2013_04_23 Doctoral Colloquium

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Olaf, Matthias and Matthijs all urged me to now concentrate on the empirical implementation, agreed that I have done (more than) enough theory and that a theory-only work would not be adequate. Olaf suggested the empirics of my dissertation may serve as a "pilot" study to later (postdoc) work.

I agree and see more clearly now that I have been procrastinating/downsizing the empirical implementation for fear of failing the abstractions of tax, welfare and social choice that I have identified and worked on so far.

I notice now that I may have gone overboard in the theory department, especially with the social choice stuff (Condorcet, preference structuration).

Olaf and Matthijs suggested the existing chapters on welfare and tax should feed into the briefing material (even though under a DP, these must be prepared and vetted by independent experts).

agreed.

Matthijs pointed out that deliberation has been tried on macro-level, abstract issues (renewables in texas, electoral reform in british columbia), and that my critique of deliberation for being overly local and immediatist, may be mistaken. He also suggested that deliberation may operate on tax choice much as smoothly as on these other, equally difficult topics.

I agree my critique of existing deliberative practice may have been too simple and I will add this literature. I'd maintain that limits of deliberation may still be one of the empirical questions facing the field. In any event, this is probably not central to my thesis.

Olaf noted that some of the existing chapters (especially: threefold crisis), may not be convincing, maybe because it focuses too much on taxation.

I understand that tax is one of many institutions (others: labor market, power relations etc.) that may contribute to an understanding of the development and crisis of welfare. I should word this more carefully.

I still think that part of those chapters on welfare and tax may be interesting in their own right, as they relate to the welfare retrenchment debate. I hope to show (somewhat trivially, really) that tax may not be a necessary, but a sufficient factor to explain the crisis of the welfare state.

Olaf suggested we look over the chapters (on May 10th) to see what, and how they might be salvaged.

Matthias and Matthijs both noted that an overly narrative ('crime story') and colloquial writing style may bore and/or distract readers.

I agree that flourish and form can never trump or drown out substance, but would like to write something that is fun to read and transparently argued -- including the occasional "I". When there is time, I'll go over this (maybe let some time pass first) and tone down the style.

Olaf noted (again), that my account focusing on "misunderstandings" may misconstrue/miss other determinants of tax choice, especially (material) interest and/or broader political attitudes about social inequality and power ("that is unrealistic", "there will always be those in power", might be possible rejoinders by deliberators). As part of this critique, Olaf suggested to look into different samples, including students of microeconomics, to disentangle cognitive misunderstandings from other effects.

I agree that this is a glaring blind spot (maybe of some of deliberative practice as well as of my work?) and I have yet to find an angle on this. Here are some (very) tentative responses:

• Chapter 3 references theoretical and empirical (Chapter 4) findings on runaway inequality and the inherently social and institutionally contingent nature of market outcomes. This, too, will have to feed into the briefing material: some preliminary understanding of the genesis of private property and accumulation. Admittedly, that's still pretty technical-cognitive.
• Some of the hypothesized misunderstandings (especially bastard hayekianism), I suggest, are the kind of "interested ideas" through which material interest may be expressed and transmitted. Maybe, they're "too clever by half".
• I have so far suggested that if material interest operates, it (cleverly) operates through the choice of tax (e.g. PCT vs PIT), not its configuration (more/less progression): anecdotally, relatively sharp progression doesn't even seem to be very contentious in Germany, but -- I argue -- the current system factually allows only very limited progression. I'm saying: inequality in tax might sufficiently (not necessarily) operate through tax choice and its abstractions. I'll have to (later!) think some more about this and talk about this with Olaf.
• Also, pragmatically, my plan was to simply show that people might want more progressive institutions than they can currently have -- and leave much of the "why" to someone else. I however see Olaf's point: I might empirically run into much less cognitive/technical-based attitudes on inequality that may forestall further deliberation.

Matthijs suggested to look into other tax choices if the PCT and its abstraction appear too daunting for a feasible DP during my PhD, including Kirchhof's proposal.

I am not sure that from the point of view of tax, any non-comprehensive deliberation of tax choice would be very meaningful. The PCT and LVT, incidentally, are not merely some exotic variant of existing taxes (as the Dual Income tax, or the Kirchhof proposal are), they play in an entirely different league. The labels and implementation of PCT and LVT may not be very important, but opening up the entire space of tax bases and schedules (including consumption and assets), I would think, would be minimally necessary. Limiting deliberation to only 2 taxes, (say, a PIT and Dual-PIT or Kirchhof), forces a decision between trivial alternatives and defines away other variables. Hope this is roughly accurate and helpful for future reference.

Maike S., Nils and Florian also kindly provided suggestions via email, but I'm not including them here.

Matthijs pointed out that -- in contrast to other deliberative practitioners -- I have a stake in this: the PCT+LVT+NIT. I agree: these alternative regimes seem greatly preferable and highly consequential to me. But, more importantly, these alternatives also help unfold the catalogue of questions and abstractions that informed tax choice requires. I understand that I've reached (passed) the point of diminishing returns of such theorizing and need to turn to empirics, which I will do. Still, I'm awed by these abstractions (they're not my own making), and I feel that even out of scientific integrity, I must not fail them in an empirical test.

Next Steps

I will review the practical documentation on deliberative polls and other formats, and work out 1-3 alternative implementations for how to do this on my topic, within resources and time available to me. - Submit 5-7 page document to Olaf, Matthijs by May 20th, including details (sample size, place, time, moderators, etc.) - Meet with Olaf, Matthijs soon afterwards.

Develop proposal to defensible stage, based on prior discussions, decisions. Matthijs suggested a 2-month timeframe to get this done. - Submit 2x-page document to Olaf, Matthijs by June 7th - Formally defend proposal by June 24th in additional meeting, open to field (attendance voluntary)

Stay in more regular contact with Matthijs. (We agreed to meet informally at Jacobs from time to time).

Salvage/rewrite existing draft chapters, especially chapters 3-6.

• I am meeting Olaf on May 10th to discuss these chapters.

Olaf Groh-Samberg

• not sure the 3 crises are really that convincing, especially the focus on tax or deliberation in there
• the chapters on taxes are what should become the briefing material
• there’s definetely enough theory
• what is the role of material interest?
• what to do if people say “that is unrealistic”, “idealistic” it will never happen (that sounds familiar). What’s behind that?
• maybe look into a sample of economics sutdents?
• only that stuff should be in the chapters that I go through with people
• make this a pilot study, maybe replicate it later at a larger scale with a large-n sample

Matthias Wingens

• set up the quasi experiment
• there’s too much narrative in the piece, not very interesting for others how I got to this question
• there’s enough theory
• detail the process of the Deliberative Poll

Matthijs Bogaards

• don’t try to be Sherlock Holmes, don’t talk about intestines, or Umberto Eco: don’t make this about the author, make it about the subject. To Matthijs, this seemed self-obsessed.
• also: don’t write “I”, the merits should be independent of the person
• thinks I have some sort of conspiracy of the elites (I don’t: hate the players, hate the game)
• disagrees that Deliberation has been mostly tried on local issues, cites Texas energy and electoral reform
• notices that I have a stake in the pct
• first and second-order seems unclear (I have clarified)
• preparatory material is not prepared by me
• maybe look into citizen juries?

Florian Hertel

• Make this a Massive Online Course, contact with iversity.
• look at results between the different modules

Nils (via e-Mail)

empfiehlt: http://join.puzzledbypolicy.eu/ ist auch ein MAOO! freut mich, wenns Dich zu etwas inspiriert. Ich wollte Dir nach der Defense eigentlich ganz was anderes sagen und ein paar Fragen aufwerfen. Weil ich nicht so weiß wie sich Dein Projekt entwickelt hat, bin ich aber unsicher, ob das Unsinn ist. Falls ja , vergiss es einfach.

Was wenn Deine Idee mit der PCT total genial ist, und es einfach noch niemanden gegeben hat und auch so schnell niemanden geben wird, der zeigen kann, dass sie gut ist? Dann solltest Du diese normative Arbeit unbedingt schreiben und auf Offe's Präferenz für die Meinung von Ökonomen zur PCT pfeifen. Dann wertet die empirische UNtersuchung von DelDem den normativen Aspekt der Arbeit vielleicht eher ab, weil sie dann weder das eine noch das andere so richtig ist. Würde Dir die BIGSSS erlauben, rein normativ zu schreiben? Oder WILLST Du so gerne einen empirischen Teil haben? Außerdem: Ja, Bogarts und Wingens haben recht mit Deiner Bescheidenheit. Schreib offensiver und wenn es erlaubt ist schreib auch mehr. Ich habe beim Lesen zunehmend Freude an dem Thema gewonnen, aber musste ständig Links klicken, um etwas zu verstehen, und fand auch dann vieles noch zu kurz erklärt. Im Hypothesen-kapitel fehlte auch etwas die Führung. Wovon wird dieses Kapitel handeln? Die Frage beantwortete sich erst nach und nach. Das war jetzt mal eben schnell runtergeschrieben.

Maike Schulz

Du hast es eigentlich selbst schon angeschnitten und Olaf ist noch mal darauf eingegangen: Einige Deiner Kapitel dienen vermutlich als Vorarbeit für die Vorbereitung Deiner Methode. Daher ist das nicht vergeblich, muss aber auch nicht Textteil der Diss werden. Allerdings wird Deine Diss dann quasi zu einer Anwendung/Überprüfung der Methode am Beispiel Deiner favorisierten Steuer, wenn man es noch weiter zuspitzt ist es eigentlich eine grundlegend methodologische Arbeit, in der Du die Anwendbarkeit der Methode testet (vor allem, wenn man es - wie Olaf meinte - auf so Aspekte wie sample size, Frageformen fokussiert). Da hat dann das Anwendungsthema ziemlich willkürlichen Charakter. Und ich hab das Gefühl, dass das aber nicht Deinem Enthusiasmus für das Thema Steuer gerecht wird. Da kann Matthias auch noch dreimal sagen "being pragmatic - do this and that", ich bin mir nicht so sicher, ob das für Dich so befriedigend ist. Wobei Du dann zumindest aufzeigen könntest, was das besondere am Vergleich verschiedener Steuern für die Anwendung der Methode ist (im Vergleich zu anderen Anwendungsthemen). Und in Bezug auf Deine Frage nach der Originalität/Innovation: Ich denke, dass das schon innovativ wäre, sofern es nicht schon mehrere deliberative polls zu konkret der Steuer gibt. Und zu Deinem Delta: Ich hab diesen ellenlangen Text von McCaffery und Baron damals nicht wirklich gelesen, hattest Du den nicht mal in core theory lesen wollen (Heuristics and Biases)? Anyway, es kommt mir so vor, als geht das ein bisschen in die Richtung Deines Deltas, wobei sich Deine vagen Vermutungen über das Delta glaube ich nicht nur auf Kognitionspsychologie/behavioral economics beziehen, sondern auch noch auf andere Sozialtheorien (ich hab davon ja keine Ahnung , Public Choice oder son Kram...), oder?