Update index.html

teaching/sov-debt-and-default/index.html

@@ -83,6 +83,7 @@ <h2 id="evidence">Evidence</h2>
 <li>Reinhart, C. M., &amp; Trebesch, C. (2016). Sovereign Debt Relief and its Aftermath. <em>Journal of the European Economic Association</em>, 14(1), 215–251. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1111/jeea.12166">DOI</a></li>
 <li>Aguiar, M., Chatterjee, S., Cole, H., &amp; Stangebye, Z. (2016). Quantitative Models of Sovereign Debt Crises. <em>Handbook of Macroeconomics</em>, 1697–1755. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/bs.hesmac.2016.04.005">DOI</a></li>
 <li>Du, W., &amp; Schreger, J. (2016). Local Currency Sovereign Risk. <em>The Journal of Finance</em>, 71(3), 1027–1070. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1111/jofi.12389">DOI</a></li>
+<li>Hebert, B. &amp; Schreger, J. (2017). The Costs of Sovereign Default: Evidence from Argentina. <em>American Economic Review</em>, 107(10), 3119-3145. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20151667">DOI</a></li>
 <li>Chamon, M., Schumacher, J., &amp; Trebesch, C. (2018). Foreign-law bonds: Can they reduce sovereign borrowing costs? <em>Journal of 
 International Economics</em>, 114, 164–179. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jinteco.2018.06.004">DOI</a></li>
 <li>Cheng, G., Diaz-Cassou, J., &amp; Erce, A. (2018). The macroeconomic effects of official debt restructuring: evidence from the Paris Club. <em>Oxford Economic Papers</em>, 71(2), 344–363. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1093/oep/gpy032">DOI</a></li>