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features_compliance_audit
Audit-Trail mit PKI-Signing für Compliance-Anforderungen.
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- ✨ Features
- 🚀 Schnellstart
- 📖 Detaillierte Dokumentation
- 💡 Best Practices
- 🔧 Troubleshooting
- 📚 Siehe auch
- 📝 Changelog
Dieses Dokument beschreibt die ersten Schritte der Compliance- und Audit-Implementierung:
- PKI Client: Minimale Schnittstelle zum Signieren und Verifizieren von Hashes (Stub).
- AuditLogger: Encrypt-then-Sign für strukturierte Audit-Logs.
Bietet eine zentrale Schnittstelle zum Signieren von Daten-Hashes (z. B. SHA-256 über verschlüsselte Audit-Logs). Später erweiterbar auf echte PKI-Backends (HSM, Remote-Signing-Dienst).
PKIConfig pki_cfg;
pki_cfg.service_id = "audit_service";
pki_cfg.endpoint = "https://pki.example.com/api/v1"; // optional
pki_cfg.cert_path = "/path/to/cert.pem"; // optional
pki_cfg.key_path = "/path/to/key.pem"; // optional
pki_cfg.signature_algorithm = "RSA-SHA256"; // Standardauto pki = std::make_shared<VCCPKIClient>(pki_cfg);
// 1. Berechne SHA-256 über Daten
std::vector<uint8_t> hash = sha256(ciphertext);
// 2. Signiere Hash
auto sig = pki->signHash(hash);
if (sig.ok) {
// sig.signature_id, sig.signature_b64, sig.cert_serial verfügbar
}
// 3. Verifiziere Signatur
bool valid = pki->verifyHash(hash, sig);- signHash: Gibt Base64-kodierten Hash zurück (kein echtes Signing).
- verifyHash: Vergleicht Base64(hash) mit gespeicherter Signatur.
- Für Produktion: Echte Kryptografie über OpenSSL oder HSM integrieren.
Strukturierte, nachvollziehbare Protokollierung sicherheitskritischer Ereignisse mit Encrypt-then-Sign:
- Verschlüssle Event-JSON mit AES-256-GCM (
FieldEncryption). - Hash Verschlüsselter Blob (iv || ciphertext || tag).
- Signiere Hash über PKI Client.
- Schreibe JSONL-Record mit Payload, Signatur und Metadaten.
AuditLoggerConfig cfg;
cfg.enabled = true;
cfg.encrypt_then_sign = true; // Aktiviere Encrypt-then-Sign
cfg.log_path = "data/logs/audit.jsonl";
cfg.key_id = "saga_log"; // Key für Log-Verschlüsselung
auto logger = std::make_shared<AuditLogger>(field_enc, pki, cfg);nlohmann::json event = {
{"user", "admin"},
{"action", "read"},
{"resource", "/content/doc123"},
{"classification", "VS-NfD"},
{"result", "success"},
{"ip", "192.168.1.42"}
};
logger->logEvent(event);{
"ts": 1700000000123,
"category": "AUDIT",
"payload": {
"type": "ciphertext",
"key_id": "saga_log",
"key_version": 1,
"iv_b64": "abc123...",
"ciphertext_b64": "xyz789...",
"tag_b64": "def456..."
},
"signature": {
"ok": true,
"id": "sig_a1b2c3d4",
"algorithm": "RSA-SHA256",
"sig_b64": "base64(...)",
"cert_serial": "DEMO-CERT-SERIAL"
}
}Setze encrypt_then_sign = false:
{
"ts": 1700000000456,
"category": "AUDIT",
"payload": {
"type": "plaintext",
"data_b64": "eyJ1c2VyIjoidXNlcjEiLCAi..."
},
"signature": {
"ok": true,
"id": "sig_xyz",
...
}
}# Beispiel in Python (zur Demonstration)
import json
import base64
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.ciphers import Cipher, algorithms, modes
with open("data/logs/audit.jsonl") as f:
for line in f:
record = json.loads(line)
# 1. Hole Ciphertext und Signatur
payload = record["payload"]
signature = record["signature"]
# 2. Verifiziere Signatur über hash(iv||ct||tag)
iv = base64.b64decode(payload["iv_b64"])
ct = base64.b64decode(payload["ciphertext_b64"])
tag = base64.b64decode(payload["tag_b64"])
to_verify = iv + ct + tag
hash_bytes = sha256(to_verify)
# Verifikation via PKI (hier stub):
# verify_signature(hash_bytes, signature["sig_b64"])
# 3. Entschlüssele mit Key
key = get_key(payload["key_id"], payload["key_version"])
cipher = Cipher(algorithms.AES(key), modes.GCM(iv, tag))
decryptor = cipher.decryptor()
plaintext = decryptor.update(ct) + decryptor.finalize()
event = json.loads(plaintext)
print(event) # Original EventDer HTTP-Server initialisiert den AuditLogger automatisch beim Start:
// Aus HttpServer::HttpServer() Konstruktor:
auto key_provider = std::make_shared<MockKeyProvider>();
key_provider->createKey("saga_log", 1);
auto field_enc = std::make_shared<FieldEncryption>(key_provider);
themis::utils::PKIConfig pki_cfg;
pki_cfg.service_id = "themis_server";
pki_cfg.signature_algorithm = "RSA-SHA256";
auto pki_client = std::make_shared<themis::utils::VCCPKIClient>(pki_cfg);
themis::utils::AuditLoggerConfig audit_cfg;
audit_cfg.enabled = true;
audit_cfg.encrypt_then_sign = true;
audit_cfg.log_path = "data/logs/audit.jsonl";
audit_cfg.key_id = "saga_log";
audit_logger_ = std::make_shared<themis::utils::AuditLogger>(
field_enc, pki_client, audit_cfg);
// Verbinde mit PolicyEngine
policy_engine_->setAuditLogger(audit_logger_);Die PolicyEngine loggt automatisch alle Enforcement-Entscheidungen:
// In PolicyEngine::evaluate():
if (audit_logger_ && d.mode == "enforce") {
nlohmann::json audit_event = {
{"event_type", "policy_evaluation"},
{"route", route},
{"classification", d.classification},
{"mode", d.mode},
{"require_content_encryption", d.require_content_encryption},
{"encrypt_logs", d.encrypt_logs},
{"redaction", d.redaction},
{"retention_days", d.retention_days},
{"timestamp", getCurrentTimeMs()}
};
if (headers.find("X-User-Id") != headers.end()) {
audit_event["user_id"] = headers["X-User-Id"];
}
audit_logger_->logEvent(audit_event);
}// In handleContentImport:
if (audit_logger_ && (pdec.classification == "vs-nfd" ||
pdec.classification == "geheim" ||
pdec.classification == "streng-geheim")) {
nlohmann::json audit_event = {
{"event_type", "content_import"},
{"classification", pdec.classification},
{"mode", pdec.mode},
{"require_encryption", pdec.require_content_encryption},
{"content_id", content_id},
{"timestamp", getCurrentTimeMs()}
};
if (user_id_header.has_value()) {
audit_event["user_id"] = user_id_header.value();
}
audit_logger_->logEvent(audit_event);
}// In handleGetContentBlob:
if (audit_logger_) {
nlohmann::json audit_event = {
{"event_type", "content_blob_access"},
{"content_id", id},
{"timestamp", getCurrentTimeMs()}
};
// Optional: User-ID aus Headers extrahieren
if (req.contains("X-User-Id")) {
audit_event["user_id"] = req["X-User-Id"];
}
audit_logger_->logEvent(audit_event);
}RetentionManager mgr(cfg.log_path, policy_engine);
// Archiviere Logs älter als 90 Tage (nach Klassifikation)
mgr.archiveOldLogs(90);
// Lösche nach 7 Jahren (gesetzlich)
mgr.purgeExpiredLogs();// In logEvent:
// Berechne Hash über vorherigem Record + aktuellem Event
auto prev_hash = readLastRecordHash();
auto chain_input = prev_hash + current_event_json;
auto sig = pki_->signHash(sha256(chain_input));# AuditLogger Tests
ctest -C Release -R "^AuditLoggerTest\." --output-on-failure
# Governance + Audit Integration Tests
ctest -C Release -R "^HttpGovernanceTest\.|^AuditLoggerTest\." --output-on-failureAlle Tests bestehen (19/19):
- AuditLogger-Tests (4/4):
-
EncryptThenSignFlow: Verschlüsselter Log mit Signatur -
PlaintextSignFlow: Nur signierter Log -
DisabledLogger: Logging deaktiviert (keine Datei) -
MultipleEvents: Mehrere Events in JSONL
-
- Governance-Tests (15/15): Alle Klassifikationen, Resource-Mappings und Policy-Header validiert
# Server starten
./themis_server
# Content mit VS-NfD klassifizieren
curl -X POST http://localhost:8080/content/import \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-H "X-Classification: VS-NfD" \
-H "X-User-Id: admin" \
-d '{
"content": {
"id": "test123",
"mime_type": "text/plain",
"category": "document"
},
"blob": "Sensitive document content"
}'
# Audit-Log prüfen
cat data/logs/audit.jsonlErwartete Log-Einträge:
-
Policy Evaluation (automatisch durch PolicyEngine):
{ "ts": 1700000000123, "category": "AUDIT", "payload": { "type": "ciphertext", "key_id": "saga_log", "key_version": 1, "iv_b64": "...", "ciphertext_b64": "...", "tag_b64": "..." }, "signature": { "ok": true, "id": "sig_abc123", "algorithm": "RSA-SHA256", "sig_b64": "...", "cert_serial": "DEMO-CERT-SERIAL" } } -
Content Import (bei VS-NfD+ Klassifikation):
- Ähnliche Struktur mit verschlüsseltem Event-JSON
Entschlüsseltes Event-JSON (für Demonstration):
{
"event_type": "policy_evaluation",
"route": "/content/import",
"classification": "vs-nfd",
"mode": "enforce",
"require_content_encryption": true,
"encrypt_logs": true,
"redaction": "standard",
"retention_days": 365,
"timestamp": 1700000000123,
"user_id": "admin"
}- Echtes PKI-Signing: OpenSSL RSA-Signaturen über SHA-256-Hash.
- PII Detection: Automatische Erkennung und Markierung von PII-Feldern in Logs.
-
Retention Manager: Automatische Archivierung/Löschung basierend auf
retention_days. - Governance Integration: Automatisches Logging bei enforce-Verstößen.
- Redaction: PII-Redaction in Logs für niedrigere Klassifikationen.
- Compliance Reports: Aggregierte Audit-Reports für Compliance-Checks.
include/utils/pki_client.hsrc/utils/pki_client.cppinclude/utils/audit_logger.hsrc/utils/audit_logger.cpptests/test_audit_logger.cpp
ThemisDB v1.3.4 | GitHub | Documentation | Discussions | License
Last synced: January 02, 2026 | Commit: 6add659
Version: 1.3.0 | Stand: Dezember 2025
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