change authors to DE

cntr-monitor/content/en/issues/2024/posts/1_dual-use.mdx

@@ -45,11 +45,11 @@ tags:
 - Weapons of mass destruction
 
 authors:
-- c-daase-en
-- m-goettsche-en
-- n-schoernig-en
-- t-marauhn-en
-- u-jakob-en
+- c-daase
+- m-goettsche
+- u-jakob
+- t-marauhn
+- n-schoernig
 ---
 
 <Leadin>In the realm</Leadin> of traditional military national security, a commodity is usually understood to be dual use if it has legitimate civilian as well as military applications—some necessary adaptations notwithstanding.[^1] The same definition applies in the broader realm of international peace and security.[^2] The term “commodity” includes physical artifacts as well as software or basic technologies. While many goods or technologies fall under this definition in principle, a dual use good must more specifically be a “major or key element for indigenous development, production, use or enhancement of military capabilities.”[^3] The use of such goods or technologies can encompass legitimate military applications, but it can also include illegitimate use when the goods or technologies are employed in ways that are not compatible with international legal obligations, including international humanitarian law (IHL). Beyond the classical dichotomy of civilian and military use, the term “dual use” can also be applied when legitimate, well-intentioned research does not have military applications per se, but could still be misused for malign purposes such as illegal weapons programs or criminal or terrorist acts.