AIC-DePIN is designed under the assumption that no environment is inherently trustworthy.
Security in AIC-DePIN is behavioral, adaptive, and revocable, not static or purely cryptographic.
Core principles:
- Zero-trust between nodes
- Trust must be earned through behavior
- No permanent authority or irreversible privilege
- Every decision is observable, auditable, and reversible
- Security is a continuous process, not a final state
In AIC-DePIN, security is not a shield — it is a living system.
AIC-DePIN is explicitly designed to tolerate and mitigate:
- Sybil attacks (mass fake node creation)
- Collusion between subsets of nodes
- Resource fraud (false CPU, bandwidth, or storage claims)
- Eclipse and isolation attacks
- Slow poisoning / long-con attacks
- Trust manipulation over time
- Human-layer attacks (social engineering, incentive abuse)
Out of scope (by design):
- Full nation-state physical takeover
- Large-scale physical destruction of infrastructure
- Task allocation is weighted by trust, not raw capacity
- Trust decays over time without verified contribution
- High trust increases responsibility, not immunity
Slashing in AIC-DePIN is not limited to tokens.
Possible penalties include:
- Trust score collapse
- Priority reduction
- Role revocation
- Temporary or permanent exclusion
- Suspicious nodes are isolated before full expulsion
- Task results can be invalidated and replayed
- No single node result is final by default
To prevent monoculture failures:
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Quorum composition enforces diversity across:
- Implementation
- Geography
- Organization
- Resource profile
Humans may intervene when:
- Disputes exceed automated resolution
- Ethical ambiguity arises
- Governance-level overrides are required
Human authority is limited and auditable:
- All interventions are logged
- Decisions are reversible
- Human actions affect trust, not absolute control
- Do not publicly disclose unpatched vulnerabilities
- Follow responsible disclosure practices
- Report issues via
SECURITY.md
Priority categories:
- Remote execution vulnerabilities
- Trust poisoning vectors
- Consensus manipulation mechanisms