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anon_enc_nullifier_kyc.circom
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anon_enc_nullifier_kyc.circom
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// Copyright © 2024 Kaleido, Inc.
//
// SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
//
// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
// You may obtain a copy of the License at
//
// http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
//
// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
// limitations under the License.
pragma circom 2.1.4;
include "./lib/check-positive.circom";
include "./lib/check-hashes.circom";
include "./lib/check-sum.circom";
include "./lib/check-nullifiers.circom";
include "./lib/check-smt-proof.circom";
include "./lib/ecdh.circom";
include "./lib/encrypt.circom";
include "./node_modules/circomlib/circuits/babyjub.circom";
// This version of the circuit performs the following operations:
// - derive the sender's public key from the sender's private key
// - check the input and output commitments match the expected hashes
// - check the input and output values sum to the same amount
// - perform encryption of the receiver's output UTXO value and salt
// - check the nullifiers are derived from the input commitments and the sender's private key
// - check the nullifiers are included in the Merkle tree
// - check the owner public keys for inputs and outputs are included in the identities merkle tree
template Zeto(nInputs, nOutputs, nUTXOSMTLevels, nIdentitiesSMTLevels) {
signal input nullifiers[nInputs];
signal input inputCommitments[nInputs];
signal input inputValues[nInputs];
signal input inputSalts[nInputs];
// must be properly hashed and trimmed to be compatible with the BabyJub curve.
// Reference: https://github.com/iden3/circomlib/blob/master/test/babyjub.js#L103
signal input inputOwnerPrivateKey;
signal input utxosRoot;
signal input utxosMerkleProof[nInputs][nUTXOSMTLevels];
signal input enabled[nInputs];
signal input identitiesRoot;
signal input identitiesMerkleProof[nOutputs + 1][nIdentitiesSMTLevels];
signal input outputCommitments[nOutputs];
signal input outputValues[nOutputs];
signal input outputOwnerPublicKeys[nOutputs][2];
signal input outputSalts[nOutputs];
signal input encryptionNonce;
// the output for a 2-element input (value and salt) encryption is a 4-element array
signal output cipherText[4];
// derive the sender's public key from the secret input
// for the sender's private key. This step demonstrates
// the sender really owns the private key for the input
// UTXOs
var inputOwnerPublicKey[2];
component pub = BabyPbk();
pub.in <== inputOwnerPrivateKey;
inputOwnerPublicKey[0] = pub.Ax;
inputOwnerPublicKey[1] = pub.Ay;
var inputOwnerPublicKeys[nInputs][2];
for (var i = 0; i < nInputs; i++) {
inputOwnerPublicKeys[i][0] = inputOwnerPublicKey[0];
inputOwnerPublicKeys[i][1] = inputOwnerPublicKey[1];
}
component checkPositives = CheckPositive(nOutputs);
checkPositives.outputValues <== outputValues;
component checkInputHashes = CheckHashes(nInputs);
checkInputHashes.commitments <== inputCommitments;
checkInputHashes.values <== inputValues;
checkInputHashes.salts <== inputSalts;
checkInputHashes.ownerPublicKeys <== inputOwnerPublicKeys;
component checkOutputHashes = CheckHashes(nOutputs);
checkOutputHashes.commitments <== outputCommitments;
checkOutputHashes.values <== outputValues;
checkOutputHashes.salts <== outputSalts;
checkOutputHashes.ownerPublicKeys <== outputOwnerPublicKeys;
component checkNullifiers = CheckNullifiers(nInputs);
checkNullifiers.nullifiers <== nullifiers;
checkNullifiers.values <== inputValues;
checkNullifiers.salts <== inputSalts;
checkNullifiers.ownerPrivateKey <== inputOwnerPrivateKey;
component checkSum = CheckSum(nInputs, nOutputs);
checkSum.inputValues <== inputValues;
checkSum.outputValues <== outputValues;
// With the above steps, we demonstrated that the nullifiers
// are securely bound to the input commitments. Now we need to
// demonstrate that the input commitments belong to the Sparse
// Merkle Tree with the root `root`.
component checkUTXOSMTProof = CheckSMTProof(nInputs, nUTXOSMTLevels);
checkUTXOSMTProof.root <== utxosRoot;
checkUTXOSMTProof.merkleProof <== utxosMerkleProof;
checkUTXOSMTProof.enabled <== enabled;
checkUTXOSMTProof.leafNodeIndexes <== inputCommitments;
// Then, we need to check that the owner public keys
// for the inputs and outputs are included in the identities
// Sparse Merkle Tree with the root `identitiesRoot`.
var ownerPublicKeyHashes[nOutputs + 1];
component hash1 = Poseidon(2);
hash1.inputs[0] <== inputOwnerPublicKey[0];
hash1.inputs[1] <== inputOwnerPublicKey[1];
ownerPublicKeyHashes[0] = hash1.out;
component hashes[nOutputs];
var identitiesMTPCheckEnabled[nOutputs + 1];
identitiesMTPCheckEnabled[0] = 1;
for (var i = 0; i < nOutputs; i++) {
hashes[i] = Poseidon(2);
hashes[i].inputs[0] <== outputOwnerPublicKeys[i][0];
hashes[i].inputs[1] <== outputOwnerPublicKeys[i][1];
ownerPublicKeyHashes[i+1] = hashes[i].out;
identitiesMTPCheckEnabled[i+1] = 1;
}
component checkIdentitiesSMTProof = CheckSMTProof(nOutputs + 1, nIdentitiesSMTLevels);
checkIdentitiesSMTProof.root <== identitiesRoot;
checkIdentitiesSMTProof.merkleProof <== identitiesMerkleProof;
checkIdentitiesSMTProof.enabled <== identitiesMTPCheckEnabled;
checkIdentitiesSMTProof.leafNodeIndexes <== ownerPublicKeyHashes;
// generate shared secret
var sharedSecret[2];
component ecdh = Ecdh();
ecdh.privKey <== inputOwnerPrivateKey;
// our circuit requires that the output UTXO for the receiver must be the first in the array
ecdh.pubKey[0] <== outputOwnerPublicKeys[0][0];
ecdh.pubKey[1] <== outputOwnerPublicKeys[0][1];
sharedSecret[0] = ecdh.sharedKey[0];
sharedSecret[1] = ecdh.sharedKey[1];
// encrypt the value for the receiver
component encrypt = SymmetricEncrypt(2);
// our circuit requires that the output UTXO for the receiver must be the first in the array
encrypt.plainText[0] <== outputValues[0];
encrypt.plainText[1] <== outputSalts[0];
encrypt.key <== sharedSecret;
encrypt.nonce <== encryptionNonce;
encrypt.cipherText[0] ==> cipherText[0];
encrypt.cipherText[1] ==> cipherText[1];
encrypt.cipherText[2] ==> cipherText[2];
encrypt.cipherText[3] ==> cipherText[3];
}
component main { public [ nullifiers, outputCommitments, encryptionNonce, utxosRoot, identitiesRoot, enabled ] } = Zeto(2, 2, 64, 10);