docs: fix various typos (#5003)

- Fixed "publically" to "publicly" in multiple places across the
documentation.
- Corrected "scenerio" to "scenario" in the `addresses.md` file.
- Addressed minor formatting issues in the documentation to ensure
consistency.

---------

Signed-off-by: Tronic <wudmytrotest404@gmail.com>

deployments/compose/process-compose-smoke-test.yml

@@ -112,7 +112,7 @@ processes:
   # Finalizer task, which will wait until all test suites have finished.
   # This allows us to ensure that.
   summary:
-    # The `command` only runs if all tests were succesful,
+    # The `command` only runs if all tests were successful,
     # otherwise the process exits due to dep failure.
     command: echo tests finished
     depends_on:

docs/protocol/src/addresses_keys/addresses.md

@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ scanning service.
 
 While diversified addresses are described as *publicly unlinkable*, a detection entity given multiple detection keys can empirically link the corresponding diversified addresses via the clue keys $\mathsf{ck_d}$ contained within them. This is because the detection entity, by reporting detected transactions to the same user, empirically knows that the detection keys $\mathsf{dtk_d}$ are linked. If the detection entity observes two addresses belonging to the user, they can link them because the clue key appears in each address and is derived solely from the detection key. 
 
-In a simplified scenerio, a user with diversified addresses ${addr_1}$ and ${addr_2}$ gives the associated detection keys ${dtk_{d_1}}$ and ${dtk_{d_2}}$ to the detection entity. The detection entity detects relevant transactions using the clue keys ${ck_{d_1}}$ and ${ck_{d_2}}$, and reports the detected transactions for ${dtk_{d_1}}$ and ${dtk_{d_2}}$ back to the user. The detection entity can naively observe that transactions related to ${ck_{d_1}}$ and ${ck_{d_2}}$ are reported back to the same user, and therefore the addresses linked to these detection keys belong to the same user. There's a notion of linkability here since the diversified addresses can be linked by the detection entity through the detection keys, from which the clue keys are derived. 
+In a simplified scenario, a user with diversified addresses ${addr_1}$ and ${addr_2}$ gives the associated detection keys ${dtk_{d_1}}$ and ${dtk_{d_2}}$ to the detection entity. The detection entity detects relevant transactions using the clue keys ${ck_{d_1}}$ and ${ck_{d_2}}$, and reports the detected transactions for ${dtk_{d_1}}$ and ${dtk_{d_2}}$ back to the user. The detection entity can naively observe that transactions related to ${ck_{d_1}}$ and ${ck_{d_2}}$ are reported back to the same user, and therefore the addresses linked to these detection keys belong to the same user. There's a notion of linkability here since the diversified addresses can be linked by the detection entity through the detection keys, from which the clue keys are derived. 
 
 To mitigate the linkability of diversified addresses when using detection keys, a user should consider using multiple third parties: distribute detection keys to different detection entities instead of a single one, reducing the risk that any single entity has enough keys to link diversified addresses.
 

docs/protocol/src/dex.md

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 # ZSwap
 
-Penumbra provides swaps wherein the user publically burns their input assets,
+Penumbra provides swaps wherein the user publicly burns their input assets,
 and privately mints the output assets. In a future upgrade, Penumbra plans to add
 sealed-bid batch swaps, protecting the privacy of the input assets to the trade.
 ZSwap allows users to privately swap between any pair of assets. All swaps in
@@ -81,7 +81,7 @@ know][bwh].  While users can prove that their user-specific state was updated
 correctly without revealing it, they cannot do so for other users' state.
 
 Instead of solving this problem, ZSwap sidesteps the need for users to do so.
-At a high level, swaps work as follows: users publically burn funds of one kind
+At a high level, swaps work as follows: users publicly burn funds of one kind
 in a coordinated way that allows the chain to compute a per-block clearing
 price, and mint or burn liquidity pool reserves.  Later, users privately mint
 funds of the other kind, proving that they previously burned funds and that the

docs/protocol/src/penumbra.md

@@ -96,7 +96,7 @@ encrypted votes and decrypt only the per-epoch totals.
 
 Penumbra provides private batch swaps using [ZSwap](./dex.md).
 ZSwap allows users to privately swap between any pair of assets.  Individual
-swaps publically burn their input notes and privately mint their output notes.
+swaps publicly burn their input notes and privately mint their output notes.
 All swaps in each block are executed in a single batch.  Users can also provide
 liquidity by anonymously creating concentrated liquidity positions.  These
 positions reveal the amount of liquidity and the bounds in which it is