raw.txt

9MA_ 11'$2 IO_t',_
O_.,.I e4s,1'.,3sol- ..4 I,'_ 'U%_" _L_L-'_-_J i _.~_A
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT ' _'_--_-'_--: '. '--_._
R. R. [_P.G_,r,1
TO : FM4/Chief, Mathematical Physics Branch DATE: _A¥ g 7 1_
_OM : FM1/Assistant Chief, Mission Planning 66-FN1-64
and Analysis Division
SUBJECT: CSM orbit determination using the T,_ radar
Apparently it is planned to use the T.MMradar while that spacecraft
is sitting on the lunar surface to determine the CBM's orbit. I am
told that the radar angle data accuracy is so poor it will not even
be used3 the com_nd module's orbit determination will be carried out
with range and range rate observations. Considering the extremely slow
rotational rate of the moon, I cannot for the life of me understand how
it will be possible to accurately determine the orientation of the command module's orbital plane. I am told they intend to do this after
the comm_nd module has made a plane change, which occurs a couple of
orbits before TN ascent, and the results will be used to establish
orbital insertion conditions for the Y,MM launch targetting..
Could you analyze the situation, determining how well the various
orbital elements m_y be determined for the folaowing data gathering
1Periods: (a) one-half pass, starting from horizon to directly overhead, (b) one complete pass from horizon to horizon, and (c) two
complete passes from horizon to horizon. I am also interested in
being informed about the correlation of the various orbital elements;
for exampl% orbital period and orientation of the plane.
I may have this all messed up and perhaps they do not really intend
to do the things in the way I understand it, but I certainly would appreciate it if you would make a rather abbreviated, order of magnitude
type, analysis of this within the next couple of weeks in order to determine whether it is even reasonable to include such a program in the
T._ computer or alternatively if it mnst be m_wdified to make it insensitive to sm_l] bias and random errors in the radar data. I just can't
help comparing this to a single radar station on the ground where conditions are far superior and our results are not red hot.
Howard W. Tindall, Jr.
¢C:
(See attached list)
Bur U.S. SavingsBondsRe:darly on thePa3'ra,/!Savins PlanMAy 10Sl tL_l'ON
_. 0174 t#aut 14. r dj I_1- II.d_
t,m'rm._ srATrs C.OVEI_Nm_NT ' ': C'"--'iV_D
i¢,4mo ","_dum JUhi ,_[) ':":
t [{. ' r,::.:,:
R. R. RAGAt, I
TO : See list attached DATE: _ _ _o_
FRO_%! : F_/Assistant Chief, 1/issionPlanning 66-FMl-t0
and Analysis Division
SUBJECT: Spacecraft computer program status report
Tom Gibson and I went to MIT on May 25 and 26 with one of our primary
objectives to determine exactlb'what the progr-m schedule situation
was for the AS-50k (AS-207/208) spacecraft computer programs. Although we had a number of verT fruitful discussions with MIT people_
such as Ed Copps, Dick Battin: John Dahlen, and Bob Mallard, on this
subject_ we really did not find out what we wanted to know. However_
I am very encouraged to see the enthusiasm and vigor with which Ed
Copps is attacking this problem.
Ed has set June 3, 1966, as a target for getting out the first cut at
a Program Development Plan, which he is anxious to talk to us about
during the following week. In fact, he intends to come down then not
only to talk over the program as he has put it together but also to
discuss its preliminary output regarding the AS-20T/208, 503, and 502
schedule situation. Tom and I concluded that it would be better to
accept this delay than for us to attempt to do the job ourselves,
which is for all practical purposes the same thing he is trying to
do. Our main objective, of course_ is to find out what the pacing
items are so that m_ximum attention can be given to these items in
an attempt to bring what is expected to be an unacceptable schedule
more into line. Possible lines of attack are as follows:
1. Review and, if possible, reduce or simplify our requirements
involving the pacing programs.
2. Give top priority to programmers working on those routines
for computer access.
3- Authorize somewhat inefficient use of computer storage by
those programmers to speed up the coding process, even at the sacrifice
of deletion of other routines.
4. Reassignment of personnel to the critical areas even though
inefficient.
5- Reassignment of certain tasks from people working on the critical systems to other groups, such as AC Fdectronics, _C, or other
internal _rT units, etc.
Bgy U.g SavingsBondsRegldarlyonthePayrollSavh_gsPlan //It is not our intention to dispute MIT esti ates of time required to
carry out specific tasks, shortening the tfme to anticipate delivery,
by telling them to do a Job in two months which they feel requires
three; although, of course, these estimates must be carefully examined
to assure ourselves we are getting the correct picture.
It is to be emphasized that we must look at the overall schedule situation and not Just the program for a specific flight.. There are obvious
interactions end trade-offs that could be made between the program_
for AS-207/208 and those for AS-503 and AS-504. If all efforts to remain within the flight schedule fail and the progr_m_ do become pacing'
for these flights--as they very well could be--we must be in a position
to understand the trade-off of flight schedule delays of one mission
as compared to another.
A couple of items which Ed Copps did tentatively identify as problem
areas which might be influencing the schedule are the following:
1. Special guidance progr_m_ are required to eDable yaw steering
during the lunar orbit insertion maneuver, providing for plane change
in excess of 6°. Ed says the Design Reference Mission calls for a 12u
capability, although he doubts that other spacecraft systems constraints
would permit such great plane changes. Accordingly, he asked us to
re-examine this specification to determine if we could live with a 6°
plane change capability, thereby avoiding the necessity of formulating
and including these special guidance progr-m_.
2. Everyone at MIT seems to feel that the preparation of the Guidance System Operations Plan (GSOP) is the most critical of al] items
since so much of the work _.st be delayed until this final definition
of program requirements is finished. Accordingly, we will attempt to
take all possible steps to assist MIT in this work, including having
EEC people stationed at MIT to assist in the development of the GSOP
,m_, almost simultaneously, giving EEC approval of it. Also, it is
intended to work on the more critical pacing items first as ones are
identified and initiate procedures whereby official l_C approval c_m
be obtained on these parts as they are completed rather than waiting
for delivery of the entire package.
I'd like to make one final observation regarding the overall situation.
It's probably terrible; I really don't know yet. But it's my feeling
that everything that can be done to help has been done. We are reacting
to the problem areas as fast as possible; MIT has reorganized in what
seems to be the best possible _ay, and they appear to be getting things
on a businesslike basis, which up to now has probably been our worst
problem. __
Howard W. Tindall, Jr.GSA IPMI_ (41 Ct_ 101-11.$
IJNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
g, /,!
Jt3i. I 3!
TO : See list _// DATE: JU_iI._lgi_._,GAi, . .
FROM : F¥_Deputy Chief, Mission Planning and 66-_,12.-83
Analysis Division
SUBJECT: Apollo rendezvous guidance computer program options
The.purpose of this memorandum is to inform you of two special features
of the Apollo spacecraft rendezvous guidance computer progr_m._ you may
not be aware of since we just added them to the system.
First of all, you recall that both spacecraft--the CSM and the I,EM--
have rendezvous guidance systems. In order for the computers to determine what maneuvers are required to bring about rendezvous, the basic
thing each of the computers needs is the state vectors--that is_ orbital
elements--of both vehicles. Up until now, al _ thought has apparently
been given to the _ program. Since the CSM is supposed to be passive,
all radar data is used to update the LE_ state vector, based on the
assumption that the CSM it is tracking is in a wel 1 known, unchanging
orbit. Also, as the l,MFfmakes maneuvers, the guidance system senses
them and so there is no need for a pilot input to the computer to inform it that they were made. However, when we consider what's going
on in the CSM, or in the l,EM during a CSM rescue, this doesn't look so
hot.
First of all, the computer may really have a better defined state vector
for its mm spacecraft_ making it more desirable to update the state vector of the other vehicle. Therefore, pilot control is needed over which
spacecraft state vector should be updated based on the radar and optical
observations. This will allow the pilot to exercise his best judgment
as opposed to providing some sort of autonm,tic logic built into the computer program. Also, if the other vehicle maneuvers, the computer won't
know it unless informed by some external source, like the crew. For this
reason and others, it is also necessary to include in both the CSM and
J,_4 computer programs the capability for the pilot to input to the computer the fact that the other spacecraft is making a maneuver such that
it can be taken into account in maintaining the best current state vector
of each spacecraft in each spacecraft's computer.
Accordingly, both of these options are being provided; that is, the crew
wil'l, inform the computer which spacecraft state vector should be updated
and he shall also input to the computer all necessary information when the
other vehicle makes a maneuver. Associated with this latter capability
is the need to assure that the observational data is not improperly used.
Therefore, in order to avoid complex and sophisticated computer logic, we
have decided to again utilize the crew's capability to understand the
:lOl_lOII BuyU.S.SavingsBondsRegularlyonthePayrollSavingsPlan /22
situation and control the computer processing in tho following way. The
pilot will interrupt the computer program at the time it is planned that
the other vehicle will make the maneuver, _hich will cause the computer
to reject all tracking data until the actual _V of the maneuver is input.
He will have to get this information by voice from the other spacecraft
after the _neuver is executed_ of course. This procedure will assure
that the quantities which are input are the most accurate available and
should assure that the observational data is used properly.
Howard W. Tinda]9 · Jr.
Addressees:
CA/D. K. Slayton l_Ml_/R. P. Patten
CB_A. B. Shepard FM/Branch Chiefs
CB/J. A. McDivitt FM2/T. F. Gibson_ Jr.
CB/E. E. Aldrin, Jr.
CF/W, J. North
CFTC. H. Woodling
CF/P. Kramer
CFTC. C. Thomas
CF/D. Gr_m_
CF_J.B.Jones
·EG/R. C. Duncan
EG2/D. C. Cheath_m
wOS3/K.J. Cox
PA/J. F. Shea
PA/W. A. Lee
PD/R. W. Williams
PD4/A. Cohen
PM/0. E. Maynard
PM2_C. H. Perrine
PM2/K. L. Turner
FA/C. C. Eraft, Jr.
FA/S. A. Sjoberg
FA/R. G. Rose
FC_J. D. Hedge
FC/E. F. Kra_z
FC/A. D. Aldrich
FC/M. F. Brooks
FC_G. S. Lunney
'FCIC. E. Cbarlesworth
FC_P. C. Shaffer
FC/H. D. Reed
FC/J. C. BostiCk .
_/!i P' Mayer
V. Jenkins
R. Huss
F. Dalby
F_3/J. P. Bryant
FM:HWT:psVrll_b IVKM [4%11 JV
MAY It&,_ [OiTlOII
-,j
UNITED STA'ITS GOVEI1.N/XIENT j._'_
' Memoandzlm
_'o : see li.,_t DAXE: 'jU£.fl_-_l_ ,,4
FRO.X! : F_[/Dcputy Chief_ t_.issionPlanning and. 66-F1_1-8_
Analysis Div_ sion
SUBJECT: Capability to do orbit navigation in earth orbit will not be iml01emented
for AS-207' or AS-504.
MT current_ has plans for suppling a number of different modes for
using _eir basic orbit deter_nation progr_. (_T call s this process
"navi_tion," so I wi_, too.) _ese modes differ in that there is a
varie_ of t_es of obser_tional data used during different _ssion
phases.
In our attempt to si_li_ the AS-504 spacecraft computer program, we
are reviewing the overa_, si_ation to deter_Mne that no _]_necessary
modes are inclu_d. For example, there is no need to perform orbit
navigation while in earth orbit for the lu_r mssion or any recog_zed
contingency situation. _is parti_r orbit _vi_tion mo_ was to
utilize star/lan_rk observations along wi_ other earth orbi_l service routines a_ special initialization capabilities to determine the
spacecraft s_te vector prior to the translunar injection_neuver ......
Since this progr_ is not required for _e lu_r _ssion, _T wi_ be
directed not to include it in the _-50_ _rogr_. Since we do not intend to _plement any pro,ams especialqy for _-20T, u_ess directed
othe_ise, it will be _opped from the _-207 computer program as we_
which means that the CSM wi_ not have the capability of deter_ning
its o_ orbital elements during that _ssion.
Accordin_y, it _i_ not be possible to satisfy 2_t mission objective
as referenced in TRW document 2132-H008-R8-OO0, "Mission Require_nts
for _o_o Spacecraft Development _ssion _-207/208_" _ted _rch 7,
1966_classifiedC°_idential'__XA3x __ \
Howard W. Tin_ Jr.
'_'_- Buy U.S. SavingsBonds Regularly on the Payroll'SavingsPlan /3-_AY lt$2 ll)lliOll
UNIT]':]) STATJ'S GOVEI(NMEN'i'
Memora zdum /' -3[!!l''_ '! ,a'::'_ ,'
R. R. [RAGAi,I
TO : F_I4/Chief, _Mathemat_cal Physics Branch DATE: JUL 8 'B66
PROM : FM/DeputyChief, Mission Pla_ning and 66-Flql-85
Analysis Division
SUBJECT: Determination of relative CSM orbit
Jim, this is just a reminder of conversations with you and k'm_labout
a job I'd like your people to do. In th£nking more about this orbit
determination task wherein the I,EMdetermines the CSM orbit while sitting
on the lunar surface, I wonder if perhaps MIT has lost sight of our primary objectives, thus leading them to the conclusion that they should use
only range and range rate data.
The only purpose of this orbit determination, as you recall, is to determine the orientation of the CSM's orbital plane for use in targeting the
T.RMascent guidance and to select a lift-off time which mnst be within a
few seconds of optimum. It is not to obtain some sort of a precision
total state vector of the CSM. BaAed on these ground rules, I just can't
believe that the angular radar data, even with relatively la_ge biases,
·cannot be useful if properly weighted, and I would think that it would
provide a great strength or reliability to the process, which I wpuld
consider mandatory. That is, we are much more interested in assuring
ourselves of getting a pretty good answer all the time rather than an
excellent answer some of the time.
The questions to be answered are: should we or shouldn't we use the angular data, even with large biases, and how do we take ,mxinmmadvantage
of our external knowledge, such as the CSM's own orbit determination
(though it's not with respect to the I.MM). Don't forget, this data
processing anst be entirely automatic. The crew will never have time
to learn how to operate all those statistical filters, etc., whatever
they are.
w_._l said he would start something here, but I wanted to make sure you
were aware of it and concurred and, in particular, would give it some
of your own personal attention. Perhaps these remarks belong at the top,
but I'd just like to reiterate that as much as I distrust it, I'm afraid
· our best source of relative orbit determination for this particular mission phase may be by the T.MMradar data. I doubt if the CSM will ever
see the T.EMon the surface, at least we'd better not count on it, and the
I_FN tracking certainly can't figure out where the T,Eb{is. Our other
source is the G&N state vector T/M at B_touchdown, which is probably ·
the best, if the antenn_ are pointed at us.
Bt/y U.& SavingsBonds Reg_Iarlyon the Payroll Savings Plan /g
_lO--IOlSM FP_ (41C[_ Io1-1_$
t.' t2-z"" F2'-;\ ;-'-;.-,
UNITI'_I) STA.TES (;OVERNMENT · ,._ _,.,_,: '..- t..T.
R. R. R_,GAi',t
TO : See list _-( DATE: JUL $ 1966
FROM : F_,_Deputy Chief, Mission Planning and 66-FM1-86
Analysis Division
SUB3ECT: HO special program available for targeting the CSM plane change in
lunar orbit
As I understand it, it is currently planned to make a plane change with
the CSM in lunar orbit within the last several revolutions prior to L_4
ascent. The purpose of this maneuver is to optimize the sharing of maneuver (propulsion) requirements between the CSM and the T.RM.
This memorandum is to inform you that there is no computer program current]j planned for either the CSM or T.k"Mspacecraft computer to carry
out the targeting for this CSM plane change. In other words, in finalizing the onboard computer program requirements for the AS-504 mission,
we are assuming that the targeting for this maneuver will be carried out
by some source external to the computer: such as pre-missionplanning in
the form of crew charts or from the MCC in real time.
Of course, the programs needed to execute this maneuver will be available,
although not provided specifically for it.
· · ' _ Jr._
i_,,-,,, Buy U.S. SavingsBondsRegularlyonthePayrollSavingsPlan t 7M;morandum /._c. ....
TO : Seelist DATE:JUL
PROM : F_Deputy Chief, Mission Planning and 66-FM1-89
AnalysisDivision
SUBJECT: LMM radar angle bias correction
As you know, the rendezvous orbit navigation process involves updating
the spacecraft state vector based on the spacecraft radar data. However, the._adar apparently has _nncceptably large angular bias errors
for soniereason. Instead of fixing the d_mn radar_ someone decided to
include in the LEM spacecraft computer program the capability of computing these raS_v angle biases at the same time the spacecraft state
vector is updated. Once these biases have been determiued to the computerts satisfaction_ they are not updated further; that is) they are
assumed to remain unchanged thereafter.
There is a contingency) however_ which would cause them to change, so
I'm told_ and that is if the T,_ were to undergo loss of pressurization.
It had been PIIT's intention to provide an option in their rendezvous orbit determ_uation program to reinitialize the computer such that it would
redetermine the radar angle biases in this event. However, in line with
our c_%paign to simplify the computer program) this option is being deleted_ which means that, in the event of spacecraft pressurization loss_
the radar angle bias may be in error by some fraction of a degree. This
does not disable the rendezvous guidance system, but rather may cause
some loss of efficiency in the use of propulsion fuel. Just how _,ch
depends on when it happens, of course, but the m_ximnm extra cost is
not expected to exceed about 50 ft/sec. We'll get a better estimate
of this cost and m_ke sure it's acceptable.
Ed Lineberry, how about you getting that done. In the meantSme, we're
telling MIT to take this option out imless we're directed otherwise.
. Howard W. Tindall) Jr.
Buy U.S.SavingsBondsRegularlyonthePayrollSavingsPlan /
SOlO-lOll __ _ __MAY 1_$2 [_111ON
UNITED ST-VrES GOVEKNMENT i-'[_2C ,_ t\/_- D
 'zorandum ;_ il ,/. _t.,
R. R. !:_AGAN
TO : Seelist DATE:JUL18 1966
FRO,_! : _-_Deputy Chief, Mission Planning and 66-_R41-94
Analysis Division
SUBJECT.: Rendezvous terminal phase guidance program in the Apollo spacecraft
computer
On July 7, 1966, a t.eam of _C and lOT "experts in rendezvous" (including Paul Kramme]_;Ed Lineberry, John Dablen, and Norm Sears) met
at MIT to discuss and review the preliminary _aidance System Operation
Plan (C_SOP)which MIT has unofficially distributed, covering the terminal phase and External Av programs for the AS-207/208 mission. %_ais
meeting was sort of a mile-pebble in the accelerated program development sequence we have established in an attempt to get all this business
on schedule, gIaatis, we sa-eobtaining bits and pieces o.fthe C_OP as
they come off the _T press rather than awaiting receipt of the formal_ly
published, final document.
It is our hope that, by reviewing and commenting on these pieces as
they.become available, the GSOP should be virtually acceptable without
modification on the date of its publication and should permit the computer program development to proceed n_ch more quickly than it has in
the past. We had previously discussed these mission programs and our
pilot in!mat and display requirements for them in detail a month or so
ago with MIT, and the pieces of the C_0P I am talking about here reflected that input very well. Therefore, most of the discussion was
for purposes of clarification to assure a firm understanding on both
MSC's and MIT's part as to what this program was really going to do and
how we were going to operate it. Basically, very few modifications were
considered necessary.
In my opinion, this meeting was highly successful; and, since ttZese
processors--the ter__"nal phase and External W--are the most signifil
cant new requirements and the most controversial of the mission programs, I feel we are probably over the htump as far as defining the
program for the AS-207/208 mission.
i would like to point out here the two items given the most attention
at this meeting since they serve well to describe the character of the
terminal phase rendezvous guidance philosophy:
1. One of the capabilities of most interest which we have provided
was the display of range, range rate_ and the angle the spacecraft X-axis
makes with respect to the local horizontal, it was decided to m_ke these
three quantities available a_ crew request at any time the data was
available. ('Yr_isstuff is used for ca_ying out the crew backup proce-
_ d_u'es.) Contrary to one of .,myprevious re-oorts, these quantities will
·_l_
B,O`U.S.SavingsBondsRegdarly , onthePayrollSavingsPlan / ?2
Al! be computed based on the current best estimate of the two spacecraft
state vectors. (We had previously expressed an intention for the computer to display raw radar range and range rate in the T.k_4). Our action
in this case was based on our desire to make the CSM and T.k_4computer
programs as much the same as possible, and, since the raw rad_ data is
available on what is said to be a highly accurate analog display in the
T.k_4,we have not really lost anything. In order to make this particular
feature of the program as independent as possible from the automatic
guidance system processing, we have divorced the display of these quantities from the activity associated with the pr_,_y guidance system to
the ,.l_Xi_m extent.
R. Based on Gemini experience, the crew has emphasized that there
is no requirement for automatic execution of the braking m_euvers by
the G&N system. As previously reported, it is felt that this task can
he carried out Just as we]l, if not better, by the crew if they are provided the proper information; namely, the range and range rate data.
At least this is true in the case of the nom_ual mission and most contingency situations, and we want to take advantage of that. However,
there are occasions when auto--tic control of these maneUvers by the
G&N m_ght be mandatory. For example, visual acquisition is required for
the crew to carry out this task, and under some abort situations lighting
conditions c_-nbe unacceptable. A3.so, there are abort cases in which
the closing velocity is too high for effective m_uual control. Recognizing that procedures are available for utilizing the remaining computer processors to cai-_y out the G&N controlled braking maneuvers by
proper pilot m_nipulation of the computer, we deleted the requirement
for automatic computer logic for this task. _e point is, we felt that
there was ins_ufficient justification to carry out the extra programming,
debugging, verification, and documentation, as well as using some 50 to
100 words of precious computer storage, for a program which was not
needed_ except in rather remote contingency situations, as long as procedures were available to handle all situations. And_ they are.
The final GSOP shall reflect these characteristi6s; otherwise, it was
accepted pretty well as is.
In the course of our discussions, I learned some rather interesting things
about the command module which I must say didn't impress me very favorably. In fact, I really wonder (i.e., doubt) if it is possible for one
crew member to carry out a rendezvous in the CS/{. For ex_w%_le, the only
observational data available to the computer is from the sextant, and
that requires manual tracking and inlrdtof observations into the computer.
(The I.k_4has automatic radar tracking with its data available to the
computer as it periodica]ly requests it.) And, of course, in order for
the pilot to use this system, he has to be down in the navigation area
of the spacecraft, which means he has to quit making observations somet_me before any SPS maneuver to get strapped into his seat. On {op of
that, the sextant apparently can't be oriented along any of the major3
spacecraft axes, which makes it necessary to orient to some attitude
not consistent with making }{CS midcourse _neuvers.
I'll bet that when we finally get a crew timeline on a CSM one-man
rendezvous_ he has to do it without any observational data available
to the computer after about 15 minutes before TPI. If my guess is
right_ in effect we have provided practically no CSM G&_ rendezvous
guidance system, and thus the Job will end up being carried out pretty
much using the crew backup procedures. Boy' __· , .... ,... . .-
. _ :,2' ' _t'.: ._ .4_ ~; _ . . ?
-·L y55,_._'"':_W: :'5'_'.:J! ..... . ,L ' ' ·:_*'_":·
"'_ "'"_':' GO " :'' :_'.,-i,_
i "i.':St
! _t · *l
_:::';..3'
.' . _:-,,- ;_: ....
.. 7,,.:,. · ._.,,.
.
,.%_,.
'. ,.'..*' ':
· _,F-?_-.,_.*_. e:_-._.:_ .._ _ i5 ?i,-'::' ,, .. · r ," "
_' :'_ "' ':':F'-:'' "' ' ?" ; "''':''"_'"_'';_"' "_: i _ _'' ;_ ' ": ' '
:,.;g_ -: ,! :.:'t : o '_"'::.._;: t .Si_'_ii_i,t , , .. ._?.: . :-_ .:. ? nar'z: AUII$ 0 1_86
· .'.,- . _..; - .. ,
; "'FROM :.i_/Deputy Ohtef_ Mission Planning 66-FMl-lO0
', "and AD,_ysisDivision _-
· , ... . · .' .
"$UBJEOT: Notes regarding the AS-207/208 OuiSence Systems Operation Plan (GSOP)
meeting with MIT
During the week of August 15, we held a review of the AS-207/208 Guidanc_
Systems Operation Plan (GSOP) at MIT. Some things interested me which
-, . I will pass on to you here. I will also include some of the more significant _ecisions--that is, direction to MIT--that were made at that
t_,_-. -.
· 1. It is currently p!_nued that the astronaut will freeze the ren-
&ezvous maneuver sequence by a manual input to the co._puter. Tais will
bedone at about twelve minutes before each of the maneuvers, including
the TPI maneuver. It serves 'to prevent new observational (e.g., radar)
data from changing the maneuver he intends to ma.k__ next. It does this
!t by causing the computer to completely ignore all new observational data
obtained between the time of his signal and the maneuver. In fact,
: whatever data is collected during that period is never Used, even after
the maneuver has been executed.
· Logic is being introduced into the rendezvous navigation program
' (i.e.2_'the orbit determination used during rende_¢ous ) which, in effect,
edits the observational data automatically. Specifically, if the change
in both the computed velocity magnitude and the _---_mputedposition of the
spacecraft is less than some pre-established amommt due to the processing
of new observation-I data, that data is adjudged _o be good and is automatically included in the solution. If the change, in either of these
quantities is in excess of some larger pre-estab__ished amount, the data
is not accepted (unless thecrew permits it), an_ a program -_arm light
comes,on. If the change in those quantities f_ ·between the'se two
ltmits, the data is accepted and used, but the _=,_m light would be lit.
: _. MIT was directed not to provide a mode Car utilizing Alignment
Optical Telescope (AOT) data in the rendezvous rr_,_zigation. This had been
ten ,l_ativelY'muggested for use in the event of a =_ndezvous radar failure
: ' ·i ,l_ut,based: on the likelihood that the AOT data _=LTLd not be of any value,
·ii .. ;:_:..-. ..'itwas . decided ... not to complicate the program to _zmit its use.
[:"47':/Xte _o fear of some ambiguity, the compuOi_r pro_z-_m is designed
'to reject ra_,_ data when. the estlm-ted range to, ,_ohetarget exceeds
::' 7.'- ' ,lmoe ii._..:'._._.'
.... :": I,,%.' :: _;;-e. -:'
} '_ ' _t.,_ '{mI' ',-..... . Buy _,_7.-_avh_gsBonds .=,.,.:RegularlyOnthe Payc.-":SavingsPlan ¢7f"
.22.' '·7'_: .-_... _m.t _ *_--, _ _v._-_ -TT·'_._ '_ - ,._, ·, ,,, _ -_·_._-.._._ ~ · _4 , _, . ,. . . .
_._ _,., -___,,__.._ _.a_._¥. _ ,: : :.,·_ _._.., :__ ......_:· _ - ? _ _ r?._, _; _._:__.
_i_;_,_ <_ _23 .__ _ :_'_ _ :·_;_-_- . ; :: · :,_% .,__.;_ _:
c_,-_"_*_,_ ' ';,-'.._._..._._'",._; _: ', _' _,_ :..,_ _.._',_,_r.-"_ ._ _.'-,. ',_i_· ',,_,j_-_.,'*'.: ,. : ' · . : .x , '.-4 ·'-_4.'_"__".--.-_?_- ,_"?
.._:;.,G'_i .._ -..'._-_._, ., .:i.!_'??,_./O- _e 'O_'}4Z_' s, _'_S_t0_6.2e$_'_esO],ye_ :'_s whether or not an :'
se asa lunar ao  si- '
'].'::,? ._-_ ":'i! _!.:":??7:_.:'_'.'?'_he_'_'ght crew peoDle ' have 'requJested that the display of dura-
_'.'_.:i:_/:_;:...._':_J:_:;t_Ocn:O_ time' _.. the terminal _hase between ._ and _PF be in seconds.
:: :.:: ' -.'._,i Sin e ·.this id ,not one Of. the standard t_. display formats, MIT .was
il" ..' :_ . ......':.'-_directed _o'ret_in units of hou_s.:_nutes.seconds as they proposed,
-: -;....unless the crew has ren_y good reasons to provide this new format.
Tom Hardy has the action.
"7. As usual, there was a discussion as to the reference to be used
in the display of altitude. MIT was directed to compute and display all
spacecraft altitudes referenced to a spherical earth with radius equal
: _ to that of the launch 10ad. This reference was determined to be best,
although not l_erfect,for rendezvous missions after what seemed to be
· . endless months of discussion. Coordinates of landmarks used for orbit
determination, however, will be referenced to the Fischer Ellipsoid.
8. As a result of the crew's dissatisfaction with the fixed headsdown attitude forced upon them during SPS maneuvers on AS-204/205, MIT
proposes to eliminate that constraint in the AS-207/208 programs. The
:_: computer will display a "preferred attitude," which is heads-up, but
wild.not automatically orient the spacecraft to that attitude. As I
understand it, it will hold whatever spacecraft "roll" attitude it happens to end up with when the thruster axis is properly aligned. It is
possible for the crew to manually change this attitude if it is undesirable by deactivating computer attitude control, then manually changing
the attitude and reinitiating computer control, which w51] then hold the
new attitude.
_. No mi_t,.,mimpulse capability is to be implemented in the LGC
since there appears to be no requirement for this, whatever it is.
10. As usual, the question of navigation (i.e., orbit determination)
in earth orbit came up again. We previously had directed MIT not to inelude this capability in the A_-20T/208 mission programs since·it is not
required for the lunar mission. However, they, and some _C people, feel
it is desirable to provide this capability in order to obtain further
experience with the process prior to going to the moon. Thus, this is
still an open item. It has been agreed, in any case, that orbit deter-
/ . ruinationusing unknown lanSm_ks would not be included, and, although
the provision ts being m_de for star/moon horizon measurements, they
will only be used to obtain CDU angles to be transmitted on the downl_nk and they will not be used in the navigation program.
Norm Sears estimates that the orbit determination process should -
· ' be comp!eted within about,ten seconds of accepting an observation. Also,
. he would liketo establish a procedure whereby data points are obtained
i "' at the rate of about one per minute.
_,..._ ;_'"' .. .. · ,. r_-._`
" .2?_. :::":_ ll. _ I_IT was directed to delete the guld_nce reference release (GER) .'_
_ _. · _ignal,!its function to be replaced by the lift-off signal. As I under- _
.'_ _? _ stand it, there is some controversyover this which Aaron Cohen intends
'&! to resolve at !_C.
: 12. One feature of this program which !a_rtic,_larly disturbs me, and
many others, is the tremendous amount of work the astronaut must perform
to use the com_uter program. Of course_ much of this comes about as a
· result of the trade-off to provide mission flexibility by giving the
crew the capability of controlling what the coml_.ter is doing as opposed
to having it perform automatically. Another specific example is the
amount of data which must be input to the computer prior to making a maneuver, including such things as spacecraft weight and inertia_ engine
trim angles, tailoff, spacecraft configuration (docked or undocked)_ 'and
level of rate response to hand controller inputs, it _'ould certainly
be desirable, if possible_ to eliminate as _uy of .these inputs as possible, either by putting them in fixed memory--if that is a reasonable
thing to do--or by deleting them altogether. T_cr_- is some question in
my mind as to how accurately some of them can be determined by the crew_
· and we may find that there is no significant advantage obtained by up-
·dating them. _is will be followed up.
I'm sure there was something else interesting tha_ .came up there_ but I
don't remember it right now.
Howard W. Tin_3, Jr. _\
. ,, ,.
· L_ .-_
·-' .'" -'_' J =_T-_"_, .'_ i5:/: :,i,"._:. '.4 ·'. "-"- '.':74_. _',, ; : ,:_',,": -'-:. - '. _. ' ...._ _'
-_'-z_,, .<" _'"' .,Im_l_lew-h. t:. '-· . _/_ _ i__
_-:_,:,.._;<.,::....._',,r, ."' .'-', :' '--': ' .' " : .- _-C'-'!",/E',-.,'
- "-'...-. '.:- : ':.zl,'lemoranaum
_':_.' ''::'_%':-'_?.' '.7..¥-:_' 2; ' SE, u _._.....
:...,':.....,:_.. .._0: .3 .' See ...... :_st _,._., '_.._.,_':; ....'_,_7. ., .._' ·...... :_. '" '........ : .... :;._...:,..:::._,_,_,_
- '-'._ 7"?':' ' * ' ' ? '_
· . ,et
:.. _OM ' : _/Deputy.._ef, Mission Pl_ing ,_a 2' 66-FMl-103
.' Analysis Division
SUBJECT.:AutOmatic rendezvous braking maneuver
_':,'
As you :*now,MIT is currently designing the command module mud lunar
module computer progr_m-_ without provision for automatic braking
maneuvers. There has been some thought to reversing this direction.
However, Don Cheatham, Aaron Cohen, and I agreed today to proceed as
we are for the AS-207/208 progr_-_-_--thatis, do not provide automatic
"' br_g maneuvers in the computer programs--since we are fairly sure
that this capability should not be required for that flight. We will
review this decision later for the AS-50_ program% based on .experience
gained during the AS-204 mission and from crew training and simulations,
after more cmzplete crew ·procedure} are defined.
Howard g. Tind-!l, Jr. I,
: . .
- - · . ...:
.....
..... -:,>:; . : _.' -
·. ._°.] BuyUS,SavingsBondsRegularlyanthePaym__SadngsPlan
-- 2.6-·'_ .- .;. _o. _'L-' _: °_._ · _4_ -_:{_y.' _ ._ ,__A_, _,, _ ,__ ' _ ' '
· · .._X- _ -:..,? .... , ..,,,-, ,_ _, -_ -_:_-._*_. _ ._ .. ,-
.-- _ ,,? ._ _'
':'A_'_:i%:._'-,_ ·,":,,._: ._,i:',_:.......-:.. '" _-_:'5_?'_' ':
·:'¥ ' ? ' ?";:'':' "" '!
· . _, °.:_ .._.,;.._ _.-ro,.:..: . ._.-$:_ . .. ,...... _/
ci : _. _ ._--_._-;. -_-%:- _... ·--._._ , ' ..'" . ...' :._
tUl' "'
F
_:._·_,i_,' ..4C.._.,:.._.i :,.-....... ,'' .,.'_ '_':-': ' 4 ' - -,.'..
_gO_ : '._:.Deput_:-_hief, Mission P_---_ _g :; 66-FMl-lOh
4_,, :_.Gnd:"AZ_F_is Division ,._
SUB3ECT: S_US of'"._e 1_ module "quick return" guidance cal_bili_
·_ais note is in response to your query regarding the "quick return"
tcapability being provided in the l_mar module (LM) for aborts during
"".thelunar descent phase. As you ree_ I reported deletion of a pro-
: '' k _:_._ in the T.M computer for generating coefficients to be used in an
ml_rt Dolynomlal to retarget the IA{ Dowered flight to provide a direct
:intercept rendezvous trajectory. You asked how far this work had pro-
-Eressed since you felt such a capability would be "comfortable."
In answer to that question, MIT Informed me that, whereas the concepts
w_re well established, there was still a considerable amount of work
required to complete this particular program. Furthermore, we have
also deleted the direct ascen_ launch guidance_ which is a necessary
'companion Drogram. Certainly of more interest to you now is_ what is
..Ouz' current capability. ':
· 'k
_e program is being written such that abort action by the pilot durin,;
Dowered descent will cause the guidance to retarget to the stan_nrd imm
·insertion orbit. Incidents_y_ it is necessary for the astronaut to
'select which engine, the Ascent Propulsion System (AlmS) or the Descent
Propulsion System (DPS), is to be used, depending on the situation.
In any case, following insertion into orbit, the crew has two choices:
either to proceed with the concentric flight plan, or to use a processor' which we'have retained for Just such situations as this, whereby
the crew may .?btain the two-impulse Lambert solution for rendezvousing
' with m_m_m AV--essenti,lly a _t_ect intercept, in effect, the latte--
-: l_rovides very nearly the same capability as we have deleted, except thvt
· _ the maneuver must be carried out in two steps _ith some delaY--say, fi--e
or ten minutes--between them, as opposed to a single maneuver.
. If the concentric flight Dlan is chosen, the time between the abort
action and rendezvous would be 'about 2_ hours with the differential
altitude varying between k2 nautical ?les above to the standard 15
nautical miles below the CSM, depending on whether the abort took place
· . '. 1._nediately after initiation of the descent maneuver or at the end of
the hover. The "direct intercept" approach would take about l½ hours
·' ibut iS only possible prior to initiation of hover since after that tim._
'_''' the intercept trajectory, _*ort-n-te!y, also intercepts the moon--fir_t:
Actual _rocea,_res have to be settled, but I feel we're in pretty good
; ' _hape here.
'_.5 '
-.., B_,,,,U-$Savings . B_ Regularlyon the P_,?ll SavingsPlan .:., .,..._ ,_.. ¥1_:,.k_';?,'_._,._ ;_
_'_ ".;:':..-,,.-?_; -_¥_{, _' _&?..<_.:_.,..'L_.j; _.v "-__-" .. .;'' ' .'." ._f'_ .... ., */> "':_.f':'-'' ., ._:.v;..,._ .. ',:,' "_
- .. t' _°
':"_"_;",'¢/';i,"' :';' '_:i!:_L._':_:'_;:_ _'i:!or:exaaple, iff an'a_t:_ccurs-':'e_r_Y in descent, the. LM _111 be _ear . ..... ,. :.
.-; .(_ ',.>. _,::, ._:._0,'000 .feet · with orbi_._ _re_oc!ty.. ,._e current i_serti_n altitude is .. "'
,_ ,.. . } ·
·*' ..i'_ -'.'?'i:?:-_._0,000 _eet. _hua, the s_acecraft would have to _ke a large altitud._
.... "._ "'_. :.':;'': ._han_ with little 'increase tm velocity, which would obvious_y'de___d
_-:; :i_'_-.'._Some rather wild gyrations of the sl_acecraft--bothhiE_ly undesirable
· . :- ": . ' \
· _ H_w_r_ W. Tin_ll, Jr.
,I cc-
(See attached llst)
.-% .
- ° , .
- . . :c"; ': k J a.j<-': , .;_.:,.',-
.,.: .. - . i_ ._'. .-,,_.._.. ?
·I :o.'< ' i.'_ _: _
["_.'
. · '_.?-41_
._'<"
c._?
'_'
' _ - - :
A . ?.,.k,>_.' ........
·! . -. ,,;:_;._ :-,'_:.'._,_;,.._ - .. , _ .
R [ * _ Ii 4 '_ ..... 1_ i_ 'I ; I _. _ ''II I i .... i : ' I I I I I 1
:' :' ':"_?;-_;'4_-_:'>.''_'._:__·':' 'i', '' :' ; - ' '
. .. ,- . _._,,._;_,_..¥. ::_,_'-.?..,_ _,-. :...
.... :· , ' ,- ¢_ -_a- _f': '-. '' .... . · "
- _i-.. -' .?_,'_j_";',__:,_',_.... _ ' :.....
·. ._ -. :/._ '-...,. _ !;_.% _ _ ...... .... .. ..-- .
· :_' · - ; '- .i_,._ ..... _.,_... . ,' .... ° -.';.
.
1
_ ,:'_ · ::_.._,_ ._ .... :. · -.: .' ....,; ,.-' · ' i.-'
.....
_- -.. <.._j a. .;; _,y_ '-._;¢ .°'}.:[._C_,-... - · , .... _ .k...-':.k_-_al "_ · .: __ ___L '.F
MA? 19b_ ,_TJ_
o '_ GU _,f_k_1t 41gr_3 IOlo11,6
UNITEDSTATESGOVERNMEN'f _
TO : FA/Director of Flight Operations DATE: $EP 1 O _$
_-I_oM : FM/Depu ty *Chief, Nission Pl_ni_ and 66-FMl-107
Analysis Division
SUBJECT: Alternate rendezvous technique - mission planning status
Since our meeting in your ofz_ice on the stable orbit rendezvous_ Ed
Lineberry and i have met on a number of occasions with other interested
people in an attempt to lay out a schedule of work needed to arrive at
the decision as to how to go on 278 and subsequent missions. This note
is to let you know the things we (I_C) intend to do and when we ex!0ect
to get them done. As you will see, most of the work is being done by the
Flight Crew Support Division and GuiS_nce Control Division since the most
significant difference from the old Concentric Flight Plan (CFP) involves
the termiu_l phase of the rendezvous.
1. Paul Kramer_ FCSD, has assigned a task to McDonnell Aircraft Co.
to perform man-in-the-loop s_m-l_tions of both the stable orbit rendezvous
technique and the _ with comparable approach velocities. S_lation of
both syst_m.q will be initiated with the transfer m_euver. The approach
velocities wi 11 be equivalent to the CFP with differential altitude varying from about 5 to 15 nau6ical miles. All failures modes w_ll be investigated. It is intended to start this three-week effort on about September 19.
2. GCD has two studies going. The first is an evaluation of the
CSM optical rendezvous gnis_nce system to determine its accuracies and
performance when operating in a stable orbit type rendezvous. The prime
objective of this study is to determine the magnitude of the dispersions
to be expected in the on-board computed _euvers starting with the
transfer from the stable orbit point. It is anticipated that this n_n!Ysi$
will be completed by mid-October.
B. The second GCD study concerns the braking phase. Ron Simpson is
in cbnwge Of this investigation which is prim_ily an expausio_ of one
previously carried out for higher closing rates. He intends to start
with conditions corresponding to CFP differential altitudes of between
5 and 15 miles. As I understand it, his m_-in-the-loop $_tionz are
usua]_y initiated at about a l0 mi_e range. The purpose, of course_ is to
determine if there is some preferred closing rate going into the braking
maneuver. These runs wi_ be performed both with and without a cockpit
display of range and range rate. He expects to _tart this analysis in
mid-September with the results to be available early in October.2
!
4. We are doing some things in MPAD too, of course, but they are
not as extensive as I indicated they might be during our meeting. Ed
Lineberry's people are carrying out analyses a_m_d at selection of the
optimum transfer angle(_)and trailing displacement for the stable
orbit rendezvous technique. These two parameters are probably interrelated growing !_ger together to keep the closing rate meaningIlul in
the face of dispersions. We still expect the preferred trailing displacemen¥co be in the order of 15 to 20 nautical m_es. At present the
two prime candidates for _ are 292° and 330°. 292°, you rec_1%, has
the advantage of providing the same approach conditions - primarily
mini_ inertial line of sight rates - as the CFP. This was the transfer
angle used on the Gemini XI re-rendezvous which, in effect, checked out
a ground controlled (perfectly:) CFP with braking without a ra_ s_m,,1-tlng a differential altitude of 5 nautical miles. _he 330 ° figure was
jointly selected by _C and MAC for the Gemini XII re-rendezvous based
on lighting considerations and time available to m_ke mid-course corrections. _e objective was to !orovide as large a value of _as !_ossible
while avoiding the unique problems associated with a 360 ° transfer in
the presence of out-of-plan and altitude dispersions. (Incidentally,
McDonnell is canopying out a considerable amount of _ork both in terms
of dispersion a._alysis and the preparation offlight crew rendezvous
charts. N_ch of this work will be applicable to our _effort. )
5. In addition, the mission planning for the Gemini XII re-rendezvous is being constrained as much as possible to duplicate the AS-278
initial CSM rendezvous conditions. In particular, we are trying to
duplicate the ground tracking orbit determination capabilities as well as
the relative motion trajectories to simulate the stable orbit rendezvous
technique.
6. As you may reca19, we originally est_ted development of ten
reference trajectories _as required to provide information for the big
decision. We have concluded that it is virt,,_lly impossible to do that
much work in a reasonable length of time, regard_less of how we redistribute our manpower. However, RAB is developing a reference trajectory for
the nominal lunar rendezvous ass,,m_ug an on-time LM lift off. It w_19 be
a two-impulse, minimum _ V trajectory to the stable orbit position. Once
this is completed they intend to perturb the LM insertion conditions up
to the 3 Si? performance of the Abort Guidance System and the Ascent
Propulsion System in order to determine the effects of these dispersions
on the Delta V. _eir work w99'_be based on the assumption that there I
is a perfect knowledge of the situation at the time of the maneuvers and
that they are executed perfectly. Ed anticipates that this work wil 1 be
completed around the middle of October.
Fin_lgy, we are issuing a program change notice to MIT to provide an
offset rendezvous target capability - trailing position only. I should
point out _-t some resistance is expected to this program change,
primarily from the FCOD since there are m_y other capabilities they give
much higher priority which we have not agreed to implement so far. I am
not certain how ASP0 w_l] react either since, as I u_derstand it, _W has
reported to Joe Shea that they see no significant advantage to this
t echni que.
£?-,% I
3
Also associated with _1] this, the _-207/208 Reference Trajectory is to
be issued on about September 23. As you are probably a_a_e_ there are a
large number of unresolved areas on this complex _ssion pr_i_ due
to the uncertainty associated with the AS-206 mission; thus, the quality
of this Reference Trajectory is going to be questionable in any case.
Unfortunately it will continue to show the initial CSM active rendezvous
as a CFP type with a differential altitude of 20 nautical miles.
Although it does not correspond to the planned documentation schedule,
I really expect another Reference Trajectory will have to be issued
prior to the release of the Operational Trajectory. Therefore, if we
change to the stable orbit rendezvous, that will either be reflected in
the new Reference Trajectory, or we will issue an addendum of some sort
such as an internal note documenting the change.
Chris, this has been a tough problem and, believe it or not, we have
spent a lot of time developing this plan for getting the answers you and
Sig want. If there is something else you think we should be doing, please
let me know.
Howard W. Tin_l 1, Jr.
CC:
FA/S. A. Sjoberg
FA/R. G. Rose
FC/J. D. Hodge
FS/H. E. Clements
FM;J. P. Mayer
FM/C. R. Huss
FM/M. V. Jenkins ·
FM12/Jo F. Dalby
FM/13/J. P. Bryant
FM14/R. P. Parten
FM/Branch Chiefs
CA/D. K. Slayton
CF/W. J. North
CF/P. Kramer
EG/R. C. Duncan
EG/D. C. Cheatbam
EG23/K. J. Cox
PA/J. F. Shea
PM2/C. H. Perrine
FM:RWT: cmJ
. " _ .' :' .
· ' ( ·
Of'TlOe4A,tFO4f_ KO. 10
GSa._ _Sl Cflll 14H--$ I,.4
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
Memorandum '"'
: SEP' ':
TO : EG/Ohief_ Guidance and Control Division DAT_. _. _- : t
· FaOM : FM/Deputy Chief, Mission pl_ing and 66-FM1-109
Analysis Division
SO_JECT: Mission rules needed for use with AGC self-check
· i As you probably recslJ, we have had an exchange of views and -_m_randa
regarding the usei_,l_ess of the Apollo computer prelim known as selfcheck. _is exchenge was started by our attempt to cut the spacecraft
· i
computer program down to an acceptable size for the 1,_R_ mission.
': Current status is that the self-check progr_ are still in; however,
I intuitively feel the 50_ pro_m_ have probably again grown to a
· .: point t_t we have again overflowed storage and will event-_lly have
:_ to have another paring down session. I would like to request that
your people who expressed an interest in preserving self-check ass,_,_
i. the task of formulating applicable mission rules which could be used
: on the 1,,_ mission in. conjunction with the self-check pro_m_.
_aese mission rules would specify exactly what action is to be taken
during the 50_ mission_ probably as a function of mission phase and
type of computer failure detected by self-check.
_ae point is, I would like to w_ke sure that this program r_nlly serves
a useful operatio_l function as opposed to a pre-flight function be-
; fore we decide to carry it to the moon at the exclusion of some other
'.i: _m someone wants. And, of co_rse_ If we do retain it in the
system, these reco-wnended mission rules should be very useful to the
Flight Control Division and to the flight crew in establishing the
operational procedures.
Howard W. Ti _ , Jr. _'
CA/D. K. Slayton
OF/W. J. North
0F_C. C. _aomas
EG/D. C. 0heatb_m
PA/ff. F. Shea
PD4/A. Cohen
FA/C. C. Kraft, Jr.
FA/S. A. Sjoberg
FC½J. D. Hedge
FN/!i P. Mayer
R. Huss
V. Jenkins · ·
FM/Branch Chiefs
FM2/T. F. Gibson, Jr.
· Fbi: ITw'T:cm .,, .
Buyq  .'.   eavingsBonds f Regularlyon, theVa . ,aWngsPlan E/ i.i
' 'i· :: . '
IAi, y 19_ II_IIDON
//
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
Memorandum -
: v. i :'m6
i_. _. *::'.' '-- _ _
"' _OM : _/Deputy Chief, Mission Pl_n_n_ng and 66-FMl-l10
_lysisDivision
$UZ2EET- IGC computer requirements to provide DI_ backup of SPS
* During our discussion at MIT last week, the question came up as to
whether it is necessary to have trajectory integration techniques in
_he LOC for the tr_-earth phase of the mission as well as the :lm-_7,
_hase. _ae argument is that if we are serious about using the I_ .
descent propulsion system to back up the command module SiS during
Il the tram_-earth phase, it will be necessary to have this inte_tion
._ capability as a service program for such things as platform alig-ment
and maneuver targeting. In fact, this capability would also be
required for trans-lunar aborts using the DPS, I suppose. The more l
think about it, the more I am convinced that this capability should
be included and I am interested in your comments on the subject. Of
course, if you agree I assume you w_l], include it in the 504 LOC
pro_A=m requirements.
Howard lq. Tindall, Jr.
QC;
CFfO. C. _aomas
EGIR. C. Dvncan
EGfD. C. Chea_b_m
PA/J. F. Shea
PA/W. A. Lee
PDfR. W. Will_m-_
PD ,/A. Cohen
PM/O. E. May_"_d
.. r z.r e
FA/C° C. Kraft, Jr.
FA/S. A. SJoberg
FAIR. G. Rose
FC/j.O. Eoa_
FC2/E.F. K.ranz
FC3/A. D. Aldrich
FO4/M.F. Brooks
1_:,/O. S. Dmney
FM/r. P. M_yer
F_/C. R. Huss
FMiS/J. P. Bryant
FM/Branch Chiefs
I M2/T. F. Gibson, Jr.
FM:HWT:cm
· I._ ·
· · . ·
OMIO_._ _ N0, l0
_V if62 _
um:r_ sr^rsz OOVER_ME_rr. F'.7_C_'-.V_D
Memorandum sE?
R. R. RAGAN
1'o : _IW;.'/F.ltght Softw:=e Branch DATE: SEP 2 1 1966
Attention: T.F. Gibson, Jr.
: FaOM : FM/Deputy Chief, Mission Planning and 66-FM1-_31
Analysis Division
SUBJECT: Rendezvous Search modes of various types
According to the notes I made during the 278 GSOP review at MIT last
August, there was aPDarently still some question as to whether an
automatic ra_-? search mode was needed. Sears also 9uestioned whether
an automatic sextant search mode was needed on the commnd module.
Has anything been done to answer either of these questions? If so,
what? If not, what can we do to close out these items?
Howard W. Ti_-11, Jr.
cc'
EG/D. Co Cheatb-m
PD4/A. Cohen
FM/M. V. Jenkins
FM: HWT: am
!_ BuyU.S.SavingsBandsl_gularlyonthePayroll $av_agsPlan.. : · . '. . . ,..
. _ ' · , i'.· j.. : ,
,_tANf]902 tD_14_
-- _ Ifltt Mi a I]_1 --I I,.i Z'
i UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT ' ''
Memorandum
TO : See list DATE_.-
_': FROM 1' FM/Deputy Chief, Mission Pl,-_ing and 66-1aM1'3_12
Analysis Division _ !i
SUBJECT: Apollo rendezvous navigation data edit is too complicated
In my notes of .the AS-207/208 GSOP meeting with MIT, reference 66-FMl-100
of August 30, I indicated that MIT was including an automatic data edit
i scheme in the rendezvous navigational pro_i_-_mfor both .the L_ and the
·0SM. As you rec_._l, this scheme was to accept rarle- or SXT data auto-
-_ 'matic_l_y if its effect 'on the spacecraft state vector is less tba- some
4 pre-established --_unt and would reject it if its effect is greater then
· · some other (3,rger) pre-established -,_unt. Data falling between these
two criteria was to be a_cepted but a warning light was to be turned
on. Dr. Shea commented that this seems _,_ecessari_y complicated - that
.re,lly there is no almParent sense in having three conditions when two
would do just as well. I must say, although I was foolish enough to
_! argue at the time, I cer+_-ly agree now that we really should ,_ke this
a s_,T.Te binary decision. Use the data or don't use the data based on
, some pre-established level of quality - probably light a light when the
computer is reject_ the data and do away with that central m_gion
altogether. I have searched my memory and can't r_e-11 W_ MIT proposed
to do it that way, but unless someone can find a good reason, we should
direct MIT to simplify the decision logic as noted above.
Flight Office Branch personnel please take appropriate action t-,,ediately. ..
· \
Addressees:
'_ (Seeattachedlist)'_ UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
..ii
Memorandum
TO : See list DAqT_.P '_P?!_l: _$G
;' FAOM : .FM/Deputy Chief, Mission Planning and 66-FM1-113 r '
SUBJECT: Tne_ are fi_Vfe_nces in the descent guia_nce 10rog_m_
on AS-503 and AS-504
It is c_ently intended to include so_ sort of tests of the IR descent
propulsion smd guiaance on the AS-503 mission. However, it is not
possible to use the s_ne gui_nce eq_tions on AS-503 as w_]] be used
on the AS-504 3_,_ar descent. _his is due to obvious diffe_nces of sm
earth orbital mission compa_d to an actual descent to the moon's surface.
·., _ae g_vitatio_l Dotention is different; the objective of the _euver
is different; there is _thing for the 1,_w landing x_r to boumce
signals off of, etc, Accordingly it is MIT's intention, with our conc_nce, to omit certain vital p_ts of the AS-504 descent gui_aBce
:pro6:!--am from the AS-SOB mission. _he purpose of this memo is to -_ke
sure that you _11 know this.
It is my understanding that there are four main processers of the AS-50_
descent gui_-_ee pro_m which are not to be included in the AS-503
program:
1. processing of the 1._iing rs_r data
2. 2auding point desi_tion
.t
3. x-axisoverride
I _. auto, tic rate of descent c°ntr°l
In addition, the_ is likely to be a cba=ge in the coordinate system of
some sort needed.
I certainly do not claim to be sm expert in descent guidance; in fact,
, quite the opposite. If anything above interests you, I would suggest
i you contact _one who x_lly k_ws wh_t they _ +_king about like
: Don Oheat_m_ Floyd Bennett or Tom Price.
·4 I
Inci_en+_lqy, we s_re c_ntly in the midst of sum exercise designe_ to :
_we the AS-278 spacecraft computer prog_m_ identical to those for ..
AS-503. Although I don't expect this to have any i_t_luenceon the
_escent guia_¢e_ I just mentioned it here to cover that possibility.
Addressees:
BuyU.ravings BondsRegularlyonthePay,tdL ,aWngsPlan g'; · :i.5
:. o .,. .._, · · ..'_'.'
· --: _ .,.' . .,- -- .,, _-. _,,.,,,.._.._.._,,,, .._.
i - caMI_f_dM_. _ 1S
--_-
%"1 UQ_,mImITZDIdl gm STII_llh$ATZSC,OVZRNMAur. ' RC: _r
Memorandu m SEP h,'-. ".'.
· ' . R.R. RAGAN
TO : See list DATE: _ Z S _ · 'i
'"' 'I _ : FM/Deputy Chief, Misston ;m,_,-m._g and. 66-FM1-11_ !.' !)
.I _1 ysis Division >
st_JEcr: Apollo spacecraft gaia_-ce navigation modes
'. currently planned for AS-503 and AS-50_
I am afraid there is a bit of confusion as to what navigation modes are
being provided in the AS-503 and AS-50_ Apol3n spacecraft computer progr_mR. I am sure I have contributed to this confusion m_self, and the
.: purpose of this -_-_ is to try and clear it _ll up.
. According to Norm Sears, it is intended to p_vlde the followt-g navi-
-] gation; that is, onlxm_d orbit determination pro_ in the AS-504
i .ct....... -d m:)du_le c-_ter program:
7
I
a. Durtng earth orbital operations there Sb*ll be no onboard
, navigatio_l capabLl/ties at all.
b. During the tra_-_,m-_ and tra-.-earth phases the _avigation
I . pro_,_n is be4-g forwn,l-ted to process both star/l_,_,_-k and star/ - '
'_ horizon measuro._nts. _ae l_n_wm_M a_ horizon may be either earth or
i 1,,_,_ at the choice of the flight crew. _t is, there is no interlock
gore .ming.which is used depending on position of the spacecraft relative
·j to those two bodies. _ae pilot -w,st m_m,,lly key in location of the .-
:,I earth l-_-_wks and it is probable that he will also have to key in 1,,.._ -
.i l_w_ks since those stored for 1,m_ orbit navigation are likely to be
of a size not readily observable _,,_ing these phase s of the mission.
c. In lunar orbit the navigation program-w11] uttl_ze only 1,m,_
l,,_ks referenced to the platform. "Twenty-eight l_t_ks w111 be
stored in the computer program, but I am certain others may be keyed in
· if the crew de_ires.
For the As-_O3 mission, it is currently intende_ to have oul_ one _avigation mode - _--_y, use of star/_-_k or star/horizonobservations.
_ae ln_t_ks an_ horizon used are restricted to earth only since i_ is
not intended to have such routines as the 1,,_-_ ephemeris, _,,rm_ rotation, '-_
" etc., l:)ro_f._mst av=*l_ble. Earth 1-_-_ks must be keyed in ._.,_11y by
the crew. Norm Sears (MIT) points out that use of this dat_ in orbits of
thetYP e clzrrently Dl-_-ed for AS-503 may act_,-lly result in defoliation
of the onboard state vector, and as a result it may be necessary to
restrict this process to a spacecraft system test rather _._ an operatio_ procedure in support of the mission. "
t '
I suppose, to m_e this entirely complete, I should also list here the
processing of the co--_-d module sextant data for rendemv_As navigation,
which w_ll be in all Block II computer progr,_m_ currently pl--_-d. "!i!:ii :?::i: i;
'" · ' .1.' ' :'_ "_."" '" '
:°'.
2
..: Other *.h,_ rendezvous navigation ut_!4zing the spacecraft radar, there
is no _avtgatio_l capab_14ty pl-_r_d to be included illthe LGC pro_i_
·- . . i:' for any mission.
_!:.-
. '.: We are currently in the midst of an exercise to ._we. the AS-278 prOgr.._ I,
:_ identically the s-_ as AS-503. Since we have & difficult schedule
.... sit_iation on AS-278, there may be implications on the navigation modes
available for the AS-503 mission as noted above; however, at this time
I do not expect that to be the case and will certainly inform you if the
situation eh-p_es.
... H6waz_1%;. _, Jr. _'
· · ._! r Addressees: '
(See attached list)
·- I
. I .--. (
'
.i
i '
] -.
'i '· ; ,
-'-".--: ':::. ' : ' · _..,,,_r i '_"J'_4_' ,'J_
- - 0% _-_-/-
G_ )*_l t4t ClI_ IOl.ll.S
UNITED STATES GOVERN"_EX'T ; ;' r"':T7_':;:?z"_
//iemorandum , -,
TO : 'See list DARE: _eEP2 ? .__ .... -_-' i'--.'
FROM : FF_Deputy Chief_ Mission Pla-_ing and 66.FM1_115 _'. ::.%a:'_ : ;.
-'7
A'_!ysis Division !_. :::;.a ·
SUz3ECr: LGC prog_-_mdevelopment for the AS-278B i_':;L%_ :___:;:Z_. !
Ibis note is intended to document my understanding of the situa_ion_y:i_--- I
, regard to the spacecraft computer pro_e_ns for 'the alternate _-27_
· mission. In particular_ I would like to record how we are respondimg._o : t .
the current pro_6_ming needs in this area. _ ,.
Although it was orig*_ally stated as a _round rule t_hatalternate _ !'--,
-:_': would be flown using the same pro.-ams developed for the pr_w_ry mmSsmop_; '
it appears that that _1 not be possible in this instance; e.g._ t_ere
are two contingencies the Apollo Program Office feels it is m_dato_<to _A_ .,.,_-_>_ ..
be prepared for. One is an extended schedule slip on the delivery on the _._'_
first IA{spacecraft, and the second is the failure of the AS-206 mission ,/
/_ -/..._4'_
of sucha naturethat it is not possibleto carryo_t theAS-278mission ....
as currently pl_ed, _e alternate mission (AS-278B) in both of these ''_
..L.?c_-'.' _
instances is to rendezvous the AS-207 com_d module with a LM_ _ the ?:,
LM, perform certain spacecraft systems tests and then to initiate a , _-..._v;..,
pro_-am_ed sequence very s_m_._ if not identical to the current AS-206 .'5, - .
mission after returning the crew to the co_d module. We are now c :- ,
attempting to determine precisely which additional processors _,st be · ;' .:
added to the AS-206 program in order to permit -_ng such a flight. Of / ; '
course_ the additional requirements depend on precisely how this mission -_,_.,_/",J?,
is to be flown_ which in turn depends on the gnia_ce system capabilities;
e.g., we are in the f_m_liar little cycle. At the least, it appears that
the capability must exist to power up the system and align the platform
in orbit; however, even these things are not certain.
I have asked Paul Stull and Tom Price to contact the various ASPO and
MPAD personnel involved in this mission p!_ing to pin down the possible
alternatives for flying this mission, leading to a precise definition of
_dditional program requirements to _he 206 program. It is our intention
to direct MIT to give the identified processors, which theoretically are
already needed in the AS-208 program, highest possible priority such that
they may be added to the 206 program at the most opportune time. It
_ppears certain that they will have to be added at some time; e.g., it
appears certain a program must be developed to support this type of a
flight. There is some question, however, as to whether the 206 prog_am
as currently defined is needed since the modified pro,dram should be able
to fly both the 206 mission amd the AS-278B mission. Our b_sic problem
is providing this augmented program in t_ to support the 206 mission if
it is flown; i.e._ it depends on the schedule of that flight amd the
program development required for it.
i_ BuyU.S.SavingsBondsRegularlyonthePayrollSavingsPlan
38'2
Accordingly, it is our intention to continue working on the present
AS-206 pro_m as currently defined until the latest time at which a
decision can be made, probably in the latter part of November or early
in December. It is at this time that the fin_ 206 pro_m inte_rmtion
· and flight acceptance verification testlng will be going .on. If, at that
: time, it is apparent the 206 flight has slipped sufficiently to permit
adding the additional processors to support the AS-278B mission, work on
the 206 pro_m _ould be terminated amd only this augmented program would
: be developed for use both on the AS-206 and AS-278B. If the current 206
schedule is maintained, however, we would be forced to complete flight
qualified 206 program ropes to be followed later by .theaugmented AS-20'6
· , _ program for support of the AS-278B mission.
! Although some pre!_y i_formation has been.obtained from MIT regarding over-_!l schedule impact, it is my intuitive feeling that it is
probably not particularly accurate, ff_erefore; i_ is my intention to
· obtain pro_m development Dlau'sfor the augmented AS-206 program which
will include the effect of work on this pro_'4m on the AS-278/50B and
50h program schedules.
This will be done as soon as the additional program requirements for the
AS-278B mission have been defined.
Addressees:
(See attached list)UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT '.--_:,-r-.-...............
_._ ,_/ 7-'7d_,_ _
TO : See list DATE: C_jT 4 1g$8
FROM : FM/Deputy Chief, _._issionPlanning and 66-_I1-118
Analysis Division
SUBJECT: No extra memory for the Apollo Spacecraft Computer
One of the most significant decisions coming out of the -4-$-278computer
program review with the Apollo Spacecraft Program ¥mnager on September
15 and 16_ was his absolute assurance that the spacecraft computer memory
would not be augmented for the /t5-503 or AS-504 flights. Accordingly,
re.Il program development should proceed on that basis for those flights.
On the other hand: I would hope and expect that work _iSt continue on
the auxiliary memory for follow-on missions_ and I feel we should offer
whatever assistance MIT can provide on a non-interference basis to that
effort.
1
Howard W. Tindai_ Jr.
Addressees:
(See attached list)
7
&;y U.S. Saz,ilzgsBotzdsReg;zlar/yon the Pay_vllSavi_zgsP/an,k_y le%2 S._'TIC)el ' / · !
Gq& Iq'el (,41C/_ m$--11,.$ · _'_,'I _,"hO I
! f F
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT .... -' '7". :'_i- LR. _A_-A,_
Memor du '
_n rtz ,_i ...._ w.
I®C£Ni',IAL FP..E$ [ i'l
TO . : See list ....... ' DA_',_
"- Analysis Division '
. $tmj_cr: l_ceduro for obtaining Apollo 8pace_ _,_.,atez;' __ /
sche dm_le infor,_tion __ //
In our (n0) attempt to establish the most me-_f_m*ul flight development
schedule for Apollo including, as it must, adjustments to conform with
the continually varying mission constraintsas well as provid/ng backup
missions for contingency situations, ._y people have legit_-_te need to
know the effect of their ideas and proposa!-_on the road/ness of the
spacecraft computer program* being developed by MIT. On the other hand,
the exact schedule of these proo_m_ is still ill-defined. As a rosul%
on occasion recently, people attempting to get this sort of information
directly from their MIT friends have obtained uncoordi_ted ami, thus,
inaccurate _*ormation upon which decisions have been made, somet_._s .
d/strossing to l_C am1 MIT both.
To avoid this problem in the future, we are fm._d/ately establishing a
proceS,,_e wherein Mr. Tom Gibson of the Flight Software Branch an_
Mr. Bob M_!l-_ of MIT, or their authorized representatives,are to
serve as the single point contacts in their respective organizations for
the procurement of schedule-type information. It w_ll be their Job to
poll ._1 _n*luenced parties to assure the information obtained is the
best possible under the cir_,m-_tances. Spacecraft computer program
schedule information obtained by any other route sh._l be used at the
user's own risk; certainly with no obligation on our part to comply.
Howard _. 2J._a_l'm.,Jr. i
_8_ssees: _o
(See attechegl list)
? _ :
.---.. a_ u.s.s_._.' gsm,,a g_,u,b_ t3,v,,/°t_,s..,&g_;s:., 9/ ::._
s _ "_" ': _"" {_'_" ' ' "_4 ' . tv.`;: .... _ ''%14;,__,,,_....... , · '
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT R. R_(,:-^_ ' "----: _-'-"':
MemorandumD. HCA_q _,- _.,(.. -:. _ .
c.'-r 'mLF,..Es1 [' ;:"'?',..., .
TO : See list _-_/[ v/DATE: OCT ! l _
r oM : m/DeputyChief,m sion '. ,JdJ i [/56-5m-12
"' AnalysisDivision
SUBJECT: Program Development Plans are co, ,,:- , F I f
: September 29th sb_ll probably go yv-a least in mY diary)
as the day of a major breakthrough at MIT. On that date we had an _1_
day meeting attended by s3 ] key MIT management personnel involved in
spacecraft computer program development. I expect it to be the first of
sirn51arweelkly sessions for as long as they are required. The purpose
of these meetings is to establish detailed program development plans for
the spacecraft computer programs. This basic _n*ormation is required
for the obvious purposes of understanding the schedule situation_ of
evaluating the impact of program changes and additions, of assigning
priority of effort - both m_power and facilities - in the optin_m
manner, of providing vital information to NASA program management for
consideration in their decisions, etc.
I mast say I was tremendously impressed with the cooperative, earnest
support _11 of these MIT people gave to this effort this time and have
every hope that it will continue for the four to six weeks of h,rd,
weekly meetings I expect Mll be needed to reach our objectives.
At this meeting, most of our attentio n was spent on two items which I
will discuss in some detail. First was the ave_sbility and adequacy
of thecomputer facilities needed for computer pro_-_m development,-and
the second was our investigation into the use of the AS-278 computer
.: prog?Y,m_ with min_w,_m change for the AS-503 mission.
i At present MIT has two 1800 digital computers on which .,] l program devel-
: opment and verification is carried out. These machines have been and
are currently completely saturated. There are no other facilities in the
!- entire universe, to our knowledge_ of proper configuration to relieve this
situation completely. This is identified as a major problem area particulswly during the months of November and December. However, an IBM B60
· is to be installed at MIT very soon and it is currently estimated that
it will be on line no later tb_u Feb_wy 1st. As you recall, we have
funded AC to the tune of about $300,000 to develop a facility in Milwaukee for use on Block I program development, i.e._ for AS-501/502. It
was emphasized that m_x_tm utilization of this facility is essential.
It was discovered during pro_m development for _S-204/205 that the hybrid
facility at MIT was an extremely valuable tool for program debugging.
This is apparently because it is so easy to get on and off this machine;
¥ _ . ''
BuyU.S.SavingsBondsRegularlyonthePayroIISavingsPlan2
in addition, it runs considerably faster than the digital computer. Thus,
it is possible for the programmers to check program fixes quickly and
determine whether they seem to be working before comm_ tting the pro,-am
to the _ll-digital tests. Phil Felle-_n of MIT presented a complete
schedule of the tasks currently planned for the hybrid compute r through
calenS_w year 1967. ]his schedule showed that ,1-_st continually there
are a number of vital tasks which must be carried on simultaneously, or
: at least on a time sbawing basis. _his is expected to present serious
problems and we are currently looking into the possibility of augmenting
the facility to relieve it. In partie,,_r, an _lm_st ideal set of hybrid
equipment is available at Beck._u - a system which had been under development for MPAD - which MIT can obtain _mmediately at a "bargain price".
b A_iitional pieces of equipment such as a Block II AGC and a core rope
s_,lator must also be obtained from some, as yet, -nknown source. MIT
is continuing to formulate plans for augmenting this facility including
· _ obtaining for us the influence it would have in improving the computer
program development schedule. Specifically, this augmentation would
make possible the s_,!taneous use of the com-_nd moduleand LM cockpit
s_,l-tors at MIT. In addition, it would give the unique capability of
being able to run data flow tests ,nd simulations of these .two spacecraft
in conjunction with each other, which wi 1] certainly be high_ y desirable
for preparation of the AS-278 mission. It was strongly emphasized that
the purpose of this facility is not flight crew training, but rather is
for the development of the spacecraft computer progr_m_ and associated
crew procedl_es.
The second half of the day was spent in discussions of how the AS-278
pro.=ms could be used in support of the AS-503 mission. A number of
routines were considered for beefing up the AS-278 program, but after
lengthy discussions only two candidates were left outstanding. One was
the 2_,--_ orbit insertion (LOI) pro_m which is certainly not needed to
fly the AS-503 mission, but which it might be advantageous to test on it.
The second and mere important processor which we probably must add to
_S-278 is the trans-l,_u-_ injection (_v.I)steering of the SIVB. This
program will probably be needed to obtain the experience of AGO steering
the SIVB on AS-503 before it is used for the actual _LI m-_euver on
AS-504. Of course, it is Uot yet certain that the AGC will be used for
this purpose on AS-504, but its likelihood is great enough that we should
be prepared for this important spacecraft systems test.
Our. next meeting will be Wednesday, October 5th during which, _,_ug other
t 'hings,we expect to review program pl_n_ MIT is preparing based on the
following ground rules:
1. Schedules should show influence of augmenting the hybrd facility.
2. They should be based on the assumption that the AS-503 will be
flown using the AS-278 progr_m_. _ae AS-278 programs will be augmented3
as necessary to do this, but it is expected that no more t_-_ the two
processors noted above sb_11 be added for that purpose.
Finally_ I expect we will review 6pen items remaining regarding the
"fi_l" definition of the AS-_8 program. Stand by for the next exciting
episode.
ltoward W. Tindal.l_ Jr. _s
Addressees:
(See attached llst)
0
_.Z_··· · t
G_/P_ _1 gl, g; IO1-11_
UNITED STATES GOVEKNMEN'r _. RAL-Aa ! I U/_I · ' -.: -.-':.: :,'
Memorandura ..4
TO : See list _'>'/_ - -'E' O_r 1 2 _o65
! t ·
FI_OM : .FM/Deputy Chief, Mission Plannin_ __ ,_t-F->%_n-129
Analysis Division /_ _ .-7 -, , _, '
SUB/EdT: Cursory definition of Spacecraft CoJi_ let '_p_bilities
current]j:planned for g_S-503and _¢4_ DAI£ .[
One of the possible actions _hich has been identified to help our spacecraft computer program development schedule is to fly the AS-503 mission
with the AS-278 programs. I have indicated in previous memoranda that
in order to do this we would probably have to add several routines to the
AS-II8 program to .make it applicable for AS-503. However: as we have
studJ,ed this m_tter in more detail, we have arrived at a point where mQ4,
one routine is still considered a candidate -- some guidance of the SIVB
s_m,,l_ting .mr.I. Ibis is a co-_-ud module program. Ibere are no additions contemplated for the LGC. Ibose interested in exactly what capability would be available are referred to the AS-278 GSOP.
I am sure if we proceed in this way that it w511 have some impact on
establishment of the final mission requirements, and in turn will influence
how certain of the spacecraft capabilities for the !un_r mission _$t be
: tested prior to _ing the AS-504 flight. I would like to call your
-; attention partic,_l_ly to the fact that .we shall have no navigation (orbit
-' determination) capability other than that associated with rendezvous for
' the AS-278 and AS-503 missions, nor will we have the ascent or descen_
guidance equations in the LGC. Ibere has been much discussion on the
testing of _11 of these. Based on recent _iscussions with ASP0 missio n
planning people, I re-lly don't expect that anymission requirements
affected by this decision are of such a _ndatory nature that we would
be directed to proceed other ebon I have indicated above. Obviously, if
this is incorrect, the sooner x._efind out about it the 'better.
SomeWhat associated with this, it seems worthwhile to me to provide a
list of the additions to the AS-278/503 progz_m which will have to be
made for 504. This list, presented below, is MIT's current best est-.'m_te _
and is by no means f_t¢ official or definitive, but perhaps it will
serve to let you know what the job we have before us is as well as giving
you some idea of the capabilities we intend to provide for AS-504.
CMD LGC
1.' Return to earth 1. Descent Ho)m*u Injection guidance
2. L0I guidance 2. Lunar l_nd/ng guidence
3. Direct intercept targeting 3. Ascent guiaence
routine
· BuyU.SSavingsBondsRegularly.onthePayrollSadngsPlan y'.: ··ii· · _· ' ': ·
'' · ' ' . i · :' .' '
?
2
6T_ LGC
4. Navigation 4. Direct intercepttargeting
a) SXT star/horizon and star/ routine
landmark 5. Orbitinte_i=tion
b) Lunar landmark a) Remove earthorbit
5. Boostmonitor b)AddL,_n_ 0
6. Orbit integration additions for 6. Lunar rotation
a) Trans-lunar operations 7. Lunar ]_nding time prediction
b) Lunar operations 8. If_ initialization program
7. Lunar ephemeris program changes
' 8. Lunar rotation routine 9- Post !_nding service program_
i 9. Lunar landing, prediction such as _ angle storage
I routine 10. I_,_ surface_ alignment
10. LGC initialization a) Norm_l
Il. Lunar landmarks(28) b) AOT failure
2_l. Launch time determination
· 12. AGSinitialization program
i change s
l_n_11y, I suppose I ought to add the following remark based strictly on
: my own intuition -- namely, we have ,lm_st certainly got a computer
storage problem on the AS-50_ pro,=ms again if _11 the above items are
i added to the AS-278 program, partic,,_ly with _11 of the special flexibilities and options which will be suggested. _herefore, the fact that
,, your favorite processors are listed above does not necessarily mean that
: we.will be able to get them _l] in.
Ho_ard W. TiSa_11; Jr. .-
Addressees:
i' (Seeattachedlist)
!
: !
: i¢........... _ %t_z C41¢__ tc1-11.6 t_CtiOP,t_t! ..... ...... ' ' .....
UNITED STATES GOVEP. NMENT P..RA_A_ [ v-' I ¢'...
Memorandura ' ....
,_oM: ._V_puty chief_ssion , _an_ing _r-_-l_o
AnalysisDivision ]'_.'L_ _ I '
SUBJECAZtitu_e T: andvelocityl_mits,=Coo_.hyt_._P_c_e_t co_uter
pro_z_am on the AS-503 mission __ _/ [
IDUED^TE /
As you know, we are currently figuring on using the AS-278 spacecraft
computer progr__m_ for AS-503. Ed Copps called me the other day to
state that the oioital integration routines in the AS-RT8 program are
sealed such that they w-Vll only wo_ for altitudes less than about
5,1_00 nautical miles above the surface of the earth and velocities no
greater than about 32,700 feet oer sec_.d. (I am told the maximum
values to be encountered in a nomJ_a3 mission are about 3,900 nautical
miles and 29_500 feet per second). He was looking for reassurance that
this scaling would not present a constraint on the AS-503 mission_ and
I told him that I didn't think it would but I would check here at [_C.
In the meantime, MIT is proceeding, assu_ming that these limits are not
· unacceptably restrictive for the AS-503 mission. If anyone knows a
': reason why this is not satisfactory_ please let me know _mmediately.
Howard W._, Jr.
· i
Addressees:
CA/O. K. Slayton
CF/C. C. Thomas
EG/R. C, Duncan
i EG/D. C. Cheath_m
_/i. Cohe_
:' PM2/C. H. Perrine
FA/C. Co Kraft, Jr.
FA/S. A. Sjoberg
FA/R. G. Rose
FC/J. D. Hedge
_/j. _.na.mmaek
FM/J. P. Mayer
_: VoR.Jenkins Huss
FM13/J. P. Bryant
FM/Braneh Chiefs
FM2/T. Fo Oibson_ Jr.
FM2/R. O. Nobles
,,_ FM:HWT: em
Bzq U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan Z/, 7 _-=="'
_....._ ,_,o-,o, , _"_-_ {..-¢-'-;_-U?_!TED STATES GOVERNMENT towo;-z-- , t
Ze I .... _ /
_-:,-t,_T?"-, _
r2r -..
TO : See list DATE: O_d T 1 0
;:):',/ '2.,;'·.,'!
I_RO?Z : · _'_{Analysis /DeputyChief,DivisionMiSsion Planning. and 66-FMl'%'_-_]] I,'-:-:' _'_17. ...... 'lF';. -.,._,i ,I,_,'_¥,
I_:":.'r/- f(,._.;.H I ,- I
SUBJECT: More on Program Development 'DUEDATE /
On October 5th_ we had the second of our weekly all day program development plan meetings at _TT. :Most of our attention was ·given to the openitems on the AS-278 progre_ which I will discuss later: but first I
would ·like to pass on some general comments regarding the Work at NTT.
Based on their intensive planning over the last couple of w,=e._s '- _ it
appears that staffing for program formulation (Norm Sears'- area) and
for prograa_,coding_ integration_ and check out (Ed Copps: area) is now
· adequate. They foresee no problem in the development of the _-278/503
and AS-50g programs in these areas. In fact_ they expect to bs in a
position to handle follo,_'-on mission programming in a routine fashion.
There is a shortage of people in John Dahlen's area. Taese are the guys
who prepare the detailed program sequencing -- C.hapter h of the Guidance
Systems Operations Plans, for those who are familiar with tk_t. They
have several more people scheduled to move into this who they consider
to be highly qualified and experienced which should help to relieve the
situation. However_ this relief _ill only be for programs developed
after AS-278 since that GSOP is currently scheduled for release on
about October 1Tth.
The other problem areas, as I have noted before_ are the computer facilities used for program development -- namely: the 1800's soon to be
augmented with a 325M360/75. How quickly the new r_M cc_._puterwill be on
line continues to be problematical. _e pacing item for this is the socalled MAC' compiler necessary for running 'AGC programs on the I_ machine.
And the hybrid computer facility is also constraining as noted previously.
Phil Felleman has done a considerable amount of excellent work in laying
out the projected schedule of its use basedboth on the current facility
and in the augmented facility which I have described previously. It is
our intention to continue the development of the justification for aug- -_
menting this facility for presentation to oum management at MBC_ probably
aroum_d October 22nd. It is Phil Felleman's estS_te that this equipment
could be operation__i by about Feb:_aary __>-_._provided they get the goahead by the first of November.
Following is a list of.the open items associated with the .a_5-278.mission
programs:
1. _nual takeover of the Saturn guidance during boost into orbit.
_ne AS-278 GSOP presently includes this capability) hcwever_ it was
hastily assembled =_nd a considerable amount of further thought and plan-
_ ning has been carried out at i,'._C leading to the desire to change tb_t
·;_I-_
_-_ _0' U.S..%vD_gs,__',._' '_',?eg_r_' _,, the ?aS'roll v!?i, gs £ia_;
$o;_-1:i2 .
formulation. It is my understanding that Guidance and Control Division
has dispatched the additional information _,__Tneeds to develop this
spacec__-aftcapability to _,_C's satisfaction. _,__Thas been directed to
prepare an i_RB -- our change control doc_%ment defining the work to be
·done and the schedule impact if it is tc be done.
2. Trans-lunar injection ,_l. F_ C_idance of the S_v-B by the
corlmand module computer for a simulation of the TLI maneuver on AS-503
has been proposed. The objective here is to test the interfaces of the
spacecraft _,'iththe SIVB; it is not considered essential to check out
actual _I guidance equations, although that ,,_ouldbe desirable. Since
this is the case. it is possible to utilize to a large extent either
the external ;_V or Lambert guidance programs already _vailable in the
AS-278 program. The question as to _:hich of these was to be used was
finally resolved in favor of the L_mbert_ even though it requires an
additional uplink and pre-tl_rust program. The reason the Lambert was
chosen was that it is exoected to be very much closer to the TLI final
formulation than the external _V_ and it is not expected that the development of these tw_o ex'cra processors is a particularly large job. i_IT
was requested to prepare an MDRB for Lam_bert steering of the SIVB with
a request that if they encounter some problem which use of the external
_V processor would relieve_ they would inform us immediately. Incide_taily_ associated· _ith providing this capability in the _-S-278/503 program:
we are informed that the a_-digita! s_Tlation to support testing of
the Saturn steering is in pretty good sS_ape as a result of the work they
had done previously. They· feel they have a good model of the Saturn
steering with the TBM guidance equations_ gimb_l dynamics, etc. _ais is
a rigid body representation including no fuel slosh or bending_ of course.
3- Lunar orbit insertion (LOI). _T will prepare an },ID_MtoB include the L0I gnidance if they desire. %Te ir-formed them that _C was not
particud.arly concerned whether this was included or not.
4. Stable orbit rendezvous. Jerry Bell (_a_B)was scheduled to discuss the changes required to the rendezvous guidance '_ith RrrT on October
7th. We decided to delay initiation of the _RB for this until our
meeting next week, at which time, hopefu31y_ the definition of this progrs,m change will be more definite.
5- LGC DSKY/eight bali discrepancy. MIT was requested to prepare
an _WDRB for the addition of the necessary transformations to _we the
computer and FDAI displays compatible.
6. APB and DPB min'_._, impulse. Aaron Cohen accepted the action
item of revie_ring within _._C the need for providing these· capabilities
in this program. _T was told not to prepare _D_RB's vet.
7. DPS "30 s_cond" maneuver constraint. _C is also to review the
need for elim_uating the current constraint on DPS maneuvers within the
26 to 30 second burn range which are not accurate!dr controlled by the AGC3
due to auto,marlo throttling'at that time. _ffT was asked to delay preparation of an }_RB _util _C cou_a es_o=_sh _us need.
8. iI._ alignment be.c'._p, it has been requested that a capability
be provided to align the Ii_J through use of the rendezvous reticle in the
CSM and the L__D reticle in the LM. Zais capability is most desirable
for the lunar mission where loss of the pri_n_ry alig=_nt systems would
be extremely serious. _T _as requested to prepare _P_s for both of
these.
9. Reentry landing point targeting. ¥ffT is continuing their investigation as to the earliest time it is possible to load the latitude and
longitude of the reentry landing point. It is still hoped that procedures may be available for input and verification of these parameters at
an acceptable time in the mission. If this investigation proves negative,
_K[Twill berequested to prepare an 1_BR.
10. Universal update. Action on this item had somehow been overlooked, it.has been our intention to have _ffTprepare an _RBon this
for some time_ but apparently we had failed to request it. Accordingly_
we did so.
il. Earth orbit navigation. Our old friend was discussed as usual.
t_T was informed t_t our direction to delete this capability had been
recently forwarded to them. }_T stated that they felt it their responsibility as the G&N contractor to formally bringto our attention their
concern that this action is improper. We jointly agreed that their best
course of action was to prepare a letter for the ASPO Manager stating.
their position on this matter. I must say I don:t feel ve_y strongly one
way or the other e_out this: but it certainly is evident that MIT has a
unanimous_ sincere Opinion. So do some ivacpeople.
I felt this meeting was quite fruitful and the ¥_T participation _as
again very cooperative. We have scheduled the next meeting for October
13th_ and after that one, I migb.t even start to tell you what the program
delivery schedule actua!]y is. How's tb_t for suspense?
[ Howard _7._T_nd_]]_ Jr. .
Addressees:
(See attached list)- UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
/ Ki'P.
', v ,7/_,. t*_,_ ,,_ ,_ r ,_.', : ....
_._-..;L. _.J_ e _,_t j J./,_'j Vr_,_/(,f,-c /V [ ,-"
· L. ',_.FJ .i'i _
TO : See list DATE:! .: 56 ]
_.':-'.-..',:_--_-_! i
FP.OM : _i/Depu_y Chief_ _ffssion Plarming and 66-F_!3,2_:7-c_ j ,-_
Analysis Division i2. '_.f...,.! ! _ :
%7_._.'./,i/...:j { i
SUBJECT: DC_ progr&_ require_._nts and mission constraints on a!_elz_be-mi_'__o_
,..,.....?
AS-_78B
,., :] ? !
Following our AB-206 spacecraft computer orogram statu_>_':e_i_t MIT (_'1. 'l
..a, · . . - _ +. ..LeL_JF- .13_11'
October 6___ we launched into a dzscusszon o_ _ne AS-2_ 'm-_e_on_a_d
its demands on the guidance system. Th!s alternate mission_ you recv_ll;
is one in which the I_M and command module are launched separately
followed by a CeM active rendezvous. T._eiR4would then be marmed amd a
number of spacecraft systems tests xqouldbe carried out_ perhaps including a IzM active station keeping exercise and docking. This _.-:ou!dbe
followed by an umm_uned sequence of I_M maneuvers basically the same as
currently planned for the pr'_m_y AS-206 mission.
After considerable discussion to establish what seemed to us to be
reasonable mission constraints_ we arrived at the following list of
programs needed to augment the AS-206 program for use on the AS-278B
mission. Tou w_lq note that al? of the changes are associated solely
with the function of determining the orientation of the platform or
a.li_uing it prior to the AS-206 maneuver sequence.
1. Platform orientation determination is required and maybe a
platform alignment program is _lso required_ although we don't think so.
R. S+_mr catalogue and associated data handling routines must be
added.
3. Modifications to the routine providing pilot interface with
the computer_ i.e._ input and displays will probably be required.
4. Preparation of an addendum to the GSOP vould be needed and it
is-to be emphasized that this work would be applicable to the AS-278B
mission only.
_he following routines were also considered but are apparently not needed
for the reasons listed.
1. G_ power-on and power-off pro,ams. _ese programs_ _,hich are
routinely provided on manned spacecraft to assist the pilot in turning
on and off this equipment, are probably not needed since it is thou_.t
this process can be carried out manually_ and it is strictly a one-time
affair3 i.e._ as far as x:e could tell it is only necessary to turn on
the equipment one time and never to turn it off.
_'g['Ji
B,g U.S,Sm,ir.?>B'v.dsR:g,Ia,-lyantZ,Payt,!.Sm.; ,'.;' :.'n
$_:¢-IGS - · .
, '7'
572
2. Some thought was given to adding special digital auto pilot
modes for RCS translation and rotation using the hand controller. Here
again it is _T's impression that processors are available in the current AS-206 program which can be u_llz_d in the station keeping and
doc_!ns exercise.
3. -LGC initialization primarily associated with state vector and
clock alignment updating. Apparently is is already possible in the
AS-206 program to input these quantities both via uplink and /)SKY.
4. Special programs to initialize and start the AS-206 maneuver
sequence. Apparently the present AS-206 program already has these capabilities by means of uplin3[ and DSKY inputs.
As you can see_ the list of programs required 5_s really been reduced to
a minimum. In addition_ these progre_ms are probably required in very
nearly the same form for the later missions_ which means work on them
is not entirely wasted. The list was kept this s_e]l by assuming that
certain constraints on the mission were acceptable. In large part: this
was done by carrying out a number of functions_ manually by the crew_
which are ordinarily under computer control. This will be apparent by
glancing through the follow,lng list of constraints which I certainly
don't claim to be complete: and in fact: some of the items listed may
not even need to be there.
1. No provision is made for re-rendezvous in the LGC. In this
category, note there is no processing of the I_Mrendezvous radar by the
LGC nor is there attitude control in the I_iprogr__m for aligning its
rendezvous lights toward the CSM.
2. It is assumed that no change _ill be required to the AS-206
m_neuver sequence progr_am. I would like to point out: however_ that
considerable flexibility exists in the targeting 'and timing of the
m_neuver as the program is presently formt_]sted.
3. Platform alignment to within about 5° of the preferred orientation about all 3 axes is acceptable for the AS-206 m_ueuver sequence.
The intent here is to provide a coarse alignment of the platform while
docked through use of the con_ma_udmodule G&N. Of course_ it would then _
be necessary to dete__unineprecisely the resulting orientation of the
LM platform.
4. There will be no provision in the LC_ to assist the astronaut
in locatir_ stars in the AOT. 5his must be done manually with wlm_tever
assistance is possible from the CSM.
5. It is probable the crew must check contents of the erasable
memory word by word via the DSKY to insure that all critical parameters
are stored properly after the LGC is turned on the first time. I s._.
referring here to quantities such as accelerometer bias: scaling factor_
etc._ equivalent to those quantities loaded by the K-start tape prior to
. ·. j
.........................3
launch. This is probably not unique to AS-278B.
6. The only DS.k__display programs to be implemented will be associated ·,ith the platform orientation determination program and those
required for the crew to check out the contents of the erasable memory.
7. _u_eG&N power-on and power-off sequence wi_ be carried out
manually by the crew.
8. An LMP will be available and in operation.
9. The RCS will be manually purged and pressurized.
10. The S&C band will be turned on _nual!y,
L1. Tae ECS primary water coolant valve will be manually activated.
12. No C or S band antenna steering will be provided.
13. No LGC AGS initialization will be provided.
14. If LM cold soak is required in the docked configuration_ the
CSM sh_]] do it.
15. T_leLM s_l always be extracted from the S!VB by the CSM even
if I_M i spadecraft changes are required [I am not certain this is a
constraint imposed by the computer program].
16. The I_lwill be powered down during launch and until manned [here
again I am not certain this is a program constraint]. _his implies
a) _here will be no launch T-M
b) _here will be no launch abort or contingency orbit insertion capability.
[If it is determined that the L_ can be launched powered-up_ I should
point out that the AS-206 program does provide these capab'_lities.]
Of course_ the status of the AS-278B alternate mission is still quite
confused. As I have indicated previously_ it is our intention to do
nothing now at _T in support of this mission except to _,_ke sure the
progr_m_ identified above, currently being prepared for the AS-278
program, are given enough priority to assure their readiness when the
decision must be made around the end of November as to what we are going
to do. In addition, we wi],l attempt to determine what_ if any, impact
this activity would have on the AS-278/503 and the AS-504 spacecraft
computer program develoloment schedule. I would be very interested to4
hear from those of you concerned with this matter if you feel that either
the list of programs or constraints given above are not accurate or adequate in some way.
Addressees:
CA/O. Sla3ton
CB/A. B. Shepard
CB/J. A. McDivitt
CB/E. E. Aldrin, Jr.
CF_W. J. North
CF/C. H. Wood_ling
CF/D. Grimm
CF/P. Framer
CFTC. C. Thomas
CF/J. B. Jones
EG/R. C. Duncan
EG/D. C. Cheatham
EG_3/K. J. Cox
EG25/T. V. Chambers
EG26/P. Ebersole
EG27_D. Gilbert
Rei
E 3/R.E.
EC-/43/_4.Kayton
EC343/C. Wasson ,'
ET_I1/T. R. Kioves
EX/lV. Foster
KA/R. F. Thompson FCS/G. S. Lunney
PA/J. F. Shea FC5/C. E. Charlesworth
PA/W. A. Lee FCS/P. C. Shaffer
PD/R. W. W_ 11iam_ FC5/J. C. Bostick
PD4/A. Cohen FCS_H. D. Reed
PM/0. E. }_mard FCS/J. E. I'Anson
PM2/C. H. Perrine FL_J. B. Hammack :
PM2/K. L. Turner FM/J. P. Yin.yet
PEI/D. Lock-rd FM/C. R. Huss
FA/C. C. Kraft, Jr. FI_. V. Jenkins
FA/S. A. Sjoberg FM12/J. F. Dalby
FA/R. G. Rose FM!3/J. P. Bryant
FC/J. D. Hodge FM14/R. P. Parten
FC2/E. F. Kranz FM/Branch Chiefs
FC3/A. D. Aldrich FM_T. F. Gibson, Jr.'
FC4_M. F. Brooks FM2/ R. O. Nobles
FC4/R. L. Carlton F_13/J. R. Gurley
FM:}5_T:cmUNITED STATES GOVERNMENT ,_ 4-k._-._ _-.-
:_,' _ _ ' ._._.:
Memorandum :_x .-_0--' *t-'-z2._ ·
TO : See list DATE: OOT l_:Z _ i
FROM : ._-_'ffDeputyChief, Mission Planning and 66-:_41-!3_,_'4.,._,_]!
" A_lysis Division ' _ ('_,_ _.l
71,, %/ f._ ,_
SUBJECT: AS-20_ LC4_-D_OgT]r_ status ]v:,.""4.,.,. '_iE c',_DATE ,,,_.;-___'::..:-._,L-Z ?-', __
On Oc_ber 6th a_ MIT, _e held a review of the AS-206 compute_ prc_" ·
which they have romantically christened "Sunburst". Our pr_msry objectives were twofold; first, to make certain that the formulation of
the program was consistent with the way we intend to fly the mission;
and second, to determine the current status of the program development.
Generally speaking_ I would say we are in good shape on the AS-206. We
appear to be on schedule with some tolerance for problems of a nature
you ordinarily expect to encounter in this type of _ork, and with a few
exceptions, the pro_m as currently defined should be entirely adequate
to support the mission.
It is still planned to release this pro,z am for rope _n_mf_cture on Dec_mber 26th. _is date has held firm for a number of months now; and
Jim _i13er, _ho has taken over direction of this program at }FFT in the
absence cf hospitalized C_orge Cherz_y, presented fairly detailed program development plans upon which he based his confidence of staying on
that schedule. He identified as the two most critical items:
a) The descent guidance for Mission Phase 2 (i.e.: tSe second DPS
maneuver) _ and
b) The digital auto pilot which is also the major processor
remaining to be completed. Jim pointed out that a number of processors
have been coded and unit tested which are now awaiting the availability
of the DAP for integrated systems tests.
Jim Filler has beefed up the manpower in both of these areas recently.
5here was one item requiring immediate attention if _nkythingis to be
done about it. Thi_ involves the manner in which the LGC is set into
action at Saturn launch. Apparently_ the program is started by the
receipt of a guidance reference release (GP_) siC_m! sent some 3 minutes
arf lO seconds prior to liftcff by the Houston MUC come-nd system.
_here are two things that sound kind of lousy to me; one is the desirability of having to send a cowm_ud from a remote site to start the system working, and the second is the fact that it is currently plagued to
Send this sig__] so long prior to liftoff. Obviously; the problem here
is that if a hold in the countdown is encountered after it is sent, it
is necessary to recycle the launch countdown back as m_ch as 2 or 3
hours which sounds completely unacceptable. I wouldn't be surprised if
.,:-z:';_ B;O'U.S. ?rings BondsRegu!m_yon _,b_PayroZ'_,_4,;, J:'-_'
....... . ............................... -- .
O.)2
I have this ,_]_ confused. If you are concerned _th this type of thing s
I suggest you get ahold of someone who _ows what they are talking about
for a precise description of the situation. Incidentally s if program
changes are required associated with this GRR problem_ there is a possi-
-bility of schedule implications.
Another item on which we spent a considerable amount of time had to do
with the implementation of two jet _llage_ which is desired on AS-206 in
order to make the DAP for that mission consistent with the DAP for
AS-208. A question arose as to whether there should be some sort of
interlock to inhibit the main engine start sig_l based on onboard sensing of _l_ge_ or rather lack of it. It was finally decided that we
should leave the program essentially as it is with a fixed duration of
_l_ge and an engine start signal issued by the LC_ at a particular time
in the sequence. This was primarily to insure that the tests performed
on AS-206 are applicable to AS-208. MIT did request that we direct
G_,_au to provide RCS jet fail indications to the LGC for use in their
automatic jet select logic in a somewhat different way than is currently
planned.
Other matters receiving consideration at this meeting were:
a) The possibility of utilizing the LGC to keep track of RCS fuel
used and remaining -- a job which apparently cannot be done accurately
in any other manner. MIT expressed reservations that the LGC would be
able to do this accurately either. In addition s there may be computer
cycle time problems since this processor would have to operate simultaneously with the DAP which is already heavily loadingthe computer.
b) _he matter of increasing the size of the downlink lists from
100 to 200 words on the AS-206 program since FCD expects that this will
be necessary for the later LM's.
MIT indicated that they intend to issue a new: complete GSOP around the
end of November. The last one, R-527s was dated June 1966. MIT intends
to release certain parts of this earlier since it is badly needed by
some parties right now.
Howard W. Tind_l_ Jr.
Addressees:
(See attached list) ·
J,'h'· -' , ,
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT R. _At-A_ I _/' I
L.I.ARSON /
OCT g2 _°_S'_, ,_'"'_ _- '_"'"
fro : See list '_h- '_'_';-"'"-- -
%. ·
i mo>z : FM,/Deputy Chief, Mission Planning and q_-_4 66+_ -135
ii Analysis Division ' &'," /'/_ / /
SUBJECT: Verification of LGC when powered-up in; .o_¢_wo_;..:_, a.__..._.../._. '.
The other day at MIT_ when we were discu_ssi_ _u= _b=_,-_be mission
·AS-278B_ the question came up of how the astronaut assures h_m-_elf that
the contents of the erasable memory is as it should'be when he first
powers-up the com_uter in space. Since there seemed to be some confusion or uncertainty at _IT, I suppose that situation is the same throughout the universe. 14e were told_ or at least I think we were told, that
-_hen first turning on the computer after it has been completely powereddo_n there is no assurance that the contents of the erasable memory will
be the same as it was when powered-do_m. Since on every manned LM
mission the computer must bebrought on line from a completely dormant
: state_ some procedure must be established for checking this portion of
'. memory, I suppose. Is anyone within the sound of my voice working on
that? In fact, who is supposed to? I guess we ought to ask NIT to do
something, and we will.
Howard I4. Tindall, Jr.
Addressees:
(See attached list)
: _ Btq U.S.SavingsBondsRegularlyon thePayroll$aNngsP/an S-7 _!
',. _ · ,
GS_ tfM_ (41OI tOt--It,&
uN[rzo STATEaSOVERNME_ I_'_:^;; I I _
i 00i' ';]'_ _:'",.'; _ _;'_-_'-! /'":-: '
' TO : See list 4 / ....... ! ? 665
' n_OM : FN/Deputy Chief, Nission Planning and t;/?//_j__p-F_;:35
SUBJECT:Apollo Spacecraft ComputerProgramSchedti_JEDATE
Since last week I promised to start quoting some delivery dates, here
goes. We are currently planning release of the flight programs for
rope manufacture as follows:
MISSION DATE
; ' AS.501/502 (CSM) October 2_
AS-206 (LM) December26
AS-2TS/503 (CSM and LE) April 15
AS-50_ (OSE and LM) November 15
Accuracy of these dates, of course, decreases with how far they are in
the future. Act-_13y, I am quite confident that we can meet this
schedule _ith the possible exception of AS-278 which still has on open
item a number of additions that could impact the schedule. I am hopeful that it will be possible to improve or make earlierthe AS-50h
delivery. As you know, rope m_,Vacture is expected to take on the
order of 5 or 6 weeks which, if added to the above dates, will give you
the rea_Bess date of the actual flight configurationof the computer
program.
\
We have requested that NIT prepare schedule delivery dates next week
for the various sections of the GSOP's for the flights before us. 7ne
list is to include both preliminary and final versions as well as
s_eeLTylng the manner in which NIT proposes to segment the GSOP's. I'll
pass these on when we get them.
Hox_"O- 1_'. Tin _ · ,Jr. _
Addressees:
(See attached list)
::.- ] , Buy U.Cc_...._/ngsBondsRegularlyon the Payro_Z'-%ffn_PsFan 0--_ ,'..,.:-::_ i:_ _ . ?/ ·
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT z _t___ _ /
L I.gll_JN _ / .
TO : See list 0O'[ _} }S:-_'_ '_! D.._pv..:"_"OcT ! ? 1965
FROM : F_Deputy Chief, Mission Planning and ___L_t 66 137
': Analysis Division _%_ _ I ./I -
1 '
i Just got back from the northlands and _ _ _c_i_ _cdding out another
t note, although I really don't have much to report. _he program developi ment p3_ing at MIT seems to be progressing nicely. We did pick up a
couple of items that require attention; e.g.,
· I a) It is necessary that NASA provide specifications on the eharac-
' teristics of the comw_ud si_l s from the AGC to the S!VB for the transi lllB_ injection simulation m_ueuver in the AS-278/503 computer program.
: Rick Nobles (FSB) has the action on this.
It was re-emphasized by MIT that they were not developing the capability
; of confirming stability of the over-al_ system. Their model of the SIVB
: is strictly rigid body and is not adequate for that purpose. It is my
understanding that _FC will perform whatever studies are necessary to
confirm adequate stability for this maneuver mode. This will be discussed
at the MSC/_FC Flight Mechanics Panel meeting next week.
i
b) Studies continue at MIT on the for_l-ltion of the offset tsLrgeting
to support the stable orbit rendezvous technique. This simulation work is
required to prepare the framework of an MDRB [program change request].
This work should be completed within about two weeks) at which time they
will prepare the MDRB. MIT is proceeding on the assumption that this capability s_s_1 be provided on both the LM and comm2_d module with an option
available for each to compute the m_euvers necessary if the other vehicle
is active.
i c) An investigation is currently underway at l_C to determine the
i advisability of starting the LM descent propulsion system at 10_ thrust
i rather tb_ 30_ thrust. It will simplify the LGC program, but since the
: for_,l_tion and coding must be completed very soon, we _,,ff]] derive very
little benefit from this change if a decision is not made very soon. In
fact, there w_1l come a time where the change w_11 make our job more
difficult.
d) Since so much concern has been expressed_ both at N_C and MIT)
with regard to the need for star/lanSmsrk and/or star/horizon navigation
on the AS-503 mission, I have requested MIT to prepare an MDRB for including that capability in the AS-278/503 program. Since the formulation
of these progr_m_ has been pretty well completed) I expect the major impact
w_11 be in havin g to finish _ the coding in time for initiation of program
systems integration which is scheduled to begin early in December.
_ Buy U.S. SavingsBondsRegzdarlyonthePayrollSavingsPlan
..... 3'?
( i,_ '7)':'!i "*&:"_-'_ ' , r-.... ' r_ .- '. ,,,? !i
· !
.?_;ii.· . _
· i_;iiiii
t
!
2
reported that their work on the action items assigned them at the
AS-20_ CAR are essentially complete.
z
_i a) Procedures for _anual computer re-start will be available
_: October l_th. [Incident_.lly,_IT feels this action should never be
carried out and certainly don't guarantee it; however_ in accordance
· wi.thour request they have laid out the best procedures they could for
_nually forcing the computer to re-start from a known location]. '
i b) On October l_th they will provide a list of parameters which
j must be input into the erasable memory if a complete loss of erasable
_i memory occurs. Procedures for carrying out this process will be
ready by 0c_ober 21st.
I
c) A complete descriptionof the Flag Word will be available
October 14th.
d) A description of how to correct the PIPA bias, etc., will be
available on October 14th. Documentation of detailed crew procedures
w_ 1_ be completed by October 21st.
· 'Ho%_ardW. Tindall_ Jr.
Addressees:
(Seeattachedlist) ··.UNITED STATES GOVEP, NMEN_T I i).'l_J_, } ,J.-_r'Y_._,:_-? _'r77.r). ,.., t
"_....: · ,F -{ r%_r_, lx/--_..-at-tk.x
TO. : PA/M_nager, Apollo Spacecraft Pro...__:'_j, :__ "Or _1 1958
:, FROM : n_/_ePuty Chief s Mission ma nning a_a_z, /,'J_-:'l I ::r.:
=v,,= T ::'7
su'_.l_c?: AGO program .for A8-501/502 - Fir_.,
_le attached memorandum lists _11 of the pro_a_l ol_ges required to the
i AS-202 pro,win to fly AS-501 and AS-502. As you can see, there are quite
a few, although most are quite simple. For example, some of these changes
! are merely co_z_ctions to bugs that were known to be in the AS-202 pro_z_am
when we flew it. We made a strong effort to minimize the changes, and it's
. m_r impression that _ll of these are really required with the possible excep- ...
tion of a couple that were put in to provide the flexibility we felt might
be needed to make the pro_m' usable for the AS-502 mission which was not
then completely defined..:
As you ree_ll, certain mission changes were required which took some time
" to negotiate, beth here at _C _d at _t-s_11. C/_rlHuss, from our diVision, :
deserves a lot of credit for his work in getting these missions revised and
+._,_sm_fm_zing the pro_ cb_ges required. (By the way, Carl is writing i:
·a note to explain the differences in the AS-501 and AS-502 missions in re- i:
........ sponse to the question you penciled onto one of my memos). We know of no il
reason at this time why the AS-501 prelim will not do the AS-502 Job. Some
!vro_m verification may be required to check such things as the differences
in'the targeting, but it is our intention to keep this to an absolute minimum. :.
_ais program has gone together very nicely. Dan Likely and his team of AC
and MIT people are to be cow--ended for the professio_-I ma_er in which i
they b-_dled this Job. _he program was frozen October llth - one day behind i
schedule. It completed test verification and was released to Raytheon for
rope manufac_ure October 2_th - on schedule. _ais pro_m has no known bugs L:
or deficiencies at thi s time. If development of A_I the AGO pro_ms went
likethis,we'dbeoutofa Job. i.
HowardW. _in._l_Jr.
Enclosure
CC
.EC tR. C. Duncan ..
w 'c. c. react,
F_ tS. A. SJoberg (w/out enclosure)
FC tj. D. Hodge
ttO.j. R.p. ttuss I4_yer(w(w/out /outenclosure) enclosure)
· __ FM:HWT:cm
.! _'/
...... _ Bz_._'_ Sa_!£s BendsReular_.._II SavingsPlan ,,.,.-
·"_' :'_: ,_-'._-:: , _' 7 . - ·,,_ , .. : - ) " .._".:7 V· -·., '[: , : , :·
· ,/ !
G_ _a_t_l _ 10Z_l_
UNITFI) STATES GOVERNA{ENT '0'-_0^_' I ._i _..._v-_x._... L'. '- :_ t:
-i
, L_, r_ :j.z',.. I _/"
: TO See list '.'../?,-2._ .g_ f. i
/., . ....._.., DATE: gO'_' 1 1968
:. mOM : _N/Deputy Chief, Mission Planninl; an_[4'i.&._ 66-FPIl-142
Analysis Division :? .._. [./_l_ / : :]
!' :
: SUBJECT: In which some items of interest :,_ the AS-2 _6LGC program status - :
? are discussed
Quite a number of things have been going on with regard to AS-206 mission
plans, spacecraft configuration, and the IGC computer program development.
I would like to take a couple of minutes here to let you know about the f;
latest_evelopmentsin thelatter.
i
Ed Copps indicates that the program development is proceeding on schedule i:
as far as he can tell, and that the next valid schedule check-point will ! :
occur in about three weeks. I suppose we will schedule a review about :
that time. I_IT has been studying the effects of the spacecraft equipment :!
deletions on the program and to date has found nothing that is not acceptable. _ey did point out that it is necessary for the ground to send :
"; · certain core--ntiswhich previously were optional. We did not take time to
examine this particular subject in detail, but I would suggest tw,n.t someone from the Flight Control Division should get in touch with Tom Price
of our Flight Soft-are Branch to learn more about this in detail.
One program change requested by ASPO was for the LGC to issue some additional core--ntisin order that redundant relays could be used ·in two mission
critical circuits. _r_T indicated that this program change could be imple- .,
mented without schedule impact since we had _]ready indicated to them that
it would be okay to delete several processors from the AS-_O6 program
which were no longer required. Specifically, we dropped out the 3rd and
4th APS maneuvers and the RCS cold soak since they are no longer a part of
the mission. We also indicated that we could probably omit the DPS cold
soak phase from the mission if that provided a significant saving in 10ro_ram i
effort or_ if it permitted, the use of a more desirable platform alignment.
Apparently the ali_ment which has been chosen for the AS-_06 has been somewhat constrained by this cold soak phase and makes necessary special pre-
·
launch processing of some sort. I_IT is to let us know if dropping this 'i:
mission phase would be beneficial to them.
Currently there are no open items on the AS-206 program, although _IT is
concerned about a couple of things. One is they are not happy about our
one-second downlink. _hey fee! that this will not provide enough data
for post-flight analysis and are concerned that _C wi_ _ soon request additional downlink formats. _e _ecqnd item is associated with the I_ space- i
craft separation from the Sat urn. Apparently we have requested that a
constant attitude rate be maintained as opposed to an inertial attitude
; _
ii :
·,
J_ Bzty U.S. Savings Bonds Regtdarlyon t.bePa'_:L-4Saq :_ngs Plan
.......... -.::;:. . ... . .,_. 'r_' _T...-_,_. ?-.--. -.J. - '.._.... . . . - _"_- . _': _ .' ,..
2
hold which would be simpler to provide. I gather they just honestly don't
understand why anyone _ants this constant rate mode s although they are
pro_,w-_g it. Carl Hnss was going to look into this a little bit.
Apparently he was not even aware that was the way it was to be. Weird. _
L
t
Two items were closed out as follows: I
J
a) %;ehave instructed MIT to implement k-jet ullage in the AS-206
pro,=am; i.e., the computer program w_]_ comm_d _11 4 jets on for the t
duration of time which would be required if only 2 jets were used. This 'iis to i_smre tb2t the ,,ll_ge w_11 be sufficient for the main engine start
, in spite of jet failures which'have been protected against by the jet select
logic in the program. Implementing the k-jet logic moans there is no need i
for the_V monitor nor the chanses to the spacecraft jet failure systems il,
which had been suggested. _ae /%V monitor, you recall_ was a proposed proBzam cbe_ge [i.e., MDKB _206-19] which was to inhibit the main engine start
signal if sufficient _V had not been detected by the LGC. "
b) MIT was informed to change the DPS engine start sequence to lO_
thrust rather t_ BO_ thrust. This change is beneficial to program development and to the engine lmeople - a rare occurence. _
· - I might also point out we had a highly successful meeting with Grumman on
October LK)th where we discussed their requirements for program taloes and
data packages for use on their s_,lation facilities. As I understand it,
everyone agreed that we could provide tapes at any time Gm-,mm_n requested
them with the understanding that they would certainly not be flight qualified - in fact, their quality will likely be unknown at the time of delivery. %;e _l _o indicated that the deficiency reports accompanying these
tapes mVght be rather crude and incomplete. As a possible work aro,_nd, it
was suggested that Grumw_n could provide a knowledgeable resident at MIT
for the last couple of weeks prior to their acquiring a tape. This person
should then be aware of the status of the program when they get it.
Actu_qly, G_,-,._u has taken steps to do this - two of their guys were up ;
there just.last week to get their feet wet. .j
Howard W. Tindall, Jr.
Addressees:
(See attached list)
i· ;'Z :!
UNITED STATES G o..OAC _
,
l'o :',;Seelist PAT: __/'_'
FRO._ : FM_Deputy Chief_ Mission Planning and 66-i_-_--_v_ :
Analysis Division
SUBJECT: ACS pro,am status for AS-278
I guess enough things have happened affecting the status of the programs
for the AS-278 mission that I ought to issue another status report.
According to MIT_ work is progressing along basically on schedule. Tae
major effort is currently in Ed Copps: area whe_--ecoding of the Drogr._-_
is going on which should be completed early in December. At that tLme _..?l
of the basic components of the progr&m will have been compiled into a :
single working assembly. It is this assembly x-:hiehAlex Kosm_°Xs Program
Integration Group puts through systermtic debugging and then finally: when
al2 of the'systems are working together; t.hrough the final program verification. It is .tobe noted that this work is done with an assembly made up
of the entire flit;ht program - it is not broken do*m into subsections
which are later a,·sembled together. Of course_ during the initial stages
of this program iz:tegration the m_jor task is to get the subroutines_
which have been i._dividually debugged and are runming in this master assemb13% to _:ork with each other. That is_ the task is to get these individue&
processors to run in sequential strings - the output of one serving as the
input to the next - with astronaut inputs and displays all working properly.
As of last week all I_/)RB's[i.e._ program modifications] under considera- _.:
tion were acted upon. Specific_ntyj it was agreed to add the so-called
univers_o_lupdate in both the CMC and the LGC. This was the only modification to the CMC and resulted in slipping the program delivery date about
one week. Other LGC MDRB's approved were a GAS__ transfo,-_nationwhich was
required in order to provide DSk_/displays consistent ,_ith the FDAI eight
b_3_ and addition of a rain,mm impulse mode for the APS.
The affect of these modifications was to delay LG-C program de!i,zery approximately a week and a half. Thus_ o'_ best current estimate of program
delivery for the AS-207 program is April 28 and the g_-208 program is May 5.
Of course, every effort will be made to L_prove this delivery schedule.
Since ,aork is proceeding again on the orbit rate eight ba_], I suppose
there may be some special processor required to compute and display initialization quantities for that black box. Pa-olStt;?. is checking into that_
as *_ell as what spacecraft this would be needed for: if any.
_DRB's which were not approved for the AS-20T pro,:r__ were those providing
the capability for AGC steering of the Sl_ si..m_7._tingtranslunar injection
and manual takeover of the Saturn during launch ___,t'earth .' orbit. Taese
'7'
...........
............... g;,,%
2
two routines would have resulted in an additional four weeks' impact on
the AS-207 delivery, vhich was judged unacceptable. However_ since a '_
test of the AGC-Si_q3 interface is considered mandatory prior to the lunar
landing mission, we have had no choice but to provide a unique program
for the ._B-503 command module. You recoil] it was our desire to fly both
the AS-278 and AS-503 missions With the same programs, but this apparently
is not possible for schedule reasons for the CMC. 5he LM programs will be
the same. Since there is very little difference in the launch schedule
· of AS-278 and AS-503, we will have to maintain tight control on new programsto be added to the _-207 programfor AS-503. '
._ As I see it right now_ the additional programs consist of:
_ a) S_lation of the TLI steeringof the BIVB.
b) Manual Saturn steering into earth orbit. (Holy waste-of-time,
Batm_: )
c) Use of star/horizon and star/ianem_rk observations in the onboard navigation process.
MIT has been directed to .proceed as noted above and will. assemble a program development plan for the AS-503 command module program. I assume
that soonest possible delivery will be in the order of a month after
AS-207 - say_ May 26.
Howard W. TS.ndJa,31 _ Jr.
Addressees:
· (Seeattachedlist).
UNITED_ ,'7' STATES NovGOVERNMENT tqm:'. '._d D.HOAC 1 I, fi/i
,, g_.$/] L.umso.
To : see list PAT_F_,/_,_.._4_l. _1
Oh:  _ssion ?lanninand I
Analysis Division
/DATE c._.......4.- _[
SUB, CT: Ground rules for MIT man loading for AGO progr_mm:ug )U_
This is really for my own records; but in case you are interested; we
presented the following ground rules to F_T with Bill Kelly's (ASPO's
MIT Contractual Officer) concurrence. These ground rules were to cover
the work they are doing in revising their man loading estimates for
contract negotiations which are coming up in the next couple of months
covering their _ork for calendar year 1967.
l) Unique programs, both hardwire and erasable_ are required
only for:
a) AS-_4, AS-206,AS-_7, AS-_8, AS-208BLM
_) AS-F0:,AS-5o3cK, AS-5o47.3:,AS-504CSM
2) Aside from AS-208B Ci.e.; AS-278B); no special programs are
currently planned for any backup or contingency missions.
3) Although follow-on flights are scheduled, no unique hardwire
programsare to be developedin theirsupport
4) However_ for scheduled missions not listed above; it is recognized that work is required of MIT which must be man loaded_ such as:
a) Generation and verification of erasable memory.
b) Update of documentation.
c) Additio_l verification and perhaps error analyses associated
with differences in the mission plan from that for which the
pro,am was originally developed.
d) Etc.
5) _D_RB action is certain. MIT shall man load to support this
activity; defining the extent to which they plan to be able to respond;
i.e., nunber and complexity of MDRB's anticipated per mission.
-. c-) ._,-,..... __-_-_ _-or --:?O (e.g.; AS-50_0)missions are +_......................... '_ _u _-_ _ +'_--
_-3n Lo-_din2-·
_--5_'! E,,/,:FLY.S',v:z,:gBo : _:dsRegularS'onthe P-'_'w' ";gsP/an :__2
7) It is recognizer that a n,_?ser of missions will be transferred
__rom main line Apollo to AAP or _ _hich will require progr__-;_.ing
support from MIT. _-.iswork will bc covered by contract changes %ased
on negotiations with _,_T at a later date.
· Incidentally, Lar_r F_ _ and I r_de a rougln estimate of the pro%able decrease of the MIT proposal as a result of deleting AAP effort from th =.
original proposal. It came out to be in the order of $500,000. :,_eare
also doing a certain _mount of trimming in other areas which mai_ yield
up to another $50%000 or so_ but I e×_ect that will be about thc llr_it.
HOwardi.L Tinda!!_Jr. ..... ;_
Addressees:
EC-/R. C. I_ncan
F_CyR. A. Gardiner
ECJ_4/%L j. Rhine
KA/lq. F. Thompson
PD4/A. Cohen
lq.Kelly
FA/C. C. Kra_'_t_jr.
FA/S. A. Sjoberg
F_/j. P. Mayer
F_C. R. Huss
FM/_i. V. Jeo_kins
__2/J. F. Dalby
F_il3/J. P. Bryant
_-__,_4/lq. P. Patten
_'/Branch Chiefs
_;2/T. F. Gibson: Jr.
_I£/_R. 0. Nobles
_,I2/P, J. S_fll
n_-/_-. A.
_,_: }D.--: cm
/
/Uiq'ITED STATES GOVERNMENT lactic.{ I"t._
? Memorandum cmvE, {
}L_.soN i _;
I' DEC, S 1,_0,_ ':'"':'"- i.- i
TO : See' list DATE: _I_¥/.._ ,,J/,,_','_-,'_-- /_
· : R. IR. RAGAbl - --_<' -':_,_-f I _ L
,,jx_,-_re.x v.:t,, j_'
_OM : FM/Deputy Chief, Mission Planning and 66-F_.,_16r_//_wAQ_/ {
A  sis Oivision
_J_ JJ
· SUBJECT: Small program change needed in the AS-501/502 ACC progr,'Lk_-
"':- PFL., '
= :::':'{';_'i ;i _': In the course of development of the AS-206 computer proi z_._ ...... ,
/
,:,:,;.._.7.!,;_..;, ,: ,;:- coding error was discovered which was immediately recognized as being
common to the AS-R0h and AS-501/502 programs. It is a scaling error;
--_-_"_:.-· if you know what that means_ which imposes the operatio_nl constraint
....._: : of not operating one of the integration progrmm_ (i.e.; Average G) at
an altitude in excess of about 3_000 n.mi. Whereas this should pose
no problem on AS-20_, we have some concern about AS-501 and AS-502.
Specifica3qy_ during the nominal mission_ the Average G program is set
into operation when the spacecraft is at an altitude of approximately
2_500 n.mi. Errors in the state vector update sent prior to the previous maneuver which places the spacecraft in this highaltitude tra-
:'i_..: ::'j-_". Jectory_ or failure to 'get that u_late into the spacecraft computer
__ ._.; ii.:i: for some reason_ could result in dispersions wherein the Average G
.... would be called upon at an altitude above the 3,000 n.mi. limit. Of
:.: :..- course the guidance system would not recognize it was at the higher
...... 'i : altitude except that a second state vector update is transmitted just
· _ :.:. before Average G is turned on in order to provide acceptable reentry
.: conditions and l_ding point control. _he whole problem results from
:!-: -- _:: . lx_r quality updates or ·none at all.
In examining this problem with MIT, it was determined that approximately
_. eight words of the program would have to be cba_ged to eliminate it. Of
_ these, six words are three double precision constants and two are program
! steps of some type, I think. Ihey are all located in a single rope module
and since they are so completely isolated_ a minimum re-verification effort
: is required to certify the changes for flight.
Ropes for the AS-501 program are currently being manufactured by Raytheon.
It would be unwise both in terms of schedule and cost to interfere with
their completion. The rope modules which they are now producing wi__lbe
perfectly adequate for verification tests and could even be used in
flight if we are willing to accept the danger of an erroneous state vector
update or the failure of it to be received. On the other hand_ it is
currently ou__ consensus that we would be wise to manufacture a single new
module to be substituted in _he spacecra_*t when it's available. It will
cost about $15_000 and will take about 30 days to make starting after
i-_ delivery of those now in process. _he cost in effort and treasure is
· j-
.... B_O,U.S.SavingsBondsRegufarfyon'thePayrollSavfngsPlan _'_
'r....... ,_-:''-. _ ...... :-- .-J"' --." '-,,% ·
._~._"_2"_- % J ' '-"_
·7::_*_:'"'-' ":''_' ' ' -' "'
.... l,._.:.--:_;-- '-ill- ' ...... .z, --__.--.-...' ,--.;?'" ii.-'::-:.' .. ' :....- ' '- - :'_ ':
Justifiably small to procure the iisurance the new rope would provide
· for possible update problemm, particularly considering the current
: . level of confidence we have in that business. It is our intention to
proceed _less directed otherwise.
Incidentally, it is my 1anderstanding that one of the m_euvers on the
' '-_ AS-502 mission is carried out at an altitude in excess of 3,000 n.mi.
'" and thus we will have no choice but to make this correction for that
.., . flight.
· r"": .'·N-: [ ' 4
·: ._'.4- -
.::.::: .:._z: _:.....
Addre'ssees:
(See attached list)
-J ._:. · ..
_..°
%!
:_.:- · . i:'¸
? :.::'_:i;:_::_,_J_i¥_ _· i_::'_...... · . ' .... :i:_,_%
. ...:_ ....._._._,,_ -,_.. , _ ........ _-:-.._._._. _.... · 5_,.2'_ . ! / iili iii: '
· q : UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT j. _.A, ,
·.... M· gmorant]ttt * °
-' 2; :
' - :- _. 1_.P-uA_AN. ':
: EOM : F_Deputy Chief, Mission Planning and 66-FM -
 ivision
_ _ ! -' su_Jzcr: LOCprosz-_mstatus for AS-206 g_/.,,.._
_.;__m; _:.,;_:_ -_-:'_' ·leto. We speAlthough nt a lot ofin atimeprevious at MITnote last Iweek expressed wrestling somewith opt_mtthesmAS-206 regarding prob- !_
_!_ _--Q'_! i ; possibility of recovering some of the one month slip MIT draped on us,
_'i:_!_{_:i.:_'_.:.'i they have convinced me now that there is really not much chance. As a .
result we pretty well convinced ourselves that it w_11 be necessary to
release a tape on December 27th, our old flight program release date_
for m_Afacturing ropes to be used for spacecraft systems tests at the
.l
,Cape. At least this "B-release" will be needed n_less the Aurora 88
progr_mm can satisfy that requirement. MIT points out tlfatif it is
; necessary for them to test the B-release-assembly and determine it's
'_:_::_;_?::i;_ deficiencies_ that effort w_ result in a further delay in release of
::_,:v..,_ .... :. the flight program. We are _ooking into the possibility of doing that ;
:_':'.... _-.._.:;_._.... .:-_, sort of pro_-_m checkout on the Bit-by-Bit s_,O _tor here at MSC if it -:'' 1:7:' '
_<2_: can be madeready in time. It appears to me we can't do tach more to :::
improve the sit_zation. ': '
Tr' %-'::-':'::i._' ....
.. u_! ':f::5- MIT has brought in superstars Alex Kos_]_ and George Cherry on a part- .
u_- _:r_' time basis even at the detriment of program development for the AS-278
-_ _'":- .... mission; we have reduced the pro_-_m requirements to the _m_t even to _-
the extent of deleting thorough restart protection - a subject which I
shs]] discuss in a little more depth later. We are retracing the AS-204. '
footsteps -_m_st exactly and as we did that time w_ll attempt to derive
l. :&·' ? . m_m benefit from whatever flight schedule slips are experienced_ ,;
"'-' '' although right now we certainly can't count on anything like that.
· ui
· Regarding the elimination of resta_v_ protection, I would like to point .
: out that this isn't a closed issue since G&C have expressed nzach concern
over this. Apparently in the design of the Block II computer_ decisions
were made based on the assumption that restart protection would be pro- _
_' vided in the software. _aey feel the probability of encountering restart
situations on Block II flights is relatively high and could result in
disaster if not handled properly. Ed Copps made a guess that to provide
complete restart protection would cost another couple of weeks for pro- .. . :
gram delivery, but it must be emphasized that that is just a guess. I
gather that it really is a rather complex process to go through .the program and make it completely insensitive to intex_-uptions which can occur [ ,
at any time. Our ,currentdirection to MIT is to provide restart protec- ;
- tion for those periods during which the probability of occurence is very, . i'
._ _.._ ... :_ _igh_ such as staging _*rom the descent to ascent power. At other times, ' , ?_
· -.. ·
Buy U,S.Savh_gsBondsRegularlyon the P_g-_lI$av . _ngsPlan '_ iU_'-'_'
_ , ;=_" _( ' _'_" : " ' 7 ' '?' ' iii.'
_, 2
.
in the event of an interruption, the computer will send the engine-off
signal and w_ll release the digital auto pilot. Protection of the state . !
-_ vector and current time is also provided and mission phase registers are ' !
' _ cleared such that no further activity w_ll be c_lled for by the computer.
. What this _-_unts to is that things are put into a more or less dormant _
.. __ state which will be known to the ground pre-mission such that it should
be possible to issue new comm_nds in an intelligent m_er to get things
r:] going again. It probably will be a major undertaking in the _C and may 1
: have implications on the RTCC program. Obviouslyit's not a good substi- i
_:j_jr_._j! ilI tute for restart protection. _aerefore, we have requested MIT to ey_mqne 'I
':_:_'_'.J this subject in more depth, first of all identifying to us procedures to .:
:_. Ji._
.
be carried out if we stick with the pro_m as described above, and second
J ':?_s_.:...- to let us _now with somewhat more precision the schedule impact associated :
'?_-_.:._._;_ with more complete restart protection. ' _
' 1:_ of our meeting at I_._[T included, partic:{pation 'by C-.m_m,,_u, which
:resulted in a couple of things. First of all;. in response 'to our st'rong
recommendation, they have f-txm.].J.y agreed to send. one of their men to I,'[[T
on an _most ft:]l time basis for the next month or so in order to provide
themselves witE a first-hand knowledge of the pro_f,_-_.m status as it devel-
: cps. MIT is completely in accord with this. Another matter discussed
.::._,. ,...,,_. _ .' concerned G_,,-_'s recommendation that a third AP_ m_euver be carried
.._:_'_""_-' -· out. An on-the-sput assessment of this indicated that it should be
x_.]'_--i_" i possible to initiate such a maneuver from the ground using the APS-2
,._).c47(.. mission phase _rocessors and _._at no program additions would be required
_.i'"? if GX-,w-a_ were successful in _lkfng the ASP0 office into doing it.
_'!._....... And that's about it -
..- &
: Howard _. Tiltall, Jr. ' ' '
i?ii Addressees:
_i (See attachedlist)
.__ - .°
.i :·7/$S,_.tf,_J 141CJ,_ 101--11,._ ........ '- '-_'".
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT . ia_t.or!I-to
T_ R. RAGAN t_
Memorandum o
p,=qCEIVED L ,.
-' . TO' : See list DEC 5 I956 DATE: --ff._..._$ ¢-i
- 1
_ROM : FF_Deputy 0hief, Mission'¢_%n_Jka_> 66-F_ ;-_/e¢_' _
__:.... Analysis Division c__ _ _ ¢'
. ._ ' SUBJECT: More interesting things about our work with MIT _74_ _.,.4,, J' '
,:._ -.:_. !
':-.'.:..,!_:_.:,!:..'..:: I always sts_ out these MIT newsletters with the hope they will be sDor_
:!:!!i_i?!_i .:?:!i_ i enough that you'll be willing to read 'em. A couple of things came up at !
-_-: our Pro_m Development Plan review on November 16 there that I thought I · ' ;:
would!_ss on. ' ' ' ' '_i
1. It's becoming more and more obvious that the program development - :':
facilities at MIT - both digital and hybrid - are going to be.severely · '!
,: saturated during the first 3 or _ months of next year. During that period - i
we will be working si_l taneously on the AS-206_ 207, 208, 503 OM and two
. 504 programs, and we certainly will not have the second hybrid on the line. 4
..-....._., _; And so.rollthis work will be dropped on the two 1800 digitals and the sin- -- ;
;,-: ?',_,:.'_;· .'.:' · gle hybrid facility until the IBM 360 digital computer is made operatio_q. -_
, --u.-- :-.:- · '. Since I am convinced the 360 readiness will not 'come early_ I have asked ' ' i
:'n_;,_S:_ MIT to set up a ,_pecialtask force specifically _o keep the development of ' :_
..-._ :.._ . ' 2
.:;_ 37 ..., that facility progressing at the greatest possible speed. In addition we . . ._
'._....-.". , propose to help as much as we can by doing such things as preparing pro- -_.,
:._.u.... gram_ here at MSC for use in .checkingout the vital MAC compiler being " :'
..._...._ : :_
-;i_,_:.-.- developed by one of their contractors. : ._
'' 2. It is my understanding that _1 AC effort on program development ' ..
being carried out at __twaukee st_a_1 be terminated upon delivery of the ,,
AS-501 documentation_hich is scheduledfor delivery on about December 5. '' i
..-._ - _e nine AC people who were sent to MIT for work on AS-501 are all being
·_, . retained and are now working on AS-206. . i_
, -..
· ': 3. It looks like we will be able to have a meaningful computer storage
: review in January. Ed Copps pointed out it is not only lack of storage
that's going to trouble us, but also other things 'likethe ]lmit to the hUm-
, ber of verbs and nouns,whateverthey are_ _hat are available.
4. Rick Nobles and his guys struck a vein of gold the other day up'
at MIT in the form of detailed flow charts of some parts of the program. - :_
_hese flow charts are the form of documentation everyone felt in their i
bones must be available somewhere 'cause you just can't program without 4
something more definitive than the GSOP. Now that we have discovered them,
: _IT has agreed to let us use them.with the understanding that they are not
ii controlle5 documents and that MIT retains no responsibility for their
._ --ccur-_cand y _'o_-:_*_ We are dellz:::=-:i _o acce_t the flow charts under
.__ .. those tez._m.s&nd _,:='LLbe responsible fo-*reproducing and distributing thezu
.: :-::,:
:i .: · . .- - ' :. '
- -i
" .:',.:_ Bvv. U.$. Savh_gs Bonds RegrdarIy on the_.._3roll Sav_ngs Plan . ._,_<=,-_ tc whoever b_s need *c kno-:. - :.'?-.-Id like _o reiter_t_ that _:._h_ve _!-
·,;aysmaintained t.hat _he ,-?.___m_ .--_oC,...... C. ;Y.,.E._,-:On __=. in_deoua%e. _ . ---_ _=-..... __C._____-- ,
in the area of flow charts and I have every intention of emphasizing that -
battle as soon as we get our pro,am development plans in shape.
· 5. Some weeks ago we discussed the possibility of having several
/_8C people associated with flight crew working in residence at MIT with
Jim Nevins' merry band on the development of Chapter 4 of the GSOP and
associated crew procedures. Oum, objective was twofold - to speed up com-
"; pletion of that work for AS-50_ as well as training these people to service
: - I
_ the flight crews in their training for these tough Block II missions. MIT
-._:._:_i_'"_ _..__: is still anxious to have these people come, but I understand from a brief
:'_,_:ii_._.:[, .-:'..' :?_:;i '-::-_::_:/:_'J'''_. _iscussion with Joe Loftus, who is handling this matter at _O, that he has
I
run into some problems, i certainly hope he is able to overcome these soon
_.:_::::i'_:i?.?_.9_'._..:...i;. because it sure looked like a good idea to m_ke 1_C as independent as possi-
"::'_'__=:!_'_::"';:' ' ')'--*:-:_':' ':i!:!-_ ble of MIT in the training of flight crews,
6. It looks 'like our biggest schedule problem will be delivery of
the AS-207/208 programs. Although we have been meeting our AS-278 milestones
.' with regard to GSOP delivery and program coding pretty well, MIT tuas recently
revised their estimate of how long it takes to perform program integration
and verification. It seems to me that the only way to improve the delivery
schedule is to get the facilities MIT nee&s as soon as possible, as noted
-.:::-_"._:; :""-'- above, and to reduce the --_unt of work that is required. We are pursuing
::'_:.':-!:. _._': the idea of establishing processor priority lists both here and at MIT with
: · .,..,l'_) ::'7]'' the intent of carrying stong all of them (including those unique for AS-503)
'?_":-_;':'-- '_ in the AS-278 pro,nam assemblies, but giving m_xi,.,m emphasis on the debug-
".._ !/':. ging and integration to those with the higher priority. For example, it's
- '** evident that it is not necessary to have the entire concentric rendezvous
·_ ":-' ' flight p_-_ operating to perform the AS-2T8 mission, since the._ma_euvers in
.............those re-rendezvous mission phases rill be established pre-flight and/or by .-
ground control a la Gemini with the need for onboard maneuver determir_tion
starting 0nly at TPI. I'm sure there are a number of other processors which
could also be labeled not mandatory for the mission. It is our intention to
: see just how far we can back off in an effort to help the schedule. It is
.- ! .;' rather depressing that we have to take steps like this, but the advantage of
.._ this approach is that if the program integration proceeds faster than antici-
· pated, or if more time becomes available for one reason or another, it w_l !
only be necessary to start working on processors which are already in the
assembly, which is a much easier thing to do th_n to add %hem in when a reprieve occurs. And of course it gives us the option of accepting delivery of
a flight program in which some of the lower priority processors are not work-'
' lng in order to obtain it sooner.
Wasn't very short was it, or interesting either, but I'll be 8-rned if I'll
throw it away after getting it to this stage.
· _ .
i H_ward W. Tindall, Jr. _- -
Addressees:
_../:. (See attached list)
-'! t .
-_ . J ·
- ......_ ' -;::,. _--:._ ;-:. : -
? i ' _:;_"*'" ':: ' '_' ' UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
D.HOA_ I 't
e, v_,, .t !,u ,..,: ' 1' ' '
o; '_':_;_-L,ir>A'n;--"! : .
R.R.RAGAb_t." ' ' ' i .-
F,KOM : FM/Deputy Chief, Mission :Planning and :,_u...,,t/_, _[' 6_ _[! 188
Analysis Division _A.,'_., ..... ! 4-"'
, I/
' ' DATE [
SUBJECT: DAP initialization simplification '/DUE
Ken Cox, Rick Nobles, Charley Parker and I got together to see what could
be done about reducing the number of crew displays and inputs associated
with the digital auto pilot (DAP). As you recall, the _6P's require initialization by the crew who specify the spacecraft configuration, choice
of RCS quads to be used, dead-band_ RCS jet failures: etc. These quantities are displayed to the crew prior to each maneuver and must be overridden if unsatisfactory. We see no way around those displays and inputs.
·It was our desire to attempt to reduce or eliminate-the, requirement for
input of additional quantities such as spacecraft weight, moments of inertia, initial engine gimbal angle settings: etc., prior to the initiation
of main engine maneuvers. It has been noted on n--merousoccasions that all
of these parameters could be determined by the co..._puteritself to well
within the degree of accuracy .req_{ired. For ex_.ple, it should be sufficient that the final engine trim angles experienced during the previous
maneuver be used at the start of the next; the weight and moments of inertia are more-or-less dependent upon the amount cf main engine propellant
which has been expended. A running accomut of th._-,propellant expended
could be continuously carried in the computer prcbe,bly based on AV, which
is computed during each maneuver. Ken Cox has prepared curves of _ach of
these quantities as functions of weight which can be used to prepare linear
approximations as functions of the sn_ation of AV to be supplied to _iI_.
It is to be emphasized that the only reason these parameters need be computed on board is to provide a backup for communlc-ation failure or lack of
: a ground station at the time it is needed since it is the intention of the
.; Flight Control Division to update these parameters from the ground routinely. Therefore_ it is our desire that these quantities be computed and
stored away in the computer at the conclusion of each main engine maneuver
: rather than just before the next so that the gro:;-t.C supplied data is not
wiped out by the less accurate values computed c. ':zrd.
It is our intention to tell k2ITthat there is _ ___em_nt to display
these quantities to the Crew_ and the program _,C _ designed that %ray
unless ',reare.informed that this is unacceptabL_ .,epresentatives of the
flight crew. If they feel it's necessary to sec =e displays_ then it
(f_l L., '(
£':.:r,7_.T.9 ,e,,,.. ::'......... &"__:':, '_._.'q' 7,.-'2z.:/o;zgr,;[7 ,,.__ .: -:d,B
9f2
must be with the understanding that there_ll be no special automatic updating of these quantities. Rick N_o!es is going to check this out.
_T was requested to prepare an _RB based on a description of the requirements noted above given to them over the phone on December 19. We'll
attempt to get it in AS-_58 but if the schedule impact is too great (as it
probably will be) we'll get it in AS-50_.
Addressees:
(See attached list)UNITED STATES GOVEKN/,fENT -_-HOAG'' I _'_r
z....
J_,*,i,A'_E!LES-'i - [
_T.i_', - I
_'_' _ ::'"' :·-'r ,'" : f,'- '" :" '-'.J''-i
TO : Sea list _, ^,_ _,. _ './.L:'_.:'_t. _A?E: [:'-_.'.ggu _......
_1.O.,: : FM/De_uty Chief, Mission 'Planning _? ....;' _ {].-189
SUBJECT: We've bit the bullet on G.W2q D_E
The fact that the 206 t2,'isI the only 7_ to be po',reredup when launched
presents a requirement for some unique manner for the G&dY to detect or
at least be informed that liftoff has occ,_rred. In the absence of a
hard%._re liftoff signa!_ it had been inter,tiedto transmit a guidance
reference release (GRR) _-'_er=_c ': ..... _-- sg means of an _"_'lir_[ to _"_a:- guidance
s_tem at a pre-dete_ined t_-me prior to iiftoff. Most recently this
value _,:asat T-30 seconds in the counties.n1. Once this signal was sent
there was no %_ay to stop the platform from being released and the coraputer
transmitting co_anis on its .2..... ze._.e. seouence. _ This has ca,_sed a great
deal of concern ever_ . .There: - at _T_ at the Cape: and here at I.%SCsince
Satumn countdovm history includes some rather weird holds. Our problem
was that any interuption in the countdown occurring after GP2Rwas transmitted would force a recycle of about 2 hours to get the G&_N squemed away
again and could very likely result in scrubbing that launch attempt, i,LIT
has proposed a f_x for this by a change in the spacecraft computer program which we have decided to impler,ent. It is the purpose of this memorandum to inform vou_ of this rather significant =.._,'.'o____e.chance. m.._n_?_'
In _olace of a ha_dwire or _ signal of ll_,_oz_ '"_' "__ _-:c intend to detect the
chance in accelleration that occurs at __+_>_ b'/_the guidance system
itself. Since the platfc_._ -.s activated long before this time_ it is
merely necessary to provide s small, relatively s-_mp!e progre_ for monitoring the_iV which, when a :ore-established threshho].d has been exceeded_
could provide a discrete to bo treated precise!i: :msthe GR_R signal. Obviously this is not any gigantic breaktbmough ....... _.. =_,:_.... - the sense w _ '-,,_av=---_
decided to do it. Although :-}'_ concept seems ?:..'3 f.c?.:'.ded: I'm sure there
will be some continuing dlscu'::ions as to the ti:.- ' 'i to be se!coted.
_LIT is currently proposing 1.3. 5's. (Recall the . :.sexperiencing i g
prior to engine ignition). Y. ._.___to __=_-._:'_ ...._ F .',ton. r_.c('on on
this §ubjeet_ the t_meshho!d be _.oca_.. _ _ :: storage. Another
choice to be made but vrhicL .... ..__:_!ue,_. :_entatzon of the
program is what system sho_cl 3t_blished . 'zr_t_o_. ' = _' .,._l_. ' MiT
would prefer using the AV me: :_a!,acku_ ::alsent :.-ithin
the last several seconds ._ri: '_. ......... _. -se thc ±_._'"_'_o_' may
not be detected for as much a' seconds ?.': usaa.It ir small
spacecraft state veu_Ol '_ · error:: " _r: sure t_ ib!efor the control
%!
- v: -' ::.-.., -_' ';.':;-' :_::/,':,'.?;j, 0/' ......
~.J
· . ·
2
of the flight ,..rillinsist that the GUN GV monitor be prime and the GPcR
discrete via EF would be sent only as a baakup in the event some G_?{ failure has been detected _nediately after !iftoff.
!t is probably worth pointing out that N_T is anxious to make this change
and are confident that it is something they can really do %,rithoutrunning
into trouble. They fe,el.the impact on pro.-am delivery is negligible and
in fact point out thattheir effort required for this programming change
and its verification _ill probably be less than that required for the deve!opment of _,-orkaroundprocedures involved in the recycle eountdo_.rn. If
we run into some sort of insu_wmou_utable problem not unforseen at this time:
it shou3_d be a relatively simple matter to retreat to the system we had
before this change_ at least insofar as the spacecraft computer program is
concerned. The basic prolonging to handle the GRR signal is not being
changed. Accordingly,' if we revert to the procedure of sending GRR at
T-30 seconds it will or_ly be necessary to change the value of this t_n_e in
the erasable load.
Well, that's about it. I hope everyone will be happy about this. I know
I am, if it only (:uts dorm on %he number of telephone calls on this horrible subject.
_ioward W. _ind_.!l: Jr.
Addressees:
(See attached list), I
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT R.RAGAN i '"'"'i
'D. HOAG i _'/'
_.,/4_ _ ii::;.;' ,J/' ;..:'.-..-.--,'_f
TO -' See list _ _ = ..-,,'--n ;",' _ _ ' ...... ATE: _"iO P,,9 1.g$_
FrtOM : _¥Deputy ....Ch_.ef_ Y:sszon _!annzng an_',':-,."-.....,Z._.%.,(., -!9l
Analysis Division I!h.;_i ,._! -
- [.;/,...,..:,c_: t .'-_''A. r!
SUBJECT: _TTs operatio digital nal com_uters - are saturatcc:'u_ti!t i ]__i he [ _;_,TE IBM o_l'becomes
i guess I ought to record the saga of the _T 360 co_ms-uter:if only so
that it may take it's proper place in history. It is a little adventure
which has been going on in the shadow of the more dram__aticcrises at 1,_T
and is now rising to the surface in it's own rigd_t. ,tlthough it looked
as though thence'was not much we could do about it except watch in fascinated horror: we have taken some steps which i hope will be effective
and which might interest you.
As far as I can t¢!l_ somewhat less tha_.a year ago -,_T-- foresaw _'on=_ _ the
j two _in_eapolis Hcne_n_l! 1800 digital computers they are using for sp.%cecraft computer program development would be inadequate at some t?,_.ein the
future. In the aTsence of good programming p!ans: it's hard to know how
they either predicted this would be the case or _:ereable to convince anyone of it. In fact, I guess they did have a bit of trouble since it wasntt
until June that they were finally given the go-ahead to procure an iB_.i360
by _iSC. Instalta-_ion of this computer has proceeded_ along with training
of _[[T personnel io use it. IBM contracted to supply some t_%oortant __¢_=-
cial program% which they have apparently del_.ve_,d on schedule, and ;,CRT
has prepared some others to permit use of this f'sciiity, , c-ut the one
which now appears ;to be the most critical of ail is the i,:_'%C co=_Iciler- a
complicated service program which translates symbolic programs into computer
language. _i_C is the I._T equivalent of IBM:s Fortran: ·except that it is
said to be superior. The development of this pro_am was contracted to
Hard<ins - a Boston ou_f__ ....._ employing betveen 40 to 80. people, de_ending _ on
? who tells you. %he compiler was to cost about _!70_000 and was to be
delivered January 15th %:ith a $200 a day pe__lty clause in the contract
for late delivery; Hankins refused an incentive reward for e_-rlier delivery.
I have no idea how the January 15 date was selected. But I am certain of
one thing - it is about two months too late. The fact is the AS-206 program development by itself has now saturated the two 1800 digital co:touters
and it's evident the situation is going to become muchworse before the
I_,[ 360 becomes operationa_l. Debugging and intewration of the AS-E0? and
AS-208 programs has just begun_ and this activit-_, will L,0_osea very heavy
load on the digital com_uter facilities very soon.
Hankins is not going to deliver on schedule. '_aeyer bimzte a slip of about
approximately 6 weeks. Of course_ delivery of th_ :-'.Ccompiler around the
%:
':_:' ::0 '"'"t ° ..:..... _ ":' ::::'!.'.:>'_;:,: " P,?':':' ?fan
..........2
1st of _arch does not by any r.eans guarantee operational capability at
that time - it will probably take at least another month to get the
system working. Unquestionably the lack of adequate digital co_rputer
facilities at _ST during the first months of next year is going to impact
delivery of the AS-207/208 programs badly: Which is going to be extremely
painful to bear.
%a_at can be done about this? _gel!_ _-T has obtained as much progr_r_ing
assistance for Han_kins as is worthwhile in an attempt to prevent his
delivery schedule from slipping even further_ although I sure wouldn't
count on it. _t_eare atto_mpting to identify ali tasks that could be
transferred from _T to our CDC 3600 simulation facility at M_C. We have
also offered to supply our 3600 software packages to _MIT when com.pleted
about the first of the year for their use on whatever 3600 systems are
a%_ilable to them in the Boston area. _nese steps may help some_ but do not
really solve the basic problem - namely what has happened at Ha._£{ins. In
spite of recent discussions with them emphasizing the importance of this
pacing item_ it becomes apparent that management of that organization is
i_mmature and unstal.!e - cor4_letely unreliable. _TT and MSC have agreed
that to maintain a_ approach depending solely upon Hankins is unacceptable.
tn our joint search for some way to _ork around this problem_ it has been
concluded that the best "backup" course of action is to replace the _T
developed _r_C prog'a_r_ng system _ith the Ir_4Fortran _,._hich_of coumse_
exists right now a_ld is said to be working well on the 360. This _zkes it
necessary to compl_'tely recode the simulation programs, those defining the
environment_ space, :raft systems_ woritearth mode!s_ etc._ into Fortran.
However_ since the;e two compiling systems are so s_milar_ this conversion
is not expected to be a very difficult or co_._ptextask although it will be
time consuming. _.ese programs are very large. Since the CDC 3600
facility here at _;C will also use these _MIT simulation pro,rams> we have
been routinely obt_:ining and documenting them. It's our intention to supply
this material to MiT for the use Of their subcontractor, probably ZBM> who
will be given the _sk of this conversion. It is anticipated that parts of
this simulation will be available for use during the latter part of january
and the complete _mckage should be finished in less than two months. __us
it is evident that this is a quicker approach for getting the IBM 360 online even if you b_lieve the new Ha._ins delivery schedule. But ___st say
I have no faith wh_tsoever in that organization in spite of M_--T:s¥aiiant
efforts to support them.
I __m very pleased to report that key personnel at MIT have given enthusiastic and wholehearted support to this plan. They have worked very hard
to solve the problems and to get I_M on-board and working promptly and
efficiently. I u_udersta_d that if the Fertran approach succeeds as we
anticipate it wi!l, _T will probably not mmintain the si_r_lation programs
in _C lan_uage for the 360 but will convert over co_._pletelyto Fortran.
Of course_ they will have to carry along the !_C simulation system for the
1800 computers as long as we continue to use the._at _T. My personal
opinion is that we will still be using them at th_: ' of next year.
??3
Aside from cutting back on the progr_r.s and thus reducing the work required_ relieving the overloaded digital computer facilities at _._T
seems to me to be the or_y co%_se of action available to improve the
delivery sched'ate for the AS-205 and AS-208 programs...although it has
taken some time to arrive at this solution_ I believe it to be the best
we can do unless you want, to pray that the flight schedule _il! slip.
Howard _'L ?indal!_ Jr.
Addressees:
(See attached list)UNITED STATES GOX__.N.,. r_,.,-,.¢_, ,sNT r :r-<'_'{' -17:1i I t.[ J--
' )Act:chi r _n,o
_::-.::, · I D. HgAS ', [
_. -, '"". _ ?'-- i I. LARS'3N ;
i'_i?:T; '_L-FI!"S · :'
TO : F_/P!ight Software Branch DAT_: d),_t-?_lso.-"--_-U--
/ ' ' i
..... ·. ] ! , [
-P,O.%, : PM/Deputy Chief. :._zss_on Planning and ]
Analysis Division - -' ; , ,
SUBJECT: U-olink_ _,;ilibe on T._,'-4 ': i .I
i
,.nU_DATE .- [
A decision was zaade yesterday which _, am su-_e _,._,__ make a lot ¢_
happy. ;_ro has finally decided +_ eoui_ the i2,_-4with a __g_'_'_-_a_up-
_-m n>.v_,,-slv th= ===_o_a_=_ eomrouter prog_','_ms_,;_- be a_aed to +h=
AS-50_ I_ program, i ass'_me that these are the same as those developed
for ;_-208 and should present no significant problem.
Apparently it is too !ate to equip the AS-503 I_M in this way_ hut since
we are using the A8-208 pro_-m for that mission) that has no influence
on our pvog_amJmi_g ....... _ecm_~_m_n_s. _'_ = +2 Please take whatever action is appropriate regarding technical direction to i_.rrT.
Hovard W. Tinda]2) jr.
cc:
CF/C. C. _Z_omas
CF24/Co Ao Jacobson
EG/R. C. Duncan
_c-_/w. _.._y
EC&S/R. Eo Lewis
PD4'/A. Cohen
FC4/Mo F. Brooks
P--_/'j._. _ack
_-Z_/JoPo M_yer
PM/C° R. Hues
_{/Mo V. jenkins
FM_/P. Jo Stu]]
_!' :i ' P. ---Y D ..... '
.8:.,y'DIS.S:,'.;,;;:_s,_ s ,,,,:,_._ , g/..'/_¢;_;_ '/y :h_ _G,._I/,S',_:.,,' ',::UNITED STATES GOVEKNMENT ...... :...... _'' ; : ' ,,_.,
·.-_ -:-.,::.._--. ,' i L _._,_.;,_
TO : See list DATE: : ,-v.,..·:,- r ·
, . ! fi
i
FKOM : z.-.¥_DeputyCaief_ _ssion Plarming and 67-__¥_;-3r''':" :-
Analysis Di-cision :' :
SUBJECT:Ropemanufacturefor_S-502 '· !
....' "[ :L
_ais note is to infozunevezTone that the AS-502 spacec_s?L__ oo_pun%-_ _uer i .
program ropes wi]l be _._de precisely the same as those for AS-50Ii
Specificaliyj it is MiT assembly Solarium 55. You recd.11 Solarium 54
was our origina] D_-501 A-re!ease_ but it was necessary to make a
modification in one of the rope modul_s to correct a scaling problem.
C!ine Frasier was gi%_n the recommendation to direct Raytheon in accordance with this on January 6_ and it is my understanding that he intendzd
to have Raytheon begin rope manufacture for AS-502 i_ediately. He informed me that the manufacture of the AS-501 ropes will be completed by
about January 12th.
Howard %L TinS_13j jr.
Addressees:
(See attached list)
_:_ r_;/_, T_' , ' "-,;-,- _'_, ' - ' _ ,?? :3_ .,'_.... '._- ?'L-..
_,._ - .._.. :-)'_,_$ L';.; .............
F.¢UNITED STATES GOV_RNM_N _ -: :-.'" '"-:'' i "
'_ .' _ 1o.'_.._a_
i
TO : See list _':' ""' DAT_..;-"(',,i_,'-_ h' :*_-71. :
I
; I
FRO_ : FM_Deputy Chief_ Mission Planning and bT-J?'z!-_
Analysis Di_-ision [___ ';:__ '___ i
SUBJECT: No smeciai spacecraft computer progr_.s are to be _J'......c_ :.c_
AS-2OSB and AS-503 IDUE DATE I
The decision has been ._ade by the Apollo Program M_nager tb_t unique
computer programs need not be developed for missions AS-208B (_i) a_
AS-503 [CM). This decision was brought about due to concern that
effort on these programs would affect development of the ,r--_inline
programs. It is certai___y consistent with n,_umerousother actions taken
recently in support of t_s activity such as augmenting the MiT staff
and providing additional facilities for this work.
AS-2OSB LM:
As you rec_all_ M_T had been directed to develop a LM program in support
of the AS-258B alternat=_ mission to be flown if some fai!u__e on ._-206
precluded flying the AS-258 mission as planned_ it vas to provide the
capability for the crew to initialize the system such that it could
carry out an unmanned maneuver sequence basically equiw-a!ent to t,hat
planned for AS-206. T_ue only addition to the AS-206 program for D,$-208B
was the capability of performing an ir_flight atigmment of tlneplatform
by the crew. B_lthough i,_T has been directed to cease work on a unique
AS-2OSB program_ they have been requested to investigate the use of the
AS-206 program _ithout change for the D_S-258B mission, ! feel there is
a good chance that by a com_ination of special crew procedures and
assistance from the ground_ tecl_iques could be developed for carr_lng
out this baelrap mission with that progrz_u,
AS-503 CM._:
it had been felt desirable to add tb_-ee cap_oi!ities listed beio_ to the
AS-205 CM program specifically for the -_£-503 mission. Since the schedule
impact was unacceptable for _o,_eAS-258 mission_ d__eeczon _ "' had been gi-_-ento
MIT to develop a unique ._£-503 cn:-*_nd r_od%;__apro_m consisting of the
basic AS-205 program wit;n the following added: (a) astronaut steering of
the booster into earth orbit: lu/_'-_ star/landmark and star/horizon navigation_ and (c) _.i steering cf the SiV_. Diow_ based on a re-__e_'by the
Apollo Program ¥_nager_ it has been concluded that the over-a] _ Apollo
project will benefit more b?_ using the _-205 progra_ as is. }_T has
been directed in accordance _:ith this decision.
::::_2
For the sake of completeness_ I might point out the rationale behind the
decisions for these deletions.
a) It has been concluded that astronaut steering of the booster is
not required for main line Apollo. At some later time_ when sched"-le and
storage permi% it may be desirable to reconsider this addition. A_reement has been reached by al! responsible management personnel_ both here
at _C and at Headquarters_ on this subject.
b) it is felt that adequate experience and confidence may be obtained in the spacecraft navigation mode utilizing star/landmark and star/
horizon observations on AS-503 by merely making the observations as previously planned_ but not processing them o_ooard except to include them
on the downiink for post-flight analysis.
c ) Although some elements of _C ha_ been proposing that command
module guidance steering of the SiVB would be prime for the transll_r
injection (TLI) n,_neuver_ the Program Manager emphasized that this is
not _C's position: and as a result the only purpose this program could
provide on AS-503 is a backup in the event of a failure of the Saturn
guid_,nce prior to the maneuver. Adequate alternate procedures are available for post-flight analysis of the spacecraft guidance systems to determine if it could have handled this task properly in the absence of the
actual _I guidance program.
I should point out that it is currently planned to include the capabilities discussed in both (b) and (c) in the AS-50_ co_d module program.
Addressees:
(See attached list)UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT ;_ :tic:ioniln:o,
I '."£_3,SeN -r--_ "'
i .cr;a_A: F:_s-: [ r
TO : See list :_:i.;!':. ].?,:::n,. 'ii":..'. D;.T_I _P,[f _ 0 _57
" J 1
FROM : FM/Deputy Chief, _Mission Plarming and i.' ...... 67 i_,_i '
· Analysis Division l--'' :'""! } '"t
SUBJE_r: Significant modifications currently pianne_ in the Ap_llot Spacecraft
Computer Programs { .. .... .... : ' , J
t'DUEDATE ' ' J
Quite a number of decisions have been obtained from the Apollo Pro,am
Manager affecting the development of the AS-258 and AS-50h spacecraft
computer progr_m_ which I am recording here for my own later reference.
As usual_ I will send it along to you on the chance that you might be
interested.
RCS translation maneuvers:
Although provision was being made in the AS-258 and AS-50g com!_ater programs for G&N controlled RCS translation maneuvers_ this capability is
being deleted. As i understand it_ the flight crew supported this decision which implies that all RCS translation maneuvers in both the command
module and LM must be performed mznu _a!ly.
Auto proceed:
Auto proceed is the misleading term which has gained popular usage to
define a capability requested by the crew for simplifying the procedure
whereby the computer is comm_nded to progress on to it's next fu_nction
with minimum input from the crew. At one time it was proposed that there
be no input at _1] from the crew under certain eirc-m_tances. However_
at this time the goal app_ently is to provide the crew with the caoabi!-
ity of making a "Proceed" command to the computer by a keyboard button
assigned exclusively for that function in place of "Verb 33 Enter" - a
g-punch operation. Eo modification is currently planned associated with
this in the AS-258 progr_m_. However_ Dr. Duncan has stated that it is
his intention to provide this capability on the AS-504 and subsequent
spacecraft through the redesignation of the "standby" button.
Direct intercept:
This. program_ which provides the capability for the crew to target a minimum Av_ 2-impulse rendezvous sequence of maneuvers_ was originally included
to provide a flexibility it was felt miglnt be required. Rendezvous mission
planning_ including aborts at the moon, has now progressed to the point
where there is no recognized need for this processorj and as a result it is
to be deleted from al _ Apollo spacecraft computer progz-_ms.
...... BwyO:S.S_vingsBondsRegularlyon thio__aymll73a";"TsPfa_ ,,2
LM S-band antenna steering:
Although it had been tentatively decided to drop this capability_ more
definitive mission p!ar_uing has revealed that there ems critical periods
in the mission, particularly daring descent_ wherein crew activity
demands computer assistamce in steering the IR_ S-band antenns, to acc2',isition with the ground. Acco_ingly this capability is to be provided
in the AS-504 i_M program.
LM platform alignment while docked:
The Program M_nager feels some provision should be made for ali_nment of
the IaM platform while docked without attitude maneuvering of the craft.
, The procedure he proposes is for _il necessary computations unique to
this process to be carried out in the IPsC utilizing data a]ready available from the C5_ programs. It is probably too !ate to 10rovide this
capability in the AS-=_08 progr_ but it should be available for AS-SCl!,
DPS backup of SPS:
At one time there was some consideration given to deleting the D_ back-Lo
of the SPS. Since procedures must be developed making large DPS r_armu-;ers
docked on the development flights_ this proposal has been dropped.
Descent guidance:
Another major program change which has been under consideration is to
substitute for the current landing site targeting a fuel saving approach
referred to as "range free". In view of recent developments associated
with the ImM spacecraft hardware_ this proposal is not considered a requirement at this time_ and so the descent guidance will proceed as it has without change. However_ s_tysis w_ 11 be carried out on the C_C proposed
modification to the descent program which would permit a range free option
if that should become necessary at some future time. This option will not
be included in the AS-504 LM pro,am unless time and storage permit. A
decision on this matter probably need not be made for another four or five
months.
Our long awaited ':Black_riday" review at },_T is now scheduled for Thursday_ january 3=2; 1967. At that t_me other modifications ,zili probably be
made for storage reasons based on priority and size of the various processors and their options. It should be lots of fun. I'll let you know
if anything interest'_ng happens.
h_ard _. Tinda!!,Jr. ,j
Addressees:
(See attached list)_y zt_2 %_z%lcN I , .
l&_ .-il _,:_ . _ _'
U ITEI)STATES _COVm I, E _7 /
lvier,q0ra az//:o i ......
TO ·· _ee ..LZS_ , ;-'".__-.'.' ,' _. ....._;_:.,_ _,_,,.. /.&d ,_ .... ' ' !AN 2 _ -1967
- "i_ [_ f..',4._':,_.... - ",_. t
lmOM ' _/Delmty C"hief_' 'Mission Planning and _
Analysis Division ' '"-'6'_' ,',_,,,'_-I '/ " --
SUBJECT: Latest on the AS-206 spacecraft compute! _ ,_.,_ .
During the January 3_lprogram development plan meeting at MIT, a couple
of things came up regarding the AS-206 program that are probably worth
recording here. '-
The most significant one, affecting date of the progrmm release, involves
verification testing· MIT has laid out a complete test plan of about 46
runs. It was their strong recommendation that if time pe_rmits, i.e., if
other factors are delaying the flight sufficiently, they should carry
out the entire test pl_. This would flight qualify the pro_m not only
for the nominal mission, contingency orbit insertion and launch aborts,
but also would verify the system's capacity for tolerating spacecraft
systems failures such as RCS jets or computer interrupts, etc. They felt
they could do the whole business by February 15, going into configuration
control about the 1st of February. Alternatively, MIT and _w_C people
have identified nine computer runs which the program m_st execute successl_lly before we would be willing to use it in flight. Taese m_ndatory
tests could be carried out within the previously stated schedule with a
release on about Jan,,_wy 30. The Apollo Spacecraft Program _Lmnager gave
permission to slip release of the flight program to do the more complete
Job in accordance wi_h our recommendation to do so on Jan,_ry 1R.
You will recall our agreement with G_mmu to release a program tape to
them whenever they felt the pro_m and their facility were ready· It is
my understanding that we are m_king the first of these program releases
on about January 18 along with sufficient t_pical test runs and verbal
· instructions to permit Gz,_m_an to make the most of it. Since early December, G_'""m_u has assigned one of their better people, Clint T_llm_, to
duty at MIT for about two or three days. each week. This arrangement seems
to have worked out very well from everyone's viewpoint, I'm very pleased
toreport.
The AS-206 operational trajectory has Just come out and apparently is
based on four-second ,11age. Since this indicated there is some conf_-
sion, Tommy Gibson and _v thought it might be worthwhile to reiterate here
that the spacecraft computer program is being designed with thirteensecond ,,lqmge as previously reported. This duration was selected, you
recall, to provide adequate ,11_ge in the event only two jets are active.
It was our _y of protecting against RCS jet failures without providing
logic for changing ullage time in that event.
_'-, B_ty:_' c-,SavfngsBondsRegularlyon thePa.'"'r_f_,' _!an
$,p_' Y I' .
e
i
2
We have experienced considerable difficulty in obtaining _rom the
Engineering and Development Directorate the necessary propulsion system
·' data needed to complete the formulation of the spacecraft computer pro-
. gr-m_. Response by that organization has been.completely _cceptable.
_' I sus!0ect this is partially due to the rather inform_] m_er in which
: · this data was requested. It is obvious that we cannot continue to - _ :
operate this way, and so in the future requests for this information w_11
be male on a much more formal basis - smothered in the usual stack of
paperwork, signed by the necessary managers around here. It is evident
that if we fail to deliver this data on schedule to MIT, slips in the
delivery of the flight progr_m_ w_l_ be charged to us - and with some
' Justification.
You rempm_ber the business we went through some months ago regarding the
attitude hold mode to be programmed in the LGC for use daring separation
of the LM from the SIVB. Without going through Rll that history, it is
probably sufficient to report that MIT has finally concluded they can
develop a better program providing inertial attitude hold rather tb_ the
attitude rate hold I previously reported would be programmed.
For whatever it's worth, I might s_m,_ize my impression of AS-206 program quality. In spite of considerable difficulty in p,,lllng this program
together at MIT, Jim Miller and Dan Lickly have done a commendable professional Job, and I re-lly expect this pro_=m to perform very well for us.
Considerable credit is also due Tom Gibson, Carl Huss and a number of
" others in providing the necessary coordination and input from P_C. I
don't know why I'm sticking my neck out on a prediction like that. Just
living dangerously, I guess.
Add_--'essees:
(See attached list)UNITED STATES G O\'_,-_'MEN'F ,'D. HO_ ' ""t (f_WkL . '
r, 7:-,? ='''N ;. Rso.
2. Yd. v ._,fOV · C,._I&f,_, _.;,,', c, I:C_,_fhAtFJt-ES:--_
.7.!./ · . . t _.11 /
','-,...('..//, l, _,
To : See lis_ I / _ .//, ._'r_: q'Y 8 1 _7
SU_3ECT:
We had another io:_3 AS-206 program development Cfmcussion at'_._T on
J_nuary-2o_r ._, an_' some things came up you migb. t fsZ_d interesting.
First of al!:.there is on/y one missies.*phase th_ has not 'been st:ccessfully run at this time - namely_ the second :.A2_m_neuver. 5%ese
Ss some fa_lir_g that this may be due to i&korop_r '%_rgetJng as oppc_c:d
to prob].¢,._ in tl_e actual program. Co3=pletio_: of' .a satisfactory best
of this mission phase wiLY signal configuration c.on'brelof the assem.-
bly to be P_intained until the final release of d_he progl'e_. It is
planned t.hatverifics,tion testing to assua-e z"Z!g%,f¢readiness will be
complete cn Februe2-y 15th_ and we've set ,cb ........ 4, Iyth ss the date for
..i the form:=3 1;_C review of the AS-kx06 program. _'e:'f'_"_cationresults. Fi_.l
acceptance of the pzx)graau_prior to rope _=_!._= ....-"-...... ........ .,__, is base4 on this
I.LTT presentation _¢hich will be here in '_H_us kc1.
Although. _ffT insists that the Digital Auto l°i2..ots: .are adequate for t_._e
mission, there are several progranl mod%fications. _nndef consideration
in this area.' In fact_.I_DRB's have been requestexl from P.w.Twhich must
be acted upon very prom!2tly if they are to be included. Briefly, they
arethefollo_._ing: ....
a) As I understand it_ an instability, due: '_o fuel slosb._,bas
been discovered _king it desirable to modify ti!e-Kal_an filter g_ins
in the DPS DJkP. As presently designed_ _.£aenthe. 5_.CStanks get f-':irly
empty, fuel slosh causes control to oscillate bac3z and forth between the
D1E and RCS Digital Auto Pilots. Tais results im. inefficient use of RCS
fuel: although it does provide adequate control e_f the vehicle. Since
AS-206 does not have an _RCS propellant short_ge_ .it is not m_datcry to
mzuke the change until a later mission. Tee pr'_ry advantage of doing
it no'{._is to get a test of the ':ultimate" system,
b) At some time during tbe DPS maneuver, i% vas intended to freeze
the DPS engine position, i.e._ no further steeriz.,.'C, commands voul.d be
given to the DPS and all control w_ould be carrie_, out with the ECS. Tais
had been proposed as an interim fix of the inst_:;,ility problem noted in
(a)_ but subsequent testing, at Oru2__an of the Dk_' on their digital sinulation has shcvn that misalig_ent of the thrust. _¢ector from the spacecraft eg actually results in a greater use of Ec,_4fuel.than' is spent in
g/;z ;r '
........ E:O,rr..... _,_..',;:.:':'ly' o:2 __.................... z _.) _........._.... ._ P_z
.7-_ .. _ .2
controlling the fuel slosh induced instability. _..Tehave requested an
],_)RBto fix the progr;,_mso that it does not free_.e the engine position.
(Incidentally, there is concern that engi_ue bell ablation br erosion
may cause large thrust _ctor misalignment, and _-eezing the engine
deflection during the maneuver could present a s_gnificant problem in
: that event).
c) 14IT is very much concerned that insu_ffic.ientda_ will be
collected during the AS-20,_ flight for adequate analysis of the Digital
Auto Pilots. It has been found that the PCM data _ll be saturated due
, to th_ unusual platform alignment _nich is required on this _ission.
Taerofore: they are anxious to obtain another sou_'ce of this data %.,hich
they bavc identified, a.s essential i_rom the very k_ginnlng. On_ of their
proposals is that the do,_nlirl:be interrupted fo_: four or five seconds
due'lng thc DPS maneuver, substituting in it's place CD_]_.ta s_p].ed
e_ery twenty mil]:isecon'_s. Flurther_ they feel i_.would be highly desir-
._ble to suppress the DkP during this period in or, er that _e data be
independent of control activity. A?cr_ostsurely *._]istype of progr_
modification will cost a lot of time even if agre._msnt could be reached
,_ by all parties that it vas _ acceptable change technically.
I predict we will not make change (a) but will m_ke change (b) since
it's so simple. V really am concerned about not getting the D.__Pdata
for postflight a_md$-sis since ttmt is one of the i_rimary reasons for '
,. flying the mission in the first place. P,eso!ution of _'hether or not to
make ckmnge (c) will probably bounce all of thc %-:,yup to the Spacecr&ft
Program M_nager.
MIT reported that it looks like nothing can be d_ue in either the hardware or software to fix the AS-206 downrupt prob3._._m.This, you recall,
is the problem resulting from higher priori'by computer tasP_ preventing
the computer from servicing the downlink needs e_._r so often during
maneuvers. _nis causes that data frame to be garbled on the ground. As
I understand it, it is possible to unscramble thi_ data postflight, thus
it is on_ly a real time flight control proble:_ _:h±_h _e b_ve recognized
and a_reed to li_ with on this mission.
I hear that Gr,_._._nhas not yet been able to use the ts.pcs delivered to
them due to problems with their o_m _ac_t_ ° .I ,_t the distinct im_,_ession that we have been "had" ou this° Ap_rently Grum_n knew their
facility would not be ready on schedmle, and in c.rder to salvage their
incentive points, got us (_J_.C)to give them a v_Sx'er based on our confession that the GFE computer program would not bc a_ai!able as promised.
I guess we Texans are no match for those slick :',,_a:,," York yankees.
Taat's about it. Obviously our toughest Job is going to be %trenching
-this !orogrmm out of _T's crasp_ since to them q_-_!ity still'comes before
schedule. __'t that's 3uo_ ' __ a little go,me_e are r_._,._.yin,, ._ and i don't3
consider it unh, - -:_
_ :. _ ,_really not near as _._c:cziedabout the quality
of the A_-20o p__ : as th?,_........ are_ but I am very w_ou_,o to get this
bunch of experic: '.S-2O_ guys off onto the AS-_7_ Drog_'s.msas scon as
po s s ible.
!
ti n,
Eowa, a W. Tinds_: Jr. _
Addressees:
EG/D. C. Cheath,_
EGZ3/,K. J. Coz
}]G25/T. ¥. C_hambars
EG26_P. E. A%ersole
EG27/D. W. Gilbert
EC_ 2/B. Reins
Ek,43/_& Kayton
EC'43/C. P. Wasson
KA/R. F. T_.o_oson
F_{/W. H. H_by
?A/J. F. Shea
PA/%7. A. Lee
PD/R. W, Williams
Pi_/O, E.Cohen Maynard
I_42/C. H. Perrine
E42/K. L. Turner
PARC. C. Kraft_ Jr.
FA_S. A. Sjoberg
FAIR. G. Rose
_C/J. D. Hodge
FC2/E. F. _nz
FC3/A. D. Aldrich
FC4,/14.'F.Brooks
FCS_G.S.Lunney
FCS/H. D. Reed _I/_. P. }fayer
FCS/J. E. I'Anson FM/'f3,R. Huss
FS/L. C. Dunseith l_._/_%'L V. Jenkins
PS5/T. F. Gibson, Jr. F_.f_/J. p. Dalby
FSS_R. O. Nobles FI,_%/J. P. Bryant
FSS/P. J. Stu3] F}_'_/R. P. Patten
FSS/L. A. Fry -_/_anch Chiefs
:FM:_,,,_I : cna
i i:i :_i,..,,_;"-._... _*_'.i.,.'... . .._.,,,., ,*. , .. _?/K..,,:.:.i,.-:_ ._;_.& ,._ . Lr",.:,.__'.
: ,.:.,-. . _ _,.... .. .. .... _ .-, ...: "3, .. . ._ ,.
'.',-..._._i_'.'.,_ ::l_,,;,'Y",,,,r'" ,. r,_ _.'A_ .,._, .,_., _'_ ........
: · :. :_ Aa,,ttq,_lJ-.... I_o i_,:.:..._,.:..,:.$. _._,_: . , ',_., .... *.,,.,.,.,.., ., .*, .. · .
Memorandum .....'
,':' ,' k. LARa0N _ ./_: ? '
F '-''-'-" ,,7.D '_: I
'to : see_.istMAYg9 1967 . _:,...:'_Yza_ -
_o_ : FM/:_.ty I_n:LILg_ 'RAGAN ---'l t_T'Z"_'_"'_x'
su-JEcr: Spacecraft computer program names( °/
7DUEDATE
I used to think MIT was a little odd when it came to selecting names for the
spacecraft computer programs with all that weird preoccupation with the s,mu.
But now I see they were right all the time and the rest of the world is
nuts - let's mmme the missions sequentially as they lif% off the launch pad.
Good grief, Charlie ]_z'o_m! Having seen my error I'd like to apologize %o
our Bostonian friends for the abuse - and worse - I used to heap upon them
and publicly announce the end of my campaign to change the program names. I
think the old ones are Just great and recommend you learn to recognize them
if you're interested, in this business.
_. There are only five _,mes you need to remember; they are:
a. SOLRUM 55
This contraction of the more familiar "Revision 55 of Solarium" was
adopted for the AS-501/AS-502 program when it was released to Raytheon for
rope manufacture. (The numerical part of the n-me is the m,,mher of the
program assembly on which the final flight verification testing was carried
out. T_alsis a characteristic of all program n_mes).
b. BURST 116
Contracted from "Revision 116 of Sunburst", this is the D_me of the
progr-m for the unm, uned LM mission we used to call AS-206.
c. SUNDISK
Sundisk is the interim Comm_ud Module program now scheduled for
release in July which could be used for any earth orbital development flight.
It probably won't ever be flown but it's availability will ensure that flight
software does not pace the first manned mission. Dave Hoag suggested I
could remember this n_me if I associated it with the shape of the co_ud
·module - sort of a disk - and, by'golly, it's worked for me.
d. COLOSSUS
This is the name of the comwmud module program designed to support
the lunar landing mission as well as all development flights anyone has
_'_'_' Buy U.S.SavingsBondsRegularlyon the PayrollSavingsPlan
S01G,*105 C_,_...
' _ ' ' ,,i.._'?*'-':_w":', ,,._ :' "":'_ ?'''_' '_· ,.] _\
thought of, so far. According to Webster's New Collegiate Dictonary it
,_:_i ' also means (1) A statue of gigantic size; as, the Colossus of l_hodeS, a : .
:_J statue of Apollo, about 120 feet high, ,de by C_Ares about 280 B.C... ""'
"_'_;4 (2) Anything of gigantic size. :.-. . ,:.
Pretty good except, I miss the Sun.
This program A_d Sundance (below) will undoubtedly be updated prior to rope
manufacture for each mission, incorporating modifications and corrections
as necessary. I expect these will be identified by different assembly num,
hers rather than completely new hemes.
e. SUNDANCE
You can remember the name of the LM program for all ash-ed missions
fi by associating dance with the LM's lovely legs - another of Dave's suggestions - and adding "Sun" as usual.
: I'm serious, as usual.
Howard W. Tindall, Jr.
Addressees:
(see page attached)
'.i
/
?. ,_ . · . -....., f_['._._._.,,._.,,, _. _m_ _a.':_'_ _ _ i
rP_Jq (4_,¢_) IGl-tI.S
UNITED STATES GOVER.!_MENT i.. ',-_x'_ t . /.i
L. L.r',R-%0 D_ _ /i ._._,-..' ..u.,:...,
lq2u_z_g & .;?' ,,9z";.,;"_:' .._. o_':' _V;IS,O_
AUG !4 !S57
;o : See lisl;below _, ,'.J/ 1 /---_'_--:
S_JECT: Crew monitoring of the L0I maneu _JE DATE
!. On August _ we had an i._ormal meeting to talk abou_ crew monitoring of the L_:r_r Orbit Insertion (LOI) maneuver. The subject
came uD in connection with J_n McDivitt's preparation for the 'STAC
oresentation. I'm writing this no_e because we ten_ativel_ agreed
on some fairly basic pomnts with regard to how we might us_ the
various systems. These pre_miuary conclusion% if they hold up,
could have application on some of the other maneuver% not Just
LOI.
2. I am sure you are all aware of the slo_ response of the thrust
vector control digital au%opilot (DAP) in the Co_nd Module when
docked with the LM. In order to avoid exciting the !ow structu__a!
frequency of this confmguration (about I cps)_ it has been necessary
to reduce the response of the DAP to a very large degree. As a resu!t_ if there is an offset in the alignment of the inztial thrust
vector from the spacecraft c.gd, turning moments will exist at the
beginning of the maneuver causing large spacecraft attmtude excursions _hich taae a couple of long period osce!_t_ons _o damp out.
Our current est_w_te of _he _ximum excursion for L0I is abou_ 8°
· based on the assumptmon of fully loaded propellant.tanks and initial thrust misalig_men_ of i . _he period of osc_l!ation_ as I
recail_ is in the order of RO seconds for the half cycle in which
the greatest excursion occurs and_ ,_mless the crew were prepared
for it, it could create considerable concern on whether or nou the
guidance system was working properly.. In the case of the LO!
maneuver_ which has a nominal duration of about 370 seconds, it is
probable that the transverse velocity increments acc-_:la,ted during
this period should not Jeopardize the crew. If this is true, the
consensus is that the crew would be willing to passively ride out
this perturbation.
3- Crew monitoring of the rest of the maneuvermust be provided
for two characteristics: duration of the burn itse_--fand attztude
error. With regard to the former, it was readily apparent that =he
only danger to the crew occurs from an overburn, that is, failure ,
of the engine to shut down in trane. There are three devlces which
;; 7:J
.-:l:'-. iL-' '-- _ ' ' .,.,.,:., .;:_'_"t"'Z". _ £-, ..:....... _, P_,n.'_!_ "'c::',:'_.: _-,.can be used to monitor and cross check against overbu-_n: the PLUGS, i
the _ V counter on the _ based on acceleration measu_red along the
longitude spacecraft axis, and the clock which can be used to compare against the anticipated duration of the nominal burn. Anoverbu-_n of about llO fps would result in lunar impact. This is equivalent to abou_ l0 seconds of extra burn duration out of a total 370 ........
second maneuver. (Acceleration level at burnout is approxi_te!y _"
1/3 g-) A 3_- low performance engine woulc extend the burn.time
just about l0 seconds which makes monitoring w_th the clock somewhat
marginal. The EP_ !ongitu_e aocelero=eter is said to have an accu- ..
racy of approz_m_tely 1-3 percent which is equivalent to about 40 fps
for the LOI maneuver. It should provide a suztable cross check. In
additzon, lunar impact resulting-from overburn, of course,'occurs as
m_%¢h as 180° from LO!_ thus, _-_. should have a good capability of
predicting this event as soon as the spacecraft appears from behind
the moon with sufficient t_-me for the crew to respond following advice
from the ground.
4. Y_nitoring attitude error is somewha_ more difficult. It appears
that a constant pitehdown error of less than 5° tP_roughout the maneuver would result in a radial, _ V downward causing lunar i_pact apo
pro_!_tely 90 orbital travel following LOI, that is, at approximately first appearance of the spacecraft from behind the moon. It was
proposed that the FDAI's be set up with one driven by the PEGS and
the other by the SCS for attitude comparison purposes once the initial
attitude transients noted above have ceased. In addition_ it is necessary that the attitude time history con,pare favorably_ith a nominal
determined preflight. 'The comparison against the preflight nominal is
to protect against a degraded Z-axis accelerometer which could cause the
guidance to deviate dangerously but would not be apparent from a comparison of the two FDAI's with each other. Differences inthe .VDAZ's,
of course, would indicate that one of the two systems was in error.
Since there is no capability for vote breaking with a thir d source,
there would be little option but to shut down when either of the two
systems indicate a dangerous condition is impending. It shouldbe
noted, though, that attitude disl_ersionsin only _ne direction, namely
zn the direction causing a radial velocity increment downwaz_ creates
a crew safety problem. In all other cases, it would not be necessary
to shut down the engine. Critical downward incremental velocity is
approximately l_O fps. '_.-
5- 'Z guess to sum it up, even without ground monitoring and without
very much onboar_ redundancy_ it looks like given some ingenuity ways
can be found to assure crew safety. However, they may requi_e awillingness to .have "blind" faith for a considerable %ime in a sysuem
t'._tmight be malfunctioning and m_ay require an ac%ion that could
prevent misaion successj tbmt is: prenm%ure rmnual shutdown of a
· perfectly performing system. Probably most of this is old stuff, but
_aough_ it migh_ be wo__th-_hile to %-r.i%eit down.
Addressees:
CA/D. l{.Slayton -PE7/D. T. Lockard
CB/A. B. Shepard FA/C. C. Kraft: Jr.
J. A. McDivitt S.A. Sjoberg
E. Aldrin,Jr. R.G. Rose
CB1/'2. P. Stafford ;fov_tz
C. H. Woodling E.G. I_anz
D. F. Gr_m FCR/J. W. Roach
P. Eramer (2) FC3/A. D. Aldrich
CF22/C. C. Thomas _ FC4/J. E. Eannigan
CF34/J. B. Jones R.L. Carlton
EG/R. A. Gardiner FCS/C. B. Parker
D. C. Cheatham J.S. Llewe _!lyn
EG23/K. J. Cox G.S. Lunney
T. P. Lins C.E. CD_rlesworth
EG25/T. V. Chambers P.C. Shaffer
EG26/P. E. Ebersole J.C. Bostick
EG2//D. W. Gilbert H.D. Reed
EG43/R. E. Lewis FL/J. B. Ham_zck
C. F. Wesson FS/L. C. Dunseith
EG42/B. Reina FSS/J. C. Stokes
ETT1/T. I%.}Cloves T.Y. Gi0son, Jr.
EX/N. G. Foster R. 0. I_ob!es
KA/R. F. _nompson L.A. Fry
_M/W. H. E_mby l_/j. P. Mayer
W. B. Evans C.R. Euss
F. C. Littleuon 14.V. Jenkins
B. D. S%urm Fl_-3/J. P. Bryan_
PA/G. I_.Low ' J. R. Gurley
K. S.._-elnknecht G.L. Hunt ....
PA2/!(.S. Eenderson F__4/R. P. Patten
PD_/A. Cohen F!_3/B. D. Weber .....
?_/0. _. Maynard F_.5/R. E. Ernul!
._._/R. Y. Ward FMT/S. P. N_nn
!'_M/Bran eh Chiefs
FM.:_Tinda!!_ Jr. :pi *".· _. G_,.AGF..'e._l[r..- NO. 2_ J JAc,[On I '_' _Jw ;..__J'
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT i I I j I_tSA, -M-',nnedSpacecraftCente_
_,._ 'b-"_'0AG , ;Mi._on l-ianning& AnalysiIs}i_sion
I L-LARSOI',I J ..
NOV_'_'I5B7 .L._.___L_,
TO R: See list below . Joel .
. FR.RAG,_r'! ;' ( ' / --'I _. DA_:NOV l 7 ,c_
- i_ ,!W _'. - ,I 67-FM-T-109
%' /'_ l
F_OM : :_,g/Deputy Chief '] ,.::..... '., '7,!.' J. .
suBJEcS_cecraft t: co_uterprego=orb_a_''L=?_:[_ion'
,/ .- , .--j J
1. _is is just anothe_Zittle i_L_T_et f_ _o_ fiZes.
2. _e spacecraft computer :programs_ of course, have orbital integration
routines to support operations around the earth and moon, as well as in
between. The gravitation of the earth_ moon and sun are treated differently dependent on which of these regions you are operating in. On a
number of occasions the question has arisen as to where the boundaries
actually are governing this.
3. T have found out that MIT currently has written the command module
program as follows. When operating within about 210 nautical miles of
the moon's or earth's surface the orbital integration only takes into
account the gravitational potential of that body including its oblateness
effects. Beyond that altitude, and up to a radial distance of 42,500
nautical miles from the earth and 8, 500 nautical miles from the moon, it
adds to these the effect of the other two bodies (withouttheir oblateness). Beyond that distance_ the oblateness effects are dropped.
4. In order to save erasable memory in the LM computer, the LM program
is somewhat different. No matter how high it is flying, it takes into
account only that body around which it is operating including all its
oblateness effects, but never takes into account perturbations caused__ .
by the gravitationalpotential of the other b_es.
Howard W. Tindall_ Jr.
Addressees:
(See attached list)
!_ Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regular(yon the Pal,roll Savings Plan
/
,
,.
' q?.:,j q,
·7
UNITEDSTATESOOVER_MEh'T /' i" _'_'-_\.rED
Memorandum 6
R. R. RAGA I_!
.o : Seeli_t be!o_ DArE:JANti iS_8
68-PA-T-2A
FROM : PA/Chief_ Apollo Data Priority Coordination
SUBJECT: First 2 hours on the moon is a countdown to launch - s_mnlated or rea!
thing.
%. Those who participated in the S_I_C presentation already know this,
but perhaps some of you_ like m% had not heard. It is currently
proposed that on the lunar landing mission the first two hours on the
!-n_r surface will be devoted to spacecraft systems checks and launch
preparations which_ for al! practical pu_ses_ simulates the final
two hours before ascent and rendezvous. Going through an operation
like this has a munber of obvious _en_fSts. It's a good pre-ascent
"simulation" which le_s you find out early if there are problems
associated %'ith that operation such as performing the necessary tasks
vithin the time allotted. And, of course_ it prepares the spacecraft
for lift off at the end of the co--nd module:s first revolution if
that action is required in response to some emergency situation. Also,
it makes the countdown for that event the same as the countdown for
the nominal ascent lunar stay---that is_ standardizes procedures.
R. In pre!0aring our mission techniques data flow we are assn_ ug that
the lunar operation will be conducted in this way. I assume those
responsible for planning other facets of the lunar operation are doing
the same.
o_Tindall_W Jr.
Addressees:
(See attached list)
__ Blq U.S.SavingsBondsRegularlony thePayrollSat4ngsPlan
/0'' /7
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT _ASA.i;.anneS_ac_cra,_ d Cs_ .
_i_ion Planning& ,_.atysL1__
Me.moradm '..
°.
TO : Seelist beZo-_ DA=:JAN 16 i8G8
68-FM-T-8
FROM ' ___/Dep'jtyCkief -:--_-'-fVED
SUBJECT: ACS acceierometers may not work. R.R. RAGAI%_
1. Apparently, there is a basic problem in the LM Abort Guidance
System (AC,B). Although it is not widely known_ there is a m_mor
the accelerometers do not work and it is highly likely G&C Division
will elect to procure the AGS accelerometers from another source.
Since it is too late to obtain and incorporate them into the system
immediate ly, _M -2_ and I_M-4wi23! use the original accelerometers in
the AGS. I believe it is their intention to select the best ones
available in ho_s of avoiding an u_noperable system.
2. I s_mwriting this note since: if the AGS is considered undependable on LK-3 and I_M-4, this fact should be taken into account in
mission planning and data priority decisions for those missions. For
example: it seems hig_h_lyundesirable to plan on utilizing the AGS for
executing maneuvers in a nominal mission as is currently planned on
Mission "D". tL_---_
Howard W. Tindall, Jr.
Addressees:
(See att-lched list)
_'.RA.,AN :
D- _OA,_ t..--
,.. /.ARSON /
?.Yz 4
_ Bz/y U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payrol#Savings Plan
-- ] " -'f- _ --..........7"....
- ?7: · . . ' .
(_m?lONJ___IOMA(_10. 10 5010-,T07
MAy tm2 ED/"P_/'_
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT _ Z,C E l V _ _ /? CL_'7-/-_' - :'
Memorandum F:B ,9 8
R. IR. PAGAN
TO : See list belo D^=:FEB$ I9S8
68-PA-T-26_
I_OM : PA/Chief, Apollo Data Priority Coordination
SUBJECT: Lunar Reentry Mission Techniques meeting
1. On February 1 we had another meeting on 1-_r reentry mission
techniques. _-_st all of our discussion dealt with the final
midcourse maneuver prior to entry. As you know, midcourse _neuvers
are currently planned to occur approximately 12 hours after qv;l which
is near the sphere of influence of the moon and about 15 hours prior
to reaching the Entry Interface (200,000 feet altitude). A-_lyses
have shown it is highly probable that these maneuvers Will have to
be made and propellant is budgeted for them. l_ning has also
included a third midcourse maneuver just prior to reentry, the need
for which is nowhere near as certain. Of course, it mst be included
in the timeline regardless of that. It is this midcourse maneuver we
discussed.
2. When should the maneuver be scheduled? Ron Bem xy stated that,
according to their studies, the magnitude of dispersions at Entry
Iuterface (EI) are relatively insensitive to the time at which the
third midcourse maneuver is made as long as it is no earlier than
about 5 hours before (FI). _herefore, this consideration puts an
upper bound on the time at which this maneuver mst be made.
Paul Pixley states that for the cases they have examined it is always
possible for the MSFN to obtain a good state vector for entry initialization provided the final midcourse maneuver occurs no later th_
2 hours before EI. _ais MSFN tracking l_m_tation establishes the i
lower bound. Selection of the actual time the maneuver should be Ii
made between these bounds is pr_,_rily based on operational consid erations. _at is, we would like to ms_ke sure the crew timeline follOWing
the maneuver is not unduly hurried and will be very much intereste_ in
the flight planning people's input on this (Tom Holloway please note).
Until something comes along to change it, we propose for now to [
schedule the third midcourse maneuver 2 hours prior to hO0,000 feet I
end al! mission plannirg and _lysis activity should be based on that.
l
I
I
3- We also established a criteria upon which it will be possible for
the flight controllers to establish the need for this -_euver in real
time. Based on the work of Claude Graves' group, it was stated that
'_ Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan, · iI
a flight path angle dispersion at EI of .38° is considered acceptable.
According to Paul Pixley_ the M_FN is capable of determining that
parameter to within 0.02-, given 30 _i_utes of tracking within 2 hours
of E!. By subtracting this we established a flight path angle dispersion
limit of .36_ as the GO/NO GO criteria for whether or not to ._ke the
midcourse maneuver. That is, if the predicted flight path angle at EI
differs from the desired value by more than .36_, the third midcourse
maneuver will be executed. According to Pete Frank, this value is
sufficiently large that the likelihood of the third midcourse maneuver
is very low.
4. It was decided that the midcourse maneuver, if necessary, will be
entirely in plane. This ground rule was established based on an understanding that very little lateral landing point adjustment is available
without very large out-of-plane maneuvers. Nor is it needed since the
lifting reentry footprint should provide more than enough lateral landing
point control.
5- Another ground rule we established was that there would be no
comparison of onboard navigation to N_FN navigation associated with the
third midcourse maneuver. _is is a necessary constraint since onboard
navigation cb-_ges the _ spacecraft state vector, which is an ,,_-cceptable thing to do just prior to entry. Furthermore, it is unnecessary
anyway, since by that time in the mission we should have sufficient faith
in the one which has been uplink from the ground without that coarse
compar i son.
6. This ruling poses the question as to how long before entry the ground
determined state vectors propogated to EI are of equal accuracy to that
determined onboard since, given co_-._,,_%cationloss, at some point the
crew should abandon the lW_N state vector and start navigation and i
maneuver targeting onboard. The Mathematical Physics Branch sad Orbital
Mission _-lysis Branch people were given the action item of determining
this crossover point which is anticipated to be well before the secpnd
midcourse -_euver. In other words_ I expect that once we have co"_tted
the spacecraft to executing the ground computed second midcourse m-_euver
- utilizing a MSFN state vector update, there should be no further star
landw_rk/star horizon exercises carried out onboard the spacecraft.
.F .
7- As a side issue, it may be desirable to include in the lunar mmsslon
plan some sort of "onboard Navigation and Return-to-Earth targeting_'
exercise as a systems test either on the transl,_n-r phase of the mission s
or more reasonably, early in the transearth phase to evaluate that i
capability. But it is to be emphasized that it is a systems test only
and that navigation and targeting of a!32 these maneuvers should be based
on ground computations given adequate co_._,_:J_uications.
............... /8. Another question which Mst be answered dealt with how soon before
EI it is reasonable for the CMC Average g program to start _,n_ing. Of
particular concern is the effect of approximations on the accuracy of
the average g integrator when computing the influence of Just the
gravitation the spacecraft is experiencing. Guidance and Performsnce
Branch is to answer that.
9. In the current flight plan we propose that platform alignments be
carried out based on a ground computed REF_MMAT at 3 hours and I hour
prior to EI. (We still haven't pinned down its specific orientation. )
In addition to the ground transmission of this _T, it is necessary
to send up the spacecraft state vectors and External Delta V targeting
parameters for the third midcourse maneuvmr if it is needed. Also the
state vector for entry initialization Mst be sen% sometime during the
last hour before entry with its time tag close to the predicted EI time.
10. _ere was considerable discussion regarding the spacecraft computer
entry programs. Several modifications have been proposed, but it was
evident from our discussion that we didn't know enough about the current
definition of these programs to do anything. We also inconclusively
discussed initialization of the ]_ again. Accordingly, it was decided
that our next meeting should include participation by MIT and North
Howard W. Tindall, Jr.
Enclosure
List of Attendees
Addressees:
(See attached list)
t'_2OFTICK4K, _ NO. I0 JIOlO--lll! ".
-- ,o_G,_nccNo. _ _ _v_'/_ ----_ ·:
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT /
Memorandum
TO : See list below D^_:FEB 2 1 B68
68-PA-T-3?A
FROM : PA/Chief, Apollo ;Data Priority
Coordination
i
SUm/ZCT: _I platform ali_ment
I
Something came out of }{onBerry's Midcourse Mission Techniques meeting
of February ? that I think should be advertised widely. Apparently,
we now have agreement among all parties, including FCOD and FOD, that
the proper platform orientation for the TrJ maneuver on a 1,m-r mission
is the one established prelaunch on the pad for use during the launch
phase. Of course, thi.sdoes no% produce zeros on the 8-ball during _LI.
_'aereason I am sending this note around is just Tx)make sure that
everyone knows and is working in accordance with that monumental decision.
Howard W. Ti_'dll a , Jr.
Addressees: "'
(See attached list)
Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularlly on the Payroll _'a;'iTigs P/t:.- -"_' Ch_,_CiKAi.ifQAt 4 NO. It _' __lO_tO7 '~..._....-I _,,.,_,__._
hL_y _ CDr_KNql
..... _ casa G4D_ IltG. NO- I_
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
Memorandum
_ECEIVED
TO : See list below r_._R1 i 1968 DATE:[ilAR '_ _.":_'_
68-PA. T-3_SA
R. J::_. _AGAN
FROM : PA/Chief, Apollo Data Priority Coorozna_zon
suB/sc-r:Ascent Phase Mission Techniques meeting - February 27, 1968
1. In the absence of Charley Parker_ our beloved leader, I inherited
the job of chairing this meeting which probably accounts for why we
didn't really get an awful lot done. However, there are a couple of
things that are probably _orth reporting.
2. We discussed the importance of the "stage verify" discrete to the
spacecraft computer. Apparently_ its sole purpose is to initialize the
DAP such that it may perform properly. For example, it stops sending
steering com,_nds to the DPS trim gimbals. It also changes the spacecraft mass used in DAP operations from the ascent stage, plus whatever
remains of the descent stage_ to ascent mass only. Based on this
information it computes jet firing duration for attitude control
differently, of course. I had been concerned that failure to get this
signal during Ascent would cause poor attitude control and we are
initiating a pro_m change request to back up "stage verify" with the
"lunar surface flag" since whenever that event occurs use of the ascent
stage only is a certainty. Jack Craven (FCD) pointed out that due to
the design of the system the much more probable failure is to get a
"stage verify" signal prematurely. If that happened, when we are still
operating on the DPS, it would stop DPS steering and would make the RCS
attitude control extremely sluggish. That would be bad news' All that
is required to do this is for either of two relays to inadvertently
open.
3. As you know, we are planning to devote a short period of time
immediately after landing on the lunar surface to checkout of critical
systems. This would be done both onboard and in the M_C leading to a
GO/NO GO for one CSM revolution (about 2 hours). This is exactly the
same sort of thing as the GO/NO GO for one revolution following earth
ia_nch, jack Craven accepted the action item, which I had previously
dis-.ussed with Gene Kranz, to establish how long it should take to do
this systems check in order that we may make all other mission planning
and crew procedures consistent. It is expected to be in the order of
3 minutes_ unless it takes a long time to really detect an APB pressure
leak. Until the GO/NO C_Dwe intend to remain in a state from which we
can instantly "abort stage" and go. After that it will take _leh
longer.
Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularlyon the PayrollSavings Plan2
2. Almost all the rest of our discussion dealt with what the com"_ud
module should be doing during and immediately following LM ascent from
the lunar surface. One unresolved question was whether or not the
command module should attempt to observe the IAi ascent with the sextant.
It was not clear what purpose would be served other than more rapid
acquisition for rendezvous navigation tracking after insertion. It
seemed to us the most important thing, of course, was for the coma-nd
module to take whatever steps are necessary to ass_u_e getting a good _$_$_
LM state vector in its computer for rendezvous maneuver targeting as
soon as possible. It scems almost certain that we should load the _$_$_ ?
nominal LM insertion state vector in the CM_ from the ground _]_ to
LM ascent to guard against subsequent communication breakdown. It
was also agreed that we should probably prepare the M_C to automatically
take the LM post-insertion state vector from the LM telemetry and transmit it back to the eom_,nd module. Whether we would actually do this
or not depends on whether we lose more by forcing the com,_nd module to
stay in the Uplink Comm_nd program (P-27) thereby preventing rendezvous !
tracking and onboard navigation for a substantial period of time. That
is, analysis may show that with good ¥_ ranging and/or sextant tracking i
the com,_nd module may be able to converge on an acceptable LM state
vector better without this ground participation, if it gets going more
quickly.
5. I guess I am attacking the old "MIT me" in stating that we are
seriously handicapped by having no reliable definition of the L,_mln-ry
1,,_,r surface and ascen_ programs (e.g., C_OP Chapters _ and 5)- I
understand review copies of these should be available within 3 to 6
weeks and I am sure nothing can be done to speed them up. We'll eat'em
raw when they get here:
Howard W. Tindall, Jr.
Enclosure
List of Attendees
Addressees:
(See attached list)F_MN (41 CFm) 101.i1.1
TO : See list below _ _ _,_>_, DAng:
68-PA-T-T3A
MOM : PA/Chief, Apollo Data Priority Coordination
sUbJECT: Some lunar mission earth orbit phase ground rules
!. i would like to _ke sure everyone is aware of some important
decisions which were made a_ Ron Be_=_y's _idcourse Phase ¥_ssion
Tec:_uiquesmeeting on April 3. _hey have to do with opera_ions during
_he earth parking orbit phase prior v_o TLi on a lunar mission.
2. Current planning involves performing the T_.I maneuvers at the first
opportunity. For Atlantic injection, this can occur approximately one
and a half hours after launch. I_ is important that the efforts of all
t_e organizations be tn accordance with that. If it is determined that
some activity preclud_:s _LI this soon, the responsible organization should
make this known immediately. As noted previously) it has been established --_
thaz no spacecraft pl_tform alignment is required prior to the first
opportunity _.I, whic_ helps the crew time line.
3. One component of the go/no go for the first TLI opportunity is validation of the S-IVB IU state vector. Since during the first revolution we
are u_bte to generate an i_BFN state vector superior to the anticipated
IU's, the check can only be gross. The actual parameter to be tested will
be magnitude of the anticipated midcourse correction. The criteria will be
based on how well we will be able to determine right from _rong rather than
on reasonable magnitude of the midcourse correction, we would be willing to
accept operationally. It will be a function of _FN tracking coverage
available prior to the go/no go decision.
4. In order to avoid having to make ,_ecessary real-time decisions) in
addition to all the sssociated pre-flight analysis and arguments to establish
the decision logic) we have established the following gro_,m.i rules:
a. We will never transmit a state vector update to _he S-IVB IU for the
first TLI opportunity.
b. We will always transmit a state vector update to the S-I_/B IIIfor
the second _LI opportunity.
c. We will always transmit a state vector update to th_ CSM G&N for %he
first _LI opportunity. The state vector to be sent to the _M will be obtained
vis telemetry from the S-ZVB lI;.
:- .... 5 :: L,'.The !n_ention, of course, is to always use the best state vector. During
the first revolution_ the IU state vector should be superior to any other
source and should be acceptable for use. Thus, there will be no reason
to update _he IU and no reason not to update the G&N. During the second
revolution we can be certain the N_SFN state vector will be adequate for
guiding through the second TLI opportunity - at least as good as, or better
_han the S-IVB IU state vector - which means no harm is done by sending a
state vector update, but it can improve the situation. There is reason
to suspect that M_FC may not approve this ground rule (b) but it seems to
me the burden of proving why we should do something else is on them.
5. Ali of this will _e documented in detail in the minutes .ofthe meeting.
i hope the c_airman will excuse my scooping him, but I felt it desirable _o
adver_ize and emphasize these things since they have a signi2icant influence
in the procedures we are implementing and you should all be aware of them.
W. Tindall,Jr. '
Addressees:
(See list attached)- -z--fL
e*s_ A'pOdA(_ G,W) ml-JtJ
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
a au"emor-n--m
...: .... ,. ,, ..... ..v.: Z Oentez.
--,C '__-\ -- '............. Divisi
- ,o._S
TO : See list below A?R 1 '.... APR8
R. R. _-_/-xr-i 68-FM-T-74
Chief
SUBJECT: Flyby solutions in the RTCC M/dcourse program will not be absolutely
op_i_m
This memo is to inform you of a simplification in l_TCC program requirements
I recently approved. As noted below, the capability we are providing appears
to be adequate and the cost of the optimization is incompatible with the
benefit to be gained. The rest of this memo is lifted almnst verbatim from
one Bob Ernull wrote to me.
Quite a few months ago, it was agreed by MPAD, FCD, and FSD that a circumlunar (flyby) mode would be included in the RTCC midcourse program for
alternate missions and cirem_rnq:_T aborts. One problem we were particularly
concerned about was the case where we have to get back home with the RCS
only; this implies both a SPS failure and DPS failure, or failure to
extract the IAi, after TLI. Because of the limited delta V _vailable from
the RCS, approximately 150 fps for translation, the guideline established
was to develop a program logic which would provide the absolute m/n_,_,m
delta V solution to insure safe entry.
In trying to develop a program which would compute the "optimum" solution,
we ran into many problems. We have reached a point now where even though
program development is not complete, we probably know how to build the
program required; however, the _:_ing time on the RTCC computers ranges
from 20-40 minutes per solution. We have examined ways of reducing this
time and do not see any possibilities which would effect any significant
reduction. Although this might be acceptable during an operation, _m_gine
the computer time and effort required to check it all out.
!
During the evaluation of computation techniques for the "oPtimum" solution
it was found that a very near opti_:m solution could be found using a
simple computation procedure based on a "return-to-nominal" concept. This
concept simply takes advantage of the fact that the nomina] pericynthion
conditions which were optimized pre-flight, will still be xery near optimum '
for any small midcom-se maneuver. Since for the RCS probl_:m we are by
definition considering for the flyby solutions, get an answer which is
near optimum and avoid the iterative search for optimized pericynthion
conditions. This reduces the run time from 20-_0 minutes for the "optirm_m"
solution to 1-2 minutes for the "return-to-nominal" solution.
· 2
: ,The next question is how _ch delta V penalty is incurred if we decide to
implement the simple and faster computation technique in the RTCC. It can
be shown that the "opt_" solution will cover S-IVB injection errors
50-100_ larger than the return-to-nominal. However, these dispersions must
be compared with the expected S-IVB 3rdispersions to get a true picture of
the situation. This comparison shows that with the return-to-nominal we
can cover S-IVB injection errors twice as l_wge as the S_errors. _his is
based on the assumption that up to 100 fps is available for the first maneuver_
the additional 50 fps is reserved for subsequent corrections.
S_m_rizing, in order for the return-to-nominal solution to be inadequate
we have to have an SPS failure, a failure of the DPS (or no extraction)
and a S-IVB dispersion t_ice as large as the predicted 3$'dispersions.
On this basis, and considering the major impact of developing_ checking
out and verifying a program where each run takes 20 minutes or more, the
decision was made to delete the requirement for computing an optimum
flyby solution and use the return to nominal technique. I hope you agree.
Attendees:
(See list attached)
! ··. ,o /,, ,
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
: Memorandum 3 019S8
TO : See listbelow F:,:_...:.A_:-,,.lDATE: APR2'31968
68-PA-T-79A
lq_oM : PA/Chief, Apollo Data Priority CoOrdination
1968
SUB3ECT: Rendezvous maneuver targeting for guidance system backup
1. During the "D/E" Rendezvous Mission Technique meeting of April
15, we spent a lot of time discussing the data transmitted from the
ground tO the spacecraft involving the CSI and CED maneuvers. This
discussion, of course, centered on how the data should be used and
led to a tentative conclusion regarding the backup of these 'LM
· maneuvers, which is somewhat different than we had previously reached.
The purpose of this memorandum is to point out this difference.
2. We had previously concluded that the com,_nd module should be
prepared to make "mirror image" rendezvous maneuvers in the event of
IAI problems. We had planned to target the CSM with data obtained by
the IAI crew from the PGNCS. _e failure we had in mind was primarily
propulsive. However, when you consider that the problem in the LM
could also be in the guidance system, it seemed logical to modify the
procedures slightly, since it is no better for the command module to
make a bum maneuver than for the LM. Also, it did not seem that we
were taking opti,,,m advantage of the LM system% particularly the AGS.
Accordingly, we now propose the following:
Both the AGS and the CSM G&N will be targeting with ground computed
CSI/CDH maneuvers passed to the spacecraft in External Delta V coordinates.
If for some reason the LM PGNCS computed maneuver is not acceptable, we
would class this as a PGNCS failure. Rather than carry out some real
/
time systems analysis at this time critical period, they would switch to
the AGS and make the ground relayed maneuver. If some further problem
is encountered prior to the maneuver, the LM would go passive and the
com._nd module would continue its countdown and make the ground computed
CSI/CDH burn. Following the burn the crew and ground would attempt to
ascertain what the oroblem is in an attempt to get the LM systems ready
for the rest of the rendezvous.
This procedure gives two levels of backup (AGS and CSM) to a PGNCS
· problem and helps keep the DM active. However, operating in this way
would likely preclude either input of rendezvous radar data into the AGS
or running through its CSI/CDH targeting computations in order to keep
it in the best state of readiness to backup the PGNCS. _aere is still :
Buy U.S. Savings Bands Regularly an the rail Savings Plan
//d_..... --· ii ii
2
a pocket of resistence (FCSD) to using the AGS in this way which makes
some higher level direction necessary. I'll try to get a decision right
away, one way or the other.
ward W. TJ.ndall, Jr.
Addressees:
(See list attached)
PA:HWTindall, Jr. :isUNnmO STATESCOVZP. a E'D
Memorandum
R. R. RAGAN
!
:: TO : FA/Chairman
Control
,
Board
Apollo Software Configuration DATE: APR -P _ 1968
68-PA-T-88A
'i FROM : PA/Chief_ Apollo Data Priority Coordination
, SUBJECT: Results of "C" Mission Rendezvous Review meeting - April 22, 1968
1. At your request_ I set up a meeting on our current "C" mission
rendezvous problems with participation by all organizations interested :-
in this activity. The attached attendee list will show you they were
well represented. Our basic purpose was to determine current status
of the situation and to recommend where to go from here with regard '
to the problems which have recently been coming 't.o light (both real ' ::
and imaginative) primarJly as a result of the crew training exercises I
atEBC. ,i
2. In snmmnry:
a. It is the consensus that the Sundisk program is acceptable for
·flight - that is_ program changes and new ropes need not be made.
b. Post release Sundisk program testing is underway to further
verify its flight readiness. Results to date have been highly satisfactory and no new program bugs have been found. This testing is .:
continuing, but confidence is high that it will be completed successi_lly. :
c. A n,,mher of open items in the crew procedures were discussed and
i decisions were made which will permit consistent, unified work in the i
future with 'regard to development of the crew timeline, si-,_lation activity, :i'
programverificationtesting_etc. i_>-
d. A number of desirable program changes were discussed which should
be incorporated in the follow-on spacecraft computer progrnm_.
Each of these items will be amplified below.
3. Post release verification testing of progrsm._ associated with' the .:
: rendezvous eXercis% currently underway, falls into three categories. '.
They are as follows:
/ a. Testing of the sextant rendezvous navigation. Two runs have been .
laid out in detail covering the period from the NBR maneuver to the
: terminal phase midcourse maneuver which are currently being run at MIT '
on their bit-by-bit si_l_tor_ their hybrid simulator_ and their digital !
_.-_). ...-. Bu3JJ-_.! S_vings Bonds _egul_rly on th_ p_.-_Z, S_vings Plan _t '
- //.2.· . , J
2
engineering simulation pro6_m. Math Physics Branch (MPAD) is desfgning
an additional run utilizing the final crew procedures, parts of which are
defined in this memorandum. MIT will also make this run. According to :
Flight Software Branch, these three runs are being made a part of the
formal post release verification and will be well documented.
b. Twelve rendezvous targeting and burn runs covering the period
between IIBR and braking have been defined bY MPAD and Flight Crew. Four
of these tests will be run on the MIT bit-by-bit simulator and also on
the North American ME-101. All twelve of these runs are being processed
through the MIT engineering simulation program, the equivalent MPAD
programs, and the bit-by-bit simulation here at MC. Many of these runs
have already been made and their results have been compared very favorably.
__ In addition_ the initial conditions and other data required to make these
runs have been delivered to the AMS at EBC. The purpose of this is to
provide test cases with which they may check out their simulator. It is
not to test the Sundisk program, and as of this date, they don't intend
'i to run these cases.
Z
c. A completely independent test plan has been designed by SS_W and
reviewed by MSC defining a series of runs to be made on the local bit-byF bit simulator.
It was the consensus that successful completion of all this testing should
provide adequate confidence in Sundisk for its use in the "C" mission.
' 4. Crew Procedures
J
.: In order that everyone may carry on using the same approach, we :
discussed and chose the following crew procedures which should be
considered official. _'aatis, they should not be chsnged without
future discussion and widespread dissemination since so many organizations are concerned.
a. The first and most important involved the workaround procedure
for the terminal phase midcourse maneuver targeting program (P-35)- It
has been decided to handle this program deficiency by desisting that
the CSM state vector rather than the S-IVB state vector be :updated based
on sextant observations after TPI. Tests have shown that this technique
works very well. In fact, it provides a theorectically perfect solution.
b. It was also decided that the crew would make a so-called "phony
m_rk" after the TPI maneuver and prior to beginning navigation. This
decision wasmade in spite of the fact that MPAD representatives did
not feel this operation was necessary.
· _,:4;,';i ; _ L_ _,;,_[ '
· 3
c. The consensus is that the "phony mark" is not necessary following :
the midcourse correction maneuver and so it will not be made at that time.
d. It was decided to set the Delta R and Delta V test parsm_ters
to zero so that after each sextant observation the crew will be forced
to observe the effect of that observation on the state vector. It will
· also cause a program alarm to occur. The pr_,_ry benefit to be gained
from this procedure is that it will provide the crew with _*ormation
regarding the trend of state vector changes which will be helpful in
their editing process. It should be noted that this is the procedure
currently in use on all simulators at MIT, EBC, MAC_ etc. It was observed
that after more simulator experience, it may be desirable to load values
somewhat larger than zero to simplify the crew operation a little. _is
would be a minor modification to the procedure.
e. Based on the strong recommendation of MIT, it was decided to
reinitialize the W-matrix during the second navigation period between
NSR and '_±. This procedure was also adopted over the objection of MPAD
personnel who intend to ca_y out future analysis to provide their contention
that it is not necessary and perhaps that it is even d_m_ging. There was
also discussion of the values to be used for reinitialization of the
W-matrix at this time. MIT currently proposes 1,OOO feet and 1 fps,
although it seems that values as much as three times larger may be
recommended before the flight.
f. _ae flight crew has concern over allowing the average "G" program
(P-_7) to run continuously after the second midcourse correction. _aey
are afraid that the aceelerometer bias may introduce unacceptable error
in the state vector. MPAD was given the action item of determining the
effect of various levels of accelerometer bias acting over different
periods of time on the range and range rate displays. This information
should give some insight into how the system should be operated when
someone establishes what accelerometer bias we should expect. As of now,
they will continue to run P-47. f
5. At least t_o program modifications should be considered for future
spacecraft programs:
a. It has come to light that the Sundisk short burn:SPS logic will
cause a premature engine shut down amounting to about four fps as a result
of some inaccurate spacecraft characteristics frozen in fixed computer
memory. It is recommended that these parameters be located in erasible
so that they may be loaded after true values are known.
b. There is an infuriating "Delta V residual bounce" following
spacecraft maneuvers which preclude accurate maneuver execution. MIT
i //f
_.,,. ._, _ _ .? _ ,,_ 1".._'F . a.. -.I
is in the process of tracking down the cause of this. Eopei_,lly it may '
be fixed in the later programs or at least maybe we will find out what .-
it really is' ' !
I
6. Finally, EBC simulator people were asked if any possible_assistance ' . i
not already available could be provided to help solve their problems. ..{
It was their opinion that at this time they have a number of known 'i :
things that must be done which will substantially improve their facility [ i
and until these are completed, they feel no organized help from MSC ·
or MIT would be partic,_l_rly helpful.
! i
_bw_d W. Tindall, Jr · -- _s . '...ii
Enclosure
List of attendees
i'
ec:
(See attached list)
PA:HWTindall, Jr.:is
[
·!
i
JUNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
!:id:C:L-i'._.;'._£3 i
__3
emoranaum ....
TO : See list below '-2.. 2'_. _.7._.,,j3_.,.>._
_Ar_:APR 3 0 1968
68-PA-T-89
FROM : PA/Chief, Apollo Data Priority Coordination
S_JECT: CSM should have good rendezvous navigation in the 1,mnr mission
1. As you know, I have been pushing to get the capability back into
_ the commnd module computer program to compute CSI and CDH rendezvous
· m_neuver targeting. The reason I consider this valuable is that with
both VEF ranging and sextant data, the comm_ud module potentially has
a better rendezvous guidance system than the IAi. _aus, with that
capability, it could provide the comparison "yard stick" for evaluating
the 12/ PGNCS determined maneuvers during a nominal flight and could
provide targeting for its own maneuvers if a com-_nd module rescue
situation arises.
2. I submitted a PCR for Colossus and MIT responded with a six week
program delivery schedule slip which, of course, is ,m_cceptable.
Therefore, this PCB has been added to the list of changes to be considered for later versions of Colossus. During our discussion of this
PCR, someone re,_rked that the IrHF ranging device is limited to use
for ranges less than 200 nautical miles, whereas the nominal range at
insertion is about 270 nautical miles, and that lighting conditions for
sextant obse_wation were poor prior to the CSI and CDH maneuvers. If
this were true, it would substantially reduce the benefit of this
capability, and in fact, might make it impossible to use the com_ud
module as noted above. I have checked into the actual situation for
1,m-r rendezvous and have found quite the opposite. The tracking
conditions are really very good. Attached to this memorandum are
figures which show this. They were lifted from an excellent memorandum
(68-FM61_-17) written by a couple of Ed Lineberry's people - James D.
Alexander and Francisco J. T. Leon-Guerrero. You will observe (Figure 1) i
that approximately five minutes after insertion into orbit both spacecraft
- are in darkness which should make sextant tracking ideal and in fact at no
time after that and prior to TPI is the angle between the _ and the sun
as observed from the com,_nd module ·less than 70©. Furthermore, you will
note (Figure 2) that, even if 200 nautical miles is a hard constraint on
VHF ranging, it should be possible to get between 5 and 10 minutes worth
of tracking before CSI, which should do quite a bit of good. And, of course, :,
as Ed Linebe_Ay says, there is nothing sacred about doing CSI that soon.
That is, by delaying it 5 or 10 minutes, we could obtain an equal -m_unt
of ex_ra V_ tracking. Of course, hopefully, ¥., will work at ranges
greater than 200 miles, particularly, if we are willing to restrict voice
comm,mications. (Figures 3 and 4 are attached to show an equally good
situation will exist on the "F" mission. )
[ m,,, U.._. Savin_s B_._l.s R.*_.*-,larl_on, the PaTroll Savings Plan ( "" ·
· % .
,., _ -'-..._ .
../:'_.. ' ' ,'3 '.,
.;,:::... ,:.
_'_'_,_.h t _ .' ' " : ::'a....: ·,, ,1 · "'-
_r
B. My basic purpose in sending around this memorandum is to clarify the
situation by distributing this data, which I found very interesting, and
to ree=phasize the desirability of equipping and utilizing the CSM in
this way.
Enclosures
Addressees:
(See list attached)
PA:HWTindall, Jr. :is
\
+
: _ o
· ¢:j/ . ·
-._,i'." - . ' ".'
· ' '*..' ,i . _.'
; .: ,,,_ . . j-.- ,:..-,. . ..3
,'iIi_. ·,bC
G_,,AGE_. ACQ. I_'O.l"l
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
Memorandum
TO : See list below DATE: MAY 6 f968
FROM : PA/Chief, Apollo Data Priority Coordination 68-PA-T-95A
· SUBJECT: PIPA Surprise
· 1. Since I was surprised at what Gunter Sabionski told me and, in
turn, almost everyone I have told has been surprised, perhaps you
too will Se surprised to learn that the least significant incremen_
output by the CSM accelerometer is equivalent to 0.2 fps' (%'aeLM
is considerably better, the value being 0.03 fps per bit. ) I suppose
we have all heard these numbers before in units of centimeters per
, second which made them sound much smaller than they really are and I,
for one, never bothered to make the conversion. Of course, what
this means is that it will be impossible to trim delta V residuals
in the command module dependably to less than 0.2 fps. Also, the
actual triming operation will be a little more difficult since the
· readout will jump in such big steps.
2. No big deal, just thought you might be interested.
Howard W. Tindall, Jr.
Addressees:
(See list attached)
PA:HWTindall_ Jr.:is
//
Buy U.S. Sat,ings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Sat,i;_gs Planc_?lcl(_. IrORM I_Q. IQ
MAy 114Zi:DnlG_
UNITED STATESGOVERNMENT _ _ C _£i V u_Q
Memorandum
R. R. RAGAN
TO : Seelistbelow DATE:MAY14 1968
68-PA-T-101A
_oM : PA/Chief, Apollo Data Priority Coordination
SUBJECT: Aborts from powered descent on the lunar landing mission
I. We spent _he entire May 8 Ascent Data Priority meeting discussing
mission techniques associated with aborts from powered descent on a
lunar landing mission. This discussion led to some pretty simple
procedures which are outlined in this memo. They are based on some
assumptions which I've also listed below, if you feel that they are
in error, please let us know.
2. The basic assumptions we made are:
a. From a Dimsengine performance and dependability standpoint, it
is preferable to operate the DPS at full thrust throughout the abort
ascent trajectory rather than at some lower level. (Is this okay after
operating for awhile at reduced thrust? Also, we must make sure there
are no bad guidance system transient problems at staging.)
b. The low level sensor light comes on when there is 1200 pounds of
propellent remaining, which is equivalent to about 120 seconds burn time
at 25% thrust, and 30 seconds burn time at -_ximnmthrust.
c. It is operationally acceptable to run the DPS to fuel depletion.
That is, there is no reason for the crew to prematurely shut down the
DPS engine if there is an advantage _o be gained by running it to fuel
depletion. (I'llbet I hear something about this_)
d. Use of the "Abort Stage" automatic sequence is as safe or safer
than manually proceeding through it one step at a time. (Someone's not
going to like this either.)
e. The crew can make a go/no go decision one minute after the DPS
low level sensor light comes on, at which time they shou?d be prepared
to either commit to landing otto goor% immediately. (A' least we are
recommending this _f it is at all possible. Of course, 'bey may abort
after tha%_ but it's getting hairy.)
f. There is a very great advantage to be gained by keeping the .-
variety of abort modes _ a minimum - that is_ always do the same thing
as often as possible. The point is, there may be some special cases in
___i_:11_. ._:_3U' .S. £,*_,i_¢.rBo=d.rE:g;,;l:.','_'' .,_.v.....,/, ,F,_, ·_',.-,_s.=".::'_:
':';.:3'
, /it '¢
": I/F
.-, ::,!, : . .::. G,)iwhich some benefit could be gained by doing things a little differently.
But, we always felt the advantage of standarized procedures outweighted
them in those cases we recognized and discussed.
3- The abort procedure is really very simple, at least if the above
assumptions holdup. So simple, in fact_ that I'm sure you'll wonder
how we spent the day: Basically_ whenever an abort situation arises
at any time during descent, the crew will hit the "Abort" button
which will automatically put the PGt_'CS(or AGS) into the DPS abort
program (1>70)and the DPS should be run to fuel depletion or to a
guided cutoff at orbital conditions, whichever occurs first. If fuel
depletion occurs_ the crew should then "Abort Stage_" which will
automatically cause separation of the DPS and will put the PGNCS (or
AGS) in the APS abort program (PT1)_ leading to a guided insertion
into orbit. We propose never initiating an abort with "Abort Stage"
as long as the DPS is still operating okay.
4. There is one special case requiring attention which occurs with an
abort approximately five minutes into power descent. It is at about
that time when the DPS is able to return the spacecraft all the way
to nominal orbit. If the DPS does make it all the way to orbit, all
is well and good. if, however, fuel depletion results in DPS shut
down just shy of that, something must be done of course. The procedure
, we propose if the velocity required to get into orbit is less than 10
fps, is for the crew to remain in P/O, not to stage the DPS, and _o use
four jet RCS to achieve orbit. This requires approximately a 15 second
burn. (This value was selected in deference to the problems brought
about by a spacecraft whose thr_sters shoot at itself.) If the velocity
required to achieve orbit is in excess of l0 fps, which would require
an APS burn of one second duration or greater, the procedure is as
before - "Abort Stage" and use the APS.
5. One item requiring some research is to make sure that the spacecraft
computer program (PT1) will provide proper guidance to the APS for a
"small" maneuver following DPS shut down. Another is to confirm that iO
fps is within the APS minimum impulse mode capability.
6. Consideration was given to establishing a special procedure in this
region where the RCS would be used _o insert the staged spacecraft.
However_ there was no advantage apparent to avoiding use Of the APS
unless there is some sort of freezing problem for short burns. In
addition to keeping the procedure simple and standard, this technique
should reduce the demand on RCS propellent and thruster lifetime. As
a matter of _nteres_, the magnitude of the remaining APS and/or RCS
mancuver:_ in the coelliptic rendezvous sequence for an abort at that
t_me are approximately as follows: CSI 35 fps, CDH 100 fps, an_ TPI
30 fps.
* ',' '4..' .'_
.. ".'? . ',,?,ii'
...?. ' ' ."::i'i:'_.
..?._,_ · . ..7. The only other situation i'd like to discuss deais with aborts late
in the descent phase after the DPS !ow level sensor light has come on.
i_aere is a real advantage to be gained if the crew spends no more than
about 60 seconds in that state before aborting since after that time the
D_J will have less than 15 seconds of burn time remaining at full thrust.
This duration would assure getting through "vertical rise" and pitchover
before DPS fuel depletion. After that, it's cutting things pretty close.
However, even then_ it stills seems best to always attempt "Abort" on
the DPS in order to get as much out of _hat engine as possible - if it's
only a cough. The full t_hrust DPS acceleration is over twice t?._t of
the APS and if it:s ever needed it:s therel The only disadvantage occurs
with a more-or-less simultaneous "J£oort" and DPS fuel depletion causing
a delay in "Abort Stage" with no engine on. If the crew has been
watching the fuel gauge, etc., he should never let this situation
arise and special procedures should not be required to handle it.
8. Finally_ I'd like to outline the alternate techniques we established
if fuel depletion DPS is not acceptable. As before, we always recommend
"Abort" rather than "Abort Stage." The modified procedures are based
on providing the equivalent of at least five seconds of DPS burn time
at m_ximum t_hrust as a pad against fuel depletion. This is equivalent
to shut_ing down the engine with about 120 fps DPS remaining. T_ere
are two classes of abort which must be considered:
a. The first is if the abort situation is detected before the low
level sensor light has come on. In this case after "Abortin_ into 1°70,
it is necessary to monitor the inertial velocity in the /)SKY (or the Dk_DR)
at the time the light comes on. If the inertial velocity is less than
5,000 fps, the astronaut should "Abort Stage" 25 seconds after the light
comes on and proceed into orbit on the APS. If the inertial velocity is
greater than 5,000 fps, it is possible to proceed into orbit on the DPS
without fuel depletion occurring. (Note: it is only necessary to monitor
the "thousands" digit to make this decision.)
b. If the abort situation arises after the iow level sensor light
has came on, the crew should "Abort Stag--_J_ediately after the pitchover maneuver following vertical rise. This would occur about l0 seconds
after the "Abort," if the abort is from hover.
_. In summ_ry, if the DPS is still working_ always use the DPS to
initiate the abort and after getting as much as possibl._ from the DPS,
"Abort Stage" if necessary to achieve orbit. This pro%'ides the following
advantages:
a. Avoids shutting down and changing engines at a time critical
point and insures a positive altitude rate before staging. ..
'"': '-'.'
· ., :,_, · .I
4
b. Obtains the maximum delta V available from the DPS.
c. Produces the greatest possible acceleration at the abort time to
get the beck out of there.
d. Makes the procedure standard for all cases - and simple!
_'_ .
Howard W. Tindali, Jr.
Enclosure
'List of Attendees
Addressees:
(See list attached)
PA: h_Tindall, Jr.: js
., .. ,-'-.
,>! · . , . ..,.'.p.. .
·
._',.},'.:'
:'2 · .',
·
' '
.!:.:
::._i:
''
/ .2UNITED STATF._ GOVERNMENT I......
aumemoran
TO : See list below mATE: MAY2 4 1968
68-PA-T-106A
Fao_ : PA/Chief, Apollo Data Priority Coordination
SUBJECT: Spacecraft computer program newsletter
1. I learned some things at MIT last week that seemed interesting
enough to justify this note. Of course, it deals primarily with the
spacecraft computer programs and their influence on the mission
techniques we are developing.
2. Pete Conrad reported that during their KBC I_S simulation, they
have experienced an apparent deficiency in Sundance when making a
docked DPS burn. He says that the DPS engine gimbal angles do not
get changed at all during that low thrust period at the beginning of
the burn which was provided specifically for trimmfng them. MIT
looked into this problem and agreed that for some reason the program
does appear to work - or not work - like Pete says. Their preliminary
guess as to the course of this·is that with low thrust and high inertial
the gimbal trim estimator may be experiencing underflow. That is, the
computer is simply not able to determine that a movement of the trim
gimbal is necessary as it is currently coded. Of course, the RCS jets
are very active both before and after throttle up.
t 3. Our requirements for getting rendezvous radar (HR) data on the down-
_A/ _ C, _ link while the LM is on the 1,m_r surface was discussed again, and I
am afraid I really blew it. MIT has resisted the program change we
requested and I am beginning to think they may very well be right. _t
is, I am not so darn sure any more that the program as currently designed
and coded is not good enough. In any case_ George Che_y now proposes
to look into a very simple change which can be made in the lun_ surface
navigation program (1_22),which would substantially increase the frequency
of RR data on the downlink. All that it amounts to is to remove the delay
after the previous computations before the computer collects another batch
of ER data. Right now this delay is 15 seconds, if we eliminate this
delay and operate P22 in the "no state vector update" mode, the computer
should cycle very fast. George Cherry is going to make an estimate of
what this RR downlink frequency would be as well as evaluating the schedule
impact for this change. I would be surprised if it is not acceptable to
I_C even if it is not perfect - whatever perfect is.
4. As Colossus is currently designed_ the crew is required to press the
"Proceed" button during the period of m_xi_m reentry G's to obtain a,
DSKY display change. A PCR had been submitted to make this procedure
· "::'!
.I.d'automatic. However_ on future consideration, we are not so sure that it
is a good thing to do. _he initial display parameter in P65 are used in
the primary go/no go logic employed by the crew in evaluating the G&N
performance to decide whether to stay on it or to go with the E_ backup.
It is essential that they see these parameters and an automatic "Proceed"
could wipe them out before they have seen and digested them under certain
circumstances. Accordingly, I suspect we should delete our request. The
discussions have revealed, however, that some modification in the coding
will probably be needed to make sure the system will work throughout the
rest of the entry even if the crew does not provide the "Proceed" signal.
5. Here is one more note in the continuing "Stage Verify" story. According to John Norton the l_r ascent program (P12) no longer checks stage
verify. That strikes me as a real improvement in the l_rogram but it
mystifies me as how it go changed without a PCR or PCN, or even letting
anyone know. Norton_ of course, uncovered it by going meticulously through
the program listing.
Howard W. Tin,all, Jr.
Addressees:
(See list attached)
PA:HWTindall, Jr.:is
.i'i ' .' r ......,
i, .L,. ·MAy iiIl_l E_,rl'l_
I '
FffMR (41 C_'I) 101.11.1
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT _ _::_;._ F.::i V =::,_-. ,_ ,
1,4" 'l
IjL.,,
Memorandum ....
TO :Seelistbelow .... t[;_ DATE: :; d_ 2 5 _9[
68-PA-T-137A
FROM : PA/Chief, Apollo Data Priority Coordination
SUBJECT: "D" Rendezvous Mission Techniques Ground Rules, Working Agreements,
and other things
On June 14 we cranked up the "D" Rendezvous Mission Techniques
activities again. It was a grueling profitable day. In fact, we
had such a good time we've scheduled another one for July 12.
Prior to the meeting I distributed a list of working agreements I
thought we had reached previously. The crew presented another list
dealing primarily with the docked LM activation/mini-football period
based on a lot of planning and simulations they have been doing lately.
The major part of the meeting was spent going through these lists. I
have since compiled a new set derived from those - including the
changes, agreements, and comments the discussion brought about. This
list is attached and we can review it July 12. The last section lists
some major discussion items still open. A list of action items is also
attached since they help to paint the picture of our current status,
which I would describe as being typically frantic.
Enclosures 3
Addressees:
(See list attached)
PA:HWTindall,Jr.:is
_5=.-, Buy U.S. Savings BondsRegularlyon thePayroll Savings Plan
· ,i s"i . :
" . : ' ':.t' 'i'
,- .. : , ': , . ,'..' ','. i/
NATIONAL ,_.; ' -='_x :..;..,,.,--,:_., .......,._c A_'.:2 SP,:.Ci AD;"..,_NISTRATiON
;: _._Af';?,,EDSF'ACECR,q.=T. C'--:';.7£R
,: ,?' _OLiS, T3_'4, 7,S.):AS77353
,JUN2 8 1968
- : .:,..::::.:,:: 68-PA-T-136A
THROUGH: NASA Resident Apollo Spacecraft Program Office
Massachusetts Institute of Technology R E C _ ] V _ [:)
Instrumentation Laboratory
Cambridgej Massachusetts 02139 -" JUL Z _6'3
TO : Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Instrumentation Laboratory APOllO DIRECTOR,,
Cambridge, Massachusetts 02139
Attn: D. G. Hoag, Director
Apollo Guidance & Navigation Program
/
FROM : Chief, Apollo Data Priority Coordination
At the June 14 "D" Rendezvous Mission Techniques meeting, I
unofficially (I guess) assigned an action item to your people
who were there. Specifically, we asked for NIT's recommended
procedure for adjusting the W-matrix during rendezvous navigation
in both the T,GC and CI_. As a matter of fact, I understand that
your people intend to discuss this with the "D" flight crew while
they are there the week of June 17. However, I would appreciate
it if you could write down the procedure you recommend in one of
your informal MIT memos for discussion and incorporation into the
mission techniques at our next meeting.
Incidentally, I think there was substantial benefit from having
your people at our last meeting and hope they can come down for
the next one, which is currently scheduled for July 12.
w. ,.Tr. !2' ......
Enclosure ¢_.'_z_s
I
DUEDATE/_(j ._
,.!:. }'.: . .
· . - ...! .? ,': .:. ·
'. .. :(', , :. ·
,,. , . ·: '.' ... ,',_,.'.
· . ....
/,,Jj'MAY I_
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
Memorandum
TO : See list attached DATE: JUL 1 6 1968
68-PA-T-151A
FROM : PA/Chief, Apollo Data Priority Coordination
SUBJECT: Lunar Ascent preparation
1. At the July 3 DTn_r Ascent Mission Techniques meeting we cleaned
up the last of the main open items for the phase of the 1,_n_r landing
mission from IAi touchdown to liftoff. We are now ready to go to press
for that part of the mission and will hold a world-wide review of it
before the end of the month.
2. _st of the discussion was devoted to establishing the CSM timeline
prior to IAiAscent. Much to my surprise, the CSM requires about eight
hours (four orbits) to prepare for I_ Ascent. Involved is all of the
work associated with determining the position of LM with respect to
the CSM orbit and with _king a plane change if it is necessary. Time
required for the LM to get ready is less than two and one-half hours
,mless rendezvous radar tracking is required. In that case, the LM
crew would have to start powering up the PGNCS about three hours before
liftoff, in order to track the co_--_udmodule during its last pass overhead. It is necessary for either the come-nd module to track the LM on
the 1,,_r surface using the sextant or_ if that is not possible, for the
LM to track the commnd module using the rendezvous radar. _e data
thus obtained issued_to_tarot the OSM plane change or the_,M
ks_ In_e timeline that we settled on, the sextant tracking of
the LM would be done three revolutions (approximately six hours) before
Ascent and the CSM plane change_ if it is required, would be performed
one and one-fourth revolutions (approximately two and one-half hours)
before liftoff. If the comm_ud module pilot is ,_ble to track the
LM with the sextant it will be necessary for us to target the comm_nd
module plane ch_uge based on NIEFN tracking and navigation, realizing
that that the resultant CSM orbit w_y be as tach as 0.3° away from
the LM position as a result of PIBFN _ccuracies. It is onl_ in this
event that ?e w_e_quire 'the T,M _ +_k th_ CMM _!tb th_ _n_ v_z_s
ra_r t_ob_._i_ th_ aa--t_a,_"ground-wou3.d__u_e._.t_o determine the out-ofpla-H_ s_eering the I_ shgu_l.dexecute during Ascent. I% is only in
the event 'tha_ the_co_m_nd module is _ble to _track the I_I that both
the come-nd module plane change and LM Ascent out-of-plane steering
would be performed.
3. _e other thing we firmed up was the logic defining when to use
the com_ud module SP_ to make a pre-Ascent plane change vs. yaw steering
_y U.S. Savin_$ _md.r Re_ularl_ ,tn tA. p.._...ll c..,,,s..,. D;.-2
the LM into the co_ud module orbit during Ascent. The rule we established
was that if the LM is less than half a degree out of the CSM orbital plane,
the LM would take care of it during Ascent at an APS propellant cost of
approximately 19 fps. If the plane change required is greater than half
a degree, the comm_nd module would be used. Thus, the minimum SPS burn
would be 50 fps. _e maximum should be no more than 200 fps, depending
on the location of the landing site and the inclination of the plane.
These limits represent burn times between three and thirteen seconds.
ow_ard W. Tindall, _
PA:HWTindall, Jr.: jsI" /
_MR (41 _) _l-tl.I
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
Memorandum
TO : See list attached DATE: JUL 't 0 _96B
68-PA-T-154A
FROM : PA/Chief) Apollo Data Priority Coordination
SUBJECT: "C" Mission Clean Up
We'll try to clean up the rest of the "C" mission open items at a
meeting on Friday) July !9_ in Room 2032B of Building 30. Retrofire
and Reentry will be discussed in the morning_ starting at 9 a.m._ and
Rendezvous in the afternoon - or as soon as we finish the Retrofire
session. Attached are open item lists for each session_ kindly lOreloared
by Stu Davis_ FUD.
ttowardW. Tindall_Jr. OEnclosures 2
PA :HWTindall_ Jr.: js
R_l,_ r]' (' ('._,,*,,;..,e,. 1_o,,,..]. D .... I..1 .... Z.. D ..... 11 0_..: .... WJ1_._DEORBiT AND ENTRY DATA PRIORITY MEETING ITE_B
1. is the entry following an RCS deorbit to be ballistic or guided?
2. Will the EN_ be used for G&N failure occua=z_ingat any time?
3. Is closed loop G&N entry to be the nominal?
4. What are the thrust vector magnitudes and directions for SM - CM RCS
deorbit _V' s?
5. Is a fine align or coarse align sufficient for deorbit?
6. Are crew using ADPC procedures?
7. What are DSKY VG and gimbal angle limits in comparison with ground
maneuver pad?
8. What are 3_ BMAG drifts?
9- What are PIPA bias and gyro drift limits and the compensation procedure?
10. Are the pads current?
ll. What is the new REFSMMAT flag setting procedure?
12. Is the G&N needed for hybrid deorbit?
Enclosure iRENDEZVOUS DATA PRIORITY _ING I_
0pen item_:
1. Trim NCC1 to keep from doing NCC2. Ken Young
2. Rendezvous with SCS if G&N fails anywhere prior to to
ESR. PhilShaffer
3. /% h limits for termiual phase. Ed Lineberry
4. Lighting constraints for TPI hard or is elevation
anglehard? FlightCrew
5- Is 27.45© the elevation angle for TPI? Paul Kramer
6. Are P-52 alignment completion necessary prior to NCCl? FDB and FCSB
7- Are the maneuverpads current? Will Presley
8. Limits on onboard TPI solution comparisons with ground
TPI. EdLineberry
9. Discussion of backup TPI AT burn solutions (duty cycle
problems). DickMoore
10. Are crew using ADPC procedures? Flight Crew
ll. Limit on DSKY VG's agreement with target load_ and limit
on gimbal angles comparision with maneuver pad. MIT
12. Residualreasonablenesslimit G&PB
13. What are allowable BMAG drift and gyro torquing angles. Gary Coen
14. What are crew time requirements for sextant star check,
P-52_P-407 Mosel
15. What are PIPA bias and gyro drift limits and compensationprocedures? GaryCoen
16. Should NC1 and NC2 be externalAV or SCS targeted? Stewart Davis
17. Whatare3_ BMAGDPg-FTS? NR
18. What short burn logic will be programmed for RTCC? Phil Shaffer
19. Any corrections to Techniques Description document.
Enclosure 2 /-_/OFT_IM_ M)MId N_ $0
GSA P_FMR (41 OvN) tO$.l_l //_
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
Memorandum
TO : See list attached DATE: 1 6 1968
68-PA-T-155A
I_OM : PA/Chief, Apollo Data Priority Coordination
sLrBJ_CT: Z_ Descent abortability computation is proposed
Ed Copps of MIT attended one of our mission techniques meeting recently
during which we discussed the use of the LM Descent Prolm]l_ion System
low level sensor light. This is the light, you recall, which comes
on When approximately 30 seconds worth of proDellant is still available
at i_11 thrust or two minutes at 25% thrust. Recognizing that the
astronaut has a complicated job to perform during the terminal part
of descent, Ed Copps is proposing a rather simple new pro_m to be
added to the LM computer to relieve the situation. Rather than the
astronaut trying to keep track Of his status based on altitude,
altitude rate, time since the low level sensor light came on, and
the throttle profile he has executed since that time, this new
program would predict for him the time at which he would no longer
be able to abort. This would be in the form of a five second warning,
during which he mast either cc._._.itto landing or mast get out of
there. _he PONCS would be telling him that if he fails to abort
before that time, it is probable that an abort would not be successful.
This sounds like a good thing to me - perhaps allowing us to get
more out of the systems more than we would otherwise be able to do.
If enough interest can be generated in it, it will probably be added
to the I.nmfn_ry Hopper. _ iV
Howard W. Tindall, Jr.
PA:HWTindall, Jr. :js
Bu'_ U.S. Savin_s Bonds Re_larl? on the P_roll $_vinl_x PI,_nMAY 1,1_ I_*iTl_ _
_PMR (41 c_lqc) 101-1,A_ :_.,
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
Memorandum
ro : See list attached DATE: _- 1 7 1968
68-PA-T-156A
ROM : PA/Chief_ Apollo Data Priority Coordination
;UBiECT: Powered descent throttle logic correction
On July 2 I sent you a note regarding the way the DPS is throttled
up after the gimbal trim phase during the powered descent maneuver.
There were a couple of errors in that memo which are too significant
to be left uncorrected.
I pointed out that MIT has programmed the LM computer so that the
throttle up time was a fixed n_mber of seconds after the targeted
time of ignition (TIG). To illustrate how important it is that the
engine be throttled up to the FTP at that time, I pointed out that
for each second delay in throttling we lose 12 seconds of "hover
time." This was my first error since it is not hover time that is
lost but rather "throttle recovery time." Throttle recovery time
is that period which has been allotted in the powered descent maneuver
for the guidance system to regulate the thrust such that it can achieve
the hi-gate targeting conditions. Failure to provide a sufficient
period of throttling will jeopardize meeting those conditions and can
result in a fouled up descent.
I went on to say that if the engine failed to start when it was supposed
to, the crew could recycle to TIG minus five seconds and the PGNCS would
countdown to ignition again with a delay of about 13 seconds from TIG
(all true) and that the trim time would be reduced by that amount since
the throttle up time was maintained as originally set. George Cherry
informs me that this is not true since in the event of a recycle to
TIG minus five seconds the throttle up time is redesignated. Accordingly, _"..
the recycle capability is really not an acceptable thing to use on the
powered descent maneuver. I do not believe that the program has been
designed improperly. It is just that the capability, as I described it_
does not really exist.
MIT is submitting a PCN describing how the program has actually been
coded since it is different than documented in the GSOP.
_Hb_ard_a_jr .__ '
PA: _indall_ Jr.: js
Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings PlanUNITF. n STATES GOVERNMENT
Memorandum
TO : See list attached DATE: JUL I 8 1968
68-PA -T-159A
FROM : PA/Chief_ Apollo Data Priority Coordination
SUBJECT: No 15 minute constraint for I_n_r Ascent Guidance
The Luminary GSOP indicates that it is necessary for the astronaut
to call up the Ascent Guidance Program (P12) at least 15 minutes
prior to lift off. This, of course, is not consistant with our
desire to be able to use p19 if we get a No Go for ll_r stay [_
approximately l0 minutes after landing. In that case_ we intend _ _
to call up P12 with less than seven minutes to go before lift off. J / _l
By checking with MIT_ we h_ve verified that the 15 minute __%t is _7 /'
not a real constraint and that the only limit is the time required
for the crew to go through the operations associated with PIR_ which
is currently estimated to be less than five minutes. (S_lations
will eventually refine this, probably to a smalqer value.)
I have asked MIT to modify their GSOP (by PCN) to reflect this.
PA:HWTindall, Jr. :is
Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan
_olo.loaG4Pr'I_fqAI. IrOPU4 NO. 10
MAY 1gl2 _rI'IGN
_'_m (dS CAvR) z41-_,.o
UNITEr') STATES GOVF_,_F_,NT
Memorandum
JUL 1 8 I968
TO : Seelistattached DATE:
68-PA-T-160A
_OM : PA/Chief_ Apollo Data Priority Coordination
SUBJECT: The IA{can handle big Descent p_e changes but requires
protection against APS abort fuel depletion
We have recently verified that the IAi has a substantial capability
to translate out of its initial orbital plane during powered Descent
at very little cost. That is, whereas previously a l_mit of 0.3- had
been quoted, it now appears that l- or more is probably possible without effecting the performance of the guidance equations, the landing
radar, the visibility of the crew during l_ding, nor are the _V
costs excessive. This capability gives us more than adequate assurance
that it will not be necessary to perform a plane change trim burn on
D0I day. And that's 8_n important:
In order to take advantage of this capability, however, it appears tha_
something may have to be done to limit the yaw steering the I24would do
in the event of an APS abort during powered Descent. As currently programmed, the PGNCS would attempt to guide the IAi all the way back into
the CSM plane.. If the abort were to occur at "hover" or after touchdown, the APS _V cost could be excessive (i.e._ 1° costs approximately
80 fps and could result in fUel depletion prior to obtaining a safe
orbit). Obviously the thing we mst do is to achieve the targeted inplane conditions in the case of an abort. We can take care of the
plane change after the LM is in orbit, perhaps using the CSM. Therefore,
it seems necessary to make a (hopeflllly) rather small change to the APS
abort program (PT1) which would limit the extent of the out-of-plane
steering. MPAD and MIT people are both in the process of studying this
and we plan to recommend specific action very soon. Something sim_]_r
willbe neededin the AGS too,I suppose.
w/idwardW. Tindall, Jr.
PA:KWTindsll) Jr. :js
Buy U.S. £avin_s Bonds Re_ularl_ an the Payroll Savines PlanC3e'"['lC]f_4_ p_R_4 NG. 10
MAY 111182IDDIT'IQf4
GS.A FPMR (41 _) SOS-$t.e
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
Memorandum
JUL i 8 1968
TO : See list attached DATE'
68-PA-T-161A
FROM : PA/Chief_ Apollo Data Priority Coordination
SUBJECT: LMAscent lift-off time can be determined by the crew
Some months ago we submitted a PCR to remove the pre-Ascent targeting
program (P10) from L_m_nary and this was done. This action was based
on an assumption that a simple crew procedure could be developed for
doing the same job: in the event of loss of co_mications: making
the rather complicated computer program _nnecessary. The L_r:WLisslon
Analysis Branch of _PAD has concluded their development and anakys&z
of this technique and is in the process of documenting it. Zt is
only necessary for the ground to supply two parameters by voice to
the crew prior to D0I which will allow them to independently determine
lift-off time to within about six seconds. This dispersion takes
into account current estimates of I_3FN accuracies: etc. The effect
on the rendezvous differential altitude due to this error is less
than one mile: which is certainly far smaller than other dispersions
which would occur in a non-co ....... mication situation. In other words:
it is more than adequate.
Quite simply the procedure requires that the crew determine the time
of closest approach of the CSM one pass before lift oft by noting
the time rendezvous radar range rate passes through zero on the tape
meter. To that time_ he m_st add the CSM orbital period and another
AT to obtain lift-off time. These are the two parameters included in
the pre-DOI pad message noted above which wi]] be determined by MEC-H
based on the actual CSM orbit.
V Howard W. Tindall, Jr. _ _ '
PA:HWTindall_ Jr.:js
Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan/
MAY l_t
GSa FlaIR (_l C_) IOl-ll.e
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
Memorandum
TO : See list attached DATE: JUL 2 6 196_
68-PA-T-169A
_aOM : PA/Chief, Apollo Data Priority Coordination
SUBJECT: July 9 and July 24 "G" Rendezvous Mission Techniques meetings
1. During the July 9 and July 24 "G" Rendezvous Mission Techniques
meetings we have developed preliminary intra-vehicular rendezvous
navigation sighting schedules. Crew work load estimates currently
in use for the "D" mission rendezvous are included. These tracking
schedules are very important since they have a predominating influence
on al_st everything else. For exampl% from these it has been possible
to develop a preliminary spacecraft attitude time history which shows
some fairly large gaps are going to be present in the CSM PIBFN :elemetry
coverage. This, of course, is due to the fact that the S-band ante_
is on the same side of the spacecraft as the sextant, which _st be pointed
down in order to observe the LM. Of course, during maneuvers occuring,
within sight of the earth, the CSM can be yawed to a heads down attitude .J
enabling S-band telemetry coverage. The rendezvous activities do not
ordinarily interfere with LM telemetry coverage.
2. The Orbital Mission Analysis Branch (0M_B) of MPAD has distributed
a memo (68-F_I62-217_ dated July 15, 1968) which presents the revised
rendezvous profile including the relative motion plots and visibility
and slant range time histories. Some of the most interesting features are:
a. Insertion occurs at approximately 320 n.m. slant range. By CSI
this range wi]_ have decreased to approximately 170 n.m.
b. The LM will appear to the CSM to be less than 8° above the lunar
horizon for the entire first two hours after insertion into orbit. After
tha% it will move below the lunar horizon.
c. There will be two points of sun interference for the sextant
tracking of the LM, one immediately after insertion and another approximately
two hours later_ about 20 minutes before TPI.
3- 0MAB presented the results of a study which shows that it is not possible
to use the same maneuver solutions for I_ maneuver targeting and CSM mirror
image targeting on a lnnar mission as is done on the "D" mission. Accordingly_ if the CSM does not have CSI targeting capability in its computer,
the LM crew will have to sequence through P72 to provide mirror image
u.s. So,a, ,guz,,Oo,,t3,w_y,oZX vt,,,, / g ?2
maneuver targeting to the CSM and then P32 to target its own guidance
systems. If the CSM does have the CSI targeting programs, the IA{ cz_w
will be relieved of this job and will use P32 only. The CSM pilot will
pick it up since the nominal procedure would call for his determination
of the I_ maneuver targets using 1_2, which he would relay to the I_ for
PGNCS solution comparison and AGS targeting. He would then use P32 to
compute his own mirror _w_ge maneuver. It appears that thc 'EPI time used
in the P32 and P72 computations m,y have to be different regardless of
which spacecraft does it. Since the mirror image m_euver is to be
executed with a one minute time delay after planned LM ignition time, it may
also be necessary to change CSI time. ONAB is looking already into this.
4. There was considerable discussion regarding initialization of the
LM PGNCS and CSM Gg_ for rendezvous navigation. As reported previously_
p_latform ali_ments by both vehicles right after inser_tioj_are now
included in the timeline. Upon completion of the CSM platfol'm alignments,
the MCC-H will relay a new LM state vector into the _ based on LGC
telemetry after insertion. Even with this update, it is Anticipated that
the uncertainties in these state vectors will be quite large, making
it necessary to use initial values in the W-w_trix which will not be
suitable for W-matrix reinitialization during the rendezvous sequence.
The Math Physics Branch is looking into that. We ended the meeting by
starting the development of some "G" mission rendezvous ground rules
and working agreements similar to those developed for "D". Those we
agreed to so far are attached.
5. The next meeting will be in September since many key people will be
on leave during August.
_W. Tinda!l,Jr.
Enclosure
PA:HWTindall, Jr. :is
/
:3e"G" MISSION RENDEZVOUS GROUND RUT._ WORKING AG_B
AND THINGS LIKE THAT
1. General
a. The reference trajectory is that provided by MPAD, dated August
15, 1968.
b. Nomenclature for the burn sequence following insertion is:
(1) CST
(2) _'.'
(3)
c. The rendezvous will be run throughout with the vehicle roll angles
0°. The only exception to this is when during maneuvers within sight of the
earth the CSM roll is 180°. ' T_ from above will_'be _tia{ed "heads down" and
TPI from below will be initiated "heads up" for either vehicle.
d. A LM state vector time tagged 12 minutes after insertion will be
uplinked to the CMC within five minutes after insertion. State vectors are not
sent to either vehicle again during the rendezvous phase.
e. _ alignments will be made starting five minutes after insertion by
both spacecraft and take precedence over the state vector update if timeline
and/or attitude conflicts develop.
f. On both spacecraft all rendezvous navigation will be carried out to
update the LM state vector. That is, the LM radar data will be used to update
the LM state vector in the LGC and the CSM sextant and VHF data will be used to
update the I_ state vector in the CMC.
g. The CMC's IA{ state vector will be updated after each IAi maneuver with
the P76 Target AV Program using the pre-burn values as determined in the LM's
pre-thrust program.
h. The state vectors in the AGS will be updated each time PGNCS is confirmed to be acceptable. This will likely be at each time it is c¢,_,_,,_tted
to make the next maneuver using the PGNCS except perhaps TPI.
i. AGC alignments will be made each time the PGNCS is realigned and each
time the state vector in the AGS is updated from the PGNCS.
t37
Enclosure 1P'p,Mm(41cafR) _l-,Le
UNITRr_ STATES GOVERNMENT
Memorandum
TO : See list attached DATE: JUL 3 0
68-PA-T-l?BA
FROM : PA/Chief, Apollo Data Priority Coordination
SUBJECT: Pulse Torquing to Achieve INYJRealignments
This memo is to describe the gyro pulse torque realign capability
being added to the _ Realign Program in L?_miuary and Colossus, Jr.
Most of it is quoted word for word from a memo Steve Copps (MIT)
wrote last February proposing it.
"The purpose of the program is to provide the capability of moving the
stable member from one orientation to another without losing inertial
reference. The actual progrRm change is an addition to the _ Realign
Program (P52). Presently a display comes on showing VO6N22 and the
gimbal angles which will be achieved by coarse aligning the gimbals.
This display is being changed to provide the navigator the option of
achieving the new orientation by coarse aligning o__rby pulse torquing
('enter' achieves one and 'proceed' the other).
"Obviously the most accurate method of realigning the IMJ is to use
star sightings, and if star sightings will be t_ken there is probably
not _ch advantage to pulse torquing. However, if there is some doubt
as to one's ability to acquire and mark on stars, or the inertial
reference accuracy required in the next orientation is less than the
error induced by pulse torquing, then this option h_s great value.
"The time to pulse torque to a new orientation is a consideration, i'ne
_xi_m time to coarse align is 15 seconds. _e time to pulse torque
is _ch longer. Since only one gyro is torqued at a time, the total
changes in angle for each axis is s,_._,edtogether and that total angle
is _ltiplied by 2 (torquing rate is approximately 1/2 degree per
second) to obtain an esti_te of realignment time.
"The induced error is directly proportional to the sum of the angles tha
each gyro is pulse torqued through. An estimate of the error induced is
obtained by m_ltiplying the sum total of change in angle by .002.
"So a single 90° yaw reorientation would take three minutes and would
induce an error of .180 degrees, ibe time to l_lse torque is s!leviated
by the fact that no star sightings are required following the alignment.
.,0.. Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan"It should be noted that during pulse torquing there is no need to ho:
the spacecraft in a fixed orientation since the _ is always in¢ _
However, there is a possibility of pulse torqu_ug the middle gimlx i:
gimbal lock. It was decided to do nothing about this problem and lea'
it to the astror_ut to monitor the FDAZ or N20 and maneuver if re_
The significant point to be made is that the change is being mech_uiz_
as an option in PSR - the _ Realignment Program - and so the contro_
for achieving the new alignment are the same as exist for that progra_
That is, there is no direct way for the crew to tell the system to _,
90° . Of course, he can probably fake it out by targeting an External
_neuver he hAS no intention of m_king - say out-of-plane to get a pre
REFSMMAT and then go into PSR to realign the IMU to an out-of-plane
orientation. This last paragraph is mY co_._;_nt. Don't call Steve if
its nutty - or me either for that matter. ._
Howard W. Tindall, Jr.
PA:HWTindall, Jr. :is· ' _TES GOVERNMENT
randU m
 ched hA'rs: SEP 1 2 19E
68-PA-T-195A
ollo Data Priority Coordination
SUBJECT: G Rendezvous
In spite of the feverish activity we have on three swinging missions
C, C', and D, a few of us found a couple of minutes to spend on the
G Rendezvous. Some things came out of it that are probably worth
reporting:
1. As you know, on the D mission during a LM active rendezvous
the co-._nd module _rill be targeted with mlvTor _mRge maneuvers to
backup the LM for CSI and CDH. These mirror image w_euvers are
identical in magnitude but opposite in direction, since it h_s been
found that the small ez'zors resulting are a reasonable price for the
simplicity we obtain in the operation. Unfortunately_ when operatin 8
around the moon it's apparently not possible to use identical _V
components for CSN m_wror i_ge targeting. This means that it wd11
probably be necessary for the crew to first cycle through the CSI/CDH
targeting program for the other spacecraft (PT0 series progrAm_) and
then run through the targeting for their own spacecraft (P30 series
programs ).
2. For the D mission itowaS decided that a single TPI elevation
angle could be adopted (27.5) for all rendezvous situations. _hat i
either spacecraft coming in from either above or below. Unfor_te_
the lunar rendezvous geometry prevents us from adopting this operatio:
simplification and we __st use different values of elevation angle de;
lng on whether the approach is from above or b_low. Tae values we h_
selected (based on Jerry Bell's work) are 26.6_ for the approach from
below and 28.3 ° for the approach from above. The basic difference be
these values is the phase angle between the two vehicles at TPI_ whicl
l_]r_r orbit is retch gr_:ater than around the earth for the same separa
distan2e. The primary reason for having to use different w lues is t_
keep the TPT maneuver along the line-of-sight. Another rea._on is to ]
component maneuver execution time for the two vehicles the _ame excep
for differences in their navigation.
If you have any co_.,._ntsor questions about any of this, om' next get
together on the lm]n_r rendezvous is currently scheduled for 9 a.m. on
September 18, 1968.
?_ Howard W. Tindali; Jr.
PA:H_indall_Jr.:js
/
/a._J. rP_R 6ct ¢s_) Iol-_t.e
UNITE.D STATES GOVEP,_N!vlE_Tr
TO : See list below DAT_: September 2°, 1968
68-1_,_-T-201
FROM : FM/Deputy Chief
SUB.TSCT: Results of September 17 Apollo Spacecraft Software Configuration
Control Board (ASSCCB) meetiog
The first t_ee hours of this marathon meeting were devoted to implementation of the descent program in LUL,5lt_RY. The currently approved
plan is to imDlement the one-phase descent scheme proposed bltFlos,-d
Bennett and his merry crew. However_ MIT has been directed to implement
it in such a way that it _:ould be possible to fly the old t_:o-phase
technique - if desired. Almost all effort is to be devoted 'cothe
one-phase technique with only one day's ,,;orthof testing included
for the t;:o-phase - and no desig_ improvements are to be developed
or included i_uthe two-phase. What this really means is t_a'_at the
cost of one day's worth of testing we _ve provided some cheap insurance for being able to change back latez- if we have to. If the decision
were made to use o_e t_o _,_,oe_ a considerable amou_t cf additional
testing would be required and at that tim_ preg?am deficienciesmight be
uncovered revealing that that capability does not really exist.
Several things that interested me about the l_e_.ene-t_hase : are.:
1. 5/acdecision of which way to go - one or two-phase is _r,ade
pre-flight and an opticn flag is set in era.,_iblememory before la_unch.
2. The much smoother attitude time history of the one-phase sche:_e
rm_y ve_*_'well p_rmit the DPS trim gimbal to do all the steering _ substantially reducing RCS usage.
3. MIT is providing a crew option via the DSK_ fo.-_ manually changing
from P63 to p6h _n the event they _,_nt to do that earlier than the automarie switch.
4. HigJ:-gate is now being deli'ned as the time at which the ia.ud_ng
radar position is changed.
.x__PA])has submitted a Prog_ram Cb.ange Request (_JR 249) to e!i.__inate a
lock-out of the landing radar dai_ above 35_000 feet (est:'_;'_teda!tituda).
Tb_s was a two ioart cha_nge since i'Lis necessa:o' to fi_:a pro,o_'amto
allo_,.. _ ±.hedata to be read and also necessary to change ti_e:.;eig!-tlr:_!;
function such t_st data above Bi,gOO feel. is _let _:l-.-_:n a zero. ir..fl.na_ceon the state vector. Since the proposed change was estimated to cost
three days schedule impact_ Floyd Bennett was requested to rewrite his
PCR to simplify the requirement _hile achieving the same end results.
Essentially, it amomlted to replacing the 35,000 foot boundary with a
50,000 foot boundary. In addition, it is necessary that I verify that
the rendezvous radar powered flight desigr_te routine (R29) can be
elin_nated as a requirement and thus be made m_callable from the descent
programs. Subsequent to the meeting I did that and have infozuued FSD.
Guidance and Control Division brought in two PCR's (Nos. 224 and 248)
which influence the processing of the landing radar data. One changed
the reasonability tests and the other provided a delay in utilizing
landing radar data for four seconds after the LGC receives a "data
good" discrete because it takes that long for the landing radar output
to converge on the true value after lock-on. Both were approved at a
cost of one day each.
MIT was requested to determine the impact of changing the descent program
such that it would be possible for the crew to con_and all four RCS jets
in the minus X direction immediately upon touchdo_m in order to smoosh
the LM into the lunar surface and keep it from turning over while the
DPS belches to a stop. Ain't tb_t the da.mnest thing _u ever heard?
Flight Crew Supiort Division presented a proposal to modify COI_DSSUS II
to pe_._it the crew to manually steer the 5%I burn in the event of a
SI'_B IU failure. No action will be taken on this until the technique
is approved by }._r.Low' s CC}3.
A really ancient P_R, No. 132, submitted by the crew to provide a \q_'
ranging data good discrete light, was f_nally disapproved since the
spacecraft wi]_l not be modified to provide the additional DS,KY_ lights
which would have been used for this.
Tom Gibson presented their proposal, _hich was approved, for the £o].!n_.:-
on spacecraft programs. A so-called COLOSSUS I Mod A will be prepared_
which is basically the COLOSSUS I program with aL1 kaboom anomalies
corrected plus the following three simple program improvements:
1. I_3 pulse torquing
2. Backup integration
3- An improvement on the mark incorporation,
It is planned that a tape release of this program will occur' on December
l, at which time mission operations testing (Level 6) can be started
along with rope manu_facture. This program _ill be used for the D _is._ion.A COLOSSUS II program is'also now being developed which starts from the
COLOSSUS t Mod A baseline to which CSI/CDH will be added. I suppose it
will also include anomalies uncovered too late for the Mod A version.
FLI_T'sestimate of tape release for this program is February l_ 1969.
It is felt that this program can probably be made ready for Spacecraft
106 - that is_ the flight after D_ _hatever that is. _HF ranging_
incidentally_ should also be available on spacecraft 106.
Howard _4. Tindall_ Jr.
Addressees:
FM/J. P. Mayer
C. R. Huss
D. H. Owen
FM13/R. P. Patten
J. R. Gurley
E. D. Murrah"
M. Collins
}_44/P. T. Pixley
R, T. Savely
FMS/R. E. F_null
FI45/H. D. Beck
FM6/R. R. Regelbrugge
K. A. Young
_w_47/S.P. _unn
R. O. Nobles
FM/Branch Chiefs
_J/Hcuston/R. J. Boudreau
_IIT/iL/M. W. Johnston
F14:t_Tindall, Jr. :js-?
cPIr'IICliA_ INOE_MNO. I0
cu_PPM(mdaR)m-lu
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
Memorandum
TO :Seelistattached DATE:September23, 1968
68-PA-T-202A
FROM :PA/Chief, Apollo Data Priority Coordination
SUBJECT: G Rendezvous Mission Techniques
If you can stand it, I would like to ,n_ounce another change in the G
mission 1,,r_r rendezvous timeline. In order to provide more tracking
which will hopefully improve CSI targeting and to avoid bothersome
real time variations of time between CSI and CDH which foul up the
plane change scheduling, we propose:
a. Move CSI five minutes later - to 55 minutes after insertion
which is nominal apogee. This is prtm_wily to avoid a rather large
radial AV at CDH.
b. Always schedule CDH one half a revolution (180°) after CSI.
c. Schedule plane changes 30 minutes prior to ODH and at ODH,
as before. The I_lshould use the Z-axis RCS LM thrusts for the CDH
maneuver (by yawing if necessary) to avoid losing ER acquisition.
d. The I_fmay include a plane ch-_ge at CSI if the CSM has
adequate sextant tracking for targeting it. Rendezvous radar only is
not considered adequate.
The new timeline looks like this:
55 ,_aa_ea. 27 30 33
0 §e 145
CszKqec)P.O. & P.O.
The only disadvantage we cui_z_ntly see is that it reduces the time between
CDH and TPI to about 33 minutes. However, 33 min,_tes Should be adequate
even with dispersions end the advantages of a relatively fixed maneuver
schedule and better navigation before CSI seem well worth it. It shouldi_
be noted that a (hopei_l!y small) change in the CSI targeting programs
(P32 and PT2) would be required to force the computer to use the i80_
spacing between CSI and CDH. This can be done in either of two ways. Our
preference would be to provide the crew control probably by modifying the
second P32 DSKY display format to utilize the third register which is
currently blank as option code. [The other two displays in this format
are apsidal crossing (N) and TPI elevation angle (E).] The simplier but
£
Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on th_ Payroll Savings Plan /,_less flexible way of doing this job is to increase the magnitude of the
parameter cux_ently stored in fixed memo r_ which is used in the CSI
test, which forces the logic to use a 180 transfer when the lmre-OSI
orbit is found to be essentially eircul-_ and apsidal crossings become
il_-defined. Ed Linebez_zy will submit a PCR for this.
Several action items came out of our meeting as follows:
a. MPAD - It is necessary to develop a rule governing the use of the
VHF data in the event no sextant data is being obtained. It is our understanding that VEF data by itself is not only inadequate, but could actually
degrade the processing. If this is so, we need to establish procedures
whereby the crew i_hibits VHF into the OMC when sextant data is not available.
b. MPAD - It is our proposal that the CSM be the prime source of
targeting the plane change maneuver regardless of which spacecraft
executes it. This is because the sextant is potentially more accurate
than the rendezvous raa_ for this partic-lAr purloose. Here again a
rule is needed to define how -.,ch sextant data is needed to target the
plane change maneuver as opposed to using the rendezvous radar solution.
c. MPAD - We came to the conclusion at the last meeting th-t it was
not possible to use the same maneuver solution for CSM mirror _-_ge
targeting as the IAiuses for burn execution. This meant the crew would
have to cycle through two programs rather than just one. On further
thought, it seems as though we can aVOid this extra complexity, which
is really rather serious. I am sure we c_n for the ODE burn and it
seems probable that something can be done for the 0SI burn too, particularly since it's constrained to be horizontal. Accordingly, we have
requested 0MAB to re-e_-m_ne this procem,_e to see if we can't clean
it up. We must also determine whether one minute delay in the mi_zor
image targeting is really a requirement since these are RCS burns and
problems at TIG don't appear to be too l_Wely.
d. ASPO - Milt Contella repeated a x,,w_r that the rendezvous radar
_ay have random error in the shaft angle measurement when the line-of-
.,_ightfrom IAi to CSM is close to the lunar surface. We must find out what
the true situation is as quickly as possible and start figuring out some
workaround procedure to be added to all the other ones.
Odds and Ends
We are assuming that the CSM will backup the IAiCSI and CDH maneuvers
using the SPS; it is probable, however, as on the D mission, that it
will backup TPI with RCS. We have also concluded that the CSM shouldJ
3
not backup the plane change since that requires yawing out-of-plane and
disrupts tracking between CSI and ODH. Of course, if it is known that
the I24will not be able to perform the plane change maneuver, the CSM
will do it at that t_me. If the I_4and CSM both fail to perform the
plane change 30 minutes before CD;;, the CDH plane change will force the
node near TPI and so in that event the plane change will be taken out
during the TPI burn targeted with R-36 to force a new node 90° after
TPI time. This, of course, is a departure from the nominal _PI plan
which calls for forcing the node at intercept (TPF).
That'sit: ___Howard W. Tindsll_ jr.
PA:HWTindall, Jr. :js_ _.:_._ C4-TJOqd_I'OJWdNO. I0
GSA f'PMm (41 CPR) 101°lS.I
UNITED STATES GOV_NME.,NT
Memorandum
TO : See list attached DAR' September 26, 19(
68-PA-T-208_
FROM : PA/Chief, Apollo Data Priority Coordination
SUBJECT: Unusual procedure required for LM Ascent from the moon
Jack Craven surprised us with a little jewel the other day during the
Lunar Surface Mission Techniques meeting. He says that in order to
enable the APS engine-on and staging co_m_uds from the LGC, it is
necessary for the crew to depress (now get this) the Abort-Stage
button: That is, depressing this button m_st be part of the standard
countdown procedure to LM liftoff.
Alternately the crew can manually arm the engine which permits them
to send the engine-on comm_ud manually, but it does not enable the LGC
signal. Furthermore, if they do this, it is necessary for the crew
to also send the engine-cutoff signal manually since the signal from
theLGCisinhibited.
Ho indall Jr.
PA:tt_indall, Jr. :is
..... Buy U.S. £aving._ Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings PlanFORM _ 10
MAY IM2 I_DrTl_
GSA F_M. (41 c_) lOl-..I
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
Memorandum
TO : See listattached DATE' October2, 1968
68-PA-T-213A
FROM : PA/Chief, Apollo Data Priority Coordination
SUBJECT: [a_ar orbit revolution counter for C t
This may seem like a trivial matter - however, before any confusion
arises let's fix_mly establish the means of identifying revolutions in
lunar orbit by l_l_m_er. Specifically, _uless there's some good reason
for choosing another way:
1. Revolutions will be started and ended at 180 ° lunar longitude,
i.e._ on the back of the moon near the point of lurer orbit insertion
(LOI). As I _derstand it) the RTCC is programmed this way.
2. The first revolution in ll_r orbit shall be, appropriately_
called number one (1). It starts at L0I (1) and ends approximately
two hours later as the CSM passes over 180 v longitude.
Howard W. Tindall_ Jr.
PA:HWTinda11) Jr. :is
,_7_ Buy U.S. Saving r Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan /_I OPTiC_tdI&. _ INO.W
MAY IlMZ I_iTIM4 ':_
G_,I,_qd¢R_cpx)_-,i.s
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
Memorandum
TO :See list attached DATE: October 7, 1968
68-PA-T-215A
FaOM : PA/Chief, Apollo Data Priority Coordination
SUBIECT: Cis-!-n_r spacecraft navigation for C'
We are still thrashing around trying to figure out what to do with regard
to cis-ln_r spacecraft navigation for the C' m_ssion. It is not clear
whether a couple of things are really necessary or not. If we could get
rid of them, it would simplify things. Unfortunately, we aren't confident
it is safe to delete them at this tim% so they are still included.
Specifically, I nm speaking of:
a. Conditioning and preserving the W-matrix
b. Naking star/lan_w_k (both earth and 3-_sr) observations as
opposed to relying completely upon star/horizon measurements.
I think we have chosen the technique requiring the least diddling around
by the crew which preserves the W-matrix. It is based on the following
decis ions:
a. The MSFN state vector will always be used for maneuver execution.
b. The MSFN state vector will always be used to reinitialize the
onboard navigation state vector. _aat is, we don't intend to preserve
the onboard computed value when new data comes from the ground.
c. The ground will only update the OMC CSM state vectors by uplinks
then into the I/_ state vector memory locations. (This applies for all
M_C's - transl,?_w and transearth - except for the final one at ET minus
two hours. In that case, the ground will send the ground state vector
to the co_,.w_ndmodule slots.)
It will be the stana_vd procedure to send state vectors for whatever the
spacecraft needs them (pri-_ily I_C ,mneuver execution) into the LM state
vector _ memory locations since this does not effect the W-mtrix. When
preparing for a maneuver, the crew will transfer these MSFN state vectors
into the co,._,_ndmodule state vector slots by use of programs provided
specifically for that purpose. This, of course_ will wipe out any state
vectors that have been computed using the onboard navigation and subsequent
navigation will use these state vectors transmitted from the ground as a new
starting point. As the crew executes the maneuver, the guidance system will_
of course, measure the maneuver and add it to the state vectors providing
the best source following the maneuver. The crew should then transfer _hese
i Buy U.S. Savings Bands Regularly an the Payroll Savin_s Plan /'f
new updated CSM state vectors back into the LK slots prior to any additional
onboard navigation in order to preserve them in case of co,,-,.,_cation failure,
whatever that is. Note that a small change is being ,_de in the M_C-H/RTCC
to permit automatically generat_g a co,,_nd message to uplink the CSM
state vectors into the O_C memory locations used for the I_ state vectors.
Someone came up with a clever idea for comparing state vectors onboard
the spacecraft. By cal!_ng up a rendezvous display of range and range
rate between the I_ and the co-._._ndmodule, they are about to see the displacement and velocity of the state vectors - that is, the MSFN versus the
onboard values. How the capability should be used is not at all clear.
Something else csme up at the meeting that was rather startling and may
have major impact. Namely, it may be impossible to do effective transearth
navigation on a re,tuberof days in the current C' launch window. Apparently
on the later days of the la,_ch window, the sun, when viewed from the
spacecraft may be too close to the earth horizon and star/horizon observations by the sextant may be impossible to obtain for a substantial part of
the transearth coast. MIT, MPAD; and GOD are in the process of establishing
what days in the launch window are effected, based on the various systems
constraints. Once this situation has been clarified, it may be necessary
to make a decision as to whether it is acceptable to launch the C' mission
on a day when transearth navigation capability onboard the spacecraft does
not really exist. How does that grab you, "Co_,_-.,_cation Loss" fans?
PA:HWTindall, Jr. :is
/y-a.,' r
OI_fZON_M_ FOP_M NO. IO
.AY lm _mo.
FPMR (41 cam) Im-l_.6
UNITED STATES GOVER_NA{ENT
Memorandum
TO :See list attached DATE: October 15, 1968
68-PA-T-219A
FROM :PA/Chief, Apollo Data Priority Coordination
SUBJECT:Lunar Rendezvous Mission Techniques
A number of people who know about the rendezvous radar (Myron Kayton,
Richard Broderick, etc.) came to our little Lunar Rendezvous Mission
Techniques meeting October 2 and assuaged our anxieties regarding the
possibility of poor shaft angle measurements when the line-of-sight to
the com_nd module passes close to the l_n_r horizon. According to the
data they presented_ the error introduced by multi-path in the rendezvous
radar data is essentially lost in the noise for elevation angles above
l0° from the horizon. (During the nominal lunar rendezvous tracking
begins at approximately l0w elevation and approaches 20_ at CSI. )
Ed Lineberry's people have made sufficient runs to show that it is
possible to use the same CSI targeting data computed in the CMC for _7!
LM maneuver solution comparison (properly biased) and for CSM mirror _ _-
image maneuver targeting. We are currently recommending that the CMP
use P32 rather than P72 since this would avoid the necessity of going
through two pre-thrust program_.
One of the most significant things coming from the meeting, I think, was
a report by the Nath Physics Branch people to the effect that the rendezvous
radar data is not expected to be of sufficient accuracy to target plane
change maneuvers prior to terminal phase. The estimated errors are simply
too great (e.g., ll i_ps,one sigma). Accordingly_ all plane change targeting prior to terminal phase mnst come from the CSM which can do an excellent
job given as little as l0 minutes worth of sextant tracking (0..5fps, one
sigma). This does introduce sort of a problem since the technique for determining the w_gnitude of the plane change maneuver is to input the time of
interest into the R36 routi ne. Unfortunately, if we put in the time of the
LM maneuver_ the solution would apply to the out-of-plane the comm_nd module
should make at a s_ntially d_rent puce in _orbit. oFOr example, at
CSI the com_ud module is leading the LM by as much as 1_2.. Of course,
the CMP could go through some "mickey mouse" to bias this timeas a Function
of this phase angle based on some charts or something. However_ he is
already pretty well bogged down with other work and so we are going to put
in a program change request for COLOSSUS II giving us a solution based on
the LM state vectors rather than the CSM state vectors somewhat as the 70
series programs compliment the 30 series.
,,o.,,, Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan /_-_jack Wright_ TEW_ had an interesting idea regarding the technique for checking the validity of the VHF ranEe data. it is his impression that the
rendezvous radar re,ge an_ range rate measurements are essentially independent of one another, in effect providing two data sources for comparison with
the VHF. Agreement of either of these with the VHF would provide confidence
in its use. The cr_L_lisplay of raw VEF data is not really accessible to
the CN1° in the lower equipment _y and, of course_ does not provide range
rate at all. Therefore_ the comparison _st be against the DSKY display
of range and range rate based on the n_vi_ated state vectors which include
the sextant observations.. It seems to us_ in lieu of real data that this
%_ _is probably a valid test of the VHF since it probably overwhelms the
_sextant data in the determination of navigatedrange and range rate. I
would like to emphasize that this is a proposal requiring verification
and may prove to be not useable. However_ I thought it interesting enough
to pass on to you.
PA:HWTindsll _ Jr. :isMAy Iml_ I_lT'llaN
_,.41(4=c_) m-...
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
Memorandum
O : See list attached DATE: October 17, t968
68-PA-T-220A
ROM : PA/Chief, Apollo Data Priority Coordination
_JECT: Transearth Spacecraft Navigation
During Jim McPherson's Transearth Spacecraft Navigation Mission
Techniques meeting of October 8 and 15, a potpourri of ground rules,
working agreements and constraints was established. I my be duplicating other reports with this memo but figure better too many reports
than not enough. All of the following apply specifically to the first
batch of sextant sightings - star/lurer horizon - after TEI on the way
back to earth. 1/anymay also apply to later navigation observations,
but I won't attempt to identify them here.
a. Prior to initiation of transearth onboard spacecraft navigation,
the pre-TEI _FN state vector navigated through TMT will be stored in
the Ct4CI_4slots and will be used to initialize the navigation. That
is, no new state vector will be uplinked.
b. Navigation using star/lunar horizon observations give approximtely the same accuracy as star/l_n_r landmarks - at least as far as
hitting the entry corridor is concerned. Accordingly for purposes of
mission simplifications - both p_e-flight preparation and real time
operation - all star/1-n_r landm_wk observational exercises will be
l
deletedfroml_r_r missionsstartingwithC'. o
c. This exercise is to start at TMT + l½ hours.
d. Altitude, which is not a constraint, should initially be about
6,000 n_utical miles.
e. Stars of 2.3 magnitude or brighter are required for l,_n_robservations.
f. Due to the required spacecraft attitude, the hi-gain ante_n_ will
probably be out-of-lock. _nerefore, low bit rate telemetry will probably
be used to transmit the data in real time. If so, marks must be made no
more frequently than one for each l0 seconds - procedures are required to
assure proper downlink antenn_ is selected.
g. After completion of this exercise, the crew will obtain sextant
photographs of the lunar horizon - to see what the horizon looks like
at altitudes of 10,O00 to 20,000 nautical miles - not to determine its
location.
Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan /__C"............... . ............ -M
P
2
h. The W-matrix will be initialized to 3,300 feet and 3.3 fps. If
possible, they will be initialized at TEI and propogated from there. These
are the same values to be used after TT,Tand included in the E memory load.
i. MPAD and MIT will establish the AR) Av threshold the crew should
use for data selections - hopefully) it will be simple but perhaps must
be a function of geometry and time in the mission. (_ae data is on the
downlink regardless of whether the crew accepts the update or not. ) It
should be noted that no good s_:l_tion facility will ever be available
to provide the crew any pre-flight judgment. Although the V83 rendezvous
RR display gives relation of pre-navigation versus navigated state vectors,
this kind of activity shall not be a part of the decision logic. If
someone comes in with a good, useful proposal, this will be reconsidered.
j. A P52 align shall be performed immediately prior to this exercise.
k. The sextant calibration shall be repeated until agreement of at
least two checks (not necessarily sequential ones) are within .006°
before "preceeding."
1. Sextant calibrations will be performed every one-half hour.
m. The CMC clock shall be updated by the _C-H whenever in "error"
by more than .040 seconds.
Howard W. Tindall, Jr.
PA:HWTindall_ Jr. :js._ _ CP'FJGNd_. M NQ. I$
M6.V l_ IEDITZ_e4
GSA _MR (41 aw) Iol4t,.s
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
Memorandum
TO : See listattached DATE:October16,1968
68-PA-T-222A
FROM : PA/Chief, Apollo Data Priority Coordination
SUBJECT: C' maneuvers - SPS versus RCS crossover
Neil To,_nsend (EP2) informed me by phone - and will supply written
confirmation - that the mini_]m duration SPS burn for C' should be
no less than 0.5 seconds. We had been ass,_m_ng something smaller.
According to MPAD (Otis Graf, FMT) this m_kes the crossover point
between use of the RCS versus the SPS engine:
Translunar midcourse correction - 5 fps
Transearth midcourse correction - 12 fps
These values will be explained completely in an FM7 memo soon to be
distributed. I just want everybody to be aware of the new values and
to start using them in his planning.
Howard W. _ndall, Jr.
PA:_indall_ fir. :is
...... Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan /.3'_OE_I'ICI_AI. lwOl_4 NO. 10
MAY $Wl2[DfT1G_I
' UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
Memorandum
TO :See list attached DATE: October 16, 1968
68-PA-T-224A
FROM : PA/Chief, Apollo Data Priority Coordination
ST._CT: C' Earth Orbit and TT,TMission Techniques Open Items
It appears we have the Earth Orbit and T[,TMission Techniques for the
C' pretty well under control. The only two significant open items that
I know of deal with the optics check and the crew procedures for protecting against an SIVB engine cutoff failure during TLI.
The problem with the optics check is that no one has really established
what they are trying to accomplish by doing it. _IY own personal opinion,
of course, is that it is not really necessary. That is, we will be willing
to do TLI with the optics busted, whatever that means, since we should be
able to align the platform using the COAS good enough to perform the
return to earth maneuver. Although, I guess, we really haven't proven
that to everyone's satisfaction yet.
How the crew should backup the $IVB IU engine cutoff signal has been a
sticky wicket (I believe that is the expression). I think we have now
gotten through the emotional phase of this one and have zeroed in on two
possible techniques, both of which seem pretty good. T_e one I personally
favor was proposed by Charley Parker. Its merits are simplicity and the
fact that it gives the IU the greatest chance to perform its job, if it is
going to. Basically, no crew action would be taken until after an elapsed
burn time is equal to that expected from a 3 sigma low perform_ug engine.
This would be like l0 seconds past the nominal burn duration. At that
time, the crew would manually shut the engine down as soon as the GNCS
indicated the targeted inertial velocity has been achieved as readout from
their DSKY display. Of course, if we really have had an IU failure, the
GNCS would indicate that we have already exceeded that velocity at that
time and so the crew would take _mmediate action by turning the abort
handle to shut down the engine and return it to its neutral position to
avoid automatic separation of the spacecraft from the SIVB. (Note that
the _ _V counter plays no role in this procedure.) In the event the
IU has truly failed to send the cutoff com_ud when everything else is
perfectly normal, this procedure would result in an overspeed of about
500 or 600 fps which would require a 2,000 to 5,000 fps return-to-nominal
midcourse maneuver three hours after TLI. This does not preclude going
into lunar orbit.
The alternate proposal is precisely the same as that, except than an additional period permitting manual crew engine cutoff is included - namely,
...... Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan /J_that period containing all burn durations possible with a 3 sig,_ performing
engine. This would be a 20 second period centered about the nomiual cutoff
time. During this period_ the crew would send a manual engine off comm_nd
if both the GNCS and the EMS AV counter indicated the desired cutoff velocity had been achieved.
Studies are continuing on both these techniques and a crew preference will
also be obtained hopefully leading to resolution within the next couple of
weeks. Since there is no crew si,_lation facility capable of faithfully
simulating the _T,T maneuver_ it will not be possible to base the decision
on experience gained in that way.
PA:HWTindall, Jr. :js
is?· - C4_TTCIqU__1_4 NO. 10 4P
GSA KPMR (41 _fR) IOl-ll.(;
, UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
Memorandum
TO : See list attached DATE: October 16, 1968
68-FM-T-225
FROM : F_Deputy Chief
SUBJECT: Results of the October 8 Apollo Spacecraft Software Configuration
Control Board (ASSCCB) meeting
In this memo I will briefly describe some of the highlights of the
subject meeting:
1. There was a long discussion regarding the effects of CDU transients on AGS alignments while on the lunar surface. It appears there
are some fairly simple procedures for making sure ,_n_cceptable errors
are not introduced into the system. A matter that was not discussed
was wbmt sort of problems we can have in the AGS alignment while om
coasting flight where spacecraft attitude changes make checking very
difficult. We will have to pursue these matters in the mission
technzques development.
2. There were four PCR's approved that I would like to call your
attention to. They are:
a. PCR 546 (LUMINARY): Delete V50N25 display in P68. Crew must
insure a stable I_ before "proceed" response to V06N43. The V50N25 display is not necessary. Attitude storage can be done after crew response
to previous V06N_3.
b. PCR 547 (INYMINA!qY): Delete V37N57 display at end of P68 and add
"Do final automatic request terminate routine (RO0)." Chapter 4 incorrectly
shows P68 terminating with V37N57.
^ c. PCR_551 (_Y): Reduce normal m_xin_m com_uded rate from
20_/sec. to 14_/sec. since m_xi_m comm_nded rate of ACA normal scaling is
too high for manual lunar landing. Reduce normal and fine scaling by a
factor of 7 for the CSM-docked case since normal and fine scaling of ACA
are too high for m_uual 1,,_r landing.
d. PCR 552 (COLOSSUS): Add 1>22ass,_mption to read as follows: The
first _ rk obtained by this program cannot be the landing site Coding in
1>22cam-ot accept landfng site as first mark.
l·_..... Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payrod Savings Plan /_0 d_2
3- Since all of DPS guided burns on the currently planned missions
terminate at 40% thrust or less, it was decided to place the DPS tailoff
for 40_ in memory rather than full thrust.
4. MIT requested that we approve a change (PCR 494), which would put
the LGC value of landing site location (ELS) on the ascent and descent
downlink format. I am not sure why they want this unless it is for systems A/!,J
testing purposes. Note: We have no capability of reading it out in the _
control center in real time right now. _ _/ _ _-_
5. PCR 250 to put SPS mass flow rate (M DOT) into erasible memory of
COLOSSUS lA was approved.
6. PCR 245 to permit use of planets in F23 and R53 was approved for
COLOSSUS II but will not be in COLOSSUS lA.
7. Just so there is no misunderstanding on this, MIT has been directed
to delete the rendezvous radar acquisition routine (R29) from the LGC
descent program (P63) completely.
Howard W. Tindall, Jr.
FM:HWTindall, Jr. :js
/zzOP'IIOI4A/. _ bm. I0
_R (_ _) IOt-I_ '
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
Memorandum
TO : See list attached DATE: October 21, 1968
68-PA-T-226A
FROM : PA/Chief, Apollo Data Priority Coordination
strsJZCT: Descent Aborts
We have finally started mission techniques meetings on lnr_r landing
descent aborts. At the risk of losing whatever confidence you might
have in m_ judgment, I would like to describe a technique we are probably
going to propose for aborts early in the descent phase. That is, within
about 25 seconds of c0mm_uding the DImS to full thrust. It is a technique
that Joe D. Payne and Floyd Bennett have been suggesting for quite a while,
but which most of the rest of us had been unwilliug to accept.
First of all, I don't think anyone will argue about what should be done
between initialization of powered descent and DImS throttle up after the
trim gimbal period (currently set for 26 seconds). The _V acquired
during that period only drops the apogee down to about _ miles so the
best thing to do is probably just shut off the engine and sit tight.
That is, no _mm_diate abort maneuvers are required ,,_less it is necessary
to get away from a hazardous DPS stage.
After going to full throttle, though, there is a short period (roughly
25 seconds) during which aborts become a little difficult to handle.
In this region the trajectory rapidly becomes suborbital, _king an i_diate
abort maneuver necessary to achieve a safe orbit. The problem is that the
spacecraft is oriented retrograde to perform the descent maneuver, which
is exactly opposite to the direction required to get back into orbit. This
causes the problem. Namely, if we want to abort on the DPS, you have a
choice of:
a. Either turning off the engine, _eorienting the spacecraft about
180 °, and reigniting the DPS to _ke a posigrade burn into orbit - and
no one wants to turn off the engine.' or
b. Leave the DPS engine on as the spacecraft is being reoriented.
Unfor_r_tely, in order to avoid gimbal lock this attitude maneuver _,st
be made in the pitch direction and leaving the engine on causes us to
acquire a large radial velocity during the attitude maneuver which mst be
removed. To do this the spacecraft would go through a pretty wild pitch
profile rotating almost a complete revolution from the time of abort to
the time of engine shutdown. The reason for this is that attitude change
is made at a rate of only l0 degrees a second, which mesns the engine would
thrust with a component in the radial direction for a long time. As you can
Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payrall Savings Plan //22
imagine, there are also considerable problems in the guidance equations,
which would cause the engine to be shutdown prematurely under certain
circ,,m_tances.
Abort Staging with the APS is not _ch better since it was felt necessary
to provide an immediate separation maneuver (currently coded to be three
seconds or 30 fps) to get away from the DPS before reorienting to posigrade
attitude. And, you can't leave it _,n_ing for the same reasons as the DPS.
So you see, even for an APS abort, we end up turning the engine on, then
off, and then back on, which we don't want to do.
Let me point out that after about 25 seconds at full throttle, the horizontal velocity required to get back into orbit when combined with the
radial velocity picked up during the attitude change res,_lts in a guidance
and attitude control situation considered acceptable. That is, it is not
necessary to turn off the engine during the pitch over to posigrade attitude. So our only concern is with aborts during the first 25 seconds after
throttle up, when it is neither acceptable to leave the engine on nor to
turn it off for fear that it won't start again.
Standby for Payne' s solution:
It is proposed that in the event of an abort recognized in that troublesome period to continue operating the DPS in the retrograde direction
until we have reached the time it is possible to make the attitude change !
to the posigrade direction without turning off the engine.' If the DPS _ _
is the system that isn't working and it is necessary to "Abort Stage" end i_
use the A_I_, it is proposed to burn the APS in the retrograde direction
as long as necessary to reach the point when we can pitch to the posigrade ._--
direction without turning off the APS.
This solution, you see, avoids the need for turning off an operating
engine and makes the procedures for both Dims and APB about the same in
this time period as they are after this period. The thing that takes tb_
awhile to get used to is burning in a retrograde direction lowering the
orbit still farther after a need for an abort has been recognized. How
do we rationalize doing a thing like that? We currently feel that the
advantages of the simplified, standardized procedures and particularly
of not shutting down a _mning engine sufficiently justify thrusting to
a situation a little worse than that which existed at the time of abort
recognition. And, of course, we do have a tremendous propell_nt surplus
if we abort at this time. Furthermore, aside from some problem associated
with throttle up, the probability of an abort being required in this 25
second period seems awfully remote m_Wing it very difficult to justify
development of a unique set of abort procedures and training to use them.
In effect, this proposal creates two rather than three abort zones. No
abort maneuvers are required prior to DPS throttle up since the I_ is still
orbital. Procedures after throttle up are all the same. There is no discre_ _
point in the descent required special techniques.Fo_.._lation of the LUMINARY DPS abort program (P70) is completely compatible
with this procedure. That is_ for a DPS abort the crew would always delay _i
taking abort action _til 25 seconds after throttle up. A program change , _'
will be necessary to support this procedure in the APS abort program (P71) I _
so that if the crew hits "Abort Stage_" the APB will light off and separate_l
mintaining a retrograde attitude until 25 seconds after DPS throttle up /
time. _en it could go into the abort guidance as currently programmed.
Specifically, the change is to have the spacecraft perform a continuous
retrograde APB burn as opposed to a three second burn followed by an
attitude change and reignition.
Mal Johnston of MIT was at our meeting and will discuss this _ith our
friends in Boston. We'll talk about it some more next time after thinking it over a couple of weeks. I'd be interested in your comments.
Howard W. Tindall_ Jr.
PA:H_l_indall, Jr. :is_,_ F,._R(4,C_R)to,-,,.*
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
Memorandum
TO ' See list attached DATE' October 25, 1968
68-PA-T-234A
FROM : PA/Chief, Apollo Data Priority Coordination
SUBJECT: C' Contingency Review
We went through the draft of the C' Contingency Mission Techniques document
on October 22, and I must say I was impressed with its quality. Zt seemed
to me the Flight Analysis Branch, the Apollo Abort Working Group, and TRW
had done a good job of putting this together. The final version will be
distributed within the next week or so.
One item that came up needed resolution deals with the block data maneuvers -
that is, those abort maneuvers which the M_C-H periodically sends to the
spacecraft to be used in the event of a subsequent complete co,.-.._ication
failure. It is necessary to agree on the targeting objectives of these
maneuvers. First of all, let me emphasize that the free return trajectory
that we adhere to on the way to the moon does not necessarily provide a
water landing and al_st assuredly does not provide a landing near the
primary recovery forces. All it does it to make sure that the spacecraft
can get back to earth with minimum Av in the event of an SPS failure. The
question to be answered is: Should the block data maneuvers merely be
designed to provide a water landing or should they also meet the additional
constraint of landin_ in the pla_ued recovery area - that is, targeted to
the CI_? We had been ass_m_ng that they would aim for the CLA, although,
this may require m_ueuvers of as mch as 1900 fps. Some people were questioning whether it would be better to avoid making a maneuver any larger
than is necessary to insure a water landing regardless of where it might
occur. Basically, it is a tradeoff between a maneuver (of up to 1900 fps)
to get where we really want to go versus a smaller maneuver (up to 250 fps)
to provide a safe landing somewhere. Of course, there is also the question
during the trans_m_r coast of when to target the w_ueuver for a direct
return which costs a lot of AV (up to 7,000 fps) as opposed to going
around the moon, which is mmch cheaper. These things are really mission
rules which must be es-mblished before the flight. They apparently aren't
agreed to yet. At least I don't know the rule.
Howard W. Tindall, Jr.
PA:HWTindall, Jr.:is
Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan /_'3--°lB'rl°lqJ_' IF°_ N°' I°
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT .
Memorandum
TO : See listattached DATE: October25, 1968
68-PA-T-235A
FROM : PA/Chief, Apollo Data Priority Coordination
SUBJECT: Some more C' L,_r Orbit Mission Techniques
At our October 14 C' L_m_r Orbit Mission Techniques meeting we settled
on a few things I would like to tell you about. Along with the TEI
block data to be sent up each revolution in l_sr orbit, we are also
going to update the spacecraft state vector in the CMC every revolution.
This will be done after tracking the pseudo-landing site and before the
P52 fine alignment. Some consideration was also given to including a
TEI external _V targeting load on the uplink each revolution but this
will not be done since the block data should be adequate. Incidentally,
the block data will be for a '_'_:J maneuver for the revolution following
the present one- that is, about three hours after its transmission. ~
We discussed the use of the tape recorder if the high-gain anten_s does
not work. In this event, you recall, it is not possible to dump the
tape at ll_n_r distances. The question to be answered is: What data
should be recorded on the tape to be brought back by the spacecraft
out of l_,_,r orbit? Surely high-bit recording of the SPS burns - LOI
and TEI- mast be included and will use about half of the tape (15
minutes at high-bit rate). Recording of lan_rk tracking on the back
side of the moon should have a high priority to be included and will
take very little tape. The technique will be for the crew to obtain
all of the sightings on a given lan_rk, which the C5_ will temporarily
store in memory. After completion of taking that set of observations
the recorder is turned on for approximately 20 seconds at low-bit rate
to collect and save that data. Since we are making eight sets of observations on the back of the moon, we are only using 160 seconds worth of tape,
that is, about _ minutes out of the remaining one-half hour at low-bit
rate.
What else should be recorded is an open question and people with requirements should come forward soon and identify themselves so the procedures
can be worked· out for the "no high-gain antenns" situation. Of course,
if the high gain is working, continuous recording on the back side of the
moon should be standard practice.
PA:RWTindall, Jr. :is ":
_?.' _7.?. S_r,/:-:Z'.r._,;_.r _,_z~.""-'r_y o_ t.b._P._yroZ/ .%_vi;:_.r P/_):
:il
. ;....: ·
7! · ' ' '""'"..,
· :..., ,: ',.:_· , ,_.%;MAY ti m
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
Memorandum
TO : See listattached DATE: October25, 1968
68-PA-T-236A
FaOM : PA/Chief, Apolln Data Priority Coordination
SUBJECT: CSI and CDH back into the AGS - maybe
Apparently the TRW AGS people have done a good job of putting the new
rendezvous radar navigation filter into that dinky computer. In fact,
they now estimate a surplus of some 80 words.
One of our brilliant _ engineers here in MPAD - Ed Lineberry - has
developed a simple technique for computing the CDI and CDH rendezvous
maneuvers provided the CSM orbit is near circular as it should be on
the G mission (reference MPAD memo, 68-FM61-B18, dated October 15, 1968,
subject: Linearized solution for CSI and CDH for a m_ltiple-half-orbitalperiod transfer between maneuvers: ). In fact, he expects that it could
be fit into the aforementioned 80 words. He and Milt Contella have already
discussed this with the TRW people who are looking it all over. If things
go well, he expects they will come to the Software Configuration Control
Board with the proposal to include it in some future AGS program and we
can decided at that time if that is the best way to use our little 80 word
Christm_ s present.
I wrote this because that idiot Ed Lineberry is too darn modest to tell
anybody and I thought you might find it interesting.
Howard W. Tindall, Jr.
pA:Kw_inda11, fir.:js
Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan" _ OPTJON&I. _II)W NO, I0
MAy IMiZ _
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT ·
Memorandum
TO : See list attached DATE: October 25_ 1968
68-PA-T-23?A
FROM : PA/Chief, Apollo Data Priority Coordination
SLrBJECT: X-axis or z-axis for LM TPI?
This memo is in response to a question that came up at the October 21
D Rendezvous Mission Techniques meeting. The question was: What is the
additional I_ RCS propellant cost if we use the z-axis RCS translation
rather than the x-axis for TPI? Chuck Pace checked with the MPAD
Constable people who figured the x-axis would cost about 15 lbs. (taking
into account the required attitude changes and use of the APS interconnect)
and the z-axis will use at least 31 lbs. of RCS propellant (ass_m_ug the
best CG location). These _mbers are based on current spacecraft data
book information. They intend to verify them through use of a 6D simnlation program in the near future and will document the results.
In the meantime, we can probably use these estimates to decide which to
use - x-axis which costs less RCS or z-axis which avoids breaking radar _
·
Howard W. Tindall_ Jr.
PA:HWTindall, Jr. :js
BOIO._M Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan //_z_ >41.
UNITED STATES OOVEP, NMENT
Memorandum
TO :See list attached DATE: October 25, 1968
68-PA-T-238A
FROM : PA/Chief, Apollo Data Priority Coordination
SU]B]ECT: Descent Aborts - Part II
This memo is to carry on from that three page snowflake I sent you the
other day on the same subject. It turns out we have encountered one
of those rare situations when in doing something to fix an undesireable
situation we actually improve something else at the same time. Specifically, the rendezvous people want to target the I_ to a substantially
higher._orbit following an early_descent abort than they had previously
proposed. This makes the horizontal posigrade burn following the descent
abort larger, of course, and alleviates that crazy pitch profile problem
which used to exist during an abort in the first 50 seconds of powered
descent. The point is that by some fairly miuor changes in the spacecraft computer program (LUEINAHY), we can probably elim/_te the special
abort procedure we used to think was necessary early in descent. Changes
to the DPS abort program (PT0) are essentially just changes in some
erasible constants. This does not impact coding but has a si_ificant
impact on testing. By that, I mean the program will work now. The APS
program change noted in last week's memo is still required but is essentially
achieved by a erasible constant change too. This will all be fi_ed up and
brought to the Software Configuration Control Board in the near future for
their approval or something.
Having the early abort situation under control, we pressed on to another
phase of descent aborts requiring some attention - specific ally_ how to
handle the situation when the DPS is not quite capable of getting the LM
all the way back into the desired insertion orbit. In order to establish
procedures, it was necessary to make some assumptions. They are:
1. We never want to "Abort Stage" and use the APS, if the DPS is
stil9 operational.
2. It is acceptable to operate the DPS to prope]]_ut depletion.*
3- We have no desire to use the APS engine again after achieving orbit
(that is, during rendezvous). Of course, we intend to use the APS propellant
through the RCS interconnect.
* This ass_mption mst be verified by ASPO and then included in their
data books.
1_o._ Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly an the Payroll Savings Plan /_ _2
_. The "Abort Monitor" in LUMINARY remains active following a DPS
propellant depletion cutoff, which may result in a AV monitor alarm, even
though the crew calls up the _V residuals.*
If we can make the above assumptions, the procedures become quite simple _p
and standard. Namely, whenever aborting on DPS, the crew will pei_mit that A_/pengine to operate at full thrust until either a guided cutoff is acheived . _.
or propell_nt depletion occurs. At that time, the crew will "proceed" to _:_.
the DSKY display of AV residuals. If the AV rem_in_ug to be gained is f _
less than BO fps, the DPS will be mannal!y staged and the crew will utilize _ _0
the RCS to achieve the desired insertion condition by nulling the _V residUals __ r
(It is probable that only the horizontal component need be tr_..*._dif a /_
convenient attitude reference is available. The FDAI eight ball should
be good for this.) If the AV to be gained is in excess of 30 fps, the
crew will hit "Abort Stage," automatically jettisoning the DImS and lighting
off the APS to make up the AV deficiency. Again, only the horizontal_V
residual need be trd,,._.d.
It is to be noted that with the new, high apogee we will be targeting for,
the RCS/APE switchover point is orbital by a substantial margin (apogee
in excess of 75 m_les) and so there is no problem in the use of an RCS /'
burn whose duration is less t_____conds. It is also to be noted that ,_ _l
if the _V required of the APS is less than 100 fps, the burn duration will [ _,_r _1
be less than 10 seconds, which probably _kes it unsafe to reignite the I _
APS. ilmere is so _ch m_mtery with what is and what is not acceptable with _/_ :_
the APS we ce_not really be sure about th_. However,--_oes not matter F_ _
. ~ . . · ... . . _
sznce there zs no problem antzczpated mn performing the rest of the maneuver f_
with RCS. L_I _!
One final comv_nt - it has been proposed that the DPS be operated at half [
thrust during aborts to prevent lofting when the APB is required to achieve Y
orbit. Two miles perigee and four miles apogee are the m_xi_,m effects.
Those do not significantly perturb the abort rendezvous and therefore the
decision was to maintain full thrust.
* This assumption mast be verified by me with MIT. _/
./ i
._'
·
14. Tin O l]_, Jr.
: PA:RWTindall, Jr. :js ....... -
'Kx _· . . OFTI_AJ. FI_U4 N_ 10
MAy IM_
GSA FI_IR (41 eftA) zot-11.I
UNITF.r_ STATES GOVERNMENT
Memorandum
TO : Seelistattached DATE: November4) 1968
68-PA-T-2_lA
MOM : PA/Chief) Apollo Data Priority Coordination
SDm3ECT: When is the rendezvous radar desi_ate routine (R2g) needed?
George Cherry (MIT) asked if it is possible to drop the rendezvous
radar designate routine (R29) out of the descent abort programs (PT0
and PT1). He gave me the impression that to do so now would significantly reduce their work and permit concentration in testing in more
profitable areas. I don't know when the next Software Board meeting
is - soon I hope. Perhaps this would be a suitable subject to bring
up at that t_m_.
, Howard W. Tindall_ Jr.
PA:HWTindall, Jr. :js
t.,o._ Buy U.S. Savings Bonds l{egularly on the Payroll Savings Plan l' _/'MAY I_
UNITED STATES GOVER_NlVIENT
Memorandum
TO : See list attached DATE: November 5_ 1968
68-PA-T-242A
FROM : PA/Chief_ Apollo Data Priority Coordination
SUBJECT: C' earth parking orbit duration is a variable
This note is just to m_We sure everyone is aware of the rather siginificant variation in the time between earth orbit insertion (EOI) and
translucent injection (TLT) on the C' mission_ depending on day and
azimuth of launch. This c_m_ as a surprise to me and may have some
impact on what you are doing. According to Ron Berry, the time from
E0I to _V.Tignition is 2 hours and 42 minutes at the start of the
December 20 launch window and decreases to 2 hours and 28 mi=ates at
the end. On the last day of the la_nch window) December 2% this time
period starts at 2 hours and 22 rain-res and shortens at the end of
the window to 2 hours and 7 miuutes. All these nn_hers) of course_
are for the first TLI opportunity, tt may be desirable to perform a
simulation vith the shorter 8_ation earth parking orbit just to m_ke
sure everything goes together properly. The poorer ground coverage
and shortened crew timeline may give some trouble if it hasn'_ been
thought out in advance.
Howard W. Tindall) Jr.
PA:HWTindall) Jr. :js
,o.,. lu3 u.s. S,,vngsL:ons!eaZady onth, £ayroltSavingsPlan /OF_lOb_L. WORSdlNG. SO
MAY Iml_ I_CT1Ce4
GSA Iq_4R (41 C:FI_) 1Q$-11.S
UN'ITE_ STATES GOVEI_MENT iF
Memorandum
ro : See list attached DAllg: November 25, 1968
68-PA-T-258A
MOM : PA/Chief, Apollo Data Priority Coordination
SUBJECT: Descent Aborts - Part III
We have had a couple more Descent Aborts Mission Techniques meetings
resulting in substantial progress which I would like to tell you about
in this memo, if you haven't already heard.
A basic ground rule we have established is that these abort procedures
go into effect at the time powered descent initiation (PDI) is attempted
(i.e., starting at the time of PDI TIG). The point is, if the descent
burn is not attempted at all another procedure is used (TBD). But once
descent is started and an abort is required, the crew will always go to
PTO or PT1, the DPS or AlX3 abort program_.
As noted previously we have eliminated the special abort zone during the
first 50 seconds of powered descent which used to require special procedures. A simple program change was made to LUMINARY to do this. In
order to cause the system to work in an acceptable way, it is also necessary to increase the insertion apogee altitude in the PGNCS targeting.
This is done by changing the value of an eX_sible memory constant in the
LGC. (Insertion apogee altitude is now 100 n.m.$ it was 60.) A preferable solution was considered for _Y but must be delayed to LUMINARY '
II due toschedule impact. It is to have the PGNCS compute the optin_un
apogee insertionaltitude in real time based on the phase angle between
the LMand the CSM at the time of the abort. It is possible to do this
such that the subsequent rendezvous sequence is almost identical to the
nominal _n_r landing mission rendezvous sequence - always providing a
one rev rendezvous with a differential altitude of 15 n.m. This program
change will likely be made in the AGS, too - perhaps even in time for the
F m_ssion since it is relatively simple. Assuming we are able to fix the
PGNCS pro_m for the _r_r landing mission, it looks like we have a yery
good, stre.ight forward, simple and standarized abort/rendezvous procedure.
One cauti,.n mist be ¢bsexved since the DPS abort program (PTO) co--rids
i_all thro:;tle _distely. _erefore, if the crew decides t) abort on
the DPS ilmmediately after PDI they must at least await engint_ stabil_ ty
before hitting the Abort button. I should also point out t_t aborts
during the first 40 seconds of powered descent will currently result in
a spacecraft pitch maneuver which will cause the MCC-H to lose all telemetry
until the crew can realign the hi-gain antenna or switch to the omnis.
A program change request for LUMINARY II has been submitted to fix this.
Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payro,!l Savings Pla _ / _3
JG_O-_2
Another area in which we have been working is the procedure following a
descent abort using the DPS engine i.-,,_.diatelyafter the engine cutoff.
Like any other maneuver_ the standard procedure is for the crew to call up
the _V residuals on the I_ and check the horizontal_V still required.
Then:
a. If the horizontal _V to be gained is less than 5 fps, which
should be the usual case for aborts prior to about 300 seconds into
powered descent, the crew will trim it with RCS without staging the DPS.
Out-of-plane and radial AV components _ill be left untrimmed and their
effects will be eliminated by the subsequent rendezvous maneuvers.
b. If the AV in the horizontal direction at the end of DPS burn
is more than 5 fps but less thru 30 fps, we want to stage the DPS off
prior to bur_ng into orbit with RCS since RCS plume _mpingement precludes dragging the DPS along. However, staging presents a problem
since the PGNCS digital auto pilot (DAP) will not be aware it has
happened. Since it would continue to ass_me the high inertia, unstaged
spacecraft, it would comm_nd excessive RCS firing for altitude control.
Like I_il, it would really hose out the RCS fuel. The easiest way around
this is to switch guidance control to "AGS" and attitude control to "AGS
attitude hold" and then manually translate into orbit with RCS based on
the I_GNCS DSEI _V display. The procedure would be to manually stage
i.--_diately after initiation of the RCS trim burn. Again, there is no
reason for tri,._,.ingthe out-of-plane and radial _V residuals.
c. If at DPS engine cutoff the AV residual in the horizontal
direction exceeds 30 fps, the procedure is to simply hit "Abort Stage."
This will automatically separate the DPS and utilize the APS to complete
the maneuver required to achieve the desired orbit. The _V required
depends on the abort time and can range from as little as 30 fps all
the way to a full Ascent duration burn. The 30 Fps boundary was chosen
because attempts to use PT1/APS for sm_ller maneuvers can result in very
large _V errors, in fact as _ch as 60 fps. Again, only the horizontal
in-plane component of AV need be trimmed after the main engine cutoff.
Of course, in case "a" noted above it will be necessary to sepaz-ate
from the DPS sometime. There was considerable discussion as to whether
a special post-insertion maneuver should be made for this or if it was
preferable to await the first of the scheduled rendezvous bu_.s - CSI.
We finally concluded t._at the most straight forwart procedure was to
separate the DPS at CSI in order to avoid the need for more complicated
special procedures for this special situation. Separation at CSI
rather than immediately at insertion also provides the peripheral advantage
of an extra hour use of DPS consumables. But that is not our reason for
reco_._nding this procedure. Of course_ it will be necessary for the
crew to ca._u_yout certain DPS safing procedures. Specifically, they
must vent _;he tanks just as they do after a nominal 1,]n_r landing. Oneopen item in regard to this is the determination of how propulsive this
venting is. If it turns out to be unacceptable we may be forced to provide
some special procedure to stage the DPS at insertion. FCD has the action
item of determi uing the magnitude of venting _V.
d W. Tindall_Jr.
PA:KWTindall, Jr. :js-- · ; o
_' GSA I:'PMR (41 4_R) 1Ol-lt.$
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
Memorandum
TO : See list attached DATE: January 10_ 1969
69-PA-T-2A
FROM : PA/Chief, Apollo Data Priority Coordination
SUB3EC?: Some decisions regarding lunar landmark tracking on the
F and G missions
We had an Ad Hoc Mission Techniques meeting on Jam,_ry 9 to talk
over lunar landmark tracking. In particular_ we wanted to discuss
what we thought bad been learned from the C' m_ssion and what we
want to do on the F and G missions. This memo is to outline all
that briefly. The specific things we were trying to decide were:
a. Whether special tests of any sort should be included on
the F mission which might permit us to broaden the acceptable sun
elevation angle constraints associated with the l_n_r landing and
b. To decide if optical observations (SCT or SXT) of the
landing site are required on DOI day for descent targeting and if
so how many_ when should they be taken, and how should they be used?
Jack Schmitt has probed extensively into the landing sun elevation
angle constraints problem both before and after C' and probably has
a better understanding of this overall situation than anyone else I
_now. He has intensely debriefed all of the C' crewman on this
specific subject and is confident that the visibility willbe acceptable for landing if the s_:n elevation angle is no less than about 3
or 4 degrees. The upper constraint he feels is in excess of 20 degrees
and the actual l_mit will probably be based on heating considerations
on the spacecraft Or the cre_ during EVA rather than visibility during
descent (we'll find out what that limit is). In other words_ it looks
like we hmve a sufficiently wide band of acceptable sun elevation angles
that this imposes no real constraint on G launch opportunities! Furthermore, there appears to be no reason to provide special tests on F
designed to broadened these limits or give us greater confidence in
them. One interesting point he emphasizes_ though, is that we should
avoid landing with a glide path within about 2 degrees of the sun elevation angle since there is a definite degradation in visibility along
that line which would impair the crew's capability of evaluating the
l_nding site. This means that we should avoid sun elevation angles
between about 14 and 18 degrees - a little band of unacceptable lighting conditions within the _ch _srger acceptable limits. He feels that
this band may be avoided in the fe_ instances we encounter it by delaying launch somewhat or by adding an extra revolution or two in lunar
Buy U.£. Savings Bonds Regularly an the Payroll Savings Plan _-orbit. It is also evident that by the use of the hybrid flight plan
we can extend the translu_r coast time with the same effect.
In su_w_ry, it appears that the sun elevation angle constraint on G
mission launch opportunities is not significant at this time and
there is no need to provide special tests on F to confirm this
opinion.
The question of optical tracking of the landing site is not so clearly
understood. However, the consensus is that it would be a serious
mistake at this time for the flight plan not to include optical observations of the landing site _s part of the descent targeting operation.
But_ based on the ease with which the C' crew located and tracked the
land_rk on their first opportunity there seems to be no reason not
to eliminate the firs_ series of landn_rk tracking_ which we had
previously included primarily for on-the-job training. Accordingly,
we intend to utilize the trac_king plan and ground targeting operations
previously developed in our Descent Mission Techniques meetings except
that the first of the two tracking periods wilt be deleted or moved
to Lei day if it can be conveniently included in the timeline. Since
the landing site will be in darkness at that time, this particular
session would have to be on some other landmark located 5 or l0 degrees
to the east of the landing site.
I would like to discuss briefly the reasons for retaining the optical
observations. Basically, they reduce to two things neither of _,_hich
could be described as mandatory - but they are certainly not just
"nice _o have" things either. The first, of course, is to _ignificantl_;
improve the accuracy of the descent targeting which will make the
descent trajectory more nearly nominal. In line with this, i_ also
.makes it more likely the lan_ing radar can return the trajectory to
within acceptable limits. _e second benefit is that they provide a
complete_ independent check on the overall targeting system in the same
sense that the star check confirms burn attitude or the horizon check
confiTM retro attitude on other mission phases.
Our discussions included numc_rically defined _FN and spacecraft _ystcms
performance (expected and/or experienced) compared to descent targetinj
requirements which, you see: I _ve not included at all on this me,.to.
However, they support the above conclusions substantially and cculd be
made available to you if you want to see them. I left them out here
simply because it is too complex a matter to discuss clearly in a ,memo
such as this. What I am trying to say is that i feel these are _:ellfounded conclusions which may be applied to both the F and G missions
and we are going to press on ba_ed on them.
Ho,,;ardW Tindall, Jr.
PA :PEJTind_ll, , Jr.: jsMAY $gl_ I_
GSA IrPMR (41 C_R) '10t-11.$
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
Memorandum
TO : See list attached DATE: January 14_ 1969
69-PA-T-3A
FROM : PA/Chief, Apollo Data Priority Coordination
SUBJECT: Operations required for cor,_¥,_,mi cation loss on F and G
are sure better than on C'
I think we have pretty well established how to handle a co_mication
loss situation on the F and G missions. In effect, we have defined
which Block data must be sent and what onboard cis-lunar navigation
needs to be carried out. In both cases, of course_ it is possible
to cut back substantially from the C' techniques. This is because
we feel it is reasonable to assume that the LM provides a "perfect"
backup for the CSM co_._.,mications.
BLOCK DATA
We established a ground rule that it is only necessary to send Block
data for abort situations when either the LM is not available or if
sufficient time to use the LM is not available. Following is a table
of all the Block data transmissions planned for F and G giving the
time of transmission for the abort opportunity which it would be used for:
Time of Transmission Time of Abort _neuver
i ,
During earth orbit T_,T+ 90 minutes. CSM only,
direct return
LOI - 15 PC + 2 forfast returnfollowing
flyby
Pre LOI1 TMT1 & 2 ass_Tm_ug perfect LOI1
PreLOI2 TEI2 Updateand TEID ass_ing
no LOI 2
PostLOI2 ForTEIaftersleep
Pre LM Jettison TEI 2 revs from jettison
After LM Jettison C' rev by rev technique except
during sleep2
In(P37)addition, to compute remember theirtheown crew return-to-earth has the capability maneuversof uinsingthetheeventGNCSof a _7 _v;_
communication loss. In order to simplify the crew's procedures_ we _ _Z
intend to transmit a sms]l amount of additional information for use a
first guess in the operation of P37. Specifically MCC-H will periodically send the crew values of the landing area (CLA), the m_ueuver magnitude (AV), and the burn ignition time (TIG) for possible future abort times.
CIS -LUNAR NAVIGATION
As you recall on C', the onboard capability for cis-lunar navigation
using P23 was thoroughly exercised and proven to be an excellent system.
Furthermore, it appears that Jim Lovell was able to do his job just
about as well in the begimning as he was later in the mission, indicating that inflight training is not particularly necessary. Based
on this experience, only two batches of P23 star/earth horizon navigation sightings shall be scheduled on the entire F and G flights. In
order to get the most from these two periods_ one should be scheduled
before TLI + 5 hours and the other after TLI + 14 hours, if it is convenient to do so. The advantage of making the first batch that early
is that it wil_ permit the _C-H to make an accurate determination of
the actual horizon altitude the CMP is using in order to update the
CMC in real time just as we did on C'. To do this it is necessary
that the observations be made in altitude less than 50_000 n.m. and
preferably lower than 35,000, which is the altitude at TI,T + 5 hours.
I would like to point out that the horizon Jim Lovell used so successfully was sort of a nebulous one of his choice and was not well defined
_king it unreliable to use the "C'" horizon altitude for the F and G
missions. Although not disasterous, a good knowledge of the horizon
substantially improves navigation prior to entry which is when it is
most important in the event of co,m=.Jnication loss. Whatever that is.
Recognize that implicit in this plan of scheduling only two batches
of observations early in the translunar coast is that there can be
no independent onboard confi_ation of the _FN navigation _hich was
considered so important to insure that we miss the moon on C'.
Math Physics Branch of MPAD has been requested to develop a P23 tracking schedule to be used for transearth navigation in the event of no
co_._,_.Jm_cation.This schedule will be included in the Flight Plan
labeled "loss of com_,nication contingency."
As you recall, the primary_se of onboard navigation during transearth coast was for conditioning the W-matrix. We have selected a
procedure for F and G which m_kes it possible to eliminate that operation. Specifically, we have concluded that a crossover point existsat 30 hours before entry_ which has the following characteristics. If _, _',_, 7
commnnication has been lost prior to that time_ the onboard system is Iii l_ _/'
capable of providing acceptable navigation_ w_ueuver targeting_ and 5
entry initialization starting from scratch with no special W-matrix
conditioning. (The flight path angle error at entry should be no
greater than 0.5°under the worse conditions.) In addition_ it has been
shown that the _FN wi]] be sufficiently accurate at E! - 30 hours
that in the event of subsequent co_,,_m_nicationloss there is no need
to perform onboard navigation but rather the crew may safely return
to earth using the data supplied for that purpose at EI - 30 by _he
MCC-H. In other words: the same procedure used on C' at Ei - 15 will
be carried out on F and G at EI - 30. Namely_ spacecraft state vectors
will be updated and the crew will be provided with midcourse maneuver
targeting and entry pad data needed to complete the mission without
further co_,_-,,,uication.
In s,_ary_ F and G operations associated with co ....... _nication loss are
being considerably simplified from those used on C'. Utilization of
I24co,_,,.,_nications m_kes it possible to _rkly reduce the n_'oer of
abort Block data pad messages_ the onboard and _FN navigation performance experienced on C' permits us to reduce onboard navigation
to a total of only two batches of star/horizon obse_w_tions. No
special procedures are required for W-m_trix initialization. I'd
call that a giant step in the right direction:
PA :HWTindall_ Jr.: j sGIIT1CI_AL FORM NG. 10
I,LK¥ IS4Z
GSA FPMA (41 clm) Iol-tt.e
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT'
Memorandum
TO :See list attached DATE: January 14, 1969
69-PA-T-4A
FaOM :PA/Chief, Apollo Data Priority Coordination
s_e3_cm:F and G cis-lunar midcourse correction scheduling
This memo is to make sure everyone is aware that we are scheduling
the final midcourse corrections before LOi and Entry differently than
on C'.
The final tr_n_Dm_v midcourse correction shall be scheduled at
LOI - 5 hours since that provides optimum midcourse correction effectiveness and confidence in subsequent MSFN tracking for L0I targeting. You
recall on C' this maneuver was at LOI - 8 in order to provide a short
crew rest period after that. This is not required on the F and G m_ssions
at this time.
The basic criteria for selecting EI - 2 hours as a last transearth
midcourse correction was to make it as late as possible while still
providing adequate MSFN tracking for entry initialization. On the
C' mission it was found that although two hours is adequate, an additional hour would be advantageous. Since there appears to be no disadvantage to moving this maneuver one hour earlier to MT - 3 hours we
propose to do so. One associated item North American is going to check
out is with regard to the effect of this on the RCS quads. There is a
slim possibility that this schedule may present a thermal problem.
I would like to emphasize that the intermediate cis-l_m_r midcourse
correction schedule is not based on trajectory consideration but rather
will be selected to fit most conveniently in the crew work/rest cycle
just as it was done on C'. Accordingly, the scheduling of these maneuvers must await development of the flight plan after which they will be
shuffled in at the most convenient times.
PA:HWTindall, Jr. :js
BuyU.S. SavingsBondsKegularlyonthePayrollSavingsPlanCl'_ W NO. I$
¢ MAY IOW.
GSAF'PNR(dhoql) ,_t-ts.s
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
Memorandum
TO : See list attached DATE: Jsn,_wy 15, 1969
69 -PA-T-SA
_oM : PA/Chief_ Apollo Data Priority Coordination
SUBJECT: F and G L_n_w Orbital operations - mostly pre-DOI LM activation stuff
On Jannsry l0 we had an F and G Mission Technlques meet_ dealing
mostly with Taan_r Orbital operations_ which I would like to record
with this thing.
In our continuing effort to figure out the best way to minimize the
D0I day timeline, I thin_ we have finally converged on the best
basic procedure for getting the I_i checked out. As usual we went
over the three most po_l_ ways proposed - namely:
a. All at one time on DOI day
b. Two work periods - one prior to L0I and one on DOI day
c. Two work periods - one on DOI day and one after L0I2
We finally selected the last of these_ basically by the process of
elimination. Trying to do everything on D0I day not only lengthens
that day by at least one hour but it also sets up a situation which
is completely intolerant of even the most minor trouble as the crew
goes through the process of manning, powering up, and checking out
the I_M. And, it should be emphasized that although it my be possible in real time to slip DOI a revolution_ it will be by no means
a simple procedure to get all squ_red away again in preparation for
the most complex operation we have ever attempted in flight. What
I sm trying to say is that we want to avoid perturbing the timeline
around D0I at al_st any cost and_ splitting up the I_M preparation
into two periods helps to do this.
Having accepted the two period technique, the question remains -
where to put the first period? Although the pre-LOI period of
checkout was attractive for a n,?m%er of reasons_ it seemed to us
questio_ble in terms on what it might do to the spacecraft thermal
situation and more seriously to what might happen to the LM steerable
S-band antenw if it were _n_towed prior to the big SPS L0I maneuvers.
Except for the fact that this time period provides continuous MSFN
coverage, all other advantages are also obtainable if we schedule
this activity after L0I 2. The thing we like about putting a two or
three hour checkout perzod after L0I 2 and before the crew rest period
Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan
_o.yl$2
is that it provides an opportnn_ty for the crew to get the LM sq-_ed
away - that is, things stowed and other housekeeping chores done before
DOI day. It also provides an opportunity to add an additional activity
which might be discovered during the D mission or as a result of continued detailed planning of the F and G missions without perturbing the
complicated pre-DOI timeline. (It also provides a place to stick in
some F unique DTO's.) Of course, this checkout period is tach more
tolerant of problems than DOI day. For example, it can be extended
although at the cost of some crew rest. And, perhaps more important,
wil_ provide more t_me for the _C-H to evalt;ate and digest the checkout
data. C_vlie Duke is going to head a tiger team mostly composed of
FCD and FCSD people to develop a detailed timeline for lAMpreparation
including all those systems tests considered essential and no more thsn
that. They will integrate these into the total timeline which includes
the crew suiting and eating and all of the other LM activation activity
as we/] as the CSM lana_?-k tracking which now consists of only one
tracking time period.
We will review the results of their work at a later Mission Techniqu&s
meeting so that everyone in the world can criticize it and finally
bless it.
In addition to that one big item there were a pot full of little
things we discussed and resolved as follows:
a. There is a minor difference of opinion between the F and G
crew as to whether the l_Bam_wk tracking should be done in the pitch
or roll mode. John Young, who favored the pitch mode, is going to
try out the other technique in an attempt to resolve this.
b. Most of us have pretty well agreed that docked AOT _ alignmerits are expensive to do _d are not necessary. Accordingly, we now
propose to .use the s_m__procedure as D for docked I_ ali_,_nts referenced
to the CSN platfo_ using the known relative orientation of the CSM and
lAM navigation bases. This does mean that an accurate I_M IMD gyro drift
check can not be m_de although we expect it wilt be good enough for a
go/no go of the system. Just how good it is will depend on how stable
the relative orientation of the navigation bases is over a two hour
period. We _,st get this information from ASPO as soon as possible.
c. Prior to and during DOI we want the LM radar turned on to check
it out and if necessary to verify PGNCS perfoAmmnce of the DOI burn.
After that the rendezvous radar may be turned off since there appears to
be no strong requirement for its use ,,ntil after the phasing burn on the
F mission or until about five minutes before powered descent on the G
mission.d. In lieu of some other positive proposal we stated that the DPS
would be separated from the ascent stage l0 minutes prior to the insertion
maneuver by executing a 2 fps horizontal retrograde RCS burn. AGS control
will probably be used for that.
e. It has been stated that there is very little difference in the
accuracy of the results obtained using the sextant rather than the scanning telescope for landw_rk tracking therefore until C' it was proposed
to use the telescope because acquisition and tracking was expected to be
easier. However_ the C' crew informs us that it is actually easier to
track a given l_nsr feature using the sextant once it is acquired and
so that is what will be done on the F and G flights.
f. Since there seems to be time available following L0I for the CMP
to get some practice lanSw_rk tracking, it will be included in the timeline. Of course_ the actual landing site will be in darkness then so
some other feature located to the east must be used instead· It is our
intention to select a lanSw_rk which will be at a 3 degree sun elevation
angle on a nominal mission since this experience would give us a little
more confidence of tracking at a low sun elevation angle. _ais benefit
is not important enough, however s to -_we any real time change in the
landmark to be used like we were prepared to do on C'.
· Tindall_ Jr.
Enclosure
List of Attendees
PA:RWTindall_ Jr. :isMAY lm_ IlIOi'TICN
PPM.(ec_) _l-,u
UNIT_.n STATES GOVERNMENT
Memorandum
TO : See list attached DATE' Ja_e_y 21, 1969
69 -PA -T-10A
FROM : PA/Chief, Apollo Data Priority Coordination
SUBJEC'r: F and G mission cis-llm_ and abort plan
On January 8 a gang of us F0D types got together to develop a proposal
on how we should use. the LM for cis-l_n_ and 1,m_w orbit aborts. In
other words, how should the C' techniques be modified due to having the
I_4DPS available to backup or use in place of the SPS. A great deal
of work has been done and documented by Carl Hnss, the Flight Analysis
Branch of MPAD_ and the Apollo Abort Working Group and the results
belatedly reported here are heavily dependent on that work. :
First of all I'd just like to state a few facts and assn_ptions upon
which the Abort Plan given in the attachment are based.
a. Except in the case of aborts from 1,_=v orbit, the SPS _11
always be the pr_m_y abort prol_]_ion system. That is_ the w_neuver
will be made with the SPS, bringing along the I_4,when possible_ so
that the DPS can be used as a backup if the SPS fails.
b. Since the SPS does not have enough propellant for TMT with the
LM attached, we _st reverse the order for leaving the moon if we want
a TMT propulsion system backup. And, I guess we do.
c. _here is a period during transl-=_w coast - from TLI until
about LOI - 20 hours that the fastest return to earth can be made
directly using a m_xi_m SPS burn after jettisoning the IAi. After
that period there is no advantage to direct returns and we don't ever
suggest making one.
d. There appears to be no period wherein it is faster to -_ke a
direct return using the DPS than it is to perform a post-pericynthion
maneuver follmwing a 60 mile flyby.
e. It is always preferable to pe_form a 1,_ flyby than a direct
return using the SPS -nless we truly have a time critical situation,
in which case we would only consider use of the m_j_m available A v
solution which, of course, includes jettisoning the LM.
f. The fastest return trajectory including a lunar flyby is with
a pericynthion altitude of 60 n.m. If we maneuver to provide a higher
IGlOom2
altitude, the trip time is most likely going to increase. This accounts
for the use of 60 n.m. in the time critical flyby modes. Of course, the
procedure nmst include making the standard regularly scheduled translnn_
midcourse corrections to achieve 60 n.m.
g. Although the real time situation (particularly spacecraft configuration b_s an overwhelming bearing on what should be done), it seems
like a good idea to place the spacecraft on a trajectory targeted to the
prime CIA as soon as practical, even though that causes an increase in
trip time, and perhaps a second maneuver after pericynthion to speed it
up.
h. Although we _lways list the SPS maneuvers as the prime mode and
only utilize the DPS as a backup to the SPS, it is recognized that the
crew and Eround _,st be trained and prepared to cai:_y out a docked DPS
burn. Accordingly, numerous additional options are available to be
agreed to either pre-flight or in real time wherein the DPS is used
instead of or in addition to the SPS. For exampl e, the desire to make
a DPS system test _y justify its use in a non-critical time situation
or the use of both the DPS and SPS w_y provide a significant advantage
given certain spacecraft system failures to provide greatest crew safety.'
Finally - we briefly discussed how to hand le partial L0I 1 Burns. First
of all we are reco,._.ending the s_m_ procedures as C' in the event Of
guidance_or control problems during LOI1 - namely SCS l_G rate Co"m_ud
takeover and burn completion. This is proposed for all the same reasons
as for C' - basically it results in a better situation. For SPS failures
prohibiting completion of LOI1, Flight'_lysis BranCh.,reco_uds,, _ound
targeted aborts using the DPS as preferable to the C type 15 minute
abor_-_-_SPSb--_ usinE on-board ch_wt targeting. This is probably the
best thing to do and I'm sure we'll talk about it a lot more before it
finally is resolved. 'One thing to be emphasized though is that, since
we have the lIPSbactmP we don't have to be in such a hurry to take action
after SPS troubles show up as we were on C'.
AIl of this will be thoroughly reviewed at a slam-bang Mission Techniques
meeting scheduled for January 29.
Wmclosure
PA:HWTindall, Jr. :jsCIS-LUNAR ABORT PLAN
Categories depend on when the need for the abort is recognized as
follows:
CATEGORY I
From TLI until abort LOI - 20 hours (The actual time will be approximately
at the equi-return time - direct return using the SPS vs flyby. This
tradeoff will be biased as described in Note I.)
A. Time Critical
1. SPS direct return without the LM, to an__CIA (_V less than
about 8,000 fps). (See Note II)
2. DPS maneuver at pericynthion + 2 hours to any CIA following a
6o milef by. (1500fps Av mx. )
B. Non-time Critical
1. SPS (or RCS) bu=_-,at convenient time before L0I - 5 hours, to
flyby pericynthion between 60 and 1500 n.m., to the prime CIA.
2. DPS (or i_CS) burn at convenient time before LOI - 5 hours, to
flyby pericynthion between 60 and 1500 n.m., to the pr_ CLA.
CATEGORY II
LOI - 20 hours until the last translu_r coast midcourse correction at
LOI - 5 hours.
A. Time Critical
1. SPS burn at pericynthion + 2 hours to a__ CIA following a 60 n.m.
flyby.
2. DPS burn at pericynthion + 2 hours to any CIA following a 60 n.m.
flyby.
B. Non-Time Critical
1. SPS or RCS burn at convenient time before LOI - 5 hours, to
flyby pericynthion between 60 and 1500 n.m. to the orime CIA.
2. DPS or RCS burn at convenient time before LOI - 5 hours, to
flyby pericynthion between 60 and 1500 n.m. to the r_ CIA.
Enclosure2
CATEGORY III
After LOI - 5 hours - or when propulsion system failures are recognized
too late to do Category II.
· -d
r A. TimeCritical
t
1. SPS60nbUrn, m. flyby.at pericynthion + 2 hours to an___CIA foliowing a
2. DPS burn at pericynthion + 2 hours to any CIA following a
60 n.m. flyby.
B. Non-Time Critical
1. SPS or RCS at earliest practical time befor e _C 5 (about TEI
+ 15 hours avoiding sphere of influence_ to the prime CIA as
fast as practical. (SeeNotesI and III)
2. DPS or RCS at earliest practical time before MCC 5 (about TEI
+ 15 hours avoiding sphere of influence) to the prime CIA as
fastas practical.(SeeNotesI and!II)
NOTE I : There is an important real time judgment factor influencing
the non-critical abort techniques trading off reduced return
time vs. large maneuvers which m_y modify the priorities.
NOTE II : The LM is jettisoned only in the case of Category I, time
critical, SPS direct return aborts.
NOTE III : Normal return velocities sb_ll be limited to less than
36,323 fps. Time critical aborts must provide entry velocities
of less than 37,500 fps.Qr/'IK_L KORM NG. l0
MAY lira
GSA I,PIdR (41 C_'R) 10t-II*$
UNITED STATES GOVEKNMENT
MemorandUm
TO : See list attached DATE: February 5, 1969
69-PA-T-l_A
_OM : PA/Chief, Apollo Data Priority Coordination
SUBJECT: Two-stage L0I looks good after C'
Just like in other fields of endeavor, it always seems possible to
use actual flight results to prove how smart you were before the
flight. I am writing this ·note to crow about how C' proved we "done
right" in pls_ing a two-stage LOI.
As you recall we originally considered manually backing up the GNCS
during L0I to avoid an overburn using both burn duration AND the EMS
_V counter. However, when wegot down to detailed pl_g on how
to do this, we concluded that we had insufficient confidence in the
AV counter to wait for it to clock out since the consequences of an
overburn are catastrophic. Furthermore, although it sounds simple,
monitoring three data sources simAltaneously and taking proper action
at this critical time turned out to be messy. As a result, the final
C' procedure was to backup the GNCS by manually shutting down the SPS
if it exceeded the L0I 1 estimated burn duration by more than six seconds.
This value was consistent with the 60 x 1T0 n.m. _tial _ orbit.
If we had been using a one-stage L0I our rule would have had to be for
the crew to shut down manually just about at the nominal burn dua_tion
(no delay) in order to avoid an unsafe pericynthion in the event of a
high thrust engine.
On C' LOI 1 we actually experienced a burn duration 4.9 seconds in excess
of that expected. Therefore, given a one-stage L0I on C' the crew would
have shut down the SPS ms_,_lly even though the G&Nwas operating properly
and then they would have had to make a second burn of about five seconds
duration to finish it off. (In addition to that, we would have been
unable to utilize the flexibility of the two-burnLOI targeting to compensate for the trajectory dispersion following the last translun_w midcourse correction and we would have ended up with a 64 mile altitude on
the back of the moon rather than a 60 circular orbit.)
Incidentally, our other pre-flight conclusion, that is, lack of confidence in the AVcounter was also proven correct on this flight by
several in-flight anomalies including an er_mtic accelerometer!
Weren't we smart?
Howard W. Tindall, Jr.
_ PA:H_indall, Buy Jr.U.S.
:isSavings Bonds Rcgslarly on the Payro_ Savings Plan / _WY _m EDrr_
Iq, Mit (41 alt) tOl-tl.I
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
Memorandum _ Manned Spacecraft Center
TO ' See list attached DATE' February 6_ 1969
69-PA-T-18A
FROM : PA/Chief_ Apollo Data Priority Coordination
SUBJECT: F/G cis-lunar midcourse Correction mission techniques
This memo is to document the cis-lunar midcourse correction mission
techniques we agreed to Ja___y 27 and 28 at the F and G Mission
Techn4ques meetings. The translun_r maneuvers are based on the following assumptions and guidelines:
a. We are not concerned about getting substantially further off
the free return trajectory than on C' - pri,_ily because we have the
DPS backup.
b. We are especially anxious to conserve RCS propellant, which
led to the procedures of allowing the midcourse corrections to grow
to SPS size if possible.
c. In order to maintain best control over the situation we
decided to use MCC 3 (at LOI- 22 hours) as the prime I_C, leaving
MCC h essentially for fine trimming if necessary.
d. The minimm SPS burn is 0.5 seconds which is equivalent to
approximately 3 fps.
Based on all that, we established the following:
a. MCC1 (at TLI + 7 hours) and _K_C2 (at TLI + 2k hours)
The need for these w_ueuvers will be based on how big MCCq
would oe if we did not make them. Specifically, _C 1 and/oz MCC2_will
not be executed as long as NEC 3 is less than about 25 fps without them.
Furthermore, we will not -_ke them ,,_less we can use the SPS (that is,
they _Tst be bigger tbsn 3 fps) and we will not trim residuals.
b. MEC3 (at L0I - 22 hours)
This is the prime maneuver to achieve the desired trajectory
around the moon. It will be made if the predicted PICC4 is greater than
about 3 fps in order to avoid using SPS for _C_. Residuals will be
trimmed to within 0.5 fps on this maneuver, which will most likely be
made with the SPS.
Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan
_o-_c. M_C_ (at LOI - 5 hours)
By taking advantage of the significant flexibility provided with
two-stage LOI maneuver in targeting the LOI maneuvers, we are often able
to avoid making an _C 4. Thst is, the LOI targeting can be done to achieve
a 60 mile circular orbit in spite of substantial approach trajectory
dispersions. This is done by rotation of the mjor axis of the initial
60 x 170 n.m. lunar Orbit. However, we established that the apsidal rotation should be limited to less than _5 degrees. If it is necessary to use
the SPS for MOC4, the residual will be tr_mw_d to within i fps.
Midcourse correction techniques on transearth leg phase of the flight were
somewhat simpler. We are retaining the C' technique of utilizing transearth
midcourse corrections only for corridor control. We have concluded that
it is desirable to avoid -_king the last midcourse correction (i.e., M_C?
at EI - 3 hours ) if at all possible. Accordingly, we opened up the entr_y
interface (EI) flight path angle limits a little more than on C'. Speci-
? fically, we will notfexer_te M_C7 if the flight path angle fells between
6.3 and 6.6 degrees 6_egrees is nominal). In order to minimize the
probability of that midcourse correction, we set the threshold for _Cg
(scheduled at EI - 15 hours) at .5 fps which is close to the MSFN targeting accuracy at that time. The first transearth m_dcourse co_ection (M_C 5
2 at TEI+ 15 hours) will not be executed ,,_lessit is greater than 1 fps.
The most significant change from C', of course, is brought about by the
DPS backup which safely permits deviation from the free return trajectory.
This makes the logic mch simpler since we don't have to consider moving
the maneuvers earlier to stay within RCS return-to-earth capability.
__o_d W. Tindall,J_
PA:HWTindall, Jr. :is_tT_UU. F1_S_4 _ 15
F,MR (41 O_lq) 101-1t.8
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
Memorandum
TO ' See list attached DATE: February ll, 1969
69-PA-T-23A
F_OM : PA/Chief, Apollo Data Priority Coordination
SUBJECT: F/G Mission Techniques - except for the lunar orbit phase - are
ready to eat
Some of the decisions and open items that came out of our F/G Mission
Techniques meetings in late January are listed in this memo. Basically,
I would say that all mission phases aside from the lu_r orbit activity
are very well understood at this time - primarily as a result of the C'
mission - and should be formally documented within the next couple of
weeks.
1. Flight Control Division is going to establish the detailed
procedures for manning and activating those LM systems required to
establish co ....... _nications in the unlikely event CSM co ...... _ication is
lost. They must include the techuiques for orientating the LM steerable
ante_u_ toward the earth if the omnis are inadequate. It is also .necessary to give some thought to when tYaecrew should initiate these procedures.
That is, what should be done with the CSM co_,-,,micationsystems first after
the total failure seems to have occurred.
2. As a standard procedure, M_C-H will update CSM state vectors on
a more-or-less periodic basis - say every l0 hours or so when it is
mutually convenient to the crew and ground, unless they have changed so
little as to make it useless. Whenever the state vectors are updated,
it will be to both the LM and CSM computer memory slots, CSM first.
3. REFSMMATS
a. The launch REFSMMATS will be retained until the IM_ alignment
after MCC 1 time whether the maneuver is _de or not.
b. The same PTC REFSMM_T will be used translunar and transearth
during the periods from the post-_C 1 to pre-_C 4 and from TET plus two
or three hours to EI - 5 hours.
c. The lunar orbit REFSMMAT to be used for the period between
the PTC times defined in "b" shall be such that the LM in _8ing atti_-_
over the landin__s_e after DOI would h_ve_0, O, 0 on the F_T. This
REFS_T will be computed by the _C-H prior to MCC4 for use in the CSM.
According to my notes, the REFSMMAT will be updated on DOI day to compensate for prediction uncertainties. I can't remember why. (On the
B,,yu.s. on,h,v,v,oU /?2G mission, of course, the REFSMMAT in the LM will be updated several times
automatically while on the lunar surface by the LGC to correspond to the
ascent alignment. Currently we plan to update the CSM more or less to the
ascent BEFSMMAT but we will not attempt to maintain it precisely the same
as the LM.)
': 4. The only burn monitoring limit it is necessary to change from
those used on C' is the one used for ov_erburn protection on LO.I1. The
extra m_ss of the LM makes this maneuver substantially longer in duration,
so that limit has been m_de correspondly larger. Specifically, it will be
10 second_ _ther _b_ _ ._n_R_
5. Math Physics Branch was requested to determine if in order to
maintain a good _FN orbit detel'minmtion capability, it is really necessary for the crew to reverse the orientation of the spacecraft x-axis
every three hours during periods of venting. It seems as though the net
effect of the venting is slw_st exactly in the least sensitive direction
when using the PTC attitude currently proposed and it would certainly
be nice to avoid u_necessary spacecraft w_neuvers; perhaps even _:nnecessary
awakening of the crew.
6. In order to insure that the crew _ 9x-p_ioences CI,E]Program 65
during entry, MCC-t{ will w_ea real time selection of entry range to avoid
P65 prior to targeting TMI. This should not be a difficult thing to do
while in lunar orbit but cann°t be done pre-mission to suit all launch
opportunitie s.
7. The crew is looking for a reco_..,_ndation as to whether the entry
should be perfol-_ed using one or two RCS rings. Claude Graves is said
to be working on this.
8. Docked DPS burns in l_r orbit
a. It was established that, if a docked DPS burn is to be used
for TE7_ it should be carried out with one burn only as opposed to two
as has been suggested.
b. In this event the LM platform will be aligned using docked
AOT sightings of stars in order to determine platfoi_m orientation (PS1).
Given the accuracy of pulse torquing, it wi].] be possible to reorient the
IMU for the maneuver without additional AOT sightings.
c. The CSM will use the Average G Program (1_7) for maintaining
state vectors if we make a docked DPS burn.
d. It was estimated that the LM could be made ready for such a
burn easily within l½ hours.r
e. _4ITwas asked to determine if the DPS gimoal trimming would _ . --
_'oz._in _he dockea confLgur_tlon ajtl0 percent ot2_.vust__zthe LUMINARY _ _ %_
pro,ram. _2_ _...-_ _/-..--..,._r,,_, _,.-n-'_' --"_.C._.j_,"-,_-_T'IF.-,."t._._.,__ , II ,
.....,. - . --
f. It is evident that complete docked DPS check list _,st be
prepared for the F and Q crews by FCSD.
9- The crew was somewhat concerned with the technique MPAD has
developed for the LO_5 minute abort. This abort ,_neuver, you recall,
is one the crew _st target for themselves in the event of a premature
SPS shutdown during LOI. The crew charts that MPAD has developed present
the _V required ass_ming the maneuver will be executed exactly 15 minutes
from the time of SPS shutdown. Since the spacecraft clocks are all keyed
to LOI TIG_ the crew feels it would be easier for them if the maneuver
were scheduled to occur 15 minutes from LOI TIG. The point is, they
were concerned that in the event of an emergency they may not note the
time of shutdown or are more likely to make a mistake in determining
when to execute the abort maneuver. Flight Analysis Branch, MPAD, is
looking into reworking these charts based on TIG rather than SECO.
10. Since there is concern over premature shutdown on either the LOI \!_
or TEI maneuver_ the crew asked if it were not logical to protect against
it, particularly in the unstable butterfly region, by use of the Thrust
Direct On switch. For example, during LOI they suggest turning that _A /
switch On from TIG + t minute to TIG + 5 minutes and on the TEI maneuver _
they would switch it On from TIG + 15 seconds to TIG + 2 minutes. Flight
Control and other guys are going to think about that: I think the greatest
fear is what would happen if thg crew neglected to switch it off in time.
That's all I can rememeber. Mostly trivia, you see which probably shows
better than anything the status of F/G Mission Technique_ for these mission
phases.
Howard W. Tindall, Jr.
PA:HWTindall, Jr. :jsMAY I_ CDffl_
UNITEI) STATES GOVERNMENT
Memorandum
TO : See list attached DATE: February ll, 1969
69-PA-T-24A
_oM : PA/Chief, Apollo Data Priority Coordination
SUBJECT: F/G Rendezvous Mission Techniques - mostly F
.
As part of F/G Torture Week, we spent Thursday, January 30 on the
rendezvous. Overall_ I would say this mission phase is in pretty
good shape with only a few unresolved items that we know about right
now. I would like to tabulate here a bunch of odds and ends we agreed
to at this meeting - as well as my memory serves me. It's mostly trivia
and if I were you I wouldn't waste my time reading anymore except maybe
paragraph 3-
1. On the D mission the CMP is prepared to m_ke a so-called "Horizontal Adjust" maneuver if it is decided to stay in the mini-football
in order to insure a closing trajectory. The F and G crews both felt
this is an_unnecessary complexity and so they will not make such a
maneuver or be prepared to m_ke one on these missions.
2. Everyone worries about overburning the L0I maneuver. Wait
until they discover it just takes an extra 12 fps on D0I to cause a
lunar impact. The LM picks up that nmch _V in about th_tee seconds
when operating at about 40 percent and so it is unlikely we will be
able to establish a ma_l backup protecting against overburn which
would provide a safe orbit. On the other hand, some sort of monitoring
is required and Rick Nobles (MPAD) was given the action of establishing
the limits for the crew to shut down the D_ ,_uually when both the AGS
the Burn Time have been exceeded by these _,_unts.
3- LM aborts due to a fouled up DOI maneuver are attracting a lot
of attention. For the past year, everyone agreed that the best technique
is to make a brute fcrce burn right back to the CSM _..,ediat_ly. This
probably works pretty well if it's done within fi.._veto e_ minutes of
DOI. After that it doesn't and the crew feels more time th_n that will
be required for them to ascertain an abort is necessary and then to
execute it. Ed L inebe_y was given the action item of performing a
parametric study to establish the best tecbni q_e for aborts up to about
15 minutes after DOI with the maxinmm possible overburn based on our
backup cut-off procedures. Whatever it turns out to be we are tentatively proposing to use the DPS at 40 percent thrust_ controlled .manual__
with the AGS maintainin& attitude hold. _ne crew would shut down about
/qrBuy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan2 :i_;
10 to 15 fOs short and finish off the burn with 4 _et RCS while sim_tane- :?
ously jettisonin_ the DPS. Milt Contella ventured the opinion that DOI _;
aborts-at, going to turn into the F equivalent of D's TPIo - Endless discussionand a mess in the end: I believeit already. _
4. We decided to create a new PAD message which the G.dP can use for _i
loading his Target Av program (P76) for the ground computed maneuvers - _
DOI_ Phasing and Insertion. It consists of Purpose, TIG, and _V's. In
addition we decided to add burn time (BT) to the LM P30 PAD.
5. It was determiued that it will not be possible for the F crew
to use their descent program (P63) for the landing radar test as they
had planned because MDC-H _rill not be prepared to support it with the / _:
necessary input data. Don't get excited. This is no great loss. _7_
6. We pinned down the complete rendezvous tracking schedules for
both spacecraft and established the following W-matrix values. The
initial values shall be lO,O00 feet_ l0 fps, and 15 _lliradians. The
values for reinitialization shall be 2,000 feet, 2 fps, and 5 milliradians. (For the unique F rendezvous tracking period between the '
Phasing and Insertion burns, the W-matrix shall be initialized using
2,000 feet, 2 fps, and 5 milliradians. ) MIT was asked why the PGNCS
computer program (LUMINARY) does not provide a simple way for initializing
the W-wmtrix value for radar bias as it does the position and velocity _:_
values. Perhaps a PCR should be submitted for that. 27_ _ _( / !]!
7, We had a lengthy discussion on rendezvous nav_t_o_ during the :i:
phasing revolution. It was soon recognized that, since the _ has no
tape recorder, it is only possible to evaluate its performance if we _:
allow the rendezvous navigation to update the state vector. However, i:
the flight controllers were concerned that if the rendezvous navigation
in back of the moon fouled up the LM state vector they could have _
problems targeting the Tn_ertion Burn which occurs shortly after A0S
On the other hand, it is possible that the rendezvous navigation could
be useful in detecting dispersions in the Phasing maneuver. Accordingly,
we reached the following agreements:
a. Rendezvous navigation by the comm_nd module will be used only
to ui0date the LM state vector_.
b. Rendezvous naviMation in the T,Mwill be used to update the LM
_tate vector until shortly efl_e LOS. After that, the LM crew will
switch the LGC to u_date the CSM state vector.
c. While the LM is in back of the moon the flight dyrmmics people
will determine if the LM onboard state vector is acceptable for executing
/?z'· ·
3
the insertion burn. If it is, it will be left alone; in fact, MCQ-M w_l]
t_ansmit it to the CSM after _nsertion. If it is not acceptable_ the LM
cre_ will be advised at AOS to term_uate their navigation program (1>20)
immediately and the update program (1>27)will be called so that the ground
may send a good LM state vector for the Insertion maneuver. It is unlikely
that they will have to do this but if they do it _st be recognized that
we will not get the rendezvous radar tracking data at the m_x_m ranges
which we are so interested in.
d. As a standard procedure the _ound will always uPdate the
CSM state vector in both spac__ecraft computers after~insertion.
8. Rendezvous radar thermal study _st be performed, I suppose, and
we established the following profiles for that purpose listed here in
order of our preference:
a. Rendezvous radar continuously operating from during the minifootball to completion of the rendezvous.
b. Same as "a" except turned off from DOI until just after
Phasing.
c. Same as "b" except turned off during the platform alignment
while in the phasing orbit.
If GAEC and RCA feel the rendezvous radar cannot support any of these
profiles - we would rather fight than switch:
9. After a little merry-go-round we agreed on what the CSM should
do for TPI targeting. He starts out running the P34 using the elevation
angle option in order to obtain a TPI solution for comparison with the LM
PGNCS. He then recycles using the time option with a TIG one minute later
than the LM's in order to backup the LM TPI maneuver.
10. Both the F and G crews and just about everyone else who stuck it
out to the end seemed to want to keep the I_ active for TPI even if the
rendezvous radar had failed. You recall the D mission rule says the CSM
should go active for that failure. I guess that _st be the right thing
to do since so many people thought so and I was just too groggy to understand.
ll. MIT was asked the following brief questions:
a. Does the CMC automatically inhibit VPIF ranging data beyond i
therecyclerangeof 327miles? _
b. Ho_ does the crew request the half-period-between - CSI- !J_'!i
and- CDH option in the reDdezvous navigation program (P32). --
.4/4
!
c. Are these options in shared erasible memory or is it possible I_t' !
to load them pre-launch on the E-memory K-Start tape.
d. How should the crew handle the sign of the out-of-plane velocity ,_/:
display from R36 if: (1) the CMP requests the IAioption for relay to the /
IAi or (2) if he uses R36 to target his own plane change maneuvers.
Well, I warned you I
Howard W. Tindall, Jr.
PA:HWTindall, Jr.:js
If/c
1OpTIGNIA__ NO,. 10
MAY tglg ICOfTIPQK
GSA KPId# (41 4::tL'lq) T01-$1.$
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
M_['_Or_['_d_,_/_ NASA _nned Spacecraft Center
TO : See list attached DATE: February ll, 1969
FROM : PA/Chief, Apollo Data Prior_ ty Coordination
SUBJECT: G D,nzr Surface Phase Mission Techniques
During the first half of 1968 we held a sequence of meetings which
culminated in a proposed set of mission techniques concerning use of
the guidance and propulsion systems while the I_ is in the luwr
surface. This was documented in a Lunar Surface Phase Mission Techniques
book, dated October 6_ 1968. On February 5 we reviewed these techniques
with the newly selected G crews, MIT_ and other organizations concerned
with this business. Some changes were made_ which I would like to tell
you about.
Probably the most significant change deals with CSM activity during
this period of time, something which most people al,_st completely
ignore. The most important thing the co-m_ud module does is to execute
a plane change such that the LM ascent can be carried out essentially
in-plane. The second thing the CMP does is to attempt sextant tracking
of the LM on the lunar surface in order to refine targeting for the LM
ascent maneuver. Our proposed plan had both of these things scheduled
in the period _w_ediately prior to IA{ ascent, taking almost eight hours
of fairly continuous activity. The plane change was l_ revs before liftoff. As a result of somebody's suggestion - I think it was Buzz Aldrin -
we looked into performing the plane change about 2_ revs after the LM
lands. We found that this resulted in considerable improvement in the
overall operation, provided it is unnecessary for the LM to lift-off prematurely. This single disadvantage is brought about by the fact that the
plane change targeting is based on an assumed LM lift-off time. The
advantages are:
a. It provides a long period of stable trajectory conditions prior
to the IA{ lift-off.
b. It makes the mission plan tolerant of slippage in plane change
execution or any other CSM activity, for that matter.
c. It shortens, simplifiez_ and balances the periods of CSM activity
better and makes them more consistant with LM periods of activity.
By moving the plane change into the landing period of activity, it is only
necessary for the CMP to start LM ascent preparation about 3/2 rev before
s;2 v.s.s, vi.s,s, d, o. v y,olz Pi,. / g Fo
LM lift-off. It is at that time while in darkness that he aligns his
platform such that d_trinM the l_t p_s$ over of the I_4 he may hopefully
make sextant observations for MCC-H's use in targetin_ the ascent.
Incidentally, you will probably be interested to know that the nominal
plane change for a mission ca_ied out in July will be about 60 f_s and
in Au_ about 10___S. Although the state vectors for _FN tracking
should provide ample stability for ca_iying out the CSM plane change
maneuver this long before ascent, it is probable that some LM yaw steering will be necessary to compensate for whatever errors propagate to
lift-off time. These errors, we feel, should be well within the LM yaw
steering capability. (Note: The yaw steering propellant requirement is
proportional to the square of the yaw steering required; one-fourth degree
costs about 5 fps, one-half degree yaw steering costs about 20 fp_s_ofAPB
propellant. )
Considerable time was spent discussing the insertion orbit for which we
should target aborts inm_diately after LM landing. As you know, during
powered descent, aborts are targeted for a variable insertion velocity
to achieve the desired rendezvous light and AAH characteristics. At the
start of powered descent abort targeting aims for a high apogee. This is
continuously decreased for aborts later in power descent until it reaches
30 n.m. apogee below which we do not care to aim. Therefore, for aborts
from powered descent later th_n that and when first on the 1,,n_r surface we
continue to aim for a l0 x 30 orbit. After passing the first go/no go
approximately three minutes after touchdown the crew exits the descent
programs which deactivates the "instantaneous" abort capability, tl_ereafter, if it is necessary to abort they mst use the standard ascent
program (P12). The question was - what should we aim for then? After
lengthy discussion we arzived at the non-,,nmuimous decision to target an
abort at that time to the l0 x 30 orbit also. The most favorable alterhate was to aim for the standard 10 x 45 which is used in the nominal
mission, although in this case, you recall, it is necessary for the I_I
to remain in the insertion orbit for two revolutions in order to catch up
to the co_._nd module before going into the standard rendezvous sequence.
The primary advantage of the lower orbit is that its higher catch up rate
permits spending about three more minutes on the 1,,=_w surface evaluating
the LM systems and preparing for the LM lift-off if it's necessary. It
also reduces probability of Alms propellant depletion which is somewhat more
likely in an abort since the crew has not yet gotten rid of some of the
equipment which they plan to jettison on the l,_n_r surface. We may hear
some more about this decision.
The third topic cons_miug most of our time dealt with lunar surface PGNCS
alignment. I think everyone is now pretty well satisfied that the operational alig_me,nt procedure should use the gravity vector as opposed to the3
AOT since it is not only eas_cr for the crew to perform but is more likely
to provide the smaller dispersion in flight path anglo - that is, it is the
safer. On the other hand, it was finally agreed that AOT/stsr _3_-_
should also be attempted - not only as a test of the system but also for
the da_.___hey will provide for determinin thg___atio_ _f _h_ TM _ +_
lunar surface. For those fanxiliar with the various alignment options, we
all'_f_n:iliyagreed on the following sequence for both the simulated countdown to lift-off at the end of the first CSM revolution (abort) and for the
lift-off at the end of the nominal lunar surface operation; the option order
ir.l, _2, 1,.3- (One thing someone ought to look into is whether the LM
lec:C_flect as a result of crew movement within the st_acecraft because if
it docs significantly change the Sl_cecraft attitude they must be careful
not to move around during these alignments. This sounds like a good action
item for the FOP.)
George Cherry suggested an alternate way of stopping RCS jet firing immediately
after touchdown. He pointed out that just jogging the hand controller will
not necessarily i_..,ediately stop the firing and suggests instead cycling
the PGNCS mode control switch to Off and then back to either Attitude Hold
or preferably Auto to reset the DAP.
In summary, I would say this whole business was substantially simplified
at our clam bake and is in pretty good shape right now. We have a solid
plan for the crew and ground activity which everyone is satisified with.
I think the only soft spot is in regard to the targeting for aborts from
the second go/no go point and that should be easy to settle soon.
dHowar W. Tindall, Jr.
PA:HWTindall, Jr. :js: See liST Below DATE: _ C_ ._-_
££.B_ 0 7.98_
_O._ : FA/Director' of Flight Operations $_ _z. ==_k_ _..
isUBJ_Cr:Spacecraft guidance for TLI
(2-18-s9)
· After yesterday's meeting/on the F mission, I have had some second
-.:: Thoughts and prompting by others about using the, spac.eeraft
· guidance and .platform for S,IVB TLI. The following summarizes my
position and is To be used as policy in FOP.
The primary (and originally my only) reason _o_ using the spaeecraft guidance as a backup to the launch vehicle platform is to
assure crew safety during first stage flight where a pia_form
failure could cause a nasty abort situation at or near max q. Following This decision, it was fairly measonable and relatively easy
To provide the crew with the capability of guiding the launeh
vehicle into orbit: and I _herefore subscribed to This position,
The switchover To spacecrafz guidance was _o be utilized when and
only when The platform fail lights were given to the crew and for
no other reasons. My concern here was That we would get ourselves
back in the same box as Gemini where an inordinate amount of work
was required to provide swiZchover criteria throughout the powered
flight phase. The probabilities associated with:{Apollo 10 platform
failures just plainly don't warrant That kind ofleffort when faced
with thc work load we have in the Apollo p_ogram.
After listening To yesterday's discussion on the work we're about
To set ou_ on in order to be able to perform'TLI ·with the spaeeeraft
guidanee: it began to be painfully obvious to me that we were
putting ourselves back in the same box mentionedabove. Further, as
Sig Sjoberg pointed out to me, Sam Phillips gave very specific instructions To both MSFC and MSt that we were To limit cum studies to
......p s_,.ce dur:ng _he _..,..o. .... ,...,,e=,., phase and, in fact , gave explicit
instructions not to consider any other backup modes other than the
polynomial in The first stage and manual guidance during the second
and _n__d szage for orbital insertion.
Based on The above, it is my direction That we cease work on any
switchover or backup guidance schemes that would be used beyond
normal orbital insertion, i realize that this will make some people
in PCOD unhappy: but i don=t feel That the work neeessary To accomplish TLi guidance with the spacecraft is worth the effort at This
'"'. C r:st opher c.
U".£
_.:'_: _see list azTaehea)O_ylCNAL. FORM NO. I0
.. ,r I_Ay 111_ EDI_IGN
FPMR(41c_) tot-.J
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
Memorandum
TO : See list attached DATE: February 20_ 1969
69-PA--28A
FROM : PA/Chief, Apollo Data Priority Coordination
SUBJECT: Descent Abort Mission Techniques
On February lB we went over our Descent Abort Mission Techniques
with the world. In general they were accepted as is. That isn't
to say we didn't have some lengthy discussions resulting in some
improvements and/or changes but we didn't make any substantial changes
to the basic ground rules, philosophy, or overall procedures. I would
like to list here some of the things we decided as well as some open
items requiring work.
1. Although we didn't spend any appreciable time discussing this,
it probably would be worthwhile to look into fixing the spacecraft
computer program (LUMINARY) such that we could use the DPS and APS
Descent Abort Progrsm_ (PT0 and PT1) before PDI (TIG). In other words,
prior to PDI the crew and/or _C-H may decide PDI is "no go." Since
the descent abort progr_m_ have the capability of targeting snd guiding an ideal ,_neuver to set up the standard rendezvous sequence it
may be quite an advantage if we are able to call upon those programs
without actually having attempted PDI as the progr_ is currently
constrained.
2. It was agreed that if the steerable S-band anten_s lock-on is
lost during a descent abor_, _the crew will not attempt to reacquire with
that antenna but rather will switch to the omnis as soon as it is convenient for them to do so. Of course, this will only supply the ground
with low-bit rate data but reacquisition with the steerable is considered
to be almnst impossible_ particularly in an emergency situation like this.
(Landing Ar_lysis Branch was given the action item of determining if the
initial descent abort attitude maneuver for any period in a nom_r_l descent
would cause the S-band steerable to loose lock. )
B. It was concluded that there is a significant advantage to having
the AGS Mode Control switch nominally set to Attitude Hold during descent
in order to perm_ t the crew to complete a landing using the AGS if they
have a PGNCS problem late in descent and consider it safer to land than
to abort. Of course, this means that an extra switch setting mast be made
if it is necessary to abort on the AGS. Specifically the AGS abort sequence
would be:
a. Set Guidance Control to AGS
'"%_ b. BuyM_?dke U.S.a Savings w_uual Brads maneuver Regularly to approximately on the Payroll Savi then_sabPlan ort attitude2
c. Set Mode Control:AGS to Auto (This is the "extra")
d. Push Abort or Abort Stage
4. We had a lengthy discussion about whether or not the DPS should be
run to propellant depletion. The Propulsion people (who are never in
attendance in any meeting dealing with how: their systems are going to be
used) have stated that z_mn_ng the DPS to propellant depletion should not
be done unless crew safety is involved. There are obviously times in the
descent aborts at which crew safety is decreased if we turn off the DPS
any sooner than we have to. Accordingly, in order to avoid some sort of
complicated logic to guide the crew in dete,'mining when they can or cs_not
run to propellant depletion_ we all agreed that the DPS will ordinarily
be run to propellant depletion if the gui_ce system does not shut it off
first. The crew took proper note that there is some h_zard ineuz_zed in
doing that and plan to manually shutdown the DPS when the propellant gauge
reads I or 2 percent remaining provided they are clearly in the region that
shutting down the DPS is not going to increase the probability of hitting
the moon AND it is clear an APS burn will be required to achieve orbit.
Implicit, of course, is that they are not so busy in treating the cause
of the abort that they fail to monitor m_d take this action.
5- In the event it is necessary to use the APS to achieve orbit,
it was concluded that the crew will not attempt to provide ullage prior to
pushing the Abort Stage Button. Although this is not accepted practice for
an in-orbit maneuver, _e could see no reason why it should not be perfectly
safe to do this following a DPS burn of any m,gnitude with completely Full
APS propellant tanks.
6. By far our longest discussion dealt with how to handle the situation
at insertion following an abort dur'iTM thefirst 300 seconds of powered
descent. Specifically, we are faced with the problem of how to jettison
the DPS conveniently and safely and at the s_me time trim the AV residuals
in order to get on the desired rendezvous trajectory. The results of this
discussion were so meager that I _ill not report them here. Particulsrly
since subsequent to the meeting several new proposals have been made that
appear better than anything we considered. Wh_t I'm saying is that our
discussion was fruitful to the extent that it got a lot of people thinking
about this problem but we probably need to get together again to discuss all
the resultant ideas and choose our course. I will set up a get together just
for that purpose.
Howard W. Tindall, Jr.
PA:HWTindall, Jr. :js14AY iIIZ
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
Memorandum Mission Planning & Analysis O nter Divisioz
TO : See list below DATE: February 20, 1969
69-FM-T-30
FROM : FM/Deputy Chief
SUB3ECT: Results of the February 18 Apollo Spacecraft Software Configum_tion
Control Board (ASSCCB) meting
This is just a short note to info_,,,you of the most significant actions
taken at the subject meeting.
1. PCR 268 for both _ARY lA and COLOSSUS PA was approved. As
a result, these pro_-_ms which will be used on the G mission will be
modified to speed up Programs P34 and P35 as recommended by Ed Lineberry,
Bob Regelbrugge, etc. Specifically, this cha.nge to the TPI and F_C targeting programs is to use a Kepler prediction _rather than the precision
n,_merical integration since it is so much '-'fasterwith no appreciable
decrease in accuracy. Zt is estimated that about 80 seconds is saved
each time these programs are called up. Since the co,..._udmodule runs
through P34 three times between CDH And TPI, this represents a saving of
about four minutes in that extremely crowded timeline. MIT intends to
implement this such that it normally operates in the fast mode but they
are providing a crew option to override that logic and use the old precision integration if it is deemed necessary. [Incidentally, no change
is being made to the Stable Orbit rendezvous program (P38). ]
2. PCR 273 to put the jerk limits used on the descent abort programs
into erasible memory was disapproved. However, we were given the action
item of determining the values which we feel are best to be put in fixed
memory. These n_:stbe relayed to MIT on or before February 21.
3. PCR 274 for LUMINARY lA and COLOSSUS 2A to modify the 1,m_r potential
was disapproved based on George Cherry's estimate that the impact would be
substantial. MIT was asked to start a parallel effort in developing the
foz_Alation for the expanded l_r_r potential model for their progr_m_ but
not to plan to implement it for the G mission. This obviously means we
will have to develop workaround procedures for DOI and descent targeting
to be used in the _C-H/RTCC.
4. PCB 732 LUMINARY lA to add rendezvous radar bias to the W-w_trix
input/output display was approved. As you recall, the crew was already
given a convenient way to readout and update the position and velocity
te_ms of the W-matrix but had to go through a special procedure for loading the rendezvous radar term. This change merely added that parameter
to the standard display. There was considerable discussion regarding units
Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly an the Payroll Savings Plan2
of these terms. MIT was given the option of changing them for crew
convenience at no impact if they could do it to both COLOSSUB and LUMINARY.
It should be emphasized this is just a nicety.
5. Several cb_ges have been approved to the Descent programs of
IA. Probably the most significant deals with providing the crew
with the capability of taking over manual control of spacecraft attitude
and then returning to automatic control while in the terra,ual descent
programs. If you are interested in this sort of thing I suggest you
contact the experts to learn precisely what is being done. As I understand it, if the crew does take over attitude control, it is important
that they maintain the co_w?uter recowm_nded attitude as displayed in the
FDAI error-needles, otherwise the throttle control by the LGC will get
screwed up. Also, there is som_ concern that if the crew does not respond
fast enough they my create an unstable situation.
Finally, I would like to confess a mistake I haye been making, which I
Rm going to try to avoid in the future. N_m_ly, in the interest of
expediency, I h_ve been sighting MPAD's POR's which are not written up
accurately or co_letely enough. From now on I Aw going to be looking
for _ch more detail specifically describing the ch_uge and the advantages
to be accrued.
Howard W. Tindall, Jr.
Addressees:
FM/J. P. Mayer
C. R. Huss
D. H. Owen
R. H. Brown
FM1B/R. P. Patten
FM2/C. A. Graves
H. D. Beck
FM6/R. R. Regelbrugge
K. A. yo,_ng
R. W. Becker
F/S. P. Mann
R. 0. Nobles
Fcs/c. B. Parker
TRW/Houston/R. J. Boudreau
MIT/IL/M. W. Johnston
NR/Downey/B. C. Johnson, ABk6
FM_Branch Chiefs
FM:HWTindall, Jr. :is*' CI"IrllCNAL. r Gsqd,4NO. 10
MAY 11N_II_DIT'[Cfi
GSA_"MR (4_C_R)Iol..A
UNFireD STATES GC)VE_I"r
Memorandum
TO : See list attached DATE: February 24, 1969
69-PA-T-BIA
lmOl_ : PA/Chief, Apollo Data l:_iorit_y Coordination
SUBJECT: Let's have no unscheduled water dumps on the F::mission
During a recent Data Selection Mission Techniques meeting we were
informed that the CSM has some sort of automatic water dump system.
It was even rumored that it might be enabled on the F mission while
the crew is sleeping during cis-lunar flight. This memo is to inform
everyone that an unscheduled water dump can really screw up MBFN orbit
determination. Accordingly, if we have a vote, this automatic capability,
if it exits, should be inhibited and water d,_m?s should only be performed as scheduled by I_C-H.
Howard W. Tindall, Jr.
PA:HWTin_ll3 Jr. :is
IOFTIlONAL FORM _0, l0
MU_T tM2 EDri*loe4
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-1t.I
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
Memorandum Cent ,'
TO : See list attached DATE: February 24, 1969
69-PA-T-32A
FROM : PA/Chief, Apollo Data Priority Coordination
SUBJECT: Some things about _FN orbit determination
A couple of interesting things came out of our Data Selection Mission
Techniques meeting of February 19.
There had been concern that the last translunar midcourse correction (MCCh)
was being scheduled too late before LOI. You recall that it is at LOI -
5 hours. Math Physics Branch reported that the 18BFNI sigma perigee
prediction uncertainty at the time of L0I targeting (at LOI - 2 hours) is
1.4 n.m., ass_3m_ng MCC4 is executed to within .2 fps. It was also reported
that if it was unnecessary to perform MCC4 the uncertainty in pexigee prediction is essentially constant from LOI - 5 hours through LOI - 2 hours:
the I si? value being .4 n.m. The significance of this_ of course, is
that our current midcourse correction logic makes it probable that M_C 4
will not be required and, therefore, it should be possible to perform LOI
targeting as _ch as 5 hours before LOI without any additional error if
it is operationally desirable to do so.
If you recall, on the C' mission we stated that _FN ranging while the
spacecraft was in lunar orbit was unnecessary unless orbit determination
problems cropped up, which they never did. This same procedure applies
to the F mission with one significant exception. In order to give us
the greatest chance of solving our c_zrrent lunar orbit determination and
lunar gravitational problems, we would like to obtain as roach _FN ranging
as possible during the ianSm_rk tracking exercise to be carried out on TEI
day. Although not mandatory, we would like to assign it a priority high
enough that it would be obtained even at some cost of voice co._._,._uications
and/or other things that might conflict with it. In other words, it is
nottrivial. _,_
Howard W. Tindall, Jr.
PA:HWTindall, Jr.: js
_10-1i:I.,' _w.rll_N;_. leOg_4 NO. i O
MAY lng E]3fT1_d
_ YP,tllR (41 CP'R) tOl-I'l.II
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
Memorandum
TO : See list below DATE: February 25, 1969
69-PA-T-B_A
FROM : PA/Chief, Apollo Data Priority Coordination
SUBJECT: D Mission LM PGNCS IMU drift checks
This memo is to backup a telephone conversation with Will Fenner. I
hope it doesn't just add confusion but I thought it might be worthwhile
to put into writing my latest with regard to the D ¥_ission lamPGNCS IMU
alignments and gyro drift checks. I am pretty sure if limi ts are approached
or slightly exceeded_ the guidance officer is going to be forced to exercise
some real time judgment and I don't envy him in this particular case. I
would recow._=nd he reference this memo if it supports his judgment but
if he doesn't use these numbers, I certainly will not call anyone's attention
to it.
Marry James, _7, has spent a considerable amount of effort in detei'mining
the magnitude of the various error sources contributing to our uncertainty
in the relative orientation of the two nay bases. I spent a good bit of
time talking to him and my feeling is that he has done a good job and these
numbers are probably okaY. The following table shows the contribution of
each of the error sources:
Values listed are the i si? misalignment uncertainty
estimates between the listed spacecraft components
Around x-axis Around y and z-axes
CSM IMD
1
rain _ rain
CSM NAV BASE
l0 l0
CSM SPA_ AXWS
20 8
csMOOCKINORING(OR  DEX)
15
DOCKINGRINC(oR
5 4
DM NAV BASE
i 1
2
LMIMN
RSS 1_rain 28rain
If you ESS these values, we find the I sigwm uncertainty around the y and
z-axes is about _ degree and around the x-axis is about ½ degree. That is,
l Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan _ g _-!
The PGNCS alignment against the CSM _ Should be within better than 3/h
degree around the y and z-axes and l_-degree around the x-axis. If we
add to this the maxi_ gyro drift we are willing to tolerate (i.e., 1.5
degree per hour) for the 2 hours between alignments, we can obtain the
largest tolerable gyro torquing angles beyond which we say the _ is
broken. It seems to me then that 4 degrees should be that limit. However,
since we have no real experience with LE _ alignments of any sort this
number must be tempered by real time judgment and thus becomes more of a
guideline value than a limit.
Howard W. Tindall, Jr. -_-
Addressees:
FC/E. F. Kranz
FC4/R. L. Carlton
FCS/W. E. Fenner
CC:
PA/G. M. Low
PD/A. Cohen
PD?/R. H. Kohrs
CF24/M. C. Contella
EG2/C. T. Hackler
C. F. Wasson
FA/C. C. Kraft, Jr.
FC/J. G. Renick
FC4/J. B. Craven
FM/J. P. _ayer
C. R. Huss
D. H. Owen
FM13/R. P. Parten
FM2/C. A. Graves
T.P xley
FMS/R.E. Ernull
FM6/K. A. Young
R. W. Becker
i_/R. O. Nobles
FN/Branc h Chiefs
THW/R. J. Boudreau
C. M. James
MIT/iL/M. W. Johnston, 7-279
PA:HWTindall, Jr. :isOg_ I_ INa, I0
llllAY IMIZ I_rTICIN
GS,,tFPMR(_ am) m-.,.i
UNITRn STATES GOVERNMENT rl_o._._..,.--.., e.,..,._,,... 1,dr' 1 :.:..-;..'c,:;:v_ ,,_.... ,,_.,_ _,¥,r
TO :
In_ oz-n,-_ , -o' _istribution DATE: FEB"'_ 5 IS59
69-_%1-_-7
FROM : r%16/Chief, Orbital Mission Analysis Branch
SUBJECT: Comparison limSts for rendezvous radar test on Apollo 9
Reference: Sbnnnahan, Philip: Rendezvous radar checkout for Apollo 9,
OMAB Memorandum 69-FM62-38, Feb. 20, 1969.
The comparison limits for the rendezvous radar test on Apollo 9 were
determined by OMAB and documented in the above reference. Recent studies
conducted by MIT/IL have Pointed out an additional error source not considered in the OMAB analyses. This error Source results from the computational inaccuracies in the Rendezvous Parameter Display Routine (R31)
for range and rnnge rate based upon the vehicle state vectors. At the
very close range at which the radar test is being conducted (~ 0.6 n. mi.)
the computed range can be in error by 600 feet and the range rate by
2 fps. This information was relayed by Mr. Malcolm Johnston of MIT/IL
via a telephone conversation on Feb. 24. Inclusion of this error source
results in limits as follows:
Range comparison 1600 feet
Range rate comparison 7 fps
The revised limits have been relayed to Mr. R. Carlton of FCD and Mr. M.
Contella of FCSD.
Edg_r C. Lineberry --
Distribution: FC5/C. B. Parker
MTT/M. Johnston C.E. Charlesworth
TEW/D. P. Johnson S.L. Davis
R. J. Boudreau W.E. Fenner
CF21/J. C. Callihan S.G. Bales
CF2_/M. C. Contella E.L. Pavelka
P. C. Kramer P.C. Shaffer
D.W. Lewis H.D. Reed
CF34/T. Guillory F_4/J. P. Mayer
T. W. Holloway H.W.Tindall
CB/J. A. McDivitt C.R. Huss
R. L. Schweickart D.H. Owen
D. R. Scott R.P. Parten
t FC5/G. S. Lunney Branch Chiefs
J. C. Bostick FM15/Editing
FC/B. Carlton FM6/Section Heads
ECL: fc
=o-. Buy U,S. Savings Bonds R,gularly on the Payroll gavings Plan '_/ /_ IFqOmMNO, 110
MAy lrJ_ i_('rl_N
In_ (q _) _$...i "
UNITW. D STATES GOVERNMENT
Memorandum oe=.
TO : See list attached DATE: February 26, 1969
69-PA-T-B5A
MOM : PA/Chief, Apollo Data Priority Coordination
SUBIEGT: F/G Niizor Image Targeting shall use a three-miuute delay
As you know, we have established as a stanS_d procedure during Apollo
rendezvous having CSM backup 1AM maneuvers in order to retain the
nominal relative motion during this critical mission phase. On the D
mission these "mirror image" CSM maneuvers are targeted with .a _IG
delayed one minute a_ter the-!_M TIG. One minute was chosen _ased on
our estiw_te that it would be adequate for the crew to detezmine
whether or not the co_w_nd module should go active nnd to take the
proper steps subsequent to that decision. John Young - the F mission
CMP - was concerned that by using a one-minute delay he is forced to
turn on his SPS trim g_mbal motors for each of the mi',*or image mqueuvers
whether he has to execute the burn or not. Since there is no significant
disadvantage in re,king the delay larger, we are changing it to three
minutes for the F and G missions in order to avoid having to turn on
those motors nnnecessarily. Henceforth, all F/G _n_lyses, s_:lations,
procedures, and techniques will be based on that value.
? Howard W. Tindall, Jr.
PA:HWTindall, Jr. :js
..... BuyU.S. SavingsBondsRegularlyonthr PayrollSavingsPlan ,2/.2 .4"KORM NO. 10
MAYI(1_
GSA P'PtMR (41 am) 101-..4
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
Memorandum
TO : See list attached DATE: February 26, 1969
69-PA-T-36A
FROM : PA/Chief, Apollo Data Priority Coordination
SUBJECT: Review of the Launch Phase Abort Mission Techniques Document
forMissionsF andG
1. References:
l_C Internal Note No. S-PA-8T-026, "Apollo Mission Techniques Saturn
V/Apollo Launch Phase Aborts, Techniques Descriptions," dated October
2.22, A1968. review of the subject document is scheduled for F_rch _, 1969,
at 9 a.m. in Building 4, Room 378. The purpose of this review is to
discuss launch phase abort techniques which have changed significantly
since the publication of the referenced techniques document, which had
been _ritten specifically for C' and D. The following list defines the
majorrevisions:
a. Modification to the C0I maneuver and expanded capability.
b. Use of a launch vehicle performance envelope for an abort cue.
c. Use of the exit heating limit as an abort limit.
d. Incorporation of the steerable LV ma_,-1 capability to the abort
techniques.
3. It is hoped that all groups associated with this area be represented
to expedite this review. Draft copies will be available at the meeting.
Howard W. Tindall, Jr.
-_3: · EMHenderson: js
'_ Buy U.S. Savings Bands Regularly an the Payroll Savings Plan ..2/.a_
y_to.lm' ' O/_'"IICiMI&L F04_4 NO. 10
hiAy lel_ ED_CI_I
GSA llrllMR (,L1CTZ_) 101-11.4
Memorandum Oent,
TO : See list attached DATE: February 27, 1969
69-PA-T-37A
FROM : PA/Chief, Apollo Data Priority Coordinatio n
SUBJECT: Some more trivia for the F mSssion
This memo is to point out a couple of oversights in our F Mission
Techniques.
1. With regard to docked DPS burns we should remember that the
I/JMINARY program used on F is the same as the SUNDANCE program to be
used on D, which due to scaling problems or something barely recognizes
that the DPS is running when it is at only 10 Percent thrust in the
docked configuration. Accordingly, it is necessary for the crew to
me_{__lly advance the throttle to 40 percent thrust for awhile prior to
going to full thrust in order for the PGNCS to trim the DPS thrust
vector through the CG. (Note: IXIMI_Y lA for G b_s been fixed so
that glmbal triw,,_ng will be done at lO percent and the stopover at
40 percent is not required. )
2. During the planning of the special F m_ssion l_ndw_rk tracking
exercise Just prior to TMT we forgot to include the C)_ state vector
updating from the NEC-H once per rev. This is so obviously necessary
that it would certainly have been caught during the earliest simalations.
However, we might as well start including it in F mission documentation
now to be done at about the same time as the periodic P52 platform
reali_._uts.
Howard W. Tinda!l, Jr.
PA:HWTindall, fir.:Js
t Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan _'_/_'OI_IONAL P01_l HO. _
IiIAy I_11 1_fi'l_4
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
- Memorandum NASA Manned Spacecraft Center
TO : F_Technical Assistant, Mission Planning DATE: February 28, 1969
and Analysis Division 69-PA-T-39A
_oM : PA/Chief, Apollo Data Priority Coordination
StmJECT: Some MPAD work needed for the G mission
During the February 26th Data Select Mission Techni ques meeting, Math
Physics Branch (MPB) picked up three actio n'items for the G mission, of
which you should be aware.
1. Prior to D0I Sextant data is used to determine the relative
location of the landing site with respect to the CSM orbital elements.
Based on this data the landing site coordinates will be changed to
facilitate descent targeting. However, it is clear that there is a
limit beyond which we will be unwilling to change the landing site
coordinates from those established pre-mission because such a big change
would appear to indicate something is fouled up. Accordingly, we have
requested the MPB to determine the magnitude of the various error sources
which would contribute to this real time change in order that the flight
controllers can intelligently assess the situation in real time. In
addition to this they are also to recommend a lower bound - that is, a
"who cares" limit wherein the change is so trivial it should be ignored.
2. On the first pass after touchdown and on the last pass prior to
124 lift-off, the two spacecraft observe each other with optics and
rendezvous radar. As presently configured, the RTCC processes the IA_
and CSM data independently. However, there are apparently techniques
for combining the solutions to get the best total solution. The MPB
was requested to analyse and doc,,w_nt the techniques which should be
used in the processing of this data in real time. Incidentally, it is
to be noted that on both of these occasions this process should be aimed
at chsnging the orientation of the CSM orbital plane as opposed to moving
the 1AM position. That is, we will use our best est_w_te of the landing
site (RI_) as the fixed reference in establishing this relative situation
in preparation for ascent targeting and the CSM plane change.
3. MPB was also requested to re-exsm_ue the quality of the various
state vectors which could be used for targeting LOI 2 - especially in the
out-of-plane direction. As I recall, when we were figuring the battle of
the two-stage LOI, the consensus was that our _nowledge of the ln_r orbital
plane based on the approach trajectory plus GNCS navigation through L0I 1
was superior to the single pass MSFN solution after LOI1. As a result we
were recomw_uding as a standard procedure that LOI 2 should always be targeted as a completely in-plane maneuver basically because no new out-of-plane
t B_y U.g. Savings Bonds Reg#larly on the Payroll Savings Plan _9/J'" _i_information was available prior to LOI 2 based on which we could do this
targeting. Obviously this must assume small G&N dispersions in the
execution of LOI1. The question is - is that still the right way to go?
· I accidentally discovered that the flight controllers were figuring on
using the post L0I 1 data to do out-of-plane targeting on LOI 2.
Dave, if task assignments are needed, wil_ you m_ke sure they are prepared?
I suspect this work is already covered.
L -
Howard W. 'l'_ndall, Jr.
cc:
FM/J. P. _ayer
FMR/F. V. Bennett
l_/J. C. McPherson
E. R. Schiesser
FM6/E. C. Lineberry
FMiB/R. P. Patten
J. R. G_rley
FC/C. E. Charlesworth
FCS/P. C. Shaffer !
TRM/R. J. Beudreau
MIT/M. W. Johnston, IL 7-279 :
PA:HWW_indall, Jr. :jsc C_SAFfflUR (_ cffR) IOl-IIJ
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
Jaemoranaum O nt r
TO : See list attached DATE: February 28, 1969
69-PA-T-40A
FROM : PA/Chief, Apollo Data Priority Coordination
SUBJECT: There will be no VEF ranging data collected while tracking the LM on
the lunar surface
It has been suggested that, in addition to optics and rendezvous radar
tracking one spacecraft of the other while the LM is on the lunar
surface, we should also utilize VHF ranging. This data would certainly
be usei_ll for post-flight analysis if not in real time. I have attempted
to resolve the situation with regard to obtaining this data and have com_
to the conclusion that it is too late to get it, as ,meor_m_te as that may
be. The basic problem is in the fox_lation of the RTCC program. And, the
program changes required appear to be too large for obtaining data which at
best mst be labeled "desirable."
Through the years our plans for CSM tracking of the I_ while on the lu_r
surface have all been based on just using the sextant. Obviously, we
intended to use the Lunar Orbital Navigation program (PR2), which not
only provides automatic optics tracking but also complies the desired
optical data, time tags, spacecraft attitude and landmark I.D. in a special
downlist package for transmission to the _C-H. The RTCC programs have been
fox'-.,latedto accept this data in that format and process it in real time.
First indications are that the spacecraft Rendezvous Navigation program
(P20) would serve the crew as well as _ for tracking the I_ on the lunar
surface with re,rd to automatic optics, and would have the additional
advantage of including VEF ranging data on the downlist. Unfor_m_tely,
though, the PRO downlist format is substantially different than the PR2
downlist and would require rather extensive changes in the RTCC program.
· For example, the sextant data is not stored in a batch of five observations
as in P22 but would have to be stripped out one at a time as the observations are obtained. This could easily cause us to miss some points. But
more important, the RTCC would have to be coded to store them for processing.
Finally, it is to be noted that 1>20 only collects a VHF data point once per
minute - almost not worth the effort: Implicit in the above is that VEF
telemetry via the _ is the only source; raw VEF does not come down directly.
In sm,w,_ry, we are abandoning efforts to get VHF for the G flight. It may
be worthwhile to put in a PCR to add VHF sampling to the P22 program and
its downlist at a reasonable data rate. Jim McPherson - would you take the
action on this, if it seems reasonable to you?
Howard W. Tindall, Jr.
PA:HWTindall,Jr.:js :
.... Buy U.S. Savings BoraJJ Rt&ularly on thc Payroll Saving$ Plan .2 / _ _1_C_T_I4AL. FORM NO. 10
IdA¥ lm_
FPMR (41 C:_R) _0$-I1J
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT.
Memorandum Oent
TO : See list attached DATE: _hrch 7, 1969
69-PA-T-h2A
FROM : PA/Chief, Apollo Data Priority Coordination
$USIECT: G D_n8r Surface stuff is still incomplete
On February 27 we held a Mission Techniques meeting which I thought was
going to simply edit the "final" version of the L,7_v Surface Document
prior to its release. To my chagrin we discovered that there are at
least two areas requiring _,ch more thought and analysis. We will
probably meet again to resolve these during the last week of March. The
release of the Mission Techniques Document will have to be delayed
accordingly.
Before delving into these major items, there are a couple of other
things I would like to mention. The first may seem trivial. It deals
with terminology - specifical_y_ use of the expression "go/no go" regarding the decision whether to stay or abort _mm_diately after landin E on
the l_m_r surface. Every time we talk about this acitivity we have to
redefine which we mean by "go" and "no go." That is - confusion inevitably
arises since "go" means to "stay" and "no go" means to "abort" or "go."
Accordingly, we are suggesting that the te_minology for this particular
decision be changed from "go/no go" to "stay/no stay" or something like
that. Just call me "Aunt _ ....."
Last s_er GAEC honored us with their presence at one of our meetings
and to celebrate the occasion we give them an action item. We asked them
how to mske the tilt-over decision and to establish the attitude and rate
limits for aborting. We haven't heard from them since_ on that or anything
else except RCS plllm_ impingement. Don't woi_xy,we still have four months
to figure out how to do it.
I would like to emphasize that we do not want to trim residuals following
the CS1/plane change maneuver. It is recoil zed that they may be rather
large since it is the first SPS undocked burn_ but we would rather take
them into account by adjusting the ascent targeting than by spending CSM
RCS propellant.
Another thing we realized about the CSM Was that we had not definitively
established the attitude the CSM should maintain during I2/ ascent nor
whether it was necessary for the M_C-H to compute the associated _ gimbal
angles.
t m,yu.s. B,l, I ,g,a,,,lyo,, t' y,U S,,,i.g,it,,,Our biggest problem in this mission phase deals with platform alignments.
Specifioally, we are still not sure what sequence of alignment options
should be used, although, I think everyone agrees we should use a gravity
alignment for the actual ascent. The basic problem seems to stem from a
lack of _:nderstanding of Just how the I/4Lurer Surface Program (P57)
actually works and, in each case, what the torquing angles really indicate.
Of course, the thing we are primarily interested in accomplishing is to
evaluate the performance - that is, the drift of the _ - in.order to
decide if it is working, if we should align the AGS to the PGNCS, if we
should update the IMU compensation parameters, if we should lift-off on
the PGNCS or the AGS, etc. Prior to our meeting at the end of March, TRW
will write out in detail how they think the system actually works along with
a description of how we should use it. Guidance and Control Division may
do the same? Then, we will all get together withMIT to see if we can get
this thing straighten out and cleared up. _
Finally, our other big problem has to do with how we should handle the
I_ilocation on the moon (RI_) and the CSM state vector, particularly
during the first two hours on the lurer su_face in preparation for the
countdown demonstration and, if necessary, ascent at the end of the first
CSM revolution. The point is we will have all the data needed to determine
the I_'s location but we do not want to change it in the various computers
(LGC, CME, RTC0) ,,nless we can maintain a consistant CSM state vector, too.
And, it is not at all clear how we can do all that. This subject becomes
another major item on the agenda of the !'ides of Narch" meeting.
¢
PA:HWTindall, Jr. :jsUNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
Memoranaum
TO : See list attached DATE: March 14, 1969
69-PA-T-44A
EOM : PA/Chief, Apollo Data Priority Coordination
SUBJECT: Happiness is having plenty of hydrogen
As I understand it, there has been a desire or requirement to have the
capability of surviving a cryo-tank failure at any time in the lurer
mission. After C'_ it was decided to keep the _ powered up throughout all _r missions even though it might be at the cost of having the
backup cryos. However, according to a recent analysis by MPAD's Guidance
and Performance Branch (R. C. Wadle, W. Scott, and D. A. Nelson), these
two characteristics are not incompatible. Since this is quite different
from what I have heard in the past, I thought you might find it interesting,
too.
According to Wadle, Scott, and Nelson, it is possible to operate with the
platform powered up and even if one tank fails as late as TET, there is
still enough hydrogen left in the other tank to provide a four day returnto-earth in a powered-down state. (Hydrogen is the most critical cons,mable. ) The powered-down state still provides for co_0kmnications; essentially
it consists of just taking' the guidance system and one fuel cell offthe
line and turning off non-essential equipment.
Howard W. Tindall, Jr.
PA:Rl_Tindall, Jr. :js
Bu3 U.y. Savings B_d.rP.,g¢l_.rly_ th, Payrd] Savings Plan ..2..2 _ _2_m w No. lO -.
MAY IlllZ EZlr%'Ji_IN
GSa Z',/'MR (41 CFR) 101-1'Li
UNITF. n STATES GOVERNMENT
Memorandum Oento
TO : See list attached DATE: March 12, 1969
69-PA-T-45A
FROM : PA/Chief_ Apollo Data l:_ior:ity Coordination
SUBJECT: Simplification to the pre-PDI abort procedure
As a result of a passing comment in one of my previous notes, Torm_y
Gibson and George Chei=i_ylooked into what it would take to provide
automatic PGNCS targeting for LM aborts at initiation of powered
descent (PDI). _ey found the capability already exists in the
program. How's that for great:
The situation I am discussing is when the need for abort is recognized
after DOI and before PDI on a lunar landing mission. The ideal procedure, of course, is for the I_i to make a maneuver at about PDI time
which wi]l set up a nominal rendezvous sequence with CSI ½ rev later.
This is exactly what the DPS and APS abort programs (PT0 and PT1) do
automatically, but it was thought these programs could only be used if
powered descent was actually started and we certainly didn't want to
start powered descent - a retrograde mqneuver when the abort maneuver
_st be posigrade. That would make it necessary to execute a large
attitude change while thrusting, it turns out that the crew may obtain
automatic targeting for an abort maneuver by proceeding into the descent
program (P63) just as if intending to land, except that he must maneuver
the spacecraft m_uually into the posi_=ade abort direction prior to PDI
time. He actually starts the DPS burn in P63 but since P63 does not
start descent guidance until the engine is throttled up, it will automatically m_intain the abort attitude the crew has established. After
achieving engine stability at about TIG plus five seconds, the crew
can press the Abort button which will automatically call up the DPS Abort
program (PT0) to compute the abort maneuver targets, immediately throttle
up to full thrust, and control the burn.
This certainly seems like a _straightforward procedure, completely consistent with stand_vd descent procedures, and aborts immediately after
PDI. I think we should establish this as our primary abort techn4que
for this missionperiod. :,
Great work_ Tom and GeOrge. Keep that up and I predict you'll go places.
Howard W. Tindall) Jr.
PA:HWTindall, Buy Jr.: U.S. jsSavings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan _r ,Z_/
IDl$-l_4D_"JCI4AJ. FOllml NG, 10
MAy 'lMZ I_i11(_1
GSA WI'MR (,4nGL'_) _$41.i
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
Memorandum ,_ l_n_ed Spacecraft Center
TO : See list attached DATE' April l, 1969
69-?A-T-52A
FROM : PA/Chief, Apollo Data Priority Coordination
SUBJECT: PGNCS operations while on the 1,m_r surface
During our Narch 27 Dm_r Surface Mission Techniques meeting I
think we finally settled how we think the PGNCS should be operated.
How many times have I said that before? This memo is to broadcast
a few new items that might be of general interest.
NIT has recently made a significant change in the PGNC8 lnr_r surface
alignment program (P57). They have added a new alternative governing
the orientation to which the _ can be aligned. Specifically, before
this change there were only two alternatives -a "prefe_xed" alignment associated with lift-off time computed by the LGC and an alignment to a REFS_fl_ATuplinked from the Mission Control Center. The
new alternative Provides the capability of an alignment to the stored
REFS_T - that is, the same REPSI_AT towhich the _ was aligned
the last time. This program change significantly simplifies crew
procedures and since it will be used several times during the lunar
stay you should be aware of it.
We have finally converged on the sequence of P57 options to be used
on the lunar surface. They are described in considerable detail in
the attachment. Briefly the sequence is:
a. A gravity alignment (Option l) to determine the direction of
the gravity vector.
b. An A0T star ali_ment (Option 2) to establish an inertial
reference which can be used with the gravity vector to determine the
LM's position on the lnr_r surface. This alignment will also provide
a drift check on the _ since the pre-DOI AOT star alignment.
c. A gravity and star alignment (Option 3) in preparation for
lift-off at the end of two hours stay, if that is necessary, and to
initialize the system for a sustained _ drift check.
d. Two Option 3's in the nominal ascent countdown. The first,
which completes the drift check, also sets up the system for the
rendezvous radar tracking of the com-_nd module two hours before the
lift-off. The second supports the Ascent itself.
Buy U.S. Savings BondsRegularly onthe PayrollSavings Plan _ 2..2
gGl$-_2
This sequence not only provides all of the data needed to support the
actual Operation But also exercises all of the options which makes the
engineers happy, The consensus was that we have tri,,.,_dthis activity
just about to a mini_,m and it should be fairly easy to include in the
crew timeline. :·
Flight Dynamics' flight controllers were requested to select the stars
to be used for the lunar surface alignment on the nomJn_l G mission
as soon as possible.
It is our understanding and recommendation that the IM_ will remain
powered up throughout the lnnsr stay. We ·should emphasize that it
is also necessary that the LGC remain powered up as in order to ,_intain gyro compensation in the _ as well as to provide the downlink
data continuously to the Mission Control Center. Apparently there
was some uncertainty about this.
After'considerable discussion it was decided that our best course of
action· is to update both the LM position on the 1,,_ surface (BT.q)
and comm_nd module state vector in the LGC during the first two hours
on the ll,_sr surface to Support sn ascent at that time, if it is
necessary. The ELS will be based on the AOT alignment and gravity
vector data _as well as crew observations during the landing and l_rhaps
on data gathered prior to DOI. (The exact msn_er in which the Mission
Control Center will do this job is the subject of a meeting next week. )
The CSM state vector will be the best MSFN estimate at the time of the
update. This is such an obvious choice you mst wonder how we wasted
our time. The only point we were concerned with was making sure that
the RLS and CSM vectors were compatible enough to support ascent guidance
at the end of a two hour stay. Me feel that this technique will probably
provide that, but we may want to reconsider after obtaining F mission
experience.
In addition to the Data Select business noted above about how to establish
RI_, we are also scheduling, a meeting specifically to discuss the ACS
operation on the lnn_r surface next week. After incorporating the
results of those meetings into the Mission Techniques Doc,,ment. for
Lunar Surface Operation, we will review and finally publish tha:tdocument a couple of weeks later. Hopefully, at that time this mission
phase should be fairly well closed out.
· H_c war_l_l _jr__.
Enclosure
PA:HWTindall, Jr. :jsLM _ AT,TG_lViENTSEQUENCE
1. Pre-undock - align to Mission Control Center REFSMMAT
2. Pre-DOI - P52 AOT align to REFSMMAT (stored)
3. Post Touchdown
a. Option I to REFSMMAT to obtain the g vector
Do not torque the I_J - specifically, the crew should recycle
(V3_---_out of the program at the VO6N93 torquing angle display
b. Option 2* to REFSMMAT - to obtain I2_ drift since pre-DOI alignment. Given the g vector of Option i this supplies all data
required for LM position detei_mination on the lunar surface
both onboard and at the Mission Control Center.
c. Update pT.q and CSM state vector in the LGC based on best
sources of data available - no attempt is made to rake these
"consistent."
4. Touchdown plus l¼ hr to prepare for RR track or lift-off after
first CSM rev.
Option 3* to landing site - using updated lift-off time from
the Mission Control Center.
5- During 1,,n_r stay (about 19 hours duration) monitor CDU angles
continuously at the Mission Control Center.
6. Lift-off - _ hours
Option 3* to REFSMMAT to obtain drift and to align for RR tracking.
7. Update CSM state vector in LGC. Optional update of _.
8. Lift-off - 45 minutes
Option 3* to landing site for Ascent.
*(a) If attempt at Option 2 fails because stars are not visible,
replace with Option 3 using sun or earth if possible.
(b) If attempts at Option 3 fail (even with s,_ or earth) replace
with Option l' s.
Note: Unset REFSMMAT flag before _6 above if using Option 1
to eliminate drift effect over long 1,_r_r stay.
Enclosure-- - ,.'_ .... '_..OP'rIONAI. lOgAN NO- I0
_y 111_ IEX)t'rlGl_i
GSA FI, Mm (,fi _vlq) _1-11.i
UNITEr) STATES GOVERNMENT
Memorandum
TO : See list below DATE: April 3, 1969
69-PA-T-53g.
mOM : PA/Chief, Apollo Data Priority Coordination
SUBJECT: Some G Mission Techniques action items
This memo is just a list of action items assigned, to MPAD and/or
FLrTwhich I remember coming from our recent G descent/descent abort
meetings. In addition to reminding those responsible for them, they
serve as some sort of indication of what's going on in this business
which you might find interesting.
1. Orbital Mission gn_lysis Branch
a. Establish a preferred rendezvous -_uvuver sequence to
guard against lunar impact in the event of late c.escent aborzs on
the AGS. This includes a recommendation on AV ;rimming at 'insertion,
too.
b. Determine if an nn_cceptable abort situation wou?d exist
if PDI were delayed one rev in real time.
2. F_th Physics Branch
a. Determine how the flight controllers should decide when to
apply the altitude bias update to the Lear Processor Display of H vs.
H. Is there some way to take into account the kr_own lmm_r s_face slope?
Specifically; find out from the mapping people wlmt the exac; slope is
for the landing sites.
b. Determine the effect of non-synchron:[zation cf t,te data
sources when updating the Lear altitude from PGNCS.
3- Landing Analysis Branch
a. Establish a technique for testing ant.determining; acceptsbility of the LGC LM state vector pre-PDI. Also, recom_.end the action -
that is, under what conditions they should abor% update the st__te vector,
advise crew of large AH, or what?
b. There is a PDI attitude burn check m_de at T-!G- 2 :-_inutes,
referenced to the horizon. Determine how accu__ate!y a pre-flight a_lue
may be established and thus if it is necessary to upOate thi; test in
real time. Also, ascertain if the sun will interfere with t_is test.
_0-_ Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on th_ Payroll Savi_gs Pi_n....... ....... _. , .
I
2
c. Is there some way to monitor the PGNCS to determiae failure
of the.P63/P6_ program change to occur when it should have by using the
V, H, H DSKY displays? I would like to avoid having to call up TGO.
Also, establish what course of action the crew should take if they fail
to get the program change.
2. Guidance and Performance Branch
Establish strip chart limit lines defioi:_g AGS perfoiEance in
terms of acceptable, marginal, and failed. Simikar l_m_ts a?e also
required for the telemetry comparison display.
5- Landing Analysis Branch and Math Physics Branch
Determine if and how the descent targeting _st be u-,'datedin
the event PDI is delayed one rev in real time af=er DOI.
6. Guidance and Performance Branch and _frT
Establish abort l_m_ts for the strip charts beyond waich impending failure of the PGNCS should be considered iwm_uent.
7. Landing Analysis Branch_ G&CD_ and MIT
a. Establish attitude error and attitude rate limit,; to be used
by the crew during descent and reco_,_,_endedacti6n if _riolate_L.
b. Establish what constitutes adequate landing radar data. Specifically, what should be used as a measure of this:
(1) The s_ount obtained and when it was obtained.
(2) _H from the strip chart at the time of lanling radar loss.
(3) Others? _ _ . __
Howard W. Tin_el!, ur.
Addres sees:
PA/G. M. Low FM/C. R. Huss
FA/C. C. Kraft, Jr. FM/D. H. Owen
FC/C. E. Charlesworth FM13/R. P. ]_rten
FC4_/R. L. Carlton FM13/J. R. Gurley
FCI_/J. B. Craven FM._/C. A. Graves
FC55/J. H. Greene FM4/P. T. Pixley
FC56/S. G. Bales FMV/R. O. Nobles
FM/J. P. Mayer F_i/Branch Chiefs
PA:HWTindall_ Jr: js.: . OrrlClL4_ A_I4 NO. IO
MAY 1lin KDrTICI4
aA Fi,MR (4aC_) IOt-Ila
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
Memorandum O =er
TO : See list attached DARE: April 4, 1969
. 69-PA-T-54A
I_OM : PA/Ohief, Apollo Data l:_ioritry Coordinnt-ion
SUSJECT: ELS Determination
On April 2 we had a Mission Techniques meeting to discuss how we
should handle the dete_nation of the LM's position on the lunar
surface (ELS). Specifically, we were concerned with how to determine its values and, after improved values are determined, when they
should be loaded into the spacecraft computer. One obvious conclusion, if anything can be called obvious coming _rom this discussion,
is that we have _uy excellent data sources for detezmining RI_, each
of which is estimated to be of a quality m_ch better than we need to
support the operation.
"pT_" is actually the LM position vector on the lunar surface consisting of three components. It is moon fixed - that is, rotates with
the moon - and is simply the latitude, longitude, and radial distance
of the LM from the moon's center.
Prior to landing it is necessary to establish the values of ELS to be
used in Descent targeting. For the first lunar landing, where the F
mission will have thoroughly surveyed the landing site, the consensus
is that we should use the RT.q determined on the F mission and only use
in-flight mission G measurements as a system check similar to the
horizon check made before retrofire. For landings at sites which have
not been surveyed previously, the PT-q mast be determined in real time
based on the _SFN/sextant tracking done pre-DOI. The Nath Physics
Branch (MPB) of MPAD proposes that this be handled in the following
way and I think everyone finally agreed it was logical, at least pending results of the F mission:
a. The CSN/IA_ state vectors will be a so-called single pass _SFN
solution based solely on data obtained during the sextant tracking
pass. Orientation of the orbital plane of this solution will be constrained by the pre-LOI plane plus confirmed maneuvers. (In fact, MPB
proposed that we use this technique throughout l??r_r orbit from LOt
through TEI. Data Select and _ people have the task of establishing
the technique for monitoring rev by rev single pass solutions with the
orbital plane un__constrainedto confirm that the pre-I/SI value falls
within the scatter of these determinations and of establishing the
limits beyond which they would abandon the pre-LOI plane orientation. )
' _' Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan ff2.72
b. Having established the CSH state vector as described in "a,"
i the sextant tracking data is given full weight in the determination
of PT.q. That is, the landing site location will be based entirely
on the sextant data determ_uation of its position relative to the CSM
i_ isstateonlyvector. used asButa system I wouldcheck likeforto aitersuiveyed ate thatsitethissuch_ asdetermi plannednation on
the nominal mission.
"i
After landing we have five good data sources for determining various
i con_ponentsof RLS. (MPB has the task of establishing their relative
t accuracy. ) We have decided to put off figuring out how we will actually
use them in real· time until after the F m_ssion since it is anticipated
that it will _mpact our choice tremendously. The various data sources
are as follows:
a. The ·crew observations made during descent and ·after landing
referenced to onboard maps - This is simply a matter of the crew
informing the ground of where they think they landed in terms of
longitude and latitude based on their visual observations. In addition
to relaying latitude and longitude, they should also express an opinion
of how certain they are about where they are.
'
b. The position is determined by use of star observations and the
gravity vector data obtained during the first _ align_nts on the
]_r surface. This data will be processed both onboard the spacecraft.and at Nission Control Center. It is also only capable of
determ_uing latitude and longitude - not radius.
c. The Lear powered flight processor _hich uses _FN doppler
data during descent is expected to have outstanding accuracy in determing the change in LM position from PDI to touchdown, provided we do
not encounter sustained periods of data dropout. The problem in
determining IAiposition on the lunar surface with this data_ of course,
depends on the accuracy of our knowledge of the LM position at PDI to
which we will add the position change measured by Lear. According to
HPB it is possible to obtain a very accurate estimate of LM position at
PDI using a _FN short arc solution with the orbital plane constrained
as discussed previously. (They emphasized, however_ that the short
arc solution is only accurate in the determination of position - not
velocity - and would only be obtained during post-landing processing
o_ tracking data obtained on the IA_between AOS and PDI. ) BTM then
is found by determining the LM position at PDI using the short arc
solution and manually adding to it the change in latitude, longitude,
and altitude as measured by the Lear Processor during powered descent.
Note that this yields all three components of RLS.d. PGNCS telemetry data may be used ina sfim_lar m_nner to the
Lear Processor. That is, by taking the PGNCE esthete of position at
PDI and at landing we are able to detez-mine its measurement of change
in latitude and longitude during descent. They my also be added to
the short arc solution described above to get EI_. It is to be
emphasized, however, that PGNCS accep+mnce of landing radar destroys
the capabilitY of determining the change in altitude as measured by
thePGNCS.
' e. we can do the same thing with the AGS state vectors as
described for the PGNCS. Again, since altitude updates are currently
planned during descent, on]y latitude and longitude can be obtained.
The question now is which of these sources do we use?
a. For RI_ radius our prefez-_ed source is the pre-flight
determined value if we l_nd at a Surveyed site. If not a surveyed
Site, we would either use the radius determined by the MSFN/sextant
observation obtained pre-DOI or from the Lear Processor plus short
arc solutions. These two sources are cux-rently estJw_ted to be
roughly equivalent.
b. For latitude and longitude all of the sources noted above
(i.e., crew/map, AOT/g, Lear, PGNCS, and AGS) are all considered
competitive and their priority nnst await F experience. It should
be noted that Lear, PGNUS, and AGS are not completely independent
in that they are all initialized from the same source.
Flight Dyna_cs, Data Select, and MPB people were given the task
of establishing the precise technique for Obtaining the Lear, PGNCS,
and AC_ solutions for PI_ latitude and longitude. This is not something that falls automatically out of the RTCC but will require a
considerable amount of manipulation of w_uy different state vectors
stored in it and a bunch of manual (simple) computations.
You will note that all of the above data sources are available within
an hour after landing and, as far as we are concerned, should provide
all of the data ever needed to cari_y out the operation. However, we
have currently planned to obtain rendezvous ra_v and sextant tracking
of each spacecraft by the other, both two hours after touchdown and
two hours before lift-off. Based on our discussions at this time, the
consensus is that this tracking is by no means mandatory. In particular,
if rendezvous radar tracking by the IA{becomes even slightly proble_tic,
it can easily be dropped. For example, if it conflicts with other crew
activity, uses too _ch LM power, presents thermal problems, or wears
out the rendezvous radar we can eliminate it from the timeline. Of
course, if in real time our other data sources get noodled up in some
z27way, it would have to be added back in at that time. In fact, I should
emphasize that we are not proposing that it be dropped from the timelinej
but rather that it could be dropped if necessary - so can the sextant
tracking for that matter, although no reason for dropping it occurred
to us.
In s,,w,_ry, we have many excellent data sources for ELS determination.
How we will use them will be established after the F mission. Rendezvous
radar track_ng by the LM on the lunar surface is no longer a requirement.
And, a couple of new MSFN facts are that a short arc solution yields a
good position vector and it is proposed that the pre-LOI determined
orbital plane plus confirmed ,_ueuvers be used throughout the 1,_r
orbit activity.
Howard W. Tindall,Jr. - _ I .
PA:HWTindall, Jr. :jsMAy I_m a[OgTION
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
Memorandum .. Oe t.r
TO : See list attached DATE_ April _ 1969
69-PA-T-55A
FROM : PA/Chief, Apollo Data Priority Coordination
s_JECr: AGE alignments in ]liar orbit and operations on the lunar surface
On April 2 we finally got around bo establish!_ how to operate the
AGS on the l_nar l_nding mission. The two basic subjects for discussion were how to handle CDU transient problems When aligning the
AGS to the PGNCS in l_n_r orbit and .how to operate the AGS in total
while on the lunar surface.
I am certainly no authority on CIYJ transients and only attempt
the following brief description so that the rest of the memo will
m_ke some sense to you. If you are interested in what CDU transients
really are, I recc--_._ndthat you find an authority on them. There
are lots of 'em - and as _ny versions. As you know, the AGE uses
the PGNCS as the primary reference in its aliEnm_nts, As I Understand it_ CDU transients have5somethihg ba_ to do with the electronics
in the PGNCS which are used to generate the data transmitted to the
AGS which the AGE uses in its alignments. Unless Certain precautions
are t_en, _ transients can occur and:are not ordin_wily obvious
to the crew. I gather that they can result in errors in the AGS
aliffn_nts of up to l½ degrees or so. During much of the operation
even the largest misalign_nt errorswould not particularly concern
us. On other occasions, such as during descent, they _aould essentially
disable the AC_ as a useful guidance and control system.
I will go through each of the AGE alignments:
a. LM Activation before Undocking
The c¢.r.-_ndmodule should be used to orient the spacecraft
to a so-called AGE calibration attitude which iS essentially just
displacing all three spacecraft axes at least 11½ degrees a_ay from
zero or maltiples of 45 degrees from the Lw_ principle axes. This
action, it is said, will permit the AGE aliEn_nt and calibration
to be carried out free of _ transients.
b. Pre-DOI after Undocking
The AGS is aligned to the PGNCS after its AOT aliffnment in
preparation of DOI. Since AGE aliEn_nt errors do not create a problem
Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Planbut are more of an snnoymnce in the AC_ monitoring of the DOI burn, no
precautions will be taken to avoid CIYJ transients.
c. Pre-PDI
This alignment in preparation for descent is most critical.
The AGS _st be alined accurately and, in order to m_4_i_e drift, it
must be aligned to the PGNCS very late before PDI. The choices here
were to add special crew procedures into an already crowded timeline
to avoid CDU transients vs. taking no precautions against their occurring, but being prepared to redo the alignment if the M_C detects a
CDU transient ali_-_nt e_zor h_s occurred. Either of these two
approaches were considered acceptable and are el_st a toss-up. It
was finally decided to avoid the special procedures and to take a
chance on the transient. If the M_C determines that a CDU transient
has occurred, the crew will be informed within 30 seconds and they mst
then rezero the CDU's and repeat the alignment. _is procedure is felt
to be simpler for the crew and, in particular, it avoids attitude
maneuvers which are part of the _ transient avoidance procedure.
d. Post-Insertion Ali_,_nts
After insertion into orbit the AC_ should then be aligned to
the PGNCS. Again in this non-critical period it was decided to take
a chance on a CDU transient occu_-£ng, particularly since this ali_-
ment is carried out within sight of the earth and the MCC is in a
position to advise the crew if a realignment is necessary.
Attached to this memo is a detailed sequential list of AGS options on
the _r surface at each step of which it is assumed the PGNCS is
still operational. In other words, it is the nominal sequence. If
the PGNCS becomes broken on the lunar surface, different and more
extensive operations will be required, which we have yet to define.
In the development of the attached sequences, some items of interest
and action items popped out which I would like to add here.
a. Whenever RI_ is updated in the PGNCS, it should be standard
procedure to update the AGS lunar launch site radius (Address 231).
_is update will be based on a Voice relay from the _C of the value
to be input via the AGS DEDAby the crew.
b. With regard to CI_ transients during AC_ aligm_nts on the
lunar surface, it was decidedthat we would rely on the M_C to
monitor and advise the crew if a CDU transient has occurred. That
is, the crew would follow no special procedure to determine if one hadoccurred except in the case of no co ....... ?_ication.
c. Guidance and Control Division and TRW were requested to advise
what timetag should be associated with the CSM state vector voiced to
the crew for input into the AGS in the event the PGNCS has failed.
d. NPAD was asked to determine if it is acceptable to input state
vectors into the AGS 15 minutes or more prior to PDI. The question here
really is whether or not the AGS numerical integration causes _cceptable
state vector errors for descent aborts if the state vectors are loaded
too early. Early loading, of course, is desirable to reduce crew
activity just before PDI.
All of this AGS jazz will be added to the Lunar Surface Mission Techniques
Doc,_nt. I think it's the last chunk. We will review the whole subject
of lunar surface activity next week and then can forget it - I hope.
W. Tindall,Jr. _'
Enclosure
PA:HWTindall, Jr. :jsCp'T_CI4AL. Itq{)_M NO* 10
MAY tlJll_ E:D4TIQfi
GSA KPt4R (41 C_q) t01o_t.S
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
Memorandum NASA F_nned Spacecraft Center
TO ' See list attached DATE: April 8, 1969
69-PA-T-56A
FROM : PA/Chief, Apollo Data Priority Coordination
SUBJECT: Some things about Ascent from. the moon
· . : .,
On April 3 we had an Ascent Mission Techniques meeting - the first
in a long time. This memo is mostly to express some rather general
observations. · '
I guess we all recognize that Ascent is really different from most
other maneuvers in an Apollo lunar landing mission. It is one in
which fairly small dispersions in the guidance can create an unsafe
situation either by setting up an iw,w_nent lunar impact or pOOr
conditions for cazzying out the subsequent rendezvous, or bY mmning
the APS out of propellent. Accordingly, special efforts have been
spent in trying to set up techniques for monitoring and detecting
dispersions of this type onboard the spacecraft so that the crew
can switch over from the PGNCS to the AGS in hopes of correcting the
degrading situation. Of course, in a case of an obvious failure
like the platform turned upside down, or something, the crew should
have no problem in knowing they should switchover. However, I am
confident that they will not be able _to detect insidious, slow drift
malfunctions of a magnitude, which could be catastrophic, in time to
save the mission. The techniques which have been proposed for this
are not sure-fire, even if executed to perfection. And, they are so
complex that I seriously doubt the crew, with their limited training,
would ever learn to use them with enough confidence that they would
switchover from the PGN_ to the AGS even when it was necessary. If
my assumptions are correct_ then it seems we _st recognize that the
ground is not onTy prime for detecting and advising the crew of slow
drift malfunctions but, in fact, _C is virtually the only source for
this. This in turns means that if the I_C loses hi-gain S-band telemetry
there will be no drift malfunction monitoring carried out and we will
simply have to trust that the PGNCS is working. Off-hand, that does
not strike me as an unacceptable situation since we only get in trouble
if co....... mications are lost AND the PGNCS fails insidiously.
Another thing we _:st face up to is that we do not have a manual
backup for Ascent Guidance and Control. Unlike the rendezvous, where
crew charts provide an excellent capability to press on in spite of
guidance system failures, no such capability exists for backing up
Ascent. It is true that techniques have been studied and proposed,
some of which might possibly work. However, the fact is that we do
u.s. so,t, o,, V,,oll i'll,, 2?2
not have a workable technique in hand today, and even if we did, it
certainly could not be considered operational _nless the crew were
thoroughly trained in its use. And, that they Certainly will not be.
Here again, this situation strikes me as no worse than "unfortunate."
So mch for general observations. Following are a few specific items
coming from our discussion:
a. I would like to re-emphasize that like most other maneuvers in
the Apollo mission, lift-off must occur on time. We are not plsnning
for some sort of launch window. Accordingly, if in counting down to
Ascent TIG the crew falls behind for some reason, the lift-off should
be delayed one CSM rev and the trouble that caused the tardiness should
be cleaned up. For example - one test for determining whether it is
possible to lift-off or not is the PGNCS alarm coming on at about TIG
-40 seconds, indicating average g will not be turned on at the right
time and the PGNCS will not be ready for lift-off.
b. In the event the PGNCS displays a AV Thrust Monitor Alarm
after the APS engine actually comes on, the crew should stick with
the PGNCS which should be holding attitude until they have determined
that the PGNCS is not going to control the spacecraft properly such
as yawing it to the proper launch azimuth and pitching over as programmed.
When these various cues have all eonfii_med lack of P_CS guidance, the
crew should switchover to the AGS without attempting to recycle the
PGNCS first. Of course, before switching over to the AGS they should
ascertain that it is working better than the PGNCS. To do this we
recommend that the nominal display for initial ascent on the AGS Dk'n4
should be altitude rate (H). Following switchover, recycle attempts
should be made to clear up the _V monitor alarm in an attempt to get
the PGNCS back on the air.
c. In order to provide redundancy for the "Engine On" signal,
procedures call for manually pushing the "Engine Start" switch. It
is to be emphasized, however, that this should be done only after the
crew dete_.._ues that the LC4D "Engine On" co_f..f_ndhas caused the engine
to start. We do not want to lift-off if the PGNCS is not issuing co_,.r,_nds.
Of course, in order to get an automatic guidance engine cutoff at insertion, this w_uual Engine Start sigual must be removed. The procedure
calls for doing this when the velocity remaining to be gained is about
200 fps (i.e., about l0 seconds to go). T.._,_.ediately preceding setting
the "Engine Arm" to "off" the intercon=ect should be closed. If removing the "k_ngine Arm" does turn off the engine, the crew should use the
same switch to turn it back on. Of course, they will then have to stop
the engine again when the velocity displayed by the PGNCS reaches nominal.3
d. We have no procedure for monitoring and backing up the PGNCS
"E_gine Off" comm_nd like those used for TT.T,LOI, DOI, and TEI. Due
to RCS attitude control activity during Ascent, the burn time can vary
as much as 20 seconds from nominal_ which makes that a useless parameter
for this purpose. The AGS and the rendezvous radar range rate are
potential candidates, but it was finally decided that rather than
adopt some complex voting logic involving those systems_ the best
technique was to simply utilize the ground monitoring to determine
which system should be used to control the Ascent Guidance and to use
whichever system is guiding as the sole cue for APB cutoff. That is,
as long as we are riding the PGNCS, let it do the job and back it up
manually only if it indicates the spacecraft has exceeded the desired
velocity. If a switchover to AGS has occurred, then use the AGS as
the sole source. It seems to us that, since this maneuver is always
in sight of the ground, a procedure like this is acceptable. Of course,
it depends on not losing telemetry.
Howard W. Tindall,Jr_
PA:HWTindall, Jr. :jsQl'"rllQ_dlU. IWOR_4NO. t·
IdAV 1Sim
GSAI'PMA(_na,n) ios-sl.I
UNITED STATES GOVERNMF.,NT
Memorandum oente,
TO : See list attached DATE: April 10_ 1969
69-PA-T-58A
FaOM : PA/Chief, Apollo Data Priority Coordination
$T_BJECr:Descent monitoring at t4_C
We have reached a plateau in our work on Descent Monitoring, perhaps
making it worthwhile to send out this memo. First of all, I don't
th/n_ there is any question that Descent is the thing that requires
most of our attention between now and the G mission, at least in the
empire of Mission Techni ques. There are still a lot of things to do
and so starting about a month ago we have been having one full day
meeting per week, which will probably continue for another month. I
thinW we have pretty well established what the t_C h_s to do and how
they do it during Descent. That's really the subject of this memo.
Our job is to work over the onboard techniques and integrate them
with the ground monitoring to make sure everything is complete and
consistent.
After considerable discussion, we have established that the ground's
job during Descent is to attempt to do the following things (not
necessarily in order of importance: ):
a. Detect DPS malfunctions and excessive RCS plume impingement.
b. Predict that adequate propellent margins are available to
permit landing.
c. Detect impending PGNCS failures.
d. F_e sure PGNCS guidance is not diverging.
e. Make sure trajectory constraints of some sort or other are
not being violated.
As far as we can tell, all of the necessary telemetry and tracking
data programs have been identified and are being implemented in the
RTCC; all necessary display formats have also been provided in the
t4_C. There are a couple of items associated with this which I would
like to mention:
a. We are on the verge of assnm_ug that RCS plume impingement is a
honest-to-God constraint which _st not be violated. Choke.' The Ia_
systems guys have a display which processes telemetry data yielding the
B,,yu.s. Bo, o,t3,P, .y,dS,,,i, l g,Pl,. ,2. 7cn_,lative plume impingement from each of the downward firing Jets. They
subtract this from the value GAEC has established as the total allowed
duration and display the results. That is, it is a display of permissible
t_m_ re,_ining. It is proposed that when this parR-_ter reaches zero,
indicating we have violated the plume impingement constraint, they will
recommend that the crew "Abort Stage" out of there:::
b. Another interesting computation _nd display that the CSM people
have provided themselves is a prediction of DPS propellent m-rgin at
touchdown. This is an especially sophisticated processor which utilizes
a nl,m_r of P(_(_ guidance parameters obtained by telemetry to predict
the A,_,mt of DPS prope_l_t required tofly the reminder of the descent
trajectory. They subtract this propellent requirement from the measured
propellAut still remaining obtained from telemetry data, to obtain the
predicted ,_wgin at touchdown. This par_ter is plotted vs. horizontal
velocity on Rn analog display. It is proposed that if the prediction
of propell_ut crosses "zero," the crew should be advised to "Abort."
It has been stated there is no question, when this prediction reaches
zero, that propellent depletion will occur before landing Rnd SO aborting is the thing to do. It is not safe to assume the converse - that
is, it does not always accurately predict that sufficient propellant
is available to complete the Descent. We're going to check this program
thoroughly to see if it really does that.
c. Impending PGNCS failure will be detected from strip ch*_ts displaying guidance system differences, very much the same as during the
launch phase. That is, differences between the AC_ and PGNCS and differences between MBFN and PGNCS will be displayed on the strip charts. Abort
l_m_t lines will be provided upon which that action will be recommended.
Other displays are used in conjunction with these strip ch_ts to positively
ascertain that the PGNCS is the errant system.
d. There was a somewhat surprising outcome from aur discussion of
trajectory constraints. Unlike launch, we were basicsl_y ,,_ble to find
any "hard" descent trajectory constraints with a possible exception of
the APS abort line (previously eallouslyreferenced as the "Dead Man"
cu_ve). That is, there appears to be no reason we could identify which
would prevent the I_ from flying all over the sky, if that is what you
call it at the moon. As a result, it seems as though we have two optionseither provide no trajectory abort limits or alternatively select dispersion
limits (for example, 3 sigma, 6 sig-_, or 9 si?) beyond which we will
arbitrarily not allow the trajectory to diverge from nominal. This currently is mv personal preference, mostly based on intuition and no data.
There is by no means a general agreement on that yet.
And that's our plateau.
Howard W. Tindall, Jr. !
PA:HWTindall, Jr. :isC4_r'ICINAL. POBM NO. 10
MAY IMI_
GSA_wMm03c:sw)tQl-nJ
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
Memorandum
TO : See list attached DATE. April 15, 1969
69-PA-T-61A
FROM : PA/Chief, Apollo Data Priority Coordination
s_B_c'r: Let's drop one of the ln_r surface RE tests
During our review of the G Mission Ia_ Surface Mission Techniques
Doc_-_nt on April 10, we c_me to a conclusion which may interest you.
It deals with the need, or really lack of need, for the crew to do
some things that are in the current flight plan. Specifically, in
the crew IR timeline, we have included two periods of IR rendezvous
ra_ tracking of the co.a._udmodule - the first is two hours after
landing and the second is two hours before lift-off. Neither of
these periods are really needed although it may be interesting to
try it once. On the other h_nd, it does require crew activity, uses
electrical power, wears out the radar, and so forth and may even
place a constraint on co--_nd module attitude during his sextant
tracking of the LM. It was our conclusion that at least one of these
periods of tracking should be e_m_nated and we are recowm_.nding that
it be the first. The reason for deleting the first is that it
interferes with the crew countdown demonstration (CDDT) for ascent,
which is synchronized with the first CSM passage over the IR. If
the crew were to perform rendezvous rad_ tracking, the CDDT wo,_ld
have to be terminated about 15 minutes before "lift-off.' By el_m_ uating the rendezvous raaar test, the CDDT can and should be run until
about TIG minus one minute.
Although we are not proposing to delete it yet, it should be noted
that the CDDT itseLT is of _rg_ual 4wTortance _nd if it interferes
with other more important activity, it could also be eliminated. It
is not a precise countdown, anyway, since obviously the crew m_st not
fire pyros, bring the APS batteries on line, pressurize t_w% and so
forth, _mless they really intend to lift-off. This _ should certainly be elim_nated from 1,_-_ landing missions after the first.
As noted in a previous memo, the co...,_ndmodule sextant tracking of
the IR is not mandatory either, although the flight controllers will
use the data if they get it to reinforce confidence in their other
data sources. A_a, of course, the post-fl/sbt people will _doubtedly
find it interesting. Here again, though, it _y be worthwhile to consider omitting one of the two sextant tracking periods. Ne are not
proposing this yet either.
Howard W. Tindal] ) Jr.
PA:H_Tindall, Jr. :js
B,,yu.s. Bo,a,u,s,,z,,lyo,,h,v,j,oU 1,z,,MAy _ ImgTmN
FfMR 6U C_m)_l-,,J
UNITED STATES OOVERNMF_2qT
Memorandum oe=e
TO : See list attached DATE: April 15, 1969
69-PA-T-63A
FaOM : PA/Chief, Apollo Data Priority Coordination
$tj18JECT:Some things about Descent
This memo is to list a few odds and ends dribbling out of our latest
Descent Monitoring clambake.
1. We have identified a new entry for the PDI pad message
voiced to the crew before DOI. Just prior to PDI the crew makes a
crude estimate of their sltitude above the 1,m_r surface by measuring
the time it takes for a 1,mn_ landmark to move from one end to the
other of their LPD line on the LM window. (I believe it noi:_lly
takes about 20 seconds and therefore two seconds is equivalent to
about a mile accuracy in altitude. ) The new Dad entry is the time
at which the altitude check lanS_rk should appear at the lower end
of the LPD line. It is cu_zently proposed that the landmark to be
used will be the same one the crew performs their on-the-job training
sextant tracking on L0I day. This has the additional benefit of
providing the _C with data for determining its location with some
precision before the altitude check.
2. D_ring powered descent the crew monitors their various
data sources to ascertain whether or not the DPS is producing an
acceptable thrust. If there is thrust de_=adation of a fairly small
_w_unt, they are supposed to exercise established mlfunction procedures
in an attempt to _prove DPS perfox_mance. If the degradation is more
severe, malfunction procedures will not help and the crew should abort.
I_M systems flight controllers were requested to establish the amount
of thrust de_udation which the crew should tolerate before beginning
the mlfunction procedures and what omnunt they should use to decide
on an i_mpdiate abort.
3. There h_s been a great deal of discussion over the merit
of the crew observlng the 1,m_ landscape during the early part of
powered descent. There are some benefits the crew is supposed to
obtain from this but it is important that it not be carried on so long
that landing radar data is lost as a result. Since it is possible to
start getting landing raSer data as early as two minutes after PDI, if
altitude is dispersed low by one mile, it is proposed that the crew
yaw the spacecraft from its face down attitude no later th_ PDI + 2
mi_l_tes. Yawing sooner would be fine.4. The attitude the crew should hold after yawing to acquire
landing radar is 6° off the principle axis in order to give s_m_etrical
landing ra_ Rnte_r_ coverage. This, of course, provides greater
probability of acquisition and "data good." (Incidentally, a possible
candidate for future spacecraft computer program change is to have the
_tomatic system also control to this attitude, compensating for the
landing ra_ antenr_ offset. )
5- It hss been said that the hi'gain S-b_nd pointing angles
during the braking p_se of powered descent are more or less constant
once the spacecraft hss been yawed for landing radar acquisition. It
would be very usei_ for the cre_ to have these pointing angles in
their onboard data for use in mnual acquisition during this period if
the S-band were to lose lock. Who figures out what these angles are -
Rocky I),_can is that you?
Howard W. Tinda_, Jr.
PA :HWTindall, Jr. :jseM _'MN(_ Om)m.ml
UNITED STATES GO_ENT
Memorandum ,ASA o.= r
TO : See list attached DATE: April 16, 1969
69-PA-T-64A
FROM : PA/Ohief, Apollo Data' Priority Coordiru_tion
$trnJECT:HOW the _BFN and sextant data are used to target D0I and Descent
Ne had a meeting on April 9 which was extremely interesting to me.
We discussed and settled on how the _3FN tracking and sextant l_ndmark observations would be used in the _X_0/RII_Cto produce optt_,_
D0I _nd Descent targeting for the I_. The big new factor that had
to be taken into accovmt somehow was the propagated state vector
ez*zorsresulting from our Ir_ccurate modeling of the 1,,_r potential.
This has forced us to c_ge our planned tech-_ques somewhat from
those proposed before the O' mission. Most of what we now plan to do
is Just as the Math physics Branch (MPB) of MPAD proposed to us at
this meet_ nE. I feel they should be com,_uded for a pretty fair
piece of work.
I would first like to describe the manner in which MPB proposed
that the RTOO orbit determination consistency checks be made during
the flight. As you recall, in a previous memo I noted that they
feel it is best to use the orientation of the orbital plane determined
pre-LOI to which they add the in-plane orbital elements based on new
MSFN tracking. Of course, it is necessary to contimaously monitor and
confirm that the pl_e established in this way is right. They intend
to do this by performing s_gle-pass MSFN solutions after each 1,,_r
orbit and comparing the resulting incitation with that established
pre-LOI. It is expected that the single-pass solutions will show a
r_nSnm variation about the pre-LOI value indicating it is safe to
cont*_,e using it. If they detect a bias or trend in these singlepass inclinations away from the pre-LOI value, they will have to update
it.
In addition to the inclination check performed continuously, they also
plan some discrete consistency checks w_de in revs 6, 7, _nd 8. These
Checks will be made by processing _FN tracking Just as will be done
later for the D0I and Descent targeting. That is, they will determine
the orbit based on rev B and 4 data and propagate it to rev 6. They
will m_ke a "plane-free" single-pass solution in rev 6 based on rev
6 tracking. They wi]] compare the three position components in local
vertical coordinates (that is, downtrack, altitude, and crosstrack) at
20 minute intervals throughout rev 6 and will plot the differences vs.
time. These plots should show the propagated error from the older
u.s. *,, Z'.roU 4'22
solution as a function of time throughout rev 6. They will do the same
thing using revs 4 and 5 data propagated to rev 7 _d compared with a
single-pass rev 7 solution. They will do the s_,_ thing with revs 5
and 6 propagated to rev 8. These position difference plots determined
for revs 6, 7, and 8 will be superimposed upon each other to make sure _,
' there is consistency on deteimlnation of propagated state vector errors.
This eonsistency_ incidents_ly, has been demonstrated on C' and we expect
to reconfirm it on the F m_ssion prior to G. If it works as expected, ....
it should be possible to determ_ue the ·propagated error in all three
components as a function of time on a state vector propagated ahead two
revs. The significance of this, of course, is that the DOI a_t descent
targeting is performed with a state vector which is two revs old and
if we are able to determine the propagation error, bias -_y be applied
to compensate for them. That is a description of a rather complicated
process. The _-_ortant thing for you to ,,_derst_nd is that a technique
appears to be available for determi uing and compensating for propagation
error in real t_me.
The -_ner in which we intend to use sextant tracking of the landing
site has not changed since before C'. That is, we intend to determine
the landing site position by applying the measured relative displace-:
merit in all three components - latitude, longitude, and radius - to
the current MSFN solution at the time of the sextant observations.
Thus, the targeting solves the relative problem compensating for eA_ors
in both MSFN state vectors and the preflight estimate of the landing
site location. We have established that the change from the preflight
value in each of these components based on the real t_me data _,st
notexceedthefollowingvalues: ._
a. Latitude _,st not be changed more than 12,OOO feet.
b. Longitude _st not change more than 6,000 feet.
c. Radiusmmstnot changemore than 6,000feet.. , · ·
These values are based on our current 3 sis,_ estimates of preflight
map accuracy RSSed with the NBFN orbit determination accuracy. It is
felt that corrections larger than these _st indicate some sort of
gross failure demanding either that the sextant tracking be redone by
delaying DOI one rev or that the sextant tracking be ignored and the
Descent targeting be based on the preflight values. Incidentslly,
the mission rule defining which of these choices to pursue is a
significant open item which m!_t be resolved.3
Now I would like to describe how the propagated errors are compensated
for.
a. Crossrange, which is essentially latitude, w_l not be compensated for propagation e_ors at all. Since we are using the frozen
plane technique, by definition_ no propagated error can occur.
b. _._or in spacecraft altitude is compensated for by changing
the radius of the landing site bY an amount equivalent to the propagated
state vector error in the altitude direction. The empirical co_ection
is determined from the propagation state vector plots described above
by reading out the error in altitude associated with a time in orbit
equivalent to touchdown time. The point is that the state vector is not
corrected, but rather compensatio n is applied to the landing site
radius since this is a _,ch cleaner procedure.
c. Downrange error is more-or-less equivalent to landing site
longitude and presents special problems. Consideration was given to
compensating downrange propagation er_ors by changing landing site
location in a manner similar to the radius bit just discussed. That
would work fine for Descent, but can result in a serious problem in
Descent aborts. Specifically, downrange error in the state vectors
during powered flight act in a way equivalent to a platform ali_m_ut
error in inertial space. Specifically, 10,OO0 feet downrange error is
·equivalent to O.1° _ misalig_m_ut. Therefore, if we were to leave
the propagated downrange error in the state vector, all powered flight
by the inertial guidance system would be carried out with O.1° error
and, in the event of a Descent abort, would cause the system to aim
for the wrong insertion conditions by that _m_unt. Of course, the AGS,
which is initialized from the PGNr_ would also have this error. Although
we don't expect the downrange error to exceed About 5,000 feet, we have
no assurance of this and conservatively feel that an alternate approach
for compensating downrange e_or is preferable. The alternate approach
we adopted ia to change the time tag on the state vectors such that the
downrange error at touchdown time is zero. Changing a state vector time
tag is not a simple thing to do in the RTCC. It has not yet been
"automatsd." As a result, it is necessary for the Data Select Officer
to manually enter the entire state vector into the RTCC using his typewriter 2_e input device. This is a time cons,,mlng process because
it must be very carefully checked. (It is recognized that the RTCC
program for the lunar landing mission has been frozen, but it was
suggested to the Data Select people that they consider automating this
input since it is becoming part of the nominal operation. ) It is to
be emphasized that this t_me tag compensation is applied to both the LM
and CSM state vectors in all three computers - RTCC, LGC, and CI_. We
may eventually establish a lower bound in this downrange compensationbelo w which it is considered acceptable t0 live With the error. For
example, if the downrange error is less than 5,000 feet, we may choose
to apply that small correction to the landing site longitude and leave
the state vectors time tag alone since that is a much simpler thing to
do. But that's not the currenttechnique. -
One significant open item I failed to mention in passing is that
there is still a controversy raging on whether a single-Pass or twopass _SFN orbit determination ShOUln be used for Descent targeting.
That is, the sextant tracking is done on rev 11 and the'l_SFN trackin g
on that rev is certainly used, The question is, should rev 10 i_SFN
tracking be incorporated in as well ? The solution to this depend s
on :ironing out inconsistencies between two computer programs .which
are given conflicting results. _ae answer could come at any time;
Once the one-rev vs. the two-rev decision is reached, of course,' i:t
will not only apply to orbit determination techniques for Descent
targeting but will also be incorporated in the _SFN propagation error
determir_tion techniques described above.
It is currently planned' that these G m_ssion operations will be
carried out on the F mission exactly as if that flight were a 1,,n_r
landing. This obViously means that to the maximum extent possible:
these techniques will also be used in the F mission sin_lations.'
There is some question, however, if changing the state vector time
tag to compensate for propagated downrange error is a reasonable th_ng
to do on-the F mission. Accordingly, this must be discussed with the
F mission operations people before we naively assume they w_11 do it.
M_ch of the preceding discussion deals with the landing site location
to be used in the LGC during Descent. The landing site position (ELS)
to be loaded in the com,_nd module computer should be the preflight
m_p values of the prime landing site landmark and there is no reason
to go through this "mickey mouse" of updating the OMC values from
the NCC before the LM lands.
The time tags on the state vectors transmitted to the spacecraft
computers on G are essentially the same as on the F mission. The IAi
state vector sent to both the LGC and CM_ will be time tagged at D0I
-10 minutes. The CSM state vector sent to both spacecraft w_]] be
time tagged at PDI + 25 minutes, which should be close to the initiation of rendezvous navigation in the case of a late Descent abort.
Except for the open items noted above, I think this pretty ·well
establishes how we plan to do the targeting for D0I and Descent on
the lunar landing m_ssion, at least until F mission results come'in.
PA:HWTindall, Jr. :isOPI'ICNA_ POfIM NO. 10
MAY 1flu [Dr'nQI4
asaP'Pm(4, 4.ax) m-,,.m
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
Memorandum o nt :
TO : PA/Nanager, Apollo Spacecraft Program DATE' April 23, 1969
" 69-PA-T-6RA
FROM : PA/Chief_ Apollo 'Data Priority Coordination
SUBJECT.' F mission rule regarding DPS gimbal drive failure indication
This memo is to report how it is currently planned to handle an
indicated failure of the DPS gimbal drive actuator (GDA) on the
F mission.
On the F mission there are two DPS m_neuvers - D0I and Phasing.
The D0I burn is about 71 fps achieved by 15 seconds duration at
l0 percent thrust and about 15 seconds at _0 percent. The Phasing
burn is about 195 fps achieved by 26 seconds at l0 percent and
about 19 seconds at Full thrust. The question to be answered was
what should the mission rule be covering a GDA fail light occu_ing
on either of these burns?
From the offset it should be made clear that advice from the _C
during the maneuvers is out of the question due to the co....... _ication
delay when the spacecraft is operating at the moon. And of course_
the DOI burn is performed in back of the moon.
The fail light com_ug on can mean any one of three things - the gimbal
is moving when it is not supposed to be_ the gimbal is not moving
when it is supposed to be, or the indication itself is at fault.
Apparently by far the greatest probability is that the failure indication itself is in error. As you know, there is no direct cockpit
readout of DPS gimbal angles. Accordingly_ the only way the crew has
of determining that the light is in error is by waiting for some other
cue such as excessive attitude error on the FDAI and hearing or seeing
the RCS jets firing to maintain attitude, as they will when the LM
attitude error as controlled by the DPS gimbal positioning exceeds
1° .
If the light comes on during the G mission, the mission rule will
almost certainly be to await the second cue before taking any action
because even a r_r_way g_mbal cannot create a problem and you l_necessarily have blown the mission by turning off the GDA if the light
is wrong. It is cu_ently intended to use this same rule on F,
although it is not so clearly proper for F as G. Specifically, in the
Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan2
event we reel_y do have a z,_nqway gimbal, it is a_st certainly possible
to continue on with the nominal mission provided the crew deactivates
Il the GDA _,_ed/ately in all cases. That is, by freezing the DPS gimbal
position, it is possible to complete not only the DOI burn, but also
the entire Phasing burn using RCS for attitude control. Analysis has
shown the RCS propellnut required is not excessive and the plume impingement constraints are not exceeded. For example, if the GI_ misalignment
were 121-°throughout the entire Phasing bUrn, only 15 seconds of RCS
would be required of the worst jet. This gives the crew more than 5
or 6 seconds to deactivate the GDA in the worst situation - n_mely a
runaway gimbal moving at o.2° sec. If the crew does not deactivate
the GDA as soon as they get the light, but rather awaits the second
cue, mistrim ,_y be too great to permit use of the DPS for the Phasing
burn. This wo,_ld force us either to use the APS for Phasing or to
perform a PDI abort, which essentially eliminates the long range
rendezvous navigation exercise and results in a non-nom_ual rendezvous
sequence. We don't think this is the case and are getting some computer
s_lations run to prove it. That is, we expect that even by awaiting
the second cue, the resultant misaliEnment will be within RCS control
capability.
In the event of a real GRA failure during the DOI there are some
things the _C can do once the IAiappears from behind the moon. Care
mst be taken, however, to mke sure that these tests do not result
in further misalignments of the DPS gimbal during the Phasing burn.
0ertainly the M_C can make an estimate of which direction the mist-rim
appears to be the largest prior to the -_ueuver and could reco,_,,_nd
that the opposite RCS jets be used for ullage in order to reduce the
probability of reaching the plume impingement constraint dUring the
Phasing burn.
The mission rule is currently written this way, with the approval
of everyone I Mow who is interested. The on3y perturbation I can
foresee _ould result from the analysis noted above showing we might
lose the DPS for Phasing if the crew awaits the second cue. In that
case, a 'review might be worthwhile.
J
CC:
(See list attached)
PA:HWTindall, Jr. :is
2¢7MAY tWl2
re,Mm(,ilcra) m-5_l
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
Memorandum
TO : See list attached DATE: Nay 2, 1969
69-PA-T-69A
_oM : PA/Chief, AlX_l.lo Data Priority Coordination
SUBJECT: CSH rendezvous navigation works fine using just VEF ranging
t
I made an announcement during the F Operations Review which was
absolutely flat-out wrong. This memo is to correct that statement
and/or just to make sure you know what capability really exists in
the CSM for rendezvous navigation.
Sometime long ago, I got the impression that acceptable rendezvous
navigation could not be done in the CSM using VEF ranging data
alone. 11_at is, I thought that if sextant tracking were not also
available due to failure Of the optics or the LM tracking light,
there was no point in processing the VHF data. It turns out that
this is not true. In fact) under certain ciro,m_tances_ such as
before CSI on the F and G missions, use of VHF ranging data alone
is said to be better than using the combined data sources. In fact_
the only place there is some question about using VHF ranging alone
is after TPI where some analyses show it breaks down.
My apologies to you_ Mr. Charlesworth.
Howard W. Tindall_ Jr.
PA:HWTindall, Jr.:js
B,,yv.s. s,,,_,,s,Bo,d,_,_:,,1,,,lj _ ,h,P,v,otts,,,_,,g,Pt,,,, _ _'av
gmo._C4_'IICI4AL EwORMNO. 10
MAy 1ICC1_4rTl_q4
GSA E_PMR (41 aR) gO_-SS.S
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
Memorandum 0. ter
TO : See list at_ached DATE: May 5_ 1969
69-PA- -7OA
FROM : PA/Chief_ Apollo Data Priority Coordination
$tmJECT: Descent Monitoring Mission Techniques - a status report
I think we are beginning to see the light at the end of the Descent
Monitoring Mission Techniques tunnel. At the April 2_ meeting on
that subject we thoroughly discussed the integration of the onboard
techniques with the activity at the MCC during powered descent and I
feel the resultant is as reasonable and complete as possible, consistent with practical operational constraints.
One thing we have finally been able to get under control was this
squirmy idea that there is some way for the crewto compare the
output of the AGS and PGNCS onboard the spacecraft with the objective
of maki-ng abort and/or switchover decisions. Obviously there is no
question that a massive system failure will be obvious to them and
their course of action will be clear. Obvious too, is the fact that
the crew will be monitoring both of these systems as well as many
other data sources throughout powered descent. But_ now kno_rn to
everyone, is the fact that there is no way for the crew to compare
AGS and PGNCS such that they are able to detect which system is ,_lfunctioning, if that malfunction is of a slow drift degradation type,
at least not with the assurance necessary to take any action. Therefore, just as in the case of ascent, not only is the _C prime for
carrying out the task of slow drift malfunction monitoring, but we
now recognize that 1_C is the only place this can be done. That_ my
friends , is a fantastic event. - the death of a myth we have been
haunted by for two years. Don't get the idea I'm happy with the situation. g/hat I am pleased about is that everyone now agrees it is the
situation. ·
There is another thing about powered descent crew procedures that has
really bugged me. Maybe I'm an "Aunt _" - certainly some smart
people laugh at this concern, but I just feel that the.crew should not
be diddling with the DSKY during powered descent unless it is absolutely
essential. They'll never hit the wrong button, of course, but if they
do_ the results can be rather lousy. Therefore, I have been carrying
on a campaign aimed at finding some way to avoid the necessity of the
crew keying up the on-call displays. This campaign has not been altogether successful. I guess partly because not everyone shares my concern.
_I10-I01J
2
Although, I started out by saying the end is in sight, we still have quite
a batch of unresolved issues which I would like to list here so that
everyone can continue to think about them.
a. There is still a wide open question concerning what is considered
our real time min_,m landing radar data requirement in order that descent
can be continued. There are many of us who feel that failure to obtain
a certain amount of good landing radar data by some point in the powered
descent is sufficient justification to abort - for example, landing
radar altitude updating by 13,OO0 feet has been suggested as a requirement. The crew apparently feels that this constraint is not real and
that their observations - visual, I suppose - are an adequate substitute.
Just how we are able to integrate in these real time crew observations
to overcome the landing radar deficiency has not been established yet
and I am not sure who, if anyone, is working on it.
b. Although, a month or so ago, the decision was made that the
crew is to manually backup the automatic switching of the landing radar
antenna position during a nominal descent, there is still substantial
concern that this is not the right thing to do. For example, the I_
systems people point out that the switch the crew uses to do this must
be cycled from "auto" through the old landing radar position to get
to the new landing radar position and a switch failure could override
a perfectly operating automatic signal and send the antenn_ scurrying
back to the position it just came from.
c. I am still not content with the AGS altitude update techniques.
That is, how many times and when during powered descent should this be
done?
d. There is some point in powered descent after which it should
be possible to continue the landing with an inoperative gimbal drive
actuator. Procedures for handling this situation in real time remain
to be established.
howardW. Tindall,Jr. .
PA:HWTindall, Jr. :js(_I_N4_ PQl_l NO. 10
MAY IMIZ I[D(T_N
Gm.& I'PMR (41 c_) Wl-lt.I
UNITED STATES OOVE'_
Memorandum _ Manned Spacecraft Center
TO : See list attached DATE: May 6, ]'969
69-PA-T-TIA
FROM : PA/Chief, Apollo Data Priority Coordination
SUSI2CT: Ascent newsletter
This memo is to reportseveralinterestingthings regardinglunar' {
ascent, both nominal and after a descent abort. _ _"//d'p_
1. It turns out we demand better performance of the PGNCS to
support ascent to orbit than we do descent. Accordingly, if it is I
necessary to abort during descent due to degradation of the PGNCS, I
it is automatically necessary to switchover from the PGNCS to the ]
AGS. Of course, this ass,,m_s that the AGS is performing better
than the PGNCS.
2. We have recently had a _mning philosophical argument regarding ascent switchover. Of course, switchover in itsel_ is not catastrophi c as is an abort; if the system you switch to is working okay,
the mission continues just as planned. This led me to push for establishing fairly tight switchover limits since I felt that it was highly desirable
to assure as near nominal rendezvous characteristics as possible. That is,
why stick with a degraded PGNCS if the AGS is working better? The only
disadvantage seems to be the hazard involved in the act of switchover
itself; all the switches, relays, and so forth have to work. In other
words, it comes down to a tradeoff between the hazards involved in switching over versus the dispersions in the rendezvous situation which could
be avoided by switching over.
More recently we have adopted a procedure for eliminating dispersions at insertion following descent aborts by making an adjustment
maneuver i.mmediately after insertion. This so-called tweak burn is used
specifically to assure satisfactory rendezvous conditions, ibis procedure
may also be used to compensate for degradation of the PGNCS during ascent
and makes it possible to leave the PGNCS in control as long as it is still
capable of providing a safe orbit. However, if the PGNCS degradation is
sufficient to justify it (say, worse than B sigma) the crew should be
advised of the situation during powered flight such that they will Stand
by for a tweak burn to be executed _nw,ediately after insertion using the
same procedures as for the descent abort.
Having adopted this technique, it seemed reasonable to set the
PGNCS switchover limits fairly wide. The value chosen was 6 sigma. The
Buy U.S. Savings BondsRegularlyon the Payroll Savings Plan _d-/ /4_
_lO.lOJ2
compromise here, of course, is the operational messiness of a tweak burn
traded off against the switchover to AGS "hazard. ''
3. One thing which could give us bad trouble is a misaligned PGNCS
prior to ascent, particularly if we ali_ the AGS to it as was planned.
The problem, of course, is that sm_ll m_ salignments csn result in unacceptable insertion conditions and, even though ground monitoring would probably
detect the situation during ascent, switchover would do no good since the
AGS would be equally misaligned. To avoid this situation entirely, we
have concluded that the best course of action is to independently align
the AGS while on the 1,,n-r surface rather than to align it to the PGNCS.
This m_kes the two systems truly independent, which not only gives us a
cross-check on the accuracy of the alignment of each but also permits a
usefUl switchover if somehow a PGNCS misalign escapes our detection
techniques. Incidentally, this also elim_r_tes the problem of CIYJ transients in the A_ lunar surface alignments. Accordingly, we are proposing
that the procedures be chsnged tQ always utilize the AGS gravity lunar
surface ali_ment technique rather than ali_m_nts to the PGNCS. I expect
this will be done once some details have been worked out.
4. It is interesting to note that the problem just discussed is not
quite as severe in the event of a descent abort. In that case, of course,
the AGS _,st have been aligned to the PGNCS and so they both will suffer ._
· the s_me _salig_ent at PDI. What happens then if we have a descent
abort and try to achieve orbit with both systems misaligned? It turns _-
out that this particular error is partially compensating- that is,thethe1%(__._
trajectory dispersion during descent is partially eliminated by the
trajectory dispersion during ascent back into orbit. In addition, :_* _.
desce shouldnt notabOrtoccurlimitSpriorWill to bedescent. tight enough In other thatwords,n cceptablewe r_ fee!wedispersi°nSa have \C_ *W_ ....9;'0
safesituation here.
Howard W. Tindall, Jr.
PA:HWTindall, Jr. :isOl_i"lO_t- F"'OI_'UI140. tO
GSA F_'MR (4! CF'R) I01-tl.6
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
Me_0_a_du_ NASA Manned Spacecraft Center
TO ' See list below DATE: May 6, 1969
69-?A-T-T2__¢
FROM : PA/Chief, Apollo Data Priority Coordination
SUBJECT: Comments on IMU compensation procedures
Attached is an MIT memo I thought you should see. It proposes that
the MCC update the gyro compensation terms in the spacecraft computers
whenever they are detectably wrong. One benefit, of course, is the
possibility of eliminating a bunch of IMU alignments. But more
important, it keeps the system right.
Incidentally, the threshold listed in the F and G Mission Rules
beyond which the PIPA bias will be updated is twice too big. The
Data Priority recommended value is .003 ft/sec 2. (See F Rules 15-
ll and 25-10, G Rules 15-11 and 24-3.) I'm sure you appreciate my
calling your attention to this important matter: Seriously, I'd
like to emphasize the significance Of this on the LM during descent'
Accelerometer bias is one of the two most undesirable IAiIMU errors
and should be minimized as much as possible. (The other, of course,
is y-axis misali_ment at PDI and that's a tough one.)
Howard W. Tindall, Jr.
Enclosure -'
Addressees:
FA/C. C. Kraft, Jr.
FC/E. F.'Kranz
G, S. Lunney
C. E. Charlesworth
?C3/A.O. Al_ieh
FC4/R. L. Carlton
FC5/C. B. Parker
FM/J. P. Mayer
_-f/s. ?. Mann
MiT/M. W. Johnston, IL 7-279
PA:HWTindall, Jr. :js
'_J_?_f?']_ Buy U.S. £aviv.gs BondsI_eguIarlyon the Payroll Savings PlanGr B_L. IL"ORM lNG. 10
UNITED STATES GOVERNM_
Memorandum oente
TO : See list attached DATE: May 8, 1969
69-PA-T-T4A
FROM : PA/Chief, Apollo Data Priority Coordination
SUB3ECT: The IA_ RR/LGC interface may be broken, but that's okay - sorta
This memo is to doc,_ment the Data Priority position regarding a recent
LMh systems problem. To wit, it is considered acceptable to proceed
with the nominal F mission with a questionable or known interface
failure between the rendezvous radar (RR) and the IAZspacecraft computer (LGC). It should be emphasized that a properly operating rendezvous radar with crew readout is still considered mandatory for DOI.
Also, this recommendation does not necessarily apply to the G mission.
Justification for this position is based on the unique character of
the F mission and on the availability of three adequate alternate
data sources. The F mission rendezvous starts with precisely controlled,
known initial conditions since one spacecraft separates from the other
in orbit; furthermore, consl_m_bles - particularly, propellant -are
abundant. The alternate data sources which can be used for rendezvous
navigation and maneuver targeting in the event of an RR/LGC interface
failure are:
a. The crew backup charts using raw RR data as displayed on the
tape meter and/or DSKY
Error analysis by FCSD has proven the crew backup chart solution
to the rendezvous problem is competitive with the PGNCS. These charts
are utilized in the nominal crew procedures. The tape meter is the
primary source of input data, however, it is also possible to obtain
raw RR data by use of the RR Self Test routine (R04) with the RR test
switch set 'to the "Off" position. Incidentally, the crew already uses
this routine periodically to check and calibrate the tape meter. It
should be noted, however, that R04 cannot be used sin_ltaneously with
the rendezvous navigation program (PR0) nor if the RR/LGC interface is
totally broken rather than intermittently malfunctioning.
b. The CSM using sextant and/or VHF ranging data
This solution is also routinely available and competitive with
the PGNCS. It should be noted, however, that the VEF ranging system
has never been flight tested and there is certainly no great confidence
in the high intensity tracking light on the LM. It failed on D: However,
either of these data sources is adequate for successful operation of
B,,yu.s. Bo,d,R,g,,lrlyo,, 1,,,y,otts,,vi.g il,,.
g010-_C6the system.
c. The MSFN solution based on pre-separation tracking and PGNCS
navigation through LM maneuvers
This solution is also comparable in accuracy to the PGNCS and,
in fact, is the real foundation upon which we are able to base our
case for this recommendation. It assumes, of course, that the PGNCS
: is operating nominally - controlling and navigating through the
maneuvers. It should be noted that if it is known the interface has
failed and PGNCS rendezvous radar navigation cannot be cax_ried out, it
is possible for the MCC to update state vectors to the LGC enabling it
to obtain its own targeting more-or-less equivalent to the MCC. Procedures
for doing this are well known to the flight controllers.
d. It is important to emphasize that ACS rendezvous navigation
and maneuver targeting should not be utilized on the F mission due to
computer program limitations which result in unacceptable errors. _he
AGS can be used for maneuver execution, of course.
If an RR/LGC interface failure occurs but is not detected by some other
means, it is quite possible that the LGC LM state vectors could be
damaged by acceptance of bum RE data - that is, crew editing is not
infallible by a long shot. However, special rendezvous solution comparison and AGS state vector update procedures are not required since
current mission techniques were developed especially to prevent execution
of wrong maneuvers. Failures of this type are the reason for the very
existence of Mission Techniques'.' The specific situation under discussion
here is not ,_n_que except that preflight concern makes everyone alert for
this specific problem. (I am assuming that the crew will be adequately
briefed, although, I am not sure when and by whom at this time.)
This paragraph is to present the other side of the coin. Our only real
concern is the added vulnerability to failures of other systems which
can force switching the mission to a rendezvous abort sequence (such as
an APE failure at the insertion m_ueuver). Crew backup charts are not
available _or these high ellipse cases (except for a CDH chart for the
PDI abort situation). _ltiple failure cases leave us dependent upon the
CSM solution, item"b" above, plus the PGNCS solution noted in item "c"
above, which should be adequate for a safe return without ER data, although
probably dispersed and perhaps costly.
This reco....endation has been coordinated with authoritative representatives
of FCD, FCSD, and PfPAD, who all agree with it. No crew input has been
obtained, however, I would be amazed if they do not also agree. Ass,_ming
Stafford'svote, I assume this matter is settled. The mission rules do not
specifically address this interface problem and require no change unless
it is desirable to add this.
Howard W. Tindall, Jr.
PA:HWT: jsUNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
Memorandum oe ter
TO : See list attached DATE' _4ay 12, 1969
69-PA-T-?SA
FaOM : PA/Chief, Apollo Data Priority Coordination
4
SUBJECT: Cis-lunar state vector updating procedure change
A lot of you won't care - but I want to make sure that those that
need to know, do. It deals with state vector updates from the NCC
to the CSM during cis-lunar flight on the G mission.
On the C' mission, state vector updates were always transmitted to
the I_4 slots in computer memory in order to avoid messing up the
inf__w_usW-matrix. Since essentially no onboard cis-lunar navigation
will be ca_ied out on G, there is no need to protect the W-matrix
and the crew has expressed a strong preference for preserving their
sacred state vectors onboard the spacecraft. With some justification,
they want the ground to update only into the CSM state vector slots,
after which they will make some checks to determine if they have been
received and stored properly and are reasonable. They will then transfer
them to the LM slots for safekeeping. In other words, the I_4 slots are
for the crew to use as they wish. The flight controllers have agreed to
do it this way. _'_ l
Howard W. Tindall, Jr.
PA:HWT: Js
Buy U.S. Savin_s Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings PlanUNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
Me_ora_du_ NASA Manned Spacecraft Center
TO : See list attached DATE: Fmy 12, 1969
69-PA-T-T6A
FRO_ : PA/Chief, Apollo Data Priority Coordination
!
8b_JECT: G mission lunar descent is uphill - all the way
Just in case you didn't know, I thought I would send you this note
about some nominal G mission landing site characteristics which I
thought were kind of interesting. First of all, apparently this
landing site (2-P-6) is about 9,000 feet lower than the mean lunar
radius. The significance of this, of course, is that all ascent
and descent targeting - in fact, all lnrmr altitudes - are referenced
with respect to the landing site radius. That is, the 60 mile circular, LOI orbit is targeted with respect to the landing site and
thus is lower by 9,000 feet than you might have assumed. But more
important, the insertion altitude after ascent which is nominally
60,000 feet above the landing site is really only 51,000 feet above
the mean lunar surface and, of course, less than that over the bn-rps.
Another interesting characteristic is that the approach to this landing
site is even lower. Specifically, the est_wmted slope of the lunar
surface as the spacecraft approaches the landing site is about 1° up_
hill. This in itself appears to be tolerable, although it does perturb
the descent trajectory a little causing the approach angle to be low -
that is, toward the visibility washout direction. Something we do want
to look into about _his was brought out by Bernie Kriegsman (MIT) the
other day. One of his computer runs showed that during the final portion
of the descent trajectory under automatic control, the spacecraft would
actually stop descending and would achieve a positive altitude rate prior
to landing. The dispersion that caused this was a 1° slope uncertainty
in the lunar dat,,_m)which when added to the aforementioned estimated
slope resulted in a 2° uphill grade. We are going to have to cross-check
this to see if this is really what happens. If it is, we are going to
have to look in to the effect of this on how the crew would respond and
how the landing radar works under this condition.
Howard W. Tindall, Jr.
PA:HWT: js
la,,.., [l_kt ._avines Bonds Eelulad3 on the Payroll Savings Plan_l ww_4k4&Il[. wQRM _ _
_&w_¥!lNI
GSA2P"PMORnall) lO1-..!
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
Memorandum oente,
TO : See list attached DATE: May 12, 1969
69-PA-T-7'i'A
FRO_ : PA/Chief, Apollo Data Priority Coordination
SUBJECT: Manual Steering for IA{Ascent
Over the years various groups have attacked the problem of if and how
the crew can manually steer the LM back into orbit from the lunar surface. These studies were started before GAEC was even selected to
build the LM and some 8n_lysis is still going on to define the opti-_,m
pitch attitude profile, which should be used in this mode. On May 8,
I invited representatives of the MSC groups I knew had been involved
in this business to a discussion - the purpose of which was to pin
down just what the status is today, We were also interested in determining if something useful could be done between now and the G mission.
In Sl_-w_ry,I think we all agreed that:
a. We should certainly not count on a manual operational backup
mode for lunar ascent in the same sense that manual modes backup some
other critical mission phases such as rendezvous targeting, burn control,
etc. However, it's better than nothing and we ought to be prepared to
do something.
b. Without a rate cow,_nd attitude control system, it is extremely
doubtful they could achieve orbit even if they had trained thoroughly
in the technique, (Cux_ently there is n_otraining planned for the G
crew. ) .'
c. There are some things we should and will do before the O mission
to prepare for this contingency, since it is an nnfortun_te fact that
there are apparently quite a variety of two-failure combinations that
can put us into this serious situation.
One of the first impressions you get when you start looking into manual
ascent is that the procedures which should be used are strongly dependent
upon the character of the system failures. That is, there are many
different combinations of failures, each of which should be handled in
a different way. As a matter of fact, the _ltiple-procedure-sets idea,
combined with the low-probability-of-occurring idea has probably been
the ,_jor reason we haven'tgot this whole thing all worked out in
detail now. However, Jack Craven has finally convinced me the situation
is not that remote and a worse situation can hsrdly be imagined. Fur.thermore, our discussion leads me to believe that these multitude of procedures
Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan2
don't really present an insurmountable problem that can only be resolved
in real time. ! get the feeling that the "variation in procedures" which
come about from many of the component failures is primarily a reconfiguration of spacecraft switch settings and the crew procedures probably aren't
too different than for the nominal ascent itself. Of course, in that
case the _C must be prepared to advise the crew exactly how the spacecraft
should be configured to best support ascent _in one of these degraded modes.
It was interesting to find that the method which must be used for the next
level or class of failures essentially boils down to the following few
options:
l
a. Prior to lift-off, some sort of initial azimth reference must be
chosen such as a prominent lanSm_rk or probably the I$_'s shadow on the
lunar surface. Im_diately after lift-off, the crew would yaw the spacecraft to place the LPD line on the shadow prior to initiating pitchover,
after which a lanSm_rk to aim for could be selected by the crew in real
time.
b. After m_uual "Engine Start", the crew would hold the vertical
rise pitch/roll attitude for 15 seconds. They would then pitch the
spacecraft in accordance with pre-selected four step Ditch profile.
_nese angles are essentially known today both:
(1) In inertial coordinates for use if a spacecraft inertial
reference system is available and
(2) In a relative coordinate system - that is_ the overhead
window marks which should be held on the lunar horizon.
I
c. Propellan_ depletion should probably be used as the "Engine Off" !
technique and it is recommended that the interconnect not be used for
attitude control since APS propellant is marginal to start with and should
be utilized exclusively for getting into orbit. The "Engine Off" co_.._r_nd
could possibly be issued manually using the DEDA output of _VX provided
the AEA and x-axis accelerometer are functional but probably shouldn't be.
This procedure_ which essentially targets the spacecraft to the nominal
insertion altitude and flight path angle most likely will result in a
large dispersion in velocity, which of course would foul up the subsequent
rendezvous. At least it provides the greatest chance of achieving orbit
at all and probably m_ uimizes the dispersions to give us a reasonable whack
at rendezvous.
It is evident the two things that the crew needs to do on this job are
an attitude reference and an attitude control mode. I was very interested
to find that if we constrain ourselves to talking about pure manual asopposed t° the various levels of degraded automatic ascent modes, we
really came out with a very short list of candidates for these
two things. Specifically for attitude reference, we have the following:
a. If the CEE is broken, but the AEA, ASA, FDAI, and needles are
available, they provide an excellent attitude reference. In fact,
in this case, the crew should fly the needle's as opposed to the four
step pitch profile noted previously since they are driven by the actual
ascent guidance ei_i_orsignal. (Unfortun_tely_ it probably means having I
to fly in Direct Attitude Control- heaven forbid:) . i
f
b. If only the LGC is broken, we can use the _ and GASTA driving
the FDAI to provide a good inertial attitude reference if we can align
it somehow (Caging, probably) and can figure out how it is aligned, I
c. The overhead window has been especially configured for use with
the horizon during ascent, which fortunately is sunlit throughout the
nominal ascent. (A sunlit horizon is not always available for descent
aborts or lift-off _mm_diately after touchdown.) Spacecraft pitch is
controlled using the horizon and window marks; spacecraft yaw utilizes
the horizon tilt and roll (that is, azimuth) must use some landmark
as noted previously.
Those are/all the choices we could think of for an attitude reference
if automatic control has been lbst. Furthermore, we found there are
only three msn,,s1 attitude control modes, which I will list in order
of preference:
a. If a PGNCS accelerometer is broken, it is possible to use the
LGC_ I_J gyros, and hand controller to obtain a DAP rate cowhand mode.
b. If the ASA and/or AEA is broken, it is possible to use the ATCA,
rate gyros, and hand controller to obtain a rate co_ud mode.
c. The rotational hand controller (ACA) can be used in either of
two Direct Attitude Control modes, both of which are probably ,_nscceptable.
They are four jet - 12° (hardover) and two jets - 2_2°.
Following is a list of things we are going to do:
a. MPAD/TRW will recommend the final angles - inertial and horizon -
to be used for carrying out the four step pitch profile.
b. FCSD will check with the crew to determine if they want to add
these numbers into their checklist along with the nominal attitude profile
check points they have already, or if they want to leave this for a real
time voice relay from the MDC.c. Clark Hackler and Jack Craven are going to develop a complete matrix
defining the prefe_ed spacecraft configuration and capability remaining
for degradation or failure of each component. This should be done by the
first week in June. Incidentally, something along this line has apparently
been worked out by GAEC already.
d. I am going to see if it possible: for some experienced pilot, preferably Pete Conrad, to run a few s_-,_lations of some of these manual
abort modes, particularly to evaluate using the overhead window attitude
reference with the three rate co--_ud and direct attitude control modes
noted above.
In mid June, we will set up a Mission Techniques meeting on this subject
with world-wide participation - particularly MIT_ TRW, and GAEC - to see
where we stand at that time. Considering the catastrophic nature of the
situation under discussion here, it seems some effort is certainly justifiable to get prepared. I would recommend that it be an effort equivalent
to ,_uual TT.T steering. In other words, a blan_ check. Everyone at MSC
and particularly the prime crew can spend full time on it, if they want
to. And, I currently plan to have a Mission Techniques document prepared
specifically for it, too - prior to G.
Howard W. Tindall, Jr.
PA :HWT: jsGS& Fl'ldR (4_ C/FRS _1-11.4
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
IVlemorandum s ce  ft °enter
TO : See list attached DATE' _y 15, 1969
69-PA-T-?
FROM : PA/Chief, Apollo Data Priority Coordination
SUBJECT: Some "improvements" in the Descent preparation procedures
As we wade deeper and deeper into Descent Mission Techniques, one
thing coming into focus is that, of all IMU error sources s the
two that hurt the most are accelerometer bias and y-axis (pitch)
m_salignment at PDI. Having recognized this, we are now proposing
some specific procedures to minimize them. This memo is to tell you
all about it in some length, I'm afraid.
There is no better test bed for determining accelerometer bias than a
spacecraft in orbit. Any output from an accelerometer is bias and
procedures have been well established for monitoring s selecting, and
updating the accelerometer bias compensation terms in the LGC. On
flights prior to Gs the practice has been to establish a threshold
below which the compensation would be left alone and above which it
would be updated from the _C. Nany of us now feel, and I am proposing
that on the G mission, it should be standard procedure prior to DOI
for the _C to update accelerometer bias compensation terms in the
LGC routinely, regardless of how good or bad the currently stored
values are. The threshold is zero.
Pitch misali_w_ut is a little bit tougher. _y I first Just state
some facts to build on?
a. The current Mission Tecbn_ ques provide only a coarse _ drift
check by comparison of the docked _ alignment at DOI - _ hours to
the undocked A0T alignment performed at D0I - ½ hour. The docked alignment uses the CSM IMU as its reference and bas an estimated accuracy of
0.5° in all axes, so drift rates as large as 0.5°/hr could go undectected.
(Specifically, the accuracy of this drift estimate is + .25°/hr. ) PDI
occurs about i½ hours after the A0T alignment, which means it is possible for pitch misali_ments like 3/_° to build up. That's sort of a
worst case kind of n_m%er s and to quote such a value will drive statistically-minded people out of their gourds, but it helps me w_ke a point.
b. Tolerable pitch misalignment at PDI to support a successful
landing is in the order of 1° ass-m_ug the landing radar comes in early
enough to compensate for the dispersions that have built up.
B,,j U.S. R,S,,I,,,O th, P,,y,oll .2ff 2._2
c. Descent aborts become hazardous if the pitch misalig_ment at
PDI exceeds about 0.35 °. (_ais n,_mber is being more accurately determined, but I'll bet it comes out within 0.05 ° of that guess.) This is
ass,,m_ngthe worst abort situation, _emely aborting at an altitude of
about 13,000 feet because no landing radar data has been accepted. If
we are willing to go beyond that point with no landing raSew, the tolerable misalignment is sm_ller than that. The point is that the
: performance requirement to support descent aborts appears to be the
more constraining than to support descent itself and I think we all feel
that it is intolerable to continue descent beyond the point a safe abort
could be executed with the degraded PGNCS.
d. Since the AGS has to be aligned to the PGNCS prior to PDI, and
pitch misalignment in the PGNCS has an equal effect on the AGS. They
are not independent in this respect.
e. Given high bit rate telemetry, ground monitoring techniques
are adequate to detect an ,,n_cceptable INN misaligement within the
first two minutes of powered descent. Thus, the crew could be infoAmed
and instructed to abort safely.
f. To abort a l,,n_r landing mission, if it could have been saved
by improving procedures, is rather ,:n_cceptable.
Based on all that, we hsve two recommendations, either or both of
which should help the situation considerably.
The first is a proposal for a better docked PGNCS alignment suggested
by Bob White of MIT, which should allow us not only to detect a drifting IMU, but to update its compensation such that we may proceed with
a nominal mission. Detailed procedures development and perfo_m_nce
analysis is under way at this time. It will dew_ud some modification
in the crew timeline during the IAi activation and checkout period as
well as the implementation of a new RTCC and/or ACE computer program
and NCC procedures. The technique requires two spacecraft attitude
maneuvera while in the docked configuration with the LM and CS)( crew
simultaneously keying out CIYJ angles before and after each of these
attitude changes. All of this _st be done after the LM I_ has been
coarsely alined as in the current flight plan. With this data, the
flight controllers can compute the LM I_J orientation and torquing
angles required. This technique is expected to be as good as an AOT
ali_ment. It does not require knowing the relative orientation of
the two navigation bases nor reading the docking ring index:
The other proposal involves making a drift check prior to PDI; it
requires no NCC participation. Considerable effort was given to
including an IM3 alignment in the timeline but many of us have3
concluded the lighting conditions make it chancey at best. The only
place it fits in the timeline is from PDI - 30 to PDI - 15. This
period is almnst perfectly centered around local high noon. Either
the sun or the moon is in the AOT field of view for almost this
entire time, making use of stars almnst impossible. Except the sun:
The nice thing about the sun is that it is certainly visible. Also
since the whole mission profile is keyed to lighting regardless to
landing site and month of the year, the sun will always be located
in the same place with respect to the IA{. MIT has been asked to write
up a precise step by step procedure for doing this. Essentially it
consists of the following:
After entering the descent program (P63), the crew would accept
the option offered them to go into the alignment program (P52). They
would specify the sun as their first "star". The LGC has the solar
ephermis and will control the spacecraft attitude to place the sun in
the center of the AOT. (The rear detent position should probably be
used to minimize attitude change unless we do PDI with windows up. )
The crew would readout the CDU glmbal angles to which the LGC is positioning the spacecraft; of particular interest is /)SKY register No. 2 -
the y-axis. The crew would then take over attitude control and cause
the sun to cross the A0T retical line in the pitch direction at which
time the actual spacecraft CIX3angles would be keyed out on the DSKY.
The difference between this actual pitch CDU angle and the previously
noted predicted value is a direct indication of drift since the AOT
ali_w_nt one hour earlier. The mission rule would be: if indicated
misalignment is less than 0.25°, the nominal mission should be continued; if the indicated misalignm_nt exceeds that value, PDI _,st be
delayed one rev, an AOT ali_m_ut would be performed two hours after
the previous one and the M_C would determine and update the PGNCS drift
compensation prior to LOS.
The value of the first recommendation is that it provides a chance to
detect and fix a problem without perturbing the nominal mission. The
value of the second is that it allows detecting and fixing a problem
before PBI is attempted, although in the worse case it forces delay
of PDI one rev, which I am sure we are going to find is a highly
undesirable thing to do.
That in a million words-or-less is where we stand on this matter today.
We will continue our analysis and procedures development based on this.
One ,,n*ortunate fact is that if we adopt these proposals, they will
not have been tested on the F mission, but I think we would all be n_ive
if we thought we are not going to learn things on F that force us to
change the procedures anyway.
_HowardW. Tindal_
PA:HWT:jsHAy m IDg%1W_/
G._m,,Mn(,aG,'R)m-.,.I
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
Memorandum
TO : See list attached DATE' May 28, 1969
69-PA- -82A
FROM : PA/Chief, Apollo Data Priority Coordination
S_JlZCT: Descent, L,_r Surface, and Ascent Mission Techni ques with the
H crew
On F_y 20 and 21 we reviewed Descent, Lnn_r Surface, and Ascent Mission
Techniques with the H crew (Pete Conrad and co. ). This get together
had two major objectives - to tell the H crew how we think these things
should be done and conversely, for the first time to get a flight crew
reaction to the techniques since in the main, they have been firmed up
too late to review thoroughly with the G crew. In general, I think
we are in pretty good shape on this stuff although there are, of course,
the inevitable open items and questions we never seem able to rid ourselves of completely.
It was interesting to note that the H crew seems desirous of cutting
back some of the activities the G crew considered worthwhile. There
are also obvious philosophical differences in their attitude regarding
the use of the automatic systems vs. a mere _uual mode. Conrad seems
-,_ch more inclined to stay with the automatic system longer than Armstrong
as well as insisting that they work. For e_mple, he does not propose
to continue in the face of no landing radar data, whereas Nell apparently
feels he can substitute visual data for it. Some other interesting
e_ T.ples are:
a. Pete would like to drop out all the visual observations of the
lunar surface, both before and after PDI including the IAmD altitude
checks.
b. Pete would like to substitute a landing radar altitude check
prior to f_DI.
c. Pete wants to do PDI face up. (Hallelujah baby' )
d. Pete also wants to drop the crew voice report of their estimate
of where they actually landed.
It might be worth reporting some other interesting things resulting
from our discussion:
a. We probably ought to add in some sort of AGS drift check pre-PDI
after the PGNCS ali_ment check using the sun.
t B,,.,v.s. ,va,,oon,3,v,,j,oUs,,,,i,, z,,,, 2o/f-32
b. There is still a controversy over when we should switch to the
AGS. Some feel it should be done only if the PGNCS is degraded to a
point where it can't make a safe orbit; others feel we should switchover as soon as it is certain the AGS will do a significantly better
job than the PGNCS.
c. The decision has been firmly made that the crew will not manually
backup the automatic landing radar antenr_ position switch.
d. There is still some work to be done in establishing procedures
in the event the GDA failure light comes on late in descent. _rly
in descent, I think everyone agrees the crew ,_st await secondary cues
before deactivating the GDA. There -_y be some advantage to imw_diately
turning it off if the light comes on late in descent in that it may be
possible to complete the landing using RCS attitude control only.
e. It was suggested that some sort of VSF ranging check could be
done while the I_4 is on the 1,_r surface, perhaps during the last overpass prior to LM ascent or even during the ascent itself. We w_ll have
to look into this to see if it is practical and useful.
Given the longer 1,_r_r stay of the H mission, it is clear the guidance
system mast be turned off to conserve electrical power. This has obvious
implications on how the system should be used just after landing and
just before lift-off. We have also decided to throw out the s_,_lated
countdown for lift-off at the end of the first CSM rev. As a result of
these and other th_ngs, I have asked TRW to revise the L,_n_r Surface
Mission Techniques and we will review them with everyone when they get
done.
PA:HWT:jsMAy ,leZ
GSAri'MR (,3 orR) ,o,-tt.4
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
Memorandum
TO : See list attached DATE: May 29, 1969
69 -PA-T-83A
_oM : PA/Chief) Apollo Data Priority Coordination
SUBJECT: DPS low level propellant light
During our final review of the Descent Mission Techniques on May 28)
... _ presented a comprehensive review of the low level DPS propel]ant
light - its operation and accuracy. The most significant piece of
information coming from this was that we are assured of about 98
seconds more DPS operation at the hover thrust level after the light
comes on. An uncertainty of about four seconds is included in that
nnmber thereby ,_king it the "worst" case. Note that this is quite
a bit smaller than numbers quoted in the past.
We are proposing the following technique. The crew should co-_t
to landing or else they should abort one minute after the low level
light comes on. That is, the descent is continued in a normal manner
for one minute after the light) at which time the crew must decide
that they can assuredly land or they should abort right then. By
aborting right then they have approxiw_tely eight to ten seconds of
DPS capability rew_ining at full thrust prior to propellant depletion.
Selection of one minute as the go/no go point came about based on an
intuitive feeling that approximately eight to ten seconds of DPS
thrusting is a reasonable minimum to get the LM the hell out of there
coupled with the operational simplicity of keeping track of a integer
minute during this busy and exciting time. It should be emphasized
that time since the low level light should be the primary cue and would
require no secondary cue provided the light is not malfunctioning and
the crew noted the time it came on. In that event) of course_ they
must use the backup system - namely the more critical propellant tank
gauge indication of three percent remaining as their cut-off time for
making the go/no go decision.
Howard W. Tindall) Jr.
PA:HWT:jsMAy IJ2 II_l'n_
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
Memorandum Oe=e'
TO : See list attached DATE: June 4, 1969
69 -PA -T-84A
FI_OM : PA/Chief_ Apollo Data Priority Coordination
SUBJECT: G Rendezvous Navigation 0JT is proposed
CMP Mike Collins ca3]ed the other day to ask if there is any reason
why he should not do active rendezvous navigation between D0I and PDI
on the G mission. That is_ he would like to run PRO incorporating
sextant and VHF ranging data to update the LM state vector in the
CI_. His primary purpose is to get some on-the-job training (OJT)
before he has to do it for real during the upcoming rendezvous. You
recall_ this was in the F Flight Plan and I assnme John Young did
it, although I'm not sure. I told him that I knew of no reason why
he shouldn't and I have asked several other experts who agree. I
also suggested to Mike that he contact John personally to get any
pertinent F mission feedback.
This memo is to inform you that this activity will be included in
the G mission timeline unless somebody comes up with a valid
objection. Do you have one?
Howard W. Tindall, Jr.
PA:HWT: js
!$tO°_' ' 1_._' CrTICI4A_ FORM NO. IO
MAY 1M_
GSA IrPMR (41 C3C_) I01-TtJ
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
Memorandum Oen e
TO : See list attached DATE: June 5, 1969
69-PA -T-8?A
FROM : PA/Chief, Apollo Data Priority Coordination
SUBJECT: PRN ranging in lunar orbit is unnecessary
This memo is to restate our requirements for PRN ranging while in
lunar orbit. I am writing it since there is evidently some confusion
about it.
At no time in lunar orbit can PRN be classified as more than "desirable" -
never "mandatory)' or even "highly desirable" as long as things are going
reasonably well. The only time ranging could become a requirement is if
the entire trajectory determination system blows up and it is necessary
to reinitialize from scratch when knowledge of the cu_z_ent state vector
is essentially nil.
Since the specific questions arising recently deal _ith PRN requirements
during powered flight - that is, ascent and descent_ I would like to
further state that during those periods PR17 ranging is virtually of no
use whatsoever. In fact, the powered flight processor in the RTCC will
not even accept that type of data. Accordingly, if there is any advantage
to be gained in configuring the spacecraft to exclude PRN during those
periods in order to e_b_nce the quality of other co,,,,_micationrequirements, I recommend that this be done.
Howard W. Tindall, Jr.
PA:HWT: jsGSA I,Pldn (41 aR) I01-SIJ
Memorandum
TO : See list attached DATE: June ll, 1969
69-PA-T-92A
PI_OM : PA/Chief_ Apollo Data Priority Coox_tinatio n
SUBJECT: CSM Rescue Mission Techniques are complete and clean
On June 9 we had our final Mission Techniques meeting on CSM Rescue. I
am pleased to report that this stuff appears to be in very good shape.
After much hard work by m_uypeople_ the CSM rescue rendezvous plans
shake down to only two basic profiles. Each of these has minor modifications to account for the number of revs required for rendezvous and the
effect of various separation ranges on the rendezvous tracking schedule.
The point to be made is that even though it is possible to list a great
variety of versions for CSM rescue depending on the initial conditions
and status of the LM_ the fact that the differences between them are so
minor gives us assurance that the limited training and simulations we
are able to afford should serve to check them out adeqUately and to
provide adequate assurance that they will work if we need them. _ae G
and H CMP's chose to deal with them somewhat differently_ but I think
their differences are clearly within the realm of crew preference.
Specifically, Nike Collins (G) has requested and is being provided with
what he calls a "Cookbook" of procedures. It consists of about 18 different
two-page checklists, each designed for a specific abort situation. In the
event of one of these aborts, it will only be necessary for him to select
and use the appropriate pages defining the operation of the guidance and
propulsion system in the usUal checklist detail and giving specific input
targeting parameters and tracking schedules. They also contain typical
relative motion plots and maneuver magnitude all referenced to GET. These
two-page contingency checklists will each be thoroughly reviewed by FCD,
FCSD, and MPAD people this week to make sure they are accurate. Dick Gordon
(H) apparently prefers now to rely somewhat more on his memory and knowledge
of how the pro_ms work and so forth and does not intend to ca_ry these
contingency procedures with him. It is his feeling that the differences
are really minor enough that he should have no trouble in carrying out the
appropriate procedures.
Ny personal opinion is that either of these approaches are perfectly
acceptable and should work just fine.
There was very little new to discuss at this meeting. Probably the most
significant result was our detailed specification of control center to CSM
targeting assistance required for the abort situations. Specifically:
a. If the CSM mast make the "tweak" maneuver (that is_ if the LM
inserts into orbit unstaged)_ the ground will supply the GET of the burn
Buy U.S. Saving$ Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan .2 PO2
initiation (i.e., I_ insertion +12 minutes), the _Vx, and the pitch gimbal
angle.
b. For the CSM to backup the phasing burn, we concluded that no special
voice transmission to the CSM is required. Tmw_diately after LM insertion
the ground will voice to the I_ (and the OSN will copy) the _V and CSI
time as soon as possible. If time permfts, this will be followed by a
complete PBO Pad to the I_i but nothing more will be sent to the CSM.
c. Before DOI the CSN will be sent a "CSN rescue Pad" consisting of
a Phasing TIG, T_I t_me for abort before PDI + 10, and TPI time for abort
after PDI + 10. These quantities are included in some more extensive LM
Pad messages but some effort should be taken to assist the CMP in stripping
out these specific parRmeters of interest to him or to send them up as a
separate Pad. Upcoming s_-_?lations w_ll show which course o2 action is
preferable.
d. If it is decided to delay PDI one rev, _C will relay to the CMP
Phasing TTG, TPI time for all descent aborts and TPI time for the "T2"
abort time shortly after lam touchdown.
Howard W. Tindall, Jr.
PA:RWT: jsaVTWI_L. IJONM _O. IO
MAY Imt IDFf'tON
P_dr( (;d OW,) tOI-Jt.e
UNITED STATES GO_ENT
Memorandum oo.t
TO : gee list attached DATE: June 13, 1969
69-PA-T-93A
FaOM : PA/Chief, Apollo Data Priority Coordination
SUBJECT: Some significant _Y program changes you should know about
I really blew it at the June 5 Apollo Spacecraft Software Configuration
Control Board meeting. Although dozens of rather minor changes were
approved, the one I was most concerned about wasn't even discussed and I
completely forgot it. This memo is to inform you that we are now desPerately trying to include a capability in the LM computer program for a
lun-_ landing flight in November which substantially improves descent
abort targeting and procedures. Currently the IA{ descent abort programs
target the sPacecraft to insertion conditions which is not entirely
accurate. _his is because the more sophisticated equations required to
do the job right were too complicated to get in the program for the G
_ ssion and we settled for some approximations that On3,Vdo a pretty
good job. Unfortunately, if we have a descent abort this makes it
necessary to trim the insertion conditions based on ground targeting.
This is the so-called "tweak" maneuver you've heard so ,_ch about which
either the IAI or cow._ud module must execute shortly after LM insertion
into orbit. It is a messy procedure and the pro_m change proposed _ill
el_m_uate its need. Furthermore, for aborts late in powered descent
.
(that is; after PDI + l0 minutes) it is necessary for the IJ4 to execute
a phasing maneuver approxiw_tely one-half rev after insertion to set up
the proper rendezvous conditions. This, too, is a messy ground targeted /
procedure which will be eliminated if this program change is implemented. /
Although I wanted to tell you about that, my main purpose in writing this
memo was to inform you that in order to get this program change in we have
to sacrifice some other things and I thought you should have an opportunity
to comp]_%n if you wanted to. First of all, storage has agmin become a
problem and so we propose that_ if necessary, MIT should delete the two
Stable Orbit Rendezvous targeting program (P38 and P39) from the LM
progr-_. We have never discovered an operational use forthese pro_ms
but m,ybe this deletion may bug somebody. (Incidentally, in order to
provide more room for the dozen or so other changes already approved, the
externally targeted I_mbert pre-thrust program [P31] has already been
deleted. ) The other caPability which may have to be dropped is the rendezvous
radar automatic acquisition provided by the PGNCS during the Descent Abort
programs (FT0 and PT1). Disabling this capability (R29), may be required
to avoid a computer cycle problem. That is, obviously the computer can
only do so much in a given period of time and it is MIT's option that
adding the proposed sophistication in the guidance may cause us to exceed
_mthat ltm_ tation. _is in turn forces us to give up another task and we
have chosen the so-called Rendezvous Radar Desi_te Routine.
This final paragraph is on another subject, but I thought I would point
out that one of the more si_ficant capabilities added last Thursday
? was the capability for the crew to readout raw rendezvous radar range and
range rate data on the DSKY during the operation of the Rendezvous Naviga-
._ tion program (P20). ibis capability had been requested several times
previously but never _de it in to the program due to scheduling problems.
' It is a real nice thing to have.
Howard W. Tindall_ Jr.
PA:EWT:jse
IttT lei BWTION
/- amas?lm (_ es.n)m.ll.I
UNIT_.r_ STATES GOVF..R.N_g. NT
Memorandum NASA _nned Spacecraft Center
TO :See listattached DATE:J,_ne19,1969
69 -PA-T-94A
Fao_ : PA/Chief, Apollo Data Priority Coordination
SUB. CT: Ascent with busted guidance and control systems
On June ll we had a Mission Techniques meeting to discuss manual ascent
from the 1,_n_ surface. _he term ma_el ascent, though, is somewhat
misleading since most of our discussion had to do with how the guidance
systems should be operated if certain of its components failed prior to
ascent. In s-m-_y, i think everyone generally agrees that:
a. ·GiVen a rate co-_,_udattitude control system, the crew should be
able to guide the spacecraft into orbit quite satisfactorily using the
horizon viewed through the overhead window as his attitude reference. _ae
resultant orbit will be far from nominal which could present rendezvous
problems, but at least we feel fairly confident he can get into orbit.
Ma_nl steering in the "Direct" attitude control mode is considered pretty
hopeless in the sense that it is probably impossible to control the spacecraft at all - not in the sense that the insertion conditions are not
acceptable.
b. Both the AGS/CES and the PGNCS have a substantial capability, even
if the accelerometers are broken. However, special procedures are required
to utilize this capability.
c. Gyro failures virtually wipe out the system with the possible
exception of the rate gyros in the AGS/CES package.
_ae rest of this memo just adds a little detail to the above S_l_,,_ry
if you are interested.
Pure Ma_;_l Ascent using rate co_,,.,_udand the horizon
Since our last meeting, Paul Kramer and Chuck Lewis have set up and run
a series of simalations using CES rate co,,.._udand the overhead window)
which I understand were general]y quite successful. _ey are _n the process
of documenting their results, so I suggest you contact them if you are
interested. Briefly, they found that using the four step pitch profile
MPAD/'JltWhas reco,._nded works very well. q'neyalso found that it is
possible to use the pitch angles in the current checklist that the crew
uses to monitor a nominal guided ascent. _ese angles are tabulated for
each 30 second time-hack. _]3ey found that letting the APS run to propellantdepletion always resulted in an excessive overspeed - that is, yielding
apogees up around 400 miles or so which suggests that it may be desirable
to use the interconnect during ,_nual ascent just as during nominal,
thereby using APS propellant rather than RCS for attitude control. I
expect we will all agree this is the right thing to do. Due to s_lator
limitations, they used the initialFI_I as sn az_,_th reference. It was
the consensus of those at the meeting that if the inertial reference is
not available, as could easily be the case, an acceptable alternate is for
the crew to yaw the spacecraft during vertical rise to place the LPD line
on the IAi shadow. Given this initial launch azimuth as a reference, they
should be able to choose prominent features downrange to head for in real
time. In addition to the horizon angles, as viewed through the overhead
window, corresponding -ngles as displayed on the _ are also available
for the crew's use if an inertial reference is available. _ae reason we
place greatest emphasis on the horizon is that it will always be there
and a good FDA1 may not. 1_. .... ... _
_with accelerometer failed still provides attitude hold rate co_,.,,_nd
andFt_I.
As well as anyone can determine, there is no reason why the PGNCS
cs_not be al_ed even with accelerometer,s broken. Of course, the gravity
align is out, but it still should be possible to use the IA{body attitude
option and the A0T two star sightings option (alignment techniques 0 and 2).
The accelerometers will cause program alarms but the aligBment programs
should still work. In either case, we would recommend aligning the
to the standard nominal REFS_T. No special procedures are required for
this and the crew would be provided a perfectly nominal FDAI display.
t Of course, no n-vigation or automatic guidance can be caxzied out without
the accelerometer, but it still should be possible to get a rate co-._nd
attitude, hold control capability provided we are able to w_nage the
digital autopilot (Ii_P) in the LGO properly. Of specific concern is
what special inputs, if any, are required to take care of vehicle mass
as the ascent progresses. You recall, the LGC decrements w_ss as part
of its DAP function but without PIPA's it won't. This also had some
Ct on which program the LGC should be operated in during ascent. It
our imPressiQn that the standard Ascent program (P12) is preferable.
Alternates suggested were the Average G program (P4T) or the Idling
program (PO0). MIT was assigned the action item of advising us precisely I
how we should handle the mass in the DAP and which prelim was best from
their viewpoint. One thing, reasons for preferring P12 is that the PGNCS
might offer a redundant Engine-On capability as well as a more favorable
attitude deadband. If the PGNCS is used with a broken accelerometer, the
crew should follow the standard four step pitch profile and fly to propell-ut
depletion as noted above.
/failed leaves o ttitude reference - _ybe
/ If the LGC has failed, it is imp_ossible to realign the I1_3. This presents
f two choices, if the alignment is known and favorable at the time of LGC
failure, it ,_y be desirable to leave it alone. If that is not the situation, it is possible to cage the _ thereby aligning it to the LM body
axis, which may provide a useful reference if the IA{ has landed in a fairly
level attitude with the z-axis close to in-plane. Obviously if the LGC has
failed_ the only capability the PGNCS can possibly offer is An inertial
attitude reference since attitude control and navigation demand a functional
AGS y or z accelerometer failed- AC_ can still go "Auto"
·L _ .:
If either the y or z-axis accelerometer is broken, · it is impossible to do
a lunar surface gravity ali_ment. However , it is possible to align the
AGS given two A0T star sightings and ground assistance to compute the IA{
body attitude. Given the star data, the _C will compute and relay to
the crew both the IA{and CSM state vectors in the AGS coordinate system
ass,_minga body axis alignment (DRr_ entry 400 + 50,000). It will be
based on the assumption the crew will select initial guidance (DEDA entry
400 + 107000 ) at precisely two miuutes before lift-off. By zeroing the
bias and scale factor coefficients in the AGS computer for the failed
accelerometer, it is possible to use automatic AGS steering into orbit
with a guided cutoff. Of course, no out-of-plane steering will result
since the spacecraftwill alWays be oriented such that the broken accelerometer is oriented out-of-plan_.
If it is the z-axis accelerometer which is broken, it would b_ necessary
for the LM to fly into orbit on its side. It is instructed to do this by
loading the so-called Wu (Addresses 51_, 515, 516) as relayed from ground
to arm the WB (DEDA entry 623 + lO,O00). It may be possible to load a
pseudo bias to compensate for the 12_-oAPB engine cant angle. There is a
real trade-off to be made here between using the manual guidance noted
above with a resultant overspeed or to fly the automatic AGS guidance with
the I_ on its side. The crew would be ,]n_ble to monitor its perfor,_nce but,
if it works as advertized it would produce good insertion conditions for
the subsequent rendezvous.
If AC_ x accelerometer is broken a good inertial reference is all that's
left
If the AGS x accelerometer is broken_ it is possible to perform a lunar
gravity alignment using the standard procedures associated with broken
PG_CS/good AGS. In this case_ we are assured of a good initial attitude
reference for use in flying the pitch profile, but the automatic guidance
and navigation is completely lost by the AGS.k
AGS/CES with a rate gryo broken
No one is able, at this time, to say whether or not the AGS can fly completely
automatically with a rate gyro disabled. It is suspected that rate feedback
is required to provide a stable system but we are not sure. Accordingly,
some runs are pls_Bed on the GAEC facilities with the RGA disabled to see
what happens. If it can't handle it, the crew will have to fly Direct in
the cha_el with the broken rate gyro using the error as a reference. _is
will also be si_lated.
One major open item coming from all this is how we should play the rendezvous
game given any of the situations here. Specifically, should we bias the liftoff time either late or early to give more time to do the rendezvous or to
put the co_._ud module behind the LM at insertion? Should some CSM w_neuver
be w_de prior to or immediately after launch? A _,,mber of people will think
about this and we'll probably get together in the next couple of weeks to
lay out some plans since this is just as important as knowing how to get in
orbit in the first place.
In all of the above cases a _,,m_erof action items were identified, pr_-_ily
dealing with establishment of precise procedures for initialization of the
systems. It is expected that the necessary information should be available
within a few weeks so that we can document all this before the G flight.
Howard W. TJ_a,11,
PA :RWT: jsj _rmm_m._ _
MAT !_U Im_lQql
,GisPPNR a (maq_to) l-,u
UNITED grATF_ GOVERNMENT
Memorandum
TO :See list attached DATE: June 24, 1969
69-PA-T-95A
FROM :PA/Chief, Apollo Data Priority Coordination
ST._TEC'rPost : Insertion CSM P52 is optional
Dick Gordon and Pete Conrad called the other day to ask how important
we feel the CSM platform alignment is just after IA{ insertion into
orbit. As I recall, this alignment is a ca_y-over from the time we
pls_ned to do the CSM pl_e change just prior to lift-off rather than
just after landing as we currently plan to do. We didn't have pulse
torquing then either. Given these changes I don't really see why it
is needed anymore, particularly if we have been monitoring the /243
for several days inflight and if necessary, have compensated it. As
a matter of fact, if it is not too late it might be reasonable to
consider dropping this CSM platform alignment from the G Flight Plan
too. _he main advantage is that it would permit CSM to remain in an
attitude compatible with rendezvous radar tracking by the LM as soon
as they finish with their P5R. Any com-_nts anyone?
Howard W. Tindall, Jr.
PA:HWT: js
Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan .2 _Y
_O*Ke14AY_ ICDITlaN
UNITEr) KrATES GOVERNMENT
gemo_/.a_um NASA Manned Spacecraft Center
TO : See list attached DATE: July l_ 1969
69-PA-T- iO1A
FROM : PA/Chief_ Apollo Data Priority Coordination
SUBJECT: Post-insertion alignment is lower priority than rendezvous
navigation
k
It has been agreed that it is more important for the LM to obtain
rendezvous navigation tracking data than to complete the platform
- realignment after insertion into orbit if problems occur which prolong it. The point is, an accurate CSI maneuver is vital but it is
recognized that bad angle data does not substantially degrade that
solution. _]3us)even though the lunar surface platform alignment
may not be red hot it should be adequate to support the rendezvous
navigation; if the crew experiences difficulty in realigning, they
should terminate that effort to insure they get an adequate _mount
of rendezvous radar data. Specifically) they should complete or
terminate the P52 by 30 minutes before CSI. If they do fail to
complete the alignment, they should add one into their timeline
immediately after CSI and depend on the CSM for their plane change
targeting.
I would like to emphasize that this is a contingency procedure since
everyone anticipates that adequate time has been provided to do this
alignment.
Howard W. Tindall, Jr.
PA :HWT:js
B,,yu.s. R,s,,l,,lyona, e,,y,oU el, 77
mmD.mCI,'rIcKAL. IWOl_4 NO. Io
IKAY Sim
C_.K IrPSdR (41 4:_R) IOI-S S.S
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
Memorandum NASA Nanned Spacecraft Center
TO :See list attached DATE:July l, t969
69-PA-T-102A
FROM :PA/Chief, Apollo Data Priority Coordination
SUBJECT:New DPS GDA Descent mission rule is imm_uent if not now
A lot of activity has been going on lately regarding the manner in
which the DPS gimbal drive actuator (GDA) is managed during descent.
This memo is to make sure everyone knows this business is going on -
and producing dramatic changes - and it is not finished yet.
The basic question, of course, is, What should be done if the GDA
caution and warning alarm goes off during descent? Until a few weeks
ago it was planned to ignore it until some secondary cue appeared to
backup the alarm since it was felt a properly operating GDA was mandatory for descent. A number of new factors have appeared on the scene
recently, which almost certainly changes this procedure. The first
and most significant was the addition of the RCS plume deflectors which
apparently have all but eliminated RCS impingement as an operational
constraint. GAEC's analysis is continuing and unless we have some sort
of duty cycle limitation, it appears we can tolerate as _ch activity
as is required for total attitude control by the RCS during a complete
lunar descent. Incidentally, RCS propellant quantities also appear
adequate for this purpose.
Some secondary factors which support this technique are the uncertainty
of whether or not the crew can sense a build-up in RCS activity when
wearing helmets and gloves. Another interesting factor is that during
normal descent, apparently the GDA doesn't move the DPS engine more than
about 0.1 ° to account for c.g. shift during the entire descent. Apparently,
the main excuse for even activating the GDA is to guard against unsb_,_,.etrieal
DPS throat erosion and engine compliance changes when throttling. It
appears a final mission rule will be to turn off the GDA as quickly as
possible if a GDA caution and warning alarm occurs and complete the descent
using RCS attitude control unless something unexpected appears in the analysis
going on now and between the flight.
Howard W. Tindall, Jr.
PA :HWT:js ' 'MAYmm
al& p_.MN (4ac_) tol-..I
UNITED STATF._ OO_
Memorandum oe-=r
TO : See list attached DATE: July 3, 1969
69-PA-T-103A
_OM : PA/Chief, Apollo I_t_. Priority Coordiru_tion ....
SUBIECT: Some new ideas on how to use the AGS during :Descent
This memo is to fill you in on a couple of late crew procedure changes
proPOsed for the G mission regarding AGS operation during descent. The
first is a technique to prepare the AGS for ixEnediate ascent which can
be used to quickly reinitialize the AGS IaM state vector immediately
after touchdovn if there is any concern that the navigation during
descent has fouled them up somehow, This is POssible since the LM
state vector on the ln_-r surface can be easily predicted before descent.
Specifically, it involves loadingsome storage location through the DR
just after the final state vector update from the PGNCS at about seven
minutes before PDI. The n,,mbers loaded would be the 1,_n_r radius (240 +
5692B) and the lunar rotation (262 - 00150), which essentially constitute
the entire state vector on a lunar surface. The rest of the state vector
elements (241, 242, 260, 261) are all loaded zeros. None of these
addresses are used during descent or descent aborts so this procedure
does not conflict with anything planned. The idea is that _._diately
after touchdown, when the 1,_v Surface flag is set, the crew would key
in 41_ + 20,000 instead of updating altitude as currently planned. This
would initialize the AGS state vector with these quantities quite accurately
to support an _diate ascent. This procedure is supposed to Be brought
to the Crew Procedures Chang e Control Board very soon, but I noticed that
Buzz Aldrin was already doing it during the Descent s_lations last week.
Everyone I have talked to feels it is a good thing to do provided it does
not overload the crew.
The second possible addition to the crew timeline involves making use of
the A_ Dk_l_ display just after touchdown to provide the crew a little
more information re_rding his touchdown attitude condition. Bob Battey
called me with a Braslau suggestion (AGS/TEW) that, since the Dk_l_ is not
used during the terminal descent, immediately after touchdown it is possible to call up address 1BO, a component of the transfo_mation matrix,
which is essentially the cosine of the tilt angle displayed in octal. It
was noted that this parameter has an interesting characteristic. If the
spacecraft is perfectly vertical, the DW_ will read _0,OO0. If the spacecraft is tilted 42°, which is the critical tilt angle, the DEDA will read
just under BO,O00 regardless of the direction of tilt. Display above
t m,ju.s. Bonds ona,i',,y,oll· ,j
30,000 is okay - the bigger;the better - and below 30,000 is bad news.
This convenient crossover value seems to make this a possible extra cue
for the crew to quickly assess whether the spacecraft has tilted more or
less than %he critical tilt-over angle. So far, none of the experts I
: have spoken to have seen anything wrong with this idea and generally
consider it a desirable thing to do. That is, the procedure should work
and should provide some useful intelligence for the crew, if they get
into a suspected tilt-over situation. It could certainly not be considered mandatory sn_ so the decision as to whether to do it or not to
do it rests entirely on the crew's task loading during the last several
hundred feet of descent. Simply, should the crew be fooling with the
D_ at this time2 Ordinarily I would say no, but Buzz seems to be able
to get masic from that little mo-.-,ywith his head turned off and both
hands tied behind him.
Howard W. Tindall, Jr.
PA :HWT: jsalqlaN$1. I _ m
MAy mm I_Tlm4
_ Pm_(R,,cramm_m) -su
UNITED 8TAT_ __
.Memorandum
TO : See listattached DATE: July7, 1969
69-PA- -104A
mom : PA/Chief, Apollo Data Priority Coordination
SUBJECT: MS_;el Ascent revisited
On July 2 we had another meeting regarding l_nual Ascent. As I have
pointed out previously, the consensus is that the crew should have an
excellent chance of achieving a safe orbit by manually steering the I=M
from the 1,m_w surface if they have a rate co-._._udattitude control
system by using the horizon view in the overhead window as an attitude
reference. _ae two primary facets we discussed this time were:
a. What sort of ground support could be provided to the crew during
powered flight and
b. What sort of rendezvous sequence would be pursued following the
LM insertion.
·his memo is to s,_...... wize the results of this session. B_iefly though -
the ground assistance can be substantial and the rendezvous can be a
fairly standard CSM rescue requiring one or two extra revs.
As you recall, the flight controllers on the ground have a substantial
capability for monitoring the LM's trajectory during powered ascent, even
with the guidance systems broken, providing the RTCC powered flight
lm!_cessor (the "Lear") is working. This program provides a complete
up-to-date state vector to drive the analog and digital displays in the
control center. As a result it is possible for the Flight Dynamics
Officer (FDO) to monitor the ascent trajectory continuously and to discern deviation from the nominal. For example, by monitoring the altitude
vs. downrange distance plot and the velocity vs. flight-path-angle plot,
he will be able to advise the crew if the radial velocity (altitude rate)
becomes ,m-cceptably dispersed. Specifically, starting about three and a
half or four minutes into ascent, after the trends are well established,
.he should be able to advise the crew to bias the remainder of their pitch
profile up or down probably using 2° increments. Given this assistance,
it is anticipated that the crew should insert with a nearly nominal
flight -path .angle.
It is also possible for the FD0 to assist the crew in maintaining a near
nominal out-of-plane velocity. _hat is, once the crew has keyed their
initial launch az_,th on their shadow and then aimed for a prominent
landmark (such as the south rim of Crater Schmit for landing site 2), the
Buy U.S. Savings BondsR,&#l_ly on the Payroll Savings Plan 20_
IM_lm2
FDO will call out 2° north/south (or left/right) attitude changes whenever his digital display of out-of-plane velocity exceeds 50 fps. _his
vectoring of the crew can start very soon after lift-off if necessary,
A mjor problem we feel we have now resolved has to do with when the crew
should shutdown the APS. Analysis has shown that a cont_,ous pitCh
angle bias of 2° can result in an unsafe perigee unless the APS is run
to propellant depletion. Therefore without ground vectoring, as noted
above, we feel it is advisable to permit the APS to operate until propellant depletion; a 2° bias does not appear to be out of reason for £
-_nual steering using that weird lnnR_ horizon as a reference. However ,
given ground assistance in attitude control a propell-nt depletion, cutoff
will certainly result in an excessively high apogee, which re.Wes the
rendezvous situation more difficult and costly. Accordingly, we propose
that as long as the ground monitoring of the trajectory ipaicates that it
is reasonably close to nominal, the FDO will voice cot..... ud engine "Off"
_Nen his display of safe velocity (Vs) equals zero. (Briefly, Vs is the
required to assure a 35,000 feet perigee at the current altitude and
flight-path-angle.) A cell at this time, ass,_m_ug a 15 second delay, will
produce an overspeed of about 300 fps yielding about 200 miles of excess
apogee which should be adequately safe. The _?ortant thing is that it
protects against apogees in excess of 250 n. m_. (which have been regularly
occurring in sinulations). Although these high orbits can be handled,
there seems to be no reason to accept them. In this sAw_ vein, analysis
has shown that we _ve been ,,n_uly conservative in proposing use of the
RCS propellant for attitude control during ascent. We now feel confident
that it is safe to stick with the nominal procedure of using APS propellant
for attitude control during manual ascent and saving the RCS for whatever
comes next.
Just about any failure combination which ,_kes it necessary to perform a
mnual ascent will also demand a CSM rescue sequence. The sequence which
seems to suit the situation best is as follows:
a. CSM performs a phasing burn (NC1) on the I_'s ._Jor axis "-pueuver
line" approxi._tely one rev after I/_insertion.
b. CSM will perform.-CSI ½ to 1½ revs after NCl depending on how high
the LM apogee turns out to be.
c. CSM performs CDH ½ rev after CSI.
d. CSM performs TPI at nora1ual elevation angle which should occur
about midpoint of darkness.
e. Braking can be done by the LM and/or CSM at the crew's discretion,
basedon thereal-tlmesituation.3
f. Plane changes Should be handled in the standard way - that is,
combined with the other CSM maneuvers and with the extra plane change
burn between CSI and CDH perfo,_m_i by the CSM if it is necessary. (It
is to be noted that any large out-of-plane situation must a]mnst certainly
be due to a velocity error at insertion and not an out-of-plane position
error. ) _ais would cause the node of the orbital planes to fall near the
m_jor CSM burns such that most of the plane change required would be
efficiently combined with them. Given control center assistance in
ascent steering though, a lnrge out-of-plane situation seems unlikely.
To insure that even a very low insertion orbit can be handled, it was
decided to bias the LM lift-off late, approximately three and one-half
minutes. Specifics]ly, the FIX) will compute a DM lift-off time consistent with a 10 mile circular insertion orbit and a nominal rendezvous
sequence. However, since it is most desirable to utilize the sequence
noted above rather than having to make rendezvous maneuvers soon after
insertion if a low orbit is achieved, we feel the best course of action
is for the LM crew to be advised to make whatever ground computed maneuver
is required at insertion to achieve an orbit equivalent to at least l0 x
30 n mi. orbit. _mat is, if they truly burn out very low, they should
boost their orbit with RCS to permit use of the CSM rendezvous sequences
noted above. Incidents] ].y,they will also be advised to make an apogee
maneuver to pull up perigee to about 16 n. mi. as a safety measure in any
case.
If for some reason the DM does not achieve a safe orbit with or without
the control center assistance noted above, we still have a straw to fall
back upon. The flight controllers have the capability _mmediately after
inserbion of computing a maneuver to insure at least a BS,000 feet perigee
based on the Lear ProcesSor. This maneuver will be scheduled at three
mimates after APS shutdown or at apogee, whichever is required. It is to
be noted that ample RCS should be available to execute this maneuver.
Although we have !nowhere _nearly the same confidence of success, procedures
have been established for the crew to execute manual Descent Aborts. The
problem here, of course, is that a single pitch attitude time history cannot be established for aborts occurring at any time in powered descent.
However, the necessary work has been done by MPAD and _W to provide the
flight controllers with an acceptable pitch profile as a function of abort
t_me inpowered descent using the horizon attitude reference which would
provide a safe orbit if the crew were to follow it. Accordingly, if
eo,.,._;_icationsare retained or regained after a descent abort, the crew
can be informed of a pitch profile to follow to achieve orbit.
One other item we discussed was the relative merits of flying a completely
mnuual ascent vs. a completely automatic ascent using the AGS with a broken
1z-axis accelerometer. You reca341 in this event it would be necessary to
fly the LM into orbit on its side in order to place the broken accelerometer in the out-of-plane direction and bring the good y-axis accelerometer
into plane to provide the automatic AGS capability. If the AGS works,
everything should be just fine, but the crew will be ,,r_ble to monitor
its performance which leads to consideration of a completely mannal ascent
with its horrible overspeed problem. However, given ground monitoring we
feel confident that a mall_;Bctioning AGS can be detected and it is our
strong recommendation that it be used. If the control center detects an
unacceptable failure, the crew would be advised to yaw in-Dl-_e and proceed into orbit using the standard manual ascent technique.
_oward 11,_______ W. Tinda.
PA :RWT:jsUNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
TO : See list attached DATE: July 10, 1969
69-PA- T-IOSA
_OM : PA/Chief, Apollo Data Priority Coordination
stmjEcr: Tweak burns ·
If you can stand it I would like for you to hear the latest on tweak
burns - the trim rmueuvers made after LM insertion from a descent
abort. I thought we had this settled and on ice a couple of months
ago but some things have happened which probably make it logical to
revise the tweak rules. The things that have happened are: I
a. The LM RCS plume impingement constraints have been substantially reduced.
..b. S_,_lations have shown that the Flight Dynsm_cs Officer (FD0)/
RTCC capability of computing the tweak maneuvers on a timely basis is
roach better than anticipated.
Some FCSD, FCD, and MPAD guys got together July 8 and c.me up with the
following:
a. Our previous rule was quite simple; if the LM inserted into orbit
with the DPS attached, the comm_nd module would make the burn; if the LM
had staged, the LM would make the maneuver. Now that the LM has been
modified with plume deflectors and additional ther,_l protection, it has
the capability of performing any tweak maneuver we foresee. Accordingly,
the rule is being modified to say that for all descent aborts prior to
PDI + l0 minutes the LM will perfoz., the tweak provided it is within
the RCS plume impingement constraint, regardless of whether the LM has
staged or not. If for some abnoz'u_l reason the LM capability is exceeded,
the CSM will perform it; the LM should not stage the DPS just to provide
a greater RCS capability. Also, the LM should not trim insertion conditions.
b. As you recall, aborts after PDI + l0 minutes require an extra
rev in addition to a phasing maneuver, which makes the tweak burn unn/ee_ssary. We have also stated that trimming the insertion conditions i_ne_-
essary. However_ if the crew wishes to trim +x there is no object_mJco
that and obviously if the +x required is large, there is no choice. It
mast be tr_,._d.
c. I would like to emphasize another rule which has been on the books
for a long time but which may not have been clear to the crew. Namely,
if the DPS shuts down with a _V required to reach the insertion conditions
B,,,v.s. Bo,a,tts,a,,oon v..u vi,,, .P-ffgreater than 30 fps, the crew should utilize the APS and PI1 to achieve
orbit. We have recow,,ended that auto,_tic Abort Stage sequence to achieve
this.
PA:HWT:js HowardW. Tindall,Jr.G!_q4AL. ILIORId IVG, 10
KPMR (41 C:Fll) 101-11.11
UNIT_'.r_ STATES GOVERNMENT
Memorandum Oenter
TO ' See list attached DATE: July 11, 1969
69-PA-T-106A
FROM : PA/Chief, Apollo Data Priority Coordination
SUBJECT: Descent Data Select procedures are finalized
On July 7 and 8 we held a final review of the Data Select procedures
and Flight Controller interface during the Descent phase of the
lunar landing mission. This lengthy memo is to describe briefly
some of the items discussed, all of which are being thoroughly
documented before the flight.
On F, as you know_ John Young did not track the center of the Landing Site 2 landmark - a crater designated "130" - but rather used a
much smaller crater on the rim of 130. He did this primarily because
it was much easier to do and, he thought, would improve the accuracy.
It is planned to use this smaller crater, which has been called "130
Prime," on the G mission also, and the RTCC is set up to do so. However, it was emphasized that we must also be prepared to use the old
"130" if for some reason lighting makes it 5mpossible for Mike Collins
to acquire "130 Prime."
It was strongly emphasized by the Data Select people that they should
be in the high-speed mode for Lear filter initialization and conditioning at least four minutes before PDI. If for some reason they are delayed
·past this point_ their confidence in the system will be degraded. In
fact if initialization is delayed until 20 seconds before PDI - the dropdead point - they feel they will have no confidence in the system throughout descent at all.
Analysis of the F flight data has revealed that the Lear processor for
some reason' gives best results when using three tracking stations
rather than four, which it was originally set up to use. Accordingly,
it w_11 be operated in the mode where the fourth station's data are
available but are excluded from the solution. If one of the three active
sites fails during descent, the Data Select people will _diately
replace it with the previously excluded site. If it is concluded that
the failed site will not be restored quickly, another site wfl]l be called
up immediately to pmovide backup for a second failure. It is to be
emphasized that bringing up this new station is to provide a backup
and an opportunity to observe its data. It will not be actively used
,_nless another site breaks down or the perform_uce of the Lear processor
unexpectedly becomes degraded in a manner consistent with poor station
location geometry which the new station could help correct.
Buy U.S. Savings BondsRegularlyon the Payroll Savings Plan ._ _>_.~
2
The Data Select people reviewed their real-time procedures for declaring
the "Lear filter is go" as follows:
a. Du_ing the free-flight processing after going into the highspeed mode at PDI minus four minutes, they plot and compare Lear results
with their best estiw_te of radius and altitude rate based on previous
MSFN tracking and a confirmed DOI maneuver. If these parameters differ
by more than 3,000 feet and 13 fps, respectively, the Lear is considered
uncertain.
b. During powered descent they have doppler comparison plots for
each of the individual _BFN sites vs. the PGNCS. These are used to
sort out a bad station.
c. They monitor Lear output plots of altitude, altitude rate, pitch,
and _ mass rate of change looking for discontinuities, internal incompatibilities, smoothness, etc.
d. The Lear filter displays an estimate of its own performance -
residuals, rate biases, and so forth. A particularly strong indicator
of performance is the residuals of the fourth (excluded) site, which is
not included in the solution.
D_ring the Descent briefing to the ,_uagement people, a week or so ago,
Chris Kraft proposed that some sort of inflight 1,,n_r orbit checkout
be made of the Lear Processor prior to Descent. After lengthy and sometimes emotional discussion, we have concluded that it is most advantageous
to use the same tracking stations and co_,_ication lines as during descent.
To do this we _,st perform the test on either the first or second 1,_n_r
orbits before the Nadrid station is lost due to earth's _otation. It was
also concluded that to perform this test in the on-line· RTCC computers
with the active third floor I_)CR was too risky. Accordingly, the proposal is as follows. Configure the network stations to transmit highspeed data for a period of 15 minutes during the first lunar rev when
the spacecraft is more-or-less over the landing site. Log the data in
the control center and then play it through a third, off-line computer
utilizing the second floor MOCR display system. Since no compatible C4_N
telemetry will be available at this time_ it will be impossible to operate
some of the displays such as the guidance officer strip charts. It will
be possible however to make a realistic, useful comparison of the Lear
output with the other MBFN processing to see that this system is working
properly end-to-end - from spacecraft to display system in the I_C. Nike
COn,ay (FSD) is responsible for assigning personnel to do this and for
getting the control center configured for the test. He also intends,if
possible, to get some simulated data and practice this test before the
flight. I think the consensus is that this test is like airline flight
insurance - a small waste of resources with very little chance of gain;
however, it can pay off real big, if we're lucky:Another question answered was, What spacecraft position should be used
for initialization of the Lear Processor in preparation of the T2 liftoff? ("T2," you recall_ is the delayed abort time shortly after landing
associated with the second stay/no-stay decision.) The problem here is
that very little time is available to assess the descent tracking and
'telemetry data in order to select the best estimate of the actual landing site location. We finally concluded that the best solution was to
use the preflight nominal value - the one computed from the F mission
tracking.
One very significant item resulting from our meeting dealt with reconfiguring the MSFN tracking network after a T2 stay decision. It had been
pla_ed to keep all stations in the same configuration as during descent
in order to support a lift-off one rev later (T3) if that turned out to
be necessary. Unfortunately this leaves only two tracking stations with
very little geometry on the core--nd module which produces two substantial
disadvantages. First, the com_ud module state vector hasn't been updated
since before DOI and it's getting kinda worn out and yet it is the one
which would have to be used in support of a T3 launch and rendezvous.
Probably more significant is the effect on th_ nominal mission_ namely
it is intended for the CSM to track the LM with the sextant at the end
of that first rev. It is anticipated that this data will provide the
best estimate of LM position on the 1,,_r surface in support of nominal
ascent targeting as well as post-flight analysis. In fact, we intend to
use this RI_ determination in preference to any of the other RLS sources
unless there is some reason to suspect it is screwed up. However_ for
the sextant data to be usefUl we must have an accurate CSM state vector
to reference the sextant data too. This requires better _FN tracking
than had been planned. Accordingly, it was decided that immediately after
a T2 stay decision_ the Ascension station would be reconfigured for CSM
tracking on the remainder of the descent rev and for the next rev too.
It will only be switched back to the LM in the event of a T3 no-stay
decision.
The problem of dete_u_ining I_ position (RLS) to support a T3 launch is
a tough nut to crack. Our choices are based on powered flight navigation
by the PGNCS, AGS_ and Lear adjusted after touchdown with an improved
estimate of LM position at PDI. It is anticipated that the LM's AOT/
gravity alignment data will not be available in time to support the Ascent
targeting although if everything goes just right it might be. The point
is that none of these data sources have ever been used before and each
has its own potential problems that could foul it up badly. This makes
its unreasonable to assign hard and fast priorities to these sources
today, although everyone agrees that the Lear should probably be the
best. The point is_ determination of RI_ for T3 is being left open to
real-time judgment of the experts who will include whatever bits of
intelligence are available during the flight to select the best value.
As noted before_ the CSM state vector and sextant tracking will normally
be used for the nominal ascent_ but it obviously won't be available for
a T3 launch.4
We discussed the PGNCS reinitialization required if PDI is delayed one
rev. · It was finally decided that virtually under no circl_m_tance would
the state vectors in the P_NCS be updated even though later tracking
data is available. The values of _rM wilt be updated by applying additional propagation biases to account for the extra rev. The exact pro-
_i cedure for doing this is too complicated to put in this memo but I
·i · believe it is understood by everybody involved.
_ And that'sthat:
i
'i
Howard W. _indal.1, Jr.
PA:I_T:js
I"_"'"'_" ltASA.&aannedSl:m_-_,_ Genter
,,,.,4R(_an),o,-.J
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT _ _allp_ & _
Memorandum , ,
TO : FO/Chief, Flight Control Division DATE: _ _ 'il
69-FM21-191
FaOM : FM/Chief, Mission Pl_ing and Analysis Division
SUBSEC'r: Descent monitorSng after landing radar velocity updating
There has been considerable discussion concerning the capability to
monitor powered descent with velocity resid-als after landing radar
(LR) velocity updating begins. This memorandum presents the recommendations of the Mission Planning and Analysis Division (MPAD) for
powered descent monitoring during this period of powered descent.
After LR velocity updating begins, the AGS/PGNCS velocity comparisons
are no longer valid. However, the powered flight processor (PFP)/PGNCS
velocity residuals and the M_FN/PGNCS range rate resid%,els (Ab) can be
used for powered descent monitoring provided this data is valid. Therefore, if the PFP is operating satisfactorily until the t_me of LR
velocity updating and no anomalies in the PFP are detected after velocity
updating, the PFP/PGNCS and MSFN/PG_CS A_ should be used to monitor the
descent trajectory.
The objective of this monitoring is to prevent erroneous LR velocity
data from destroying the PGNCS state vector to the extent that a PGNCS
abort e_nnot be achieved. The monitoring should basic-lly ensure that
the PFP/PGNCS velocity residuals converge to a near zero value after LR
velocity updating. The 14_ts for PFP/PGNCS velocity residual monitoring
after velocity updating should be the s_e as the values used prior to
velocity updating, unless the FFP/PGNCS residuals are near the l_mits
when velocity updating begins. In this c_se the PFP/PGNCS residuals
l_mlts should be increased by 10 ft/sec to ensure that the LR has
sufficient opportunity to cause the PGNCS velocity to converge to the
correct value.
co--
(See list attached)CdPlrlCIt_. Ifl_M NO. 10
MAY tie2
UNITF. D STATES GOVERN'/_ENT
TO : See list attached DATE: July 14, 1969
69-PA-T-109A
FROM : PA/Chief, Apollo Data Priority Coordination
SUBJECT: How we will handle the effect of mscons on the I,M lunar
surface gravity alignments
What do we do if one of those big d_mn lumps of gold is buried so near
the Ia_ that it screws up our gravity alignment on the lunar surface?
/ Without exception, the calculations of all the various far-flung experts
_/ predict that mascons should have no significant effect on our lunar sur-
,. . face gravity alignments. In fact, based on this we have chosen to use
_ .{ gravity alignments nominally as opposed to star alignments. _ey are
easier to do and probably more accurate. A few of us got together the
_ other day, though, to figure out what to do if, contrary to expectation,
some sort of Weird gravity effect is noted, which appears to be acting on
the LM on the 1,,n_r surface. This memo is to tell you about that.
! _ ' As you kn°w we have several sources of data for determining the LM's
_ i position on the lunar surface (ELS). One of these is through the use of
: ;_, data obtained from I_ platform measurements of the direction of the lunar
": _ gravity and from AOT observations of the stars. If this determsnation,
:'_' using the I_ data, disagrees substantially with the other data sources,
--,_ ' we mst consider the possibility that it's due to gravity anomalies. _ae
,....' sort of difference we are willing to tolerate is 0.3° in longitude, which
is more or less equivalent to 0.3° pitch misalignw_nt in the platform.
True alignmout ex_ors in excess of that could present ascent guidance
problems. Since 0.3 ° is equivalent to about five miles, you'd expect the
crew'S estimate of position could probably be useful in determining the true
situation. All they'd have to do is tell us they are short or over-shot
the target point a great deal.
If uncertainty still persists, it seems we mast believe the gravity and use
it for our alignments - both PGNCS and AC_. _aat is, we have more faith in
it than in our other sources of _ determination, However, if e_m_nation of all these sources convince us that the gravity does have some funnies greater than 0.3 ° associated with it, we would have to modify the crew
procedures in real time such that the ascent platform alignment is done
using the stars (Alignment Technique 2) rather than gravity.
Consideration was given to hedging our bet by aligning the PGNCS to the
stars and using the lunar gravity alignment in the AGS. Further consideration, however, revealed an interesting and somewhat sad thing. What we
actually discovered was that the ground trajectory processing during ascentis also affected by downrange position error - that old demon that seems to
· be plaguing us in so w_uy ways recently. _e fact is that throughout ascent
we would never know which system was right and so we would never have the
intelligence to switch over from one system to the other. In other words,
! ' there is no point in using different Align_nt Techniques for the two guid-
? ance systems.
The problem noted above is primarily in support of Ascent i rev after landing. After that, additional very accui_ate sources of BLS determination
become available. Specifically CSM sextant tracking of the I_ is always
the prime source and if Nike has trouble on one try, he should try again
on later revs - there are plenty of opportunities and little else to do.
If he still fails and the uncertainty noted above exists, we have the
situation in which LM rendezvous radar tracking of the CSM becomes mandatory. You recall we deleted this from the timeline with the understanding
it would be reinserted if we could determine ELS in no other way and this
is that case. We sure don't expect this to happen, but if it does RR will
be needed.
In s,_mm_ry then:
a. We should always align both AGS and PGNCS to the same data source,
gravity or stars.
b. We Use gravity ,_less we have some eoncrete reason to question it -
such as all data sources including the crew esthete of _.q are in disagreement with it by more than O.B° in longitude (pitch). In that case,
use tne stars (both AGS and PGNCS).
c. Naturally longitude initialization e_mor louses up the ground
ascent trajectory monitoring just like it does descent.
d. If RLS uncertainty persists, either CSM sextant or IAM RR tracking
of the other vehicle becomes mandatory.
W. Tindall,Jr._
PA :RWT: jSO/FT]ON_ FOAM NO. ]0
MAY II1_ l_n'lON
GSA FPMR (41 C_R) ml-1_4
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
Memorandum ,_ Manned Spacecraft Center
TO : See list attached DATE: July 16, 1969
69-PA-T-iliA
FROM : PA/Chief, Apollo Data Priority Coordination
SUBJECT: Change in delayed PDI Descent targeting procedures
Ibis probably doesn't amount to a gnat's elbow to you, but I would like
to change something in a memo that I just sent out the other day dealing
with spacecraft state vector updating if we delay PDI one rev. Previously
we planned to leave the state vector in the IAi computer alone but to
change the landing site position (RLS) to account for propagation error
for the extra rev. Since then there has been a big flap brought about by
our discovery that the com-_ud module is making uncoupled attitude maneuvers which cause surprisingly large perturbation to the orbit. In order
to minimize these effects in the descent targeting for the delayed PDI
situation, we have concluded that it is best to redetermine the LM state
vector based on the newer MSFN tracking (revs 12 and 13) and uplink it to
the LM if PDI is delayed. Since the RIB already has been compensated
properly for the associated propagation exx_ors, it does not need to be
changed.
Howard W. Tindall_ Jr.
PA :HWT: js
Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Planlli,t.y' '
Jilt i_mmi
aSA _a (61C_) iol-..e
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
Memorandum
TO : See list attached DATE: July 17, 1969
FROM : PA/Chief, Apollo Data Priority Coordination
SUBJECT: Gyro calibration and accelerometer bias update and redline values
Chuck Wasson _rote a memo, dated June 27, 1969, to Gene Kranz and me
defining in detail the Guidance and Control Division's (G&CD's) position
on "in-flight gyro calibration and accelerometer bias update and redline
values." In it he pointed out that both the Mission Rnles and the Mission
Techniques Doc-ments should be brought into agreement with his recommendations. Actually this subject has been discussed endlessly in the Mission
Techniques meetings and elsewhere and so there were no surprises in the
values and techniques proposed. However, his memo does again draw our
attention to the minor differences in official documentation and reminds
us that that is a sloppy way to do business. I talked it over with
Cliff Charlesworth (FCD) and Mal Johnston (MIT) and we all concurred
that the numbers Chuck Wasson proposes are as good as any and we have
taken steps to comply with his recommendation. Namely_ future issues
of Mission Rules and Mission Techniques Documents will confo_'m with the
G&CD's recommendations as listed in the referenced memo.
Howard W. Tindall, Jr.
PA:HWT: js
· _,-,= Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan _... ':'UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
Memorandum ' 'NASA' _nned Spacecraft Center
TO : See list attached DATE: August l, 1969
69-?A- .Zl A
F_O_ : PA/Chief, Apollo Data Priority Coordination
SUBJECT: How to land next to a Surveyor - a short novel for do-it,yourselfers
As you know a decision has beenmade for:the H;mission toland next
to Surveyor III. Considerable s_unt of work has already been spent
in figuring out how to perform a so-called point landing, but a o,_m_er
of computer program and procedure changes are required which cannot be
implemented prior to this mission, Accordingly, we have had a threeday Mission Techniques fx-ee-for-all starting July.30 to see what we
could jury-rig together to improve our chances of landing next to the
Surveyor. Obviously, the techniques used on G are not adequate for
that purpose, but we don't Want to shake them up too badly at this time.
If you would like my gdess as to how well we will actually do prior to
getting any analysis results for the techniques proposed or even _ch
understanding of what happened on the last mission, I _ould guess that
we will probably be able to land within about one mile of where we aim.
If we land within walking distance_ it is my feeling we have to give
mostof the creditto "lad_ y luck." : r
Almost the first question that anyone asks is, How well do we know the
location of the Surveyor? _he m_pping people gave us an excellent briefing on what they know so far about the landing site. They are virtually
certain they know exactly where the Surveyor is .with respect to the
local teri_ainbased on a comparison of photography taken by the Surveyor
itself against Orbiter photography of the local te_-_in pattern. Other
data sources confirm these results. They brought out that the sun elevation angle during descent will be :such that the Surveyor is entirely
in darkness (unless the launch date is changed) and almost certainly
will not be visible to the crew. This is because the Surveyor is well
inside a shallow, funnel-shaped crater whose sides slope at an average
of about 15°. They also informed us that someone has already chosen a
landing target point located 1,000 feet east cud 500 feet .north of the
Surveyor :itself. There is some question if that is the spot we really
want to aim for, but all precision mapping and survey work is being
done with respect to this target point, This includes selection of
five distinct lanam_rks which can be used for the sextant tracking required
for descent targeting.
We have m_de a two-pronged attack on the problem of how to land next
to the Surveyor. _he first deals with improving as _ch as possible
Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on th, Payroll Savings Plan2
the ground targeting of the PGNCS. That is, providing the best possible
state vector and landing point position - telling the system where it
is and where it is supposed to go. Hopefully, this will get the crew
to within an envelope from which they can fly over to the desired /andlng point. The second prong, of course, is to increase as ,_ch as possible the LM's ,_ueuver capability under crew control so that they can
do that.
Regarding the targeting, several things are being done to substantially
improve the situation on the H mission as compared to the G mission in
this respect. First of al!_ the fact that the landing site is "16
minutes" further to the west provides time after D0I to update the IAi
state vector and BI_ from the ground. On the G mission we had to do
all this on the rev before DOI. Slipping the update this way permits
us to use MSFN t_cking data one rev younger and reduces the effect of
propagation e_ors signific-ntly. Furthermore, the last pass of MBFN
tracking is obtained directly on the LM itself after nDdocking, thereby
reducing the effects of docked attitude _neuvers snd the undocking
,_ueuver itself on the stat& vector.
In addition to the better MSFN tracking situation just noted, we Tm,st
make a concerted effort to reduce the in-orbit perturbations during
the last three revs before DOI and are offering the following ninestep program to do this.
1. While docked to the LM, the co,_._.-ndmodule should use balanced
RCS couples for attitude control. (A data book change involving IAi
plume impingement constraints is required which Bob Carlton will
work out. )
2. When undocked, the IAi should use balanced RCS couples for
all attitude control. (This would have required an onboard computer
program change which we can't get for this flight and MIT insists
we are better off without it. )
3. Absolutely no venting or dumping is allowed.': For heaven's
sake, will all spacecraft system people please take note of this.
What seems insignificant to you is a nightw_e to orbit dete_,,_ination
people.
4. _ne IAiRCS hot firing test should be reduced and modified.
Specifically, no translation-l hot firings should be made and the AC_
pulse mode jet firings should be made balanced and with mini_,m duration. (TTCA checkout should be done with cold firings. )3
5. Particular attention should be given to minimizing LM PGNCS
"average g" on time during DOI. To do this we have decided to eliminate all residual _V trimming (unless x is greater than I fps and it
shouldn't be ). MIT was asked to advise on how to terminate "average
g" the best and fastest way.
6. Associated with item 5, program changes mnst be made in both
the PGNCS and the RTCC. Specifically, we are changing the PGNCS
coast/align down1 ist to include the residuals and the RTCC/I_C to
process and display them to within 0.O1 fps for use in "confirming"
the DOI burn.
7. The undocking m_neuver should be executed in a radial
direction with the I_ below the CSM. Docking probe capture latches
should be used to eliminate any net AV but that technique requires
approval of the structures people. (John Zarcaro is following up on
this. ) If this is impossible, the LM should null all residuals
acquired during undocking.
8. The LM 360° yaw around inspection maneuver should be eliminated
unless there is a real time indication (barber pole) that the landing
gear did not deploy properly.
9. All stationkeeping should be done by the CSM - none by the
LM. To permit this, the CSM should use Z rather than X-axis RCS jets
to execute the separation burn, thereby retaining visual contact
with the I_.
In s,_,.,,_ry,it is intended to perform the same sequence of tracking
and state vector updating as on the G m_ssion in order to assure
capability of l_ding in the event of subsequent problems. However,
in the H mission nominal timeline a LM state vector will be ·uplinked
at about AOS + l0 minutes using I_FN tracking from the last two revs
before DOI plus a confirmed DOI maneuver as discussed above.
At this time we have no assurance that even the targeting based on these
improved state vector techniques will support a point landing. Accordingly, we have examined additional data sources available after DOI
which may be used to further tune-up the targeting. I_FN tracking,
I_M visual observations, and LM radar observations were all considered
potential candidates. Of these we finally decided to concentrate only
on the first. Although the anticipated errors will most likely be in
the state vectors, it is felt to be operationally too difficult to ·
update them again. Accordingly, all adjustments and targeting have to
27?be made to the targeted landing point, which hopefully will achieve
the same end objective. A change is being :provided in the spacecraft
computer program (LUMINARY) to permit updating the landing point location in the downrange and crossrange directions. (Altitude updating
capability will also be provided in this new extended verb. ) At this
time we know of no data source which can be used to obtain a crossrange correction but we have work underway to use MSFN tracking to
obtain a downrange correction which will be voiced to the crew for
input into the PGNCS prior to PDI - 8 m_uutes. Taere are three possible ways for using the MSFN tracking now under consideration:
1. T_.m_diately after AOS, at least three MSFN ranging (not doppler)
observations will be obtained on the LM over a six to eight minute
period. Since downrange error at A0S is predom_uently along the line
of sight to the MSFN station, range alw_st gives a direct measurement
of the downrange error. Tn order to obtain this data it is necessary
that the IA{ high-gain, S-band ante nn_ be operating and that the spacecraft Ranging switch to set to "Range."
2. The Lear Processor will be activated as soon after A0S as is
possible, consistent with the generation of the confirmed post-DOI
state vector. (_hat is, at about A0S + 19 miuutes). The inertial
velocity determined by the Lear Processor wi,]1be compared to this
updated state vector to determine the difference in radial velocity
which my be directly related to downrange error. FOD, FSD, and
MPAD have the task of defining the RTCC Drogram change required to
permit activation of the Lear in coasting flight at this time in the
mission.
3- The weighting structure of the Lear Processor my be changed
to permit direct measurement of position and velocity as opposed to
velocity alone as is now done. There is some hope that this may give
us a direct measurement of downrange position error.
The Nath Physics Branch has a task of determining the accuracy of these
three techniques such that we can choose which, if any, should be used
for this job. It is to be noted that the Lear Processor can only be
operated in one of the two modes suggested. FCD, Data Select people,
and FCSD flight plan guys will work out the detailed timeline to
establish how this all goes together.
Given a ground estf,_te of downrange error from one or two of these
data sources, there are two ways to go. The preferred is to voice
this co_ction (in feet) to the crew for direct input into the PGNCS
3aO5
via the DSKY with an extended verb before cslling P63 for the last
time. This will cause the entire descent trajectory to be slipped
by that amount. If the LUMINARY program change required to do this
doesn't get in, the flight controllers have been requested to be
ready to com-_ud up a new, corrected RLS. In either case, it must
be done within the period of five minutes or so between availability
of the correction and the crew call-up of P63.
It is to be noted that the crew can use this ne_ extended verb even
after PDI... If they have the guts: Accordingly_ later indications
of error could be handled this way, although everyone is reluctant
to use that technique now. Alternatively the ground can advise the
crew of how to trigger their LPD When it is first activated in P6_
to achieve the same objective with the least possible DPS propel_ut
cost. This idea is not universally accepted yet either.
Finally, one word about the LM optical tracking of an upstream
landmark. This task _as already assigned to the H mission as a DTO.
Since the tracking occurs at about PDI - 15 minutes, there is some
concern that it will interfere unacceptably with operationally required
activity. Hopefully it will not interfere but if it does, it will
probably be dropped. In any case, it is anticipated that the lanaw_rk
sighted will not _ave been previously surveyed accurately enough to
be useful. Accordingly, current plans do not include real time use
of the data. If the I/4crew does make the observation, it has been ·
suggested that the CMP could subsequently track it and the landing
site, thereby providing useful postflight data.
Serious consideration is being given to modifying the descent trajectory
to provide as much hover capability as possible for the crew. We feel
this could enhance their capability of flying over to the Surveyor.
Possible modifications include coming in "hotter." One specific suggestion was aiming at 500 feet altitude for 19 fps sink rate and 80 fps
horizontal velocity rather than the 14 fps and 60 fps used on G. Other
changes include optimizing the throttle recovery time, moving high-gate
higher and things like that. Floyd Bennett's guys and MIT are preparing a shopping list of possible performance improvement items for our
selection.
Good luck.., and good night, Suzy, wherever you are.
PA:HWT: jsUNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
Memorandum
TO : See list attached DATE: August 29, 1969
69-PA -T-116A
FROM : PA/Chief, Apollo Data Priority Coordination
SUBJECT: A lengthy status report on lunar point landing including some
remarks about CSM D0I
It is clear that lunar point landing capability is absolutely necessary
if we are to support the exploration program the scientists want. That
is, mission success intrinsically depends upon it. (The current definition
of "point landing" is for the LM to touchdown on the lnr_r surface within
I kilometer of a point referenced to specific features on the moon which
have been selected preflight.)
For Apollo 12 we have made a o_mher of Nission Techniques improvements
which should reduce landing point dispersion significantly. However, we
were constrained to implementing only those changes which have small impact
on the _C and crew timelines due to the _mm_uence of the flight.
A primary goal of Apollo 13 is to demonstrate a real, honest-to-goodness
point landing capability and various groups have been working on ways of
doing that job as well as possible without the mi_m timeline impact
constraint. This work has been going on for several months now and has
led to a number of proposals for changes in the Apollo 12 procedures,
software, and hardware. On August 22 and 25 we reviewed these proposals
in an attempt to evaluate and incorporate them - and anything else that
came up - into the Mission Techniques to be used on Apollo 13. It is the
purpose of this memo to present the current status of all that_ including
items being worked on, and hardware and software chauges needed.
It was interesting and encouraging to obseiwe that we really did not come
up with any radical changes from the Apollo 12 baseline. In fact, there
were only two basic changes involved in the plan we are all now concentrating
on. They are:
a. Schedule the I_/CSM undocking about one revolution earlier - that
is at about _ revolutions before PDI. (This does not mean an extra two
hours in the timeline; some activities can be moved from before undocking
to after undocking. )
b. Achieve the pre-descent orbit (i.e., 8 x 60 n.m.) on "LOI day"
rather than on "descent day." This, of course_ means getting into that
orbit with the CSM SPS and makes descent the only burn to be done by the
DPS.
Buy U.S. Savings BondsRegularlyon the Payroll Savings Plan ,_.2Each of these individually is beneficial; however, the second probably is
not possible without the first. They both require a lot of work to prove
feasibility and desirability and - assuming that is proven - to produce
the final procedures, plans, and rules to support a flight.
So much for the introduction!
One way of slicing the point landing pie is like this:
a. The _C must supply accurate state vectors and targeting (i.e.,
where the LM is and where it's supposed to go to) to initialize the LM
guidance system (PGNCS) for descent. Any inconsistency in these parameters
will result in an equivalent position error when the crew takes over during
the last several thousand feet.
b. The PGNCS _st be adjusted and operated during descent as accurately
as possible for the same reason. This includes things like pre-descent
tuning and optimum utilization of the landing radar data.
c. The crew _st be provided with as much terminal descent maneuver
capability and control as possible.
Most of this memo deals with the first of these, although a great deal of
attention is being given all three.
How can we obtain accurate state vectors and targeting for descent? First
of all, experience has shown that the_FNorbit dete_mination system works
best when utilizing tracking data obtained on two successive revolutions.
We have also found that the results are better when the LMand CSM are
separated. This leads to the first proposal, which Dave Reed (FDB/FCD) has
been pushing for a long time, in spite of our ignorance. Namely, undock
one rev earlier so that we can get two complete _FN tracking passes on the
LMalone. Although the primary purpose of this is to assure getting the
best possible _FN determination of the LM orbit_ some other benefits spin
off. For example, the I_ crew would be able to perform two PGNCS alignments
(P52's) two or more hours apart to get a decent I_J drift check and perhaps
!
even allow the M_C to determine and uplink improved gyro compensation !
coefficients. We couldn't do that before. It also means the landing site I
tracking with the CSM optics is done undocked. The significance of this is
that undocked tracking is necessary to make the early "DOI" with the CSM
possible. More about that later. Anyway, Bob Lindsey (FCSD) and others
are busy assembling a revised flight plan to reflect this change and I'm
sure all the r_mifications are not apparent yet. Hopefully, they will be
able to reshuffle the LMactivation and checkout activities so that we do
not require w,_ch increase in the crew work period° Certainly it should be
less than a complete rev (i.e., two hours).
3o?The other thing we concentrated on to improve the state vectors was to
reduce as much as possible any perturbations to the LM trajectory caused
by onboard activity during these last two revs before PDI. And, the
importance of these things cannot be too strongly emphasized, particularly
to the crews themselves since they are the best and final policemen. The
Apollo 12 changes caught most of these (see memo 69-PA-T-114A, dated
August l, 1969); undocking earlier eliminates all the rest of the known
ones except that darned LM water boiler venting (we must leave fixing
this to the CCB) and the DOI burn itself, which is the next subject.
Doing the DOI burn with the CSM SPS is not a new idea. It was proposed
several months ago by MPAD primarily to save LM DPS propellant. (It can
save as much as 70 fps which is equivalent to about lh seconds of hover.)
It also eliminates the wear and tear of the low thrust D0I burn on the
DPS engine - particularly throat erosion. The big question is - when
should this CSM DOI burn be performed? After several false starts we
have finally concluded the only place it can be done in the timeline is
on LOI day since on descent day the crew timeline and/or the descent
targeting was rent asunder by it - usually both. On the other hand,
doing it on LOI day - perhaps combined with LOI 2 into a single maneuver -
probably improves the targeting. This is because the M_C/RTCC is given
about ten revolutions of stable orbit tracking to psych out exactly what
that crazy lunar potential is doing to us and to compensate for it; also
there is no last minute DOI maneuver to introduce unknown _V errors. Of
course, the accuracy of the CSM landmark tracking of the landing site must
not be degraded too much or this advantage can be lost.
Actually, it appears right now that finding a way to do landmark tracking
is the key to whether or not we can do the CSM DOI. First of all I'd like
to make clear that this tracking is mandatory for point landing. Many
people have expressed surprise at this but it is a fact. Accordingly, it
would be ridiculous to launch a mission on which point landing is equivalent
to mission success if we are not confident the tracking can be done. Our
problem, of course, is having done the DOI burn with the CSM, we nmst .[_
either do the landmark tracking in the low orbit or we must raise the CSM's
orbit at least l½ revolutions before PDI to track from the higher orbit in
time to target the LM. Unfortunately there is no simulator on earth with "'i:-I
which we can develop confidence in the low orbit tracking operation. And, I ]
certainly the benefits of CSM DOI are not sufficiently great that we would \ [_' ii'
be willing to try low orbit tracking on Apollo 13 for the first time thereby I _ ' ii.
jeopardizing the entire point landing demonstration objective of that flight.: :i I
That leaves early circularization as our only remaining possibility. On _ ,'_
the surfaceit appearsfeasiblebut we'll have to get into the details "_'..
before we' ll know.There are some other things about which we mst satisfy ourselves regarding
CSM DOI. For example:
a. Can L0I 2 and DOI be combined? Is there a solution to targeting such
a burn? (Incidentally, an RTCC program change would probably be required
for this. )
b. How do you monitor this maneuver where one second overburn results | /_
: in lunar impact? And, what is the contingency recovery plan? i
c. Is the post-DOI orbit safe or does it get too low sometime before
PDI?
d. How large will the PDI disperions be (primarily Ah)? Can the I !/
descent guidance handle them? Are there any crew or _C monitoring impli- t
cations? If the PDI
dispersions ,_y be too large, _mst a trim burn be l
scheduled andwhen? (
e. Is it possible to include a landing radar test a rev or two before
PDI which traces out the descent approach te_i_ain signature for us? If
so, how do we use it (e.g., real time slope determJuation and LGC coefficient
update, BTM altitude update, part of the real time landing radar enable
decision during descent, etc.)?
f. When does the CSM circularize (at 60 n.m., I suppose)? And how
are the current abort targeting programs and procedures affected?
Although this memo is already too long, I'm afraid it can't be complete
without a comment on the proposal for pre-PDI landmark tracking by the
IAi to tune up the descent targeting. Attempts to include this and the
associated activity into the timeline have been very frustrating. On the
other hand, estimates of its benefit have been decreasing to a point where
some of us even feel it is more likely to foul things up than to help.
Accordingly, it is my recowm,=ndation that it be dropped completely from
Apollo, including related computer program changes and any premission
photographic requirements. I will write another note to document the
reasons for this negative reco_mnendation.
In s,?_ry, I guess it's obvious but the fact is we really don't know
how much benefit we'll get from any of these things we're talking about
doing. Our approach actually has been to dream up anything that might
help and see if it can be applied without too much strain. It is based
on the assumption that the task is almost impossible and so we've got to
do everything we can, no matter how little each item contributes. What
is our chance of success? Hopeful is my guess. The kind of things proposed
here plus optimization of the descent trajectory to squeeze out the last
m_llisecond of hover time on the DPS plus some intelligent handling of the
LR data (requiring computer pro_m changes, no doubt) just might do the
trick.
HowardW. Tindall,Jr. C?_
PA :HWT: js
NASA -- MSC, :: _, :_? . _, '-5 '::;- /::
('_1 LLNTTED STATES .......... v _,
/
· _ : _ea lit5 ;-'.. =c:._:a , DATE: $ep_er-ber L, - .....
69-PA -T-il .vA
?_o_ : PA/Chief, Apollo DaUa Priorlw Coordination
_L_jECT: No,ice of a eaten-all Apollo 12 Y_ssion Techniques meeting
5_'_ }&ave ,- ,ca'' aau_'=c -"' a Miss ior.'_-_c::_r.-2_2cs .... _=*_-=_z,_ on ]<.ond_y_Sepzember i5,
:yo9, to go over vne _.moz±o -_...... _ _g:% for _ne '..... _s% time. Al%_:ough
.-s',os_ of mhe d!saussZon will probably deal wi_h _he _anazng and rendezvous
p rmses, we woulc ...... z__= _o clean up all open items regardless of mission
phase.
Following !s a lis% of some _a!ngs - know peooie would like to cover.
Per_.tps i% can be used as an agenda:
a/1. L0i - Target for circular CSM Orbit at DOI or CDH?
u
_/2. Descen_
/
L_- _. Shopping lis_ of descent trajectory and guidance changes
to improve DPS propellant margins
o. _fect of altitude dispersion at PDI on descent trajectory,
_V_ throttle control, etc.
b//c. Selection of landing site targeting (do we aim for l,OOO
s/5oo
_. Docked alignment and sun check status
_e. DOY face up for AGS compatibility
_f. DOI residual tri_Sng-ules /'_ _ _ _7_/3C_.f ' _ <:cf"./'_.r3 ,_
_/g. Preferred _ a;tltude _.oidmode :o be used in coasting
,--g,._ bce'ore ant af=er 'DOT _/5//O - w3/U_'-d - _:_,,,,,>_
_r,. AOT 7re-PDi Lardzark observation - deletion of
/ ant n_,'da,a is to be used (_-_ /_
_. LR _.ec% cr"_ _..u_ e:,?__( '-'
L/_- U:.:oof'_---'_'.,. - '.e. :.,, when ar.abased on what data source
:,,,,'oa'-"_ :_:._ ran,5-i-;_, ese. )
?., _"._._ .
>:
- ?,t
:" 3oZ, .
. . . .'. , ._/
·! '--'
/_. Us_: of DZ{. zo'_ _ .' -: ':'":"---_'_ ( '-
'-' _,.;hn_ar f;"ri_ace
: _. RT_ determirmtion afzer touchdo,_a
b. Surface alignment and drift check techniques
/(1) .2ffect of powering down
/ (3) ACS -gyro calibra_ior, with high inclination
c. CSM plane change scheduling
4. Ascen_
_/a° Insertion targeting to give near zero CDH_ ___ P/_
b. MS_w_ coverage
c. Criteria for H vs H s_i%choyer lines
( _/5. Rendezvous
_._a. Post-insertion alignment - deletion of (_ .._ // _2-Jr_J-_/_9_-c.+
/
./b. NaviEation tracking schedule and initialization ground rules
_/c. Use of AGS in place of the manual charts
_/d. Rendezvous maneuver voting logic
6. Post-rendezvous
a. Plane changes for photographic objectives
(I) trim requirements
(2) burn monitoring ,.
_' b. '2._,._wi_,:_reverse i-,a-_ko-_no__. " . . : , , . · ,,
.i J- ,,.
/_a. ZiV£ Evasive Procedure
_. LOI '
J(1) Intermedla_e throttle up on docked DPS burns (_ *z,v./__;¢
/(2) Doc' ed,_b=ns
/(B) 15 minutes SPS abort;- deletion of
c. DOI
J(1) Direct return vs _ wi;h ACS
(2) _rgeting with AV z = 0
d. Descent abort coefficient upd. atir_ and/or use of %weak burns.
_e. PDI + !0 to PDI + i5 iXIMINARY change vs phasing
I
Jr.., T2 _p_%as±ng rmneuver
("' w/g. Review of manual ascent status
_. Need for "Collins Cookbook" of abort rendezvous
_/5. Direct ascent rendezvous plan for I._ _ater prdolem
i
J. Docked DPS burn for contingency photographic mission
T_e fun starts a_ 9 a.m. in loom 378 of Building 4, probably wi_h a review
of interesting Apollo ll anomalies.
Howard W. Tind*ll, Jr.
i_q:_.JT:jsm
¥T¥"
?QI_'ECNAL FOIIN NO, 10
MAY114Z
GSA Ifi_lll (l C:FII) 101-11.1
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
Memorandum
TO : See List attached DATE: September 12, 1969
69-PA-T-118A
ROM : PA/Chief, Apollo Data Priority Coordination
SUB3ECT: Invitation to an Apollo 13 Lunar Orbit Mission Techniques meeting
"The time has come" the walrus said, "to talk of many things." This
classic quotation apparently now applies to the Apollo 13 lunar orbit
mission techniques and this walrus is suggesting Tuesday, September 23.
Bob Lindsay has subjected his flight plan to three iterations already
and it's shaping up nicely; the F0D guys have a lot of answers regardlng CSM DOI, LM descent targeting and general trajectory information,
and, if no one objects, we're going to aim for a Fra Mauro landing to
break the data flow log jam.
As a result of the modifications to the Apollo 12 baseline for point
landing like early undocking and CSM DOI, there are a number of things
to be understood and agreed to. For example -
Y l. LOI and D0I targeting and subsequent orbits.
/2. PDI dispersions; i.e., trim or no trim.
43. Is a CSM separation burn needed? If so, when?
/4. The abort situation in general and specifically - should we
consider reducing the standard altitude from 60 n.m. to k5 (say)?
f5. Descent trajectory modifications for optimum DPS propellant
usage.
/6. Descent targeting objectives.
F
iT. Use of RLS and LPD.
J8. -- and like that --
Room 378, Building 4, has been reserved for this clambake. We'll start
at 9 a.m.
Howard W. Tindall, Jr.
PA:HWT:dpf
Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan N^S^--_MSC
..... yo?J_AY _ A
mm Iq_n (mimm) m-l_
UNITED STATES GOVEP,_NMENT
Memorandum Oe.t
TO : See list attached DATE: September 16, 1969
69 -PA -T-119A
FROM : PA/Chief, Apollo Data Priority Coordination
SUBJECT: We don't have to change _Y _ch for point landing but there's
gold in them hills.'
On September 12 we had a spacecraft computer program requirements meeting
for Apollo 13. We called it because there were a lot of proposals floating around which had been advertised as "needed for point landing." On
the other hand, these programs _st be released for rope manufacture on
about November 15 and so there obviously wouldn't be time to take much
action after Chris K_ft's soft_are CCB late this month. But it turns out
that that doesn't w_tter because we came out with only one or two changes
we felt were worthwhile·for LUMINARY and maybe one small, unimportant change
for COLOSSUS.
We also uncovered what appears to be a DPS Av gold mine: Some GCD guys
(Tom Moore and Ed Smith) and Allen Klump (MIT) have been working on e
scheme which involves temporary throttling down early in Braking (P63) to
almost eliminate the need for sustained low throttle operation at the end
of P63. If this isn't Fool's Gold the potential saving appears to be in
excess of 100 fps. This technique certainly deserves a lot of attention
pronto' MPAD will immediately crank up their analysis factory to learn
more about the effect on attitudes, monitoring procedures, _C-H trajectory
processing, etc., and to develop confidence in it. An off-line program
tape will be made by MIT for the crew to try in the IaW_. We must also get
a Data Book change to permit operating the DPS this way. (Ed Smith is go_r_
do this.) And, we'll look for other hardware problems too.
We've requested that, if possible, this descent program modification be
designed so that it can be deactivated by changing constants or something
if some late discovery scares us.
The other significant change is to compensate for a spacecraft deficiency.
Pressurization causes the I_I to become bloated and that in turns moves
the LPD window markings. Since this can' t be corrected on the Apollo 13
I_f,we propose to add some biases in the LPD program. (Conrad will have to
· do this in his head, I guess.)
One other change is still under consideration but will probably be dropped.
That is the "co-ordinated turn" feature proposed for P66. The PGNCS would
align the z-axis along the velocity vector as a pilot aid. It appears they
don't need or want it but they're taking one last look.
_. Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan _ FO2
%
Two programs were deleted outright, forevei_more. They are:
a. The docked alignment technique - since it doesn't fit in the new
timeline and we don't need it anyway. That is, we wouldn't use it if we had
it.
b. The pre-PDI landmark observation program in the LE. As noted in an
earlier memo_ this idea didn't pan out.
The rest of the ideas were rejected for Apollo 13, _aybe some will turn out
to be worthwhile on some later flight, particularly the first one. They
are:
a. "Delta Guidance" which tends to standardize the terminal trajectory
and reduce LPD _V costs.
b. Landing radar (LR) pre-filter
c. Addition of a te_in model for use in LR processing
d. Provision for enabling only LR velocity data (without altitude data)
into the PGNCS navigation.
e. Changes in the LR weighting structure.
f. Increase in the LR sawTle rate into the PGNCS navigation.
g. Increasing the LR data rate on the downlist in R7V from I to l0 per
second.
Neither of the two COLOSSUS proposals are really associated with point landing,
nor are they really needed. One is the rate assistance for the optics and
the other is a change to pe_,,_t the computer to accept optics w_rks when the
spacecraft attitude rate exceeds 2/3° /sec - the current limit in the program.
This change increases the danger of CDU transieqts and we _st learn from MIT
how _ch before we buy this one.
I was su%prised and pleased to find we could get by so cheaply. I expected
we would want more but the message appears to be that we have a good - and
reliable - program already. Let's leave it alone I I swear I don't see how
I could have been unaware of that _V nugget - considering how hard everyone's
been looking for them. Had my head up and locked, I guess.
Howard _. Tindall, Jr.
Enc lo sure
List of Attendees
PA :HWT:js_ PW lvO. ms
MAY IIIZ I_
(_ ffffl4/t (4_ aiR) _l*lSJ
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
Memorandum ,_ I4anned Spacecraft Center
TO ' see list attached DATE: September 24, 1969
Fao_ : PA/Chief, Apollo Data Priority Coordination
sI._JEC'I': ApoLlo 1.2 'I_ssion Techniques
On September 15 and 16 we had the second (and last) Mission Techniques
meeting for Apollo 12.. It was advertised to be a "catchall" and it was.
It all went smoothly enough considering how many people were there - the
place was stuffed (even the projection room: ) - and the exhaustion and
emotion these things bring. Personally, I think it was productive - lot's
of agreements- and complete. This memo is to record what happened - as
well as I can remember. Please excuse the length. I've drawn al'_ows in
the _rgin by the things which fascinated me the most. If you don't want
to read it all, follow the arrows.
Cislunar Navigation
On all 1,mar missions so far, the crew has perfo_-med on-the-job training
of cislunar navigation (P23) while on the way to the moon. _1_is had the
additional objective of establishing the earth horizon altitude that the
current comm_ud module pilot was using. Although it was suggested that
this activity is unnecessary, the crew elected to include it in their
flight plan as on previous flights. In fact, they may even try some star/
horizon tracking on the return-to-earth phase of the mission to see how
badly the sun interferes. Another associated agreement was that Apollo 12
would revert to the Apollo l0 technique for storage of spacecraft state
vectors in the OMC. That is, the values transmitted from the ground would
be stored in both the comm_nd module and IAislots.
LOI Targeting
It was agreed that the LOI targeting would be biased to provide a 60 n. mi. t!
circular orbit at the time of the CDH maneuver in the nom_ual rendezvous,
just as was done on Apollo 11. You recall there were some people who felt
that aiming for a circular orbit at DOI would have been preferable. In
_%_ fact, it was even suggested that procedures be developed to provide a cir-
¥\_' cular orbit on both occasions.
LOI Aborts
The 15 minute SPS aborts from LOT have been dropped just like the TLT l0
minute jobby-dos.
._. Buy U.S. Savings BondsRrgularly on thr Payroll Savings Plan ,_r',,L j_· _ '_:. r°I,. .,.. _,
.;. : 2
Starting with Apollo 12, most Apollo missions do not have a complete DPS
backup abort capability throughout the entire LOI burn. For example, on
Apollo 12 there is a period of about 1OO seconds in the LOI burn during
which the DPS alone would not be able to provide a return-to-earth capability. It is possible to close this gap on Apollo 12 by augmenting the
DPS with an APS docked burn. Procedures for doing this were discussed
and settled upon, and a checklist is under development. One important
: agreement was that the crew would ordinarily use what they refer to as
the "quick and dirty" procedure to execute the docked DPS burn. It is
estimated to take about one-half hour to go through it. If more t_? is
available, they will use the same procedures but will proceed at a more
re]sxed rate. The only exception to this occurs when two DPS maneuvers
are required, the second of which is at least 15 hours after the first.
In this case, they might as well go through the full-blown process of
aligning the P_NCS and carrying out a targeted burn.
MIT was given the action item of confirming that the CSM DAP was okay
for an SPS burn with a fully loaded LM ascent stage since under certain
circ,_m_tances, it may be desirable to attempt mn SPS burn before falling
back on the APS.
Pre-DOI Stuff
The crew has currently scheduled four times at which they will obtain
CDU angles simultaneously in both spacecraft to be voiced to the ground
for precise determination of the LM platform orientation while docked to
the CSM. The ground support programs and displays are said to be in
working order. It is intended that prior to LOS before the undocked I_4
I_J alignment (P52), the MEC will relay the anticipated gyro torquing angles
for comparison with the crew's P52 results. If the torquing angles they
actually experience differ from these values by more than 0.5°, the PGNCS
will be considered NO-GO for DOI. (Rick Nobles has the action item of
confirming acceptability of that limit or of proposing a better value ASAP.)
Because this procedure provides an accurate IMJ _ift check before DOI, we
have agreed to delete the post-DOI sun check used on Apollo 11.
The crew has changed the AGS targeting procedures for the DOI burn such that
they use the ground relayed pad values rather than the PGNCS 1186 values. _ae
importance of this change is that the AGS will now be targeted correctly
and post-burn AGS residuals will have meaning.
DOI
The flight controllers requested that the crew call up P40 for the DOI burn
before LOS and hesitate long enough for the _C to obtain the actual intended
PGNCS D0I -_ueuver on the downlink. They need this data when confirming
the burn in the I_4 state vector after DOI.
- .As a result of the briefing by MPAD on the effects of PDI dispersions on
the powereddescent trajectory, it was concluded that there is never a need
to trim any component of the DOI burn. This decision modifies a previous
proposal that any AX residual in excess of i fps was to be trawled. Essentially, we have established that as long as the residuals at DOI are small
enough to indicate that the PGN_S/DPS is not broken (currently set at 5 fps)
we are willing to absorb the residual dispersion in the descent trajectory.
DOI Abort
for The Apollo the DOI12aborts crew was on thecompletely last twounhappy flights.withIt theis procedure their intention we hadtodeveloped use
a guided rendezvous in this situation instead of the old brute force technique.
Specifica]]y, they will use the AGS rendezvous programs executing a TPI type
maneuver at DOI + l0 minutes with a transfer time of 20 m_uutes. Use of this
technique will result in a braking maneuver of no greater than about 30 fps,
which is _ch smaller than the brute force technique yields and which was
their major objection with it. Bob Carlton (FCD) was asked to resolve the
open item of whether or not it is acceptable to attempt braking with the
Z-axis RCS jets without having staged the DPS. Specifically, it was thought
that this would cause considerable X-axis thrusting for attitude control
which might exceed thermal constraint limits. If that turns out to be the
case, we will probably modify the procedure to include jettisoning the DPS
before _PI.
Point Landing ........................................
_ There are several new things we learned with regard to our attempt at point
l_nding on Apollo 12. Analysis based on a typical spacecraft attitude time
history shows that an estiw_ted O.16-1b. thrust from the I_ water boiler
will result in a 6,000-ft. miss. G_m_u is now reporting that it may
actually be more like a .25-1b. thrust. If this data is right, we are
in deep trouble with a capital "S".
._._This basic spacecraft design deficiency, along with other ,_uknown perturbative
effects, have forced us to accept a proposal which worries a lot of us.
Namely, it is now felt necessary that a final correction to the descent targeting be cai_i_iedout during powered descent through use of the new program
capability (_RLS) that _e requested at our last meeting. Furthermore, this
mnual input will only be done at that time, never before entering P63 as we
had previously planned. We put preliminary upper and lower limits in the
magnitude of this co_ection. Specifically, it will only be applied in the I
downrange direction if the correction falls between 2_OOO and 20,000 feet.
It was felt that the accuracy was not sufficient to support smaller cox_ections and that the effect on the guidance makes larger corrections ,_cceptable.
Two action items were issued on this subject. One was for me to schedule a
Data Select meeting to work out precise procedures for determining the _RTS
correction. (It was held September 17.) The other item was for MIT to
concentrate heavily on testing this program change during the powered flight
phase to develop high confidence that this procedure won't blow the whole
mission.Allen K_,_p (MIT) has recommended that some procedure be deVeloped to
determine a crossrange correction to be computed as a function of measured
platform drift. And, he was promptly giVen the action item of findingout
·hOW to do this. I would like to emphasize that if a way can be found, it
may be the solution to one of our more serious problems because current
indications are that we are much worse off crossrange the_ downrange. It
is Klump's feeling that the biggest contributor to that is platform misalignment.
It was reported that the crew set the updating AGS altitude at 7,000 feet
rather than 2,000 feet which the Apollo ll crew used. (This was a CPCB
action endorsed at our meeting.)
DescentTrajectoryChanges "
Mission _r_lysis Branch briefed us on reco_--_nded descent trajectory
changes, some of which _Ve been incorporated and some of which still
enjoy "proposal" status.
Most of the which couldbe considered
a. changes for _mproving the
DPS _V situation were so ineffectiVe that they were rejected. One which
deserves considerable attention, however, is the elimination of the descent
·trajectory constraint which provides insensitivity to a failure in the DPS
propellent valVes. A potential saving of about 52 fps can be obtained from
this, and first indications are that most concerned organizations will agree
to it. (ASPO is working on this. )
b. The only other trajectory change involves increasing the LM targeted horizontal Velocity at 500 ft. altitude from 60 fps to 80 fps to
increase the LPD redesi_v_tion capability. The vertical velocity at 500
ft. will remain unchanged at 16 fps. This trajectory change creates no
real difference in the _V budget.
refutation One particularly of a comm interesting nuly helditem beliefthatthatcameitfrom was impossible this presentation to redesiwasov_te the '
short. MPAD shows that to the contrary substantial redesi_tion short is
possible without -_cceptable loss in visibility of the landing point. I
belieVe this fact has quite a bearing on choosing the PGNCS target location
with respect to where we really want to land and should cause a significant
change in the way peOPle have _een treating this subject.
· Landing Radar Operation
Four significant changes are being made to the crew procedures involving
the landing radar.
a. During the pre-DOI l_uding radar test, the crew will not drive i,.'
the antenn_ to determine if it will move properly. (This is an endorsementof a recent CPCB action.)
b. The crew will not normally backup the landing radar ante_
reposition co,,_nd from the LGC in P64, as Was done on Apollo ll. However,
if the antenna fails to reposition automatically, they will attempt to
manually co.._nd it. Regardless of whether this works or not, if they
get a 523 alarm, it is the consensus that they should enable landing
radar data to be processed during the rest of the descent by hitting
"proceed'.
,_ recommc.endedA modification to include atolanding the Apollo radar 11testprocedures at about was9 minutes previously before
PDI. It was for early evaluation of the landing radar as well as a
direct measurement of spacecraft altitude at that time. After considerable
discussion at this meeting, it was concluded that this landing radar test
was really not worthwhile_ and it is now recommended that it be deleted
from the procedures. Because a specific LM attitude had been selected to
support this test, it may be advisable to pick a new opti-_:m value.
Accordingly, Rocky Duncan was requested to work with Ed Fendell to determine this new LM attitude to be relayed to the flight planning guys.
d. The Apollo /2 crew - bless their hearts - are anxious to avoid
any ,m_ecessarY diddling with the DSK/ during powered descent. In line ,
with thi.s splendid goal, they have requested that the flight controllers !_
monitor_h (the difference between landing radar-measured and PGNCS- !_
estimated altitude) and advise them when they should inhibit and when
they should enable the landing radar data so that they do not have to
call up that parameter on the DSKY.
Low Level DPS Propellent
The Apollo 12 crew has requested that the flight controllers call out the
DPS propellent situation during hover somewhat differently than was done
on Apollo ll. Whereas the Apollo ll crew wanted a countdown of time remaining, the Apollo 12 crew has requested a call out of time since low level.
Specifically, they would like reports at 30 seconds, 60 seconds, and 90
seconds since the low level indication and "co_t time" - all properly
biased for co_,.,_,_nicationdelays.
Descent Aborts
Although there were a lot of words spoken on the subJect_ it was obvious
that descent abort techniques have been changed very little since Apollo IT. --_
In fact, the only significant difference is the substitution of the variable
insertion targeting for aborts after PDI + l0 minutes in place of a variable
phasing burn one-half rev after insertion. This simplification was possible& o w
6
due to a progrnm change m_de to the Apollo 12 version of I/NFFNAEY. AIl
descent abort targeting is based on the assumption that the IAiwill perform
some perigee-raising maneuver before going through perigee again. For
aborts after PDI + l0 minutes it wi]] be a 10 fps burn performed 50 minutes
after insertion.
The tweak vs. trim rules were discussed again and it was agreed that the
I_C would only re/ay a tweak maneuver in the event of one or the other of
the fo/lowing circumstances:
a. An abort after PDI + l0 m_uutes on the A GS (because the ACS program
discontinues variable insertion targeting after that point).
b. If the PGNCS is degraded but is st_ll working we]] enough to avoid
switchover. (We define the PGNCS as being degraded if its trim maneuver
differs from the ground computed value by more than 10 fps, )
Although all of the abort rendezvous procedures follow a pattern very
similar to the nominal rendezvous there are slight differences which could
create problems if they are missed. As a result, the co_-,_nd module pilot
intends to caizy along the same "Descent Abort Rendezvous Cookbook" originally developed for Mike Collins on Apollo Il. This handbook of assorted
rendezvous procedures is essentially unchanged from the last flight except
to reflect slight changes in the descent trajectory aha new MSFN coverage
times.
Lunar Surface Activities
After considerable discussion, a proposal for extending the 1,,n_r stay two
hours was rejected. The advantages cited for this proposal were better
M_FN coverage during ascent and a timeline less sensitive to real t_,_
extension of the EVA. On the other hand, we would either have to reduce
the subsequent sleep period or delay TEI one rev in order to satisfy the
photographic objective. In addition it is said to violate a m_sion directive
l_m_ting the stay to 32 hours, which we would have to get changed, and would
delay development of the operational trajectory, crew training data package,
etc. Since the cu_ient MSFN coverage is operations]]y adequate (although the
_T.qEPscientists may not agree) and the other advantages were of wnrginal
benefit, we decided to leave it as is except to reco-m_ud that the IMU be
ofkeptelectrical powered uppower throughout confirm theit luisnaradequate. stay as Accordingly, long as real the timeApo_l computations n ll _
· lunsr surface ali_ment procedures will be used without change on Apollo 12.
If in real time it is necessary to power down the I_J, the only modification
to the alignw_nt procedures would be to change the first Ali_-_ut Technique 3
performed after powering up the It4Jfrom a REFSMMAT option (3) to a T align
option (4).Due to the high inclination being used on this flight the AGS lunar surface
calibration drift esti_tion can be in error as much as 1.3° per hour. TRW
has reco..,ended that the AGS 1TJn_r surface calibration be dropped unless
the crew is able to apply some biases to the co_ections, which they_st
input into the AGS during this procedure, it is currently planned that the
crew will apply these co_rections which will be provided them within a week
by 51TW.
Ascent
One particularly interesting piece of inforn_tion reported at this meeting
was that the current ascent profile assures us of losing E-band steerable
ante=n_ lock-on for the last three minutes of ascent: Wouldn't that have
been a surprise? Anyway, it has been agreed that the crew will yaw right
20°, four minutes after lift-off (I now hear this should be two m_uutes)
in order to provide solid high-gain coverage. (This, incidentally, also
applies to late aborts from descent. ) There is some question as to what
should be done about the AGS since it does not provide a manual yaw attitude
override feature like the PGNCS and thus we would lose high-gain coverage
if we switch over to the AGS which would be undesirable. The crew will
work with Je_y Thomas (TR%_) to sort out the AGS o!0eration. Specifically,
they will input new vaues for Wb which controls spacecraft yaw attitude
during a burn even though this screws up the FDAI ball. There are some
obviously horrible _mplications on manual ascent when high-gain coverage
and a window view of the horizon are both particularly necessary.
Another ascent agreement is that the targeted radial velocity at insertion
w_11 be adjusted to compensate for CSM orbital dispersions to provide a
nominally zero CDH maneuver.
Rendezvous
Consideration has been given to deleting the platform alignments (P52) by
one or both of the spacecraft d,_,_ediatelyafter LM insertion into orbit.
Although it is agreed that these alignments are not by any means mandatory,
we have decided to leave them in the flight plan. That is, both spacecraft
will C°ntinue to do the post-insertion P52. To assure adequate rendezvous
navigation at this critical time it was emphasized that the I_4 should
discontinue the P52 if it has not been completed within 38 minutes before
CSI. pete Conrad indicated that they had also modified the checklist to i
continue rendezvous navigation to within 8 minutes instead of L9 minutes I
of CSI providingaboutfourmoremarks.
Also associated with the rendezvous navigation was the agreement that in
all cases the crew would reinitiate the W-matrix iw_ediately after each
maneuver before taking any additional observations. This applies to both
spacecraft not only in the nominal case but even when the instr_mentation.
· , ° a,'/.
8
is operating in a degraded mode. (This is another endorsement of a CPCB
action. )
The rendezvous maneuver voting logic has bee_ changed slightly to reflect
fully active participation of the AGS in place of the mnual charts. In
? order of decreasing priority, the maneuvers will be performed as follows:
J
a. BurnPGNCSif itagreeswiththeC_. i
/
b. Burn PGNCS if it agrees with the AGS (or charts), i
c. Burn CMC solution using whichever I_ guidance system is better.
In all cases, the same _V comparison values are to be used as on Apollo l0
and APOllo 11. ·
Post'Rendezvous
After the rendezvous, the CSM m_kes a plane change in order to obtain
photographic coverage of future landing sites. It was agreed that the
crew would monitor this plane change burn using the s_me attitude and
attitude rate limits as other m_euvers and a manual backup of engine
cutoff if the burn exceeds the predicted value by more than 1 second.
The _ is not included in this shutdown logic.
Entry
G&N program changes have been m_4e which result in a guided entry that more
nearly approximates the ideal 4g tragectory. As a result of these chs_ges ,
it is necessary to reduce the nomlual entry range to 1250 n. mi. to assure
no "up control".
Once committed to a G&N entry_ we have decided not to change the target
point even if the G&_ subsequently fails. In order to make the landing
point obtained with _S guidance consistent with this, the _ procedures
are being modified for this specific case to include a bank reversal at
20,000 fps velocity. ·If the G&_ has failed earlier than about EI - l0 hours,
there is time to move the recovery force the 70 or 80 miles north and no
_S bank reversal will be used. This m_kes this EMS entry compatible wi---th
its backup - the _g constant manual technique.
That's it forApollo1R. Bringon 13____t
Howard W. Tindall, Jr.
PA:HWT: js
NASA -- MSC *"_ / F-~_
_ POWAI k_. _
MAY WI_ _
ua v,Pt4n(s_am) m.lta
UNITED STAT_ GOVERNMENT
Memorandum o.. r
TO :See list attached DATE: September 29, 1969
69-PA-T-123A
MKOM :PA/Chief, Apollo Data Priority Coordination
SUBI_CT:Status report on Apollo 13 Mission Techniques- or "Go for CSM DOI"
Based on the September 23 MiSsion Techniques meeting, it appears that the
co--nd module D0I type mission should be adopted for Apollo 13. At this
meeting we reviewed all facets of this approach and could find none that
would keep us i_om going this _ay; on the other hand, the advantages
appeared to be substantial. As a matter of fact, it appears to me that
the mission techniques for Apollo involving a CSM D0I are essentially almost
complete - long before the mission. I would particularly like to bring your
attention to the fine work that Bob Lindsey has done in the development of
the detailed flight plan. This had a very important part to play in proving
feasibility of this approach and it appears to be in excellent shape. Our
next step is to present our plans to the CCB for their approval.
As you recall, it is our desire to place the CSN/I_ into the pre-descent
orbit on L0I day. In fact, the LOI maneuvers should be designed to accomplish
this. There appears to be no reason why they'couldn't. In fact, one of the
more important decisions made yesterday was to rename the L0I maneuvers:
the te_minology L0I 1 and L0I2 will be discontinued and L0I and DOI will be
used instead. The current plan is for L0I to do the job of LOI1 - that is,
to provide an intermediate ln_,r orbit of about 60 by l?0 n. mi. D0I will
achieve the combined objectives of the old L0I R and DOI; that is, it will
bring the spacecraft into a 58.5 by ?.5 n. mi. orbit. It is this shape,
according to Nath Physics Branch (_C_B)of EPAD, which will precess to the
desired 58.6 by 7.8 n. mi. orbit at the time of PDI about i day later.
Incidentally, this was a point of particulsr interest to us. MPB expressed
considerable confidence in their est_,_te and are convinced that the orbital
altitudes w_11 never become 8_ngerously low but will only vary a little over
this period. NPAD also confirmed that there is no -_zoblem in targeting the
new D0I maneuver. Apparently, the computational procedures do not differ
from those used for L0I2.
Considerable discussion was devoted to monitoring D0I and providing a
contingency bail-out technique for a G&N failure that produces an overspeed.
Although this work is not complete, it seems that procedures which _j-_antee
safety can be developed. This is true in spite of the fact that an overburn
of ozLly I second will result in lunar impact which means there is no May for
the crew to insure a safe DOI, at least in the sense that it is insured for
the old L0I1 and LOI 2 maneuvers. On the other hand, since the crew can
certainly prevent overspeeds in excess of 40 or 50 fps, it is only necessaryto provide a contingency, cenned maneuver to be executed which will preclude
lu_ar impact if an overspeed in this range hss occ,_,z?d. Accordingly, we
reached agreement that the crew will give the Cd_Na chance to do its job and
will not manually shut the SPS off until burn duration was at least i second
longer than predicted. If the crew is unsure about whether a G&N failure has
occurred, they will properly orient the spacecraft and prepare for the contingency ,_ueuver while awaiting confiz'_ation from the gro,_nd after AOS as to
whether they have a safe or unsafe situation.
The next question concerned the possible magnitude of the dispersion at PDI
if no adjustment (trim) m_neuver were provided between DOI and PDI. More
to the point, the question was whether a trim maneuver must be included in
the nominal flight plan. On l,_n_r missions so far, the altitude dispersion,
which is the only one of significance to us, has averaged about 630 feet per
revolution. (The lsrgest was 900 ft. per rev.) If this is a one si? value,
the largest dispersion that should be expected in altitude at PDI on a three
si? basis is about 23,000 feet. We tried to think of all the possible
adverse effects on descent which could result from a known altitude dispersion
at PDI. These included guidance capability, landing radar availability, crew
visibility, onboard and ground monitoring, crew training, effects on aborts,
and _V costs. Of these, only the l_st seems to be effected significantly,
and even that one is not too bad. Specifically, it appears that if we arrive
at PDI 20,000 feet higher th_n we desire, the DPS _V penalty is in the order
of 35 fps. If we are 20,000 feet low at PDI we actually save about 16 fps.
Based on all this, we concluded that it did not seem necessary, or even
desirable, to include a trim m_ueuver in the nominal timeline but we would
establish a contingency procedure to handle excessive PDI altitude dispersions.
Thus, if during the crew sleep period MCC predicts the altitude at PDI will
be outside of acceptable limits, the crew will be awakened BO mir_tes early in
order that they may ,_ke the small CSM RCS -_ueuver required. Initially, we
have established the acceptable region of acceptable PDI altitude to be
between 30,000 and 70,000 feet (the nomJr_l, you recall, is 50,000 feet).
The RCS burn objective would be to raise the altitude, if too low, to 30,000 feet
(since it's wasteful and ,_=necessary to go higher) or if it is too high, to
lower it to 50,000 feet.
The Flight Crew Support people have revised the I_ activation and checkout
timeline extensively from the Apo31o 11/12 baseline. Since we are undocking
one rev earlier, a special attempt has been m_de to move as many activities
as possible from before undocking to after undocking. By doing this, and
slightly reducing the crew eat period, it is only necessary for the crew to
start their work period 30 minutes earlier than on Apolln 12. _hose of you
interested in specific details should get in touch with Bob Lindsey.
Some of the activities we spent a good deal of time reviewing dealt with
undocking, LM inspection by the CMP, and the separation burn. It had already
been agreed that the LM inspection by the CMP could be substantially reduced
3.2/unless there had been some earlier indication of problems in landing-gear
deployment. _is being the case, it seemed desirable to combine the separation burn with the undocking. Accordingly, we proposed that with the spacecraft in the undocking attitude (i.e., X-axis along the local vertical with
the CSM below the LM) a soft undocking would be executed, followed by a CSM
-X RCS i fps by the com_nd module using P47 to set up a separation rate.
It is noted that the sun will be behind the I_ but this was felt to be
acceptable. Separating l_We this will place the CSM in front and above the
LM three-quarters of a rev later at the time of his circularization burn.
Having moved the separation maneuver earlier like that, the CSM is relatively
free to perform landmark tracking on the landing site while in the pre-PDI
low orbit two revs before PDI. The longest discussion of the day dealt with
whether or not they should do this. It was clear from the start that it would
not contribute m_ch, if anything, to the Apollo 13 operation, but on the other
hand, it provides sort of a free opportunity to gain valuable experience which
could be used for planning a future mission. Final resolution was that it
would be included in the current timeline with the understanding that it was
not a mandatory requirement. If simulations show that it interferes with
required activities, it will be dropped.
It is very interesting to note the relatively lmbusy timeline the I_ crew
has after undocking. And that's nice. In spite of that_ we are proposing
to delete two other activities from this period. The first is the LM
rendezvous navigation (P20), pr_rily because it requires extra IA_ attitude changes with the possibility of perturbing its orbit. The second was
a test of the landing rasev during the last pass over the landing site which
would also provide an opportunity for mapping out the lunar terrain on the
approach path to the landing site. Although, intuitively, it sounded like
nice data to get, nobody could offer a concrete use for it and so it was
dropped.
One item that I am sure will be getting plenty of attention by the time you
read this deals with the crew's request to change the mission profile in
order to provide a higher sun-elevation angle during descent. Everyone,
Jim Lovell in particular, is concerned about using the old minimum sun-elevation
angle constraint when going into a mountainous region like _k_ _uro. The
whole area is likely to be bathed in shadows and that so,_ndspoetic but like
bad news. MPAD and others should be looking into the tradeoffs in terms of
SPS AV required and transl,_n_r transient time, etc. to relieve this ,_ndesirable
characteristic.
Another thing that gets changed by the CSM D0I is descent abort. This is
brought about by the fact that we really do not have confidence that CSM
landmark tracking can be done in the low orbit. Accordingly, we have
scheduled CSM circularization l½ revs before PDI. This makes the abortsituation from powered descent different from on previous flights. Specifically, it will be essentially identical to.descent aborts from the second
I PDI opport,m_ty on Apollo 11/12. I don't feel that this is a particularly
i bad situation. As a m_tter of fact, aborts from hover are actually better -
::! that is the resulting rendezvous is more nearly nominal t_u aborts from
_; hover on a first opportunity Apollo 11/12 descent. One thing we are looking
into is a use of the variable insertion targeting capability such that aborts
.: early in powered descent would take an extra rev to rendezvous, in order to
obtain navigation tracking data before CSI.
In s,_-_w_rys I think we can proceed with this plan with confidence. There
is plenty of detailed work to do primarily regarding the DOI monitoring and
contingency procedures. However, many products like the flight plan are in
good shape today. Unusual, but nice, this far before the flight date.
PA:HWT: js
NASA -- MSC
.72.3_mm_w
JA_Y m m
a,_Rq.n¢1a,n)m-.J
_ 8TAT_ GOVERNMENT
Memorandum
TO : See list attached DATE: October 20, 1969
69-PA-T-129A
FROM : PA/Chief, Apollo Data Priority Coordination
s_JBj_c'r: What can be done about the AOT?
One of the largest exi_or sources affecting precision landing on the moon
is the LM platform alignment accuracy at PDI. The A0T is adequate to fly
an Apollo 11 type mission but it is simply not designed to support precise
landings; A0T alignments, as currently carried out, leave something to be
desired. The resul_ is we _,st depend more on the LPD to get us where
we want to go - that is, to correct the terminal descent trajectory for
errors built up during the braking phase. This is undesirable, of course,
partic,]l_rly in the crossrange direction. Another ,,_t'or_r_te fact is
that the lousy alignment accuracy obscures inflight IM_ drift determination
and virtually forces us to depend on _he preflight compensation for anything but gross changes. This is good enough for flight safety (i.e.,
abortability) but can also screw up the precision landing. (Here are some
n,,mbers: 0.1° out-of-plane ali_-_nt error at PDI causes a 2,000 ft. crossrange error. A B si? PGNCS drift will cause this misalig_-_ut. A0T alignments experienced in flight haven' t been much better than that either. )
Aside from making sure you are aware of the situation, I am writing this
snowflake to solicit any ideas you might have to _mprove this business. Is
there some way we can 1reprovethe AOT? Or its alig_w_nt in the IAM? Or the
way we get and use the marks in the computer pro_m? Or should we ask the
crew to make more marks - (Note: without a D0I burn, the crew timeline is
tolerant)?- or something?
If you think of something, do it - or give me a cai1 and I'll put your name
in lights, Baby:
Howard W. Tindall, Jr.
PA :RWT: js
B=y U.Y. Savings Bonds Reg=larly on the Payroll Savings Plan N^SA--MSt
_O,-tlmmm_
UATIm
UNIT_.D STATE8 GOVERNMENT
Memorandum
TO : See list attached DATE: October 21, 1969
69-PA-T-130A
FaOM : M/Chief, Apollo Data Priority Coordination
SUalECT:Let's hear it for "Delta Guidance":
As part of the Apo_ lo software team's contribution in the search for extra
hover time and/or payload capability_ they are vigorously working on
the development of a new descent guidance and throttle control technique.
The lmayoff could be _mpressive compared to things like tryt_ to decrease
IaM weight. Specifically, a _V improvement on the nominal mission of as
much as 100 fps might be realized, which is equivalent to 18 seconds of
hover or 300 lbs. increase in descent payload. _aere are also some other
substantial benefits to be gained from this new program formulation. It
is the purpose of this memo to mRke sure you know about this business as
well as to give you a report on its sta_us.
Somettm_ ago a couple of Guidance and Control Division (GOD) people,
Tom Mbere, Jay _{ontgomery- and others I am sure - conceived the basic
idea of what they called "Delta Guidance." The unique characteristic
of this guidance scheme, as I understand it, is that given a dispersion
it attempts to guide the spacecraft back to the nom_-I trajectory as
opposed to looking for a new way of achieving the targeted end conditions
like most guidance techniques do. It appears that this can be done without significant pe_lty in terms of payload or undesirable transient traJectory characteristics. Their work has been further developed by a group
of MIT people, led by Allen Klump, which has resulted in a finished set of
guidance equations in our hands at this time, which only await the thorough
analysis and testing required for f_mel tuning and to develop flight confidence. In addition, a complex targeting proszam has been developed for
use in l_nafng down the various guidance coefficients and targeting parameters.
On October 16 MIT, GGD, and MPAD people got together to discuss and understand the progr-m forB_,l_tion and to layout plans for the analysis work
ahead. The specific products we are aiming for are an off-]the LUMINARY
assembly which can be exercised in the variOUs st_,lRtors within a month
or so and an agree-to analysis plan which will yield all of the understanding
and confidence required to permit addition of this program into the LM spacecraft computer for the Apollo 14 flight. Release of that program, I suppose,
will not occur until M_rch, which may seem like a long time from now. But
it's clear that substantial changes to the descent guidance progz-_m - the
lmrogram controlling the most critical phase of the mission - will certainly
not be approved u_less we have the absolute confidence of everyone involved
Bxev U.S. Savintx Bonds Rtt_,larly on the Payroll Savings Plan2
that we are doing the right thing. And that is going to take Some _tim_.
In addition to the nominal_V improvement (that is, increased hover or
payload capability) there are some other benefits from Delta ·Guidance.
_. 1. Although N69 ( _ HI_) corrections during P63 are relatively cheap
with the preseAnt system, the new guidance technique allows us to perform
: them with no A_V cost.
2. Redesignations are improved in two ways. First of all the _V : ' : '_:_
required to relocate the landing point a specific distance is markedly
reduced. Furthermore, massive redesignations can be performed both long
and short without unscceptable loss of landing site visibility.
3. The fact that the guidance is attempting to return the trajectory
to nominal means that we are essentially providing a standardized tei_minal
descent for the crew. For example, it eliminates the drooping characteristic that somet_s occurs as a result of dispersions or landing radar updates
during P6_ whichin the worst cases could even lead to lunar impact. A
standardized terminal trajectory should also have a beneficial effect on
crew training in somewhat the snm_ way the standardized rendezvous terminal
phasehasdone. -
The second and third benefits just listed will be available if Delta L _ :i
Guidance is _mplemented, regardless of whether or not we obtain permission;
from the DPS people to operate their engine in the new way I am going to
discuss here. And, they are probably sufficient justification in themselves
to implement it, particularly because redesignation apparently will play an
important role in providing a point landing capability. However, we can
only get the big _V saving dangled tantalizingly before you in the first
paragraph if we can operate the DPS engine differently than we are currently
allowed. Actually we have two choices we can give the DPS people; it doesn't
make _,ch difference to us which they choose. The first involves no hardware
changes at all, as far as we know, but I am sure the Propulsion people will
want to do some qualification testing on the DPS to permit it. The thing
we want to do is to throttle the engine from the full thrust position down
to 50 or 60 percent thrust (their choice) and back to full thrust periodically
during the descent braking phase (P63). With a nominal engine, this throttling
would occur about one per mtuute for a duration of about six seconds each
time. Lower thrust engines will do it less often and higher thrust more.
The alternate approach involves providing a small throttleable region around
FTP large enough to compensate for the engine thrust dispersion. This socalled "shallow throttling" can be used with the same guidance technique
and it eliminates the need for throttling through the forbidden zone. Intuitively, this would seem to be a superior approach since it compensates continuously and directly for the engineAcharacteristic that is giving us all
the trouble. However, it only saves A_V if good engine efficiency is mainrained within the shallow throttling zone. I have heard that in order to
rB
do that, some sort of DPS hardware change must be made. (According to
Allen Klump it involves a precise shaping of some propellent valve
pintle, whatever that means. ) Engine requalification would no doubt be
required for that too. Mr. Apollo Spacecraft Pro,am Manager, if I still
have your attention, I would l_ke to urge you to exert whatever influence
you can spare toward clearing the DPS for this kind of operation. The
benefit to be gained is expected to be worth the cost and effort (converted
to lbs./buck) particularly since our informal data sources indicate the
DPS can hack it.
One other area requiring immediate attention, which I haven't mentioned
so far, involves descent monitoring both onboard and on the ground. The
LGC co_m._nded thrust will be entirely different than now which means that
some of the MEC displays and Flight Control Mission Rules will become
obsolete and will require replacement. It may be desirable to change some
of the onboard displays also. Nothing at all has been done so far in this
area.
In slm,_ry, it appears our guidance people have conceived and are developing
a technique for descent guidance which has real advantages over the existing
system if it works as advertized. It is possible to get it ready and implemented by APOllo 14 provided we place high priority and continuous effort
on it. In order to reap one of the greatest benefits, it is necessary that
the DPS be qualified to operate' in a new way and so that must be vigorously
pursued. Why are you still sitting here reading this stupid thing when
·there is all that important.work to be done?
PA :RWT: js
NASA -- MSCUNTrEDSTA'r GOVERNMFNT. .llann CenW
Memorandum ' - "--
: [
TO : See list below DATE: October 21, 1969
69-nt-T-Z3Z
%_1Lo_: E_DeputyChief
$uBJEcr: Apollo Spacecraft Software Configuration Control Board meeting
number 32
On October 9 Chris Kraft convened the first Software Configuration Board
meeting since J,me 5 at MIT. We had a real pot full of POR's to discuss,
some of which were approved for Apollo 13, some for 14, and some were _t
in a category in which NIT was to conti_e development to a point where
their value could be assessed, perhaps for Apo11_ 14 implementation.
This memo is to documgnt briefly what happened there:
1. COLOSSUS Apo!in 12
PCR 960 - In case you weren't aware, a 49-word erasable memory
program has been developed which will permit the CME to start Time Base
Six (_6) in the S-IVB. This relieves the crew of a somewhat dangerous
manual setting channel bits, if they ever encounter this absolutely impossible-to-encounter S-IVB inertial reference failure.
2. COLOSSUB Apollo 13
There were seven program changes approved for this program, some
of the more interesting ones were:
P0R 936 - This change relieves the crew of the task of keying in
TIG when he needs to apply an out-of-plane component as Dart of the CSI
or 0DE burn. The LM program was fixed this way too.
POR 949 - Software fix for the split _,l,e problem in the V_ ranging
equivalent to the fix for the two ra_s on the IAi.
POR 966 - This makes Option 3 the nominal option in P52. This
saves the crew some DSEY key strokes.
PCR 967 hopel_lly will fix the pUlSe torquing program so that it
will execute a 90° _T change three time faster than it currently
does and without screwing the _ ball around like a d_,nWen sailor's
Augekagle.
l_y U.S. Savings Band$ Regularly on the pa*roll Savings Plan
-- 32?2
3. COLOSSUS Apollo 14
About 14 program changes were approved for Apol!n 14 (that's fitting, L
isn't it?). Some of the more interesting ones are:
PCR 869 provides rate-assisted optics for the lanam, wk tracking
program (P22) which should be especially useful in the low orbits currently
pls nned.
: PCR 868 consists of several cis-l-r_r navigation program (P23)
changes, some of which are probably useful since they help the crew orient
the spacecraft to get good star/horizon observations. One improvement
involves making the altitude of the horizon a fUnction of range which
doesn't leave me particularly warm. I would suggest that Math Physics
Branch take a look at that.
PCR's 822, 917, 916, and 857 were ell deletions yielding a total
of about 700 words. Specifically, they are the stroking test, P31,
TPI search (P17/P77), and a chunk of the pre-flight performance test
flight program.
PCR 867 m-kes it possible to calxy out orbit rate torquing with
any roil attitude using R6_.
4. COL0SSL_ Off-line Assemblies
_ae two progr-w_ in the development hoppe r are PCR 876, a new prelaunch technique, and PCR 927, the Universal pointing routine which will
be needed by at least Apollo 16 to support the CS14 experimental package.
5. LUMINARY Apollo 13
About 9 changes were approved for LUMINARY, including:
POR 882 to replace the DSEY display of horizontal velocity during
P66 with the horizontal velocity component in the spacecraft X and Z plane.
PCR 285, submitted by yours truly, to remove the check for the auto
throttle discrete. Essentially this change eltmtT_tes pro_m P67 and
makes it possible for the crew to use the manual throttle at any time during
descent. It also makes the program insensitive to failure of the auto
throttle discrete. (CCK requested that MIT look into _-k_ng the LaC commanded thrust a DSKY display as a part of this PCR. )
· 6. LUMINARY Apolln 14
Approximately 11 changes have been approved for Apollo 1_, including:
PCR 896, which not only saves about 50 words, but should increase
descent navigation accuracy by centering the readout of landing radar
velocity at PIPTIME.B
PCR 892, which deletes the rendezvous radar automatic acquisition
capability during ascent. It is already inoperable during descent and
descent aborts. Deletion of It29frees Bgo words of memory. Incidentally,
Routine 29 does not work in the ApoLlo 12 prog_v_m and will not be fixed
for Apollo lB. In other words, it never worked end never will:
7. L _UMTWARYOff-line Assemblies
There is some interesting development work going on with LUMINARY.
The one that almpeals to me the most is Delta Guidance (PCR 969), which I
have written about in another memo. Work on a landing radar pre-filter
(PCR 9_1) and addition of a simple 1,_r te_in profile (PCR 940) are
also under consideration for descent pro6_mm chs_ges. The so-called coordinated turn during a ms_,,,lly controlled lunar landing (PCR 88_) is
still in the mill.
PCR 888 is under consideration to modify the _ control authority
model to incl,,de the effect of RCS plume deflectors.
PCR 890 is supposed to improve the slosh stability of the 12/DAP
to be used when docked with the CSM.
A very interesting endeavor underway at MIT that you should be aware of
is an attempt to develop a CSM rendezvous program which will operate as
nearly automatically as is possible. If the off-line program proves
dramatically successful in the crew simvd_tions, the efforts may be
expanded to other computer pro_A_m_ including those in the I2/.
Another substantial effort at MIT has been devoted to recoding the CSM
pro_dn ,nAchmore efficiently than COLOSSUS. This effort has been completed,
resulting in a program called Artemis which they have in their hands now,
but which has not been tested. It i_ovides at least 2,700 words of available memory and with some pro6_mm deletions could cough up as _,ch as 4,300.
Since we have no foreseeable need for this extra storage and we don't want
to give up the considerable confidence we have in the current operationally
proven COLOSSUS progr_m_ MIT was directed to discontinue further work on
Artemis. Incidentally, no equivalent effort has been done on LUMINARY and
no such work is planned now. It was stated, however, that the LUMIE
savings potential is est!-_ted to _h less than for COL0SSUS.
/42 i -
Howard I,/. T'l.ndall, Jr.
AdO_essees ·
(See attached page)
FM:HWT:Js_ m mDMIaN
m Imm. N.(mmcml)m.l_m ·.
UNITED STAT_ GOVERNMENT
Memo__um NASA Manned Spacecraft Center
TO : See list attached DATE: October R1, 1969
69-PA-T-13PA
FROM : H_/Ohief, Apollo Data Priority Coordination
sumJ_cr: Apollo 12 Newsletter
So many things have changed - some subtly, some considerably - that
I thought a newsletter might be useful. It is written particularly
for those of you who have not been directly involved in preparation
for Apollo 19.
I2i_ Drift Check
Based on providing a safe (not point) landing with abortability, 1/PAD
has established the 124 IMU drift rate tolerances to be .35°/hr. about
the pitch axis (If)and 1.5°/hr. about the roll and yaw axes (X; Z).
Using the new docked alignment technique followed by the pre-DOI/PDI
A0T alignment (P52) about 2 3/4 hours later, the allowable differences
in the actual torquing angles from those predicted by the t_C are 0.8 °
around Y and 3.6° around X and Z. _hese are nice and wide, making a
NO/GO improbable. However, if they are exceeded, D0I must be delayed
one rev and the crew will repeat the P52 about two hours after the first.
Based on these torquing angles, the crew will compute and update the
compensation lmarameters in the LGC using standard techniques and a decf,_lto-octal conversion chart they have been supplied. If the P52 repeat
eonfirms a changing drift rate greater than 1.5°/hr. in any axis, the
is broken and POI is NO/GO for the mission. Otherwise, there is no further
check and the mission is continued. (Note: it is necessary for the crew
to update their own _ compensation since the 1:52 occurs shortly after
LOS and it is important that the new compensation be in operation ASAP
after the P52 toavoid a misali_ment build-up before PDI. )
DOI
A change in the Mission Rules has been agreed to which clarifies action
in the event of large DOI residuals. As noted previously, we're willing
to accept PDI altitude dispersions resulting from DOI residuals less than
5 fps. There are failures which could cause larger residuals than that,
though, that do not preclude descent. For example, failure of the PGNCS
to shut off the DPS. Manual backup for this could result in about 8 fps
overspeed with perfect PGNCS, AGS, and DPS still available. RCS (-Z) plume
impingement prevents trimming more than about 5 fps so the rule says:
a. If PGNCS residual is greater than l0 fps - abort
U.S. Bo, th,Ws,oU .7.3d
m'lO-_./
2
b. If H_NCS residual is greater than 5 fps but less than l0 fps -
trim to 5 fps and continue if the PGNCS is working okay.
c. If PGNCS residual is less than 5 fps - continue if the PGNCS is
okay.
7_ DOIAborts
I
·_ FCD has determined that the X-axis RCS plume impingement is marginal to
support I_ Z-axis braking from a DOI abort rendezvous, so the procedure
is to Jettison the DPS at TPI.
Landing Radar
Since our September 15/16 Apollo Mission Techniques meeting we have had
second thoughts on how we should handle a 523 alarm, which indicates that
the landing radar antenna has failed to reposition correctly after high
gate. At the time of our meeting, consensus of those present was that
processing landing radar after high gate was a desirable thing to do even
when it was actually near Position 1. Since that time independent an-lysis /
by MIT and MPAD has indicated that, although we wouldn't be in bad trouble
allowing the landing radar to come in, we are better off to inhibit it in "
some cases, provided we have had good landing radar data untilhigh gate.
It is true that with the recent spacecraft computer program changes there
are some occasions when we would be slightly better off to process the
data but the operational complexity of sorting out which situation we have
in real time is not warranted. We also preferred, if possible, to keep
the crew procedure the same, regardless of whether co,_._,_cation with the
control center was available or not. Therefore, in the event of a 523 alarm,
the precise crew procedure is V58 (to inhibit the landing raS_w) and "Proceed"
(to clear the alaim) and then an "_r._orReset."
Lurer Surface
Everyone must know by now that the CCB decided the PGNCS should be
powered down on the lunar surface. Before powering down, though, the /
crew has agreed to do two (rather than one) AOT alignments (Technique 2)
to prOvide data which gives the MCCa substantially better chance of
determining LM position on the moon.
MBFN Orbit Determination
It has been found that by adding one more term in the RTCC lunar potential
model, we are able to improve the orbit determination and descent targeting
significantly. It even permits high-quality, single-pass solutions: There
was some concern that the incompatibility of the RTCC with the spacecraft
computers might present some problem but as of now we can't thin_ of any
so - it's in the RTCC, but won't be in the spacecraft for either Apollo 12
or 13.
Howard W. Tindall, Jr.
PA :HWT:js '._mm
UNIT_.n STATES GOVERNMRNT
Memorandum
TO : See list attached DATE: October 29, 1969
69-PA-T-133A
FROM : PA/Chief, Apollo Data Priority Coordination
SUBJECt: Spacecraft separation procedures
I blundered into something the other daywhich is probably none of my
business but is interesting, so I thought I would bring your attention
to it. Some time before Apollo l0 the trajectory flight controllers
assembled a "Cookbook" of spacecraft separation recipes condensed from
the myriad of proposals and recommendations that have been floating
around- both _ritten or verbal - dealing with all of the possible separation operations involving all of the various spacecraft and booster
pieces during nominal and contingency missions. Apparently this had
become an overwhelming business, obviously requiring understanding and
preflight agreement. And, they reacted on their own to be prepared.
Subsequent to that, they requested MPAD to refine their Cookbook into
a formal document presenting each of the different separation sequences
in a stanS_wd roi-matx including such things as crew procedures, dia_m_
of spacecraft attitude in various stages in the sequence and relative
motion plots. As this work progressed, a great deal of simplification
resulted due to the similarities of the various situations. On October 22,
we had a pseudo Data Priority meetingat the flight controllers' request
with MPAD and FCSD people to review this document (MPAD's Internal Note
69-FM-262, which Flight Analysis Branch prepared for Apollo 12) and to reach
final agreement on the procedures given. Although the document proved to
be in excellent shape, as well as complete, several substantial modifications
were agreed upon, and it will be uDdated in the near i_ture to reflect them.
Currently it includes all of the separation situations that could ever be
encountered on Apollo - not just Apollo 12. Furthermore, it is planned
to have those dealing just with Apollo 12 included in that crew's checklist
·at their own request.
In order to m_intain control over this business, which up til now has
been informal, it is my understanding that Carl Huss intends to put this
document under the authority of the Crew Procedures Control Board if
they're willing, such that changes can only be made with their approval.
_hat certainly sounds like a good thing to do to me.
Howard W. Tindall, Jr.
PA:HWT:js
Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on th_ Payroll Savings Plan _.T 2_
--A --OPII_ML POaM _ m
MAY um mmllm
em ppm(ea_Jm._
UNIT'KOSTATE.5 O0_ENT
Memorandum 0e=t
TO ' See list attached DATE' October 29, 1969
69-PA-T-134A
FROM : PA/Chief, Apollo Data Priority Coordination
SUBJECT: Don't turn off the landing radar
A ripple just passed through our system, which I probably ought to
document for the record. Pete Conrad called the other day suggesting
that it might be a good nominal procedure to inhibit (V58E) landing
radar data from the PGNCS at about the time it exits the Descent visibilty phase (P_). Ordinarily, this would be when they initiate manual
control (P66) at about 500-ft. altitude. After poll tug interested MSC
and MIT people on this, we have reco_uded against it and the crew
has concu_ed even though it was agreed that the accuracy of the navigation probably would not be significantly affected and there is a slight
possibility of some spurious data getting in, particularly below lO0-_t.
altitude. (In fact, I think everyone agreed that if there were a way
to inhibit the velocity data at that point, that would be a good thing
to do. ) The primary reasons for advising against this procedure were:
a. Landing radar altitude data is highly desirable during this
part of the descent and V58 stops everything.
b. I_KY operations are undesirable if they can be avoided.
Consideration was given to changing the landing radar velocity weighting
factor to zero in P65/66/67 but this is also not reco_,,_nded (although it
may be before the flight) because that technique stops the velocity data
too early in the descent.
Although the decision is to leave the crew procedures as they are_ this
·was probably a worthwhile review of this volatile subject and w_y yet
result in a change in the weighting factor as Apollo ll landing radar
analysis is further defined.
Howard W. Tindall, Jr.
PA:HWT:js
mou.s.s=,v ,va,,,lj , a, vo,ms,,i,v vt,, Y.f?GtTIONU. PORM N0. 1IQ
M&Y III Im4T_N
J_Mn (aa cl,_) t4s-ltJ
UNIT,.r) STATES GOVERNMENT
Memorandum.
TO : See list attached DATE: October 29, 1969
69-PA-T-138A
FROM : PA/Chief, Apollo Data Priority Coordination
SUBJECT: Automatic CSM Rendezvous
Partly because of Mike Collin's post-flight criticisms and partly
because we donrt have anything else to do anymore, some of us MSC
and MIT guys had a little meeting the other day to discuss implementation of a quasi-automatic CSM rendezvous capability in the GN_. Of
course, it is impossible to provide a fully auto_tic rendezvous system
in the CSM because of the manual optics which are required for rendezvous
navigation. Our objective at this meeting was to review and endorse
an _IT proposed design of a system that comes as close to f,_l_y automatic
as is reasonably possible. Based on the agreements reached at our meeting, MIT is going to develop an off-line COLOSEL_ assembly and associated support doc,Tmentation which we can try out on the CMS. Although
MIT was noncommittal on schedule, the impression given was that it would
be available around the first of the new year. If it turns out really
great and doesn't shake up the pro_m too much we will probably add
it to a flight assembly and perhaps look at some of the other pro_m_
the s_me way, including those in the IA{. At the least, it is a good
source of experience for future projects.
To give you a little idea of what is being done, let me just list some
of the operations which the computer will relieve the crew from doing.
a. Automatic W-matrix initialization
b. More Judgment in the automatic data editing
c. Automatic cycling from program to program
d. Automatic loading of "Target _V" to update the IA{ state vector
when it has maneuvered
e. Automatic I_P (R03) initialization
f. Automatic attitude maneuvers without crew authorization (but
with displays to tell what it's trying to do)
Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan2
In addition to these specific items, there is also a general clean-up
of the program such as eliminating the need for the crew to input
standard parameters we are nnlikely to ever change (such aselevation
?, angle and terminal phase transfer angle) and a n,_mber of displays
·which the crew ordinarily has no interest in seeing. Altogether it
is anticipated that the total number of /)SKY key strokes would be
: reduced from the 850 or so required on Apollo I1 to under 300.
_aere is some question as to whether it would be necessary for a crew
to learn how to operate the system in the old non-autow_tic mode. It
appears there is a good chance that the automatic mode will be capable
of handling not only a standard rendezvous, but also any of the abort
situations that can be imagined as well. We will have to await completion of the program before we w_] know that. Provision is being made,
of course, to inte_z .,ptthe auto,_tic mode to permit non-nominal things
such as unscheduled platfoz_.-alig_nts (P52) and up-links from the
ground (P27) or anything else that might become necessary in real time.
This is being done by providing standard reset points throughout the
sequence, each identified and callable by a new program number. (MIT's
current plan is to use the PSX's for this purpose.)
Two new programs or routines were strongly endorsed for addition into
this system, if they aren't too difficult. _e first is a new targeting
(prethrust) program to permit onboard computation of the height adjustment maneuver used in a number of abort sequences. At present the crew
is required to use a chart in conjunction with the CSI progrsm (P32) to
back-upthe ground targeting, which is prime. Provision of this pro_-_m
would mske the spacecraft independent of the ground for all abort rendezvous sequences cu_ently plsnned. _e other would provide automatic
sequencing of the G&N for a com,_nd module SPS plane change, including
IMU pulse torquing and spacecraft attitude control. At present this is
a really messy procedure which the C_P would have to ca_y out by himself
in a time critical period if that need ever occurred in flight. Incidently, these capabilities would be good additions to the present system:
It was interesting to note the enthusiasm most of the people had for this
undertaking. But, of course, I was careful to invite only those whom I
thought would be friendly since we are not necessarily designing a flight
system but rather a trial system based on a philosophy new to MSC operational
people. It will be easier to deautomate it later if that's a good idea
than to go the other way.
Howard W. Tindall_ Jr.
PA:HWT: jsCIPTIICI4/A. 1_I_4 NO. tO
_4AY l_lW 1_4?IGV
_'Mm (,in C_R) S4s-ls.s
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
Memorandum o .t r
TO : See list attached DATE: October 29, 1969
69-PA-T-139A
FaOM : PA/Chief, Apollo Data Priority Coordination
8tmJEOT: AGS licks PGNCS for RCS Insertion
Pete Conrad has discovered and, if necessary, intends to do something
that Dan Payne and others around here got squared away a year or more
ago. Unfortunately, due to the press of more urgent business, we
failed to advertise it enough. This note is to make sure you know that
the AGS does a better job than the PGNCS of guiding the LM into orbit
using the RCS if the APS stops prematurely and can't be restarted. And,
it should be used in this unlikely and horrifying event.
It may surprise you to learn that if the APS fails during the last minute
of I_fascent, insertion may still be achieved using the RCS. For this
specific case, a 4 jet RCS burn about 9 minutes long would be required
to pick up the remaining 1,O00 fps. (This obviously far exceeds the
85-second constraint currently limiting +X RCS operation, but who will
quibble over that?)
The proper procedure for RCS insertion is to switch to AGS AUTO, since
AGS will steer the vehicle automatically at RCS thrust acceleration levels
while PGNCS will not. Meanwhile, the PGNCS velocity-to-be-gained display
may be monitored to verify that AGS is perfo_,.iug adequately. When the
PGNCS velocity-to-be-gained is small (i.e., less than 25 fps) control
could be switched back to PGNCS and the standard velocity residual trSmming procedures could be employed. Use of AGS AUTO relieves the crew of
m_uually maintaining attitude such that the PGNCS display of total velocityto-be-gained is along the X-axis during a long RCS burn. Also, AGS guidance
has cross-range position control assuring insertion into the CSM plane while
PGNCS does not.
As I said, Pete fowud all this out for himself and intends to act according
with our blessing if this happens. This is another example of a lowprobability contingency procedure cleared away. We'll have to be careful
we don't carry this kind of effort too far or we'll be arrested for violation of the law of diminishing returns:
Howard W. Tindall, Jr.
PA:HWT:js
FM: JDPayne: js
Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan .^sA--Msc_ NO. 10 5010,-1417
NAy Ilia I[ZNI'11_4
GIlA GIKN. IICG. NC_ 17
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
Memorandum
TO : See list attached DATE: November 4, 1969
69-PA-T-14PA
FROM : PA/Chief, Apollo Data Priority Coordination
SUBJECT: Apollo 12 Descent - Final comments
There are a couple of new developments you should know about the
Apollo 12 descent.
Back in July somebody decided to offset the landing-site targets
1,000 ft. east and 500 ft. north of the Surveyor, primarily based on.
the ess,_mption that it would be easier for the crew to take over manually from a position biased that way and fly over to the actual point
they want to touchdown. Since that time, simulation experience and
descent analysis has shown that biasing the descent targets like that
is not only nunecessary, but is actually a little undesirable. For
example, it appears for visual reasons that short redesignations may
be even better than redesign_ting long. In response to Pete Conrad's
request for eliminating these biases, I have polled everyone I can
think of who has interest in this subject and have found that everyone
either feels it is a good idea or they don't think it makes any difference. And so we are going to remove the biases in the descent guidance
targets. This does not change any crew procedures, onboard data packages,
or ground procedures. It only involves changing some constants in the
control center computer program and the basic philosophy of how we want
to do the job.
The other modification deals with the LM venting. For one reason or
another, GAC has made a precise measurement of the LM water boiler thrust
level. According to Ron Kubicki, the results of their tests will be
added to the data book. The preliminary estimate of the effect on the
PDI state vector, if the venting is ignored in the RTCC orbit determination and integration programs, is an ezzor in the order of 4_000 ft. in
an uprange direction (i.e., short). As you know, we have established
a routine procedure of adjusting the PGNCS landing-site target (ELS)
during powered descent based on MSFN tracking _mmediately prior to PDI.
This procedure, hopefully, will compensate for up or downrange state
; vector errors resulting from any source, including venting. As a resul%
if we were certain the MSFN tracking will be working and able to support
this procedure_ there would be no reason to even consider compensating for
the venting in the initial descent targeting. However, to cover the possibility that the system might fail at that critical time_ we have decided
to bias the landing-site targets (ltLS) transmitted to the LM prior to
powered descent. The Math Physics Branch of }4PAD has the responsibility
yr7
Buy U.S. Savings Bonds.Regularly on the Pay?o_l!,Saving,Plan?
2
for determining the magnitude of this correction and for including it in
the Data Select procedures.
I would like to take this opportunity to modify a prediction I made in
'i
writing early in August. At that time I thought our chances of landing
= near the Surveyor were very low. fbat if we landed closer than about a
half mile, we would have to credit Lady Luck. Based on things that
have happened since then, including the addition of the _TM update
during powered descent, and particularly the confidence the crew has
now developed in the LPD since the visual capability of their _ is
working so well - and for whatever it's worth - my feeling now is that
as long as the systems work as well as they have in the past, we have
a pretty good chance of landing near the Surveyor. And I would rather
be on record as predicting that_ than predicting a miss. If we do miss_
I'll bet it's because of errors in the crossrange direction, so large
that the crew does not recognize where they are after high gate or
beyond this redesignation capability. The NBFN targeting is weakest
in that direction and e_w6y AOT alignments hurt us most in that direction too.
Hoard W. 2h2ndall_ Jr.
PA:ltv/T: j sOIf1'IOKAL FORM NO. 10 5010--107
MAY t1142EDI_
GSA GIE_. REG. /_C'. 27
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENrF
Memorandum Oen e:
TO : See list attached DATE: November 1% 1969
69-PA-T-145A
FROM : PA/Chief_ Apollo Data Priority Coordination
SUBJECT: _ high-bit rate telemetry data is not mandatory
A somewhat controversial mission rule is on the books for the Apollo 12
flight dealing with LM high-bit rate data. Specifically_ it indicates
that it is all right to proceed with the mission (e.g._ undocking, DOI,
PDI, etc.) in the absence of LM high-bit rate data with an implied provision that some sort of procedures would be carried out to verify the
PGNCS is operating properly. On November 13 Chris Kraft, Sig Sjoberg
Gene Kranz_ Cliff Charlesworth, Steve Bales_ and I reviewed that mission
rule and concluded that it is proper and will be used on Apollo 12. I'm
_riting this memo at CCK's request to record that fact.
Prior to the meeting_ Steve Bales _prepared a rev-by-rev listing of the
procedures to be followed to certify proper PGNCS operation from power-up
through lunar surface operation, which showed that it is possible through
use of voice communications and some special onboard procedures to check
the computer_ the gyros_ and the accelerometers. It is obvious that
these procedures impose an additional workload on both the crew and the
flight controllers_ which could force delay of DOI. Under no circumstances
w6uld DOI be performed prior to the satisfactory completion of the checks.
The most significant impact would result from loss of core--nd uplink
capability since that would force the crew to manually input a lot of data
into the computer via the DSKY_ which they ordinarily do not have to pay
any attention to at all. _he LM state vectors (twice)_ RI_, and perhaps
the REFS_T are the most significant of these. However_ as I understand
it, loss of high-bit rate telemetry does not necessarily mean the uplink
wouldn't work; for exampl% it should be operational if the failure is in
the high-gain ante_n_. And, it was agreed to use it to avoid the voice
read up of the data and the crew input task. The new thing brought about
by absence of high-bit rate telemetry is that it would be necessary for
the crew to read out and voice down all of the data for the MCC to verify
complete and accurate receipt.
Subsequent to the meeting_ it was recalled that the Luminary program has
the capability of computing its own Descent REFSMMAT - (P52 Option h) -
using a landing time supplied by the ground. This capability should
probably be used although it may introduce other problems. Steve is
checking this out.
s37
Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularlyon the Pat'roll Savings Plal:Another item requiring further investigation deals with the erasable
memory. As you know, it is standard procedure to dump erasable memory
to the ground for a complete check to make sure none of the parameters
loaded preflight have been lost. It is not obvious that this is a
mandatory requirement since in no flight has a single parameter ever
been found to be in error. Furthermore, MIT conducted a special test
involving numerous off-on cycling of the LGC with a check of the E-memory
on each cycle. Again, no loss of data was observed. (The test exceeded
lO,O00 cycles when it was terminated due to test-equipment failure. )
Steve was given the action of identifying E-memory critical parameters
which the crew must check if an E-memory dump cannot be performed.
Incidentally_ it will be necessary forthe crew to synchronize the LGC
clock without MCC assistance. They should be able to do this using
the CMC as a reference to within 0.3 seconds which is considered acceptable.
In summ_ry_ the mission rule is correct as written. This meeting confirmed
that but als0 uncovered some open items which we must have squared away
before descent without high-bit rate data.
Howard W. Tinda!!_Jr.
PA:HWT: js
NASA -- MSCIPQ_M NO, 10 $010-,107
WAY IJ_ _rrllON
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
Memorandum
TO : See list attached DATE: November 24_ 1969
69-PA-T-146A
F_OM : PA/Chief, Apollo Data Priority Coordination
SU_TECT: Apollo 13 Odds and Ends Neeting
This memo is to notify you of an Odds and Ends Nission Techniques meeting
for Apollo 13 on December 5, 1969, starting at 9 a.m., Room 378 of Building 14-.
Very likely it will be the last big get together we will have for that
mission. Generally, subjects to be discussed result from the effect of
the CSM D0I on the mission techniques: specifically, the DOI monitoring,
the contingency bail-out maneuver, the descent abort rendezvous plans and
things like how to align and check the LM I_J, the attitude time history,
and so forth. Obviously, feedback from the Apo11_ 1_ mission could also
have quite an influence. I will put together some sort of an agenda before
the meeting and welcome your suggestions.
PA:_WT:js
Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularlyon the Payroll Savings Plan
NASA _ MSCOlVll'iO_:_l. _ NO. I$ _I0.-157
MAY t_ 1;Otll'lON
SSA Gil_l. IIE_... NO. 27
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
Memorandum _ Nanned Spacecraft Center
TO : See list attached DATE: November 24, 1969
69-PA-T-l_TA
FRO_ : PA/Chief, Apollo Data Priority Coordination
SUBJECT: Rover Navigation
I poked my nose into the Rover Navigation System and so Dave Pendley
invited me to a meeting at I_3FC on November 21, 1969. _ae purpose of
the meeting was to try and firm up the basic design of the Rover Navigation System with the Boeing people who are responsible for building
it. It was strongly emphasized that time is very short to provide any
system at all if they_ant to fly the Rover as currently scheduled. In
fact, the Seattle Boeing people seemed very reluctant to consider any
system other than the one they originally proposed because they insist
there is not enough time. (Curiously enough it doesn't seem as though
they really have a detailed design for even their proposed system. At
least that is the impression I got from their responsesto questions.)
It was interesting to observe that l4arshall, the local Boeing management,
and NSC people were completely in agreement on everything. What we all
wanted to do was to simplify the system as much as possible. For example,
a. Eliminate the automatic sun-seeking azimuth alignment device.
b. Use the astronaut to reinitialize the system periodicatly throughout the traverse, thereby relaxing the accuracy requirement. They will
want to check it periodically anyway.
c. Decouple the components such that failures in one part do not wipe
out the entire system. Specifically, we would like some way of determining
Rover heading and distance travelled - the most useful outputs - if the
computer fails. This makes use of a directional gyro logical.
Boeing (Seattle) acted as if they never had heard of a directional gyro and
almost certainly, will come in with a negative response on their action item
of looking into this simpler system. However, there were some guys from
MSFC with heavy German accents who said they intended to check back into
their labs to come up with some proposals. And the local Boeing guys will
too. Then they are all supposed to get together in a week or two to decide
what they are going to do. I would be amazed if Narshall is not put into
a position where they must either:
a. Direct Boeing to implement the simpler system, which of course also
gives Boeing a blank check for cost, schedules, etc.
L:uyU.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the PayroWSavings Plan _ q'._b. Permit Boeing to implement the system they want to use.
: Ny opinion is that it really doesn't _tter what happens because after
listening to the Apollo 12 EVA and John Cooper's description of how the
operation is conducted, I am convinced that we don't need any navigation
system at all: The important point was that prior to starting a traverse,
: the ground and the crew will have jointly laid out the whole thing in
detail. Then as the traverse progresses there will be a joint, step-bystep tracking of current position on their maps. There should never be
a time when the crew and the ground people don't know exactly where they
are and if any uncertainty ever arises, the n_mber one task will be to
reestablish their location somehow - by retracing their steps to a known
benchmark if necessary. Visualize then what you would do if it ever
became necessary to return directly to the LM. If the navigation system's
displays agree with what you see on the map, there is no question about it.
If the navigation system's displays do not agree with the map, again I
don't think there is any question - you have got to believe the map and
act in accordance with it.' I have come to the conclusion that the navigation system is not required to get the crew back to the Iai. Certainly it
would be helpful, but not necessary. It doesn't seem necessary to establish
where you are for scientific purposes either, since again the crew's eyeballs
and map will have highest priority along with their photography. It seems
as though the most useful function of the navigation system is to make their
EVA more efficient by helping them keep track of where they are on their
map. Of course, all that is required to do that is an indication of their
heading and distance travelled - a compass and an odometer. All of these
points were made very clear to the _rshall and local Boeing people, who
understand them completely and intend to proceed accordingly.
In s,_mm_ry, I don't think we have anything to worry about from an operational
standpoint, regardless of what kind of navigation system we get on the Rover.
There may be some problem in getting the system they are most likely to try
for_ but those problems will be in terms of cost, weight, and schedule which
are the business of others who are well aware of the situation and apparently
competent. I was quite impressed with the quality of the _rshall and local
Boeing people who are in charge of the overall Rover pro_m.
!
Howard W. _5.ndall, Jr.
PA:tt_:js_ NO. 10 :55JO--IC17
GSA C.4_L dmE_. N_, 317
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
Memorandum
TO : See list attached DATE: December 17, 1969
69-PA-T-lh9A
_OM : PA/Chief, Apollo Data Priority Coordination
SUB/aCT: Apollo 13 Mission Techniques are in good shape
On December 5 we had what I expect to be our last full-blown Mission
Techniques meeting for Apollo 13. This memo is to tell you about it.
As you probably know, the recovery people would like to move the end-ofmission landing point closer to their support base in Samoa. Accordingly,
the 'P,:and L entry targeting will be aimed at 172° W rather than the 165o W
longitude used on previous missions. The Retrofire Officer pointed out
that this change does not apply to the targeting for all the block data
nor will it be used if due to a G&N failure it is necessary to perform
the _ mneuver with the SCS. In these cases they want the landing point
well clear of any land at all and they'll use the old mid Pacific line.
A more important change, ih om the crew's standpoint, was their agreement
to be prepared to fly the _S and $ g mnual backup techniques, banking
either to the north or south. On previous missions they have only been
prepared to go north. The reentry planning people (MPAD) felt that this
additional capability was required since the more westerly landing site
is close to a bunch of islands and could get us in a bind if we were not
prepared to go either way. Unlike previous missions, steering to the
south will be the prime mode unless !-nd or weather is unacceptable there.
I would like to reemphasize that all this only applies to entry without
the G&_.
One of the techniques that is significantly changed on Apollo 13 deals
with IAi_ alignments and drift checks. The change is due to: a) we
are undocking i rev earlier, which makes it impossible to carry out an
accurate inertial alignment while docked like we did on Apollo 12, but
it does permit two undocked AOT alignments; b) the smaller size of the
acceptable landing site makes it necessary to reduce the allowable drift
rate about the vertical (x) axis since that results in an out-of-plane
dispersion at landing. Until this flight we used a limit selected to
protect against continuing the mission with a broken //_J. We must reduce
this l_mit now to make sure the guidancesystem will deliver the LM to
within the 1 kilometer radius of the desired landing point for both crew
safety and mission success reasons. The final result of our deliberations,
at this meeting and at a subsequent meeting_ yielded the following technique.
We concluded that by far the most accurate drift determination could be
carried out by comparing the LM system to the CSM while still docked to
Buy U.S. SavingsBands Regularlyon the Payroll SavingsPlan '_ zt _2
the CSM. Accordingly, we will use that data to determine whether or not
it is necessary to update the IEI drift compensation in the LGC and to
determine the new compensation values. If new compensation is required,
i it will be uplinked from the ground prior to the first undocked AOT align-
% ment. We will then confirm that the IMU is operating acceptably to proceed
with descent based on the torquing angles calculated at the second undocked
AOT ali_ment. (I am writing a detailed description of all this for those
interested in more detail.)
As a result of the excellent landmark tracking the Apollo 12 crew carried
out, we feel confident we know the Apollo 13 landing site location accurately enough to reco_,.-_.ndthe following mission rule: landmark tracking
is not mandatory for descent. Obviously we intend to use whatever landmark
tracking is obtained and plans call for attempts to be made in both revs 12
and lB. The point is that if for some reason we do not get this tracking,
the landing should not be delayed. Although this data wi]] significantly
reduce dispersion, we do not need it badly enough to go an extra rev thereby
clobbering both crew and ground procedures.
By far the most emotion-1 discussion of all involved monitoring of the CSM
DOI maneuver. The basic question was, should the ]_ be included in the
monitoring techniques? Our final resolution was that it should not and
that the CSM D0I monitoring would be carried out exactly as was done during
. LOI2 on all previous lnn_r missions. Namely, the G&_Nwill be given every
opportunity to do its job and the crew will mam,_lly co.._w-nsengine off if
either the predicted burn time is exceeded by 1 second or the G&N itself
indicates that an overbu_n is occurring because the automatic cutoff failed
to get through for some reason. In the event the burn is apparently completed satisfactorir_y but the E_S indicates an overburn, it will obviously
be necessary to convince ourselves beyond a question of a doubt that the
EMS is w£ong and that the G&N has achieved the targeted orbit. This deterruination will be made by the crew's obser_tion of time of earth rise above
the lunar horizon compared to a prediction provided by the ground before
DOI. The details involved in this ground determination mast be worked out
and the technique will be rehearsed in flight during the 1,,n_r orbits before
DOI. (For your information, a i second overburn will produce an extra l0 fps
which just results in 1,_r_r impact. Earth acquisition time will be delayed
14 seconds due to a i second overburn thus it is this kind of time difference
the crew _,st be able to discern with absolute confidence. ) If an overburn
actually occurs, the crew is to make canned SCS/SPS posi_de maneuver of
100 fps. Execution t_m_ is 30 minutes after DOI.
MPAD currentl_ predicts that the perigee and apogee altitude should only
change about_ mile between DOI and PDI. it is their est_mste that at DOI
they will be able to predict the PDI altitude to within 9,000 feet. Associated with this was a discussion regarding necessity for tr_,,_,._ngDOI
residuals, which also affects the PDI altitude. It was decided to trim x
to within .2 fps and z to within i fps. However, since then we havereconsidered and agreed that the rule should be to trim both x and z to
within I fps. Out-of-plane (y) is not to be tr_f,,i,,ed at all. The objective
of this is to make it almost certain that tr_,.m_ng will not be required
since we want to save the RCS and it is not really necessary.
You are probably well aware of the special effort we have been m_king to
reduce trajectory perturbations as much as we could. Our objective was to
improve the ground targeting for the descent to provide a pinpoint landing
capability. We have now proven, both analytically and on Apollo 12, that
we are able to compensate for these perturbations by use of the targeting
update (_B_-q) during powered descent. It also seems ,_nlike!y that we are
ever really going to be able to eliminate the perturbations. That is, we
must plan on continued use of APT.q. If we accept this as a fact of life,
there is no justification for fixing the LM vent in an attempt to make it
non-propulsive. It is also possible to live with venting from the CSM
water boiler if the systems people decide it's necessary to _m it, although
it is certainly better if we don't have to. One thing for sure. If the
CSM G&N performance degrades due to the higher operating temperatures, we
must make sure that that is not worse than venting on the overall trajectory
control problem.
Although the Apollo 13 I_I LPD is supposed to have been fixed to compensate
for the effects of IA_bloating, we concluded that it is still desirable to
check it in flight as was done on Apollo 12. A change had been made in the
LM's computer pro_m to take into account mc salignment of the LPD. We
established a rule that if the in-flight check shows that the _ is off
by more than 1o, in either pitch or yaw, the ground will update the parameters in the erasable memory. MIT was requested to _n_oAm the MDC Guidance
Officer exactly how this is to be done.
We discussed establishing an alternate flight plan to be used in the event
LN/CSM separation is delayed for some reason, but finally concluded that it
could best be worked out in real time. It seems, as a rule of thumb, that
delays in separation of up to 40 m_uutes could be tolerated fairly well -
beyond that would probably require delay of the descent for an extra rev.
Descent aborts are a little different than on Apollo 12 because the earlier
undocking changes the CSM/LM separation distance substantially. Actually,
the situation is better. During the first 5 minutes and 40 seconds of
descent a 2-rev rendezvous is required; after that it changes to 1 rev through
TI. T2 is 2-rev and occurs at about 20 minutes and _5 seconds after PDI.
(This compares favorably to Apollos I1 and 12 when we had a 1-rev rendezvous
through 10 minutes, then 2 revs through TI and B revs for T2:)
Aside from some rumbles about knocking 2 hours out of the rendezvous,
Apollo 13 techniques seem pretty firm. Although I'm sure there'll be the
typical diddling til the flight, we Iprobably won't get together again.
Howard W. Tindall, ,Ir.
PA :HWT: j sOWTION&L. _ NO. _0 $010--107
klAy IM_ EDrTX)N
GSA GtN. Nr_G,. N_. _
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
.'7.
'" Memorandum NASA Nanned Spacecraft Center
TO : See list attached DATE: December 18) 1969
69-PA-T-lk8A
FROM : PA/Chief_ Apollo Data Priority Coordination
SUBJECT: LM _ drift checks prior to descent for Apollo 13 and up
We are making some fairly substantial changes to the way we are aligning and checking the drift of the LM II4Jbefore descent on the Apollo 13
mission. Just for the record I would like to document what it is we are
doing and why.
:Jj
Two things have happened as we progressed from Apollo 12 to 13 which,Q:* have
made it necessary to change the techniques. Probably the most significant
is performing the D0I maneuver with the CSM. This in turn presented a
problem with regard to landmark tracking by the CSM since we aren't sure
it can be done in the 60 x 8 n. mi. pre-descent orbit. So_ in order to
assure getting the lanSm_rk tracking_ we decided to recircularize the CSM
orbit to the 60-mile altitude. And to get the tracking done in time to
(" use the data_ we are forced to undock from the LM i rev earlier than we
did on Apollo 12. Undocking earlier means that less time is spent while
docked during the LM activation and checkout which precludes our making
an accurate docked alignment of the LM platform. (We have neither sufficient time nor the necessary attitude changes in the new timeline.) On
the other hand) undocking early gives us an extra rev of LM free flight
which allows carrying out two A0T (P52) alignments during each of the
last two darkness passes before PDI.
The other significant thing that made it necessary to change the techniques
is the fact that we are landing on a rough area on the moon in which the
acceptable touchdown conditions are constrained to a very small area. For
planning purposes it is defined as a circle with i kilometer radius. The
point is_ whereas on previous missions we could miss the targeted-landing
point by many miles and still land and achieve the primary mission objective,
on this flight we cannot even land safely very far from our i kilometer
circle. This obviously imposes a demand for superior performance from the
PGNC$ than was needed on previous flights. In particular_ we must make
sure misalignment of the platform at PDI about the vertical (x) axis is
about an order of magnitude smaller than was acceptable on Apollos ll and
12. On those missions the maximnm acceptable x misalignment was based on
protecting against continuing with a broken system. Specifically_ we were
able to tolerate a platform drifting at a rate up to 1.5 O/hr. The fact
that this would cause a very large miss in landing point location was not
sufficient justification to delay or scrub out the landing. Now we are
Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan2
-h
not willing to go on if the guidance system is going to miss our little
circle. An analysis shows that a misalignment in excess of 0.19° at PDI
is all we can tolerate. By moving our last platform alignment as late as
possible before PDI, we can pinpoint our largest acceptable drift rate.
Assuming the latest we can do the P52 is I hour and 20 minutes before PDI,
the maximum allowable drift rate turns out to be .145 O/hr. (that is about
a 4.4 sigma system).
Our number one problem comes about when determining first of all if the
system is working better than that, or not. Secondly, if it isn't, how
do we get the new compensation to the spacecraft? After a good bit of
head scratching, the consensus is that our best determination of drift
rate (not absolute inertial alignment) can be made using the CSM platform
as a reference while the LM is still docked. If you can assume there is
no slipping or bending between the two spacecraft while docked, the MCC
is able to detect drift rates in excess of .04 o/hr. dependably. We feel
this is at least as good as two PSR's spaced i rev apart. In fact, it's
probably better. So we plan on using the crew's readout (N20) of LM and
CSM gimbal angles while docked to make the determination of whether or not
the IA{IMU is working well enough to support a landing. Furthermore, if we
find the drift in excessive, we intend to use that same data to determ_ue
new values of drift compensation which will be uplinked to the LM after
undocking , but before the first AOT alignment. This procedure should not
only be the most accurate way to do it, but also avoids another problem.
Namely, there is no straightforward way of using the data obtained from
the two AOT alignments, the last of whichoccurs in back of the moon i hour
before PDI, and uplinking the new compensation values_ if that turned out
to be necessary, without delaying the landing i rev. Of course we have every
intention of rechecking the system for acceptable performance based on the
undocked AOT alignments but the procedure outlined above should preclude
finding it unacceptable at a time when it is difficult to do anything about
it.
We are not changing our criteria used to establish acceptable drift and
misalignment about the other two axes, y and z. As before the y limit was
chosen to provide a safe descent abort capability since pitch misalignment
does not significantly affect landing-point accuracy as long as the landing radar data comes in. The z-axis limit is still based on making sure
the system is not broken since we can stand massive misalignments around
the braking thrust axis. (Note: I_ z is approximately along the LM x-axis. )
1, ,.Ir.
Enclosure
PA :H%.TT:j s
J
NASA _ MSCM&¥ 1112 [C)n'ION
qSA G[JN. NEG. NO. Z?
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
Memorandum °en.r
TO : See list below DATE: December 31, 1969
69-PA-T-152A
FROM : PA/Chief, Apollo Data Priority Coordination
suB3Ecr: Can we cut 2 hours out of the Apollo rendezvous?
As you no doubt are aware, there is a movement afoot to shorten the
Apollo rendezvous by 2 hours. This would be done by eliminating the
CSI and CDH maneuvers and executing TPI about ½ hour after insertion.
The reason this is being considered is to reduce the crew's workday
which currently is really pretty bad. Of course the thing we would
have to accept is a reduced capability to tolerate dispersed conditions.
In any case, at the urging of members from several of the upcoming
crews, Ed Lineberry and his people have been working on a new trajectory
and timeline. We would like to get together on January 1_ to go over
this business and decide what to do next. I am sure it is too late to
consider a change of this magnitude for Apollo 13, but I don't believe
it is too late for Apollo 14 unless the new plan has some m_jor drawbacks.
If you're interested, call me in a week or so for time and place.
Howard W. Tindall, Jr.
Addressees:
AC/C. C. Kraft, Jr. FM/J. P. Mayer
PA/J. A. McDivitt FM4/J. C. McPherson
FA/S. A. Sjoberg FM5/R. E. Ernull
CB/T. P. Stafford FM6/E. C. Linebex_y
CB/D. R. Scott FM6/R. Regelbrugge
CB/A. B. Shepard FS5/J. C. Stokes
UB/E. A. Cernan FSS/L. Dungan
CB/E. D. Mitchell NASA HQB./XB/R. Sherrod
CF24/P. Kramer MIT/M. Johnston, TI.
CF2_/M. C. Contells
UF34/T. W. Holloway
EGT/C. T. Hackler
FC/E. F. Kranz
FC/C. Charlesworth
FC/G. S. Luuney
FC_/J. E. Hannigan
FCS/J. C. Bostick
FC5/P. C. Shaffer
PA:HWT:jsBuy U.S. SavingsBondsRegularlyon the PayrollSavingsPlan .TP', .v
/_'-u_.$ NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION
MANNED SPACECRAFT CENTER
HOUSTON,TEXAS 77058
,..EPLV _EF£.TO: 70-PA-T-fA January 5, 19TO
MEMDRANDUM TO: See list attached
FROM : PA/Chief, Apollo Data Priority Coordination
SUBJECT : A small change in CSM D0I confirmation procedures
We ran into a little snag on confirming the CSM DOI maneuver which has
forced us to change the mission technique a little bit and I think you
should know about it.
The CSM DOI burn brings perigee to about 8-miles altitude and it 0nly
takes an overspeed of l0 fps to cause an impact. Accordingly, we must
have absolute confidence that such an overspeed has not occuxxed. On
the other hand, we strongly desire to give the C_ every chance to do
its job since it almost certainly will do it right. For this reason
we have retained the simple crew technique for protecting against a maifunctioning G&N by manually shutting down the engine if the predicted
burn time is exceeded by i second, and we are not including the _ in
the logic. If at the conclusion of the maneuver the _ confi_Lms that
the G&N did right, we should have confidence that everything is okay since
that has got to be more than Just coincidence. Our only problem occurs
if both the G&N and _ appear to be operating properly, but the E_B
indicates an overspeed. Then something must be done to determine which
of the two systems is correct. If the G&_Nproves to be correct, we should
press on with the m_ssion. If the _ is right, an emergency m_neuver must
*be executed within ½ hour to get out of there and, since the G_ must be
broken, the landing will probably have to be abandoned. Originally we
intended to solve this dile_rms, in the ,_ulikely event it occu_ed by having
the crew note the time of earth rise. It was originally felt that this
observation would provide the crew an absolutely dependable, simple
onboard technique for making this critical decision. We have since found
that that is not so dependable and have chosen to use an alternate procedure. Namely, we have been ,_ble to find dependable onboard techniques
and have decided to depend on the MSFN tracking and I_C processing to
determine which of the sources is correct if the G&N and EMS disagree with
each other. This can be done dependably to infoim the crew in time for
them to execute the bail-out maneuver. This procedure has been agreed toover the phone by key flight controllers and the prime Apollo 13 crew, and
it will be used during the simulations starting this week. Work on earthrise procedures is being terminated.
Howard W. Tindall, Jr.
'!
PA :HWT:js
NASA--M$O:.i" /_Y__ NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION
_< _ MANNED SPACECRAFT CENTER
-_V_'_'/_Y_ HOUSTON. '[EXAS 77058
IN REPLY REFER TO: 70_PA_T_IA 'January 7, 1970
MEMORANDUM TO: See list attached
FROM : PA/Chief, Apollo Data Priority Coordination
SUBJECT : Important IA{ computer program change for Apollo 13 descent
_'aerewere some things about the terminal descent on th_ last mission
that kind of spooked a lot of people. One of the things suggested as
a result of this was to add a capability to the IA{ guidance and control
system which would assist the crew during the last 100 feet or so of the
descent. Specifically, fix the PGNCS so that it will provide an automatic nulling of the horizontal velocity while the crew controls the
: descent rate with the ROD switch. _ais memo is to inform you that we
are adding this capability to the system for the next flight - Apollo 13 -
and to describe briefly just what it is we are doing.
A modification is being made to P66 which will eliminate P65 oA if you
like, replace it with a similar but superior capability. We are retaining
the current P66 mode of operation exactly but are adding the following
"uto"
feature to it. If the crew switches from "ktt_t,,a_Mold" to _ the
PGNCS will null horizontal velocity to zero L both fore/aft and lateral.
It does this, of course, just as the crew would in the manual mo_d?by
controlling the spacecraft attitude. There is no restriction for switching back and forth between-'_ttitude Hold" and '_uto" in P66 as often as
the crew desires.
It is anticipated that the crew would fly the descent to an altitude of
about 100 feet exactly as has been done on both previous missions - that
is, they will exit P64 and go into P66 (Att. Hold) and manually control
rate of descent and attitude to place the spacecraft over the desired
touchdown point with small horizontal velocity remaining (say about 3 fps
and certainly not more than l0 fps). At this point they can switch to
Auto which wouldcause the PGNCS to take over attitude control to get and
maintain the horizontal velocity as near zero as it is able, leaving the
crew free to monitor their systems, watch out the windows, control the
rate of descent, etc. MIT also fixed the system so that the attitude2
errors are always displayed on the FDAI "error" needles in P66 so the crew
will know what the I_NCS plans to do when they enable it.
i
r
ii Since there is no programmed constraint keeping the crew from switching
-I to Auto when the horizontal velocities are quite large, spacecraft atti-
·_ tude limits have been programmed to insure that the LM does not suddenly
i! pitch or yaw to an extreme attitude in an attempt to kill off these velo-
'_ cities, if the crew were to select Auto under those conditions. This
limit is in erasable memory and is currently set at 20o.
o ! . .
.i An associated feature we are lmplement{ng is the inhibiting of the landing
. t . o .
radar data at about the same pozn_ in order to znsure that spurious velocity data does not cause undesirable attitude or translational transients.
Since there is no apparent reason P65 would ever be preferred to the new
Auto P66, the PGNCS logic is being fixed so that if the P6_ target conditions are met prior to the crew taking over in 1%6, the automatic program
switching from P64 will be to P66 Auto rather than 1%5. _aus, with this
change and the one previously implemented so that the PGNCS ignores the
throttle mode switch position, we have essentially el_m_uated both P65
and 1%7, and have remaining two modes of operation in P66. Most experts
involved seem to feel that if we had been clairvoyant the programs would
have been implemented this way in the First place.
_.t One final word, this program change was not seriously considered until
December 12 at which time a group of us got together here and pinned
down specific functional requirements which we then discussed over the
phone with MIT's Russ Larson and Allan Klumpp. It was interesting to
note that they had also thought about this and had a_ived at almost
exactly the same conclusions. At our request they set about _plementing
this change in an orderly but expeditious way, resulting in an offline
assembly delivered to _SC at the break of dawn on December 23. Gene Cernan
and Pete Conrad exercised it in the LMS that day and proclaimed it to be
outstanding. Jim Lovell has also played with it at the Cape and is said
to have expressed his pleasure and burning desire for it. MIT, in the
meantime, has completed their detailed reverification of the program.
GAC's Clint Till_n has also exercised it on their simalator and John Norton
has reviewed the actual coding and I am told declared it to be a work of
art. In other words, although we are messing with absolutely the most
critical part of the most critical phase of the mission, we are confident
that the change has been made correctly and are releasing the tape to
Raytheon to make the new M_xiule 5 rope to be delivered to KBC before CDDT.
Although I'm certain there are others, I personally know that a large dose
of special credit should go to Allan Klumpp and Tom Price for getting this
job done so well and so quickly:
Howard W. Tindall, Jr.
PA :R_T:js _"_9
NASA -- MSCz_'_'_, Mission Planning and Analysis Division
,/_v_/_.,_T._', NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION
_ .L_.,._'L_ ) MANNED SPACECRAFT CENTER
IN REPLY REFER TO: 70-FM-T-4 January 13, 19TO
MEMORANDUMT0: See list attached
FROM : FM/Deputy Chief
SUBJECT : AAP Rendezvous Mission Techniques
In order to help solidify requirements for the AAP CSM computer prog_:am
we are having a Mission Techniques type meeting on Tuesday, January 27
at 9 a.m., in Room 378 of Building 4. The specific subject to be discussed is the rendezvousphase of the AAP mission. The thing we are
particularly anxious to pin down is the type of maneuver sequence we
feel should be utilized, since that will define onboard programs required.
It will also probably help clarify other aspects of mission planning such
as crew procedures and onboard charts, trajectory and attitude profiles
and even some hardware requirements such as the flashing beacon and V_
specification. A basic assumption, which I believe has been accepted
without argument, is that a completely onboard capability for performing
the rendezvous should be implemented since the ground support may be
marginal. In fact, as a spin-off from this meeting, just how well the
ground should be able to help with the rendezvous may become better
understood.
T_is is a working session and attendance should be limited to people
directly concerned with this subject.
Howard W. Tindall, Jr.
PA:HWT:js(
[_ _lw__..;dli,ll___ NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION
U.s%...
IN REPLY REFER TO: ?0-FM-T-5 January 13, 1970
MEMORANDUM TO: See list attached
FROM : FM/Chair_nn, Apollo Spacecraft Software
Configuration Control Board
SUBJECT : AAP CSM Computer Progrnm Requirements meeting
I
I thought it might be fun to have an overall AAP CSM Computer Program
Requirements meeting so we've scheduled one on Wednesday, January 28,
1970 at 9 a.m. in Room 966 of Building 2. At this time we would like
to reach agreement upon a list of deletions which can be made to a
particular mainline Apollo Colossus program established as the baseline. We would then like to identify all additions and/or modifications required to support AAP. _his definition should be in the fo_m
of functional requirements although it should be advantageous to ca_y
their definition to a fairly fine degree of detail when possible to
do so. We are also anxious to understand just what these programs are
going to be used for.
Based on the results of this meeting, the Flight Support Division of
F0D will generate the formal requirements documentation to be forwarded
to MIT for implementation and the program will be placed under configuration control as soon as possible - over two years before the flight:
Howard W. Tindall, Jr.
PA:HWT:js;/'"ui$ NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION
MANNEDSPACECRAFCET NTER
HOUSTON, TEXAS 7*7058
iN REPLY REFER TO: 70-PA-T-SA Janusry 20, 1970
MEMDBANEJMTO: See list attached
FROM : PA/Chief, Apollo Data Priority Coordination
SUBJECT : The Apollo rendezvous can be shortened by 2 hours
As you no doubt are aware, there is a movement afoot to shorten the
Apollo rendezvous by 2 hours. _nis would be done by eliminating the
CSI and CDH maneuvers and executing TPI about ½ hour after insertion.
I thought the reason this was being considered was to reduce the crew's
workday, which has been pretty long. Apparently it is also to permit
more EVA time on the lunar surface. In any case, a gang of us got
together January l_ to talk it over. We were interested in hearing
about what work has gone on, what the feasibility of doing this is,
and to decide where to go from there. This memo is to briefly describe
the technique (Ed Lineberry's people are doc,_m_uting this in detail
and if you are interested you should call him) and to let you know
that it does appear feasible. I will also note what has to be done
now - the first thing being, to obtain MBC management approval to go
on with it.
*Following is a brief description of what the technique is:
a. Both the CSMand I_platformare aligned prior to LMlift-off.
They are not ordinarily realigned during the rendezvous.
b. The CSM orbital should be 60 n. mi. circular as before. The LM
insertion orbit will be l0 x 48 n. mi., instead of lC)x _5 n. mi. _ais
small change will cause the post-TPI trajectory to be virtually identical
to that utilized in the past.
c. Lift-off will be timed to provide the proper relative position
of the LM to the CSM at the time of TPI execution which will occur
38minutes after insertion. Thus, lift-off would be about 2_2minutes
earlier than on previous missions.
d. It should be possible to obtain at least 25 marks by each
spacecraft for their rendezvous navigation. Since we intend to always
use the time option of the TPI targeting program, it should be possible
to continue navigation significantly later than in the past. It can't
slip early on us.2
e. The TPT maneuver is significantly different than before. It is
about 85 fps and rather than along the line-of-sight, it is almost
perpendicular to it (i.e., pitched down about 45o). Also, in order to
provide an in-plane braking, the TPI maneuver will be made to force a
node 90° later, that is, at the second midcourse maneuver.
f. We concluded that, since the I_ TPI maneuver is RCS, the probability of an unexpected I_ inability to execute the maneuver is 81mnst
zero. Accordingly there should be no reguirement for the CSM to prepare
to execute a mirror image TPI maneuver. Of course, if a LM failure has
occurred which would preclude its performing TPI, the CSM would do it.
It was noted that, since a CSM TPI would result in a very low orbit, it
must also be active for braking.
Although we probed all related areas, we could find very little adverse
impact by going to this plan. Certainly we have not changed the descent
aborts and their associated rendezvous techniques - that is, one and two
rev plans, including the CSI and CDH would still be utilized exactly as
before and, of course, the crew and ground control must be trained and
prepared to do them. This plan essentially consists of eliminating part
of that standard rendezvous and, therefore crew training is ,_ffected.
One area that FCSD will probably look into is the provision of TPI chart_
for the crew to backup the PGNCS and AGS. If these are required, they
must be substantially different from the current ones.
The only other open area deals with changes to the RTCC. 0nly two were
identified - the lift-off time computation and a program to determine
a trim maneuver after LM insertion into orbit. The former should be
extremely simple, if it is required at all. The need for the latter
will depend to some extent on the sensitivity of the rendezvous to small
errors in actual I_ lift-off time and other insertion dispersions.
Ed Lineberry's people will continue their work in pinning down this
sensitivity. The three involved FOD divisJonswill then establish whatever new RTCC requirements are really needed. This should be done within
a week or so.
One pseudo-mission rule we agreed on was that this rendezvous approach
should only be used in the nominal case when all important systems and
trajectory conditions are as they should be. That is, if things like
the rendezvous radar, the tracking light, or any of the other systems
used for rendezvous are known to be broken, or if we have targeting
problems, such as poor definition of the LM's position, or of the CSM
orbital elements we would, in real time, switch from this guick rendezvous
to the standard approach used on all previous flights. Of course, this
switchover _st be made before lift-off since after that time we will
have created a phasing situation that pretty well co,._-_tsus to go on
with the shortened plan.In s,_.¢._ry_a simple approach to shorten{rig the Apollo rendezvous by
2 hours was agreed upon by just about everyone interested in this
subject, The impact seems quite limited and_ to me, well worth paying
for the rather attractive benefit. I would be surprised if we have
overlooked anything that would change this picture although_ of course,
it is possible, I suppose. Accordingly, we will continue working on
this approach - cleaning up the loose ends noted above and will approach
our leaders to see if it should be incorporated into the Apollo 1_ mission.
Essentially what we are offering is an increased capability which can be
used either to extend the lunar surface work or to Just shorten a long,
tough day.
PA:HWT: js
NASA _ MSC _ Coral., Houston. Texas.' ,_' "' NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION
I_[l_l_ 1 , MANNEDSPACECRAFT,
CENTER
HOUSTON.'T£XA77S058
INREPLYREFERTO: 70-FA-T-13 ' FeBruary 12, 1970
MEMOP_-DUM TO: See list attached
FROM . : FA/Chairman, Apollo Spacecraft Software
· Configuration Control Board
SUBJECT : Software for the AAP CSM spacecraft computer
The time appeared right to try to find out exactly what the program
requirements are for. the CSM cOmPuter for AAP and we '.hadmeetings on
January 28 and 30 tO'do that.- AS a result of these meetings, a number
of PCR'S will be prepared and submitted to the Apollo spacecraft Software configuration Control Board .(SCB) meeting to be held early in
March._ At that time we wiil:approve or disapprove these changes and
th e program will be essentially under configuration control. One thing
that seems clear from our discussions is that program changes' required
: for _ are very few in number and, except for the docked digital autopilot, seem to be quite simpl e. 'This is n° surprise; of course,'.'but it
is nice to confirm it.
Before getting into the ·detail of these meetings themselves, I would
like to state a couple of ground rules which We established associated
with the AAP computer program and how we intend to manage it. First
of all, we selected the Apollo 14 command module program as our baseline since it is the latest, completely defined program we have right
now. ;It i'sour intention to apprOVe automatically any PCR for AAP Which
is approved for Apollo. '.In'the case' of program changes for Apollo which
are not desirable for AAP we will issue an AAP PCR at the -same t'ime
which deletes that particular capability. By thi s paper=work device we
will maintain' a complete ·list of PCR's defining·the AAP program changes
required _for the current ApOllo program to make it ready for AAP if we
were to break off a flight progr am from Apollo 'forAAP at'that' time.
In addition, 'it will Provide an up-to-date definition of the capabilities
of the AAP CSM program we Plan to: implement.
To get this list off with a big bang, we went through the entire Apollo lk
program and identified all those programs, routines, and extended verbs
which we felt should be deleted. This list, which will be covered officially by PCR'S, accompanies this memo for your information. The criteria
used' to decide just what should be dropped from the Apollo program for AAP2
i
was simple. If someone could not identify a firm requirement for a .;
particular capability, it was a_tomatically deleted. It should be
pointed out that by deletion we mean that the capability will not be
available for use in flight. We are not insisting that every word of
code associated with that particular program needs to be torn from the
assembly, but we are asking that all references to these capabilities
be eliminated from all AAP program documentation such as the GSOP's,
Test Plans, User's Guides, Flow Charts, and so forth. Of course, the
thing we are trying to do is to minimize the work of the program developers. Obviously under Certain circumstances it will be easier toleave
some of these capabilities in the Pr0gram, including testing them. In
that case they should be retained. However, this will be by exception
only and will require approval of the SCB.
By far, the largest discussion dealt with therendezvous and how it should
be performed. Basically the question was, should we use the standard
Apollo techniques involving a CSI and CDH maneuver or, as some people
suggested, should we change to a more flexible sequence of maneuvers used
on occasion on Gemini, namely the NCC/NSR combination? The advantage of
the former is that it exists in the current program. The advantage of
the latter is that it provides a great deal more capability to maintain
a nominal terminal phase in the face of dispersion. Its advocates
expressed concern, that dispersion could be rather large on AAP due to
the limited tracking available for targeting the early phasing-type
maneuvers. The eventual outcome of all this was that we decided to go
with the NCC/NSR sequence and this program will be changed ·accordingly.
It should be noted that this decision also impacts the mission planning;
that is, future reference trajectory documentation will reflect this
decision. In addition to agreeing to the change to NCC/NSR, which is
said to be rather trivial as far as the programming is concerned, We
also agreed to add a new targeting program for computation of two earlier
phasing maneuvers.
There were only about 6 or 8 other program changes suggested specifically
for AAP and they are all pretty simple, like extending the VHF ranging
input capability beyond 327 n. mi. and improving the SPS short burn
logic to support the small rendezvous maneuvers. I might also point out
two rather substantial Apollo changes which AAP will automatically inherit.
They are the rendezvous improvements to simplify·the crew's procedures and
the universal Pointing program being added to P20. Special attention will
be given this important one to assure that there are no unique requirements
for AAP which have not been provided by this routine since it will probably
be used for attitude control of·the docked configuration.
We also assigned some action items:
a. Make sure there is no special problem involved in aligning the
CSM !MU prior to launch from a Saturn I-Bi rather than a Saturn V pad.
(Charley Parker, FCD).
3B
b. Verify the interface from the CMC to the Saturn IU is identical
to Saturn V to make sure our Pll program is all right. (Tom Lins, GCD)
c. Identify any coarse alignment program requirement we might have
for aligning the co,-_nd module IMU while docked to the Cluster_ using
the Cluster as an attitude reference.
d. Prepare a complete PCR identifying the functional requirements
for the docked DAP. This big job, of course_ is the responsibility of
the GCD and Tom Lins will see that it gets done.
e. Jack Williams will get everyone concerned together to scrub
the telemetr_ downlist, identifying spares and additions, if any.
I think everyone at the meetings agreed that we are in pretty good
shape with respect to the definition of the AAP programs and should
have little trouble in preparing the program from the Apollo assemb_v
at the time we decide to do so. Although that won't probably occur
for at least another year_ it is expected that some off-line assemblies
and documentation will be prepared by MIT as often as their effort on
Apollo mainline permits.
: W.Tindall, Jr.
%
Enclosure
.FA:HWT:js
_. _ _ ?
,.... !_. DELETIONSFORAAP
\.
DELETEDPROGRAMS
P15 Initiation of IU TB6
·: P22 OrbitalNavigation
- P24 Rate-aidedopticsfor landmarktracking
PB2 Co-Elliptic Sequence Initiation CSI)
P33 Constant Delta Altitude iCDH)
PB7 Return-to-Earth (RTE)
P38 Stable Orbit Rendezvo'us(SOR)
P39 Stable Orbit Midcourse .(SO_4)
P52 IMU Realign (Option 4 only)*
P65 Everything used exclusive for V_ 27,000 fps can be deleted
P66 from the Entry program such as Up Control and Ballistic
P72 LM Co-Elliptic Sequence Initiation (CSI)
P73 LM Constant Delta Altitude (CDH)
P74 LM TPI Targeting
- P75 .LM TPMTargeting :.
F76 Target _ ¥
t
"' ' P77 IA_TPI Search
lmY8-- LM sOR Targeting
·_ ;!-_ P79 I_ SOM Targeting.
'7
DELETED ROUTINES
t{O5 S-Band Antenna Acquisition AngLes_
_;_:'x%o_._L,_i! i _-'E33 _:."_:CMC/LGC Clock Synchronization. __' _ --.::.
R6_ PTC/Orbital Rate
, .....r-,_._, _/_,_ Set SurfaeelFlag
'-- _ - _ _._'_52,_-__ e_ set Landing site ' : ..:_2_:.::.'-
'-:: :_ .......... : :' V59 --'· Please.'Mark-_Optics Calibration) - , .:-:_:_ ::,.- _ -:
V64 Start'_S--Ba_d Ant Calibration '" ' _:_ _-' _:_
_,:!.... , _ V68 CSM Stroke_Test.l-On :- :::__.- -
"" '" V94 Enable :_iSidn_arTracking Recycle '__-::': -_
·General - Delete all lunar and cislunar capability such as numerical
integration and anything that requires use of the lunar ephemeris which
_ willnot be provided./ ' NATIONAL:AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION
MANNED SPACECRAFT CENTER
HOUSTON,TEXAS.., 77058 .... :. _r6.;
IN REPLYREFERTO: 70-FA-T-16 February 19, 1970
f: _ - _ [
MEMORANDUMTO: See list attached
FROM : FA/Chairman, Apollo Spacecraft Software
Configuration Control Board
SUBJECT : "For whom does the bell toll?' ... *
"Delta Guidance" ...
"Oh:"
A couple of years ago, before any of the lunar flights, GCD started
looking into improvements in the I24descent gUidance and navigation
(G&N) computer programs to compensate for possible problems in rough
terrain, landing radar performance, descent targeting by the ground,
etc. Actually , they were quite successful; they conceived the socalled delta guidance, prefilter, and terrain model package which sub-
'' stantially increases the LPD capability at a very reasonable descent
propellant cost. Since then we have performed two lunar landings,
including the pin-point Apollo 12, which have pretty well eliminated
the original need which the modifications were to satisfy.
But, delta gUidance does provide a chance to make a big _V saving in
the earlier braking phase of descent by compensating for the inability
of the descent engine to throttle near the max-thrust setting. So the
decision had to be made - is the _V saving (i.e., 90 fps which is
equivalent to 30-O':lbspayload to the moon's surface, or to 20 seconds
of hover time) valuab]_e_enough:-_oeXtensivel_revise the LM G&N program
and to modulate the descent engine th??ugh ;_h_ non-throtteable zone up
to 10 times? .......... _"_'-' "_'?
An additional data point to be considered before making that decision is
the fact thatabout one-half of that%_V_a_fngs Can_'_obtained in other
ways. One way is to change the targeting_ which has no effect on the
on-board guidance or procedures at_a_t_:'_Utis not so:_0nservative about
protecting against simultaneous DR_:_al_e failures and:a low performing
DPS engine. A second approach is.to develop a procedure for throttling
the DPS engine down'only once dUrfng t_ebraking phasefor a period to
be determined at the start of descent _ase_.:on either_on-board or ground-i
computedestimatesof actualDPS p_rfarmance.
The decision is - do not implementCdeZta:guidance (tearing up the LGC
program is not worth the 40 or 50 fps.extra that it would provide); do
implement one or a combination of both of the alternates noted above.· . . · . ·
2
Some small program and display changes may be implemented to provide an
on-board capability - esther auto or manual - to throttle the DPS.
Incidentally, there is one survivor from this delta guidance program
- change "package". There appears to be unanimous agreement that we should
add the terrain model of the specific landing site we're going to in
.: place of the present "billiard ball" moon. This will eliminate some
objectionable pitch excursions and will make the LPD work better.
Howard W. Tindall, Jr.
FA:HWT: js
NASA _ M$C