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Rancher 'Audit Log' leaks sensitive information

High severity GitHub Reviewed Published Feb 8, 2024 in rancher/rancher • Updated Oct 16, 2024

Package

gomod github.com/rancher/rancher (Go)

Affected versions

>= 2.6.0, < 2.6.14
>= 2.7.0, < 2.7.10
>= 2.8.0, < 2.8.2

Patched versions

2.6.14
2.7.10
2.8.2

Description

Impact

A vulnerability has been identified which may lead to sensitive data being leaked into Rancher's audit logs. Rancher Audit Logging is an opt-in feature, only deployments that have it enabled and have AUDIT_LEVEL set to 1 or above are impacted by this issue.

The leaks might be caught in the audit logs upon these actions:

  • Creating cloud credentials or new authentication providers. It is crucial to note that all authentication providers (such as AzureAD) and cloud providers (such as Google) are impacted.
  • Downloading a kubeconfig file from a downstream or a local cluster.
  • Logging in/out from Rancher.

The affected data may include the following:

  • HTTP headers
Field Location
X-Api-Auth-Header Request header
X-Api-Set-Cookie-Header Response header
X-Amz-Security-Token Request header
credentials Request body
applicationSecret Request Body
oauthCredential Request Body
serviceAccountCredential Request Body
spKey Request Body
spCert Request body
spCert Response body
certificate Request body
privateKey Request body
  • API Server calls returning Secret objects (including sub-types, such as kubernetes.io/dockerconfigjson).
  • Raw command lines used by agents to connect to the Rancher server which expose sensitive information (e.g. register ... --token abc).
  • Kubeconfig contents when the 'Download KubeConfig' feature is used in the Rancher UI.

The patched versions will redact the sensitive data, replacing it with [redacted], making it safer for consumption. It is recommended that static secrets are rotated after the system is patched, to limit the potential impact of sensitive data being misused due to this vulnerability.

Note:

  1. The severity of the vulnerability is intricately tied to the logging strategy employed. If logs are kept locally (default configuration), the impact is contained within the system, limiting the exposure.
    However, when logs are shipped to an external endpoint, the vulnerability's severity might increase, as resistance against leaks is contingent on the security measures implemented at the external log collector level.
  2. The final impact severity for confidentiality, integrity and availability is dependent on the permissions that the leaked credentials have on their own services.

Patches

Patched versions include releases 2.6.14, 2.7.10 and 2.8.2.

Workarounds

If AUDIT_LEVEL 1 or above is required and you cannot update to a patched Rancher version, ensure that the log is handled appropriately and it is not shared with other users or shipped into a log ingestion solution without the appropriate RBAC enforcement. Otherwise, disabling the Audit feature or decreasing it to the audit level 0, mitigates the issue.

For more information

If you have any questions or comments about this advisory:

References

@andypitcher andypitcher published to rancher/rancher Feb 8, 2024
Published to the GitHub Advisory Database Feb 8, 2024
Reviewed Feb 8, 2024
Published by the National Vulnerability Database Oct 16, 2024
Last updated Oct 16, 2024

Severity

High

CVSS overall score

This score calculates overall vulnerability severity from 0 to 10 and is based on the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS).
/ 10

CVSS v4 base metrics

Exploitability Metrics
Attack Vector Network
Attack Complexity Low
Attack Requirements None
Privileges Required High
User interaction Passive
Vulnerable System Impact Metrics
Confidentiality High
Integrity None
Availability None
Subsequent System Impact Metrics
Confidentiality High
Integrity High
Availability High

CVSS v4 base metrics

Exploitability Metrics
Attack Vector: This metric reflects the context by which vulnerability exploitation is possible. This metric value (and consequently the resulting severity) will be larger the more remote (logically, and physically) an attacker can be in order to exploit the vulnerable system. The assumption is that the number of potential attackers for a vulnerability that could be exploited from across a network is larger than the number of potential attackers that could exploit a vulnerability requiring physical access to a device, and therefore warrants a greater severity.
Attack Complexity: This metric captures measurable actions that must be taken by the attacker to actively evade or circumvent existing built-in security-enhancing conditions in order to obtain a working exploit. These are conditions whose primary purpose is to increase security and/or increase exploit engineering complexity. A vulnerability exploitable without a target-specific variable has a lower complexity than a vulnerability that would require non-trivial customization. This metric is meant to capture security mechanisms utilized by the vulnerable system.
Attack Requirements: This metric captures the prerequisite deployment and execution conditions or variables of the vulnerable system that enable the attack. These differ from security-enhancing techniques/technologies (ref Attack Complexity) as the primary purpose of these conditions is not to explicitly mitigate attacks, but rather, emerge naturally as a consequence of the deployment and execution of the vulnerable system.
Privileges Required: This metric describes the level of privileges an attacker must possess prior to successfully exploiting the vulnerability. The method by which the attacker obtains privileged credentials prior to the attack (e.g., free trial accounts), is outside the scope of this metric. Generally, self-service provisioned accounts do not constitute a privilege requirement if the attacker can grant themselves privileges as part of the attack.
User interaction: This metric captures the requirement for a human user, other than the attacker, to participate in the successful compromise of the vulnerable system. This metric determines whether the vulnerability can be exploited solely at the will of the attacker, or whether a separate user (or user-initiated process) must participate in some manner.
Vulnerable System Impact Metrics
Confidentiality: This metric measures the impact to the confidentiality of the information managed by the VULNERABLE SYSTEM due to a successfully exploited vulnerability. Confidentiality refers to limiting information access and disclosure to only authorized users, as well as preventing access by, or disclosure to, unauthorized ones.
Integrity: This metric measures the impact to integrity of a successfully exploited vulnerability. Integrity refers to the trustworthiness and veracity of information. Integrity of the VULNERABLE SYSTEM is impacted when an attacker makes unauthorized modification of system data. Integrity is also impacted when a system user can repudiate critical actions taken in the context of the system (e.g. due to insufficient logging).
Availability: This metric measures the impact to the availability of the VULNERABLE SYSTEM resulting from a successfully exploited vulnerability. While the Confidentiality and Integrity impact metrics apply to the loss of confidentiality or integrity of data (e.g., information, files) used by the system, this metric refers to the loss of availability of the impacted system itself, such as a networked service (e.g., web, database, email). Since availability refers to the accessibility of information resources, attacks that consume network bandwidth, processor cycles, or disk space all impact the availability of a system.
Subsequent System Impact Metrics
Confidentiality: This metric measures the impact to the confidentiality of the information managed by the SUBSEQUENT SYSTEM due to a successfully exploited vulnerability. Confidentiality refers to limiting information access and disclosure to only authorized users, as well as preventing access by, or disclosure to, unauthorized ones.
Integrity: This metric measures the impact to integrity of a successfully exploited vulnerability. Integrity refers to the trustworthiness and veracity of information. Integrity of the SUBSEQUENT SYSTEM is impacted when an attacker makes unauthorized modification of system data. Integrity is also impacted when a system user can repudiate critical actions taken in the context of the system (e.g. due to insufficient logging).
Availability: This metric measures the impact to the availability of the SUBSEQUENT SYSTEM resulting from a successfully exploited vulnerability. While the Confidentiality and Integrity impact metrics apply to the loss of confidentiality or integrity of data (e.g., information, files) used by the system, this metric refers to the loss of availability of the impacted system itself, such as a networked service (e.g., web, database, email). Since availability refers to the accessibility of information resources, attacks that consume network bandwidth, processor cycles, or disk space all impact the availability of a system.
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:H/UI:P/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H

EPSS score

1.393%
(87th percentile)

Weaknesses

CVE ID

CVE-2023-22649

GHSA ID

GHSA-xfj7-qf8w-2gcr

Source code

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