🔒 Security Fix: Validate username in D-Bus calls#81
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Introduced `validate_username` helper function in `src/app/fprint.rs` to enforce strict validation (alphanumeric, -, _, ., max 255 chars) on usernames before passing them to privileged `fprintd` D-Bus methods. This mitigates potential injection risks or malformed data issues. Applied validation to: - `list_enrolled_fingers_dbus` - `delete_fingerprint_dbus` - `delete_fingers` - `clear_all_fingers_dbus` - `enroll_fingerprint_process` Added unit tests to verify validation logic.
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This PR addresses a security vulnerability where usernames were passed to D-Bus calls without validation.
Changes:
validate_usernamefunction insrc/app/fprint.rs.-,_,.).validate_username.Security Impact:
Prevents passing malformed or malicious username strings to the
fprintdservice, reducing the risk of unexpected behavior or potential exploitation.PR created automatically by Jules for task 12948134448153143460 started by @jotuel