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Update dependency Jinja2 to v3.1.6 [SECURITY] #166

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@renovate renovate bot commented Aug 6, 2024

This PR contains the following updates:

Package Change Age Adoption Passing Confidence
Jinja2 (changelog) ==3.1.4 -> ==3.1.6 age adoption passing confidence

GitHub Vulnerability Alerts

CVE-2024-56326

An oversight in how the Jinja sandboxed environment detects calls to str.format allows an attacker that controls the content of a template to execute arbitrary Python code.

To exploit the vulnerability, an attacker needs to control the content of a template. Whether that is the case depends on the type of application using Jinja. This vulnerability impacts users of applications which execute untrusted templates.

Jinja's sandbox does catch calls to str.format and ensures they don't escape the sandbox. However, it's possible to store a reference to a malicious string's format method, then pass that to a filter that calls it. No such filters are built-in to Jinja, but could be present through custom filters in an application. After the fix, such indirect calls are also handled by the sandbox.

CVE-2024-56201

A bug in the Jinja compiler allows an attacker that controls both the content and filename of a template to execute arbitrary Python code, regardless of if Jinja's sandbox is used.

To exploit the vulnerability, an attacker needs to control both the filename and the contents of a template. Whether that is the case depends on the type of application using Jinja. This vulnerability impacts users of applications which execute untrusted templates where the template author can also choose the template filename.

CVE-2025-27516

An oversight in how the Jinja sandboxed environment interacts with the |attr filter allows an attacker that controls the content of a template to execute arbitrary Python code.

To exploit the vulnerability, an attacker needs to control the content of a template. Whether that is the case depends on the type of application using Jinja. This vulnerability impacts users of applications which execute untrusted templates.

Jinja's sandbox does catch calls to str.format and ensures they don't escape the sandbox. However, it's possible to use the |attr filter to get a reference to a string's plain format method, bypassing the sandbox. After the fix, the |attr filter no longer bypasses the environment's attribute lookup.


Release Notes

pallets/jinja (Jinja2)

v3.1.6

Compare Source

This is the Jinja 3.1.6 security release, which fixes security issues but does not otherwise change behavior and should not result in breaking changes compared to the latest feature release.

PyPI: https://pypi.org/project/Jinja2/3.1.6/
Changes: https://jinja.palletsprojects.com/en/stable/changes/#version-3-1-6

  • The |attr filter does not bypass the environment's attribute lookup, allowing the sandbox to apply its checks. GHSA-cpwx-vrp4-4pq7

v3.1.5

Compare Source

Released 2024-12-21

  • The sandboxed environment handles indirect calls to str.format, such as
    by passing a stored reference to a filter that calls its argument.
    :ghsa:q2x7-8rv6-6q7h
  • Escape template name before formatting it into error messages, to avoid
    issues with names that contain f-string syntax.
    :issue:1792, :ghsa:gmj6-6f8f-6699
  • Sandbox does not allow clear and pop on known mutable sequence
    types. :issue:2032
  • Calling sync render for an async template uses asyncio.run.
    :pr:1952
  • Avoid unclosed auto_aiter warnings. :pr:1960
  • Return an aclose-able AsyncGenerator from
    Template.generate_async. :pr:1960
  • Avoid leaving root_render_func() unclosed in
    Template.generate_async. :pr:1960
  • Avoid leaving async generators unclosed in blocks, includes and extends.
    :pr:1960
  • The runtime uses the correct concat function for the current environment
    when calling block references. :issue:1701
  • Make |unique async-aware, allowing it to be used after another
    async-aware filter. :issue:1781
  • |int filter handles OverflowError from scientific notation.
    :issue:1921
  • Make compiling deterministic for tuple unpacking in a {% set ... %}
    call. :issue:2021
  • Fix dunder protocol (copy/pickle/etc) interaction with Undefined
    objects. :issue:2025
  • Fix copy/pickle support for the internal missing object.
    :issue:2027
  • Environment.overlay(enable_async) is applied correctly. :pr:2061
  • The error message from FileSystemLoader includes the paths that were
    searched. :issue:1661
  • PackageLoader shows a clearer error message when the package does not
    contain the templates directory. :issue:1705
  • Improve annotations for methods returning copies. :pr:1880
  • urlize does not add mailto: to values like @a@b. :pr:1870
  • Tests decorated with @pass_context`` can be used with the ``|select`` filter. :issue:1624`
  • Using set for multiple assignment (a, b = 1, 2) does not fail when the
    target is a namespace attribute. :issue:1413
  • Using set in all branches of {% if %}{% elif %}{% else %} blocks
    does not cause the variable to be considered initially undefined.
    :issue:1253

Configuration

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This PR was generated by Mend Renovate. View the repository job log.

@renovate renovate bot changed the title Update dependency Jinja2 to v3.1.4 [SECURITY] Update dependency Jinja2 to v3.1.5 [SECURITY] Dec 24, 2024
@renovate renovate bot force-pushed the renovate/pypi-jinja2-vulnerability branch from 33fa602 to e53de3f Compare December 24, 2024 00:42
@renovate renovate bot force-pushed the renovate/pypi-jinja2-vulnerability branch from e53de3f to ca54830 Compare January 13, 2025 07:21
@renovate renovate bot changed the title Update dependency Jinja2 to v3.1.5 [SECURITY] Update dependency Jinja2 to v3.1.6 [SECURITY] Mar 6, 2025
@renovate renovate bot force-pushed the renovate/pypi-jinja2-vulnerability branch from ca54830 to d12c7bb Compare March 6, 2025 04:54
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