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fp56.txt
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THE SECOND charge against the House of Representatives is, that it will
be too small to possess a due knowledge of the interests of its constituents.
As this objection evidently proceeds from a comparison of the proposed
number of representatives with the great extent of the United States,
the number of their inhabitants, and the diversity of their interests,
without taking into view at the same time the circumstances which will
distinguish the Congress from other legislative bodies, the best answer
that can be given to it will be a brief explanation of these peculiarities.
It is a sound and important principle that the representative ought to
be acquainted with the interests and circumstances of his constituents.
But this principle can extend no further than to those circumstances and
interests to which the authority and care of the representative relate.
An ignorance of a variety of minute and particular objects, which do not
lie within the compass of legislation, is consistent with every attribute
necessary to a due performance of the legislative trust. In determining
the extent of information required in the exercise of a particular authority,
recourse then must be had to the objects within the purview of that authority.
What are to be the objects of federal legislation? Those which are of
most importance, and which seem most to require local knowledge, are commerce,
taxation, and the militia. A proper regulation of commerce requires much
information, as has been elsewhere remarked; but as far as this information
relates to the laws and local situation of each individual State, a very
few representatives would be very sufficient vehicles of it to the federal
councils. Taxation will consist, in a great measure, of duties which will
be involved in the regulation of commerce. So far the preceding remark
is applicable to this object. As far as it may consist of internal collections,
a more diffusive knowledge of the circumstances of the State may be necessary.
But will not this also be possessed in sufficient degree by a very few
intelligent men, diffusively elected within the State? Divide the largest
State into ten or twelve districts, and it will be found that there will
be no peculiar local interests in either, which will not be within the
knowledge of the representative of the district. Besides this source of
information, the laws of the State, framed by representatives from every
part of it, will be almost of themselves a sufficient guide. In every
State there have been made, and must continue to be made, regulations
on this subject which will, in many cases, leave little more to be done
by the federal legislature, than to review the different laws, and reduce
them in one general act. A skillful individual in his closet with all
the local codes before him, might compile a law on some subjects of taxation
for the whole union, without any aid from oral information, and it may
be expected that whenever internal taxes may be necessary, and particularly
in cases requiring uniformity throughout the States, the more simple objects
will be preferred. To be fully sensible of the facility which will be
given to this branch of federal legislation by the assistance of the State
codes, we need only suppose for a moment that this or any other State
were divided into a number of parts, each having and exercising within
itself a power of local legislation. Is it not evident that a degree of
local information and preparatory labor would be found in the several
volumes of their proceedings, which would very much shorten the labors
of the general legislature, and render a much smaller number of members
sufficient for it? The federal councils will derive great advantage from
another circumstance. The representatives of each State will not only
bring with them a considerable knowledge of its laws, and a local knowledge
of their respective districts, but will probably in all cases have been
members, and may even at the very time be members, of the State legislature,
where all the local information and interests of the State are assembled,
and from whence they may easily be conveyed by a very few hands into the
legislature of the United States. The observations made on the subject
of taxation apply with greater force to the case of the militia. For however
different the rules of discipline may be in different States, they are
the same throughout each particular State; and depend on circumstances
which can differ but little in different parts of the same State. The
attentive reader will discern that the reasoning here used, to prove the
sufficiency of a moderate number of representatives, does not in any respect
contradict what was urged on another occasion with regard to the extensive
information which the representatives ought to possess, and the time that
might be necessary for acquiring it. This information, so far as it may
relate to local objects, is rendered necessary and difficult, not by a
difference of laws and local circumstances within a single State, but
of those among different States. Taking each State by itself, its laws
are the same, and its interests but little diversified. A few men, therefore,
will possess all the knowledge requisite for a proper representation of
them. Were the interests and affairs of each individual State perfectly
simple and uniform, a knowledge of them in one part would involve a knowledge
of them in every other, and the whole State might be competently represented
by a single member taken from any part of it. On a comparison of the different
States together, we find a great dissimilarity in their laws, and in many
other circumstances connected with the objects of federal legislation,
with all of which the federal representatives ought to have some acquaintance.
Whilst a few representatives, therefore, from each State, may bring with
them a due knowledge of their own State, every representative will have
much information to acquire concerning all the other States. The changes of time, as was formerly remarked, on the comparative situation
of the different States, will have an assimilating effect. The effect
of time on the internal affairs of the States, taken singly, will be just
the contrary. At present some of the States are little more than a society
of husbandmen. Few of them have made much progress in those branches of
industry which give a variety and complexity to the affairs of a nation.
These, however, will in all of them be the fruits of a more advanced population,
and will require, on the part of each State, a fuller representation.
The foresight of the convention has accordingly taken care that the progress
of population may be accompanied with a proper increase of the representative
branch of the government. The experience of Great Britain, which presents
to mankind so many political lessons, both of the monitory and exemplary
kind, and which has been frequently consulted in the course of these inquiries,
corroborates the result of the reflections which we have just made. The
number of inhabitants in the two kingdoms of England and Scotland cannot
be stated at less than eight millions. The representatives of these eight
millions in the House of Commons amount to five hundred and fifty-eight. Of this number, one ninth are elected by three hundred and sixty-four
persons, and one half, by five thousand seven hundred and twenty-three
persons. [1] It cannot be supposed that the half thus elected, and who
do not even reside among the people at large, can add any thing either
to the security of the people against the government, or to the knowledge
of their circumstances and interests in the legislative councils. On the
contrary, it is notorious, that they are more frequently the representatives
and instruments of the executive magistrate, than the guardians and advocates
of the popular rights. They might therefore, with great propriety, be
considered as something more than a mere deduction from the real representatives
of the nation. We will, however, consider them in this light alone, and
will not extend the deduction to a considerable number of others, who
do not reside among their constituents, are very faintly connected with
them, and have very little particular knowledge of their affairs. With
all these concessions, two hundred and seventy-nine persons only will
be the depository of the safety, interest, and happiness of eight millions
that is to say, there will be one representative only to maintain the
rights and explain the situation OF TWENTY-EIGHT THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED
AND SEVENTY constituents, in an assembly exposed to the whole force of
executive influence, and extending its authority to every object of legislation
within a nation whose affairs are in the highest degree diversified and
complicated. Yet it is very certain, not only that a valuable portion
of freedom has been preserved under all these circumstances, but that
the defects in the British code are chargeable, in a very small proportion,
on the ignorance of the legislature concerning the circumstances of the
people. Allowing to this case the weight which is due to it, and comparing
it with that of the House of Representatives as above explained it seems
to give the fullest assurance, that a representative for every THIRTY
THOUSAND INHABITANTS will render the latter both a safe and competent
guardian of the interests which will be confided to it.