The Gibbard–Satterthwaite theorem establishes that any non-dictatorial voting rule with at least three alternatives is inherently vulnerable to strategic manipulation. This thesis examines the practical consequences of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem by analyzing the susceptibility of various voting methods under a range of social conditions and models of voter behavior. To support this analysis, a modular and performant simulation framework—kingmaker—is developed for granular modeling of electoral conditions across diverse strategic environments and preference distributions. Using kingmaker, this thesis offers a systematic evaluation of the frequency, impact, and structure of strategic voting across multiple electoral systems. The results yield empirical insight into the robustness of these systems and identify the conditions under which theoretical manipulability becomes operationally significant.
- Much thanks to the folks at pref_voting for their comprehensive work on social choice research.
- I'd also like to thank my advisor Michael Pearce for his guidance and support.
Kingmaker © 2025 by Chance Addis is licensed under CC BY 4.0. To view a copy of this license, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/