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+# MSC4174: Web Push pusher kind
+
+As stated in [MSC3013](https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-spec-proposals/pull/3013), a first MSC about push notification encryption, that the present MSC is to replace:
+
+Push notifications have the problem that they typically go through third-party push providers in order to be delivered,
+e.g. FCM (Google) or APNs (Apple) and a push gateway (sygnal). In order to prevent these push providers and
+push gateways from being able to read any sensitive information the `event_id_only` format was introduced, which only
+pushes the `event_id` and `room_id` of an event down the push. After receiving the push message the client can hit the
+`GET /_matrix/client/r0/rooms/{roomId}/event/{eventId}` to fetch the full event, and then create the notification based
+on that.
+
+Even the `event_id_only` leaks some metadata that can be avoided.
+
+Today, web clients supporting push notifications (eg. hydrogen) needs to use a matrix to webpush gateway. This requires
+going over the specifications, because they use `endpoint`, and `auth` in the `PusherData` (hydrogen [[1]], sygnal [[2]]),
+while the specifications let understand that only `url` and `format` are allowed [[3]].
+=> __PusherData already need to be updated__ to add `auth` and `endpoint`.
+
+Web Push is a standard for (E2EE) push notifications, defined with RFC8030+RFC8291+RFC8292 [[4]][[5]][[6]]: many libraries
+are already available and robuste: they are reviewed, and acknowledge by experts.
+
+Having a webpush push kind would provide push notifications without gateway to
+- Web app and desktop app
+- Android apps using UnifiedPush (MSC2970 was open for this and won't be required anymore)
+- Android apps using FCM (It is possible to push to FCM with webpush standard [[7]])
+- Maybe other ? We have seen apple moving a lot into web push support [[8]]
+
+[1]: https://github.com/element-hq/hydrogen-web/blob/9b68f30aad329c003ead70ff43f289e293efb8e0/src/platform/web/dom/NotificationService.js#L32
+[2]: https://github.com/matrix-org/sygnal/blob/main/sygnal/webpushpushkin.py#L152
+[3]: https://spec.matrix.org/v1.9/client-server-api/#_matrixclientv3pushers_pusherdata
+[4]: https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8030
+[5]: https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8291
+[6]: https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8292
+[7]: https://gist.github.com/mar-v-in/2a054e3a4c0a508656549fc7d0aaeb74#webpush
+[8]: https://developer.apple.com/documentation/usernotifications/sending-web-push-notifications-in-web-apps-and-browsers
+
+## Proposal
+
+`PusherData` fields are now define as follow:
+- `format`: Required if `kind` is `http` or `webpush`, not used if `kind` is `email`. The format to send
+notifications in to Push Gateways. The details about what fields the homeserver should send to the push gateway
+are defined in the Push Gateway Specification. Currently the only format available is ’event_id_only'.
+- `url`: Required if `kind` is `http`, not used else. The URL to use to send notifications to. MUST be an
+HTTPS URL with a path of /_matrix/push/v1/notify
+- `endpoint`: Required if `kind` is `webpush`, not used else. The URL to send notification to, as defined as a
+`push resource` by RFC8030. MUST be an HTTPS URL.
+- `auth`: Required if `kind` is `webpush`, not used else. The authentication secret. This is 16 random bytes
+encoded in base64 url.
+
+The POST request to the endpoint dedicated to the creation, modification and deletin of pushers,
+`POST /_matrix/client/v3/pushers/set` now supports a new `kind`: `webpush`.
+- `kind`: Required: The `kind` of pusher to configure. `http` makes a pusher that sends HTTP pokes. `webpush` makes a
+pusher that sends Web Push encrypted messages. `email` makes a pusher that emails the user with unread notifications.
+`null` deletes the pusher.
+- `pushkey`: Required: This is a unique identifier for this pusher. The value you should use for this is the routing
+or destination address information for the notification, for example, the APNS token for APNS or the Registration ID
+for GCM. If your notification client has no such concept, use any unique identifier. Max length, 512 bytes.
+If the `kind` is "email", this is the email address to send notifications to.
+If the `kind` is `webpush`, this is the user agent public key encoded in base64 url. The public key comes from a ECDH
+keypair using the P-256 (prime256v1, cf. FIPS186) curve.
+
+A VAPID (Voluntary Application Server Identification, cf RFC8292) is often needed to be able to register with a push
+server.
+It is proposed to add a `m.webpush` capability to the `/capabilities` endpoint with this format:
+```
+"m.webpush": {
+	"enabled": true,
+	"vapid": "BNbXV88MfMI0fSxB7cDngopoviZRTbxIS0qSS-O7BZCtG04khMOn-PP2ueb_X7Aeci42n02kJ0-JJJ0uQ4ELRTs"
+}
+```
+It is also useful to decide if the client should register a pusher using `http` kind and and old style
+Sygnal WebPush semantic. A client that supports this kind of pusher should use it if the server supports it too, and
+not register another `http` pusher to avoid duplicate pushes.
+
+## Potential issues
+
+While implemnting, one have to be carreful with RFC8291: many libraries use the 4th draft of this spec. Checking the
+Content-Encoding header is a good way to know if it the correct version. If the value is `aes128gcm`, then it uses
+the right specifications, else (`aesgcm`), then it uses the draft version.
+
+## Alternatives
+
+`pushkey` could be a random ID, and we can add `p256dh` in the `PusherData`. But it would require client to store it,
+while the public key already identify that pusher. And, client already use the PusherData that way.
+
+`vapid` parameter could be made optional considering it is officially not a requirement, however it seems
+existing big players push servers need it anyway to be able to subscribe, so it was decided to make it mandatory
+to avoid issues with those.
+
+## Security considerations
+
+Security considerations are listed by RFC8030 [[9]], there are mainly resolved with RFC8291 (Encryption) and
+RFC8292 (VAPID).
+
+Like any other federation request, there is a risk of SSRF. This risk is limited since the post data isn't
+arbitrary (the content is encrypted), and a potential malicious actor don't have access to the response.
+Nevertheless, it is recommended to not post to private addresses, with the possibility with a setting to
+whitelist a private IP. (Synapse already have ip_range_whitelist [[10]])
+It is also recommended to not follow redirection, to avoid implementation issue where the destination is check
+before sending the request but not for redirections.
+
+Like any other federation request, there is a risk of DOS amplification. One malicious actor register many users
+to a valid endpoint, then change the DNS record and target another server, then notify all these users. This
+amplification is very limited since HTTPS is required and the TLS certificate of the target will be rejected. The
+request won't reach any functionnality of the targeted application. The home server can reject pusher if the response
+code is not one intended.
+
+[9]: https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8030#section-8
+[10]: https://matrix-org.github.io/synapse/latest/usage/configuration/config_documentation.html#ip_range_whitelist
+
+## Unstable prefix
+
+- Until this proposal is considered stable, implementations must use
+`org.matrix.msc4174.webpush` instead of `m.webpush`.
+
+## Dependencies
+
+-
+