meet the demands of a complex and technological future.</p> +<p>The second U.S. strategic objective should be to restore deterrence of further nuclear use by Russia or China. Doing so would enable the United States and its allies and partners to continue to pursue the first strategic objective at lower risk and with a lower level of violence.</p> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Integrating civics concepts into the STEM and tech world is not just an educational priority — it is a democratic imperative.</code></em></strong></p> +<p>The third U.S. strategic objective in both conflicts should be to avoid uncontrolled nuclear escalation. This means deterring large-scale nuclear escalation by Russia and China even if restoring deterrence of further limited nuclear use is unachievable.</p> -<p><em>HOW DO WE INTEREST STEM STUDENTS AND TECH WORKERS IN CIVICS?</em></p> +<p>The fourth U.S. strategic objective should be to demonstrate that the adversaries’ limited nuclear escalation did not result in any meaningful political-military gains. Achieving this objective in one theater could enhance the achievement of the U.S. objectives mentioned above in the second theater. It would also arguably enhance deterrence of future aggression and escalation.</p> -<p><strong>Reveal Impact:</strong> Herbert Lin, a fellow in cyber policy at Stanford University, often tells his students that it behooves them to understand how government works because it is government that effectively dictates what we can know and understand about the universe, primarily through decisions about how to allocate its massive funding. AI and cybersecurity are good examples of how governments are developing rules, regulations, and policies that will impact the development and deployment of technology. But technical experts are not just impacted — they can and should also have an impact. They are members of society with valuable experience and skills to bring to societal problems, and thus they should participate in the discussions both as experts and as members of society.</p> +<p>The scenario’s description of the Ukraine conflict complicates the establishment of further clear U.S. strategic objectives consistent with the four above objectives. The scenario posits that some eastern NATO allies have begun deploying forces into Ukraine, and NATO airpower is now flying support missions for Ukrainian forces on the offensive in preparation for the liberation of Crimea “within weeks.”</p> -<p><strong>Elevate the Role of Translators Between STEM and Policy:</strong> There is a critical need for individuals who can bridge the gap between STEM and policy by getting involved in the process and acting as “translators.” These professionals must understand both technical concepts and policy implications, enabling them to communicate effectively between the two communities. Teaching policymakers the technical aspect of emerging technologies, while helping technologists navigate the complexities of policy, is essential for fostering collaboration and innovation. To strengthen this vital role, we must create programs and positions that elevate these “translators” by raising awareness of their importance, making these roles more prestigious, and incentivizing individuals to pursue them. By recognizing and investing in these positions, we can ensure that the intersection of technology and policy is more effectively navigated, driving ethical innovation and informed decisionmaking. There are several examples of Master of Science (MS) degrees in tech and public policy, but there is still room for more. In the field of cybersecurity, Tufts University offers a degree in Cybersecurity and Public Policy and the University of Texas at Austin offers a Master of Public Affairs (MPAff ) dual degree program between its Cockrell School of Engineering and its Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs.</p> +<p>It is not clear, however, what U.S. territorial objectives should be in the Ukraine conflict post Russian nuclear use. Combined NATO-Ukraine forces pressing to drive Russian forces from all Ukrainian territory might make restoring deterrence of Russian nuclear use significantly more difficult and could increase the risk of uncontrolled escalation. A less risky, but still ambitious, option would be to demand Russian withdrawal from all Ukrainian territory that Russia has seized since the February 2022 invasion in exchange for NATO withdrawal from the portions of Kaliningrad it now occupies. However, this would leave Russia in control of Crimea.</p> -<p><strong>Connect to the Scientific Revolution and the Age of Enlightenment:</strong> STEM students may be interested in the connections between the Scientific Revolution, with its questioning of established concepts and structures, and its influence on the Age of Enlightenment, which in turn informed the Declaration of Independence and the U.S. Constitution, with the framers developing our radical system of government in the same breath, and in much the same way, that a new world of scientific discovery and understanding was helping inform new ways of thinking. The framers did not see a bright distinction between what today we might call “hard science” and “soft science.”</p> +<p>Regardless of which U.S. objective is chosen regarding Ukraine, U.S. objectives should clearly include termination of all fighting between NATO/Ukraine and Russia, consistent with the achievement of the other U.S. strategic objectives identified above.</p> -<p><strong>Bridge the Gap between Binary and Shades of Gray:</strong> We must explore how the mathematical and scientific principles and “answers” that seem so black and white today actually arrived through a process — a process of discernment and discovery that did not always yield societal acceptance at first. Similarly, the framers of the Constitution set up not just institutions but a process for arriving at the “right” answer for the advancement of individuals, society, and the nation. And just as science is constantly raising new questions about long-held answers or assumptions about the universe, democracy is always moving toward a more perfect union, with change coming about through the work of informed and engaged citizens.</p> +<p>What is the relative priority of this set of potential U.S. strategic objectives in this strategic context?</p> -<p><strong>Leverage the Scientific Method to Strengthen Civic Engagement:</strong> The principles of the scientific method — critical thinking, evidence-based reasoning, and an iterative approach to problem-solving — offer a powerful framework for enhancing civic engagement. By teaching students to apply the scientific method to democratic participation, we can cultivate a more informed and thoughtful citizenry. Encouraging students to evaluate information with the same rigor they would in a scientific setting allows them to engage in civil discourse and embrace differing perspectives. This connection between scientific inquiry and the democratic process helps foster collaboration and critical thinking, empowering students who are driven to solve problems to apply their skills to civic challenges. Embedding these principles into civics education not only reinforces a sense of civic responsibility but also ensures that the next generation is equipped to address complex societal issues with thoughtful, evidence-based approaches.</p> +<p>Restoring the territorial status quo ante (with a possible modification regarding Ukraine) while avoiding uncontrolled escalation are undoubtedly the two most important objectives. Achieving these two objectives in both theaters would amount to “victory.” Immediately restoring deterrence of nuclear use is not necessary to “win” the conflicts, but doing so would reduce both the cost and the risk of doing so. Achieving the two most important objectives would also arguably result in achieving the fourth objective of denying U.S. adversaries any significant political-military gain through their nuclear escalation, thereby enhancing future deterrence of war and escalation in war.</p> -<p><em>WHAT ARE THE MOST IMPORTANT CIVICS CONCEPTS TO CONVEY?</em></p> +<p>In the scenario, there is no clear indication of whether success in one theater is more important to the United States than in the other theater. However, one thing is clear: U.S. and allied successes in achieving their objectives in one theater would be likely to affect the decision calculus of the adversary in the other theater regarding further nuclear escalation.</p> -<blockquote> - <h4 id="csiss-civics-for-adults"><code class="highlighter-rouge">CSIS’s Civics for Adults</code></h4> -</blockquote> +<h4 id="assuring-allies-after-strategic-deterrence-failure">Assuring Allies after Strategic Deterrence Failure</h4> -<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Developed in partnership with the Annenberg Public Policy Center at the University of Pennsylvania, CSIS’s Civics for Adults guide aims to help civics experts and content providers create resources for business, government, and higher education leaders. The goal is to enhance civic understanding among adults and improve the functioning of democratic institutions within communities by identifying existing resources suitable for adults and adapting civics materials originally designed for schools.</code></em></p> +<p>The second key issue noted by the Project Atom 2024 designers involves how the United States can assure its allies and partners in the wake of a failure to deter limited nuclear escalation by an adversary. This is indeed an important question, as one potential adversary motivation to escalate is to shatter U.S.-led alliance cohesion. Maintaining such cohesion is critically important to the achievement of the highest priority U.S. strategic objectives in both theaters. Thus, effectively assuring U.S. allies after strategic deterrence failure is in effect an enabler of the primary war aims of the United States should a nuclear-armed adversary choose to escalate.</p> -<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">First, the guide emphasizes that civic knowledge alone is insufficient; it must be paired with civic skills that can produce positive outcomes for both institutions and communities. Second, it offers actionable guidance on developing civics content for adults, ensuring they grasp the importance of the federal system, the roles of each branch of government, the separation of powers, the rule of law, and civilian control of the armed forces. Additionally, it highlights the importance of promoting civic engagement and fostering a sense of civic responsibility in learners. Only when individuals take ownership of their work and are invested in the success of their institutions and communities can they consistently make decisions that contribute to the long-term health of democracy.</code></em></p> +<p>Assuring allies in the immediate aftermath of adversary nuclear use, particularly if they have been the target of such use, is more complex than assurance while deterring first use. Allies might be concerned the United States will not respond forcefully enough to either restore deterrence and/or continue to defend their vital interests for fear that the conflict might escalate out of control and put the U.S. homeland at risk. Conversely, allies might fear that the U.S. response to adversary nuclear escalation will elicit further adversary nuclear escalation in the theater, putting the allies at increased risk.</p> -<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">The guide also provides advice on how to effectively tailor civics to adults, noting that adults are typically self-directed learners who engage more with content when it has immediate relevance to their lives or careers. It emphasizes that materials should include narratives that resonate with adults’ work experiences and lived realities, sparking discussions about both the strengths and shortcomings of current systems. Further, employers should focus on implementing achievable civics goals, such as encouraging employees to vote or compensating them for jury duty or community service.</code></em></p> +<p>Despite these legitimate concerns, allies and partners in both theaters have no credible alternatives to U.S. nuclear extended deterrence commitments. In NATO, the only non-U.S. nuclear weapons capabilities are French and British. Other NATO allies are unlikely to see those forces as credible alternatives to U.S. nuclear forces in the wake of limited nuclear deterrence failure given the vast superiority of Russian nuclear forces over those of the United Kingdom and France combined. In Asia, there are no existing alternatives to U.S. nuclear weapons capabilities whatsoever.</p> -<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Lastly, the guide stresses that outreach should not be limited to large corporations or government institutions. Equal attention should be given to local chambers of commerce, small businesses, community colleges, and trade schools. While concise, this guide serves as a practical starting point for content creators developing or adapting civics resources to engage adults in both their workplaces and communities.</code></em></p> +<p>If U.S. responses to initial Russian or Chinese escalation make clear that the United States is willing to engage in a competition in dire risk-taking, and that Russia and China must also fear potential uncontrolled escalation, allies are likely to be reassured in the near term. The greatest fear of allies who rely on U.S. extended nuclear deterrence is that in extremis the United States will be unwilling to risk strikes on the United States homeland to defend them. A decisive early demonstration that this fear is unfounded would bolster allies’ confidence and potentially convince U.S. adversaries that they had miscalculated about the U.S. stake in the conflict, as well as about U.S. political will to defend that stake resolutely.</p> -<p>CSIS’s Civics for Adults guide discusses the key civics concepts all Americans should understand (see box above).</p> +<p>However, if the U.S. responses result in further Russian or Chinese nuclear use against U.S. allies and partners, allied confidence will likely go down. Once deterrence has failed — as evidenced by limited adversary nuclear use against U.S. allies or partners — allies will want to be reassured about our ability to defend them against such attacks, not just deter them.</p> -<p>Of particular importance in the technology arena is an understanding of civic responsibility — obligations that go beyond oneself and are essential for a functioning democracy based on the then-radical idea of self-governance. Civic responsibility can help inform the “why” of ethics. It can also strengthen the message that security, particularly cybersecurity, is a shared responsibility between the government and the individual.</p> +<p>Decisions about how to respond to limited nuclear deterrence failure will be about how best to achieve U.S. (and allied) political-military objectives while avoiding uncontrolled escalation. If the United States succeeds in achieving its objectives while avoiding uncontrolled escalation, allies are likely to be assured. And those U.S. response decisions may need to be made too quickly to allow for extensive consultation if they are to be effective. For example, if an adversary escalates to limited nuclear use in an effort to coerce war termination on terms it can accept because it is decisively losing the conventional war, how long can we expect them to wait to see if their coercive use has had the desired effect before they decide to escalate further?</p> -<p>Also important, as noted, is an understanding of how policy decisions are made and at what level(s) of government. Major funding decisions are generally made by the U.S. Congress and the executive branch, but state and local governments can also impact the level of resources available for the development of technology or new engineering projects, for example. Similarly, policies and laws establishing limits or guidelines for scientific or technological research could come from federal, state, or even local governments. Understanding our system of federalism is important for understanding how to bring about change or influence outcomes.</p> +<h4 id="military-response-options-after-strategic-deterrence-failure">Military Response Options after Strategic Deterrence Failure</h4> -<p>Finally, reinforcing a sense of shared values and aspirations captured in the notion of a more perfect union, for which we must always strive, can help strengthen the commitment to using STEM-related expertise to reinforce, rather than undermine, those values.</p> +<p>The third key issue raised by the Project Atom 2024 designers involves the range of potential U.S. military responses to adversary limited nuclear escalation. The relevant range of such military options will be a direct function of the political-military objectives they are designed to achieve or support.</p> -<p><em>HOW DO WE GET CIVICS CONCEPTS INTO THE STEM CURRICULUM?</em></p> +<p>A recap of the U.S. strategic objectives identified above allows one to identify sub-objectives and military options to achieve them:</p> -<p>Civics education must be embedded across a variety of subjects, not limited to social studies. Civics concepts should permeate STEM fields, where the intersection of technology, ethics, and policy is increasingly important.</p> +<p><em>RESTORE OR MAINTAIN THE TERRITORIAL STATUS QUO ANTE</em></p> -<p><strong>Leverage Initiatives Such As the 2023 National Cyber Workforce and Education Strategy:</strong></p> +<p><strong>Potential Sub-Objective:</strong> Restore U.S. or allied conventional superiority following limited adversary nuclear strikes on key U.S. or allied conventional forces.</p> -<p>Among the foundational skills highlighted in the strategy are the following:</p> +<p><strong>Potential Military Options:</strong> Depends on the exact nature of the military impact of adversary nuclear use and the adversary’s own vulnerability to U.S. response options. Analysis is required to understand the range of potential targets this objective and sub-objective might dictate and to determine whether currently planned military capabilities enable effective strikes on such targets on operationally relevant timelines.</p> -<ul> - <li> - <p>“Be Active Participants in Society and the Economy.”</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>“Understand the Social, Technical, &amp; Cultural Dynamics of Computational Technology, including Equity and Inclusion.”</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>“Ethically, Securely, and Safely Use Information” and “Recognize the Rights, Privacy, Responsibilities, &amp; Opportunities of an Interconnected Digital World.”</p> - </li> -</ul> +<p><em>RESTORE DETERRENCE OF FURTHER NUCLEAR USE BY RUSSIA AND CHINA</em></p> -<p>These objectives are all advanced by civics education.</p> +<p><strong>Potential Sub-Objective:</strong> Convince adversary that their nuclear escalation was a dire miscalculation regarding how the United States would respond and that further adversary escalation will fail to achieve their objectives while increasing the risk of uncontrolled escalation.</p> -<p>The strategy also seeks to “Invigorate the Pursuit of Foundational Cyber Skills and Cyber Careers.” As noted earlier, the Commission on Public Service determined that teaching civics was one of the most important and foundational ways to inspire public service and careers with a mission.</p> +<p><strong>Potential Military Options:</strong> Must exceed either the level of violence or the strategic impact that the adversary anticipated — likely difficult to know with confidence — in order to shake their confidence in their ability to gauge how the United States might respond to further escalation. There is a potential role here for the calculated revelation of capabilities of which the adversary was previously unaware that have potentially decisive military effects (“You didn’t tell me they could do that. What else don’t I know?”).</p> -<p>Finally, the strategy notes that “cyber education should be integrated across disciplines so learners can gain the requisite knowledge and skills in relevant and contextualized learning experiences.” Again, the kind of cross-discipline approach advocated in this report meets that objective.</p> +<p><em>AVOID UNCONTROLLED NUCLEAR ESCALATION</em></p> -<p><strong>Support Teacher Training and Professional Development:</strong> Teachers play a central role in fostering civic engagement among students, but they need better support to effectively incorporate civics and ethics into STEM subjects. Professional development programs should equip educators with the tools to teach the ethical and civic dimensions of technology. Partnerships between schools, universities, and tech companies can also help educators stay up-to-date with the latest technological advancements and their societal implications. Additionally, teacher training schools should place greater emphasis on teaching educators to teach civics, especially in today’s politically polarized environment. This training should include an understanding of the pervasive impact of technology in government. For example, the rollout of the Affordable Care Act and efforts to use technology for a more transparent and accountable government could serve as relevant case studies. Potential STEM teachers should also be required to have a basic understanding of civics and the role of laws and be encouraged to use similar examples in their classes.</p> +<p><strong>Potential Sub-Objective:</strong> Convince adversary that U.S. nuclear responses and conventional operations are being conducted in pursuit of limited war aims that do not constitute an immediate threat to state survival and do not constitute the initiation of a large-scale counterforce attack designed to negate their strategic nuclear deterrent.</p> -<p><strong>Inspire STEM-Related Civic Engagement:</strong> Schools across the country should experiment with integrating social studies and STEM concepts. For example, in 2021, U.S. history teachers at South Doyle High School in Knoxville, Tennessee, developed a cross-disciplinary project to explore the city’s lack of sidewalks. This project allowed students to learn about post–World War II history, 1950s building codes, urban planning, civil engineering, and even the health impacts of inadequate walking infrastructure, such as its effects on heart health and obesity rates. Although this is just one example, it demonstrates how some schools are working to bridge the gap between civics and the hard sciences.</p> +<p><strong>Potential Military Options:</strong> Avoid strikes that threaten the adversary’s ability to detect nuclear attacks, command and control their nuclear forces, etc. Pair messaging about the purpose of the U.S. response with promises of U.S. restraint if Russia or China were to cease nuclear use.</p> -<p><strong>Integrate Cybersecurity and AI as Use Cases:</strong> AI presents an unparalleled opportunity to engage students and the public in discussions about ethics and civic responsibility. Integrating AI as a focal point in civics education, from K–12 to higher education, can enhance students’ understanding of both historical context and the role technology plays in democracy. Policymakers, educators, and communities must work together to ensure AI is not only a subject of study but also a means to teach critical civics concepts.</p> +<p><em>DEMONSTRATE ADVERSARY LIMITED NUCLEAR ESCALATION DID NOT RESULT IN MEANINGFUL POLITICAL-MILITARY GAINS</em></p> -<blockquote> - <h4 id="national-security-agency-and-department-of-homeland-security-centers-of-academic-excellence-in-cybersecurity-designations"><code class="highlighter-rouge">National Security Agency and Department of Homeland Security Centers of Academic Excellence in Cybersecurity Designations</code></h4> -</blockquote> +<p><strong>Potential Sub-Objectives:</strong> Send a message to the adversary in the second theater of conflict that limited nuclear escalation is unlikely to have the coercive effects they seek. Send a message to future potential adversaries that there is no nuclear coercive offramp from failed conventional aggression against the United States and its allies.</p> -<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">One way to incentivize higher education to bring civics concepts into more technical areas might be to leverage the National Security Agency (NSA) and Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Centers of Academic Excellence in Cybersecurity (CAE-C) designations. These official designations, awarded by the NSA and DHS, recognize academic institutions that demonstrate excellence in cybersecurity education and research. Because the cybersecurity standards required to achieve this designation are high, earning it can “enhance [an] institution’s reputation, attract top-tier students and faculty, and open doors to federal funding and partnerships.”</code></em></p> +<p><strong>Potential Military Options:</strong> Almost all the options noted above could serve this purpose if effective in denying the adversary their objectives and in making clear that further nuclear escalation increases the risk of uncontrolled escalation. The nature and extent of U.S. and allied resolve must be messaged appropriately.</p> -<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">There are several designations under the CAE-C umbrella, including Cyber Defense Education (CAE-CDE), Cyber Research (CAE-R), and Cyber Operations (CAE-CO). As a result, incorporating a civics education component into one of these criteria could quickly incentivize academic institutions to invest in and prioritize civics education to attain these prestigious designations. Since civics would suddenly become a government-recognized standard with direct workforce applications — such as clear communication and effective compromise — the field could attain new prestige. This, in turn, could attract more students and adults to civics, fostering a culture of lifelong learning and civic engagement.</code></em></p> +<p><em>TERMINATION OF FIGHTING BETWEEN NATO/UKRAINE AND RUSSIA, CONSISTENT WITH ACHIEVEMENT OF OTHER U.S. STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES</em></p> -<p><strong>Incentivize Civics in STEM through Testing and Hiring:</strong> It’s often said that if you don’t test for it, it won’t be taught. Standardized tests could integrate some basic civics concepts, such as civic responsibility and respect for the rule of law, into questions related to STEM subjects. Additionally, as noted above, schools — particularly in higher education — tend to prioritize education that aligns with hiring demands. If businesses recognized the importance of a civically literate workforce and included this in their hiring decisions, it could significantly influence schools’ decisions on what to teach.</p> +<p><strong>Potential Sub-Objective:</strong> Create facts on the ground that provide negotiating leverage that enables termination of the Ukraine conflict.</p> -<p><strong>Address Equity and Inclusion in STEM and Civics Education:</strong> It is vital to create pathways for underrepresented groups to engage in both STEM and policymaking roles. Addressing barriers to entry and retention for first-generation and minority students is crucial for building a diverse and inclusive workforce. Programs should encourage these students to see themselves as active participants in both technological innovation and democratic governance, promoting civic responsibility alongside technical skills.</p> +<p><strong>Potential Military Options:</strong> Seize more or all of Kaliningrad to use as a bargaining chip. Escalate level of NATO military intervention in Ukraine conflict.</p> -<p><strong>Reframe Civics Education as a Shared Responsibility:</strong> Civics education should be viewed as a collective responsibility involving educators, policymakers, businesses, and the public. Federal, state, and local governments must collaborate to scale ongoing efforts in civics education, while private-sector support can help bridge the resource gap. Additionally, integrating civics education as a criterion for attaining Centers of Excellence designations can incentivize higher education institutions to prioritize this critical area.</p> +<p>There are several key issues associated with the military response options outlined above that need to be taken into account.</p> -<p><strong>Use a Systems-Based Approach to Civics and STEM Integration:</strong> A holistic, systems-based approach is necessary to successfully integrate civics into STEM education. Collaboration across federal, state, and local governments; educational institutions; and tech companies is crucial for creating sustainable change. By aligning resources and goals across sectors, we can build an educational ecosystem that fosters technical expertise and civic engagement, ensuring that democracy and innovation go hand in hand.</p> +<p><em>NUCLEAR OR NONNUCLEAR RESPONSE?</em></p> -<p>To maximize the impact of the integration of civics in STEM education, existing initiatives must be scaled and interconnected. Numerous programs across education, government, and the private sector are working across STEM, ethics, and civic responsibility. However, these efforts often operate in silos, at times also using differing terminology, which further hinders efforts to identify and connect them. By creating stronger connections between these initiatives — whether through partnerships, shared resources, or collaborative platforms — we can amplify their reach and effectiveness.</p> +<p>The first of these is whether the U.S. military responses to Russian or Chinese nuclear use should be nuclear or nonnuclear. If the objective of the U.S. military response is to restore deterrence of nuclear use, then there are several problems with a nonnuclear response. First, if the purpose of the adversary’s escalation was to coerce war termination on terms they can accept because they are decisively losing the conventional war, then a nonnuclear response may convince them that they simply need to hit the United States harder in pursuit of their objective. Further, they may conclude that it safe to escalate because the United States is reluctant to respond in kind for fear of uncontrolled escalation. Second, if restoring deterrence requires that the United States respond in a more severe way than anticipated by the adversary in order to convince them that they cannot be confident in predicting future U.S. responses to further escalation, then a nonnuclear response is less likely to meet this criterion.</p> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">To maximize the impact of the integration of civics in STEM education, existing initiatives must be scaled and interconnected.</code></em></strong></p> +<p>If the U.S. objective is to restore U.S. or allied conventional superiority following limited adversary nuclear strikes, then the decision to respond with nuclear or nonnuclear weapons should hinge in part on which response is most likely to be more militarily effective. Increasing the range of relevant targets susceptible to a U.S. nuclear or nonnuclear response option would increase the range of options available to the president.</p> -<p>Similarly, employers should ensure that as they implement initiatives to engage their workforces in ways that build their civic knowledge, skills, and engagement, they include aspects designed specifically to reach employees who are more STEM oriented. This should include finding ways for their employees to use their technical skills in civic engagement activities to strengthen their communities. Leaders should also clearly communicate why civics is important and encourage other tech sector leaders to do the same.</p> +<p>Finally, for the U.S. objective of avoiding uncontrolled nuclear escalation, at first glance it might seem that nonnuclear military response options may be preferred. And in some circumstances this would be true. However, if the effect of selecting a nonnuclear response to adversary nuclear escalation is to convince the adversary that the United States is so concerned about uncontrolled escalation that it fears responding in kind, then a U.S. nonnuclear response could actually increase the risk of eventual uncontrolled escalation. This may seem counterintuitive, but if a U.S. nonnuclear response to adversary limited nuclear use results in encouraging further adversary nuclear escalation, then the U.S. nuclear responses that may eventually be required to achieve U.S. objectives are likely to be larger in scale and more provocative in their effects. This could well make uncontrolled escalation more likely.</p> -<p>A coordinated, system-wide approach that aligns stakeholders at the local, state, and federal levels will allow for the replication of successful models, accelerating progress toward a more civically engaged, technically proficient workforce better prepared to address the challenges and opportunities of rapid innovation in a democracy.</p> +<p><em>STRIKE RUSSIAN OR CHINESE TERRITORY WITH NUCLEAR WEAPONS?</em></p> -<hr /> +<p>The second key issue regarding U.S. military responses to adversary limited nuclear use involves whether to strike targets on Russian or Chinese territory with nuclear weapons given the potentially escalatory nature of such action. On the one hand, strikes on the adversary’s homeland would cross a potential firebreak against uncontrolled escalation. On the other hand, making the adversary’s territory a sanctuary from U.S. limited nuclear responses could create a potentially decisive asymmetry in the ability of the two sides to achieve relevant military effects with nuclear weapons. A limited U.S. nuclear response (or a credibly communicated threat) that makes clear that Russian or Chinese territory will not be a sanctuary if the adversary continues to escalate could be effective in restoring deterrence following adversary first use. This decision in particular will be highly scenario dependent.</p> -<p><strong>Suzanne Spaulding</strong> is senior adviser for homeland security and director of the Defending Democratic Institutions project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). She also serves as a member of the Cyberspace Solarium Commission.</p> +<p><em>RANGE OF AVAILABLE NUCLEAR OPTIONS</em></p> -<p><strong>Paula Reynal</strong> is a program manager and research associate for the Defending Democratic Institutions Project at CSIS, where she supports the project’s research agenda and coordinates events.</p> +<p>The effectiveness of U.S. military response options in the wake of adversary limited nuclear escalation will in part be a function of the range of available nuclear options available to the U.S. president. Identifying future nuclear force and capability requirements first requires development of a future strategy for addressing the two-peer nuclear threat environment, a strategy that is likely to create new operational requirements for nuclear and conventional forces. But strategy development alone is not enough. Detailed wargaming and simulation is needed to analyze the ways in which limited nuclear use by both sides potentially affects the course of twenty-first-century conflict and escalation dynamics across a range of scenarios and strategic circumstances. Without such analysis, U.S. efforts to identify the range of nuclear options needed to address limited nuclear escalation will risk missing key insights.</p> -<p><strong>Aosheng Pusztaszeri</strong> is a research assistant for the International Security Program at CSIS, where he supports research on the intersection of emerging technologies, national security, and intelligence.</p>Suzanne Spaulding and Paula ReynalAs technology continues to shape society, it’s essential for tech leaders to recognize their role in strengthening democracy. This report highlights the urgent need to integrate civic knowledge and responsibility into STEM education and careers.Ukraine’s Military AI Ecosystem2024-11-12T12:00:00+08:002024-11-12T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/ukraines-military-ai-ecosystem<p><em>This report examines the Ukrainian government initiatives and key institutions driving the development of military AI capabilities. It also explores the preconditions that have shaped their adoption in the Ukraine war.</em></p> +<p><em>HOW TO MESSAGE U.S. INTENT AND WAR AIMS PAIRED WITH A GIVEN MILITARY RESPONSE</em></p> -<excerpt /> +<p>As Thomas Schelling first made clear in his book Strategy of Conflict, there are certain strategic circumstances in which deterrence or the avoidance of further escalation can only be achieved if one pairs a credible threat of military response with a credible promise of restraint that provides the adversary with an acceptable, if not desirable, offramp. Given the clear role of coercive limited nuclear use in Russian strategy and doctrine, and the potential for China to adopt a similar strategy and practice when it soon acquires the necessary nuclear capabilities, the United States must determine how it will formulate and implement this pairing of threat with promise to deter such limited nuclear use. This includes not only ensuring that U.S. nuclear forces have the requisite range of capabilities to make the threat element credible and effective, but also determining what forms of restraint the United States is willing to promise and how to make such promises credible and effective in the context of a high-intensity theater conflict in which nuclear weapons have already been employed.</p> -<p>This report is the first part of a series on military artificial intelligence (AI) development and its application in the war in Ukraine. It will focus on two critical aspects of AI adoption in Ukraine’s military:</p> +<p><em>RECOMMENDED MILITARY RESPONSE OPTIONS</em></p> + +<p>The final step in a scenario-based analysis of this central problem is making recommendations regarding U.S. military responses to Russian and Chinese nuclear escalation in this scenario.</p> + +<p>Regarding Russian escalation, the United States should simultaneously pursue its objectives of restoring the territorial status quo ante, reestablishing deterrence of further nuclear use, and restoring U.S. and allied conventional superiority following limited Russian nuclear strikes. This could be done by executing low-yield nuclear strikes on key military targets in Kaliningrad paired with clear messaging that Russia must halt further nuclear use and that U.S. war aims are limited to restoring the territorial status quo ante vis-à-vis NATO (and possibly a return to the pre-February 2022 borders in Ukraine). However, should Russia escalate with further nuclear use, U.S. war aims might change, and U.S. military responses will become more severe.</p> + +<p>Regarding China, assuming Chinese forces are no longer capable of conducting a Taiwan invasion due to U.S. and allied conventional actions, simultaneously pursuing the U.S. objectives of restoring deterrence and restoring U.S. and allied conventional superiority following limited Chinese nuclear strikes (as the territorial status quo ante already is intact) could be an appropriate course of action. This could take the form of a U.S. response in kind on three of the militarized islands in the South China Sea: Mischief Reef, Subi Reef, and Fiery Cross. Such strikes would not affect the Chinese mainland and, given the U.S. position on territorial disputes in the South China Sea, would not constitute attacks on Chinese territory. This response would make clear that the United States will neither tolerate, nor be disadvantaged by, Chinese limited nuclear use. These strikes should be paired with clear messaging that U.S. war aims are limited to defending Taiwan and our regional allies and to achieving an immediate ceasefire. However, it should be kept in mind that should China escalate with further nuclear use, U.S. war aims might change and the Chinese mainland may not be a sanctuary.</p> + +<h4 id="non-kinetic-response-options-after-strategic-deterrence-failure">Non-Kinetic Response Options after Strategic Deterrence Failure</h4> + +<p>There is a wide array of potential non-kinetic response options to adversary limited nuclear use in this scenario that could further the achievement of the U.S. strategic objectives identified above. The most important of these are the following (in descending order):</p> <ol> <li> - <p>The conditions and factors that contributed to military AI development from the beginning of the war with Russia in 2014</p> + <p>Messaging in support of achieving the purposes of U.S. military responses to adversary limited nuclear use. How this might be done has been discussed above. Formulating this kind of messaging should become part of both the political-military planning process and the presidential decision-support process.</p> </li> <li> - <p>The key government institutions and initiatives responsible for driving AI adoption, along with a summary of their major AI-related initiatives</p> + <p>Information actions designed to make the adversary a pariah for having been the first to violate the nuclear taboo since 1945. The purpose of this is to make it difficult, if not impossible, for third parties to side with Russia or China in the wake of their nuclear escalation, and to affect the Russian and Chinese leaderships’ decision calculus regarding further escalation.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Information actions designed to convince both elements of Russian and Chinese political and military leadership, and the Russian and Chinese populations, that their leaders’ actions are risking large-scale nuclear war and the destruction of their nations in a failing pursuit of nonessential objectives. The purpose of this is to put pressure on the leadership to terminate the conflict.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Economic actions designed to make clear that the longer the adversaries continue the war, the more long term the economic damage they will incur. This also serves the purpose of pressuring their leaderships to terminate the conflict, though it is not clear that such economic effects can be imposed on a timeline sufficient to affect relatively near-term adversary decisionmaking.</p> </li> </ol> -<p>The summary section below presents key findings and insights on both of these aspects.</p> +<h4 id="impact-of-the-law-of-armed-conflict-on-us-military-responses">Impact of the Law of Armed Conflict on U.S. Military Responses</h4> -<h4 id="1-ai-is-in-experimental-deployment-and-is-overwhelmingly-geared-toward-supportive-functions">1. AI is in experimental deployment and is overwhelmingly geared toward supportive functions.</h4> +<p>Finally, Project Atom 2024 asked how U.S. policy, when U.S. nuclear planning and operations comply with the law of armed conflict, might affect U.S. military responses in this scenario. Compliance with the law of armed conflict poses no insurmountable barriers to the United States developing effective military response options in support of the array of potential strategic objectives identified in this paper.</p> -<p>Although AI is frequently discussed in the context of the war in Ukraine, its full deployment on the battlefield remains limited. Numerous AI-driven capabilities and technologies are being tested along the frontlines, in long-range strikes within Russian territory, and across multidomain operations, but these efforts are largely experimental rather than indicative of AI systematically replacing human functions in warfare. AI currently assumes a predominantly supportive and informational role, and even when AI capabilities advance and improve, they are not yet implemented in fully autonomous modes on the battlefield.</p> +<h4 id="conclusion-4">Conclusion</h4> -<h4 id="2-there-is-growing-government-involvement-in-ai-development-in-ukraine-through-organizational-regulative-and-technological-initiatives-led-by-various-government-stakeholders">2. There is growing government involvement in AI development in Ukraine through organizational, regulative, and technological initiatives led by various government stakeholders.</h4> +<p>The insights derived from this analysis make clear that there is a need to move beyond thinking only about how to deter aggression and subsequent escalation in wars with multiple nuclear-armed adversaries in the twenty-first century. The failure of deterrence of limited nuclear use would create extremely dangerous circumstances, but there are plausible ways to achieve U.S. and allied strategic objectives without automatically triggering large-scale nuclear war.</p> -<p>Initially, the development of AI-driven technologies in Ukraine was spearheaded by the private sector and volunteer initiatives. However, government institutions and agencies have recently begun to build their own capacities for advancing new technologies. This shift is evident in the creation of new organizational divisions and units within government institutions and the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU), which are specifically dedicated to AI-focused technologies and their deployment. These efforts mark a significant step toward the institutionalization of AI innovation within the public sector.</p> +<p>Having said that, there is a need to expand the scope of the initial Project Atom 2024 analysis to address the full range of plausible scenarios and strategic circumstances in which the United States and its allies and partners might face the challenge of responding to a failure to deter limited nuclear use in a theater conflict with Russia or China. In the scenario addressed here, the United States and its allies find themselves rapidly and decisively winning the conventional war in both theaters simultaneously. As a result, Russian and Chinese nuclear escalation seems to be motivated by a desire to terminate the conflicts on terms they can accept before U.S. and allied conventional success further worsens the outcome. This is a very different strategic circumstance than a scenario in which an adversary is winning the conventional conflict and seeks to secure rapid victory through limited nuclear escalation, or one in which the United States is forced to consider limited nuclear first use to prevent a decisive conventional military defeat. Analysis of those and other scenarios and circumstances would likely produce new and important insights regarding the four key issues addressed in this project.</p> -<h4 id="3-the-ukrainian-government-is-focusing-on-the-adoption-of-commercial-ai-rather-than-on-developing-new-technology-within-government-institutions">3. The Ukrainian government is focusing on the adoption of commercial AI rather than on developing new technology within government institutions.</h4> +<hr /> -<p>Ukrainian authorities, having recognized that the speed and quality of technology development in the private sector far exceed those of the government sector, have prioritized creating infrastructure and procedures for the fast adoption of commercial technology. This approach has resulted in simplifying regulations on the adoption of innovation by the AFU, initiating programs for prototype testing, and providing grant funding to early-stage start-ups, among other initiatives. Moreover, most newly established units within Ukraine’s military, such as the Unmanned Systems Forces, are dedicated to integrating new technologies into military operations rather than participating in combat itself.</p> +<p><strong>Heather Williams</strong> is the director of the Project on Nuclear Issues and a senior fellow in the International Security Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS).</p> -<h4 id="4-the-absence-of-a-long-term-strategy-for-military-ai-development-poses-significant-challenges-to-the-sustained-and-effective-adoption-of-these-technologies">4. The absence of a long-term strategy for military AI development poses significant challenges to the sustained and effective adoption of these technologies.</h4> +<p><strong>Reja Younis</strong> is the associate fellow with the Project on Nuclear Issues in the International Security Program at CSIS, where she leads research on nuclear deterrence issues, nuclear strategy, and emerging technologies.</p> -<p>The lack of a long-term strategy for military AI development represents a critical gap within the government’s approach to emerging technologies. Despite Ukraine’s recognized technological potential, there is no unified vision guiding the use of AI in defense. This strategic void is primarily driven by limited management capacity across government institutions and by the inexperience of political leadership in addressing the complexities of warfare. As a result, the focus has been on immediate, tactical solutions rather than on establishing a cohesive, forward-looking strategy to harness the full potential of AI in military operations.</p> +<p><strong>Lachlan MacKenzie</strong> is a research associate with the Project on Nuclear Issues in the International Security Program at CSIS.</p> -<h4 id="5-between-2014-and-2022-two-grassroots-applications--analytics-for-situational-awareness-and-drones-for-intelligence-surveillance-and-reconnaissance-isr--laid-the-groundwork-for-the-post-2022-surge-in-military-ai-following-russias-full-scale-invasion-military-ai-expanded-significantly-across-six-major-applications-with-a-growing-number-of-companies-focusing-on-autonomy">5. Between 2014 and 2022, two grassroots applications — analytics for situational awareness and drones for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) — laid the groundwork for the post-2022 surge in military AI. Following Russia’s full-scale invasion, military AI expanded significantly across six major applications, with a growing number of companies focusing on autonomy.</h4> +<p><strong>Christopher Ford</strong> is professor of International Relations and Strategic Studies at Missouri State University’s Graduate School of Defense and Strategic Studies and a visiting fellow at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University.</p> -<p>This report categorizes AI applications in Ukraine’s military operations into six major areas, listed below. A more detailed analysis of these applications will be provided in subsequent reports in this series.</p> +<p><strong>Rebecca Davis Gibbons</strong> is senior associate (non-resident) with the Project on Nuclear Issues at CSIS and an assistant professor of political science at the University of Southern Maine.</p> -<ul> - <li> - <p><strong>Autonomy.</strong> The most significant advancements have been in autonomous systems, where Ukraine is making strides in areas such as GPS-denied navigation and swarm operations.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Open-source intelligence and fighting disinformation.</strong> AI helps to analyze large volumes of digital content from media and social networks and to identify Russian narratives, propaganda, and information campaigns spreading disinformation.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Situational awareness and command and control.</strong> AI enhances situational awareness with numerous software platforms used by the military to analyze battlefield and intelligence data and to facilitate real-time efficient decisionmaking.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Demining.</strong> AI-powered analytic software and AI-enabled unmanned ground vehicles improve the efficiency and safety of mine clearance.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Training and simulation.</strong> AI-driven training simulations are helping soldiers adapt to complex battlefield conditions by playing close-to-real combat scenarios with AI adjustments to address warfighters’ skill gaps.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Damage assessment.</strong> AI is crucial in damage assessment, utilizing satellite data and drone imagery to analyze damage, losses, and devastation and to estimate future recovery efforts.</p> - </li> -</ul> +<p><strong>Ankit Panda</strong> is the Stanton senior fellow in the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. His research interests include nuclear strategy, escalation, missiles and missile defense, space security, and U.S. alliances.</p> -<h4 id="6-several-factors-have-facilitated-the-rapid-development-of-military-ai-in-ukraine-creating-a-unique-environment-for-defense-innovation">6. Several factors have facilitated the rapid development of military AI in Ukraine, creating a unique environment for defense innovation.</h4> +<p><strong>Melanie W. Sisson</strong> is a fellow in the Foreign Policy program’s Strobe Talbott Center for Security, Strategy, and Technology where she researches the use of the armed forces in international politics, strategies of deterrence, U.S. national security strategy, defense policy, and defense applications of emerging technologies.</p> -<p>The situation in Ukraine over the last decade, particularly the ongoing conflict with Russia, has affected all aspects of society and necessitated rapid adaptation in defense and related fields. These factors have enabled Ukraine to test and deploy AI-driven solutions in real battlefield conditions, leading to numerous innovations, particularly in the realm of autonomy and autonomous weapon systems.</p> +<p><strong>Gregory Weaver</strong> is the principal of Strategy to Plans LLC. Prior to this, he was deputy director for strategic stability on the Joint Chiefs of Staff Directorate for Strategic Plans and Policy (J5).</p>Heather Williams, et al.There is a growing risk that U.S. adversaries might resort to nuclear use in a regional conflict. To help address for this threat, the Project on Nuclear Issues invited a group of experts to develop competing strategies for responding to strategic deterrence failure.UK Sanctions On Russia2024-11-15T12:00:00+08:002024-11-15T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/uk-sanctions-on-russia<p><em>This report presents findings from the second meeting of the UK Sanctions Implementation and Strategy Taskforce, held in October 2024.</em> <excerpt></excerpt> <em>The discussion aimed to identify opportunities to optimise the use of existing sanctions regimes and enhance the effectiveness of sanctions as a strategic tool. Members provided a list of recommendations for the UK to develop a strategy which not only sends a clear signal of UK priorities, but also has a tangible impact.</em></p> -<ul> - <li> - <p><strong>Existential need for advanced technology.</strong> The Russian invasion of 2022 created an urgent, existential need for Ukraine to develop advanced defense technologies rapidly. The high-stakes environment pushed both government and private sectors to prioritize technological advancements, such as AI, to enhance military capabilities. This urgency also catalyzed a willingness to experiment with AI, leading to quicker deployment of AI-driven capabilities in combat.</p> +<h3 id="introduction">Introduction</h3> + +<p>Following Brexit, the UK had an opportunity to develop its independent sanctions framework to address the evolving geopolitical landscape and its own foreign policy messaging. This framework included a broader range of thematic and geographic sanctions regimes, targeting issues such as corruption, human rights abuses and cyber activities, while countering threats to international peace and security. In an attempt to give substance to this vision, in February 2024, the UK published its first Sanctions Strategy, outlining its approach to ensuring that sanctions are effective, giving the UK more influence in the world, and helping to “keep Britain safe”.</p> + +<p>In June 2024, RUSI’s Centre for Finance and Security set up the UK Sanctions Implementation and Strategy Taskforce, made up of 50 former UK and other government officials, senior sanctions executives from the financial sector and industry, and academics, from the UK and elsewhere. The first meeting highlighted a series of implementation challenges, such as: resourcing and expertise; engagement with industry; alignment with international partners; and the lack of a clear set of objectives for the UK’s sanctions policy. Notably, while Russia has become the focus of the UK’s sanctions response, the Taskforce also emphasised the need for a more comprehensive and flexible approach beyond Russia alone.</p> + +<p>This report presents findings from the second Taskforce meeting, which was held in October 2024. The discussion aimed to identify opportunities to optimise the use of existing sanctions regimes and enhance the effectiveness of sanctions as a strategic tool. Members provided a list of recommendations for the UK to develop a strategy which not only sends a clear signal of UK priorities, but also has a tangible impact. None of the comments made by the Taskforce members are attributable.</p> + +<h3 id="thematic-sanctions">Thematic Sanctions</h3> + +<p>The Taskforce first discussed ways to increase the effectiveness of the UK’s thematic regimes, which had been described in the previous meeting as mostly “presentational” and lacking clear criteria and vision. The discussion focused on three regimes: Global Anti-Corruption (GAC) sanctions; Global Human Rights (GHR) sanctions; and cyber sanctions.</p> + +<h3 id="global-anti-corruption-sanctions">Global Anti-Corruption Sanctions</h3> + +<p>The Taskforce recognised the steps the UK has taken to address corruption through its GAC sanctions regime. However, discussions highlighted gaps in the current approach that hinder its legitimacy and credibility, mostly linked to the lack of clarity regarding the criteria and purpose for which these sanctions are deployed, and the strategy for their use.</p> + +<p>Members reiterated the risk of sanctions targeting corruption in name only without being accompanied by genuine disruption of related networks and criminal enforcement. They described the GAC regime as an “uncomfortable fit” between sanctions and criminal enforcement, with sanctions being prioritised over the actual targeting of corruption. One Taskforce member pointed to the EU’s misappropriation sanctions regimes as a useful cautionary tale for anti-corruption sanctions. Introduced in 2011 to target corruption and financial misappropriation by government officials in Egypt and Tunisia, these sanctions regimes struggled to achieve tangible results, securing no convictions and becoming the subject of political disputes. The failure of these regimes, according to Taskforce members, resulted from a lack of criminal enforcement efforts due to limited resources and political will.</p> + +<p>The Taskforce warned that without robust investigations, prosecutions and confiscations of the proceeds of corruption accompanying the rollout of anti-corruption sanctions, the GAC regime might face a similar fate and lack credibility. To ensure this does not happen, members recommended appropriate resourcing of law enforcement agencies, and stronger coordination between government agencies responsible for sanctions enforcement and criminal prosecutions. They also argued that better processes for listing and delisting would be useful for more targeted action against corrupt individuals.</p> + +<p>Another Taskforce member stressed the disparity between the UK’s efforts to combat corruption at home and its actions abroad. Noting the UK’s recent decline in international rankings such as Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index, they argued that the lack of focus on domestic corruption weakens the UK’s credibility in the global fight against corruption and its sanctions response.</p> + +<p>To increase international credibility, Taskforce members suggested complementing anti-corruption sanctions, measures to tackle domestic corruption, and criminal enforcement with capacity-building in target countries, particularly in the Global South. One member from civil society cautioned that a failure to cooperate with local justice systems could result in sanctions being perceived as neocolonial, undermining their legitimacy and impact.</p> + +<h3 id="global-human-rights-sanctions">Global Human Rights Sanctions</h3> + +<p>The Taskforce also discussed GHR sanctions, which have become a prominent aspect of the UK’s independent sanctions regime, particularly through the Global Human Rights Sanctions Regulations 2020. GHR sanctions allow the UK to target individuals and entities involved in serious human rights violations by freezing their assets and restricting their travel. While recognising the value of these sanctions in principle, Taskforce members noted that the sanctions were far from realising their full potential.</p> + +<p>One primary concern raised by Taskforce members was that human rights sanctions often do not serve their intended purpose of deterrence, but are instead adopted as a form of punishment. The discussions highlighted that, similarly to GAC sanctions, GHR sanctions often operate in a vacuum, without the support of additional efforts to promote human rights globally. Some participants suggested including GHR sanctions in a broader human rights strategy, combining them, for instance, with diplomatic efforts and criminal prosecution of human rights abuses.</p> + +<p>Taskforce members from the legal sector also noted that these kinds of sanctions are in place indefinitely, with little evidence that they influence the behaviour of the targeted individuals or regimes. This situation, combined with a lack of clear criteria for lifting human rights sanctions or explanation of the reasoning behind designations, raises questions about the long-term purpose and effectiveness of these sanctions, and risks reducing their overall legitimacy. Taskforce members stressed the need to gather more data on the impact of GHR sanctions on the ground, for instance by establishing collaboration with local organisations to assess whether the sanctions were providing accountability for human rights abusers or deterring further abuses.</p> + +<h3 id="cyber-sanctions">Cyber Sanctions</h3> + +<p>Cyber sanctions have also emerged as a growing area of focus for the UK, particularly as cybercrime and state-sponsored cyber activities have become more prevalent. These sanctions aim to disrupt the financial operations of cyber-criminals and state-backed actors involved in malicious cyber activities.</p> + +<p>Taskforce members noted that compliance with cyber sanctions is not particularly complex for financial institutions (FIs) in terms of screening, but that challenges arise with tracing the broader criminal networks involved in cybercrime. Similarly to GAR and GHR sanctions, the key challenge was the lack of criteria clarifying what it takes for a specific network to be sanctioned. Some members noted that the more cyber sanctions designations there are, the easier it is for the industry to learn and comply. However, for cyber sanctions, as well as for other lists, designations are often the result of the work of pressure groups or the gathering of information found in the public domain, which can be altered. Participants noted that this made it difficult for the private sector to understand why sanctions targeted some groups rather than others. Some Taskforce members from the private sector also argued that FIs do not operate in an active intelligence-sharing community within the sector, with banks only seeing data at their disposal and becoming overreliant on information in the public domain.</p> + +<p>According to the Taskforce, any information that authorities can provide will make a difference. An example of new approaches to mitigating this challenge is the US Office of Foreign Assets Control’s move to add IP and virtual wallet addresses to sanctions designation details; FIs can input these addresses into their compliance systems to support their efforts to unveil the networks involved.</p> + +<p>Members of the Taskforce also stressed the legal and operational grey areas for insurers. They noted that insurers may face conflicting obligations: on the one hand, they may be required to pay claims to clients affected by ransomware, but on the other hand, if they identify a designated entity to be behind a ransomware attack, they must avoid making payments because that would violate sanctions. To overcome this issue, the Taskforce recommended the UK issues clearer guidelines on how insurers should handle claims related to ransomware attacks, and share best practices on how to identify and prevent cyber-related sanctions violations.</p> + +<h3 id="geographic-sanctions">Geographic Sanctions</h3> + +<p>The Taskforce discussed strategies to enhance the effectiveness of the UK’s country-specific sanctions. Members emphasised the importance of maintaining a balanced approach, ensuring that the focus on Russia does not overshadow other critical sanctions regimes, such as those applied to North Korea and Iran. These states continue to pose significant global security threats through their illicit activities and development of nuclear and other weapons programmes. However, the implementation and enforcement of related sanctions regimes have seen reduced focus in recent years.</p> + +<p>Taskforce members identified common challenges related to the current geographic regimes. First, they pointed out the persistence across multiple regimes of similar sanctions-evasion practices. For instance, North Korea’s continued use of ship-to-ship oil transfers, flag-hopping, smuggling, and collaboration with other sanctioned countries enable it to evade sanctions and sustain the development of its nuclear weapons programme, while also serving as a blueprint for other sanctioned jurisdictions, such as Russia. According to participants, the cessation of the UN Panel of Experts on North Korea, which previously played a key role in monitoring and reporting on suspicions of sanctions evasion, has also weakened oversight and enforcement, and increased evading activities. Taskforce members agreed that there was an opportunity for the UK to assume a leadership role in ensuring that sanctions violations are properly monitored and addressed. They suggested: expanding sanctions designations to cover individuals and entities involved in facilitating partnerships among sanctioned jurisdictions; ensuring the adequate coordination of geographically divided desks within UK government departments; and implementing measures to cut off access to shared resources and illicit networks.</p> + +<p>Second, as regimes such as North Korea and Russia progressively disengage from Western financial and corporate ecosystems to avoid sanctions, there are fewer opportunities to disrupt evasion activities through the compliance efforts of Western businesses. Some Taskforce members from the insurance community emphasised that overcompliance by the private sector may exacerbate this issue. They noted that, while some government officials view overcompliance as a positive trend that keeps businesses away from high-risk activities, those officials neglect the resulting unintended consequences, such as the creation of parallel structures by sanctioned entities outside the scope of G7 regulatory oversight. Members cited the growing role of Russia’s shadow fleet as an example of this. The oil price cap (OPC) was designed to leverage the fact that 90% of the world’s ocean-going tonnage was insured by Protection and Indemnity (P&amp;I) Clubs in the International Group, all of which are based in G7 countries, and the clubs could therefore police the sanctions. However, Russia has moved away from Western services through the development of the shadow fleet, which now reportedly transports 90% of Russian crude oil, beyond Western oversight. Taskforce members recommended that the UK expand the designations of vessels involved in violations of the OPC to strengthen the enforcement of maritime sanctions.</p> + +<p>Furthermore, representatives from the P&amp;I insurance community noted that they are largely unconcerned with North Korean sanctions, because vessels associated with the country rarely enter Western ports or rely on major Western insurers. However, this leads to a knowledge gap within the insurance and shipping sectors, where companies have little direct experience dealing with North Korea’s maritime operations, and may therefore be ill-prepared to address the sophisticated evasion techniques being used.</p> + +<p>Third, the current system relies heavily on private data providers for information to conduct sanctions screening, without a guarantee of the accuracy of the data they provide. The absence of centralised oversight or clear competency in the management of entity-screening systems means that many organisations may be operating with outdated or incomplete information, reducing the overall effectiveness of sanctions. Taskforce members reiterated the need for the UK government to expand its collaboration with industry and provide more information about sanctioned entities and suspected involved actors, to support compliance in the private sector, reflecting the national security priority placed on the use of sanctions. To address this, a Taskforce member suggested exploring opportunities for industry secondments, where experienced professionals from the private sector could work within government agencies to improve mutual understanding of industry-specific challenges. Such initiatives could bridge the gap between government and industry, accelerating the development of more effective sanctions policies and improving compliance across sectors.</p> + +<p>Fourth, participants stressed challenges in the enforcement of geographic sanctions similar to those found in the enforcement of thematic regimes. According to one participant, the issue with enforcement is rooted in the lack of proactivity in investigations – the launch of an investigation is often reliant on self-reporting – and the number and amount of fines imposed, which do not act as a deterrent in comparison to the cost of compliance. Members recommended a speedier upscaling and expansion of the remit and resources of agencies responsible for enforcing sanctions. To achieve this, the UK should consider a more collaborative and unified approach to improve information sharing; an increase in resources across the whole sanctions architecture; and greater engagement with industry.</p> + +<p>Fifth, consistent with the point raised for GAC/GHR sanctions, the Taskforce noted that the UK should lay out a clear series of actions required for the wind-down of sanctions for geographic regimes. While the grounds for which sanctions were adopted against actors such as Russia remain active, planning for the eventuality of a wind-down or an offramp helps to avoid the unintended consequences of overly extended sanctions. Ensuring that sanctions are well-targeted and calibrated, both in the short and the long term, will help maintain the UK’s credibility and the strategic effectiveness of sanctions in achieving a behavioural change in their targets.</p> + +<h3 id="recommendations">Recommendations</h3> + +<p>To improve the credibility and legitimacy of the UK’s thematic and geographic sanctions regimes, Taskforce members provided the following recommendations:</p> + +<ol> + <li> + <p><strong>Strengthen and unify the UK government architecture.</strong> Effective sanctions implementation and enforcement require greater coordination between the various government departments involved, including the FCDO, the Treasury and the Home Office – and, where relevant, intelligence services. A more unified approach is needed to ensure that sanctions are implemented consistently across departments and that existing programmes are aligned. The UK should consider developing an integrated sanctions “agency” model that would address any inter-institutional competitiveness, gaps and/or opportunities for miscommunication; improve information-sharing; and simplify reporting obligations for the private sector.</p> </li> <li> - <p><strong>Active civil society and a robust private sector.</strong> Ukraine’s vibrant civil society and entrepreneurial private sector have been instrumental in driving defense innovation. Even before the full-scale invasion, the Ukrainian entrepreneurial spirit, combined with a deep sense of national defense responsibility, led many private companies and start-ups to actively contribute to the war effort. These organizations have developed AI-driven solutions ranging from autonomous drones to advanced surveillance systems, with many innovations coming from small teams responding quickly to military demands. The active participation of nongovernmental actors in AI-enabled defense technology development and the fast deployment of commercial technology have significantly accelerated progress in this area.</p> + <p><strong>Expand and review the list of designated entities and individuals.</strong> The processes and criteria for listing individuals and entities under both thematic and geographic regimes should be reviewed, to ensure sanctions meet the intended goals and are reaching the right targets. The UK should also continue broadening its sanctions on entities and individuals, particularly those involved in facilitating sanctions evasion. This includes targeting and sharing information with the private sector on shell companies, financial intermediaries and other entities that play a role in efforts to circumvent sanctions beyond the Western ecosystem.</p> </li> <li> - <p><strong>Permissive regulatory frameworks.</strong> Ukraine’s regulatory environment for military AI was absent before the invasion. Unlike in many other countries, where regulatory bottlenecks can slow down innovation, Ukraine’s government refused to regulate military AI, allowing innovators to respond quickly to frontline needs and develop AI applications that could be immediately deployed in combat settings. The Ministry of Digital Transformation (MDT) prioritizes a soft, business-friendly approach, aiming to avoid overregulation. Instead of imposing strict rules, the ministry uses a bottom-up strategy, offering voluntary guidelines and tools to prepare businesses for future regulations. This approach extends to the defense sector, as the MDT has indicated that it does not plan to introduce regulation of AI in the defense sector.</p> + <p><strong>Provide more and better data.</strong> The UK government should focus on improving the quality and accessibility of data used in its sanctions regimes. This includes providing FIs and other private sector actors with up-to-date and accurate data, incorporating newer data points such as IP and virtual wallet addresses. Additional training and capacity building should be offered to both government agencies and private sector firms, particularly smaller companies, to ensure their expertise in managing the increasing volume and complexity of data involved in sanctions enforcement.</p> </li> <li> - <p><strong>Direct communication between engineers and military personnel.</strong> One of the most significant accelerators of military AI development in Ukraine has been direct communication between engineers and military personnel. Through a well-established network of technical workshops positioned near the frontline or within military units, including mobile drone repair vans, engineers from private companies are able to closely monitor and assess the performance of their systems in real combat scenarios. This proximity enables engineers working on unmanned systems and autonomous capabilities to receive real-time feedback, allowing for the rapid refinement of their technologies.</p> + <p><strong>Improve public-private collaboration.</strong> Regular consultations with FIs, technology companies and other private sector actors are essential to ensure that sanctions are effectively implemented and that their design has the best chance of success. The UK government should establish a formal mechanism for ongoing dialogue with the private sector, focusing on emerging challenges such as cyber sanctions and ransomware, and ensuring that companies have the guidance they need to comply with sanctions regulations.</p> </li> <li> - <p><strong>Foreign assistance providing access to new technologies.</strong> International support, from both governments and private companies, has been crucial in allowing Ukraine to leap forward in its technological capabilities. This support has facilitated Ukraine’s adoption of new technologies, such as analytical tools from Palantir, communication infrastructure via Starlink, and the migration of critical government data to Microsoft’s cloud services, to name just a few examples. This external assistance has not only equipped Ukraine with essential tools for innovation but has also fostered opportunities for collaborative development between Ukrainian and foreign companies, thereby strengthening Ukraine’s military and technological capabilities.</p> + <p><strong>Balance domestic and international efforts.</strong> The UK government must align its domestic efforts with its international actions. This includes strengthening domestic anti-corruption laws, frameworks and enforcement mechanisms to complement the GAC regime. The UK should also focus on diplomatic engagement and capacity-building initiatives in strategic jurisdictions, such as providing training to law enforcement agencies or supporting the development of local anti-corruption frameworks, recognising that sanctions are one tool in a wider foreign policy toolbox.</p> </li> -</ul> - -<h4 id="7-collaboration-on-ai-between-ukraine-and-the-us-government-can-be-mutually-beneficial">7. Collaboration on AI between Ukraine and the U.S. government can be mutually beneficial.</h4> - -<p>What follows are several key recommendations for the U.S. government to foster closer collaboration in AI development between the United States and Ukraine in a way that will be beneficial to both countries.</p> - -<ul> <li> - <p><strong>Strategic support.</strong> The United States should leverage its technological leadership to help Ukraine develop a cohesive long-term strategy for integrating AI into defense operations. By providing strategic guidance, the United States can help to align Ukraine’s national priorities in AI development while gaining valuable insights into AI applications in active warfare.</p> + <p><strong>Enhance sanctions enforcement capabilities.</strong> Enforcement of sanctions has been inconsistent, with significant gaps in the UK’s ability to investigate and prosecute sanctions violations. The UK government should introduce clearer enforcement guidelines, similar to the framework established under the Bribery Act, to ensure penalties for sanctions violations are appropriate and proportional and focus on genuine sanctions evaders rather than low-hanging fruit. Furthermore, the UK government must increase funding and resources to enable more effective investigations and prosecutions.</p> </li> <li> - <p><strong>Closing the feedback loop.</strong> A structured feedback system for evaluating the performance of U.S.-provided drones and military technologies in Ukraine would benefit both nations. U.S. companies could quickly iterate and improve their technologies, while Ukraine would receive more tailored and effective capabilities, enhancing battlefield operations.</p> + <p><strong>Enhance maritime enforcement.</strong> Given Russia’s and North Korea’s reliance on maritime sanctions evasion tactics, the UK government should invest in better maritime tracking systems, and coordinate with international partners to improve enforcement in key shipping lanes. It should prioritise targeted actions against vessels involved in ship-to-ship transfers and flag-hopping, along with secondary sanctions on facilitators of these activities. The UK government should ensure it takes a leadership role in the newly formed Multilateral Sanctions Monitoring Team, leveraging its expertise in key areas such as maritime sanctions and financial services in support of this renewed initiative.</p> </li> <li> - <p><strong>AI in U.S. foreign aid.</strong> The United States should integrate AI development into its foreign aid programs for Ukraine, providing essential computing infrastructure to support AI innovation. This would strengthen Ukraine’s defense capabilities and establish the country as a hub for military AI development, benefiting U.S. strategic interests in global AI leadership.</p> + <p><strong>Combine sanctions with criminal enforcement.</strong> To ensure the effectiveness of sanctions, they must be deployed together with additional tools, such as robust criminal justice responses. Sanctions should be accompanied by more investigations, prosecutions and confiscations of criminal proceeds. Law enforcement agencies such as the Combating Kleptocracy Cell should intensify their efforts to prosecute money laundering and corruption offences, together with sanctions evasion offences.</p> </li> <li> - <p><strong>AI-focused training and entrepreneurial development.</strong> The United States should establish AI-related programs for Ukrainian defense entrepreneurs and business leaders. These initiatives would foster Ukraine’s defense tech ecosystem and strengthen U.S.-Ukraine collaboration, positioning both countries to lead in AI-driven defense innovation.</p> + <p><strong>Improve monitoring and impact assessment.</strong> The UK government should invest in monitoring and evaluation mechanisms to assess the impact of its sanctions regimes. For instance, the FCDO could collaborate with international partners and local organisations to gather data on the effects of sanctions on the ground. Regular assessments can both help to ensure that sanctions are achieving their intended outcomes and inform decisions about whether they should remain in place or whether new ones should be adopted.</p> </li> -</ul> - -<h3 id="understanding-ukraines-ai-ecosystem">Understanding Ukraine’s AI Ecosystem</h3> + <li> + <p><strong>Establish a roadmap for lifting sanctions.</strong> The UK government should develop a framework for reviewing and potentially rolling back sanctions. This framework should include specific benchmarks for compliance, such as changes in the behaviour of the targeted individuals or regimes. Sanctions should be seen as a tool for encouraging behavioural change, not just as a punishment. Any wind-down needs to be coordinated with international partners to avoid creating loopholes or undermining the overall sanctions regime. This is applicable across all sanctions regimes to ensure that sanctions have a clear endgame that compels targets to change their behaviour in exchange for sanctions relief.</p> + </li> +</ol> -<p>This section provides a comprehensive overview of Ukraine’s military AI ecosystem. It begins by providing a background to Ukraine’s commercial AI sector, which for more than a decade has been quite successful — more than is commonly recognized in the West. Next, the paper examines how Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2014 resulted in major changes to the Ukrainian military’s approach to software and data, changes that were critical to the foundation of the military’s post-2022 introduction of AI technologies. Finally, it provides an overview of the key government organizations responsible for driving AI adoption throughout Ukraine’s military as well as a summary of their AI-related initiatives.</p> +<p>The Taskforce agreed that sanctions have become a preferred tool in the UK’s foreign policy arsenal, particularly in the wake of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. However, as the scope and complexity of sanctions continues to expand, the Taskforce was clear that the UK government must ensure that the entirety of its sanctions regimes remain effective. By implementing the recommendations outlined in this report, the UK government can enhance the effectiveness of its thematic and geographic sanctions, ensuring that they achieve real impact in both disrupting illicit activities and promoting international security. Failure to address these issues risks reducing the UK’s sanctions regime to a largely symbolic tool, rather than one that drives meaningful change on the global stage.</p> -<h4 id="commercial-ai-in-ukraine-a-decade-of-quiet-success">Commercial AI in Ukraine: A Decade of Quiet Success</h4> +<hr /> -<p>In the race for leadership in artificial intelligence, Ukraine may appear an unlikely contender. However, this comparatively small nation is demonstrating significant potential, with a highly skilled and technologically adept population. Notably, nearly two-thirds of Ukrainians express optimism regarding AI’s potential to enhance human life, reflecting widespread public confidence in the transformative capabilities of the technology.</p> +<p><strong>Gonzalo Saiz</strong> is a Research Fellow at the Centre for Finance and Security at RUSI, focusing on sanctions and counter-threat finance. His research focuses on sanctions implementation, circumvention and evasion tactics, and sanctions enforcement, primarily through SIFMANet (Sanctions and Illicit Finance Monitoring and Analysis Network). Gonzalo’s reseach on counter-threat finance includes work on the abuse of non-profit organisations for terrorist financing, crime-enabled terrorist financing, and the financing of right-wing extremism.</p> -<p>Indeed, for more than a decade, Ukraine has quietly served as a developer of innovative AI capabilities that have captured the world’s imagination. While a full list is beyond the scope of this paper, three companies — Looksery, Respeecher, and Augmented Pixels — provide a helpful illustration of how Ukraine’s commercial AI sector has long been more impactful and more capable than is commonly understood outside technology communities.</p> +<p><strong>Maria Nizzero</strong> is a Research Fellow at the Centre for Finance and Security at RUSI. Her research examines the UK, EU and global financial crime landscape, asset recovery and sanctions, and the foreign policy dimension of illicit finance. Maria holds a PhD in International Public Law and International Relations from the Universitat Pompeu Fabra in Barcelona, where she was an Associate Professor for four years, teaching EU Politics and Institutions.</p>Gonzalo Saiz and Maria NizzeroThis report presents findings from the second meeting of the UK Sanctions Implementation and Strategy Taskforce, held in October 2024.U.S. Public Diplomacy Now2024-11-14T12:00:00+08:002024-11-14T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/us-public-diplomacy-now<p><em>The United States needs to rethink public diplomacy in an era dominated by great-power competition. U.S. public diplomacy must work harder than ever to showcase the superior attractiveness and value of the United States and its policies over competing alternatives.</em></p> -<p>First, in 2015, Snap Inc. — a Santa Monica-based technology company and the maker of the popular Snapchat social media app — spent $150 million to acquire Looksery, a two-year-old Ukrainian AI tech firm. Looksery’s AI-based facial recognition and augmented reality technology laid the foundation for Snapchat’s Lens portfolio, which today boasts 250 million daily users. In 2022, Snap Inc. stated that the company still employed 300 Ukrainian staff, almost all of whom are engineers.</p> +<excerpt /> -<p>Second, Ukrainian AI companies have also been involved in Hollywood, providing AI technology for audio generation. In 2020, Disney sought to include a younger version of Luke Skywalker in the television series The Mandalorian, but faced a challenge in that Star Wars actor Mark Hamill was 68 years old. Disney contracted with the Ukrainian AI company Respeecher to synthesize a younger voice that was sufficiently high-quality to meet Disney’s exacting standards.</p> +<p>China and Russia leverage technology, social media, and big data as tools to deceptively present information for hostile purposes. The United States must embrace a bold approach to public diplomacy to protect the ideas, values, electoral processes, and all the elements that make a free and open society possible and prevent it from becoming a casualty in the information war.</p> -<p>Third and finally, Qualcomm acquired Augmented Pixels in 2022. Founded in 2010 in Odesa, Augmented Pixels developed AI navigation technologies, such as 3D mapping and localization, for drones and AI glasses. At the time of purchase, Augmented Pixels’ commercial customers included National Geographic, LG Electronics, Intel, and more.</p> +<h3 id="from-cold-war-to-information-war-the-evolution-of-us-public-diplomacy">From Cold War to Information War: The Evolution of U.S. Public Diplomacy</h3> -<p>The main takeaway from these cases is that Ukraine’s AI sector was a meaningful player in commercial technology markets — taken seriously even by leading Western companies — long before Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022. A 2024 study conducted on behalf of Ukraine’s MDT found that Ukraine has 243 AI-focused companies and a broader information technology (IT) and software workforce comprising more than 307,000 specialists. Additionally, Ukrainian universities have launched a remarkable 106 specialized AI and machine learning (ML) programs across 42 institutions, resulting in a 122 percent increase in enrollment over five years. The report found that Ukraine produces more IT graduates than any other Central or Eastern European country, with a quarter of these graduates specializing in AI/ML.</p> +<p>Discussions of U.S. public diplomacy over the last two decades are often framed around its “failures,” what’s “wrong” with it, what a “mess” it is, and its diminishing returns. The solution is not reorganizing U.S. government institutions or simply increasing congressional appropriations. Rather, it involves refocusing the collective perspective on how the U.S. government should think about public diplomacy in an era dominated by great-power competition. A comprehensive “all of the above” approach to public diplomacy is more appropriate for countering authoritarian states in the context of the Information Age.</p> -<p>Despite Ukraine’s aforementioned strengths, its AI sector continues to encounter substantial challenges. According to the 2023 Government AI Readiness Index by Oxford Insights, Ukraine was ranked 60th out of 193 countries in AI integration into public service. The country’s AI development is hindered by several factors, including insufficient computing infrastructure and a shortage of skilled human capital due to the relocation of IT engineers fleeing the war (although some have continued working remotely for their Ukrainian employers). Additionally, Ukraine’s low government research and development investment further constrains the sector’s growth.</p> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">A comprehensive “all of the above” approach to public diplomacy is more appropriate for countering authoritarian states in the context of the Information Age.</code></em></strong></p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/nzE7KG9.png" alt="image01" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 1: Comparison of Ukraine and United States in Government AI Readiness Index 2023.</strong> Source: <a href="https://oxfordinsights.com/ai-readiness/ai-readiness-index/">“Government AI Readiness Index 2023,” Oxford Insights</a>.</em></p> +<p>Edmund Gullion coined the term “public diplomacy” in 1965, but deliberate engagements with international audiences had become a prominent component of U.S. peacetime foreign policy since the beginning of the Cold War (see Box 1). Initial policy was focused on a bipolar world order, with the Cold War aligning nations between the United States and the Soviet Union. The goal of bipolar public diplomacy was to “win the hearts and minds” in favor of Western values: representative democracy, free speech, religious freedom, gender equality, and capitalistic economies over the only other option — communism.</p> -<p>Surprisingly, the Oxford Insights report found that Ukraine matches the United States — the index’s top-ranked country — in one crucial aspect: vision. However, vision alone is not enough to boost AI development and deployment. Ukraine’s position in the index underscores a critical gap between the ambitious plans of its tech sector and the resources needed to execute them.</p> +<p>Following the end of the Cold War, the Clinton administration disbanded many of the institutions at the core of U.S. public diplomacy. The U.S. Information Agency (USIA), created by President Dwight D. Eisenhower in 1953 as an independent agency to promote U.S. values overseas through information programs, was dissolved in 1999. Many components of the USIA’s public diplomacy were transferred to the Department of State, while an independent Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG) was tasked with overseeing international broadcasting networks like Voice of America.</p> -<h3 id="military-ai-in-ukraine-since-2014-necessary-growth">Military AI in Ukraine since 2014: Necessary Growth</h3> +<p>The 9/11 terrorist attacks marked the re-securitization of public diplomacy as the United States sought to “win the hearts and minds of Muslims” across the Muslim world. Like the post–Cold War era, however, there were few media alternatives for audiences in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, Libya, Yemen, or Somalia.</p> -<h4 id="pre-2022-laying-a-digital-foundation">Pre-2022: Laying a Digital Foundation</h4> +<p>In 2018, the Trump administration rebranded the BBG as the U.S. Agency for Global Media (USAGM), an independent federal agency that oversees and broadcasts news and information about the United States and the world internationally.</p> -<p>Though the 2022 full-scale invasion shocked the world, for Ukrainians, it was not the start of the war with Russia. Russia’s occupation of Ukrainian territories in 2014 was a major wake up call for Ukrainian society — including Ukraine’s tech sector, which became increasingly willing to directly support Ukrainian armed forces.</p> +<p>The Department of State and the USAGM sought to maintain credibility with international audiences as new technologies emerged, allowing other voices to compete with U.S. efforts to promote Western norms and institutions globally.</p> -<p>The 2022 full-scale invasion, however, did mark a watershed moment in Ukraine’s approach to military artificial intelligence. Prior to 2022, Kyiv had not prioritized AI in its defense strategy, despite the ongoing war in the Donbas region. However, groundwork laid by volunteer groups since 2014 — focused not on AI but on software for data collection, analysis, and warfighting operational support — has proved instrumental in facilitating rapid military AI development and adoption since 2022.</p> +<blockquote> + <h4 id="box-1-what-is-public-diplomacy"><code class="highlighter-rouge">Box 1. What Is Public Diplomacy?</code></h4> +</blockquote> -<p>This subsection will examine two key military use cases from the 2014–2022 period that enabled AI integration after the full-scale invasion: situational awareness systems and drones. After 2014, volunteers from Ukraine’s tech sector developed systems using modern data and software techniques (though not ML/AI). Over time, these systems dramatically improved Ukraine’s intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition, and reconnaissance (ISTAR) capabilities and even overtook competing official systems in adoption and impact.</p> +<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">A challenge in any effort to revamp public diplomacy lies in the fact that there are multiple definitions of the term and competing understandings of what activities fall under its umbrella. A traditional understanding of the term might only include state-to-state activities. More broadly defined, U.S. public diplomacy also encompasses official messaging from the Department of State and the White House; U.S. international broadcasting via USAGM, Voice of America, and Radio Free Europe; and other soft power tools, military operations, and covert actions.</code></em></p> -<p><em>Situational Awareness</em></p> +<p>U.S. public diplomacy today faces a fundamentally different landscape than it has ever encountered since its inception: a highly digitalized, multipolar world order where audiences can choose where they get their information and what they believe, all in the palm of their hands. Today’s market diversification provides audiences with many choices, including numerous countries with actively engaging foreign ministries and their state-sponsored news networks. Audiences are no longer passive consumers of whatever is available — they get to choose where they invest their time and attention. There are fewer gatekeepers to instant information. Videos, images, and articles no longer have to pass through a newspaper editor or network producer to reach an audience. A caveat, however, is that deepfakes, propaganda, and other forms of unverified information also have direct lines to mass audiences.</p> -<p>Between 2014 and 2022, Ukraine’s tech-savvy and patriotic workforce developed and introduced 11 new situational awareness and battlefield management systems to the Ukrainian military. Because they were unofficial and unsanctioned, one might think that these volunteer initiatives would be divorced from real military requirements. In practice, however, the volunteer groups had direct communication with front line operational forces, allowing them to focus their development efforts on high-priority military needs. One of the initiatives, the situational awareness system Delta, was eventually adopted and formally integrated into the Ukrainian military. The remarkable fact is that some unofficial volunteer systems and software have achieved near-universal adoption by the relevant Ukrainian forces, vastly exceeding the adoption rate of some official military technology initiatives that sought (and usually failed) to provide similar capabilities.</p> +<p>This means U.S. public diplomacy must work harder than ever to showcase the superior attractiveness and value of the United States and its policies over competing alternatives. To do this, policymakers and practitioners must reframe their thinking from what public diplomacy was to what it needs to be in the coming century, which will likely be dominated by superpower competition between the United States, China, and Russia. They must refocus on multipolar public diplomacy and fill leadership voids in this space. In other words, the United States needs to reorient public diplomacy policy as a tool of relativity.</p> -<p>The diverse capabilities of these systems — generally originating from explicit military requests — ranged from fire control, artillery optimization, and air traffic management to combat command and control. These systems not only significantly enhanced Ukraine’s operational effectiveness but also helped transition the Ukrainian military to a modern data- and software-enabled fighting force.</p> +<p>Effective public diplomacy will require appropriate levels of congressional funding and more effective use of that money. As the United States has decreased spending on public diplomacy, China and Russia continue to invest heavily in sophisticated propaganda in the developing world. The underlying goal of the U.S. effort should be not just to make the United States the most attractive and desirable country in the world but to position it as the “partner of choice” in competition with other vying players. Reputational security achieved through public diplomacy is undervalued, as reflected in underinvestment.</p> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">[Early situational awareness and command and control systems] not only significantly enhanced Ukraine’s operational effectiveness but also helped transition the Ukrainian military to a modern data- and software-enabled fighting force.</code></em></strong></p> +<h3 id="from-values-to-interests-in-public-diplomacy">From Values to Interests in Public Diplomacy</h3> -<p>One of the most noteworthy volunteer groups is Aerorozvidka, whose situational awareness system Delta has become a linchpin in Ukraine’s multidomain operations. Started in 2016 and transferred to the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine (MoD) in 2023, Delta seamlessly integrates NATO ISTAR standards to provide essential situational awareness across all branches of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU). Building on this foundation, Aerorozvidka has spearheaded the creation of situational awareness centers in eight cities, each focused on gathering information from its respective section of the front. These centers serve as technological hubs, uniting and coordinating intelligence from a wide variety of sources — drones, satellites, stationary cameras, sensors, field scouts, and data from allies. The system even digitizes information from loyal informants in temporarily occupied territories, who interface with government apps and chatbots. Bringing all these different data sources together in a unified software platform is a challenge even for the United States military, but Delta achieves this and enjoys high user satisfaction among Ukrainian forces. As will be discussed further in this paper, Delta has recently been enhanced with AI/ML-enabled capabilities. At one point, there was an officially sanctioned military system — Dzvin — in development that promised similar capabilities as the volunteer-built Delta. However, this fell victim to bureaucratic hurdles and corruption and never achieved meaningful adoption despite its official introduction into the AFU in 2022. A diverse range of military officials told CSIS that Delta now is the de facto standard and Dzvin is functionally irrelevant. Delta is also of keen interest to NATO, which has described the system as “ground-breaking” following its victory in a 2017 NATO hackathon and prominent testing in NATO military exercises, most recently in 2024.</p> +<p>If the United States is to refocus its public diplomacy policy, the central purpose of multipolar public diplomacy must be building alliances. Current U.S. policy underpins the “marketplace of ideas,” which focuses on values and norm-building. The issue is that when the United States advocates for and institutionalizes its values, it often neglects the divergent values held by foreign audiences. Strategic communication is not unidirectional; it is imperative to listen to counterparts when shaping the United States’ image and to avoid actions that contradict the desired perception. This is why the United States continuously struggles to improve its image and reputation in the Middle East. Large majorities in nine Middle Eastern countries report feeling that “the West doesn’t respect Muslim values, nor show concern for the Islamic and Muslim worlds.”</p> -<p>The Kropyva artillery software system improves target accuracy and routinely reduces the time between receiving orders and striking targets by up to tenfold. Ukrainian artillerymen access Kropyva through a tablet or mobile phone, then enter enemy coordinates, which are automatically translated to the nearest available artillery battery along with precalculated aiming trajectories. The Army SOS volunteer organization developed Kropyva in 2014, and 90 to 95 percent of Ukrainian artillery units have adopted it as their primary artillery fire control system. Another military system helping to coordinate artillery strikes, GisArta, attracted widespread attention in the Western press as “Uber for artillery,” even though Kropyva is more widely used and impactful according to Ukrainian military officials in conversation with CSIS.</p> +<p>Instead, multipolar public diplomacy is underpinned by the “marketplace of loyalties,” which focuses on interests. In this framework, states can work together to pursue their individual and common goals despite contradicting value sets. This is illustrated by the cooperation between the United States and the Soviet Union during World War II. Based on a shared interest in defeating Nazi Germany, two world powers vying for dominance were able to work together for a common goal that benefited both of their interests, despite disagreements on political and economic values. Likewise, the United States’ relationship with Saudi Arabia is a modern example. The two countries have markedly different value sets, yet based on mutual security, economic, and energy interests, they work together for mutual advantage, even in the face of starkly contrasting values and continuous tension. The killing of Washington Post columnist Jamal Khashoggi in 2018 is an example of a value-based difference that tested but did not break the U.S.-Saudi relationship, which is underpinned by common geopolitical interests.</p> -<p>Kropyva and Delta are just two of dozens of examples demonstrating how systems initially developed by tech industry volunteers changed Ukraine’s armed forces after 2014. Many of these systems began with the modest goal of supporting warfighter decisionmaking and have since evolved into advanced situational awareness and battle management systems routinely used by hundreds of thousands of soldiers. Prior to 2022, the adoption of these modern software and data-driven platforms also laid the groundwork for AI/ML integration. As critical information sources were networked and digitized, the data they generated became the raw material for training AI models and enabling AI-driven capabilities.</p> +<p>Two-way, mutually beneficial relationships that advance respective interests — not values — must drive the U.S. alliance-building for the remainder of the twenty-first century. Per Richard Haass, “Foreign policy is not about virtue signaling; it is about advancing interests. Prioritizing and compartmentalizing are essential.” This is not to say that the United States should give up on promoting democratic values — quite the contrary. U.S. public diplomacy needs to create reputational security by being genuine, authentic, and consistent. However, given the democratic backsliding over the last two decades and the rise of regimes that do not share Western values regarding universal human rights, the cost of pursuing global democratization and a liberal world order is growing exponentially. The United States’ political, social, and economic capital simply cannot afford to re-democratize the international system while also fending off power advances by China and Russia. It becomes a cost-benefit analysis, where interests offer a greater potential for cross-cultural engagement, dialogue, and cooperation than do values.</p> -<p>The success of volunteer-led grassroots projects underscores a crucial point: in the face of existential threats, innovation in Ukraine has primarily thrived outside traditional channels. However, this decentralized approach is not without its challenges. Many of these teams still operate on shoestring budgets, relying heavily on donations. The lack of systemic support and funding raises concerns about the long-term sustainability and interoperability of this diversity of systems. Ukraine still possesses a hard-won technological edge, but the government needs to ensure that these successful initiatives are put on a more secure long-term foundation and incorporated into official plans and strategies. Unfortunately, multiple executives in Ukraine’s defense technology ecosystem told CSIS that the scale of Ukraine’s technological edge is shrinking as Russian forces improve their own technology and their pace of innovation adoption. Whereas previously Russian forces would take a month or more to adapt to new Ukrainian innovations before adopting countermeasures in the form of new tactics or technologies, now Russian forces may need as little as two or three days.</p> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">U.S. public diplomacy needs to create reputational security by being genuine, authentic, and consistent.</code></em></strong></p> -<p><em>Drones</em></p> +<p>Likewise, the rise of a “post-truth” reality, marked by information overload and rampant disinformation, has created a social ecosystem that significantly bottlenecks the marketplace of ideas. The best ideas do not always rise to the top; even those that do are not always accepted as the best. At a time when the philosophical applicability of the “marketplace of ideas” is failing, the “marketplace of loyalties” offers a viable alternative. The underlying premise of refocusing U.S. public diplomacy is that this new approach focuses on making the United States the partner of choice over China or Russia, based on its superior ability to deliver on the interests of foreign audiences and governments.</p> -<p>Prior to 2022, drones were in use by both sides, mostly for remotely piloted ISR missions and without AI/ML capabilities. Drones have become a ubiquitous feature of the post-2022 war with Russia, widely recognized as a transformational capability for both sides. However, the impact of drones during the 2014–2022 period was considerably more limited.</p> +<h3 id="the-centrality-of-emerging-technology">The Centrality of Emerging Technology</h3> -<p>The war in Donbas served as an early testing ground for commercial drones, with both sides exploring their potential. While Russian forces made early strides in drone warfare, the Ukrainian side’s attempts to leverage commercial drones were met with mixed results. The lack of trained operators, coupled with the high attrition rate of these relatively expensive items for Ukrainian soldiers who usually had to buy them at their own expense, initially dampened enthusiasm for their widespread adoption. Volunteer organizations, which have played a crucial role in supporting Ukraine’s military efforts, did not — prior to 2022 — prioritize drone acquisition. Similarly, official military decisionmakers were slow to recognize the potential of these systems, focusing instead on more traditional assets.</p> +<p>Information is the currency of the new world order, so to compete in a multipolar landscape, U.S. public diplomacy must be competitive in telling its narratives to the rest of the world. Technology and buy-in from tech companies are important elements in formulating a public diplomacy strategy suitable for the twenty-first century. The importance of diplomatic ties to and collaboration with tech companies is evidenced by the soaring number of countries that have established dedicated diplomatic missions to Silicon Valley in the San Francisco Bay Area. Luckily, the United States and its private sector already outcompete both China and Russia in technology development, so it simply comes down to leveraging the public and private resources already at play while combating adversarial attempts to weaponize the same technological advances. But how can technology help U.S. public diplomacy in a multipolar world order?</p> -<p>In cases where Ukrainian forces did use drones, the priority use case was ISR. China was a major supplier of commercial drones to Ukraine, primarily for civilian purposes such as agriculture and event photography, often referred to as “wedding” drones. However, these also saw usage in combat, even prior to 2022, again mostly for ISR. Hence, Ukrainian defense companies focused their military drone development efforts primarily on medium and long-range reconnaissance and artillery fire correction. Notable examples include the PD-2 from UkrSpecSystems, the Furia from Athlone Avia, the R18 from Aerorozvidka, and the ACS-3M from Skyeton. Companies like DeVIRo also contributed with their Leleka-100, further expanding Ukraine’s domestic drone capabilities, while the Punisher, a strike drone produced by UA Dynamics, represents Ukraine’s foray into offensive drone technology.</p> +<p>First, technology can provide greater internet access. The United States needs to be able to deliver its content to audiences, even in countries that control or restrict access. Therefore, technology that provides increased access is invaluable. For example, Starlink’s mobile broadband satellite system provides access across the African continent. Likewise, USAGM’s Open Technology Fund programs, which provide virtual private networks and censorship-circumvention tools, are steps in this direction. For example, the agency has worked with nthLink, Psiphon, and Lantern since the outbreak of the Ukraine conflict in 2014 to provide Russians with greater access to Western media.</p> -<p>Despite the early use of drones in the war in Donbas, neither Ukrainian nor Russian drones were equipped with ISR AI/ML capabilities. However, increased familiarity with drones would set the stage for later AI adoption.</p> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">The United States needs to be able to deliver its content to audiences, even in countries that control or restrict access. Therefore, technology that provides increased access is invaluable.</code></em></strong></p> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Despite the early use of drones in the war in Donbas, neither Ukrainian nor Russian drones were equipped with ISR AI/ML capabilities.</code></em></strong></p> +<p>Second, technology can provide improved techniques for telling the United States’ story. Even the most credible and authentic narratives can fail if they are not persuasive or never reach their intended audience. Leveraging new technologies to enhance the storytelling context of U.S. public diplomacy, elicit emotional responses, and achieve persuasive outcomes will be vital for outperforming competing narratives from China and Russia. This can range from artificial intelligence to virtual reality, augmented reality, mixed reality, or infotainment.</p> -<h4 id="post-invasion-ai-surge-wide-ranging-military-ai-applications">Post-Invasion AI Surge: Wide-Ranging Military AI Applications</h4> +<p>Third, technology can aid in countering state-sponsored disinformation and influence operations. U.S. public diplomacy cannot operate on its own merits alone. It must leverage emerging technology to identify, track, counter, and discredit narratives and false information spread through Chinese and Russian active measures. This requires interagency cooperation through initiatives like the Department of State’s Global Engagement Center (GEC), as well as public-private partnerships with the tech sector, like Facebook’s election integrity program, to employ rapid alert detection networks to identify artificial amplification, deepfakes, content coordination, etc. The European External Action Service (EEAS), for example, employs a rapid alert system to detect disinformation and coordinate multistate responses through the Emergency Response Coordination Centre, EEAS Situation Room, G7 Rapid Response Mechanism, and NATO.</p> -<p>Despite Ukraine having been at war with Russia for nearly a decade, its 2022 full-scale invasion was a shock to the Ukrainian military system. The survival of Ukraine as an independent state was at stake, and leaders across civilian, military, and commercial structures reacted accordingly. Society as a whole mobilized to support the armed forces, and in many cases, everyday citizens volunteered to participate in combat and defend Ukraine.</p> +<h3 id="who-is-the-audience-of-a-refocused-public-diplomacy">Who Is the Audience of a Refocused Public Diplomacy?</h3> -<p>The commercial technology sector of Ukraine was also swept up in this wave. What had been a volunteering side project for many became the dominant focus of their professional life. In numerous cases, these efforts were centered on maintaining and enhancing existing digital platforms like Delta and Kropyva. However, a new suite of volunteer-built capabilities focusing on the opportunities of AI technology also emerged.</p> +<p>To enhance the competitive edge of U.S. public diplomacy over the next century, the conceptual focus on “foreign audiences” should be broadened operationally to include a range of foreign actors: corporations, nongovernmental organizations, cities, diasporas, influencers, and more. The Department of State’s Office of Global Partnerships is a model for partnering U.S. government staff and resources with nontraditional partners across business, philanthropy, and community organizations that could be mirrored within the Office of Policy, Planning, and Resources (R/PPR).</p> -<p>As with the pre-2022 era, there was no centrally guided plan to accelerate the adoption of AI for priority use cases. Rather, experimentation with AI emerged organically, as technically proficient volunteers explored solutions to the diverse security challenges facing all of Ukrainian society — from disinformation to cyberwar to front-line conflict.</p> +<p>Additionally, U.S. public diplomacy suffers from a lack of engagement with the domestic public. While Americans frequently see headlines about how China and Russia challenge the United States abroad, they often lack substantive knowledge of how the U.S. government is working to compete in this shifting world order. As public opinion influences both political representation and appropriations, better engaging and informing U.S. residents about the efforts and successes of public diplomacy is crucial for securing public support, congressional recruitment, and greater influence in interagency cooperation.</p> -<p>While much of the technology development and drive behind Ukrainian AI efforts originated in the private sector and volunteer communities, the Ukrainian government and military responded with significant organizational changes to accelerate and improve the adoption of AI-enabled capabilities.</p> +<p>The Smith-Mundt Modernization Act of 2012 allowed for greater transparency and access to materials intended for foreign audiences but maintained restrictions on their use for influencing domestic U.S. public opinion. Further revisions to the act should consider eliminating outdated policies and rethinking U.S. public diplomacy’s domestic engagement strategy.</p> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">While much of the technology development and drive behind Ukrainian AI efforts originated in the private sector and volunteer communities, the Ukrainian government and military responded with significant organizational changes to accelerate and improve the adoption of AI-enabled capabilities.</code></em></strong></p> +<h3 id="achieving-public-diplomacy-goals-in-the-coming-decades">Achieving Public Diplomacy Goals in the Coming Decades</h3> -<h3 id="the-institutional-landscape-for-military-ai-development-in-ukraine">The Institutional Landscape for Military AI Development in Ukraine</h3> +<p>Refocusing U.S. public diplomacy’s purview requires a whole-of-government approach, interagency exercises to expose resource gaps, and designing a grand strategy that outlines responsibilities and costs associated with expanding capacity. This requires five key first steps to compete in the coming multipolar world. These span leadership, cooperation, evaluation, purpose, and training.</p> -<p>The institutional landscape supporting AI development in Ukraine has evolved significantly since 2022, with many government agencies and institutions shifting from initially neglecting AI to actively creating specialized departments and units dedicated to developing AI capabilities. This transformation has been driven largely by the pressing demands of the ongoing war against Russia, where AI technologies have repeatedly demonstrated the potential to provide an advantage on the battlefield.</p> +<h4 id="1-consistency-in-leadership-and-strategy">1. Consistency in Leadership and Strategy</h4> -<p>Of special note, Ukraine has gone so far as to create an entirely new branch of its armed forces, the Unmanned Systems Forces. While smaller than the other branches of the Ukrainian military, it is nevertheless technically their peer, and it serves as evidence that Ukrainian leadership views as critical the task of driving organizational reforms to account for new technological realities.</p> +<p>U.S. public diplomacy has been self-sabotaged out of the gate for over 20 years by a lack of consistent leadership. The position of the undersecretary for public diplomacy and public affairs (R) was vacant 44 percent of the 22 years between 1999 and 2021 (over nine and a half years), with nine congressional appointees filling the office the other 56 percent of the time (just over 12 years). This lack of institutional continuity has prevented the development of an organized and coherent strategy for implementation across the Department of State, let alone the entire U.S. government. This inconsistency has contributed to China and Russia outperforming the United States in the information and influence domain over the last two decades. If the United States is serious about competing with China and Russia in this space, the White House must prioritize quickly filling this critical office with qualified personnel. However, given the broken Senate confirmation process, creating a role that bypasses the lengthy process would be beneficial.</p> -<p>Other defense and security institutions have also created new organizations and empowered them to accelerate technology innovation, such as Special Unit Typhoon, a new part of the National Guard of Ukraine. One newly created organization within the MoD, the Center for Innovation and Defense Technologies (CIDT), is a direct outgrowth of the tech volunteer community’s efforts. In 2023, the CIDT took official responsibility for upgrading and developing situational awareness technologies, including the Delta system discussed in a previous section. In 2024, the developers began integrating AI/ML capabilities into Delta with an initial focus on video and text processing for the identification of enemy forces in real time.</p> +<p>That said, in the United States, the executive branch cannot bypass the legislative branch if reputational security advancements are to be achieved. If the Senate confirmation process cannot be streamlined, it is critical for congressional leadership to better address authorizations and appropriations related to public diplomacy.</p> -<p>In other cases, the war has led organizations to reinvent their mandate. Both the Defense Intelligence of Ukraine (DIU, a subordinate body of the MoD) and the Security Service of Ukraine (SSU) have taken a leading role in developing and executing long-range precision strikes on Russian infrastructure. In previous years, these organizations would not have been responsible for such missions. AI is a useful enabling technology for long-range precision strikes, and both organizations have developed the relevant competencies to be at the forefront of AI adoption. For example, AI-based computer vision is helpful for accurate navigation in GPS-denied environments, such as the territory on both sides of the Russian border. More broadly, both the DIU and the SSU have adopted AI for processing and analyzing vast volumes of battlefield data.</p> +<p>In contrast, leaders like Xi Jinping in China and Vladimir Putin in Russia can arbitrarily redirect national resources at will.</p> -<p>Beyond creating new institutions and changing the mandate of existing ones, Ukrainian authorities are also implementing regulatory reforms and launching diverse initiatives to make it easier for companies to develop AI — and for military units to adopt it. The MDT, which is responsible for policymaking in AI development, is fostering an innovation-friendly regulatory environment, avoiding overregulation and promoting AI development through initiatives such as the Army of Drones and the Brave1 platform (further discussed below). These initiatives have accelerated the deployment of unmanned systems — including AI-driven ones — by providing essential financial and organizational support to early-stage projects.</p> +<h4 id="2-centrality-of-leadership-in-interagency-cooperation">2. Centrality of Leadership in Interagency Cooperation</h4> -<h4 id="profiles-of-organizations-in-ukraines-military-ai-ecosystem">Profiles of Organizations in Ukraine’s Military AI Ecosystem</h4> +<p>U.S. public diplomacy during the Cold War was successful because the USIA was the centralized leader of U.S. government information and influence efforts, with direct access to the White House and the National Security Council. Today, the lack of influential leadership in public diplomacy weakens the U.S. government’s effectiveness in the information domain. Edward R. Murrow, the late director of the USIA, recommended that “public diplomacy be in at the takeoff of foreign policies, not just at the occasional crash landing.” The absence of a prominent agency leader also reduces attention from senior-level policymakers in both the executive and legislative branches.</p> -<p>The development of AI-enabled warfare is not occurring in isolation; it is shaped by a complex institutional landscape of government agencies and stakeholders. This section provides an overview of key institutions, along with their initiatives specifically related to developing military AI and drones, while excluding the broader scope of these institutions’ functions as it falls outside the focus of this research. Due to the classified nature of much of the information on government initiatives, this overview remains general, without going into the technical specifics of the projects and technologies involved. The purpose of this section is to offer a clearer understanding of Ukraine’s somewhat unstructured governmental approach to military AI development, as well as to facilitate the identification of relevant counterparts for collaboration where Ukrainian models or initiatives align with U.S. government objectives.</p> +<p>There is no point in creating a new USIA, as that would be an unhelpful bureaucratic reorganization. However, giving the White House and the National Security Council authority over a singular organization or agency, as the USIA once had when it participated in White House cabinet and National Security Council meetings, would clarify, harmonize, and centralize U.S. government efforts, increasing the efficiency of interagency cooperation and resource allocation. Positioning the GEC as the dedicated central hub, for example, would be ideal, as it is Department of State-focused but enjoys more operational cooperation and buy-in from the national security and intelligence communities than R/PPR. This would require official interagency memoranda of agreement directing other agencies and departments to be accountable to the GEC. It would also necessitate more funding — for example, liaisons to the GEC, GEC liaisons to the tech world, and additional billets within the GEC for analysts, supervisors, and possibly their own software programmers.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/NM8CBwz.png" alt="image02" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 2: Map of Military AI Stakeholders in Ukraine.</strong> Source: CSIS analysis.</em></p> +<p>Another way to achieve greater impact is by doubling down on performance measurement in U.S. public diplomacy. This would allow practitioners to demonstrate its effectiveness and value as a security tool to policymakers in Congress and the White House. The work done by R/PPR’s Research and Evaluation Unit is the first step in institutionalizing performance measurements across U.S. public diplomacy. However, it is important to stress that psychological and sociological influences are slow processes. No social science programming can yield comprehensive results in a matter of weeks, months, or even years. Policymakers need to understand that public diplomacy measurement and evaluation is a cumulative process, with trends revealing themselves over the course of years, decades, or even generations. Assessment expectations within an annual budget cycle, for example, will do little more than illustrate the fact that individual and societal influence is far from instantaneous. There must be a willingness to consider the compounding evidence of comprehensive mixed-methods research over time.</p> -<h4 id="ministry-of-defense">Ministry of Defense</h4> +<h4 id="3-efficiency-of-dollars-spent">3. Efficiency of Dollars Spent</h4> -<p>The MoD of Ukraine is the government body responsible for overseeing national defense and the AFU. The MoD is headed by the minister of defense, while the president of Ukraine holds the position of supreme commander-in-chief of the armed forces.</p> +<p>Furthermore, the United States does not need to outspend China or Russia in this domain; instead, it must allocate resources and efforts more efficiently. Audience analysis and segmentation are ideal methods to achieve this. The key is to win over moderate and persuadable audiences, so the greatest resources should be focused on countries and regions not already aligned exclusively with China or Russia. This should begin with countries of strategic geopolitical interest to the United States that are being actively courted by either country. For example, Panama was one of China’s first Belt and Road Initiative partners, and the influx of Chinese investments influenced the outcome of Panamanian elections and legislative votes in favor of China’s economic and security priorities over those of the United States. Similarly, the popularity of the Arabic-language RT (Russia’s international news network) has influenced public perception of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in North Africa and the Middle East.</p> -<p><strong>Organizational AI Initiatives</strong></p> +<p>While an in-depth strategic analysis by regional experts is required to develop a comprehensive list of countries of strategic geopolitical interest to the United States, numerous natural-mineral-rich countries in the Global South are being lobbied by both Chinese and Russian public and private sectors. Some key examples include the following:</p> <ul> <li> - <p><strong>Center for Innovation and Defense Technologies.</strong> In 2021, the MoD established the CIDT to reform its approach to IT project management. Its primary objective is to modernize automated combat management systems and develop future operational-strategic, tactical, and situational awareness systems. A notable achievement in this workstream is the formal adoption of the Delta situational awareness system by the MoD in 2023, which the CIDT inherited from the volunteer organization Aerorozvidka. Public information on the CIDT’s AI-related initiatives is limited, particularly beyond its focus on the Delta platform. However, recent job postings for machine learning engineers, MLOps specialists, and computer vision researchers suggest that the CIDT is prioritizing the integration of AI-enabled solutions into Delta.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Unmanned Systems Forces.</strong> A dedicated branch of the AFU, the Unmanned Systems Forces (USF), was established to systematize and expand the experience gained in the deployment of unmanned systems while formalizing a doctrinal approach suited to the realities of asymmetrical warfare. The USF is responsible for operations across all domains and levels, ranging from frontline engagements to deep strikes within enemy territory. Under the leadership of Colonel Vadym Sukharevsky, the USF plays a central role in introducing unmanned systems throughout the AFU, adopting emerging technologies, sharing innovations, and training units and brigades to use new systems. The USF is tasked with identifying the most effective systems to address the diverse challenges faced by the AFU on the battlefield. To date, over 170 models of unmanned systems have been integrated into frontline operations, positioning the USF as a critical driver of technological innovation in combat.</p> + <p><strong>Africa:</strong> Zimbabwe (platinum group metals and lithium), the Democratic Republic of the Congo (copper, cobalt, lithium, and petroleum), Mali (iron, lead, chromium, nickel, lithium, and uranium), Guinea (iron and uranium), Mozambique (iron, titanium, graphite, and copper), South Africa (iron, platinum, manganese, and uranium), and Zambia (copper, cobalt, and platinum group metals).</p> </li> -</ul> - -<p><strong>AI Technology Initiatives</strong></p> - -<ul> - <li><strong>Innovation Development Accelerator.</strong> The MoD has sought to accelerate the development and adoption of defense technologies through the creation of the Innovation Development Accelerator. Established in 2023, this initiative is designed to streamline and modernize the ministry’s operations by addressing issues of overregulation, lengthy processes, and inefficiencies in collaboration with defense companies. The accelerator aims to reduce the time required for the implementation of weapons and equipment from more than two years to approximately 45 days, while simplifying bureaucratic procedures to enhance operational efficiency. One of its six core priorities is the advancement of robotization and AI tech adoption for unmanned aerial vehicles, as well as ground and water drones.</li> -</ul> - -<p><strong>Initiatives in AI Regulation</strong></p> - -<ul> <li> - <p><strong>Doctrine for Unmanned Systems Forces.</strong> The USF has developed a comprehensive doctrine and statute for all branches of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, which is currently being tested in operational units. The documentation is developed for every level, from squad to battalion, and it will standardize tactics and procedures for the use of unmanned systems across the AFU. The creation of this statute marks a significant step toward the formalization and regulation of unmanned system deployment, ensuring consistent operational practices across the military.</p> + <p><strong>South America:</strong> Bolivia (petroleum), Chile (lithium and copper), Mexico (iron, copper, and zinc), Peru (iron, manganese, and copper), Jamaica (iron, copper, and zinc), the Dominican Republic (copper, nickel, and zinc), Guatemala (iron, nickel, and zinc), and Panama (access to the canal).</p> </li> <li> - <p><strong>Political Declaration on Responsible Military Use of AI and Autonomy.</strong> The only AI-related regulatory initiative in which the MoD is currently involved is the Political Declaration on Responsible Military Use of AI and Autonomy, launched in 2023. This provides a framework for the responsible use of military AI and aims to build international consensus, guiding states in the ethical development, deployment, and use of military AI technologies. Besides this international initiative, the MoD has not yet released any public strategies or formalized vision regarding AI implementation or the development of autonomous systems.</p> + <p><strong>Asia:</strong> India (iron, manganese, graphite, zinc, and copper), Uzbekistan (petroleum, uranium, copper, and zinc), Indonesia (nickel, cobalt, and copper), Kazakhstan (manganese, uranium, iron, copper, zinc, and petroleum), Kyrgyzstan (iron, manganese, petroleum, and zinc), Malaysia (iron, manganese, copper, and bauxite), and Tajikistan (iron, uranium, petroleum, and zinc).</p> </li> </ul> -<h4 id="defense-intelligence-of-the-mod-of-ukraine">Defense Intelligence of the MoD of Ukraine</h4> +<h4 id="4-purpose-as-informer-or-persuader">4. Purpose as Informer or Persuader</h4> -<p>The Main Directorate of Intelligence of the MoD, also known as the Defense Intelligence of Ukraine (DIU), serves as the military intelligence agency to the country’s leadership and the AFU. Its portfolio includes intelligence, cyber, technology development, and occasionally direct execution of high-priority missions.</p> +<p>Reinforcing institutional mission sets is also vital. The goal of U.S. public diplomacy might be compared to counterinsurgency’s purpose of winning the “hearts and minds” during military conflict. In the Information Age, public diplomacy should aim to build the United States’ credibility with global audiences. USAGM has spent decades cultivating a reputation for credibility with its various networks, serving as a transparent and objective news outlet. The agency needs to retain its editorial independence to remain a recognized international source of fact-based journalism.</p> -<p><strong>AI Technology Initiatives:</strong></p> +<p>As Nicholas J. Cull argues, “international broadcasting is powerful but works best at arm’s length.” This necessitates codified barriers to operational interference from the White House or Congress. Politics must stay out of USAGM for it to remain attractive to foreign audiences as a reliable source of information. On the other hand, as a central branch of the executive government, the Department of State should remain the primary tool of political advocacy in advancing the United States’ narratives to the rest of the world. The Department of State is the central hub for engaging, through various soft power means, in persuasive communication that articulates the attractiveness of U.S. policies and engagement.</p> -<ul> - <li> - <p><strong>AI for analytics.</strong> The DIU has emerged as one of the most advanced users and adopters of AI technology within the military. According to Lieutenant General Kyrylo Budanov, chief of the DIU, the increasing volume of acquired intelligence data necessitated the enhancement of analytical capabilities. To address this challenge, the analytical branch has been significantly bolstered with technologies for automated data processing, integrating artificial intelligence to improve the efficiency and accuracy of analysis. This integration of AI has been critical in managing large datasets and enhancing the decisionmaking process within the intelligence operations of Ukraine.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Drones for long-range strikes.</strong> The DIU is a leading agency in conducting long-range strikes into Russian territory using drones equipped with some elements of autonomy. These autonomous drones play a crucial role in Ukraine’s ability to carry out precision strikes at extended distances, significantly expanding the operational capabilities of its military. The use of such autonomous systems represents a forward-looking approach to modern warfare, where AI-enabled technologies enhance the effectiveness of long-range operations while minimizing the need for direct human intervention. While the Ukrainian government has not disclosed all of the functions that AI plays in this mission, government officials told CSIS that AI does play an important role. This positions the DIU as a key player in the development and application of autonomous military technologies in Ukraine.</p> - </li> -</ul> +<h4 id="5-advanced-training-and-professional-development">5. Advanced Training and Professional Development</h4> -<h4 id="security-service-of-ukraine">Security Service of Ukraine</h4> +<p>Lastly, communication is a skills-based profession, yet most foreign service officers and many public diplomacy officers are not highly trained communication practitioners. The State Department should model high-level training and strategically oriented professional development programs with academic partners, like the Defense Department’s program for mid-career public affairs officers (PAOs) at San Diego State University’s School of Journalism and Media Studies. This curriculum provides PAOs with advanced theoretical knowledge and practical skills in campaign planning, implementation, and measurement. It also trains PAOs to serve as strategic counselors to commanding officers.</p> -<p>The Security Service of Ukraine (SSU) serves as the country’s principal security and intelligence agency, tasked with safeguarding national security, conducting counterintelligence operations and counterterrorism efforts, and combating organized crime. It operates under the authority of the president of Ukraine.</p> +<p>Experienced public diplomacy officers need similar advanced training and professional development to build industry-led skill sets in campaign planning and implementation, program development, audience analysis, measurement, and evaluation, and counseling senior foreign service officers, ambassadors, and policymakers.</p> -<p><strong>AI Technology Initiatives</strong></p> +<p>Options for collaboration with academia include specialized programs in public diplomacy at institutions such as the University of Southern California’s Annenberg School for Communication and Journalism, Syracuse University’s Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, Oklahoma State University’s School of Global Studies, and George Washington University’s School of Media and Public Affairs. Another option is to pair the Foreign Service Institute and R/PPR with academic and research partners, facilitated through the Office of Global Partnerships’ Diplomacy Lab program.</p> -<ul> - <li><strong>Naval drones.</strong> One of the SSU’s most innovative contributions to the war effort is its use of naval drones, which have significantly impacted the balance of power in the Black Sea. These drones are not just simple unmanned vessels; due to constant close interaction between the SSU and its drone operators and engineers, they have evolved into multifunctional platforms that are constantly undergoing technological improvements. For example, the Sea Baby drones, initially designed for explosive attacks on Russian naval ships and infrastructure, have been enhanced to perform additional functions such as offensive sea mining. They have successfully laid mines in strategic locations, significantly impacting Russian naval operations. Moreover, due to recent upgrades, the drones are equipped with rocket systems — specifically the Grad multiple rocket launchers, which have already shown effectiveness in targeting Russian positions.</li> -</ul> +<p>As the U.S. government seeks to contain its adversaries’ influence and geopolitical impact, it is critical to consider lessons from the twentieth century. Public diplomacy was a novel tool that helped tip the Cold War stalemate in the United States’ favor. The White House and Congress must prioritize investments in public diplomacy’s capacity to become a competitive tool in the international information ecosystem and reconsider what twenty-first-century public diplomacy requires for effective global strategic communications. The undersecretary for public diplomacy and public affairs (R) and USAGM’s lack of centrality in the national security community will continue to handcuff U.S. government efforts if inaction persists. Meanwhile, the United States will watch as China and Russia continue to build alliances across the globe and fortify their legitimacy as superpowers.</p> -<h4 id="national-guard-of-ukraine">National Guard of Ukraine</h4> +<hr /> -<p>The National Guard of Ukraine is a military force under the command of the Ukrainian Ministry of Internal Affairs, and it is tasked with protecting public order, securing strategically important facilities, and countering illegal paramilitary groups. During martial law periods, the units of the National Guard are subordinate to the AFU.</p> +<p><strong>Daniel F. Runde</strong> is a senior vice president, director of the Project on Prosperity and Development, and holds the William A. Schreyer Chair in Global Analysis at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C.</p> -<p><strong>Organizational AI Initiatives</strong></p> +<p><strong>Phillip Arceneaux</strong> is an assistant professor of strategic communication at Miami University.</p>Daniel F. Runde and Phillip ArceneauxThe United States needs to rethink public diplomacy in an era dominated by great-power competition. U.S. public diplomacy must work harder than ever to showcase the superior attractiveness and value of the United States and its policies over competing alternatives.Countering China And Russia2024-11-14T12:00:00+08:002024-11-14T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/countering-china-and-russia<p><em>This brief lays an ana­lytic foundation for considering gender analyses, and Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) programs, as strategic enablers for accomplishing key Department of Defense (DoD) priorities.</em> <excerpt></excerpt> <em>In order to do so, it first explores the gendered dimensions of authoritarianism and deterrence and then discerns a number of specific ways that WPS programs can be leveraged to give the DoD strategic advantages in critical theaters. CSIS stress-tested these concepts through a tabletop exercise designed to illuminate the conditions under which planners might assess that a gender-informed strategic approach would generate meaningful advantage for the United States. The brief concludes with recommendations for how the DoD might generate enterprise-wide momentum toward meaningfully leveraging WPS tools and incorporating gender perspectives in key processes.</em></p> -<ul> - <li>In 2024, the National Guard of Ukraine established a specialized unit known as Typhoon, which is focused on the deployment of unmanned aerial systems for military operations. This unit, composed of seasoned Special Forces veterans, has been created with the objective of enhancing the operational capabilities of combat brigades by integrating advanced unmanned systems into their strategic and tactical frameworks. The veterans within the unit bring a wealth of combat experience, which is crucial for the effective deployment of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) in complex battlefield environments. By integrating unmanned systems into combat operations, the Typhoon unit aims to increase both the flexibility and responsiveness of brigade-level engagements, enhancing operational efficiency and reducing risks to personnel.</li> -</ul> +<h3 id="introduction">Introduction</h3> -<h4 id="ministry-of-digital-transformation">Ministry of Digital Transformation</h4> +<p>Deterrence — essentially, utilizing instruments of power to convince an adversary to refrain from taking a particular course of action — is a core aspect of the United States’ strategy to halt the advance of authoritarian regimes across multiple domains. In order to better organize the DoD’s deterrent posture, the 2022 National Defense Strategy (NDS) puts forward an intriguing construct: tailored, integrated deterrence. Integrated deterrence is, at its core, a way of reminding the DoD about the fundamentals of deterrence: namely, that it is a psychological calculation rather than a particular widget or program. In order for an adversary to be deterred, it must believe that a course of action that it is considering is not worth pursuing. The key components of strategies that dissuade adversaries from undesirable activities are capabilities, such as the actual military and other elements of national power, and credibility, namely demonstrations of the political will to act in the event a red line is crossed.</p> -<p>The Ministry of Digital Transformation of Ukraine (MDT), established in 2019, is responsible for shaping and implementing state policy in digitalization, the digital economy, and digital innovation. It focuses on e-government, digital democracy, the development of digital skills and rights, open data, national electronic resources, and broadband infrastructure.</p> +<p>The central challenge before the DoD — and the U.S. government more broadly — is to better tailor its deterrent strategies through more creative employment of military ways and means. This requires a better understanding of the psychologies of power and vulnerabilities within adversary regimes. In other words, building deterrence strategies that actually affect the psychological calculations of most U.S. adversary authoritarian regimes requires taking a much more serious look at their power structures and concepts of power, both of which are heavily gendered.</p> -<p><strong>Organizational AI Initiatives</strong></p> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">The central challenge before the DoD — and the U.S. government more broadly — is to better tailor its deterrent strategies through more creative employment of military ways and means.</code></em></strong></p> -<ul> - <li><strong>The Expert Committee on AI Development.</strong> The Expert Committee on AI Development, established under the MDT in December 2019, plays an important role in enhancing the country’s competitiveness in the field of AI. Composed predominantly of business and science representatives, the committee’s main task is to drive AI policy recommendations, facilitate research and development, and nurture talent across various domains.</li> -</ul> +<h3 id="gender-as-a-conceptual-lens">Gender as a Conceptual Lens</h3> -<p><strong>AI Technology Initiatives</strong></p> +<p>“Gender” does not mean “women”; rather, gender is a way to express and promulgate core notions of identity and power at individual and structural levels. “Gender” as a conceptual lens is not limited to women and women’s representation. Although women often play important roles in challenging authoritarian power structures — as recent events in Iran demonstrate — they do so in opposition to the reactionary gender roles prescribed for all citizens by authoritarian regimes. While women are often drivers for thinking about gendered aspects of security questions — if not catalysts for social change — analytically focusing on one gender misses the bigger societal and structural pictures of which gender is a key part.</p> + +<blockquote> + <h4 id="methodology"><code class="highlighter-rouge">Methodology</code></h4> +</blockquote> + +<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">To understand how WPS and gender-related approaches might help illuminate more effective approaches to building tailored, integrated deterrence strategies, CSIS initiated a multipronged project that incorporated a mixed methods analytic approach in its research design. Over the course of one year, CSIS</code></em></p> <ul> <li> - <p><strong>Army of Drones.</strong> Launched in July 2022 by the MDT, the Army of Drones initiative represents a significant effort to integrate unmanned aerial vehicles into Ukraine’s defense capabilities. Initially conceived as a fundraising campaign, the initiative quickly evolved into a systematic and comprehensive program aimed at both procuring drones and training operators for their effective deployment on the battlefield. The program’s scope has grown to encompass not only the direct supply of drones to frontline units but also the promotion of domestic UAV production, significantly bolstering Ukraine’s defense industrial base. One of the core objectives of the Army of Drones initiative is to equip Ukrainian armed forces with modern, locally produced UAVs that can be used for reconnaissance, surveillance, and tactical strikes.</p> - - <p>Moreover, the initiative places significant emphasis on the training and skill enhancement of drone operators, ensuring that personnel are proficient in utilizing the advanced technologies embedded in contemporary UAV systems. By the end of 2023, 20,000 operators had successfully completed the training. This comprehensive approach — combining procurement, production, and operator training — has had a transformative impact on the use of drones in frontline operations, making the Army of Drones a pivotal component of Ukraine’s broader defense strategy.</p> + <p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">convened six working groups with leading gender, regional, and strategy experts;</code></em></p> </li> <li> - <p><strong>Brave1.</strong> As an effort to support projects and companies in their early stages, a platform dubbed “Brave1” was established in July 2023. It is designed to facilitate collaboration among all major stakeholders in the government’s defense sector, the tech industry, and investors and volunteers. Manufacturers who meet the 12 priority verticals of technological development identified by the general staff of the AFU for the Brave1 cluster and have passed a defense expert review can apply to get military expertise; testing opportunities; and organizational, informational, and financial support for their projects. Brave1 also funds early-stage miltech start-ups, giving grants up to UAH 8,000,000 (approximately USD 194,000). As of September 2024, the program has awarded 299 grants totaling USD 6.5 million.</p> - - <p>In October 2024, the MDT stated that the list of priority verticals of technological development will be revised, with a larger focus on electronic warfare and AI-enabled capabilities.</p> - - <p>Events organized by Brave1 provide valuable insights into the urgent technological needs and priorities of the AFU, as the topics and competition areas reflect requests gathered by the Brave1 team from various military institutions and agencies. For example, the deputy commander-in-chief of the AFU has identified key areas for technological advancement, including alternative navigation systems, jamming-resistant communications, drone swarm technologies, “friend or foe” identification, and improved target identification and engagement capabilities. Events such as the Precision Hackathon exemplify the immediate demand for AI-driven solutions in defense technology — including advanced targeting systems, real-time data integration, and innovative smart munitions capable of adjusting their trajectories to engage dynamic targets. The emphasis on autonomous and semi-autonomous systems with precision targeting capabilities and network-centric tools for combat operations reflects a broader shift toward AI-enabled autonomy in military applications. Furthermore, events like the AI for Ukraine Recovery Hackathon, which focused on topics such as cybersecurity, damage assessment, and disinformation prevention, underscore the pivotal role of AI in strengthening Ukraine’s defense capabilities and supporting its recovery efforts.</p> + <p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">conducted dozens of research interviews;</code></em></p> + </li> + <li> + <p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">traveled to both U.S. Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM) and U.S. European Command (EUCOM) theaters to engage with experts and planners at operational or theater levels; and</code></em></p> + </li> + <li> + <p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">designed, ran, and analyzed a tabletop exercise to “stress test” and validate insights derived from working group discussions, interviews, and study trips.</code></em></p> </li> </ul> -<p><strong>Initiatives in AI Regulation</strong></p> +<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Research interviews were conducted utilizing a grounded theory approach; that is, theory was designed based on the information shared by interlocutors. In this case, participants were asked to share their views of the major problems they grappled with on a daily basis without reference to gender or WPS efforts. Theories on the utility of gender analytic approaches and WPS programs were constructed afterward.</code></em></p> -<ul> - <li> - <p><strong>Approach to AI regulation.</strong> The MDT is responsible for overseeing Ukraine’s digital development, digital economy, and innovation, with AI being an integral component of this policy. Consequently, the ministry also holds responsibility for AI regulation. However, it has explicitly emphasized a commitment to avoiding overregulation by adopting a soft, business-friendly approach. The MDT plans to implement a bottom-up strategy, initially preparing businesses for future regulations before moving toward formal implementation. In the early stages, the state will provide businesses with tools such as general and sector-specific recommendations, voluntary codes of conduct, a legal assistance platform, and a regulatory sandbox for product testing, all aimed at facilitating compliance with forthcoming legislation.</p> +<h3 id="what-do-authoritarians-want">What Do Authoritarians Want?</h3> - <p>The current regulatory framework includes the Concept of Development of Artificial Intelligence in Ukraine, adopted in 2020, followed by the AI Regulation Roadmap introduced in 2023. While neither document constitutes formal regulation, they provide guiding principles for AI development within the country.</p> +<p>What do authoritarians want? The short answer: power. They use gender scripts and repertoires to consolidate and maintain power; however, in so doing, they offer the United States opportunities to fracture, exploit, or contradict those scripts in ways that serve deterrent strategies. Authoritarian scripts often involve the repression of women and marginalized gender groups and the simultaneous promotion of what it means to be a desirable and powerful man, which may reflect both how authoritarian regimes acquire power and what they believe power is.</p> - <p>The MDT also plays a significant role in fostering defense innovation, making its approach to AI regulation in the defense sector particularly clear in its white paper “Artificial Intelligence Regulation in Ukraine: Vision of the Ministry of Digital Transformation of Ukraine.” The ministry has stated that it does not intend to propose any regulation of AI systems within the defense sector, emphasizing a noninterventionist stance in this domain.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Simplifying regulation for local high-tech defense industry.</strong> To boost local production, the MDT has made some considerable steps in terms of regulatory simplification for private drone companies. By implementing regulatory changes, the allowed profit margin for Ukrainian drone manufacturers was increased from 1 percent to 25 percent. This change makes the drone production business more financially viable and attractive for local companies. Previously, the low profitability cap of 1 percent limited potential earnings, discouraging investment and innovation. By raising the limit to 25 percent, the government aims to stimulate growth in the domestic high-tech defense industry, encouraging companies to scale up production and invest in advanced technologies.</p> +<h3 id="russia-gender-and-women">Russia, Gender, and Women</h3> - <p>Furthermore, regulations governing contract negotiations, goods acceptance for military use, operational clearance, and delivery to the front were streamlined. Measures were also implemented to accelerate the operational approval process for UAV manufacturers, facilitating faster integration into state procurement contracts and supply chains for frontline operations. The government eliminated the requirement for export service control documents, simplifying the import of drones and their components, and removed the need for Security Service approvals, significantly expediting the overall approval process. Additionally, drone manufacturers can opt into the special “Diia.City” tax regime for IT companies, which allows up to 50 percent of employees eligible for military service to be exempted from active duty.</p> - </li> -</ul> +<p>Women’s equality is written into Russia’s constitution, and women in Russia occupy a relatively more equal social position than their counterparts in other authoritarian contexts. Yet, as of 2024, it is clear that Vladimir Putin’s brand of authoritarianism relies on strict differentiation between men and women. Russian women occupy a significant place in the labor market, and, in general, they are more educated than Russian men, but the legal and social differentiation of men and women has increased in Russia since the February 2022 invasion of Ukraine. Feminist activists and gender equality advocates have been vocal opponents of the invasion.</p> -<h4 id="innovations-development-fund">Innovations Development Fund</h4> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">The legal and social differentiation of men and women has increased in Russia since the February 2022 invasion of Ukraine.</code></em></strong></p> -<p>The Innovations Development Fund (previously called the Ukrainian Startup Fund) is the first and only state institution dedicated to helping innovative projects and tech start-ups secure early-stage funding and launch their ventures. Established in 2018 by the Ministry of Finance of Ukraine, it has been managed by the MDT since 2023.</p> +<p>In the Soviet era, Russian laws supported gender equality, but then, as now, women’s social role was heavily centered on their childbearing and childrearing capacity. Although many women held jobs outside the home, they were banned from professions that might threaten their reproductive health, and pronatalist policies featured heavily in Soviet economic plans. Indeed, especially today, Russian women are encouraged to bear children to counter the nation’s declining birth rate — a statistic associated with decreased competitiveness in the global economy. Cloaked in the language of “traditional values,” Moscow’s sustained campaign against lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and queer (LGBTQ+) rights can also be understood in light of its pronatalist stance.</p> -<p><strong>AI Technology Initiatives</strong></p> +<p>This emphasis on “traditional values” has not always been a part of Vladimir Putin’s political arsenal. He began emphasizing cultural traditionalism (and restrictive gender roles for men and women) toward the end of his second term as president (2007–2008) and ramped up the rhetoric significantly after returning to the presidency in 2012. Along with his performance of virile masculine virtues in public spaces and photo opportunities, Putin began drawing starker lines of contrast between Russian “civilization” and the West. The close connections and affinity between Putin’s regime and the Russian army — an organization notorious for the brutality not only of its battlefield tactics, but also of its barracks culture — further underlined the importance of aggressive, “macho” behavior in legitimizing Putin’s abrogation of political opposition. Since the invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the violence of the war and domestic violence have been mutually reinforcing.</p> -<ul> - <li> - <p><strong>Program for defense start-ups.</strong> The “Fast Track to Victory” program is an example of Ukraine’s capacity to rapidly adapt and use existing infrastructure to foster innovation in defense technologies. This program streamlines the interaction between the MoD and UAV manufacturers, facilitating a more efficient approval process for drone technologies. By leveraging the fund’s web portal, UAV developers with finished products can apply directly for official ministry approval. This approval is essential as it authorizes the MoD to procure the products and allows the AFU to deploy them.</p> +<p>These restrictive visions of gender cut across Russia’s many social, ethnic, and cultural divides. In places where support for Putin might be limited because of his regime’s actions in the past — Chechnya, for example — promoting this version of violent, dominating masculinity is a way to consolidate support in certain quarters (and divide potential opposition by casting the regime’s role in “natural” and “nonpolitical” terms). Public memory of the chaos of the 1990s makes calls for order (even if restrictive) appealing across Russia.</p> - <p>According to government documents describing the program, the application process is designed to be efficient, with all submissions reviewed by MoD representatives in a timely manner. The program specifically targets UAVs that meet the tactical and technical characteristics required by the military, ensuring that the products are immediately relevant to the operational needs of the AFU. Once approved, the products can be integrated into military service, streamlining the deployment of innovative drone technologies on the battlefield.</p> - </li> -</ul> +<h3 id="china-gender-and-women">China, Gender, and Women</h3> -<h4 id="ministry-of-strategic-industries-and-ukrainian-defense-industry">Ministry of Strategic Industries and Ukrainian Defense Industry</h4> +<p>Women in twentieth and twenty-first century China have found their social and legal position highly dependent on the internal politics of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP): despite robust official rhetoric about communism’s equality principles, men remain socially and legally advantaged over women. As of 2024, under the leadership of Xi Jinping, China is undergoing a period of rising discrimination against women and inequality between men and women. Indeed, the CCP has been intensifying its crackdown on feminist activists and is increasingly reliant on the subjugation of women to maintain its hold on power. This is evident in the proliferation of unchecked gender-based violence, emphasis on “harmony” in response to dissent, and the performance of stereotypical masculinity by Xi and other high-ranking officials.</p> -<p>The Ministry of Strategic Industries is responsible for overseeing Ukraine’s military-industrial complex, which includes a state-owned enterprise named Ukrainian Defense Industry (formerly known as UkrOboronProm). This entity manages over 100 defense-related enterprises, many of which are remnants of Soviet-era companies. While efforts are underway to modernize some of these enterprises to meet the demands of the current war, the ministry and its associated industries remain predominantly focused on traditional defense platforms — such as artillery production and missile programs — rather than on emerging technologies like software-driven systems and AI, which are increasingly defining modern warfare.</p> +<p>Rising economic uncertainty in China in the early 2020s has been accompanied by new policies pushing women into traditional roles of wife and mother in the home and making it far more difficult for women to obtain a divorce. Concern over a “masculinity crisis” has led to crackdowns on certain kinds of popular music, clothing, and other forms of expression deemed too “feminine” for Chinese men. At the same time, official rhetoric in support of Xi Jinping has focused on his paternal and masculine qualities, painting him as an ideal type of husband and father. Mirroring the CCP’s characterization of the Chinese state as a familial unit, this rhetoric makes space both for increasing the centralization of power in the CCP and for collectively enduring potential economic downturns. Sexist elements of Confucianism tend to replace the more egalitarian language of Marxism in these displays.</p> -<p><strong>AI Technology Initiatives</strong></p> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">As of 2024, under the leadership of Xi Jinping, China is undergoing a period of rising discrimination against women and inequality between men and women.</code></em></strong></p> + +<p>At the same time, China’s economic uncertainty will be directly impacted by women’s choices. Decades of the infamous one-child policy have produced severely declining birthrates in China, threatening a demographic contraction that will likely lead to greater instability. Efforts to both encourage and shame women into marriage and childbearing have had little discernible effect thus far, and, among younger generations, women — and to a lesser extent even men — express solidarity with feminism and gender equality. Most significantly, Chinese women were at the forefront of protests in China against the CCP’s draconian Covid-19 policies. The CCP’s campaign to shut down feminist dissent networks was only partially successful, as their previous anti-dissent campaigns focused on the threat of male dissenters. Women’s criticism of the regime poses a more complicated threat to the CCP’s dominance of the political discourse in China, in part because of the efforts the CCP has made to exclude them from the political realm and because of the growing popularity of feminist ideas among ordinary young women.</p> + +<p>In other words, as Xi strengthens his grip on power in Beijing, the CCP is fomenting concerns that boys are being “feminized,” and it has chosen not to place women in CCP leadership positions, a move that appears to contradict decades of Chinese policy promoting gender equality. Indeed, Beijing’s vision of a strong China now includes returning women to traditional gender roles — such as pushing them into marriage and childbirth — and cracking down on feminist activism. Much more directly, the Xinjiang crackdown has an extremely strong gendered element — specifically the elimination of Uyghur masculinity and the mass sterilization of women, combined with the imposition of Han men on Uyghur households.</p> + +<h3 id="a-dictators-gender-playbook">A Dictator’s Gender Playbook</h3> + +<p>Both Beijing and Moscow are weaponizing aspects of gender to advance their own strategic aims — and in somewhat similar ways. Indeed, there almost appears to be a gender-oriented “Dictator’s Playbook” with the following elements:</p> <ul> <li> - <p><strong>AI implementation together with the MDT.</strong> In 2021, Ukrainian Defense Industry signed a memorandum of intent with the MDT to coordinate efforts in advancing the digital economy and fostering innovation, with a specific focus on AI technology. Formerly, UkrOboronProm had also expressed plans to establish a dedicated unit for AI development. However, Ukrainian Defense Industry sources told CSIS that these initiatives have not yet been realized or advanced, highlighting a gap between stated intentions and actual implementation in the area of digital and AI-driven defense innovation. This suggests that while there is recognition of the importance of emerging technologies, the practical shift toward their integration in Ukraine’s defense industry remains limited.</p> + <p>Women support national strength by serving as wives and mothers within the politically stabilizing institution of marriage</p> </li> <li> - <p><strong>Cooperation with Helsing.</strong> In 2024, the Ministry for Strategic Industries signed a memorandum with Helsing GmbH, a German company specializing in software development and AI integration in defense technologies. This cooperation aims to enhance Ukrainian defense technologies by integrating AI into drones, particularly Ukrainian-made UAVs. This is probably the only public mention of ministry- or state-owned enterprises introducing AI technology in their production.</p> + <p>Western ideas about sexuality are a threat to national strength</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Power means domination over other countries</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Young people are weaker than the generation the leaders came from, especially young men, and a demographic crisis looms without change</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Women in power are deceitful and threatening</p> </li> </ul> -<p><strong>Initiatives in AI Regulation</strong></p> +<p>These gender-driven positions are spilling over into the politics and strategic priorities of third-party states. As elites in Georgia, for example, are expanding cooperation with both Moscow and Beijing, they are simultaneously targeting women political leaders and rolling back progress on gender equity. Conversely, upward of 60,000 Ukrainian women have been on the front lines of the country’s war against Moscow, enhancing the resilience and resistance capabilities of Ukraine overall in the face of an overwhelming adversary. Interviews on the ground in Ukraine in August 2023 suggested that investments in civil society — and in particular women’s groups — since 2014 helped create a sufficiently prodemocratic Ukrainian identity that, in turn, contributed to a ferocious national will to fight. In Iran, which engages in gender apartheid, a powerful protest movement has been challenging the authority and legitimacy of the Ayatollah’s radical Islamic regime — a protest movement that was sparked and carried forward by women and girls.</p> -<ul> - <li><strong>Upcoming strategic AI project for key economic sectors.</strong> Somewhat unexpectedly, given the ministry’s responsibilities and the current situation in the country, the Ukrainian government has approved a concept for a state program using artificial intelligence in strategic sectors of the economy and has designated the Ministry of Strategic Industries as responsible for the development of a detailed AI program for these priority sectors. The program aims to enhance Ukraine’s economic potential and strengthen its global market position by 2026 in such sectors as machinery, chemicals, defense, nuclear industry, agriculture, healthcare, and scientific activities.</li> -</ul> +<p>The question is: If U.S. adversaries are using similar gender-conservative playbooks, what might these gendered activities mean for U.S. strategy broadly, and for tailored, integrated deterrence specifically? In other words, gender appears to represent a critical societal fault line for contemporary authoritarian regimes — and a key, if perhaps underappreciated, mechanism for mobilizing prodemocratic forces and national will to fight. This leads to an interesting proposition: might gender-related tools, and primarily those associated with the WPS toolkit, provide the United States and the DoD with key vectors for tailoring its integrated deterrence strategies.</p> -<h4 id="money-matters">Money Matters</h4> +<h3 id="strategic-concepts-using-wps-and-gender-analyses-as-strategic-enablers-for-building-competitive-advantage">Strategic Concepts: Using WPS and Gender Analyses as Strategic Enablers for Building Competitive Advantage</h3> -<p>The development of the defense industry and the sustainability of military operations are heavily dependent on the government’s purchasing capacity, regardless of the scale and quality of research, development, and production. In FY 2024, the Ukrainian government has allocated UAH 58.8 billion (USD 1.4 billion) for the acquisition of UAVs and an additional UAH 1.5 billion (USD 36 million) to support the Brave1 platform.</p> +<p>As one interlocutor over the course of the study noted: given the manifold strategic advantages that WPS programs and capabilities can present for the United States, it may be time for the DoD enterprise writ large to consider gender as a significant dimension of competition rather than as a set of abstract concepts. While a number of components, for example INDOPACOM, have already taken and are promulgating this conceptual approach, the concept of gender as a domain needs to be understood throughout all of the DoD’s echelons.</p> -<p>However, Ukrainian defense companies face significant challenges, including export bans imposed since the onset of the full-scale war due to the need to satisfy the demand for weapon systems for the AFU first. As a result, many defense factories remain underutilized due to insufficient funding for weapons procurement in the state budget and the consequent low purchasing capacity from the government. Although the defense industry’s capacity is estimated at around USD 20 billion, the maximum government procurement budget for 2024 is only USD 6 billion. In response, discussions have recently begun regarding the reopening of defense exports. A parliamentary working group is currently evaluating risks and developing a mechanism to enable Ukraine’s reentry into the global arms market.</p> +<p>If gender is a dimension of competition, WPS tools then logically become a DoD strategic enabler — that is, a mechanism for more effective accomplishment of DoD activities and priorities. Accordingly, by considering the interrelated problems of strategic competition and tailored, integrated deterrence within a gender perspective, this brief underscores a number of ways that the DoD can leverage WPS as a strategic enabler to build advantages:</p> -<p>Drone production represents a significant area of expansion. Ukrainian Defense Industry sources told CSIS that the current production output for FPV drones alone exceeds 2 million units in 2024, although only 1 million have been contracted by the government to date. A survey conducted among defense companies revealed that 38 percent of them have more than half of their production capacity idle, while 85 percent are considering relocation abroad. The primary factors that could prevent such relocation include the reopening of exports, an increase in government procurement orders, and the establishment of long-term contracts.</p> +<ul> + <li> + <p><strong>WPS as a flanking maneuver.</strong> China and Russia have both ceded this space by ignoring WPS initiatives — that is, by not participating in decisionmaking processes to elevate women’s engagement in peace, political, and security discussions. As a result, this gives the United States, and the DoD specifically, opportunities to outflank Chinese and Russian activities in the Eurasian and Indo-Pacific theaters, if not globally.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>WPS as a mechanism to expand the competitive space.</strong> WPS represents unique opportunities to interact and engage with partner and allied nations in a theater that is entirely absent China’s participation. For instance, WPS opens pathways for enhanced dialogue between the United States and say, Japan, via Track 1.5 dialogues that have positive externalities that span beyond the WPS mission. To that end, WPS represents a key vector for shaping allied and partner perceptions that is presently underutilized.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>WPS as a mechanism for crisis assurance and communication on other non-WPS national security matters.</strong> Among democratic states, WPS creates positive spaces that are often viewed as not politically controversial. Accordingly, the United States ought to consider how WPS spaces might create vectors for communicating broader policy messages to key allies and partners in theater.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>WPS and gender as a strategic offset vis-à-vis Russia’s numerical superiority in a warfighting context.</strong> A recent CSIS report found that “European states are likely to face significant challenges conducting large-scale combat missions, particularly in such areas as heavy maneuver forces, naval combatants, and support capabilities such as logistics and fire support.” Much like during the Cold War, Russia has a vast supply of manpower that it is willing to expend on the front lines in Ukraine (and elsewhere). During the Cold War, that numerical advantage was offset by U.S. and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) nuclear weapons. As it is unlikely that the United States will want to utilize nuclear weapons in a contemporary contingency unless absolutely necessary, U.S. allies and partners in the EUCOM area of responsibility (AOR) must be able to call upon their entire populations to resist and deter Russian aggression.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>WPS and gender as a tool for societal resilience vis-à-vis an expansionist Russia.</strong> As one strategy expert noted, “deterrence is ” In other words, the ability of a society to withstand attacks by aggressors is a key aspect of deterrence strategies, and it informs issues like continuity of governance and operations planning. As discovered during a research trip in August 2023, women’s groups in Ukraine were — and are — critical in building national-level societal cohesion and resistance to authoritarian aggression. Designing gender-informed strategic offsets and societal resilience strategies requires incorporating gender perspectives centrally into national security and societal resilience planning and preparedness operations, rather than as an afterthought.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Gender treatment as a key strategic competition indicator or warning.</strong> Democratic backsliding in order to cater to authoritarian regimes such as China and Russia is almost always accompanied by gender-based harassment and the undermining of women’s rights. Given that almost all contemporary authoritarian regimes double down on these gender-based playbooks, it is worth exploring how the utilization of gender by U.S. allies, partners, and adversaries can inform indicators and warnings about regime trajectories.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Women fighters as strategic assets.</strong> Much as women in Ukraine have been critical on the front lines in the war against Russia, Kurdish women’s units were fierce fighters against the Islamic State. Further, the reputational damage to misogynistic Islamic State fighters being forced to fight — and lose — to women made such women’s units strategic rather than tactical assets. This suggests the need to more meaningfully consider the utility of women and women’s units within combat formations to create military advantage.</p> + </li> +</ul> -<p>Besides that, the Ministry of Strategic Industries is actively working to address current challenges in the industry, with a key focus on securing external funding for the purchase of Ukrainian defense products, including UAVs. ZBROYARI: Manufacturing Freedom is a global fundraising campaign aimed at raising USD 10 billion from partner countries to produce Ukrainian weapons in 2024. Of EUR 60 million in Dutch contributions, EUR 20 million is for FPV drones, EUR 22.5 million for Dutch drones, and EUR 17.5 million for Ukrainian-made naval drones.</p> +<p>It is worth underscoring that these concepts are primarily focused on women and the application of the WPS toolkit. However, given that many contemporary authoritarian regimes use a militaristic, misogynistic version of masculinity to consolidate and promulgate power, considerable further work should be done to understand how different masculinities and different genders might intersect with efforts to implement NDS objectives and tailor deterrent strategies.</p> -<h3 id="conclusion">Conclusion</h3> +<h3 id="testing-the-utility-of-wps-informed-approaches-in-dod-scenarios-through-tabletop-exercises">Testing the Utility of WPS-Informed Approaches in DoD Scenarios through Tabletop Exercises</h3> -<p>Military AI in Ukraine underwent a rapid transition from being a secondary concern during almost eight years of war in Donbas to becoming a cornerstone of the country’s survival after the full-scale Russian invasion of 2022. This dramatic transition is reflected in the growth of private companies developing military AI capabilities, which have increased from two dozen or so in the beginning of 2022 to over a thousand in 2024. The Ukrainian government embraced the role of innovation enabler by streamlining the bureaucratic processes for technology adoption, adapting its organizational structures to meet rapidly advancing technological capabilities, and providing funding to the commercial defense sector.</p> +<p>What might applying these concepts in practice look like? How might a WPS or gender-forward approach modify approaches to operations, activities, and investments (OAIs) in key theaters? And do practitioners agree with the premise that such WPS-informed approaches might generate strategic advantage for the United States? To discern answers to these questions, CSIS designed a series of tabletop exercises (TTXs) that allowed players to develop new OAIs associated with global competition against China and Russia. The following insights were gained through that activity.</p> -<p>As a result of these efforts, most of the industry representatives and brigade commanders interviewed by CSIS confirmed that numerous AI solutions are currently being tested on the frontline. They expect a transition to semi-autonomous unmanned capabilities in a year or two, wherein the human role will only be in confirmation of a strike. However, Ukraine may not have the luxury of time and must fast-track the realization of this vision.</p> +<p>First, according to player assessments, gender-linked OAIs produced greater advantages in long-term competition. As one participant noted, “if you have one country or society that is willing to mobilize 100 percent of its people and one that is only willing to mobilize 49 percent of its people, one’s got a big advantage over the other.” In the words of another player, “the quantity that our adversaries have when it comes to an actual contingency . . . given their numerical superiority, just the mass they can throw at these problems . . . ensuring that all of society and our allies and partners [are] able to mobilize, to resist and to deter, [to] defend all these things is going to be essential.”</p> -<p>To achieve this, Ukraine must overcome several challenges that are hindering its military AI development: insufficient funding, the limited capacity of small companies and their fragmented efforts in developing AI capabilities, competition within the government for resources, and a lack of coordination among key defense and military institutions to create a unified approach to military AI. Additionally, there is a shortage of computing power and experienced AI professionals in the country to work on classified technology, which are critical for making military AI a game-changer in the fight against Russia.</p> +<p>Second, there was no meaningful difference between the treatments with respect to escalation risk. In other words, players believed that gender-informed competition mechanisms and OAIs constituted a net positive. Gender-informed competition, especially activities that linked civil society groups and showed that U.S. partners had a great capacity to mobilize diverse constituencies, supported integrated deterrence and campaigning.</p> -<p>While Russia is investing enormous resources into transitioning to an economy on a war footing with a focus on technological advancement within its military, Ukraine requires support from its international partners to fully leverage the advantages of AI as a competitive edge across all battlefields and frontlines in its fight against a conventionally superior adversary.</p> +<p>During the TTX discussion, participants ultimately concluded that U.S. adversaries, particularly China, were likely to view any action as escalatory by virtue of the fact that Beijing is likely to be hostile to any form of increased U.S. activity. Escalation might therefore be better conceived as a given rather than something to be avoided. Further, one participant noted that the United States might do well to design activities that would force adversaries to respond. A number of participants maintained that a command post exercise that tested whole-of-society mobilization in the INDOPACOM AOR might be one useful way to do this while simultaneously building capacity.</p> -<p>The conclusion of this paper presents recommendations on how the U.S. government can collaborate with Ukraine to harness the advantages of military AI development and ensure that both nations remain at the forefront of AI and defense innovation.</p> +<p>The discussion of escalation led to contemplating whether supporting women’s groups might lead to authoritarian backlash. Women’s groups, and women individually, are often targets for repression and retaliation; in any number of instances when women rise in status under authoritarian regimes, conspiracy theories circulate that their power is a result of U.S. backing. In order to minimize such risk, efforts to engage women and women’s groups should be treated carefully and with the overall intention to do no harm.</p> -<h4 id="1-providing-strategic-support">1. Providing strategic support</h4> +<p>Third, there was no major difference with respect to how players assessed long-term competitive effects and regional prioritization for OAIs between the two treatments. Both treatments saw groups prioritize preparing partners as the optimal long-term strategy in support of integrated deterrence and campaigning (48 percent in gender-linked OAI treatments, 45 percent in non-gender-linked treatments). Regionally, across the treatments players focused on activities in INDOPACOM (75 percent in gender-linked OAI treatments, 67 percent in non-gender-linked treatments). Last, there was a similar distribution with respect to complementary interagency activity. Across both treatments, players emphasized combining military competition with diplomacy and measures designed to inform and influence targeted populations.</p> -<p>The United States, with its technological superiority and numerous AI-related defense programs, is uniquely positioned to assist Ukraine in addressing its challenge of lacking a cohesive, government-led strategy for defense technology development. Given the United States’ forward-looking and long-term AI development plans, it can collaborate with Ukraine to craft a comprehensive, mid-term strategy for integrating AI into its military for beyond immediate tactical solutions.</p> +<p>The only meaningful difference between treatments was with respect to intelligence. In treatments with gender-linked OAIs, players appear to have assessed that working with civil society groups gave them increased situational awareness, as they less frequently selected intelligence activities. This is likely due to a sense that WPS-linked activities helped them better understand the operational environment.</p> -<p>This support would offer Ukraine much-needed guidance to align its decentralized bottom-up approach with a coherent national vision, allowing volunteer groups, start-ups, the defense sector, and government institutions to operate in synergy with national priorities. This approach could help Ukraine align government stakeholders’ efforts in accordance with a single strategy in order to avoid wasting resources, and it could increase competition by promoting efficient resource allocation and funding for AI-enabled capabilities development.</p> +<p>In other words, what became apparent from the TTX is that planners assess that WPS has a key role to play in great power competition. This is because WPS can help mobilize diverse constituencies in partner states (capacity) and increase the ability of the United States to counter malign actions in the gray zone (capability) — especially since the United States is often blind to adversary operations designed to hijack civil society. WPS represents a way to more effectively counter authoritarian strategies to compete with, if not undermine, U.S. positioning and leadership.</p> -<p>The benefits for the United States are twofold. First, by collaborating with Ukraine, the United States can access real-time insights into the application of AI technologies in active warfare, gaining valuable data that can enhance its own AI capabilities. Second, support for Ukraine’s efforts is a contribution to strengthening the global security architecture and countering common adversaries.</p> +<h3 id="applying-the-insights-the-european-and-pacific-deterrence-initiatives">Applying the Insights: The European and Pacific Deterrence Initiatives</h3> -<h4 id="2-unlocking-battlefield-data-for-innovation">2. Unlocking battlefield data for innovation</h4> +<p>The European Deterrence Initiative (EDI) and the Pacific Deterrence Initiative (PDI) are flagship programs designed to better organize DoD programs and capabilities intended to communicate U.S. and partner red lines to Moscow and Beijing, respectively. Because they are also theater-specific programs with dedicated congressional authorization, oversight, and funding levels, they provide key insights into how the DoD implements its deterrence strategies over multiple fiscal years. Critically, gender and WPS are rarely, if ever, referenced in discussions about EDI and PDI — which creates opportunities for usefully reconsidering how such approaches might inform OAIs for the EUCOM and INDOPACOM theaters. Combining insights from all the research conducted over the course of the study, some ideas for recalibrating PDI and EDI investments with a gender-informed approach emerge:</p> -<p>To harness the full potential of AI in defense, Ukraine must build a collaborative framework that brings government authorities and private sector innovators together on data-sharing strategies. This framework should regulate access to and use of real-world combat data by establishing clear legal procedures and protocols for data collection, storage, and sharing — all while safeguarding national security. Such an environment would streamline access for approved developers and foster sustainable business models, incentivizing private investment in military AI research.</p> +<ul> + <li> + <p><strong>Exercising.</strong> Within INDOPACOM, the DoD could increase the number of exercises with partner units that have a higher number of women entering their ranks — such as the Japanese Self-Defense Forces and Philippine forces during the annual Balikatan exercise — to show how to build partner capacity while signaling the expanding role of women in defense, something China will struggle to match.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Increased presence.</strong> The DoD can use permanent and rotational forces to demonstrate to allies and partners in theater the power and utility of women in combat, as well as in combat support and combat service support Likewise, both Moscow and Beijing are utilizing regressive gender roles as mechanisms for consolidating state power. The United States might consider using its increased forward presence to demonstrate other more democratic and meritocratic gender roles that can undermine adversary morale and cohesion.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Network-building.</strong> The DoD can work with women’s groups in countries like Papua New Guinea to build information-gathering mechanisms for monitoring Chinese economic coercion and infrastructure projects that are damaging to the region. Doing so might simultaneously empower women within local societies and create new mechanisms for countering China’s economic expansionism and elite capture strategies.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Posture and military construction.</strong> As the United States adjusts its posture in the EUCOM and INDOPACOM theaters, choices of where and how bases and facilities are constructed will have effects on local Conducting a gender analysis, and understanding local gender dynamics, can help inform strategies for using military construction monies in a manner that will engender the greatest level of local support for U.S. presence.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Enhanced prepositioning.</strong> A key aspect of EDI and PDI is the forward stationing of key equipment and materiel that could be utilized in a crisis or contingency. Host nation support — that is, the ability of a given country to support U.S. forces during peacetime and war — includes a nation’s ability to ensure that U.S. forces are able to land, access such equipment, and move in a crisis. Considering women and women’s networks more centrally in prepositioning and host nation support activities may build complementarity between EDI or PDI and building whole-of-society resistance and resilience strategies.</p> + </li> +</ul> -<p>The United States could play a pivotal role in enabling this effort, helping Ukraine develop a technical and regulative framework by drawing from its own experience of data exchange within global projects such as the Combined Joint All-Domain Command and Control, where military data is shared among allied countries and the U.S. military. This initiative could set a global precedent for responsible data sharing in defense technology development. Ukraine could monetize its combat data by offering access to countries, organizations such as NATO, and even private defense companies in order to improve their AI tech and the interoperability of all parties involved.</p> +<h3 id="conclusions-and-recommendations">Conclusions and Recommendations</h3> -<h4 id="3-closing-a-feedback-loop">3. Closing a feedback loop</h4> +<p>War is a centrally human endeavor; gender is a core aspect of individual identity and of the human experience. Omitting gender, and gender perspectives, from defense planning and operations creates enormous blind spots toward adversary weaknesses and opportunities with allies and partners. If the DoD is to build its deterrent strategies in a tailored manner, considering gender more centrally in its war and defense planning is essential. A number of recommendations flow from the above analysis:</p> -<p>Currently, the United States sends significant military aid to Ukraine, including drones, and many U.S. start-ups and drone manufacturers are contributing by donating their products through volunteers, NGOs, and Ukrainian government initiatives. However, there is no established system for collecting feedback on the performance and effectiveness of these drones on the battlefield, leaving the feedback loop incomplete. Establishing a more structured and standardized feedback collection process would be highly beneficial for both parties.</p> +<ul> + <li> + <p><strong>Additional resources.</strong> Many of the applications of WPS for tailored, integrated deterrence purposes as outlined above are conceptual rather than resource That said, the current funding levels for WPS activities — particularly those involving allies and partners — is unlikely to be sufficient for these purposes. It is outside the scope of this brief to develop a concrete budgetary recommendation; partnering with Congress, the DoD should establish a WPS/Strategic Competition pilot fund for actioning these activities that includes an assessment of the resources required to increase their scale.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Leverage gender advisers.</strong> The DoD has established a cadre of gender advisers (GENADs) across its command structures. In addition to the WPS-related training, education, and partner support work these GENADs perform, components should bring them into key planning and other processes to ensure that their perspective and ideas can be integrated into operational and strategic approaches.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>A broader gender lens.</strong> While women and women’s issues are often the starting point for considerations of gender, at the end of the day “gender” also includes how men view Do men living under repressive authoritarian regimes in Russia, China, or Iran agree with the policies of gender apartheid — and the promotion of hollow, militaristic versions of “manliness”? How do women in these societies relate to men? What are men’s own aspirations and how do they realize them?</p> + </li> +</ul> -<p>For U.S. companies, faster and more organized feedback would enable them to shorten their iteration cycles, update their platforms and software more rapidly, and scale up production of cutting-edge technology. This is particularly important when it comes to AI, where software updates can be implemented much quicker than hardware — without the need to alter supply chains, source new components, or update manufacturing processes. On the Ukrainian side, this would mean receiving more advanced and better-suited capabilities for their battlefield conditions, as U.S. companies have the resources and capital to accelerate drone and AI development, as well as to scale up production. By closing this feedback loop, both the United States and Ukraine can enhance their technological capabilities and improve the effectiveness of military assistance on the ground.</p> +<p>Taking the WPS agenda forward toward countering and deterring authoritarian regimes requires situating women within the broader societal context of which men are a part. Considering gender and WPS in this way is not to “weaponize” or “militarize” these toolkits. Rather, it is a way to acknowledge that women have been, and will be, decisive when it comes to countering authoritarian expansionism. Women are active, and at times critical, agents in both war and peace; smart strategy will better incorporate women — and all genders — more fully into the tailored deterrence strategies needed to prevent war from occurring. Many authoritarian adversaries are weaponizing gender against U.S. interests; it is past time for the U.S. government, and the DoD within it, to develop sufficiently gender-informed responses. Viewed in this light, applying a gender perspective to the problem of strategic competition is a necessary step toward accomplishing the UN-supported vision for Women, Peace, and Security.</p> -<h4 id="4-considering-ukraines-ai-in-us-foreign-aid">4. Considering Ukraine’s AI in U.S. foreign aid</h4> +<hr /> -<p>Current U.S. financial assistance to Ukraine, primarily through USAID, has been vital for the digital development of the country. However, by integrating an AI component into this aid, the United States can achieve two key objectives: enhancing Ukraine’s AI capabilities and securing a role in what could become a global AI development hub.</p> +<p><strong>Kathleen J. McInnis</strong> is a senior fellow and director of the Smart Women, Smart Power Initiative at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C.</p> -<p>Ukraine’s regulatory environment for AI is highly permissive, and its political leadership is open to embracing technological risks for significant advancements. This combination creates a unique “laboratory” for AI development that the United States cannot afford to overlook. This approach requires more than just funding; it necessitates providing computing infrastructure to key AI innovation centers in Ukraine, such as the MoD, research institutions, and labs. By equipping these entities with the necessary computational power, AI research and development can accelerate at an unprecedented pace.</p> +<p><strong>Benjamin Jensen</strong> is a senior fellow in the Futures Lab in the Defense and Security Department at CSIS.</p> -<h4 id="5-offering-ai-focused-training-experience-exchange-and-entrepreneurial-development-programs">5. Offering AI-focused training, experience exchange, and entrepreneurial development programs</h4> +<p><strong>Audrey Aldisert</strong> is a research associate in the Defense and Security Department at CSIS.</p> -<p>The U.S. government should establish training and experience exchange programs for Ukraine’s defense entrepreneurs. These programs would focus on developing expertise in AI applications, the specifics of defense industry, and international market and investor relations to build successful defense-oriented enterprises. Given the rapid growth of Ukraine’s defense tech ecosystem, these initiatives would enable entrepreneurs to gain a deeper understanding of how to attract investments, scale innovations, and align with national security objectives. For the United States, such programs offer the opportunity to strengthen collaboration with Ukraine’s emerging defense sector. This partnership would give the United States valuable connections with Ukrainian innovators across the defense industry, benefiting both nations in shaping the future of AI in national security and defense.</p> +<p><strong>Alexis Day</strong> is an associate director of the Smart Women, Smart Power Initiative at CSIS.</p>Kathleen McInnis, et al.This brief lays an ana­lytic foundation for considering gender analyses, and Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) programs, as strategic enablers for accomplishing key Department of Defense (DoD) priorities.Build A Future Force For UA2024-11-14T12:00:00+08:002024-11-14T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/build-a-future-force-for-ukraine<p><em>Ending the war and establishing lasting peace in Ukraine is impossible without implementing practical measures to deter potential future waves of Russian aggression. Crafting an effective deterrence strategy, however, presents its own unique challenges.</em></p> -<p>The development and integration of military AI into future weapon systems is inevitable. While the United States leads in technological innovation, it faces limitations in testing these advancements under real combat conditions. Collaboration with Ukraine presents a unique and mutually beneficial opportunity to bridge this gap. By working together with Ukraine, the United States can gain firsthand insights into the practical applications of military AI and autonomous systems without putting “boots on the ground.” Otherwise, real combat environments remain theoretical or simulated for U.S. systems manufacturers. Moreover, this partnership can provide valuable contributions to the international debate on safe and responsible AI deployment, offering concrete evidence from battlefield usage to help construct a global framework for military AI governance. As AI continues to reshape defense landscapes, U.S.-Ukraine collaboration stands to advance technological innovation while setting standards for responsible and ethical AI integration into military systems worldwide.</p> +<excerpt /> -<hr /> +<p>The recent US elections have created a new political reality that will impact global stability in the coming years, including the Russian war in Ukraine. While Donald Trump’s stated goal of ending the war quickly resonates with Ukrainians, achieving a lasting peace requires selecting the right strategies and resources to ensure sustainable results. Apart from dealing with immediate challenges on the battlefield, given Vladimir Putin’s obsession with Ukraine, any solution that lacks this lasting impact risks disastrous consequences, as Russia could recover, rearm, and reignite the conflict.</p> -<p><strong>Kateryna Bondar</strong> is a fellow with the Wadhwani Center for AI and Advanced Technologies at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.</p>Kateryna BondarThis report examines the Ukrainian government initiatives and key institutions driving the development of military AI capabilities. It also explores the preconditions that have shaped their adoption in the Ukraine war.Too Good To Lose2024-11-12T12:00:00+08:002024-11-12T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/too-good-to-lose<p><em>When it comes to the future of American semiconductor manufacturing and the success of the CHIPS Act, Intel is not too big to fail, but it is too good to lose.</em></p> +<p>Defining long-term security arrangements for Ukraine requires a comprehensive set of military and strategic measures for maintaining stability and defending Ukraine’s territory, society, economy and rule of law against future foreign aggression. Such measures are widely seen as critical to Ukraine’s post-war recovery and to preventing future escalations.</p> -<excerpt /> +<p>This topic is especially challenging to address while Ukraine’s immediate security remains under severe threat. After enduring nearly three years of active war, Ukraine still needs ongoing support for operations, including additional weapons, funding and domestic mobilisation. Meanwhile, the support from international partners shows signs of wavering, and in the US, assistance to Ukraine has become a point of contentious political debate. With uncertainties around how and when Ukraine will emerge from this war, within what borders and in what economic state, it is understandably difficult to plan for its long-term security.</p> -<p>In 2022, Congress enacted the bipartisan CHIPS and Science Act (CHIPS Act), a pivotal initiative which seeks to ensure U.S. leadership in semiconductor technology — the backbone of everything from cars to household appliances to defense systems. The CHIPS Act represents a national effort to reverse recent trends, driven by major industrial policies of other countries, that have led to the loss of U.S. leadership in the technology needed to manufacture the most advanced semiconductors. The United States has also seen an erosion of onshore chipmaking, which now accounts for only about 10 percent of global capacity. The urgency of the situation was brought into sharp relief by highly disruptive chip shortages during the Covid-19 pandemic. Meanwhile, China — the United States’ most formidable strategic competitor — is making rapid strides in semiconductor technology, particularly in defense-related areas.</p> +<p>However, long-term strategising remains essential, as lacking a clear security vision creates a void that complicates any future planning. Without this long-term perspective, doubts may arise about Ukraine’s prospects, potentially impacting international support even if its territory is liberated. So long as Russia remains under Putin’s regime, the existential threat to Ukraine will persist, driven by Putin’s personal fixation on the country which may push him beyond rational limits. While some observers suggest that Ukraine should pursue territorial concessions as a path to compromise, this approach misunderstands the existential nature of the conflict. For Putin, territory is not the ultimate goal – ending Ukraine’s sovereignty and independence is. Concessions would not end hostilities but instead encourage further aggression, as they would fail to address the core motives driving Putin’s actions.</p> -<p>In its plan for implementing the CHIPS Act, the U.S. government has earmarked substantial federal assistance for the world’s three most advanced chipmakers, among others, to construct leading-edge manufacturing facilities and grow U.S. regional semiconductor ecosystems. Two of these firms, the Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Corporation (TSMC) and Samsung, are slated to receive substantial funding to support major investments in such ecosystems, which bring manifold opportunities for local growth and employment. Both firms are headquartered outside the United States and have, in the past, kept the lion’s share of their research and development (R&amp;D) and technology development in their respective home countries.</p> +<p>NATO membership offers a natural path forward. Once active hostilities conclude, Ukraine’s admission to NATO will be crucial to stabilising the region. Ukraine must, however, be treated not merely as a security liability but as an asset. Structuring and strengthening Ukraine’s defences will make this discussion more feasible, as a robust new NATO member will strengthen the alliance.</p> -<p>The third leading-edge firm is the storied Intel Corporation, the largest and most advanced U.S.-headquartered manufacturer. Intel has an unmatched history of breakthrough semiconductor innovations — including the first programmable microprocessor and the x86 architecture — which have together made an “indelible impact on the world of computing . . . [that] continues to shape the digital landscape of the modern world.”</p> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Under current conditions, with limitations on weapon types and their use, Ukraine is fighting a war that NATO would never choose to fight</code></em></strong></p> -<p>While Intel is at present trailing TSMC and Samsung in chip process technology, it is the only U.S.-headquartered firm within striking distance of regaining U.S. capabilities at advanced process nodes. The company has made massive commitments to invest heavily — more than $100 billion over the next five years — in new chipmaking capability and capacity on domestic soil, aiming to develop and manufacture chips at the most advanced process nodes of 2 nanometers (nm) and below. Recognizing the importance of this, the U.S. government has announced plans to award Intel the largest share of federal support under the CHIPS Act. Successful implementation, and the resultant national security benefits, will depend on Intel.</p> +<p>One crucial assumption is that Putin will refrain from attacking Ukraine if Russia lacks either the resources or the likelihood of success. Although the first condition may be difficult to ensure indefinitely, the second can be achieved. Should Ukraine possess or have access to sufficient defensive capabilities to thwart any future invasion, this would significantly reduce the likelihood of renewed aggression. This approach, often called “deterrence by denial”, would serve as an effective defence.</p> -<p>Unfortunately, at this juncture, Intel is experiencing financial and operational turbulence, in no small part due to its ambitious investments pursuant to the CHIPS Act’s objectives. Now, with a recently announced strategic recovery plan, the company appears to be seeking additional investment. Given Intel’s importance to the CHIPS Act’s economic and strategic goals, it is vital that the company remains viable and capable of carrying out its commitments — with even more public support, if necessary, than it has already been given.</p> +<p>Other forms of deterrence may be less optimal. For instance, “deterrence by punishment” appears limited in impact. Russia is already incurring staggering losses in the current conflict, allocating over 40% of its state budget to the war and losing close to 700,000 troops as casualties, thousands of weapon systems, and most of its Black Sea fleet. For most regimes, such losses would be unsustainable, but for Putin, they do not appear to have impacted his commitment to the war. To force a resolution, the Kremlin would need to lose strategically – not merely in manpower or equipment, but through a fundamental military failure.</p> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Given Intel’s importance to the CHIPS Act’s economic and strategic goals, it is vital that the company remains viable and capable of carrying out its commitments — with even more public support, if necessary, than it has already been given.</code></em></strong></p> +<p>Recognising the importance of deterrence, the Ukrainian government has incorporated this strategy into its national military framework, known as the “Victory Plan”. While largely classified, key elements were outlined by President Volodymyr Zelensky in the Verkhovna Rada on 16 October 2024, with “Deterrence” as a central theme addressing long-term security. Zelensky proposed a “strategic non-nuclear deterrence package” within Ukraine, aimed at providing a robust defence against potential Russian aggression. According to Zelensky, “the deterrence package ensures that Russia faces a choice: engage in diplomacy or see its war machine dismantled. Peace through strength”.</p> -<h3 id="intels-turnaround-strategy">Intel’s Turnaround Strategy</h3> +<p>The focus should be on building a force capable of repelling future aggression and ensuring that, if Russia attacks, it will face defeat on the battlefield. Such a capability must not only be developed but also maintained at a high state of readiness. It should be evident to Russia that any attack would lead to decisive failure, thereby preventing it from trying.</p> -<p>Intel’s operational and financial difficulties received extensive media coverage in 2024, some of which exaggerated the severity of its challenges and perhaps adversely affected the company’s stock price. Shortly after Intel’s CEO, Pat Gelsinger, took charge in 2021, he announced an ambitious “IDM 2.0” strategy, which included plans for the company to become a major global player in the contract-manufacturing (“foundry”) market. The initial plan called for the establishment of a new business unit, Intel Foundry Services (later rebranded as Intel Foundry), as well as tens of billions of dollars for the construction of new manufacturing facilities to service surging demand. Intel Foundry, when announced, represented a significant expansion beyond Intel’s integrated device manufacturer (IDM) business model, in which the company’s manufacturing capacity was reserved for Intel-designed chips. Intel Foundry, however, allows for the manufacturing of chips designed by other firms, which puts Intel in direct competition with other large foundry providers such as TSMC.</p> +<p>The effectiveness of such deterrence must also be evident to the people of Ukraine, allied governments, and the international business community. Confidence in Ukraine’s military potential should be strong enough to assure investors that they can safely conduct business in the country. The only way to sustain such a force in the long term is to match it with a strong economy. In this respect, the example of South Korea is particularly relevant. Despite the absence of a peace agreement with the North, the deterrent capability of military power has provided the security necessary for sustained social and economic growth.</p> -<p>In 2024, Gelsinger unveiled the next phase of the firm’s strategy, announcing that it will further separate its design business from Intel Foundry, which will be an independent subsidiary with substantial autonomy, complete with its own board of directors, bylaws, and operating structure. This action is intended to provide foundry services for chip design firms with stronger protection of intellectual property.</p> +<p>Building such a force will be a significant challenge. First, it must deter a Russian force that, despite multiple failures in Ukraine, remains large in numbers. Second, any ceasefire would give Russia the opportunity to rebuild its military capabilities, potentially enhancing its strike power. Russia, after all, spares no resources in producing weapons, with at least 40% of its state budget currently allocated to the military.</p> -<p>Some progress on this front has already been made. In a multibillion-dollar arrangement, Intel Foundry will leverage new process technology to manufacture chips for Amazon’s cloud computing wing beginning in 2025, including customized server devices. Forbes observed that “This can only be looked at as a positive — a strategic, long-term deal that Intel didn’t have before. If you can get the number-one cloud provider to do not just one but two highly custom chips with you, one in the foundry and one in a custom server chip, that portends a very good future.”</p> +<p>The costs of building a credible deterrent force are easy to underestimate. Simply sending older Western equipment to Ukraine will not achieve the necessary deterrent effect. Only competitive capabilities will suffice. For example, the current provision of older F-16s to Ukraine is inadequate to deny Russian air superiority over the frontlines due to outdated radars and missiles. As a result, Russia continues to dominate the airspace in close proximity to the battlefield.</p> -<p>Additionally, backed by a $3 billion federal grant, Intel will develop chip manufacturing infrastructure for the U.S. defense industry. The federal award represents “another win for Intel Foundry, and even more so for the highly secure supply chain that Gelsinger has been intent on building for Intel over the past few years.”</p> +<p>The value of tactical air superiority cannot be overstated. Today, Ukraine faces significant challenges in dealing with Russia’s gliding bombs, missiles, and long-range drones. A competitive air force is as essential for Ukraine as it is for any NATO country preparing for war. With NATO membership, these costs could be shared – especially for high-cost capabilities like aviation. Without it membership, Ukraine will have to build and sustain them on its own.</p> -<p>Despite this progress, profitability will take time, as the high capital costs and lengthy timelines required to bring new fabs online limits near-term revenues. In 2023, for example, the company’s foundry unit brought in $18.9 billion but reported an operating loss of around $7 billion, as well as other operational problems. Intel does not expect the new fabs to generate “meaningful” revenue until 2027.</p> +<p>Planning for a future force cannot be based on today’s operational environment. Under current conditions, with limitations on weapon types and their use, Ukraine is fighting a war that NATO would never choose to fight. NATO’s strategy would rely on overwhelming airpower and deep strikes to weaken enemy forces before they reached the frontline. Instead, Ukraine is meeting Russian forces at their strongest, at the front. Lacking adequate air and long-range firepower, Ukraine is compelled to compensate with the lives of its people – at least until a more effective operational model is established. Addressing the shortcomings of the current model is crucial not only for immediate success but also for ensuring future security. Delaying this effort results in the tragic loss of lives on a daily basis, underscoring the urgent need for decisive action. This painful reality demands immediate attention and cannot be overlooked.</p> -<h4 id="issues-with-process-technology-and-products">Issues with Process Technology and Products</h4> +<p>The costs of building this force could be significantly reduced by leveraging Ukraine’s industrial capabilities, implementing leasing arrangements, and creating international funds with contributions from multiple donors for specific programmes. Ukraine has the potential to close a massive capability gap if its industrial base is engaged in full. Unlike Western defence industries, Ukraine’s industry is operating on a war footing, with many factories running 24/7 and bureaucratic red tape kept to a minimum.</p> -<p>According to a September 2024 Reuters report, Intel faces difficulties in its upcoming 18A process technology, which is slated for high-volume production in 2025. Reuters indicated that Broadcom, a major fabless firm, had concluded after tests that Intel’s process was not yet ready for such production. Yet the report, even if accurate, may not be indicative of a significant problem, as Intel’s timeline anticipates the 18A technology to be ready for high-volume production in mid-2025, rather than mid- or even late 2024. Moreover, Intel reports that it already has a dozen customers using its 18A tool kit.</p> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Strategically planning Ukraine’s future military force, anticipating evolving trends, and conducting rapid assessments is not just essential for Ukraine’s survival; it is critical for the security of Western allies as well</code></em></strong></p> -<p>Intel’s 13th- and 14th-generation Intel Core processors are also reportedly encountering problems, which have potentially arisen from manufacturing defects. The company also reported in September 2024 that it would no longer use its Intel 20A process technology in Arrow Lake processors and instead outsource Arrow Lake production to Taiwan’s TSMC, stating that “because of our early success on Intel 18A . . . [we are able] to shift engineering resources from Intel 20A earlier than expected as we near completion of our five-nodes-in-four-years plan.” While some may see this move as a setback, it may reflect a strategic shift to concentrate on the 18A process. Other observers have pointed out that “Intel 20A was always a bridge to the more refined Intel 18A.”</p> +<p>However, cost is not the only challenge. In accepting that deterrent capabilities must be competitive, the ongoing need for adaptation and innovation becomes crucial. The speed of technological advancement today is unprecedented. Innovation teams on all sides of the war are working tirelessly, introducing new measures and countermeasures. Technologies such as computer vision, electronic warfare, and long-range communications are poised to profoundly influence future military concepts and capabilities, and we have yet to see how these will ultimately shape weapon systems. The successful implementation of these technologies on the battlefield could render many older weapons and doctrines obsolete, a trend already visible in the current war. Ukraine’s future force must remain competitive in this rapidly evolving operational environment, which makes long-term predictions difficult.</p> -<h4 id="shifts-in-demand">Shifts in Demand</h4> +<p>For example, small and medium-sized unmanned platforms are challenging the concept of air superiority, operating beyond the reach of traditional aviation and air defence. At the same time, electronic warfare has significantly impacted the effectiveness of these platforms. Current developments in computer vision aim to make these systems immune to electronic warfare, while counter-air drones are being designed to present a new challenge to drone warfare itself. All of these systems are part of an evolving operational landscape, competing for battlefield dominance.</p> -<p>Traditionally, Intel’s main revenue sources have been chips for personal computers and for data centers, which in 2023 accounted for 80 percent of the company’s revenues. The market for these kinds of chips, however, is being affected by a shift in consumer demand toward graphics processing units (GPUs) and central processing units (CPUs) that support applications of artificial intelligence (AI) — a market in which Intel’s presence is relatively limited — plus increasing competition from rivals AMD and Nvidia. As a result of these shifts, the company’s revenues declined from $79 billion in 2021 to $54 billion in 2023. As of mid-August 2024, Intel’s shares were trading below the company’s book value for the first time since 1981.</p> +<p>Keeping up the pace of adaptation and technological development is now a critical requirement to remain relevant. Unfortunately, many Western developers and governments have not yet achieved the necessary speed. For example, procurement and export control systems, designed for peacetime conditions, are ill-suited to the fast-paced demands of modern warfare. These bureaucratic hurdles prevent too many innovative platforms from being deployed effectively in the field. Western militaries and governments should not view this as a minor delay in aiding Ukraine. Rather, lengthy supply chains and slow adaptation cycles risk rendering critical platforms obsolete before they can be competitive.</p> -<p>Gelsinger’s response has been decisive. In August 2024, in order to cut costs, he announced that Intel would reduce its workforce by 15,000 by November, suspend its shareholder dividend, and reduce or eliminate many employee perks. While the company’s stock price declined by roughly two-thirds between February 2021 and September 2024, recent turnaround strategy announcements have led to a modest rebound.</p> +<p>After assessing the ongoing war, former US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Mark Milley, co-authored an article warning that the US military is not keeping pace with the fast-changing nature of modern warfare, and this issue is likely even more pronounced in European militaries. Now is the time for faster research and development, more rapid prototyping, and quicker delivery to the battlefield. The multiyear cycles traditionally required for new weapons must be viewed as an unaffordable luxury of the past.</p> -<h4 id="national-security-implications">National Security Implications</h4> +<p>Strategically planning Ukraine’s future military force, anticipating evolving trends, and conducting rapid assessments is not just essential for Ukraine’s survival; it is critical for the security of Western allies as well. The urgent need to innovate and collaborate in defence capabilities cannot be overstated. Only by embracing change and acting decisively can the West ensure that this conflict does not become a harbinger of greater crises in the future.</p> -<p>While recent accounts of Intel’s difficulties have mostly been confined to the business pages, the company’s future has broad national and global significance far beyond its employees and shareholders. Intel is a critical player in the U.S. government’s efforts to reduce dependency on chips manufactured abroad — notably the significant concentration of production in Taiwan — and regain leadership in semiconductor manufacturing technology. Both capability and capacity are needed to provide an alternative source for the most advanced chips and a more resilient supply chain for foundational chips essential to the automotive, telecommunications, and medical sectors. If Intel’s restructuring efforts fail, larger U.S. efforts are unlikely to achieve their objectives, with significant ramifications for U.S. national security and economic future. Indeed, as Geoff Colvin recently argued in Fortune, “Intel is no longer a conventional company and can no longer be evaluated as one. . . . it’s now a corporate actor on the geopolitical stage.” Policymakers must recognize Intel’s national security importance within this decade’s dramatically changed geopolitical environment.</p> +<hr /> -<h3 id="intel-and-the-chips-act">Intel and the CHIPS Act</h3> +<p><strong>Andriy Zagorodnyuk</strong> is the Chairman of the Centre for Defence Strategies. He previously headed the Ukraine MOD’s Reform Projects Office, was appointed as an adviser to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, and served as his country’s Defence Minister between 2019 and 2020.</p>Andriy ZagorodnyukEnding the war and establishing lasting peace in Ukraine is impossible without implementing practical measures to deter potential future waves of Russian aggression. Crafting an effective deterrence strategy, however, presents its own unique challenges.Power And Planet2024-11-13T12:00:00+08:002024-11-13T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/power-and-planet<p><em>In July 2024, CSIS’s Energy Security and Climate Change Program, in collaboration with the Scholl Chair in International Business, hosted a one-day trade and climate simulation game titled Power and Planet. The focus was on how players representing key nations make decisions at the intersection of climate and trade policy to reduce emissions, boost economic opportunity, and ensure security.</em></p> -<p>The Covid-19 pandemic led to disruptions across the U.S. semiconductor supply chain — most notably in the automotive industry — as well as volatility in other industries and supply chains involving PCs and data centers. While the causes of the shortage are complex, it highlighted the fact that when foreign supply is limited, the United States no longer has the domestic chipmaking capacity to manufacture the most advanced semiconductors which many products demand. Recognizing the national security and economic implications of this vulnerability, Congress enacted the CHIPS Act in 2022, which seeks to support U.S. chipmakers’ efforts to recapture technological leadership and to encourage the expansion of semiconductor manufacturing capacity in the United States. The CHIPS Act deploys a combination of federal grants, loans, and tax incentives for investments in U.S. semiconductor manufacturing, as well as support for R&amp;D and related workforce initiatives.</p> +<excerpt /> -<p>Beginning in late 2023, the Department of Commerce proposed a series of federal funding awards for companies undertaking capital investments in chipmaking. Intel is the provisional recipient of the largest single federal award package, reflecting both its centrality in the U.S. semiconductor ecosystem and the scale of its investments in chipmaking. The Department of Commerce’s Preliminary Memorandum of Terms (PMT) with Intel, announced in March 2024, included grants of up to $8.5 billion to help finance the construction, expansion, and modernization of wafer fabrication, advanced packaging, and development facilities in Ohio, Arizona, New Mexico, and Oregon. Additionally, the PMT provides up to $11 billion in federal loans to support Intel’s investments. The company also indicated that it would take advantage of the Department of the Treasury’s Investment Tax Credit for fab construction, which is expected cover up to 25 percent of qualifying capital expenditures undertaken by the end of 2026. Furthermore, Intel will receive $3 billion in additional CHIPS Act grants for a Secure Enclave program, which would ensure a protected supply of leading-edge chips for the U.S. government.</p> +<p>The game explored the geopolitical and economic dynamics that arise when a bloc of developed countries establishes a climate club. Will such a club drive greater global cooperation on emissions as it expands, or will it trigger trade wars, creating a bleaker outlook for long-term climate outcomes? How do economic, environmental, geopolitical, or security considerations shape players’ priorities?</p> -<h4 id="a-central-role-in-growing-us-technological-capacity">A Central Role in Growing U.S. Technological Capacity</h4> +<p>This report documents the game and how participants navigated the one-day simulation. It outlines the game’s setup, turn-by-turn progression, and key takeaways for policymakers. Additionally, the authors examine the game’s limitations and propose areas for further research.</p> -<p>It would be difficult to overstate Intel’s role in the success or failure of the CHIPS Act. Intel has been described as “the only U.S.-based company with leading-edge semiconductor fabs” capable of developing and manufacturing cutting-edge chips that are necessary to support advanced applications of AI at the 2 nm node and below. While Intel’s 3-nm production and below may be a year or more behind that of global leaders TSMC and Samsung (indeed, Samsung is apparently struggling with technical challenges itself), no other U.S.-owned semiconductor maker is in a position to reignite U.S. semiconductor manufacturing process leadership.</p> +<h3 id="game-structure-and-rules">Game Structure and Rules</h3> -<p>Despite the near-term cash flow concerns, Intel remains committed to its over $100 billion investment in new U.S. chipmaking capability and capacity over the next five years. No other large chip manufacturer is investing anywhere close to the scale of Intel’s projects in the United States over the same time frame. These plans necessarily require very high levels of capital expenditure, with payoffs only coming in the medium-to-long term. In early 2024, to raise the necessary capital, Intel sold a 49 percent share in its Ireland-based fab to Apollo Global Management for a sum of $11 billion. In addition, Intel has concluded a deal with Brookfield Asset Management, a major investment firm, to funnel $30 billion into two new chipmaking facilities in Arizona. Notwithstanding Intel’s internal layoffs and other setbacks, Gelsinger affirmed in August 2024 that the company remains committed to domestic manufacturing, stating that “Intel is prioritizing our core investments that are laying the groundwork for our future, and . . . our existing U.S. projects in Arizona, New Mexico, Ohio and Oregon.”</p> +<p>Each player was assigned to one of three teams: G7+ (representing the Group of Seven countries along with Australia and South Korea), China, or emerging markets. Each player assumed the role of a government leader tasked with achieving their country’s ambitions for climate, economics, and security. Twenty-five experts from the climate and trade communities participated, representing a diverse mix of academic and civil society institutions, private companies, foreign embassies, and trade associations.</p> -<p>Intel’s ambitious manufacturing objectives rest on exceptional technological capabilities. Intel remains at the cutting edge of chip manufacturing innovation: its next process technology, Intel 18A, operates at the 1.8 nm node and is expected to compete directly with TSMC’s 2 nm “N2” process. Intel 18A combines multiple process innovations, from 3D hybrid bonding to nanosheet transistors to back-side power delivery. Intel plans to use 18A process technology in its own new server processor, Clearwater Forest.</p> +<p>During the game, each participant represented a country or, in the case of China, a political or administrative entity. The three teams were as follows:</p> -<h4 id="still-a-first-mover">Still a First Mover</h4> - -<p>Despite its recent setbacks, Intel continues to be a first-mover on leveraging technologies that would bring it back to leading-edge manufacturing process leadership. Recently, Intel finalized a deal with the Dutch lithography equipment maker ASML to receive ASML’s first 2024 run of new state-of-the-art High-Numerical Aperture Extreme Ultraviolet (High-NA EUV) lithography machines. High-NA EUV lithography further shortens the wavelength of the ultraviolet light used to etch nanoscale circuits, a crucial process for the next generation of lower-nanometer chipmaking. According to IBM, the ASML machines “can perform a new technique that could pave the way to developing and producing chips at nodes even smaller than 2 nm.” It is important to note these are not just plans. Intel received the world’s first High-NA EUV machine in December 2023, which was installed and calibrated in the spring of 2024 at the company’s technology development fab in Oregon. Moreover, Intel is slated to receive a second machine in late 2024 and, according to reports, has committed to buying ASML’s entire 2024 run of High-NA EUV tools, giving it a head start on deploying this new technology.</p> - -<p>While Intel’s principal competitors, TSMC and Samsung, are also making investments in U.S. chipmaking under the CHIPS Act, their new fabs will only represent a small portion of each company’s capacity. TSMC and Samsung remain the national champions for Taiwan and South Korea, respectively, retaining essential know-how and R&amp;D facilities in their home countries, whose governments have well-honed incentive strategies to nurture and sustain leading-edge chipmaking at home. They are responsive, first and foremost, to their own national ecosystems and the needs of their governments. Intel’s decision to pause new chipmaking investments in Europe underscores the limits foreign-owned chipmakers may set on their U.S. manufacturing operations and investments as markets, company strategies, and geopolitical concerns evolve.</p> - -<p>If Intel were to bow out of CHIPS Act initiatives — whether by its own decision, a change in U.S. government policy, or the acquisition of the company’s foundry business by a third party not bound to the CHIPS Act — the act’s successful and timely implementation would be seriously jeopardized. The stakes are high, including for national defense; as writer Mackenzie Hawkins recently pointed out in Bloomberg, “Intel’s woes may . . . jeopardize the government’s ability to reach its policy goals, which include establishing a secure supply of cutting-edge chips for the Pentagon and making a fifth of the world’s advanced processors by 2030.” Finding a U.S.-headquartered replacement to maintain domestic ownership of Intel’s higher-end fabs or to preserve its technological know-how would be nearly impossible.</p> - -<p>As veteran chip industry analyst Dan Hutcheson succinctly put it, “The purpose of the Chips Act was partly to make sure we kept Intel as an American company supported by the American government.” The Biden administration appears to recognize this: The Financial Times reported in September 2024 that Intel and the U.S. government were on track to finalize negotiations on the $8.5 billion grant contract by the end of the year, which “would amount to a vote of confidence in Intel by the U.S. government.”</p> - -<p>In parallel with Intel’s negotiations with the Commerce Department, reports have surfaced that Samsung, Apple, and the fabless design firm Qualcomm are considering taking a stake in Intel or acquiring the company outright. It is not clear that these or other similar reports have much substance. In September 2024, Intel reportedly rebuffed an overture from UK-based, SoftBank-owned Arm Holdings to acquire its product division.</p> - -<p>Moreover, an acquisition of Intel, or pieces of it, by another major chip firm would unquestionably face antitrust scrutiny in the United States and possibly elsewhere, as well as a likely challenge by the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) if the investor were foreign. At the very least, takeover of any part of Intel’s business could disrupt the delicate negotiations between the company and the government.</p> +<ul> + <li> + <p><strong>G7+ team.</strong> Each of the 11 participants represented each G7 country (except Italy), Australia, and South Korea. The U.S. delegation had three players, acting as the president, the special presidential envoy for climate, and Congress. And European Union was represented by one player.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Emerging markets team.</strong> The nine participants represented Brazil, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Turkey, and Vietnam.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>China team.</strong> The five participants represented the following political authorities and administrative entities: Chinese president Xi Jinping and the Politburo Standing Committee of the Chinese Communist Party; the National Development and Reform Commission and the National Energy Administration; the Ministry of Ecology and Environment; the Ministry of Commerce, Ministry of Finance, People’s Bank of China, State Administration of Taxation, Security Regulatory Commission, and Banking and Insurance Regulatory Commission; and provincial and local governments.</p> + </li> +</ul> -<p>Given the stakes in this global contest, it is unfortunate that the negotiations over Intel’s CHIPS Act funding continue to become more complex, with the CHIPS Program Office reportedly requiring commitments beyond those outlined in the act, and which some suggest are more akin to those required for private equity investments than for a congressionally mandated grant program. Overly stringent government requirements, though designed to ensure CHIPS Act funding meets the program’s goals, could paradoxically compromise Intel’s ability to utilize the grants. For example, Politico recently cited concerns from a number of CHIPS Act recipients that government negotiations are both slow and expansive with conditions on the CHIPS Act awards that have little to do with ensuring the success of the projects. While recognizing the obligation to meet statutory requirements, more than two years after passage of the CHIPS Act, the Commerce Department has yet to distribute major funding.</p> +<p>Participants received individual motivations outlining objectives to pursue and defensive interests to protect, both within their team’s deliberations and in the broader game context. They were asked to make decisions consistent with that guidance but to be creative in how they realized their goals.</p> -<h3 id="ensuring-intels-continued-us-manufacturing-presence">Ensuring Intel’s Continued U.S. Manufacturing Presence</h3> +<p>The game covered a five-year time frame from 2027 to 2032 and consisted of three rounds, each lasting between one and one-and-a-half hours. The first round began with instructions to the G7+ to establish a climate club in the first turn. Over the next two turns, exogenous geopolitical and climate conditions continued to worsen as global temperatures passed key global targets, climate-associated extreme events negatively affected different regions, and geopolitical tensions worsened.</p> -<p>As noted, having Intel continue as an innovative, internationally competitive U.S. semiconductor manufacturer is a matter not only of economic interest, but of national security. The release of near-term CHIPS Act funding is becoming more important, especially given the scale of Intel’s investments and its ongoing financial difficulties. In response to potential further delay — attributed to the slow disbursement of federal aid — in Intel’s $28 billion Ohio project, Governor Mike DeWine has requested that the Biden administration expedite the necessary funding to Intel. However, the new fabs funded by these grants will not generate significant revenues until 2027, exposing the company to cash-flow challenges in the interim. One recent industry analysis commented that “Intel’s continued struggle begs the question: will the U.S. government need to do more?”</p> +<p>Teams were assigned separate rooms to strategize, deliberate, and set policies. Teams could submit action forms to make official communications or announce policy decisions. These were publicly announced to all other teams and the game’s moderators (Control). In addition to central moderators, each room had a facilitator answering questions and announcing updates from Control. Control could amend the scenario at any time to introduce events that could shift game dynamics, such as the reestablishment of the World Trade Organization (WTO) Appellate Body.</p> -<p>Should the government concur with the assessment that Intel is not too big to fail but too good to lose, there are major recent precedents for federal policy measures to shore up companies whose collapse would bring unacceptable national costs. For example, the 2008 financial crisis posed an existential threat to large U.S. financial and manufacturing companies; confronting the prospect of imminent calamity, the Bush administration implemented the Troubled Assets Relief Program (TARP), providing $426 billion in federal support to stabilize financial and manufacturing institutions, including failing U.S. automakers, that were considered “too big to fail.” TARP was not designed to subsidize or nationalize struggling companies, but rather to give them an interim financial bridge, allowing them to remain solvent while working toward profitability and continuing to serve as pillars of the U.S. economy.</p> +<p>Except for the first hour and the last 30 minutes of the game, when teams deliberated over their opening and closing strategies, written bilateral communications and in-person bilateral and multilateral meetings were allowed between teams. Participants were free to take action independently of their team by submitting individual action forms. There was no limit to the number of forms participants could table per round, though all were encouraged to stay within the scope of trade, economic, and climate policy actions. They were also blocked from declaring war or resorting to kinetic military action.</p> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Should the government concur with the assessment that Intel is not too big to fail but too good to lose, there are major recent precedents for federal policy measures to shore up companies whose collapse would bring unacceptable national costs.</code></em></strong></p> +<p>Each team started the game with a score assigned by Control representing their collective standing in 2027 across four categories: economy, emissions, domestic political support, and allies (i.e., the level of cohesion within the group). Control updated the scores after each round based on how each team’s actions had affected these four categories, and facilitators privately distributed these to team members. Teams could choose which categories they wished to prioritize through their actions, consistent with their internal motivations, but they were instructed to consider the long-term effects beyond the game’s five-year time frame. For example, they had no obligation to implement dramatic emissions cuts within five years, as establishing credible long-term climate policies was sufficient to realize climate ambitions, though potentially at the expense of economic outcomes or domestic political support.</p> -<p>Importantly, TARP was executed at scale in several affected industries. In December 2008, the Bush administration announced a $17.4 billion rescue loan for U.S. automakers. President Bush later recalled that he “didn’t want history to look back and say, ‘Bush could have done something but chose not to do it.’” Incoming President Barack Obama defended Bush’s action as a “necessary step to avoid a collapse in our auto industry that would have devastating consequences for our economy and our workers.” Obama augmented the Bush administration’s financial support for U.S. auto firms with federal outlays eventually totaling about $80 billion. Washington subsequently recovered most of these funds, with the net cost to taxpayers amounting to about $10 billion. No major U.S. automaker disappeared during the crisis, and the Big Three auto manufacturers remain a key element in today’s domestic manufacturing economy.</p> +<p>Each round was followed by a 30-minute break enabling teams to regroup and participants to address personal business, as well as a 30-minute adjudication session in which all teams reconvened in the main meeting room to receive an update on game progress from Control. The day ended with a one-hour hotwash for organizers to reflect on the decisions participants made throughout the game and for participants to share feedback on the game’s overall design and conduct.</p> -<p>Similar measures were extended to ailing financial institutions under the Treasury Department’s 2008 Capital Purchase Program (CPP), which exchanged financial assistance for preferred stock in the companies, along with debt securities and warrants to purchase common and preferred stock. Under the CPP, the Treasury Department acquired $205 billion worth of shares to shore up troubled financial services firms over the short term, of which $200 billion was eventually redeemed by those same institutions. The purpose of the CPP was to enable financial firms to continue supplying essential levels of liquidity to the U.S. economy.</p> +<h3 id="game-progression-and-key-events">Game Progression and Key Events</h3> -<h4 id="avoiding-disaster">Avoiding Disaster</h4> +<h4 id="round-1-club-formation-and-reactions">Round 1: Club Formation and Reactions</h4> -<p>The objective of TARP was to avert a second Great Depression, which could have been triggered by the collapse of the U.S. financial and manufacturing sectors. It not only succeeded but did so at what proved to be a bearable cost to the government. A 2022 Congressional Budget Office study observed that “the U.S. financial system was in a precarious position when the TARP was created, and the transactions envisioned and ultimately undertaken entailed substantial financial risk for the federal government. Nevertheless, the TARP’s net realized costs have proved to be near the low end of the range of possible outcomes anticipated at the program’s outset.”</p> +<p>The first round, set in 2027, was devoted to establishing a G7+ climate club and immediate reactions from other participants. The G7+ team was tasked with reaching an agreement on the nature of their climate club within the first hour, while other teams considered their engagement strategies. The emerging markets team made preemptive announcements, expressing concern that wealthy nations would unilaterally impose border measures and undermine multilateral efforts to reduce emissions. They called on the G7+ to adopt collective strategies that accounted for their past emissions and developing countries’ need for financial support and technology for mitigation. China echoed these sentiments, offering support for the emerging markets’ position and inviting an open bilateral discussion.</p> -<p>Although the specifics of TARP and the CPP fortunately do not align perfectly with Intel’s current challenges, Intel’s current operational problems have important parallels with the crisis of 2008:</p> +<p>The G7+ announced the creation of a climate club with the following features:</p> <ul> <li> - <p>Intel is the central player in the government’s implementation of the CHIPS Act, which is critical for national security and economic well-being. The company could benefit a great deal from federal support to surmount a cash flow pinch in 2025–26, when its new fabs begin to generate revenue in 2027 and beyond. The goal of such a cash flow would be to provide financing to enable Intel to keep the construction and investments on track while signaling a commitment to the company’s success.</p> + <p><strong>Carbon-free economy goal.</strong> Members commit to achieving a carbon-free economy by 2050.</p> </li> <li> - <p>Semiconductor manufacturing is not a waning industrial sector. The demand for advanced chips is robust, due in no small part to the AI boom. The question is not whether the sector is viable, but who will lead its production and reap the rewards, including the revenue necessary to fund the next round of innovation.</p> + <p><strong>Carbon accounting.</strong> Members gradually implement value chain accounting across all economic sectors.</p> </li> <li> - <p>Without Intel’s continued participation, achieving the CHIPS Act’s main goals — reestablishing American technological leadership in high-end chip manufacturing and reducing reliance on foreign chipmakers — will be exceedingly difficult, if not impossible.</p> + <p><strong>Carbon border measures.</strong> Each member establishes its own carbon border measure, such as the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) for the European Union or carbon tariffs for the United States under the Foreign Pollution Fee Act.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Internal trade exemption.</strong> Members assign no climate-related border measures internally, pending the negotiation of an internal green marketplace.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Technology transfers.</strong> Members make technology transfers to low- and lower-middle-income countries wishing to join the club.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Shared oversight.</strong> All members participate in oversight and decisionmaking.</p> </li> </ul> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">The demand for advanced chips is robust, due in no small part to the AI boom. The question is not whether the sector is viable, but who will lead its production and reap the rewards, including the revenue necessary to fund the next round of innovation.</code></em></strong></p> - -<h4 id="how-could-it-be-done">How Could It Be Done?</h4> - -<p>Additional federal support for Intel should be envisaged on both national security grounds and to favor domestic R&amp;D investment. This support could come in various forms: an extension of the CHIPS Advanced Manufacturing Investment Credit; the extension of additional loans and loan guarantees; targeted tax measures; and other similar measures taken under TARP and CPP. If the Big Three automakers and major U.S. financial institutions were deemed “too big to fail” in 2008, Intel can be similarly considered “too important to fail” in today’s increasingly perilous geopolitical environment.</p> - -<p>While the CHIPS Act has been instrumental in laying the groundwork for increased U.S. manufacturing capacity, the existence of new facilities does not guarantee their effective utilization. The U.S. government should thus consider how it can build on the foundational work of the CHIPS Act by focusing on strengthening the domestic supply chain. For example, targeted tax measures that provide incentives for the consumption of U.S.-produced wafers could not only help ensure the best possible return on new manufacturing facilities, but also encourage the building of additional capacity once the CHIPS Act incentives run out. Policies to help onshore the semiconductor supply chain will help to ensure that U.S. development and production of advanced chips is prioritized, thus encouraging periodic technological upgrades and even enabling the co-location of technology developments that are critical to national security.</p> - -<p>While some will point out — correctly — that government support is inconsistent with traditional laissez-faire principles, historical precedent shows that national security concerns have overridden such principles during major crises such as World Wars I and II, the Cold War, and the 2008 financial crisis. Indeed, Washington has consistently taken steps to invest in and nurture key industries relevant to defense and health (including major investments in vaccine manufacturing during the Covid-19 pandemic).</p> - -<p>Similar fears regarding the semiconductor industry’s competitiveness prompted significant federal investment and trade measures in the 1980s, when the U.S. chip industry was at risk of losing technological leadership. Major government investment, matched by the private sector, helped form the successful Sematech research and manufacturing consortium, which enabled the U.S. chip industry to regain competitiveness. Now, the future of Intel — the linchpin of the CHIPS Act — cannot be left to the vagaries of the market, especially one shaped and conditioned by other countries’ industrial policies.</p> - -<h3 id="perspectives-from-abroad-policies-of-allies-and-competitors">Perspectives from Abroad: Policies of Allies and Competitors</h3> - -<p>The cyclical nature of the semiconductor industry means it must make substantial investments to maintain and improve production capacity during economic downturns for the eventual recovery in demand. Semiconductor companies require significant capital to maintain their production capacity. To address these industry characteristics, leading manufacturers abroad often receive both direct and indirect government support, frequently on a massive scale.</p> - -<p>This is not new. The world’s leading semiconductor foundries, TSMC and United Microelectronics Corporation (UMC), were both established with the support of the Taiwanese government when they spun off from the Industrial Technology Research Institute (ITRI). Since 1991, as the foundry concept gained traction, TSMC has experienced rapid growth as the world’s leading semiconductor foundry, acquiring unparalleled expertise and capabilities.</p> - -<p>Similarly, SK Hynix, one of the leading South Korean companies in advanced memory semiconductor manufacturing, is now a successful company despite sustaining major losses in the past following sharp declines in DRAM semiconductor prices that began in the mid-1990s. Pressured by the South Korean government, Hyundai Electronics Industries acquired LG Semicon, and their semiconductor division spun off as SK Hynix in 2001. After the spin-off, Hynix faced severe financial pressures from a heavy debt load and low DRAM prices. To restore the firm’s viability, a consortium of private and national financial institutions implemented a comprehensive support program, including debt forgiveness, equity conversion, credit limit expansion, debt maturity extension, and interest rate reductions. Hynix is now a profitable and competitive company.</p> +<p>China criticized the proposal as vague and likely to undermine global trading rules for protectionist purposes. However, the China team refrained from taking adversarial action, instead calling for more details from the G7+ about the climate club. Meanwhile, China, Brazil, and India announced they would begin discussions on creating a global carbon accounting system open to all countries. The round closed with the United States and Canada communicating Mexico’s decision to join the club.</p> -<p>This policy approach remains relevant today. The Japanese government recently allocated $1.3 billion to Kioxia Holdings, Japan’s leading memory semiconductor company, which experienced very significant losses in 2023 primarily due to a cyclical downturn in demand for memory chips. Continuing to address the firm’s financial challenge, the Japanese government has recently allocated $1.3 billion in support of the company. This funding could stabilize Kioxia with the broader goal of ensuring Japan maintains its technological leadership in NAND flash memory, supporting a robust supply network to meet future market demand.</p> +<h4 id="round-2-expansion-attempts-and-emerging-market-responses">Round 2: Expansion Attempts and Emerging Market Responses</h4> -<p>As these examples suggest, government policies have often played, and continue to play, major roles in shaping the industrial landscape in semiconductors. Today, many of the world’s leading countries are actively promoting domestic production. Like the United States, these nations are backing their domestic chipmakers with public support for investments in R&amp;D and manufacturing capacity. What is clear, however, is that these governments will not allow these key national enterprises to fail.</p> +<p>The second round, covering the period of 2028–2029, unfolded as a battle for influence over emerging markets between the G7+ and China, with China scoring some early wins. Talks between China, Brazil, and India on establishing a global carbon accounting system gained momentum as all remaining BRICS members and Saudi Arabia joined. In response, the G7+ offered to collaborate by sharing data and discussing potential common standards.</p> -<p>In fact, reflecting both the China challenge and new efforts of countries such as the United States, policies to support semiconductor manufacturing within national borders have increased in scale and frequency. This list of recent government investments in key domestic manufacturing companies illustrates the scale of financial support for firms in this strategic industry.</p> +<p>In addition, China released a three-pronged strategy designed to counter the G7+ club:</p> <ul> <li> - <p><strong>France:</strong> In June 2023, France announced that it would allocate $3.1 billion in public funding to its most advanced semiconductor manufacturer, STMicroelectronics, to build a semiconductor manufacturing plant in Crolles, in partnership with U.S.-based GlobalFoundries. STMicro, regarded as one of the most innovative firms in Europe, has benefitted from extensive state support since its formation under government auspices in 1968.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Japan:</strong> After taking a largely laissez-faire approach, the Japanese government concluded it could not be economically secure without production of advanced semiconductors, particularly those used by its auto industry. Since 2022, in a major national initiative, the Japanese government has allocated $6 billion to Rapidus, aiming to establish this government- and privately-owned company as the flagship of Japan’s “ambition to catch up in semiconductor manufacturing.” Additionally, the company is expected to receive additional private bank loans and subsidies in its ambitious bid to produce cutting-edge chips.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>South Korea:</strong> Samsung and SK Hynix are engaged in discussions with the Korea Development Bank (KDB) about utilizing a low-interest loan program, valued at $12.3 billion, which is aimed at bolstering the semiconductor industry. SK Hynix will again seek government support, reportedly applying for a loan amounting to $2.1 billion. More broadly, South Korea recently enacted the “K-Chips Act,” a major program with significant incentives to promote national high-tech industries, notably semiconductors. The architect of the “K-Chips Act,” a former Samsung executive, sees the stakes as fundamentally shaping national trajectories, emphasizing that “the winner of the global chip battle will control the economic security order, while the loser will end up becoming a technological colony.”</p> + <p>Reserve the right to “respond appropriately” to any discriminatory measures.</p> </li> <li> - <p><strong>China:</strong> China offers perhaps the leading case of government support for the industry. At the end of 2022, the Chinese government was reportedly planning to spend $143 billion over the next five years to support its semiconductor industry. In 2022, the Semiconductor Manufacturing International Corporation (SMIC) received $282.1 million. This continues the China Integrated Circuit Industry Investment Fund (the “Big Fund”) to support investments in China’s semiconductor value chain, including production capacity, equipment, materials, and advanced packaging. In May 2024, China launched its third semiconductor “Big Fund,” a $45.7 billion investment vehicle to support the country’s domestic semiconductor industry. This figure is roughly on par with the CHIPS Act but more narrowly focused in that these resources will likely primarily benefit Huawei’s chip design and SMIC’s chip manufacturing. These new measures augment China’s already-massive government support for the country’s chip sector, including direct subsidies, preferential loans from government banks, and equity infusions, as well as subsidies from regional and municipal governments involving land, electrical power, and infrastructure. The ability to domestically develop and produce advanced chips is a top priority for China’s leadership, and this comprehensive strategy reflects that commitment. The collective effort of these programs dwarfs the support offered by other countries.</p> + <p>Invest RMB 10 trillion over 10 years to speed up the decarbonization of China’s economy.</p> </li> <li> - <p><strong>Taiwan:</strong> Even in Taiwan, arguably the leading center of semiconductor manufacturing today, the government has recently stepped in to provide support. In January 2023, Taiwan enacted its own version of theCHIPS Act that “offers investment tax credits of 25% on R&amp;D and 5% on equipment.” This introduced the country’s largest-ever tax deduction for R&amp;D expenses and related capital investments in semiconductors, designed to benefit eligible semiconductor companies such as TSMC that meet specific criteria. These incentives complement the special benefits that Taiwan grants for research and manufacturing organizations located in science and industrial parks, which include, according to a Boston Consulting Group report, “relatively low-cost access to land, water, electricity, and infrastructure, as well as the possibility of expedited approvals and the elimination of import and export duties.” These multifaceted measures reflect the long-term commitment of the government to ensuring the continued success of its leading firms and the country’s central position in this global industry.</p> + <p>Launch the Inclusive Green Belt, focused on a fair accounting mechanism for carbon, technology sharing for climate challenges, and promoting free trade in environmental goods and services.</p> </li> </ul> -<h3 id="conclusion">Conclusion</h3> +<p>China later secured the backing of India, Russia, Saudi Arabia, and South Africa to pursue a joint dispute settlement case at the WTO against U.S. carbon border tariffs. This decision prompted Control to announce the reestablishment of the WTO Appellate Body based on a coin toss.</p> -<p>The United States and its allies confront an unparalleled strategic challenge from China that has the potential to escalate. In any such confrontation, leadership in and access to advanced semiconductor technology — and the AI systems these innovations enable — will play a central role and could even be decisive. Numerous recent analyses conclude that China is investing heavily in the sector and is rapidly gaining on the United States in strategic areas of microelectronic production, a dynamic that raises major national security concerns.</p> +<p>However, China’s momentum soon slowed. Crucially, no country chose to join the Inclusive Green Belt. While Russia responded positively to that proposal, China instead started bilateral negotiations on nuclear cooperation and a 30-year gas supply agreement aiming to reduce Chinese coal dependence.</p> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Successful and timely implementation of the CHIPS Act is a critical step to addressing that challenge and deterring conflict — and that cannot happen without Intel.</code></em></strong></p> +<p>In contrast, the G7+ successfully enticed Mexico and Turkey to join its climate club, though it had to concede to their demands for preferential conditions. To further strengthen the club, the United States announced a USD 1 trillion fund offering grants and submarket loads for climate investments — exclusively accessible to club members.</p> -<p>Successful and timely implementation of the CHIPS Act is a critical step to addressing that challenge and deterring conflict — and that cannot happen without Intel. Accordingly, the U.S. government needs to be proactive, make CHIPS Act resources available as soon as possible, and accept that while there will always be risks, speed and compromise are crucial to achieve the CHIPS Act’s central goals. More broadly, the Departments of Commerce and Defense need to begin using existing tools, contracting mechanisms, and authorities — such as OTA — to support Intel through its current transition and not wait until Intel’s financial position slows its progress and further erodes the country’s competitive position. Prompt and strategic action must be taken to bring the objectives of the CHIPS Act closer to reality. Implementing an array of supportive measures beyond the CHIPS Act would also be a powerful way to underscore that the government wants Intel, and the semiconductor industry, to thrive and grow for decades to come.</p> +<p>Courted on both sides, emerging markets sought to strengthen their negotiating power by leveraging their collective resources. Brazil, Indonesia, Vietnam, and South Africa came together to form the Organization of Critical Minerals Exporters (OCME) to promote inclusive, fair, sustainable, and stable critical minerals markets. In the process, OCME even attracted Australia and Canada to join its ranks.</p> -<hr /> +<p>Toward the end of the round, members of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries Plus (OPEC+) coordinated to undermine the green transition within the G7+. They released large quantities of oil into the market, aiming to slow the growth of electric vehicles (EVs) and stall investment in critical minerals. Officially, OPEC+ presented this as a move to ease the global cost of living.</p> -<p><strong>Sujai Shivakumar</strong> is director and senior fellow of Renewing American Innovation at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C.</p> +<h4 id="round-3-final-negotiations-and-outcomes">Round 3: Final Negotiations and Outcomes</h4> -<p><strong>Charles Wessner</strong> is a senior adviser (non-resident) with Renewing American Innovation at CSIS.</p> +<p>The third and final round, covering 2030–2032, did not bring any realignment among the teams. The G7+ solidified its climate club by achieving three key milestones. First, it finalized a major internal agreement on the green marketplace, tackling tariffs and nontariff barriers to establish a free market for environmental goods and services, public procurement options, conformity assessment and standards, nondiscriminatory access to incentives programs, and critical minerals. Second, the group tackled inflation concerns by reallocating tariff revenue toward cost transfers, home retrofitting for higher efficiency, and clean vehicles and electricity subsidies. Lastly, the G7+ anchored Turkey into the club, largely through an EU commitment to accelerate Turkey’s accession talks and South Korea’s pledge to invest in Turkey’s nuclear and EV sectors.</p> -<p><strong>Thomas Howell</strong> is an international trade attorney specializing in the semiconductor industry and a consultant with Renewing American Innovation at CSIS.</p>Sujai Shivakumar, et al.When it comes to the future of American semiconductor manufacturing and the success of the CHIPS Act, Intel is not too big to fail, but it is too good to lose.Inflection Point2024-11-07T12:00:00+08:002024-11-07T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/inflection-point<p><em>The United States and its partners have the financial and technical tools to provide safer, cost-effective technology to help bridge the digital divide in the Global South, where competition for high-quality digital infrastructure plays into broader great power tensions.</em></p> +<p>However, the G7+ could not prevent Mexico from leaving the club as inflationary pressures and declining economic opportunities within the club prompted its exit. Additionally, a joint EU-U.S. offer granting OCME members access to climate funds in exchange for preferential access to critical minerals went unanswered.</p> -<excerpt /> +<p>China, meanwhile, toughened its opposition to the G7+ club by imposing an export ban on all critical minerals processing technologies. However, China failed to gain traction in emerging markets despite pledging up to RMB 10 trillion in foreign direct investment to countries that would join the Inclusive Green Belt and remove tariffs on Chinese green goods. Additionally, the global carbon accounting discussions from the first and second rounds seemed to stall or fall by the wayside.</p> -<h3 id="introduction">Introduction</h3> +<p>Among emerging markets, cohesion dissolved as each country pursued its national interests, choosing to negotiate bilaterally — either with other emerging markets or with other teams. India agreed to double its imports of Russian oil and gas in exchange for Indian investment into the Russian energy sector along with enhanced cooperation on decarbonization between the two countries. India further secured public financing from Saudi Arabia for domestic climate and energy transition projects, while Saudi Arabia negotiated a uranium deal with the United States and Australia to facilitate the Gulf region’s development of nuclear energy. OCME welcomed India, Japan, and South Korea within its ranks as “trusted processing and recycling centers,” but no other multilateral agreements emerged.</p> -<p>Developing countries across the globe are installing or upgrading their digital infrastructure. But choosing a telecommunications vendor involves weighing factors such as cost, efficiency, quality, and security. The Covid-19 pandemic drove home the importance of connectivity and secure networks, over which information on e-commerce, education, financial services, and health — as well as national security — must pass. China has initially taken the lead in this sector by providing telecommunications solutions and financing primarily to countries in the Indo-Pacific and Africa. Meanwhile, the United States has fallen behind in addressing this important infrastructure gap. The United States and its partners have the financial and technical tools to provide safer and cost-effective technology to help bridge the digital divide in the Global South, where competition for high-quality digital infrastructure plays into broader great power tensions.</p> +<h3 id="scoring-progression">Scoring Progression</h3> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">The United States and its partners have the financial and technical tools to provide safer and cost-effective technology to help bridge the digital divide in the Global South, where competition for high-quality digital infrastructure plays into broader great power tensions.</code></em></strong></p> +<p>As the day progressed, each team dealt with advances and setbacks, and its scores in the four categories (economy, political support, emissions, and allies) shifted accordingly. The formation of a climate club by the G7+ team in round 1 improved its members’ emissions outlook, raising their emissions score from 2 to 4. By contrast, the club engendered the threat of trade restrictions and geopolitical hostility, lowering the team’s economy score from 6 to 4 and political support score from 5 to 3. China and emerging markets also saw bleak economic outcomes, with the club’s border adjustments and tariffs creating an economic burden for nonmember states. Round 2 saw general improvements for the G7+ and China teams, with the G7+ team expanding its alliance and China presenting a clear alternative to the G7-led climate club. The emerging markets team, however, was left with worsening natural disasters and inadequate financial commitments, reducing its political, economic, and allied scores.</p> -<h3 id="a-high-risk-network">A High-Risk Network</h3> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/loZ92Lb.png" alt="image01" /> +<em>▲ Table 1: Progression of Scores by Team and Round</em></p> -<p>China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) features an initiative that is quickly becoming the country’s most prolific and impactful infrastructure investment: the Digital Silk Road (DSR). The DSR encompasses investments in wireless networks, surveillance cameras, subsea cables, and satellites; it is primarily financed and constructed by state-owned banks and companies such as Huawei, Hengtong, HMN Technologies, Hikvision, Dahua, and BeiDou. The bulk of China’s DSR contracts are with Indo-Pacific and African countries, where companies like Huawei are providing affordable mobile phones, cloud computing, and other types of hardware. Huawei Marine Networks, now known as HMN Technologies, has spearheaded subsea cable network infrastructure. In the last decade, the company has completed 108 projects that have amounted to an estimated 60,000 kilometers of subsea cable; roughly 16 of those projects are in 27 countries in the Indo-Pacific.</p> +<h3 id="team-analysis">Team Analysis</h3> -<p>Chinese companies also have a significant stake in the 5G wireless networks around the world. Huawei and ZTE have engaged in nearly 160 projects in Africa, Asia, and Europe, providing network equipment and infrastructure. Recipient countries have so far welcomed these investments, namely for the speed at which the projects are implemented — but also for the price. Due to Chinese government subsidies, Huawei and ZTE can offer below-market rates, with Huawei offering as much as 30 percent below typical costs.</p> +<p><strong>G7+ team.</strong> The G7+ team proved particularly fractious due to the large number of participants and their diverse domestic approaches to climate policy. Internal differences kept the club from policy alignment. Early on, the EU and U.S. players retreated to separate rooms to coordinate their positions, a practice they continued at regular intervals. These divided sessions slowed overall club negotiations as each prioritized the management of their internal cohesion. The U.S. and EU policy proposals were also in conflict, as the United States had no internal carbon price to secure its climate goals, while the European Union was attached to its emissions trading system, which forced other members to mediate.</p> -<p>According to a report by the European think tank MERICS, Chinese companies are also involved in providing products in the e-governance, online education, and telehealth sectors. Huawei and ZTE have implemented these projects — predominantly in Africa and Central Asia — with more financing from the Chinese government than from local governments, multilateral development banks, and G7 countries combined.</p> +<p>Ultimately, the European Union and the United States reached an ungainly compromise and agreed on the main terms and benefits of the club, which they reluctantly extended to the rest of the group. However, the European Union stressed that its agreement was contingent on establishing a shared financing mechanism and access to U.S. subsidies in later rounds, which virtually halted the club’s implementation until all details were finalized in the late stages of the game.</p> -<p>The United States has consistently raised security concerns about China’s digital technology investments, citing questions of national security, cybersecurity, personal security, and intellectual property, as well as the potential for authoritarian nations to surveil their own citizens. Some countries have heeded this advice; telecom carriers in Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands, Sweden, and the United Kingdom have replaced Chinese equipment with technology from low-risk vendors, or vendors that adhere to agreed-upon standards on privacy, data collection, surveillance, and intellectual property. The United States and many countries in the European Union have signed onto the Prague Proposals, which call on countries to select carriers and providers that will prioritize safe and secure 5G networks and communication technologies.</p> +<p>Consumed by internal negotiations throughout the game, the G7+ had little bandwidth to devote to a coherent outreach strategy for membership candidates — or even to consider how its proposals might appeal to them. Unable to tolerate China’s presence within the club, the United States clearly defined the group’s collective stance toward China, though the group’s lack of coordination was evident in the absence of cohesive messaging inside meetings.</p> -<h3 id="offering-an-alternative">Offering an Alternative</h3> +<p><strong>The China team.</strong> The team’s structure was designed to mirror the decisionmaking processes that shape energy and climate policies in China. Each player represented a specific government entity. However, such internal dynamics were largely muted during the gameplay, as players were not assertive in their assigned roles. Instead, the team took a collaborative approach and deferred to the president/politburo when making major decisions. This pattern persisted when a different player assumed the presidency later in the game for logistical reasons.</p> -<p>The countries that have signed onto China’s BRI and the DSR are doing so for several reasons. A primary motivation is to address critical infrastructure gaps by providing digital connectivity. The Covid-19 pandemic emphasized this need, underscoring its importance to nearly all aspects of daily life for individuals, companies, and governments. The BRI and DSR have stepped into this gap to provide something the United States and its allies have not. Typically, information and communication technology (ICT) projects are approved, deployed, and financed much more quickly by China than they would be through a G7 development bank. Approvals by the latter institutions often are bogged down by long feasibility studies, risk assessments, and other considerations. China, by contrast, offers a more streamlined approach: loans, construction companies, and equipment, all from one source.</p> +<p>In the early stages of the game, players spent significant time aligning their views on two key points: the state of energy and climate in China and the government’s priorities and redlines. Once the team reached a consensus, it acted as a unified block in international proceedings. No player deviated from the agenda during meetings with foreign representatives, the group consulted internally before and after each meeting, and no actions were taken without the group’s consent.</p> -<p>The United States and its partners have struggled to provide an alternative to the DSR; however, in recent years, Washington has established agencies, initiatives, and partnerships to prioritize ICT projects overseas, including investments in wireless networks, Open Radio Access Network (ORAN) technology, surveillance cameras, subsea cables, mobile handsets, and satellites, as well as systems upgrades from 2G and 3G to 5G and beyond. But there are multiple avenues available for additional policies to increase export and development finance of these technologies by trusted suppliers.</p> +<p>Although players were keen to use China’s strengths in technology and state-driven international finance during negotiations, they took a cautious approach, avoiding proposals that might harm China’s economic security. Only in the final turn did China act on its stated opposition to the G7+ club by raising export controls on critical minerals technology. Their other initiatives to compete with the G7+ for global leadership, such as the Inclusive Green Belt and global carbon accounting schemes, stalled.</p> -<blockquote> - <h4 id="case-study-mexico"><code class="highlighter-rouge">Case Study: Mexico</code></h4> -</blockquote> +<p><strong>The emerging markets team.</strong> In the initial stages of the game, India and South Africa sought to lead a preemptive strategy to deter or at least mitigate the impact of the anticipated G7+ climate club. However, discussions broke down due to competing national interests. Turkey’s economic ties with Europe, as well as Mexico’s trade relationship with the United States, made them more conciliatory toward the G7+, culminating in their decision to join the G7+ club. However, Mexico later withdrew after determining the cost of membership was too high. By contrast, Indonesia and Vietnam were wary of antagonizing or overly depending on China, which hindered unification efforts.</p> -<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Over a decade ago, Mexico reached an inflection point in the development of its digital strategy and connectivity policies. Its experience offers both an example of best practices and a cautionary tale.</code></em></p> +<p>Natural resources also played a major role for players on the emerging markets team, as seen in the establishment of the OCME. Russia, meanwhile, pursued a natural gas and nuclear agreement with China, though its primary strategy was disruption. Russia used its cyber capabilities and natural resources to sow discord, particularly within the G7+, and to deter any actions that might threaten demand for its hydrocarbon exports. By the end of the game, the emerging markets team was too fragmented to resemble a cohesive economic bloc.</p> -<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">In 2013, Mexico implemented a constitutional reform that created the Federal Institute of Telecommunications (IFT) and the Federal Economic Commission for Competition (COFECE). Both are independent regulators and antitrust authorities with very broad powers. This was born out of a larger reform process in the telecommunication and broadcasting sectors that took place in Mexico and in Latin America more broadly. The reforms reviewed and updated the legislative frameworks and institutions created in the 1990s to boost competition after market liberalization during that decade. As in many Latin American markets, fixed-line telephony in Mexico was provided by the state-owned operator, Teléfonos de México (Telmex), until the early 1990s, when the government gradually divested its assets to national and foreign investors. In 1995, the Mexican government passed the landmark Federal Telecommunications Law (LFT), opening all market segments for competition and removing geographic limitations for fixed and mobile telephony networks.</code></em></p> +<h3 id="key-outcomes-and-insights">Key Outcomes and Insights</h3> -<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">The IFT promotes and regulates competition and the efficient development of telecommunications and broadcasting, in accordance with its constitutional mandate and the 2014 Federal Law for Telecommunications and Broadcasting, LFTR, as well as the 2014 Federal Law for Economic Competition. The COFECE is responsible for overseeing, promoting, and guaranteeing competition and free market access in Mexico. The COFECE has a board that consists of seven commissioners; a Technical Secretariat that analyzes the market and its competitiveness; a strategic planning and institutional evaluation coordinator; and an internal comptroller that oversees COFECE officials.</code></em></p> +<p><strong>The outcomes highlighted the risks of a trade-based climate strategy.</strong> The game ended with escalating trade tensions, a worsening economic outlook for many countries, and only a modest increase in global ambitions for climate change. Despite mounting pressure from the public and increasingly visible climate effects, players prioritized economic and geopolitical goals over emissions reductions. Throughout the simulation, U.S.-China relations remained distant, and even the threat of a trade war failed to inspire rapprochement on carbon accounting standards, green development spending, or a common approach to climate and trade. The potential benefits of joining the G7+ climate club were not compelling enough to attract major emitters such as India, Brazil, or Indonesia.</p> -<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Upon the creation of the IFT, Mexico licensed new national broadcasting networks, designated officials to evaluate carriers and operators, introduced rules for unbundling Telmex, and created a public registry of licenses. Since its creation, IFT has been viewed as a credible authority; as a result, prices have decreased and competition has increased. There are now dozens of new local broadcasting licenses in radio and television, including for indigenous communities. Mexico’s internet penetration rate stood at 83.2 percent of the total population at the start of 2024, up from 44 percent in 2013. In 2015, AT&amp;T undertook a series of local acquisitions, and the U.S.-headquartered company now comprises 16 percent of the market for mobile telephone operators. In December 2021, AT&amp;T Mexico announced it intended to launch a 5G network using its 2.5 GHz spectrum, making it the first mobile network operator in the country to build such a network.</code></em></p> +<p><strong>Ambiguity prevented teams from taking decisive action in early rounds.</strong> As China and the emerging markets awaited details about the nascent club, they cautioned the G7+ against adopting protectionist measures but did not oppose the creation of a climate club outright or threaten direct retaliation. This left the G7+ team relatively free to act without external pressure. Most notably, China and the emerging markets failed to unite around a credible alternative to the G7+ effort. This could reflect a lack of appetite for climate clubs, or it could stem from emerging markets hedging their bets between potentially attractive options. In any case, the G7+ team appeared too preoccupied with its internal divisions to capitalize on opportunities to bring large emitters from the emerging markets team (such as Brazil, India, or Indonesia) into the fold or pressure China to increase its internal ambitions for climate.</p> -<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Despite a more competitive ICT market, domestic politics have hindered and threatened progress. Most concerning has been the chipping away of IFT’s independence and operational ability. When former president Andrés Manuel López Obrador entered office in 2018, he sought to undermine the independent IFT. Since February 2022, the agency has operated with only four of its seven presiding commissioners, as President López Obrador refused to nominate any more. This has left the agency without enough commissioners to operate effectively; losing another would render it completely inoperable. The IFT’s budget has also decreased by roughly 41.1 percent since 2014, hampering its ability to implement its mandate. Additionally, the government has set high spectrum fees, which has undercut telecommunications operators’ ability to expand broadband connectivity, particularly in rural areas, and undermined IFT’s efforts to license more spectrum. The country also remains plagued by anticompetitive tendencies, despite the efforts of the IFT and COFECE.</code></em></p> +<p><strong>Economic imperatives appeared to have a stabilizing effect on Chinese decisionmaking.</strong> Appearing hesitant to jeopardize economic opportunities through retaliatory measures, the China team explored alternative options ranging from warning the G7+ against discriminatory measures to engaging with emerging markets in various formats and appealing to the WTO. When these efforts failed, China finally opted for retaliation, the scope of which was narrow, focusing on critical minerals and WTO litigation. The China team calculated that persistent macroeconomic difficulties would make it unfeasible to sustain a large-scale trade war that could compromise other priorities, including national security and climate goals.</p> -<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Mexico has stood apart from its Latin American peers in creating and implementing one of the most sophisticated telecommunications regulations. But, before concluding his term, former president López Obrador sent to Congress an initiative for constitutional reform that would disappear IFT and COFECE and assign their responsibilities to different ministries within the executive branch. This initiative is waiting to be analyzed in Congress. In order to build on the progress of the 1990s, Mexico’s new president, Claudia Sheinbaum, will have to undo Obrador’s efforts and reinstitute the authority of these bodies, while also ensuring they are protected from political winds. Mexico is an excellent case study of how a country can succeed in building an effective and laudable regulatory infrastructure and have it subsequently come apart due to politics.</code></em></p> +<p><strong>Geopolitical considerations, as well as regional and economic proximity, strongly influenced decisionmaking.</strong> After the G7+ formally established its club, the United States and Canada swiftly approached Mexico, and the European Union approached Turkey. These moves seemed low risk and logical given the nations’ geographic proximity, political ties, and significant trade flows. By contrast, India was never directly courted to join either the G7+ club or China’s Inclusive Green Belt. The country’s ambivalent geopolitical positioning, as well as its low-ambition trade and climate mitigation policies, may have acted as deterrents.</p> -<h4 id="us-resources">U.S. RESOURCES</h4> +<p>Notably, both Mexico and Turkey sought access to the G7+ club in a manner that would permit continued Chinese investment in their economies. They requested that goods produced by Chinese companies on their soil, like BYD EVs, not be excluded from the internal green marketplace. Meanwhile, bilateral deals — such as those between China and Russia, Russia and India, or Saudi Arabia and the United States — aligned with existing geopolitical and sectoral relationships.</p> -<p>The United States has established new agencies and tools in recent years to help promote and support U.S. technology — particularly ICT — abroad. These efforts can be further honed to more effectively support U.S. and partner initiatives in the developing world, as well as private company engagement in this sector.</p> +<p><strong>Trade liberalization and energy supplies were the most effective tools for driving collaboration and realignment.</strong> Both the G7+ and China made technology transfer and investment central to their efforts to entice other countries to cooperate, but they met with little success. Attempts by China and the emerging markets to exert influence through tighter controls on critical minerals or fossil fuels were also of limited influence. In contrast, trade liberalization played a significant role in supporting and dissuading club membership. Access to the green marketplace was key in attracting Mexico and Turkey to the G7+ club, while market access for Chinese green goods deterred emerging markets from embracing the Inclusive Green Belt. Energy supply played a significant role in bilateral deals between teams but was not a driver for clubs.</p> -<p><em>U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC)</em></p> +<h3 id="lessons-for-policymakers">Lessons for Policymakers</h3> -<p>In October 2018, the U.S. Congress passed the bipartisan Better Utilization of Investment Leading to Development (BUILD) Act to support and finance investments in emerging economies and to boost national security and foreign policy priorities in critical markets. The BUILD Act combined the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID)’s Development Credit Authority (DCA) to form the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC). The DFC has stated that encouraging ICT investments in low and lower-middle-income countries is a key priority for the agency. The agency can provide loans, loan guarantees, equity financing, political risk insurance, and technical assistance to support investments in the telecom industry; it can only work on private sector projects, not ones supported by the public sector. However, the DFC is limited in working in networks that include high-risk vendor equipment. According to the 2019 National Defense Authorization Act, U.S. financing agencies investing in networks with this type of equipment must get a waiver from the head of the relevant executive agency or from the Director of National Intelligence and must have a phase-out plan to “rip and replace” the high-risk vendor equipment.</p> +<p><strong>Clear policy communication is paramount in multilateral negotiations — both in the run-up to a major policy pronouncement and upon its enactment.</strong> Slow, cautious play characterized the game’s opening turns as all three teams appeared unsure of how to proceed or respond. After the G7+ and China teams published their proposals, they spent considerable time dispelling misunderstandings and clarifying their terms. Without clearly articulated goals and terms, club members had little opportunity to market membership to large emitters or potential geopolitical allies.</p> -<p>The DFC and its predecessor OPIC have undertaken several ICT investments in the past two decades, including a network acquisition in the Pacific Islands; renewable power for cell phone towers in Nigeria and the Central African Republic; telecommunications infrastructure in Myanmar; and, in Jordan, infrastructure to provide a critical interconnection point for an internet cable system connecting Europe and Asia. In 2018, the DFC also provided $100 million in financing to Africell for the expansion of affordable mobile voice and data services in The Gambia, Sierra Leone, Uganda, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, as well as upgrades to network equipment in these countries to accommodate increased traffic.</p> +<p><strong>Climate clubs are contingent on flexible mechanisms that accommodate diverse national interests.</strong> The G7+ team struggled to overcome its members’ disparate policy approaches but struck compromises to clinch an ambitious agreement based on long-term decarbonization. For example, the European Union exempted U.S. products from CBAM, even in the absence of a U.S. carbon market, in exchange for access to Inflation Reduction Act–style subsidies and expanded trade in green goods. The members also did not create a unified border measure, instead allowing each country to follow its national preference. Flexibility was crucial in expanding the club in later turns, as demonstrated in Mexico’s and Turkey’s attempts to protect Chinese investment in their territories.</p> -<p><em>The Export-Import Bank of the U.S. (EXIM)</em></p> +<p><strong>Climate clubs must be aggressively marketed to emerging markets and geopolitical allies.</strong> Neither the G7+ team nor the China team succeeded in attracting development economies to their club. This failure appears to stem from a lack of coordination among emerging markets as well as the one-size-fits-all approaches of the G7+ and China. Participants did not form any transactional arrangements, such as exchanging access to critical minerals for industrial investment or market access.</p> -<p>EXIM has been mandated by Congress to enact its China and Transformational Exports Program (CTEP) to help U.S. exporters facing competition from China, particularly in the fields of AI, wireless communications, and fintech. Established in 2019, CTEP is expected to counter export subsidies and finance provided by China, advance U.S. leadership, and support U.S. innovation, employment, and technological standards. Exporters can take advantage of EXIM’s reduced fees, extended repayment tenors, and exceptions from other EXIM policies to get financing on transactions with at least 51 percent U.S. content. However, to date there have been no ICT deals financed through CTEP.</p> +<p><strong>Trade has the potential to drive, as well as deter, climate action.</strong> Conventional climate club designs feature a common border measure to encourage nonmembers to join and adopt emissions targets. This is precisely what drove Mexico and Turkey to seek accession to the G7+ club. Yet trade policy considerations also complicated the search for solutions. The debate over the nature and extent of the border measure almost derailed the formation of the G7+ club, as the European Union and the United States disagreed on whether to adhere to WTO rules for raising border adjustments or selectively liberalize trade within the club. Later in the game, China’s demand for tariff-free treatment of its exports as a condition for participating in its Inclusive Green Belt deterred emerging markets from joining.</p> -<p>Additionally, EXIM can also provide loans, loan guarantees, and insurance for the purchase of goods and services shipped or invoiced from any country to facilitate U.S. exports for 5G-related transactions. EXIM has lowered its U.S. content threshold. But the creditworthiness of potential in-country private sector partners has remained a key challenge in many instances, particularly in countering opaque Chinese lending practices.</p> +<h3 id="priorities-for-future-research">Priorities for Future Research</h3> -<p><em>Department of Commerce</em></p> +<p><strong>Improve modeling of climate-focused trade mechanisms.</strong> A key shortfall in this game was the inability to model or quantitatively understand the economic, trade, emissions, and political stakes of different decisions. Participants had to reason about decisions using intuition or by asking questions of Control. They were also limited in their ability to compare options or grapple with the outcomes of different actions. Although policymakers in the real world face substantial uncertainty in the outcomes of their decisions, they must enter negotiations with some quantitative understanding of how to achieve their climate and economic goals.</p> -<p>The Creating Helpful Incentives to Produce Semiconductors and Science Act (CHIPS Act) of 2022 authorized billions of dollars for funding to the Departments of Commerce, Defense, and State to develop onshore domestic manufacturing of semiconductors. It also included appropriations to fund the USA Telecommunications Act to support the global telecom supply chain and counter the expansion of Chinese companies such as Huawei and ZTE. Provisions from the CHIPS Act are meant to further U.S. software advantages and to develop the Open Radio Access Network (ORAN), which would allow for a more interoperable telecommunications model and enable alternative vendors to enter markets for specific network components, rather than competing with end-to-end packages offered by companies like Huawei.</p> +<p><strong>Understand the priorities of emerging markets in climate and trade negotiations.</strong> Future research on climate clubs should focus on devising a coherent approach that enables the identification and harmonization of the diverse and often conflicting security, climate, and economic priorities of emerging market and developing economies (EMDEs). Research could explore how climate clubs can tailor membership incentives, such as market access, technology transfer, and political support, to attract EMDE participation. This could alleviate the shortcomings of the narrow, one-size-fits-all approaches observed in this simulation.</p> -<p>The CHIPS Act provides $1.5 billion through a Public Wireless Supply Chain Innovation Fund to the Department of Commerce’s National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA), in coordination with other agencies, to support investments in ORAN, developments of software-based wireless technologies, and funding for “leap-ahead” innovations in the U.S. mobile broadband market.</p> +<p><strong>Develop a standardized and adaptable global carbon accounting framework.</strong> Lack of consensus on carbon accounting standards and other evaluative criteria emerged as a major obstacle to cooperation during the simulation. Future research should focus on identifying carbon accounting procedures that meet enough needs to become standardized, such as accounting for data access and validation procedures. Proactive multilateral engagement is critical to effectively integrating these global standards into trade negotiations and carbon border mechanisms.</p> -<p><em>Department of State</em></p> +<p><strong>Identify and navigate geopolitical and security redlines in climate negotiations.</strong> The simulation illustrated that bilateral and multilateral agreements that align with existing geopolitical relationships or shared economic and security interests have higher rates of success. Future research should focus on identifying geopolitical and security redlines that hinder climate negotiations, as well as the ways climate clubs can mitigate these obstacles through measures such as public diplomacy, economic incentives, and security guarantees.</p> -<p>The CHIPS Act allocates $500 million over five years to a new International Technology Security and Innovation (ITSI) Fund, which gives money to the Department of State to provide for international information and communications technology security and semiconductor supply chain activities, including to support the development and adoption of secure and trusted telecommunications technologies, secure semiconductor supply chains, and other emerging technologies. The State Department can use the fund for its own programming but can also allocate money to USAID, EXIM, and the DFC.</p> +<hr /> -<p>The focus of the fund has been less on ICT and more on semiconductors. Funding has gone to new hires at the State Department and to partnerships with Costa Rica, Indonesia, Mexico, Panama, the Philippines, and Vietnam to explore opportunities to grow and diversify the global semiconductor ecosystem. In a March 2023 press release, the State Department communicated that $40.7 million in fiscal year 2023 ITSI funding would be used in the ICT space to provide capacity building training as well as technical advice on policy formulation and regulatory frameworks, cybersecurity tools, financing, project preparation support, and other investment de-risking measures to catalyze private sector investments in secure ICT networks, including field testing and pilot deployments of ORAN networks. The full scope and scale of these investments are not yet clear.</p> +<p><strong>Joseph Majkut</strong> is the director of the Energy Security and Climate Change Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C.</p> -<p><em>U.S. Trade and Development Agency (USTDA)</em></p> +<p><strong>Guillaume Ferlet</strong> is an external consultant on trade and climate issues with CSIS.</p> -<p>USTDA provides financial tools to support the export of U.S. goods and services for priority infrastructure projects in emerging economies. USTDA funds project preparation, feasibility studies, and partnership-building activities. Though it is typically involved on the front end of projects, USTDA has also financed ICT-related initiatives in the Indo-Pacific and Africa.</p> +<p><strong>William Reinsch</strong> holds the Scholl Chair in International Business at CSIS.</p>Joseph Majkut, et al.In July 2024, CSIS’s Energy Security and Climate Change Program, in collaboration with the Scholl Chair in International Business, hosted a one-day trade and climate simulation game titled Power and Planet. The focus was on how players representing key nations make decisions at the intersection of climate and trade policy to reduce emissions, boost economic opportunity, and ensure security.Collaborative AI Governance2024-11-13T12:00:00+08:002024-11-13T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/collaborative-ai-governance<p><em>The UK and Canada, leveraging their strengths as trusted middle powers, are well-positioned to lead in setting global AI standards, fostering ethical, responsible and innovative AI governance.</em></p> -<p>In 2023, the agency awarded a grant to NOW Telecom Company to conduct a feasibility study and pilot project to support the development of a nationwide 5G mobile and fixed-wireless network in the Philippines. The company chose New Jersey-based Bell Labs Consulting, part of the research arm of Nokia, to conduct the study. The USTDA also awarded a grant to Malawian internet service provider Converged Technology Networks Limited (CTN) to conduct a feasibility study on the expansion of digital connectivity to underserved communities in the country. CTN selected California-based Connectivity Capital LLC to conduct the study.</p> +<excerpt /> -<p><em>U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID)</em></p> +<p>AI has moved out of the academic sphere and is rapidly becoming a “general-purpose” technology with a significant impact on industry, government and society. As a result, there is an urgent need to develop a cross-sectoral environment for AI within countries to attract foreign direct investment, and actively participate in global trade and meet both economic and national security goals.</p> -<p>USAID provides grants and technical assistance for an array of programs across the digital sector. In June 2022, the agency launched its Asia ORAN Academy as part of the Biden administration’s Indo-Pacific Strategy. The academy brings together officials and representatives from the private and public sectors, as well as academia, with an expectation to expand its initial work in the Philippines to the rest of the region. As of June 2024, USAID was in final negotiations to open an ORAN Lab at the University of the Philippines’ Electrical and Electronics Engineering Institute. USAID’s Better Access and Connectivity (BEACON) Activity is also engaging the Philippine government and industry leaders in the country through a series of workshops and trainings on field testing and through the adoption of legislation and regulations that facilitate ORAN deployment.</p> +<p>However, in parallel to the technological investment in and development of this capability, robust governance systems must be in place to ensure the development and application of AI is trustworthy.</p> -<p>USAID is additionally engaged in the Digital Invest initiative, also launched in 2022, which works with investment partners to increase the ability of companies to qualify for commercial funding. Digital Invest provides an average of $500,000 per partner for investments related to resilient digital infrastructure, increased digital inclusion, and stronger economic development. Digital Invest partners have backed over 60 technology companies across 38 countries, with projects ranging from the expansion of broadband connectivity infrastructure in Liberia to a digital payment platform in Uzbekistan to a fund supporting female investors and tech founders across South and Southeast Asia.</p> +<p>These levels of trust, predictability and protection are particularly important at a time when collaboration between global powers and economies of a lesser magnitude is vital, but when different forms of regulation may be better suited to smaller economies and political structures. Moreover, the so-called “rules-based order” that once governed global interactions is now inconsistently applied. This presents a unique opportunity for like-minded middle economies to unite and collectively set the highest standards for AI’s ethical and responsible use in ways that uphold their strong commitment to democratic principles, human rights and freedoms.</p> -<p><em>Office of Strategic Capital (OSC)</em></p> +<p>In times of global uncertainty, the UK and Canada have consistently been viewed as trusted partners and “safe pairs of hands”. Both countries have respected political systems, strong higher education institutions, a shared monarchy, similarities in the legal and regulatory regimes, and military alliances (NATO and the “Five Eyes”). While many middle economies wait for powers like the US and the EU to set data and AI standards rules in the digital world, progress has been slow. Therefore, taking stock of the milestones and progress achieved in countries such as Canada and the UK is crucial, as well as considering the formation of a coalition of middle economies to set and influence global standards in this area.</p> -<p>The newly created OSC, established in 2022 within the Department of Defense, is mandated to mobilize and scale private sector capital. Its Fiscal Year 2024 Investment Strategy outlined its initial target priorities, which include ORAN as both a part of the DoD’s FutureG and 5G critical technology area and a mandated field in the FY 2024 National Defense Authorization Act. The OSC’s complete suite of financial tools is still under development, but at this time, it can provide direct loans for capital investment and equipment finance. These loans range from $10 million to $150 million, with long repayment tenor. The OSC announced its first Notice of Funding Availability in September 2024 and will be considering applications through the rest of the fiscal year.</p> +<p>Both countries are navigating their roles as middle powers in the global AI race, which is dominated by the US, the EU and China. Ranked third (UK) and fifth (Canada) in the 2024 top 10 countries leading in AI research and technology, with a market value of $21 billion for the UK and 144 generative AI-related startups in Canada, and scores of 38.1 (UK) and 34 (Canada) in the leading 20 AI countries in 2023 by research capacity, these countries have significant potential to collaborate on AI governance and the establishment of trustworthy and responsible AI cooperation. Demis Hassabis and Geoffrey Hinton, two thought leaders in AI research and practice, are both British, with Hinton having spent a significant part of his career in Canada – which is also home to other leading global AI scholars like Yoshua Bengio.</p> -<h4 id="global-partnerships">GLOBAL PARTNERSHIPS</h4> +<h3 id="canada-and-the-uks-progress-and-existing-challenges">Canada and the UK’s Progress and Existing Challenges</h3> -<p>U.S. partners and allies have established several initiatives through the G7 to address critical infrastructure needs. In each of these, digital connectivity — particularly in the Indo-Pacific, sub-Saharan Africa, and Latin America — is a core part of cooperative engagement.</p> +<p>Progress in data privacy and protection in the UK is an excellent example of progressive national efforts in the data-driven and digitalised world. These efforts have already resulted in comprehensive legislative frameworks like the Data Protection Act 2018 and UK-GDPR, both of which align with the EU’s GDPR to safeguard personal data across various sectors. The UK has also made progress in sector-specific privacy advancements, particularly in health informatics, with initiatives such as NHS Digital implementing stricter controls on patient data access through the Data Security and Protection Toolkit. Innovations like the UK National Data Strategy and the UK National AI Strategy highlight the government’s commitment to ensuring the responsible use of data while fostering innovation in digital services and AI applications. The Alan Turing Institute, which is the UK’s National Institute for Data Science and AI, focuses on advancing world-class research and applying it to national and global challenges, developing skills and training for the future, and driving informed public conversation. The Ada Lovelace Institute develops research, policy and practice to ensure that data and AI is used and harnessed in ways that maximise social wellbeing and put technology at the service of humanity.</p> -<p><em>Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment (PGI)</em></p> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">There is a unique opportunity for like-minded middle economies to unite and collectively set the highest standards for AI’s ethical and responsible use</code></em></strong></p> -<p>The G7 partners announced PGI, known then as Build Back Better World, at the Carbis Bay summit in June 2021. This effort was intended to counter BRI and target critical infrastructure to support health care, gender, climate, and ICT. The United States has set the goal of mobilizing $200 billion in investments over the next three years as part of the larger $600 billion target made by the G7. Much of PGI’s focus has been on developing economic corridors in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Angola, and the Philippines’ Luzon Corridor. Yet there have been few announcements on digital connectivity, which suggests that there is more to be done in this sector through this initiative.</p> +<p>Canadian progress in AI ethics and regulation is also worthy of note. Canada has been at the forefront of promoting ethical AI through the Pan-Canadian Artificial Intelligence Strategy and Algorithmic Impact Assessment tools. In 2018, as Ontario’s Information and Privacy Commissioner, Dr Ann Cavoukian introduced the seven foundational principles of “Privacy by Design”. These principles directly informed the development of the EU’s GDPR. Currently, the Canadian government is actively working on regulations – including the proposed AI and Data Act (AIDA) – to ensure transparency, fairness and accountability in developing and using AI systems. Canada’s strength in AI research, notably through the Canadian Institute for Advanced Research and Center for International Governance Innovation, has positioned the country as a global leader in AI ethics and governance, encouraging responsible innovation. Programmes including the Vector Institute (Ontario) and Mila (Quebec AI Institute) contribute significantly to research on ethical AI and developing tools for assessing algorithmic fairness.</p> -<p>In 2023, as part of PGI, Africa Data Centers received a $300 million loan from the Development Finance Corporation to construct data centers throughout the continent. The DFC, EXIM, USAID, and USTDA also announced they would build on DFC’s existing financing for Africell in Angola, the DRC, The Gambia, and Sierra Leone (all part of the Lobito economic corridor) to support the expansion of wireless services and a digital payments initiative. Additionally, in the DRC, USTDA and USAID announced the provision of programming and financial support for last-mile connectivity and ORAN equipment for the piloting of U.S. firm Parallel Wireless with Vodacom DRC in five villages.</p> +<p>The key challenge lies in integrating these ethical standards into broader legal frameworks and ensuring uniform implementation across provinces, particularly given Canada’s decentralised governance. There are also significant concerns regarding the ethical use of AI in public services, such as law enforcement, where algorithmic bias and surveillance risks must be carefully managed. Balancing the rapid development of AI technologies with ethical considerations and privacy preservation remains a complex and ongoing issue, particularly as AI systems become more pervasive in sectors like healthcare, education and finance. Despite progress on ethical frameworks, the lack of comprehensive national AI legislation presents hurdles in ensuring consistent oversight across industries.</p> -<p><em>Trilateral Infrastructure Partnership (TIP)</em></p> +<h3 id="current-collaborations-and-joint-efforts">Current Collaborations and Joint Efforts</h3> -<p>The TIP is a partnership between the DFC, the Japan Bank for International Cooperation ( JBIC), Australia’s Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT), and Export Finance Australia (EFA). TIP partners are looking to cofinance infrastructure projects mainly in the Pacific Islands and Southeast Asia. Though there are few projects under the TIP banner, two are in ICT.</p> +<p>This progress notwithstanding, challenges remain, particularly in balancing innovation with compliance, as industries such as health informatics seek more flexible use of personal data while maintaining privacy. The issue of cross-border data flows post-Brexit presents regulatory complexities, especially with potential data adequacy rulings from the EU. The rapid advancement of AI and big data analytics in sectors like finance and healthcare tests the limits of existing frameworks, prompting ongoing discussions about updating privacy laws to cover emerging technologies like AI-driven decision-making systems and biometric data usage.</p> -<p>TIP’s first project has been the Palau spur, an approximately $30 million construction project for a subsea fiber optic cable to the Republic of Palau. The project is to connect to a DFC-financed subsea cable, the world’s longest, which stretches from Singapore to the United States. In May 2023, the TIP partners announced their support for the Australian telecom company, Telstra, in its acquisition of Digicel Pacific. The JBIC and DFC provided $50 million each in credit guarantees for EFA’s $1.33 billion financing package to support the acquisition. Telstra’s move is expected to further Digicel’s delivery of high-quality telecommunication services to more than 2.5 million subscribers in Papua New Guinea, Fiji, Vanuatu, Samoa, Tonga, and Nauru.</p> +<p>Canada and the UK have been actively fostering collaboration on AI-related initiatives. For example, in 2019, the UK-Canada AI Initiative was launched to fund collaborative research projects between the two countries. This initiative focuses on AI’s application in areas like health and environmental sustainability and on the ethical challenges posed by AI technologies. The goal is to leverage the AI expertise of both countries while promoting research that aligns with their shared values of transparency, fairness and privacy protection. The 2024 UK-Canada science of AI safety partnership serves as another collaborative initiative.</p> -<p><em>Quad</em></p> +<p>The UK and Canada are both active internationally in advocating for the responsible use of AI. They are co-signatories of the 2019 OECD AI Principles, the 2022–2024 Council of Europe AI Convention drafting group, the 2023 G7 Ministers’ Statement, the 2023 Bletchley Declaration and the 2024 Seoul Ministerial Declaration. They have also both participated in the Global Partnership on Artificial Intelligence. This multilateral engagement runs in parallel with national legislative frameworks such as the Pan-Canadian Artificial Intelligence Strategy and the UK National AI Strategy, both of which are oriented towards building AI ecosystems that prioritise ethical standards, transparency and fairness.</p> -<p>The Quad — Australia, India, Japan, and the United States — is also engaged on the ICT front and has announced ICT projects in the Pacific Islands, including on subsea cables and ORAN technology. At the Quad Leaders’ Summit in May 2023, the partners announced the establishment of the Quad Partnership for Cable Connectivity and Resilience, with the aim of bringing together public and private sector actors to address gaps in this type of infrastructure.</p> +<h3 id="how-can-canada-and-the-uk-make-a-difference">How Can Canada and the UK Make a Difference?</h3> -<p>Under this partnership, Australia is to establish a new Indo-Pacific Cable Connectivity and Resilience Program to share best practices and provide technical assistance to Indo-Pacific governments. The United States is providing technical assistance and capacity building on subsea cable system security through its $5 million CABLES program.</p> +<p>Building on a long history of collaboration between the UK and Canada in emerging technologies, shared values and similarities in political cultures and the diversity of their populations, as well as the novel approaches and practices established and implemented in both countries, joint efforts could be enhanced in the following areas:</p> -<p>The partners also announced a cooperation with the government of Palau and the Palau National Communications Corporation (PNCC) to design, implement, and operationalize the deployment of ORAN capabilities. The USTDA is expected to fund a technical assistance grant to scope the size and scale of the project. This announcement marked the first planned deployment of ORAN technology in the region.</p> +<h4 id="data-governance-and-data-protection">Data Governance and Data Protection</h4> -<p><em>Global Coalition on Telecommunications (GCOT)</em></p> +<p>Both countries could build a bilateral data governance framework that enhances data protection while facilitating secure data sharing for research, public health, and economic growth. This would ensure that data governance aligns with ethical standards and that personal data is protected across both countries while enabling the flow of information critical to innovation and commerce.</p> -<p>GCOT was launched in October 2023 by the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, and Japan to increase cooperation and coordination on shared priorities such as telecommunications supply chain diversification and open network architectures, as well as the building of a broader international consensus on key areas of telecommunications policy and the promotion of innovation and growth opportunities in the sector. The U.S. Departments of State and Commerce are the key agencies involved in this initiative. There have been few details or updates since its launch nearly a year ago.</p> +<p>For example, the US–EU Privacy Shield Framework offers a reference point for cross-border data governance. Although invalidated in 2020, it was initially designed to facilitate data transfers while ensuring compliance with stringent privacy laws on both sides of the Atlantic. A UK–Canada data governance initiative could draw lessons from this experience to build a framework that maintains high data privacy standards without impeding cross-border innovation and AI research.</p> -<h4 id="private-sector">PRIVATE SECTOR</h4> +<h4 id="development-of-cybersecurity-and-defence-against-hybrid-informational-threats">Development of Cybersecurity and Defence Against Hybrid Informational Threats</h4> -<p>A major player in the promotion of diversity in digital equipment is the private sector. Private companies can both benefit from government support and mobilize their own capital and resources to be more competitive. One key argument from host countries is the lack of alternatives to Chinese or other high-risk providers for affordable and speedy installation of technology. However, the European Union, United States, Japan, and South Korea have a host of companies available for partnership that share similar values on information security, intellectual property, and high-quality standards.</p> +<p>Joint investments in cybersecurity systems include cooperation on AI-driven threat detection, defensive measures against cyberattacks and developing countermeasures to combat disinformation and hybrid attacks. This could involve research collaborations between top universities in both countries, pooling expertise to create cutting-edge tools that protect national digital infrastructure.</p> -<p>The United States and its allies are identifying tools to de-risk markets and promote private sector mobilization and have worked with local governments in the developing world to create enabling environments for high standards of investment, but these efforts still lack the speed and the push for U.S.-based companies to invest. More engagement between the U.S. government and private sector is needed in order to implement tools to support U.S. companies and meet host government needs in faster and more transparent ways.</p> +<p>Australia and Singapore’s cybersecurity cooperation is a strong example of two countries collaborating to enhance cyber defences. Under their Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, Australia and Singapore signed a Memorandum of Understanding in 2017 to cooperate on cybersecurity initiatives. This partnership includes joint cyber threat exercises, collaboration on cyber capacity building, sharing good practice on cybersecurity governance, and developing common frameworks for cyber risk management. The UK and Canada could adopt a similar model by establishing a formal cybersecurity cooperation framework focusing on joint threat intelligence sharing, collaborative defence against cyberattacks, and coordinated responses to disinformation and hybrid informational threats.</p> -<blockquote> - <h4 id="case-study-india"><code class="highlighter-rouge">Case Study: India</code></h4> -</blockquote> +<h4 id="investment-in-ai-startups-and-innovation">Investment in AI Startups and Innovation</h4> -<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">India is at its own inflection point as it pushes to further its already impressive digital public infrastructure (DPI) efforts, attempting to expand resources and connectivity to more than a billion people. There are opportunities in the market, including in ORAN, but preference for competitive local telecom and ICT companies, as well as some skepticism around ORAN, may hamper major headway.</code></em></p> +<p>The AI ecosystem in the UK and Canada is thriving, with solid support for startups and innovation hubs. The UK’s Alan Turing Institute and Canada’s Vector Institute are global leaders in AI research, and both countries have numerous AI startups working on cutting-edge innovations. Earlier this year, Innovate UK invited UK companies developing AI for improving healthcare to apply to join its Global Incubator Programme in collaboration with MaRS Discovery District in Toronto, Canada. However, more can be done to foster cross-border investment and collaboration in this space. A bilateral initiative to increase investment in AI startups could include creating joint AI venture capital funds, protection for creator rights and intellectual property, support for incubators, and cross-border mentorship programmes.</p> -<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">A part of India’s success so far is its regulator, the Telecom Regulatory Authority of India (TRAI). TRAI was established in 1997 with the objective of creating a fair and transparent market and pushing the country toward more connectivity. India now has the second-largest wireless and wireline subscriber base in the world: 1.72 billion, as of March 2023. India’s teledensity — the number of telephones per 100 population — stood at 84.15 percent as of March 2023, an increase of 10 percent in a decade. The prices of SIM cards and cellular data have also fallen significantly, allowing many more people to access mobile phone technologies.</code></em></p> +<p>Franco-German AI collaboration is a prime example of bilateral cooperation aimed at fostering innovation. By signing the Aachen Treaty in 2019, the two countries solidified their collaboration in research and digital transformation.</p> -<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Within India, local talent and capable companies have enabled the country to create a strong foundation in data systems. Since India’s DPI endeavor, the country has created a data technology structure known as the “India Stack,” which consists of three different layers: unique identity (Aadhaar); complimentary payments systems (Unified Payments Interface, Aadhaar Payments Bridge, Aadhaar Enabled Payment Service); and data exchange (DigiLocker and Account Aggregator). The layered system enables secure online, paperless, and cashless digital access for a variety of public and private services.</code></em></p> +<h4 id="fostering-responsible-ai-talent-and-establishing-educational-exchange-projects">Fostering Responsible AI Talent and Establishing Educational Exchange Projects</h4> -<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">The usage and benefits speak for themselves. United Payments Interface accounts for 68 percent of all payment transactions in the country. As of February 2024, more than 12 billion transactions are completed every month through UPI. In 2020, with this system in place, the Indian government was able to provide pandemic assistance and a platform for vaccinations. Government reports note that the use of digital payments has expanded the customer base of smaller merchants, which in turn has built a record of credit and cash flow, improving access to finance. In 2009, nearly 400 million Indians lacked a unique identity record, but Aadhaar’s campaign to bring about a national ID succeeded in covering roughly 95 percent of the population by 2022. Japan’s NEC, a company with extensive experience in biometric identification, laid the groundwork for Aadhaar with technologies such as facial and fingerprint recognition. DPI has also benefited government coffers: an estimated 8.8 million new taxpayers were registered between July 2017 and March 2022. Citizens can access documents issued by the central and state governments through one platform, which has streamlined bureaucratic procedures and services. The stack has digitized and simplified Know Your Customer (KYC) procedures, lowering the compliance costs to banks using e-KYC from $12 to $0.06. The biometric system ensures that people cannot assume fake identities and that banks have access to reliable and secure data, both of which contribute to the lowering of compliance costs.</code></em></p> +<p>As AI continues to grow, the need for a skilled AI workforce has become critical. The UK and Canada are home to world-class universities and AI research institutions that have already made strides in educating the next generation of AI talent. However, the demand for responsible AI practitioners is rising, and there is room for deeper cooperation in building the skills pipeline.</p> -<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Even with a strong foundation, India is looking to expand its digital infrastructure to more users in rural and unconnected areas. It is considering ORAN offerings to see if that approach would be cost effective, high quality, scalable, and secure. Official bilateral and multilateral exchanges on this topic are ongoing; Indian national security advisor Ajit Doval and his U.S. counterpart, Jake Sullivan, have discussed engagement in the ORAN space, and the topic has been included in Quad summits. India and the United States have also launched the Critical and Emerging Technologies (iCET) initiative, which promotes cooperation between the private sector and research and scientific institutions in both countries to advance next-gen technologies such as AI, telecom, ORAN, quantum computing, semiconductors, and space innovation.</code></em></p> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">The UK and Canada could build a bilateral data governance framework that enhances data protection while facilitating secure data sharing for research, public health, and economic growth</code></em></strong></p> -<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">India has already taken steps toward using ORAN technology in its own industries. In 2023, Tata Consulting Services and Tejas Networks formed a consortium to upgrade 4G and 5G networks; TCS will be the system integrator for the entire telecom network, while Tejas will be responsible for equipment and radio access network (RAN). Indian prime minister Narendra Modi has also traveled to the United States to pitch U.S. companies on partnerships with Indian companies that have investment and implementation experience in 4G, 5G, and ORAN, as well as 5G core, mobile edge cloud solutions, base stations, Internet of Things (IoT) sensors, and 5G smartphones. Indian telecom companies Airtel and Reliance Jio have supported ORAN; Airtel has reportedly conducted a trial of the technology and has signed a deal with U.S.-based Mavenir for its deployment to 4G and 5G sites in low-revenue-generating rural areas, with an initial target of 2,500 sites (to be scaled up to 10,000). Reliance Jio is also developing its own ORAN stack.</code></em></p> +<p>The MIT-IBM Watson AI Lab is an example of collaboration between academia and industry on AI. Through this partnership, researchers from both institutions work together on AI research, focusing on responsible AI development.</p> -<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Questions remain around costs and scalability. Indian telecom market watchers have queried whether ORAN works for the higher configurations used for 5G networks by Indian telecom companies, noting that they find the technology neither cost effective nor mature. Scalability and feasibility are issues as well. The country head of Mavenir for India has said that he initially expected ORAN deployments to surge, but that the Indian market has proven to be one of the most complex in the world for ORAN rollouts due to a large user base, high population density in cities, and diverse terrain and temperature conditions. India’s more challenging geographic areas may be a better fit for basic 3G, 4G, or 5G infrastructure. Additionally, there are concerns around technology fragmentation; India has benefited from a global standard in which the whole country is integrated. Issues around equipment “super cycles” are also a concern, as each new technological upgrade — from networks to smartphones — comes with its own specialized equipment. With the advent of AI and the likelihood of related technologies emerging, there will need to be significant public and private investment in managing super cycles; most governments, particularly those in developing countries, will need to attract or support that investment in order to both manage the demand for new devices and technologies and build workforce capacity. Finally, questions remain around the viability of ORAN. Some experts would like to see a larger country like the United States pilot and deploy ORAN on a large scale before India undertakes such an effort. To skeptics, ORAN’s unproven elements seem risky for a billion-person country that is looking to keep costs down, integrate systems seamlessly, and ensure safe and secure connectivity.</code></em></p> +<h4 id="enhancing-healthcare-and-public-health-systems-with-trustworthy-ai">Enhancing Healthcare and Public Health Systems with Trustworthy AI</h4> -<h3 id="recommendations-for-the-united-states-partners-and-the-private-sector">Recommendations for the United States, Partners, and the Private Sector</h3> +<p>Canada and the UK have advanced healthcare systems and have increasingly adopted AI to improve healthcare delivery, particularly during the Covid-19 pandemic. AI technologies in healthcare can enhance diagnostics, predict patient outcomes, and streamline public health responses. However, AI’s use in healthcare must be carefully regulated to ensure it is trustworthy, ethical and aligned with public trust.</p> -<p>Communications technology, including ORAN, is a strategic asset that can enable not only innovation and dynamism through competitive markets (including but not limited to ORAN), but also control, surveillance, and repression (including through closed systems with predatory vendor lock-in). As the United States and its partners work to build out telecommunications networks in the developing world, both the technologies themselves and the regulatory frameworks must be centered around principles of interoperability, security, and openness. Each stakeholder has a role to play to create an enabling environment for good governance and standards, creating the conditions for mobilizing private sector capital and providing safe and reliable access to connectivity.</p> +<p>Canadian-French health cooperation, including the Future of Healthcare using Artificial Intelligence mission, is focused on establishing industrial R&amp;D collaboration opportunities (specifically for technology co-development validation and adaption) in the digital health sector, and has been designed to promote discussions on commercialisation-oriented R&amp;D collaboration opportunities.</p> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">As the United States and its partners work to build out telecommunications networks in the developing world, both the technologies themselves and the regulatory frameworks must be centered around principles of interoperability, security, and openness.</code></em></strong></p> +<h3 id="towards-a-deeper-future-ukcanada-cooperative-initiative-on-ai">Towards a Deeper Future UK–Canada Cooperative Initiative on AI</h3> -<ul> - <li> - <p><strong>Use Guiding Principles for Secure Networks:</strong> Governing frameworks and values are as important as technology itself. Governments are working to shape these frameworks as innovations emerge and new security concerns manifest alongside them. The Prague Proposals, PGI, the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework, the Digital Economy Partnership Agreement, and others offer guidelines for trusted, safe, and secure networks. Development and export finance institutions of the United States and its allies should embed these principles in their financing operations. CSIS’s own criteria, the CSIS Criteria for Security and Trust in Telecommunications Networks and Services, also provides a foundation for shared principles and could complement the work of the Prague Proposals and the European Union’s 5G Toolbox. The criteria are designed to help governments and network owners and operators to determine trustworthiness and security. They provide a framework to assess potential suppliers and to implement domestic policies to safeguard telecommunications networks.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Maximize Coordination and Financial Resources among U.S. Agencies and Development Partners:</strong> With the infrastructure finance gap widening and need soaring, DFC, EXIM, and partner development finance and export credit agencies need to work through existing mechanisms such as IPEF, TIP, and the Quad to maximize funds and extend reach. Cofinancing is notoriously difficult, but examples exist in which partners have seen more success when making specific contributions amid a broader project lifecycle, rather than trying to provide general support. Agencies and countries have different strengths that can be applied at various stages. Pooling funds to target specific and focused investments are another way for partners to utilize capital on shared objectives and in regions of shared interest. For example, at the recent Indo-Pacific Business Forum (IPBF) in Singapore, member countries announced the IPEF Catalytic Capital Fund to support the expansion of a clean economy infrastructure project pipeline in the forum’s emerging and upper-middle-income economies. Australia, Japan, Korea, and the United States contributed $33 million in grant funding, with a goal to generate up to $3.3 billion in private investment.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Reform or Expand EXIM’s CTEP to Support Partner Telecoms:</strong> As CSIS recommended in the report, “The U.S. EXIM Bank in an Age of Great Power Competition,” released this year, CTEP should be more flexible and should include companies interested in participating to be exempt from the EXIM policies that can limit investor competitiveness. EXIM so far has come up short in maximizing CTEP, hampered in part by its requirement to ensure that loans will have a “reasonable assurance of repayment” and its 2 percent loss default ratio cap. To prevent EXIM from self-selecting out of deals and to allow it to take on greater risk (and thus be more competitive), the default cap should be raised in critical industries or on projects that fall under the CTEP umbrella. In line with this, EXIM should lower content requirements for financing. This would allow more U.S. and partner-country companies working in complex supply chains to get more involved in building trusted networks. Some U.S. companies have no choice but to source from abroad, which limits their ability to qualify for EXIM financing. Reasonable conditions for dropping content requirements, particularly for the sake of competitiveness and the promotion of trusted vendors, would almost certainly help the CTEP pipeline and U.S. businesses. The world has changed dramatically in the last 40 years: most supply chains are now global, and competitive manufacturing is a worldwide enterprise. In the same report, CSIS highlighted the U.S. Government Accountability Office’s 2012 report stating that EXIM’s domestic content requirements were too stringent compared to those of other G7 export credit agencies.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Focus Resources on Key Strategic Markets:</strong> The ITSI fund and other pledged financial commitments are too small given the necessary financing needed to address the digital infrastructure gap. Focusing these funds in geographies and on technologies in which markets and offerings such as ORAN can be piloted and tested would be a better way to provide proof of concept and could later attract further public funding and mobilize private sector capital. Simultaneously targeting a large market such as India or Indonesia, a medium-sized market such as Kenya or Brazil, and a smaller market such as the Pacific or the Caribbean would offer a way to test different geographies, legal and regulatory systems, and population needs. This would provide lessons on successes and obstacles, as well as a road map for scaling up or moving to similar markets.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Create Matchmaking Opportunities and Promote Alternatives:</strong> Host countries and local businesses should work through organized business forums and initiatives to solicit public and private sector funding. Initiatives like PGI and relevant government departments and agencies — such as the Department of Commerce, the Department of State, DFC, and EXIM — should work with local chambers of commerce and other business and trade organizations to establish such forums where they do not exist or strengthen those that do. An example to emulate is the recent IPBF that kicked off the Singapore IPEF Clean Economy Investor Forum. The forum acted as a matchmaker between investors and projects as well as a platform for sharing expertise and best practices in climate-related investments. The forum showcased $23 billion in sustainable infrastructure initiatives in IPEF-member economies — $6 billion of which belong to reportedly shovel-ready projects — to investors and interested governments.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Maintain Leadership on R&amp;D and Deployment:</strong> Nearly all initiatives and funds, including ITSI, have capacity building and technical assistance components. U.S. departments and agencies should offer training opportunities and foster an ecosystem of players involved in testing and integrating their interfaces and equipment, thus ensuring the openness and interoperability of ORAN solutions and other digital infrastructure efforts from trusted providers. This could build on some of the announced projects from the ITSI Fund, PGI, and IPEF, which include funding testing and integration centers, publishing reports and hosting conferences on proofs of concept, organizing workshops to develop and exchange ideas on new technologies, and helping operators test and verify the interoperability of ORAN equipment from different providers. This would be the first step in bringing down the costs of implementing ORAN and helping telecom companies scale their operations in this area.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Foster Accountability in Major Initiatives:</strong> The Quad, PGI, IPEF, and other initiatives have all announced major projects and deliverables at summits, conferences, and leader visits. While announcements are relatively easy, implementing projects and maintaining them amid changing political leadership is harder. An accountability tracker that measures the status of announcements and the impact of such initiatives should be put in place to ensure these projects get off the ground and that there is some way to measure if they are viable. This tracker will provide valuable data on government commitments, lessons learned, and the impact of projects on host communities.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Promote Good Governance and Transparent Regulatory Regimes:</strong> Businesses often cite corruption and the lack of regulatory transparency as major hindrances to investment in developing economies. Much of this governance work has been done in capacity building programs through USAID and in initiatives like IPEF. The Fair Economy pillar has made significant progress; in a June 2024 IPEF ministerial meeting in Singapore, members announced measures to provide technical assistance and capacity building for fighting financial crimes like money laundering and terrorism financing, promote inclusivity in law enforcement on anticorruption efforts, and develop and implement anticorruption policies and measures. Ongoing efforts at the government-to-government level, as well as engagement with the private sector, will build on this foundation to establish a better environment for high-quality projects.</p> - </li> -</ul> - -<h3 id="conclusion">Conclusion</h3> +<p>A proposed cooperative initiative must grow to encompass more countries than just the UK and Canada. It must include other leading middle economies that are deeply committed to these issues and working to develop national capacities for AI- and data-driven systems. Such a cooperation framework could serve as a model for establishing bilateral agreements and enhancing collaboration among other middle economies within the G20 and beyond. It could also encourage countries like the Netherlands, Australia, South Korea, New Zealand and Japan to strengthen their efforts in developing ethical frameworks for responsible and efficient AI governance.</p> -<p>Countries across the globe are at an inflection point in deciding the course of digital infrastructure plans. Some are looking to emerging technologies, ensuring their digitalization plans take into account future developments and anticipate the necessary equipment, providers, and workforce. Others are working to ensure that rural communities are connected and can receive important services that foster economic and social development.</p> +<hr /> -<p>Regardless, any digital infrastructure plan must consider the importance of having a safe, secure, and trusted network. Short-term price and deployment considerations are important, but there are real long-term consequences to hosting personal, business, and government digital traffic on high-risk vendor equipment. The United States and its partners and allies must recognize the need for speed and affordability in host country decisionmaking and make the case that their provisions are a viable alternative. The foundation for doing so exists, but the road map calls for more focus and consistency, as well as further monitoring of results to track accountability and proof of concept.</p> +<p><strong>Ann Fitz-Gerald</strong> is a Professor of International Security and the Director of the Balsillie School of International Affairs in Waterloo, Canada.</p> -<hr /> +<p><strong>Carsten Maple</strong> is a Professor of Cyber Systems Engineering at the University of Warwick’s Cyber Security Centre.</p> -<p><strong>Erin Murphy</strong> is deputy director of Chair on India and Emerging Asia Economics and senior fellow of Emerging Asia Economics at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). She has spent her career in several public and private sector roles, including as an analyst on Asian political and foreign policy issues at the Central Intelligence Agency, director for the Indo-Pacific at the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation, founder and principal of her boutique advisory firm focused on Myanmar, and an English teacher with the Japan Exchange and Teaching (JET) Program in Saga, Japan.</p>Erin L. MurphyThe United States and its partners have the financial and technical tools to provide safer, cost-effective technology to help bridge the digital divide in the Global South, where competition for high-quality digital infrastructure plays into broader great power tensions.The West Must Stop Russia2024-11-04T12:00:00+08:002024-11-04T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/the-west-must-stop-russia<p><em>After more than a decade of the largest war in Europe since the Second World War, the West can no longer ignore the fact that the tipping point of the global balance of power lies in Ukraine.</em></p> +<p><strong>Halyna Padalko</strong> is a PhD student in Computer Science at the National Aerospace University (KhAI) and a Fellow at the Balsillie School of International Affairs.</p>Ann M. Fitz-Gerald, et al.The UK and Canada, leveraging their strengths as trusted middle powers, are well-positioned to lead in setting global AI standards, fostering ethical, responsible and innovative AI governance.Build Civic Tech2024-11-13T12:00:00+08:002024-11-13T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/build-civic-tech<p><em>As technology continues to shape society, it’s essential for tech leaders to recognize their role in strengthening democracy. This report highlights the urgent need to integrate civic knowledge and responsibility into STEM education and careers.</em></p> <excerpt /> -<p>While relentlessly pursuing its genocidal policy to destroy Ukraine as a nation and Ukrainians as a distinct national and ethnic group, Moscow has been pushing an international agenda of a “new world order” to replace the Western-led, rules-based system of international relations.</p> +<p>There is an urgent need to strengthen civic knowledge, skills, and engagement across all ages, including adults. This includes those who study and work in STEM fields. Technology plays an increasingly central role in our lives and society, in ways that are both constructive and destructive. Tech innovators must understand the concept of civic responsibility inherent in “we the people,” and think critically about the impact of the work they do. At the same time, we need to inspire tech and science experts to help ensure that decisions by government, at all levels and across all three branches, are informed.</p> -<p>The West’s weak response to Russia’s threat to international peace has catalysed an imploding of the global security order. We are facing an emboldened Sino-Russian alliance which strongly believes there is a window of opportunity to gain the power to set the rules for a new, unfree world, ruled by force.</p> +<p>This report focuses on the integration of civic knowledge and responsibility into STEM education and careers, and how individuals in STEM fields can and must hold institutions accountable and move us toward a more perfect union. Reinvigorating civics knowledge and civic skills has become a national and economic security imperative. The urgency requires reaching not just K-12 students but also adults. This report also offers actionable recommendations for businesses and government, and other organizations committed to equipping employees, partners, and associates with essential civic knowledge and skills.</p> -<p>Russia’s large-scale destruction of Ukraine is tangible evidence of how international peace can crumble in front of our eyes when rogue actors who seek to detonate it demonstrate more determination and resolve than those who purport to defend it. The free world’s demonstrable lack of resolute will to uphold international law is a major factor in the current global crisis and invites further chaos and violence.</p> +<h3 id="introduction">Introduction</h3> -<p>This historic moment calls for urgent revision of the current Western course of conspicuously inadequate actions to remove the threat of Russia as the linchpin of the anti-Western, anti-democratic axis. If the world is to avoid a new global conflict, Western policy must be refocused on a full commitment to defending the principles of the liberal rules-based order that is designed to make the world safer.</p> +<p>Compared to any other period of human history, the pace of technological advancement over the last few decades is unmatched. The era we currently find ourselves in is marked by exponential growth in areas such as biotechnology, the internet, data analytics, quantum computing, machine learning, and artificial intelligence (AI). Each of these holds the power to change the world completely, for better or for worse.</p> -<h3 id="the-russian-threat">The Russian Threat</h3> +<p>Humanity and technology are inextricably linked. The 2023 National Cyber Workforce and Education Strategy aptly states, “technology itself does not have a value system; rather, it carries the values of its owners and operators.”</p> -<p>Vladimir Putin’s Russia is not just an existential threat to Ukraine. Russia’s aggressive, revanchist regime is the origin point of the international anti-Western axis. Just as at other critical moments in its history, Russia is once again redefining itself through confrontation with the West. Moscow is challenging Western primacy in international relations in order to reclaim its status of global power. For the Kremlin, the freedom to act above and outside the limits and restrictions of international law is the symbol of such supremacy.</p> +<p>The release of AI technology widely available to the public has highlighted that today’s technology can be used both as a tool and as a weapon. It is vital to encourage developments that promote innovation while intentionally maximizing the potential for technologies to be used in positive ways. Foundational to this goal is the need to strengthen civic responsibility, respect for the rule of law, and an understanding of the role of government — and, most importantly, the role of citizens — in a healthy democracy. That is the function of civics education.</p> -<p>For the past two decades, the world has been observing an escalating “Russia crisis” – the critical threat posed by a criminal, militarised, totalitarian, aggressive, revanchist and genocidal regime to international peace. Rather than countering the growing threat, Western policy has relied on the “too big to fail” approach in dealing with Moscow. Consequently, Russia has largely enjoyed protection from the consequences of its criminal actions, and has been able to continue pursuing its nefarious strategic course.</p> +<p>CivxNow defines civics as “the lifelong process that makes people into informed and engaged members of their communities — which range from schools and towns or neighborhoods to the whole nation and even the world.” Today, civics education is crucial for understanding and addressing the broader implications of technology. It must be provided at all education levels — K–12, colleges and universities, and even for adults. Strengthening civic knowledge and skills can help build system and societal resilience against tech-enabled threats, actively counter divisiveness and cynicism in society by reinvigorating shared aspirations and empowering citizens, and even strengthen workforce cohesion. Beyond that, incorporating civics concepts into science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) education and the technology sector can better position our democracy to benefit from all that technology offers.</p> -<p>Moscow’s goal is to replace the current liberal, rules-based international system with a “new world order”, where the role of the West is notably reduced. This was Vladimir Putin’s message in speeches given in 2014, 2023 and 2024.</p> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Today, civics education is crucial for understanding and addressing the broader implications of technology. It must be provided at all education levels — K–12, colleges and universities, and even for adults.</code></em></strong></p> -<p>In 2014, Putin made a threatening warning which made clear that Russia will have no limits in pursuing this goal:</p> +<p>This is the goal of the Defending Democratic Institutions (DDI) project’s Civics in STEM initiative. As part of this effort, DDI has already hosted two private roundtables — on June 17 and July 23, 2024 — bringing together distinguished leaders from the private sector, government, and academia. These discussions explored why incorporating civics education into STEM is critical for society, as well as the challenges and strategies associated with promoting civics within the technology sector.</p> + +<p>By embedding civics education into STEM curricula, we help ensure that future innovators are not only skilled in their technical disciplines but also equipped with the knowledge and values necessary to contribute to a just, inclusive, and democratic society. This integration bridges the gap between technical expertise and policy, helping to ensure that the innovations of tomorrow are guided by principles and policies that strengthen democracy and uphold ethical standards.</p> + +<h3 id="background">Background</h3> + +<p>The unparalleled pace of technological advancements in recent history has often caught us off guard, leading to a growing recognition of the need to include ethical and policy considerations alongside technological innovation.</p> + +<p>Rapid technological development has significantly impacted U.S. democracy in both positive and negative ways. Technology has enabled increased voter engagement, enhanced transparency, efficient communication, and the rapid dissemination of information. Yet, it has also contributed to a growing digital divide, rampant misinformation and disinformation, and mounting cybersecurity threats.</p> + +<p>At the societal level, the internet has enabled unprecedented connectivity, yet it has also contributed to a disconnect between the individual and their respective communities. Social media has empowered civil society and historically marginalized groups, revolutionizing social movements and increasing accessibility to information. However, it has helped enable the rise of tribalism and deepened polarization. Similarly, while there will be many benefits from embedding AI into our daily lives, we must remain aware of both the visible and unforeseen implications, which may carry significant consequences.</p> +<p><em>“Cyberspace is composed of not only technology and protocols but also people. People are an integral part of cyberspace, both in creating and using it. In less than a generation, technology has transformed our daily lives …. We rely on [it] for our national security, economic development, and innovation. More than any other domain — air, space, sea, or land — people conceived of and created cyberspace and will continue to improve it.”</em></p> <blockquote> - <p>“… changes in the world order – and what we are seeing today are events on this scale – have usually been accompanied by, if not global war and conflict, then by chains of intensive local-level conflicts.”</p> + <h4 id="kemba-walden-former-national-cyber-director">Kemba Walden, Former National Cyber Director</h4> </blockquote> -<p>Russia’s hostile ambitions were spelled out formally when, in 2021, Moscow issued an ultimatum to NATO, publicly outlining its far-reaching demands for a dangerous level of influence over the eastern flank of the alliance.</p> - -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Western powers continue to treat Russia as a pillar of the strategic global balance, as a consequence of which their policy towards Russian aggression has been ultimately premised on Kyiv making concessions to Moscow</code></em></strong></p> +<p>Given the double-edged nature of technological innovation, it is important to incorporate civics education to ensure that technology’s impact on society is understood and responsibly managed. Over the past several years, there has been a growing emphasis on including ethics in STEM education. (See, e.g., the work of roundtable participants listed in Appendix A.) Civics, particularly the concept of civic responsibility, can provide an important “why” to that ethics discussion. Democracy only works if individuals understand their obligations as part of “we the people.”</p> -<p>Moscow’s determination to defy the West has been severely underestimated. The quest for a “new world order”, driven by the Sino-Russian alliance, is changing global dynamics. In essence, the new Eastern-led order is based on taking advantage of the globalised economy while destroying the liberal rules-based international order. Rogue regimes in Iran, North Korea, Syria, Venezuela and Belarus are being legitimised. The expanding BRICS group is building an alternative economic system of the “global majority” to provide shelter from Western sanctions and ensure global political dominance.</p> +<p>Civic knowledge and skills should not be limited to students interested in the social sciences; they should be considered essential for those working in the technology sector. Integrating key civics concepts, such as civic responsibility, into STEM education and the tech sector can challenge students and professionals alike to think critically about their responsibilities regarding the work they either hope to do or are already doing. Hopefully, this will inspire them to contribute constructively to their workplaces, communities, nation, and world.</p> -<p>To claim domination, the Sino-Russian alliance is committed to:</p> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Integrating key civics concepts, such as civic responsibility, into STEM education and the tech sector can challenge students and professionals alike to think critically about their responsibilities regarding the work they either hope to do or are already doing.</code></em></strong></p> -<ul> - <li> - <p>Advancing an international agenda of creating spheres of influence by instigating conflicts and chaos to fracture global solidarity.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Displacing the universal rules-based order through special bilateral arrangements that advance a global power alignment tilted towards their alliance, with Beijing being the biggest beneficiary.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Reversing humanity’s progress by challenging the universal nature of human rights and political freedoms.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Reducing the global domain of freedom by subverting democracies and by corrupting political and economic establishments to foment authoritarianism.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Diminishing the influence of Western democracies in international relations by subverting international organisations.</p> - </li> -</ul> +<p>Having individuals who are both tech savvy and policy sensitive is a prerequisite for developing effective laws, policies, and norms to guide our democracy in an increasingly tech-driven world. Bringing civics concepts into STEM training can help drive more informed policies around the development and use of technology by building a pipeline of technology-oriented individuals interested in public service, the military, and even private sector work that provides a sense of mission.</p> -<p>The objective of the Sino-Russian strategy is a return to an inherently dangerous and divisive “might makes right” reality in international relations. While disguised as a universal order of sovereign and equal states, such a system defies the equal application of international law to exempt the great powers from any restrictions imposed by universal rules.</p> +<p>“Inspired to Serve,” the report of the National Commission on Military, National, and Public Service, made reinvigorating civics its number one recommendation for inspiring young people to serve:</p> -<p>The new Eastern-led order will privilege major international actors with influence and power to coerce smaller countries. While talking about “multipolarity” and “multilateralism”, both Moscow and Beijing share the position of denying smaller countries equal standing in international relations. This essence of the “new order” is illustrated perfectly by the policy of the anti-Western axis towards Ukraine, which promotes and serves Russian interests.</p> +<blockquote> + <p>Widespread and effective civic education is an essential requirement for fostering a culture of service in which Americans can identify how their own strengths, skills, and interests could contribute to the public good by addressing needs in their communities and Nation. When 22 percent of American adults cannot name any of the three branches of government, it is well past time for the country to take action.</p> +</blockquote> -<h3 id="the-wests-self-defeating-russia-policy">The West’s Self-Defeating Russia Policy</h3> +<p>STEM education has rightly been viewed over the last several decades as a national security imperative. Yet, teaching civics is also a national security imperative. Integrating civics concepts into STEM is critical as society and technology continue to evolve together. The last several decades have seen a decline in civics education that has left too many without a clear understanding of the importance of democracy, the rule of law, or their role in it. This gap exists beyond STEM fields but is particularly consequential for individuals who will help shape innovation moving forward.</p> -<p>At its core, Western Russia policy – especially since Vladimir Putin’s revanchist speech at the 2007 Munich Security Conference – has been mostly focused on global strategic stability.</p> +<p>The future of technology will play a pivotal role in determining whether societies evolve toward greater democracy or slide into authoritarianism. Take AI as an example. AI has the potential to enhance democratic processes by enabling more efficient governance, increasing transparency, and empowering citizens through better access to information. Yet, if AI is left unchecked or misused, it could easily concentrate power in the hands of a few, enabling surveillance, manipulation, and control on an unprecedented scale.</p> -<p>The US’s reset of relations with Russia after the latter’s 2008 war on Georgia ushered in a period of a doomed appeasement strategy. Instead of taming Moscow’s aggression by firmly upholding international law, Putin’s quest to satisfy revanchist “grievances” was tolerated. This policy resulted in destructive consequences for the world. An emboldened Kremlin unleashed disinformation, interference, corruption, subversion and violence on a scale which affects the entire trajectory of global affairs.</p> +<p>An expert in one of our roundtable discussions highlighted the importance of securing market democracy, warning that without public action, big data and AI could lead to a drift toward “totalitarian surveillance [and] oppression.” If the public does not actively shape industrial and government policy “toward [ensuring] diversity, competition, and every individual having a voice,” the system risks tilting in the opposite direction, following the models of Russia and China. Technological advances could instead be used for surveillance, censorship, and repression. China is already exporting this model globally through its Belt and Road Initiative. Its recent sale of Huawei surveillance equipment to Uganda’s military regime is an example of moving a nation toward a surveillance society. The governance structures we establish today will be critical in ensuring that technology serves as a force for democratic empowerment rather than a tool for authoritarian control.</p> -<p>Russia’s war on Ukraine has been the main point of its attack on international peace and security in its efforts to re-establish global dominance.</p> +<p>AI is already being used to refine social media and content algorithms, keeping users engaged in a continuous stream of personalized content. While this may not always be harmful, increasingly personalized feeds can lead to more segmented thinking, the extremization of opinions, and, in some cases, heightened polarization that could escalate into violence. Furthermore, according to Harvard Business Review, AI has the potential to exacerbate existing biases in data, including those against minorities. A 2024 National Academies of Science, Engineering, and Medicine study on facial recognition points out multiple examples of where the systems have misidentified innocent Black Americans, causing them to be arrested. Further, a criminal justice algorithm used in Broward County, Florida, was found to be twice as likely to mislabel African American defendants as “high risk” compared to White defendants.</p> -<p>From the beginning of Russia’s illegal and unprovoked war of aggression on Ukraine in 2014, the West misdefined this interstate war as a “Ukraine crisis” to diminish the international threat of an aggressive Russia. The horrific images of Moscow’s 2022 large-scale offensive and consequent massacres of Ukrainian civilians forced Western leaders to face the grim reality of the actual “Russia crisis”. Now, in 2024, there is finally a growing understanding that Moscow is using its war against Ukraine as a system-changing conflict within a global confrontation driven by the Sino-Russian alliance to bring down the Western-led rules based order.</p> +<p>Our choices now — both at home and as a global society — will influence whether AI becomes a catalyst for a more open, participatory society or a mechanism for exacerbating injustice and reinforcing autocratic regimes. Understanding the role of governance and governance structures is crucial, as these structures, institutions, and processes will have a huge impact on the outcomes.</p> -<p>Despite committing grave violations of international law and undermining world peace, Russia has largely enjoyed protection from the consequences of its criminal actions. At the same time, Ukraine – the victim of Russia’s unprovoked and illegal aggression – has been bound hand and foot in exercising its legal right to self-defence.</p> +<p><em>“We can look at what is happening to society as a result of innovation, and right now, around the AI conversations, there is a sense of we should build what we can, not what we should.… You can’t put the genie back in the bottle, but you can help people holding the bottle understand what the implications may be. The important question to address is: How do we empower people to better understand what the implications are and what role they can play?”</em></p> +<blockquote> + <h4 id="jen-ellis-founder-nextjensecurity">Jen Ellis, Founder, NextJenSecurity</h4> +</blockquote> -<p>Russia – a country with nuclear capabilities and an army, territory and economy many times larger than that of Ukraine – continues to be shielded from concerted international action to counteract its genocidal war of aggression, while Ukraine – a country which gave up its nuclear weapons in exchange for security – has been struggling to receive sufficient international support to defend itself against genocide and safeguard international principles that benefit all.</p> +<h3 id="how-did-we-get-here">How Did We Get Here?</h3> -<p>The inept international response to Russia’s war against Ukraine exposes the grotesque design of the international security system. Eight decades on from the Dumbarton Oaks Conference, the peace and security of humanity is still at the mercy of the two totalitarian, genocidal regimes in Moscow and Beijing, and critically depends on the political resolve in three Western capitals – Washington, London and Paris. In Ukraine’s case, the political position in Berlin also bears influence, considering Germany’s important role in the EU and NATO.</p> +<p>The launch of Sputnik by the Soviet Union in 1957 had a profound impact on the United States, particularly on its education system, leading to a dramatic shift toward STEM education. The shock of Sputnik created a sense of urgency, motivating policymakers, educators, and students to prioritize STEM. Numerous public awareness campaigns highlighted the importance of scientific achievement and encouraged a generation of young people to pursue careers in STEM.</p> -<p>Western powers continue to treat Russia as a pillar of the strategic global balance. It is as a direct consequence of this radically flawed approach that Western policy towards Russian aggression has been ultimately premised on Kyiv making concessions to Moscow.</p> +<p>In 1958, Congress passed the National Defense Education Act, providing substantial federal funding for STEM education. The act aimed to produce more scientists, engineers, and mathematicians to help the United States maintain its technological superiority and enhance national security. On May 10, 1950, U.S. president Harry S. Truman signed the National Science Foundation Act, creating the first federal agency dedicated to supporting education and fundamental research across all scientific disciplines. Since this pivot, the U.S. education system has undergone significant curriculum reforms to emphasize STEM subjects and create a more technically skilled and scientifically literate workforce.</p> -<p>From 2014, Russian interests were accommodated by ever-shifting Western red lines on the invasion; by the position of there being “no military solution” to the conflict which invited bolder Russian aggression; by Washington’s “leading from behind” to avoid a more active role in fulfilling its obligations under the Budapest Memorandum; by symbolic sanctions incommensurate with Moscow’s transgressions; by the Berlin- and Paris-mediated “peace process” which implied concessions from Ukraine by design; and by the policy of “de-escalation” which denied military assistance for Ukraine to mount an effective defence.</p> +<p>These curriculum reforms extended beyond K–12 and into higher education. The launch of Sputnik led to increased support for higher education institutions in the form of funding for research and development programs in STEM fields, leading to the expansion of graduate programs and the establishment of new research facilities.</p> -<p>While Western support for Ukraine has dramatically increased since 2022, when Russia’s role as the aggressor was finally recognised by the UN, the policy approach has remained stuck in the logic that “Russia is too big to fail”.</p> +<p>The focus on STEM education had several implications for civics education in the United States, as the Sputnik-induced shift initially diverted attention and, ultimately, resources from it. As noted in a 2020 commentary, in the decades following Sputnik’s launch, the desire to maintain superiority in STEM-related fields remained a priority as the world grew more connected and complex. Over time, this resulted in less class time and fewer resources available for civics education.</p> -<p>All the major points of Western policy, such as the refusal to deploy NATO troops in Ukraine; the limitations on the use of Western-supplied weapons to strike military targets in Russian territory (and for some, even in Ukraine’s Crimea); and statements like “Russia cannot win in Ukraine”, “we will support Ukraine for as long as it takes”, “we must help Ukraine to strengthen its position at the negotiating table” or “Ukraine will be able to join NATO after winning the war” reflect the underlying reality that Russia’s interests, however illegitimate, play a weighty role in Western decision-making.</p> +<p>Other factors have likely contributed to this dynamic. For instance, STEM metrics and outcomes can be easily and uniformly tracked across different countries, reinforcing and intensifying competition between nations. Moreover, civics education is sometimes viewed as a subjective, politically sensitive area of study. It is also difficult for the general public to conceptualize, internalize, and actively prioritize the importance of a good civics education, which means there is less public pressure for it. In comparison, STEM fields appear straightforward, apolitical, and noncontroversial.</p> -<p>Instead of fully committing to helping Kyiv repel Russian aggression, the West chose to pursue “escalation management”, enabling Moscow to wreak havoc in Ukraine and largely protecting Russia from the war.</p> +<p>In recent decades, the difference in career paths and salaries in STEM versus non-STEM fields has substantially changed. When high school students and college freshmen consider their career paths, STEM fields often offer a clearer sense of direction — leading to roles like doctors and software engineers — frequently with attractive salaries. In contrast, the career path in civics is less defined, though equally important, which may partly explain the increasing preference for STEM among younger generations.</p> -<p>The limited support for Ukraine makes clear that the West never truly had a strategy for Russia’s defeat – which would entail complete unconditional withdrawal of Russian military formations from all of Ukraine, the renunciation of Moscow’s territorial claims, justice for war criminals, and reparations. Without Russia’s defeat, there cannot be a Ukrainian victory, only de facto or de jure concessions by Kyiv.</p> +<h4 id="the-current-state-of-play-in-civics-education">The Current State of Play in Civics Education</h4> -<p>A defeated Russia is an infinitely lesser threat than an undefeated Russia. Sacrificing Ukraine will not solve the problem of the aggressive, revanchist, totalitarian Russian state. If the black hole of Putin’s Russia swallows Ukraine, it will increase its gravitational pull. The West will face the consequences of the new global power re-alignment, consisting first and foremost of Sino-Russian domination in Europe.</p> +<p>The last several decades have seen a drastic decline in civics education in the United States, which has left too many without a clear understanding of the importance of democracy or their role in it. A report by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce Foundation found that “more than 70% of Americans fail a basic civics literacy quiz on topics like the three branches of government, the number of Supreme Court justices, and other basic functions of our democracy.” According to the National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP), in 2022, 22 percent of eighth-graders “scored at or above the NAEP Proficient level in civics.” The 2023 Annenberg Civics Knowledge Survey also found that many adults did not know what rights the First Amendment protected, and only 65 percent of respondents could name the three branches of government.</p> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">The West’s obsessive and unjustifiable avoidance of confrontation with Russia in fact increases the risk of direct engagement becoming the only option</code></em></strong></p> +<p>Funding for civics remains an ongoing issue. Federal funding for K–12 STEM education is roughly $50 per student, while funding for civics is closer to 50 cents. The lack of funding and attention paid to the humanities affects higher education as well. Facing budget constraints, many public universities target humanities and liberal arts programs first in their attempts to balance their budgets. At private universities, prestige and lack of tangible vocational benefits seem to have played a role in this trend. Other factors also contribute to this trend, such as the perceived value of a humanities-centered education and job prospects after graduation. This trend transcends borders. According to Ben Goldstein, “humanities and social science fields without a clear pre-professional connection — disciplines classifiable as ‘qualitative academia’ — have been falling out of favor worldwide. Between 2015 and 2018, the share of bachelors, masters, and doctoral degrees awarded in humanities fields fell 5%, 11%, and 9% respectively on average throughout the OECD, with drops of varying proportions detected in 24 of the 36 OECD countries.”</p> -<p>In fact, by refusing to shoot down Russian missiles and drones in NATO airspace; by refusing to implement a humanitarian military mission to protect Ukraine’s civilian infrastructure, especially its nuclear power plants; by drip-feeding military aid to Kyiv, withholding critically needed weapons and imposing restrictions on Ukrainian strikes against Russia; by stalling on NATO membership for Ukraine; and by accepting China’s say on the security of Europe, the West – and the US in particular – has already manifestly relinquished its leadership role in international relations.</p> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Funding for civics remains an ongoing issue. Federal funding for K–12 STEM education is roughly $50 per student, while funding for civics is closer to 50 cents.</code></em></strong></p> -<p>The self-defeating policy of risk aversion has also severely damaged the credibility of NATO’s own deterrence. NATO is projecting the image of a panic room, not that of an actionable force capable of providing security – even for its own members.</p> +<p>The decline of civics education is matched by a decline of trust in U.S. democracy and democratic institutions, such as the U.S. Congress and the justice system. A 2024 Gallup poll found that only 28 percent of U.S. adults are “satisfied” with how democracy is working in the United States — a new 40-year low. A similar poll found that only 9 percent of U.S. adults have a “great deal” or “quite a lot” of confidence in the U.S. Congress and 30 percent have a “great deal” or “quite a lot” of confidence in the U.S. Supreme Court. Similarly, the 2022 Annenberg Civics Knowledge Survey found that nearly 7 in 10 people (67 percent) agreed with the statement that the Supreme Court “gets too messed up in politics,” an increase of 12 percent since 2019. In 2024, another poll found that “7 in 10 Americans think the high court’s justices are more influenced by ideology.” This perspective is not limited to the highest courts. For example, a 2023 survey by the National Center for State Courts found that 61 percent of respondents believed state courts are “political.”</p> -<h3 id="the-cost-of-inertia-is-rapidly-rising">The Cost of Inertia is Rapidly Rising</h3> +<h4 id="meeting-an-urgent-need--civics-for-adults">Meeting an Urgent Need — Civics for Adults</h4> -<p>The alarming lack of resolute political will in Western capitals to uphold the fundamental rules of global security is giving oxygen to Russia’s and its anti-Western allies’ ambition to reshape our world according to their oppressive vision.</p> +<p>Democracy depends on informed and engaged citizens. Americans today live in one of the most polarized eras in our nation’s history, a pattern that continues to grow exponentially due to information operations by foreign adversaries, declining trust in our democratic institutions, and a lack of civic understanding of how to engage effectively with our democracy. With civics education having been underresourced and undervalued for decades, we now see a resulting lack of civic knowledge and skills that has left many adults ill equipped to fulfill their essential roles within our democracy.</p> -<p>The West cannot isolate itself from the outcome of Russia’s war. This is no longer about “helping Ukraine”, but about the responsibility of Western governments to their own citizens to ensure a peaceful future.</p> +<p>K–12 and higher education reform are critical to rebuilding a foundation of civics knowledge but require significant time to implement before we see results. Given the urgency of the issues, we cannot wait for this long-term investment. There is an immediate need to remedy the current civics knowledge gap among adults.</p> -<p>The West’s obsessive and unjustifiable avoidance of confrontation with Russia in fact increases the risk of direct engagement becoming the only option. For now, while the Ukrainian army maintains high combat readiness, NATO countries can still avoid a direct face-off with Russia by deploying their troops away from the frontline to help Ukraine protect civilian areas and critical infrastructure and deter invasion from Belarus or, potentially, Russia-occupied Transnistria in Moldova if Russia succeeds in subverting the pro-Western course of Chișinău.</p> +<p>Empowering adults with civics knowledge can strengthen democratic participation and counter the growing influence of misinformation, enabling a more resilient and informed electorate. In the technology sector, where professionals are shaping the digital infrastructure of society, understanding the values and aspirations of democracy and the responsibility of individuals in a democracy is even more crucial.</p> -<p>With North Korea sending troops to fight Ukraine, the West’s response to Russia’s war is a watershed moment for the future of humanity. Ukrainians shouldn’t be fighting alone to defend the rules-based order. Not fighting alongside Ukraine means helping Russia to achieve its nefarious goals.</p> +<p>In May 2022, CSIS launched its Civics at Work (CaW) initiative, a partnership with leading civics groups, national security practitioners, and business leaders looking to reinvigorate civics literacy as a national and economic security imperative, both through their respective workforces and in their larger communities. Business leaders, in particular, are optimally positioned to take on this role. As leaders, employers, community members, and patriots, businesses must be at the heart of any effort to reinvigorate the public’s civics awareness and engagement. Commerce, innovation, and U.S. competitiveness all depend on a healthy democracy and continuing commitment to the rule of law. Civics literacy is a fundamental part of a successful and thriving community, and businesses have a unique ability to contribute by investing in their workforces. Furthermore, a Harvard Business Review paper notes that free markets rely on free and stable political systems to thrive, which can be reinforced through stronger civics education.</p> -<p>If the West fails to defend the universality of the values of freedom and justice in Ukraine, it will eventually find itself in the role of the global “minority”, while the Sino-Russian alliance will be legitimised as the voice of the “global majority” and proceed to impose its will over the entirety of the international system.</p> +<p>Importantly, because people today trust their employers more than the government or the media, companies remain one of the few institutions with broad public support and are equipped with the “resources, political power, incentives, and responsibility” to help protect democracy. In another Harvard Business Review white paper, BET Networks president Scott Mills notes that companies also recognize the need to foster environments where employees from diverse backgrounds can collaborate and communicate effectively. As such, skills such as strong collaboration, clear and regular communication, compromise, and mutual respect — areas that can be strengthened by increasing civic skills such as civil discourse and renewing a sense of shared aspirations — are crucial for creating these successful business environments.</p> -<p>The free world urgently needs leadership from both sides of the Atlantic to safeguard the vision of the rules-based order, where countries are protected from spheres of influence and oppressive domination. Rogue states breaking the foundational rules of global security and peace must face a commensurate response. The world needs united and devoted action to save Ukraine in order to save the world.</p> +<p>The private sector plays a critical role in its ability to leverage investment for good — directing financial resources toward initiatives that not only generate profits but also contribute to society. This approach aligns with global policies aimed at mitigating risks associated with new and emerging technologies while also addressing the need to move from a first-to-market mentality to a best-to-market imperative. In this context, the business case for promoting civics education has never been stronger or more critical.</p> -<hr /> +<p><em>“Teaching the discipline of law to those seeking technical graduate degrees in cybersecurity has been highly rewarding. The students are usually intimidated to begin the class but then embrace the study as they begin to understand the “system” of the rule of law in our country - the Separation of Powers; the role of courts; the distinction between legislation and regulation; etc. I am convinced that we can and must cultivate a commitment within science and technology communities to understand the rule of law, to embrace it, to defend it and proselytize about it.”</em></p> +<blockquote> + <h4 id="dan-sutherland-professor-of-cybersecurity-law-and-policy-george-washington-university">Dan Sutherland, Professor of Cybersecurity Law and Policy, George Washington University</h4> +</blockquote> -<p><strong>Volodymyr Ohryzko</strong> is Director of the Centre for Russian Studies in Ukraine. He was the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine from 2007-2009 and the Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Ukraine to Austria from 1999-2004.</p> +<p>As part of CaW, DDI developed Civics for Adults: An Implementation Guide for Businesses, Civics for Adults: A Guide for Civics Content Providers, and hosted discussions on how civics can promote the role of businesses in U.S. democracy. The first business leader to sign up to participate in CSIS’s CaW was Brad Smith, president of Microsoft. During a January 2021 CSIS program on the importance of equipping STEM students with civics education, Smith said:</p> -<p><strong>Roman Sohn</strong> is an international law expert and researcher on the Russian war on Ukraine and Russia’s genocide against Ukrainians.</p> +<blockquote> + <p>Technology has become a multidisciplinary activity and every engineer at a company like Microsoft needs a bigger dose of the liberal arts and civics in particular … and what is true at a place like Microsoft is true across the tech sector …. At the end of the day, the heart of our society is our democratic foundation and therefore civics education always has to be at the heart of this multidisciplinary approach.</p> +</blockquote> -<p><strong>Ariana Gic</strong> is the Director of the Direct Initiative International Centre for Ukraine and a Senior Advisor at the Centre for Eastern European Democracy. Ms Gic is sanctioned by the Russian Federation.</p>Volodymyr Ohryzko, et al.After more than a decade of the largest war in Europe since the Second World War, the West can no longer ignore the fact that the tipping point of the global balance of power lies in Ukraine.SIFMANet Pretoria Report2024-11-01T12:00:00+08:002024-11-01T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/sifmanet-pretoria-report<p><em>This report details the roundtable discussions in Pretoria to share views on South African policy relating to the sanctions on Russia and Belarus, as well as other issues of financial integrity.</em></p> +<h4 id="ongoing-challenges">Ongoing Challenges</h4> -<excerpt /> +<p>Incorporating civics concepts into the STEM and tech worlds faces several ongoing challenges, primarily stemming from a disconnect between scientific and policy communities. Yet, a grasp of how our system works is essential for those entering technology and science-oriented fields; governmental decisions not only directly influence innovation and discovery, but, perhaps even more importantly, directly affect implementation. Teaching scientists and engineers that considering social impact and learning about taking a scientific or engineering concept from idea to use requires understanding — and, quite possibly, acting within a civics context — in order to achieve success; this should be an important aspect of science and engineering education.</p> -<p>In mid-September 2024, the Centre for Finance and Security (CFS) at RUSI, with the support of the South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA), hosted a roundtable in Pretoria. The roundtable provided a forum for private and public sector participants, including banks and government departments (as detailed below), to share views on South African policy relating to the sanctions levied by G7 states on Russia and Belarus, as well as other issues of financial integrity. Identities of participants are confidential.</p> +<p>Bridging the gap between “techies” and policymakers is difficult, as it entails encouraging technologists to navigate the nuanced “gray areas” of societal and policy issues, as well as the equally challenging task of teaching policy professionals that there can be clear right and wrong answers in technical realms. Failure to do so means failed public policy due to a mismatch between legislators and regulators intents and what is technically feasible. It also means failure of scientists and engineers to take into account societal issues as they design the technology. Teaching the two communities to be speak a common language is thus really important for society’s health and wellbeing.</p> -<p>This roundtable was accompanied by a series of additional meetings in Johannesburg and Cape Town with representatives from the financial services industry, academics, policy analysts and government stakeholders, covering expertise in foreign policy, financial services regulation, and sanctions and compliance. These included, among others, the South African Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO), the South African Reserve Bank (SARB), the State Security Agency (SSA) and the Financial Intelligence Centre (FIC). This event is part of the in-country engagements conducted by the CFS-led Sanctions and the Illicit Finance Monitoring and Analysis Network (SIFMANet), supported by the National Endowment for Democracy.</p> +<p>For example, a potential use case could be the accreditation requirements of the British Computer Society (BCS) in the United Kingdom. Founded in 1957, BCS is a charity dedicated to “[raising] standards of competence and conduct across the IT industry.” To achieve this, BCS provides a wide range of accreditation, qualification, and certification services for IT professionals, higher education programs, and at-home education. Due to its international recognition, BCS accreditations and qualifications are highly sought after by employers in the IT sector and academic programs.</p> -<p>Participants in the discussions fell into two general categories, which steered the conversations in the following ways:</p> +<p>To obtain official BCS accreditation, programs and courses must satisfy BCS’s “Criteria for Accreditation.” One such criterion is “the ability to [recognize] the legal, social, ethical and professional issues involved in the exploitation of computer technology and be guided by the adoption of appropriate professional, ethical and legal practices.”</p> -<ol> - <li> - <p>Academics and policy analysts: South Africa has limited direct trade with Russia, but for many reasons the political relationship is stronger than the figures imply. As a result, many representatives of the academic and policy research communities have travelled to Russia since 2022 to attend trade fairs and other economic and political events. These participants tended to focus on local policymaking sovereignty and political matters, rather than assessing South Africa’s position on Russia sanctions.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Financial services: Many participants in the meetings worked in compliance and legal functions in banks, or in supervisory and regulatory roles relating to the sector. In contrast to the academics and policy analysts, these participants expressed considerable concern about the need to balance international regulators’ and banking partners’ expectations against South Africa’s policy of neutrality, non-alignment and multilateralism.</p> - </li> -</ol> +<p>The BCS use case has been studied to assess its effectiveness in implementing a nationwide ethics requirement in educational curricula. A study by Tom McEwan and Sandra Cairncross from Edinburgh Napier University notes some challenges in implementing BCS’s Legal, Social, Ethical and Professional Issues (LSEPIs) criteria in higher education. In their paper, the authors observed that “technically-oriented undergraduate students are often reluctant to engage with [BCS’s] ‘Legal, Social, Ethical and Professional Issues (LSEPI).’” They further noted that, after a decade of increasingly relaxed social and ethical standards in certain media, such as widespread illegal downloading of music, video, and software, many current UK undergraduates “appear to have an increasingly cavalier attitude to intellectual property in digital media” despite receiving BCS training.</p> -<p>As a result, the discussions covered a wide range of topics, but generally were concerned thematically with how South Africa can create its own independent diplomatic and political path while also benefiting from cooperation with competing great powers.</p> +<p>While this is just one paper examining the efficacy of BCS’s LSEPI requirements, it presents a mixed picture. The requirements are well intentioned and capable of being implemented on a national scale, but they still encounter many of the same challenges faced by traditional general education and undergraduate requirements in the United Kingdom. Fundamentally, the results may point toward the importance of instilling a sense of civic responsibility to help explain why students should care about ethics.</p> -<h3 id="non-alignment-and-the-material-consequences-of-sanctions">Non-alignment and the Material Consequences of Sanctions</h3> +<p>Another challenge lies in educating teachers on how to integrate civics into STEM curricula. Education schools are not adequately preparing teachers to teach civics, let alone equipping STEM teachers to integrate civics concepts into their lessons. Political polarization exacerbates the challenge. For example, a study by Daniela Kruel DiGiacomo et al. found that only 28 percent of teachers believe parents would support them teaching about contemporary elections, even though 81 percent report that doing so would help meet state curriculum standards. This impacts both the content teachers feel comfortable covering and the overall quality of civics education students receive. Additionally, the same study found that schools lack training for teachers on handling polarization, largely due to insufficient administrative support. As a result, 92 percent of teachers said they will “shut down” student discussions on contentious topics to avoid partisan conflicts, rather than encouraging constructive dialogue and working on civil discourse.</p> -<p>Participants’ initial reactions to engagement regarding sanctions focused on South Africa’s policies of multilateralism and neutrality. The government’s policy is to enforce only UN sanctions, rejecting what it sees as unilaterally applied restrictive measures on Russia and Belarus. As one government representative put it: “We value our relations with our partners whether it’s where the sun rises or where the sun sets.”</p> +<p>Moreover, an expert in one of our roundtable discussions noted the ongoing challenge of engaging some first-generation students, and other minorities that are underrepresented in STEM fields, with civics because they often feel disenfranchised by the very system we ask them to study and value. A potential solution could be to emphasize that civics can empower them to become effective agents of change, helping to dismantle barriers and injustices that prevent more students from advancing in STEM careers.</p> -<p>Participants frequently referred to the theoretical dimensions of the fallout of this stance, and a sense of being stuck in the middle between fighting factions. A failure to apply sanctions would worsen relationships with the G7, while applying them would cause political (if not trading) difficulties with Russia. “Being forced to choose sides between Russia and the West – this is not something we should be asked to do”, one academic participant noted. Several participants described the situation as similar to Cold War-era divisions. As a result, some noted that government decisions are rooted at times not in a policy’s merit, but its perceived geopolitical alignment.</p> +<p>Moreover, the binary thinking often characteristic of STEM fields — and the focus on solving technical problems — leads many to avoid political discourse and civic engagement, mistakenly believing it doesn’t apply to them. Many in the field are drawn to STEM subjects precisely to avoid the messiness of civil society, preferring a world seen through the binary lens of 0s and 1s. Teaching STEM students that it is not only acceptable to engage in discussions that involve ethics and values, but that it is in fact necessary and valuable in developing acceptable technical solutions to societal problems, is thus critical.</p> -<p>At the same time, private sector participants noted that South Africa’s historically close ties to Russia had led some leaders to make statements that undermined its neutral position. According to one participant, “sometimes what comes out of politicians’ mouths is not non-alignment, and that does affect perceptions of the country”.</p> +<p>Understanding the variety of motivations of tech professionals is important. An expert in one of our roundtable discussions described the four Ps of motivation guiding people in the field: protection, prestige, patriotism, and puzzle-solving. The challenge — and the opportunity — lies in finding the commonality between those motivations and being civically literate.</p> -<p>The conversation then focused on sanctions’ effects in South Africa, with participants highlighting numerous developmental dilemmas that South African policymakers face. For example, government representatives cited the need for economic growth and new jobs for a growing and ambitious population, with one saying, “we would like to see a safer Africa in a better world that is peaceful”.</p> +<p>Finally, incentives within the business world are not always in sync with broader societal good. While corporate responsibilities lie with shareholders and employees, the right decision for business is not always seen as aligned with what’s best for society. Framing democracy as a business asset is a critical step in aligning private sector incentives with public good. Although the tension between societal good and corporate responsibilities is an issue that we will continue to grapple with, there are numerous cases in which the private sector leverages its influence to safeguard democracy and incentivize civic-minded investment. These companies recognize the importance of civics education as a business imperative and have incorporated it into their programs, demonstrating the societal impact of technology and its alignment with democratic principles.</p> -<p>Academic participants noted the developmental impact of the sanctions, highlighting the timing immediately following the Covid-19 pandemic. They noted the inflationary pressures and resulting interest rate increases, which one participant observed “led to a significant effect on the masses, particularly on the poor indebted”. Another academic agreed, highlighting the sanctions’ impact on the “debt crisis in the African continent”.</p> +<h3 id="conclusion-and-recommendations">Conclusion and Recommendations</h3> -<p>Another issue discussed was energy, with one policy analyst noting that South Africa is likely to face a gas crisis after 2026. Gazprom, they said, was one solution to this issue. Other participants saw opportunities for building stronger intra-African supply chains, rather than relying on imports from other continents. Fertiliser and energy were cited as areas where this had been discussed.</p> +<p>Democracy is neither invincible nor inevitable. It can only be sustained by a civically informed and engaged citizenry that comes together with a common purpose. However, this fundamental prerequisite is threatened by the decades-long decline in civics education, which has left Americans lacking the skills to fulfill their essential role in moving us toward a more perfect union.</p> -<p>Participants also assessed the importance of engaging with G7 countries on these material and developmental impacts of sanctions. In addition to emphasising the country’s overall policy of multilateralism, it may be important to identify the problematic consequences of sanctions in South Africa and seek potential diplomatic solutions that would ease these effects.</p> +<p>As we move to reinvigorate civics education, we cannot afford to leave anyone behind. We cannot settle for reaching only those who are already interested in government and the role of the individual in a democracy. We must find ways to also engage those whose interests lie in more technological and scientific fields. And we must reach adults as well as students.</p> -<h3 id="using-other-financial-crime-compliance-tools-to-address-sanctions-risks">Using Other Financial Crime Compliance Tools to Address Sanctions Risks</h3> +<p>The challenges we face today — polarization, misinformation, and a lack of trust in our institutions — underscore the urgent need for a reinvigorated focus on civics education. As democracy’s survival hinges upon informed participation, it is essential that education systems empower citizens to understand their role in shaping our more perfect union. Nowhere is this more important than in the STEM and tech world. Science and technology have an undisputed influence on society, and the decisions made by tech professionals shape not only the future of innovation but also the fabric of society and its democratic institutions.</p> -<p>Participants from the banking sector said they lacked detailed guidance from the government to support them with their concerns about international regulators’ and business partners’ sanctions compliance expectations. The conversations took on greater urgency because of the greylisting of South Africa by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) in February 2023, as a result of which South Africa began work on a 22-point mutually agreed Action Plan to address the deficiencies identified by FATF. Private sector participants worried that the country’s financial crime reputation would be further hampered if secondary sanctions were placed on a South African bank, and/or if correspondent banks – those global banks that connect South African banks to the international financial system – were no longer willing to process transactions with the country’s financial institutions as a result of perceived sanctions circumvention risks.</p> +<p>Infusing civics concepts into STEM education can ensure that the next generation of technologists understands that they have a civic responsibility to think about the societal impact of their innovations. This interdisciplinary approach is key to preparing a workforce that is technically skilled and civically engaged, including engagement in the development of norms, policies, and laws.</p> -<p>Representatives from South Africa’s supervisory and regulatory bodies agreed that, because the stated policy was one of neutrality, they were unable to provide detailed guidance for complying with G7 sanctions. However, many of these representatives also emphasised the importance of ensuring other financial crime controls were robust in order to mitigate some aspects of sanctions risks and concerns. They felt that some of South Africa’s improvements to meet the FATF Action Plan agenda – particularly around identifying beneficial ownership – would also improve banks’ ability to manage sanctions risk. To that end, South Africa updated its beneficial ownership regime in 2023. SARB has recently imposed administrative penalties on some banks and insurance companies for failures in relation to beneficial owner identification and other financial crime deficiencies, measures that should lead to great focus on these issues across the regulated sector.</p> +<p>Integrating civics concepts into the STEM and tech world is not just an educational priority — it is a democratic imperative. As technology continues to shape the world, those at the forefront of innovation must be equipped with the civic knowledge and ethical grounding to guide their work responsibly. And those making governance decisions must be equally prepared to meet the demands of a complex and technological future.</p> -<p>Terrorism financing (TF) and proliferation finance (PF) were also highlighted as areas of concern, with representatives from financial regulators highlighting the results of the June 2024 Terror Financing National Risk Assessment (known as the TF NRA). The TF NRA primarily focused on Islamic State and right-wing terrorism, rather than the activities of Wagner Group or other Russian-backed military groups. However, representatives from the supervisory authorities said that “the financial aspect of foreign military training” had been taken into consideration in the TF NRA.</p> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Integrating civics concepts into the STEM and tech world is not just an educational priority — it is a democratic imperative.</code></em></strong></p> -<p>Participants noted the potential overlap between the TF and PF regimes, on one hand, and the Russia sanctions regimes, on the other. They noted similarities to the May 2024 Mutual Evaluation Report for Jersey, released by the Council of Europe’s permanent monitoring body, the Committee of Experts on the Evaluation of Anti-Money Laundering Measures and the Financing of Terrorism (MONEYVAL). The evaluation reported few TF and PF regimes in relation to UN sanctions, but highlighted the significant action undertaken by the Jersey authorities on Russia sanctions implementation, which assured assessors that the relevant systems and controls are in place.</p> +<p><em>HOW DO WE INTEREST STEM STUDENTS AND TECH WORKERS IN CIVICS?</em></p> -<p>Participants from government bodies also discussed the closer relationship between the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) and Russia, and the potential conventional weapons and nuclear weapons proliferation implications of that relationship. One participant asked, “Do you start coming to Russia sanctions through DPRK or vice versa?”, suggesting that the growing nexus between Russia and the DPRK, in breach of UN Security Council sanctions on the DPRK, might play a future role in assessing South Africa’s response to Russia sanctions. Reflecting this perspective, participants said that South African government bodies responsible for counter-proliferation controls had become more active recently, but that they needed to widen their focus: “They’re looking at a very narrow aspect of PF, so we need to refresh the PF risk assessments.”</p> +<p><strong>Reveal Impact:</strong> Herbert Lin, a fellow in cyber policy at Stanford University, often tells his students that it behooves them to understand how government works because it is government that effectively dictates what we can know and understand about the universe, primarily through decisions about how to allocate its massive funding. AI and cybersecurity are good examples of how governments are developing rules, regulations, and policies that will impact the development and deployment of technology. But technical experts are not just impacted — they can and should also have an impact. They are members of society with valuable experience and skills to bring to societal problems, and thus they should participate in the discussions both as experts and as members of society.</p> -<p>Nonetheless, both private and public sector representatives accepted that banks’ focus on beneficial ownership, as well as improving their TF and PF controls, would not solve their geopolitical dilemma. “The implications of things that are not [UN Security Council-endorsed] sanctions would be a problem for us to manage”, a government representative said.</p> +<p><strong>Elevate the Role of Translators Between STEM and Policy:</strong> There is a critical need for individuals who can bridge the gap between STEM and policy by getting involved in the process and acting as “translators.” These professionals must understand both technical concepts and policy implications, enabling them to communicate effectively between the two communities. Teaching policymakers the technical aspect of emerging technologies, while helping technologists navigate the complexities of policy, is essential for fostering collaboration and innovation. To strengthen this vital role, we must create programs and positions that elevate these “translators” by raising awareness of their importance, making these roles more prestigious, and incentivizing individuals to pursue them. By recognizing and investing in these positions, we can ensure that the intersection of technology and policy is more effectively navigated, driving ethical innovation and informed decisionmaking. There are several examples of Master of Science (MS) degrees in tech and public policy, but there is still room for more. In the field of cybersecurity, Tufts University offers a degree in Cybersecurity and Public Policy and the University of Texas at Austin offers a Master of Public Affairs (MPAff ) dual degree program between its Cockrell School of Engineering and its Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs.</p> -<h3 id="secondary-sanctions-and-correspondent-banking-relationships">Secondary Sanctions and Correspondent Banking Relationships</h3> +<p><strong>Connect to the Scientific Revolution and the Age of Enlightenment:</strong> STEM students may be interested in the connections between the Scientific Revolution, with its questioning of established concepts and structures, and its influence on the Age of Enlightenment, which in turn informed the Declaration of Independence and the U.S. Constitution, with the framers developing our radical system of government in the same breath, and in much the same way, that a new world of scientific discovery and understanding was helping inform new ways of thinking. The framers did not see a bright distinction between what today we might call “hard science” and “soft science.”</p> -<p>While needing to balance these policy concerns, banks said they were aware of the sanctions risks and demonstrated their commitment to improving their controls in order to maintain strong relationships with overseas partners.</p> +<p><strong>Bridge the Gap between Binary and Shades of Gray:</strong> We must explore how the mathematical and scientific principles and “answers” that seem so black and white today actually arrived through a process — a process of discernment and discovery that did not always yield societal acceptance at first. Similarly, the framers of the Constitution set up not just institutions but a process for arriving at the “right” answer for the advancement of individuals, society, and the nation. And just as science is constantly raising new questions about long-held answers or assumptions about the universe, democracy is always moving toward a more perfect union, with change coming about through the work of informed and engaged citizens.</p> -<p>To the degree possible, regulators also sought to support banks to get the information they require. Government representatives said they were committed to awareness raising, outreach and training for compliance personnel, although “we don’t prescribe any search criteria”. As noted previously, much of this guidance refers to general controls, rather than sanctions-specific guidance.</p> +<p><strong>Leverage the Scientific Method to Strengthen Civic Engagement:</strong> The principles of the scientific method — critical thinking, evidence-based reasoning, and an iterative approach to problem-solving — offer a powerful framework for enhancing civic engagement. By teaching students to apply the scientific method to democratic participation, we can cultivate a more informed and thoughtful citizenry. Encouraging students to evaluate information with the same rigor they would in a scientific setting allows them to engage in civil discourse and embrace differing perspectives. This connection between scientific inquiry and the democratic process helps foster collaboration and critical thinking, empowering students who are driven to solve problems to apply their skills to civic challenges. Embedding these principles into civics education not only reinforces a sense of civic responsibility but also ensures that the next generation is equipped to address complex societal issues with thoughtful, evidence-based approaches.</p> -<p>Banking representatives also criticised international private and public sector partners for a lack of guidance relevant to the South African context. Private sector representatives said that many case studies and typologies for evasion and circumvention were focused on Russian evasion activities in or from Europe or the US, rather than reflecting the African context. Similarly, banks said they would be able to carry out better risk assessments of their customers and transactions if they received more detailed information from correspondent banks, which often change their criteria without notification or explanation. They said they may be able to proactively identify potential clients or transaction patterns of concern if they had more detailed information.</p> +<p><em>WHAT ARE THE MOST IMPORTANT CIVICS CONCEPTS TO CONVEY?</em></p> -<p>There were also concerns about new financial technologies (including cryptocurrencies and stable coins) and smaller banks, which were seen to have less mature financial crime compliance systems. The regulatory participants said they were aware of and considering the implications of these and were working to align their standards. However, one private sector representative said that they noted a large difference in compliance maturity between the country’s few larger banks, when compared to smaller (“Tier 2”) banks. Most illicit actors, they said, would not carry out transactions through the larger banks, but instead through the mid-sized and smaller institutions.</p> +<blockquote> + <h4 id="csiss-civics-for-adults"><code class="highlighter-rouge">CSIS’s Civics for Adults</code></h4> +</blockquote> -<p>Another issue, one participant said, was the lack of knowledge within South African banks about how to consider trade-related sanctions and restrictive measures. There was little discussion, they said, between the trade finance and sanctions teams. As a result, “a lot of the banking industry doesn’t know how to apply sanctions in a trade environment”.</p> +<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Developed in partnership with the Annenberg Public Policy Center at the University of Pennsylvania, CSIS’s Civics for Adults guide aims to help civics experts and content providers create resources for business, government, and higher education leaders. The goal is to enhance civic understanding among adults and improve the functioning of democratic institutions within communities by identifying existing resources suitable for adults and adapting civics materials originally designed for schools.</code></em></p> -<h3 id="aligning-financial-services-supervision">Aligning Financial Services Supervision</h3> +<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">First, the guide emphasizes that civic knowledge alone is insufficient; it must be paired with civic skills that can produce positive outcomes for both institutions and communities. Second, it offers actionable guidance on developing civics content for adults, ensuring they grasp the importance of the federal system, the roles of each branch of government, the separation of powers, the rule of law, and civilian control of the armed forces. Additionally, it highlights the importance of promoting civic engagement and fostering a sense of civic responsibility in learners. Only when individuals take ownership of their work and are invested in the success of their institutions and communities can they consistently make decisions that contribute to the long-term health of democracy.</code></em></p> -<p>Another theme from the engagement with government representatives was that supervision was spread across several departments spanning banking and non-banking financial services, financial surveillance and the SARB payments department. Participants said that there was an “imbalance” in the capacity and coverage of the sectors.</p> +<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">The guide also provides advice on how to effectively tailor civics to adults, noting that adults are typically self-directed learners who engage more with content when it has immediate relevance to their lives or careers. It emphasizes that materials should include narratives that resonate with adults’ work experiences and lived realities, sparking discussions about both the strengths and shortcomings of current systems. Further, employers should focus on implementing achievable civics goals, such as encouraging employees to vote or compensating them for jury duty or community service.</code></em></p> -<p>Participants said they had been surprised by the Jersey MONEYVAL evaluation because the jurisdiction had one main supervisor, causing them to consider their own supervision architecture. The participants said they were also engaging with other international regulatory bodies to understand their supervision model. The key, participants agreed, was to have consistency and communication between them.</p> +<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Lastly, the guide stresses that outreach should not be limited to large corporations or government institutions. Equal attention should be given to local chambers of commerce, small businesses, community colleges, and trade schools. While concise, this guide serves as a practical starting point for content creators developing or adapting civics resources to engage adults in both their workplaces and communities.</code></em></p> -<h3 id="conclusion">Conclusion</h3> +<p>CSIS’s Civics for Adults guide discusses the key civics concepts all Americans should understand (see box above).</p> -<p>Based on these discussions, it was clear that the South African government had a clear policy of non-alignment and neutrality when it comes to G7 sanctions on Russia, despite trade relations favouring closer alignment with the West. At the same time, there appears to be room for open and pragmatic conversations on both sides: for South African policymakers to express their reservations and material concerns about the financial impacts of sanctions for their economic security, stability and development, and for G7 governments to provide greater information about their priorities. There may also be an opportunity for G7 countries to consider the specific concerns of South Africa (and other non-aligned countries) – for example, how to support both alternative resolutions to energy supply issues (notably the forthcoming gas supply issue), and intra-African trade. Even within the South African framing regarding its neutrality, discussions emphasised that Russia sanctions had implications for South Africa’s economic stability. Where impacts on particular sectors were keenly felt, participants highlighted a greater need for dialogue with the EU, the US and the UK, as well as potentially some coordination with regional African organisations, to raise similar concerns. This may be particularly relevant for issues around the debt crisis and evidencing any impacts of the sanctions on the population. Even within the South African framing regarding its neutrality, discussions emphasised that Russia sanctions had implications for South Africa’s economic stability. Where impacts on particular sectors were keenly felt, participants highlighted a greater need for dialogue with the EU, the US and the UK, as well as potentially some coordination with regional African organisations, to raise similar concerns. This may be particularly relevant for issues around the debt crisis and evidencing any impacts of the sanctions on the population.</p> +<p>Of particular importance in the technology arena is an understanding of civic responsibility — obligations that go beyond oneself and are essential for a functioning democracy based on the then-radical idea of self-governance. Civic responsibility can help inform the “why” of ethics. It can also strengthen the message that security, particularly cybersecurity, is a shared responsibility between the government and the individual.</p> -<p>Many of the concerns raised by the private sector centred on how to obtain better information relevant to their context to improve their financial crime compliance (including but not limited to information related to Russian sanctions). This may include G7 countries providing country- or region-specific typologies for Russian evasion and circumvention. It may also include better communication between correspondent banks and their partners in South Africa. At the same time, private sector representatives remain legally bound to comply with South African law, which excludes the G7 sanctions.</p> +<p>Also important, as noted, is an understanding of how policy decisions are made and at what level(s) of government. Major funding decisions are generally made by the U.S. Congress and the executive branch, but state and local governments can also impact the level of resources available for the development of technology or new engineering projects, for example. Similarly, policies and laws establishing limits or guidelines for scientific or technological research could come from federal, state, or even local governments. Understanding our system of federalism is important for understanding how to bring about change or influence outcomes.</p> -<p>One partial solution to this tension may be to improve wider financial crime controls, highlighted by South Africa’s focus on better beneficial owner identification, which was driven by the country’s effort to escape the FATF greylist. However, this can only be a partial solution at best: banks will face the same dilemmas if they receive beneficial ownership information indicating that an account is held by a sanctioned Russian individual.</p> +<p>Finally, reinforcing a sense of shared values and aspirations captured in the notion of a more perfect union, for which we must always strive, can help strengthen the commitment to using STEM-related expertise to reinforce, rather than undermine, those values.</p> -<p>In sum, when it comes to sanctions on Russia, the private sector in South Africa finds itself caught in an invidious position between stewarding critical international relationships (notably with correspondent banks) that are central to the country’s economic security and a government that for political – not economic – reasons, chooses a policy of non-alignment with the West.</p> +<p><em>HOW DO WE GET CIVICS CONCEPTS INTO THE STEM CURRICULUM?</em></p> -<hr /> +<p>Civics education must be embedded across a variety of subjects, not limited to social studies. Civics concepts should permeate STEM fields, where the intersection of technology, ethics, and policy is increasingly important.</p> -<p><strong>Olivia Allison</strong> is an Associate Fellow at RUSI and an independent consultant. She has more than 15 years’ experience carrying out complex international investigations and supporting the development of integrity and governance for state-owned companies, international companies and international financial institutions. She has a wide range of financial crime and asset-tracing experience from leadership roles held in London, Moscow, Kyiv and Kazakhstan.</p>Olivia AllisonThis report details the roundtable discussions in Pretoria to share views on South African policy relating to the sanctions on Russia and Belarus, as well as other issues of financial integrity.Crossing Deepfake Rubicon2024-11-01T12:00:00+08:002024-11-01T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/crossing-deepfake-rubicon<p><em>New research finds that we can now no longer trust our eyes and ears to reliably distinguish between real and AI-generated images, audio, and video. What does this mean in a world where the weaponization of synthetic media is becoming increasingly prevalent?</em></p> +<p><strong>Leverage Initiatives Such As the 2023 National Cyber Workforce and Education Strategy:</strong></p> -<excerpt /> +<p>Among the foundational skills highlighted in the strategy are the following:</p> <ul> <li> - <p>In recent years, threat actors have increasingly used synthetic media — digital content produced or manipulated by artificial intelligence (AI) — to enhance their deceptive activities, harming individuals and organizations worldwide with growing frequency.</p> + <p>“Be Active Participants in Society and the Economy.”</p> </li> <li> - <p>In addition, the weaponization of synthetic media has also begun to undermine people’s trust in information integrity more widely, posing concerning implications for the stability and resilience of the U.S.’s information environment.</p> + <p>“Understand the Social, Technical, &amp; Cultural Dynamics of Computational Technology, including Equity and Inclusion.”</p> </li> <li> - <p>At present, an individual’s ability to recognize AI-generated content remains the primary defense against people falling prey to deceptively presented synthetic media.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>However, a recent experimental study by CSIS found that people are no longer able to reliably distinguish between authentic and AI-generated images, audio, and video sourced from publicly available tools.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>That human detection has ceased to be a reliable method for identifying synthetic media only heightens the dangers posed by the technology’s misuse, underscoring the pressing need to implement alternative countermeasures to address this emerging threat.</p> + <p>“Ethically, Securely, and Safely Use Information” and “Recognize the Rights, Privacy, Responsibilities, &amp; Opportunities of an Interconnected Digital World.”</p> </li> </ul> -<h3 id="introduction">Introduction</h3> - -<p>Synthetic media, which refers to text, images, audio, and video generated or manipulated by AI, presents both significant opportunities and risks. Recent advancements in generative AI technology have considerably reduced the data, computing power, and cost required to create highly realistic synthetic content. Coupled with the technology’s growing accessibility, as evident from the rapidly expanding constellation of widely available user-friendly offerings, it has become easier than ever for anyone to manufacture genuine-seeming digital content using AI. The uses of such technology are seemingly endless, from the humorous, such as making fictional images of the pope wearing Balenciaga or videos of Tom Cruise dancing, to the commercial, such as streamlining work by assisting in email writing or creating digital avatars of people to use in training videos, news stories, or even for speaking with simulations of deceased loved ones. There has also been significant interest in harnessing generative AI’s transformative potential for the greater good, from accelerating critical scientific research to making sophisticated disability aids like glasses that translate speech to text for the hard of hearing.</p> - -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/5iB2pou.jpeg" alt="image01" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Synthetic images of Pope Francis wearing Balenciaga, first shared on Reddit by creator Pablo Xavier, which quickly went viral across social media platforms. To this day, many viewers still do not realize this is AI-generated.</strong> Source: <a href="https://www.reddit.com/r/midjourney/comments/120vhdc/the_pope_drip/">Pablo Xavier, “The Pope Drip,” Reddit, March 24, 2023</a>.</em></p> - -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/x5mAyuM.png" alt="image02" /> -<em>▲ <strong>One of the many videos featured on the now widely notorious Tom Cruise deepfake account on TikTok.</strong> Source: <a href="https://www.tiktok.com/@deeptomcruise/video/7181490100314885382?lang=en">deeptomcruise, TikTok video, December 26, 2022, 00:19</a>.</em></p> - -<p>Yet, generative AI has also become a potent tool for misuse. On the morning of May 22, 2023, an AI-generated photograph reportedly showing an explosion near the Pentagon began to circulate extensively on social media platforms, causing widespread confusion and panic as well as a temporary but meaningful dip in the U.S. stock market. While any adverse effects from this particular incident, in the end, were nominal, its occurrence nonetheless is illustrative of a broader trend of synthetic media being utilized to damaging ends. From criminal activities to adversarial military and intelligence operations, generative AI has more and more empowered the deception capabilities of threat actors, permitting them to manufacture convincingly realistic but fake digital content (colloquially known by many as “deepfakes”) at unprecedented speed, scale, and degrees of precision. The rising ease of use and utility of the technology has led to a boom of AI-enabled deception incidents taking place over recent years, with the technology’s abuse inflicting a growing amount of financial, reputational, physical, and mental harm to individuals and organizations worldwide. Already, the dangers posed by weaponized synthetic media have begun to shift from the theoretical to the realized.</p> - -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/xvc9yZI.png" alt="image03" /> -<em>▲ <strong>This synthetic image was falsely reported as a photograph of an explosion near the Pentagon. It was widely circulated before being debunked as fake, causing widespread confusion and even a temporary dip in the U.S. stock market.</strong> Source: <a href="https://x.com/sentdefender/status/1660650575569059840/photo/1">OSINTdefender (@sentdefender), X post, May 22, 2023, 09:04 am</a>.</em></p> - -<p>Thus far, the threat that has garnered the most public attention and alarm has been the risk of AI-enabled deceptions disrupting political elections by influencing voting outcomes, instigating unrest and violence, or damaging trust in the electoral process. Among the record number of elections held in 2024, the majority have already been subject to widely-circulated synthetic content that falsely depicts politicians or famous figures engaging in inappropriate or controversial behavior, criticizing their opposition, and promising policy changes. With the U.S. presidential election only a week away, widespread concerns have been understandably raised about the dangers of a flood of AI-generated content amplifying misinformation, or of an opportunely timed viral synthetic image or video of a political candidate influencing voters’ decisions.</p> - -<p>Today’s synthetic media threat landscape extends far beyond the realm of political elections. AI-enabled financial fraud was found to have risen by 700 percent in 2023, and experts have predicted it will result in losses of up to $40 billion by 2027. Meanwhile, AI nonconsensual intimate media, accounting for 96 percent of all synthetic videos online as of 2019, has already claimed what is estimated to be millions of adults and children as victims — with that number expected to rise swiftly. Other AI-enabled deception incidents have also occurred with increasing frequency, spanning gray zone warfare such as influence operations and cyberattacks, espionage and surveillance, military deception operations, domestic disinformation, and more. As improvements in the technology’s capabilities and accessibility continue, the volume and breadth of deception activity will likely grow.</p> - -<p>The discrete harms arising from these incidents are further compounded by a more insidious danger: AI-enabled deception threatens to corrode the public’s trust in the integrity of all information more broadly. There is already evidence that this has started to occur. In turn, this risks imperiling the foundations of the U.S.’s information environment, a vital pillar of societal stability and resilience.</p> - -<p>Today, the principal defense against AI-enabled deceptions is people’s ability to recognize synthetic media when encountering it in their day-to-day lives. However, rapid advancements in generative AI have increasingly constrained human detection capabilities as synthetic media has become more convincingly realistic. While the necessity of adopting alternative countermeasures, spanning from the technological to the regulatory, to compensate has been widely recognized as critical, in practice, implementation of these measures remains largely nascent. As such, this growing vulnerability means that awareness of when people are no longer able to depend solely on their eyes and ears to detect AI-generated content is critical in order to better recognize when human detection is no longer an effective safeguard against the technology’s misuse.</p> +<p>These objectives are all advanced by civics education.</p> -<p>To determine the current level of human detection capabilities, CSIS conducted a large-scale experimental study testing individuals’ ability to differentiate between authentic media and synthetic images, audio, and videos sourced from publicly accessible generative AI technology. Overall, the study found that people struggled to accurately identify AI-generated content to any meaningful degree, with some demographics being more susceptible to certain types of synthetic media than others. This brief reviews the study’s key findings and offers an overview of the current synthetic media threat landscape, examining both ongoing and speculative harms in areas in which the abuse of this technology has become more prevalent. It is clear that weaponized synthetic media has begun to mature from an emergent to an established national security threat. That the inflection point has now been reached where human detection capabilities are unreliable only serves to underscore the pressing need to implement robust alternative countermeasures to address this growing danger.</p> +<p>The strategy also seeks to “Invigorate the Pursuit of Foundational Cyber Skills and Cyber Careers.” As noted earlier, the Commission on Public Service determined that teaching civics was one of the most important and foundational ways to inspire public service and careers with a mission.</p> -<h3 id="the-study-results">The Study Results</h3> +<p>Finally, the strategy notes that “cyber education should be integrated across disciplines so learners can gain the requisite knowledge and skills in relevant and contextualized learning experiences.” Again, the kind of cross-discipline approach advocated in this report meets that objective.</p> -<p>To assess how well people were able to detect AI-generated content, CSIS conducted a perceptual study involving nearly 1,300 North Americans aged from 18 to 85. Participants were asked to distinguish between synthetic and authentic media items, including images, audio, and videos both silent and fully audiovisual. The study also examined how other factors affected detection performance, including authenticity, language, modality, image subject matter, age, and participants’ preexisting familiarity with synthetic media. To ensure that the AI-generated content would be representative of the quality and type of synthetic media people were likely to come across “in the wild”, or in their daily lives, all synthetic test items were sourced from publicly available products and services.</p> +<p><strong>Support Teacher Training and Professional Development:</strong> Teachers play a central role in fostering civic engagement among students, but they need better support to effectively incorporate civics and ethics into STEM subjects. Professional development programs should equip educators with the tools to teach the ethical and civic dimensions of technology. Partnerships between schools, universities, and tech companies can also help educators stay up-to-date with the latest technological advancements and their societal implications. Additionally, teacher training schools should place greater emphasis on teaching educators to teach civics, especially in today’s politically polarized environment. This training should include an understanding of the pervasive impact of technology in government. For example, the rollout of the Affordable Care Act and efforts to use technology for a more transparent and accountable government could serve as relevant case studies. Potential STEM teachers should also be required to have a basic understanding of civics and the role of laws and be encouraged to use similar examples in their classes.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/FZ4l7RX.png" alt="image04" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 1: Average Detection Accuracy by Media Type.</strong> Source: <a href="https://arxiv.org/abs/2403.16760">Di Cooke et al., “As Good As A Coin Toss: Human detection of AI-generated images, videos, audio, and audiovisual stimuli,” March 25, 2024</a>.</em></p> +<p><strong>Inspire STEM-Related Civic Engagement:</strong> Schools across the country should experiment with integrating social studies and STEM concepts. For example, in 2021, U.S. history teachers at South Doyle High School in Knoxville, Tennessee, developed a cross-disciplinary project to explore the city’s lack of sidewalks. This project allowed students to learn about post–World War II history, 1950s building codes, urban planning, civil engineering, and even the health impacts of inadequate walking infrastructure, such as its effects on heart health and obesity rates. Although this is just one example, it demonstrates how some schools are working to bridge the gap between civics and the hard sciences.</p> -<p>Altogether, the study’s findings paint a bleak picture of people’s ability to discern the legitimacy of digital content in today’s world. On average, participants correctly distinguished between synthetic and authentic media 51.2 percent of the time — roughly equivalent in accuracy to a coin toss. Images were the most difficult for participants to identify (49 percent average accuracy), with better detection performance on silent videos (51 percent) and audio clips (54 percent). Participants were the most successful at determining the authenticity of fully audiovisual clips (55 percent). These results are relatively unsurprising since public discourse and scientific research have closely monitored people’s diminishing detection capabilities as generative AI has advanced in recent years. Nonetheless, it is valuable to confirm that this critical watershed moment has indeed been reached: humans can no longer depend solely on their own eyes and ears to reliably distinguish between reality and AI-generated falsehoods.</p> +<p><strong>Integrate Cybersecurity and AI as Use Cases:</strong> AI presents an unparalleled opportunity to engage students and the public in discussions about ethics and civic responsibility. Integrating AI as a focal point in civics education, from K–12 to higher education, can enhance students’ understanding of both historical context and the role technology plays in democracy. Policymakers, educators, and communities must work together to ensure AI is not only a subject of study but also a means to teach critical civics concepts.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/K4iLc5K.png" alt="image05" /> -<em>▲ <strong>The study’s most convincing synthetic image: Only 10.7 percent of all participants correctly identified this as an AI-generated image, with the rest believing it to be a photograph of a real person.</strong> Source: <a href="https://arxiv.org/abs/2403.16760">Di Cooke et al., “As Good As A Coin Toss: Human detection of AI-generated images, videos, audio, and audiovisual stimuli,” March 25, 2024</a>.</em></p> +<blockquote> + <h4 id="national-security-agency-and-department-of-homeland-security-centers-of-academic-excellence-in-cybersecurity-designations"><code class="highlighter-rouge">National Security Agency and Department of Homeland Security Centers of Academic Excellence in Cybersecurity Designations</code></h4> +</blockquote> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/b2dj9kL.png" alt="image06" /> -<em>▲ <strong>The study’s most convincing synthetic audiovisual clip: When participants were presented with the AI-manipulated video clip (of comedian Nora Tschirner) on the right, 75.8 percent incorrectly labeled it as authentic. In comparison, the original video (of anchorwoman Marietta Slomka) is on the left.</strong> Source: <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=V4ln4SyVNjg&amp;list=PL8ax9s9DVKClTiPm9c5Wkq9wOG4hGKyVH&amp;index=5">Deepfacelabfan, “Deepfake — Marietta Slomka zu Nora Tschirner — 128 LIAE 15k RW only — 90min FAKE,” YouTube video, April 7, 2022, 00:46</a>.</em></p> +<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">One way to incentivize higher education to bring civics concepts into more technical areas might be to leverage the National Security Agency (NSA) and Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Centers of Academic Excellence in Cybersecurity (CAE-C) designations. These official designations, awarded by the NSA and DHS, recognize academic institutions that demonstrate excellence in cybersecurity education and research. Because the cybersecurity standards required to achieve this designation are high, earning it can “enhance [an] institution’s reputation, attract top-tier students and faculty, and open doors to federal funding and partnerships.”</code></em></p> -<p>This does not mean that all AI-generated content being produced today is now indistinguishable from authentic media. Low- and mid-quality synthetic media still contains artifacts, or observable AI glitches such as bizarre-looking hands or illegible text, which make their provenance apparent. Regardless, our study demonstrates that numerous generative AI tools which are easily accessible to the public today can produce sufficiently realistic synthetic content that is relatively indistinguishable from authentic content to the human senses. Moreover, as the average quality of synthetic media improves while the technology matures, even low- and mid-quality outputs will become more realistic. For example, later iterations of AI image generators have already become increasingly capable of rendering real-looking hands, which makes relying on them as a potential “tell” of AI-generated content being present decreasingly useful.</p> +<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">There are several designations under the CAE-C umbrella, including Cyber Defense Education (CAE-CDE), Cyber Research (CAE-R), and Cyber Operations (CAE-CO). As a result, incorporating a civics education component into one of these criteria could quickly incentivize academic institutions to invest in and prioritize civics education to attain these prestigious designations. Since civics would suddenly become a government-recognized standard with direct workforce applications — such as clear communication and effective compromise — the field could attain new prestige. This, in turn, could attract more students and adults to civics, fostering a culture of lifelong learning and civic engagement.</code></em></p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/xiDUnsF.png" alt="image07" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 2: Detection Performance by Language Familiarity.</strong> Source: Cooke et al., “As Good As A Coin Toss.”</em></p> +<p><strong>Incentivize Civics in STEM through Testing and Hiring:</strong> It’s often said that if you don’t test for it, it won’t be taught. Standardized tests could integrate some basic civics concepts, such as civic responsibility and respect for the rule of law, into questions related to STEM subjects. Additionally, as noted above, schools — particularly in higher education — tend to prioritize education that aligns with hiring demands. If businesses recognized the importance of a civically literate workforce and included this in their hiring decisions, it could significantly influence schools’ decisions on what to teach.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/e0GPfI7.png" alt="image08" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 3: Detection Performance by Age.</strong> Source: Cooke et al., “As Good As A Coin Toss.”</em></p> +<p><strong>Address Equity and Inclusion in STEM and Civics Education:</strong> It is vital to create pathways for underrepresented groups to engage in both STEM and policymaking roles. Addressing barriers to entry and retention for first-generation and minority students is crucial for building a diverse and inclusive workforce. Programs should encourage these students to see themselves as active participants in both technological innovation and democratic governance, promoting civic responsibility alongside technical skills.</p> -<p>The study’s other findings offer more nuanced insights into people’s vulnerabilities to different types of AI-enabled deceptions, examining how various elements may impact an individual’s detection capabilities. For instance, participants’ average detection accuracy was found to be significantly lower for audio, video, and audiovisual items featuring a foreign language than for items featuring languages in which they were fluent (Figure 2). Meanwhile, younger participants outperformed their older counterparts to the greatest degree when tested on audiovisual and audio-only clips (Figure 3). These findings indicate that people are more likely to misidentify synthetic media presented in a foreign language, and that older individuals are less sensitive to recognizing synthetic audio-based media. Given the rise of multilingual synthetic misinformation as well as the growing popularity of AI phone scams which often target older generations, these findings suggest that these two demographics may be more vulnerable to certain types of AI-enabled deceptions than previously realized.</p> +<p><strong>Reframe Civics Education as a Shared Responsibility:</strong> Civics education should be viewed as a collective responsibility involving educators, policymakers, businesses, and the public. Federal, state, and local governments must collaborate to scale ongoing efforts in civics education, while private-sector support can help bridge the resource gap. Additionally, integrating civics education as a criterion for attaining Centers of Excellence designations can incentivize higher education institutions to prioritize this critical area.</p> -<h3 id="the-threat-landscape">The Threat Landscape</h3> +<p><strong>Use a Systems-Based Approach to Civics and STEM Integration:</strong> A holistic, systems-based approach is necessary to successfully integrate civics into STEM education. Collaboration across federal, state, and local governments; educational institutions; and tech companies is crucial for creating sustainable change. By aligning resources and goals across sectors, we can build an educational ecosystem that fosters technical expertise and civic engagement, ensuring that democracy and innovation go hand in hand.</p> -<p>The proliferation of weaponized synthetic media presents a clear and present danger to national security. To more effectively address these dangers, a more comprehensive understanding of the risks posed by its misuse and the various ways it has already been weaponized is required. Within only a few short years, the synthetic media threat landscape has expanded rapidly, with generative AI increasingly being exploited for nefarious purposes. Consequently, this rise in AI-enabled deception incidents has resulted in individuals and organizations around the world suffering financial, reputational, physical, and mental harm, even death, and countries worldwide experiencing detrimental effects on their societal stability and resilience. Now that it is clear publicly available generative AI tools can produce highly realistic synthetic media capable of deceiving even the most discerning of observers, these dangers have only become even more acute.</p> +<p>To maximize the impact of the integration of civics in STEM education, existing initiatives must be scaled and interconnected. Numerous programs across education, government, and the private sector are working across STEM, ethics, and civic responsibility. However, these efforts often operate in silos, at times also using differing terminology, which further hinders efforts to identify and connect them. By creating stronger connections between these initiatives — whether through partnerships, shared resources, or collaborative platforms — we can amplify their reach and effectiveness.</p> -<p>Generative AI has become an increasingly powerful force multiplier for deception, making it easier, faster, and cheaper to conduct more sophisticated stratagems than ever before — from producing synthetic content at an industrial scale to more precisely tailoring it to a target’s specific vulnerabilities. These lowering barriers have, in turn, expanded the pool of threat actors who now are able to leverage this technology, from extremist organizations and organized crime groups to lone individuals with malicious intent. As of today, it costs less than $10 to create 30 minutes of customized synthetic audio featuring a target’s voice or to manufacture a batch of over 1,000 individually personalized spear-phishing emails. Efforts to prevent the misuse of commercial products and services have been inconsistent in both their implementation and effectiveness, enabling the circumnavigation of guardrails to varying degrees of success. Meanwhile, open-source generative AI tools, which by their nature have more easily removable safeguards, have also furnished threat actors with a diverse and customizable toolkit, such as live face-swapping and voice-masking software, found to be used in real-time impersonation schemes. In addition, a shadow industry has begun to quickly develop to address this growing demand for purpose-built deception technologies. Spreading throughout the dark web and encrypted messaging platforms, it sells everything from prebuilt custom software to more bespoke services for explicitly abusive purposes.</p> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">To maximize the impact of the integration of civics in STEM education, existing initiatives must be scaled and interconnected.</code></em></strong></p> -<p>However, the rise in AI-enabled deceptions has not been uniform. Rather, generative AI tools have been co-opted to greater degrees in scenarios where they currently provide a significant offensive edge to threat actors’ stratagems over existing non-AI methods. For instance, the sharp rise of AI-enabled financial fraud over the past few years is a direct result of the substantial advantage afforded by AI technology, as AI text and audio generation tools are able to produce compelling synthetic content in less resource-intensive manners than when utilizing non-AI techniques. Conversely, AI-enabled deception incidents have been less prevalent in areas where synthetic media presently does not provide a similarly significant offensive edge. This has been found to be the case with deceptions involving the dissemination of false narratives, where conventional techniques such as manipulatively editing authentic media or sharing it out of context still remain highly effective and relatively easy to accomplish, limiting the comparative utility of generative AI tools. Regardless, as the technology’s capabilities improve and barriers to using it decrease, it will undoubtedly be more extensively adopted for all manner of stratagems.</p> +<p>Similarly, employers should ensure that as they implement initiatives to engage their workforces in ways that build their civic knowledge, skills, and engagement, they include aspects designed specifically to reach employees who are more STEM oriented. This should include finding ways for their employees to use their technical skills in civic engagement activities to strengthen their communities. Leaders should also clearly communicate why civics is important and encourage other tech sector leaders to do the same.</p> -<p>Compounding these harms is the second-order risk posed by weaponized synthetic media: the corrosion of information integrity. The proliferation of deceptive AI-generated content risks damaging the public’s trust in the veracity of any information they encounter more generally as they become increasingly unable to trust their eyes and ears to reliably inform them as to what is real and what is fake. This degradation of trust in the truth jeopardizes the resilience of the U.S.’s information environment, or its “epistemic security” — which risks heightening its vulnerability to political and economic instability and constraining national security capabilities. Less epistemically secure societies are more limited in their ability to engage in collective and timely decision-making, making them more susceptible to adversarial manipulation, reducing their capacity for effective crisis response, and constraining critical defense and intelligence capabilities. This threat is not a novel one. Instances of widespread conventional misinformation have already been found to have diminished public trust in information from media and government institutions, resulting in decreased faith in political election integrity, weakened confidence in national security organizations, and led to violence and unrest. For example, pervasive false anti-vaccination narratives during the Covid-19 pandemic undermined vaccine confidence and institutional trust in the United States. The proliferation of these falsehoods, in turn, stymied economic growth, trade, and diplomacy, damaged education, and increased the number of vaccine-preventable outbreaks.</p> +<p>A coordinated, system-wide approach that aligns stakeholders at the local, state, and federal levels will allow for the replication of successful models, accelerating progress toward a more civically engaged, technically proficient workforce better prepared to address the challenges and opportunities of rapid innovation in a democracy.</p> -<p>Synthetic media misuse risks intensifying the damage done to the public’s trust in information by making it harder to distinguish fact from fiction. One can easily imagine how the viral AI-generated image of an explosion near the Pentagon, mentioned at the beginning of this brief, may have resulted in more significant adverse effects in a less epistemically secure society. Decreased public trust in information from institutional sources could have made later debunking by authorities less successful or take longer, enabling the falsehood to disseminate further and permitting greater knock-on effects to occur, such as more extensive financial volatility than just a brief dip in the stock market, which in turn could have led to civil unrest or facilitated the ability of foreign adversaries to leverage the unrest to their benefit.</p> +<hr /> -<p>There are signs that the increased prevalence of synthetic media has already begun to damage the public’s epistemic trust. Research shows that repeated exposure to unlabelled synthetic media makes individuals more susceptible to misidentifying future synthetic content as well as reduces individuals’ confidence in the truthfulness of all information. More recently, it was discovered that Russia’s extensive use of AI-enabled deceptions throughout the still ongoing Russo-Ukrainian conflict has had a detrimental effect on Ukrainian citizens’ confidence in information, making them significantly more skeptical of the truthfulness of all digital content they encounter online. Even just the existence of synthetic media itself has begun to erode aspects of the public’s trust, as evident in the increasing frequency of authentic media being wrongly dismissed as AI-generated. The trend has become especially prevalent in information-contested spaces, such as political elections or the Israel-Hamas conflict, where both sides have frequently decried real digital content as being fake. As the synthetic media threat landscape continues to expand, these adverse effects will likely only grow stronger. Ultimately, it is the convergence of these immediate and systemic threats that makes countering weaponized synthetic media a national security imperative.</p> +<p><strong>Suzanne Spaulding</strong> is senior adviser for homeland security and director of the Defending Democratic Institutions project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). She also serves as a member of the Cyberspace Solarium Commission.</p> -<h3 id="types-of-ai-enabled-deceptions">Types of AI-Enabled Deceptions</h3> +<p><strong>Paula Reynal</strong> is a program manager and research associate for the Defending Democratic Institutions Project at CSIS, where she supports the project’s research agenda and coordinates events.</p> -<p>The current synthetic media threat landscape can be broadly divided into six categories of AI-enabled deceptions: gray zone warfare, espionage and surveillance, military deception, domestic politics, nonconsensual intimate media, and financial crime. However, with the technology’s continued advancement, it is anticipated that the depth and breadth of AI-enabled deception incidents will also expand and diversify, including hate crimes, falsification of evidence in legal proceedings, corporate espionage or sabotage, and more. To better illustrate the contours of today’s landscape, a selection of particularly noteworthy AI deception incidents that have taken place across the six major categories have been shared below.</p> +<p><strong>Aosheng Pusztaszeri</strong> is a research assistant for the International Security Program at CSIS, where he supports research on the intersection of emerging technologies, national security, and intelligence.</p>Suzanne Spaulding and Paula ReynalAs technology continues to shape society, it’s essential for tech leaders to recognize their role in strengthening democracy. This report highlights the urgent need to integrate civic knowledge and responsibility into STEM education and careers.Ukraine’s Military AI Ecosystem2024-11-12T12:00:00+08:002024-11-12T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/ukraines-military-ai-ecosystem<p><em>This report examines the Ukrainian government initiatives and key institutions driving the development of military AI capabilities. It also explores the preconditions that have shaped their adoption in the Ukraine war.</em></p> -<h4 id="gray-zone-warfare">Gray Zone Warfare</h4> +<excerpt /> -<p>Synthetic media has been increasingly weaponized within gray zone warfare, or actions that take place in the murky waters between regular statecraft and outright warfare, such as information warfare, cyberattacks, and political and economic coercion. Examples of AI-enabled deception incidents that have occurred in the gray zone include the following:</p> +<p>This report is the first part of a series on military artificial intelligence (AI) development and its application in the war in Ukraine. It will focus on two critical aspects of AI adoption in Ukraine’s military:</p> -<ul> - <li> - <p>State-affiliated influence operations have disseminated synthetic images and videos as part of propaganda or information campaigns surrounding major political focal points or noteworthy events, including elections in Europe and Taiwan, U.S. politics, the Russo-Ukrainian and Israeli-Hamas conflicts, and the 2023 Maui wildfires.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Real-time face-swapping software was used to successfully impersonate Kyiv mayor Vitali Klitschko in a series of video calls with several mayors of major European cities as part of a targeted influence operation.</p> - </li> +<ol> <li> - <p>An alleged AI-generated sex tape of a presidential candidate in the 2023 Turkish elections, purportedly published by an adversarial state, was widely circulated, leading to the candidate’s withdrawal from the race.</p> + <p>The conditions and factors that contributed to military AI development from the beginning of the war with Russia in 2014</p> </li> <li> - <p>Chinese, Iranian, North Korean, and Russian state-affiliated actors were found to have been manufacturing synthetic content for spear phishing as part of cyberattacks they were planning to conduct.</p> + <p>The key government institutions and initiatives responsible for driving AI adoption, along with a summary of their major AI-related initiatives</p> </li> -</ul> +</ol> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/kW7uO1I.png" alt="image09" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Fake news channel clips featuring AI-generated TV anchors were shared by bot accounts online as a part of pro-Chinese information campaigns.</strong> Source: <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/02/07/technology/artificial-intelligence-training-deepfake.html">Adam Satariano and Paul Mozur, “The People Onscreen Are Fake. The Disinformation Is Real.,” New York Times, February 7, 2022</a>.</em></p> +<p>The summary section below presents key findings and insights on both of these aspects.</p> -<h4 id="espionage-and-surveillance">Espionage and Surveillance</h4> +<h4 id="1-ai-is-in-experimental-deployment-and-is-overwhelmingly-geared-toward-supportive-functions">1. AI is in experimental deployment and is overwhelmingly geared toward supportive functions.</h4> -<p>Synthetic media has also been leveraged to a lesser extent, at least to public knowledge, for espionage and surveillance operations by states and the private cyber surveillance industry, strengthening online impersonations of real or fictitious individuals to obtain confidential information from targets. Examples of AI-enabled espionage and surveillance incidents include the following:</p> +<p>Although AI is frequently discussed in the context of the war in Ukraine, its full deployment on the battlefield remains limited. Numerous AI-driven capabilities and technologies are being tested along the frontlines, in long-range strikes within Russian territory, and across multidomain operations, but these efforts are largely experimental rather than indicative of AI systematically replacing human functions in warfare. AI currently assumes a predominantly supportive and informational role, and even when AI capabilities advance and improve, they are not yet implemented in fully autonomous modes on the battlefield.</p> -<ul> - <li> - <p>Synthetic media was used in a fictitious Washington think tank employee’s made-up LinkedIn account, which was suspected of being run as part of a Russian espionage operation.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Private cyber-intelligence companies used hundreds of fake accounts of social media content, impersonating activists, journalists, and young women, to covertly gather information from targets, including IP addresses and personal contact information.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>State-affiliated actors used social engineering assisted by large language models (LLM) to manipulate targets and facilitate the collection and analysis of open-source information.</p> - </li> -</ul> +<h4 id="2-there-is-growing-government-involvement-in-ai-development-in-ukraine-through-organizational-regulative-and-technological-initiatives-led-by-various-government-stakeholders">2. There is growing government involvement in AI development in Ukraine through organizational, regulative, and technological initiatives led by various government stakeholders.</h4> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/easgrTO.png" alt="image10" /> -<em>▲ <strong>This fake LinkedIn account of a fictitious Washington think tank employee, suspected of being used for a Russian espionage operation, was found to have used a synthetic image for the profile photo.</strong> Source: <a href="https://apnews.com/article/ap-top-news-artificial-intelligence-social-platforms-think-tanks-politics-bc2f19097a4c4fffaa00de6770b8a60d">Raphael Satter, “Experts: Spy used AI-generated face to connect with targets,” AP News, June 13, 2019</a>.</em></p> +<p>Initially, the development of AI-driven technologies in Ukraine was spearheaded by the private sector and volunteer initiatives. However, government institutions and agencies have recently begun to build their own capacities for advancing new technologies. This shift is evident in the creation of new organizational divisions and units within government institutions and the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU), which are specifically dedicated to AI-focused technologies and their deployment. These efforts mark a significant step toward the institutionalization of AI innovation within the public sector.</p> -<h4 id="military-deception">Military Deception</h4> +<h4 id="3-the-ukrainian-government-is-focusing-on-the-adoption-of-commercial-ai-rather-than-on-developing-new-technology-within-government-institutions">3. The Ukrainian government is focusing on the adoption of commercial AI rather than on developing new technology within government institutions.</h4> -<p>Although the adversarial use of synthetic media for targeted military operations has so far been limited in practice, AI-enabled military deception remains a topic of great concern due to the large number of ways in which the technology could be leveraged to gain a battlefield advantage. This includes creating entirely fictitious events to alter or skew enemy intelligence, impersonating military personnel to falsify or muddle orders, and manufacturing noise to mask one’s actions from an adversary or to overwhelm and confuse them. There are two particularly noteworthy examples of AI-enabled military deception incidents:</p> +<p>Ukrainian authorities, having recognized that the speed and quality of technology development in the private sector far exceed those of the government sector, have prioritized creating infrastructure and procedures for the fast adoption of commercial technology. This approach has resulted in simplifying regulations on the adoption of innovation by the AFU, initiating programs for prototype testing, and providing grant funding to early-stage start-ups, among other initiatives. Moreover, most newly established units within Ukraine’s military, such as the Unmanned Systems Forces, are dedicated to integrating new technologies into military operations rather than participating in combat itself.</p> -<ul> - <li> - <p>AI-generated content featuring Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelensky has been published and circulated extensively on social media to sow confusion and discord, including a synthetic video of him calling for his troops to immediately lay down their arms and surrender to Russian forces.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Russian radio and TV networks were hacked to air fictitious AI-generated emergency broadcasts of Russian president Vladimir Putin declaring martial law due to Ukrainian forces invading Russian territory, causing some to actually evacuate in confusion.</p> - </li> -</ul> +<h4 id="4-the-absence-of-a-long-term-strategy-for-military-ai-development-poses-significant-challenges-to-the-sustained-and-effective-adoption-of-these-technologies">4. The absence of a long-term strategy for military AI development poses significant challenges to the sustained and effective adoption of these technologies.</h4> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/DbhTCki.png" alt="image11" /> -<em>▲ <strong>A social media post shows the airing of an emergency Russian TV broadcast featuring an AI-generated video that falsely depicted Russian president Vladamir Putin declaring martial law and calling for evacuation due to the Ukrainian invasion.</strong> Source: <a href="https://x.com/AlexKokcharov/status/1665709387648827397">Alex Kokcharov (@Alex Kokcharov), X post, June 15, 2023, 6:17 am</a>.</em></p> +<p>The lack of a long-term strategy for military AI development represents a critical gap within the government’s approach to emerging technologies. Despite Ukraine’s recognized technological potential, there is no unified vision guiding the use of AI in defense. This strategic void is primarily driven by limited management capacity across government institutions and by the inexperience of political leadership in addressing the complexities of warfare. As a result, the focus has been on immediate, tactical solutions rather than on establishing a cohesive, forward-looking strategy to harness the full potential of AI in military operations.</p> -<h4 id="domestic-politics">Domestic Politics</h4> +<h4 id="5-between-2014-and-2022-two-grassroots-applications--analytics-for-situational-awareness-and-drones-for-intelligence-surveillance-and-reconnaissance-isr--laid-the-groundwork-for-the-post-2022-surge-in-military-ai-following-russias-full-scale-invasion-military-ai-expanded-significantly-across-six-major-applications-with-a-growing-number-of-companies-focusing-on-autonomy">5. Between 2014 and 2022, two grassroots applications — analytics for situational awareness and drones for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) — laid the groundwork for the post-2022 surge in military AI. Following Russia’s full-scale invasion, military AI expanded significantly across six major applications, with a growing number of companies focusing on autonomy.</h4> -<p>In recent years, there has been a surge in synthetic media being employed by domestic actors to create deceptive political content, predominately in regard to political elections. A selection of AI-enabled incidents include the following:</p> +<p>This report categorizes AI applications in Ukraine’s military operations into six major areas, listed below. A more detailed analysis of these applications will be provided in subsequent reports in this series.</p> <ul> <li> - <p>The Venezuelan government ran fake news stories featuring AI-generated newscasters as part of a widespread domestic propaganda campaign to influence its citizens.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Both pro-Israeli and pro-Palestinian social media accounts shared synthetic images of the ongoing Gaza conflict, such as AI-generated photos of a crying baby among bomb wreckage, to further false narratives.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>An AI-generated nonconsensual pornographic video of a senior U.S. government official at the Department of Homeland Security was circulated online as part of an ongoing smear campaign.</p> + <p><strong>Autonomy.</strong> The most significant advancements have been in autonomous systems, where Ukraine is making strides in areas such as GPS-denied navigation and swarm operations.</p> </li> <li> - <p>Synthetic images of former president Donald Trump, portrayed as being real, were used in an attack ad by an opposition candidate during the U.S. presidential primaries.</p> + <p><strong>Open-source intelligence and fighting disinformation.</strong> AI helps to analyze large volumes of digital content from media and social networks and to identify Russian narratives, propaganda, and information campaigns spreading disinformation.</p> </li> <li> - <p>Synthetic media of politicians were falsely portrayed as authentic, including videos of UK prime minister Keir Starmer shouting at staff, U.S. president Joe Biden calling for a military draft, and a Slovakian presidential candidate discussing vote rigging during the election’s final days.</p> + <p><strong>Situational awareness and command and control.</strong> AI enhances situational awareness with numerous software platforms used by the military to analyze battlefield and intelligence data and to facilitate real-time efficient decisionmaking.</p> </li> <li> - <p>A robocall campaign used a synthetic audio clip of President Biden’s voice to urge thousands of New Hampshire residents not to vote in the state’s primary.</p> + <p><strong>Demining.</strong> AI-powered analytic software and AI-enabled unmanned ground vehicles improve the efficiency and safety of mine clearance.</p> </li> <li> - <p>UK far-right actors and politicians widely circulated anti-immigrant and Islamophobic synthetic content across social media ahead of the 2024 elections.</p> + <p><strong>Training and simulation.</strong> AI-driven training simulations are helping soldiers adapt to complex battlefield conditions by playing close-to-real combat scenarios with AI adjustments to address warfighters’ skill gaps.</p> </li> <li> - <p>Fictitious videos and images of celebrities such as Taylor Swift, as well as entirely AI-generated Black voters, endorsing former president Trump’s 2024 U.S. presidential campaign have been frequently shared online by political supporters in the run up to the 2024 elections.</p> + <p><strong>Damage assessment.</strong> AI is crucial in damage assessment, utilizing satellite data and drone imagery to analyze damage, losses, and devastation and to estimate future recovery efforts.</p> </li> </ul> -<h4 id="nonconsensual-intimate-media">Nonconsensual Intimate Media</h4> +<h4 id="6-several-factors-have-facilitated-the-rapid-development-of-military-ai-in-ukraine-creating-a-unique-environment-for-defense-innovation">6. Several factors have facilitated the rapid development of military AI in Ukraine, creating a unique environment for defense innovation.</h4> -<p>One of the most prolific abuses of generative AI to date has been the production of AI-generated nonconsensual intimate media of adults and children. Accounting for 96 percent of all synthetic media videos in existence in 2019, the adult nonconsensual pornography industry and the online trafficking of child sexual abuse materials have exploded in the years since, claiming millions of adult and child victims to date. Examples of incidents include the following:</p> +<p>The situation in Ukraine over the last decade, particularly the ongoing conflict with Russia, has affected all aspects of society and necessitated rapid adaptation in defense and related fields. These factors have enabled Ukraine to test and deploy AI-driven solutions in real battlefield conditions, leading to numerous innovations, particularly in the realm of autonomy and autonomous weapon systems.</p> <ul> <li> - <p>An Indian journalist investigating the rape of a young girl was the target of an extensive hate campaign, which included synthetic pornography of her being circulated online.</p> + <p><strong>Existential need for advanced technology.</strong> The Russian invasion of 2022 created an urgent, existential need for Ukraine to develop advanced defense technologies rapidly. The high-stakes environment pushed both government and private sectors to prioritize technological advancements, such as AI, to enhance military capabilities. This urgency also catalyzed a willingness to experiment with AI, leading to quicker deployment of AI-driven capabilities in combat.</p> </li> <li> - <p>An automated Telegram bot service created and published sexual images of an estimated 24,000 women and girls.</p> + <p><strong>Active civil society and a robust private sector.</strong> Ukraine’s vibrant civil society and entrepreneurial private sector have been instrumental in driving defense innovation. Even before the full-scale invasion, the Ukrainian entrepreneurial spirit, combined with a deep sense of national defense responsibility, led many private companies and start-ups to actively contribute to the war effort. These organizations have developed AI-driven solutions ranging from autonomous drones to advanced surveillance systems, with many innovations coming from small teams responding quickly to military demands. The active participation of nongovernmental actors in AI-enabled defense technology development and the fast deployment of commercial technology have significantly accelerated progress in this area.</p> </li> <li> - <p>Sexually explicit images and videos of school girls and female teachers being produced and shared online by male students in Korea, Brazil, Spain, and the United States, among others.</p> + <p><strong>Permissive regulatory frameworks.</strong> Ukraine’s regulatory environment for military AI was absent before the invasion. Unlike in many other countries, where regulatory bottlenecks can slow down innovation, Ukraine’s government refused to regulate military AI, allowing innovators to respond quickly to frontline needs and develop AI applications that could be immediately deployed in combat settings. The Ministry of Digital Transformation (MDT) prioritizes a soft, business-friendly approach, aiming to avoid overregulation. Instead of imposing strict rules, the ministry uses a bottom-up strategy, offering voluntary guidelines and tools to prepare businesses for future regulations. This approach extends to the defense sector, as the MDT has indicated that it does not plan to introduce regulation of AI in the defense sector.</p> </li> <li> - <p>A recently uncovered worldwide trafficking ring producing and selling sexually synthetic images depicting photorealistic children on a reported “industrial scale.”</p> + <p><strong>Direct communication between engineers and military personnel.</strong> One of the most significant accelerators of military AI development in Ukraine has been direct communication between engineers and military personnel. Through a well-established network of technical workshops positioned near the frontline or within military units, including mobile drone repair vans, engineers from private companies are able to closely monitor and assess the performance of their systems in real combat scenarios. This proximity enables engineers working on unmanned systems and autonomous capabilities to receive real-time feedback, allowing for the rapid refinement of their technologies.</p> </li> <li> - <p>A deluge of synthetic pornography featuring Taylor Swift spread across the social media platform X, forcing the online platform to block searches of the celebrity temporarily.</p> + <p><strong>Foreign assistance providing access to new technologies.</strong> International support, from both governments and private companies, has been crucial in allowing Ukraine to leap forward in its technological capabilities. This support has facilitated Ukraine’s adoption of new technologies, such as analytical tools from Palantir, communication infrastructure via Starlink, and the migration of critical government data to Microsoft’s cloud services, to name just a few examples. This external assistance has not only equipped Ukraine with essential tools for innovation but has also fostered opportunities for collaborative development between Ukrainian and foreign companies, thereby strengthening Ukraine’s military and technological capabilities.</p> </li> </ul> -<h4 id="financial-crime">Financial Crime</h4> +<h4 id="7-collaboration-on-ai-between-ukraine-and-the-us-government-can-be-mutually-beneficial">7. Collaboration on AI between Ukraine and the U.S. government can be mutually beneficial.</h4> -<p>AI-enabled financial crime has quickly become one of the most widespread misuses of synthetic media. Criminals have employed generative AI tools to impersonate, extort, and hack for a multitude of fraudulent activities, with personalized AI spear-phishing emails and voice phone scams experiencing the largest growth. With an estimated 700 percent increase in incidents in 2023 from the previous year, financial experts predict that AI-enabled financial fraud could lead to losses of $40 billion by 2027. Noteworthy incidents include the following:</p> +<p>What follows are several key recommendations for the U.S. government to foster closer collaboration in AI development between the United States and Ukraine in a way that will be beneficial to both countries.</p> <ul> <li> - <p>The head of a UK energy firm was personally tricked into transferring nearly $250,000 by fraudsters who used voice cloning to impersonate the parent company’s CEO.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Reportedly the largest AI-generated scam to date, thousands of synthetic videos of celebrities such as Elon Musk and MrBeast promoting fake financial schemes have been widely circulated on social media platforms.</p> + <p><strong>Strategic support.</strong> The United States should leverage its technological leadership to help Ukraine develop a cohesive long-term strategy for integrating AI into defense operations. By providing strategic guidance, the United States can help to align Ukraine’s national priorities in AI development while gaining valuable insights into AI applications in active warfare.</p> </li> <li> - <p>An Arizona woman was the target of a fake ransoming scheme in which fraudsters impersonated her daughter over the phone using voice-cloning technology.</p> + <p><strong>Closing the feedback loop.</strong> A structured feedback system for evaluating the performance of U.S.-provided drones and military technologies in Ukraine would benefit both nations. U.S. companies could quickly iterate and improve their technologies, while Ukraine would receive more tailored and effective capabilities, enhancing battlefield operations.</p> </li> <li> - <p>An employee of a financial firm was tricked during a week-long ruse into paying out $25 million to fraudsters after the scammers used real-time synthetic audiovisual software to impersonate the employee’s senior personnel and colleagues through a series of group video conferences, emails, and calls.</p> + <p><strong>AI in U.S. foreign aid.</strong> The United States should integrate AI development into its foreign aid programs for Ukraine, providing essential computing infrastructure to support AI innovation. This would strengthen Ukraine’s defense capabilities and establish the country as a hub for military AI development, benefiting U.S. strategic interests in global AI leadership.</p> </li> <li> - <p>The Yahoo Boys, a crime collective, have widely adopted AI tools for romance scams and sextortion, employing live face and voice impersonation software and “nudification” apps to trick and blackmail targets. This has led not only to financial loss but also to tragic deaths in which some targets, frequently teenagers, took their own lives.</p> + <p><strong>AI-focused training and entrepreneurial development.</strong> The United States should establish AI-related programs for Ukrainian defense entrepreneurs and business leaders. These initiatives would foster Ukraine’s defense tech ecosystem and strengthen U.S.-Ukraine collaboration, positioning both countries to lead in AI-driven defense innovation.</p> </li> </ul> -<h3 id="conclusion">Conclusion</h3> +<h3 id="understanding-ukraines-ai-ecosystem">Understanding Ukraine’s AI Ecosystem</h3> -<p>As generative AI technology continues to advance, so does the potential for its misuse. In only a few short years, the synthetic media threat landscape has changed dramatically. AI-enabled deceptions have become increasingly complex and varied, ranging from gray zone warfare to financial fraud and beyond. Not only has the weaponization of synthetic media already begun to cause real and substantial harm to people and organizations worldwide, but it also threatens to undermine public trust in all information online, regardless of the truth. Overall, these developments present troubling implications for U.S. national security.</p> +<p>This section provides a comprehensive overview of Ukraine’s military AI ecosystem. It begins by providing a background to Ukraine’s commercial AI sector, which for more than a decade has been quite successful — more than is commonly recognized in the West. Next, the paper examines how Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2014 resulted in major changes to the Ukrainian military’s approach to software and data, changes that were critical to the foundation of the military’s post-2022 introduction of AI technologies. Finally, it provides an overview of the key government organizations responsible for driving AI adoption throughout Ukraine’s military as well as a summary of their AI-related initiatives.</p> -<p>These dangers have become even more severe as it has been made clear that widely available generative AI technology has progressed to the point that people can no longer depend on their eyes and ears to reliably detect the synthetic content they might encounter in their everyday lives. With this primary line of defense compromised, pursuing alternative solutions has never been so vital. Now more than ever, stakeholders across the private and public sectors must work together to implement multifaceted countermeasures that bridge the technological, regulatory, and educational domains to oppose the growing threat posed by weaponized synthetic media.</p> +<h4 id="commercial-ai-in-ukraine-a-decade-of-quiet-success">Commercial AI in Ukraine: A Decade of Quiet Success</h4> -<hr /> +<p>In the race for leadership in artificial intelligence, Ukraine may appear an unlikely contender. However, this comparatively small nation is demonstrating significant potential, with a highly skilled and technologically adept population. Notably, nearly two-thirds of Ukrainians express optimism regarding AI’s potential to enhance human life, reflecting widespread public confidence in the transformative capabilities of the technology.</p> -<p><strong>Di Cooke</strong> is a horizon fellow with the International Security Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C.</p> +<p>Indeed, for more than a decade, Ukraine has quietly served as a developer of innovative AI capabilities that have captured the world’s imagination. While a full list is beyond the scope of this paper, three companies — Looksery, Respeecher, and Augmented Pixels — provide a helpful illustration of how Ukraine’s commercial AI sector has long been more impactful and more capable than is commonly understood outside technology communities.</p> -<p><strong>Abby Edwards</strong> is a former research associate in the International Security Program at CSIS.</p> +<p>First, in 2015, Snap Inc. — a Santa Monica-based technology company and the maker of the popular Snapchat social media app — spent $150 million to acquire Looksery, a two-year-old Ukrainian AI tech firm. Looksery’s AI-based facial recognition and augmented reality technology laid the foundation for Snapchat’s Lens portfolio, which today boasts 250 million daily users. In 2022, Snap Inc. stated that the company still employed 300 Ukrainian staff, almost all of whom are engineers.</p> -<p><strong>Alexis Day</strong> is an associate director for the Smart Women, Smart Power Initiative at CSIS.</p> +<p>Second, Ukrainian AI companies have also been involved in Hollywood, providing AI technology for audio generation. In 2020, Disney sought to include a younger version of Luke Skywalker in the television series The Mandalorian, but faced a challenge in that Star Wars actor Mark Hamill was 68 years old. Disney contracted with the Ukrainian AI company Respeecher to synthesize a younger voice that was sufficiently high-quality to meet Disney’s exacting standards.</p> -<p><strong>Devi Nair</strong> is a former associate director and associate fellow in the International Security Program at CSIS.</p> +<p>Third and finally, Qualcomm acquired Augmented Pixels in 2022. Founded in 2010 in Odesa, Augmented Pixels developed AI navigation technologies, such as 3D mapping and localization, for drones and AI glasses. At the time of purchase, Augmented Pixels’ commercial customers included National Geographic, LG Electronics, Intel, and more.</p> -<p><strong>Sophia Barkoff</strong> is a former research intern in Defending Democratic Institutions in the International Security Program at CSIS.</p> +<p>The main takeaway from these cases is that Ukraine’s AI sector was a meaningful player in commercial technology markets — taken seriously even by leading Western companies — long before Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022. A 2024 study conducted on behalf of Ukraine’s MDT found that Ukraine has 243 AI-focused companies and a broader information technology (IT) and software workforce comprising more than 307,000 specialists. Additionally, Ukrainian universities have launched a remarkable 106 specialized AI and machine learning (ML) programs across 42 institutions, resulting in a 122 percent increase in enrollment over five years. The report found that Ukraine produces more IT graduates than any other Central or Eastern European country, with a quarter of these graduates specializing in AI/ML.</p> -<p><strong>Katie Kelly</strong> is a former social media and outreach intern in the International Security Program at CSIS.</p>Di Cooke, et al.New research finds that we can now no longer trust our eyes and ears to reliably distinguish between real and AI-generated images, audio, and video. What does this mean in a world where the weaponization of synthetic media is becoming increasingly prevalent?SIFMANet Budapest Report2024-10-31T12:00:00+08:002024-10-31T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/sifmanet-budapest-report<p><em>Discussions held in Budapest in September 2024 addressed the state of sanctions implementation and enforcement in Hungary.</em></p> +<p>Despite Ukraine’s aforementioned strengths, its AI sector continues to encounter substantial challenges. According to the 2023 Government AI Readiness Index by Oxford Insights, Ukraine was ranked 60th out of 193 countries in AI integration into public service. The country’s AI development is hindered by several factors, including insufficient computing infrastructure and a shortage of skilled human capital due to the relocation of IT engineers fleeing the war (although some have continued working remotely for their Ukrainian employers). Additionally, Ukraine’s low government research and development investment further constrains the sector’s growth.</p> -<excerpt /> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/nzE7KG9.png" alt="image01" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 1: Comparison of Ukraine and United States in Government AI Readiness Index 2023.</strong> Source: <a href="https://oxfordinsights.com/ai-readiness/ai-readiness-index/">“Government AI Readiness Index 2023,” Oxford Insights</a>.</em></p> -<p>In September 2024, the Centre for Finance and Security at RUSI convened a roundtable discussion with public and private sector representatives from Hungary to discuss the state of sanctions implementation and enforcement in the country. The roundtable was organised with the support of the Budapest-based think tank Equilibrium Institute. Participants included the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, the Hungarian Financial Intelligence Unit and the Customs Unit of the National Tax and Customs Administration, the Hungarian National Bank, the Government Office of the Capital City Budapest, professional associations, companies, law firms and financial institutions.</p> +<p>Surprisingly, the Oxford Insights report found that Ukraine matches the United States — the index’s top-ranked country — in one crucial aspect: vision. However, vision alone is not enough to boost AI development and deployment. Ukraine’s position in the index underscores a critical gap between the ambitious plans of its tech sector and the resources needed to execute them.</p> -<p>The event was part of RUSI’s work to understand and highlight key challenges for sanctions implementation through its Sanctions and Illicit Finance Monitoring and Analysis Network (SIFMANet), funded by the National Endowment for Democracy. This conference report represents the findings gathered during the Budapest engagement. None of the discussions from the event are attributable.</p> +<h3 id="military-ai-in-ukraine-since-2014-necessary-growth">Military AI in Ukraine since 2014: Necessary Growth</h3> -<h3 id="the-legal-and-institutional-sanctions-framework-in-hungary">The Legal and Institutional Sanctions Framework in Hungary</h3> +<h4 id="pre-2022-laying-a-digital-foundation">Pre-2022: Laying a Digital Foundation</h4> -<p>Throughout the workshop, participants highlighted the fact that the current sanctions implementation landscape in Hungary is decentralised, involving multiple authorities, including the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, the National Tax and Customs Administration’s FIU and Customs Unit, the National Bank and the BFKH, along with other relevant agencies. Below follows a description of the relevant national competent authorities as described by participants.</p> +<p>Though the 2022 full-scale invasion shocked the world, for Ukrainians, it was not the start of the war with Russia. Russia’s occupation of Ukrainian territories in 2014 was a major wake up call for Ukrainian society — including Ukraine’s tech sector, which became increasingly willing to directly support Ukrainian armed forces.</p> -<p>The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade only established its Sanctions Department in March 2024. The Sanctions Department engages in policymaking in European Council working groups, develops expert opinions on sanctions proposals, coordinates implementation with the competent authorities, and participates in sanctions enforcement and export authorisation procedures. The department can also veto the decisions of the BFKH on the export of dual-use goods and military technology. Furthermore, it can issue opinions on the decisions of the BFKH regarding the provision of services, and the import of goods generating significant revenues for Russia, among other decisions. The department also provides opinions on large-scale government projects and bilateral protocols, and can offer, on request, opinions for companies on sanctions implementation issues.</p> +<p>The 2022 full-scale invasion, however, did mark a watershed moment in Ukraine’s approach to military artificial intelligence. Prior to 2022, Kyiv had not prioritized AI in its defense strategy, despite the ongoing war in the Donbas region. However, groundwork laid by volunteer groups since 2014 — focused not on AI but on software for data collection, analysis, and warfighting operational support — has proved instrumental in facilitating rapid military AI development and adoption since 2022.</p> -<p>The responsibility for implementing targeted financial sanctions primarily rests with the FIU, which is part of the National Tax and Customs Administration. As a result of the need to heighten Hungary’s sanctions response following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the FIU underwent a significant reorganisation to enhance its operational capabilities. This restructuring has allowed the FIU to gain practical experience in sanctions enforcement, a process that had been somewhat limited prior to this period. The volume of transactions screened for sanctions purposes by the FIU increased following the invasion, and its sanctions responsibilities expanded. Since August 2024, the FIU has been responsible for screening any transfer of funds exceeding €100,000 out of the EU by any entity of which more than 40% is owned by Russia-linked entities or persons.</p> +<p>This subsection will examine two key military use cases from the 2014–2022 period that enabled AI integration after the full-scale invasion: situational awareness systems and drones. After 2014, volunteers from Ukraine’s tech sector developed systems using modern data and software techniques (though not ML/AI). Over time, these systems dramatically improved Ukraine’s intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition, and reconnaissance (ISTAR) capabilities and even overtook competing official systems in adoption and impact.</p> -<p>The institutional framework for sanctions enforcement in Hungary requires FIs and companies to report any transactions or assets suspected of violating sanctions directly to the FIU. The FIU is tasked with analysing these reports and determining whether any violations have occurred. If a potential violation is identified, the matter is escalated to the court, which holds the authority to freeze the assets or block the transactions in question. This dual role of the FIU – as both an administrative and a police unit – has increased its prominence within the sanctions implementation landscape. However, despite the improvements in reporting mechanisms and operational frameworks, the FIU acknowledges the need for a clearer demarcation between its traditional financial intelligence functions and its new responsibilities concerning sanctions implementation. To facilitate information exchange regarding sanctions cases, the FIU utilises FIU. net to ensure that international stakeholders can access relevant data efficiently.</p> +<p><em>Situational Awareness</em></p> -<p>The Hungarian National Bank plays a critical role in the prudential supervision of FIs, ensuring that they maintain capital adequacy and liquidity. The National Bank had to adapt its operational protocols to account for the impact of sanctions on FIs, integrating sanctions compliance into its anti-money laundering and counterterrorist financing (AML/CTF) supervisory framework. The sanctions-related responsibilities have intensified the bank’s Anti-Money Laundering Supervision Department’s cooperation with the bank’s Regulatory Department, the relevant Hungarian authorities, and professional associations.</p> +<p>Between 2014 and 2022, Ukraine’s tech-savvy and patriotic workforce developed and introduced 11 new situational awareness and battlefield management systems to the Ukrainian military. Because they were unofficial and unsanctioned, one might think that these volunteer initiatives would be divorced from real military requirements. In practice, however, the volunteer groups had direct communication with front line operational forces, allowing them to focus their development efforts on high-priority military needs. One of the initiatives, the situational awareness system Delta, was eventually adopted and formally integrated into the Ukrainian military. The remarkable fact is that some unofficial volunteer systems and software have achieved near-universal adoption by the relevant Ukrainian forces, vastly exceeding the adoption rate of some official military technology initiatives that sought (and usually failed) to provide similar capabilities.</p> -<p>The BFKH’s Department of Trade, Defence Industry, Export Control and Precious Metal Assay is responsible for licensing dual-use and military goods, as well as the implementation of certain sectoral sanctions. These include sanctions related to investments in the Russian energy sector, the re-export of fuel to Russia, the export of luxury goods and the provision of services, among others. The BFKH is also responsible for implementing certain financial sanctions, such as the prohibitions on transactions with the Central Bank of Russia and on accepting bank deposits over €100,000. Through its participation in the COARM and Dual-Use Goods working parties of the European Council, the BFKH is also integrated into the policy aspect of sanctions in Brussels. While taking on additional sanctions responsibilities since February 2022, the BFKH still operates with the same resources as before the full-scale invasion, putting it under increased pressure.</p> +<p>The diverse capabilities of these systems — generally originating from explicit military requests — ranged from fire control, artillery optimization, and air traffic management to combat command and control. These systems not only significantly enhanced Ukraine’s operational effectiveness but also helped transition the Ukrainian military to a modern data- and software-enabled fighting force.</p> -<p>The Hungarian Customs Unit, part of the National Tax and Customs Administration, is charged with overseeing import–export activities related to Russia. Given the high volumes of trade with countries regarded as circumvention hubs, the increased burden on customs officials, coupled with limited resources, has hampered effective enforcement. Currently, only a few staff members are dedicated to sanctions-related oversight within the Customs Unit, and they are reliant on information from the European Commission due to their limited capacity for independent intelligence production.</p> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">[Early situational awareness and command and control systems] not only significantly enhanced Ukraine’s operational effectiveness but also helped transition the Ukrainian military to a modern data- and software-enabled fighting force.</code></em></strong></p> -<p>Several other authorities are responsible for implementing sectoral and targeted sanctions: the Aviation Supervisory Authority Department of the Ministry of Construction and Transport implements bans on private and charter flights; the National Media and Infocommunications Authority is responsible for media bans; and the National Directorate-General for Aliens Policing implements entry bans.</p> +<p>One of the most noteworthy volunteer groups is Aerorozvidka, whose situational awareness system Delta has become a linchpin in Ukraine’s multidomain operations. Started in 2016 and transferred to the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine (MoD) in 2023, Delta seamlessly integrates NATO ISTAR standards to provide essential situational awareness across all branches of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU). Building on this foundation, Aerorozvidka has spearheaded the creation of situational awareness centers in eight cities, each focused on gathering information from its respective section of the front. These centers serve as technological hubs, uniting and coordinating intelligence from a wide variety of sources — drones, satellites, stationary cameras, sensors, field scouts, and data from allies. The system even digitizes information from loyal informants in temporarily occupied territories, who interface with government apps and chatbots. Bringing all these different data sources together in a unified software platform is a challenge even for the United States military, but Delta achieves this and enjoys high user satisfaction among Ukrainian forces. As will be discussed further in this paper, Delta has recently been enhanced with AI/ML-enabled capabilities. At one point, there was an officially sanctioned military system — Dzvin — in development that promised similar capabilities as the volunteer-built Delta. However, this fell victim to bureaucratic hurdles and corruption and never achieved meaningful adoption despite its official introduction into the AFU in 2022. A diverse range of military officials told CSIS that Delta now is the de facto standard and Dzvin is functionally irrelevant. Delta is also of keen interest to NATO, which has described the system as “ground-breaking” following its victory in a 2017 NATO hackathon and prominent testing in NATO military exercises, most recently in 2024.</p> -<p>For a complete understanding of the sanctions framework in Hungary, it is important to highlight that Hungary has been granted several exemptions in EU sanctions packages. Together with Slovakia and Czechia, the country has a temporary exemption from the prohibition of imports of crude oil by pipeline; the Rosatom-led Paks II nuclear power plant’s construction was also granted exemption; and the import of certain, otherwise sanctioned, goods remains authorised for the maintenance of Russian metro cars in Budapest.</p> +<p>The Kropyva artillery software system improves target accuracy and routinely reduces the time between receiving orders and striking targets by up to tenfold. Ukrainian artillerymen access Kropyva through a tablet or mobile phone, then enter enemy coordinates, which are automatically translated to the nearest available artillery battery along with precalculated aiming trajectories. The Army SOS volunteer organization developed Kropyva in 2014, and 90 to 95 percent of Ukrainian artillery units have adopted it as their primary artillery fire control system. Another military system helping to coordinate artillery strikes, GisArta, attracted widespread attention in the Western press as “Uber for artillery,” even though Kropyva is more widely used and impactful according to Ukrainian military officials in conversation with CSIS.</p> -<h3 id="sanctions-compliance-in-the-hungarian-private-sector">Sanctions Compliance in the Hungarian Private Sector</h3> +<p>Kropyva and Delta are just two of dozens of examples demonstrating how systems initially developed by tech industry volunteers changed Ukraine’s armed forces after 2014. Many of these systems began with the modest goal of supporting warfighter decisionmaking and have since evolved into advanced situational awareness and battle management systems routinely used by hundreds of thousands of soldiers. Prior to 2022, the adoption of these modern software and data-driven platforms also laid the groundwork for AI/ML integration. As critical information sources were networked and digitized, the data they generated became the raw material for training AI models and enabling AI-driven capabilities.</p> -<p>Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine prompted a political debate in Hungary, marked by a critical governmental narrative on sanctions and their financial and economic impact on the country. Participants at the roundtable described the collapse of Sberbank Europe AG due to asset freezes under the initial sanctions packages as a key example. This case reverberated through the banking sector, leading to considerable deposit outflows and heightened sensitivity among FIs regarding liquidity and capital management.</p> +<p>The success of volunteer-led grassroots projects underscores a crucial point: in the face of existential threats, innovation in Ukraine has primarily thrived outside traditional channels. However, this decentralized approach is not without its challenges. Many of these teams still operate on shoestring budgets, relying heavily on donations. The lack of systemic support and funding raises concerns about the long-term sustainability and interoperability of this diversity of systems. Ukraine still possesses a hard-won technological edge, but the government needs to ensure that these successful initiatives are put on a more secure long-term foundation and incorporated into official plans and strategies. Unfortunately, multiple executives in Ukraine’s defense technology ecosystem told CSIS that the scale of Ukraine’s technological edge is shrinking as Russian forces improve their own technology and their pace of innovation adoption. Whereas previously Russian forces would take a month or more to adapt to new Ukrainian innovations before adopting countermeasures in the form of new tactics or technologies, now Russian forces may need as little as two or three days.</p> -<p>In the wake of the sanctions imposed after the invasion, FIs in Hungary faced an urgent need to adapt to new requirements. Representatives from the Hungarian financial sector noted that although they had previous experience with sanctions stemming from Russia’s initial invasion of Eastern Ukraine and annexation of Crimea in 2014 – primarily focusing on name-/entity screening – the heightened and more complex restrictive measures on Russia necessitated more rigorous and manual work. FIs must now screen transactions comprehensively and assess whether the goods or end users involved are subject to sanctions, rather than simply screening for name matches. The absence of automated tools for monitoring financial flows related to sanctions violations poses significant challenges for Hungarian banks. While some tools, such as Swift’s Compliance Analytics, assist in analysing changes in financial flows that might be indicative of sanctions evasion activity, they often fall short of providing the depth of analysis required for transactions with high risks, and cannot provide the granular insights necessary for effective compliance. As it stands, compliance teams must often screen transactions manually on a case-by-case basis, which includes evaluating complex scenarios such as the export of aluminium wires to Russia or the import of salmon from the country.</p> +<p><em>Drones</em></p> -<p>To better safeguard against non-compliance, participants from the financial sector argue that rather than simply rejecting transactions, FIs should adopt a US-style approach that allows for the blocking of funds within FIs until sufficient documentation confirming the lawfulness of transactions is provided. This shift would ensure that, while banks are still held accountable for compliance, additional pressure would be placed on corporates to bolster their sanctions awareness, as they would lose access to funds submitted for processing that are not properly documented. Enhanced technological capabilities in monitoring and reporting on sanctions-related activities are therefore needed to ease the burden of manual review processes.</p> +<p>Prior to 2022, drones were in use by both sides, mostly for remotely piloted ISR missions and without AI/ML capabilities. Drones have become a ubiquitous feature of the post-2022 war with Russia, widely recognized as a transformational capability for both sides. However, the impact of drones during the 2014–2022 period was considerably more limited.</p> -<p>Private sector representatives also highlighted the compliance challenges posed by the current fragmented sanctions reporting landscape in Hungary, involving multiple authorities and duplicating reporting lines. This creates confusion and inefficiencies. Banks in Hungary can self-report compliance failings to the FIU, but they also have obligations to report to the Hungarian National Bank. This dual reporting structure underscores the need for a clearer, more integrated approach to sanctions enforcement.</p> +<p>The war in Donbas served as an early testing ground for commercial drones, with both sides exploring their potential. While Russian forces made early strides in drone warfare, the Ukrainian side’s attempts to leverage commercial drones were met with mixed results. The lack of trained operators, coupled with the high attrition rate of these relatively expensive items for Ukrainian soldiers who usually had to buy them at their own expense, initially dampened enthusiasm for their widespread adoption. Volunteer organizations, which have played a crucial role in supporting Ukraine’s military efforts, did not — prior to 2022 — prioritize drone acquisition. Similarly, official military decisionmakers were slow to recognize the potential of these systems, focusing instead on more traditional assets.</p> -<p>In the corporate sector, firms that have longstanding practices in managing export controls for dual-use goods are well prepared to follow sanctions regulations. However, the broader corporate sector remains ill-equipped to handle the complexities introduced by recent sanctions. SMEs find it especially challenging to navigate sanctions compliance.</p> +<p>In cases where Ukrainian forces did use drones, the priority use case was ISR. China was a major supplier of commercial drones to Ukraine, primarily for civilian purposes such as agriculture and event photography, often referred to as “wedding” drones. However, these also saw usage in combat, even prior to 2022, again mostly for ISR. Hence, Ukrainian defense companies focused their military drone development efforts primarily on medium and long-range reconnaissance and artillery fire correction. Notable examples include the PD-2 from UkrSpecSystems, the Furia from Athlone Avia, the R18 from Aerorozvidka, and the ACS-3M from Skyeton. Companies like DeVIRo also contributed with their Leleka-100, further expanding Ukraine’s domestic drone capabilities, while the Punisher, a strike drone produced by UA Dynamics, represents Ukraine’s foray into offensive drone technology.</p> -<p>Last, legislators and regulatory bodies in Hungary appear to have struggled to coordinate their efforts, particularly given the complexity of sanctions legislation. Existing interdepartmental collaboration has proven challenging, complicating compliance for businesses and FIs. A centralised sanctions authority could streamline processes and facilitate better communication among stakeholders.</p> +<p>Despite the early use of drones in the war in Donbas, neither Ukrainian nor Russian drones were equipped with ISR AI/ML capabilities. However, increased familiarity with drones would set the stage for later AI adoption.</p> -<h3 id="interpretation-of-eu-sanctions-regulations">Interpretation of EU Sanctions Regulations</h3> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Despite the early use of drones in the war in Donbas, neither Ukrainian nor Russian drones were equipped with ISR AI/ML capabilities.</code></em></strong></p> -<p>Interpreting EU sanctions regulations has proven to be a challenge for Hungarian businesses and authorities alike. Participants at the roundtable discussed how the complexity of EU sanctions regulations – characterised by frequent updates and inaccessible language – creates a significant burden for compliance teams, which must navigate a constantly shifting landscape. The rapid pace of change means that organisations often lack the time and resources needed to allow them to adapt their compliance frameworks.</p> +<h4 id="post-invasion-ai-surge-wide-ranging-military-ai-applications">Post-Invasion AI Surge: Wide-Ranging Military AI Applications</h4> -<p>In this context, private sector participants expressed concerns regarding the interpretation of EU sanctions law, perceiving it as not clear enough. They agreed that language used in these regulations often lacks clarity and coherence, making it difficult for key stakeholders in both the public and private sectors (such as customs officials and FIs) to implement them effectively. Beyond the lack of clarity, rapid modifications to sanctions regulations also pose a challenge. Corporate sector participants noted that a change in the rules can create immediate barriers for goods in transit.</p> +<p>Despite Ukraine having been at war with Russia for nearly a decade, its 2022 full-scale invasion was a shock to the Ukrainian military system. The survival of Ukraine as an independent state was at stake, and leaders across civilian, military, and commercial structures reacted accordingly. Society as a whole mobilized to support the armed forces, and in many cases, everyday citizens volunteered to participate in combat and defend Ukraine.</p> -<p>Furthermore, the inconsistent application of sanctions across different EU member states complicates compliance, as varying interpretations can lead to confusion and misalignment. The expectation of uniform application of EU regulations is often undermined by practical realities on the ground. For example, a participant noted that there have been instances of Hungarian export licences not being accepted by EU member states at the eastern border. The agreement between the customs authorities of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Finland and Poland since May 2024 on the uniform implementation of trade sanctions sought to enhance regional coordination, but it has also reportedly led to a redirection of trade flows through Hungary, which is not currently party to this agreement. Due to the redirection of trade flows, the Hungarian Customs Unit’s workload, which includes managing flows at the external borders of the EU with Serbia and Ukraine, has increased, according to participants.</p> +<p>The commercial technology sector of Ukraine was also swept up in this wave. What had been a volunteering side project for many became the dominant focus of their professional life. In numerous cases, these efforts were centered on maintaining and enhancing existing digital platforms like Delta and Kropyva. However, a new suite of volunteer-built capabilities focusing on the opportunities of AI technology also emerged.</p> -<p>To navigate interpretation, some private sector participants have attempted to draw parallels between EU regulations and the more straightforward frameworks of US sanctions. One participant noted that they visit the FAQs page on the website of the US Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control and use analogues to interpret EU sanctions packages. Participants highlighted that the sanctions advisories published by the US were much clearer and more accessible than EU FAQs, which do not serve as sufficient guidance and have on occasion been contradicted in rulings by the European Court of Justice. Indeed, private sector participants noted that becoming acquainted with US sanctions is rising among the priorities of EU businesses as the potential for US secondary sanctions increases. This heightened scrutiny has forced FIs to reassess their risk profiles and enhance their compliance mechanisms, particularly for contracts involving non-EU entities.</p> +<p>As with the pre-2022 era, there was no centrally guided plan to accelerate the adoption of AI for priority use cases. Rather, experimentation with AI emerged organically, as technically proficient volunteers explored solutions to the diverse security challenges facing all of Ukrainian society — from disinformation to cyberwar to front-line conflict.</p> -<p>Participants highlighted that a critical need has emerged for the European Commission to issue much clearer interpretative notices similar to those from US regulatory bodies. The current approach to introducing FAQs lacks legal standing and their phrasing still often fails to provide the clarity necessary for effective compliance. Clear, consistent guidelines from the Commission would help mitigate these challenges.</p> +<p>While much of the technology development and drive behind Ukrainian AI efforts originated in the private sector and volunteer communities, the Ukrainian government and military responded with significant organizational changes to accelerate and improve the adoption of AI-enabled capabilities.</p> -<h3 id="awareness-raising-of-compliance-obligations-in-hungary">Awareness-Raising of Compliance Obligations in Hungary</h3> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">While much of the technology development and drive behind Ukrainian AI efforts originated in the private sector and volunteer communities, the Ukrainian government and military responded with significant organizational changes to accelerate and improve the adoption of AI-enabled capabilities.</code></em></strong></p> -<p>In an environment where compliance obligations are often viewed as ambiguous, FIs and businesses must have a clear understanding of the start and end points of their due diligence responsibilities. Overcompliance has become a prevalent strategy for mitigating risk, whereby institutions screen every transaction meticulously and often reject them when they remain unconvinced of their legitimacy. However, this approach can lead to operational inefficiencies and increased costs. To mitigate this, participants discussed the need to enhance industry’s understanding of compliance obligations, and some of the actions already being taken to improve awareness.</p> +<h3 id="the-institutional-landscape-for-military-ai-development-in-ukraine">The Institutional Landscape for Military AI Development in Ukraine</h3> -<p>The government and various industry associations in Hungary have made efforts to raise awareness, but resources for education on compliance are often scarce. The BFKH has organised export control forums and participates in webinars, while the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade engages in events dedicated to raising awareness about sanctions compliance. However, the authorities’ efforts need more support from the private sector, as few industry associations are involved. More associations could contribute to awareness-raising efforts.</p> +<p>The institutional landscape supporting AI development in Ukraine has evolved significantly since 2022, with many government agencies and institutions shifting from initially neglecting AI to actively creating specialized departments and units dedicated to developing AI capabilities. This transformation has been driven largely by the pressing demands of the ongoing war against Russia, where AI technologies have repeatedly demonstrated the potential to provide an advantage on the battlefield.</p> -<p>The National Bank’s AML/CTF department aims to contribute to these efforts and sends out a daily newsletter to supervised entities on relevant legislative changes and responds to questions. Participants welcomed this support, and pointed out that the volume of emails received from the National Bank is so high that recipients’ systems occasionally mark them as spam.</p> +<p>Of special note, Ukraine has gone so far as to create an entirely new branch of its armed forces, the Unmanned Systems Forces. While smaller than the other branches of the Ukrainian military, it is nevertheless technically their peer, and it serves as evidence that Ukrainian leadership views as critical the task of driving organizational reforms to account for new technological realities.</p> -<p>Furthermore, according to one participant, the National Bank’s successful awareness-raising campaign on online fraud, CyberShield, could offer a template for a campaign on sanctions violations risks. The campaign is supported by the Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of National Economy, as well as several other authorities, such as the police and the Hungarian Banking Association, the main advocacy group for FIs. Beyond raising customers’ awareness of online fraud, the campaign aims to foster the exchange of information and best practices between FIs, law enforcement and other authorities.</p> +<p>Other defense and security institutions have also created new organizations and empowered them to accelerate technology innovation, such as Special Unit Typhoon, a new part of the National Guard of Ukraine. One newly created organization within the MoD, the Center for Innovation and Defense Technologies (CIDT), is a direct outgrowth of the tech volunteer community’s efforts. In 2023, the CIDT took official responsibility for upgrading and developing situational awareness technologies, including the Delta system discussed in a previous section. In 2024, the developers began integrating AI/ML capabilities into Delta with an initial focus on video and text processing for the identification of enemy forces in real time.</p> -<p>Another challenge highlighted by participants as facing compliance professionals in Hungary is the limited access to information about enforcement actions and case studies that could inform best practices. In the US, open communication about sanctions violations offers valuable learning opportunities for FIs and businesses. Conversely, the lack of similar transparency in the EU is a missed opportunity to showcase valuable lessons to the business community, and hinders the ability to learn from others’ mistakes.</p> +<p>In other cases, the war has led organizations to reinvent their mandate. Both the Defense Intelligence of Ukraine (DIU, a subordinate body of the MoD) and the Security Service of Ukraine (SSU) have taken a leading role in developing and executing long-range precision strikes on Russian infrastructure. In previous years, these organizations would not have been responsible for such missions. AI is a useful enabling technology for long-range precision strikes, and both organizations have developed the relevant competencies to be at the forefront of AI adoption. For example, AI-based computer vision is helpful for accurate navigation in GPS-denied environments, such as the territory on both sides of the Russian border. More broadly, both the DIU and the SSU have adopted AI for processing and analyzing vast volumes of battlefield data.</p> -<p>In addition to awareness-raising on implementation, strengthened strategic communications are also necessary to highlight the aim of sanctions. Some private sector representatives raised the question of compensation for loss of business income due to sanctions, which underlines the need to further explain the importance of burden-sharing in the efforts to limit the Russian military complex’s access to funding and materials in its war of aggression on Ukraine.</p> +<p>Beyond creating new institutions and changing the mandate of existing ones, Ukrainian authorities are also implementing regulatory reforms and launching diverse initiatives to make it easier for companies to develop AI — and for military units to adopt it. The MDT, which is responsible for policymaking in AI development, is fostering an innovation-friendly regulatory environment, avoiding overregulation and promoting AI development through initiatives such as the Army of Drones and the Brave1 platform (further discussed below). These initiatives have accelerated the deployment of unmanned systems — including AI-driven ones — by providing essential financial and organizational support to early-stage projects.</p> -<h3 id="recommendations">Recommendations</h3> +<h4 id="profiles-of-organizations-in-ukraines-military-ai-ecosystem">Profiles of Organizations in Ukraine’s Military AI Ecosystem</h4> + +<p>The development of AI-enabled warfare is not occurring in isolation; it is shaped by a complex institutional landscape of government agencies and stakeholders. This section provides an overview of key institutions, along with their initiatives specifically related to developing military AI and drones, while excluding the broader scope of these institutions’ functions as it falls outside the focus of this research. Due to the classified nature of much of the information on government initiatives, this overview remains general, without going into the technical specifics of the projects and technologies involved. The purpose of this section is to offer a clearer understanding of Ukraine’s somewhat unstructured governmental approach to military AI development, as well as to facilitate the identification of relevant counterparts for collaboration where Ukrainian models or initiatives align with U.S. government objectives.</p> + +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/NM8CBwz.png" alt="image02" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 2: Map of Military AI Stakeholders in Ukraine.</strong> Source: CSIS analysis.</em></p> + +<h4 id="ministry-of-defense">Ministry of Defense</h4> + +<p>The MoD of Ukraine is the government body responsible for overseeing national defense and the AFU. The MoD is headed by the minister of defense, while the president of Ukraine holds the position of supreme commander-in-chief of the armed forces.</p> + +<p><strong>Organizational AI Initiatives</strong></p> <ul> <li> - <p><strong>Consult industry stakeholders:</strong> To enhance the efficacy of sanctions enforcement, national policymakers in Hungary and the European Commission should engage further with industry stakeholders before, during and after issuing sanctions. Participants noted that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade consults strategic industries, and the Commission also takes a consultative approach. However, further fostering of public–private collaboration throughout all stages of sanctions policymaking would ensure that the applicability and potential consequences of sanctions are thoroughly assessed. This would also help minimise unintended consequences for businesses, and support their implementation efforts to achieve the effect policymakers are seeking.</p> + <p><strong>Center for Innovation and Defense Technologies.</strong> In 2021, the MoD established the CIDT to reform its approach to IT project management. Its primary objective is to modernize automated combat management systems and develop future operational-strategic, tactical, and situational awareness systems. A notable achievement in this workstream is the formal adoption of the Delta situational awareness system by the MoD in 2023, which the CIDT inherited from the volunteer organization Aerorozvidka. Public information on the CIDT’s AI-related initiatives is limited, particularly beyond its focus on the Delta platform. However, recent job postings for machine learning engineers, MLOps specialists, and computer vision researchers suggest that the CIDT is prioritizing the integration of AI-enabled solutions into Delta.</p> </li> <li> - <p><strong>Increase clarity and transparency in regulations:</strong> Regulations should be formulated in a way that eliminates ambiguity and provides clear directives to stakeholders. While strategic ambiguity creates a sense of unease that might bolster overcompliance, clarity will foster more precise compliance that minimises the potential for misunderstandings that can then lead to inadvertent violations and unintended effects.</p> + <p><strong>Unmanned Systems Forces.</strong> A dedicated branch of the AFU, the Unmanned Systems Forces (USF), was established to systematize and expand the experience gained in the deployment of unmanned systems while formalizing a doctrinal approach suited to the realities of asymmetrical warfare. The USF is responsible for operations across all domains and levels, ranging from frontline engagements to deep strikes within enemy territory. Under the leadership of Colonel Vadym Sukharevsky, the USF plays a central role in introducing unmanned systems throughout the AFU, adopting emerging technologies, sharing innovations, and training units and brigades to use new systems. The USF is tasked with identifying the most effective systems to address the diverse challenges faced by the AFU on the battlefield. To date, over 170 models of unmanned systems have been integrated into frontline operations, positioning the USF as a critical driver of technological innovation in combat.</p> </li> +</ul> + +<p><strong>AI Technology Initiatives</strong></p> + +<ul> + <li><strong>Innovation Development Accelerator.</strong> The MoD has sought to accelerate the development and adoption of defense technologies through the creation of the Innovation Development Accelerator. Established in 2023, this initiative is designed to streamline and modernize the ministry’s operations by addressing issues of overregulation, lengthy processes, and inefficiencies in collaboration with defense companies. The accelerator aims to reduce the time required for the implementation of weapons and equipment from more than two years to approximately 45 days, while simplifying bureaucratic procedures to enhance operational efficiency. One of its six core priorities is the advancement of robotization and AI tech adoption for unmanned aerial vehicles, as well as ground and water drones.</li> +</ul> + +<p><strong>Initiatives in AI Regulation</strong></p> + +<ul> <li> - <p><strong>Centralise competences and simplify processes:</strong> The involvement of numerous authorities in Hungary requires a high degree of coordination that is often difficult to manage effectively. Fragmentation creates uncertainty and leads to a duplication of effort for the private sector. Centralising domestic sanctions competences into a single agency would mitigate these challenges and facilitate implementation.</p> + <p><strong>Doctrine for Unmanned Systems Forces.</strong> The USF has developed a comprehensive doctrine and statute for all branches of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, which is currently being tested in operational units. The documentation is developed for every level, from squad to battalion, and it will standardize tactics and procedures for the use of unmanned systems across the AFU. The creation of this statute marks a significant step toward the formalization and regulation of unmanned system deployment, ensuring consistent operational practices across the military.</p> </li> <li> - <p><strong>Enhance sanctions expertise:</strong> The level of understanding of sanctions regulations and obligations remains low, particularly among non-financial corporates. Awareness-raising initiatives should be prioritised and strengthened, by both the public and private sectors. Existing campaigns such as the Hungarian National Bank’s CyberShield programme on fraud could offer a template for wider awareness-raising efforts on sanctions. Furthermore, participants called for a central source of information on sanctions, such as a sanctions hotline.</p> + <p><strong>Political Declaration on Responsible Military Use of AI and Autonomy.</strong> The only AI-related regulatory initiative in which the MoD is currently involved is the Political Declaration on Responsible Military Use of AI and Autonomy, launched in 2023. This provides a framework for the responsible use of military AI and aims to build international consensus, guiding states in the ethical development, deployment, and use of military AI technologies. Besides this international initiative, the MoD has not yet released any public strategies or formalized vision regarding AI implementation or the development of autonomous systems.</p> </li> +</ul> + +<h4 id="defense-intelligence-of-the-mod-of-ukraine">Defense Intelligence of the MoD of Ukraine</h4> + +<p>The Main Directorate of Intelligence of the MoD, also known as the Defense Intelligence of Ukraine (DIU), serves as the military intelligence agency to the country’s leadership and the AFU. Its portfolio includes intelligence, cyber, technology development, and occasionally direct execution of high-priority missions.</p> + +<p><strong>AI Technology Initiatives:</strong></p> + +<ul> <li> - <p><strong>Invest in IT and data tools:</strong> Investing in improved IT systems and data analytics tools within customs and regulatory authorities would boost effective sanctions enforcement. This investment would enable better tracking and analysis of financial flows, as well as improved engagement with the private sector, thereby enhancing compliance capabilities across the board.</p> + <p><strong>AI for analytics.</strong> The DIU has emerged as one of the most advanced users and adopters of AI technology within the military. According to Lieutenant General Kyrylo Budanov, chief of the DIU, the increasing volume of acquired intelligence data necessitated the enhancement of analytical capabilities. To address this challenge, the analytical branch has been significantly bolstered with technologies for automated data processing, integrating artificial intelligence to improve the efficiency and accuracy of analysis. This integration of AI has been critical in managing large datasets and enhancing the decisionmaking process within the intelligence operations of Ukraine.</p> </li> <li> - <p><strong>Harmonise sanctions implementation:</strong> Hungarian customs authorities highlighted the challenge of managing an increased flow of goods through the country, linked to the enhanced customs cooperation between the Baltic countries, Finland and Poland. Hungary could benefit from joining this agreement, as it would help to prevent making the country attractive for the rerouting of trade flows. This challenge further underscores the need for the EU to work towards better alignment and harmonisation of sanctions implementation across member states.</p> + <p><strong>Drones for long-range strikes.</strong> The DIU is a leading agency in conducting long-range strikes into Russian territory using drones equipped with some elements of autonomy. These autonomous drones play a crucial role in Ukraine’s ability to carry out precision strikes at extended distances, significantly expanding the operational capabilities of its military. The use of such autonomous systems represents a forward-looking approach to modern warfare, where AI-enabled technologies enhance the effectiveness of long-range operations while minimizing the need for direct human intervention. While the Ukrainian government has not disclosed all of the functions that AI plays in this mission, government officials told CSIS that AI does play an important role. This positions the DIU as a key player in the development and application of autonomous military technologies in Ukraine.</p> </li> </ul> -<p>SIFMANet has repeatedly observed similar challenges across the 14 EU member states it has visited so far, and regularly shares recommendations with policymakers in Brussels to support the improved implementation of sanctions against Russia. These recommendations amplify the suggestions gathered from the public and private sectors, including in Hungary. Yet despite the clear and widespread understanding of these challenges, they persist. As we approach the third anniversary of Russia’s illegal invasion of Ukraine, the EU must redouble its efforts to ensure that governments and the private sector take all necessary steps to restrict the resourcing and funding of Russia’s war of aggression.</p> +<h4 id="security-service-of-ukraine">Security Service of Ukraine</h4> -<hr /> +<p>The Security Service of Ukraine (SSU) serves as the country’s principal security and intelligence agency, tasked with safeguarding national security, conducting counterintelligence operations and counterterrorism efforts, and combating organized crime. It operates under the authority of the president of Ukraine.</p> -<p><strong>Gonzalo Saiz</strong> is a Research Fellow in the Centre for Finance and Security research team at RUSI.</p> +<p><strong>AI Technology Initiatives</strong></p> -<p><strong>Balázs Gyimesi</strong> is the Communications Manager of RUSI Europe in Brussels.</p>Gonzalo Saiz and Balázs GyimesiDiscussions held in Budapest in September 2024 addressed the state of sanctions implementation and enforcement in Hungary.More Than Meets The Eye2024-10-31T12:00:00+08:002024-10-31T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/more-than-meets-the-eye<p><em>Though U.S.-Philippine economic ties are well documented, the day-to-day impact of the relationship in the Philippines is often underreported. The United States must enhance public awareness and understanding of its economic and investment activities in the Philippines.</em></p> +<ul> + <li><strong>Naval drones.</strong> One of the SSU’s most innovative contributions to the war effort is its use of naval drones, which have significantly impacted the balance of power in the Black Sea. These drones are not just simple unmanned vessels; due to constant close interaction between the SSU and its drone operators and engineers, they have evolved into multifunctional platforms that are constantly undergoing technological improvements. For example, the Sea Baby drones, initially designed for explosive attacks on Russian naval ships and infrastructure, have been enhanced to perform additional functions such as offensive sea mining. They have successfully laid mines in strategic locations, significantly impacting Russian naval operations. Moreover, due to recent upgrades, the drones are equipped with rocket systems — specifically the Grad multiple rocket launchers, which have already shown effectiveness in targeting Russian positions.</li> +</ul> -<excerpt /> +<h4 id="national-guard-of-ukraine">National Guard of Ukraine</h4> -<p>The size and scope of U.S.-Philippine economic cooperation is well documented; however, the quantitative and qualitative impacts on the Philippines are poorly understood. Without comprehensive, accurate, and easily accessible data on U.S. investments and their effects in the Philippines, malign actors may promote false or harmful narratives, thereby weakening public support for the U.S.-Philippine alliance. It is crucial for the United States to improve public awareness and understanding of its economic and investment activities in the Philippines.</p> +<p>The National Guard of Ukraine is a military force under the command of the Ukrainian Ministry of Internal Affairs, and it is tasked with protecting public order, securing strategically important facilities, and countering illegal paramilitary groups. During martial law periods, the units of the National Guard are subordinate to the AFU.</p> -<h3 id="introduction">Introduction</h3> +<p><strong>Organizational AI Initiatives</strong></p> -<p>The United States and the Philippines share a robust and enduring relationship based on shared values, national interest, and dense people-to-people connections. Filipinos regularly identify the United States as one of the country’s most trusted partners. Traditionally, the United States has been a key military partner for the Philippines, and since the 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty, the two countries have stood together in defense of their common interests. The alliance is the United States’ oldest in the Indo-Pacific. While the military relationship between the two countries is often at the forefront of policy conversations, the United States’ economic relationship with the Philippines is also of great significance. Creating strong economic linkages between like-minded partners throughout the region, such as the Philippines, is crucial to upholding a rules-based order and meeting countries’ demands for tangible benefits to cooperation.</p> +<ul> + <li>In 2024, the National Guard of Ukraine established a specialized unit known as Typhoon, which is focused on the deployment of unmanned aerial systems for military operations. This unit, composed of seasoned Special Forces veterans, has been created with the objective of enhancing the operational capabilities of combat brigades by integrating advanced unmanned systems into their strategic and tactical frameworks. The veterans within the unit bring a wealth of combat experience, which is crucial for the effective deployment of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) in complex battlefield environments. By integrating unmanned systems into combat operations, the Typhoon unit aims to increase both the flexibility and responsiveness of brigade-level engagements, enhancing operational efficiency and reducing risks to personnel.</li> +</ul> -<p>The economic relationship between the United States and the Philippines dates to the early twentieth century, when the Philippines was a U.S. territory. After the conclusion of the Spanish-American War in 1898, the Philippines came under the administration of the United States and remained so for nearly 50 years. During this time, the Philippine economy was strongly tethered to the United States and remained deeply intertwined even after Philippine independence in 1946. The Bell Trade Act of 1946, for instance, coupled the newly independent Philippine economy to that of the United States by allowing for free trade for 8 years and implementing a gradual application of tariffs over the next 20. U.S.-Philippine efforts at economic cooperation paved the way for future advancement, with U.S. investments playing a key role in the development of the Philippine manufacturing, agricultural, and services sectors. The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) has collaborated with the Philippine government since 1961, investing nearly $5 billion over the past 60 years.</p> +<h4 id="ministry-of-digital-transformation">Ministry of Digital Transformation</h4> -<p>Under President Ferdinand “Bongbong” Marcos Jr., the Philippines became one of 14 negotiating parties in the U.S.-led Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity (IPEF). More significant for the time being, the United States and Philippines have launched a series of bilateral economic initiatives under the administrations of Marcos and President Joe Biden. These include the Luzon Economic Corridor, meant to develop critical infrastructure in the Philippines, the first-ever Presidential Trade and Investment Mission to Manila in March 2024, and the U.S.-Philippines Agreement for Cooperation in Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy (or the 123 Agreement) that entered into force in July 2024.</p> +<p>The Ministry of Digital Transformation of Ukraine (MDT), established in 2019, is responsible for shaping and implementing state policy in digitalization, the digital economy, and digital innovation. It focuses on e-government, digital democracy, the development of digital skills and rights, open data, national electronic resources, and broadband infrastructure.</p> -<p>Though the direct trade, investment, and aid figures between the United States and Philippines are well documented, the quantitative and qualitative impacts of this deep economic relationship are not. Information on the effects of the United States’ investment efforts in the Philippines is often difficult to find, obscuring the depth of this partnership. Furthermore, this underreporting creates opportunity for malign actors to minimize or mischaracterize U.S. initiatives in order to manipulate Philippine public opinion. Already, disinformation regarding the U.S. defense commitment to Filipino forces in the South China Sea is pervasive on Philippine social media. Discrediting the accomplishments made possible by close cooperation between the two governments has the potential to weaken decades of collaboration and jeopardize the current renaissance in the alliance. In an attempt to illuminate the results of the U.S.-Philippine relationship, this brief explores the ways in which significant U.S. investments in several sectors deliver wide-ranging benefits for the Philippine public.</p> +<p><strong>Organizational AI Initiatives</strong></p> -<h3 id="state-of-us-philippine-economic-ties">State of U.S.-Philippine Economic Ties</h3> +<ul> + <li><strong>The Expert Committee on AI Development.</strong> The Expert Committee on AI Development, established under the MDT in December 2019, plays an important role in enhancing the country’s competitiveness in the field of AI. Composed predominantly of business and science representatives, the committee’s main task is to drive AI policy recommendations, facilitate research and development, and nurture talent across various domains.</li> +</ul> -<p>Goods and services trade between the United States and the Philippines reached an estimated $36.1 billion in 2022, with exports to the Philippines accounting for $12.8 billion and imports into the United States $23.3 billion. In 2022, the United States was the Philippines’ top export destination, accounting for 14.1 percent of Philippine exports at $15.5 billion; China follows at 13.9 percent, Hong Kong at 11.5, Japan at 10.2, and Singapore at 6.42, respectively. In contrast, in import terms, China’s supply of imported goods to the country is valued at $53.6 billion, amounting to 32.1 percent of the Philippines’ total imports; Indonesia trails behind at 8.15 percent, South Korea at 7.49, the United States at 5.02, and Taiwan at 4.52, respectively. Trade figures from May 2024 demonstrate that the United States remains the Philippines’ top export destination, and that the economic growth trend between the two countries continues to grow.</p> +<p><strong>AI Technology Initiatives</strong></p> -<p>In terms of investment, between 2013 and the first quarter of 2024, the Philippine Statistics Authority recorded the United States as the fifth-largest source of approved foreign investment, accounting for 7 percent, or roughly $3.6 billion. The United States is trailed closely by China, the sixth-largest source of approved foreign investment, clocking in at $3.2 billion. In 2022, U.S. foreign investment in the Philippines rose 15.7 percent year over year from 2021 to $6.2 billion, led by a combination of manufacturing and professional, scientific, and technical services, along with wholesale trade.</p> +<ul> + <li> + <p><strong>Army of Drones.</strong> Launched in July 2022 by the MDT, the Army of Drones initiative represents a significant effort to integrate unmanned aerial vehicles into Ukraine’s defense capabilities. Initially conceived as a fundraising campaign, the initiative quickly evolved into a systematic and comprehensive program aimed at both procuring drones and training operators for their effective deployment on the battlefield. The program’s scope has grown to encompass not only the direct supply of drones to frontline units but also the promotion of domestic UAV production, significantly bolstering Ukraine’s defense industrial base. One of the core objectives of the Army of Drones initiative is to equip Ukrainian armed forces with modern, locally produced UAVs that can be used for reconnaissance, surveillance, and tactical strikes.</p> -<p>Since the launch of IPEF in 2022, the United States and the Philippines have continued to mark significant accomplishments in their economic partnership. During President Marcos’ visit to Washington in April 2024 for trilateral discussions with President Biden and Japanese prime minister Kishida Fumio, the three countries announced the first Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment (PGI) corridor in the Indo-Pacific, the Luzon Economic Corridor. Aiming to support connectivity between Subic Bay, Clark, Manila, and Batangas, the Luzon Economic Corridor is the first project of the PGI-IPEF Investment Accelerator and will allow the three countries to coordinate investments in infrastructure projects, clean energy, and semiconductor supply chains. Through this larger policy, the United States can work with IPEF partners to develop country-specific investment approaches in key sectors as targeted by each IPEF partner. In the same document, the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation announced a $20 million loan for affordable housing throughout the country as well as its intent to open a regional office in the Philippines.</p> + <p>Moreover, the initiative places significant emphasis on the training and skill enhancement of drone operators, ensuring that personnel are proficient in utilizing the advanced technologies embedded in contemporary UAV systems. By the end of 2023, 20,000 operators had successfully completed the training. This comprehensive approach — combining procurement, production, and operator training — has had a transformative impact on the use of drones in frontline operations, making the Army of Drones a pivotal component of Ukraine’s broader defense strategy.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Brave1.</strong> As an effort to support projects and companies in their early stages, a platform dubbed “Brave1” was established in July 2023. It is designed to facilitate collaboration among all major stakeholders in the government’s defense sector, the tech industry, and investors and volunteers. Manufacturers who meet the 12 priority verticals of technological development identified by the general staff of the AFU for the Brave1 cluster and have passed a defense expert review can apply to get military expertise; testing opportunities; and organizational, informational, and financial support for their projects. Brave1 also funds early-stage miltech start-ups, giving grants up to UAH 8,000,000 (approximately USD 194,000). As of September 2024, the program has awarded 299 grants totaling USD 6.5 million.</p> -<p>When it comes to development assistance, USAID invests some $120 million annually to support market-driven growth in the Philippines, as well as to foster stronger democratic systems and improve education and health services. The Philippines has also been a major beneficiary of other assistance programs, such as Millenium Challenge Corporation (MCC) grants. In February 2024, the MCC began talks with Philippine officials about restarting threshold programs, smaller scale grants aimed at improving policies. The Philippines previously had received MCC threshold grants (2006–2009) amounting to $20.7 million; in 2016, it received its first compact grant — aimed at poverty reduction and economic stimulus — for $434 million.</p> + <p>In October 2024, the MDT stated that the list of priority verticals of technological development will be revised, with a larger focus on electronic warfare and AI-enabled capabilities.</p> -<p>Beyond traditional channels of economic engagement, since 2015, the U.S. Department of State has provided the Philippines with $463 million in security assistance through Foreign Military Financing (FMF), international military education and training, as well as peacekeeping operations funded through the Global Peace Operations Initiative. FMF figures are growing rapidly, with the United States providing $100 million in FY 2022 to potentially quintupling FMF to $500 million each year from FY 2025–2029. Under the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement, the United States has already allotted $109 million in support of base facility improvements, supplies, and military equipment, with an additional $128 million planned in the 2025 fiscal year. In the 2+2 talks held in the Philippines in July 2024, U.S. secretary of defense Lloyd Austin pledged an additional $500 million in military financing from the FY 2024 budget.</p> + <p>Events organized by Brave1 provide valuable insights into the urgent technological needs and priorities of the AFU, as the topics and competition areas reflect requests gathered by the Brave1 team from various military institutions and agencies. For example, the deputy commander-in-chief of the AFU has identified key areas for technological advancement, including alternative navigation systems, jamming-resistant communications, drone swarm technologies, “friend or foe” identification, and improved target identification and engagement capabilities. Events such as the Precision Hackathon exemplify the immediate demand for AI-driven solutions in defense technology — including advanced targeting systems, real-time data integration, and innovative smart munitions capable of adjusting their trajectories to engage dynamic targets. The emphasis on autonomous and semi-autonomous systems with precision targeting capabilities and network-centric tools for combat operations reflects a broader shift toward AI-enabled autonomy in military applications. Furthermore, events like the AI for Ukraine Recovery Hackathon, which focused on topics such as cybersecurity, damage assessment, and disinformation prevention, underscore the pivotal role of AI in strengthening Ukraine’s defense capabilities and supporting its recovery efforts.</p> + </li> +</ul> -<h3 id="benefits-of-us-private-investment-in-the-philippines">Benefits of U.S. Private Investment in the Philippines</h3> +<p><strong>Initiatives in AI Regulation</strong></p> -<p>Foreign and domestic businesses may register with one of the Philippines’ 19 investment promotion authorities, including the Philippine Board of Investment and the Philippine Economic Zone Authority (PEZA). These authorities are split based on geographic regions and industry strengths, such as the manufacturing and logistics network in Luzon, the tourism cluster throughout Luzon and Mindanao, and the agro-industrial cluster in Mindanao.</p> +<ul> + <li> + <p><strong>Approach to AI regulation.</strong> The MDT is responsible for overseeing Ukraine’s digital development, digital economy, and innovation, with AI being an integral component of this policy. Consequently, the ministry also holds responsibility for AI regulation. However, it has explicitly emphasized a commitment to avoiding overregulation by adopting a soft, business-friendly approach. The MDT plans to implement a bottom-up strategy, initially preparing businesses for future regulations before moving toward formal implementation. In the early stages, the state will provide businesses with tools such as general and sector-specific recommendations, voluntary codes of conduct, a legal assistance platform, and a regulatory sandbox for product testing, all aimed at facilitating compliance with forthcoming legislation.</p> -<p>Much of the foreign investment into the Philippines’ export-oriented manufacturing and services industries is routed through special economic zones managed by PEZA, which works to facilitate investor operations all the way down to registration and paperwork filing. As of April 2023, the Philippines was operating 419 different special economic zones throughout the country, ranging from manufacturing zones and information technology parks to agro-industrial economic zones and tourist export enterprises. Within the zones, the Philippine government can dole out tax incentives while sparing foreign businesses from lengthy bureaucratic procedures.</p> + <p>The current regulatory framework includes the Concept of Development of Artificial Intelligence in Ukraine, adopted in 2020, followed by the AI Regulation Roadmap introduced in 2023. While neither document constitutes formal regulation, they provide guiding principles for AI development within the country.</p> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">As of April 2023, the Philippines was operating 419 different special economic zones throughout the country, ranging from manufacturing zones and information technology parks to agro-industrial economic zones and tourist export enterprises.</code></em></strong></p> + <p>The MDT also plays a significant role in fostering defense innovation, making its approach to AI regulation in the defense sector particularly clear in its white paper “Artificial Intelligence Regulation in Ukraine: Vision of the Ministry of Digital Transformation of Ukraine.” The ministry has stated that it does not intend to propose any regulation of AI systems within the defense sector, emphasizing a noninterventionist stance in this domain.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Simplifying regulation for local high-tech defense industry.</strong> To boost local production, the MDT has made some considerable steps in terms of regulatory simplification for private drone companies. By implementing regulatory changes, the allowed profit margin for Ukrainian drone manufacturers was increased from 1 percent to 25 percent. This change makes the drone production business more financially viable and attractive for local companies. Previously, the low profitability cap of 1 percent limited potential earnings, discouraging investment and innovation. By raising the limit to 25 percent, the government aims to stimulate growth in the domestic high-tech defense industry, encouraging companies to scale up production and invest in advanced technologies.</p> -<p>More important than investment from U.S. government programs is the U.S. private investment that flourishes in and beyond the PEZA zones, covering a variety of sectors of the Philippine economy. The CSIS Southeast Asia Program selected seven of these sectors for study based on their growth and importance to the Philippines. Ranging from renewable energy investments to aerospace engineering, the following case studies examine how U.S. private investment delivers tangible benefits for the Philippines that go beyond simply reporting overall investment and trade figures.</p> + <p>Furthermore, regulations governing contract negotiations, goods acceptance for military use, operational clearance, and delivery to the front were streamlined. Measures were also implemented to accelerate the operational approval process for UAV manufacturers, facilitating faster integration into state procurement contracts and supply chains for frontline operations. The government eliminated the requirement for export service control documents, simplifying the import of drones and their components, and removed the need for Security Service approvals, significantly expediting the overall approval process. Additionally, drone manufacturers can opt into the special “Diia.City” tax regime for IT companies, which allows up to 50 percent of employees eligible for military service to be exempted from active duty.</p> + </li> +</ul> -<h4 id="renewable-energy">Renewable Energy</h4> +<h4 id="innovations-development-fund">Innovations Development Fund</h4> -<p>The Philippine government under President Marcos has identified clean energy development as a top priority and embraced cooperation with partner nations on that front, including through the clean economy pillar of IPEF. As one of the countries most affected by increasingly severe weather events, this is necessary not only to meet the Philippines’ net-zero goals, but also to grow other industries, like semiconductor manufacturing, in which foreign investors are seeking access to renewable energy. This is why the development of renewable energy is one of the three initial priorities of the Luzon Economic Corridor, announced in April 2024, the other two being rail and port modernization and the advancement of commercial enterprises at Subic Bay.</p> +<p>The Innovations Development Fund (previously called the Ukrainian Startup Fund) is the first and only state institution dedicated to helping innovative projects and tech start-ups secure early-stage funding and launch their ventures. Established in 2018 by the Ministry of Finance of Ukraine, it has been managed by the MDT since 2023.</p> -<p>Collaboration between the United States and the Philippines in establishing clean, sustainable power grids is of great importance to local Philippine communities. An archipelagic nation, the Philippine energy grid is deeply reliant on imported fossil fuels. Though 97.5 percent of Philippine households are electrified, the mountainous and archipelagic nature of the country’s geography presents significant challenges to consistent, inexpensive power. Successive Philippine administrations have prioritized a more resilient regional grid based on modular renewable energy. The 2020 census indicated that there were about 26.39 million households throughout the country. U.S. investments in Philippine nuclear power would be of great benefit to local communities isolated from main power grids and for improving quality of life and maintaining consistent, cheap electrification in major cities. Geothermal, solar, and wind energy account for 32.7 percent of the country’s energy sources. The Philippines aims to reach 50 percent renewable energy by 2050. Under the previous administration of President Rodrigo Duterte, lawmakers amended the Public Services Act to allow for 100 percent ownership by foreign investors of utilities ranging from power to telecoms, opening the door to more foreign investment in the Philippine energy grid. As a result of this and other reforms, the Philippines has become one of the most attractive emerging markets for investment in renewables, according to BloombergNEF’s 2023 climate report.</p> +<p><strong>AI Technology Initiatives</strong></p> -<p>Given its geographic location, the Philippines has immense solar energy potential. U.S.-based BrightNight Power, in collaboration with the Ayala Group’s ACEN, has agreed to jointly invest $1.2 billion over the next five years to develop the Philippines’ renewable energy capacity. U.S. solar panel manufacturers are increasingly looking to the Philippines for production, allowing Filipinos easier access to domestically produced, cheaper solar panels while also exporting those panels to countries like the United States and Canada. Sol-Go Inc., participating in Commerce Secretary Gina Raimondo’s Presidential Trade and Investment Mission in March 2024, announced that it will build a new solar panel factory in the Philippines in addition to its current factory operating in Batangas. This additional investment will allow Sol-Go to triple its locally sourced workforce and increase its capacity so that it can produce 50 megawatts (MW) of solar panels. With the average Filipino household using 200 kilowatt-hours of energy per month, 50 MW could easily power 180,000 homes.</p> +<ul> + <li> + <p><strong>Program for defense start-ups.</strong> The “Fast Track to Victory” program is an example of Ukraine’s capacity to rapidly adapt and use existing infrastructure to foster innovation in defense technologies. This program streamlines the interaction between the MoD and UAV manufacturers, facilitating a more efficient approval process for drone technologies. By leveraging the fund’s web portal, UAV developers with finished products can apply directly for official ministry approval. This approval is essential as it authorizes the MoD to procure the products and allows the AFU to deploy them.</p> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Collaboration between the United States and the Philippines in establishing clean, sustainable power grids is of great importance to local Philippine communities.</code></em></strong></p> + <p>According to government documents describing the program, the application process is designed to be efficient, with all submissions reviewed by MoD representatives in a timely manner. The program specifically targets UAVs that meet the tactical and technical characteristics required by the military, ensuring that the products are immediately relevant to the operational needs of the AFU. Once approved, the products can be integrated into military service, streamlining the deployment of innovative drone technologies on the battlefield.</p> + </li> +</ul> -<p>The 123 Agreement between the United States and the Philippines sets the stage for nuclear energy collaboration between the two countries moving forward by allowing U.S. companies to invest in nuclear projects throughout the country. NuScale Power, for instance, aims to invest up to $7.5 billion through 2031 to build small modular reactors in the Philippines. These reactors would greatly benefit more geographically isolated communities with tenuous connections to main power grids, while also touting smaller footprints, reduced cost, and locational flexibility in comparison to traditional nuclear reactors.</p> +<h4 id="ministry-of-strategic-industries-and-ukrainian-defense-industry">Ministry of Strategic Industries and Ukrainian Defense Industry</h4> -<h4 id="information-technology-and-business-process-management">Information Technology and Business Process Management</h4> +<p>The Ministry of Strategic Industries is responsible for overseeing Ukraine’s military-industrial complex, which includes a state-owned enterprise named Ukrainian Defense Industry (formerly known as UkrOboronProm). This entity manages over 100 defense-related enterprises, many of which are remnants of Soviet-era companies. While efforts are underway to modernize some of these enterprises to meet the demands of the current war, the ministry and its associated industries remain predominantly focused on traditional defense platforms — such as artillery production and missile programs — rather than on emerging technologies like software-driven systems and AI, which are increasingly defining modern warfare.</p> -<p>The information technology and business process management (IT-BPM) sector covers a wide range of services in the Philippines, all aimed at managing certain aspects of business operations for third parties.</p> +<p><strong>AI Technology Initiatives</strong></p> -<p>During the 2008 global recession, demand for overseas Filipino workers (OFWs) decreased significantly, prompting the Philippine government to provide training for OFWs to become call center agents. By 2010, the Philippines had surpassed India in voice-based IT-BPM services. As of 2023, the IT-BPM industry had reached 1.57 million employees, and it is forecast to employ 2.5 million by 2028. In April 2024, the ubiquity of Philippine IT-BPM services went viral on social media when a Philippines-based IT-BPM employee worked as a virtual cashier in a New York City restaurant thousands of miles away.</p> +<ul> + <li> + <p><strong>AI implementation together with the MDT.</strong> In 2021, Ukrainian Defense Industry signed a memorandum of intent with the MDT to coordinate efforts in advancing the digital economy and fostering innovation, with a specific focus on AI technology. Formerly, UkrOboronProm had also expressed plans to establish a dedicated unit for AI development. However, Ukrainian Defense Industry sources told CSIS that these initiatives have not yet been realized or advanced, highlighting a gap between stated intentions and actual implementation in the area of digital and AI-driven defense innovation. This suggests that while there is recognition of the importance of emerging technologies, the practical shift toward their integration in Ukraine’s defense industry remains limited.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Cooperation with Helsing.</strong> In 2024, the Ministry for Strategic Industries signed a memorandum with Helsing GmbH, a German company specializing in software development and AI integration in defense technologies. This cooperation aims to enhance Ukrainian defense technologies by integrating AI into drones, particularly Ukrainian-made UAVs. This is probably the only public mention of ministry- or state-owned enterprises introducing AI technology in their production.</p> + </li> +</ul> -<p>U.S. businesses have increasingly outsourced services to the Philippines in the last few decades, and U.S. investment has played a crucial role in the development of the sector. From 2014 to 2023, the Philippines has benefitted from nearly $5.2 billion worth of foreign direct investment (FDI) from the United States in general professional, scientific, and technical services. With its young, tech-literate, and largely English-proficient population, the Philippines presents an ideal location for U.S. IT-BPM investments. Government initiatives, including Republic Act No. 7916, which established Special Economic Zones through PEZA, offer tax incentives and ease the ability to conduct business for foreign investors. From 2003 to 2021, 395 U.S.-based firms invested $22.4 billion in the Philippines, 35 percent of which, or around $7.8 billion, went to the IT-BPM sector, one of the key growth drivers for PEZA, bringing in nearly $260 million of investments from the first quarter of 2024 alone.</p> +<p><strong>Initiatives in AI Regulation</strong></p> -<p>IT-BPM companies are often desirable places of employment for Filipinos. U.S.-owned companies ranging from American Express to Synchrony and Accenture rank near the top of a “best workplaces” list compiled by the Information Technology and Business Process Association of the Philippines and Great Place to Work. Surveys undertaken by Great Place to Work, a platform that uses employee data to certify workplaces with good levels of trust and work culture, indicate that from January 2022 to May 2023, “94 percent of IT-BPM employees in best workplaces experience a high-trust workplace culture.” The schedule flexibility offered by IT-BPM companies, paired with the flexibility to work from home that such jobs involve, makes the sector particularly attractive to recent graduates. The Philippines produces about 850,000 college graduates yearly, 87,000 of whom have degrees in fields suited to the IT-BPM sector.</p> +<ul> + <li><strong>Upcoming strategic AI project for key economic sectors.</strong> Somewhat unexpectedly, given the ministry’s responsibilities and the current situation in the country, the Ukrainian government has approved a concept for a state program using artificial intelligence in strategic sectors of the economy and has designated the Ministry of Strategic Industries as responsible for the development of a detailed AI program for these priority sectors. The program aims to enhance Ukraine’s economic potential and strengthen its global market position by 2026 in such sectors as machinery, chemicals, defense, nuclear industry, agriculture, healthcare, and scientific activities.</li> +</ul> -<p>Both foreign and domestic investment in the Philippines has historically been concentrated within the Metro Manila National Capital Region and the surrounding regions of Luzon. Investments are slowly flowing to other emerging regions, particularly northern Luzon and the Visayas. Moreover, even though the IT-BPM sector is more widely distributed than most, it is still concentrated in a few urban centers; Bacolod, Cebu, Clark, Davao, and Iloilo are the main hubs. Nationwide broadband speeds, while improving, still lag behind those of other members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. Through the Digital Cities 2025 Initiative, the Philippine government is providing basic digital literacy and skills training in more rural provinces. These initiatives will likely pay dividends as the Philippines continues to advertise itself as an IT-BPM hub to U.S. investors.</p> +<h4 id="money-matters">Money Matters</h4> -<h4 id="semiconductor-manufacturing">Semiconductor Manufacturing</h4> +<p>The development of the defense industry and the sustainability of military operations are heavily dependent on the government’s purchasing capacity, regardless of the scale and quality of research, development, and production. In FY 2024, the Ukrainian government has allocated UAH 58.8 billion (USD 1.4 billion) for the acquisition of UAVs and an additional UAH 1.5 billion (USD 36 million) to support the Brave1 platform.</p> -<p>With highly educated, English-proficient workers, the Philippines is an appealing location for semiconductor manufacturing. Concentrated in Metro Manila, Calabarzon (Cavite, Laguna, Batangas, Rizal, and Quezon), northern and central Luzon, and Cebu, the Philippine electronics industry is split between 73 percent semiconductor manufacturing and 27 percent electronics manufacturing. Electronics exports reached $12.9 billion in 2023, nearly 60 percent of total Philippine exports. From 2014 to 2023, the United States invested roughly $7.91 billion in Philippine computer and electronic manufacturing.</p> +<p>However, Ukrainian defense companies face significant challenges, including export bans imposed since the onset of the full-scale war due to the need to satisfy the demand for weapon systems for the AFU first. As a result, many defense factories remain underutilized due to insufficient funding for weapons procurement in the state budget and the consequent low purchasing capacity from the government. Although the defense industry’s capacity is estimated at around USD 20 billion, the maximum government procurement budget for 2024 is only USD 6 billion. In response, discussions have recently begun regarding the reopening of defense exports. A parliamentary working group is currently evaluating risks and developing a mechanism to enable Ukraine’s reentry into the global arms market.</p> -<p>Given the number of Filipinos employed in the semiconductor industry, disruptions in U.S. investment can and have proven damaging to local communities. At its peak in 2008, Intel employed 5,000 direct workers and around 36,000 indirect workers in the Philippines. In the aftermath of the 2008 global recession, however, Intel shut down its Cavite-based chip assembly, testing, and packaging facility. As the global semiconductor manufacturing supply chain continues to evolve and mature, it is important to recognize the value of these private investments to local communities. As of April 2023, the semiconductor industry employed 2.5 million Filipinos.</p> +<p>Drone production represents a significant area of expansion. Ukrainian Defense Industry sources told CSIS that the current production output for FPV drones alone exceeds 2 million units in 2024, although only 1 million have been contracted by the government to date. A survey conducted among defense companies revealed that 38 percent of them have more than half of their production capacity idle, while 85 percent are considering relocation abroad. The primary factors that could prevent such relocation include the reopening of exports, an increase in government procurement orders, and the establishment of long-term contracts.</p> -<p>Through the CHIPS and Science Act of 2022, the United States seeks to diversify and de-risk the global semiconductor ecosystem by boosting manufacturing and research both at home and in trusted partner countries. The International Technology Security and Innovation Fund, under the CHIPS Act, earmarked $500 million over five years to promote a secure, trustworthy telecommunications network aimed at ensuring semiconductor supply chain security by spreading out the traditionally concentrated semiconductor supply chain among friendly partners, including the Philippines.</p> +<p>Besides that, the Ministry of Strategic Industries is actively working to address current challenges in the industry, with a key focus on securing external funding for the purchase of Ukrainian defense products, including UAVs. ZBROYARI: Manufacturing Freedom is a global fundraising campaign aimed at raising USD 10 billion from partner countries to produce Ukrainian weapons in 2024. Of EUR 60 million in Dutch contributions, EUR 20 million is for FPV drones, EUR 22.5 million for Dutch drones, and EUR 17.5 million for Ukrainian-made naval drones.</p> -<p>In 2023, the Department of State announced that it would collaborate with the Philippine government to explore further cooperation in semiconductor supply chain security. During the Presidential Trade and Investment Mission in March 2024, Secretary Raimondo announced an investment of over $1 billion in the Philippine technology sector, aiming to double the number of semiconductor factories in the country; currently, there are 13 semiconductor factories focused on the assembly, testing, and packaging segment of the semiconductor supply chain.</p> +<h3 id="conclusion">Conclusion</h3> -<p>In November 2023, President Marcos stressed that semiconductors and electronics remain top-priority sectors for his administration. PEZA aims to aggressively promote the Philippines as a site for overseas electronic and semiconductor manufacturing. Together with IT-BPM, electronics and semiconductors have been among the Philippines’ top exports in 2024.</p> +<p>Military AI in Ukraine underwent a rapid transition from being a secondary concern during almost eight years of war in Donbas to becoming a cornerstone of the country’s survival after the full-scale Russian invasion of 2022. This dramatic transition is reflected in the growth of private companies developing military AI capabilities, which have increased from two dozen or so in the beginning of 2022 to over a thousand in 2024. The Ukrainian government embraced the role of innovation enabler by streamlining the bureaucratic processes for technology adoption, adapting its organizational structures to meet rapidly advancing technological capabilities, and providing funding to the commercial defense sector.</p> -<p>U.S. companies have been increasingly investing in the Philippine semiconductor space. In May 2023, Analog Devices announced an investment of $200 million in a research and development facility in Cavite. In August 2023, Texas Instruments announced that it would invest up to $1 billion in facility expansion in Clark and Baguio City. The Philippines aims to move up the semiconductor value chain, hoping to establish a lab-scale wafer fabrication plant by 2028.</p> +<p>As a result of these efforts, most of the industry representatives and brigade commanders interviewed by CSIS confirmed that numerous AI solutions are currently being tested on the frontline. They expect a transition to semi-autonomous unmanned capabilities in a year or two, wherein the human role will only be in confirmation of a strike. However, Ukraine may not have the luxury of time and must fast-track the realization of this vision.</p> -<h4 id="agriculture">Agriculture</h4> +<p>To achieve this, Ukraine must overcome several challenges that are hindering its military AI development: insufficient funding, the limited capacity of small companies and their fragmented efforts in developing AI capabilities, competition within the government for resources, and a lack of coordination among key defense and military institutions to create a unified approach to military AI. Additionally, there is a shortage of computing power and experienced AI professionals in the country to work on classified technology, which are critical for making military AI a game-changer in the fight against Russia.</p> -<p>The United States and the Philippines are longtime partners in the agricultural sector — in 2022, U.S.-Philippine bilateral agricultural trade exceeded $4 billion. With its growing population, expanding middle class, and increasing household income, the Philippines is an important destination for U.S. agricultural goods. The United States and the Philippines convened their first Food Security Dialogue in May 2023. Ongoing U.S. projects in the Philippines aim to support capacity building in food regulatory agencies and agricultural industries while digitizing the connection between farmers and buyers. A plurality of Philippine agriculture (39 percent) is based in Luzon, followed by Mindanao and Visayas at 33.4 and 27.4 percent, respectively.</p> +<p>While Russia is investing enormous resources into transitioning to an economy on a war footing with a focus on technological advancement within its military, Ukraine requires support from its international partners to fully leverage the advantages of AI as a competitive edge across all battlefields and frontlines in its fight against a conventionally superior adversary.</p> -<p>Despite this, the Philippines is vulnerable to food insecurity, a situation further exacerbated by climate change. Its reliance on imported food makes the Philippines the most food-insecure country in the region. Due to the country’s limited infrastructure linking its farmers to markets and its vulnerability to external food supply shocks, improving food production is crucial to securing Philippine agricultural supply chains. President Marcos has made the strengthening of the Philippines’ food supply a key priority of his administration, boosting the budget for agricultural programs. Under the Marcos administration, the Department of Agriculture’s budget was boosted by nearly 70 percent from 2022 to 2024 compared to the 2017–2021 appropriation under the previous administration.</p> +<p>The conclusion of this paper presents recommendations on how the U.S. government can collaborate with Ukraine to harness the advantages of military AI development and ensure that both nations remain at the forefront of AI and defense innovation.</p> -<p>From September to October 2023, the United States’ first Agricultural Technology Trade Mission explored opportunities to help support the Philippine agricultural supply chain as it traveled to Davao and Manila. The trade mission brought together various Philippine companies, government agencies, local businesses, and U.S. companies to discuss the importance of food security collaboration. The trade mission highlighted innovations in agricultural technology that have the potential to enhance the country’s agricultural productivity.</p> +<h4 id="1-providing-strategic-support">1. Providing strategic support</h4> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Due to the country’s limited infrastructure linking its farmers to markets and its vulnerability to external food supply shocks, improving food production is crucial to securing Philippine agricultural supply chains.</code></em></strong></p> +<p>The United States, with its technological superiority and numerous AI-related defense programs, is uniquely positioned to assist Ukraine in addressing its challenge of lacking a cohesive, government-led strategy for defense technology development. Given the United States’ forward-looking and long-term AI development plans, it can collaborate with Ukraine to craft a comprehensive, mid-term strategy for integrating AI into its military for beyond immediate tactical solutions.</p> -<p>U.S. investors, including Cargill, John Deere, and PepsiCo, have a long history of investment in the Philippine agricultural space. Cargill, which has had a presence in the Philippines since 1947, has made several key investments over the past decade. It collaborated with the Jollibee Foods Corporation to create a joint-venture poultry processing facility in Batangas in 2017, creating 1,000 new jobs. As of 2022, the facility employs 1,200 workers. Similarly, Cargill operates a joint-venture plant in Laguna that produces carrageenan, a common food additive and thickener. In 2018, the company announced that it would invest $235 million over two years to help the country meet the increasing demand for chicken and pork. As of 2024, Cargill directly employs over 950 people throughout the country.</p> +<p>This support would offer Ukraine much-needed guidance to align its decentralized bottom-up approach with a coherent national vision, allowing volunteer groups, start-ups, the defense sector, and government institutions to operate in synergy with national priorities. This approach could help Ukraine align government stakeholders’ efforts in accordance with a single strategy in order to avoid wasting resources, and it could increase competition by promoting efficient resource allocation and funding for AI-enabled capabilities development.</p> -<h4 id="defense-and-aerospace-manufacturing">Defense and Aerospace Manufacturing</h4> +<p>The benefits for the United States are twofold. First, by collaborating with Ukraine, the United States can access real-time insights into the application of AI technologies in active warfare, gaining valuable data that can enhance its own AI capabilities. Second, support for Ukraine’s efforts is a contribution to strengthening the global security architecture and countering common adversaries.</p> -<p>Given its strategic location and well-educated workforce, the Philippines is in a prime position to contribute to defense and aerospace supply chains. The defense and aerospace sectors, made especially pertinent due to ongoing tensions between the Philippines and China over disputed territories in the South China Sea, are critical to the Philippines’ defense modernization initiatives. To support foreign investments in national defense, Philippine senators have proposed spending roughly $17.5 million under the Self-Reliant Defense Posture Revitalization Act aimed at encouraging investment in the local manufacturing of defense equipment.</p> +<h4 id="2-unlocking-battlefield-data-for-innovation">2. Unlocking battlefield data for innovation</h4> -<p>The Philippines hosts two prominent U.S. aerospace and defense manufacturing companies: RTX’s Collins Aerospace and Moog Controls Corporation. Collins Aerospace manufactures airplane parts and interiors within the Philippines, supplying both Airbus and Boeing. Collins Aerospace established a facility in Tanauan City, Batangas, in 2012, manufacturing myriad cabin interior products ranging from airplane galleys and galley inserts to oxygen equipment and lavatories. The facility has expanded from task-based engineering to design drawing and process refinement; by 2018, the Philippines-based engineering team was supporting the design of complex galleys and had already designed a head of version shipset, or the first configured and manufactured aircraft of the order. In 2023, the company began producing seats for Boeing, Airbus, and Embraer.</p> +<p>To harness the full potential of AI in defense, Ukraine must build a collaborative framework that brings government authorities and private sector innovators together on data-sharing strategies. This framework should regulate access to and use of real-world combat data by establishing clear legal procedures and protocols for data collection, storage, and sharing — all while safeguarding national security. Such an environment would streamline access for approved developers and foster sustainable business models, incentivizing private investment in military AI research.</p> -<p>As of 2024, Collins Aerospace plans to expand its existing operations in the Philippines — hoping to add 300,000 sq. ft. to its existing 400,000 sq. ft. complex in Tanauan City. Collins Aerospace’s community outreach to regional universities has the potential to create a significant impact. In 2023, for example, the company challenged students from the De La Salle College of Saint Benilde to develop and design aircraft cabin proposals under the university’s Benilde Industrial Design program. The same year, Collins explored potential partnerships with Batangas State University-Lipa.</p> +<p>The United States could play a pivotal role in enabling this effort, helping Ukraine develop a technical and regulative framework by drawing from its own experience of data exchange within global projects such as the Combined Joint All-Domain Command and Control, where military data is shared among allied countries and the U.S. military. This initiative could set a global precedent for responsible data sharing in defense technology development. Ukraine could monetize its combat data by offering access to countries, organizations such as NATO, and even private defense companies in order to improve their AI tech and the interoperability of all parties involved.</p> -<p>Moog Controls Corporation, a U.S. designer and manufacturer of precision control products found in military and commercial aircraft, has been established in Baguio City since 1984. Spread out over two campuses, one for servovalves (a type of valve used to regulate control or pressure of fluid in response to an electrical signal) and actuation systems for commercial aircraft applications and the other for high-performance motion control solutions, Moog employs about 1,400 personnel. In 2018, the company announced their intention to boost aerospace industry output in the Philippines, citing the growth of the aerospace market. Moog received a PEZA Excellence Award in 2023 as an outstanding employer behind community projects.</p> +<h4 id="3-closing-a-feedback-loop">3. Closing a feedback loop</h4> -<h4 id="critical-minerals-and-electric-vehicles">Critical Minerals and Electric Vehicles</h4> +<p>Currently, the United States sends significant military aid to Ukraine, including drones, and many U.S. start-ups and drone manufacturers are contributing by donating their products through volunteers, NGOs, and Ukrainian government initiatives. However, there is no established system for collecting feedback on the performance and effectiveness of these drones on the battlefield, leaving the feedback loop incomplete. Establishing a more structured and standardized feedback collection process would be highly beneficial for both parties.</p> -<p>The Philippines’ critical mineral wealth, which has largely gone untapped, makes it an ideal partner in electrical vehicle (EV) battery and component supply chains. Only 5 percent of the Philippines’ $1 trillion worth of gold, nickel, zinc, and silver reserves has been explored. Moreover, with the growing importance of electric vehicles (EVs) in international decarbonization efforts, the Philippines’ critical mineral wealth makes it an ideal partner for EV battery and component supply chains. As of 2023, PEZA remains in talks with several EV manufacturers, including one U.S. firm, Envirotech Vehicles, to manufacture electric buses, cars, and heavy equipment in-country. In September 2023, Envirotech Vehicles announced its acquisition of a 3,000 square meter final assembly facility in the Clark Free Trade Zone; it eventually plans to open two manufacturing lines capable of producing more than 2,000 vehicles per year at the plant.</p> +<p>For U.S. companies, faster and more organized feedback would enable them to shorten their iteration cycles, update their platforms and software more rapidly, and scale up production of cutting-edge technology. This is particularly important when it comes to AI, where software updates can be implemented much quicker than hardware — without the need to alter supply chains, source new components, or update manufacturing processes. On the Ukrainian side, this would mean receiving more advanced and better-suited capabilities for their battlefield conditions, as U.S. companies have the resources and capital to accelerate drone and AI development, as well as to scale up production. By closing this feedback loop, both the United States and Ukraine can enhance their technological capabilities and improve the effectiveness of military assistance on the ground.</p> -<h4 id="logistics-and-shipping">Logistics and Shipping</h4> +<h4 id="4-considering-ukraines-ai-in-us-foreign-aid">4. Considering Ukraine’s AI in U.S. foreign aid</h4> -<p>With convenient access to markets in Southeast Asia, China, Japan, and South Korea, as well as its proximity to Australia and India, the Philippines is in a prime location for logistics, transportation, and shipping services. As of March 2023, the Philippine freight and logistics market was valued at $16.8 billion. The growing ubiquity of e-commerce within the country, and throughout the region, necessitates not only strong general infrastructure in ports, roads, and rail connections, but also robust freight and logistics networks.</p> +<p>Current U.S. financial assistance to Ukraine, primarily through USAID, has been vital for the digital development of the country. However, by integrating an AI component into this aid, the United States can achieve two key objectives: enhancing Ukraine’s AI capabilities and securing a role in what could become a global AI development hub.</p> -<p>In the aftermath of the global Covid-19 pandemic, e-commerce grew more popular within the country — from March 2020 to January 2021, the number of Philippine online vendors increased from 1,700 to 93,818. Leading e-commerce sites like Shoppee, Lazada, Zalora, and Beauty MNL brought in $17 billion in revenue from 73 million monthly, active users. To handle this flow, the Philippine government has partnered with foreign investors for infrastructure investments as well as freight and logistics services.</p> +<p>Ukraine’s regulatory environment for AI is highly permissive, and its political leadership is open to embracing technological risks for significant advancements. This combination creates a unique “laboratory” for AI development that the United States cannot afford to overlook. This approach requires more than just funding; it necessitates providing computing infrastructure to key AI innovation centers in Ukraine, such as the MoD, research institutions, and labs. By equipping these entities with the necessary computational power, AI research and development can accelerate at an unprecedented pace.</p> -<p>New Clark City, a planned municipality built about fifty miles from Metro Manila, has emerged as an ideal location within the Philippines for logistics investments. After 36 years in the Philippines, FedEx opened a $30 million gateway facility in Clark City, aimed at improving the company’s ability to operate within the country and in the region at large. Manila’s main airport, the Ninoy Aquino International Airport, is notorious for congestion and inefficiency, prompting government agencies to consider outlying areas around the capital, such as Clark, as new logistics and transportation hubs. FedEx’s Clark investments followed up on refurbishments to the company’s headquarters in Makati in 2018, as well as making an additional $2.2 million worth of investments in two facilities in 2017.</p> +<h4 id="5-offering-ai-focused-training-experience-exchange-and-entrepreneurial-development-programs">5. Offering AI-focused training, experience exchange, and entrepreneurial development programs</h4> -<p>UPS, another major global logistics company, announced in 2024 that it would build a new hub at Clark International Airport by 2025 to strengthen its supply chain and logistics services, which is necessary given the growth of e-commerce. In partnership with the Luzon International Premiere Airport Development Group, this is part of a $250 million investment push UPS is making throughout the region.</p> +<p>The U.S. government should establish training and experience exchange programs for Ukraine’s defense entrepreneurs. These programs would focus on developing expertise in AI applications, the specifics of defense industry, and international market and investor relations to build successful defense-oriented enterprises. Given the rapid growth of Ukraine’s defense tech ecosystem, these initiatives would enable entrepreneurs to gain a deeper understanding of how to attract investments, scale innovations, and align with national security objectives. For the United States, such programs offer the opportunity to strengthen collaboration with Ukraine’s emerging defense sector. This partnership would give the United States valuable connections with Ukrainian innovators across the defense industry, benefiting both nations in shaping the future of AI in national security and defense.</p> -<h3 id="institutional-barriers-to-us-philippine-trade-and-investment">Institutional Barriers to U.S.-Philippine Trade and Investment</h3> +<p>The development and integration of military AI into future weapon systems is inevitable. While the United States leads in technological innovation, it faces limitations in testing these advancements under real combat conditions. Collaboration with Ukraine presents a unique and mutually beneficial opportunity to bridge this gap. By working together with Ukraine, the United States can gain firsthand insights into the practical applications of military AI and autonomous systems without putting “boots on the ground.” Otherwise, real combat environments remain theoretical or simulated for U.S. systems manufacturers. Moreover, this partnership can provide valuable contributions to the international debate on safe and responsible AI deployment, offering concrete evidence from battlefield usage to help construct a global framework for military AI governance. As AI continues to reshape defense landscapes, U.S.-Ukraine collaboration stands to advance technological innovation while setting standards for responsible and ethical AI integration into military systems worldwide.</p> -<p>The current Philippine constitution, ratified in 1987, includes several economic provisions that have negatively impacted the Philippines’ net inflow of foreign direct investment, notably restrictions on foreign ownership in certain sectors. In the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development’s World Investment Report 2023, the Philippines ranked sixth among its Southeast Asian peers in FDI inflows. Under the Marcos administration, the Philippines now aims to improve its standing to second by 2028. A 2022 amendment to the Public Service Act, made effective in 2023, allowed full public ownership of industries such as airports, railways, and telecommunications, creating a new area of opportunity for foreign investors. The same year, an amendment to the Foreign Investment Act allowed foreign investors to set up and fully own domestic enterprises, easing access to the Philippine market. The Philippine House of Representatives and Senate are currently debating whether to amend the constitution to further promote foreign economic investment, though similar efforts in previous administrations have failed. Talks of amendment have stalled at least until the 2025 midterm elections.</p> +<hr /> -<h3 id="key-findings-and-recommendations">Key Findings and Recommendations</h3> +<p><strong>Kateryna Bondar</strong> is a fellow with the Wadhwani Center for AI and Advanced Technologies at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.</p>Kateryna BondarThis report examines the Ukrainian government initiatives and key institutions driving the development of military AI capabilities. It also explores the preconditions that have shaped their adoption in the Ukraine war.Too Good To Lose2024-11-12T12:00:00+08:002024-11-12T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/too-good-to-lose<p><em>When it comes to the future of American semiconductor manufacturing and the success of the CHIPS Act, Intel is not too big to fail, but it is too good to lose.</em></p> -<p><strong>Finding:</strong> U.S. companies operating in the Philippines demonstrate varying degrees of transparency in their official databases and on their websites. Investment and employment figures are quite vague, effectively obscuring the impact of these investments.</p> +<excerpt /> -<ul> - <li><strong>Recommendation 1:</strong> The United States should work with the private sector and other stakeholders to develop a comprehensive database outlining U.S. investment in the Philippines, clearly and transparently listing the specific impacts of such investments, including employment figures. Though press releases offer insight into ongoing and future projects initiated by foreign businesses, they do not paint a cohesive picture of the community impact made by such investments.</li> -</ul> +<p>In 2022, Congress enacted the bipartisan CHIPS and Science Act (CHIPS Act), a pivotal initiative which seeks to ensure U.S. leadership in semiconductor technology — the backbone of everything from cars to household appliances to defense systems. The CHIPS Act represents a national effort to reverse recent trends, driven by major industrial policies of other countries, that have led to the loss of U.S. leadership in the technology needed to manufacture the most advanced semiconductors. The United States has also seen an erosion of onshore chipmaking, which now accounts for only about 10 percent of global capacity. The urgency of the situation was brought into sharp relief by highly disruptive chip shortages during the Covid-19 pandemic. Meanwhile, China — the United States’ most formidable strategic competitor — is making rapid strides in semiconductor technology, particularly in defense-related areas.</p> -<p><strong>Finding:</strong> Current resources for collating the impact of U.S. investment in the Philippines, or even foreign investment generally, are not user friendly. Further complicating matters, U.S. and Philippine numbers vary significantly, which obscures the impact of U.S.-Philippine economic cooperation. Data from the Philippine Statistics Authority only accounts for investments through investment promotion agencies that have been granted incentives from the Philippine government, reflecting just a fraction of total U.S. investments. Meanwhile, data from the various investment promotion authorities only account for those investments granted incentives by the Philippine government.</p> +<p>In its plan for implementing the CHIPS Act, the U.S. government has earmarked substantial federal assistance for the world’s three most advanced chipmakers, among others, to construct leading-edge manufacturing facilities and grow U.S. regional semiconductor ecosystems. Two of these firms, the Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Corporation (TSMC) and Samsung, are slated to receive substantial funding to support major investments in such ecosystems, which bring manifold opportunities for local growth and employment. Both firms are headquartered outside the United States and have, in the past, kept the lion’s share of their research and development (R&amp;D) and technology development in their respective home countries.</p> -<ul> - <li> - <p><strong>Recommendation 2:</strong> The U.S. and Philippine governments should partner closely in collating their data and making both sets mutually intelligible. Consistency among the two countries’ platforms and datasets would help create a more cohesive, easily accessible narrative. It would be to the benefit of the United States and the Philippines to create a joint resource with which to harmonize their datasets and investment figures.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Recommendation 3:</strong> PEZA and the Philippine Statistics Authority should better aggregate incoming investments into the Philippines’ many economic zones and investment promotion authorities within unified charts, demonstrating aggregate total investments from specific countries in specific sectors. For example, it is currently not possible to filter foreign investments by country of investor, industry, promotion authority, or region within the same table.</p> - </li> -</ul> +<p>The third leading-edge firm is the storied Intel Corporation, the largest and most advanced U.S.-headquartered manufacturer. Intel has an unmatched history of breakthrough semiconductor innovations — including the first programmable microprocessor and the x86 architecture — which have together made an “indelible impact on the world of computing . . . [that] continues to shape the digital landscape of the modern world.”</p> -<p><strong>Finding:</strong> Neither businesses nor the U.S. government adequately socialize the impacts of their investments on local communities, missing a key opportunity to point the narrative toward the efficacy of the U.S.-Philippine economic partnership. Most announcements are limited to business press briefings that are not often accessible to the audiences they are targeting.</p> +<p>While Intel is at present trailing TSMC and Samsung in chip process technology, it is the only U.S.-headquartered firm within striking distance of regaining U.S. capabilities at advanced process nodes. The company has made massive commitments to invest heavily — more than $100 billion over the next five years — in new chipmaking capability and capacity on domestic soil, aiming to develop and manufacture chips at the most advanced process nodes of 2 nanometers (nm) and below. Recognizing the importance of this, the U.S. government has announced plans to award Intel the largest share of federal support under the CHIPS Act. Successful implementation, and the resultant national security benefits, will depend on Intel.</p> -<ul> - <li><strong>Recommendation 4:</strong> Businesses and the U.S. government should expand their online presences to counter rising disinformation and counter narratives that threaten to sway public opinion. U.S. companies should more actively use popular social media platforms in the Philippines to highlight the benefits brought by their investments.</li> -</ul> +<p>Unfortunately, at this juncture, Intel is experiencing financial and operational turbulence, in no small part due to its ambitious investments pursuant to the CHIPS Act’s objectives. Now, with a recently announced strategic recovery plan, the company appears to be seeking additional investment. Given Intel’s importance to the CHIPS Act’s economic and strategic goals, it is vital that the company remains viable and capable of carrying out its commitments — with even more public support, if necessary, than it has already been given.</p> -<p><strong>Finding:</strong> Despite the longstanding economic partnership, relatively few U.S. business leaders have traveled to the Philippines or have become aware of the potential of its rapidly growing and increasingly open economy. The 2024 Presidential Trade and Investment Mission was successful in bringing representatives from 22 U.S. businesses to the Philippines. In a similar vein, the 2023 Agricultural Technology Trade Mission to Mindanao brought together key stakeholders from throughout the private sector and government to brainstorm future opportunities for improving the Philippines’ agricultural supply chain.</p> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Given Intel’s importance to the CHIPS Act’s economic and strategic goals, it is vital that the company remains viable and capable of carrying out its commitments — with even more public support, if necessary, than it has already been given.</code></em></strong></p> -<ul> - <li><strong>Recommendation 5:</strong> Person-to-person exchanges should remain consistent throughout administrations. Both recent U.S. government–led trade missions were the first of their kind. The United States, regardless of administration, should ensure the continuation of such exchanges.</li> -</ul> +<h3 id="intels-turnaround-strategy">Intel’s Turnaround Strategy</h3> -<p><strong>Finding:</strong> Investments in the Philippines remain strongly centered in Luzon, and particularly in and around Metro Manila and its surrounding areas. Business interest in areas such as Cebu and Davao are growing, but Manila remains oversaturated with investment. Moreover, with limited availability and bureaucratic red tape preventing easy access to cheap land, both business owners and potential employees are thus at a disadvantage.</p> +<p>Intel’s operational and financial difficulties received extensive media coverage in 2024, some of which exaggerated the severity of its challenges and perhaps adversely affected the company’s stock price. Shortly after Intel’s CEO, Pat Gelsinger, took charge in 2021, he announced an ambitious “IDM 2.0” strategy, which included plans for the company to become a major global player in the contract-manufacturing (“foundry”) market. The initial plan called for the establishment of a new business unit, Intel Foundry Services (later rebranded as Intel Foundry), as well as tens of billions of dollars for the construction of new manufacturing facilities to service surging demand. Intel Foundry, when announced, represented a significant expansion beyond Intel’s integrated device manufacturer (IDM) business model, in which the company’s manufacturing capacity was reserved for Intel-designed chips. Intel Foundry, however, allows for the manufacturing of chips designed by other firms, which puts Intel in direct competition with other large foundry providers such as TSMC.</p> -<ul> - <li><strong>Recommendation 6:</strong> The United States should work to diversify the span of its investments throughout the Philippines. The unitary nature of the Philippine government and the ongoing narrative of “Imperial Manila,” that is, that most of the country’s progress is concentrated in the capital region, makes this difficult to achieve. Expanding investment projects into emerging regions — from Iloilo and Cebu in the central Philippines to Davao and its surroundings in the south — would offer excellent opportunities for Filipinos. The expansion of the IT-BPM sector throughout the Philippines, for instance, helped to more evenly distribute work away from Manila, leading to the development and revitalization of other urban hubs.</li> -</ul> +<p>In 2024, Gelsinger unveiled the next phase of the firm’s strategy, announcing that it will further separate its design business from Intel Foundry, which will be an independent subsidiary with substantial autonomy, complete with its own board of directors, bylaws, and operating structure. This action is intended to provide foundry services for chip design firms with stronger protection of intellectual property.</p> -<hr /> +<p>Some progress on this front has already been made. In a multibillion-dollar arrangement, Intel Foundry will leverage new process technology to manufacture chips for Amazon’s cloud computing wing beginning in 2025, including customized server devices. Forbes observed that “This can only be looked at as a positive — a strategic, long-term deal that Intel didn’t have before. If you can get the number-one cloud provider to do not just one but two highly custom chips with you, one in the foundry and one in a custom server chip, that portends a very good future.”</p> -<p><strong>Japhet Quitzon</strong> is an associate fellow for the Southeast Asia Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C.</p> +<p>Additionally, backed by a $3 billion federal grant, Intel will develop chip manufacturing infrastructure for the U.S. defense industry. The federal award represents “another win for Intel Foundry, and even more so for the highly secure supply chain that Gelsinger has been intent on building for Intel over the past few years.”</p> -<p><strong>Gregory B. Poling</strong> is a senior fellow and director of the Southeast Asia Program and the Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative at CSIS.</p>Japhet Quitzon and Gregory B. PolingThough U.S.-Philippine economic ties are well documented, the day-to-day impact of the relationship in the Philippines is often underreported. The United States must enhance public awareness and understanding of its economic and investment activities in the Philippines.China In Global South Ports2024-10-30T12:00:00+08:002024-10-30T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/china-in-global-south-ports<p><em>Port infrastructure is an investment area where China is outpacing the United States. A strategy to counter China’s influence in Global South ports is an important piece of a larger program to enable a better offer to the Global South.</em></p> +<p>Despite this progress, profitability will take time, as the high capital costs and lengthy timelines required to bring new fabs online limits near-term revenues. In 2023, for example, the company’s foundry unit brought in $18.9 billion but reported an operating loss of around $7 billion, as well as other operational problems. Intel does not expect the new fabs to generate “meaningful” revenue until 2027.</p> -<excerpt /> +<h4 id="issues-with-process-technology-and-products">Issues with Process Technology and Products</h4> -<p>Port infrastructure around the world is critical to U.S. economic and military security. Although vitally important, it is an investment area where China is outpacing the United States. China now dominates maritime trade in terms of volume, shipbuilding activity, and construction and ownership of ports around the world. China’s position puts U.S. economic interests and national security priorities at risk.</p> +<p>According to a September 2024 Reuters report, Intel faces difficulties in its upcoming 18A process technology, which is slated for high-volume production in 2025. Reuters indicated that Broadcom, a major fabless firm, had concluded after tests that Intel’s process was not yet ready for such production. Yet the report, even if accurate, may not be indicative of a significant problem, as Intel’s timeline anticipates the 18A technology to be ready for high-volume production in mid-2025, rather than mid- or even late 2024. Moreover, Intel reports that it already has a dozen customers using its 18A tool kit.</p> -<p>A strategy to counter China’s influence in Global South ports is an important piece of a larger program to enable a better offer to the Global South. Actions include creating a port infrastructure strategy, promoting transparency in global port infrastructure procurement, and using other tools to better compete against China. Several policy recommendations are not unique to ports but apply to other infrastructure investment areas, such as undersea cables or digital architecture. China’s dominance of overseas ports is well established, but the U.S. policy response is lacking. This policy brief initiates a much-needed conversation and offers preliminary suggestions for consideration and further assessment.</p> +<p>Intel’s 13th- and 14th-generation Intel Core processors are also reportedly encountering problems, which have potentially arisen from manufacturing defects. The company also reported in September 2024 that it would no longer use its Intel 20A process technology in Arrow Lake processors and instead outsource Arrow Lake production to Taiwan’s TSMC, stating that “because of our early success on Intel 18A . . . [we are able] to shift engineering resources from Intel 20A earlier than expected as we near completion of our five-nodes-in-four-years plan.” While some may see this move as a setback, it may reflect a strategic shift to concentrate on the 18A process. Other observers have pointed out that “Intel 20A was always a bridge to the more refined Intel 18A.”</p> -<h3 id="the-global-souths-demand-for-port-infrastructure">The Global South’s Demand for Port Infrastructure</h3> +<h4 id="shifts-in-demand">Shifts in Demand</h4> -<p>During the past 25 years, international trade patterns have shifted in favor of the Global South. Even though North-North trade is responsible for the biggest share of international trade (37.1 percent), South-South trade has increased by 14.1 percent since 1995, reaching a 25 percent share. Trade between developing countries has increased by an average annual rate of 9.8 percent since 2000, reaching $5.3 trillion in 2021. Over the same period, world trade grew at an annual rate of 5.5 percent. According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 2024 World Economic Outlook, world trade is expected to increase by 3 percent in 2024 and by 3.3 percent in 2025. As a result, the demand for port infrastructure from the Global South will continue to rise as these countries seek to develop and integrate into global trade.</p> +<p>Traditionally, Intel’s main revenue sources have been chips for personal computers and for data centers, which in 2023 accounted for 80 percent of the company’s revenues. The market for these kinds of chips, however, is being affected by a shift in consumer demand toward graphics processing units (GPUs) and central processing units (CPUs) that support applications of artificial intelligence (AI) — a market in which Intel’s presence is relatively limited — plus increasing competition from rivals AMD and Nvidia. As a result of these shifts, the company’s revenues declined from $79 billion in 2021 to $54 billion in 2023. As of mid-August 2024, Intel’s shares were trading below the company’s book value for the first time since 1981.</p> -<p>Maritime transport is the backbone of international trade. Around 80 percent of the volume of international trade in goods is carried by sea; this figure is even greater for developing countries. Lower-income countries and small islands are 1.5 to 2 times more reliant on their ports for global trade than the global average. High-quality port infrastructure supports successful economic growth, especially in export-driven economies in developing regions. It attracts investment in production and distribution systems, supports the growth of manufacturing and logistics, and generates more employment. Port development supports supply chain diversification, which is particularly important in the face of shutdown due to accidents, pandemics, or wars.</p> +<p>Gelsinger’s response has been decisive. In August 2024, in order to cut costs, he announced that Intel would reduce its workforce by 15,000 by November, suspend its shareholder dividend, and reduce or eliminate many employee perks. While the company’s stock price declined by roughly two-thirds between February 2021 and September 2024, recent turnaround strategy announcements have led to a modest rebound.</p> -<p>In 2000, the United States was the top trading partner for over 80 percent of countries. As of today, this figure has shrunk to 30 percent, while China has now become the top trading partner for more than 120 countries. China is South America’s top trading partner, and it is Africa’s largest trading partner in terms of total volume, dwarfing U.S.-Africa trade by a factor of four, according to the United States Institute of Peace.</p> +<h4 id="national-security-implications">National Security Implications</h4> -<h3 id="chinas-leadership-in-port-infrastructure">China’s Leadership in Port Infrastructure</h3> +<p>While recent accounts of Intel’s difficulties have mostly been confined to the business pages, the company’s future has broad national and global significance far beyond its employees and shareholders. Intel is a critical player in the U.S. government’s efforts to reduce dependency on chips manufactured abroad — notably the significant concentration of production in Taiwan — and regain leadership in semiconductor manufacturing technology. Both capability and capacity are needed to provide an alternative source for the most advanced chips and a more resilient supply chain for foundational chips essential to the automotive, telecommunications, and medical sectors. If Intel’s restructuring efforts fail, larger U.S. efforts are unlikely to achieve their objectives, with significant ramifications for U.S. national security and economic future. Indeed, as Geoff Colvin recently argued in Fortune, “Intel is no longer a conventional company and can no longer be evaluated as one. . . . it’s now a corporate actor on the geopolitical stage.” Policymakers must recognize Intel’s national security importance within this decade’s dramatically changed geopolitical environment.</p> -<p>Within this context, China has significantly invested in the Maritime Silk Road (MSR) to increase trade route options and bypass choke points, posing a significant challenge for U.S. trade. In 2013, Chinese president Xi Jinping unveiled the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), an ambitious political-economic infrastructure initiative to link East Asia and Europe through land, sea and air under China’s leadership and with the backing of its resources. The twenty-first-century MSR is responsible for the BRI maritime routes that connect China to Europe and the Arctic Ocean via the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean. President Xi has repeatedly emphasized that economic powers must be maritime and shipping powers. As China now positions itself as the world’s top exporter, top shipbuilder, and largest trading nation, with around 95 percent of its international trade carried out through sea-lanes, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) will soon dominate global maritime trade.</p> +<h3 id="intel-and-the-chips-act">Intel and the CHIPS Act</h3> -<p>The Indo-Pacific is a major hub of global commerce and will continue to be the main target for China’s maritime control. The 10 busiest container ports in the world are located along the shores of the Pacific and Indian Oceans. The Indian Ocean hosts 80 percent of China’s imported oil and 95 percent of China’s trade with the Middle East, Africa, and Europe. China also has a strong presence in port construction in the developing world: it operates or has ownership of 91 active port projects across the globe where military use is a possibility, providing it with a foothold in every continent except Antarctica. These projects are part of the MSR network, which, according to the People’s Republic of China (PRC) State Council Information Office, has reached 117 ports across 43 countries, mostly in the Global South. China’s position of control and influence over the majority of port infrastructure globally poses a significant economic and military security threat to the United States. Simply put, China could use its power to interfere with operations that rely on port access – including military and economic operations – and are vital to U.S. interests.</p> +<p>The Covid-19 pandemic led to disruptions across the U.S. semiconductor supply chain — most notably in the automotive industry — as well as volatility in other industries and supply chains involving PCs and data centers. While the causes of the shortage are complex, it highlighted the fact that when foreign supply is limited, the United States no longer has the domestic chipmaking capacity to manufacture the most advanced semiconductors which many products demand. Recognizing the national security and economic implications of this vulnerability, Congress enacted the CHIPS Act in 2022, which seeks to support U.S. chipmakers’ efforts to recapture technological leadership and to encourage the expansion of semiconductor manufacturing capacity in the United States. The CHIPS Act deploys a combination of federal grants, loans, and tax incentives for investments in U.S. semiconductor manufacturing, as well as support for R&amp;D and related workforce initiatives.</p> -<p>Ports are one strategic infrastructure investment area where China is outpacing the United States. In addition to technology, digital infrastructure, and energy infrastructure, China has made significant and strategic investments in ports that are highly connected to global trade networks and critical to the global flow of goods. It has invested in port projects in 16 of the top 20 countries or territories for shipping connectivity. Six of those countries are from the Global South: Egypt, Malaysia, Saudi Arabia, Thailand, the United Arab Emirates, and Vietnam. More than 27 percent of global container trade last year passed through terminals where leading Chinese and Hong Kong–based firms held direct stakes.</p> +<p>Beginning in late 2023, the Department of Commerce proposed a series of federal funding awards for companies undertaking capital investments in chipmaking. Intel is the provisional recipient of the largest single federal award package, reflecting both its centrality in the U.S. semiconductor ecosystem and the scale of its investments in chipmaking. The Department of Commerce’s Preliminary Memorandum of Terms (PMT) with Intel, announced in March 2024, included grants of up to $8.5 billion to help finance the construction, expansion, and modernization of wafer fabrication, advanced packaging, and development facilities in Ohio, Arizona, New Mexico, and Oregon. Additionally, the PMT provides up to $11 billion in federal loans to support Intel’s investments. The company also indicated that it would take advantage of the Department of the Treasury’s Investment Tax Credit for fab construction, which is expected cover up to 25 percent of qualifying capital expenditures undertaken by the end of 2026. Furthermore, Intel will receive $3 billion in additional CHIPS Act grants for a Secure Enclave program, which would ensure a protected supply of leading-edge chips for the U.S. government.</p> -<p>China’s state-owned enterprises (SOEs) also dominate in financing, design, construction, and management of overseas port infrastructure. Between 2010 and 2019, Chinese companies invested roughly $11 billion into overseas ports. China’s two main SOEs involved in port infrastructure are COSCO Shipping Ports, the world’s largest shipping company and port terminal operator, operating and managing 371 berths globally, and China Merchants Ports, the sixth-largest port terminal operator globally. Additionally, the China Communications Construction Company Limited (CCCC) is the biggest port design and construction enterprise in the world. It shapes more than 70 percent of the national standards for the water transportation industry and designed 7 of the top 10 ports. State support to Chinese shipping companies in their endeavors totaled an estimated $132 billion between 2010 and 2018.</p> +<h4 id="a-central-role-in-growing-us-technological-capacity">A Central Role in Growing U.S. Technological Capacity</h4> -<h3 id="concerns-about-chinas-port-infrastructure">Concerns about China’s Port Infrastructure</h3> +<p>It would be difficult to overstate Intel’s role in the success or failure of the CHIPS Act. Intel has been described as “the only U.S.-based company with leading-edge semiconductor fabs” capable of developing and manufacturing cutting-edge chips that are necessary to support advanced applications of AI at the 2 nm node and below. While Intel’s 3-nm production and below may be a year or more behind that of global leaders TSMC and Samsung (indeed, Samsung is apparently struggling with technical challenges itself), no other U.S.-owned semiconductor maker is in a position to reignite U.S. semiconductor manufacturing process leadership.</p> -<p>China-backed infrastructure projects permeate the Global South. However, these projects often come with unsustainable financing terms, a lack of transparency, and a clear disregard for environmental and social norms. China even imports its workforce and prevents locals from profiting from the investment projects. In its first 10 years, cumulative BRI engagement surpassed $1 trillion, and the developing world amassed an estimated $385 billion in “hidden debt” to China. For each dollar of aid to low- and middle-income countries, China has provided $9 of debt.</p> +<p>Despite the near-term cash flow concerns, Intel remains committed to its over $100 billion investment in new U.S. chipmaking capability and capacity over the next five years. No other large chip manufacturer is investing anywhere close to the scale of Intel’s projects in the United States over the same time frame. These plans necessarily require very high levels of capital expenditure, with payoffs only coming in the medium-to-long term. In early 2024, to raise the necessary capital, Intel sold a 49 percent share in its Ireland-based fab to Apollo Global Management for a sum of $11 billion. In addition, Intel has concluded a deal with Brookfield Asset Management, a major investment firm, to funnel $30 billion into two new chipmaking facilities in Arizona. Notwithstanding Intel’s internal layoffs and other setbacks, Gelsinger affirmed in August 2024 that the company remains committed to domestic manufacturing, stating that “Intel is prioritizing our core investments that are laying the groundwork for our future, and . . . our existing U.S. projects in Arizona, New Mexico, Ohio and Oregon.”</p> -<p>Sri Lanka has accumulated more than $8 billion in debt to Chinese SOEs, of which $1.1 billion was used to construct Hambantota Port. In 2017, when the Sri Lankan government was struggling to repay its debts, it had agreed to lease the port to China for 99 years in exchange for debt reduction. However, in 2024, Sri Lanka had to renegotiate its debt after it defaulted on its foreign loans in 2022. The situation raised concerns about China’s economic and geopolitical influence through predatory lending and the risks for smaller countries that undertake infrastructure deals with China.</p> +<p>Intel’s ambitious manufacturing objectives rest on exceptional technological capabilities. Intel remains at the cutting edge of chip manufacturing innovation: its next process technology, Intel 18A, operates at the 1.8 nm node and is expected to compete directly with TSMC’s 2 nm “N2” process. Intel 18A combines multiple process innovations, from 3D hybrid bonding to nanosheet transistors to back-side power delivery. Intel plans to use 18A process technology in its own new server processor, Clearwater Forest.</p> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">China-backed infrastructure projects permeate the Global South. However, these projects often come with unsustainable financing terms, a lack of transparency, and a clear disregard for environmental and social norms.</code></em></strong></p> +<h4 id="still-a-first-mover">Still a First Mover</h4> -<p>Similarly, as of 2022, Pakistan owed $23 billion to China. After large-scale borrowing, particularly in relation to the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), Pakistan is struggling to repay its debt and faces an economic crisis. These loans may have contained hidden terms that hinder Pakistan’s economy and force the country to depend on China. Although some analysis dismisses accusations of China’s debt-trap diplomacy, other issues surrounding Chinese lending remain, including lack of transparency, economic viability, social and environmental concerns, and wielding debt for political leverage.</p> +<p>Despite its recent setbacks, Intel continues to be a first-mover on leveraging technologies that would bring it back to leading-edge manufacturing process leadership. Recently, Intel finalized a deal with the Dutch lithography equipment maker ASML to receive ASML’s first 2024 run of new state-of-the-art High-Numerical Aperture Extreme Ultraviolet (High-NA EUV) lithography machines. High-NA EUV lithography further shortens the wavelength of the ultraviolet light used to etch nanoscale circuits, a crucial process for the next generation of lower-nanometer chipmaking. According to IBM, the ASML machines “can perform a new technique that could pave the way to developing and producing chips at nodes even smaller than 2 nm.” It is important to note these are not just plans. Intel received the world’s first High-NA EUV machine in December 2023, which was installed and calibrated in the spring of 2024 at the company’s technology development fab in Oregon. Moreover, Intel is slated to receive a second machine in late 2024 and, according to reports, has committed to buying ASML’s entire 2024 run of High-NA EUV tools, giving it a head start on deploying this new technology.</p> -<p>Additional concerns remain about China’s port infrastructure due to its potential dual use for commercial and military purposes. Out of the 70 commercial port projects in the Global South, an estimated 55 projects have the potential for naval use as well. That said, naval use is more likely to occur in ports where China owns the majority share – currently 10 port projects.</p> +<p>While Intel’s principal competitors, TSMC and Samsung, are also making investments in U.S. chipmaking under the CHIPS Act, their new fabs will only represent a small portion of each company’s capacity. TSMC and Samsung remain the national champions for Taiwan and South Korea, respectively, retaining essential know-how and R&amp;D facilities in their home countries, whose governments have well-honed incentive strategies to nurture and sustain leading-edge chipmaking at home. They are responsive, first and foremost, to their own national ecosystems and the needs of their governments. Intel’s decision to pause new chipmaking investments in Europe underscores the limits foreign-owned chipmakers may set on their U.S. manufacturing operations and investments as markets, company strategies, and geopolitical concerns evolve.</p> -<p>There is growing reason for concern as Chinese port projects become more ambitious in terms of uses and strategic location. In 2017, China established its first overseas military base in Djibouti at the entrance of the Red Sea, one of the world’s busiest shipping lanes, six miles from a U.S. military base. There are concerns about similar attempts to establish a military presence in other parts of the Global South. U.S. officials suspect that China and Cambodia made a deal allowing Chinese armed forces to use Ream Naval Base, strategically located on the country’s southern coast facing the Gulf of Thailand, on the heels of elevated conflict with the Philippines and others in the South Sea. The Cambodian government has denied these accusations. Similarly, in the United Arab Emirates, China is accused of attempting to construct a clandestine military facility in the port of Khalifa, outside Abu Dhabi. China is also attempting to build a military base on the Atlantic coast of Africa.</p> +<p>If Intel were to bow out of CHIPS Act initiatives — whether by its own decision, a change in U.S. government policy, or the acquisition of the company’s foundry business by a third party not bound to the CHIPS Act — the act’s successful and timely implementation would be seriously jeopardized. The stakes are high, including for national defense; as writer Mackenzie Hawkins recently pointed out in Bloomberg, “Intel’s woes may . . . jeopardize the government’s ability to reach its policy goals, which include establishing a secure supply of cutting-edge chips for the Pentagon and making a fifth of the world’s advanced processors by 2030.” Finding a U.S.-headquartered replacement to maintain domestic ownership of Intel’s higher-end fabs or to preserve its technological know-how would be nearly impossible.</p> -<p>In addition to commercial and military use, port infrastructure could also be used for spying and intelligence gathering. With access to the business trade hubs, China could spy on U.S. commercial and military movements. A 2024 congressional probe showed communications equipment in Chinese-made cranes at U.S. ports, suggesting vulnerabilities to supply chains, trade data, and other sensitive information. China has secured a commanding position through Logink (also known as the National Transportation and Logistics Public Information Platform), a Chinese state-owned digital logistics platform. At least 24 ports worldwide have adopted the Logink system, which could allow China to access significant amounts of confidential information related to transportation, pricing, and management of goods (including military equipment), threatening U.S. economic and military security.</p> +<p>As veteran chip industry analyst Dan Hutcheson succinctly put it, “The purpose of the Chips Act was partly to make sure we kept Intel as an American company supported by the American government.” The Biden administration appears to recognize this: The Financial Times reported in September 2024 that Intel and the U.S. government were on track to finalize negotiations on the $8.5 billion grant contract by the end of the year, which “would amount to a vote of confidence in Intel by the U.S. government.”</p> -<p>China is also exporting container cranes from Shanghai Zhenhua Heavy Industries Company Limited (ZPMC). ZPMC dominates the global market for container cranes with a staggering 70 percent market share. For example, ZPMC manufactures 80 percent of the cranes used in U.S. ports; this includes 10 strategic seaports. These cranes come equipped with sensors that can track container details, which raises concerns about Chinese access to information about shipped goods, including U.S. military equipment.</p> +<p>In parallel with Intel’s negotiations with the Commerce Department, reports have surfaced that Samsung, Apple, and the fabless design firm Qualcomm are considering taking a stake in Intel or acquiring the company outright. It is not clear that these or other similar reports have much substance. In September 2024, Intel reportedly rebuffed an overture from UK-based, SoftBank-owned Arm Holdings to acquire its product division.</p> -<h3 id="us-activity-in-port-infrastructure">U.S. Activity in Port Infrastructure</h3> +<p>Moreover, an acquisition of Intel, or pieces of it, by another major chip firm would unquestionably face antitrust scrutiny in the United States and possibly elsewhere, as well as a likely challenge by the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) if the investor were foreign. At the very least, takeover of any part of Intel’s business could disrupt the delicate negotiations between the company and the government.</p> -<p>Today China strongly outperforms the United States in the financing, building, and management of ports. The United States has a limited number of ports, and its infrastructure is deficient and vulnerable to inclement weather. Currently, the United States has 208 commercial ports – up from 178 in 2010. U.S. ports are either privately owned and operated, or they are managed by federal, state, or local government or quasi-governmental authorities. The owner of a U.S. port might lease port infrastructure to a terminal operator in charge of maintaining equipment and buildings. In comparison, China has over 2,000 commercial ports domestically and nearly 100 ports abroad. Furthermore, U.S. port companies do not score well in global rankings. None of the world’s top 10 shipping companies or top 10 seaport operators are American, and only four U.S. ports are among the top 50 busiest ports in the world. None of the U.S. ports make it into the Container Port Performance Index top 20 list.</p> +<p>Given the stakes in this global contest, it is unfortunate that the negotiations over Intel’s CHIPS Act funding continue to become more complex, with the CHIPS Program Office reportedly requiring commitments beyond those outlined in the act, and which some suggest are more akin to those required for private equity investments than for a congressionally mandated grant program. Overly stringent government requirements, though designed to ensure CHIPS Act funding meets the program’s goals, could paradoxically compromise Intel’s ability to utilize the grants. For example, Politico recently cited concerns from a number of CHIPS Act recipients that government negotiations are both slow and expansive with conditions on the CHIPS Act awards that have little to do with ensuring the success of the projects. While recognizing the obligation to meet statutory requirements, more than two years after passage of the CHIPS Act, the Commerce Department has yet to distribute major funding.</p> -<p>In addition, U.S. port infrastructure is largely outdated. The 2021 Report Card for American Infrastructure by the American Society of Civil Engineers gives a B-minus to U.S. port infrastructure. According to the Freight Intermodal Connectors Study, 91 percent of U.S. ports have a fair, mediocre, or poor rating: 35 percent are fair, 19 percent are mediocre, and 37 percent are poor. At the same time, U.S. ports have been increasingly vulnerable to climate. In 2022, Hurricane Ian forced temporary closures of seven major U.S. ports. Droughts in the Panama Canal disrupted vessels serving U.S. East Coast ports. Besides, many U.S. ports have infrastructure limitations that do not allow them to receive larger vessels, according to the U.S. Department of Transportation.</p> +<h3 id="ensuring-intels-continued-us-manufacturing-presence">Ensuring Intel’s Continued U.S. Manufacturing Presence</h3> -<p>In terms of overseas ports, the United States severely lags China, as the United States does not manage or own any commercial ports outside its territories. The U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC), however, is beginning to invest in some port infrastructure abroad. In May 2023, the DFC announced a $150 million commitment to Yilport Terminal Operations to expand and modernize the Puerto Bolívar container port in Ecuador. This is a significant step forward, but a more robust pipeline of projects must be developed.</p> +<p>As noted, having Intel continue as an innovative, internationally competitive U.S. semiconductor manufacturer is a matter not only of economic interest, but of national security. The release of near-term CHIPS Act funding is becoming more important, especially given the scale of Intel’s investments and its ongoing financial difficulties. In response to potential further delay — attributed to the slow disbursement of federal aid — in Intel’s $28 billion Ohio project, Governor Mike DeWine has requested that the Biden administration expedite the necessary funding to Intel. However, the new fabs funded by these grants will not generate significant revenues until 2027, exposing the company to cash-flow challenges in the interim. One recent industry analysis commented that “Intel’s continued struggle begs the question: will the U.S. government need to do more?”</p> -<p>In November 2021, the White House announced the Biden-Harris Action Plan for America’s Ports and Waterways, recognizing that U.S. ports are underfunded and that poor infrastructure has important costs for the U.S. economy and global competitiveness. The administration under President Joe Biden developed the Bipartisan Infrastructure Deal (BID) and the Port Infrastructure Development Grant (PIDG) program, which both allocate investment to improve port infrastructure. The U.S. Department of Transportation will award $230 million to the PIDG, and the Biden administration committed $17 billion to the BID. While this is a good start, much more funding should be allocated, with a specific strategy focusing on the Global South. Currently, the U.S. government does not consider the commercial maritime industry as critical infrastructure, making it even more difficult to prioritize the sector.</p> +<p>Should the government concur with the assessment that Intel is not too big to fail but too good to lose, there are major recent precedents for federal policy measures to shore up companies whose collapse would bring unacceptable national costs. For example, the 2008 financial crisis posed an existential threat to large U.S. financial and manufacturing companies; confronting the prospect of imminent calamity, the Bush administration implemented the Troubled Assets Relief Program (TARP), providing $426 billion in federal support to stabilize financial and manufacturing institutions, including failing U.S. automakers, that were considered “too big to fail.” TARP was not designed to subsidize or nationalize struggling companies, but rather to give them an interim financial bridge, allowing them to remain solvent while working toward profitability and continuing to serve as pillars of the U.S. economy.</p> -<p>Moreover, the United States could also draw on the financing and expertise of multilateral development banks (MDBs) and international financial institutions (IFIs) when it comes to ports infrastructure. These institutions provide financing and technical assistance to the private sector in middle- and low-income countries, help de-risk investments, and catalyze private capital. In 2021, MDBs were the second-largest financier in these countries and financed 9 percent of the total value of private investment in infrastructure projects. From 2010 to 2021, the largest share of MDB financing of private investment in infrastructure projects went to the transport sector and represented 38 percent of all financing. In 2023, a total of 18 port projects in 11 countries received investments worth $4.9 billion, twice the amount in 2022, according to a World Bank report. The Latin America-Caribbean region had the highest level of private investments for ports, reaching $1.5 billion in five ports in Brazil and $975 million in one port in Peru.</p> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Should the government concur with the assessment that Intel is not too big to fail but too good to lose, there are major recent precedents for federal policy measures to shore up companies whose collapse would bring unacceptable national costs.</code></em></strong></p> -<p>However, the U.S.-led multilateral lending process has discouraged developing countries. Compared to Chinese lending under the BRI, Western MDB loans tend to be less attractive, as they are more difficult to apply for and are contingent on more rigorous vetting requirements and standards for bankability. China, by contrast, is often involved in predatory lending, which imposes unfair terms on the borrower and makes its deals look more attractive on the surface. To compete with China, Western MDBs must streamline their services and strike a better balance between managing risk and delivering results.</p> +<p>Importantly, TARP was executed at scale in several affected industries. In December 2008, the Bush administration announced a $17.4 billion rescue loan for U.S. automakers. President Bush later recalled that he “didn’t want history to look back and say, ‘Bush could have done something but chose not to do it.’” Incoming President Barack Obama defended Bush’s action as a “necessary step to avoid a collapse in our auto industry that would have devastating consequences for our economy and our workers.” Obama augmented the Bush administration’s financial support for U.S. auto firms with federal outlays eventually totaling about $80 billion. Washington subsequently recovered most of these funds, with the net cost to taxpayers amounting to about $10 billion. No major U.S. automaker disappeared during the crisis, and the Big Three auto manufacturers remain a key element in today’s domestic manufacturing economy.</p> -<p>China also has a growing influence in these traditionally U.S.-led institutions. China now has the second-highest aggregate voting power in the IFIs it supports, even though it significantly trails the United States. Despite many Chinese firms being sanctioned or debarred from the World Bank for fraud and corruption, China has consistently ranked among the top countries receiving MDB contracts, and Chinese firms easily outperform firms of other countries in securing contracts, according to the Center for Global Development.</p> +<p>Similar measures were extended to ailing financial institutions under the Treasury Department’s 2008 Capital Purchase Program (CPP), which exchanged financial assistance for preferred stock in the companies, along with debt securities and warrants to purchase common and preferred stock. Under the CPP, the Treasury Department acquired $205 billion worth of shares to shore up troubled financial services firms over the short term, of which $200 billion was eventually redeemed by those same institutions. The purpose of the CPP was to enable financial firms to continue supplying essential levels of liquidity to the U.S. economy.</p> -<h3 id="recommendations">Recommendations</h3> +<h4 id="avoiding-disaster">Avoiding Disaster</h4> -<p>The United States cannot respond on its own to the increasing Chinese presence in Global South ports; it must rely on the MDB system, a strong interagency process, and allies and partners to offer better terms and financing to counter China’s growing influence in port infrastructure in the Global South. Some initial recommendations are put forward in this paper, but further dialogue and research are needed to devise specific actions so the United States can lead on this important infrastructure.</p> +<p>The objective of TARP was to avert a second Great Depression, which could have been triggered by the collapse of the U.S. financial and manufacturing sectors. It not only succeeded but did so at what proved to be a bearable cost to the government. A 2022 Congressional Budget Office study observed that “the U.S. financial system was in a precarious position when the TARP was created, and the transactions envisioned and ultimately undertaken entailed substantial financial risk for the federal government. Nevertheless, the TARP’s net realized costs have proved to be near the low end of the range of possible outcomes anticipated at the program’s outset.”</p> -<h4 id="1-devise-a-clear-national-security-strategy-on-international-ports">1. Devise a Clear National Security Strategy on International Ports</h4> +<p>Although the specifics of TARP and the CPP fortunately do not align perfectly with Intel’s current challenges, Intel’s current operational problems have important parallels with the crisis of 2008:</p> -<p>The next U.S. presidential administration should develop a clear port infrastructure strategy to convey why a Global South port infrastructure presence is in the U.S. security interest. The strategy should focus on immediate concerns and a long-term vision for working with allies and becoming an effective competitor and alternative to Chinese investments. This strategy must be followed by a streamlined interagency approach throughout the whole government. Currently, U.S. government efforts on the matter are siloed, but the administration can fix this situation if it provides a clear strategy and elevates ports to a top priority. Consolidated interagency efforts will provide more focus and avoid redundant efforts.</p> +<ul> + <li> + <p>Intel is the central player in the government’s implementation of the CHIPS Act, which is critical for national security and economic well-being. The company could benefit a great deal from federal support to surmount a cash flow pinch in 2025–26, when its new fabs begin to generate revenue in 2027 and beyond. The goal of such a cash flow would be to provide financing to enable Intel to keep the construction and investments on track while signaling a commitment to the company’s success.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Semiconductor manufacturing is not a waning industrial sector. The demand for advanced chips is robust, due in no small part to the AI boom. The question is not whether the sector is viable, but who will lead its production and reap the rewards, including the revenue necessary to fund the next round of innovation.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Without Intel’s continued participation, achieving the CHIPS Act’s main goals — reestablishing American technological leadership in high-end chip manufacturing and reducing reliance on foreign chipmakers — will be exceedingly difficult, if not impossible.</p> + </li> +</ul> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">The next U.S. presidential administration should develop a clear port infrastructure strategy to convey why a Global South port infrastructure presence is in the U.S. security interest.</code></em></strong></p> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">The demand for advanced chips is robust, due in no small part to the AI boom. The question is not whether the sector is viable, but who will lead its production and reap the rewards, including the revenue necessary to fund the next round of innovation.</code></em></strong></p> -<p>The strategy should focus not on the hundreds of ports across the Global South but on the top 15–20 most strategic locations and then establish a U.S. strategy on how to better compete in each of those ports in the long run. The United States should then use all its available soft-power tools to establish a strong presence in those ports and the surrounding region.</p> +<h4 id="how-could-it-be-done">How Could It Be Done?</h4> -<h4 id="2-partner-with-allies-and-locals">2. Partner with Allies and Locals</h4> +<p>Additional federal support for Intel should be envisaged on both national security grounds and to favor domestic R&amp;D investment. This support could come in various forms: an extension of the CHIPS Advanced Manufacturing Investment Credit; the extension of additional loans and loan guarantees; targeted tax measures; and other similar measures taken under TARP and CPP. If the Big Three automakers and major U.S. financial institutions were deemed “too big to fail” in 2008, Intel can be similarly considered “too important to fail” in today’s increasingly perilous geopolitical environment.</p> -<p>The United States needs to develop a strategy and partnerships with allies to secure safe access to ports abroad while also ensuring allies have a stake in building new ports for the Global South (see annex). For example, in Rijeka, Croatia, the United States used diplomacy to sway Croatia to negotiate a contract with Maersk instead of a Chinese operator. Rijeka is strategically valuable because the U.S. military and NATO use the port to move equipment, and it provides access to central European markets.</p> +<p>While the CHIPS Act has been instrumental in laying the groundwork for increased U.S. manufacturing capacity, the existence of new facilities does not guarantee their effective utilization. The U.S. government should thus consider how it can build on the foundational work of the CHIPS Act by focusing on strengthening the domestic supply chain. For example, targeted tax measures that provide incentives for the consumption of U.S.-produced wafers could not only help ensure the best possible return on new manufacturing facilities, but also encourage the building of additional capacity once the CHIPS Act incentives run out. Policies to help onshore the semiconductor supply chain will help to ensure that U.S. development and production of advanced chips is prioritized, thus encouraging periodic technological upgrades and even enabling the co-location of technology developments that are critical to national security.</p> -<p>The United States should further rely on commercial diplomacy to engage in government-to-government trade assistance with foreign officials on behalf of U.S. companies’ interests. The Advocacy Center, part of the International Trade Administration, offers support to U.S. businesses to win foreign government procurements. The Transaction Advisory Fund (TAF), a function of the Infrastructure Transaction and Assistance Network (ITAN), launched in 2018, provides support to government agencies in the Indo-Pacific region, the Western Hemisphere, and sub-Saharan Africa for developing sustainable, transparent, and high-quality infrastructure. International legal funds like the TAF are vital in helping ministries negotiate transparent and fair contracts. TAF funding helped Myanmar renegotiate the Kyaukphyu port, a prime example of promoting transparency and quality in instances where the U.S. private sector does not offer a competitive alternative.</p> +<p>While some will point out — correctly — that government support is inconsistent with traditional laissez-faire principles, historical precedent shows that national security concerns have overridden such principles during major crises such as World Wars I and II, the Cold War, and the 2008 financial crisis. Indeed, Washington has consistently taken steps to invest in and nurture key industries relevant to defense and health (including major investments in vaccine manufacturing during the Covid-19 pandemic).</p> -<h4 id="3-envision-new-tools-and-streamline-financing-for-port-infrastructure">3. Envision New Tools and Streamline Financing for Port Infrastructure</h4> +<p>Similar fears regarding the semiconductor industry’s competitiveness prompted significant federal investment and trade measures in the 1980s, when the U.S. chip industry was at risk of losing technological leadership. Major government investment, matched by the private sector, helped form the successful Sematech research and manufacturing consortium, which enabled the U.S. chip industry to regain competitiveness. Now, the future of Intel — the linchpin of the CHIPS Act — cannot be left to the vagaries of the market, especially one shaped and conditioned by other countries’ industrial policies.</p> -<p>Competing with China within the global port infrastructure does not mean owning, building, and financing every port. Instead, U.S. companies can become shareholders or board members at international ports. Alternatively, the United States can offer attractive deals that are not directly related to a port but within the same city, thereby providing more value to the municipal government. Other strategies for effectively competing with China’s influence in the region include buying land surrounding the ports, engaging the private sector, and financing alternative ports in the surrounding region.</p> +<h3 id="perspectives-from-abroad-policies-of-allies-and-competitors">Perspectives from Abroad: Policies of Allies and Competitors</h3> -<p>In this regard, U.S. corporations often hesitate to invest in ports because there is limited commercial return – unless the government can guarantee access to capital. This is where the U.S. government can step in. The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) can play a role in catalyzing private sector investment in critical infrastructure. The DFC and U.S. Export-Import Bank can also be valuable tools in countering China’s influence. For example, DFC agreed in November 2023 to fund Colombo West International Terminal Pvt. Ltd. (CWIT), a consortium of India’s largest port operator, Adani Ports and SEZ Ltd., for $553 million in Sri Lanka. In 2019, the United States and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam signed the Cooperation Framework to Strengthen Infrastructure Finance, aimed to support infrastructure development through market-oriented and private sector investment. The governments committed to remove regulatory, market, and legal barriers to private sector investment and prioritize development of financial instruments, project finance, the local debt market, capital markets, and analysis of government liabilities.</p> +<p>The cyclical nature of the semiconductor industry means it must make substantial investments to maintain and improve production capacity during economic downturns for the eventual recovery in demand. Semiconductor companies require significant capital to maintain their production capacity. To address these industry characteristics, leading manufacturers abroad often receive both direct and indirect government support, frequently on a massive scale.</p> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) can play a role in catalyzing private sector investment in critical infrastructure. The DFC and U.S. Export-Import Bank can also be valuable tools in countering China’s influence.</code></em></strong></p> +<p>This is not new. The world’s leading semiconductor foundries, TSMC and United Microelectronics Corporation (UMC), were both established with the support of the Taiwanese government when they spun off from the Industrial Technology Research Institute (ITRI). Since 1991, as the foundry concept gained traction, TSMC has experienced rapid growth as the world’s leading semiconductor foundry, acquiring unparalleled expertise and capabilities.</p> -<p>The United States can increase the overall funding available for the private sector to invest in the space by pulling together resources within capital markets. The United States should incentivize IFIs and MDBs, such as the Inter-American Development Bank and the International Finance Corporation, to invest in Global South port projects, which will attract U.S. companies and other private sector engagement. Teaming up with other countries will allow the United States to pool funding through a consortium focused specifically on Global South ports.</p> +<p>Similarly, SK Hynix, one of the leading South Korean companies in advanced memory semiconductor manufacturing, is now a successful company despite sustaining major losses in the past following sharp declines in DRAM semiconductor prices that began in the mid-1990s. Pressured by the South Korean government, Hyundai Electronics Industries acquired LG Semicon, and their semiconductor division spun off as SK Hynix in 2001. After the spin-off, Hynix faced severe financial pressures from a heavy debt load and low DRAM prices. To restore the firm’s viability, a consortium of private and national financial institutions implemented a comprehensive support program, including debt forgiveness, equity conversion, credit limit expansion, debt maturity extension, and interest rate reductions. Hynix is now a profitable and competitive company.</p> -<h4 id="4-establish-procurement-best-practices">4. Establish Procurement Best Practices</h4> +<p>This policy approach remains relevant today. The Japanese government recently allocated $1.3 billion to Kioxia Holdings, Japan’s leading memory semiconductor company, which experienced very significant losses in 2023 primarily due to a cyclical downturn in demand for memory chips. Continuing to address the firm’s financial challenge, the Japanese government has recently allocated $1.3 billion in support of the company. This funding could stabilize Kioxia with the broader goal of ensuring Japan maintains its technological leadership in NAND flash memory, supporting a robust supply network to meet future market demand.</p> -<p>The United States should strive to promote transparency in global port infrastructure procurement. The rule of law, transparency, public engagement, and better awareness about how to govern ports will inform the public and ensure ports follow best practices. The United States and its allies can establish a market standard by picking 10–15 ports and reforming them thoroughly. For example, most economic coercion comes out of port terminal operating contracts and procurement. After reforming a select group of ports, companies will be more interested in operating in the ports that are more transparent.</p> +<p>As these examples suggest, government policies have often played, and continue to play, major roles in shaping the industrial landscape in semiconductors. Today, many of the world’s leading countries are actively promoting domestic production. Like the United States, these nations are backing their domestic chipmakers with public support for investments in R&amp;D and manufacturing capacity. What is clear, however, is that these governments will not allow these key national enterprises to fail.</p> -<p>China is quick with financing port construction and maintenance, but its BRI contracts lack transparency and impose questionable and opaque confidentiality clauses that are predatory in nature. In a report analyzing 100 debt contracts between China and foreign governments, 100 percent of China Development Bank contracts and 43 percent of contracts held by the Export-Import Bank of China required such clauses. Unfortunately, the U.S.-led multilateral lending process does not offer attractive counteroffers, as they tend to be less user friendly and have more rigorous vetting requirements and standards for bankability, leaving developing countries vulnerable to using China as a lender of last resort.</p> +<p>In fact, reflecting both the China challenge and new efforts of countries such as the United States, policies to support semiconductor manufacturing within national borders have increased in scale and frequency. This list of recent government investments in key domestic manufacturing companies illustrates the scale of financial support for firms in this strategic industry.</p> -<p>The U.S. government could use platforms such as the Customs Trade Partnership against Terrorism to enable the private sector to share information on unfair practices with governments suffering from predatory circumstances. The Department of Justice could offer technical legal assistance to foreign countries to help litigate such matters. The United States helped the Congolese mining company Gécamines reach a settlement with a Chinese mining company over royalties owed over a copper and cobalt mine.</p> +<ul> + <li> + <p><strong>France:</strong> In June 2023, France announced that it would allocate $3.1 billion in public funding to its most advanced semiconductor manufacturer, STMicroelectronics, to build a semiconductor manufacturing plant in Crolles, in partnership with U.S.-based GlobalFoundries. STMicro, regarded as one of the most innovative firms in Europe, has benefitted from extensive state support since its formation under government auspices in 1968.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Japan:</strong> After taking a largely laissez-faire approach, the Japanese government concluded it could not be economically secure without production of advanced semiconductors, particularly those used by its auto industry. Since 2022, in a major national initiative, the Japanese government has allocated $6 billion to Rapidus, aiming to establish this government- and privately-owned company as the flagship of Japan’s “ambition to catch up in semiconductor manufacturing.” Additionally, the company is expected to receive additional private bank loans and subsidies in its ambitious bid to produce cutting-edge chips.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>South Korea:</strong> Samsung and SK Hynix are engaged in discussions with the Korea Development Bank (KDB) about utilizing a low-interest loan program, valued at $12.3 billion, which is aimed at bolstering the semiconductor industry. SK Hynix will again seek government support, reportedly applying for a loan amounting to $2.1 billion. More broadly, South Korea recently enacted the “K-Chips Act,” a major program with significant incentives to promote national high-tech industries, notably semiconductors. The architect of the “K-Chips Act,” a former Samsung executive, sees the stakes as fundamentally shaping national trajectories, emphasizing that “the winner of the global chip battle will control the economic security order, while the loser will end up becoming a technological colony.”</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>China:</strong> China offers perhaps the leading case of government support for the industry. At the end of 2022, the Chinese government was reportedly planning to spend $143 billion over the next five years to support its semiconductor industry. In 2022, the Semiconductor Manufacturing International Corporation (SMIC) received $282.1 million. This continues the China Integrated Circuit Industry Investment Fund (the “Big Fund”) to support investments in China’s semiconductor value chain, including production capacity, equipment, materials, and advanced packaging. In May 2024, China launched its third semiconductor “Big Fund,” a $45.7 billion investment vehicle to support the country’s domestic semiconductor industry. This figure is roughly on par with the CHIPS Act but more narrowly focused in that these resources will likely primarily benefit Huawei’s chip design and SMIC’s chip manufacturing. These new measures augment China’s already-massive government support for the country’s chip sector, including direct subsidies, preferential loans from government banks, and equity infusions, as well as subsidies from regional and municipal governments involving land, electrical power, and infrastructure. The ability to domestically develop and produce advanced chips is a top priority for China’s leadership, and this comprehensive strategy reflects that commitment. The collective effort of these programs dwarfs the support offered by other countries.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Taiwan:</strong> Even in Taiwan, arguably the leading center of semiconductor manufacturing today, the government has recently stepped in to provide support. In January 2023, Taiwan enacted its own version of theCHIPS Act that “offers investment tax credits of 25% on R&amp;D and 5% on equipment.” This introduced the country’s largest-ever tax deduction for R&amp;D expenses and related capital investments in semiconductors, designed to benefit eligible semiconductor companies such as TSMC that meet specific criteria. These incentives complement the special benefits that Taiwan grants for research and manufacturing organizations located in science and industrial parks, which include, according to a Boston Consulting Group report, “relatively low-cost access to land, water, electricity, and infrastructure, as well as the possibility of expedited approvals and the elimination of import and export duties.” These multifaceted measures reflect the long-term commitment of the government to ensuring the continued success of its leading firms and the country’s central position in this global industry.</p> + </li> +</ul> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Unfortunately, the U.S.-led multilateral lending process does not offer attractive counteroffers, as they tend to be less user friendly and have more rigorous vetting requirements and standards for bankability, leaving developing countries vulnerable to using China as a lender of last resort.</code></em></strong></p> +<h3 id="conclusion">Conclusion</h3> -<p>Furthermore, the role of investigative journalists is crucial in exposing corruption within the ports sector. The market does not have the best reputation, and it is important to expose collusion, human trafficking, and monopoly. Also, the United States can support public financial management education within the governments that oversee port infrastructure so they can identify deals that are too good to be true.</p> +<p>The United States and its allies confront an unparalleled strategic challenge from China that has the potential to escalate. In any such confrontation, leadership in and access to advanced semiconductor technology — and the AI systems these innovations enable — will play a central role and could even be decisive. Numerous recent analyses conclude that China is investing heavily in the sector and is rapidly gaining on the United States in strategic areas of microelectronic production, a dynamic that raises major national security concerns.</p> -<h4 id="5-provide-cutting-edge-technology">5. Provide Cutting-Edge Technology</h4> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Successful and timely implementation of the CHIPS Act is a critical step to addressing that challenge and deterring conflict — and that cannot happen without Intel.</code></em></strong></p> -<p>The maritime sector is dangerously reliant on the PRC for equipment and technology. The U.S. Select Committee on the Chinese Communist Party released an investigative report that showed extreme vulnerabilities in ZPMC crane control systems produced in the PRC, software used at U.S. maritime facilities, and other maritime infrastructure components. The United States has a competitive advantage over China in advanced technology, such as within the green energy transition, that can be applied within the port infrastructure space. If the United States can transform a port through technology that improves efficiency and saves on transaction costs, then it can offer something China cannot. The United States’ advantage over China should be its ability to compete for better maintenance and product quality.</p> +<p>Successful and timely implementation of the CHIPS Act is a critical step to addressing that challenge and deterring conflict — and that cannot happen without Intel. Accordingly, the U.S. government needs to be proactive, make CHIPS Act resources available as soon as possible, and accept that while there will always be risks, speed and compromise are crucial to achieve the CHIPS Act’s central goals. More broadly, the Departments of Commerce and Defense need to begin using existing tools, contracting mechanisms, and authorities — such as OTA — to support Intel through its current transition and not wait until Intel’s financial position slows its progress and further erodes the country’s competitive position. Prompt and strategic action must be taken to bring the objectives of the CHIPS Act closer to reality. Implementing an array of supportive measures beyond the CHIPS Act would also be a powerful way to underscore that the government wants Intel, and the semiconductor industry, to thrive and grow for decades to come.</p> <hr /> -<p><strong>Daniel F. Runde</strong> is a senior vice president, director of the Project on Prosperity and Development, and holds the William A. Schreyer Chair in Global Analysis at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C.</p> +<p><strong>Sujai Shivakumar</strong> is director and senior fellow of Renewing American Innovation at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C.</p> -<p><strong>Austin Hardman</strong> is a research assistant for the Project on Prosperity and Development at CSIS.</p> +<p><strong>Charles Wessner</strong> is a senior adviser (non-resident) with Renewing American Innovation at CSIS.</p> -<p><strong>Clara Bonin</strong> is a former intern for the Project on Prosperity and Development at CSIS.</p>Daniel F. Runde, et al.Port infrastructure is an investment area where China is outpacing the United States. A strategy to counter China’s influence in Global South ports is an important piece of a larger program to enable a better offer to the Global South.AI Safety Institute Network2024-10-30T12:00:00+08:002024-10-30T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/ai-safety-institute-network<p><em>The AI Seoul Summit launched an international network of AI safety institutes in May 2024. Now, they must work to define their goals, mechanisms, and the strategy to accelerate AI safety science.</em></p> +<p><strong>Thomas Howell</strong> is an international trade attorney specializing in the semiconductor industry and a consultant with Renewing American Innovation at CSIS.</p>Sujai Shivakumar, et al.When it comes to the future of American semiconductor manufacturing and the success of the CHIPS Act, Intel is not too big to fail, but it is too good to lose.Inflection Point2024-11-07T12:00:00+08:002024-11-07T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/inflection-point<p><em>The United States and its partners have the financial and technical tools to provide safer, cost-effective technology to help bridge the digital divide in the Global South, where competition for high-quality digital infrastructure plays into broader great power tensions.</em></p> <excerpt /> -<h3 id="overview">OVERVIEW</h3> +<h3 id="introduction">Introduction</h3> -<p>On November 21 and 22, 2024, technical artificial intelligence (AI) experts from nine countries and the European Union will meet for the first time in San Francisco. The agenda: starting the next phase of international cooperation on AI safety science through a network of AI safety institutes (AISIs). The United States, United Kingdom, European Union, Japan, Singapore, South Korea, Canada, France, Kenya, and Australia make up the initial members of the network, which was first launched by U.S. secretary of commerce Gina Raimondo at the May 2024 AI Seoul Summit. At the time of the launch, Italy and Germany were also potential members of the network, as signatories to the Seoul Statement of Intent toward International Cooperation on AI Safety Science, or Seoul Statement, the network’s founding document. However, a September announcement by Raimondo and U.S. secretary of state Antony Blinken confirmed that Kenya would instead be the final member of the AISI International Network at this stage.</p> +<p>Developing countries across the globe are installing or upgrading their digital infrastructure. But choosing a telecommunications vendor involves weighing factors such as cost, efficiency, quality, and security. The Covid-19 pandemic drove home the importance of connectivity and secure networks, over which information on e-commerce, education, financial services, and health — as well as national security — must pass. China has initially taken the lead in this sector by providing telecommunications solutions and financing primarily to countries in the Indo-Pacific and Africa. Meanwhile, the United States has fallen behind in addressing this important infrastructure gap. The United States and its partners have the financial and technical tools to provide safer and cost-effective technology to help bridge the digital divide in the Global South, where competition for high-quality digital infrastructure plays into broader great power tensions.</p> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">On November 21 and 22, 2024, technical artificial intelligence (AI) experts from nine countries and the European Union will meet for the first time in San Francisco. The agenda: starting the next phase of international cooperation on AI safety science through a network of AI safety institutes (AISIs).</code></em></strong></p> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">The United States and its partners have the financial and technical tools to provide safer and cost-effective technology to help bridge the digital divide in the Global South, where competition for high-quality digital infrastructure plays into broader great power tensions.</code></em></strong></p> -<p>According to the Seoul Statement, the international network will serve to “accelerate the advancement of the science of AI safety” at a global level by promoting “complementarity and interoperability” between institutes and fostering a “common international understanding” of AI safety approaches. While the statement does not define specific goals or mechanisms for AISI collaboration, it suggests that they “may include” coordinating research, sharing resources and relevant information, developing best practices, and exchanging or codeveloping AI model evaluations. Now, in the months following the AI Seoul Summit, AISI network members must begin to articulate the objectives, deliverables, timelines, and avenues for cooperation that will put the promise of AISI cooperation into action.</p> +<h3 id="a-high-risk-network">A High-Risk Network</h3> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">In the months following the AI Seoul Summit, AISI network members must begin to articulate the objectives, deliverables, timelines, and avenues for cooperation that will put the promise of AISI cooperation into action.</code></em></strong></p> +<p>China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) features an initiative that is quickly becoming the country’s most prolific and impactful infrastructure investment: the Digital Silk Road (DSR). The DSR encompasses investments in wireless networks, surveillance cameras, subsea cables, and satellites; it is primarily financed and constructed by state-owned banks and companies such as Huawei, Hengtong, HMN Technologies, Hikvision, Dahua, and BeiDou. The bulk of China’s DSR contracts are with Indo-Pacific and African countries, where companies like Huawei are providing affordable mobile phones, cloud computing, and other types of hardware. Huawei Marine Networks, now known as HMN Technologies, has spearheaded subsea cable network infrastructure. In the last decade, the company has completed 108 projects that have amounted to an estimated 60,000 kilometers of subsea cable; roughly 16 of those projects are in 27 countries in the Indo-Pacific.</p> -<p>This paper examines next steps for developing the International Network of AI Safety Institutes from the Seoul Statement. It provides recommendations to members ahead of the inaugural network meeting in San Francisco this November and the AI Action Summit in Paris in February 2025. These recommendations fall in line with three key questions:</p> +<p>Chinese companies also have a significant stake in the 5G wireless networks around the world. Huawei and ZTE have engaged in nearly 160 projects in Africa, Asia, and Europe, providing network equipment and infrastructure. Recipient countries have so far welcomed these investments, namely for the speed at which the projects are implemented — but also for the price. Due to Chinese government subsidies, Huawei and ZTE can offer below-market rates, with Huawei offering as much as 30 percent below typical costs.</p> -<ol> - <li> - <p><strong>Goals of collaboration: What is the AISI network trying to achieve and when?</strong></p> +<p>According to a report by the European think tank MERICS, Chinese companies are also involved in providing products in the e-governance, online education, and telehealth sectors. Huawei and ZTE have implemented these projects — predominantly in Africa and Central Asia — with more financing from the Chinese government than from local governments, multilateral development banks, and G7 countries combined.</p> - <p>While there are many potential benefits to international collaboration, there are also real costs that should not be ignored. At a minimum, collaboration demands staff time, capacity, and possibly money from partners. The AISI network should therefore have clear goals for which type of international cooperation between safety institutes offers the maximum return on investment. These goals should be supported by specific priorities, deliverables, and timelines that steer the network’s efforts toward a meaningful return on investment.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Mechanisms of collaboration: What will the AISI network do and how will it work?</strong></p> +<p>The United States has consistently raised security concerns about China’s digital technology investments, citing questions of national security, cybersecurity, personal security, and intellectual property, as well as the potential for authoritarian nations to surveil their own citizens. Some countries have heeded this advice; telecom carriers in Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands, Sweden, and the United Kingdom have replaced Chinese equipment with technology from low-risk vendors, or vendors that adhere to agreed-upon standards on privacy, data collection, surveillance, and intellectual property. The United States and many countries in the European Union have signed onto the Prague Proposals, which call on countries to select carriers and providers that will prioritize safe and secure 5G networks and communication technologies.</p> - <p>The success of the network depends on how effectively its members can act upon shared goals. There are many different ways for the members to “collaborate,” and not all of them are equally attractive. Network members should consider what the mechanisms of collaboration will be — for example, leadership structures, research exchanges, shared platforms, and annual conferences.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>International strategy: How will the AISI network fit into and engage with other international AI efforts?</strong></p> +<h3 id="offering-an-alternative">Offering an Alternative</h3> - <p>The AI governance landscape is increasingly crowded with international initiatives, including from the Group of Seven (G7), the United Nations, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the Global Partnership on AI (GPAI), the International Organization for Standardization (ISO), and more. All of these demand time from a small (though growing) community of government staff from member countries who can credibly claim to have some expertise on AI governance and safety issues. AISI network members should be able to articulate how their grouping is different from these preexisting initiatives, how it will effectively engage with them (or not), and for what purpose.</p> - </li> -</ol> +<p>The countries that have signed onto China’s BRI and the DSR are doing so for several reasons. A primary motivation is to address critical infrastructure gaps by providing digital connectivity. The Covid-19 pandemic emphasized this need, underscoring its importance to nearly all aspects of daily life for individuals, companies, and governments. The BRI and DSR have stepped into this gap to provide something the United States and its allies have not. Typically, information and communication technology (ICT) projects are approved, deployed, and financed much more quickly by China than they would be through a G7 development bank. Approvals by the latter institutions often are bogged down by long feasibility studies, risk assessments, and other considerations. China, by contrast, offers a more streamlined approach: loans, construction companies, and equipment, all from one source.</p> -<p>This paper begins with background on the AISI network and explains its importance. Next, it offers an overview of network members’ organizations and stated functions. It concludes with recommendations regarding nine further questions for developing the goals, collaboration mechanisms, and international strategy of the network.</p> +<p>The United States and its partners have struggled to provide an alternative to the DSR; however, in recent years, Washington has established agencies, initiatives, and partnerships to prioritize ICT projects overseas, including investments in wireless networks, Open Radio Access Network (ORAN) technology, surveillance cameras, subsea cables, mobile handsets, and satellites, as well as systems upgrades from 2G and 3G to 5G and beyond. But there are multiple avenues available for additional policies to increase export and development finance of these technologies by trusted suppliers.</p> -<h3 id="background">BACKGROUND</h3> +<blockquote> + <h4 id="case-study-mexico"><code class="highlighter-rouge">Case Study: Mexico</code></h4> +</blockquote> -<h4 id="what-is-ai-safety-and-why-does-it-matter">What Is AI Safety and Why Does It Matter?</h4> +<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Over a decade ago, Mexico reached an inflection point in the development of its digital strategy and connectivity policies. Its experience offers both an example of best practices and a cautionary tale.</code></em></p> -<p>As defined by the Bletchley Declaration, issued by attendees of the UK AI Safety Summit in November 2023, AI safety is a scientific field of research focused on evaluating, preventing, and mitigating risks from advanced AI systems. In this case, it refers narrowly to AI systems at or beyond the current state of the art. These risks can range from deepfakes to the use of AI for bioterrorism; new risks will emerge as AI’s capabilities continue to evolve. Somewhat confusingly, other individuals and organizations may define AI safety more broadly to include lower-performing systems that are not operating at the technical frontier. Still others may or may not include issues around ethics and bias when using the term “AI safety.” This paper’s use of the term “AI safety” follows the U.S. AI Safety Institute’s example of focusing exclusively on safety issues related to advanced AI systems.</p> +<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">In 2013, Mexico implemented a constitutional reform that created the Federal Institute of Telecommunications (IFT) and the Federal Economic Commission for Competition (COFECE). Both are independent regulators and antitrust authorities with very broad powers. This was born out of a larger reform process in the telecommunication and broadcasting sectors that took place in Mexico and in Latin America more broadly. The reforms reviewed and updated the legislative frameworks and institutions created in the 1990s to boost competition after market liberalization during that decade. As in many Latin American markets, fixed-line telephony in Mexico was provided by the state-owned operator, Teléfonos de México (Telmex), until the early 1990s, when the government gradually divested its assets to national and foreign investors. In 1995, the Mexican government passed the landmark Federal Telecommunications Law (LFT), opening all market segments for competition and removing geographic limitations for fixed and mobile telephony networks.</code></em></p> -<p>AI safety science can be split into two main streams of research: technical safety, or improving the internal “machinery” of AI models; and process-based safety, or improving how people build, develop, and interact with AI models.</p> +<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">The IFT promotes and regulates competition and the efficient development of telecommunications and broadcasting, in accordance with its constitutional mandate and the 2014 Federal Law for Telecommunications and Broadcasting, LFTR, as well as the 2014 Federal Law for Economic Competition. The COFECE is responsible for overseeing, promoting, and guaranteeing competition and free market access in Mexico. The COFECE has a board that consists of seven commissioners; a Technical Secretariat that analyzes the market and its competitiveness; a strategic planning and institutional evaluation coordinator; and an internal comptroller that oversees COFECE officials.</code></em></p> -<p>Technical AI safety focuses on understanding how the engineering and science behind AI models works, and how to make models perform reliably and in the scope of their intended use cases. These three areas of research are known as:</p> +<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Upon the creation of the IFT, Mexico licensed new national broadcasting networks, designated officials to evaluate carriers and operators, introduced rules for unbundling Telmex, and created a public registry of licenses. Since its creation, IFT has been viewed as a credible authority; as a result, prices have decreased and competition has increased. There are now dozens of new local broadcasting licenses in radio and television, including for indigenous communities. Mexico’s internet penetration rate stood at 83.2 percent of the total population at the start of 2024, up from 44 percent in 2013. In 2015, AT&amp;T undertook a series of local acquisitions, and the U.S.-headquartered company now comprises 16 percent of the market for mobile telephone operators. In December 2021, AT&amp;T Mexico announced it intended to launch a 5G network using its 2.5 GHz spectrum, making it the first mobile network operator in the country to build such a network.</code></em></p> -<ul> - <li> - <p><strong>Assurance:</strong> Understanding how a model makes decisions and why it behaves the way it does</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Robustness:</strong> Ensuring a model operates reliably under adverse contexts</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Specification:</strong> Designing a model that produces desired results as intended.</p> - </li> -</ul> +<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Despite a more competitive ICT market, domestic politics have hindered and threatened progress. Most concerning has been the chipping away of IFT’s independence and operational ability. When former president Andrés Manuel López Obrador entered office in 2018, he sought to undermine the independent IFT. Since February 2022, the agency has operated with only four of its seven presiding commissioners, as President López Obrador refused to nominate any more. This has left the agency without enough commissioners to operate effectively; losing another would render it completely inoperable. The IFT’s budget has also decreased by roughly 41.1 percent since 2014, hampering its ability to implement its mandate. Additionally, the government has set high spectrum fees, which has undercut telecommunications operators’ ability to expand broadband connectivity, particularly in rural areas, and undermined IFT’s efforts to license more spectrum. The country also remains plagued by anticompetitive tendencies, despite the efforts of the IFT and COFECE.</code></em></p> -<p>Meanwhile, process-based safety is concerned with the policies, practices, and procedures that surround AI. This stream of AI safety is more operational in nature. It focuses on how frontier AI developers, deployers, and users build, manage, and monitor AI models, including by evaluating models for capabilities, limitations, and risks, and documenting and reporting model information. It may also include processes that are implemented by the users of AI.</p> +<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Mexico has stood apart from its Latin American peers in creating and implementing one of the most sophisticated telecommunications regulations. But, before concluding his term, former president López Obrador sent to Congress an initiative for constitutional reform that would disappear IFT and COFECE and assign their responsibilities to different ministries within the executive branch. This initiative is waiting to be analyzed in Congress. In order to build on the progress of the 1990s, Mexico’s new president, Claudia Sheinbaum, will have to undo Obrador’s efforts and reinstitute the authority of these bodies, while also ensuring they are protected from political winds. Mexico is an excellent case study of how a country can succeed in building an effective and laudable regulatory infrastructure and have it subsequently come apart due to politics.</code></em></p> -<p>Beyond preventing adverse risks, AI safety serves to accelerate adoption and innovation by building public trust. As Elizabeth Kelly, director of the U.S. AI Safety Institute, said in a CSIS interview, “safety promotes trust, which promotes adoption, which drives innovation.” AI safety boosts public trust by allowing people to pause, stop, or change course as needed.</p> +<h4 id="us-resources">U.S. RESOURCES</h4> -<p>A helpful analogy, one frequently used in the risk management sector, compares AI safety capabilities with the brakes on a car. At first consideration, the purpose of brakes seems obvious and narrow: to make the car go slower. However, the existence of brakes also allows cars to go faster. As a thought experiment, imagine how fast drivers would be willing to go if no car came equipped with any brakes. How easy would it be to avoid a crash or turn a corner if drivers could never change their speed? How might one pause to change tires or fix a problem? Navigating such scenarios would almost certainly be a disaster. Even with speed limit regulations in place, a world without brakes would be a world in which drivers went much, much slower.</p> +<p>The United States has established new agencies and tools in recent years to help promote and support U.S. technology — particularly ICT — abroad. These efforts can be further honed to more effectively support U.S. and partner initiatives in the developing world, as well as private company engagement in this sector.</p> -<p>Policymakers should approach AI safety with this parallel in mind. Like the brakes of a car, building technical and management capabilities for AI can help boost confidence in the technology and ultimately accelerate the pace of adoption and innovation.</p> +<p><em>U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC)</em></p> -<h4 id="what-are-ai-safety-institutes-and-what-will-they-do">What Are AI Safety Institutes and What Will They Do?</h4> +<p>In October 2018, the U.S. Congress passed the bipartisan Better Utilization of Investment Leading to Development (BUILD) Act to support and finance investments in emerging economies and to boost national security and foreign policy priorities in critical markets. The BUILD Act combined the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID)’s Development Credit Authority (DCA) to form the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC). The DFC has stated that encouraging ICT investments in low and lower-middle-income countries is a key priority for the agency. The agency can provide loans, loan guarantees, equity financing, political risk insurance, and technical assistance to support investments in the telecom industry; it can only work on private sector projects, not ones supported by the public sector. However, the DFC is limited in working in networks that include high-risk vendor equipment. According to the 2019 National Defense Authorization Act, U.S. financing agencies investing in networks with this type of equipment must get a waiver from the head of the relevant executive agency or from the Director of National Intelligence and must have a phase-out plan to “rip and replace” the high-risk vendor equipment.</p> -<p>Since 2023, governments around the world have mobilized around AI’s rapidly growing capabilities and potential risks. As part of this effort, several governments have launched AI safety institutes, publicly funded research institutions focused on mitigating risks from the frontier of AI development. AISIs provide governments with in-house technical expertise and organizational capacity to evaluate and monitor cutting-edge AI models for risks to public and national security.</p> +<p>The DFC and its predecessor OPIC have undertaken several ICT investments in the past two decades, including a network acquisition in the Pacific Islands; renewable power for cell phone towers in Nigeria and the Central African Republic; telecommunications infrastructure in Myanmar; and, in Jordan, infrastructure to provide a critical interconnection point for an internet cable system connecting Europe and Asia. In 2018, the DFC also provided $100 million in financing to Africell for the expansion of affordable mobile voice and data services in The Gambia, Sierra Leone, Uganda, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, as well as upgrades to network equipment in these countries to accommodate increased traffic.</p> -<p>AISIs have been tasked by governments with a wide-ranging mandate to address the complex challenges posed by advanced AI systems. They will perform foundational technical research, develop guidance for the public and private sectors, and work closely with companies to test models before deployment. While it is unusual for a single government entity to tackle all three of these functions at once, the breakneck speed of AI development and the staggering number of open questions in the field of AI safety research mean that governments require in-house capacity on each of them. According to Kelly, it is important that these three functions — research, testing, and guidance — reinforce each other to form a “virtuous” cycle (Figure 1):</p> +<p><em>The Export-Import Bank of the U.S. (EXIM)</em></p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/U1n4i1Y.png" alt="image01" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 1: AISI Core Functions.</strong> Source: <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/us-vision-ai-safety-conversation-elizabeth-kelly-director-us-ai-safety-institute">“The U.S. Vision for AI Safety: A Conversation with Elizabeth Kelly, Director of the U.S. AI Safety Institute,” CSIS, July 31, 2024</a>; and <a href="https://www.nist.gov/system/files/documents/2024/05/21/AISI-vision-21May2024.pdf">“The United States Artificial Intelligence Safety Institute: Vision, Mission, and Strategic Goals,” U.S. Artificial Intelligence Safety Institute, May 21, 2024</a>.</em></p> +<p>EXIM has been mandated by Congress to enact its China and Transformational Exports Program (CTEP) to help U.S. exporters facing competition from China, particularly in the fields of AI, wireless communications, and fintech. Established in 2019, CTEP is expected to counter export subsidies and finance provided by China, advance U.S. leadership, and support U.S. innovation, employment, and technological standards. Exporters can take advantage of EXIM’s reduced fees, extended repayment tenors, and exceptions from other EXIM policies to get financing on transactions with at least 51 percent U.S. content. However, to date there have been no ICT deals financed through CTEP.</p> -<p>To keep pace with the cutting edge of AI safety research, AISIs have prioritized the hiring of technical staff and opened offices in cities with deep pools of AI talent like San Francisco. In addition to developing expertise internally, AISIs aim to cultivate a robust ecosystem of AI safety researchers in labs, industry, and academia through their guidance on best-in-class evaluation methods.</p> +<p>Additionally, EXIM can also provide loans, loan guarantees, and insurance for the purchase of goods and services shipped or invoiced from any country to facilitate U.S. exports for 5G-related transactions. EXIM has lowered its U.S. content threshold. But the creditworthiness of potential in-country private sector partners has remained a key challenge in many instances, particularly in countering opaque Chinese lending practices.</p> -<p>AISIs are engaging a wide range of stakeholders on each of their core functions. Far from fearing the launch of AISIs worldwide, firms and universities engaged in advanced AI have called for governments to increase their capacity to perform AI research, conduct testing, and issue guidance. Earlier this year, top U.S. AI companies such as Google, Microsoft, Anthropic, and Amazon joined the U.S. AISI Consortium (AISIC) as part of its inaugural cohort of members. AISIC is composed of over 200 organizations from across the private sector, academia, civil society, and government and facilitates collaboration on AI safety research and evaluations. Members are expected to contribute to one of nine key areas of guidance, reproduced verbatim below:</p> +<p><em>Department of Commerce</em></p> -<ol> - <li> - <p>Develop new guidelines, tools, methods, protocols, and best practices to facilitate the evolution of industry standards for developing or deploying AI in safe, secure, and trustworthy ways</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Develop guidance and benchmarks for identifying and evaluating AI capabilities, with a focus on capabilities that could potentially cause harm</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Develop approaches to incorporate secure-development practices for generative AI, including special considerations for dual-use foundation models, including:</p> - </li> -</ol> +<p>The Creating Helpful Incentives to Produce Semiconductors and Science Act (CHIPS Act) of 2022 authorized billions of dollars for funding to the Departments of Commerce, Defense, and State to develop onshore domestic manufacturing of semiconductors. It also included appropriations to fund the USA Telecommunications Act to support the global telecom supply chain and counter the expansion of Chinese companies such as Huawei and ZTE. Provisions from the CHIPS Act are meant to further U.S. software advantages and to develop the Open Radio Access Network (ORAN), which would allow for a more interoperable telecommunications model and enable alternative vendors to enter markets for specific network components, rather than competing with end-to-end packages offered by companies like Huawei.</p> -<ul> - <li> - <p>Guidance related to assessing and managing the safety, security, and trustworthiness of models and related to privacy-preserving machine learning</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Guidance to ensure the availability of testing environments</p> - </li> -</ul> +<p>The CHIPS Act provides $1.5 billion through a Public Wireless Supply Chain Innovation Fund to the Department of Commerce’s National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA), in coordination with other agencies, to support investments in ORAN, developments of software-based wireless technologies, and funding for “leap-ahead” innovations in the U.S. mobile broadband market.</p> -<ol> - <li> - <p>Develop and ensure the availability of testing environments</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Develop guidance, methods, skills, and practices for successful red-teaming and privacy-preserving machine learning</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Develop guidance and tools for authenticating digital content</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Develop guidance and criteria for AI workforce skills, including risk identification and management; test, evaluation, validation, and verification (TEVV); and domain-specific expertise</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Explore the complexities at the intersection of society and technology, including the science of how humans make sense of and engage with AI in different contexts</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Develop guidance for understanding and managing the interdependencies between and among AI actors along the lifecycle.</p> - </li> -</ol> +<p><em>Department of State</em></p> -<p>Note that while these nine areas of guidance overlap with the nine core functions of an AI safety institute identified in Section 4 of this paper, they do not cover the full breadth of AISIs’ operations. As Section 4 will discuss, AISIs perform functions such as forming consortia of AI researchers, stakeholders, and experts and promoting the international adoption of AI safety guidelines that are outside the scope of the AISIC.</p> +<p>The CHIPS Act allocates $500 million over five years to a new International Technology Security and Innovation (ITSI) Fund, which gives money to the Department of State to provide for international information and communications technology security and semiconductor supply chain activities, including to support the development and adoption of secure and trusted telecommunications technologies, secure semiconductor supply chains, and other emerging technologies. The State Department can use the fund for its own programming but can also allocate money to USAID, EXIM, and the DFC.</p> -<p>In August, OpenAI chief executive officer Sam Altman stated that his company has been working closely with the U.S. AISI on an agreement to provide early access to its next foundation model for safety testing and evaluations. OpenAI is not alone in providing the U.S. AISI access to its models for testing. Director Kelly said that the institute has “commitments from all of the leading frontier model developers to work with them on these tests.” These commitments demonstrate that leading companies understand the need for AI safety research and recognize the important role that the U.S. AISI has to play. While critics have questioned how industry will balance competition and safety, AISIs are free from the financial self-interest which has caused some to question the adequacy of private AI safety efforts in the past.</p> +<p>The focus of the fund has been less on ICT and more on semiconductors. Funding has gone to new hires at the State Department and to partnerships with Costa Rica, Indonesia, Mexico, Panama, the Philippines, and Vietnam to explore opportunities to grow and diversify the global semiconductor ecosystem. In a March 2023 press release, the State Department communicated that $40.7 million in fiscal year 2023 ITSI funding would be used in the ICT space to provide capacity building training as well as technical advice on policy formulation and regulatory frameworks, cybersecurity tools, financing, project preparation support, and other investment de-risking measures to catalyze private sector investments in secure ICT networks, including field testing and pilot deployments of ORAN networks. The full scope and scale of these investments are not yet clear.</p> -<p>On October 21, top AI developers including Amazon, Meta, Microsoft, and OpenAI signed a letter to Congress calling on lawmakers to authorize the U.S. AISI before the end of the year. The letter, which was led by Americans for Responsible Innovation and the Information Technology Industry Council (ITI), states that “[a]s other nations around the world are establishing their own AI Safety Institutes, furthering NIST’s ongoing efforts is essential to advancing U.S. AI innovation, leadership, and national security.” “Authorizing legislation, and the accompanying necessary resources,” it argues, “will give much needed certainty to NIST’s role in AI safety and reliability.”</p> +<p><em>U.S. Trade and Development Agency (USTDA)</em></p> -<p>The letter echoes similar calls for Congress to authorize the AISI by Scale AI Founder and CEO Alexandr Wang earlier in October, as well as a letter from top AI companies to establish the AISI on a statutory basis in July. The July letter, also published by Americans for Responsible Innovation and ITI, argues that authorizing the AISI “provides a venue to convene the leading experts across industry and government to contribute to the development of voluntary standards that ultimately assist in de-risking adoption of AI technologies.” It’s not just the biggest companies that stand to benefit from the U.S. AISI — crucially, the letter argued that the institute may level the playing field for enterprises that use or develop AI but are unable to perform robust testing and evaluation in-house due to their size or the technical ability of their staff.</p> +<p>USTDA provides financial tools to support the export of U.S. goods and services for priority infrastructure projects in emerging economies. USTDA funds project preparation, feasibility studies, and partnership-building activities. Though it is typically involved on the front end of projects, USTDA has also financed ICT-related initiatives in the Indo-Pacific and Africa.</p> -<p>While the concept of a government organization that works closely with AI companies on safety is still new, history shows that this kind of arrangement between government and industry can be highly successful. One good example is the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA), a U.S. federal agency that performs safety tests of new motor vehicle models for manufacturers. Established in the 1970s to reduce accidents and deaths by encouraging manufacturers to produce safer vehicles, NHTSA led what has become today an industry standard of crash testing and rating vehicles out of five stars according to their safety. Some 50 years since its launch, NHTSA continues to perform crash tests and produce star ratings, as well as issue government safety ratings, safety information, and best practices.</p> +<p>In 2023, the agency awarded a grant to NOW Telecom Company to conduct a feasibility study and pilot project to support the development of a nationwide 5G mobile and fixed-wireless network in the Philippines. The company chose New Jersey-based Bell Labs Consulting, part of the research arm of Nokia, to conduct the study. The USTDA also awarded a grant to Malawian internet service provider Converged Technology Networks Limited (CTN) to conduct a feasibility study on the expansion of digital connectivity to underserved communities in the country. CTN selected California-based Connectivity Capital LLC to conduct the study.</p> -<p>NHTSA is a useful model of a third-party government arbiter that has produced substantial win-win results for the public and for companies. The administration’s rating system lowers costs to consumers by supplying accurate, reliable, and simple safety information for free. Meanwhile, companies are incentivized to adopt new and better safety measures into their vehicles. As NHTSA’s acting administrator has stated, “[o]ur 5-Star Safety Ratings system continues to give Americans the information they need to choose the vehicle that’s right for them. The program also encourages vehicle manufacturers to incorporate advanced vehicle safety technologies into more makes and models, ultimately reducing injuries and deaths on America’s roads.” Because safety is a selling point for customers, most of the United States’ manufacturers willingly sign up for the NHTSA’s 5-star system and use the results in advertising new vehicle models.</p> +<p><em>U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID)</em></p> -<p>As AISIs mature organizationally, they could fulfill a similar arbiter role for AI models as the NHTSA has for motor vehicles. As has been the case with motor vehicles, testing AI models could lead to innovation in which safety is a key competitive feature. AI companies could communicate to customers that their model has passed AISI testing and evaluations, which could in turn help to build public trust and make AI models with higher safety standards more commercially competitive among consumers. Top frontier AI developers’ willingness to work with the U.S. AISI on testing their models before deployment is a good first step to making safety a key feature of AI industry standards, as the NHTSA has done with the U.S. motor vehicle industry over the last 50 years.</p> +<p>USAID provides grants and technical assistance for an array of programs across the digital sector. In June 2022, the agency launched its Asia ORAN Academy as part of the Biden administration’s Indo-Pacific Strategy. The academy brings together officials and representatives from the private and public sectors, as well as academia, with an expectation to expand its initial work in the Philippines to the rest of the region. As of June 2024, USAID was in final negotiations to open an ORAN Lab at the University of the Philippines’ Electrical and Electronics Engineering Institute. USAID’s Better Access and Connectivity (BEACON) Activity is also engaging the Philippine government and industry leaders in the country through a series of workshops and trainings on field testing and through the adoption of legislation and regulations that facilitate ORAN deployment.</p> -<h4 id="timeline-of-ai-safety-institutes">Timeline of AI Safety Institutes</h4> +<p>USAID is additionally engaged in the Digital Invest initiative, also launched in 2022, which works with investment partners to increase the ability of companies to qualify for commercial funding. Digital Invest provides an average of $500,000 per partner for investments related to resilient digital infrastructure, increased digital inclusion, and stronger economic development. Digital Invest partners have backed over 60 technology companies across 38 countries, with projects ranging from the expansion of broadband connectivity infrastructure in Liberia to a digital payment platform in Uzbekistan to a fund supporting female investors and tech founders across South and Southeast Asia.</p> -<p>The first AISIs were announced last year, with the United States and United Kingdom launching initiatives at the UK AI Safety Summit in November 2023. Japan, Singapore, and the European Union’s EU AI Office followed in early 2024. Since then, Canada and South Korea have revealed plans for their own AISIs. The inclusion of France, Kenya, and Australia in the AISI network suggests that more institutes are still to come. For instance, in May French research institutions Laboratoire National de Métrologie et d’Essais (LNE) and National Institute for Research in Digital Science and Technology (Inria) announced a partnership to set up an “AI Evaluation” program that will advance research and the development of testing and evaluation methods for general-purpose AI models at the national level. While this program has not yet been named as an official AI safety institute for France, an announcement may take place at the AI Action Summit in France in February 2025, similar to the announcement made by South Korea at the AI Seoul Summit in May.</p> +<p><em>Office of Strategic Capital (OSC)</em></p> -<p>The AISI International Network marks a logical next step in a series of recent bilateral agreements between institutes. In April 2024, the United States signed a memorandum of understanding with the United Kingdom for close collaboration between institutes and established a dialogue with the EU AI Office to jointly develop evaluation tools for AI models. Meanwhile, the United Kingdom, for its part, has established additional partnerships with Canada and France on AI safety, and the European Union and Japan have indicated future cooperation between safety institutes in the coming months.</p> +<p>The newly created OSC, established in 2022 within the Department of Defense, is mandated to mobilize and scale private sector capital. Its Fiscal Year 2024 Investment Strategy outlined its initial target priorities, which include ORAN as both a part of the DoD’s FutureG and 5G critical technology area and a mandated field in the FY 2024 National Defense Authorization Act. The OSC’s complete suite of financial tools is still under development, but at this time, it can provide direct loans for capital investment and equipment finance. These loans range from $10 million to $150 million, with long repayment tenor. The OSC announced its first Notice of Funding Availability in September 2024 and will be considering applications through the rest of the fiscal year.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/XvdrSKG.png" alt="image02" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 2: Timeline of Major Events in AI Safety Since 2019.</strong></em></p> +<h4 id="global-partnerships">GLOBAL PARTNERSHIPS</h4> -<h3 id="why-the-aisi-international-network-matters">WHY THE AISI INTERNATIONAL NETWORK MATTERS</h3> +<p>U.S. partners and allies have established several initiatives through the G7 to address critical infrastructure needs. In each of these, digital connectivity — particularly in the Indo-Pacific, sub-Saharan Africa, and Latin America — is a core part of cooperative engagement.</p> -<p>The AISI International Network is important for several reasons:</p> +<p><em>Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment (PGI)</em></p> -<ul> - <li> - <p><strong>The network provides a much-needed venue for building international consensus on definitions, procedures, and best practices around AI safety.</strong> The science of evaluating AI models is a nascent yet vital field of research that underpins global efforts to develop safe and responsible AI. Currently, these efforts are limited by a lack of consensus on key definitions (for instance, what constitutes a “frontier” AI model or a “secure” system) and on the steps involved in testing, evaluation, and monitoring procedures.</p> +<p>The G7 partners announced PGI, known then as Build Back Better World, at the Carbis Bay summit in June 2021. This effort was intended to counter BRI and target critical infrastructure to support health care, gender, climate, and ICT. The United States has set the goal of mobilizing $200 billion in investments over the next three years as part of the larger $600 billion target made by the G7. Much of PGI’s focus has been on developing economic corridors in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Angola, and the Philippines’ Luzon Corridor. Yet there have been few announcements on digital connectivity, which suggests that there is more to be done in this sector through this initiative.</p> - <p>International consensus would increase regulatory interoperability, or the degree to which different domestic regulatory systems can smoothly interface and interact. Interoperability allows for the even implementation of international AI governance efforts. One such effort is the G7 Hiroshima AI Process Code of Conduct, which calls for “robust” and “trustworthy” AI systems but lacks technical definitions of the terms. Shared definitions would help create a common measuring stick by which regulators gauge these characteristics. Countries could choose policy options along such a ruler based on their risk tolerance for given AI applications. In this example, governments would require different levels of robustness and trustworthiness along the same underlying scale, as is the case for safety in the automobile and aviation industries. A common understanding of AI safety concepts would help clarify the steps countries must take to honor the G7 code of conduct and other international commitments.</p> +<p>In 2023, as part of PGI, Africa Data Centers received a $300 million loan from the Development Finance Corporation to construct data centers throughout the continent. The DFC, EXIM, USAID, and USTDA also announced they would build on DFC’s existing financing for Africell in Angola, the DRC, The Gambia, and Sierra Leone (all part of the Lobito economic corridor) to support the expansion of wireless services and a digital payments initiative. Additionally, in the DRC, USTDA and USAID announced the provision of programming and financial support for last-mile connectivity and ORAN equipment for the piloting of U.S. firm Parallel Wireless with Vodacom DRC in five villages.</p> - <p>In this way, interoperability based on common definitions, procedures, and best practices can help to facilitate trade in the future. As a previous CSIS paper argued, fragmented legal frameworks that require company compliance with many different obligations can create technical barriers to the free flow of goods and services. Diverging regulatory approaches that require companies to demonstrate that a product is “safe” according to 10 different metrics from 10 different jurisdictions, for instance, is not only highly inefficient but often prohibitively costly. Instead, the AISI International Network could serve as one venue in which to develop a coherent language around AI safety, helping to lower future potential barriers to trade.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>International collaboration will help governments achieve economies of scale in AI safety research.</strong> Thus far, AISIs have cooperated on a bilateral basis, which, while useful, can limit the impact and scope of AI safety efforts. By sharing priorities, resources, and expertise through a multilateral configuration, the AISI International Network aims to be more than the sum of its parts. AISIs can contribute strategically to the goals of the network by coordinating roles and responsibilities, de-duplicating research and therefore saving time, capacity, and money.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>The network offers an opportunity to extend U.S. leadership in global AI governance.</strong> The United States has already demonstrated significant leadership in AI safety by being one of the first to launch its AISI in 2023 and by spearheading the AISI network initiative in 2024. It should maintain this leadership going forward with the view that the network will help shape global AI safety practices that will predominantly affect U.S. companies.</p> +<p><em>Trilateral Infrastructure Partnership (TIP)</em></p> - <p>This is important for not only setting safety norms at home, but also advocating for U.S. interests abroad. Consider, for instance, the EU AI Act: while the first wave of the act came into force on August 1, the requirements for developers of frontier AI models above 10^25 floating operation points (FLOPS) of compute power have yet to be defined. Rather, the EU AI Office — the European Union’s representation to the AISI International Network — is tasked with developing codes of practice for the developers of these models, almost all of which are S. companies.</p> +<p>The TIP is a partnership between the DFC, the Japan Bank for International Cooperation ( JBIC), Australia’s Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT), and Export Finance Australia (EFA). TIP partners are looking to cofinance infrastructure projects mainly in the Pacific Islands and Southeast Asia. Though there are few projects under the TIP banner, two are in ICT.</p> - <p>According to Article 56 of the AI Act, the EU AI Office must develop codes of practice for frontier AI companies to identify, assess, manage, and report “systemic” risks by May 2, 2025. To meet this tight deadline, it may look to the work of the AISI International Network if it deems it sufficiently mature to draw upon. Having a seat at the same table as the EU AI Office is therefore a valuable opportunity to help develop safety norms that the European Union may apply to U.S. companies. Even if the European Union ultimately decides to develop its codes of practice alone, the network will still provide the United States with a direct line of communication to the EU AI Office for articulating AI safety best practices in the future.</p> - </li> -</ul> +<p>TIP’s first project has been the Palau spur, an approximately $30 million construction project for a subsea fiber optic cable to the Republic of Palau. The project is to connect to a DFC-financed subsea cable, the world’s longest, which stretches from Singapore to the United States. In May 2023, the TIP partners announced their support for the Australian telecom company, Telstra, in its acquisition of Digicel Pacific. The JBIC and DFC provided $50 million each in credit guarantees for EFA’s $1.33 billion financing package to support the acquisition. Telstra’s move is expected to further Digicel’s delivery of high-quality telecommunication services to more than 2.5 million subscribers in Papua New Guinea, Fiji, Vanuatu, Samoa, Tonga, and Nauru.</p> -<h3 id="overview-of-aisi-network-members">OVERVIEW OF AISI NETWORK MEMBERS</h3> +<p><em>Quad</em></p> -<p>It is still early days for AI safety institutes, both as organizations and as concepts. Members of the AISI International Network are highly varied in their organizational maturity, which can be expected given that most are only months old. Even the U.S. AISI, one of the most established institutes, was announced only in November 2023 and became operational in early 2024. Other AISIs, such as those of Japan, Singapore, South Korea, and the European Union, are still in the process of hiring and setting out the priorities of their institutes, according to public documents and conversations by CSIS with officials. Still other network members, like Kenya and Australia, have yet to clearly state whether their governments will even establish an AISI.</p> +<p>The Quad — Australia, India, Japan, and the United States — is also engaged on the ICT front and has announced ICT projects in the Pacific Islands, including on subsea cables and ORAN technology. At the Quad Leaders’ Summit in May 2023, the partners announced the establishment of the Quad Partnership for Cable Connectivity and Resilience, with the aim of bringing together public and private sector actors to address gaps in this type of infrastructure.</p> -<p>Nevertheless, established AISIs report strong similarities in funding and staff size thus far. As Table 1 illustrates, the annual budgets of network members currently hover around $10 million, with some notable exceptions. First, the UK AISI is already an outlier with a budget of approximately £50 million ($65 million) per year, according to CSIS sources. Second, the United States’ fiscal year 2025 budget requests an increase of $47.7 million for investment into the U.S. AISI and the advancement of AI research, standards, and testing in line with President Biden’s October 2023 AI executive order, which, if approved, would greatly boost the average network budget. Finally, an announcement by the Canadian government in April pledges C$50 million (approximately US$36 million) for a Canadian AISI, though the funding period is unspecified.</p> +<p>Under this partnership, Australia is to establish a new Indo-Pacific Cable Connectivity and Resilience Program to share best practices and provide technical assistance to Indo-Pacific governments. The United States is providing technical assistance and capacity building on subsea cable system security through its $5 million CABLES program.</p> -<p>Public statements and private conversations between CSIS and government officials reveal that staff sizes will also be comparable between institutes. More established AISIs currently employ approximately 20 to 30 staff, most of whom are technical experts. Private conversations with CSIS indicate that the EU AI Office’s AI safety unit, which will fulfill most of the same functions as an AISI (Table 2), will likely hold approximately 50 staff members.</p> +<p>The partners also announced a cooperation with the government of Palau and the Palau National Communications Corporation (PNCC) to design, implement, and operationalize the deployment of ORAN capabilities. The USTDA is expected to fund a technical assistance grant to scope the size and scale of the project. This announcement marked the first planned deployment of ORAN technology in the region.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/IYd2imR.png" alt="image03" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Table 1: Organizational Overview of AISI Network Members.</strong> Source: Public statements from AISI network members and relevant government officials and bodies.</em></p> +<p><em>Global Coalition on Telecommunications (GCOT)</em></p> -<p>AISI network members also intend to fulfill similar functions. Based on a document review of all public statements from AISIs and relevant government officials, this paper provides a list of the nine areas of AI safety in which institutes may operate (see Table 2). These functions are:</p> +<p>GCOT was launched in October 2023 by the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, and Japan to increase cooperation and coordination on shared priorities such as telecommunications supply chain diversification and open network architectures, as well as the building of a broader international consensus on key areas of telecommunications policy and the promotion of innovation and growth opportunities in the sector. The U.S. Departments of State and Commerce are the key agencies involved in this initiative. There have been few details or updates since its launch nearly a year ago.</p> -<ol> - <li> - <p>Performing (technical) research on AI safety tools</p> - </li> +<h4 id="private-sector">PRIVATE SECTOR</h4> + +<p>A major player in the promotion of diversity in digital equipment is the private sector. Private companies can both benefit from government support and mobilize their own capital and resources to be more competitive. One key argument from host countries is the lack of alternatives to Chinese or other high-risk providers for affordable and speedy installation of technology. However, the European Union, United States, Japan, and South Korea have a host of companies available for partnership that share similar values on information security, intellectual property, and high-quality standards.</p> + +<p>The United States and its allies are identifying tools to de-risk markets and promote private sector mobilization and have worked with local governments in the developing world to create enabling environments for high standards of investment, but these efforts still lack the speed and the push for U.S.-based companies to invest. More engagement between the U.S. government and private sector is needed in order to implement tools to support U.S. companies and meet host government needs in faster and more transparent ways.</p> + +<blockquote> + <h4 id="case-study-india"><code class="highlighter-rouge">Case Study: India</code></h4> +</blockquote> + +<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">India is at its own inflection point as it pushes to further its already impressive digital public infrastructure (DPI) efforts, attempting to expand resources and connectivity to more than a billion people. There are opportunities in the market, including in ORAN, but preference for competitive local telecom and ICT companies, as well as some skepticism around ORAN, may hamper major headway.</code></em></p> + +<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">A part of India’s success so far is its regulator, the Telecom Regulatory Authority of India (TRAI). TRAI was established in 1997 with the objective of creating a fair and transparent market and pushing the country toward more connectivity. India now has the second-largest wireless and wireline subscriber base in the world: 1.72 billion, as of March 2023. India’s teledensity — the number of telephones per 100 population — stood at 84.15 percent as of March 2023, an increase of 10 percent in a decade. The prices of SIM cards and cellular data have also fallen significantly, allowing many more people to access mobile phone technologies.</code></em></p> + +<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Within India, local talent and capable companies have enabled the country to create a strong foundation in data systems. Since India’s DPI endeavor, the country has created a data technology structure known as the “India Stack,” which consists of three different layers: unique identity (Aadhaar); complimentary payments systems (Unified Payments Interface, Aadhaar Payments Bridge, Aadhaar Enabled Payment Service); and data exchange (DigiLocker and Account Aggregator). The layered system enables secure online, paperless, and cashless digital access for a variety of public and private services.</code></em></p> + +<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">The usage and benefits speak for themselves. United Payments Interface accounts for 68 percent of all payment transactions in the country. As of February 2024, more than 12 billion transactions are completed every month through UPI. In 2020, with this system in place, the Indian government was able to provide pandemic assistance and a platform for vaccinations. Government reports note that the use of digital payments has expanded the customer base of smaller merchants, which in turn has built a record of credit and cash flow, improving access to finance. In 2009, nearly 400 million Indians lacked a unique identity record, but Aadhaar’s campaign to bring about a national ID succeeded in covering roughly 95 percent of the population by 2022. Japan’s NEC, a company with extensive experience in biometric identification, laid the groundwork for Aadhaar with technologies such as facial and fingerprint recognition. DPI has also benefited government coffers: an estimated 8.8 million new taxpayers were registered between July 2017 and March 2022. Citizens can access documents issued by the central and state governments through one platform, which has streamlined bureaucratic procedures and services. The stack has digitized and simplified Know Your Customer (KYC) procedures, lowering the compliance costs to banks using e-KYC from $12 to $0.06. The biometric system ensures that people cannot assume fake identities and that banks have access to reliable and secure data, both of which contribute to the lowering of compliance costs.</code></em></p> + +<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Even with a strong foundation, India is looking to expand its digital infrastructure to more users in rural and unconnected areas. It is considering ORAN offerings to see if that approach would be cost effective, high quality, scalable, and secure. Official bilateral and multilateral exchanges on this topic are ongoing; Indian national security advisor Ajit Doval and his U.S. counterpart, Jake Sullivan, have discussed engagement in the ORAN space, and the topic has been included in Quad summits. India and the United States have also launched the Critical and Emerging Technologies (iCET) initiative, which promotes cooperation between the private sector and research and scientific institutions in both countries to advance next-gen technologies such as AI, telecom, ORAN, quantum computing, semiconductors, and space innovation.</code></em></p> + +<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">India has already taken steps toward using ORAN technology in its own industries. In 2023, Tata Consulting Services and Tejas Networks formed a consortium to upgrade 4G and 5G networks; TCS will be the system integrator for the entire telecom network, while Tejas will be responsible for equipment and radio access network (RAN). Indian prime minister Narendra Modi has also traveled to the United States to pitch U.S. companies on partnerships with Indian companies that have investment and implementation experience in 4G, 5G, and ORAN, as well as 5G core, mobile edge cloud solutions, base stations, Internet of Things (IoT) sensors, and 5G smartphones. Indian telecom companies Airtel and Reliance Jio have supported ORAN; Airtel has reportedly conducted a trial of the technology and has signed a deal with U.S.-based Mavenir for its deployment to 4G and 5G sites in low-revenue-generating rural areas, with an initial target of 2,500 sites (to be scaled up to 10,000). Reliance Jio is also developing its own ORAN stack.</code></em></p> + +<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Questions remain around costs and scalability. Indian telecom market watchers have queried whether ORAN works for the higher configurations used for 5G networks by Indian telecom companies, noting that they find the technology neither cost effective nor mature. Scalability and feasibility are issues as well. The country head of Mavenir for India has said that he initially expected ORAN deployments to surge, but that the Indian market has proven to be one of the most complex in the world for ORAN rollouts due to a large user base, high population density in cities, and diverse terrain and temperature conditions. India’s more challenging geographic areas may be a better fit for basic 3G, 4G, or 5G infrastructure. Additionally, there are concerns around technology fragmentation; India has benefited from a global standard in which the whole country is integrated. Issues around equipment “super cycles” are also a concern, as each new technological upgrade — from networks to smartphones — comes with its own specialized equipment. With the advent of AI and the likelihood of related technologies emerging, there will need to be significant public and private investment in managing super cycles; most governments, particularly those in developing countries, will need to attract or support that investment in order to both manage the demand for new devices and technologies and build workforce capacity. Finally, questions remain around the viability of ORAN. Some experts would like to see a larger country like the United States pilot and deploy ORAN on a large scale before India undertakes such an effort. To skeptics, ORAN’s unproven elements seem risky for a billion-person country that is looking to keep costs down, integrate systems seamlessly, and ensure safe and secure connectivity.</code></em></p> + +<h3 id="recommendations-for-the-united-states-partners-and-the-private-sector">Recommendations for the United States, Partners, and the Private Sector</h3> + +<p>Communications technology, including ORAN, is a strategic asset that can enable not only innovation and dynamism through competitive markets (including but not limited to ORAN), but also control, surveillance, and repression (including through closed systems with predatory vendor lock-in). As the United States and its partners work to build out telecommunications networks in the developing world, both the technologies themselves and the regulatory frameworks must be centered around principles of interoperability, security, and openness. Each stakeholder has a role to play to create an enabling environment for good governance and standards, creating the conditions for mobilizing private sector capital and providing safe and reliable access to connectivity.</p> + +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">As the United States and its partners work to build out telecommunications networks in the developing world, both the technologies themselves and the regulatory frameworks must be centered around principles of interoperability, security, and openness.</code></em></strong></p> + +<ul> <li> - <p>Developing and disseminating evaluation tools and products</p> + <p><strong>Use Guiding Principles for Secure Networks:</strong> Governing frameworks and values are as important as technology itself. Governments are working to shape these frameworks as innovations emerge and new security concerns manifest alongside them. The Prague Proposals, PGI, the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework, the Digital Economy Partnership Agreement, and others offer guidelines for trusted, safe, and secure networks. Development and export finance institutions of the United States and its allies should embed these principles in their financing operations. CSIS’s own criteria, the CSIS Criteria for Security and Trust in Telecommunications Networks and Services, also provides a foundation for shared principles and could complement the work of the Prague Proposals and the European Union’s 5G Toolbox. The criteria are designed to help governments and network owners and operators to determine trustworthiness and security. They provide a framework to assess potential suppliers and to implement domestic policies to safeguard telecommunications networks.</p> </li> <li> - <p>Testing and evaluating AI systems</p> + <p><strong>Maximize Coordination and Financial Resources among U.S. Agencies and Development Partners:</strong> With the infrastructure finance gap widening and need soaring, DFC, EXIM, and partner development finance and export credit agencies need to work through existing mechanisms such as IPEF, TIP, and the Quad to maximize funds and extend reach. Cofinancing is notoriously difficult, but examples exist in which partners have seen more success when making specific contributions amid a broader project lifecycle, rather than trying to provide general support. Agencies and countries have different strengths that can be applied at various stages. Pooling funds to target specific and focused investments are another way for partners to utilize capital on shared objectives and in regions of shared interest. For example, at the recent Indo-Pacific Business Forum (IPBF) in Singapore, member countries announced the IPEF Catalytic Capital Fund to support the expansion of a clean economy infrastructure project pipeline in the forum’s emerging and upper-middle-income economies. Australia, Japan, Korea, and the United States contributed $33 million in grant funding, with a goal to generate up to $3.3 billion in private investment.</p> </li> <li> - <p>Publishing AI safety standards and guidelines</p> + <p><strong>Reform or Expand EXIM’s CTEP to Support Partner Telecoms:</strong> As CSIS recommended in the report, “The U.S. EXIM Bank in an Age of Great Power Competition,” released this year, CTEP should be more flexible and should include companies interested in participating to be exempt from the EXIM policies that can limit investor competitiveness. EXIM so far has come up short in maximizing CTEP, hampered in part by its requirement to ensure that loans will have a “reasonable assurance of repayment” and its 2 percent loss default ratio cap. To prevent EXIM from self-selecting out of deals and to allow it to take on greater risk (and thus be more competitive), the default cap should be raised in critical industries or on projects that fall under the CTEP umbrella. In line with this, EXIM should lower content requirements for financing. This would allow more U.S. and partner-country companies working in complex supply chains to get more involved in building trusted networks. Some U.S. companies have no choice but to source from abroad, which limits their ability to qualify for EXIM financing. Reasonable conditions for dropping content requirements, particularly for the sake of competitiveness and the promotion of trusted vendors, would almost certainly help the CTEP pipeline and U.S. businesses. The world has changed dramatically in the last 40 years: most supply chains are now global, and competitive manufacturing is a worldwide enterprise. In the same report, CSIS highlighted the U.S. Government Accountability Office’s 2012 report stating that EXIM’s domestic content requirements were too stringent compared to those of other G7 export credit agencies.</p> </li> <li> - <p>Disseminating AISI research and guidelines to the public</p> + <p><strong>Focus Resources on Key Strategic Markets:</strong> The ITSI fund and other pledged financial commitments are too small given the necessary financing needed to address the digital infrastructure gap. Focusing these funds in geographies and on technologies in which markets and offerings such as ORAN can be piloted and tested would be a better way to provide proof of concept and could later attract further public funding and mobilize private sector capital. Simultaneously targeting a large market such as India or Indonesia, a medium-sized market such as Kenya or Brazil, and a smaller market such as the Pacific or the Caribbean would offer a way to test different geographies, legal and regulatory systems, and population needs. This would provide lessons on successes and obstacles, as well as a road map for scaling up or moving to similar markets.</p> </li> <li> - <p>Forming consortia of AI researchers, stakeholders, and experts</p> + <p><strong>Create Matchmaking Opportunities and Promote Alternatives:</strong> Host countries and local businesses should work through organized business forums and initiatives to solicit public and private sector funding. Initiatives like PGI and relevant government departments and agencies — such as the Department of Commerce, the Department of State, DFC, and EXIM — should work with local chambers of commerce and other business and trade organizations to establish such forums where they do not exist or strengthen those that do. An example to emulate is the recent IPBF that kicked off the Singapore IPEF Clean Economy Investor Forum. The forum acted as a matchmaker between investors and projects as well as a platform for sharing expertise and best practices in climate-related investments. The forum showcased $23 billion in sustainable infrastructure initiatives in IPEF-member economies — $6 billion of which belong to reportedly shovel-ready projects — to investors and interested governments.</p> </li> <li> - <p>Promoting the international adoption of AI safety guidelines</p> + <p><strong>Maintain Leadership on R&amp;D and Deployment:</strong> Nearly all initiatives and funds, including ITSI, have capacity building and technical assistance components. U.S. departments and agencies should offer training opportunities and foster an ecosystem of players involved in testing and integrating their interfaces and equipment, thus ensuring the openness and interoperability of ORAN solutions and other digital infrastructure efforts from trusted providers. This could build on some of the announced projects from the ITSI Fund, PGI, and IPEF, which include funding testing and integration centers, publishing reports and hosting conferences on proofs of concept, organizing workshops to develop and exchange ideas on new technologies, and helping operators test and verify the interoperability of ORAN equipment from different providers. This would be the first step in bringing down the costs of implementing ORAN and helping telecom companies scale their operations in this area.</p> </li> <li> - <p>Investigating infringements of domestic regulations</p> + <p><strong>Foster Accountability in Major Initiatives:</strong> The Quad, PGI, IPEF, and other initiatives have all announced major projects and deliverables at summits, conferences, and leader visits. While announcements are relatively easy, implementing projects and maintaining them amid changing political leadership is harder. An accountability tracker that measures the status of announcements and the impact of such initiatives should be put in place to ensure these projects get off the ground and that there is some way to measure if they are viable. This tracker will provide valuable data on government commitments, lessons learned, and the impact of projects on host communities.</p> </li> <li> - <p>Encouraging domestic innovation in AI</p> + <p><strong>Promote Good Governance and Transparent Regulatory Regimes:</strong> Businesses often cite corruption and the lack of regulatory transparency as major hindrances to investment in developing economies. Much of this governance work has been done in capacity building programs through USAID and in initiatives like IPEF. The Fair Economy pillar has made significant progress; in a June 2024 IPEF ministerial meeting in Singapore, members announced measures to provide technical assistance and capacity building for fighting financial crimes like money laundering and terrorism financing, promote inclusivity in law enforcement on anticorruption efforts, and develop and implement anticorruption policies and measures. Ongoing efforts at the government-to-government level, as well as engagement with the private sector, will build on this foundation to establish a better environment for high-quality projects.</p> </li> -</ol> +</ul> -<p>Table 2 demonstrates that most AISI network members will principally focus on the first seven of these nine functions, with notably only the European Union performing a regulatory role as part of the EU AI Office. This overlap between network members’ stated functions points to a strong basis for collaboration between AISIs.</p> +<h3 id="conclusion">Conclusion</h3> -<p>It also shows that some institutes have already begun to produce work related to their stated functions. Some deliverables predate the AISI, such as the Japanese Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry’s AI Business Guidelines, but have been incorporated and built upon by current AISI efforts. Others are novel efforts by institutes since their launch, such as the U.S. AISI’s guidance for Managing Misuse Risk for Dual-Use Foundation Models, and the UK AISI’s Inspect and Singapore’s Project Moonshot, two testing and evaluation toolkits for large language models (LLMs).</p> +<p>Countries across the globe are at an inflection point in deciding the course of digital infrastructure plans. Some are looking to emerging technologies, ensuring their digitalization plans take into account future developments and anticipate the necessary equipment, providers, and workforce. Others are working to ensure that rural communities are connected and can receive important services that foster economic and social development.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/CTxpjph.png" alt="image04" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Table 2: Overview of AISI Network Members’ Stated Functions.</strong> Source: Public statements from AISI network members and relevant government officials and bodies.</em></p> +<p>Regardless, any digital infrastructure plan must consider the importance of having a safe, secure, and trusted network. Short-term price and deployment considerations are important, but there are real long-term consequences to hosting personal, business, and government digital traffic on high-risk vendor equipment. The United States and its partners and allies must recognize the need for speed and affordability in host country decisionmaking and make the case that their provisions are a viable alternative. The foundation for doing so exists, but the road map calls for more focus and consistency, as well as further monitoring of results to track accountability and proof of concept.</p> -<p>It is worth noting, however, that while institutes share many similarities in funding, size, and functions, they are housed under different kinds of public bodies. Several institutes are located within government agencies focused on technological innovation and standards, including the U.S. National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST); the UK Department for Science, Innovation and Technology (DSIT); and the Japanese Information Technology Promotion Agency (IPA). Others are housed in government-funded research organizations, like the South Korean Electronics and Telecommunications Research Institute (ETRI) and the Singaporean Digital Trust Centre, itself a part of Nanyang Technological University. Finally, as Table 2 illustrates, the EU AI Office has the largest set of functions as an institution that promotes innovation, research, and regulatory compliance to the EU AI Act. The different kinds of home institutions in which AISIs are housed may have implications for the focus and capacity of different network members, and therefore the strengths that each member may bring to the network.</p> +<hr /> -<h3 id="questions-and-recommendations">QUESTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS</h3> +<p><strong>Erin Murphy</strong> is deputy director of Chair on India and Emerging Asia Economics and senior fellow of Emerging Asia Economics at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). She has spent her career in several public and private sector roles, including as an analyst on Asian political and foreign policy issues at the Central Intelligence Agency, director for the Indo-Pacific at the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation, founder and principal of her boutique advisory firm focused on Myanmar, and an English teacher with the Japan Exchange and Teaching (JET) Program in Saga, Japan.</p>Erin L. MurphyThe United States and its partners have the financial and technical tools to provide safer, cost-effective technology to help bridge the digital divide in the Global South, where competition for high-quality digital infrastructure plays into broader great power tensions.The West Must Stop Russia2024-11-04T12:00:00+08:002024-11-04T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/the-west-must-stop-russia<p><em>After more than a decade of the largest war in Europe since the Second World War, the West can no longer ignore the fact that the tipping point of the global balance of power lies in Ukraine.</em></p> -<p>Similarities between AISI network members in terms of funding, size, and stated functions are a strong foundation for international cooperation on AI safety. However, ensuring that the AISI International Network maintains momentum requires translating the high-level Seoul Statement into a concrete set of priorities, deliverables, and timelines. To do so, this paper poses the following nine questions and recommendations to network members:</p> +<excerpt /> -<h4 id="goals-of-collaboration-what-is-the-aisi-network-trying-to-achieve-and-when">Goals of Collaboration: What Is the AISI Network Trying to Achieve and When?</h4> +<p>While relentlessly pursuing its genocidal policy to destroy Ukraine as a nation and Ukrainians as a distinct national and ethnic group, Moscow has been pushing an international agenda of a “new world order” to replace the Western-led, rules-based system of international relations.</p> -<p><em>1. What areas of collaboration should the AISI network prioritize in the near term?</em></p> +<p>The West’s weak response to Russia’s threat to international peace has catalysed an imploding of the global security order. We are facing an emboldened Sino-Russian alliance which strongly believes there is a window of opportunity to gain the power to set the rules for a new, unfree world, ruled by force.</p> -<p><strong>Recommendation:</strong> The AISI International Network does not have the capacity or resources to effectively collaborate on every domain of AI safety. For some domains, such as sharing sensitive information about models, AISIs may even face legal limitations to collaboration. Rather than spreading finite resources thinly in an effort to achieve everything all at once, network members should first focus on executing a few specific projects well. These should be attainable in the near future to demonstrate continued momentum from the AI Seoul Summit.</p> +<p>Russia’s large-scale destruction of Ukraine is tangible evidence of how international peace can crumble in front of our eyes when rogue actors who seek to detonate it demonstrate more determination and resolve than those who purport to defend it. The free world’s demonstrable lack of resolute will to uphold international law is a major factor in the current global crisis and invites further chaos and violence.</p> -<p>When selecting priority areas, members should consider areas with the greatest overlap in AISI’s functions, capacity, and expertise, and deliverables that are both impactful and realistic. To start, they should establish a research agenda for the network’s technical and guidance safety work going forward. This will help to set the scope of the network’s efforts and to keep members on track as they and the network mature. As discussed in this paper’s recommendation to Question 3, the AISI network conference in November may be a good place to set and present this agenda to the public.</p> +<p>This historic moment calls for urgent revision of the current Western course of conspicuously inadequate actions to remove the threat of Russia as the linchpin of the anti-Western, anti-democratic axis. If the world is to avoid a new global conflict, Western policy must be refocused on a full commitment to defending the principles of the liberal rules-based order that is designed to make the world safer.</p> -<p>In the medium term, network members should look to develop a common, evidence-based approach to AISIs’ testing and evaluation methodologies. While not all AISIs may necessarily have the same requirements for assessing models, they should at least have a common understanding of what methodologies such as “red teaming” comprise. Developing a consensus on testing and evaluation methods would help to deconflict and de-duplicate efforts between AISIs and to facilitate other areas of collaboration in the future, such as promoting safety guidelines or developing joint evaluation tools. If the AISI network can start by ensuring that AISIs all speak the same language in AI safety, more elaborate collaboration projects can take place.</p> +<h3 id="the-russian-threat">The Russian Threat</h3> -<p><em>2. What deliverables should the AISI network aim to produce?</em></p> +<p>Vladimir Putin’s Russia is not just an existential threat to Ukraine. Russia’s aggressive, revanchist regime is the origin point of the international anti-Western axis. Just as at other critical moments in its history, Russia is once again redefining itself through confrontation with the West. Moscow is challenging Western primacy in international relations in order to reclaim its status of global power. For the Kremlin, the freedom to act above and outside the limits and restrictions of international law is the symbol of such supremacy.</p> -<p><strong>Recommendation:</strong> Although the AISI network is very new, members should still consider what the end products of their collaboration might be. One of the first deliverables that the network could produce is a clear statement of its intended goals, functions, research agenda, and mechanisms of collaboration that builds on the Seoul Statement. In as much detail as possible, the statement should articulate the mission of the network, its intended scope of work, and how it will relate to other international organizations working on AI. Network members may also consider developing a comprehensive list of the specific risks that they will test. This statement would not only help network members set the agenda for collaboration, but it would also help external governments and organizations to understand the value of the AISI network and how the network can support their efforts.</p> +<p>For the past two decades, the world has been observing an escalating “Russia crisis” – the critical threat posed by a criminal, militarised, totalitarian, aggressive, revanchist and genocidal regime to international peace. Rather than countering the growing threat, Western policy has relied on the “too big to fail” approach in dealing with Moscow. Consequently, Russia has largely enjoyed protection from the consequences of its criminal actions, and has been able to continue pursuing its nefarious strategic course.</p> -<p><em>3. What are some key dates for these deliverables?</em></p> +<p>Moscow’s goal is to replace the current liberal, rules-based international system with a “new world order”, where the role of the West is notably reduced. This was Vladimir Putin’s message in speeches given in 2014, 2023 and 2024.</p> -<p><strong>Recommendation:</strong> There are two big international events related to AI safety on the horizon that offer some initial deadlines for AISI network deliverables. First, the November 2024 San Francisco convening is an obvious date to publicly initiate international collaboration on AI safety. In September, the U.S. Department of Commerce and U.S. Department of State announced that “the goal of this convening is to kickstart the Network’s technical collaboration ahead of the AI Action Summit in Paris in February 2025,” starting with aligning “on priority work areas for the Network,” as the recommendation above supports. The February summit, therefore, is an important second date for network deliverables. The AI Action Summit will be the third of its kind since the UK AI Safety Summit last year and offers a high-profile, public venue in which to showcase the AISI network and its work. These two events — in November 2024 and February 2025 — are mere moments away in the context of international collaboration. If AISI members can capitalize on their opportunities, however, they could significantly contribute to the network’s mission of accelerating AI safety science.</p> +<p>In 2014, Putin made a threatening warning which made clear that Russia will have no limits in pursuing this goal:</p> -<h4 id="mechanisms-of-collaboration-what-will-the-aisi-network-do-and-how-will-it-work">Mechanisms of Collaboration: What Will the AISI Network Do and How Will It Work?</h4> +<blockquote> + <p>“… changes in the world order – and what we are seeing today are events on this scale – have usually been accompanied by, if not global war and conflict, then by chains of intensive local-level conflicts.”</p> +</blockquote> -<p><em>4. How will network members collaborate?</em></p> +<p>Russia’s hostile ambitions were spelled out formally when, in 2021, Moscow issued an ultimatum to NATO, publicly outlining its far-reaching demands for a dangerous level of influence over the eastern flank of the alliance.</p> -<p><strong>Recommendation:</strong> AISIs should aim to have a regular cadence of meetings, perhaps every six months, to sustain momentum and keep collaboration moving forward. AISIs could collaborate through any number of venues, including research exchanges, annual conferences, shared digital platforms, and more. Network members will likely use a mix of these and other venues in different combinations as the network matures over time. To start, research exchanges between AISIs may be one of the first mechanisms of collaboration given that it is relatively inexpensive.</p> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Western powers continue to treat Russia as a pillar of the strategic global balance, as a consequence of which their policy towards Russian aggression has been ultimately premised on Kyiv making concessions to Moscow</code></em></strong></p> -<p><em>5. Will network members specialize in their work, or will they share equal responsibilities?</em></p> +<p>Moscow’s determination to defy the West has been severely underestimated. The quest for a “new world order”, driven by the Sino-Russian alliance, is changing global dynamics. In essence, the new Eastern-led order is based on taking advantage of the globalised economy while destroying the liberal rules-based international order. Rogue regimes in Iran, North Korea, Syria, Venezuela and Belarus are being legitimised. The expanding BRICS group is building an alternative economic system of the “global majority” to provide shelter from Western sanctions and ensure global political dominance.</p> -<p><strong>Recommendation:</strong> It would be premature to assign specific responsibilities to AISI network members today given that most are only months old, if established at all. However, members should consider the benefits and drawbacks of different organizational structures as the network develops. Currently, AISI network members share equal responsibilities by default. While this can be useful for promoting equal participation and accountability from members, it can also add unnecessary costs to collaboration. If each member were to take charge on a different project, for instance, the network could risk losing time, capacity, and focus. This kind of structure could also place undue pressure on the capacity and expertise of each of the AISIs to contribute before they are ready.</p> +<p>To claim domination, the Sino-Russian alliance is committed to:</p> -<p>Instead, the AISI network may consider leveraging each member’s comparative advantages in expertise, capacity, and funding. Those that are most able to contribute to projects, for instance, should be able and incentivized to do so, as is discussed in Question 7. For now, more mature AISIs like those of the United States, the United Kingdom, and Singapore could have greater responsibilities within the network while other members, such as Kenya or Australia, contribute through more specialized ways. These roles could shift over time as AISIs mature, however.</p> +<ul> + <li> + <p>Advancing an international agenda of creating spheres of influence by instigating conflicts and chaos to fracture global solidarity.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Displacing the universal rules-based order through special bilateral arrangements that advance a global power alignment tilted towards their alliance, with Beijing being the biggest beneficiary.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Reversing humanity’s progress by challenging the universal nature of human rights and political freedoms.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Reducing the global domain of freedom by subverting democracies and by corrupting political and economic establishments to foment authoritarianism.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Diminishing the influence of Western democracies in international relations by subverting international organisations.</p> + </li> +</ul> -<p><em>6. Will the AI safety summits continue to serve as the principal international venue for AISIs and the AISI network?</em></p> +<p>The objective of the Sino-Russian strategy is a return to an inherently dangerous and divisive “might makes right” reality in international relations. While disguised as a universal order of sovereign and equal states, such a system defies the equal application of international law to exempt the great powers from any restrictions imposed by universal rules.</p> -<p><strong>Recommendation:</strong> Since the first AISIs were announced at Bletchley Park in November 2023, AISIs have been closely tied to the AI safety summits. However, the summit series is steadily shifting its focus from AI safety to AI adoption and innovation; in May, the AI Seoul Summit placed AI innovation and inclusiveness firmly on the agenda. The next summit, the AI Action Summit in February 2025, will reportedly include AI safety as only one of five topic areas.</p> +<p>The new Eastern-led order will privilege major international actors with influence and power to coerce smaller countries. While talking about “multipolarity” and “multilateralism”, both Moscow and Beijing share the position of denying smaller countries equal standing in international relations. This essence of the “new order” is illustrated perfectly by the policy of the anti-Western axis towards Ukraine, which promotes and serves Russian interests.</p> -<p>Nevertheless, a shift in focus does not mean that summits are not a good international venue for AISIs and the AISI network. In fact, it may make it an even better venue for helping to shift the rhetoric around AI safety from “doom and gloom” to “safety for trust, adoption, and innovation” — a far more politically salient message. This paper therefore recommends that AISIs and the AISI network continue to use the AI safety summits as a high-profile international venue for their efforts for as long as the summit series continues.</p> +<h3 id="the-wests-self-defeating-russia-policy">The West’s Self-Defeating Russia Policy</h3> -<p><em>7. What will the network’s leadership and voting structure look like?</em></p> +<p>At its core, Western Russia policy – especially since Vladimir Putin’s revanchist speech at the 2007 Munich Security Conference – has been mostly focused on global strategic stability.</p> -<p><strong>Recommendation:</strong> Currently, the AISI network has a horizontal leadership and consensus or opt-in only voting structure by default. Given that the Seoul Statement makes no indication of leadership and voting structure, however, network members are open to consider different possibilities and their trade-offs. For example, a consensus-based structure can help to foster good intentions for international cooperation, but it can also make it challenging to take meaningful collective action. Similarly, having just one member serve as a leader may seem unfair, but a rotating leadership structure can be ineffectual and prioritize the interests of that country (or bloc) for that period.</p> +<p>The US’s reset of relations with Russia after the latter’s 2008 war on Georgia ushered in a period of a doomed appeasement strategy. Instead of taming Moscow’s aggression by firmly upholding international law, Putin’s quest to satisfy revanchist “grievances” was tolerated. This policy resulted in destructive consequences for the world. An emboldened Kremlin unleashed disinformation, interference, corruption, subversion and violence on a scale which affects the entire trajectory of global affairs.</p> -<p>The network’s leadership and voting structures need not be zero sum, however. In the long run, members’ representation within the network should be proportionate to their contributions; those that invest more time, money, expertise, and resources should be rewarded with a greater say in its direction. This means that the U.S. and UK AISIs would likely be rewarded with leadership of the network due to their organizational capacity. The United States, for its part, should aspire to lead the AISI network, as discussed in the third section of this paper. Rather than merely insisting on leading, however, it should commit the resources and time that positions it to deserve to lead. Leadership should be earned based on the scale of meaningful contributions to the field of AI safety science, a structure that also incentivizes on other network members to participate and invest more into AI safety and the AISI network as well.</p> +<p>Russia’s war on Ukraine has been the main point of its attack on international peace and security in its efforts to re-establish global dominance.</p> -<h4 id="international-strategy-how-will-the-aisi-network-fit-into-and-engage-with-other-international-ai-efforts">International Strategy: How Will the AISI Network Fit into and Engage with Other International AI Efforts?</h4> +<p>From the beginning of Russia’s illegal and unprovoked war of aggression on Ukraine in 2014, the West misdefined this interstate war as a “Ukraine crisis” to diminish the international threat of an aggressive Russia. The horrific images of Moscow’s 2022 large-scale offensive and consequent massacres of Ukrainian civilians forced Western leaders to face the grim reality of the actual “Russia crisis”. Now, in 2024, there is finally a growing understanding that Moscow is using its war against Ukraine as a system-changing conflict within a global confrontation driven by the Sino-Russian alliance to bring down the Western-led rules based order.</p> -<p><em>8. How will the network be different from and engage with other international organizations working on AI issues, such as the ISO, G7, United Nations, GPAI, or OECD?</em></p> +<p>Despite committing grave violations of international law and undermining world peace, Russia has largely enjoyed protection from the consequences of its criminal actions. At the same time, Ukraine – the victim of Russia’s unprovoked and illegal aggression – has been bound hand and foot in exercising its legal right to self-defence.</p> -<p><strong>Recommendation:</strong> Just as one of the objectives of the AISI network is to avoid duplicating work between AISIs, the network itself should avoid duplicating the work of other international organizations. Considering how the AISI network will fit into the broader landscape of these organizations from the start will help members think more strategically about what role this forum plays on the global AI governance stage.</p> +<p>Russia – a country with nuclear capabilities and an army, territory and economy many times larger than that of Ukraine – continues to be shielded from concerted international action to counteract its genocidal war of aggression, while Ukraine – a country which gave up its nuclear weapons in exchange for security – has been struggling to receive sufficient international support to defend itself against genocide and safeguard international principles that benefit all.</p> -<p>To do this, the AISI network should emphasize its unique position to provide technical expertise and capacity to governments working on wider AI governance efforts. In the past year alone, numerous government initiatives have been launched to ensure responsible frontier AI development, including the Biden administration’s AI executive order, the EU AI Act, the G7 Hiroshima AI Process Code of Conduct, and the March 2024 UN resolution on AI. These initiatives, though commendable, are often staffed by diplomats who lack the depth of in-house technical expertise that the AISI network has demonstrated an ability to amass. It is this expertise that could turn what are currently high-level principles and frameworks into practical implementation for developers.</p> +<p>The inept international response to Russia’s war against Ukraine exposes the grotesque design of the international security system. Eight decades on from the Dumbarton Oaks Conference, the peace and security of humanity is still at the mercy of the two totalitarian, genocidal regimes in Moscow and Beijing, and critically depends on the political resolve in three Western capitals – Washington, London and Paris. In Ukraine’s case, the political position in Berlin also bears influence, considering Germany’s important role in the EU and NATO.</p> -<p>For instance, the G7’s code of conduct instructs developers to “identify, evaluate, and mitigate risks across the AI lifecycle,” but provides little guidance as to how. While the G7 has partnered with the OECD to develop this level of specificity for the code of conduct, it would greatly benefit from the testing and evaluation tools that the Seoul Statement names as one of the potential areas for collaboration within the AISI International Network. Network members should consider how to engage with other international organizations’ AI efforts with these synergies in mind.</p> +<p>Western powers continue to treat Russia as a pillar of the strategic global balance. It is as a direct consequence of this radically flawed approach that Western policy towards Russian aggression has been ultimately premised on Kyiv making concessions to Moscow.</p> -<p><em>9. Will the network remain a closed group of high-capacity countries, or will it be open to any country that wants to join?</em></p> +<p>From 2014, Russian interests were accommodated by ever-shifting Western red lines on the invasion; by the position of there being “no military solution” to the conflict which invited bolder Russian aggression; by Washington’s “leading from behind” to avoid a more active role in fulfilling its obligations under the Budapest Memorandum; by symbolic sanctions incommensurate with Moscow’s transgressions; by the Berlin- and Paris-mediated “peace process” which implied concessions from Ukraine by design; and by the policy of “de-escalation” which denied military assistance for Ukraine to mount an effective defence.</p> -<p><strong>Recommendation:</strong> The AISI International Network was born out of recognition that AI risks do not stop at national borders. It therefore makes sense that the network should be open to more members that want to join. A wider membership would help to build international agreement on AI safety science and potentially to continue to reach economies of scale on AI safety institutes. Furthermore, incorporating more developing countries’ perspectives early on — either through full membership or agreements — could bring new insight into AI safety risks that current AISI network members and their companies may have missed.</p> +<p>While Western support for Ukraine has dramatically increased since 2022, when Russia’s role as the aggressor was finally recognised by the UN, the policy approach has remained stuck in the logic that “Russia is too big to fail”.</p> -<p>However, network members will have to consider the serious trade-offs between expanding the network’s membership and diluting its current nimbleness and consensus as a small group. Even countries or blocs that are closely aligned in values to current members may lack the technical expertise to meaningfully contribute to the network, thus raising the costs of collaboration and possibly reducing its impact.</p> +<p>All the major points of Western policy, such as the refusal to deploy NATO troops in Ukraine; the limitations on the use of Western-supplied weapons to strike military targets in Russian territory (and for some, even in Ukraine’s Crimea); and statements like “Russia cannot win in Ukraine”, “we will support Ukraine for as long as it takes”, “we must help Ukraine to strengthen its position at the negotiating table” or “Ukraine will be able to join NATO after winning the war” reflect the underlying reality that Russia’s interests, however illegitimate, play a weighty role in Western decision-making.</p> -<p>One way to address this could be requiring prospective members to demonstrate their ability to meaningfully contribute to the network — such as through a minimum degree of expertise and capacity — before they can join. The purpose here is not to make the AISI network into an elite club, but to recognize that the network’s goal of accelerating AI safety science cannot be realistically achieved by expanding membership to everyone who wants it. The AISI network could consider partnership programs with other international organizations like GPAI, the OECD, or the Group of 20 (G20) in order to collaborate with interested countries that do not necessarily have the depth of AI safety expertise to join the network. Such partnerships could help to foster wider international cooperation on AI safety and engage more developing countries on the AISI network’s efforts in particular.</p> +<p>Instead of fully committing to helping Kyiv repel Russian aggression, the West chose to pursue “escalation management”, enabling Moscow to wreak havoc in Ukraine and largely protecting Russia from the war.</p> -<h3 id="conclusion">CONCLUSION</h3> +<p>The limited support for Ukraine makes clear that the West never truly had a strategy for Russia’s defeat – which would entail complete unconditional withdrawal of Russian military formations from all of Ukraine, the renunciation of Moscow’s territorial claims, justice for war criminals, and reparations. Without Russia’s defeat, there cannot be a Ukrainian victory, only de facto or de jure concessions by Kyiv.</p> -<p>The AISI International Network marks a significant next step in global AI safety efforts. The network provides an opportunity to build international consensus on definitions, procedures, and best practices around AI safety; reach economies of scale in AI safety research; and extend U.S. leadership in international AI governance. The similarities between currently established AISIs in terms of size, funding, and functions provide a strong basis for cooperation, though network members must be aware of the different institutions in which different AISIs are housed.</p> +<p>A defeated Russia is an infinitely lesser threat than an undefeated Russia. Sacrificing Ukraine will not solve the problem of the aggressive, revanchist, totalitarian Russian state. If the black hole of Putin’s Russia swallows Ukraine, it will increase its gravitational pull. The West will face the consequences of the new global power re-alignment, consisting first and foremost of Sino-Russian domination in Europe.</p> -<p>While the Seoul Statement is a good start for multilateralizing cooperation between AISIs, network members must now decide how to turn intent into action. At the November convening in San Francisco, they should strive to set the network’s goals, mechanisms, and international strategy in preparation for the AI Action Summit in February 2025. In doing so, they must ask tough questions, including about priorities, leadership, and membership.</p> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">The West’s obsessive and unjustifiable avoidance of confrontation with Russia in fact increases the risk of direct engagement becoming the only option</code></em></strong></p> -<hr /> +<p>In fact, by refusing to shoot down Russian missiles and drones in NATO airspace; by refusing to implement a humanitarian military mission to protect Ukraine’s civilian infrastructure, especially its nuclear power plants; by drip-feeding military aid to Kyiv, withholding critically needed weapons and imposing restrictions on Ukrainian strikes against Russia; by stalling on NATO membership for Ukraine; and by accepting China’s say on the security of Europe, the West – and the US in particular – has already manifestly relinquished its leadership role in international relations.</p> -<p><strong>Gregory C. Allen</strong> is the director of the Wadhwani AI Center at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C.</p> +<p>The self-defeating policy of risk aversion has also severely damaged the credibility of NATO’s own deterrence. NATO is projecting the image of a panic room, not that of an actionable force capable of providing security – even for its own members.</p> -<p><strong>Georgia Adamson</strong> is a research associate with the Wadhwani AI Center at CSIS.</p>Gregory C. Allen and Georgia AdamsonThe AI Seoul Summit launched an international network of AI safety institutes in May 2024. Now, they must work to define their goals, mechanisms, and the strategy to accelerate AI safety science.Stay Ahead2024-10-29T12:00:00+08:002024-10-29T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/stay-ahead<p><em>This report gives recommendations on export controls, global tech governance, domestic incentives for building tech capabilities in chips and clean technologies, and the future of international tech cooperation and competition.</em></p> +<h3 id="the-cost-of-inertia-is-rapidly-rising">The Cost of Inertia is Rapidly Rising</h3> -<excerpt /> +<p>The alarming lack of resolute political will in Western capitals to uphold the fundamental rules of global security is giving oxygen to Russia’s and its anti-Western allies’ ambition to reshape our world according to their oppressive vision.</p> -<h3 id="introduction">INTRODUCTION</h3> +<p>The West cannot isolate itself from the outcome of Russia’s war. This is no longer about “helping Ukraine”, but about the responsibility of Western governments to their own citizens to ensure a peaceful future.</p> -<p><strong><em>Resolving the Emerging Economic Security Trilemma</em></strong></p> +<p>The West’s obsessive and unjustifiable avoidance of confrontation with Russia in fact increases the risk of direct engagement becoming the only option. For now, while the Ukrainian army maintains high combat readiness, NATO countries can still avoid a direct face-off with Russia by deploying their troops away from the frontline to help Ukraine protect civilian areas and critical infrastructure and deter invasion from Belarus or, potentially, Russia-occupied Transnistria in Moldova if Russia succeeds in subverting the pro-Western course of Chișinău.</p> -<p>The United States is in the midst of a generational shift in economic policy and its role in national security planning. Even in these polarized times, there is surprising consensus across the American political spectrum that the economic policies and global institutions fostered since World War II are no longer adequate. They have left the United States vulnerable to competition with non-market actors, principally China; domestic economic dislocations; and global crises such as climate change and pandemics. These vulnerabilities persist and will await the next administration.</p> +<p>With North Korea sending troops to fight Ukraine, the West’s response to Russia’s war is a watershed moment for the future of humanity. Ukrainians shouldn’t be fighting alone to defend the rules-based order. Not fighting alongside Ukraine means helping Russia to achieve its nefarious goals.</p> -<p>Global technology competition continues to gather pace. Earlier this year, U.S. secretary of commerce Gina Raimondo compared the contemporary chips race to the space race of the 1960s: a new Sputnik moment. Indeed, we may be living through five Sputnik moments at the same time across semiconductors, artificial intelligence (AI), quantum computing, climate technologies, and biotechnologies. Losing our edge in any one of these areas – especially, the triad of chips, AI, and quantum – could meaningfully diminish the United States’ economic prospects and national security. As Darío Gil, chair of the National Science Board and senior vice president and director at IBM Research, noted at the board’s 490th Meeting, “science and technology are the new currency of global power.”</p> +<p>If the West fails to defend the universality of the values of freedom and justice in Ukraine, it will eventually find itself in the role of the global “minority”, while the Sino-Russian alliance will be legitimised as the voice of the “global majority” and proceed to impose its will over the entirety of the international system.</p> -<p>Staying ahead of the technology race is more challenging than ever. The United States and its allies must contend with a primary competitor that uses its scale and prowess to weaponize innovation, flout fair competition, exercise control over vital value chains, and engage in economic coercion. Meanwhile, China continues to reap the benefits of having played the long game with countries around the world, particularly in the Global South. At stake for the United States and its allies is their long-term prosperity, the resilience and security of their markets and democracies, and the rules-based economic order they fostered for three generations.</p> +<p>The free world urgently needs leadership from both sides of the Atlantic to safeguard the vision of the rules-based order, where countries are protected from spheres of influence and oppressive domination. Rogue states breaking the foundational rules of global security and peace must face a commensurate response. The world needs united and devoted action to save Ukraine in order to save the world.</p> -<p>As these realities have come into clearer view in recent years, the past two U.S. administrations have put their respective stamps – in design and tenor – on “economic security,” rewriting the implicit contract between governments and markets. Under the Biden administration, U.S. economic security policy evolved dramatically in pursuit of competitiveness, resilience, and national security goals. G7 and other allies followed suit, with policymakers in Japan and the European Union codifying formal economic security frameworks, creating mandates within their respective governments, and developing similar policies.</p> +<hr /> -<p>The United States, in pursuit of competitiveness and resilience goals, has implemented promote measures entailing unprecedented public and private investments in reviving U.S. chipmaking and building capabilities across clean tech and other technologies. A second set of measures has sought to align competitiveness and national security goals by protecting technologies and markets by expanding export controls, sanctions, and investment screening, as well as a continuation of strategic tariffs. A third, in part to counter China, has involved plurilateral economic cooperation agreements with partners on supply chain resilience and the energy transition, as well as bilateral initiatives on technology innovation.</p> +<p><strong>Volodymyr Ohryzko</strong> is Director of the Centre for Russian Studies in Ukraine. He was the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine from 2007-2009 and the Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Ukraine to Austria from 1999-2004.</p> -<p>Early implementation has shown signs of industrial revival across the United States: private sector investment commitments – domestic and foreign – in strategic sectors such as chips, clean power, clean-tech manufacturing, and others totaled over $900 billion over the past four years. And protect measures such as export controls have blunted Chinese and Russian acquisition of dual-use technologies. And yet, implemenation challenges have emerged, along with second-order effects.</p> +<p><strong>Roman Sohn</strong> is an international law expert and researcher on the Russian war on Ukraine and Russia’s genocide against Ukrainians.</p> -<p>While export controls on Russia degraded Putin’s war machine in the early days, their efficacy has been tested by transshipment from third countries and Russia’s continued reliance on Chinese chips and chipmaking materials. Similarly, while new U.S. export controls initiated in 2022 and 2023 blunted China’s access to sensitive AI chips, Beijing has responded with its own industrial policies to “design out” and circumvent U.S. controls and standards. It has also enacted tit-for-tat trade restrictions on processed critical minerals – a key chokepoint in the chips and electric vehicle value chains.</p> +<p><strong>Ariana Gic</strong> is the Director of the Direct Initiative International Centre for Ukraine and a Senior Advisor at the Centre for Eastern European Democracy. Ms Gic is sanctioned by the Russian Federation.</p>Volodymyr Ohryzko, et al.After more than a decade of the largest war in Europe since the Second World War, the West can no longer ignore the fact that the tipping point of the global balance of power lies in Ukraine.SIFMANet Pretoria Report2024-11-01T12:00:00+08:002024-11-01T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/sifmanet-pretoria-report<p><em>This report details the roundtable discussions in Pretoria to share views on South African policy relating to the sanctions on Russia and Belarus, as well as other issues of financial integrity.</em></p> -<p>Tensions between the protect, promote, and partner strategies have emerged, particularly regarding the use of subsidies, tax breaks, and domestic sourcing requirements aimed at promoting U.S. chipmaking and clean technologies. These policies have sparked concerns among key allies – Japan, South Korea, and the European Union – over a subsidy race that could disadvantage their own industries. Similarly, the U.S. government has led efforts to engage partners via new economic cooperation agreements such as the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF) and the Americas Partnership for Economic Prosperity (APEP). These agreements, however, do not come with either increased market access or meaningful financing benefits that partners seek, in part due to U.S. domestic political considerations. These do not fare well relative to China’s long-term play in the Global South, notwithstanding concerns about the Belt and Road Initiative’s flaws, including debt overhang and poor standards in some countries.</p> +<excerpt /> -<p>Given these limitations, the bigger question is whether the promote-protect-partner framework adds up to a long-term economic security strategy. The answer to that question will depend on how effectively the next administration navigates the emerging “economic security policy trilemma.” While not quite an impossible trinity, the trilemma means that policymakers will be able to pursue any two sets of measures (for example, promoting domestic industries and protecting dual-use technologies) but not without sacrificing the third (for example, deep integration with supply chain partners). This collection of essays from leading experts at CSIS’s newly formed Economic Security and Technology Department is our contribution to this debate.</p> +<p>In mid-September 2024, the Centre for Finance and Security (CFS) at RUSI, with the support of the South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA), hosted a roundtable in Pretoria. The roundtable provided a forum for private and public sector participants, including banks and government departments (as detailed below), to share views on South African policy relating to the sanctions levied by G7 states on Russia and Belarus, as well as other issues of financial integrity. Identities of participants are confidential.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/zr0zDJW.png" alt="image01" /> -<em>▲ <strong>An Emerging Economic Security Trilemma.</strong> Source: Author’s own creation.</em></p> +<p>This roundtable was accompanied by a series of additional meetings in Johannesburg and Cape Town with representatives from the financial services industry, academics, policy analysts and government stakeholders, covering expertise in foreign policy, financial services regulation, and sanctions and compliance. These included, among others, the South African Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO), the South African Reserve Bank (SARB), the State Security Agency (SSA) and the Financial Intelligence Centre (FIC). This event is part of the in-country engagements conducted by the CFS-led Sanctions and the Illicit Finance Monitoring and Analysis Network (SIFMANet), supported by the National Endowment for Democracy.</p> -<p>An immediate priority is to assess the impact of protect measures such as export controls, sanctions, investment screening, and strategic tariffs, including their second-order effects. Greg Allen and Barath Harithas underscore the importance of building the capabilities of the Department of Commerce and related departments. But that alone will not be enough: the United States must work effectively with allies, as James Andrew Lewis argues, on forging a post–Wassenaar Arrangement technology alliance with meaningful European and Asian buy-in. At some point, though, Scott Kennedy warns, the administration’s use of defensive measures will stretch the United States’ ability to militate the rules-based economic order that it has fostered for decades.</p> +<p>Participants in the discussions fell into two general categories, which steered the conversations in the following ways:</p> -<p>Ultimately, the most critical long-term path for the United States is to out-innovate China across advanced technologies. The CHIPS and Science Act as well as Inflation Reduction Acts put in place a number of building blocks of a strategy – investments in industrial infrastructure, research and development (R&amp;D), and the workforce; a creative capital and investment attraction program; and partnerships with supply chain partners. As Sujai Shivakumar notes, the United States will need to finish the swing with investments in technology clusters and R&amp;D cooperation that will require a sustained bipartisan effort to bear fruit. Adam Frost calls for a national security–focused approach to directing U.S. government financing in critical and emerging technologies. In addition, Joseph Majkut highlights the need for technology enablers such as access to clean power, along with a large transmission infrastructure, to fuel AI and advanced manufacturing.</p> +<ol> + <li> + <p>Academics and policy analysts: South Africa has limited direct trade with Russia, but for many reasons the political relationship is stronger than the figures imply. As a result, many representatives of the academic and policy research communities have travelled to Russia since 2022 to attend trade fairs and other economic and political events. These participants tended to focus on local policymaking sovereignty and political matters, rather than assessing South Africa’s position on Russia sanctions.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Financial services: Many participants in the meetings worked in compliance and legal functions in banks, or in supervisory and regulatory roles relating to the sector. In contrast to the academics and policy analysts, these participants expressed considerable concern about the need to balance international regulators’ and banking partners’ expectations against South Africa’s policy of neutrality, non-alignment and multilateralism.</p> + </li> +</ol> -<p>Promote tools alone are limited: innovation does not happen in isolation, not to mention the cost of promote tools to the taxpayer amid already unprecedented levels of federal debt. Rather the time- and stress-tested drivers of innovation are competition in secure, trusted international technology markets and cooperation with allies, including on research and development and supply chains. Strong enforcement of intellectual property rights, Kirti Gupta argues, is essential if innovators are to enter markets. Given the global and distributed nature of technology value chains (from base materials to end products), Ilaria Mazzocco reminds us of the productivity benefits that will accrue to U.S. clean tech firms that take risks, compete in global markets, and integrate into value chains.</p> +<p>As a result, the discussions covered a wide range of topics, but generally were concerned thematically with how South Africa can create its own independent diplomatic and political path while also benefiting from cooperation with competing great powers.</p> -<p>Nowhere are competitive markets and a favorable investment climate more important than in the Global South. Without meaningful market access or substantial financing commitments, Bill Reinsch and Erin Murphy argue, agreements such as IPEF are unlikely to attract long-term buy-in from partners. As a reminder of what is possible, Rick Rossow points out that the U.S.-India commercial partnership, including its focus on chips, critical minerals, and other critical and emerging technologies, could prove pivotal for both countries, with potential spillovers for others.</p> +<h3 id="non-alignment-and-the-material-consequences-of-sanctions">Non-alignment and the Material Consequences of Sanctions</h3> -<p>We are well into the era of economic security. The need for an allied approach is now axiomatic, but it will require the United States to lead and partner in equal measures. The challenge for the next administration is to build on the early lessons of recent years and devise a long-term, bipartisan economic security strategy that balances domestic goals with international cooperation and the complexities of the global markets.</p> +<p>Participants’ initial reactions to engagement regarding sanctions focused on South Africa’s policies of multilateralism and neutrality. The government’s policy is to enforce only UN sanctions, rejecting what it sees as unilaterally applied restrictive measures on Russia and Belarus. As one government representative put it: “We value our relations with our partners whether it’s where the sun rises or where the sun sets.”</p> -<h2 id="protecting-sensitive-technologies-preserving-us-advantage">Protecting Sensitive Technologies, Preserving U.S. Advantage</h2> +<p>Participants frequently referred to the theoretical dimensions of the fallout of this stance, and a sense of being stuck in the middle between fighting factions. A failure to apply sanctions would worsen relationships with the G7, while applying them would cause political (if not trading) difficulties with Russia. “Being forced to choose sides between Russia and the West – this is not something we should be asked to do”, one academic participant noted. Several participants described the situation as similar to Cold War-era divisions. As a result, some noted that government decisions are rooted at times not in a policy’s merit, but its perceived geopolitical alignment.</p> -<h3 id="mismatch-of-strategy-and-budgets-in-ai-chip-export-controls">Mismatch of Strategy and Budgets in AI Chip Export Controls</h3> +<p>At the same time, private sector participants noted that South Africa’s historically close ties to Russia had led some leaders to make statements that undermined its neutral position. According to one participant, “sometimes what comes out of politicians’ mouths is not non-alignment, and that does affect perceptions of the country”.</p> -<blockquote> - <h4 id="gregory-c-allen">Gregory C. Allen</h4> -</blockquote> +<p>The conversation then focused on sanctions’ effects in South Africa, with participants highlighting numerous developmental dilemmas that South African policymakers face. For example, government representatives cited the need for economic growth and new jobs for a growing and ambitious population, with one saying, “we would like to see a safer Africa in a better world that is peaceful”.</p> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Regardless of who wins the November 2024 election, export control represents a great deal of unfinished business for the next presidential administration to take on.</code></em></strong></p> +<p>Academic participants noted the developmental impact of the sanctions, highlighting the timing immediately following the Covid-19 pandemic. They noted the inflationary pressures and resulting interest rate increases, which one participant observed “led to a significant effect on the masses, particularly on the poor indebted”. Another academic agreed, highlighting the sanctions’ impact on the “debt crisis in the African continent”.</p> -<p>Two dates from 2022 are likely to echo in geopolitical history. The first, Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine on February 24, hardly needs further explanation. The second is one that many Americans may not recognize. On October 7, 2022, the U.S. Department of Commerce issued new export control regulations that placed a de facto ban on U.S. sales to China of the most advanced computer chip hardware that powers modern artificial intelligence (AI) models.</p> +<p>Another issue discussed was energy, with one policy analyst noting that South Africa is likely to face a gas crisis after 2026. Gazprom, they said, was one solution to this issue. Other participants saw opportunities for building stronger intra-African supply chains, rather than relying on imports from other continents. Fertiliser and energy were cited as areas where this had been discussed.</p> -<p>The United States and China agree that leadership in AI technology is critical to the future of military power. For years, Chinese government and military procurement records openly advertised the desire for U.S. chips to power Chinese AI surveillance systems and new AI military supercomputing facilities. Since more than 90 percent of AI chips used in Chinese data centers are designed by U.S. semiconductor companies and are therefore subject to U.S. export controls, loss of access to the U.S. chip market could put China’s entire future as an AI superpower in jeopardy.</p> +<p>Participants also assessed the importance of engaging with G7 countries on these material and developmental impacts of sanctions. In addition to emphasising the country’s overall policy of multilateralism, it may be important to identify the problematic consequences of sanctions in South Africa and seek potential diplomatic solutions that would ease these effects.</p> -<p>Grand historical turning points rarely take the form of long bureaucratic documents, but the October 7 export controls were one of those rare times. Ten days after the new regulations came out, Secretary of State Antony Blinken said: “We are at an inflection point. The post–Cold War world has come to an end, and there is an intense competition underway to shape what comes next. And at the heart of that competition is technology.”</p> +<h3 id="using-other-financial-crime-compliance-tools-to-address-sanctions-risks">Using Other Financial Crime Compliance Tools to Address Sanctions Risks</h3> -<p>Blinken is right. Even though the October 7 export controls were in many ways narrowly targeted on only the most advanced AI chips and chipmaking tools, as a whole, the policy marked a major reversal of over 25 years of trade and technology policy toward China in at least three ways.</p> +<p>Participants from the banking sector said they lacked detailed guidance from the government to support them with their concerns about international regulators’ and business partners’ sanctions compliance expectations. The conversations took on greater urgency because of the greylisting of South Africa by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) in February 2023, as a result of which South Africa began work on a 22-point mutually agreed Action Plan to address the deficiencies identified by FATF. Private sector participants worried that the country’s financial crime reputation would be further hampered if secondary sanctions were placed on a South African bank, and/or if correspondent banks – those global banks that connect South African banks to the international financial system – were no longer willing to process transactions with the country’s financial institutions as a result of perceived sanctions circumvention risks.</p> -<p>First, the controls were targeted at multiple chokepoints across the semiconductor supply chain, blocking sales not only of the advanced AI chips being used by the Chinese military but also the advanced software and equipment required to make them. The United States is trying to ensure that China cannot replace what the United States is no longer willing to sell.</p> +<p>Representatives from South Africa’s supervisory and regulatory bodies agreed that, because the stated policy was one of neutrality, they were unable to provide detailed guidance for complying with G7 sanctions. However, many of these representatives also emphasised the importance of ensuring other financial crime controls were robust in order to mitigate some aspects of sanctions risks and concerns. They felt that some of South Africa’s improvements to meet the FATF Action Plan agenda – particularly around identifying beneficial ownership – would also improve banks’ ability to manage sanctions risk. To that end, South Africa updated its beneficial ownership regime in 2023. SARB has recently imposed administrative penalties on some banks and insurance companies for failures in relation to beneficial owner identification and other financial crime deficiencies, measures that should lead to great focus on these issues across the regulated sector.</p> -<p>Second, the export controls apply on a geographic basis for China as a whole, not just to the Chinese military. That is a response to China’s strategy of military-civil fusion, which has worked to deepen and obscure the linkages between China’s commercial technology companies and China’s military.</p> +<p>Terrorism financing (TF) and proliferation finance (PF) were also highlighted as areas of concern, with representatives from financial regulators highlighting the results of the June 2024 Terror Financing National Risk Assessment (known as the TF NRA). The TF NRA primarily focused on Islamic State and right-wing terrorism, rather than the activities of Wagner Group or other Russian-backed military groups. However, representatives from the supervisory authorities said that “the financial aspect of foreign military training” had been taken into consideration in the TF NRA.</p> -<p>Third, previous U.S. export controls were designed to allow China to progress technologically but to restrict the pace so that the United States and its allies retained a durable lead. The new policy, by contrast, in some cases aims to actively degrade China’s technological capabilities. Without access to the United States’ enabling technology, many leading Chinese semiconductor firms have been set back years.</p> +<p>Participants noted the potential overlap between the TF and PF regimes, on one hand, and the Russia sanctions regimes, on the other. They noted similarities to the May 2024 Mutual Evaluation Report for Jersey, released by the Council of Europe’s permanent monitoring body, the Committee of Experts on the Evaluation of Anti-Money Laundering Measures and the Financing of Terrorism (MONEYVAL). The evaluation reported few TF and PF regimes in relation to UN sanctions, but highlighted the significant action undertaken by the Jersey authorities on Russia sanctions implementation, which assured assessors that the relevant systems and controls are in place.</p> -<p>It took a long time for the United States to get here. After decades of ratcheting Chinese government provocations, the Biden administration basically said, “enough is enough.”</p> +<p>Participants from government bodies also discussed the closer relationship between the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) and Russia, and the potential conventional weapons and nuclear weapons proliferation implications of that relationship. One participant asked, “Do you start coming to Russia sanctions through DPRK or vice versa?”, suggesting that the growing nexus between Russia and the DPRK, in breach of UN Security Council sanctions on the DPRK, might play a future role in assessing South Africa’s response to Russia sanctions. Reflecting this perspective, participants said that South African government bodies responsible for counter-proliferation controls had become more active recently, but that they needed to widen their focus: “They’re looking at a very narrow aspect of PF, so we need to refresh the PF risk assessments.”</p> -<p>This is not a policy of decoupling (yet), but it is proof of the United States’ unwillingness to remain tightly coupled to the Chinese technology sector under previous conditions. Subsequent policies, such as the Treasury Department’s outbound investment restrictions on China’s AI and semiconductor industries, hint at the United States’ desire for more comprehensive economic security and technology.</p> +<p>Nonetheless, both private and public sector representatives accepted that banks’ focus on beneficial ownership, as well as improving their TF and PF controls, would not solve their geopolitical dilemma. “The implications of things that are not [UN Security Council-endorsed] sanctions would be a problem for us to manage”, a government representative said.</p> -<p>But there is a critical gap between the strategic importance and sophistication of the policy’s design and the resources that the government is allocating to enforce it.</p> +<h3 id="secondary-sanctions-and-correspondent-banking-relationships">Secondary Sanctions and Correspondent Banking Relationships</h3> -<p>The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) at the U.S. Department of Commerce is the agency charged with enforcing export controls, not just on semiconductors bound for China but for all U.S. dual-use technology exports that might end up in Russia, Iran, North Korea, or other restricted destinations. To implement its work overseeing trillions of dollars in economic activity and policing smuggling operations worldwide, BIS has fewer than 600 employees and a relatively paltry budget of just under $200 million. Semiconductors are just one technology category out of hundreds that this organization is responsible for enforcing.</p> +<p>While needing to balance these policy concerns, banks said they were aware of the sanctions risks and demonstrated their commitment to improving their controls in order to maintain strong relationships with overseas partners.</p> -<p>Reporting by The Information found at least eight Chinese AI chip-smuggling networks, with each engaging in transactions valued at more than $100 million. China is betting that its network of smugglers and shell companies can find the leaks in the BIS export control enforcement barrier. As long as Congress continues to neglect BIS by providing grossly inadequate resources compared to the size and importance of its mission, China has a reasonable expectation of success. BIS needs not only more money, but also more skilled staff, more enforcement agents, and better enabling technology, especially for data analysis.</p> +<p>To the degree possible, regulators also sought to support banks to get the information they require. Government representatives said they were committed to awareness raising, outreach and training for compliance personnel, although “we don’t prescribe any search criteria”. As noted previously, much of this guidance refers to general controls, rather than sanctions-specific guidance.</p> -<p>Moreover, the Department of Commerce needs more help from the rest of the government, in particular the U.S. intelligence community. Declassified Central Intelligence Agency documents show that the intelligence community was deeply involved in assisting export control enforcement during the Cold War and delivered solid results by doing so. These are capabilities and priorities that have significantly atrophied in the post–Cold War era but urgently need to be restored.</p> +<p>Banking representatives also criticised international private and public sector partners for a lack of guidance relevant to the South African context. Private sector representatives said that many case studies and typologies for evasion and circumvention were focused on Russian evasion activities in or from Europe or the US, rather than reflecting the African context. Similarly, banks said they would be able to carry out better risk assessments of their customers and transactions if they received more detailed information from correspondent banks, which often change their criteria without notification or explanation. They said they may be able to proactively identify potential clients or transaction patterns of concern if they had more detailed information.</p> -<p>Regardless of who wins the November 2024 election, export control represents a great deal of unfinished business for the next presidential administration to take on.</p> +<p>There were also concerns about new financial technologies (including cryptocurrencies and stable coins) and smaller banks, which were seen to have less mature financial crime compliance systems. The regulatory participants said they were aware of and considering the implications of these and were working to align their standards. However, one private sector representative said that they noted a large difference in compliance maturity between the country’s few larger banks, when compared to smaller (“Tier 2”) banks. Most illicit actors, they said, would not carry out transactions through the larger banks, but instead through the mid-sized and smaller institutions.</p> -<p>Finally, the United States cannot do this alone. U.S. allies need to take a good look at their own export controls and broader economic security toolboxes. There are some innovative economic security policy experiments going on in places like Taiwan, South Korea, and Japan. Allies need to share information on best practices, align approaches, and devote appropriate resources to have a reasonable chance of success.</p> +<p>Another issue, one participant said, was the lack of knowledge within South African banks about how to consider trade-related sanctions and restrictive measures. There was little discussion, they said, between the trade finance and sanctions teams. As a result, “a lot of the banking industry doesn’t know how to apply sanctions in a trade environment”.</p> -<h3 id="from-reaction-to-strategy">From Reaction to Strategy</h3> +<h3 id="aligning-financial-services-supervision">Aligning Financial Services Supervision</h3> -<p><strong><em>A New Framework for U.S. Export Control Enforcement</em></strong></p> +<p>Another theme from the engagement with government representatives was that supervision was spread across several departments spanning banking and non-banking financial services, financial surveillance and the SARB payments department. Participants said that there was an “imbalance” in the capacity and coverage of the sectors.</p> -<blockquote> - <h4 id="barath-harithas">Barath Harithas</h4> -</blockquote> +<p>Participants said they had been surprised by the Jersey MONEYVAL evaluation because the jurisdiction had one main supervisor, causing them to consider their own supervision architecture. The participants said they were also engaging with other international regulatory bodies to understand their supervision model. The key, participants agreed, was to have consistency and communication between them.</p> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">It is critical that the U.S government does not engage in a reactive dance that leads to overstretch and inevitable failure. Crucially, the United States must more effectively rally allies to join the fray, transforming a fragmented response into a united front.</code></em></strong></p> +<h3 id="conclusion">Conclusion</h3> -<p>The United States has relied on a “siege wall” of export controls to keep critical technologies (e.g., advanced semiconductors) out of Chinese hands. There have been increasing reports highlighting the leakiness of export controls, calling into question the efficacy of what increasingly appears to be a technology Maginot Line for the United States. In light of selective failures, critics have rushed to declare export controls ineffective, overlooking the complexities that inform their enforcement and impact.</p> +<p>Based on these discussions, it was clear that the South African government had a clear policy of non-alignment and neutrality when it comes to G7 sanctions on Russia, despite trade relations favouring closer alignment with the West. At the same time, there appears to be room for open and pragmatic conversations on both sides: for South African policymakers to express their reservations and material concerns about the financial impacts of sanctions for their economic security, stability and development, and for G7 governments to provide greater information about their priorities. There may also be an opportunity for G7 countries to consider the specific concerns of South Africa (and other non-aligned countries) – for example, how to support both alternative resolutions to energy supply issues (notably the forthcoming gas supply issue), and intra-African trade. Even within the South African framing regarding its neutrality, discussions emphasised that Russia sanctions had implications for South Africa’s economic stability. Where impacts on particular sectors were keenly felt, participants highlighted a greater need for dialogue with the EU, the US and the UK, as well as potentially some coordination with regional African organisations, to raise similar concerns. This may be particularly relevant for issues around the debt crisis and evidencing any impacts of the sanctions on the population. Even within the South African framing regarding its neutrality, discussions emphasised that Russia sanctions had implications for South Africa’s economic stability. Where impacts on particular sectors were keenly felt, participants highlighted a greater need for dialogue with the EU, the US and the UK, as well as potentially some coordination with regional African organisations, to raise similar concerns. This may be particularly relevant for issues around the debt crisis and evidencing any impacts of the sanctions on the population.</p> -<p>The effectiveness of export controls cannot be reduced to a simple binary assessment; it is contingent upon the specific product categories in question. For instance, the smuggling of chips has proven alarmingly straightforward. In 2023, NVIDIA shipped over a million leading-edge chips, each valued at approximately $40,000 and portable enough that 609 units can fit into a single freight box. Conversely, ASML sold only 53 state-of-the-art extreme ultraviolet (EUV) lithography machines in 2023, each costing $350 million and requiring 13 truck-sized containers and 250 crates for transportation, with extensive logistics and post-sales support needed. The latter product category has shown far less evidence of smuggling compared to chips, which have reportedly been smuggled in bulk orders valued over $100 million.</p> +<p>Many of the concerns raised by the private sector centred on how to obtain better information relevant to their context to improve their financial crime compliance (including but not limited to information related to Russian sanctions). This may include G7 countries providing country- or region-specific typologies for Russian evasion and circumvention. It may also include better communication between correspondent banks and their partners in South Africa. At the same time, private sector representatives remain legally bound to comply with South African law, which excludes the G7 sanctions.</p> -<p>This essay offers three recommendations for improving export control enforcement:</p> +<p>One partial solution to this tension may be to improve wider financial crime controls, highlighted by South Africa’s focus on better beneficial owner identification, which was driven by the country’s effort to escape the FATF greylist. However, this can only be a partial solution at best: banks will face the same dilemmas if they receive beneficial ownership information indicating that an account is held by a sanctioned Russian individual.</p> -<ol> - <li> - <p>Enforcement efforts must prioritize areas where compliance is most tractable. This requires a clear-eyed understanding of the objectives behind export controls. The goal is not merely to prevent specific end products from reaching China; rather, the true litmus test of these controls lies in their ability to impede China’s indigenization campaign.</p> +<p>In sum, when it comes to sanctions on Russia, the private sector in South Africa finds itself caught in an invidious position between stewarding critical international relationships (notably with correspondent banks) that are central to the country’s economic security and a government that for political – not economic – reasons, chooses a policy of non-alignment with the West.</p> - <p>For instance, while preventing advanced semiconductors from reaching China is crucial, the greater concern is ensuring that China cannot manufacture these technologies at scale. Controls should target more strongly critical chokepoints such as semiconductor manufacturing equipment, especially EUV machines, service and repair components, and electronic design software. Given the inherent leakiness of export controls for chips, it is crucial to recognize that these measures are at best a tool to increase acquisition costs for China in the short run. The ultimate long-term objective, however, must focus on undermining China’s efforts toward technological indigenization and self-sufficiency.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>The current approach to export control enforcement resembles a game of “whack-a-mole,” where smuggling networks emerge, vanish, and reemerge faster than they can be addressed. To overcome this cycle, regulators need to move from the reactive blacklisting of suspicious entities to implementing a preapprovals regime. In other words, instead of fixating on whom to bar from the game, authorities should shift their focus toward who gets to play. By so doing, regulators can more effectively limit the avenues available for smuggling.</p> +<hr /> - <p>This can be operationalized through: (1) establishing a certification process during initial procurement to create a marketplace of trusted sellers and to enhance compliance knowledge among stakeholders; (2) implementing digital waybills to reduce documentation fraud and improve traceability, thereby addressing customs evasion; and (3) mandating the use of preapproved logistics providers who are required to report any consignments not received within a specified timeframe to the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) at the Department of Commerce. This measure will help identify suspicious entities and facilitate timely spot checks, creating a more effective feedback loop for detection and enforcement.</p> +<p><strong>Olivia Allison</strong> is an Associate Fellow at RUSI and an independent consultant. She has more than 15 years’ experience carrying out complex international investigations and supporting the development of integrity and governance for state-owned companies, international companies and international financial institutions. She has a wide range of financial crime and asset-tracing experience from leadership roles held in London, Moscow, Kyiv and Kazakhstan.</p>Olivia AllisonThis report details the roundtable discussions in Pretoria to share views on South African policy relating to the sanctions on Russia and Belarus, as well as other issues of financial integrity.Crossing Deepfake Rubicon2024-11-01T12:00:00+08:002024-11-01T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/crossing-deepfake-rubicon<p><em>New research finds that we can now no longer trust our eyes and ears to reliably distinguish between real and AI-generated images, audio, and video. What does this mean in a world where the weaponization of synthetic media is becoming increasingly prevalent?</em></p> + +<excerpt /> + +<ul> + <li> + <p>In recent years, threat actors have increasingly used synthetic media — digital content produced or manipulated by artificial intelligence (AI) — to enhance their deceptive activities, harming individuals and organizations worldwide with growing frequency.</p> </li> <li> - <p>The United States must work more closely with allied partners to multilateralize export controls. U.S. export restrictions on their own are insufficient. They must be the portcullis of the castle, not its keep. The current stalemate stems from the United States expecting allies to mirror its controls, while partners have been overly cautious, fearing such actions might set a precedent for future expectations. This dynamic is unsustainable. The United States must acknowledge the economic concerns of its allies, while allies must recognize that failure to act could result in the United States imposing stricter measures in bilateral settings. There is common interest on both sides to accept a “highest-common-denominator” approach to multilateral controls. By aligning interests, even imperfectly, the United States can enhance collective enforcement capabilities, thereby flushing out the smuggling quarry from remaining avenues.</p> + <p>In addition, the weaponization of synthetic media has also begun to undermine people’s trust in information integrity more widely, posing concerning implications for the stability and resilience of the U.S.’s information environment.</p> </li> -</ol> - -<p>In conclusion, as any middling tactician knows, eventually all walls are outflanked. The real question is how easily, and therefore which ones truly deserve our focus. Moreover, given the leanness of BIS, it is critical that the U.S government does not engage in a reactive dance that leads to overstretch and inevitable failure. Crucially, the United States must more effectively rally allies to join the fray, transforming a fragmented response into a united front. By clarifying objectives, refining enforcement strategies, and fostering multilateral cooperation, the United States can reclaim control over the rules of the game and tilt the odds in favor of success against slippery evasion strategies. These recommendations not only address the immediate challenges posed by export control enforcement but also contribute to a more coherent and effective strategy in the long term against technology transfer to adversarial nations.</p> - -<h3 id="defensive-measures-against-china">Defensive Measures Against China</h3> - -<p><strong><em>Time for a Reevaluation</em></strong></p> - -<blockquote> - <h4 id="scott-kennedy">Scott Kennedy</h4> -</blockquote> - -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">If current trends continue, the U.S. and Chinese economies will be decoupled in many areas, not just advanced technologies with military applications. And it is just as likely that the result of this division will be either global fragmentation or an isolated United States.</code></em></strong></p> - -<p>On a recent trip to China, I visited a Chinese firm that is on the U.S. Department of Commerce’s Entity List. When discussion turned to their designation, they claimed utter disbelief and surprise; they could not fathom what prompted Washington’s action. It is possible that their claims of innocence are genuine, but given their place in an important high-tech sector, likely links to the Chinese party-state, and the nature of some of their customers, one can also see why the U.S. government would have taken this step.</p> - -<p>In fact, it may be difficult to disagree with most, if not every, individual decision the U.S. government has taken in the last five years to protect itself in the face of the broad national security challenge China presents to the United States, its allies, and the rules-based global order. Nevertheless, the cumulative effect of all of this action deserves careful evaluation. And where the result is not as intended, Washington needs to recalibrate its policy approach.</p> - -<p>There are now around 1,000 Chinese companies and institutions blacklisted by the United States for national security or human rights reasons. The list of “controlled items” that require a license to be exported to China has ballooned, and in the case of advanced semiconductors and semiconductor equipment, the restrictions are country-wide. Extremely high U.S. tariffs – far above standard most favored nation (MFN) levels – are now applied to most Chinese goods, even those with no strategic value. The coverage of sectors in which screening of inward investment deals apply has expanded dramatically, while the United States and its allies have started developing new regulations for outward investment to China. As a result of a law passed in the spring of 2024, social media app TikTok will be banned in the United States unless ByteDance, its parent company, sells the platform to a non-Chinese owner. The Biden administration recently adopted a draft executive order that would ban Chinese connected and autonomous vehicles and their components from the U.S. market starting with the 2027 model year. The administration and Congress are considering a wide range of other defensive measures as well.</p> - -<p>What does all of this activity add up to? Is it worth it? And might there be a better way? It is time to ask – and answer – these and many other questions. There are at least four potential negative consequences that emerge from this tidal wave.</p> - -<p>The Biden administration argues that it is pursuing a “small yard, high fence strategy,” meaning that it aims to protect national security while having as limited an impact on commerce as possible. Mitigating national security vulnerabilities from commerce with China – known as de-risking – may have been the original goal and still may be the overall purpose. But the breadth of the actions and the tit-for-tat, action-reaction by Washington, Beijing, and others is resulting in a far greater reduction of bilateral business and rerouting of supply chains than is reflected in the official policy framing. If current trends continue, the U.S. and Chinese economies will be decoupled in many areas, not just advanced technologies with military applications. And it is just as likely that the result of this division will be either global fragmentation or an isolated United States.</p> - -<p>Second, and relatedly, while individual measures, such as those on advanced semiconductors and equipment, may initially work or be effective for several years, this is far from guaranteed. Although China has long aimed for greater technological self-reliance, there is ample evidence that the industries it has prioritized, the extent of its financial support and other measures, and the willingness of Chinese industry to actively participate has in part been in reaction to this U.S.-led technology boycott. It is possible that in some areas China will advance faster than it otherwise would have in individual technologies and in occupying the leadership of technology ecosystems. Moreover, as a result of less connectivity with Chinese industry and researchers, U.S. innovation may also suffer. If so, instead of mitigating national security risks, the United States may end making the problem worse.</p> - -<p>Third, less connectivity with China means a slower energy transition. Yes, China has unfairly subsidized clean-energy products such as solar panels, wind turbines, batteries, and electric vehicles. And, yes, it sold a substantial portion of overproduction on global markets, threatening competitors in many countries. That said, a straight-out ban of such goods from other markets will necessarily mean less products in the short term. Additionally, if protection is not made conditional on the rapid development of high-quality domestic alternatives at prices the middle class can afford, these restrictions will be for naught.</p> - -<p>And fourth, the U.S. approach is changing the nature of the international economic order in front of our eyes. In the 1960s, in the face of growing competition from Japan and other East Asian countries, the United States and its allies developed the rules and tools for anti-dumping and countervailing duties, and with them the underlying principles of “fair trade.” Although these tools have various biases and are subject to widespread abuse, they did provide compensation to industries that were suffering from greater international competition and, as a result, kept the greater project of globalization alive. The expansion of export controls and other defensive measures is fundamentally challenging the notion – embedded in the original General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the World Trade Organization (WTO) – that national security justifications to restrict international commerce should be limited and the exception to the rule. The rise of “economic security” as a rationale for policy even more directly threatens to make open commerce and financial flows a thing of the past.</p> - -<p>The seriousness of the Chinese challenge to the United States and the rules-based order requires definitive policies, but it does not justify any and all policies. The United States and its allies need to reassess their approach and adapt as needed. Here are three recommendations:</p> - -<ol> <li> - <p>The United States needs to decide precisely what kind of outcomes it wants and what kind of outcomes it is unwilling to accept. Is bifurcation of the global economy, even if the United States is relatively isolated, acceptable simply because it means less connectivity with China? Would it be acceptable for the United States to maintain technological advantage over China if it means the elimination of a rules-based order and a race to the bottom in the use of tools to restrict global commerce?</p> + <p>At present, an individual’s ability to recognize AI-generated content remains the primary defense against people falling prey to deceptively presented synthetic media.</p> </li> <li> - <p>Washington needs to include cost-benefit analysis for its overall approach and for each policy initiative. The presence of a national security risk does not mean the costs of any one policy are irrelevant. In fact, there are usually multiple possible options to address a risk, and their relative costs and benefits should be weighed, and done so with transparency.</p> + <p>However, a recent experimental study by CSIS found that people are no longer able to reliably distinguish between authentic and AI-generated images, audio, and video sourced from publicly available tools.</p> </li> <li> - <p>And finally, because this overall shift is so consequential to the U.S. national security and economy, more information about individual cases and the broader national security threat China poses to the United States needs to be shared with the U.S. public. The U.S. government should consider how much more information could be shared without compromising U.S. intelligence methods and sources. The Chinese interlocutors I met during a recent trip may not deserve a clearer explanation, but as a part of a democracy, the American people deserve to know more.</p> + <p>That human detection has ceased to be a reliable method for identifying synthetic media only heightens the dangers posed by the technology’s misuse, underscoring the pressing need to implement alternative countermeasures to address this emerging threat.</p> </li> -</ol> +</ul> -<p>It is possible that taking these steps could yield the conclusion that substantial changes in policy are needed. But it is also possible that the current approach could be reaffirmed. Hence, there should be a consensus in favor of being more careful, deliberate, and transparent.</p> +<h3 id="introduction">Introduction</h3> -<h2 id="the-investing-in-america-agenda">The Investing in America Agenda</h2> +<p>Synthetic media, which refers to text, images, audio, and video generated or manipulated by AI, presents both significant opportunities and risks. Recent advancements in generative AI technology have considerably reduced the data, computing power, and cost required to create highly realistic synthetic content. Coupled with the technology’s growing accessibility, as evident from the rapidly expanding constellation of widely available user-friendly offerings, it has become easier than ever for anyone to manufacture genuine-seeming digital content using AI. The uses of such technology are seemingly endless, from the humorous, such as making fictional images of the pope wearing Balenciaga or videos of Tom Cruise dancing, to the commercial, such as streamlining work by assisting in email writing or creating digital avatars of people to use in training videos, news stories, or even for speaking with simulations of deceased loved ones. There has also been significant interest in harnessing generative AI’s transformative potential for the greater good, from accelerating critical scientific research to making sophisticated disability aids like glasses that translate speech to text for the hard of hearing.</p> -<h3 id="clustering-for-innovation">Clustering for Innovation</h3> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/5iB2pou.jpeg" alt="image01" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Synthetic images of Pope Francis wearing Balenciaga, first shared on Reddit by creator Pablo Xavier, which quickly went viral across social media platforms. To this day, many viewers still do not realize this is AI-generated.</strong> Source: <a href="https://www.reddit.com/r/midjourney/comments/120vhdc/the_pope_drip/">Pablo Xavier, “The Pope Drip,” Reddit, March 24, 2023</a>.</em></p> -<blockquote> - <h4 id="sujai-shivakumar">Sujai Shivakumar</h4> -</blockquote> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/x5mAyuM.png" alt="image02" /> +<em>▲ <strong>One of the many videos featured on the now widely notorious Tom Cruise deepfake account on TikTok.</strong> Source: <a href="https://www.tiktok.com/@deeptomcruise/video/7181490100314885382?lang=en">deeptomcruise, TikTok video, December 26, 2022, 00:19</a>.</em></p> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">By fostering the growth of thick regional ecosystems, partnerships encourage more Americans to connect to and have a stake in the nation’s economic future – securing the nation from within.</code></em></strong></p> +<p>Yet, generative AI has also become a potent tool for misuse. On the morning of May 22, 2023, an AI-generated photograph reportedly showing an explosion near the Pentagon began to circulate extensively on social media platforms, causing widespread confusion and panic as well as a temporary but meaningful dip in the U.S. stock market. While any adverse effects from this particular incident, in the end, were nominal, its occurrence nonetheless is illustrative of a broader trend of synthetic media being utilized to damaging ends. From criminal activities to adversarial military and intelligence operations, generative AI has more and more empowered the deception capabilities of threat actors, permitting them to manufacture convincingly realistic but fake digital content (colloquially known by many as “deepfakes”) at unprecedented speed, scale, and degrees of precision. The rising ease of use and utility of the technology has led to a boom of AI-enabled deception incidents taking place over recent years, with the technology’s abuse inflicting a growing amount of financial, reputational, physical, and mental harm to individuals and organizations worldwide. Already, the dangers posed by weaponized synthetic media have begun to shift from the theoretical to the realized.</p> -<p>Last month, the Elevate Quantum Tech Hub broke ground on the new Quantum Tech Park in Arvada, Colorado. It is one of 31 Tech Hubs designated by the U.S. Department of Commerce to stimulate innovation-based regional economic growth. This initiative is one part of a larger effort across the federal government to expand and connect innovation networks across the nation.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/xvc9yZI.png" alt="image03" /> +<em>▲ <strong>This synthetic image was falsely reported as a photograph of an explosion near the Pentagon. It was widely circulated before being debunked as fake, causing widespread confusion and even a temporary dip in the U.S. stock market.</strong> Source: <a href="https://x.com/sentdefender/status/1660650575569059840/photo/1">OSINTdefender (@sentdefender), X post, May 22, 2023, 09:04 am</a>.</em></p> -<h4 id="the-push-from-the-chips-and-science-act">The Push from the CHIPS and Science Act</h4> +<p>Thus far, the threat that has garnered the most public attention and alarm has been the risk of AI-enabled deceptions disrupting political elections by influencing voting outcomes, instigating unrest and violence, or damaging trust in the electoral process. Among the record number of elections held in 2024, the majority have already been subject to widely-circulated synthetic content that falsely depicts politicians or famous figures engaging in inappropriate or controversial behavior, criticizing their opposition, and promising policy changes. With the U.S. presidential election only a week away, widespread concerns have been understandably raised about the dangers of a flood of AI-generated content amplifying misinformation, or of an opportunely timed viral synthetic image or video of a political candidate influencing voters’ decisions.</p> -<p>The CHIPS and Science Act of 2022 established a suite of grant programs designed to catalyze technology cluster development, including the Tech Hubs Program through the Economic Development Administration at the Department of Commerce, the Microelectronics Commons Hubs through the Department of Defense (DOD), and the Innovation Engines through the National Science Foundation (NSF):</p> +<p>Today’s synthetic media threat landscape extends far beyond the realm of political elections. AI-enabled financial fraud was found to have risen by 700 percent in 2023, and experts have predicted it will result in losses of up to $40 billion by 2027. Meanwhile, AI nonconsensual intimate media, accounting for 96 percent of all synthetic videos online as of 2019, has already claimed what is estimated to be millions of adults and children as victims — with that number expected to rise swiftly. Other AI-enabled deception incidents have also occurred with increasing frequency, spanning gray zone warfare such as influence operations and cyberattacks, espionage and surveillance, military deception operations, domestic disinformation, and more. As improvements in the technology’s capabilities and accessibility continue, the volume and breadth of deception activity will likely grow.</p> -<ul> - <li> - <p>The Department of Commerce’s Tech Hubs envisions 31 regional consortia that focus on specific emerging technologies. Starting in July 2024, 12 hubs have each received “implementation funding” between $19 million and $51 million for workforce development and manufacturing initiatives.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>The DOD’s Microelectronics Commons Hubs consists of eight networks that aim to close the “lab-to-fab” gap in microelectronics for commercial and defense applications, each receiving between $15 million and $40 million.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>The NSF’s Innovation Engines include 10 regions that each have received an initial $15 million in grants covering multiple technology domains, such as robotics, advanced materials, and artificial intelligence.</p> - </li> -</ul> +<p>The discrete harms arising from these incidents are further compounded by a more insidious danger: AI-enabled deception threatens to corrode the public’s trust in the integrity of all information more broadly. There is already evidence that this has started to occur. In turn, this risks imperiling the foundations of the U.S.’s information environment, a vital pillar of societal stability and resilience.</p> -<p>The largest awards, at $51 million each, went to four of the Department of Commerce’s Tech Hubs: Heartland Bioworks in Indianapolis, Indiana; iFAB TechHub in Champaign-Urbana, Illinois; Sustainable Polymers Tech Hub in Akron, Ohio; and Tulsa Hub for Equitable and Trustworthy Autonomy in Tulsa, Oklahoma.</p> +<p>Today, the principal defense against AI-enabled deceptions is people’s ability to recognize synthetic media when encountering it in their day-to-day lives. However, rapid advancements in generative AI have increasingly constrained human detection capabilities as synthetic media has become more convincingly realistic. While the necessity of adopting alternative countermeasures, spanning from the technological to the regulatory, to compensate has been widely recognized as critical, in practice, implementation of these measures remains largely nascent. As such, this growing vulnerability means that awareness of when people are no longer able to depend solely on their eyes and ears to detect AI-generated content is critical in order to better recognize when human detection is no longer an effective safeguard against the technology’s misuse.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/ZTR7iH7.png" alt="image02" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Federal Investments in Regional Emerging Technology Hubs Under the CHIPS Act, 2024.</strong> Source: <a href="https://www.eda.gov/funding/programs/regional-technology-and-innovation-hubs">“Regional Technology and Innovation Hubs (Tech Hubs),“ U.S. Economic Development Administration, accessed October 22, 2024</a>; <a href="https://microelectronicscommons.org/">“The Microelectronics Commons: A National Network of Prototyping Innovation Hubs,“ Microelectronics Commons, accessed October 22, 2024</a>; and <a href="https://new.nsf.gov/funding/initiatives/regional-innovation-engines">“Regional Innovation Engines,“ U.S. National Science Foundation, accessed October 22, 2024</a>.</em></p> +<p>To determine the current level of human detection capabilities, CSIS conducted a large-scale experimental study testing individuals’ ability to differentiate between authentic media and synthetic images, audio, and videos sourced from publicly accessible generative AI technology. Overall, the study found that people struggled to accurately identify AI-generated content to any meaningful degree, with some demographics being more susceptible to certain types of synthetic media than others. This brief reviews the study’s key findings and offers an overview of the current synthetic media threat landscape, examining both ongoing and speculative harms in areas in which the abuse of this technology has become more prevalent. It is clear that weaponized synthetic media has begun to mature from an emergent to an established national security threat. That the inflection point has now been reached where human detection capabilities are unreliable only serves to underscore the pressing need to implement robust alternative countermeasures to address this growing danger.</p> -<h4 id="drawing-in-additional-investments">Drawing in Additional Investments</h4> +<h3 id="the-study-results">The Study Results</h3> -<p>These federal awards are expected to induce investment from the private sector and local governments, and in some cases already have. In addition to their $40.5 million implementation grant from the Department of Commerce, Elevate Quantum received $77 million from the state of Colorado and $10 million from New Mexico, including a portion dedicated to a loan guarantee program. Additionally, Elevate Quantum has attracted over $1 billion in private and venture capital investment. These stacked investments facilitate the creation and expansion of innovation and industrial networks that connect researchers, designers, manufacturers, equipment suppliers, materials suppliers, and end users.</p> +<p>To assess how well people were able to detect AI-generated content, CSIS conducted a perceptual study involving nearly 1,300 North Americans aged from 18 to 85. Participants were asked to distinguish between synthetic and authentic media items, including images, audio, and videos both silent and fully audiovisual. The study also examined how other factors affected detection performance, including authenticity, language, modality, image subject matter, age, and participants’ preexisting familiarity with synthetic media. To ensure that the AI-generated content would be representative of the quality and type of synthetic media people were likely to come across “in the wild”, or in their daily lives, all synthetic test items were sourced from publicly available products and services.</p> -<h4 id="fostering-workforce-training-and-development">Fostering Workforce Training and Development</h4> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/FZ4l7RX.png" alt="image04" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 1: Average Detection Accuracy by Media Type.</strong> Source: <a href="https://arxiv.org/abs/2403.16760">Di Cooke et al., “As Good As A Coin Toss: Human detection of AI-generated images, videos, audio, and audiovisual stimuli,” March 25, 2024</a>.</em></p> -<p>Next, by centering workforce development and training, these hubs also help meet the high demand for a skilled technical workforce while ensuring that regional and local communities benefit from their activities. With a sustained focus on education, including vocational training at community colleges, as well as the development of pathways to high-quality jobs, these investments are needed to sustain more inclusive growth within local and regional ecosystems. The new National Science and Technology Council Workforce Center of Excellence, supported by a $250 million investment from the U.S. Department of Commerce, plays a similar role in prioritizing workforce development.</p> +<p>Altogether, the study’s findings paint a bleak picture of people’s ability to discern the legitimacy of digital content in today’s world. On average, participants correctly distinguished between synthetic and authentic media 51.2 percent of the time — roughly equivalent in accuracy to a coin toss. Images were the most difficult for participants to identify (49 percent average accuracy), with better detection performance on silent videos (51 percent) and audio clips (54 percent). Participants were the most successful at determining the authenticity of fully audiovisual clips (55 percent). These results are relatively unsurprising since public discourse and scientific research have closely monitored people’s diminishing detection capabilities as generative AI has advanced in recent years. Nonetheless, it is valuable to confirm that this critical watershed moment has indeed been reached: humans can no longer depend solely on their own eyes and ears to reliably distinguish between reality and AI-generated falsehoods.</p> -<h4 id="connecting-resources">Connecting Resources</h4> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/K4iLc5K.png" alt="image05" /> +<em>▲ <strong>The study’s most convincing synthetic image: Only 10.7 percent of all participants correctly identified this as an AI-generated image, with the rest believing it to be a photograph of a real person.</strong> Source: <a href="https://arxiv.org/abs/2403.16760">Di Cooke et al., “As Good As A Coin Toss: Human detection of AI-generated images, videos, audio, and audiovisual stimuli,” March 25, 2024</a>.</em></p> -<p>Finally, these grant programs actively connect existing and new public and private resources. Some programs span several consortia, allowing for synergies to form across firms, universities, and research organizations engaged in a variety of emerging technologies. For example, the Elevate Quantum Tech Hub is just down the road from the Rocky Mountain Innovation Engine, easing potential collaboration across teams working on quantum, AI, renewable energy, and robotics. Likewise, both the Southwest Advanced Prototyping Microelectronics Commons Hub and Southwest Sustainability Innovation Engine will be hosted by Arizona State University, accelerating mutual advances in fields including advanced manufacturing, 5G/6G, disaster mitigation, and products for end users.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/b2dj9kL.png" alt="image06" /> +<em>▲ <strong>The study’s most convincing synthetic audiovisual clip: When participants were presented with the AI-manipulated video clip (of comedian Nora Tschirner) on the right, 75.8 percent incorrectly labeled it as authentic. In comparison, the original video (of anchorwoman Marietta Slomka) is on the left.</strong> Source: <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=V4ln4SyVNjg&amp;list=PL8ax9s9DVKClTiPm9c5Wkq9wOG4hGKyVH&amp;index=5">Deepfacelabfan, “Deepfake — Marietta Slomka zu Nora Tschirner — 128 LIAE 15k RW only — 90min FAKE,” YouTube video, April 7, 2022, 00:46</a>.</em></p> -<h4 id="going-beyond-proximity">Going Beyond Proximity</h4> +<p>This does not mean that all AI-generated content being produced today is now indistinguishable from authentic media. Low- and mid-quality synthetic media still contains artifacts, or observable AI glitches such as bizarre-looking hands or illegible text, which make their provenance apparent. Regardless, our study demonstrates that numerous generative AI tools which are easily accessible to the public today can produce sufficiently realistic synthetic content that is relatively indistinguishable from authentic content to the human senses. Moreover, as the average quality of synthetic media improves while the technology matures, even low- and mid-quality outputs will become more realistic. For example, later iterations of AI image generators have already become increasingly capable of rendering real-looking hands, which makes relying on them as a potential “tell” of AI-generated content being present decreasingly useful.</p> -<p>This all-of-government strategy to develop a network of connected regional innovation ecosystems recognizes that economically dynamic innovation clusters are an outcome of active and interlinked networks of cooperation among entrepreneurs, investors, educational and research organizations, small and large firms, public agencies, and philanthropies. While successful technology clusters are one outcome of networking, collaboration requires more than simply locating assets in proximity to one another. Multiple actors spread across different organizations need incentives to work together in complex ways to fund, research, develop, scale up, and bring new products and services to the marketplace.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/xiDUnsF.png" alt="image07" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 2: Detection Performance by Language Familiarity.</strong> Source: Cooke et al., “As Good As A Coin Toss.”</em></p> -<p>A suite of public-private partnerships that address the specific challenges of cooperation provides this alignment. The programs discussed above will need to work in complement with other federal and state programs – including partnerships such as the Small Business Innovation Research program, the Manufacturing USA centers, and the Manufacturing Extension Partnership – to grow connective tissue across the innovation ecosystem.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/e0GPfI7.png" alt="image08" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 3: Detection Performance by Age.</strong> Source: Cooke et al., “As Good As A Coin Toss.”</em></p> -<h4 id="need-for-continuity">Need for Continuity</h4> +<p>The study’s other findings offer more nuanced insights into people’s vulnerabilities to different types of AI-enabled deceptions, examining how various elements may impact an individual’s detection capabilities. For instance, participants’ average detection accuracy was found to be significantly lower for audio, video, and audiovisual items featuring a foreign language than for items featuring languages in which they were fluent (Figure 2). Meanwhile, younger participants outperformed their older counterparts to the greatest degree when tested on audiovisual and audio-only clips (Figure 3). These findings indicate that people are more likely to misidentify synthetic media presented in a foreign language, and that older individuals are less sensitive to recognizing synthetic audio-based media. Given the rise of multilingual synthetic misinformation as well as the growing popularity of AI phone scams which often target older generations, these findings suggest that these two demographics may be more vulnerable to certain types of AI-enabled deceptions than previously realized.</p> -<p>By fostering the growth of thick regional ecosystems, partnerships encourage more Americans to connect to and have a stake in the nation’s economic future – securing the nation from within. They are also essential to drive the nation’s technological competitiveness in global markets and ensure security from external threats.</p> +<h3 id="the-threat-landscape">The Threat Landscape</h3> -<p>To be successful, partnerships must address the challenges of collaboration across multiple actors, operate at sufficient scale, and be seen as dependable and durable. This means that partnerships need to be evaluated and recalibrated regularly to ensure that they are well focused operationally. It is also important to recognize that innovation partnership programs work in complement with each other, forming mutually reinforcing networks of institutions that solve diverse problems requiring collective action. Moreover, if partnerships are to grow this connective tissue of collaboration, it requires policy patience. Long-term, sustained investments are needed for connections to take root. In this regard, policymakers need to recognize that the CHIPS and Science Act is not a one-and-done deal. Especially in this era of intense innovation-based competition for markets and national power, securing technological leadership must be a substantial and sustained bipartisan effort.</p> +<p>The proliferation of weaponized synthetic media presents a clear and present danger to national security. To more effectively address these dangers, a more comprehensive understanding of the risks posed by its misuse and the various ways it has already been weaponized is required. Within only a few short years, the synthetic media threat landscape has expanded rapidly, with generative AI increasingly being exploited for nefarious purposes. Consequently, this rise in AI-enabled deception incidents has resulted in individuals and organizations around the world suffering financial, reputational, physical, and mental harm, even death, and countries worldwide experiencing detrimental effects on their societal stability and resilience. Now that it is clear publicly available generative AI tools can produce highly realistic synthetic media capable of deceiving even the most discerning of observers, these dangers have only become even more acute.</p> -<h3 id="meeting-the-energy-demands-of-economic-competition">Meeting the Energy Demands of Economic Competition</h3> +<p>Generative AI has become an increasingly powerful force multiplier for deception, making it easier, faster, and cheaper to conduct more sophisticated stratagems than ever before — from producing synthetic content at an industrial scale to more precisely tailoring it to a target’s specific vulnerabilities. These lowering barriers have, in turn, expanded the pool of threat actors who now are able to leverage this technology, from extremist organizations and organized crime groups to lone individuals with malicious intent. As of today, it costs less than $10 to create 30 minutes of customized synthetic audio featuring a target’s voice or to manufacture a batch of over 1,000 individually personalized spear-phishing emails. Efforts to prevent the misuse of commercial products and services have been inconsistent in both their implementation and effectiveness, enabling the circumnavigation of guardrails to varying degrees of success. Meanwhile, open-source generative AI tools, which by their nature have more easily removable safeguards, have also furnished threat actors with a diverse and customizable toolkit, such as live face-swapping and voice-masking software, found to be used in real-time impersonation schemes. In addition, a shadow industry has begun to quickly develop to address this growing demand for purpose-built deception technologies. Spreading throughout the dark web and encrypted messaging platforms, it sells everything from prebuilt custom software to more bespoke services for explicitly abusive purposes.</p> -<blockquote> - <h4 id="joseph-majkut">Joseph Majkut</h4> -</blockquote> +<p>However, the rise in AI-enabled deceptions has not been uniform. Rather, generative AI tools have been co-opted to greater degrees in scenarios where they currently provide a significant offensive edge to threat actors’ stratagems over existing non-AI methods. For instance, the sharp rise of AI-enabled financial fraud over the past few years is a direct result of the substantial advantage afforded by AI technology, as AI text and audio generation tools are able to produce compelling synthetic content in less resource-intensive manners than when utilizing non-AI techniques. Conversely, AI-enabled deception incidents have been less prevalent in areas where synthetic media presently does not provide a similarly significant offensive edge. This has been found to be the case with deceptions involving the dissemination of false narratives, where conventional techniques such as manipulatively editing authentic media or sharing it out of context still remain highly effective and relatively easy to accomplish, limiting the comparative utility of generative AI tools. Regardless, as the technology’s capabilities improve and barriers to using it decrease, it will undoubtedly be more extensively adopted for all manner of stratagems.</p> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">By pursuing immediately available options today and zero-carbon options in the medium term, the United States can realize progress toward strategic goals and improve its competitiveness without sacrificing climate outcomes.</code></em></strong></p> +<p>Compounding these harms is the second-order risk posed by weaponized synthetic media: the corrosion of information integrity. The proliferation of deceptive AI-generated content risks damaging the public’s trust in the veracity of any information they encounter more generally as they become increasingly unable to trust their eyes and ears to reliably inform them as to what is real and what is fake. This degradation of trust in the truth jeopardizes the resilience of the U.S.’s information environment, or its “epistemic security” — which risks heightening its vulnerability to political and economic instability and constraining national security capabilities. Less epistemically secure societies are more limited in their ability to engage in collective and timely decision-making, making them more susceptible to adversarial manipulation, reducing their capacity for effective crisis response, and constraining critical defense and intelligence capabilities. This threat is not a novel one. Instances of widespread conventional misinformation have already been found to have diminished public trust in information from media and government institutions, resulting in decreased faith in political election integrity, weakened confidence in national security organizations, and led to violence and unrest. For example, pervasive false anti-vaccination narratives during the Covid-19 pandemic undermined vaccine confidence and institutional trust in the United States. The proliferation of these falsehoods, in turn, stymied economic growth, trade, and diplomacy, damaged education, and increased the number of vaccine-preventable outbreaks.</p> -<p>As the United States adopts a more assertive approach to economic security and technological competition, it must adapt its energy policy. These efforts promise an economy that will be better able to weather global challenges, revitalizing regions with innovative technology and productive jobs and establishing a strong lead in twenty-first-century technologies. However, realizing the potential of these industries will require more energy, placing demands on the electric grid and necessitating a smart approach in order to be successful.</p> +<p>Synthetic media misuse risks intensifying the damage done to the public’s trust in information by making it harder to distinguish fact from fiction. One can easily imagine how the viral AI-generated image of an explosion near the Pentagon, mentioned at the beginning of this brief, may have resulted in more significant adverse effects in a less epistemically secure society. Decreased public trust in information from institutional sources could have made later debunking by authorities less successful or take longer, enabling the falsehood to disseminate further and permitting greater knock-on effects to occur, such as more extensive financial volatility than just a brief dip in the stock market, which in turn could have led to civil unrest or facilitated the ability of foreign adversaries to leverage the unrest to their benefit.</p> -<p>Under current policies, the United States is building a new industrial base in strategic technologies. Enabled by recent legislation – the CHIPS and Science Act and the Inflation Reduction Act – semiconductor fabs and battery factories now account for 60 percent of manufacturing investment. As these factories come online, they will introduce substantial new power requirements, as documented in a recent report from CSIS. The new TSMC semiconductor fabrication facility in Arizona will require more than a gigawatt of power. In Georgia, where manufacturing is a key driver of economic growth, planners are expecting six gigawatts of additional demand, more than twice what was added by the recently finished Units 3 and 4 at the Vogtle nuclear plant.</p> +<p>There are signs that the increased prevalence of synthetic media has already begun to damage the public’s epistemic trust. Research shows that repeated exposure to unlabelled synthetic media makes individuals more susceptible to misidentifying future synthetic content as well as reduces individuals’ confidence in the truthfulness of all information. More recently, it was discovered that Russia’s extensive use of AI-enabled deceptions throughout the still ongoing Russo-Ukrainian conflict has had a detrimental effect on Ukrainian citizens’ confidence in information, making them significantly more skeptical of the truthfulness of all digital content they encounter online. Even just the existence of synthetic media itself has begun to erode aspects of the public’s trust, as evident in the increasing frequency of authentic media being wrongly dismissed as AI-generated. The trend has become especially prevalent in information-contested spaces, such as political elections or the Israel-Hamas conflict, where both sides have frequently decried real digital content as being fake. As the synthetic media threat landscape continues to expand, these adverse effects will likely only grow stronger. Ultimately, it is the convergence of these immediate and systemic threats that makes countering weaponized synthetic media a national security imperative.</p> -<p>For a sector that has seen negligible growth over the past two decades, these are substantial increases, and they do not even account for the rapidly growing power demands involved in artificial intelligence (AI). Akin to factories, AI datacenters transform data and electricity into valuable tokens. The more value AI creates, the greater its associated power demands become. Optimistic projections suggest AI datacenters could consume up to 10 percent of grid capacity by the end of the decade. Such an expansion has the potential to generate immense value but could be hindered by an inability to provide sufficient energy.</p> +<h3 id="types-of-ai-enabled-deceptions">Types of AI-Enabled Deceptions</h3> -<p>To achieve these goals, it is important to continue reducing greenhouse gas emissions. The companies driving growth in AI and advanced manufacturing are committed to clean power. And policymakers, on a bipartisan basis, recognize the advantages of producing goods with lower emissions. Compared to adversaries like Russia and China, the United States produces key strategic goods with fewer emissions. As global markets increasingly prioritize sustainability, cleanliness will become synonymous with competitiveness.</p> +<p>The current synthetic media threat landscape can be broadly divided into six categories of AI-enabled deceptions: gray zone warfare, espionage and surveillance, military deception, domestic politics, nonconsensual intimate media, and financial crime. However, with the technology’s continued advancement, it is anticipated that the depth and breadth of AI-enabled deception incidents will also expand and diversify, including hate crimes, falsification of evidence in legal proceedings, corporate espionage or sabotage, and more. To better illustrate the contours of today’s landscape, a selection of particularly noteworthy AI deception incidents that have taken place across the six major categories have been shared below.</p> -<p>The next administration will be well-positioned to build upon recent industry innovations and policy developments, leveraging U.S. natural resources and ingenuity. Three key areas are particularly important to unlocking the United States’ economic and strategic potential:</p> +<h4 id="gray-zone-warfare">Gray Zone Warfare</h4> + +<p>Synthetic media has been increasingly weaponized within gray zone warfare, or actions that take place in the murky waters between regular statecraft and outright warfare, such as information warfare, cyberattacks, and political and economic coercion. Examples of AI-enabled deception incidents that have occurred in the gray zone include the following:</p> <ul> <li> - <p><strong>Transmission:</strong> Building extensive transmission infrastructure reduces power grid costs by increasing efficiency and better utilizing assets. Transmission infrastructure connects markets to geographically diverse power plants, reducing costs during normal operations, keeping the lights on during emergencies, and delivering renewable power from remote regions to manufacturing hubs, thereby reducing both costs and emissions while also contributing to carbon competitiveness. Accelerating the build out of transmission capability requires political leadership to create urgency for delivering these complicated projects, particularly at the state level and through federal permitting reform, which will pay off in future economic opportunities. The Bipartisan Infrastructure Law authorized the Department of Energy (DOE) $2.5 billion for transmission, which will spur a few projects, but the large societal benefits from increased transmission justify tax credit support akin to what is already offered for wind and solar projects.</p> + <p>State-affiliated influence operations have disseminated synthetic images and videos as part of propaganda or information campaigns surrounding major political focal points or noteworthy events, including elections in Europe and Taiwan, U.S. politics, the Russo-Ukrainian and Israeli-Hamas conflicts, and the 2023 Maui wildfires.</p> </li> <li> - <p><strong>Nuclear Energy:</strong> Expanding the nuclear fleet is a medium-term option for meeting new demand. Nuclear power emits no greenhouse gas emissions and is highly reliable, making it a key target for technology companies, which are already contracting to restart old reactors. Building new nuclear power plants will be challenging, and potentially expensive, but necessary to achieve national goals. New projects face substantial costs and the risk of budget overruns, but new subsidies are meant to solidify the business case for nuclear energy production and to support project development. As new ventures are deployed, the consequent supply chains and worker experience will reduce costs for later projects and also decrease the timeline and project uncertainty that has plagued projects in the past.</p> + <p>Real-time face-swapping software was used to successfully impersonate Kyiv mayor Vitali Klitschko in a series of video calls with several mayors of major European cities as part of a targeted influence operation.</p> </li> <li> - <p><strong>Natural Gas:</strong> Following the shale revolution, natural gas has become the mainstay of the U.S. energy mix. High supplies and low prices mean that at least part of new demand will be met by new gas power plants, the building of which can be left to the market. However, to ensure the gas industry’s longevity and to address related climate concerns, policymakers will need to prioritize carbon capture technology, especially by supporting the development of CO2 pipelines linking new generators with storage reservoirs. Congress has already created the 45Q tax credits to incentivize the capturing of carbon, and the DOE is supporting first-of-a-kind projects to reduce costs. Getting ahead on this infrastructure will enable the United States to meet immediate demands for natural gas in a way that supports longer-term ambitions for sustainability.</p> + <p>An alleged AI-generated sex tape of a presidential candidate in the 2023 Turkish elections, purportedly published by an adversarial state, was widely circulated, leading to the candidate’s withdrawal from the race.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Chinese, Iranian, North Korean, and Russian state-affiliated actors were found to have been manufacturing synthetic content for spear phishing as part of cyberattacks they were planning to conduct.</p> </li> </ul> -<p>To seize these new opportunities, the United States must confront familiar challenges: maintaining affordability, reducing emissions, and protecting reliability. By pursuing immediately available options today and zero-carbon options in the medium term, the United States can realize progress toward strategic goals and improve its competitiveness without sacrificing climate outcomes. By uniting bipartisan support and implementing smart, regionally adaptable solutions, the United States can seize this opportunity to ensure a sustainable and prosperous future for all.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/kW7uO1I.png" alt="image09" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Fake news channel clips featuring AI-generated TV anchors were shared by bot accounts online as a part of pro-Chinese information campaigns.</strong> Source: <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/02/07/technology/artificial-intelligence-training-deepfake.html">Adam Satariano and Paul Mozur, “The People Onscreen Are Fake. The Disinformation Is Real.,” New York Times, February 7, 2022</a>.</em></p> -<h3 id="intellectual-property-rights-and-the-future-of-us-technological-leadership">Intellectual Property Rights and the Future of U.S. Technological Leadership</h3> +<h4 id="espionage-and-surveillance">Espionage and Surveillance</h4> -<blockquote> - <h4 id="kirti-gupta">Kirti Gupta</h4> -</blockquote> +<p>Synthetic media has also been leveraged to a lesser extent, at least to public knowledge, for espionage and surveillance operations by states and the private cyber surveillance industry, strengthening online impersonations of real or fictitious individuals to obtain confidential information from targets. Examples of AI-enabled espionage and surveillance incidents include the following:</p> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Policymakers face the challenge of striking the appropriate balance between incentivizing investment in risky R&amp;D while ensuring that any social cost due to potential misuse of the IP system is minimized.</code></em></strong></p> +<ul> + <li> + <p>Synthetic media was used in a fictitious Washington think tank employee’s made-up LinkedIn account, which was suspected of being run as part of a Russian espionage operation.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Private cyber-intelligence companies used hundreds of fake accounts of social media content, impersonating activists, journalists, and young women, to covertly gather information from targets, including IP addresses and personal contact information.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>State-affiliated actors used social engineering assisted by large language models (LLM) to manipulate targets and facilitate the collection and analysis of open-source information.</p> + </li> +</ul> -<p>The global competition for leadership in technologies critical for the economic and national security of nation states – from semiconductors to artificial intelligence and quantum computing – is well understood. A less well-known pillar is the intellectual property (IP) system, which is crucial for incentivizing and enabling the innovation necessary for this technological leadership. This article sheds a spotlight on why and how IP plays that essential role.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/easgrTO.png" alt="image10" /> +<em>▲ <strong>This fake LinkedIn account of a fictitious Washington think tank employee, suspected of being used for a Russian espionage operation, was found to have used a synthetic image for the profile photo.</strong> Source: <a href="https://apnews.com/article/ap-top-news-artificial-intelligence-social-platforms-think-tanks-politics-bc2f19097a4c4fffaa00de6770b8a60d">Raphael Satter, “Experts: Spy used AI-generated face to connect with targets,” AP News, June 13, 2019</a>.</em></p> -<p>The IP system is designed to incentivize innovation by granting the investor temporary property rights for an invention or a creation. The patent system is critical to incentivizing research and development (R&amp;D) in some areas that require massive upfront investment and have uncertain prospects for success. One example is biopharmaceuticals, which requires years of R&amp;D for discovery, in addition to a long regulatory process to get approval for a new drug to enter the market. The design of semiconductor chips is another example, as it requires highly skilled and specialized workers and large upfront costs to develop new and improved cutting-edge circuit design for specific functionalities.</p> +<h4 id="military-deception">Military Deception</h4> -<p>If an invention is finally successful in the marketplace, the patent owner enjoys a temporary right to exclude others from making, using, or selling that invention. Patent owners can also license their invention and grant these rights to another, thereby generating revenues from the initial R&amp;D investment and enabling the diffusion of new technology. On the flip side, there have been concerns about misuse of the patent system by patent aggregators who allegedly amass a number of patents that may not be valid (i.e., erroneously granted in the first place), invoke patent protections in instances where they do not apply, or amass patents of limited value. These patent aggregators are not seeking to develop or market inventions but rather aim to extract quick monetary settlements from the patent implementers, who are seeking to avoid litigation costs or a temporary disruption of their products.</p> +<p>Although the adversarial use of synthetic media for targeted military operations has so far been limited in practice, AI-enabled military deception remains a topic of great concern due to the large number of ways in which the technology could be leveraged to gain a battlefield advantage. This includes creating entirely fictitious events to alter or skew enemy intelligence, impersonating military personnel to falsify or muddle orders, and manufacturing noise to mask one’s actions from an adversary or to overwhelm and confuse them. There are two particularly noteworthy examples of AI-enabled military deception incidents:</p> -<p>Policymakers face the challenge of striking the appropriate balance between incentivizing investment in risky R&amp;D while ensuring that any social cost due to potential misuse of the IP system is minimized. The United States’ IP system goes through phases. It is sometimes characterized as too strong, granting property rights for “weak” inventions and creating unnecessary costs and uncertainty for implementers. At other times, it is seen as too weak, lacking the tools for proper enforcement of the property rights that incentivize innovation.</p> +<ul> + <li> + <p>AI-generated content featuring Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelensky has been published and circulated extensively on social media to sow confusion and discord, including a synthetic video of him calling for his troops to immediately lay down their arms and surrender to Russian forces.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Russian radio and TV networks were hacked to air fictitious AI-generated emergency broadcasts of Russian president Vladimir Putin declaring martial law due to Ukrainian forces invading Russian territory, causing some to actually evacuate in confusion.</p> + </li> +</ul> -<p>If history serves as a guide, it is pointing in the direction of a revival of the IP regime in the United States. The U.S. Chamber of Commerce maintains the Global IP Index, which ranks countries based on the robustness of their IP system; in recent years, the United States slid to number 13, before climbing back up again to first position. A 2011 study on the economic cost to the United States of IP infringement from China received a lot of attention. Moreover, injunctive relief – sought by patent owners in courtrooms to stop infringers from copying their inventions or copyrighted material – has become increasingly rare. The U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO), responsible for granting patents, can also invalidate patents via serial rounds of challenges on the validity of a patent while such litigation is pending. In response to this environment, several legislative proposals are currently in different phases of markup in Congress. These pieces of legislation involve expanding the eligibility of patentable subject matter, strengthening the enforceability of patents, and limiting serial challenges to a granted patent while it is in the process of a legal challenge based on potential infringement.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/DbhTCki.png" alt="image11" /> +<em>▲ <strong>A social media post shows the airing of an emergency Russian TV broadcast featuring an AI-generated video that falsely depicted Russian president Vladamir Putin declaring martial law and calling for evacuation due to the Ukrainian invasion.</strong> Source: <a href="https://x.com/AlexKokcharov/status/1665709387648827397">Alex Kokcharov (@Alex Kokcharov), X post, June 15, 2023, 6:17 am</a>.</em></p> -<p>The U.S. IP regime does not exist in isolation. Recently, the European Union established the Unified Patent Court, with one of its goals being fast-tracking patent-challenge trials. China has been strengthening its IP regime, including by establishing four specialized IP courts in the last two decades. Since IP rights are often licensed on a global basis to reduce transaction costs, how one country enforces those rights directly impacts others. The IP enforcement regime of the United States needs to become stronger and faster to avoid litigation of disputes around global IP portfolios moving to other jurisdictions.</p> +<h4 id="domestic-politics">Domestic Politics</h4> -<p>The United States is currently a leader in several critical technologies that rely on revenues generated from the licensing of IP rights in global markets. Most of the innovation in the United States is driven by R&amp;D investments from the private sector, which must be incentivized to invest in long-term R&amp;D. Technological leadership is the result of long-term, consistent R&amp;D investment, and the United States must continue incentivizing the private sector so that the country remains a technological leader going forward.</p> - -<p>If the United States has an innovation agenda – that is, if it aims to invest and lead in critical emerging technologies to bolster U.S. economic and national security – IP must have a prominent role. A strong IP enforcement regime, with clear boundaries around IP rights and which can ensure quality inventions are granted those rights, helps the inventors and implementers, who are both needed for an innovation ecosystem to thrive. The next administration should consider IP as a part of the broader innovation agenda and not view it as an issue of technical obscurity to be treated in isolation. A strong IP system works for everyone. The United States can continue to lead in R&amp;D-intensive innovation and product development and minimize infringement, especially outside of U.S. borders, by pursuing three key actions: (1) strengthening the USPTO with resources to ensure that only quality (and valid) inventions get the appropriate IP protection; (2) streamlining the system of repeat validity challenges on already granted inventions; and (3) making progress on the legislative proposals for enhancing the enforceability of legitimate IP rights.</p> - -<h3 id="the-necessity-of-a-national-interest-account">The Necessity of a National Interest Account</h3> - -<blockquote> - <h4 id="adam-frost">Adam Frost</h4> -</blockquote> - -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">The next administration should therefore make a counterintuitive move and immediately propose structural changes that increase its options for execution. This is where a National Interest Account should be a top priority.</code></em></strong></p> - -<p>It is no surprise that the next administration will immediately confront a knot of challenges at the intersection of economic growth, technological advantage, national security, and foreign policy. Right now, excellent thinkers are searching for new frameworks to conceptualize this complexity and to inform the strategies and policies of the next president. This is important intellectual work.</p> - -<p>The more urgent work for the next administration, however, involves immediately proposing reforms that increase the government’s options for executing its strategies, whenever they are determined.</p> - -<p>And a National Interest Account should be proposal number one.</p> - -<h4 id="execution-before-strategy">Execution Before Strategy?</h4> - -<p>The “usual path” of strategy development is well travelled. After a new administration takes office, it formally begins translating the president’s platform into specific strategies, plans, and policies.</p> - -<p>How you define the question dictates the answer. And how the next administration conceptualizes and then articulates a strategic approach to the complex and interdependent challenges of competition for economic growth, technological advantage, national security, and foreign influence is no easy task. This is far from settled, and the task of getting the ideas right should not be underestimated.</p> - -<p>But in government, ideas are insufficient and federal strategy development is a long process. Beneath every national security strategy or executive order lie months of intellectual and bureaucratic work. Moreover, for new officials, there is the addition of discovery – learning the myriad stakeholders that require coordination, which adds months of meetings and memos.</p> - -<p>In the end, the “usual path” will produce the way ahead. And the president will endorse or sign the bureaucratic manifestations of their will.</p> - -<p>Then the usual thing will happen. An authority will call a meeting synonymous with “next steps” and begin to inventory all the interagency “tools” – existing authorities and resources – needed to execute the just-signed strategy. These will inevitably include existing innovations such as the CHIPS Act Program Office; the rechartered Development Finance Corporation (DFC); the reauthorized Export–Import Bank (EXIM), with its China and Transformational Exports Program (CTEP); the revitalized Loan Program Office at the Department of Energy; and the always-included Defense Production Act (DPA).</p> - -<p>The laws, policies, and regulations that govern how the executive branch executes its authorities and allots the funds granted are, to put it mildly, labyrinthine. Every “tool” has its own independent constraints, and months will be spent divining workarounds or exceptions, all of which carry risks. Thus, execution inevitably becomes a compromise between the ideas and what can actually be done or, worse, a mere rebranding of what is already being done.</p> - -<p>To explicitly state the open secret: good ideas are hard, but executing is harder.</p> - -<p>The next administration should therefore make a counterintuitive move and immediately propose structural changes that increase its options for execution.</p> - -<p>This is where a National Interest Account should be a top priority.</p> - -<h4 id="what-is-a-national-interest-account">What Is a National Interest Account?</h4> - -<p>The concept is simple, and shamelessly plagiarized from Australia, a close U.S. ally.</p> - -<p>Were Congress to authorize a tightly scoped, time-limited, and dollar-capped National Interest Account with strenuous reporting requirements, a president could direct government agencies, like those listed above, to support loans deemed in the national interest.</p> - -<p>Why? Restrictive laws and Office of Management and Budget (OMB) regulations govern the lending of the various federal departments and agencies. Every loan carries the risk of nonpayment, and those who approve the loans must be conservative in the credit risks they accept on behalf of the taxpayers. This is right and proper.</p> - -<p>But many regulations were created in a different time, and for different problems. In today’s competition for economic growth, technological advantage, national security, and foreign influence, our challenges cross old models, while our tools do not – yet.</p> - -<p>With a good interagency process, a National Interest Account responsibly shifts approving riskier loans and their related issues to the wider perspectives of Senate-confirmed Cabinet members, including the Department of the Treasury and OMB, from the more insular individual agencies. With a National Interest Account, both determinations – whether a loan actually is in the national interest and whether the risk of that loan is acceptable – would be made with the larger policy and national-interest pictures in mind. Meanwhile, the government lenders would remain within their remit and simply execute their authorities – providing credit assessments, portfolio management, and finance.</p> - -<p>For example, if China’s economic coercion of an ally or partner is to be effective, the impact of refusal must be severe enough to coerce the political outcome. This affects the macroeconomic outlook of the coerced, thereby raising the risk of any loan to that market. Today, good credit analysis would likely tell the lender to walk away. And I frequently had to tell my colleagues at the Departments of State and Defense precisely that. But a National Interest Account could allow agencies like EXIM to refer such cases to the cabinet, where the merits and risks could be deliberated, thereby creating an option for action that today simply does not exist.</p> - -<h4 id="the-urgency-of-optionality">The Urgency of Optionality</h4> - -<p>It is counterintuitive to prioritize reforming the ways and means before we know the ends. But whatever an administrations strategy, it will rise or fall on execution. Concepts such as a National Interest Account create options to achieve the president’s ends where today there are few. Thus, the next administration should urgently prioritize structural reforms that affect implementation concurrent with the development of strategy – or the best of ideas risk remaining only that.</p> - -<h2 id="technology-cooperation-competition-and-economic-relations">Technology Cooperation, Competition, and Economic Relations</h2> - -<h3 id="indias-ascending-role-for-us-economic-security">India’s Ascending Role for U.S. Economic Security</h3> - -<blockquote> - <h4 id="richard-rossow">Richard Rossow</h4> -</blockquote> - -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">The next U.S. administration should take the time to meet with international partners such as India before staking out policy positions related to domestic industrial and trade policy. Ignoring U.S. partners in the early days could have repercussions when U.S. officials engage on vital global issues later.</code></em></strong></p> - -<p>While U.S. elections are primarily driven by domestic issues, the policy positions taken by the winner are relevant for a wide array of global partners. In the case of India, for example, the United States and India share concerns about overreliance on China as a dominant supplier of manufactured goods. Consequently, Indian firms have been ramping up investments in the United States, actions significant for both countries moving forward. The next U.S. administration should take the time to meet with international partners such as India before staking out policy positions related to domestic industrial and trade policy. Ignoring U.S. partners in the early days could have repercussions when U.S. officials engage on vital global issues later.</p> - -<p>A deeper economic relationship with India is in the United States’ interests for several reasons. First, India is expected to continue growing faster than any other large nation in the foreseeable future, with growth expected to top 7 percent in 2024. BlackRock recently predicted that India will leap over Japan and Germany to become the world’s third-largest economy in just three years. In 2023, Goldman Sachs predicted that the Indian economy will be the world’s second-largest by 2075, at an estimated $52.5 trillion. For U.S. companies looking to grow, India’s topline numbers draw attention – even if the practicalities of doing business in India remain challenging at times.</p> - -<p>Second, Indian companies compose a growing source of investment into the United States. As the Confederation of Indian Industry highlighted in their Indian Roots, American Soil report in 2023, India has invested $80 billion into the United States, employing over 400,000 people. In 2023 alone, India added $4.7 billion in fresh foreign direct investment (FDI) into the United States, about 3 percent of inward FDI from all sources that year. In the coming years, as the Indian economy continues to grow, this number will also likely grow substantially as well. Indian firms are even taking advantage of U.S. industrial programs like the Inflation Reduction Act. India’s Vikram Solar, for example, last year announced plans for a $1.5 billion solar-manufacturing footprint in the United States. Policy stability is key to ensuring that investment plans can be executed, and continue to be made.</p> - -<p>Securing a strong commercial relationship with India is vital for another critical reason. Akin to how the U.S. defense industrial base has looked at ways to improve India’s domestic defense production to help India wean itself off Russian equipment, the United States can support India’s interests in weaning its technology sector off of Chinese imports. China (plus Hong Kong) is India’s largest goods trade partner, with $148 billion in bilateral trade in FY 2023, resulting in a trade deficit for India of nearly $100 billion. Paired with India’s expected growth rates outlined above, helping India reduce imports from China will impair China’s industrial expansion significantly. To Chinese officials, India must be considered a vital economic engine to maintain export-led growth in the future. The United States can be a strong partner to “Make in India” and avoid this fate.</p> - -<p>Finally, U.S. policymakers should seek new platforms to share practical experiences, and possibly some level of policy equivalence, in screening Chinese investments in advanced technologies. While India may be years away from becoming a significant producer of advanced technologies – such as quantum computers, robotics, leading-edge semiconductors, and 6G communications equipment – India is already at the forefront of the research and engineering that fuels these sectors. For example, India’s information technology services exports are expected to reach $199 billion this year. The U.S. government continues to build new programs with India that will further enhance a shared research and development agenda in key technologies such as the 2023 collaboration between the U.S. National Science Foundation and India’s Department of Biotechnology. While such steps expand bilateral cooperation, they may also introduce new vulnerabilities without appropriate oversight measures.</p> - -<p>Successive U.S. administrations have built a unique architecture of high-level dialogues that provide a vital platform for discussing trade and technology issues, including the U.S.-India initiative on Critical and Emerging Technologies and the many workstreams under the Quad framework. These forums have resulted in important agreements such as the 2023 U.S.-India Semiconductor Supply Chain and Innovation Partnership memorandum of understanding.</p> - -<p>India is not the only fast-growing, nontraditional U.S. partner that will require the attention of policymakers as U.S. industrial strategy and trade policy is reviewed. For example, Vietnam, Indonesia, and the Philippines – large and fast-growing countries – together have nearly 500 million people and a combined GDP that is over 60 percent of India’s.</p> - -<p>The next U.S. administration will likely enjoy a full four-year term with its counterpart government in India, which has its next national election in 2029. According to the Pew Research Center, the economy continues to be the primary concern for supporters of both presidential candidates. Initial policy pushes would understandably seek to further improve domestic economic prospects, particularly in manufacturing. Yet foreign policy also ranks relatively high for supporters of both candidates. With key partners across the Indo-Pacific, policy stability, particularly in ways that encourage two-way economic integration with key partners, is important. The last four years have seen a range of important new agreements and robust commercial announcements that both widen and deepen the United States’ economic partnership, ranging from microchips to vaccines. While the days of free trade agreements may not be returning any time soon, the United States can forge meaningful linkages with like-minded nations by avoiding protectionism and encouraging bilateral investment.</p> - -<h3 id="making-infrastructure-in-the-indo-pacific-a-success">Making Infrastructure in the Indo-Pacific a Success</h3> - -<blockquote> - <h4 id="erin-murphy">Erin Murphy</h4> -</blockquote> - -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Infrastructure requires patient capital and investing. The lifecycle of an infrastructure project can take years and does not follow the neat timelines of summits and high-level meetings that crave big announcements.</code></em></strong></p> - -<p>Though U.S. administrations have continuously railed against China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), they have been very slow in offering a clear alternative to the quick contracts and massive financing offered by China to infrastructure projects globally. Recently, however, a proliferation of initiatives and partnerships have been introduced that aim to bring together partners and allies, leverage their respective tools and strengths, and convince the private sector to mobilize their own capital into developing economies. Though laudable, the United States – and the Biden administration in particular – will have to ensure a politically transition-proof strategy that is concerted, committed, focused, and continuous in order to provide the trillions of dollars in infrastructure funding needed in just the Indo-Pacific alone, as well as to future-proof these economies from debt sustainability, climate change, and labor and industry transformations.</p> - -<p>Inducive economic tools and strategic investments are now key elements in engaging in economic security in the Indo-Pacific. The Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF), the G7’s Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment (PGI), the Quad, and the Trilateral Infrastructure Partnership (TIP), to name just a few, all feature efforts to target collaborative infrastructure financing, manifest tangible U.S. commitment to the region, and compete effectively with the BRI.</p> - -<p>But the United States is contending with an actor that does not play by the rules. China can offer projects and products at attractive prices and speeds, directing its state-owned companies and banks to strategic markets. Though the BRI has had some initial successes in the race for infrastructure, the United States need not mimic the way China does business. Yet the United States does need to reform its own operations. The BRI’s ballooning debt and unhappy customers reveal why that approach is problematic, and those issues are pushing China to change how it invests. In contending with the challenge offered by China in infrastructure project investments globally, the United States must maintain standards and act with transparency, especially with taxpayer (or anyone’s) dollars.</p> - -<p>Sustaining the continuity and efficacy of the infrastructure initiatives that the Biden administration has begun requires a change in mindset and the deployment of the tapestry of tools available in a coordinated and cohesive way.</p> - -<p>Infrastructure requires patient capital and investing. The lifecycle of an infrastructure project can take years and does not follow the neat timelines of summits and high-level meetings that crave big announcements. Feasibility studies, permitting, due diligence, securing financing, and then getting the actual project started and completed all take a lot of time and money. There are ways to speed up the process, including ensuring transparency; lowering costs around undertaking environmental and social impact assessments in developing countries; and ensuring the host country has clear rules and regulations. Some of that work is already being done – working with IPEF signatories on tax and rule-of-law transparency and encouraging the Blue Dot Network that promotes high-quality standards in infrastructure – and the United States should double down on these efforts.</p> - -<p>This leads to another aspect in need of attention: trade and market access. Though the pendulum on trade in the United States has swung against it, this – especially market access – is what Asian countries want, particularly IPEF signatories. Trade with market access can be provided to those that meet IPEF standards and thus encourage domestic regulatory and governance reforms. This is a more inducive carrot than providing capacity building for tax reform. IPEF’s Latin American counterpart, the Americas Partnership for Economic Prosperity (APEP), mirrors much of IPEF. Though it also does not offer market access, the United States has bilateral free trade agreements (FTAs) with 8 of the 11 APEP countries, making economic partnerships more holistic and durable. Although former president Trump has threatened to get rid of IPEF and could do the same with APEP, the FTAs will remain in place, thereby guaranteeing ongoing economic engagement. These agreements shape the framework for addressing developments in critical sectors, such as decarbonization and digital trade, but in order to be politically transition-proof, they will have to include more tangible carrots and durability.</p> - -<p>Another obstacle to the U.S. initiatives involves debt sustainability, particularly as the majority of BRI recipient countries are in debt distress. Indebted countries do not want to take on hundreds of millions of dollars in additional debt financing, even with concessional lending or generous repayment terms. In order to address these debt sustainability issues and critical infrastructure needs, the United States will need to work with the Paris Club through various multilateral debt treatment initiatives and via blended financing opportunities.</p> - -<p>Concerns about debt and debt sustainability also influence how the Export-Import Bank of the United States (EXIM) is able to build out its pipeline and be more competitive in the telecommunications, renewable energy, and semiconductor arenas. EXIM so far has come up short in maximizing its China and Transformational Exports Program (CTEP), partly hampered by statutory requirements to (1) ensure that loans will have a “reasonable assurance of repayment” and (2) maintain a 2 percent statutory default cap. For EXIM to be more competitive, take on greater risks, and not self-select out of deals, the default cap should be raised on critical industries, or at least on those projects that fall under the CTEP umbrella.</p> - -<p>Cofinancing or collaborative financing is nice on paper but nearly impossible in practice. No host government or project lead wants to sign multiterm contracts with governments and multilateral financing agencies. There is also competition for a small number of viable projects. Overcoming this concern involves aligning due diligence practices and deploying single joint-term sheets to cut down on paperwork and bureaucracy. The United States and its partners should also find where they best fit along the project lifecycle. As noted above, infrastructure projects have multiple phases and angles, each of which could play to the different strengths of each player.</p> - -<p>Mobilizing private sector capital has been, and will continue to be, a challenge. The U.S. government needs to more deeply engage with the private sector to determine what it would take for private actors to invest in strategic markets, instead of focusing solely on implementing policy it thinks will move that capital. Private sector financing already is being carried out in the energy transition space, most notably in Indonesia’s Just Energy Transition Partnership (JETP), with potential JETP programs extending to Vietnam and the Philippines. The partnership intends to mobilize an initial $20 billion in public and private financing over a three-to-five-year period using a mix of grants, concessional loans, market-rate loans, guarantees, and private investments. The JETP includes $10 billion in public sector pledges and a $126 million commitment from the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation to an Indonesian geothermal company. The signatories of the JETP also committed to help mobilize and facilitate $10 billion in private investments from an initial set of private financial institutions, including some of the world’s largest private banks. Since the launch, a total of approximately $281.6 million has been allocated as grants or technical assistance across roughly 40 programs, managed across five financial institutions and implemented by eight different executing agencies.</p> - -<p>Even if a project, an initiative, or even a policy is a strategic imperative for the U.S. government, the same may not be true for the private sector. Some markets will still be too risky and the return on investment too unlikely for the private sector, which looks to ensure its investments are repaid and profitable. Working with the private sector, either locally or multinationally, on their needs in undertaking these projects is a critical step in shaping the correct tools to pursue infrastructure investments globally.</p> - -<p>Pieces of the foundation for addressing critical infrastructure needs are there, but it will take sustained focus, leadership, and telling a good story to get it done.</p> - -<h3 id="can-the-united-states-have-a-trade-policy-without-market-access">Can the United States Have a Trade Policy Without Market Access?</h3> - -<blockquote> - <h4 id="william-a-reinsch">William A. Reinsch</h4> -</blockquote> - -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">More market access for U.S. products can only be obtained by providing more access for imports into the United States. There is no free lunch in trade negotiations.</code></em></strong></p> - -<p>A hallmark of the Biden administration’s trade policy has been its refusal to negotiate trade agreements that include market access – the reduction of tariffs or non-tariff barriers to facilitate trade. The administration has occasionally said it supports more market access for U.S. products, but it has failed to accept the reality that trade negotiations are inevitably reciprocal. More market access for U.S. products can only be obtained by providing more access for imports into the United States. There is no free lunch in trade negotiations.</p> - -<p>When asked what they wanted out of the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity (IPEF) agreement, Asian participants in CSIS’s research responded politely that they were looking for “tangible benefits.” This is code for “what’s in it for us?,”which is exactly what every experienced trade negotiator asks. The answer from the Biden administration has been “very little.” The same thing has happened with other ongoing regional negotiations – the Americas Partnership for Economic Prosperity (APEP) and the U.S.-EU Trade and Technology Council (TTC).</p> - -<p>There are two reasons for this reluctance to take up market access. One is political – a desire to avoid intraparty warfare between the Democratic left and center. (The former sees trade as imports that harm U.S. workers. The latter views it as exports that promote growth and jobs.) The second reason is philosophical – past trade agreements are perceived as having primarily benefited large corporations and their executives at the expense of workers.</p> - -<p>Both arguments lead to the same safe choice: pursuing trade agreements that do not contain “tangible benefits.” The dilemma for the current administration has been that trade agreements are not just about trade – they are symbols of the relationship between the participants, and symbols have power. An ambitious, binding agreement is proof that the United States is committed to ongoing engagement with the other party (or parties) on equitable terms, proof that would be welcomed in Asia, Latin America, and Europe. That was the rationale for the Trans-Pacific Partnership agreement, and the Trump administration’s rejection of it was widely seen in Asia as indicating a lack of interest in and commitment to the region on the part of the United States. That action left the United States without a policy and led to pressure on the Biden administration to develop a new economic approach to Asia, and subsequently to the Americas.</p> - -<p>Caught between demands for a policy that demonstrated U.S. commitment and reluctance to pursue an agreement that involved any meaningful market concessions, the administration came up with IPEF and APEP, both of which have been derided as unambitious agreements. The situation was made worse in November 2023 when the administration pulled back its support for the trade pillar of the IPEF agreement in the face of opposition from progressive Democratic members of Congress. While the trade pillar is technically not dead; it is on life support, and it appears that only the other three pillars – supply chains, decarbonization and sustainability, and anti-corruption and taxation – will survive. Those are not unimportant, but they are also not trade agreements. The origin story of the TTC is different, but the result is the same – much talk about cooperation with few tangible results beyond an impressive display of unity in sanctioning Russia.</p> - -<p>Meanwhile, China is not standing still in the competition for regional influence. It has applied to join the Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership and is using its membership in the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership to expand its market access while the United States is, essentially, “just watching.”</p> - -<p>What does this mean for the future? Neither presidential candidate is likely to return to conventional trade agreements, although, ironically, Trump may be more willing to start new negotiations than Harris. Instead, there is discussion about alternatives to what is currently on the table. One possibility is to focus negotiations on regulatory harmonization or mutual recognition on the theory that aligning regulations on commerce will increase trade. There is something to that. Standards conformance would make it easier for products to cross borders. Moreover, such mutual recognition could allow professionals like lawyers and accountants to work in partner countries and thus increase services trade. The problem is that those negotiations are not easy. Regulators in every country like the way they do things and resist being told that they must do them differently, or that they have to recognize that someone else’s rules are as good as theirs.</p> - -<p>A second alternative is to focus on individual sectors – such as critical minerals – when making trade agreements. This is also a good idea, but like the first, it will be more difficult in practice than in theory. Countries that have minerals are, of course, interested in selling them, but they also want to capture more of the value added by processing the resources and manufacturing the products that contain them. If the United States is only interested in extraction, the negotiations may not get far.</p> - -<p>Ultimately, success on any of these fronts will require an attitude change. If the United States only wants to receive and not give, any negotiation is doomed. The important word here is an old one – reciprocity. It was popular in trade debates in the 1980s when it meant that the United States should insist that other countries match concessions with its own. Today, the situation is reversed: other countries are demanding that the United States match their concessions with some of its own. Until the United States is willing to do that, progress on trade agreements will remain elusive.</p> - -<h3 id="rethinking-competition-with-china-on-clean-technologies">Rethinking Competition with China on Clean Technologies</h3> - -<blockquote> - <h4 id="ilaria-mazzocco">Ilaria Mazzocco</h4> -</blockquote> - -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">While China’s industrial policy does create significant market distortions, policymakers should spend more resources identifying gaps in the U.S. innovation ecosystem and focus more on U.S. competitive advantages.</code></em></strong></p> - -<p>U.S.-China technological competition is widespread and complex, but there is one technological sphere with a clear leader: Chinese companies are increasingly outperforming competitors in cost and quality when it comes to established clean technologies ranging from solar panels and lithium-ion batteries to electric vehicles (EVs). While the United States erects more barriers to keep out Chinese firms, it also needs to avoid technological isolation, contend with more competition on the international stage, and be prepared to compete in emerging and next-generation clean technologies.</p> - -<p>Many of Washington’s current policies vis-à-vis Chinese clean technology companies assume thattheir rise is predominantly, if not solely, driven by subsidies. However, this overlooks the broader context that enabled the development of these companies and technologies, including China’s massive effort to create markets for these goods over the past two decades and the role played by innovative companies integrated into global value chains. Focusing solely on overcapacity, for example, might lead observers to miss that it is the most successful and competitive manufacturers that are leading the export boom – such as EV maker BYD.</p> - -<p>While China’s industrial policy does create significant market distortions, policymakers should spend more resources identifying gaps in the U.S. innovation ecosystem and focus more on U.S. competitive advantages. As it implements its own industrial policy strategy, the United States should learn from its main competitor. For example, few policymakers focus on the high levels of automation in Chinese factories as a source of advantage even though the Chinese government has been explicitly supporting a shift toward more automation and the digitalization of manufacturing – and encouraging the use of Chinese-made industrial robots in the process. Talent, financing, and regional clusters also matter, as does stable policy committed to creating demand for these emerging technologies.</p> - -<p>The demand piece will be crucial moving forward for the technologies where the U.S. government hopes to compete with incumbent Chinese firms, such as batteries and next-generation technologies like green hydrogen and carbon capture and storage. There are ways to bolster demand in the United States, for example, by building out more infrastructure for charging, promoting grid modernization and expansion, and engaging in permitting reform. Yet, a protected market often lacks incentives for innovation and efficiency, which is why Washington should encourage U.S. companies to engage in head-to-head competition with Chinese firms.</p> - -<p>Chinese cleantech companies are already rapidly expanding internationally both in terms of exports and, increasingly, investment in third markets. Chinese firms are establishing factories beyond China’s borders for refined minerals, components, and final goods, including solar panels and EVs. Far from a hostile takeover, these types of investments are often in direct response to demands by host countries.</p> - -<p>The United States is not unique in deploying tariffs against Chinese-made goods, but it looks more isolated in seeking to contain, rather than attract, Chinese investment. European, Southeast Asian, Latin American, and various other governments have explicitly invited Chinese companies to localize their production, something firms are eager to do in order to access these countries’ markets or to export to third markets, including the United States.</p> - -<p>Another trend is also at play internationally. To improve their competitiveness, international companies are seeking to access Chinese clean technology through joint ventures, licensing deals, and even by acquiring shares in Chinese startup companies (as in the case of Stellantis and Volkswagen). This raises the possibility that much of the world, including some U.S. allies, may become more technologically integrated with China, not least because Chinese firms have some of the most advanced clean technologies on the market.</p> - -<p>Ultimately, if the United States wants to compete with China, it will need to draw the correct lessons from history. The successes of clean technology today owe much to globalized value chains that took advantage of China’s manufacturing ecosystem and large market in the past. If national security demands the exclusion of China from some or all of the United States’ clean technology value chains, policymakers will need to be clear-eyed about the costs and trade-offs and must identify strategic priorities. In some technologies, derisking may be possible in a limited fashion; in others, Washington may need to strengthen its linkages with other countries. Sectoral agreements on steel or critical minerals may provide interesting formats for potential partnerships on a sectoral basis. Still, the United States will need to think strategically about concessions over market access or joint research and development. Finally, a world where the largest economies engage in green industrial policy may eventually require finding a credible multilateral platform to discuss potential solutions to increasing trade disputes and distortions.</p> - -<h2 id="technology-statecraft-and-global-governance">Technology Statecraft and Global Governance</h2> - -<h3 id="building-a-tech-alliance">Building a Tech Alliance</h3> - -<blockquote> - <h4 id="james-a-lewis">James A. Lewis</h4> -</blockquote> - -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Europe is the crux of the tech-alliance problem. Countries like Japan and Australia are ready to work together with the United States, but there is a degree of ambivalence in Europe.</code></em></strong></p> - -<p>Calls to create some kind of technology alliance among democracies can be grounded in experience. We can identify requirements for developing an alliance and the actions needed to turn proposals into agreement. However, while alliances are easy to propose, they are hard to build.</p> - -<p>The first, and most important, of these requirements is there must be a shared problem that potential partners wish to address through collective action. Maintaining U.S. technological dominance is not a shared problem and probably not the best appeal for partnership. Similarly, calling for a crusade against China is not universally appealing in Europe or Asia.</p> - -<p>Europe is the crux of the tech-alliance problem. Countries like Japan and Australia are ready to work together with the United States, but there is a degree of ambivalence in Europe. There is also a degree of envy over U.S. technological success. European political culture is still shaped by the traumas of the twentieth century, and one explanation for extraterritorial regulation of U.S. technology companies is that Americans should “remember Europe’s history” and how it creates deep concerns for fundamental rights such as privacy. Others say that the purpose of technology regulation is, at least partially, to slow down U.S. companies so that European companies can catch up.</p> - -<p>Two phrases from Brussels highlight the problem: “European values” and “tech sovereignty” (or “digital sovereignty”). The first implies somewhat simplistically that there are different values in the United States and Europe. The second is more problematic. European sources say that tech sovereignty means not only independence from China, but also from the United States. Any proposal for a new alliance needs to show how it aligns with this EU goal of increased sovereignty.</p> - -<p>One way to overcome sovereignty issues is to build a new technology alliance upon existing structures such as the G7 or the Wassenaar Arrangement, but both would need to be modified – the G7 by adding counties like Australia, South Korea, and the Netherlands and Wassenaar by removing Russia and perhaps Hungary. Other groups, including AUKUS, the Quad, and the U.S.-EU Trade and Technology Council, are too narrow to serve as a foundation.</p> - -<p>Wassenaar, the current tech regime, has shortcomings. It is 30 years old, technological change challenges the scope of its controls, and it now lacks the strategic underpinnings that led to its creation (and Russia’s membership). Wassenaar was a response to the end of the Cold War and was designed for that context. While it is not in Western interests to dismantle Wassenaar, it does need to be supplemented by measures that go beyond export controls. Judging from past experience, the best route might start with the G7 and then add additional countries, since the Wassenaar Arrangement itself grew out of G7 talks.</p> - -<p>Who in the U.S. government makes the appeal for an alliance is also important. It must be a senior political figure from either the White House (preferably the president) or the secretary of state or treasury. In the past, the Department of Commerce has not been considered by other countries to have sufficient heft, although this may have changed in the Biden administration. In addition, many countries do not consider the Department of Defense the right counterpart for economic security issues. Other departments or staff-level proposals will not be taken seriously (remember that every government starts its review of a proposal by asking its embassy if the Americans are serious, and the embassies look for signs like senior-level interest, funding, and follow-through). Working an announcement into a presidential speech, even a single sentence, would help kickstart a technology alliance.</p> - -<p>A formal proposal must immediately follow a presidential announcement. It must lay out initial thinking on which technologies are covered and the security rationale for the alliance, as well as provide details on membership criteria, frequency of meetings, secretarial functions, and what a commitment would entail in terms of time, money, and personnel. The proposal cannot be set in stone but rather should be presented as a discussion paper, open to amendment by other participants. Further, the United States must go into discussions knowing the minimum it can accept and what is essential. Ideally this would be joint effort, specifically, a joint proposal coming from the United States, Japan, and a G7 European member.</p> - -<p>A technology alliance may need to have both positive and defensive goals to attract wide support, but combining these two ends can be difficult. For example, managing technology transfer to China is a central strategic consideration, but so is coordinating policies and promoting the development of emerging technologies. While AUKUS is too focused on defense to easily translate into a broader tech alliance, Pillars 1 (advanced capabilities, including cyber, AI, and quantum and 2 (industrial base cooperation) could provide useful precedent. The most challenging issue in any joint effort to jointly create new technologies is how the members will share funding and intellectual property rights.</p> - -<p>A final point to bear in mind is that it will take months, perhaps years, to create a new tech regime. An ideal time to start such an initiative is at the start of a new administration. The spring of 2025 could be the launch point.</p> - -<hr /> - -<p><strong>Navin Girishankar</strong> is president of the Economic Security and Technology Department at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). He leads a bipartisan team of over 40 resident staff and an extensive network of non-resident affiliates dedicated to providing independent research and strategic insights on economic and technology policies and their critical role in competitiveness as well as national security.</p> - -<p><strong>Gregory C. Allen</strong> is the director of the Wadhwani AI Center at CSIS. Mr. Allen’s expertise and professional experience spans AI, robotics, semiconductors, space technology, and national security.</p> - -<p><strong>Adam Frost</strong> is the former senior vice president for the China and Transformational Exports Program at the Export-Import Bank of the United States.</p> - -<p><strong>Kirti Gupta</strong> is a noted economist and expert specializing in global matters related to technology, antitrust, and intellectual property (IP). Dr. Gupta’s diverse expertise spans engineering, product, litigation, and policy issues in the technology sector. She currently serves as vice president and chief economist of global technology at Cornerstone Research, leading their technology, digital economy, and artificial intelligence practice.</p> - -<p><strong>Barath Harithas</strong> is a senior fellow with the Economics Program and Scholl Chair in International Business at CSIS, focusing on issues at the intersection of national security, trade, and technology. He has held diverse public service roles in Singapore spanning the U.S.-China relationship, international trade, and AI standards.</p> - -<p><strong>Scott Kennedy</strong> is senior adviser and Trustee Chair in Chinese Business and Economics at CSIS. A leading authority on Chinese economic policy and U.S.-China commercial relations, Kennedy has traveled to China for 36 years. Ongoing focuses include China’s innovation drive, Chinese industrial policy, U.S.-China relations, and global economic governance.</p> - -<p><strong>James Lewis</strong> writes on technology and strategy at CSIS. Lewis has a track record of being among the first to identify new tech and security issues and devise polices to address them. He leads a long-running track 2 dialogue with the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations. His current work looks at how countries innovate and at digitalization and its political, economic, and security effects.</p> - -<p><strong>Joseph Majkut</strong> is director of the Energy Security and Climate Change Program at CSIS. In this role, he leads the program’s work understanding the geopolitics of energy and climate change and working to ensure a global energy transition that is responsive to the risks of climate change and the economic and strategic priorities of the United States and the world. Joseph is an expert in climate science, climate policy, and risk and uncertainty analysis for decisionmaking.</p> - -<p><strong>Ilaria Mazzocco</strong> is a deputy director and a senior fellow with the Trustee Chair in Chinese Business and Economics at CSIS. She has over a decade of experience researching industrial policy, Chinese climate policy, and the intersection between the energy transition and economic and national security.</p> - -<p><strong>Erin Murphy</strong> is deputy director and a senior fellow for emerging Asia economics with the Chair on India and Emerging Asia Economics at CSIS. She has spent her career in several public and private sector roles, including as an analyst on Asian political and foreign policy issues at the Central Intelligence Agency, director for the Indo-Pacific at the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation, founder and principal of her boutique advisory firm focused on Myanmar, and an English teacher with the Japan Exchange and Teaching (JET) Program in Saga, Japan.</p> - -<p><strong>William Alan Reinsch</strong> holds the Scholl Chair in International Business at CSIS. He is also an adjunct assistant professor at the University of Maryland School of Public Policy, teaching a course in trade policy and politics.</p> - -<p><strong>Richard Rossow</strong> is a senior adviser and holds the Chair on India and Emerging Asia Economics at CSIS. In this role, he helps frame and shape policies to promote greater business and economic engagement between the two countries, with a unique focus on tracking and engaging Indian states.</p> - -<p><strong>Sujai Shivakumar</strong> directs Renewing American Innovation (RAI) at CSIS, where he also serves as a senior fellow. Dr. Shivakumar brings over two decades of experience in policy studies related to U.S. competitiveness and innovation.</p>Navin Girishankar, et al.This report gives recommendations on export controls, global tech governance, domestic incentives for building tech capabilities in chips and clean technologies, and the future of international tech cooperation and competition.Cockpit Or Command Center?2024-10-29T12:00:00+08:002024-10-29T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/cockpit-or-command-center<p><em>The future of airpower hinges on the U.S. Air Force’s ability to integrate autonomous drones into manned formations. This analysis explores the trade-offs between cockpit and command center–based control in shaping the next era of combat operations.</em></p> - -<excerpt /> - -<ul> - <li> - <p><strong>Networks of manned and unmanned aircraft will command the skies.</strong> These teams will be increasingly modular and optimized for counterair, interdiction, and close air support missions.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>A mix of war games, Red Flag exercises, and dynamic home station simulations will test the ability of airmen – on the ground and in the skies – to execute mission command through networks of unmanned aircraft</strong> and respond to rapid changes in the threat environment. Together, these experiments will help guide not just airpower, but the entire joint planning and targeting cycle, into an era of algorithmic warfare.</p> - </li> -</ul> - -<h3 id="introduction">Introduction</h3> - -<p>There is a new theory of airpower on the horizon. Over the next five years, the U.S. Air Force (USAF) plans to invest billions in research and development for a force of over 1,000 collaborative combat aircraft (CCA). The vision includes working with allies and partners to pair fourth- and fifth-generation aircraft with versatile unmanned systems, creating aerial networks that can rapidly adapt to changes in the battlespace. Multiple reports and war games portend a new future in which unmanned systems will replace an aging, expensive manned aircraft and create entirely new mission profiles optimized for peer conflict. The fate of these unmanned systems is critical, given both the Air Force’s decision in July 2024 to reevaluate its sixth-generation aircraft and the emergence of new Air Task Forces.</p> - -<p>Yet how will military organizations command and control distributed networks of CCAs in future air operations? Will such networks be proverbial “loyal wingmen,” subject only to the tactical commands of a pilot in a cockpit? Or will drones do the bidding of the command centers, like Combined Air Operations Centers (CAOCs)? The command and control (C2) architecture surrounding CCAs will almost certainly prove to be as consequential as the systems themselves in forging the future of air power. The U.S. military needs a clear concept of mission command for autonomous aircraft, executed across multidomain battle networks and tailored to different mission types.</p> - -<p>There is a fundamental tradeoff between tactical responsiveness and operational effectiveness. Where missions require time-sensitive adjustments, CCA C2 should center on the mission leader and ensure pilots have the right mix of high-bandwidth, low-latency comms and human-factor-optimized software to help them respond to the chaos and complexity of aerial combat. Where missions require concentration and unity of effort – the alignment of mass and objective – CCA C2 should focus on operational planning and mission execution directed from command centers. The Air Force and other aviation arms across the services need to invest in flexible battle networks and in concepts and training regimes that help adapt the core processes of command and control to the realities of modern warfare. To achieve this, the USAF should start conducting more robust studies and war games involving C2, alongside an accelerated series of experiments. It is one thing to pick a new piece of equipment; it is another to forge new doctrines and processes around the equipment.</p> - -<h3 id="the-third-offset-takes-flight">The Third Offset Takes Flight</h3> - -<p>The concept of pairing unmanned combat aircraft with traditional air formations dates back to the notions of “the Third Offset” and “the loyal wingman.” The Third Offset – a term coined by former deputy secretary of defense Robert Work in 2014 – proposes the use of technological advantages to offset Russia’s and China’s abilities to amass combat power. Its theory of victory was to ensure that the United States retained a generational lead in weaponry. As part of this strategy, defense analysts envisioned a new, unmanned “loyal wingman” that could increase the performance of fourth- and fifth-generation combat aircraft.</p> - -<p>Many of the initial loyal wingman tests involved turning fourth-generation fighter aircraft into remotely piloted vehicles. For example, during the 2017 Have Raider II experiments, Lockheed Martin Skunk Works paired an unmanned F-16 with a manned ground station to test autonomous flight during simulated air-ground strikes. In 2023, the USAF unveiled Project Venom, a series of experiments designed to load autonomous code into six F-16s and test the systems’ operation across a range of missions. These efforts built on earlier experiments that focused on perfecting the software necessary for autonomous flight. These experiments continue today through the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA)’s Air Combat Evolution program, which tests prototypes like the X-62A.</p> - -<p>CCA concepts have since evolved beyond adapting fourth-generation platforms to building unmanned aircraft with treaty allies. Over the past year, five companies submitted CCA designs, two of which – General Atomics and Anduril – the Air Force is now considering. The General Atomics candidate is the Gambit, built to change configurations for different mission profiles to maximize fungibility. Anduril entered the CCA contest via its 2023 acquisition of Blue Force, whose group 5 vehicle, Fury, will be integrated with Anduril’s family of autonomous vehicles.</p> - -<p>Both firms share a vision of using software to optimize hardware performance and interoperability – an idea that grows out of earlier work by DARPA, including the Adapting Cross-Domain Kill-Webs (ACK) program and the larger concept of mosaic warfare. In line with this vision, CCAs will not only increase the survival of manned aircraft, but also enhance lethality by enabling software-defined kill webs.</p> - -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/4XuCgo9.png" alt="image01" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 1: Advanced Battle Management System.</strong> Source: <a href="https://www.aflcmc.af.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/2432103/emerald-flag-exercise-begins/">“Emerald Flag exercise begins,” Air Force Life Cycle Management Center, December 1, 2020</a>.</em></p> - -<p>This vision also extends to allies and partners. Building on their own experiments with the Boeing Ghost Bat, the Australians are looking to establish trilateral cooperation with the United States and Japan on CCAs. Japan is increasing its investments in multiple unmanned programs, including the Global Combat Air Platform, which is under development with Italy and the United Kingdom. Not to be outdone, India is on schedule to start flight testing its CCA variant later in 2024. In December 2022, France, Spain, and Germany sealed a 3.2-billion-euro agreement for Europe’s Future Combat Air System (FCAS) program. In February 2024, the United Kingdom released its Defence Drone Strategy, highlighting the country’s efforts with unmanned aircraft systems.</p> - -<p>China and Russia have introduced similar concepts and prototypes. In 2022, the People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) unveiled its FH-97A “Loyal Wingman” drone, designed to operate alongside fifth-generation fighters like the J-20 and J-31, which are currently undergoing extensive upgrades. The PLAAF approach to CCAs seems to be to replicate existing low-cost U.S. prototypes like the XQ-58A Valkyrie, which is currently being developed by the Air Force Research Laboratory and the Marine Corps. The Russian defense establishment, led by the Advanced Research Foundation, has long pursued unmanned aerial systems with advanced features and integration capabilities. The development of the Altius and S-70 Okhotnik-B – the latter integrated with the Su-57, Russia’s fifth-generation multirole aircraft – provide compelling evidence of Russian CCA endeavors.</p> - -<p>Taken together, these initiatives point to a prevailing trend across multiple countries: the addition of unmanned aircraft as key nodes in multidomain networks designed to execute traditional airpower missions like counterair operations, interdiction, and close air support. Similar to earlier DARPA concepts, these nodes enable the delegation of key tasks and support missions across a software-defined kill web. This pairing of manned and unmanned systems puts a premium on command and control, prioritizing the execution of mission command through algorithms that guide autonomous systems.</p> - -<h3 id="command-and-control">Command and Control</h3> - -<p>As states race to integrate CCAs into their air forces, a question remains: How will militaries command and control new formations?</p> - -<p>Command is a continuous function that consists of key subtasks: collecting and distinguishing relevant information, translating it into estimates to determine objectives and courses of action, converting these plans into orders, and monitoring progress through assessments. Command takes the form of a system that links together a focal point – the commander – with a staff that aligns its intent with the commander’s key decisions. In Marine Corps doctrine, command encompasses decisionmaking as well as the directing of others; control concerns feedback loops and the management of a “continuous flow of information about [an] unfolding situation.” As a result, the C2 architecture for CCAs must factor in who directs the platforms and how feedback loops are analyzed in a fluid environment with shifting objectives.</p> - -<p>A recurring theme in the evolution of airpower has been the usage of C2 to concentrate and sequence tactical air effects in time and space while also allowing the airman in the cockpit flexibility in emerging situations. In the aftermath of Operation Desert Storm, a historical study by James Winnefeld and Dana Johnson defined C2 as “unity of effort.” The study analyzed a joint air operation between the Army Air Corps, Marines, and Navy to thwart Japan’s invasion of Midway. While strategically successful, the Battle of Midway revealed a lack of operational unity of effort between land-based and sea-based air campaigns. This absence of coordination persisted through the Korean War, where service rivalries hindered joint air operations.</p> - -<p>The Battle of Midway had a single commander overseeing all air assets. In Korea, the Air Force, Marine Corps, and Navy were divided in their command structures. Despite efforts at coordination, joint operations continued to be plagued by interservice rivalries, conflicting doctrines, and poor communication. The Vietnam War further exposed these issues, demonstrating the need for significant changes to achieve true unity of effort.</p> - -<p>The process of managing joint airpower has evolved since World War II, largely due to the Joint Targeting Coordination Board’s efforts to deconflict service perspectives on mission priorities. In the 1970s, the military streamlined the chain of command by giving the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) greater authority and by emphasizing the role of combatant commanders (COCOM) in joint operations. This move toward greater coordination was further solidified by the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. The result was the introduction of a Joint Forces Air Component Commander (JFACC), as well as the development of the master attack plan (MAP) and air tasking order (ATO), which improved centralized control and coordination of air assets and was used to great effect in Desert Storm.</p> - -<p>Yet operational unity of effort must also accommodate the fluidity of tactical combat, where the unforeseen can create new and unforgiving realities. When not accompanied by tactical flexibility, centralized C2 can create brittle systems.</p> - -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/aQkOFs5.png" alt="image02" /> -<em>▲ Photo: Connecticut State Library Federal Documents, W 2.6:F 45/2</em></p> - -<p>This dilemma is addressed in the doctrines of multiple services, which emphasize the need to balance centralized control with decentralized execution. Air Force doctrine, for example, dictates the conduct of operations through centralized command, distributed control, and decentralized execution (CC-DC-DE). In this framework, mission flexibility and combat lethality are maximized through the generation of mission-appropriate sorties, allowing the commander to adapt to circumstances. In Marine Corps antiair warfare, this is referred to as the principle of centralized command and decentralized control.</p> - -<p>Both ideas center on the concept of mission command. The core of mission command is a culture of trust and a blueprint for disciplined initiative at all echelons based on the commander’s intent. While the concept dates back to nineteenth-century operational art, mission command entered U.S. military writings formally in 1905. The concept evolved over the years, eventually giving rise to a core idea adapted for airpower in 1962: centralized command and decentralized execution.</p> - -<blockquote> - <p><em>In the chaos of battle, it is essential to decentralize decision authority to the lowest practical level because over centralization slows action and leads to inertia.</em></p> - <h4 id="-fm-100-5-1986">– FM 100-5 (1986)</h4> -</blockquote> - -<p>As an approach to command and control, mission command represents both a philosophical tenet and a set of planning and operation processes designed to foster a culture of initiative. For generations, Army and Marine Corps doctrines have grounded the concept in a belief that war is an inherently chaotic contest (Zweikampf) defined by friction, uncertainty, and fluidity. As a result, combatants must balance operational synchronization – the movement of large formations to fight decisive battles in time and space – with tactical adaptations that allow subordinates to anticipate and respond to changing circumstances. Applied to CCAs, this means that networks of autonomous aircraft will have to balance operational effectiveness and tactical efficiency. Mission command will need to be integrated into algorithms to make it possible for pilots to delegate aspects of air-to-air combat to drones and react to feedback from the edge of the battlefield – whether they’re in a ground command center or in an airborne warning and control system (AWACS) aircraft.</p> - -<p>While airmen are highly capable of decentralized execution, the modern joint air tasking cycle also codifies principles of centralized command and operational synchronization. This six-stage cycle matches air capabilities and effects against larger, operational objectives – as defined by the Joint Force Commander – and results in an ATO that shape the joint air operations.</p> - -<p>The first stage of the joint air tasking cycle is “Objectives, Effects and Guidance,” which provides guidance on objectives and desired effects. The final product for this stage is the air apportionment recommendation, which is provided by the JFACC in consultation with other component commanders.</p> - -<p>The next stage, “Target Development,” matches targets to air taskings and aimpoints, which are fed to the Targeting Effects Team (TET). The TET then reviews, nominates, and prioritizes targets, ensuring that each attack meets JFC guidance. The product of this effort, when approved by the JFC, is the joint integrated prioritized targeting list.</p> - -<p>Next, in the “Weaponeering and Allocation” stage, the Joint Air Operations Center quantifies the expected results of employing all available means in every domain against prioritized targets. The final targets are then delivered to the master air attack plan team. Following the JFC’s air apportionment decision, a final number of sorties by weapon system is developed for each objective and task.</p> - -<p>The fourth stage is “ATO Production and Dissemination,” in which the ATO production team constructs, publishes, and disseminates the daily ATO and Special Instructions to appropriate forces. The ATO includes information such as the order of battle, target worksheets, and component requirements.</p> - -<p>In the fifth stage, “Execution Planning and Force Execution,” the JFACC directs air capabilities and forces in joint air operations. During this stage, the JFACC has the ability to redirect air assets and coordinate with component commanders.</p> - -<p>During the final stage, “Assessment,” a continuous process measures the overall effectiveness of joint force capabilities at both the tactical and operational levels. Assessment is not the end of the cycle, but rather a continuous activity that provides input at all the stages of the cycle.</p> - -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/T7rul0r.png" alt="image03" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 2: Contingency and Crisis Execution: The Tasking Cycle.</strong> Note: JOPP is Joint Operational Planning Process and JOPPA is Joint Operational Planning Process for Air. Source: <a href="https://www.doctrine.af.mil/Portals/61/documents/AFDP_3-0/3-0-D29-I-OPS-The-Tasking-Cycle.pdf">“Contingency and Crisis Execution: Tasking Cycle,” Air Force Doctrine Publication (AFDP) 3-0: Operations and Planning, Curtis E. LeMay Center for Doctrine Development and Education, November 4, 2016</a>.</em></p> - -<p>Even this carefully choreographed process, however, cannot match the infinite range of possibilities that emerge in war. Air operations require decentralized execution as pilots respond to the friction, uncertainty, and fluidity of war. The loadout of CCAs will be determined by the air tasking cycle – with airmen loading different payloads and sensor arrays – but their employment may have to adjust to sudden changes at both operational and tactical levels.</p> - -<p>At the operational level, situations may emerge that demand a sudden realignment of missions, leading the CAOG commander to override the ATO to respond to a new threat. For example, imagine a squadron of F-35s operating with CCAs to conduct a fight sweep to seek out and destroy enemy aircraft. The command post receives indications that a squadron of enemy fifth-generation fighters are moving to attack a high-value air asset (HVAA) and are likely to overwhelm friendly fighters. The HVAA is hundreds of miles from the intended fighter sweep. To the extent that CCAs are capable of remote-split operations separate from the flight leader, they are operationally effective and the CCAs can be redirected to support HVAA protection, leaving the F-35s to continue the sweep – albeit at greater risk than originally planned.</p> - -<p>At the tactical level, CCAs must support delegations by pilots already overwhelmed by the massive amount of information generated by modern aircraft. This delegation should be an extension of commanders’ intents and allow the CCAs to perform with initiative within the limits of the mission. CCAs need to be able to respond to changing tactical situations noticed either by the pilot or by sensors feeding algorithms supporting autonomous systems. This kind of feedback loop is the essence of decentralized execution; if CCAs lack it, they are likely to render missions brittle, causing overwhelmed pilots to have to manage more information – in their cockpit and on devices controlling CCAs – than the human mind can process, especially amid physical stress and fear. According to the Mike Tyson retelling of Moltke and Eisenhower quotes, “everyone has a plan until they get punched in the face.” Seeing, dodging, or taking the blow to set up a counterstrike are the essence of being tactically responsive.</p> - -<p>Moreover, CCAs will need to be capable of executing mission command at both operational and tactical levels, with optimal C2s determined by mission type. In some missions, the value of operational effectiveness outweighs the utility of tactical responsiveness. The inverse is also true; other missions require tactical responsiveness to a degree that outweighs the benefits of perfect operational effectiveness. Much of the modern air tasking cycle is built around a C2 architecture that links CCAs to the command center, rather than to the pilot in the cockpit. From the development of objectives, effects, and guidance to target development to master attack planning, the majority of flight planning takes place in command centers, even when orchestrated through nodes like AWACS. Since a command center has a wider perspective than any individual mission leader, nesting C2 for CCAs there ensures that assessments are indeed a continuous activity. Economies of scale afforded by centralized control should not be immediately discounted due to the lure of the fighter pilot.</p> - -<p>Yet in complex missions that require tactical-level delegation, CCAs have the capability to reduce the cognitive burden on pilots, thus extending their reach. This increase in efficiency should translate into superior mission performance. An F-35 accompanied by two CCAs loaded with air-to-air missiles and decoys will likely produce more air-to-air kills than a single aircraft, even if the two have comparable weapons loadouts. Likewise, a group of 10 F-35s and F-15Xs flying alongside 100 CCAs would be even more effective. To the extent that algorithms are an extension of mission command, the pilot is free to see and respond to change based on mission command.</p> - -<p>The future of air power, as waged through networks of manned and unmanned systems, will depend on tailoring CCA algorithms to the logic of each mission. Unlocking the full potential of CCAs will require wargames, experiments, and studies that explore mission command in various scenarios and new C2 models by mission type. These experiments will need to incorporate new concepts for generating Air Task Forces based on new combat wings optimized for great power competition. Furthermore, the experiments will need to stress-test new task forces employing Agile Combat Employment (ACE), an operational scheme of maneuver, and multidomain pulse operations. In other words, distributed networks of aircraft will have to come together from distributed airfields and synchronize airpower with cyber warfare – and other technical means – to create windows of opportunity. To be operational, these efforts must take into account multiple pulse operations, as well as the ability to generate combat power in and through the air over the course of a campaign. That task will require deeper digital integration and data synthesis – using artificial intelligence and machine learning – from multiple warfighting functions, as well as the imagining of entirely new ATOs that are more joint and dynamic. Software will be as important as hardware in this vision of future airpower.</p> - -<p>The following exploration analyzes hypothetical air campaigns through the lens of the fundamental tradeoff between operational effectiveness and tactical responsiveness. From reflecting on the combined bomber offenses in World War II and air war over Vietnam to John Warden and the Gulf War and the Balkans, the air campaign is the preferred unit of analysis for operational study. While air campaigns tend to involve a mix of missions, the scenarios below will visualize and describe three campaigns that are each oriented around a mission area: counterair operations, interdiction – including both counterland and countersea operations – and close air support.</p> - -<p>This analytical framing is frequently used in Air Force studies. The Battle of Britain, for instance, has been used to study counterair operations; a wide range of cases – from World War II to the wars in Korea and Vietnam – have been used to study the development of close air support and interdiction.</p> - -<p>Below, a fictional planning scenario is used to analyze three future campaigns: counterair operations, interdiction in littoral environments, and close air support. In each, the adversary is intentionally kept abstract in order to focus the analysis on the C2 character of the mission sets, which are evaluated in terms of operational effectiveness and tactical responsiveness. The adversary is held constant across all three scenarios and assumed to be a peer competitor capable of contesting U.S. power across multiple domains, including air. Other major assumptions include:</p> - -<ul> - <li> - <p>The United States is fighting as part of a larger coalition of partners and allies (the norm throughout its history).</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>The conflict involves nuclear powers but has not crossed the threshold where either side uses nuclear weapons in pursuit of strategic or operational objectives.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>While there have been large exchanges in space and cyberspace, all sides retain the ability to support air, ground, and maritime operations with space and cyber capabilities.</p> - </li> -</ul> - -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/bJKYjsJ.png" alt="image04" /></p> - -<h3 id="campaign-scenario-20xx">Campaign Scenario: 20XX</h3> - -<p>It is 20XX, and the United States finds itself engaged in a regional war as part of a coalition seeking to stop an authoritarian state from illegally annexing the territory of one of its neighbors. After a series of space, cyber, air, and maritime operations over the initial thirty days, there is now a forward line of troops (FLOT), with the United States providing air support to partner ground forces as additional units mobilize. This leads to a series of battles in air, at sea, and on land as each side seeks to gain a position of advantage along the FLOT.</p> - -<p>In planning the next phase and delineating how best to sequence major operations in pursuit of objectives, the Coalition Joint Task Force (CJTF) is exploring options for three different air campaigns: (1) counterair, (2) interdiction, and (3) close air support.</p> - -<p>The counterair campaign would prioritize gaining air superiority to open up a ground or maritime counteroffensive. At present, there is air parity, and each side has yet to roll back the other side’s air defense network or sufficiently attrite the other side’s air force to establish air superiority. The resulting air parity makes it difficult to achieve more than a tactical breakthrough on the ground or to forward-deploy naval surface combatants integrated into CJTF operations. This results in a static FLOT and long lines of communication that burn readiness and risk creating a protracted conflict. The counterair campaign would dedicate all available air assets to establishing air control, if not supremacy, before transitioning to major operations in other domains.</p> - -<p>The interdiction campaign would prioritize striking targets across the depth of the littorals to shock the enemy system and create conditions for a localized counterattack. The mission would establish temporary air control to enable air interdiction against both enemy lines of communication and logistical nodes just beyond the FLOT, which are critical to projecting power through littorals. By strangling the enemy and channeling its movement into a series of kill boxes in the joint fires area, the campaign would set conditions for a simultaneous air and ground counteroffensive. This emphasis on simultaneity differentiates the interdiction campaign from the phasing and sequencing of the counterair campaign.</p> - -<p>The close air support campaign would prioritize generating effects on the FLOT to enable a breakthrough. Unlike the interdiction campaign, the priority of air control is along the FLOT and enabling terminal attack control (TAC) based on guidance given by the ground commander to joint terminal attack controllers (JTAC). This campaign would combine type 1, 2, and 3 controls to enable close coordination between coalition ground forces and aircraft. This coordination, and the ability to mass air effects on key ground objectives, sets conditions for an operational envelopment along the FLOT. Like the interdiction campaign, the emphasis is on simultaneity. Unlike the interdiction concept, the CAS campaign would focus on principles of objective and mass, using tightly coupled air and ground effects – including attack helicopters and loitering munitions in the air-ground littoral – to enable a decisive ground maneuver.</p> - -<h4 id="tradeoffs-in-the-counterair-campaign">Tradeoffs in the Counterair Campaign</h4> - -<p>In the fictional scenario above, the counterair campaign would mix offensive and defensive counterair to establish air superiority. There are historical precedents in multiple World War II cases, in which novel methods were used to bait German fighters as part of the Royal Air Force (RAF) circus offensive that followed the Battle of Britain.</p> - -<p>In a campaign setting, which involves longer time periods and multiple major operations, planners must focus on attrition rates and how best to pull an adversary into air operations that produce diminishing marginal returns. Every sortie generates losses that exceed the value of the mission. Losses inhibit the enemy’s ability to generate air power, changing how the adversary fights (i.e., assigning aircraft to missions) while reducing the time and space required to achieve air superiority.</p> - -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/jM1kOEM.png" alt="image05" /> -<em>▲ <strong>A Spitfire Mark VB from the United Kingdom Royal Air Force in 1940.</strong> Photo: G. Woodbine/Second World War Official Collection/Imperial War Museums.</em></p> - -<p>This notional counterair campaign would almost certainly rely on a mix of SEAD and fighter sweeps to establish air superiority. Modern radars, especially when connected to space effects, enable situational awareness and tracking. Establishing air superiority first requires blinding the enemy and destroying its ability to track and target friendly aircraft. Second, if enemy planes cannot be destroyed on the ground – the best place to kill an aircraft – they must be engaged in a series of operations designed to change the balance of air power.</p> - -<p>These missions, even with intelligence over-match, would likely require CCAs that are more tactically responsive. Air-to-air combat and the adjustment to unforeseen aspects of an adversary’s air defenses – as seen in the evolution of SEAD missions since Vietnam – require the ability to recognize and respond to changes in the tactical environment. Feedback loops create a fluid environment prone to sudden changes.</p> - -<p>Mission command for CCAs in these situations takes the form of pilots directly adjusting mission parameters in response to a changing environment. This would likely require building in preconstructed mission sets that the pilot can rapidly assign as the threat environment changes. For example, consider a fighter sweep in which two F-35s are each paired with four CCAs, mixing electronic countermeasures and air-to-air weapons. The flight leader receives confirmation that there are more enemy aircraft than originally anticipated and relative to the payload. She could dynamically retask the CCAs to jam and harass the enemy combat air patrol while the manned aircraft pull back to regroup and assess the situation with an AWACS and/or the command center (e.g., CAOG). Decentralized execution takes the form of an ability to assign missions to networked CCAs in order to free up time and space for pilots to adjust to new information.</p> - -<p>Alternatively, DCA would focus more on a mix of active and passive defenses. In modern war, these cut across multiple domains and include everything from space-based sensors to AEGIS destroyers and patriot missile sites. Aircraft play a role that includes shooting down cruise and loitering munitions – as seen both in the April 2024 defense of Israel from an Iranian strike and in the skies of Ukraine – but that role tends to be supporting as opposed to supported. This dynamic puts a premium on operational effectiveness and on empowering an air defense commander to integrate air and missile defense to include a larger number of land platforms (e.g., surface-to-air missiles, radars, directed energy, high-powered microwave) and sea platforms (e.g., naval cruisers, destroyers, and frigates) alongside airborne networks of manned and unmanned aircraft. Mission command applies here, but managing air and missile threats across large areas requires more centralized control measures, whether in an AWAC or a ground-based command center.</p> - -<h4 id="tradeoffs-in-the-interdiction-campaign">Tradeoffs in the Interdiction Campaign</h4> - -<p>In the fictional planning scenario above, the interdiction campaign would combine both counterland and countersea air operations focused on denying the enemy power projection in the seams of the air, sea, and ground. In U.S. joint doctrine, this littoral environment includes “those land areas (and their adjacent sea and associated air space) that are predominantly susceptible to engagement and influence from the sea and may reach far inland.” Modern battle networks and long-range precision fires extend the segments of air, ground, and sea that constitute the site of modern littoral warfare.</p> - -<p>The most likely targets of the interdiction campaign would be logistics nodes and lines of communication. The theory of victory is that reducing the enemy’s supplies reduces its combat power, creating a more favorable correlation of forces for offensive action and/or limiting the ability of the enemy to project power. This logic is evident across multiple, historical interdiction campaigns, which carry a different theory of victory than strategic attack and which are built around decisive blows against enemy C2.</p> - -<p>During the Italian campaign, allied planners designed Operation Strangle as an independent air interdiction campaign targeting German supply lines, intended to render the planned ground offensive (Operation Diadem) unnecessary. The effort had mixed results and led to an enduring debate about whether to target enemy supplies or mobility. This debate shaped air interdiction campaigns in Korea. For example, the Saturate interdiction campaign targeted North Korean rail lines to reduce supply, focusing on a narrow corridor on a continuous basis.</p> - -<p>The effects are not limited to counterland operations. Maritime interdiction played a key role in World War II. The RAF Coastal Command, for instance, was pivotal to the Battle of the Atlantic, in sub-hunting missions in the Bay of Biscay, and in attacks on marine lines of communication connecting Germany to key industrial materials in Scandinavia. Of note, many of these efforts benefitted from work by technical experts who integrated new technologies, including air-to-surface radar and applied operations research – the use of formal mathematical models and statistics to analyze patterns and trends in armed combat. The Luftwaffe replicated this maritime interdiction capability through its Fliegerführer Atlantik.</p> - -<p>In Vietnam, Operation Rolling Thunder (1965–1968) was largely an air interdiction campaign, with over 90 percent of the targets consisting of transportation nodes. In addition to destroying combat potential by targeting supplies and lines of communication, interdiction can channel the enemy’s movements, attriting its forces. Of Desert Storm’s 40,000 strike sorties, roughly 38,000 were air interdiction. Some of these missions included the attack on the infamous “Highway of Death,” where coalition aircraft destroyed Iraqi forces retreating from Kuwait into Iraq.</p> - -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/coMD2bv.png" alt="image06" /> -<em>▲ <strong>The “Highway of Death,” the result of U.S. forces bombing retreating Iraqi forces, Kuwait, 1991.</strong> Photo: Photo 12/Universal Images Group via Getty Images.</em></p> - -<p>Interdiction requires operational-level coordination and careful target selection. These missions naturally lend themselves to a C2 architecture that executes mission command through a command center. CCAs could become part of a larger joint fires scheme for interdicting lines of communication; they could carry a mix of electronic attack payloads and air-ground (or air-sea) munitions, which work alongside long-range strike assets currently fielded by the Marine Littoral Regiment and the Army’s Multi-Domain Task Force.</p> - -<p>In addition, CCAs could act as escorts for long-range strike munitions targeting naval logistics vessels and amphibious shipping, protecting the missiles from being shot down by enemy air patrols. Consider an MDTF Typhon battery and an AEGIS Destroyer firing a salvo of Tomahawk missiles at a key target. Through joint fires coordination, the CAOG could task on-call CCAs to carry a mix of payloads to support the mission, freeing up human pilots for other missions. While the same salvo could be supported by a manned-unmanned team, the theater-level fires synchronization makes it more aligned with C2 oriented toward operational effectiveness.</p> - -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/ELsBrJb.png" alt="image07" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 3: Mid-Range Capability Supporting Multidomain Operations.</strong> Source: Typhon briefing slide, Rapid Capabilities and Critical Technologies Office presentation, U.S. Army.</em></p> - -<p>One exception is strike coordination and reconnaissance (SCAR). These missions are the interdiction equivalent of a movement to contact. They are flown to detect and target enemy units in a defined geographic area where “potential targets are known or suspected to exist, or where mobile enemy ground units have relocated because of ground fighting.” This uncertainty and fluidity put a premium on tactical responsiveness. A network of manned and unmanned aircraft can – consistent with Joint Interdiction doctrine – cycle “multiple attacking flights through the target area and provid[e] prioritized targeting guidance and enemy air defense updates to maximize the effect of each sortie.” In this case, mission command extends through the cockpit to the CCA for decentralized execution as the flight leader responds to unforeseen changes. For example, an F-15X or F-35 flying alongside 10 CCAs would be able to respond not just to its own sensors but to a larger constellation of joint and interagency capabilities in order to identify and disrupt enemy targets.</p> - -<p>As in counterair operations, CCAs performing interdiction roles would need preplanned mission profiles to support autonomous execution. Humans will still be in the loop, encoding rules of engagement and strike deconfliction when necessary. At the same time, the entire joint fires doctrine and framework will need to test how new campaign concepts relate to existing doctrine and to the targeting cycle. Again, it is one thing to enable CCAs to fly. It is another to integrate them into planning and staff processes that took decades, if not centuries, to emerge in the military profession. There will need to be new, flatter joint architectures optimized for multidomain effects and dynamic joint targeting cycles.</p> - -<h4 id="tradeoffs-in-the-close-air-support-campaign">Tradeoffs in the Close Air Support Campaign</h4> - -<p>In the fictional planning scenario above, focusing air power at the FLOT would require deep air-ground integration. In the chaos of combat, changing planned missions to take advantage of emerging ground conditions also requires a great degree of flexibility. This defining requirement puts the C2 architecture squarely in the tactical responsiveness camp, albeit with a twist. The JTAC on the ground becomes a kind of cockpit.</p> - -<p>Procedures for CAS have evolved since World War II. Following the fall of France, the Wann/Woodall Report recommended creating a distinct communication network to connect ground radios to aircraft under special circumstances. This concept laid the foundation for the emergence of CAS C2 and the Tactical Air Force task organization used in experiments in North Africa (e.g., the Desert Air Force). Failures during the 1942 Dieppe Raid (Operation Jubilee) further showed the need for new C2 constructs that integrated tactical air and army formations. Close air support concepts continued to evolve between 1943 and 1945 in campaigns in Italy and Northwest Europe. By the Normandy Campaign, air-ground integration procedures had matured to differentiate between indirect and direct support, setting the foundation for modern CAS. These procedures played a critical role in the Battle of the Falaise Pocket, to which RAF hurricanes made essential contributions.</p> - -<p>This iterated approach to developing deeper air-ground integration continued across multiple conflicts in the late twentieth century. Each major war, according to historian I.B. Holley Jr., saw the military profession relearn the importance of air-ground teamwork. Whether in Korea or Vietnam – or in Israel’s experience across multiple conflicts – practitioners had to adapt air-ground communications, liaison relationships, and procedures to new technologies and air defense schemes. In Holley Jr.’s view, analyzing this history and learning the lessons of past air campaigns is a requirement for updating future CAS doctrine.</p> - -<p>CCAs offer a new opportunity to refine close air support concepts and doctrine in a manner that reflects deeper service integration than in previous wars. In other words, CCA design features and USAF doctrine should integrate with Army, Navy, and Marine Corps concepts, leading to potential change in joint doctrine. If CCAs are built to only perform counterair missions, they miss an opportunity to realize their full potential.</p> - -<p>This potential could see the emergence of new procedures in which JTACs on the ground take control of CCAs to conduct CAS and to deconflict airspace, thus maximizing joint effects against key targets. In the aforementioned fictional scenario, consider an enemy force attempting to break out of a beach landing site and seize an airport. This breakout would likely involve a concentration of artillery and air defense moved forward to support ground formations, with air-launched effects and loitering munitions serving as an advanced guard. Containing the breakthrough would require forward JTACs coordinating CAS and other joint fire support to destroy, disrupt, suppress, fix, harass, neutralize, or delay advancing enemy columns in support of the ground commander’s defensive plan. The fog, friction, and chaos of the ground battle undermine operational effectiveness and put a premium on tactical responsiveness. In a major ground campaign, operational art for joint fires is about logistics and building a C5ISR-T network able to support dynamic targeting and operational reach.</p> - -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/qhShwI6.png" alt="image08" /></p> - -<h3 id="conclusion-exercises-wargames-and-doctrine">Conclusion: Exercises, Wargames, and Doctrine</h3> - -<p>Looking across the three fictional planning scenarios provides an insight into the refinement of C2 requirements for CCAs.</p> - -<p>This will require testing different cockpit C2 interfaces in dynamic settings like Red Flag Exercises, along with the introduction of enhanced simulation capabilities in the USAF’s new command wings. Replicating the stress of counterair, SCAR and CAS missions will be the only way to gauge the optimal cockpit C2 structure for connecting the best of the human pilot with the functionality of the CCA.</p> - -<p>There is also a need to develop new experiments that test the current planning and air tasking cycle, ideally through wargames that inform new concept development and doctrine for tasking CCAs through command posts. These wargames should parallel ongoing experiments like the Global Information Dominance Experiments (GIDE) and Project Convergence. The more services and coalition partners involved in stress-testing the current approach to planning and coordinating the delivery of joint effects, the better the insights will be. These experiments offer a valuable forum to test emerging ideas, from the Joint Warfighting Concept and related priorities to service-level force design and development initiatives. In other words, proper C2 architecture for CCAs has the potential to unlock innovation across the U.S. military. And that innovation will require a mix of exercises, wargames, and even study groups that will act as incubators for developing new concepts and capabilities. In all likelihood, an entirely new planning and tasking process for joint effects could emerge from this experimentation campaign, closing the deterrent gap.</p> - -<p>These experiments will need to stress-test the ability of new software architectures to connect networks and evaluate data streams from disparate sources. Consistent with prior recommendations, these efforts should also include options for democratizing and digitizing C2 to allow for the rapid upload and transfer of data packets from a wide mix of civilian and military sensor networks. Again, there is as much art as there is science in the development of these mosaic-like systems, and in the balancing of tactical responsiveness and operational effectiveness.</p> - -<p>The modern American way of war is defined as much by mission command as by massing effects. Because modern combat takes place along complex battle networks, centralized command and decentralized execution must work in and through algorithms. The challenge of twenty-first century operational art, therefore, will be deciding how best to pair human judgment with the precision and speed of machines. As a result, determining the optimal C2 architecture for executing mission command through CCA networks should be a national security priority.</p> - -<hr /> - -<p><strong>Benjamin Jensen</strong> is a senior fellow in the Futures Lab in the International Security Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C., as well as the Petersen Chair of Emerging Technology and a professor of strategic studies at the Marine Corps University School of Advanced Warfighting.</p> - -<p><strong>Christopher Koeltzow</strong>, USAF Colonel, was 2024 military fellow at CSIS.</p> - -<p><strong>Allen Agnes</strong>, USAF Colonel, was 2024 military fellow at CSIS.</p> - -<p><strong>Eric Williams</strong>, USMC Colonel, was 2024 military fellow at CSIS.</p>Benjamin Jensen, et al.The future of airpower hinges on the U.S. Air Force’s ability to integrate autonomous drones into manned formations. This analysis explores the trade-offs between cockpit and command center–based control in shaping the next era of combat operations.Operation Days Of Repentance2024-10-28T12:00:00+08:002024-10-28T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/operation-days-of-repentance<p><em>Israel’s recent strikes on Iran’s military infrastructure signal the vulnerability of Tehran’s air defences and expose the limitations of its regional deterrence strategy.</em></p> - -<excerpt /> - -<p>In the early hours of 26 October, Israel announced that it had launched “precise and targeted” strikes on “military targets” in Iran, as part of Operation Days of Repentance, its much-awaited response to the Iranian ballistic missile attack at the start of the month.</p> - -<p>Video from Iran appeared to show air defences active over Tehran. The Israelis have briefed that there were three waves of strikes, apparently involving around 100 aircraft, including drones, all of which returned home safely. Footage being shown on Israeli television shows a mixture of F-15 and F-16 aircraft preparing to launch, though there is speculation that Israeli F-35I were also involved. It does not sound like Israeli ground-launched ballistic missiles were used; the leaked US assessment released online recently suggested that air-launched ballistic missiles were being readied for use by the Israeli Air Force. These are suspected to have been used in the April attack near Esfahan, and their range means they could have been launched from well outside Iranian airspace. At least one journalist has been briefed that Israeli aircraft breached Iranian airspace, a claim that lends weight to the use of F-35Is.</p> - -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">The scale of the strike and (apparent) avoidance of civilian areas makes this look far more precise than the equivalent Iranian attack, as well as justifying it as a defensive measure</code></em></strong></p> - -<p>It now seems likely that the route used by the Israeli Air Force involved flying through Syrian airspace and launching from over Iraq, although there would have been a risk of giving early warning to Iran if detected by Syrian radar (or Russian radar based in Syria). Recent regional diplomacy by Iran might have resulted in the Gulf states not wanting their airspace to be used by Israeli aircraft. Israeli officials briefing that the waves of strikes included hitting targets in Syria and Iraq could be misdirection, but more likely indicates that this was indeed the route taken, and that radars and threats along the way were suppressed or destroyed to clear a path. Iraq has since complained to the UN about violations of its airspace. The alternative route would have been a very long diversion down the Red Sea and around the Arabian peninsula: this would have required multiple mid-air refuelling operations, although the Israelis have demonstrated this capability recently when striking Houthi targets in Yemen, and have rehearsed it extensively over the years.</p> - -<h3 id="the-goldilocks-option-what-was-struck">The “Goldilocks Option”: What was Struck?</h3> - -<p>The Israelis claim to have struck air defences, missile production and “additional aerial capabilities”. There are no current nuclear targets in the areas identified (other than a research facility and reactor in Tehran), nor have we seen suggestions yet that oil refining or production facilities were struck directly. Details now being briefed to US media suggest that air defence systems (Russian-supplied S-300s, including radars) were struck, including those protecting facilities like the Abadan oil refinery and the Bandar Imam Khomeini petrochemical complex. In addition, there are images suggesting that some missile development and drone facilities operated by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) at Khojir and Parchin (in and around Tehran) were also struck, as well as possibly the missile test facility at Shahroud. Parchin also included facilities previously identified as being part of Iran’s research into nuclear weapons development before it was suspended.</p> - -<h3 id="impact-and-implications-iran-is-vulnerable">Impact and Implications: Iran is Vulnerable</h3> - -<p>This Israeli operation was considerably more extensive than April, but was still a restrained response aimed at emphasising Israel’s conventional military superiority and removing threats in the form of missile production facilities, while not appearing “escalatory”. Striking Tehran makes public the Israeli ability to hit Iran’s capital and defeat its air defences, but the scale of the strike and (apparent) avoidance of civilian areas makes this look far more precise than the equivalent Iranian attack, as well as justifying it as a defensive measure. The picture that is emerging is one of significant damage to Iranian air defences as well as missile launch facilities, both of which would be intended to show the Iranians that they are vulnerable to further strikes if they attempt retaliation. There is some speculation that all of Iran’s S-300 batteries have now been struck and possibly destroyed. These have hardly performed well to date, but if they have been stripped away entirely – leaving Iran with only domestically produced systems – this will increase the sense of vulnerability the regime feels. It is also hardly a resounding success for Russian military exports, especially following similar Ukrainian successes against the S-300).</p> - -<p>Moreover, the complexity of the operation should not be underestimated. Over 100 aircraft would be a significant proportion of the Israeli Air Force’s combat fleet (estimated at between 270 and 300), which has been operating at a ferocious tempo for over a year, especially during its campaign in Lebanon. This is alongside the deployment of airborne refuelling, surveillance, and command and control capabilities over a round trip claimed to be 1,600 km.</p> - -<p>The nature of the operation looks like a win for US leverage, albeit bought with the deployment of THAAD and 100 personnel to Israel. In addition, the restraint on display has probably been met with a sense of relief among Gulf oil producers, as the measured nature of the attack avoided disruptions to regional energy supply chains, which had been a growing concern during the weeks of heightened speculation. They have also avoided being directly implicated in the attacks (and have issued the predictable responses criticising them), while benefitting from Iranian military capabilities being further degraded. Meanwhile, Israel’s use of Syrian and Iraqi airspace comes at little cost, as Iran is unlikely to retaliate against either country, while Israel has been able to reaffirm its dominance of regional air activity.</p> - -<h3 id="the-iranian-response">The Iranian Response</h3> - -<p>Iranian media tried to immediately downplay the impact – despite reports of four Iranian military personnel being killed – but the regime is probably still evaluating the attacks, and the Supreme Leader issued an equivocal statement on 27 October. Iranian officials admitted there had been attacks on border radar stations in the provinces of Tehran, Ilam and Khuzestan but claimed that these had been “successfully countered” and that Israel’s long-range, air-launched missiles carried “very light warheads – about one-fifth the size of Iranian ballistic missile warheads”. The Iranian regime appears to be trying to limit public demand for a military retaliation against Israel. But regardless of how well it can hide any damage, this is the largest direct conventional attack on Iranian territory since the Iran–Iraq War (including both fighting with the Iraqis and the US strikes on the Iranian navy under Operation Praying Mantis). This needs to be factored in to understanding the psychological impact, especially if the taboo on direct strikes on Iran that are formally declared appears to have been shattered (the April attack on Esfahan was never formally acknowledged by Israel).</p> - -<h3 id="what-next">What Next?</h3> - -<p>Iranian proxy response options have been limited by the damage done to both Hamas and Hezbollah, while the US has bolstered Israeli air defences with the deployment of additional ballistic missile defences (though the reported arrival of yet another THAAD battery has been disputed). However, beyond this set of direct exchanges, the progress of the fighting in Gaza and Lebanon remains a potential trigger for further confrontation. Iran is reportedly still trying to help Hezbollah rebuild, and there is still the possibility that the Israelis will choose to launch attacks that kill (for example) IRGC Qods Force personnel in Lebanon or Syria; there has been no confirmation of the condition of the head of the Qods Force for several weeks.</p> - -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Regardless of how well the regime in Tehran can hide any damage, this is the largest direct conventional attack on Iranian territory since the Iran–Iraq War</code></em></strong></p> - -<p>Iran is still caught in a dilemma about how to respond to the stripping away of its deterrent in the form of its regional partners, and harassing attacks by Hezbollah or the Houthis could still provoke a response if they hit a sensitive target or cause high-profile civilian casualties. We still don’t know the extent to which more aggressive elements in the Iranian system might be advising the Supreme Leader, and media reporting and government briefings in Europe and the Middle East continue to highlight Iranian covert influence and assassination planning or operations. Tehran’s latest messaging hints at a pause for recalibration now that Israel’s anticipated retaliation has played out. This is reinforced by statements from the Iranian military, which have affirmed Tehran’s “right to take lawful and legitimate action at an appropriate time”, while also emphasising the need for a “lasting ceasefire in Gaza and Lebanon”.</p> - -<p>Israel’s strikes have exposed Iran’s vulnerabilities, particularly the apparent degradation of its air defence systems. This also underscores the limitations of Tehran’s forward-defence doctrine, which relies on proxies to shield Iran from direct conflict. Given these setbacks, Iran is probably keen to avoid an extended period of direct confrontation with Israel. While Tehran cannot feasibly abandon its support for groups like Hezbollah and Hamas in the near term, it is likely to recalibrate its strategy to reinforce internal stability and safeguard its broader regional interests. Moreover, the debate over the status and role of its nuclear programme will continue to rage, especially around whether or not there is utility in maintaining its threshold status, or whether – given the vast gap in conventional capabilities – further steps might be necessary to try to bolster any deterrent effect.</p> - -<p>An initial judgement might therefore be that this operation looks to have put a cap on this bout between Israel and Iran, but the underlying points of friction remain: the progress of Iran’s nuclear programme, the scale of the threat to Israel, proxy activity across the region, and the status of Israeli hostages.</p> - -<hr /> - -<p><strong>Matthew Savill</strong> is the Director of Military Sciences at RUSI, focussing on developments and trends in modern conflict, and the use of force in the 21st Century.</p> - -<p><strong>Burcu Ozcelik</strong> is a Senior Research Fellow for Middle East Security within the International Security department at RUSI.</p>Matthew Savill and Dr Burcu OzcelikIsrael’s recent strikes on Iran’s military infrastructure signal the vulnerability of Tehran’s air defences and expose the limitations of its regional deterrence strategy.Japan-U.S. Cybersecurity2024-10-25T12:00:00+08:002024-10-25T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/japan-us-cybersecurity<p><em>Cybersecurity is the foundation for a robust U.S.-Japan alliance. This report analyzes the cybersecurity policies of both countries and the prospects for future collaboration on critical infrastructure cybersecurity and resilience.</em></p> - -<excerpt /> - -<h3 id="introduction">Introduction</h3> - -<p>Cybersecurity has long been regarded as a critical part of national security. The sophistication, complexity, and scale of cyberattacks have increased, with state-sponsored actors posing significant threats to nations and international cybercriminal groups conducting massive attacks globally. Meanwhile, the ongoing digitalization of society is expanding cyberspace, leading to the complicated and expanded interdependencies among infrastructures, services, and functions. It is, therefore, becoming more important to ensure the cybersecurity and resilience of critical infrastructures that people and nations rely on every day. This is considered a national priority in most countries and a global issue where international cooperation is essential.</p> - -<p>With regard to the Japan-U.S. relationship, the alliance has become more important than ever in light of rising geopolitical tensions in the Indo-Pacific region, and cyberspace is playing a key role as a foundation for a robust alliance. Both countries are currently at a pivotal point in their national cybersecurity. In the United States, the National Cybersecurity Strategy (NCS), released in March 2023, represents a significant shift from previous policies. This includes further government involvement in the private sector, including regulatory approaches, and a shift of the cybersecurity burden away from end users to providers. In Japan, the National Security Strategy (NSS), released in December 2022, puts a strong emphasis on fundamentally enhancing the country’s cybersecurity posture, including the implementation of its own “active cyber defense” (ACD). Furthermore, the recent passage of key legislations enhancing Japan’s security clearance system and economic security will have a positive impact on cybersecurity. Taking these evolutions as an opportunity, it is the right time to reassess the current state of Japan-U.S. cybersecurity cooperation and explore ways forward for further collaboration.</p> - -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Taking these evolutions as an opportunity, it is the right time to reassess the current state of Japan-U.S. cybersecurity cooperation and explore ways forward for further collaboration.</code></em></strong></p> - -<p>There are two key areas for consideration in promoting holistic and effective Japan-U.S. cybersecurity cooperation. First, both countries’ cybersecurity authorities, roles, and responsibilities are highly decentralized, making it challenging to gain a comprehensive overview of the subject. Second, while there are a number of high-level frameworks and agreements for cooperation between both governments, there is still a need for more specific and operational collaboration. To address these issues, this paper begins by providing a comprehensive overview of the cybersecurity postures in both countries, including the basic policies, organizational structures, and functions, with a focus on recent developments. It then reviews Japan-U.S. cooperation to date, discusses the current state of critical infrastructure cybersecurity and resilience in both countries, and offers recommendations for operationalizing cooperation in this area.</p> - -<h3 id="fundamentals-of-cybersecurity-in-the-united-states-and-japan">Fundamentals of Cybersecurity in the United States and Japan</h3> - -<p>The United States and Japan have highly decentralized and complicated cybersecurity structures and functions across their governments, which results in overlapping authorities, roles, and responsibilities. While several cybersecurity experts focus on specific areas of cooperation, there is a lack of comprehensive and accurate understanding of the cybersecurity postures in both countries. To pursue effective Japan-U.S. cooperation in specific areas, it would be essential, as a prerequisite, to have a clear understanding of these cybersecurity postures and to be able to map both countries’ policies, structures, functions, initiatives, and so on. The following provides an overview of cybersecurity postures in both countries, focusing on recent developments and future direction.</p> - -<h4 id="cybersecurity-in-the-united-states">Cybersecurity in the United States</h4> - -<p><em>Basic Strategy and Policy</em></p> - -<p>Cybersecurity policy in the United States is commonly believed to be relatively bipartisan. The two major political parties have been pursuing a similar direction in general, although they have minor differences. The U.S. government has historically strongly emphasized prioritizing and reinforcing voluntary public-private partnerships (PPPs) to enhance the national cybersecurity posture. However, recent significant cyber incidents, such as those at SolarWinds in 2020 and Colonial Pipeline in 2021, as well as growing geopolitical tensions, have resulted in a major change in this policy. Recognizing cybersecurity as a matter of national security, the Biden administration has made a significant shift in policy to strengthen government involvement in the private sector. This includes strengthening the federal government’s organizational structure by creating high-level government posts responsible for cybersecurity; introducing and updating laws and regulations; and expanding government-led initiatives.</p> - -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Recognizing cybersecurity as a matter of national security, the Biden administration has made a significant shift in policy to strengthen government involvement in the private sector.</code></em></strong></p> - -<p>The Biden administration’s cybersecurity policies are largely based on the recommendations from the Cyberspace Solarium Commission (CSC), established under the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2019. In addition, Executive Order (EO) 14028: Improving the Nation’s Cybersecurity, signed in May 2021, has served as the foundation for numerous federal cybersecurity initiatives to date. In March 2023, the NCS was released for the first time in four and a half years. The strategy is composed of five key pillars: (1) “defend critical infrastructure,” (2) “disrupt and dismantle threat actors,” (3) “shape market forces to drive security and resilience,” (4) “invest in a resilient future,” and (5) “forge international partnerships to pursue shared goals.” The NCS acknowledges the continued importance of voluntary PPPs, but also points out that this alone is not sufficient. It highlights the need for baseline requirements for critical infrastructure and the shift of accountability for cybersecurity away from end users to more capable manufacturers and providers. This demonstrates the administration’s clear intention to increase government involvement. The Office of the National Cyber Director (ONCD) publishes an annual National Cybersecurity Strategy Implementation Plan (NCSIP) to ensure transparency and accountability for the implementation of the strategy. This plan outlines the specific implementation items, responsible agency, contributing entities, and deadlines for each strategic objective. The second edition, published in May 2024, is the most recent version of the plan. Federal cybersecurity measures are being implemented in accordance with the plan.</p> - -<p><em>Organizational Structure</em></p> - -<p>Figure 1 shows an overview of the cybersecurity organizational structure centered on the U.S. federal government. ONCD leads and coordinates federal cybersecurity strategy and policy in the White House. The deputy national security advisor for cyber and emerging technology in the National Security Council (NSC) serves as an adviser to the president on national security issues related to cyber. Although the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) is not a cybersecurity-focused organization, it issues specific instructions to government agencies to implement policies such as EOs and manages and oversees their processes of implementation, including budgetary aspects.</p> - -<p>In the executive departments, the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) in the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) plays a central role as the operational lead for federal cybersecurity and the national coordinator for critical infrastructure cybersecurity and resilience. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) in the Department of Justice (DOJ) serves as a law enforcement entity for cybercrimes. The National Security Agency (NSA) in the Department of Defense (DOD) is tasked with protecting U.S. national security systems, the DOD, and the defense industrial base. It is also one of the key agencies for cyber intelligence. The U.S. Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM) in the DOD is a military wing responsible for cyber operations to defend against and respond to cyberattacks on the nation. The Department of State (DOS) focuses on cyber diplomacy. The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) in the Department of Commerce (DOC) plays a key role in developing cybersecurity resources such as standards, frameworks, guidance, and practices. The National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) serves as the principal adviser to the president on telecommunications and information policy, including cybersecurity. There are designated Sector Risk Management Agencies (SRMAs) that are responsible for managing critical infrastructure sectors. Further details can be found in Chapter 4. Independent regulatory entities, such as the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), are also increasingly involved in the cybersecurity field, leveraging their respective existing authorities.</p> - -<p>The U.S. federal government’s cybersecurity budget request for FY 2025 is $27.5 billion, with $13 billion allocated for civilian agencies and $14.5 billion for the DOD. The number of employees in CISA, the operational core of the federal government, was 3,161 as of August 2023.</p> - -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/iH7CUeK.png" alt="image01" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 1: Cybersecurity Organizational Structure Centered on the U.S. Federal Government.</strong> Source: Author’s analysis.</em></p> - -<p><em>Current State</em></p> - -<ul> - <li>Defense</li> -</ul> - -<p>In September 2023, the DOD released the overview version of the Department of Defense Cyber Strategy for the first time since 2018. The strategy aligns with the priorities set out in the U.S. National Security Strategy (NSS) and the National Defense Strategy released in 2022, as well as the NCS. It includes four lines of effort: (1) “defend the nation,” (2) “prepare to fight and win the nation’s wars,” (3) “protect the cyber domain with allies and partners,” and (4) “build enduring advantages in cyberspace.” In March 2024, the new Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Cyber Policy was established to enhance defense cyber policy.</p> - -<p>USCYBERCOM is the primary entity responsible for cyber operations related to national defense. While its missions and activities are not necessarily all publicly available, one of its recent priorities has been to work with allies to respond to potential cyber activities from outside the country that pose a threat to the United States. This is represented by the concept “defend forward,” which defends against malicious cyber activities at their source. One form of this concept is the implementation of “hunt forward operations.” This initiative contributes to the cyber defense of the host country by monitoring and detecting malicious cyber activities on the host country’s network while also contributing to the defense of the United States against attacks from foreign adversaries. USCYBERCOM has shared leadership with the NSA since its establishment. The two organizations work together on cyber operations, with the NSA providing its own cyber intelligence insights and resources to support USCYBERCOM.</p> - -<ul> - <li>Intelligence</li> -</ul> - -<p>The U.S. intelligence community is led by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), with the NSA playing a major role, particularly in the area of cybersecurity. The NSA collects foreign signals intelligence and provides it to U.S. policymakers and military forces. In the past, the NSA’s operations were less transparent and accessible to the public. However, in recent years, the NSA has been moving away from its historical secrecy and becoming more open to the public. It is actively promoting collaboration with the private sector as well as federal agencies, including strengthening its partnership with the defense industrial base through the Cybersecurity Collaboration Center (CCC) and developing and providing technical guidance in collaboration with CISA, the FBI, and other agencies. In recent years, the government has adopted a policy of sharing threat intelligence in a timely manner with a broad range of stakeholders by declassifying the information as much as possible. This has led to closer cooperation between government and critical infrastructure.</p> - -<ul> - <li>Law Enforcement</li> -</ul> - -<p>The FBI is the lead federal agency investigating cybercrimes, working with other agencies such as CISA and the NSA, foreign partners and law enforcement entities, and the private sector. The National Cyber Investigative Joint Task Force (NCIJTF) is a government-wide initiative that integrates investigative efforts against cyber threats. The FBI is responsible for organizing and leading this, with the participation of over 30 agencies in the intelligence community and law enforcement. The Internet Crime Complaint Center is a resource for the general public to report internet crimes. The FBI has recently assigned cyber assistant legal attachés to embassies worldwide to work closely with international authorities.</p> - -<p>In recent years, the FBI and DOJ have shifted their focus from traditional criminal investigations (e.g., establishing a case, arresting, prosecuting, convicting, and sending criminals to prison) to the disruption of cybercriminals. This shift could make it more challenging to prosecute crimes without sufficient evidence. However, the government has prioritized proactive measures, including the prevention of crimes, early detection, and the prevention of the spread of damage. The government has been implementing this policy aggressively, conducting a series of law enforcement operations. These include disrupting international ransomware groups such as ALPHV/BlackCat and LockBit, as well as the botnets used by state-sponsored actors such as Volt Typhoon, Flax Typhoon, and 911 S5. The case of LockBit is one of the largest coordinated operations in recent years, involving law enforcement agencies from around the world. The National Police Agency (NPA) of Japan also participated in the operation, along with the Five Eyes countries (an intelligence alliance composed of Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States) and other international partners.</p> - -<ul> - <li>Diplomacy</li> -</ul> - -<p>The DOS is responsible for coordinating diplomatic engagement on the security of international cyberspace in bilateral, multilateral, and regional forums. It also leads intergovernmental cyber dialogues with international partners, including Japan. The Biden administration has enhanced its system for promoting national and economic security in cyberspace and digital technology from a diplomatic perspective through the establishment of the Bureau of Cyberspace and Digital Policy in April 2022, the appointment of the first-ever ambassador-at-large for it in September of the same year, and other measures. Furthermore, in May 2024, the DOS published its first United States International Cyberspace and Digital Policy Strategy. The strategy outlines four key areas of action to build digital solidarity. These include promoting a secure and resilient digital ecosystem, aligning rights-respecting approaches with international partners, building coalitions and engaging partners to counter threats to cyberspace, and strengthening international partners’ digital and cyber capacity. There is also a plan to have trained cyber and digital officers in every U.S. embassy around the world by the end of 2024. The White House is also leading international cooperation on cybersecurity through initiatives such as the International Counter Ransomware Initiative (CRI). The current status of Japan-U.S. cybersecurity cooperation is outlined in Chapter 3.</p> - -<ul> - <li>Government System Protection</li> -</ul> - -<p>The federal Chief Information Security Officer (CISO) oversees cybersecurity policy, planning, and implementation for the executive branch. OMB provides instructions on specific cybersecurity measures to be implemented by federal agencies with a deadline through the issuance of memoranda and other means. CISA serves as the operational lead for cybersecurity in the Federal Civilian Executive Branch (FCEB). The Federal Information Security Modernization Act (FISMA) of 2014 requires government agencies to include incident detection, reporting, and response procedures in their information security programs. FISMA also requires OMB to publish an annual report on the progress and state of implementation in federal agencies. EO 14028 of May 2021 is based on FISMA. One of the sections notes the modernization of federal government cybersecurity. It includes a number of directives for FCEB, such as the use of secure cloud services, transition to zero trust architecture, and deployment of multi-factor authentication and data encryption. CISA maintains and publishes a Known Exploited Vulnerabilities Catalog as part of its operational support to federal agencies. The Known Exploited Vulnerabilities Catalog includes recommended actions that agencies must take by specified dates, which serves as a binding operational directive. CISA also offers the Continuous Diagnostics and Mitigation Program, which provides cybersecurity tools, integration services, and dashboards to assist agencies in enhancing their security posture. Note that the NSA is primarily responsible for the protection of government agencies with respect to the national security system (NSS). While EO 14028 is a directive for the FECB, a separate National Security Memorandum (NSM), NSM-8, was issued in January 2022 that requires the NSS to meet equivalent or greater cybersecurity requirements than those defined in the EO.</p> - -<ul> - <li>Critical Infrastructure Protection</li> -</ul> - -<p>The Biden administration considers critical infrastructure cybersecurity and resilience a national security priority. The national framework for critical infrastructure protection has long been based on the 2013 Presidential Policy Directive (PPD-21). However, the National Security Memorandum on Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience (NSM-22), the first revision in 11 years, was signed by the president in April 2024. NSM-22 designates 16 critical infrastructure sectors, which is the same as PPD-21. CISA, as the national coordinator, is responsible for the cybersecurity and resilience of the nation’s critical infrastructure. Each sector is overseen by a designated SRMA, which is the competent agency related to that industry and responsible for risk management and mitigation in the sector.</p> - -<p>Given that the majority of critical infrastructure is owned and operated by the private sector, it is the responsibility of these entities to ensure their own cybersecurity. The government also plays a supporting role in these efforts. The specifics of PPPs vary by sector. In general, critical infrastructure owners and operators cooperate with the SRMA of the sector. In addition, the Sector Coordinating Council (SCC), which comprises critical infrastructure owners and operators, trade associations, and other entities within the sector, serves as a forum for discussing sector-specific strategies, policies, and plans. SCC also works closely with the Government Coordinating Council (GCC), which is the corresponding government entity for the sector. Technical and operational activities are typically managed through Information Sharing and Analysis Centers (ISACs), which are established in each industry. The National Council of ISACs (NCI) facilitates cross-sector operational coordination among ISACs. In addition, there are several specific initiatives related to critical infrastructure protection. One of the most notable initiatives to date is the Joint Cyber Defense Collaborative (JCDC), which was launched in August 2021. It is a framework of cross-sector collaboration between selected private-sector entities and key government agencies, including CISA, the NSA, and the FBI.</p> - -<p>The United States has long relied on voluntary PPPs as a primary policy approach. However, there has been a notable increase in legislative and regulatory approaches under the Biden administration. In March 2022, the Cyber Incident Reporting for Critical Infrastructure Act (CIRCIA) was passed, requiring critical infrastructure owners and operators to report significant incidents and ransomware payments to the government. The rule-making process is currently underway. In addition, as indicated in the NCS and NSM-22, further cybersecurity requirements and regulations are being considered for each sector. Further details on critical infrastructure protection can be found in Chapter 4 and beyond.</p> - -<ul> - <li>Small- and Medium-sized Businesses Protection</li> -</ul> - -<p>In general, small- and medium-sized businesses (SMBs) often have smaller budgets, fewer employees, and less cybersecurity expertise than large corporations. These companies are often part of key supply chains, large corporate groups, or critical infrastructure and have been increasingly targeted by attackers as the weakest link. The government has identified the need to enhance the cybersecurity posture of SMBs as a critical issue. CISA assists SMBs in reducing their cyber risks by providing guidance tailored to their needs and free services and tools. NIST also plays an important role in this effort. It has launched a website, Small Business Cybersecurity Corner, which provides a centralized collection of cybersecurity guidance, training, and other resources for SMBs, including NIST IR 7621. Additionally, the Small Business Cybersecurity Community of Interest was established to facilitate the exchange of information and resources. To date, over 1,000 small businesses have participated in this initiative.</p> - -<ul> - <li>Consumers and the General Public</li> -</ul> - -<p>It is important to raise cybersecurity awareness among the general public in order to build nationwide cybersecurity capabilities. In the United States, CISA has taken a leading role in working with the federal government; state, local, tribal, and territorial governments; and the private sector to disseminate information and conduct campaigns to ensure that the public is aware of cyber threats and can safely use the digital space. October has been designated as National Cybersecurity Awareness Month since 2004. In 2023, the initiative celebrated its 20th anniversary, and CISA launched a new permanent cybersecurity awareness program, Secure Our World. The program is focused on four key actions: use strong passwords, enable multi-factor authentication, recognize and report phishing, and update software. These actions are designed to encourage behavioral change throughout the year.</p> +<p>In recent years, there has been a surge in synthetic media being employed by domestic actors to create deceptive political content, predominately in regard to political elections. A selection of AI-enabled incidents include the following:</p> <ul> - <li>Technologies, Products, and Services</li> + <li> + <p>The Venezuelan government ran fake news stories featuring AI-generated newscasters as part of a widespread domestic propaganda campaign to influence its citizens.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Both pro-Israeli and pro-Palestinian social media accounts shared synthetic images of the ongoing Gaza conflict, such as AI-generated photos of a crying baby among bomb wreckage, to further false narratives.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>An AI-generated nonconsensual pornographic video of a senior U.S. government official at the Department of Homeland Security was circulated online as part of an ongoing smear campaign.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Synthetic images of former president Donald Trump, portrayed as being real, were used in an attack ad by an opposition candidate during the U.S. presidential primaries.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Synthetic media of politicians were falsely portrayed as authentic, including videos of UK prime minister Keir Starmer shouting at staff, U.S. president Joe Biden calling for a military draft, and a Slovakian presidential candidate discussing vote rigging during the election’s final days.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>A robocall campaign used a synthetic audio clip of President Biden’s voice to urge thousands of New Hampshire residents not to vote in the state’s primary.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>UK far-right actors and politicians widely circulated anti-immigrant and Islamophobic synthetic content across social media ahead of the 2024 elections.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Fictitious videos and images of celebrities such as Taylor Swift, as well as entirely AI-generated Black voters, endorsing former president Trump’s 2024 U.S. presidential campaign have been frequently shared online by political supporters in the run up to the 2024 elections.</p> + </li> </ul> -<p>The security of technologies, products, and services is a broad topic. This paper does not cover all aspects of the topic, but one of the Biden administration’s key interests is the promotion of secure by design and secure by default. This is the concept of ensuring that products and services are secure from the design phase and that security features are built in by default for the products and services. This aligns with the NCS’s primary objective of shifting cybersecurity accountability to manufacturers and providers. CISA, in collaboration with federal agencies and international partners, including Japan, has been actively promoting the adoption of these principles. In May 2024, 68 of the world’s leading software manufacturers made a voluntary commitment to CISA’s Secure by Design Pledge, pledging to design products with better security built in. Furthermore, CISA is advancing this principle, shifting the concept of secure by design to secure by demand, to ensure that customers understand the necessity of the security and safety of the products and push vendors to improve their products. In March 2024, CISA and OMB released a Secure Software Development Attestation Form, which requires producers of software used by the federal government to attest to the adoption of secure development practices aligned with NIST’s Secure Software Development Framework. Subsequently, in August 2024, CISA released a software acquisition guide for federal agencies, which can be used by a broader range of stakeholders, including the private sector. The guide provides recommendations for software assurance in the cybersecurity supply chain risk management life cycle, focusing on the secure by demand concept. In a related effort, CISA has been facilitating community discussions to promote the use of the Software Bill of Materials (SBOM) to increase software transparency. The government has also been calling for the use of memory-safe languages for secure software development. Additionally, as indicated in the NCS, a legal framework for holding software producers accountable is also being considered. Regarding consumer devices, the White House announced a plan for an internet of things (IoT) labeling program in July 2023. The objective is to make secure IoT devices widely available through a voluntary approach that leverages market forces. The program is currently being prepared under the leadership of the FCC with the aim of becoming operational by the end of 2024. Several government initiatives are being developed under the common concept of secure by design.</p> +<h4 id="nonconsensual-intimate-media">Nonconsensual Intimate Media</h4> -<p>Another key issue is the safety and security of artificial intelligence (AI), which is considered a foundation of the use of AI in EO 14110: Safe, Secure, and Trustworthy Development and Use of Artificial Intelligence, signed in October 2023. The EO addresses a wide range of issues, including risk assessment and mitigation for the use of AI in critical infrastructure, the security of the foundation models, and the detection and labeling of synthetic content. These tasks have been assigned to CISA, NIST, and other government agencies.</p> +<p>One of the most prolific abuses of generative AI to date has been the production of AI-generated nonconsensual intimate media of adults and children. Accounting for 96 percent of all synthetic media videos in existence in 2019, the adult nonconsensual pornography industry and the online trafficking of child sexual abuse materials have exploded in the years since, claiming millions of adult and child victims to date. Examples of incidents include the following:</p> <ul> - <li>Workforce</li> + <li> + <p>An Indian journalist investigating the rape of a young girl was the target of an extensive hate campaign, which included synthetic pornography of her being circulated online.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>An automated Telegram bot service created and published sexual images of an estimated 24,000 women and girls.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Sexually explicit images and videos of school girls and female teachers being produced and shared online by male students in Korea, Brazil, Spain, and the United States, among others.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>A recently uncovered worldwide trafficking ring producing and selling sexually synthetic images depicting photorealistic children on a reported “industrial scale.”</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>A deluge of synthetic pornography featuring Taylor Swift spread across the social media platform X, forcing the online platform to block searches of the celebrity temporarily.</p> + </li> </ul> -<p>A shortage of cybersecurity professionals is a common challenge for both the public and private sectors globally. In July 2023, the United States published the National Cyber Workforce and Education Strategy (NCWES), which focuses on four pillars: (1) “equip every American with foundational cyber skills,” (2) “transform cyber education,” (3) “expand and enhance America’s cyber workforce,” and (4) “strengthen the federal cyber workforce.” In releasing the strategy, government agencies, industry, academia, and nonprofit organizations have committed to working together to implement the strategy through training, apprenticeship programs, and partnerships. ONCD is leading this national initiative. In June 2024, ONCD released a report outlining its progress to date and future work plans for implementing NCWES.</p> - -<h4 id="cybersecurity-in-japan">Cybersecurity in Japan</h4> - -<p><em>Basic Strategy and Policy</em></p> - -<p>The Japanese political system has been relatively stable and consistent in terms of the parliamentary cabinet system, with the Liberal Democratic Party having been in power for a long time, except for a few periods. With regard to cybersecurity policy, there are some similarities with the United States in terms of a decentralized government organizational structure and the basis of voluntary PPPs.</p> - -<p>The current cybersecurity policy is based on the Cybersecurity Basic Act, which went into full effect in January 2015. The act outlines the fundamental principles and responsibilities of the nation in advancing cybersecurity policies. It also establishes the framework for developing a national cybersecurity strategy and other policy initiatives. In January 2015, the Cybersecurity Strategic Headquarters was established in the cabinet under the act, and the National Center of Incident Readiness and Strategy for Cybersecurity (NISC) was established in the Cabinet Secretariat as the national cybersecurity center. The national Cybersecurity Strategy has been updated approximately once every three years since its initial version in 2013, with the latest version released in September 2021. The latest strategy sets “Cybersecurity for All” as its main theme and outlines three key directions: (1) “advancing digital transformation (DX) and cybersecurity simultaneously,” (2) “ensuring the overall safety and security of cyberspace as it becomes increasingly public, interconnected and interrelated,” and (3) “enhancing initiatives from the perspective of Japan’s national security.” The strategy reflects the current geopolitical landscape, naming China, Russia, and North Korea as countries of concern for the first time. It also indicates the importance of international cooperation with the United States, the Quad (a strategic security grouping that includes Australia, India, Japan, and the United States), the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and other like-minded countries, as well as the importance of economic security and supply chains. Additionally, the government releases an annual report that serves as both a review of the previous fiscal year and a plan for the current year, outlining the key achievements and implementation plan based on the strategy.</p> - -<p>Japan’s cybersecurity is now at a pivotal point. Most recently, the NSS of Japan, released in December 2022, outlined a strategy to fundamentally enhance the nation’s cybersecurity posture. While the ACD in general includes a wide range of proactive cyber operations, the strategy focuses on three key areas as its own ACD: enhanced PPPs, detection of attack sources using information provided by telecommunication service providers, and government operations against attack sources. It also includes the strengthening of the government’s organizational structure, including the restructuring of NISC and a significant increase in government staff for cyber. The implementation of the strategy, including the introduction of legislation, is currently underway. Furthermore, the position of minister of state for economic security was established in the cabinet in October 2021, and the Economic Security Promotion Act was passed in May 2022. In May 2024, a new regulation based on the act came into effect to ensure the safety and reliability of essential infrastructure. In the same month, a bill on a new security clearance system was passed. This will include cybersecurity information in the protected information and greatly expand the scope of clearance to the nondefense private sector. These developments will have a positive impact on further enhancing the nation’s cybersecurity.</p> - -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Japan’s cybersecurity is now at a pivotal point. Most recently, the NSS of Japan, released in December 2022, outlined a strategy to fundamentally enhance the nation’s cybersecurity posture.</code></em></strong></p> - -<p><em>Organizational Structure</em></p> - -<p>Figure 2 provides an overview of the organizational structure of cybersecurity centered on the Japanese government. The Cybersecurity Strategic Headquarters in the cabinet is the highest decisionmaking body for national cybersecurity. The headquarters comprises the chief cabinet secretary, the ministers related to cybersecurity, and external experts. The headquarters works closely with the National Security Council (NSC) in the cabinet. NISC serves as the secretariat for the headquarters and plays a coordinating role for government agencies involved in cybersecurity and critical infrastructure.</p> - -<p>The NPA is a law enforcement agency responsible for investigating cybercrimes. The Ministry of Defense (MOD) is responsible for cybersecurity in the field of national defense, and the Japan Self-Defense Force (JSDF) is in charge of cyber defense for its own organization, including MOD. The Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications (MIC) is responsible for cybersecurity policy related to information and communications networks. It also serves as a regulatory body for the communications industry. The National Institute of Information and Communications Technology (NICT), which is under the jurisdiction of MIC, conducts research and development (R&amp;D) for cybersecurity in the information and communications technology (ICT) field. The Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) develops cybersecurity policies for private companies across a range of industries. The Information-technology Promotion Agency (IPA), which is under the jurisdiction of METI, maintains a national certification system of information security and conducts studies and research in the field to support the national information technology strategy from a technical and human resources perspective. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) is responsible for managing diplomatic relations in the cyber domain. The Digital Agency is a relatively new agency, established in September 2021 to promote the digitalization of national and local government. It is also involved in cybersecurity from the perspective of DX. Moreover, as in the United States, critical infrastructure sectors are overseen by designated government agencies. Further details can be found in Chapter 4.</p> - -<p>The Japanese government’s cybersecurity-related budget for FY 2024 is ¥212.86 billion, with approximately ¥152 billion allocated to MOD and the remainder distributed among non-MOD agencies. This represents an increase of approximately 54 percent from the FY 2023 initial budget. It should be noted that the cybersecurity-related budgets released by governments cannot be directly compared due to differences in the definition and scope of cybersecurity. While the exact number of NISC employees is not made public, as of FY 2023, it is made up of approximately 100 government officials and employees with specialized expertise from the private sector. Additionally, NISC plans to double the number of staff in FY 2024. Further expansion is anticipated in the coming years through organizational restructuring based on the NSS of Japan.</p> - -<p>While it is not easy to precisely map out the roles and responsibilities of cybersecurity-related government agencies in the United States and Japan, a rough relationship may be expressed as in Figure 3. Please note that this simplified mapping does not necessarily define a complete and exhaustive relationship between the two.</p> - -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/eC5noNH.png" alt="image02" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 2: Cybersecurity Organizational Structure Centered on the Japanese Government.</strong> Source: Author’s analysis; and <a href="https://www.nisc.go.jp/pdf/policy/kihon-s/cs-senryaku2021-gaiyou-en.pdf">National Center of Incident Readiness and Strategy for Cybersecurity (NISC), Japan’s Cybersecurity Strategy 2021 (overview) (Tokyo: NISC, September 28, 2021), 8</a>.</em></p> - -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/POENk7X.png" alt="image03" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 3: Mapping of Cybersecurity-Related Government Agencies in Japan and the United States.</strong> Source: Author’s analysis.</em></p> +<h4 id="financial-crime">Financial Crime</h4> -<p><em>Current State</em></p> +<p>AI-enabled financial crime has quickly become one of the most widespread misuses of synthetic media. Criminals have employed generative AI tools to impersonate, extort, and hack for a multitude of fraudulent activities, with personalized AI spear-phishing emails and voice phone scams experiencing the largest growth. With an estimated 700 percent increase in incidents in 2023 from the previous year, financial experts predict that AI-enabled financial fraud could lead to losses of $40 billion by 2027. Noteworthy incidents include the following:</p> <ul> - <li>Defense</li> + <li> + <p>The head of a UK energy firm was personally tricked into transferring nearly $250,000 by fraudsters who used voice cloning to impersonate the parent company’s CEO.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Reportedly the largest AI-generated scam to date, thousands of synthetic videos of celebrities such as Elon Musk and MrBeast promoting fake financial schemes have been widely circulated on social media platforms.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>An Arizona woman was the target of a fake ransoming scheme in which fraudsters impersonated her daughter over the phone using voice-cloning technology.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>An employee of a financial firm was tricked during a week-long ruse into paying out $25 million to fraudsters after the scammers used real-time synthetic audiovisual software to impersonate the employee’s senior personnel and colleagues through a series of group video conferences, emails, and calls.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>The Yahoo Boys, a crime collective, have widely adopted AI tools for romance scams and sextortion, employing live face and voice impersonation software and “nudification” apps to trick and blackmail targets. This has led not only to financial loss but also to tragic deaths in which some targets, frequently teenagers, took their own lives.</p> + </li> </ul> -<p>As highlighted in the NSS of Japan, Japan’s national cyber defense is undergoing a significant transformation. To date, the scope of JSDF defenses has been limited primarily to MOD and JSDF network systems, but the strategy will expand this to include critical infrastructure. Japan’s ACD, a key focus of the strategy, also includes relatively offensive-leaning cyber operations, such as “to penetrate and neutralize attacker’s servers.” While the strategy is still in the process of implementation, it is anticipated that JSDF, NPA, or equivalent organizations will play a key role in conducting such operations. To enable the government to fulfill this role, it is essential to expand and strengthen the government’s cyber staff. JSDF has already initiated this process in advance of the strategy. As of the end of FY 2022, the number of cyber professionals was approximately 890. The goal is to increase this number to 4,000 by the end of FY 2027. In addition, the number of operators for cyber-related systems in the Ground, Maritime, and Air Self-Defense Forces is planned to be expanded to 20,000. To support this plan, the educational system of the JSDF is being enhanced, including through the reorganization of Japan’s Ground Self-Defense Force (JGSDF) Signal School into the System &amp; Signal/Cyber School with a new cyber department, introduction of a cyber course at the JGSDF High Technical School, and establishment of a cyber specialized department at the National Defense Academy. Additionally, a new system for hiring private-sector professionals for a limited period has been implemented. Furthermore, Japan has been engaged in the activities of the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCDCOE) since 2019 and has participated in the cyber defense exercises (Locked Shields) hosted by the CCDCOE. Japan is expanding its international cooperation in cyber defense operations.</p> - -<ul> - <li>Intelligence</li> -</ul> +<h3 id="conclusion">Conclusion</h3> -<p>The Cabinet Intelligence and Research Office (CIRO) is an intelligence agency directly under the Prime Minister’s Office responsible for collecting, consolidating, and analyzing information on important cabinet policies. The government intelligence community includes the CIRO, MOD, NPA, MOFA, and the Public Security Intelligence Agency, which work closely together in intelligence collection and analysis.</p> +<p>As generative AI technology continues to advance, so does the potential for its misuse. In only a few short years, the synthetic media threat landscape has changed dramatically. AI-enabled deceptions have become increasingly complex and varied, ranging from gray zone warfare to financial fraud and beyond. Not only has the weaponization of synthetic media already begun to cause real and substantial harm to people and organizations worldwide, but it also threatens to undermine public trust in all information online, regardless of the truth. Overall, these developments present troubling implications for U.S. national security.</p> -<p>Japan operates a security clearance system based on the Specially Designated Secrets Act, which designates the four fields (defense, diplomacy, reconnaissance, and terrorism) as classified national security information. The current system has subjected primarily government officials and a smaller number of private-sector employees engaged in defense fields to eligibility screening. A new security clearance legislation, passed in May 2024, significantly expands the scope of the existing system. The new system will expand the scope of information to be protected to a wider range of economic security information, including cybersecurity. It will also greatly expand the scope of eligibility screening to the private sector. The government is currently developing detailed operational rules for implementation in 2025. The new system will also have a significant impact on the cybersecurity field, further promoting classified information sharing with like-minded countries and stricter management of it.</p> +<p>These dangers have become even more severe as it has been made clear that widely available generative AI technology has progressed to the point that people can no longer depend on their eyes and ears to reliably detect the synthetic content they might encounter in their everyday lives. With this primary line of defense compromised, pursuing alternative solutions has never been so vital. Now more than ever, stakeholders across the private and public sectors must work together to implement multifaceted countermeasures that bridge the technological, regulatory, and educational domains to oppose the growing threat posed by weaponized synthetic media.</p> -<ul> - <li>Law Enforcement</li> -</ul> +<hr /> -<p>In April 2022, NPA established the Cyber Affairs Bureau to streamline and reinforce cybersecurity roles and responsibilities distributed across various sections within the organization. The new bureau is responsible for developing and implementing cyber policies within NPA in a centralized manner. In addition, the National Cyber Unit was established as a centralized national investigative agency to address cyber cases that have a significant impact, are highly technical, and involve international criminal groups. It also serves as a central point of contact for international law enforcement agencies. In line with these developments, the number of public attributions has been increasing in recent years. These are conducted solely by Japan and in cooperation with like-minded countries, including the United States. Furthermore, Japan has conducted disruptive operations against cybercrime infrastructure in coordination with international law enforcement agencies, including the United States. NPA played an important role in providing technical expertise in the international coordinated operation against LockBit, one of the world’s largest ransomware groups, in February 2024. It developed and provided ransomware decryption tools, which were used by over 6 million victims.</p> +<p><strong>Di Cooke</strong> is a horizon fellow with the International Security Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C.</p> -<p>Furthermore, the Japan Cybercrime Control Center (JC3), a nonprofit PPP, facilitates the sharing and analysis of threat and crime information among industry, academia, and law enforcement entities to identify and reduce risks related to cybercrime. In addition to NPA, major companies across sectors participate in the center and collaborate closely under confidentiality agreements. The organization also collaborates with the National Cyber-Forensics and Training Alliance of the United States.</p> +<p><strong>Abby Edwards</strong> is a former research associate in the International Security Program at CSIS.</p> -<ul> - <li>Diplomacy</li> -</ul> +<p><strong>Alexis Day</strong> is an associate director for the Smart Women, Smart Power Initiative at CSIS.</p> -<p>MOFA’s approach to cyber diplomacy is based on three pillars: the promotion of the rule of law in cyberspace, the promotion of confidence-building measures, and capacity-building support. Japan, along with the United States and other like-minded countries, takes the position that conventional international law applies in cyberspace. It is actively engaged in international discussions through participation in government expert meetings at the United Nations, among other venues. Additionally, as the first Asian member of the Convention on Cybercrime, Japan is actively engaged in discussions to expand the number of signatory countries to this convention.</p> +<p><strong>Devi Nair</strong> is a former associate director and associate fellow in the International Security Program at CSIS.</p> -<p>The Japanese government has been conducting intergovernmental cyber dialogues with countries and regions, including the United States, the United Kingdom, the European Union, and ASEAN. On capacity building, MOFA has coordinated initiatives to provide cooperation and support in a number of key areas, including awareness-raising, critical infrastructure protection, incident response, and cybercrime countermeasures, with a particular focus on ASEAN. Furthermore, MOFA has long had the post of ambassador for cyber policy, which oversees consultations with foreign governments and the government-wide cyber foreign policy. For further information on existing Japan-U.S. cooperation in this area, please refer to Chapter 3.</p> +<p><strong>Sophia Barkoff</strong> is a former research intern in Defending Democratic Institutions in the International Security Program at CSIS.</p> -<ul> - <li>Government System Protection</li> -</ul> +<p><strong>Katie Kelly</strong> is a former social media and outreach intern in the International Security Program at CSIS.</p>Di Cooke, et al.New research finds that we can now no longer trust our eyes and ears to reliably distinguish between real and AI-generated images, audio, and video. What does this mean in a world where the weaponization of synthetic media is becoming increasingly prevalent?SIFMANet Budapest Report2024-10-31T12:00:00+08:002024-10-31T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/sifmanet-budapest-report<p><em>Discussions held in Budapest in September 2024 addressed the state of sanctions implementation and enforcement in Hungary.</em></p> -<p>NISC, which leads the defense of government agencies, includes the Government Security Operation Coordination (GSOC) team. GSOC centrally monitors information collected from sensors installed in each agency 24/7. It also collects and analyzes data on cyberattacks and threats and shares that information with agencies to help improve the government’s overall response capabilities.</p> +<excerpt /> -<p>The government has established the Common Standards for Cybersecurity Measures for Government Agencies and Related Agencies as a common framework to enhance the cybersecurity posture of government agencies. The standards are reviewed regularly, with the latest version released in July 2023. The document specifies a common baseline that all agencies must meet and additional optional measures to ensure a higher level of security. This allows risk-based measures to be implemented continuously in accordance with each agency’s specific situation. The latest version includes a new requirement for government contractors to implement measures in accordance with NIST SP 800-171 for managing cybersecurity risk in the supply chain.</p> +<p>In September 2024, the Centre for Finance and Security at RUSI convened a roundtable discussion with public and private sector representatives from Hungary to discuss the state of sanctions implementation and enforcement in the country. The roundtable was organised with the support of the Budapest-based think tank Equilibrium Institute. Participants included the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, the Hungarian Financial Intelligence Unit and the Customs Unit of the National Tax and Customs Administration, the Hungarian National Bank, the Government Office of the Capital City Budapest, professional associations, companies, law firms and financial institutions.</p> -<p>While each agency has had a CISO for many years, starting in FY 2016, a deputy director general for cybersecurity and information technology has been assigned to each organization as a full-time position to assist the CISO. The agencies are coordinated with one another through interagency CISO meetings.</p> +<p>The event was part of RUSI’s work to understand and highlight key challenges for sanctions implementation through its Sanctions and Illicit Finance Monitoring and Analysis Network (SIFMANet), funded by the National Endowment for Democracy. This conference report represents the findings gathered during the Budapest engagement. None of the discussions from the event are attributable.</p> -<ul> - <li>Critical Infrastructure Protection</li> -</ul> +<h3 id="the-legal-and-institutional-sanctions-framework-in-hungary">The Legal and Institutional Sanctions Framework in Hungary</h3> -<p>There are similarities in the organizational framework for critical infrastructure protection in Japan and the United States. The basic policy and framework are defined in the Cybersecurity Policy for Critical Infrastructure Protection (CPCIP), which is approved by the Cybersecurity Strategy Headquarters and published by NISC. The initial version was released in 2005, and subsequent regular updates have led to the most recent edition, released in March 2024. The latest version added the ports and harbors industry as a new 15th critical infrastructure sector in response to the cyberattack on the Port of Nagoya in 2023. NISC, as the national coordinator, is responsible for critical infrastructure cybersecurity and resilience across the nation. In line with the NSS of Japan, NISC plans to double its staff in FY 2024, strengthening its structure in preparation for future restructuring into a new national cybersecurity agency. Five government agencies have been designated responsible organizations for overseeing respective industries and managing and mitigating risks specific to their sectors.</p> +<p>Throughout the workshop, participants highlighted the fact that the current sanctions implementation landscape in Hungary is decentralised, involving multiple authorities, including the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, the National Tax and Customs Administration’s FIU and Customs Unit, the National Bank and the BFKH, along with other relevant agencies. Below follows a description of the relevant national competent authorities as described by participants.</p> -<p>In Japan, as in other countries, the majority of critical infrastructure is owned and operated by the private sector. It is, therefore, essential to foster PPPs to enhance the nation’s collective cyber defense capabilities. In general, critical infrastructure owners and operators share information directly with the agencies responsible for the sector as well as with NISC. There is also an organization called Capability for Engineering of Protection, Technical Operation, Analysis and Response (CEPTOAR), which represents each sector and subsector. Major sectors, such as ICT, finance, power, and transportation, have ISACs in place to facilitate technical and operational cooperation within their respective sector. NISC leads an annual cross-sector exercise program to enhance collective response capabilities across sectors. Most recently, in April 2019, the Cybersecurity Council was established with the cross-sector participation of government agencies and selected private companies related to critical infrastructure and cybersecurity. The objective of this council is to facilitate rapid information sharing and analysis between the public and private sectors.</p> +<p>The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade only established its Sanctions Department in March 2024. The Sanctions Department engages in policymaking in European Council working groups, develops expert opinions on sanctions proposals, coordinates implementation with the competent authorities, and participates in sanctions enforcement and export authorisation procedures. The department can also veto the decisions of the BFKH on the export of dual-use goods and military technology. Furthermore, it can issue opinions on the decisions of the BFKH regarding the provision of services, and the import of goods generating significant revenues for Russia, among other decisions. The department also provides opinions on large-scale government projects and bilateral protocols, and can offer, on request, opinions for companies on sanctions implementation issues.</p> -<p>In May 2024, a new regulation was initiated based on the Economic Security Promotion Act. This requires the government to conduct a prior review of the installation and outsourced operation of critical facilities of designated essential infrastructure owners and operators. The objective is to ensure the safety and reliability of critical infrastructure services against threats posed by foreign adversaries. Currently, there is no law similar to CIRCIA mandating incident reporting across all sectors. However, the potential advantages of implementing such a measure are being discussed at a panel of experts hosted by the Japanese government. In addition, sector-specific reporting requirements are currently in place as regulations and other means. Further details on critical infrastructure protection can be found in Chapter 4.</p> +<p>The responsibility for implementing targeted financial sanctions primarily rests with the FIU, which is part of the National Tax and Customs Administration. As a result of the need to heighten Hungary’s sanctions response following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the FIU underwent a significant reorganisation to enhance its operational capabilities. This restructuring has allowed the FIU to gain practical experience in sanctions enforcement, a process that had been somewhat limited prior to this period. The volume of transactions screened for sanctions purposes by the FIU increased following the invasion, and its sanctions responsibilities expanded. Since August 2024, the FIU has been responsible for screening any transfer of funds exceeding €100,000 out of the EU by any entity of which more than 40% is owned by Russia-linked entities or persons.</p> -<ul> - <li>SMBs’ Protection</li> -</ul> +<p>The institutional framework for sanctions enforcement in Hungary requires FIs and companies to report any transactions or assets suspected of violating sanctions directly to the FIU. The FIU is tasked with analysing these reports and determining whether any violations have occurred. If a potential violation is identified, the matter is escalated to the court, which holds the authority to freeze the assets or block the transactions in question. This dual role of the FIU – as both an administrative and a police unit – has increased its prominence within the sanctions implementation landscape. However, despite the improvements in reporting mechanisms and operational frameworks, the FIU acknowledges the need for a clearer demarcation between its traditional financial intelligence functions and its new responsibilities concerning sanctions implementation. To facilitate information exchange regarding sanctions cases, the FIU utilises FIU. net to ensure that international stakeholders can access relevant data efficiently.</p> -<p>Cybersecurity for SMBs is a major concern in Japan as well. METI and IPA have been leading initiatives in this area. IPA has established a website to provide SMBs with a centralized access point for resources, tools, and services of information security. In addition, it has published guidelines for SMBs, outlining the actions that both senior management and operational managers should take from their respective perspectives. It also introduced a comprehensive support package for SMBs at a low cost, offering a range of services, including consultation, anomaly monitoring, emergency response support, cyber insurance, and more. In addition, a self-declaration program has been implemented, enabling organizations to self-declare their cybersecurity actions taken according to their maturity level. This is also used as a prerequisite for applying for the government’s IT subsidy program.</p> +<p>The Hungarian National Bank plays a critical role in the prudential supervision of FIs, ensuring that they maintain capital adequacy and liquidity. The National Bank had to adapt its operational protocols to account for the impact of sanctions on FIs, integrating sanctions compliance into its anti-money laundering and counterterrorist financing (AML/CTF) supervisory framework. The sanctions-related responsibilities have intensified the bank’s Anti-Money Laundering Supervision Department’s cooperation with the bank’s Regulatory Department, the relevant Hungarian authorities, and professional associations.</p> -<p>Furthermore, in November 2020, the Supply-Chain Cybersecurity Consortium (SC3) was established as an industry-led initiative to promote cybersecurity measures for the entire supply chain, including SMBs, with the industry stakeholders working together. Cybersecurity for SMBs is a key area of focus discussed in a working group of the consortium.</p> +<p>The BFKH’s Department of Trade, Defence Industry, Export Control and Precious Metal Assay is responsible for licensing dual-use and military goods, as well as the implementation of certain sectoral sanctions. These include sanctions related to investments in the Russian energy sector, the re-export of fuel to Russia, the export of luxury goods and the provision of services, among others. The BFKH is also responsible for implementing certain financial sanctions, such as the prohibitions on transactions with the Central Bank of Russia and on accepting bank deposits over €100,000. Through its participation in the COARM and Dual-Use Goods working parties of the European Council, the BFKH is also integrated into the policy aspect of sanctions in Brussels. While taking on additional sanctions responsibilities since February 2022, the BFKH still operates with the same resources as before the full-scale invasion, putting it under increased pressure.</p> -<ul> - <li>Consumers and the General Public</li> -</ul> +<p>The Hungarian Customs Unit, part of the National Tax and Customs Administration, is charged with overseeing import–export activities related to Russia. Given the high volumes of trade with countries regarded as circumvention hubs, the increased burden on customs officials, coupled with limited resources, has hampered effective enforcement. Currently, only a few staff members are dedicated to sanctions-related oversight within the Customs Unit, and they are reliant on information from the European Commission due to their limited capacity for independent intelligence production.</p> -<p>NISC is leading awareness-raising initiatives in cooperation with other government agencies. Since 2010, February has been designated as Cybersecurity Month, with the objective of promoting public awareness and understanding of cybersecurity. NISC has created a dedicated website for public awareness, which provides a centralized set of resources. These include a handbook for safe and secure use of the internet, FAQs on cybersecurity-related laws and regulations, and educational video content.</p> +<p>Several other authorities are responsible for implementing sectoral and targeted sanctions: the Aviation Supervisory Authority Department of the Ministry of Construction and Transport implements bans on private and charter flights; the National Media and Infocommunications Authority is responsible for media bans; and the National Directorate-General for Aliens Policing implements entry bans.</p> -<ul> - <li>Technologies, Products, and Services</li> -</ul> +<p>For a complete understanding of the sanctions framework in Hungary, it is important to highlight that Hungary has been granted several exemptions in EU sanctions packages. Together with Slovakia and Czechia, the country has a temporary exemption from the prohibition of imports of crude oil by pipeline; the Rosatom-led Paks II nuclear power plant’s construction was also granted exemption; and the import of certain, otherwise sanctioned, goods remains authorised for the maintenance of Russian metro cars in Budapest.</p> -<p>Japan has a long history of implementing robust IoT security measures. In 2019, the government-led NOTICE project, which scans IoT devices connected to the internet in Japan to identify vulnerable devices and report them to users for remediation, launched in cooperation with the private sector. In addition, in 2020, the technical standard for devices connected to the internet was revised to mandate minimum security requirements for devices. Security measures are being implemented for both devices before introduction to the market and those already deployed. Most recently, METI has led discussions to introduce an IoT-labeling scheme similar to that in the United States. The program is expected to be partially launched during FY 2024. A working group will be established between the governments of the United States and Japan to develop an action plan for the mutual recognition of schemes.</p> +<h3 id="sanctions-compliance-in-the-hungarian-private-sector">Sanctions Compliance in the Hungarian Private Sector</h3> -<p>Secure by design and secure by default is also a key theme in Japan. The Japanese government is a cosignatory to the joint guidance on secure by design issued in October 2023 by international partners, including CISA. In the area of SBOM, METI has developed guidance on SBOM implementation based on the results of a multiyear testing project. MIC is also studying the use of SBOM in the communications sector, conducting a pilot project to install SBOM in selected facilities of communications carriers to evaluate its effectiveness and identify any issues that may arise.</p> +<p>Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine prompted a political debate in Hungary, marked by a critical governmental narrative on sanctions and their financial and economic impact on the country. Participants at the roundtable described the collapse of Sberbank Europe AG due to asset freezes under the initial sanctions packages as a key example. This case reverberated through the banking sector, leading to considerable deposit outflows and heightened sensitivity among FIs regarding liquidity and capital management.</p> -<p>Regarding AI, the Hiroshima AI Process, a Group of Seven (G7)-led initiative to develop international rules for the use of AI, was launched at the G7 Hiroshima Summit in May 2023. Japan, as the chairing country, led the discussion. In December 2023, the Hiroshima AI Process Comprehensive Policy Framework, Hiroshima Process International Guiding Principles for All AI Actors, and Hiroshima Process International Code of Conduct for Organizations Developing Advanced AI Systems were developed as deliverables of the Hiroshima AI Process. Within the government, there is a growing focus on the use of AI with safety and security. In February 2024, the Japan AI Safety Institute (AISI) was established. In April 2024, the AI Guidelines for Business was published, consolidating AI-related guidance previously dispersed across multiple agencies. The Japan AISI and NIST have completed a mapping of the AI Guidelines for Business and the NIST AI Risk Management Framework to ensure consistency with international discussions and to promote interoperability of AI policy frameworks between the United States and Japan.</p> +<p>In the wake of the sanctions imposed after the invasion, FIs in Hungary faced an urgent need to adapt to new requirements. Representatives from the Hungarian financial sector noted that although they had previous experience with sanctions stemming from Russia’s initial invasion of Eastern Ukraine and annexation of Crimea in 2014 – primarily focusing on name-/entity screening – the heightened and more complex restrictive measures on Russia necessitated more rigorous and manual work. FIs must now screen transactions comprehensively and assess whether the goods or end users involved are subject to sanctions, rather than simply screening for name matches. The absence of automated tools for monitoring financial flows related to sanctions violations poses significant challenges for Hungarian banks. While some tools, such as Swift’s Compliance Analytics, assist in analysing changes in financial flows that might be indicative of sanctions evasion activity, they often fall short of providing the depth of analysis required for transactions with high risks, and cannot provide the granular insights necessary for effective compliance. As it stands, compliance teams must often screen transactions manually on a case-by-case basis, which includes evaluating complex scenarios such as the export of aluminium wires to Russia or the import of salmon from the country.</p> -<ul> - <li>Workforce</li> -</ul> +<p>To better safeguard against non-compliance, participants from the financial sector argue that rather than simply rejecting transactions, FIs should adopt a US-style approach that allows for the blocking of funds within FIs until sufficient documentation confirming the lawfulness of transactions is provided. This shift would ensure that, while banks are still held accountable for compliance, additional pressure would be placed on corporates to bolster their sanctions awareness, as they would lose access to funds submitted for processing that are not properly documented. Enhanced technological capabilities in monitoring and reporting on sanctions-related activities are therefore needed to ease the burden of manual review processes.</p> -<p>The 2021 national Cybersecurity Strategy highlights the need for a more robust cybersecurity workforce in terms of both quality and quantity through cooperation between the public and private sectors. This is one of the cross-cutting measures in the strategy to secure and train human resources. Cybersecurity-related agencies are implementing specific measures. For instance, MIC/NICT has operated the National Cyber Training Center since 2017. The center offers a range of training programs, including hands-on practical exercises for government agencies, local governments, and critical infrastructure owners and operators, as well as technical R&amp;D programs to train young people and practical defense exercises intended for national events such as the Olympics and World Expo. In 2017, METI and IPA established the Industrial Cyber Security Center of Excellence, which offers a one-year program to train IT and operational technology professionals with technology, management, and business perspectives. The lecturers are world-leading experts in control system security.</p> +<p>Private sector representatives also highlighted the compliance challenges posed by the current fragmented sanctions reporting landscape in Hungary, involving multiple authorities and duplicating reporting lines. This creates confusion and inefficiencies. Banks in Hungary can self-report compliance failings to the FIU, but they also have obligations to report to the Hungarian National Bank. This dual reporting structure underscores the need for a clearer, more integrated approach to sanctions enforcement.</p> -<p>Regarding industry-led initiatives, a cross-industry cybersecurity study group has been active since 2015, with participation from companies in the critical infrastructure sectors. It has been engaged in discussions on how to strengthen the human resources ecosystem through collaboration between industry, academia, and government. The group has developed a reference defining human resources that aligns with NIST SP800-181, while taking into account the organizational structure and business practices of Japanese companies.</p> +<p>In the corporate sector, firms that have longstanding practices in managing export controls for dual-use goods are well prepared to follow sanctions regulations. However, the broader corporate sector remains ill-equipped to handle the complexities introduced by recent sanctions. SMEs find it especially challenging to navigate sanctions compliance.</p> -<h3 id="current-status-of-japan-us-cooperation">Current Status of Japan-U.S. Cooperation</h3> +<p>Last, legislators and regulatory bodies in Hungary appear to have struggled to coordinate their efforts, particularly given the complexity of sanctions legislation. Existing interdepartmental collaboration has proven challenging, complicating compliance for businesses and FIs. A centralised sanctions authority could streamline processes and facilitate better communication among stakeholders.</p> -<h4 id="japan-as-a-trusted-partner">Japan as a Trusted Partner</h4> +<h3 id="interpretation-of-eu-sanctions-regulations">Interpretation of EU Sanctions Regulations</h3> -<p>The United States is an important ally of Japan, and both countries have had a long-standing alliance built on mutual trust and cooperation for many years. While the alliance covers a wide range of areas, including national and economic security, many of today’s cooperative activities rely on cyberspace as their foundation. For instance, the digital infrastructure that serves as the foundation for intelligence and information sharing; Japan’s critical infrastructure, which U.S. military bases in Japan depend on; the supply chain that broadly covers both countries, including the defense industry; and the international business environment are all closely related to cyberspace. It is, therefore, essential to ensure the security and resilience of cyberspace if the two countries are to facilitate effective cooperation.</p> +<p>Interpreting EU sanctions regulations has proven to be a challenge for Hungarian businesses and authorities alike. Participants at the roundtable discussed how the complexity of EU sanctions regulations – characterised by frequent updates and inaccessible language – creates a significant burden for compliance teams, which must navigate a constantly shifting landscape. The rapid pace of change means that organisations often lack the time and resources needed to allow them to adapt their compliance frameworks.</p> -<p>The recent rise in geopolitical tensions in the Indo-Pacific region and the increasing cyber threats posed by state-sponsored actors make Japan’s position in cybersecurity increasingly important. It is also important to note that a robust cybersecurity partnership between the United States and Japan, like-minded countries that share the common values of the Free and Open Indo-Pacific, serves as deterrence against these foreign adversaries.</p> +<p>In this context, private sector participants expressed concerns regarding the interpretation of EU sanctions law, perceiving it as not clear enough. They agreed that language used in these regulations often lacks clarity and coherence, making it difficult for key stakeholders in both the public and private sectors (such as customs officials and FIs) to implement them effectively. Beyond the lack of clarity, rapid modifications to sanctions regulations also pose a challenge. Corporate sector participants noted that a change in the rules can create immediate barriers for goods in transit.</p> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">The recent rise in geopolitical tensions in the Indo-Pacific region and the increasing cyber threats posed by state-sponsored actors make Japan’s position in cybersecurity increasingly important.</code></em></strong></p> +<p>Furthermore, the inconsistent application of sanctions across different EU member states complicates compliance, as varying interpretations can lead to confusion and misalignment. The expectation of uniform application of EU regulations is often undermined by practical realities on the ground. For example, a participant noted that there have been instances of Hungarian export licences not being accepted by EU member states at the eastern border. The agreement between the customs authorities of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Finland and Poland since May 2024 on the uniform implementation of trade sanctions sought to enhance regional coordination, but it has also reportedly led to a redirection of trade flows through Hungary, which is not currently party to this agreement. Due to the redirection of trade flows, the Hungarian Customs Unit’s workload, which includes managing flows at the external borders of the EU with Serbia and Ukraine, has increased, according to participants.</p> -<p>There are multiple public reports that assess Japan’s national cybersecurity capabilities, and each has a different methodology for its assessment. It is, therefore, important to have an in-depth understanding of the assessment methodologies when citing these reports. The author views Japan’s national cybersecurity capabilities as being on par with those of other like-minded countries. For example, the National Cyber Power Index 2022 assesses countries based on a range of indicators, including malicious activities such as external destructive attacks, reconnaissance, and financial crimes. Japan, with a low score in such indicators, is ranked 16th among all 30 countries. The report’s overall evaluation is based on two major elements: the cyber capabilities of a nation and its intentions to exercise those capabilities, including misuse. Japan is categorized as a nation with high capabilities and low intentions. In particular, Japan’s capabilities in the area of commercial cybersecurity technology and R&amp;D, which is one of the evaluation indicators, are rated highly. Similarly, in Cyber Capabilities and National Power, Japan is not ranked in the top category, but it is still evaluated as “a world leader in cyberspace technologies.” This indicates that cybersecurity technology and capabilities in the private sector are highly regarded. A security firm’s survey found that only 32 percent of organizations in Japan paid a ransom in 2023 after being infected with ransomware. The average rate across 15 countries, including the United States and Japan, was 54 percent, with the United States at 77 percent. The report indicates that Japan’s relatively low rate may be due to the nature of Japan as a disaster-prone country and the implementation of advanced backup measures to mitigate such risks. This could be another example of the advanced technological capabilities of Japanese companies, with their thorough preparedness in normal times and ability to quickly respond to and recover from incidents.</p> +<p>To navigate interpretation, some private sector participants have attempted to draw parallels between EU regulations and the more straightforward frameworks of US sanctions. One participant noted that they visit the FAQs page on the website of the US Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control and use analogues to interpret EU sanctions packages. Participants highlighted that the sanctions advisories published by the US were much clearer and more accessible than EU FAQs, which do not serve as sufficient guidance and have on occasion been contradicted in rulings by the European Court of Justice. Indeed, private sector participants noted that becoming acquainted with US sanctions is rising among the priorities of EU businesses as the potential for US secondary sanctions increases. This heightened scrutiny has forced FIs to reassess their risk profiles and enhance their compliance mechanisms, particularly for contracts involving non-EU entities.</p> -<p>Furthermore, Japan has achieved remarkable success in cyber operations, with no significant incidents during national events that can often be attractive targets for global attackers. These include the Tokyo 2020 Summer Olympics and Paralympic Games, the 2019 Rugby World Cup, the 2019 G20 Summit, and the 2023 G7 Summit. In particular, more than 450 million attack events were observed during the Tokyo 2020 Summer Olympics, which was more than twice the number observed during the London 2012 Summer Olympics, but through the implementation of appropriate measures, the games were able to conclude without any major incidents. This success was made possible by the significant contribution of Japanese companies with advanced technological capabilities as well as the close PPPs. Furthermore, in January 2023, NTT, a major Japanese telecommunications operator, became the first Asian member of JCDC in the United States. This could be further evidence of the high level of capability and international credibility of Japanese companies.</p> +<p>Participants highlighted that a critical need has emerged for the European Commission to issue much clearer interpretative notices similar to those from US regulatory bodies. The current approach to introducing FAQs lacks legal standing and their phrasing still often fails to provide the clarity necessary for effective compliance. Clear, consistent guidelines from the Commission would help mitigate these challenges.</p> -<p>The NSS of Japan demonstrates the government’s strong intention to fundamentally enhance national cybersecurity capabilities with sufficient authorities and resources. This is not only a strategic goal for Japan but also a strong commitment to the international community, especially like-minded countries. The implementation of this strategy is expected to facilitate robust and operational public-private bidirectional cooperation by further enhancing government capabilities and deepening the engagement of the private sector for national cybersecurity. This nationwide evolution will significantly enhance Japan-U.S. cybersecurity cooperation.</p> +<h3 id="awareness-raising-of-compliance-obligations-in-hungary">Awareness-Raising of Compliance Obligations in Hungary</h3> -<h4 id="existing-framework">Existing Framework</h4> +<p>In an environment where compliance obligations are often viewed as ambiguous, FIs and businesses must have a clear understanding of the start and end points of their due diligence responsibilities. Overcompliance has become a prevalent strategy for mitigating risk, whereby institutions screen every transaction meticulously and often reject them when they remain unconvinced of their legitimacy. However, this approach can lead to operational inefficiencies and increased costs. To mitigate this, participants discussed the need to enhance industry’s understanding of compliance obligations, and some of the actions already being taken to improve awareness.</p> -<p>Cybersecurity has been identified as a key area of cooperation for the Japan-U.S. alliance. At the summit level, cybersecurity cooperation is regarded as a foundation for expanding and deepening security and defense cooperation. The joint statement issued in April 2024 highlighted the two countries’ commitment to strengthening cooperation in the areas of information and cybersecurity, as well as critical infrastructure protection. The U.S.-Japan Competitiveness and Resilience (CoRe) Partnership, a collaborative framework between the two countries agreed at the Japan-U.S. Summit in April 2021, identifies cybersecurity and critical infrastructure resilience as key areas of cooperation, along with the digital economy and economic security. Similarly, at the Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee (“2+2”) held in July 2024, the two countries reaffirmed “the foundational importance of cyber and information security for the Alliance,” as well as “the importance of enhancing the cybersecurity of critical infrastructure.”</p> +<p>The government and various industry associations in Hungary have made efforts to raise awareness, but resources for education on compliance are often scarce. The BFKH has organised export control forums and participates in webinars, while the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade engages in events dedicated to raising awareness about sanctions compliance. However, the authorities’ efforts need more support from the private sector, as few industry associations are involved. More associations could contribute to awareness-raising efforts.</p> -<p>There are several government-wide bilateral dialogue frameworks in place. The Japan-U.S. Cyber Dialogue has been in place since 2013, with Japan’s MOFA and the U.S. DOS leading discussions on a wide range of topics, including situational awareness, cyber policy, cooperation in international fora, and capacity building. These discussions are attended by representatives from multiple government agencies with cybersecurity responsibilities from both countries. The U.S.-Japan Dialogue on the Digital Economy, formerly the U.S.-Japan Policy Cooperation Dialogue on the Internet Economy, has been held on a regular basis since 2010. The dialogue addresses a wide range of policy issues related to the digital economy, including cybersecurity. The dialogue, led by MIC and the DOS, is composed of two parts: an intergovernmental meeting and a public-private meeting. This meeting is also designed to serve as a framework to promote the CoRe Partnership. Furthermore, the U.S.-Japan Cyber Defense Policy Working Group, an intergovernmental cyber dialogue focused on defense policy, has been held since 2014 between MOD and the DOD. Other interagency dialogues and cooperative efforts are also underway, such as the memorandum of cooperation on cybersecurity signed between DHS and METI in January 2023.</p> +<p>The National Bank’s AML/CTF department aims to contribute to these efforts and sends out a daily newsletter to supervised entities on relevant legislative changes and responds to questions. Participants welcomed this support, and pointed out that the volume of emails received from the National Bank is so high that recipients’ systems occasionally mark them as spam.</p> -<p>Regarding the multilateral framework, the Quad has established a cooperation agenda in cybersecurity, focusing on four key areas: critical infrastructure cybersecurity, supply chain risk management, software security, and human resource development and training. This is known as the Quad Cybersecurity Partnership: Joint Principles. The topics have been regularly discussed among senior government cyber officials through the Quad Senior Cyber Group. At the Quad Foreign Ministers’ Meeting held in Tokyo in July 2024, the four member countries announced the establishment of the Quad Cyber Ambassadors Meeting to discuss the cyber capacity-building projects in the Indo-Pacific region and responsible state behavior in cyberspace. Furthermore, the United States, Japan, and South Korea have been working together through the Trilateral Diplomacy Working Group for Foreign Ministry Cooperation on North Korea’s Cyber Threats since December 2023. The NCS of the United States also emphasizes the importance of international cooperation, leveraging frameworks such as the Quad and the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity. At the G7, it has been confirmed that the seven countries should pursue four key approaches through the Cyber Working Group: (1) “promoting responsible state behavior,” (2) “improving cybersecurity, including in the private sector,” (3) “developing and using tools to deter and respond to malicious (state) behavior” and disrupt the attacker’s infrastructure, and (4) “strengthening our partners’ cyber security capacity.” The group has also agreed to work on countering ransomware, developing critical infrastructure cybersecurity and resilience, mutual recognition of schemes for secure IoT devices, and secure by design. At the United Nations, both the United States and Japan have taken the position that existing international law applies to cyberspace and have engaged in discussions to reinforce cyber norms of responsible state behavior. In recent years, following Japan’s official membership in the NATO CCDCOE, there has been an increase in the level of cooperation between the United States and Japan in multilateral cyber exercises. At the NATO Summit in Washington, D.C., in July 2024, NATO and its Indo-Pacific partner countries, including Japan, confirmed their intention to enhance practical cooperation in four key areas, including cyber defense. In the White House-led CRI, Japan, as an original member, has also contributed to international initiatives to counter ransomware.</p> +<p>Furthermore, according to one participant, the National Bank’s successful awareness-raising campaign on online fraud, CyberShield, could offer a template for a campaign on sanctions violations risks. The campaign is supported by the Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of National Economy, as well as several other authorities, such as the police and the Hungarian Banking Association, the main advocacy group for FIs. Beyond raising customers’ awareness of online fraud, the campaign aims to foster the exchange of information and best practices between FIs, law enforcement and other authorities.</p> -<p>With regard to cooperation in industry, for example, ICT-ISAC Japan and Communications ISAC/IT-ISAC in the United States have been cooperating since 2016. The ISAC members have been exchanging threat information and best practices, as well as discussing operational collaboration, through regularly scheduled workshops. In 2019, a memorandum of cooperation was also signed between ICT-ISAC Japan and IT-ISAC to further strengthen cooperation. Furthermore, other collaborative efforts between ISACs in both countries are in place in key sectors such as finance and electricity.</p> +<p>Another challenge highlighted by participants as facing compliance professionals in Hungary is the limited access to information about enforcement actions and case studies that could inform best practices. In the US, open communication about sanctions violations offers valuable learning opportunities for FIs and businesses. Conversely, the lack of similar transparency in the EU is a missed opportunity to showcase valuable lessons to the business community, and hinders the ability to learn from others’ mistakes.</p> -<p>While there are several policy cooperation initiatives between Japan and the United States at various levels and entities, there is still room for improvement in the actual implementation of these items. In recent years, there has been an increase in practical cooperation between both governments, including the release of joint guidance and advisories, law enforcement coordination, and capacity-building support in third countries. While this is a positive development, the number of such efforts would not necessarily be as large as that of the various cooperation agendas described above. There is still much to be done. To achieve deeper collaboration between the two countries, it is essential to operationalize and accelerate these agendas with greater involvement of the private sector.</p> +<p>In addition to awareness-raising on implementation, strengthened strategic communications are also necessary to highlight the aim of sanctions. Some private sector representatives raised the question of compensation for loss of business income due to sanctions, which underlines the need to further explain the importance of burden-sharing in the efforts to limit the Russian military complex’s access to funding and materials in its war of aggression on Ukraine.</p> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">To achieve deeper collaboration between the two countries, it is essential to operationalize and accelerate these agendas with greater involvement of the private sector.</code></em></strong></p> +<h3 id="recommendations">Recommendations</h3> -<h3 id="cooperation-on-critical-infrastructure-cybersecurity-and-resilience">Cooperation on Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity and Resilience</h3> +<ul> + <li> + <p><strong>Consult industry stakeholders:</strong> To enhance the efficacy of sanctions enforcement, national policymakers in Hungary and the European Commission should engage further with industry stakeholders before, during and after issuing sanctions. Participants noted that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade consults strategic industries, and the Commission also takes a consultative approach. However, further fostering of public–private collaboration throughout all stages of sanctions policymaking would ensure that the applicability and potential consequences of sanctions are thoroughly assessed. This would also help minimise unintended consequences for businesses, and support their implementation efforts to achieve the effect policymakers are seeking.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Increase clarity and transparency in regulations:</strong> Regulations should be formulated in a way that eliminates ambiguity and provides clear directives to stakeholders. While strategic ambiguity creates a sense of unease that might bolster overcompliance, clarity will foster more precise compliance that minimises the potential for misunderstandings that can then lead to inadvertent violations and unintended effects.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Centralise competences and simplify processes:</strong> The involvement of numerous authorities in Hungary requires a high degree of coordination that is often difficult to manage effectively. Fragmentation creates uncertainty and leads to a duplication of effort for the private sector. Centralising domestic sanctions competences into a single agency would mitigate these challenges and facilitate implementation.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Enhance sanctions expertise:</strong> The level of understanding of sanctions regulations and obligations remains low, particularly among non-financial corporates. Awareness-raising initiatives should be prioritised and strengthened, by both the public and private sectors. Existing campaigns such as the Hungarian National Bank’s CyberShield programme on fraud could offer a template for wider awareness-raising efforts on sanctions. Furthermore, participants called for a central source of information on sanctions, such as a sanctions hotline.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Invest in IT and data tools:</strong> Investing in improved IT systems and data analytics tools within customs and regulatory authorities would boost effective sanctions enforcement. This investment would enable better tracking and analysis of financial flows, as well as improved engagement with the private sector, thereby enhancing compliance capabilities across the board.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Harmonise sanctions implementation:</strong> Hungarian customs authorities highlighted the challenge of managing an increased flow of goods through the country, linked to the enhanced customs cooperation between the Baltic countries, Finland and Poland. Hungary could benefit from joining this agreement, as it would help to prevent making the country attractive for the rerouting of trade flows. This challenge further underscores the need for the EU to work towards better alignment and harmonisation of sanctions implementation across member states.</p> + </li> +</ul> -<h4 id="global-challenges">Global Challenges</h4> +<p>SIFMANet has repeatedly observed similar challenges across the 14 EU member states it has visited so far, and regularly shares recommendations with policymakers in Brussels to support the improved implementation of sanctions against Russia. These recommendations amplify the suggestions gathered from the public and private sectors, including in Hungary. Yet despite the clear and widespread understanding of these challenges, they persist. As we approach the third anniversary of Russia’s illegal invasion of Ukraine, the EU must redouble its efforts to ensure that governments and the private sector take all necessary steps to restrict the resourcing and funding of Russia’s war of aggression.</p> -<p>This and subsequent chapters shift the focus of discussions to critical infrastructure cybersecurity and resilience, which is one of the priority areas for Japan-U.S. cooperation. In light of the growing threats to critical infrastructure, it has become increasingly important for nations to ensure the cybersecurity and resilience of critical infrastructure, which people and nations rely on every day. This is a universal challenge for governments worldwide, requiring cooperation with a wide range of domestic and international stakeholders.</p> +<hr /> -<p>The majority of infrastructure is owned and operated by private companies, and they are primarily responsible for protecting their own organizations. At the same time, the government plays a key role in empowering them through various means, including its own intelligence, law enforcement authorities, international coordination, policy tools (e.g., grants, incentives), and regulations, as infrastructure cybersecurity is a matter of national defense. Private companies also cooperate with the government in providing technical and operational expertise with their unique threat and risk information, as well as cybersecurity products and services. This is a shared responsibility among a diverse range of stakeholders.</p> +<p><strong>Gonzalo Saiz</strong> is a Research Fellow in the Centre for Finance and Security research team at RUSI.</p> -<p>Furthermore, international cooperation is also essential, given the global nature of cyberspace. The fundamental principle is, of course, that nations should cooperate to reinforce international cyber norms of responsible state behavior. However, in practice, this approach alone cannot address all issues. There are a number of other considerations that leave room for international cooperation, including infrastructure interdependencies, global supply chains, regulatory harmonization, and the resilience of like-minded countries as a whole. These are still developing areas of discussion. No country is yet perfect, and all are still developing through a process of trial and error. Given the global nature of these challenges, it is imperative that countries work together to address them.</p> +<p><strong>Balázs Gyimesi</strong> is the Communications Manager of RUSI Europe in Brussels.</p>Gonzalo Saiz and Balázs GyimesiDiscussions held in Budapest in September 2024 addressed the state of sanctions implementation and enforcement in Hungary.More Than Meets The Eye2024-10-31T12:00:00+08:002024-10-31T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/more-than-meets-the-eye<p><em>Though U.S.-Philippine economic ties are well documented, the day-to-day impact of the relationship in the Philippines is often underreported. The United States must enhance public awareness and understanding of its economic and investment activities in the Philippines.</em></p> -<h4 id="opportunity-for-japan-us-alliance">Opportunity for Japan-U.S. Alliance</h4> +<excerpt /> -<p>As previously stated, the Japan-U.S. alliance is founded on cyberspace, with critical infrastructure being a central element of this. For instance, there are interdependencies in critical infrastructure between the two countries. The failure of essential national functions, such as power, communications, and transportation, directly impacts information and intelligence sharing between the two countries, as well as the transportation of goods and personnel for defense. In addition, globally interconnected infrastructures such as the internet can rapidly propagate the effects of a failure in one country to others. Both countries have world-class internet service providers (ISPs), which account for approximately half of the world’s Tier 1 carriers. These companies have a significant impact on the global network infrastructure.</p> +<p>The size and scope of U.S.-Philippine economic cooperation is well documented; however, the quantitative and qualitative impacts on the Philippines are poorly understood. Without comprehensive, accurate, and easily accessible data on U.S. investments and their effects in the Philippines, malign actors may promote false or harmful narratives, thereby weakening public support for the U.S.-Philippine alliance. It is crucial for the United States to improve public awareness and understanding of its economic and investment activities in the Philippines.</p> -<p>Today, the United States and Japan are facing a common significant threat to their critical infrastructure. In January 2024, the heads of ONCD, CISA, the FBI, and USCYBERCOM testified at a hearing of the House Select Committee on the Chinese Communist Party, warning of the threat posed by suspected Chinese-sponsored actors known as Volt Typhoon. The group has been targeting U.S. critical infrastructure, with a particular focus on the nation’s essential sectors, including communications, energy, transportation, and water. This is being done through tactics known as “living off the land,” where the attacker gains access to infrastructure and remains undetected for an extended period of time to pre-position itself to immediately trigger a destructive action in the event of an emergency. This is not only a threat to the United States but also to Japan, a U.S. ally in the Indo-Pacific region. This is an extremely deep-rooted problem, with such activities expected to continue for at least five years. Even the United States, which is at the center of the problem, has not yet been able to fully “uncover and eradicate” the threat. In light of this common threat posed by advanced state-sponsored actors, it is imperative that allied countries leverage their respective information and expertise to jointly analyze the threat and risk and develop countermeasures. It is also crucial to ensure that Japan and the United States can collectively respond to such activities in order to maintain the resilience of their alliance as a whole in the event of an attack.</p> +<h3 id="introduction">Introduction</h3> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">It is also crucial to ensure that Japan and the United States can collectively respond to such activities in order to maintain the resilience of their alliance as a whole in the event of an attack.</code></em></strong></p> +<p>The United States and the Philippines share a robust and enduring relationship based on shared values, national interest, and dense people-to-people connections. Filipinos regularly identify the United States as one of the country’s most trusted partners. Traditionally, the United States has been a key military partner for the Philippines, and since the 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty, the two countries have stood together in defense of their common interests. The alliance is the United States’ oldest in the Indo-Pacific. While the military relationship between the two countries is often at the forefront of policy conversations, the United States’ economic relationship with the Philippines is also of great significance. Creating strong economic linkages between like-minded partners throughout the region, such as the Philippines, is crucial to upholding a rules-based order and meeting countries’ demands for tangible benefits to cooperation.</p> -<p>Both governments recognize the importance of Japan-U.S. cooperation in the field of critical infrastructure and have made it a high priority on the agendas of the Japan-U.S. Summit, bilateral cyber dialogue, and the Quad. However, both countries’ efforts tend to focus on domestic issues, and concrete and tangible operational collaboration between the two countries is not necessarily sufficient. As previously stated, Japan and the United States have recently been implementing more practical cooperation initiatives, but there is still a need for both countries to further expand these efforts and operationalize them with speed and scale while ensuring greater involvement of critical infrastructure owners and operators in both countries.</p> +<p>The economic relationship between the United States and the Philippines dates to the early twentieth century, when the Philippines was a U.S. territory. After the conclusion of the Spanish-American War in 1898, the Philippines came under the administration of the United States and remained so for nearly 50 years. During this time, the Philippine economy was strongly tethered to the United States and remained deeply intertwined even after Philippine independence in 1946. The Bell Trade Act of 1946, for instance, coupled the newly independent Philippine economy to that of the United States by allowing for free trade for 8 years and implementing a gradual application of tariffs over the next 20. U.S.-Philippine efforts at economic cooperation paved the way for future advancement, with U.S. investments playing a key role in the development of the Philippine manufacturing, agricultural, and services sectors. The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) has collaborated with the Philippine government since 1961, investing nearly $5 billion over the past 60 years.</p> -<h4 id="recent-developments">Recent Developments</h4> +<p>Under President Ferdinand “Bongbong” Marcos Jr., the Philippines became one of 14 negotiating parties in the U.S.-led Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity (IPEF). More significant for the time being, the United States and Philippines have launched a series of bilateral economic initiatives under the administrations of Marcos and President Joe Biden. These include the Luzon Economic Corridor, meant to develop critical infrastructure in the Philippines, the first-ever Presidential Trade and Investment Mission to Manila in March 2024, and the U.S.-Philippines Agreement for Cooperation in Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy (or the 123 Agreement) that entered into force in July 2024.</p> -<p>This section outlines frameworks and efforts related to critical infrastructure cybersecurity and resilience in the United States and Japan, with a focus on recent developments.</p> +<p>Though the direct trade, investment, and aid figures between the United States and Philippines are well documented, the quantitative and qualitative impacts of this deep economic relationship are not. Information on the effects of the United States’ investment efforts in the Philippines is often difficult to find, obscuring the depth of this partnership. Furthermore, this underreporting creates opportunity for malign actors to minimize or mischaracterize U.S. initiatives in order to manipulate Philippine public opinion. Already, disinformation regarding the U.S. defense commitment to Filipino forces in the South China Sea is pervasive on Philippine social media. Discrediting the accomplishments made possible by close cooperation between the two governments has the potential to weaken decades of collaboration and jeopardize the current renaissance in the alliance. In an attempt to illuminate the results of the U.S.-Philippine relationship, this brief explores the ways in which significant U.S. investments in several sectors deliver wide-ranging benefits for the Philippine public.</p> -<p><em>THE UNITED STATES</em></p> +<h3 id="state-of-us-philippine-economic-ties">State of U.S.-Philippine Economic Ties</h3> -<ul> - <li>Basic Strategy and Policy</li> -</ul> +<p>Goods and services trade between the United States and the Philippines reached an estimated $36.1 billion in 2022, with exports to the Philippines accounting for $12.8 billion and imports into the United States $23.3 billion. In 2022, the United States was the Philippines’ top export destination, accounting for 14.1 percent of Philippine exports at $15.5 billion; China follows at 13.9 percent, Hong Kong at 11.5, Japan at 10.2, and Singapore at 6.42, respectively. In contrast, in import terms, China’s supply of imported goods to the country is valued at $53.6 billion, amounting to 32.1 percent of the Philippines’ total imports; Indonesia trails behind at 8.15 percent, South Korea at 7.49, the United States at 5.02, and Taiwan at 4.52, respectively. Trade figures from May 2024 demonstrate that the United States remains the Philippines’ top export destination, and that the economic growth trend between the two countries continues to grow.</p> -<p>The fundamental policy framework for critical infrastructure protection is based on NSM-22. This memorandum replaced PPD-21 of 2013, making the first update to the framework in 11 years. The document is also intended to formalize the efforts made by the U.S. government during this period. This includes defining the role and responsibilities of CISA as the national coordinator for critical infrastructure protection, which did not exist at the time, as well as defining the role and responsibilities of the SRMAs. This requires SRMAs to conduct sector-specific risk assessments and develop sector-specific risk management plans every two years. CISA/DHS is required to conduct cross-sector risk assessments based on input from the SRMAs and develop a National Infrastructure Risk Management Plan (NIRMP) every two years. It is assumed that the National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) 2013, developed under PPD-21, will remain effective until the release of NIRMP, which is due by April 2025. NSM-22 also requires the development of minimum cybersecurity and resilience requirements for critical infrastructure and the implementation of these requirements using regulatory and other authorities. In addition, it requires the government to understand critical infrastructure interdependencies, analyze systemic risk, identify systemically important entities (SIEs), and enhance collaboration with the intelligence community, including the timely sharing of declassified information.</p> +<p>In terms of investment, between 2013 and the first quarter of 2024, the Philippine Statistics Authority recorded the United States as the fifth-largest source of approved foreign investment, accounting for 7 percent, or roughly $3.6 billion. The United States is trailed closely by China, the sixth-largest source of approved foreign investment, clocking in at $3.2 billion. In 2022, U.S. foreign investment in the Philippines rose 15.7 percent year over year from 2021 to $6.2 billion, led by a combination of manufacturing and professional, scientific, and technical services, along with wholesale trade.</p> -<p>In June 2024, DHS released the Strategic Guidance and National Priorities for U.S. Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience. This guidance aligns with NSM-22 and identifies risk areas that the nation should prioritize over the next two years to build secure and resilient critical infrastructure. The priority areas include addressing cyber threats posed by China, managing the evolving risks presented by AI, and identifying and mitigating supply chain vulnerabilities. The document then outlines the priorities for mitigating those risks, including adopting baseline requirements, incentivizing service providers to reduce risk, and identifying SIEs.</p> +<p>Since the launch of IPEF in 2022, the United States and the Philippines have continued to mark significant accomplishments in their economic partnership. During President Marcos’ visit to Washington in April 2024 for trilateral discussions with President Biden and Japanese prime minister Kishida Fumio, the three countries announced the first Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment (PGI) corridor in the Indo-Pacific, the Luzon Economic Corridor. Aiming to support connectivity between Subic Bay, Clark, Manila, and Batangas, the Luzon Economic Corridor is the first project of the PGI-IPEF Investment Accelerator and will allow the three countries to coordinate investments in infrastructure projects, clean energy, and semiconductor supply chains. Through this larger policy, the United States can work with IPEF partners to develop country-specific investment approaches in key sectors as targeted by each IPEF partner. In the same document, the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation announced a $20 million loan for affordable housing throughout the country as well as its intent to open a regional office in the Philippines.</p> -<p>The National Cyber Incident Response Plan (NCIRP) was developed in 2016 as a document outlining a national approach to addressing large-scale cyber incidents. In accordance with the NCS, CISA is currently leading the revision of this plan, which is scheduled for release by the end of 2024. The U.S. critical infrastructure protection effort is in the midst of a major renewal, with anticipated developments over the next year.</p> +<p>When it comes to development assistance, USAID invests some $120 million annually to support market-driven growth in the Philippines, as well as to foster stronger democratic systems and improve education and health services. The Philippines has also been a major beneficiary of other assistance programs, such as Millenium Challenge Corporation (MCC) grants. In February 2024, the MCC began talks with Philippine officials about restarting threshold programs, smaller scale grants aimed at improving policies. The Philippines previously had received MCC threshold grants (2006–2009) amounting to $20.7 million; in 2016, it received its first compact grant — aimed at poverty reduction and economic stimulus — for $434 million.</p> -<ul> - <li>Sectors</li> -</ul> +<p>Beyond traditional channels of economic engagement, since 2015, the U.S. Department of State has provided the Philippines with $463 million in security assistance through Foreign Military Financing (FMF), international military education and training, as well as peacekeeping operations funded through the Global Peace Operations Initiative. FMF figures are growing rapidly, with the United States providing $100 million in FY 2022 to potentially quintupling FMF to $500 million each year from FY 2025–2029. Under the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement, the United States has already allotted $109 million in support of base facility improvements, supplies, and military equipment, with an additional $128 million planned in the 2025 fiscal year. In the 2+2 talks held in the Philippines in July 2024, U.S. secretary of defense Lloyd Austin pledged an additional $500 million in military financing from the FY 2024 budget.</p> -<p>NSM-22 defines 16 critical infrastructure sectors and SRMAs for the sectors (Figure 4). While there has been discussion about whether cloud infrastructure, on which all sectors depend, and space systems, which have become more strategic for both commercial and military use, should be added as new sectors, NSM-22 does not change the sector designation of the previous directive. However, NSM-22 requires DHS to develop recommendations for the president regarding the list of critical infrastructure sectors and subsectors, leaving the potential for future designation.</p> +<h3 id="benefits-of-us-private-investment-in-the-philippines">Benefits of U.S. Private Investment in the Philippines</h3> -<p>There is a wide range of sector types, from those with strict cybersecurity regulations to those with few such regulations, and the maturity of cybersecurity varies from sector to sector. Even within a sector, there is a large gap in maturity between large and small companies. The government has identified water, healthcare, and K-12 educational institutions as sectors that are particularly vulnerable to attack and under-resourced. It is, therefore, providing support through the provision of sector-specific guidance and shared services. The significant cyber incident at Change Healthcare in February 2024, which reportedly affected the patient records of one in three Americans and had a broad impact on the entire sector, was a clear example of the urgent need to elevate the cybersecurity posture of these sectors. This has led to accelerated discussions on the development of minimum cybersecurity requirements and legislation in the healthcare sector. The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), as the SRMA, has also published a sector-specific strategy that includes setting sector-specific performance goals, encouraging best practices, and providing financial support and incentives to strengthen sector-wide cybersecurity. The water sector has also been engaged in discussions on developing cybersecurity requirements and regulations in light of the widespread cyberattacks by Iranian-supported actors as well as growing concerns about being a potential target of Volt Typhoon.</p> +<p>Foreign and domestic businesses may register with one of the Philippines’ 19 investment promotion authorities, including the Philippine Board of Investment and the Philippine Economic Zone Authority (PEZA). These authorities are split based on geographic regions and industry strengths, such as the manufacturing and logistics network in Luzon, the tourism cluster throughout Luzon and Mindanao, and the agro-industrial cluster in Mindanao.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/eIO1vYk.png" alt="image04" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 4: Critical Infrastructure Sectors in the United States.</strong> Source: Author’s compilation based on <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/2024/04/30/national-security-memorandum-on-critical-infrastructure-security-and-resilience/">“National Security Memorandum on Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience,” White House, April 30, 2024</a>.</em></p> +<p>Much of the foreign investment into the Philippines’ export-oriented manufacturing and services industries is routed through special economic zones managed by PEZA, which works to facilitate investor operations all the way down to registration and paperwork filing. As of April 2023, the Philippines was operating 419 different special economic zones throughout the country, ranging from manufacturing zones and information technology parks to agro-industrial economic zones and tourist export enterprises. Within the zones, the Philippine government can dole out tax incentives while sparing foreign businesses from lengthy bureaucratic procedures.</p> -<ul> - <li>Structure of Information Sharing and Incident Response</li> -</ul> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">As of April 2023, the Philippines was operating 419 different special economic zones throughout the country, ranging from manufacturing zones and information technology parks to agro-industrial economic zones and tourist export enterprises.</code></em></strong></p> -<p>Figure 5 shows the nationwide information-sharing and incident response structure, including both public and private sectors, in relation to critical infrastructure. Please note that this figure is created based on publicly available information, including NCIRP, and has been generalized to provide a comprehensive overview rather than specific details. Therefore, it should be noted that the information provided may not be entirely precise or applicable to all cases.</p> +<p>More important than investment from U.S. government programs is the U.S. private investment that flourishes in and beyond the PEZA zones, covering a variety of sectors of the Philippine economy. The CSIS Southeast Asia Program selected seven of these sectors for study based on their growth and importance to the Philippines. Ranging from renewable energy investments to aerospace engineering, the following case studies examine how U.S. private investment delivers tangible benefits for the Philippines that go beyond simply reporting overall investment and trade figures.</p> -<p>CISA serves as the national coordinator for critical infrastructure protection. The National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center (NCCIC) within CISA serves as the operational center for critical infrastructure protection, coordinating and sharing information on vulnerabilities, incidents, risk mitigations, and others in cooperation with public and private organizations. The National Coordinating Center for Communications (NCC), under the NCCIC, monitors events affecting telecommunications services and infrastructure and leads incident response in cooperation with the United States Computer Emergency Readiness Team (US-CERT)/the Industrial Control Systems Cyber Emergency Response Team (ICS-CERT), government agencies, and private operators, mainly in the communications sector. Unlike other ISACs established independently in the private sector, the Communications ISAC is an operational function of NCC. It facilitates information sharing and analysis in the private sector while operating within the government. The Office of the National Coordinator, which serves as a single coordination point for SRMAs, will be established within CISA under the direction of NSM-22. The Cyber Threat Intelligence Integration Center (CTIIC) is operated by ODNI and serves as the central hub for cyber threat intelligence, integrating and analyzing information collected from intelligence communities such as the Central Intelligence Agency and the NSA to support incident response. NCIJTF is hosted by the FBI and serves as the primary coordinating body for law enforcement operations, including cybercriminal investigations and prosecutions. In the event of significant incidents, the Cyber Unified Coordination Group (UCG) is formed to facilitate the coordination of incident response among NCCIC, CTIIC, NCIJTF, and other relevant agencies. The Cyber Response Group, which is organized under the NSC, coordinates the incident response at the policy level. Sector-specific coordination is conducted through SRMAs.</p> +<h4 id="renewable-energy">Renewable Energy</h4> -<p>Each sector has a self-organized and self-governed SCC. It comprises critical infrastructure owners and operators, trade associations, and other relevant entities. SCC serves as the primary coordinating body within the sector, facilitating information sharing and the discussions of sector-specific strategies and risks. It also serves as a point of contact for the corresponding GCC and SRMA within the government. Cross-sector cooperation among SCCs is facilitated by the Critical Infrastructure Cross-Sector Council (CICSC). The Critical Infrastructure Partnership Advisory Council (CIPAC) serves as a framework for cross-sector cooperation between the public and private sectors (both SCCs and GCCs). Additionally, ISACs have been established in the private sector as industry-led organizations for day-to-day operational cooperation. There are more than 20 ISACs in the United States. While they are not necessarily mapped with sectors on a one-to-one basis, there is an ISAC that covers each sector, such as the Communications ISAC, Financial Services ISAC (FS-ISAC), Electricity ISAC (E-ISAC), and so on. NCI facilitates cross-sector operational cooperation among ISACs. These ISACs also cooperate with CISA and SRMAs at the operational level. Moreover, several cross-sector initiatives exist, such as JCDC, where major companies and government agencies engage in operational cooperation on specific issues. As outlined above, collaboration between critical infrastructure owners and operators and government agencies is being implemented at various levels, from strategic and planning aspects to operational aspects through various channels, including SCC and ISAC, as well as direct communication with CISA and SRMAs.</p> +<p>The Philippine government under President Marcos has identified clean energy development as a top priority and embraced cooperation with partner nations on that front, including through the clean economy pillar of IPEF. As one of the countries most affected by increasingly severe weather events, this is necessary not only to meet the Philippines’ net-zero goals, but also to grow other industries, like semiconductor manufacturing, in which foreign investors are seeking access to renewable energy. This is why the development of renewable energy is one of the three initial priorities of the Luzon Economic Corridor, announced in April 2024, the other two being rail and port modernization and the advancement of commercial enterprises at Subic Bay.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/Jh0eb5j.png" alt="image05" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 5: Information-Sharing and Incident Response Structure in the United States.</strong> Source: Author’s analysis based on <a href="https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/2023-01/national_cyber_incident_response_plan.pdf">U.S. Department of Homeland Security, National Cyber Incident Response Plan (Washington, D.C.: DHS, December 2016)</a>.</em></p> +<p>Collaboration between the United States and the Philippines in establishing clean, sustainable power grids is of great importance to local Philippine communities. An archipelagic nation, the Philippine energy grid is deeply reliant on imported fossil fuels. Though 97.5 percent of Philippine households are electrified, the mountainous and archipelagic nature of the country’s geography presents significant challenges to consistent, inexpensive power. Successive Philippine administrations have prioritized a more resilient regional grid based on modular renewable energy. The 2020 census indicated that there were about 26.39 million households throughout the country. U.S. investments in Philippine nuclear power would be of great benefit to local communities isolated from main power grids and for improving quality of life and maintaining consistent, cheap electrification in major cities. Geothermal, solar, and wind energy account for 32.7 percent of the country’s energy sources. The Philippines aims to reach 50 percent renewable energy by 2050. Under the previous administration of President Rodrigo Duterte, lawmakers amended the Public Services Act to allow for 100 percent ownership by foreign investors of utilities ranging from power to telecoms, opening the door to more foreign investment in the Philippine energy grid. As a result of this and other reforms, the Philippines has become one of the most attractive emerging markets for investment in renewables, according to BloombergNEF’s 2023 climate report.</p> -<ul> - <li>Public and Private Initiatives</li> -</ul> +<p>Given its geographic location, the Philippines has immense solar energy potential. U.S.-based BrightNight Power, in collaboration with the Ayala Group’s ACEN, has agreed to jointly invest $1.2 billion over the next five years to develop the Philippines’ renewable energy capacity. U.S. solar panel manufacturers are increasingly looking to the Philippines for production, allowing Filipinos easier access to domestically produced, cheaper solar panels while also exporting those panels to countries like the United States and Canada. Sol-Go Inc., participating in Commerce Secretary Gina Raimondo’s Presidential Trade and Investment Mission in March 2024, announced that it will build a new solar panel factory in the Philippines in addition to its current factory operating in Batangas. This additional investment will allow Sol-Go to triple its locally sourced workforce and increase its capacity so that it can produce 50 megawatts (MW) of solar panels. With the average Filipino household using 200 kilowatt-hours of energy per month, 50 MW could easily power 180,000 homes.</p> -<p>The United States has a long history of close PPPs in critical infrastructure protection, with a variety of collaborative initiatives currently in place. JCDC, one of the most notable initiatives in recent years, is a cross-sector, operational collaborative framework composed of key government agencies and selected private-sector companies. This enables members to share and analyze unique threat intelligence and information from both the government and the private sector, as well as jointly develop countermeasures in a timely manner. The initiative was launched in 2021 with the participation of approximately 10 companies, primarily in the IT, communications, and cybersecurity industries. The number of participating companies has since expanded to other sectors, and there are now over 300 members, including NTT, a major telecommunications carrier in Japan, as the first member in the Asian region. As indicated in the NCS, one of the current focuses is to enhance the speed and scale of operations. This would need to include cooperation with major foreign companies to address growing global-scale threats posed by state-sponsored actors. Other sector-based operational cooperation includes the Department of Energy’s Energy Threat Analysis Center, the DOD’s Defense Industrial Base Collaborative Information Sharing Environment, and the NSA’S CCC. The government plans to further strengthen and integrate these individual efforts into a federal cybersecurity center.</p> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Collaboration between the United States and the Philippines in establishing clean, sustainable power grids is of great importance to local Philippine communities.</code></em></strong></p> -<p>Another key initiative is the ICT Supply Chain Risk Management (SCRM) Task Force, which was launched in 2018. It is a PPP program that identifies challenges and develops solutions to enhance the resilience of the global ICT supply chain. The group is primarily composed of private companies in the communications and IT sectors, as well as CISA, and works on specific topics such as AI, SMBs, and software, providing guidance and other deliverables to the public.</p> +<p>The 123 Agreement between the United States and the Philippines sets the stage for nuclear energy collaboration between the two countries moving forward by allowing U.S. companies to invest in nuclear projects throughout the country. NuScale Power, for instance, aims to invest up to $7.5 billion through 2031 to build small modular reactors in the Philippines. These reactors would greatly benefit more geographically isolated communities with tenuous connections to main power grids, while also touting smaller footprints, reduced cost, and locational flexibility in comparison to traditional nuclear reactors.</p> -<ul> - <li>Laws and Regulations</li> -</ul> +<h4 id="information-technology-and-business-process-management">Information Technology and Business Process Management</h4> -<p>As previously stated, the Biden administration has acknowledged the importance of long-lasting voluntary PPPs. However, it has also recognized that this alone is not sufficient and has taken a major step in strengthening laws, regulations, and requirements for critical infrastructure.</p> +<p>The information technology and business process management (IT-BPM) sector covers a wide range of services in the Philippines, all aimed at managing certain aspects of business operations for third parties.</p> -<p>CIRCIA is one of the examples that highlights this approach. This is the first cross-sector legislation requiring critical infrastructure owners and operators to report significant cyber incidents to the government within 72 hours and ransomware payments within 24 hours. The Notice of Proposed Rule Making was released in April 2024, and the final rule is expected to take effect in 2025. In addition, the White House is currently leading a review and reinforcement of sector-specific cybersecurity requirements as part of existing regulations. The pipeline, rail, and airline industries have made notable progress in recent years in enhancing and refining their cybersecurity requirements, overseen by the Transportation Security Administration. Furthermore, in February 2024, an EO was issued to reinforce cybersecurity in the ports industry, with requirements currently under development. In the healthcare sector, the NDAA of FY 2023 included enhanced security requirements for medical devices, and further requirements and regulations for organizations are also under discussion. In the communications sector, FCC is exploring the potential use of its existing regulatory authority over communications carriers to establish and expand cybersecurity rules. Congress is also considering a legislative approach for certain sectors, such as the water sector, where regulators have limited authority to build additional cybersecurity requirements on existing regulations. The variation from highly regulated to largely unregulated sectors is a significant concern, and the NCS and NSM-22 have emphasized the need to develop common baseline requirements for entire sectors. Moreover, as a broader regulation beyond critical infrastructure, SEC’s updated rule of December 2023 requires listed companies to disclose material incidents within four business days and to annually disclose the cybersecurity posture of their organizations. As previously stated, there are a number of regulations across sectors, and some of these are said to be duplicative and inefficient, leading to unnecessary burdens for companies. ONCD is now taking the lead in studying ways to harmonize these regulations.</p> +<p>During the 2008 global recession, demand for overseas Filipino workers (OFWs) decreased significantly, prompting the Philippine government to provide training for OFWs to become call center agents. By 2010, the Philippines had surpassed India in voice-based IT-BPM services. As of 2023, the IT-BPM industry had reached 1.57 million employees, and it is forecast to employ 2.5 million by 2028. In April 2024, the ubiquity of Philippine IT-BPM services went viral on social media when a Philippines-based IT-BPM employee worked as a virtual cashier in a New York City restaurant thousands of miles away.</p> -<ul> - <li>Other Policy Approaches</li> -</ul> +<p>U.S. businesses have increasingly outsourced services to the Philippines in the last few decades, and U.S. investment has played a crucial role in the development of the sector. From 2014 to 2023, the Philippines has benefitted from nearly $5.2 billion worth of foreign direct investment (FDI) from the United States in general professional, scientific, and technical services. With its young, tech-literate, and largely English-proficient population, the Philippines presents an ideal location for U.S. IT-BPM investments. Government initiatives, including Republic Act No. 7916, which established Special Economic Zones through PEZA, offer tax incentives and ease the ability to conduct business for foreign investors. From 2003 to 2021, 395 U.S.-based firms invested $22.4 billion in the Philippines, 35 percent of which, or around $7.8 billion, went to the IT-BPM sector, one of the key growth drivers for PEZA, bringing in nearly $260 million of investments from the first quarter of 2024 alone.</p> -<p>There are several ways to encourage companies to meet cybersecurity requirements, including not only regulations but also various policy approaches, such as the use of government procurement power and grants. This is a strategic objective included in pillar 3 of the NCS, as well as a policy objective incorporated into NSM-22. For instance, while not necessarily limited to critical infrastructure, the proposed revisions to the Federal Acquisition Regulation include relatively strong requirements for federal contractors to report cyber incidents within eight hours, provide SBOM information for systems involved in contracted services, and allow government agencies access to their network systems in the event of an incident. For cloud services, the Federal Risk and Authorization Management Program (FedRAMP) is in operation as a federal procurement requirement. This requires cloud providers to comply with cybersecurity requirements based on NIST SP 800-53 and obtain certification. In the defense industry, the Cybersecurity Maturity Model Certification 2.0 is being developed to certify the cybersecurity maturity of contractors based on NIST SP 800-171. Moreover, it has become more common in recent years for certain cybersecurity requirements to be incorporated into the application process for federal grant programs.</p> +<p>IT-BPM companies are often desirable places of employment for Filipinos. U.S.-owned companies ranging from American Express to Synchrony and Accenture rank near the top of a “best workplaces” list compiled by the Information Technology and Business Process Association of the Philippines and Great Place to Work. Surveys undertaken by Great Place to Work, a platform that uses employee data to certify workplaces with good levels of trust and work culture, indicate that from January 2022 to May 2023, “94 percent of IT-BPM employees in best workplaces experience a high-trust workplace culture.” The schedule flexibility offered by IT-BPM companies, paired with the flexibility to work from home that such jobs involve, makes the sector particularly attractive to recent graduates. The Philippines produces about 850,000 college graduates yearly, 87,000 of whom have degrees in fields suited to the IT-BPM sector.</p> -<ul> - <li>Voluntary Framework and Guidance</li> -</ul> +<p>Both foreign and domestic investment in the Philippines has historically been concentrated within the Metro Manila National Capital Region and the surrounding regions of Luzon. Investments are slowly flowing to other emerging regions, particularly northern Luzon and the Visayas. Moreover, even though the IT-BPM sector is more widely distributed than most, it is still concentrated in a few urban centers; Bacolod, Cebu, Clark, Davao, and Iloilo are the main hubs. Nationwide broadband speeds, while improving, still lag behind those of other members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. Through the Digital Cities 2025 Initiative, the Philippine government is providing basic digital literacy and skills training in more rural provinces. These initiatives will likely pay dividends as the Philippines continues to advertise itself as an IT-BPM hub to U.S. investors.</p> -<p>Government agencies frequently publish cybersecurity frameworks, guidance, best practices, and other resources, with NIST playing a central role. The NIST Cybersecurity Framework (CSF) would be the most central document of them all. The CSF 1.0 was initially developed in 2013 for critical infrastructure, and the CSF 2.0, the latest version, was released in February 2024. The CSF has been widely adopted internationally as a common framework that can be used by a wide variety of organizations, regardless of size or industry. The CSF 2.0 is a voluntary, risk-based, and global consensus-based framework that was developed through a two-year revision process, incorporating stakeholders’ comments and feedback. Japanese companies have been actively involved in the revision process, providing comments, participating in workshops, and engaging in individual discussions. In addition, the framework concept has recently gained recognition even in the regulatory environment. In regulatory discussions, there is a clear need for a risk-based approach rather than prescriptive checklist-based requirements. There is also a need for a common framework that all industries can rely on to help avoid duplicative requirements, as well as a common language that facilitates communication with stakeholders at all levels. The CSFs are increasingly being brought up as a potential solution to the needs. Furthermore, CISA has developed voluntary Cross-Sector Cybersecurity Performance Goals (CPGs), which are based on the CSF and summarize the minimum practices that should be implemented by critical infrastructure owners and operators in all sectors. Moreover, sector-specific goals are being developed based on these CPGs under the leadership of CISA and SRMAs.</p> +<h4 id="semiconductor-manufacturing">Semiconductor Manufacturing</h4> -<p>CISA and SRMAs provide sector-specific guidance and best practices, such as for the water and healthcare sectors. CISA, NIST, ICT SCRM Task Force, and other entities also provide resources to support SMBs that lack the resources to implement cybersecurity measures. In addition, industry-led guidance is also being developed in each sector. For instance, the Cyber Risk Institute in the financial sector provides resources to assist financial organizations in implementing risk management aligned with the CSF, which takes into account sector-specific risk and regulatory environments.</p> +<p>With highly educated, English-proficient workers, the Philippines is an appealing location for semiconductor manufacturing. Concentrated in Metro Manila, Calabarzon (Cavite, Laguna, Batangas, Rizal, and Quezon), northern and central Luzon, and Cebu, the Philippine electronics industry is split between 73 percent semiconductor manufacturing and 27 percent electronics manufacturing. Electronics exports reached $12.9 billion in 2023, nearly 60 percent of total Philippine exports. From 2014 to 2023, the United States invested roughly $7.91 billion in Philippine computer and electronic manufacturing.</p> -<p>In addition, technical and operational advisories and guidance, including those for significant threats such as severe vulnerabilities and large-scale attacks by state-sponsored actors, are being published by major government agencies such as CISA, the FBI, and the NSA, in cooperation with international partners. The partners are primarily Five Eyes countries, with some EU countries, but there have been cases where the United States and Japan have collaborated on the release of advisories, such as the joint advisory on BlackTech in September 2023.</p> +<p>Given the number of Filipinos employed in the semiconductor industry, disruptions in U.S. investment can and have proven damaging to local communities. At its peak in 2008, Intel employed 5,000 direct workers and around 36,000 indirect workers in the Philippines. In the aftermath of the 2008 global recession, however, Intel shut down its Cavite-based chip assembly, testing, and packaging facility. As the global semiconductor manufacturing supply chain continues to evolve and mature, it is important to recognize the value of these private investments to local communities. As of April 2023, the semiconductor industry employed 2.5 million Filipinos.</p> -<ul> - <li>Plan and Preparedness</li> -</ul> +<p>Through the CHIPS and Science Act of 2022, the United States seeks to diversify and de-risk the global semiconductor ecosystem by boosting manufacturing and research both at home and in trusted partner countries. The International Technology Security and Innovation Fund, under the CHIPS Act, earmarked $500 million over five years to promote a secure, trustworthy telecommunications network aimed at ensuring semiconductor supply chain security by spreading out the traditionally concentrated semiconductor supply chain among friendly partners, including the Philippines.</p> -<p>As part of the NIPP, a Sector-Specific Plan is developed in each sector, which outlines the sector-specific environment and risks, along with goals and priorities for addressing those risks. Going forward, SRMAs will conduct sector-specific risk assessments in accordance with NSM-22 guidance. The assessments will identify major risks within a sector, taking into account any interdependencies with other sectors. The Sector Specific Risk Management Plan will be updated based on the assessment every two years. CISA will also conduct a cross-sector risk assessment based on each sector’s risk assessment and input from the intelligence community and identify cross-sector critical risks. The NIRMP will then be developed every two years based on the work completed. These plans will serve as the foundation for risk management across the entire critical infrastructure.</p> +<p>In 2023, the Department of State announced that it would collaborate with the Philippine government to explore further cooperation in semiconductor supply chain security. During the Presidential Trade and Investment Mission in March 2024, Secretary Raimondo announced an investment of over $1 billion in the Philippine technology sector, aiming to double the number of semiconductor factories in the country; currently, there are 13 semiconductor factories focused on the assembly, testing, and packaging segment of the semiconductor supply chain.</p> -<p>In an advanced effort, the National Risk Management Center (NRMC) under CISA has developed the National Critical Functions (NCFs), which analyze critical infrastructure in terms of functions essential to national operations rather than sectors or companies. The NCFs have a set of 55 functions in four categories: “connect,” “distribute,” “manage,” and “supply.” The NCFs are designed to assist CISA in examining interdependencies and systemic risk among critical infrastructure entities as functions. The NCF Risk Architecture is being developed under the leadership of NRMC to structure dependencies between sub-functions, systems, and assets and components by decomposing the NCFs. The results will be used for more advanced risk analysis, such as identifying the critical elements and entities on which the NCFs depend. The initial set of NCFs was released in 2019, but subsequent studies, such as the development of the NCF Risk Architecture, have taken time due to the complexity of the task. The NCFs can be utilized as a tool for advanced risk analysis of critical infrastructure. However, at this point, there is still a need to increase awareness of NCFs among stakeholders and ensure that they are being fully utilized in actual operations. Another related concept is the one proposed by the CSC, which is to identify and support systemically important entities among a wide range of critical infrastructure owners and operators in exchange for higher-security requirements. Although several attempts to legislate this idea have failed, the administration is currently pursuing the work to identify and prioritize these entities as SIEs. This effort is also formalized in NSM-22. While the list will not be publicly available, it is expected to be used for a variety of purposes, including national incident response, prioritization of government efforts, and consideration of the applicability of regulatory requirements.</p> +<p>In November 2023, President Marcos stressed that semiconductors and electronics remain top-priority sectors for his administration. PEZA aims to aggressively promote the Philippines as a site for overseas electronic and semiconductor manufacturing. Together with IT-BPM, electronics and semiconductors have been among the Philippines’ top exports in 2024.</p> -<p>Regarding national-level cyber exercises, the Cyber Storm initiative, hosted by CISA, has been conducted every other year since 2006. This cross-sector, public-private, operational-based functional exercise brings together over 2,000 participants, including federal agencies, local governments, multi-sectoral critical infrastructure owners and operators, ISACs, and international partners. The exercise simulates responses to significant cyber incident scenarios in critical infrastructure. While this exercise is primarily for public and private-sector participants in the United States, Japan participates in the information-sharing and incident response coordination exercise as a member of the International Watch and Warning Network with like-minded countries. Another industry-led initiative is the tri-sector exercise, which brings together owners and operators in the financial, power, and communications sectors. Participants are divided into attack and defense teams. Previously, the lessons learned from the exercise were shared with the government after the event, but government officials have directly participated in the exercise since the third event held in March 2024.</p> +<p>U.S. companies have been increasingly investing in the Philippine semiconductor space. In May 2023, Analog Devices announced an investment of $200 million in a research and development facility in Cavite. In August 2023, Texas Instruments announced that it would invest up to $1 billion in facility expansion in Clark and Baguio City. The Philippines aims to move up the semiconductor value chain, hoping to establish a lab-scale wafer fabrication plant by 2028.</p> -<ul> - <li>Technologies, Products, and Services</li> -</ul> +<h4 id="agriculture">Agriculture</h4> -<p>The critical infrastructure is based on a diverse range of technologies, products, and services. While this paper does not cover all topics in detail, it does briefly address two recent developments of note: AI and internet routing security.</p> +<p>The United States and the Philippines are longtime partners in the agricultural sector — in 2022, U.S.-Philippine bilateral agricultural trade exceeded $4 billion. With its growing population, expanding middle class, and increasing household income, the Philippines is an important destination for U.S. agricultural goods. The United States and the Philippines convened their first Food Security Dialogue in May 2023. Ongoing U.S. projects in the Philippines aim to support capacity building in food regulatory agencies and agricultural industries while digitizing the connection between farmers and buyers. A plurality of Philippine agriculture (39 percent) is based in Luzon, followed by Mindanao and Visayas at 33.4 and 27.4 percent, respectively.</p> -<p>A number of AI-related initiatives are being undertaken in line with EO 14110, which places the safety and security of AI at the forefront of all considerations. One of the key areas of the EO is to manage AI risks in critical infrastructure. A cross-sector and sector-specific risk assessment related to the use of AI in critical infrastructure was conducted, and based on the results, guidelines on AI safety and security for critical infrastructure owners and operators were developed in April 2024. Furthermore, the EO directs federal agencies to utilize these guidelines to consider mandating certain guidance for critical infrastructure. In April 2024, DHS established the AI Safety and Security Board, which brings together AI experts from industry, academia, and government based on the EO’s direction. The board will provide recommendations to DHS and SRMAs on security, resilience, and incident response related to the use of AI in critical infrastructure.</p> +<p>Despite this, the Philippines is vulnerable to food insecurity, a situation further exacerbated by climate change. Its reliance on imported food makes the Philippines the most food-insecure country in the region. Due to the country’s limited infrastructure linking its farmers to markets and its vulnerability to external food supply shocks, improving food production is crucial to securing Philippine agricultural supply chains. President Marcos has made the strengthening of the Philippines’ food supply a key priority of his administration, boosting the budget for agricultural programs. Under the Marcos administration, the Department of Agriculture’s budget was boosted by nearly 70 percent from 2022 to 2024 compared to the 2017–2021 appropriation under the previous administration.</p> -<p>Another area of growing government concern in recent years is internet routing security. The security challenges associated with internet technologies have been well known for many years. However, with the recent increase in threats posed by state-sponsored actors, security issues on Border Gateway Protocol and the potential attacks, such as route hijacking, are now considered part of the national security problem. The NCS has identified this as an area for improvement. Furthermore, FCC is considering implementing regulations that would encourage ISPs to adopt Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) as a technical measure. ONCD released a roadmap outlining measures for both the public and private sectors to enhance internet routing security. Given the nature of the internet, this issue cannot be resolved by U.S. carriers alone. It is essential to coordinate with a broader range of stakeholders involved in internet routing.</p> +<p>From September to October 2023, the United States’ first Agricultural Technology Trade Mission explored opportunities to help support the Philippine agricultural supply chain as it traveled to Davao and Manila. The trade mission brought together various Philippine companies, government agencies, local businesses, and U.S. companies to discuss the importance of food security collaboration. The trade mission highlighted innovations in agricultural technology that have the potential to enhance the country’s agricultural productivity.</p> -<p><em>JAPAN</em></p> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Due to the country’s limited infrastructure linking its farmers to markets and its vulnerability to external food supply shocks, improving food production is crucial to securing Philippine agricultural supply chains.</code></em></strong></p> -<ul> - <li>Basic Strategy and Policy</li> -</ul> +<p>U.S. investors, including Cargill, John Deere, and PepsiCo, have a long history of investment in the Philippine agricultural space. Cargill, which has had a presence in the Philippines since 1947, has made several key investments over the past decade. It collaborated with the Jollibee Foods Corporation to create a joint-venture poultry processing facility in Batangas in 2017, creating 1,000 new jobs. As of 2022, the facility employs 1,200 workers. Similarly, Cargill operates a joint-venture plant in Laguna that produces carrageenan, a common food additive and thickener. In 2018, the company announced that it would invest $235 million over two years to help the country meet the increasing demand for chicken and pork. As of 2024, Cargill directly employs over 950 people throughout the country.</p> -<p>The basic policy framework for critical infrastructure protection in Japan is based on the CPCIP. The document outlines the designation of critical infrastructure sectors, the roles and responsibilities of government agencies and critical infrastructure owners and operators, and the basic framework for public-private information sharing and incident response. The CPCIP is reviewed every few years to reflect changes in the threat landscape and cyber environment. The latest version was released in March 2024. It puts a strong emphasis on cybersecurity as a business management issue, organizational governance, risk-based management tailored to specific organizations and sectors, and comprehensive measures throughout the supply chain, including critical infrastructure owners and operators.</p> +<h4 id="defense-and-aerospace-manufacturing">Defense and Aerospace Manufacturing</h4> -<ul> - <li>Sectors</li> -</ul> +<p>Given its strategic location and well-educated workforce, the Philippines is in a prime position to contribute to defense and aerospace supply chains. The defense and aerospace sectors, made especially pertinent due to ongoing tensions between the Philippines and China over disputed territories in the South China Sea, are critical to the Philippines’ defense modernization initiatives. To support foreign investments in national defense, Philippine senators have proposed spending roughly $17.5 million under the Self-Reliant Defense Posture Revitalization Act aimed at encouraging investment in the local manufacturing of defense equipment.</p> -<p>The CPCIP designates 15 critical infrastructure sectors and government agencies responsible for overseeing sectors (Figure 6). In response to the cyber incident caused by suspected state-sponsored actors in the Port of Nagoya in 2023, the government elevated ports and harbors as the fifteenth sector, previously part of the logistics sector. The sector designation is subject to ongoing review, with the policy document revised in light of the evolving threat landscape. This has resulted in an expansion from the original 10 sectors in 2005 to 13 sectors in 2014, 14 sectors in 2018, and 15 sectors in 2024. There is a discussion about whether cloud infrastructure should be included in the list of sectors due to other sectors’ high degree of dependence on it for a digital infrastructure. While the space system is not currently included in the sector, due to its importance, discussions on space cybersecurity are ongoing, led by METI, including the release of voluntary guidelines to encourage commercial space operators to take measures.</p> +<p>The Philippines hosts two prominent U.S. aerospace and defense manufacturing companies: RTX’s Collins Aerospace and Moog Controls Corporation. Collins Aerospace manufactures airplane parts and interiors within the Philippines, supplying both Airbus and Boeing. Collins Aerospace established a facility in Tanauan City, Batangas, in 2012, manufacturing myriad cabin interior products ranging from airplane galleys and galley inserts to oxygen equipment and lavatories. The facility has expanded from task-based engineering to design drawing and process refinement; by 2018, the Philippines-based engineering team was supporting the design of complex galleys and had already designed a head of version shipset, or the first configured and manufactured aircraft of the order. In 2023, the company began producing seats for Boeing, Airbus, and Embraer.</p> -<p>In Japan, as in the United States, cybersecurity requirements and regulations for critical infrastructure vary by sector, and there are variations in maturity levels across sectors and among companies of different sizes within the same sector. For example, ransomware attacks on healthcare organizations have been a particular challenge in recent years.</p> +<p>As of 2024, Collins Aerospace plans to expand its existing operations in the Philippines — hoping to add 300,000 sq. ft. to its existing 400,000 sq. ft. complex in Tanauan City. Collins Aerospace’s community outreach to regional universities has the potential to create a significant impact. In 2023, for example, the company challenged students from the De La Salle College of Saint Benilde to develop and design aircraft cabin proposals under the university’s Benilde Industrial Design program. The same year, Collins explored potential partnerships with Batangas State University-Lipa.</p> -<p>Figure 7 provides the mapping of the critical infrastructure sectors in the United States and Japan. Note, however, that this is a simplified overview and that the industries and services included in the sectors in the two countries may not be identical or perfectly aligned.</p> +<p>Moog Controls Corporation, a U.S. designer and manufacturer of precision control products found in military and commercial aircraft, has been established in Baguio City since 1984. Spread out over two campuses, one for servovalves (a type of valve used to regulate control or pressure of fluid in response to an electrical signal) and actuation systems for commercial aircraft applications and the other for high-performance motion control solutions, Moog employs about 1,400 personnel. In 2018, the company announced their intention to boost aerospace industry output in the Philippines, citing the growth of the aerospace market. Moog received a PEZA Excellence Award in 2023 as an outstanding employer behind community projects.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/sImzF8d.png" alt="image06" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 6: Critical Infrastructure Sectors in Japan.</strong> Source: Author’s compilation based on <a href="https://www.nisc.go.jp/eng/pdf/cip_policy_2024_eng.pdf">National Center of Incident Readiness and Strategy for Cybersecurity (NISC), The Cybersecurity Policy for Critical Infrastructure Protection (Tokyo: Cybersecurity Strategic Headquarters, Government of Japan, March 8, 2024), 55</a>.</em></p> +<h4 id="critical-minerals-and-electric-vehicles">Critical Minerals and Electric Vehicles</h4> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/TeLkr3F.png" alt="image07" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 7: Mapping of Critical Infrastructure Sectors in Japan and the United States.</strong> Source: Author’s analysis.</em></p> +<p>The Philippines’ critical mineral wealth, which has largely gone untapped, makes it an ideal partner in electrical vehicle (EV) battery and component supply chains. Only 5 percent of the Philippines’ $1 trillion worth of gold, nickel, zinc, and silver reserves has been explored. Moreover, with the growing importance of electric vehicles (EVs) in international decarbonization efforts, the Philippines’ critical mineral wealth makes it an ideal partner for EV battery and component supply chains. As of 2023, PEZA remains in talks with several EV manufacturers, including one U.S. firm, Envirotech Vehicles, to manufacture electric buses, cars, and heavy equipment in-country. In September 2023, Envirotech Vehicles announced its acquisition of a 3,000 square meter final assembly facility in the Clark Free Trade Zone; it eventually plans to open two manufacturing lines capable of producing more than 2,000 vehicles per year at the plant.</p> -<ul> - <li>Structure of Information Sharing and Incident Response</li> -</ul> +<h4 id="logistics-and-shipping">Logistics and Shipping</h4> -<p>Figure 8 shows the nationwide information-sharing and incident response structure, including both public and private sectors, in relation to critical infrastructure. Please note that this figure is created based on publicly available sources, including CPCIP, and has been generalized to provide a comprehensive overview rather than specific details. Therefore, it should be noted that the information provided may not be entirely precise or applicable to all cases.</p> +<p>With convenient access to markets in Southeast Asia, China, Japan, and South Korea, as well as its proximity to Australia and India, the Philippines is in a prime location for logistics, transportation, and shipping services. As of March 2023, the Philippine freight and logistics market was valued at $16.8 billion. The growing ubiquity of e-commerce within the country, and throughout the region, necessitates not only strong general infrastructure in ports, roads, and rail connections, but also robust freight and logistics networks.</p> -<p>NISC is the national coordinator for critical infrastructure protection, acting as a counterpart to CISA. NISC serves as a government Computer Security Incident Response Team (CSIRT) as well as the national CSIRT, which is operated jointly with the Japan Computer Emergency Response Team Coordination Center (JPCERT/CC) that coordinates with the private sector. NISC leads the coordination and sharing of information on vulnerabilities, incidents, and risk mitigation in cooperation with private-sector and government agencies, including NPA, MOD, MOFA, MIC, METI, Digital Agency, and agencies responsible for sector risk management, crisis management, and disaster prevention. Sector-specific coordination is conducted through relevant agencies, which is similar to SRMAs in the United States. NISC is more focused on coordination, and the substantive measures are being developed and implemented primarily by agencies responsible for cybersecurity and critical infrastructure protection.</p> +<p>In the aftermath of the global Covid-19 pandemic, e-commerce grew more popular within the country — from March 2020 to January 2021, the number of Philippine online vendors increased from 1,700 to 93,818. Leading e-commerce sites like Shoppee, Lazada, Zalora, and Beauty MNL brought in $17 billion in revenue from 73 million monthly, active users. To handle this flow, the Philippine government has partnered with foreign investors for infrastructure investments as well as freight and logistics services.</p> -<p>Each sector and subsector has an organization called CEPTOAR, which comprises critical infrastructure owners and operators and trade associations (e.g., general incorporated associations) as a point of contact for NISC. The CEPTOAR Council is a cross-sector council comprising representatives of CEPTOAR in each sector. In Japan, as in the United States, ISACs exist as industry-led organizations for day-to-day operational cooperation. In contrast to the United States, ISACs in Japan are not necessarily established in all sectors, but there are ISACs in major sectors such as ICT, finance, power, and transportation. The ICT-ISAC Japan, previously known as the Telecom-ISAC Japan, is the oldest ISAC in Japan, established in 2002. Additionally, there are ISACs that focus on specific industries, including software, automotive, and trade. In recent years, there has been a growing movement to establish new ISACs in other sectors, including the medical sector. While there is no formal organization like NCI in the United States, regular inter-ISAC meetings are held to facilitate cooperation among ISACs to address cross-sector issues.</p> +<p>New Clark City, a planned municipality built about fifty miles from Metro Manila, has emerged as an ideal location within the Philippines for logistics investments. After 36 years in the Philippines, FedEx opened a $30 million gateway facility in Clark City, aimed at improving the company’s ability to operate within the country and in the region at large. Manila’s main airport, the Ninoy Aquino International Airport, is notorious for congestion and inefficiency, prompting government agencies to consider outlying areas around the capital, such as Clark, as new logistics and transportation hubs. FedEx’s Clark investments followed up on refurbishments to the company’s headquarters in Makati in 2018, as well as making an additional $2.2 million worth of investments in two facilities in 2017.</p> -<p>Furthermore, there are several initiatives, such as the Cybersecurity Council, where selected major companies and government agencies gather across sectors to share information, conduct analysis, and develop countermeasures. The collaboration between critical infrastructure owners and operators and government agencies, which is similar to that in the United States in terms of organizational structure, is conducted through various channels, including ISAC, as well as direct communications with NISC and agencies responsible for the sector.</p> +<p>UPS, another major global logistics company, announced in 2024 that it would build a new hub at Clark International Airport by 2025 to strengthen its supply chain and logistics services, which is necessary given the growth of e-commerce. In partnership with the Luzon International Premiere Airport Development Group, this is part of a $250 million investment push UPS is making throughout the region.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/2tPB9Zx.png" alt="image08" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 8: Information-Sharing and Incident Response Structure in Japan.</strong> Source: Author’s analysis based on <a href="https://www.nisc.go.jp/eng/pdf/cip_policy_2024_eng.pdf">National Center of Incident Readiness and Strategy for Cybersecurity (NISC), The Cybersecurity Policy for Critical Infrastructure Protection (Tokyo: Cybersecurity Strategic Headquarters, Government of Japan, March 8, 2024), 62–64</a>.</em></p> +<h3 id="institutional-barriers-to-us-philippine-trade-and-investment">Institutional Barriers to U.S.-Philippine Trade and Investment</h3> -<ul> - <li>Public and Private Initiatives</li> -</ul> +<p>The current Philippine constitution, ratified in 1987, includes several economic provisions that have negatively impacted the Philippines’ net inflow of foreign direct investment, notably restrictions on foreign ownership in certain sectors. In the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development’s World Investment Report 2023, the Philippines ranked sixth among its Southeast Asian peers in FDI inflows. Under the Marcos administration, the Philippines now aims to improve its standing to second by 2028. A 2022 amendment to the Public Service Act, made effective in 2023, allowed full public ownership of industries such as airports, railways, and telecommunications, creating a new area of opportunity for foreign investors. The same year, an amendment to the Foreign Investment Act allowed foreign investors to set up and fully own domestic enterprises, easing access to the Philippine market. The Philippine House of Representatives and Senate are currently debating whether to amend the constitution to further promote foreign economic investment, though similar efforts in previous administrations have failed. Talks of amendment have stalled at least until the 2025 midterm elections.</p> -<p>Japan’s approach to critical infrastructure protection is also based on a voluntary PPP, as outlined in the CPCIP. While there have been several information-sharing frameworks, including the Initiative for Cyber Security Information Sharing Partnership of Japan (J-CSIP) and JC3, in 2019, the Cybersecurity Council was established to further strengthen public-private information sharing. The council is composed of three tiers of memberships: Category 1, Category 2, and General. Its objective is to facilitate the sharing and analysis of threat information and the development of countermeasures in a timely manner while establishing nondisclosure agreements within a membership tier. Category 1 members bring predictive, undetermined, or undisclosed threat information under a strong obligation of confidentiality with legal penalties for noncompliance. The members then analyze the information, provide feedback to each other, and develop countermeasures. NISC serves as the secretariat, while JPCERT/CC serves as the operational coordinator. Finally, developed countermeasures are shared with the entire council if there is a high degree of certainty. If this is not the case, only Category 2 members receive the information in advance of the general members under a strong obligation of confidentiality and provide their own feedback, thereby contributing to improving the degree of accuracy of the information. The council started with 91 members and has since grown to over 300.</p> +<h3 id="key-findings-and-recommendations">Key Findings and Recommendations</h3> -<p>Another major initiative, SC3, has been in place since 2020, aiming to enhance cybersecurity throughout the supply chain, including critical infrastructure. This is an industry-led consortium comprising private companies of all sizes across various sectors. It is structured around several working groups, each focusing on a specific topic related to supply chain cybersecurity, including SMBs, attack trends and countermeasures, industry-academia-government collaboration, and international collaboration. Furthermore, the Cyber Risk Intelligence Center-Cross Sectors Forum (CRIC CSF), established in 2015, is another industry-led cross-sector initiative comprising companies primarily in the critical infrastructure sector. The forum is focused on specific themes related to cross-sector issues in the industry, including the definition of cybersecurity human resources, cybersecurity as business management, laws and regulations, and cybersecurity in DX. In Japan, there are a number of examples, such as SC3 and CRIC CSF, where private companies in the critical infrastructure sectors have taken the initiative to lead discussions on national-level cybersecurity issues. This would indicate a high degree of industry independence and the maturity of mutual aid. This may be a distinctive feature of Japan, in contrast to Western countries where the government typically plays a more prominent role.</p> +<p><strong>Finding:</strong> U.S. companies operating in the Philippines demonstrate varying degrees of transparency in their official databases and on their websites. Investment and employment figures are quite vague, effectively obscuring the impact of these investments.</p> <ul> - <li>Laws and Regulations</li> + <li><strong>Recommendation 1:</strong> The United States should work with the private sector and other stakeholders to develop a comprehensive database outlining U.S. investment in the Philippines, clearly and transparently listing the specific impacts of such investments, including employment figures. Though press releases offer insight into ongoing and future projects initiated by foreign businesses, they do not paint a cohesive picture of the community impact made by such investments.</li> </ul> -<p>Currently, Japan does not have a legal requirement for sector-wide incident reporting like CIRCIA in the United States, although the necessity of such a mandate is being discussed. Some sectors have sector-specific regulations in place to maintain critical infrastructure services that require incident reporting to the relevant agencies. For instance, in the case of the information and telecommunications sector, carriers are obliged to report both the physical failure and cyber incident to MIC if the impact exceeds the threshold defined in the Telecommunications Business Act.</p> - -<p>Furthermore, the Economic Security Promotion Act introduced a new rule in May 2024 to ensure the safety and reliability of essential infrastructure. The government designates essential infrastructure sectors and operators within these sectors based on specific criteria. Prior to the introduction of designated critical facilities and the outsourcing of their maintenance to third parties, covered operators are required to submit plans to the government for screening. Although there is not a one-to-one correspondence between the 15 essential infrastructure sectors and the 15 critical infrastructure sectors, there is a large overlap between them. Currently, over 200 companies have been designated based on criteria such as service scale, coverage, and number of customers. The plans that covered operators submit must include an outline of the facilities (e.g., function, purpose, and location); information on all contractors, including cascaded subcontractors, involved in the equipment or outsourced maintenance (e.g., country of establishment, nationality of board members, country of manufacture, business relationship with foreign governments); and a risk management plan, including cybersecurity measures. If the government determines that there is a significant risk that the facilities may be used as a means of disruptive attacks by foreign adversaries, it may recommend or order the operators to take necessary preventive measures. The rule is risk-based, with covered operators and facilities limited based on criteria from an economic security standpoint. However, it could have a broad impact on major critical infrastructure owners and operators across sectors.</p> +<p><strong>Finding:</strong> Current resources for collating the impact of U.S. investment in the Philippines, or even foreign investment generally, are not user friendly. Further complicating matters, U.S. and Philippine numbers vary significantly, which obscures the impact of U.S.-Philippine economic cooperation. Data from the Philippine Statistics Authority only accounts for investments through investment promotion agencies that have been granted incentives from the Philippine government, reflecting just a fraction of total U.S. investments. Meanwhile, data from the various investment promotion authorities only account for those investments granted incentives by the Philippine government.</p> <ul> - <li>Other Policy Approaches</li> + <li> + <p><strong>Recommendation 2:</strong> The U.S. and Philippine governments should partner closely in collating their data and making both sets mutually intelligible. Consistency among the two countries’ platforms and datasets would help create a more cohesive, easily accessible narrative. It would be to the benefit of the United States and the Philippines to create a joint resource with which to harmonize their datasets and investment figures.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Recommendation 3:</strong> PEZA and the Philippine Statistics Authority should better aggregate incoming investments into the Philippines’ many economic zones and investment promotion authorities within unified charts, demonstrating aggregate total investments from specific countries in specific sectors. For example, it is currently not possible to filter foreign investments by country of investor, industry, promotion authority, or region within the same table.</p> + </li> </ul> -<p>The government is implementing enhanced cybersecurity requirements for both government agencies and contractors. The Common Standards for Cybersecurity Measures for Government Agencies and Related Agencies, issued by NISC, outlines the cybersecurity standards that government agencies must meet. The July 2023 revision reinforced the standards required for contractors based on NIST SP 800-171 to address supply chain risks. In the defense industry, the Acquisition, Technology &amp; Logistics Agency under the DOD introduced a new cybersecurity standard for defense contractors in 2023 that incorporates the requirements of NIST SP 800-171, aligning it with the U.S. standards for the defense industry. Regarding cloud services, the Information system Security Management and Assessment Program (ISMAP), a program similar to the FedRAMP of the United States, has been operational since 2020. Furthermore, government funding programs include cybersecurity requirements, such as IT implementation subsidies, in their application requirements. Additionally, there is discussion on a potential tax incentive program for companies in the defense industry that meet certain cybersecurity requirements.</p> +<p><strong>Finding:</strong> Neither businesses nor the U.S. government adequately socialize the impacts of their investments on local communities, missing a key opportunity to point the narrative toward the efficacy of the U.S.-Philippine economic partnership. Most announcements are limited to business press briefings that are not often accessible to the audiences they are targeting.</p> <ul> - <li>Voluntary Framework and Guidance</li> + <li><strong>Recommendation 4:</strong> Businesses and the U.S. government should expand their online presences to counter rising disinformation and counter narratives that threaten to sway public opinion. U.S. companies should more actively use popular social media platforms in the Philippines to highlight the benefits brought by their investments.</li> </ul> -<p>NISC publishes the guidelines for establishing safety principles for ensuring the cybersecurity of critical infrastructure as a document based on the CPCIP, which outlines common cybersecurity measures required for all sectors. Based on this document, agencies responsible for the sectors and industry develop their own cybersecurity standards and guidelines, taking into account sector-specific features. It is the responsibility of critical infrastructure owners and operators to ensure the cybersecurity of their infrastructure by utilizing these standards and guidelines, or in some cases, complying with them in accordance with relevant regulations. NISC’s guidelines are reviewed on a regular basis, and the latest version, released in July 2023, have focused on strengthening organizational governance and supply chain risk management in cybersecurity as well as clarifying the minimum baseline standards to be implemented and additional ones as recommended options.</p> - -<p>Regarding the NIST CSF, IPA has been providing Japanese translations since the initial release. NISC’s guidelines and their supplementary documents also reflect the CSF concept as the basis for the risk-based approach. In addition, the Cybersecurity Management Guidelines for Japanese Enterprise Executives, published by METI, also reflect the basic concepts of the CSF. As previously noted, Japan has been engaged in the CSF revision process, providing comments and participating in workshops. The CSF has been increasingly adopted in Japanese industry, particularly among multinational companies, as a way to ensure consistent and aligned risk management with international stakeholders.</p> - -<p>In addition to sector-specific guidance and best practices developed by government agencies and industry associations, METI, IPA, MIC, and others also provide guidance that can be used by a wide range of companies, including critical infrastructure owners and operators across sectors, including those focusing on industrial control systems, cloud infrastructure, corporate management, and SMBs. IPA is also working with NIST and CISA to disseminate key frameworks and guidance from the United States. This includes publishing Japanese translations of CISA’s CPGs and other NIST publications, in addition to the CSF.</p> - -<p>With regard to the government’s releases of technical and operational advisories and guidance on critical threats, it is likely that the frequency of release and level of detail would be lower than in the United States, although it is not easy to make comparisons given that not all information is necessarily publicly available. The government is expected to expand its operational staff in the coming years along with the restructuring of NISC. This will enable the government to release more detailed, actionable guidance with technical and operational aspects in a timelier manner. It is also encouraging to note that the United States and Japan are increasingly issuing advisories in cooperation, as in the case of the joint advisories issued in September 2023 and July 2024.</p> +<p><strong>Finding:</strong> Despite the longstanding economic partnership, relatively few U.S. business leaders have traveled to the Philippines or have become aware of the potential of its rapidly growing and increasingly open economy. The 2024 Presidential Trade and Investment Mission was successful in bringing representatives from 22 U.S. businesses to the Philippines. In a similar vein, the 2023 Agricultural Technology Trade Mission to Mindanao brought together key stakeholders from throughout the private sector and government to brainstorm future opportunities for improving the Philippines’ agricultural supply chain.</p> <ul> - <li>Plan and Preparedness</li> + <li><strong>Recommendation 5:</strong> Person-to-person exchanges should remain consistent throughout administrations. Both recent U.S. government–led trade missions were the first of their kind. The United States, regardless of administration, should ensure the continuation of such exchanges.</li> </ul> -<p>As previously stated, based on the guidelines published by NISC, agencies responsible for the sectors and industry have developed sector-specific standards and guidelines on which organizations implement and maintain their cybersecurity posture. With regard to further study on critical infrastructure protection, the Japanese government is aware of the need to address the increasingly complex interdependencies among infrastructures. The CPCIP indicates that the Cabinet Secretariat plans to conduct interdependency analysis, which will help it identify systemic risks of infrastructure, including both physical and cyber aspects. The designation of essential infrastructure owners and operators and critical facilities under the new rule based on the Economic Security Promotion Act may have certain similarities with the concept of NCFs and SIEs in terms of identifying especially important entities and functions across sectors.</p> - -<p>Regarding national-level cyber exercises, a cross-sector exercise hosted by NISC has been held annually since 2006. This exercise involves over 6,000 participants from critical infrastructure owners and operators, government agencies, and commercial cybersecurity companies across all sectors and verifies the effectiveness of cross-sector incident response processes through tabletop exercises. In addition, sector-specific cyber exercises are conducted by ISACs, such as those in the ICT sector and the electric power sector, as well as by government agencies, such as those in the financial sector.</p> +<p><strong>Finding:</strong> Investments in the Philippines remain strongly centered in Luzon, and particularly in and around Metro Manila and its surrounding areas. Business interest in areas such as Cebu and Davao are growing, but Manila remains oversaturated with investment. Moreover, with limited availability and bureaucratic red tape preventing easy access to cheap land, both business owners and potential employees are thus at a disadvantage.</p> <ul> - <li>Technologies, Products, and Services</li> + <li><strong>Recommendation 6:</strong> The United States should work to diversify the span of its investments throughout the Philippines. The unitary nature of the Philippine government and the ongoing narrative of “Imperial Manila,” that is, that most of the country’s progress is concentrated in the capital region, makes this difficult to achieve. Expanding investment projects into emerging regions — from Iloilo and Cebu in the central Philippines to Davao and its surroundings in the south — would offer excellent opportunities for Filipinos. The expansion of the IT-BPM sector throughout the Philippines, for instance, helped to more evenly distribute work away from Manila, leading to the development and revitalization of other urban hubs.</li> </ul> -<p>While Japan has not received as much policy attention for internet routing security as the United States, the implementation of RPKI, a key technology to address the issue, is progressing. As of September 2024, approximately 48 percent of routes in Japan have been implemented with Route Origin Authorization, a key technical component of RPKI, compared to approximately 40 percent in the United States.</p> - -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/jpGy7f2.png" alt="image09" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 9: Mapping of Critical Infrastructure Protection Framework between Japan and the United States.</strong> Source: Author’s analysis.</em></p> - -<p>With regard to IoT security, Japan has a long history of proactive and advanced efforts focused on protecting its communications infrastructure. As previously stated, since 2019, the country has been implementing the NOTICE project, which extensively scans IoT devices connected to the internet in Japan, identifies devices with weak passwords, and encourages users to correct their settings. This has been made possible by the amendment of the law to authorize NICT to conduct the scan, and ICT-ISAC and over 80 domestic ISPs are cooperating to identify and notify the owners of vulnerable devices. This is a truly nationwide initiative to mitigate botnet risks through public-private cooperation. Additionally, NICT monitors communications flowing into the domestic darknet. By analyzing communications that are presumed to originate from botnet devices, NICT identifies infected IoT devices, followed by the same process as NOTICE. Furthermore, in 2020, the technical standards for IoT devices connected to the internet were revised to require devices to meet minimum cybersecurity requirements, such as prohibiting default passwords and implementing access control functions. METI is also developing a voluntary conformity assessment program for a broader range of IoT devices, with the aim of launching the program during FY 2024. A dialogue has been initiated with the U.S. government to establish mutual recognition with the U.S. labeling scheme.</p> - -<p>Japan is at the forefront of the commercial 5G network deployment using the Open Radio Access Network (O-RAN). NTT DOCOMO started the world’s first nationwide deployment of 5G commercial services using O-RAN in 2020. One of the key concerns in the international deployment of secure and reliable 5G networks is the security of O-RAN. In May 2023, a report on O-RAN security was published by a Quad working group. The study found that O-RAN-specific security risks in 5G networks are only 4 percent of the total, and do not fundamentally alter the security environment of wireless communication networks compared to conventional networks. Recently, through the NTIA grant program, testing projects have been conducted by international partners, including operators from Japan, the United States, and India, to evaluate interoperability and security. Furthermore, a joint effort between companies in both countries has been made to conduct interoperability testing using test beds provided by NTT DOCOMO and other companies.</p> - -<p>Figure 9 provides a simplified mapping of the critical infrastructure protection frameworks of the United States and Japan. It should be noted that this mapping is intended to provide a comprehensive overview and does not necessarily represent a complete one-to-one relationship in terms of roles and responsibilities, scale, and operational maturities.</p> - -<h3 id="recommendations-for-japan-us-cooperation-on-critical-infrastructure-cybersecurity-and-resilience">Recommendations for Japan-U.S. Cooperation on Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity and Resilience</h3> - -<p>Based on the discussions so far, this chapter outlines recommendations for Japan-U.S. cybersecurity cooperation in the areas of critical infrastructure cybersecurity and resilience. The recommendations are divided into two main categories: basic prerequisites for enhancing operational collaboration and specific areas of collaboration based on these prerequisites.</p> +<hr /> -<h4 id="prerequisites-for-operational-collaboration">Prerequisites for Operational Collaboration</h4> +<p><strong>Japhet Quitzon</strong> is an associate fellow for the Southeast Asia Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C.</p> -<p><em>Obtain a comprehensive overview of national cybersecurity posture in both countries and comparatively map the postures</em></p> +<p><strong>Gregory B. Poling</strong> is a senior fellow and director of the Southeast Asia Program and the Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative at CSIS.</p>Japhet Quitzon and Gregory B. PolingThough U.S.-Philippine economic ties are well documented, the day-to-day impact of the relationship in the Philippines is often underreported. The United States must enhance public awareness and understanding of its economic and investment activities in the Philippines.China In Global South Ports2024-10-30T12:00:00+08:002024-10-30T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/china-in-global-south-ports<p><em>Port infrastructure is an investment area where China is outpacing the United States. A strategy to counter China’s influence in Global South ports is an important piece of a larger program to enable a better offer to the Global South.</em></p> -<p>A comprehensive cybersecurity strategy requires a unified approach across the entire society. As previously discussed, the organizations and functions of national cybersecurity in the United States and Japan are highly decentralized and complex, with multiple stakeholders interacting with each other. All those involved in cybersecurity cooperation between the two countries should first have a comprehensive common understanding of the overall picture, including how cybersecurity is structured and functions in both countries, as well as what is taking place in the nation as a whole. This should be a prerequisite to pursuing specific areas of cooperation. It helps everyone understand how each specific area of cooperation fits into the broader picture and how it relates to other areas and stakeholders. It also facilitates whole-optimal and effective national-level cooperation, avoiding the creation of silos. Then, all stakeholders should have a shared understanding of mapping counterparts in both countries at the respective levels of the public and private sectors and establish the appropriate channels for structured collaboration. Regardless of the form of relationship (e.g., one-to-one, one-to-many, or many-to-many), it is important to eliminate as much duplication as possible in each channel.</p> +<excerpt /> -<p>In particular, Japan is currently in the process of reinforcing its government cybersecurity posture. This is being done through a review of its organizational structure and authorities, roles, and responsibilities, including the establishment of a new cybersecurity agency and the enhancement of JSDF’s capabilities. In the United States, the government structure and functions have evolved over the past several years, including the establishment of ONCD. Taking these changes as great opportunity, it is worthwhile to undertake a comprehensive review of the relationship between the two countries’ systems at all levels, including the public and private sectors, as well as policies and initiatives. The information presented in this paper would help all stakeholders obtain these aspects and serves as a first step in implementing the following recommendations.</p> +<p>Port infrastructure around the world is critical to U.S. economic and military security. Although vitally important, it is an investment area where China is outpacing the United States. China now dominates maritime trade in terms of volume, shipbuilding activity, and construction and ownership of ports around the world. China’s position puts U.S. economic interests and national security priorities at risk.</p> -<p><em>Expand and operationalize the interoperable mechanism for classified and unclassified cyber information sharing</em></p> +<p>A strategy to counter China’s influence in Global South ports is an important piece of a larger program to enable a better offer to the Global South. Actions include creating a port infrastructure strategy, promoting transparency in global port infrastructure procurement, and using other tools to better compete against China. Several policy recommendations are not unique to ports but apply to other infrastructure investment areas, such as undersea cables or digital architecture. China’s dominance of overseas ports is well established, but the U.S. policy response is lacking. This policy brief initiates a much-needed conversation and offers preliminary suggestions for consideration and further assessment.</p> -<p>Now that cybersecurity has become a matter of national security, it is becoming increasingly important to establish a secure and efficient mechanism for sharing sensitive or classified cybersecurity information between Japan and the United States. While a framework for sharing classified information between the two countries already exists, it is limited in terms of the types of information protected and the level of classification and has not necessarily been sufficient in the area of cybersecurity. The recently passed security clearance legislation in Japan will greatly expand the scope of the existing system by extending the scope of information to include cybersecurity, the level of classified classification, and the scope of clearance to a broader private sector, which had previously been focused on government officials. This would be a major step forward in the exchange of classified information in the cybersecurity field. The government is currently developing operational standards in preparation for the launch of the system in 2025. This preparation should include ensuring interoperability with like-minded countries, including the United States, as a key area of focus. Looking ahead, it would be beneficial for both governments to engage in specific discussions on how to expand and operationalize the existing interoperable mechanism to cover the cyber domain. While Japan is not necessarily required to join the Five Eyes alliance, it is important to establish a trusted framework with the new clearance system defining procedures and protocols for cyber intelligence sharing. It is also necessary for the Japanese and U.S. governments to clearly define and agree on a centralized point of contact between them so that cyber intelligence sharing can be conducted through a single channel.</p> +<h3 id="the-global-souths-demand-for-port-infrastructure">The Global South’s Demand for Port Infrastructure</h3> -<p>At the same time, it is important to note that today’s cybersecurity information sharing has been focused more on providing useful information in a timely manner and as broadly as possible through declassification. There are multiple ways for information sharing, including the security clearance system and the Traffic Light Protocol, for instance. It is, therefore, important for Japan and the United States to identify and clarify the various means of information exchange tailored to the specific type of information to be handled.</p> +<p>During the past 25 years, international trade patterns have shifted in favor of the Global South. Even though North-North trade is responsible for the biggest share of international trade (37.1 percent), South-South trade has increased by 14.1 percent since 1995, reaching a 25 percent share. Trade between developing countries has increased by an average annual rate of 9.8 percent since 2000, reaching $5.3 trillion in 2021. Over the same period, world trade grew at an annual rate of 5.5 percent. According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 2024 World Economic Outlook, world trade is expected to increase by 3 percent in 2024 and by 3.3 percent in 2025. As a result, the demand for port infrastructure from the Global South will continue to rise as these countries seek to develop and integrate into global trade.</p> -<p><em>Japan to take further steps to enhance government cybersecurity posture through implementation of the NSS</em></p> +<p>Maritime transport is the backbone of international trade. Around 80 percent of the volume of international trade in goods is carried by sea; this figure is even greater for developing countries. Lower-income countries and small islands are 1.5 to 2 times more reliant on their ports for global trade than the global average. High-quality port infrastructure supports successful economic growth, especially in export-driven economies in developing regions. It attracts investment in production and distribution systems, supports the growth of manufacturing and logistics, and generates more employment. Port development supports supply chain diversification, which is particularly important in the face of shutdown due to accidents, pandemics, or wars.</p> -<p>In the NSS of Japan, Japan has committed to fundamentally enhance the government’s cybersecurity capabilities, including the implementation of proactive cyber operations. This can be achieved by enhancing both the operational authorities and capabilities of the government.</p> +<p>In 2000, the United States was the top trading partner for over 80 percent of countries. As of today, this figure has shrunk to 30 percent, while China has now become the top trading partner for more than 120 countries. China is South America’s top trading partner, and it is Africa’s largest trading partner in terms of total volume, dwarfing U.S.-Africa trade by a factor of four, according to the United States Institute of Peace.</p> -<p>Japan is currently focusing on potential amendments to existing laws, including the Telecommunications Business Act and the Unauthorized Computer Access Prohibition Act, to grant operational authorities. While some of the legislative issues are complex, given their constitutional implications, it is essential for Japanese policymakers to accelerate the discussion to clarify the government’s strategic objectives at the operational level and identify the means to achieve them in reality. The strategy primarily outlines the government’s intended actions. However, it also assumes that telecommunication carriers and other private companies will be positioned to indirectly support government operations by providing information on communications and threat intelligence as well as analysis expertise. It is, therefore, important, in legislative discussions, to define the roles and responsibilities of private companies in national cyber defense, legal protection, and financial support for the cost of facilities, people, and operations.</p> +<h3 id="chinas-leadership-in-port-infrastructure">China’s Leadership in Port Infrastructure</h3> -<p>Furthermore, a new cybersecurity agency, built on NISC, should become the primary entity for coordinating, operating, and enforcing national cyber resilience. It should also serve as a centralized point of contact for international cooperation. As the government’s technical and operational activities increase in this evolution, the new agency, as a national CSIRT, needs to secure additional cyber professionals. While the government’s cyber workforce is being expanded at NISC, NPA, JSDF, and other agencies, further expansion should be considered for the new agency to be fully operational. This could be done through hiring professionals from the private sector as well as leveraging capacity-building programs offered by the private sector.</p> +<p>Within this context, China has significantly invested in the Maritime Silk Road (MSR) to increase trade route options and bypass choke points, posing a significant challenge for U.S. trade. In 2013, Chinese president Xi Jinping unveiled the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), an ambitious political-economic infrastructure initiative to link East Asia and Europe through land, sea and air under China’s leadership and with the backing of its resources. The twenty-first-century MSR is responsible for the BRI maritime routes that connect China to Europe and the Arctic Ocean via the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean. President Xi has repeatedly emphasized that economic powers must be maritime and shipping powers. As China now positions itself as the world’s top exporter, top shipbuilder, and largest trading nation, with around 95 percent of its international trade carried out through sea-lanes, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) will soon dominate global maritime trade.</p> -<p>The strategy is already in place and further implementation would enhance the government’s cybersecurity capabilities, which in turn will stimulate more bidirectional operational cooperation between the public and private sectors than ever before. This would further reinforce Japan’s overall cybersecurity posture and facilitate international collaboration and coordination. While the strategy is currently being implemented, it would be beneficial for Japan and the United States to proceed now with discussions on potential ways for to enhance cooperation built on the implementation.</p> +<p>The Indo-Pacific is a major hub of global commerce and will continue to be the main target for China’s maritime control. The 10 busiest container ports in the world are located along the shores of the Pacific and Indian Oceans. The Indian Ocean hosts 80 percent of China’s imported oil and 95 percent of China’s trade with the Middle East, Africa, and Europe. China also has a strong presence in port construction in the developing world: it operates or has ownership of 91 active port projects across the globe where military use is a possibility, providing it with a foothold in every continent except Antarctica. These projects are part of the MSR network, which, according to the People’s Republic of China (PRC) State Council Information Office, has reached 117 ports across 43 countries, mostly in the Global South. China’s position of control and influence over the majority of port infrastructure globally poses a significant economic and military security threat to the United States. Simply put, China could use its power to interfere with operations that rely on port access – including military and economic operations – and are vital to U.S. interests.</p> -<h4 id="collaboration-on-plans-preparedness-and-operations">Collaboration on Plans, Preparedness, and Operations</h4> +<p>Ports are one strategic infrastructure investment area where China is outpacing the United States. In addition to technology, digital infrastructure, and energy infrastructure, China has made significant and strategic investments in ports that are highly connected to global trade networks and critical to the global flow of goods. It has invested in port projects in 16 of the top 20 countries or territories for shipping connectivity. Six of those countries are from the Global South: Egypt, Malaysia, Saudi Arabia, Thailand, the United Arab Emirates, and Vietnam. More than 27 percent of global container trade last year passed through terminals where leading Chinese and Hong Kong–based firms held direct stakes.</p> -<p><em>Engage in national-level advanced risk analysis focusing on critical infrastructures of both countries</em></p> +<p>China’s state-owned enterprises (SOEs) also dominate in financing, design, construction, and management of overseas port infrastructure. Between 2010 and 2019, Chinese companies invested roughly $11 billion into overseas ports. China’s two main SOEs involved in port infrastructure are COSCO Shipping Ports, the world’s largest shipping company and port terminal operator, operating and managing 371 berths globally, and China Merchants Ports, the sixth-largest port terminal operator globally. Additionally, the China Communications Construction Company Limited (CCCC) is the biggest port design and construction enterprise in the world. It shapes more than 70 percent of the national standards for the water transportation industry and designed 7 of the top 10 ports. State support to Chinese shipping companies in their endeavors totaled an estimated $132 billion between 2010 and 2018.</p> -<p>The cybersecurity and resilience of critical infrastructure is a matter of national concern, affecting not just one organization or sector but the entire nation, as a failure in one organization can have cascading effects on that sector, other sectors, and the entire nation. It is, therefore, becoming increasingly important to conduct a national-level risk analysis that focuses on understanding the interdependencies of critical infrastructure sectors and functions, analyzing their systemic risks, and identifying the most critical entities and functions with a risk-based approach. The United States has been working in this area for several years, beginning with the development of NCFs, while Japan is currently in the early stages of conducting interdependency analysis. However, neither has necessarily focused on the international perspective but rather on the domestic one. In reality, however, the interdependencies and systemic risks have an international reach. These interconnectivities are particularly strong between nations that are allied as well as economically tied to each other.</p> +<h3 id="concerns-about-chinas-port-infrastructure">Concerns about China’s Port Infrastructure</h3> -<p>It would, therefore, be beneficial to pursue cooperation in the area of national-level risk analysis, including critical infrastructures for which both countries rely on each other. This could include mapping out the interdependencies of both countries’ infrastructures as a whole, including, but not limited to, communications and digital infrastructure as a foundation for intelligence and information sharing; communications, power, water, and transportation infrastructure on which U.S. military bases in Japan depend; and financial and logistics infrastructure that is key to their economic activities. This would also include analyzing their systemic risks, taking into account the timescale of impacts, and identifying the sectors, operators, and functions that are particularly important. This will greatly assist both countries in responding collectively to national-scale incidents and ensuring the resilience of the alliance as a whole.</p> +<p>China-backed infrastructure projects permeate the Global South. However, these projects often come with unsustainable financing terms, a lack of transparency, and a clear disregard for environmental and social norms. China even imports its workforce and prevents locals from profiting from the investment projects. In its first 10 years, cumulative BRI engagement surpassed $1 trillion, and the developing world amassed an estimated $385 billion in “hidden debt” to China. For each dollar of aid to low- and middle-income countries, China has provided $9 of debt.</p> -<p>In today’s digitally interconnected world, interdependencies have become so complex that even a domestic-focused analysis is challenging. Even in the United States, which is a leader in this field, the study has not yet been fully completed. Bringing together the analytical methodologies and practices of both countries can add value to existing studies in both countries. For instance, the NCFs in the United States could be leveraged in Japan’s interdependency analysis while the concept of designating essential infrastructure owners and operators and critical facilities in Japan’s new regulation could provide insights for the study of SIEs in the United States. From this perspective as well, it would be mutually beneficial for the two countries to collaborate on risk analysis at the national level.</p> +<p>Sri Lanka has accumulated more than $8 billion in debt to Chinese SOEs, of which $1.1 billion was used to construct Hambantota Port. In 2017, when the Sri Lankan government was struggling to repay its debts, it had agreed to lease the port to China for 99 years in exchange for debt reduction. However, in 2024, Sri Lanka had to renegotiate its debt after it defaulted on its foreign loans in 2022. The situation raised concerns about China’s economic and geopolitical influence through predatory lending and the risks for smaller countries that undertake infrastructure deals with China.</p> -<p>While this initiative should be led by key government agencies responsible for national security and critical infrastructure protection (NSC and CISA of the United States and the National Security Secretariat and NISC of Japan), it is crucial to expand the involvement of critical infrastructure owners and operators more than ever. It is clear that the owners and operators have the most accurate understanding of the functions and services on which they depend, and they are responsible for managing their own risks, including interdependencies. To be more effective, the study would need to include at least the major operators in each sector in both countries.</p> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">China-backed infrastructure projects permeate the Global South. However, these projects often come with unsustainable financing terms, a lack of transparency, and a clear disregard for environmental and social norms.</code></em></strong></p> -<p><em>Regularly conduct cross-sector public-private joint cyber exercises</em></p> +<p>Similarly, as of 2022, Pakistan owed $23 billion to China. After large-scale borrowing, particularly in relation to the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), Pakistan is struggling to repay its debt and faces an economic crisis. These loans may have contained hidden terms that hinder Pakistan’s economy and force the country to depend on China. Although some analysis dismisses accusations of China’s debt-trap diplomacy, other issues surrounding Chinese lending remain, including lack of transparency, economic viability, social and environmental concerns, and wielding debt for political leverage.</p> -<p>In the event of a significant cyber incident that could affect national security, all stakeholders across the public and private sectors, including international partners, must work together to respond. It is essential to prioritize preparedness and exercises in peacetime. While both countries have conducted cross-sector public-private cyber exercises, they have not necessarily focused primarily on collaboration with international partners, as seen in joint exercises between defense authorities.</p> +<p>Additional concerns remain about China’s port infrastructure due to its potential dual use for commercial and military purposes. Out of the 70 commercial port projects in the Global South, an estimated 55 projects have the potential for naval use as well. That said, naval use is more likely to occur in ports where China owns the majority share – currently 10 port projects.</p> -<p>As a first step toward conducting a joint large-scale cyber exercise, both countries, led by CISA and NISC, should work together to develop national response plans and exercise scenarios at both the national and alliance levels, with a particular focus on cross-border considerations, to enable a coordinated collective response. The plan should include the incident response procedure, its prioritization, the counterparts of each entity, and communication channels based on the national-level risk analysis. The scenario could involve a cyberattack impacting multiple critical infrastructure sectors simultaneously, assuming a significant national-level threat from state-sponsored actors. This will verify how both countries and their respective entities can collectively respond to incidents. This may be a too large-scale, near-worst-case scenario exercise, but as previously mentioned, the United States and Japan have been facing a common geopolitical threat, and the risk of both countries’ critical infrastructure being affected strategically at the same time can no longer be ignored.</p> +<p>There is growing reason for concern as Chinese port projects become more ambitious in terms of uses and strategic location. In 2017, China established its first overseas military base in Djibouti at the entrance of the Red Sea, one of the world’s busiest shipping lanes, six miles from a U.S. military base. There are concerns about similar attempts to establish a military presence in other parts of the Global South. U.S. officials suspect that China and Cambodia made a deal allowing Chinese armed forces to use Ream Naval Base, strategically located on the country’s southern coast facing the Gulf of Thailand, on the heels of elevated conflict with the Philippines and others in the South Sea. The Cambodian government has denied these accusations. Similarly, in the United Arab Emirates, China is accused of attempting to construct a clandestine military facility in the port of Khalifa, outside Abu Dhabi. China is also attempting to build a military base on the Atlantic coast of Africa.</p> -<p>It is recommended that such an exercise be conducted on an annual basis to review and reinforce the plan in response to evolving threats and to ensure its continued effectiveness. It is essential that all entities involved in the developed scenario, from both the public and private sectors, are included as participants.</p> +<p>In addition to commercial and military use, port infrastructure could also be used for spying and intelligence gathering. With access to the business trade hubs, China could spy on U.S. commercial and military movements. A 2024 congressional probe showed communications equipment in Chinese-made cranes at U.S. ports, suggesting vulnerabilities to supply chains, trade data, and other sensitive information. China has secured a commanding position through Logink (also known as the National Transportation and Logistics Public Information Platform), a Chinese state-owned digital logistics platform. At least 24 ports worldwide have adopted the Logink system, which could allow China to access significant amounts of confidential information related to transportation, pricing, and management of goods (including military equipment), threatening U.S. economic and military security.</p> -<p><em>Expand overarching public-private operational collaboration in the United States and Japan</em></p> +<p>China is also exporting container cranes from Shanghai Zhenhua Heavy Industries Company Limited (ZPMC). ZPMC dominates the global market for container cranes with a staggering 70 percent market share. For example, ZPMC manufactures 80 percent of the cranes used in U.S. ports; this includes 10 strategic seaports. These cranes come equipped with sensors that can track container details, which raises concerns about Chinese access to information about shipped goods, including U.S. military equipment.</p> -<p>It is recommended that both countries establish a centralized framework for cross-sector operational collaboration that includes key private companies and government agencies responsible for critical infrastructure protection. While both countries have public-private cooperation frameworks in place at the domestic level, as well as operational cooperation between the two countries locally or partially in certain areas, there is an opportunity to further expand and integrate these initiatives into an environment where all necessary players can come together and cooperate in a flexible and timely manner. For instance, while NTT is involved in JCDC from Japan, there are several other companies in Japan with a high level of technical and operational expertise. Furthermore, U.S.-based companies are individually engaged in collaborative efforts with Japan. For example, Microsoft has partnered with the Japanese government, while Google has established a cybersecurity research center in Tokyo. By incorporating some of these into a larger Japan-U.S. PPP framework, the level of operational collaboration could be further enhanced. The centralized framework would enable the public and private sectors of both countries to enhance activities such as threat intelligence and information sharing, joint analysis, and the development of countermeasures. While not all information handled in operational collaboration is necessarily classified, the passage of Japan’s security clearance legislation would also greatly facilitate collaboration. This would consequently assist both countries in issuing joint attribution and advisories with greater frequency than ever before, which would contribute to reinforcing international deterrence as well as providing actionable cybersecurity measures to the public at large.</p> +<h3 id="us-activity-in-port-infrastructure">U.S. Activity in Port Infrastructure</h3> -<p>In cross-border public-private operational collaboration, it is crucial to build trust among members. It is advisable to begin with a small, limited number of the most capable companies that can interact with each other with sufficient trust and agility. This can then be expanded gradually. While the private sector plays an important role in collaboration, the role of CISA and NISC as lead agencies is also crucial to effectively promote top-down nationwide cooperation. It is essential to maintain a robust channel of collaboration between the two. One potential step would be to assign liaisons with cybersecurity expertise in CISA and NISC to each other. This would clarify the point of contact as well as build trust between the two organizations, promoting closer collaboration on a daily basis. CISA’s liaison office in the United Kingdom and the JSDF’s liaison officers at the Pentagon may be suitable models for consideration.</p> +<p>Today China strongly outperforms the United States in the financing, building, and management of ports. The United States has a limited number of ports, and its infrastructure is deficient and vulnerable to inclement weather. Currently, the United States has 208 commercial ports – up from 178 in 2010. U.S. ports are either privately owned and operated, or they are managed by federal, state, or local government or quasi-governmental authorities. The owner of a U.S. port might lease port infrastructure to a terminal operator in charge of maintaining equipment and buildings. In comparison, China has over 2,000 commercial ports domestically and nearly 100 ports abroad. Furthermore, U.S. port companies do not score well in global rankings. None of the world’s top 10 shipping companies or top 10 seaport operators are American, and only four U.S. ports are among the top 50 busiest ports in the world. None of the U.S. ports make it into the Container Port Performance Index top 20 list.</p> -<p><em>Deepen sector-to-sector collaboration</em></p> +<p>In addition, U.S. port infrastructure is largely outdated. The 2021 Report Card for American Infrastructure by the American Society of Civil Engineers gives a B-minus to U.S. port infrastructure. According to the Freight Intermodal Connectors Study, 91 percent of U.S. ports have a fair, mediocre, or poor rating: 35 percent are fair, 19 percent are mediocre, and 37 percent are poor. At the same time, U.S. ports have been increasingly vulnerable to climate. In 2022, Hurricane Ian forced temporary closures of seven major U.S. ports. Droughts in the Panama Canal disrupted vessels serving U.S. East Coast ports. Besides, many U.S. ports have infrastructure limitations that do not allow them to receive larger vessels, according to the U.S. Department of Transportation.</p> -<p>The United States and Japan face similar challenges in sectors that are vulnerable to being targeted by state-sponsored actors, such as the electricity, communications, transportation, and water sectors, as well as sectors that are vulnerable to ransomware attacks, such as the healthcare sector. It is, therefore, recommended that the two countries deepen direct sector-to-sector collaboration to address sector-specific cyber and physical security and resilience. In addition to the common cybersecurity standards and requirements across sectors, each sector requires sector-specific risk management and resilience that takes into account its unique ecosystems with supply chains, business practices, systems, facilities, and other specific components. This requires different expertise in different industries and sectors. Fortunately, the sector designations in both countries are similar and can be relatively easily mapped. It would be beneficial to collaborate on developing and sharing guidance, best practices, and tools between sectors in both countries to enhance sector-specific capabilities. This would also be beneficial for under-resourced sectors to optimize their limited cyber resources. Moreover, establishing an environment where sector-specific threats and vulnerabilities are directly shared between the sectors would be a significant operational benefit.</p> +<p>In terms of overseas ports, the United States severely lags China, as the United States does not manage or own any commercial ports outside its territories. The U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC), however, is beginning to invest in some port infrastructure abroad. In May 2023, the DFC announced a $150 million commitment to Yilport Terminal Operations to expand and modernize the Puerto Bolívar container port in Ecuador. This is a significant step forward, but a more robust pipeline of projects must be developed.</p> -<p>In the context of sector-to-sector collaboration, Japan and the United States can focus more on industry-specific characteristics beyond cybersecurity, including physical security and disaster management. Since the interdependency extends beyond cyberspace, it is important to consider physical security when identifying systemic risk. Japan has a long history of experiencing several national-scale disasters, including typhoons, earthquakes, and tsunamis. As a result, the country has developed a wealth of experience and expertise in dealing with such events, ensuring cyber and physical resilience. In particular, Japan’s major companies, which provide essential infrastructure services that support the functioning of the nation, are well-versed in integrated resilience measures specific to their industry. This is the source of Japan’s ability to provide infrastructure services with a high degree of stability and accuracy, and its practices can be highly beneficial for improving resilience and ensuring business continuity in sectors with similar characteristics in the United States.</p> +<p>In November 2021, the White House announced the Biden-Harris Action Plan for America’s Ports and Waterways, recognizing that U.S. ports are underfunded and that poor infrastructure has important costs for the U.S. economy and global competitiveness. The administration under President Joe Biden developed the Bipartisan Infrastructure Deal (BID) and the Port Infrastructure Development Grant (PIDG) program, which both allocate investment to improve port infrastructure. The U.S. Department of Transportation will award $230 million to the PIDG, and the Biden administration committed $17 billion to the BID. While this is a good start, much more funding should be allocated, with a specific strategy focusing on the Global South. Currently, the U.S. government does not consider the commercial maritime industry as critical infrastructure, making it even more difficult to prioritize the sector.</p> -<p>Specific forms of cooperation could include operational collaboration between ISACs. While cooperation between government agencies is essential, it is also crucial to involve private companies, which own and operate the majority of critical infrastructure. It is, therefore, beneficial to facilitate direct collaboration between major companies representing sectors in both countries. One potential approach to advance this is to exchange a few selected cybersecurity staff from major companies in each sector in both countries for a certain period. Such an initiative would not only facilitate the exchange of valuable insights between the two sectors; it would also lay the foundation for the trust needed to facilitate operational collaboration.</p> +<p>Moreover, the United States could also draw on the financing and expertise of multilateral development banks (MDBs) and international financial institutions (IFIs) when it comes to ports infrastructure. These institutions provide financing and technical assistance to the private sector in middle- and low-income countries, help de-risk investments, and catalyze private capital. In 2021, MDBs were the second-largest financier in these countries and financed 9 percent of the total value of private investment in infrastructure projects. From 2010 to 2021, the largest share of MDB financing of private investment in infrastructure projects went to the transport sector and represented 38 percent of all financing. In 2023, a total of 18 port projects in 11 countries received investments worth $4.9 billion, twice the amount in 2022, according to a World Bank report. The Latin America-Caribbean region had the highest level of private investments for ports, reaching $1.5 billion in five ports in Brazil and $975 million in one port in Peru.</p> -<p><em>Enhance coordinated operations to disrupt threat actors</em></p> +<p>However, the U.S.-led multilateral lending process has discouraged developing countries. Compared to Chinese lending under the BRI, Western MDB loans tend to be less attractive, as they are more difficult to apply for and are contingent on more rigorous vetting requirements and standards for bankability. China, by contrast, is often involved in predatory lending, which imposes unfair terms on the borrower and makes its deals look more attractive on the surface. To compete with China, Western MDBs must streamline their services and strike a better balance between managing risk and delivering results.</p> -<p>As the number of borderless cyberattacks targeting critical infrastructure continues to grow, it is becoming increasingly clear that international law enforcement agencies must take a more coordinated approach to countermeasures, including the takedown of botnets, shutdown of cryptocurrency infrastructures, recovery of ransom, and assistance to victims. The United States and Japan have a collaborative relationship in this area, with a particularly strong partnership in recent years, including in the coordinated response to the LockBit ransomware group. However, the number of such operations is smaller than that of the United States and European countries, and there is still room to expand cooperation in this area. As NPA demonstrated its high technical capabilities with the LockBit operation, Japan can make a further contribution with these capabilities. Furthermore, with the growing geopolitical tensions, Japan’s strategic location at the center of the Indo-Pacific region presents an opportunity for Japan to contribute to criminal investigations with the unique information it gathers in the region. Japan can also serve as a hub state for cooperation with other countries in the region, working with the United States.</p> +<p>China also has a growing influence in these traditionally U.S.-led institutions. China now has the second-highest aggregate voting power in the IFIs it supports, even though it significantly trails the United States. Despite many Chinese firms being sanctioned or debarred from the World Bank for fraud and corruption, China has consistently ranked among the top countries receiving MDB contracts, and Chinese firms easily outperform firms of other countries in securing contracts, according to the Center for Global Development.</p> -<p>The FBI and NPA are responsible for the enforcement of countermeasures. However, since the cloud, networks, and cryptocurrency infrastructure utilized by attackers are tied to private providers internationally, it is necessary for companies in both countries to cooperate with law enforcement agencies within the legal framework. Further collaboration between law enforcement agencies and increased opportunities for coordinated operations involving private organizations in both countries would reinforce deterrence and demonstrate Japan-U.S. solidarity against foreign adversaries.</p> +<h3 id="recommendations">Recommendations</h3> -<h4 id="additional-areas-of-collaboration">Additional Areas of Collaboration</h4> +<p>The United States cannot respond on its own to the increasing Chinese presence in Global South ports; it must rely on the MDB system, a strong interagency process, and allies and partners to offer better terms and financing to counter China’s growing influence in port infrastructure in the Global South. Some initial recommendations are put forward in this paper, but further dialogue and research are needed to devise specific actions so the United States can lead on this important infrastructure.</p> -<p><em>Harmonize rules, standards, and framework</em></p> +<h4 id="1-devise-a-clear-national-security-strategy-on-international-ports">1. Devise a Clear National Security Strategy on International Ports</h4> -<p>One key objective of Japan-U.S. collaboration is to harmonize the various cybersecurity processes in both countries. While there is a wide range of approaches to cybersecurity, from mandatory requirements to voluntary standards and frameworks, it is important to harmonize these internationally to streamline processes and ensure consistency. This is of particular importance for allied countries to ensure the interoperability of rules and frameworks, reduce the burden on multinational companies located in both countries, and ensure the same levels of cybersecurity.</p> +<p>The next U.S. presidential administration should develop a clear port infrastructure strategy to convey why a Global South port infrastructure presence is in the U.S. security interest. The strategy should focus on immediate concerns and a long-term vision for working with allies and becoming an effective competitor and alternative to Chinese investments. This strategy must be followed by a streamlined interagency approach throughout the whole government. Currently, U.S. government efforts on the matter are siloed, but the administration can fix this situation if it provides a clear strategy and elevates ports to a top priority. Consolidated interagency efforts will provide more focus and avoid redundant efforts.</p> -<p>There is currently a growing discussion in Japan on the potential requirement for critical infrastructure owners and operators across sectors to report significant cyber incidents. As this discussion continues, it will be necessary for Japan to investigate and analyze similar regulations in other countries, including the U.S. CIRCIA, to achieve greater effectiveness and alignment. Furthermore, as a voluntary guideline for critical infrastructure, it would be beneficial to crosswalk and map between a series of Japan’s guidelines and the U.S. CSF and CPGs. It would also be beneficial for both countries to develop and standardize basic principles with international partners, such as minimum baseline requirements that may be developed in the United States in the near future, as baseline requirements should not differ significantly across nations. It is also recommended that government procurement and certification requirements be standardized to reduce the administrative burden on companies in both countries. For example, although FedRAMP and ISMAP, certification programs for cloud services, are said to be equivalent to some extent, providers need to obtain certification separately from each. There is an opportunity to explore the possibility of mutual recognition.</p> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">The next U.S. presidential administration should develop a clear port infrastructure strategy to convey why a Global South port infrastructure presence is in the U.S. security interest.</code></em></strong></p> -<p>It would also be beneficial for both countries to further promote the adoption of the NIST CSF as a risk-based, standards-based, flexible, technology-neutral, and global consensus-based framework. Japan has a long history of international partners engaging in CSF development and implementation. The release of CSF 2.0 is an opportunity for the private sector to take the lead in the transition to the new version, the development of supplementary resources, the sharing of use cases and lessons learned, and the expansion of application to a wide range of organizations, including SMBs. These should continue to be promoted through cooperation with NIST and the National Cybersecurity Center of Excellence (NCCoE) community. The use of a common framework for cybersecurity risk management enables organizations in both countries to visualize risks and their management plans and communicate in a common language, facilitating discussions on operational collaboration. Furthermore, in recent years, the CSF has been frequently brought up in regulatory discussions, with a growing consensus that it should serve as a common foundation for all involved. Thus, the adoption of the CSF has become a crucial step in facilitating international regulatory harmonization as well.</p> +<p>The strategy should focus not on the hundreds of ports across the Global South but on the top 15–20 most strategic locations and then establish a U.S. strategy on how to better compete in each of those ports in the long run. The United States should then use all its available soft-power tools to establish a strong presence in those ports and the surrounding region.</p> -<p><em>Cooperate on specific technologies and services</em></p> +<h4 id="2-partner-with-allies-and-locals">2. Partner with Allies and Locals</h4> -<p>The United States and Japan have world-leading technological capabilities and much to gain from cooperating in specific technological areas. This paper does not address all of them, as its focus is on critical infrastructure protection, but briefly outlines some of the potential areas of cooperation.</p> +<p>The United States needs to develop a strategy and partnerships with allies to secure safe access to ports abroad while also ensuring allies have a stake in building new ports for the Global South (see annex). For example, in Rijeka, Croatia, the United States used diplomacy to sway Croatia to negotiate a contract with Maersk instead of a Chinese operator. Rijeka is strategically valuable because the U.S. military and NATO use the port to move equipment, and it provides access to central European markets.</p> -<ul> - <li>Internet routing security</li> -</ul> +<p>The United States should further rely on commercial diplomacy to engage in government-to-government trade assistance with foreign officials on behalf of U.S. companies’ interests. The Advocacy Center, part of the International Trade Administration, offers support to U.S. businesses to win foreign government procurements. The Transaction Advisory Fund (TAF), a function of the Infrastructure Transaction and Assistance Network (ITAN), launched in 2018, provides support to government agencies in the Indo-Pacific region, the Western Hemisphere, and sub-Saharan Africa for developing sustainable, transparent, and high-quality infrastructure. International legal funds like the TAF are vital in helping ministries negotiate transparent and fair contracts. TAF funding helped Myanmar renegotiate the Kyaukphyu port, a prime example of promoting transparency and quality in instances where the U.S. private sector does not offer a competitive alternative.</p> -<p>The internet is an inherently open and internationally interconnected infrastructure. In particular, routing security, which is currently a key area of focus, requires a collaborative approach involving multiple stakeholders internationally. The United States and Japan have a number of global leading providers of telecommunications, data centers, and cloud services. Many of these entities may have already implemented RPKI and other routing security measures in their infrastructure, but they could further influence the entire internet ecosystem, including SMBs and customer networks, by advocating their practices through the international community of internet operations. As the United States shifts its focus to a domestic regulatory approach, it would be highly beneficial for U.S. and Japanese operators to spearhead industry-led initiatives as a model for the community and to promote international stakeholder approaches.</p> +<h4 id="3-envision-new-tools-and-streamline-financing-for-port-infrastructure">3. Envision New Tools and Streamline Financing for Port Infrastructure</h4> -<ul> - <li>5G/O-RAN security</li> -</ul> +<p>Competing with China within the global port infrastructure does not mean owning, building, and financing every port. Instead, U.S. companies can become shareholders or board members at international ports. Alternatively, the United States can offer attractive deals that are not directly related to a port but within the same city, thereby providing more value to the municipal government. Other strategies for effectively competing with China’s influence in the region include buying land surrounding the ports, engaging the private sector, and financing alternative ports in the surrounding region.</p> -<p>The United States and Japan are in relatively similar positions with regard to the development and deployment of 5G networks using O-RAN, as there are no traditional wireless communications equipment vendors with a significant global market share, such as Nokia and Ericsson in Europe. In the international deployment of secure and reliable 5G networks, O-RAN security is a key area of focus and an opportunity for mutually beneficial collaboration between the United States and Japan. The O-RAN security report published by Quad states that networks using O-RAN do not fundamentally alter the security environment of wireless communication networks compared to conventional networks. Moving forward, it would be beneficial for the two countries to showcase their achievements in building secure networks by conducting joint tests focusing on cybersecurity in a phase closer to commercial implementation. This can be achieved through NTIA grant programs in which both Japanese and U.S. carriers participate, as well as test beds provided by carriers.</p> +<p>In this regard, U.S. corporations often hesitate to invest in ports because there is limited commercial return – unless the government can guarantee access to capital. This is where the U.S. government can step in. The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) can play a role in catalyzing private sector investment in critical infrastructure. The DFC and U.S. Export-Import Bank can also be valuable tools in countering China’s influence. For example, DFC agreed in November 2023 to fund Colombo West International Terminal Pvt. Ltd. (CWIT), a consortium of India’s largest port operator, Adani Ports and SEZ Ltd., for $553 million in Sri Lanka. In 2019, the United States and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam signed the Cooperation Framework to Strengthen Infrastructure Finance, aimed to support infrastructure development through market-oriented and private sector investment. The governments committed to remove regulatory, market, and legal barriers to private sector investment and prioritize development of financial instruments, project finance, the local debt market, capital markets, and analysis of government liabilities.</p> -<ul> - <li>Vulnerability scanning</li> -</ul> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) can play a role in catalyzing private sector investment in critical infrastructure. The DFC and U.S. Export-Import Bank can also be valuable tools in countering China’s influence.</code></em></strong></p> -<p>The NOTICE project, which has been in operation in Japan for over five years, extensively scans vulnerabilities in internet-facing IoT devices in Japan and encourages users to take corrective action. Meanwhile, CISA has been providing a Cyber Hygiene Vulnerability Scanning service since 2022 that scans vulnerabilities in internet-facing devices owned by registered companies and issues reports and alerts. There are similarities between the two programs. Through cooperation, both programs could provide insights on how to enhance their programs from various perspectives, including technical implementations and user outreach methods. Moreover, there could be an opportunity for collaboration in sharing services, tools, and resources of the programs.</p> +<p>The United States can increase the overall funding available for the private sector to invest in the space by pulling together resources within capital markets. The United States should incentivize IFIs and MDBs, such as the Inter-American Development Bank and the International Finance Corporation, to invest in Global South port projects, which will attract U.S. companies and other private sector engagement. Teaming up with other countries will allow the United States to pool funding through a consortium focused specifically on Global South ports.</p> -<ul> - <li>Space system security</li> -</ul> +<h4 id="4-establish-procurement-best-practices">4. Establish Procurement Best Practices</h4> -<p>While space systems have not been designated as critical infrastructure in either country, it is clear that space has already become a strategic domain for both commercial and military use. While there is a growing concern about the cybersecurity of space systems, including from a national security perspective, both countries are still in the early stages of addressing the specific risk. In the United States, CISA, the NSC, and the National Space Council are taking the lead in studying minimum cybersecurity requirements for space systems. CISA, in cooperation with the private sector, recently released a paper outlining recommendations for space system operators. In Japan, METI has published cybersecurity guidelines for commercial space systems. As this is a new and evolving area, there may be an opportunity for the two countries to cooperate in assessing space-specific threats and risks and developing a risk management plan. In January 2023, the United States and Japan signed a framework agreement on comprehensive space cooperation. It would be worthwhile for both countries to prioritize cybersecurity as a key area of cooperation in anticipation of the potential designation of space systems as critical infrastructure in the future.</p> +<p>The United States should strive to promote transparency in global port infrastructure procurement. The rule of law, transparency, public engagement, and better awareness about how to govern ports will inform the public and ensure ports follow best practices. The United States and its allies can establish a market standard by picking 10–15 ports and reforming them thoroughly. For example, most economic coercion comes out of port terminal operating contracts and procurement. After reforming a select group of ports, companies will be more interested in operating in the ports that are more transparent.</p> -<ul> - <li>Post-quantum cryptography</li> -</ul> +<p>China is quick with financing port construction and maintenance, but its BRI contracts lack transparency and impose questionable and opaque confidentiality clauses that are predatory in nature. In a report analyzing 100 debt contracts between China and foreign governments, 100 percent of China Development Bank contracts and 43 percent of contracts held by the Export-Import Bank of China required such clauses. Unfortunately, the U.S.-led multilateral lending process does not offer attractive counteroffers, as they tend to be less user friendly and have more rigorous vetting requirements and standards for bankability, leaving developing countries vulnerable to using China as a lender of last resort.</p> -<p>Cryptography is a foundational technology for ensuring the confidentiality and integrity of data. It is a critical element of cybersecurity. The release of post-quantum cryptography (PQC) standards by NIST this year further accelerates global efforts around PQC migration. In the United States, the goal is to complete the migration in federal agencies by 2035, as outlined in NSM-10 and a subsequent OMB directive. During the long-term transition, it is essential to ensure connectivity and interoperability between organizations and systems, as there will be a mixed environment of systems with both existing and PQC algorithms. This is also true for the Japan-U.S. alliance. There is an opportunity for both governments to collaborate on coordinating migration road maps for government agencies and critical infrastructure and aligning their efforts on deployment to ensure cybersecurity and interoperability of the digital infrastructure and operational environment on which both countries depend. Moreover, Japanese companies could further contribute to the advancement of international PQC migration initiatives by actively engaging with relevant communities, such as the NCCoE’s project, where they can share best practices and develop guidance on PQC migration.</p> +<p>The U.S. government could use platforms such as the Customs Trade Partnership against Terrorism to enable the private sector to share information on unfair practices with governments suffering from predatory circumstances. The Department of Justice could offer technical legal assistance to foreign countries to help litigate such matters. The United States helped the Congolese mining company Gécamines reach a settlement with a Chinese mining company over royalties owed over a copper and cobalt mine.</p> -<h3 id="conclusion">Conclusion</h3> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Unfortunately, the U.S.-led multilateral lending process does not offer attractive counteroffers, as they tend to be less user friendly and have more rigorous vetting requirements and standards for bankability, leaving developing countries vulnerable to using China as a lender of last resort.</code></em></strong></p> -<p>The Japan-U.S. alliance is more important than ever in light of the growing geopolitical tensions in the Indo-Pacific region. Much of today’s alliance activities are based on cyberspace, with critical infrastructure for which both countries rely on each other being a central element. Given the shared significant threat to critical infrastructure posed by state-sponsored actors, it is imperative for the two countries to cooperate in critical infrastructure protection to ensure the cybersecurity and resilience of the alliance as a whole and demonstrate their robust solidarity against foreign adversaries.</p> +<p>Furthermore, the role of investigative journalists is crucial in exposing corruption within the ports sector. The market does not have the best reputation, and it is important to expose collusion, human trafficking, and monopoly. Also, the United States can support public financial management education within the governments that oversee port infrastructure so they can identify deals that are too good to be true.</p> -<p>While there are a number of policy cooperation agendas between the two countries at various levels and entities, including critical infrastructure protection, there is still room for improvement in implementing concrete and tangible operational collaboration. It is crucial for both countries to further expand and operationalize these efforts with speed and scale while ensuring further involvement of critical infrastructure owners and operators. There are several potential avenues for collaboration, including engaging in national and alliance-level risk analysis, conducting cross-sector public-private joint cyber exercises, expanding the public-private operational collaboration environment, deepening sector-to-sector collaboration, enhancing coordinated operations to disrupt threat actors, harmonizing cybersecurity processes, and cooperating in specific technologies and services. To facilitate these specific operational collaborations efficiently, it is also important for all parties involved in Japan-U.S. cybersecurity cooperation to have a comprehensive understanding of both countries’ highly decentralized and complicated cybersecurity structures and their roles, responsibilities, and authorities.</p> +<h4 id="5-provide-cutting-edge-technology">5. Provide Cutting-Edge Technology</h4> -<p>Japan and the United States are currently at a pivotal point in their national cybersecurity policies, with key national security and cybersecurity strategies and legislation being implemented. Taking these evolutions as an opportunity, it is the right time to reassess the current state of Japan-U.S. cybersecurity cooperation and explore ways forward for further collaboration.</p> +<p>The maritime sector is dangerously reliant on the PRC for equipment and technology. The U.S. Select Committee on the Chinese Communist Party released an investigative report that showed extreme vulnerabilities in ZPMC crane control systems produced in the PRC, software used at U.S. maritime facilities, and other maritime infrastructure components. The United States has a competitive advantage over China in advanced technology, such as within the green energy transition, that can be applied within the port infrastructure space. If the United States can transform a port through technology that improves efficiency and saves on transaction costs, then it can offer something China cannot. The United States’ advantage over China should be its ability to compete for better maintenance and product quality.</p> <hr /> -<p><strong>Taro Hashimoto</strong> is a visiting fellow with the Japan Chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C. He has been with Nippon Telegraph and Telephone (NTT) Group for over 15 years, where he has held various roles in cybersecurity and telecommunication businesses, including service planning, development and operation, research and development, corporate risk management, and human resource development from both technology and management perspectives.</p>Taro HashimotoCybersecurity is the foundation for a robust U.S.-Japan alliance. This report analyzes the cybersecurity policies of both countries and the prospects for future collaboration on critical infrastructure cybersecurity and resilience.Trusted Chips2024-10-24T12:00:00+08:002024-10-24T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/trusted-chips<p><em>A quest for “trusted chips” risks sidetracking crucial semiconductor policy solutions. Aligned policy goals are needed to truly secure and de-risk supply chains, balancing national security, economic viability, and technological feasibility.</em></p> +<p><strong>Daniel F. Runde</strong> is a senior vice president, director of the Project on Prosperity and Development, and holds the William A. Schreyer Chair in Global Analysis at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C.</p> + +<p><strong>Austin Hardman</strong> is a research assistant for the Project on Prosperity and Development at CSIS.</p> + +<p><strong>Clara Bonin</strong> is a former intern for the Project on Prosperity and Development at CSIS.</p>Daniel F. Runde, et al.Port infrastructure is an investment area where China is outpacing the United States. A strategy to counter China’s influence in Global South ports is an important piece of a larger program to enable a better offer to the Global South.AI Safety Institute Network2024-10-30T12:00:00+08:002024-10-30T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/ai-safety-institute-network<p><em>The AI Seoul Summit launched an international network of AI safety institutes in May 2024. Now, they must work to define their goals, mechanisms, and the strategy to accelerate AI safety science.</em></p> <excerpt /> -<h3 id="introduction">Introduction</h3> +<h3 id="overview">OVERVIEW</h3> -<p>The United States and its allies have taken significant actions to promote the de-risking of semiconductor supply chains. Protecting and controlling these supply chains also remain critical components of national and economic security discussions. To achieve this holistically, several sometimes-conflicting goals need to be met:</p> +<p>On November 21 and 22, 2024, technical artificial intelligence (AI) experts from nine countries and the European Union will meet for the first time in San Francisco. The agenda: starting the next phase of international cooperation on AI safety science through a network of AI safety institutes (AISIs). The United States, United Kingdom, European Union, Japan, Singapore, South Korea, Canada, France, Kenya, and Australia make up the initial members of the network, which was first launched by U.S. secretary of commerce Gina Raimondo at the May 2024 AI Seoul Summit. At the time of the launch, Italy and Germany were also potential members of the network, as signatories to the Seoul Statement of Intent toward International Cooperation on AI Safety Science, or Seoul Statement, the network’s founding document. However, a September announcement by Raimondo and U.S. secretary of state Antony Blinken confirmed that Kenya would instead be the final member of the AISI International Network at this stage.</p> -<ol> - <li> - <p>Critical technologies and products need to be controlled.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Export control sanctions must be enforced.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Sensitive information must be safeguarded against attacks through compromised chips.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Overreliance on nonmarket actors must be avoided.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>A competitive, commercially viable semiconductor supply must be ensured.</p> - </li> -</ol> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">On November 21 and 22, 2024, technical artificial intelligence (AI) experts from nine countries and the European Union will meet for the first time in San Francisco. The agenda: starting the next phase of international cooperation on AI safety science through a network of AI safety institutes (AISIs).</code></em></strong></p> -<p>Many of these policy goals have been recently subsumed under a general call for “trusted” or “trustworthy” chips. In reality, the goals are varied and complex, and trade-offs are unavoidable. For example, adding security features will increase costs and might not be technically feasible for most semiconductors.</p> +<p>According to the Seoul Statement, the international network will serve to “accelerate the advancement of the science of AI safety” at a global level by promoting “complementarity and interoperability” between institutes and fostering a “common international understanding” of AI safety approaches. While the statement does not define specific goals or mechanisms for AISI collaboration, it suggests that they “may include” coordinating research, sharing resources and relevant information, developing best practices, and exchanging or codeveloping AI model evaluations. Now, in the months following the AI Seoul Summit, AISI network members must begin to articulate the objectives, deliverables, timelines, and avenues for cooperation that will put the promise of AISI cooperation into action.</p> -<p>Without specific, clearly defined, and aligned policy goals – along with an appreciation of the technological boundary conditions and an understanding of the economic impacts along the supply chain – the discussions among the United States and its allies are unlikely to yield meaningful results. “Trusted chips” will continue to mean different things to different stakeholders, detracting from solving the underlying issues.</p> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">In the months following the AI Seoul Summit, AISI network members must begin to articulate the objectives, deliverables, timelines, and avenues for cooperation that will put the promise of AISI cooperation into action.</code></em></strong></p> -<p>This white paper offers three recommendations for policymakers to address pertinent questions about the semiconductor supply chain:</p> +<p>This paper examines next steps for developing the International Network of AI Safety Institutes from the Seoul Statement. It provides recommendations to members ahead of the inaugural network meeting in San Francisco this November and the AI Action Summit in Paris in February 2025. These recommendations fall in line with three key questions:</p> <ol> <li> - <p>Align on specific policy objectives rather than definitions.</p> + <p><strong>Goals of collaboration: What is the AISI network trying to achieve and when?</strong></p> + + <p>While there are many potential benefits to international collaboration, there are also real costs that should not be ignored. At a minimum, collaboration demands staff time, capacity, and possibly money from partners. The AISI network should therefore have clear goals for which type of international cooperation between safety institutes offers the maximum return on investment. These goals should be supported by specific priorities, deliverables, and timelines that steer the network’s efforts toward a meaningful return on investment.</p> </li> <li> - <p>Use, refine, and align existing policy tools devised for specific objectives.</p> + <p><strong>Mechanisms of collaboration: What will the AISI network do and how will it work?</strong></p> + + <p>The success of the network depends on how effectively its members can act upon shared goals. There are many different ways for the members to “collaborate,” and not all of them are equally attractive. Network members should consider what the mechanisms of collaboration will be — for example, leadership structures, research exchanges, shared platforms, and annual conferences.</p> </li> <li> - <p>Enable and seek industry involvement to ensure commercial viability and promote fast adoption.</p> + <p><strong>International strategy: How will the AISI network fit into and engage with other international AI efforts?</strong></p> + + <p>The AI governance landscape is increasingly crowded with international initiatives, including from the Group of Seven (G7), the United Nations, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the Global Partnership on AI (GPAI), the International Organization for Standardization (ISO), and more. All of these demand time from a small (though growing) community of government staff from member countries who can credibly claim to have some expertise on AI governance and safety issues. AISI network members should be able to articulate how their grouping is different from these preexisting initiatives, how it will effectively engage with them (or not), and for what purpose.</p> </li> </ol> -<h3 id="mapping-wide-ranging-policy-objectives-onto-a-trusted-chip-concept-will-fail">Mapping Wide-Ranging Policy Objectives onto a “Trusted Chip” Concept Will Fail</h3> +<p>This paper begins with background on the AISI network and explains its importance. Next, it offers an overview of network members’ organizations and stated functions. It concludes with recommendations regarding nine further questions for developing the goals, collaboration mechanisms, and international strategy of the network.</p> -<p>Security typically deals with technical controls and processes, whereas trust is a social concept that goes a step further: It is fundamentally about relationship dynamics and the expectations that come with them.</p> +<h3 id="background">BACKGROUND</h3> -<p>The term “trusted chip” thus sets a high bar. It might imply, for example, the confidence that the semiconductor will perform according to its specifications under all conditions and be free of unintended defects or malicious manipulation. It could also signal awareness or control over the product’s provenance – transparency about the chip’s exact supply chain, or at least certainty that critical steps in the supply chain took place outside the control of adversaries.</p> +<h4 id="what-is-ai-safety-and-why-does-it-matter">What Is AI Safety and Why Does It Matter?</h4> -<p>Among semiconductor industry experts, the term “trust” historically means one of two narrowly defined concepts:</p> +<p>As defined by the Bletchley Declaration, issued by attendees of the UK AI Safety Summit in November 2023, AI safety is a scientific field of research focused on evaluating, preventing, and mitigating risks from advanced AI systems. In this case, it refers narrowly to AI systems at or beyond the current state of the art. These risks can range from deepfakes to the use of AI for bioterrorism; new risks will emerge as AI’s capabilities continue to evolve. Somewhat confusingly, other individuals and organizations may define AI safety more broadly to include lower-performing systems that are not operating at the technical frontier. Still others may or may not include issues around ethics and bias when using the term “AI safety.” This paper’s use of the term “AI safety” follows the U.S. AI Safety Institute’s example of focusing exclusively on safety issues related to advanced AI systems.</p> -<blockquote> - <h4 id="trusted-microcontrollers">Trusted Microcontrollers</h4> -</blockquote> +<p>AI safety science can be split into two main streams of research: technical safety, or improving the internal “machinery” of AI models; and process-based safety, or improving how people build, develop, and interact with AI models.</p> -<blockquote> - <p>A dedicated microcontroller (MCU), or parts of an MCU designed to secure hardware through integrated cryptographic features, is called a Trusted Platform Module (TPM). TPMs have proliferated from sensitive defense or government applications to high-volume consumer devices such as personal computers and mobile phones. An ISO/IEC 11889 standard was published in 2009. Trusted MCUs are instrumental in achieving high system-level cybersecurity standards, such as those called for by the U.S. Cybersecurity Label for consumer and Internet of Things devices or the European Union’s Cyber Resilience Act.</p> -</blockquote> +<p>Technical AI safety focuses on understanding how the engineering and science behind AI models works, and how to make models perform reliably and in the scope of their intended use cases. These three areas of research are known as:</p> -<blockquote> - <h4 id="trusted-supply-chains">Trusted Supply Chains</h4> -</blockquote> +<ul> + <li> + <p><strong>Assurance:</strong> Understanding how a model makes decisions and why it behaves the way it does</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Robustness:</strong> Ensuring a model operates reliably under adverse contexts</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Specification:</strong> Designing a model that produces desired results as intended.</p> + </li> +</ul> -<blockquote> - <p>In 2003, the U.S. Department of Defense initiated a Trusted Foundry Program, now part of the Defense Microelectronics Activity (DMEA)’s Trusted Supplier Program. As of early 2024, 16 out of 82 accredited trusted suppliers were also accredited for semiconductor foundry services, to provide services for advanced and foundational chips. The program is tailored to critical but less cost-sensitive defense and national security applications.</p> -</blockquote> +<p>Meanwhile, process-based safety is concerned with the policies, practices, and procedures that surround AI. This stream of AI safety is more operational in nature. It focuses on how frontier AI developers, deployers, and users build, manage, and monitor AI models, including by evaluating models for capabilities, limitations, and risks, and documenting and reporting model information. It may also include processes that are implemented by the users of AI.</p> -<p>The two concepts can be applied simultaneously. However, while the latter can be applied to all semiconductors, the former is limited to a specific product category.</p> +<p>Beyond preventing adverse risks, AI safety serves to accelerate adoption and innovation by building public trust. As Elizabeth Kelly, director of the U.S. AI Safety Institute, said in a CSIS interview, “safety promotes trust, which promotes adoption, which drives innovation.” AI safety boosts public trust by allowing people to pause, stop, or change course as needed.</p> -<p>There are more recent attempts to broaden the concept of trusted semiconductors. Examples can be found in the 2023 European Chips Act, which advocates for “trusted, secure and green chips.” However, a clear definition remains elusive.</p> +<p>A helpful analogy, one frequently used in the risk management sector, compares AI safety capabilities with the brakes on a car. At first consideration, the purpose of brakes seems obvious and narrow: to make the car go slower. However, the existence of brakes also allows cars to go faster. As a thought experiment, imagine how fast drivers would be willing to go if no car came equipped with any brakes. How easy would it be to avoid a crash or turn a corner if drivers could never change their speed? How might one pause to change tires or fix a problem? Navigating such scenarios would almost certainly be a disaster. Even with speed limit regulations in place, a world without brakes would be a world in which drivers went much, much slower.</p> -<p>In the context of controlling access to the most advanced artificial intelligence (AI) hardware, secure and governable AI chips have been proposed, expanding on the concept of trusted MCUs.</p> +<p>Policymakers should approach AI safety with this parallel in mind. Like the brakes of a car, building technical and management capabilities for AI can help boost confidence in the technology and ultimately accelerate the pace of adoption and innovation.</p> -<p>Some policymakers even proposed the concept of trusted semiconductors as a trade remedy – that is, restricting access to U.S. and allied markets to trade with trusted chips. Lastly, it has been suggested that trusted chips could aid in verifying export control compliance.</p> +<h4 id="what-are-ai-safety-institutes-and-what-will-they-do">What Are AI Safety Institutes and What Will They Do?</h4> -<p>This short overview illustrates how the concept of trust, broadly applied to semiconductor markets, glosses over crucial details: Should it apply to all chips or only some? Should it benefit broad consumer markets or defense contractors? Do the costs of implementing a technical solution matter or not? Mapping wide-ranging policy objectives – such as export control, supply risk mitigation, trade policy, cybersecurity, and integrity of critical microelectronic systems – onto the “trust” concept is bound to fail. Worse, it will distract from meaningful discussions.</p> +<p>Since 2023, governments around the world have mobilized around AI’s rapidly growing capabilities and potential risks. As part of this effort, several governments have launched AI safety institutes, publicly funded research institutions focused on mitigating risks from the frontier of AI development. AISIs provide governments with in-house technical expertise and organizational capacity to evaluate and monitor cutting-edge AI models for risks to public and national security.</p> -<h3 id="answering-four-questions-can-structure-and-focus-the-discussion">Answering Four Questions Can Structure and Focus the Discussion</h3> +<p>AISIs have been tasked by governments with a wide-ranging mandate to address the complex challenges posed by advanced AI systems. They will perform foundational technical research, develop guidance for the public and private sectors, and work closely with companies to test models before deployment. While it is unusual for a single government entity to tackle all three of these functions at once, the breakneck speed of AI development and the staggering number of open questions in the field of AI safety research mean that governments require in-house capacity on each of them. According to Kelly, it is important that these three functions — research, testing, and guidance — reinforce each other to form a “virtuous” cycle (Figure 1):</p> -<p>Policy solutions to guide semiconductor export control, supply risk mitigation, trade policy, and cybersecurity are nevertheless pertinent. They need to be coupled with an appreciation for technological feasibility and private sector commercial incentives.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/U1n4i1Y.png" alt="image01" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 1: AISI Core Functions.</strong> Source: <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/us-vision-ai-safety-conversation-elizabeth-kelly-director-us-ai-safety-institute">“The U.S. Vision for AI Safety: A Conversation with Elizabeth Kelly, Director of the U.S. AI Safety Institute,” CSIS, July 31, 2024</a>; and <a href="https://www.nist.gov/system/files/documents/2024/05/21/AISI-vision-21May2024.pdf">“The United States Artificial Intelligence Safety Institute: Vision, Mission, and Strategic Goals,” U.S. Artificial Intelligence Safety Institute, May 21, 2024</a>.</em></p> -<p>Answering four questions will help to structure and focus the discussion (Figure 1).</p> +<p>To keep pace with the cutting edge of AI safety research, AISIs have prioritized the hiring of technical staff and opened offices in cities with deep pools of AI talent like San Francisco. In addition to developing expertise internally, AISIs aim to cultivate a robust ecosystem of AI safety researchers in labs, industry, and academia through their guidance on best-in-class evaluation methods.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/AcVHFqr.png" alt="image01" /> -<em>▲ Figure 1: Option Space for Key Semiconductor Policy Questions</em></p> +<p>AISIs are engaging a wide range of stakeholders on each of their core functions. Far from fearing the launch of AISIs worldwide, firms and universities engaged in advanced AI have called for governments to increase their capacity to perform AI research, conduct testing, and issue guidance. Earlier this year, top U.S. AI companies such as Google, Microsoft, Anthropic, and Amazon joined the U.S. AISI Consortium (AISIC) as part of its inaugural cohort of members. AISIC is composed of over 200 organizations from across the private sector, academia, civil society, and government and facilitates collaboration on AI safety research and evaluations. Members are expected to contribute to one of nine key areas of guidance, reproduced verbatim below:</p> <ol> <li> - <p><strong>Which semiconductors should be covered?</strong> MCUs and microprocessors (MPUs) allow, in principle, the implementation of on-chip security features to establish trust, traceability, and, potentially, governance features. However, MCUs and MPUs combined cover less than 15 percent of the semiconductor market. On-chip security features are not technically feasible for much of the remaining 85 percent (e.g., sensors, power semiconductors, other discrete semiconductors). These devices lack the compute and memory capabilities to execute trust functionality.</p> - - <p>A unique, tamper-proof, chip-level identification for all semiconductors would be commercially prohibitive in most cases. Printing a unique marker on every semiconductor’s packaging would be cheaper, but it would still need to be backed by an industry-wide global database to detect misuse reliably.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Which systems should be covered?</strong> Critical applications – such as military command, control, communications, and computing equipment – require the highest technical level of device security and supply chain provenance. Additionally, the export of these application-specific or dual-use chips to adversaries often needs to be controlled. At the same time, the universe of parties that are affected by stringent requirements is relatively small: government agencies or prime contractors as buyers and a small number of accredited suppliers. Their willingness to shoulder the additional compliance and risk mitigation costs is high.</p> - - <p>Another example involves high-volume consumer devices, which can indeed provide a high level of trust. For instance, a laptop or mobile phone must protect personal information and securely execute payment transactions. While this can be achieved with on-chip hardware security (available to retail consumers as aftermarket products for less than $30), full end-to-end control of a mobile phone or laptop supply chain is not commercially viable. For instance, one major U.S. consumer electronics company’s supplier list includes 200 suppliers with 600 sites at locations across the globe.</p> - - <p>Basic connected consumer devices often fall short of any digital security standards, something the EU Cyber Resilience Act and the S. Cybersecurity Label seek to address.</p> + <p>Develop new guidelines, tools, methods, protocols, and best practices to facilitate the evolution of industry standards for developing or deploying AI in safe, secure, and trustworthy ways</p> </li> <li> - <p><strong>What are the policy requirements?</strong> After deciding which parts of the semiconductor market and which systems should be covered, policymakers need to agree on who or what they are trying to protect and what degree of certainty constitutes success in achieving their goals.</p> - - <p>At the level of a single chip or microelectronic system, policy goals might include the control of exports and protecting the system (or data) from unauthorized access or manipulation. Alternatively, labeling trusted semiconductors could serve as a trade action in disguise to restrict imports from suppliers or countries engaging in nonmarket state practices and policies.</p> - - <p>At the level of the entire supply chain, policy goals may include the reliable supply of commercial semiconductor goods and supply chain transparency. In the case of the U.S. Department of Defense’s Trusted Supplier Program, the goal is very tight control over every step of the semiconductor supply chain.</p> - - <p>Along with these requirements come different definitions of what constitutes success. Trade remedies might be considered successful at the 80 percent level, an export control agency might be satisfied with 95 percent compliance, and defense-critical applications could demand an even higher level of confidence in the integrity of the respective semiconductor supply.</p> + <p>Develop guidance and benchmarks for identifying and evaluating AI capabilities, with a focus on capabilities that could potentially cause harm</p> </li> <li> - <p><strong>Is the solution commercially viable?</strong> If governments procure trusted chips for critical applications, they can set the economic incentives directly and compensate suppliers for the costs of manufacturing and controlled supply chains. Suppliers can price in the opportunity cost of export controls, that is, the fact that application-specific products cannot be sold in certain markets.</p> - - <p>The economics will play out very differently in the case of high-volume consumer applications, where end customers may or may not be willing to pay a premium for security or availability. In those scenarios, governments must work closely with industry and gradually influence economic incentives to steer commercial actors toward policy goals.</p> - - <p>Answering these questions theoretically results in a large number of different scenarios. However, these scenarios can be distilled into a limited number of practical policy challenges – and the tools to address those challenges are often already available. Policymakers should focus on refining these tools and achieving better alignment among allies regarding their use.</p> + <p>Develop approaches to incorporate secure-development practices for generative AI, including special considerations for dual-use foundation models, including:</p> </li> </ol> -<h3 id="solve-practical-policy-challenges-instead-of-an-overarching-definition">Solve Practical Policy Challenges Instead of an Overarching Definition</h3> - -<p>In reality, solving practical policy challenges is less complex. Semiconductor devices date back to 1947, as do the challenges to safeguard the technology, protect critical electronic systems and sensitive information from unreliable or malicious chips, and ensure a commercially viable supply of semiconductors. Even the risks of overreliance and state-subsidized industrial production are not new – although the scale of this risk might well be.</p> - <ul> <li> - <p><strong>Critical Electronic Systems:</strong> For national security reasons, the United States and its allies have long controlled the semiconductor supply chain for critical electronic systems, such as those used in defense applications. This may involve both hardware and supply chain solutions. Given the sensitive nature of the applications, tools like DMEA’s Trusted Supplier Program are typically deployed on a national level. In addition to whitelisting trustworthy suppliers, blacklisting certain entities is an effective option with a strong forward-signaling impact. Examples include the EU toolbox for 5G security (though deployed with varying urgency among member states) and the more targeted Section 5949 of the U.S. National Defense Authorization Act of 2023.</p> - - <p>Commercial viability can typically be achieved due to the limited scope of applications, semiconductor volumes, and involved parties.</p> + <p>Guidance related to assessing and managing the safety, security, and trustworthiness of models and related to privacy-preserving machine learning</p> </li> <li> - <p><strong>Cybersecurity of Electronic (Sub-)Systems:</strong> This is another area where technical and commercially viable solutions either already exist (e.g., ISO/IEC 11889 for secure crypto-processors, ISO/SAE 21434 for automotive cybersecurity) or are being implemented (e.g., the S. Cybersecurity Label and the EU Cyber Resilience Act). More recently, the U.S. government proposed a rule to secure information and communications technology for connected vehicles. The rule would regulate hardware “designed, developed, manufactured, or supplied by a person owned by, controlled by . . . the PRC or Russia.” Effectively, a concept of “non-trusted” semiconductors is being established, though without explicitly calling it that.</p> - - <p>Therefore, policy and commercial solutions are available or have been proposed for these use cases.</p> + <p>Guidance to ensure the availability of testing environments</p> </li> +</ul> + +<ol> <li> - <p><strong>Export Controls:</strong> Limiting the export of certain types of semiconductors, their underlying technology, and manufacturing equipment is an established practice for the United States and its allies. New frameworks might be needed to address shortcomings of existing multilateral export control regimes. Still, in the meantime, multilateral, case-by-case agreements have been successfully achieved (e.g., the United States, Japan, and the Netherlands reaching a deal to curb chipmaking exports to China). Enforcing export controls for advanced AI MPUs is challenging, and stopping the illicit flow of legacy semiconductors to Russia is even harder. Solutions have been proposed to improve export control compliance, but introducing the concept of trusted MCUs or trusted supply chains is not among them. Export control is not an inbound issue – ensuring the United States and its allies get trusted products – but an outbound issue – ensuring adversaries do not obtain them.</p> + <p>Develop and ensure the availability of testing environments</p> </li> <li> - <p><strong>Supply Chain Provenance Law:</strong> Various supply chain provenance requirements have been introduced in recent years. Examples include the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act and the Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive. In response to these requirements, companies – including semiconductor manufacturers – are implementing rigorous supply chain monitoring and verification systems, which, by definition, will apply to all their products. Introducing a “trusted chip” certification based on a geography- or entity-specific listing would be possible and might – considering the forward-signaling effect of various U.S. rulemaking proposals – already be expected by industry participants. Policymakers, however, need to carefully weigh the additional reporting burden on the industry against national and economic security goals.</p> + <p>Develop guidance, methods, skills, and practices for successful red-teaming and privacy-preserving machine learning</p> </li> <li> - <p><strong>Trade Remedies:</strong> There is mounting concern that Chinese industrial policy, including in the semiconductor market, supports domestic firms that do not operate according to market principles. The United States and its allies can use tools – principally tariffs – to counter nonmarket policies and practices. However, these remedies often amount to too little, too late, especially if lengthy negotiations among allies precede them. Moreover, tariffs are applied to the end product entering a market – such as a computer, mobile phone, or industrial machinery control system. Relatively few chips enter the U.S. and allied markets as components; instead, they are part of a microelectronic system (which is predominantly assembled in Asia). In those cases, the amount of the subsidy on the chip is a very small percentage of the total value of the end product and thus not much of a deterrent. Other, more targeted, entity-based policies might be more effective in countering the threat of overreliance, but such discussions are beyond the scope of this paper. Suffice it to say that introducing a “trusted chip buyers alliance” to exclude countries of concern from allied markets broadly would face significant legal and practical hurdles, in addition to the abovementioned technical and commercial challenges of providing supply chain provenance.</p> + <p>Develop guidance and tools for authenticating digital content</p> </li> -</ul> - -<h3 id="policy-recommendations">Policy Recommendations</h3> - -<p>Each of the above challenges must be addressed with specific policy solutions. Some, like secure MCUs, are specific to the semiconductor industry. Others, such as export controls or transparency and certification of supply chains, extend beyond semiconductors. It is beyond the scope of this paper to make recommendations for each of them. As it pertains to the discussion about “trusted” or “trustworthy” chips, this paper offers the following recommendations to policymakers:</p> - -<ul> <li> - <p><strong>Align on specific policy objectives rather than definitions.</strong> Acknowledging that challenges, tools, and policy prerogatives may differ, aligning on clear, specific policy goals is important. A shared understanding is key to enabling problem-specific solutions. Often, the implementation will have to be country-specific, but integrated and aligned measures are needed to avoid negative spillover effects or loopholes. This is easier to achieve for discrete policy challenges than for a broad concept like “trusted chips.”</p> + <p>Develop guidance and criteria for AI workforce skills, including risk identification and management; test, evaluation, validation, and verification (TEVV); and domain-specific expertise</p> </li> <li> - <p><strong>Use, refine, and align existing policy tools devised for specific objectives.</strong> Rules and tools already exist to address many of the current technical and geopolitical challenges facing the semiconductor industry. Policymakers should focus on jointly deploying these tools toward a common goal and augmenting national tool kits where there are gaps.</p> + <p>Explore the complexities at the intersection of society and technology, including the science of how humans make sense of and engage with AI in different contexts</p> </li> <li> - <p><strong>Enable and seek industry involvement to ensure commercial viability and promote fast adoption.</strong> An innovative and competitive semiconductor ecosystem is essential for the United States and its allies. Implementing both “promote” and “protect” policies through regular exchanges with industry representatives is key. Moreover, industry compliance with those policies is crucial for their effectiveness.</p> + <p>Develop guidance for understanding and managing the interdependencies between and among AI actors along the lifecycle.</p> </li> -</ul> - -<hr /> +</ol> -<p><strong>Andreas Schumacher</strong> is a visiting technology fellow in the Economic Security and Technology Department and the Scholl Chair in International Business at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.</p>Andreas SchumacherA quest for “trusted chips” risks sidetracking crucial semiconductor policy solutions. Aligned policy goals are needed to truly secure and de-risk supply chains, balancing national security, economic viability, and technological feasibility.NATO’s Airborne EW2024-10-24T12:00:00+08:002024-10-24T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/natos-airborne-electromagnetic-warfare<p><em>Long overlooked in mainstream defence circles as a “niche” capability reserved for deep specialists, airborne electronic warfare capabilities are an increasingly essential component in NATO’s ability to deter and defeat Russian aggression in Europe.</em></p> +<p>Note that while these nine areas of guidance overlap with the nine core functions of an AI safety institute identified in Section 4 of this paper, they do not cover the full breadth of AISIs’ operations. As Section 4 will discuss, AISIs perform functions such as forming consortia of AI researchers, stakeholders, and experts and promoting the international adoption of AI safety guidelines that are outside the scope of the AISIC.</p> -<excerpt /> +<p>In August, OpenAI chief executive officer Sam Altman stated that his company has been working closely with the U.S. AISI on an agreement to provide early access to its next foundation model for safety testing and evaluations. OpenAI is not alone in providing the U.S. AISI access to its models for testing. Director Kelly said that the institute has “commitments from all of the leading frontier model developers to work with them on these tests.” These commitments demonstrate that leading companies understand the need for AI safety research and recognize the important role that the U.S. AISI has to play. While critics have questioned how industry will balance competition and safety, AISIs are free from the financial self-interest which has caused some to question the adequacy of private AI safety efforts in the past.</p> -<p>As the UK and other European NATO members attempt to adapt their air forces to better meet the threat of wider Russian military aggression in the coming years, airborne electromagnetic warfare (EW) is a key area where non-US capabilities are in worryingly short supply across the Alliance. Investment in European airborne electromagnetic attack (EA) can, if done correctly, offer rapid increases in the survivability and lethality of existing air force aircraft and weapon systems. By the same token, however, significant expansion of capacity in Europe to rapidly update EW mission data is also essential in order to maintain current air capabilities in the face of an increasingly rapid pace of Russian radar and EW system adaptation – in part driven by the pressures Russia faces in its war against Ukraine.</p> +<p>On October 21, top AI developers including Amazon, Meta, Microsoft, and OpenAI signed a letter to Congress calling on lawmakers to authorize the U.S. AISI before the end of the year. The letter, which was led by Americans for Responsible Innovation and the Information Technology Industry Council (ITI), states that “[a]s other nations around the world are establishing their own AI Safety Institutes, furthering NIST’s ongoing efforts is essential to advancing U.S. AI innovation, leadership, and national security.” “Authorizing legislation, and the accompanying necessary resources,” it argues, “will give much needed certainty to NIST’s role in AI safety and reliability.”</p> -<p>Airborne EW capabilities play several key roles in high-intensity air operations, and are especially important for the vital suppression and destruction of enemy air defences (SEAD/DEAD) mission set. The first role is defensive electronic countermeasures (ECM), where aircraft employ directed jamming effects to try to degrade and break the lock of either the radar of a hostile aircraft or surface-to-air missile system that is targeting them. The second role is offensive stand-off escort jamming, where specialised aircraft with high-powered jamming arrays either mounted in the airframe or in underwing pods degrade hostile airborne and ground-based radar threats from much further back. This enables them to significantly increase the survivability of other attack aircraft or weapons in a strike package that is closer to the threat. The third role is offensive stand-in jamming, where stealth aircraft or advanced decoys, missiles or UAVs conduct suppressive jamming on specific high-priority threat systems from comparatively close range. This is done to provide a temporary window of access for other aircraft or weapons to get through to targets in the area.</p> +<p>The letter echoes similar calls for Congress to authorize the AISI by Scale AI Founder and CEO Alexandr Wang earlier in October, as well as a letter from top AI companies to establish the AISI on a statutory basis in July. The July letter, also published by Americans for Responsible Innovation and ITI, argues that authorizing the AISI “provides a venue to convene the leading experts across industry and government to contribute to the development of voluntary standards that ultimately assist in de-risking adoption of AI technologies.” It’s not just the biggest companies that stand to benefit from the U.S. AISI — crucially, the letter argued that the institute may level the playing field for enterprises that use or develop AI but are unable to perform robust testing and evaluation in-house due to their size or the technical ability of their staff.</p> -<h3 id="dependency-on-the-us">Dependency on the US</h3> +<p>While the concept of a government organization that works closely with AI companies on safety is still new, history shows that this kind of arrangement between government and industry can be highly successful. One good example is the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA), a U.S. federal agency that performs safety tests of new motor vehicle models for manufacturers. Established in the 1970s to reduce accidents and deaths by encouraging manufacturers to produce safer vehicles, NHTSA led what has become today an industry standard of crash testing and rating vehicles out of five stars according to their safety. Some 50 years since its launch, NHTSA continues to perform crash tests and produce star ratings, as well as issue government safety ratings, safety information, and best practices.</p> -<p>Currently, NATO’s air forces are heavily dependent on US Air Force (USAF) and US Navy (USN) aircraft to provide both stand-off and stand-in jamming against a high-end threat like Russia, although several other countries’ fighter fleets have impressive ECM capabilities already for close-range self-defence. NATO’s primary stand-off jamming capability is provided by USN EA-18G Growler aircraft and the USAF EC-130H Compass Call, which is now being replaced by the new EA-37B. SEAD support is also provided by the Tornado electronic combat/reconnaissance (ECR) aircraft of the Italian Air Force and German Air Force, as well as the F-16CM “Wild Weasels” of the USAF’s 480th Fighter Squadron in Germany. However, in terms of EA systems, these Cold War-era aircraft only carry self-protection jamming equipment that is increasingly obsolescent against the more modern Russian threats if used without cover from the more powerful US stand-off systems like the EA-18G and EA-37B. The Tornado ECRs are also only available in small numbers, and the majority of the USAF F-16CM fleet is based in South Korea and Japan. It is notable that in almost any high-end NATO SEAD/DEAD exercise, USN EA-18Gs perform the majority of the EA support, since they offer by far the greatest capability in their class.</p> +<p>NHTSA is a useful model of a third-party government arbiter that has produced substantial win-win results for the public and for companies. The administration’s rating system lowers costs to consumers by supplying accurate, reliable, and simple safety information for free. Meanwhile, companies are incentivized to adopt new and better safety measures into their vehicles. As NHTSA’s acting administrator has stated, “[o]ur 5-Star Safety Ratings system continues to give Americans the information they need to choose the vehicle that’s right for them. The program also encourages vehicle manufacturers to incorporate advanced vehicle safety technologies into more makes and models, ultimately reducing injuries and deaths on America’s roads.” Because safety is a selling point for customers, most of the United States’ manufacturers willingly sign up for the NHTSA’s 5-star system and use the results in advertising new vehicle models.</p> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Significant expansion of capacity in Europe to rapidly update electronic warfare mission data is essential in order to maintain current air capabilities in the face of an increasingly rapid pace of Russian adaptation</code></em></strong></p> +<p>As AISIs mature organizationally, they could fulfill a similar arbiter role for AI models as the NHTSA has for motor vehicles. As has been the case with motor vehicles, testing AI models could lead to innovation in which safety is a key competitive feature. AI companies could communicate to customers that their model has passed AISI testing and evaluations, which could in turn help to build public trust and make AI models with higher safety standards more commercially competitive among consumers. Top frontier AI developers’ willingness to work with the U.S. AISI on testing their models before deployment is a good first step to making safety a key feature of AI industry standards, as the NHTSA has done with the U.S. motor vehicle industry over the last 50 years.</p> -<p>However, the USN attempted to withdraw its land-based EA-18G units from the European theatre in mid-2022 to bolster its presence in the Indo-Pacific and Middle East. The Growler is a critical part of the Carrier Air Wing force structure, and demand for its capabilities greatly outstrips the number of squadrons available to deploy at any given time. That attempt did not immediately lead to withdrawal, but relying on US EA support as a lynchpin of European NATO SEAD/DEAD capabilities remains a high-risk posture. One of the most likely scenarios in which Russia might risk direct conflict with a NATO member is if the US is drawn into either a serious military standoff or an actual conflict with China in the Indo-Pacific. In any clash over Taiwan or in the South China Sea, airborne EA assets would be some of the most in-demand in the entire US arsenal, meaning few if any EA-18G Growlers or USAF EA-37B Compass Call aircraft would be made available to respond to a Russian threat in Europe during a concurrent crisis. This means a much greater burden of the high-end EW effort would fall on European capabilities than in any previous post-Cold War conflict.</p> +<h4 id="timeline-of-ai-safety-institutes">Timeline of AI Safety Institutes</h4> -<h3 id="european-and-uk-airborne-ew-hardware">European and UK Airborne EW Hardware</h3> +<p>The first AISIs were announced last year, with the United States and United Kingdom launching initiatives at the UK AI Safety Summit in November 2023. Japan, Singapore, and the European Union’s EU AI Office followed in early 2024. Since then, Canada and South Korea have revealed plans for their own AISIs. The inclusion of France, Kenya, and Australia in the AISI network suggests that more institutes are still to come. For instance, in May French research institutions Laboratoire National de Métrologie et d’Essais (LNE) and National Institute for Research in Digital Science and Technology (Inria) announced a partnership to set up an “AI Evaluation” program that will advance research and the development of testing and evaluation methods for general-purpose AI models at the national level. While this program has not yet been named as an official AI safety institute for France, an announcement may take place at the AI Action Summit in France in February 2025, similar to the announcement made by South Korea at the AI Seoul Summit in May.</p> -<p>The French Rafale and Swedish Gripen both offer impressive ECM self-protection capabilities, but neither are currently equipped for dedicated stand-off or stand-in jamming. This follows a pattern across NATO air forces where EW in the air domain was primarily thought of as an aircraft self-defence capability outside of specialist units during decades of counterinsurgency operations. However, faced with the challenge of the extensive Russian integrated air defence system, European air forces now face a requirement for much greater offensive stand-off and stand-in jamming capabilities to support SEAD/DEAD operations at scale. Germany has ordered the development of 15 “Eurofighter EK” aircraft from existing airframes, designed to replace its ageing Tornado ECRs in the SEAD role. The EK will use an active electronically scanned array (AESA) radar developed by Hensoldt; the Aeraxis EW sensor suit from Saab; and AI-enabled software and mission data by Helsing. However, it will not be certified as combat ready until 2030, and that timeline assumes that the programme faces no delays.</p> +<p>The AISI International Network marks a logical next step in a series of recent bilateral agreements between institutes. In April 2024, the United States signed a memorandum of understanding with the United Kingdom for close collaboration between institutes and established a dialogue with the EU AI Office to jointly develop evaluation tools for AI models. Meanwhile, the United Kingdom, for its part, has established additional partnerships with Canada and France on AI safety, and the European Union and Japan have indicated future cooperation between safety institutes in the coming months.</p> -<p>The F-35 is also a potent airborne EW asset, and one that has been purchased by a large number of NATO members including the UK, the Netherlands, Norway, Italy, Finland, Denmark, Belgium, Poland, Germany and Czechia. Despite being primarily designed for low-observable strike and SEAD/DEAD operations, its APG-81 radar and advanced mission systems enable highly effective ECM for self-defence and also provide potent stand-in jamming and potentially limited stand-off jamming capabilities against both airborne and surface threats. Even a few F-35s can greatly enhance the survivability of not only their own formation but also allied assets operating alongside them as part of composite air operations. However, the F-35 still faces tactical limitations that make it difficult to generate sustained EW effects for more than short bursts, and pilots potentially risk compromising their position to hostile sensors when emitting in this way. More advanced EA capabilities that formed part of the intended Block 4 upgrade have in many cases been delayed until at least 2029 by issues with the electrical power generation capacity of the existing F-135 engine and hardware manufacturing bottlenecks. Most countries that have bought F-35s also lack the capacity or rights to modify or create their own mission data sets, and instead rely on the US for their mission data and threat library updates.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/XvdrSKG.png" alt="image02" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 2: Timeline of Major Events in AI Safety Since 2019.</strong></em></p> -<p>However, this does not fully apply to the UK since it is part of the Australian, Canadian and United Kingdom Reprogramming Laboratory (ACURL), which enables it to generate UK-specific mission data. Beyond the ACURL for its F-35B fleet, the UK has several national airborne EW development and procurement programmes. For stand-in jamming effects, the RAF is exploring options for stand-in jamming payloads for its Autonomous Collaborative Platform (ACP) programme, and continues to fund development work on a stand-in jamming variant of the MBDA SPEAR 3 miniature cruise missile called SPEAR EW. Potent ECM capabilities are also a core feature of the new ECRS Mk2 AESA radar, which is being procured to eventually be retrofitted onto the 40 Tranche 3 aircraft in the RAF Typhoon fleet. However, SPEAR EW has not actually been ordered so far, and the ECRS Mk2 has been developed very slowly compared to AESA radar development programmes for comparable fighters. On current timeframes, RAF Typhoons with the new radar are unlikely to be in service on the frontlines before the late 2020s. The threat outlook in Europe, therefore, would seem to suggest that allocating increased funding and priority to whichever of these existing programmes can offer the most rapid path to procurement and introduction to service is something that should be seriously considered. Given the lack of funding so far for ECRS Mk2 radar sets for the remaining 77 RAF Tranche 2 Typhoons, urgent updates to the capability of their existing ESM and Defensive Aid Sub-System (DASS) suites should also be examined – especially if novel software techniques could improve capability faster than hardware upgrades planned but not yet funded within the Typhoon LTE construct.</p> +<h3 id="why-the-aisi-international-network-matters">WHY THE AISI INTERNATIONAL NETWORK MATTERS</h3> -<h3 id="the-crucial-role-of-mission-data-and-software">The Crucial Role of Mission Data and Software</h3> +<p>The AISI International Network is important for several reasons:</p> -<p>Investment in platforms, sensors and effectors – however important – is also insufficient by itself. EW effectiveness requires electronic intelligence (ELINT) collection capabilities to record hostile radar emissions and covert intelligence collection in order to help understand enemy systems in depth. Many of these ELINT gathering capabilities can be and are mounted on a variety of assets besides fighter aircraft, with the RC-135W Rivet Joint and P-8 Poseidon being notable but by no means exclusive examples. One key objective must be to make better use of the huge amount of such data that is naturally collected by the increasingly capable digital sensors on most airborne and some land and maritime platforms during everyday training and on operations, since the vast majority of this data is not currently captured and fed into the EW analysis and mission data cycle. Beyond improving collection, however, making use of ELINT also requires the ability to rapidly convert collected data on hostile systems into frequent mission data updates in order to enable aircraft and EW systems to remain effective once a conflict starts. Outside the US, where once again the vast majority of NATO capacity and capability resides, the three most capable countries in terms of collection, ELINT analysis and mission data update generation are France, Sweden and the UK. Other countries such as Germany, Italy and Czechia also have centres of expertise and capability, but at a significantly smaller scale.</p> +<ul> + <li> + <p><strong>The network provides a much-needed venue for building international consensus on definitions, procedures, and best practices around AI safety.</strong> The science of evaluating AI models is a nascent yet vital field of research that underpins global efforts to develop safe and responsible AI. Currently, these efforts are limited by a lack of consensus on key definitions (for instance, what constitutes a “frontier” AI model or a “secure” system) and on the steps involved in testing, evaluation, and monitoring procedures.</p> -<p>The UK has long maintained greater mission data generation capacity than most other NATO allies, largely through the Joint Electronic Warfare Operational Support Centre (JEWOSC) – a Strategic Command asset that is located within the RAF Air and Space Warfare Centre at RAF Waddington. However, dependency on data collected by the US for the JEWOSC’s work is still high, and budgetary and personnel limitations prevent major expansion of capacity without leveraging new techniques such as those offered by machine learning (ML) and artificial intelligence (AI) toolsets. The task is more complex and simultaneously more essential than ever before, as Russian forces already make widespread use of sophisticated digital radar and EW systems with advanced processing capabilities that can very rapidly alter their signal patterns, energy levels and even frequency bands. This means that not only are they more difficult to detect within the background “noise” of any battlespace, but they are also difficult to identify from their emission signature and can rapidly adapt their signal to reduce the ability of EW to degrade their effectiveness. Consequently, mission data for aircraft, defensive aid suites, weapon seekers and EW systems must be updated far more rapidly than ever before to remain effective in any conflict involving a major power like Russia.</p> + <p>International consensus would increase regulatory interoperability, or the degree to which different domestic regulatory systems can smoothly interface and interact. Interoperability allows for the even implementation of international AI governance efforts. One such effort is the G7 Hiroshima AI Process Code of Conduct, which calls for “robust” and “trustworthy” AI systems but lacks technical definitions of the terms. Shared definitions would help create a common measuring stick by which regulators gauge these characteristics. Countries could choose policy options along such a ruler based on their risk tolerance for given AI applications. In this example, governments would require different levels of robustness and trustworthiness along the same underlying scale, as is the case for safety in the automobile and aviation industries. A common understanding of AI safety concepts would help clarify the steps countries must take to honor the G7 code of conduct and other international commitments.</p> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Faced with the challenge of Russia’s extensive integrated air defence system, European air forces now face a requirement for much greater offensive stand-off and stand-in jamming capabilities to support SEAD/DEAD operations at scale</code></em></strong></p> + <p>In this way, interoperability based on common definitions, procedures, and best practices can help to facilitate trade in the future. As a previous CSIS paper argued, fragmented legal frameworks that require company compliance with many different obligations can create technical barriers to the free flow of goods and services. Diverging regulatory approaches that require companies to demonstrate that a product is “safe” according to 10 different metrics from 10 different jurisdictions, for instance, is not only highly inefficient but often prohibitively costly. Instead, the AISI International Network could serve as one venue in which to develop a coherent language around AI safety, helping to lower future potential barriers to trade.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>International collaboration will help governments achieve economies of scale in AI safety research.</strong> Thus far, AISIs have cooperated on a bilateral basis, which, while useful, can limit the impact and scope of AI safety efforts. By sharing priorities, resources, and expertise through a multilateral configuration, the AISI International Network aims to be more than the sum of its parts. AISIs can contribute strategically to the goals of the network by coordinating roles and responsibilities, de-duplicating research and therefore saving time, capacity, and money.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>The network offers an opportunity to extend U.S. leadership in global AI governance.</strong> The United States has already demonstrated significant leadership in AI safety by being one of the first to launch its AISI in 2023 and by spearheading the AISI network initiative in 2024. It should maintain this leadership going forward with the view that the network will help shape global AI safety practices that will predominantly affect U.S. companies.</p> -<p>ML and AI technologies are likely to further increase the speed at which adversary systems adapt and change their behaviour in the coming years. However, these technologies also offer a path for the UK (and other NATO members) to greatly increase the speed and power of collection and mission data update cycles – especially by multiplying the capacity of relatively small teams of specialists. Therefore, the question of how to most efficiently and rapidly integrate advanced ML and AI capabilities into the JEWOSC in order to enhance its capacity and the speed at which it can generate new mission data should be a priority for the Ministry of Defence, even in a budgetary and strategic context where there are a huge variety of competing ones.</p> + <p>This is important for not only setting safety norms at home, but also advocating for U.S. interests abroad. Consider, for instance, the EU AI Act: while the first wave of the act came into force on August 1, the requirements for developers of frontier AI models above 10^25 floating operation points (FLOPS) of compute power have yet to be defined. Rather, the EU AI Office — the European Union’s representation to the AISI International Network — is tasked with developing codes of practice for the developers of these models, almost all of which are S. companies.</p> -<p>In February 2022, USAF F-35s found that even with the aircraft’s unmatched ELINT gathering sensor and analysis capabilities as a SEAD asset, some Russian radars were able to evade accurate identification by using previously unseen “war reserve modes”. The pace of Russian EW and radar signal adaptation has increased many times since then thanks to the pressure of the conflict against Ukraine. Without the capacity to update airborne mission data at a comparable pace, the UK will not only miss the opportunity to develop effective airborne EW capabilities that can help improve NATO’s SEAD/DEAD capabilities and thus its deterrence posture, but it will also risk seeing its existing combat air fleets lose survivability and lethality against Russia and other state threats over time.</p> + <p>According to Article 56 of the AI Act, the EU AI Office must develop codes of practice for frontier AI companies to identify, assess, manage, and report “systemic” risks by May 2, 2025. To meet this tight deadline, it may look to the work of the AISI International Network if it deems it sufficiently mature to draw upon. Having a seat at the same table as the EU AI Office is therefore a valuable opportunity to help develop safety norms that the European Union may apply to U.S. companies. Even if the European Union ultimately decides to develop its codes of practice alone, the network will still provide the United States with a direct line of communication to the EU AI Office for articulating AI safety best practices in the future.</p> + </li> +</ul> -<hr /> +<h3 id="overview-of-aisi-network-members">OVERVIEW OF AISI NETWORK MEMBERS</h3> -<p><strong>Justin Bronk</strong> is the Senior Research Fellow for Airpower and Technology in the Military Sciences team at RUSI, and the Editor of the RUSI Defence Systems online journal. His particular areas of expertise include the modern combat air environment, Russian and Chinese ground-based air defences and fast jet capabilities, the air war during the Russian invasion of Ukraine, unmanned combat aerial vehicles and novel weapons technology.</p>Justin BronkLong overlooked in mainstream defence circles as a “niche” capability reserved for deep specialists, airborne electronic warfare capabilities are an increasingly essential component in NATO’s ability to deter and defeat Russian aggression in Europe.Democracy And Human Rights2024-10-24T12:00:00+08:002024-10-24T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/democracy-and-human-rights<p><em>Authoritarian states are targeting weaknesses in democratic governance to undermine U.S. interests across the globe. It is time for a bipartisan strategy that rallies alliances, business, and civil society actors in defense of democratic governance and human rights.</em></p> +<p>It is still early days for AI safety institutes, both as organizations and as concepts. Members of the AISI International Network are highly varied in their organizational maturity, which can be expected given that most are only months old. Even the U.S. AISI, one of the most established institutes, was announced only in November 2023 and became operational in early 2024. Other AISIs, such as those of Japan, Singapore, South Korea, and the European Union, are still in the process of hiring and setting out the priorities of their institutes, according to public documents and conversations by CSIS with officials. Still other network members, like Kenya and Australia, have yet to clearly state whether their governments will even establish an AISI.</p> -<excerpt /> +<p>Nevertheless, established AISIs report strong similarities in funding and staff size thus far. As Table 1 illustrates, the annual budgets of network members currently hover around $10 million, with some notable exceptions. First, the UK AISI is already an outlier with a budget of approximately £50 million ($65 million) per year, according to CSIS sources. Second, the United States’ fiscal year 2025 budget requests an increase of $47.7 million for investment into the U.S. AISI and the advancement of AI research, standards, and testing in line with President Biden’s October 2023 AI executive order, which, if approved, would greatly boost the average network budget. Finally, an announcement by the Canadian government in April pledges C$50 million (approximately US$36 million) for a Canadian AISI, though the funding period is unspecified.</p> -<p>Throughout its history, the United States has emphasized human rights and democracy as core tenets of global engagement but struggled to balance those priorities against the exigencies of immediate geopolitical threats. At home, the definition of democracy itself is increasingly contested in a hyper-partisan political environment that foreign adversaries seek to exploit for their own strategic gain. Both at home and abroad, key foreign policy strategists are questioning whether the United States and its allies have the consensus or capacity necessary to put values at the core of their resistance to coercion and cooption by aggrieved and autocratic adversaries.</p> +<p>Public statements and private conversations between CSIS and government officials reveal that staff sizes will also be comparable between institutes. More established AISIs currently employ approximately 20 to 30 staff, most of whom are technical experts. Private conversations with CSIS indicate that the EU AI Office’s AI safety unit, which will fulfill most of the same functions as an AISI (Table 2), will likely hold approximately 50 staff members.</p> -<p>This report argues that the United States can – and must – do more to promote democracy and democratic norms internationally if it is to secure a favorable international order that preserves common prosperity and security as well as a dignified way of life for people everywhere in the twenty-first century. It further argues that it is precisely because of, not in spite of, the aggressive ambitions and methods of the autocratic powers that the United States must integrate defense of democracy and human rights into its national security strategy. It notes that despite divisions at home, a broad bipartisan commitment exists to defend and advance democratic values that can be harnessed to sustain such a strategy. The report further illustrates that in key regions of the world, U.S. allies and partners are themselves recognizing that both their security and their economic interests depend on the democratic resilience of vulnerable states in their near abroad. Many are articulating strategies and preparing tools that align with or complement U.S. approaches.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/IYd2imR.png" alt="image03" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Table 1: Organizational Overview of AISI Network Members.</strong> Source: Public statements from AISI network members and relevant government officials and bodies.</em></p> -<p>The United States therefore has a requirement and opportunities to develop an integrated democracy strategy. The point is not that military, economic, or diplomatic objectives should be subordinated to human rights or democracy priorities, but rather that these strategies should be integrated in national security planning alongside diplomatic, military, and economic objectives. Key elements would include the following efforts:</p> +<p>AISI network members also intend to fulfill similar functions. Based on a document review of all public statements from AISIs and relevant government officials, this paper provides a list of the nine areas of AI safety in which institutes may operate (see Table 2). These functions are:</p> -<ul> +<ol> <li> - <p><strong>Harness democratic allies and partners:</strong> It is important that any democratic agenda not be seen as a special interest of the United States but as one shared by a diverse array of nations globally. This is not a matter of recruiting allies and partners to a singular strategy but rather empowering them to shape debates and reinforce democratic norms internationally and in their own regions. The best framing for this effort in Asia, Africa, or Latin America is around sovereignty, prosperity, resilience, and national self-strengthening rather than justice or strategic competition with China and Russia. Empirical demonstrations, for example, that accountability, transparency, rule of law mechanisms, and women’s empowerment enhance national wealth and strength will be powerful. One successful example of such a regional approach is the National Endowment for Democracy’s Sunnylands Initiative on Enhancing Democratic Partnership in the Indo-Pacific.</p> + <p>Performing (technical) research on AI safety tools</p> </li> <li> - <p><strong>Harness the business community:</strong> The U.S. business community should understand the competitive advantage of promoting a normative agenda that enhances openness and rules given their need for a level playing field in overseas markets and to counter the corruption and kleptocracy that have become business models for the modern-day authoritarian. Private sector engagement and trade policy levers can have significant impact on transparency and good governance that in turn reinforce accountability to the governed.</p> + <p>Developing and disseminating evaluation tools and products</p> </li> <li> - <p><strong>Harness civil society and support democrats at risk:</strong> The United States should continue to underwrite the development of democratic institutions worldwide, including an independent civil society. U.S. leaders should be consistent in meeting with and speaking out on behalf of dissidents and champions of freedom to encourage those struggling on the front lines of the normative democratic challenge. State Department reporting on democracy and human rights, and the work of U.S. Agency for Global Media components such as Radio Free Asia and Voice of America, also promote norms of openness and free expression and protect democrats at risk.</p> + <p>Testing and evaluating AI systems</p> </li> <li> - <p><strong>Enhance resilience of international institutions:</strong> China’s growing diplomatic influence in bodies such as the UN Human Rights Council has proven frustrating for U.S. interests. Efforts by autocracies to neuter or reshape international institutions should be a reason to increase U.S. diplomatic efforts rather than allow UN and regional bodies to become advocates for an authoritarian vision of regional and global order inconsistent with their origins.</p> + <p>Publishing AI safety standards and guidelines</p> </li> <li> - <p><strong>Enhance U.S. strategic communications:</strong> Authoritarian regimes can often prove more agile than democracies at disseminating information and maintaining message discipline, but democratic allies enjoy the advantage of representing norms desired by billions of people worldwide. The United States and its allies should develop a global information strategy that supports local independent media, facilitates access to balanced news and analysis, and actively counters false and self-interested narratives advanced by authoritarians.</p> + <p>Disseminating AISI research and guidelines to the public</p> </li> <li> - <p><strong>Harness digital technology:</strong> Digital technologies, particularly social media and artificial intelligence (AI), are playing an increasingly important role in enhancing the threat of algorithmically proliferated attacks on democracies and on the idea of democracy itself. Digital literacy, social media regulation, and support for those seeking to develop digital tools that are explicitly designed to enhance conversation and compromise (i.e., democratic norms), should be enhanced. The United States and its allies should also lead on establishing international principles on AI, oppose the unauthorized and unlabeled use of deep fakes, and establish digital norms, particularly around elections.</p> + <p>Forming consortia of AI researchers, stakeholders, and experts</p> </li> <li> - <p><strong>Sustain bipartisan consensus:</strong> As with most foreign policy issues, bipartisan unity and executive-congressional consensus will ensure strategic continuity and enhance prospects for success in advancing U.S. interests. A deliberate bipartisan coalition would help advance a values-based foreign policy that reflects the best traditions of the United States and defend U.S. security, while demonstrating to allies, partners, democratic activists, and autocratic adversaries alike that American unity, solidarity, and sustained commitment to the issue is strategic and unshakable.</p> + <p>Promoting the international adoption of AI safety guidelines</p> </li> -</ul> - -<p>Democracy is said to be in decline. But it is better understood to be under attack. Citizens today who are unhappy with their leaders, in democracies and autocracies alike, seek not less of a voice in political affairs, but more. Not fewer rights and protections, but more. Not less democracy, but better democracy. And they’re looking for allies.</p> - -<p>The good news is supporting democratic development is not financially costly and plays to America’s strengths. But some creativity and urgency in developing a coherent democracy support strategy is needed. Failing to do so while watching our adversaries shape global norms that conform to their illiberal model will have profound effects on U.S. and allied security.</p> - -<h3 id="introduction">Introduction</h3> - -<p>The essence of grand strategy is the ability to reconcile two seemingly contradictory objectives in the pursuit of national interest. No objective has been more fundamental to the founding of the American republic and the United States’ role in the world than the advancement of democracy and individual rights. And no objective has proven more vexing to those who have sought to secure the republic through balance of power strategies that pursue alignments and projection of power unencumbered by debates about the political nature of other states in the system. This tension is as old as the United States itself, but it has resurfaced in the context of renewed great power geopolitical competition.</p> - -<p>Can the United States formulate a grand strategy that incorporates liberal democratic values, avoids charges of hypocrisy, and withstands intensifying geopolitical fragmentation? This essay argues that we can – and must – do so if we are to secure a favorable international order that preserves common prosperity and security as well as the American way of life in the twenty-first century. Far from ignoring the complex realities of our times, such a strategy accounts for them. And while U.S. democracy itself is under unprecedented stress, and its return to health essential to any strategy’s success, addressing that urgent challenge should not distract us from the strategic importance of promoting international norms that support human dignity and have proved in both logic and empirical study to foster international peace, security, and development. Doing so can also help knit together common threads that have traditionally united Americans across the political divide and been a source of national strength.</p> - -<p>The premise of this report is that the United States and its allies and partners are engaged in a systems-level contest in which they must prevail. It begins with a review of the U.S. historical context and an assessment of the emerging conceptual obstacles and opportunities at home and abroad that confront any values-based foreign policy strategy. The report concludes by introducing a framework for integrating “democracy” and democratic values across all instruments of U.S. national power, not to the exclusion of realpolitik, hard power considerations but in thoughtful, creative, and effective combination with them.</p> - -<h3 id="values-and-the-american-way-of-statecraft">Values and the American Way of Statecraft</h3> - -<p>Americans have long struggled to find the proper balance between our transformational democratic values and our more risk-averse pursuit of commercial and diplomatic advantage. When the Empress of China set sail from New York in 1784 to open commerce with the Qing Empire for the newly independent United States, Major Samuel Shaw was sent along as the country’s first diplomatic representative to what was then called the East Indies. Shaw was instructed not to emphasize U.S. democracy, which might offend the Celestial Emperor, but instead to emphasize the new republic’s support for anticolonialism as a contrast to the United States’ major geopolitical rival, Great Britain. Similar geopolitical concerns prompted top U.S. diplomats to downplay democratic norms well into the twentieth century, including the approach to China by Henry Kissinger, George Schultz, and Brent Scowcroft in the 1970s through the 1990s, as well as the stance of multiple administrations toward Saudi Arabia and the Gulf nations.</p> - -<p>Other U.S. leaders have moved sharply in the opposite direction, prioritizing democracy, self-rule, and human rights over security and business interests. President Woodrow Wilson stunned the U.S. business and foreign policy establishments in 1913 by moving quickly to recognize the new Republic of China and simultaneously pushing out the Mexican junta of General Victoriano Huerta. In a similar vein, President Jimmy Carter in the late 1970s rejected two decades of support for anticommunist allies and chose to condition security cooperation in Asia – namely with South Korea, the Philippines, and Taiwan – on improvements in human rights.</p> - -<p>Neither of these contrasting approaches – the hard power realpolitik of Shaw, Kissinger, and Scowcroft nor the undisciplined idealism of Wilson and Carter – proved durable. Kissinger’s realism invited the pendulum swing of the Carter administration, while President George H.W. Bush’s approach to the Tiananmen Square massacre invited a debilitating congressional backlash on trade relations with China that took a year to resolve. On the other side, Wilson retreated from his early idealism and rejected self-determination for non-European peoples at Versailles at the end of World War I, in the process turning a generation of idealistic nationalists into anti-American revolutionaries (including Ho Chi Minh). Carter’s clashes with the leaders of South Korea, the Philippines, and Central American republics in the late 1970s proved untenable in the face of Soviet expansionism in the less-developed world, and he was forced to drop human rights pressure on allies. Idealism divorced from realism proved no more enduring than realism divorced from idealism.</p> - -<p>Some leaders in U.S. history have been notably more successful at integrating values and power politics and avoiding these pendulum swings. Thomas Jefferson and later Commodore Matthew Perry, who opened Japan in 1853, both argued that the United States had a strategic interest in supporting independent, well-governed republics in the Pacific because they would be more resistant to the hegemonic aspirations of America’s expanding European rivals (this was based on the assumption, of course, that these independent republics would give the vote to white men only). The most influential strategic thinker in American history, Alfred Thayer Mahan, wrote in the 1890s that the United States needed both commercial and “moral” influence in Asia and the Caribbean. However, his idealism was limited by a recognition of the limits to the scope of this influence, and thus he discouraged extending this policy to further reaches of South America or the continent of Asia, where U.S. power and interests began to fade. Some would see this self-restraint as cynical, but Mahan saw it as a pragmatic form of a moral foreign policy.</p> - -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Idealism divorced from realism proved no more enduring than realism divorced from idealism.</code></em></strong></p> + <li> + <p>Investigating infringements of domestic regulations</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Encouraging domestic innovation in AI</p> + </li> +</ol> -<p>After witnessing the counterproductive swings between idealism and realpolitik of the Wilson administration, President Franklin Delano Roosevelt sought a better balance during World War II. He championed the Atlantic Charter and the “Four Freedoms” (freedom of speech and worship, and freedom from fear and want) and set the stage for inclusion of those norms in postwar international institutions. But he was also willing to accept close relations with dictatorships in Latin America and with Soviet leader Joseph Stalin in order to keep them on side against Hitler – allegedly stating that “they may be SOBs, but they’re my SOBs.”</p> +<p>Table 2 demonstrates that most AISI network members will principally focus on the first seven of these nine functions, with notably only the European Union performing a regulatory role as part of the EU AI Office. This overlap between network members’ stated functions points to a strong basis for collaboration between AISIs.</p> -<p>These cycles of American enthusiasm for and against a values-based foreign policy have consistently been shaped – and often distorted by – geopolitical setbacks. The American entry into World War I, escalation in Vietnam, and the invasion of Iraq were all ostensibly driven primarily by hard-power considerations (restoring balance in the Euro-Atlantic, preventing the expansion of international communism, and reshaping Middle East security, respectively). However, presidents at the time framed the war efforts in moralistic terms that they believed the U.S. public would support. When the public turned against those wars in the 1920s, 1970s, and 2000s, the democratic imperative in U.S. foreign policy also became a casualty. The horrific battlefield experiences of the Great War fueled the isolationist America First movement and a distasteful tolerance on the right for Hitlerism that split the Republican Party before Pearl Harbor. The moral confusion of the Vietnam War prompted a backlash against democratic allies and a softer line toward the Soviet Union that split the Democratic Party in the 1970s (and gave birth to the neoconservative movement). The sagging enthusiasm for democracy promotion after the Iraq War had a similar effect. CSIS surveys of foreign policy specialists in the United States and Asia in 2014 found that the U.S. respondents’ prioritization of democracy, rule of law, women’s empowerment, and human rights briefly aligned more closely with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and Singapore than democratic Japan, India, or South Korea. This same hangover from Iraq helps to explain why President Barack Obama expressed explicit appreciation of the realpolitik approach of Scowcroft and the George H.W. Bush administration during the 2008 campaign despite discomfort among prodemocracy advocates in his own party.</p> +<p>It also shows that some institutes have already begun to produce work related to their stated functions. Some deliverables predate the AISI, such as the Japanese Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry’s AI Business Guidelines, but have been incorporated and built upon by current AISI efforts. Others are novel efforts by institutes since their launch, such as the U.S. AISI’s guidance for Managing Misuse Risk for Dual-Use Foundation Models, and the UK AISI’s Inspect and Singapore’s Project Moonshot, two testing and evaluation toolkits for large language models (LLMs).</p> -<p>After each of these instances, the American people’s support for values-based foreign policy reverted to the norm with the rise of new authoritarian threats. Roosevelt’s January 1941 Four Freedoms speech and August 1941 Atlantic Charter took hold because the pact between Axis powers had metastasized the spreading cancers of Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan. The Truman Doctrine emerged from the early post–World War II clashes with Soviet ambitions in Greece and Eastern Europe. Ronald Reagan’s June 1982 Westminster Speech championing international democracy promotion was embraced at home and abroad because of Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev’s invasion of Afghanistan three years earlier. And Joe Biden’s framing of a world clash between authoritarian and democratic states resonated in ways it would not have when he was vice president because of the menacing turns and growing strategic alignment of China and Russia.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/CTxpjph.png" alt="image04" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Table 2: Overview of AISI Network Members’ Stated Functions.</strong> Source: Public statements from AISI network members and relevant government officials and bodies.</em></p> -<p>Ultimately, for all its inconsistency, hypocrisy, and vacillation over the years, no power in the history of the world has done more to advance human freedom and dignity than the United States of America. However, the United States cannot afford to continue framing its approach to democracy and human rights as a reaction to world events in a series of undisciplined pendulum swings – not if the goal is to shape global norms and the balance of power, build alliances, and deter authoritarian aggression, kinetic and otherwise – over the course of a multigenerational contest. History teaches that there is risk in overplaying values as the defining characteristic of strategic competition and even greater risk in failing to understand how fundamental democratic values are to the longer-term security of the United States.</p> +<p>It is worth noting, however, that while institutes share many similarities in funding, size, and functions, they are housed under different kinds of public bodies. Several institutes are located within government agencies focused on technological innovation and standards, including the U.S. National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST); the UK Department for Science, Innovation and Technology (DSIT); and the Japanese Information Technology Promotion Agency (IPA). Others are housed in government-funded research organizations, like the South Korean Electronics and Telecommunications Research Institute (ETRI) and the Singaporean Digital Trust Centre, itself a part of Nanyang Technological University. Finally, as Table 2 illustrates, the EU AI Office has the largest set of functions as an institution that promotes innovation, research, and regulatory compliance to the EU AI Act. The different kinds of home institutions in which AISIs are housed may have implications for the focus and capacity of different network members, and therefore the strengths that each member may bring to the network.</p> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">The United States cannot afford to continue framing its approach to democracy and human rights as a reaction to world events.</code></em></strong></p> +<h3 id="questions-and-recommendations">QUESTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS</h3> -<p>Realist scholars have long associated democracy with “idealism” and contrasted that with “realism.” But a “realist” foreign policy must recognize that competition over what – and whose – governance norms, rules, and standards will prevail in the twenty-first century is no less important than the more traditional competition for predominance in outer space, cyberspace, or undersea warfare. And as with those other domains, the United States will require a strategy that is premised on an understanding of the nature of the challenges of our time, including the ideational fight we face both abroad and at home.</p> +<p>Similarities between AISI network members in terms of funding, size, and stated functions are a strong foundation for international cooperation on AI safety. However, ensuring that the AISI International Network maintains momentum requires translating the high-level Seoul Statement into a concrete set of priorities, deliverables, and timelines. To do so, this paper poses the following nine questions and recommendations to network members:</p> -<h3 id="difficult-terrain">Difficult Terrain</h3> +<h4 id="goals-of-collaboration-what-is-the-aisi-network-trying-to-achieve-and-when">Goals of Collaboration: What Is the AISI Network Trying to Achieve and When?</h4> -<p><strong><em>Democracy’s Strategic Logic, Challenges, and Opportunities Abroad</em></strong></p> +<p><em>1. What areas of collaboration should the AISI network prioritize in the near term?</em></p> -<h4 id="why-democracy-matters">Why Democracy Matters</h4> +<p><strong>Recommendation:</strong> The AISI International Network does not have the capacity or resources to effectively collaborate on every domain of AI safety. For some domains, such as sharing sensitive information about models, AISIs may even face legal limitations to collaboration. Rather than spreading finite resources thinly in an effort to achieve everything all at once, network members should first focus on executing a few specific projects well. These should be attainable in the near future to demonstrate continued momentum from the AI Seoul Summit.</p> -<p>The logic of democracy – transparent, accountable, inclusive, and representative governance under law – is instinctive to most Americans. Without transparency and rule of law, corruption festers. When national leaders are accountable to their citizens, they have an incentive to deliver public goods and practical solutions to national problems and less motivation to engage in foreign adventures. This is the logic behind democratic peace theory: that democracies do not go to war with one another. When citizens are treated with dignity, when they have a voice in how they are governed and who governs them, and when they have reasonable confidence in equal protection under law, they are less prone to resort to extralegal means of redress, including violence. And when they have agency at home, they have less reason to flee across borders in desperation to escape political and economic injustice, affecting the security and stability of neighbors.</p> +<p>When selecting priority areas, members should consider areas with the greatest overlap in AISI’s functions, capacity, and expertise, and deliverables that are both impactful and realistic. To start, they should establish a research agenda for the network’s technical and guidance safety work going forward. This will help to set the scope of the network’s efforts and to keep members on track as they and the network mature. As discussed in this paper’s recommendation to Question 3, the AISI network conference in November may be a good place to set and present this agenda to the public.</p> -<p>Overall, while some nondemocratic states may deliver positive outcomes in the short run, often by mortgaging the future for the present, the track record of autocrats is grim (see, for example, Belarus, Cuba, Iran, Myanmar, Nicaragua, North Korea, Russia, Sudan, Venezuela, or Zimbabwe), while the benefits of democracy are increasingly borne out in the data. Recent studies by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Stanford University, Sweden’s V-Dem Institute, and others, for instance, have shown that democratic governance leads to better health, security, peace, and development outcomes.</p> +<p>In the medium term, network members should look to develop a common, evidence-based approach to AISIs’ testing and evaluation methodologies. While not all AISIs may necessarily have the same requirements for assessing models, they should at least have a common understanding of what methodologies such as “red teaming” comprise. Developing a consensus on testing and evaluation methods would help to deconflict and de-duplicate efforts between AISIs and to facilitate other areas of collaboration in the future, such as promoting safety guidelines or developing joint evaluation tools. If the AISI network can start by ensuring that AISIs all speak the same language in AI safety, more elaborate collaboration projects can take place.</p> -<p>Equally important, there is also ample empirical evidence that how nations organize themselves internally will go a long way in determining how they seek to shape the environment outside their borders. If a nation’s leaders are afraid of the free flow of information at home, they will feel the same way internationally. If they rule by kleptocracy, they will welcome opaque systems of elite corruption elsewhere. If they prefer rule by law rather than rule of law domestically, odds are they will support the shaping of a similar system abroad. Allied with other powerful nations with similar illiberal values, these states can leverage their collective power to try to reshape the international system consistent with those values and their narrow self-interest rather than for the global good.</p> +<p><em>2. What deliverables should the AISI network aim to produce?</em></p> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">How nations organize themselves internally will go a long way in determining how they seek to shape the environment outside their borders.</code></em></strong></p> +<p><strong>Recommendation:</strong> Although the AISI network is very new, members should still consider what the end products of their collaboration might be. One of the first deliverables that the network could produce is a clear statement of its intended goals, functions, research agenda, and mechanisms of collaboration that builds on the Seoul Statement. In as much detail as possible, the statement should articulate the mission of the network, its intended scope of work, and how it will relate to other international organizations working on AI. Network members may also consider developing a comprehensive list of the specific risks that they will test. This statement would not only help network members set the agenda for collaboration, but it would also help external governments and organizations to understand the value of the AISI network and how the network can support their efforts.</p> -<p>But the reverse is equally true: the alliance of common values and interests between the United States and democratic-minded citizens globally can have powerful strategic potential in the twenty-first century, particularly in the Global South with its rapidly growing, restless, and relatively youthful demographic demanding a greater voice in their future.</p> +<p><em>3. What are some key dates for these deliverables?</em></p> -<h4 id="the-challenges-internationally">The Challenges Internationally</h4> +<p><strong>Recommendation:</strong> There are two big international events related to AI safety on the horizon that offer some initial deadlines for AISI network deliverables. First, the November 2024 San Francisco convening is an obvious date to publicly initiate international collaboration on AI safety. In September, the U.S. Department of Commerce and U.S. Department of State announced that “the goal of this convening is to kickstart the Network’s technical collaboration ahead of the AI Action Summit in Paris in February 2025,” starting with aligning “on priority work areas for the Network,” as the recommendation above supports. The February summit, therefore, is an important second date for network deliverables. The AI Action Summit will be the third of its kind since the UK AI Safety Summit last year and offers a high-profile, public venue in which to showcase the AISI network and its work. These two events — in November 2024 and February 2025 — are mere moments away in the context of international collaboration. If AISI members can capitalize on their opportunities, however, they could significantly contribute to the network’s mission of accelerating AI safety science.</p> -<p>While some criticize Biden and members of Congress for framing strategic competition with China in ideational terms, the reality is that Beijing and Moscow have long viewed the spread of democracy as an existential threat, and seen strategic advantage in sowing doubts about, if not actively undermining, democratic practices. While China or Russia might have taken a more defensive stance in response to the color revolutions of the early 2000s, both have gone on the offensive in recent years. Russian interference in the 2016 U.S. elections is well documented even if the effects are debated. Around the same time, Beijing was caught pouring money into Australia’s parliament, which led to strict foreign interference laws by Canberra (Canada and New Zealand have since had the same experience). China’s foreign interference and elite capture strategies have had more success in Australia’s neighborhood, most notably with the 2022 security pact that China convinced the strategically situated Solomon Islands to sign after well-funded “study tours” for its leaders to Beijing. Leaders in China and Russia have also aligned in championing a counter-democracy coalition through the Shanghai Cooperation Organization meetings and the expansion of the BRICS grouping to include Iran.</p> +<h4 id="mechanisms-of-collaboration-what-will-the-aisi-network-do-and-how-will-it-work">Mechanisms of Collaboration: What Will the AISI Network Do and How Will It Work?</h4> -<p>In a kind of backhanded compliment, the PRC and Russia in recent years have even referred to themselves as democracies, albeit on their own illiberal terms. While seemingly absurd on its face, this is the latest of their attempts to redefine and thus frontally challenge accepted international norms, as witnessed in Chinese activity within UN agencies and other international institutions. The United States and its allies snicker at these subversive efforts at their own peril – even if in seeking to wrap themselves in democratic cloth, China and Russia inadvertently show their hand: their recognition of the power of the democratic idea, their fear of a world that conforms to true democratic norms, and their deep insecurity over the reality of their own systems.</p> +<p><em>4. How will network members collaborate?</em></p> -<p>Under its new Global Civilization Initiative, Beijing asserts that ancient civilizations like China’s provide a superior cultural legitimacy over the democratic norms advocated by the United States and its allies and partners, and reflected in the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Their message is that thinkers like John Locke, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, and Jefferson have no place in non-Western culture and emphasize wherever possible shortcomings in Western democratic practice. And even where Beijing and Moscow are not actively intervening, they offer diplomatic support to those resisting international pressure on democracy and human rights – most egregiously in the cases of North Korea, Myanmar, Iran, and Syria.</p> +<p><strong>Recommendation:</strong> AISIs should aim to have a regular cadence of meetings, perhaps every six months, to sustain momentum and keep collaboration moving forward. AISIs could collaborate through any number of venues, including research exchanges, annual conferences, shared digital platforms, and more. Network members will likely use a mix of these and other venues in different combinations as the network matures over time. To start, research exchanges between AISIs may be one of the first mechanisms of collaboration given that it is relatively inexpensive.</p> -<p>This combination of cultural narratives, disparagement (or malign appropriation) of democracy, support for brutal dictatorships, and elite capture in weakly governed states is backed by an increasingly well-resourced and effective strategy of disinformation by Beijing and Moscow. In its first public report on Chinese interference and disinformation, the State Department found that:</p> +<p><em>5. Will network members specialize in their work, or will they share equal responsibilities?</em></p> -<blockquote> - <p>The PRC’s information manipulation efforts feature five primary elements: leveraging propaganda and censorship, promoting digital authoritarianism, exploiting international organizations and bilateral partnerships, pairing co-optation and pressure, and exercising control over Chinese-language media.</p> -</blockquote> +<p><strong>Recommendation:</strong> It would be premature to assign specific responsibilities to AISI network members today given that most are only months old, if established at all. However, members should consider the benefits and drawbacks of different organizational structures as the network develops. Currently, AISI network members share equal responsibilities by default. While this can be useful for promoting equal participation and accountability from members, it can also add unnecessary costs to collaboration. If each member were to take charge on a different project, for instance, the network could risk losing time, capacity, and focus. This kind of structure could also place undue pressure on the capacity and expertise of each of the AISIs to contribute before they are ready.</p> -<p>It is becoming evident that the next phase of the PRC’s strategy is to harness the emerging information technology ecosystem to capture entire communities within a data environment that Beijing can control and manipulate. As the State Department report notes, Beijing is now offering to help developing countries to establish their own “smart cities” complete with Chinese technology for surveillance and one-way flows of data to Beijing. The technology competition of the twenty-first century is also fundamentally a competition about democratic norms of openness, transparency, and accountability. Beijing and Moscow’s aims are being abetted by the use of bots, deepfakes, and other tools of disinformation being made available in the digital space by artificial intelligence (AI).</p> +<p>Instead, the AISI network may consider leveraging each member’s comparative advantages in expertise, capacity, and funding. Those that are most able to contribute to projects, for instance, should be able and incentivized to do so, as is discussed in Question 7. For now, more mature AISIs like those of the United States, the United Kingdom, and Singapore could have greater responsibilities within the network while other members, such as Kenya or Australia, contribute through more specialized ways. These roles could shift over time as AISIs mature, however.</p> -<p>While Beijing and Moscow did not create all the conditions for deteriorating democratic norms globally, these powers have accelerated negative trend lines by actively exploiting and exacerbating areas of societal divisions and weak governance. According to Freedom House, 2023 was the 18th straight year of decline in global freedom. Freedom House noted that the key drivers globally were denial of press freedoms and increased risk of harm for expressing personal beliefs, coupled with increasing extremism and intolerance online. Put another way, it is the ability of the governed to hold their leaders accountable that is under assault while intolerance is being manipulated to divide, demonize, and marginalize legitimate debate – and these factors in turn create even more favorable conditions for strategies of foreign interference and elite capture by malign revisionist powers like China.</p> +<p><em>6. Will the AI safety summits continue to serve as the principal international venue for AISIs and the AISI network?</em></p> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">While Beijing and Moscow did not create all the conditions for deteriorating democratic norms globally, these powers have accelerated negative trend lines.</code></em></strong></p> +<p><strong>Recommendation:</strong> Since the first AISIs were announced at Bletchley Park in November 2023, AISIs have been closely tied to the AI safety summits. However, the summit series is steadily shifting its focus from AI safety to AI adoption and innovation; in May, the AI Seoul Summit placed AI innovation and inclusiveness firmly on the agenda. The next summit, the AI Action Summit in February 2025, will reportedly include AI safety as only one of five topic areas.</p> -<h4 id="the-opportunities-abroad">The Opportunities Abroad</h4> +<p>Nevertheless, a shift in focus does not mean that summits are not a good international venue for AISIs and the AISI network. In fact, it may make it an even better venue for helping to shift the rhetoric around AI safety from “doom and gloom” to “safety for trust, adoption, and innovation” — a far more politically salient message. This paper therefore recommends that AISIs and the AISI network continue to use the AI safety summits as a high-profile international venue for their efforts for as long as the summit series continues.</p> -<p>Freedom House’s 2024 report notes that 2023 marked the 18th consecutive year of democratic decline, yet the world has more freedom today than it had 50 years ago, and in 2024 more people will have voted around the world than ever before in history – over half of all adults on the planet. And in Asia – the major arena for great power competition – Freedom House found that freedom began growing again in 2022. This finding is consistent with surveys of regional elites in the Indo-Pacific conducted by CSIS since 2009, which consistently found that thought leaders from India to Japan associated themselves more with democracy, rule of law, good governance, and human rights than contrasting themes offered by China such as “noninterference” or any sort of “Beijing consensus” around authoritarian development. This aspirational map does not mean that elites within less developed countries will automatically forego bribes on offer from Beijing (so-called elite capture) or that leaders of postcolonial states will instinctively look to the former imperial powers for lessons on democracy. But it does reinforce the point that citizens in China’s own region – and perhaps in China itself – expect greater empowerment and accountability of their governments and associate their own national success with democracy, good governance, and protection of human rights.</p> +<p><em>7. What will the network’s leadership and voting structure look like?</em></p> -<p>There are indications that democratic governments are increasingly reflecting those norms in foreign policy strategies, while younger civil society activists are also taking action. In 2020, youth across East Asia formed the Milk Tea Alliance to support students marching for democracy in Hong Kong. In 2022, Japanese civil society groups reached out to form the Indo-Pacific Platform for Universal Values and established the first regional network to host political dissidents at risk. Through the Sunnylands Initiative started by CSIS and the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) in 2019, thought leaders from across the Indo-Pacific have gathered each year to push for greater alignment of efforts in support of democratic norms.</p> +<p><strong>Recommendation:</strong> Currently, the AISI network has a horizontal leadership and consensus or opt-in only voting structure by default. Given that the Seoul Statement makes no indication of leadership and voting structure, however, network members are open to consider different possibilities and their trade-offs. For example, a consensus-based structure can help to foster good intentions for international cooperation, but it can also make it challenging to take meaningful collective action. Similarly, having just one member serve as a leader may seem unfair, but a rotating leadership structure can be ineffectual and prioritize the interests of that country (or bloc) for that period.</p> -<p>Once-reticent governments have also become more forward-leaning about the importance of democracy to their security. Japan incorporated support for universal values in its 2022 National Security Strategy and 2023 Development Cooperation Charter. South Korea has committed to reflecting universal values in its overall foreign policy, emphasized human rights and the rule of law in its 2022 Indo-Pacific Strategy, and hosted the third global Summit for Democracy in 2024. Australia launched a new International Development Policy that focused on supporting accountability, while its Home Affairs Ministry launched a Democracy Task Force to guard against foreign interference at home and in the region. While Australian diplomats sometimes caution their American counterparts against over-emphasizing democracy and human rights in the Pacific Islands, a 2024 public opinion survey by the University of Sydney’s U.S. Studies Centre found that average Australian and Japanese citizens were actually more likely than Americans to want their government to push for improvements in democracy abroad (72 percent of Australians, 69 percent of Japanese, and 61 percent of Americans).</p> +<p>The network’s leadership and voting structures need not be zero sum, however. In the long run, members’ representation within the network should be proportionate to their contributions; those that invest more time, money, expertise, and resources should be rewarded with a greater say in its direction. This means that the U.S. and UK AISIs would likely be rewarded with leadership of the network due to their organizational capacity. The United States, for its part, should aspire to lead the AISI network, as discussed in the third section of this paper. Rather than merely insisting on leading, however, it should commit the resources and time that positions it to deserve to lead. Leadership should be earned based on the scale of meaningful contributions to the field of AI safety science, a structure that also incentivizes on other network members to participate and invest more into AI safety and the AISI network as well.</p> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Once-reticent governments have also become more forward-leaning about the importance of democracy to their security.</code></em></strong></p> +<h4 id="international-strategy-how-will-the-aisi-network-fit-into-and-engage-with-other-international-ai-efforts">International Strategy: How Will the AISI Network Fit into and Engage with Other International AI Efforts?</h4> -<p>To be clear, even close U.S. allies such as Japan, South Korea, or Australia will take a lighter approach on human rights or democracy issues with other states than the U.S. government or Congress. Part of this difference is size – few nations can withstand retaliation by China like the United States can. Part of the difference is cultural, since few went through anything like the American Revolution or the Civil War to define and safeguard the future of democracy. And part of the explanation is free-riding, since it has often been useful for the Americans to be the bad cop on human rights at times when Japan or South Korea were seeking relative economic gains in the region and around the world.</p> +<p><em>8. How will the network be different from and engage with other international organizations working on AI issues, such as the ISO, G7, United Nations, GPAI, or OECD?</em></p> -<p>Yet China’s coercive revisionism, foreign interference, and successful elite capture in Southeast Asia, South Asia, and the Pacific have alerted the maritime democracies to an ideational threat to their strategic interests and national sovereignty. There is a pronounced alignment of government declaratory policy and civil society efforts across the region that could be harnessed as part of a grand strategy on democracy, if that strategy is iterative and not imposed from Washington.</p> +<p><strong>Recommendation:</strong> Just as one of the objectives of the AISI network is to avoid duplicating work between AISIs, the network itself should avoid duplicating the work of other international organizations. Considering how the AISI network will fit into the broader landscape of these organizations from the start will help members think more strategically about what role this forum plays on the global AI governance stage.</p> -<p>Since the Atlantic Charter, Europe has always been the natural partner for the United States in advancing democratic norms globally, but this transatlantic alignment has grown barnacles since Brexit and the 2016 U.S. presidential election. Europeans are now less likely than publics in America’s Asian alliances to say that they share common democratic norms with the United States. The European Union has also been beset by internal democratic challenges and extremism from Hungary’s suppression of press and civil liberties to the electoral successes of the far right in Germany, as the round of European and then French elections demonstrated in the summer of 2024. Some member states like Denmark have long been active in advancing democracy abroad, but a lack of internal consensus on priorities has meant that most EU democracy support comes in the form of technical assistance when requested from host governments. And even with effective transatlantic alignment on democracy and human rights, Beijing or Moscow will be quick to paint those efforts as the return of the imperial masters (as China’s Global Times did in 2022 with a doctored photo of the G7 foreign ministers clad in the khaki uniforms and pith helmets of their armies during the Boxer Rebellion).</p> +<p>To do this, the AISI network should emphasize its unique position to provide technical expertise and capacity to governments working on wider AI governance efforts. In the past year alone, numerous government initiatives have been launched to ensure responsible frontier AI development, including the Biden administration’s AI executive order, the EU AI Act, the G7 Hiroshima AI Process Code of Conduct, and the March 2024 UN resolution on AI. These initiatives, though commendable, are often staffed by diplomats who lack the depth of in-house technical expertise that the AISI network has demonstrated an ability to amass. It is this expertise that could turn what are currently high-level principles and frameworks into practical implementation for developers.</p> -<p>Nevertheless, the combination of Russian and Chinese political interference and Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine has raised the focus of European governments and thought leaders on the democratic challenge facing the free world. The participation of Japan, South Korea, Australia, and New Zealand (known as the IP4) in NATO summits indicates the possibility for greater unity of effort globally by the net exporters of security in the international system. Europeans may have soured on American democracy, but polls indicate they have soured on China more and are looking to expand strategic partnerships with Japan, South Korea, India, and Australia in ways they would not have five years ago. The coalition-building opportunity is to strengthen the Euro-Pacific link as much as it is to reenergize the transatlantic one. The American approach to sub-Saharan Africa also requires European partnership to be effective, and there is growing recognition in Brussels that democratic backsliding requires new efforts to keep open civil society space, broaden political participation to women and other groups, and beat China in the digital game to ensure a clean and open information environment.</p> +<p>For instance, the G7’s code of conduct instructs developers to “identify, evaluate, and mitigate risks across the AI lifecycle,” but provides little guidance as to how. While the G7 has partnered with the OECD to develop this level of specificity for the code of conduct, it would greatly benefit from the testing and evaluation tools that the Seoul Statement names as one of the potential areas for collaboration within the AISI International Network. Network members should consider how to engage with other international organizations’ AI efforts with these synergies in mind.</p> -<p>Latin America continues to hold democratic elections, but monitoring by Freedom House, the Economist Intelligence Unit, and the Bertlesmann Stiftung Transformation Index in 2023 all found overall negative trends, including rising authoritarianism and political strife. China and Russia have enabled authoritarian sustainability in countries like Cuba and Venezuela and have largely been given a pass by democracies like Mexico or Brazil. Yet Latin America’s democracies continue to hold elections and maintain the key institutions of democratic governance and accountability, including functioning legislatures and courts and high levels of public education. The opportunity lies in international support for strengthening those institutions.</p> +<p><em>9. Will the network remain a closed group of high-capacity countries, or will it be open to any country that wants to join?</em></p> -<p>In summary, despite a disturbing global landscape of democratic backsliding and closing civic space, there are multiple opportunities emerging for coalitions to form in support of democratic norms. When the Biden administration hosted the first Summit for Democracy in 2021, the aim was to harness just such a coalition. However, the terms of participation were largely dictated from the White House, and key partners ranging from Japan to India attended with trepidation at the signal being sent by excluding strategic swing states like Thailand and Singapore.</p> +<p><strong>Recommendation:</strong> The AISI International Network was born out of recognition that AI risks do not stop at national borders. It therefore makes sense that the network should be open to more members that want to join. A wider membership would help to build international agreement on AI safety science and potentially to continue to reach economies of scale on AI safety institutes. Furthermore, incorporating more developing countries’ perspectives early on — either through full membership or agreements — could bring new insight into AI safety risks that current AISI network members and their companies may have missed.</p> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Despite a disturbing global landscape of democratic backsliding and closing civic space, there are multiple opportunities emerging for coalitions to form in support of democratic norms.</code></em></strong></p> +<p>However, network members will have to consider the serious trade-offs between expanding the network’s membership and diluting its current nimbleness and consensus as a small group. Even countries or blocs that are closely aligned in values to current members may lack the technical expertise to meaningfully contribute to the network, thus raising the costs of collaboration and possibly reducing its impact.</p> -<p>The second Summit for Democracy in 2023 was cohosted with South Korea, the Netherlands, Costa Rica, and Zambia, giving a stronger sense of empowerment to regional – and, importantly, non-Western – democracies. The second summit faced some criticism because the host countries narrowed the focus of democratic challenges to fit their respective regional vantage points ratherthan addressing universal concerns. However, its efforts to provide a more inclusive space for discussions on addressing global democratic challenges were received as a much-welcomed approach by the participants, including those from Africa – where at least 24 countries, including many summit participants, held elections that year. The opportunity abroad is not to form what Robert Kaplan once called a “League of Democracies” under U.S. leadership, but rather to develop a strategy that recognizes the variable geometry of regional relations and looks for leadership within regions and civil society.</p> +<p>One way to address this could be requiring prospective members to demonstrate their ability to meaningfully contribute to the network — such as through a minimum degree of expertise and capacity — before they can join. The purpose here is not to make the AISI network into an elite club, but to recognize that the network’s goal of accelerating AI safety science cannot be realistically achieved by expanding membership to everyone who wants it. The AISI network could consider partnership programs with other international organizations like GPAI, the OECD, or the Group of 20 (G20) in order to collaborate with interested countries that do not necessarily have the depth of AI safety expertise to join the network. Such partnerships could help to foster wider international cooperation on AI safety and engage more developing countries on the AISI network’s efforts in particular.</p> -<p>By the time of the third summit, hosted by South Korea in March 2024, however, it was clear that an opportunity was missed to play to democracy’s strengths – its vibrancy, creativity, and direct connection to protecting human dignity. What could have been an opportunity to celebrate the fruits of free, democratic expression, such as music, art, literature, and debate, became a dreary long march of scripted panel discussions, leader statements, and commitments to “be better.” Nowhere was democracy precisely defined, an oversight when its definition is unclear to many and under attack by others.</p> +<h3 id="conclusion">CONCLUSION</h3> -<p>This requires a level of sophistication, nuance, and volume control that does not come naturally to American political discourse. But of course, domestic political support is essential.</p> +<p>The AISI International Network marks a significant next step in global AI safety efforts. The network provides an opportunity to build international consensus on definitions, procedures, and best practices around AI safety; reach economies of scale in AI safety research; and extend U.S. leadership in international AI governance. The similarities between currently established AISIs in terms of size, funding, and functions provide a strong basis for cooperation, though network members must be aware of the different institutions in which different AISIs are housed.</p> -<h3 id="the-challenges-and-opportunities-at-home">The Challenges and Opportunities at Home</h3> +<p>While the Seoul Statement is a good start for multilateralizing cooperation between AISIs, network members must now decide how to turn intent into action. At the November convening in San Francisco, they should strive to set the network’s goals, mechanisms, and international strategy in preparation for the AI Action Summit in February 2025. In doing so, they must ask tough questions, including about priorities, leadership, and membership.</p> -<p>Formulating a strategy to counter these trends would be challenging enough if the threats were exogenous, but American democracy itself is also being corroded in the current environment by forces both international and domestic. In 2023, the Pew Research Center found that public trust in the federal government was ticking downward again after a brief uptick in 2020 and 2021, with fewer than 20 percent of Americans saying they trusted the government in Washington to do what is right.</p> +<hr /> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">American democracy itself is also being corroded in the current environment by forces both international and domestic.</code></em></strong></p> +<p><strong>Gregory C. Allen</strong> is the director of the Wadhwani AI Center at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C.</p> -<p>Declining trust in democratic governance is a problem across many of the societies that should be part of an international coalition to defend and advance democratic norms. Cambridge University’s Bennet Institute found in surveys that across the Western democracies, majorities of young respondents expressed lack of confidence in their own democracies. However, the United States suffers from particular structural factors at present, including gerrymandered districts, the rise of “angertainment” programs, the demise of local journalism, and the lack of compulsory voting – all of which tend to skew election results away from the ideological center and exacerbate partisanship. Partisanship has also infected the ability of Congress and the American people to rally around a common national vision for protecting and advancing democracy internationally. In 2023, a narrow majority of Republicans for the first time said that they favor less U.S. involvement in global affairs, reflecting a “make America great again” repudiation of Reagan’s vision in the 1982 Westminster speech. Yet Republicans are also far more likely than Democrats to believe that the United States is the greatest country in the world, given the left’s own growing penchant for casting the West and capitalism as illegitimate, a 2021 Chicago Council on Global Affairs survey found. This polarization between the increasingly vocal left and right wings of politics makes the very definition of a democracy agenda more complicated. Older Republican supporters of former president Donald Trump are far less likely to support democratic Ukraine, for example, while younger Democratic voters are equally less likely to support democratic Israel.</p> +<p><strong>Georgia Adamson</strong> is a research associate with the Wadhwani AI Center at CSIS.</p>Gregory C. Allen and Georgia AdamsonThe AI Seoul Summit launched an international network of AI safety institutes in May 2024. Now, they must work to define their goals, mechanisms, and the strategy to accelerate AI safety science.Stay Ahead2024-10-29T12:00:00+08:002024-10-29T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/stay-ahead<p><em>This report gives recommendations on export controls, global tech governance, domestic incentives for building tech capabilities in chips and clean technologies, and the future of international tech cooperation and competition.</em></p> -<p>Yet division at home is no reason to retreat from a robust strategy of supporting freedom abroad. The Founding Fathers did not promise the world a perfect government, just a system of government that would provide the opportunity to work toward a “more perfect union.” There are opportunities to forge a common national purpose around democracy at home because majorities of the American people also recognize what is at stake – and because the United States’ most important allies and partners do as well.</p> +<excerpt /> -<h4 id="the-opportunities-for-consensus-at-home">The Opportunities for Consensus at Home</h4> +<h3 id="introduction">INTRODUCTION</h3> -<p>Despite polarization overall, Americans agree on some key elements of what would constitute a strategy to advance democratic values globally. In the Chicago Council on Global Affairs survey cited above, Americans listed “strengthening democracy at home” as second only to “strengthening education” as a necessary tool to remain a leading power. In the same survey, 86 percent of Americans listed strengthening democracy abroad as either “important” or “very important,” with only 4 percent replying that it was “not important at all.” Congressional funding for the major tools of democracy promotion has increased over the past few years, with budgets for the NED and its affiliate institutes, the U.S. Agency for Global Media (USAGM), and internal State Department programs to counter Chinese and Russian disinformation all expanding at double-digit rates.</p> +<p><strong><em>Resolving the Emerging Economic Security Trilemma</em></strong></p> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Despite polarization overall, Americans agree on some key elements of what would constitute a strategy to advance democratic values globally.</code></em></strong></p> +<p>The United States is in the midst of a generational shift in economic policy and its role in national security planning. Even in these polarized times, there is surprising consensus across the American political spectrum that the economic policies and global institutions fostered since World War II are no longer adequate. They have left the United States vulnerable to competition with non-market actors, principally China; domestic economic dislocations; and global crises such as climate change and pandemics. These vulnerabilities persist and will await the next administration.</p> -<p>Congressional support for the tools of democracy promotion reflects the growing recognition that democracy is at risk abroad, but perhaps the greatest driver is the national consensus that the United States must rally to defend its interests against an increasingly coercive and revisionist China. Indeed, China policy is one of the few areas of real bipartisan consensus in Washington today, as indicated by the comity of the cochairs and the activism of the House Select Committee on the Chinese Communist Party. Even the Heritage Foundation, which has attracted criticism from Democrats and many independent media for proposals in its Project 2025 to supercharge presidential authority in a second Trump administration, issued a report on China calling for an emphasis on democracy and human rights. This political consensus will prove a double-edged sword, though. On one side, the clarity of purpose around strategic competition with China is yielding resources, focus, and presidential-level attention. On the other side, casting this fight for democracy as a contest with China can alienate key allies and partners that will be critical to forming a coalition in support of democratic norms, and perhaps distract governments from problems with democratic governance that are important on their own merit and not just derivative of competition with China.</p> +<p>Global technology competition continues to gather pace. Earlier this year, U.S. secretary of commerce Gina Raimondo compared the contemporary chips race to the space race of the 1960s: a new Sputnik moment. Indeed, we may be living through five Sputnik moments at the same time across semiconductors, artificial intelligence (AI), quantum computing, climate technologies, and biotechnologies. Losing our edge in any one of these areas – especially, the triad of chips, AI, and quantum – could meaningfully diminish the United States’ economic prospects and national security. As Darío Gil, chair of the National Science Board and senior vice president and director at IBM Research, noted at the board’s 490th Meeting, “science and technology are the new currency of global power.”</p> -<p>It is also important to emphasize that despite the fascination with culture wars and authoritarianism on the right wing of the Republican Party, the mainstream Republican leadership includes some of the most vocal and active leaders on democracy and human rights in Congress, such as Senators Dan Sullivan and Marco Rubio. Similarly, while the progressive wing of the Democratic Party may criticize democratic nations such as Israel or India for perceived democratic regression (among other issues), the party overall sees no contradiction between speaking frankly with friends and allies about concerns – and accepting the same in return – and pursuing a strategic foreign policy. In short, there are leaders in Congress who could play a central role in forging a bipartisan consensus around championing democracy and human rights in U.S. foreign policy despite the polarization that besets the country and both parties. The key is for leaders in both parties to frame the strategy in ways that are inclusive of common values shared across the aisle and that reflect the interests of the American people regardless of party.</p> +<p>Staying ahead of the technology race is more challenging than ever. The United States and its allies must contend with a primary competitor that uses its scale and prowess to weaponize innovation, flout fair competition, exercise control over vital value chains, and engage in economic coercion. Meanwhile, China continues to reap the benefits of having played the long game with countries around the world, particularly in the Global South. At stake for the United States and its allies is their long-term prosperity, the resilience and security of their markets and democracies, and the rules-based economic order they fostered for three generations.</p> -<h3 id="toward-an-integrated-democracy-strategy">Toward an Integrated Democracy Strategy</h3> +<p>As these realities have come into clearer view in recent years, the past two U.S. administrations have put their respective stamps – in design and tenor – on “economic security,” rewriting the implicit contract between governments and markets. Under the Biden administration, U.S. economic security policy evolved dramatically in pursuit of competitiveness, resilience, and national security goals. G7 and other allies followed suit, with policymakers in Japan and the European Union codifying formal economic security frameworks, creating mandates within their respective governments, and developing similar policies.</p> -<p>A successful U.S. values-based foreign policy must move away from the historic pendulum swings between idealism and realism if it is to sustain domestic and international support and have strategic effects. Just as “integrated deterrence” has emerged as an essential component of defense strategy, so too the United States and its allies will need a new “integrated democracy strategy” to prevail in the battle of norms. The point is not that military, economic, or diplomatic objectives should be subordinated to human rights or democracy priorities, but rather that these strategies should be integrated in national security planning alongside diplomatic, military, and economic objectives.</p> +<p>The United States, in pursuit of competitiveness and resilience goals, has implemented promote measures entailing unprecedented public and private investments in reviving U.S. chipmaking and building capabilities across clean tech and other technologies. A second set of measures has sought to align competitiveness and national security goals by protecting technologies and markets by expanding export controls, sanctions, and investment screening, as well as a continuation of strategic tariffs. A third, in part to counter China, has involved plurilateral economic cooperation agreements with partners on supply chain resilience and the energy transition, as well as bilateral initiatives on technology innovation.</p> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">A successful U.S. values-based foreign policy must move away from the historic pendulum swings between idealism and realism.</code></em></strong></p> +<p>Early implementation has shown signs of industrial revival across the United States: private sector investment commitments – domestic and foreign – in strategic sectors such as chips, clean power, clean-tech manufacturing, and others totaled over $900 billion over the past four years. And protect measures such as export controls have blunted Chinese and Russian acquisition of dual-use technologies. And yet, implemenation challenges have emerged, along with second-order effects.</p> -<p>One useful point of reference is the U.S. military’s traditional “DIME” construct for assessing threats and instruments of power. The diplomatic, military, and economic pillars have been fairly consistent over time, but the “I” has evolved from “intelligence” to “information.” One more evolution is needed, and that is to consider the ideational – that is not just the competition of information and narratives but the much more foundational competition of norms and ideas. This would reflect the reality that ideational contests, whether in the United States, Asia, Europe, or the Global South more broadly, are closely related to Chinese and Russian efforts to undermine U.S. power: its alliances, forward presence, economic interests, and political principles alike. If realism is about accurately assessing power dynamics, then it should be clear – as Joseph Nye noted in conceiving the concept of “soft power” – that the ideational dimension of competition is becoming as important as the diplomatic, military, or economic. Asserting the importance of information in the Information Age should not be a stunning insight. In the end, this is a matter of power and realism and not just à la carte idealism.</p> +<p>While export controls on Russia degraded Putin’s war machine in the early days, their efficacy has been tested by transshipment from third countries and Russia’s continued reliance on Chinese chips and chipmaking materials. Similarly, while new U.S. export controls initiated in 2022 and 2023 blunted China’s access to sensitive AI chips, Beijing has responded with its own industrial policies to “design out” and circumvent U.S. controls and standards. It has also enacted tit-for-tat trade restrictions on processed critical minerals – a key chokepoint in the chips and electric vehicle value chains.</p> -<p>An integrated democracy strategy would harness all tools of national power in an all-of-government but also all-of-society framework. Coalition building with democratic allies and partners along with businesses and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) would reinforce the traditional approach of outreach to civil society groups. The incentives and risk tolerance for business, allies, civil society, and different government agencies will vary, so this is not a matter of a single operational plan to be implemented by all actors so much as a variable geometry of coalitions to attack key problems, such as corruption, free speech, electoral integrity, government oversight and accountability, information integrity, and rule of law. The strategy would have to be authorized by the president, drafted by the National Security Council, coordinated with Congress, overseen from within the White House, and ultimately operationalized by individual agencies in support and coordination with one another. The following are key elements of this strategy that would need to be implemented by the United States.</p> +<p>Tensions between the protect, promote, and partner strategies have emerged, particularly regarding the use of subsidies, tax breaks, and domestic sourcing requirements aimed at promoting U.S. chipmaking and clean technologies. These policies have sparked concerns among key allies – Japan, South Korea, and the European Union – over a subsidy race that could disadvantage their own industries. Similarly, the U.S. government has led efforts to engage partners via new economic cooperation agreements such as the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF) and the Americas Partnership for Economic Prosperity (APEP). These agreements, however, do not come with either increased market access or meaningful financing benefits that partners seek, in part due to U.S. domestic political considerations. These do not fare well relative to China’s long-term play in the Global South, notwithstanding concerns about the Belt and Road Initiative’s flaws, including debt overhang and poor standards in some countries.</p> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">An integrated democracy strategy would harness all tools of national power in an all-of-government but also all-of-society framework.</code></em></strong></p> +<p>Given these limitations, the bigger question is whether the promote-protect-partner framework adds up to a long-term economic security strategy. The answer to that question will depend on how effectively the next administration navigates the emerging “economic security policy trilemma.” While not quite an impossible trinity, the trilemma means that policymakers will be able to pursue any two sets of measures (for example, promoting domestic industries and protecting dual-use technologies) but not without sacrificing the third (for example, deep integration with supply chain partners). This collection of essays from leading experts at CSIS’s newly formed Economic Security and Technology Department is our contribution to this debate.</p> -<h4 id="harness-democratic-allies-and-partners">Harness Democratic Allies and Partners</h4> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/zr0zDJW.png" alt="image01" /> +<em>▲ <strong>An Emerging Economic Security Trilemma.</strong> Source: Author’s own creation.</em></p> -<p>This is not a matter of recruiting allies and partners to a singular strategy but rather empowering them to shape debates and reinforce democratic norms internationally and in their own regions. The best framing for this effort in Asia, Africa, or Latin America is around sovereignty, prosperity, resilience, and national self-strengthening rather than justice or strategic competition with China and Russia. Empirical demonstrations that accountability, transparency, rule of law mechanisms, and women’s empowerment enhance national wealth and strength will be powerful.</p> +<p>An immediate priority is to assess the impact of protect measures such as export controls, sanctions, investment screening, and strategic tariffs, including their second-order effects. Greg Allen and Barath Harithas underscore the importance of building the capabilities of the Department of Commerce and related departments. But that alone will not be enough: the United States must work effectively with allies, as James Andrew Lewis argues, on forging a post–Wassenaar Arrangement technology alliance with meaningful European and Asian buy-in. At some point, though, Scott Kennedy warns, the administration’s use of defensive measures will stretch the United States’ ability to militate the rules-based economic order that it has fostered for decades.</p> -<p>The NED’s Sunnylands Initiative on democracy in the Indo-Pacific is a useful example of how thought leaders in a region can help to validate and align a democracy strategy to their unique context while reinforcing that universal norms are indeed universal. First started in Sunnylands, California, by the NED and CSIS in 2020 and continued in Odawara, Japan, in 2022 and other locations in the Indo-Pacific, each Sunnylands meeting culminates in diverse regional thought leaders drafting and signing a joint statement with a vision and action plan for broad regional cooperation on advancing democratic norms and governance, including expanding support for democracy advocates at risk, grants to regional civil society organizations, and early warning of regional democratic setbacks.</p> +<p>Ultimately, the most critical long-term path for the United States is to out-innovate China across advanced technologies. The CHIPS and Science Act as well as Inflation Reduction Acts put in place a number of building blocks of a strategy – investments in industrial infrastructure, research and development (R&amp;D), and the workforce; a creative capital and investment attraction program; and partnerships with supply chain partners. As Sujai Shivakumar notes, the United States will need to finish the swing with investments in technology clusters and R&amp;D cooperation that will require a sustained bipartisan effort to bear fruit. Adam Frost calls for a national security–focused approach to directing U.S. government financing in critical and emerging technologies. In addition, Joseph Majkut highlights the need for technology enablers such as access to clean power, along with a large transmission infrastructure, to fuel AI and advanced manufacturing.</p> -<p>Similar initiatives in other regions would yield results. It is critical that democratic values be owned and advanced not just by Euro-Atlantic peoples but by a broad range of cultures and contexts to prevent self-interested autocrats from speciously claiming cultural alienation from those values.</p> +<p>Promote tools alone are limited: innovation does not happen in isolation, not to mention the cost of promote tools to the taxpayer amid already unprecedented levels of federal debt. Rather the time- and stress-tested drivers of innovation are competition in secure, trusted international technology markets and cooperation with allies, including on research and development and supply chains. Strong enforcement of intellectual property rights, Kirti Gupta argues, is essential if innovators are to enter markets. Given the global and distributed nature of technology value chains (from base materials to end products), Ilaria Mazzocco reminds us of the productivity benefits that will accrue to U.S. clean tech firms that take risks, compete in global markets, and integrate into value chains.</p> -<p>Critics of a democracy agenda often assume such a policy must entail dividing the world into strict blocs – democratic vs. authoritarian – and jettisoning relationships with those that are deemed nondemocratic. Admittedly, some talk in those terms, and there is little question that relationships among fellow democracies are fundamentally stronger and more sustainable than those with poor or deteriorating human rights records. But ultimately there is no reason one cannot promote democratic norms and still work closely and constructively with nondemocratic nations in areas of common purpose and strategic interest, including in the normative sphere.</p> +<p>Nowhere are competitive markets and a favorable investment climate more important than in the Global South. Without meaningful market access or substantial financing commitments, Bill Reinsch and Erin Murphy argue, agreements such as IPEF are unlikely to attract long-term buy-in from partners. As a reminder of what is possible, Rick Rossow points out that the U.S.-India commercial partnership, including its focus on chips, critical minerals, and other critical and emerging technologies, could prove pivotal for both countries, with potential spillovers for others.</p> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">There is no reason one cannot promote democratic norms and still work closely and constructively with nondemocratic nations in areas of common purpose and strategic interest.</code></em></strong></p> +<p>We are well into the era of economic security. The need for an allied approach is now axiomatic, but it will require the United States to lead and partner in equal measures. The challenge for the next administration is to build on the early lessons of recent years and devise a long-term, bipartisan economic security strategy that balances domestic goals with international cooperation and the complexities of the global markets.</p> -<h4 id="harness-the-business-community">Harness the Business Community</h4> +<h2 id="protecting-sensitive-technologies-preserving-us-advantage">Protecting Sensitive Technologies, Preserving U.S. Advantage</h2> -<p>The business community should be particularly inclined to see the merit of this approach and positioned to shape outcomes based on the need for a level playing field in overseas markets. As a 2021 task force report by CSIS, the McCain Institute, and Freedom House put it:</p> +<h3 id="mismatch-of-strategy-and-budgets-in-ai-chip-export-controls">Mismatch of Strategy and Budgets in AI Chip Export Controls</h3> <blockquote> - <p>Any serious effort to promote democracy and counter authoritarianism must include measures to combat corruption and kleptocracy, which have become business models for modern-day authoritarians. Corruption and its weaponization by authoritarians harms effective governance, undermines economic growth, and weakens the rule of law. It corrodes public trust and is interwoven with security issues like organized and transnational crime, terrorism, human rights abuses, and conflict.</p> + <h4 id="gregory-c-allen">Gregory C. Allen</h4> </blockquote> -<p>U.S. trade policy, though anemic compared with years past, can still provide an important tool to reinforce good governance and accountability. The Trans-Pacific Partnership agreements provided market access that incentivized Vietnam to improve labor rights and transparency. The current Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity (IPEF) offers no such market access opportunities but could still be utilized to strengthen rules on digital trade, labor rights, and the environment where those priorities align with other key partners like Japan, Australia, or South Korea. Global standards on anti-corruption can also be compelling for governments because of the clear link to improved investment and growth, as the Financial Action Task Force has demonstrated. The business community will be less well positioned to use its leverage to protect democrats at risk or impose punishments for human rights abuses, except when legislation, national policy, or reputational risk compel them to do so – as occurred with the Uyghur Forced Labor Protection Act signed into law in 2022. Nevertheless, private sector and trade policy levers can have significant impacts on anti-corruption, transparency, and good governance that in turn reinforce accountability to the governed.</p> - -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">The business community should be particularly inclined to see the merit of this approach and positioned to shape outcomes based on the need for a level playing field in overseas markets.</code></em></strong></p> - -<h4 id="harness-civil-society-and-support-democrats-at-risk">Harness Civil Society and Support Democrats at Risk</h4> - -<p>An effective integrated democracy strategy would be an “all of the above” strategy. Companies or smaller allies might not be able to accept the risk associated with condemning human rights abuses or protecting democrats at risk. Size does matter, and the U.S. government can absorb retaliation in a ways no other state or firm can. Consequently, the president and the secretary of state should meet with and speak out for dissidents or champions of freedom like the Dalai Lama even when that carries diplomatic risk. Legislation passed in Congress by a wide margin in 2024 to counter disinformation against the Dalai Lama is another example of the bipartisanship that is possible on such issues.</p> - -<p>Consistency in this regard is critical: it encourages those on the front lines of freedom, it sets an example for other world leaders, it keeps authoritarian states on notice, and it prevents a backlash at home that could force overcompensation that proves more destabilizing for diplomacy. It is worth noting that Reagan developed a strong dialogue with Mikhail Gorbachev despite years of support for dissidents and George W. Bush did the same with former Chinese president Hu Jintao despite regular meetings with the Dalai Lama. The key was that these presidents did so out of conviction and not political calculation. That conviction must remain consistently in evidence to avoid the appearance that support for dissidents is gratuitous, episodic, or politically motivated.</p> - -<p>U.S. support for accurate reporting of democracy and human rights conditions is equally important. The organizations under the USAGM (such as Radio Free Asia, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, and Radio Marti) should remain robustly resourced and free to spotlight conditions as they find them. In the same vein, U.S. ambassadors need to understand the strategic value of democratic norms and be both authorized and equipped to speak confidently and assertively about them in their assigned countries. Likewise, officers in U.S. embassies must be authorized to report fully and accurately on issues such as trafficking, human rights, or women’s rights as they find them.</p> - -<p>Finally, U.S. funding of global democracy support work should continue to increase and U.S. State Department and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) funding should continue going toward building capacity of democratic institutions, including domestic civil society groups. The funding should not – as most Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) donors choose – be based on host government preferences. In fact, Japan and South Korea have begun debating how to delink some grants so that they can go directly to civil society groups. The U.S. government should encourage this trend and allies’ broader support of democratic institutions internationally. Support for marginalized groups may not always be popular with host governments, but it builds more resilient and accountable societies. For example, empowering women has proven an effective tool for achieving accountability in ceasefires and trade agreements, sustaining the peace once achieved, and increasing economic productivity.</p> - -<h4 id="do-not-cede-international-institutions">Do Not Cede International Institutions</h4> - -<p>China’s growing diplomatic influence in bodies such as the UN Human Rights Council has proven frustrating for U.S. diplomacy. However, it is worth remembering these and other major international institutions are fundamentally American in origin. Eleanor Roosevelt herself lobbied to integrate her husband’s Four Freedoms into the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Moreover, international institutions have proven useful in ways not originally envisioned. The Helsinki Accords were signed in 1975 with one basket (of four) focused on emigration, press freedom, and social issues. Most negotiators at the time had low expectations that these areas would be implemented, but they ultimately proved crucial to holding the Soviet Union to account for the free emigration of Jews and other human rights issues over the next 15 years.</p> - -<p>The United States cannot cede the field in these international institutions; rather, it should engage and seek to shape them in normative directions for which they were originally conceived. The position of the democracies is stronger than the results reveal. Beijing’s influence is a result of effort and not just size. When the Human Rights Council debated whether to put the UN Human Rights Commissioner’s report on crimes against humanity in Xinjiang on its agenda in 2022, President Xi Jinping personally called members of the council to persuade them to vote against the move. The United States relied on its ambassador in Geneva to rustle support and even then, China won by only two votes.</p> - -<p>Stepping up the effort on these battles is important, as retreat would</p> - -<ul> - <li> - <p>allow China, Russia, or Iran to increasingly turn these institutions into mouthpieces for their values and norms and against the United States and its allies with the Global South, while advancing resolutions endorsing China’s Global Civilization Initiative, defending Russia’s war in Ukraine, and reflexively condemning Israel</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>make it much more difficult to use these institutions to address true human rights violations</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>deny the United States a key forum for aligning positions on crucial human rights and democracy issues with allies and partners and to coordinate international approaches</p> - </li> -</ul> - -<p>It will also be important to look beyond the UN institutions to consider regional organizations. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) established an Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights in 2009, which has underperformed in the face of coups in Thailand and Myanmar and shows a general division over values. Yet capacity building and engagement with the commission could yield future dividends in the ways the Helsinki Accords surprised many. The African Union established the Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights in 1987 (when the grouping was still the Organization of African Unity). That commission is more active than ASEAN’s and regularly calls out member states for human rights violations. The United States has been relatively unengaged with the Pacific Islands Forum, which also has a secretariat with a charter to advance good governance and democracy. These regional organizations can be far more effective venues for advancing human rights and democracy for the obvious reason that they reflect regional values and priorities. Beijing is stepping up its own diplomatic engagement and offering significant funding to these regional organizations, for example, building the African Union’s new headquarters building in Addis Ababa. The United States and its allies should not be constructing buildings, but they can do more to invest in work on democracy, good governance, and human rights.</p> - -<h4 id="enhance-us-strategic-communications">Enhance U.S. Strategic Communications</h4> - -<p>Authoritarian regimes can often prove more agile than democracies at disseminating information and maintaining message discipline, but they also have a far weaker brand to sell. Democratic allies enjoy the advantage of representing norms – including open access to quality information – that are desired by billions of people worldwide, along with an honest interest in the sovereignty and well-being of others. The United States and its allies ought to play to these strengths by developing an information strategy that supports local independent media, facilitates access to balanced news and analysis, and actively counters false and self-interested narratives advanced by authoritarians. In addition to ensuring adequate resourcing of existing USAGM global media entities, a new entity ought to be established to provide free-of-charge, fact-based information to Global South countries whose media are littered with PRC and other authoritarian-influenced propaganda.</p> - -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Democratic allies enjoy the advantage of representing norms – including open access to quality information – that are desired by billions of people worldwide.</code></em></strong></p> - -<p>The U.S. government has long suffered from an inability to develop, let alone coordinate, a disciplined strategic communications strategy, with the Pentagon focused on “cognitive warfare” and the State Department on “public diplomacy.” While strategic oversight from Washington is required, there is a risk of overcentralizing implementation. U.S. ambassadors in the field, in partnership with local embassy staff and civic partners, are likely to have a far more nuanced and effective understanding of local media and narrative environments.</p> - -<p>While in recent years the United States has become adept at using instruments such as the State Department’s Global Engagement Center to better understand how and where PRC and Russian disinformation have made inroads in third countries, the United States needs more tools to address the challenge, including those outside of government. One successful example is the CSIS Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, which demonstrated how independent research institutions can sometimes move more nimbly, with more credibility, and have broader impact than the U.S. government can. In the democratic space, think tanks and independent NGOs have the reach to not only assess the challenge and be effective messengers on disinformation but also to build capacity, jointly develop solutions, and create networks among countries facing similar challenges. At the same time, it will be important that these institutions retain their independence and not be used as mouthpieces for U.S. or other governments’ national narratives.</p> - -<p>In short, while an “all of government” approach to countering disinformation has proven challenging, an “all of society” approach will bring certain advantages that closed, authoritarian states will not enjoy.</p> - -<h4 id="harness-digital-technology">Harness Digital Technology</h4> - -<p>The State Department’s recent report on PRC disinformation activities highlighted the important role of digital technologies, particularly social media, in enhancing the growing threat of AI-enhanced deepfakes and algorithmically proliferated attacks on democracies and the idea of democracy itself. Those organizations working for democratic governance, particularly international NGOs, need support to develop and share the digital tools necessary to fight back. The conflict in Gaza has offered an alarming picture of what losing the digital information battle looks like, with one poll showing that the majority of young people who claim to support the slogan “from the river to the sea” do not know which river or which sea to which it refers.</p> - -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">The United States and its allies must support digital literacy</code></em></strong></p> - -<p>The United States and its allies must support digital literacy not only at home but also in third countries. The U.S. government should partner with, and as needed regulate, social media giants to ensure that they take responsibility for the disinformation on their platforms. Governments should actively support those seeking to develop digital tools that are explicitly (and algorithmically) designed to enhance conversation and compromise – in other words, democratic norms – and not hate and division. The Open Technology Fund and similar democracy-affirming organizations should receive increased funding to this end. This is crucial in societies with relatively higher levels of political polarization and citizen mistrust toward traditional news media, which are more vulnerable to disinformation activities by domestic and foreign actors alike. In more open economies with a larger and more diverse set of competing advertising and social media markets, exposure and susceptibility to disinformation content is especially concerning. David Lauer’s study of social media platforms like Facebook, for example, underscores that their algorithms can exacerbate societal divisions and polarization by often promoting eye-catching and inflammatory content such as disinformation, extreme political views, and conspiracy theories to garner greater public engagement over their commercial rivals.</p> - -<p>The United States and its allies should also lead on establishing international principles on AI, oppose the unauthorized and unlabeled use of deep fakes, and establish norms that may be adopted in nations most vulnerable to Chinese or Russian disinformation, particularly around elections. The United States has already made significant strides in this area. In February 2024, the Biden administration launched the Artificial Intelligence Safety Institute Consortium (AISIC), fulfilling its commitment from the first global AI Safety Summit in the United Kingdom in November 2023. Collaborating with over 200 technology companies and organizations, including Apple, the consortium is housed within the U.S. AI Safety Institute and ensures that the U.S. government plays a pivotal role in setting national AI standards and developing tools to mitigate potential risks from the emerging technology. The U.S. AI Safety Institute will also collaborate with its international counterparts, already including the United Kingdom’s AI Safety Institute, on developing methods of evaluating the safety of AI tools and the systems that underpin them.</p> - -<p>Additionally, in July 2024 members of Congress proposed the Content Origin Protection and Integrity from Edited and Deepfaked Media Act (COPIED Act) to protect original content from unauthorized use in AI training. These moves reflect the increasing recognition among U.S. political and private industry leaders of the need for a robust approach to AI safety, both domestically and internationally.</p> - -<h4 id="sustain-bipartisan-consensus">Sustain Bipartisan Consensus</h4> - -<p>As with most foreign policy issues, bipartisan unity and executive-congressional consensus will ensure strategic continuity and enhance prospects for success in advancing U.S. interests. As noted, leading members of both parties in the Senate and the House have expressed strong commitment to defending and promoting democratic values globally to counteract the malign influence of China, Russia, and others. While differences remain between and within political parties on specific policies, their unity of principle offers a critical strategic opportunity that must be cultivated. In partnership with a compliant White House going forward, a bipartisan coalition could help frame, fund, and overcome political logjams to advance a values-based foreign policy that reflects the best traditions of the United States and defends U.S. security against the authoritarian onslaught, while demonstrating to allies, partners, democratic activists, and autocratic adversaries alike that American unity, solidarity, and sustained commitment to the issue are as strong as ever.</p> - -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Leading members of both parties in the Senate and the House have expressed strong commitment to defending and promoting democratic values globally to counteract the malign influence of China, Russia, and others.</code></em></strong></p> - -<p><em>FINAL NOTE: DEMOCRACY AT HOME</em></p> - -<p>Some will charge that the United States has little credibility to promote democratic values globally when its own democracy is in such disrepair. This is a false dichotomy. There is no doubt that the American example matters. The United States does the authoritarians’ work for them when democratic practices are undermined at home or its politicians mirror the rhetoric, actions, and attitudes of authoritarians in their conduct. The U.S. democratic model is often considered the ultimate standard – despite endemic flaws throughout its history – so when egregiously dysfunctional, it can degrade the democratic brand overall.</p> - -<p>But the logic behind the intrinsic value of democracy and democratic norms in international affairs stands on its own, independent of the health of U.S. political society at any given time. America’s domestic challenges, if anything, only make it more urgent that other democratic nations step forward to fill gaps or complement U.S. democracy promotion work. Struggling populations around the world are not waiting for the United States to get its house in order before seeking dignity and rights for themselves. To the contrary, they are seeking international solidarity and support more than ever. Regardless of what is happening at home, the institutionalization of democratic norms globally will remain critical to U.S. strategic interests and those of other like-minded peoples around the world.</p> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Regardless of who wins the November 2024 election, export control represents a great deal of unfinished business for the next presidential administration to take on.</code></em></strong></p> -<h3 id="conclusion">Conclusion</h3> +<p>Two dates from 2022 are likely to echo in geopolitical history. The first, Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine on February 24, hardly needs further explanation. The second is one that many Americans may not recognize. On October 7, 2022, the U.S. Department of Commerce issued new export control regulations that placed a de facto ban on U.S. sales to China of the most advanced computer chip hardware that powers modern artificial intelligence (AI) models.</p> -<p>If a strategist were told that a single factor would advance global peace, development, health, and security outcomes while making one the natural ally of billions of people worldwide, one would think that issue would be considered a strategic priority. But dismissal of – if not hostility toward – considering a twenty-first-century democracy agenda remains far too prevalent. Saddled with mental baggage fortified by excesses from the recent past, too many policymakers and strategists resolutely avoid considering a careful and creative approach to integrating democracy promotion into the U.S. foreign policy tool box.</p> +<p>The United States and China agree that leadership in AI technology is critical to the future of military power. For years, Chinese government and military procurement records openly advertised the desire for U.S. chips to power Chinese AI surveillance systems and new AI military supercomputing facilities. Since more than 90 percent of AI chips used in Chinese data centers are designed by U.S. semiconductor companies and are therefore subject to U.S. export controls, loss of access to the U.S. chip market could put China’s entire future as an AI superpower in jeopardy.</p> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">If a strategist were told that a single factor would advance global peace, development, health, and security outcomes while making one the natural ally of billions of people worldwide, one would think that issue would be considered a strategic priority.</code></em></strong></p> +<p>Grand historical turning points rarely take the form of long bureaucratic documents, but the October 7 export controls were one of those rare times. Ten days after the new regulations came out, Secretary of State Antony Blinken said: “We are at an inflection point. The post–Cold War world has come to an end, and there is an intense competition underway to shape what comes next. And at the heart of that competition is technology.”</p> -<p>In many ways this is odd. For decades the United States and its allies have celebrated the advantages of a forward-leaning U.S. global posture to help shape the international security environment. It should not be a substantial conceptual leap, then, to pursuing a more active, forward-leaning, and thoughtful “shaping” policy in the political realm given the ever-increasing empirical data connecting a more democratic world to global security and development.</p> +<p>Blinken is right. Even though the October 7 export controls were in many ways narrowly targeted on only the most advanced AI chips and chipmaking tools, as a whole, the policy marked a major reversal of over 25 years of trade and technology policy toward China in at least three ways.</p> -<p>Ultimately, a smartly implemented democracy agenda would play to one of the most valuable strategic assets in the U.S. arsenal: the power to inspire and attract billions of people worldwide who seek the same rights and dignity reflected in the American ideal. To that end, the concept of “democracy promotion” must never again be connected to the offensive application of U.S. military power, but instead conducted peacefully and confidently in support of the aspirations of billions around the world for more transparent, accountable, inclusive, representative governance under law. In so doing, democratically empowered citizens globally – in defense of their own interests, protecting their own sovereignty – may become force multipliers in the defining normative competition of the coming century. They can help counter China and Russia as those countries seek to unapologetically shape norms within their own countries and internationally – where might makes right, elite corruption is tolerated if not encouraged, individual freedom is suppressed, information is controlled or manipulated, and strongman rule replaces rule of law.</p> +<p>First, the controls were targeted at multiple chokepoints across the semiconductor supply chain, blocking sales not only of the advanced AI chips being used by the Chinese military but also the advanced software and equipment required to make them. The United States is trying to ensure that China cannot replace what the United States is no longer willing to sell.</p> -<p>Democracy is said to be in decline. But it is better understood to be under attack. From Myanmar to Belarus, Nicaragua to Hong Kong, Venezuela to Zimbabwe to Ukraine and beyond, millions of citizens in every corner of the globe continue to fight for their political rights and liberties even in the face of unspeakable violence. Those frustrated with the quality of their politics – including in troubled democracies – are seeking not less of a voice in political affairs but more. Not fewer rights and protections, but more. Not less democracy, but better democracy. And they’re looking for allies.</p> +<p>Second, the export controls apply on a geographic basis for China as a whole, not just to the Chinese military. That is a response to China’s strategy of military-civil fusion, which has worked to deepen and obscure the linkages between China’s commercial technology companies and China’s military.</p> -<p>The good news is supporting democratic development is not financially costly and plays to America’s strengths. But some creativity and urgency in developing a coherent democracy support strategy is needed. Failing to do so while watching American adversaries shape global norms that conform to their illiberal model will have profound effects on U.S. and allied security.</p> +<p>Third, previous U.S. export controls were designed to allow China to progress technologically but to restrict the pace so that the United States and its allies retained a durable lead. The new policy, by contrast, in some cases aims to actively degrade China’s technological capabilities. Without access to the United States’ enabling technology, many leading Chinese semiconductor firms have been set back years.</p> -<p>In short, focusing only on the “three D’s” of U.S. foreign policy – defense, diplomacy and (economic) development – will be insufficient to meet the challenges of the twenty-first century. A fourth “D” – democracy – must be added as the essential foundation for the rest.</p> +<p>It took a long time for the United States to get here. After decades of ratcheting Chinese government provocations, the Biden administration basically said, “enough is enough.”</p> -<hr /> +<p>This is not a policy of decoupling (yet), but it is proof of the United States’ unwillingness to remain tightly coupled to the Chinese technology sector under previous conditions. Subsequent policies, such as the Treasury Department’s outbound investment restrictions on China’s AI and semiconductor industries, hint at the United States’ desire for more comprehensive economic security and technology.</p> -<p><strong>Michael J. Green</strong> is a non-resident senior adviser and Henry A. Kissinger Chair in Strategy at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) and professor and CEO of the United States Studies Centre Sydney.</p> +<p>But there is a critical gap between the strategic importance and sophistication of the policy’s design and the resources that the government is allocating to enforce it.</p> -<p><strong>Derek Mitchell</strong> is a non-resident senior advisor with the Presidential Office and Asia Program at CSIS. Between 2018 and 2023, Ambassador Mitchell was president of the National Democratic Institute, a U.S.-based nonprofit, nongovernment organization dedicated to supporting democratic development worldwide.</p>Michael J. Green and Derek MitchellAuthoritarian states are targeting weaknesses in democratic governance to undermine U.S. interests across the globe. It is time for a bipartisan strategy that rallies alliances, business, and civil society actors in defense of democratic governance and human rights.China In Multilateral System2024-10-23T12:00:00+08:002024-10-23T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/china-in-multilateral-system<p><em>China is gaining influence within the international institutions that the United States has created, funded, and legitimized. China’s strategic positioning in multilateral bodies has allowed it to exert considerable influence, particularly within the UN system.</em></p> +<p>The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) at the U.S. Department of Commerce is the agency charged with enforcing export controls, not just on semiconductors bound for China but for all U.S. dual-use technology exports that might end up in Russia, Iran, North Korea, or other restricted destinations. To implement its work overseeing trillions of dollars in economic activity and policing smuggling operations worldwide, BIS has fewer than 600 employees and a relatively paltry budget of just under $200 million. Semiconductors are just one technology category out of hundreds that this organization is responsible for enforcing.</p> -<excerpt /> +<p>Reporting by The Information found at least eight Chinese AI chip-smuggling networks, with each engaging in transactions valued at more than $100 million. China is betting that its network of smugglers and shell companies can find the leaks in the BIS export control enforcement barrier. As long as Congress continues to neglect BIS by providing grossly inadequate resources compared to the size and importance of its mission, China has a reasonable expectation of success. BIS needs not only more money, but also more skilled staff, more enforcement agents, and better enabling technology, especially for data analysis.</p> -<h3 id="introduction">Introduction</h3> +<p>Moreover, the Department of Commerce needs more help from the rest of the government, in particular the U.S. intelligence community. Declassified Central Intelligence Agency documents show that the intelligence community was deeply involved in assisting export control enforcement during the Cold War and delivered solid results by doing so. These are capabilities and priorities that have significantly atrophied in the post–Cold War era but urgently need to be restored.</p> -<p>The landscape of great power competition within multilateral institutions has significantly evolved over the past few decades, reflecting broader shifts in global power dynamics. The United States, historically dominant in these forums, now faces increasing competition from China and other emerging powers. Absent of a challenger, China is gaining influence within the international institutions that the United States has created, funded, and legitimized. China’s strategic positioning and substantial investments in multilateral bodies have allowed it to exert considerable influence, particularly within the United Nations system.</p> +<p>Regardless of who wins the November 2024 election, export control represents a great deal of unfinished business for the next presidential administration to take on.</p> -<p>China’s approach includes placing its citizens in key leadership positions, increasing staffing, and boosting unearmarked financial contributions to multilateral institutions. This strategy not only enhances China’s influence over global policies but also promotes its development model and geopolitical interests in the Global South. Despite being the largest financial contributor to many international organizations, the United States has seen a relative decline in its influence, partly due to financial constraints, strategic missteps, and underrepresentation in staffing. Building on the 2021 CSIS report The Future of U.S. Leadership in Multilateral Development Institutions: A Playbook for the Next 10 Years, this policy brief presents recent trends regarding the Global South’s growing alignment with China and suggests ways for the United States to reclaim its influence within the multilateral system.</p> +<p>Finally, the United States cannot do this alone. U.S. allies need to take a good look at their own export controls and broader economic security toolboxes. There are some innovative economic security policy experiments going on in places like Taiwan, South Korea, and Japan. Allies need to share information on best practices, align approaches, and devote appropriate resources to have a reasonable chance of success.</p> -<h3 id="chinas-rising-influence-in-the-multilateral-system">China’s Rising Influence in the Multilateral System</h3> +<h3 id="from-reaction-to-strategy">From Reaction to Strategy</h3> -<p>Multilateral institutions play a crucial role in collaborative governance and consensus building, reflecting broader shifts in global power structures. Since their inception nearly eight decades ago, the United States has maintained a preeminent norm-setting role in these institutions, leveraging its economic and political influence to shape international agendas and advocate for Western values. However, this influence has been steadily declining, coinciding with the rise of China as a formidable player on the global stage. At the same time, developing countries have demanded a greater voice in shaping these institutions in ways that are distinct from the priorities of both the United States and China.</p> +<p><strong><em>A New Framework for U.S. Export Control Enforcement</em></strong></p> <blockquote> - <h4 id="box-1-exerting-influence-in-multilateral-organizations"><code class="highlighter-rouge">Box 1. Exerting Influence in Multilateral Organizations</code></h4> + <h4 id="barath-harithas">Barath Harithas</h4> </blockquote> -<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">China has a track record of using multilateral institutions to promote its interests under the guise of the UN flag and in contravention of UN rules requiring agency heads to act as neutral international civil servants rather than agents of their home country.</code></em></p> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">It is critical that the U.S government does not engage in a reactive dance that leads to overstretch and inevitable failure. Crucially, the United States must more effectively rally allies to join the fray, transforming a fragmented response into a united front.</code></em></strong></p> -<ul> - <li> - <p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Under Chinese leadership, the International Civil Aviation Organization, which decides global flight paths and which airspace belongs to what countries, has excluded Taiwan from the organization.</code></em></p> - </li> - <li> - <p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">A UN whistleblower, a former employee of the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), has alleged China’s use of intimidation of human rights defenders, bribery, and edited documents to remove mention of unflattering realities, such as facts about the origins of the Covid-19 virus and human rights abuses in China.</code></em></p> - </li> - <li> - <p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">In October 2022, the United Nations Human Rights Council voted on whether to hold a debate on human rights violations against Uyghur Muslims in Xinjiang after the OHCHR released an assessment that found evidence of serious abuses, including possible crimes against humanity. China managed to garner enough support to kill the resolution, with 19 votes against it, 17 in favor, and 11 abstentions. China successfully avoided further discussions and accountability for its human rights violations, including “mass arbitrary detention, widespread torture, sexual violence, coercive birth suppression, family separation, forced labor, and repression of religious and cultural practices in Xinjiang.”</code></em></p> - </li> - <li> - <p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">By placing Chinese nationals in senior positions, China aims to boost the presence of Chinese tech companies, garner support for Chinese state-backed initiatives, and push the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)’s authoritarian norms. After being reelected unopposed as the International Telecommunication Union’s (ITU) secretary general, Houlin Zhao, whose previous experience includes developing telecommunications standards for the Chinese government, insisted that allegations of Huawei’s 5G equipment being used for espionage were baseless and politically motivated. Under the pretense of digital inclusion, the ITU touted its role in Huawei’s rollout of digital infrastructure in nearly 80 countries, impacting 90 million people in remote areas. Huawei is the same Chinese corporation responsible for developing and implementing surveillance technology, including facial recognition and a “Uighur alert” system, to enable China’s techno-authoritarian model of governance. The CCP leverages the United Nations’ specialized agency for digital technologies to push for authoritarian norms and sell its mobile network equipment and surveillance systems to train its own artificial intelligence. The ITU has adopted dozens of standards proposals from Chinese companies such as Huawei. The ITU’s standards are then adopted by developing countries that lack regulatory agencies of their own. that lack regulatory agencies of their own.</code></em></p> - </li> -</ul> +<p>The United States has relied on a “siege wall” of export controls to keep critical technologies (e.g., advanced semiconductors) out of Chinese hands. There have been increasing reports highlighting the leakiness of export controls, calling into question the efficacy of what increasingly appears to be a technology Maginot Line for the United States. In light of selective failures, critics have rushed to declare export controls ineffective, overlooking the complexities that inform their enforcement and impact.</p> + +<p>The effectiveness of export controls cannot be reduced to a simple binary assessment; it is contingent upon the specific product categories in question. For instance, the smuggling of chips has proven alarmingly straightforward. In 2023, NVIDIA shipped over a million leading-edge chips, each valued at approximately $40,000 and portable enough that 609 units can fit into a single freight box. Conversely, ASML sold only 53 state-of-the-art extreme ultraviolet (EUV) lithography machines in 2023, each costing $350 million and requiring 13 truck-sized containers and 250 crates for transportation, with extensive logistics and post-sales support needed. The latter product category has shown far less evidence of smuggling compared to chips, which have reportedly been smuggled in bulk orders valued over $100 million.</p> -<p>China was largely uninvolved in the affairs of multilateral organizations such as the United Nations until the 1990s. Apart from issues relating to Taiwan, China rarely exercised interest or made voluntary contributions to the United Nations. China’s engagement increased rapidly once it started on the path toward globalizing its economy (see Box 1). China’s increasing influence in the United Nations has become evident through several trends:</p> +<p>This essay offers three recommendations for improving export control enforcement:</p> <ol> <li> - <p><strong>Competing for Leadership Positions:</strong> Through its leadership roles in multilateral forums, China promotes efforts that support its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), influencing global standards and practices in ways that favor its economic and political values and interests. Beijing has cultivated UN leaders, such as Secretary-General António Guterres, to champion the BRI and align it with the UN Sustainable Development Goals. Under Chinese leadership, the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) has emphasized projects that dovetail with BRI objectives, raising concerns among Western leaders about China’s potential to undermine the integrity of multilateral institutions.</p> - - <p>In 2021, Chinese nationals led 4 of the 15 major UN specialized agencies: the FAO, the International Civil Aviation Organization, the International Telecommunication Union (ITU), and the United Nations Industrial Development Organization. Additionally, China sought leadership of a fifth agency, the World Intellectual Property Organization, but that effort was successfully thwarted. Nevertheless, the leadership positions held by Chinese nationals in key agencies underscore China’s strategic positioning within the UN system and its intent to influence global policies and priorities in critical areas such as international development and technological advancement.</p> + <p>Enforcement efforts must prioritize areas where compliance is most tractable. This requires a clear-eyed understanding of the objectives behind export controls. The goal is not merely to prevent specific end products from reaching China; rather, the true litmus test of these controls lies in their ability to impede China’s indigenization campaign.</p> - <p>African nations, as the largest regional bloc in the United Nations, with a 28 percent voting share, have played a crucial role in supporting China’s rise within multilateral institutions. A robust focus on Africa continues to pay dividends for China in multilateral fora, as evidenced by African support in electing Chinese nationals to the lead positions in four UN principal agencies, as well as securing deputy slots in nine others. African votes have also been pivotal in the passage of U.S.-opposed Chinese resolutions and increasing China’s representation within the UN Secretariat and various UN funds and programs, further solidifying Beijing’s influence.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Increasing Its Personnel Footprint:</strong> China has strategically increased its presence within multilateral institutions by boosting staff numbers. The number of Chinese nationals employed by the United nations nearly doubled from 2009 to 2022, reaching 1,564 personnel in 2022. In tandem, China sponsored 32 UN junior professional officers (JPOs) and 590 other professional staff between 2015 and 2021, achieving rapid growth in just five years. To counterbalance China’s growing personnel footprint and increase the number of U.S. nationals in international organizations, the U.S. Department of State has made efforts over the past three years to publicize JPO vacancies in international institutions.</p> + <p>For instance, while preventing advanced semiconductors from reaching China is crucial, the greater concern is ensuring that China cannot manufacture these technologies at scale. Controls should target more strongly critical chokepoints such as semiconductor manufacturing equipment, especially EUV machines, service and repair components, and electronic design software. Given the inherent leakiness of export controls for chips, it is crucial to recognize that these measures are at best a tool to increase acquisition costs for China in the short run. The ultimate long-term objective, however, must focus on undermining China’s efforts toward technological indigenization and self-sufficiency.</p> </li> <li> - <p><strong>Flexing Its Financial Muscle:</strong> Over the past decade, China has more than quadrupled its discretionary contributions to multilateral development institutions, including significant voluntary funding directed to multilateral development bank (MDB) concessional financing windows and specialized UN entities.China’s role in the World Bank has also expanded significantly since it joined in 1980. By 2013, it had become the third-largest shareholder in the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the World Bank’s lending arm, with 5.03 percent of the voting power. This not only reflects China’s economic growth but also deliberate policy choices aimed at enhancing its global influence. China’s level of funding is still a fraction of that provided by the United States, but China has been able to mobilize this funding to advance national priorities in ways that the United States has not.</p> + <p>The current approach to export control enforcement resembles a game of “whack-a-mole,” where smuggling networks emerge, vanish, and reemerge faster than they can be addressed. To overcome this cycle, regulators need to move from the reactive blacklisting of suspicious entities to implementing a preapprovals regime. In other words, instead of fixating on whom to bar from the game, authorities should shift their focus toward who gets to play. By so doing, regulators can more effectively limit the avenues available for smuggling.</p> - <p>China’s financial influence also includes substantial contributions to the World Bank’s International Development Association and specialized UN entities such as the International Fund for Agricultural Development, the World Food Programme, and UNICEF. In addition, within the UN system, China created the UN Peace and Development Trust Fund in 2016 with a $200 million contribution over 10 years, supporting peacekeeping, rapid response, and conflict prevention and mediation. It remains the only donor to this fund and has explicitly stated that the fund is intended to align the United Nations’ Agenda 2030 with the BRI. Additionally, in 2018, due in part to African lobbying, China placed an 8,000-strong standby force at the United Nations’ disposal for crisis deployment, and China is now the largest troop contributor among the UN Security Council’s permanent members.</p> + <p>This can be operationalized through: (1) establishing a certification process during initial procurement to create a marketplace of trusted sellers and to enhance compliance knowledge among stakeholders; (2) implementing digital waybills to reduce documentation fraud and improve traceability, thereby addressing customs evasion; and (3) mandating the use of preapproved logistics providers who are required to report any consignments not received within a specified timeframe to the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) at the Department of Commerce. This measure will help identify suspicious entities and facilitate timely spot checks, creating a more effective feedback loop for detection and enforcement.</p> </li> <li> - <p><strong>Leveraging New Institutions to Pursue Commercial Interests:</strong> To challenge the current global order, or to respond to what it sees as unfair treatment, China has established new multilateral organizations and partnerships, particularly with the Global South, such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and the New Development Bank, where it is the largest or co-largest shareholder and which exclude the United States. These institutions not only enhance China’s financial and strategic reach but also provide a platform for promoting its development model and policy preferences.</p> - - <p>The strategic engagement of Chinese firms in multilateral institutions further underscores China’s expanding influence. China’s ability to integrate its commercial interests with its strategic objectives has led to the prominence of Chinese firms in MDB contracts. In 2019 alone, Chinese firms won contracts worth $7.4 billion from major MDBs, representing 14 percent of total contracts by value. In recent years, Chinese firms have continued to rise to be the top or near-top recipients of contracts from MDBs. Between fiscal years 2013 and 2022, Chinese businesses were awarded around 20 percent of all contracts from the World Bank, positioning them as its top contract recipients. This dominance in procurement reflects institutional rules favoring the lowest bids and the substantial presence of Chinese firms in infrastructure sectors. China’s commercial benefits from these contracts align with its broader strategy of leveraging economic tools to gain political and strategic advantages within multilateral frameworks.</p> + <p>The United States must work more closely with allied partners to multilateralize export controls. U.S. export restrictions on their own are insufficient. They must be the portcullis of the castle, not its keep. The current stalemate stems from the United States expecting allies to mirror its controls, while partners have been overly cautious, fearing such actions might set a precedent for future expectations. This dynamic is unsustainable. The United States must acknowledge the economic concerns of its allies, while allies must recognize that failure to act could result in the United States imposing stricter measures in bilateral settings. There is common interest on both sides to accept a “highest-common-denominator” approach to multilateral controls. By aligning interests, even imperfectly, the United States can enhance collective enforcement capabilities, thereby flushing out the smuggling quarry from remaining avenues.</p> </li> </ol> -<h3 id="chinas-strategic-engagement-with-the-global-south">China’s Strategic Engagement with the Global South</h3> - -<p>China’s strategy extends beyond merely filling top positions and personnel in the multilateral system; it actively shapes the norms and policies of these institutions to align with its broader geopolitical goals. More importantly, China presents itself as a developing country and leading advocate for the Global South.</p> - -<p>Beijing has articulated a doctrine that places development and multilateralism at the forefront of Chinese foreign policy: “Big powers are the key, China’s periphery the priority, developing countries the foundation, and multilateral platforms the stage.” Through platforms such as the AIIB and the Islamic Development Bank (IsDB), Global South nations gain access to substantial economic aid, infrastructure development, and investment – critical for their development goals. China has had a long-standing relationship with the IsDB and, in recent years, established a partnership to assist bank members in constructing anti-pandemic infrastructure. China’s involvement provides these countries alternatives to Western-led financial institutions, often with more favorable terms and less-stringent conditions regarding governance and human rights standards.</p> - -<p>Additionally, China’s diplomatic strategy includes steering nations toward its commercial sector. In recent years, China has significantly increased its presence in countries such as Sri Lanka, Cambodia, Djibouti, Venezuela, Laos, and others through strategic and significant foreign direct investment and foreign aid. Many of these countries now align themselves more closely with China’s geopolitical interests, resulting in diminished reliance on traditional Western partners, including the United States. Nations that engage in deals with China do not face consequences from the United States, even when the United States is a major donor or trading partner.</p> - -<p>China is actively using personal engagement to strengthen ties and leverage its position, often filling the vacuum left by U.S. neglect in various regions. In Africa, for example, where U.S. influence has been waning in recent years, China has maintained leading engagement among the continent’s central, eastern, and southern countries. In these regions, China fosters visits and interactions with senior security leaders across various sectors, including the army, air force, navy, and police, supporting Beijing’s strategic goals and agenda on the continent. China has also established 53 embassies in Africa – three more than the United States.</p> - -<p>Moreover, high-level visits have not been a regular feature of U.S.-Africa relations. However, the Biden administration has recently increased its focus on China, leading to more high-level engagements with African nations. In 2023, 17 cabinet members and leaders of U.S. government departments and agencies visited 26 African countries. Despite this uptick, these efforts pale in comparison to China’s sustained attention to Africa. For 33 years, Chinese foreign ministers have consistently made Africa their first stop in annual overseas travel, a standard practice so routine it garners no special media attention. Xi Jinping personally made 10 visits to Africa between 2014 and 2020.</p> - -<p>As a result of these trends, China’s influence within multilateral institutions has profoundly shaped the positions and voting behaviors of Global South countries on key global issues. This influence became particularly evident through their voting patterns on critical matters such as the war in Ukraine, human rights violations, and the status of Taiwan.</p> - -<h4 id="russias-full-scale-invasion-of-ukraine">Russia’s Full-Scale Invasion of Ukraine</h4> - -<p>Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, many African, Asian, and Latin American countries have abstained from voting on resolutions condemning Russia’s actions. During the March 2022 emergency voting session on the “Aggression against Ukraine” resolution in the UN General Assembly, 17 African countries abstained from voting and an additional eight declined participation. This abstention reflects a diplomatic balancing act, influenced by economic and political ties with the West, China, and Russia. It demonstrates the nuanced positions these countries adopt to maintain favorable relations and avoid jeopardizing economic partnerships.</p> - -<p>The abstentions and opposition to the resolutions against Russian aggression may reveal a growing assertiveness among countries of the Global South in shaping their foreign policies independently of traditional power blocs. Alternatively, the abstentions could be a reaction against what is seen as “the West” prioritizing a war in Europe over deadly conflicts in the Global South. The abstentions may also reflect countries’ unwillingness to involve themselves in a conflict that does not concern them. Regardless, this trend is indicative of a broader shift toward a multipolar world where Global South countries seek to assert their independence and protect their interests on the global stage.</p> - -<h4 id="human-rights-violations">Human Rights Violations</h4> +<p>In conclusion, as any middling tactician knows, eventually all walls are outflanked. The real question is how easily, and therefore which ones truly deserve our focus. Moreover, given the leanness of BIS, it is critical that the U.S government does not engage in a reactive dance that leads to overstretch and inevitable failure. Crucially, the United States must more effectively rally allies to join the fray, transforming a fragmented response into a united front. By clarifying objectives, refining enforcement strategies, and fostering multilateral cooperation, the United States can reclaim control over the rules of the game and tilt the odds in favor of success against slippery evasion strategies. These recommendations not only address the immediate challenges posed by export control enforcement but also contribute to a more coherent and effective strategy in the long term against technology transfer to adversarial nations.</p> -<p>In addition, China’s influence extends to human rights issues, where many Global South countries align with China’s positions on sensitive topics such as Xinjiang, Tibet, and Hong Kong. During the 2022 vote on holding a Human Rights Council debate on human rights violations in Xinjiang, most African countries abstained or voted against the resolution in a show of support for China. This alignment stems from China’s extensive economic engagements and development assistance, which create an implicit expectation of political backing in international forums. China’s strategic investment and aid allow it to build a network of allies that support its positions in multilateral organizations.</p> +<h3 id="defensive-measures-against-china">Defensive Measures Against China</h3> -<h4 id="status-of-taiwan">Status of Taiwan</h4> +<p><strong><em>Time for a Reevaluation</em></strong></p> -<p>China’s influence also plays a critical role in issues of sovereignty and territorial integrity, particularly concerning Taiwan. Most Global South countries, influenced by their economic and diplomatic ties with China, not only profess adherence to the One China policy but go further by adopting Beijing’s preferred language of the “One China principle.” For example, Eswatini is the only African nation to recognize Taiwan. This diplomatic stance is crucial for China as it seeks to isolate Taiwan internationally. Support from these countries in international forums ensures that resolutions or statements potentially supportive of Taiwan rarely pass, consolidating China’s position and preventing any diplomatic recognition of Taiwan.</p> +<blockquote> + <h4 id="scott-kennedy">Scott Kennedy</h4> +</blockquote> -<p>The alignment of Global South countries with China often results in the dilution of Western-led efforts to address issues such as human rights abuses, democratic governance, and territorial disputes. This shift complicates the balance of power within multilateral institutions, making it more challenging for Western nations to garner support for their initiatives. Consequently, this dynamic can lead to a fragmented international order where achieving consensus on critical global issues becomes increasingly difficult, impacting the effectiveness of global governance.</p> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">If current trends continue, the U.S. and Chinese economies will be decoupled in many areas, not just advanced technologies with military applications. And it is just as likely that the result of this division will be either global fragmentation or an isolated United States.</code></em></strong></p> -<h3 id="recommendations">Recommendations</h3> +<p>On a recent trip to China, I visited a Chinese firm that is on the U.S. Department of Commerce’s Entity List. When discussion turned to their designation, they claimed utter disbelief and surprise; they could not fathom what prompted Washington’s action. It is possible that their claims of innocence are genuine, but given their place in an important high-tech sector, likely links to the Chinese party-state, and the nature of some of their customers, one can also see why the U.S. government would have taken this step.</p> -<p>The change in landscape discussed above may have initially caused some challenges, but it is time to reflect inward, assessing U.S. shortcomings in strategy and execution more than focusing on what others have done. An urgent mission objective for the United States and its allies should be to restore primacy in the multilateral system. Many of the actionable steps the United States can take toward reclaiming power ceded to China are connected and more complicated than they may appear, but they are critical to achieving foreign policy objectives through the multilateral system.</p> +<p>In fact, it may be difficult to disagree with most, if not every, individual decision the U.S. government has taken in the last five years to protect itself in the face of the broad national security challenge China presents to the United States, its allies, and the rules-based global order. Nevertheless, the cumulative effect of all of this action deserves careful evaluation. And where the result is not as intended, Washington needs to recalibrate its policy approach.</p> -<ul> - <li> - <p><strong>Establish priorities, align resources, and coordinate across U.S. missions.</strong></p> +<p>There are now around 1,000 Chinese companies and institutions blacklisted by the United States for national security or human rights reasons. The list of “controlled items” that require a license to be exported to China has ballooned, and in the case of advanced semiconductors and semiconductor equipment, the restrictions are country-wide. Extremely high U.S. tariffs – far above standard most favored nation (MFN) levels – are now applied to most Chinese goods, even those with no strategic value. The coverage of sectors in which screening of inward investment deals apply has expanded dramatically, while the United States and its allies have started developing new regulations for outward investment to China. As a result of a law passed in the spring of 2024, social media app TikTok will be banned in the United States unless ByteDance, its parent company, sells the platform to a non-Chinese owner. The Biden administration recently adopted a draft executive order that would ban Chinese connected and autonomous vehicles and their components from the U.S. market starting with the 2027 model year. The administration and Congress are considering a wide range of other defensive measures as well.</p> - <p>To regain leadership in international organizations and counter China’s growing influence, the United States should establish regular communication channels between U.S. representatives at international organizations, relevant home bureaus at the State Department, and U.S. country missions worldwide. This will help the United States better understand the domestic environments and specific needs of Global South countries, enabling it to build support in capitals for its preferences, address reasons for their alignment with China, and strengthen bilateral and multilateral relationships.</p> +<p>What does all of this activity add up to? Is it worth it? And might there be a better way? It is time to ask – and answer – these and many other questions. There are at least four potential negative consequences that emerge from this tidal wave.</p> - <p>Improving interagency cooperation within the U.S. government is another crucial step for achieving foreign policy goals and enhancing overall diplomatic effectiveness. Utilizing integrated digital platforms for communication and management of policy implementation, which allow for real-time sharing of data and insights, can significantly improve interagency workflow and efficiency.</p> +<p>The Biden administration argues that it is pursuing a “small yard, high fence strategy,” meaning that it aims to protect national security while having as limited an impact on commerce as possible. Mitigating national security vulnerabilities from commerce with China – known as de-risking – may have been the original goal and still may be the overall purpose. But the breadth of the actions and the tit-for-tat, action-reaction by Washington, Beijing, and others is resulting in a far greater reduction of bilateral business and rerouting of supply chains than is reflected in the official policy framing. If current trends continue, the U.S. and Chinese economies will be decoupled in many areas, not just advanced technologies with military applications. And it is just as likely that the result of this division will be either global fragmentation or an isolated United States.</p> - <p>However, enhanced communication and coordination are meaningless without established priorities. The United States should develop a priority list of top multilateral issues for missions to focus on. This prioritization will help guide missions in addressing the most pressing global challenges and ensure that U.S. efforts are concentrated where they will have the greatest impact. This approach will enable the United States to effectively mobilize resources, advocate for key initiatives, and foster partnerships that align with its values and interests, countering the influence of other major players such as China in the Global South. Matching resources and communication channels to prioritizations will prevent wasted political capital and maximize the weight of influence wielded in multilateral organizations.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Invest in the diplomatic corps.</strong></p> +<p>Second, and relatedly, while individual measures, such as those on advanced semiconductors and equipment, may initially work or be effective for several years, this is far from guaranteed. Although China has long aimed for greater technological self-reliance, there is ample evidence that the industries it has prioritized, the extent of its financial support and other measures, and the willingness of Chinese industry to actively participate has in part been in reaction to this U.S.-led technology boycott. It is possible that in some areas China will advance faster than it otherwise would have in individual technologies and in occupying the leadership of technology ecosystems. Moreover, as a result of less connectivity with Chinese industry and researchers, U.S. innovation may also suffer. If so, instead of mitigating national security risks, the United States may end making the problem worse.</p> - <p>The United States should prioritize developing personal relationships with political leaders and decisionmakers to enhance its soft power in international diplomacy. This means prioritizing a personal, on-the-ground presence to build relationships and understand the interests and needs of other nations. These relationships are crucial, as they often influence decisions and ensure diplomats remain well informed through regular information sharing. The United States is already moving in this direction by opening new embassies in Pacific Island nations such as Tonga and Kiribati, demonstrating a commitment to foster closer ties. However, more needs to be done on this front.</p> +<p>Third, less connectivity with China means a slower energy transition. Yes, China has unfairly subsidized clean-energy products such as solar panels, wind turbines, batteries, and electric vehicles. And, yes, it sold a substantial portion of overproduction on global markets, threatening competitors in many countries. That said, a straight-out ban of such goods from other markets will necessarily mean less products in the short term. Additionally, if protection is not made conditional on the rapid development of high-quality domestic alternatives at prices the middle class can afford, these restrictions will be for naught.</p> - <p>The United States should also prioritize improving training and providing incentives for diplomats to gain experience in multilateral institutions, with a focus on refining diplomacy skills. Training programs should be enhanced to include comprehensive modules on modern diplomacy, incorporating digital literacy, strategic communications, and crisis management.</p> +<p>And fourth, the U.S. approach is changing the nature of the international economic order in front of our eyes. In the 1960s, in the face of growing competition from Japan and other East Asian countries, the United States and its allies developed the rules and tools for anti-dumping and countervailing duties, and with them the underlying principles of “fair trade.” Although these tools have various biases and are subject to widespread abuse, they did provide compensation to industries that were suffering from greater international competition and, as a result, kept the greater project of globalization alive. The expansion of export controls and other defensive measures is fundamentally challenging the notion – embedded in the original General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the World Trade Organization (WTO) – that national security justifications to restrict international commerce should be limited and the exception to the rule. The rise of “economic security” as a rationale for policy even more directly threatens to make open commerce and financial flows a thing of the past.</p> - <p>The United States is currently undergoing a major overhaul in its approach to training diplomats, making more training a career requirement and developing additional courses for diplomats at all career stages. The U.S. Congress has also mandated in the National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2024 that training related to multilateral diplomacy be included and strengthened. This action recognizes that incentives, such as career advancement opportunities, financial rewards, and recognition, should be provided to encourage diplomats to take on challenging assignments within multilateral institutions.</p> +<p>The seriousness of the Chinese challenge to the United States and the rules-based order requires definitive policies, but it does not justify any and all policies. The United States and its allies need to reassess their approach and adapt as needed. Here are three recommendations:</p> - <p>Establishing a multilateral “cone” for diplomats should be a part of the training overhaul. By having an entire portion of officers specializing in this niche of foreign affairs, diplomats will become knowledgeable of processes unique to these systems and will have already formed valuable personal relationships with diplomats from other countries in the same field. Formalizing a multilateral track within the Foreign Service would produce stronger personnel in vital roles within the multilateral system.</p> - </li> +<ol> <li> - <p><strong>Leverage technology and data.</strong></p> - - <p>The United States should leverage advanced technology and data management systems to improve coordination and strategic decisionmaking in multilateral forums. As diplomacy increasingly demands data-driven insights, integrating technologies like artificial intelligence (AI) and big data analytics will enable the United States to process and analyze vast amounts of information swiftly and accurately, identify patterns, predict trends, and respond to emerging issues more effectively.</p> - - <p>Incorporating these technologies can significantly enhance various diplomatic functions. For instance, AI can sift through social media data to conduct sentiment analysis, allowing diplomats to gauge public opinion and measure the impact of their diplomatic efforts. Big data analytics can also aid in negotiations by removing bias and developing possible scenarios, providing diplomats with a strategic edge. By ensuring continuity and efficiency, information can easily be passed from outgoing to incoming representatives, preventing years of work from being wasted.</p> - - <p>In 2021, the State Department released its first-ever enterprise data strategy, Enterprise Data Strategy – Empowering Data Informed Diplomacy, marking a significant step in the department’s shift toward a data-centric approach. This strategy aims to equip the department’s workforce with timely, data-driven insights crucial for making important mission and management decisions. Since 2021, U.S. secretary of state Antony Blinken has pressed to hire hundreds of data specialists and to build collaboration with the “policy” bureaus in what the State Department calls “Data Informed Diplomacy.” The State Department is now in the midst of deploying AI and considering the range of tasks where it can be of use, as Blinken discussed publicly in late June 2024.</p> - - <p>By investing in data analysis initiatives, equipping diplomats with the necessary skills, and fostering a data-centric culture, the United States can enhance its strategic capabilities. This approach will not only improve coordination and information sharing among U.S. diplomatic missions and international organizations but also offer a compelling alternative to the authoritarian models promoted by China.</p> + <p>The United States needs to decide precisely what kind of outcomes it wants and what kind of outcomes it is unwilling to accept. Is bifurcation of the global economy, even if the United States is relatively isolated, acceptable simply because it means less connectivity with China? Would it be acceptable for the United States to maintain technological advantage over China if it means the elimination of a rules-based order and a race to the bottom in the use of tools to restrict global commerce?</p> </li> <li> - <p><strong>Prioritize strategic engagement with influential UN members.</strong></p> - - <p>Prioritizing engagement with influential countries in the United Nations can help the United States build strategic alliances and regain leadership in international organizations. By understanding and addressing the unique interests and needs of these countries, the United States can foster stronger bilateral and multilateral relationships, thereby enhancing its diplomatic influence.</p> - - <p>Understanding the objectives of others helps the United States to be a better partner. For instance, Brazil seeks to lead initiatives focused on revitalizing multilateral organizations such as the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States and the India, Brazil, South Africa Dialogue Forum. Brazil has also been advocating for UN Security Council reform to gain a permanent seat. By supporting these efforts, the United States can align with Brazil’s strategic goals, promoting cooperation on regional stability, economic development, and social progress. Additionally, Brazil is a key player in environmental issues and sustainable development, particularly given its stewardship of the Amazon rainforest. Collaborating on environmental issues could strengthen U.S.-Brazil relations while contributing to global climate goals.</p> - - <p>Similarly, involving Pakistan in dialogues about security, counterterrorism, and economic development can also open new avenues for cooperation and reinforce the United States’ commitment to stability in South Asia. The International Monetary Fund recently approved a $7 billion loan to Pakistan. Pakistan plays a key role in regional security, especially concerning the situation in Afghanistan. Furthermore, Pakistan is a significant participant in China’s BRI, with projects such as the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor. By addressing Pakistan’s economic development needs and offering alternative partnerships, the United States can counterbalance China’s influence and strengthen bilateral ties.</p> + <p>Washington needs to include cost-benefit analysis for its overall approach and for each policy initiative. The presence of a national security risk does not mean the costs of any one policy are irrelevant. In fact, there are usually multiple possible options to address a risk, and their relative costs and benefits should be weighed, and done so with transparency.</p> </li> <li> - <p><strong>Increase U.S. leadership and staffing in multilateral organizations.</strong></p> + <p>And finally, because this overall shift is so consequential to the U.S. national security and economy, more information about individual cases and the broader national security threat China poses to the United States needs to be shared with the U.S. public. The U.S. government should consider how much more information could be shared without compromising U.S. intelligence methods and sources. The Chinese interlocutors I met during a recent trip may not deserve a clearer explanation, but as a part of a democracy, the American people deserve to know more.</p> + </li> +</ol> - <p>As recommended in the 2021 CSIS report, actively advocating for U.S. candidates in leadership positions within multilateral organizations is essential for advancing U.S. foreign policy objectives and fostering cooperation on shared challenges. The United States must identify and develop qualified U.S. candidates with extensive experience and a deep understanding of international affairs.</p> +<p>It is possible that taking these steps could yield the conclusion that substantial changes in policy are needed. But it is also possible that the current approach could be reaffirmed. Hence, there should be a consensus in favor of being more careful, deliberate, and transparent.</p> - <p>Public endorsements from high-ranking officials, such as the secretary of state, can significantly enhance the visibility and credibility of these candidates. For example, the early endorsement of Doreen Bogdan-Martin for the ITU secretary-general position by the State Department and USAID administrator Samantha Power highlighted a forward-looking strategy that should be emulated. Furthermore, the groundwork for Bogan-Martin was laid years prior under the Trump administration with a successful deputy secretary-general campaign, followed by strong efforts to clear the campaign field so that it was only the U.S. candidate running against Russia’s Rashid Ismailov.</p> +<h2 id="the-investing-in-america-agenda">The Investing in America Agenda</h2> - <p>Such diplomatic efforts are vital in garnering support for U.S. candidates. Utilizing diplomatic channels, including embassies and international forums, to lobby for U.S. candidates is critical. Focusing on organizations where leadership positions are becoming vacant and where U.S. strategic interests are most significant – such as the ITU, International Maritime Organization, FAO, and World Bank – is essential. Collaborating with like-minded countries to counterbalance undemocratic competitors’ influence and maintaining engagement with organizations, even if U.S. candidates are not elected, will further secure U.S. interests.</p> +<h3 id="clustering-for-innovation">Clustering for Innovation</h3> - <p>In addition, seconding staff to key UN agencies allows for the development of relationships with counterparts from other countries, fostering networks that can be leveraged to support U.S. initiatives and candidates for leadership positions. Such positions provide an opportunity to build a cadre of U.S. experts experienced in multilateral settings, improving the United States’ ability to navigate and influence these organizations in the long term. These seconded positions should be targeted toward strategic UN roles that align with U.S. foreign policy objectives and areas of interest.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Invest in economic development to complement diplomatic efforts.</strong></p> +<blockquote> + <h4 id="sujai-shivakumar">Sujai Shivakumar</h4> +</blockquote> - <p>Investing in economic development abroad is crucial for the United States to maintain its leadership role in the international arena and address global challenges effectively. By strengthening development efforts, the United States enhances its ability to shape international norms and standards. In this context, Africa emerges as a critical region where increased U.S. engagement can yield significant geopolitical and economic benefits. One critical aspect is increasing the frequency of visits by senior U.S. government officials and commercial officers to African countries, which can address mutual interests and foster stronger bilateral relationships.</p> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">By fostering the growth of thick regional ecosystems, partnerships encourage more Americans to connect to and have a stake in the nation’s economic future – securing the nation from within.</code></em></strong></p> + +<p>Last month, the Elevate Quantum Tech Hub broke ground on the new Quantum Tech Park in Arvada, Colorado. It is one of 31 Tech Hubs designated by the U.S. Department of Commerce to stimulate innovation-based regional economic growth. This initiative is one part of a larger effort across the federal government to expand and connect innovation networks across the nation.</p> - <p>Enhancing trade and investment is another critical aspect. Reauthorizing initiatives such as the African Growth and Opportunity Act promotes stronger trade ties between the United States and African nations by offering African countries better access to the U.S. market and encouraging economic growth.</p> +<h4 id="the-push-from-the-chips-and-science-act">The Push from the CHIPS and Science Act</h4> - <p>Maintaining strategic dialogue with key African regional organizations, such as the African Union, is also crucial for fostering collaborative relationships and understanding regional priorities and challenges. This dialogue can lead to more effective cooperation on issues such as security, development, and governance, aligning U.S. and African interests.</p> +<p>The CHIPS and Science Act of 2022 established a suite of grant programs designed to catalyze technology cluster development, including the Tech Hubs Program through the Economic Development Administration at the Department of Commerce, the Microelectronics Commons Hubs through the Department of Defense (DOD), and the Innovation Engines through the National Science Foundation (NSF):</p> - <p>By committing to a more robust and consistent diplomatic presence, the United States can build long-term partnerships and counter China’s influence. This approach will not only support U.S. foreign policy objectives but also contribute to the stability and prosperity of developing regions.</p> +<ul> + <li> + <p>The Department of Commerce’s Tech Hubs envisions 31 regional consortia that focus on specific emerging technologies. Starting in July 2024, 12 hubs have each received “implementation funding” between $19 million and $51 million for workforce development and manufacturing initiatives.</p> </li> <li> - <p><strong>Promote modernization in the UN System.</strong></p> - - <p>The United States should prioritize modernization and reform efforts within multilateral forums to ensure these institutions remain relevant and effective in addressing global challenges. As a major contributor to the UN budget, the United States has a vested interest in ensuring that funds are used appropriately. The United States should advocate for various reforms:</p> - - <ul> - <li> - <p><strong>Investing in the Latest Digital Tools and AI:</strong> Modernizing with the latest digital tools and AI is crucial for streamlining data sharing, analyzing global trends, and predicting crises. Such technological advancements can enhance the ability of multilateral organizations to respond swiftly and effectively to emerging issues under U.S. leadership.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Enhancing Transparency and Accountability:</strong> This can be achieved through regular independent audits, public reporting of financial statements, and encouraging whistleblower protections within the United Nations.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Supporting Security Council Reform:</strong> Advocating for the inclusion of new permanent seats for African and Latin American countries will help better reflect global power shifts. Reform to the UN Security Council regarding the permanent members is unlikely to be significant due to ongoing regional competition. Conflicts such as Brazil versus Mexico, Japan versus China, and the challenge of selecting a single African country for a permanent seat make substantial changes improbable. Instead, any changes that occur will remain at the margins, reflecting incremental adjustments rather than comprehensive reform. Additional proposals, such as expanding the G7 to include Australia, South Korea, and the European Union, have been put forward to form a “formal Democracies 10,” or D10, that would promote coordinated actions among democracies.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Reforming the Human Rights Council:</strong> The current incentive structure allows bad actors to seek Human Rights Council membership to pursue their own immunity and protect fellow violators. There are no negative consequences for countries with low human rights standards sitting on the council. This is unacceptable. There must be increased accountability for those with poor marks on the State Department’s annual Country Reports on Human Rights Practices.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Reviewing UN Procurement Policies:</strong> This ensures fair contract distribution, preventing a disproportionate allocation to countries such as China. Although China may not win the majority of UN contracts, its success rate appears higher compared to others, similar to its performance with the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank. This trend highlights the need for more transparent and equitable procurement practices within the United Nations to maintain a balanced and fair competitive environment for all participating countries.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Introducing Clear Performance Metrics:</strong> Regular evaluations of UN agencies are essential to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of their operations. The United States can support these efforts by advocating for the definition of key performance indicators, conducting regular impact assessments, and implementing feedback mechanisms involving beneficiaries and stakeholders.</p> - </li> - </ul> + <p>The DOD’s Microelectronics Commons Hubs consists of eight networks that aim to close the “lab-to-fab” gap in microelectronics for commercial and defense applications, each receiving between $15 million and $40 million.</p> </li> <li> - <p><strong>Pay late dues and leverage funding in the future.</strong></p> - - <p>The United States should address the recurring issue of late payments to the United Nations. This may require paying double in one year to rectify the situation when Congress approves the following year. The Chinese Communist Party does not have the same appropriations process as the U.S. Congress. In pursuit of enabling the secretary of state, a designee of the secretary, or the U.S. ambassador to the United Nations to do their job from a position of strength, rather than constantly playing catch-up, an effort to reconcile the currently incongruent fiscal cycles of the U.S. government and the United Nations would be a worthy endeavor.</p> - - <p>Resolving late payments in Congress should be paired with empowering the secretary of state with clearer, more subjective control over the funds to establish greater diplomatic leverage at their disposal. To be clear, leveraging finances is a separate issue from paying dues on time, but the goal should be to have nothing potentially tainting the authority or credibility of the United States. As it now stands, U.S. diplomats have little to no flexibility in both authority and resource allocation to effectively administer repercussions for bad actors.</p> + <p>The NSF’s Innovation Engines include 10 regions that each have received an initial $15 million in grants covering multiple technology domains, such as robotics, advanced materials, and artificial intelligence.</p> </li> </ul> -<h3 id="conclusion">Conclusion</h3> +<p>The largest awards, at $51 million each, went to four of the Department of Commerce’s Tech Hubs: Heartland Bioworks in Indianapolis, Indiana; iFAB TechHub in Champaign-Urbana, Illinois; Sustainable Polymers Tech Hub in Akron, Ohio; and Tulsa Hub for Equitable and Trustworthy Autonomy in Tulsa, Oklahoma.</p> -<p>The United States cannot abandon its leadership role in the United Nations and other multilateral institutions despite legitimate criticisms of their performance, transparency, and oversight. The United States must “ride herd” on the multilateral system. To counterbalance China’s growing influence, the United States must enhance communication and coordination across its diplomatic missions, invest in training and incentives for its diplomats, leverage advanced technology and data, and prioritize personal diplomacy. Strengthening partnerships with influential UN members and increasing U.S. leadership in multilateral organizations are also critical. Additionally, promoting modernization and accountability within multilateral forums can ensure these institutions remain effective and aligned with democratic values.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/ZTR7iH7.png" alt="image02" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Federal Investments in Regional Emerging Technology Hubs Under the CHIPS Act, 2024.</strong> Source: <a href="https://www.eda.gov/funding/programs/regional-technology-and-innovation-hubs">“Regional Technology and Innovation Hubs (Tech Hubs),“ U.S. Economic Development Administration, accessed October 22, 2024</a>; <a href="https://microelectronicscommons.org/">“The Microelectronics Commons: A National Network of Prototyping Innovation Hubs,“ Microelectronics Commons, accessed October 22, 2024</a>; and <a href="https://new.nsf.gov/funding/initiatives/regional-innovation-engines">“Regional Innovation Engines,“ U.S. National Science Foundation, accessed October 22, 2024</a>.</em></p> -<p>Implementing these recommendations is crucial for the United States to regain and sustain its influence, especially in the Global South. This region is becoming an increasingly significant arena in the great power competition between the United States and China, with its large voting blocs and strategic partnerships. For the next U.S. administration, prioritizing these actions will be essential to countering China’s growing dominance and ensuring that U.S. values and interests are upheld in the international arena.</p> +<h4 id="drawing-in-additional-investments">Drawing in Additional Investments</h4> -<p>In this era of great power competition, it is imperative for the United States to adapt and reinforce its leadership within multilateral institutions. By doing so, the United States can better address global challenges, promote sustainable development, and maintain a balanced international order. Taking a proactive stance will enable the United States to effectively navigate the complexities of global diplomacy and secure a leading role in shaping the future of international relations.</p> +<p>These federal awards are expected to induce investment from the private sector and local governments, and in some cases already have. In addition to their $40.5 million implementation grant from the Department of Commerce, Elevate Quantum received $77 million from the state of Colorado and $10 million from New Mexico, including a portion dedicated to a loan guarantee program. Additionally, Elevate Quantum has attracted over $1 billion in private and venture capital investment. These stacked investments facilitate the creation and expansion of innovation and industrial networks that connect researchers, designers, manufacturers, equipment suppliers, materials suppliers, and end users.</p> -<hr /> +<h4 id="fostering-workforce-training-and-development">Fostering Workforce Training and Development</h4> -<p><strong>Daniel F. Runde</strong> is a senior vice president, director of the Project on Prosperity and Development, and holds the William A. Schreyer Chair in Global Analysis at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C.</p> +<p>Next, by centering workforce development and training, these hubs also help meet the high demand for a skilled technical workforce while ensuring that regional and local communities benefit from their activities. With a sustained focus on education, including vocational training at community colleges, as well as the development of pathways to high-quality jobs, these investments are needed to sustain more inclusive growth within local and regional ecosystems. The new National Science and Technology Council Workforce Center of Excellence, supported by a $250 million investment from the U.S. Department of Commerce, plays a similar role in prioritizing workforce development.</p> -<p><strong>Austin Hardman</strong> is a research assistant with the Project on Prosperity and Development at CSIS.</p>Daniel F. Runde and Austin HardmanChina is gaining influence within the international institutions that the United States has created, funded, and legitimized. China’s strategic positioning in multilateral bodies has allowed it to exert considerable influence, particularly within the UN system.The Military Use Of AI2024-10-22T12:00:00+08:002024-10-22T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/the-military-use-of-ai<p><em>Increasing cross-strait tensions between China and Taiwan suggest the need for the latter to look into the advantages offered by new defence approaches. With a defence budget vastly outpaced by China, Taiwan’s Overall Defense Concept recognises a need to look to cutting-edge technologies to offset scale imbalances.</em> <excerpt></excerpt> <em>This paper examines the challenges and opportunities Taiwan will need to consider for the military application of one such emerging technology: AI.</em></p> +<h4 id="connecting-resources">Connecting Resources</h4> -<p>Key challenges in the use of AI include: data-security concerns; ethical implications of autonomous weapons; unpredictability and unreliability of systems; high costs of implementation and maintenance; potential for increased use of armed force; issues of accountability and responsibility; risks associated with deepfake technology; and the danger of over-reliance on AI systems leading to a loss of traditional human military skills.</p> +<p>Finally, these grant programs actively connect existing and new public and private resources. Some programs span several consortia, allowing for synergies to form across firms, universities, and research organizations engaged in a variety of emerging technologies. For example, the Elevate Quantum Tech Hub is just down the road from the Rocky Mountain Innovation Engine, easing potential collaboration across teams working on quantum, AI, renewable energy, and robotics. Likewise, both the Southwest Advanced Prototyping Microelectronics Commons Hub and Southwest Sustainability Innovation Engine will be hosted by Arizona State University, accelerating mutual advances in fields including advanced manufacturing, 5G/6G, disaster mitigation, and products for end users.</p> -<p>In terms of opportunities, the paper discusses the potential benefits of AI in enhancing situational awareness, improving command-and-control capabilities, and enabling advanced simulations for military training and strategy development. AI-powered systems can process vast amounts of data quickly, providing comprehensive battlefield intelligence and enabling faster, more accurate decision-making.</p> +<h4 id="going-beyond-proximity">Going Beyond Proximity</h4> -<p>The paper emphasises the importance of carefully considering ethical, security and operational factors when integrating AI into Taiwan’s defence strategy. It suggests that effective use of AI could serve as a force multiplier for Taiwan’s military, potentially helping to offset China’s numerical and resource advantages.</p> +<p>This all-of-government strategy to develop a network of connected regional innovation ecosystems recognizes that economically dynamic innovation clusters are an outcome of active and interlinked networks of cooperation among entrepreneurs, investors, educational and research organizations, small and large firms, public agencies, and philanthropies. While successful technology clusters are one outcome of networking, collaboration requires more than simply locating assets in proximity to one another. Multiple actors spread across different organizations need incentives to work together in complex ways to fund, research, develop, scale up, and bring new products and services to the marketplace.</p> -<p>The research underscores the potential of AI to significantly enhance Taiwan’s defence capabilities, while also cautioning about the risks and challenges associated with its implementation. The paper advocates for a balanced approach that maximises the benefits of AI in military applications while mitigating potential drawbacks and ethical concerns.</p> +<p>A suite of public-private partnerships that address the specific challenges of cooperation provides this alignment. The programs discussed above will need to work in complement with other federal and state programs – including partnerships such as the Small Business Innovation Research program, the Manufacturing USA centers, and the Manufacturing Extension Partnership – to grow connective tissue across the innovation ecosystem.</p> -<h3 id="introduction">INTRODUCTION</h3> +<h4 id="need-for-continuity">Need for Continuity</h4> -<p>Scholars may differ on the probability of a Taiwan contingency, but cross-strait tensions between Taiwan and China are rising, and Beijing refuses to exclude the use of military force. The “One China” policy that many countries have adopted limits Taiwan’s ability to rely on collective defence or alliances. Taiwan can expect US support, but as the experience of Ukraine suggests, it needs to be resolute and prepared to defend itself. US allies in the region that are friendly to Taiwan (Japan, South Korea, Australia) may become involved, but there are no legally binding agreements or authoritative policy statements that would make that a reliable planning assumption. Given limitations in resources and difficulties in resupply to the island, to deter China and defend itself, Taiwan must seek advantage from emerging technologies and strategies, such as the military use of AI, while preserving interoperability with its sole security guarantor, the US, through alignment on concepts and systems.</p> +<p>By fostering the growth of thick regional ecosystems, partnerships encourage more Americans to connect to and have a stake in the nation’s economic future – securing the nation from within. They are also essential to drive the nation’s technological competitiveness in global markets and ensure security from external threats.</p> -<p>China’s economic growth over recent decades has given the country a defence budget more than 20 times that of Taiwan, changing the balance of military power across the Taiwan Strait. How can Taiwan respond? The answer lies in the asymmetric strategy of Taiwan’s Overall Defense Concept (ODC), which uses the small to control the big, leveraging Taiwan’s lead in cutting-edge technologies to gain advantage through the military use of AI. The transformation of modern warfare relies on the collection, organisation and manipulation of data: the ODC attempts to maximise Taiwan’s defence advantages by matching the characteristics of the battlefield environment in the Taiwan Strait to the development and application of low-cost, high-efficiency, high-quantity and high-survival weapons. The ODC envisions a large number of miniature missile assault boats, land-launched missiles, mines, attack drones and anti-armour rockets. Its effectiveness requires the use of AI to synchronise situational awareness with kinetic and electromagnetic effects. AI can enhance Taiwan’s defence and operational capabilities, serving as a multidomain force multiplier for other combat platforms and formations. This paper explores the opportunities and challenges associated with the effective use and implementation of AI in Taiwan’s military.</p> +<p>To be successful, partnerships must address the challenges of collaboration across multiple actors, operate at sufficient scale, and be seen as dependable and durable. This means that partnerships need to be evaluated and recalibrated regularly to ensure that they are well focused operationally. It is also important to recognize that innovation partnership programs work in complement with each other, forming mutually reinforcing networks of institutions that solve diverse problems requiring collective action. Moreover, if partnerships are to grow this connective tissue of collaboration, it requires policy patience. Long-term, sustained investments are needed for connections to take root. In this regard, policymakers need to recognize that the CHIPS and Science Act is not a one-and-done deal. Especially in this era of intense innovation-based competition for markets and national power, securing technological leadership must be a substantial and sustained bipartisan effort.</p> -<h4 id="methodology-and-structure">METHODOLOGY AND STRUCTURE</h4> +<h3 id="meeting-the-energy-demands-of-economic-competition">Meeting the Energy Demands of Economic Competition</h3> -<p>The paper’s methodology primarily relied on a review of English-language literature from 2019 to 2024. This is due in part to the scarcity of Chinese-language publications on the subject. However, the main reason for a focus on English-language and in particular US literature is that the US is the only country legally obliged to support Taiwan in securing the means for its defence and committed by leadership statements to come to its assistance. Given Taiwan’s unusual diplomatic status, alignment with US concepts and initiatives is thus of particular importance.</p> +<blockquote> + <h4 id="joseph-majkut">Joseph Majkut</h4> +</blockquote> -<p>The paper has three main sections. The first offers a general outline of the advantages and disadvantages of military adoption of AI. The second explores starting points for the use of AI by Taiwan’s military and addresses the imperative to advance further. The third section evaluates AI prospects for Taiwan’s military and proposes solutions to overcome obstacles. The paper concludes with some key considerations for Taiwan’s government.</p> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">By pursuing immediately available options today and zero-carbon options in the medium term, the United States can realize progress toward strategic goals and improve its competitiveness without sacrificing climate outcomes.</code></em></strong></p> -<h3 id="challenges-and-opportunities-for-the-military-use-of-ai">CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR THE MILITARY USE OF AI</h3> +<p>As the United States adopts a more assertive approach to economic security and technological competition, it must adapt its energy policy. These efforts promise an economy that will be better able to weather global challenges, revitalizing regions with innovative technology and productive jobs and establishing a strong lead in twenty-first-century technologies. However, realizing the potential of these industries will require more energy, placing demands on the electric grid and necessitating a smart approach in order to be successful.</p> -<p>Coined by US computer scientist John McCarthy in 1956, the term “AI” referred to “the potential for creating machines that could simulate human intelligence”. AI denotes a machine’s capability to perform cognitive functions typically associated with the human mind. While there are risks associated with its use in a range of industries, from healthcare to finance, its application in the military domain carries unique challenges.</p> +<p>Under current policies, the United States is building a new industrial base in strategic technologies. Enabled by recent legislation – the CHIPS and Science Act and the Inflation Reduction Act – semiconductor fabs and battery factories now account for 60 percent of manufacturing investment. As these factories come online, they will introduce substantial new power requirements, as documented in a recent report from CSIS. The new TSMC semiconductor fabrication facility in Arizona will require more than a gigawatt of power. In Georgia, where manufacturing is a key driver of economic growth, planners are expecting six gigawatts of additional demand, more than twice what was added by the recently finished Units 3 and 4 at the Vogtle nuclear plant.</p> -<h4 id="risks-and-challenges">RISKS AND CHALLENGES</h4> +<p>For a sector that has seen negligible growth over the past two decades, these are substantial increases, and they do not even account for the rapidly growing power demands involved in artificial intelligence (AI). Akin to factories, AI datacenters transform data and electricity into valuable tokens. The more value AI creates, the greater its associated power demands become. Optimistic projections suggest AI datacenters could consume up to 10 percent of grid capacity by the end of the decade. Such an expansion has the potential to generate immense value but could be hindered by an inability to provide sufficient energy.</p> -<p>Miliary use of AI presents concerns particular to the risks that accompany the use of lethal force. These disadvantages highlight challenges and risks associated with military use of AI, and the importance of carefully considering the ethical, security, financial and human factors involved in leveraging AI technologies in defence strategies.</p> +<p>To achieve these goals, it is important to continue reducing greenhouse gas emissions. The companies driving growth in AI and advanced manufacturing are committed to clean power. And policymakers, on a bipartisan basis, recognize the advantages of producing goods with lower emissions. Compared to adversaries like Russia and China, the United States produces key strategic goods with fewer emissions. As global markets increasingly prioritize sustainability, cleanliness will become synonymous with competitiveness.</p> -<ol> - <li> - <p><strong>Data security:</strong> AI – like any other digital technology – can be hacked or manipulated. When systems are breached, sensitive information can be stolen and exploited, to the advantage of the adversary. In 2015, the US Office of Personnel Management suffered large-scale breaches of government data in the form of theft of confidential data affecting millions of federal employees and contractors. Sensitive personal information of approximately 21.5 million individuals who had undergone background checks, including 5.6 million fingerprint records, was stolen. The vulnerability of systems used to store and process sensitive information raises serious concerns about the ability to safeguard the systems on which AI would depend.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Ethics:</strong> While using robots in combat can reduce the number of human casualties and enhance operational efficiency, ethical questions arise when considering fully autonomous robotic soldiers. The concern is whether it is morally acceptable to allow machines to make life-and-death decisions without human oversight. The South Korean military considered deploying AI-powered sentry robots along the border with North Korea. These robots were equipped with automatic targeting and firing capabilities, raising significant ethical concerns about excluding human judgement. The prospect that they could engage and kill human targets without direct human oversight sparked widespread debate. Critics argued that delegating life-and-death decisions to autonomous machines inherently undermines human dignity and the principles of just war. The use of such AI-powered “killer robots” could lead to wars being fought entirely between autonomous systems, rather than between human soldiers, posing profound ethical questions about the role of human agency in warfare. Further challenges arose regarding accountability and responsibility if a malfunction in these robots were to cause civilian casualties. The “black box” non-transparent nature of the AI algorithms controlling the systems complicated the determination of accountability.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Unpredictability/unreliability:</strong> In 2021, an AI-powered drone strike carried out by the US military in Kabul, Afghanistan resulted in the deaths of 10 civilians, of whom seven were children, instead of the intended Islamic State in Khorasan target. The AI algorithms powering the drone’s target identification and engagement systems had failed to adequately discriminate between military and civilian targets, leading to the terrible loss of innocent and young life. The unpredictability of AI arises from the complexity and adaptability of these algorithms, which can learn, evolve and make decisions in ways that are not fully transparent in or constrained by their initial programming. As they encounter new situations and environments, their actions become increasingly difficult to anticipate with certainty, even when their ultimate goals are known.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Costs and maintenance:</strong> Building and maintaining AI systems in the military sector can incur significant costs, due to the systems’ complexity. Repair, maintenance and frequent upgrades add to the financial burden. In 2019, the US Department of Defense (DoD) awarded Microsoft a $10-billion cloud computing contract as part of its Cloud Strategy; known as the Joint Enterprise Defence Infrastructure (JEDI) project, it used AI to make it more effective. However, significant delays and cost overruns arose due to the complex engineering of the required AI systems. The “opaque nature” of the AI algorithms used in the JEDI project also “raised worries about unintended consequences” and the ability to properly test, validate and maintain these advanced technologies, which resulted in the Pentagon cancelling the contract. The need to ensure the security, reliability and transparency of these AI systems adds further to the complexity and cost of military modernisation, which can hamper the military’s efforts to integrate cutting-edge AI technologies.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Increased use of armed force:</strong> AI-driven information-processing systems could enable a proliferation of target information, broadening the use of force and potentially leading to more civilian casualties. According to a 2023 media report, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) used an AI system known as Habsora (“the Gospel”) to rapidly identify and recommend targets for airstrikes in Gaza. According to the IDF, by extracting information quickly and automatically, Habsora provides targeted recommendations that match exactly to the identifications made by humans. Habsora and Israel’s Target Division have helped to build a database of between 30,000 and 40,000 people suspected of being Hamas or Palestinian Islamic Jihad militants. To put it another way, AI-driven systems have accelerated the compilation of a vast potential kill list. Before Habsora, it would take Israel up to a year to identify 50 potential targets in Gaza. During the May 2021 conflict, the AI system identified around 100 targets per day.</p> - </li> +<p>The next administration will be well-positioned to build upon recent industry innovations and policy developments, leveraging U.S. natural resources and ingenuity. Three key areas are particularly important to unlocking the United States’ economic and strategic potential:</p> + +<ul> <li> - <p><strong>Accountability and responsibility:</strong> AI in the military raises both C2 and legal questions about accountability. Current research suggests AI systems need more rigorous testing to be validated and considered safe in risky military situations. Such systems often involve a complex network of stakeholders, including developers, data providers, users and regulators. Attributing responsibility can be challenging, as each stakeholder is likely to contribute to the operation of the system in different ways. Aside from humanitarian issues, the unpredictability of AI can, as the above example on unpredictability demonstrates, obscure who should be held accountable when things go wrong. The more AI systems become autonomous and capable of independent decisions, the more difficult it becomes to determine who should be held accountable for their actions. Should it be the AI system itself, its developers or its users? Developing and adapting C2 and legal structures to govern the use of AI is essential to maintain the military chain of command and establish lines of accountability.</p> + <p><strong>Transmission:</strong> Building extensive transmission infrastructure reduces power grid costs by increasing efficiency and better utilizing assets. Transmission infrastructure connects markets to geographically diverse power plants, reducing costs during normal operations, keeping the lights on during emergencies, and delivering renewable power from remote regions to manufacturing hubs, thereby reducing both costs and emissions while also contributing to carbon competitiveness. Accelerating the build out of transmission capability requires political leadership to create urgency for delivering these complicated projects, particularly at the state level and through federal permitting reform, which will pay off in future economic opportunities. The Bipartisan Infrastructure Law authorized the Department of Energy (DOE) $2.5 billion for transmission, which will spur a few projects, but the large societal benefits from increased transmission justify tax credit support akin to what is already offered for wind and solar projects.</p> </li> <li> - <p><strong>Deepfake technology risks:</strong> In March 2023, The Intercept uncovered a US Special Operations Command procurement document that suggests the US military is seeking to develop deepfake or other AI-based technologies to deceive its adversaries. The document showed that the military wishes to use deepfakes to mislead enemies on the battlefield. However, there is a risk that use of deepfakes in combat could percolate up to the field of foreign relations. Militaries serving societies that believe in the principle of democratic control of armed forces should be wary of capabilities such as deepfakes that can undermine trust and the principle of truth, without which their democracies cannot function.</p> + <p><strong>Nuclear Energy:</strong> Expanding the nuclear fleet is a medium-term option for meeting new demand. Nuclear power emits no greenhouse gas emissions and is highly reliable, making it a key target for technology companies, which are already contracting to restart old reactors. Building new nuclear power plants will be challenging, and potentially expensive, but necessary to achieve national goals. New projects face substantial costs and the risk of budget overruns, but new subsidies are meant to solidify the business case for nuclear energy production and to support project development. As new ventures are deployed, the consequent supply chains and worker experience will reduce costs for later projects and also decrease the timeline and project uncertainty that has plagued projects in the past.</p> </li> <li> - <p><strong>Path dependency:</strong> As militaries adopt AI-powered systems, there is a risk over time that they will lose the institutional memory of performing tasks the “old-fashioned” way (without AI support). Ultimately, the more reliant on AI systems a military becomes, the greater the cost when that system is penetrated.</p> + <p><strong>Natural Gas:</strong> Following the shale revolution, natural gas has become the mainstay of the U.S. energy mix. High supplies and low prices mean that at least part of new demand will be met by new gas power plants, the building of which can be left to the market. However, to ensure the gas industry’s longevity and to address related climate concerns, policymakers will need to prioritize carbon capture technology, especially by supporting the development of CO2 pipelines linking new generators with storage reservoirs. Congress has already created the 45Q tax credits to incentivize the capturing of carbon, and the DOE is supporting first-of-a-kind projects to reduce costs. Getting ahead on this infrastructure will enable the United States to meet immediate demands for natural gas in a way that supports longer-term ambitions for sustainability.</p> </li> -</ol> +</ul> -<h4 id="opportunities">OPPORTUNITIES</h4> +<p>To seize these new opportunities, the United States must confront familiar challenges: maintaining affordability, reducing emissions, and protecting reliability. By pursuing immediately available options today and zero-carbon options in the medium term, the United States can realize progress toward strategic goals and improve its competitiveness without sacrificing climate outcomes. By uniting bipartisan support and implementing smart, regionally adaptable solutions, the United States can seize this opportunity to ensure a sustainable and prosperous future for all.</p> -<p>AI offers potentially significant advantages to military capability in terms of increased speed and accuracy, enhanced battlefield awareness and enhanced decision-making capabilities. Some of the examples examined below reflect bold claims, and it must be noted that technologies under development frequently fail to live up to early ambitions. However, given the immaturity and fast-moving nature of the AI field, it is appropriate to evaluate opportunities with an open mind about the potential range of utility.</p> +<h3 id="intellectual-property-rights-and-the-future-of-us-technological-leadership">Intellectual Property Rights and the Future of U.S. Technological Leadership</h3> -<p>AI is changing not just how the military fights, but how it works from head to tail. It potentially offers better situational understanding, faster decisions, improved targeting, less risk to military personnel, and more efficient recruitment, training and logistics, gifting militaries cost savings and advantages in planning, executing and sustaining missions. Some of these benefits are unproven, others may never materialise in the form projected, and many are accompanied by vulnerabilities and risks of over-dependence. While there is a cost–benefit balance to be struck, no matter how much AI is adopted for a force, understanding how these systems may work and shape the way an adversary thinks and acts has become indispensable.</p> +<blockquote> + <h4 id="kirti-gupta">Kirti Gupta</h4> +</blockquote> -<ol> - <li> - <p><strong>Situational awareness:</strong> With AI-powered sensors and technologies, military intelligence organisations can better understand battlefield conditions and provide a more comprehensive picture of adversary capabilities and intent. US Army researchers have developed machine learning algorithms that can operate in bandwidth-constrained environments to rapidly update situational awareness. These algorithms can compress data while maintaining near-optimal performance, allowing models to be frequently retrained on decentralised data sources, helping soldiers gain real-time analysis in a rapidly changing battlefield. The US Army is planning to integrate AI into tactical command posts by integrating disparate data sources into a common operational picture. AI systems can predict enemy actions, identify weaknesses, assess the environment, plan missions and suggest ways to avoid problems. By rapidly analysing disparate data sources, AI can provide precise intelligence forecasts, mission planning recommendations and situational assessments far quicker than human analysts alone.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Enhanced C2:</strong> AI systems allow the military to swiftly and precisely process large volumes of data and acquire nuanced insights, bringing unprecedented efficiency and accuracy to their decision-making process. The US DoD is creating an AI-powered system to combine data from different sensors into a single picture to help the joint force make better decisions. The US military has developed the CJADC2 (Combined Joint All-Domain Command and Control) concept, which aims to increase interoperability and AI integration across all domains. By leveraging AI to rapidly collect, analyse and disseminate information on the battlefield, CJADC2 can identify and engage targets faster to create a well-informed force capable of defeating adversaries through accelerated decision-making cycles. By employing AI algorithms for predictive analytics and scenario modelling, the military can anticipate evolving threats and make immediate strategic adjustments to ensure agile, responsive C2. This capability is viewed by military strategists in both the US and China as a critical determinant that could prove decisive in shaping the outcomes of future armed conflicts and warfare scenarios.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Simulations and modelling:</strong> AI enables highly realistic simulations and modelling of complex military scenarios, systems and environments. This lets militaries test new ideas, strategies and equipment in a virtual environment before trying them in the real world. For example, the US Air Force is using AI-powered digital twins and simulations to model performance and maintenance requirements of aircraft such as the F-35 fighter. This helps accelerate innovation in areas such as predictive maintenance and mission planning. By personalising training regimens, AI enables more effective preparation of forces for dynamic real-world scenarios without compromising the safety of personnel. In the long term, AI-driven simulation training could be more cost effective than other kinds of realistic training simulations.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Lethal autonomous weapon systems:</strong> The integration of weaponry equipped with advanced sensors and algorithms offers a significant advance in military capability. These systems autonomously identify targets while ensuring human oversight for specific engagements, thereby enhancing precision, speed and efficiency. AI-supported autonomous systems have the processing power to draw on all the data-rich systems mentioned above to form an integrated, rapidly functional “kill chain” that can predict enemy actions, identify vulnerabilities, assess environmental conditions, evaluate mission strategies and recommend mitigation plans. By anticipating threats, optimising tactics and streamlining decision-making through AI-powered analytics, military forces can stay one step ahead of their targets, increasing operational effectiveness and mission success rates.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Training and recruitment:</strong> The US Air Force and the US Army have used AI-powered training tools that can reduce the time needed to complete training materials by up to 40%. AI-based chatbots have been used to assist with military recruitment, for example the US Army’s chatbot, Sergeant Star, which officially came into operation in 2006. The US Navy is deploying a conversational AI system called “Amelia” to handle and resolve the most common technical support questions from naval and civilian personnel, reducing the need for human support agents. The rollout of Amelia is part of the Navy’s $136-million Navy Enterprise Service Desk initiative to update and merge more than 90 IT support centres into a unified assistance platform.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Logistics:</strong> AI-driven solutions hold immense potential for streamlining logistics processes within the military domain. AI algorithms can analyse historical data on equipment use, maintenance schedules and operational rhythms to predict future demand for spare parts, ammunition, fuel and so on, enabling more proactive inventory management with the aim of avoiding stock-outs or surpluses of critical supplies. The US Army is using AI for predictive logistics, leveraging the technology to help forecast and manage the supply of parts and equipment more efficiently.</p> - </li> -</ol> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Policymakers face the challenge of striking the appropriate balance between incentivizing investment in risky R&amp;D while ensuring that any social cost due to potential misuse of the IP system is minimized.</code></em></strong></p> -<h3 id="taiwans-military-use-of-ai">TAIWAN’S MILITARY USE OF AI</h3> +<p>The global competition for leadership in technologies critical for the economic and national security of nation states – from semiconductors to artificial intelligence and quantum computing – is well understood. A less well-known pillar is the intellectual property (IP) system, which is crucial for incentivizing and enabling the innovation necessary for this technological leadership. This article sheds a spotlight on why and how IP plays that essential role.</p> -<p>Taiwan is in a strategically central and commanding position in the Western Pacific. Its location across sea lanes connecting large economies and its proximity to the Chinese mainland make Taiwan vital in terms of defence and power projection for the major powers. Taiwan is also an important international trade hub and a partner in global supply chains.</p> +<p>The IP system is designed to incentivize innovation by granting the investor temporary property rights for an invention or a creation. The patent system is critical to incentivizing research and development (R&amp;D) in some areas that require massive upfront investment and have uncertain prospects for success. One example is biopharmaceuticals, which requires years of R&amp;D for discovery, in addition to a long regulatory process to get approval for a new drug to enter the market. The design of semiconductor chips is another example, as it requires highly skilled and specialized workers and large upfront costs to develop new and improved cutting-edge circuit design for specific functionalities.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/mSF50vm.png" alt="image01" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 1: Taiwan’s Location in the First Island Chain.</strong> Source: AndreaNicolini/Adobe Stock.</em></p> +<p>If an invention is finally successful in the marketplace, the patent owner enjoys a temporary right to exclude others from making, using, or selling that invention. Patent owners can also license their invention and grant these rights to another, thereby generating revenues from the initial R&amp;D investment and enabling the diffusion of new technology. On the flip side, there have been concerns about misuse of the patent system by patent aggregators who allegedly amass a number of patents that may not be valid (i.e., erroneously granted in the first place), invoke patent protections in instances where they do not apply, or amass patents of limited value. These patent aggregators are not seeking to develop or market inventions but rather aim to extract quick monetary settlements from the patent implementers, who are seeking to avoid litigation costs or a temporary disruption of their products.</p> -<p>Figures from 2023 show Taiwan as the 17th-largest trading economy globally, with a trade volume of more than $900 billion in that year. Taiwan produces more than 60% of the world’s semiconductors and more than 90% of the most advanced ones. One Taiwanese company, TSMC, dominates the global semiconductor market, with 57% of the market share of semiconductor foundries in 2021. If Taiwan were to be attacked and production disrupted, no country could fill the void, and a halt in the manufacture and distribution of semiconductors would cause a shortage of technology products such as smartphones, computers and cars, along with company closures.</p> +<p>Policymakers face the challenge of striking the appropriate balance between incentivizing investment in risky R&amp;D while ensuring that any social cost due to potential misuse of the IP system is minimized. The United States’ IP system goes through phases. It is sometimes characterized as too strong, granting property rights for “weak” inventions and creating unnecessary costs and uncertainty for implementers. At other times, it is seen as too weak, lacking the tools for proper enforcement of the property rights that incentivize innovation.</p> -<p>China expresses a preference for peaceful unification but has spent the past 20 years developing its military to conquer Taiwan. China’s leaders consistently communicate that Taiwan should be under Beijing’s control, and that they are willing to use force to achieve this. As Taiwan becomes more independent and less interested in unifying with China, Beijing may decide that force is the only way to achieve its political goals regarding Taiwan.</p> +<p>If history serves as a guide, it is pointing in the direction of a revival of the IP regime in the United States. The U.S. Chamber of Commerce maintains the Global IP Index, which ranks countries based on the robustness of their IP system; in recent years, the United States slid to number 13, before climbing back up again to first position. A 2011 study on the economic cost to the United States of IP infringement from China received a lot of attention. Moreover, injunctive relief – sought by patent owners in courtrooms to stop infringers from copying their inventions or copyrighted material – has become increasingly rare. The U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO), responsible for granting patents, can also invalidate patents via serial rounds of challenges on the validity of a patent while such litigation is pending. In response to this environment, several legislative proposals are currently in different phases of markup in Congress. These pieces of legislation involve expanding the eligibility of patentable subject matter, strengthening the enforceability of patents, and limiting serial challenges to a granted patent while it is in the process of a legal challenge based on potential infringement.</p> -<h4 id="taiwans-starting-points">TAIWAN’S STARTING POINTS</h4> +<p>The U.S. IP regime does not exist in isolation. Recently, the European Union established the Unified Patent Court, with one of its goals being fast-tracking patent-challenge trials. China has been strengthening its IP regime, including by establishing four specialized IP courts in the last two decades. Since IP rights are often licensed on a global basis to reduce transaction costs, how one country enforces those rights directly impacts others. The IP enforcement regime of the United States needs to become stronger and faster to avoid litigation of disputes around global IP portfolios moving to other jurisdictions.</p> -<p>Currently, the Taiwanese military is actively exploring and utilising AI technology to enhance military efficiency and strengthen defence capabilities. For example, the Tri-Service General Hospital, one of the largest teaching hospitals in Taiwan, receives more than 2 million visits per year. By combining a Microsoft large-scale language model with AI and the technical support of Microsoft’s Taiwan R&amp;D centre, the hospital has brought together medical big data and Azure OpenAI to improve the accuracy of medical audio-visual recognition, to be automatically generated by AI to enable doctors and caregivers to improve the quality of diagnosis and care. The hospital’s medical information team will extend its technology development to record reports of doctors’ check-ups, outpatient clinics and surgeries, and the research results from medical image recognition, while reports of disease signs and symptoms and diagnoses will be generated and shared with the 13 military hospitals in the area of electrocardiography, to improve the speed of first aid through AI technology.</p> +<p>The United States is currently a leader in several critical technologies that rely on revenues generated from the licensing of IP rights in global markets. Most of the innovation in the United States is driven by R&amp;D investments from the private sector, which must be incentivized to invest in long-term R&amp;D. Technological leadership is the result of long-term, consistent R&amp;D investment, and the United States must continue incentivizing the private sector so that the country remains a technological leader going forward.</p> -<p>China is rapidly increasing its intelligence-gathering capabilities against Taiwan, including through cyber attacks, surveillance aircraft (drones) and electronic warfare. A significant challenge for Taiwan is to monitor and analyse these multidomain threats. Taiwan is seeking to learn from countries such as Israel to improve its own use of these technologies to counter the growing Chinese threat. By leveraging AI algorithms for data fusion and pattern recognition, Taiwan can gain actionable insights into adversary intentions and activities. This includes using signal intelligence from communications and radar transmissions to understand China’s capabilities and intentions. Social media monitoring to detect disinformation campaigns or indications of impending military activity enables proactive decision-making and threat-mitigation strategies.</p> +<p>If the United States has an innovation agenda – that is, if it aims to invest and lead in critical emerging technologies to bolster U.S. economic and national security – IP must have a prominent role. A strong IP enforcement regime, with clear boundaries around IP rights and which can ensure quality inventions are granted those rights, helps the inventors and implementers, who are both needed for an innovation ecosystem to thrive. The next administration should consider IP as a part of the broader innovation agenda and not view it as an issue of technical obscurity to be treated in isolation. A strong IP system works for everyone. The United States can continue to lead in R&amp;D-intensive innovation and product development and minimize infringement, especially outside of U.S. borders, by pursuing three key actions: (1) strengthening the USPTO with resources to ensure that only quality (and valid) inventions get the appropriate IP protection; (2) streamlining the system of repeat validity challenges on already granted inventions; and (3) making progress on the legislative proposals for enhancing the enforceability of legitimate IP rights.</p> -<p>As cyber threats become increasingly complex and pervasive, Taiwan must strengthen its cyber-defence capabilities to protect critical infrastructure and sensitive information. Taiwan has elevated cyber security as a national security priority and is taking proactive measures through initiatives such as the National Institute of Cyber Security and the Administration for Cyber Security of the Ministry of Digital Affairs, which is developing cutting-edge AI tools to detect fraudulent online activities, analyse suspicious messages and combat misinformation or false information campaigns. By further leveraging AI for threat hunting, anomaly detection and incident response, Taiwan can enhance its ability to defend against cyber attacks and minimise the impact of cyber incidents on military operations.</p> +<h3 id="the-necessity-of-a-national-interest-account">The Necessity of a National Interest Account</h3> -<p>In the ongoing Ukraine–Russia war, UAVs, especially smaller, low-cost drones adapted for combat roles, have demonstrated astonishing operational effectiveness in missions such as surveillance, targeting and precision-strike operations, enabling the outgunned Ukrainian army to deliver precise strikes and inflict significant damage against the quantitively superior Russian army.</p> +<blockquote> + <h4 id="adam-frost">Adam Frost</h4> +</blockquote> -<p>The ability to use missiles, drones and mines is critical for the defence of Taiwan, which needs to signal the ability to destroy invading ships and aircraft before they reach the main island. Taiwan could use drones with large payloads to attack China’s amphibious fleet, strike strategic targets and supplement crewed aircraft. They could also be used to serve as missile decoys and enable dispersed operations from roads if airbases are attacked. The use of multi-layered deterrence to maintain a solid defence posture is particularly suitable for Taiwan’s national defence strategy, which assumes lean military strength and tight procurement budget allocation. Taiwan’s drone capabilities are currently inferior to those of China. To catch up, Taiwan has set up the Drone National Team programme, which by mid-2024 had brought together companies and the military to produce more than 3,200 drones.</p> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">The next administration should therefore make a counterintuitive move and immediately propose structural changes that increase its options for execution. This is where a National Interest Account should be a top priority.</code></em></strong></p> -<p>The National Chung Shan Institute of Science and Technology (NCSIST) in Taoyuan City has indicated its plans to integrate AI and deep learning to develop an intelligent training environment that integrates live, virtual and constructive simulation into the more than 240 sets of simulation systems it has established for Taiwan’s army, including a drone-operated training simulator and the Brave Eagle training system, which has the potential to improve the comprehensive effectiveness of the army’s combat power. This year, Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense established a National Defense Innovation Group. The ministry has demonstrated its determination to strengthen its asymmetric warfare capabilities, and has begun in-depth cooperation with the US Department of Commerce to promote projects such as drone systems, anti-drone systems, and AI use.</p> +<p>It is no surprise that the next administration will immediately confront a knot of challenges at the intersection of economic growth, technological advantage, national security, and foreign policy. Right now, excellent thinkers are searching for new frameworks to conceptualize this complexity and to inform the strategies and policies of the next president. This is important intellectual work.</p> -<h4 id="current-use-of-ai-in-chinas-military">CURRENT USE OF AI IN CHINA’S MILITARY</h4> +<p>The more urgent work for the next administration, however, involves immediately proposing reforms that increase the government’s options for executing its strategies, whenever they are determined.</p> -<p>China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has been actively developing and deploying AI since the mid-2010s. These efforts are in line with China’s broader strategic initiatives, such as the Made in China 2025 plan from 2015 and the New Generation of Artificial Intelligence Development Plan, released in 2017.</p> +<p>And a National Interest Account should be proposal number one.</p> -<p>In July 2017, China’s State Council released a policy document, the “Developmental Regulations on a New Artificial Intelligence Generation”, which outlines the country’s AI development plan. The document demonstrates China’s ambition to become a world leader in AI by 2030. It stipulates that AI will be used for defence purposes, including command decision-making, military simulation and defence equipment. Since the release of the document, China has started to use AI more extensively in its military, particularly in the following areas:</p> +<h4 id="execution-before-strategy">Execution Before Strategy?</h4> -<ul> - <li> - <p><strong>Unmanned combat systems:</strong> The PLA has been developing and using unmanned AI systems since 2015. These include drones for air, ground, sea and subsea operations. China has world-class capabilities in AI-dependent drone swarms with military potential. In April 2023, the PLA tested an AI system to help with artillery targeting, showing how AI is used in weapons.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Battlefield awareness and decision-making:</strong> The PLA is using AI to improve awareness on the battlefield and in decision-making. This means combining data from different sources to get a complete up-to-date picture. Chinese military experts have discussed the idea of a “command brain”, to use AI for making plans at the tactical and operational levels.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Multidomain operations:</strong> AI has been employed by China to conduct and coordinate actions across the domains of land, sea, air, space and cyber since at least 2020. AI helps to combine and analyse data from different domains to improve effectiveness.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Predictive maintenance and logistics:</strong> China is using AI to maintain equipment and improve logistics. AI can predict when equipment might fail and help with decisions about where to put resources. China has been using AI in this area since at least 2020. This is part of a broader strategy to leverage AI for military advantage and modernisation.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Information and electronic warfare:</strong> AI is being used in information and electronic warfare to help the PLA in modern conflict. For example, the PLA Navy Submarine Academy has awarded contracts related to AI-based adaptive beamforming techniques.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Simulation and training:</strong> The PLA is using AI in training its military personnel through realistic and effective simulations of warfare. The PLA has been integrating AI technologies into various aspects of military training and operations as part of a shift towards “intelligentized warfare”. This shift began gaining significant momentum around 2015, when China emphasised the importance of AI Informatisation in its defence strategy.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Command, control and communication:</strong> AI is being added to the PLA’s command, control and communication systems to improve military operations. This includes applications at all levels of warfare.</p> - </li> -</ul> +<p>The “usual path” of strategy development is well travelled. After a new administration takes office, it formally begins translating the president’s platform into specific strategies, plans, and policies.</p> -<p>China has ambitious plans to employ AI in the military, but limited transparency means that it is not always clear how advanced these systems are. The PLA is still working on overcoming challenges in testing, training and developing concepts for these AI-enabled systems. The development of military AI in the PLA is certainly changing. In the near future, changes will probably be small, but in the long term, they could be substantial.</p> +<p>How you define the question dictates the answer. And how the next administration conceptualizes and then articulates a strategic approach to the complex and interdependent challenges of competition for economic growth, technological advantage, national security, and foreign influence is no easy task. This is far from settled, and the task of getting the ideas right should not be underestimated.</p> -<h4 id="taiwans-necessary-tilt-towards-ai">TAIWAN’S NECESSARY TILT TOWARDS AI</h4> +<p>But in government, ideas are insufficient and federal strategy development is a long process. Beneath every national security strategy or executive order lie months of intellectual and bureaucratic work. Moreover, for new officials, there is the addition of discovery – learning the myriad stakeholders that require coordination, which adds months of meetings and memos.</p> -<p>Four areas that shape Taiwan’s defence are connected to the kinds of capability advantages presented by the military application of AI.</p> +<p>In the end, the “usual path” will produce the way ahead. And the president will endorse or sign the bureaucratic manifestations of their will.</p> -<ol> - <li> - <p>AI’s centrality to China–US rivalry and the PLA’s modernisation make it a major consideration in Taiwan’s defence strategy. In 2021, veteran US diplomat Henry Kissinger warned that, among other things, a mutual failure to understand each other’s AI capability could lead to conflict. China’s President Xi Jinping talked about “emerging domain strategic capabilities” at the National People’s Congress on 11 March 2024, calling on the military to deepen reforms, promote innovation and enhance emerging strategic capabilities. AI is a source as well as an instrument of conflict between Taiwan’s principal ally and its principal adversary, so even if a resource imbalance makes it difficult for Taiwan to acquire capabilities at the same level as China, there is no escaping the need for it to understand the AI capabilities of both ally and adversary, and how those are shaping the future of warfare.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>US forces that might be available to defend Taiwan are based some distance away in Japan, Guam and elsewhere, making early warning of preparations for invasion essential to a successful defence strategy. It is equally important that decision-makers in Taiwan and the US base their judgements on sources of information that both can trust. The more AI and machine learning are adopted by the US to monitor and assess China’s intentions towards Taiwan, including any indications of a possible military build-up or preparations for invasion, the more important it becomes for Taiwan to keep pace and not allow a gap to open in terms of a common standard for indications and warnings.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>A successful invasion of Taiwan would require large amounts of materiel to cross the Taiwan Strait, making the underwater battlefield of particular importance. It is therefore natural that Taiwan is strongly incentivised to develop autonomous underwater vehicles (AUVs) powered by AI technology. The National Sun Yat-sen University successfully built Taiwan’s first marine-specific AUV with AI capabilities in 2020. It leverages AI and deep learning for object recognition, tracking, obstacle avoidance and self-correction during underwater operations. By integrating AI into autonomous systems, Taiwan can extend its operational reach and capabilities, enabling unmanned platforms to operate in contested environments and execute missions with minimal human oversight.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>The air domain has a twofold importance for Taiwan’s defence – as a means by which an invasion force could arrive, and as a means by which Taiwan’s own forces could be degraded or destroyed in advance of an invasion. According to the 2022 National Defense Technology Trend Assessment Report published in late 2022 by Taiwan’s defense think tank, the Institute for National Defense and Security Research, Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense believes that drones should be the focus of Taiwan’s asymmetric warfare weaponry development. NCSIST, the main R&amp;D organisation of the Armament Bureau of Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense, is developing AI-enabled weapon systems related to the use of drones.</p> - </li> -</ol> +<p>Then the usual thing will happen. An authority will call a meeting synonymous with “next steps” and begin to inventory all the interagency “tools” – existing authorities and resources – needed to execute the just-signed strategy. These will inevitably include existing innovations such as the CHIPS Act Program Office; the rechartered Development Finance Corporation (DFC); the reauthorized Export–Import Bank (EXIM), with its China and Transformational Exports Program (CTEP); the revitalized Loan Program Office at the Department of Energy; and the always-included Defense Production Act (DPA).</p> -<p>In conclusion, the integration of AI into Taiwan’s military is already offering many opportunities to enhance operational effectiveness and strengthen deterrence. As AI continues to advance, Taiwan must invest in R&amp;D, talent acquisition and international collaboration to harness the full potential of AI technologies and secure its position as a resilient and capable force for peace and stability in the region.</p> +<p>The laws, policies, and regulations that govern how the executive branch executes its authorities and allots the funds granted are, to put it mildly, labyrinthine. Every “tool” has its own independent constraints, and months will be spent divining workarounds or exceptions, all of which carry risks. Thus, execution inevitably becomes a compromise between the ideas and what can actually be done or, worse, a mere rebranding of what is already being done.</p> -<h3 id="challenges-and-recommendations-for-taiwans-future-military-use-of-ai">CHALLENGES AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR TAIWAN’S FUTURE MILITARY USE OF AI</h3> +<p>To explicitly state the open secret: good ideas are hard, but executing is harder.</p> -<p>This section lays out seven principal challenges faced by Taiwan in advancing the implementation of AI for military functions, and makes recommendations for how to address them to continue its necessary tilt towards AI.</p> +<p>The next administration should therefore make a counterintuitive move and immediately propose structural changes that increase its options for execution.</p> -<h4 id="challenge-1-data-security-and-privacy-concerns">CHALLENGE 1: DATA SECURITY AND PRIVACY CONCERNS</h4> +<p>This is where a National Interest Account should be a top priority.</p> -<p>Information has always been vital in war, but in modern warfare, information – data – is the foundation for leveraging the power of AI to deliver military advantage. Implementing AI in military operations requires vast amounts of data, including information about tactics, personnel and equipment. Military drones with the latest sensors capture live intelligence on enemy movements and send the data to command centres for analysis.</p> +<h4 id="what-is-a-national-interest-account">What Is a National Interest Account?</h4> -<p>More data can only be beneficial if the problems of information overload can be managed and the data can be reliably fused into a single picture. Algorithms and machine learning find patterns, trends and problems in big data, helping to turn raw data into useful information, and helping leaders to make decisions and plan ahead. Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense is implementing standardised protocols and secure cloud infrastructure to overcome information silos. This network lets data flow between different organisations, helping them work together and understand the operational landscape better.</p> +<p>The concept is simple, and shamelessly plagiarized from Australia, a close U.S. ally.</p> -<p>However, ensuring the security and privacy of this data presents a significant challenge. Concerns include unauthorised access, data breaches and exploitation by adversaries. Military personnel are encouraged to share information through user-friendly tools and platforms that let people in different places work together. But it is vital to ensure sharing technology is used properly.</p> +<p>Were Congress to authorize a tightly scoped, time-limited, and dollar-capped National Interest Account with strenuous reporting requirements, a president could direct government agencies, like those listed above, to support loans deemed in the national interest.</p> -<h4 id="recommendations">RECOMMENDATIONS</h4> +<p>Why? Restrictive laws and Office of Management and Budget (OMB) regulations govern the lending of the various federal departments and agencies. Every loan carries the risk of nonpayment, and those who approve the loans must be conservative in the credit risks they accept on behalf of the taxpayers. This is right and proper.</p> -<ul> - <li> - <p>Use encryption to protect data stored on computers and sent over the internet.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Implement secure communication protocols to ensure that data transmitted between systems remains protected from interception or tampering.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Restrict access to data to authorised personnel.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Verify user identities for accessing sensitive information.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Prioritise anonymisation and pseudonymisation techniques to de-identify sensitive data, reducing the risk of exposure in the event of a breach while still allowing for meaningful analysis and use.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Engage advanced encryption to protect sensitive data during transmission and storage.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Use secure cloud infrastructure for scalable processing with robust access controls and data isolation.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Use strict data-handling protocols, such as applying anonymisation and secure deletion procedures.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Ensure continuous improvement based on feedback from military units, enhancing both performance and security.</p> - </li> -</ul> +<p>But many regulations were created in a different time, and for different problems. In today’s competition for economic growth, technological advantage, national security, and foreign influence, our challenges cross old models, while our tools do not – yet.</p> -<p><strong><code class="highlighter-rouge">Real-world example:</code></strong> <em><code class="highlighter-rouge">The US DoD’s Project Maven, which uses AI for object recognition in military imagery and video data, makes use of advanced encryption and secure cloud infrastructure to protect the sensitive data used in its AI-powered object recognition systems for military intelligence.</code></em></p> +<p>With a good interagency process, a National Interest Account responsibly shifts approving riskier loans and their related issues to the wider perspectives of Senate-confirmed Cabinet members, including the Department of the Treasury and OMB, from the more insular individual agencies. With a National Interest Account, both determinations – whether a loan actually is in the national interest and whether the risk of that loan is acceptable – would be made with the larger policy and national-interest pictures in mind. Meanwhile, the government lenders would remain within their remit and simply execute their authorities – providing credit assessments, portfolio management, and finance.</p> -<h4 id="challenge-2-transparency-and-explainability">CHALLENGE 2: TRANSPARENCY AND EXPLAINABILITY</h4> +<p>For example, if China’s economic coercion of an ally or partner is to be effective, the impact of refusal must be severe enough to coerce the political outcome. This affects the macroeconomic outlook of the coerced, thereby raising the risk of any loan to that market. Today, good credit analysis would likely tell the lender to walk away. And I frequently had to tell my colleagues at the Departments of State and Defense precisely that. But a National Interest Account could allow agencies like EXIM to refer such cases to the cabinet, where the merits and risks could be deliberated, thereby creating an option for action that today simply does not exist.</p> -<p>Many AI techniques, such as deep learning, are “black boxes”, in which the decision-making process is not transparent or easily explainable to human operators and decision-makers. Interpretable AI can help to identify potential biases or errors in the decision-making process, which is crucial for high-stakes military applications.</p> +<h4 id="the-urgency-of-optionality">The Urgency of Optionality</h4> -<h4 id="recommendations-1">RECOMMENDATIONS</h4> +<p>It is counterintuitive to prioritize reforming the ways and means before we know the ends. But whatever an administrations strategy, it will rise or fall on execution. Concepts such as a National Interest Account create options to achieve the president’s ends where today there are few. Thus, the next administration should urgently prioritize structural reforms that affect implementation concurrent with the development of strategy – or the best of ideas risk remaining only that.</p> -<ul> - <li> - <p>Develop more transparent and interpretable AI models that allow military personnel to understand the “reasoning” behind the system’s decisions, enabling better oversight and trust in the technology.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Utilise research on AI explainability and visualisation techniques to improve the understandability of military AI systems. Visualisation techniques such as saliency maps and feature importance plots can help human operators quickly comprehend the factors influencing an AI system’s outputs.</p> - </li> -</ul> +<h2 id="technology-cooperation-competition-and-economic-relations">Technology Cooperation, Competition, and Economic Relations</h2> -<p><strong><code class="highlighter-rouge">Real-world example:</code></strong> <em><code class="highlighter-rouge">The US’s Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency’s Explainable AI (XAI) programme, which ended in 2021, aimed to produce more transparent machine learning models while maintaining high performance, applicable to military decision-support systems.</code></em></p> +<h3 id="indias-ascending-role-for-us-economic-security">India’s Ascending Role for U.S. Economic Security</h3> -<h4 id="challenge-3-robustness-and-reliability">CHALLENGE 3: ROBUSTNESS AND RELIABILITY</h4> +<blockquote> + <h4 id="richard-rossow">Richard Rossow</h4> +</blockquote> -<p>AI systems have been shown to be vulnerable to adversarial attacks that can drastically reduce their performance, posing risks in high-stakes military applications. Robust security measures, such as adversarial training and model hardening, can help harden AI systems against intentional attacks designed to deceive or disable them.</p> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">The next U.S. administration should take the time to meet with international partners such as India before staking out policy positions related to domestic industrial and trade policy. Ignoring U.S. partners in the early days could have repercussions when U.S. officials engage on vital global issues later.</code></em></strong></p> -<h4 id="recommendations-2">RECOMMENDATIONS</h4> +<p>While U.S. elections are primarily driven by domestic issues, the policy positions taken by the winner are relevant for a wide array of global partners. In the case of India, for example, the United States and India share concerns about overreliance on China as a dominant supplier of manufactured goods. Consequently, Indian firms have been ramping up investments in the United States, actions significant for both countries moving forward. The next U.S. administration should take the time to meet with international partners such as India before staking out policy positions related to domestic industrial and trade policy. Ignoring U.S. partners in the early days could have repercussions when U.S. officials engage on vital global issues later.</p> -<ul> - <li> - <p>Implement robust security measures to protect AI models from external manipulation.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Continuously monitor for new vulnerabilities and develop countermeasures.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Use continuous monitoring and rapid response to emerging vulnerabilities. This is crucial to maintaining the reliability of military AI systems in the face of evolving threats.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Limit external access to critical AI models and defence techniques, which can help prevent adversaries from reverse-engineering or exploiting these systems.</p> - </li> -</ul> +<p>A deeper economic relationship with India is in the United States’ interests for several reasons. First, India is expected to continue growing faster than any other large nation in the foreseeable future, with growth expected to top 7 percent in 2024. BlackRock recently predicted that India will leap over Japan and Germany to become the world’s third-largest economy in just three years. In 2023, Goldman Sachs predicted that the Indian economy will be the world’s second-largest by 2075, at an estimated $52.5 trillion. For U.S. companies looking to grow, India’s topline numbers draw attention – even if the practicalities of doing business in India remain challenging at times.</p> -<p><strong><code class="highlighter-rouge">Real-world example:</code></strong> <em><code class="highlighter-rouge">The US Army Research Laboratory is developing AI systems that can detect and resist adversarial attacks, particularly for image recognition systems used in military applications.</code></em></p> +<p>Second, Indian companies compose a growing source of investment into the United States. As the Confederation of Indian Industry highlighted in their Indian Roots, American Soil report in 2023, India has invested $80 billion into the United States, employing over 400,000 people. In 2023 alone, India added $4.7 billion in fresh foreign direct investment (FDI) into the United States, about 3 percent of inward FDI from all sources that year. In the coming years, as the Indian economy continues to grow, this number will also likely grow substantially as well. Indian firms are even taking advantage of U.S. industrial programs like the Inflation Reduction Act. India’s Vikram Solar, for example, last year announced plans for a $1.5 billion solar-manufacturing footprint in the United States. Policy stability is key to ensuring that investment plans can be executed, and continue to be made.</p> -<h4 id="challenge-4-technological-limitations-and-integration-complexity">CHALLENGE 4: TECHNOLOGICAL LIMITATIONS AND INTEGRATION COMPLEXITY</h4> +<p>Securing a strong commercial relationship with India is vital for another critical reason. Akin to how the U.S. defense industrial base has looked at ways to improve India’s domestic defense production to help India wean itself off Russian equipment, the United States can support India’s interests in weaning its technology sector off of Chinese imports. China (plus Hong Kong) is India’s largest goods trade partner, with $148 billion in bilateral trade in FY 2023, resulting in a trade deficit for India of nearly $100 billion. Paired with India’s expected growth rates outlined above, helping India reduce imports from China will impair China’s industrial expansion significantly. To Chinese officials, India must be considered a vital economic engine to maintain export-led growth in the future. The United States can be a strong partner to “Make in India” and avoid this fate.</p> -<p>Deploying AI systems in military environments often involves integrating complex technologies across diverse platforms and systems. Compatibility issues, interoperability challenges and limitations in AI capabilities may hinder seamless integration and adoption.</p> +<p>Finally, U.S. policymakers should seek new platforms to share practical experiences, and possibly some level of policy equivalence, in screening Chinese investments in advanced technologies. While India may be years away from becoming a significant producer of advanced technologies – such as quantum computers, robotics, leading-edge semiconductors, and 6G communications equipment – India is already at the forefront of the research and engineering that fuels these sectors. For example, India’s information technology services exports are expected to reach $199 billion this year. The U.S. government continues to build new programs with India that will further enhance a shared research and development agenda in key technologies such as the 2023 collaboration between the U.S. National Science Foundation and India’s Department of Biotechnology. While such steps expand bilateral cooperation, they may also introduce new vulnerabilities without appropriate oversight measures.</p> -<h4 id="recommendations-3">RECOMMENDATIONS</h4> +<p>Successive U.S. administrations have built a unique architecture of high-level dialogues that provide a vital platform for discussing trade and technology issues, including the U.S.-India initiative on Critical and Emerging Technologies and the many workstreams under the Quad framework. These forums have resulted in important agreements such as the 2023 U.S.-India Semiconductor Supply Chain and Innovation Partnership memorandum of understanding.</p> -<ul> - <li> - <p>Design AI systems with modular and scalable architectures to facilitate integration with existing military infrastructure.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Prioritise interoperability standards and protocols to ensure compatibility across different platforms and systems.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Conduct rigorous testing and evaluation of AI systems in realistic operational environments to identify and address technological limitations and performance gaps.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Implement iterative development processes to refine AI algorithms and improve system capabilities over time.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Pool resources and share knowledge, which can accelerate technological advances and facilitate smoother integration of AI into military operations.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Foster collaboration and partnerships with industry, academia and allies to leverage expertise and resources in AI research and development.</p> - </li> -</ul> +<p>India is not the only fast-growing, nontraditional U.S. partner that will require the attention of policymakers as U.S. industrial strategy and trade policy is reviewed. For example, Vietnam, Indonesia, and the Philippines – large and fast-growing countries – together have nearly 500 million people and a combined GDP that is over 60 percent of India’s.</p> + +<p>The next U.S. administration will likely enjoy a full four-year term with its counterpart government in India, which has its next national election in 2029. According to the Pew Research Center, the economy continues to be the primary concern for supporters of both presidential candidates. Initial policy pushes would understandably seek to further improve domestic economic prospects, particularly in manufacturing. Yet foreign policy also ranks relatively high for supporters of both candidates. With key partners across the Indo-Pacific, policy stability, particularly in ways that encourage two-way economic integration with key partners, is important. The last four years have seen a range of important new agreements and robust commercial announcements that both widen and deepen the United States’ economic partnership, ranging from microchips to vaccines. While the days of free trade agreements may not be returning any time soon, the United States can forge meaningful linkages with like-minded nations by avoiding protectionism and encouraging bilateral investment.</p> + +<h3 id="making-infrastructure-in-the-indo-pacific-a-success">Making Infrastructure in the Indo-Pacific a Success</h3> -<p><strong><code class="highlighter-rouge">Real-world example:</code></strong> <em><code class="highlighter-rouge">The US Air Force’s Advanced Battle Management System uses a modular, open-systems approach to integrate AI capabilities across multiple platforms and domains. This approach enables rapid adaptation to new technologies and threats while maintaining cross-branch and allied forces interoperability.</code></em></p> +<blockquote> + <h4 id="erin-murphy">Erin Murphy</h4> +</blockquote> -<h4 id="challenge-5-insufficient-training-data">CHALLENGE 5: INSUFFICIENT TRAINING DATA</h4> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Infrastructure requires patient capital and investing. The lifecycle of an infrastructure project can take years and does not follow the neat timelines of summits and high-level meetings that crave big announcements.</code></em></strong></p> -<p>Many military applications lack the large, high-quality datasets typically required to train effective AI models using machine learning.</p> +<p>Though U.S. administrations have continuously railed against China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), they have been very slow in offering a clear alternative to the quick contracts and massive financing offered by China to infrastructure projects globally. Recently, however, a proliferation of initiatives and partnerships have been introduced that aim to bring together partners and allies, leverage their respective tools and strengths, and convince the private sector to mobilize their own capital into developing economies. Though laudable, the United States – and the Biden administration in particular – will have to ensure a politically transition-proof strategy that is concerted, committed, focused, and continuous in order to provide the trillions of dollars in infrastructure funding needed in just the Indo-Pacific alone, as well as to future-proof these economies from debt sustainability, climate change, and labor and industry transformations.</p> -<h4 id="recommendations-4">RECOMMENDATIONS</h4> +<p>Inducive economic tools and strategic investments are now key elements in engaging in economic security in the Indo-Pacific. The Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF), the G7’s Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment (PGI), the Quad, and the Trilateral Infrastructure Partnership (TIP), to name just a few, all feature efforts to target collaborative infrastructure financing, manifest tangible U.S. commitment to the region, and compete effectively with the BRI.</p> -<ul> - <li> - <p>When dealing with limited training data, techniques such as data augmentation can be employed to artificially expand the dataset. This includes methods such as cropping, flipping, rotating or adding noise to existing data samples. While not a complete solution, data augmentation can help increase the diversity and size of training datasets.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Instead of training models from scratch on limited data, transfer learning allows leveraging of models pre-trained on large, general datasets and then fine-tuning them on the smaller, domain-specific military datasets. This can significantly reduce data requirements while still achieving good performance.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>For certain military use cases such as simulations or scenario modelling, it may be possible to generate synthetic training data using rule-based systems, physics engines or generative adversarial networks. While ensuring realism is crucial, synthetic data can supplement real-world data to increase the overall training dataset size.</p> - </li> -</ul> +<p>But the United States is contending with an actor that does not play by the rules. China can offer projects and products at attractive prices and speeds, directing its state-owned companies and banks to strategic markets. Though the BRI has had some initial successes in the race for infrastructure, the United States need not mimic the way China does business. Yet the United States does need to reform its own operations. The BRI’s ballooning debt and unhappy customers reveal why that approach is problematic, and those issues are pushing China to change how it invests. In contending with the challenge offered by China in infrastructure project investments globally, the United States must maintain standards and act with transparency, especially with taxpayer (or anyone’s) dollars.</p> + +<p>Sustaining the continuity and efficacy of the infrastructure initiatives that the Biden administration has begun requires a change in mindset and the deployment of the tapestry of tools available in a coordinated and cohesive way.</p> + +<p>Infrastructure requires patient capital and investing. The lifecycle of an infrastructure project can take years and does not follow the neat timelines of summits and high-level meetings that crave big announcements. Feasibility studies, permitting, due diligence, securing financing, and then getting the actual project started and completed all take a lot of time and money. There are ways to speed up the process, including ensuring transparency; lowering costs around undertaking environmental and social impact assessments in developing countries; and ensuring the host country has clear rules and regulations. Some of that work is already being done – working with IPEF signatories on tax and rule-of-law transparency and encouraging the Blue Dot Network that promotes high-quality standards in infrastructure – and the United States should double down on these efforts.</p> + +<p>This leads to another aspect in need of attention: trade and market access. Though the pendulum on trade in the United States has swung against it, this – especially market access – is what Asian countries want, particularly IPEF signatories. Trade with market access can be provided to those that meet IPEF standards and thus encourage domestic regulatory and governance reforms. This is a more inducive carrot than providing capacity building for tax reform. IPEF’s Latin American counterpart, the Americas Partnership for Economic Prosperity (APEP), mirrors much of IPEF. Though it also does not offer market access, the United States has bilateral free trade agreements (FTAs) with 8 of the 11 APEP countries, making economic partnerships more holistic and durable. Although former president Trump has threatened to get rid of IPEF and could do the same with APEP, the FTAs will remain in place, thereby guaranteeing ongoing economic engagement. These agreements shape the framework for addressing developments in critical sectors, such as decarbonization and digital trade, but in order to be politically transition-proof, they will have to include more tangible carrots and durability.</p> + +<p>Another obstacle to the U.S. initiatives involves debt sustainability, particularly as the majority of BRI recipient countries are in debt distress. Indebted countries do not want to take on hundreds of millions of dollars in additional debt financing, even with concessional lending or generous repayment terms. In order to address these debt sustainability issues and critical infrastructure needs, the United States will need to work with the Paris Club through various multilateral debt treatment initiatives and via blended financing opportunities.</p> + +<p>Concerns about debt and debt sustainability also influence how the Export-Import Bank of the United States (EXIM) is able to build out its pipeline and be more competitive in the telecommunications, renewable energy, and semiconductor arenas. EXIM so far has come up short in maximizing its China and Transformational Exports Program (CTEP), partly hampered by statutory requirements to (1) ensure that loans will have a “reasonable assurance of repayment” and (2) maintain a 2 percent statutory default cap. For EXIM to be more competitive, take on greater risks, and not self-select out of deals, the default cap should be raised on critical industries, or at least on those projects that fall under the CTEP umbrella.</p> + +<p>Cofinancing or collaborative financing is nice on paper but nearly impossible in practice. No host government or project lead wants to sign multiterm contracts with governments and multilateral financing agencies. There is also competition for a small number of viable projects. Overcoming this concern involves aligning due diligence practices and deploying single joint-term sheets to cut down on paperwork and bureaucracy. The United States and its partners should also find where they best fit along the project lifecycle. As noted above, infrastructure projects have multiple phases and angles, each of which could play to the different strengths of each player.</p> + +<p>Mobilizing private sector capital has been, and will continue to be, a challenge. The U.S. government needs to more deeply engage with the private sector to determine what it would take for private actors to invest in strategic markets, instead of focusing solely on implementing policy it thinks will move that capital. Private sector financing already is being carried out in the energy transition space, most notably in Indonesia’s Just Energy Transition Partnership (JETP), with potential JETP programs extending to Vietnam and the Philippines. The partnership intends to mobilize an initial $20 billion in public and private financing over a three-to-five-year period using a mix of grants, concessional loans, market-rate loans, guarantees, and private investments. The JETP includes $10 billion in public sector pledges and a $126 million commitment from the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation to an Indonesian geothermal company. The signatories of the JETP also committed to help mobilize and facilitate $10 billion in private investments from an initial set of private financial institutions, including some of the world’s largest private banks. Since the launch, a total of approximately $281.6 million has been allocated as grants or technical assistance across roughly 40 programs, managed across five financial institutions and implemented by eight different executing agencies.</p> + +<p>Even if a project, an initiative, or even a policy is a strategic imperative for the U.S. government, the same may not be true for the private sector. Some markets will still be too risky and the return on investment too unlikely for the private sector, which looks to ensure its investments are repaid and profitable. Working with the private sector, either locally or multinationally, on their needs in undertaking these projects is a critical step in shaping the correct tools to pursue infrastructure investments globally.</p> -<p><strong><code class="highlighter-rouge">Real-world example:</code></strong> <em><code class="highlighter-rouge">The US Air Force’s Dataworks initiative aims to create high-quality diverse datasets for AI training in military applications, addressing the challenge of limited data in sensitive contexts. This initiative is crucial for overcoming data-scarcity challenges in developing AI for sensitive military applications.</code></em></p> +<p>Pieces of the foundation for addressing critical infrastructure needs are there, but it will take sustained focus, leadership, and telling a good story to get it done.</p> -<h4 id="challenge-6-keeping-pace-with-rapid-ai-advances">CHALLENGE 6: KEEPING PACE WITH RAPID AI ADVANCES</h4> +<h3 id="can-the-united-states-have-a-trade-policy-without-market-access">Can the United States Have a Trade Policy Without Market Access?</h3> -<p>AI is changing fast, so it is challenging for the military’s testing and use to keep pace with developments in the technology.</p> +<blockquote> + <h4 id="william-a-reinsch">William A. Reinsch</h4> +</blockquote> -<h4 id="recommendations-5">RECOMMENDATIONS</h4> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">More market access for U.S. products can only be obtained by providing more access for imports into the United States. There is no free lunch in trade negotiations.</code></em></strong></p> -<ul> - <li> - <p>Agile development allows the military to be more responsive to the fast-paced changes in AI, rather than relying on traditional, lengthy procurement processes.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Continuous integration and testing help ensure new AI systems are thoroughly vetted before being deployed in operational environments.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Investing in internal AI R&amp;D helps the military stay ahead of the curve and develop custom solutions tailored to its specific needs.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Attracting and retaining skilled AI researchers and engineers ensures the military has the necessary expertise to effectively leverage the latest advances.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Collaborating with academic and industry partners can help the military access the latest AI innovations and knowledge.</p> - </li> -</ul> +<p>A hallmark of the Biden administration’s trade policy has been its refusal to negotiate trade agreements that include market access – the reduction of tariffs or non-tariff barriers to facilitate trade. The administration has occasionally said it supports more market access for U.S. products, but it has failed to accept the reality that trade negotiations are inevitably reciprocal. More market access for U.S. products can only be obtained by providing more access for imports into the United States. There is no free lunch in trade negotiations.</p> -<p><strong><code class="highlighter-rouge">Real-world example:</code></strong> <em><code class="highlighter-rouge">The US DoD’s Joint Artificial Intelligence Center (JAIC) uses an agile development approach, allowing for rapid prototyping and iteration of AI systems. This approach allows JAIC to keep pace with rapid advancements in AI technology while ensuring that developed systems meet the specific needs of the military.</code></em></p> +<p>When asked what they wanted out of the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity (IPEF) agreement, Asian participants in CSIS’s research responded politely that they were looking for “tangible benefits.” This is code for “what’s in it for us?,”which is exactly what every experienced trade negotiator asks. The answer from the Biden administration has been “very little.” The same thing has happened with other ongoing regional negotiations – the Americas Partnership for Economic Prosperity (APEP) and the U.S.-EU Trade and Technology Council (TTC).</p> -<h4 id="challenge-7-ethical-and-legal-implications">CHALLENGE 7: ETHICAL AND LEGAL IMPLICATIONS</h4> +<p>There are two reasons for this reluctance to take up market access. One is political – a desire to avoid intraparty warfare between the Democratic left and center. (The former sees trade as imports that harm U.S. workers. The latter views it as exports that promote growth and jobs.) The second reason is philosophical – past trade agreements are perceived as having primarily benefited large corporations and their executives at the expense of workers.</p> -<p>AI raises complex ethical and legal issues around autonomy, compliance with international law and accountability for AI-driven decisions and actions.</p> +<p>Both arguments lead to the same safe choice: pursuing trade agreements that do not contain “tangible benefits.” The dilemma for the current administration has been that trade agreements are not just about trade – they are symbols of the relationship between the participants, and symbols have power. An ambitious, binding agreement is proof that the United States is committed to ongoing engagement with the other party (or parties) on equitable terms, proof that would be welcomed in Asia, Latin America, and Europe. That was the rationale for the Trans-Pacific Partnership agreement, and the Trump administration’s rejection of it was widely seen in Asia as indicating a lack of interest in and commitment to the region on the part of the United States. That action left the United States without a policy and led to pressure on the Biden administration to develop a new economic approach to Asia, and subsequently to the Americas.</p> -<h4 id="recommendations-6">RECOMMENDATIONS</h4> +<p>Caught between demands for a policy that demonstrated U.S. commitment and reluctance to pursue an agreement that involved any meaningful market concessions, the administration came up with IPEF and APEP, both of which have been derided as unambitious agreements. The situation was made worse in November 2023 when the administration pulled back its support for the trade pillar of the IPEF agreement in the face of opposition from progressive Democratic members of Congress. While the trade pillar is technically not dead; it is on life support, and it appears that only the other three pillars – supply chains, decarbonization and sustainability, and anti-corruption and taxation – will survive. Those are not unimportant, but they are also not trade agreements. The origin story of the TTC is different, but the result is the same – much talk about cooperation with few tangible results beyond an impressive display of unity in sanctioning Russia.</p> -<ul> - <li> - <p>Develop comprehensive ethical guidelines and frameworks specific to the use of AI in military contexts. Ensure that these guidelines address issues such as human oversight, accountability and the responsible use of autonomous systems.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Engage with and draw on the work of international processes set up to explore and develop regulation on lethal autonomous weapon systems (LAWS) in the context of international humanitarian law, such as the Group of Governmental Experts on LAWS at the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs in Geneva.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Ensure military AI applications comply with national and international regulations, including regulations governing the use of force, data protection and human rights.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Conduct legal reviews and assessments to identify and mitigate potential legal risks.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Foster transparency in AI systems by providing clear documentation of their capabilities, limitations and decision-making processes.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Establish mechanisms for accountability, including processes for reviewing and auditing AI-related decisions and actions.</p> - </li> -</ul> +<p>Meanwhile, China is not standing still in the competition for regional influence. It has applied to join the Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership and is using its membership in the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership to expand its market access while the United States is, essentially, “just watching.”</p> -<p><strong><code class="highlighter-rouge">Real-world example:</code></strong> <em><code class="highlighter-rouge">The UK Ministry of Defence has established an AI Ethics Advisory Panel to provide external advice and scrutiny of its AI development and deployment, ensuring alignment with ethical principles and legal requirements.</code></em></p> +<p>What does this mean for the future? Neither presidential candidate is likely to return to conventional trade agreements, although, ironically, Trump may be more willing to start new negotiations than Harris. Instead, there is discussion about alternatives to what is currently on the table. One possibility is to focus negotiations on regulatory harmonization or mutual recognition on the theory that aligning regulations on commerce will increase trade. There is something to that. Standards conformance would make it easier for products to cross borders. Moreover, such mutual recognition could allow professionals like lawyers and accountants to work in partner countries and thus increase services trade. The problem is that those negotiations are not easy. Regulators in every country like the way they do things and resist being told that they must do them differently, or that they have to recognize that someone else’s rules are as good as theirs.</p> -<h3 id="conclusion">CONCLUSION</h3> +<p>A second alternative is to focus on individual sectors – such as critical minerals – when making trade agreements. This is also a good idea, but like the first, it will be more difficult in practice than in theory. Countries that have minerals are, of course, interested in selling them, but they also want to capture more of the value added by processing the resources and manufacturing the products that contain them. If the United States is only interested in extraction, the negotiations may not get far.</p> -<p>AI appears to offer significant military advantages in terms of strategy (especially information processing and C2), operational capabilities, logistics and support. However, navigating the complexities of implementing AI in the military field requires careful consideration of not only technological capabilities but also ethical and organisational challenges.</p> +<p>Ultimately, success on any of these fronts will require an attitude change. If the United States only wants to receive and not give, any negotiation is doomed. The important word here is an old one – reciprocity. It was popular in trade debates in the 1980s when it meant that the United States should insist that other countries match concessions with its own. Today, the situation is reversed: other countries are demanding that the United States match their concessions with some of its own. Until the United States is willing to do that, progress on trade agreements will remain elusive.</p> -<p>In Taiwan’s case, where material imbalances and political dependencies dominate the risks of conflict, those responsible for the island’s defence cannot afford to neglect any aspect of AI’s potential to gain time and level the playing field. Embracing AI in the military fosters a culture of innovation and adaptability to stay ahead of emerging threats and technological advances. By investing in R&amp;D and fostering collaboration with international partners, Taiwan can design military AI systems with modular and scalable architectures that can accommodate updates and upgrades as the technology evolves, as well as remaining interoperable with its key ally, the US.</p> +<h3 id="rethinking-competition-with-china-on-clean-technologies">Rethinking Competition with China on Clean Technologies</h3> -<p>By identifying and mitigating risks proactively, Taiwan’s military can make gains beyond enhancing its own defensive capabilities. Keeping up with the rapid pace of AI development through the recommendations in this paper will enable the military to more effectively integrate and leverage the latest AI innovations to maintain a world-class technological edge, making Taiwan a globally more attractive defence industry partner. The combination of Taiwan’s industrial and technological and skills base, experience in AI research and experimentation, and the pressures of its defence challenges position it to take a lead on the military application of AI.</p> +<blockquote> + <h4 id="ilaria-mazzocco">Ilaria Mazzocco</h4> +</blockquote> -<p>Ultimately, Taiwan must embrace military AI because its adversary uses it, and so does its ally, and Taiwan must align with them on critical defence judgements and for interoperability. Taiwan needs AI to offset its scale disadvantages in demographics and material capability. AI-powered automation can multiply the number of platforms without the need for large personnel outlays. Gains in administrative and logistic efficiency permit scarce military personnel to focus their efforts on more critical missions and tasks, thereby maximising operational effectiveness.</p> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">While China’s industrial policy does create significant market distortions, policymakers should spend more resources identifying gaps in the U.S. innovation ecosystem and focus more on U.S. competitive advantages.</code></em></strong></p> -<p>Given the complex geopolitical situation and rapid advances in military AI, Taiwan faces a critical decision regarding the immediate development of AI for military use.</p> +<p>U.S.-China technological competition is widespread and complex, but there is one technological sphere with a clear leader: Chinese companies are increasingly outperforming competitors in cost and quality when it comes to established clean technologies ranging from solar panels and lithium-ion batteries to electric vehicles (EVs). While the United States erects more barriers to keep out Chinese firms, it also needs to avoid technological isolation, contend with more competition on the international stage, and be prepared to compete in emerging and next-generation clean technologies.</p> -<h4 id="key-considerations">KEY CONSIDERATIONS</h4> +<p>Many of Washington’s current policies vis-à-vis Chinese clean technology companies assume thattheir rise is predominantly, if not solely, driven by subsidies. However, this overlooks the broader context that enabled the development of these companies and technologies, including China’s massive effort to create markets for these goods over the past two decades and the role played by innovative companies integrated into global value chains. Focusing solely on overcapacity, for example, might lead observers to miss that it is the most successful and competitive manufacturers that are leading the export boom – such as EV maker BYD.</p> -<p>Key considerations for the Taiwanese government include:</p> +<p>While China’s industrial policy does create significant market distortions, policymakers should spend more resources identifying gaps in the U.S. innovation ecosystem and focus more on U.S. competitive advantages. As it implements its own industrial policy strategy, the United States should learn from its main competitor. For example, few policymakers focus on the high levels of automation in Chinese factories as a source of advantage even though the Chinese government has been explicitly supporting a shift toward more automation and the digitalization of manufacturing – and encouraging the use of Chinese-made industrial robots in the process. Talent, financing, and regional clusters also matter, as does stable policy committed to creating demand for these emerging technologies.</p> -<ol> - <li> - <p>Strategic necessity: AI development is likely to be crucial for Taiwan’s asymmetric defence strategy against potential threats from China. As China continues to advance its military AI capabilities, Taiwan needs to develop countermeasures to maintain a credible deterrent. AI could significantly enhance Taiwan’s surveillance, reconnaissance and early warning systems, providing a vital edge in situational awareness and response time.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Technological readiness: Taiwan has a strong technological foundation, particularly in semiconductor manufacturing, which could support AI development. However, it may face challenges in terms of data availability, computational power and specialised expertise for military AI applications. Careful assessment of these capabilities is necessary to ensure effective development and deployment.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Economic considerations: Given Taiwan’s limited defence budget compared to China’s, investing in AI could be a cost-effective way to enhance military capabilities. AI systems could potentially provide force multiplication effects, allowing Taiwan to do more with less. However, the initial investment and ongoing maintenance costs must be carefully weighed against other defence priorities.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Operational impact: Integrating AI into military operations will require significant changes in training, doctrine and organisational structure. Taiwan’s military will need to develop new skills and competencies to effectively utilise AI systems. Additionally, robust cyber-security measures must be implemented to protect AI systems from potential attacks or manipulation.</p> - </li> -</ol> +<p>The demand piece will be crucial moving forward for the technologies where the U.S. government hopes to compete with incumbent Chinese firms, such as batteries and next-generation technologies like green hydrogen and carbon capture and storage. There are ways to bolster demand in the United States, for example, by building out more infrastructure for charging, promoting grid modernization and expansion, and engaging in permitting reform. Yet, a protected market often lacks incentives for innovation and efficiency, which is why Washington should encourage U.S. companies to engage in head-to-head competition with Chinese firms.</p> -<p>To mitigate risks and accelerate the development and integration of AI capabilities in the military, Taiwan should consider:</p> +<p>Chinese cleantech companies are already rapidly expanding internationally both in terms of exports and, increasingly, investment in third markets. Chinese firms are establishing factories beyond China’s borders for refined minerals, components, and final goods, including solar panels and EVs. Far from a hostile takeover, these types of investments are often in direct response to demands by host countries.</p> -<ol> - <li> - <p>Focusing on specific AI applications that address critical defence needs.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Leveraging international partnerships, particularly with the US, for technology sharing and expertise.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Investing in education and training programmes to build a skilled workforce for AI development and implementation.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Prioritising cyber security and resilience in AI system design and deployment.</p> - </li> -</ol> +<p>The United States is not unique in deploying tariffs against Chinese-made goods, but it looks more isolated in seeking to contain, rather than attract, Chinese investment. European, Southeast Asian, Latin American, and various other governments have explicitly invited Chinese companies to localize their production, something firms are eager to do in order to access these countries’ markets or to export to third markets, including the United States.</p> -<p>In conclusion, while there are challenges and risks associated with rapidly developing military AI, the strategic necessity for Taiwan appears to outweigh these concerns. In addition, China’s growing military capabilities, its future ambitions and the potential for AI to serve as a force multiplier make it crucial for Taiwan to consider prioritising the development of military AI applications. However, this should be done thoughtfully, with careful consideration of ethical implications, international norms and the need for robust security measures.</p> +<p>Another trend is also at play internationally. To improve their competitiveness, international companies are seeking to access Chinese clean technology through joint ventures, licensing deals, and even by acquiring shares in Chinese startup companies (as in the case of Stellantis and Volkswagen). This raises the possibility that much of the world, including some U.S. allies, may become more technologically integrated with China, not least because Chinese firms have some of the most advanced clean technologies on the market.</p> -<hr /> +<p>Ultimately, if the United States wants to compete with China, it will need to draw the correct lessons from history. The successes of clean technology today owe much to globalized value chains that took advantage of China’s manufacturing ecosystem and large market in the past. If national security demands the exclusion of China from some or all of the United States’ clean technology value chains, policymakers will need to be clear-eyed about the costs and trade-offs and must identify strategic priorities. In some technologies, derisking may be possible in a limited fashion; in others, Washington may need to strengthen its linkages with other countries. Sectoral agreements on steel or critical minerals may provide interesting formats for potential partnerships on a sectoral basis. Still, the United States will need to think strategically about concessions over market access or joint research and development. Finally, a world where the largest economies engage in green industrial policy may eventually require finding a credible multilateral platform to discuss potential solutions to increasing trade disputes and distortions.</p> -<p><strong>Cheng-Hung Hsu</strong> is the Chief of Operations Control at Taiwan’s Information, Communications and Electronic Force Command. His research interests include cyber security, defence strategy and Indo-Pacific policy. He holds a BA in Electronic Engineering and is a graduate of the Republic of China Air Force Air Command and Staff College.</p>Cheng-Hung HsuIncreasing cross-strait tensions between China and Taiwan suggest the need for the latter to look into the advantages offered by new defence approaches. With a defence budget vastly outpaced by China, Taiwan’s Overall Defense Concept recognises a need to look to cutting-edge technologies to offset scale imbalances.Russia’s Sarmat Test Failure2024-10-22T12:00:00+08:002024-10-22T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/russias-sarmat-test-failure<p><em>The failure of Russia’s recent RS-28 Sarmat ICBM test points to potential propulsion issues, complicating Moscow’s strategic deterrent and future nuclear balance calculations.</em></p> +<h2 id="technology-statecraft-and-global-governance">Technology Statecraft and Global Governance</h2> -<excerpt /> +<h3 id="building-a-tech-alliance">Building a Tech Alliance</h3> -<p>On 24 September 2024, Russia conducted a test of the RS-28 Sarmat heavy liquid-fuelled intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) which was likely a catastrophic failure. Satellite imagery showed heavy damage to the Plesetsk Cosmodrome as well as fires in the woods surrounding the test site. This commentary will assess the potential causes of the test failure as well as its ramifications.</p> +<blockquote> + <h4 id="james-a-lewis">James A. Lewis</h4> +</blockquote> -<h3 id="causes-of-the-test-failure">Causes of the Test Failure</h3> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Europe is the crux of the tech-alliance problem. Countries like Japan and Australia are ready to work together with the United States, but there is a degree of ambivalence in Europe.</code></em></strong></p> -<p>At this point, it cannot be known with any degree of certainty precisely why the test launch failed, though some early analysis suggests that the first stage booster of the missile suffered a catastrophic mechanical failure. However, it is possible to extrapolate from what is known about the missile and its design to generate hypotheses for further discussion.</p> +<p>Calls to create some kind of technology alliance among democracies can be grounded in experience. We can identify requirements for developing an alliance and the actions needed to turn proposals into agreement. However, while alliances are easy to propose, they are hard to build.</p> -<p>At first blush, it would seem odd that a failure of the propulsion system should have occurred. The PDU-99 rocket engine of the RS-28 is understood by many to be a derivative of the RD-274 employed on the R-36M2, Russia’s current silo-based ICBM. The RD-274 is a mature design, variants of which have been employed since the mid-1980s. The fuel mix of UDMH (unsymmetrical dimethylhydrazine) and N202 is not especially volatile by the standards of liquid fuel, and has been employed on the R-36 series for several decades. On first inspection, then, the poor performance of the three-stage Sarmat vis the two-stage R-36 is a puzzle.</p> +<p>The first, and most important, of these requirements is there must be a shared problem that potential partners wish to address through collective action. Maintaining U.S. technological dominance is not a shared problem and probably not the best appeal for partnership. Similarly, calling for a crusade against China is not universally appealing in Europe or Asia.</p> -<p>Part of the answer for the difficulties that the Russians are facing may be available in the statements made by Vladimir Putin when the project was announced. Putin claimed that the missile has a shorter boost stage than previous generations of liquid-fuelled ICBMs, ostensibly a means of making interception by missile defences more difficult. While no missile could entirely avoid detection by the US’s Space-Based Infrared System in its boost phase, a shorter boost phase could compress the time available for detection, classification and cueing sensors associated with midcourse intercept. This might represent a hedge against a future development such as the fielding of a US space-based sensor layer capable of tracking Russian ICBMs, the deployment of space-based interceptors (which would theoretically be capable of boost phase intercept) or the placement of longer-range ballistic missile interceptors such as those used by the Ground-Based Midcourse Defense system (which was once considered) in Europe.</p> +<p>Europe is the crux of the tech-alliance problem. Countries like Japan and Australia are ready to work together with the United States, but there is a degree of ambivalence in Europe. There is also a degree of envy over U.S. technological success. European political culture is still shaped by the traumas of the twentieth century, and one explanation for extraterritorial regulation of U.S. technology companies is that Americans should “remember Europe’s history” and how it creates deep concerns for fundamental rights such as privacy. Others say that the purpose of technology regulation is, at least partially, to slow down U.S. companies so that European companies can catch up.</p> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">The difficulties faced by the Russian nuclear enterprise with respect to Sarmat may be a reflection of the inherent complexity of the new system’s propulsion and its lighter structure</code></em></strong></p> +<p>Two phrases from Brussels highlight the problem: “European values” and “tech sovereignty” (or “digital sovereignty”). The first implies somewhat simplistically that there are different values in the United States and Europe. The second is more problematic. European sources say that tech sovereignty means not only independence from China, but also from the United States. Any proposal for a new alliance needs to show how it aligns with this EU goal of increased sovereignty.</p> -<p>From an engineering standpoint, what is noteworthy is that the viable approaches to shortening a missile’s boost phase could explain the complications faced by the RS-28. One approach to optimising the efficiency which some commentators have suggested has been used for the RS-28 is the use of a stepped liquid engine which utilises multiple combustion chambers with different pressure levels and mixes of fuel and oxidiser to optimise the acceleration of the missile for different stages in its flight. This would pose several challenges, including the fact that staged combustion creates the risk of combustion instabilities because of the variable rate of combustion which can lead to varying vibrational loads (and thus a risk of mechanical failure) as well as pogo oscillations. The latter are self-sustaining oscillations driven by resonance between pressure pulsation in the propulsion system and mechanical vibration, leading to a positive feedback loop which can result in structural damage. If a fuel-rich mix (with a high fuel to oxidiser ratio) is used in early stages, this also raises the possibility of higher levels of mechanical stress early in a missile’s launch. Similarly, higher chamber pressures in the early stages would also pose some risk of structural damage. This can interact with the decision to employ a lighter orthogrid structure for the missile’s booster casing. This structure has the advantage of cutting the booster’s weight and can add to a missile’s resilience. However, orthogrid structures can be sensitive to localised changes in the axial load, which can impact different parts of the grid asymmetrically, creating stress concentrations near weld lands. This phenomenon would be associated with a stepped engine with a high rate of combustion at earlier stages.</p> +<p>One way to overcome sovereignty issues is to build a new technology alliance upon existing structures such as the G7 or the Wassenaar Arrangement, but both would need to be modified – the G7 by adding counties like Australia, South Korea, and the Netherlands and Wassenaar by removing Russia and perhaps Hungary. Other groups, including AUKUS, the Quad, and the U.S.-EU Trade and Technology Council, are too narrow to serve as a foundation.</p> -<p>A second (albeit less likely) possibility which has been proposed by some analysts is that the RS-28 employs a pulse detonation engine which relies on distinct rapid combustion cycles (as opposed to the continuous combustion of traditional engines) to generate thermal efficiency. While Rostec has conducted tests of pulse detonation engines in the last decade, their employment on the Sarmat is uncertain. If this was attempted, however, this would provide another explanation for the missile’s failure. The challenge of employing a pulse detonation engine is that components are subjected to even more extreme stress by repeated intense detonations, which also produce a great deal more mechanical vibration than is seen in a continuous combustion engine. Although the Russian fuel mix of UDMH and N202 is relatively stable for a liquid fuel mix, any liquid-fuelled engine will be to an extent sensitive to mechanical vibrations, which can impact the stability of fuel flow to a chamber (with unpredictable effects) and can also damage the turbopumps which pressurise and deliver fuel, among other things.</p> +<p>Wassenaar, the current tech regime, has shortcomings. It is 30 years old, technological change challenges the scope of its controls, and it now lacks the strategic underpinnings that led to its creation (and Russia’s membership). Wassenaar was a response to the end of the Cold War and was designed for that context. While it is not in Western interests to dismantle Wassenaar, it does need to be supplemented by measures that go beyond export controls. Judging from past experience, the best route might start with the G7 and then add additional countries, since the Wassenaar Arrangement itself grew out of G7 talks.</p> -<p>On first examination, then, some of the plausible reasons for the Sarmat’s repeated test failures would suggest that Russia’s efforts to shorten the missile’s boost phase created complications which would not otherwise have existed, particularly if the missile uses a variant of the tried and tested RD-274 engine. If this is the case, it would be illustrative of the degree to which Russian planners regard future developments in air and missile defence as credible threats, as they will have paid a considerable price in system complexity in order to overcome these challenges. Combined with somewhat puzzling Russian investments such as the Posideon nuclear torpedo, this would suggest that Russia’s stated fears regarding missile defences were more than just a source of diplomatic leverage in engagement with the West. It would also follow that these concerns can be instrumentalised as part of a competitive strategies approach to compel less than astute choices on the part of the Russians.</p> +<p>Who in the U.S. government makes the appeal for an alliance is also important. It must be a senior political figure from either the White House (preferably the president) or the secretary of state or treasury. In the past, the Department of Commerce has not been considered by other countries to have sufficient heft, although this may have changed in the Biden administration. In addition, many countries do not consider the Department of Defense the right counterpart for economic security issues. Other departments or staff-level proposals will not be taken seriously (remember that every government starts its review of a proposal by asking its embassy if the Americans are serious, and the embassies look for signs like senior-level interest, funding, and follow-through). Working an announcement into a presidential speech, even a single sentence, would help kickstart a technology alliance.</p> -<h3 id="the-significance-of-the-latest-issues-in-a-troubled-program">The Significance of the Latest Issues in a Troubled Program</h3> +<p>A formal proposal must immediately follow a presidential announcement. It must lay out initial thinking on which technologies are covered and the security rationale for the alliance, as well as provide details on membership criteria, frequency of meetings, secretarial functions, and what a commitment would entail in terms of time, money, and personnel. The proposal cannot be set in stone but rather should be presented as a discussion paper, open to amendment by other participants. Further, the United States must go into discussions knowing the minimum it can accept and what is essential. Ideally this would be joint effort, specifically, a joint proposal coming from the United States, Japan, and a G7 European member.</p> -<p>The RS-28 has had a relatively troubled history in programmatic terms. This has included repeated delays to its ejection tests (which demonstrate the ability to “cold launch” a missile from its silo with pressurised gas). The flight testing of the missile was also repeatedly delayed, and the first test launch of the Sarmat, which was meant to occur in 2020, was carried out two years later. Since this point, Sarmat has had at least one other failed flight test (as well as two tests cancelled) before September’s catastrophic failure.</p> +<p>A technology alliance may need to have both positive and defensive goals to attract wide support, but combining these two ends can be difficult. For example, managing technology transfer to China is a central strategic consideration, but so is coordinating policies and promoting the development of emerging technologies. While AUKUS is too focused on defense to easily translate into a broader tech alliance, Pillars 1 (advanced capabilities, including cyber, AI, and quantum and 2 (industrial base cooperation) could provide useful precedent. The most challenging issue in any joint effort to jointly create new technologies is how the members will share funding and intellectual property rights.</p> -<p>The difficulties faced by the Russian nuclear enterprise with respect to Sarmat may be a reflection of the inherent complexity of the new system’s propulsion and its lighter structure. However, structural fragilities within the Russian missile design and manufacturing ecosystem have also been cited as possible causes, something exemplified by personnel shortages at Proton-PM, which manufactures the Sarmat’s propulsion system.</p> +<p>A final point to bear in mind is that it will take months, perhaps years, to create a new tech regime. An ideal time to start such an initiative is at the start of a new administration. The spring of 2025 could be the launch point.</p> -<p>Irrespective of its causes, the troubled history of the RS-28 programme is significant. While Russia has a large and diversified nuclear arsenal, its silo-based ICBMs are of particular significance. Because of their size and fuel efficiency, liquid-fuelled ICBMs can carry considerably larger payloads than solid-fuelled missiles. This comes at a cost both in terms of system complexity and the time taken to prepare a missile for launch, but it also means considerable increases in the payload a missile can carry. Both the RS-28 and its predecessor, the R-36M2, can carry 10 multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRVS). For reference, this is three times as many as the solid-fuelled RS-24 Yars. Moreover, while silo-based missiles are static targets, they also benefit from hardening (reportedly up to 4,000 psi for R-36 silos) as well as reliable communications. Finally, unlike most other means of delivery, silo-based systems do not require as many visible preparatory steps to launch.</p> +<hr /> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">The balance of first strike-capable systems has a psychological effect, and can shape perceptions of the strategic balance of forces as well as crisis behaviour</code></em></strong></p> +<p><strong>Navin Girishankar</strong> is president of the Economic Security and Technology Department at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). He leads a bipartisan team of over 40 resident staff and an extensive network of non-resident affiliates dedicated to providing independent research and strategic insights on economic and technology policies and their critical role in competitiveness as well as national security.</p> -<p>For Russia, this is important for several reasons. Firstly, the throw weight of the RS-28 is a hedge against a rapid future improvement in US strike capabilities and missile defences. According to some authors, improvements in accurate low-fallout targeting of nuclear weapons as well as the speed and penetrative capacity of conventional prompt strike weapons can allow many Russian delivery systems to be destroyed prior to launch. The challenge for missile defences would then be simplified to mopping up the remnants of Russia’s strategic forces – a task potentially made easier by space-based sensors which can enable birth-to-death tracking. The technical viability and affordability of such a counterforce strategy is highly debatable, but it seems clear that Russian leaders believe it – something evidenced by their considerable investments in novel delivery systems meant to evade missile defences. In this context, silo-based missiles are a major hedge against a first strike, since they ensure that even a small number of surviving missiles can carry considerable throw weight. This function, delivering a “deep second strike”, was a driver for MIRVing ICBMs in the Soviet era. Relatedly, the RS-28 was meant to be a delivery system for the YU-71 Avangaard hypersonic glide vehicle, itself a major part of Russia’s efforts to hedge against future US missile defences (although other missiles such as the RS-18 can also carry Avangaard).</p> +<p><strong>Gregory C. Allen</strong> is the director of the Wadhwani AI Center at CSIS. Mr. Allen’s expertise and professional experience spans AI, robotics, semiconductors, space technology, and national security.</p> -<p>Secondly, MIRVed silo-based missiles represent an important factor in the balance of first strike capabilities between Russia and the US, given that these missiles can be launched with comparatively little visible preparation. Though the question of whether the Russians have ever viewed MIRVed ICBMs in these terms is the subject of considerable debate, they nonetheless play a role in US decision-makers’ perceptions of what Albert Wohlstetter memorably called the “delicate balance of terror”. We might consider, for example, how the development of the R-36 during the Cold War influenced US perceptions of the strategic vulnerability of Minuteman silos. Even assuming that a nuclear first strike of any kind is an act of suicidal folly in all circumstances, particularly given that the US maintains a large fleet of nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines, the risk of one has always been factored into US planning. The US’s most recent Nuclear Posture Review rejects the notion of forces being on a “hair trigger alert”, but reaffirms the need to minimise the risk of either a first strike or nuclear blackmail, suggesting that these are viewed as plausible outcomes. At a minimum, the balance of first strike-capable systems has a psychological effect, and can shape perceptions of the strategic balance of forces as well as crisis behaviour.</p> +<p><strong>Adam Frost</strong> is the former senior vice president for the China and Transformational Exports Program at the Export-Import Bank of the United States.</p> -<p>Despite Russia’s robust nuclear deterrent, the difficulties that it is facing with respect to fielding a successor to the ageing R-36 are thus not insignificant. For this reason, it is likely that the RS-28 was accepted into service despite its patchy test record – a relatively unusual occurrence. For illustration, the R-36M2 underwent 20 successful flight tests before acceptance into service.</p> +<p><strong>Kirti Gupta</strong> is a noted economist and expert specializing in global matters related to technology, antitrust, and intellectual property (IP). Dr. Gupta’s diverse expertise spans engineering, product, litigation, and policy issues in the technology sector. She currently serves as vice president and chief economist of global technology at Cornerstone Research, leading their technology, digital economy, and artificial intelligence practice.</p> -<p>This impacts the strategic balance in several ways. First, should challenges with the RS-28 persist to a degree that calls its reliability into question, Russian leaders’ behaviour in an escalating crisis may be impacted. For example, it may be deemed necessary to take steps such as dispersing mobile missiles earlier in a crisis than would normally be the case. Parsing and contextualising this behaviour will be important. On a more positive note, given the US’s own issues with the ageing Minuteman arsenal (due to be replaced in 2030 by Sentinel), the challenges faced by the RS-28 further limit the risk that Russia perceives itself as enjoying a relative advantage with respect to first strike capabilities. Though unlikely to lead to any form of use, such an imbalance could incentivise brinkmanship, particularly if Russian planners perceive the imbalance as a factor in US calculations of the balance of power. These assessments of how the other side views the strategic balance will become all the more complex in a context where the US will also be compelled to balance China’s growing nuclear arsenal later in the decade and beyond. The additional time bought by delays to the RS-28 can be employed to modernise the US’s silo-based ICBMs, as well as to field conventional prompt strike options and carry out future improvements in strategic missile defences. These could, collectively, be used to ensure that systems such as the RS-28 remain a Russian backstop against a Western counterforce strategy and do not come to be viewed as a means of underwriting conventional aggression backed by nuclear blackmail.</p> +<p><strong>Barath Harithas</strong> is a senior fellow with the Economics Program and Scholl Chair in International Business at CSIS, focusing on issues at the intersection of national security, trade, and technology. He has held diverse public service roles in Singapore spanning the U.S.-China relationship, international trade, and AI standards.</p> -<hr /> +<p><strong>Scott Kennedy</strong> is senior adviser and Trustee Chair in Chinese Business and Economics at CSIS. A leading authority on Chinese economic policy and U.S.-China commercial relations, Kennedy has traveled to China for 36 years. Ongoing focuses include China’s innovation drive, Chinese industrial policy, U.S.-China relations, and global economic governance.</p> -<p><strong>Sidharth Kaushal</strong> is the Research Fellow for Sea Power at RUSI. His research at RUSI covers the impact of technology on maritime doctrine in the 21st century, and the role of sea power in a state’s grand strategy.</p>Sidharth KaushalThe failure of Russia’s recent RS-28 Sarmat ICBM test points to potential propulsion issues, complicating Moscow’s strategic deterrent and future nuclear balance calculations.Salmon Swimming Upstream2024-10-21T12:00:00+08:002024-10-21T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/salmon-swimming-upstream<p><em>More and more nations and companies will send mission towards the Moon over the next several years. What challenges do these space operators face and how can they be addressed?</em></p> +<p><strong>James Lewis</strong> writes on technology and strategy at CSIS. Lewis has a track record of being among the first to identify new tech and security issues and devise polices to address them. He leads a long-running track 2 dialogue with the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations. His current work looks at how countries innovate and at digitalization and its political, economic, and security effects.</p> -<excerpt /> +<p><strong>Joseph Majkut</strong> is director of the Energy Security and Climate Change Program at CSIS. In this role, he leads the program’s work understanding the geopolitics of energy and climate change and working to ensure a global energy transition that is responsive to the risks of climate change and the economic and strategic priorities of the United States and the world. Joseph is an expert in climate science, climate policy, and risk and uncertainty analysis for decisionmaking.</p> -<blockquote> - <p><em>“I think we’re going to the moon because it’s in the nature of the human being to face challenges. It’s by the nature of his deep inner soul . . . we’re required to do these things just as salmon swim upstream.”</em></p> - <h4 id="-neil-armstrong-1969">— Neil Armstrong, 1969</h4> -</blockquote> +<p><strong>Ilaria Mazzocco</strong> is a deputy director and a senior fellow with the Trustee Chair in Chinese Business and Economics at CSIS. She has over a decade of experience researching industrial policy, Chinese climate policy, and the intersection between the energy transition and economic and national security.</p> -<p>Humankind has had an on-again, off-again relationship with the Moon. During the 1960s, over 63 spacecraft, including several crewed Apollo missions, launched to the Moon. In contrast, during the 1980s, no nation launched a lunar mission. Over the course of the following decades, however, the world gradually fell back in love with our closest celestial neighbor. During the last four years alone, 11 nations and the European Space Agency have all sent payloads and spacecraft to the Moon.</p> +<p><strong>Erin Murphy</strong> is deputy director and a senior fellow for emerging Asia economics with the Chair on India and Emerging Asia Economics at CSIS. She has spent her career in several public and private sector roles, including as an analyst on Asian political and foreign policy issues at the Central Intelligence Agency, director for the Indo-Pacific at the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation, founder and principal of her boutique advisory firm focused on Myanmar, and an English teacher with the Japan Exchange and Teaching (JET) Program in Saga, Japan.</p> -<p>Most of these missions were operated by government agencies and focused on scientific research and exploration. However, a few were carried out by companies such as Intuitive Machines and Astrobotic. A number of countries plan to send humans to the lunar surface within the next 10 years, and some have plans to establish a long-term human presence either in lunar orbit or on the Moon’s surface. At the time of writing, there was probably just one active mission on the lunar surface, a Chinese lander and associated rover, and several active spacecraft in lunar orbits.</p> +<p><strong>William Alan Reinsch</strong> holds the Scholl Chair in International Business at CSIS. He is also an adjunct assistant professor at the University of Maryland School of Public Policy, teaching a course in trade policy and politics.</p> -<p>While the majority of future space endeavors will undoubtedly take place near Earth, more and more activities will likely happen in cislunar space, or the area between geosynchronous Earth orbit and the Moon. From the perspective of the United States, reasons to focus attention on cislunar space include lunar science and exploration, future crewed missions, and concerns about China’s space ambitions.</p> +<p><strong>Richard Rossow</strong> is a senior adviser and holds the Chair on India and Emerging Asia Economics at CSIS. In this role, he helps frame and shape policies to promote greater business and economic engagement between the two countries, with a unique focus on tracking and engaging Indian states.</p> -<h4 id="cislunar-challenges">CISLUNAR CHALLENGES</h4> +<p><strong>Sujai Shivakumar</strong> directs Renewing American Innovation (RAI) at CSIS, where he also serves as a senior fellow. Dr. Shivakumar brings over two decades of experience in policy studies related to U.S. competitiveness and innovation.</p>Navin Girishankar, et al.This report gives recommendations on export controls, global tech governance, domestic incentives for building tech capabilities in chips and clean technologies, and the future of international tech cooperation and competition.Cockpit Or Command Center?2024-10-29T12:00:00+08:002024-10-29T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/cockpit-or-command-center<p><em>The future of airpower hinges on the U.S. Air Force’s ability to integrate autonomous drones into manned formations. This analysis explores the trade-offs between cockpit and command center–based control in shaping the next era of combat operations.</em></p> -<p>Operating in cislunar space presents new technical and policy challenges that the United States will want to consider. While exponential growth in cislunar activities is unlikely over the next 10 years, there will be modest expansion. To maximize the chances of success for U.S. cislunar missions and ensure the long-term sustainability and safety of cislunar space, the United States should assume a global leadership role and take actions, sooner rather than later, to address the anticipated cislunar challenges discussed in this report.</p> +<excerpt /> -<p>The list of related operational challenges is long. There is little space situational awareness (SSA) in cislunar space. The Global Positioning System (GPS) was not designed for this region, so without enhancements it cannot reliably provide cislunar navigation and timing services. In classical orbital mechanics, the motion of a near-Earth satellite can be predicted as part of a two-body problem (i.e., Earth and the spacecraft). In cislunar space, this two-body problem poorly predicts motion. Other issues, such as the impacts of cosmic radiation and lunar dust on equipment and humans, also pose hazards to cislunar missions.</p> +<ul> + <li> + <p><strong>Networks of manned and unmanned aircraft will command the skies.</strong> These teams will be increasingly modular and optimized for counterair, interdiction, and close air support missions.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>A mix of war games, Red Flag exercises, and dynamic home station simulations will test the ability of airmen – on the ground and in the skies – to execute mission command through networks of unmanned aircraft</strong> and respond to rapid changes in the threat environment. Together, these experiments will help guide not just airpower, but the entire joint planning and targeting cycle, into an era of algorithmic warfare.</p> + </li> +</ul> -<p>The space governance and operator coordination issues concerning cislunar activities are equally complex. Internationally, there are no agreed-upon rules of the road for operating in cislunar space or best practices for cislunar debris mitigation. Though cislunar space is covered by the treaties that underpin international space law, these treaties have sizable gaps and are subject to conflicting interpretations. Fortunately, while not focused on space, there are other non-space international treaties and frameworks that could offer lessons for space governance.</p> +<h3 id="introduction">Introduction</h3> -<h4 id="report-objectives-and-approach">REPORT OBJECTIVES AND APPROACH</h4> +<p>There is a new theory of airpower on the horizon. Over the next five years, the U.S. Air Force (USAF) plans to invest billions in research and development for a force of over 1,000 collaborative combat aircraft (CCA). The vision includes working with allies and partners to pair fourth- and fifth-generation aircraft with versatile unmanned systems, creating aerial networks that can rapidly adapt to changes in the battlespace. Multiple reports and war games portend a new future in which unmanned systems will replace an aging, expensive manned aircraft and create entirely new mission profiles optimized for peer conflict. The fate of these unmanned systems is critical, given both the Air Force’s decision in July 2024 to reevaluate its sixth-generation aircraft and the emergence of new Air Task Forces.</p> -<p>The goal of this report is to examine and assess oft-heard claims of a new Moon race, growing lunar economy, and need to extend military power into cislunar space. To write this report, the authors researched government and private sector activities planned for cislunar space by over 10 nations, covering the next decade. They interviewed cislunar stakeholders from government agencies, private companies, and academia. Additionally, the authors assessed cislunar reports prepared by other researchers.</p> +<p>Yet how will military organizations command and control distributed networks of CCAs in future air operations? Will such networks be proverbial “loyal wingmen,” subject only to the tactical commands of a pilot in a cockpit? Or will drones do the bidding of the command centers, like Combined Air Operations Centers (CAOCs)? The command and control (C2) architecture surrounding CCAs will almost certainly prove to be as consequential as the systems themselves in forging the future of air power. The U.S. military needs a clear concept of mission command for autonomous aircraft, executed across multidomain battle networks and tailored to different mission types.</p> -<p>Though there is certainly a lot of buzz about cislunar growth, the authors of this report found evidence of only a modest increase in cislunar activities over the next decade compared to the past 10 years. Additionally, the authors found little sign of a business case for cislunar activities that is not closely tied to government funding and support. Almost all cislunar activities, no matter the mission’s nation of origin, have a civilian focus. The authors also could not identify any compelling strategic military value from cislunar space and did not foresee one developing in the next decade that could make a decisive difference in any conflict between the United States and China, Russia, or another nation-state. However, national security organizations may want access to cislunar SSA data for surveillance purposes.</p> +<p>There is a fundamental tradeoff between tactical responsiveness and operational effectiveness. Where missions require time-sensitive adjustments, CCA C2 should center on the mission leader and ensure pilots have the right mix of high-bandwidth, low-latency comms and human-factor-optimized software to help them respond to the chaos and complexity of aerial combat. Where missions require concentration and unity of effort – the alignment of mass and objective – CCA C2 should focus on operational planning and mission execution directed from command centers. The Air Force and other aviation arms across the services need to invest in flexible battle networks and in concepts and training regimes that help adapt the core processes of command and control to the realities of modern warfare. To achieve this, the USAF should start conducting more robust studies and war games involving C2, alongside an accelerated series of experiments. It is one thing to pick a new piece of equipment; it is another to forge new doctrines and processes around the equipment.</p> -<p>But even under these conditions — modest growth in overall cislunar activities, no clear cislunar use cases without governments as a customer, and no clear strategic military value of cislunar space — there are reasons to focus on cislunar space and identify and address challenges facing cislunar operators. Through the Artemis program, the United States is establishing significant cislunar equities, building the foundation for sustainable human activity in cislunar space, investing in lunar infrastructure, and creating an ecosystem of commercial cislunar services. Addressing cislunar challenges discussed in this report is critical to the success of these endeavors. This report specifically seeks to analyze and recommend ways U.S. decisionmakers can address cislunar governance, coordination, and infrastructure challenges.</p> +<h3 id="the-third-offset-takes-flight">The Third Offset Takes Flight</h3> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">In conclusion, this report’s authors could find no evidence of a lunar gold rush and no indication of a real commer cial lunar economy. Cislunar activity is supported almost exclusively by government spending.</code></em></strong></p> +<p>The concept of pairing unmanned combat aircraft with traditional air formations dates back to the notions of “the Third Offset” and “the loyal wingman.” The Third Offset – a term coined by former deputy secretary of defense Robert Work in 2014 – proposes the use of technological advantages to offset Russia’s and China’s abilities to amass combat power. Its theory of victory was to ensure that the United States retained a generational lead in weaponry. As part of this strategy, defense analysts envisioned a new, unmanned “loyal wingman” that could increase the performance of fourth- and fifth-generation combat aircraft.</p> -<p>On governance challenges, the report first provides background on international treaties and national U.S. space policies, laws, and regulations. Later, the report discusses specific policy and governance gaps that should be addressed to promote a safe and sustainable cislunar environment. The report also introduces and provides background on several non-space international frameworks that govern other areas with similar characteristics as cislunar space, such as Antarctica, the Arctic, and international air and maritime domains. The authors frequently cite these existing frameworks when describing models and approaches that could apply to cislunar space.</p> +<p>Many of the initial loyal wingman tests involved turning fourth-generation fighter aircraft into remotely piloted vehicles. For example, during the 2017 Have Raider II experiments, Lockheed Martin Skunk Works paired an unmanned F-16 with a manned ground station to test autonomous flight during simulated air-ground strikes. In 2023, the USAF unveiled Project Venom, a series of experiments designed to load autonomous code into six F-16s and test the systems’ operation across a range of missions. These efforts built on earlier experiments that focused on perfecting the software necessary for autonomous flight. These experiments continue today through the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA)’s Air Combat Evolution program, which tests prototypes like the X-62A.</p> -<p>The report also outlines operational and infrastructure challenges confronting operators of cislunar missions, explaining why these cislunar challenges are both different and similar to those confronting operators with missions in orbits closer to Earth. The authors note that infrastructure challenges, such as generating power and ensuring communications, are primarily solved by hardware and equipment — whereas operational challenges, such as traffic coordination and collision avoidance, require both technical solutions and operator-to-operator coordination.</p> +<p>CCA concepts have since evolved beyond adapting fourth-generation platforms to building unmanned aircraft with treaty allies. Over the past year, five companies submitted CCA designs, two of which – General Atomics and Anduril – the Air Force is now considering. The General Atomics candidate is the Gambit, built to change configurations for different mission profiles to maximize fungibility. Anduril entered the CCA contest via its 2023 acquisition of Blue Force, whose group 5 vehicle, Fury, will be integrated with Anduril’s family of autonomous vehicles.</p> -<h4 id="report-recommendations">REPORT RECOMMENDATIONS</h4> +<p>Both firms share a vision of using software to optimize hardware performance and interoperability – an idea that grows out of earlier work by DARPA, including the Adapting Cross-Domain Kill-Webs (ACK) program and the larger concept of mosaic warfare. In line with this vision, CCAs will not only increase the survival of manned aircraft, but also enhance lethality by enabling software-defined kill webs.</p> -<p>Finally, the report offers several key recommendations for consideration by U.S. policymakers. First, the United States should work to find understanding with China on addressing international space governance and operational coordination challenges related to cislunar space, because the vast majority of cislunar activity over the next decade will be tied to these two nations. Second, the United States should consider whether it furthers U.S. interests to keep cislunar space nonmilitarized, taking an approach from the U.S. playbook toward Antarctica in the 1950s. Third, the United States should consider international approaches to building and operating cislunar infrastructure, combining resources, preventing duplication, and maximizing the gain for the cost to U.S. taxpayers.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/4XuCgo9.png" alt="image01" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 1: Advanced Battle Management System.</strong> Source: <a href="https://www.aflcmc.af.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/2432103/emerald-flag-exercise-begins/">“Emerald Flag exercise begins,” Air Force Life Cycle Management Center, December 1, 2020</a>.</em></p> -<p>In conclusion, this report’s authors could find no evidence of a lunar gold rush and no indication of a real commercial lunar economy. Cislunar activity is supported almost exclusively by government spending. Certainly, Britain’s famed eighteenth-century economist Adam Smith would not characterize the cislunar environment as a market-based economy. There are currently no clear strategic military benefits derived from cislunar space derived from cislunar space, with little chance a cislunar space system could influence the outcome of a conflict on Earth.</p> +<p>This vision also extends to allies and partners. Building on their own experiments with the Boeing Ghost Bat, the Australians are looking to establish trilateral cooperation with the United States and Japan on CCAs. Japan is increasing its investments in multiple unmanned programs, including the Global Combat Air Platform, which is under development with Italy and the United Kingdom. Not to be outdone, India is on schedule to start flight testing its CCA variant later in 2024. In December 2022, France, Spain, and Germany sealed a 3.2-billion-euro agreement for Europe’s Future Combat Air System (FCAS) program. In February 2024, the United Kingdom released its Defence Drone Strategy, highlighting the country’s efforts with unmanned aircraft systems.</p> -<h4 id="evolving-future-considerations">EVOLVING FUTURE CONSIDERATIONS</h4> +<p>China and Russia have introduced similar concepts and prototypes. In 2022, the People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) unveiled its FH-97A “Loyal Wingman” drone, designed to operate alongside fifth-generation fighters like the J-20 and J-31, which are currently undergoing extensive upgrades. The PLAAF approach to CCAs seems to be to replicate existing low-cost U.S. prototypes like the XQ-58A Valkyrie, which is currently being developed by the Air Force Research Laboratory and the Marine Corps. The Russian defense establishment, led by the Advanced Research Foundation, has long pursued unmanned aerial systems with advanced features and integration capabilities. The development of the Altius and S-70 Okhotnik-B – the latter integrated with the Su-57, Russia’s fifth-generation multirole aircraft – provide compelling evidence of Russian CCA endeavors.</p> -<p>Maybe someday, in the distant future, there will be a market-based lunar economy and a reason to have a military presence in cislunar space. This may happen if a cislunar activity could unexpectedly produce significant commercial value, such as mining of rare earth elements that could cost-effectively be returned and sold on Earth. This may also happen if the United States and China, ignoring the precedent of Antarctica, cannot agree to forestall the equivalent of a cislunar colonial land grab and resulting rush of military assets to the cislunar region. Additionally, dramatically lowering transportation costs to the Moon may also generate new lunar business cases.</p> +<p>Taken together, these initiatives point to a prevailing trend across multiple countries: the addition of unmanned aircraft as key nodes in multidomain networks designed to execute traditional airpower missions like counterair operations, interdiction, and close air support. Similar to earlier DARPA concepts, these nodes enable the delegation of key tasks and support missions across a software-defined kill web. This pairing of manned and unmanned systems puts a premium on command and control, prioritizing the execution of mission command through algorithms that guide autonomous systems.</p> -<p>Ultimately, the calculus fundamentally changes if — probably when — large numbers of humans start living on the Moon and in other parts of the solar system. Many of us, these authors included, foresee that future. But that is not on the 10-year plan, probably not even on the 25-year one. There are, however, strong reasons to go to the Moon today and in the foreseeable future: to explore the unknown, learn, and advance science for the sake of all humankind. That is reason enough to address the challenges described in this report.</p> +<h3 id="command-and-control">Command and Control</h3> -<h3 id="introduction-and-background">INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND</h3> +<p>As states race to integrate CCAs into their air forces, a question remains: How will militaries command and control new formations?</p> -<h4 id="defining-cislunar-space">DEFINING “CISLUNAR SPACE”</h4> +<p>Command is a continuous function that consists of key subtasks: collecting and distinguishing relevant information, translating it into estimates to determine objectives and courses of action, converting these plans into orders, and monitoring progress through assessments. Command takes the form of a system that links together a focal point – the commander – with a staff that aligns its intent with the commander’s key decisions. In Marine Corps doctrine, command encompasses decisionmaking as well as the directing of others; control concerns feedback loops and the management of a “continuous flow of information about [an] unfolding situation.” As a result, the C2 architecture for CCAs must factor in who directs the platforms and how feedback loops are analyzed in a fluid environment with shifting objectives.</p> -<p>In this report, “cislunar space” refers to the area between geosynchronous orbit around Earth (about 36,000 kilometers from Earth’s surface) and the Moon (approximately 384,000 kilometers from Earth’s surface, on average). Orbits around the Moon, trajectories to and from the Moon, the five Earth–Moon Lagrange points (L1, L2, L3, L4, and L5), and the Moon itself are also included in this report’s definition. Effectively, three different environments in which space operations can occur are included in this definition: the Moon’s surface, lunar orbits, and Earth orbits and trajectories to and from the Moon.</p> +<p>A recurring theme in the evolution of airpower has been the usage of C2 to concentrate and sequence tactical air effects in time and space while also allowing the airman in the cockpit flexibility in emerging situations. In the aftermath of Operation Desert Storm, a historical study by James Winnefeld and Dana Johnson defined C2 as “unity of effort.” The study analyzed a joint air operation between the Army Air Corps, Marines, and Navy to thwart Japan’s invasion of Midway. While strategically successful, the Battle of Midway revealed a lack of operational unity of effort between land-based and sea-based air campaigns. This absence of coordination persisted through the Korean War, where service rivalries hindered joint air operations.</p> -<p>Like the Moon itself, most objects in cislunar space are orbiting Earth, though some objects are also orbiting the Moon. However, due to Earth’s gravitational pull, orbits higher than 700 kilometers above the lunar surface are not stable. To further complicate matters, the mass of the Moon is irregularly distributed, which renders its gravitational field uneven. This means that at altitudes lower than 100 kilometers from the Moon’s surface, only four lunar orbital inclinations support stable orbits. Objects attempting to orbit the Moon below 100 kilometers at other inclinations must perform frequent station-keeping maneuvers and expend fuel to remain in orbit.</p> +<p>The Battle of Midway had a single commander overseeing all air assets. In Korea, the Air Force, Marine Corps, and Navy were divided in their command structures. Despite efforts at coordination, joint operations continued to be plagued by interservice rivalries, conflicting doctrines, and poor communication. The Vietnam War further exposed these issues, demonstrating the need for significant changes to achieve true unity of effort.</p> -<p>Objects in cislunar space are affected not only by Earth’s gravitational effects but also by the Moon’s gravity. As with any two large celestial bodies, there are five Lagrange points around the Earth and Moon at which the gravitational pull of the Earth and Moon is exactly equal to the amount of centripetal force needed for a small object, such as a satellite or spacecraft, to move with them. Due to these gravitational dynamics, the Lagrange points are nearly stationary relative to the Earth-Moon rotating frame.</p> +<p>The process of managing joint airpower has evolved since World War II, largely due to the Joint Targeting Coordination Board’s efforts to deconflict service perspectives on mission priorities. In the 1970s, the military streamlined the chain of command by giving the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) greater authority and by emphasizing the role of combatant commanders (COCOM) in joint operations. This move toward greater coordination was further solidified by the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. The result was the introduction of a Joint Forces Air Component Commander (JFACC), as well as the development of the master attack plan (MAP) and air tasking order (ATO), which improved centralized control and coordination of air assets and was used to great effect in Desert Storm.</p> -<h4 id="history-of-cislunar-space">HISTORY OF CISLUNAR SPACE</h4> +<p>Yet operational unity of effort must also accommodate the fluidity of tactical combat, where the unforeseen can create new and unforgiving realities. When not accompanied by tactical flexibility, centralized C2 can create brittle systems.</p> -<p>Since Russia’s Luna 1 became the first spacecraft to reach the vicinity of the Moon in January 1959, approximately 140 missions have been launched to the Moon, either landing on the lunar surface, entering lunar orbit, or conducting a lunar flyby. Thirteen countries and the the European Space Agency (ESA) have launched spacecraft toward the Moon. The first U.S. spacecraft to reach the vicinity of the Moon was Pioneer 4, which conducted a lunar flyby in March 1959. In 1990, Japan became the third nation to launch a lunar probe, called Hiten, and the third nation to reach the lunar surface when Hiten’s small orbiter, Hagoromo, was intentionally crashed into the Moon in 1993 after completing several lunar orbits.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/aQkOFs5.png" alt="image02" /> +<em>▲ Photo: Connecticut State Library Federal Documents, W 2.6:F 45/2</em></p> -<p>The majority of lunar missions have been launched and managed by government entities, with only four spacecraft ever sent to the Moon operated by private sector organizations. Cislunar space saw the most activity at the height of the space race between the 1950s and 1970s. Interest in the Moon quickly declined by the 1980s; as already noted, there were zero missions to the Moon from 1980 to 1989. Although there has been a steady increase in cislunar activity since 1990, the total number of lunar missions since then is only about two-thirds that of missions in just the 1960s. Almost all cislunar traffic to date has resulted from spacecraft traveling to the Moon, though spacecraft bound for other locations in the solar system have passed through cislunar space.</p> +<p>This dilemma is addressed in the doctrines of multiple services, which emphasize the need to balance centralized control with decentralized execution. Air Force doctrine, for example, dictates the conduct of operations through centralized command, distributed control, and decentralized execution (CC-DC-DE). In this framework, mission flexibility and combat lethality are maximized through the generation of mission-appropriate sorties, allowing the commander to adapt to circumstances. In Marine Corps antiair warfare, this is referred to as the principle of centralized command and decentralized control.</p> -<p>Over the past decade, between 2014 and 2024, about 20 missions sent from Earth have transited cislunar space on their way to the Moon. To place this number into context, over 12,000 objects — including satellites, scientific probes, landers, crewed spacecraft, and components of space stations — have been launched into space during this same period. While the number of missions through cislunar space has increased over the past four decades, the increase is small compared to the exponential growth in the number of satellites launched into orbits closer to Earth. Overall, missions through cislunar space are just a small fraction of the total number of spacecraft launched from Earth.</p> +<p>Both ideas center on the concept of mission command. The core of mission command is a culture of trust and a blueprint for disciplined initiative at all echelons based on the commander’s intent. While the concept dates back to nineteenth-century operational art, mission command entered U.S. military writings formally in 1905. The concept evolved over the years, eventually giving rise to a core idea adapted for airpower in 1962: centralized command and decentralized execution.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/mDgOqKV.png" alt="image01" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 1: Cislunar Region wih Cone Denoting the Area of Greatest Cislunar Activity.</strong> Source: CSIS Aerospace Security Project.</em></p> +<blockquote> + <p><em>In the chaos of battle, it is essential to decentralize decision authority to the lowest practical level because over centralization slows action and leads to inertia.</em></p> + <h4 id="-fm-100-5-1986">– FM 100-5 (1986)</h4> +</blockquote> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/K8hSQJq.png" alt="image02" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 2: Launches to the Moon by Decade.</strong> Source: <a href="https://science.nasa.gov/moon/missions/">“Moon Missions,” NASA, accessed August 17, 2024</a>.</em></p> +<p>As an approach to command and control, mission command represents both a philosophical tenet and a set of planning and operation processes designed to foster a culture of initiative. For generations, Army and Marine Corps doctrines have grounded the concept in a belief that war is an inherently chaotic contest (Zweikampf) defined by friction, uncertainty, and fluidity. As a result, combatants must balance operational synchronization – the movement of large formations to fight decisive battles in time and space – with tactical adaptations that allow subordinates to anticipate and respond to changing circumstances. Applied to CCAs, this means that networks of autonomous aircraft will have to balance operational effectiveness and tactical efficiency. Mission command will need to be integrated into algorithms to make it possible for pilots to delegate aspects of air-to-air combat to drones and react to feedback from the edge of the battlefield – whether they’re in a ground command center or in an airborne warning and control system (AWACS) aircraft.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/LqesqYZ.png" alt="image03" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Table 1: New Space Objects by Year.</strong> Note: Data is current as of September 26, 2024. Source: <a href="https://www.unoosa.org/oosa/osoindex/index.jspx">“Outer Space Objects Index,” UN Office for Outer Space Affairs</a>.</em></p> +<p>While airmen are highly capable of decentralized execution, the modern joint air tasking cycle also codifies principles of centralized command and operational synchronization. This six-stage cycle matches air capabilities and effects against larger, operational objectives – as defined by the Joint Force Commander – and results in an ATO that shape the joint air operations.</p> -<h3 id="national-cislunar-policies-and-activities">NATIONAL CISLUNAR POLICIES AND ACTIVITIES</h3> +<p>The first stage of the joint air tasking cycle is “Objectives, Effects and Guidance,” which provides guidance on objectives and desired effects. The final product for this stage is the air apportionment recommendation, which is provided by the JFACC in consultation with other component commanders.</p> -<p>Today, cislunar activity remains limited because there are few commercial cislunar use cases and requirements that are independent of a government operator or customer. Most lunar activities are funded and operated by governments, primarily for scientific research and exploration to better understand the Moon and its environs. Most commercial lunar missions are also closely tied to government science and research requirements and funding. For example, Japanese company ispace and U.S. companies Astrobotic and Intuitive Machines have already launched and are planning more commercial missions to carry government-sponsored scientific payloads to the Moon, as well as nongovernment payloads.</p> +<p>The next stage, “Target Development,” matches targets to air taskings and aimpoints, which are fed to the Targeting Effects Team (TET). The TET then reviews, nominates, and prioritizes targets, ensuring that each attack meets JFC guidance. The product of this effort, when approved by the JFC, is the joint integrated prioritized targeting list.</p> -<p>In addition to conducting scientific research, many Moon missions aim to demonstrate technologies such as lunar rovers that could be used on future missions. Two upcoming lunar missions, part of the Chang’e program operated by China’s national space agency, will test technologies intended to support a future long-term uncrewed lunar base. In addition to supporting NASA’s Commercial Lunar Payload Services (CLPS) program, future missions from Astrobotic, Firefly Aerospace, and Intuitive Machines, among others, will carry a variety of payloads, including rovers, hoppers, sensors, scien tific experiments, and small satellites for private sector organizations and space agencies from around the world looking to test their technologies on and in orbit around the Moon.</p> +<p>Next, in the “Weaponeering and Allocation” stage, the Joint Air Operations Center quantifies the expected results of employing all available means in every domain against prioritized targets. The final targets are then delivered to the master air attack plan team. Following the JFC’s air apportionment decision, a final number of sorties by weapon system is developed for each objective and task.</p> -<p>Other organizations are looking at using the Moon to preserve Earth’s cultural heritage and biodiversity. For example, the UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) intends to send a memory disk containing the UNESCO preamble in 275 human languages to the lunar surface on ispace’s upcoming Hakuto-R 2. Additionally, a group of scientists wants to use the Moon to create a biorepository of cryopreserved seeds and living cells as a safeguard against possible threats to life on Earth. In a similar vein, Interstellar Lab’s Mission Little Prince aims to grow flowers on the Moon in an environment-controlled plant pod.</p> +<p>The fourth stage is “ATO Production and Dissemination,” in which the ATO production team constructs, publishes, and disseminates the daily ATO and Special Instructions to appropriate forces. The ATO includes information such as the order of battle, target worksheets, and component requirements.</p> -<p>For the near future, use cases such as scientific research, technology demonstrations, and, on a smaller scale, disaster planning are the drivers for cislunar traffic. Notably, the United States and China are pursuing ambitious agendas to create human habitats in lunar orbit and land people on the Moon. Over the next several years, the authors of this report anticipate around 40 significant missions launching toward cislunar space, not including missions that merely transit cislunar space bound for deep space destinations.</p> +<p>In the fifth stage, “Execution Planning and Force Execution,” the JFACC directs air capabilities and forces in joint air operations. During this stage, the JFACC has the ability to redirect air assets and coordinate with component commanders.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/hbDibDj.png" alt="image04" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Table 2: Significant Future Cislunar Missions.</strong> Source: Authors’ research and analysis.</em></p> +<p>During the final stage, “Assessment,” a continuous process measures the overall effectiveness of joint force capabilities at both the tactical and operational levels. Assessment is not the end of the cycle, but rather a continuous activity that provides input at all the stages of the cycle.</p> -<p>At this point, the report authors should acknowledge the challenges in counting cislunar missions. Rather than attempting to count all missions, the authors identified significant future missions that represented the most considerable and impactful cislunar undertakings.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/T7rul0r.png" alt="image03" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 2: Contingency and Crisis Execution: The Tasking Cycle.</strong> Note: JOPP is Joint Operational Planning Process and JOPPA is Joint Operational Planning Process for Air. Source: <a href="https://www.doctrine.af.mil/Portals/61/documents/AFDP_3-0/3-0-D29-I-OPS-The-Tasking-Cycle.pdf">“Contingency and Crisis Execution: Tasking Cycle,” Air Force Doctrine Publication (AFDP) 3-0: Operations and Planning, Curtis E. LeMay Center for Doctrine Development and Education, November 4, 2016</a>.</em></p> -<p>Many future cislunar missions look like matryoshka, or Russian nesting, dolls; they are complex systems of systems, with some providing lunar ridesharing. Most Artemis missions have many moving parts, including the Orion spacecraft, modules of the Lunar Gateway, and space vehicles associated with the Starship Human Landing System (HLS). Additionally, China’s Chang’e 6 mission included a lander, ascender, return vehicle, mini rover, and an orbiter built by Pakistan. The future Chang’e 8 mission is also expected to include international payloads. Each Chang’e and Artemis mission is included in the significant mission list.</p> +<p>Even this carefully choreographed process, however, cannot match the infinite range of possibilities that emerge in war. Air operations require decentralized execution as pilots respond to the friction, uncertainty, and fluidity of war. The loadout of CCAs will be determined by the air tasking cycle – with airmen loading different payloads and sensor arrays – but their employment may have to adjust to sudden changes at both operational and tactical levels.</p> -<p>The CLPS program epitomizes the concept of lunar ridesharing, transporting NASA payloads and creating opportunities for smaller companies, international partners, and other organizations to send missions, including scientific instruments, rovers, and orbiters, to the Moon. This approach is diversifying the types of entities launching to cislunar space and increasing the number of individual organizations with payloads in lunar orbit and on the Moon’s surface.</p> +<p>At the operational level, situations may emerge that demand a sudden realignment of missions, leading the CAOG commander to override the ATO to respond to a new threat. For example, imagine a squadron of F-35s operating with CCAs to conduct a fight sweep to seek out and destroy enemy aircraft. The command post receives indications that a squadron of enemy fifth-generation fighters are moving to attack a high-value air asset (HVAA) and are likely to overwhelm friendly fighters. The HVAA is hundreds of miles from the intended fighter sweep. To the extent that CCAs are capable of remote-split operations separate from the flight leader, they are operationally effective and the CCAs can be redirected to support HVAA protection, leaving the F-35s to continue the sweep – albeit at greater risk than originally planned.</p> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Many future cislunar missions look like matryoshka, or Russian nesting, dolls; they are complex systems of systems, with some providing lunar ridesharing.</code></em></strong></p> +<p>At the tactical level, CCAs must support delegations by pilots already overwhelmed by the massive amount of information generated by modern aircraft. This delegation should be an extension of commanders’ intents and allow the CCAs to perform with initiative within the limits of the mission. CCAs need to be able to respond to changing tactical situations noticed either by the pilot or by sensors feeding algorithms supporting autonomous systems. This kind of feedback loop is the essence of decentralized execution; if CCAs lack it, they are likely to render missions brittle, causing overwhelmed pilots to have to manage more information – in their cockpit and on devices controlling CCAs – than the human mind can process, especially amid physical stress and fear. According to the Mike Tyson retelling of Moltke and Eisenhower quotes, “everyone has a plan until they get punched in the face.” Seeing, dodging, or taking the blow to set up a counterstrike are the essence of being tactically responsive.</p> -<p>This report considers each CLPS mission a significant mission but not individual payloads, though many of these payloads are described in the report. In general, this report does not count instruments or experiments that remain associated with or near another spacecraft, lander, or rover as a significant mission. For example, a memory disk sponsored by UNESCO that will be carried on Hakuto-R 2 is not included in the significant mission tally.</p> +<p>Moreover, CCAs will need to be capable of executing mission command at both operational and tactical levels, with optimal C2s determined by mission type. In some missions, the value of operational effectiveness outweighs the utility of tactical responsiveness. The inverse is also true; other missions require tactical responsiveness to a degree that outweighs the benefits of perfect operational effectiveness. Much of the modern air tasking cycle is built around a C2 architecture that links CCAs to the command center, rather than to the pilot in the cockpit. From the development of objectives, effects, and guidance to target development to master attack planning, the majority of flight planning takes place in command centers, even when orchestrated through nodes like AWACS. Since a command center has a wider perspective than any individual mission leader, nesting C2 for CCAs there ensures that assessments are indeed a continuous activity. Economies of scale afforded by centralized control should not be immediately discounted due to the lure of the fighter pilot.</p> -<p>If the report authors could not find clear indications of funding or recent progress for a future concept or mission — meaning the mission’s existence is based only on a press release — the authors did not include the mission in Figure 1. For missions beyond 2030, it was often difficult to differentiate real plans from aspirations, as many decisions on government funding for activities so far into the future have yet to be made. The authors also questioned whether Russia has the financial resources to execute its upcoming cislunar plans, which include at least three lunar missions, but still includes those on the significant mission list.</p> +<p>Yet in complex missions that require tactical-level delegation, CCAs have the capability to reduce the cognitive burden on pilots, thus extending their reach. This increase in efficiency should translate into superior mission performance. An F-35 accompanied by two CCAs loaded with air-to-air missiles and decoys will likely produce more air-to-air kills than a single aircraft, even if the two have comparable weapons loadouts. Likewise, a group of 10 F-35s and F-15Xs flying alongside 100 CCAs would be even more effective. To the extent that algorithms are an extension of mission command, the pilot is free to see and respond to change based on mission command.</p> -<p>Additionally, the fully assembled Lunar Gateway is not specifically listed in the table, though completion of the station will be a significant achievement. Finally, one mission in the table — DESTINY+ — has a lengthly transit time through cislunar space on its way to the parent body of the Geminids meteor shower.</p> +<p>The future of air power, as waged through networks of manned and unmanned systems, will depend on tailoring CCA algorithms to the logic of each mission. Unlocking the full potential of CCAs will require wargames, experiments, and studies that explore mission command in various scenarios and new C2 models by mission type. These experiments will need to incorporate new concepts for generating Air Task Forces based on new combat wings optimized for great power competition. Furthermore, the experiments will need to stress-test new task forces employing Agile Combat Employment (ACE), an operational scheme of maneuver, and multidomain pulse operations. In other words, distributed networks of aircraft will have to come together from distributed airfields and synchronize airpower with cyber warfare – and other technical means – to create windows of opportunity. To be operational, these efforts must take into account multiple pulse operations, as well as the ability to generate combat power in and through the air over the course of a campaign. That task will require deeper digital integration and data synthesis – using artificial intelligence and machine learning – from multiple warfighting functions, as well as the imagining of entirely new ATOs that are more joint and dynamic. Software will be as important as hardware in this vision of future airpower.</p> -<p><em>United States</em></p> +<p>The following exploration analyzes hypothetical air campaigns through the lens of the fundamental tradeoff between operational effectiveness and tactical responsiveness. From reflecting on the combined bomber offenses in World War II and air war over Vietnam to John Warden and the Gulf War and the Balkans, the air campaign is the preferred unit of analysis for operational study. While air campaigns tend to involve a mix of missions, the scenarios below will visualize and describe three campaigns that are each oriented around a mission area: counterair operations, interdiction – including both counterland and countersea operations – and close air support.</p> -<p><strong>Policies</strong></p> +<p>This analytical framing is frequently used in Air Force studies. The Battle of Britain, for instance, has been used to study counterair operations; a wide range of cases – from World War II to the wars in Korea and Vietnam – have been used to study the development of close air support and interdiction.</p> -<p>In December 2021, the White House released the United States Space Priorities Framework, which outlined various goals related to national and economic security and scientific advancement for U.S. activities in space. Those goals include:</p> +<p>Below, a fictional planning scenario is used to analyze three future campaigns: counterair operations, interdiction in littoral environments, and close air support. In each, the adversary is intentionally kept abstract in order to focus the analysis on the C2 character of the mission sets, which are evaluated in terms of operational effectiveness and tactical responsiveness. The adversary is held constant across all three scenarios and assumed to be a peer competitor capable of contesting U.S. power across multiple domains, including air. Other major assumptions include:</p> <ul> <li> - <p>maintaining “leadership in space exploration and space science”;</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>advancing “the development and use of space-based Earth observation capabilities that support action on climate change”;</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>fostering “a policy and regulatory environment that enables a competitive and burgeoning U.S. commercial space sector”;</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>protecting “space-related critical infrastructure” and strengthening “the security of the U.S. space industrial base”;</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>defending “national security interests from the growing scope and scale of space and counterspace threats”;</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>investing in science, technology, engineering, and mathematics education;</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>playing a lead role in “strengthening global governance of space activities”;</p> + <p>The United States is fighting as part of a larger coalition of partners and allies (the norm throughout its history).</p> </li> <li> - <p>bolstering “space situational awareness sharing and space traffic coordination”; and</p> + <p>The conflict involves nuclear powers but has not crossed the threshold where either side uses nuclear weapons in pursuit of strategic or operational objectives.</p> </li> <li> - <p>prioritizing “space sustainability and planetary protection.”</p> + <p>While there have been large exchanges in space and cyberspace, all sides retain the ability to support air, ground, and maritime operations with space and cyber capabilities.</p> </li> </ul> -<p>The framework emphasizes retaining U.S. leadership in space and broadening and deepening international space collaboration. Though this document does not focus on cislunar space specifically, its priorities apply to all U.S. activities and initiatives in space.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/bJKYjsJ.png" alt="image04" /></p> + +<h3 id="campaign-scenario-20xx">Campaign Scenario: 20XX</h3> + +<p>It is 20XX, and the United States finds itself engaged in a regional war as part of a coalition seeking to stop an authoritarian state from illegally annexing the territory of one of its neighbors. After a series of space, cyber, air, and maritime operations over the initial thirty days, there is now a forward line of troops (FLOT), with the United States providing air support to partner ground forces as additional units mobilize. This leads to a series of battles in air, at sea, and on land as each side seeks to gain a position of advantage along the FLOT.</p> + +<p>In planning the next phase and delineating how best to sequence major operations in pursuit of objectives, the Coalition Joint Task Force (CJTF) is exploring options for three different air campaigns: (1) counterair, (2) interdiction, and (3) close air support.</p> + +<p>The counterair campaign would prioritize gaining air superiority to open up a ground or maritime counteroffensive. At present, there is air parity, and each side has yet to roll back the other side’s air defense network or sufficiently attrite the other side’s air force to establish air superiority. The resulting air parity makes it difficult to achieve more than a tactical breakthrough on the ground or to forward-deploy naval surface combatants integrated into CJTF operations. This results in a static FLOT and long lines of communication that burn readiness and risk creating a protracted conflict. The counterair campaign would dedicate all available air assets to establishing air control, if not supremacy, before transitioning to major operations in other domains.</p> + +<p>The interdiction campaign would prioritize striking targets across the depth of the littorals to shock the enemy system and create conditions for a localized counterattack. The mission would establish temporary air control to enable air interdiction against both enemy lines of communication and logistical nodes just beyond the FLOT, which are critical to projecting power through littorals. By strangling the enemy and channeling its movement into a series of kill boxes in the joint fires area, the campaign would set conditions for a simultaneous air and ground counteroffensive. This emphasis on simultaneity differentiates the interdiction campaign from the phasing and sequencing of the counterair campaign.</p> + +<p>The close air support campaign would prioritize generating effects on the FLOT to enable a breakthrough. Unlike the interdiction campaign, the priority of air control is along the FLOT and enabling terminal attack control (TAC) based on guidance given by the ground commander to joint terminal attack controllers (JTAC). This campaign would combine type 1, 2, and 3 controls to enable close coordination between coalition ground forces and aircraft. This coordination, and the ability to mass air effects on key ground objectives, sets conditions for an operational envelopment along the FLOT. Like the interdiction campaign, the emphasis is on simultaneity. Unlike the interdiction concept, the CAS campaign would focus on principles of objective and mass, using tightly coupled air and ground effects – including attack helicopters and loitering munitions in the air-ground littoral – to enable a decisive ground maneuver.</p> + +<h4 id="tradeoffs-in-the-counterair-campaign">Tradeoffs in the Counterair Campaign</h4> + +<p>In the fictional scenario above, the counterair campaign would mix offensive and defensive counterair to establish air superiority. There are historical precedents in multiple World War II cases, in which novel methods were used to bait German fighters as part of the Royal Air Force (RAF) circus offensive that followed the Battle of Britain.</p> + +<p>In a campaign setting, which involves longer time periods and multiple major operations, planners must focus on attrition rates and how best to pull an adversary into air operations that produce diminishing marginal returns. Every sortie generates losses that exceed the value of the mission. Losses inhibit the enemy’s ability to generate air power, changing how the adversary fights (i.e., assigning aircraft to missions) while reducing the time and space required to achieve air superiority.</p> + +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/jM1kOEM.png" alt="image05" /> +<em>▲ <strong>A Spitfire Mark VB from the United Kingdom Royal Air Force in 1940.</strong> Photo: G. Woodbine/Second World War Official Collection/Imperial War Museums.</em></p> + +<p>This notional counterair campaign would almost certainly rely on a mix of SEAD and fighter sweeps to establish air superiority. Modern radars, especially when connected to space effects, enable situational awareness and tracking. Establishing air superiority first requires blinding the enemy and destroying its ability to track and target friendly aircraft. Second, if enemy planes cannot be destroyed on the ground – the best place to kill an aircraft – they must be engaged in a series of operations designed to change the balance of air power.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/7VjOCg7.png" alt="image05" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 3: Example Commercial Lunar Mission Supporting CLPS - Intuitive Machines IM-2.</strong> Source: Intuitive Machines (reprinted with permission).</em></p> +<p>These missions, even with intelligence over-match, would likely require CCAs that are more tactically responsive. Air-to-air combat and the adjustment to unforeseen aspects of an adversary’s air defenses – as seen in the evolution of SEAD missions since Vietnam – require the ability to recognize and respond to changes in the tactical environment. Feedback loops create a fluid environment prone to sudden changes.</p> -<p>In addition to these national space priorities, the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP), together with the National Science and Technology Council, developed and published the National Cislunar Science and Technology Strategy in 2022. The strategy seeks to foster interagency cooperation and advance U.S. cislunar science and technology leadership. It defines four objectives: “support research and development to enable long-term growth in Cislunar space”; “expand international S&amp;T [science and technology] cooperation in Cislunar space”; “extend U.S. space situational awareness capabilities into Cislunar space”; and “implement Cislunar communications and PNT [positioning, navigation, and timing] capabilities.” Though OSTP does not itself direct funding or administer space programs, its cislunar strategy will likely influence spending and priorities across the U.S. federal government.</p> +<p>Mission command for CCAs in these situations takes the form of pilots directly adjusting mission parameters in response to a changing environment. This would likely require building in preconstructed mission sets that the pilot can rapidly assign as the threat environment changes. For example, consider a fighter sweep in which two F-35s are each paired with four CCAs, mixing electronic countermeasures and air-to-air weapons. The flight leader receives confirmation that there are more enemy aircraft than originally anticipated and relative to the payload. She could dynamically retask the CCAs to jam and harass the enemy combat air patrol while the manned aircraft pull back to regroup and assess the situation with an AWACS and/or the command center (e.g., CAOG). Decentralized execution takes the form of an ability to assign missions to networked CCAs in order to free up time and space for pilots to adjust to new information.</p> -<p>Although China is not specifically mentioned in the United States Space Policy Framework or National Cislunar Science and Technology Strategy, Beijing’s central role as a motivator for U.S. cislunar activities is undeniable. Some U.S. experts have argued that China could obtain a first-mover advantage and become the dominant power in cislunar space, to the detriment of U.S. interests. Additionally, the current NASA administrator, Bill Nelson, has expressed concern that China could try to restrict U.S. access to lunar resources if it establishes a long-term presence on the Moon before the United States does. Other U.S. experts worry about the impacts of China’s cislunar activities on U.S. prestige and influence, framing cislunar plans within the context of broader geopolitical competition between the two powers.</p> +<p>Alternatively, DCA would focus more on a mix of active and passive defenses. In modern war, these cut across multiple domains and include everything from space-based sensors to AEGIS destroyers and patriot missile sites. Aircraft play a role that includes shooting down cruise and loitering munitions – as seen both in the April 2024 defense of Israel from an Iranian strike and in the skies of Ukraine – but that role tends to be supporting as opposed to supported. This dynamic puts a premium on operational effectiveness and on empowering an air defense commander to integrate air and missile defense to include a larger number of land platforms (e.g., surface-to-air missiles, radars, directed energy, high-powered microwave) and sea platforms (e.g., naval cruisers, destroyers, and frigates) alongside airborne networks of manned and unmanned aircraft. Mission command applies here, but managing air and missile threats across large areas requires more centralized control measures, whether in an AWAC or a ground-based command center.</p> -<p>Finally, many government actors — including the United States, China, Russia, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) — have stated that space could be used for warfighting. Though cislunar space is not the primary focus of U.S. military attention on the space domain, the Department of Defense (DoD) is leading several initiatives, described later in this report, focused on cislunar space. However, it is not clear how cislunar space fits into the overall national security strategy, because the DoD has neither articulated broad cislunar goals nor put forward a cislunar strategy.</p> +<h4 id="tradeoffs-in-the-interdiction-campaign">Tradeoffs in the Interdiction Campaign</h4> -<p><strong>Enacted Law</strong></p> +<p>In the fictional planning scenario above, the interdiction campaign would combine both counterland and countersea air operations focused on denying the enemy power projection in the seams of the air, sea, and ground. In U.S. joint doctrine, this littoral environment includes “those land areas (and their adjacent sea and associated air space) that are predominantly susceptible to engagement and influence from the sea and may reach far inland.” Modern battle networks and long-range precision fires extend the segments of air, ground, and sea that constitute the site of modern littoral warfare.</p> -<p>Over the past 90 years, the United States has enacted numerous laws related to military, civilian, and commercial space activities, which would apply not only to near-Earth orbits but also to cislunar space. Title 51 of U.S. Code contains laws related to national and commercial space programs. Applicable laws related to defense and military space programs are mostly found in Title 10.</p> +<p>The most likely targets of the interdiction campaign would be logistics nodes and lines of communication. The theory of victory is that reducing the enemy’s supplies reduces its combat power, creating a more favorable correlation of forces for offensive action and/or limiting the ability of the enemy to project power. This logic is evident across multiple, historical interdiction campaigns, which carry a different theory of victory than strategic attack and which are built around decisive blows against enemy C2.</p> -<p>The <strong>Communications Act</strong> of 1934 provided the basis for federal regulation of telephone, telegraph, and radio communications and was later amended to include requirements for commercial satellite licensing and use of radio spectrum. The act established the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) to regulate use of these technologies in the United States. This law also applies to U.S. entities wanting to use spectrum to communicate from, to, and in cislunar space.</p> +<p>During the Italian campaign, allied planners designed Operation Strangle as an independent air interdiction campaign targeting German supply lines, intended to render the planned ground offensive (Operation Diadem) unnecessary. The effort had mixed results and led to an enduring debate about whether to target enemy supplies or mobility. This debate shaped air interdiction campaigns in Korea. For example, the Saturate interdiction campaign targeted North Korean rail lines to reduce supply, focusing on a narrow corridor on a continuous basis.</p> -<p>The <strong>National Aeronautics and Space Act</strong> of 1958 separated military and civilian space government functions and emphasized the peaceful character of U.S. pursuits in space. The act also established NASA, the first U.S. government organization dedicated to the civilian use of space.</p> +<p>The effects are not limited to counterland operations. Maritime interdiction played a key role in World War II. The RAF Coastal Command, for instance, was pivotal to the Battle of the Atlantic, in sub-hunting missions in the Bay of Biscay, and in attacks on marine lines of communication connecting Germany to key industrial materials in Scandinavia. Of note, many of these efforts benefitted from work by technical experts who integrated new technologies, including air-to-surface radar and applied operations research – the use of formal mathematical models and statistics to analyze patterns and trends in armed combat. The Luftwaffe replicated this maritime interdiction capability through its Fliegerführer Atlantik.</p> -<p>The <strong>Commercial Space Launch Act</strong> of 1984 provided the Department of Transportation authority to regulate commercial spaceflight, including commercial launch services; required the government to assume responsibility for large third-party damages that could arise from U.S. commercial space activities; and laid the foundation for future regulation of commercial human spaceflight.</p> +<p>In Vietnam, Operation Rolling Thunder (1965–1968) was largely an air interdiction campaign, with over 90 percent of the targets consisting of transportation nodes. In addition to destroying combat potential by targeting supplies and lines of communication, interdiction can channel the enemy’s movements, attriting its forces. Of Desert Storm’s 40,000 strike sorties, roughly 38,000 were air interdiction. Some of these missions included the attack on the infamous “Highway of Death,” where coalition aircraft destroyed Iraqi forces retreating from Kuwait into Iraq.</p> -<p>The <strong>U.S. Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act</strong> of 2015 extended the moratorium until 2023 on regulation of commercial human spaceflight activities, which has since been extended to early 2025. The law also explicitly allowed U.S. citizens and companies to own and sell any resources extracted from bodies in space, such as asteroids and the Moon, permitting them to “facilitate commercial exploration for and commercial recovery of space resources.” The text also states that the United States, in accordance with the Outer Space Treaty, cannot use this law to “assert sovereignty or sovereign or exclusive rights or jurisdiction over, or the ownership of, any celestial body.” Notably, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Luxembourg, and Japan have all enacted similar laws that allow the ownership and transfer of ownership of space resources.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/coMD2bv.png" alt="image06" /> +<em>▲ <strong>The “Highway of Death,” the result of U.S. forces bombing retreating Iraqi forces, Kuwait, 1991.</strong> Photo: Photo 12/Universal Images Group via Getty Images.</em></p> -<p><strong>Regulations</strong></p> +<p>Interdiction requires operational-level coordination and careful target selection. These missions naturally lend themselves to a C2 architecture that executes mission command through a command center. CCAs could become part of a larger joint fires scheme for interdicting lines of communication; they could carry a mix of electronic attack payloads and air-ground (or air-sea) munitions, which work alongside long-range strike assets currently fielded by the Marine Littoral Regiment and the Army’s Multi-Domain Task Force.</p> -<p>Today, the U.S. government regulates elements of every private U.S. space activity. The Department of Transportation oversees private spaceports and licenses launch and reentry of spacecraft, requiring information about the space payload as part of the licensing process. The FCC licenses spectrum use and imposes associated requirements regarding space sustainability on licensees. Any satellite or spacecraft wishing to broadcast radio frequencies to or from any territory of the United States must receive a license from the FCC, including foreign satellites seeking to serve the U.S. market. The Department of Commerce licenses remote-sensing satellites, including ones conducting non-Earth imaging, such as imaging of other satellites in space.</p> +<p>In addition, CCAs could act as escorts for long-range strike munitions targeting naval logistics vessels and amphibious shipping, protecting the missiles from being shot down by enemy air patrols. Consider an MDTF Typhon battery and an AEGIS Destroyer firing a salvo of Tomahawk missiles at a key target. Through joint fires coordination, the CAOG could task on-call CCAs to carry a mix of payloads to support the mission, freeing up human pilots for other missions. While the same salvo could be supported by a manned-unmanned team, the theater-level fires synchronization makes it more aligned with C2 oriented toward operational effectiveness.</p> -<p>Beyond these regulations, the United States is considering proposals to regulate novel private sector space activities, a process often referred to as “mission authorization.” These novel activities include commercial habitats, in-space manufacturing, and on-orbit refueling, none of which are clearly addressed by existing licensing schemes.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/ELsBrJb.png" alt="image07" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 3: Mid-Range Capability Supporting Multidomain Operations.</strong> Source: Typhon briefing slide, Rapid Capabilities and Critical Technologies Office presentation, U.S. Army.</em></p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/dVNOUtq.png" alt="image06" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 4: NASA Crewed Lunar Missions Milestone Timeline.</strong> Source: <a href="https://www.nasa.gov/fy-2025-budget-request/">“Fiscal Year 2025 Budget Request,” NASA, last updated August 29, 2024</a>.</em></p> +<p>One exception is strike coordination and reconnaissance (SCAR). These missions are the interdiction equivalent of a movement to contact. They are flown to detect and target enemy units in a defined geographic area where “potential targets are known or suspected to exist, or where mobile enemy ground units have relocated because of ground fighting.” This uncertainty and fluidity put a premium on tactical responsiveness. A network of manned and unmanned aircraft can – consistent with Joint Interdiction doctrine – cycle “multiple attacking flights through the target area and provid[e] prioritized targeting guidance and enemy air defense updates to maximize the effect of each sortie.” In this case, mission command extends through the cockpit to the CCA for decentralized execution as the flight leader responds to unforeseen changes. For example, an F-15X or F-35 flying alongside 10 CCAs would be able to respond not just to its own sensors but to a larger constellation of joint and interagency capabilities in order to identify and disrupt enemy targets.</p> -<p><strong>Activities</strong></p> +<p>As in counterair operations, CCAs performing interdiction roles would need preplanned mission profiles to support autonomous execution. Humans will still be in the loop, encoding rules of engagement and strike deconfliction when necessary. At the same time, the entire joint fires doctrine and framework will need to test how new campaign concepts relate to existing doctrine and to the targeting cycle. Again, it is one thing to enable CCAs to fly. It is another to integrate them into planning and staff processes that took decades, if not centuries, to emerge in the military profession. There will need to be new, flatter joint architectures optimized for multidomain effects and dynamic joint targeting cycles.</p> -<p>To date and for the foreseeable future, the majority of U.S. missions that transit cislunar space, reach lunar orbit, or land on the Moon are directly or indirectly funded by NASA and focus on space exploration. Today, most NASA funding for cislunar missions supports the Artemis program, an initiative to reestablish a human presence and build a long-term base on the Moon, as well as lay the foundations for a future crewed mission to Mars. According to NASA, the goals of the Artemis program are to make new scientific discoveries, realize economic benefits from returning to the Moon, and inspire a new generation of explorers.</p> +<h4 id="tradeoffs-in-the-close-air-support-campaign">Tradeoffs in the Close Air Support Campaign</h4> -<p>Achieving those goals will come at a high cost. According to the NASA Office of Inspector General, the agency will have spent approximately $93 billion on the Artemis program (including work on the Space Launch System) between 2012 and 2025. In 2022, NASA launched the uncrewed Artemis I mission, which placed the Orion capsule into lunar orbit and returned the craft to Earth. The first crewed Artemis mission, Artemis II, will take four astronauts into Earth orbit and a free-return trajectory around the Moon no earlier than 2025. The subsequent Artemis III mission, planned for no earlier than 2026, will take astronauts to the lunar surface and target a landing site near the Moon’s south pole.</p> +<p>In the fictional planning scenario above, focusing air power at the FLOT would require deep air-ground integration. In the chaos of combat, changing planned missions to take advantage of emerging ground conditions also requires a great degree of flexibility. This defining requirement puts the C2 architecture squarely in the tactical responsiveness camp, albeit with a twist. The JTAC on the ground becomes a kind of cockpit.</p> -<p>In addition to facilitating the Artemis program’s second human landing on the Moon, the third crewed Artemis mission, Artemis IV, will dock with the Lunar Gateway, a planned space station that will provide habitation space for astronauts and serve as a communications hub and science laboratory. NASA plans for the station to use a near-rectilinear halo orbit (NRHO) associated with the Earth–Moon L2 Lagrange point. In-space assembly of the Lunar Gateway is planned to start in 2028. NASA is collaborating with ESA, the Canadian Space Agency, the Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA), the UAE, and commercial partners on the project. Planned for no earlier than 2030 and 2031, respectively, Artemis V and VI will also complete lunar landings and continue efforts to construct the Lunar Gateway.</p> +<p>Procedures for CAS have evolved since World War II. Following the fall of France, the Wann/Woodall Report recommended creating a distinct communication network to connect ground radios to aircraft under special circumstances. This concept laid the foundation for the emergence of CAS C2 and the Tactical Air Force task organization used in experiments in North Africa (e.g., the Desert Air Force). Failures during the 1942 Dieppe Raid (Operation Jubilee) further showed the need for new C2 constructs that integrated tactical air and army formations. Close air support concepts continued to evolve between 1943 and 1945 in campaigns in Italy and Northwest Europe. By the Normandy Campaign, air-ground integration procedures had matured to differentiate between indirect and direct support, setting the foundation for modern CAS. These procedures played a critical role in the Battle of the Falaise Pocket, to which RAF hurricanes made essential contributions.</p> -<p>To enhance its Deep Space Network to support upcoming lunar missions, NASA is building and expanding a network of Lunar Exploration Ground Sites (LEGS) so the agency can remain in continuous communications with the Moon during its orbit around Earth. NASA is also developing the LunaNet framework and Lunar Communications Relay and Navigation Systems (LCRNS) project to enable cislunar networking and connectivity services.</p> +<p>This iterated approach to developing deeper air-ground integration continued across multiple conflicts in the late twentieth century. Each major war, according to historian I.B. Holley Jr., saw the military profession relearn the importance of air-ground teamwork. Whether in Korea or Vietnam – or in Israel’s experience across multiple conflicts – practitioners had to adapt air-ground communications, liaison relationships, and procedures to new technologies and air defense schemes. In Holley Jr.’s view, analyzing this history and learning the lessons of past air campaigns is a requirement for updating future CAS doctrine.</p> -<p>In addition to the Artemis program, NASA is currently funding missions to the Moon as part of the CLPS program, an initiative through which the agency contracts with companies to deliver freight to the lunar surface. Two CLPS awardees, Astrobotic and Intuitive Machines, have already sent commercial spacecraft to the Moon carrying NASA payloads. While the Astrobotic spacecraft suffered a malfunction en route and was not able to complete its mission, the Intuitive Machines spacecraft touched down on the Moon in February 2024, completing the world’s first successful commercial lunar landing. Currently, NASA has several CLPS contracts (i.e., trips to the Moon) on the books to deliver payloads to the lunar surface. Many NASA payloads planned for CLPS missions were built through the Lunar Surface Instrument and Technology Payloads (LSITP) program.</p> +<p>CCAs offer a new opportunity to refine close air support concepts and doctrine in a manner that reflects deeper service integration than in previous wars. In other words, CCA design features and USAF doctrine should integrate with Army, Navy, and Marine Corps concepts, leading to potential change in joint doctrine. If CCAs are built to only perform counterair missions, they miss an opportunity to realize their full potential.</p> -<p>Focused on planetary exploration, NASA’s Small Innovative Missions for Planetary Exploration (SIMPLEx) program is also funding missions to the Moon. The aim of SIMPLEx is to build small, low-cost spacecraft for launches as secondary payloads on other missions. For example, a SIMPLEx mission called LunaH-Map was launched on Artemis I in 2022. Though the LunaH-Map mission experienced propulsion problems after deployment, it did conduct a lunar flyby and returned some data to Earth. The only other SIMPLEx mission to the Moon, a lunar orbiter called Lunar Trailblazer, is currently scheduled to launch in 2025.</p> +<p>This potential could see the emergence of new procedures in which JTACs on the ground take control of CCAs to conduct CAS and to deconflict airspace, thus maximizing joint effects against key targets. In the aforementioned fictional scenario, consider an enemy force attempting to break out of a beach landing site and seize an airport. This breakout would likely involve a concentration of artillery and air defense moved forward to support ground formations, with air-launched effects and loitering munitions serving as an advanced guard. Containing the breakthrough would require forward JTACs coordinating CAS and other joint fire support to destroy, disrupt, suppress, fix, harass, neutralize, or delay advancing enemy columns in support of the ground commander’s defensive plan. The fog, friction, and chaos of the ground battle undermine operational effectiveness and put a premium on tactical responsiveness. In a major ground campaign, operational art for joint fires is about logistics and building a C5ISR-T network able to support dynamic targeting and operational reach.</p> -<p>The DoD is also funding work related to cislunar space. Specifically, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) is leading a project that aims to move large payloads in cislunar space using a nuclear thermal rocket (NTR). The Demonstration Rocket for Agile Cislunar Operations (DRACO) program will produce a baseline design for the NTR reactor, build the reactor, and launch it into space to conduct experiments on the technologies in orbit. The DRACO flight experiment could take place as soon as 2027. DARPA is also funding the 10-Year Lunar Architecture (LunA-10) Capability Study, through which 14 companies are proposing architectures for future lunar infrastructure. Initial study results were presented in June 2024.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/qhShwI6.png" alt="image08" /></p> -<p>Additionally, the Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL) is developing two satellites, Oracle-Mobility and Oracle-Prime, designed to provide SSA information on objects in cislunar space. The Oracle-Mobility satellite will test new navigational techniques needed for cislunar operations and object tracking and is expected to launch no earlier than 2025. Applying lessons learned from the Oracle-Mobility mission, the Oracle-Prime satellite will operate in a halo orbit associated with the Earth–Moon L1 Lagrange point and test techniques to monitor space objects that transit cislunar space.</p> +<h3 id="conclusion-exercises-wargames-and-doctrine">Conclusion: Exercises, Wargames, and Doctrine</h3> -<p>There are also several U.S. companies attempting to build and launch missions to the Moon for commercial purposes. For example, Astrolab is developing the Flexible Logistics and Exploration (FLEX) lunar rover, which will be launched on SpaceX’s Starship rocket. Astrolab has agreements from eight customers to carry commercial payloads on the rover to the Moon’s surface in 2026.</p> +<p>Looking across the three fictional planning scenarios provides an insight into the refinement of C2 requirements for CCAs.</p> -<p><strong>Australia</strong></p> +<p>This will require testing different cockpit C2 interfaces in dynamic settings like Red Flag Exercises, along with the introduction of enhanced simulation capabilities in the USAF’s new command wings. Replicating the stress of counterair, SCAR and CAS missions will be the only way to gauge the optimal cockpit C2 structure for connecting the best of the human pilot with the functionality of the CCA.</p> -<p>In partnership with NASA, Australia plans to build and send a rover to the surface of the Moon on an upcoming Artemis mission, perhaps as early as 2026. Support for the development of the rover comes in part from Australia’s Moon to Mars initiative, which awards grants to Australian space companies, aiming to grow the country’s space economy and give it a greater role in future missions to the Moon. Moon to Mars additionally funded the development of scientific instruments to be used for other U.S.-led lunar missions. However, Australia does not currently have an agreement with the United States to send an Australian astronaut to the Moon as part of the Artemis program.</p> +<p>There is also a need to develop new experiments that test the current planning and air tasking cycle, ideally through wargames that inform new concept development and doctrine for tasking CCAs through command posts. These wargames should parallel ongoing experiments like the Global Information Dominance Experiments (GIDE) and Project Convergence. The more services and coalition partners involved in stress-testing the current approach to planning and coordinating the delivery of joint effects, the better the insights will be. These experiments offer a valuable forum to test emerging ideas, from the Joint Warfighting Concept and related priorities to service-level force design and development initiatives. In other words, proper C2 architecture for CCAs has the potential to unlock innovation across the U.S. military. And that innovation will require a mix of exercises, wargames, and even study groups that will act as incubators for developing new concepts and capabilities. In all likelihood, an entirely new planning and tasking process for joint effects could emerge from this experimentation campaign, closing the deterrent gap.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/ikfWg36.png" alt="image07" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 5: Commercial Lunar Payload Services Landing Sites.</strong> Source: <a href="https://science.nasa.gov/lunar-science/clps-deliveries/">“Commercial Lunar Payload Services (CLPS) Deliveries,” NASA</a>.</em></p> +<p>These experiments will need to stress-test the ability of new software architectures to connect networks and evaluate data streams from disparate sources. Consistent with prior recommendations, these efforts should also include options for democratizing and digitizing C2 to allow for the rapid upload and transfer of data packets from a wide mix of civilian and military sensor networks. Again, there is as much art as there is science in the development of these mosaic-like systems, and in the balancing of tactical responsiveness and operational effectiveness.</p> -<p><strong>Canada</strong></p> +<p>The modern American way of war is defined as much by mission command as by massing effects. Because modern combat takes place along complex battle networks, centralized command and decentralized execution must work in and through algorithms. The challenge of twenty-first century operational art, therefore, will be deciding how best to pair human judgment with the precision and speed of machines. As a result, determining the optimal C2 architecture for executing mission command through CCA networks should be a national security priority.</p> -<p>The Canadian Space Agency has two programs focused on the Moon: the Lunar Exploration Accelerator Program (LEAP), which manages the science, technology, and commercial lunar payloads opportunities for Canadian industry and academic partners, and Canadarm3, a robotic arm built by Canadian company MDA Space that will be installed on the Lunar Gateway to manipulate and maneuver objects on the exterior of the station. Canadarm3 will perform a similar role to the first Canadarm, used on the Space Shuttle orbiter, and Canadarm2, currently installed on the International Space Station (ISS). In return for supplying Canadarm3, NASA offered Canada the opportunity to send science, technology, and commercial lunar payloads and fly two Canadian astronauts to the Moon on Artemis missions.</p> +<hr /> -<p><strong>China</strong></p> +<p><strong>Benjamin Jensen</strong> is a senior fellow in the Futures Lab in the International Security Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C., as well as the Petersen Chair of Emerging Technology and a professor of strategic studies at the Marine Corps University School of Advanced Warfighting.</p> -<p>In 2004, China announced the Chinese Lunar Exploration Program (CLEP) — also known as the Chang’e Project — which would consist of a series of robotic lunar missions built and operated by the China National Space Administration. As originally envisioned, China planned for eight Chang’e missions, six of which have been completed. The series of Chang’e missions has operated lunar landers, rovers, orbiters, and sample-return activities. In 2024, China’s most recent CLEP mission, Chang’e 6, successfully landed on the Moon’s south pole and returned a sample of the lunar regolith (a layer of loose, dust-like material that covers the Moon’s surface). The last two missions, Chang’e 7 and Chang’e 8, are expected to launch in 2026 and 2028, respectively. Chang’e 8 will test technologies required to build a permanent base and could be powered by nuclear technology. Both missions would land in the lunar south pole.</p> +<p><strong>Christopher Koeltzow</strong>, USAF Colonel, was 2024 military fellow at CSIS.</p> -<p>In July 2023, China declared that crewed missions would be added to CLEP, with a crewed landing on the lunar surface planned for 2030. Separately, China also announced plans in 2019 for a future scientific research station to be constructed within the next 10 years at the Moon’s south pole. This vision has likely evolved into the planned International Lunar Research Station (ILRS), a joint venture between China and Russia announced in 2021. At least 10 additional countries have signed up to support the ILRS, including Venezuela, Belarus, Pakistan, Azerbaijan, South Africa, Egypt, Nicaragua, Thailand, Serbia, and Kazakhstan. China is also planning a GPS-like constellation for lunar orbit that will provide satellite navigation for the Moon. To recruit international partners for its crewed research station, China announced the creation of the International Lunar Research Station Cooperation Organization (ILRSCO) in 2023.</p> +<p><strong>Allen Agnes</strong>, USAF Colonel, was 2024 military fellow at CSIS.</p> -<p>China is currently operating the Queqiao 1 relay satellite in a halo orbit associated with the Earth–Moon L2 Lagrange point, providing communications for China’s missions to the side of the Moon not facing Earth. Operating in a frozen elliptical orbit around the Moon, the Queqiao 2 satellite also serves as a communications relay for lunar missions.</p> +<p><strong>Eric Williams</strong>, USMC Colonel, was 2024 military fellow at CSIS.</p>Benjamin Jensen, et al.The future of airpower hinges on the U.S. Air Force’s ability to integrate autonomous drones into manned formations. This analysis explores the trade-offs between cockpit and command center–based control in shaping the next era of combat operations.Operation Days Of Repentance2024-10-28T12:00:00+08:002024-10-28T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/operation-days-of-repentance<p><em>Israel’s recent strikes on Iran’s military infrastructure signal the vulnerability of Tehran’s air defences and expose the limitations of its regional deterrence strategy.</em></p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/1ovzmz1.png" alt="image08" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 6: Chang’e Timeline.</strong> Source: <a href="https://nssdc.gsfc.nasa.gov/planetary/lunar/cnsa_moon_future.html">David R. Williams, “Future Chinese Lunar Missions,” NASA</a>.</em></p> +<excerpt /> -<p>In June 2024, China released a road map for a series of projects aimed at building lunar infrastructure, including elements related to communications and SSA, as well as GPS-equivalent services for lunar and deep-space users.</p> +<p>In the early hours of 26 October, Israel announced that it had launched “precise and targeted” strikes on “military targets” in Iran, as part of Operation Days of Repentance, its much-awaited response to the Iranian ballistic missile attack at the start of the month.</p> -<p><strong>Europe</strong></p> +<p>Video from Iran appeared to show air defences active over Tehran. The Israelis have briefed that there were three waves of strikes, apparently involving around 100 aircraft, including drones, all of which returned home safely. Footage being shown on Israeli television shows a mixture of F-15 and F-16 aircraft preparing to launch, though there is speculation that Israeli F-35I were also involved. It does not sound like Israeli ground-launched ballistic missiles were used; the leaked US assessment released online recently suggested that air-launched ballistic missiles were being readied for use by the Israeli Air Force. These are suspected to have been used in the April attack near Esfahan, and their range means they could have been launched from well outside Iranian airspace. At least one journalist has been briefed that Israeli aircraft breached Iranian airspace, a claim that lends weight to the use of F-35Is.</p> -<p>Through ESA, Europe is closely involved in NASA’s Artemis missions. Most notably, ESA produces the European Service Module (ESM) for the Orion crewed capsule. Already tested on Artemis I, the ESM will be used on all Artemis missions. In addition, ESA will be providing several components for the Lunar Gateway, specifically a habitation module, a refueling and storage module, and a module that will contain communications equipment for linking with the lunar surface and satellites in lunar orbit. In return for these contributions, ESA will be able to send two European astronauts to the Moon as part of the Artemis program.</p> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">The scale of the strike and (apparent) avoidance of civilian areas makes this look far more precise than the equivalent Iranian attack, as well as justifying it as a defensive measure</code></em></strong></p> -<p>ESA is also designing Argonaut, a lunar lander that can perform a variety of different missions. Argonaut will be able to carry cargo such as scientific payloads, power-generation and -storage equipment, and lunar rovers to the Moon’s surface. Currently, ESA is planning to use the Ariane 6 rocket to launch Argonaut missions.</p> +<p>It now seems likely that the route used by the Israeli Air Force involved flying through Syrian airspace and launching from over Iraq, although there would have been a risk of giving early warning to Iran if detected by Syrian radar (or Russian radar based in Syria). Recent regional diplomacy by Iran might have resulted in the Gulf states not wanting their airspace to be used by Israeli aircraft. Israeli officials briefing that the waves of strikes included hitting targets in Syria and Iraq could be misdirection, but more likely indicates that this was indeed the route taken, and that radars and threats along the way were suppressed or destroyed to clear a path. Iraq has since complained to the UN about violations of its airspace. The alternative route would have been a very long diversion down the Red Sea and around the Arabian peninsula: this would have required multiple mid-air refuelling operations, although the Israelis have demonstrated this capability recently when striking Houthi targets in Yemen, and have rehearsed it extensively over the years.</p> -<p>To support Artemis, Argonaut, and other lunar missions, ESA established a program called Moonlight to provide PNT services for the Moon, as well as communication and data relay services between the Earth and Moon. Currently scheduled to launch in 2026, the Lunar Pathfinder is the first spacecraft developed as part of this initiative. The satellite will orbit the Moon, communicating with Earth using an X-band link and with missions on the Moon using S-band and ultra-high frequency links. It will be launched with the CLPS Blue Ghost M2.</p> +<h3 id="the-goldilocks-option-what-was-struck">The “Goldilocks Option”: What was Struck?</h3> -<p><strong>India</strong></p> +<p>The Israelis claim to have struck air defences, missile production and “additional aerial capabilities”. There are no current nuclear targets in the areas identified (other than a research facility and reactor in Tehran), nor have we seen suggestions yet that oil refining or production facilities were struck directly. Details now being briefed to US media suggest that air defence systems (Russian-supplied S-300s, including radars) were struck, including those protecting facilities like the Abadan oil refinery and the Bandar Imam Khomeini petrochemical complex. In addition, there are images suggesting that some missile development and drone facilities operated by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) at Khojir and Parchin (in and around Tehran) were also struck, as well as possibly the missile test facility at Shahroud. Parchin also included facilities previously identified as being part of Iran’s research into nuclear weapons development before it was suspended.</p> -<p>In August 2023, India became the fourth nation to successfully land on the Moon, landing the Chandrayaan-3 probe in the lunar south pole region. India is working with Japan on the Lunar Polar Exploration (LUPEX) mission, expected to be launched no earlier than 2025. Japan agreed to provide the rover and launcher for LUPEX, while India agreed to provide the mission’s lander. Additionally, India is in the early stages of planning its Chandrayaan-4 mission with the aim of returning a sample of lunar regolith to Earth.</p> +<h3 id="impact-and-implications-iran-is-vulnerable">Impact and Implications: Iran is Vulnerable</h3> -<p><strong>Israel</strong></p> +<p>This Israeli operation was considerably more extensive than April, but was still a restrained response aimed at emphasising Israel’s conventional military superiority and removing threats in the form of missile production facilities, while not appearing “escalatory”. Striking Tehran makes public the Israeli ability to hit Iran’s capital and defeat its air defences, but the scale of the strike and (apparent) avoidance of civilian areas makes this look far more precise than the equivalent Iranian attack, as well as justifying it as a defensive measure. The picture that is emerging is one of significant damage to Iranian air defences as well as missile launch facilities, both of which would be intended to show the Iranians that they are vulnerable to further strikes if they attempt retaliation. There is some speculation that all of Iran’s S-300 batteries have now been struck and possibly destroyed. These have hardly performed well to date, but if they have been stripped away entirely – leaving Iran with only domestically produced systems – this will increase the sense of vulnerability the regime feels. It is also hardly a resounding success for Russian military exports, especially following similar Ukrainian successes against the S-300).</p> -<p>In 2019, two private entities from Israel — SpaceIL and Israel Aerospace Industries — launched the Beresheet lunar lander, the first privately funded attempt to reach the Moon. The lander ultimately crashed into the Moon after its gyroscopes failed on approach to the landing site. SpaceIL announced plans in 2020 to build a second Beresheet lander for launch in 2024, but there is no public indication of subsequent progress on this mission. Israel Aerospace Industries is also partnering with OHB SE, a German aerospace technologies group, on the Lunar Surface Access Service (LSAS) program, which supports commercial lunar payload delivery. The first LSAS mission is planned for 2025.</p> +<p>Moreover, the complexity of the operation should not be underestimated. Over 100 aircraft would be a significant proportion of the Israeli Air Force’s combat fleet (estimated at between 270 and 300), which has been operating at a ferocious tempo for over a year, especially during its campaign in Lebanon. This is alongside the deployment of airborne refuelling, surveillance, and command and control capabilities over a round trip claimed to be 1,600 km.</p> -<p><strong>Japan</strong></p> +<p>The nature of the operation looks like a win for US leverage, albeit bought with the deployment of THAAD and 100 personnel to Israel. In addition, the restraint on display has probably been met with a sense of relief among Gulf oil producers, as the measured nature of the attack avoided disruptions to regional energy supply chains, which had been a growing concern during the weeks of heightened speculation. They have also avoided being directly implicated in the attacks (and have issued the predictable responses criticising them), while benefitting from Iranian military capabilities being further degraded. Meanwhile, Israel’s use of Syrian and Iraqi airspace comes at little cost, as Iran is unlikely to retaliate against either country, while Israel has been able to reaffirm its dominance of regional air activity.</p> -<p>Japan has maintained an active lunar exploration program for over 30 years. In 1990, it sent the Hiten spacecraft to the Moon, making it the third country after the Soviet Union and United States to launch a lunar mission. Japan did not send another spacecraft to the Moon until 2007, when it launched the SELENE mission, also called Kaguya, composed of three separate spacecraft: a main orbiter, a relay satellite, and another satellite designed to map the Moon’s gravity field.</p> +<h3 id="the-iranian-response">The Iranian Response</h3> -<p>Japan’s most recent lunar mission was the Smart Lander for Investigating Moon (SLIM), designed to demonstrate precision lunar landings. As it descended to the lunar surface in January 2024, SLIM successfully deployed two lunar landers. Unfortunately, the lander touched down with its solar arrays misoriented away from the Sun, which meant that it could not generate the amount of power required for normal operations. Even in this state, SLIM survived several lunar nights — but has not communicated with ground controllers on Earth since April 2024.</p> +<p>Iranian media tried to immediately downplay the impact – despite reports of four Iranian military personnel being killed – but the regime is probably still evaluating the attacks, and the Supreme Leader issued an equivocal statement on 27 October. Iranian officials admitted there had been attacks on border radar stations in the provinces of Tehran, Ilam and Khuzestan but claimed that these had been “successfully countered” and that Israel’s long-range, air-launched missiles carried “very light warheads – about one-fifth the size of Iranian ballistic missile warheads”. The Iranian regime appears to be trying to limit public demand for a military retaliation against Israel. But regardless of how well it can hide any damage, this is the largest direct conventional attack on Iranian territory since the Iran–Iraq War (including both fighting with the Iraqis and the US strikes on the Iranian navy under Operation Praying Mantis). This needs to be factored in to understanding the psychological impact, especially if the taboo on direct strikes on Iran that are formally declared appears to have been shattered (the April attack on Esfahan was never formally acknowledged by Israel).</p> -<p>Japan has several missions planned over the next few years. This includes the Hakuto-R 2 mission, planned by Japanese company ispace scheduled for late 2024, which will carry a lunar lander and micro rover. Toyota and JAXA are currently developing a crewed, pressurized lunar rover that will be flown to the Moon on a future Artemis mission. As part of the NASA CLPS initiative, the Japanese company Dymon is also planning to launch a lunar rover called Yaoki on an upcoming Intuitive Machines mission to demonstrate its ability to support future NASA missions. Additionally, Japan will cooperate with India on the aforementioned joint LUPEX mission.</p> +<h3 id="what-next">What Next?</h3> -<p>As part of the Artemis program, Washington and Tokyo signed an agreement in April 2024 for a Japanese astronaut to be the first non-U.S. national to crew an Artemis mission to the lunar surface.</p> +<p>Iranian proxy response options have been limited by the damage done to both Hamas and Hezbollah, while the US has bolstered Israeli air defences with the deployment of additional ballistic missile defences (though the reported arrival of yet another THAAD battery has been disputed). However, beyond this set of direct exchanges, the progress of the fighting in Gaza and Lebanon remains a potential trigger for further confrontation. Iran is reportedly still trying to help Hezbollah rebuild, and there is still the possibility that the Israelis will choose to launch attacks that kill (for example) IRGC Qods Force personnel in Lebanon or Syria; there has been no confirmation of the condition of the head of the Qods Force for several weeks.</p> -<p><strong>Russia</strong></p> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Regardless of how well the regime in Tehran can hide any damage, this is the largest direct conventional attack on Iranian territory since the Iran–Iraq War</code></em></strong></p> -<p>Russia’s most recent mission to the Moon, the uncrewed Luna 25 lunar lander, failed when the probe crashed into the Moon’s surface in 2023. Several more Luna missions are in various stages of planning and development, with some scheduled for launch in the next five years. These upcoming uncrewed missions are part of the Luna-Glob program, which aims to create a fully robotic lunar base based on plans from 1997. This program would set the stage for later crewed missions to the Moon.</p> +<p>Iran is still caught in a dilemma about how to respond to the stripping away of its deterrent in the form of its regional partners, and harassing attacks by Hezbollah or the Houthis could still provoke a response if they hit a sensitive target or cause high-profile civilian casualties. We still don’t know the extent to which more aggressive elements in the Iranian system might be advising the Supreme Leader, and media reporting and government briefings in Europe and the Middle East continue to highlight Iranian covert influence and assassination planning or operations. Tehran’s latest messaging hints at a pause for recalibration now that Israel’s anticipated retaliation has played out. This is reinforced by statements from the Iranian military, which have affirmed Tehran’s “right to take lawful and legitimate action at an appropriate time”, while also emphasising the need for a “lasting ceasefire in Gaza and Lebanon”.</p> -<p>Planned for launch in 2027, the lunar orbiter Luna 26 is the next Russian mission to the Moon. It will carry a scientific payload, as well as serve as a communications relay between the Moon and Earth. In 2019, Beijing and Moscow agreed to cooperate on both Russia’s Luna 26 mission and China’s Chang’e 7 mission. Originally, ESA had also intended to collaborate with Russia on Luna 26; however, following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the agency canceled these plans and withdrew from work with Russia on the Luna 27 mission, a lander planned for the lunar south pole. Russia has claimed it will complete Luna 26 and Luna 27 independently, with the latter consisting of a primary mission (Luna 27a) and a backup (Luna 27b) in the event Luna 27a fails.</p> +<p>Israel’s strikes have exposed Iran’s vulnerabilities, particularly the apparent degradation of its air defence systems. This also underscores the limitations of Tehran’s forward-defence doctrine, which relies on proxies to shield Iran from direct conflict. Given these setbacks, Iran is probably keen to avoid an extended period of direct confrontation with Israel. While Tehran cannot feasibly abandon its support for groups like Hezbollah and Hamas in the near term, it is likely to recalibrate its strategy to reinforce internal stability and safeguard its broader regional interests. Moreover, the debate over the status and role of its nuclear programme will continue to rage, especially around whether or not there is utility in maintaining its threshold status, or whether – given the vast gap in conventional capabilities – further steps might be necessary to try to bolster any deterrent effect.</p> -<p>As early as 2009, Russia had been planning a new, reusable, crewed space capsule for use in low Earth orbit (LEO) and for transportation to the Moon. This new Orel spacecraft would be designed to transport up to four humans. In 2020, Russian officials announced plans for an uncrewed test launch of Orel in 2023 that never happened. Russia also said it was planning an uncrewed mission to the Moon in 2028, but there are no signs that it remains on track tomeet this goal. And although it announced in 2007 that it aimed to field its own Lunar Orbital Station, there has been no subsequent indication of work on its development.</p> +<p>An initial judgement might therefore be that this operation looks to have put a cap on this bout between Israel and Iran, but the underlying points of friction remain: the progress of Iran’s nuclear programme, the scale of the threat to Israel, proxy activity across the region, and the status of Israeli hostages.</p> -<p>Given budget constraints — and the failure of Luna 25 in 2023 — it is unlikely that Russia will be able to launch any of these proposed missions. Sanctions imposed on Russia since its invasion of Ukraine have severely limited its access to Western technologies and microelectronics, further stalling Russian efforts to start or continue work on future Moon missions.</p> +<hr /> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Given budget constraints — and the failure of Luna 25 in 2023 — it is unlikely that Russia will be able to launch any of these proposed missions.</code></em></strong></p> +<p><strong>Matthew Savill</strong> is the Director of Military Sciences at RUSI, focussing on developments and trends in modern conflict, and the use of force in the 21st Century.</p> -<p><strong>South Korea</strong></p> +<p><strong>Burcu Ozcelik</strong> is a Senior Research Fellow for Middle East Security within the International Security department at RUSI.</p>Matthew Savill and Dr Burcu OzcelikIsrael’s recent strikes on Iran’s military infrastructure signal the vulnerability of Tehran’s air defences and expose the limitations of its regional deterrence strategy.Japan-U.S. Cybersecurity2024-10-25T12:00:00+08:002024-10-25T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/japan-us-cybersecurity<p><em>Cybersecurity is the foundation for a robust U.S.-Japan alliance. This report analyzes the cybersecurity policies of both countries and the prospects for future collaboration on critical infrastructure cybersecurity and resilience.</em></p> -<p>Launched in 2022, the Korea Pathfinder Lunar Orbiter (KPLO), also known as Danuri, is South Korea’s first spacecraft to operate beyond geostationary Earth orbit (GEO). The KPLO was designed to survey the lunar surface and help identify possible landing sites for future missions. It is currently orbiting the Moon. The South Korean space agency is planning an uncrewed mission to the lunar surface in 2032 and actively participates in UN discussions on lunar norms and sustainability.</p> +<excerpt /> -<p><strong>Other Countries</strong></p> +<h3 id="introduction">Introduction</h3> -<p>Additional countries have flown payloads on another nation’s lunar missions in the past several years or have plans to do so in the next decade. For example, the UAE is sponsoring an experiment created by students at AGH University of Science and Technology in Poland for inclusion as a rideshare payload on an upcoming Astrobotic CLPS mission. The UAE also developed a lunar rover that flew aboard ispace’s Hakuto-R 1 mission but was lost in the lander’s crash. Following the crash, Prime Minister and Vice President Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid Al Maktoum signaled that the country will make another attempt at a lunar landing. Additionally, the UAE has other lunar plans, providing an airlock for the Lunar Gateway and making the UAE the only non-ISS partner nation providing hardware for the new station.</p> +<p>Cybersecurity has long been regarded as a critical part of national security. The sophistication, complexity, and scale of cyberattacks have increased, with state-sponsored actors posing significant threats to nations and international cybercriminal groups conducting massive attacks globally. Meanwhile, the ongoing digitalization of society is expanding cyberspace, leading to the complicated and expanded interdependencies among infrastructures, services, and functions. It is, therefore, becoming more important to ensure the cybersecurity and resilience of critical infrastructures that people and nations rely on every day. This is considered a national priority in most countries and a global issue where international cooperation is essential.</p> -<p>Similarly, in May 2024, Pakistan sent the iCube Qamar, a CubeSat designed to orbit the Moon and take photos of the lunar surface, as a payload on board China’s Chang’e 6 mission. In 2022, Mexico initiated its Colmena project, an effort to promote Mexican participation in lunar exploration through the development of microrobots, five of which were launched aboard Astrobotic’s Peregrine 1 mission. While the mission’s failure destroyed the payload, a second Colmena mission is slated for 2027. Turkey is planning on launching its lunar orbiter AYAP 1 in 2026, followed by AYAP 2, which aims to land a rover on the Moon in 2028. Finally, New Zealand plans to conduct SSA research and create a cislunar SSA capability in partnership with NASA.</p> +<p>With regard to the Japan-U.S. relationship, the alliance has become more important than ever in light of rising geopolitical tensions in the Indo-Pacific region, and cyberspace is playing a key role as a foundation for a robust alliance. Both countries are currently at a pivotal point in their national cybersecurity. In the United States, the National Cybersecurity Strategy (NCS), released in March 2023, represents a significant shift from previous policies. This includes further government involvement in the private sector, including regulatory approaches, and a shift of the cybersecurity burden away from end users to providers. In Japan, the National Security Strategy (NSS), released in December 2022, puts a strong emphasis on fundamentally enhancing the country’s cybersecurity posture, including the implementation of its own “active cyber defense” (ACD). Furthermore, the recent passage of key legislations enhancing Japan’s security clearance system and economic security will have a positive impact on cybersecurity. Taking these evolutions as an opportunity, it is the right time to reassess the current state of Japan-U.S. cybersecurity cooperation and explore ways forward for further collaboration.</p> -<h3 id="international-space-governance-frameworks">INTERNATIONAL SPACE GOVERNANCE FRAMEWORKS</h3> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Taking these evolutions as an opportunity, it is the right time to reassess the current state of Japan-U.S. cybersecurity cooperation and explore ways forward for further collaboration.</code></em></strong></p> -<p>There are several space-specific international treaties and other international agreements that address space issues, as well as the U.S.-led Artemis Accords. While no treaty deals solely with cislunar space, the provisions of the space-specific agreements cover cislunar space no differently than any other domain.</p> +<p>There are two key areas for consideration in promoting holistic and effective Japan-U.S. cybersecurity cooperation. First, both countries’ cybersecurity authorities, roles, and responsibilities are highly decentralized, making it challenging to gain a comprehensive overview of the subject. Second, while there are a number of high-level frameworks and agreements for cooperation between both governments, there is still a need for more specific and operational collaboration. To address these issues, this paper begins by providing a comprehensive overview of the cybersecurity postures in both countries, including the basic policies, organizational structures, and functions, with a focus on recent developments. It then reviews Japan-U.S. cooperation to date, discusses the current state of critical infrastructure cybersecurity and resilience in both countries, and offers recommendations for operationalizing cooperation in this area.</p> -<h4 id="the-outer-space-treaty-and-related-agreements">THE OUTER SPACE TREATY AND RELATED AGREEMENTS</h4> +<h3 id="fundamentals-of-cybersecurity-in-the-united-states-and-japan">Fundamentals of Cybersecurity in the United States and Japan</h3> -<p>Evolving from several arms control resolutions debated in the United Nations during 1966, the Outer Space Treaty (OST) of 1967 was the first international treaty concerning space. It serves as the foundation for international space law and addresses all government and private sector space activities carried out by parties to the treaty. Although the treaty does not reference cislunar space, it does specifically reference the Moon — and thus, due to its broad applicability to all space activities, does apply to cislunar space.</p> +<p>The United States and Japan have highly decentralized and complicated cybersecurity structures and functions across their governments, which results in overlapping authorities, roles, and responsibilities. While several cybersecurity experts focus on specific areas of cooperation, there is a lack of comprehensive and accurate understanding of the cybersecurity postures in both countries. To pursue effective Japan-U.S. cooperation in specific areas, it would be essential, as a prerequisite, to have a clear understanding of these cybersecurity postures and to be able to map both countries’ policies, structures, functions, initiatives, and so on. The following provides an overview of cybersecurity postures in both countries, focusing on recent developments and future direction.</p> -<p>There are currently 114 parties to the OST, including all major spacefaring nations. Key provisions of the treaty state that</p> +<h4 id="cybersecurity-in-the-united-states">Cybersecurity in the United States</h4> -<ul> - <li> - <p>“the exploration and use of outer space . . . shall be carried out for the benefit and in the interests of all countries . . . and shall be the province of all mankind”;</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>outer space shall be “free for exploration and use by all States”;</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>outer space is “not subject to national appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by any other means”;</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>states shall not place nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction in orbit or on celestial bodies, or “station such weapons in outer space;</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>“the moon and other celestial bodies shall be used . . . exclusively for peaceful purposes,” with no weapons testing of any kind, military maneuvers, or the establishment of military bases;</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>astronauts shall be regarded “as envoys of mankind”;</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>states shall be responsible for national space activities, whether carried out by “governmental agencies or by non-governmental entities”;</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>states shall be liable for damage caused by their space objects; and</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>states shall avoid “harmful contamination” of space and celestial bodies.</p> - </li> -</ul> +<p><em>Basic Strategy and Policy</em></p> -<p>The Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS), which played a key role in creating the OST, was originally established by the UN General Assembly in 1958 as an ad hoc committee that became a permanent body in 1959 tasked with addressing the exploration and use of space for the benefit of all humanity. The UN Office for Outer Space Affairs (UNOOSA) acts as the secretariat for COPUOS, helping to implement space treaties and General Assembly resolutions that form the basis of international space law.</p> +<p>Cybersecurity policy in the United States is commonly believed to be relatively bipartisan. The two major political parties have been pursuing a similar direction in general, although they have minor differences. The U.S. government has historically strongly emphasized prioritizing and reinforcing voluntary public-private partnerships (PPPs) to enhance the national cybersecurity posture. However, recent significant cyber incidents, such as those at SolarWinds in 2020 and Colonial Pipeline in 2021, as well as growing geopolitical tensions, have resulted in a major change in this policy. Recognizing cybersecurity as a matter of national security, the Biden administration has made a significant shift in policy to strengthen government involvement in the private sector. This includes strengthening the federal government’s organizational structure by creating high-level government posts responsible for cybersecurity; introducing and updating laws and regulations; and expanding government-led initiatives.</p> -<p>Other than the OST, there are four other legally binding international agreements that govern space. Each applies to spacecraft, people, and activities in cislunar space.</p> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Recognizing cybersecurity as a matter of national security, the Biden administration has made a significant shift in policy to strengthen government involvement in the private sector.</code></em></strong></p> -<p>The <strong>Rescue Agreement</strong> of 1968 requires that parties to the agreement provide assistance, when possible, to spacecraft personnel in distress or in the event of an accident or emergency landing. Additionally, should a party to the agreement become aware of spacecraft personnel in distress, they are required to notify the launching nation and the UN secretary general. The agreement also permits nations to request assistance recovering their space objects that land in territories outside of their jurisdiction. The launching nation is required to cover any costs incurred during recovery efforts.</p> +<p>The Biden administration’s cybersecurity policies are largely based on the recommendations from the Cyberspace Solarium Commission (CSC), established under the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2019. In addition, Executive Order (EO) 14028: Improving the Nation’s Cybersecurity, signed in May 2021, has served as the foundation for numerous federal cybersecurity initiatives to date. In March 2023, the NCS was released for the first time in four and a half years. The strategy is composed of five key pillars: (1) “defend critical infrastructure,” (2) “disrupt and dismantle threat actors,” (3) “shape market forces to drive security and resilience,” (4) “invest in a resilient future,” and (5) “forge international partnerships to pursue shared goals.” The NCS acknowledges the continued importance of voluntary PPPs, but also points out that this alone is not sufficient. It highlights the need for baseline requirements for critical infrastructure and the shift of accountability for cybersecurity away from end users to more capable manufacturers and providers. This demonstrates the administration’s clear intention to increase government involvement. The Office of the National Cyber Director (ONCD) publishes an annual National Cybersecurity Strategy Implementation Plan (NCSIP) to ensure transparency and accountability for the implementation of the strategy. This plan outlines the specific implementation items, responsible agency, contributing entities, and deadlines for each strategic objective. The second edition, published in May 2024, is the most recent version of the plan. Federal cybersecurity measures are being implemented in accordance with the plan.</p> -<p>The <strong>Liability Convention</strong> of 1972 states that countries are liable for any damages incurred from all space objects launched from their territories. The crash of a nuclear-powered Soviet satellite onto Canadian territory in 1978 resulted in the only claim to date made under this convention.</p> +<p><em>Organizational Structure</em></p> -<p>The <strong>Registration Convention</strong> of 1976 requires that states submit details to the United Nations about their spacecraft and satellites launched into space. The associated UN registry of space objects contains information such as the name of the launching nation, an appropriate designator of the space object or its registration number, date and location of launch, basic orbital parameters, and general function of the space object.</p> +<p>Figure 1 shows an overview of the cybersecurity organizational structure centered on the U.S. federal government. ONCD leads and coordinates federal cybersecurity strategy and policy in the White House. The deputy national security advisor for cyber and emerging technology in the National Security Council (NSC) serves as an adviser to the president on national security issues related to cyber. Although the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) is not a cybersecurity-focused organization, it issues specific instructions to government agencies to implement policies such as EOs and manages and oversees their processes of implementation, including budgetary aspects.</p> -<p>Though most of the <strong>Moon Agreement</strong> of 1984 merely reemphasizes provisions of the OST, it also includes new language specifying that the Moon is “the common heritage of mankind” and providing clarity on the use of lunar resources. The treaty specifies that all references to the Moon also apply to all other celestial bodies in the Solar System, including orbits and trajectories to, from, and around them. Regarding the lawful use of lunar resources, the treaty planned to establish an international regime to administer the exploitation of resources on the Moon, other planets, asteroids, and any of the Solar System’s other celestial bodies. The regime was never implemented because there are only 17 parties to the treaty as of October 2024. The Moon Agreement has had little impact on international space law, as most spacefaring nations, including the United States, Russia, and China, decided not to sign it.</p> +<p>In the executive departments, the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) in the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) plays a central role as the operational lead for federal cybersecurity and the national coordinator for critical infrastructure cybersecurity and resilience. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) in the Department of Justice (DOJ) serves as a law enforcement entity for cybercrimes. The National Security Agency (NSA) in the Department of Defense (DOD) is tasked with protecting U.S. national security systems, the DOD, and the defense industrial base. It is also one of the key agencies for cyber intelligence. The U.S. Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM) in the DOD is a military wing responsible for cyber operations to defend against and respond to cyberattacks on the nation. The Department of State (DOS) focuses on cyber diplomacy. The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) in the Department of Commerce (DOC) plays a key role in developing cybersecurity resources such as standards, frameworks, guidance, and practices. The National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) serves as the principal adviser to the president on telecommunications and information policy, including cybersecurity. There are designated Sector Risk Management Agencies (SRMAs) that are responsible for managing critical infrastructure sectors. Further details can be found in Chapter 4. Independent regulatory entities, such as the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), are also increasingly involved in the cybersecurity field, leveraging their respective existing authorities.</p> -<p>In addition to these five legally binding international space agreements, UNOOSA often highlights five non-binding resolutions approved by the General Assembly that articulate key principles of international space law. The earliest of these resolutions is the Declaration of Legal Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, which predates the OST and was passed in 1963. The other resolutions, passed in the 1980s and 1990s, present principles for international television broadcasting from satellites, remote sensing of Earth from space, and nuclear power sources in space, as well as a declaration on the importance of international cooperation in space for the benefit of all people, with a particular focus on developing nations.</p> +<p>The U.S. federal government’s cybersecurity budget request for FY 2025 is $27.5 billion, with $13 billion allocated for civilian agencies and $14.5 billion for the DOD. The number of employees in CISA, the operational core of the federal government, was 3,161 as of August 2023.</p> -<p>In 2010, COPUOS established the Working Group on the Long-term Sustainability of Outer Space Activities to identify issues impacting space sustainability — such as space debris, SSA, space weather, and national regulatory regimes for space — and develop ideas and voluntary guidelines to improve them. In 2019, COPUOS adopted a set of 21 voluntary best-practice guidelines for long-term sustainability that had been negotiated and approved by the working group.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/iH7CUeK.png" alt="image01" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 1: Cybersecurity Organizational Structure Centered on the U.S. Federal Government.</strong> Source: Author’s analysis.</em></p> -<p>To address the use of space resources, including those on the Moon, the legal subcommittee of COPUOS also created the Working Group on Legal Aspects of Space Resource Activities in 2022, giving it a five-year mandate to examine the benefits of establishing a framework for use of space resources and whether such a framework might require new international agreements. Establishment of this working group represents a consensus view of COPUOS members that the OST does not adequately address the issue of space resource use and denotes members’ willingness to consider new international instruments to tackle it.</p> +<p><em>Current State</em></p> -<p>Finally, during their official annual meetings in June 2024, COPUOS members agreed to establish the Action Team on Lunar Activities Consultation (ATLAC), which aims to provide recommendations for international consultative mechanisms on sharing information and best practices, ensuring safety, facilitating interoperability for lunar activities, protecting the lunar environment, and mitigating the creation of debris in lunar orbit. ATLAC membership is open to any COPUOS member, though key participants will include the United States and China. One expert involved in the establishment of the action team noted to this report’s authors that it was designed to facilitate such discussions between the United States, China, and Russia on lunar governance and coordination. The group will share its final recommendations during COPUOS meetings in 2027.</p> +<ul> + <li>Defense</li> +</ul> -<p>While not directly related to cislunar space or the Moon, it is worth noting that UNOOSA supports the work of the International Committee on Global Navigation Satellite Systems (ICG). The ICG serves as a coordinating body for operators of such systems, working to facilitate compatibility, interoperability, communications, and transparency to benefit all global users of PNT services.</p> +<p>In September 2023, the DOD released the overview version of the Department of Defense Cyber Strategy for the first time since 2018. The strategy aligns with the priorities set out in the U.S. National Security Strategy (NSS) and the National Defense Strategy released in 2022, as well as the NCS. It includes four lines of effort: (1) “defend the nation,” (2) “prepare to fight and win the nation’s wars,” (3) “protect the cyber domain with allies and partners,” and (4) “build enduring advantages in cyberspace.” In March 2024, the new Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Cyber Policy was established to enhance defense cyber policy.</p> -<h4 id="the-international-telecommunication-union">THE INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATION UNION</h4> +<p>USCYBERCOM is the primary entity responsible for cyber operations related to national defense. While its missions and activities are not necessarily all publicly available, one of its recent priorities has been to work with allies to respond to potential cyber activities from outside the country that pose a threat to the United States. This is represented by the concept “defend forward,” which defends against malicious cyber activities at their source. One form of this concept is the implementation of “hunt forward operations.” This initiative contributes to the cyber defense of the host country by monitoring and detecting malicious cyber activities on the host country’s network while also contributing to the defense of the United States against attacks from foreign adversaries. USCYBERCOM has shared leadership with the NSA since its establishment. The two organizations work together on cyber operations, with the NSA providing its own cyber intelligence insights and resources to support USCYBERCOM.</p> -<p>Originally established by the International Telegraph Convention of 1865, the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) is now a UN agency responsible for issues pertaining to information and communications technologies. Most of its mission is focused on Earth, but a key part of its responsibilities relates to the space environment. The ITU is responsible for international coordination of radio spectrum use, including spectrum used by satellites. It facilitates international coordination of spectrum use for spacecraft orbiting Earth — meaning the ITU has effectively had a regulatory role for most spacecraft, since every crewed and uncrewed spacecraft in orbit since Sputnik 1 in 1957 has relied on radio communications.</p> +<ul> + <li>Intelligence</li> +</ul> -<p>The ITU groups satellites orbiting Earth into two categories: GEO, also called GSO, or non-geostationary orbit (non-GSO). Due to the finite space for satellites in GEO — sometimes compared to beachfront property on Earth — the ITU has developed rules that balance the access of all nations to these valuable slots and approval of new systems on a first-come, first-served basis.</p> +<p>The U.S. intelligence community is led by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), with the NSA playing a major role, particularly in the area of cybersecurity. The NSA collects foreign signals intelligence and provides it to U.S. policymakers and military forces. In the past, the NSA’s operations were less transparent and accessible to the public. However, in recent years, the NSA has been moving away from its historical secrecy and becoming more open to the public. It is actively promoting collaboration with the private sector as well as federal agencies, including strengthening its partnership with the defense industrial base through the Cybersecurity Collaboration Center (CCC) and developing and providing technical guidance in collaboration with CISA, the FBI, and other agencies. In recent years, the government has adopted a policy of sharing threat intelligence in a timely manner with a broad range of stakeholders by declassifying the information as much as possible. This has led to closer cooperation between government and critical infrastructure.</p> -<p>To date, there are very few ITU rules or decisions that relate specifically to cislunar space or the Moon. The union’s first foray into regulating spectrum use in cislunar space happened in 1971, when it added a provision to the Radio Regulations, the ITU’s legally binding spectrum rules, limiting the potential for interference to radio astronomy in the shielded zone of the Moon (SZM). The SZM is defined as the lunar surface area and adjacent part of space that are shielded from emissions originating from within 100,000 kilometers of Earth’s center (i.e., the far side of the Moon). The rule was designed to keep this naturally quiet zone free from human-made radio-signal interference so that the SZM could be used for radio astronomy in the future.</p> +<ul> + <li>Law Enforcement</li> +</ul> -<p>Since then, the ITU has not promulgated additional formal rules focused on cislunar space or the Moon. In 1997, it urged members to carefully assess the impacts of communications relay systems between the Earth and Moon. More recently, attendees at the 2023 World Radio Conference, a gathering organized by the ITU every three to four years to update the Radio Regulations, approved studies to look at frequency bands for lunar and cislunar communications. The results of the studies will be presented and debated at the 2027 conference.</p> +<p>The FBI is the lead federal agency investigating cybercrimes, working with other agencies such as CISA and the NSA, foreign partners and law enforcement entities, and the private sector. The National Cyber Investigative Joint Task Force (NCIJTF) is a government-wide initiative that integrates investigative efforts against cyber threats. The FBI is responsible for organizing and leading this, with the participation of over 30 agencies in the intelligence community and law enforcement. The Internet Crime Complaint Center is a resource for the general public to report internet crimes. The FBI has recently assigned cyber assistant legal attachés to embassies worldwide to work closely with international authorities.</p> -<h4 id="the-artemis-accords">THE ARTEMIS ACCORDS</h4> +<p>In recent years, the FBI and DOJ have shifted their focus from traditional criminal investigations (e.g., establishing a case, arresting, prosecuting, convicting, and sending criminals to prison) to the disruption of cybercriminals. This shift could make it more challenging to prosecute crimes without sufficient evidence. However, the government has prioritized proactive measures, including the prevention of crimes, early detection, and the prevention of the spread of damage. The government has been implementing this policy aggressively, conducting a series of law enforcement operations. These include disrupting international ransomware groups such as ALPHV/BlackCat and LockBit, as well as the botnets used by state-sponsored actors such as Volt Typhoon, Flax Typhoon, and 911 S5. The case of LockBit is one of the largest coordinated operations in recent years, involving law enforcement agencies from around the world. The National Police Agency (NPA) of Japan also participated in the operation, along with the Five Eyes countries (an intelligence alliance composed of Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States) and other international partners.</p> -<p>The Artemis Accords are non-binding multilateral agreements between the United States and 43 other countries that contain various provisions related to norms of behavior in space. The United States has stated that these accords are intended to help facilitate operational implementation of obligations derived from the OST and other international space agreements.</p> +<ul> + <li>Diplomacy</li> +</ul> -<p>The Artemis Accords established new norms among signatories aimed at improving the transparency, peacefulness, and interoperability of space activities. Among other commitments, signatories agree to release scientific information gathered through civil space exploration to the public and other Artemis signatories; make reasonable efforts to adhere to existing interoperability standards for space infrastructure; protect space sites considered significant to human heritage; and prevent the accumulation of orbital debris around the Moon.</p> +<p>The DOS is responsible for coordinating diplomatic engagement on the security of international cyberspace in bilateral, multilateral, and regional forums. It also leads intergovernmental cyber dialogues with international partners, including Japan. The Biden administration has enhanced its system for promoting national and economic security in cyberspace and digital technology from a diplomatic perspective through the establishment of the Bureau of Cyberspace and Digital Policy in April 2022, the appointment of the first-ever ambassador-at-large for it in September of the same year, and other measures. Furthermore, in May 2024, the DOS published its first United States International Cyberspace and Digital Policy Strategy. The strategy outlines four key areas of action to build digital solidarity. These include promoting a secure and resilient digital ecosystem, aligning rights-respecting approaches with international partners, building coalitions and engaging partners to counter threats to cyberspace, and strengthening international partners’ digital and cyber capacity. There is also a plan to have trained cyber and digital officers in every U.S. embassy around the world by the end of 2024. The White House is also leading international cooperation on cybersecurity through initiatives such as the International Counter Ransomware Initiative (CRI). The current status of Japan-U.S. cybersecurity cooperation is outlined in Chapter 3.</p> -<p>Though legal experts continue to disagree on the meaning of OST language related to using space resources, the Artemis Accords assert that the extraction and utilization of space resources can be done without violating the OST. Specifically, they state that the use of space “does not inherently constitute national appropriation under Article II” of the OST. Furthermore, they call for the development of international practices and rules governing the extraction and use of space resources.</p> +<ul> + <li>Government System Protection</li> +</ul> -<p>The Artemis Accords are the first international agreement to implement a concept referred to as “safety zones,” which are designed to prevent the activities of one nation from causing harmful interference to the activities of other countries — for example, to or by lunar launch and landing sites. Both launches and landings on the Moon’s surface create plumes of regolith and debris, which may damage or blind nearby spacecraft. Artemis signatories are expected to notify and coordinate with the creators of safety zones before conducting space activities within these areas. However, some experts have suggested safety zones may constitute “national appropriation” in violation of Article II of the OST. But it can be noted that international maritime law does provide precedent for safety zones, albeit in a different domain.</p> +<p>The federal Chief Information Security Officer (CISO) oversees cybersecurity policy, planning, and implementation for the executive branch. OMB provides instructions on specific cybersecurity measures to be implemented by federal agencies with a deadline through the issuance of memoranda and other means. CISA serves as the operational lead for cybersecurity in the Federal Civilian Executive Branch (FCEB). The Federal Information Security Modernization Act (FISMA) of 2014 requires government agencies to include incident detection, reporting, and response procedures in their information security programs. FISMA also requires OMB to publish an annual report on the progress and state of implementation in federal agencies. EO 14028 of May 2021 is based on FISMA. One of the sections notes the modernization of federal government cybersecurity. It includes a number of directives for FCEB, such as the use of secure cloud services, transition to zero trust architecture, and deployment of multi-factor authentication and data encryption. CISA maintains and publishes a Known Exploited Vulnerabilities Catalog as part of its operational support to federal agencies. The Known Exploited Vulnerabilities Catalog includes recommended actions that agencies must take by specified dates, which serves as a binding operational directive. CISA also offers the Continuous Diagnostics and Mitigation Program, which provides cybersecurity tools, integration services, and dashboards to assist agencies in enhancing their security posture. Note that the NSA is primarily responsible for the protection of government agencies with respect to the national security system (NSS). While EO 14028 is a directive for the FECB, a separate National Security Memorandum (NSM), NSM-8, was issued in January 2022 that requires the NSS to meet equivalent or greater cybersecurity requirements than those defined in the EO.</p> -<p>Russia has criticized various elements of the Artemis Accords for being U.S.-centric. China has said the accords reinforce competition rather than cooperation in space. Neither nation has signed the Artemis Accords nor signaled an interest in supporting the Artemis program. Conversely, there is no indication that the United States would collaborate with China or Russia on the ILRS. China suggested during a presentation at the International Astronautical Congress in 2023 that the ILRS framework would eventually include space sustainability principles akin to the Artemis Accords.</p> +<ul> + <li>Critical Infrastructure Protection</li> +</ul> -<h3 id="non-space-international-frameworks-with-analogues-to-space-governance">NON-SPACE INTERNATIONAL FRAMEWORKS WITH ANALOGUES TO SPACE GOVERNANCE</h3> +<p>The Biden administration considers critical infrastructure cybersecurity and resilience a national security priority. The national framework for critical infrastructure protection has long been based on the 2013 Presidential Policy Directive (PPD-21). However, the National Security Memorandum on Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience (NSM-22), the first revision in 11 years, was signed by the president in April 2024. NSM-22 designates 16 critical infrastructure sectors, which is the same as PPD-21. CISA, as the national coordinator, is responsible for the cybersecurity and resilience of the nation’s critical infrastructure. Each sector is overseen by a designated SRMA, which is the competent agency related to that industry and responsible for risk management and mitigation in the sector.</p> -<p>There are several domains on Earth that have similar jurisdictional characteristics as space, including Antarctica, the Arctic, the high seas, and international airspace. Each of these areas possesses its own established international governance mechanisms, which can provide lessons for future space governance frameworks and evolutions of current international space law. This section provides an overview of these non-space agreements and frameworks, and the subsequent section draws parallels to space governance and identifies lessons that could be used to help address associated gaps.</p> +<p>Given that the majority of critical infrastructure is owned and operated by the private sector, it is the responsibility of these entities to ensure their own cybersecurity. The government also plays a supporting role in these efforts. The specifics of PPPs vary by sector. In general, critical infrastructure owners and operators cooperate with the SRMA of the sector. In addition, the Sector Coordinating Council (SCC), which comprises critical infrastructure owners and operators, trade associations, and other entities within the sector, serves as a forum for discussing sector-specific strategies, policies, and plans. SCC also works closely with the Government Coordinating Council (GCC), which is the corresponding government entity for the sector. Technical and operational activities are typically managed through Information Sharing and Analysis Centers (ISACs), which are established in each industry. The National Council of ISACs (NCI) facilitates cross-sector operational coordination among ISACs. In addition, there are several specific initiatives related to critical infrastructure protection. One of the most notable initiatives to date is the Joint Cyber Defense Collaborative (JCDC), which was launched in August 2021. It is a framework of cross-sector collaboration between selected private-sector entities and key government agencies, including CISA, the NSA, and the FBI.</p> -<h4 id="the-law-of-the-sea-treaty">THE LAW OF THE SEA TREATY</h4> +<p>The United States has long relied on voluntary PPPs as a primary policy approach. However, there has been a notable increase in legislative and regulatory approaches under the Biden administration. In March 2022, the Cyber Incident Reporting for Critical Infrastructure Act (CIRCIA) was passed, requiring critical infrastructure owners and operators to report significant incidents and ransomware payments to the government. The rule-making process is currently underway. In addition, as indicated in the NCS and NSM-22, further cybersecurity requirements and regulations are being considered for each sector. Further details on critical infrastructure protection can be found in Chapter 4 and beyond.</p> -<p>Signed in 1982, the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), also called the “Law of the Sea Treaty,” established the international legal framework for maritime activities and uses of ocean resources. Key provisions of the treaty include granting nations the right to assert sovereignty up to 12 nautical miles from shore, giving all states freedom of navigation and overflight of the high seas, and setting up rules for exploring and exploiting sea-floor resources. Currently, 167 parties and the European Union have ratified the treaty — with the notable exception of the United States, which has cited concerns that treaty provisions on the use of seabed resources were not free-market friendly.</p> +<ul> + <li>Small- and Medium-sized Businesses Protection</li> +</ul> -<p>Established in 1994 in accordance with UNCLOS provisions, the International Seabed Authority (ISA) authorizes and controls seabed mineral extraction and works to protect the seafloor environment. To justify such regulation, UNCLOS asserts that ocean resources, outside of those under national jurisdiction, are the “common heritage of mankind.” The work and policies of the ISA are governed by an assembly made up by representatives of all parties to UNCLOS, a 36-person council elected by the assembly, and a secretary-general elected by the assembly for a four-year term. To date, it has authorized over 30 seabed mining-exploration contracts. As the ISA has not yet finalized regulations for commercial mining, held up by calls for a global moratorium due to alleged environmental impacts, it has yet to issue any approvals for commercial deep-sea mining projects.</p> +<p>In general, small- and medium-sized businesses (SMBs) often have smaller budgets, fewer employees, and less cybersecurity expertise than large corporations. These companies are often part of key supply chains, large corporate groups, or critical infrastructure and have been increasingly targeted by attackers as the weakest link. The government has identified the need to enhance the cybersecurity posture of SMBs as a critical issue. CISA assists SMBs in reducing their cyber risks by providing guidance tailored to their needs and free services and tools. NIST also plays an important role in this effort. It has launched a website, Small Business Cybersecurity Corner, which provides a centralized collection of cybersecurity guidance, training, and other resources for SMBs, including NIST IR 7621. Additionally, the Small Business Cybersecurity Community of Interest was established to facilitate the exchange of information and resources. To date, over 1,000 small businesses have participated in this initiative.</p> -<p>At the same time as the original UNCLOS negotiations in the 1980s, the United States enacted the Deep Seabed Hard Minerals Resources Act to provide a licensing framework for U.S. companies wanting to mine the seafloor. Though the United States has issued licenses for seafloor mining, some experts argue that U.S. companies could face international legal risks should they begin commercial mining without ISA approval.</p> +<ul> + <li>Consumers and the General Public</li> +</ul> -<h4 id="the-antarctic-treaty-and-antarctic-treaty-system">THE ANTARCTIC TREATY AND ANTARCTIC TREATY SYSTEM</h4> +<p>It is important to raise cybersecurity awareness among the general public in order to build nationwide cybersecurity capabilities. In the United States, CISA has taken a leading role in working with the federal government; state, local, tribal, and territorial governments; and the private sector to disseminate information and conduct campaigns to ensure that the public is aware of cyber threats and can safely use the digital space. October has been designated as National Cybersecurity Awareness Month since 2004. In 2023, the initiative celebrated its 20th anniversary, and CISA launched a new permanent cybersecurity awareness program, Secure Our World. The program is focused on four key actions: use strong passwords, enable multi-factor authentication, recognize and report phishing, and update software. These actions are designed to encourage behavioral change throughout the year.</p> -<p>Antarctica is the only continent without an indigenous human population. No human is believed to have seen Antarctica or its ice shelf until 1820. Since that first sighting, seven countries have made territorial claims on the continent, with some national claims overlapping with others. The Cold War added another dimension to the geopolitics of Antarctica: though neither the United States nor the Soviet Union made territorial claims, both operated research stations there. Additionally, neither saw Antarctica as having strategic military value, with both nations seeking to prevent the militarization of the continent.</p> +<ul> + <li>Technologies, Products, and Services</li> +</ul> -<p>Though some claimant nations to territory on Antarctica initially objected, the United States pursued the development of and eventually succeeded in establishing an international treaty that preserved the freedom of scientific research and peaceful use of the continent without adjudicating or deciding on any territorial claims. Convened by the United States in 1958, the Antarctic Conference, which produced the Antarctic Treaty, only included the 12 nations with contemporary scientific equities in Antarctica during the International Geophysical Year (IGY) of 1957 to 1958. Signed in 1959, the Antarctic Treaty serves as the foundation for a system of treaties and agreements that today provide the international governance framework for the continent.</p> +<p>The security of technologies, products, and services is a broad topic. This paper does not cover all aspects of the topic, but one of the Biden administration’s key interests is the promotion of secure by design and secure by default. This is the concept of ensuring that products and services are secure from the design phase and that security features are built in by default for the products and services. This aligns with the NCS’s primary objective of shifting cybersecurity accountability to manufacturers and providers. CISA, in collaboration with federal agencies and international partners, including Japan, has been actively promoting the adoption of these principles. In May 2024, 68 of the world’s leading software manufacturers made a voluntary commitment to CISA’s Secure by Design Pledge, pledging to design products with better security built in. Furthermore, CISA is advancing this principle, shifting the concept of secure by design to secure by demand, to ensure that customers understand the necessity of the security and safety of the products and push vendors to improve their products. In March 2024, CISA and OMB released a Secure Software Development Attestation Form, which requires producers of software used by the federal government to attest to the adoption of secure development practices aligned with NIST’s Secure Software Development Framework. Subsequently, in August 2024, CISA released a software acquisition guide for federal agencies, which can be used by a broader range of stakeholders, including the private sector. The guide provides recommendations for software assurance in the cybersecurity supply chain risk management life cycle, focusing on the secure by demand concept. In a related effort, CISA has been facilitating community discussions to promote the use of the Software Bill of Materials (SBOM) to increase software transparency. The government has also been calling for the use of memory-safe languages for secure software development. Additionally, as indicated in the NCS, a legal framework for holding software producers accountable is also being considered. Regarding consumer devices, the White House announced a plan for an internet of things (IoT) labeling program in July 2023. The objective is to make secure IoT devices widely available through a voluntary approach that leverages market forces. The program is currently being prepared under the leadership of the FCC with the aim of becoming operational by the end of 2024. Several government initiatives are being developed under the common concept of secure by design.</p> -<p>As part of the treaty framework, signatories began meeting regularly to discuss issues related to Antarctica, such as environmental protection and cooperation on research. Officially called the Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting (ATCM) process, these meetings now occur each year, and participants make decisions by consensus. These annual meetings have provided opportunities for treaty Consultative Parties to develop specific, legally binding agreements, with greater precision than the original treaty on rules covering specific activities in Antarctica. The ATCM process has also been a mechanism for treaty parties to update and address contemporary issues that were not foreseen at the time the treaty was drafted.</p> +<p>Another key issue is the safety and security of artificial intelligence (AI), which is considered a foundation of the use of AI in EO 14110: Safe, Secure, and Trustworthy Development and Use of Artificial Intelligence, signed in October 2023. The EO addresses a wide range of issues, including risk assessment and mitigation for the use of AI in critical infrastructure, the security of the foundation models, and the detection and labeling of synthetic content. These tasks have been assigned to CISA, NIST, and other government agencies.</p> -<p>Currently, key legally binding documents of the Antarctic Treaty System include the original 1959 treaty, the Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty, the Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources, and the Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Seals. These documents and resolutions, decisions, recommendations, and other measures adopted by past ATCMs cover many topics, such as peaceful use and scientific collaboration, environmental protections, preservation of historic sites, management of tourism, designation and management of protected areas, mapping, safety, information sharing, logistical cooperation, and weather and meteorological cooperation.</p> +<ul> + <li>Workforce</li> +</ul> -<p>Since 1998, commercial mining in Antarctica has been prohibited. Prior to this ban, several treaty parties had been working on a treaty addendum that would have regulated future resource extraction. Growing concerns about impacts of human activities to Earth, not just in Antarctica but around the world, and the rise of the environmental movement in the 1980s led to the abandonment of the addendum. At that time, Australia and France initiated efforts to oppose plans to allow future mining. Even today, there is limited interest in Antarctic mining, as experts question its business viability.</p> +<p>A shortage of cybersecurity professionals is a common challenge for both the public and private sectors globally. In July 2023, the United States published the National Cyber Workforce and Education Strategy (NCWES), which focuses on four pillars: (1) “equip every American with foundational cyber skills,” (2) “transform cyber education,” (3) “expand and enhance America’s cyber workforce,” and (4) “strengthen the federal cyber workforce.” In releasing the strategy, government agencies, industry, academia, and nonprofit organizations have committed to working together to implement the strategy through training, apprenticeship programs, and partnerships. ONCD is leading this national initiative. In June 2024, ONCD released a report outlining its progress to date and future work plans for implementing NCWES.</p> -<h4 id="the-international-regulations-for-preventing-collisions-at-sea">THE INTERNATIONAL REGULATIONS FOR PREVENTING COLLISIONS AT SEA</h4> +<h4 id="cybersecurity-in-japan">Cybersecurity in Japan</h4> -<p>Until the 1860s, most maritime nations developed and used their own navigation rules and practices. In 1863, the United Kingdom and France agreed on a set of maritime rules that were eventually adopted by 30 countries, including the United States. A well-known guide to these regulations, published in 1867 by British official Thomas Gray, was called The Rule of the Road, the progenitor of all future references to such guidelines as “rules of the road.” To expand on these regulations, the United States convened the first International Maritime Conference in 1889 to discuss additional measures needed to prevent maritime collisions. Throughout the next 70 years, a regular cadence of major international maritime conferences updated and revised these rules.</p> +<p><em>Basic Strategy and Policy</em></p> -<p>Then in 1972, all contemporary international navigation and maritime rules were replaced entirely by the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea, also known as Collision Regulations (COLREGs), which specify the rules of the road for ships at sea with the aim of preventing accidents. The COLREGs are published and maintained by the International Maritime Organization (IMO), a UN agency established in 1948 that focuses on ensuring safety at sea. Nations become a member of the IMO by ratifying the Convention on the International Maritime Organization, whereupon they are required to enact the COLREGs as national law within their own jurisdictions.</p> +<p>The Japanese political system has been relatively stable and consistent in terms of the parliamentary cabinet system, with the Liberal Democratic Party having been in power for a long time, except for a few periods. With regard to cybersecurity policy, there are some similarities with the United States in terms of a decentralized government organizational structure and the basis of voluntary PPPs.</p> -<h4 id="the-arctic-council">THE ARCTIC COUNCIL</h4> +<p>The current cybersecurity policy is based on the Cybersecurity Basic Act, which went into full effect in January 2015. The act outlines the fundamental principles and responsibilities of the nation in advancing cybersecurity policies. It also establishes the framework for developing a national cybersecurity strategy and other policy initiatives. In January 2015, the Cybersecurity Strategic Headquarters was established in the cabinet under the act, and the National Center of Incident Readiness and Strategy for Cybersecurity (NISC) was established in the Cabinet Secretariat as the national cybersecurity center. The national Cybersecurity Strategy has been updated approximately once every three years since its initial version in 2013, with the latest version released in September 2021. The latest strategy sets “Cybersecurity for All” as its main theme and outlines three key directions: (1) “advancing digital transformation (DX) and cybersecurity simultaneously,” (2) “ensuring the overall safety and security of cyberspace as it becomes increasingly public, interconnected and interrelated,” and (3) “enhancing initiatives from the perspective of Japan’s national security.” The strategy reflects the current geopolitical landscape, naming China, Russia, and North Korea as countries of concern for the first time. It also indicates the importance of international cooperation with the United States, the Quad (a strategic security grouping that includes Australia, India, Japan, and the United States), the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and other like-minded countries, as well as the importance of economic security and supply chains. Additionally, the government releases an annual report that serves as both a review of the previous fiscal year and a plan for the current year, outlining the key achievements and implementation plan based on the strategy.</p> -<p>The Arctic Council is an intergovernmental forum established in 1996 to promote cooperation, coordination, and engagement between countries with territory in the Arctic. Only nations with Arctic territory — Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russia, Sweden, and the United States — are members of the council, though representatives of Indigenous peoples can join as permanent participants. Additionally, non-Arctic nations can be admitted as observers. Senior officials representing each member nation convene every six months to discuss past accomplishments and future work of the council, as well as issue a nonbinding declaration. Every two years, the council holds ministerial-level meetings.</p> +<p>Japan’s cybersecurity is now at a pivotal point. Most recently, the NSS of Japan, released in December 2022, outlined a strategy to fundamentally enhance the nation’s cybersecurity posture. While the ACD in general includes a wide range of proactive cyber operations, the strategy focuses on three key areas as its own ACD: enhanced PPPs, detection of attack sources using information provided by telecommunication service providers, and government operations against attack sources. It also includes the strengthening of the government’s organizational structure, including the restructuring of NISC and a significant increase in government staff for cyber. The implementation of the strategy, including the introduction of legislation, is currently underway. Furthermore, the position of minister of state for economic security was established in the cabinet in October 2021, and the Economic Security Promotion Act was passed in May 2022. In May 2024, a new regulation based on the act came into effect to ensure the safety and reliability of essential infrastructure. In the same month, a bill on a new security clearance system was passed. This will include cybersecurity information in the protected information and greatly expand the scope of clearance to the nondefense private sector. These developments will have a positive impact on further enhancing the nation’s cybersecurity.</p> -<p>The council itself was not established by a formal international treaty but rather by the Ottawa Declaration, signed by representatives of the future council’s membership. Its mandate covers a wide range of topics, including sustainable development of the Arctic region and environmental protection, but specifically excludes one topic: military security.</p> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Japan’s cybersecurity is now at a pivotal point. Most recently, the NSS of Japan, released in December 2022, outlined a strategy to fundamentally enhance the nation’s cybersecurity posture.</code></em></strong></p> -<p>There is no budget or secretariat for the Arctic Council. The council is only a forum and lacks the ability to implement or enforce any of the guidelines or recommendations approved during council meetings. However, council members negotiated and concluded the Arctic Search and Rescue Agreement in 2011, which addresses responsibilities and coordination for international search and rescue activities in the region.</p> +<p><em>Organizational Structure</em></p> -<h4 id="the-convention-on-international-civil-aviation">THE CONVENTION ON INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION</h4> +<p>Figure 2 provides an overview of the organizational structure of cybersecurity centered on the Japanese government. The Cybersecurity Strategic Headquarters in the cabinet is the highest decisionmaking body for national cybersecurity. The headquarters comprises the chief cabinet secretary, the ministers related to cybersecurity, and external experts. The headquarters works closely with the National Security Council (NSC) in the cabinet. NISC serves as the secretariat for the headquarters and plays a coordinating role for government agencies involved in cybersecurity and critical infrastructure.</p> -<p>The Convention on International Civil Aviation, signed in 1944, established rules for airspace, aircraft registration, safety and security, personnel licensing, aircraft communications, customs and duties, and environmental protections and addressed national jurisdictional questions related to air travel. It recognizes states’ sovereignty over the airspace directly above their territory, which includes land areas and territorial waters. Parties to the convention must enact national laws that enforce convention rules and regulations and provide aircraft navigation services in their sovereign territories. Convention rules apply in the airspace above international waters, known as “high-seas airspace.”</p> +<p>The NPA is a law enforcement agency responsible for investigating cybercrimes. The Ministry of Defense (MOD) is responsible for cybersecurity in the field of national defense, and the Japan Self-Defense Force (JSDF) is in charge of cyber defense for its own organization, including MOD. The Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications (MIC) is responsible for cybersecurity policy related to information and communications networks. It also serves as a regulatory body for the communications industry. The National Institute of Information and Communications Technology (NICT), which is under the jurisdiction of MIC, conducts research and development (R&amp;D) for cybersecurity in the information and communications technology (ICT) field. The Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) develops cybersecurity policies for private companies across a range of industries. The Information-technology Promotion Agency (IPA), which is under the jurisdiction of METI, maintains a national certification system of information security and conducts studies and research in the field to support the national information technology strategy from a technical and human resources perspective. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) is responsible for managing diplomatic relations in the cyber domain. The Digital Agency is a relatively new agency, established in September 2021 to promote the digitalization of national and local government. It is also involved in cybersecurity from the perspective of DX. Moreover, as in the United States, critical infrastructure sectors are overseen by designated government agencies. Further details can be found in Chapter 4.</p> -<p>The convention also set up the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), the UN agency charged with coordinating standards and best practices for international air travel regarding topics such as air navigation, navigational infrastructure, flight procedures, cross-border aviation, and air-accident investigations. The ICAO is governed by a council — consisting of 36 members elected from the 193-member nations of the organization — that is responsible for adopting new standards and rules.</p> +<p>The Japanese government’s cybersecurity-related budget for FY 2024 is ¥212.86 billion, with approximately ¥152 billion allocated to MOD and the remainder distributed among non-MOD agencies. This represents an increase of approximately 54 percent from the FY 2023 initial budget. It should be noted that the cybersecurity-related budgets released by governments cannot be directly compared due to differences in the definition and scope of cybersecurity. While the exact number of NISC employees is not made public, as of FY 2023, it is made up of approximately 100 government officials and employees with specialized expertise from the private sector. Additionally, NISC plans to double the number of staff in FY 2024. Further expansion is anticipated in the coming years through organizational restructuring based on the NSS of Japan.</p> -<h3 id="cislunar-governance-and-policy-challenges">CISLUNAR GOVERNANCE AND POLICY CHALLENGES</h3> +<p>While it is not easy to precisely map out the roles and responsibilities of cybersecurity-related government agencies in the United States and Japan, a rough relationship may be expressed as in Figure 3. Please note that this simplified mapping does not necessarily define a complete and exhaustive relationship between the two.</p> -<p>There are policy, legal, and regulatory questions that impact current activities, as well as the future evolution of human activities, in cislunar space. These cislunar questions are generally the same ones that exist today for all other areas of space, whether in near-Earth orbits or beyond the Moon. Governance questions applicable to cislunar space, therefore, should be addressed as much as possible so that resulting frameworks apply broadly to all regions of space.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/eC5noNH.png" alt="image02" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 2: Cybersecurity Organizational Structure Centered on the Japanese Government.</strong> Source: Author’s analysis; and <a href="https://www.nisc.go.jp/pdf/policy/kihon-s/cs-senryaku2021-gaiyou-en.pdf">National Center of Incident Readiness and Strategy for Cybersecurity (NISC), Japan’s Cybersecurity Strategy 2021 (overview) (Tokyo: NISC, September 28, 2021), 8</a>.</em></p> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">These cislunar questions are generally the same ones that exist today for all other areas of space, whether in near-Earth orbits or beyond the Moon.</code></em></strong></p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/POENk7X.png" alt="image03" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 3: Mapping of Cybersecurity-Related Government Agencies in Japan and the United States.</strong> Source: Author’s analysis.</em></p> -<p>To tackle cislunar governance questions, this report examines broader space governance matters, identifying key unresolved issues that resulted from either gaps in national and international frameworks or technological advancements that were not foreseen when space treaties were negotiated. Today, there are three main deficits in international space governance, which the report authors assert should be addressed to facilitate the safe, sustainable, and secure development of cislunar space. Governments should</p> +<p><em>Current State</em></p> <ul> - <li> - <p>modify and elaborate upon rules regarding permissible activities in space,</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>further define property rights in space and use of space resources, and</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>establish rules of the road for human-made objects in space.</p> - </li> + <li>Defense</li> </ul> -<p>As the Moon is likely the first celestial body other than Earth on which humans might live and work, new space governance rules applying to cislunar space will not only involve spacecraft in space but also probably people and equipment interacting on the lunar surface.</p> - -<p>The OST and three related space agreements — the Rescue and Liability Conventions and Rescue Agreement (not including the Moon Agreement due to its low number of signatories) — that established the foundations for international space law somewhat address these issues. However, there are no consensus definitions or meanings of certain key treaty phrases.</p> +<p>As highlighted in the NSS of Japan, Japan’s national cyber defense is undergoing a significant transformation. To date, the scope of JSDF defenses has been limited primarily to MOD and JSDF network systems, but the strategy will expand this to include critical infrastructure. Japan’s ACD, a key focus of the strategy, also includes relatively offensive-leaning cyber operations, such as “to penetrate and neutralize attacker’s servers.” While the strategy is still in the process of implementation, it is anticipated that JSDF, NPA, or equivalent organizations will play a key role in conducting such operations. To enable the government to fulfill this role, it is essential to expand and strengthen the government’s cyber staff. JSDF has already initiated this process in advance of the strategy. As of the end of FY 2022, the number of cyber professionals was approximately 890. The goal is to increase this number to 4,000 by the end of FY 2027. In addition, the number of operators for cyber-related systems in the Ground, Maritime, and Air Self-Defense Forces is planned to be expanded to 20,000. To support this plan, the educational system of the JSDF is being enhanced, including through the reorganization of Japan’s Ground Self-Defense Force (JGSDF) Signal School into the System &amp; Signal/Cyber School with a new cyber department, introduction of a cyber course at the JGSDF High Technical School, and establishment of a cyber specialized department at the National Defense Academy. Additionally, a new system for hiring private-sector professionals for a limited period has been implemented. Furthermore, Japan has been engaged in the activities of the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCDCOE) since 2019 and has participated in the cyber defense exercises (Locked Shields) hosted by the CCDCOE. Japan is expanding its international cooperation in cyber defense operations.</p> -<p>Though there are few similarities between life on Earth and the harsh vacuum of space or surface of the Moon, elements of governance frameworks used to regulate areas on Earth beyond national borders, such as Antarctica and the high seas, should be assessed when considering how to update international space governance frameworks. The non-space governance frameworks described earlier in this report, some of which date to before the founding of the United Nations, have proven durable.</p> +<ul> + <li>Intelligence</li> +</ul> -<p>This section attempts to understand the reasons for that durability and discern lessons that can be applied to future space governance. For example, unlike the Antarctic Treaty System or UNCLOS, the OST did not establish a consultative mechanism or process for treaty parties to update space governance rules or address new issues that have arisen due to technological change, increasing commercial activities, and increased military interests in space. The report authors discuss international space governance gaps and describe how non-space international agreements and frameworks have addressed similar concerns and considerations in their respective domains. Though the Moon Agreement is effectively not relevant to international space law, it is discussed as a reference that could help serve as a guide for a new agreement.</p> +<p>The Cabinet Intelligence and Research Office (CIRO) is an intelligence agency directly under the Prime Minister’s Office responsible for collecting, consolidating, and analyzing information on important cabinet policies. The government intelligence community includes the CIRO, MOD, NPA, MOFA, and the Public Security Intelligence Agency, which work closely together in intelligence collection and analysis.</p> -<h4 id="permissible-activities-in-space">PERMISSIBLE ACTIVITIES IN SPACE</h4> +<p>Japan operates a security clearance system based on the Specially Designated Secrets Act, which designates the four fields (defense, diplomacy, reconnaissance, and terrorism) as classified national security information. The current system has subjected primarily government officials and a smaller number of private-sector employees engaged in defense fields to eligibility screening. A new security clearance legislation, passed in May 2024, significantly expands the scope of the existing system. The new system will expand the scope of information to be protected to a wider range of economic security information, including cybersecurity. It will also greatly expand the scope of eligibility screening to the private sector. The government is currently developing detailed operational rules for implementation in 2025. The new system will also have a significant impact on the cybersecurity field, further promoting classified information sharing with like-minded countries and stricter management of it.</p> -<p>Broadly speaking, activities in cislunar space could include government activities of either a civilian or military character and commercial, private sector activities. The OST and Moon Agreement provide some, albeit broad, direction on permissible uses of space, including cislunar space. The OST calls for the exploration and use of space for the benefit of all nations but does not provide a comprehensive list of permissible activities. However, it does enumerate various non-permissible space activities, such as national appropriation of space and the placement of nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction in space. Without referencing outer space writ large, the OST says that the Moon and other celestial bodies should only be used for peaceful purposes.</p> +<ul> + <li>Law Enforcement</li> +</ul> -<p>The OST and Moon Agreement language relating to permissible activities drew upon the Antarctic Treaty, which placed similar, but not identical, constraints on what nations could do in Antarctica. Like outer space, Antarctica was reserved for peaceful purposes, with an emphasis on scientific exploration and research. Any activities of a military nature are prohibited. Similarly, the OST prohibits military activities on the Moon and other celestial bodies, but not in outer space.</p> +<p>In April 2022, NPA established the Cyber Affairs Bureau to streamline and reinforce cybersecurity roles and responsibilities distributed across various sections within the organization. The new bureau is responsible for developing and implementing cyber policies within NPA in a centralized manner. In addition, the National Cyber Unit was established as a centralized national investigative agency to address cyber cases that have a significant impact, are highly technical, and involve international criminal groups. It also serves as a central point of contact for international law enforcement agencies. In line with these developments, the number of public attributions has been increasing in recent years. These are conducted solely by Japan and in cooperation with like-minded countries, including the United States. Furthermore, Japan has conducted disruptive operations against cybercrime infrastructure in coordination with international law enforcement agencies, including the United States. NPA played an important role in providing technical expertise in the international coordinated operation against LockBit, one of the world’s largest ransomware groups, in February 2024. It developed and provided ransomware decryption tools, which were used by over 6 million victims.</p> -<p>Since signing the Antarctic Treaty, signatories have refrained from militarizing the continent, though experts disagree on what constitutes militarization. In contrast, there are military interests in space today. However, it is not clear what military advantages could be obtained specifically in or from cislunar space. Advocates for extending military operations into cislunar space acknowledge that the Moon’s distance precludes it from having any direct and meaningful impact on terrestrial operations but suggest actions from cislunar space could affect space systems nearer to Earth. In particular, these arguments assert that cislunar space is a high ground that can be used for deploying weapons against satellites in lower orbits and conducting space observation and surveillance.</p> +<p>Furthermore, the Japan Cybercrime Control Center (JC3), a nonprofit PPP, facilitates the sharing and analysis of threat and crime information among industry, academia, and law enforcement entities to identify and reduce risks related to cybercrime. In addition to NPA, major companies across sectors participate in the center and collaborate closely under confidentiality agreements. The organization also collaborates with the National Cyber-Forensics and Training Alliance of the United States.</p> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">However, it is not clear what military advantages could be obtained specifically in or from cislunar space.</code></em></strong></p> +<ul> + <li>Diplomacy</li> +</ul> -<p>For example, one report expressed concerns that China might use the Moon’s gravity to slingshot hostile spacecraft around the Moon and into position to attack satellites in GEO or other orbits. While technically possible, such technology — if developed and deployed — offers no strategic advantage over the myriad of counterspace weapons that could be launched today. It would also be a much more time-consuming way to deliver a weapon targeting a satellite in GEO than other possible methods. Slingshotting around the Moon to reach GEO takes a lot of time and is designed to save spacecraft fuel — not the kind of maneuvering that would underpin a successful military attack.</p> +<p>MOFA’s approach to cyber diplomacy is based on three pillars: the promotion of the rule of law in cyberspace, the promotion of confidence-building measures, and capacity-building support. Japan, along with the United States and other like-minded countries, takes the position that conventional international law applies in cyberspace. It is actively engaged in international discussions through participation in government expert meetings at the United Nations, among other venues. Additionally, as the first Asian member of the Convention on Cybercrime, Japan is actively engaged in discussions to expand the number of signatory countries to this convention.</p> -<p>One could argue that launching a counterspace weapon from cislunar space toward a satellite in GEO or lower orbits could offer a way to stage a surprise attack from an unexpected direction. While true, this advantage dissipates once it becomes known that such weapons are being deployed and possibly used. Improved cislunar SSA could certainly help provide advance warning of such activities, but since the vast majority of expected future cislunar missions are civilian, these SSA improvements should be the responsibility of civilian and commercial operators. However, military users could acquire cislunar SSA data from these sources, like they acquire other commercial space services like satellite communications.</p> +<p>The Japanese government has been conducting intergovernmental cyber dialogues with countries and regions, including the United States, the United Kingdom, the European Union, and ASEAN. On capacity building, MOFA has coordinated initiatives to provide cooperation and support in a number of key areas, including awareness-raising, critical infrastructure protection, incident response, and cybercrime countermeasures, with a particular focus on ASEAN. Furthermore, MOFA has long had the post of ambassador for cyber policy, which oversees consultations with foreign governments and the government-wide cyber foreign policy. For further information on existing Japan-U.S. cooperation in this area, please refer to Chapter 3.</p> -<p>Another reason given by proponents of conducting military activities in cislunar space is that it affords an ideal vantage to conduct space observation and surveillance and to assess counterspace operations at lower orbits. In reality, a system placed on the Moon or in halo orbits associated with the Earth–Moon L1 and L2 points could not provide continuous, persistent surveillance of any point on Earth or in lower Earth orbits. Earth itself would block cislunar observation platforms from having a persistent view of activities in near-Earth orbits.</p> +<ul> + <li>Government System Protection</li> +</ul> -<p>Additionally, the Moon rotates around Earth about every 28 days, so it is not a static observation point relative to Earth. A system in cislunar space would lose track of areas for long periods of time. Plus, a spacecraft near the Moon is 10 times further from Earth (nearly 400,000 kilometers) than a spacecraft in GEO (about 36,000 kilometers). A network of sensors located on Earth, however, can provide persistent monitoring of activities in GEO, as is done today.</p> +<p>NISC, which leads the defense of government agencies, includes the Government Security Operation Coordination (GSOC) team. GSOC centrally monitors information collected from sensors installed in each agency 24/7. It also collects and analyzes data on cyberattacks and threats and shares that information with agencies to help improve the government’s overall response capabilities.</p> -<p>Scientists in China have proposed another cislunar use for space monitoring, publishing a paper on using a lunar gravity assist for placement into retrograde GEO, along the same plane on the same plane as Earth’s equator. Such an orbit, which would run in the opposite direction of standard drift, would allow a spacecraft to get a view of the entire GEO belt every 12 hours but pose significant collision risks to other satellites in GEO, with one expert noting it would be akin to driving a car the wrong way on a highway. Additionally, a retrograde GEO system would not be able to examine any one spacecraft in detail due to the high relative velocities between such a monitoring system and other satellites in GEO drift orbits. There is also no clear benefit to using such a monitoring satellite rather than existing SSA sensors placed on Earth.</p> +<p>The government has established the Common Standards for Cybersecurity Measures for Government Agencies and Related Agencies as a common framework to enhance the cybersecurity posture of government agencies. The standards are reviewed regularly, with the latest version released in July 2023. The document specifies a common baseline that all agencies must meet and additional optional measures to ensure a higher level of security. This allows risk-based measures to be implemented continuously in accordance with each agency’s specific situation. The latest version includes a new requirement for government contractors to implement measures in accordance with NIST SP 800-171 for managing cybersecurity risk in the supply chain.</p> -<p>The larger question is: Under what circumstances should utilizing cislunar space for observation or collecting SSA data be characterized as a military use? Certainly, a military-owned and -operated satellite presumes a military use. But, as noted earlier in this section, improvements to cislunar SSA systems should be the focus of civilian and commercial operators. Civil-government or commercial cislunar capabilities that observe and characterize space activities, including a retrograde GEO system, could collect the same information and data as military-operated systems but would not carry the same militarization concerns. However, there is no reason military users should not have access to SSA data available from civilian and commercial sources.</p> +<p>While each agency has had a CISO for many years, starting in FY 2016, a deputy director general for cybersecurity and information technology has been assigned to each organization as a full-time position to assist the CISO. The agencies are coordinated with one another through interagency CISO meetings.</p> -<p>Ultimately, the raison d’être for extending military forces into cislunar space seems tied more to national honor and fear that China might do something there first than to a real strategic military goal. If this is true, the situation looks no different than Antarctica in the 1950s. To save time and military resources that could best be used elsewhere, the two superpowers of that day wisely made the decision to keep military interests and the Cold War out of Antarctica.</p> +<ul> + <li>Critical Infrastructure Protection</li> +</ul> -<p>In addition to questions about military uses of cislunar space, this report examines commercial, private sector uses. Like the Antarctic Treaty, the OST is silent on commercial, for-profit activities in cislunar or any part of space. But the OST does create room for broadly nongovernmental space activities by including a clause requiring nations to authorize and continuously supervise all national space activities by governmental and nongovernmental entities. This language satisfied both the Soviet Union, which sought to limit space to government-only missions, and the United States, which sought to permit commercial space developments.</p> +<p>There are similarities in the organizational framework for critical infrastructure protection in Japan and the United States. The basic policy and framework are defined in the Cybersecurity Policy for Critical Infrastructure Protection (CPCIP), which is approved by the Cybersecurity Strategy Headquarters and published by NISC. The initial version was released in 2005, and subsequent regular updates have led to the most recent edition, released in March 2024. The latest version added the ports and harbors industry as a new 15th critical infrastructure sector in response to the cyberattack on the Port of Nagoya in 2023. NISC, as the national coordinator, is responsible for critical infrastructure cybersecurity and resilience across the nation. In line with the NSS of Japan, NISC plans to double its staff in FY 2024, strengthening its structure in preparation for future restructuring into a new national cybersecurity agency. Five government agencies have been designated responsible organizations for overseeing respective industries and managing and mitigating risks specific to their sectors.</p> -<p>In the late 1950s and early 1960s, there was arguably little commercial appetite for space beyond nascent plans for commercial communications satellites — and certainly no business plans built around the extraction of space resources from the Moon, asteroids, or other space objects.</p> +<p>In Japan, as in other countries, the majority of critical infrastructure is owned and operated by the private sector. It is, therefore, essential to foster PPPs to enhance the nation’s collective cyber defense capabilities. In general, critical infrastructure owners and operators share information directly with the agencies responsible for the sector as well as with NISC. There is also an organization called Capability for Engineering of Protection, Technical Operation, Analysis and Response (CEPTOAR), which represents each sector and subsector. Major sectors, such as ICT, finance, power, and transportation, have ISACs in place to facilitate technical and operational cooperation within their respective sector. NISC leads an annual cross-sector exercise program to enhance collective response capabilities across sectors. Most recently, in April 2019, the Cybersecurity Council was established with the cross-sector participation of government agencies and selected private companies related to critical infrastructure and cybersecurity. The objective of this council is to facilitate rapid information sharing and analysis between the public and private sectors.</p> -<p>Space activity is now dominated by the private sector, though a significant percentage of commercial space activities are financed by governments. However, few of these current private sector space activities are related to the extraction or use of space resources.</p> +<p>In May 2024, a new regulation was initiated based on the Economic Security Promotion Act. This requires the government to conduct a prior review of the installation and outsourced operation of critical facilities of designated essential infrastructure owners and operators. The objective is to ensure the safety and reliability of critical infrastructure services against threats posed by foreign adversaries. Currently, there is no law similar to CIRCIA mandating incident reporting across all sectors. However, the potential advantages of implementing such a measure are being discussed at a panel of experts hosted by the Japanese government. In addition, sector-specific reporting requirements are currently in place as regulations and other means. Further details on critical infrastructure protection can be found in Chapter 4.</p> -<p>Once it is possible to realize economic gains from resource extraction (or some other activity) on the Moon or other celestial bodies, nations will want a way to claim and protect their shares, as well as their national entities involved in those activities. The International Seabed Authority (ISA) established by the UNCLOS is an attempt to internationally regulate seabed mining, partly to avoid a rush to grab seafloor territory and bypass any motivations for a country to use armed force to assert national rights to ocean resources. The question, discussed in the next section, is whether a similar arrangement could work for space.</p> +<ul> + <li>SMBs’ Protection</li> +</ul> -<h4 id="property-rights-in-space-and-use-of-space-resources">PROPERTY RIGHTS IN SPACE AND USE OF SPACE RESOURCES</h4> +<p>Cybersecurity for SMBs is a major concern in Japan as well. METI and IPA have been leading initiatives in this area. IPA has established a website to provide SMBs with a centralized access point for resources, tools, and services of information security. In addition, it has published guidelines for SMBs, outlining the actions that both senior management and operational managers should take from their respective perspectives. It also introduced a comprehensive support package for SMBs at a low cost, offering a range of services, including consultation, anomaly monitoring, emergency response support, cyber insurance, and more. In addition, a self-declaration program has been implemented, enabling organizations to self-declare their cybersecurity actions taken according to their maturity level. This is also used as a prerequisite for applying for the government’s IT subsidy program.</p> -<p>Property rights stipulate how a resource can be owned and used and have existed in some form since ancient times. Today, property rights are closely tied to national sovereignty, determined by national law, and provided by the nation-state to entities under its jurisdiction. The one notable instance in which property rights originate from an authority other than the nation-state is the bottom of the ocean, which is defined by UNCLOS as the “common heritage of mankind.” In this case, property rights to the seabed and ocean floor, including to resources within those areas, are shared by all nations and people. According to this principle, no nation or entity can unilaterally claim or distribute those resources. Only the ISA, as established by UNCLOS, has that right.</p> +<p>Furthermore, in November 2020, the Supply-Chain Cybersecurity Consortium (SC3) was established as an industry-led initiative to promote cybersecurity measures for the entire supply chain, including SMBs, with the industry stakeholders working together. Cybersecurity for SMBs is a key area of focus discussed in a working group of the consortium.</p> -<p>The use of resources in any domain is closely tied to property rights, namely that the decision to use a resource is predicated on the ability of that entity to first assert ownership of it. In space, property rights and national sovereignty are somewhat constrained by the OST. Specifically, Article II of the OST states that space, “including the moon and other celestial bodies, is not subject to national appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by any other means.” As already noted, legal scholars disagree on the meaning of “national appropriation,” with some arguing it prohibits any property claims while others assert it allows for private appropriations of space resources.</p> +<ul> + <li>Consumers and the General Public</li> +</ul> -<p>The OST does not provide clear direction on how national laws and regulations apply to space, but it does tacitly permit nations to exercise a degree of sovereignty in authorizing and continuously supervising their national space activities. Since the OST did not establish consultative bodies that regularly meet to discuss treaty implementation issues, like UNCLOS did with the ISA and the Antarctic Treaty System with its consultative meetings, there has not been an easy way to clarify this ambiguity.</p> +<p>NISC is leading awareness-raising initiatives in cooperation with other government agencies. Since 2010, February has been designated as Cybersecurity Month, with the objective of promoting public awareness and understanding of cybersecurity. NISC has created a dedicated website for public awareness, which provides a centralized set of resources. These include a handbook for safe and secure use of the internet, FAQs on cybersecurity-related laws and regulations, and educational video content.</p> -<p>Experts generally agree that the OST prohibits national claims to territory in space, including territory on a celestial body, such as the Moon or an asteroid. But nations may still want to use these locations for their own national purposes. And the issue is that although outer space is large, there are certain locations, trajectories, or orbits that will have more value than others. There are probably only so many space objects that can safely occupy a given location, trajectory, or orbit at the same time. For orbits, this is sometimes called “orbital carrying capacity.” The Artemis Accords somewhat address this issue by creating safety zones, though the original intention of safety zones was to prevent harmful interference from one nation’s space activity on another nation’s space mission.</p> +<ul> + <li>Technologies, Products, and Services</li> +</ul> -<p>In cislunar space, many users will probably want to operate around the Earth–Moon Lagrange points, particularly L1 and L2. Though only points in empty space, the Lagrange points are special due to the gravitational balance between the Moon and Earth at these locations. Spacecraft can orbit these points using a Lissajous orbit or halo orbit. Halo orbits associated with the L2 point are particularly useful because they provide a spacecraft a continuous line of sight to Earth and the far side of the Moon. Orbits associated with the L1 point are useful because they provide a spacecraft a continuous line of sight to both Earth and the near side of the Moon.</p> +<p>Japan has a long history of implementing robust IoT security measures. In 2019, the government-led NOTICE project, which scans IoT devices connected to the internet in Japan to identify vulnerable devices and report them to users for remediation, launched in cooperation with the private sector. In addition, in 2020, the technical standard for devices connected to the internet was revised to mandate minimum security requirements for devices. Security measures are being implemented for both devices before introduction to the market and those already deployed. Most recently, METI has led discussions to introduce an IoT-labeling scheme similar to that in the United States. The program is expected to be partially launched during FY 2024. A working group will be established between the governments of the United States and Japan to develop an action plan for the mutual recognition of schemes.</p> -<p>In addition to orbits associated with Earth–Moon Lagrange points, space in low lunar orbit (LLO) around the Moon will also be valuable. Only certain inclinations in LLO are stable. Finally, the “peaks of eternal light” — the locations near the lunar poles exposed to the most sunlight each day — will also be valuable because they will be the best locations to build solar power infrastructure.</p> +<p>Secure by design and secure by default is also a key theme in Japan. The Japanese government is a cosignatory to the joint guidance on secure by design issued in October 2023 by international partners, including CISA. In the area of SBOM, METI has developed guidance on SBOM implementation based on the results of a multiyear testing project. MIC is also studying the use of SBOM in the communications sector, conducting a pilot project to install SBOM in selected facilities of communications carriers to evaluate its effectiveness and identify any issues that may arise.</p> -<p>Due to this legal uncertainty, there is currently no framework for adjudicating competing national claims to valuable locations in cislunar space, such as halo orbits associated with the Earth–Moon L2 Lagrange point or high-value crater-ridge real estate (i.e., peaks of eternal light) on the Moon. There is also no universally agreed-to framework among all spacefaring nations on the legality of exploiting lunar resources such as ice and minerals. To date, nations have extracted small amounts of material from the lunar surface for analysis, sometimes bringing those samples back to Earth. But the salient question is how to address space resource use at scale, potentially for commercial gain. There is no space equivalent to the ISA for internationally licensing and regulating resource extraction (though the Moon Agreement would have established such a mechanism). This ambiguity creates significant uncertainty for legal protections for space activities and may hinder private sector space investments.</p> +<p>Regarding AI, the Hiroshima AI Process, a Group of Seven (G7)-led initiative to develop international rules for the use of AI, was launched at the G7 Hiroshima Summit in May 2023. Japan, as the chairing country, led the discussion. In December 2023, the Hiroshima AI Process Comprehensive Policy Framework, Hiroshima Process International Guiding Principles for All AI Actors, and Hiroshima Process International Code of Conduct for Organizations Developing Advanced AI Systems were developed as deliverables of the Hiroshima AI Process. Within the government, there is a growing focus on the use of AI with safety and security. In February 2024, the Japan AI Safety Institute (AISI) was established. In April 2024, the AI Guidelines for Business was published, consolidating AI-related guidance previously dispersed across multiple agencies. The Japan AISI and NIST have completed a mapping of the AI Guidelines for Business and the NIST AI Risk Management Framework to ensure consistency with international discussions and to promote interoperability of AI policy frameworks between the United States and Japan.</p> -<p>Most nations, including the United States, did not support the approach taken by the Moon Agreement on space resources. The United States criticized UNCLOS and the Moon Agreement for designating a region as the “common heritage of all mankind” as counter to free market principles. This language was a main reason the United States decided not to ratify UNCLOS. Opponents of the Moon Treaty also expressed concerns that one of the goals of the agreement’s proposed regulatory regime would be equitable sharing of benefits from lunar resources, as they worried this approach could disadvantage private sector initiatives. This precedent suggests that a workable international framework for distributing space resources should not mirror such an approach.</p> +<ul> + <li>Workforce</li> +</ul> -<p>To address the ambiguity of the OST language, the United States asserts through the Artemis Accords that the extraction and utilization of space resources does not inherently constitute national appropriation and can be accomplished in compliance with the OST. By signing the Artemis Accords, many other nations have supported this interpretation. But there is no international consensus on the term “space resource,” which does not appear in the OST text. As noted earlier, COPUOS has established a special working group to discuss the legal uncertainties around the term.</p> +<p>The 2021 national Cybersecurity Strategy highlights the need for a more robust cybersecurity workforce in terms of both quality and quantity through cooperation between the public and private sectors. This is one of the cross-cutting measures in the strategy to secure and train human resources. Cybersecurity-related agencies are implementing specific measures. For instance, MIC/NICT has operated the National Cyber Training Center since 2017. The center offers a range of training programs, including hands-on practical exercises for government agencies, local governments, and critical infrastructure owners and operators, as well as technical R&amp;D programs to train young people and practical defense exercises intended for national events such as the Olympics and World Expo. In 2017, METI and IPA established the Industrial Cyber Security Center of Excellence, which offers a one-year program to train IT and operational technology professionals with technology, management, and business perspectives. The lecturers are world-leading experts in control system security.</p> -<p>As another reference, the Antarctic Treaty System currently bans commercial resource extraction from Antarctica, though there was a failed attempt in the 1980s to add a new agreement establishing a mineral extraction regime. But the Antarctic Treaty never claimed that Antarctica was the common heritage of humankind. Spectrum is another finite resource, albeit somewhat different from seabed minerals or Antarctic oil deposits. To optimize the use of spectrum, the ITU facilitates international coordination — but does not license spectrum, a role performed by national regulators.</p> +<p>Regarding industry-led initiatives, a cross-industry cybersecurity study group has been active since 2015, with participation from companies in the critical infrastructure sectors. It has been engaged in discussions on how to strengthen the human resources ecosystem through collaboration between industry, academia, and government. The group has developed a reference defining human resources that aligns with NIST SP800-181, while taking into account the organizational structure and business practices of Japanese companies.</p> -<p>Ultimately, though the United States has made clear it has no intention of claiming territory in space, whether on the Moon or anywhere else, its position on the use of space resources and concepts like safety zones could be disingenuously used by China and Russia to grab territory, claiming they were only following U.S. precedent. Opening this door has the potential to create a rush to claim resources, which effectively means claims on associated lunar real estate by designating safety zones. This is exactly what the OST aimed to prevent, as well as what the Antarctic Treaty, the UNCLOS through the ISA, and the ITU sought to avoid in their own domains.</p> +<h3 id="current-status-of-japan-us-cooperation">Current Status of Japan-U.S. Cooperation</h3> -<h4 id="space-rules-of-the-road">SPACE RULES OF THE ROAD</h4> +<h4 id="japan-as-a-trusted-partner">Japan as a Trusted Partner</h4> -<p>The main reason to develop rules of the road for space, including cislunar space, is to prevent collisions between space objects. In the sea domain, this was the same goal that drove the development and introduction of the COLREGs designed to prevent collisions of ships. There is no internationally agreed-to set of rules or regulations on spacecraft behaviors or collision avoidance, though some nongovernmental organizations — such as the Space Safety Coalition, which has international participation — have put forward guidelines for space behaviors.</p> +<p>The United States is an important ally of Japan, and both countries have had a long-standing alliance built on mutual trust and cooperation for many years. While the alliance covers a wide range of areas, including national and economic security, many of today’s cooperative activities rely on cyberspace as their foundation. For instance, the digital infrastructure that serves as the foundation for intelligence and information sharing; Japan’s critical infrastructure, which U.S. military bases in Japan depend on; the supply chain that broadly covers both countries, including the defense industry; and the international business environment are all closely related to cyberspace. It is, therefore, essential to ensure the security and resilience of cyberspace if the two countries are to facilitate effective cooperation.</p> -<p>The only reference to space behaviors is contained in Article IX of the OST. This section stipulates that treaty parties must conduct their space activities “with due regard to the corresponding interests of all other States Parties to the treaty” and should consult with each other in cases where one nation’s activities could “cause potentially harmful interference” to another’s. As with other terms used in the OST, there is no definition of “due regard” or “harmful interference” in the text and no treaty-specific mechanism or venue to provide the needed clarifications.</p> +<p>The recent rise in geopolitical tensions in the Indo-Pacific region and the increasing cyber threats posed by state-sponsored actors make Japan’s position in cybersecurity increasingly important. It is also important to note that a robust cybersecurity partnership between the United States and Japan, like-minded countries that share the common values of the Free and Open Indo-Pacific, serves as deterrence against these foreign adversaries.</p> -<p>Outside the United Nations, the United States has tried to make progress on space safety through the Artemis Accords. Helpfully, the Artemis Accords establish a “safety zone” concept — originally envisioned by the Hague Space Resources Working Group Building Blocks — intended to prevent harmful interference between national space activities. However, the Artemis Accords do not create new obligations for parties to the OST, which already requires signatories to coordinate when they expect “harmful interference” — a term that remains undefined in either treaty.</p> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">The recent rise in geopolitical tensions in the Indo-Pacific region and the increasing cyber threats posed by state-sponsored actors make Japan’s position in cybersecurity increasingly important.</code></em></strong></p> -<p>The long-term sustainability guidelines developed by COPUOS could help shape future efforts to develop COLREG-like rules for space, but the guidelines themselves lack the required specificity to serve as rules of the road for space operations. The ATLAC recently established by COPUOS also could develop the foundation for future rules of the road for lunar space activities.</p> +<p>There are multiple public reports that assess Japan’s national cybersecurity capabilities, and each has a different methodology for its assessment. It is, therefore, important to have an in-depth understanding of the assessment methodologies when citing these reports. The author views Japan’s national cybersecurity capabilities as being on par with those of other like-minded countries. For example, the National Cyber Power Index 2022 assesses countries based on a range of indicators, including malicious activities such as external destructive attacks, reconnaissance, and financial crimes. Japan, with a low score in such indicators, is ranked 16th among all 30 countries. The report’s overall evaluation is based on two major elements: the cyber capabilities of a nation and its intentions to exercise those capabilities, including misuse. Japan is categorized as a nation with high capabilities and low intentions. In particular, Japan’s capabilities in the area of commercial cybersecurity technology and R&amp;D, which is one of the evaluation indicators, are rated highly. Similarly, in Cyber Capabilities and National Power, Japan is not ranked in the top category, but it is still evaluated as “a world leader in cyberspace technologies.” This indicates that cybersecurity technology and capabilities in the private sector are highly regarded. A security firm’s survey found that only 32 percent of organizations in Japan paid a ransom in 2023 after being infected with ransomware. The average rate across 15 countries, including the United States and Japan, was 54 percent, with the United States at 77 percent. The report indicates that Japan’s relatively low rate may be due to the nature of Japan as a disaster-prone country and the implementation of advanced backup measures to mitigate such risks. This could be another example of the advanced technological capabilities of Japanese companies, with their thorough preparedness in normal times and ability to quickly respond to and recover from incidents.</p> -<h3 id="cislunar-operational-and-infrastructure-challenges">CISLUNAR OPERATIONAL AND INFRASTRUCTURE CHALLENGES</h3> +<p>Furthermore, Japan has achieved remarkable success in cyber operations, with no significant incidents during national events that can often be attractive targets for global attackers. These include the Tokyo 2020 Summer Olympics and Paralympic Games, the 2019 Rugby World Cup, the 2019 G20 Summit, and the 2023 G7 Summit. In particular, more than 450 million attack events were observed during the Tokyo 2020 Summer Olympics, which was more than twice the number observed during the London 2012 Summer Olympics, but through the implementation of appropriate measures, the games were able to conclude without any major incidents. This success was made possible by the significant contribution of Japanese companies with advanced technological capabilities as well as the close PPPs. Furthermore, in January 2023, NTT, a major Japanese telecommunications operator, became the first Asian member of JCDC in the United States. This could be further evidence of the high level of capability and international credibility of Japanese companies.</p> -<p>There are several cislunar operational and infrastructure challenges that, if unaddressed, will cause increasingly significant impediments to the safety, sustainability, and efficiency of cislunar operations. Though some of these challenges result from a lack of physical infrastructure and equipment needed to support a sustained crewed and uncrewed lunar presence, others stem from gaps in coordination mechanisms and agreed-to processes for operating in cislunar space. This section outlines several of these challenges, attempting to describe specifically whether the problem stems primarily from inadequate infrastructure or a lack of operator coordination processes.</p> +<p>The NSS of Japan demonstrates the government’s strong intention to fundamentally enhance national cybersecurity capabilities with sufficient authorities and resources. This is not only a strategic goal for Japan but also a strong commitment to the international community, especially like-minded countries. The implementation of this strategy is expected to facilitate robust and operational public-private bidirectional cooperation by further enhancing government capabilities and deepening the engagement of the private sector for national cybersecurity. This nationwide evolution will significantly enhance Japan-U.S. cybersecurity cooperation.</p> -<h4 id="space-situational-awareness">SPACE SITUATIONAL AWARENESS</h4> +<h4 id="existing-framework">Existing Framework</h4> -<p>Fundamentally, SSA is knowledge of the current and predicted future locations of objects in space. Objects in space can be detected and tracked using a variety of sensors, such as radar, optical, laser-ranging, and radio-frequency (RF) technologies. Terrestrial radar systems are typically used for detecting and tracking objects in LEO, including operational and non-operational spacecraft and debris fragments. For GEO, terrestrial optical telescopes are usually used for detecting and tracking objects, as radar signals are usually not powerful enough to track objects at such distances. Satellites equipped with optical sensors and cameras can also provide SSA data. Since virtually all operational spacecraft emit RF signals, RF receivers on Earth or other spacecraft can be used to detect and track active spacecraft in all orbits.</p> +<p>Cybersecurity has been identified as a key area of cooperation for the Japan-U.S. alliance. At the summit level, cybersecurity cooperation is regarded as a foundation for expanding and deepening security and defense cooperation. The joint statement issued in April 2024 highlighted the two countries’ commitment to strengthening cooperation in the areas of information and cybersecurity, as well as critical infrastructure protection. The U.S.-Japan Competitiveness and Resilience (CoRe) Partnership, a collaborative framework between the two countries agreed at the Japan-U.S. Summit in April 2021, identifies cybersecurity and critical infrastructure resilience as key areas of cooperation, along with the digital economy and economic security. Similarly, at the Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee (“2+2”) held in July 2024, the two countries reaffirmed “the foundational importance of cyber and information security for the Alliance,” as well as “the importance of enhancing the cybersecurity of critical infrastructure.”</p> -<p>In addition to data derived from these sensor systems, many satellites are equipped with GPS receivers, allowing operators to know the precise location of their satellites at any time. Some operators choose to share location information for their satellites with other operators, government entities, or third parties such as the Space Data Association, an international nongovernmenal organization that facilitates operator-to-operator information sharing.</p> +<p>There are several government-wide bilateral dialogue frameworks in place. The Japan-U.S. Cyber Dialogue has been in place since 2013, with Japan’s MOFA and the U.S. DOS leading discussions on a wide range of topics, including situational awareness, cyber policy, cooperation in international fora, and capacity building. These discussions are attended by representatives from multiple government agencies with cybersecurity responsibilities from both countries. The U.S.-Japan Dialogue on the Digital Economy, formerly the U.S.-Japan Policy Cooperation Dialogue on the Internet Economy, has been held on a regular basis since 2010. The dialogue addresses a wide range of policy issues related to the digital economy, including cybersecurity. The dialogue, led by MIC and the DOS, is composed of two parts: an intergovernmental meeting and a public-private meeting. This meeting is also designed to serve as a framework to promote the CoRe Partnership. Furthermore, the U.S.-Japan Cyber Defense Policy Working Group, an intergovernmental cyber dialogue focused on defense policy, has been held since 2014 between MOD and the DOD. Other interagency dialogues and cooperative efforts are also underway, such as the memorandum of cooperation on cybersecurity signed between DHS and METI in January 2023.</p> -<p>All these SSA technologies were designed to track objects in lower Earth orbits, though most could be used for tracking objects in cislunar space. For example, terrestrial optical telescopes and RF sensors could track operational spacecraft. Spacecraft with optical sensors and cameras in cislunar space could likely also be used for cislunar SSA purposes. However, just as it is not feasible to use radar for tracking objects in GEO, power requirements make it difficult to use terrestrial radar systems to track cislunar objects. Laser-ranging systems might be feasible for tracking objects in cislunar space.</p> +<p>Regarding the multilateral framework, the Quad has established a cooperation agenda in cybersecurity, focusing on four key areas: critical infrastructure cybersecurity, supply chain risk management, software security, and human resource development and training. This is known as the Quad Cybersecurity Partnership: Joint Principles. The topics have been regularly discussed among senior government cyber officials through the Quad Senior Cyber Group. At the Quad Foreign Ministers’ Meeting held in Tokyo in July 2024, the four member countries announced the establishment of the Quad Cyber Ambassadors Meeting to discuss the cyber capacity-building projects in the Indo-Pacific region and responsible state behavior in cyberspace. Furthermore, the United States, Japan, and South Korea have been working together through the Trilateral Diplomacy Working Group for Foreign Ministry Cooperation on North Korea’s Cyber Threats since December 2023. The NCS of the United States also emphasizes the importance of international cooperation, leveraging frameworks such as the Quad and the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity. At the G7, it has been confirmed that the seven countries should pursue four key approaches through the Cyber Working Group: (1) “promoting responsible state behavior,” (2) “improving cybersecurity, including in the private sector,” (3) “developing and using tools to deter and respond to malicious (state) behavior” and disrupt the attacker’s infrastructure, and (4) “strengthening our partners’ cyber security capacity.” The group has also agreed to work on countering ransomware, developing critical infrastructure cybersecurity and resilience, mutual recognition of schemes for secure IoT devices, and secure by design. At the United Nations, both the United States and Japan have taken the position that existing international law applies to cyberspace and have engaged in discussions to reinforce cyber norms of responsible state behavior. In recent years, following Japan’s official membership in the NATO CCDCOE, there has been an increase in the level of cooperation between the United States and Japan in multilateral cyber exercises. At the NATO Summit in Washington, D.C., in July 2024, NATO and its Indo-Pacific partner countries, including Japan, confirmed their intention to enhance practical cooperation in four key areas, including cyber defense. In the White House-led CRI, Japan, as an original member, has also contributed to international initiatives to counter ransomware.</p> -<p>An object in GEO can be tracked by an optical telescope or RF receiver at a fixed location on Earth’s surface. Objects in LEO are tracked by ground-based radars that do not maintain positive custody of each tracked object as it orbits Earth. Rather, an object’s position is confirmed when it passes over a radar site. At all other times, its position is predicted based on Keplerian orbital dynamics.</p> +<p>With regard to cooperation in industry, for example, ICT-ISAC Japan and Communications ISAC/IT-ISAC in the United States have been cooperating since 2016. The ISAC members have been exchanging threat information and best practices, as well as discussing operational collaboration, through regularly scheduled workshops. In 2019, a memorandum of cooperation was also signed between ICT-ISAC Japan and IT-ISAC to further strengthen cooperation. Furthermore, other collaborative efforts between ISACs in both countries are in place in key sectors such as finance and electricity.</p> -<p>Irrespective of the sensor phenomenology, detecting and tracking objects in cislunar space requires, at a minimum, a network of terrestrial sensors located around the globe. Unlike objects in GEO, whose orbital period is the same as Earth’s rotation, objects in cislunar space, as well as in LEO and medium Earth orbit (MEO), orbit Earth at a rate different from the speed at which Earth revolves on its axis.</p> +<p>While there are several policy cooperation initiatives between Japan and the United States at various levels and entities, there is still room for improvement in the actual implementation of these items. In recent years, there has been an increase in practical cooperation between both governments, including the release of joint guidance and advisories, law enforcement coordination, and capacity-building support in third countries. While this is a positive development, the number of such efforts would not necessarily be as large as that of the various cooperation agendas described above. There is still much to be done. To achieve deeper collaboration between the two countries, it is essential to operationalize and accelerate these agendas with greater involvement of the private sector.</p> -<p>Objects in LEO and MEO orbit Earth at a speed faster than the rotation of Earth on its axis, while objects in cislunar orbit at a slower rate than Earth’s rotation. Terrestrial sensors tracking objects in cislunar space need to hand off and receive custody of tracked objects as cislunar space rotates from and into the sensors’ fields of view. Detecting and tracking objects in cislunar space will require a new approach that differs from the ones used for LEO, MEO, and GEO objects. Additionally, the power requirements for ground-based radar to reach cislunar space would likely rule out its use for detecting and tracking cislunar objects.</p> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">To achieve deeper collaboration between the two countries, it is essential to operationalize and accelerate these agendas with greater involvement of the private sector.</code></em></strong></p> -<p>Finally, any Earth-based sensor would lose custody of objects in lunar orbit as they transit around the side of the Moon that is always facing away from Earth. Given that the rotational period of an object in stable lunar orbit is as little as two hours, it would be possible to quickly reacquire the position of space objects once they reappear on the Earth-facing side. Keplerian orbital dynamics would apply to stable lunar orbits, so it would be possible to predict the position of objects during transit around the Moon’s far side.</p> +<h3 id="cooperation-on-critical-infrastructure-cybersecurity-and-resilience">Cooperation on Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity and Resilience</h3> -<h4 id="space-object-tracking-and-traffic-coordination">SPACE OBJECT TRACKING AND TRAFFIC COORDINATION</h4> +<h4 id="global-challenges">Global Challenges</h4> -<p>The DoD began tracking and cataloging satellites with the launch of Sputnik in 1957. In the 1960s, it started developing mathematical equations and source code used to predict the positions of satellites in Earth orbit. By the 1970s, the DoD and NASA adopted a standardized model and the two-line element (TLE) set format for space object tracking and position predictions. After the public release of the models, the TLE format became the industry standard for predicting satellite position.</p> +<p>This and subsequent chapters shift the focus of discussions to critical infrastructure cybersecurity and resilience, which is one of the priority areas for Japan-U.S. cooperation. In light of the growing threats to critical infrastructure, it has become increasingly important for nations to ensure the cybersecurity and resilience of critical infrastructure, which people and nations rely on every day. This is a universal challenge for governments worldwide, requiring cooperation with a wide range of domestic and international stakeholders.</p> -<p>Today, TLE datasets are used for various purposes. In conjunction with operator-to-operator information and maneuver plan sharing, government and private sector satellite operators use TLE data for planning and managing daily satellite operations. Militaries use TLE data to track the satellites and spacecraft of other nations as part of SSA operations. Astronomers and amateur space object trackers on Earth use TLE datasets to plan space observations. Launch operators and government and commercial operators planning on-orbit activities also use TLE data for planning purposes.</p> +<p>The majority of infrastructure is owned and operated by private companies, and they are primarily responsible for protecting their own organizations. At the same time, the government plays a key role in empowering them through various means, including its own intelligence, law enforcement authorities, international coordination, policy tools (e.g., grants, incentives), and regulations, as infrastructure cybersecurity is a matter of national defense. Private companies also cooperate with the government in providing technical and operational expertise with their unique threat and risk information, as well as cybersecurity products and services. This is a shared responsibility among a diverse range of stakeholders.</p> -<p>Keplerian orbital mechanics, used to model objects in GEO or lower orbits, assume any two objects with mass — for example, Earth and a spacecraft — will impact each other’s orbital position. This is called a “two-body problem.” Unlike objects in these lower orbits, objects in cislunar space are also affected by the mass and gravity of the Moon. This is called a “three-body problem.” This means that cislunar trajectories cannot be effectively approximated or predicted using equations designed for Keplerian orbital mechanics. Object predictions from models used today for objects in GEO or lower orbits would remain accurate for only a very short period because the TLE format and its underlying equations are not suitable for non-Keplerian, three-body-problem conditions.</p> +<p>Furthermore, international cooperation is also essential, given the global nature of cyberspace. The fundamental principle is, of course, that nations should cooperate to reinforce international cyber norms of responsible state behavior. However, in practice, this approach alone cannot address all issues. There are a number of other considerations that leave room for international cooperation, including infrastructure interdependencies, global supply chains, regulatory harmonization, and the resilience of like-minded countries as a whole. These are still developing areas of discussion. No country is yet perfect, and all are still developing through a process of trial and error. Given the global nature of these challenges, it is imperative that countries work together to address them.</p> -<p>Since 2011, NASA has relied on the Multimission Automated Deepspace Conjunction Assessment Process (MADCAP), managed by the Jet Propulsion Laboratory, to assess the risks of collision for spacecraft orbiting the Moon and Mars. Given the lack of SSA infrastructure beyond GEO, the positions of spacecraft orbiting the Moon and Mars are provided by operators using radiometric tracking involving ground-based antennas. Some scientists are also trying to use very long baseline interferometry (VLBI) to track objects in cislunar space. Both of these techniques require that the object being tracked emit a radio signal, so this method could not be used to track non-operational satellites or inert space debris or fragments.</p> +<h4 id="opportunity-for-japan-us-alliance">Opportunity for Japan-U.S. Alliance</h4> -<h4 id="positioning-navigation-and-timing">POSITIONING, NAVIGATION, AND TIMING</h4> +<p>As previously stated, the Japan-U.S. alliance is founded on cyberspace, with critical infrastructure being a central element of this. For instance, there are interdependencies in critical infrastructure between the two countries. The failure of essential national functions, such as power, communications, and transportation, directly impacts information and intelligence sharing between the two countries, as well as the transportation of goods and personnel for defense. In addition, globally interconnected infrastructures such as the internet can rapidly propagate the effects of a failure in one country to others. Both countries have world-class internet service providers (ISPs), which account for approximately half of the world’s Tier 1 carriers. These companies have a significant impact on the global network infrastructure.</p> -<p>Currently, global PNT data from satellites is provided by four different navigation satellite systems: the United States’ GPS, Russia’s Global Navigation Satellite System (GLONASS), China’s BeiDou Navigation Satellite System, and the European Union’s Galileo. The systems are all located in MEO at altitudes between 19,000 kilometers and 24,000 kilometers. There are also two regional PNT systems: the Indian Regional Navigation Satellite System (NavIC) and Japan’s Quasi-Zenith Satellite System (QZSS).</p> +<p>Today, the United States and Japan are facing a common significant threat to their critical infrastructure. In January 2024, the heads of ONCD, CISA, the FBI, and USCYBERCOM testified at a hearing of the House Select Committee on the Chinese Communist Party, warning of the threat posed by suspected Chinese-sponsored actors known as Volt Typhoon. The group has been targeting U.S. critical infrastructure, with a particular focus on the nation’s essential sectors, including communications, energy, transportation, and water. This is being done through tactics known as “living off the land,” where the attacker gains access to infrastructure and remains undetected for an extended period of time to pre-position itself to immediately trigger a destructive action in the event of an emergency. This is not only a threat to the United States but also to Japan, a U.S. ally in the Indo-Pacific region. This is an extremely deep-rooted problem, with such activities expected to continue for at least five years. Even the United States, which is at the center of the problem, has not yet been able to fully “uncover and eradicate” the threat. In light of this common threat posed by advanced state-sponsored actors, it is imperative that allied countries leverage their respective information and expertise to jointly analyze the threat and risk and develop countermeasures. It is also crucial to ensure that Japan and the United States can collectively respond to such activities in order to maintain the resilience of their alliance as a whole in the event of an attack.</p> -<p>Since these satellite networks are designed to provide PNT data to terrestrial users, their signals are directed toward Earth and not deep space. Unless PNT signals are received on Earth and redirected into cislunar space or PNT satellite systems are redesigned to transmit into space as well as toward Earth, spacecraft in cislunar space would need some other way to reliably determine their position and establish timing. As described in earlier chapters, the United States, China, and Europe have plans to create lunar PNT infrastructure.</p> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">It is also crucial to ensure that Japan and the United States can collectively respond to such activities in order to maintain the resilience of their alliance as a whole in the event of an attack.</code></em></strong></p> -<p>It is worth recalling that the Apollo missions were able to use two different navigation methods on their journeys to the Moon and back. Their main source of navigation data came from radio signals exchanged between the Apollo spacecraft and ground stations on Earth. The position of the Apollo Command Module could be calculated by measuring the Doppler shift of signals from the spacecraft, transmitting and analyzing ranging signals sent to the spacecraft, and using two receivers on Earth to conduct VLBI analysis on Apollo signals. Additionally, the Apollo spacecraft were equipped with inertial guidance systems, which do not require external signals to operate. For Artemis missions, NASA’s Orion capsule uses an inertial guidance system, GPS receivers, star-tracking technology, and an optical camera-based navigation system. Like Apollo, Orion — or any cislunar spacecraft emitting radio signals — can be tracked from Earth using VLBI techniques.</p> +<p>Both governments recognize the importance of Japan-U.S. cooperation in the field of critical infrastructure and have made it a high priority on the agendas of the Japan-U.S. Summit, bilateral cyber dialogue, and the Quad. However, both countries’ efforts tend to focus on domestic issues, and concrete and tangible operational collaboration between the two countries is not necessarily sufficient. As previously stated, Japan and the United States have recently been implementing more practical cooperation initiatives, but there is still a need for both countries to further expand these efforts and operationalize them with speed and scale while ensuring greater involvement of critical infrastructure owners and operators in both countries.</p> -<p>In addition to the provision of real-time data on position, a spatial reference and associated coordinate system is needed for both cislunar space and the surface of the Moon to precisely measure locations within the given reference framework. A three-dimensional reference system would be needed for cislunar space, while a two-dimensional system would suffice for the lunar surface.</p> +<h4 id="recent-developments">Recent Developments</h4> -<p>Commonly used for objects in Earth orbit, an Earth-fixed coordinate system using x, y, and z measurements from Earth’s center could be used for objects in cislunar space. Alternatively, a Moon-fixed coordinate system could be created using x, y, and z measurements from the center of the Moon. Either a spherical coordinate system using latitude and longitude or a standardized Cartesian coordinate system that models the Moon as a flat plane would work for the Moon’s surface. An example of a Cartesian coordinate system used for Earth is the Universal Transverse Mercator. Currently, the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, NASA, the U.S. Geological Survey, and the U.S. Space Force are collaborating on an effort to design a reference system for the Moon.</p> +<p>This section outlines frameworks and efforts related to critical infrastructure cybersecurity and resilience in the United States and Japan, with a focus on recent developments.</p> -<p>In addition to the difficulties receiving timing data from GPS or other existing PNT systems in cislunar space, time itself behaves differently on the Moon due to the theory of relativity. The motion of the Moon relative to Earth, as well as its lower gravity, means that time actually moves 56 microseconds faster on the Moon than on Earth each day. While this difference may seem unimportant on the surface, precision time measured to nanoseconds is typically needed for navigation. Even if the moon had its own PNT constellation, potentially like what ESA envisioned as part of its Moonlight initiative, there would still be a 56-microsecond discrepancy per day between lunar time and Earth time. In April 2024, as part of the National Cislunar Science and Technology Strategy, the White House directed NASA to lead and coordinate with other federal agencies on efforts to establish a lunar time standard.</p> +<p><em>THE UNITED STATES</em></p> -<h4 id="debris-and-detritus">DEBRIS AND DETRITUS</h4> +<ul> + <li>Basic Strategy and Policy</li> +</ul> -<p>Only 12 humans have been to the Moon, but humankind has already left a significant amount of trash on the lunar surface. The current tally includes boosters from over 50 crashed landings, almost 100 bags of human waste, and miscellaneous items such as golf balls, boots, and a feather. In total, it is about 200 tons of trash.</p> +<p>The fundamental policy framework for critical infrastructure protection is based on NSM-22. This memorandum replaced PPD-21 of 2013, making the first update to the framework in 11 years. The document is also intended to formalize the efforts made by the U.S. government during this period. This includes defining the role and responsibilities of CISA as the national coordinator for critical infrastructure protection, which did not exist at the time, as well as defining the role and responsibilities of the SRMAs. This requires SRMAs to conduct sector-specific risk assessments and develop sector-specific risk management plans every two years. CISA/DHS is required to conduct cross-sector risk assessments based on input from the SRMAs and develop a National Infrastructure Risk Management Plan (NIRMP) every two years. It is assumed that the National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) 2013, developed under PPD-21, will remain effective until the release of NIRMP, which is due by April 2025. NSM-22 also requires the development of minimum cybersecurity and resilience requirements for critical infrastructure and the implementation of these requirements using regulatory and other authorities. In addition, it requires the government to understand critical infrastructure interdependencies, analyze systemic risk, identify systemically important entities (SIEs), and enhance collaboration with the intelligence community, including the timely sharing of declassified information.</p> -<p>To date, according to experts, there are only a few dozen pieces of human-made space debris in cislunar space. But it may prove difficult to keep debris levels low, as there are no internationally agreed-to, end-of-life disposal guidelines for spacecraft operating in cislunar space and no standard debris-mitigation procedures. Additionally cislunar operators are already facing increased collision risks between the few spacecraft in lunar orbit, heightening the risk that collisions produce debris fragments. A lack of agreed-to, cislunar, operator-to-operator, space-safety, coordination, and data-sharing mechanisms — particularly ones that include China — probably leads to increasing collision risk and debris-fragment creation.</p> +<p>In June 2024, DHS released the Strategic Guidance and National Priorities for U.S. Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience. This guidance aligns with NSM-22 and identifies risk areas that the nation should prioritize over the next two years to build secure and resilient critical infrastructure. The priority areas include addressing cyber threats posed by China, managing the evolving risks presented by AI, and identifying and mitigating supply chain vulnerabilities. The document then outlines the priorities for mitigating those risks, including adopting baseline requirements, incentivizing service providers to reduce risk, and identifying SIEs.</p> -<p>Any debris fragments near the Earth–Moon L 4 and L5 Lagrange points might produce particularly acute risks to cislunar operators in these areas. At these stable equilibria, balanced gravitational forces trap both natural and artificial debris into clouds, posing physical risks to satellites stationed at or around these points. This same problem does not exist at L1, L2, or L3, all of which are unstable equilibria and thus allow debris to dissipate more easily.</p> +<p>The National Cyber Incident Response Plan (NCIRP) was developed in 2016 as a document outlining a national approach to addressing large-scale cyber incidents. In accordance with the NCS, CISA is currently leading the revision of this plan, which is scheduled for release by the end of 2024. The U.S. critical infrastructure protection effort is in the midst of a major renewal, with anticipated developments over the next year.</p> -<h4 id="radiation">RADIATION</h4> +<ul> + <li>Sectors</li> +</ul> -<p>Objects in cislunar space are exposed to higher levels of solar radiation (also called “solar energetic particles”) and cosmic radiation (also called “galactic cosmic rays”) than those experienced nearer to Earth, posing a risk to microelectronics and human safety. Unprotected by either an appreciable atmosphere or magnetic field, the lunar surface is battered by intense solar radiation when facing the Sun.</p> +<p>NSM-22 defines 16 critical infrastructure sectors and SRMAs for the sectors (Figure 4). While there has been discussion about whether cloud infrastructure, on which all sectors depend, and space systems, which have become more strategic for both commercial and military use, should be added as new sectors, NSM-22 does not change the sector designation of the previous directive. However, NSM-22 requires DHS to develop recommendations for the president regarding the list of critical infrastructure sectors and subsectors, leaving the potential for future designation.</p> -<p>Due to the orbit of the Lunar Gateway around the Moon, it will be positioned in interplanetary space 80 percent of the time. This is a very different environment than near-Earth orbit — the location of every other long-term habitable space station to date, where the main source of radiation is the inner Van Allen belt, produced when cosmic radiation interacts with Earth’s magnetic field. When compared to past stations, the Lunar Gateway will experience notably higher levels and greater intensities of cosmic radiation, which has a higher relative biological effectiveness (i.e., to what extent a dose of radiation affects human tissue) than Van Allen–belt radiation.</p> +<p>There is a wide range of sector types, from those with strict cybersecurity regulations to those with few such regulations, and the maturity of cybersecurity varies from sector to sector. Even within a sector, there is a large gap in maturity between large and small companies. The government has identified water, healthcare, and K-12 educational institutions as sectors that are particularly vulnerable to attack and under-resourced. It is, therefore, providing support through the provision of sector-specific guidance and shared services. The significant cyber incident at Change Healthcare in February 2024, which reportedly affected the patient records of one in three Americans and had a broad impact on the entire sector, was a clear example of the urgent need to elevate the cybersecurity posture of these sectors. This has led to accelerated discussions on the development of minimum cybersecurity requirements and legislation in the healthcare sector. The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), as the SRMA, has also published a sector-specific strategy that includes setting sector-specific performance goals, encouraging best practices, and providing financial support and incentives to strengthen sector-wide cybersecurity. The water sector has also been engaged in discussions on developing cybersecurity requirements and regulations in light of the widespread cyberattacks by Iranian-supported actors as well as growing concerns about being a potential target of Volt Typhoon.</p> -<p>Microelectronics can unexpectedly fail if they are not appropriately designed to withstand the expected levels of radiation in cislunar space. In July 2024, NASA revealed that microelectronics in the Europa Clipper spacecraft probably do not have sufficient radiation hardening to survive the radiation environment around Jupiter; however, NASA later cleared the spacecraft for launch, determining it could withstand the expected radiation. Meanwhile, Firefly’s first CLPS mission, slated for launch in 2024, will carry the RadPC-Lunar payload, a radiation-tolerant computing system built under the LSITP program, to test the architecture’s ability to operate in high-radiation environments.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/eIO1vYk.png" alt="image04" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 4: Critical Infrastructure Sectors in the United States.</strong> Source: Author’s compilation based on <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/2024/04/30/national-security-memorandum-on-critical-infrastructure-security-and-resilience/">“National Security Memorandum on Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience,” White House, April 30, 2024</a>.</em></p> -<p>Existing technologies can be used to shield equipment and spacecraft from radiation levels expected on and near the Moon; however, since shielding adds costs and weight, engineers designing lunar systems will need to carefully balance requirements for radiation protection with other considerations impacting overall system requirements.</p> +<ul> + <li>Structure of Information Sharing and Incident Response</li> +</ul> -<h4 id="lunar-regolith">LUNAR REGOLITH</h4> +<p>Figure 5 shows the nationwide information-sharing and incident response structure, including both public and private sectors, in relation to critical infrastructure. Please note that this figure is created based on publicly available information, including NCIRP, and has been generalized to provide a comprehensive overview rather than specific details. Therefore, it should be noted that the information provided may not be entirely precise or applicable to all cases.</p> -<p>The solid rock of the Moon’s surface is covered in regolith, a layer of loose, dust-like material composed of small, electrostatically charged particles made by meteor impacts. The average particle size of this lunar dust is about 72 micrometers. For comparison, the width of a human hair is on average about 100 micrometers and the size of a particle of grass pollen is about 25 micrometers. Medium-grain sand is about 500 micrometers in size.</p> +<p>CISA serves as the national coordinator for critical infrastructure protection. The National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center (NCCIC) within CISA serves as the operational center for critical infrastructure protection, coordinating and sharing information on vulnerabilities, incidents, risk mitigations, and others in cooperation with public and private organizations. The National Coordinating Center for Communications (NCC), under the NCCIC, monitors events affecting telecommunications services and infrastructure and leads incident response in cooperation with the United States Computer Emergency Readiness Team (US-CERT)/the Industrial Control Systems Cyber Emergency Response Team (ICS-CERT), government agencies, and private operators, mainly in the communications sector. Unlike other ISACs established independently in the private sector, the Communications ISAC is an operational function of NCC. It facilitates information sharing and analysis in the private sector while operating within the government. The Office of the National Coordinator, which serves as a single coordination point for SRMAs, will be established within CISA under the direction of NSM-22. The Cyber Threat Intelligence Integration Center (CTIIC) is operated by ODNI and serves as the central hub for cyber threat intelligence, integrating and analyzing information collected from intelligence communities such as the Central Intelligence Agency and the NSA to support incident response. NCIJTF is hosted by the FBI and serves as the primary coordinating body for law enforcement operations, including cybercriminal investigations and prosecutions. In the event of significant incidents, the Cyber Unified Coordination Group (UCG) is formed to facilitate the coordination of incident response among NCCIC, CTIIC, NCIJTF, and other relevant agencies. The Cyber Response Group, which is organized under the NSC, coordinates the incident response at the policy level. Sector-specific coordination is conducted through SRMAs.</p> -<p>As there is virtually no air on the moon, wind does not disturb the regolith. Rather, the regolith can be disturbed by electrical force (since it is composed of charged particles), micrometeoroid impacts, and engine landing and launch plumes. Due to the low gravity of the Moon and lack of air to slow down the particles by drag, engine plumes can eject regolith at very high speeds (measured in several kilometers per second) over very large distances. Additionally, these plume–surface interactions are presently poorly understood, making the effects that lunar landings may have on surrounding spacecraft unpredictable. A payload built by NASA flying aboard Firefly’s first CLPS mission, known as Stereo Cameras for Lunar Plume Surface Studies (SCALPSS) 1.1, will image the behavior of the regolith as the lander touches down on the Moon to better understand the surface effects of lunar landings. The collection of in situ data will complement NASA’s existing efforts to model and predict these interactions.</p> +<p>Each sector has a self-organized and self-governed SCC. It comprises critical infrastructure owners and operators, trade associations, and other relevant entities. SCC serves as the primary coordinating body within the sector, facilitating information sharing and the discussions of sector-specific strategies and risks. It also serves as a point of contact for the corresponding GCC and SRMA within the government. Cross-sector cooperation among SCCs is facilitated by the Critical Infrastructure Cross-Sector Council (CICSC). The Critical Infrastructure Partnership Advisory Council (CIPAC) serves as a framework for cross-sector cooperation between the public and private sectors (both SCCs and GCCs). Additionally, ISACs have been established in the private sector as industry-led organizations for day-to-day operational cooperation. There are more than 20 ISACs in the United States. While they are not necessarily mapped with sectors on a one-to-one basis, there is an ISAC that covers each sector, such as the Communications ISAC, Financial Services ISAC (FS-ISAC), Electricity ISAC (E-ISAC), and so on. NCI facilitates cross-sector operational cooperation among ISACs. These ISACs also cooperate with CISA and SRMAs at the operational level. Moreover, several cross-sector initiatives exist, such as JCDC, where major companies and government agencies engage in operational cooperation on specific issues. As outlined above, collaboration between critical infrastructure owners and operators and government agencies is being implemented at various levels, from strategic and planning aspects to operational aspects through various channels, including SCC and ISAC, as well as direct communication with CISA and SRMAs.</p> -<p>Previous operations on the Moon have demonstrated that regolith can harm electrical and mechanical systems. Lunar regolith and dust also pose a risk to humans, causing issues with respiration. Since the early days of the space race, operators of missions to the Moon have had to contend with the impacts of lunar regolith on their missions. In fact, as Apollo 17 commander Gene Cernan observed, “Dust is probably one of our greatest inhibitors to a nominal operation on the Moon.” Lunar activities that disturb and generate plumes of regolith have the potential to cause problems, especially in areas such as the lunar south pole, where there is expected to be a relatively high density of missions from a variety of nations.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/Jh0eb5j.png" alt="image05" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 5: Information-Sharing and Incident Response Structure in the United States.</strong> Source: Author’s analysis based on <a href="https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/2023-01/national_cyber_incident_response_plan.pdf">U.S. Department of Homeland Security, National Cyber Incident Response Plan (Washington, D.C.: DHS, December 2016)</a>.</em></p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/EGvAHGC.png" alt="image09" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 7: Regolith Size.</strong> Source: <a href="https://ntrs.nasa.gov/api/citations/20220008062/downloads/The%20Challenge%20of%20Lunar%20Dust%20-%20v4.pdf">Kristen John, “The Challenge of Lunar Dust,” NASA, June 8, 2022</a>.</em></p> +<ul> + <li>Public and Private Initiatives</li> +</ul> -<p>To address concerns about lunar dust, many experts cite the need for greater coordination between lunar operators to prevent harmful interference between space systems, particularly around spacecraft launch and landing sites. The concept of a safety zone enshrined in the Artemis Accords is one such effort to establish a coordination approach to mitigate impacts of lunar dust on lunar operations.</p> +<p>The United States has a long history of close PPPs in critical infrastructure protection, with a variety of collaborative initiatives currently in place. JCDC, one of the most notable initiatives in recent years, is a cross-sector, operational collaborative framework composed of key government agencies and selected private-sector companies. This enables members to share and analyze unique threat intelligence and information from both the government and the private sector, as well as jointly develop countermeasures in a timely manner. The initiative was launched in 2021 with the participation of approximately 10 companies, primarily in the IT, communications, and cybersecurity industries. The number of participating companies has since expanded to other sectors, and there are now over 300 members, including NTT, a major telecommunications carrier in Japan, as the first member in the Asian region. As indicated in the NCS, one of the current focuses is to enhance the speed and scale of operations. This would need to include cooperation with major foreign companies to address growing global-scale threats posed by state-sponsored actors. Other sector-based operational cooperation includes the Department of Energy’s Energy Threat Analysis Center, the DOD’s Defense Industrial Base Collaborative Information Sharing Environment, and the NSA’S CCC. The government plans to further strengthen and integrate these individual efforts into a federal cybersecurity center.</p> -<p>In addition to policy solutions, experts have raised technical solutions to the hazards posed by dust. To this end, NASA has developed an electrodynamic dust shield, which prevents dust accumulation using electric fields, and plans to send this payload to the Moon in 2024 aboard the Blue Ghost M1 mission. NASA is also exploring the use of different materials to prevent dust accumulation on sensitive surfaces such as solar panels, sensors, and optical systems. To test the “stickiness” of lunar regolith to different objects, NASA is launching its Regolith Adherence Characterization payload aboard Blue Ghost M1 to measure regolith accumulation rates across different test materials.</p> +<p>Another key initiative is the ICT Supply Chain Risk Management (SCRM) Task Force, which was launched in 2018. It is a PPP program that identifies challenges and develops solutions to enhance the resilience of the global ICT supply chain. The group is primarily composed of private companies in the communications and IT sectors, as well as CISA, and works on specific topics such as AI, SMBs, and software, providing guidance and other deliverables to the public.</p> -<h4 id="heat-and-power">HEAT AND POWER</h4> +<ul> + <li>Laws and Regulations</li> +</ul> -<p>Temperatures on the lunar surface range from 250 degrees Fahrenheit (121°C) during the lunar daytime to −208 degrees Fahrenheit (−133°C) at night. There are some places on the Moon where temperatures can drop to −410 degrees Fahrenheit (−246°C) or lower. Microelectronics cannot typically survive these extreme temperature swings, which can make materials brittle and damage connections. To survive the intense cold and heat, electronic equipment on the lunar surface needs to have power to regulate temperature.</p> +<p>As previously stated, the Biden administration has acknowledged the importance of long-lasting voluntary PPPs. However, it has also recognized that this alone is not sufficient and has taken a major step in strengthening laws, regulations, and requirements for critical infrastructure.</p> -<p>The lunar night itself also creates power-generation and power-storage challenges that will need to be addressed for sustained operations. For example, spacecraft orbiting the Moon and on the lunar surface using solar power must have sufficient battery capacity (or another form of power storage) to operate throughout the lunar night.</p> +<p>CIRCIA is one of the examples that highlights this approach. This is the first cross-sector legislation requiring critical infrastructure owners and operators to report significant cyber incidents to the government within 72 hours and ransomware payments within 24 hours. The Notice of Proposed Rule Making was released in April 2024, and the final rule is expected to take effect in 2025. In addition, the White House is currently leading a review and reinforcement of sector-specific cybersecurity requirements as part of existing regulations. The pipeline, rail, and airline industries have made notable progress in recent years in enhancing and refining their cybersecurity requirements, overseen by the Transportation Security Administration. Furthermore, in February 2024, an EO was issued to reinforce cybersecurity in the ports industry, with requirements currently under development. In the healthcare sector, the NDAA of FY 2023 included enhanced security requirements for medical devices, and further requirements and regulations for organizations are also under discussion. In the communications sector, FCC is exploring the potential use of its existing regulatory authority over communications carriers to establish and expand cybersecurity rules. Congress is also considering a legislative approach for certain sectors, such as the water sector, where regulators have limited authority to build additional cybersecurity requirements on existing regulations. The variation from highly regulated to largely unregulated sectors is a significant concern, and the NCS and NSM-22 have emphasized the need to develop common baseline requirements for entire sectors. Moreover, as a broader regulation beyond critical infrastructure, SEC’s updated rule of December 2023 requires listed companies to disclose material incidents within four business days and to annually disclose the cybersecurity posture of their organizations. As previously stated, there are a number of regulations across sectors, and some of these are said to be duplicative and inefficient, leading to unnecessary burdens for companies. ONCD is now taking the lead in studying ways to harmonize these regulations.</p> -<p>There are several locations on the Moon that, while not always receiving light, are exposed to longer periods of sunlight than most locations on the lunar surface. Referenced earlier in the report, these are called peaks of eternal light, a term whose original meaning referred to theoretical points on any celestial body that are always lit by the Sun. On the Moon, these points are located on the ridges of craters in both the north and south poles.</p> +<ul> + <li>Other Policy Approaches</li> +</ul> -<p>Placement of solar power generation equipment at these locations would have the advantage of being able to produce electricity more consistently. These locations will undoubtedly become valuable lunar real estate, and infrastructure built by one nation on these ridges could influence the value of nearby positions. Specifically, construction of equipment at one location may impact the ability of other nearby locations to see the Sun, possibly creating shadowing over what had previously been a peak of eternal light. Currently, there is no lunar power grid to transmit electricity from these locations near the poles to other parts of the Moon. Additionally, the accumulation of lunar dust and regolith on the surface of solar panels risks dampening electricity generation. This risk will be particularly pronounced in areas of potentially high landing activity, such as the lunar south pole, due to plume–surface interactions.</p> +<p>There are several ways to encourage companies to meet cybersecurity requirements, including not only regulations but also various policy approaches, such as the use of government procurement power and grants. This is a strategic objective included in pillar 3 of the NCS, as well as a policy objective incorporated into NSM-22. For instance, while not necessarily limited to critical infrastructure, the proposed revisions to the Federal Acquisition Regulation include relatively strong requirements for federal contractors to report cyber incidents within eight hours, provide SBOM information for systems involved in contracted services, and allow government agencies access to their network systems in the event of an incident. For cloud services, the Federal Risk and Authorization Management Program (FedRAMP) is in operation as a federal procurement requirement. This requires cloud providers to comply with cybersecurity requirements based on NIST SP 800-53 and obtain certification. In the defense industry, the Cybersecurity Maturity Model Certification 2.0 is being developed to certify the cybersecurity maturity of contractors based on NIST SP 800-171. Moreover, it has become more common in recent years for certain cybersecurity requirements to be incorporated into the application process for federal grant programs.</p> -<p>Looking beyond solar power, nuclear power systems offer attractive solutions for the Moon because they are not dependent on the Sun and can provide consistent generation throughout the lunar day and night. In 2022, NASA and the U.S. Department of Energy announced contracts with three companies to begin work designing concepts for nuclear power systems to be placed on the Moon. Additionally, Roscosmos announced in May 2024 that it is considering building a nuclear power plant on the Moon in partnership with China.</p> +<ul> + <li>Voluntary Framework and Guidance</li> +</ul> -<h4 id="communications">COMMUNICATIONS</h4> +<p>Government agencies frequently publish cybersecurity frameworks, guidance, best practices, and other resources, with NIST playing a central role. The NIST Cybersecurity Framework (CSF) would be the most central document of them all. The CSF 1.0 was initially developed in 2013 for critical infrastructure, and the CSF 2.0, the latest version, was released in February 2024. The CSF has been widely adopted internationally as a common framework that can be used by a wide variety of organizations, regardless of size or industry. The CSF 2.0 is a voluntary, risk-based, and global consensus-based framework that was developed through a two-year revision process, incorporating stakeholders’ comments and feedback. Japanese companies have been actively involved in the revision process, providing comments, participating in workshops, and engaging in individual discussions. In addition, the framework concept has recently gained recognition even in the regulatory environment. In regulatory discussions, there is a clear need for a risk-based approach rather than prescriptive checklist-based requirements. There is also a need for a common framework that all industries can rely on to help avoid duplicative requirements, as well as a common language that facilitates communication with stakeholders at all levels. The CSFs are increasingly being brought up as a potential solution to the needs. Furthermore, CISA has developed voluntary Cross-Sector Cybersecurity Performance Goals (CPGs), which are based on the CSF and summarize the minimum practices that should be implemented by critical infrastructure owners and operators in all sectors. Moreover, sector-specific goals are being developed based on these CPGs under the leadership of CISA and SRMAs.</p> -<p>A spacecraft in orbit around Earth can only communicate when it has line of sight to ground stations, also called “gateways,” that are configured to support communications for that particular spacecraft. Often, a spacecraft is not in continuous communications with Earth, as there are times during its orbit when there are no suitable ground stations within line of sight. In some cases, satellites in orbit share ground station infrastructure, so satellite operators have to preschedule transmission times on specific ground-based antennas.</p> +<p>CISA and SRMAs provide sector-specific guidance and best practices, such as for the water and healthcare sectors. CISA, NIST, ICT SCRM Task Force, and other entities also provide resources to support SMBs that lack the resources to implement cybersecurity measures. In addition, industry-led guidance is also being developed in each sector. For instance, the Cyber Risk Institute in the financial sector provides resources to assist financial organizations in implementing risk management aligned with the CSF, which takes into account sector-specific risk and regulatory environments.</p> -<p>However, satellites in GEO can maintain continuous communications with one ground station, rather than having to hand off communications between ground stations, because the orbits of those satellites mean they are always stationary relative to a point on Earth’s surface. For this reason, NASA operates a constellation of satellites in GEO that can maintain communications with specific ground stations while serving as a data relay for spacecraft in lower Earth orbits.</p> +<p>In addition, technical and operational advisories and guidance, including those for significant threats such as severe vulnerabilities and large-scale attacks by state-sponsored actors, are being published by major government agencies such as CISA, the FBI, and the NSA, in cooperation with international partners. The partners are primarily Five Eyes countries, with some EU countries, but there have been cases where the United States and Japan have collaborated on the release of advisories, such as the joint advisory on BlackTech in September 2023.</p> -<p>Due to the large distances, communications between Earth and spacecraft beyond GEO require larger ground-based antennas with higher gain than those used for communications with spacecraft in near-Earth orbits. This means that NASA equipment and other similar infrastructure designed for communications with spacecraft beyond GEO, such as NASA’s Deep Space Network (DSN), is limited and usually in high demand. Communications are scheduled for short windows dependent not only on the availability of bandwidth, but also on when the ground infrastructure has line of sight to the spacecraft. Like the DSN, China operates a deep-space communications network that could support lunar communications. The European Union also operates a deep-space communications system called European Space Tracking (ESTRACK).</p> +<ul> + <li>Plan and Preparedness</li> +</ul> -<p>Any increase in cislunar activities will place additional strain on already taxed communications capacity able to support lunar missions. In addition, given that one side of the Moon always faces away from Earth, connectivity for all parts of the Moon will also require a way to relay data from the far side of the Moon. This will necessitate a relay satellite or infrastructure on the lunar surface to transmit data around the Moon. As noted earlier, China is currently operating two lunar relay satellites and has plans to build additional lunar communications infrastructure. Described in earlier sections, the U.S. LunaNet framework and the European Moonlight initiative are also focused on fielding new lunar communications capabilities.</p> +<p>As part of the NIPP, a Sector-Specific Plan is developed in each sector, which outlines the sector-specific environment and risks, along with goals and priorities for addressing those risks. Going forward, SRMAs will conduct sector-specific risk assessments in accordance with NSM-22 guidance. The assessments will identify major risks within a sector, taking into account any interdependencies with other sectors. The Sector Specific Risk Management Plan will be updated based on the assessment every two years. CISA will also conduct a cross-sector risk assessment based on each sector’s risk assessment and input from the intelligence community and identify cross-sector critical risks. The NIRMP will then be developed every two years based on the work completed. These plans will serve as the foundation for risk management across the entire critical infrastructure.</p> -<p>Several private companies are currently attempting to establish private communications networks in hopes of supplying lunar communication capabilities as a service to lunar and cislunar operators. Intuitive Machines is planning on launching its Khon-series relay satellites aboard its CLPS missions. These satellites will form the core of Intuitive Machines’ Khonstellation, its cislunar data-relay service. In 2024, NASA awarded Intuitive Machines a contract for providing lunar communications and navigation services, in addition to awarding Intuitive Machines a study contract for a lunar communications and navigation user terminal and Aalyria Technologies a study contract on lunar networking. Also slated to launch aboard an Intuitive Machines mission is a Nokia cellular network funded through NASA’s Tipping Point initiative that will enable communication between the Nova-C lander, the Micro-Nova hopper, and Lunar Outpost’s rover, establishing the first cellular network on the Moon in order to demonstrate the feasibility of such a network for future missions. Additionally, ispace is planning on deploying two relay satellites during its APEX 1.0 mission, slated for 2026, as part of a future data-relay service.</p> +<p>In an advanced effort, the National Risk Management Center (NRMC) under CISA has developed the National Critical Functions (NCFs), which analyze critical infrastructure in terms of functions essential to national operations rather than sectors or companies. The NCFs have a set of 55 functions in four categories: “connect,” “distribute,” “manage,” and “supply.” The NCFs are designed to assist CISA in examining interdependencies and systemic risk among critical infrastructure entities as functions. The NCF Risk Architecture is being developed under the leadership of NRMC to structure dependencies between sub-functions, systems, and assets and components by decomposing the NCFs. The results will be used for more advanced risk analysis, such as identifying the critical elements and entities on which the NCFs depend. The initial set of NCFs was released in 2019, but subsequent studies, such as the development of the NCF Risk Architecture, have taken time due to the complexity of the task. The NCFs can be utilized as a tool for advanced risk analysis of critical infrastructure. However, at this point, there is still a need to increase awareness of NCFs among stakeholders and ensure that they are being fully utilized in actual operations. Another related concept is the one proposed by the CSC, which is to identify and support systemically important entities among a wide range of critical infrastructure owners and operators in exchange for higher-security requirements. Although several attempts to legislate this idea have failed, the administration is currently pursuing the work to identify and prioritize these entities as SIEs. This effort is also formalized in NSM-22. While the list will not be publicly available, it is expected to be used for a variety of purposes, including national incident response, prioritization of government efforts, and consideration of the applicability of regulatory requirements.</p> -<h3 id="key-considerations-for-next-steps">KEY CONSIDERATIONS FOR NEXT STEPS</h3> +<p>Regarding national-level cyber exercises, the Cyber Storm initiative, hosted by CISA, has been conducted every other year since 2006. This cross-sector, public-private, operational-based functional exercise brings together over 2,000 participants, including federal agencies, local governments, multi-sectoral critical infrastructure owners and operators, ISACs, and international partners. The exercise simulates responses to significant cyber incident scenarios in critical infrastructure. While this exercise is primarily for public and private-sector participants in the United States, Japan participates in the information-sharing and incident response coordination exercise as a member of the International Watch and Warning Network with like-minded countries. Another industry-led initiative is the tri-sector exercise, which brings together owners and operators in the financial, power, and communications sectors. Participants are divided into attack and defense teams. Previously, the lessons learned from the exercise were shared with the government after the event, but government officials have directly participated in the exercise since the third event held in March 2024.</p> -<p>Looking forward, it is worth restating the anticipated amount of U.S. and foreign cislunar activity expected in the decade ahead. In total, there are about 40 significant missions, though often several payloads are associated with each mission, from all nations headed to the Moon over the next several years, with many of those missions associated with NASA’s Artemis program and CLPS initiative.</p> +<ul> + <li>Technologies, Products, and Services</li> +</ul> -<p>There is no indication of a lunar gold rush because there are no strong revenue-generating businesses centered around cislunar activities anchored by commercial customers. The Moon’s surge in commercial activity is tied mostly to NASA’s CLPS program, where many payloads ferried to the lunar surface are for NASA and commercial rideshare payloads are effectively subsidized by NASA. Truly commercial uses of the Moon remain a chimera, with no obvious sign this could change in the next several years. The cislunar domain is dominated by government activities, with the missions planned for the next decade operated by governments, strongly tied to government funding and use, or taking advantage of government-subsidized rideshare missions.</p> +<p>The critical infrastructure is based on a diverse range of technologies, products, and services. While this paper does not cover all topics in detail, it does briefly address two recent developments of note: AI and internet routing security.</p> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">There is no indication of a lunar gold rush because there are no strong revenue-generating businesses centered around cislunar activities anchored by commercial customers.</code></em></strong></p> +<p>A number of AI-related initiatives are being undertaken in line with EO 14110, which places the safety and security of AI at the forefront of all considerations. One of the key areas of the EO is to manage AI risks in critical infrastructure. A cross-sector and sector-specific risk assessment related to the use of AI in critical infrastructure was conducted, and based on the results, guidelines on AI safety and security for critical infrastructure owners and operators were developed in April 2024. Furthermore, the EO directs federal agencies to utilize these guidelines to consider mandating certain guidance for critical infrastructure. In April 2024, DHS established the AI Safety and Security Board, which brings together AI experts from industry, academia, and government based on the EO’s direction. The board will provide recommendations to DHS and SRMAs on security, resilience, and incident response related to the use of AI in critical infrastructure.</p> -<p>Though the United States has released a cislunar technology strategy, it has not articulated a comprehensive national cislunar strategy or goals, nor a cislunar national security strategy. However, the U.S. Space Priorities Framework provides sufficient guidance to help shape U.S. cislunar efforts. Given the lack of clear commercial business cases for cislunar space, with no indication this absence is due to government action or inaction, efforts aimed at addressing the cislunar challenges identified in this report should primarily focus on furthering U.S. government requirements and not premature — or potentially imaginary — commercial ones.</p> +<p>Another area of growing government concern in recent years is internet routing security. The security challenges associated with internet technologies have been well known for many years. However, with the recent increase in threats posed by state-sponsored actors, security issues on Border Gateway Protocol and the potential attacks, such as route hijacking, are now considered part of the national security problem. The NCS has identified this as an area for improvement. Furthermore, FCC is considering implementing regulations that would encourage ISPs to adopt Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) as a technical measure. ONCD released a roadmap outlining measures for both the public and private sectors to enhance internet routing security. Given the nature of the internet, this issue cannot be resolved by U.S. carriers alone. It is essential to coordinate with a broader range of stakeholders involved in internet routing.</p> -<h4 id="addressing-cislunar-governance-gaps">ADDRESSING CISLUNAR GOVERNANCE GAPS</h4> +<p><em>JAPAN</em></p> -<p>This report asserts that international space governance frameworks lack needed clarity and definition in three main areas: space rules of the road, property rights and resource use, and permissible activities. These governance gaps are not unique to cislunar space. The same lack of clarity and definition for these areas in current space treaties equally applies to activities in other parts of space.</p> +<ul> + <li>Basic Strategy and Policy</li> +</ul> -<p>As international space activities increase, particularly by the United States and China, space will become less safe and secure if these deficits are not addressed. A lack of agreed-to and followed space rules of the road will increase spacecraft collision risks. A lack of consensus by spacefaring nations on property rights, space resources, and permissible activities will lead to a greater chance of misunderstandings and miscalculations by space powers, potentially increasing geopolitical tensions and sparking conflict on Earth. Ultimately, a lack of consensus increases many dimensions of risk: risk of misunderstandings, risk of collisions, risk to businesses and investment decisions, risk to life and property, and risk of conflict.</p> +<p>The basic policy framework for critical infrastructure protection in Japan is based on the CPCIP. The document outlines the designation of critical infrastructure sectors, the roles and responsibilities of government agencies and critical infrastructure owners and operators, and the basic framework for public-private information sharing and incident response. The CPCIP is reviewed every few years to reflect changes in the threat landscape and cyber environment. The latest version was released in March 2024. It puts a strong emphasis on cybersecurity as a business management issue, organizational governance, risk-based management tailored to specific organizations and sectors, and comprehensive measures throughout the supply chain, including critical infrastructure owners and operators.</p> -<p>These hazards are particularly acute for cislunar space. Fortunately, there are various international efforts trying to fill these gaps, some by the United Nations and another, potentially complementary initiative in the United States’ Artemis Accords. No matter the forum or agreement, the solution should involve both the United States and China. In 2023, the United States and China together accounted for around 80 percent of the world’s space launches. Most of the planned missions to cislunar space over the next decade are sponsored or supported by these two countries.</p> +<ul> + <li>Sectors</li> +</ul> -<p>Agreement between the United States and China on an approach to address the cislunar space governance gaps discussed in this report would de facto establish the international standard. But neither the United States nor China can unilaterally fill those gaps, as each nation will throw sand in the gears of any attempt by the other to impose its will on the world. This is no different than U.S. and Soviet behavior during the Cold War. Other entities such as Russia, India, and ESA are still important, but they are not kingmakers.</p> +<p>The CPCIP designates 15 critical infrastructure sectors and government agencies responsible for overseeing sectors (Figure 6). In response to the cyber incident caused by suspected state-sponsored actors in the Port of Nagoya in 2023, the government elevated ports and harbors as the fifteenth sector, previously part of the logistics sector. The sector designation is subject to ongoing review, with the policy document revised in light of the evolving threat landscape. This has resulted in an expansion from the original 10 sectors in 2005 to 13 sectors in 2014, 14 sectors in 2018, and 15 sectors in 2024. There is a discussion about whether cloud infrastructure should be included in the list of sectors due to other sectors’ high degree of dependence on it for a digital infrastructure. While the space system is not currently included in the sector, due to its importance, discussions on space cybersecurity are ongoing, led by METI, including the release of voluntary guidelines to encourage commercial space operators to take measures.</p> -<p>While there is no need to disregard or contradict the OST and other international space agreements, addressing the identified space governance gaps need not happen as part of UN processes. There are over 100 nations in COPUOS, only a small fraction of which operate spacecraft. An even smaller fraction has a space launch capability, and fewer still have cislunar plans. The COPUOS ATLAC could provide a forum for U.S. and Chinese dialogue on cislunar governance questions, though it is too early to predict its chances of success — especially as COPUOS members continue to disagree on whom to name as vice chairs of the body.</p> +<p>In Japan, as in the United States, cybersecurity requirements and regulations for critical infrastructure vary by sector, and there are variations in maturity levels across sectors and among companies of different sizes within the same sector. For example, ransomware attacks on healthcare organizations have been a particular challenge in recent years.</p> -<p>Looking for ways to address thorny international issues outside of UN processes is not a new idea. Consider the Antarctic Treaty, whose groundwork was laid not at the United Nations but by the IGY and a subsequent conference organized by the United States that included only 12 nations. Interestingly, the United States has endorsed a concept for an International Lunar Year, taking inspiration from the IGY and International Polar Year of 2007 to 2008, possibly opening the door for an approach to cislunar space modeled after Antarctica. Additionally, the Arctic Council was formed using a similar mindset; only nations with Arctic territory have a vote. These models could be applied to new cislunar space governance negotiations. This might mean setting criteria for participation in a new international convention on space issues that relates to a nation’s stake and existing presence in space. Only nations that meet the criteria get a seat at the table.</p> +<p>Figure 7 provides the mapping of the critical infrastructure sectors in the United States and Japan. Note, however, that this is a simplified overview and that the industries and services included in the sectors in the two countries may not be identical or perfectly aligned.</p> -<p>At a minimum, the United States and China need a seat, particularly on measures and frameworks designed to ensure the safe and sustainable use of the space environment. Approaches that produce multiple governance frameworks overlapping with the same operational environments and geographical regions of space increase risks for space operators. International air travel and maritime shipping only work as well as they do because national leaders negotiated and agreed to one set of rules governing global air travel and one for maritime traffic.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/sImzF8d.png" alt="image06" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 6: Critical Infrastructure Sectors in Japan.</strong> Source: Author’s compilation based on <a href="https://www.nisc.go.jp/eng/pdf/cip_policy_2024_eng.pdf">National Center of Incident Readiness and Strategy for Cybersecurity (NISC), The Cybersecurity Policy for Critical Infrastructure Protection (Tokyo: Cybersecurity Strategic Headquarters, Government of Japan, March 8, 2024), 55</a>.</em></p> -<p>It would not be a good outcome to have more than one set of rules of the road for space — for example, one agreed upon by the United States and its traditional allies and one agreed upon by China and perhaps Russia. That would be like having cars on the same highway following different sets of traffic rules. There is no reason to think China could unilaterally impose its own rules on the United States or that the United States could impose its own rules on China. This is arguably the limit of the Artemis Accords, as China is unlikely to sign onto it. But the principles outlined in the accords could be used during any future discussions and negotiations with China on new cislunar space governance rules.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/TeLkr3F.png" alt="image07" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 7: Mapping of Critical Infrastructure Sectors in Japan and the United States.</strong> Source: Author’s analysis.</em></p> -<h4 id="learning-from-existing-governance-frameworks">LEARNING FROM EXISTING GOVERNANCE FRAMEWORKS</h4> +<ul> + <li>Structure of Information Sharing and Incident Response</li> +</ul> -<p>To frame and inform initiatives aimed at filling cislunar space governance gaps, this report introduced and discussed existing treaties and arrangements covering non-space domains that could offer lessons for space. Since no existing non-space framework has every element needed to cover all space governance gaps, the report’s authors have described which parts of each system could apply to space and cislunar activities.</p> +<p>Figure 8 shows the nationwide information-sharing and incident response structure, including both public and private sectors, in relation to critical infrastructure. Please note that this figure is created based on publicly available sources, including CPCIP, and has been generalized to provide a comprehensive overview rather than specific details. Therefore, it should be noted that the information provided may not be entirely precise or applicable to all cases.</p> -<p>One lesson from the non-space examples is that national leaders did not let unbridgeable differences on issues tangential to core topics undermine efforts to negotiate consensus positions. For example, the Antarctic Treaty avoids any position on territorial claims, as the treaty drafters realized that no consensus on that issue was possible. Insistence on addressing claims would have torpedoed the agreement. In a similar vein, the Arctic Council excludes military matters from its agenda, recognizing that all nations with Arctic territory already use the region for military purposes and have no desire to coordinate on that topic with potential adversaries. The council’s founders instead focused on areas where member interests overlapped, such as sustainable development and environmental protection of the region.</p> +<p>NISC is the national coordinator for critical infrastructure protection, acting as a counterpart to CISA. NISC serves as a government Computer Security Incident Response Team (CSIRT) as well as the national CSIRT, which is operated jointly with the Japan Computer Emergency Response Team Coordination Center (JPCERT/CC) that coordinates with the private sector. NISC leads the coordination and sharing of information on vulnerabilities, incidents, and risk mitigation in cooperation with private-sector and government agencies, including NPA, MOD, MOFA, MIC, METI, Digital Agency, and agencies responsible for sector risk management, crisis management, and disaster prevention. Sector-specific coordination is conducted through relevant agencies, which is similar to SRMAs in the United States. NISC is more focused on coordination, and the substantive measures are being developed and implemented primarily by agencies responsible for cybersecurity and critical infrastructure protection.</p> -<p>Another lesson from the non-space frameworks is that there is no one-size-fits-all approach for structuring negotiations or the final form of an agreement. Except for the Arctic Council, all of the non-space frameworks discussed originate from official treaties. Though it is merely an inter-governmental forum, deliberations in the Arctic Council have produced three official treaties and been effective at maintaining dialogue and coordination between Arctic nations. Of the non-space frameworks, only UNCLOS originated directly from a UN-facilitated process. For example, the negotiations that produced the Convention on International Civil Aviation pre-dated the creation of the United Nations. The Antarctic Treaty was negotiated specifically outside of the United Nations so that the agreement would not be influenced by the UN General Assembly and members with no contemporary presence on the continent.</p> +<p>Each sector and subsector has an organization called CEPTOAR, which comprises critical infrastructure owners and operators and trade associations (e.g., general incorporated associations) as a point of contact for NISC. The CEPTOAR Council is a cross-sector council comprising representatives of CEPTOAR in each sector. In Japan, as in the United States, ISACs exist as industry-led organizations for day-to-day operational cooperation. In contrast to the United States, ISACs in Japan are not necessarily established in all sectors, but there are ISACs in major sectors such as ICT, finance, power, and transportation. The ICT-ISAC Japan, previously known as the Telecom-ISAC Japan, is the oldest ISAC in Japan, established in 2002. Additionally, there are ISACs that focus on specific industries, including software, automotive, and trade. In recent years, there has been a growing movement to establish new ISACs in other sectors, including the medical sector. While there is no formal organization like NCI in the United States, regular inter-ISAC meetings are held to facilitate cooperation among ISACs to address cross-sector issues.</p> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Another lesson from the non-space frameworks is that there is no one-size-fits-all approach for structuring negotiations or the final form of an agreement.</code></em></strong></p> +<p>Furthermore, there are several initiatives, such as the Cybersecurity Council, where selected major companies and government agencies gather across sectors to share information, conduct analysis, and develop countermeasures. The collaboration between critical infrastructure owners and operators and government agencies, which is similar to that in the United States in terms of organizational structure, is conducted through various channels, including ISAC, as well as direct communications with NISC and agencies responsible for the sector.</p> -<p>A final lesson — perhaps the most important of the three — is that the non-space frameworks described in this report are durable because they can evolve over time. Each of the frameworks has consultative mechanisms baked into its structure so there is no need to negotiate a new treaty or agreement and involve the entire UN General Assembly or the 102-member COPUOS to make decisions. These mechanisms have allowed framework parties to update and clarify aspects of their governance structures to keep up with changes in technologies, societal preferences, business use cases, environmental considerations, and other factors that have changed over time. Some of these agreement-specific mechanisms take the form of annual or regular meetings at which binding and non-binding decisions can be made. Of the space-specific treaties and frameworks noted in this report, only the ITU has such a mechanism, which has probably contributed to the union’s longevity.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/2tPB9Zx.png" alt="image08" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 8: Information-Sharing and Incident Response Structure in Japan.</strong> Source: Author’s analysis based on <a href="https://www.nisc.go.jp/eng/pdf/cip_policy_2024_eng.pdf">National Center of Incident Readiness and Strategy for Cybersecurity (NISC), The Cybersecurity Policy for Critical Infrastructure Protection (Tokyo: Cybersecurity Strategic Headquarters, Government of Japan, March 8, 2024), 62–64</a>.</em></p> -<h4 id="building-lunar-infrastructure">BUILDING LUNAR INFRASTRUCTURE</h4> +<ul> + <li>Public and Private Initiatives</li> +</ul> -<p>Improving cislunar infrastructure can optimize U.S. cislunar efforts, particularly activities aiming for a long-term, sustained presence on the lunar surface. Specifically, NASA’s vision for the Moon will require processes and systems that can provide power and communications, protect electronics and humans from radiation, provide positioning and navigation services, collect cislunar SSA information, manage cislunar space traffic to minimize spacecraft collision risks, and mitigate the risks to lunar operations from regolith dust.</p> +<p>Japan’s approach to critical infrastructure protection is also based on a voluntary PPP, as outlined in the CPCIP. While there have been several information-sharing frameworks, including the Initiative for Cyber Security Information Sharing Partnership of Japan (J-CSIP) and JC3, in 2019, the Cybersecurity Council was established to further strengthen public-private information sharing. The council is composed of three tiers of memberships: Category 1, Category 2, and General. Its objective is to facilitate the sharing and analysis of threat information and the development of countermeasures in a timely manner while establishing nondisclosure agreements within a membership tier. Category 1 members bring predictive, undetermined, or undisclosed threat information under a strong obligation of confidentiality with legal penalties for noncompliance. The members then analyze the information, provide feedback to each other, and develop countermeasures. NISC serves as the secretariat, while JPCERT/CC serves as the operational coordinator. Finally, developed countermeasures are shared with the entire council if there is a high degree of certainty. If this is not the case, only Category 2 members receive the information in advance of the general members under a strong obligation of confidentiality and provide their own feedback, thereby contributing to improving the degree of accuracy of the information. The council started with 91 members and has since grown to over 300.</p> -<p>Many planned lunar activities will happen in the same areas, specifically in the south pole, so there will be a need for one nation’s systems to coexist near other nations’ missions. Effective solutions for this issue are not primarily technical ones but depend on the development of coordination mechanisms and baseline agreement regarding how to behave on the Moon and in lunar orbit. Improved coordination mechanisms between spacecraft operators, both transiting space between GEO and the Moon and in lunar orbit, would likely go a long way toward mitigating the threat of cislunar spacecraft collisions and minimizing risks of new debris creation.</p> +<p>Another major initiative, SC3, has been in place since 2020, aiming to enhance cybersecurity throughout the supply chain, including critical infrastructure. This is an industry-led consortium comprising private companies of all sizes across various sectors. It is structured around several working groups, each focusing on a specific topic related to supply chain cybersecurity, including SMBs, attack trends and countermeasures, industry-academia-government collaboration, and international collaboration. Furthermore, the Cyber Risk Intelligence Center-Cross Sectors Forum (CRIC CSF), established in 2015, is another industry-led cross-sector initiative comprising companies primarily in the critical infrastructure sector. The forum is focused on specific themes related to cross-sector issues in the industry, including the definition of cybersecurity human resources, cybersecurity as business management, laws and regulations, and cybersecurity in DX. In Japan, there are a number of examples, such as SC3 and CRIC CSF, where private companies in the critical infrastructure sectors have taken the initiative to lead discussions on national-level cybersecurity issues. This would indicate a high degree of industry independence and the maturity of mutual aid. This may be a distinctive feature of Japan, in contrast to Western countries where the government typically plays a more prominent role.</p> -<p>As noted, efficiently supporting upcoming U.S. lunar activities will require certain technological solutions, including communications, power, and navigation and positioning information. Though the United States, ESA, China, and other spacefaring entities can continue to pursue their own cislunar goals, there is an opportunity to address infrastructure challenges using an international model. The United States is already thinking internationally by developing the LunaNet communications framework, an open-architecture approach intended to facilitate allied collaboration around lunar connectivity.</p> +<ul> + <li>Laws and Regulations</li> +</ul> -<p>There are several helpful examples for structuring international cooperation in space. One is the ISS model, which assigned responsibilities for the provisions of certain space-station components to individual countries. A nearly identical model is the Artemis program, which trades opportunities to fly payloads and astronauts on Artemis missions for equipment, systems, and components provided by other countries for use in the Artemis architecture and Lunar Gateway. Notably, other than the UAE, all other nations contributing to the Lunar Gateway are also ISS partners. A third model is ESA’s Ariane project, which led to the development of the Ariane 1 rocket and creation of Arianespace, a company that operates this family of launch vehicles.</p> +<p>Currently, Japan does not have a legal requirement for sector-wide incident reporting like CIRCIA in the United States, although the necessity of such a mandate is being discussed. Some sectors have sector-specific regulations in place to maintain critical infrastructure services that require incident reporting to the relevant agencies. For instance, in the case of the information and telecommunications sector, carriers are obliged to report both the physical failure and cyber incident to MIC if the impact exceeds the threshold defined in the Telecommunications Business Act.</p> -<p>It is worth taking a closer look at the approach used for the Ariane project, which is the same way that ESA funds and manages all its projects. For the original Ariane project, about 10 partner nations pooled funds and assigned one organization to act as project manager. Each partner nation signed up for the project knowing it would receive a certain rate of return on national funding provided to the project. Specifically, domestic firms in each partner country received contracts totaling 80 percent of the amount invested by their governments. This approach allows partners to invest in their own domestic industries and pool resources for greater impact.</p> +<p>Furthermore, the Economic Security Promotion Act introduced a new rule in May 2024 to ensure the safety and reliability of essential infrastructure. The government designates essential infrastructure sectors and operators within these sectors based on specific criteria. Prior to the introduction of designated critical facilities and the outsourcing of their maintenance to third parties, covered operators are required to submit plans to the government for screening. Although there is not a one-to-one correspondence between the 15 essential infrastructure sectors and the 15 critical infrastructure sectors, there is a large overlap between them. Currently, over 200 companies have been designated based on criteria such as service scale, coverage, and number of customers. The plans that covered operators submit must include an outline of the facilities (e.g., function, purpose, and location); information on all contractors, including cascaded subcontractors, involved in the equipment or outsourced maintenance (e.g., country of establishment, nationality of board members, country of manufacture, business relationship with foreign governments); and a risk management plan, including cybersecurity measures. If the government determines that there is a significant risk that the facilities may be used as a means of disruptive attacks by foreign adversaries, it may recommend or order the operators to take necessary preventive measures. The rule is risk-based, with covered operators and facilities limited based on criteria from an economic security standpoint. However, it could have a broad impact on major critical infrastructure owners and operators across sectors.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/K1mObCW.png" alt="image10" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 8: Selected Planned Activities in the Lunar South Pole Area.</strong> Source: Authors’ research based on multiple sources.</em></p> +<ul> + <li>Other Policy Approaches</li> +</ul> -<p>There are several benefits to modeling an effort on the Ariane project for building and operating lunar infrastructure. The first is that it allows for cost sharing across many nations interested in developing and using lunar infrastructure for their own national efforts. If there were commercial use cases for developing such infrastructure on the Moon, there would be no need for an international, government-sponsored activity, as market forces would be driving the development of lunar infrastructure. But government missions and missions primarily supported or subsidized by government funding are the only real customers for lunar infrastructure services. An international, government-funded and -driven approach would thus ensure the final product matches space agencies’ science and exploration needs.</p> +<p>The government is implementing enhanced cybersecurity requirements for both government agencies and contractors. The Common Standards for Cybersecurity Measures for Government Agencies and Related Agencies, issued by NISC, outlines the cybersecurity standards that government agencies must meet. The July 2023 revision reinforced the standards required for contractors based on NIST SP 800-171 to address supply chain risks. In the defense industry, the Acquisition, Technology &amp; Logistics Agency under the DOD introduced a new cybersecurity standard for defense contractors in 2023 that incorporates the requirements of NIST SP 800-171, aligning it with the U.S. standards for the defense industry. Regarding cloud services, the Information system Security Management and Assessment Program (ISMAP), a program similar to the FedRAMP of the United States, has been operational since 2020. Furthermore, government funding programs include cybersecurity requirements, such as IT implementation subsidies, in their application requirements. Additionally, there is discussion on a potential tax incentive program for companies in the defense industry that meet certain cybersecurity requirements.</p> -<p>Another benefit to an internationalized initiative is that it could attenuate national pressure to compete for certain lunar real estate, such as peaks of eternal light (ideal for solar power infrastructure) or Earth–Moon Lagrange points (ideal for communications nodes). Internationalized cislunar architecture could also be an anchor for peaceful coexistence in space, just as the ISS maintains a peaceful link between the United States and Russia today. Finally, an international approach can be structured to provide benefits to national industries. The Ariane 1 and ESA models guarantee national governments’ return on investment that gets funneled directly back to their domestic industrial bases. The ISS and Artemis programs, while structured differently, do the same thing. These models effectively offer protectionist returns to domestic industries while pursuing international collaboration.</p> +<ul> + <li>Voluntary Framework and Guidance</li> +</ul> -<h4 id="improving-operator-coordination-and-data-sharing">IMPROVING OPERATOR COORDINATION AND DATA SHARING</h4> +<p>NISC publishes the guidelines for establishing safety principles for ensuring the cybersecurity of critical infrastructure as a document based on the CPCIP, which outlines common cybersecurity measures required for all sectors. Based on this document, agencies responsible for the sectors and industry develop their own cybersecurity standards and guidelines, taking into account sector-specific features. It is the responsibility of critical infrastructure owners and operators to ensure the cybersecurity of their infrastructure by utilizing these standards and guidelines, or in some cases, complying with them in accordance with relevant regulations. NISC’s guidelines are reviewed on a regular basis, and the latest version, released in July 2023, have focused on strengthening organizational governance and supply chain risk management in cybersecurity as well as clarifying the minimum baseline standards to be implemented and additional ones as recommended options.</p> -<p>Ideally, new cislunar monitoring infrastructure, possibly comprising systems on Earth and the Moon as well as spacecraft in cislunar space, will provide comprehensive SSA services for operators of cislunar spacecraft. Infrastructure could also provide positioning and tracking data about spacecraft and human-made systems operating on the Moon’s surface. There are plans in the next 10 years to build and launch space systems to collect SSA data in cislunar space. One or two SSA data-collecting satellites, however, would only be able to provide coverage on a very small portion of cislunar space — just a drop in the ocean.</p> +<p>Regarding the NIST CSF, IPA has been providing Japanese translations since the initial release. NISC’s guidelines and their supplementary documents also reflect the CSF concept as the basis for the risk-based approach. In addition, the Cybersecurity Management Guidelines for Japanese Enterprise Executives, published by METI, also reflect the basic concepts of the CSF. As previously noted, Japan has been engaged in the CSF revision process, providing comments and participating in workshops. The CSF has been increasingly adopted in Japanese industry, particularly among multinational companies, as a way to ensure consistent and aligned risk management with international stakeholders.</p> -<p>Building robust and comprehensive SSA infrastructure will be costly and take time. As noted in the previous section, one idea to address this need would be to create an international partnership to build cislunar infrastructure, such as an SSA network. The authors of this report think this approach has merit but recognize that it would take time to negotiate and establish the foundations for an internationalized cislunar infrastructure operator, effectively equivalent to a lunar public utility company.</p> +<p>In addition to sector-specific guidance and best practices developed by government agencies and industry associations, METI, IPA, MIC, and others also provide guidance that can be used by a wide range of companies, including critical infrastructure owners and operators across sectors, including those focusing on industrial control systems, cloud infrastructure, corporate management, and SMBs. IPA is also working with NIST and CISA to disseminate key frameworks and guidance from the United States. This includes publishing Japanese translations of CISA’s CPGs and other NIST publications, in addition to the CSF.</p> -<p>In the meantime, something should be done to reduce the risk of collisions for spacecraft operating in cislunar space, including in lunar orbit. There is also a need to coordinate activities on the lunar surface, particularly in the Moon’s south pole due to the amount of expected activity there (see Figure 8). Even with the paltry number of active spacecraft orbiting the Moon — only about a handful today — there are increasing collision risks. Fortunately, unlike orbits closer to Earth, there are very few known human-made debris objects or fragments in cislunar space and only one recent example of human-made debris unintentionally hitting the Moon’s surface. International agreed-to rules and norms on mitigating the creation of cislunar debris — accepted by both the United States and China, as well as other lunar operators — could go a long way in protecting the cislunar environment from new human-made debris.</p> +<p>With regard to the government’s releases of technical and operational advisories and guidance on critical threats, it is likely that the frequency of release and level of detail would be lower than in the United States, although it is not easy to make comparisons given that not all information is necessarily publicly available. The government is expected to expand its operational staff in the coming years along with the restructuring of NISC. This will enable the government to release more detailed, actionable guidance with technical and operational aspects in a timelier manner. It is also encouraging to note that the United States and Japan are increasingly issuing advisories in cooperation, as in the case of the joint advisories issued in September 2023 and July 2024.</p> -<p>One way to address both cislunar space traffic coordination and deconfliction and prevent the creation of new cislunar debris is to incorporate these elements into international space governance frameworks. Though the authors of this report believe that negotiators and diplomats, especially U.S. and Chinese ones, can ultimately find common ground on these and other space governance issues, the authors recognize this may take time. Until then, cislunar governmental and private sector spacecraft operators from all nations can do a lot on their own, taking matters somewhat into their own hands.</p> +<ul> + <li>Plan and Preparedness</li> +</ul> -<p>Spacecraft operators can vastly reduce the risk of collisions and events that could cause new cislunar debris by increasing coordination and data sharing. No operator wants its satellite to collide with another or to hit a piece of space debris, so arguably all operators share a common goal, one of self-interest.</p> +<p>As previously stated, based on the guidelines published by NISC, agencies responsible for the sectors and industry have developed sector-specific standards and guidelines on which organizations implement and maintain their cybersecurity posture. With regard to further study on critical infrastructure protection, the Japanese government is aware of the need to address the increasingly complex interdependencies among infrastructures. The CPCIP indicates that the Cabinet Secretariat plans to conduct interdependency analysis, which will help it identify systemic risks of infrastructure, including both physical and cyber aspects. The designation of essential infrastructure owners and operators and critical facilities under the new rule based on the Economic Security Promotion Act may have certain similarities with the concept of NCFs and SIEs in terms of identifying especially important entities and functions across sectors.</p> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Spacecraft operators can vastly reduce the risk of collisions and events that could cause new cislunar debris by increasing operator-to-operator coordination and data sharing.</code></em></strong></p> +<p>Regarding national-level cyber exercises, a cross-sector exercise hosted by NISC has been held annually since 2006. This exercise involves over 6,000 participants from critical infrastructure owners and operators, government agencies, and commercial cybersecurity companies across all sectors and verifies the effectiveness of cross-sector incident response processes through tabletop exercises. In addition, sector-specific cyber exercises are conducted by ISACs, such as those in the ICT sector and the electric power sector, as well as by government agencies, such as those in the financial sector.</p> -<p>Outside of diplomatic channels or government-to-government negotiations, operators and other space stakeholders from the United States, China, and other nations are working together in forums such as the Consultative Committee for Space Data Systems and International Organization for Standards to establish mechanisms and best practices for improved information sharing. These efforts are not tied specifically to cislunar space, but to space operations more broadly and touch on issues such as data standards, sharing spacecraft position information, and operator notification procedures to forestall collisions. Such discussions could eventually include elements important to cislunar operators, particularly considerations for landing and launch from the Moon’s surface and measures to prevent the creation of new cislunar debris. These discussions can also help build trust between U.S. and Chinese space stakeholders.</p> +<ul> + <li>Technologies, Products, and Services</li> +</ul> -<h4 id="military-use-and-national-security">MILITARY USE AND NATIONAL SECURITY</h4> +<p>While Japan has not received as much policy attention for internet routing security as the United States, the implementation of RPKI, a key technology to address the issue, is progressing. As of September 2024, approximately 48 percent of routes in Japan have been implemented with Route Origin Authorization, a key technical component of RPKI, compared to approximately 40 percent in the United States.</p> -<p>Outer space up to GEO is widely used for military purposes, with significant national security equities in those regions of space. The U.S. military relies on space to fight and win wars, with satellites between LEO and GEO performing all or parts of critical missions, such as navigation, missile warning, and communications. Additionally, the U.S. economy depends on space, with power utilities, communications networks, and financial institutions using precision timing derived from GPS satellites. Commercial air travel is increasingly dependent on GPS. Many American households, businesses, and first responders use satellites for broadband connectivity. In these regions of space, the United States has many reasons to protect and defend its equities — which do face counterspace threats.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/jpGy7f2.png" alt="image09" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 9: Mapping of Critical Infrastructure Protection Framework between Japan and the United States.</strong> Source: Author’s analysis.</em></p> -<p>But beyond GEO, things start to look very different. There are no current cislunar assets that enable joint operations. The United States would gain no clear strategic military advantage over China or any potential adversary from military activities in cislunar space. No technology that could be conceivably deployed within the next few decades could influence military outcomes on Earth. There is also no appreciable economic activity or national presence to defend and protect other than initiatives focused on science and exploration. Though future human habitation or significant economic activities on other planets could change these dynamics, there is no sign this will happen anytime soon. If the military needed SSA data on cislunar space, it could obtain that from systems operated by civilian or commercial entities.</p> +<p>With regard to IoT security, Japan has a long history of proactive and advanced efforts focused on protecting its communications infrastructure. As previously stated, since 2019, the country has been implementing the NOTICE project, which extensively scans IoT devices connected to the internet in Japan, identifies devices with weak passwords, and encourages users to correct their settings. This has been made possible by the amendment of the law to authorize NICT to conduct the scan, and ICT-ISAC and over 80 domestic ISPs are cooperating to identify and notify the owners of vulnerable devices. This is a truly nationwide initiative to mitigate botnet risks through public-private cooperation. Additionally, NICT monitors communications flowing into the domestic darknet. By analyzing communications that are presumed to originate from botnet devices, NICT identifies infected IoT devices, followed by the same process as NOTICE. Furthermore, in 2020, the technical standards for IoT devices connected to the internet were revised to require devices to meet minimum cybersecurity requirements, such as prohibiting default passwords and implementing access control functions. METI is also developing a voluntary conformity assessment program for a broader range of IoT devices, with the aim of launching the program during FY 2024. A dialogue has been initiated with the U.S. government to establish mutual recognition with the U.S. labeling scheme.</p> -<p>Every dollar the U.S. military spends on a cislunar-focused project is a dollar taken away from another effort that likely has more effect on U.S. national security. In particular, if U.S. defense and military officials are concerned about fielding capabilities to deter and address threats from China by 2027, any resources spent today on cislunar national security capabilities could be better spent elsewhere. Nothing the U.S. military deploys to cislunar space can help win a war on Earth, whether with China or anybody else. Technological developments and other circumstances could cause a reevaluation of this calculus, but that does not rule out the consideration that a nonmilitarized cislunar space is the right answer now. And “right answer now” means “for the foreseeable future” — a span measured in many decades. In the far distant future, realistic plans for human colonies on the Moon and other planets, lunar economic equities threatened by space piracy, cislunar deployment of weapons of mass destruction targeting Earth or non-Earth locations would mean reevaluating the wisdom of keeping military activities out of cislunar space.</p> +<p>Japan is at the forefront of the commercial 5G network deployment using the Open Radio Access Network (O-RAN). NTT DOCOMO started the world’s first nationwide deployment of 5G commercial services using O-RAN in 2020. One of the key concerns in the international deployment of secure and reliable 5G networks is the security of O-RAN. In May 2023, a report on O-RAN security was published by a Quad working group. The study found that O-RAN-specific security risks in 5G networks are only 4 percent of the total, and do not fundamentally alter the security environment of wireless communication networks compared to conventional networks. Recently, through the NTIA grant program, testing projects have been conducted by international partners, including operators from Japan, the United States, and India, to evaluate interoperability and security. Furthermore, a joint effort between companies in both countries has been made to conduct interoperability testing using test beds provided by NTT DOCOMO and other companies.</p> -<p>The United States faced similar considerations regarding Antarctica in the 1950s. At that time, Washington was concerned that the Cold War could extend to Antarctica, sparking both a territorial land grab and race to establish military dominance there. Smartly, the United States saw no benefit from that development and worked diplomatically to preserve the status quo, which meant keeping military activities out and preserving the region for scientific research. Fortunately, the Soviet Union agreed to insulate Antarctica from military activities as long as it could be a party to the negotiation and subsequent agreement. It is critical to highlight that this arrangement only worked because the United States gave the Soviet Union a seat at the negotiating table.</p> +<p>Figure 9 provides a simplified mapping of the critical infrastructure protection frameworks of the United States and Japan. It should be noted that this mapping is intended to provide a comprehensive overview and does not necessarily represent a complete one-to-one relationship in terms of roles and responsibilities, scale, and operational maturities.</p> -<p>Both the United States and China talk publicly about national security considerations for cislunar space. But the core considerations on both sides are national prestige and fears about getting shut out of cislunar opportunities, rather than strategic military advantage. As with Antarctica, it may be better for the United States and China to keep military uses and activities away from cislunar space for as long as possible.</p> +<h3 id="recommendations-for-japan-us-cooperation-on-critical-infrastructure-cybersecurity-and-resilience">Recommendations for Japan-U.S. Cooperation on Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity and Resilience</h3> -<p>What happens if the United States seeks to preserve the nonmilitarized cislunar status quo through an agreement with China and other nations, with compliance monitored via new civil and commercial cislunar SSA capabilities? Achieving this outcome would free up U.S. defense funding and resources for better use elsewhere, possibly on other military space capabilities closer to Earth. China, like the Soviet Union regarding Antarctica, might be receptive to preserving a nonmilitarized cislunar environment. But if China does not agree on that goal, the United States should let China waste resources. Every renminbi spent on a Chinese military cislunar development — to win a race that would grant it no strategic advantage — is a renminbi not spent on some other system that could truly harm U.S. national security. For the foreseeable future, nothing China could do in cislunar space would alter the military calculus on Earth should it ever find itself in a direct conflict with the United States.</p> +<p>Based on the discussions so far, this chapter outlines recommendations for Japan-U.S. cybersecurity cooperation in the areas of critical infrastructure cybersecurity and resilience. The recommendations are divided into two main categories: basic prerequisites for enhancing operational collaboration and specific areas of collaboration based on these prerequisites.</p> -<p>In the interest of optimizing the use of military resources, the United States may want to consider whether DoD cislunar programs, such as those at DARPA and AFRL, should be funded from the defense or non-defense budgets. Programs like AFRL’s Oracle-Mobility and Oracle-Prime are designed to test cislunar SSA and tracking technologies, which could support civilian and commercial cislunar activities and align with NASA’s cislunar infrastructure needs. There is no reason such programs could not be managed and funded by NASA or another civilian agency. Additionally, the U.S. government could contract with companies, who could build and operate commercial systems, to provide cislunar SSA data and services. Alternatively or concurrently, the United States could undertake an international approach to building such cislunar infrastructure. In either case, DoD and other national security users who want SSA data for cislunar space domain awareness, such as for monitoring China’s cislunar activities, could obtain such data from civilian or commercial systems.</p> +<h4 id="prerequisites-for-operational-collaboration">Prerequisites for Operational Collaboration</h4> -<h3 id="recommendations">RECOMMENDATIONS</h3> +<p><em>Obtain a comprehensive overview of national cybersecurity posture in both countries and comparatively map the postures</em></p> -<p>Based on the preceding observations on potential paths forward, the authors offer the following recommendations for consideration by U.S. policymakers:</p> +<p>A comprehensive cybersecurity strategy requires a unified approach across the entire society. As previously discussed, the organizations and functions of national cybersecurity in the United States and Japan are highly decentralized and complex, with multiple stakeholders interacting with each other. All those involved in cybersecurity cooperation between the two countries should first have a comprehensive common understanding of the overall picture, including how cybersecurity is structured and functions in both countries, as well as what is taking place in the nation as a whole. This should be a prerequisite to pursuing specific areas of cooperation. It helps everyone understand how each specific area of cooperation fits into the broader picture and how it relates to other areas and stakeholders. It also facilitates whole-optimal and effective national-level cooperation, avoiding the creation of silos. Then, all stakeholders should have a shared understanding of mapping counterparts in both countries at the respective levels of the public and private sectors and establish the appropriate channels for structured collaboration. Regardless of the form of relationship (e.g., one-to-one, one-to-many, or many-to-many), it is important to eliminate as much duplication as possible in each channel.</p> -<p><strong>Address governance gaps and coordination with China:</strong> To create a safe and sustainable cislunar environment so that the United States can achieve its national objectives, the United States should address cislunar space governance and coordination gaps in a manner that includes input from China. These governance gaps include agreement on permissible activities, property rights and space resources, and space rules of the road. Additionally, the United States should work with China to increase operator-to-operator data and information sharing related to space safety. Other nations should be included, but coordination protocols and governance agreements and principles negotiated without China are not worth the time. Ideally, solutions to address these issues for cislunar space can address these issues across all of space too.</p> +<p>In particular, Japan is currently in the process of reinforcing its government cybersecurity posture. This is being done through a review of its organizational structure and authorities, roles, and responsibilities, including the establishment of a new cybersecurity agency and the enhancement of JSDF’s capabilities. In the United States, the government structure and functions have evolved over the past several years, including the establishment of ONCD. Taking these changes as great opportunity, it is worthwhile to undertake a comprehensive review of the relationship between the two countries’ systems at all levels, including the public and private sectors, as well as policies and initiatives. The information presented in this paper would help all stakeholders obtain these aspects and serves as a first step in implementing the following recommendations.</p> -<p>There are several possible approaches that could be used by the United States to address cislunar governance gaps. An approach modeled on the Arctic Council — not a treaty but an intergovernmental agreement — could provide a body through which the United States and China, as well as other spacefaring nations meeting certain membership criteria, could discuss cislunar space governance and coordination. As with the Arctic Council, this approach would exclude direct involvement with the United Nations and its full membership. In taking the first steps in establishing such a cislunar space council, the United States could look to the Ottawa Declaration, which established the Arctic Council, for guidance. An International Lunar Year conference — already being discussed by the United States — could also aim to facilitate discussions on cislunar governance among nations with lunar equities. Should it pursue any of these paths, the United States could base its negotiating positions on the Artemis principles. But as the report’s authors have already noted, it is not realistic to expect that China would sign the Artemis Accords, since it was not consulted during their formulation.</p> +<p><em>Expand and operationalize the interoperable mechanism for classified and unclassified cyber information sharing</em></p> -<p>Additionally, the United States could try to find consensus with China on cislunar coordination issues through UN arrangements such as the ATLAC. As noted in an earlier section, this action team was established to provide a forum for U.S.-Chinese discussions on cislunar space coordination. Ultimately, a modest goal for the ATLAC may be to build trust between the two powers. Trust is needed for both sides to grow more comfortable directly engaging with each other on cislunar space safety, coordination, and governance issues — and later in drafting more comprehensive agreements on broader space governance, coordination, and safety issues.</p> +<p>Now that cybersecurity has become a matter of national security, it is becoming increasingly important to establish a secure and efficient mechanism for sharing sensitive or classified cybersecurity information between Japan and the United States. While a framework for sharing classified information between the two countries already exists, it is limited in terms of the types of information protected and the level of classification and has not necessarily been sufficient in the area of cybersecurity. The recently passed security clearance legislation in Japan will greatly expand the scope of the existing system by extending the scope of information to include cybersecurity, the level of classified classification, and the scope of clearance to a broader private sector, which had previously been focused on government officials. This would be a major step forward in the exchange of classified information in the cybersecurity field. The government is currently developing operational standards in preparation for the launch of the system in 2025. This preparation should include ensuring interoperability with like-minded countries, including the United States, as a key area of focus. Looking ahead, it would be beneficial for both governments to engage in specific discussions on how to expand and operationalize the existing interoperable mechanism to cover the cyber domain. While Japan is not necessarily required to join the Five Eyes alliance, it is important to establish a trusted framework with the new clearance system defining procedures and protocols for cyber intelligence sharing. It is also necessary for the Japanese and U.S. governments to clearly define and agree on a centralized point of contact between them so that cyber intelligence sharing can be conducted through a single channel.</p> -<p><strong>Ensure nonmilitarized status:</strong> The United States should assess whether there are compelling strategic cislunar military uses or goals. The authors of this report assert that this report do not see any now or in the foreseeable future and assert that cislunar space looks like Antarctica did in the 1950s. If it does not foresee any strategic national security objectives, the United States should advocate for the same approach taken in Antarctica, meaning no military uses of cislunar space, reinforcing the OST provisions already prohibiting military activities on the Moon and other celestial bodies. This would require an agreement between the United States and China, ideally including other spacefaring nations, to keep military interests out of cislunar space. Such an agreement could be negotiated outside of the United Nations, mirroring the approach taken for the Antarctic Treaty. Arguably, this process could proceed hand in hand with the first recommendation in this section, meaning that part of the effort to create a cislunar space council might involve efforts to ensure the nonmilitarized status of cislunar space. This approach does not rule out U.S. national security interest in monitoring cislunar space and assumes DoD and other national security users could acquire cislunar SSA data from civilian or commercial sources for such purposes.</p> +<p>At the same time, it is important to note that today’s cybersecurity information sharing has been focused more on providing useful information in a timely manner and as broadly as possible through declassification. There are multiple ways for information sharing, including the security clearance system and the Traffic Light Protocol, for instance. It is, therefore, important for Japan and the United States to identify and clarify the various means of information exchange tailored to the specific type of information to be handled.</p> -<p><strong>Pursue international collaboration on infrastructure:</strong> Solutions to address cislunar infrastructure requirements can best be addressed internationally by pooling resources and creating shared capabilities that potentially lessen the motivations for friction over desirable lunar real estate such as the peaks of eternal light. An international approach that allows partner nations to earn returns on their investments and support domestic industries provides an incentive to participate. The Ariane project offers one model for consideration. Such internationalized infrastructure could help preserve the peaceful, scientific use of the Moon and cislunar space, creating a strong foundation for the United States and other nations to pursue their scientific research and exploration goals. Shared international ownership of cislunar architecture could also form the sinews of peace between nations with cislunar activities, even in times of tension. Arguably, the ISS has served that purpose, remaining one of the last places of peaceful collaboration between the West and Russia over the past two years. Future internationalized cislunar infrastructure could serve the same purpose and advance not only U.S. national interests, but the interests of all humankind.</p> +<p><em>Japan to take further steps to enhance government cybersecurity posture through implementation of the NSS</em></p> -<p>The report’s authors also want to reiterate a few things that the United States does not need to do. There is presently no need for a specific U.S. cislunar strategy or national security cislunar strategy. Existing U.S. space goals and strategy documents are sufficient, though U.S. government implementation plans will prove useful. While investments in new cislunar SSA technologies and systems are important, improved coordination mechanisms and operator data sharing can vastly improve cislunar space safety and sustainability. Incremental steps today to improve cislunar SSA data collection are sufficient to meet the anticipated traffic, giving the United States time to develop a holistic and thoughtful architecture for a future cislunar SSA network. Taking steps to create agreed-to rules to prevent the creation of new cislunar space debris further lessens any urgency to build cislunar SSA infrastructure. Additionally, there is no need for U.S. military projects focused on cislunar space.</p> +<p>In the NSS of Japan, Japan has committed to fundamentally enhance the government’s cybersecurity capabilities, including the implementation of proactive cyber operations. This can be achieved by enhancing both the operational authorities and capabilities of the government.</p> -<p>Ultimately, the authors acknowledge that these recommendations — collaborating with China, limiting military activities beyond GEO, and internationalizing lunar infrastructure — challenge aspects of conventional U.S. thinking on space. This means that implementing one or all of these recommendations will require significant political will. But the United States should not be afraid to make a course correction resulting in an outcome that better aligns with U.S. interests, even if that path seems hard.</p> +<p>Japan is currently focusing on potential amendments to existing laws, including the Telecommunications Business Act and the Unauthorized Computer Access Prohibition Act, to grant operational authorities. While some of the legislative issues are complex, given their constitutional implications, it is essential for Japanese policymakers to accelerate the discussion to clarify the government’s strategic objectives at the operational level and identify the means to achieve them in reality. The strategy primarily outlines the government’s intended actions. However, it also assumes that telecommunication carriers and other private companies will be positioned to indirectly support government operations by providing information on communications and threat intelligence as well as analysis expertise. It is, therefore, important, in legislative discussions, to define the roles and responsibilities of private companies in national cyber defense, legal protection, and financial support for the cost of facilities, people, and operations.</p> -<h3 id="conclusion">CONCLUSION</h3> +<p>Furthermore, a new cybersecurity agency, built on NISC, should become the primary entity for coordinating, operating, and enforcing national cyber resilience. It should also serve as a centralized point of contact for international cooperation. As the government’s technical and operational activities increase in this evolution, the new agency, as a national CSIRT, needs to secure additional cyber professionals. While the government’s cyber workforce is being expanded at NISC, NPA, JSDF, and other agencies, further expansion should be considered for the new agency to be fully operational. This could be done through hiring professionals from the private sector as well as leveraging capacity-building programs offered by the private sector.</p> -<blockquote> - <p><em>“We choose to go to the Moon. . . . We choose to go to the Moon in this decade and do the other things, not because they are easy, but because they are hard.”</em></p> - <h4 id="-president-john-f-kennedy-1962">— President John F. Kennedy, 1962</h4> -</blockquote> +<p>The strategy is already in place and further implementation would enhance the government’s cybersecurity capabilities, which in turn will stimulate more bidirectional operational cooperation between the public and private sectors than ever before. This would further reinforce Japan’s overall cybersecurity posture and facilitate international collaboration and coordination. While the strategy is currently being implemented, it would be beneficial for Japan and the United States to proceed now with discussions on potential ways for to enhance cooperation built on the implementation.</p> -<p>There is a lot of promise — and hype — around the future of humankind in cislunar space. But there are also hard realities. Only the United States and China are positioned to develop and launch crewed spacecraft to the Moon. Russia has ambitious plans for crewed lunar missions but insufficient resources to make them happen. Without the United States and China, there would be very few missions to cislunar space over the next decade. Several other nations are planning uncrewed missions to the Moon, but most of these missions are hitching a ride on a U.S. spacecraft. While some of these future missions will be operated by companies, they are still inextricably tied to government funding and objectives — particularly to NASA funding. Today, there are few, if any, realized business cases separate from the government for cislunar activities.</p> +<h4 id="collaboration-on-plans-preparedness-and-operations">Collaboration on Plans, Preparedness, and Operations</h4> -<p>Almost all activities in cislunar space, including in orbit and on the surface of the Moon, focus on science and research. As with Antarctica, there is no clear or obvious strategic military benefit derived from cislunar space. Militarily “winning” in cislunar space, no matter how one defines it, would do nothing to alter the outcome of a conflict between the United States and China — or any other possible adversary. Military funding and resources can be better spent elsewhere. It is in the interests of the United States to keep military uses out of cislunar space as long as possible and to retain the focus on science, leaving open the door to future business use cases such as mining.</p> +<p><em>Engage in national-level advanced risk analysis focusing on critical infrastructures of both countries</em></p> -<p>There is no indication of a lunar gold rush, though cislunar traffic has steadily increased since the 1980s. If there is one area of increased activity deserving of attention, it is the lunar south pole. There will likely be more overlapping activities from various nations at the lunar south pole than anywhere else on the Moon. Governments’ investments in technologies and infrastructure and their efforts to address space governance gaps should be aimed at making sure that activity in this region and in lunar orbits can be done safely, sustainably, and efficiently. Given that the current focus is science and exploration, the United States should continue to collaborate with partners worldwide, potentially taking an international approach to building and operating cislunar infrastructure to meet these goals. Furthermore, the United States should try to collaborate with China, particularly on cislunar space governance and operational space safety coordination.</p> +<p>The cybersecurity and resilience of critical infrastructure is a matter of national concern, affecting not just one organization or sector but the entire nation, as a failure in one organization can have cascading effects on that sector, other sectors, and the entire nation. It is, therefore, becoming increasingly important to conduct a national-level risk analysis that focuses on understanding the interdependencies of critical infrastructure sectors and functions, analyzing their systemic risks, and identifying the most critical entities and functions with a risk-based approach. The United States has been working in this area for several years, beginning with the development of NCFs, while Japan is currently in the early stages of conducting interdependency analysis. However, neither has necessarily focused on the international perspective but rather on the domestic one. In reality, however, the interdependencies and systemic risks have an international reach. These interconnectivities are particularly strong between nations that are allied as well as economically tied to each other.</p> -<p>The current geopolitical environment makes it harder to work collaboratively with China. The Cold War provided a similarly tense environment — yet it was against this backdrop that the United States, Soviet Union, and dozens of nations produced the OST and several subsequent space agreements. This context produced the Apollo-Soyuz mission, laying the groundwork for the ISS decades later. Cislunar space and beyond is probably the best environment — maybe the only environment today — where the United States and China, as well as many other nations, can find common ground on shared interests. The United States should seize this opportunity, both for U.S. national interests and for humankind more broadly.</p> +<p>It would, therefore, be beneficial to pursue cooperation in the area of national-level risk analysis, including critical infrastructures for which both countries rely on each other. This could include mapping out the interdependencies of both countries’ infrastructures as a whole, including, but not limited to, communications and digital infrastructure as a foundation for intelligence and information sharing; communications, power, water, and transportation infrastructure on which U.S. military bases in Japan depend; and financial and logistics infrastructure that is key to their economic activities. This would also include analyzing their systemic risks, taking into account the timescale of impacts, and identifying the sectors, operators, and functions that are particularly important. This will greatly assist both countries in responding collectively to national-scale incidents and ensuring the resilience of the alliance as a whole.</p> -<hr /> +<p>In today’s digitally interconnected world, interdependencies have become so complex that even a domestic-focused analysis is challenging. Even in the United States, which is a leader in this field, the study has not yet been fully completed. Bringing together the analytical methodologies and practices of both countries can add value to existing studies in both countries. For instance, the NCFs in the United States could be leveraged in Japan’s interdependency analysis while the concept of designating essential infrastructure owners and operators and critical facilities in Japan’s new regulation could provide insights for the study of SIEs in the United States. From this perspective as well, it would be mutually beneficial for the two countries to collaborate on risk analysis at the national level.</p> -<p><strong>Clayton Swope</strong> is the deputy director of the Aerospace Security Project and a senior fellow in the International Security Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS).</p> +<p>While this initiative should be led by key government agencies responsible for national security and critical infrastructure protection (NSC and CISA of the United States and the National Security Secretariat and NISC of Japan), it is crucial to expand the involvement of critical infrastructure owners and operators more than ever. It is clear that the owners and operators have the most accurate understanding of the functions and services on which they depend, and they are responsible for managing their own risks, including interdependencies. To be more effective, the study would need to include at least the major operators in each sector in both countries.</p> -<p><strong>Louis Gleason</strong> is a former research intern for the CSIS Aerospace Security Project.</p>Clayton Swope and Louis GleasonMore and more nations and companies will send mission towards the Moon over the next several years. What challenges do these space operators face and how can they be addressed?Philippine Energy Security2024-10-21T12:00:00+08:002024-10-21T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/philippine-energy-security<ul> - <li><em>The Philippines’ fragile energy outlook threatens to undermine efforts to secure its strategic autonomy vis-à-vis an assertive China.</em></li> -</ul> +<p><em>Regularly conduct cross-sector public-private joint cyber exercises</em></p> -<excerpt /> +<p>In the event of a significant cyber incident that could affect national security, all stakeholders across the public and private sectors, including international partners, must work together to respond. It is essential to prioritize preparedness and exercises in peacetime. While both countries have conducted cross-sector public-private cyber exercises, they have not necessarily focused primarily on collaboration with international partners, as seen in joint exercises between defense authorities.</p> -<ul> - <li> - <p><em>A tabletop exercise held at CSIS this spring with U.S. and Philippine participants explored the strategic implications of different energy investments and their vulnerability to disruption.</em></p> - </li> - <li> - <p><em>Bringing online renewable and clean energy sources is an imperative to providing for Philippine energy security in the long term, but fossil fuels will have a critical stabilizing role in the near term.</em></p> - </li> - <li> - <p><em>The United States can support its ally through enhanced alliance programing, technical assistance, and new approaches to interagency cooperation.</em></p> - </li> -</ul> +<p>As a first step toward conducting a joint large-scale cyber exercise, both countries, led by CISA and NISC, should work together to develop national response plans and exercise scenarios at both the national and alliance levels, with a particular focus on cross-border considerations, to enable a coordinated collective response. The plan should include the incident response procedure, its prioritization, the counterparts of each entity, and communication channels based on the national-level risk analysis. The scenario could involve a cyberattack impacting multiple critical infrastructure sectors simultaneously, assuming a significant national-level threat from state-sponsored actors. This will verify how both countries and their respective entities can collectively respond to incidents. This may be a too large-scale, near-worst-case scenario exercise, but as previously mentioned, the United States and Japan have been facing a common geopolitical threat, and the risk of both countries’ critical infrastructure being affected strategically at the same time can no longer be ignored.</p> -<h3 id="introduction">Introduction</h3> +<p>It is recommended that such an exercise be conducted on an annual basis to review and reinforce the plan in response to evolving threats and to ensure its continued effectiveness. It is essential that all entities involved in the developed scenario, from both the public and private sectors, are included as participants.</p> -<h4 id="an-alliance-reborn">An Alliance Reborn</h4> +<p><em>Expand overarching public-private operational collaboration in the United States and Japan</em></p> -<p>The U.S.-Philippine alliance is experiencing a renaissance. Driven by unrelenting pressure from Beijing on Philippine activities in the South China Sea, Manila has pushed forward with Washington on a range of measures to modernize the alliance and give substance to the commitments outlined in the 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty. The once-stalled Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) — which provides for U.S. construction of joint facilities, pre-positioning of equipment, and rotational deployment of troops at designated Philippine military sites — has been given new life amid a flurry of military-to-military cooperation, and was expanded from five to nine sites in 2023. This July, the United States quintupled foreign military financing to the Philippines, announcing that $500 million would be made available in the 2024 fiscal year by the Indo-Pacific Security Supplemental Appropriations Act. And in April 2024, recognizing that economic independence plays an equal part in securing the Philippines’ strategic autonomy, leaders of the United States, the Philippines, and Japan announced the Luzon Economic Corridor, an initiative under the G7 Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment (PGI) to accelerate coordinated investments in high-impact infrastructure connecting four locations: Subic Bay, Clark Freeport and Special Economic Zone, Manila, and Batangas.</p> +<p>It is recommended that both countries establish a centralized framework for cross-sector operational collaboration that includes key private companies and government agencies responsible for critical infrastructure protection. While both countries have public-private cooperation frameworks in place at the domestic level, as well as operational cooperation between the two countries locally or partially in certain areas, there is an opportunity to further expand and integrate these initiatives into an environment where all necessary players can come together and cooperate in a flexible and timely manner. For instance, while NTT is involved in JCDC from Japan, there are several other companies in Japan with a high level of technical and operational expertise. Furthermore, U.S.-based companies are individually engaged in collaborative efforts with Japan. For example, Microsoft has partnered with the Japanese government, while Google has established a cybersecurity research center in Tokyo. By incorporating some of these into a larger Japan-U.S. PPP framework, the level of operational collaboration could be further enhanced. The centralized framework would enable the public and private sectors of both countries to enhance activities such as threat intelligence and information sharing, joint analysis, and the development of countermeasures. While not all information handled in operational collaboration is necessarily classified, the passage of Japan’s security clearance legislation would also greatly facilitate collaboration. This would consequently assist both countries in issuing joint attribution and advisories with greater frequency than ever before, which would contribute to reinforcing international deterrence as well as providing actionable cybersecurity measures to the public at large.</p> -<p>But despite substantial progress, the alliance still faces tremendous challenges in securing the Philippines’ freedom from coercion. The country is on the wrong end of a significant capacity gap with China in the South China Sea. Outmatched by tens of China Coast Guard ships and hundreds of Chinese maritime militia vessels, the Philippines struggles to maintain access to outposts in disputed areas, even within its own exclusive economic zone. Regular confrontations with Chinese ships — and, more recently, aircraft — have injured Philippine troops, damaged vessels and equipment, and come dangerously close to resulting in the death of a service member, a contingency that could force Manila to invoke U.S. alliance commitments.</p> +<p>In cross-border public-private operational collaboration, it is crucial to build trust among members. It is advisable to begin with a small, limited number of the most capable companies that can interact with each other with sufficient trust and agility. This can then be expanded gradually. While the private sector plays an important role in collaboration, the role of CISA and NISC as lead agencies is also crucial to effectively promote top-down nationwide cooperation. It is essential to maintain a robust channel of collaboration between the two. One potential step would be to assign liaisons with cybersecurity expertise in CISA and NISC to each other. This would clarify the point of contact as well as build trust between the two organizations, promoting closer collaboration on a daily basis. CISA’s liaison office in the United Kingdom and the JSDF’s liaison officers at the Pentagon may be suitable models for consideration.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/ndUB05w.png" alt="image01" /></p> +<p><em>Deepen sector-to-sector collaboration</em></p> -<p>There are also challenges to the alliance from within the Philippines. While the current administration, political-military establishment, and a majority of public opinion support strong U.S. ties, there remains a vocal anti-U.S. coalition of politicians and elites with ties to the Duterte administration or China. Pro-China and anti-U.S. narratives are widespread in a fractured information environment susceptible to disinformation campaigns by China-linked media outlets. Cynics argue that Washington is only using the Philippines as a tool to contain China and defend Taiwan. Even among those who support stronger U.S.-Philippine ties, the shadow of past failures — particularly China’s 2012 seizure of Scarborough Shoal — looms large. Commitments to defense spending, military cooperation, and economic support do not necessarily answer the lingering concern that in a critical moment, the United States may not be willing or able to protect the Philippines.</p> +<p>The United States and Japan face similar challenges in sectors that are vulnerable to being targeted by state-sponsored actors, such as the electricity, communications, transportation, and water sectors, as well as sectors that are vulnerable to ransomware attacks, such as the healthcare sector. It is, therefore, recommended that the two countries deepen direct sector-to-sector collaboration to address sector-specific cyber and physical security and resilience. In addition to the common cybersecurity standards and requirements across sectors, each sector requires sector-specific risk management and resilience that takes into account its unique ecosystems with supply chains, business practices, systems, facilities, and other specific components. This requires different expertise in different industries and sectors. Fortunately, the sector designations in both countries are similar and can be relatively easily mapped. It would be beneficial to collaborate on developing and sharing guidance, best practices, and tools between sectors in both countries to enhance sector-specific capabilities. This would also be beneficial for under-resourced sectors to optimize their limited cyber resources. Moreover, establishing an environment where sector-specific threats and vulnerabilities are directly shared between the sectors would be a significant operational benefit.</p> -<h4 id="a-critical-vulnerability-energy">A Critical Vulnerability: Energy</h4> +<p>In the context of sector-to-sector collaboration, Japan and the United States can focus more on industry-specific characteristics beyond cybersecurity, including physical security and disaster management. Since the interdependency extends beyond cyberspace, it is important to consider physical security when identifying systemic risk. Japan has a long history of experiencing several national-scale disasters, including typhoons, earthquakes, and tsunamis. As a result, the country has developed a wealth of experience and expertise in dealing with such events, ensuring cyber and physical resilience. In particular, Japan’s major companies, which provide essential infrastructure services that support the functioning of the nation, are well-versed in integrated resilience measures specific to their industry. This is the source of Japan’s ability to provide infrastructure services with a high degree of stability and accuracy, and its practices can be highly beneficial for improving resilience and ensuring business continuity in sectors with similar characteristics in the United States.</p> -<p>Even as Washington and Manila work to modernize their alliance and solidify its foundations, an emerging vulnerability threatens to undermine its potential: the Philippines’ fragile energy outlook.</p> +<p>Specific forms of cooperation could include operational collaboration between ISACs. While cooperation between government agencies is essential, it is also crucial to involve private companies, which own and operate the majority of critical infrastructure. It is, therefore, beneficial to facilitate direct collaboration between major companies representing sectors in both countries. One potential approach to advance this is to exchange a few selected cybersecurity staff from major companies in each sector in both countries for a certain period. Such an initiative would not only facilitate the exchange of valuable insights between the two sectors; it would also lay the foundation for the trust needed to facilitate operational collaboration.</p> -<p>The Philippine energy mix is heavily dependent on imported fossil fuels, with coal accounting for 60 percent of power generation in 2022, up from 34 percent in 2010. This reliance on fossil fuels increases vulnerability to supply disruptions, a risk amplified by the nation’s archipelagic geography. The country suffers from some of the highest electricity prices in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). These vulnerabilities are compounded by operational challenges, including frequent blackouts, with most Filipinos experiencing power outages at least once a month.</p> +<p><em>Enhance coordinated operations to disrupt threat actors</em></p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/9jVDUze.png" alt="image02" /></p> +<p>As the number of borderless cyberattacks targeting critical infrastructure continues to grow, it is becoming increasingly clear that international law enforcement agencies must take a more coordinated approach to countermeasures, including the takedown of botnets, shutdown of cryptocurrency infrastructures, recovery of ransom, and assistance to victims. The United States and Japan have a collaborative relationship in this area, with a particularly strong partnership in recent years, including in the coordinated response to the LockBit ransomware group. However, the number of such operations is smaller than that of the United States and European countries, and there is still room to expand cooperation in this area. As NPA demonstrated its high technical capabilities with the LockBit operation, Japan can make a further contribution with these capabilities. Furthermore, with the growing geopolitical tensions, Japan’s strategic location at the center of the Indo-Pacific region presents an opportunity for Japan to contribute to criminal investigations with the unique information it gathers in the region. Japan can also serve as a hub state for cooperation with other countries in the region, working with the United States.</p> -<p>The inadequacies of the power grid, including issues of transmission, storage, and inter-island connectivity, are concerns that the Philippines’ Department of Energy (PDOE) is keenly focused on. The grid also harbors a strategic vulnerability: its operator, the National Grid Corporation of the Philippines (NGCP), is 40 percent owned by the State Grid Corporation of China (SGCC). Fears in both Manila and Washington that Beijing could disable the grid in a time of crisis have lent urgency to efforts to reform its ownership and operational structure.</p> +<p>The FBI and NPA are responsible for the enforcement of countermeasures. However, since the cloud, networks, and cryptocurrency infrastructure utilized by attackers are tied to private providers internationally, it is necessary for companies in both countries to cooperate with law enforcement agencies within the legal framework. Further collaboration between law enforcement agencies and increased opportunities for coordinated operations involving private organizations in both countries would reinforce deterrence and demonstrate Japan-U.S. solidarity against foreign adversaries.</p> -<p>Parallel to addressing immediate challenges, the Philippines is setting ambitious long-term goals under its Philippine Energy Plan 2023-2050 (PEP), which envisions a significant transition to renewable energy. The PEP aims to increase the share of renewables in the energy mix to over 50 percent by 2050, a substantial shift. Key legislative changes, such as a recent bill allowing 100 percent foreign ownership of renewable energy projects, are steps toward reaching this goal.</p> +<h4 id="additional-areas-of-collaboration">Additional Areas of Collaboration</h4> -<p>However, the country’s heavy reliance on energy imports continues to be a pressing issue, with over 50 percent of its energy supply sourced through net imports. The impending depletion of the Malampaya gas fields in the South China Sea, which currently supply about 30 percent of Luzon’s electricity, further exacerbates this problem. China’s willingness to use its coast guard to contest any new exploration or development in disputed areas has created reluctance within the private sector to invest in such a high-risk environment.</p> +<p><em>Harmonize rules, standards, and framework</em></p> -<p>Without smart mitigation, the Philippines’ current energy challenges threaten to leave it economically stunted and vulnerable to global supply shocks, economic coercion, physical and cyberattacks on infrastructure, and information operations that seek to undermine its strategic autonomy. How Manila calibrates its energy policy in the next several years will have critical ramifications for Philippine national security, the U.S.-Philippine alliance, and the Indo-Pacific at large.</p> +<p>One key objective of Japan-U.S. collaboration is to harmonize the various cybersecurity processes in both countries. While there is a wide range of approaches to cybersecurity, from mandatory requirements to voluntary standards and frameworks, it is important to harmonize these internationally to streamline processes and ensure consistency. This is of particular importance for allied countries to ensure the interoperability of rules and frameworks, reduce the burden on multinational companies located in both countries, and ensure the same levels of cybersecurity.</p> -<h3 id="tabletop-exercise-design">Tabletop Exercise Design</h3> +<p>There is currently a growing discussion in Japan on the potential requirement for critical infrastructure owners and operators across sectors to report significant cyber incidents. As this discussion continues, it will be necessary for Japan to investigate and analyze similar regulations in other countries, including the U.S. CIRCIA, to achieve greater effectiveness and alignment. Furthermore, as a voluntary guideline for critical infrastructure, it would be beneficial to crosswalk and map between a series of Japan’s guidelines and the U.S. CSF and CPGs. It would also be beneficial for both countries to develop and standardize basic principles with international partners, such as minimum baseline requirements that may be developed in the United States in the near future, as baseline requirements should not differ significantly across nations. It is also recommended that government procurement and certification requirements be standardized to reduce the administrative burden on companies in both countries. For example, although FedRAMP and ISMAP, certification programs for cloud services, are said to be equivalent to some extent, providers need to obtain certification separately from each. There is an opportunity to explore the possibility of mutual recognition.</p> -<p>To better understand the challenges, opportunities, and trade-offs facing Manila and Washington as they try to provide for Philippine energy security, CSIS conducted a tabletop exercise (TTX) with participants from U.S. government agencies, think tanks, and private sector energy companies, plus Philippine academics, national security experts, and former government officials. The TTX was conducted in person in April 2024 over two days, facilitating candid discussions under the Chatham House Rule.</p> +<p>It would also be beneficial for both countries to further promote the adoption of the NIST CSF as a risk-based, standards-based, flexible, technology-neutral, and global consensus-based framework. Japan has a long history of international partners engaging in CSF development and implementation. The release of CSF 2.0 is an opportunity for the private sector to take the lead in the transition to the new version, the development of supplementary resources, the sharing of use cases and lessons learned, and the expansion of application to a wide range of organizations, including SMBs. These should continue to be promoted through cooperation with NIST and the National Cybersecurity Center of Excellence (NCCoE) community. The use of a common framework for cybersecurity risk management enables organizations in both countries to visualize risks and their management plans and communicate in a common language, facilitating discussions on operational collaboration. Furthermore, in recent years, the CSF has been frequently brought up in regulatory discussions, with a growing consensus that it should serve as a common foundation for all involved. Thus, the adoption of the CSF has become a crucial step in facilitating international regulatory harmonization as well.</p> -<p>The TTX took players through three interconnected modules focusing on energy, competition, and conflict, with the goal of determining optimal investments for different stakeholders within the context of strategic competition. Teams of participants representing the United States, the Philippines, China, and the private sector worked together to develop investment strategies and ranked seven areas of energy investment by priority: transmission and distribution, storage, renewables, nuclear, domestic oil and gas, imported oil and gas, and coal. The energy module was run three times over the course of the exercise, creating three sets of investment preferences: one after initial strategy discussions within players’ own teams, a second after each team’s preferences were shared with all other teams in a group discussion, and a third after teams had participated in competition and conflict modules.</p> +<p><em>Cooperate on specific technologies and services</em></p> -<p>Additionally, in advance of the TTX, a survey of Philippine public opinion was conducted by CSIS in cooperation with Philippine public opinion research firm WR Numero Research. This March 2024 in-person survey of 1,765 Filipinos informed the scenarios and design of the modules within the TTX, and results were used to inform participants of baseline attitudes among the Philippine public on key issues.</p> +<p>The United States and Japan have world-leading technological capabilities and much to gain from cooperating in specific technological areas. This paper does not address all of them, as its focus is on critical infrastructure protection, but briefly outlines some of the potential areas of cooperation.</p> -<h4 id="exercise-results-and-key-findings">Exercise Results and Key Findings</h4> +<ul> + <li>Internet routing security</li> +</ul> -<p>The energy investment preferences of each team are summarized in the table below, which lists the top three priorities for each team by round.</p> +<p>The internet is an inherently open and internationally interconnected infrastructure. In particular, routing security, which is currently a key area of focus, requires a collaborative approach involving multiple stakeholders internationally. The United States and Japan have a number of global leading providers of telecommunications, data centers, and cloud services. Many of these entities may have already implemented RPKI and other routing security measures in their infrastructure, but they could further influence the entire internet ecosystem, including SMBs and customer networks, by advocating their practices through the international community of internet operations. As the United States shifts its focus to a domestic regulatory approach, it would be highly beneficial for U.S. and Japanese operators to spearhead industry-led initiatives as a model for the community and to promote international stakeholder approaches.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/RqpXhde.png" alt="image03" /></p> +<ul> + <li>5G/O-RAN security</li> +</ul> -<p>Over the course of the TTX, several key themes emerged.</p> +<p>The United States and Japan are in relatively similar positions with regard to the development and deployment of 5G networks using O-RAN, as there are no traditional wireless communications equipment vendors with a significant global market share, such as Nokia and Ericsson in Europe. In the international deployment of secure and reliable 5G networks, O-RAN security is a key area of focus and an opportunity for mutually beneficial collaboration between the United States and Japan. The O-RAN security report published by Quad states that networks using O-RAN do not fundamentally alter the security environment of wireless communication networks compared to conventional networks. Moving forward, it would be beneficial for the two countries to showcase their achievements in building secure networks by conducting joint tests focusing on cybersecurity in a phase closer to commercial implementation. This can be achieved through NTIA grant programs in which both Japanese and U.S. carriers participate, as well as test beds provided by carriers.</p> -<p><em>The Battle for the Grid</em></p> +<ul> + <li>Vulnerability scanning</li> +</ul> -<p>Transmission and distribution (T+D), and to a lesser extent storage, were key focuses of the U.S., Philippine, and Chinese teams from the beginning to the end of the game. The focus on transmission and distribution — with transmission referring to large-scale movement of high-voltage power from plants to substations, and distribution referring to smaller-scale movement of lower-voltage power from substations to consumers — was particularly acute given the contested status of the NGCP’s Chinese ownership stake. The Chinese team viewed its involvement in the Philippine electrical grid as a lever of power that it could employ in a crisis to cause paralysis among Philippine decisionmakers and, potentially, military forces. The United States and the Philippines both recognized that threat, which contributed to their own prioritization of T+D. Both additionally expressed an interest to enhance the grid and expand it to more remote areas, seeing its current state as a key bottleneck in delivering reliable power across the Philippines.</p> +<p>The NOTICE project, which has been in operation in Japan for over five years, extensively scans vulnerabilities in internet-facing IoT devices in Japan and encourages users to take corrective action. Meanwhile, CISA has been providing a Cyber Hygiene Vulnerability Scanning service since 2022 that scans vulnerabilities in internet-facing devices owned by registered companies and issues reports and alerts. There are similarities between the two programs. Through cooperation, both programs could provide insights on how to enhance their programs from various perspectives, including technical implementations and user outreach methods. Moreover, there could be an opportunity for collaboration in sharing services, tools, and resources of the programs.</p> -<p>Philippine participants emphasized that while the future of SGCC’s ownership stake in the grid is a political question, there are also practical concerns about the operation of the grid. Although the NGCP concession agreement mandates that Philippine nationals remain in charge of all operational functions of the grid, SGCC has been accused of instead hiring Chinese personnel and even having systems and operator instructions exclusively in Chinese, raising questions about whether the Philippines can easily replace Chinese functions inside the NGCP.</p> +<ul> + <li>Space system security</li> +</ul> -<p>In contrast to the national teams, the private sector team remained hesitant about investing in the grid. The concession agreement with SGCC was seen as a fundamental obstacle, as all cooperative projects would need to involve the Chinese company, which would preclude involvement from most other private partners, particularly U.S. companies. The Philippines’ archipelagic geography was also seen as making transmission or distribution development in Mindanao and the Visayas economically unattractive — a problem compounded by fears that any investment would be subject to the approval of local political leaders who sometimes have personal interests in utility markets, introducing a high level of political risk for the life of the project.</p> +<p>While space systems have not been designated as critical infrastructure in either country, it is clear that space has already become a strategic domain for both commercial and military use. While there is a growing concern about the cybersecurity of space systems, including from a national security perspective, both countries are still in the early stages of addressing the specific risk. In the United States, CISA, the NSC, and the National Space Council are taking the lead in studying minimum cybersecurity requirements for space systems. CISA, in cooperation with the private sector, recently released a paper outlining recommendations for space system operators. In Japan, METI has published cybersecurity guidelines for commercial space systems. As this is a new and evolving area, there may be an opportunity for the two countries to cooperate in assessing space-specific threats and risks and developing a risk management plan. In January 2023, the United States and Japan signed a framework agreement on comprehensive space cooperation. It would be worthwhile for both countries to prioritize cybersecurity as a key area of cooperation in anticipation of the potential designation of space systems as critical infrastructure in the future.</p> -<p><em>Competing Priorities: Imported Oil and Gas vs. Renewables</em></p> +<ul> + <li>Post-quantum cryptography</li> +</ul> -<p>Strong interest in renewable energy solutions for the Philippines was evident, consistently ranking among the top four priority areas for all teams. But notable shifts in priorities occurred over the course of the game, with more groups placing a higher priority on imported oil and gas (IO&amp;G) than renewable energy (RE) by the end of the TTX.</p> +<p>Cryptography is a foundational technology for ensuring the confidentiality and integrity of data. It is a critical element of cybersecurity. The release of post-quantum cryptography (PQC) standards by NIST this year further accelerates global efforts around PQC migration. In the United States, the goal is to complete the migration in federal agencies by 2035, as outlined in NSM-10 and a subsequent OMB directive. During the long-term transition, it is essential to ensure connectivity and interoperability between organizations and systems, as there will be a mixed environment of systems with both existing and PQC algorithms. This is also true for the Japan-U.S. alliance. There is an opportunity for both governments to collaborate on coordinating migration road maps for government agencies and critical infrastructure and aligning their efforts on deployment to ensure cybersecurity and interoperability of the digital infrastructure and operational environment on which both countries depend. Moreover, Japanese companies could further contribute to the advancement of international PQC migration initiatives by actively engaging with relevant communities, such as the NCCoE’s project, where they can share best practices and develop guidance on PQC migration.</p> -<p>In round one, renewables enjoyed high interest from all teams, but did not make the top three of the Philippines team, which placed IO&amp;G as their number one priority. The Philippine team explained that its preference was driven by the necessities of timing: only IO&amp;G was perceived to be able to meet rising energy demand over the next 10–15 years. Following this discussion, other teams responded: IO&amp;G rose above renewable energy for the United States in round two, and the private sector also mildly elevated priority on IO&amp;G. After the teams played through competition and conflict scenarios, the shift became even more pronounced, with the United States elevating IO&amp;G to its top priority. Renewables remained in the top three only for China, which continued to think that their adoption would present opportunities for increased influence in the Philippines through the provision of renewable equipment and technology. Renewables remained a close fourth, however, for both the Philippines and the United States, who both saw a transition to renewable energy as inevitable for the Philippines, current strategic exigencies notwithstanding.</p> +<h3 id="conclusion">Conclusion</h3> -<p><em>Mirrored Image Problems: Nuclear Energy and Domestic Oil and Gas</em></p> +<p>The Japan-U.S. alliance is more important than ever in light of the growing geopolitical tensions in the Indo-Pacific region. Much of today’s alliance activities are based on cyberspace, with critical infrastructure for which both countries rely on each other being a central element. Given the shared significant threat to critical infrastructure posed by state-sponsored actors, it is imperative for the two countries to cooperate in critical infrastructure protection to ensure the cybersecurity and resilience of the alliance as a whole and demonstrate their robust solidarity against foreign adversaries.</p> -<p>Despite official efforts to accelerate cooperation between the United States and the Philippines on civil nuclear technology, nuclear energy was deprioritized by the national teams. Philippine participants placed a low priority on nuclear energy, citing popular fears of a nuclear disaster given the frequency of extreme weather events in the Philippines. The Fukushima accident in Japan, brought on by an extreme weather event itself, has remained in the public eye in the Philippines as maritime communities have voiced concerns over the potential impact of treated nuclear wastewater released into the Pacific Ocean.</p> +<p>While there are a number of policy cooperation agendas between the two countries at various levels and entities, including critical infrastructure protection, there is still room for improvement in implementing concrete and tangible operational collaboration. It is crucial for both countries to further expand and operationalize these efforts with speed and scale while ensuring further involvement of critical infrastructure owners and operators. There are several potential avenues for collaboration, including engaging in national and alliance-level risk analysis, conducting cross-sector public-private joint cyber exercises, expanding the public-private operational collaboration environment, deepening sector-to-sector collaboration, enhancing coordinated operations to disrupt threat actors, harmonizing cybersecurity processes, and cooperating in specific technologies and services. To facilitate these specific operational collaborations efficiently, it is also important for all parties involved in Japan-U.S. cybersecurity cooperation to have a comprehensive understanding of both countries’ highly decentralized and complicated cybersecurity structures and their roles, responsibilities, and authorities.</p> -<p>The reverse disparity was observed for domestic oil and gas: though it is unclear whether untapped gas reserves in the South China Sea would make a critical difference in meeting Philippine energy needs over the coming decades, it remained a major topic of discussion almost entirely for its symbolic importance. The national teams ultimately deprioritized it, with Philippine and U.S. teams citing the risk of interference by China as a critical barrier to development. However, due in part to extensive media coverage over the last decade, oil and gas in the South China Sea are widely seen in the Philippines as valuable resources that have been unjustly denied by China.</p> +<p>Japan and the United States are currently at a pivotal point in their national cybersecurity policies, with key national security and cybersecurity strategies and legislation being implemented. Taking these evolutions as an opportunity, it is the right time to reassess the current state of Japan-U.S. cybersecurity cooperation and explore ways forward for further collaboration.</p> -<p>These sensibilities were also observed in the public opinion survey conducted prior to the TTX.</p> +<hr /> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/QfJwdlo.png" alt="image04" /></p> +<p><strong>Taro Hashimoto</strong> is a visiting fellow with the Japan Chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C. He has been with Nippon Telegraph and Telephone (NTT) Group for over 15 years, where he has held various roles in cybersecurity and telecommunication businesses, including service planning, development and operation, research and development, corporate risk management, and human resource development from both technology and management perspectives.</p>Taro HashimotoCybersecurity is the foundation for a robust U.S.-Japan alliance. This report analyzes the cybersecurity policies of both countries and the prospects for future collaboration on critical infrastructure cybersecurity and resilience.Trusted Chips2024-10-24T12:00:00+08:002024-10-24T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/trusted-chips<p><em>A quest for “trusted chips” risks sidetracking crucial semiconductor policy solutions. Aligned policy goals are needed to truly secure and de-risk supply chains, balancing national security, economic viability, and technological feasibility.</em></p> -<p>While survey participants favored energy transmission and grid development as the top targets for U.S. energy investment in the Philippines, over 40 percent also supported oil and gas exploration, while less than 25 percent expressed support for nuclear power.</p> +<excerpt /> -<h4 id="planning-for-a-secure-transition">Planning for a Secure Transition</h4> +<h3 id="introduction">Introduction</h3> -<p>The U.S. and Philippine teams were aligned in their goal of enabling the Philippines to resist coercion. To do this, their final energy investment strategies sought to balance competing priorities in several dimensions:</p> +<p>The United States and its allies have taken significant actions to promote the de-risking of semiconductor supply chains. Protecting and controlling these supply chains also remain critical components of national and economic security discussions. To achieve this holistically, several sometimes-conflicting goals need to be met:</p> -<ul> +<ol> <li> - <p>Near-term stability vs. long-term sustainability</p> + <p>Critical technologies and products need to be controlled.</p> </li> <li> - <p>Economic efficiency vs. strategic preparedness</p> + <p>Export control sanctions must be enforced.</p> </li> <li> - <p>Energy sourcing vs. power infrastructure</p> + <p>Sensitive information must be safeguarded against attacks through compromised chips.</p> </li> <li> - <p>Grid resilience vs. grid expansion</p> + <p>Overreliance on nonmarket actors must be avoided.</p> </li> -</ul> - -<p>IO&amp;G, especially liquidified natural gas (LNG), was seen to be a critical component of the Philippines’ energy mix over the coming decades and one of the only energy sources that could meet growing demand in the near term. Both teams sought to make investments in LNG terminals and plants to connect this resource to the transmission grid and to distribute these terminals geographically such that, in the event of a conflict, cargoes could still be delivered.</p> - -<p>The power grid was also a top priority. The Philippine team aimed to implement an urgent review and elimination of Chinese involvement in grid systems and operations such that, even if the SGCC concession agreement itself was not altered or canceled, grid operations would remain firmly under Philippine control. Teams also identified a need to develop grid infrastructure to integrate renewable energy resources. In doing so, participants saw an opportunity to enhance the resilience of the power system by developing microgrids that would not be integrated directly into the NGCP-run central grid. This was seen as a better fit for the Philippines’ archipelagic geography as well as an opportunity for U.S. and other companies to contribute to developing the Philippine power system in a way that would avoid the difficulties of partnering with the Chinese-invested NGCP.</p> - -<p>Storage was a key piece of each team’s final strategy, and was linked with plans to both import hydrocarbons in the near term and bring online renewable energy in the long term. The Philippine team aimed to fast-track the creation of a strategic petroleum reserve that would provide for 90 days of the country’s energy consumption, a measure that the Philippine government started in 2019 but put on hold in 2022. Teams also sought to invest in power storage for the energy grid as a prerequisite for the connection of renewable energy sources — without it, the variable output of renewables could contribute to grid instability.</p> - -<p>Renewables themselves were seen as the final essential component of a Philippine energy security strategy. Transition to renewables was seen as the best way to reduce the Philippines’ external dependencies and vulnerabilities to price shocks, blockades, and resource depletion. Solar, offshore wind, and hydropower were all raised as important sources to explore, with all likely to play some role in a renewables mix. While the Philippines is already a significant producer of geothermal energy, little opportunity was seen to expand this production, which is heavily dependent on localized areas of geothermal activity. Biomass was also dismissed as having little potential to play a major role in a future renewable energy mix, though smaller-scale efforts to incorporate biofuels for vehicles were seen as having some potential utility.</p> - -<h4 id="potential-for-disruption">Potential for Disruption</h4> - -<p>The China team’s strategy revolved around different end goals: maintaining influence over Philippine energy sectors, displacing the United States as a provider and partner in these areas, and ultimately disrupting the U.S.-Philippine alliance. To this end, its prioritization of different energy investments was not based on any desired end state for the Philippines’ energy outlook, but instead largely sought to follow whichever area the Philippines was interested in and outcompete the United States in order to establish or maintain influence. The ability of China’s government to directly control the investment or operations of both state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and nominally private Chinese companies was seen as an advantage that would allow China to outbid U.S. or other companies on renewable projects. Facing a Philippine team that declared a clear interest in working with the United States, the China team also turned to investing in renewables and microgrids in the provinces, hoping to foster the narrative that China was in fact doing more for Philippine public good than the United States. And in response to Philippine efforts to limit Chinese involvement in the power grid, the China team aimed to leverage connections with provincial governments and local authorities to impede those efforts and prevent Philippine leadership from uniting to execute its planned strategy.</p> - -<h3 id="ongoing-efforts-and-potential-tools">Ongoing Efforts and Potential Tools</h3> - -<p>Public and private actors in the Philippines and the United States are actively pursuing many of the secure transition strategies identified during the TTX. This section will outline ongoing, high-value U.S. initiatives that are aimed at improving Philippine energy security or that have strong potential to serve as vehicles for future efforts.</p> - -<p><em>Energy Policy Dialogue</em></p> - -<p>In August 2023, the United States and the Philippines launched the first U.S.-Philippines Energy Policy Dialogue. A product of agreements made during Vice President Kamala Harris’s visit to the Philippines in November 2022, the dialogue brought together representatives from the Department of State’s Bureau of Energy Resources, the Department of Energy (DOE), and the PDOE to discuss the acceleration of renewable energy, transmission modernization and expansion, and reducing dependence on imported fossil fuels. The dialogue also established priorities for future technical support and discussed nuclear energy cooperation opportunities, likely aiding in the signing of a 123 Agreement the following year.</p> - -<p>During the fourth 2+2 Ministerial Dialogue between foreign and defense secretaries of the United States and the Philippines on July 30, 2024, the two sides committed to convening a second energy policy dialogue in Manila later this year, noting that the dialogue will provide “a platform to accelerate efforts to diversify critical minerals supply chains, promote renewable energy deployment, foster reliable and resilient power grids, and elevate energy security.”</p> + <li> + <p>A competitive, commercially viable semiconductor supply must be ensured.</p> + </li> +</ol> -<p><em>Civil Nuclear Cooperation</em></p> +<p>Many of these policy goals have been recently subsumed under a general call for “trusted” or “trustworthy” chips. In reality, the goals are varied and complex, and trade-offs are unavoidable. For example, adding security features will increase costs and might not be technically feasible for most semiconductors.</p> -<p>In November 2023, the United States and the Philippines signed a 123 Agreement on civil nuclear cooperation. Entered into force on July 2, 2024, the agreement provides the legal framework for exports to the Philippines of nuclear material, equipment, components, and information for nuclear research and civil nuclear energy production. Even before the signing of the agreement, the PEP had targeted 1,200 MW of nuclear power generation by 2032, increasing to 2,400 MW by 2035, and up to a total of 4,800 MW by 2050. The initial 1,200 MW is envisioned to come from eight 150 MW small modular reactors (SMRs). Several Philippine companies are already exploring cooperation with U.S. SMR firms, including Ultra Safe Nuclear and NuScale Power. The United States is facilitating further connections through a civil nuclear industry working group based in Manila, which held its first virtual meeting between U.S. companies and the Philippine government on July 31.</p> +<p>Without specific, clearly defined, and aligned policy goals – along with an appreciation of the technological boundary conditions and an understanding of the economic impacts along the supply chain – the discussions among the United States and its allies are unlikely to yield meaningful results. “Trusted chips” will continue to mean different things to different stakeholders, detracting from solving the underlying issues.</p> -<p>In addition to SMRs, the Philippines is also considering the possibility of conventional nuclear reactors, including the potential restoration of the existing Bataan Nuclear Power Plant. The plant was completed in 1986 but shuttered before it was ever fired, amid public protests and concerns that it was built near a major fault line in an earthquake-prone region. Nevertheless, the PDOE is in discussions with Korea Hydro &amp; Nuclear Power about a feasibility study on reviving the plant, which was originally engineered to provide an output of 621 MW.</p> +<p>This white paper offers three recommendations for policymakers to address pertinent questions about the semiconductor supply chain:</p> -<p><em>Energy Secure Philippines</em></p> +<ol> + <li> + <p>Align on specific policy objectives rather than definitions.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Use, refine, and align existing policy tools devised for specific objectives.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Enable and seek industry involvement to ensure commercial viability and promote fast adoption.</p> + </li> +</ol> -<p>The U.S. Agency for International Development’s (USAID) primary workstream on Philippine energy is Energy Secure Philippines, a five-year, $34 million project that aims to improve the reliability and resilience of the Philippine power system. Running from 2020 to 2025, the program focuses on digitization of distribution and utilities, development of financing platforms for utility resiliency investments, development of a resiliency assessment system, and implementation of cybersecurity standards and best practices across the power sector.</p> +<h3 id="mapping-wide-ranging-policy-objectives-onto-a-trusted-chip-concept-will-fail">Mapping Wide-Ranging Policy Objectives onto a “Trusted Chip” Concept Will Fail</h3> -<p><em>Competitive Renewable Energy Zones</em></p> +<p>Security typically deals with technical controls and processes, whereas trust is a social concept that goes a step further: It is fundamentally about relationship dynamics and the expectations that come with them.</p> -<p>In September of 2018, the PDOE authorized the study and designation of Competitive Renewable Energy Zones (CREZ) in the Philippines. Conducted by the PDOE and the NGCP with support from USAID and the DOE’s National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL), CREZ is a transmission planning tool that seeks to identify high concentrations of renewable resources and plan for corresponding transmission infrastructure that would maximize efficiencies and provide the groundwork for investment in renewables generation. The process is chaired by the PDOE but also involves the NGCP as well as numerous organizations and departments associated with energy, the electricity market, and the grid. USAID and NREL have provided training and assistance to the PDOE and the NGCP in identifying CREZ and conducting load modeling, forecasting, and power system planning. The model is based on Texas’s implementation of CREZ from 2005 to 2014 to bring wind power into the state’s grid but currently incorporates only the analysis and planning phases, with no commitment to construct the planned transmission infrastructure. The project does, however, provide assistance to the PDOE in preparing and submitting new renewable transmission projects to the Energy Regulatory Commission, as well as training for the commission on how to assess those submissions. CREZ is currently in phase three, which spans from 2023 to 2025 and focuses on implementing plans from phases one and two as well as mapping offshore wind resources for future implementation.</p> +<p>The term “trusted chip” thus sets a high bar. It might imply, for example, the confidence that the semiconductor will perform according to its specifications under all conditions and be free of unintended defects or malicious manipulation. It could also signal awareness or control over the product’s provenance – transparency about the chip’s exact supply chain, or at least certainty that critical steps in the supply chain took place outside the control of adversaries.</p> -<p><em>Luzon Economic Corridor</em></p> +<p>Among semiconductor industry experts, the term “trust” historically means one of two narrowly defined concepts:</p> -<p>In April 2024, U.S., Philippine, and Japanese leaders together launched the Luzon Economic Corridor (LEC) as an initiative of the G7 Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment (PGI). To be coordinated by the State Department, the LEC is aimed at supporting connectivity between Subic Bay, Clark Freeport and Special Economic Zone, Manila, and Batangas, with $14.75 million to support project preparation and technical assistance for infrastructure and other strategic investments.</p> +<blockquote> + <h4 id="trusted-microcontrollers">Trusted Microcontrollers</h4> +</blockquote> -<p>The original announcement of the LEC mentioned energy only in the context of “clean energy and semiconductor supply chains and deployments,” one of four target investment areas that also include rail, ports modernization, and agribusiness. But a PGI fact sheet released by the White House on June 13 during the G7 summit in Fasano, Italy, touted more specific developments, including a U.S. Trade and Development Agency (USTDA) grant for a private energy developer in the Philippines to evaluate the use of a U.S. geothermal firm’s technology to increase power production. The fact sheet also lists a grant for a feasibility study and pilot for a Philippine telecom operator to develop a 5G mobile and fixed wireless network in the Philippines — a project that does not clearly fall within the specified focuses of the original LEC launch announcement. Given the broad scope of investments covered by the LEC’s stated goals and the apparent flexibility in incorporating new ones, it is likely that the LEC could function as a vehicle for further activities related to energy security.</p> +<blockquote> + <p>A dedicated microcontroller (MCU), or parts of an MCU designed to secure hardware through integrated cryptographic features, is called a Trusted Platform Module (TPM). TPMs have proliferated from sensitive defense or government applications to high-volume consumer devices such as personal computers and mobile phones. An ISO/IEC 11889 standard was published in 2009. Trusted MCUs are instrumental in achieving high system-level cybersecurity standards, such as those called for by the U.S. Cybersecurity Label for consumer and Internet of Things devices or the European Union’s Cyber Resilience Act.</p> +</blockquote> -<p><em>Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement</em></p> +<blockquote> + <h4 id="trusted-supply-chains">Trusted Supply Chains</h4> +</blockquote> -<p>Signed in 2014, EDCA provides for the U.S. construction of joint facilities, pre-positioning of equipment, and rotational deployment of troops at designated Philippine military sites. EDCA projects to date have been focused on improving Philippine military facilities, but there have also been mentions of potential expansion of programming to include efforts aimed at benefiting surrounding communities. A May 2023 White House fact sheet on the U.S.-Philippine alliance noted that the United States was working with communities near EDCA sites to drive sustainable development and investment. A joint statement from the 2+2 Ministerial Dialogue in July mentions plans for USAID to pre-position humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR) commodities for use by Philippine civilian disaster response authorities at one EDCA site. Given the interest in providing public goods to local communities, EDCA programming that could provide local energy solutions has the potential to both contribute to energy resiliency and counter anti-EDCA and anti-U.S. narratives.</p> +<blockquote> + <p>In 2003, the U.S. Department of Defense initiated a Trusted Foundry Program, now part of the Defense Microelectronics Activity (DMEA)’s Trusted Supplier Program. As of early 2024, 16 out of 82 accredited trusted suppliers were also accredited for semiconductor foundry services, to provide services for advanced and foundational chips. The program is tailored to critical but less cost-sensitive defense and national security applications.</p> +</blockquote> -<p><em>Millennium Challenge Corporation</em></p> +<p>The two concepts can be applied simultaneously. However, while the latter can be applied to all semiconductors, the former is limited to a specific product category.</p> -<p>In December 2023, the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) selected the Philippines for a threshold program, a grant “designed to support policy and institutional reforms that address economic growth constraints.” As of February 2024, no focus area for the grant had been decided. The July joint statement from the 2+2 Ministerial Dialogue directly referenced the threshold program agreement, urging both sides to work toward its completion as soon as possible. Given the variety of possible focus areas, it is difficult to speculate whether energy is under consideration. But the Philippines’ high electricity costs and unreliable power likely qualify as economic growth constraints that would at least lead the MCC to consider a focus on energy policy reforms.</p> +<p>There are more recent attempts to broaden the concept of trusted semiconductors. Examples can be found in the 2023 European Chips Act, which advocates for “trusted, secure and green chips.” However, a clear definition remains elusive.</p> -<h3 id="recommendations">Recommendations</h3> +<p>In the context of controlling access to the most advanced artificial intelligence (AI) hardware, secure and governable AI chips have been proposed, expanding on the concept of trusted MCUs.</p> -<h4 id="secure-near-term-stability">Secure Near-Term Stability</h4> +<p>Some policymakers even proposed the concept of trusted semiconductors as a trade remedy – that is, restricting access to U.S. and allied markets to trade with trusted chips. Lastly, it has been suggested that trusted chips could aid in verifying export control compliance.</p> -<p>Facing rapidly rising energy demand, continuous threats of maritime coercion, and the very real risk of near-term conflict, the Philippines needs help to stabilize its energy outlook and prepare for crisis scenarios. Hydrocarbons, though they may be destined to be replaced by cleaner, renewable alternatives, will remain an important component of the Philippines’ energy mix for the next several decades. They will be especially vital over the next 10–15 years, before nuclear and renewable sources can begin to contribute at sufficient scale. LNG, as a cleaner alternative to other fossil fuels, will play an important role in this context.</p> +<p>This short overview illustrates how the concept of trust, broadly applied to semiconductor markets, glosses over crucial details: Should it apply to all chips or only some? Should it benefit broad consumer markets or defense contractors? Do the costs of implementing a technical solution matter or not? Mapping wide-ranging policy objectives – such as export control, supply risk mitigation, trade policy, cybersecurity, and integrity of critical microelectronic systems – onto the “trust” concept is bound to fail. Worse, it will distract from meaningful discussions.</p> -<p>Washington should reconsider recent efforts to curb U.S. LNG exports, such as the pause implemented on LNG export project approvals in January 2024. While a federal court issued a stay in July that ended the pause, such efforts create uncertainty about the future of U.S. LNG that undermines investing and contracting processes. For European allies, U.S. LNG exports have been a critical backstop for sanctioned Russian gas since the invasion of Ukraine. Japan, the world’s second-largest importer of LNG, has also been a foundational buyer for several U.S. export projects. While the Philippines’ current LNG imports are not coming from the United States, future supplies almost certainly will. Given the importance of Philippine energy security to the United States’ own national security, Washington should aim to facilitate, not jeopardize, future purchases of U.S. LNG by the Philippines.</p> +<h3 id="answering-four-questions-can-structure-and-focus-the-discussion">Answering Four Questions Can Structure and Focus the Discussion</h3> -<p>Within the Philippines, the United States should support the country’s efforts to develop LNG terminal infrastructure and connect LNG plants to the grid. It can also support efforts to improve port infrastructure and to diversify delivery points, which would ensure shipments of LNG or other hydrocarbons could continue to reach the Philippines in the event of conflict in the South China Sea or Taiwan Strait.</p> +<p>Policy solutions to guide semiconductor export control, supply risk mitigation, trade policy, and cybersecurity are nevertheless pertinent. They need to be coupled with an appreciation for technological feasibility and private sector commercial incentives.</p> -<p>While LNG is a priority, other hydrocarbons may have a role to play in preparing for crisis scenarios. The United States should support the revival of a strategic petroleum reserve for the Philippines. The two countries should also conduct a cost-benefit analysis on the construction of an additional oil refinery. Following the closure of the Tabangao Refinery in Batangas in August 2020, the Philippines only has one refinery in operation, which could prove to be a vulnerability.</p> +<p>Answering four questions will help to structure and focus the discussion (Figure 1).</p> -<p>Investments in hydrocarbons, including LNG, will be difficult to coordinate through agencies like USAID, the Development Finance Corporation, or MCC, given strong funding preferences for clean and renewable energy. And high-profile initiatives such as the LEC may be better received by an environmentally conscious Philippine public if they avoid association with hydrocarbons. But given the strategic value of such investments, there may be opportunity for funds earmarked for regional deterrence to be channeled into energy security, or for projects to be funded through alliance programming like EDCA.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/AcVHFqr.png" alt="image01" /> +<em>▲ Figure 1: Option Space for Key Semiconductor Policy Questions</em></p> -<p>Nevertheless, in many of these areas, even Department of Defense (DOD) budgets may be insufficient to make direct contributions to infrastructure. For reference, three Philippine energy companies announced an investment in March of $3.3 billion to develop an LNG terminal in Batangas. In these cases, the United States may be able to aid by instead providing technical assistance and planning in a process that could draw from the CREZ model, focusing not on renewable energy but on determining the most efficient investments to fulfill basic crisis preparations through construction of hydrocarbon infrastructure.</p> +<ol> + <li> + <p><strong>Which semiconductors should be covered?</strong> MCUs and microprocessors (MPUs) allow, in principle, the implementation of on-chip security features to establish trust, traceability, and, potentially, governance features. However, MCUs and MPUs combined cover less than 15 percent of the semiconductor market. On-chip security features are not technically feasible for much of the remaining 85 percent (e.g., sensors, power semiconductors, other discrete semiconductors). These devices lack the compute and memory capabilities to execute trust functionality.</p> -<h4 id="prepare-for-a-sustainable-future">Prepare for a Sustainable Future</h4> + <p>A unique, tamper-proof, chip-level identification for all semiconductors would be commercially prohibitive in most cases. Printing a unique marker on every semiconductor’s packaging would be cheaper, but it would still need to be backed by an industry-wide global database to detect misuse reliably.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Which systems should be covered?</strong> Critical applications – such as military command, control, communications, and computing equipment – require the highest technical level of device security and supply chain provenance. Additionally, the export of these application-specific or dual-use chips to adversaries often needs to be controlled. At the same time, the universe of parties that are affected by stringent requirements is relatively small: government agencies or prime contractors as buyers and a small number of accredited suppliers. Their willingness to shoulder the additional compliance and risk mitigation costs is high.</p> -<p>Renewable energy is envisioned to form the backbone of the Philippines energy mix, with the PEP calling for renewables to provide 35 percent of electricity generation by 2030 and over 50 percent by 2050. While renewables have the obvious benefit of reducing carbon emissions, they also have many advantages over fossil fuels in terms of energy security, especially in reducing exposure to external supply shocks.</p> + <p>Another example involves high-volume consumer devices, which can indeed provide a high level of trust. For instance, a laptop or mobile phone must protect personal information and securely execute payment transactions. While this can be achieved with on-chip hardware security (available to retail consumers as aftermarket products for less than $30), full end-to-end control of a mobile phone or laptop supply chain is not commercially viable. For instance, one major U.S. consumer electronics company’s supplier list includes 200 suppliers with 600 sites at locations across the globe.</p> -<p>The United States should continue to support renewable energy investments in the Philippines. USAID and DOE cooperation with the PDOE and other Philippine stakeholders on the CREZ model is a prime example of how technical assistance programs can help attract and direct private capital to maximize public gains and achieve the Philippines’ goal of creating a secure and resilient renewable power grid. Though technical in nature and perhaps less eye-catching than traditional infrastructure in rail or ports, the CREZ program is setting the foundation for the Philippines’ renewable energy future and demonstrates a high level of trust between U.S. and Philippine energy policy counterparts. U.S. and Philippine leaders should consider providing additional visibility for the CREZ program in joint statements and press releases on U.S.-Philippine economic and strategic achievements. Demonstrating high-level support for CREZ would amplify the program’s ability to attract investment and highlight a critical area of U.S.-Philippine cooperation.</p> + <p>Basic connected consumer devices often fall short of any digital security standards, something the EU Cyber Resilience Act and the S. Cybersecurity Label seek to address.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>What are the policy requirements?</strong> After deciding which parts of the semiconductor market and which systems should be covered, policymakers need to agree on who or what they are trying to protect and what degree of certainty constitutes success in achieving their goals.</p> -<p>At the same time, renewables should not be overly securitized. Unlike in the case of fossil fuels, there is significant opportunity for investments in renewable energy to receive funding from development finance institutions. Multilateral development banks (Asian Development Bank, World Bank) and U.S. development agencies have energy transition and climate finance as priority lending areas. These same lenders, however, can have difficulty funding projects if they are overtly associated with security. Development of renewable transmission and generation, even when facilitated by smart planning efforts like CREZ, will require tens of billions of dollars in capital investment over the next several decades; efforts to champion U.S.-Philippine cooperation in these areas should be careful not to lose any funding opportunities through an over-association with military or strategic goals.</p> + <p>At the level of a single chip or microelectronic system, policy goals might include the control of exports and protecting the system (or data) from unauthorized access or manipulation. Alternatively, labeling trusted semiconductors could serve as a trade action in disguise to restrict imports from suppliers or countries engaging in nonmarket state practices and policies.</p> -<p>Nuclear energy is another important potential source of clean power. U.S.-Philippine cooperation on nuclear is further along than other areas and, in some ways, has a clearer trajectory. Targets for the number of SMRs and the resulting level of power generation have been set by the PEP; high-level support from leadership in both countries has been made clear in numerous announcements over the past two years; and public discussions are already occurring between Philippine firms and potential U.S. SMR providers.</p> + <p>At the level of the entire supply chain, policy goals may include the reliable supply of commercial semiconductor goods and supply chain transparency. In the case of the U.S. Department of Defense’s Trusted Supplier Program, the goal is very tight control over every step of the semiconductor supply chain.</p> -<p>Though progress has been rapid, the installation of SMRs in the Philippines is certain to be a long process that, given the relative nascency of the technologies involved, comes with a risk of delays and cost overruns. In late 2023, one of the leading SMR firms in talks to work with the Philippines, NuScale Power, saw its planned SMR project in the state of Utah canceled after costs had grown from an initial $3 billion in 2015 to $9.3 billion by 2023. In facilitating talks between the Philippines and U.S. nuclear firms, the State Department’s Bureau of Energy Resources and the DOE should help the Philippines critically evaluate proposals and compare options to ensure that any eventual agreement is based on realistic estimates. The unpopularity of nuclear power among the Philippine public means that if U.S.-provided SMRs in the country get saddled with significant delays, cost overruns, or other issues, the resulting negative impact on U.S.-Philippine relations would be substantial. Even if projects proceed as planned, U.S. energy officials should prepare to help Philippine counterparts demonstrate the benefits of clean nuclear power and prove its safety to the public.</p> + <p>Along with these requirements come different definitions of what constitutes success. Trade remedies might be considered successful at the 80 percent level, an export control agency might be satisfied with 95 percent compliance, and defense-critical applications could demand an even higher level of confidence in the integrity of the respective semiconductor supply.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Is the solution commercially viable?</strong> If governments procure trusted chips for critical applications, they can set the economic incentives directly and compensate suppliers for the costs of manufacturing and controlled supply chains. Suppliers can price in the opportunity cost of export controls, that is, the fact that application-specific products cannot be sold in certain markets.</p> -<h4 id="prevent-disruption">Prevent Disruption</h4> + <p>The economics will play out very differently in the case of high-volume consumer applications, where end customers may or may not be willing to pay a premium for security or availability. In those scenarios, governments must work closely with industry and gradually influence economic incentives to steer commercial actors toward policy goals.</p> -<p>The addition of new power sources is crucial to ensuring Philippine energy security, but the reliability and resilience of transmission and distribution infrastructure is just as important.</p> + <p>Answering these questions theoretically results in a large number of different scenarios. However, these scenarios can be distilled into a limited number of practical policy challenges – and the tools to address those challenges are often already available. Policymakers should focus on refining these tools and achieving better alignment among allies regarding their use.</p> + </li> +</ol> -<p>One paramount concern is China’s involvement in the transmission grid through its ownership stake and operational involvement in the NGCP. Its 25-year concession agreement means that the NGCP will, in theory, continue to operate the grid through at least 2034. But concerns over the NGCP’s performance and Chinese ownership have led media and Philippine legislators to push for a review of the company’s activities and the nature of Chinese involvement in its operations. President Marcos himself said in May 2023 that the government would “take back control” of the NGCP if necessary.</p> +<h3 id="solve-practical-policy-challenges-instead-of-an-overarching-definition">Solve Practical Policy Challenges Instead of an Overarching Definition</h3> -<p>From a strategic perspective, having 40 percent of the Philippines’ grid operator owned by a Chinese SOE is far from ideal. While it may not significantly affect day-to-day operations, it likely means that Beijing has access to intimate details about the Philippine power system that could be exploited in a time of conflict to disable key functions via kinetic or cyberattack. But at this point, ousting SGCC’s minority stake would not necessarily reduce these risks, as the vulnerabilities would likely persist unless key infrastructure and grid management systems were entirely replaced. At the same time, nationalization of SGCC’s stake would almost certainly provoke a response from China in the form of economic retaliation or, potentially, escalation over maritime disputes. The operational effectiveness of the NGCP is another question: the corporation has been the subject of pointed criticism from Marcos and others over failures to adequately manage the grid.</p> +<p>In reality, solving practical policy challenges is less complex. Semiconductor devices date back to 1947, as do the challenges to safeguard the technology, protect critical electronic systems and sensitive information from unreliable or malicious chips, and ensure a commercially viable supply of semiconductors. Even the risks of overreliance and state-subsidized industrial production are not new – although the scale of this risk might well be.</p> -<p>USAID programs to enhance Philippine grid management capacity, assess resilience, and improve utility markets are valuable tools that allow the United States to contribute to positive outcomes without getting too deeply involved in highly politicized discussions about the performance and role of the NGCP. It would be wise for Washington to allow Manila to take the lead on managing the NGCP and determining what, if anything, to do about China’s stake in it while continuing technical assistance for grid management and cybersecurity.</p> +<ul> + <li> + <p><strong>Critical Electronic Systems:</strong> For national security reasons, the United States and its allies have long controlled the semiconductor supply chain for critical electronic systems, such as those used in defense applications. This may involve both hardware and supply chain solutions. Given the sensitive nature of the applications, tools like DMEA’s Trusted Supplier Program are typically deployed on a national level. In addition to whitelisting trustworthy suppliers, blacklisting certain entities is an effective option with a strong forward-signaling impact. Examples include the EU toolbox for 5G security (though deployed with varying urgency among member states) and the more targeted Section 5949 of the U.S. National Defense Authorization Act of 2023.</p> -<p>Where Washington can play a larger role is in showing the value that U.S.-Philippine cooperation is bringing to the Filipino people. Military cooperation, and especially the presence of U.S. troops in the Philippines via EDCA, remains a focal point of counternarratives promoted by anti-U.S. media and politicians. While the provision of HADR resources for communities near EDCA sites is an excellent project that should be expanded, efforts on local energy resilience (such as small-scale solar generation or other shared facilities that contribute to the local grid) can also be a cost-effective way to reach out to local communities and associate U.S. presence with improvements not just to peace and security, but to day-to-day life.</p> + <p>Commercial viability can typically be achieved due to the limited scope of applications, semiconductor volumes, and involved parties.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Cybersecurity of Electronic (Sub-)Systems:</strong> This is another area where technical and commercially viable solutions either already exist (e.g., ISO/IEC 11889 for secure crypto-processors, ISO/SAE 21434 for automotive cybersecurity) or are being implemented (e.g., the S. Cybersecurity Label and the EU Cyber Resilience Act). More recently, the U.S. government proposed a rule to secure information and communications technology for connected vehicles. The rule would regulate hardware “designed, developed, manufactured, or supplied by a person owned by, controlled by . . . the PRC or Russia.” Effectively, a concept of “non-trusted” semiconductors is being established, though without explicitly calling it that.</p> -<h4 id="align-efforts">Align Efforts</h4> + <p>Therefore, policy and commercial solutions are available or have been proposed for these use cases.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Export Controls:</strong> Limiting the export of certain types of semiconductors, their underlying technology, and manufacturing equipment is an established practice for the United States and its allies. New frameworks might be needed to address shortcomings of existing multilateral export control regimes. Still, in the meantime, multilateral, case-by-case agreements have been successfully achieved (e.g., the United States, Japan, and the Netherlands reaching a deal to curb chipmaking exports to China). Enforcing export controls for advanced AI MPUs is challenging, and stopping the illicit flow of legacy semiconductors to Russia is even harder. Solutions have been proposed to improve export control compliance, but introducing the concept of trusted MCUs or trusted supply chains is not among them. Export control is not an inbound issue – ensuring the United States and its allies get trusted products – but an outbound issue – ensuring adversaries do not obtain them.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Supply Chain Provenance Law:</strong> Various supply chain provenance requirements have been introduced in recent years. Examples include the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act and the Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive. In response to these requirements, companies – including semiconductor manufacturers – are implementing rigorous supply chain monitoring and verification systems, which, by definition, will apply to all their products. Introducing a “trusted chip” certification based on a geography- or entity-specific listing would be possible and might – considering the forward-signaling effect of various U.S. rulemaking proposals – already be expected by industry participants. Policymakers, however, need to carefully weigh the additional reporting burden on the industry against national and economic security goals.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Trade Remedies:</strong> There is mounting concern that Chinese industrial policy, including in the semiconductor market, supports domestic firms that do not operate according to market principles. The United States and its allies can use tools – principally tariffs – to counter nonmarket policies and practices. However, these remedies often amount to too little, too late, especially if lengthy negotiations among allies precede them. Moreover, tariffs are applied to the end product entering a market – such as a computer, mobile phone, or industrial machinery control system. Relatively few chips enter the U.S. and allied markets as components; instead, they are part of a microelectronic system (which is predominantly assembled in Asia). In those cases, the amount of the subsidy on the chip is a very small percentage of the total value of the end product and thus not much of a deterrent. Other, more targeted, entity-based policies might be more effective in countering the threat of overreliance, but such discussions are beyond the scope of this paper. Suffice it to say that introducing a “trusted chip buyers alliance” to exclude countries of concern from allied markets broadly would face significant legal and practical hurdles, in addition to the abovementioned technical and commercial challenges of providing supply chain provenance.</p> + </li> +</ul> -<p>U.S. tools and efforts involved in improving the Philippines’ energy security are spread across numerous agencies and departments. To date, there exists no cohesive platform for coordinating efforts, such that many U.S. government employees who attended the TTX were unaware of projects being pursued by other agencies that had the potential to synergize with their own work. Among the currently existing mechanisms, the Energy Security Dialogue comes closest in that it theoretically covers the full range of U.S.-Philippine energy cooperation. But its inaugural iteration lacked participation from several important implementers, including USAID, USTDA, and DOD. As a merely annual meeting between U.S. and Philippine counterparts, it fails to stimulate year-round coordination within Washington on disparate efforts that impact Philippine energy security.</p> +<h3 id="policy-recommendations">Policy Recommendations</h3> -<p>There is room for a more flexible, cross-cutting mechanism to organize efforts targeted at energy security. In analyzing this problem, the Energy for Growth Hub has proposed the implementation of Energy Security Compacts, a five-year agreement on joint investments between the United States and a partner nation. Based on the structure of MCC compact agreements, an Energy Security Compact would be rooted in an initial constraints analysis and report to both Congress and the National Security Council (NSC), which would play a significant role in facilitating cooperation across agencies. The program would require legislation to establish it within either MCC or USAID; it could be made even more effective by the introduction of a mandate for global energy security at the MCC and the extension, per the Energy for Growth Hub, of certain “DOD loan and loan guarantee authorities under the Defense Production Act to specific investments in allied nations.” This last provision would be particularly useful in the Philippine case to mobilize funding for measures such as a petroleum stockpile, refinery redundancy, and other strategic energy projects that don’t meet the requirements of development lenders focused primarily on energy transition initiatives.</p> +<p>Each of the above challenges must be addressed with specific policy solutions. Some, like secure MCUs, are specific to the semiconductor industry. Others, such as export controls or transparency and certification of supply chains, extend beyond semiconductors. It is beyond the scope of this paper to make recommendations for each of them. As it pertains to the discussion about “trusted” or “trustworthy” chips, this paper offers the following recommendations to policymakers:</p> -<p>While an Energy Security Compact authority enacted through legislation would be ideal, the executive branch can also try to approximate some of these functions through existing authorities and workstreams. While the DOE and Department of State should continue to play a leading role, agency representation at the forthcoming second annual Energy Policy Dialogue should be increased. The two countries should also consider creating a working group subordinate to the Energy Policy Dialogue that would meet quarterly to discuss progress toward shared goals and provide a motivational mechanism for energy stakeholders across U.S. agencies to regularly harmonize efforts related to the Philippines. The NSC can also play an important coordinating role. Some projects to shore up strategic energy vulnerabilities in the Philippines may be able to be addressed through additional EDCA programming. But without additional authorizations, there will likely remain a disconnect between the deterrence value of energy security in the Philippines and the ability of DOD resources to contribute to it.</p> +<ul> + <li> + <p><strong>Align on specific policy objectives rather than definitions.</strong> Acknowledging that challenges, tools, and policy prerogatives may differ, aligning on clear, specific policy goals is important. A shared understanding is key to enabling problem-specific solutions. Often, the implementation will have to be country-specific, but integrated and aligned measures are needed to avoid negative spillover effects or loopholes. This is easier to achieve for discrete policy challenges than for a broad concept like “trusted chips.”</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Use, refine, and align existing policy tools devised for specific objectives.</strong> Rules and tools already exist to address many of the current technical and geopolitical challenges facing the semiconductor industry. Policymakers should focus on jointly deploying these tools toward a common goal and augmenting national tool kits where there are gaps.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Enable and seek industry involvement to ensure commercial viability and promote fast adoption.</strong> An innovative and competitive semiconductor ecosystem is essential for the United States and its allies. Implementing both “promote” and “protect” policies through regular exchanges with industry representatives is key. Moreover, industry compliance with those policies is crucial for their effectiveness.</p> + </li> +</ul> <hr /> -<p><strong>Harrison Prétat</strong> is a fellow and deputy director for the Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C.</p> - -<p><strong>Yasir Atalan</strong> is an associate data fellow for the Futures Lab in the International Security Program at CSIS.</p> - -<p><strong>Gregory B. Poling</strong> is a senior fellow and director for the Southeast Asia Program and the Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative at CSIS.</p> - -<p><strong>Benjamin Jensen</strong> is a senior fellow for the Futures Lab in the International Security Program at CSIS.</p>Harrison Prétat, et al.The Philippines’ fragile energy outlook threatens to undermine efforts to secure its strategic autonomy vis-à-vis an assertive China. \ No newline at end of file +<p><strong>Andreas Schumacher</strong> is a visiting technology fellow in the Economic Security and Technology Department and the Scholl Chair in International Business at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.</p>Andreas SchumacherA quest for “trusted chips” risks sidetracking crucial semiconductor policy solutions. Aligned policy goals are needed to truly secure and de-risk supply chains, balancing national security, economic viability, and technological feasibility. \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/hkers/2024-12-02-trial-of-jimmy-lai-day-100.html b/hkers/2024-12-02-trial-of-jimmy-lai-day-100.html new file mode 100644 index 00000000..f969be93 --- /dev/null +++ b/hkers/2024-12-02-trial-of-jimmy-lai-day-100.html @@ -0,0 +1,215 @@ + + + + + + + + + + 【黎智英案・審訊第 100 日】 · The Republic of Agora + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +
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【黎智英案・審訊第 100 日】

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獨媒報導 | 2024.12.02

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  • 黎指中美冷戰屬價值之爭 以「核武」比喻道德權威 官問怎樣「一分鐘便可擺平」
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iamge01

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【獨媒報導】壹傳媒創辦人黎智英及3間蘋果公司被控串謀勾結外國勢力及串謀刊印煽動刊物等罪，今（2日）於高院（移師西九龍法院）踏入第100日審訊，黎智英第八日作供。黎於2019年7月參與美國智庫「保衛民主基金會」公開對談，期間稱美國政府有「道德權威」，好比「核武」，因此香港極需要美國的支持。黎庭上強調，中美之間的「戰爭」並不牽涉武器，乃價值上的爭鋒，並否認提倡冷戰。法官杜麗冰一度問黎，他稱「他們好像沒有任何武器便上戰場，當你使用核武的話，只需一分鐘便可擺平他們」，是什麼意思。黎則稱他並非意指真實的核武，他只是使用誇張手法表達，以及將道德權威比喻為核武。法官李素蘭追問，黎為何會以「核武」作為比喻？黎聞言則笑指：「如果我選擇另一些比喻的話，你也會問我相同的問題。」

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黎稱給予陳梓華的金錢從不牽涉「報酬」成份

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辯方大律師關文渭繼續主問，圍繞黎與另一被告陳梓華之間的金錢往來。辯方展示2019年10月11日陳梓華的銀行帳戶紀錄，可見一筆144,100港元的支票存入款項。財務文件顯示該14萬元是給予陳梓華舉辦展覽的贊助。黎則稱當時沒有留意詳情便簽名，並指 Mark Simon 提供相關資料。

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辯方另展示支票紀錄，顯示由黎持有的力高顧問有限公司，在2020年2月底，以支票形式把80,273元存入陳梓華的戶口。陳早前供稱，黎智英支付他英國和台北之旅的費用，合共約6萬元，而其餘款項是林姓女示威者的開支。

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黎則表示對這8萬元不知情，也沒有牽涉其中。被問到力高的銀行戶口有多少個授權簽署人，黎則稱不知道。黎另被問到如何向陳支付旅程的開支，黎亦稱不知道，可能是 Mark Simon 以支票形式歸還給陳。黎又稱，Mark Simon 會作出決定，並不需要經他的同意才能批出該筆款項。

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辯方另提及，黎早前否認轉讓離岸公司 LACOCK 是作為給予陳的「報酬」。黎堅稱，與陳梓華之間的金錢往來中，從來沒有牽涉「報酬」的性質。

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黎否認陳梓華提及成立流亡政府和軍隊

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李宇軒作供時，提到陳梓華透露他領導一隊勇武隊，以及有一處地方儲存物資，其小隊亦涉及製作爆炸品的「科學實驗」。李亦提到，陳曾評論一宗大埔開槍事件，以及討論成立流亡政府和軍隊、找以色列軍隊協助訓練勇武。

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不過黎在庭上稱，在與陳的溝通之中，陳從沒向他提及上述事情，陳也沒提及自己牽涉該宗大埔開槍事件。

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黎Twitter轉發IPAC推文 惟堅稱不知道IPAC

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辯方接著圍繞黎的 Twitter（現稱X）提問。辯方指黎在2020年5月22日開設Twitter帳戶，問黎當時是否知道「對華政策跨國議會聯盟」（Inter-Parliamentary Alliance on China，簡稱 IPAC）。黎稱不知道，也沒有與負責管理帳戶的李兆富討論過 IPAC，而黎亦稱自己對 IPAC 不感興趣。

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辯方指，黎在2020年6月13日在 Twitter 轉發一則《華爾街日報》的文章〈Global Coalition of Legislators Faces Challenges Countering China〉，當中提及不同國家的議員組成聯盟 IPAC，以應付中國帶來的挑戰。黎並加上評論：「It is encouraging to see leaders from different nationalities and ideological backgrounds to join force @ipcglobal to tackle the world’s most urgent geopolitical challenge #CCP, a belligerent regime imposes distorted values on its people and others.」

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黎則稱整個推文都是由李兆富準備，而他在發布之前可能只曾瞥一眼（had a glance）。辯方指從黎與李之間的訊息紀錄可見，在該推文發布之前，二人從未提及過 IPAC 或《華爾街日報》。黎確認。

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黎稱信任李兆富 幾乎全部批准發布 官質疑李事前理應曾徵詢黎

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辯方問，李有否得到黎的同意才發布上述推文。黎則稱，每當李兆富傳送草擬推文給他，他幾乎都會批准，而他只會粗略過目。辯方追問，黎如何批准李發布？黎則稱他信任李，因李是他的徒弟（mentee），替他工作了很長時間，所以認為李知道自己想要的是什麼，後來李不需要得到他的批准也可以自行決定發布。

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法官杜麗冰追問，黎聲稱推文發布之前沒有過目，只依賴李的理解，可是這是黎自己的 Twitter 帳戶，李必然事先知道黎的理解，才會使用他的帳戶來發布相關帖文，例如李會問黎「這樣發布IPAC是否合適」之類。黎否認，並重申帳戶是由李負責管理。黎強調當時沒有留意 IPAC，也未有問李有關 IPAC 的事宜。

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黎稱不知道「避風港法案」、不知道知道羅傑斯和裴倫德與IPAC有關

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至於國安法生效之後，辯方展示黎於2020年7月17日的推文：「#HongKong #SafeHarborAct and #PeoplesFreedomandChoiceAct are good wherewithals to our resistance movement. Salute all former CGs and State Dept staff for caring about this place we call home.」。辯方指根據黎與李兆富之間的 WhatsApp，二人在推文發布之前，並沒有提及過《香港避風港法案》（Hong Kong Safe Harbor Act）和《香港人自由和選擇法》（Hong Kong People’s Freedom and Choice Act）。黎在庭上表示，從不知道「避風港法案」，直至在法庭上才知道。至於推文中的標籤（hashtag），黎稱肯定是李兆富加入的。

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辯方另展示2020年7月22日的推文，乃轉發 IPAC 的推文。惟黎庭上稱當時沒有留意 IPAC，當李兆富徵詢他的時候，他可能只是瞥了一眼，又稱當時不關注 IPAC 這類組織，因為與他沒有任何關係。

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法官李運騰指，當時是7月22日，換言之《國安法》已經生效，問黎是否有興趣知道國際社會怎樣回應《國安法》生效？黎同意，他認為國際社會應提供支持，以保護香港的自由免受侵蝕，但他只是希望。被問到希望社會提供怎樣的支持，黎則稱沒有想過。

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辯方指，黎在2020年8月14日轉發 IPAC 的一則推文，並標註了羅傑斯和標籤「#IPAC」，其時是黎首次被捕四日之後。惟黎稱不記得自己有見過這個推文。黎否認知道羅傑斯（Benedict Rogers）和裴倫德（Luke de Pulford）與 IPAC 有關。

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推文向攬炒巴致敬及標註「#StandwithHongKong」 黎稱不知攬炒巴與SWHK關係

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辯方展示2020年10月24日黎的推文，當中標註「攬炒巴」劉祖廸的帳戶：「I salute to @finnlau_cd. At only 26, he has the wisdom knowing exactly when and what the right role to play. He inspired his peers in his former role, and he’ll do it this time. The outside world support is very important. #StandwithHongKong」

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黎稱他記得有份草擬此推文，其後傳送給李兆富。最終發布的推文含有標籤「#StandwithHongKong」，黎稱是由李加上。法官李素蘭問黎，當時知不知道劉祖廸與「重光團隊」（Stand with Hong Kong，簡稱 SWHK）的關係。黎稱不知道，沒有人告訴過他，他也沒有思考過兩者之間的關係。

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黎稱，他當時閱讀了《蘋果》於2020年10月24日的中文報導「遊行被圍捕險洩身份 攬炒巴死裏逃生 帶署歷警暴 拒保後返英」，然後草擬上述推文，惟報導中未有提及劉與「重光團隊」的關係，他並沒有深入思考兩者關係。辯方提到報紙版面載有「Stand with Hong Kong until dawn」的廣告，惟黎當時認為這是一句口號，而不知道「Stand with Hong Kong」是一個組織。

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黎稱，向劉致敬是因為他的勇氣，而劉的年紀（26歲）乃從報導中得知。推文提及劉的「過去角色」以及他「這次會去做」，黎解釋意思是劉過去在「連登」擔當精神領袖，而他將會進行游說爭取國際支持香港。

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報導提及劉曾在一次未經批准集結中被捕，日子是2020年1月1日。黎則稱當時未有閱讀整篇報導，後來從陳梓華口中才知道此事。辯方展示陳梓華在2020年1月2日的訊息，陳向黎說，劉遇上麻煩事，所以旅程需延誤。

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黎否認串謀陳梓華、李宇軒和攬炒巴等人請求外國制裁

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辯方總結串謀勾結外國勢力罪，問黎有否串謀或同意陳梓華，請求外國對中國實施制裁、封鎖或敵對行為。黎稱他除了要求陳跟勇武派溝通以平息暴力之外，便從來沒要求陳做任何事情。黎亦否認串謀或同意 Mark Simon 和劉祖廸請求外國制裁。

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至於被控方指稱為「串謀者」的李宇軒、時任日本議員菅野志櫻里和協助在全球各地推動馬格尼茨基人權問責法（Magnitsky Act）的英國金融家 Bill Browder，黎則稱當時未聽聞過他們的名字，直至在庭上才聽過。

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黎指新冷戰屬價值之爭 以「核武」比喻道德權威 官問為何以「核武」為比喻

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辯方指，黎智英於2019年7月赴美會見時任美國副總統彭斯和時任美國國務卿蓬佩奧之後，在7月10日與「保衛民主基金會」（Foundation for Defense of Democracies，簡稱FDD）的資深副主席 Johnathan Schanzer 進行公開對談，並向黎展示對談錄音謄本。當時黎強調反修例是「最後一戰」，而香港人的反抗是道德力量的戰爭，又指美國政府有「道德權威（moral authority）」，其支持是「核武（nuclear weapon）」，因此香港極需要美國的支持。黎形容中國與美國之間進入「新冷戰」，是關乎價值的鬥爭，而香港正在「前線」，他最後指，美國不能只說不做，同時亦要以行動支持香港人。

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辯方問黎說「新冷戰」和「核武」是什麼意思？黎則指這是一種比喻，意思是美國人的道德權威好比「核武」，強調中美之間的「戰爭」並不牽涉武器。辯方問黎是否提倡中美冷戰？黎表示，他當時乃指出特朗普政府與中國已經形成和正在進行冷戰；「當然我支持與中國冷戰」，惟他否認提倡冷戰。而「戰爭」是價值上的爭鋒，而非使用武器的戰爭。

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黎表示，他認為美國應該用道德權威作為武器，來與中國對戰。被問到「道德權威」意思是什麼，黎指「道德權威」是「正義、公義和公平，以及活在真實和正確的事情之中」，而這與中國有別。

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法官杜麗冰指，黎在對談中聲稱：「他們好像沒有任何武器便上戰場，當你使用核武的話，只需一分鐘便可擺平他們。」（“It’s like they’re like going to the battle without any weapon, and you have the nuclear weapon you can finish them in a minute.”）如果正如黎所稱「核武」的意思是「道德權威」的話，怎樣以「道德權威」在一分鐘內擺平？黎重申以上言論只是比喻。惟杜官表示不明白。黎則回應，他並非意指真實的核武，他只是使用誇張手法表達，以及將道德權威比喻為核武。黎亦解釋，中國有真實的核武，但是他們沒有道德權威。

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法官李素蘭追問，黎為何會以「核武」作為比喻？黎聞言則笑指：「如果我選擇另一些比喻的話，你也會問我相同的問題。」

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法官李素蘭又問，該對談影片在網上廣播，黎會否認為觀眾會從字面的意思理解「核武」？黎解釋，他在節目中指中國沒有「核武」，可是現實裡中國的確有核武，所以他提及的「核武」意思就是「道德權威」。

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黎否認文章提倡中美貿易戰

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辯方另展示黎於2019年9月30日，刊登於《華爾街日報》的文章〈There’s Hope for Freedom, Even in China〉。

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辯方問黎有否提倡中美貿易戰？黎則指他撰寫文章的時候，特朗普政府與中國之間的貿易戰已經發生，因此否認自己提倡貿易戰。黎表示，他在文章中稱希望美國與中國交涉時能夠連繫到價值層面，是因為他認為這樣的話能夠改變中國，使中國加入普世的核心價值體系。

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法官杜麗冰則指，當黎使用「西方核心價值」這詞語的時候，便代表該些價值不是「普世」，因為世界上有很多國家，不只西方國家。黎認同，但是該些價值在世界貿易之中會交換，包括法治和透明度。

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辯方問黎，是否認為當美國與中國交涉時連繫到人權和核心價值，就會令中國讓步？黎同意。法官李運騰指，當黎撰寫文章的時候，美國與中國交涉時還未連繫上人權和價值議題。黎同意，並指中美兩國只是在對抗。李官追問，黎是否希望兩國交涉時連繫上人權和價值議題，增加貿易戰的另一面向？黎同意。

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文章提及「中國經濟內爆」 黎：嘗試舉例說明若經濟爆破政府統治正當性隨之崩塌

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李官又指，文章提到「如果中國經濟內爆（If China’s economy implodes）」，問黎撰寫文章時有沒有與其他人討論過？黎則表示沒有與任何人討論，他在文章中的意思是，當中國經濟內爆的話，中國政府的統治正當性也會崩塌。

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李官追問黎是否發明「中國經濟內爆」這個概念，還是從其他人的文章讀來或從其他人口中聽來？黎回答，他只是嘗試舉例說明，當中國經濟爆破，其政府的統治正當性也會隨之崩塌，因為中國政府的統治正當性一直建基於經濟發展。他亦指，不排除有人曾經提出過這個概念，可是他撰寫這篇文章之時，並未有閱讀過其他相關文章。

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黎同意，他相信當中國接受國際貿易的核心價值時，便能夠改變中國，並補充指之所以有貿易戰，是因為有價值觀上的差異。

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辯方另展示黎在2020年2月19日刊登於《華爾街日報》的文章，其時正值新冠疫情爆發。辯方指，黎在文章中形容美國是自由和開放，又指中美缺乏互信，貿易戰是源於信任問題，問黎想在文章帶出什麼信息。黎則指「純粹讓事實說話」。被問到有否意圖要求美國去做任何事情，黎稱沒有。

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受訪稱「很想CIA、美國影響我們」 黎：利用謠言

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辯方指，黎於2020年5月接受台灣節目「鄉民來衝康」的訪問，他曾說：「我們很想 CIA，我很想美國影響我們，我很想英國影響我們，我很想外國影響我們，他們的支持是我們唯一能夠撐下去的，外國的勢力是現在我們非常需要，讓我們撐下去的。」

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黎庭上回應：「我們需要美國的影響，我們需要英國的影響。」被問到什麼影響，黎則指意思是美國和英國對香港的支持，而他們的支持是香港撐下去的唯一方法。他又指，當時被問到香港示威有否受到 CIA（美國中央情報局）的影響，所以他才會如此回答。

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法官杜麗冰問，為何黎會說需要 CIA 的影響？黎則指，因為當時有很多謠言，指 CIA 叫人出來參與示威、香港的示威是由 CIA 指示等。黎反覆強調這些謠言並不是真實的，所以他受訪時說希望 CIA 影響他們，乃利用該謠言來表示希望美國能影響他們。

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黎強調沒有任何外國影響香港的示威 官質疑怎樣保證

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黎強調，當時從沒有任何外國勢力影響香港的示威，「如果有任何外國影響的話，那便是他們的支持。」辯方繼而追問，當時的示威有沒有受到美國的影響？黎回答：「完全沒有，我可以保證。」

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法官李素蘭追問，「你說你可以保證，你可以怎樣保證？」黎則指，如果有任何外國的影響，人們會知道。黎又指，正如他在節目中說，「美國怎樣叫200萬人出來示威？」，反問：「如果美國能叫200萬人出來示威，如果他們能這樣做的話，那為什麼他們不在內地做同樣的事情？」

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辯方指，黎受訪時稱「外國的勢力是現在我們非常需要」，問黎是什麼意思。黎則指，「外國勢力」就是國際社會的支持，即是任何可以令運動持續的「支持」。法官李運騰問，「支持」是以什麼形式？黎指，可以是「為我們發聲，為我們跟中國對話，為我們向中國交涉，甚至為我們而譴責中國」。

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案件明日續審。

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案件編號：HCCC51/2022

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+ + + + diff --git a/hkers/2024-12-03-trial-of-jimmy-lai-day-101.html b/hkers/2024-12-03-trial-of-jimmy-lai-day-101.html new file mode 100644 index 00000000..485c58b0 --- /dev/null +++ b/hkers/2024-12-03-trial-of-jimmy-lai-day-101.html @@ -0,0 +1,223 @@ + + + + + + + + + + 【黎智英案・審訊第 101 日】 · The Republic of Agora + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +
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【黎智英案・審訊第 101 日】

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獨媒報導 | 2024.12.03

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  • 黎智英認國安法生效前 受訪倡外國制裁阻通過 稱不能等待條文出爐後才反對
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iamge01

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【獨媒報導】壹傳媒創辦人黎智英及3間蘋果公司被控串謀勾結外國勢力及串謀刊印煽動刊物等罪，今（3日）於高院（移師西九龍法院）踏入第101日審訊，黎智英第九日作供。辯方圍繞黎的意圖提問，針對《文匯報》報導指稱黎「為美國打仗」、「為其美國主子說話」，黎否認，並強調香港示威與美國沒有關係，其言論是想證明香港人的價值觀與美國人一致。辯方在庭上播放黎在《國安法》生效之前的受訪片段，黎稱美國應對中國官員實施制裁、凍結銀行帳戶，以及停止向中國輸出技術等，又稱相信特朗普是有信用的人。他在庭上確認提倡制裁，希望阻止中國實施《國安法》。

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黎稱沒與美國退休軍官討論核武 因核武比喻美國人擁有的價值

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辯方大律師關文渭繼續主問，就黎智英的意圖提問。昨日提到，黎於2019年7月10日出席美國智庫「保衛民主基金會」（Foundation for Defense of Democracies，簡稱FDD）公開對談。他當時稱美國有「道德權威（moral authority）」，其支持猶如「核武（nuclear weapon）」。黎又指：「他們（中國）好像沒有任何武器便上戰場，當你使用核武的話，只需一分鐘便可擺平他們。」（“It’s like they’re like going to the battle without any weapon, and you have the nuclear weapon you can finish them in a minute.”）辯方今播放相關片段。

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辯方問，黎說「我們正在敵方陣營替你們打仗（we are fighting your war in your enemy camp）」，是什麼意思。黎指「我們」是指香港和示威者，正如他之前所說，冷戰是一埸價值之爭，而香港人與美國價值觀一致，因此若然香港與中國對戰，那代表香港與美國屬同一陣線。

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辯方問黎有否與美國前副國防部長 Paul Wolfowitz 和退休軍官 Jack Keane 討論過核武？黎稱沒有，因他只是以「核武」比喻美國人所擁有的價值。

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辯方指黎說「很想CIA影響我們」時在笑 黎同意：從來沒有這種事

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辯方昨日提到，黎於2020年5月接受台灣節目《鄉民來衝康》的訪問，當他被問到有沒有CIA（美國中央情報局）影響香港的示威，他說：「我們很想 CIA，我很想美國影響我們，我很想英國影響我們，我很想外國影響我們，他們的支持是我們唯一能夠撐下去的，外國的勢力是現在我們非常需要，讓我們撐下去的。」辯方今在庭上播放相關片段。

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辯方指，從畫面可見黎說以上說話時正在笑。黎同意，「因為從來都沒有這種事。」

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黎否認「為美國打仗」、否認美國是「主子」

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辯方展示《文匯報》報導〈肥黎默認「為美打仗」 政界批賣港禍國〉，當中引述黎在受訪時提及「中美新冷戰」，並指：「多名立法會議員昨日接受香港文匯報訪問時批評，美國一心箝制中國發展，而黎智英則為其美國主子說話，以各種手段破壞香港社會秩序，其賣港行為令人髮指。」

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辯方引述報導指黎變相承認香港的反政府事件是「為美國打仗」，問黎這說法是否真確。黎否認，並指香港的示威與美國沒有關係；而他在「保衛民主基金會」中說「我們正在敵方陣營替你們打仗」，是用比喻手法來說明香港示威是爭取價值，而該些價值觀與美國的一致。辯方追問黎是否「為美國打仗」，黎回答：「不是，我們不是為美國打仗，我們是為自己而戰」，以避免中國侵害香港的自由，並重申香港示威是爭取與美國一致的價值。

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辯方引述報導形容「黎智英則為其美國主子說話」，黎則否認，並稱其言論是想證明香港人的價值觀與美國人一致，強調香港人和美國人沒有實質的關係。辯方追問黎，美國是否他的主子？黎否認。

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黎稱聽過「中國內爆」但未聞「支爆」

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法官李素蘭重提昨日證供，引述黎提到如果中國經濟內爆的話，中國政府的統治正當性便會崩塌。黎解釋，其意思是中國政府的統治正當性是來自經濟發展，但是如果經濟崩潰的話，中國政府便會失去統治正當性，國家主席習近平亦可能要下台，並強調他只是作出預測和臆測。

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法官李素蘭問黎，「你是在2019年9月作出預測，這說法正確嗎？」黎確認。法官李素蘭繼而指，黎在當時已撰文提及中國內爆，然而黎作供關於2020年1月11日的陽明山會議時，卻聲稱「支爆」這字詞是由「攬炒巴」劉祖廸在會議上首先提出，質疑黎聲稱當時從沒聽過「支爆」的說法。黎同意，他當時從未聽聞「支爆」一字，正確的字眼應是「中國內爆」（China implosion），而「支爆」和「支那」是一種古老的方式談論「中國」，如果今時今日有人使用這字詞，對方不會明白意思。

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由於是次審訊語言為英文，庭上就「支爆」的英語翻譯為「China implosion」，與「中國內爆」的英語翻譯相同。因此黎解釋自己未曾聽聞「支爆（China implosion）」之後，不諳中文的法官李素蘭表示仍然不明白，並重複問題，質疑黎早已撰文提及「中國內爆」（同樣譯作「China implosion」），卻稱未曾聽過「支爆」的說法。

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黎則重申他未曾聽聞「支爆」，他只提及過「中國內爆（China implosion）」，若從英語翻譯過來即是「中國爆」，然而「支爆」則是一種過於古老的方式去說「中國」，他從未聽過有人如此說「支那」、「支爆」，現今人們聽到不會明白是什麼意思。

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辯方大律師關文渭介入並解釋，「支那（Shina）」本來是日本使用的詞語去形容「中國」，是一個帶貶損和貶意的詞語，也是一個古老的詞語，今時今日很少人使用。

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法官杜麗冰問，所以黎的意思是他曾經聽聞「中國內爆」，但是未曾聽過「支爆」。黎同意，所以當劉祖廸說「支爆」時，他表示不明白，要求劉解釋，但是黎確認自己有撰文提及「中國內爆」。

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國安法消息傳出翌日 提出開設Twitter 黎：冀讓世界知道香港發生什麼事

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辯方指2020年5月21日，黎向時任《蘋果》副社長陳沛敏傳送《香港01》的新聞，有關人大擬在港實施《國安法》，黎並說：「仆街打到嚟喇！」翌日即2020年5月22日，黎向李兆富傳送訊息，稱有見人大打算通過在香港實施《國安法》，現在是設立 Twitter 帳戶的好時機。辯方問黎何以這樣說。黎指開設 Twitter 是想讓世界知道香港發生什麼事。

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iamge02 +▲ 前《蘋果日報》執行總編輯 林文宗（左）、副社長 陳沛敏（右）

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辯方追問，當時《國安法》條文尚未公開，問黎何以得知《國安法》內容。黎則指憑當時的新聞報導得知《國安法》將會取代香港現行的法律制度。黎認為《國安法》會凌駕《基本法》和法治。

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Twitter 帖文標籤「#MagnitskyAct」 黎稱出自李兆富之手、只有粗略理解

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辯方展示2020年5月23日的訊息紀錄，陳沛敏向黎智英傳送一張人大政協委員的合照，相中眾人手持「支持國安立法 護航一國兩制」橫額，陳並稱：「Will they be on the list?」黎問：「What do you mean? Thanks」，陳回覆：「賣港賊，制裁名單？」黎表示：「I see. Good suggest.」陳續表示：「張相和唐英年的發言 disgusted many Hong Kong people」，黎其後稱：「I’ve already put them on my Twitter: should US government put these people (on) the sanction list?」

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辯方指，黎同日將同一張人大政協委員合照傳送給李兆富，問原因為何。黎稱是因應陳沛敏的提議，他認為是很好的提議，所以傳送給李兆富，供他在 Twitter 發布。

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辯方指，黎的 Twitter 帳戶同日發布帖文，顯示人大政協委員合照，並加上字句：「Should US government put them on the sanction list? #MagnitskyAct」黎稱帖文是因應陳沛敏的提議，發布合照是因為相中的人大政協委員削弱香港的自由。

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辯方問黎當時知道《國安法》是關於什麼嗎？黎表示知道得不詳細，但從新聞報導，他得悉《國安法》將會是一個凌駕《基本法》和法治的法律，以及會是嚴厲的法律。辯方追問黎何以得知《國安法》削弱法治？黎指當時市內有很多輿論，包括民主派和作家。

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辯方提到帖文內有標籤「#MagnitskyAct」，黎則稱是由李兆富加上的。辯方問黎當時明白「Magnitsky Act」是什麼嗎？黎稱不明白詳情，但是從表面上來看，這個詞是關於制裁。黎又稱自己對「Magnitsky Act」只有粗略的理解，而且一般而言不會在意李兆富加入的標籤。

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《蘋果》發起「一人一信救香港」 黎：用盡所有必要的手段去阻止國安法實施

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辯方指2020年5月24日《蘋果》頭版發起「一人一信救香港」行動。黎稱目的是阻止《國安法》實施，因《國安法》對香港具破壞性。

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iamge03

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陳沛敏曾供稱不認同做法，並且同日以 WhatsApp 傳送黃之鋒的 Facebook 帖文截圖給黎。黃在帖文稱「睇到真係覺得有啲骨痹同埋肉麻」，指香港不應要求別國的總統去拯救香港。

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黎當時回覆表示：「他（黃）說了什麼並不重要，這是看待美國和目前議題的不同觀點，我不認同他，任何東西可以幫助到我們的話都應該去用。我知道很多人都不認同這行動，包括李柱銘，但是在危機面前我們不能裝作謹慎和聰明，勇敢是唯一出路！現時已沒有其他方法對付中共了。」（“What he says doesn’t matter. That’s a very different view of looking at US and the matter at hand. I don’t agree with him, whatever we can secure to help us we must use now. I know a lot of people don’t agree with this including Martin, but now is time crisis we can’t pretend to be careful and clever. The only way is to be brave! There’s no other way to deal with CCP now.”）

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黎庭上解釋，當時處於危急關頭，所以他認為要用盡所有必要的方法去阻止《國安法》實施，但他知道陳沛敏和張劍虹均不認同「一人一信」做法。辯方問黎會否視這些訊息為給予陳沛敏指示？黎說不會，「我只是回覆她，這裡沒有任何指示。」

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image04 +▲ 前《蘋果日報》社長 張劍虹

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辯方問到，當時陳沛敏和張劍虹均不認同「一人一信救香港」，黎又如何發起行動？黎表示：「因為我是老闆。」他其後表示，當時提出這行動的同事必定認同這行動，並舉例指時任動新聞總監張志偉認同。張在本案中沒有被起訴。

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黎指李兆富提議Twitter上載信件照片及標註特朗普 惟最終沒有實行

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黎指，由於當時正值疫情，郵寄實體信件的話可能需時一個月，所以李兆富提議在 Twitter 上載信件，然後標註特朗普的帳戶，但是黎相信最後沒有實行，因他記不起有人上載信件照片及標註特朗普。

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辯方遂展示「一人一信救香港」頭版，當中提到「三大方法向特朗普表達訴求」，包括 Twitter、Facebook 和白宮聯署。黎確認三種方法均不需要經過《蘋果》便能做到。法官李運騰問黎是否不會知道讀者最終有否採用 Twitter 的方法。黎同意，因上載信件的照片到 Twitter 毋須經過《蘋果》。

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辯方追問，為何上載信件照片到 Twitter 並標註特朗普最終未有實行？黎則表示不記得原因，起初他提出實體信件較震撼，可是後來他們收集到信件之後，並沒有拍照及標註特朗普，他記不起有如此做過。

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黎亦確認，頭版上的信件樣本是 Mark Simon 基於黎的理念而撰寫出來。

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黎：國安法破壞香港言論自由 作為老闆應承擔所有責任

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辯方提到，黎於2020年5月25日重新擔任壹傳媒集團主席，他早前證供亦解釋：「《國安法》之後，如果《蘋果》發生了任何事，我希望我會是完全承擔責任的那一個人。」辯方問，黎說會承擔責任，是否與這個「一人一信救香港」行動有關？黎則表示，承擔責任是概括的說法。

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辯方追問黎是為了什麼事情承擔責任？黎指即將來臨的《國安法》，使傳媒生意非常危險，「作為老闆，我理應承擔所有責任，面對這些危險。」辯方問為什麼形容為「危險」？黎指：「因為我們大概都知道《國安法》是什麼，我們大概都知道《國安法》是嚴厲的，它會對香港的言論自由帶來破壞。」

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黎受訪及Twitter均倡制裁中國官員、凍結帳戶 冀阻國安法通過

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辯方庭上播放《霍士新聞》片段，黎於2020年5月26日受訪時稱美國應對中國官員實施制裁、凍結銀行帳戶，以及停止向中國輸出技術等。辯方問黎是否提倡制裁？黎同意。辯方繼而問，當黎說停止向中國輸出技術時，黎是否提倡封鎖和敵對行動？黎則指這是制裁而非敵對行動。

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辯方展示黎與張劍虹之間的訊息紀錄，張引述時事評論員桑普在D100節目中稱美國將會實施制裁；黎則回應張，指這不足以阻嚇中國，而他期望見到更嚴厲的制裁。辯方問黎說不足以阻嚇中國是什麼意思。黎表示當時認為制裁力度不足夠去阻止中國訂立國安法。至於「更嚴厲的制裁」，黎稱只是表達自己意見，他當時正觀望有沒有其他措施。

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辯方展示2020年5月27日黎發布的 Twitter 帖文，他轉發《霍士新聞》的影片連結，並說：「Thank you @MariaBartiromo for being so caring about me and about #HKers. We will continue our #FightforFreedom. #CCPChina must change or it will be a threat to the freedom of the rest of the world. We must do what it takes and what we can.」

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同日黎的帳戶發布另一則帖文：「There should be sanctions on #CCPChina officials who violate universal value of human rights. Nations should stop exporting technology #CCPChina must play by the international rules.」黎相信帖文是出自他手筆。辯方問黎為何會說應該向中國官員實施制裁？黎說因為制裁可以阻止《國安法》實施。

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辯方展示同日另一則帖文：「The most effective sanction you can impose is to freeze Chinese officials’ bank accounts in US. Expose how corrupted they are. Your action will be much appreciated not only by #Hkers, but also the Chinese who suppressed by #CCP and every soul aspired to be free.」

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辯方展示同日另一則帖文，黎分享《彭博》文章〈U.S. Weighs Sanctions on Chinese Officials, Firms Over Hong Kong〉，並加上字句：「Mr. President @realDonaldTrump. You’re a man of his words. You said if China passes the national security act there will be serious consequences.」

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黎認國安法前受訪倡外國制裁 稱不能等待條文後出爐才反對

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辯方另展示黎與張劍虹之間的訊息，於2020年5月27日，黎提及美國制裁中國官員和企業的話，將會是對中國經濟「打擊」。被問到「打擊（blow）」是什麼意思，黎稱即是「打（the hit）」、「輾壓（the crush）」及「制裁官員和企業」。辯方問為了什麼目的？黎表示他理解特朗普對中國官員實施制裁是為了阻止《國安法》；至於為何要制裁中國企業，他則稱不知道。

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2020年5月28日黎智英接受《彭博》訪問，主持人問黎為何認為時任美國總統特朗普是「香港的最後希望」？黎引述特朗普說過如果香港實施《國安法》，「他會做一些認真的事（“he would do something serious”）」，但是他不知道特朗普相關措施會有多嚴厲。他促請美國實施制裁，相信特朗普是守信用的人，希望特朗普能在週末對中國實施嚴厲的制裁。

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黎表示，他認為美國最有效的制裁措施是凍結中國高官的外地銀行戶口，因為他們有大量貪污的錢（corrupted money）儲存在美國和歐洲的銀行戶口裡。

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黎確認上述說話反映他當時所真誠相信的想法。辯方提到，主持人說其時黎尚未有機會看到《國安法》條文，直至6月30日實施的晚上，為何不等待實際條文出爐，之後才反對它？黎在節目中回答，不能夠等待，世界應該阻止《國安法》通過。辯方問黎當時為何如此說。黎說不能等待條文公開，因外國需要對中國作出反應。

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辯方另播放《英國廣播公司》（BBC）的訪問片段，黎引述特朗普稱，若然中國實施港區《國安法》的話會有「嚴重後果」，又指美國單憑說話是不足夠，還要有實際行動。辯方問黎口中的「行動」是什麼意思。黎說是制裁，即請求美國對中國實施最嚴厲的制裁。

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案件明天續審。

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案件編號：HCCC51/2022

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N. Korean Troops In Russia

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The Meaning and Significance of North Korean Troops’ Deployment to Russia

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Choi Yonghwan | 2024.12.04

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Why did North Korea decide to deploy its troops to Ukraine? Pyongyang appears to be concerned that Trump’s electoral victory could restrict its opportunity to become a critical part of Russia’s Eurasian security architecture and to cement its status as a nuclear power.

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The details of North Korea’s troop deployments to Russia will likely become clearer over time. However, the repercussions are clear: the North Korean army’s participation in the war will dramatically increase Russia–North Korea cooperation.

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But why did North Korea suddenly take this step? There have been several occasions during the Ukraine war when Russia has been on the defensive. However, the recent situation does not seem particularly difficult for Russia. The true answer is to be found in North Korea’s own strategic objectives: Pyongyang appears to want to reshape the geopolitical landscape on the Korean Peninsula.

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Since the Eighth Communist Party Congress in 2021, North Korea’s foreign strategy can be described as a “New Cold War Structure Utilisation Strategy”, which consists of an effort to refashion the geopolitical landscape on the Korean Peninsula. The beginning of this was the improvement of Pyongyang’s relations with Beijing by taking advantage of the rising tensions between the US and China. North Korea also strengthened its relationship with Moscow after Russia’s all-out invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. To all intents and purposes, Pyongyang viewed the rising US–China strategic competition and the Russo-Ukrainian war as a strategic opportunity.

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North Korean leader Kim Jong-un’s perception of the international situation is evident in his 2021 and 2022 “State of the Nation” addresses, in which he referred to the current international situation as a “New Cold War” and as a period of “multi-polarisation”. As seen from Pyongyang, the country’s old weakness of being overly dependent on China could be offset by better relations with Russia, thereby creating a trilateral relationship which may amount to the best international political situation for North Korea since the end of the Cold War in the late 1980s. This has the added advantage of providing Kim with the ability to rely on both China and Russia to diminish the importance of the UN sanctions regime on North Korea and effectively paralyse any international effort to monitor breaches of these sanctions.

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Seen from this perspective, the prospect of Donald Trump’s electoral triumph, which already seemed very real in October, was dreaded in Pyongyang because it was clear that Trump was determined to bring about at least a ceasefire in Ukraine, and if this resulted in the end of the war in Ukraine, the future of North Korea’s relations with Russia would be uncertain. Kim’s policy of “strategic diversification” would have come to nothing.

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Moscow and Pyongyang clearly discussed the deployment well before the US election. Yet it is instructive to note that the official justification for North Korea’s entry into the war was the Ukrainian incursion into Russian territory in Kursk. This provided Russia with the excuse to invoke Article 4 in the newly-concluded Russia–North Korea security treaty; the Russian government chose to claim that the Ukrainian army’s advance into Kursk had created a “state of war” in which Russia’s territory was “invaded” from Ukraine, thereby activating the mutual defence provisions of the Russian-North Korean treaty. Of course, it was Russia that invaded Ukraine first, and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is a clear violation of Article 2, Paragraph 4 of the UN Charter, which prohibits the use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of other states. However, neither Moscow nor Pyongyang is bothered by such niceties.

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The participation of large numbers of North Korean regular troops, especially combat troops, in the Russo-Ukrainian war means that the conflict has turned into an international one

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The North Korean regime is likely to extract financial compensation for the lives of its soldiers that it has now sent into the Russian meat grinder. However, the most significant advantage for Pyongyang is that what it perceives as the entrenchment of a Cold War conflict structure serves its purposes because it makes the resolution of the North Korean issue virtually impossible.

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International Political Implications of Russian Troops Deployed in North Korea

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The dispatch of North Korean troops may not have a significant impact on the war situation between Russia and Ukraine. Still, considering the level of North Korea–Russia cooperation, the war will likely cause changes in international relations. The participation of large numbers of North Korean regular troops, especially combat troops, in the Russo-Ukrainian war means that the conflict has turned into an international one. The participation of North Korean forces and the corresponding level of demand from Ukraine for South Korea’s support will also increase in direct proportion to one another. And if the nature of the war changes to an international one, the level of NATO’s involvement will increase, and the threat of a Russian nuclear attack will become more acute.

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To start with, the dispatch of North Korean troops is a clear sign that North Korea and Russia are joining forces on the anti-US front and that North Korea could become one of the core countries in the non-Western Eurasian security structure that Russia has vowed to build.

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It is still unclear what the Eurasian security structure promoted by Russia entails. Still, if North Korea, as a country with nuclear weapons, participates in this structure, there is a concern that this will create a new nuclear state alliance that also encompasses Belarus, where Russia’s tactical nuclear weapons have already been deployed, and Iran, whose nuclear ambitions are growing.

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Moreover, it is fully anticipated that, in return for its military participation, North Korea will demand to join the Russian-led Collective Security Organisation, as well as other international organisations such as the BRICS or the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, and Russia will no longer be able to dither on such membership applications. Should these steps be taken, they will likely increase North Korea’s status and role in the anti-US or anti-Western camp under a multipolar order, which could be an opportunity for North Korea to break out of its diplomatic isolation.

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In addition, there is a concern that North Korea’s status as an “unofficial” nuclear state could be established as a fact, leading to a crisis in the international non-proliferation regime. The trend is already apparent. In September this year, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov publicly stated that Moscow viewed the notion of “denuclearising” North Korea as a “closed matter”, claiming that Russia understood Pyongyang’s logic of relying on nuclear weapons as the foundation of its defence.

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The Russia–North Korea New Treaty specifies in its Article 10 “cooperation” between the two countries concerning “peaceful nuclear energy”. If Russia proceeds with nuclear energy cooperation with North Korea – which has violated the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and developed nuclear weapons – this will constitute an approval of North Korea’s possession of atomic weapons. The creation of a new Russian-led nuclear alliance or even Moscow’s acquiescence in North Korea’s nuclear development will pose a threat to the international non-proliferation regime that has been maintained since the end of the Cold War.

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Impact on Security in Northeast Asia and the Korean Peninsula

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The dispatch of North Korean troops implies a direct link between matters on the Korean Peninsula and the Russo-Ukrainian war. The more pressure that is exerted on Russia in Ukraine, the more opportunities will be created for North Korea, making the Korean Peninsula more susceptible to the effects of the current European war. In particular, with North Korea’s growing leverage over Russia, there is concern about the direct impact of the close relationship between the two countries. Even in the case of conventional armaments, the high degree of complementarity between the weapon systems operated by North Korea and Russia suggests that the synergy in the two countries’ cooperation will be very high. Russia possesses all the core technologies for the development of strategic and tactical nuclear weapons, which North Korea claims to have developed but has not yet completed.

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Furthermore, the fact that the North Korean army’s deployment to Russia is justified by Article 4 of the Russia–North Korea Security Treaty, which refers to a mutual security guarantee, must mean that – at least in principle - the same collective security article could be invoked by Moscow to justify a greater Russian involvement in any potential future conflict on the Korean Peninsula. Thus, Russia and North Korea, functioning as a de facto military alliance, could face off against the South Korea–US alliance, increasing the nuclear-based character of such a potential future confrontation. This will further strengthen North Korea’s current position of defining inter-Korean relations as “hostile relations between two countries” (it is no accident that North Korea’s constitution has recently been modified to include precisely such a definition) and will inevitably lead to a prolonged period of political and military tension on the Korean Peninsula.

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In addition, the dispatch of troops could become a new channel for North Korea to earn foreign currency and an essential opportunity for the North Korean military to gain combat experience. This will considerably increase the security threat to South Korea. In particular, Pyongyang’s accumulation of technology and expertise in operating inexpensive and effective weapon systems such as drones will lead to a different practical threat. At the same time, it should also be admitted that the dispatch of North Korean combat troops could be an opportunity to assess the combat effectiveness and training level of the North Korean military, which would be of interest to South Korea and the militaries of many Western countries.

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Outlook and Challenges

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However, it is necessary to consider that the ripple effect of North Korea’s appearance on a European battlefield will vary, depending on North Korean troops’ participation method.

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The most direct and explicit method is for North Korean combat troops to participate in the war as an independent operational authority. This is likely to change the nature of the war to an international one, and it is also a method that will require Russia to pay a higher future political and economic price for North Korea’s involvement.

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The dispatch of troops could become a new channel for North Korea to earn foreign currency and an essential opportunity for the North Korean military to gain combat experience

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Alternatively, the North Korean regime may choose to reduce the burden of escalation by having its troops participate in the war as part of the Russian military or as individuals in a “private military company” such as the Wagner Group. However, if the recent report that Kim Young-bok – the deputy chief of staff of the General Staff of the Korean People’s Army – is in charge of the North Korean troops deployed to Russia is accurate, it is likely that the North Korean troops will not be content with participating in the war as individuals.

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The challenge facing Seoul and all Western governments is that, in the short term, there are limited means to effectively restrain the North Korean military’s participation in the war or to punish Pyongyang for it. Therefore, governments need to take a longer-term view and rely on experience and diplomatic assets accumulated since the end of the Cold War to produce workable responses.

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For example, after the fall of the Soviet Union, Russia’s position on the Korean peninsula was the most pragmatic among the four surrounding powers; it simply re-adjusted its relationship with North Korea to a normal state relationship, notwithstanding Pyongyang’s accusations that Moscow was “selling off” its interest to the “US dollar”. Needless to say, relations between Russia and the West are likely to remain frosty for a considerable time after the Russo-Ukrainian war. Still, Russia’s relationship with the West does not necessarily have to be a reason for South Korea and Russia to live in hostility.

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Thus, it remains crucial for South Korea to present a vision for the post-war relationship with Russia. Undoubtedly, it won’t be easy to significantly improve relations with China and Russia in the short term. Yet, it is imperative to establish policy measures that can restrain China–Russia–North Korea relations. Seoul also needs to consider a roundabout approach, leveraging its relations with Central Asian countries that are closely linked to China and Russia.

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Yet none of this obviates the need, in the short term, to continue warning the international community about the risks to global security that the deployment of North Korean troops poses. It is equally important for Seoul to lay out its own “red lines” regarding the cooperation between Russia and North Korea. In particular, Seoul needs to reiterate Russia’s international responsibility as a permanent member of the UN Security Council and as a NPT “P5” member, and to continue raising global awareness about the transfer of advanced military technology, including nuclear weapons, that the Moscow–Pyongyang relationship entails.

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Choi Yonghwan is a senior research fellow at South Korea’s Institute for National Security Strategy (INSS). He also serves as a standing member of the Advisory Committee on Democratic Peace and Unification.

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+ + + + diff --git a/hkers/2024-12-04-trial-of-jimmy-lai-day-102.html b/hkers/2024-12-04-trial-of-jimmy-lai-day-102.html new file mode 100644 index 00000000..47d45879 --- /dev/null +++ b/hkers/2024-12-04-trial-of-jimmy-lai-day-102.html @@ -0,0 +1,222 @@ + + + + + + + + + + 【黎智英案・審訊第 102 日】 · The Republic of Agora + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +
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【黎智英案・審訊第 102 日】

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獨媒報導 | 2024.12.04

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  • 袁弓夷拍片稱示威有人被謀殺強姦 黎智英批常誇大其辭 不予信任
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iamge01

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【獨媒報導】壹傳媒創辦人黎智英及3間蘋果公司被控串謀勾結外國勢力及串謀刊印煽動刊物等罪，今（4日）於高院（移師西九龍法院）踏入第102日審訊，黎智英第十日作供。辯方圍繞黎的意圖提問，當中提及《蘋果》曾發布袁弓夷的影片，袁稱反修例中有人被謀殺和強姦，而黎在 Twitter 轉載影片。不過黎稱經過數次接觸後，認為袁常誇大其辭、又想與他攀關係，感到不舒服故疏遠他。2020年6月11日，袁向黎傳送語音訊息，稱自己翌日會見時任美國國際宗教自由大使 Sam Brownback，打算向對方提出制裁夏寶龍，冀黎協助聯絡天主教香港教區榮休主教陳日君樞機，冀得到陳的支持和寫信。黎當時回覆指樞機答應的機會不大，但可以嘗試聯絡。黎在庭上稱事實上沒有替袁聯絡樞機，「因為我不相信這個人。」

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此外，辯方播放黎的受訪片段，黎表示自己準備面對「坐監嘅犧牲」，辯方問當黎所做的事變得不合法，還會否繼續？黎說：「不，不是不合法，我只是準備好面對後果。」法官李素蘭追問，黎理應做了非法的事，才會坐監？黎卻表示：「我不覺得我做過違法的事情，但是我在監獄已有四年。」

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李宇軒稱經陳梓華找到《蘋果》寫手 Jack Hazlewood 借出戶口收眾籌款項

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李宇軒早前供稱，2019年7月的「中英聯合聲明登報眾籌」，即第二次眾籌，使用了另一個眾籌平台「gofundme.com」，惟後來發現該平台規定款項必須經由英國開設的英鎊戶口接收，後來經陳梓華找到《蘋果》寫手 Jack Hazlewood 借出銀行戶口。

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黎庭上稱不認識 Jack Hazlewood，亦從沒聽聞他的名字。辯方遂展示他的 WhatsApp 訊息紀錄，顯示 Jack Hazlewood 於2020年5月31日傳送一份文章的 PDF 檔案給黎。黎稱不能開啟 PDF 檔案，Jack Hazlewood 遂傳送3張文章的截圖給黎。黎庭上卻回應：「這些人對我而言就如一種滋擾，通常這樣介紹自己，傳送一些東西給我，要求我們刊登⋯⋯我便回覆交由編輯決定。」

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法官杜麗冰問，既然黎稱這些訊息是滋擾、不想收到這些訊息，為何不直接無視它？黎表示不知道。杜官又問，為何黎向 Jack Hazlewood 說會轉發他的截圖？黎僅指他可能之前跟對方溝通過，「可能我說我會轉發，然後睡覺，翌日醒來便忘記了。」法官李運騰追問，但是黎在訊息表明「我會現在轉發」；黎則表示不知道。

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當黎再被問 Jack Hazlewood 是否協助李宇軒轉帳款項，黎反問：「我怎樣知道？」，稱不熟悉這些名字，可能 Jack Hazlewood 曾經替《蘋果》撰文一至兩次，但他不知道。

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黎稱不知道Jack Hazlewood 惟辯方指黎曾轉發其帖文

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辯方展示黎於2020年5月31日的 Twitter 帖文，顯示他轉發 Jack Hazlewood 的帖文，並說：「Mr @JackHHazlewood thanks for advocating for Apple English edition. Certainly we need more subscribers so we can be financially viable. Having subscribers from all over the world will also sent #CCP a clear and strong message that the world is watching.」

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辯方又指訊息紀錄亦顯示黎曾將 Jack Hazlewood 相關截圖轉發給李兆富。黎則回應，帖文的內容是完全不同的話題，關於宣傳《蘋果》英文版，而非 Jack Hazlewood 在訊息所述的東西。

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法官杜麗冰問黎有否閱讀過 Jack Hazlewood 傳來的文章。黎堅稱他肯定沒有，只是當時對方傳送了三張截圖，他以為是緊急事情，所以才會轉發，「如果我快要睡覺，我不會閱讀任何東西。」

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黎曾轉發Jack Hazlewood帖文 感謝宣傳蘋果英文版

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辯方又展示黎與張志偉之間的訊息，張於2020年5月31日傳送兩張 Twitter 截圖，指 Jack Hazlewood 和羅傑斯（Benedict Rogers）分別宣傳《蘋果》英文版。

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黎於同日傳送 Jack Hazlewood 在 Twitter 的另一則帖文截圖，當中稱在外國人在香港以外的地方未能下載《蘋果》手機應用程式。黎並吩咐張盡快解決問題。張回覆「收到」。被問到當時是否已經知道 Jack Hazlewood 這個名字，黎稱沒有留意。

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辯方問，陳梓華有否向黎提起 Jack Hazlewood 這個人？黎說沒有，並重申除了要求陳平息暴力之外，便沒有與陳討論其他事情。辯方引述李宇軒的證供，指在籌備中英聯合聲明登報期間，Jack Hazlewood 的聯絡方法乃由李宗澤（Wilson Li）提供。黎稱不知道。

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黎否認增加個人影響力：若說垃圾說話，影響力有何重要？

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辯方問黎對《紐約時報》的取態如何。黎指《紐約時報》是進步自由派（progressive liberal），他們總是對特朗普及其所屬的共和黨有負面評價，但是黎並不苟同。

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辯方提及陳梓華供稱黎聲稱想增加個人影響力，黎否認。辯方追問黎為何替《紐約時報》撰文。黎稱因為希望接觸到更多人，希望自己的信息接觸到愈多人愈好。黎又反問：「如果我說了一些垃圾說話，我的影響力又有何重要呢？⋯⋯我的影響力並不重要，如果我說一些愚蠢的話。」

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辯方指，黎於2020年6月3日在 Twitter 發布帖文：「Overseas fellows and Americans, please subscribe to our Apple Daily English edition. Your subscription is more than only the financial help, but it is political protection for us against #CCP crackdown.」

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黎解釋若然海外學者和美國人為香港發聲的話，外國的政客便需要聆聽，又指「我們」可以是指香港人和《蘋果》。被問到為何要特別提及美國人，黎指因為美國人最具影響力。

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黎稱袁弓夷想攀關係、經常誇大其辭

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辯方提到，現被國安處通緝的袁弓夷曾拍片響應「一人一信救香港」，影片於2020年5月29日至6月1日在《蘋果》平台播放。黎在 Twitter 亦有轉載影片，並稱期望特朗普實施制裁。袁在影片中呼籲外國投資者從香港撤資，又稱反修例示威中有人被謀殺和強姦。黎則稱沒有看過影片，也沒有參與製作，如今在庭上觀看後，認為袁的說法誇張，自己不認同。至於他轉載影片，他則承認當時是疏忽。

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黎表示，與袁接觸幾次之後，「我有點感到不舒服，我感覺到他總是想與我攀關係」，由於對此感到不舒服，所以後來疏遠他。

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辯方指，袁乘機前往美國華盛頓之前，曾問黎有沒有東西想袁幫忙，黎回覆沒有任何提議。黎確認，因為當時對他感到不舒服，又指袁沒有告訴他要去美國做什麼。被問到這感覺從何而來，黎估計這是日積月累，他看了袁的影片之後，發覺部份言論並非事實，情況並非如他口中那麼極端。

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辯方聞言後，引述黎較早前卻說沒看過袁的影片，要求黎解釋。黎稱不記得有否看過，並重申他感覺到袁總是想與他攀關係，對此感到不舒服，又指袁經常誇大其辭。法官李運騰則提醒辯方是在盤問黎。

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黎曾告訴張劍虹小心袁弓夷 質疑袁隱藏背後動機

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辯方展示黎與時任《蘋果》社長張劍虹之間的訊息，當中提及一篇訪問。黎不記得是哪一篇訪問，但他確認有告訴張要提防袁這個人，因他對袁感到不舒服。黎在訊息中告訴張「他（袁）是郭文貴的人」，黎解釋意思是袁與郭有關。被問到郭文貴在紐約做了什麼，黎稱不知道他做了什麼，但是：「我只是有個印象，可能他是個騙子。」

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iamge02 +▲ 前《蘋果日報》社長 張劍虹

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黎亦在訊息中告訴張「他（袁）想與我合作反共」。黎解釋，郭理應對抗中共政權，可是事實不然，而袁卻想與郭合作。黎又指他告訴張，他不認同及不接受袁，質疑袁有隱藏的議程或背後動機，而未有表露出來，因此著張要提防袁。

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訊息亦顯示張劍虹說不用害怕《國安法》，黎解釋張的意思是若中共內鬥的話，《國安法》便不會很嚴厲，但最終結果證明他估計錯誤。

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辯方問，若然黎認為《國安法》不會很嚴厲，那黎便不需要呼籲外國制裁，那麼黎當時有否繼續呼籲制裁？黎表示當時有繼續呼籲制裁。辯方追問原因。黎回答指「《國安法》不會很嚴厲」只是他的臆測，如果《國安法》不會嚴厲的話，他認為他不會繼續呼籲制裁。

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法官李運騰提到，袁的影片發布一星期之後，才有上述黎與張劍虹之間的訊息，問黎有否要求將袁的影片從《蘋果》網站刪除。黎則表示他未足以警覺到想起袁的影片，他對影片沒有很深的印象。法官杜麗冰指黎聲稱不認同該影片。黎同意，因為影片含有不實和誇大的說法。

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杜官問黎，誰人介紹袁弓夷給他認識？黎稱袁會在 YouTube 發布影片，何俊仁曾提議邀請袁弓夷及其女兒袁彌明一起吃晚飯，相信還有邀請袁彌明的丈夫。黎又稱認識袁彌明很長時間，因她亦有參與民主運動。

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袁弓夷曾要求黎協助聯絡陳日君 以支持制裁夏寶龍 黎稱沒協助問

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辯方指，袁弓夷在2020年6月11日向黎傳送語音訊息，稱自己翌日會見時任美國國際宗教自由大使 Sam Brownback，對方負責宗教自由，而夏寶龍「呢條友又燒教堂，又拆十字架」，袁稱需要得到天主教香港教區榮休主教陳日君樞機的支持，並寫信給 Sam Brownback 或時任美國國務卿蓬佩奧，講述夏寶龍犯了宗教罪行，「應該要馬上制裁」，冀黎可以協助聯絡樞機。黎亦以語音回覆袁，指樞機答應的機會不大，「佢唔熟你嘅話，佢會好謹慎嘅」，但是黎表示即管幫袁問問，惟他相信樞機不會答應。

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辯方問黎，回覆袁之後，有否協助他問陳日君樞機？黎回答：「沒有，因為我不相信這個人。」辯方又指，袁其後傳送一連串訊息給黎，惟黎並未有回覆。黎確認，並說：「我不認為我曾費神看過。」他稱他沒有理會袁，「因為我不相信他，我不想與他有聯繫。」

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黎稱自己對袁冷淡 傳送針對袁負面評價 惟袁不夠敏感

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辯方指，黎在一日之前，即2020年6月10日，以通訊軟件 Signal 向袁傳送一篇時事評論員梁啟智對袁的評價節錄，「見咁多人推介袁爸爸條片，即管襟入去睇吓。Sorry，睇咗一半，完全睇唔到落去，個推論亂到離晒大譜」、「一開口鬧泛民，第一個開嘅係李國能⋯⋯李國能幾時做咗泛民？然後又話 Martin Lee，仲講起草基本法開始就讓步⋯⋯成個 CFA 係 Martin Lee 爭取返嚟，八九民運之後仲辭埋草委，讓乜步？然後又開袋住先，問題係袋住先咪就係泛民否決咗囉。咁都可以用嚟鬧泛民？」、「呢啲直頭係 misinformation，虛假信息來的。我真係覺得黃絲圈對信息確切的要求唔見得比藍絲圈高好多。」

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辯方問黎為何傳送相關評價給袁？黎說是讓袁知道相關評語，「這是一種我不需要自己說任何話便能拒絕他的做法」，「你知道，使用其他人的評價。」

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辯方指，不過翌日袁依然傳送訊息給黎，要求黎協助取得陳日君樞機的支持，問黎知不知道原因。黎則表示：「我只能說這個人不夠敏感。」辯方追問，袁未能理解黎的暗示嗎？黎同意，「你可以從我的訊息看到，我當時非常冷淡。」

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黎稱愛中國文化人民但不愛中國政府

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辯方展示黎與李兆富之間於2020年6月6日的訊息，黎稱要集中制裁中國政府，惟辯方指，黎較早前主張制裁對象應集中在中國官員，要求黎解釋為何說法有變？黎則理解「中國」和「中國政府（China government）」是一樣，均破壞了香港。

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辯方問黎：「你愛中國嗎？」黎表示，以中國作為一個國家（as a country）而言，包含她的文化和人民，「當然我愛她。」可是以中國作為一個受共產黨統治的國家（as a state that is ruled by the communist party）而言，他不認為他愛中國，因為這個國家的價值觀與他的價值觀有抵觸。

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在辯方提問下，黎表示他愛中國、但不愛中國政府，直至現在也是。辯方繼而追問，黎剛才又何以說「中國」和「中國政府」都一樣？黎僅表示他當時只是回答辯方的問題，當時他口中的「中國」就是「中國政府」（China as a state）。

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受訪稱有份通過國安法的官員海外銀行戶口存有貪污金錢 黎認屬猜測

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2020年6月10日，黎接受史丹福大學胡佛研究所（Hoover Institution）訪問時，稱香港需要國際，尤其是美國，去協助制裁中國，「現在是制裁中國的最佳時機，去迫使中國更好地管束自己的行為，與普世價值接軌，使世界和平。」黎庭上解釋，因為中國的行為和價值觀與西方有衝突，所以才會有貿易戰。

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黎在受訪時指，美國應該在香港絕望之前便制裁和懲罰中國，「如果中國不放棄訂立《國安法》，香港無論如何都會被破壞，若撤回香港的特殊經濟地位，即管去做，因為怎樣也好都是無意義的。」黎庭上解釋，希望《國安法》能夠減弱或暫緩實施，他當時立場依然是反對取消香港特殊經濟地位；如果香港實施《國安法》的話，香港便會被破壞，屆時取消香港特殊地位與否，也變得亳無意義。

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黎受訪時另提到，美國應該凍結中國貪污官員在西方國家的銀行戶口，那些戶口有大量金錢，而那些有份打壓香港的官員，「應該在個人層面感受自己行為所帶來的痛苦。」（“I think those who are involved in this oppression should personally feel the pain of their action.”）

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黎解釋，他認為有份通過《國安法》的官員，在海外銀行戶口存有涉及貪污的金錢。法官杜麗冰問黎是否猜測？黎同意是猜測。

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黎在訪問中說，如果外國制裁中國的話，香港會是中國與外國貿易的唯一渠道。黎解釋因為香港是國際金融中心，他說這句話的時候，以為《國安法》不會實施，所以才會如此說。

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辯方問黎，會否繼續抗爭，即使這樣做變得不合法？黎回答他不會在違法的基礎上抗爭，因為這樣的話便會被拘捕。黎接著提到：「如今在《國安法》之下，抗爭是不可能的，現在為香港抗爭已無意義，已經萬劫不復。（“… it’s beyond redemption.”）」辯方提醒黎，現在只需集中在案發當時的想法，而不是現在的想法。黎聞言表示，只是嘗試回答辯方的問題，「因為我不會再抗爭了，這是沒有用的。（“… because I won’t be fighting anymore. It’s useless.”）」

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黎：不覺得做過違法事 但在監獄已有四年

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辯方播放2020年6月10日黎接受《自由亞洲電台》訪問的片段，他稱：「我好耐已經決定咗唔諗後果，如果我每一件事，我諗後果，我都做唔到嘅，我每講一句話，我都諗後果，我係做唔到㗎喇。恐慌呢樣嘢已經唔喺我意識裡面喇。如果我真係要為咗呢度最後犧牲，無論係坐監嘅犧牲，甚至乎冇咗條命都好，我都願意㗎，我都冇選擇㗎。」

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辯方問黎，他在節目中說準備「犧牲」，換言之當他所做的事變得不合法，還會否繼續？黎說：「不，不是不合法，我只是預計將會面對後果。」辯方追問，那為何黎提到「坐監嘅犧牲」？黎僅說：「我現時正在監獄。」法官李素蘭追問，黎理應做了非法的事，才會坐監？黎卻表示：「我不覺得我做過違法的事情，但是我在監獄已有四年。」

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黎亦在節目中稱：「如果你係愛呢個地方，你亦覺得冇咗呢個地方好可惜，我哋真係要團結一致，去做最後嘅抗爭去保住，香港呢個家園，我係願意同你一齊抗爭落去。或者有啲人，『算數啦，過去佢嚟到，我哋做大陸人囉，無自由，我有得食，有得住，有得歡樂，我咪算囉。』我亦唔怪你，每一個人要做自己嘅選擇，但係我哋必然會有好多人選擇留喺度抗爭，而我會同呢啲人一齊抗爭到底。」播畢影片之後，旁聽席有人拍手。

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辯方問黎，黎是否會繼續抗爭，即使抗爭變得不合法。黎說，如果抗爭變成不合法，便無論如何都沒有空間抗爭，說像香港現時的情況，沒有人會出來抗爭。辯方則提醒黎，不是要集中現今情況。

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辯方又問，黎說會跟其他人一起抗爭到底，但是他是否認識這些人？黎表示不知道，就如他不會認識所有參與遊行的200萬人。

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案件明日續審。

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散庭後，保安將涉嫌拍手的女旁聽人士帶入庭外的房間，有兩名軍裝警員向她調查。直至下午約4時58分，約7至8名警員把女士帶離法院，約十多名軍裝警員到場設立封鎖線，步行至對面馬路後，便不准市民尾隨。有記者問在場警員是否拘捕及是否涉及任何控罪，警員僅稱純粹帶走該名女士及會放行。

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案件編號：HCCC51/2022

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Peace Through Agency

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How to End Russia’s War in Ukraine

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Ray Hartley and Greg Mills | 2024.12.05

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With the return of Donald Trump imminent and President Volodymyr Zelensky’s proposal of NATO security guarantees for Ukraine’s unoccupied territories on the table, attention has turned to how peace might be made to end Russia’s invasion.

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Russia’s war in Ukraine is an assault on values and democracy as much as a battle for territory. Whatever President-elect Donald Trump might like to think, the war will not end through territorial concessions, since Vladimir Putin is unlikely to be satisfied only with pieces of Ukraine. And believing that the war is about Ukraine’s attachment to territory alone represents a narrow, somewhat statist view that is out of sync with the country’s contemporary character.

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Ukraine has changed in a dramatic way since its independence from the embers of the Soviet Union in 1991, more than 70 years after it first declared its independence with the invasion of the Bolsheviks in late 1917. The next stage in a process of gradually asserting its interests was the Orange Revolution, which delivered a government independent of Russia’s interests in 2004. The revolution of dignity followed 10 years later, leading to the ousting of the pro-Moscow President Viktor Yanukovych and the reinstatement of the 2004 constitution. In 2019, President Petro Poroshenko, who had replaced Yanukovych, was defeated at the polls by Volodymyr Zelensky, and the rest is history.

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But what is not history is Ukraine’s attachment to democracy. “Ukrainians have a voice”, says the country’s Nobel peace laureate Oleksandra Matviichuk, “and they won’t accept peace being made without them”. In this way, Ukraine is no different to South Africa, or any other country where peace has stuck – locals require agency, and the best that international actors can do is to uniformly pressure the parties to the table.

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Yet a consistent feature of the last Trump and the current Biden administrations in the US is their disregard for the interests of their allies. The US proved, in cutting and running from Afghanistan, that it is just too big and careless to take on board the interests of others.

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Believing that the war is about Ukraine’s attachment to territory alone represents a narrow, somewhat statist view that is out of sync with the country’s contemporary character

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From the time of the talks with the Taliban in Qatar (under Trump, which excluded the government of Afghanistan) to the abandonment of Kabul to the Taliban (under Biden), there is a constant thread. Locals don’t have agency, or at least local allies don’t have agency in the face of geopolitical interests.

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But cutting and running in this way was not cost-free.

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If there is a lesson to be learnt from Afghanistan, it is in the consequences and interconnectedness of foreign policy actions. It is no coincidence that Putin invaded Ukraine (again) in February 2022 just six months after Washington left Kabul in a chaotic and duplicitous manner that could hardly have deterred a watching Moscow.

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But let us return to the present, and the prospect of ending what has become a grim war of attrition inexorably grinding up Ukrainian civilians and territory as much as Russian soldiers and equipment.

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There is a risk, in Matviichuk’s words, that “without security guarantees, Russia will use the peace simply to prepare for the next round of war”. Any peace treaty has to recognise past failures, such as the Budapest Memorandum signed in 1994, which supposedly prevented Russia, the US and the UK from threatening or using military force or economic coercion against Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan, “except in self-defence or otherwise in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations”.

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As a result, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine gave up their nuclear weapons. Subsequent events have demonstrated that security guarantees are both critical and problematic, since NATO membership – the most useful guarantee against further Russian aggression – is subject to the political whims of Hungary, Slovakia and other governments that will probably, on current form, veto Kyiv’s application.

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Moreover, as Matviichuk reminds us, Ukraine will not simply “give up” on its people in the occupied territories in the east and Crimea. “Under occupation means living in a ‘grey zone’”, she says, “without rights, no tools to defend themselves, and meaning a constant fear of torture, rape, murder, disappearance, forced migration to camps. Occupation makes human suffering invisible, but it does not mean that it is not happening”.

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Nor is it possible for Ukraine simply to forget these Russian atrocities against civilians. “Only this week Russia launched an Intercontinental Ballistic Missile – or ICBM”, she notes, “against a peaceful civilian city. They have also attacked our energy system, leaving many uncertain how they will survive the winter. But we are still waiting to hear the response, the criticism, of the international community”.

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For Ukraine, this war is yet another phase in its people’s long struggle for statehood against Russian imperialism, a commitment to values and agency that they are not likely to willingly trade

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For the Nobel laureate, peace is not about trading territory, but “about people”, since it is “immoral not to speak about people”. For Ukraine, this war is yet another phase in its people’s long struggle for statehood against Russian imperialism, a commitment to values and agency that they are not likely to willingly trade, or at least certainly not for long.

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As former President Viktor Yushchenko, who led the Orange Revolution in peeling away Russia’s grip on Ukraine 20 years ago, said in an interview with one of the authors, “An integral part of Ukrainian identity is to fight for our freedom and democracy, our own language and culture. This is why Ukrainians will never submit to Moscow’s brutal imperialism and tyranny.”

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Those trying to cut a deal with Putin cannot expect Kyiv to go along with a version of Taliban redux. Kyiv is, after all, not Kabul, and Ukrainians are not Afghans.

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Ray Hartley is the Research Director of the Brenthurst Foundation.

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Greg Mills heads the Johannesburg-based Brenthurst Foundation, established in 2005 by the Oppenheimer family to strengthen African economic performance.

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【黎智英案・審訊第 103 日】

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獨媒報導 | 2024.12.05

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  • 黎智英：不想籲員工「抗爭到底」因「他們的人生比《蘋果日報》更加重要」
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iamge01

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【獨媒報導】壹傳媒創辦人黎智英及3間蘋果公司被控串謀勾結外國勢力及串謀刊印煽動刊物等罪，今（5日）於高院（移師西九龍法院）踏入第103日審訊，黎智英第11日作供。辯方提問圍繞《國安法》生效前黎的意圖，提到2020年6月18日，黎在《蘋果日報》25週年慶祝活動中向員工發言：「無人會迫到你哋做烈士」，籲員工：「攞住對自己嘅良知，攞住對社會嘅良知去做。」當辯方問黎有否籲員工去「抗爭到底」時，黎表示：「我沒有如此說過⋯⋯而且我不想這樣做⋯⋯因為他們的人生比《蘋果日報》更加重要。」

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黎否認文章引起憎恨 稱僅陳述事實

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辯方展示黎的專欄「成敗樂一笑」文章，於2020年6月15日刊登的〈窒息中的香港人 逃亡還是抗爭〉。當中稱「國安法不僅把香港變成沒有自由法治的一般大陸城市，甚至會是新疆一樣恐怖籠罩下的集中營，怎不令香港人害怕」，辯方問黎當時是否已知道《國安法》內容？黎則估計說法只是基於坊間的傳言，因當時有很多有關《國安法》的報導和意見，所有人都關注。

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辯方引述控方指控稱，黎在文章將英國稱呼為「前宗主國」，是意圖引起市民對政府的憎恨。黎隨即指這是事實。辯方重申這是控方的指控，問黎為何如此寫。黎指因為美國取消了香港特殊地位之後，英國履行了前宗主國的責任，賦予300萬名持有BNO護照的香港人赴英定居的權利。

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辯方問黎，有否在文章中間接地請求外國制裁，黎否認，重申他只是陳述事實。辯方又指，黎在文章形容「無恥無信的政權」。黎稱是指中國政權，但他否認有意引起市民對中國政府憎恨，「我只是陳述事實⋯⋯《基本法》賦予我們的已化為烏有。」

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辯方續指文章指稱「我們的教育制度變成了洗腦機器」，問黎有何根據？黎則稱他在文章中已說明了根據，又提到現在所有教科書，甚至圖書館的書，均受到審查。辯方提醒黎只需集中在2020年6月的情況。黎解釋，當時所有事來得非常迫切，而他有權提出相關例子。

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辯方指，黎在文章中提及自己被控刑事恐嚇的案件，遭控方要求禁止出境，稱：「誰會在國安風頭火勢之下承受政治風險？我們律政司司長鄭若驊不是斬釘截鐵地說，國安法不設追溯期，是大話連篇嗎？」黎庭上稱這是他的個人意見，並無意引起對司法機關的憎恨。辯方大律師關文渭提到處理該案的法官為法官李運騰。李官隨即否認，並指刑事恐嚇案是裁判法院的案件，並非由他處理，更提到自己曾在高院批出黎的保釋。

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辯方問黎有否在這裡意圖引起憎恨？黎稱沒有意圖引起市民憎恨司法機關，他只是陳述《國安法》所帶來的政治壓力，「而且我的案件很具政治性，沒有人想承受風險。」法官杜麗冰表示不明白，文章提到的案件是關於刑事恐嚇而非政治。黎解釋：「因為我本人已具政治性，不是我的案件。⋯⋯你知道，別人以政治的目光看待我⋯⋯」

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在法官李素蘭追問下，黎表示他的想法並非憑空出現，當時閱讀不同文章和報導，有相關印象，而他是基於這些印象來撰寫文章。

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黎稱對攬炒巴不感興趣 沒留意其與國際線有關

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辯方展示2020年6月15日《蘋果》「隔牆有耳」欄目，題為〈中共威脅全球民主自由 攬炒巴加入國際聯軍反抗〉，其時是黎在壹傳媒大樓會見陳梓華的前一日。黎同意可能從報導標題得知「攬炒巴」劉祖廸加入國際線。辯方問黎在2020年6月的時候，有否留意到一個叫 IPAC 的組織？黎否認，重申在法庭上才首次聽聞 IPAC。

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辯方問「重光團隊」（Stand with Hong Kong，簡稱 SWHK）又有否聽過？黎亦說沒有聽過，即使他可能曾聽過，但是沒有印象。法官杜麗冰追問，黎剛才說有聽過 SWHK 嗎？黎解釋，因為李兆富替 Twitter 帖文加上的標籤（hashtag）含有「Stand with Hong Kong」，但他未有留意或對此留下印象。

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辯方另展示2020年10月24日的《蘋果》報導〈遊行被圍捕險洩身份 攬炒巴死裏逃生 帶署歷警暴 拒保後返英〉。辯方問黎，在2020年1月台灣陽明山會見「攬炒巴」劉祖廸的時候，是否知道劉某程度上與國際線有關？黎則稱當時未有太留意這個人，沒有深入想過。黎亦稱只曾瞥一眼上述報導。

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Enjoyed spending time with @lukedepulford. Keep fighting together🔥 https://t.co/lFmXqHrkm4 — Finn Lau 劉祖廸 (@finnlau_cd) October 11, 2020

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法官李運騰追問，黎認為國際線是重要，而這些報導是關於國際線，黎不會有興趣看看報導內容是什麼嗎？黎稱自己讀到報導時僅留意劉一個人，多於國際線，又稱自己對劉從不感興趣，除了籲他運用影響力平息勇武派暴力之外。

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法官李素蘭一度問黎是否認識報導中顯示的外國政治人物，當中包括被指稱為「共謀者」的時任日本議員菅野志櫻里。黎則稱不認識任何一人。

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黎稱「不一定會如期實施」 其後說倘國安法實施香港會死

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2020年6月18日，張劍虹向黎傳送新華社的網站文章，當中指《港區國安法》對四類危害國家安全的犯罪行為和刑事責任作出明確決定，包括分裂國家、顛覆國家政權、恐怖活動和勾結外國勢力危害國家安全。黎回覆：「是的，沒新意。現在是通過時間而已」，又表示：「我看不一定會如期實施。」

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iamge02 +▲ 前《蘋果日報》社長 張劍虹

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黎庭上解釋，雖然當時《國安法》條文未公開，之所以說「沒新意」，是因為從當時的報導和傳言，對於《國安法》有粗略理解。至於「我看不一定會如期實施」，黎則表示是一廂情願（wishful thinking）。

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辯方指同日，黎向李兆富傳送訊息，指香港立《國安法》後，是否取消特殊地位也沒有分別。黎庭上解釋，因為《國安法》實施之後，香港便會「死掉」，當時是回應李兆富的訊息。

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同日，黎的 Twitter 帳戶發布帖文：「Whether or not the world imposes sanctions on #China and revocation of #HK’s special status as an autonomous region depends on the objective standard, ie if the #NSL is imposed, #1C2S is dead and it leaves the world with no other options.」黎稱帖文乃由李兆富撰寫，他亦不知道「1C2S」是什麼意思。

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辯方指，黎曾向張劍虹稱「我看不一定會如期實施」，兩日前黎亦曾向陳梓華說《國安法》不會太嚴厲，為何現在又說若通過《國安法》香港會死掉？黎則解釋，根據李兆富的訊息，顯示立法程序會繼續，說話背景已經完全不同。

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黎向員工稱「無人會迫到你哋做烈士」 否認籲員工戰鬥

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辯方指2020年6月18日，壹傳媒大樓舉辦《蘋果日報》25週年慶祝活動，並在庭上當日影片，黎智英身旁是張劍虹和前動新聞平台總監張志偉。黎向一眾員工發言稱：「都未曾試過風調雨順㗎。一係就話我哋血腥八卦，一係就呢個封殺廣告，一係就畀人攻擊。到依家呢，就《國安法》都嚟埋，都唔知點樣做喇真係。就靠你哋去做喇。」黎表示只要求一件事：「你哋對住《國安法》嘅做法就係，你哋用返你哋對自己嘅責任，對社會嘅責任，對你哋家庭嘅責任去做呢份工作，無人會迫你哋點樣去做，無人會迫到你哋做烈士。」黎籲員工：「攞住對自己嘅良知，攞住對社會嘅良知去做」，而他不會叫員工怎樣去做，又笑說：「《蘋果日報》到今日，做到咁樣樣，係你哋造成嘅，唔關我事㗎吓」，影片傳來笑聲和鼓掌聲。黎笑言：「《國安法》嚟唔關我事」，最後表示欣賞一眾員工付出，寄語大家繼續努力。

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辯方指，黎在2020年6月10日接受《自由亞洲電台》訪問時稱：「每一個人要做自己嘅選擇，但係我哋必然會有好多人選擇留喺度抗爭，而我會同呢啲人一齊抗爭到底。」然而8日之後卻向員工說「無人會迫到你哋做烈士」，兩種說法有沒有矛盾。黎稱沒有矛盾，因他在慶祝活動發言所指的是員工的人生，但他受訪時所談論的是自己的人生，「我沒有理所當然地認為我可以談論他們的人生⋯⋯他們理應為自己的人生去做選擇。」

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辯方又問黎有否籲員工去「抗爭到底」？黎表示：「我沒有如此說過⋯⋯而且我不想這樣做⋯⋯因為他們的人生比《蘋果日報》更加重要。」

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辯方問黎，截至2020年6月18日，他與《蘋果》管理層之間，有沒有任何共識去「抗爭到底」？黎否認，並稱從來沒有談論這些。

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辯方問黎，是否認為控方會基於《國安法》之前的行為而起訴他。黎不肯定，但自言一直想法樂觀，想著最好的情況。辯方提到《國安法》沒有追溯效力。黎僅回應：「我希望是如此。」

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對談節目稱若特朗普實施制裁將得到美國人民支持 黎否認請求制裁

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辯方指，黎於2020年6月18日在美國智庫 Acton Institute 節目，與美國神父 Robert Sirico 對談。黎稱經過新冠肺炎疫情之後，西方國家不再信任中國，並以審慎的態度與中國貿易，加上中國經濟變得衰弱，是一個好時機去改變中國。黎指，若然特朗普推行一連串的制裁和懲罰措施，會得到很多美國人民的支持，因為新冠疫情導致很多美國人喪失親友、企業倒閉和蒙受金錢損失等等，他們對於中國憤憤不平，必定會支持制裁中國。

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黎庭上否認在對談中請求美國制裁或懲罰中國，又指他在對談中是舉例說明中國應該給人民言論自由。

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黎否認說過若自己被捕美英「唔會坐視不理」

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楊清奇早前作供提及在2020年6月黎住所的飯局中，黎向在座人士稱不怕被捕，若果被捕就「更加證明到中國和香港政府對人權嘅打壓」，並相信「美國、英國同歐洲係唔會坐視不理」。楊又引述黎稱只有實施制裁，才能有助改善香港的人權狀況。

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黎在庭上否認說過上述言論，又稱自己不會傲慢自大到說自己被捕的話會引起國際關注。

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辯方另展示2020年6月20日的 Twitter 帖文：「Although there are more details but it doesn’t come with a deadline. Why the delay? Sanctions and condemnations from all over the world certain create the pressure. There might also be divide within the #CCP holding it back as well.」

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法官李運騰指，帖文所說的東西，似乎與黎智英向張劍虹所表達的「一廂情願」一致，但是似乎與李兆富的訊息、稱《國安法》進程繼續的說法有矛盾，然而李兆富撰寫帖文的時候，是否巧合地與黎的想法一致？黎則指，可能李了解他的想法，所以如此撰寫帖文。

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辯方指，訊息紀錄顯示，李兆富的草擬帖文中並沒有「Sanctions」和「condemnations」的字眼，但是最終發布的帖文卻含有上述字眼，然而根據紀錄，黎在帖文發布翌日下午才回覆同意帖文內容。

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受訪稱國安法實施是「香港的死期」 黎稱真誠相信

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辯方指，2020年6月23日，《蘋果》發布報導〈【港版國安法】黎智英接受日本雜誌專訪：國安法實施就是「香港的死期」〉，指黎智英接受日本《FACTA》月刊訪問，引述黎稱「一旦港版國安法正式實施，公平、公義社會瞬間瓦解，當香港變成人治的社會，那就是香港的死期」。

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辯方指，當時黎尚未有機會看《國安法》內容。黎同意，他解釋其言論只是表達將會發生什麼的概念。黎亦同意報導準確地反映他的想法，而他真誠相信該些想法。

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Twitter帖文稱中共及其傀儡應受罰 黎稱出自李兆富手筆

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辯方展示黎 Twitter 帳戶於2020年6月23日發布的帖文，他轉發王丹的帖文，並加上評論：「#CCP has a trade war with Americans, legal battle with Canadians, fist fight with Indians, psychological warfare against Taiwanese, and street fight with #HKers. Soon it will exhaust itself to death.」黎否認撰寫帖文，相信是李兆富翻譯王丹的帖文及發表。辯方指對話紀錄顯示，黎和李之間在6月22至23日期間並沒有傳送任何訊息。黎同意，指發布上述帖文是李的主意。

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辯方指2020年6月24日，黎的帳戶發布帖文：「#CarrieLam said countries offering #HKers right of abode and proposing sanctions are hypocrites. But the Lams are British nations. Perhaps the #CCP should consider asking the Lams to relinquish their foreign citizenship.」

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辯方另展示黎的帳戶於2020年6月26日發布的五則帖文，分別為：

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「@HawleyMO thank you for #StandingwithHongKong. #CCPChina and its puppets should be punished for violating the rightful freedom of #HKers.」

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「When you are forbidden from doing business simply because of your political opinion, it is no longer the free market, the free society we once cherished. This is how #CCP’s influence slowly murdered #HongKong’s autonomy」

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「IFJ did a good job to expose #CCPChina’s attempts to whitewash itself from the horrendous human rights violation. The truth will always prevail. @IFJGlobal」(轉載國際記者聯盟的報告 The China Story: Reshaping the World’s Media）

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「Only terrorists will make such offer. @JustinTrudeau must stand resolutely against #CCP’s bullying. 120 years ago the fanatics of Qing Dynasty did the same thing against foreign nationals in China. It was the beginning of the end of the absolute monarchy.」

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「#CCP thinks Australia is dependent on China and the disease is keeping everyone busy. No. The world is beginning to decouple from this opaque and corrupt regime by shifting the global supply chain.」

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黎表示，雖然帖文所述與他當時的想法一致，但是行文方式並不像他，相信是出自李的手筆。被問到「decouple」的意思，黎指即是「切斷連繫」和「切割」的意思。

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黎即使自己是特別個案也不理 「這是頂天立地的時候」

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辯方展示黎與張劍虹之間於2020年6月28日的訊息對話，二人談及黎未能出境赴台灣，張劍虹指待黎在8月官司結束之後，便可以出境。張劍虹提到：「消息至今仍然是沒有追溯期」，黎說：「就是我是特別個案，我也不理了，這是頂天立地的時候，其他不重要了」，張說：「上帝會保守老闆你的，每天都為你祈禱」，黎說：「謝謝，我亦相信上主會幫我，所以我無憂無慮，一往直前。」

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辯方問訊息中提到的「個案」是指什麼案件，惟黎表示不記得。辯方遂提醒黎，他涉刑事恐嚇《東方》記者的案件，於2020年9月被裁定罪名不成立。辯方問黎為何說「就是我是特別個案」，為何認為自己的案件特別。黎稱因為自己是在政治範疇的敏感人物。

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辯方指，2020年6月28日黎與 Mark Simon 在訊息中商討線上會議時間，與會者包括張劍虹、時任動新聞總監張志偉和黎私人公司的職員 Lucia。黎稱 Lucia 有份製作網上節目「Live Chat with Jimmy Lai」，並指提議開設節目者另有其人，相信是 Mark Simon 和李兆富。

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黎曾向張劍虹稱：金盤洗手不再抗爭無可能

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辯方指2020年6月29日，張劍虹向黎傳送《蘋果》報導〈【港版國安法】葉國謙稱「金盤洗手」不會追究 陳智思警告市民勿越紅線〉，並說：「老闆加油，蘋果加油，香港加油」，黎回覆：「但願如此，但手（金）盤洗手不再抗爭無可能，煮到埋嚟就食，無所謂，謝謝。」

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黎庭上解釋，他當時認為香港不可能停止抗爭、不可能放棄，《國安法》亦不是一個終結，不過自己當時過於樂觀。

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黎與張的訊息亦提及時事評論員劉細良，黎稱他認識劉，與劉曾經對談約四次，準確次數不記得，話題關於《國安法》實施後會發生什麼事。

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黎否認說服陳繼續戰鬥 強調不會叫他「自殺」

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辯方提及，陳梓華作供期間被法官李運騰問到，陳是否有意干犯《國安法》。陳當時回答：「視乎有咩人喺身邊。」李官接著問陳，是否一旦有其他人同行，便會去干犯《國安法》。陳回答，當他與黎在2020年6月會面時，他感到恐懼，表示想退縮，但是被黎說服了，所以繼續做一直所做的事。

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辯方問黎有否說服陳繼續？黎堅稱沒有，並自言一直提醒別人謹慎、不要觸犯《國安法》罪行，包括朋友和同事，所以對於關係不太親近的陳，他更加沒有可能說服陳去做相反的事情。黎又形容陳的說法荒謬，強調自己從沒叫他做任何事情，反問：「我會叫他做什麼？難道自殺嗎？」

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黎並否認叫陳請求外國對中國實施制裁，重申一直以來只叫他跟勇武派溝通以平息暴力。黎亦否認要求陳繼續戰鬥，「這從不是我們之間的話題。」

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案件明日續審。

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案件編號：HCCC51/2022

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+ + + + diff --git a/hkers/2024-12-06-trial-of-jimmy-lai-day-104.html b/hkers/2024-12-06-trial-of-jimmy-lai-day-104.html new file mode 100644 index 00000000..72a01b67 --- /dev/null +++ b/hkers/2024-12-06-trial-of-jimmy-lai-day-104.html @@ -0,0 +1,212 @@ + + + + + + + + + + 【黎智英案・審訊第 104 日】 · The Republic of Agora + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +
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【黎智英案・審訊第 104 日】

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獨媒報導 | 2024.12.06

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  • 黎智英曾草擬公開信 預計國安法生效、一旦入獄後發布
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iamge01

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【獨媒報導】壹傳媒創辦人黎智英及3間蘋果公司被控串謀勾結外國勢力及串謀刊印煽動刊物等罪，今（6日）於高院（移師西九龍法院）踏入第104日審訊，黎智英第12日作供。辯方圍繞黎的意圖提問，開始進入國安法生效之後的7月1日。黎當日早上向數名泛民及員工傳送訊息，指國安法條文「辣到離譜」、「香港將無法治無自由，政府行政無法無天，我們寸步難移，動彈不得」，形容「香港已死」。黎稱知道國安法生效之後，呼籲制裁變了刑事罪行，他否認有繼續相關行為，「這樣做是自殺式的（It’s suicidal to do so）。」

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訊息紀錄顯示，黎曾向其教父兼《華爾街日報》編輯 Bill McGurn 提交文章「來自香港監獄的信（Letter from a Hong Kong Jail）」，一旦入獄後供外媒發布，但其後改變主意。信件有兩段談及黎向美國人說的話、希望美國人不要忘記香港人，惟黎否認請求外國制裁、封鎖或敵對行為。

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iamge02 +▲ （資料圖片）

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國安法生效後李兆富退出管理Twitter 黎否認立法後呼籲制裁

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2020年6月30日晚國安法生效，昨日黎提到他晚上9時許便睡覺。辯方指，負責管理黎 Twitter 帳戶的李兆富於7月1日凌晨約3時傳送訊息給黎，提出交由其他人管理Twitter帳戶會較好（But it’d be better if your presence on Twitter will be managed by someone else.），並向黎道歉（I am really sorry）。

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辯方指，黎相隔一段時間，於7月1日早上接近7時回覆李，表示會與其助手 Mark Simon 商討其他人選。黎亦向李提到：「我剛讀了國安法細節，它們非常嚴厲，是對香港法治和自由的嚴重攻擊，很傷心，香港已死。你保持低調是正確的，我們數天後再談吧。這是很嚴重的事情。」（Simon, I just read the details of National Security Law. They are very draconian and a severe attack on HK’s rule of law and freedom. So sad. HK is dead. You’re right to stay low profile. A couple of days later let’s talk a bit more. This is really serious stuff. Cheers, Jimmy）

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辯方指黎向李說「保持低調是正確的」，為何李想低調？黎指「因為很危險。」辯方指國安法生效之前，黎很多時提及制裁，但國安法生效之後，黎是否知道已變了刑事罪行？黎同意，並稱所以他說國安法嚴厲。辯方接著問黎有否繼續呼籲制裁？黎稱：「沒有，這樣做是自殺式的（It’s suicidal to do so）。」

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辯方展出黎與Mark Simon之間的訊息，Mark Simon 指，因李替黎管理Twitter一事被曝光，李感到不開心。黎則向Mark Simon 坦承是他告訴別人，因為想將功勞歸予李。

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iamge03 +▲ 黎智英

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黎向多名泛民傳送訊息指國安法非常嚴厲 「香港已死」

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辯方指，黎將李兆富的說話轉述給 Mark Simon 之後，黎也向Mark 提到：「國安法細節剛公布，它們非常嚴厲，是對香港法治和自由的嚴重攻擊，很傷心，香港已死！」（The details of National Security Law just came out. They’re very draconian and a severe attack on HK’s rule of law and freedom. So sad. HK is dead!）

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辯方指，黎同日向民主黨創黨主席李柱銘傳送類似的訊息：「國安法細節剛公布，條文非常嚴厲，是對香港法治和自由的嚴重攻擊，很傷心，香港已死！」（The details of National Security Law just came out. The terms are very draconian and is a severe attack on HK’s rule of law and freedom. So sad. HK is dead.）

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辯方問黎為何向不同人傳送相同的東西？黎表示：「因為這是我當時的想法。」

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辯方指，黎智英亦向民主黨何俊仁傳送訊息：「看了國安法細節簡直辣到離譜，香港將無法治無自由，政府行政完全無法無天，我們寸步難移，動彈不得，我們真的要想清楚以後的策略。」黎亦向同是民主黨的李永達傳送一模一樣的訊息。

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黎也有向陳沛敏傳送訊息：「沛敏，看了國安法細節嚇了一跳，辣到離譜，香港將無法治和自由，政府行政無法無天，泛民寸步難移，動彈不得，先要想好策略對付，不容魯莽。」

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iamge04 +▲ 陳沛敏

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黎指管理層對國安法很小心 相信有研究條文

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辯方指，黎於7月1日向林文宗傳送類似訊息。林回覆時提到國安法不止惡，還很嚴厲，「我們也要好好研究當中對付傳媒的條文」。辯方問黎，管理層和黎自己有研究嗎？黎相信管理層有研究，因他們對於國安法的影響很小心，至於他自己，則等待他們的研究結果。

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黎亦稱，在國安法之前，他曾有一次出席張劍虹安排的國安法研討會。至於黎沒有出席的研討會，辯方問其他人事後有否轉述討論內容給黎？黎則稱認為沒有需要，因其他人都知道他會很謹慎。

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黎國安法前撰信 預計入獄後供外媒發布

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辯方指，黎的教父兼《華爾街日報》編輯 Bill McGurn，在2020年7月1日早上7時傳送一篇黎的文章「來自香港監獄的信（Letter from a Hong Kong Jail）」。McGurn 指黎在較早前傳送了此文章給他，並提醒黎若有任何地方需要修改，現在便要提出，「我相信會很有力。」

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黎的信開首提到：「如果你正在讀這封信，代表我正在監獄裡，拜中國共產黨司法所賜。」（If you are reading this, it means I am in jail, courtesy of Chinese Communist justice.）

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「但是我有很棒的同伴。相比起在外面，我在這裡更自由。一旦當權者將捍衛真相和法治打成罪行時，哪裡應是一個誠實的人的容身之處呢？」（But I am in excellent company. In some ways I am freer here than I was outside. When authorities make it a crime to stand up for truth and the rule of law, where else should an honest man be?）

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黎又提到：「我是一個老人。發生在我身上的事並不重要。未來是屬於年輕人的。大部份香港年輕人未曾活在英國殖民統治底下，或是被中共直接統治，但是他們知道自由是什麼，而他們亦知道北京的主子堅決地不讓他們享受自由。香港新一代人從共產主義得到第一身教訓，而他們永不會接受它。」（I am an old man. What happens to me does not matter. The future belongs to the young. Most of Hong Kong’s young never lived under British colonial rule or direct Communist rule. But they know what freedom is, and they are learning that their masters in Beijing are determined they will never taste it.The rising Hong Kong generation is getting a first hand lesson in Communism, and they will never accept it.）

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「所以我的朋友例如美國可以做什麼？主要需記住的事，就是我們，手無寸鐵的香港人民，正在同一陣線、為了相同的原則而抗爭。如果中國是如此對待香港人——在中國歷史上創造出最繁盛和創新的社會的人們——你能想像到中國會更好地對待你們嗎？尤其是她在權力中崛起？」（So what can our friends like America do? The main thing to remember is that we the people of Hong Kong, unarmed as we are, are fighting on the same side for the same principles. If China is going to treat Hong Kong people this way – people who produced the most prosperous and innovative society in China history – can you really imagine that China will treat you any better, especially as it grows in power?）

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「我一直欽佩美國，我的美國朋友，我現在處於牢房裡說這些話。我們在香港正受到中國輾壓，因為我們與你們的價值觀一致。當我們需要幫助的關頭，請不要忘記你的朋友。」（I have always admired America. To my American friends, I now say this from my jail cell. We in Hong Kong are being crushed by China because we share your values. Please do not forget your friends in our hour of need.）

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辯方問黎，他與McGurn之間是否知道黎會坐牢？黎表示這只是他的預計。被問到是否想在他入獄後發布文章，黎表示他有這樣的意圖，但是他其後吩咐 Mark Simon 不要發布。黎亦確認，該信件所述反映他當時真誠相信的想法，而他是在7月1日之前撰寫。

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辯方提到，信件有兩段談及黎向美國人說的話、想他們做什麼。黎確認，但他否認請求外國制裁、封鎖或敵對行為。

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訊息稱「中共癲咗」 黎：國安法超乎預期地嚴厲

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辯方指，2020年7月1日早上黎亦向陳沛敏提到：「今天我去籌款站幫忙籌款，不派海報，你認為怎樣？」陳回覆：「其實如果你是想公開現身作為一種姿態，海報不派也不會影響效用果。」黎回覆：「好，我就去籌站幫手籌款一陣照個相就走。中共癲咗，我們也得重新策劃以後做法。劍虹已有方案。」

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辯方問黎為何說「中共癲咗」，黎稱因為國安法超乎預期地嚴厲。辯方提到，黎早前供稱，認為國安法不會如期實施，以及條文不會太嚴厲。黎確認，並重申這是他的一廂情願。

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有關遊行期間派發海報一事，辯方提到6月29日訊息顯示，黎向民主黨李永達表示會在七一籌款街站派發3,000張海報。至7月1日，黎與張劍虹、羅偉光、林文宗和陳沛敏等管理層商討應否在街站派發海報，他們分別以訊息回覆黎時，均不建議派海報。黎確認，因為國安法實施，他們要求自己謹慎行事。辯方指，最終決定是街站不派發海報；黎則稱不是他的決定，當時有人告訴他，相信是民主派。

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黎稱國安法後「很小心」 知道提制裁可囚終身

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辯方提到，黎在2020年6月接受史丹福大學胡佛研究所（Hoover Institution）訪問時，稱美國應該在香港絕望之前便制裁和懲罰中國，問黎在國安法實施之後，有否提倡相關主張？黎表示沒有再想過，但是強調他必定會知道提出制裁是犯法，「我對此很小心。」辯方問黎知不知道這是可以懲罰的罪行？黎表示：「可以是終身（監禁）。」

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黎受訪稱以「一種不同的方式」抗爭 否認意指非法手段

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2020年7月2日美聯社刊出黎智英的專訪。黎向記者稱：「我的希望持續了很久，塑造了今天的我。」（The hope I had (in Hong Kong) lasted for a long time, it made me who I am today）。黎確認說過這句話。

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報導引述黎稱會繼續為民主抗爭，但是現在要以「一種不同的方式」進行（Lai said he will continue fighting for democracy, but it will now have to be in a “very different way.”）。黎確認他曾說過「為民主抗爭」。

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辯方又問，「一種不同的方式」是什麼意思。黎指：「我意思是這會不同，有新的法律，所以我們的行動應該改變，我們的態度應該改變。」辯方追問有什麼不同。黎說當日只是國安法生效第二日，僅說會十分不同，但他提到：「我還未放棄為民主抗爭，但是這將會是十分不同，所以我們才需要改變。」辯方問黎是否意指使用非法手段抗爭？黎說：「不是，所以我才會說不同。」

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黎受訪稱不會離開 「不但令自己蒙羞，也使《蘋果》失信於人」

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美聯社報導引述黎稱：「我要視乎有多少人留在抗爭陣營中」，補充指很多人會被新法律嚇怕。（“We will have to see how many of us are left in the fighting camp,” he said, adding that many will be frightened away by the new law.）黎稱：「我們要站起來，成為運動團結的支柱，以及香港公義的氣節。」（“We will have to stand up and be the backbone of the movement’s integrity, and the integrity of Hong Kong’s justice,” he said.）

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黎解釋，上述說話意思是留下來抗爭的人，會成為運動團結的支柱，而「運動團結的支柱」（backbone of the movement’s integrity）是指未有放棄的人。

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報導指黎拒絕闡述民主運動會怎樣繼續，只說需要討論如何前進。（Lai declined to elaborate on how the pro-democracy movement will continue, saying that discussions are needed on how to move forward.）辯方問黎跟誰人討論，黎說那些留下來抗爭的人。

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報導引述黎說：「我不能（離開），如果我離開，不但令自己蒙羞，也使《蘋果》失信於人，我會削弱民主運動的團結⋯⋯有些事情我一定要負責任。」（“I cannot (leave). If I leave, not only do I disgrace myself, I’d discredit Apple Daily, I’d undermine the solidarity of the democratic movement,” he said. “It’s something I have to take responsibility for.”）

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黎在庭上確認曾說上述言論。辯方指黎當時因為刑事恐嚇案的保釋條件而不能離開香港，並且曾向高院申請離港，但是被拒絕，辯方呈上相關判決理由。黎確認自己不能離開香港，並提到「任何其他方式也不行。」在辯方追問下，黎進一步解釋：「我是說我不能夠離開香港，但是如果我想離開香港，我總有方法⋯⋯你知道，一些非法途徑⋯⋯」黎最後同意他並沒有意圖如此做。

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李兆富請辭8小時之後 黎稱李會繼續管理 Twitter 帳戶

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辯方指，2020年7月1日上午約11時，即李兆富提出請辭約8小時之後，Mark Simon 向黎發送訊息：「我正跟他（李兆富）溝通。我會盡我所能協助他。（I’m communicating with him now. I will do all I can for him.）」黎回覆：「他現在起將會繼續管理我的Twitter 。如果他返回美國，他可以在那裡替我管理帳戶，所以不需要找其他人了。（He’s going to continue to manage my Twitter for now. If he goes back to US he can manage it there for me. So no need to find someone else now.）」Mark Simon 指：「他（李）說他會做 Twitter 多幾星期，他將於7月8日返回美國，但他在當地可以繼續做一段時間。我告訴他只要留在美國便應該沒有問題，如果有人問起，我們會說他已沒有做。」

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辯方另展示黎與李之間的訊息，李提出請辭之後，黎依然繼續傳送新聞及資料給李。而黎的Twitter帳戶在7月1日仍有發布帖文。黎稱帖文是出自李的手筆。

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辯方問，黎收到李的請辭之後，有改變主意嗎？黎指李身在美國，若他在當地管理帳戶，會使他較心安。辯方指訊息使用「返回美國」字眼，是否代表李來自美國？黎同意，並指李在美國有個家庭。黎提到李在國安法生效之前已離開香港，惟法官李運騰引述 Mark Simon 的訊息提及李「將於7月8日返回美國」。辯方則表示會要求控方作進一步披露，關於李的出境紀錄。

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李官又問及，李是否本案「串謀者」之一？控方確認，指李是「串謀發布煽動刊物」及「串謀勾結外國勢力」兩罪的串謀者。

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黎指國安法不透明、不清楚紅線

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控方指，黎智英在2020年7月1日接受《霍士新聞》（Fox News）訪問，並庭上播放相關片段。黎表示會留在香港直至最後一刻，「不，我不能離開，如果我離開，我令自己蒙羞，我令《蘋果日報》名譽受損，我也損害民主運動的團結。（“I can’t go away, if I go away, I disgrace myself, I discredit Apple Daily, I also undermine the solidarity of the democratic movement.”）」主持人指他曾被捕數次，所涉罪名或能判終身監禁。黎回應稱不知道將會發生什麼事，「但當政府不尊重法律，你不會知道紅線在哪。」他又批評政府不理會人民，既然不知道紅線在哪，便不會予以理會。

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辯方引述黎稱「你不會知道紅線在哪」，黎確認並指「國安法下沒有紅線，它是非常不透明（opaque）。」辯方指，黎既已知道國安法之下請求制裁是超越「紅線」，那麼他口中的「紅線」是指什麼呢？黎僅指，就國安法而言，真的不知道什麼會是犯法。

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案件下星期一（9日）續審。

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案件編號：HCCC51/2022

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Europe And The Sahel

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【黎智英案・審訊第 104 日】

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Carlota G. Encina | 2024.12.04
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Widespread instability and the growing influence of China and Russia has increased the strategic importance of the Sahel to European security. A reset in relations between Europe and the region is direly needed.

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獨媒報導 | 2024.12.06
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  • 黎智英曾草擬公開信 預計國安法生效、一旦入獄後發布
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【黎智英案・審訊第 98 日】

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Peace Through Agency

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獨媒報導 | 2024.11.28
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  • 黎智英否認曾說「推爆個政府」、「國際力量」 稱不知道陳梓華與國際線有關連
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Ray Hartley and Greg Mills | 2024.12.05
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With the return of Donald Trump imminent and President Volodymyr Zelensky’s proposal of NATO security guarantees for Ukraine’s unoccupied territories on the table, attention has turned to how peace might be made to end Russia’s invasion.

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China In The Euro-Atlantic

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【黎智英案・審訊第 102 日】

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Sidharth Kaushal, et al. | 2024.11.28
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This paper outlines the likely scope of a putative presence of the People’s Liberation Army Navy in and around the Euro-Atlantic in the next 15 years and the nature of the foreign policy it will support.

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獨媒報導 | 2024.12.04
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  • 袁弓夷拍片稱示威有人被謀殺強姦 黎智英批常誇大其辭 不予信任
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【黎智英案・審訊第 97 日】

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N. Korean Troops In Russia

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獨媒報導 | 2024.11.27
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  • 陳梓華指稱黎智英欲領導勇武派 黎反駁：荒誕可笑、不可能這樣說
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Choi Yonghwan | 2024.12.04
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Why did North Korea decide to deploy its troops to Ukraine? Pyongyang appears to be concerned that Trump’s electoral victory could restrict its opportunity to become a critical part of Russia’s Eurasian security architecture and to cement its status as a nuclear power.

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Allied Export Controls

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Europe And The Sahel

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Gregory C. Allen | 2024.11.26
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There is a fierce debate in the United States and among its allies about the impacts of export controls, and nowhere is that debate more heated than in the semiconductor equipment manufacturing industry.

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Carlota G. Encina | 2024.12.04
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Widespread instability and the growing influence of China and Russia has increased the strategic importance of the Sahel to European security. A reset in relations between Europe and the region is direly needed.

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U.S. Immigration Policy

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【黎智英案・審訊第 101 日】

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Thibault Denamiel, et al. | 2024.11.25
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Critical sectors of the U.S. economy remain badly understaffed. Additionally, because of the U.S. industrial policies creating positions in targeted industries and an aging workforce tied to specific career paths, shortages are set to become more dire in the medium term.

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獨媒報導 | 2024.12.03
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  • 黎智英認國安法生效前 受訪倡外國制裁阻通過 稱不能等待條文出爐後才反對
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UK FATF Mutual Evaluation

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【黎智英案・審訊第 100 日】

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Kathryn Westmore | 2024.11.25
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At the first meeting of the UK Financial Action Task Force (FATF) Mutual Evaluation, experts discussed how the UK can best prepare for its upcoming FATF evaluation in 2027.

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獨媒報導 | 2024.12.02
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  • 黎指中美冷戰屬價值之爭 以「核武」比喻道德權威 官問怎樣「一分鐘便可擺平」
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