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+# Standard Engineering Controls for AI SAFE² Compliance
+
+**Version:** 1.0  
+**Date:** February 7, 2026  
+**Author:** Vincent Sullivan  
+**Status:** Technical Specification
+
+![Compensating Controls Spec](https://placehold.co/1200x630/1D1D1F/f6921e?text=Engineering+Controls+Specification)
+
+---
+
+## The Engineering Mandate
+
+The **AI SAFE² Framework** operates on the core axiom: **"Policy is Intent. Engineering is Reality."**
+
+To be compliant with AI SAFE² v2.1, an organization cannot simply document a risk in a risk register. They must deploy **Compensating Engineering Controls** that mechanically enforce the policy at runtime.
+
+This specification outlines the minimum viable engineering standards for the critical control layers: **Sanitization**, **Circuit Breakers**, **State Verification**, **NHI Binding**, and **Swarm Consensus**.
+
+---
+
+## Control Spec 1: The Operational Circuit Breaker (Pillar 3)
+**Objective:** Prevent "Runaway" agentic behavior (Infinite Loops, Financial Drain, Denial of Service).
+
+### The Requirement
+The system must possess a mechanical governor independent of the Agent's LLM logic. This governor must track velocity and accumulation of resources and sever execution **before** a human administrator can intervene.
+
+### Implementation Standard
+*   **Location:** Must reside at the **Gateway / Proxy Layer** (between the Agent and the Tool API). It cannot reside inside the System Prompt.
+*   **Mechanism:** Token Bucket or Leaky Bucket algorithm.
+*   **Latency Budget:** < 20ms added latency.
+*   **Failure Mode:** **Fail-Closed.** If the metering service goes offline, all Agent traffic halts.
+
+### The Logic Flow (Pseudo-Code)
+```text
+FUNCTION Check_Circuit_Breaker(Agent_ID):
+  Current_Spend = Get_Redis_Counter(Agent_ID)
+  Velocity_Rate = Get_Velocity(Agent_ID)
+
+  IF Current_Spend > Hard_Cap OR Velocity_Rate > Spike_Threshold:
+      Log_Event("Circuit Trip", Severity=CRITICAL)
+      Return 402_Payment_Required  // Or 429_Too_Many_Requests
+      Sever_Connection()
+  ELSE:
+      Pass_Request()
+```
+## Control Spec 2: In-Line Input Sanitization (Pillar 1)
+**Objective:** Prevent Prompt Injection and Jailbreaking from reaching the inference layer.
+
+### The Requirement
+All inputs from "Untrusted Sources" (Users, Web Scrapers, Email Ingestion) must be sanitized *before* entering the Context Window. Relying on the model to "refuse" a jailbreak is non-compliant.
+
+### Implementation Standard
+*   **Inspection Depth:** Must scan both **User Input** and **Retrieval Context** (RAG Data).
+*   **Detection Method:** Hybrid approach required.
+    1.  **Static Analysis:** Regex patterns for known jailbreak signatures (e.g., "Ignore previous instructions").
+    2.  **Vector Similarity:** Cosine similarity check against a "Known Threat" vector database.
+*   **Action:** Redaction or Rejection.
+
+### The Logic Flow (Pseudo-Code)
+```text
+FUNCTION Sanitize_Input(User_Text):
+  // Layer 1: Static
+  IF Regex_Match(User_Text, Threat_Patterns):
+      Return Block_Request("Static Signature Detected")
+
+  // Layer 2: Semantic
+  Similarity_Score = Vector_DB.Compare(User_Text, Threat_Embeddings)
+  IF Similarity_Score > 0.85:
+      Return Block_Request("Semantic Injection Attempt")
+
+  Return Forward_To_LLM()
+```
+---
+
+### **Image 2: Control Spec 3 (State Verification)**
+<p align="center">
+  <img src="assets/AI%20Cryptographic%20State%20Verification%20Workflow%20Control%20Spec%203.png" alt="Cryptographic State Verification Workflow" width="100%">
+</p>
+
+## Control Spec 3: Cryptographic State Verification (Pillar 2)
+**Objective:** Detect "Memory Poisoning" and "Semantic Drift" in RAG systems and Long-Term Memory.
+
+### The Requirement
+Agents that utilize long-term memory or vector stores must be auditable for integrity. The system must be able to prove that the agent's "Knowledge Base" has not been altered by an unauthorized entity.
+
+### Implementation Standard
+*   **Method:** SHA-256 Hashing of Artifacts.
+*   **Trigger:** Executed before critical "Write" operations or high-stakes "Read" operations.
+*   **Validation:** The current hash of the Vector Index or Knowledge Graph must match the "Last Known Good" hash stored in the immutable ledger.
+
+### The Logic Flow (Pseudo-Code)
+```text
+FUNCTION Verify_State(Memory_Volume):
+  Current_Hash = SHA256(Memory_Volume)
+  Trusted_Hash = Ledger.Get_Last_Commit(Memory_Volume_ID)
+
+  IF Current_Hash != Trusted_Hash:
+      Trigger_Alert("Integrity Violation: Memory Drift Detected")
+      Lock_Agent(Agent_ID) // Fail-Secure
+      Require_Human_Override()
+  ELSE:
+      Proceed()
+```
+---
+
+### **Image 3: Control Spec 4 & 5 (NHI & Swarms)**
+<p align="center">
+  <img src="assets/Control%20Spec%204%20%26%205%20(NHI%20%26%20Swarms)%20v2.png" alt="Control Spec 4 & 5 NHI and Swarms" width="100%">
+</p>
+
+## Control Spec 4: NHI Ephemeral Binding (Pillar 1 & 2)
+**Objective:** Prevent "Stale Credential" abuse and lateral movement by Non-Human Identities (NHI).
+
+### The Requirement
+Agent identities must not use static, long-lived API keys (e.g., a hardcoded `.env` variable that lasts for years). Authentication must be bound to the specific *session* or *task*.
+
+### Implementation Standard
+*   **Method:** Token Exchange / Short-Lived Certificates (TTL < 60 minutes).
+*   **Binding:** Credentials must be cryptographically bound to the Agent's unique Instance ID.
+*   **Rotation:** Automated rotation upon task completion or failure.
+
+### The Logic Flow (Pseudo-Code)
+```text
+FUNCTION Mint_Agent_Credential(Agent_Manifest):
+  // 1. Verify Agent Integrity
+  Verify_Signature(Agent_Manifest)
+
+  // 2. Issue Short-Lived Token
+  Token = Vault.Issue(
+      Role="Agent_Finance",
+      TTL="300s", // 5 Minutes
+      Scopes=["read_invoice"] // Least Privilege
+  )
+
+  Return Token
+```
+## Control Spec 5: Swarm Consensus Validation (Pillar 4)
+**Objective:** Prevent "Consensus Hijacking" in Multi-Agent Systems.
+
+### The Requirement
+In a swarm architecture, no single agent should have unilateral authority to execute a high-risk action. Decisions must be validated by a "Quorum" or a "Supervisor Node" before execution.
+
+### Implementation Standard
+*   **Threshold:** Defined as N/M signatures required (e.g., 2 of 3 agents must agree).
+*   **Topology Check:** Ensure the request originated from a valid node within the mapped swarm topology, not an external injector.
+
+### The Logic Flow (Pseudo-Code)
+```text
+FUNCTION Execute_Swarm_Action(Proposed_Action):
+  Signatures = Collect_Votes(Swarm_Nodes)
+
+  IF Count(Signatures) < Quorum_Threshold:
+      Return Block_Request("Consensus Failed: Insufficient Votes")
+
+  IF Verify_Topology(Signatures) == False:
+      Return Block_Request("Topology Violation: Unauthorized Node")
+
+  Return Execute(Proposed_Action)
+```
+
+
+---
+
+### **Image 4: Implementation Matrix**
+
+## Implementation Matrix
+
+| Control Level | Circuit Breaker | Sanitization | State Verification | NHI Management |
+| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
+| **Basic (DIY)** | Python `time.sleep()` | Basic Regex Blacklist | File timestamp checks | Static `.env` files |
+| **Standard (Toolkit)** | Redis-backed Token Counter | Vector-based Threat Match | SHA-256 File Hashing | Automated Key Rotation |
+| **Enterprise (Engineered)** | **API Gateway Interception** | **Zero-Dwell Inspection** | **Blockchain/Ledger Proof** | **Ephemeral Service Mesh** |
+
+*Note: The **AI SAFE² Implementation Toolkit** provides the code patterns for the "Standard" level controls. "Enterprise" controls require custom architecture integration via the **Digital Shield Program**.*