on-instinct-in-animals.qmd

# On Instinct in Animals

You will bring suit against me, I feel sure, when I set forth for you to-day's little problem, with which we have already fumbled long enough.
You will cry out again: "What has this to do with character?"
Cry out if you like, but let me first of all match you with other opponents,[^121-1] against whom you may bring suit -- such as Posidonius and Archidemus;[^121-2] these men will stand trial.
I shall then go on to say that whatever deals with character does not necessarily produce good character.

Man needs one thing for his food, another for his exercise, another for his clothing, another for his instruction, and another for his pleasure.
Everything, however, has reference to man's needs, although everything does not make him better.
Character is affected by different things in different ways: some things serve to correct and regulate character, and others investigate its nature and origin.

And when I seek the reason why Nature brought forth man, and why she set him above other animals, do you suppose that I have left character-study in the rear?
No; that is wrong.
For how are you to know what character is desirable, unless you have discovered what is best suited to man?
Or unless you have studied his nature?
You can find out what you should do and what you should avoid, only when you have learned what you owe to your own nature.

"I desire," you say, "to learn how I may crave less, and fear less.
Rid me of my unreasoning beliefs.
Prove to me that so-called felicity is fickle and empty, and that the word easily admits of a syllable's increase."[^121-3]
I shall fulfil your want, encouraging your virtues and lashing your vices.
People may decide that I am too zealous and reckless in this particular; but I shall never cease to hound wickedness, to check the most unbridled emotions, to soften the force of pleasures which will result in pain, and to cry down men's prayers.
Of course I shall do this; for it is the greatest evils that we have prayed for, and from that which has made us give thanks comes all that demands consolation.

Meanwhile, allow me to discuss thoroughly some points which may seem now to be rather remote from the present inquiry.
We were once debating whether all animals had any feelings about their "constitution."[^121-4]
That this is the case is proved particularly by their making motions of such fitness and nimbleness that they seem to be trained for the purpose.
Every being is clever in its own line.
The skilled workman handles his tools with an ease born of experience; the pilot knows how to steer his ship skilfully; the artist can quickly lay on the colours which he has prepared in great variety for the purpose of rendering the likeness, and passes with ready eye and hand from palette to canvas.
In the same way an animal is agile in all that pertains to the use of its body.

We are apt to wonder at skilled dancers because their gestures are perfectly adapted to the meaning of the piece and its accompanying emotions, and their movements match the speed of the dialogue.
But that which art gives to the craftsman, is given to the animal by nature.
No animal handles its limbs with difficulty, no animal is at a loss how to use its body.
This function they exercise immediately at birth.
They come into the world with this knowledge; they are born full-trained.

But people reply: "The reason why animals are so dexterous in the use of their limbs is that if they move them unnaturally, they will feel pain.
They are *compelled* to do thus, according to your school, and it is fear rather than will-power which moves them in the right direction."
This idea is wrong.
Bodies driven by a compelling force move slowly; but those which move of their own accord possess alertness.
The proof that it is not fear of pain which prompts them thus, is, that even when pain checks them they struggle to carry out their natural motions.

Thus the child who is trying to stand and is becoming used to carry his own weight, on beginning to test his strength, falls and rises again and again with tears until through painful effort he has trained himself to the demands of nature.
And certain animals with hard shells, when turned on their backs, twist and grope with their feet and make motions side-ways until they are restored to their proper position.
The tortoise on his back feels no suffering; but he is restless because he misses his natural condition, and does not cease to shake himself about until he stands once more upon his feet.

So all these animals have a consciousness of their physical constitution, and for that reason can manage their limbs as readily as they do; nor have we any better proof that they come into being equipped with this knowledge than the fact that no animal is unskilled in the use of its body.

But some object as follows: "According to your account, one's constitution consists of a ruling power[^121-5] in the soul which has a certain relation towards the body.
But how can a child comprehend this intricate and subtle principle, which I can scarcely explain even to you?
All living creatures should be born logicians, so as to understand a definition which is obscure to the majority of Roman citizens!"

Your objection would be true if I spoke of living creatures as understanding "a definition of constitution," and not "their actual constitution."
Nature is easier to understand than to explain; hence, the child of whom we were speaking does not understand what "constitution" is, but understands *its own* constitution.
He does not know what "a living creature" is, but he feels that he is an animal.

Moreover, that very constitution of his own he only understands confusedly, cursorily, and darkly.
We also know that we possess souls, but we do not know the essence, the place, the quality, or the source, of the soul.
Such as is the consciousness of our souls which we possess, ignorant as we are of their nature and position, even so all animals possess a consciousness of their own constitutions.
For they must necessarily feel this, because it is the same agency by which they feel other things also; they must necessarily have a feeling of the principle which they obey and by which they are controlled.

Everyone of us understands that there is something which stirs his impulses, but he does not know what it is.
He knows that he has a sense of striving, although he does not know what it is or its source.
Thus even children and animals have a consciousness of their primary element, but it is not very clearly outlined or portrayed.

"You maintain, do you," says the objector, "that every living thing is at the start adapted to its constitution, but that man's constitution is a reasoning one, and hence man is adapted to himself not merely as a living, but as a reasoning, being?
For man is dear to himself in respect of that wherein he is a man.
How, then, can a child, being not yet gifted with reason, adapt himself to a reasoning constitution?"

But each age has its own constitution, different in the case of the child, the boy, and the old man; they are all adapted to the constitution wherein they find themselves.
The child is toothless, and he is fitted to this condition.
Then his teeth grow, and he is fitted to that condition also.
Vegetation also, which will develop into grain and fruits, has a special constitution when young and scarcely peeping over the tops of the furrows, another when it is strengthened and stands upon a stalk which is soft but strong enough to bear its weight, and still another when the colour changes to yellow, prophesies threshing-time, and hardens in the ear -- no matter what may be the constitution into which the plant comes, it keeps it, and conforms thereto.

The periods of infancy, boyhood, youth, and old age, are different; but I, who have been infant, boy, and youth, am still the same.
Thus, although each has at different times a different constitution, the adaptation of each to its constitution is the same.
For nature does not consign boyhood or youth, or old age, to me; it consigns me to them.
Therefore, the child is adapted to that constitution which is his at the present moment of childhood, not to that which will be his in youth.
For even if there is in store for him any higher phase into which he must be changed, the state in which he is born is also according to nature.

First of all, the living being is adapted to itself, for there must be a pattern to which all other things may be referred.
I seek pleasure; for whom?
For myself.
I am therefore looking out for myself.
I shrink from pain; on behalf of whom?
Myself.
Therefore, I am looking out for myself.
Since I gauge all my actions with reference to my own welfare, I am looking out for myself before all else.
This quality exists in all living beings -- not engrafted but inborn.

Nature brings up her own offspring and does not cast them away; and because the most assured security is that which is nearest, every man has been entrusted to his own self.
Therefore, as I have remarked in the course of my previous correspondence, even young animals, on issuing from the mother's womb or from the egg, know at once of their own accord what is harmful for them, and avoid death-dealing things.[^121-6]
They even shrink when they notice the shadow of birds of prey which flit overhead.

No animal, when it enters upon life, is free from the fear of death.
People may ask: "How can an animal at birth have an understanding of things wholesome or destructive?"
The first question, however, is *whether* it can have such understanding, and not *how* it can understand.
And it is clear that they have such understanding from the fact that, even if you add understanding, they will act no more adequately than they did in the first place.
Why should the hen show no fear of the peacock or the goose, and yet run from the hawk, which is a so much smaller animal not even familiar to the hen?
Why should young chickens fear a cat and not a dog?
These fowls clearly have a presentiment of harm -- one not based on actual experiments; for they avoid a thing before they can possibly have experience of it.

Furthermore, in order that you may not suppose this to be the result of chance, they do not shrink from certain other things which you would expect them to fear, nor do they ever forget vigilance and care in this regard; they all possess equally the faculty of avoiding what is destructive.
Besides, their fear does not grow as their lives lengthen.

Hence indeed it is evident that these animals have not reached such a condition through experience; it is because of an inborn desire for self-preservation.
The teachings of experience are slow and irregular; but whatever Nature communicates belongs equally to everyone, and comes immediately.

If, however, you require an explanation, shall I tell you how it is that every living thing tries to understand that which is harmful?
It feels that it is constructed of flesh; and so it perceives to what an extent flesh may be cut or burned or crushed, and what animals are equipped with the power of doing this damage; it is of animals of this sort that it derives an unfavourable and hostile idea.
These tendencies are closely connected; for each animal at the same time consults its own safety, seeking that which helps it, and shrinks from that which will harm it.
Impulses towards useful objects, and revulsion from the opposite, are according to nature; without any reflection to prompt the idea, and without any advice, whatever Nature has prescribed, is done.

Do you not see how skillful bees are in building their cells?
How completely harmonious in sharing and enduring toil?
Do you not see how the spider weaves a web so subtle that man's hand cannot imitate it; and what a task it is to arrange the threads, some directed straight towards the centre, for the sake of making the web solid, and others running in circles and lessening in thickness -- for the purpose of tangling and catching in a sort of net the smaller insects for whose ruin the spider spreads the web?

This art is born, not taught; and for this reason no animal is more skilled than any other.
You will notice that all spider-webs are equally fine, and that the openings in all honeycomb cells are identical in shape.
Whatever art communicates is uncertain and uneven; but Nature's assignments are always uniform.
Nature has communicated nothing except the duty of taking care of themselves and the skill to do so; that is why living and learning begin at the same time.

No wonder that living things are born with a gift whose absence would make birth useless.
This is the first equipment that Nature granted them for the maintenance of their existence -- the quality of adaptability and self-love.
They could not survive except by desiring to do so.
Nor would this desire alone have made them prosper, but without it nothing could have prospered.
In no animal can you observe any low esteem, or even any carelessness, of self.
Dumb beasts, sluggish in other respects, are clever at living.
So you will see that creatures which are useless to others are alert for their own preservation.[^121-7]
Farewell.

[^121-1]: *i.e.*, in addition to myself and confirming my statement.

[^121-2]: Frag. 17 von Arnim.

[^121-3]: *i.e.* *felicitas* becomes in*felicitas*.

[^121-4]: *i.e.*, their physical make-up, the elements of their physical being.

[^121-5]: *i.e.*, the "soul of the world," of which each living soul is a part. The Stoics believed that it was situated in the heart. Zeno called it ἡγεμονικόν, "ruling power"; while the Romans used the term *principale* or *principatus*. The principle described above is ὀρμή (impulse) or τόνος (tension).

[^121-6]: Seneca is both sound and modern in his account of animal "intelligence." It is instinct, due to sensory-motor reactions, and depending largely upon type heredity.

[^121-7]: A theme developed by Cicero (*De fin.* iii. 16): *placet . . . simul atque natum sit animal . . . , ipsum sibi conciliari et commendari ad se conservandum*.