Update codeowners (open-quantum-safe#458)

* prepare fixing open-quantum-safe#457 Signed-off-by: Michael Baentsch <57787676+baentsch@users.noreply.github.com> * refactor for proper code ownership tagging Signed-off-by: Michael Baentsch <57787676+baentsch@users.noreply.github.com> --------- Signed-off-by: Michael Baentsch <57787676+baentsch@users.noreply.github.com>
beldmit · Aug 3, 2024 · 8a2b5bc · 8a2b5bc
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diff --git a/.github/CODEOWNERS b/.github/CODEOWNERS
@@ -1,3 +1,10 @@
 # https://docs.github.com/en/github/creating-cloning-and-archiving-repositories/about-code-owners
 
 * @baentsch
+/oqsprov/oqs_hyb_kem.c @bhess
+/oqs-template/generate.yml @baentsch @bhess @feventura
+/CMakeLists.txt @baentsch @thb-sb
+/.circleci/config.yml @baentsch @thb-sb
+/.github/workflows @baentsch @thb-sb
+/oqsprov/oqs_sig.c @baentsch @feventura
+/scripts/oqsprovider-pkcs12gen.sh @iyanmv
diff --git a/CONTRIBUTING.md b/CONTRIBUTING.md
@@ -22,6 +22,12 @@ All PRs should move to "Ready for Review" stage only if all CI tests pass (are g
 The OQS core team is happy to provide feedback also to Draft PRs in order to improve
 them before the final "Review" stage.
 
+### CODEOWNERS
+
+This file is used to track which contributors are most well suited for reviewing
+changes to specific sections, typically because they authored part or all of them.
+Thus, any PR should revisit and possibly update this file suitably.
+
 ### Coding style
 
 This project has adopted the [OpenSSL coding style](https://www.openssl.org/policies/technical/coding-style.html).

diff --git a/README.md b/README.md
@@ -178,16 +178,16 @@ Team
 
 Contributors to the `oqsprovider` include:
 
-- Michael Baentsch
-- Christian Paquin
-- Richard Levitte
-- Basil Hess
-- Julian Segeth
-- Alex Zaslavsky
-- Will Childs-Klein
-- Thomas Bailleux
-- Felipe Ventura
-- Iyán Méndez Veiga
+- Michael Baentsch (initial author and maintainer; responsible for all code except as listed per specific contributions below)
+- Christian Paquin (original OpenSSL111 OQS integrator)
+- Richard Levitte (OpenSSL provider wizard and initial `cmake` setup)
+- Basil Hess (hybrid KEM integration & pqcrystals/mayo OID management)
+- Julian Segeth (some memory management improvements)
+- Alex Zaslavsky (improvements on OpenSSL integration)
+- Will Childs-Klein (improvements on Kyber hybrid OIDs)
+- Thomas Bailleux (many build, CI and usage improvements for different platforms)
+- Felipe Ventura (composite sig integration and OID management)
+- Iyán Méndez Veiga (PKCS#12 testing)
 
 History
 -------

diff --git a/oqsprov/oqs_hyb_kem.c b/oqsprov/oqs_hyb_kem.c
@@ -0,0 +1,239 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 AND MIT
+
+/*
+ * OQS OpenSSL 3 provider
+ *
+ * Hybrid KEM code.
+ *
+ */
+
+static OSSL_FUNC_kem_encapsulate_fn oqs_hyb_kem_encaps;
+static OSSL_FUNC_kem_decapsulate_fn oqs_hyb_kem_decaps;
+
+/// EVP KEM functions
+
+static int oqs_evp_kem_encaps_keyslot(void *vpkemctx, unsigned char *ct,
+                                      size_t *ctlen, unsigned char *secret,
+                                      size_t *secretlen, int keyslot)
+{
+    int ret = OQS_SUCCESS, ret2 = 0;
+
+    const PROV_OQSKEM_CTX *pkemctx = (PROV_OQSKEM_CTX *)vpkemctx;
+    const OQSX_EVP_CTX *evp_ctx = pkemctx->kem->oqsx_provider_ctx.oqsx_evp_ctx;
+
+    size_t pubkey_kexlen = 0;
+    size_t kexDeriveLen = 0, pkeylen = 0;
+    unsigned char *pubkey_kex = pkemctx->kem->comp_pubkey[keyslot];
+
+    // Free at err:
+    EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx = NULL, *kgctx = NULL;
+    ;
+    EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL, *peerpk = NULL;
+    unsigned char *ctkex_encoded = NULL;
+
+    pubkey_kexlen = evp_ctx->evp_info->length_public_key;
+    kexDeriveLen = evp_ctx->evp_info->kex_length_secret;
+
+    *ctlen = pubkey_kexlen;
+    *secretlen = kexDeriveLen;
+
+    if (ct == NULL || secret == NULL) {
+        OQS_KEM_PRINTF3("EVP KEM returning lengths %ld and %ld\n", *ctlen,
+                        *secretlen);
+        return 1;
+    }
+
+    peerpk = EVP_PKEY_new();
+    ON_ERR_SET_GOTO(!peerpk, ret, -1, err);
+
+    ret2 = EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(peerpk, evp_ctx->keyParam);
+    ON_ERR_SET_GOTO(ret2 <= 0, ret, -1, err);
+
+    ret2 = EVP_PKEY_set1_encoded_public_key(peerpk, pubkey_kex, pubkey_kexlen);
+    ON_ERR_SET_GOTO(ret2 <= 0, ret, -1, err);
+
+    kgctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(evp_ctx->keyParam, NULL);
+    ON_ERR_SET_GOTO(!kgctx, ret, -1, err);
+
+    ret2 = EVP_PKEY_keygen_init(kgctx);
+    ON_ERR_SET_GOTO(ret2 != 1, ret, -1, err);
+
+    ret2 = EVP_PKEY_keygen(kgctx, &pkey);
+    ON_ERR_SET_GOTO(ret2 != 1, ret, -1, err);
+
+    ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey, NULL);
+    ON_ERR_SET_GOTO(!ctx, ret, -1, err);
+
+    ret = EVP_PKEY_derive_init(ctx);
+    ON_ERR_SET_GOTO(ret <= 0, ret, -1, err);
+
+    ret = EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(ctx, peerpk);
+    ON_ERR_SET_GOTO(ret <= 0, ret, -1, err);
+
+    ret = EVP_PKEY_derive(ctx, secret, &kexDeriveLen);
+    ON_ERR_SET_GOTO(ret <= 0, ret, -1, err);
+
+    pkeylen = EVP_PKEY_get1_encoded_public_key(pkey, &ctkex_encoded);
+    ON_ERR_SET_GOTO(pkeylen <= 0 || !ctkex_encoded || pkeylen != pubkey_kexlen,
+                    ret, -1, err);
+
+    memcpy(ct, ctkex_encoded, pkeylen);
+
+err:
+    EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx);
+    EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(kgctx);
+    EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+    EVP_PKEY_free(peerpk);
+    OPENSSL_free(ctkex_encoded);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+static int oqs_evp_kem_decaps_keyslot(void *vpkemctx, unsigned char *secret,
+                                      size_t *secretlen,
+                                      const unsigned char *ct, size_t ctlen,
+                                      int keyslot)
+{
+    OQS_KEM_PRINTF("OQS KEM provider called: oqs_hyb_kem_decaps\n");
+
+    int ret = OQS_SUCCESS, ret2 = 0;
+    const PROV_OQSKEM_CTX *pkemctx = (PROV_OQSKEM_CTX *)vpkemctx;
+    const OQSX_EVP_CTX *evp_ctx = pkemctx->kem->oqsx_provider_ctx.oqsx_evp_ctx;
+
+    size_t pubkey_kexlen = evp_ctx->evp_info->length_public_key;
+    size_t kexDeriveLen = evp_ctx->evp_info->kex_length_secret;
+    unsigned char *privkey_kex = pkemctx->kem->comp_privkey[keyslot];
+    size_t privkey_kexlen = evp_ctx->evp_info->length_private_key;
+
+    // Free at err:
+    EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+    EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL, *peerpkey = NULL;
+
+    *secretlen = kexDeriveLen;
+    if (secret == NULL)
+        return 1;
+
+    if (evp_ctx->evp_info->raw_key_support) {
+        pkey = EVP_PKEY_new_raw_private_key(evp_ctx->evp_info->keytype, NULL,
+                                            privkey_kex, privkey_kexlen);
+        ON_ERR_SET_GOTO(!pkey, ret, -10, err);
+    } else {
+        pkey = d2i_AutoPrivateKey(&pkey, (const unsigned char **)&privkey_kex,
+                                  privkey_kexlen);
+        ON_ERR_SET_GOTO(!pkey, ret, -2, err);
+    }
+
+    peerpkey = EVP_PKEY_new();
+    ON_ERR_SET_GOTO(!peerpkey, ret, -3, err);
+
+    ret2 = EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(peerpkey, evp_ctx->keyParam);
+    ON_ERR_SET_GOTO(ret2 <= 0, ret, -4, err);
+
+    ret2 = EVP_PKEY_set1_encoded_public_key(peerpkey, ct, pubkey_kexlen);
+    ON_ERR_SET_GOTO(ret2 <= 0 || !peerpkey, ret, -5, err);
+
+    ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey, NULL);
+    ON_ERR_SET_GOTO(!ctx, ret, -6, err);
+
+    ret = EVP_PKEY_derive_init(ctx);
+    ON_ERR_SET_GOTO(ret <= 0, ret, -7, err);
+    ret = EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(ctx, peerpkey);
+    ON_ERR_SET_GOTO(ret <= 0, ret, -8, err);
+
+    ret = EVP_PKEY_derive(ctx, secret, &kexDeriveLen);
+    ON_ERR_SET_GOTO(ret <= 0, ret, -9, err);
+
+err:
+    EVP_PKEY_free(peerpkey);
+    EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+    EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+/// Hybrid KEM functions
+
+static int oqs_hyb_kem_encaps(void *vpkemctx, unsigned char *ct, size_t *ctlen,
+                              unsigned char *secret, size_t *secretlen)
+{
+    int ret = OQS_SUCCESS;
+    const PROV_OQSKEM_CTX *pkemctx = (PROV_OQSKEM_CTX *)vpkemctx;
+    size_t secretLen0 = 0, secretLen1 = 0;
+    size_t ctLen0 = 0, ctLen1 = 0;
+    unsigned char *ct0, *ct1, *secret0, *secret1;
+
+    ret = oqs_evp_kem_encaps_keyslot(vpkemctx, NULL, &ctLen0, NULL, &secretLen0,
+                                     0);
+    ON_ERR_SET_GOTO(ret <= 0, ret, OQS_ERROR, err);
+    ret = oqs_qs_kem_encaps_keyslot(vpkemctx, NULL, &ctLen1, NULL, &secretLen1,
+                                    1);
+    ON_ERR_SET_GOTO(ret <= 0, ret, OQS_ERROR, err);
+
+    *ctlen = ctLen0 + ctLen1;
+    *secretlen = secretLen0 + secretLen1;
+
+    if (ct == NULL || secret == NULL) {
+        OQS_KEM_PRINTF3("HYB KEM returning lengths %ld and %ld\n", *ctlen,
+                        *secretlen);
+        return 1;
+    }
+
+    ct0 = ct;
+    ct1 = ct + ctLen0;
+    secret0 = secret;
+    secret1 = secret + secretLen0;
+
+    ret = oqs_evp_kem_encaps_keyslot(vpkemctx, ct0, &ctLen0, secret0,
+                                     &secretLen0, 0);
+    ON_ERR_SET_GOTO(ret <= 0, ret, OQS_ERROR, err);
+
+    ret = oqs_qs_kem_encaps_keyslot(vpkemctx, ct1, &ctLen1, secret1,
+                                    &secretLen1, 1);
+    ON_ERR_SET_GOTO(ret <= 0, ret, OQS_ERROR, err);
+
+err:
+    return ret;
+}
+
+static int oqs_hyb_kem_decaps(void *vpkemctx, unsigned char *secret,
+                              size_t *secretlen, const unsigned char *ct,
+                              size_t ctlen)
+{
+    int ret = OQS_SUCCESS;
+    const PROV_OQSKEM_CTX *pkemctx = (PROV_OQSKEM_CTX *)vpkemctx;
+    const OQSX_EVP_CTX *evp_ctx = pkemctx->kem->oqsx_provider_ctx.oqsx_evp_ctx;
+    const OQS_KEM *qs_ctx = pkemctx->kem->oqsx_provider_ctx.oqsx_qs_ctx.kem;
+
+    size_t secretLen0 = 0, secretLen1 = 0;
+    size_t ctLen0 = 0, ctLen1 = 0;
+    const unsigned char *ct0, *ct1;
+    unsigned char *secret0, *secret1;
+
+    ret = oqs_evp_kem_decaps_keyslot(vpkemctx, NULL, &secretLen0, NULL, 0, 0);
+    ON_ERR_SET_GOTO(ret <= 0, ret, OQS_ERROR, err);
+    ret = oqs_qs_kem_decaps_keyslot(vpkemctx, NULL, &secretLen1, NULL, 0, 1);
+    ON_ERR_SET_GOTO(ret <= 0, ret, OQS_ERROR, err);
+
+    *secretlen = secretLen0 + secretLen1;
+
+    if (secret == NULL)
+        return 1;
+
+    ctLen0 = evp_ctx->evp_info->length_public_key;
+    ctLen1 = qs_ctx->length_ciphertext;
+
+    ON_ERR_SET_GOTO(ctLen0 + ctLen1 != ctlen, ret, OQS_ERROR, err);
+
+    ct0 = ct;
+    ct1 = ct + ctLen0;
+    secret0 = secret;
+    secret1 = secret + secretLen0;
+
+    ret = oqs_evp_kem_decaps_keyslot(vpkemctx, secret0, &secretLen0, ct0,
+                                     ctLen0, 0);
+    ON_ERR_SET_GOTO(ret <= 0, ret, OQS_ERROR, err);
+    ret = oqs_qs_kem_decaps_keyslot(vpkemctx, secret1, &secretLen1, ct1, ctLen1,
+                                    1);
+    ON_ERR_SET_GOTO(ret <= 0, ret, OQS_ERROR, err);
+
+err:
+    return ret;
+}