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nf_anon_nullifier.circom
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nf_anon_nullifier.circom
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// Copyright © 2024 Kaleido, Inc.
//
// SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
//
// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
// You may obtain a copy of the License at
//
// http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
//
// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
// limitations under the License.
pragma circom 2.1.4;
include "./lib/check-nullifier-tokenid-uri.circom";
include "./lib/check-hashes-tokenid-uri.circom";
include "./lib/check-smt-proof.circom";
include "./node_modules/circomlib/circuits/babyjub.circom";
// This version of the circuit performs the following operations:
// - derive the sender's public key from the sender's private key
// - check the input and output commitments match the expected hashes
// - check the input and output values sum to the same amount
// - check the nullifiers are derived from the input commitments and the sender's private key
// - check the nullifiers are included in the Merkle tree
template Zeto(nSMTLevels) {
signal input tokenId;
signal input tokenUri;
signal input nullifier;
signal input inputCommitment;
signal input inputSalt;
// must be properly hashed and trimmed to be compatible with the BabyJub curve.
// Reference: https://github.com/iden3/circomlib/blob/master/test/babyjub.js#L103
signal input inputOwnerPrivateKey;
signal input root;
signal input merkleProof[nSMTLevels];
signal input outputCommitment;
signal input outputOwnerPublicKey[2];
signal input outputSalt;
var tokenIds[1] = [tokenId];
var tokenUris[1] = [tokenUri];
var inputCommitments[1] = [inputCommitment];
var inputSalts[1] = [inputSalt];
var nullifiers[1] = [nullifier];
var outputCommitments[1] = [outputCommitment];
var outputSalts[1] = [outputSalt];
var outputOwnerPublicKeys[1][2] = [outputOwnerPublicKey];
// derive the sender's public key from the secret input
// for the sender's private key. This step demonstrates
// the sender really owns the private key for the input
// UTXOs
var senderPublicKey[2];
component pub = BabyPbk();
pub.in <== inputOwnerPrivateKey;
senderPublicKey[0] = pub.Ax;
senderPublicKey[1] = pub.Ay;
var inputOwnerPublicKeys[1][2] = [senderPublicKey];
component checkInputHashes = CheckHashesForTokenIdAndUri(1);
checkInputHashes.tokenIds <== tokenIds;
checkInputHashes.tokenUris <== tokenUris;
checkInputHashes.commitments <== inputCommitments;
checkInputHashes.salts <== inputSalts;
checkInputHashes.ownerPublicKeys <== inputOwnerPublicKeys;
component checkOutputHashes = CheckHashesForTokenIdAndUri(1);
checkOutputHashes.tokenIds <== tokenIds;
checkOutputHashes.tokenUris <== tokenUris;
checkOutputHashes.commitments <== outputCommitments;
checkOutputHashes.salts <== outputSalts;
checkOutputHashes.ownerPublicKeys <== outputOwnerPublicKeys;
component checkHashesSum = CheckNullifierForTokenIdAndUri(1);
checkHashesSum.nullifiers <== nullifiers;
checkHashesSum.tokenIds <== tokenIds;
checkHashesSum.tokenUris <== tokenUris;
checkHashesSum.salts <== inputSalts;
checkHashesSum.ownerPrivateKey <== inputOwnerPrivateKey;
component checkSMTProof = CheckSMTProof(1, nSMTLevels);
checkSMTProof.root <== root;
checkSMTProof.merkleProof <== [merkleProof];
checkSMTProof.enabled <== [1];
checkSMTProof.leafNodeIndexes <== inputCommitments;
}
component main { public [ nullifier, outputCommitment, root ] } = Zeto(64);