on-the-vanity-of-place-seeking.qmd

# On the Vanity of Place-Seeking

You have been demanding more frequent letters from me.
But if we compare the accounts, you will not be on the credit side.[^118-1]
We had indeed made the agreement that your part came first, that you should write the first letters, and that I should answer.
However, I shall not be disagreeable; I know that it is safe to trust you, so I shall pay in advance, and yet not do as the eloquent Cicero bids Atticus do:[^118-2] "Even if you have nothing to say, write whatever enters your head."

For there will always be something for me to write about, even omitting all the kinds of news with which Cicero fills his correspondence: what candidate is in difficulties, who is striving on borrowed resources and who on his own; who is a candidate for the consulship relying on Caesar, or on Pompey, or on his own strong-box; what a merciless usurer is Caecilius,[^118-3] out of whom his friends cannot screw a penny for less than one per cent each month.

But it is preferable to deal with one's own ills, rather than with another's -- to sift oneself and see for how many vain things one is a candidate, and cast a vote for none of them.
This, my dear Lucilius, is a noble thing, this brings peace and freedom -- to canvass for nothing, and to pass by all the elections of Fortune.
How can you call it enjoyable, when the tribes are called together and the candidates are making offerings in their favourite temples -- some of them promising money gifts and others doing business by means of an agent, or wearing down their hands with the kisses of those to whom they will refuse the least finger-touch after being elected -- when all are excitedly awaiting the announcement of the herald, do you call it enjoyable, I say, to stand idle and look on at this Vanity Fair without either buying or selling?

How much greater joy does one feel who looks without concern, not merely upon the election of a praetor or of a consul, but upon that great struggle in which some are seeking yearly honours, and others permanent power, and others the triumph and the prosperous outcome of war, and others riches, or marriage and offspring, or the welfare of themselves and their relatives!
What a great-souled action it is to be the only person who is canvassing for nothing, offering prayers to no man, and saying: "Fortune, I have nothing to do with you.
I am not at your service.
I know that men like Cato are spurned by you, and men like Vatinius made by you.[^118-4]
I ask no favours."
This is the way to reduce Fortune to the ranks.

These, then, are the things about which we may write in turn, and this is the ever fresh material which we may dig out as we scan the restless multitudes of men, who, in order to attain something ruinous, struggle on through evil to evil, and seek that which they must presently shun or even find surfeiting.

For who was ever satisfied, after attainment, with that which loomed up large as he prayed for it?
Happiness is not, as men think, a greedy thing; it is a lowly thing; for that reason it never gluts a man's desire.
You deem lofty the objects you seek, because you are on a low level and hence far away from them; but they are mean in the sight of him who has reached them.
And I am very much mistaken if he does not desire to climb still higher; that which you regard as the top is merely a rung on the ladder.

Now all men suffer from ignorance of the truth; deceived by common report, they make for these ends as if they were good, and then, after having won their wish, and suffered much, they find them evil, or empty, or less important than they had expected.
Most men admire that which deceives them at a distance, and by the crowd good things are supposed to be big things.

Now, lest this happen also in our own case, let us ask what is the Good.
It has been explained in various ways; different men have described it in different ways.
Some define it in this way: "That which attracts and calls the spirit to itself is a Good."
But the objection at once comes up -- what if it does attract, but straight to ruin?
You know how seductive many evils are.
That which is true differs from that which looks like the truth; hence the Good is connected with the true, for it is not good unless it is also true.
But that which attracts and allures, is only *like* the truth; it steals your attention, demands your interest, and draws you to itself.

Therefore, some have given this definition: "That is good which inspires desire for itself, or rouses towards itself the impulse of a struggling soul."
There is the same objection to this idea; for many things rouse the soul's impulses, and yet the search for them is harmful to the seeker.
The following definition is better: "That is good which rouses the soul's impulse towards itself in accordance with nature, and is worth seeking only when it begins to be thoroughly worth seeking."
It is by this time an honourable thing; for that is a thing completely worth seeking.

The present topic suggests that I state the difference between the Good and the honourable.[^118-5]
Now they have a certain quality which blends with both and is inseparable from either: nothing can be good unless it contains an element of the honourable, and the honourable is necessarily good.
What, then, is the difference between these two qualities?
The honourable is the perfect Good, and the happy life is fulfilled thereby; through its influence other things also are rendered good.

I mean something like this: there are certain things which are neither good nor bad -- as military or diplomatic service, or the pronouncing of legal decisions.
When such pursuits have been honourably conducted, they begin to be good, and they change over from the "indifferent" class into the Good.
The Good results from partnership with the honourable, but the honourable is good in itself.
The Good springs from the honourable, but the latter from itself.
What is good might have been bad; what is honourable could never have been anything but good.

Some have defined as follows: "That is good which is according to nature."
Now attend to my own statement: that which is good is according to nature, but that which is according to nature does not also become immediately good; for many things harmonize with nature, but are so petty that it is not suitable to call them good.
For they are unimportant and deserve to be despised.
But there is no such thing as a very small and despicable good, for, as long as it is scanty, it is not good, and when it begins to be good, it ceases to be scanty.
How, then, can the Good be recognized?
Only if it is completely according to nature.

People say: "You admit that that which is good is according to nature; for this is its peculiar quality.
You admit, too, that there are other things according to nature, which, however, are not good.
How then can the former be good, and the latter not?
How can there be an alteration in the peculiar quality of a thing, when each has, in common with the other, the special attribute of being in accord with nature?"

Surely because of its magnitude.
It is no new idea that certain objects change as they grow.
A person, once a child, becomes a youth; his peculiar quality is transformed; for the child could not reason, but the youth possesses reason.
Certain things not only grow in size as they develop, but grow into something else.

Some reply: "But that which becomes greater does not necessarily become different.
It matters not at all whether you pour wine into a flask or into a vat; the wine keeps its peculiar quality in both vessels.
Small and large quantities of honey are not distinct in taste."
But these are different cases which you mention; for wine and honey have a uniform quality; no matter how much the quantity is enlarged, the quality is the same.
For some things endure according to their kind and their peculiar qualities, even when they are enlarged.

There are others, however, which, after many increments, are altered by the last addition; there is stamped upon them a new character, different from that of yore.
One stone makes an archway -- the stone which wedges the leaning sides and holds the arch together by its position in the middle.
And why does the last addition, although very slight, make a great deal of difference?
Because it does not increase; it fills up.

Some things, through development, put off their former shape and are altered into a new figure.[^118-6]
When the mind has for a long time developed some idea, and in the attempt to grasp its magnitude has become weary, that thing begins to be called "infinite."
And then this has become something far different from what it was when it seemed great but finite.
In the same way we have thought of something as difficult to divide; at the very end, as the task grows more and more hard, the thing is found to be "indivisible."
Similarly, from that which could scarcely or with difficulty be moved we have advanced on and on -- until we reach the "immovable."
By the same reasoning a certain thing was according to nature; its greatness has altered it into some other peculiar quality and has rendered it a Good.
Farewell.

[^118-1]: *i.e.*, *solvendo aeri alieno*, "in a position to pay one's debts."

[^118-2]: *Ad Att.* i. 12. 4.

[^118-3]: *Ad Att.* i. 12. 1: "Even his relatives can't screw a penny out of Caecilius at less than 12 per cent" (Winstedt).

[^118-4]: For the character of Vatinius see *Ep.* xciv. 25 note; for a similar comparison of V. with Cato see *Ep.* cxx. 19.

[^118-5]: Discussed in *Ep.* lxxi. 4 f., lxxiv. 30, lxxvi. 16 ff., and especially lxxxvii. 25: *nam idem est honestum et bonum*. The Academic school tended to draw more of a distinction than the Stoic, as in *Ep.* lxxxv. 17 f.

[^118-6]: This argument (that complete virtue is a sort of transforming climax of life) is not to be confused with the theory of *accessio* (a term used also in Roman law), or "addition"; for virtue does not permit of *accessio*, or the addition of any external advantage. See *Ep.* lxvi. 9 *quid accedere perfecto potest?*