ADD-05 MitigationConfirmed

[c4-bot-7]

Lines of code

Vulnerability details

See:

Pull Request

This PR is among the additional scope to be reviewed.

Reserve attempts to introduce a new functionality that allows governance to forcibly settle an auction, in the case of, say a censorship.

This imo has been sufficiently done.

After going through all 6 modified files we have a new supported method and the governance can achieve this by querying the newly implemented forceSettleTrade()

+    // === Governance ===

+     /// Forcibly settle a trade, losing all value
+     /// Should only be called in case of censorship
+     /// @param trade The trade address itself
+     /// @custom:governance
+     function forceSettleTrade(ITrade trade) public virtual governance {
+         // should not call any ERC20 functions, in case bricked
+
+         IERC20Metadata sell = trade.sell();
+         delete trades[sell];
+         tradesOpen--;
+         emit TradeSettled(trade, sell, trade.buy(), 0, 0);
+     }

[c4-judge]

thereksfour marked the issue as satisfactory