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Burn Revenue from Coretime Sales #10
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# RFC-0010: Burn Coretime Revenue | ||
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| **Start Date** | 19.07.2023 | | ||
| **Description** | Revenue from Coretime sales should be burned | | ||
| **Authors** | Jonas Gehrlein | | ||
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## Summary | ||
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The Polkadot UC will generate revenue from the sale of available Coretime. The question then arises: how should we handle these revenues? Broadly, there are three potential paths – burning the revenue and thereby removing it from total issuance or divert it to the Treasury. This Request for Comment (RFC) presents arguments favoring burning as the preferred mechanism for handling revenues from Coretime sales. | ||
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## Motivation | ||
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How to handle the revenue accrued from Coretime sales is an important economic question that influences the value of DOT and should be properly discussed before deciding for either of the options. Now is the best time to start this discussion. | ||
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## Stakeholders | ||
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Polkadot DOT token holders. | ||
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## Explanation | ||
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This RFC discusses potential benefits of burning the revenue accrued from Coretime sales instead of diverting them to Treasury. Here are the following arguments for it. | ||
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It's in the interest of the Polkadot community to have a consistent and predictable Treasury income, because volatility in the inflow can be damaging, especially in situations when it is insufficient. This raises the question: Why should we consider adding more volatility to the Treasury by tying it to fluctuating Coretime sales? Notably, Coretime revenue often appears to be inversely correlated with times when the Treasury should increase spending. During periods of low Coretime utilization (indicated by lower prices), it's important for the Treasury to spend more on projects and endeavours to increase the demand for Coretime. This pattern underscores that Coretime sales, by their very nature, are an inconsistent and unpredictable source of funding for the Treasury. Given the importance of maintaining a steady and predictable inflow, it's unnecessary to rely on another volatile mechanism. Some might argue that we could have both: a steady inflow (from inflation) and some added bonus from Coretime sales, but burning the revenue would offer further benefits as described below. | ||
There was a problem hiding this comment. Choose a reason for hiding this commentThe reason will be displayed to describe this comment to others. Learn more. Would it be worth adding the proposed change in Treasury income from inflation to this same RFC so the entire change in tokenomics can be discussed in one place & ensures that reviewers have the complete picture? There was a problem hiding this comment. Choose a reason for hiding this commentThe reason will be displayed to describe this comment to others. Learn more. done in a0a8345. Nonetheless, my primary focus remains on the discourse surrounding the burn mechanism. |
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- **Balancing Inflation:** While DOT as a utility token inherently profits from a (reasonable) net inflation, it also benefits from a deflationary force that functions as a counterbalance to the overall inflation. Right now, the only mechanism on Polkadot that burns fees is the one for underutilized DOT in the Treasury. Finding other, more direct target for burns makes sense and the Coretime market is a good option. | ||
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- **Clear incentives:** By burning the revenue accrued on Coretime sales, prices paid by buyers are clearly costs. This removes distortion from the market that might arise when the paid tokens occur on some other places within the network. In that case, some actors might have secondary motives of influencing the price of Coretime sales, because they benefit down the line. For example, actors that actively participate in the Coretime sales are likely to also benefit from a higher Treasury balance, because they might frequently request funds for their projects. While those effects might appear far-fetched, they could accumulate. Burning the revenues makes sure that the prices paid are clearly costs to the actors themselves. | ||
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- **Collective Value Accrual:** Following the previous argument, burning the revenue also generates some externality, because it reduces the overall issuance of DOT and thereby increases the value of each remaining token. In contrast to the aforementioned argument, this benefits all token holders collectively and equally. Therefore, I'd consider this as the preferrable option, because burns lets all token holders participate at Polkadot's success as Coretime usage increases. | ||
There was a problem hiding this comment. Choose a reason for hiding this commentThe reason will be displayed to describe this comment to others. Learn more. Can you share any models or analysis that outline expectations or scenarios for Coretime income to be burned as this would be useful as it regards treasury spending more generally. There was a problem hiding this comment. Choose a reason for hiding this commentThe reason will be displayed to describe this comment to others. Learn more. this depends on the pricing mechanism which is, to my knowledge, not yet finalized. There was a problem hiding this comment. Choose a reason for hiding this commentThe reason will be displayed to describe this comment to others. Learn more. that means we cannot evaluate/estimate the impact of this RFC and unable to make objective decision |
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I can only see 2 paths discussed here: burning or put into treasury. What's the 3rd option?
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you are right, I'll fix it. Originally, I also thought about the possibility to divert revenues to validators. But after making the point about "Clear Incentives", this struck me as an option not even worth including.