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tckks-interactive-mp-bootstrapping-Chebyshev.cpp
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tckks-interactive-mp-bootstrapping-Chebyshev.cpp
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//==================================================================================
// BSD 2-Clause License
//
// Copyright (c) 2014-2022, NJIT, Duality Technologies Inc. and other contributors
//
// All rights reserved.
//
// Author TPOC: contact@openfhe.org
//
// Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
// modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions are met:
//
// 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, this
// list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
//
// 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice,
// this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation
// and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
//
// THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS "AS IS"
// AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
// IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE
// DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT HOLDER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
// FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
// DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR
// SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER
// CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY,
// OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE
// OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
//==================================================================================
/*
Demo for Multi-Party Interactive Collective Bootstrapping in Threshold-CKKS (TCKKS).
3 parties want to evaluate a Chebyshev series on their secret input
This protocol is secure against (n-1) collusion among the participating parties, where n is
the number of participating parties.
*/
#define PROFILE
#include "openfhe.h"
using namespace std;
using namespace lbcrypto;
static void checkApproximateEquality(const std::vector<std::complex<double>>& a,
const std::vector<std::complex<double>>& b, int vectorSize, double epsilon) {
std::vector<std::complex<double>> allTrue(vectorSize);
std::vector<std::complex<double>> tmp(vectorSize);
for (int i = 0; i < vectorSize; i++) {
allTrue[i] = 1;
tmp[i] = abs(a[i] - b[i]) <= epsilon;
}
if (tmp != allTrue) {
cerr << __func__ << " - " << __FILE__ << ":" << __LINE__ << " IntMPBoot - Ctxt Chebyshev Failed: " << endl;
cerr << __func__ << " - " << __FILE__ << ":" << __LINE__ << " - is diff <= eps?: " << tmp << endl;
}
else {
std::cout << "SUCESSFUL Bootstrapping!\n";
}
}
void TCKKSCollectiveBoot(enum ScalingTechnique scaleTech);
int main(int argc, char* argv[]) {
std::cout << "Interactive (3P) Bootstrapping Ciphertext [Chebyshev] (TCKKS) started ...\n";
// Same test with different rescaling techniques in CKKS
TCKKSCollectiveBoot(ScalingTechnique::FIXEDMANUAL);
TCKKSCollectiveBoot(ScalingTechnique::FIXEDAUTO);
TCKKSCollectiveBoot(ScalingTechnique::FLEXIBLEAUTO);
TCKKSCollectiveBoot(ScalingTechnique::FLEXIBLEAUTOEXT);
std::cout << "Interactive (3P) Bootstrapping Ciphertext [Chebyshev] (TCKKS) terminated gracefully!\n";
return 0;
}
// Demonstrate interactive multi-party bootstrapping for 3 parties
// We follow Protocol 5 in https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/304, "Multiparty
// Homomorphic Encryption from Ring-Learning-With-Errors"
void TCKKSCollectiveBoot(enum ScalingTechnique scaleTech) {
if (scaleTech != ScalingTechnique::FIXEDMANUAL && scaleTech != ScalingTechnique::FIXEDAUTO &&
scaleTech != ScalingTechnique::FLEXIBLEAUTO && scaleTech != ScalingTechnique::FLEXIBLEAUTOEXT) {
std::string errMsg = "ERROR: Scaling technique is not supported!";
OPENFHE_THROW(config_error, errMsg);
}
CCParams<CryptoContextCKKSRNS> parameters;
// A. Specify main parameters
/* A1) Secret key distribution
* The secret key distribution for CKKS should either be SPARSE_TERNARY or UNIFORM_TERNARY.
* The SPARSE_TERNARY distribution was used in the original CKKS paper,
* but in this example, we use UNIFORM_TERNARY because this is included in the homomorphic
* encryption standard.
*/
SecretKeyDist secretKeyDist = UNIFORM_TERNARY;
parameters.SetSecretKeyDist(secretKeyDist);
/* A2) Desired security level based on FHE standards.
* In this example, we use the "NotSet" option, so the example can run more quickly with
* a smaller ring dimension. Note that this should be used only in
* non-production environments, or by experts who understand the security
* implications of their choices. In production-like environments, we recommend using
* HEStd_128_classic, HEStd_192_classic, or HEStd_256_classic for 128-bit, 192-bit,
* or 256-bit security, respectively. If you choose one of these as your security level,
* you do not need to set the ring dimension.
*/
parameters.SetSecurityLevel(HEStd_128_classic);
/* A3) Scaling parameters.
* By default, we set the modulus sizes and rescaling technique to the following values
* to obtain a good precision and performance tradeoff. We recommend keeping the parameters
* below unless you are an FHE expert.
*/
usint dcrtBits = 50;
usint firstMod = 60;
parameters.SetScalingModSize(dcrtBits);
parameters.SetScalingTechnique(scaleTech);
parameters.SetFirstModSize(firstMod);
/* A4) Multiplicative depth.
* The multiplicative depth detemins the computational capability of the instantiated scheme. It should be set
* according the following formula:
* multDepth >= desired_depth + interactive_bootstrapping_depth
* where,
* The desired_depth is the depth of the computation, as chosen by the user.
* The interactive_bootstrapping_depth is either 3 or 4, depending on the ciphertext compression mode: COMPACT vs SLACK (see below)
* Example 1, if you want to perform a computation of depth 24, you can set multDepth to 10, use 6 levels
* for computation and 4 for interactive bootstrapping. You will need to bootstrap 3 times.
*/
parameters.SetMultiplicativeDepth(10);
parameters.SetKeySwitchTechnique(KeySwitchTechnique::HYBRID);
uint32_t batchSize = 16;
parameters.SetBatchSize(batchSize);
/* Protocol-specific parameters (SLACK or COMPACT)
* SLACK (default) uses larger masks, which makes it more secure theoretically. However, it is also slightly less efficient.
* COMPACT uses smaller masks, which makes it more efficient. However, it is relatively less secure theoretically.
* Both options can be used for practical security.
* The following table summarizes the differences between SLACK and COMPACT:
* Parameter SLACK COMPACT
* Mask size Larger Smaller
* Security More secure Less secure
* Efficiency Less efficient More efficient
* Recommended use For applications where security is paramount For applications where efficiency is paramount
*/
auto compressionLevel = COMPRESSION_LEVEL::COMPACT;
parameters.SetInteractiveBootCompressionLevel(compressionLevel);
CryptoContext<DCRTPoly> cryptoContext = GenCryptoContext(parameters);
cryptoContext->Enable(PKE);
cryptoContext->Enable(KEYSWITCH);
cryptoContext->Enable(LEVELEDSHE);
cryptoContext->Enable(ADVANCEDSHE);
cryptoContext->Enable(MULTIPARTY);
usint ringDim = cryptoContext->GetRingDimension();
// This is the maximum number of slots that can be used for full packing.
usint maxNumSlots = ringDim / 2;
std::cout << "TCKKS scheme is using ring dimension " << ringDim << std::endl;
std::cout << "TCKKS scheme number of slots " << batchSize << std::endl;
std::cout << "TCKKS scheme max number of slots " << maxNumSlots << std::endl;
std::cout << "TCKKS example with Scaling Technique " << scaleTech << std::endl;
const usint numParties = 3;
std::cout << "\n===========================IntMPBoot protocol parameters===========================\n";
std::cout << "num of parties: " << numParties << "\n";
std::cout << "===============================================================\n";
double eps = 0.0001;
// Initialize Public Key Containers
KeyPair<DCRTPoly> kp1; // Party 1
KeyPair<DCRTPoly> kp2; // Party 2
KeyPair<DCRTPoly> kp3; // Lead party - who finalizes interactive bootstrapping
KeyPair<DCRTPoly> kpMultiparty;
////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
// Perform Key Generation Operation
////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
// Round 1 (party A)
kp1 = cryptoContext->KeyGen();
// Generate evalmult key part for A
auto evalMultKey = cryptoContext->KeySwitchGen(kp1.secretKey, kp1.secretKey);
// Generate evalsum key part for A
cryptoContext->EvalSumKeyGen(kp1.secretKey);
auto evalSumKeys = std::make_shared<std::map<usint, EvalKey<DCRTPoly>>>(
cryptoContext->GetEvalSumKeyMap(kp1.secretKey->GetKeyTag()));
// Round 2 (party B)
kp2 = cryptoContext->MultipartyKeyGen(kp1.publicKey);
auto evalMultKey2 = cryptoContext->MultiKeySwitchGen(kp2.secretKey, kp2.secretKey, evalMultKey);
auto evalMultAB = cryptoContext->MultiAddEvalKeys(evalMultKey, evalMultKey2, kp2.publicKey->GetKeyTag());
auto evalMultBAB = cryptoContext->MultiMultEvalKey(kp2.secretKey, evalMultAB, kp2.publicKey->GetKeyTag());
auto evalSumKeysB = cryptoContext->MultiEvalSumKeyGen(kp2.secretKey, evalSumKeys, kp2.publicKey->GetKeyTag());
auto evalSumKeysJoin = cryptoContext->MultiAddEvalSumKeys(evalSumKeys, evalSumKeysB, kp2.publicKey->GetKeyTag());
cryptoContext->InsertEvalSumKey(evalSumKeysJoin);
auto evalMultAAB = cryptoContext->MultiMultEvalKey(kp1.secretKey, evalMultAB, kp2.publicKey->GetKeyTag());
auto evalMultFinal = cryptoContext->MultiAddEvalMultKeys(evalMultAAB, evalMultBAB, evalMultAB->GetKeyTag());
cryptoContext->InsertEvalMultKey({evalMultFinal});
/////////////////////
// Round 3 (party C) - Lead Party (who encrypts and finalizes the bootstrapping protocol)
kp3 = cryptoContext->MultipartyKeyGen(kp2.publicKey);
auto evalMultKey3 = cryptoContext->MultiKeySwitchGen(kp3.secretKey, kp3.secretKey, evalMultKey);
auto evalMultABC = cryptoContext->MultiAddEvalKeys(evalMultAB, evalMultKey3, kp3.publicKey->GetKeyTag());
auto evalMultBABC = cryptoContext->MultiMultEvalKey(kp2.secretKey, evalMultABC, kp3.publicKey->GetKeyTag());
auto evalMultAABC = cryptoContext->MultiMultEvalKey(kp1.secretKey, evalMultABC, kp3.publicKey->GetKeyTag());
auto evalMultCABC = cryptoContext->MultiMultEvalKey(kp3.secretKey, evalMultABC, kp3.publicKey->GetKeyTag());
auto evalMultABABC = cryptoContext->MultiAddEvalMultKeys(evalMultBABC, evalMultAABC, evalMultBABC->GetKeyTag());
auto evalMultFinal2 = cryptoContext->MultiAddEvalMultKeys(evalMultABABC, evalMultCABC, evalMultCABC->GetKeyTag());
cryptoContext->InsertEvalMultKey({evalMultFinal2});
auto evalSumKeysC = cryptoContext->MultiEvalSumKeyGen(kp3.secretKey, evalSumKeys, kp3.publicKey->GetKeyTag());
auto evalSumKeysJoin2 = cryptoContext->MultiAddEvalSumKeys(evalSumKeys, evalSumKeysC, kp3.publicKey->GetKeyTag());
cryptoContext->InsertEvalSumKey(evalSumKeysJoin2);
if (!kp1.good()) {
std::cout << "Key generation failed!" << std::endl;
exit(1);
}
if (!kp2.good()) {
std::cout << "Key generation failed!" << std::endl;
exit(1);
}
if (!kp3.good()) {
std::cout << "Key generation failed!" << std::endl;
exit(1);
}
// END of Key Generation
std::vector<std::complex<double>> input({-4.0, -3.0, -2.0, -1.0, 0.0, 1.0, 2.0, 3.0, 4.0});
// Chebyshev coefficients
std::vector<double> coefficients({1.0, 0.558971, 0.0, -0.0943712, 0.0, 0.0215023, 0.0, -0.00505348, 0.0, 0.00119324,
0.0, -0.000281928, 0.0, 0.0000664347, 0.0, -0.0000148709});
// Input range
double a = -4;
double b = 4;
Plaintext pt1 = cryptoContext->MakeCKKSPackedPlaintext(input);
usint encodedLength = input.size();
auto ct1 = cryptoContext->Encrypt(kp3.publicKey, pt1);
ct1 = cryptoContext->EvalChebyshevSeries(ct1, coefficients, a, b);
// INTERACTIVE BOOTSTRAPPING STARTS
ct1 = cryptoContext->IntMPBootAdjustScale(ct1);
// Leading party (party B) generates a Common Random Poly (crp) at max coefficient modulus (QNumPrime).
// a is sampled at random uniformly from R_{Q}
auto crp = cryptoContext->IntMPBootRandomElementGen(kp3.publicKey);
// Each party generates its own shares: maskedDecryptionShare and reEncryptionShare
// (h_{0,i}, h_{1,i}) = (masked decryption share, re-encryption share)
// we use a vector inseat of std::pair for Python API compatibility
vector<Ciphertext<DCRTPoly>> sharesPair0; // for Party A
vector<Ciphertext<DCRTPoly>> sharesPair1; // for Party B
vector<Ciphertext<DCRTPoly>> sharesPair2; // for Party C
// extract c1 - element-wise
auto c1 = ct1->Clone();
c1->GetElements().erase(c1->GetElements().begin());
// masked decryption on the client: c1 = a*s1
sharesPair0 = cryptoContext->IntMPBootDecrypt(kp1.secretKey, c1, crp);
sharesPair1 = cryptoContext->IntMPBootDecrypt(kp2.secretKey, c1, crp);
sharesPair2 = cryptoContext->IntMPBootDecrypt(kp3.secretKey, c1, crp);
vector<vector<Ciphertext<DCRTPoly>>> sharesPairVec;
sharesPairVec.push_back(sharesPair0);
sharesPairVec.push_back(sharesPair1);
sharesPairVec.push_back(sharesPair2);
// Party B finalizes the protocol by aggregating the shares and reEncrypting the results
auto aggregatedSharesPair = cryptoContext->IntMPBootAdd(sharesPairVec);
auto ciphertextOutput = cryptoContext->IntMPBootEncrypt(kp3.publicKey, aggregatedSharesPair, crp, ct1);
// INTERACTIVE BOOTSTRAPPING ENDS
// distributed decryption
auto ciphertextPartial1 = cryptoContext->MultipartyDecryptMain({ciphertextOutput}, kp1.secretKey);
auto ciphertextPartial2 = cryptoContext->MultipartyDecryptMain({ciphertextOutput}, kp2.secretKey);
auto ciphertextPartial3 = cryptoContext->MultipartyDecryptLead({ciphertextOutput}, kp3.secretKey);
vector<Ciphertext<DCRTPoly>> partialCiphertextVec;
partialCiphertextVec.push_back(ciphertextPartial1[0]);
partialCiphertextVec.push_back(ciphertextPartial2[0]);
partialCiphertextVec.push_back(ciphertextPartial3[0]);
Plaintext plaintextMultiparty;
cryptoContext->MultipartyDecryptFusion(partialCiphertextVec, &plaintextMultiparty);
plaintextMultiparty->SetLength(encodedLength);
// Ground truth result
std::vector<std::complex<double>> result(
{0.0179885, 0.0474289, 0.119205, 0.268936, 0.5, 0.731064, 0.880795, 0.952571, 0.982011});
Plaintext plaintextResult = cryptoContext->MakeCKKSPackedPlaintext(result);
std::cout << "Ground Truth: \n\t" << plaintextResult->GetCKKSPackedValue() << std::endl;
std::cout << "Computed Res: \n\t" << plaintextMultiparty->GetCKKSPackedValue() << std::endl;
checkApproximateEquality(plaintextResult->GetCKKSPackedValue(), plaintextMultiparty->GetCKKSPackedValue(),
encodedLength, eps);
std::cout << "\n============================ INTERACTIVE DECRYPTION ENDED ============================\n";
std::cout << "\nTCKKSCollectiveBoot FHE example with rescaling technique: " << scaleTech << " Completed!"
<< std::endl;
}