🔍 Static Analysis Report - 2026-02-05 (Tool Availability Issue)

[github-actions[bot]]

Executive Summary

Static analysis scan attempted on 145 agentic workflows but encountered tool availability issues. While automated security scanning with zizmor, poutine, and actionlint could not be completed, manual analysis was performed to identify security patterns and provide recommendations.

Status: ⚠️ Scan Incomplete - Tool Availability Issues
Workflows Total: 145
Workflows Analyzed: 5 (manual sample)
Critical Issues Found: 0 (limited scan)
Recommendations: 4 action items

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Scan Attempt Details

Tools Status

Tool	Purpose	Status	Issue
zizmor	Security vulnerability scanner	❌ Not Available	Docker images not ready
poutine	Supply chain security	❌ Not Available	Docker images not ready
actionlint	Workflow linting	❌ Not Available	Docker images not ready
gh-aw (binary)	CLI compilation tool	❌ Build Failed	Go proxy blocked (network restrictions)

Root Cause Analysis

The static analysis could not be completed due to:

1. MCP Server Issue: Docker images not ready for agentic-workflows MCP server
2. Build Environment: Cannot build gh-aw from source due to network restrictions blocking golang.org proxy
3. Tool Dependencies: Static analysis tools (zizmor, poutine, actionlint) require Docker containers or gh-aw binary

Error Details:

MCP error -32603: calling "tools/call": docker images not ready
go: download go1.25.0: Get "(proxy.golang.org/redacted) Forbidden

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Manual Analysis Findings

Despite tool unavailability, manual inspection of workflow files revealed the following patterns:

Finding 1: Strict Mode Configuration

Issue: Workflows with strict: false bypass security validation
Severity: 🟡 Medium
Count: 5 workflows

Affected Workflows

1. daily-team-evolution-insights.md
2. dev.md
3. example-permissions-warning.md
4. security-guard.md
5. security-review.md

Security Implications:

• Strict mode enforces action pinning to SHAs (prevents supply chain attacks)
• Strict mode validates network configurations
• Strict mode ensures safe-outputs for write operations
• Disabling strict mode reduces security guarantees

Recommendation: Review each workflow to determine if strict: false is necessary. If possible, enable strict mode and address any validation errors.

Finding 2: Permission Patterns

Status: ✅ Generally Good
Observation: Most workflows follow principle of least privilege

Common Pattern:

permissions:
  contents: read
  issues: read
  pull-requests: read

Analysis: The majority of workflows use read-only permissions, which is a security best practice. This limits the potential damage if a workflow is compromised.

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Impact Assessment

What We're Missing Without Static Analysis

Zizmor would detect:

• Artipacked (artifact poisoning vulnerabilities)
• Template injection risks
• Dangerous workflow patterns
• Secret exposure risks
• Known-pwned actions usage

Poutine would detect:

• Supply chain security issues
• Dependency vulnerabilities
• Unpinned action references
• Malicious package risks

Actionlint would detect:

• Syntax errors in workflows
• Invalid action references
• Deprecated GitHub Actions features
• Type mismatches in workflow expressions
• Invalid shell commands

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Recommendations

Immediate Actions

1. Fix Tool Availability (Priority: 🔴 Critical)

   • Investigate Docker image availability for MCP server
   • Consider pre-building gh-aw binary in CI/CD pipeline
   • Explore alternative installation methods for restricted environments
   • Document tool dependencies and prerequisites

2. Review Strict Mode Disabled Workflows (Priority: 🟡 Medium)

   • Audit the 5 workflows with strict: false
   • Determine if strict mode can be enabled
   • Document legitimate reasons for strict mode bypass
   • Consider creating exceptions tracking

Short-term Actions

3. Establish Automated Security Scanning (Priority: 🟡 Medium)

   • Add static analysis to CI/CD pipeline
   • Set up scheduled daily scans
   • Create alerts for new security findings
   • Integrate security checks into pull request reviews

4. Create Security Baseline (Priority: 🟢 Low)

   • Document current security posture
   • Establish security metrics and KPIs
   • Track security improvements over time
   • Build historical trend analysis

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Technical Details

Environment Information

Build Environment:

• Platform: linux
• OS: Linux 6.11.0-1018-azure
• Go Version: 1.23.12 (at /opt/hostedtoolcache/go/1.23.12/x64)
• Docker: Images not ready
• Network: Restricted (golang.org proxy blocked)

Attempted Commands:

# Failed: MCP compile with static analysis
mcp__agentic_workflows__compile --actionlint --zizmor --poutine

# Failed: Build gh-aw from source
make build
# Error: go: download go1.25.0: Forbidden

# Failed: Direct tool usage
which zizmor poutine actionlint
# Not found in PATH

Workflow Statistics

Total Workflows: 145
Compiled Lock Files: 145 (.lock.yml files exist)
Markdown Sources: 145 (.md files)
Strict Mode Disabled: 5 workflows
Strict Mode Enabled/Default: 140 workflows (96.6%)

Permission Patterns:

• Read-only permissions: Majority (good practice)
• Mixed permissions: Some workflows with actions:read, models:read
• Write permissions: Limited use (appropriate)

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Next Steps

To enable automated static analysis scanning:

1. Resolve Docker Image Issue

   • Check MCP server configuration
   • Verify Docker daemon availability
   • Pull required images manually if needed
   • Test MCP tools in isolation

2. Alternative Tool Installation

   • Install zizmor directly: cargo install zizmor or use pre-built binary
   • Install poutine: Download from releases
   • Install actionlint: go install github.com/rhysd/actionlint/cmd/actionlint@latest
   • Update workflow to use direct tool invocation

3. Build Process Improvements

   • Pre-build gh-aw binary in separate job
   • Cache compiled binary for reuse
   • Use GitHub Actions artifact to share binary
   • Consider vendoring Go dependencies

4. Re-run Scan

   • Once tools are available, trigger new scan
   • Compare results with this baseline
   • Track improvements and regressions
   • Update security posture documentation

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Workaround: Manual Static Analysis Template

Until automated tools are available, use this manual checklist for workflow reviews:

Security Checklist:

• Actions pinned to full SHA (not tags or branches)
• Permissions follow least privilege principle
• No hardcoded secrets or tokens
• Input validation for workflow_dispatch
• Safe handling of pull_request_target events
• Review third-party actions for security
• Network access appropriately restricted
• Artifact uploads/downloads validated

Code Quality Checklist:

• Workflow syntax valid
• Action references exist and are current
• Shell commands properly quoted
• Error handling implemented
• Timeout configured appropriately
• Resource limits specified

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Historical Context

Previous Scans: None found in cache memory
First Scan Attempt: 2026-02-05
Baseline Established: Yes (manual analysis)

Cache Memory Updated:

• /tmp/gh-aw/cache-memory/security-scans/2026-02-05-failed-attempt.json

Future scans will be able to compare against this baseline to track:

• New vulnerabilities introduced
• Security improvements made
• Tool availability changes
• Workflow security trends

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Missing Tool Report

To help resolve this issue, I'm also reporting the missing tools:

Tool Unavailability Summary:

• Static analysis tools required: zizmor, poutine, actionlint
• Delivery mechanism: Docker containers via MCP server
• Alternative: Direct installation or pre-built binaries
• Workaround: Manual security reviews (current approach)

Impact:

• Cannot perform automated vulnerability detection
• Cannot validate against security best practices
• Cannot identify supply chain risks
• Limited to manual pattern analysis

Recommended Solution:

1. Pre-install tools in GitHub Actions environment
2. Use alternative MCP server with direct tool binaries
3. Build and cache gh-aw binary in earlier workflow step
4. Consider self-hosted runners with pre-configured tools

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References:

• Workflow Run §21729150549

AI generated by Static Analysis Report

• expires on Feb 12, 2026, 9:33 PM UTC

[github-actions[bot]]

This discussion was automatically closed because it expired on 2026-02-12T21:33:10.826Z.

Closed by Workflow