Revizor is a security-oriented fuzzer for detecting information leaks in CPUs, such as Spectre and Meltdown. It tests CPUs against Leakage Contracts and searches for unexpected leaks.
For more details, see our Paper (open access here), and the follow-up papers (1, 2).
You can find a quick start guide at Quick Start.
For information on how to use Revizor, see User Documentation.
For information on how to contribute to Revizor, see CONTRIBUTING.md.
If you find a bug in Revizor, don't hesitate to open an issue.
If something is confusing or you need help in using Revizor, we have a discussion page.
To cite this project, you can use the following references:
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Original paper that introduced the concept of Model-based Relation Testing as well as the Revizor tool:
Oleksii Oleksenko, Christof Fetzer, Boris Köpf, Mark Silberstein. "Revizor: Testing Black-box CPUs against Speculation Contracts" in Proceedings of the 27th ACM International Conference on Architectural Support for Programming Languages and Operating Systems (ASPLOS), 2022.
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Theoretical foundations of leakage contract:
Marco Guarnieri, Boris Köpf, Jan Reineke, and Pepe Vila. "Hardware-software contracts for secure speculation" in Proceedings of the 2021 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP), 2021.
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Accessible summary of the two papers above, in a journal format:
Oleksii Oleksenko, Christof Fetzer, Boris Köpf, Mark Silberstein. "Revizor: Testing Black-box CPUs against Speculation Contracts". In IEEE Micro, 2023.
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Paper that introduced speculation filtering, observation filtering, and contract-based input generation:
Oleksii Oleksenko, Marco Guarnieri, Boris Köpf, and Mark Silberstein. "Hide and Seek with Spectres: Efficient discovery of speculative information leaks with random testing" in Proceedings of the 2023 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP), 2022.
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Paper that introduced exception-based testing (i.e., focus on Meltdown, Foreshadow) into Revizor:
Jana Hofmann, Emanuele Vannacci, Cédric Fournet, Boris Köpf, and Oleksii Oleksenko. "Speculation at Fault: Modeling and Testing Microarchitectural Leakage of CPU Exceptions." in Proceedings of 32nd USENIX Security Symposium (USENIX Security), 2023.
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