Wirgeuard kernel module broken #3
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Same in 2.25 |
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…tion commit 07fd5b6cdf3cc30bfde8fe0f644771688be04447 upstream. Each cset (css_set) is pinned by its tasks. When we're moving tasks around across csets for a migration, we need to hold the source and destination csets to ensure that they don't go away while we're moving tasks about. This is done by linking cset->mg_preload_node on either the mgctx->preloaded_src_csets or mgctx->preloaded_dst_csets list. Using the same cset->mg_preload_node for both the src and dst lists was deemed okay as a cset can't be both the source and destination at the same time. Unfortunately, this overloading becomes problematic when multiple tasks are involved in a migration and some of them are identity noop migrations while others are actually moving across cgroups. For example, this can happen with the following sequence on cgroup1: #1> mkdir -p /sys/fs/cgroup/misc/a/b #2> echo $$ > /sys/fs/cgroup/misc/a/cgroup.procs #3> RUN_A_COMMAND_WHICH_CREATES_MULTIPLE_THREADS & #4> PID=$! #5> echo $PID > /sys/fs/cgroup/misc/a/b/tasks #6> echo $PID > /sys/fs/cgroup/misc/a/cgroup.procs the process including the group leader back into a. In this final migration, non-leader threads would be doing identity migration while the group leader is doing an actual one. After #3, let's say the whole process was in cset A, and that after #4, the leader moves to cset B. Then, during #6, the following happens: 1. cgroup_migrate_add_src() is called on B for the leader. 2. cgroup_migrate_add_src() is called on A for the other threads. 3. cgroup_migrate_prepare_dst() is called. It scans the src list. 4. It notices that B wants to migrate to A, so it tries to A to the dst list but realizes that its ->mg_preload_node is already busy. 5. and then it notices A wants to migrate to A as it's an identity migration, it culls it by list_del_init()'ing its ->mg_preload_node and putting references accordingly. 6. The rest of migration takes place with B on the src list but nothing on the dst list. This means that A isn't held while migration is in progress. If all tasks leave A before the migration finishes and the incoming task pins it, the cset will be destroyed leading to use-after-free. This is caused by overloading cset->mg_preload_node for both src and dst preload lists. We wanted to exclude the cset from the src list but ended up inadvertently excluding it from the dst list too. This patch fixes the issue by separating out cset->mg_preload_node into ->mg_src_preload_node and ->mg_dst_preload_node, so that the src and dst preloadings don't interfere with each other. Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Reported-by: Mukesh Ojha <quic_mojha@quicinc.com> Reported-by: shisiyuan <shisiyuan19870131@gmail.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1654187688-27411-1-git-send-email-shisiyuan@xiaomi.com Link: https://www.spinics.net/lists/cgroups/msg33313.html Fixes: f817de9 ("cgroup: prepare migration path for unified hierarchy") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v3.16+ Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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In 2019, Sergey fixed a lockdep splat with 15341b1 ("char/random: silence a lockdep splat with printk()"), but that got reverted soon after from 4.19 because back then it apparently caused various problems. But the issue it was fixing is still there, and more generally, many patches turning printk() into printk_deferred() have landed since, making me suspect it's okay to try this out again. This should fix the following deadlock found by the kernel test robot: [ 18.287691] WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected [ 18.287692] 4.19.248-00165-g3d1f971aa81f #1 Not tainted [ 18.287693] ------------------------------------------------------ [ 18.287712] stop/202 is trying to acquire lock: [ 18.287713] (ptrval) (console_owner){..-.}, at: console_unlock (??:?) [ 18.287717] [ 18.287718] but task is already holding lock: [ 18.287718] (ptrval) (&(&port->lock)->rlock){-...}, at: pty_write (pty.c:?) [ 18.287722] [ 18.287722] which lock already depends on the new lock. [ 18.287723] [ 18.287724] [ 18.287725] the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: [ 18.287725] [ 18.287726] -> #2 (&(&port->lock)->rlock){-...}: [ 18.287729] validate_chain+0x84a/0xe00 [ 18.287729] __lock_acquire (lockdep.c:?) [ 18.287730] lock_acquire (??:?) [ 18.287731] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave (??:?) [ 18.287732] tty_port_tty_get (??:?) [ 18.287733] tty_port_default_wakeup (tty_port.c:?) [ 18.287734] tty_port_tty_wakeup (??:?) [ 18.287734] uart_write_wakeup (??:?) [ 18.287735] serial8250_tx_chars (??:?) [ 18.287736] serial8250_handle_irq (??:?) [ 18.287737] serial8250_default_handle_irq (8250_port.c:?) [ 18.287738] serial8250_interrupt (8250_core.c:?) [ 18.287738] __handle_irq_event_percpu (??:?) [ 18.287739] handle_irq_event_percpu (??:?) [ 18.287740] handle_irq_event (??:?) [ 18.287741] handle_edge_irq (??:?) [ 18.287742] handle_irq (??:?) [ 18.287742] do_IRQ (??:?) [ 18.287743] common_interrupt (entry_32.o:?) [ 18.287744] _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore (??:?) [ 18.287745] uart_write (serial_core.c:?) [ 18.287746] process_output_block (n_tty.c:?) [ 18.287747] n_tty_write (n_tty.c:?) [ 18.287747] tty_write (tty_io.c:?) [ 18.287748] __vfs_write (??:?) [ 18.287749] vfs_write (??:?) [ 18.287750] ksys_write (??:?) [ 18.287750] sys_write (??:?) [ 18.287751] do_fast_syscall_32 (??:?) [ 18.287752] entry_SYSENTER_32 (??:?) [ 18.287752] [ 18.287753] -> #1 (&port_lock_key){-.-.}: [ 18.287756] [ 18.287756] -> #0 (console_owner){..-.}: [ 18.287759] check_prevs_add (lockdep.c:?) [ 18.287760] validate_chain+0x84a/0xe00 [ 18.287761] __lock_acquire (lockdep.c:?) [ 18.287761] lock_acquire (??:?) [ 18.287762] console_unlock (??:?) [ 18.287763] vprintk_emit (??:?) [ 18.287764] vprintk_default (??:?) [ 18.287764] vprintk_func (??:?) [ 18.287765] printk (??:?) [ 18.287766] get_random_u32 (??:?) [ 18.287767] shuffle_freelist (slub.c:?) [ 18.287767] allocate_slab (slub.c:?) [ 18.287768] new_slab (slub.c:?) [ 18.287769] ___slab_alloc+0x6d0/0xb20 [ 18.287770] __slab_alloc+0xd6/0x2e0 [ 18.287770] __kmalloc (??:?) [ 18.287771] tty_buffer_alloc (tty_buffer.c:?) [ 18.287772] __tty_buffer_request_room (tty_buffer.c:?) [ 18.287773] tty_insert_flip_string_fixed_flag (??:?) [ 18.287774] pty_write (pty.c:?) [ 18.287775] process_output_block (n_tty.c:?) [ 18.287776] n_tty_write (n_tty.c:?) [ 18.287777] tty_write (tty_io.c:?) [ 18.287778] __vfs_write (??:?) [ 18.287779] vfs_write (??:?) [ 18.287780] ksys_write (??:?) [ 18.287780] sys_write (??:?) [ 18.287781] do_fast_syscall_32 (??:?) [ 18.287782] entry_SYSENTER_32 (??:?) [ 18.287783] [ 18.287783] other info that might help us debug this: [ 18.287784] [ 18.287785] Chain exists of: [ 18.287785] console_owner --> &port_lock_key --> &(&port->lock)->rlock [ 18.287789] [ 18.287790] Possible unsafe locking scenario: [ 18.287790] [ 18.287791] CPU0 CPU1 [ 18.287792] ---- ---- [ 18.287792] lock(&(&port->lock)->rlock); [ 18.287794] lock(&port_lock_key); [ 18.287814] lock(&(&port->lock)->rlock); [ 18.287815] lock(console_owner); [ 18.287817] [ 18.287818] *** DEADLOCK *** [ 18.287818] [ 18.287819] 6 locks held by stop/202: [ 18.287820] #0: (ptrval) (&tty->ldisc_sem){++++}, at: ldsem_down_read (??:?) [ 18.287823] #1: (ptrval) (&tty->atomic_write_lock){+.+.}, at: tty_write_lock (tty_io.c:?) [ 18.287826] #2: (ptrval) (&o_tty->termios_rwsem/1){++++}, at: n_tty_write (n_tty.c:?) [ 18.287830] #3: (ptrval) (&ldata->output_lock){+.+.}, at: process_output_block (n_tty.c:?) [ 18.287834] #4: (ptrval) (&(&port->lock)->rlock){-...}, at: pty_write (pty.c:?) [ 18.287838] #5: (ptrval) (console_lock){+.+.}, at: console_trylock_spinning (printk.c:?) [ 18.287841] [ 18.287842] stack backtrace: [ 18.287843] CPU: 0 PID: 202 Comm: stop Not tainted 4.19.248-00165-g3d1f971aa81f #1 [ 18.287843] Call Trace: [ 18.287844] dump_stack (??:?) [ 18.287845] print_circular_bug.cold+0x78/0x8b [ 18.287846] check_prev_add+0x66a/0xd20 [ 18.287847] check_prevs_add (lockdep.c:?) [ 18.287848] validate_chain+0x84a/0xe00 [ 18.287848] __lock_acquire (lockdep.c:?) [ 18.287849] lock_acquire (??:?) [ 18.287850] ? console_unlock (??:?) [ 18.287851] console_unlock (??:?) [ 18.287851] ? console_unlock (??:?) [ 18.287852] ? native_save_fl (??:?) [ 18.287853] vprintk_emit (??:?) [ 18.287854] vprintk_default (??:?) [ 18.287855] vprintk_func (??:?) [ 18.287855] printk (??:?) [ 18.287856] get_random_u32 (??:?) [ 18.287857] ? shuffle_freelist (slub.c:?) [ 18.287858] shuffle_freelist (slub.c:?) [ 18.287858] ? page_address (??:?) [ 18.287859] allocate_slab (slub.c:?) [ 18.287860] new_slab (slub.c:?) [ 18.287861] ? pvclock_clocksource_read (??:?) [ 18.287862] ___slab_alloc+0x6d0/0xb20 [ 18.287862] ? kvm_sched_clock_read (kvmclock.c:?) [ 18.287863] ? __slab_alloc+0xbc/0x2e0 [ 18.287864] ? native_wbinvd (paravirt.c:?) [ 18.287865] __slab_alloc+0xd6/0x2e0 [ 18.287865] __kmalloc (??:?) [ 18.287866] ? __lock_acquire (lockdep.c:?) [ 18.287867] ? tty_buffer_alloc (tty_buffer.c:?) [ 18.287868] tty_buffer_alloc (tty_buffer.c:?) [ 18.287869] __tty_buffer_request_room (tty_buffer.c:?) [ 18.287869] tty_insert_flip_string_fixed_flag (??:?) [ 18.287870] pty_write (pty.c:?) [ 18.287871] process_output_block (n_tty.c:?) [ 18.287872] n_tty_write (n_tty.c:?) [ 18.287873] ? print_dl_stats (??:?) [ 18.287874] ? n_tty_ioctl (n_tty.c:?) [ 18.287874] tty_write (tty_io.c:?) [ 18.287875] ? n_tty_ioctl (n_tty.c:?) [ 18.287876] ? tty_write_unlock (tty_io.c:?) [ 18.287877] __vfs_write (??:?) [ 18.287877] vfs_write (??:?) [ 18.287878] ? __fget_light (file.c:?) [ 18.287879] ksys_write (??:?) Cc: Sergey Senozhatsky <sergey.senozhatsky.work@gmail.com> Cc: Qian Cai <cai@lca.pw> Cc: Lech Perczak <l.perczak@camlintechnologies.com> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Cc: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> Cc: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com> Cc: John Ogness <john.ogness@linutronix.de> Reported-by: kernel test robot <oliver.sang@intel.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/Ytz+lo4zRQYG3JUR@xsang-OptiPlex-9020 Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 2b1299322016731d56807aa49254a5ea3080b6b3 upstream.
tl;dr: The Enhanced IBRS mitigation for Spectre v2 does not work as
documented for RET instructions after VM exits. Mitigate it with a new
one-entry RSB stuffing mechanism and a new LFENCE.
== Background ==
Indirect Branch Restricted Speculation (IBRS) was designed to help
mitigate Branch Target Injection and Speculative Store Bypass, i.e.
Spectre, attacks. IBRS prevents software run in less privileged modes
from affecting branch prediction in more privileged modes. IBRS requires
the MSR to be written on every privilege level change.
To overcome some of the performance issues of IBRS, Enhanced IBRS was
introduced. eIBRS is an "always on" IBRS, in other words, just turn
it on once instead of writing the MSR on every privilege level change.
When eIBRS is enabled, more privileged modes should be protected from
less privileged modes, including protecting VMMs from guests.
== Problem ==
Here's a simplification of how guests are run on Linux' KVM:
void run_kvm_guest(void)
{
// Prepare to run guest
VMRESUME();
// Clean up after guest runs
}
The execution flow for that would look something like this to the
processor:
1. Host-side: call run_kvm_guest()
2. Host-side: VMRESUME
3. Guest runs, does "CALL guest_function"
4. VM exit, host runs again
5. Host might make some "cleanup" function calls
6. Host-side: RET from run_kvm_guest()
Now, when back on the host, there are a couple of possible scenarios of
post-guest activity the host needs to do before executing host code:
* on pre-eIBRS hardware (legacy IBRS, or nothing at all), the RSB is not
touched and Linux has to do a 32-entry stuffing.
* on eIBRS hardware, VM exit with IBRS enabled, or restoring the host
IBRS=1 shortly after VM exit, has a documented side effect of flushing
the RSB except in this PBRSB situation where the software needs to stuff
the last RSB entry "by hand".
IOW, with eIBRS supported, host RET instructions should no longer be
influenced by guest behavior after the host retires a single CALL
instruction.
However, if the RET instructions are "unbalanced" with CALLs after a VM
exit as is the RET in #6, it might speculatively use the address for the
instruction after the CALL in #3 as an RSB prediction. This is a problem
since the (untrusted) guest controls this address.
Balanced CALL/RET instruction pairs such as in step #5 are not affected.
== Solution ==
The PBRSB issue affects a wide variety of Intel processors which
support eIBRS. But not all of them need mitigation. Today,
X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE triggers an RSB filling sequence that mitigates
PBRSB. Systems setting RETPOLINE need no further mitigation - i.e.,
eIBRS systems which enable retpoline explicitly.
However, such systems (X86_FEATURE_IBRS_ENHANCED) do not set RETPOLINE
and most of them need a new mitigation.
Therefore, introduce a new feature flag X86_FEATURE_RSB_VMEXIT_LITE
which triggers a lighter-weight PBRSB mitigation versus RSB Filling at
vmexit.
The lighter-weight mitigation performs a CALL instruction which is
immediately followed by a speculative execution barrier (INT3). This
steers speculative execution to the barrier -- just like a retpoline
-- which ensures that speculation can never reach an unbalanced RET.
Then, ensure this CALL is retired before continuing execution with an
LFENCE.
In other words, the window of exposure is opened at VM exit where RET
behavior is troublesome. While the window is open, force RSB predictions
sampling for RET targets to a dead end at the INT3. Close the window
with the LFENCE.
There is a subset of eIBRS systems which are not vulnerable to PBRSB.
Add these systems to the cpu_vuln_whitelist[] as NO_EIBRS_PBRSB.
Future systems that aren't vulnerable will set ARCH_CAP_PBRSB_NO.
[ bp: Massage, incorporate review comments from Andy Cooper. ]
[ Pawan: Update commit message to replace RSB_VMEXIT with RETPOLINE ]
Signed-off-by: Daniel Sneddon <daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com>
Co-developed-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 2fa7d94afc1afbb4d702760c058dc2d7ed30f226 upstream.
The first commit cited below attempts to fix the off-by-one error that
appeared in some comparisons with an open range. Due to this error,
arithmetically equivalent pieces of code could get different verdicts
from the verifier, for example (pseudocode):
// 1. Passes the verifier:
if (data + 8 > data_end)
return early
read *(u64 *)data, i.e. [data; data+7]
// 2. Rejected by the verifier (should still pass):
if (data + 7 >= data_end)
return early
read *(u64 *)data, i.e. [data; data+7]
The attempted fix, however, shifts the range by one in a wrong
direction, so the bug not only remains, but also such piece of code
starts failing in the verifier:
// 3. Rejected by the verifier, but the check is stricter than in #1.
if (data + 8 >= data_end)
return early
read *(u64 *)data, i.e. [data; data+7]
The change performed by that fix converted an off-by-one bug into
off-by-two. The second commit cited below added the BPF selftests
written to ensure than code chunks like #3 are rejected, however,
they should be accepted.
This commit fixes the off-by-two error by adjusting new_range in the
right direction and fixes the tests by changing the range into the
one that should actually fail.
Fixes: fb2a311 ("bpf: fix off by one for range markings with L{T, E} patterns")
Fixes: b37242c ("bpf: add test cases to bpf selftests to cover all access tests")
Signed-off-by: Maxim Mikityanskiy <maximmi@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20211130181607.593149-1-maximmi@nvidia.com
[OP: cherry-pick selftest changes only]
Signed-off-by: Ovidiu Panait <ovidiu.panait@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 9c6d778800b921bde3bff3cff5003d1650f942d1 upstream. Automatic kernel fuzzing revealed a recursive locking violation in usb-storage: ============================================ WARNING: possible recursive locking detected 5.18.0 #3 Not tainted -------------------------------------------- kworker/1:3/1205 is trying to acquire lock: ffff888018638db8 (&us_interface_key[i]){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: usb_stor_pre_reset+0x35/0x40 drivers/usb/storage/usb.c:230 but task is already holding lock: ffff888018638db8 (&us_interface_key[i]){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: usb_stor_pre_reset+0x35/0x40 drivers/usb/storage/usb.c:230 ... stack backtrace: CPU: 1 PID: 1205 Comm: kworker/1:3 Not tainted 5.18.0 #3 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.13.0-1ubuntu1.1 04/01/2014 Workqueue: usb_hub_wq hub_event Call Trace: <TASK> __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline] dump_stack_lvl+0xcd/0x134 lib/dump_stack.c:106 print_deadlock_bug kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2988 [inline] check_deadlock kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3031 [inline] validate_chain kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3816 [inline] __lock_acquire.cold+0x152/0x3ca kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5053 lock_acquire kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5665 [inline] lock_acquire+0x1ab/0x520 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5630 __mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:603 [inline] __mutex_lock+0x14f/0x1610 kernel/locking/mutex.c:747 usb_stor_pre_reset+0x35/0x40 drivers/usb/storage/usb.c:230 usb_reset_device+0x37d/0x9a0 drivers/usb/core/hub.c:6109 r871xu_dev_remove+0x21a/0x270 drivers/staging/rtl8712/usb_intf.c:622 usb_unbind_interface+0x1bd/0x890 drivers/usb/core/driver.c:458 device_remove drivers/base/dd.c:545 [inline] device_remove+0x11f/0x170 drivers/base/dd.c:537 __device_release_driver drivers/base/dd.c:1222 [inline] device_release_driver_internal+0x1a7/0x2f0 drivers/base/dd.c:1248 usb_driver_release_interface+0x102/0x180 drivers/usb/core/driver.c:627 usb_forced_unbind_intf+0x4d/0xa0 drivers/usb/core/driver.c:1118 usb_reset_device+0x39b/0x9a0 drivers/usb/core/hub.c:6114 This turned out not to be an error in usb-storage but rather a nested device reset attempt. That is, as the rtl8712 driver was being unbound from a composite device in preparation for an unrelated USB reset (that driver does not have pre_reset or post_reset callbacks), its ->remove routine called usb_reset_device() -- thus nesting one reset call within another. Performing a reset as part of disconnect processing is a questionable practice at best. However, the bug report points out that the USB core does not have any protection against nested resets. Adding a reset_in_progress flag and testing it will prevent such errors in the future. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/CAB7eexKUpvX-JNiLzhXBDWgfg2T9e9_0Tw4HQ6keN==voRbP0g@mail.gmail.com/ Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reported-and-tested-by: Rondreis <linhaoguo86@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Alan Stern <stern@rowland.harvard.edu> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/YwkflDxvg0KWqyZK@rowland.harvard.edu Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Sep 16, 2022
[ Upstream commit 84a53580c5d2138c7361c7c3eea5b31827e63b35 ] The SRv6 layer allows defining HMAC data that can later be used to sign IPv6 Segment Routing Headers. This configuration is realised via netlink through four attributes: SEG6_ATTR_HMACKEYID, SEG6_ATTR_SECRET, SEG6_ATTR_SECRETLEN and SEG6_ATTR_ALGID. Because the SECRETLEN attribute is decoupled from the actual length of the SECRET attribute, it is possible to provide invalid combinations (e.g., secret = "", secretlen = 64). This case is not checked in the code and with an appropriately crafted netlink message, an out-of-bounds read of up to 64 bytes (max secret length) can occur past the skb end pointer and into skb_shared_info: Breakpoint 1, seg6_genl_sethmac (skb=<optimized out>, info=<optimized out>) at net/ipv6/seg6.c:208 208 memcpy(hinfo->secret, secret, slen); (gdb) bt #0 seg6_genl_sethmac (skb=<optimized out>, info=<optimized out>) at net/ipv6/seg6.c:208 #1 0xffffffff81e012e9 in genl_family_rcv_msg_doit (skb=skb@entry=0xffff88800b1f9f00, nlh=nlh@entry=0xffff88800b1b7600, extack=extack@entry=0xffffc90000ba7af0, ops=ops@entry=0xffffc90000ba7a80, hdrlen=4, net=0xffffffff84237580 <init_net>, family=<optimized out>, family=<optimized out>) at net/netlink/genetlink.c:731 #2 0xffffffff81e01435 in genl_family_rcv_msg (extack=0xffffc90000ba7af0, nlh=0xffff88800b1b7600, skb=0xffff88800b1f9f00, family=0xffffffff82fef6c0 <seg6_genl_family>) at net/netlink/genetlink.c:775 #3 genl_rcv_msg (skb=0xffff88800b1f9f00, nlh=0xffff88800b1b7600, extack=0xffffc90000ba7af0) at net/netlink/genetlink.c:792 #4 0xffffffff81dfffc3 in netlink_rcv_skb (skb=skb@entry=0xffff88800b1f9f00, cb=cb@entry=0xffffffff81e01350 <genl_rcv_msg>) at net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2501 #5 0xffffffff81e00919 in genl_rcv (skb=0xffff88800b1f9f00) at net/netlink/genetlink.c:803 #6 0xffffffff81dff6ae in netlink_unicast_kernel (ssk=0xffff888010eec800, skb=0xffff88800b1f9f00, sk=0xffff888004aed000) at net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1319 #7 netlink_unicast (ssk=ssk@entry=0xffff888010eec800, skb=skb@entry=0xffff88800b1f9f00, portid=portid@entry=0, nonblock=<optimized out>) at net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1345 #8 0xffffffff81dff9a4 in netlink_sendmsg (sock=<optimized out>, msg=0xffffc90000ba7e48, len=<optimized out>) at net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1921 ... (gdb) p/x ((struct sk_buff *)0xffff88800b1f9f00)->head + ((struct sk_buff *)0xffff88800b1f9f00)->end $1 = 0xffff88800b1b76c0 (gdb) p/x secret $2 = 0xffff88800b1b76c0 (gdb) p slen $3 = 64 '@' The OOB data can then be read back from userspace by dumping HMAC state. This commit fixes this by ensuring SECRETLEN cannot exceed the actual length of SECRET. Reported-by: Lucas Leong <wmliang.tw@gmail.com> Tested: verified that EINVAL is correctly returned when secretlen > len(secret) Fixes: 4f4853d ("ipv6: sr: implement API to control SR HMAC structure") Signed-off-by: David Lebrun <dlebrun@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
raystef66
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Nov 23, 2022
commit 2b1299322016731d56807aa49254a5ea3080b6b3 upstream.
tl;dr: The Enhanced IBRS mitigation for Spectre v2 does not work as
documented for RET instructions after VM exits. Mitigate it with a new
one-entry RSB stuffing mechanism and a new LFENCE.
== Background ==
Indirect Branch Restricted Speculation (IBRS) was designed to help
mitigate Branch Target Injection and Speculative Store Bypass, i.e.
Spectre, attacks. IBRS prevents software run in less privileged modes
from affecting branch prediction in more privileged modes. IBRS requires
the MSR to be written on every privilege level change.
To overcome some of the performance issues of IBRS, Enhanced IBRS was
introduced. eIBRS is an "always on" IBRS, in other words, just turn
it on once instead of writing the MSR on every privilege level change.
When eIBRS is enabled, more privileged modes should be protected from
less privileged modes, including protecting VMMs from guests.
== Problem ==
Here's a simplification of how guests are run on Linux' KVM:
void run_kvm_guest(void)
{
// Prepare to run guest
VMRESUME();
// Clean up after guest runs
}
The execution flow for that would look something like this to the
processor:
1. Host-side: call run_kvm_guest()
2. Host-side: VMRESUME
3. Guest runs, does "CALL guest_function"
4. VM exit, host runs again
5. Host might make some "cleanup" function calls
6. Host-side: RET from run_kvm_guest()
Now, when back on the host, there are a couple of possible scenarios of
post-guest activity the host needs to do before executing host code:
* on pre-eIBRS hardware (legacy IBRS, or nothing at all), the RSB is not
touched and Linux has to do a 32-entry stuffing.
* on eIBRS hardware, VM exit with IBRS enabled, or restoring the host
IBRS=1 shortly after VM exit, has a documented side effect of flushing
the RSB except in this PBRSB situation where the software needs to stuff
the last RSB entry "by hand".
IOW, with eIBRS supported, host RET instructions should no longer be
influenced by guest behavior after the host retires a single CALL
instruction.
However, if the RET instructions are "unbalanced" with CALLs after a VM
exit as is the RET in #6, it might speculatively use the address for the
instruction after the CALL in #3 as an RSB prediction. This is a problem
since the (untrusted) guest controls this address.
Balanced CALL/RET instruction pairs such as in step #5 are not affected.
== Solution ==
The PBRSB issue affects a wide variety of Intel processors which
support eIBRS. But not all of them need mitigation. Today,
X86_FEATURE_RSB_VMEXIT triggers an RSB filling sequence that mitigates
PBRSB. Systems setting RSB_VMEXIT need no further mitigation - i.e.,
eIBRS systems which enable legacy IBRS explicitly.
However, such systems (X86_FEATURE_IBRS_ENHANCED) do not set RSB_VMEXIT
and most of them need a new mitigation.
Therefore, introduce a new feature flag X86_FEATURE_RSB_VMEXIT_LITE
which triggers a lighter-weight PBRSB mitigation versus RSB_VMEXIT.
The lighter-weight mitigation performs a CALL instruction which is
immediately followed by a speculative execution barrier (INT3). This
steers speculative execution to the barrier -- just like a retpoline
-- which ensures that speculation can never reach an unbalanced RET.
Then, ensure this CALL is retired before continuing execution with an
LFENCE.
In other words, the window of exposure is opened at VM exit where RET
behavior is troublesome. While the window is open, force RSB predictions
sampling for RET targets to a dead end at the INT3. Close the window
with the LFENCE.
There is a subset of eIBRS systems which are not vulnerable to PBRSB.
Add these systems to the cpu_vuln_whitelist[] as NO_EIBRS_PBRSB.
Future systems that aren't vulnerable will set ARCH_CAP_PBRSB_NO.
[ bp: Massage, incorporate review comments from Andy Cooper. ]
Signed-off-by: Daniel Sneddon <daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com>
Co-developed-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
[ bp: Adjust patch to account for kvm entry being in c ]
Signed-off-by: Suraj Jitindar Singh <surajjs@amazon.com>
Signed-off-by: Suleiman Souhlal <suleiman@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
raystef66
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Dec 9, 2022
commit b740d806166979488e798e41743aaec051f2443f upstream.
Syzbot reported the following lockdep splat
======================================================
WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
6.0.0-rc7-syzkaller-18095-gbbed346d5a96 #0 Not tainted
------------------------------------------------------
syz-executor307/3029 is trying to acquire lock:
ffff0000c02525d8 (&mm->mmap_lock){++++}-{3:3}, at: __might_fault+0x54/0xb4 mm/memory.c:5576
but task is already holding lock:
ffff0000c958a608 (btrfs-root-00){++++}-{3:3}, at: __btrfs_tree_read_lock fs/btrfs/locking.c:134 [inline]
ffff0000c958a608 (btrfs-root-00){++++}-{3:3}, at: btrfs_tree_read_lock fs/btrfs/locking.c:140 [inline]
ffff0000c958a608 (btrfs-root-00){++++}-{3:3}, at: btrfs_read_lock_root_node+0x13c/0x1c0 fs/btrfs/locking.c:279
which lock already depends on the new lock.
the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:
-> #3 (btrfs-root-00){++++}-{3:3}:
down_read_nested+0x64/0x84 kernel/locking/rwsem.c:1624
__btrfs_tree_read_lock fs/btrfs/locking.c:134 [inline]
btrfs_tree_read_lock fs/btrfs/locking.c:140 [inline]
btrfs_read_lock_root_node+0x13c/0x1c0 fs/btrfs/locking.c:279
btrfs_search_slot_get_root+0x74/0x338 fs/btrfs/ctree.c:1637
btrfs_search_slot+0x1b0/0xfd8 fs/btrfs/ctree.c:1944
btrfs_update_root+0x6c/0x5a0 fs/btrfs/root-tree.c:132
commit_fs_roots+0x1f0/0x33c fs/btrfs/transaction.c:1459
btrfs_commit_transaction+0x89c/0x12d8 fs/btrfs/transaction.c:2343
flush_space+0x66c/0x738 fs/btrfs/space-info.c:786
btrfs_async_reclaim_metadata_space+0x43c/0x4e0 fs/btrfs/space-info.c:1059
process_one_work+0x2d8/0x504 kernel/workqueue.c:2289
worker_thread+0x340/0x610 kernel/workqueue.c:2436
kthread+0x12c/0x158 kernel/kthread.c:376
ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S:860
-> #2 (&fs_info->reloc_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}:
__mutex_lock_common+0xd4/0xca8 kernel/locking/mutex.c:603
__mutex_lock kernel/locking/mutex.c:747 [inline]
mutex_lock_nested+0x38/0x44 kernel/locking/mutex.c:799
btrfs_record_root_in_trans fs/btrfs/transaction.c:516 [inline]
start_transaction+0x248/0x944 fs/btrfs/transaction.c:752
btrfs_start_transaction+0x34/0x44 fs/btrfs/transaction.c:781
btrfs_create_common+0xf0/0x1b4 fs/btrfs/inode.c:6651
btrfs_create+0x8c/0xb0 fs/btrfs/inode.c:6697
lookup_open fs/namei.c:3413 [inline]
open_last_lookups fs/namei.c:3481 [inline]
path_openat+0x804/0x11c4 fs/namei.c:3688
do_filp_open+0xdc/0x1b8 fs/namei.c:3718
do_sys_openat2+0xb8/0x22c fs/open.c:1313
do_sys_open fs/open.c:1329 [inline]
__do_sys_openat fs/open.c:1345 [inline]
__se_sys_openat fs/open.c:1340 [inline]
__arm64_sys_openat+0xb0/0xe0 fs/open.c:1340
__invoke_syscall arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:38 [inline]
invoke_syscall arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:52 [inline]
el0_svc_common+0x138/0x220 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:142
do_el0_svc+0x48/0x164 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:206
el0_svc+0x58/0x150 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:636
el0t_64_sync_handler+0x84/0xf0 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:654
el0t_64_sync+0x18c/0x190 arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S:581
-> #1 (sb_internal#2){.+.+}-{0:0}:
percpu_down_read include/linux/percpu-rwsem.h:51 [inline]
__sb_start_write include/linux/fs.h:1826 [inline]
sb_start_intwrite include/linux/fs.h:1948 [inline]
start_transaction+0x360/0x944 fs/btrfs/transaction.c:683
btrfs_join_transaction+0x30/0x40 fs/btrfs/transaction.c:795
btrfs_dirty_inode+0x50/0x140 fs/btrfs/inode.c:6103
btrfs_update_time+0x1c0/0x1e8 fs/btrfs/inode.c:6145
inode_update_time fs/inode.c:1872 [inline]
touch_atime+0x1f0/0x4a8 fs/inode.c:1945
file_accessed include/linux/fs.h:2516 [inline]
btrfs_file_mmap+0x50/0x88 fs/btrfs/file.c:2407
call_mmap include/linux/fs.h:2192 [inline]
mmap_region+0x7fc/0xc14 mm/mmap.c:1752
do_mmap+0x644/0x97c mm/mmap.c:1540
vm_mmap_pgoff+0xe8/0x1d0 mm/util.c:552
ksys_mmap_pgoff+0x1cc/0x278 mm/mmap.c:1586
__do_sys_mmap arch/arm64/kernel/sys.c:28 [inline]
__se_sys_mmap arch/arm64/kernel/sys.c:21 [inline]
__arm64_sys_mmap+0x58/0x6c arch/arm64/kernel/sys.c:21
__invoke_syscall arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:38 [inline]
invoke_syscall arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:52 [inline]
el0_svc_common+0x138/0x220 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:142
do_el0_svc+0x48/0x164 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:206
el0_svc+0x58/0x150 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:636
el0t_64_sync_handler+0x84/0xf0 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:654
el0t_64_sync+0x18c/0x190 arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S:581
-> #0 (&mm->mmap_lock){++++}-{3:3}:
check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3095 [inline]
check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3214 [inline]
validate_chain kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3829 [inline]
__lock_acquire+0x1530/0x30a4 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5053
lock_acquire+0x100/0x1f8 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5666
__might_fault+0x7c/0xb4 mm/memory.c:5577
_copy_to_user include/linux/uaccess.h:134 [inline]
copy_to_user include/linux/uaccess.h:160 [inline]
btrfs_ioctl_get_subvol_rootref+0x3a8/0x4bc fs/btrfs/ioctl.c:3203
btrfs_ioctl+0xa08/0xa64 fs/btrfs/ioctl.c:5556
vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline]
__do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:870 [inline]
__se_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:856 [inline]
__arm64_sys_ioctl+0xd0/0x140 fs/ioctl.c:856
__invoke_syscall arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:38 [inline]
invoke_syscall arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:52 [inline]
el0_svc_common+0x138/0x220 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:142
do_el0_svc+0x48/0x164 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:206
el0_svc+0x58/0x150 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:636
el0t_64_sync_handler+0x84/0xf0 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:654
el0t_64_sync+0x18c/0x190 arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S:581
other info that might help us debug this:
Chain exists of:
&mm->mmap_lock --> &fs_info->reloc_mutex --> btrfs-root-00
Possible unsafe locking scenario:
CPU0 CPU1
---- ----
lock(btrfs-root-00);
lock(&fs_info->reloc_mutex);
lock(btrfs-root-00);
lock(&mm->mmap_lock);
*** DEADLOCK ***
1 lock held by syz-executor307/3029:
#0: ffff0000c958a608 (btrfs-root-00){++++}-{3:3}, at: __btrfs_tree_read_lock fs/btrfs/locking.c:134 [inline]
#0: ffff0000c958a608 (btrfs-root-00){++++}-{3:3}, at: btrfs_tree_read_lock fs/btrfs/locking.c:140 [inline]
#0: ffff0000c958a608 (btrfs-root-00){++++}-{3:3}, at: btrfs_read_lock_root_node+0x13c/0x1c0 fs/btrfs/locking.c:279
stack backtrace:
CPU: 0 PID: 3029 Comm: syz-executor307 Not tainted 6.0.0-rc7-syzkaller-18095-gbbed346d5a96 #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 09/30/2022
Call trace:
dump_backtrace+0x1c4/0x1f0 arch/arm64/kernel/stacktrace.c:156
show_stack+0x2c/0x54 arch/arm64/kernel/stacktrace.c:163
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline]
dump_stack_lvl+0x104/0x16c lib/dump_stack.c:106
dump_stack+0x1c/0x58 lib/dump_stack.c:113
print_circular_bug+0x2c4/0x2c8 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2053
check_noncircular+0x14c/0x154 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2175
check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3095 [inline]
check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3214 [inline]
validate_chain kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3829 [inline]
__lock_acquire+0x1530/0x30a4 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5053
lock_acquire+0x100/0x1f8 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5666
__might_fault+0x7c/0xb4 mm/memory.c:5577
_copy_to_user include/linux/uaccess.h:134 [inline]
copy_to_user include/linux/uaccess.h:160 [inline]
btrfs_ioctl_get_subvol_rootref+0x3a8/0x4bc fs/btrfs/ioctl.c:3203
btrfs_ioctl+0xa08/0xa64 fs/btrfs/ioctl.c:5556
vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline]
__do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:870 [inline]
__se_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:856 [inline]
__arm64_sys_ioctl+0xd0/0x140 fs/ioctl.c:856
__invoke_syscall arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:38 [inline]
invoke_syscall arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:52 [inline]
el0_svc_common+0x138/0x220 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:142
do_el0_svc+0x48/0x164 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:206
el0_svc+0x58/0x150 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:636
el0t_64_sync_handler+0x84/0xf0 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:654
el0t_64_sync+0x18c/0x190 arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S:581
We do generally the right thing here, copying the references into a
temporary buffer, however we are still holding the path when we do
copy_to_user from the temporary buffer. Fix this by freeing the path
before we copy to user space.
Reported-by: syzbot+4ef9e52e464c6ff47d9d@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.19+
Reviewed-by: Anand Jain <anand.jain@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
candyceline
pushed a commit
to candyceline/kernel_xiaomi_munch
that referenced
this issue
Jan 19, 2023
A recent clang 16 update has broken the functionality of `-polly-invariant-load-hoisting` and fails compilation when kernel is compiled with full LTO, causing the following backtrace: PLEASE submit a bug report to https://github.com/llvm/llvm-project/issues/ and include the crash backtrace, preprocessed source, and associated run script. Stack dump: 0. Program arguments: clang -Wp,-MD,drivers/md/.md.o.d -nostdinc -isystem /tmp/cirrus-ci-build/toolchains/clang/lib/clang/16.0.0/include -I../arch/arm64/include -I./arch/arm64/include/generated -I../include -I./include -I../arch/arm64/include/uapi -I./arch/arm64/include/generated/uapi -I../include/uapi -I./include/generated/uapi -include ../include/linux/kconfig.h -include ../include/linux/compiler_types.h -I../drivers/md -Idrivers/md -D__KERNEL__ -mlittle-endian -DKASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SHIFT=3 -Qunused-arguments -Wall -Wundef -Wstrict-prototypes -Wno-trigraphs -fno-strict-aliasing -fno-common -fshort-wchar -Werror-implicit-function-declaration -Werror=return-type -Wno-format-security -std=gnu89 --target=aarch64-linux-gnu --prefix=/tmp/cirrus-ci-build/Kernel/../toolchains/clang/bin/aarch64-linux-gnu- --gcc-toolchain=/tmp/cirrus-ci-build/toolchains/clang -Wno-misleading-indentation -Wno-bool-operation -Werror=unknown-warning-option -Wno-unsequenced -opaque-pointers -fno-PIE -mgeneral-regs-only -DCONFIG_AS_LSE=1 -fno-asynchronous-unwind-tables -Wno-psabi -DKASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SHIFT=3 -fno-delete-null-pointer-checks -Wno-frame-address -Wno-int-in-bool-context -Wno-address-of-packed-member -O3 -march=armv8.1-a+crypto+fp16+rcpc -mtune=cortex-a53 -mllvm -polly -mllvm -polly-ast-use-context -mllvm -polly-detect-keep-going -mllvm -polly-invariant-load-hoisting -mllvm -polly-run-inliner -mllvm -polly-vectorizer=stripmine -mllvm -polly-loopfusion-greedy=1 -mllvm -polly-reschedule=1 -mllvm -polly-postopts=1 -fstack-protector-strong --target=aarch64-linux-gnu --gcc-toolchain=/tmp/cirrus-ci-build/toolchains/clang -meabi gnu -Wno-format-invalid-specifier -Wno-gnu -Wno-duplicate-decl-specifier -Wno-asm-operand-widths -Wno-initializer-overrides -Wno-tautological-constant-out-of-range-compare -Wno-tautological-compare -mno-global-merge -Wno-void-ptr-dereference -Wno-unused-but-set-variable -Wno-unused-const-variable -fno-omit-frame-pointer -fno-optimize-sibling-calls -Wvla -flto -fwhole-program-vtables -fvisibility=hidden -Wdeclaration-after-statement -Wno-pointer-sign -Wno-array-bounds -fno-strict-overflow -fno-stack-check -Werror=implicit-int -Werror=strict-prototypes -Werror=date-time -Werror=incompatible-pointer-types -fmacro-prefix-map=../= -Wno-initializer-overrides -Wno-unused-value -Wno-format -Wno-sign-compare -Wno-format-zero-length -Wno-uninitialized -Wno-pointer-to-enum-cast -Wno-unaligned-access -DKBUILD_BASENAME=\"md\" -DKBUILD_MODNAME=\"md_mod\" -D__KBUILD_MODNAME=kmod_md_mod -c -o drivers/md/md.o ../drivers/md/md.c 1. <eof> parser at end of file 2. Optimizer CC drivers/media/platform/msm/camera_v2/camera/camera.o AR drivers/media/pci/intel/ipu3/built-in.a CC drivers/md/dm-linear.o #0 0x0000559d3527073f (/tmp/cirrus-ci-build/toolchains/clang/bin/clang-16+0x3a7073f) raystef66#1 0x0000559d352705bf (/tmp/cirrus-ci-build/toolchains/clang/bin/clang-16+0x3a705bf) raystef66#2 0x0000559d3523b198 (/tmp/cirrus-ci-build/toolchains/clang/bin/clang-16+0x3a3b198) raystef66#3 0x0000559d3523b33e (/tmp/cirrus-ci-build/toolchains/clang/bin/clang-16+0x3a3b33e) raystef66#4 0x00007f339dc3ea00 (/usr/lib/libc.so.6+0x38a00) raystef66#5 0x0000559d35affccf (/tmp/cirrus-ci-build/toolchains/clang/bin/clang-16+0x42ffccf) raystef66#6 0x0000559d35b01710 (/tmp/cirrus-ci-build/toolchains/clang/bin/clang-16+0x4301710) raystef66#7 0x0000559d35b01a12 (/tmp/cirrus-ci-build/toolchains/clang/bin/clang-16+0x4301a12) raystef66#8 0x0000559d35b09a9e (/tmp/cirrus-ci-build/toolchains/clang/bin/clang-16+0x4309a9e) raystef66#9 0x0000559d35b14707 (/tmp/cirrus-ci-build/toolchains/clang/bin/clang-16+0x4314707) clang-16: error: clang frontend command failed with exit code 139 (use -v to see invocation) Neutron clang version 16.0.0 (https://github.com/llvm/llvm-project.git 598f5275c16049b1e1b5bc934cbde447a82d485e) Target: aarch64-unknown-linux-gnu Thread model: posix InstalledDir: /tmp/cirrus-ci-build/Kernel/../toolchains/clang/bin Therefore, move `-polly-invariant-load-hoisting` to the bottom and use it conditionally when clang < 16. This is to be noted that a condition for LTO has not been used here specifically since the broken polly flag can harm the binaries regardless of the usage of LTO in some unwanted scenarios and ways. Additionally, if we conditionally use polly for LTO only, or with LTO and Clang < 16 condition, old compilers will not be able to use the flag without LTO at all. Therefore, just abandon this flag entirely for clang >= 16. Signed-off-by: Tashfin Shakeer Rhythm <tashfinshakeerrhythm@gmail.com>
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…g the sock [ Upstream commit 3cf7203ca620682165706f70a1b12b5194607dce ] There is a race condition in vxlan that when deleting a vxlan device during receiving packets, there is a possibility that the sock is released after getting vxlan_sock vs from sk_user_data. Then in later vxlan_ecn_decapsulate(), vxlan_get_sk_family() we will got NULL pointer dereference. e.g. #0 [ffffa25ec6978a38] machine_kexec at ffffffff8c669757 raystef66#1 [ffffa25ec6978a90] __crash_kexec at ffffffff8c7c0a4d raystef66#2 [ffffa25ec6978b58] crash_kexec at ffffffff8c7c1c48 raystef66#3 [ffffa25ec6978b60] oops_end at ffffffff8c627f2b raystef66#4 [ffffa25ec6978b80] page_fault_oops at ffffffff8c678fcb raystef66#5 [ffffa25ec6978bd8] exc_page_fault at ffffffff8d109542 raystef66#6 [ffffa25ec6978c00] asm_exc_page_fault at ffffffff8d200b62 [exception RIP: vxlan_ecn_decapsulate+0x3b] RIP: ffffffffc1014e7b RSP: ffffa25ec6978cb0 RFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 0000000000000008 RBX: ffff8aa000888000 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 000000000000000e RSI: ffff8a9fc7ab803e RDI: ffff8a9fd1168700 RBP: ffff8a9fc7ab803e R8: 0000000000700000 R9: 00000000000010ae R10: ffff8a9fcb748980 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff8a9fd1168700 R13: ffff8aa000888000 R14: 00000000002a0000 R15: 00000000000010ae ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff CS: 0010 SS: 0018 raystef66#7 [ffffa25ec6978ce8] vxlan_rcv at ffffffffc10189cd [vxlan] raystef66#8 [ffffa25ec6978d90] udp_queue_rcv_one_skb at ffffffff8cfb6507 raystef66#9 [ffffa25ec6978dc0] udp_unicast_rcv_skb at ffffffff8cfb6e45 raystef66#10 [ffffa25ec6978dc8] __udp4_lib_rcv at ffffffff8cfb8807 #11 [ffffa25ec6978e20] ip_protocol_deliver_rcu at ffffffff8cf76951 raystef66#12 [ffffa25ec6978e48] ip_local_deliver at ffffffff8cf76bde raystef66#13 [ffffa25ec6978ea0] __netif_receive_skb_one_core at ffffffff8cecde9b raystef66#14 [ffffa25ec6978ec8] process_backlog at ffffffff8cece139 raystef66#15 [ffffa25ec6978f00] __napi_poll at ffffffff8ceced1a raystef66#16 [ffffa25ec6978f28] net_rx_action at ffffffff8cecf1f3 raystef66#17 [ffffa25ec6978fa0] __softirqentry_text_start at ffffffff8d4000ca raystef66#18 [ffffa25ec6978ff0] do_softirq at ffffffff8c6fbdc3 Reproducer: https://github.com/Mellanox/ovs-tests/blob/master/test-ovs-vxlan-remove-tunnel-during-traffic.sh Fix this by waiting for all sk_user_data reader to finish before releasing the sock. Reported-by: Jianlin Shi <jishi@redhat.com> Suggested-by: Jakub Sitnicki <jakub@cloudflare.com> Fixes: 6a93cc9 ("udp-tunnel: Add a few more UDP tunnel APIs") Signed-off-by: Hangbin Liu <liuhangbin@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Jiri Pirko <jiri@nvidia.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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commit 11933cf1d91d57da9e5c53822a540bbdc2656c16 upstream.
The propagate_mnt() function handles mount propagation when creating
mounts and propagates the source mount tree @source_mnt to all
applicable nodes of the destination propagation mount tree headed by
@dest_mnt.
Unfortunately it contains a bug where it fails to terminate at peers of
@source_mnt when looking up copies of the source mount that become
masters for copies of the source mount tree mounted on top of slaves in
the destination propagation tree causing a NULL dereference.
Once the mechanics of the bug are understood it's easy to trigger.
Because of unprivileged user namespaces it is available to unprivileged
users.
While fixing this bug we've gotten confused multiple times due to
unclear terminology or missing concepts. So let's start this with some
clarifications:
* The terms "master" or "peer" denote a shared mount. A shared mount
belongs to a peer group.
* A peer group is a set of shared mounts that propagate to each other.
They are identified by a peer group id. The peer group id is available
in @shared_mnt->mnt_group_id.
Shared mounts within the same peer group have the same peer group id.
The peers in a peer group can be reached via @shared_mnt->mnt_share.
* The terms "slave mount" or "dependent mount" denote a mount that
receives propagation from a peer in a peer group. IOW, shared mounts
may have slave mounts and slave mounts have shared mounts as their
master. Slave mounts of a given peer in a peer group are listed on
that peers slave list available at @shared_mnt->mnt_slave_list.
* The term "master mount" denotes a mount in a peer group. IOW, it
denotes a shared mount or a peer mount in a peer group. The term
"master mount" - or "master" for short - is mostly used when talking
in the context of slave mounts that receive propagation from a master
mount. A master mount of a slave identifies the closest peer group a
slave mount receives propagation from. The master mount of a slave can
be identified via @slave_mount->mnt_master. Different slaves may point
to different masters in the same peer group.
* Multiple peers in a peer group can have non-empty ->mnt_slave_lists.
Non-empty ->mnt_slave_lists of peers don't intersect. Consequently, to
ensure all slave mounts of a peer group are visited the
->mnt_slave_lists of all peers in a peer group have to be walked.
* Slave mounts point to a peer in the closest peer group they receive
propagation from via @slave_mnt->mnt_master (see above). Together with
these peers they form a propagation group (see below). The closest
peer group can thus be identified through the peer group id
@slave_mnt->mnt_master->mnt_group_id of the peer/master that a slave
mount receives propagation from.
* A shared-slave mount is a slave mount to a peer group pg1 while also
a peer in another peer group pg2. IOW, a peer group may receive
propagation from another peer group.
If a peer group pg1 is a slave to another peer group pg2 then all
peers in peer group pg1 point to the same peer in peer group pg2 via
->mnt_master. IOW, all peers in peer group pg1 appear on the same
->mnt_slave_list. IOW, they cannot be slaves to different peer groups.
* A pure slave mount is a slave mount that is a slave to a peer group
but is not a peer in another peer group.
* A propagation group denotes the set of mounts consisting of a single
peer group pg1 and all slave mounts and shared-slave mounts that point
to a peer in that peer group via ->mnt_master. IOW, all slave mounts
such that @slave_mnt->mnt_master->mnt_group_id is equal to
@shared_mnt->mnt_group_id.
The concept of a propagation group makes it easier to talk about a
single propagation level in a propagation tree.
For example, in propagate_mnt() the immediate peers of @dest_mnt and
all slaves of @dest_mnt's peer group form a propagation group propg1.
So a shared-slave mount that is a slave in propg1 and that is a peer
in another peer group pg2 forms another propagation group propg2
together with all slaves that point to that shared-slave mount in
their ->mnt_master.
* A propagation tree refers to all mounts that receive propagation
starting from a specific shared mount.
For example, for propagate_mnt() @dest_mnt is the start of a
propagation tree. The propagation tree ecompasses all mounts that
receive propagation from @dest_mnt's peer group down to the leafs.
With that out of the way let's get to the actual algorithm.
We know that @dest_mnt is guaranteed to be a pure shared mount or a
shared-slave mount. This is guaranteed by a check in
attach_recursive_mnt(). So propagate_mnt() will first propagate the
source mount tree to all peers in @dest_mnt's peer group:
for (n = next_peer(dest_mnt); n != dest_mnt; n = next_peer(n)) {
ret = propagate_one(n);
if (ret)
goto out;
}
Notice, that the peer propagation loop of propagate_mnt() doesn't
propagate @dest_mnt itself. @dest_mnt is mounted directly in
attach_recursive_mnt() after we propagated to the destination
propagation tree.
The mount that will be mounted on top of @dest_mnt is @source_mnt. This
copy was created earlier even before we entered attach_recursive_mnt()
and doesn't concern us a lot here.
It's just important to notice that when propagate_mnt() is called
@source_mnt will not yet have been mounted on top of @dest_mnt. Thus,
@source_mnt->mnt_parent will either still point to @source_mnt or - in
the case @source_mnt is moved and thus already attached - still to its
former parent.
For each peer @m in @dest_mnt's peer group propagate_one() will create a
new copy of the source mount tree and mount that copy @child on @m such
that @child->mnt_parent points to @m after propagate_one() returns.
propagate_one() will stash the last destination propagation node @m in
@last_dest and the last copy it created for the source mount tree in
@last_source.
Hence, if we call into propagate_one() again for the next destination
propagation node @m, @last_dest will point to the previous destination
propagation node and @last_source will point to the previous copy of the
source mount tree and mounted on @last_dest.
Each new copy of the source mount tree is created from the previous copy
of the source mount tree. This will become important later.
The peer loop in propagate_mnt() is straightforward. We iterate through
the peers copying and updating @last_source and @last_dest as we go
through them and mount each copy of the source mount tree @child on a
peer @m in @dest_mnt's peer group.
After propagate_mnt() handled the peers in @dest_mnt's peer group
propagate_mnt() will propagate the source mount tree down the
propagation tree that @dest_mnt's peer group propagates to:
for (m = next_group(dest_mnt, dest_mnt); m;
m = next_group(m, dest_mnt)) {
/* everything in that slave group */
n = m;
do {
ret = propagate_one(n);
if (ret)
goto out;
n = next_peer(n);
} while (n != m);
}
The next_group() helper will recursively walk the destination
propagation tree, descending into each propagation group of the
propagation tree.
The important part is that it takes care to propagate the source mount
tree to all peers in the peer group of a propagation group before it
propagates to the slaves to those peers in the propagation group. IOW,
it creates and mounts copies of the source mount tree that become
masters before it creates and mounts copies of the source mount tree
that become slaves to these masters.
It is important to remember that propagating the source mount tree to
each mount @m in the destination propagation tree simply means that we
create and mount new copies @child of the source mount tree on @m such
that @child->mnt_parent points to @m.
Since we know that each node @m in the destination propagation tree
headed by @dest_mnt's peer group will be overmounted with a copy of the
source mount tree and since we know that the propagation properties of
each copy of the source mount tree we create and mount at @m will mostly
mirror the propagation properties of @m. We can use that information to
create and mount the copies of the source mount tree that become masters
before their slaves.
The easy case is always when @m and @last_dest are peers in a peer group
of a given propagation group. In that case we know that we can simply
copy @last_source without having to figure out what the master for the
new copy @child of the source mount tree needs to be as we've done that
in a previous call to propagate_one().
The hard case is when we're dealing with a slave mount or a shared-slave
mount @m in a destination propagation group that we need to create and
mount a copy of the source mount tree on.
For each propagation group in the destination propagation tree we
propagate the source mount tree to we want to make sure that the copies
@child of the source mount tree we create and mount on slaves @m pick an
ealier copy of the source mount tree that we mounted on a master @m of
the destination propagation group as their master. This is a mouthful
but as far as we can tell that's the core of it all.
But, if we keep track of the masters in the destination propagation tree
@m we can use the information to find the correct master for each copy
of the source mount tree we create and mount at the slaves in the
destination propagation tree @m.
Let's walk through the base case as that's still fairly easy to grasp.
If we're dealing with the first slave in the propagation group that
@dest_mnt is in then we don't yet have marked any masters in the
destination propagation tree.
We know the master for the first slave to @dest_mnt's peer group is
simple @dest_mnt. So we expect this algorithm to yield a copy of the
source mount tree that was mounted on a peer in @dest_mnt's peer group
as the master for the copy of the source mount tree we want to mount at
the first slave @m:
for (n = m; ; n = p) {
p = n->mnt_master;
if (p == dest_master || IS_MNT_MARKED(p))
break;
}
For the first slave we walk the destination propagation tree all the way
up to a peer in @dest_mnt's peer group. IOW, the propagation hierarchy
can be walked by walking up the @mnt->mnt_master hierarchy of the
destination propagation tree @m. We will ultimately find a peer in
@dest_mnt's peer group and thus ultimately @dest_mnt->mnt_master.
Btw, here the assumption we listed at the beginning becomes important.
Namely, that peers in a peer group pg1 that are slaves in another peer
group pg2 appear on the same ->mnt_slave_list. IOW, all slaves who are
peers in peer group pg1 point to the same peer in peer group pg2 via
their ->mnt_master. Otherwise the termination condition in the code
above would be wrong and next_group() would be broken too.
So the first iteration sets:
n = m;
p = n->mnt_master;
such that @p now points to a peer or @dest_mnt itself. We walk up one
more level since we don't have any marked mounts. So we end up with:
n = dest_mnt;
p = dest_mnt->mnt_master;
If @dest_mnt's peer group is not slave to another peer group then @p is
now NULL. If @dest_mnt's peer group is a slave to another peer group
then @p now points to @dest_mnt->mnt_master points which is a master
outside the propagation tree we're dealing with.
Now we need to figure out the master for the copy of the source mount
tree we're about to create and mount on the first slave of @dest_mnt's
peer group:
do {
struct mount *parent = last_source->mnt_parent;
if (last_source == first_source)
break;
done = parent->mnt_master == p;
if (done && peers(n, parent))
break;
last_source = last_source->mnt_master;
} while (!done);
We know that @last_source->mnt_parent points to @last_dest and
@last_dest is the last peer in @dest_mnt's peer group we propagated to
in the peer loop in propagate_mnt().
Consequently, @last_source is the last copy we created and mount on that
last peer in @dest_mnt's peer group. So @last_source is the master we
want to pick.
We know that @last_source->mnt_parent->mnt_master points to
@last_dest->mnt_master. We also know that @last_dest->mnt_master is
either NULL or points to a master outside of the destination propagation
tree and so does @p. Hence:
done = parent->mnt_master == p;
is trivially true in the base condition.
We also know that for the first slave mount of @dest_mnt's peer group
that @last_dest either points @dest_mnt itself because it was
initialized to:
last_dest = dest_mnt;
at the beginning of propagate_mnt() or it will point to a peer of
@dest_mnt in its peer group. In both cases it is guaranteed that on the
first iteration @n and @parent are peers (Please note the check for
peers here as that's important.):
if (done && peers(n, parent))
break;
So, as we expected, we select @last_source, which referes to the last
copy of the source mount tree we mounted on the last peer in @dest_mnt's
peer group, as the master of the first slave in @dest_mnt's peer group.
The rest is taken care of by clone_mnt(last_source, ...). We'll skip
over that part otherwise this becomes a blogpost.
At the end of propagate_mnt() we now mark @m->mnt_master as the first
master in the destination propagation tree that is distinct from
@dest_mnt->mnt_master. IOW, we mark @dest_mnt itself as a master.
By marking @dest_mnt or one of it's peers we are able to easily find it
again when we later lookup masters for other copies of the source mount
tree we mount copies of the source mount tree on slaves @m to
@dest_mnt's peer group. This, in turn allows us to find the master we
selected for the copies of the source mount tree we mounted on master in
the destination propagation tree again.
The important part is to realize that the code makes use of the fact
that the last copy of the source mount tree stashed in @last_source was
mounted on top of the previous destination propagation node @last_dest.
What this means is that @last_source allows us to walk the destination
propagation hierarchy the same way each destination propagation node @m
does.
If we take @last_source, which is the copy of @source_mnt we have
mounted on @last_dest in the previous iteration of propagate_one(), then
we know @last_source->mnt_parent points to @last_dest but we also know
that as we walk through the destination propagation tree that
@last_source->mnt_master will point to an earlier copy of the source
mount tree we mounted one an earlier destination propagation node @m.
IOW, @last_source->mnt_parent will be our hook into the destination
propagation tree and each consecutive @last_source->mnt_master will lead
us to an earlier propagation node @m via
@last_source->mnt_master->mnt_parent.
Hence, by walking up @last_source->mnt_master, each of which is mounted
on a node that is a master @m in the destination propagation tree we can
also walk up the destination propagation hierarchy.
So, for each new destination propagation node @m we use the previous
copy of @last_source and the fact it's mounted on the previous
propagation node @last_dest via @last_source->mnt_master->mnt_parent to
determine what the master of the new copy of @last_source needs to be.
The goal is to find the _closest_ master that the new copy of the source
mount tree we are about to create and mount on a slave @m in the
destination propagation tree needs to pick. IOW, we want to find a
suitable master in the propagation group.
As the propagation structure of the source mount propagation tree we
create mirrors the propagation structure of the destination propagation
tree we can find @m's closest master - i.e., a marked master - which is
a peer in the closest peer group that @m receives propagation from. We
store that closest master of @m in @p as before and record the slave to
that master in @n
We then search for this master @p via @last_source by walking up the
master hierarchy starting from the last copy of the source mount tree
stored in @last_source that we created and mounted on the previous
destination propagation node @m.
We will try to find the master by walking @last_source->mnt_master and
by comparing @last_source->mnt_master->mnt_parent->mnt_master to @p. If
we find @p then we can figure out what earlier copy of the source mount
tree needs to be the master for the new copy of the source mount tree
we're about to create and mount at the current destination propagation
node @m.
If @last_source->mnt_master->mnt_parent and @n are peers then we know
that the closest master they receive propagation from is
@last_source->mnt_master->mnt_parent->mnt_master. If not then the
closest immediate peer group that they receive propagation from must be
one level higher up.
This builds on the earlier clarification at the beginning that all peers
in a peer group which are slaves of other peer groups all point to the
same ->mnt_master, i.e., appear on the same ->mnt_slave_list, of the
closest peer group that they receive propagation from.
However, terminating the walk has corner cases.
If the closest marked master for a given destination node @m cannot be
found by walking up the master hierarchy via @last_source->mnt_master
then we need to terminate the walk when we encounter @source_mnt again.
This isn't an arbitrary termination. It simply means that the new copy
of the source mount tree we're about to create has a copy of the source
mount tree we created and mounted on a peer in @dest_mnt's peer group as
its master. IOW, @source_mnt is the peer in the closest peer group that
the new copy of the source mount tree receives propagation from.
We absolutely have to stop @source_mnt because @last_source->mnt_master
either points outside the propagation hierarchy we're dealing with or it
is NULL because @source_mnt isn't a shared-slave.
So continuing the walk past @source_mnt would cause a NULL dereference
via @last_source->mnt_master->mnt_parent. And so we have to stop the
walk when we encounter @source_mnt again.
One scenario where this can happen is when we first handled a series of
slaves of @dest_mnt's peer group and then encounter peers in a new peer
group that is a slave to @dest_mnt's peer group. We handle them and then
we encounter another slave mount to @dest_mnt that is a pure slave to
@dest_mnt's peer group. That pure slave will have a peer in @dest_mnt's
peer group as its master. Consequently, the new copy of the source mount
tree will need to have @source_mnt as it's master. So we walk the
propagation hierarchy all the way up to @source_mnt based on
@last_source->mnt_master.
So terminate on @source_mnt, easy peasy. Except, that the check misses
something that the rest of the algorithm already handles.
If @dest_mnt has peers in it's peer group the peer loop in
propagate_mnt():
for (n = next_peer(dest_mnt); n != dest_mnt; n = next_peer(n)) {
ret = propagate_one(n);
if (ret)
goto out;
}
will consecutively update @last_source with each previous copy of the
source mount tree we created and mounted at the previous peer in
@dest_mnt's peer group. So after that loop terminates @last_source will
point to whatever copy of the source mount tree was created and mounted
on the last peer in @dest_mnt's peer group.
Furthermore, if there is even a single additional peer in @dest_mnt's
peer group then @last_source will __not__ point to @source_mnt anymore.
Because, as we mentioned above, @dest_mnt isn't even handled in this
loop but directly in attach_recursive_mnt(). So it can't even accidently
come last in that peer loop.
So the first time we handle a slave mount @m of @dest_mnt's peer group
the copy of the source mount tree we create will make the __last copy of
the source mount tree we created and mounted on the last peer in
@dest_mnt's peer group the master of the new copy of the source mount
tree we create and mount on the first slave of @dest_mnt's peer group__.
But this means that the termination condition that checks for
@source_mnt is wrong. The @source_mnt cannot be found anymore by
propagate_one(). Instead it will find the last copy of the source mount
tree we created and mounted for the last peer of @dest_mnt's peer group
again. And that is a peer of @source_mnt not @source_mnt itself.
IOW, we fail to terminate the loop correctly and ultimately dereference
@last_source->mnt_master->mnt_parent. When @source_mnt's peer group
isn't slave to another peer group then @last_source->mnt_master is NULL
causing the splat below.
For example, assume @dest_mnt is a pure shared mount and has three peers
in its peer group:
===================================================================================
mount-id mount-parent-id peer-group-id
===================================================================================
(@dest_mnt) mnt_master[216] 309 297 shared:216
\
(@source_mnt) mnt_master[218]: 609 609 shared:218
(1) mnt_master[216]: 607 605 shared:216
\
(P1) mnt_master[218]: 624 607 shared:218
(2) mnt_master[216]: 576 574 shared:216
\
(P2) mnt_master[218]: 625 576 shared:218
(3) mnt_master[216]: 545 543 shared:216
\
(P3) mnt_master[218]: 626 545 shared:218
After this sequence has been processed @last_source will point to (P3),
the copy generated for the third peer in @dest_mnt's peer group we
handled. So the copy of the source mount tree (P4) we create and mount
on the first slave of @dest_mnt's peer group:
===================================================================================
mount-id mount-parent-id peer-group-id
===================================================================================
mnt_master[216] 309 297 shared:216
/
/
(S0) mnt_slave 483 481 master:216
\
\ (P3) mnt_master[218] 626 545 shared:218
\ /
\/
(P4) mnt_slave 627 483 master:218
will pick the last copy of the source mount tree (P3) as master, not (S0).
When walking the propagation hierarchy via @last_source's master
hierarchy we encounter (P3) but not (S0), i.e., @source_mnt.
We can fix this in multiple ways:
(1) By setting @last_source to @source_mnt after we processed the peers
in @dest_mnt's peer group right after the peer loop in
propagate_mnt().
(2) By changing the termination condition that relies on finding exactly
@source_mnt to finding a peer of @source_mnt.
(3) By only moving @last_source when we actually venture into a new peer
group or some clever variant thereof.
The first two options are minimally invasive and what we want as a fix.
The third option is more intrusive but something we'd like to explore in
the near future.
This passes all LTP tests and specifically the mount propagation
testsuite part of it. It also holds up against all known reproducers of
this issues.
Final words.
First, this is a clever but __worringly__ underdocumented algorithm.
There isn't a single detailed comment to be found in next_group(),
propagate_one() or anywhere else in that file for that matter. This has
been a giant pain to understand and work through and a bug like this is
insanely difficult to fix without a detailed understanding of what's
happening. Let's not talk about the amount of time that was sunk into
fixing this.
Second, all the cool kids with access to
unshare --mount --user --map-root --propagation=unchanged
are going to have a lot of fun. IOW, triggerable by unprivileged users
while namespace_lock() lock is held.
[ 115.848393] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000010
[ 115.848967] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
[ 115.849386] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
[ 115.849803] PGD 0 P4D 0
[ 115.850012] Oops: 0000 [raystef66#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI
[ 115.850354] CPU: 0 PID: 15591 Comm: mount Not tainted 6.1.0-rc7 raystef66#3
[ 115.850851] Hardware name: innotek GmbH VirtualBox/VirtualBox, BIOS
VirtualBox 12/01/2006
[ 115.851510] RIP: 0010:propagate_one.part.0+0x7f/0x1a0
[ 115.851924] Code: 75 eb 4c 8b 05 c2 25 37 02 4c 89 ca 48 8b 4a 10
49 39 d0 74 1e 48 3b 81 e0 00 00 00 74 26 48 8b 92 e0 00 00 00 be 01
00 00 00 <48> 8b 4a 10 49 39 d0 75 e2 40 84 f6 74 38 4c 89 05 84 25 37
02 4d
[ 115.853441] RSP: 0018:ffffb8d5443d7d50 EFLAGS: 00010282
[ 115.853865] RAX: ffff8e4d87c41c80 RBX: ffff8e4d88ded780 RCX: ffff8e4da4333a00
[ 115.854458] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: ffff8e4d88ded780
[ 115.855044] RBP: ffff8e4d88ded780 R08: ffff8e4da4338000 R09: ffff8e4da43388c0
[ 115.855693] R10: 0000000000000002 R11: ffffb8d540158000 R12: ffffb8d5443d7da8
[ 115.856304] R13: ffff8e4d88ded780 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
[ 115.856859] FS: 00007f92c90c9800(0000) GS:ffff8e4dfdc00000(0000)
knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 115.857531] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 115.858006] CR2: 0000000000000010 CR3: 0000000022f4c002 CR4: 00000000000706f0
[ 115.858598] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
[ 115.859393] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
[ 115.860099] Call Trace:
[ 115.860358] <TASK>
[ 115.860535] propagate_mnt+0x14d/0x190
[ 115.860848] attach_recursive_mnt+0x274/0x3e0
[ 115.861212] path_mount+0x8c8/0xa60
[ 115.861503] __x64_sys_mount+0xf6/0x140
[ 115.861819] do_syscall_64+0x5b/0x80
[ 115.862117] ? do_faccessat+0x123/0x250
[ 115.862435] ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x17/0x40
[ 115.862826] ? do_syscall_64+0x67/0x80
[ 115.863133] ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x17/0x40
[ 115.863527] ? do_syscall_64+0x67/0x80
[ 115.863835] ? do_syscall_64+0x67/0x80
[ 115.864144] ? do_syscall_64+0x67/0x80
[ 115.864452] ? exc_page_fault+0x70/0x170
[ 115.864775] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
[ 115.865187] RIP: 0033:0x7f92c92b0ebe
[ 115.865480] Code: 48 8b 0d 75 4f 0c 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 83 c8 ff
c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 90 f3 0f 1e fa 49 89 ca b8 a5 00 00
00 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d 42 4f 0c 00 f7 d8 64 89
01 48
[ 115.866984] RSP: 002b:00007fff000aa728 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX:
00000000000000a5
[ 115.867607] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000055a77888d6b0 RCX: 00007f92c92b0ebe
[ 115.868240] RDX: 000055a77888d8e0 RSI: 000055a77888e6e0 RDI: 000055a77888e620
[ 115.868823] RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000001
[ 115.869403] R10: 0000000000001000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 000055a77888e620
[ 115.869994] R13: 000055a77888d8e0 R14: 00000000ffffffff R15: 00007f92c93e4076
[ 115.870581] </TASK>
[ 115.870763] Modules linked in: nft_fib_inet nft_fib_ipv4
nft_fib_ipv6 nft_fib nft_reject_inet nf_reject_ipv4 nf_reject_ipv6
nft_reject nft_ct nft_chain_nat nf_nat nf_conntrack nf_defrag_ipv6
nf_defrag_ipv4 ip_set rfkill nf_tables nfnetlink qrtr snd_intel8x0
sunrpc snd_ac97_codec ac97_bus snd_pcm snd_timer intel_rapl_msr
intel_rapl_common snd vboxguest intel_powerclamp video rapl joydev
soundcore i2c_piix4 wmi fuse zram xfs vmwgfx crct10dif_pclmul
crc32_pclmul crc32c_intel polyval_clmulni polyval_generic
drm_ttm_helper ttm e1000 ghash_clmulni_intel serio_raw ata_generic
pata_acpi scsi_dh_rdac scsi_dh_emc scsi_dh_alua dm_multipath
[ 115.875288] CR2: 0000000000000010
[ 115.875641] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
[ 115.876135] RIP: 0010:propagate_one.part.0+0x7f/0x1a0
[ 115.876551] Code: 75 eb 4c 8b 05 c2 25 37 02 4c 89 ca 48 8b 4a 10
49 39 d0 74 1e 48 3b 81 e0 00 00 00 74 26 48 8b 92 e0 00 00 00 be 01
00 00 00 <48> 8b 4a 10 49 39 d0 75 e2 40 84 f6 74 38 4c 89 05 84 25 37
02 4d
[ 115.878086] RSP: 0018:ffffb8d5443d7d50 EFLAGS: 00010282
[ 115.878511] RAX: ffff8e4d87c41c80 RBX: ffff8e4d88ded780 RCX: ffff8e4da4333a00
[ 115.879128] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: ffff8e4d88ded780
[ 115.879715] RBP: ffff8e4d88ded780 R08: ffff8e4da4338000 R09: ffff8e4da43388c0
[ 115.880359] R10: 0000000000000002 R11: ffffb8d540158000 R12: ffffb8d5443d7da8
[ 115.880962] R13: ffff8e4d88ded780 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
[ 115.881548] FS: 00007f92c90c9800(0000) GS:ffff8e4dfdc00000(0000)
knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 115.882234] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 115.882713] CR2: 0000000000000010 CR3: 0000000022f4c002 CR4: 00000000000706f0
[ 115.883314] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
[ 115.883966] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Fixes: f2ebb3a ("smarter propagate_mnt()")
Fixes: 5ec0811 ("propogate_mnt: Handle the first propogated copy being a slave")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Reported-by: Ditang Chen <ditang.c@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Seth Forshee (Digital Ocean) <sforshee@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) <brauner@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit b18cba09e374637a0a3759d856a6bca94c133952 ] Commit 9130b8d ("SUNRPC: allow for upcalls for the same uid but different gss service") introduced `auth` argument to __gss_find_upcall(), but in gss_pipe_downcall() it was left as NULL since it (and auth->service) was not (yet) determined. When multiple upcalls with the same uid and different service are ongoing, it could happen that __gss_find_upcall(), which returns the first match found in the pipe->in_downcall list, could not find the correct gss_msg corresponding to the downcall we are looking for. Moreover, it might return a msg which is not sent to rpc.gssd yet. We could see mount.nfs process hung in D state with multiple mount.nfs are executed in parallel. The call trace below is of CentOS 7.9 kernel-3.10.0-1160.24.1.el7.x86_64 but we observed the same hang w/ elrepo kernel-ml-6.0.7-1.el7. PID: 71258 TASK: ffff91ebd4be0000 CPU: 36 COMMAND: "mount.nfs" #0 [ffff9203ca3234f8] __schedule at ffffffffa3b8899f raystef66#1 [ffff9203ca323580] schedule at ffffffffa3b88eb9 raystef66#2 [ffff9203ca323590] gss_cred_init at ffffffffc0355818 [auth_rpcgss] raystef66#3 [ffff9203ca323658] rpcauth_lookup_credcache at ffffffffc0421ebc [sunrpc] raystef66#4 [ffff9203ca3236d8] gss_lookup_cred at ffffffffc0353633 [auth_rpcgss] raystef66#5 [ffff9203ca3236e8] rpcauth_lookupcred at ffffffffc0421581 [sunrpc] raystef66#6 [ffff9203ca323740] rpcauth_refreshcred at ffffffffc04223d3 [sunrpc] raystef66#7 [ffff9203ca3237a0] call_refresh at ffffffffc04103dc [sunrpc] raystef66#8 [ffff9203ca3237b8] __rpc_execute at ffffffffc041e1c9 [sunrpc] raystef66#9 [ffff9203ca323820] rpc_execute at ffffffffc0420a48 [sunrpc] The scenario is like this. Let's say there are two upcalls for services A and B, A -> B in pipe->in_downcall, B -> A in pipe->pipe. When rpc.gssd reads pipe to get the upcall msg corresponding to service B from pipe->pipe and then writes the response, in gss_pipe_downcall the msg corresponding to service A will be picked because only uid is used to find the msg and it is before the one for B in pipe->in_downcall. And the process waiting for the msg corresponding to service A will be woken up. Actual scheduing of that process might be after rpc.gssd processes the next msg. In rpc_pipe_generic_upcall it clears msg->errno (for A). The process is scheduled to see gss_msg->ctx == NULL and gss_msg->msg.errno == 0, therefore it cannot break the loop in gss_create_upcall and is never woken up after that. This patch adds a simple check to ensure that a msg which is not sent to rpc.gssd yet is not chosen as the matching upcall upon receiving a downcall. Signed-off-by: minoura makoto <minoura@valinux.co.jp> Signed-off-by: Hiroshi Shimamoto <h-shimamoto@nec.com> Tested-by: Hiroshi Shimamoto <h-shimamoto@nec.com> Cc: Trond Myklebust <trondmy@hammerspace.com> Fixes: 9130b8d ("SUNRPC: allow for upcalls for same uid but different gss service") Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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Feb 7, 2023
[ Upstream commit 6c4ca03bd890566d873e3593b32d034bf2f5a087 ] During EEH error injection testing, a deadlock was encountered in the tg3 driver when tg3_io_error_detected() was attempting to cancel outstanding reset tasks: crash> foreach UN bt ... PID: 159 TASK: c0000000067c6000 CPU: 8 COMMAND: "eehd" ... #5 [c00000000681f990] __cancel_work_timer at c00000000019fd18 #6 [c00000000681fa30] tg3_io_error_detected at c00800000295f098 [tg3] #7 [c00000000681faf0] eeh_report_error at c00000000004e25c ... PID: 290 TASK: c000000036e5f800 CPU: 6 COMMAND: "kworker/6:1" ... #4 [c00000003721fbc0] rtnl_lock at c000000000c940d8 #5 [c00000003721fbe0] tg3_reset_task at c008000002969358 [tg3] #6 [c00000003721fc60] process_one_work at c00000000019e5c4 ... PID: 296 TASK: c000000037a65800 CPU: 21 COMMAND: "kworker/21:1" ... #4 [c000000037247bc0] rtnl_lock at c000000000c940d8 #5 [c000000037247be0] tg3_reset_task at c008000002969358 [tg3] #6 [c000000037247c60] process_one_work at c00000000019e5c4 ... PID: 655 TASK: c000000036f49000 CPU: 16 COMMAND: "kworker/16:2" ...:1 #4 [c0000000373ebbc0] rtnl_lock at c000000000c940d8 #5 [c0000000373ebbe0] tg3_reset_task at c008000002969358 [tg3] #6 [c0000000373ebc60] process_one_work at c00000000019e5c4 ... Code inspection shows that both tg3_io_error_detected() and tg3_reset_task() attempt to acquire the RTNL lock at the beginning of their code blocks. If tg3_reset_task() should happen to execute between the times when tg3_io_error_deteced() acquires the RTNL lock and tg3_reset_task_cancel() is called, a deadlock will occur. Moving tg3_reset_task_cancel() call earlier within the code block, prior to acquiring RTNL, prevents this from happening, but also exposes another deadlock issue where tg3_reset_task() may execute AFTER tg3_io_error_detected() has executed: crash> foreach UN bt PID: 159 TASK: c0000000067d2000 CPU: 9 COMMAND: "eehd" ... #4 [c000000006867a60] rtnl_lock at c000000000c940d8 #5 [c000000006867a80] tg3_io_slot_reset at c0080000026c2ea8 [tg3] #6 [c000000006867b00] eeh_report_reset at c00000000004de88 ... PID: 363 TASK: c000000037564000 CPU: 6 COMMAND: "kworker/6:1" ... #3 [c000000036c1bb70] msleep at c000000000259e6c #4 [c000000036c1bba0] napi_disable at c000000000c6b848 #5 [c000000036c1bbe0] tg3_reset_task at c0080000026d942c [tg3] #6 [c000000036c1bc60] process_one_work at c00000000019e5c4 ... This issue can be avoided by aborting tg3_reset_task() if EEH error recovery is already in progress. Fixes: db84bf4 ("tg3: tg3_reset_task() needs to use rtnl_lock to synchronize") Signed-off-by: David Christensen <drc@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Pavan Chebbi <pavan.chebbi@broadcom.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230124185339.225806-1-drc@linux.vnet.ibm.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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Mar 12, 2023
commit 60eed1e3d45045623e46944ebc7c42c30a4350f0 upstream.
code path:
ocfs2_ioctl_move_extents
ocfs2_move_extents
ocfs2_defrag_extent
__ocfs2_move_extent
+ ocfs2_journal_access_di
+ ocfs2_split_extent //sub-paths call jbd2_journal_restart
+ ocfs2_journal_dirty //crash by jbs2 ASSERT
crash stacks:
PID: 11297 TASK: ffff974a676dcd00 CPU: 67 COMMAND: "defragfs.ocfs2"
#0 [ffffb25d8dad3900] machine_kexec at ffffffff8386fe01
#1 [ffffb25d8dad3958] __crash_kexec at ffffffff8395959d
#2 [ffffb25d8dad3a20] crash_kexec at ffffffff8395a45d
#3 [ffffb25d8dad3a38] oops_end at ffffffff83836d3f
#4 [ffffb25d8dad3a58] do_trap at ffffffff83833205
#5 [ffffb25d8dad3aa0] do_invalid_op at ffffffff83833aa6
#6 [ffffb25d8dad3ac0] invalid_op at ffffffff84200d18
[exception RIP: jbd2_journal_dirty_metadata+0x2ba]
RIP: ffffffffc09ca54a RSP: ffffb25d8dad3b70 RFLAGS: 00010207
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff9706eedc5248 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: ffff97337029ea28 RDI: ffff9706eedc5250
RBP: ffff9703c3520200 R8: 000000000f46b0b2 R9: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 00000001000000fe R12: ffff97337029ea28
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff9703de59bf60 R15: ffff9706eedc5250
ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff CS: 0010 SS: 0018
#7 [ffffb25d8dad3ba8] ocfs2_journal_dirty at ffffffffc137fb95 [ocfs2]
#8 [ffffb25d8dad3be8] __ocfs2_move_extent at ffffffffc139a950 [ocfs2]
#9 [ffffb25d8dad3c80] ocfs2_defrag_extent at ffffffffc139b2d2 [ocfs2]
Analysis
This bug has the same root cause of 'commit 7f27ec9 ("ocfs2: call
ocfs2_journal_access_di() before ocfs2_journal_dirty() in
ocfs2_write_end_nolock()")'. For this bug, jbd2_journal_restart() is
called by ocfs2_split_extent() during defragmenting.
How to fix
For ocfs2_split_extent() can handle journal operations totally by itself.
Caller doesn't need to call journal access/dirty pair, and caller only
needs to call journal start/stop pair. The fix method is to remove
journal access/dirty from __ocfs2_move_extent().
The discussion for this patch:
https://oss.oracle.com/pipermail/ocfs2-devel/2023-February/000647.html
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230217003717.32469-1-heming.zhao@suse.com
Signed-off-by: Heming Zhao <heming.zhao@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <mark@fasheh.com>
Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org>
Cc: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com>
Cc: Changwei Ge <gechangwei@live.cn>
Cc: Gang He <ghe@suse.com>
Cc: Jun Piao <piaojun@huawei.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Jun 2, 2023
[ Upstream commit 05bb0167c80b8f93c6a4e0451b7da9b96db990c2 ] ACPICA commit 770653e3ba67c30a629ca7d12e352d83c2541b1e Before this change we see the following UBSAN stack trace in Fuchsia: #0 0x000021e4213b3302 in acpi_ds_init_aml_walk(struct acpi_walk_state*, union acpi_parse_object*, struct acpi_namespace_node*, u8*, u32, struct acpi_evaluate_info*, u8) ../../third_party/acpica/source/components/dispatcher/dswstate.c:682 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x233302 #1.2 0x000020d0f660777f in ubsan_get_stack_trace() compiler-rt/lib/ubsan/ubsan_diag.cpp:41 <libclang_rt.asan.so>+0x3d77f #1.1 0x000020d0f660777f in maybe_print_stack_trace() compiler-rt/lib/ubsan/ubsan_diag.cpp:51 <libclang_rt.asan.so>+0x3d77f #1 0x000020d0f660777f in ~scoped_report() compiler-rt/lib/ubsan/ubsan_diag.cpp:387 <libclang_rt.asan.so>+0x3d77f #2 0x000020d0f660b96d in handlepointer_overflow_impl() compiler-rt/lib/ubsan/ubsan_handlers.cpp:809 <libclang_rt.asan.so>+0x4196d #3 0x000020d0f660b50d in compiler-rt/lib/ubsan/ubsan_handlers.cpp:815 <libclang_rt.asan.so>+0x4150d #4 0x000021e4213b3302 in acpi_ds_init_aml_walk(struct acpi_walk_state*, union acpi_parse_object*, struct acpi_namespace_node*, u8*, u32, struct acpi_evaluate_info*, u8) ../../third_party/acpica/source/components/dispatcher/dswstate.c:682 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x233302 #5 0x000021e4213e2369 in acpi_ds_call_control_method(struct acpi_thread_state*, struct acpi_walk_state*, union acpi_parse_object*) ../../third_party/acpica/source/components/dispatcher/dsmethod.c:605 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x262369 #6 0x000021e421437fac in acpi_ps_parse_aml(struct acpi_walk_state*) ../../third_party/acpica/source/components/parser/psparse.c:550 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x2b7fac #7 0x000021e4214464d2 in acpi_ps_execute_method(struct acpi_evaluate_info*) ../../third_party/acpica/source/components/parser/psxface.c:244 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x2c64d2 #8 0x000021e4213aa052 in acpi_ns_evaluate(struct acpi_evaluate_info*) ../../third_party/acpica/source/components/namespace/nseval.c:250 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x22a052 #9 0x000021e421413dd8 in acpi_ns_init_one_device(acpi_handle, u32, void*, void**) ../../third_party/acpica/source/components/namespace/nsinit.c:735 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x293dd8 #10 0x000021e421429e98 in acpi_ns_walk_namespace(acpi_object_type, acpi_handle, u32, u32, acpi_walk_callback, acpi_walk_callback, void*, void**) ../../third_party/acpica/source/components/namespace/nswalk.c:298 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x2a9e98 #11 0x000021e4214131ac in acpi_ns_initialize_devices(u32) ../../third_party/acpica/source/components/namespace/nsinit.c:268 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x2931ac #12 0x000021e42147c40d in acpi_initialize_objects(u32) ../../third_party/acpica/source/components/utilities/utxfinit.c:304 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x2fc40d #13 0x000021e42126d603 in acpi::acpi_impl::initialize_acpi(acpi::acpi_impl*) ../../src/devices/board/lib/acpi/acpi-impl.cc:224 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0xed603 Add a simple check that avoids incrementing a pointer by zero, but otherwise behaves as before. Note that our findings are against ACPICA 20221020, but the same code exists on master. Link: acpica/acpica@770653e3 Signed-off-by: Bob Moore <robert.moore@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 14694179e561b5f2f7e56a0f590e2cb49a9cc7ab ]
Trying to suspend to RAM on SAMA5D27 EVK leads to the following lockdep
warning:
============================================
WARNING: possible recursive locking detected
6.7.0-rc5-wt+ #532 Not tainted
--------------------------------------------
sh/92 is trying to acquire lock:
c3cf306c (&irq_desc_lock_class){-.-.}-{2:2}, at: __irq_get_desc_lock+0xe8/0x100
but task is already holding lock:
c3d7c46c (&irq_desc_lock_class){-.-.}-{2:2}, at: __irq_get_desc_lock+0xe8/0x100
other info that might help us debug this:
Possible unsafe locking scenario:
CPU0
----
lock(&irq_desc_lock_class);
lock(&irq_desc_lock_class);
*** DEADLOCK ***
May be due to missing lock nesting notation
6 locks held by sh/92:
#0: c3aa0258 (sb_writers#6){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: ksys_write+0xd8/0x178
#1: c4c2df44 (&of->mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x138/0x284
#2: c32684a0 (kn->active){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x148/0x284
#3: c232b6d4 (system_transition_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: pm_suspend+0x13c/0x4e8
#4: c387b088 (&dev->mutex){....}-{3:3}, at: __device_suspend+0x1e8/0x91c
#5: c3d7c46c (&irq_desc_lock_class){-.-.}-{2:2}, at: __irq_get_desc_lock+0xe8/0x100
stack backtrace:
CPU: 0 PID: 92 Comm: sh Not tainted 6.7.0-rc5-wt+ #532
Hardware name: Atmel SAMA5
unwind_backtrace from show_stack+0x18/0x1c
show_stack from dump_stack_lvl+0x34/0x48
dump_stack_lvl from __lock_acquire+0x19ec/0x3a0c
__lock_acquire from lock_acquire.part.0+0x124/0x2d0
lock_acquire.part.0 from _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x5c/0x78
_raw_spin_lock_irqsave from __irq_get_desc_lock+0xe8/0x100
__irq_get_desc_lock from irq_set_irq_wake+0xa8/0x204
irq_set_irq_wake from atmel_gpio_irq_set_wake+0x58/0xb4
atmel_gpio_irq_set_wake from irq_set_irq_wake+0x100/0x204
irq_set_irq_wake from gpio_keys_suspend+0xec/0x2b8
gpio_keys_suspend from dpm_run_callback+0xe4/0x248
dpm_run_callback from __device_suspend+0x234/0x91c
__device_suspend from dpm_suspend+0x224/0x43c
dpm_suspend from dpm_suspend_start+0x9c/0xa8
dpm_suspend_start from suspend_devices_and_enter+0x1e0/0xa84
suspend_devices_and_enter from pm_suspend+0x460/0x4e8
pm_suspend from state_store+0x78/0xe4
state_store from kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x1a0/0x284
kernfs_fop_write_iter from vfs_write+0x38c/0x6f4
vfs_write from ksys_write+0xd8/0x178
ksys_write from ret_fast_syscall+0x0/0x1c
Exception stack(0xc52b3fa8 to 0xc52b3ff0)
3fa0: 00000004 005a0ae8 00000001 005a0ae8 00000004 00000001
3fc0: 00000004 005a0ae8 00000001 00000004 00000004 b6c616c0 00000020 0059d190
3fe0: 00000004 b6c61678 aec5a041 aebf1a26
This warning is raised because pinctrl-at91-pio4 uses chained IRQ. Whenever
a wake up source configures an IRQ through irq_set_irq_wake, it will
lock the corresponding IRQ desc, and then call irq_set_irq_wake on "parent"
IRQ which will do the same on its own IRQ desc, but since those two locks
share the same class, lockdep reports this as an issue.
Fix lockdep false positive by setting a different class for parent and
children IRQ
Fixes: 7761808 ("pinctrl: introduce driver for Atmel PIO4 controller")
Signed-off-by: Alexis Lothoré <alexis.lothore@bootlin.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231215-lockdep_warning-v1-1-8137b2510ed5@bootlin.com
Signed-off-by: Linus Walleij <linus.walleij@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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commit 2fa7d94afc1afbb4d702760c058dc2d7ed30f226 upstream.
The first commit cited below attempts to fix the off-by-one error that
appeared in some comparisons with an open range. Due to this error,
arithmetically equivalent pieces of code could get different verdicts
from the verifier, for example (pseudocode):
// 1. Passes the verifier:
if (data + 8 > data_end)
return early
read *(u64 *)data, i.e. [data; data+7]
// 2. Rejected by the verifier (should still pass):
if (data + 7 >= data_end)
return early
read *(u64 *)data, i.e. [data; data+7]
The attempted fix, however, shifts the range by one in a wrong
direction, so the bug not only remains, but also such piece of code
starts failing in the verifier:
// 3. Rejected by the verifier, but the check is stricter than in #1.
if (data + 8 >= data_end)
return early
read *(u64 *)data, i.e. [data; data+7]
The change performed by that fix converted an off-by-one bug into
off-by-two. The second commit cited below added the BPF selftests
written to ensure than code chunks like raystef66#3 are rejected, however,
they should be accepted.
This commit fixes the off-by-two error by adjusting new_range in the
right direction and fixes the tests by changing the range into the
one that should actually fail.
Fixes: fb2a311 ("bpf: fix off by one for range markings with L{T, E} patterns")
Fixes: b37242c ("bpf: add test cases to bpf selftests to cover all access tests")
Signed-off-by: Maxim Mikityanskiy <maximmi@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20211130181607.593149-1-maximmi@nvidia.com
[OP: cherry-pick selftest changes only]
Signed-off-by: Ovidiu Panait <ovidiu.panait@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 9c6d778800b921bde3bff3cff5003d1650f942d1 upstream. Automatic kernel fuzzing revealed a recursive locking violation in usb-storage: ============================================ WARNING: possible recursive locking detected 5.18.0 raystef66#3 Not tainted -------------------------------------------- kworker/1:3/1205 is trying to acquire lock: ffff888018638db8 (&us_interface_key[i]){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: usb_stor_pre_reset+0x35/0x40 drivers/usb/storage/usb.c:230 but task is already holding lock: ffff888018638db8 (&us_interface_key[i]){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: usb_stor_pre_reset+0x35/0x40 drivers/usb/storage/usb.c:230 ... stack backtrace: CPU: 1 PID: 1205 Comm: kworker/1:3 Not tainted 5.18.0 raystef66#3 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.13.0-1ubuntu1.1 04/01/2014 Workqueue: usb_hub_wq hub_event Call Trace: <TASK> __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline] dump_stack_lvl+0xcd/0x134 lib/dump_stack.c:106 print_deadlock_bug kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2988 [inline] check_deadlock kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3031 [inline] validate_chain kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3816 [inline] __lock_acquire.cold+0x152/0x3ca kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5053 lock_acquire kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5665 [inline] lock_acquire+0x1ab/0x520 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5630 __mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:603 [inline] __mutex_lock+0x14f/0x1610 kernel/locking/mutex.c:747 usb_stor_pre_reset+0x35/0x40 drivers/usb/storage/usb.c:230 usb_reset_device+0x37d/0x9a0 drivers/usb/core/hub.c:6109 r871xu_dev_remove+0x21a/0x270 drivers/staging/rtl8712/usb_intf.c:622 usb_unbind_interface+0x1bd/0x890 drivers/usb/core/driver.c:458 device_remove drivers/base/dd.c:545 [inline] device_remove+0x11f/0x170 drivers/base/dd.c:537 __device_release_driver drivers/base/dd.c:1222 [inline] device_release_driver_internal+0x1a7/0x2f0 drivers/base/dd.c:1248 usb_driver_release_interface+0x102/0x180 drivers/usb/core/driver.c:627 usb_forced_unbind_intf+0x4d/0xa0 drivers/usb/core/driver.c:1118 usb_reset_device+0x39b/0x9a0 drivers/usb/core/hub.c:6114 This turned out not to be an error in usb-storage but rather a nested device reset attempt. That is, as the rtl8712 driver was being unbound from a composite device in preparation for an unrelated USB reset (that driver does not have pre_reset or post_reset callbacks), its ->remove routine called usb_reset_device() -- thus nesting one reset call within another. Performing a reset as part of disconnect processing is a questionable practice at best. However, the bug report points out that the USB core does not have any protection against nested resets. Adding a reset_in_progress flag and testing it will prevent such errors in the future. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/CAB7eexKUpvX-JNiLzhXBDWgfg2T9e9_0Tw4HQ6keN==voRbP0g@mail.gmail.com/ Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reported-and-tested-by: Rondreis <linhaoguo86@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Alan Stern <stern@rowland.harvard.edu> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/YwkflDxvg0KWqyZK@rowland.harvard.edu Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 84a53580c5d2138c7361c7c3eea5b31827e63b35 ] The SRv6 layer allows defining HMAC data that can later be used to sign IPv6 Segment Routing Headers. This configuration is realised via netlink through four attributes: SEG6_ATTR_HMACKEYID, SEG6_ATTR_SECRET, SEG6_ATTR_SECRETLEN and SEG6_ATTR_ALGID. Because the SECRETLEN attribute is decoupled from the actual length of the SECRET attribute, it is possible to provide invalid combinations (e.g., secret = "", secretlen = 64). This case is not checked in the code and with an appropriately crafted netlink message, an out-of-bounds read of up to 64 bytes (max secret length) can occur past the skb end pointer and into skb_shared_info: Breakpoint 1, seg6_genl_sethmac (skb=<optimized out>, info=<optimized out>) at net/ipv6/seg6.c:208 208 memcpy(hinfo->secret, secret, slen); (gdb) bt #0 seg6_genl_sethmac (skb=<optimized out>, info=<optimized out>) at net/ipv6/seg6.c:208 #1 0xffffffff81e012e9 in genl_family_rcv_msg_doit (skb=skb@entry=0xffff88800b1f9f00, nlh=nlh@entry=0xffff88800b1b7600, extack=extack@entry=0xffffc90000ba7af0, ops=ops@entry=0xffffc90000ba7a80, hdrlen=4, net=0xffffffff84237580 <init_net>, family=<optimized out>, family=<optimized out>) at net/netlink/genetlink.c:731 #2 0xffffffff81e01435 in genl_family_rcv_msg (extack=0xffffc90000ba7af0, nlh=0xffff88800b1b7600, skb=0xffff88800b1f9f00, family=0xffffffff82fef6c0 <seg6_genl_family>) at net/netlink/genetlink.c:775 raystef66#3 genl_rcv_msg (skb=0xffff88800b1f9f00, nlh=0xffff88800b1b7600, extack=0xffffc90000ba7af0) at net/netlink/genetlink.c:792 raystef66#4 0xffffffff81dfffc3 in netlink_rcv_skb (skb=skb@entry=0xffff88800b1f9f00, cb=cb@entry=0xffffffff81e01350 <genl_rcv_msg>) at net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2501 raystef66#5 0xffffffff81e00919 in genl_rcv (skb=0xffff88800b1f9f00) at net/netlink/genetlink.c:803 raystef66#6 0xffffffff81dff6ae in netlink_unicast_kernel (ssk=0xffff888010eec800, skb=0xffff88800b1f9f00, sk=0xffff888004aed000) at net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1319 raystef66#7 netlink_unicast (ssk=ssk@entry=0xffff888010eec800, skb=skb@entry=0xffff88800b1f9f00, portid=portid@entry=0, nonblock=<optimized out>) at net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1345 raystef66#8 0xffffffff81dff9a4 in netlink_sendmsg (sock=<optimized out>, msg=0xffffc90000ba7e48, len=<optimized out>) at net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1921 ... (gdb) p/x ((struct sk_buff *)0xffff88800b1f9f00)->head + ((struct sk_buff *)0xffff88800b1f9f00)->end $1 = 0xffff88800b1b76c0 (gdb) p/x secret $2 = 0xffff88800b1b76c0 (gdb) p slen $3 = 64 '@' The OOB data can then be read back from userspace by dumping HMAC state. This commit fixes this by ensuring SECRETLEN cannot exceed the actual length of SECRET. Reported-by: Lucas Leong <wmliang.tw@gmail.com> Tested: verified that EINVAL is correctly returned when secretlen > len(secret) Fixes: 4f4853d ("ipv6: sr: implement API to control SR HMAC structure") Signed-off-by: David Lebrun <dlebrun@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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This patch implements deduplication feature in zram. The purpose of this work is naturally to save amount of memory usage by zram. Android is one of the biggest users to use zram as swap and it's really important to save amount of memory usage. There is a paper that reports that duplication ratio of Android's memory content is rather high [1]. And, there is a similar work on zswap that also reports that experiments has shown that around 10-15% of pages stored in zswp are duplicates and deduplicate them provides some benefits [2]. Also, there is a different kind of workload that uses zram as blockdev and store build outputs into it to reduce wear-out problem of real blockdev. In this workload, deduplication hit is very high due to temporary files and intermediate object files. Detailed analysis is on the bottom of this description. Anyway, if we can detect duplicated content and avoid to store duplicated content at different memory space, we can save memory. This patch tries to do that. Implementation is almost simple and intuitive but I should note one thing about implementation detail. To check duplication, this patch uses checksum of the page and collision of this checksum could be possible. There would be many choices to handle this situation but this patch chooses to allow entry with duplicated checksum to be added to the hash, but, not to compare all entries with duplicated checksum when checking duplication. I guess that checksum collision is quite rare event and we don't need to pay any attention to such a case. Therefore, I decided the most simplest way to implement the feature. If there is a different opinion, I can accept and go that way. Following is the result of this patch. Test result #1 (Swap): Android Marshmallow, emulator, x86_64, Backporting to kernel v3.18 orig_data_size: 145297408 compr_data_size: 32408125 mem_used_total: 32276480 dup_data_size: 3188134 meta_data_size: 1444272 Last two metrics added to mm_stat are related to this work. First one, dup_data_size, is amount of saved memory by avoiding to store duplicated page. Later one, meta_data_size, is the amount of data structure to support deduplication. If dup > meta, we can judge that the patch improves memory usage. In Adnroid, we can save 5% of memory usage by this work. Test result #2 (Blockdev): build the kernel and store output to ext4 FS on zram <no-dedup> Elapsed time: 249 s mm_stat: 430845952 191014886 196898816 0 196898816 28320 0 0 0 <dedup> Elapsed time: 250 s mm_stat: 430505984 190971334 148365312 0 148365312 28404 0 47287038 3945792 There is no performance degradation and save 23% memory. Test result raystef66#3 (Blockdev): copy android build output dir(out/host) to ext4 FS on zram <no-dedup> Elapsed time: out/host: 88 s mm_stat: 8834420736 3658184579 3834208256 0 3834208256 32889 0 0 0 <dedup> Elapsed time: out/host: 100 s mm_stat: 8832929792 3657329322 2832015360 0 2832015360 32609 0 952568877 80880336 It shows performance degradation roughly 13% and save 24% memory. Maybe, it is due to overhead of calculating checksum and comparison. Test result raystef66#4 (Blockdev): copy android build output dir(out/target/common) to ext4 FS on zram <no-dedup> Elapsed time: out/host: 203 s mm_stat: 4041678848 2310355010 2346577920 0 2346582016 500 4 0 0 <dedup> Elapsed time: out/host: 201 s mm_stat: 4041666560 2310488276 1338150912 0 1338150912 476 0 989088794 24564336 Memory is saved by 42% and performance is the same. Even if there is overhead of calculating checksum and comparison, large hit ratio compensate it since hit leads to less compression attempt. I checked the detailed reason of savings on kernel build workload and there are some cases that deduplication happens. 1) *.cmd Build command is usually similar in one directory so content of these file are very similar. In my system, more than 789 lines in fs/ext4/.namei.o.cmd and fs/ext4/.inode.o.cmd are the same in 944 and 938 lines of the file, respectively. 2) intermediate object files built-in.o and temporary object file have the similar contents. More than 50% of fs/ext4/ext4.o is the same with fs/ext4/built-in.o. 3) vmlinux .tmp_vmlinux1 and .tmp_vmlinux2 and arch/x86/boo/compressed/vmlinux.bin have the similar contents. Android test has similar case that some of object files(.class and .so) are similar with another ones. (./host/linux-x86/lib/libartd.so and ./host/linux-x86-lib/libartd-comiler.so) Anyway, benefit seems to be largely dependent on the workload so following patch will make this feature optional. However, this feature can help some usecases so is deserved to be merged. [1]: MemScope: Analyzing Memory Duplication on Android Systems, dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=2797023 [2]: zswap: Optimize compressed pool memory utilization, lkml.kernel.org/r/1341407574.7551.1471584870761.JavaMail.weblogic@epwas3p2 Change-Id: I8fe80c956c33f88a6af337d50d9e210e5c35ce37 Reviewed-by: Sergey Senozhatsky <sergey.senozhatsky@gmail.com> Acked-by: Minchan Kim <minchan@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/patchwork/patch/787162/ Patch-mainline: linux-kernel@ Thu, 11 May 2017 22:30:26 Signed-off-by: Charan Teja Reddy <charante@codeaurora.org> Signed-off-by: Park Ju Hyung <qkrwngud825@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: UtsavBalar1231 <utsavbalar1231@gmail.com>
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[ Upstream commit ca10845a56856fff4de3804c85e6424d0f6d0cde ] While running btrfs/061, btrfs/073, btrfs/078, or btrfs/178 we hit the following lockdep splat: ====================================================== WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 5.9.0-rc3+ raystef66#4 Not tainted ------------------------------------------------------ kswapd0/100 is trying to acquire lock: ffff96ecc22ef4a0 (&delayed_node->mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: __btrfs_release_delayed_node.part.0+0x3f/0x330 but task is already holding lock: ffffffff8dd74700 (fs_reclaim){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: __fs_reclaim_acquire+0x5/0x30 which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> raystef66#3 (fs_reclaim){+.+.}-{0:0}: fs_reclaim_acquire+0x65/0x80 slab_pre_alloc_hook.constprop.0+0x20/0x200 kmem_cache_alloc+0x37/0x270 alloc_inode+0x82/0xb0 iget_locked+0x10d/0x2c0 kernfs_get_inode+0x1b/0x130 kernfs_get_tree+0x136/0x240 sysfs_get_tree+0x16/0x40 vfs_get_tree+0x28/0xc0 path_mount+0x434/0xc00 __x64_sys_mount+0xe3/0x120 do_syscall_64+0x33/0x40 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 -> #2 (kernfs_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}: __mutex_lock+0x7e/0x7e0 kernfs_add_one+0x23/0x150 kernfs_create_link+0x63/0xa0 sysfs_do_create_link_sd+0x5e/0xd0 btrfs_sysfs_add_devices_dir+0x81/0x130 btrfs_init_new_device+0x67f/0x1250 btrfs_ioctl+0x1ef/0x2e20 __x64_sys_ioctl+0x83/0xb0 do_syscall_64+0x33/0x40 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 -> #1 (&fs_info->chunk_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}: __mutex_lock+0x7e/0x7e0 btrfs_chunk_alloc+0x125/0x3a0 find_free_extent+0xdf6/0x1210 btrfs_reserve_extent+0xb3/0x1b0 btrfs_alloc_tree_block+0xb0/0x310 alloc_tree_block_no_bg_flush+0x4a/0x60 __btrfs_cow_block+0x11a/0x530 btrfs_cow_block+0x104/0x220 btrfs_search_slot+0x52e/0x9d0 btrfs_insert_empty_items+0x64/0xb0 btrfs_insert_delayed_items+0x90/0x4f0 btrfs_commit_inode_delayed_items+0x93/0x140 btrfs_log_inode+0x5de/0x2020 btrfs_log_inode_parent+0x429/0xc90 btrfs_log_new_name+0x95/0x9b btrfs_rename2+0xbb9/0x1800 vfs_rename+0x64f/0x9f0 do_renameat2+0x320/0x4e0 __x64_sys_rename+0x1f/0x30 do_syscall_64+0x33/0x40 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 -> #0 (&delayed_node->mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}: __lock_acquire+0x119c/0x1fc0 lock_acquire+0xa7/0x3d0 __mutex_lock+0x7e/0x7e0 __btrfs_release_delayed_node.part.0+0x3f/0x330 btrfs_evict_inode+0x24c/0x500 evict+0xcf/0x1f0 dispose_list+0x48/0x70 prune_icache_sb+0x44/0x50 super_cache_scan+0x161/0x1e0 do_shrink_slab+0x178/0x3c0 shrink_slab+0x17c/0x290 shrink_node+0x2b2/0x6d0 balance_pgdat+0x30a/0x670 kswapd+0x213/0x4c0 kthread+0x138/0x160 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 other info that might help us debug this: Chain exists of: &delayed_node->mutex --> kernfs_mutex --> fs_reclaim Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(fs_reclaim); lock(kernfs_mutex); lock(fs_reclaim); lock(&delayed_node->mutex); *** DEADLOCK *** 3 locks held by kswapd0/100: #0: ffffffff8dd74700 (fs_reclaim){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: __fs_reclaim_acquire+0x5/0x30 #1: ffffffff8dd65c50 (shrinker_rwsem){++++}-{3:3}, at: shrink_slab+0x115/0x290 #2: ffff96ed2ade30e0 (&type->s_umount_key#36){++++}-{3:3}, at: super_cache_scan+0x38/0x1e0 stack backtrace: CPU: 0 PID: 100 Comm: kswapd0 Not tainted 5.9.0-rc3+ raystef66#4 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.13.0-2.fc32 04/01/2014 Call Trace: dump_stack+0x8b/0xb8 check_noncircular+0x12d/0x150 __lock_acquire+0x119c/0x1fc0 lock_acquire+0xa7/0x3d0 ? __btrfs_release_delayed_node.part.0+0x3f/0x330 __mutex_lock+0x7e/0x7e0 ? __btrfs_release_delayed_node.part.0+0x3f/0x330 ? __btrfs_release_delayed_node.part.0+0x3f/0x330 ? lock_acquire+0xa7/0x3d0 ? find_held_lock+0x2b/0x80 __btrfs_release_delayed_node.part.0+0x3f/0x330 btrfs_evict_inode+0x24c/0x500 evict+0xcf/0x1f0 dispose_list+0x48/0x70 prune_icache_sb+0x44/0x50 super_cache_scan+0x161/0x1e0 do_shrink_slab+0x178/0x3c0 shrink_slab+0x17c/0x290 shrink_node+0x2b2/0x6d0 balance_pgdat+0x30a/0x670 kswapd+0x213/0x4c0 ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x41/0x50 ? add_wait_queue_exclusive+0x70/0x70 ? balance_pgdat+0x670/0x670 kthread+0x138/0x160 ? kthread_create_worker_on_cpu+0x40/0x40 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 This happens because we are holding the chunk_mutex at the time of adding in a new device. However we only need to hold the device_list_mutex, as we're going to iterate over the fs_devices devices. Move the sysfs init stuff outside of the chunk_mutex to get rid of this lockdep splat. CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.4.x: f3cd2c58110dad14e: btrfs: sysfs, rename device_link add/remove functions CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.4.x Reported-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit e773ca7da8beeca7f17fe4c9d1284a2b66839cc1 ] Actually, burst size is equal to '1 << desc->rqcfg.brst_size'. we should use burst size, not desc->rqcfg.brst_size. dma memcpy performance on Rockchip RV1126 @ 1512MHz A7, 1056MHz LPDDR3, 200MHz DMA: dmatest: /# echo dma0chan0 > /sys/module/dmatest/parameters/channel /# echo 4194304 > /sys/module/dmatest/parameters/test_buf_size /# echo 8 > /sys/module/dmatest/parameters/iterations /# echo y > /sys/module/dmatest/parameters/norandom /# echo y > /sys/module/dmatest/parameters/verbose /# echo 1 > /sys/module/dmatest/parameters/run dmatest: dma0chan0-copy0: result #1: 'test passed' with src_off=0x0 dst_off=0x0 len=0x400000 dmatest: dma0chan0-copy0: result #2: 'test passed' with src_off=0x0 dst_off=0x0 len=0x400000 dmatest: dma0chan0-copy0: result raystef66#3: 'test passed' with src_off=0x0 dst_off=0x0 len=0x400000 dmatest: dma0chan0-copy0: result raystef66#4: 'test passed' with src_off=0x0 dst_off=0x0 len=0x400000 dmatest: dma0chan0-copy0: result raystef66#5: 'test passed' with src_off=0x0 dst_off=0x0 len=0x400000 dmatest: dma0chan0-copy0: result raystef66#6: 'test passed' with src_off=0x0 dst_off=0x0 len=0x400000 dmatest: dma0chan0-copy0: result raystef66#7: 'test passed' with src_off=0x0 dst_off=0x0 len=0x400000 dmatest: dma0chan0-copy0: result raystef66#8: 'test passed' with src_off=0x0 dst_off=0x0 len=0x400000 Before: dmatest: dma0chan0-copy0: summary 8 tests, 0 failures 48 iops 200338 KB/s (0) After this patch: dmatest: dma0chan0-copy0: summary 8 tests, 0 failures 179 iops 734873 KB/s (0) After this patch and increase dma clk to 400MHz: dmatest: dma0chan0-copy0: summary 8 tests, 0 failures 259 iops 1062929 KB/s (0) Signed-off-by: Sugar Zhang <sugar.zhang@rock-chips.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1605326106-55681-1-git-send-email-sugar.zhang@rock-chips.com Signed-off-by: Vinod Koul <vkoul@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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commit 190113b4c6531c8e09b31d5235f9b5175cbb0f72 upstream. Prarit reported that depending on the affinity setting the ' irq $N: Affinity broken due to vector space exhaustion.' message is showing up in dmesg, but the vector space on the CPUs in the affinity mask is definitely not exhausted. Shung-Hsi provided traces and analysis which pinpoints the problem: The ordering of trying to assign an interrupt vector in assign_irq_vector_any_locked() is simply wrong if the interrupt data has a valid node assigned. It does: 1) Try the intersection of affinity mask and node mask 2) Try the node mask 3) Try the full affinity mask 4) Try the full online mask Obviously #2 and raystef66#3 are in the wrong order as the requested affinity mask has to take precedence. In the observed cases #1 failed because the affinity mask did not contain CPUs from node 0. That made it allocate a vector from node 0, thereby breaking affinity and emitting the misleading message. Revert the order of #2 and raystef66#3 so the full affinity mask without the node intersection is tried before actually affinity is broken. If no node is assigned then only the full affinity mask and if that fails the full online mask is tried. Fixes: d6ffc6a ("x86/vector: Respect affinity mask in irq descriptor") Reported-by: Prarit Bhargava <prarit@redhat.com> Reported-by: Shung-Hsi Yu <shung-hsi.yu@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Tested-by: Shung-Hsi Yu <shung-hsi.yu@suse.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/87ft4djtyp.fsf@nanos.tec.linutronix.de Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 4a9d81caf841cd2c0ae36abec9c2963bf21d0284 ] If the elem is deleted during be iterated on it, the iteration process will fall into an endless loop. kernel: NMI watchdog: BUG: soft lockup - CPU#4 stuck for 22s! [nfsd:17137] PID: 17137 TASK: ffff8818d93c0000 CPU: 4 COMMAND: "nfsd" [exception RIP: __state_in_grace+76] RIP: ffffffffc00e817c RSP: ffff8818d3aefc98 RFLAGS: 00000246 RAX: ffff881dc0c38298 RBX: ffffffff81b03580 RCX: ffff881dc02c9f50 RDX: ffff881e3fce8500 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: ffffffff81b03580 RBP: ffff8818d3aefca0 R8: 0000000000000020 R9: ffff8818d3aefd40 R10: ffff88017fc03800 R11: ffff8818e83933c0 R12: ffff8818d3aefd40 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff8818e8391068 R15: ffff8818fa6e4000 CS: 0010 SS: 0018 #0 [ffff8818d3aefc98] opens_in_grace at ffffffffc00e81e3 [grace] #1 [ffff8818d3aefca8] nfs4_preprocess_stateid_op at ffffffffc02a3e6c [nfsd] #2 [ffff8818d3aefd18] nfsd4_write at ffffffffc028ed5b [nfsd] raystef66#3 [ffff8818d3aefd80] nfsd4_proc_compound at ffffffffc0290a0d [nfsd] raystef66#4 [ffff8818d3aefdd0] nfsd_dispatch at ffffffffc027b800 [nfsd] raystef66#5 [ffff8818d3aefe08] svc_process_common at ffffffffc02017f3 [sunrpc] raystef66#6 [ffff8818d3aefe70] svc_process at ffffffffc0201ce3 [sunrpc] raystef66#7 [ffff8818d3aefe98] nfsd at ffffffffc027b117 [nfsd] raystef66#8 [ffff8818d3aefec8] kthread at ffffffff810b88c1 raystef66#9 [ffff8818d3aeff50] ret_from_fork at ffffffff816d1607 The troublemake elem: crash> lock_manager ffff881dc0c38298 struct lock_manager { list = { next = 0xffff881dc0c38298, prev = 0xffff881dc0c38298 }, block_opens = false } Fixes: c87fb4a ("lockd: NLM grace period shouldn't block NFSv4 opens") Signed-off-by: Cheng Lin <cheng.lin130@zte.com.cn> Signed-off-by: Yi Wang <wang.yi59@zte.com.cn> Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit c5c97cadd7ed13381cb6b4bef5c841a66938d350 ]
The ubsan reported the following error. It was because sample's raw
data missed u32 padding at the end. So it broke the alignment of the
array after it.
The raw data contains an u32 size prefix so the data size should have
an u32 padding after 8-byte aligned data.
27: Sample parsing :util/synthetic-events.c:1539:4:
runtime error: store to misaligned address 0x62100006b9bc for type
'__u64' (aka 'unsigned long long'), which requires 8 byte alignment
0x62100006b9bc: note: pointer points here
00 00 00 00 ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff
^
#0 0x561532a9fc96 in perf_event__synthesize_sample util/synthetic-events.c:1539:13
#1 0x5615327f4a4f in do_test tests/sample-parsing.c:284:8
#2 0x5615327f3f50 in test__sample_parsing tests/sample-parsing.c:381:9
raystef66#3 0x56153279d3a1 in run_test tests/builtin-test.c:424:9
raystef66#4 0x56153279c836 in test_and_print tests/builtin-test.c:454:9
raystef66#5 0x56153279b7eb in __cmd_test tests/builtin-test.c:675:4
raystef66#6 0x56153279abf0 in cmd_test tests/builtin-test.c:821:9
raystef66#7 0x56153264e796 in run_builtin perf.c:312:11
raystef66#8 0x56153264cf03 in handle_internal_command perf.c:364:8
raystef66#9 0x56153264e47d in run_argv perf.c:408:2
raystef66#10 0x56153264c9a9 in main perf.c:538:3
#11 0x7f137ab6fbbc in __libc_start_main (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x38bbc)
raystef66#12 0x561532596828 in _start ...
SUMMARY: UndefinedBehaviorSanitizer: misaligned-pointer-use
util/synthetic-events.c:1539:4 in
Fixes: 045f8cd ("perf tests: Add a sample parsing test")
Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210214091638.519643-1-namhyung@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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commit 90bd070aae6c4fb5d302f9c4b9c88be60c8197ec upstream. The following deadlock is detected: truncate -> setattr path is waiting for pending direct IO to be done (inode->i_dio_count become zero) with inode->i_rwsem held (down_write). PID: 14827 TASK: ffff881686a9af80 CPU: 20 COMMAND: "ora_p005_hrltd9" #0 __schedule at ffffffff818667cc #1 schedule at ffffffff81866de6 #2 inode_dio_wait at ffffffff812a2d04 raystef66#3 ocfs2_setattr at ffffffffc05f322e [ocfs2] raystef66#4 notify_change at ffffffff812a5a09 raystef66#5 do_truncate at ffffffff812808f5 raystef66#6 do_sys_ftruncate.constprop.18 at ffffffff81280cf2 raystef66#7 sys_ftruncate at ffffffff81280d8e raystef66#8 do_syscall_64 at ffffffff81003949 raystef66#9 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe at ffffffff81a001ad dio completion path is going to complete one direct IO (decrement inode->i_dio_count), but before that it hung at locking inode->i_rwsem: #0 __schedule+700 at ffffffff818667cc #1 schedule+54 at ffffffff81866de6 #2 rwsem_down_write_failed+536 at ffffffff8186aa28 raystef66#3 call_rwsem_down_write_failed+23 at ffffffff8185a1b7 raystef66#4 down_write+45 at ffffffff81869c9d raystef66#5 ocfs2_dio_end_io_write+180 at ffffffffc05d5444 [ocfs2] raystef66#6 ocfs2_dio_end_io+85 at ffffffffc05d5a85 [ocfs2] raystef66#7 dio_complete+140 at ffffffff812c873c raystef66#8 dio_aio_complete_work+25 at ffffffff812c89f9 raystef66#9 process_one_work+361 at ffffffff810b1889 raystef66#10 worker_thread+77 at ffffffff810b233d #11 kthread+261 at ffffffff810b7fd5 raystef66#12 ret_from_fork+62 at ffffffff81a0035e Thus above forms ABBA deadlock. The same deadlock was mentioned in upstream commit 28f5a8a ("ocfs2: should wait dio before inode lock in ocfs2_setattr()"). It seems that that commit only removed the cluster lock (the victim of above dead lock) from the ABBA deadlock party. End-user visible effects: Process hang in truncate -> ocfs2_setattr path and other processes hang at ocfs2_dio_end_io_write path. This is to fix the deadlock itself. It removes inode_lock() call from dio completion path to remove the deadlock and add ip_alloc_sem lock in setattr path to synchronize the inode modifications. [wen.gang.wang@oracle.com: remove the "had_alloc_lock" as suggested] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210402171344.1605-1-wen.gang.wang@oracle.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210331203654.3911-1-wen.gang.wang@oracle.com Signed-off-by: Wengang Wang <wen.gang.wang@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com> Cc: Mark Fasheh <mark@fasheh.com> Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org> Cc: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com> Cc: Changwei Ge <gechangwei@live.cn> Cc: Gang He <ghe@suse.com> Cc: Jun Piao <piaojun@huawei.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Tried it again (after a looooong time) with 2.92 and wireguard is working again as it should. So this can be closed |
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Might be related to #2 but since 2.23 the wireguard kernel backend seems to be broken. There are no received packages on any connection.
Tested 2.22 ,2.23 and 2.24.
On 2.22 everything is working as it should , on 2.23 and 2.24 only outgoing packages.
Userspace wireguard is also working.
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