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signature: add OpenPGP signing mechanism based on Sequoia #2569
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(I'm not an "official" reviewer here, FWIW) I skimmed your code and I have to say it looks generally great. But very similarly to your PR in ostreedev/ostree#3278 it'd be quite nice I think to list out why we're making this change. Especially questions like: Do we still need the openpgp backend too going forward? I do wonder whether it makes sense for such a thing to live separately from this repository. Would it have a stable API/ABI? Of course adding it to this repository suddenly grows the scope of things here from "Go" to "Go, Rust and C" which is not at all a small thing. But, I personally also do like the idea of opening up to thinking about how we use Rust code in this stack too. (To be clear, I am not speaking in any way for the other people who have done 99% of the work in this repository that are not me) |
//go:build !containers_image_openpgp | ||
// +build !containers_image_openpgp | ||
//go:build !containers_image_openpgp && !containers_image_sequoia | ||
// +build !containers_image_openpgp,!containers_image_sequoia |
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Should we default to sequoia or not?
Eventually the build tag, whichever tag it ends up being, should be documented in README.md
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Hey @ueno , I’m very sorry I couldn’t get back to this discussion since … April?, due to a different RHEL priority (… possibly relevant here: sigstore signatures, using the Go standard-library The code in this PR is all good. We do need to figure out packaging, and RH package ownership.
There’s a product discussion motivating the inclusion of this — and I assume product concerns would drive the continued existence of OpenPGP for a number of years. The default … should be kept up to date, but also needs to be somewhat practical to use.
This repository is currently consumed by referencing it in *shrug* That means that adding an entirely new built artifact into this repo would probably not hurt any existing packaging. But one other implication is that different versions of “Podman & friends” can be concurrently installed and include different versions of c/image, i.e. the C-API shared library (in a single system-wide location) will have to maintain a stable ABI to support all of those versions; directly including the Rust+C part in the c/image repo would not allow us to develop the server and client in immediate lockstep, so there’s no direct benefit of using one repo for all. One thing I’m unsure about is assumptions of the Go tooling about repository contents — we have a Podman etc. developers who don’t directly work on signing do need some reasonably convenient way to get an environment which doesn’t panic during process start. For GPGME, we tell them to install existing packages, on both Linux and macOS: https://github.com/containers/image/tree/main?tab=readme-ov-file#building . Something at about that level of hassle (or less) should exist for https://github.com/containers/image/tree/main?tab=readme-ov-file#building , or those developers are going to start sticking |
In the discussion in April, a couple of motivations raised are:
As for the future of the openpgp backend, I agree with @mtrmac that it still has some value to maintain it as a legacy/standalone backend, even if sigstore signatures are preferred.
Not sure if this is an ideal solution, but one option might be to merge mechanism_sequoia.go into mechanism_gpgme.go (rename it accordingly), and make it use the existing GPGME backend as a fallback if it fails to load |
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This adds a new OpenPGP signing mechanism based Sequoia[1]. As Sequoia is written in Rust and doesn't provide a stable C FFI, this integration uses a minimal shared library as a "point solution". To build, first follow the instruction at [2] and install `libpodman_sequoia.so*` into the library path, and then build with the following command from the top-level directory: $ make BUILDTAGS="btrfs_noversion libdm_no_deferred_remove containers_image_sequoia" Note also that, for testing on Fedora, crypto-policies settings might need to be modified to explictly allow SHA-1 and 1024 bit RSA, as the testing keys in signature/fixtures are using those legacy algorithms. 1. https://sequoia-pgp.org/ 2. https://github.com/ueno/podman-sequoia Signed-off-by: Daiki Ueno <dueno@redhat.com>
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That’s interesting … that would certainly eliminate concerns about developers not being able to work on other things. OTOH we’d then need some other mode to run in tests, and in production, to ensure we are using the right backend. |
This adds a new OpenPGP signing mechanism based Sequoia[1]. As Sequoia
is written in Rust and doesn't provide a stable C FFI, this
integration uses a minimal shared library as a "point solution".
To build, first follow the instruction at [2] and install
libpodman_sequoia.so*
into the library path, and then build with thefollowing command from the top-level directory:
Note also that, for testing on Fedora, crypto-policies settings might
need to be modified to explictly allow SHA-1 and 1024 bit RSA, as the
testing keys in signature/fixtures are using those legacy algorithms.