Remove commented out todos, line wrap

draft-connolly-tls-mlkem-key-agreement.md

@@ -281,9 +281,9 @@ encapsulation keys and ciphertexts that fall within the TLS constraints.
 Some post-quantum key exchange algorithms, including ML-KEM, have non-zero
 probability of failure, meaning two honest parties may derive different
 shared secrets.  This would cause a handshake failure. ML-KEM has a
-cryptographically small failure rate less than 2^-138; implementers should be aware of the
-potential of handshake failure. Clients can retry if a failure is
-encountered.
+cryptographically small failure rate less than 2^-138; implementers should
+be aware of the potential of handshake failure. Clients can retry if a
+failure is encountered.
 
 # Security Considerations {#security-considerations}
 
@@ -355,10 +355,6 @@ more constraints for secure use in contexts outside of TLS 1.3 handshake key
 agreement. These computational binding properties for KEMs were formalized in
 {{CDM23}}.
 
-<!-- TODO: extrapolate on Kemmy Schmidt implications; in the mlkem document, -->
-<!-- strongly encourage implementers to use the seed variant of FIPS 203 to -->
-<!-- achieve strong binding properties -->
-
 # IANA Considerations
 
 This document requests/registers three new entries to the TLS Named Group