remove extra space

cntr-monitor/content/en/issues/2024/posts/7_edt.mdx

@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ tags:
 -	Explosives
 -	France
 -	Gaza
--	Germany Secret ServicesExec
+-	Germany Secret Services
 -	Human enhancement
 -	Hypersonic systems
 -	intelligence services
@@ -269,7 +269,7 @@ The analysis also shows that certain technologies are considered relevant by pra
 
 It is also interesting how the discussion evolving around dual-use technologies finds its way into national security strategies. On the one hand, the strategies are used to describe the intent of an adversary to use technology that is interchangeable between the civilian and military domains. One example is the USA’s NSS from 2022, where the PRC is referred to as an actor that repurposes the scientific findings of civilian research to profit from dual-use aspects for military applications. A closer look at other NSSs reveals that building bridges between civilian and military technologies is not an exception. The NSSs of Japan, Pakistan, the Republic of Korea, and Russia emphasize that the transfer of knowledge from the private, economic, and civilian sectors to the military domain could help to further enhance military technologies.
 
-In this regard, it is essential to consider how national positions on technology in the context of the NSSs impact discussions about the problem of dual-use technologies, especially in light of increasing global competition, in which such technologies often play a key role. For example, despite many German universities having civil clauses, there is also a long tradition of coordination between the Federal Ministry of Education and Research (BMBF) and the Ministry of Defence (BMVg).
+In this regard, it is essential to consider how national positions on technology in the context of the NSSs impact discussions about the problem of dual-use technologies, especially in light of increasing global competition, in which such technologies often play a key role. For example, despite many German universities having civil clauses, there is also a long tradition of coordination between the Federal Ministry of Education and Research (BMBF) and the Ministry of Defense (BMVg).
 
 However, our analysis also shows that more in-depth research is needed and that the NSSs do not tell the whole story . One of the reasons for this is that the broad-based security strategies, in particular, do not differentiate between technologies that are civilian use only or dual-use, technologies that represent a continuation of an existing technology at a higher level and genuinely new, emergent technologies that provide the military with completely new capabilities and may also have a disruptive effect. Many questions therefore remain unanswered, which further research by CNTR will address. For when it comes to the question of regulation and even arms control, the fact that many of the technologies seen as relevant are indeed dual use will make it harder to find solutions that the majority of actors can agree on. The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) proves that it is not unfeasible to implement strict verification measures even in an area where there is a possibility of unlawful use. However,  long-established normative reservations, which do not apply to many “emerging” technologies, also play a role here. International endeavors are currently underway, such as the discussion in the CCW about lethal autonomous weapon systems. Approaches to cyber arms control do exist, even though they are still in their infancy. There are strategies to regulate, for example, the hardware needed for high performance and with the REAIM conference initiated by the Netherlands and the Republic of South Korea, an international forum is beginning to form to discuss the responsible use of military AI.