Merge bitcoin#28263: Add fuzz test for FSChaCha20Poly1305, AEADChacha…

…20Poly1305

8607773 Add fuzz test for FSChaCha20Poly1305 (stratospher)
c807f33 Add fuzz test for AEADChacha20Poly1305 (stratospher)

Pull request description:

  This PR adds fuzz tests for `AEADChaCha20Poly1305` and `FSChaCha20Poly1305` introduced in bitcoin#28008.

  Run using:
  ```
  $ FUZZ=crypto_aeadchacha20poly1305 src/test/fuzz/fuzz
  $ FUZZ=crypto_fschacha20poly1305 src/test/fuzz/fuzz
  ```

ACKs for top commit:
  dergoegge:
    tACK 8607773
  marcofleon:
    Tested ACK 8607773. Ran both targets for ~200 CPU hours. Coverage of intended targets looks good to me. The simulation of damaged keys and checks that follow seem useful as well.

Tree-SHA512: b6b85661d896e653caeed330f941fde665fc2bbd97ecd340808a3f365c469fe9134aa77316569a771dc36d1158cac1a5f76700bcfc45fff12aef07562e48feb9

src/Makefile.test.include

@@ -309,6 +309,7 @@ test_fuzz_fuzz_SOURCES = \
  test/fuzz/crypto_aes256.cpp \
  test/fuzz/crypto_aes256cbc.cpp \
  test/fuzz/crypto_chacha20.cpp \
+ test/fuzz/crypto_chacha20poly1305.cpp \
  test/fuzz/crypto_common.cpp \
  test/fuzz/crypto_diff_fuzz_chacha20.cpp \
  test/fuzz/crypto_hkdf_hmac_sha256_l32.cpp \

src/test/fuzz/crypto_chacha20poly1305.cpp

@@ -0,0 +1,200 @@
+// Copyright (c) 2020-2021 The Bitcoin Core developers
+// Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying
+// file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.
+
+#include <crypto/chacha20poly1305.h>
+#include <random.h>
+#include <span.h>
+#include <test/fuzz/FuzzedDataProvider.h>
+#include <test/fuzz/fuzz.h>
+#include <test/fuzz/util.h>
+
+#include <cstddef>
+#include <cstdint>
+#include <vector>
+
+constexpr static inline void crypt_till_rekey(FSChaCha20Poly1305& aead, int rekey_interval, bool encrypt)
+{
+    for (int i = 0; i < rekey_interval; ++i) {
+        std::byte dummy_tag[FSChaCha20Poly1305::EXPANSION] = {{}};
+        if (encrypt) {
+            aead.Encrypt(Span{dummy_tag}.first(0), Span{dummy_tag}.first(0), dummy_tag);
+        } else {
+            aead.Decrypt(dummy_tag, Span{dummy_tag}.first(0), Span{dummy_tag}.first(0));
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+FUZZ_TARGET(crypto_aeadchacha20poly1305)
+{
+    FuzzedDataProvider provider{buffer.data(), buffer.size()};
+
+    auto key = provider.ConsumeBytes<std::byte>(32);
+    key.resize(32);
+    AEADChaCha20Poly1305 aead(key);
+
+    // Initialize RNG deterministically, to generate contents and AAD. We assume that there are no
+    // (potentially buggy) edge cases triggered by specific values of contents/AAD, so we can avoid
+    // reading the actual data for those from the fuzzer input (which would need large amounts of
+    // data).
+    InsecureRandomContext rng(provider.ConsumeIntegral<uint64_t>());
+
+    LIMITED_WHILE(provider.ConsumeBool(), 10000)
+    {
+        // Mode:
+        // - Bit 0: whether to use single-plain Encrypt/Decrypt; otherwise use a split at prefix.
+        // - Bit 2: whether this ciphertext will be corrupted (making it the last sent one)
+        // - Bit 3-4: controls the maximum aad length (max 511 bytes)
+        // - Bit 5-7: controls the maximum content length (max 16383 bytes, for performance reasons)
+        unsigned mode = provider.ConsumeIntegral<uint8_t>();
+        bool use_splits = mode & 1;
+        bool damage = mode & 4;
+        unsigned aad_length_bits = 3 * ((mode >> 3) & 3);
+        unsigned aad_length = provider.ConsumeIntegralInRange<unsigned>(0, (1 << aad_length_bits) - 1);
+        unsigned length_bits = 2 * ((mode >> 5) & 7);
+        unsigned length = provider.ConsumeIntegralInRange<unsigned>(0, (1 << length_bits) - 1);
+        // Generate aad and content.
+        auto aad = rng.randbytes<std::byte>(aad_length);
+        auto plain = rng.randbytes<std::byte>(length);
+        std::vector<std::byte> cipher(length + AEADChaCha20Poly1305::EXPANSION);
+        // Generate nonce
+        AEADChaCha20Poly1305::Nonce96 nonce = {(uint32_t)rng(), rng()};
+
+        if (use_splits && length > 0) {
+            size_t split_index = provider.ConsumeIntegralInRange<size_t>(1, length);
+            aead.Encrypt(Span{plain}.first(split_index), Span{plain}.subspan(split_index), aad, nonce, cipher);
+        } else {
+            aead.Encrypt(plain, aad, nonce, cipher);
+        }
+
+        // Test Keystream output
+        std::vector<std::byte> keystream(length);
+        aead.Keystream(nonce, keystream);
+        for (size_t i = 0; i < length; ++i) {
+            assert((plain[i] ^ keystream[i]) == cipher[i]);
+        }
+
+        std::vector<std::byte> decrypted_contents(length);
+        bool ok{false};
+
+        // damage the key
+        unsigned key_position = provider.ConsumeIntegralInRange<unsigned>(0, 31);
+        std::byte damage_val{(uint8_t)(1U << (key_position & 7))};
+        std::vector<std::byte> bad_key = key;
+        bad_key[key_position] ^= damage_val;
+
+        AEADChaCha20Poly1305 bad_aead(bad_key);
+        ok = bad_aead.Decrypt(cipher, aad, nonce, decrypted_contents);
+        assert(!ok);
+
+        // Optionally damage 1 bit in either the cipher (corresponding to a change in transit)
+        // or the aad (to make sure that decryption will fail if the AAD mismatches).
+        if (damage) {
+            unsigned damage_bit = provider.ConsumeIntegralInRange<unsigned>(0, (cipher.size() + aad.size()) * 8U - 1U);
+            unsigned damage_pos = damage_bit >> 3;
+            std::byte damage_val{(uint8_t)(1U << (damage_bit & 7))};
+            if (damage_pos >= cipher.size()) {
+                aad[damage_pos - cipher.size()] ^= damage_val;
+            } else {
+                cipher[damage_pos] ^= damage_val;
+            }
+        }
+
+        if (use_splits && length > 0) {
+            size_t split_index = provider.ConsumeIntegralInRange<size_t>(1, length);
+            ok = aead.Decrypt(cipher, aad, nonce, Span{decrypted_contents}.first(split_index), Span{decrypted_contents}.subspan(split_index));
+        } else {
+            ok = aead.Decrypt(cipher, aad, nonce, decrypted_contents);
+        }
+
+        // Decryption *must* fail if the packet was damaged, and succeed if it wasn't.
+        assert(!ok == damage);
+        if (!ok) break;
+        assert(decrypted_contents == plain);
+    }
+}
+
+FUZZ_TARGET(crypto_fschacha20poly1305)
+{
+    FuzzedDataProvider provider{buffer.data(), buffer.size()};
+
+    uint32_t rekey_interval = provider.ConsumeIntegralInRange<size_t>(32, 512);
+    auto key = provider.ConsumeBytes<std::byte>(32);
+    key.resize(32);
+    FSChaCha20Poly1305 enc_aead(key, rekey_interval);
+    FSChaCha20Poly1305 dec_aead(key, rekey_interval);
+
+    // Initialize RNG deterministically, to generate contents and AAD. We assume that there are no
+    // (potentially buggy) edge cases triggered by specific values of contents/AAD, so we can avoid
+    // reading the actual data for those from the fuzzer input (which would need large amounts of
+    // data).
+    InsecureRandomContext rng(provider.ConsumeIntegral<uint64_t>());
+
+    LIMITED_WHILE(provider.ConsumeBool(), 10000)
+    {
+        // Mode:
+        // - Bit 0: whether to use single-plain Encrypt/Decrypt; otherwise use a split at prefix.
+        // - Bit 2: whether this ciphertext will be corrupted (making it the last sent one)
+        // - Bit 3-4: controls the maximum aad length (max 511 bytes)
+        // - Bit 5-7: controls the maximum content length (max 16383 bytes, for performance reasons)
+        unsigned mode = provider.ConsumeIntegral<uint8_t>();
+        bool use_splits = mode & 1;
+        bool damage = mode & 4;
+        unsigned aad_length_bits = 3 * ((mode >> 3) & 3);
+        unsigned aad_length = provider.ConsumeIntegralInRange<unsigned>(0, (1 << aad_length_bits) - 1);
+        unsigned length_bits = 2 * ((mode >> 5) & 7);
+        unsigned length = provider.ConsumeIntegralInRange<unsigned>(0, (1 << length_bits) - 1);
+        // Generate aad and content.
+        auto aad = rng.randbytes<std::byte>(aad_length);
+        auto plain = rng.randbytes<std::byte>(length);
+        std::vector<std::byte> cipher(length + FSChaCha20Poly1305::EXPANSION);
+
+        crypt_till_rekey(enc_aead, rekey_interval, true);
+        if (use_splits && length > 0) {
+            size_t split_index = provider.ConsumeIntegralInRange<size_t>(1, length);
+            enc_aead.Encrypt(Span{plain}.first(split_index), Span{plain}.subspan(split_index), aad, cipher);
+        } else {
+            enc_aead.Encrypt(plain, aad, cipher);
+        }
+
+        std::vector<std::byte> decrypted_contents(length);
+        bool ok{false};
+
+        // damage the key
+        unsigned key_position = provider.ConsumeIntegralInRange<unsigned>(0, 31);
+        std::byte damage_val{(uint8_t)(1U << (key_position & 7))};
+        std::vector<std::byte> bad_key = key;
+        bad_key[key_position] ^= damage_val;
+
+        FSChaCha20Poly1305 bad_fs_aead(bad_key, rekey_interval);
+        crypt_till_rekey(bad_fs_aead, rekey_interval, false);
+        ok = bad_fs_aead.Decrypt(cipher, aad, decrypted_contents);
+        assert(!ok);
+
+        // Optionally damage 1 bit in either the cipher (corresponding to a change in transit)
+        // or the aad (to make sure that decryption will fail if the AAD mismatches).
+        if (damage) {
+            unsigned damage_bit = provider.ConsumeIntegralInRange<unsigned>(0, (cipher.size() + aad.size()) * 8U - 1U);
+            unsigned damage_pos = damage_bit >> 3;
+            std::byte damage_val{(uint8_t)(1U << (damage_bit & 7))};
+            if (damage_pos >= cipher.size()) {
+                aad[damage_pos - cipher.size()] ^= damage_val;
+            } else {
+                cipher[damage_pos] ^= damage_val;
+            }
+        }
+
+        crypt_till_rekey(dec_aead, rekey_interval, false);
+        if (use_splits && length > 0) {
+            size_t split_index = provider.ConsumeIntegralInRange<size_t>(1, length);
+            ok = dec_aead.Decrypt(cipher, aad, Span{decrypted_contents}.first(split_index), Span{decrypted_contents}.subspan(split_index));
+        } else {
+            ok = dec_aead.Decrypt(cipher, aad, decrypted_contents);
+        }
+
+        // Decryption *must* fail if the packet was damaged, and succeed if it wasn't.
+        assert(!ok == damage);
+        if (!ok) break;
+        assert(decrypted_contents == plain);
+    }
+}