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library.bib
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@article{chic94,
abstract = {Differences in property rights create a motive for trade among otherwise identical regions. Two regions with identical technologies, endowments, and preferences will trade if one, the South, has ill-defined property rights on environmental resources. Trade with a region with well-defined property rights transmits and enlarges the problem of the commons: the North overconsumes underpriced resource-intensive products imported from the South. This occurs even though trade equalizes all prices, of goods and factors, worldwide. Taxing the use of resources in the South is unreliable as it can lead to more overextraction. Property-rights policies may be more effective.},
author = {Chichilnisky, Graciela},
doi = {10.1126/science.151.3712.867-a},
file = {::},
issn = {0036-8075},
journal = {American Economic Review},
month = {feb},
number = {4},
pages = {851--874},
pmid = {17746758},
publisher = {American Economic Association},
title = {{North-South Trade and the Global Environment}},
url = {http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/20888544 http://www.jstor.org/stable/2118034},
volume = {84},
year = {1994}
}
@article{Chichilnisky1994,
abstract = {We review the optimal pattern of carbon emission abatements across countries in a simple multi-country world. We model explicitly (with the model in Chichilnisky, 1993b) the fact that the atmosphere is a public good. Within this framework we establish conditions for it to be necessary for optimality that the marginal cost of abatement be the same in all countries. These conditions are quite restrictive, and amount to either ignoring distributional issues between countries or operating within a framework within which lump-sum transfers can be made between countries. These results have implications for the use of tradeable emission permits, which as normally advocated will lead to the equalization of marginal abatement costs across countries. The observation that the atmosphere is a public good implies that we may need to look at a Lindahl equilibrium rather than a Walrasian equilibrium in tradeable permits. {\textcopyright} 1994.},
author = {Chichilnisky, Graciela and Heal, Geoffrey},
doi = {10.1016/0165-1765(94)90119-8},
issn = {01651765},
journal = {Economics Letters},
number = {4},
pages = {443--449},
title = {{Who should abate carbon emissions?. An international viewpoint}},
volume = {44},
year = {1994}
}
@techreport{Mattila2009,
address = {Helsinki},
author = {Mattila, Tuomas and Kujanp{\"{a}}{\"{a}}, Marjukka and Myllymaa, Tuuli and Korhonen, Marja-Riitta and Soukka, Risto and Dahlbo, Helena},
file = {:home/juha/.local/share/data/Mendeley Ltd./Mendeley Desktop/Downloaded/Mattila et al. - 2009 - Ostoskassien ilmastovaikutusten v{\"{a}}hent{\"{a}}minen.pdf:pdf},
institution = {Suomen Ymp{\"{a}}rist{\"{o}}keskus},
number = {2/2009},
series = {Suomen ymp{\"{a}}rist{\"{o}}},
title = {{Ostoskassien ilmastovaikutusten v{\"{a}}hent{\"{a}}minen}},
url = {https://helda.helsinki.fi/bitstream/handle/10138/38000/SY2{\_}2009{\_}Ostoskassien.pdf?sequence=1},
year = {2009}
}
@article{Mehling2018,
abstract = {Applying carbon charges, not trade tariffs, to imports would bolster the Paris Agreement, argue Michael Mehling and colleagues. Applying carbon charges, not trade tariffs, to imports would bolster the Paris Agreement.},
author = {Mehling, Michael A. and van Asselt, Harro and Das, Kasturi and Droege, Susanne},
doi = {10.1038/d41586-018-05708-7},
issn = {0028-0836},
journal = {Nature},
number = {7714},
pages = {321},
title = {{Beat protectionism and emissions at a stroke}},
url = {http://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-018-05708-7 https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-018-05708-7},
volume = {559},
year = {2018}
}
@book{stav16,
author = {Stavins, Robert N. and Stowe, Robert C.},
file = {:home/juha/.local/share/data/Mendeley Ltd./Mendeley Desktop/Downloaded/Stavins, Stowe - 2016 - The Paris Agreement and Beyond International Climate Change Policy Post-2020.pdf:pdf},
publisher = {Harvard Project on Climate Agreements},
title = {{The Paris Agreement and Beyond: International Climate Change Policy Post-2020}},
url = {http://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/files/2016-10{\_}paris-agreement-beyond{\_}v4.pdf},
year = {2016}
}
@incollection{CS2010,
address = {London},
author = {{Commonwealth Secretariat}},
booktitle = {Saving Small Island Developing States: Environmental and Natural Resource Challenges},
doi = {10.14217/9781848590823-15-en},
editor = {Nath, S. and Roberts, J. and Madhoo, Y.},
publisher = {Commonwealth Secretariat},
title = {{An illustration of the tragedy of the commons: The demise of the Aral Sea}},
year = {2010}
}
@article{Parry1999,
abstract = {This paper employs analytical and numerical models to assess the welfare effects of a revenue-neutral carbon tax and (nonauctioned) carbon emissions permits, taking into account preexisting tax distortions in factor markets. The presence of preexisting taxes significantly raises the general equilibrium costs of both policies. This cost increase is much greater under emissions permits, since this policy does not generate revenues to reduce distortionary taxes. Under our central estimates emissions permits cannot increase welfare unless environmental damages exceed about {\$}18 per ton of carbon. In contrast, an appropriately scaled carbon tax is welfare-improving so long as environmental damages are positive.},
author = {Parry, Ian W. H. and Williams, Roberton C. and Goulder, Lawrence H.},
doi = {10.1006/JEEM.1998.1058},
issn = {0095-0696},
journal = {Journal of Environmental Economics and Management},
month = {jan},
number = {1},
pages = {52--84},
publisher = {Academic Press},
title = {{When Can Carbon Abatement Policies Increase Welfare? The Fundamental Role of Distorted Factor Markets}},
url = {https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0095069698910580},
volume = {37},
year = {1999}
}
@article{Pindyck2017b,
author = {Pindyck, Robert S.},
doi = {10.1111/ecca.12243},
file = {:home/juha/.local/share/data/Mendeley Ltd./Mendeley Desktop/Downloaded/Pindyck - 2017 - Coase Lecture-Taxes, Targets and the Social Cost of Carbon.pdf:pdf},
issn = {00130427},
journal = {Economica},
month = {jul},
number = {335},
pages = {345--364},
publisher = {John Wiley {\&} Sons, Ltd (10.1111)},
title = {{Coase Lecture-Taxes, Targets and the Social Cost of Carbon}},
url = {http://doi.wiley.com/10.1111/ecca.12243},
volume = {84},
year = {2017}
}
@article{Cleland2006,
abstract = {Promotion of family planning in countries with high birth rates has the potential to reduce poverty and hunger and avert 32{\%} of all maternal deaths and nearly 10{\%} of childhood deaths. It would also contribute substantially to women's empowerment, achievement of universal primary schooling, and long-term environmental sustainability. In the past 40 years, family-planning programmes have played a major part in raising the prevalence of contraceptive practice from less than 10{\%} to 60{\%} and reducing fertility in developing countries from six to about three births per woman. However, in half the 75 larger low-income and lower-middle income countries (mainly in Africa), contraceptive practice remains low and fertility, population growth, and unmet need for family planning are high. The cross-cutting contribution to the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals makes greater investment in family planning in these countries compelling. Despite the size of this unfinished agenda, international funding and promotion of family planning has waned in the past decade. A revitalisation of the agenda is urgently needed. Historically, the USA has taken the lead but other governments or agencies are now needed as champions. Based on the sizeable experience of past decades, the key features of effective programmes are clearly established. Most governments of poor countries already have appropriate population and family-planning policies but are receiving too little international encouragement and funding to implement them with vigour. What is currently missing is political willingness to incorporate family planning into the development arena.},
author = {Cleland, John and Bernstein, Stan and Ezeh, Alex and Faundes, Anibal and Glasier, Anna and Innis, Jolene},
doi = {10.1016/S0140-6736(06)69480-4},
issn = {0140-6736},
journal = {The Lancet},
month = {nov},
number = {9549},
pages = {1810--1827},
publisher = {Elsevier},
title = {{Family planning: the unfinished agenda}},
url = {https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0140673606694804},
volume = {368},
year = {2006}
}
@article{Nolan2008,
abstract = {The present research investigated the persuasive impact and detectability of normative social influence. The first study surveyed 810 Californians about energy conservation and found that descriptive normative beliefs were more predictive of behavior than were other relevant beliefs, even though respondents rated such norms as least important in their conservation decisions. Study 2, a field experiment, showed that normative social influence produced the greatest change in behavior compared to information highlighting other reasons to conserve, even though respondents rated the normative information as least motivating. Results show that normative messages can be a powerful lever of persuasion but that their influence is underdetected.},
author = {Nolan, Jessica M. and Schultz, P. Wesley and Cialdini, Robert B. and Goldstein, Noah J. and Griskevicius, Vladas},
doi = {10.1177/0146167208316691},
issn = {0146-1672},
journal = {Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin},
number = {7},
pages = {913--923},
title = {{Normative Social Influence is Underdetected}},
url = {http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0146167208316691 https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0146167208316691},
volume = {34},
year = {2008}
}
@article{Heal2017,
author = {Heal, Geoffrey},
doi = {10.1257/jel.20151335},
file = {:home/juha/.local/share/data/Mendeley Ltd./Mendeley Desktop/Downloaded/Heal - 2017 - The Economics of the Climate.pdf:pdf},
issn = {0022-0515},
journal = {Journal of Economic Literature},
number = {3},
pages = {1046--63},
title = {{The Economics of the Climate}},
url = {http://pubs.aeaweb.org/doi/10.1257/jel.20151335 https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/jel.20151335},
volume = {55},
year = {2017}
}
@article{Hintermann2016,
author = {Hintermann, Beat and Peterson, Sonja and Rickels, Wilfried},
doi = {10.1093/reep/rev015},
issn = {1750-6816},
journal = {Review of Environmental Economics and Policy},
month = {jan},
number = {1},
pages = {108--128},
publisher = {Narnia},
title = {{Price and Market Behavior in Phase II of the EU ETS: A Review of the Literature: Appendix Table 1}},
url = {https://academic.oup.com/reep/article-lookup/doi/10.1093/reep/rev015},
volume = {10},
year = {2016}
}
@techreport{Suomenilmastopaneeli2018,
author = {Suomen ilmastopaneeli},
file = {:home/juha/.local/share/data/Mendeley Ltd./Mendeley Desktop/Downloaded/Suomen ilmastopaneeli - 2018 - Ilmastopaneelin muistio asunto-, energia- ja ymp{\"{a}}rist{\"{o}}ministeri Kimmo Tiilikaisen pyynt{\"{o}}{\"{o}}n, Il.pdf:pdf},
institution = {Suomen ilmastopaneeli},
title = {{Ilmastopaneelin muistio asunto-, energia- ja ymp{\"{a}}rist{\"{o}}ministeri Kimmo Tiilikaisen pyynt{\"{o}}{\"{o}}n, Ilmastopaneelin n{\"{a}}kemykset pitk{\"{a}}n aikav{\"{a}}lin p{\"{a}}{\"{a}}st{\"{o}}v{\"{a}}hennystavoitteen asettamisessa huomioon otettavista seikoista}},
url = {https://www.ilmastopaneeli.fi/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/Ilmastopaneelin-muistio{\_}hyvaksytty{\_}4.6.2018.pdf},
year = {2018}
}
@techreport{OECD2018,
abstract = {This paper investigates the joint impact of the European Union Emissions Trading System (EU ETS), Europe's main climate change policy, on carbon emissions and economic performance of regulated companies. The impact on emissions is analysed using installation-level carbon emissions from national Polluting Emissions Registries from France, Netherlands, Norway and the United Kingdom complemented with data from the European Pollutant Release and Transfer Register (E-PRTR). The impact on firm performance is analysed using firm-level data for all countries covered by the EU ETS. A matching methodology exploiting installation-level inclusion criteria combined with difference-in-differences is used to estimate the policy's causal impact on installations' emissions and on firms' revenue, assets, profits and employment. We find that the EU ETS has induced carbon emission reductions in the order of -10{\%} between 2005 and 2012, but had no negative impact on the economic performance of regulated firms. These results demonstrate that concerns that the EU ETS would come at a cost in terms of competitiveness have been vastly overplayed. In fact, we even find that the EU ETS led to an increase in regulated firms' revenues and fixed assets. We explore various explanations for these findings.},
address = {Paris},
author = {Dechezlepr{\^{e}}tre, Antoine and Nachtigall, Daniel and Venmans, Frank},
doi = {https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1787/4819b016-en},
file = {:home/juha/.local/share/data/Mendeley Ltd./Mendeley Desktop/Downloaded/Dechezlepr{\^{e}}tre, Nachtigall, Venmans - 2018 - The joint impact of the European Union emissions trading system on carbon emissions and ec.pdf:pdf},
institution = {OECD Publishing},
number = {1515},
series = {OECD Economics Department Working Papers},
title = {{The joint impact of the European Union emissions trading system on carbon emissions and economic performance}},
url = {https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/content/paper/4819b016-en},
year = {2018}
}
@techreport{Itkonen2017,
abstract = {We model a network of linked permit markets to examine efficiency and dependencies between the markets in a competitive equilibrium. Links enable the participants of one emissions trading system to use the permits of another system. To improve the cost-efficiency of the international policy architecture, the Paris climate agreement set out a framework for linking local policies. International trade in permits reduces costs by merging markets, but in a large network it is generally not obvious which markets end up linked in the equilibrium. Also, indirect links might allow foreign regulators to undermine domestic policy outcomes. We apply graph theory to study dependencies between markets and to determine how the network is partitioned into separate market areas. Our main theorem characterizes the dependency structure of the equilibrium in an exogenous trading network. We show that markets merge when they are connected by a particular pattern of links. The results help to identify potential sources of both cost reductions and foreign interference, and to secure the efficiency of climate change policies.},
author = {Itkonen, Juha V. A.},
institution = {Bank of Finland},
month = {aug},
number = {No. 20/2017},
series = {Bank of Finland Research Discussion Paper},
title = {{Efficiency and Dependency in a Network of Linked Permit Markets}},
url = {https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract{\_}id=3017176},
year = {2017}
}
@article{Benartzi2017,
abstract = {Governments are increasingly adopting behavioral science techniques for changing individual behavior in pursuit of policy objectives. The types of “nudge” interventions that governments are now adopting alter people's decisions without coercion or significant changes to economic incentives. We calculated ratios of impact to cost for nudge interventions and for traditional policy tools, such as tax incentives and other financial inducements, and we found that nudge interventions often compare favorably with traditional interventions. We conclude that nudging is a valuable approach that should be used more often in conjunction with traditional policies, but more calculations are needed to determine the relative effectiveness of nudging.},
author = {Benartzi, Shlomo and Beshears, John and Milkman, Katherine L. and Sunstein, Cass R. and Thaler, Richard H. and Shankar, Maya and Tucker-Ray, Will and Congdon, William J. and Galing, Steven},
doi = {10.1177/0956797617702501},
file = {:home/juha/.local/share/data/Mendeley Ltd./Mendeley Desktop/Downloaded/Benartzi et al. - 2017 - Should Governments Invest More in Nudging.pdf:pdf},
issn = {0956-7976},
journal = {Psychological Science},
number = {8},
pages = {1041--1055},
title = {{Should Governments Invest More in Nudging?}},
url = {http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0956797617702501 https://scholar.google.com/scholar?start=10{\&}hl=fi{\&}as{\_}sdt=0,5{\&}sciodt=0,5{\&}as{\_}ylo=2015{\&}cites=4697151464288395715{\&}scipsc={\#}d=gs{\_}qabs{\&}u={\%}23p{\%}3DX93dtcLyGGgJ},
volume = {28},
year = {2017}
}
@article{Dasgupta2008,
author = {Dasgupta, Partha},
doi = {10.1007/s11166-008-9049-6},
issn = {0895-5646},
journal = {Journal of Risk and Uncertainty},
month = {dec},
number = {2-3},
pages = {141--169},
publisher = {Springer US},
title = {{Discounting climate change}},
url = {http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s11166-008-9049-6},
volume = {37},
year = {2008}
}
@article{Allcott2019,
abstract = {"Nudge"-style interventions are often deemed successful if they generate large behavior change at low cost, but they are rarely subjected to full social welfare evaluations. We combine a field experiment with a simple theoretical framework to evaluate the welfare effects of one especially policy-relevant intervention, home energy social comparison reports. In our sample, the reports increase social welfare, although traditional evaluation approaches overstate gains because they ignore significant costs incurred by nudge recipients. Overall, home energy report welfare gains might be overstated by {\$}620 million. We develop a prediction algorithm for optimal targeting; this approach would double the welfare gains.},
author = {Allcott, Hunt and Kessler, Judd B.},
doi = {10.1257/app.20170328},
issn = {1945-7782},
journal = {American Economic Journal: Applied Economics},
number = {1},
pages = {236--76},
title = {{The Welfare Effects of Nudges: A Case Study of Energy Use Social Comparisons}},
url = {https://pubs.aeaweb.org/doi/10.1257/app.20170328 https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/app.20170328},
volume = {11},
year = {2019}
}
@article{mccr11,
author = {McCright, Aaron M and Dunlap, Riley E},
doi = {10.1111/j.1533-8525.2011.01198.x},
file = {:home/juha/.local/share/data/Mendeley Ltd./Mendeley Desktop/Downloaded/McCright, Dunlap - 2011 - The politicization of climate change and polarization in the American public's views of global warming, 2001.pdf:pdf},
issn = {1533-8525},
journal = {Sociological Quarterly},
month = {mar},
number = {2},
pages = {155--194},
publisher = {Blackwell Publishing Inc},
title = {{The politicization of climate change and polarization in the American public's views of global warming, 2001–2010}},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1533-8525.2011.01198.x},
volume = {52},
year = {2011}
}
@article{Koch2014,
abstract = {The price of EU allowances (EUAs) in the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) fell from almost 30€/tCO2 in mid-2008 to less than 5€/tCO2 in mid-2013. The sharp and persistent price decline has sparked intense debates both in academia and among policy-makers about the decisive allowance price drivers. In this paper we examine whether and to what extent the EUA price drop can be justified by three commonly identified explanatory factors: the economic recession, renewable policies and the use of international credits. Capitalizing on marginal abatement cost theory and a broadly extended data set, we find that only variations in economic activity and the growth of wind and solar electricity production are robustly explaining EUA price dynamics. Contrary to simulation-based analyses, our results point to moderate interaction effects between the overlapping EU ETS and renewable policies. The bottom line, however, is that 90{\%} of the variations of EUA price changes remains unexplained by the abatement-related fundamentals. Together, our findings do not support the widely-held view that negative demand shocks are the main cause of the weak carbon price signal. In view of the new evidence, we evaluate the EU ETS reform options which are currently discussed.},
author = {Koch, Nicolas and Fuss, Sabine and Grosjean, Godefroy and Edenhofer, Ottmar},
doi = {10.1016/J.ENPOL.2014.06.024},
issn = {0301-4215},
journal = {Energy Policy},
month = {oct},
pages = {676--685},
publisher = {Elsevier},
title = {{Causes of the EU ETS price drop: Recession, CDM, renewable policies or a bit of everything?—New evidence}},
url = {https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0301421514003966},
volume = {73},
year = {2014}
}
@techreport{VTV2017,
author = {VTV},
file = {:home/juha/.local/share/data/Mendeley Ltd./Mendeley Desktop/Downloaded/VTV - 2017 - Sy{\"{o}}tt{\"{o}}tariffi tuulis{\"{a}}hk{\"{o}}n tuotannon tukemisessa.pdf:pdf},
institution = {Valtiontalouden tarkastusvirasto},
isbn = {9789524993661},
number = {2/2017},
series = {Valtiontalouden tarkastusviraston tuloksellisuustarkastuskertomukset},
title = {{Sy{\"{o}}tt{\"{o}}tariffi tuulis{\"{a}}hk{\"{o}}n tuotannon tukemisessa}},
url = {http://urn.fi/urn:isbn:978-952-499-367-8},
year = {2017}
}
@book{dale68,
annote = {Toronto},
author = {Dales, J H},
publisher = {University of Toronto Press},
title = {{Pollution, Property and Prices}},
year = {1968}
}
@article{Schneider2011,
abstract = {The clean development mechanism (CDM) under the Kyoto Protocol allows industrialized countries to use credits from greenhouse gas (GHG) abatement projects in developing countries. A key requirement of the CDM is that the emission reductions be real, measurable and additional. This article uses data from registered projects to evaluate the extent to which these objectives are met by projects that reduce hydrofluorocarbon-23 (HFC-23) emissions in the production of hydrochlorofluorocarbon-22 (HCFC-22). The data show that HCFC-22 plants produced significantly less HFC-23 during periods when no emission credits could be claimed compared with periods when HFC-23 destruction could be credited under the CDM. Moreover, the total amount of HCFC-22 produced appears to be determined mainly by CDM rules. This suggests that the claimed emission reductions may partly not be real and that the CDM provides perverse incentives to generate more HFC-23. The accelerated phase-out of HCFCs under the Montreal Protocol on Substa...},
author = {Schneider, Lambert},
doi = {10.3763/cpol.2010.0096},
file = {:home/juha/.local/share/data/Mendeley Ltd./Mendeley Desktop/Downloaded/Schneider - 2011 - Perverse incentives under the CDM an evaluation of HFC-23 destruction projects.pdf:pdf},
issn = {14693062},
journal = {Climate Policy},
keywords = {benchmarking,cdm,clean development mechanism,hcfc-22,hfc-23,kyoto protocol,montreal protocol},
month = {mar},
number = {2},
pages = {851--864},
publisher = {Taylor {\&} Francis Group},
title = {{Perverse incentives under the CDM: an evaluation of HFC-23 destruction projects}},
url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.3763/cpol.2010.0096},
volume = {11},
year = {2011}
}
@article{lisk11,
abstract = {Motivated by the structure of existing pollution permit markets, we study the equilibrium path that results from allocating an initial stock of storable permits to an agent, or a group of agents, in a position to exercise market power. A large seller of permits exercises market power no differently than a large supplier of an exhaustible resource. However, whenever the large agent's endowment falls short of his efficient endowment – allocation profile that would exactly cover his emissions along the perfectly competitive path – market power is greatly mitigated by a commitment problem, much like in a durable‐goods monopoly. We illustrate our theory with two applications: the US sulphur market and the international carbon market that may eventually develop beyond the Kyoto Protocol.},
author = {Liski, Matti and Montero, Juan-Pablo},
doi = {10.1111/j.1468-0297.2010.02366.x},
journal = {The Economic Journal},
month = {mar},
number = {551},
pages = {116--144},
publisher = {Blackwell Publishing Ltd},
title = {{Market Power in an Exhaustible Resource Market: The Case of Storable Pollution Permits}},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0297.2010.02366.x},
volume = {121},
year = {2011}
}
@article{Nordhaus2007,
author = {Nordhaus, William D.},
doi = {10.1257/jel.45.3.686},
journal = {Journal of Economic Literature},
month = {jul},
number = {3},
pages = {686--702},
title = {{A Review of the Stern Review on the Economics of Climate Change}},
url = {http://pubs.aeaweb.org/doi/10.1257/jel.45.3.686},
volume = {45},
year = {2007}
}
@book{Pigou1920,
address = {London},
author = {Pigou, A. C.},
publisher = {Macmillan and co},
title = {{The Economics of Welfare}},
url = {http://pombo.free.fr/pigou1920.pdf},
year = {1920}
}
@article{Böhringer2012,
abstract = {Issues of emission leakage and competitiveness are at the fore of the climate policy debate in all the major economies implementing or proposing to implement substantial emission cap-and-trade programs. Unilateral climate policy cannot directly impose emission prices on foreign sources, but it can complement domestic emission pricing with border carbon adjustment to reduce leakage and increase global cost-effectiveness. While border carbon adjustment has a theoretical efficiency rationale, its practical implementation is subject to serious caveats. This article summarizes the results of an Energy Modeling Forum study (EMF 29) on the efficiency and distributional impacts of border carbon adjustment. We find that border carbon adjustment can effectively reduce leakage and ameliorate adverse impacts on energy-intensive and trade-exposed industries of unilaterally abating countries. However, the scope for global cost savings is small. The main effect of border carbon adjustment is to shift the economic burden of emission reduction to non-abating countries through implicit changes in international prices.},
author = {B{\"{o}}hringer, Christoph and Balistreri, Edward J. and Rutherford, Thomas F.},
doi = {10.1016/J.ENECO.2012.10.003},
issn = {0140-9883},
journal = {Energy Economics},
month = {dec},
pages = {S97--S110},
publisher = {North-Holland},
title = {{The role of border carbon adjustment in unilateral climate policy: Overview of an Energy Modeling Forum study (EMF 29)}},
url = {https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0140988312002460},
volume = {34},
year = {2012}
}
@book{WEO2018,
address = {Paris},
author = {IEA},
doi = {https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1787/weo-2018-en},
institution = {International Energy Agency},
pages = {661},
title = {{World Energy Outlook 2018}},
url = {https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/content/publication/weo-2018-en},
year = {2018}
}
@techreport{Goulder2010,
abstract = {Federal action addressing climate change is likely to emerge either through new legislation or via the U.S. EPA's authority under the Clean Air Act. The prospect of federal action raises important questions regarding the interconnections between federal efforts and state-level climate policy developments. In the presence of federal policies, to what extent will state efforts be cost-effective? How does the co-existence of state- and federal-level policies affect the ability of state efforts to achieve emissions reductions? This paper addresses these questions. We find that state-level policy in the presence of a federal policy can be beneficial or problematic, depending on the nature of the overlap between the two systems, the relative stringency of the efforts, and the types of policy instruments engaged. When the federal policy sets limits on aggregate emissions quantities, or allows manufacturers or facilities to average performance across states, the emission reductions accomplished by a subset of U.S. states may reduce pressure on the constraints posed by the federal policy, thereby freeing facilities or manufacturers to increase emissions in other states. This leads to serious "emissions leakage" and a loss of cost-effectiveness at the national level. In contrast, when the federal policy sets prices for emissions or does not allow manufactures to average performance across states, these difficulties are usually avoided. Even in circumstances involving problematic interactions, there may be other attractions of state-level climate policy. We evaluate a number of arguments that have been made to support state-level climate policy in the presence of federal policies, even when problematic interactions arise.},
author = {Goulder, Lawrence H. and Stavins, Robert N.},
file = {:home/juha/.local/share/data/Mendeley Ltd./Mendeley Desktop/Downloaded/Goulder, Stavins - 2010 - Interactions between state and federal climate change policies.pdf:pdf},
number = {No. 16123},
series = {NBER Working Paper},
title = {{Interactions between state and federal climate change policies}},
url = {http://www.nber.org/papers/w16123},
year = {2010}
}
@article{Pohjola2017,
author = {Pohjola, Matti},
file = {:home/juha/.local/share/data/Mendeley Ltd./Mendeley Desktop/Downloaded/Pohjola - 2017 - Suomen talouskasvu ja sen l{\"{a}}hteet 1860–2015.pdf:pdf},
journal = {Kansantaloudellinen aikakauskirja},
keywords = {Pohjola2017},
number = {3},
title = {{Suomen talouskasvu ja sen l{\"{a}}hteet 1860–2015}},
url = {https://www.taloustieteellinenyhdistys.fi/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/KAK{\_}3{\_}2017{\_}176x245{\_}WEB-8-34.pdf},
volume = {113},
year = {2017}
}
@article{Hoel1996,
abstract = {If some, but not all, countries are cooperating to reduce CO2 emissions, one could make the following argument: a high carbon tax for carbon intensive tradeable sectors in the cooperating countries will reduce the production of goods from these sectors, and therefore CO2 emissions, in the cooperating countries. However, this will to a large extent be counteracted by increased production of such goods in the countries that have no climate policy. And since it is only total CO2 emissions from all countries that are relevant for the climate, there is no point in a policy that simply relocates CO2 emissions from the cooperating countries to the countries that have no climate policy. According to this line of reasoning, carbon intensive tradeable sectors should thus face a lower carbon tax than other sectors of the economy. This paper shows that a carbon tax should not be differentiated across sectors in the economy, provided one can use import and export tariffs on all traded goods. It is also shown that such a differentiation of carbon taxes is optimal for the cooperating countries if they are prevented from using tariffs on the traded goods. However, informational or political factors constraining the use of tariffs are likely also to constrain the possibility of differentiating carbon taxes between sectors.},
author = {Hoel, Michael},
doi = {10.1016/0047-2727(94)01490-6},
issn = {0047-2727},
journal = {Journal of Public Economics},
month = {jan},
number = {1},
pages = {17--32},
publisher = {North-Holland},
title = {{Should a carbon tax be differentiated across sectors?}},
url = {https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/0047272794014906},
volume = {59},
year = {1996}
}
@unpublished{pmr2015,
address = {Washington, DC},
author = {{Partnership for Market Readiness}},
file = {:home/juha/.local/share/data/Mendeley Ltd./Mendeley Desktop/Downloaded/{\{}Partnership for Market Readiness{\}} - 2015 - Carbon Leakage Theory, Evidence and Policy Design.pdf:pdf},
institution = {World Bank},
series = {PMR Technical Note},
title = {{Carbon Leakage Theory, Evidence and Policy Design}},
url = {https://www.thepmr.org/system/files/documents/Technical Note 11{\_}Carbon Leakage.pdf},
year = {2015}
}
@article{Allcott2012,
author = {Allcott, Hunt and Greenstone, Michael},
doi = {10.1257/jep.26.1.3},
issn = {0895-3309},
journal = {Journal of Economic Perspectives},
number = {1},
pages = {3--28},
title = {{Is There an Energy Efficiency Gap?}},
url = {http://pubs.aeaweb.org/doi/10.1257/jep.26.1.3 https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/jep.26.1.3},
volume = {26},
year = {2012}
}
@book{Sterner2013,
author = {Sterner, Thomas and Coria, Jessica},
publisher = {Routledge},
title = {{Policy instruments for environmental and natural resource management}},
year = {2013}
}
@article{Goulder2013,
abstract = {This paper presents a range of insights from recent literature on how climate-change policies and other environmental policies interact with the fiscal system. It explores four issues associated with fiscal interactions. First, it examines how these interactions influence the prospects for a "double dividend:" both an environmental improvement and a reduction in the costs of the tax system. Second, it analyzes how the use of revenues from a carbon tax or from a cap-and-trade system involving auctioned emissions allowances influences these policies' economic costs. Third, it addresses the question whether carbon taxes or cap-and-trade programs represent more efficient sources of government revenue than other, more traditional revenue sources such as income, sales, or payroll taxes. Finally, it analyzes how fiscal interactions affect the choice between CO 2 emissions-pricing instruments (carbon taxes and cap and trade) and other climate policy instruments.},
author = {Goulder, Lawrence H.},
doi = {10.1016/j.eneco.2013.09.017},
file = {:home/juha/.local/share/data/Mendeley Ltd./Mendeley Desktop/Downloaded/Goulder - 2013 - Climate change policy's interactions with the tax system ☆.pdf:pdf},
journal = {Energy Economics},
keywords = {Cap and trade,Carbon tax,Climate change policy,General equilibrium impacts,Revenue-neutral,Tax-interactions},
number = {1},
pages = {S3--S11},
title = {{Climate change policy's interactions with the tax system}},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.eneco.2013.09.017},
volume = {40},
year = {2013}
}
@misc{vatt2016,
author = {VATT},
publisher = {Valtion taloudellinen tutkimuskeskus VATT},
title = {{Luonnos hallituksen esitykseksi eduskunnalle laiksi p{\"{a}}{\"{a}}st{\"{o}}kaupasta johtuvien ep{\"{a}}suorien kustannusten kompensaatiosta; TEM/888/03.01.01/2016}},
url = {https://vatt.fi/documents/2956369/3204078/115{\_}07{\_}01{\_}2016{\_}lausunto.pdf},
year = {2016}
}
@article{Mattoo2012,
abstract = {This paper presents an analytical framework to encompass contributions to the literature on equity in climate change, and highlights the consequences—in terms of future emissions allocations—of different approaches to equity. These include: progressive cuts relative to historic levels; equal per capita emissions, historic responsibility, and ability to pay; and preserving future development opportunities. We show that because climate change goals dictate a stringent global carbon budget, each of the approaches to equity necessarily imposes large costs on at least some groups of countries.},
author = {Mattoo, Aaditya and Subramanian, Arvind},
doi = {10.1016/J.WORLDDEV.2011.11.007},
issn = {0305-750X},
journal = {World Development},
month = {jun},
number = {6},
pages = {1083--1097},
publisher = {Pergamon},
title = {{Equity in Climate Change: An Analytical Review}},
url = {https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0305750X11002919},
volume = {40},
year = {2012}
}
@article{Aldy2016,
abstract = {The Paris Agreement culminates a six-year transition towards an international climate policy architecture based on parties submitting national pledges every five years1. An important policy task will be to assess and compare these contributions2,3. We use four integrated assessment models to produce metrics of Paris Agreement pledges, and show differentiated effort across countries: wealthier countries pledge to undertake greater emission reductions with higher costs. The pledges fall in the lower end of the distributions of the social cost of carbon and the cost-minimizing path to limiting warming to 2 °C, suggesting insufficient global ambition in light of leaders' climate goals. Countries' marginal abatement costs vary by two orders of magnitude, illustrating that large efficiency gains are available through joint mitigation efforts and/or carbon price coordination. Marginal costs rise almost proportionally with income, but full policy costs reveal more complex regional patterns due to terms of trade effects.},
author = {Aldy, Joseph E. and Pizer, William and Tavoni, Massimo and Reis, Lara Aleluia and Akimoto, Keigo and Blanford, Geoffrey and Carraro, Carlo and Clarke, Leon E. and Edmonds, James and Iyer, Gokul C. and McJeon, Haewon C. and Richels, Richard and Rose, Steven and Sano, Fuminori},
doi = {10.1038/nclimate3106},
issn = {1758-678X},
journal = {Nature Climate Change},
keywords = {Climate,Environmental economics,change mitigation},
month = {nov},
number = {11},
pages = {1000--1004},
publisher = {Nature Publishing Group},
title = {{Economic tools to promote transparency and comparability in the Paris Agreement}},
url = {http://www.nature.com/articles/nclimate3106},
volume = {6},
year = {2016}
}
@article{Perino2018,
abstract = {The new rules of the EU ETS will fundamentally change its character. The long-term cap on emissions will become a function of past and future market outcomes, temporarily puncturing the waterbed and having retroactive impacts on GHG abatement from overlapping policies.},
author = {Perino, Grischa},
doi = {10.1038/s41558-018-0120-2},
file = {:home/juha/Lataukset/New Eu ETS.pdf:pdf},
issn = {1758-678X},
journal = {Nature Climate Change},
keywords = {Climate,Environmental economics,change mitigation,change policy},
month = {apr},
number = {4},
pages = {262--264},
publisher = {Nature Publishing Group},
title = {{New EU ETS Phase 4 rules temporarily puncture waterbed}},
url = {http://www.nature.com/articles/s41558-018-0120-2},
volume = {8},
year = {2018}
}
@article{Hart2008,
abstract = {How do technology spillovers affect the relationship between emissions taxes and technological change? Without spillovers, a regulator applies Pigovian taxes which lead to a first-best optimum (optimal emissions and optimal technology investment). Given spillovers, Pigovian taxes are likely to be second-best optimal if emissions-saving technology and production technology are equally undersupplied; raising taxes above the Pigovian level boosts emissions-saving investment, but only at the expense of production investment. The technologies are equally undersupplied when there is a degree of symmetry between the sectors, and the economy is on a balanced growth path. On a transition path with rising atmospheric stocks and a high level of investment in emissions-saving technology, a regulator may raise carbon taxes above the Pigovian level in order to encourage investment in emissions-saving technology at the expense of production technology. I show this using both analytical and numerical results.},
author = {Hart, Rob},
doi = {10.1016/j.jeem.2007.06.004},
issn = {00950696},
journal = {Journal of Environmental Economics and Management},
number = {2},
pages = {194--212},
title = {{The timing of taxes on CO2 emissions when technological change is endogenous}},
url = {https://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0095069607001088 https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0095069607001088},
volume = {55},
year = {2008}
}
@article{Takalo2014,
author = {Takalo, Tuomas},
file = {:home/juha/.local/share/data/Mendeley Ltd./Mendeley Desktop/Downloaded/Takalo - 2014 - Innovaatiopolitiikan haasteet.pdf:pdf},
journal = {Kansantaloudellinen aikakauskirja},
number = {3},
title = {{Innovaatiopolitiikan haasteet}},
url = {https://www.taloustieteellinenyhdistys.fi/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/KAK32014Takalo.pdf},
volume = {110},
year = {2014}
}
@article{Mont2005,
author = {Mont, Oksana and Dalhammar, Carl},
doi = {10.1504/IJSD.2005.009575},
issn = {0960-1406},
journal = {International Journal of Sustainable Development},
number = {4},
pages = {258},
title = {{Sustainable consumption: at the cross-road of environmental and consumer policies}},
url = {http://www.inderscience.com/link.php?id=9575},
volume = {8},
year = {2005}
}
@article{Costa2013,
abstract = {“Nudges” are being widely promoted to encourage energy conservation. We show that the popular electricity conservation “nudge” of providing feedback to households on own and peers' home electricity usage in a home electricity report is two to four times more effective with political liberals than with conservatives. Political conservatives are more likely than liberals to opt out of receiving the home electricity report and to report disliking the report. Our results suggest that energy conservation nudges need to be targeted to be most effective.},
author = {Costa, Dora L. and Kahn, Matthew E.},
doi = {10.1111/jeea.12011},
file = {:home/juha/.local/share/data/Mendeley Ltd./Mendeley Desktop/Downloaded/Costa, Kahn - 2013 - Energy Conservation “Nudges” and Environmentalist Ideology Evidence from a Randomized Residential Electricity F.pdf:pdf},
issn = {15424766},
journal = {Journal of the European Economic Association},
number = {3},
pages = {680--702},
title = {{Energy Conservation “Nudges” and Environmentalist Ideology: Evidence from a Randomized Residential Electricity Field Experiment}},
url = {https://academic.oup.com/jeea/article-lookup/doi/10.1111/jeea.12011 https://academic.oup.com/jeea/article/11/3/680/2300535},
volume = {11},
year = {2013}
}
@article{Allcott2014,
abstract = {We document three remarkable features of the Opower program, in which social comparison-based home energy reports are repeatedly mailed to more than six million households nationwide. First, initial reports cause high-frequency "action and backsliding," but these cycles attenuate over time. Second, if reports are discontinued after two years, effects are relatively persistent, decaying at 10-20 percent per year. Third, consumers are slow to habituate: they continue to respond to repeated treatment even after two years. We show that the previous conservative assumptions about post-intervention persistence had dramatically understated cost effectiveness and illustrate how empirical estimates can optimize program design.},
author = {Allcott, Hunt and Rogers, Todd},
doi = {10.1257/aer.104.10.3003},
issn = {0002-8282},
journal = {American Economic Review},
number = {10},
pages = {3003--37},
title = {{The Short-Run and Long-Run Effects of Behavioral Interventions: Experimental Evidence from Energy Conservation}},
url = {http://pubs.aeaweb.org/doi/10.1257/aer.104.10.3003 https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/aer.104.10.3003},
volume = {104},
year = {2014}
}
@techreport{Ekholm2015,
abstract = {One of the main principles in the UNFCCC is the recognition of parties' "common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities". Countries' past contributions to climate change or global greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions differ, which has prompted discussion over their historical responsibility for current and future climate change. This report first assesses the countries' contribution to historical GHG emissions using different scopes of time and emission sources, both as cumulative emissions and cumulatively on per-capita terms. The choice over the scope used affects the countries' contribution significantly. Whether emissions prior to 1990 are accounted affects particularly the contribution of USA, EU and China, whereas the inclusion of LULUCF emissions has a tremendous effect on the contribution of Brazil and Indonesia. When emissions are measured on per-capita terms, the contribution of e.g. Brazil and Indonesia can become significant, while that of EU is decreased considerably. Different assumptions hence lead to very different conclusions on countries' responsibilities for climate change. The report also analyses the possibility to define per-capita based emission budgets to countries, from which the historical emission would be subtracted. The choice of scope has again large implications for the countries' remaining budgets, but regardless of the choice, such an approach would lead to unrealistic emission pathways for USA and Russia, making it unclear whether such tonne-per-tonne accounting of historical emissions is reasonable in burden sharing. Therefore, to make historical responsibility a usable concept in climate negotiations, the scope of countries' accountability for past emissions should be first settled and efforts should be viewed in a broader context than that of direct emission reductions.},
author = {Ekholm, Tommi and Lindroos, Tomi J.},
file = {:home/juha/.local/share/data/Mendeley Ltd./Mendeley Desktop/Downloaded/Ekholm, Lindroos - 2015 - Assessing countries' historical contributions to GHG emissions.pdf:pdf},
institution = {VTT Technical Research Centre of Finland},
pages = {22},
title = {{Assessing countries' historical contributions to GHG emissions}},
url = {https://www.vtt.fi/inf/julkaisut/muut/2015/VTT-R-00139-15.pdf},
year = {2015}
}
@article{Wang2019,
abstract = {There is a great deal of evidence that climate change affects socioeconomic systems. The social cost of carbon (SCC) is calculated by scientists to monetarize the incremental unit of carbon emission and is used to assess climate policies. This study begins with a review of current research on the SCC, followed by a discussion of the choice of models for the SCC. We give a list of advantages of disadvantages of each model and finally use a meta-analysis to evaluate the SCC from published research. The main findings were as follows. (i) Integrated assessment models (IAMs) are often employed to assess the SCC, research on IAMs was started booming in the 1990s and slightly decreased after 2012. (ii) The estimated SCC ranges from −50 to 8752{\$}/tC (−13.36–2386.91{\$}/tCO2), with a mean value of 200.57{\$}/tC (54.70{\$}/tCO2) and it equals to 112.86{\$}/tC (30.78{\$}/tCO2) with a PRTP at 3{\%} in peer-reviewed studies. (iii) The estimated SCC is higher in newer publication year and in peer-reviewed studies, the same trend happens with a higher climatic sensitivity and employing DICE/RICE and PAGE. (iv) The pure rate of time preference (PRTP) is tightly associated with the estimated SCC, and a higher PRTP has a lower estimated SCC. (v) The outliers often appear without realistic scenario setting and in studies have not peer-reviewed.},
author = {Wang, Pei and Deng, Xiangzheng and Zhou, Huimin and Yu, Shangkun},
doi = {10.1016/J.JCLEPRO.2018.11.058},
issn = {0959-6526},
journal = {Journal of Cleaner Production},
month = {feb},
pages = {1494--1507},
publisher = {Elsevier},
title = {{Estimates of the social cost of carbon: A review based on meta-analysis}},
url = {https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0959652618334589},
volume = {209},
year = {2019}
}
@article{Ostrom1999,
abstract = {In a seminal paper, Garrett Hardin argued in 1968 that users of a commons are caught in an inevitable process that leads to the destruction of the resources on which they depend. This article discusses new insights about such problems and the conditions most likely to favor sustainable uses of common-pool resources. Some of the most difficult challenges concern the management of large-scale resources that depend on international cooperation, such as fresh water in international basins or large marine ecosystems. Institutional diversity may be as important as biological diversity for our long-term survival.},
author = {Ostrom, Elinor and Burger, Joanna and Field, Christopher B. and Norgaard, Richard B. and Policansky, David},
doi = {10.1126/science.284.5412.278},
file = {:home/juha/Lataukset/Ostrom{\_}etal1999.pdf:pdf},
issn = {0036-8075},
journal = {Science},
month = {apr},
number = {5364},
pages = {1243--1248},
pmid = {9563937},
publisher = {American Association for the Advancement of Science},
title = {{The Tragedy of the Commons}},
url = {http://science.sciencemag.org/content/284/5412/278},
volume = {162},
year = {1999}
}
@book{IPCCwg3ar5,
abstract = {Climate Change 2014: Mitigation of Climate Change is the third part of the Fifth Assessment Report (AR5) of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) — Climate Change 2013 / 2014 — and was prepared by its Working Group III. The volume provides a comprehensive and transparent assessment of relevant options for mitigating climate change through limiting or preventing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, as well as activities that reduce their concentrations in the atmosphere.},
author = {IPCC},
doi = {10.1017/CBO9781107415416},
editor = {{Edenhofer, O., R. Pichs-Madruga, Y. Sokona, E. Farahani, S. Kadner, K. Seyboth, A. Adler, I. Baum, S. Brunner, P. Eickemeier, B. Kriemann, J. Savolainen, S. Schl{\"{o}}mer, C. von Stechow}, T. Zwickel and J.C. Minx},
isbn = {9781107415416},
publisher = {Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York, NY, USA.},
title = {{Climate Change 2014: Mitigation of Climate Change. Contribution of Working Group III to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change}},
url = {https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/2018/02/ipcc{\_}wg3{\_}ar5{\_}full.pdf},
year = {2014}
}
@book{tiet06,
address = {Washington},
annote = {Alunperin julkaistu vuonna 1985.},
author = {Tietenberg, T H},
publisher = {RFF press},
title = {{Emission trading, Principles and Practice}},
year = {2006}
}
@misc{Barrett1994,
abstract = {Effective management of international environmental resources requires cooperation, and in practice cooperation is usually codified in international environmental agreements (IEAs). The essential feature of IEAs is that they cannot be enforced by a third party. This paper explores the properties of self-enforcing IEAs using two models. In one, the number of signatories, the terms of the agreement, and the actions of nonsignatories are determined jointly. In the other, the IEA is modelled as an infinitely repeated game, but one which is renegotiation-proof. Both models indicate that IEAs can do little to improve on the noncooperative outcome when the number of countries that share the resource is large.},
author = {Barrett, Scott},
booktitle = {Oxford Economic Papers},
doi = {10.2307/2663505},
pages = {878--894},
publisher = {Oxford University Press},
title = {{Self-Enforcing International Environmental Agreements}},
url = {https://www.jstor.org/stable/2663505},
volume = {46},
year = {1994}
}
@article{Gowdy2008,
abstract = {The policy recommendations of most economists are based on the rational actor model. The emphasis is on achieving efficient allocation by insuring that property rights are completely assigned and that market failures are corrected. This paper takes the position that so-called behavioral “anomalies” are central to human decision-making and, therefore, should be the starting point for effective economic policies. This contention is supported by game theory experiments involving humans and closely related primates. This research suggests that the standard economic approach to climate change policy, with its focus on narrowly rational, self-regarding responses to monetary incentives, is seriously flawed.},
author = {Gowdy, John M.},
doi = {10.1016/j.jebo.2008.06.011},
issn = {01672681},
journal = {Journal of Economic Behavior {\&} Organization},
number = {3-4},
pages = {632--644},
title = {{Behavioral economics and climate change policy}},
url = {https://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0167268108001364 https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167268108001364},
volume = {68},
year = {2008}
}
@book{IPCC2018,
abstract = {An IPCC Special Report on the impacts of global warming of 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels and related global greenhouse gas emission pathways, in the context of strengthening the global response to the threat of climate change, sustainable development, and efforts to eradicate poverty},
annote = {Stocker, Thomas F.
Qin, Dahe
Plattner, Gian Kasper
Tignor, Melinda M.B.
Allen, Simon K.
Boschung, Judith
Nauels, Alexander
Xia, Yu
Bex, Vincent
Midgley, Pauline M.},
author = {IPCC},
booktitle = {Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change},
publisher = {Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change},
title = {{Global warming of 1.5°C}},
url = {https://www.ipcc.ch/sr15/},
year = {2018}
}
@book{ipcc13,
author = {IPCC},
publisher = {Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change},
title = {{Climate Change 2013: The Physical Science Basis}},
year = {2013}
}
@book{Hanley2007,
abstract = {2nd ed. Economy-environment interactions -- The economics of sustainable development -- Market failure -- Incentive design -- Pollution taxes and tradable emission permits: theory into practice -- Transboundary pollution and global public goods -- Nonrenewable resources: Market structure and policy -- Nonrenewable resources: Scarcity, costs and externalities -- Renewable natural resources: The fishery -- Forestry economics -- Theory and methods for environmental valuation.},
author = {Hanley, Nick and Shogren, Jason F. and White, Ben},
edition = {2nd ed.},
isbn = {9780333971376},
keywords = {Hanley2007},
pages = {459},
publisher = {Palgrave Macmillan, New York, N.Y.},
title = {{Environmental economics : in theory and practice}},
type = {Book},
url = {https://catalogue.nla.gov.au/Record/3852010},
year = {2007}
}
@article{Hsiang2018,
author = {Hsiang, Solomon and Kopp, Robert E.},
doi = {10.1257/jep.32.4.3},
file = {:home/juha/.local/share/data/Mendeley Ltd./Mendeley Desktop/Downloaded/Hsiang, Kopp - 2018 - An Economist{\&}{\#}039s Guide to Climate Change Science.pdf:pdf;:home/juha/.local/share/data/Mendeley Ltd./Mendeley Desktop/Downloaded/Hsiang, Kopp - 2018 - An Economist{\&}{\#}039s Guide to Climate Change Science(2).pdf:pdf},
issn = {0895-3309},
journal = {Journal of Economic Perspectives},
number = {4},
pages = {3--32},
title = {{An Economist's Guide to Climate Change Science}},
url = {https://pubs.aeaweb.org/doi/10.1257/jep.32.4.3 https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/jep.32.4.3},
volume = {32},
year = {2018}
}
@article{Böhringer2016,
abstract = {Since the mid-1990's the European Union (EU) aims at pushing global climate policy. The objective is to promote international cooperation by the adoption of substantial EU-wide greenhouse gas emission reduction targets and their least-cost implementation. Our quantitative impact assessment of the EU Climate and Energy Package shows that the myriad of instruments used in the EU to curb greenhouse gas emissions is doomed to generate substantial excess cost. We conclude that EU climate and energy policy should better disentangle its choices of objectives, targets, and policy instruments on rigorous economic grounds in order to improve the coherence and overall cost-effectiveness of policy initiatives.},
author = {B{\"{o}}hringer, Christoph and Keller, Andreas and Bortolamedi, Markus and {Rahmeier Seyffarth}, Anelise},
doi = {10.1016/J.ENPOL.2015.12.034},
issn = {0301-4215},
journal = {Energy Policy},
month = {jul},
pages = {502--508},
publisher = {Elsevier},
title = {{Good things do not always come in threes: On the excess cost of overlapping regulation in EU climate policy}},
url = {https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0301421515302470},
volume = {94},
year = {2016}
}
@article{Allcott2011,
abstract = {This paper evaluates a series of programs run by a company called OPOWER to send Home Energy Report letters to residential utility customers comparing their electricity use to that of their neighbors. Using data from randomized natural field experiments at 600,000 treatment and control households across the United States, I estimate that the average program reduces energy consumption by 2.0{\%}. The program provides additional evidence that non-price interventions can substantially and cost effectively change consumer behavior: the effect is equivalent to that of a short-run electricity price increase of 11 to 20{\%}, and the cost effectiveness compares favorably to that of traditional energy conservation programs. Perhaps because the treatment included descriptive social norms, effects are heterogeneous: households in the highest decile of pre-treatment consumption decrease usage by 6.3{\%}, while consumption by the lowest decile decreases by only 0.3{\%}. A regression discontinuity design shows that different categories of “injunctive norms” played an insignificant role in encouraging relatively low users not to increase usage.},
author = {Allcott, Hunt},
doi = {10.1016/J.JPUBECO.2011.03.003},
issn = {0047-2727},
journal = {Journal of Public Economics},
month = {oct},
number = {9-10},
pages = {1082--1095},
publisher = {North-Holland},
title = {{Social norms and energy conservation}},
url = {https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0047272711000478},
volume = {95},
year = {2011}
}
@techreport{Itkonen2009,
annote = {Keskustelualoite 3/2009, Valtiovarainministeri{\"{o}}},
author = {Itkonen, Juha V. A.},
institution = {Valtiovarainministeri{\"{o}}},
number = {3/2009},
pages = {121},
series = {Keskustelualoite},
title = {{P{\"{a}}{\"{a}}st{\"{o}}kauppaj{\"{a}}rjestelmien linkitt{\"{a}}misen ilmastopoliittiset vaikutukset}},
year = {2009}
}
@article{Gillingham2018,
author = {Gillingham, Kenneth and Stock, James H.},
doi = {10.1257/jep.32.4.53},
file = {:home/juha/.local/share/data/Mendeley Ltd./Mendeley Desktop/Downloaded/Gillingham, Stock - 2018 - The Cost of Reducing Greenhouse Gas Emissions.pdf:pdf},
issn = {0895-3309},
journal = {Journal of Economic Perspectives},
number = {4},
pages = {53--72},
title = {{The Cost of Reducing Greenhouse Gas Emissions}},
url = {https://pubs.aeaweb.org/doi/10.1257/jep.32.4.53 https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/jep.32.4.53},
volume = {32},
year = {2018}
}
@phdthesis{Magnusson2017,
abstract = {This thesis consists of three essays on the use of economic instruments in environmental policy. The first essay analyses the case for interstate cooperation in environmental taxation while the second and the third essays study questions specific to the use of economic instruments in climate change mitigation. The first essay analyses the incentives of national governments to cooperate in regulating pollutants that spill over jurisdictional boundaries. A well-established result within the literature that assumes perfect competition is that a country, which is small in the sense that it cannot affect world prices, has no incentive to depart from the cooperative choice of environmental regulation. By generalising the model presented by Oates and Schwab (1987, 1988) it is shown that this result does not hold for pollutants that have regional or global characteristics, as e.g. sulphur dioxide (SO2) and carbon dioxide (CO2) have. The second essay demonstrates a methodology for analysing the progress and failure of projects in the CDM. It models the hazard of first issuance. Integrated over duration, the hazard of first issuance gives the time to market, defined as the duration between the start of the Global Stakeholder Process and the first issuance of Certified Emissions Reductions (CERs). It is shown that 50$\backslash${\%} of all projects which have started the Global Stakeholder Process fail to issue CERs, while the remainder has a median time to market of 4 years. The third essay illustrates a paradox in which overlapping climate policy instruments may have the unintended consequence of accelerating rather than decelerating global warming. The insight follows from a dynamic model, where a quota obligation for power generated from renewables is introduced alongside a carbon budget. A dynamic model allows to study how the schedule at which the carbon budget is exhausted is affected by the quota obligation. The exhaustion schedule determines the global temperature response.},
author = {Magnusson, Roland},
school = {University of Helsinki},
title = {{Essays on Economic Instruments for the Control of Environmental Externalities}},
type = {Doctoral dissertation},
url = {https://helda.helsinki.fi/handle/10138/228747},
year = {2017}
}
@article{Nordhaus2015,
author = {Nordhaus, William D.},
doi = {10.1257/aer.15000001},
file = {:home/juha/.local/share/data/Mendeley Ltd./Mendeley Desktop/Downloaded/Nordhaus - 2015 - Climate Clubs Overcoming Free-Riding in International Climate Policy.pdf:pdf},
issn = {0002-8282},
journal = {American Economic Review},
number = {4},
pages = {1339--70},
title = {{Climate Clubs: Overcoming Free-Riding in International Climate Policy}},
url = {http://pubs.aeaweb.org/doi/10.1257/aer.15000001 https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/aer.15000001 https://ideas.repec.org/a/aea/aecrev/v105y2015i4p1339-70.html},
volume = {105},
year = {2015}
}
@article{Calel2016,
abstract = {Abstract This paper investigates the impact of the European Union Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) on technological change, exploiting installations level inclusion criteria to estimate the System's causal impact on firms' patenting. We find that the EU ETS has increased low-carbon innovation among regulated firms by as much as 10{\%}, while not crowding out patenting for other technologies. We also find evidence that the EU ETS has not affected patenting beyond the set of regulated companies. These results imply that the EU ETS accounts for nearly a 1{\%} increase in European low-carbon patenting compared to a counterfactual scenario.},
author = {Calel, Raphael and Dechezlepr{\^{e}}tre, Antoine},
doi = {10.1162/REST_a_00470},
issn = {0034-6535},
journal = {Review of Economics and Statistics},
month = {mar},
number = {1},
pages = {173--191},
publisher = {The MIT Press},
title = {{Environmental Policy and Directed Technological Change: Evidence from the European Carbon Market}},
url = {http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/10.1162/REST{\_}a{\_}00470},
volume = {98},
year = {2016}
}
@article{Schultz2007,
abstract = {Despite a long tradition of effectiveness in laboratory tests, normative messages have had mixed success in changing behavior in field contexts, with some studies showing boomerang effects. To test a theoretical account of this inconsistency, we conducted a field experiment in which normative messages were used to promote household energy conservation. As predicted, a descriptive normative message detailing average neighborhood usage produced either desirable energy savings or the undesirable boomerang effect, depending on whether households were already consuming at a low or high rate. Also as predicted, adding an injunctive message (conveying social approval or disapproval) eliminated the boomerang effect. The results offer an explanation for the mixed success of persuasive appeals based on social norms and suggest how such appeals should be properly crafted.},
annote = {From Duplicate 2 (The Constructive, Destructive, and Reconstructive Power of Social Norms - Schultz, P. Wesley; Nolan, Jessica M.; Cialdini, Robert B.; Goldstein, Noah J.; Griskevicius, Vladas)
10.1111/j.1467-9280.2007.01917.x},
author = {Schultz, P. Wesley and Nolan, Jessica M. and Cialdini, Robert B. and Goldstein, Noah J. and Griskevicius, Vladas},
doi = {10.1111/j.1467-9280.2007.01917.x},
file = {:home/juha/.local/share/data/Mendeley Ltd./Mendeley Desktop/Downloaded/Schultz et al. - 2007 - The Constructive, Destructive, and Reconstructive Power of Social Norms.pdf:pdf},
issn = {0956-7976},
journal = {Psychological Science},
month = {may},
number = {5},
pages = {429--434},
title = {{The Constructive, Destructive, and Reconstructive Power of Social Norms}},
url = {http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1111/j.1467-9280.2007.01917.x https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1467-9280.2007.01917.x http://pss.sagepub.com/content/18/5/429.abstract https://www.jsmf.org/meetings/2008/july/social norms Cialdini.pdf},
volume = {18},
year = {2007}
}
@unpublished{VTV2015,
author = {VTV},
file = {:home/juha/.local/share/data/Mendeley Ltd./Mendeley Desktop/Downloaded/Valtiontalouden tarkastusvirasto - 2015 - Laillisuustarkastuskertomus Budjetointimenettelyt.pdf:pdf},
institution = {Valtiontalouden tarkastusvirasto},
number = {15/2015},
series = {Valtiontalouden tarkastusviraston tarkastuskertomus},
title = {{Laillisuustarkastuskertomus: Budjetointimenettelyt}},
url = {https://www.vtv.fi/app/uploads/2018/06/04082313/budjetointimenettelyt-15-2015.pdf},
year = {2015}
}
@article{hahn84,
abstract = {The appeal of using markets as a means of allocating scarce resources stems in large part from the assumption that a market will approximate the competitive ideal. When competition is not a foregone conclusion, the question naturally arises as to how a firm might manipulate the market to its own advantage. This paper analyzes the issue of market power in the context of markets for transferable property rights. First, a model is developed that explains how a single firm with market power might exercise its influence. This is followed by an examination of the model in the context of a particular policy problem--the control of particulate sulfates in the Los Angeles region.},
author = {Hahn, Robert W},
doi = {10.2307/1883124},
journal = {The Quarterly Journal of Economics},
number = {4},
pages = {753--765},
title = {{Market Power and Transferable Property Rights}},
url = {https://www.jstor.org/stable/1883124},
volume = {99},
year = {1984}
}
@article{Aldy2010,
author = {Aldy, Joseph E. and Krupnick, Alan J. and Newell, Richard G. and Parry, Ian W. H. and Pizer, William A.},
doi = {10.1257/jel.48.4.903},
file = {:home/juha/Dropbox/README/Designing climate mitigation policies.pdf:pdf},
issn = {0022-0515},
journal = {Journal of Economic Literature},
number = {4},
pages = {903--34},
title = {{Designing Climate Mitigation Policy}},
url = {http://pubs.aeaweb.org/doi/10.1257/jel.48.4.903 https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/jel.48.4.903},
volume = {48},
year = {2010}
}
@article{Diffenbaugh2019,
abstract = {{\textless}p{\textgreater}Understanding the causes of economic inequality is critical for achieving equitable economic development. To investigate whether global warming has affected the recent evolution of inequality, we combine counterfactual historical temperature trajectories from a suite of global climate models with extensively replicated empirical evidence of the relationship between historical temperature fluctuations and economic growth. Together, these allow us to generate probabilistic country-level estimates of the influence of anthropogenic climate forcing on historical economic output. We find very high likelihood that anthropogenic climate forcing has increased economic inequality between countries. For example, per capita gross domestic product (GDP) has been reduced 17–31{\%} at the poorest four deciles of the population-weighted country-level per capita GDP distribution, yielding a ratio between the top and bottom deciles that is 25{\%} larger than in a world without global warming. As a result, although between-country inequality has decreased over the past half century, there is ∼90{\%} likelihood that global warming has slowed that decrease. The primary driver is the parabolic relationship between temperature and economic growth, with warming increasing growth in cool countries and decreasing growth in warm countries. Although there is uncertainty in whether historical warming has benefited some temperate, rich countries, for most poor countries there is {\textgreater}90{\%} likelihood that per capita GDP is lower today than if global warming had not occurred. Thus, our results show that, in addition to not sharing equally in the direct benefits of fossil fuel use, many poor countries have been significantly harmed by the warming arising from wealthy countries' energy consumption.{\textless}/p{\textgreater}},
author = {Diffenbaugh, Noah S. and Burke, Marshall},
doi = {10.1073/pnas.1816020116},
file = {:home/juha/.local/share/data/Mendeley Ltd./Mendeley Desktop/Downloaded/Diffenbaugh, Burke - 2019 - Global warming has increased global economic inequality.pdf:pdf},
issn = {0027-8424},
journal = {Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences},
month = {apr},
pages = {201816020},
publisher = {National Academy of Sciences},
title = {{Global warming has increased global economic inequality}},
url = {http://www.pnas.org/lookup/doi/10.1073/pnas.1816020116},
year = {2019}
}
@techreport{Seppälä2009,
abstract = {Tutkimuksessa selvitettiin Suomen tuotannon ja kulutuksen elinkaariset ymp{\"{a}}rist{\"{o}}vaikutukset toimialoittain ja tuoteryhmitt{\"{a}}in vuosina 2002 ja 2005. Hankkeen tuloksena syntyi ENVIMAT- malli, jolla voidaan arvioida materiaalivirtojen, ymp{\"{a}}rist{\"{o}}vaikutusten ja taloudellisten vaikutusten v{\"{a}}lisi{\"{a}} suhteita. Malli edustaa ns. ymp{\"{a}}rist{\"{o}}laajennettua panos-tuotosty{\"{o}}kalua, jossa perustana ovat taloudelliset panos-tuotostaulukot yhdistettyn{\"{a}} elinkaarisiin ymp{\"{a}}rist{\"{o}}vaikutuksiin. Suomelle tehty ENVIMAT-malli mahdollistaa tuotanto- ja kulutusl{\"{a}}ht{\"{o}}isen ymp{\"{a}}rist{\"{o}}vaikutusten analysoinnin siten, ett{\"{a}} ty{\"{o}}llisyys- ja arvonlis{\"{a}}ysvaikutukset ovat samanaikaisesti mukana. Kotimaisten ymp{\"{a}}rist{\"{o}}vaikutusten lis{\"{a}}ksi on arvioitu tuonnin aiheuttamat vaikutukset ulkomailla poikkeuksellisen kattavasti. Suomen tuotannon elinkaarisista vaikutuksista viennin osuus on eritelty jokaisen toimialan kohdalla. Suomalaisten kulutusta on tarkasteltu sek{\"{a}} yksityisen ett{\"{a}} julkisen kulutuksen kannalta. Hankkeen laajasta tulosaineistosta mainittakoon, ett{\"{a}} Suomi aiheuttaa puolet ymp{\"{a}}rist{\"{o}}vaikutuksistaan rajojensa ulkopuolella tuontituotteiden valmistuksen kautta. Ilmastovaikutusten kannalta ulkomailla tapahtuvat p{\"{a}}{\"{a}}st{\"{o}}t ovat noin 70-80 {\%} kotimaan p{\"{a}}{\"{a}}st{\"{o}}ist{\"{a}}, useiden muiden ymp{\"{a}}rist{\"{o}}vaikutuksien kohdalla osuus on viel{\"{a}}kin suurempi. Samalla Suomi k{\"{a}}ytt{\"{a}}{\"{a}} yht{\"{a}} paljon ulkomaisia luonnonvaroja kuin kotimaisia. Kotimaan kulutus ja investoinnit (ns. loppuk{\"{a}}ytt{\"{o}}) aiheuttavat runsaat puolet kansantaloutemme elinkaarisista ymp{\"{a}}rist{\"{o}}vaikutuksista. Vajaa puolet Suomen ymp{\"{a}}rist{\"{o}}vaikutuksista kohdentuu vientituotteille. Ilmastonmuutoksen osalta kotimaan loppuk{\"{a}}ytt{\"{o}} aiheuttaa hieman vientiteollisuutta suuremmat vaikutukset. Suurin osa kotimaisen kulutuksen vaikutuksista aiheutuu asumisen, ravinnon ja yksityisautoilun kautta. Kiinteist{\"{o}}palveluiden, julkisen liikenteen ja muiden palveluiden osuus kotimaan loppuk{\"{a}}yt{\"{o}}n ymp{\"{a}}rist{\"{o}}vaikutuksista on noin 40{\%}. ENVIMAT- mallin avulla voidaan laatia nopeasti karkeita elinkaaripohjaisia ymp{\"{a}}rist{\"{o}}vaikutusarvioita erilaisille tuotteille tai tuoteryhmille. Erityisen{\"{a}} sovellusalueena l{\"{a}}hitulevaisuudessa on hiilijalanj{\"{a}}lkilaskelmat. Mallia voidaan k{\"{a}}ytt{\"{a}}{\"{a}} eri toimintojen seurausvaikutusten kartoittamiseen sek{\"{a}} tuoteketjujen ett{\"{a}} kansantalouden tasoilla. Jatkossa mallia suunnitellaan k{\"{a}}ytett{\"{a}}v{\"{a}}ksi ajallisen kehityksen tarkasteluun, kest{\"{a}}v{\"{a}}n kehityksen seurantaan, ilmastonmuutoksen hillint{\"{a}}toimenpiteiden suunnitteluun sek{\"{a}} eri muutostekij{\"{o}}iden tunnistamiseen ja vaikutusarviointiin.},
author = {Sepp{\"{a}}l{\"{a}}, Jyri and M{\"{a}}enp{\"{a}}{\"{a}}, Ilmo and Koskela, Sirkka and Mattila, Tuomas and Nissinen, Ari and Katajajuuri, Juha-Matti and H{\"{a}}rm{\"{a}}, Tiina and Korhonen, Marja-Riitta and Saarinen, Merja and Virtanen, Yrj{\"{o}}},
file = {:home/juha/.local/share/data/Mendeley Ltd./Mendeley Desktop/Downloaded/Sepp{\"{a}}l{\"{a}} et al. - 2009 - Suomen kansantalouden materiaalivirtojen ymp{\"{a}}rist{\"{o}}vaikutusten arviointi ENVIMAT-mallilla.pdf:pdf},
isbn = {978-952-11-3460-9},
number = {20/2009},
publisher = {Suomen ymp{\"{a}}rist{\"{o}}keskus},
series = {Suomen ymp{\"{a}}rist{\"{o}}},
title = {{Suomen kansantalouden materiaalivirtojen ymp{\"{a}}rist{\"{o}}vaikutusten arviointi ENVIMAT-mallilla}},
url = {https://helda.helsinki.fi/handle/10138/38010},
year = {2009}
}
@book{croc66,
annote = {Ref. Hanley et al. (2006).
New York},
author = {Crocker, T D},
booktitle = {The Economics of Air Pollution},
publisher = {W.W. Norton},
title = {{The Structuring of Atmospheric Pollution Control Systems}},
year = {1966}
}
@article{Grubb2011,
abstract = {The reality of trying to raise substantial long-term revenues for international climate finance, including the outcome of the High-Level Advisory Group on Climate Change Financing, is revealing the need for fresh thinking on finance sources which takes account of political realities. Particularly after the credit crunch, it will be very difficult to raise all the international finance required from sources that have clear national identity and are presently under the control of finance ministries in the OECD countries. This article argues that the revenue associated with charging for the carbon embodied in the international trade of carbon-intensive commodities is an option with attractive properties. The article explains this option of WTO-compatible ‘border carbon cost levelling', indicates potential revenues from its application to key carbon-intensive commodities, and outlines the potential ethical and political economy attractions of the option.},
author = {Grubb, Michael},
doi = {10.1080/14693062.2011.582285},
issn = {1469-3062},
journal = {Climate Policy},
number = {3},
pages = {1050--1057},
title = {{International climate finance from border carbon cost levelling}},
url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/14693062.2011.582285 https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/14693062.2011.582285},
volume = {11},
year = {2011}
}
@article{Parry2010,
abstract = {1. Public Economics - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - Incidence 2. Public Economics - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes 3. Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological - Energy - Government Policy 4. Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological - Environmental Economics - Climate; Natural Disasters; Global Warming 5. Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological - Environmental Economics - Government Policy},
author = {Parry, Ian W. H. and Williams, R. C.},
file = {:home/juha/.local/share/data/Mendeley Ltd./Mendeley Desktop/Downloaded/Parry, Williams - 2010 - What are the costs of meeting distributional objectives for climate policy.pdf:pdf},
journal = {BE Journal of Economic Analysis {\&} Policy},
keywords = {Environmental and Energy Economics,Public Economi},
title = {{What are the costs of meeting distributional objectives for climate policy?}},
url = {http://www.degruyter.com/view/j/bejeap.2010.10.issue-2/bejeap.2010.10.2.2552/bejeap.2010.10.2.2552.xml},
year = {2010}
}
@article{Goulder2011,
author = {Goulder, Lawrence H. and Stavins, Robert N.},
doi = {10.2307/29783749},
journal = {The American Economic Review},
number = {3},
pages = {253--257},
publisher = {American Economic Association},
title = {{Challenges from State-Federal Interactions in US Climate Change Policy}},
url = {https://www.jstor.org/stable/29783749},
volume = {101},
year = {2011}
}
@article{Bretschger2013,
abstract = {{\textless}p{\textgreater}The paper argues that negotiation costs can prevent the international community from finding a new international climate agreement. To define a feasible way of facilitating the negotiation process, I analyze basic equity principles and their relationship to climate policy and economic development. Based on the most relevant principles, I propose a general synthetic rule for burden sharing in international climate policy. The rule avoids complexity and comprises both egalitarian and cost-sharing aspects, which appears to be crucial for achieving a climate agreement. Carbon budgets for the different countries are calculated under different parameter assumptions.{\textless}/p{\textgreater}},
author = {Bretschger, Lucas},
doi = {10.1017/S1355770X13000284},
issn = {1355-770X},
journal = {Environment and Development Economics},
month = {oct},
number = {5},
pages = {517--536},
publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
title = {{Climate policy and equity principles: fair burden sharing in a dynamic world}},
url = {https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/identifier/S1355770X13000284/type/journal{\_}article},
volume = {18},
year = {2013}
}
@article{Newell2003,
author = {Newell, Richard G. and Stavins, Robert N.},
doi = {10.1023/A:1021879330491},
issn = {0922680X},
journal = {Journal of Regulatory Economics},
number = {1},
pages = {43--59},
publisher = {Kluwer Academic Publishers},
title = {{Cost Heterogeneity and the Potential Savings from Market-Based Policies}},
url = {http://link.springer.com/10.1023/A:1021879330491},
volume = {23},
year = {2003}
}
@book{ipcc07b,
author = {IPCC},
publisher = {Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change},
title = {{2006 IPCC Guidelines for National Greenhouse Gas Inventories, Volume 2: Energy}},
year = {2006}
}
@incollection{Stavins2003,
abstract = {Environmental policies typically combine the identification of a goal with some means to achieve that goal. This chapter focuses exclusively on the second component, the means – the “instruments” – of environmental policy, and considers, in particular, experience around the world with the relatively new breed of economic-incentive or market-based policy instruments. I define these instruments broadly, and consider them within four categories: charge systems; tradable permits; market friction reductions; and government subsidy reductions. Within charge systems, I consider effluent charges, deposit-refund systems, user charges, insurance premium taxes, sales taxes, administrative charges, and tax differentiation. Within tradeable permit systems, I consider both credit programs and cap-and-trade systems. Under the heading of reducing market frictions, I examine market creation, liability rules, and information programs. Finally, under reducing government subsidies, I review a number of specific examples from around the world. By defining market-based instruments broadly, I cast a large net for this review of applications. As a consequence, the review is extensive. But this should not leave the impression that market-based instruments have replaced, or have come anywhere close to replacing, the conventional, command-and-control approach to environmental protection. Further, even where these approaches have been used in their purest form and with some success, such as in the case of tradeable-permit systems in the United States, they have not always performed as anticipated. In the final part of the chapter, I ask what lessons can be learned from our experiences. In particular, I consider normative lessons for design and implementation, analysis of prospective and adopted systems, and identification of new applications.},
author = {Stavins, Robert N.},
booktitle = {Handbook of Environmental Economics},
doi = {10.1016/S1574-0099(03)01014-3},
file = {:home/juha/Dropbox/README/Hanbook of Envionmental economics/Stavins{\_}2003{\_}Handbook-of-Environmental-Economics.pdf:pdf},
isbn = {9780444500632},
month = {jan},
pages = {355--435},
publisher = {Elsevier},
title = {{Experience with Market-Based Environmental Policy Instruments}},
url = {https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1574009903010143},
volume = {1},
year = {2003}
}
@article{coas60,
abstract = {This paper is concerned with those actions of business firms which have harmful effects on others. The standard example is that of a factory the smoke from which has harmful effects on those occupying neighboring properties. The economic analysis of such a situation has usually proceeded in terms of a divergence between the private and social product of the factory, in which economists have largely followed the treatment of Pigou in The Economics of Welfare. The conclusions to which this kind of analysis seems to have led most economists is that it would be desirable to make the owner of the factory liable for the damage caused to those injured by the smoke, or alternatively, to place a tax on the factory owner varying with the amount of smoke produced and equivalent in money terms to the damage it would cause, or finally, to exclude the factory from residential districts (and presumably from other areas in which the emission of smoke would have harmful effects on others). It is my contention that the suggested courses of action are inappropriate, in that they lead to results which are not necessarily, or even usually, desirable.},
annote = {From Duplicate 1 (
The Problem of Social Cost
- Coase, Ronald H )
From Duplicate 1 (
The Problem of Social Cost
- Coase, R H )
},
author = {Coase, Ronald H},
chapter = {5},
doi = {10.1086/466560},
editor = {MacNeilage, P F},
issn = {00222186},
journal = {The Journal of Law and Economics},
number = {1},
pages = {1--44},
publisher = {UChicago Press},
title = {{The Problem of Social Cost}},
url = {http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/abs/10.1086/466560},
volume = {3},
year = {1960}
}
@article{Ambec2013,
author = {Ambec, S. and Cohen, M. A. and Elgie, S. and Lanoie, P.},
doi = {10.1093/reep/res016},
issn = {1750-6816},
journal = {Review of Environmental Economics and Policy},
keywords = {Ambec2013},
month = {jan},
number = {1},
pages = {2--22},
publisher = {Narnia},
title = {{The Porter Hypothesis at 20: Can Environmental Regulation Enhance Innovation and Competitiveness?}},
url = {https://academic.oup.com/reep/article-lookup/doi/10.1093/reep/res016},
volume = {7},
year = {2013}
}
@article{Brekke2008,
abstract = {This paper attempts to bring some central insights from behavioural economics into the economics of climate change. In particular, it discusses (i) implications of prospect theory, the equity premium puzzle, and time-inconsistent preferences in the choice of discount rate used in climate-change cost assessments, and (ii) the implications of various kinds of social preferences for the outcome of climate negotiations. Several reasons are presented for why it appears advisable to choose a substantially lower social discount rate than the average return on investments. It also seems likely that taking social preferences into account increases the possibilities of obtaining international agreements, compared to the standard model. However, there are also effects going in the opposite direction, and the importance of sanctions is emphasized.},
author = {Brekke, Kjell Arne and Johansson-Stenman, Olof},
doi = {10.1093/oxrep/grn012},