Impact
Affected configurations:
- Single-origin JupyterHub deployments
- JupyterHub deployments with user-controlled applications running on subdomains or peer subdomains of either the Hub or a single-user server.
By tricking a user into visiting a malicious subdomain, the attacker can achieve an XSS directly affecting the former's session. More precisely, in the context of JupyterHub, this XSS could achieve the following:
- Full access to JupyterHub API and user's single-user server, e.g.
- Create and exfiltrate an API Token
- Exfiltrate all files hosted on the user's single-user server: notebooks, images, etc.
- Install malicious extensions. They can be used as a backdoor to silently regain access to victim's session anytime.
Patches
To prevent cookie-tossing:
- Upgrade to JupyterHub 4.1 (both hub and user environment)
- enable per-user domains via
c.JupyterHub.subdomain_host = "https://mydomain.example.org"
- set
c.JupyterHub.cookie_host_prefix_enabled = True
to enable domain-locked cookies
or, if available (applies to earlier JupyterHub versions):
- deploy jupyterhub on its own domain, not shared with any other services
- enable per-user domains via
c.JupyterHub.subdomain_host = "https://mydomain.example.org"
References
Impact
Affected configurations:
By tricking a user into visiting a malicious subdomain, the attacker can achieve an XSS directly affecting the former's session. More precisely, in the context of JupyterHub, this XSS could achieve the following:
Patches
To prevent cookie-tossing:
c.JupyterHub.subdomain_host = "https://mydomain.example.org"
c.JupyterHub.cookie_host_prefix_enabled = True
to enable domain-locked cookiesor, if available (applies to earlier JupyterHub versions):
c.JupyterHub.subdomain_host = "https://mydomain.example.org"
References