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WalkthroughA new error constant for invalid recipient signatures is added to the error definitions. In the payment stream contract, cryptographic signature verification logic is introduced for mutual stream cancellation, including new internal functions for message hashing and ECDSA signature checking. These functions are defined but not yet invoked in the main cancellation workflow. Changes
Sequence Diagram(s)sequenceDiagram
participant User
participant PaymentStreamContract
participant CryptoLib
User->>PaymentStreamContract: Request mutual_cancel(stream_id, sig_r, sig_s, recipient_pubkey)
PaymentStreamContract->>CryptoLib: get_message_hash(stream_id, approved)
CryptoLib-->>PaymentStreamContract: message_hash
PaymentStreamContract->>CryptoLib: verify_ecdsa_signature(message_hash, sig_r, sig_s, recipient_pubkey)
CryptoLib-->>PaymentStreamContract: is_valid
alt Signature valid
PaymentStreamContract-->>User: Proceed with mutual cancellation
else Signature invalid
PaymentStreamContract-->>User: Revert with INVALID_RECIPIENT_SIGNATURE error
end
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Actionable comments posted: 5
🧹 Nitpick comments (1)
src/base/errors.cairo (1)
142-143: Clarify the error message to match the constant nameThe error constant
INVALID_RECIPIENT_SIGNATUREsuggests signature validation failure, but the message says "No recipient signature" which implies absence. Consider updating for clarity:- pub const INVALID_RECIPIENT_SIGNATURE: felt252 = 'Error: No recipient signature'; + pub const INVALID_RECIPIENT_SIGNATURE: felt252 = 'Error: Invalid recipient signature';
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📒 Files selected for processing (2)
src/base/errors.cairo(1 hunks)src/payment_stream.cairo(5 hunks)
⏰ Context from checks skipped due to timeout of 90000ms. You can increase the timeout in your CodeRabbit configuration to a maximum of 15 minutes (900000ms). (1)
- GitHub Check: tests
| // use openzeppelin::utils::cryptography::interface::ISRC6; | ||
| use openzeppelin::utils::cryptography::snip12::{ | ||
| OffchainMessageHash, SNIP12Metadata, StructHash, | ||
| }; |
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Remove unused imports and implement proper SNIP12 message hashing
The SNIP12 imports (OffchainMessageHash, SNIP12Metadata, StructHash) are imported but not used. The current get_message_hash implementation uses basic Pedersen hashing instead of SNIP12's structured message hashing with domain separation.
For proper SNIP12 compliance, either:
- Remove the unused imports if not implementing SNIP12
- Implement proper SNIP12 message hashing with domain separation
🤖 Prompt for AI Agents
In src/payment_stream.cairo around lines 19 to 22, the SNIP12 imports are unused
and the get_message_hash function uses basic Pedersen hashing instead of SNIP12
structured hashing. To fix this, either remove the unused SNIP12 imports if you
do not plan to implement SNIP12 message hashing, or update get_message_hash to
use SNIP12's OffchainMessageHash or StructHash with domain separation to comply
with SNIP12 standards.
| fn get_message_hash(self: @ContractState, stream_id: u256, approved: felt252) -> felt252 { | ||
| let mut hash_state = PedersenTrait::new(0); | ||
| hash_state = hash_state.update('CancelStreamMessage'); | ||
| hash_state = hash_state.update(stream_id.low.into()); | ||
| hash_state = hash_state.update(stream_id.high.into()); | ||
| hash_state = hash_state.update(approved); | ||
| hash_state.finalize() | ||
| } |
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Add replay protection and domain separation to message hash
The current message hash implementation has critical security issues:
- No replay protection: The same signature can be reused multiple times
- No domain separation: Signatures could be valid across different contracts
- Not SNIP12 compliant: Despite the PR title, this doesn't follow SNIP12 standard
Consider adding:
- A nonce or timestamp for replay protection
- Contract address for domain separation
- Proper SNIP12 structured hashing
🤖 Prompt for AI Agents
In src/payment_stream.cairo around lines 323 to 330, the get_message_hash
function lacks replay protection, domain separation, and SNIP12 compliance. To
fix this, include a nonce or timestamp parameter in the hash inputs to prevent
replay attacks, add the contract address to the hash to ensure domain
separation, and restructure the hashing logic to follow the SNIP12 standard
format for message hashing. Update the function signature and hash computation
accordingly to incorporate these elements.
| fn get_message_hash(self: @ContractState, stream_id: u256, approved: felt252) -> felt252 { | ||
| let mut hash_state = PedersenTrait::new(0); | ||
| hash_state = hash_state.update('CancelStreamMessage'); | ||
| hash_state = hash_state.update(stream_id.low.into()); | ||
| hash_state = hash_state.update(stream_id.high.into()); | ||
| hash_state = hash_state.update(approved); | ||
| hash_state.finalize() | ||
| } | ||
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| fn mutual_cancel( | ||
| self: @ContractState, | ||
| stream_id: u256, | ||
| sig_r: felt252, | ||
| sig_s: felt252, | ||
| recipient_pubkey: felt252, | ||
| ) -> bool { | ||
| let message_hash = self | ||
| .get_message_hash(stream_id, '1'); // 1 recipient has approve the cancellation | ||
| let is_valid = check_ecdsa_signature(message_hash, recipient_pubkey, sig_r, sig_s); | ||
| assert(is_valid, INVALID_RECIPIENT_SIGNATURE); | ||
| return true; | ||
| } |
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💡 Verification agent
🧩 Analysis chain
Verify test coverage for signature verification
The new signature verification functions lack test coverage. Please ensure comprehensive tests for:
- Valid signature verification
- Invalid signature rejection
- Replay attack prevention
- Edge cases (wrong stream_id, wrong recipient, etc.)
🏁 Script executed:
#!/bin/bash
# Search for tests related to mutual cancellation or signature verification
echo "Searching for signature verification tests..."
fd -e cairo -e rs test | xargs rg -l "mutual_cancel|recipient.*signature|snip12" | head -20
echo -e "\nSearching for any test files that might test the payment stream cancel functionality..."
fd -e cairo test | xargs rg -l "cancel.*stream|StreamCanceled" | head -10Length of output: 532
Add comprehensive tests for mutual_cancel signature verification
I didn’t find any existing tests covering the mutual_cancel flow or ECDSA signature checks. Please add or extend tests in your suite to cover:
- Valid signature acceptance for
mutual_cancel - Rejection of invalid signatures (wrong
r,s, or public key) - Replay-attack prevention (same signature cannot be reused)
- Edge cases (incorrect
stream_id, unauthorized recipient, zero/overflow values)
Suggested locations:
- tests/test_payment_stream.cairo – extend with
mutual_cancelscenarios - (Optional) a new file, e.g. tests/test_signature_verification.cairo, if you prefer to isolate signature tests
🤖 Prompt for AI Agents
In src/payment_stream.cairo around lines 323 to 345, there are no tests covering
the mutual_cancel function and its ECDSA signature verification. Add
comprehensive tests in tests/test_payment_stream.cairo or a new test file like
tests/test_signature_verification.cairo to cover valid signature acceptance,
rejection of invalid signatures (altered r, s, or public key), replay attack
prevention by ensuring the same signature cannot be reused, and edge cases such
as incorrect stream_id, unauthorized recipient, and zero or overflow values.
These tests should call mutual_cancel with various inputs and assert expected
success or failure outcomes.
| fn mutual_cancel( | ||
| self: @ContractState, | ||
| stream_id: u256, | ||
| sig_r: felt252, | ||
| sig_s: felt252, | ||
| recipient_pubkey: felt252, | ||
| ) -> bool { | ||
| let message_hash = self | ||
| .get_message_hash(stream_id, '1'); // 1 recipient has approve the cancellation | ||
| let is_valid = check_ecdsa_signature(message_hash, recipient_pubkey, sig_r, sig_s); | ||
| assert(is_valid, INVALID_RECIPIENT_SIGNATURE); | ||
| return true; | ||
| } |
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💡 Verification agent
🧩 Analysis chain
Fix signature verification logic and validate recipient
Several issues with the mutual_cancel implementation:
- Hardcoded approval value: Always passes
'1'for approved, making the parameter meaningless - Missing recipient validation: Should verify that
recipient_pubkeymatches the stream recipient's public key - Redundant return type: Function returns
boolbut always returnstrue(reverts on failure) - Not integrated: Function is defined but never called
🏁 Script executed:
#!/bin/bash
# Check if mutual_cancel is called anywhere in the codebase
echo "Searching for mutual_cancel function calls..."
rg "mutual_cancel" --type cairo -A 3 -B 3Length of output: 172
Here's a refined check to locate any invocations of mutual_cancel in the repo:
🏁 Script executed:
#!/bin/bash
echo "Searching for calls to mutual_cancel..."
rg -n "mutual_cancel(" .Length of output: 194
Let’s retry locating any calls (escaping the parenthesis):
🏁 Script executed:
#!/bin/bash
echo "Searching for calls to mutual_cancel..."
rg -n 'mutual_cancel\(' .Length of output: 173
Revise and integrate mutual_cancel in the cancellation workflow
The new mutual_cancel at src/payment_stream.cairo:333–345 needs the following fixes before merging:
- Ensure it’s actually invoked
- No references found beyond its definition—either call it from your cancel function or remove it.
- Remove or parameterize the hard-coded approval flag
- Passing
'1'intoget_message_hashmakes the “approved” argument meaningless. Use a dynamic flag or drop the parameter.
- Passing
- Validate the signer against the stored stream recipient
- Lookup the recipient’s public key in state and assert that it matches
recipient_pubkeybefore signature verification.
- Lookup the recipient’s public key in state and assert that it matches
- Simplify the return type
- Since the function either returns
trueor reverts, change its signature to-> ()(no return value) to avoid redundant booleans.
- Since the function either returns
🤖 Prompt for AI Agents
In src/payment_stream.cairo around lines 333 to 345, the mutual_cancel function
is defined but never called, so integrate it by invoking it from the main cancel
function or remove it if unused. Replace the hard-coded '1' approval flag in
get_message_hash with a dynamic parameter or remove it if unnecessary. Add a
check to retrieve the stored recipient public key from the contract state and
assert it matches the recipient_pubkey argument before verifying the signature.
Finally, change the function signature to return no value (-> ()) since it
either succeeds or reverts, eliminating the redundant boolean return.
| fn cancel(ref self: ContractState, stream_id: u256) { | ||
| // check for mutual cancel approval via SNIP12 | ||
|
|
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Incomplete implementation - signature verification not integrated
The comment indicates intent to check mutual cancellation approval, but the mutual_cancel function is never called. This means:
- The PR objective of "verify recipient signature via snip12" is not achieved
- Stream cancellation still works without recipient approval
- The new signature verification code is dead code
Either:
- Complete the implementation by calling
mutual_cancelwith appropriate parameters - Remove the incomplete code until ready for full implementation
Would you like me to help implement the complete signature verification flow in the cancel function?
🤖 Prompt for AI Agents
In src/payment_stream.cairo around lines 1004 to 1006, the cancel function
comments mention checking mutual cancel approval via SNIP12, but the
mutual_cancel function is never called, leaving signature verification
unimplemented and allowing cancellation without recipient approval. To fix this,
integrate a call to mutual_cancel within the cancel function, passing the
necessary parameters such as the stream_id and signature data, to enforce
recipient signature verification before allowing cancellation. Alternatively, if
the feature is not ready, remove the incomplete mutual_cancel related code to
avoid dead code and confusion.
1 participant
Summary by CodeRabbit
New Features
Bug Fixes