on-choosing-our-teachers.qmd

# On Choosing Our Teachers

What is this force, Lucilius, that drags us in one direction when we are aiming in another, urging us on to the exact place from which we long to withdraw?
What is it that wrestles with our spirit, and does not allow us to desire anything once for all?
We veer from plan to plan.
None of our wishes is free, none is unqualified, none is lasting.

"But it is the fool," you say, "who is inconsistent; nothing suits him for long."
But how or when can *we* tear ourselves away from this folly?
No man by himself has sufficient strength to rise above it; he needs a helping hand, and some one to extricate him.

Epicurus[^52-1] remarks that certain men have worked their way to the truth without any one's assistance, carving out their own passage.
And he gives special praise to these, for their impulse has come from within, and they have forged to the front by themselves.
Again, he says, there are others who need outside help, who will not proceed unless someone leads the way, but who will follow faithfully.
Of these, he says, Metrodorus was one; this type of man is also excellent, but belongs to the second grade.
We ourselves are not of that first class, either; we shall be well treated if we are admitted into the second.
Nor need you despise a man who can gain salvation only with the assistance of another; the will to be saved means a great deal, too.

You will find still another class of man, -- and a class not to be despised, -- who can be forced and driven into righteousness, who do not need a guide as much as they require someone to encourage and, as it were, to force them along.
This is the third variety.
If you ask me for a man of this pattern also, Epicurus tells us that Hermarchus was such.
And of the two last-named classes, he is more ready to congratulate the one,[^52-2] but he feels more respect for the other; for although both reached the same goal, it is a greater credit to have brought about the same result with the more difficult material upon which to work.

Suppose that two buildings have been erected, unlike as to their foundations, but equal in height and in grandeur.
One is built on faultless ground, and the process of erection goes right ahead.
In the other case, the foundations have exhausted the building materials, for they have been sunk into soft and shifting ground and much labour has been wasted in reaching the solid rock.
As one looks at both of them, one sees clearly what progress the former has made, but the larger and more difficult part of the latter is hidden.

So with men's dispositions; some are pliable and easy to manage, but others have to be laboriously wrought out by hand, so to speak, and are wholly employed in the making of their own foundations.
I should accordingly deem more fortunate the man who has never had any trouble with himself; but the other, I feel, has deserved better of himself, who has won a victory over the meanness of his own nature, and has not gently led himself, but has wrestled his way, to wisdom.

You may be sure that this refractory nature, which demands much toil, has been implanted in us.
There are obstacles in our path; so let us fight, and call to our assistance some helpers.
"Whom," you say, "shall I call upon?
Shall it be this man or that?"[^52-3]
There is another choice also open to you; you may go to the ancients; for they have the time to help you.
We can get assistance not only from the living, but from those of the past.

Let us choose, however, from among the living, not men who pour forth their words with the greatest glibness, turning out commonplaces, and holding, as it were, their own little private exhibitions,[^52-4] -- not these, I say, but men who teach us by their lives, men who tell us what we ought to do and then prove it by practice, who show us what we should avoid, and then are never caught doing that which they have ordered us to avoid.

Choose as a guide one whom you will admire more when you see him act than when you hear him speak.

Of course I would not prevent you from listening also to those philosophers who are wont to hold public meetings and discussions, provided they appear before the people for the express purpose of improving themselves and others, and do not practise their profession for the sake of self-seeking.
For what is baser than philosophy courting applause?
Does the sick man praise the surgeon while he is operating?

In silence and with reverent awe submit to the cure.[^52-5]
Even though you cry applause, I shall listen to your cries as if you were groaning when your sores were touched.
Do you wish to bear witness that you are attentive, that you are stirred by the grandeur of the subject?
You may do this at the proper time; I shall of course allow you to pass judgment and cast a vote as to the better course.
Pythagoras made his pupils keep silence for five years; do you think that they had the right on that account to break out immediately into applause?

How mad is he who leaves the lecture-room in a happy frame of mind simply because of applause from the ignorant!
Why do you take pleasure in being praised by men whom you yourself cannot praise?
Fabianus used to give popular talks, but his audience listened with self-control.
Occasionally a loud shout of praise would burst forth, but it was prompted by the greatness of his subject, and not by the sound of oratory that slipped forth pleasantly and softly.

There should be a difference between the applause of the theatre and the applause of the school; and there is a certain decency even in bestowing praise.
If you mark them carefully, all acts are always significant, and you can gauge character by even the most trifling signs.
The lecherous man is revealed by his gait, by a movement of the hand, sometimes by a single answer, by his touching his head with a finger,[^52-6] by the shifting of his eye.
The scamp is shown up by his laugh; the madman by his face and general appearance.
These qualities become known by certain marks; but you can tell the character of every man when you see how he gives and receives praise.

The philosopher's audience, from this corner and that, stretch forth admiring hands, and sometimes the adoring crowd almost hang over the lecturer's head.
But, if you really understand, that is not praise; it is merely applause.
These outcries should be left for the arts which aim to please the crowd; let philosophy be worshipped in silence.

Young men, indeed, must sometimes have free play to follow their impulses, but it should only be at times when they act from impulse, and when they cannot force themselves to be silent.
Such praise as that gives a certain kind of encouragement to the hearers themselves, and acts as a spur to the youthful mind.
But let them be roused to the matter, and not to the style; otherwise, eloquence does them harm, making them enamoured of itself, and not of the subject.

I shall postpone this topic for the present; it demands a long and special investigation, to show how the public should be addressed, what indulgences should be allowed to a speaker on a public occasion, and what should be allowed to the crowd itself in the presence of the speaker.
There can be no doubt that philosophy has suffered a loss, now that she has exposed her charms for sale.
But she can still be viewed in her sanctuary, if her exhibitor is a priest and not a pedlar.
Farewell.

[^52-1]: Frag. 192 Usener.

[^52-2]: *i.e.*, that of Metrodorus, who had the happier nature.

[^52-3]: *i.e.*, a representative of this school or that. Seneca's reply is, in effect, "Upon no present school; go to the ancients."

[^52-4]: *Circulatores* were travelling showmen who performed sword-swallowing and snake-charming feats, or cheap stump speakers who displayed their eloquence at the street-corners in the hope of a few pence. The word is also found in the sense of "pedlar".

[^52-5]: This and what follows, to § 11, are the words with which a true philosopher is supposed to address his hearers.

[^52-6]: The scratching of the head with one finger was for some reason regarded as a mark of effeminacy or of vice; *cf.* the charge brought against Pompey, Plutarch, *Moralia*, 89 E and Ammianus, 17. 11 *quod genuino quodam more caput digito uno scalpebat . . . ut dissolutum*. Compare also Juvenal, ix. 133 *scalpere caput digito*.