How to detect and respond to OAuth consent attacks in Google...#266
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🔗 Additional ContextOriginal Blog Post: https://redcanary.com/blog/threat-detection/google-workspace-oauth-attack/ Content Categories: Based on the analysis, this content was categorized under "GWS - Workspace Pentesting -> (new page) OAuth Consent / Token Grant Abuse (Consent Phishing) + Detection/Response (Admin Reports 'token' audit, GAM token inventory) OR add under "GWS - Google Platforms Phishing"". Repository Maintenance:
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🤖 Automated Content Update
This PR was automatically generated by the HackTricks News Bot based on a technical blog post.
📝 Source Information
🎯 Content Summary
What the post is about
This post explains an OAuth consent (“consent phishing”) attack path in Google Workspace that can turn a single user’s authorization click into persistent API access for an attacker-controlled OAuth application. It then ties that OAuth access to supply-chain impact by abusing the Chrome Web Store API scope to modify/publish Chrome extensions. The post is primarily detection-and-response focused and includes concrete **Admin Reports audit log fiel...
🔧 Technical Details
OAuth consent phishing (Google Workspace): social-engineer a victim into approving an attacker-controlled OAuth client on a legitimate Google consent screen. After consent, the attacker gains API access via OAuth tokens that can persist until revoked and may bypass repeated MFA challenges, making it a durable foothold without password theft. Detection should pivot on Google Admin Reports OAuth Token audit events where
events.nameisauthorize, extractingclient_id,app_name, andscope/scope_datato identify suspicious new authorizations.Scope-to-supply-chain escalation: request OAuth scopes that grant control over a distribution or admin surface (e.g.,
https://www.googleapis.com/auth/chromewebstore). Once granted, use the corresponding API (Chrome Web Store API in this case) to modify/publish assets the victim manages, delivering malicious updates that can steal session cookies/auth tokens from downstream users and enable account takeover in third-party services...🤖 Agent Actions
Summary
Added a focused OAuth consent abuse detection/response section (Admin Reports token audit fields, GAM baselining, alerting logic, response, mitigations) to the Google Workspace OAuth phishing page and updated references.
Files Updated
src/pentesting-cloud/workspace-security/gws-google-platforms-phishing/README.mdTests
This PR was automatically created by the HackTricks Feed Bot. Please review the changes carefully before merging.
📚 Repository Maintenance
All .md files have been checked for proper formatting (headers, includes, etc.).