From 07b7ad1847b35d6c6462feb83c420a86247dd7ff Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Gabriel Mihalache <mihalache@gmail.com>
Date: Sun, 25 Aug 2024 23:04:41 -0400
Subject: [PATCH] Order learning

---
 teaching/sov-debt-and-default/index.html | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/teaching/sov-debt-and-default/index.html b/teaching/sov-debt-and-default/index.html
index 8e8cd49..f8703f3 100644
--- a/teaching/sov-debt-and-default/index.html
+++ b/teaching/sov-debt-and-default/index.html
@@ -279,9 +279,9 @@ <h2 id="continuous">Continuous Time Methods</h2>
 
 <h2 id="learning">Learning, Reputation, and Ambiguity</h2>
 <ul>
+<li>Amador, M., &amp; Phelan, C. (2021). Reputation and Sovereign Default. <em>Econometrica</em>, 89(4), 1979–2010. <a href="https://doi.org/10.3982/ecta16685">DOI</a></li>
 <li>Roch, F., &amp; Roldán, F. (2023). Uncertainty, Sovereign Default Risk, and State-Contingent Debt. <em>Journal of Political Economy Macroeconomics</em>, 1(2), 334–370. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1086/723950">DOI</a></li>
 <li>Paluszynski, R. (2023). Learning about Debt Crises. <em>American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics</em>, 15(1), 106–134. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1257/mac.20190189">DOI</a></li>
-<li>Amador, M., &amp; Phelan, C. (2021). Reputation and Sovereign Default. <em>Econometrica</em>, 89(4), 1979–2010. <a href="https://doi.org/10.3982/ecta16685">DOI</a></li>
 <li>Morelli, J. M., &amp; Moretti, M. (2023). Information Frictions, Reputation, and Sovereign Spreads. <em>Journal of Political Economy</em>, 131(11), 3066–3102. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1086/724855">DOI</a></li>
 <li>Marcos Chamon &amp; Francisco Roldán (2024). Sovereign Debt Tolerance with Potentially Permanent Costs of Default. <em>IMF Economic Review</em>. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1057/s41308-024-00260-z">DOI</a></li>
 <li>Stelios Fourakis (2024). <em> Sovereign Default and Government Reputation</em>. Working paper.</li>