macSandbox is designed to provide isolation when running Claude Code with elevated permissions. Security is fundamental to this project.
| Version | Supported |
|---|---|
| latest | ✅ |
If you discover a security vulnerability, please:
- Do not open a public issue
- Email the maintainer directly or use GitHub's private vulnerability reporting
- Include:
- Description of the vulnerability
- Steps to reproduce
- Potential impact
- Suggested fix (if any)
macSandbox relies on:
- Apple's Containerization framework - Each container runs in a dedicated lightweight VM
- Kernel isolation - Separate kernel per container
- Filesystem isolation - Only mounted directories are accessible
- Network isolation - Containers have isolated network stacks
- Accidental file deletion on host
- Runaway processes affecting host system
- Unintended system modifications
- Malicious modification of mounted directories (by design,
/workspaceis read-write) - Exfiltration of data from mounted directories
- Vulnerabilities in Apple's Virtualization framework itself
- Only mount directories you intend Claude to access
- Review Claude's actions in the mounted workspace
- Keep your macOS and container CLI updated
- Don't mount sensitive directories like
~/.sshor~/.aws