Session 4: Build Intelligence, Security & Cloud layers (6 prototypes)#22
Session 4: Build Intelligence, Security & Cloud layers (6 prototypes)#22blackboxprogramming wants to merge 1 commit intomainfrom
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…it, gateway Session 4 build sprint across Intelligence, Security, and Cloud layers: - ai-failover: Provider chain (Claude→GPT→Llama) with circuit breakers - prompt-registry: 8 versioned templates with provider overrides - token-tracker: Per-route/provider cost tracking with budget alerts - webhook-verify: Signature verification for GitHub/Stripe/Slack/Salesforce - audit-log: Structured append-only event logging with indexing - api-gateway: Cloudflare Workers edge gateway with rate limiting and auth https://claude.ai/code/session_0136vvNAuboRaFzeaWbo547Y
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| print(f"Generic verify: {result.value}") | ||
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| print() | ||
| print(verifier.status_summary()) |
Check failure
Code scanning / CodeQL
Clear-text logging of sensitive information High
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AI 25 days ago
In general, to fix clear‑text logging of sensitive data, you prevent direct or indirect inclusion of secrets (or objects closely tied to them) in log or status outputs. Instead, you log only non‑sensitive aggregates or metadata (e.g., counts, boolean flags) or explicitly redact sensitive parts.
For this specific case, the taint source is self._secrets and the sink is the string constructed in status_summary() and printed in main(). We should change status_summary() so it no longer embeds ', '.join(self._secrets.keys()). A simple, non‑disruptive approach is to log just the number of registered providers. This preserves useful diagnostics while avoiding exposure of the provider identifiers that CodeQL considers tainted. Concretely:
- In
WebhookVerifier.status_summary, replace line 383:f"║ Providers: {', '.join(self._secrets.keys()):<23}║",
- With a line reporting only the count, e.g.:
f"║ Providers: {len(self._secrets):<23}║",
No new imports or helper methods are needed; we only use len(self._secrets), which is already available.
| @@ -380,7 +380,7 @@ | ||
| f"║ Expired: {s['expired']:<8} ({s['expired']*100//total:>3}%) ║", | ||
| f"║ Replay: {s['replay']:<8} ({s['replay']*100//total:>3}%) ║", | ||
| "╠══════════════════════════════════════╣", | ||
| f"║ Providers: {', '.join(self._secrets.keys()):<23}║", | ||
| f"║ Providers: {len(self._secrets):<23}║", | ||
| f"║ Nonce Cache: {len(self._nonces):<22}║", | ||
| "╚══════════════════════════════════════╝", | ||
| ] |
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Pull request overview
This PR implements Session 4, a comprehensive build sprint across three critical infrastructure layers: Intelligence (AI), Security (SEC), and Cloud (CLD). The work adds 6 new production-ready prototypes comprising 18 new files, advancing BlackRoad from 8 to 14 total prototypes.
The implementation demonstrates strong architectural thinking with the AI failover chain using circuit breaker patterns, edge-first API design via Cloudflare Workers, and immutable audit logging for compliance. The code is well-structured with clear separation of concerns, comprehensive error handling in most areas, and good use of environment variables for secrets management.
Changes:
- Intelligence Layer: AI provider failover chain (Claude → GPT → Llama) with circuit breakers, prompt template registry with 8 default templates, and per-route token tracking with budget alerts
- Security Layer: Webhook signature verification for GitHub/Stripe/Slack/Salesforce with replay protection, and structured audit logging with append-only storage
- Cloud Layer: Cloudflare Workers edge gateway with rate limiting, authentication, CORS, and request routing
Reviewed changes
Copilot reviewed 22 out of 22 changed files in this pull request and generated 13 comments.
Show a summary per file
| File | Description |
|---|---|
| prototypes/ai-failover/provider.py | AI provider abstraction with unified interface for Claude, OpenAI, and Llama |
| prototypes/ai-failover/circuit_breaker.py | Circuit breaker pattern implementation for provider health tracking |
| prototypes/ai-failover/failover_router.py | Core routing logic with automatic failover and provider scoring |
| prototypes/ai-failover/config.py | Provider configuration with priorities, costs, and circuit breaker thresholds |
| prototypes/ai-failover/README.md | Documentation for the failover chain architecture |
| prototypes/prompt-registry/template.py | Prompt template model with variable substitution and provider overrides |
| prototypes/prompt-registry/registry.py | Template storage, CRUD operations, and 8 default templates |
| prototypes/prompt-registry/README.md | Documentation for the prompt registry |
| prototypes/token-tracker/tracker.py | Token usage tracking with per-route/provider metrics and dashboards |
| prototypes/token-tracker/budget.py | Budget management with multi-level alerts (50%, 75%, 90%, 100% thresholds) |
| prototypes/token-tracker/README.md | Documentation for token tracking and budget alerts |
| prototypes/webhook-verify/verifier.py | Webhook signature verification with HMAC-SHA256 and replay protection |
| prototypes/webhook-verify/README.md | Documentation for webhook verification |
| prototypes/audit-log/logger.py | Structured audit logger with convenience methods for different event types |
| prototypes/audit-log/store.py | Append-only event storage with indexing for fast queries |
| prototypes/audit-log/README.md | Documentation for audit logging pipeline |
| prototypes/api-gateway/worker.js | Cloudflare Workers edge gateway with routing, rate limiting, and auth |
| prototypes/api-gateway/wrangler.toml | Cloudflare deployment configuration with environment-specific settings |
| prototypes/api-gateway/README.md | Documentation for the API gateway |
| TODO.md | Updated with 6 completed items from Session 4 |
| MEMORY.md | Added Session 4 summary with implementation details |
| .STATUS | Updated to SESSION_4 with new prototype status |
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| const current = await env.RATE_LIMIT.get(key); | ||
| const count = current ? parseInt(current) : 0; | ||
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| if (count >= limit) { | ||
| return jsonResponse( | ||
| { | ||
| error: "Rate limit exceeded", | ||
| limit, | ||
| window_seconds: window, | ||
| retry_after: window, | ||
| }, | ||
| 429, | ||
| { "Retry-After": String(window) } | ||
| ); | ||
| } | ||
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| // Increment counter | ||
| await env.RATE_LIMIT.put(key, String(count + 1), { | ||
| expirationTtl: window, | ||
| }); |
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The rate limiting implementation has a race condition. Between checking the count and incrementing it (lines 145-164), multiple concurrent requests from the same IP could pass the limit check before any of them increment the counter. This could allow burst traffic to exceed the rate limit. Consider using atomic operations or a more robust rate limiting algorithm like the token bucket or sliding window counter patterns.
| // ── Route Handlers ───────────────────────────────────────────────── | ||
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| async function handleRoute(request, env) { | ||
| const body = await request.json(); |
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The handleRoute and handleComplete functions call request.json() without try-catch error handling. If the request body is not valid JSON, this will throw an unhandled exception that propagates to the top-level try-catch (lines 66-77), which returns a generic 500 error. Consider adding specific error handling for JSON parsing to return a more helpful 400 error with a message indicating the request body must be valid JSON.
| def _compact(self) -> None: | ||
| """Remove oldest events and rebuild indexes.""" | ||
| # Keep the most recent half | ||
| keep_from = len(self._events) // 2 | ||
| self._events = self._events[keep_from:] | ||
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| # Rebuild indexes | ||
| self._by_actor.clear() | ||
| self._by_action.clear() | ||
| self._by_category.clear() | ||
| self._by_outcome.clear() | ||
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| for idx, evt in enumerate(self._events): | ||
| self._by_actor[evt["actor"]].append(idx) | ||
| self._by_action[evt["action"]].append(idx) | ||
| self._by_category[evt["category"]].append(idx) | ||
| self._by_outcome[evt["outcome"]].append(idx) |
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The _compact method in AuditStore has a potential race condition. If an append operation happens concurrently with compaction, the indexes could become inconsistent with the events list. The append adds an event and updates indexes based on the old list length, but if compaction runs simultaneously and rebuilds indexes, those index entries could reference incorrect positions. Consider adding thread synchronization or making the store explicitly single-threaded in the documentation.
| lines.extend([ | ||
| "╠══════════════════════════════════════════╣", | ||
| f"║ Budget: ${budget_status['spent']:.2f} / ${budget_status['limit']:.2f}" | ||
| f" ({budget_status['percent_used']:.0f}%)" | ||
| + " " * 10 + "║", |
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The budget status formatting has potential string length issues that could break the ASCII box alignment. The dynamic text insertion doesn't account for variable-length numbers, which could make the box display incorrectly when the budget values are large or have many decimal places.
| lines.extend([ | |
| "╠══════════════════════════════════════════╣", | |
| f"║ Budget: ${budget_status['spent']:.2f} / ${budget_status['limit']:.2f}" | |
| f" ({budget_status['percent_used']:.0f}%)" | |
| + " " * 10 + "║", | |
| # Compute box width from the top border to ensure consistent alignment | |
| box_width = len("╔══════════════════════════════════════════╗") | |
| inner_width = box_width - 2 # exclude the left and right border characters | |
| budget_text = ( | |
| f" Budget: ${budget_status['spent']:.2f} / ${budget_status['limit']:.2f}" | |
| f" ({budget_status['percent_used']:.0f}%)" | |
| ) | |
| lines.extend([ | |
| "╠══════════════════════════════════════════╣", | |
| f"║{budget_text.ljust(inner_width)}║", |
| budget_status = self.budget.status() | ||
| lines.extend([ | ||
| "╠══════════════════════════════════════════╣", | ||
| f"║ Budget: ${budget_status['spent']:.2f} / ${budget_status['limit']:.2f}" | ||
| f" ({budget_status['percent_used']:.0f}%)" | ||
| + " " * 10 + "║", | ||
| "╚══════════════════════════════════════════╝", |
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The dashboard formatting assumes budget_status dictionary will have 'spent', 'limit', and 'percent_used' keys, but the BudgetManager.status() method returns 'spent' as 0.0 (with a comment that "Caller fills this") and 'percent_used' as 0.0. This creates a disconnect where the dashboard will show misleading budget information. The TokenTracker should either populate these values when calling budget.status() or the status() method should accept the total_cost parameter.
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| // Forward to upstream webhook handler with all headers for verification | ||
| const upstream = env.UPSTREAM_URL || "http://localhost:8080"; | ||
| const response = await fetch(`${upstream}/webhook/${provider}`, { |
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The upstream URL is constructed using the provider parameter from the URL path without validation. This creates a Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability where an attacker could potentially inject path traversal sequences or special characters to reach unintended upstream endpoints. The provider parameter should be validated against a whitelist of allowed provider names before being used in the URL construction.
| except HTTPError as e: | ||
| error_body = e.read().decode("utf-8") if e.fp else "" | ||
| raise ProviderError( | ||
| self.name, | ||
| f"HTTP {e.code}: {error_body[:200]}", | ||
| ) from e |
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The error handling in _sync_post truncates error_body to 200 characters without checking if e.fp is valid or if the read operation succeeds. If the error response is malformed or the connection is already closed, e.read() could raise an exception. Consider wrapping the error_body extraction in a try-except block to prevent the error handler from failing.
| def is_available(self) -> bool: | ||
| """Can we send a request through this circuit?""" | ||
| state = self.state | ||
| if state == CircuitState.CLOSED: | ||
| return True | ||
| if state == CircuitState.HALF_OPEN: | ||
| return self._half_open_calls < self.half_open_max_calls |
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The is_available property checks _half_open_calls in HALF_OPEN state but doesn't increment this counter. The counter should be incremented when a request is made in HALF_OPEN state, but there's no mechanism to do this. This means multiple concurrent requests could all pass the is_available check and exceed the half_open_max_calls limit. Consider implementing a method to track when a request starts in HALF_OPEN state or using atomic operations for thread safety.
| def status(self) -> dict: | ||
| """Current budget status.""" | ||
| return { | ||
| "daily_limit": self._daily_limit, | ||
| "monthly_limit": self._monthly_limit, | ||
| "limit": self._daily_limit, # Alias | ||
| "spent": 0.0, # Caller fills this | ||
| "percent_used": 0.0, | ||
| "thresholds_triggered": list(self._triggered), |
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The BudgetManager.status() method returns spent as 0.0 with a comment "Caller fills this", but the TokenTracker.dashboard() method uses budget_status['spent'] directly without filling it. This will always show $0.00 spent in the dashboard even when budget has been used. The spent value should be passed to the budget status or calculated within the status method.
| const headers = Object.fromEntries(request.headers.entries()); | ||
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| // Forward to upstream webhook handler with all headers for verification | ||
| const upstream = env.UPSTREAM_URL || "http://localhost:8080"; | ||
| const response = await fetch(`${upstream}/webhook/${provider}`, { | ||
| method: "POST", | ||
| headers: { | ||
| "Content-Type": request.headers.get("Content-Type") || "application/json", | ||
| "X-Gateway": "cloudflare", | ||
| "X-Original-Headers": JSON.stringify(headers), |
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The handleWebhook function serializes all request headers into X-Original-Headers as JSON without validation or sanitization. This could potentially be exploited if an attacker sends malicious header values that, when JSON-stringified and parsed by the upstream, could cause issues. Additionally, forwarding all headers could leak sensitive information. Consider whitelisting only necessary headers or sanitizing header values before forwarding.
Summary
Completed Session 4 build sprint across three critical layers: Intelligence (AI), Security (SEC), and Cloud (CLD). Built 6 new production-ready prototypes totaling 18 new files, advancing BlackRoad from 8 to 14 total prototypes.
Key Changes
Intelligence Layer (AI)
prototypes/ai-failover/- AI provider failover chain with circuit breakersprovider.py,circuit_breaker.py,failover_router.py,config.pyprototypes/prompt-registry/- Reusable, versioned prompt templatesprototypes/token-tracker/- Per-route and per-provider token usage trackingSecurity Layer (SEC)
prototypes/webhook-verify/- Webhook signature verificationprototypes/audit-log/- Structured audit logging pipelineCloud & Edge Layer (CLD)
prototypes/api-gateway/- Cloudflare Workers edge gatewayImplementation Details
Status Updates
.STATUSfrom SESSION_3 to SESSION_4 (2026-02-04)MEMORY.mdwith full implementation detailsTesting
Each prototype includes:
Ready for integration testing with the existing bridge infrastructure.
https://claude.ai/code/session_0136vvNAuboRaFzeaWbo547Y