🚨 [security] Upgrade electron: 4.1.1 → 19.0.4 (major)

[depfu]

---

🚨 Your current dependencies have known security vulnerabilities 🚨

This dependency update fixes known security vulnerabilities. Please see the details below and assess their impact carefully. We recommend to merge and deploy this as soon as possible!

---

Here is everything you need to know about this upgrade. Please take a good look at what changed and the test results before merging this pull request.

What changed?

✳️ electron (4.1.1 → 19.0.4) · Repo

Security Advisories 🚨

🚨 Compromised child renderer processes could obtain IPC access without nodeIntegrationInSubFrames being enabled

Impact

This vulnerability allows a renderer with JS execution to obtain access to a new renderer process with nodeIntegrationInSubFrames enabled which in turn allows effective access to ipcRenderer.

Please note the misleadingly named nodeIntegrationInSubFrames option does not implicitly grant Node.js access rather it depends on the existing sandbox setting. If your application is sandboxed then nodeIntegrationInSubFrames just gives access to the sandboxed renderer APIs (which includes ipcRenderer).

If your application then additionally exposes IPC messages without IPC senderFrame validation that perform privileged actions or return confidential data this access to ipcRenderer can in turn compromise your application / user even with the sandbox enabled.

Patches

This has been patched and the following Electron versions contain the fix:

• 18.0.0-beta.6
• 17.2.0
• 16.2.6
• 15.5.5

Workarounds

Ensure that all IPC message handlers appropriately validate senderFrame as per our security tutorial here.

For more information

If you have any questions or comments about this advisory, email us at security@electronjs.org.

🚨 AutoUpdater module fails to validate certain nested components of the bundle

Impact

This vulnerability allows attackers who have control over a given apps update server / update storage to serve maliciously crafted update packages that pass the code signing validation check but contain malicious code in some components.

Please note that this kind of attack would require significant privileges in your own auto updating infrastructure and the ease of that attack entirely depends on your infrastructure security.

Patches

This has been patched and the following Electron versions contain the fix:

• 18.0.0-beta.6
• 17.2.0
• 16.2.0
• 15.5.0

Workarounds

There are no workarounds for this issue, please update to a patched version of Electron.

For more information

If you have any questions or comments about this advisory, email us at security@electronjs.org.

🚨 AutoUpdater module fails to validate certain nested components of the bundle

Impact

This vulnerability allows attackers who have control over a given apps update server / update storage to serve maliciously crafted update packages that pass the code signing validation check but contain malicious code in some components.

Please note that this kind of attack would require significant privileges in your own auto updating infrastructure and the ease of that attack entirely depends on your infrastructure security.

Patches

This has been patched and the following Electron versions contain the fix:

• 18.0.0-beta.6
• 17.2.0
• 16.2.0
• 15.5.0

Workarounds

There are no workarounds for this issue, please update to a patched version of Electron.

For more information

If you have any questions or comments about this advisory, email us at security@electronjs.org.

🚨 Compromised child renderer processes could obtain IPC access without nodeIntegrationInSubFrames being enabled

Impact

This vulnerability allows a renderer with JS execution to obtain access to a new renderer process with nodeIntegrationInSubFrames enabled which in turn allows effective access to ipcRenderer.

Please note the misleadingly named nodeIntegrationInSubFrames option does not implicitly grant Node.js access rather it depends on the existing sandbox setting. If your application is sandboxed then nodeIntegrationInSubFrames just gives access to the sandboxed renderer APIs (which includes ipcRenderer).

If your application then additionally exposes IPC messages without IPC senderFrame validation that perform privileged actions or return confidential data this access to ipcRenderer can in turn compromise your application / user even with the sandbox enabled.

Patches

This has been patched and the following Electron versions contain the fix:

• 18.0.0-beta.6
• 17.2.0
• 16.2.6
• 15.5.5

Workarounds

Ensure that all IPC message handlers appropriately validate senderFrame as per our security tutorial here.

For more information

If you have any questions or comments about this advisory, email us at security@electronjs.org.

🚨 AutoUpdater module fails to validate certain nested components of the bundle

Impact

This vulnerability allows attackers who have control over a given apps update server / update storage to serve maliciously crafted update packages that pass the code signing validation check but contain malicious code in some components.

Please note that this kind of attack would require significant privileges in your own auto updating infrastructure and the ease of that attack entirely depends on your infrastructure security.

Patches

This has been patched and the following Electron versions contain the fix:

• 18.0.0-beta.6
• 17.2.0
• 16.2.0
• 15.5.0

Workarounds

There are no workarounds for this issue, please update to a patched version of Electron.

For more information

If you have any questions or comments about this advisory, email us at security@electronjs.org.

🚨 Compromised child renderer processes could obtain IPC access without nodeIntegrationInSubFrames being enabled

Impact

This vulnerability allows a renderer with JS execution to obtain access to a new renderer process with nodeIntegrationInSubFrames enabled which in turn allows effective access to ipcRenderer.

Please note the misleadingly named nodeIntegrationInSubFrames option does not implicitly grant Node.js access rather it depends on the existing sandbox setting. If your application is sandboxed then nodeIntegrationInSubFrames just gives access to the sandboxed renderer APIs (which includes ipcRenderer).

If your application then additionally exposes IPC messages without IPC senderFrame validation that perform privileged actions or return confidential data this access to ipcRenderer can in turn compromise your application / user even with the sandbox enabled.

Patches

This has been patched and the following Electron versions contain the fix:

• 18.0.0-beta.6
• 17.2.0
• 16.2.6
• 15.5.5

Workarounds

Ensure that all IPC message handlers appropriately validate senderFrame as per our security tutorial here.

For more information

If you have any questions or comments about this advisory, email us at security@electronjs.org.

🚨 AutoUpdater module fails to validate certain nested components of the bundle

Impact

This vulnerability allows attackers who have control over a given apps update server / update storage to serve maliciously crafted update packages that pass the code signing validation check but contain malicious code in some components.

Please note that this kind of attack would require significant privileges in your own auto updating infrastructure and the ease of that attack entirely depends on your infrastructure security.

Patches

This has been patched and the following Electron versions contain the fix:

• 18.0.0-beta.6
• 17.2.0
• 16.2.0
• 15.5.0

Workarounds

There are no workarounds for this issue, please update to a patched version of Electron.

For more information

If you have any questions or comments about this advisory, email us at security@electronjs.org.

🚨 Compromised child renderer processes could obtain IPC access without nodeIntegrationInSubFrames being enabled

Impact

This vulnerability allows a renderer with JS execution to obtain access to a new renderer process with nodeIntegrationInSubFrames enabled which in turn allows effective access to ipcRenderer.

Please note the misleadingly named nodeIntegrationInSubFrames option does not implicitly grant Node.js access rather it depends on the existing sandbox setting. If your application is sandboxed then nodeIntegrationInSubFrames just gives access to the sandboxed renderer APIs (which includes ipcRenderer).

If your application then additionally exposes IPC messages without IPC senderFrame validation that perform privileged actions or return confidential data this access to ipcRenderer can in turn compromise your application / user even with the sandbox enabled.

Patches

This has been patched and the following Electron versions contain the fix:

• 18.0.0-beta.6
• 17.2.0
• 16.2.6
• 15.5.5

Workarounds

Ensure that all IPC message handlers appropriately validate senderFrame as per our security tutorial here.

For more information

If you have any questions or comments about this advisory, email us at security@electronjs.org.

🚨 Renderers can obtain access to random bluetooth device without permission in Electron

Impact

This vulnerability allows renderers to obtain access to a random bluetooth device via the web bluetooth API if the app has not configured a custom select-bluetooth-device event handler. The device that is accessed is random and the attacker would have no way of selecting a specific device.

All current stable versions of Electron are affected.

Patches

This has been patched and the following Electron versions contain the fix:

• 17.0.0-alpha.6
• 16.0.6
• 15.3.5
• 14.2.4
• 13.6.6

Workarounds

Adding this code to your app can workaround the issue.

app.on('web-contents-created', (event, webContents) => {
  webContents.on('select-bluetooth-device', (event, devices, callback) => {
    // Prevent default behavior
    event.preventDefault();
    // Cancel the request
    callback('');
  });
});

For more information
If you have any questions or comments about this advisory, email us at security@electronjs.org.

🚨 Renderers can obtain access to random bluetooth device without permission in Electron

Impact

This vulnerability allows renderers to obtain access to a random bluetooth device via the web bluetooth API if the app has not configured a custom select-bluetooth-device event handler. The device that is accessed is random and the attacker would have no way of selecting a specific device.

All current stable versions of Electron are affected.

Patches

This has been patched and the following Electron versions contain the fix:

• 17.0.0-alpha.6
• 16.0.6
• 15.3.5
• 14.2.4
• 13.6.6

Workarounds

Adding this code to your app can workaround the issue.

app.on('web-contents-created', (event, webContents) => {
  webContents.on('select-bluetooth-device', (event, devices, callback) => {
    // Prevent default behavior
    event.preventDefault();
    // Cancel the request
    callback('');
  });
});

For more information
If you have any questions or comments about this advisory, email us at security@electronjs.org.

🚨 Renderers can obtain access to random bluetooth device without permission in Electron

Impact

This vulnerability allows renderers to obtain access to a random bluetooth device via the web bluetooth API if the app has not configured a custom select-bluetooth-device event handler. The device that is accessed is random and the attacker would have no way of selecting a specific device.

All current stable versions of Electron are affected.

Patches

This has been patched and the following Electron versions contain the fix:

• 17.0.0-alpha.6
• 16.0.6
• 15.3.5
• 14.2.4
• 13.6.6

Workarounds

Adding this code to your app can workaround the issue.

app.on('web-contents-created', (event, webContents) => {
  webContents.on('select-bluetooth-device', (event, devices, callback) => {
    // Prevent default behavior
    event.preventDefault();
    // Cancel the request
    callback('');
  });
});

For more information
If you have any questions or comments about this advisory, email us at security@electronjs.org.

🚨 Renderers can obtain access to random bluetooth device without permission in Electron

Impact

This vulnerability allows renderers to obtain access to a random bluetooth device via the web bluetooth API if the app has not configured a custom select-bluetooth-device event handler. The device that is accessed is random and the attacker would have no way of selecting a specific device.

All current stable versions of Electron are affected.

Patches

This has been patched and the following Electron versions contain the fix:

• 17.0.0-alpha.6
• 16.0.6
• 15.3.5
• 14.2.4
• 13.6.6

Workarounds

Adding this code to your app can workaround the issue.

app.on('web-contents-created', (event, webContents) => {
  webContents.on('select-bluetooth-device', (event, devices, callback) => {
    // Prevent default behavior
    event.preventDefault();
    // Cancel the request
    callback('');
  });
});

For more information
If you have any questions or comments about this advisory, email us at security@electronjs.org.

🚨 Renderers can obtain access to random bluetooth device without permission in Electron

Impact

This vulnerability allows renderers to obtain access to a random bluetooth device via the web bluetooth API if the app has not configured a custom select-bluetooth-device event handler. The device that is accessed is random and the attacker would have no way of selecting a specific device.

All current stable versions of Electron are affected.

Patches

This has been patched and the following Electron versions contain the fix:

• 17.0.0-alpha.6
• 16.0.6
• 15.3.5
• 14.2.4
• 13.6.6

Workarounds

Adding this code to your app can workaround the issue.

app.on('web-contents-created', (event, webContents) => {
  webContents.on('select-bluetooth-device', (event, devices, callback) => {
    // Prevent default behavior
    event.preventDefault();
    // Cancel the request
    callback('');
  });
});

For more information
If you have any questions or comments about this advisory, email us at security@electronjs.org.

🚨 Sandboxed renderers can obtain thumbnails of arbitrary files through the nativeImage API

Impact

This vulnerability allows a sandboxed renderer to request a "thumbnail" image of an arbitrary file on the user's system. The thumbnail can potentially include significant parts of the original file, including textual data in many cases.

All current stable versions of Electron are affected.

Patches

This was fixed with #30728, and the following Electron versions contain the fix:

• 15.0.0-alpha.10
• 14.0.0
• 13.3.0
• 12.1.0
• 11.5.0

Workarounds

If your app enables contextIsolation, this vulnerability is significantly more difficult for an attacker to exploit.

Further, if your app does not depend on the createThumbnailFromPath API, then you can simply disable the functionality. In the main process, before the 'ready' event:

delete require('electron').nativeImage.createThumbnailFromPath

For more information

If you have any questions or comments about this advisory, email us at security@electronjs.org.

🚨 Sandboxed renderers can obtain thumbnails of arbitrary files through the nativeImage API

Impact

This vulnerability allows a sandboxed renderer to request a "thumbnail" image of an arbitrary file on the user's system. The thumbnail can potentially include significant parts of the original file, including textual data in many cases.

All current stable versions of Electron are affected.

Patches

This was fixed with #30728, and the following Electron versions contain the fix:

• 15.0.0-alpha.10
• 14.0.0
• 13.3.0
• 12.1.0
• 11.5.0

Workarounds

If your app enables contextIsolation, this vulnerability is significantly more difficult for an attacker to exploit.

Further, if your app does not depend on the createThumbnailFromPath API, then you can simply disable the functionality. In the main process, before the 'ready' event:

delete require('electron').nativeImage.createThumbnailFromPath

For more information

If you have any questions or comments about this advisory, email us at security@electronjs.org.

🚨 Sandboxed renderers can obtain thumbnails of arbitrary files through the nativeImage API

Impact

This vulnerability allows a sandboxed renderer to request a "thumbnail" image of an arbitrary file on the user's system. The thumbnail can potentially include significant parts of the original file, including textual data in many cases.

All current stable versions of Electron are affected.

Patches

This was fixed with #30728, and the following Electron versions contain the fix:

• 15.0.0-alpha.10
• 14.0.0
• 13.3.0
• 12.1.0
• 11.5.0

Workarounds

If your app enables contextIsolation, this vulnerability is significantly more difficult for an attacker to exploit.

Further, if your app does not depend on the createThumbnailFromPath API, then you can simply disable the functionality. In the main process, before the 'ready' event:

delete require('electron').nativeImage.createThumbnailFromPath

For more information

If you have any questions or comments about this advisory, email us at security@electronjs.org.

🚨 IPC messages delivered to the wrong frame in Electron

Impact

IPC messages sent from the main process to a subframe in the renderer process, through webContents.sendToFrame, event.reply or when using the remote module, can in some cases be delivered to the wrong frame.

If your app does ANY of the following, then it is impacted by this issue:

• Uses remote
• Calls webContents.sendToFrame
• Calls event.reply in an IPC message handler

Patches

This has been fixed in the following versions:

• 9.4.0
• 10.2.0
• 11.1.0
• 12.0.0-beta.9

Workarounds

There are no workarounds for this issue.

For more information

If you have any questions or comments about this advisory, email us at security@electronjs.org.

🚨 IPC messages delivered to the wrong frame in Electron

Impact

IPC messages sent from the main process to a subframe in the renderer process, through webContents.sendToFrame, event.reply or when using the remote module, can in some cases be delivered to the wrong frame.

If your app does ANY of the following, then it is impacted by this issue:

• Uses remote
• Calls webContents.sendToFrame
• Calls event.reply in an IPC message handler

Patches

This has been fixed in the following versions:

• 9.4.0
• 10.2.0
• 11.1.0
• 12.0.0-beta.9

Workarounds

There are no workarounds for this issue.

For more information

If you have any questions or comments about this advisory, email us at security@electronjs.org.

🚨 IPC messages delivered to the wrong frame in Electron

Impact

IPC messages sent from the main process to a subframe in the renderer process, through webContents.sendToFrame, event.reply or when using the remote module, can in some cases be delivered to the wrong frame.

If your app does ANY of the following, then it is impacted by this issue:

• Uses remote
• Calls webContents.sendToFrame
• Calls event.reply in an IPC message handler

Patches

This has been fixed in the following versions:

• 9.4.0
• 10.2.0
• 11.1.0
• 12.0.0-beta.9

Workarounds

There are no workarounds for this issue.

For more information

If you have any questions or comments about this advisory, email us at security@electronjs.org.

🚨 Context isolation bypass in Electron

Impact

Apps using both contextIsolation and sandbox: true are affected.
Apps using both contextIsolation and nativeWindowOpen: true are affected.

This is a context isolation bypass, meaning that code running in the main world context in the renderer can reach into the isolated Electron context and perform privileged actions.

Workarounds

There are no app-side workarounds, you must update your Electron version to be protected.

Fixed Versions

• 11.0.0-beta.6
• 10.1.2
• 9.3.1
• 8.5.2

For more information

If you have any questions or comments about this advisory:

• Email us at security@electronjs.org

🚨 Context isolation bypass in Electron

Impact

Apps using both contextIsolation and sandbox: true are affected.
Apps using both contextIsolation and nativeWindowOpen: true are affected.

This is a context isolation bypass, meaning that code running in the main world context in the renderer can reach into the isolated Electron context and perform privileged actions.

Workarounds

There are no app-side workarounds, you must update your Electron version to be protected.

Fixed Versions

• 11.0.0-beta.6
• 10.1.2
• 9.3.1
• 8.5.2

For more information

If you have any questions or comments about this advisory:

• Email us at security@electronjs.org

🚨 Unpreventable top-level navigation

Impact

The will-navigate event that apps use to prevent navigations to unexpected destinations as per our security recommendations can be bypassed when a sub-frame performs a top-frame navigation across sites.

Patches

• 11.0.0-beta.1
• 10.0.1
• 9.3.0
• 8.5.1

Workarounds

Sandbox all your iframes using the sandbox attribute. This will prevent them creating top-frame navigations and is good practice anyway.

For more information

If you have any questions or comments about this advisory:

• Email us at security@electronjs.org

🚨 Unpreventable top-level navigation

Impact

The will-navigate event that apps use to prevent navigations to unexpected destinations as per our security recommendations can be bypassed when a sub-frame performs a top-frame navigation across sites.

Patches

• 11.0.0-beta.1
• 10.0.1
• 9.3.0
• 8.5.1

Workarounds

Sandbox all your iframes using the sandbox attribute. This will prevent them creating top-frame navigations and is good practice anyway.

For more information

If you have any questions or comments about this advisory:

• Email us at security@electronjs.org

🚨 Context isolation bypass in Electron

Impact

Apps using both contextIsolation and sandbox: true are affected.
Apps using both contextIsolation and nativeWindowOpen: true are affected.

This is a context isolation bypass, meaning that code running in the main world context in the renderer can reach into the isolated Electron context and perform privileged actions.

Workarounds

There are no app-side workarounds, you must update your Electron version to be protected.

Fixed Versions

• 11.0.0-beta.6
• 10.1.2
• 9.3.1
• 8.5.2

For more information

If you have any questions or comments about this advisory:

• Email us at security@electronjs.org

🚨 Unpreventable top-level navigation

Impact

The will-navigate event that apps use to prevent navigations to unexpected destinations as per our security recommendations can be bypassed when a sub-frame performs a top-frame navigation across sites.

Patches

• 11.0.0-beta.1
• 10.0.1
• 9.3.0
• 8.5.1

Workarounds

Sandbox all your iframes using the sandbox attribute. This will prevent them creating top-frame navigations and is good practice anyway.

For more information

If you have any questions or comments about this advisory:

• Email us at security@electronjs.org

🚨 Context isolation bypass via Promise in Electron

Impact

Apps using contextIsolation are affected.

This is a context isolation bypass, meaning that code running in the main world context in the renderer can reach into the isolated Electron context and perform privileged actions.

Workarounds

There are no app-side workarounds, you must update your Electron version to be protected.

Fixed Versions

• 9.0.0-beta.21
• 8.2.4
• 7.2.4
• 6.1.11

For more information

If you have any questions or comments about this advisory:

• Email us at security@electronjs.org

🚨 Context isolation bypass via leaked cross-context objects in Electron

Impact

Apps using contextIsolation are affected.

This is a context isolation bypass, meaning that code running in the main world context in the renderer can reach into the isolated Electron context and perform privileged actions.

Workarounds

There are no app-side workarounds, you must update your Electron version to be protected.

Fixed Versions

• 9.0.0-beta.21
• 8.2.4
• 7.2.4

Non-Impacted Versions

• 9.0.0-beta.*

For more information

If you have any questions or comments about this advisory:

• Email us at security@electronjs.org

🚨 Arbitrary file read via window-open IPC in Electron

Impact

The vulnerability allows arbitrary local file read by defining unsafe window options on a child window opened via window.open.

Workarounds

Ensure you are calling event.preventDefault() on all new-window events where the url or options is not something you expect.

Fixed Versions

• 9.0.0-beta.21
• 8.2.4
• 7.2.4

For more information

If you have any questions or comments about this advisory:

• Email us at security@electronjs.org

🚨 Context isolation bypass via contextBridge in Electron

Impact

Apps using both contextIsolation and contextBridge are affected.

This is a context isolation bypass, meaning that code running in the main world context in the renderer can reach into the isolated Electron context and perform privileged actions.

Workarounds

There are no app-side workarounds, you must update your Electron version to be protected.

Fixed Versions

• 9.0.0-beta.21
• 8.2.4
• 7.2.4

For more information

If you have any questions or comments about this advisory:

• Email us at security@electronjs.org

🚨 Context isolation bypass via Promise in Electron

Impact

Apps using contextIsolation are affected.

This is a context isolation bypass, meaning that code running in the main world context in the renderer can reach into the isolated Electron context and perform privileged actions.

Workarounds

There are no app-side workarounds, you must update your Electron version to be protected.

Fixed Versions

• 9.0.0-beta.21
• 8.2.4
• 7.2.4
• 6.1.11

For more information

If you have any questions or comments about this advisory:

• Email us at security@electronjs.org

🚨 Context isolation bypass via Promise in Electron

Impact

Apps using contextIsolation are affected.

This is a context isolation bypass, meaning that code running in the main world context in the renderer can reach into the isolated Electron context and perform privileged actions.

Workarounds

There are no app-side workarounds, you must update your Electron version to be protected.

Fixed Versions

• 9.0.0-beta.21
• 8.2.4
• 7.2.4
• 6.1.11

For more information

If you have any questions or comments about this advisory:

• Email us at security@electronjs.org

🚨 Context isolation bypass via leaked cross-context objects in Electron

Impact

Apps using contextIsolation are affected.

This is a context isolation bypass, meaning that code running in the main world context in the renderer can reach into the isolated Electron context and perform privileged actions.

Workarounds

There are no app-side workarounds, you must update your Electron version to be protected.

Fixed Versions

• 9.0.0-beta.21
• 8.2.4
• 7.2.4

Non-Impacted Versions

• 9.0.0-beta.*

For more information

If you have any questions or comments about this advisory:

• Email us at security@electronjs.org

🚨 Context isolation bypass via contextBridge in Electron

Impact

Apps using both contextIsolation and contextBridge are affected.

This is a context isolation bypass, meaning that code running in the main world context in the renderer can reach into the isolated Electron context and perform privileged actions.

Workarounds

There are no app-side workarounds, you must update your Electron version to be protected.

Fixed Versions

• 9.0.0-beta.21
• 8.2.4
• 7.2.4

For more information

If you have any questions or comments about this advisory:

• Email us at security@electronjs.org

🚨 Arbitrary file read via window-open IPC in Electron

Impact

The vulnerability allows arbitrary local file read by defining unsafe window options on a child window opened via window.open.

Workarounds

Ensure you are calling event.preventDefault() on all new-window events where the url or options is not something you expect.

Fixed Versions

• 9.0.0-beta.21
• 8.2.4
• 7.2.4

For more information

If you have any questions or comments about this advisory:

• Email us at security@electronjs.org

Release Notes

Too many releases to show here. View the full release notes.

Commits

See the full diff on Github. The new version differs by 6 commits:

• Bump v19.0.4
• chore: fix nan spec runner on macOS (#34463)
• test: fix for flaky renderer crash test (#34455)
• test: skip flaky test on 32-bit Windows (#34449)
• docs: fix `did-frame-navigate` example in webFrameMain docs (#34444)
• fix: on macOS show BrowserWindow on maximize if not currently shown (#34365)

---

Depfu will automatically keep this PR conflict-free, as long as you don't add any commits to this branch yourself. You can also trigger a rebase manually by commenting with @depfu rebase.

All Depfu comment commands

@​depfu rebase

Rebases against your default branch and redoes this update

@​depfu recreate

Recreates this PR, overwriting any edits that you've made to it

@​depfu merge

Merges this PR once your tests are passing and conflicts are resolved

@​depfu close

Closes this PR and deletes the branch

@​depfu reopen

Restores the branch and reopens this PR (if it's closed)

@​depfu pause

Ignores all future updates for this dependency and closes this PR

@​depfu pause [minor|major]

Ignores all future minor/major updates for this dependency and closes this PR

@​depfu resume

Future versions of this dependency will create PRs again (leaves this PR as is)