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# Tax Choice {#tax}
<!-- \begin{quote}
\emph{``Advocates of redistributive taxes must wake up and realize that their end is in jeopardy on account of their poor choice of means:
they are fighting, and losing, the wrong war.''}
\\*
--- Edward J.\ \citet[848]{McCaffery2005}
%add correct citation
\end{quote}
<!-- %Note that what Ganghof + Scharpf 2004:
%37 is incorrect in their treatment of capital incomes.
%They are actually taxed, when they are consumed, given that the tax is cash-flow based (dissavings count!).
%Consider the Haig-Simons.
%This is a widespread misunderstanding of the PCT, particularly with regards to its evil twins.
%Contact Ganghof + Scharpf about this mistake!
% Fundamental agreement on the likely advantages of a PCT regime has been reached in the (albeit heterodox) economics literature (conceptually Brümmerhoff 1990:
%357ff, empirically Tomer et al.
%2008, normatively McCaffery 2002).
%What Is The Perfect Tax?
%Friedman is actually a fan of the PCT, and has argued to use it to pay for the war effort in the past.
%This is via Robert Frank 2011 (Darwin). -->
## Tax Criteria
### Optimality
A system is efficient if it maximizes outputs for given inputs.
<!-- %somewhere in McCaffery:
%Ramsey optimal tax literatre:
%"inverse elasticity" rule.
%This can lead to perverse ideas:
%working wifes is ok, but low wages for immigrants with hig hwork ethic? -->
But exactly *what* should be maximized?
Efficiency norms vary and can conflict.
I present here three popular definitions in increasing order of strength.
[^1]
Earlier entries are subsets of later entries, as visualized in .
Pareto Efficiency.
: \phantomsection
[\[sec:pareto\]]{#sec:pareto label="sec:pareto"}
An allocation is pareto-optimal, when no one can be made better off *without making someone else worse off*.
Pareto optimality, is, in fact not a pure efficiency norm but includes an equity component, too.
Kaldor-Hicks Efficiency.
: \phantomsection
[\[sec:kaldor-hicks\]]{#sec:kaldor-hicks label="sec:kaldor-hicks"} An allocation is Kaldor-Hicks efficient, when no one can be made better off without making someone else worse off *by the same or a greater amount* of disutility [@Kaldor1939; @Hicks1939].
It can also be described as a pareto-optimal outcome where sufficient compensatory sidepayments can be made from the winners to the loosers.
Social Welfare Optimum.
: \phantomsection
[\[sec:swo\]]{#sec:swo label="sec:swo"} The pure efficiency norm is given by the utilitarian slogan "The greatest good for the greatest many" [@Mill1863].
It knows no equity at all, but is concerned only with the sum total.
It is also known as a social welfare optimum in game theory (for example, @Oye-1985-aa).
\centering
![Selected Efficiency Norms, Where Area Equals Utility[]{label="fig:Efficiencies"}](efficiency-norms){#fig:Efficiencies width="100%"}
I choose as the weakest of these efficiency norms and note whenever a stronger efficiency norm is required for an argument.
Pareto efficiency is also widespread efficiency norm that is convenient for its link to (page ).
#### In Dubio Pro Mercatus.
The above posited perfect markets can be shown to work Adam @Smith-1776-lq's *Invisible Hand* [-@Smith-1776-lq].
More formally, the first theorem of welfare economics states that any competitive equilibrium will be Pareto optimal:
no one could be made better off, without making someone else worse off[^2].
For () efficiency, the burden of proof then lies on state interventions in . [\[sec:perfect-competition\]](#sec:perfect-competition){reference-type="ref" reference="sec:perfect-competition"}
It follows that a tax should affect market interactions as little as possible.
#### Minimize Deadweight Losses
The efficiency loss that *does* occur when taxes alter market interactions is called a deadweight loss (DWL), illustrated in .
It arises as follows:
consumers and producers both reduce their buying and selling, as consumers face higher and producers lower prices.
This reduces the welfare, or surplus of consumers and producers.
Some of this loss is transferred to government.
The net that is not recouped as tax revenue is the deadweight-loss of taxation.
A desirable tax should have a minimal deadweight loss.
[\[des:minimal-DWL\]]{#des:minimal-DWL label="des:minimal-DWL"}
A desirable tax will maintain and strengthen incentives to maximize private, unobserved effort in work and investment.
[\[des:Incentives\]]{#des:Incentives label="des:Incentives"}
##### Reformulations of DWL.
The idea of the DWL of taxation can be reformulated in a number of ways.
Factor Unemployment
: refers to DWLs in markets of factors of production, when tax wedges cause incomplete employment of labor or capital.
This problem is particularly dire in the indivisible supply of low-productivity labor, where entire strata of workers may be unable to find gainful employment at post-tax wages.
This problem of is further discussed in and addressed in desideratum [\[des:low-price-floor\]](#des:low-price-floor){reference-type="ref" reference="des:low-price-floor"}.
Taxes are Anti-Growth.
: A sophisticated version of this sentiment will also argue that widespread DWLs waste economic resources in the medium and long run.
Neutrality.
: The DWL of a tax can also be described as its impact on a hypothetical, before-tax, pareto optimal market.
An efficient, desirable tax is neutral in the sense of leaving pre-tax relative prices unchanged [@McCaffery2005 849].
<!-- %I definetely NEED to look into the Harbinger triangle literature on the costs of taxation.
%This seems to be different from this (Marshallian?) view based on consumer surplus.
%There's also a view based on (Pigou?), asking whether the loosers (the taxpayers) can be compensated by the winners (the recipients of subsidies). -->
#### Responsiveness is Elasticity.
This responsiveness is called the *price elasticity* of demand and supply respectively.
It is defined as the percent change in quantity demanded (supplied) over a percent change in price [@Marshall1890].
Where $E-{d}$ ($E-{s}$) is the price elasticity of demand (supply), $Q-{d}$ ($Q-{s}$) the quantity demanded (supplied) and $P$ the price, it holds that:
$$\label{eq:PED}
E-{d}=\frac{\%\ \mbox{change in quantity demanded}}{\%\ \mbox{change in price}}=\frac{\Delta Q-{d}/{Q-{d}}}{{\Delta P}/{P}}$$
and
$$\label{eq:PES}
E-{s}=\frac{\%\ \mbox{change in quantity supplied}}{\%\ \mbox{change in price}}=\frac{\Delta Q-{s}/{Q-{s}}}{{\Delta P}/{P}}$$.
#### Elasticities of Supply and Demand
become more intuitive when applied in polar cases of [perfect inelasticity](fig:inelastic) () and [perfect elasticity](fig:elastic) ().
##### Perfectly elastic
supply (demand) does not respond at all to changes in price.
Whatever the price, suppliers (buyers) will always produce (buy) the same quantity.
It is displayed by a perpendicular supply (demand) curve in .
##### Perfectly inelastic
supply (demand) responds maximally to minimal changes in price.
When the price drops (rises) below a certain point, suppliers (buyers) will cease stop producing (buying) any quantity.
Below (above) the horizontal supply (demand) curve in , no production (buying) occurs at all.
\centering
![Perfectly Inelastic Supply and Demand[]{label="fig:inelastic"}](inelastic){#fig:inelastic width="100%"}
\centering
![Perfectly Elastic Supply and Demand[]{label="fig:elastic"}](elastic){#fig:elastic width="100%"}
\centering
![Unit Elastic Supply and Demand[]{label="fig:unit-elastic"}](unit-elastic){#fig:unit-elastic width="100%"}
##### Unit elastic
supply (demand) responds proportionally to changes in price.
Along a supply (demand) curve of slope $1$ ($-1$), producers (buyers) produce (buy) one percent more quantity for each percent increase (decrease) in price[^6].
#### Elasticities and DWLs.
Because DWLs stem from market participants tax-depressed activity, less price responsive activities will be more efficient to tax.
Relatively inelastic supply and demand will have relatively smaller DWLs (@Ramsey, @Piatkowski2008 [16]).
This is illustrated in figures [\[fig:DWL\]](#fig:DWL){reference-type="ref" reference="fig:DWL"} and [\[fig:smaller-DWL\]](#fig:smaller-DWL){reference-type="ref" reference="fig:smaller-DWL"}.
displays the same market with the same tax, only with relatively less elastic (= more inelastic) supply and demand.
Compared to the original DWL-scenario in , the DWL in is absolutely smaller and smaller relative to the recouped tax revenue.
Because both producers and buyers are less responsive to the tax-induced price change, they each loose less of their surplus.
A doable specification of desideratum [\[des:minimal-DWL\]](#des:minimal-DWL){reference-type="ref" reference="des:minimal-DWL"} on [minimal DWLs](des:minimal-DWL) is:
A doable tax falls on inelastic bases.
[\[des:tax-inelastic\]]{#des:tax-inelastic label="des:tax-inelastic"}
#### Determinants of Elasticity.
Elasticities are hard to quantify:
if prices change, they typically change only marginally.
Elasticities are typically known only *locally*, that is, in the vicinity of equilibrium prices.
Elasticities are determined by a host of factors.
The price elasticity of supply depends, amongst other things, on the mobility of labor and capital employed in production, the availability of substitute consumers or the ability to substitute current for future sales (a.k.a.
liquidity).
The price elasticity of demand depends, amongt other things, on the availability of substitute goods, brand loyalty or ability to substitute current for future consumption.
### Incidence
#### Flypaper Theory is False.
To illustrate this dynamic, first consider .
In this market (actually the same as in ), a tax is placed on the supplier.
For any given market price, the producer is now willing to produce less.
The supply curve shifts upwards by exactly the amount of the tax.
Assuming constant demand, the curtailed supply will raise the price above the prior equilibrium.
Both consumers and producers end up paying for the tax.
Consumers have to buy at higher prices.
Producers have to sell at lower prices.
In this case, consumers and producers carry an equal share of the tax burden.
[^4]
The naive "flypaper theory of tax incidence" is false:
the state cannot easily legislate [who *should* pay](sec:fiscal-redistributionIsPersonal) a tax.
Instead it must anticipate market reactions to the tax and gauge the *effective* incidence, irrespective of where the tax was originally levied.
[^5]
#### The Relatively Less Elastic Bears Relatively More.
The incidence is not only different from where a tax is levied, it can also fall asymmetrically on demand and supply.
More specifically, the incidence of a tax is determined by the *relative* price elasticities of supply and demand:
whoever is less elastic (more inelastic) bears a relatively greater share of the burden.
illustrates the incidence of a tax on suppliers in a market with relatively less elastic (more inelastic) demand.
It is the same market as in and [\[fig:DWL\]](#fig:DWL){reference-type="ref" reference="fig:DWL"}, only the elasticity of demand is different:
buyers react relatively less to price changes than sellers.
As a result, buyers are willing to pay quite a lot to maintain a similar quantity.
Sellers, by contrast, will curtail their production substantially when prices drop.
The market reaches a post-tax equilibrium at a price much greater than pre-tax equilibrium for consumers, and a little lower for producers.
Consumers end up bearing most of the burden.
#### Incidence is Hard.
As argued in the above, relative price elasticities of demand and supply can be hard to ascertain ex-ante, and they are affected by many factors.
To reliably gauge the effective incidence of a tax, government would have to know the elasticities in a myriad of markets and constellations with great precision.
This will be very costly and likely unsuccessful.
To effectively redistribute between [natural persons only](des:personal-taxation), as per desideratum [\[des:personal-taxation\]](#des:personal-taxation){reference-type="ref" reference="des:personal-taxation"}, a doable tax will fall on market interactions where relative elasticities of demand and supply can be easily and reliably ascertained.
Government can achieve non-random, normatively justifiable redistribution only when:
A doable tax has a well-determined incidence.
[\[des:determined-incidence\]]{#des:determined-incidence label="des:determined-incidence"}
<!-- civicon quote (for the incidence day): the curious task of economics is to .. -->
<!-- %taxing corporations is stupid: they are, and for good reasons, only virtual entities \cite{Coase1937}
%actually Coase suggests we shouldn't get into this, we should not favor some ways of organizing cooperation over others \ldots
%remind people here about natural persons, but that is in fairness.
%taxes should always be in real terms, never in nomal terms.
%That's studpid otherwise. -->
### Natural Personhood
<!-- %\subsection{Natural Persons}
%The first complication of taxation is actually a clarification:
%redistribution is only meaningfully defined between \emph{natural} persons, that is, actual human beings.
%William \citeauthor{Vickrey1947} begins his classic \emph{Agenda for Progressive Taxation}:
%``Genuinely progressive taxation is necessarily personal taxation'' (\citeyear{Vickrey1947}:
%1).
%comment here somehow on the foundational argument:
%that you are entitled to whatever you earn in uncoerced exchange --- or are you?
%also comment here somehow on where that relies on the state
%in protection of property rights for private consumption
%in protection of land etc.
%for control
%na this isn't so good.
%we know from earlier desiderata, we want it to be progressive, but just how and why we want that is less clear.
%that's why this is about fairness, not just equity. -->
#### Corporations
Corporate bodies have rightfully been characterized as fictions.
The welfare of all these non-natural, private juristic persons ultimately accrues to natural persons as their owners, workers or consumers[^1].
Equity considerations do not apply at the corporate level[^2].
As per desideratum [\[des:redistribution-and-revenue-are-one\]](#des:redistribution-and-revenue-are-one){reference-type="ref" reference="des:redistribution-and-revenue-are-one"}, . [\[sec:fiscal-redistribution-and-revenue-are-one\]](#sec:fiscal-redistribution-and-revenue-are-one){reference-type="ref" reference="sec:fiscal-redistribution-and-revenue-are-one"} [\[des:redistribution-and-revenue-are-one\]](#des:redistribution-and-revenue-are-one){reference-type="ref" reference="des:redistribution-and-revenue-are-one"}
It follows that for both these components:
A doable tax falls only on natural persons.
[\[des:personal-taxation\]]{#des:personal-taxation label="des:personal-taxation"}
#### Families
<!-- %add triangle of impossibility here -->
<!-- %for a more comprehensive discussion of gender and tax, especially its interatcion through class, see \cite{McCaffery2009a}
%also note that imputed income would provide a partial fix for the problem as in \cite[6304]{McCaffery2009a} -->
\phantomsection
[\[sec:love-marriage\]]{#sec:love-marriage label="sec:love-marriage"}
> *"Love and marriage, love and marriage\
> Go together like horse and carriage\
> (...)\
> Try, try, try to separate them:\
> It's an illusion."*\
> --- Frank Sinatra (1915-1998)
Personal taxation becomes impossible when common usage, transfers and mutual obligations become so intensive, informal and intangible as to render individual accounts meaningless.
In modern, functionally differentiated societies such *mechanical solidarity* is --- for better or for worse --- largely replaced by extensive, formalized and tangible *organic solidarity* [@Durkheim-1893-aa].
Romantic cohabitation, marriage and the nuclear family alone remain as refuges of mechanical solidarity.
Personal taxation of (married) couples and families becomes impracticable.
They are therefore taxed as *one* entity, or at least under one rate.
A problem arises:
you have to add (two) potentially (very) different incomes[^3] together and tax them under a *single* rate.
There are two ways to do this.
First, you can apply the same schedule as for single households, which would punish people just for getting married or having children.
For example, two people earning \$50,000 each would, after marriage, be taxed under the higher rate applicable at \$100,000.
Secondly, you can divide the family income by the number of people in the household and apply the tax rate for this *average* income.
In this case, the tax liability will depend on the *distribution* of incomes *between* the family members.
If their incomes are starkly different, they will benefit from applying a progressive rate to their *average* income.
This conundrum cannot be resolved:
it is the equivalent to @Arrow1950's *Impossibility Theorem* in taxation.
Of three desirable things, you can only have two:
1. [a progressive schedule](des:SharpProgression),
2. neutrality towards marriage and
3. tax liability independent of the distribution of income in a household (@Moffitt2003 [124], @Dalsgaard2005 [29])
.
I have stated here that progression is desirable, and that people should not and cannot be punished for mechanical solidarity in family and marriage.
It follows that, while undesirable, the tax liability *will* be dependent on the distribution of income in a household.
The contradictions arising in the taxation of family and marriage point to more fundamental [problems of drawing boundaries](sec:work-play) (page ) based on administrative and analytical abstractions (here:
, page ) that are not unambiguously applicable in real life.
As this particular problem affects all progressive taxes, it will not be further addressed here.
The aggregate costs of taxation depend on the responsiveness, or elasticities of what is being taxed.
The individual costs --- who *really* pays --- also depend on this responsiveness.
### Timing
<!-- on accrual vs on realisation -->
<!-- (this may or may not be the same as the savings norm issue) -->
<!-- or maybe it should be called liquidity -->
<!-- %does this belong here?
%include here the visualization from McCaffery, note that it is an application of Modigiliani's Life Cycle Income Hypothesis (Wikipedia) (original source is unclear) -->
<!--
this also covers the liquidy issue, and problems that arise when stuff isn't liquid -->
<!-- Any non-flat distributive norm of taxation requires that *ability to pay* (or some other criterion) is measurable.
In a non-static economy, this ability will change over time.
It is hard to know exactly *when* welfare accrues to people and can be even harder to measure.
#### The Good: Exchanges.
In perfect, liquid markets exchanges are so frequent, intensive and transparent that the equilibrium valuation of buyers and sellers can be known at every time and with great precision.
Stock exchanges are a good example:
company stocks are bought an sold so often, by so many people, and so publicly that at every second during the trading day, the current valuation of a company is known with the greatest possible accuracy, reflecting all past publicly available information (this according to the efficient market hypothesis (EMH), originally stated by @Cowles1937).
If you own stock, the taxman can determine the welfare losses and gains that accrue to you on any given day, even without you ever selling your share of a company.
#### The OK: Frequent Buying and Selling.
Exchanges do not exist for all goods and services in an economy.
An equilibrium valuation for many things is reached only when, and if they are bought and sold.
This is relatively unproblematic for things that are bought an sold relatively often, such as labor.
In labor markets, the taxman can simply assume that the welfare of your human capital accrues to you only when the first salary is transferred, even though this is probably incorrect.
Your value as a trained worker, after all, did not accrue to you over night, but was (l)earned over many years.
#### The OK: Standardized Goods With Great Volume.
Even without *individually* frequent buying and selling, equilibrium valuation is possible when goods and services are easily comparable and bought and sold by *someone*.
Used cars, for example, can be easily evaluated because their quality is comparable in terms of standardized features and someone, somewhere will sell a same or similar car most of the time.
[^7]
All the taxman has to do is to record all the equilibrium prices, and he can quantify just how much better off you are, once you have inherited your grandmothers car, even if you do not plan on ever selling it.
[^8]
#### The Bad: Illiquid Markets of Unstandardized Goods.
Sadly for the taxman, some goods are hardly ever traded and are of unstandardized quality, such as large real estate or privately owned companies.
Not only is no valuation of these things publicly known, it simply is not defined:
just how much that mansion or family enterprise is worth *cannot* be known unless and until it is sold.
#### The Ugly: Flight Into Illiquid Markets.
\phantomsection
[\[sec:flight-2-illiquid\]]{#sec:flight-2-illiquid label="sec:flight-2-illiquid"}
Things can get even more ugly, when taxpayers anticipate the state's inability to tax welfare accrual in illiquid markets and react accordingly.
Taxpayers can have several incentives to "hide" their welfare accrual in illiquid markets.
First
taxpayers have an incentive to smooth out their welfare accrual over time.
Second, given that we all die, taxpayers have an incentive to postpone taxation of their welfare accrual until after they are dead, or even into the farther future after their children's death.
This is not an esoteric or theoretic problem:
given the large properties handed down for generations in the form of real estate or privately owned companies, a substantial part of material inequality in our societies will escape taxation, at least under a humanly meaningful time horizon.
Thirdly, and most sinisterly, taxpayers can follow the strategy of "[tax evasion 101](sec:Evasion101)", *buy* illiquid goods, *borrow* and spend on them as collateral and *die* before the illiquid good is ever sold.
When taxpayers *do* react to these incentives and buy illiquid assets, they will not only evade redistribution, but they will also cause substantial welfare losses.
When, for example, many taxpayers decide to invest in real estate, rather than company stock, equity markets may lack that very capital that they could put to potentially more *socially* productive use.
Even worse, when the owner of an inherited family SME avoids a merger or acquisition for fear of taxation (the firm *could* be evaluated after the M&A deal), [perfect competition condition](sec:perfect-competition) () is violated, and at least one invisible hand of the free market is tied behind our backs. [\[itm:easy-entry-exit\]](#itm:easy-entry-exit){reference-type="ref" reference="itm:easy-entry-exit"}
In the worst case, originally liquid markets will freeze up as more taxpayers postpone their selling into the indefinite future.
[^9]
#### The Unavoidable: Illiquid Goods.
It is important to note here, that for all their tax-hassle, "naturally" illiquid assets such as privately owned firms are not an avoidable aberration of efficient markets.
Rewards of private information and unobservable effort in the form of such illiquid assets are in fact a necessary condition for an innovative market economy.
An economy in which *all* privately known but uncertain information would immediately be made public and evaluated (decided upon) on an open exchange is, essentially, a planned, if democratic, economy.
Two problems would arise.
First, the universal exchange would underestimate the value of goods that are produced with uncertain innovation and unobservable effort, precisely because the stochastic value of such goods is initially low.
Second, people would have little incentive to invest maximum unobservable effort and uncertain innovations in the first place, because the universal exchange would prevent them from ever obtaining any above-average returns on their new product.
Had Sergey Brin and Lawrence Page of Google Inc. been forced to publish and evaluate their innovative search algorithm during every state of its development, they would have had limited incentives to start hacking code in the first place.
The careful timing of initial public offerings (IPOs) of technology startups also reflects this fundamental capitalist contradiction between efficient markets (EMH) and incentive design.
[^10]
#### Between a Rock and Hard Place: Taxation on Accrual or Realization.
Governments have two equally poor choices to tax illiquid goods.
They can either tax on *accrual* or on *realization*.
##### On Accrual.
To tax on *actual* accrual, government has to evaluate an illiquid good in the absence of *any* market evaluation.
Two problems arise.
First, by creating an evaluation and consequent incentives out of mid-air, government becomes a central planner.
Second, the evaluation itself will put extraordinary strain on the political process.
Absent any objectifiable basis or normative justification for government evaluations, it will be hard to insulate the political process from corruption in these zero-sum games between different goods, owners and the state.
A publicly accountable administration evaluating two equally illiquid family-owned firms every year will be under tremendous pressure from both owners, as well as everyone else who does not own either of the two firms.
##### On Realization.
To tax on realization, government has to wait until eventually, an illiquid good *is* sold at an equilibrium price.
Again, two problems arise.
First, effective taxation may be postponed beyond a humanly meaningful timespan.
Secondly, as argued in the above, taxation on realization can cause taxpayers to [flee into illiquid markets and to freeze up previously liquid markets](sec:flight-2-illiquid).
There is no good way to tax accrual in illiquid assets.
Exempting illiquid assets from taxation altogether will lead to the same problems as taxation on realization:
even more taxpayers will shelter their accrual in illiquid goods.
The evaluation of illiquid assets may in some instances be as unavoidable as illiquid goods themselves.
Banks do it when they establish collateral for a loan or when they assess the creditworthiness of a privately-owned firm.
[^11]
States may have to do it in taxation.
Still, whenever possible, states should avoid messing with this (productive?) contradiction inherent to the capitalist mode of production:
[\[des:liquid-assets\]]{#des:liquid-assets label="des:liquid-assets"}
A doable tax will fall on liquid assets. -->
#### Haig-Simons Identity of Income
#### Two Savings Norms
Much of the debate on taxation in recent years has concentrated on the relative taxation of capital and labor.
This dichotomy is no longer [empirically meaningful](sec:CapitalNoClass), and [normatively contradictory](sec:savings-norms).
#### Empirically: Marxism is Dead --- Capital is no Longer a Class in Itself.
\phantomsection
[\[sec:CapitalNoClass\]]{#sec:CapitalNoClass label="sec:CapitalNoClass"}
For [personal taxation](des:personal-taxation) as per desideratum [\[des:personal-taxation\]](#des:personal-taxation){reference-type="ref" reference="des:personal-taxation"}, capital and labor incomes are an irrelevant, false dichotomy.
Today, capital is no longer a class in itself:
even middle class earners have substantial capital incomes, for example from capital-based pensions or life insurances [@Grabka2007a XV].
In a (happily) past world of bifurcation between workers and capitalists, balancing the taxation of labor and capital incomes made redistributive sense.
When almost everyone is, to some extent, a capitalist, taxation of either of the two incomes does not neatly map on (page ).
*Any* tax mix of labor and capital incomes will have indeterminate redistributive effects.
#### Normatively: Two Savings Norms Conflict.
\phantomsection
[\[sec:savings-norms\]]{#sec:savings-norms label="sec:savings-norms"}
Capital, in the last instance, is saved labor income.
There are two conflicting, equally plausible norms on how to treat saving.
##### Ordinary Savings Norm.
\phantomsection
[\[sec:OSN\]]{#sec:OSN label="sec:OSN"}
According to the ordinary savings norm, people save to shift labor incomes within their lifetime, or between generations [@McCaffery2005 819].
They receive a return to capital to make up for the the risk borne and the pure discount of the future.
Because the saver and the non-saver are same ex ante, they should not be taxed differently ex post.
In short, people should not be punished to smooth out their consumption over time.
##### Yield-to-Capital Norm.
\phantomsection
[\[sec:Y2C\]]{#sec:Y2C label="sec:Y2C"}
According to the yield-to-capital norm, the return to capital that people receive is additionally accumulated welfare that should be taxed.
Under income taxation, these two norms are in fatal tension.
*Any* mix of capital and labor income taxation will violate either of the two norms.
There is no meaningful way to tell the one kind of (ordinary) saving from the other (yield) kind:
they are the two sides of the same coin.
#### Structural Agnosticism.
A tax regime can avoid this empirical futility and normative contradictions when it is agnostic in its treatment of labor and capital incomes:
[\[des:structural-agnosticism\]]{#des:structural-agnosticism label="des:structural-agnosticism"}
A doable tax will be agnostic towards labor and capital incomes.
[^1]: Foundations with their earmarked, tax-exempt and free-roaming capital may be a exception to this generalization.
The beneficiaries of a foundation's mission may substitute as natural persons to which the foundations welfare --- albeit involuntarily --- accrues.\
A [critical acclaim](http://maxheld.de/2010/03/27/foundations-may-be-bad/) of the political economy, democratic legitimacy and taxation of supposedly benevolent foundations is direly needed but clearly beyond the scope of this thesis.
[^2]: Corporate bodies are, of course, *operative* fictions in their consumption of [Common Goods](sec:common-good) and [Natural Monopolies](sec:natural-monopoly).
To receive correct price signals, corporate bodies should therefore be subjected to Pigouvian taxes and fees.
[^3]: The problem occurs in equivalent form when a different base for progressive taxation is chosen, for example property or consumption.
[^4]: In this illustration, the costs to consumers and producers are only the product of the post-tax quantity and the prices they receive, respectively.
In these are the rectangles $B$ and $C$ formed by the price difference to equilibrium prices at post-tax quantities.
An equivalent mechanism operates to distribute the burden of the DWL, or the foregone consumption (production) at lower (higher) prices.
The DWL is also split evenly between consumers and producers in this case.
More generally, the DWL is split according to relative elasticities of supply and demand:
whichever is less elastic, bears the greater DWL.
The "incidence" of DWLs is customarily not included in assessments of tax incidence, precisely because tax incidence is concerned with the ultimate origin of tax *revenue*.
The DWL, by definition, is that welfare lost that is *not* recouped as tax revenue.
[^5]: The usual assumption is that incidence applies only to indirect taxes (VAT, Corporate Income Tax).
I find this limited application of incidence implausible.
The concept remains applicable for direct taxes (Personal Income Tax (PIT), Asset Tax), too.
A PIT on labor incomes, for instance, may partially fall on employers when labor markets are very tight:
tax-depressed worker supply may lead employers to pay more.
Even an Asset Tax may fall on people other than the owners when demand for their collateral is sufficiently inelastic:
interest rates may rise when private capital becomes less abundant.
A more complete discussion of the incidence of the different taxes must await on page .
[^6]: The complications of point-vs.-arc elasticities are of no relevance here.
For a review, see [@Allen1933] and recently, [@Vaughan1988].
[^7]: ...even though the quality may not be symmetrically observable in this, @Akerlof-1970-aa's ([-@Akerlof-1970-aa]) proverbial lemon's market.
[^8]: ...or, in Germany, a private service by the name of [Schwacke](http://www.schwacke.de/), in the US [Kelly Blue Book](http://www.kbb.com/).
[^9]: The catastrophic welfare effects of freezing-up of illiquid markets could recently be observed during the 2007-2010 financial crisis, when banks, for fear of bad risks (not taxation) ceased to evaluate each other and stopped lending each other money overnight.
[^10]: For a recent commentary on the same contradiction in the governance of rating agencies, see @TheEconomist2009.
Rating agencies, like tech entrepreneurs need incentives to come up with clever algorithms in the first place.
At the same time, EMH demands that all information (and the technology to analyze it) be made public immediately.
[^11]: One may be tempted to believe that the state should be able to evaluate illiquid assets because banks do it, too.
This misconstrues the extension of credit by a bank.
The evaluation of collateral by a bank is of course an *equilibrium* valuation, albeit one that is (hopefully) never cashed in.
Borrowers can go to a different bank to seek a higher valuation.
Lenders can turn away creditors if they seek a lower valuation.
Citizens cannot go to another tax administration to get another evaluation of their illiquid good.
They have only one state.
<!-- ## Fried 1992
this appears to be re mccaffery
There are three arguments, says Fried 965 why savers and spenders ought to be treated the same, and she says, they're all flawed
1) Abstinence ideas: savers and spenders ought tob ear equivalent tax burdens because they have equivalent wealth ex post, once the costs of deferreing consumtpion are accounted for
this is, in fact, as fried notes 967, an improved income tax.
the abstinence justification is: you have costs when deferring consumptions, psychic costs. OR: you have less utility for the remaining lifetime
2) Bradford: savers and spenders ought to bear equivalent tax burdens, whether or not they are in equivalent positions ex post, because they face equivalent choices ex ante
3) savers and spenders ought to bear the equivalent tax burdens because they are entitled to preserve the relative ex post advantages, whether equivalent or not, that they enjoy in a no-tax world.
now here is a key argument (971) she argues that the abstinence theory is wrong, because we never compensate for pscychic cost of at the margin-leisure, we don't do this for workers, they work at the margin of where they are indifferent between working and not working. But we don't reward them enduring the psychic cost of working, we just tax them anyway. So they will include this in their rationales for working more. Her argument is: then why do it for the psychic cost of saving?!?
here's a tentative solution: we do that for workers, actually, and we should: it's the base-rate of only consumption, which I think we should continue -->
<!-- Schumpeter 1918
- reads like today!
- cite SChumpeter: the confusion and non-scientific/ideological nature seems very interesting, p. 99
- 103: argues that once there is a state, *anything* could be a matter for the public; now I am not so sure, there are still economic considerations (economies of scale, etc.)
- 104: that's a good thought – it's ahistorical to think of previous times as hyper-private, without the state – because this *functional differentiation* simply had not happened yet.
- 105: that's a good point: that the crisis must be fundamental, related to the foundational logic – maybe we have that today with the dual crises of the welfare state
- 108: such a great notion how the democracies are saddled with the old baggage of feudalism! It was the princes state that was assimiliated (as far as possible by democracies)
- notice that this 108ff schumpeter makes the same argument as could be made about post-communist welfare states: they *were no* welfare *states* under socialism, because the economy and state were *one* undifferentiated realm
- 114: not sure how we can practically have a monopoly tax, but some things work out great – the land value tax! Schumpeter also recommends it!
- 116: fantastic keynes-esque quote on the end of history in tax
- 124: the whole war debt thing is a bit of magical thinking ...
- 131: more keynesian optimism on the future end of history
Comment: Schumpeter might really be thinking about the laffer curve: past regime does not work because costs of extraction are prehibivey, so you need a new system.
In away, schumpeter really thinks AS WE MUSt of tax state as interfacing the mixed economy. -->
<!-- from seligman 20: 20: look again into Buchanan, and relate it to Nagel/murphy the myth of ownership: maybe both looking from the right AND the left, infinite regress ensues – (this is hard to say). TODO actually this is still pretty loose, I think probably think about this in a more careful way. The bottom line would be something like this: buchanan talks about the fiscal illusion, which requires a prior of private property, which is difficult to talk about without reference to the institutions that actually allow private property and commerce. On the other hand, talking about the advantage of public goods only makes sense once you talk about -->
<!-- Buchanan 1967
TODO Cite Buchanan on fiscal illusion in diss, and the italians he cites, seems quite similar.
- hereagain the myth of ownership strikes hard: it is VERY hard to price the "real" cost of public goods, almost circularly.
- either way, infinite regress ensues.
- i'd like to hear him argue against the LVT or PCT
- I agree with much of this: financial transaction tax really is a tax that's widely loved because no one knows who pays it. -->
<!-- Thorndike Address
Thorndike is interested in the arguments on fairness, not the answers (that's interesting, that's great for CiviCon!)
Consent, Compliance and Confession.
Question: how about the compliance on illiquid tax, especially within the PIT (on accrual or realisation)
Look back into Macomber, what the ruling says, maybe get back to Ajay (it seems that Macomber did *not* introduce realisation-based evaluation).
- We should do relate this to social/epistemic/individual preferences *explicitly* (if we can)
- We should explicate the external validity (real world?), increase the complexity (effort, capital)
- We should try and relate this to Kahnemann/Tversky research program.
- [Lucy Barnes](https://www.kent.ac.uk/politics/staff/canterbury/barnes.html) was quite interested in this stuff
> relate to Kahnemann/Tversky work on bounded rationality: which behavioral biases work here?
It's not clear to me how these biases translate to more complex tax scenarios.
McCaffery and Baron have tried this, but only on very, very simple models.
Loss Aversion probably plays a role. -->
<!-- ## mcCaffery: misunderstandings
is right indeed "the canonical understanding of consumption taxes changes under consistently progressive rates. No longer are prepaid and postpaid consumption taxes - taxes on wages and spending, respecitbely - equivalent. Postpaid consumption taxes can and do burden the yield to capital, and not in an arbitrary, random way. Far from it: A progressive postpaid consumption tax emerges as the fairest and least arbitrary of all comprehensive tax systems, precisely because it chooses to make its decisions about the appropriate level of progressivity at the right time. In doind so, it burdens some but not all uses of capital and its yield. and for normatively attractive reasons". (812)
wow.
"This traditional view has generated an impoverished choice set for tax, consisting of a badly flawed status quo on the one hand and a flat consumption tax of some sort on the other. Under the guiding light of the traditional view, we are heading ever closer towards a flat wage tax." 812
"Under progressive tax rates a postpaid, cash-flow or (all equivalently) spending tax is not equivalent to a yield-exempt or wage tax" 813
governing dynamics of inequality.
"Genuinely progressive taxation is necessarily personal taxation" (Vickrey 1947 "Agenda for Progressive taxation" as cited in MCCafferty 830)
if you want read more on this by Mirrleess, Bankman and Griffith, as cited in McCafferty 835 and elsewhere
Hobbes and smith come down for consumption taxes. Both the father of economics and the father of the state
Hobbes, Leviathan 386-87
[T]he equality of imposition, consisteth rather in the equality of that which is consumed than of the riches of the persons that consume the same. For what reason is there that he which laboureth much, and sparing the fruits of his labour, consumeth little, should be more charged than he that living idlely, getteth little, and spendeth all he gets, seeing the one hath no more protection from the commonwealth than the other? But when the impositions are laid upon those things which men consume, every man payeth equally for what he useth, nor is the commonwealth defrauded by the luxurious waste of private men.
Smith
Every tax ought to be levied at the time, or in the manner, in which it is most likely to be convenient for the contributor to pay it.... Taxes upon such consumable goods as are articles of luxury, are all finally paid by the consumer, and generally in a manner that is very convenient for him. He pays them little by little, as he has occasion to buy the goods. As he is at liberty too, either to buy, or not to buy, as he pleases, it must be his own fault if he ever suffers any considerable inconveniency from such taxes. Smith supra note 54 in cafferty
McCaffery says the USA mistake came from mistaking the Haigs-Simon definition: "an is had become an ought" (emphgasis in original. 840 MccFfery
this comes from Andrew's' idea that the most sophisticated reason for the PCT would be principled nontaxation of the yield to capital. That is the wrong reason! It is taxed, too. just differently.
yields to capital are taxed, and only there where they elevate living standards (that's vertical quity) as opposed to horizontal equity between saving, then spending
McCaffery makes this very point that progressivity, even though desired, is disappearing because of the choice of really bad tax choice.
848: "Advocates of redistributive taxes must wake up and realize that their end is in jeopardy on account of their poor choice of means: they are fighting, and losing, the wrong war."
Neutrality in comparison to a no-tax world seems nice, but is a problematic thing.
if you avoid distortion of the saving-spending decision, you skew the work-leisure tradeoff.
comment on this!
neutrality, or rather, fairness, narrowly understood as economic welfarist perspective (the optimal tax literature) is bad.
1) judgment of fairness need to take the pretax status quo as normatively appropriate
2) optimal welfare-maximizing tax answer may clash with ordinary moral intutions and reflective normative commitments
Make the point of lumpy earner, steady earner and trust fund baby *878) compare to the other tersm used for the same thing.
note, as McCaffery does on 883 that private markets can also solve the consumer durables smoothing problem: leasing, reanting.
the income tax problem for the propertied classes gets even worse because of the "wait until realiziation" and the "wait until debt is repaid" problem - bth may never happen for the super rich (this is McCaffery 888) (at least this shifts the time problem, and may make it very problematic. in the US, the fact that things canthat are inherited can be sold at fair market value free of tax makes this an even bigger problem. This is an extension of the CIT problem actually, a problem that maters for all things where accretions are not immediatley realized. "Tax planning 101 is elegantly simple: buy, borrow, die" (890)
this can't be easily solved, it's an admoinositratove nightmare.
hence the backstop of the estate and gift tax.
this is it: DYSFUNCTIONS OF THE BACKSTOPS. Dysfunctional backstoppers of PIT: CIT, PIT.
nice quote "THings in tax today are bad" (McCaffery 893)
899: "Together with the basic tax planning of buy/borrow/die, lower tax rates on capital realizations and corporate dividends, cash-value life insurance, and the taxation of home-ownership, the new developments in retirement savings help to move tax towards a world in which citizens will pay taxes on their wages, under a compressed rate structure, and never again. This is the world of prepaid consumption, or wage, taxation"
people arbitrage their way toward a falt, wage-tax.
"Corporations are legal fictions".
the key moral intuition, and Rawlsian reflective equilibrium is this: it seems fair and appropriate to burden capital ransactions when these facilitate or enable a better lifestyle, reflecting a greater "ability to pay" or more "benefits received" from the social compact. But it does not seem fair and appropriate to burden capital transactions when they are used simply and sensibly to move around in time uneven labor market earnings." 921
"People treat a plan as realistic when it approximates what already exists and as utopican when it departs from current arrangements. Only proposals that are hardly worht fighting for - reformist tinkering - seem practicable" (Roberto Managebrai Unger, False Necesseity 12 1987 as cited in McCaffery 938)
> "A progressive postpaid consumption tax emerges as the fairest and least arbitrary of all comprehensive tax systems, precisely because it chooses to make its decisions about the appropriate level of progressivity at the right time. In doing so, it burdens some but not all uses of capital and its yield, and for normatively attractive reasons."
> Edward J. McCaffery (2005: 812).
There are three types of taxes
1. Income taxes (including capital incomes)
2. Prepaid consumption taxes (VAT), or, equivalently, payroll taxes, or, equivalently social contributions (such as statutory health insurance, unemployment insurance, pensions, etc. in Germany)
3. Postpaid, progressive consumption taxes ("The Perfect Tax"), based on a cash flow account of spending (Consumption = Income - Savings / aka Haig-Simons definition of income).
There are two savings norms (as in: what exactly is saving?)
1. Ordinary Savings Norm: saving is just postponed consumption, "smoothed out" over the lifetime. Nominal interest is just a compensation for postponement (think: inflation, risk, growth, discounting of the future). Incomes from savings (= capital incomes) should not be taxed.
2. Yield-to-Capital Norm: incomes from savings are a genuine accretion to wealth. Interest is income. Incomes from savings (= capital incomes) should be taxed.
Note:
- Income taxes (if complete) adopt a yield-to-capital norm. All capital incomes are (ideally) taxed. (In reality, as McCafferty explained, they hardly ever are, because there are systemic flaws, such as "tax evasion 101")
- Prepaid consumption taxes (or VAT, or payroll, or social contributions) adopt an ordinary savings norm. No capital incomes are taxed.
- Postpaid progressive consumption taxes (or spending taxes, or cash flow based consumption taxes) tax some capital incomes. To the extent that (dis!)saving is used to smooth out consumption, interest is not taxed. To the extent that it is used to enhance lifestyle, or for lumpy consumption (opposite of smoothed out), it is taxed.
For a review of different taxes and how they work, consider my prospectus (again attached), pages 60-66
Consider this example to understand that a VAT (German MwSt.) is the same as a proportional payroll or proportional social contribution. -->
<!-- # other last reasons Nozick
On distributive justice: no, it shouldn't be entitlement "that a person is entitled to those goods acquired in uncoerced exchanges with others" (Robert Nozick, as cited in Bankman, Griffith 1997: 1915)
I want a welfarist theory of distibritutive justice. It shouldn't be utilitarianism, it should be leximin / Rawls.
Also: dynamics / outliers / network effects (Benkler, matthias' guy) / inequality / spirit level.
Also: Hobbesian. -->
<!-- # McCaffery
- McCaffery 2009 (819): tax. Most importantly, it develops more formally two norms about the taxation of capital: the yield-to-capital norm, which holds that the return to capital is an increment of value that ought to be taxed, and the ordinary-savings norm, which holds that savings that merely shift labor earnings within a lifetime or between taxpayers ought not to be excessively burdened. These two norms are in fatal tension under an income tax; in contrast, a consistent, progressive postpaid consumption tax accommodates both norms by design.
these are actually last reasons! -->
<!-- also: man works to live / live to work about the fischergleichnis böll story -->
<!-- %note, improve language-wise:
%DWL is the opposite of gains from trade.
%the question is:
%why is the DWL here, and not in some other section, namely do ability?
%this figure happens earlier as fig:DWL -->
<!-- %note somewhere that this applies only to revenue generation and redistributive taxation;
%pigouvian is the opposite -->
<!-- %discuss somewhere:
%vertical vs.\ horizontal equity (\citealt{Mankiw-2004-aa}:
%255);
%this is key for a rule-of-law, fair tax.
%It's also the same norm as gleiches wird gleich, unterschiedlich unterschiedlich behandelt, somewhere in the German Basic Law.
%Find out where. -->
<!-- %here, I still have to write a bit on distributive justice
%http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Justice#Theories-of-distributive-justice
%http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Distributive-justice
%compare them, explain why I go for Rawls
%In philosophy, the term "maximin" is often used in the context of John Rawls's A Theory of Justice, where he refers to it (Rawls (1971, p.
%152)) in the context of The Difference Principle.
%Rawls defined this principle as the rule which states that social and economic inequalities should be arranged so that "they are to be of the greatest benefit to the least-advantaged members of society".
%In other words, an unequal distribution can be just when it maximizes the mininum benefit to those who have the lowest allocation of welfare-conferring resources (which he refers to as "primary goods").[5][6]
%note that this is only loosely related to the maximin use otherwise used. -->
Second, Rawls suggests two distributive norms, the *difference principle* and the *fair equality of opportunity*.
[^3]
Under the *difference principle*, differences in endowments as well as subsequent social and economic inequalities are acceptable only if their granting also benefits the least fortunate.
[^4]
If inequities cannot be thereby justified, such undeserved differences (by birth or other random allocations) in endowment should be corrected by intervention for *fair equality of opportunity*.
This latter norm of fair equality of opportunity is a pure equity norm on the equality of inputs.
The difference principle is more complicated.
It combines equity and efficiency norms.
It is that weak pareto optimum (WPO),
[^5]
which maximizes the minimum payoff (maximin) in outcomes.
illustrates the two Rawlsian norms of distributive justice in context.
\centering
![Selected Distributive Norms and Rawlsian Distributive Justice (in green)[]{label="fig:distributive-norms"}](distributive-norms){#fig:distributive-norms width="100%"}
### Fairness
#### Why Rawls?
Any comprehensive discussion of distributional justice is beyond the scope of this thesis.
@Rawls-1971 *Theory of Justice* is presented here for four reasons.
First, *justice as fairness* serves as a convenient cut-off point on a (crudely) imagined continuum of theories of distributive justice from left to right, from egalitarianism to utilitarianism and liberitarianism.
[^6]
It is assumed that all allocative norms "left of" Rawls [such as @Cohen2000], stressing equity over efficiency will strictly prefer the PCT over the status quo.
Conversely, theorists on the right end of the imagined continuum (for instance, @Nozick1974) may not share all of the normative foundations of the PCT, or even prefer it over the status quo.
Second, the *difference principle* is (page ) when I argue the normative superiority of the progressive taxation of consumption.
Thirdly, in arguing that the PCT is the perfect tax, I attempt to establish it as an *reflective equilibrium* [@Rawls-1971 49] emerging from a pragmatic-spirited back-and-forth between what is , and what is @McCaffery2005 [856].
Fourth, @Rawls-1971' *Theory of Justice* ([-@Rawls-1971]) is an end-state theory of distributive justice [@Fried1999 1007], not a procedural prescription (for example @Dahl-1989-aa).
A political process, aside from @Rawls-1971ian liberty, is not prescribed in its own right.
It merely serves as an *independent* variable in ,explaining and criticizing why it may have failed to deliver the superior allocative outcome.
#### Implications for Tax Design.
Two desiderata for tax design emerge from @Rawls-1971's Theory of Justice.
First, the principle of *fair equality of opportunity* introduces equity as a goal for taxation.
It is a general and unspecific norm.
Translating it into a desideratum for tax design hinges on an empirical assessment of opportunity
in the real world.
A specification of this norm must therefore await an inspection of the (page ) in modern society. [\[sec:inequality-dynamics\]](#sec:inequality-dynamics){reference-type="ref" reference="sec:inequality-dynamics"}
Second, the *difference principle* provides a more straightforward guideline for redistributive taxation.
It implies that taxation should exempt from redistribution economic inequality if, and to the extent that, it makes the least fortunate better off.
This may occur when able people require economic to exert maximum efforts (desideratum [\[des:Incentives\]](#des:Incentives){reference-type="ref" reference="des:Incentives"}).
Because axiomatically assumed perfectly competitive markets can be shown to be pareto optimal, it follows that:
[\[des:difference-principle\]]{#des:difference-principle label="des:difference-principle"}
A desirable tax exempts from redistribution economic inequality if, and to the extent that, it makes the least fortunate better off.
Generally, for axiomatically assumed *homo economicus* to , she needs incentives.
Desideratum [\[des:Incentives\]](#des:Incentives){reference-type="ref" reference="des:Incentives"} is closely related to desideratum [\[des:minimal-DWL\]](#des:minimal-DWL){reference-type="ref" reference="des:minimal-DWL"} ().
[^1]: The selected efficiency principles are all cardinal, rather than ordinal in definition, and do all not consider the aggregation problem commonly known as *diminishing utility to wealth* [@Hicks1946].
While these are substantial shortcomings, they do not concern me in the efficiency discussion of the perfect tax.
Respective *equity* implications are discussed in sections [\[sec:diminishing-marginal-utility\]](#sec:diminishing-marginal-utility){reference-type="ref" reference="sec:diminishing-marginal-utility"} () and [\[sec:positional-race\]](#sec:positional-race){reference-type="ref" reference="sec:positional-race"} ().
[^2]: Demonstrated first graphically by [@Lerner1944], mathematically by [@Lange1934], [@Debreu1954] and others.
[^3]: These two distributive norms follow the equal liberty principle in *lexical* order, meaning that no distributive improvements can justify infringements of equal liberties.
[^4]: [@Rawls-1971 122] warns that this calculus must not only include strictly economic payoffs, but must also take into account the intangible correlates of social inequality as societal and cultural participation, as well as confidence.
[^5]: An allocation is weakly pareto optimal when no other allocation is *strictly* preferred by everyone.
A strong pareto optimum, by contrast, requires only that all individuals will receive same *or* higher payoffs.
[^6]: A right-hand pole comprising of utilitarian *and* libertarian ideals obviously reveals the futility of any one-dimensional scaling of theories of allocative justice.
<!-- As if economics were true
Milton Friedman argued that for economic models is does not matter whether assumptions are realistic, or whether actors understand them – but whether predictions are borne out, and whether actors behave *as if they had some given theory in mind*.
An instructive example for this would be a billard player who does not know the laws of physics in any case, but behaves *as if* s/he understood them.
This is the example from Friedman.
Paul Pfleiderer via Econtalk on Russ Ruberts points out that this depends on *continuous* and *instantaneous* feedback – so these are repetetitive games, with quick feedback.
So something like the 10k hours rules might apply.
Paul Pfleider then applies this to capital structure decisions by firms – a lot of research on this.
How do firms decide this?
The problem that we have is that very similar firms objectively have very different capital structures, and we don't know why.
So the solutions suggested by economists are incredibly complex – but there's a catch: CEOs make very few capital structure decisions, and they don't get immediate feedback (none).
So the 10k hour learning kind of rule does not at all apply.
... so I need to make some kind of pragmatic argument out of this. -->
## Base, Schedule and Timing
Taxation offers highly structured choices along the three dimensions of base, schedule and timing, the first two of which are cross-tabulated in table.
<!-- TODO refer to tax overview table here -->
There can be no meaningful democratic rule on taxation that does not ultimately opt for a definitive mix of distinct combinations along those dimensions.
The choice among these (already high-level) alternatives cannot be abstracted away, or relegated to experts:
it hinges on irreducible moral and causal judgments [for example, @McCaffery2005].
<!-- %``analytic muddle of tax'' (\citealt{McCaffery2005}: 862) -->
<!-- %McCaffery:
%There are four particularly important ones in tax: the taxable unit, the tax base, the rate structure, and the timing of tax.
%Who pays tax? On what? How much? When? TheseRead more at location 137 • Delete this highlight
%Note: add this to my systematic Edit -->
<!-- %what about the distinction about INDIRECT taxes.
%Indirect taxes are taxes levied on entities other than those expected to bear the eventual burden. -->
<!-- Which taxes exist in the real world, and which taxes are conceivable?
It will not be possible to list them all here in all their legal and administrative detail.
Instead, rough archetypes of real existing taxes ([vat]{acronym-label="vat" acronym-form="singular+short"}, [payroll]{acronym-label="payroll" acronym-form="singular+short"}, (Dual) [pit]{acronym-label="pit" acronym-form="singular+short"}, [cit]{acronym-label="cit" acronym-form="singular+short"}, [lbt]{acronym-label="lbt" acronym-form="singular+short"}) will serve to compare them to the three hypothetical (or rare) taxes suggested ([pct]{acronym-label="pct" acronym-form="singular+short"}, [wt]{acronym-label="wt" acronym-form="singular+short"}, [nit]{acronym-label="nit" acronym-form="singular+short"}). -->
## Taxes on Income
### Taxes on Capital Income
#### Corporate Income Tax (CIT)
\phantomsection
[\[sec:CIT\]]{#sec:CIT label="sec:CIT"}
The [cit]{acronym-label="cit" acronym-form="singular+short"} taxes the earnings
[^1]
of an incorporated firm.
It is usually proportional.
Unincorporated firms do not pay [cit]{acronym-label="cit" acronym-form="singular+short"}, instead their owners owe [pit]{acronym-label="pit" acronym-form="singular+short"} on their business earnings.
[^2]
<!-- %Graetz 1979:
%1635 makes my key point:
%the one reason for CIT is that "undistributed corporate income does not escape taxation"
%abolish business taxation (1636)
%a corporation has no one "ability to pay" -->
[cits]{acronym-label="cit" acronym-form="plural+short"} are proportional, with rates around 20% in the EU.
Countries have recently created issued sectoral (trade, finance) or regional (Hong Kong, London) exemptions from the [cit]{acronym-label="cit" acronym-form="singular+short"} to attract investment [@Genschel2009; @Ganghof2007; @Genschel2005].
##### Local Business Tax (LBT)
\phantomsection
[\[sec:LBT\]]{#sec:LBT label="sec:LBT"}
Taxes on local businesses exist only in some OECD countries, including Germany.
In Germany, local authorities can tax local business a progressive tax on their earnings.
Local authorities set the rate of the tax (within federally mandated margins).
Firms are taxable based on the location of their establishments.
Earnings of firms with multiple establishments are weighed by the sum of wages and salaries paid.
### Taxes on Capital and Labor Income
#### Personal Income Tax (PIT)
\phantomsection
[\[sec:PIT\]]{#sec:PIT label="sec:PIT"}
Under the [pit]{acronym-label="pit" acronym-form="singular+short"}, all sources of personal income (labor, capital) are added and taxed under a single schedule.
[pit]{acronym-label="pit" acronym-form="singular+short"} schedules are typically progressive.
Marginal (not average!) tax rates in Germany range from 14% to 42% (Bundesministerium für Finanzen 2009).
<!-- %The personal income tax is usually levied according to a progressive schedule both on labor and capital income.
%Its incidence is borne by the taxed individual, but it disincentivizes work and (risky) investment.
%It taxes capital twice:
%once when it is initially earned and again when it generates an interest.
%Income taxes only on labor (payroll tax, social contributions) can contribute to structural unemployment by raising effective price floors, especially when they are not sufficiently progressive.
%Personal income taxes on capital (\ldots
%gains tax) necessitate a corollary taxation of corporate income.
%Without it, taxpayers could easily evade payment by incorporating capital it in a firm, withdrawing earnings only slowly.
%Corporate income tax rates spill over to personal (capital gains) tax rates (Ganghof & Genschel 2008, Ganghof 2006).
%Like the personal income tax, they depress economic activity.
%Moreover, corporate income taxes are indeterminate with regard to incidence and flat in their progression.
%The tax incidence in a firm on either labor or capital is determined by a host of firm- and market-specific factors, including the relative factor price elasticities.
%Corporate income taxes apply one rate over all shares.
%The lifesavings of a worker, invested in a company through her life insurance, are taxed at exactly the same rate as the share of a stock-market tycoon.
%As the base of the corporate income tax is relatively mobile (compared to labor, consumption), it can easily evade taxation or compete down rates. -->
##### Dual Income Tax (Dual PIT).
\phantomsection
[\[sec:Dual-PIT\]]{#sec:Dual-PIT label="sec:Dual-PIT"}
The [2-pit]{acronym-label="2-pit" acronym-form="singular+short"} is a variation on the [pit]{acronym-label="pit" acronym-form="singular+short"}, where schedules differ between capital and labor sources of income.
[2-pits]{acronym-label="2-pit" acronym-form="plural+short"} burden capital relatively less than labor incomes.
The [2-pits]{acronym-label="2-pit" acronym-form="plural+short"} was introduced to avoid the negative growth effects of high capital taxation (particularly through its , p. ) and to counteract capital flight.
In Sweden, a pioneer of the [2-pit]{acronym-label="2-pit" acronym-form="singular+short"}, the top marginal (not average!) rate for labor incomes is 55%.
Capital incomes are taxed proportionally at 30% (marginal rate equals average rate).
### Taxes on Labor Income
#### Payroll Taxes (Payroll)
\phantomsection
[\[sec:Payroll\]]{#sec:Payroll label="sec:Payroll"}
In Germany, and many other countries, social contributions for old age, health, unemployment and long term care insurance are implemented as payroll taxes.
Payroll taxes are paid on labor income.
Whether they are implemented as withholding taxes (the employer withholds and transfers the tax) or paid out of the employees funds is of no significance here:
it does not matter for (page ).
##### Social Insurance Contributions
\phantomsection
[\[sec:SIC\]]{#sec:SIC label="sec:SIC"}
are capped [payroll]{acronym-label="payroll" acronym-form="singular+short"}, actually.
Despite this terminological confusion and their administration in semi-independent public agencies, it is important to note that social contributions are government revenue, irrespective of their quasi-fiscal status.
Social contributions are proper pages
To the extent that government adopts universal provision of health care, unemployment insurance and long term care as allocative goals, compulsory contributions to these services are .
To the extent that government finances old-age pensions out of current incomes, such PAYGO contributions are intertemporally and intergenerationally redistributive taxes.
[^3]
To the extent that private markets for health care, unemployment and long term care insurance are plagued by lemons markets [@Akerlof-1970-aa], respective contributions serve to (page ) and are proper revenue-generating taxes.
Additionally, universal health care provides provision against epidemics (think vaccinations) and unemployment insurance serves as an automatic stabilizer to smooth out economic growth.
Social insurance contributions are presented here for the sake of completion and clarification.
They are, when typically implemented as payroll taxes, a variation of a [2-pit]{acronym-label="2-pit" acronym-form="singular+short"}.
Rates for social insurance contributions are usually proportional.
In the EU, they vary from 20% in Denmark to 32% in Germany and 50% in France (Statistisches Bundesamt Deutschland 2007).
In Germany, contributions are capped above a certain income threshold, above which additional income is not taxed.
## Taxes on Consumption
### Prepaid Consumption Taxes
#### Value Added Tax (VAT)
\phantomsection
[\[sec:VAT\]]{#sec:VAT label="sec:VAT"}
The [vat]{acronym-label="vat" acronym-form="singular+short"} is best understood as an elegant advancement of a retail sales tax.
A retail sales tax charges sellers a fixed percentage of the sales price on goods for which the (corporate or private) buyer is the end user.
Because under a sales tax, the tax on any single taxable transaction is very high, incentives to evade the tax and to smuggle goods are great.
What is more, the state looses *all* tax revenue on a given good when evasion occurs.
The VAT was developed to address this problem.
Instead of charging sellers only at the end of a production chain (before the good is consumed), sellers are charged a percentage of their sales prices on *all* goods, including investment and intermediary goods.
Sellers invoice the tax to buyers.
Buyers are then eligible for refunds on their VAT receipts:
they can deduct all of *their* sales.
Instead of kicking in only at the last transaction before consumption, the VAT charges every transaction according to the value added at the respective stage of production.
It is handed down the economic cycle to whoever ultimately consumes a good.
The tax burden on any *single* transaction is much smaller:
value added instead of entire sales price are taxed.
Incentives to evade the tax on any single transaction are thereby greatly reduced.
[^4]
VATs are very common in the EU, standard rates differ from 15% (Luxembourg, Cyprus) to 25% (Denmark), with the majority of countries above 20%.
Reduced rates are frequently implemented for foodstuffs and other basic needs.
<!-- %The value-add tax (VAT) is a straightforward indirect tax.
%It has a relatively immobile base (consumption of everyone), supposedly robust revenues, and is relatively incentive-neutral.
%The VAT is, however, regressive (poorer people spend more of their income generating capacity on consumption).
%Like payroll taxes, the VAT raises effective price floors of labor when socially acceptable minima are present, and can thereby contribute to structural unemployment.It emerges from this simplified overview that taxes with progressive schedules also tend to have relative mobile bases#.
%If mobile tax bases erode relatively more because of tax competition, so will progressive schedules. -->
##### Graduated VAT
### Postpaid Consumption Taxes
#### Progressive Consumption Tax (PCT)
\phantomsection
[\[sec:PCT\]]{#sec:PCT label="sec:PCT"}
The [pct]{acronym-label="pct" acronym-form="singular+short"} is applied to the total consumption of natural persons.
Crucially, it is *postpaid* and *cash-flow based*.
Postpaid.
: It is crucial to understand that the PCT is *not* a VAT or sales tax of any kind with progressive rates (say, a higher rate for luxury goods).
The PCT is not *prepaid* on the price of individual *consumer goods*, but *postpaid* on the sum of individual *consumer accounts*.