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     height: 100%;
     margin-bottom: 1em;
     transition: all 0.5s;
+    position: relative;
+}
+
+.pr6-articles article .article-dots, .pr6-statistics article .article-dots {
+  position: absolute;
+  width: 15%;
+  bottom: 5px;
+  right: 5px;
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pmg/templates/pr6/articles/ben-cronin.html

@@ -59,6 +59,10 @@ <h3>I The need for meaningful public participation</h3>
         time periods made available (particularly for appropriations and division of revenue bills) and by the limited
         capacity available to parliamentarians (see Part III below).</p>
 
+    <blockquote class="full">
+        On a more positive note, there is an increased opportunity to make online submissions, which mitigates the potential of regional exclusion for in-person oral submissions.
+    </blockquote>
+
     <p>In addition to the persisting challenges, the Sixth Parliament also faced a number of unprecedented hurdles in
         performing its task of facilitating public participation. In this regard, the significant impacts of Covid-19
         shutdowns and the fire that burned down Parliament’s main building, should be noted. On a more positive note,

pmg/templates/pr6/articles/devi-pillay.html

@@ -91,6 +91,9 @@ <h3>Reflections on the Sixth Parliament</h3>
     <p>What explains these weaknesses? We have found four main reasons for the ineffectiveness of committee oversight.
     </p>
 
+    <blockquote>
+        The political environment disincentivises close scrutiny of the Executive – even though they have strong oversight powers.
+    </blockquote>
     <p>Firstly, the political environment disincentivises close scrutiny of the Executive – even though they have strong
         oversight powers, MPs tend not to use them. MPs of the majority party must exercise oversight over senior
         members of their own party who occupy positions in the Executive – the same members who determine the
@@ -101,21 +104,29 @@ <h3>Reflections on the Sixth Parliament</h3>
         interventions. It was clear from all of our interviews – and all of the testimonies at the Zondo Commission –
         that this political environment is the main obstacle to effective oversight.</p>
 
+    <blockquote class="right">
+        ...most committees work in ways that are generally ineffective and even sometimes counter-productive.
+    </blockquote>
     <p>Secondly, we found that most committees work in ways that are generally ineffective and even sometimes
         counter-productive. They allow the Executive to present lengthy reports, taking up most or all of the time
         allocated to oversight. When MPs are afforded the opportunity to ask questions, this is conducted in an
         unproductive format which elides effective interrogation and meaningful responses. There is a preoccupation with
         protocol and formality which often derails meetings on substantive matters. Committees also tend to focus on
         financial and operational matters, to the exclusion of addressing larger questions of executive performance,
         meaningful impact, and the overall accountability chain in government.</p>
-
+    <blockquote>
+        Oversight is under-resourced.
+    </blockquote>   
     <p>Thirdly, oversight is under-resourced. This is true in terms of the money allocated to oversight functions, which
         is insufficient, and the way funds are allocated or prioritised is often problematic. Committees also do not
         have enough time for oversight activities over the wide range of institutions they oversee. Technical support is
         also an area where committees sorely need more resources. Content advisors, researchers, legal advisors, and
         financial experts are indispensable in supporting oversight activities, but the research units are
         under-capacitated and unable to meet the growing demand for their services due to lack of resources.</p>
 
+    <blockquote class="right">
+        ...many MPs do not have either the necessary capabilities or the commitment required to effectively fulfil their oversight duties.
+    </blockquote>
     <p>Fourthly, many MPs do not have either the necessary capabilities or the commitment required to effectively fulfil
         their oversight duties. Parliament can only ever be as effective as its members. MPs need to be knowledgeable of
         the work of the departments they oversee, government processes, and the broader socio-economic context so that

pmg/templates/pr6/articles/judith-february.html

@@ -20,6 +20,10 @@
 
     <p>Reflecting on oversight and accountability, broadly speaking, Parliament’s performance has been mediocre and unfortunately marred by inconsistencies. The release of the report by the Judicial Commission of Inquiry into Allegations of State Capture, Corruption and Fraud in the Public Sector including Organs of State (the Report) in June 2022 outlined in detail how the ANC defanged Parliament between 2009 and 2018, facilitating rampant corruption and the wholesale capture of the South African state by politically connected individuals. Indeed, the Report concluded that weaknesses in parliamentary oversight and executive accountability had contributed to corruption and maladministration and <a href="https://www.stateofthenation.gov.za/zondo-commission-reports/Part%206%20Vol%204%20-%20Judicial%20Commission%20of%20Inquiry%20into%20State%20Capture%20Report.pdf" target="_blank">recommended</a> that Parliament consider reforms to improve its oversight and accountability function. In October of that year, the Presidency submitted a <a href="https://www.stateofthenation.gov.za/assets/downloads/State%20Capture%20Commission%20Response.pdf" target="_blank">report</a> to Parliament on the implementation of the Commission’s recommendations. Despite adopting its own thirty-one-page implementation <a href="https://www.parliament.gov.za/storage/app/media/Docs/atc/4a755e82-cfd5-4ffd-b0f2-a633facc36c3.pdf" target="_blank">report</a> in response, Parliament’s performance in acting on the Commission’s recommendations has been inconsistent at best, with many MPs apparently viewing the process as a tick-box exercise requiring little real engagement.  In some instances, Parliament outright rejected the Report’s recommendations for apparently trivial reasons. Faced with this clear opportunity to hold the errant executive to account, many parliamentarians chose to avoid political discomfort by simply acceding to party pressure.  In many ways, the Report, and its implementation, was a defining feature of the Sixth Parliament. </p>
 
+    <blockquote>
+        The National Assembly expressed a similarly supine attitude towards executive accountability in its response to several high-profile corruption scandals this term. 
+    </blockquote>
+
     <p>The National Assembly expressed a similarly supine attitude towards executive accountability in its response to several high-profile corruption scandals this term. For example, its decision to reject an independent panel’s report on the <a href="https://www.corruptionwatch.org.za/misappropriation-of-resources-misuse-of-power-phala-phalas-best-outcome/" target="_blank">Phala Phala</a> matter has been widely criticised and viewed as an abject failure. Similarly, its handling of the <a href="https://amabhungane.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/210712_Karpower-slide_desktop.pdf" target="_blank">Karpowership</a> controversy has done little to foster confidence in Parliament’s ability or appetite to rein in executive excess. Indeed, Parliament’s abdication of this constitutional function is perhaps best illustrated by the fact that some ministers, despite having been heavily implicated in state capture by the Report, have nevertheless been promoted to powerful positions at the head of various parliamentary portfolio committees. Rather than hold errant officials to account, the Sixth Parliament preferred to reward their unethical behaviour.</p>
 
     <p>There were, however, positive moments of robust accountability during the Sixth Parliament. On 21 February 2024, and in an unprecedented move in South Africa’s democratic history, Parliament voted to remove Western Cape Judge President John Hlophe, and retired Judge Nkola Motata, from office in terms of section 177(3) of the Constitution. The Judicial Service Commission (JSC) found Hlophe guilty of gross misconduct following his attempt to improperly influence the outcome of a matter before the Constitutional Court involving then-President Jacob Zuma. Judge Hlophe’s improper conduct dated back to 2008, meaning it took more than fifteen years for the JSC and Parliament to hold Judge Hlophe fully to account. Similarly, the complaint against Judge Motata dated back to 2007, and arose from his conduct surrounding his conviction for drunk driving earlier that year. While these matters took far too long to reach their conclusion, Parliament’s decision nevertheless represents an important step in maintaining the efficacy and legitimacy of the judiciary.</p>
@@ -31,13 +35,18 @@
     <p>This term also saw an end to the familiar disruption of parliamentary processes (and consequent violence) by members of the EFF. Following their disruptive conduct at the 2023 State of the Nation Address (SONA) the Speaker of the National Assembly ordered six EFF members to leave the Chamber. Instead of leaving, the members crossed the floor and jumped on the stage at the Cape Town City Hall where President Cyril Ramaphosa was to deliver the address. The Speaker then suspended proceedings and called on the parliamentary security services to remove the members. The Speaker referred the matter to the Powers and Privileges Committee, which in turn found the members to be in contempt of Parliament and recommended sanctions against them, including a one-month suspension effective from 1 February 2024. The implicated members’ challenge to this decision in the Western Cape High Court was dismissed in a <a href="https://www.parliament.gov.za/press-releases/western-cape-high-court-dismisses-eff-application-prevent-parliament-applying-joint-rules" target="_blank">scathing judgment</a>.</p>
 
     <p>A concerning absence of transparency was, however, highlighted by Parliament’s move to virtual meetings following the advent of the Covid-19 pandemic in early 2020. While virtual meetings initially provided an uptick in transparency and public participation – with members of the public being able to observe and comment on parliamentary meetings as they unfolded – it quickly became clear that not all meetings were being made available in this way. In fact, only 67% of meetings were either live-streamed or otherwise made available online. Given that Parliament has been physically inaccessible since January 2022 (as a result of the fire described below), this means that roughly one-third of parliamentary meetings have effectively been taking place in secret.</p>
-
+    <blockquote class="right">
+        In April 2021, following the constitutional challenge to the Promotion of Access to Information Act by civil society group My Vote Counts, Parliament passed the Political Party Funding Act to regulate the manner in which political parties are funded.
+    </blockquote>
     <p>On another front, the Sixth Parliament flexed its legislative muscles this term by passing a number of significant pieces of legislation. In April 2021, following the constitutional challenge to the Promotion of Access to Information Act by civil society group My Vote Counts, Parliament passed the Political Party Funding Act to regulate the manner in which political parties are funded. The Act, which is the first of its kind in South Africa, aims to ensure that parties are transparent in how they receive and report the funds that are donated to them. The Act has the potential to fundamentally improve and deepen the way in which South African citizens exercise their political rights and represents a huge step towards creating an informed and empowered electorate.</p>
 
     <p>Similarly, in May 2023, and for the first time since 2012, Parliament amended the Constitution by passing the Sign Language Bill. The bill sought to afford people who are deaf or hearing impaired equal protection before the law. The unanimous adoption of this constitutional amendment brought to 12 the number of official languages in South Africa.</p>
 
     <p>The Electoral Amendment Bill, which will allow independent candidates to stand in the 2024 provincial and national elections, was passed by Parliament on 22 February 2023. The Bill was immediately subjected to a constitutional challenge in which the participation threshold for independent candidates (obtaining signatures equivalent to 15% of the votes required to win a seat in a particular region) was struck out, with Parliament being afforded twenty-four months to remedy the defect. The Constitutional Court’s <a href="https://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZACC/2023/42.html" target="_blank">decision</a> was limited to the facts before it, and therefore does not affect the participation threshold of new unrepresented parties (who are still required to obtain the 15% quota). Despite its deficiencies, the Act is a promising step towards a more inclusive and competitive representative democracy.</p>
 
+    <blockquote>
+        A further feature of the Sixth’s Parliament legislative agenda has been the increasing securitisation of the state. 
+    </blockquote>
     <p>A further feature of the Sixth’s Parliament legislative agenda has been the increasing securitisation of the state. The General Intelligence Laws Amendment Bill 2023 is the latest act in an onslaught began during the Zuma era. On track to be passed into law before the end of the term, the Bill has widely been described as malicious and inadequate. Many of its provisions are vague, and ambiguous and allow the intrusion of state security agencies into society in a way that undermines democracy and lays the groundwork for a return to state capture. One of the Bill’s primary aims is to remove all restrictions on state security agencies’ ability to spy on people and organisations engaged in political advocacy. It does so by (i) unreasonably expanding the notion of national security, (ii) increasing state security agencies’ powers to conduct security vetting and (iii) expanding state security agencies’ powers of mass surveillance. The fact that it was rushed through Parliament towards the end of 2023, with little to no opposition, is deeply concerning.</p>
 
     <p>Perhaps the lowest point of the Sixth Parliament occurred on the morning of 2 January 2022. Just after 5:00 am, the City of Cape Town’s Fire and Rescue services were notified of a fire at the Parliamentary complex. The fire started on the third floor of the National Council of Provinces building and spread via the offices and gymnasium to the National Assembly building which was severely damaged. Crucially, the fire was able to spread in the way that it did due to a lack of proper maintenance and a failure to ensure compliance with building codes and fire prevention basics. Indeed, Parliament’s investigation into the fire revealed “pervasive non-compliance with fire regulations and requirements across multiple facets, including smoke detectors, fire alarm panels, emergency notification systems, sprinkler systems and evacuation route planning.” It has subsequently come to light that the fire was started by Zandile Mafe, who was able to make his way into the precinct following “lapses in perimeter monitoring” occasioned by Parliamentary Protection Services “not working nights or weekends” and the police officer on duty having “fallen asleep” at his desk. Parliament’s reconstruction, now finally underway, should be completed by late 2025, at a cost of R2 billion. As a result of the damage to the National Assembly building, several key sittings of Parliament, including the State of the Nation Address, have been held at the Cape Town City Hall. It was a distinctly saddening moment and perhaps a leitmotif of the faltering nature of our democracy itself.</p>

pmg/templates/pr6/articles/kevin-deveaux.html

@@ -60,6 +60,11 @@ <h3>3. Administrative Autonomy</h3>
 
     <p>In <strong>Sri Lanka</strong>, the Parliament consists of a unicameral legislature, comprised of elected representatives from across the country. The Constitution of Sri Lanka provides a legal framework for parliamentary autonomy, delineating the powers and functions of the legislative branch. It grants the Secretary General of the Parliament the status of a constitutional officer and grants the post the autonomy to hire and manage staff.<sup data-fn="7">7</sup></p>
 
+    <div class="article-image">
+        <img src="/static/resources/images/pr6/sri-lanka-parliament.jpeg" />
+        <div class="image-caption">Sri Lanka Parliament</div>
+    </div>
+
     <p>The brief constitutional provisions have been further entrenched through the <em>Parliamentary Staffs Act</em>.<sup data-fn="8">8</sup> That Act is also brief, but has been the foundation for the autonomy of the Parliament and its administration, including the autonomy of the Secretary-General to manage staff. Through this legal framework, the Parliament has been able to maintain de jure and de facto administrative autonomy. This has allowed the institution to maintain a cadre of specialised administrative support for MPs, committees and the Parliament, which is important for preserving and maintaining institutional memory and professional expertise.</p>
 
     <h3>4. Financial Autonomy</h3>
@@ -74,6 +79,11 @@ <h3>4. Financial Autonomy</h3>
 
     <p>In <strong>Malaysia</strong>, the Parliament is overseen by a Chief Administrator, responsible for the administrative and financial matters of Parliament, who is selected from the Public Service. Additionally, there are two Secretaries of the Parliament: the Clerk of the Senate and the Clerk of the House of Representatives, both appointed by His Majesty the King of Malaysia as per the Constitution.</p>
 
+    <div class="article-image">
+        <img src="/static/resources/images/pr6/malaysia-houses-of-parliament.jpg" />
+        <div class="image-caption">Malaysia Parliament</div>
+    </div>
+
     <p>With the Chief Administrator being appointed and reporting to the executive, this means, for financial matters, the Parliament has almost no autonomy over how it spends the funds allocated to the institution through the annual state budget.</p>
 
     <p>In <strong>Sri Lanka</strong>, Parliament must request funding each year through the annual state budget. Despite the budget having to be approved and endorsed by the Parliament each year, the institution provides its request for funding to the Ministry of Finance and will then wait for the determination from the Ministry as to the final allocation of annual funds. The same legislation that established the autonomy of the parliamentary administration was intended to also have financial regulations incorporated that would have enabled the Parliament to establish the internal systems that are required to allow for the institution to be autonomy financially. However, to date, no such regulations or any other legal instrument have been adopted to allow for the Parliament to function autonomously. Without such autonomy, the Parliament is unable to address many of the key reforms it wants to implement, as it lacks the resources to accomplish what it wants to achieve.</p>